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Box 11, Folder 8, Antisemitism, 1976-1983.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date September 28, 1979
to See list below
from Milton Himmelfarb
subject Max Beloff, "The Anti-Semitic Persuasion,"
Encounter, August 1979

A copy is attached.

Beloff is the distinguished English Jewish historian and political scientist. Here he reviews a number of works bearing on antisemitism, Zionism, and Israel.

It is a thoughtful and, especially for American Jews, sobering essay.



MH:rg

cc: Bertram H. Gold
 Selma Hirsh
 Abe Karlikow
 Irving Levine
 Yehuda Rosenman
 Seymour Samet
 Ira Silverman
 ✓ Marc Tanenbaum

October 22, 1980

Dear Mr. Weil:

Thank you for those copies of your "Imperfectly Mastered Past." I have given them to Mr. Gold and Rabbi Tanenbaum, and have also taken the liberty of making copies for other colleagues of mine who should be especially interested.

Before too long I hope to be able to let you know whether any of them is prepared to help toward the comparative study you have in mind.

Yours,

Milton Himmelfarb

Mr. Frederick D. Weil
Hilles Library
Harvard University
59 Shepard Street
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

MH:rg

bc: Milton Ellerstein
Bertram H. Gold
Abe Karlikow
Marc Tanenbaum


THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date November 18, 1971
to Seymour Samet
from Milton Ellerin *ME*
subject "Briefs"

For some time now I have been looking for a practical way to transmit gleanings to staff from the quantity of information which moves across my desk. To that end I've put together this informal newsletter as an "in the house" organ. I trust it will be informative, helpful and interesting.

"Briefs" will be produced semi-monthly and distributed to Staff Advisory Committee and Division Heads.

ME/lk
Enc.



BRIEFS

NATIONAL FRONT, England's lunatic fringe anti-Semitic movement conducted sustained, and unsuccessful, effort to prevent Britain's entry into the Common Market. National Front members attended Conservative Party heckling speakers with remarks such as "Jewish international bankers will be the only people to benefit from Common Market entry."

SILLY BUT, the notion may spread. Anti-Semitic press claiming that Attorney General Mitchell's authorization to admit Russian Jews into the United States is but a covert scheme to double America's Jewish population. They allege that first will come Russian Jews, then Jews from Arab countries, and eventually Jews from Israel.

WHERE ARE THEY NOW? Father Charles E. Coughlin reached his 80th birthday in Detroit on October 25, 1971, still writing pamphlets, books and articles.

SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE - National Program Director Rev. Hosea Williams, back from a four week visit to China, visibly impressed. Williams now preaching that America's civil rights struggle is not a race but a class struggle. Williams does not advocate violent revolution for black Americans because it is "impractical," although, says he, "I accept non-violence as a strategy, although not necessarily as a philosophy."

COURT ORDERED BUSING BACKFIRING: Recent bombings of school buses in Pontiac and Kalamazoo, Michigan focus a spotlight on the emotional and surging resistance to court ordered busing to achieve school integration. Several national groups being organized to combat busing including Florida-based group "Citizens Against Forced Busing" led by former Governor Claude Kirk who advocated a "National Parents Union" to contest forced busing via constitutional amendment. Bills to that end have been introduced in both the House and Senate. Anti-Semitic Liberty Lobby also moving to coordinate indigenous anti-busing groups springing up in various parts of the country.

A BIRCH BARK - "TIMELY WARNING" by Robert Welch - pamphlet (Oct.1971) declares: "The record seems to me to indicate quite clearly that, since at least 1960, Richard Nixon has had the all pervading ambition, and the unshakable determination, to use the Presidency of the United States as a stepping stone from which to become the first ruler of the world -- that Nixon knows any such position can only be achieved with the approval and support of the Communist movement and the Insiders who control it."

THE WALLACE CANDIDACY - the question of George Wallace's Presidential candidacy in 1972, never in serious doubt, coming closer to final resolution. In late September Wallace headquarters mailed more than a million copies of a questionnaire soliciting opinions on who shall be his Vice Presidential running mate; on what Wallace might do to increase his vote potential, and what answers the recipients suggest on issues of busing, crime, drugs, taxes, prayer in schools, and pornography.

COMMUNIST MONOLITH? - A further fragmentation of the already splintered Marxist movement accelerated by the contemplated Nixon visit to Red China. The puritanical Progressive Labor Party, itself a spin-off from the Communist Party, no longer is the American branch of the Chinese Communist Party. PLP denounced Mao for his personality cult as a Revisionist, and for having become "bourgeoisie."

OMENS AND PORTENTS - Buckley's National Review, cameo piece of the conservative press, never, not even since 1967, enthusiastic in its support for Israel, is piqued over Israel's refusal to embrace Administration proposals for a Middle East settlement. N.R. chipping away at the notion widely held by anti-Communists that Israel is a bulwark against Russian domination in the Middle East. The October 8th issue maintains that the Soviets have begun to renew contacts with Israelis; that "Delegations from Israel have visited Moscow and not merely to view Lenin's tomb." Moreover, N.R. holds that the current "impasse represents a plus for the Soviets, a minus for U.S."

ISRAEL IN THE DAILY WORLD - Generally speaking the U.S. Marxist press has of late ignored Israel and indeed the whole Middle East. Attica, San Quentin, Angela Davis, are of more immediate concern. Lone exception is CPUSA's Daily World. Ever the U.S. instrument of Soviet foreign policy, Daily World loses no opportunity to throw darts at the Israeli balloon. Obscure items such as "Israel Deficit Up Again" get page 2 coverage. Recent deportation of 18 U.S. blacks by Israel sweet wine for the Daily World cup.

AMERICAN NAZIS - Always on the alert to gain a foothold in the political door, hard core anti-Semitic groups frequently support candidates for public office whom they perceive to be in the ultra conservative mold. Unsolicited they distribute literature, and attempt to recruit members at political rallies. National Socialist White People's Party - progeny of Rockwell's American Nazi Party minions - were promptly and personally booted out by Philadelphia Mayor Elect Frank Rizzo when he noted the ersatz storm troopers handing out hate literature at a September 30th pre-election rally.

SELF DEFENSE - "The Power Structure is trying to take away our right to bear arms" editorializes Right On! publication of the Cleaver faction of the Black Panther Party. "It means that they don't want us to have guns to protect ourselves when they come busting down our doors..." Suggests formation of gun clubs, urges "if you have a gun, get another,"

and sloganizes "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Death to those who deserve it."

NEW ANTI-ZIONIST MOVEMENT being organized by Saul Joftes, ousted head of B'nai B'rith's Department of International Affairs. Joftes, during a bitter court struggle, alleged that B'nai B'rith was an undisclosed arm of the Zionist movement. His newly created World Confederation of National Jewish Organizations seeks to include Soviet Jewish groups, and claims contact with four Jewish apologists for Soviet regime, including editor of Soviet Yiddish language publication Sovietish Heimland.

RECENT CHINA VISITORS expressly invited by Peking included Panther leader Huey Newton, Pablo Guzman of the Young Lords, and representatives of the Revolutionary Union, a small, select group of Mao oriented, violence addicted American youth. Peking's purpose in bringing these groups together shrouded in uncertainty. A new clandestine Maoist underground?

LOOKING HOMEWARD - Eldridge Cleaver, fugitive Black Panther leader, confirmed to New York Post reporter that he will soon end self-imposed Algerian exile. Wife Kathleen returned to U.S. in mid-October and has plunged into full schedule of meetings with black militants. Cleaver, silent about how he intends to avoid arrest when he returns, declares that his followers' future activities will be patterned after urban terrorist guerrilla movements. Cleaver vitriolic in denunciations of Red China and Cuba, and Huey Newton who, he says, wants to work within the system.

ARAB PROPAGANDISTS quick to seize on the widely reported incident of expulsion of American blacks by Israel. Propagandist M.T.Mehdi editorializing in his publication Action declared: "The Israeli racists expelled last week a number of American black Jews who claim ancestral ties to Patriarch Abraham...There is no doubt they can make a stronger claim of a theoretical tie to the Middle East than the Javits, the Meyersons and the Slavic, Poles and other Europeans who were converted to Judaism...The Zionist racists are imitating their Nazi mentors who viewed the 'Jewish problem' as the Israelis look towards the black problem."

PRAYER AMENDMENT, narrowly defeated in recent House of Representatives vote, looms as a campaign issue in 1972 congressional elections. Many citizens groups, led by Mrs. Benjamin Ruhlin, head of Prayer Campaign Committee, will erect billboards in home districts of Congressmen who opposed the amendment, to remind constituents of how those legislators voted. Proponents of the measure predict that issue will come up again in the future.

500 NAZI SS veteran members of "Das Reich" Division, notorious for the 1944 massacre of more than 600 men and women in a French village, recently convened in Bavaria, formed an association pledged to "preserve the comradeship of the last war, sealed in blood."

DEATH NOTICE - Moroccan Jews alarmed over widespread distribution of anonymous threat in wake of abortive attempt to assassinate King Hassan II:

"All Jews residing in Morocco take note of this warning.

Bandits of history, assassins of Christ, sexual maniacs who commit incest with their unmarried mothers and sisters, neurotic adorers of the golden veal, mercenaries of American imperialism, dirty Jews, cursed inhuman race...Never, ten thousand times never, will we forget your vandal crimes, your murders among "all" our ARAB brothers in the Middle East.

We, young Moroccans of the vanguard, know that the present regime protects you (more or less) and makes easier the historic task inherent to your rotten nature; to make economic slaves of us. But your end, dirty Jews, is near, remember this well; JULY 10, 1971 is only the beginning for the extermination of all the Jews of Morocco."

LINK WITH THE PAST - George A. Link, 27 year old disciple of the late George Lincoln Rockwell, has started his own organization, the American Mobilizers, Elite Guard and all. (Shades of pre-World War II Christian Mobilizers!) The American Eagle is the Mobilizers' insignia, The New American, its official publication, to be published every six weeks. A promotional flyer notes "America is dying from an overdose of freedom"; then asks the question "Will you volunteer your fists in the service of America?" Headquarters located in Mt. Vernon, N.Y.

