Box 5, Folder 37, Vatican/Israel, Undated.
It seems clear that the Vatican's early opposition to Zionism and to the Jewish State was based on (a) theological reasons; (b) historical reasons; i.e., Christian claims to "own" Palestine since the days of Constantine; and (c) socio-political reasons; i.e., the intense pressures from Arab Christians and their fear of reprisals from the Arab-Muslim world.

**THEOLOGICAL REASONS FOR OPPOSITION**

On May 19, 1906 - three months after the appearance of *The Jewish State*, Theodor Herzl had an interview with Msgr. Antonio Agliardi, the Papal Nuncio in Vienna, for the purpose of enlisting the support of the Catholic Church for the Zionist movement. Herzl explained to Agliardi that he did not want a Jewish "kingdom" in the Holy Land and that he would be prepared to accord extraterritorial status to the holy places.

According to Herzl's Diaries, the Nuncio gave him a cold reception. For contractual relations, Roman law (ius gentium in ust relations had stimulated all nations to think A words guilt in terms of a contracted relationship (Gottem, p 197).

Herzl persisted in his efforts to win Catholic support. On January 22, 1904, he was received by Rafael Cardinal Merry del Val, the Papal Secretary of State. The Cardinal made it clear to Herzl that the Church could not allow the Jews to take possession of the Holy Land as long as they denied the divinity of Jesus Christ.

In response to Herzl's assurances that the holy places could have

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extraterritorial status, Cardinal Merry del Val said that the holy places could not be regarded as entities separate from the Holy Land.

Three days later on January 25, Herzl held a lengthy audience with Pope Pius X (1903-1914), who had assumed the Papacy the year before. Pius X had a good personal relations with the Jews, He too told Herzl that the Church could not favor Israel’s return to Zion as long as the Jews did not accept Jesus as the Savior. In his Diaries, Herzl quotes the Pope as having said:

"We cannot prevent the Jews from going to Jerusalem but we could never sanction it... The Jews have not recognized our Lord; therefore we cannot recognize the Jewish people."

Herzl then pointed to the fact that the Ottoman overlords of Palestine also were not Christians. The Pope replied:

"I know, it is not pleasant to see the Turks in possession of our Holy Places. We simply have to put up with that. But to support the Jews in the acquisition of the Holy Places, that we cannot do."

"If you come to Palestine and settle your people there," the Pope then said to Herzl, "we want to have churches and priests ready to baptize all of you."

2. In his diocese of Mantua, before he became Pope Pius X, he had prohibited the celebration of a solemn mass on the King’s birthday because the city council which asked for it had attended a celebration in the Synagogue.
Quite possibly to soften the effect of Vatican rejection, Cardinal Merry del Val, in a meeting several weeks later, promised Herzl's close associate Heinrich York-Steiner, that if all the Jews wanted to be "admitted" to the land of their ancestors, he would regard that as a "humanitarian" endeavor and would not impede their efforts to found colonies in Palestine.

The Vatican's general opposition to Zionism and to a Jewish State - based primarily on theological grounds - thus dominated the Holy See's policies from the late 1890s until the end of World War I.


HISTORIC REASONS FOR OPPOSITION TO ZIONISM/ISRAEL

The Holy See's opposition to the establishment of Jewish sovereignty over the Holy Land has been traced by some scholars to "a Catholic nostalgia for the Crusades." In his landmark study, Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom, Dr. Walter Zander (Praegar Publishers, 1971), cites the writings of a Catholic authority, Pascal Baldi, "who considered it providential that Jerusalem was held under the domination of Italy, France and England (in this order), 'the three nations who had played so great a part in the Holy Wars', and who looked forward to..."
Zander observes that "of the twin ideals which had dominated the Crusades," one was "the liberation of the Christian sanctuaries" from the ruling Moslem "infidels and heathens." That goal had been realized by the combined efforts of the Allies through their defeat of the Ottoman Turks in World War I. The second goal: Rome set itself to the task of reestablishment of Latin Christianity in Palestine.

Originally, the Vatican officially entrusted France with the role of protector of Catholic interests in the Levant, and urged France to become the protector over the Holy Land. When the Palestine Mandate was ultimately given to (Protestant) Great Britain, the Vatican attempted to secure a leading influence of Catholic countries in the control of the Holy Places.

Ironically, the Gospels do not contain any obligation for the Christian to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem or the Holy Land. There is not a connection between Christian salvation and Christian control or domination of the Holy Land. As Dr. Zander documents, many of the Church Fathers denied that pilgrimages to the Holy Land established a special spiritual link with Christ which could not be achieved elsewhere, and therefore such linkage with Palestine was not a special way to salvation.
The Church Fathers - St. Augustine, St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and even St. Jerome (who spent 30 years of his last days in Bethlehem where he translated the Vulgate based on Hebrew scholarship) agreed that ultimately the place is irrelevant for salvation, and that "the Kingdom of God is within us and that the Gates of Heaven are open over Britain as over Jerusalem, and that the true pilgrimage is from the flesh to the spirit and not from Cappadocia to Palestine." (St. Gregory, 335-394 CE).

In spite of this teaching, the Holy Places took on an increasingly strong hold on the Christian imagination. Even if pilgrimages could not lead to salvation, many felt that in the Holy Land they were nearer to the person of Christ. Thus, over the centuries pilgrimages to the Holy Land became an essential part of Christian life.

The situation changed...

It took several centuries... 

p. 8 - In "The History of the Crusades,"

in the West, up to the beginning of the 11th century... for their sins and eternal reward." 

INSERT B, P. 8

The theology of the Crusaders passed through various stages. As summarized by Zander (pp.18,19),

"In the beginning the thoughts of the Crusaders were directed to the liberation of the Holy Land for the sake of men's salvation... with apocalyptic overtones about the Second Coming. After the conquest (July 1099), when Jerusalem was threatened again with onslaughts of the unbelievers, the period of the Sanctuaries was conceived as a unique opportunity, 'the acceptable time,' for a supreme sacrifice. When Jerusalem was lost (October 1187) again to the Moslems, its fall was felt as an insult to God, and the Crusaders were called upon to revenge the injury. Some even saw in the loss of Jerusalem a new Crucifixion, and the reconquest of the earthly Jerusalem appeared as a Jacob's ladder to the heavenly city of salvation.

"Lastly the Crusaders claimed the land as their heritage, seeing themselves as the spiritual successors of Israel and the beneficiares of Christ's sacrifice..."

The Dominican Stephan of Bourbon wrote, "We are the descendants of the Holy Land both according to the flesh and the spirit... here our mother the Church had its origin. Likewise the land is ours by the RIGHT OF SUCCESSION AS FAR AS WE ARE THE TRUE CHILDREN OF GOD..."
In Valmar Cramer's compendium, a Crusader is quoted as saying:

"This land belongs to us by the right of purchase and acquisition; for Christ bought it for us by his blood, HAS EXPELLED THE JEWISH PEOPLE FROM IT BY THE MIGHT OF THE ROMANS AND HAS HANDED IT TO CHRISTENDOM."

The religious basis of the Crusades had been the conviction that the Holy Places of Christendom could not be left in the hands of a non-Christian power, and therefore had to be restored by force to Christendom. But this conviction was soon attacked by many sides — by mystics, and by Reformation leaders.

For mystics such as Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), "the true and best penance is when man turns away from everything which is not God." For Thomas a Kempis (early 1400s), and others, pilgrimages to spiritual perfection required no outward travel, even to Jerusalem.

Martin Luther, father of the Protestant Reformation, declared in his "Appeal to the Christian Nobility of German Nationality," that pilgrimages are "evil deeds and God has not decreed them. They are devilish ghosts and the mony and the work which are being spent on a pilgrimage should be used a thousand times better for the maintenance of one's family and for the poor."

Similarly, Calvin fulminated against pilgrimages, asserting that pilgrimages favored by the Papacy were without value, and that they had no foundation in Scriptures.

After the Ottoman Turks had conquered Constantinople in 1453, and in 1517, took Jerusalem from the Egyptian Mameluks, there was no longer any question of a reconquest of the Holy Places. European Christians no longer believed that the liberation of the Holy Land was essential for their salvation or happiness. The European mind turned to ventures of discovery and commerce. Palestine was seen not so much as the Holy Land but as part of the Levant.