Prepared by
Milton Ellerin

11/18/71
71-970-12

Marc Laventbaum

APR 18 1983

MEMORANDUM

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

DAD/TA
date April 15, 1983
to Seymour Samet
from Milton Ellerin
subject Report: Panel on Anti-Semitism -- American Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors

In my February 17 memorandum to you in which I reported on the initial planning meeting for this session, I wrote that while I had agreed to AJC's participation with ADL and the AJCongress, but "...quite frankly, I have some reservations. I believe that any balanced, reasoned assessment of world-wide anti-Semitism will be instantly challenged by this particular audience." Unfortunately, my prophecy turned out to be correct, but I am getting ahead of my story.

As you know, Larry Goldberg, acting on behalf of the Holocaust survivors, dumped the whole thing in our lap, and until a few weeks before the session, nothing by way of planning was done. It wasn't until we involved Micki Alperin that the session took shape. We had decided that the format for the session would be one in which a panel of experts would answer questions put to us by a well-known media personality, and through the good offices of Amy Goldberg, Marvin Kalb, of NBC, agreed to undertake the chore. At this point, I then contacted Justin Finger at ADL who in turn secured Phil Baum, of the Congress. I prepared a series of questions for Marvin Kalb's use and we were ready to go, or so we thought. We so informed Larry Goldberg's office. Efforts to pin down precisely where the session would be held, the physical arrangements, etc., were consummated with great difficulty.

On Friday, April 8 (the session was held on Tuesday, April 12), late in the afternoon, I finally spoke with Goldberg's office to offer suggestions as to the physical arrangements (name plates, microphones, room location and some idea as to who would moderate the program).

Originally we were told that the session on anti-Semitism would be held in an auditorium seating some 5000 people, but during my Friday conversation I learned it would be held in a room seating 500. When I expressed some doubt as to the adequacy of the room, I was glibly told not to worry -- if the room was inadequate, we would all simply traipse over to the auditorium which had the seating capacity of 5000.

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On Monday morning the day prior to the session, Micki received word from Marvin Kalb's office that he would be physically unable to fulfill his role having once again injured his back and was now immobile. At this point we did not know whether Goldberg's office had been reached by Kalb's office, or whether they had made any arrangements for a back-up moderator, just in case. As a result we were inhibited from attempting to secure a replacement for fear that if we did, we would have two on our hands. Efforts by Micki to reach anyone at the Washington Convention Hall where the Gathering took place were futile. It was impossible to get through to anyone. In the meantime, Amy Goldberg was trying to line up Martin Agronsky but hesitated to make the approach for the afore-mentioned reason -- possibly having two moderators on hand. Finally late Monday afternoon, I got hold of Gus Finger and through ADL's intervention their Washington office secured Fred Fisk, a local radio personality who, having been appraised of the situation, agreed to act as moderator, a role he ultimately fulfilled.

While I don't wish to make a whole megillah out of this report, a few further observations are necessary in order to understand what transpired.

Having travelled to Washington with Gus Finger, we proceeded to the Convention Center, where it was soon apparent that chaos was the prevailing ambience. No one knew anything about the session, no one knew where we could find Larry Goldberg, and only with great difficulty did we locate the room assigned for the session. While indeed it appeared that the room would hold 500, there was no dais, no chairs, no microphones, no nameplates and no indication that this was the room in which the session would be held.

As we made our way through the main feature of the Gathering, i.e., the survivors village, registration desk, exhibits, etc., we were greeted with a heart-rending scene of numerous people wandering over the floor, carrying signs, wearing sweatshirts indicating who they were, where they were from and who they were looking for. The din and confusion was indescribable even as various people availed themselves of a microphone to broadcast pleas similar to those contained in the signs and sweatshirts. Tears flowed in profusion and as previously indicated, the chaos, although understandable, was beyond belief.

Fifteen minutes before the session was to begin we found the chairman who turned out to be Solomon Zynstein, a VP of the Convening Group. After begging, beseeching and imploring, we secured sufficient chairs for the dais and a microphone. Approximately at this time Bookie informed me

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that Meir Kahane was in the hall and was going to interrupt our session. I so informed Zynstein and Fred Fisk, the moderator, who by this time had appeared. In the meantime, the crowds were streaming in and by 12:55 there wasn't an available spot in the room. In addition to trying to devise a strategy to deal with Kahane (our strategy was not to let him speak), we had to introduce ourselves to the moderator, and I thrust the list of questions I had prepared for Kalb in Fisk's hands, and we agreed that they would constitute the basis for the ensuing discussion. At 12:57 someone, whose identity I never did learn, breathlessly announced to me that the session would have to be delayed an hour, for reasons which I never understood, since the confusion of trying to settle a myriad of details left me little time or patience to cope with anything else. After a quick assessment of the situation, it soon became apparent that it would be impossible to postpone the session and we proceeded forthwith.

The session got off on an auspicious note when Zynstein utilized his role to deliver a lengthy assessment of the world scene as he perceived it, and then on with the show. There wasn't an inch of standing room available and the space between what passed for the dais and the audience was completely filled with squatters. Cassandra that I am, I was overwhelmed with the possible tragic consequences if fire had broken out in the auditorium.

Bookie's information turned out to be accurate and some fifteen or twenty minutes after the panelists responded to questions and engaged in cross-comment, in walked Kahane, which as might be anticipated, precipitated a murmur, if not a roar, from the attendees. He worked his way until he was adjacent to the dais, whereupon someone from the audience augmented by a-claque, insisted that Kahane be given the opportunity to speak. Seasoned observer though I am, I find it hard to accurately describe what then ensued, except that people all over the room now divided into two camps -- those who wanted to hear Kahane and those who resented his intrusion -- were shouting at each other. The chairman shouted at Kahane and Fisk was red-faced, incredulous and perplexed. Somehow out of that din and confusion a compromise was agreed upon whereby Kahane would be granted the privilege of asking the first question, and we attempted to proceed. Following the next question, someone from the audience got up to deliver an oration, the contents of which I couldn't grasp, which then evoked a series of cat-calls from the audience. The audience by this time was restive and growing more unruly by the minute. Zynstein, wisely, I thought, decided to halt the proceedings and entertain questions, whereupon Kahane took the microphone, presumably to ask a question, but in

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lieu thereof, delivered his standard dirge of a world being engulfed by anti-Semitism. The anti-Kahane people began shouting that he was only supposed to ask a question, and Kahane insisted he never agreed to such a limitation. Others in the audience shouted to let him speak. One virtue in the battle that was taking place was that even Kahane, after five or ten minutes finally gave up. There followed two or possibly three emotionally charged questions which produced further exchanges from audience, when it was then apparent that it was useless to proceed any further and the chairman decided to terminate the proceedings, but not until he delivered an impassioned ten-minute speech, the contents of which escape me beyond the fact that it had something to do with the survivors and the ability of the Jewish people to overcome anti-Semitism through the ages.

Many in the audience who were largely uninformed were distressed over the turn of events, and were anxious to hear what the panel of "experts" had to say. Somehow Finger and Baum escaped, but I was trapped on the dais and literally besieged by people who wanted to ask questions, which I proceeded to answer for the next 30 minutes or so. While I was answering questions, tape recorders were thrust in my face, reporters representing publications unknown to me were taking notes, and Lord knows what the end product of all this will be.

Several things are clear to me as a result of this experience. What transpired has to be viewed against a backdrop of an audience which was overcome by intense emotion and one which does not trust the Christian world. No one, I believe, will be able to convince the Holocaust survivors, at least when they gather in a body, that the Holocaust may not happen again.

What transpired that afternoon was an unforgettable experience the likes of which I had never experienced or ever will again, but in all candor, I'm glad I was there.

ME:jmw
cc: Don Feldstein
Hy Bookbinder
Micki Alperin

83-970-5

October 5, 1976

H. Applebaum, M. Fine, M. Tanenbaum, M. Yarmon
Sonya F. Kaufer

"The New Anti-Semitism"


The ADL has asked if we would like to join them in re-printing the attached article by J. L. Talmon from The New Republic, September 18, 1976. Since I need to get back to them before the end of the week, will you please let me have your recommendation no later than Thursday afternoon, October 7, 1976.

If you feel that reprints would be useful, please let me know how many you would want (and are prepared to have charged to your budget).

Thank you.

SFK:F

encl.



Sony

The New Anti-Semitism

by J.L. Talmon

In those distant days, when General de Gaulle drank a toast to "the state of Israel, our friend and ally," a right wing antiemitic weekly in Paris, which fiercely upheld the idea of "Algérie Française," published a long article under the title "Is it possible to be a friend of Israel and an anti-Semite at the same time?" The author thought that it was. He argued that Israel was a nation of peasants and soldiers, while "the Rothschilds were neither farmers nor warriors." One cannot help being reminded of that fine distinction when hearing nowadays PLO spokesmen swearing that they are fighting racist Zionism, but have nothing against Judaism as a religion, and Jews passionately insisting that the former was only another formula for the latter.

In the pre-Holocaust period and before the Jewish state came into existence the distinction was tenable. There were then gentile anti-Zionists who by no stretch of the imagination could be called anti-Semites. Their reservations against Zionism stemmed from a variety of motives: the Zionist endeavor was a threat to the Arabs; it was utopian romanticism, and it was sure to create more problems than it would solve; the paraphernalia of statehood, with power politics and the fundamental immorality attending it could not be reconciled with the spiritual vocation of Judaism.

It has become impossible to maintain the distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism since Auschwitz and since 1948, and the honest and thoughtful non-anti-Semitic anti-Zionists in the Western world realize it. I can recall a revealing conversation in a Cambridge (England) college in the late 1950s. My host, an eminent historian and devout Christian, summed up his feelings about Zionism by saying that it had become plain to all that the Zionist idea was a grievous error, and the British involvement with it a disastrous mistake. But—he went on with deep feeling and intense sincerity that were characteristic of the man—"the Jewish state has already come into being and it is there, and it is just unthinkable for the Christian world to let it go under." I believe it was the latter sentiment that made practically all Western nations recoil almost instinctively from the motion in the UN condemning Zionism as racism, and thereby undermining the very legitimacy, not to speak of the

moral case, of the State of Israel.

The word "Holocaust" does not signify only the physical fate of six million Jews, of a third of the Jewish people as they existed in 1939. It drives home the stark fact of the irretrievable and irreversible end of a vital and rich Jewish civilization spun over nearly 15 centuries throughout the lands of Central and Eastern Europe by closely knit, populous communities, with their peculiar ancient religion, culture, language, art, folkways, social-economic structures, self-governing institutions, values, aspirations and dreams. In comparison with that rich, dense and compact fabric of Jewish life, the contemporary Jewish settlements in the West present, with all their well-being, power, influence, freedom, great opportunities and cultural and social achievements, a picture of atomization and disintegration, of a paucity of authentically Jewish features and of growing assimilation. The sole heir and repository of the destroyed Jewish civilization is Israel.

Out of ignorance or out of propagandist zeal Arab spokesmen shrug all this off by wearisome repetition that the Jews are only a religious sect, descendants of an ethnic group or adherents of a philosophical system. An Israeli who since the Six Day War consistently opposed annexation of territories densely populated by Arabs and has fought tendencies in his own camp to refuse recognition to the Palestinian Arabs as an entity entitled to corporate self-expression free from alien rule, may claim the moral right to ask Arab writers to exercise a measure of intellectual integrity in this matter. If they justly resent others telling them that they are or are not a nation, they have no business to decide for others whether they are a nation or a religion. They cannot portray the Palestinian Arabs as a nation deserving the right of national self-determination, though historically they had never identified themselves as such nor ever possessed the attributes of distinct nationhood; and at the same time deny the same right to bearers of one of the oldest traditions of mankind in their ancestral home. The Jews were aroused in the last century to political nationalism under the stress of unparalleled persecution and in tune with the spirit of the modern age, which has been stirring nation after nation, tribe after tribe to the most remote confines of the earth to demand a place under the sun as a self-governing community.

Not only the Jews wherever they be, but the Christian world as a whole, with its awareness of the

J.L. Talmon is the author of *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy and Political Messianism*.

peculiarity of the Jewish phenomenon, its sense of obligation, duty and guilt toward the Jews, is acutely conscious of the fact that the destruction of the State of Israel would drive a knife into the very heart of Judaism not only by decimating, and—who knows—wiping out perhaps another three million Jews so soon after the Holocaust, but also by annihilating the last remnant of the integral historic Jewish civilization. The blow to world Jewry, its pride, faith in itself and in its future would prove too heavy for it to survive as an entity, just—as I hasten to add—a disaster befalling US Jewry would sound the doom of Israel. The fortunes of Israel and the diaspora are so linked that no wedge can be driven to separate them. The asymmetry between Israelis and Palestinians is in that respect so obvious that one hardly needs to argue that Arab civilization in the 22 independent states from the Atlantic to Iran, would not in any appreciable manner be damaged or adversely affected, even if not a single Arab were left on the West Bank of the Jordan (which no one advocates). Much criticism may be leveled against the past policies of the Israeli government—its muddle-headed, self-centered and self-righteous obtuseness to Arab susceptibilities, its obsession with security. But there never existed an unambiguous, firm resolve to keep all the territories, forever. The government of Israel lacked the conviction, the will and the courage to decide to annex the latter, but neither did it have the strength to make up its mind and declare itself outright against any annexation. There was the doctrinal and emotional commitment to the historic Jewish right to the whole of Eretz Israel. Settlement on the land was always held as being of the essence of Zionism. The names of ancient historic places exercised a magic fascination. Above all, there were the implacable Arab hostility, the fear of indefensible borders, and the reluctance to offer ammunition to the right-wingers. There were no particular pressures from outside, and an erroneous evaluation of Arab capacity and of the winds of change in the world at large had won wide acceptance. All these combined to foster the policies of immobilism, to encourage activists in and outside the establishment to take partisan action to create settlements, and to inhibit the authorities from resolutely setting their face against it. In giving in to pressure to establish settlements across the 1967 border in strategic points or on historic sites, the government allowed the image of "the creeping conquest" to strike roots in the Arab minds and to spread everywhere. Encouragement was thereby offered to extremists at home to demand a national decision in favor of the principle of total annexation.

There is no doubt that had the Arabs given the slightest token of a readiness to accept the existence of the State of Israel, the vast majority of Israelis, including those who harbor deep suspicions about Arab intentions as well as those who were finding it most difficult to "renounce" the Jewish rights to Hebron and

Nablus, would have opted with enthusiasm or out of a resigned sober assessment of the data of the situation—for withdrawal from most of the occupied territories. There are also just too many thoughtful Israelis, with memories of oppression, an anguished desire to safeguard Jewish identity and authenticity and with liberal convictions and temper to envisage with equanimity the specter of a Jewish master race forcing itself upon an alien, hostile, subject people constituting some 40 percent of the population, in an age of passionate, obsessive nationalism, and in the era of decolonization. I dare say no sophisticated Arab propagandist would expect that the slogan of a single, democratic, secular Palestinian state of Moslems, Christians and Jews would be taken seriously by world opinion, in the light of what has happened in Lebanon, and the fate of the Kurds and Assyrians.

Even if one discounts the bitter lessons of worldwide tensions and conflict between ethnic groups with different traditions, cultural background and social development living together, the panacea offered by the leaders of the PLO would still be totally at variance with what even the minimalists among Jews and the international community as a whole had envisaged Jewish settlement in the national home to be about: a refuge from persecution and a home for the Jewish genius to express itself in an integral manner.

I remember a conversation I had a year or two after the Six Day War with a highly cultivated Arab notable, who had a very colorful past. The man had taken the trouble to study Jewish history, the Zionist classics and even Hebrew, and he had become convinced that the feelings about their distinct collective identity were so deep in both communities that the only way of solving the conflict, healing the wounds and preventing endless misery in the future was to sever them. It is anguishing that a liberal historian of national movements feels, after 30 years of studying them, that it's necessary to endorse the view that in a world of nationalist obsession and egalitarian passion, separation was the most practical remedy for ethnic strife. Nor should the Arabs forget that an apocalyptic Day of Judgment would in all certainty mark not the doom of one side only, but that the other one would also be engulfed.

Men of good will on both sides should, bearing this in mind, try not to succumb, nor let others grow neurotic, under the shadow of a demonologized image of the adversary. They should also try as far as possible to spare the susceptibilities of the other side. While insisting on Arab recognition of Israel's existence, a good many Israelis would be ready not to press for an explicitness that may weigh too heavily on obsessively held principles in Arab nationalist philosophy. They would not for instance resent or begrudge to the Arabs the revised vision of their political theology, which puts its trust in time, internal difficulties, the growing indifference of the world and of the Jews across the

ocean, to bring within half a century or so the demise of that nonviable, alien little state in the heart of the Arab continent. And the Jews should do all they can not to let this happen.

Jews all over the world were incensed and deeply affronted by the condemnation of Zionism as racism. There was something horribly mean and spiteful in spokesmen of what is, in their language, always named "the noble Arab race" bamboozling representatives of states, born yesterday, without even a word in their native tongues to describe the Jew, without the vaguest knowledge or understanding of the peculiar and distant roots and the worldwide aspects of the Jewish problem and the Middle East conflict, without any authentic information on what is going on in present-day Israel. No less repulsive was the plotting with Machiavellian regimes, whose cynical opportunism knows no bounds, to brand as racists the most tragic victims of racism, for whom actually the very word had been coined, and upon whom it has been practiced most thoroughly.

After all, not so long ago the words anti-Semitism and racism were almost synonymous. In the European countries the Jews were almost the only representatives of an alien race. There were no Negroes, Chinese or Arabs there. The race theory gained its mass appeal only because those to whom it was being sold could apply it there and then to Jews. It is enough to try to define racism and to sort out its data to bring home how utterly alien it is to Zionist ideology and Jewish mentality, and indeed interests.

What is racism about? It signifies biological determinism. There was the primary ineffable and unfathomable datum of blood, which unalterably predetermined character, inclinations, reactions, ideas, beliefs, conduct to the most refined intellectual and artistic activity. "Pure" blood endowed its possessors—the race—with an unerring instinct, unreflecting self-assurance, a distinct style, and there was no more heinous thing than the mixing of different kinds of blood, especially of an inferior with a superior brand. It resulted in mongrelization, debility and degeneration. There was a Darwinian rivalry and struggle between the races for a portion of the cosmic life-force, for survival, self-assertion and power. In this eternal confrontation combative vitality was the supreme instrument, and its cultivation the highest task; and not the training of an abstract, universal intellect in order to discover objective universal truths, not moral education designed to foster a sense of justice and fairness to all. Preoccupation with allegedly universal, human, objective values had a debilitating effect on the prowess of the race, since it diluted its firm resolve and compact simplicity, and undermined its fighting self-concentration. The Jews were simultaneously insiders and outsiders, an anti-race with no roots in the soil, given wholly to abstract speculation. They were propagators of inter-

nationalism, of the idea of the equality of races, of liberalism, democracy and pacifism. They were the begetters of international systems such as capitalism and finance, and at the same time the prophets of cosmopolitan revolutionary ideologies such as socialism and of individualistic theories like psychoanalysis. They were therefore a most dangerous solvent and were a poisonous destroyer of race certainties and vigor. They fomented class cleavages, exploitation and struggles. They had always exploited the host race, and at the same time had from Moses to Lenin—in the language of Hitler—been inciting the mobs of inferior races against the national elites of the superior breeds, all that as part of an international plot to dominate and exploit the stultified and benumbed Nordic nations.

The insidious, eternal well-poisoner had to be severely segregated and eventually extirpated so that his blood and ideas no longer infected the superior breeds. What has all this got to do with Zionist theory or Israeli practice? Has any one seen in Israel notices of separate public lavatories or separate seats in public conveyances for Jews and Arabs? Are Arabs not admitted to schools and universities in Israel? Are mixed marriages forbidden there?

What does the much publicized absence of civil marriage, which incidentally irks all liberal Jews, really purport? It is a concession to the religious minority, for whom, like for members of most religious denominations, adherence to the rite of immemorial antiquity is a matter of conscience. But at a deeper level, the reluctant consent of the secular parties to the religious rules on civic status stems from the anguished, post-Auschwitz fear that as a result of the destruction of the cohesion of Jewish life in Central and Eastern Europe, the atomized, rapidly assimilating secularized Jewish communities, in which mixed marriages threaten to disrupt all that is left of the fabric of Jewish life, are left with the synagogue as the sole focus of group identity. The people of Israel, so desperately anxious for Jewish survival and unity, must not set a bad example by lowering the barriers and facilitating mixed marriages; so say the defenders of the status quo. Mixed marriages are not forbidden in Israel. It's just that no facilities are provided for them. But there are ways to have them solemnized. They are then legally recognized. The Law of Return is, again, motivated by an anxious desire to bring Jews in, and not by a resolve to keep others out.