The Turks were no longer the "accursed race" described by Pope Urban, "utterly alienated from God, degenerate and despised." But had become a member of the family of nations. In 1535, Francis I, King of France, concluded an alliance between France ("the eldest daughter of the Church"), and the Ottoman Empire, the leading Islamic power of that time. It opened a new era in the relationship between the Christian Powers and Islam, and became the pattern for a long series of treaties or 'capitulations' ("little chapters") extending over several centuries.
Most of these treaties revealed a new attitude toward the Holy Places. They were concerned with commerce and politics, and indicated that Western Christians were no longer interested in the reconquest of the sanctuaries. As the treaty of 1535 revealed, the Western Christian powers desired only the right of trading merchandise to practice their own religion; that was all that remained of the far-reaching aims of the Crusades. The Holy Places were not mentioned in the treaty, nor were Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

Similar changes were reflected in treaties between the Republic of Venice, the Netherlands (1612), and Britain (1675) with Turkey. Between 1535 and the French Revolution in 1789, not a single treaty concluded by a Western Power with Turkey contained a single clause about the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. (Zander, p. 25.)
Thus, among numerous references cited, St. Augustine (354-430 C.E.) proclaimed: "God is indeed everywhere, and He who created all things is not contained or shut in by any one place."

The Church Fathers were debating the spiritual value of pilgrimages at the time when Jerusalem was part of the Byzantine Empire and belonged, therefore, to the Christian world. Since Constantine the Great had accepted Christianity as the religion of the Roman Empire, the Government which controlled the Holy Places had been Christian.

The situation changed, however, in 638 C.E. when the Arabs conquered Jerusalem under Caliph Omar. For the first time the Christian world was faced with the fact that its most sacred shrines were in the hands of "infidels." The response of the Crusaders was that the Holy Land had to be reconquered by force and to be ruled by a Christian kingdom.

It took several centuries for this attitude to develop. The struggle between the Arabs and the West which extended from Spain, over the Mediterranean, to the borders of the Byzantine Empire, was not conceived at first in religious terms. In the East a change occurred in the tenth century when the Byzantine armies under the Emperors Nicephorus and Jean Tzimesces, advanced into Syria and Galilee, taking Tiberias, Nazareth, and Caesarea.
In "The History of the Crusades," Sir Steven Runciman wrote: "Up to that time, there was no greater merit in dying in battle for the protection of the Empire against the infidel Arab than against the Christian Bulgar; nor did the Church make any distinction. But both Emperors Nicephorus and John declared that the struggle was now for the glory of Christendom, for the rescue of the Holy Places, and for the destruction of Islam. Nicephorus emphasized that these wars were Christian wars...he saw himself as a Christian champion, and even threatened to march on Mecca to establish there the throne of Christ."

In the West, up to the beginning of the 11th century, the Christian princes in the North of Spain were hardly conscious of the fact that they were involved in the sacred task of defending the Church. It was the Order of Cluny that brought about a change. Under its influence a Christian renaissance spread through France and Spain, uniting all forces and giving them the dynamic conviction that war against the infidels was a sacred duty for the Christian. The idea developed of a Christian Holy War against the unbelievers, a war which would give the soldiers of Christ forgiveness for their sins and eternal reward.

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layman, went to Rome to sound out the Vatican on its attitude toward having Protestant Britain rather than France - which was officially entrusted by the Vatican as a protector of Catholic interests in the Levant - assume the protectorate over the Holy Land. On April 11, 1917, Sykes met with Msgr. Eugenio Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII, 1939-58), who was then Under-secretary for Extraordinary Affairs at the Secretariat of State. A few days later, he had an audience with Pope Benedict XV (1914-22). From these talks Sykes assumed that the Vatican was ready to accept Britain as the mandatory power in Palestine.

(According to the Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (p. 1083), "Sykes used his influence as a distinguished Catholic layman to explain to Vatican authorities that Zionism would not clash with Christian or Catholic wishes concerning the holy places in Palestine."

Weizmann's most intimate collaborator in Allied discussions (Sachar, p. 180).

See "The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918" by J. S. Friedman (1963). At Sykes' suggestion, Pacelli received Nahum Sokolow on April 29, 1917, when Sokolow came to Rome on behalf of the Zionist Executive to seek Vatican support for the planned Jewish National Home in Palestine. Pacelli was interested but insisted that the Zionists stay clear of an area extending well beyond the holy places. On May 1, Sokolow was received by the Papal Secretary of State, Pietro Cardinal Gasparri. Gasparri also discussed the holy places and claimed for the Church a "reserved zone" (similar to the one provided for in the Sykes-Picot Agreement), including not only Jerusalem but also Bethlehem, Nazareth, and its environs, Tiberias and Jericho. AS LONG AS THE VATICAN'S
requirements were met, Gaspari said to Sokolow, the Holy See wished the Zionists well in their attempt to set up a state in Palestine. When Sokolow said that the Zionists wanted only an "autonomous home," Gaspari assured him that he might count on the sympathy of the Church.

On May 8, 1917, Sokolow was received in private audience by the conscientious (1914-1922) Della Chiesa-trained diplomat from her school/noble lineage — Benedict XV. Aware of Britain's interest in Zionism, the Pope listened attentively to Sokolow and declared that the return of the Jews to Palestine was a miraculous event and in keeping with God's will. As for the holy places, he said he had no doubt that a satisfactory agreement could be worked out. "Yes, Yes," he told Sokolow, "I believe we shall be good neighbors."

The Pope also said:

"The problem of the Holy Places is for us of extraordinary importance. The holy rights must be protected. We will settle this between the Church and the Great Powers. It is necessary that you respect those rights in all their extent."

Sokolow gave assurance that the Zionists would respect the holy places, and the audience ended with mutual assurances of understanding.

On the strength of Sokolow's report, Chaim Weizmann felt justified in telling a Zionist conference in London that the Church would not
Weizmann said 5 weeks after the publication of the Balfour Declaration that "Sir Mark Sykes was the man who has done more than any other to obtain the (Balfour) Declaration from the Government." (p.4) Speech recorded June 9, 1917.

In contrast, Sir George Curzon noted that Sykes was a member of the War Cabinet in 1917, agreed with the conditions, and said that it was Sykes who by his persistent efforts persuaded the Government to a definite conclusion.

Sir Mark Sykes in 1917.

Result of great collective effort & decision of Britain & Canada.

Hence in England laid the foundation for which Weizmann

Solomon's Temple could have been in 1917 the Balfour Declaration.

In fact, then very soon, that Balfour & Weizmann could not have been possible without Herzl's leadership & Ze'ev's genius in Balfour's part.
oppose Zionist aims in Palestine.

( Ambassador Minnibbi suggests that Sokolow, among other Zionist leaders, was oversanguine regarding the Vatican's attitude toward Zionism, suggesting that Sokolow misread the signals at his 1917 meeting with Pope Benedict XV.)

The issuance of the Balfour Declaration in November 1917 - due in large measure to Sir Mark Sykes' "faith and energy" - and Gen. Edmund H. H. Allenby's conquest of Jerusalem apparently stirred misgivings in the Vatican concerning the safety of the holy places under the new regime in Palestine. The Vatican was apprehensive that Palestine would not be placed under INTERNATIONAL RULE, as envisioned in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. By December 1917, Pope Benedict XV had expressed his concern to De Salis, the British Representative to the Holy See, lest THE JEWS GAIN DIRECT CONTROL OVER PALESTINE'S AFFAIRS TO THE DETRIMENT OF CHRISTIAN INTERESTS.