Far be it from me to describe the Jewish-Arab coexistence in Israel as an idyll. How could it be, in face of the terrible clash of rights, decades of war, traumatic memories, mutual fear and suspicion? The policies and attitudes of Israel, however, will stand any comparison with the treatment of Poles by the Second Reich, of the Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians in inter-war Poland, the attitude of the kingdom of Hungary toward its Slav and Romanian subjects, the fate of the Irish under

British rule, not to speak of the situation of Jews in the countries of Eastern Europe—all cases of a dominant race set upon strengthening its hold, by methods which include settling members of its ethnic group in border areas inhabited by national minorities. Why has no one formally asked a UN commission to investigate the policies of the USSR in the Baltic countries designed to swamp those minorities with multitudes of Great Russians and members of other races, and to transfer large numbers of Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians into remote areas of Russia?

As to the right of Arab refugees to return, surely not many cases, indeed hardly any, could be cited of return of refugees whom an international or revolutionary cataclysm has sent flying. Where should we look for them? On the Indian sub-continent? In Central and Eastern Europe? In the vast expanse of Africa? The whole delicate and intricate fabric of life, into which nearly a million Jewish refugees from the Arab countries had been absorbed, would be destroyed by the come-back of the whole mass of Arab refugees.

The heart-searching and the malaise weighing upon many Israelis and voiced by them publicly on the Palestinian tragedy has no parallel whatsoever in the broodings or public statements of Arabs on the fate of the Jews and the causes that have led them to establish themselves in the Jewish National Home. It is a travesty of the truth to depict the Zionists as a band of imperialists who sat down to hatch a plot to conquer and dispossess an Arab nation, for the sheer love of power and spoils, out of unprovoked hatred for Arabs.

Zionism was motivated by a determination to escape the fate of being an eternal anvil to the blows of turbulent history, by a desire to find a safe refuge where the Jews could be themselves, free to express their particularity, away from the grave international, nationalist, social and revolutionary complications in which they had invariably been caught in modern times. They seem now to have landed in the very heart of the universal vortex, and to be compelled to act, to some extent at least, as instruments of grave dislocation to another people.

For 2000 years they were as a "Cain race" exposed to the never ending barrage of opprobrium and hostility of Christianity. No sooner had Auschwitz and the common interest in warding off the dangers of neo-paganism begun to grant some relief, than Judaism found itself under a ferocious assault by Islam, with the uncomprehending unfriendliness of races and creeds of the Third World, which lacked any of the background and experiences to make them understand, let alone sympathize, with the Zionist endeavor. Judaism was beset finally with the resentment of members of historically deprived ethnic groups, who envied the rapid Jewish success in the New World.

For generations it was axiomatically believed by Jews that there was no enemy on the left—the natural defender of all the oppressed and the persecuted. Being

part of a marginal, hard-pressed minority, inheriting the prophetic and the Messianic traditions together with the social and mental restlessness of town dwellers and migrants, turned many Jews into prophets, pioneers, leaders and practitioners of evolution. In the same almost Oedipal manner as happened at the time of the scission between the mother religion (Judaism) and the daughter religion (nascent Christianity) nearly 2000 years ago, the church of the religion of revolution has now risen against the people who were the begetters of their creed. The old myth of a Judeo-Marxist international plot has been substituted by the myth of an international Zionist-American-Imperialist conspiracy. It has come in response to the compulsive need to see the world divided into a camp of imperialists and a camp of peoples striving for national liberation.

In its terrible isolation, the state of Israel has become the old Jewish outlaw: the outcast, the collective Jew of the nations. A pariah people has, as it were, created a pariah state. The would-be imperialist has been reduced to beggary. It is now the barefoot nomads of the tents of Kedar who sit upon mountains of gold, hold the world to ransom through the possession of a treasure, one that fell into their lap without them having to hoe or spin, and for the life blood of the nations they are exacting a tribute, in comparison with which the old usury of the Jews appears a miserable pittance. Indeed, they seem determined to follow a set plan to dominate the heights of world economy.

At the opening session of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, the counsel for the defense, Dr. Servatius, asked the eminent Judaic scholar who was presenting the historical background of the Holocaust, what was the reason for the permanence and universality of the phenomenon of anti-Semitism? Surely, there must be something in the Jews that provoked such a reaction? Jews tend to become very angry when such a question is put, and a few years ago a British scholar, certainly no anti-Semite, got into trouble when he ventured to raise the point in a review of a book on anti-Semitism in the French Enlightenment.

It all started long, long ago. Hellenism and Rome succeeded in divesting all the conquered peoples, at least their urban elites, of their native languages and cultures. The Jews were the exception, because of their overpowering consciousness of being the sole trustees of a terrifying truth—the existence of a one, omnipotent, wholly transcendental, invisible god. In the Latinized or Hellenized Roman Empire the recalcitrant Jews came to stand out as a strange, queer, incomprehensible, and uncannily frightening breed. The facelessness of their god suggested that they had much to hide, their refusal to mix was proof of misanthropy, and their resistance to Caesar-worship manifested perverse rebelliousness. The Christianized gentiles were thus already disposed to view the crucifixion, the

rejection of Christ by the obnoxious people, in a predetermined way. The fact that all Apostles were Jews was almost ignored, but Judas Iscariot was remembered as the Jew *par excellence*. To the barbarian tribes that later overran the Roman Empire and established themselves upon its ruins, the Jews appeared as uncanny aliens, bearers of a much older and higher civilization, burdened with the murder of the Savior.

As highly problematic aliens, with no strong ties and no reputation to lose, the Jews chose or were driven by restrictive legislation into the less reputable occupations or into new ventures which the old established conservative populations were unequipped or reluctant to take up because of their novelty, their hazardous nature and their lack of that respectability which comes from sheer duration. Trade and then money-lending became almost exclusive Jewish occupations. The image of the usurer Shylock stuck to them. The Jews fulfilled a necessary and pioneering role in the urban life of the early Middle Ages. When they became expendable, and the host nations had overcome their early inhibitions and were ready and eager to take up the till then despised pursuits, the Jews were expelled from most of Western Europe. They established themselves in the Eastern underdeveloped part of the European continent as the nearly sole and at first welcome middle class, and in such countries as the wide flung Polish Republic and the Kingdom of Hungary as the major part of the urban population.

The emancipation of the Jews by victorious liberalism, the onset of secularization and capitalist industrialization came almost at the same time to the European continent. Together they released immense, bottled-up, volcanic forces of a purposeful race, which had for ages been compelled to practice an exceptionally severe economy of energy in the very restricted fields of religious observance, study of the law and money-making. The Jews seized the new opportunities with ferocious abandon. In some countries they made their leap at a strategically crucial moment, as modernization was put on the agenda, and the gentile population, gentry and peasantry, were not yet ready to join in the race. Bewildered, powerfully affected, often inconvenienced, in many cases deprived of old status and privileges, and even harmed and ruined by the flood of change, the gentile neighbors came to identify the whole process with the Jews, and to hold them responsible for it, since the newcomers seemed to be the greatest beneficiaries thereof. They felt offended by yesterday's pariah who had overnight grown so mighty, and too big for his boots. To the impoverished nobles and dispossessed peasants flocking to towns, the Jews, whom they found there, looked like invaders who had forestalled them. There ensued a tension and conflict that came to a climax in the Nazi campaign to drive the Jewish invaders back, and ended in Auschwitz. The same pattern may be detected in the

fortunes of the Jews under the Communist regimes. After centuries of Tsarist oppression and humiliation the Russian Jews had every reason to flock into the ranks of Revolutionaries. They played an enormous part in all the Socialist parties, being before 1917 actually more numerous in the Social Revolutionary and Menshevik factions than in the Bolshevik camp. When Lenin and his followers seized power, most Jews hesitated at first to join them, having like most Russians, grave doubts about their survival. The non-Jewish intelligentsia was unwilling to collaborate with the Bolshevik authorities. Jewish hesitations were soon swept away by the terrible pogroms which broke out in the areas held by the counterrevolutionary generals and the Ukrainian nationalists. So the Jews were again placed in the role of pioneers. At first, this was held to be irrelevant, since the proletarian revolution was supposed to recognize no distinction between Jew, Greek and Gentile. When, however, the Soviet-bred cadres of non-Jewish intelligentsia came up ready and eager to play their parts, and the great patriotic war revived Russian nationalism, the Jews began to appear too conspicuous and too ubiquitous in high places.

Similarly, at the end of World War II the Polish Jews had every reason to welcome the new regime. Pre-war Poland had been a hotbed of anti-Semitism. The Red Army had saved the remnants of Polish Jewry. A social revolution was altogether overdue in Eastern Europe. So while the majority of Poles resented Russian rule most bitterly, the Jews could be trusted by the Soviets and their Polish satellites. Twenty-odd years later a racist campaign was launched by the Polish Communist party, under the official slogan coined by a party theoretician that no self-respecting nation could tolerate such a disproportionate influence by a racially alien group. And this in a regime drawing its inspiration from such "foreigners" as Marx and Lenin.

Throughout the ages the Christian-Jewish relationship has been beset by a profound neurosis. The peculiar, indeed unique concatenation of historical circumstances never ceased to feed the conflict of feelings in the Christian psyche toward the Jew: awe, sense of obligation, resentful hatred, contempt, guilt. The gentiles were thus conditioned to react to the stimuli that the Jew projected with an intensity out of all proportion. It was not, in the final analysis, the nature of the stimulus; it was the neurotic disposition that somehow made the behavior and acts of the Jew appear as a caricature. Hence the utterly contradictory accusations with which Jews have been charged: they were clannish, and then they became too obtrusive; they were cringing and soon too arrogant; they were blamed for being superstitious and obscurantists, and then for being profaners of all ancient traditions and promoters of shoddy vanguardism. They stood condemned as capitalists, and at the same time were feared as revolutionaries. No doubt, the highly ambiguous

situation of the Jews, their being always exposed to some kind of blame, their existence, rights and character never being quite taken for granted as natural, obvious, the eternal fear of discrimination and persecution—all these shaped a nervous, neurotic, restless, furtive or self-assertive, at all events, an intense, exaggerated and shrill manner of responding.

Not so long ago an article in the London *Times* spoke of the paranoia of American Jews. The allegedly excessive touchiness of Jews has more than once evoked the reaction that the Jews were claiming exemptions from criticism, as if a single word of criticism was an expression of heinous anti-Semitism, and therefore inadmissible.

The Jews may exaggerate, but the reflex is far from being unjustified. Experience has shown again and again that not only was there something infectious in anti-Semitism, but that it belonged to that sort of emotion which makes one lose control, one's sense of proportion, which escalates, drags one down, unleashes uncontrollable dormant instincts: "the rush of blood." I was reminded of that, when I recently read a revealing passage by an attractive and humane British historian on his experiences in World War I. "Most men, I suppose, have a paleolithic savage somewhere in them. . . . I have, anyway. . . . that's the beastliest thing in war, the damnable frivolity. One's like a merry mischievous ape tearing up the image of god." What else could one say about the queer passion for destroying graves in Jewish cemeteries, or about the coarse, savage venom and spite, and the urge to sneer, insult and hurt displayed in anti-Semitic literature? At the end of the road is Auschwitz. In the Jewish reflex to criticism, and in the insistence to be spared it, there is therefore something of that which moves say the blacks and other traditionally underprivileged races in the US to claim compensating allowances for past deprivation, on top of formally equal opportunity in the present.

For generations, the Jewish question was haunting the world. The term has become "irrelevant" on the morrow of the Holocaust. Those to whom it had applied had ceased to exist. Instead, the State of Israel, which was meant to solve it, has become the problem child of the world. After displaying dazzling military valour which dumbfounded all those who had for ages been mocking Jewish cowardice, the people of Israel have found themselves in the situation of a ghetto of victors, a besieged city, an outcast nation.

Israel is caught between contradictory sentiments and commitments. It is yearning for peace. But it is confronted with an implacable enemy threatening total destruction; it is weighed down by the traumas of Munich and Auschwitz and fearful of the terrible risks involved in whatever alternative it finds the courage or is forced to choose. In a painful self-questioning mood, it is being challenged, goaded, prodded to hurry, to take the plunge into the unknown, to consent to the setting

up at its doorstep of a garrison state headed by a terrorist leadership flushed with success, driven by a feeling of being on the crest of the wave and on the way to total victory. In recent weeks, the Israel-Arab conflict has been powerfully affected by two sets of events of an utterly contradictory nature, and it is impossible to leave them out without any comment: the drama of Entebbe and the ghastly, to the outside world totally incomprehensible, happenings in the Lebanon.

The former—a tale of valor which caught the imagination of the world and will be celebrated for a long time in ballad, legend and film—has acted as a tonic to Israeli morale. But it is the Israeli doves who have special reasons to rejoice. Their orientation was all along based on two props: the assumption that the Arabs were deeply convinced of Israeli invincibility and the hope that, as a consequence, Israeli moderation and magnanimity may instill some realism into Arab thinking and a readiness to make a deal. The Yom Kippur war, the grave internal problems of Israel and the courting of the Arab states by the community of nations had created among the Arabs the conviction that Israel was on the run, disintegrating, disoriented and abandoned by all. That extraordinary feat of courage, ingenuity and organization is bound to make many Arabs pause and think, especially in the light of the butchery that is going on in the Lebanon, the incredible inter-Arab diplomatic somersaults, the sorry plight of the Palestinian refugees in the Lebanese camps, and the impasse and the defeats which threaten the PLO with strangulation from the hands of its patrons of yesterday.

The Arab leadership in the occupied territories may one of these days pick up courage to emancipate itself from the PLO and other outside agencies and organize itself to treat with the Israeli government, which on its part will then be duty bound to respond, with or without the concurrence of Jordan. In the meantime, Israel will still be scolded for its dithering behavior, for interfering directly or through its desperately anxious brethren in the diaspora, with the policies of the great powers, for endangering their interests, meddling in their internal party politics—an unheard of thing in the United States. It is threatened with the spectre of a new wave of anti-Semitism, bullied with hints about dual loyalty, when all it wants is, after all, just to stay alive, afloat and tolerably safe, free to contribute in its own way to the wonderfully knit tapestry of world civilization and humanity's quest for a just society.

Even when all allowances are made for the part which irresolute and misguided behavior, unwise and rash pronouncements by Israeli politicians may have played in alienating sympathy, there still remains the fundamental truth that somehow the Jewish right to live and to exist on a basis of genuine equality, as a right, and not on sufferance or in return for some special excellence, is not yet taken for granted as natural and obvious by the world.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date August 8, 1980
 to David Harris
 from Milton Ellerin:
 subject Consultation on Anti-Semitism

In response to your request for comment or suggestions on the draft material prepared by Prof. Hyman I agree in part with Sam Rabinove's observation that this is "likely to be much too academic."

Quite apart from Sam's fears, the agenda as set forth by Prof. Hyman is simply too full to be accomplished in one week much less one day.

Consider: The participants are asked to

- 1) Share information on the nature and extent of anti-Semitism in the United States.
- 2) Share information on the state of analysis of anti-Semitism.
- 3) Develop a working definition of anti-Semitism.
- 4) Explore the way in which anti-Semitism can be injected into political conflict as well as the purpose of such manipulation.
- 5) Locate areas of potential group tension and anti-Semitic activity.
- 6) Devise a preliminary resolution agenda of a study of anti-Semitism.
- 7) Assess the use of appropriate utilization in earlier studies on anti-Semitism.
- 8) To consider both the types and subjects of research which would expand our understanding of anti-Semitism in America.

Obviously all of the above are fascinating and important subjects to explore, but in one day?

It seems to me that within the limited allocated time frame we could best devote our time to an assessment of the current status of anti-Semitism along the lines of our previous discussions -- Perceptions vs. Realities. Additionally, it would be helpful to explore if there is a need for new and broader definitions of anti-Semitism (attacks on Israel, attacks on Zionism, etc.).

Finally, as Sam suggested, some discussion on how anti-Semitism can be most effectively combatted should be included.

ME:mp

cc: Bert Gold
 Milton Himmelfarb
 Selma Hirsh
 Irving Levine

Geraldine Rosenfield
 Seymour Samet
 Phyllis Sherman
 John Slawson
 ✓ Marc Tanenbaum

NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR RELEASE ON RECEIPT

NEW YORK, Nov. 26. . . A group of well-known social scientists participating in an all-day consultation on anti-Semitism at the headquarters of the American Jewish Committee, have called for more intensive research into the history, politics and psychology of religious hatred.

One leading Jewish historian -- Professor Ismar Schorsch, of the Jewish Theological Seminary -- stated that while the Holocaust could never be forgotten, constant preoccupation with its horrors has helped create the impression that the history of the Jews was one of unrelieved misfortune instead of a series of ups and downs.

One understandable effect of the Holocaust, Professor Schorsch said, was that Jews "had come to see enemies everywhere," thus warping their relationships with other groups.

Commenting on the need for continued research into the root causes of anti-Semitism, several of those present felt that research, however skilled, must be supplemented by other investigatory procedures. Without these, they thought, a number of gaps in their knowledge of the development of anti-Semitism would remain unfilled.

Wherever anti-Semitism had constituted a powerful threat to Jews, the conferees agreed, it had been "institutionalized," that is, it had acquired governmental approval. The United States was different from a number of other nations, it was said, because there had never been such institutionalization here of anti-Semitism.

The failure of anti-Semitism to gain a firm foothold in the United States, it was believed, was one of the matters requiring further analysis and it was felt that there was also a need to study the "international-

-- more --

Maynard I. Wishner, President; Howard I. Friedman, Chairman, Board of Governors; Theodore Ellenoff, Chairman, National Executive Council; Gerard Weinstock, Chairman, Board of Trustees.

Bertram H. Gold, Executive Vice President

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ization" of anti-Semitism and its implications for domestic conflict in the United States.

Several of the participants felt there has been a shift from group conflict to localized, more or less isolated expressions of anti-Semitism, at least in the United States. They stressed the importance of paying sufficient attention to elements that seem to resist pluralism in American society.

There should also, it was agreed, be further exploration of the conditions under which anti-Semitism finds "crucial expression," and into the relationship between social conflict and anti-Semitism. It was important to "ask the right questions" and not be distracted by largely irrelevant if sometimes dramatic events.

The group was welcomed by Maynard I. Wishner, President of the American Jewish Committee. Paula Hyman, of the Department of History at Columbia University, acted as chairperson. The following were the formal presentations on which the discussions were based:

American Anti-Semitism: The Comparative Historical Context.

Professor Michael Dobkowski, Department of Religious Studies, Hobart & William Smith College.

Updating the Polls. William Schneider, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Holocaust Consciousness and the Study of Anti-Semitism. Professor Ismar Schorsch, Jewish Theological Seminary.

When is Political Conflict Anti-Semitism? Professor Stephen P. Cohen, Department of Social Psychology, Graduate Center, CUNY.

Founded in 1906, the American Jewish Committee is this country's pioneer human relations organization. It combats bigotry, protects the civil and religious rights of Jews at home and abroad, and seeks improved human relations for all people everywhere.

(See attached sheet for participants).

Morris Abram
Honorary President, AJC

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Yankelovich Skelly & White

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City University Graduate
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Naomi Cohen
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Maynard Wishner
President, AJC



Harvard University Committee on Degrees in Social Studies

October 16, 1980

Mr. Milton Himmelfarb
American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th St.
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Himmelfarb:

I recently wrote an article on anti-Semitism in West Germany since 1945, which I wanted to make available to your organization (it has already been published). Marty Lipset suggested to me that I contact you, Marc Tannenbaum, and Bert Gold; and I have enclosed copies for each of you--would you mind passing the other two on? If you would like to excerpt it for a newsletter or use information from it for talks, etc., I hope you will feel free (assuming, of course, you only attribute my own conclusions to me).

I would be interested in pursuing this subject in a more comparative framework in the medium future (I must finish my dissertation first, which will probably take the rest of the academic year). In particular, I have been thinking of comparing anti-Semitism in West Germany with that in Austria, France (especially in the light of the recent events, although I had already been thinking of this case), and the U.S. Does the AJC support such work, or do you know where I might inquire, aside from the standard social sciences sources or the ADL? I would follow roughly the same methodology as in the enclosed piece and use opinion surveys.

I hope you find this piece useful, and I would be interested to know what you think of it and if you have any criticisms which I could incorporate into future work.