When Sykes revisited Rome in the winter of 1918, he noted a marked change in the Vatican's attitude toward Zionism. HE NOW FOUND CARDINAL GASPARRI THOROUGHLY UNSYMPATHETIC. On March 1, 1919, the Tablet published a denial of reports that the Pope had ever supported Zionism. On March 10, 1919, while the peace conference was meeting in Paris, Pope Benedict told a secret consistory in Rome that "IT WOULD BE FOR US AND ALL CHRISTIAN A BITTER GRIEF IF UNBELIEVERS IN PALESTINE WERE PUT INTO A SUPERIOR OR MORE PRIVILEGED POSITION." Although the Pope did not specify who the "unbelievers" were, he was evidently seeking to influence the peace conference to the end that JEWS WOULD NOT BE GIVEN A

\[ \sqrt{ } \] PERDOMINANT POSITION IN PALESTINE.
The Vatican was probably ready to accept a British Mandate, BUT WITH NO PRIVILEGES FOR THE ZIONISTS AND, PREFERABLY, WITH INTERNATIONAL STATUS FOR THE HOLY PLACES. The Pope had probably been influenced by the reports sent to him from England by Francis Cardinal Bourne, who had visited Palestine in that period and wrote anti-Zionist letters also to Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour and Prime Minister David Lloyd George. The British Government gave assurances to the Vatican on the safeguarding of Catholic interest in the holy places, in case Britain were to receive the mandate, but it seems that the VATICAN STILL PREFERRED THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALESTINE.

(The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement signed by Britain and France in May 1916, proposed the division of the Ottoman Empire between the three principal Entente Powers: Britain, France, claimed Mosul and Greater Syria (which it understood to include all Palestine), while Britain wanted to create an independent Arab state in the interior of Syria and Mesopotamia. The Sykes-Picot Agreement provided that Palestine, south of French-controlled Lebanon down to a line running from Gaza to the Dead Sea, was to be set apart as an “international zone” whose administration was to be decided after consultation with Russia and other Entente allies. The Vatican supported this plan for the internationalization of Palestine - at least for several years.)

In April 1920, the San Remo Conference awarded the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain, subject to the approval of the League of Nations. There was no disagreement that Syria was to be allocated to France as a special mandatory responsibility, that Iraq was to be awarded to Britain, and that Palestine, from now on, would become a British mandate. The San Remo Conference formally validated this understanding at San Remo on April 25, 1920.
Nations. On April 26, 1920, the Vatican made known its fears that JEWISH ELEMENTS MIGHT BECOME PREDOMINANT IN PALESTINE UNDER BRITISH RULE. These fears were discussed in Catholic circles even in England, where the anti-Zionist Cardinal Bourne told a nationwide Catholic conference in Liverpool that "A NEW NON-CHRISTIAN INFLUENCE WAS BEING DELIBERATELY SET UP IN THE LAND WHENCE COUNTLESS GENERATIONS OF CHRISTENDOM HAD LONGED AND STRIVEN TO OUST A NON-CHRISTIAN POWER."

By this time the Vatican appeared to have been influenced by the FEAR OF COMMUNISM. In 1921 representatives of the Zionist movement visiting Rome were informed by a Vatican spokesman that the Holy See did not wish to "ASSIST THE JEWISH RACE, WHICH IS PERMEATED WITH A REVOLUTIONARY AND REBELLIOUS SPIRIT," TO GAIN CONTROL OVER THE HOLY LAND. The Pope clearly had been impressed by anti-Semitic reports that the Jewish pioneers were Bolsheviks who were seeking to establish a Communist regime in Palestine.

In June 1921, Pope Benedict XV protested that THE CHRISTIANS IN PALESTINE WERE NOW WORSE OFF THAN UNDER TURKISH RULE AND CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALL CHRISTIAN STATES, CATHOLIC AND NON-CATHOLIC, TO MAKE A JOINT PROTEST TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE HOLY SEE IN THE HOLY PLACES. He did this despite repeated assurances from the British that they would afford ample protection to the holy places and that, as Sir Ronald Storrs put it to the Pope, THE JEWS WOULD NEVER BE PERMITTED TO "DOMINATE" THE HOLY PLACES.
Popes Benedict XV and Pius XI (1922-39) were further influenced against the British and the Jews by lurid reports from Msgr. Luigi Barlassina, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. Barlassina, who overlooked no opportunity to side with the Arabs, told Roman and Vatican audiences that the Balfour Declaration had enabled the Jews to come out openly with their plan to set up "the Empire of Zion," that some kibbutzim in Palestine were run according to extreme communist principles, and that Jerusalem alone now had 500 prostitutes.

In the spring of 1922, Weizmann arrived in Rome to help undo the damage caused by Barlassina's reports. He had two interviews with Cardinal Gasparri, who was still Pope's Secretary of State. Gasparri assured Weizmann that the Vatican did not oppose a Jewish national home in Palestine, provided that the interests of non-Jewish communities there were safeguarded and that the Jews were not given a "privileged position" in the country.

According to Weizmann's memoirs, Trial and Error, it seemed to him that Gasparri somehow considered the World Zionist Organization a branch of Britain's Palestine government. After Weizmann had reported to Gasparri on Jewish settlement and reconstruction work in Palestine, Gasparri remarked that he was not worried about Jewish settlement in the Holy Land. "It is your university that I fear," the Cardinal said, referring to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In a note to the
British Embassy, Gasparri stressed again that "THE HOLY SEE DOES NOT OPPOSE THE ACQUISITION BY THE JEWS IN PALESTINE OF EQUAL CIVIL RIGHTS" BUT THAT IT COULD NOT CONSENT TO GIVE THE JEWS A POSITION OF PREPONDERANCE LET ALONE AGREE TO THE CREATION OF A JEWISH STATE.¹

In May 1922, Gasparri submitted a memorandum to the League of Nations Council, which was then about to ratify the British Mandate for Palestine, protesting that the CREATION OF A JEWISH NATIONAL HOME IN PALESTINE UNDER THE BALFOUR DECLARATION GAVE THE ZIONISTS "A PRIVILEGED POSITION." The theme was repeated on June 1 by L'Osservatore Romano, the semiofficial Vatican paper, which agreed to the British Mandate in principal but DEMANDED MODIFICATIONS IN THE DECLARATION BECAUSE ZIONISM WOULD BE DETERMINED TO PEACE IN PALESTINE AND WOULD ROB THE NATIVE POPULATION OF ITS RIGHTS...

On Dec. 11, 1922, Pope Pius XI (1922-39), in an allocution at a secret consistory made a special reference to the question of the holy places and the rights of the Holy See, which SHOULD BE PROTECTED NOT ONLY AGAINST JEWS AND UNBELIEVERS BUT ALSO AGAINST ALL OTHER NON-CATHOLIC RELIGIONS. At a secret consistory on May 23, 1923, he declared that the Church would defend the "undeniable, OBVIOUS AND OVERWHELMING RIGHTS OF CATHOLICISM TO THE HOLY PLACES IN PALESTINE." In a papal bull of May 1924, he again called for the solution of problem of the holy places IN ACCORDANCE WITH CATHOLIC INTERESTS.

The protection of the interests of the Roman Catholic Church was the central concern of the Holy See. Thus, on January 20, 1923, Cardinal Gasparri struck an agreement with Mussolini that the Vatican would dispatch the Papal Nuncios to Mussolini's government, and Mussolini agreed to the Vatican on June 9, 1923, the Vatican then pledged complete support to Mussolini, declaring he was one of the "best men ever by Providence."

Three years later, in 1926, Pope Pius XI began negotiations with Mussolini on the Lateran Concordat signed on February 11, 1929, the Lateran agreement recognized Catholicism as "sole religion of the state. It also provided that the Vatican City would be recognized as an independent sovereign state and that Catholicism would be taught compulsory in the schools. Mussolini also promised large financial compensations to the Holy See. This need for "Catholic dominance of society seemed to extend to the Holy Land..."
When Benito Mussolini's Fascist Party first assumed power in Italy (October 1922), its attitude toward Zionism was cool. ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS, THE VATICAN EXERTED PRESSURE ON THE MUSSOLINI GOVERNMENT TO TAKE AN ANTI-ZIONIST STAND. Later, Marchese Alberto Theodol, the Italian Representative to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, assumed an ANTI-ZIONIST POSITION, claiming to PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE CATHOLICS IN PALESTINE. In 1927 Mussolini told Victor Jacobson that he had to take into account the feelings of his "neighbor" (i.e. the Vatican), WHICH WAS IMPLACABLY OPPOSED TO ZIONIST ASPIRATIONS.

Meanwhile, VATICAN OFFICIALS AND HIGHLY PLACED CHURCH CIRCLES CONTINUED THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST ZIONISM. Barlassina, now a cardinal and papal representative in Jerusalem, alleged that the ZIONISTS WERE DRVING ARAB WORKERS OUT AND REPLACING THEM WITH THOUSANDS OF THEIR "CORELIGIONISTS FROM RUSSIA."

Late in November 1929, L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO CARRIED AN EDITORIAL HEADLINED, "THE JEWISH DANGER THREATENING THE ENTIRE WORLD." The Oct. 3, 1936, issue of the Jesuit paper, Civiltà Cattolica, which was close to the Holy See, said that "THE JEWS CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS AND PERMANENT DANGER TO SOCIETY..." Another issue of that year said, "ZIONISM MIGHT OFFER A WAY OUT, BUT THE CREATION OF A JEWISH STATE WOULD INCREASE THE JEWISH MENACE." IN AN EDITORIAL (APRIL 2, 1938) THE SAME PAPER SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST THING FOR THE JEWS TO DO WAS TO RELINQUISH
THEIR CLAIMS ON PALESTINE AND, IF POSSIBLE, LEAVE THE COUNTRY ALTOGETHER. CIVILIA CATTOLICA WAS TO BE SINGULARLY CONSISTENT IN ITS OPPOSITION TO ZIONISM AND LATER TO ISRAEL. (IT HAD A RECORD OF ANTISEMITISM, GOING BACK TO THE 1880s, WHEN IT PUBLISHED OUTRIGHT ACCUSATIONS OF RITUAL MURDER AGAINST THE JEWS.)

The Vatican's firm opposition to a Jewish National Home in Palestine was reiterated forcefully between the summer of 1943 and the summer of 1944, when the Second World War was clearly going the Allies' way. According to Prof. Silvio Ferrari*, Cardinal Luigi Maglioni, Vatican Secretary of State, wrote a letter on May 18, 1943, to Amleto Cattaneo, Catholic delegate in Washington, instructing him to inform the U.S. Government that Catholics throughout the world "COULD NOT BUT BE WOUNDED IN THEIR RELIGIOUS PRIDE SHOULD PALESTINE BE HANDED OVER TO THE JEWS OR BE PLACED VIRTUALLY UNDER THEIR CONTROL."

In what will come as a surprise to many Jews (and Christians), Msgr. Angelo Roncalli, then Apostolic Delegate to Istanbul and later Pope John XXIII (1958-63), held similar but less hawkish opinions as expressed in a letter to Cardinal Maglioni, Sept. 4, 1943. This would show that the Vatican Secretary of State's line met with the approval of the Vatican diplomats most actively involved in helping save Jews during the Nazi holocaust. Prof. Ferrari comments that "this leads us to the conclusion backed by other documents' that the Vatican's OPPOSITION TO THE CREATION OF A JEWISH STATE IN THE HOLY LAND WAS NOT CAUSED BY

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ANTI-SEMITIC FEELING BUT RATHER BY THE VATICAN'S DETERMINATION TO
PROTECT CATHOLIC INTERESTS IN PALESTINE. VATICAN OPPOSITION TO ARAB
DOMINATION IN PALESTINE.

The Vatican's resistance to a "Jewish Home" did not mean it favored
Arab domination in the Holy Land. In April 1944, the Vatican's Secretary
of State, Cardinal Maglione, expressed to Myron C. Taylor, President Roosevelt's personal representative to the Pope, the Vatican's
concern over the plan to create a Pan-Arab confederation (the Arab
League) in the Middle East, which they felt would put the Christian
community's future in "an uncertain and precarious position."

The Vatican urged that the Great Powers intervene to insure that
"the basic legislation of the planned Confederation would clearly give
non-Muslims freedom of opinion, freedom of worship and peace with
Muslims as regards civil rights and duties." Maglione said that these
conditions were a sine qua non for making this plan "at least partly
acceptable."

The Vatican feared that either Arab or Jewish domination would
prejudice Catholic interests in Palestine. These interests, the Holy
See believed, would be better protected by a solution where "neither
Jews nor Arabs, but a Third Power, should have control in the Holy
Land." The Vatican thus favored either a continuation of the British
Mandate (or a mandate given to another "Christian power") or the
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ALL PALESTINE UNDER UN SUPERVISION. Either solution meant that control of the Holy Land would be safely in Christian hands. They believed this would avert the danger of the Arab-Jewish conflict degenerating into open war and the possible threat of irreparable destruction to the Holy Places.

Between 1945 and 1947, this proposed solution to the Palestine question was supported by Archbishop Spellman of New York and his adviser on "Palestinian affairs," Msgr. Thomas J. McMahon. The Vatican shared their views but decided to make no public statement about a plan which was firmly opposed by both the Arab countries and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. The Vatican followed an extremely reserved line and avoided any official statement of its position on the Palestine conflict.

During the final years of the British mandate, the Vatican had apparently become impressed with the humanitarian work the Zionists had performed in Palestine, particularly in the resettlement of refugees from the Nazi holocaust. As indicated above, the Holy See now favored the "status quo," namely, the continuation of the Jewish National Home under the British Mandate, or the internationalization proposal. Some circles in the Vatican showed signs of supporting the Zionist "establishment" under Weizmann, whom they regarded as the link between the Zionist movement and the British authorities. They were, however, deeply worried about the civil strife waged by splinter groups such as
the Stern group (Lohame Herut Israel) which they feared might result in damage to holy places.

On April 10, 1945, Moshe Sherotok (Sharett), then head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, had an audience with Pius XII (1939-1958). Sherotok told the Pope that the murder of 6 million Jews by the Nazis had been possible only because the Jews had no state of their own, that a radical change must take place in the life of the Jewish people after the war. Sherotok said that he knew of no conflict of interest between Zionist aspirations in Palestine and the interests of Christianity and Catholicism there, and that the Jewish State to be set up in Palestine would undertake to protect the Christian holy places. He then told Pius XII that the Jews hoped for the "moral support" of the Catholic Church for "our renewed existence in Palestine." The Pope's questions and answers were reportedly courteous but noncommittal.

Arab countries were now beginning to exert heavy pressure on Pope Pius XII to mobilize the Catholic Church against the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. On Aug. 3, 1946, Pius XII was visited by a delegation from the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, which requested his intervention against the Zionists. The Pope's reply was as follows:

"We deplore all resorts to force and violence from whatever quarter they come. Thus we also deplored repeatedly in the past the persecution that fanatic anti-Semitism unleashed against the Hebrew people."
Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, The Zionist Movement And The Partition Of Palestine
By Avi Shlaim
Published By Columbia University Press
Reviewed by Prof. Howard L. Adelson

This is a long volume which tells us nothing that was not well known before it was written. Nevertheless, it is written in an interesting and lucid style even though it suffers from a somewhat unsympathetic treatment of the Zionist movement.

Abdullah was clearly a very dastardly individual who was also a puppet of the British in the Near East. His control of the Transjordanian region of mandatory Palestine was engineered by the British to the detriment of Jewish claims to the entire mandatory territory. However, he had a scenario of his own for the development of the Near East. The rivalry between the Hashemites, who had led the Arab revolt against the Turks during the First World War, and the Saudi rulers of the Arabian peninsula was one of the stimuli for Abdullah's policy. When Ibn Saud expelled Abdullah's father from his kingdom in the Arabian peninsula, Abdullah became the senior Hashemite ruler. It was impossible to eject Ibn Saud from his conquest of the Arabian peninsula, but Abdullah had an alternate plan which had originated after the First World War for the creation of a Greater Syria which would include most of mandatory Palestine, Transjordanian Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and perhaps even Iraq. Such a state would dominate the Arab world, and Abdullah never lost sight of that goal. His relationship with the Zionists was motivated solely by his desire to achieve that aim.