Sincerely,

Frederick Weil

Frederick D. Weil
Lecturer

The Imperfectly Mastered Past:
Anti-Semitism in West Germany since the Holocaust

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

(to be published in the
New German Critique,
number 20, [1980])

(This version includes tables not
in the published text.)

by
Frederick D. Weil
Harvard University

While it is probably still correct to insist that the Nazi murder of European Jews, the Holocaust, is unique in the history of man's cruelty to man, one has a disturbing sense that it may not remain so--rather, that it may become a typical form of reaction by a society at a particular stage of development to a particular kind of crisis. One's natural reaction to this suspicion is to inquire into the conditions which permit this kind of tragedy and into the measures which help to inhibit its occurrence. One obvious way to approach an understanding here is to ask what the Germans themselves have learned from this crime. The broadcast of the American television program, "The Holocaust," in Germany provides an appropriate occasion for reflection,¹ and the special issue of the New German Critique on this topic (Number 19, Winter 1980) contained a number of excellent articles analyzing the German response. However, it struck me that while most of the accounts of the German public reaction were historically oriented, there was little attempt made to trace the concrete historical development of post-war mass public

1. I happened to be spending a year doing research in West Germany on the development of political tolerance there since World War II when the program was shown there. I therefore had a chance to read some of the newspaper accounts of the German public's reaction to the program and to talk informally with German and German-Jewish friends; and I also was there to see and participate in memorials to the fortieth anniversary of the Reichskristallnacht Nazi pogrom, to see some of the latest films from the so-called "Hitler-wave," and to follow the debates about the statute of limitations for war crimes and murder (as well as the Berufsverbot and the anti-terrorist measures). Since I experienced all these things in a rather impressionistic way, I was very glad to be able to read several of the accounts in the New German Critique which brought much of the scattered material together and which reported on debates which I missed.

opinion. My own research has been limited mainly to questions of political- rather than ethnic or racial tolerance, but anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism cannot be entirely ignored in considering German liberalism--any more than in considering American. I therefore felt I might be able to contribute to the discussion begun in the New German Critique by adding a slightly different perspective and by deepening the concrete historical context.

In particular, I would like (a) to discuss the question of the attitude of anti-Semitism in Germany, which is not the same as the question of its effects, (b) to suggest, in a non-comprehensive way, how and when these attitudes become radically dangerous, (c) to make some observations about the post-war development and likely outlook for anti-Semitism and ethnic prejudice in Germany, and (d) to place the effects of the television program into a longer-term perspective. Without trying to anticipate it entirely, the argument made here may be expressed in several theses:

(a) Anti-Semitism was severe in pre-Nazi Germany, but it was not as severe as that in Eastern Europe nor much more severe than in the United States at the same time. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Holocaust was the "logical" outcome of German anti-Semitism, even in the crisis of the 1930s. Moishe Postone gives a provocative analysis in the New German Critique of the function which anti-Semitism empirically played in National Socialist propaganda; but--given the social, religious, and ethnic heterogeneity of Germany, even at that time, and the German middle class' proven susceptibility to accepting Slavs, workers

and socialists, and Catholics as scapegoats for intractable problems of social development--it seems unlikely that Jews could have been the only possible scapegoats.²

(b) Social and economic anti-Jewish prejudice is a seemingly universal phenomenon where there are Jewish populations, but it does not generally become radically dangerous for Jews unless it becomes "politicized," that is, attached to a radically anti-Semitic political movement: and the more successful the movement, the more radically dangerous for the Jews. However, there is no necessary correspondence between the success of such a movement and the importance to it of its anti-Semitic doctrines: the Nazi rise is largely explicable without reference to their anti-Semitism. (This is not the same as saying that their anti-Semitism was "unimportant"--it is arguably the most "important" thing about the Nazis.)

(c) We will see that popular anti-Semitism has largely declined in West Germany since the war (as it also has in the United States) and, everything else being equal, it may very well continue to decline. The most reassuring aspect, from the point of view developed here, is the virtual disappearance of anti-Semitic political movements, for reasons which have very little

2. One may also profitably compare American nativism and bigotry as a reaction to many of the same socioeconomic and developmental strains from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries: America, of course, had a number of "safety valves" not available to Germany. Cf. S.M. Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason; Higham, Strangers in the Land. With regard to the "scapegoat" function of anti-Semitism, see Eva Reichmann's distinction between objective and subjective anti-Semitism: Hostages of Civilization (Boston, 1951).

to do with social and economic anti-Semitic prejudice. On the other hand, ethnic prejudice remains, and (1) anti-Semitism remains more severe in Germany than in the United States, and (2) it also has significantly new objects in the foreign Guest Workers, especially the Turks.

(d) Markovits and Hayden are probably correct when they write in the New German Critique that the TV program's effects on public opinion will be short-lived; this is almost always the case with such "events" (and, of course, it is simply too soon to talk about long-term effects). However, an inspection not only of the long-term trends up to now but also of their structural roots will allow us to say whether the time was ripe for such a posited catalytic effect: to some extent it was.

The Holocaust and the Politics of Radical Anti-Semitism

There seems little doubt that the Holocaust was the greatest of the Nazi crimes as well as the greatest tragedy to befall Jews in millenia of anti-Semitism. The causes, particulars, and effects of the Holocaust cannot be examined adequately here; but working backward historically from the mass murders, one may make several observations. (1) During wartime Nazi totalitarianism, under conditions of a state of siege with all effective centers of opposition neutralized or suppressed, it would have been extremely difficult for even Germans of good will to prevent mass murders of defenseless civilians outside German borders or in isolated death camps; but if it had not been for widespread moral indifference (or at worst, active support), even passive

resistance among an unorganized, if sizable, minority might have hindered deportations, interfered with mechanisms of execution which required widespread coordination, or at least forced the regime to concentrate only on strictly military wartime activity.

(2) The same is even truer during the period of Nazi consolidation of power. At the beginning, there was still some organization available; and later, during the process of Gleichschaltung (coordination), some of the organizations--especially those like the churches, which were only neutralized but not fully suppressed--might have made it a condition of their coordination to resist politically and militarily "needless" discrimination, if there had been popular support for such moves. (3) The Nazi achievement of mass support is largely explicable without reference to their anti-Semitic ideological elements,³ although this ideology was undoubtedly important for the hard-core center which provided sustaining energy through difficult periods. But it is nevertheless important to note the susceptibility of large numbers of Germans to the use of anti-Semitism as a scapegoat in dealing with the social and economic displacement which occurred in the process of industrialization and modernization, especially in the crisis of the 1930s. (4) Although political anti-Semitism served the same scapegoat function among some segments of the German population at least since the last third of the nineteenth

3. See M. Rainer Lepsius' short but comprehensive account of the collapse of democracy in Germany, "From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and National Socialist Takeover: Germany," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe (Baltimore, 1978), pp. 34-79. Also cf. Reichmann.

century--and flared up during the political and economic crises of 1873-95, 1918-23, and 1930-33--it never achieved any notable political success (either in mass support or in legislation) until it became attached to a successful, radically antidemocratic mass movement.⁴

Thus, although anti-Semitism was not as virulent in Germany at this time as it was in Eastern Europe, and although the existing anti-Semitism did not in itself imply the death camps, a serious but not extreme social intolerance was magnified to tragic proportions by extreme political intolerance (a) because a successful antidemocratic mass movement which incorporated radical anti-Semitism as one (but not the only, however one may debate it) of its positions came to power; but also (b) because popular resistance was lacking to prevent the radical enactment of this program, which was not essential for the siezing or holding of power and could presumably have been prevented by a population with enough moral will to draw this line. If this analysis is correct, then our priorities in examining post-Nazi German anti-Semitism must be to concentrate first on the political realm and what shapes it, and only second on the less malignant social and economic ethnocentric prejudices.

Although we have insisted on the priority of the political realm, the study of German political culture since 1945 is too large an undertaking in the present context for us to do more than highlight a couple of factors.⁵ We may proceed from the less

4. Cf. Karl D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship (New York, Praeger: 1970), pp. 34-45, 420-44.

to the more profound.

(a) Most Germans have accepted reality. There is almost no public support for a revival of National Socialism, at least in its old colors. When asked, "Suppose a new National Socialist party tried to come to power; what would you do?" 13 percent of the respondents to a national survey in 1953 still said they would greet it and an additional 20 percent were indifferent; but when the same question was repeated in 1977, only 7 percent said they would greet it and 14 percent said they would not care.⁶ However, about a quarter or a third of the population still refuse to find the historical Nazi regime all bad, although there is a long-term trend toward rejection. In 1945 and 1946, 47 percent of German respondents in the American zone of occupation agreed that "National Socialism was a good idea badly carried out;" in 1947 and 1948, the figure rose to 55 percent, about where it remained until 1968 (for the whole nation); but by 1977 the number agreeing dropped to 26 percent. Likewise, 38 percent

5. The best accounts from fifteen to twenty years ago--which are also the best known--are now dated: Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963), and Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (Garden City, 1967 [1965]); the best recent account of a changed German political culture is David Conradt, "Changing German Political Culture," in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston, 1980).