For the Zionists, on the other hand, the goal, at least after the adoption of the Biltmore Program in 1942, was the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state in a portion of Palestine. Zionist leadership at the Jewish Agency was desperately searching for any Arab leader who would be willing to envision the creation of such a Jewish state. Abdullah wanted support for his plans in terms of money and public relations, and he felt that the Zionists could provide that assistance. Even on the basis of the material presented by Shlaim, which, as I have said, was well known, there was no real collu- sion to achieve a common goal. There were a series of individual short term agreements, most of which failed as far as the Zionist goal was concerned, which eventually led to King Abdullah seizing control of the bulk of the territory intended for the Palestinian Arab state. The establishment of Israel was never dependent upon the agreement of King Abdullah. That was clear from the beginning. Abdullah merely used the Jews for his purposes.

Collusion is clearly the wrong word to use in describing the relationship between Abdullah and the Zionists. Each was following its own plan. There was never a complete, full understanding and plan to be carried out jointly.
"WE ALWAYS OBSERVED (AN) ATTITUDE OF PERFECT IMPARTIALITY... AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CONFORM TO IT IN THE FUTURE.

"But it is clear that this IMPARTIALITY, WHICH OUR APOSTOLIC MISSION IMPOSES ON US AND WHICH PLACES US ABOVE THE CONFLICTS THAT ARE RENDERING HUMAN SOCIETY ESPECIALLY AT THIS DIFFICULT MOVEMENT, CANNOT SIGNIFY INDIFFERENCE. (We will) endeavor that justice and peace in Palestine may become a constructive reality, that the order springing from the efficient cooperation of all interested parties may be created and each of the parties now in conflict may have a guarantee of security of existence as well as physical and moral living conditions on which may be established a normal situation of material and cultural welfare."

VATICAN'S VIEWS TOWARD PARTITION PLAN, 1947

In April 1947, Great Britain submitted the Palestine issue to the United Nations. There was now no chance that Britain's mandate in the Holy Land would be extended. Among other factors, doubts arose regarding the wisdom of entrusting Palestine to UN administration for fear of inviting Soviet penetration into the Middle East. The Vatican was now faced with an alternative: (a) a divided Holy Land resulting from the creation of a Jewish state and an Arab state, or (b) the creation of a single state in Palestine representing both sides but with an Arab majority.
The first proposal was clearly unacceptable to major Catholic leadership. Archbishop Spellman openly criticized the "Partition Plan," saying, "The Catholic Church strongly opposes any form of partition, primarily on the ground that the whole land is sacred to Christ." (Cited in a memorandum from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, George Wadsworth, in a memorandum to Loy W. Henderson, Jan. 13, 1947.) Key officials in the Vatican Secretary of State's office agreed in principle with these opinions but withheld making them official. That was due to the fact, according to Prof. Ferrari, the Vatican followed its traditional policy of "reserve," which counseled against any explicit public statements that "might well have conflicted with Jewish aspirations for national independence."

At the same time, Middle Eastern Catholic communities and, more discreetly, missionary organizations working in the Holy Land, advocated the creation of a single Arab-controlled state in Palestine. In the Vatican, these positions were welcomed warmly in some ecclesiastical circles close to the Sacred Oriental Congregation, which was particularly aware of the implications of the Palestine issue for the future of Catholic missionary activities throughout the Middle East. Despite the pressure placed on the Pope and the Holy see by these groups, and despite "the existence of objectively significant factors favoring the Arab" (Ferrari), the Vatican Secretary of State's Office did not declare itself in favor of an Arab State in Palestine.
The reluctance to do so is explained (a) by the belief that the Arab proposals, opposed both by the United States and the USSR, would not have been approved by the UN General Assembly, and (b) most especially, the Vatican's hopes for the INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM. The latter proposal was an important feature of the UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) plan to divide Palestine approved in the summer of 1947.

From the official statements made to UNSCOP by the Custodia di Terra Santa, the most important Catholic organization working in Palestine, and by the Catholic Near East Welfare Association (whose president was Archbishop Spellman and whose national secretary was Msgr. McMahon) on June 5, 1947, the Vatican at first appeared to be seeking safeguards that did not necessarily mean making Jerusalem a "corpus separatum." But clearly the Vatican was extremely pleased when this solution was supported by the majority of UNSCOP. The Vatican believed that a "corpus separatum" gave the best protection possible for the Holy Places as well as the Catholic community in Palestine. In addition, the Holy See indicated that it provided a legal and institutional framework incorporating the universal meaning of the Holy Places, and prevented Jerusalem from becoming part of a Jewish or Arab State. These principles, it was asserted, were deeply rooted in the Catholic world.

The possibility of obtaining an international status for the City of Jerusalem led the Vatican Secretariat of State not to oppose the plan
to divide the Holy Land in 1947. (At the same time, the Vatican did not openly oppose the idea of creating a single Arab-controlled State in Palestine, fearing that would compromise good relations with Arab countries or would expose Catholic communities to dangerous reprisals from Arabs should the UN favor the latter solution.) In this decisive year in the Middle East question, it is therefore correct to say that 

THE VATICAN WAS OPPOSED TO THE CREATION OF A JEWISH STATE, IF THE DIVISION OF PALESTINE ENSURED JERUSALEM'S INTERNATIONALIZATION.

When the partition of Palestine came to a vote at the United Nations on Nov. 19, 1947, MOST OF THE CATHOLIC COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD BODY APPROVED THE ACTION THAT CLEARED THE WAY FOR THE CREATION OF THE JEWISH STATE. The Latin American countries, together with other Catholic countries like Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Philippines, were hardly likely to vote so overwhelmingly for the partition of the Holy Land unless they knew that the Vatican did not oppose this solution. This position was never subsequently abandoned -despite some interim uncertainty in 1947-48 caused by the Vatican's interest in the U.S. proposal to drop the Partition Plan and to place the whole of Palestine under UN "temporary trusteeship."

THE VATICAN, ISRAEL, AND JERUSALEM - 1947-49

On December 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly, acting on the
proposal by the UNSCOP majority, approved the division of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish State. The UN body also established that Jerusalem and its environs were to constitute a "corpus separatum" directly under UN control. As a result of the attack by five Arab nations on the newly-proclaimed Jewish State, these provisions for the Partition Plan and for Jerusalem and the Holy Places were not implemented. During the hostilities, Jordanian and Israeli troops respectively took up positions in the "old city" - where the majority of Holy Places were located, and the "new city" - where much of the city's administration was situated.

The protracted Jordanian and Israeli occupation challenged the plans for Jerusalem's internationalization advocated in the Nov. 29, 1947, UN Resolution. In the face of that reality, and with a debate imminent in the UN on the Palestine question, the Holy See decided to end its STRATEGY OF SILENCE and to make public its position.

Pope Pius XII, who scrupulously avoided taking sides in the conflict and who is said to have favored the continuation of a mandatory regime in order to assure the safety of the Holy Places, issued his official reaction to the war in three Papal encyclicals. The first, *Auspicio Quaedam*, (May 10/1948), expressed concern for the Holy Places and offered a prayer that the "situation in Palestine be at long last settled justly."
The second, *In multiplicibus curis* (Oct. 24, 1948), was promulgated when it was clear that the Israelis were winning. Pius XII urged the giving of "an international character to Jerusalem and its vicinity (...) as a better guarantee for the safety of the sanctuaries under the present circumstances." In that encyclical, the Pope mentioned that, speaking before a "delegation of distinguished Arabs" who "came to render us homage," that

"Once war was declared, without abandoning the attitude of impartiality imposed on us by our apostolic mission, which places us above the conflicts which agitate human society, we did not fail to bend our efforts... for the triumph of justice and peace in Palestine and for the respect and safeguarding of the holy places."

(The Rev. J.M. Kelly, chairman of the Anglican Commission on Roman Catholic relations, has written in his just-published, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, that "Pius XII saw himself as the Pope of peace... (but) his efforts to remain 'strictly neutral' during World War II led to sharp criticisms of his failure to speak out strongly against the Nazis. During the claims of Pius defenders that he did speak out, what remains clear, Father Kelly writes, "is that the veiled or generalized language traditional to the curia was not a suitable instrument for dealing with cynically planned world domination and genocide.")

In his third encyclical, *Redemptoris nostri* (April 15, 1949)
which appeared two days after the signing of the armistice agreement, the Pope sought to "persuade the rulers of nations, and those whose duty it is to settle this important question, to accord to Jerusalem and its surroundings a juridical status." He then pleaded that

"...ALL RIGHTS TO THE HOLY PLACES WHICH CATHOLICS DURING MANY CENTURIES HAVE ACQUIRED AND TIME AND AGAIN DEFENDED VALIANTLY, AND WHICH OUR PREDECESSORS HAVE SOLEMNLY AND EFFECTIVELY VINDICATED, SHOULD BE PRESERVED INVIOLATE..."

On May 14, 1948, L'Osservatore Romano, declared:

"MODERN ZIONISM IS NOT THE TRUE HEIR OF BIBLICAL ISRAEL, BUT A SECULAR STATE... THEREFORE THE HOLY LAND AND ITS SACRED SITE BELONG TO CHRISTIANITY, THE TRUE ISRAEL."

In reporting on the War of Independence, the official Jesuit publication, Civiltà Cattolica, made its sympathies clear. It referred to Israeli setbacks as "Arab victories" and to Israeli victories as "advances." Only Egyptian and Jordanian communiques were quoted in full. In its June 19, 1948, issue the paper reported that "two Zionist emissaries" has been caught trying to poison the wells in Gaza.

The publication of the Papal encyclicals at this time, according to Prof. Ferrarri, resulted from acute concern over the damage suffered by
the Catholic sanctuaries and institutions in the Holy City. They were also animated by the hope that, once internationalized, Jerusalem might become the place where thousands of Palestinian refugees - including a sizeable contingent of Palestinian Christians - would wish to settle.

France now exerted pressures on the Vatican expecting that it would be able to exploit opportunities opened up by the international administration of Jerusalem as a means of regaining its influence it once had in the Middle East as "watchdog of Catholic interests." The French Ambassador to the Vatican thus was given instructions by Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, to "demand that the Pontiff take an official position favoring the internationalization of Jerusalem and the Holy Places."

In September 1948, two Israeli emissaries - Dr. Jacob Zerzog and Dr. Chaim Wardi - undertook a mission to Rome to discuss the future of Jerusalem and the Holy Places. In January 1949, Msgr. McMahon visited Palestine to pursue these discussions. Both missions failed to reach any agreements. This led the Vatican to renew its demands for an international regime for Jerusalem. These failures also stimulated Pope Pius XII to publish his second encyclical, In Redemptoris Nostri, (see p. 15), in which he invited the CATHOLIC WORLD TO RUSH TO THE DEFENSE OF THE HOLY PLACES AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM.

The Pope's appeal was taken up by the Catholics in many parts of
the world, particularly in the United States and France. In the United States, Cardinal Spellman approached President Truman directly and from May to August 1949, there was a lengthy exchange of letters between the two through which Spellman hoped to convince Truman of the "necessity of placing Jerusalem and its environs beyond the control of any local group." (Italics mine.)

Despite a second mission by McMahon to Palestine in the summer of 1949 and a final attempt in Rome in November 1949 undertaken by Jacob Herzog, the Vatican and Israel failed to reach agreement and they began the 4th session of the UN General Assembly in open disagreement on the Jerusalem issue.

Following a fiercely contested debate, the UN adopted on Dec. 9, 1949, an Australian resolution calling for the TERRITORIAL INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM. The resolution was opposed by Jordan and Israel, the United States and the United Kingdom, among the Great Powers. It was supported by the Arab bloc (excepting Jordan), the Communist bloc (which Prof. Ferrara said "saw internationalization of Jerusalem as a CHANCE TO ENTER MIDDLE EAST POLITICS") and the majority of Catholic countries, "no doubt heavily influenced by the Vatican."

That action further stiffened Israel's and Jordan's positions. They intensified their negotiations to find an agreement based on Jerusalem's division and accelerated the integration of the sections of
Jerusalem they controlled into their respective states.

In the spring of 1949, when the State of Israel sought admission to the United Nations, several Catholic countries opposed its application on the ground that Israel had "failed to carry out the full internationalization scheme" proposed by the United Nations for Jerusalem. No such accusation was made against Jordan, which had MOST OF THE HOLY PLACES IN ITS TERRITORY AND HAD REFUSED EVEN TO CONSIDER RELINQUISHING ITS RULE OVER THESE PLACES AND OVER THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM.

The Israel Parliament proclaimed Jerusalem as its capital and transferred its headquarters and main government offices there. The King of Jordan, worried about the rise of dangerous opposition to his rule from Amman, appointed a Supreme Custodian of the Holy Places in Jerusalem.

The Holy See refused to recognize any part of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, or the State of Israel itself. The Papal Delegate to Palestine resided in the Arab sector of Jerusalem, and the VATICAN EXERTED PRESSURE ON CATHOLIC STATES TO ESTABLISH THEIR EMBASSIES AND LEGATIONS IN OR NEAR TEL AVIV, RATHER THAN IN JERUSALEM.

(As recently as July 2, 1986, the head of the U.S. Catholic bishops called on President Ronald Reagan to convince the U.S. Senate to drop legislation that could result in the moving of the U.S. Embassy in Israel..."
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Bishop James Malone, president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, in a letter to President Reagan, urged him to ask Sen. Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, to withdraw an amendment on the embassy transfer. The amendment has been proposed for pending legislation on strengthening diplomatic security in the face of terrorism.

(Terming the Helms' amendment "very dangerous," Bishop Malone wrote: "The effect of the amendment could force the transfer of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. I know that previous efforts to achieve this objective have been opposed by your administration and I write to request your leadership in opposing this very dangerous amendment.")

(The U.S. Catholic Conference, the bishops' public policy arm, in 1984 opposed measures to move the embassy "because we believed such a unilateral move would fail to address the special significance Jerusalem holds for Moslems, Jews and Christians and it would present yet another obstacle to progress toward a Middle East peace. Our position, then as now," he wrote, "has been guided by the overall position of the Holy See on Jerusalem." ) (National Catholic News Service, July 7, 1986.)

In 1950 new discussions and negotiations took place, at first centering on the Garreau plan which proposed internationalization of a limited area of Jerusalem, but including all the Christian Holy Places.
Subsequently, a draft statute was drawn up by the Trusteeship Council based on guidelines in the Dec. 9, 1949 resolution which had reaffirmed the internationalization of all Jerusalem. Neither proposal received sufficient support of the UN General Assembly which completed its work in Dec. 1950 without adopting any resolution regarding Jerusalem.

Only after it became obvious that the Jewish State was viable and vigorous, and that the United Nations was incapable of enforcing its resolutions regarding the internationalization of Jerusalem and the holy places, did the Vatican make its first tentative approaches with the Israelis, if not with the State of Israel. On March 27, 1952, Pope Pius XII received Moshe Sharett, now Israel's Foreign Minister, in a private unofficial audience. (See p. 11 for report on first audience.) Sharett assured the Pope that Israel would respect Christian rights. The Pope did not take any stand on the subjects raised by Sharett. In the years that followed, Israel was visited by a number of eminent Catholics including some Latin American prelates, who subsequently spoke in highly complimentary terms of what they had seen in the country. A growing number of Catholic priests began the serious study of modern Hebrew. In 1955, a group of Jesuits, Dominicans, and Franciscans spent six months in an intensive Hebrew-language course, studying side-by-side with new Jewish immigrants.

Vatican authorities were impressed by Israel's attitude toward the holy places. In November 1955, Israel's Ministry of Religious Affairs
presented to Msgr. Antonio Vergani, the Latin Patriarchal Representative in Israel, a check in final compensation for war damage to Catholic institutions. In a formal letter to the Israel government (Nov. 16, 1955), Vergani thanked the government for the "CONSTANT ASSISTANCE I WAS GIVEN IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS OUTSTANDING BETWEEN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL WITHIN THE LATTER'S TERRITORY."
THE official Vatican, however, still seemed reluctant to mention the State of Israel by name. In May 1955, several months prior to Vergani’s letter, the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra had been granted an audience by Pope Pius XII and had given him a private concert as a gesture of gratitude for the help the Church had given to Jewish victims of Nazism. In its review of the concert, L'Osservatore Romano simply said that the Pope had addressed "Jewish musicians of fourteen different nationalities." Not a word was mentioned about the actual nationality of the players.