6. Institut fuer Demoskopie, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung V: 1968-1973 (Allensbach, 1974), p. 231; David P. Conradt, The German Polity (New York, 1978), p. 49. (The Jahrbuecher will hereafter be referred to in this form: IfD V.) The figures in the Jahrbuch should be compared to those presented for a similar question in France by Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, Reequilibration (Baltimore, 1978), p. 122: the French gave far less support to their democratic institutions in 1958 than did the Germans in the same year.

of the Germans asked in a 1964 survey denied that the National Socialist state was "an unjust state [Unrechtstaat], a criminal regime [Verbrecherregime]," but this figure dropped to 24 percent in 1978. Significantly, the "Holocaust" TV program had virtually no effect on either of these two questions: in surveys conducted about a month after the telecast, support for National Socialism rose four percentage points for the former question and one point for the latter (that is, no real change).⁷

The same long-term trends are observable regarding the post World War II international settlement. As many as 71 percent of Germans in the American zone of occupation in 1946 believed that Germany might be reunified in the near future; thirty years, a cold war, and an Ostpolitik later in 1976, only 13 percent expected a speedy reunification. West Germans also gave up hope that the former German lands now east of East Germany (east of the Oder-Neisse line) would one day be returned to Germany: in 1953, 66 percent believed they would be returned, but by 1970 only 11 percent thought so. Indeed, with the coming of Brandt's Ostpolitik and the general thaw in East-West relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, large majorities became willing to

7. Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany (hereafter, OMGUS), cited in Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, the OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949 (Urbana, University of Illinois Press: 1970), p. 33; Max Kaase, "Demokratische Einstellungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Rudolf Wildenmann, ed., Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch fuer Politik, vol. 2 (Guenter Olzog Verlag, Munich: 1971), question 1232; Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim, reported in Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland (List Verlag, Munich: 1979), p. 334; IfD Reports; Der Spiegel 19 (1979), p. 205.

formalize the international status quo by recognizing the existing borders: support for recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the (East) German-Polish border and of the German Democratic Republic itself both rose from about one West German in ten in the 1950s to two out of every three in the early 1970s. It is probable that this turning away from "national" problems greatly helped open the way for Germans to turn their attention to their "social" problems.⁸

(b) Most Germans have come to accept the Nazis' responsibility for committing war crimes, but most do not accept any theory of collective guilt. Thus, the opinion that Germany alone was responsible for starting World War II rose from 32 percent in 1951 to 62 percent in 1967, and we saw earlier that a rising majority from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s were willing to call the Nazi regime a criminal regime. Rising numbers of Germans were also aware that this was their image in the world, but since the late 1960s, this perception has begun to decline. A survey organization asked the open-ended question, "One often hears that the Germans are unloved in the world. Why do you think this is so?" In 1955, only 13 percent of the respondents volunteered the opinion that it was due to the Nazis and the second world war; this answer was eventually given by 38 percent

8. These are, of course, the two aspects of the classical "German Question;" cf. A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History, (New York, Capricorn: 1962), p. 9; Dahrendorf, p. 426. For another analysis of the German Question and a great deal of public opinion data, including much cited in this paragraph, see Gebhard Schweigler, National Consciousness in Divided Germany (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications: 1975), pp. 150, 156, 169. Also see IfD V, pp. 510, 525; Merritt and Merritt, p. 24; Conradt (1980), Table VII.3.

of those asked in 1969; but the opinion declined to 27 percent by 1975.⁹ However, again until the late 1960s, a growing majority of Germans came to favor "drawing a line" (Schlussstrich ziehen) on the past and enforcing a statute of limitations on war crimes--the numbers rose from 34 percent in 1958 to 67 percent in 1969--but from then, opinion began to level off or even reverse, falling slightly to 62 percent by 1978. It seems that the television program, "The Holocaust" reinforced this trend, for public opinion changed twelve points in three months, dropping to 50 percent in 1979 in favor of retaining a statute of limitations.¹⁰

(c) An overwhelming majority of Germans has come to support the Bonn democracy; and smaller, but rising numbers of Germans also support civil liberties in concrete cases. Neo-fascist parties have only once attained more than 2 percent of the vote in a national election since 1945 (4 percent in 1969), and communist parties have not attained more than 2 percent of the vote since 1949, when they received 6 percent; and voting turnout has risen from just under 80 percent in the first federal elections in 1949 to stabilize at over 90 percent in the last several elections.

9. IfD IV, p. 146; IfD I, p. 125; IfD II, p. 138; IfD III, p. 260; IfD V, p. 221; IfD VI, p. 56.

10. IfD III, p. 221; IfD IV, p. 165; IfD V, p. 232; Survey numbers 3062, 3065. Markovits and Hayden report a larger change in their article in the New German Critique, but the survey they refer to was conducted more immediately after the program than that reported here. This is the only question for which the telecast seems to have had this magnitude effect; moreover, since the Parliament voted several months later to lift the statute of limitations, and permit war criminals to continue to be brought to trial, the program's effect on this issue may have been very great indeed, even if it only encouraged an already existing opinion trend.

Of course, voting statistics are not good measures of "deep" democratic beliefs, but they do indicate a high level of popular legitimation. More revealing have been answers to survey questions of this sort: "Do you think it is better for a country to have ONE party in order to have the greatest possible unity, or SEVERAL parties so that the different opinions can be freely represented?" In 1950 only 53 percent chose a multiparty system and a full 24 percent said "one party," while in 1979 the democratic alternative received 90 percent support and only 4 percent said "one party." Support for the present constitution also rose from 30 percent in 1955 to 70 percent in 1978.¹¹

Respect for civil liberties has also grown, but to a lesser extent. Thus, in answer to the abstract question, "which of the four freedoms do you personally consider most important--freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from fear, or freedom from want?" the number saying "freedom of speech" rose from 26 percent in 1949 to 58 percent in 1970; and concrete tolerance for a communist party's right to exist rose from 34 percent in 1950 (after dropping to 28 percent in 1957, during the period when the German Communist Party was banned) to 45 percent in 1979. Indeed, by the 1970s, Germans were expressing higher levels of political tolerance in opinion surveys than were Americans in allowing a range of unpopular nonconformists to speak publicly (an atheist, a communist, a neo-Nazi).¹²

11. IfD Jahrbuecher and Reports; 1979 ZUMABUS survey, Mannheim; Schweigler, p. 197.

12. EMNID, cited in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, The Governments of Germany (New York, Crowell: 1970), p. 105; IfD I: 272-3; IfD

This short excursus is not meant to be comprehensive, nor does it examine the root causes of democratization and liberalization, but it should serve to indicate that West Germany has moved largely into the liberal democratic camp. Indeed, Germans have not repudiated the Nazi past to an extent which an outside observer might think fit, but on the other hand, they have begun to accumulate the backlog of democratic tradition which is often thought to have prevented several older democracies from collapsing in the Great Depression.

Trends in Popular Anti-Semitism in Post-Nazi West Germany

Two factors must, above all, be taken into consideration in interpreting responses to opinion survey questions concerning anti-Semitism. First, there are very few Jews left in Germany. While the Jewish population before 1933 was greater than 500,000, since the war there have been only about 20,000 to 30,000 Jews living in Germany (with a population above 60 million), and half of them live in West Berlin. The natural consequence is that very few gentile Germans know Jews, and this number is declining. In 1949, only 25 percent of Germans said they had never known a Jew, but of the remaining 75 percent who (had) had Jewish acquaintances, only 13 percent met them since 1939, and a mere 8 percent since 1945. By 1974, fully two-thirds (68 percent) of the German population seems never to have met a Jew.¹³ Secondly,

III: 455; IfD V: 320; Frederick D. Weil, "Tolerance of Free Speech in the United States and West Germany, 1970-79," paper presented to the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, August 27-31, 1980, New York City.

13. IfD I: 128; Herbert A. Sallen, Zum Antisemitismus in der

anti-Semitism is by no means officially legitimated, and laws have been proposed which would levy a fine or prison sentence for publicly making anti-Semitic remarks or committing anti-Semitic acts in Germany: virtually all anti-Semitism must now exist as an informal undercurrent. Therefore, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that anti-Jewish prejudice in Germany since 1945 is a paradox; for it exists without public anti-Semites and without Jews.

As Figure 1 shows, most elements of ethnocentrism in general, and anti-Semitism in particular, have steadily declined in West Germany since the early 1950s, although there is a slight indication that it may have risen in the early 1990s. Thus, the proportion of Germans who believed that Germans are, or are for the most part, "more capable and gifted than other peoples" declined from 60 percent in 1955 to between 38 and 45 percent in the mid-1960s, but it seems to have risen again to 49 percent in 1976. And the opinion trend on "abstract" anti-Semitism seems similar. For example, Germans' perceptions of anti-Semitism in Germany have for the most part declined over a long period. In 1949, 68 percent of the population thought anti-Semitism was the same or worse than in 1945 (32 percent thought it had eased); this figure rose to 76 percent in 1952 (as against 24 percent who saw a decline in prejudice); but in 1974, the population split 50-50 in saying that anti-Semitism was either at least as bad, or better, than a few years before.¹⁴ A similar rise in anti-

Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1977), p. 284.

14. There was a change in question wording, which may have made a

Semitism in the early 1950s can be seen in the open question, "what is your overall view of Jews;" for in 1949, 23 percent of the respondents made spontaneously anti-Semitic remarks (47 percent tolerant or philo-semitic), while in 1952, 34 percent of the responses were anti-Semitic (30 percent tolerant or philo-semitic). And the same decline in anti-Semitism from the 1950s on can be seen in the general question, "would you say that Germany is better off without Jews": the 1952 response was almost the same as in the previous question--38 percent thought Germany was better off without Jews--but anti-Semitic responses declined steadily till the mid-1960s to 19 percent in 1965; since then the question seems not to have been repeated. It is very difficult to draw from these data, or from the more specific questions reported below, a firm "level of anti-Semitism,"¹⁵ but it does seem clear that there has been a long-term, moderate decline in prejudice.

As we turn to questions on more specific or concrete aspects of anti-Semitism, it will be useful to recall the distinction made earlier between social and economic anti-Semitism on the one hand and political anti-Semitism on the other hand; anti-Zionism, however, while also a political opinion, is not identical to

difference: the respondent was always asked to compare the present to the recent past, but in 1949-52 the recent past was identified as 1945, the date of the Nazi defeat. This factor may have had a suppressing effect: If the 1974 reference had also been to 1945, one might expect--if all the population had such long memories--a more dramatic change registered. IfD IV, p. 154; VII, p. 56. IfD I, p. 128; Sallen, question 100.

15. IfD I, p. 128; IV, p. 96. Cf. also OMGUS data for the American zone in 1947 and 1948; Report nos. 49 and 122.

political anti-Semitism. For a number of these questions, parallel questions exist which allow us to compare anti-Semitism in Germany with anti-Semitism in the United States and with other forms of ethnocentrism in Germany.