The accession of Pope John XXIII in 1958 inaugurated an era of liberalization in the attitudes of the Catholic Church. The new Pope, formerly Angelo Cardinal Roncalli, had maintained cordial relations with Jews, and, on his election, exchanged messages of goodwill with the President and Chief Rabbi of Israel. His coronation was attended by Eliyahu Sasson, then Israel's Ambassador to Italy, who attended the ceremonies as a "special delegate of the government of Israel." In 1962 Saul Colbi, Director of the Department for Christian Communities of the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs, attended the opening ceremonies of the Vatican Council.

The Vatican still did not establish official diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. To no small extent, this was motivated by FEAR OF ARAB REPRISALS AGAINST CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES OR INSTITUTIONS IN ARAB LANDS. The extent of the pressure the Arab states were capable of exerting can best be seen from what transpired during the Vatican Council, which, begun by POPE John XXIII and continued by his successor, Paul VI, met in four separate sessions from 1962 to 1965. (See my paper on Vatican Council II and JEWISH-Christian Relations available from the American Jewish Committee.)
When the 1963 session discussed a proposed "Declaration on the Jews" repudiating the deicide charge of collective Jewish guilt for the Crucifixion, the Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria, United Arab Republic, warned that such a statement would have to face "the music from the Arab nations." He asserted that to admit that the Jews had not been guilty in the death of Jesus would mean that they had a right to their Homeland after all, and this the Arabs could not tolerate. Such warnings, combined with religious opposition from conservative and several openly anti-Semitic clerics, prevented that session from taking up the statement.

During the October 1964 session, when the statement was discussed again, the Arab League countries instructed their diplomatic representatives in Rome to contact the cardinals and bishops and make plain to them the political implications of a pro-Jewish declaration on the part of the Council. Arab newspapers warned that the matter of the Jewish declaration would be raised at the conference of leaders of nonaligned nations that was meeting in Cairo at the time. When the Council gave preliminary approval to a strongly worded statement condemning anti-Jewish discrimination and declaring that the Church rejected the deicide charge against the Jews, Foreign Minister Kadri Toukan of Jordan said that the act would encourage Israel to "continue its aggressive policy." Ten Christian members of the Jordanian Parliament sent a message to Pope Paul calling the statement a "stab in the heart of Christianity."

Two days after the passage of the pro-Jewish statement, the Pope, in an effort to pacify the Arabs, arranged to meet with Charles Helou, the Christian President of Lebanon. Augustin Cardinal Bea, President of the Vatican Secretariat of Christian Unity, in
a front-page editorial in L'Osservatore Romano, stressed the purely religious significance of the declaration, denying that it had any political aims or intentions. The statement was finally ratified when the Vatican Council closed in October 1965, and was a modified version of the draft declaration passed the year before.

In January 1964, Pope Paul made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. After arriving in Jordan on January 4, he spent January 5 in Israel, visiting Megiddo, Nazareth, Tiberias, and Capernaum, repeatedly announcing that he had come strictly as a pilgrim to worship at the holy places there. The Arab world exploited the occasion for propaganda purposes. Reporters arriving in Jordan from all over the world to cover the Pope's visit were given kits from the Jordanian Office of Information containing violently anti-Jewish material. The Arabic version of the Jordan radio's response to the Pope's message declared that "two thousand years ago the Jews crucified Christ and fifteen years ago they attacked the people of Palestine...the Jews are the enemies of God and of all religions in the world."

In his response to an address of welcome from President Zalman Shazar, who met the Pope as he entered Israel, Pope Paul referred to the President as "Your Excellency," and expressed his thanks to the "authorities" who had been kind to him, but he never referred to "Israel" or to a "Jewish State." At the same time, he instructed Eugène Cardinal Tisserant, who had accompanied him on the journey, to kindle memorial lights and to recite a prayer in the Memorial Chamber in Yad Vashem. When he left, Pope Paul VI told the Israeli Chief of Protocol that "we saw today a living people at work, a calm and serene people." He also accepted a medallion with the words "State of Israel" engraved upon it in Hebrew, and said,
"Shalom, shalom" in Hebrew.

THE VATICAN AND JERUSALEM - AFTER 1967

Jerusalem's unification under Israeli control in 1967 led to a resumed debate which had produced no significant result since the beginning of the 1950s. Following Israel's victory in the Six-Day War, Pope Paul VI at a consistory held on June 26, 1967, called for the INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM. According to the Vatican spokesman who released the report of the consistory to the New York Times, Israel's assurances that it would afford all faiths free access to the holy places was not enough to satisfy the Vatican. On June 9, 1967, Msgr. Vallainc, the Vatican's official spokesman, forcefully and clearly reaffirmed its traditional position based on the TERRITORIAL INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE ENTIRE CITY. He stated that "the UN resolutions of November 1947 were and are in accord with the wishes of the Holy See." A few days later the Vatican observer at the UN circulated a document declaring that the Vatican was "convinced that the only solution which offers a sufficient guarantee for the protection of Jerusalem and of its Holy Places is to place the city and its vicinity under an INTERNATIONAL REGIME." He further stated that "the term 'internationalization' in its proper sense means a SEPARATE TERRITORY. A 'CORPUS SEPARATUM' SUBJECT TO AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME." (caps mine.)

On June 30, 1967, a group of Latin American countries inspired by the Vatican, presented a draft resolution designed to support the INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM, but this did not obtain a sufficient majority to be accepted by the General Assembly. That failure indicated that the majority of the nations represented at the UN no longer considered this solution viable.

The Vatican apparently was now willing to come to terms with the new situation created by Israel's victory. A number of meetings were held in Rome between Ehud Avriel, Israeli Ambassador to Italy, and Vatican
officials, including the Pope, which led to the decision to receive an Israeli emissary in the Vatican bearing a message from Eshkol for Paul VI. It was also agreed that a Vatican representative would be sent immediately afterwards to Israel "to get first-hand knowledge of the situation and the attitude of the local authorities".

In July 1967, a series of meetings was held in Jerusalem between Prime Minister Eshkol and Msgr. Angelo Felici, the Vatican Under-Secretary for Extraordinary Affairs. At the end of this mission a joint communiqué, signed by Msgr. Felici and Dr. Jacob Herzog, Director General of the Prime Minister's Office, on July 11, recorded that the discussion had taken place regarding "a number of possible formulae...that might be taken into consideration for the purposes of an acceptable solution of the important issue connected with the Holy Places."

Shortly after a statement circulated by the Israeli Foreign Ministry further stated that the parties had discussed the possibility of drawing up a STATUTE FOR THE HOLY PLACES "without prejudice to the acquired rights of the various communities" based on "a satisfactory legal formula designed to give the Holy Places status comparable, in rights and immunity, to that of diplomatic missions." The joint communiqué described the talks as having been marked by "cordiality and mutual understanding."

VATICAN RECONSIDERATIONS

The failure of the Latin American resolution at the UN, and the Israeli government's willingness to open negotiations regarding the status of the Holy Places led the Vatican to reconsider its position.

From August 1967, the Vatican's position became more elastic and indefinite. Its demand for a specially internationally guaranteed status for Jerusalem and the Holy Places was no longer accompanied by the usual references to the territorial internationalization of the city.
Pope Paul VI appeared to make this explicit in an important allocution on December 22, 1967, which stressed the two features that the Vatican considered "essential and impossible to evade" in any solution to the problems of Jerusalem and the Holy Places:

"The first concerns the Holy Places properly so-called and considered as such by the three great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is a matter of guaranteeing freedom of worship, respect for preservation of, and access to the Holy Places, PROTECTED BY SPECIAL IMMUNITIES THANKS TO A SPECIAL STATUTE, WHOSE OBSERVATION WOULD BE GUARANTEED BY AN INSTITUTION INTERNATIONAL IN CHARACTER, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORIC AND RELIGIOUS PERSONALITY OF JERUSALEM. The second aspect of the question refers to the free enjoyment of the legitimate civil and religious rights of persons, residences and activities of ALL COMMUNITIES present on the territory of Palestine."

Thus, the Pope spelled out the three features needed to be incorporated in any formula replacing that of Jerusalem's territorial internationalization – on which the Vatican no longer insists:

(1) the protection of the Holy Places and the HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS CHARACTER OF THE CITY;

(2) the INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF THE STATUTE which would have to be applicable to both the Holy Places and Jerusalem; and

(3) guarantees regarding the civil and religious rights of the communities involved in Palestine.

The first feature – "the historical and religious character of the city" – indicates a refusal to accept a solution based only on the extraterritorial nature of the Holy Places, which, although protecting adequately the Holy Places themselves could not provide any guarantee against changes resulting, for example from town-planning and architectural innovations which might change the sacred character of the entire city.
(UNESCO Resolution 3.343, adopted October 1968, reflected these Vatican concerns by referring to "patrimoine culturel" consisting not only of the Holy Places but the entire Holy City as well and which stressed its value "pour l'humanité tout entière." )

This December 22, 1967, speech of Pope Paul VI clearly wished to clarify that while the Vatican was prepared to abandon Jerusalem's territorial internationalization and consider alternative solutions (which, however, were not specified), it was not prepared to compromise on the basic requirements that had led it in 1948-50 to request a "corpus separatum", namely, the need to ensure the presence of a significant Christian community in Palestine, and the need to protect the Holy Places. These requirements would apparently have to be satisfied in any new formula put forward.

The Israeli position clearly diverges from this Vatican view in that Israel regards Jerusalem firstly as the capital of the Jewish State, and the interests of the international community are restricted to the Holy Places. As expressed by then Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban in a letter to the UN Secretary General on April 20, 1968, and in a speech before the UN General Assembly on Sept. 19, 1969, "the international interest in Jerusalem has always been understood to derive from the presence of the Holy Places", the problem was therefore "to assure the universal character of the Holy Places" by means of mechanisms guaranteeing control by the various religious communities. This was the basis for Israel's proposals for the extraterritoriality of the Holy Places discussed in the 1967 negotiations.

The Vatican considers this unsatisfactory because it gave no Catholic guarantee regarding (a) the survival of the Christian community in Palestine, and (b) the protection of the sacred character of Jerusalem
from which, in the Vatican's view, the problem of the Holy Places could not be isolated. Seeking to mobilize Islamic opinion, Pope Paul VI sent a message in September 1969 to the Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat, Morocco, in which he proposed that an agreement between Jews, Christians and Muslims to recognize the sacred character of Jerusalem and the other holy places.

On October 6, 1969, Foreign Minister Abba Eban met with Pope Paul VI, and said: "I found an atmosphere of esteem and profound respect for our sovereignty and for our historical evolution." He also noted that he had seen an Israeli flag on display in a corridor in the Vatican. But despite this ionic spirit, the core difficulties were obviously not overcome.

In early 1971, the Pope sent a letter to the Israeli President in which he bluntly stated that he could not subscribe to any agreement with a country that the Vatican did not recognize while a state of war existed in the Middle East and rejected an apparent Israeli offer to acknowledge "the Pope as the representative of all the Christian groups" (The World Council of Churches and other Christian bodies expressed concerns that an agreement between the Vatican and Israel might be at their expense, and several protested. See W. Zander's book p. 111 ff.)

In later years, Paul VI's statements on Jerusalem stressed the growing concern for the fate of the Christian communities in Palestine engaged in an exodus criticized by Catholic Church leaders. These criticisms seem oblivious to the fact that some 14,000 Christians emigrated from Jerusalem during the period of Jordanian occupation from 1948 to 1967, and that it has come to a halt since 1967. Against the background of the departures of Christians from such Arab countries as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya, it seems that what the Christian community in Israel has become one of the most stable and flourishing. (See my Testimony on Jerusalem before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 28, 1971, available from the American Jewish Committee)
The Pope's statements - linked to progress in ecumenism and interreligious relationships that had occurred in the 1960s and 1970s - also developed more fully the theme of religious pluralism in Jerusalem, the Holy City for the three great monotheistic religions. Both of these concerns led to the underscoring of the Vatican's basic demand: a special internationally guaranteed statute which would ensure the sacred and universal character of Jerusalem.

The 1970s passed with no particularly significant change in the Vatican's position on Jerusalem while relations between the Vatican and Israel - although undergoing periods of tension - slowly but steadily improved and were strengthened by the positive outcome of the return of the Notre Dame de France Convent to the Vatican, by the visit of Msgr. (Les Ker, p. 83) underscretary of State, functioned as Secretary of State, long-time Resident of Giovanni Benelli of the Vatican Secretary of State to Israel in 1972, and by Meche Dayan's visit to the Vatican a few years later.

In November 1977, Egypt's President Sadat made his historic journey to Jerusalem and with Menachem Begin, and President Jimmy Carter signed the breakthrough Camp David agreement. Pope John Paul II welcomed the Camp David agreement while Egypt and Israel did not resolve their differences over Jerusalem. In a confidential message to both sides, the Vatican reiterated its position.

Pope John Paul II in a speech before the UN General Assembly in 1979, reaffirmed in keeping with Paul VI's previous statements the "hope for a special statute that under international guarantees...would respect the particular nature of Jerusalem."

In October 1979, the Vatican's Permanent Observer to the UN distributed a detailed document reaffirming the Holy See's demand for "a special statute internationally guaranteed for Jerusalem," using specifically religious language, the document gave priority to "the
intention...to preserve and guarantee to the Holy City its identity as a religious center unique and outstanding in the history of the world, in such a way that may become a stable place of encounter and concord for the three great monotheistic religions." According to the Vatican, this implied "above all, the recognition of an historical and religious pluralism, to be put into practice by according to all of the three religions, in their particular expression as communities, full enjoyment of their respective rights, EXCLUDING POSITIONS OF PREDOMINANCE, (caps mine), and, indeed, favoring the prospect of a useful human and religious dialogue".

The final part of the document concentrated on the theme of equal rights, both religious and civil, for all three communities present in Jerusalem. It specifies the need "to define the territory and list the Holy Places, as well as provide for the guarantees and for the supervision which the international community will have to give to the 'statute' and for the juridical form of this commitment and of the accord of the interested parties."

By concentrating on religious pluralism and equal rights the Vatican now seems to reduce the former paramount significance of the Holy Places as if they were now a detail in a larger design aimed at making Jerusalem the place where the three major monotheistic religious could work together in the future in light of the historical memories of the past.

Shortly before the Israeli Knesset declared Jerusalem to be the "whole and united capital" of the Jewish State, L'Osservatore Romano warned against the unilateral initiatives by one state and the inadequacy of "bilateral agreements between one or more states." That seemed to be an indirect reference to a possible solution negotiated between Israel
and a number of Arab countries, excluding "Christian" countries. The Vatican journal again stressed the need for an "appropriate legal system, guaranteed by some higher international authority" meaning quite likely the UN.

While today the Vatican seems to be flexible about the legal framework of the special statute for Jerusalem and perhaps will not require its extension to the entire city, the Holy See does firmly demand that it should be international in nature and be designed to have three purposes.

(1) protection with complete equality of the religious and civil rights of the communities in Palestine.

(2) the safeguarding of the sacred character of Jerusalem and protection of the Holy Places, and

(3) the encouragement of dialogue and collaboration between the believers in the three monotheistic religions.

Resserting Israel's commitment to extra-territoriality of the Holy Places, Abba Eban has summarized Israel's policies in these words:

"The city (Jerusalem) is open to the constructive initiative of Jews, Christians and Moslems the world over in the furtherance of its development, especially of its cultural and spiritual assets, and in increasing the number of institutions and enterprises testifying to the city's historical uniqueness and special mission of promoting faith, progress and peace. Should Christian and Moslem circles, to whom Jerusalem is dear, manifest initiative of their own, it will be welcome and they will benefit from Government support, just as they have been beneficiting up to now."