The simplest and most direct expression of political anti-Semitism is the opinion that Jews or Jewish organizations exercise too great an influence on national politics (see Table 1 and Figure 1). A very small and declining proportion of Germans have said that the Federation of Jews in Germany has too much political influence (from 13 percent in 1966 to 6 percent in 1971), and only 18 percent said in 1974 that Jews in general had too much political influence. This question was always asked with a list of potentially overly-influential groups, and Jews were virtually always perceived as the least or almost least objectionable (the trade unions were most often seen as too powerful). Very similar results were obtained in 1965 from a sample of elites (100 each doctors, lawyers, Catholic clergy, and Protestant clergy): 11 percent of the combined sample responded that the Federation of Jews in Germany had too much political influence; but very significantly, 16 percent of the doctors and 18 percent of the lawyers, as against only 3 percent of the Catholic- and 6 percent of the Protestant clergy, gave this anti-Semitic response.¹⁶ One cannot, of course, extrapolate the opinions of the political elites from these figures, but considering that the clergy may have an interest in saying that another religion does not have too much influence, the fact that other elites are more anti-

16. IfD IV: 174, 337; V, p. 217; Sallen, question 39.

Semitic than the general population does not bode well for German political culture.¹⁷

When this question has been asked the same way in the United States (since 1975), Jews have also been near the bottom of the list, but in comparison with Germany, they were seen much more often as too influential: 37 percent said "too influential" in 1975, 26 percent in 1976, and 19 percent in 1977. However, when the question was asked in the U.S. without a comparative list, the "too influential" response dropped from nearly half the population in the late 1930s (after rising to well over half in the mid-1940s) to 17 percent in 1962 and 11 percent in 1964. The careful reader will notice that the highest figures since World War II come during the post-1974 economic squeeze caused by rising oil prices, but that otherwise the levels of political anti-Semitism measured this way are about the same in the two countries--perhaps a little lower in Germany. Two cautionary observations must be made in interpreting these results: (a) other evidence from the U.S. indicates that neither Jews nor Israel were seen as the chief causes of America's economic or political problems connected with the oil price rise--rather, the oil companies, the Arab nations, and the President were held mainly responsible--but large numbers did believe that Jews and Zionist organizations were among the groups with too much influence on American Middle Eastern policy;¹⁸ and (b) as we noted

17. Cf. Dahrendorf on the conservatism of the law profession in Germany, 1965: 221-36; cf. Klaus von Beyme, Die politische Elite in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Piper, Munich: 1971).

above, the slightly lower levels of political anti-Semitism in Germany on this measure may simply reflect the fact that there are so few Jews living there, especially as compared to America. The second factor can, of course, cut both ways, for on the other available measure of political anti-Semitism available for both countries, the results are strongly reversed. In the United States since the War, between 70 and 80 percent of the respondents declared themselves willing to vote for a Jewish candidate for President if nominated by their own party; but in Germany in the same period (a survey in 1960), only 31 percent were willing to vote for a Jew in their own party, less than half the American figures.¹⁹ This second question may in some ways be a better measure of political anti-Semitism since it requires less estimation of an empirical fact and asks only for a political judgment: if this is so, then political anti-Semitism may be much higher in Germany than in the U.S.

German opinions on politically motivated crimes against the Jews have followed much the same trends as opinions on National Socialism (see above): the crimes have become increasingly delegitimated but the guilt, or its consequences, has been more and more rejected. The Institut fuer Demoskopie asked several questions in 1949, four years after the fall of the Nazi regime,

18. Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, "Anti-Semitism and Israel: A Report on American Public Opinion" (manuscript, December 1978), 12, 14, 15, 21. Also cf. Charles Herbert Stember, "The Recent History of Public Attitudes," in Stember, et al., Jews in the Mind of America (New York, Basic Books: 1966), pp. 31-234, esp. p. 121.

19. Lipset and Schneider, p. 13; IfD III, p. 218.

about the effects of National Socialist ideology and policy regarding the Jews. At that time, misinformation about the fate of the Jews was quite high despite the revelations of the closely-followed Nuernberg War-Crimes trials. 65 percent of the respondents had no idea how many Jews were then (in 1949) left in Germany, and an additional 20 percent guessed the wrong answer.²⁰ Furthermore, only 30 percent of the 1949 respondents believed that most Jews in Nazi Germany had been killed; 30 percent thought most had emigrated and an additional 34 percent claimed not to know what happened to them. Most respondents (65 percent) also believed that Nazi propaganda had been effective in intensifying anti-Semitic feelings in Germany, but much smaller numbers were willing to admit that they themselves had been so affected: 21 percent said they were sympathetic to this propaganda (52 percent were indifferent, and 27 percent found it "repugnant") and only 7 percent reported reacting favorably to seeing Jews wearing yellow Stars of David (27 percent were indifferent or claimed not to have seen it, and 50 percent found the sight bad).²¹

Twelve years later in 1961, a number of surveys were conducted during the trial of Adolf Eichmann, who was condemned to death by an Israeli court for mass murder. While 67 percent of

20. In 1974, the overall rate of misinformation remained roughly constant at 79 percent; but only 5 percent had no idea, and just under half made a close or correct estimate; Sallen, 1977: 277.

21. IfD I: 129-30. These latter questions have not, so far as I am aware, been asked again since 1949; but even if they had been, demographic turnover in the population and the effects of time on memory would have made interpretation of responses problematical.

the Germans surveyed favored the death sentence or life at hard labor (as against 15 percent who urged consideration of mitigating circumstances), majorities also agreed with these opinions in connection with the trial: "I personally had nothing to do with it and don't want to hear anything more about it" (59 percent; 28 percent disagreed), "it would be best to forget about this affair and to concern ourselves exclusively with the present and future" (53 percent; 33 percent disagreed), and "I think one should defend the German people in this affair, and not just offer apologies; many people knew nothing of it" (72 percent, 11 percent disagreed).²² Likewise, 88 percent of the respondents to a 1961 survey answered "no" to the question, whether "you as a German feel at all guilty [mitschuldig] for the extermination of the Jews," and only 8 percent acknowledged any sense of collective guilt at all.²³ However, large majorities have maintained that many Germans did not know at the time what was happening to the Jews--72 percent in 1961 and 77 percent in 1979.²⁴

As noted above, it was proposed to make it a crime in Germany to make anti-Semitic remarks publicly or to engage in anti-Semitic activity. Such laws, of course, would not set an unequivocal standard of liberalism--American laws, for instance, are not proscriptive in this respect, but rather prohibit

22. IfD III: 225, 227.

23. IfD III, p. 227. Shortly before the "Holocaust" TV program, 16 percent felt that all Germans who were adults at the time of the Third Reich bore some kind of guilt; after the film, this figure rose slightly to 22 percent: see Markovits and Hayden, p. 68.

24. IfD III: 229; Survey no. 3065.

discrimination or vandalism or violence against persons, for the most part blind to the characteristics of the victim--but popular opinion on obedience to such laws could be taken as a rough measure of attitudes on political anti-Semitic crimes. In 1949 and 1958 the IfD asked whether "persons who commit anti-Semitic actions in Germany today should be punished by a court or not," and the proportion answering "yes" rose from 41 to 46 percent in this period; two years later in 1960 the same question, with the word "anti-Semitic" changed to "anti-Jewish" (judenfeindlich), drew a response of 78 percent saying that crimes against Jews should be punished.²⁵ And in 1970, the population of Hessen was asked their opinion on a slightly different statement, "One should not publicly abuse the Jews, of course, but prison is too hard a penalty for anti-Semitic remarks": 60 percent agreed and 32 percent disagreed.²⁶ Thus, the only fully comparable questions (1949-1958) show a moderate trend toward willingness to condemn political anti-Semitic crimes. Again, however, as was the case for Nazi war crimes, there has been a rising tendency to reject collective guilt or responsibility for past (proven) crimes. Thus, while 31 percent of Germans in 1949 disagreed that "Germany has an obligation to make reparations to the still living German Jews," 46 percent in 1966 agreed with the demand, "the reparations to the Jews should finally be ended; they have already gotten too much" (see Figure 1).²⁷

25. IfD I: 131; III: 219.

26. Hans D. Klingemann and Franz Urban Pappi, Politischer Radicalismus (Oldenbourg, Munich: 1972), p. 66.

Economic and social anti-Semitism are less explosive than political anti-Semitism, and for that reason, although there are more available data, we will examine these aspects more briefly. In general, most of the more concrete questions which measure probable behavior showed some easing of economic and social anti-Semitism in Germany; but the more attitudinal questions, which seem to measure simple prejudice, did not show such unambiguous trends (see Tables 1 and 2). Thus, a declining number of respondents said they would not shop in a Jewish store if the same goods were cheaper there (25 percent in 1949, 14 percent in 1974); and a declining number also said they would not marry a Jew (70 percent in 1949, 54 percent in 1961), but here prejudice was considerably higher than that in the United States at the same time (57 percent in 1950 and 37 percent in 1962 gave these responses). Other questions which elicited decreasingly anti-Semitic responses included the perceptions that Jews are industrious, peace-loving, helpful, and artistically talented. However, a good number of other questions showed rising levels of economic and social anti-Semitism and also compared unfavorably to levels of prejudice in America. Thus, the perceptions increased that Jews do not like physical work and will avoid it, that they incite hatred and unrest (paradoxically so, since they are also seen as increasingly peace-loving), that they are

27. Likewise, in 1949, 54 percent said that reparations should be made, and just before the 1979 showing of the "Holocaust" TV program, 45 percent believed that Germans had a moral obligation to make reparations to the victims of the Holocaust; after the program the figure rose again to 54 percent. IfD I, p. 130; IV, p. 204; Markovits and Hayden, p. 68.

cowardly, and that they keep others out of business (the responses in the U.S. show less prejudice on this item). The perception declined somewhat that Jews are intelligent, and Jews are seen much more often in Germany as using shady business practices and dirty tricks than in the U.S.²⁸

Finally, although it has been shown in the United States²⁹ that anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli sentiments are only weakly related to anti-Jewish prejudices, this is still often found to be a form of anti-Semitism, or an attitude which masks anti-Semitism in complex ways.³⁰ Thus, 66 percent of Germans asked in a 1949 survey said they thought the establishment of the state of Israel was a "solution to the Jewish question:"³¹ of course, many Zionists (i.e. Jewish nationalists) would agree here with German nationalists or anti-Semites. German Jews are also seen as possibly less than fully faithful German citizens, whose loyalties

28. IfD I, p. 131; III, p. 215; Sallen, question 79; Lipset and Schneider, p. 12. Cf. also IfD III, pp. 216-17; IV, p. 95; Sallen, questions 24-57, 59, 62, 67; Markovits and Hayden, p. 68; Lipset and Schneider, p. 17.

29. Cf. Lipset and Schneider, 1978.

30. Several of the contributors to the New German Critique point out that many Germans who lived through the Nazi period or who came to maturity in the first two decades after 1945 developed a form of philo-Semitism and philo-Zionism which masked real feelings of guilt which they could not deal with or overcome; and in the same way, many young Germans who came to maturity since the mid-1960s--also unable to overcome their sense of guilt for what their parents' generation did during the war--paradoxically turned to anti-Zionism as a way of opposing their parents. See especially the articles by Postone and Herf; also see the theory as it was developed by Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, Die Unfaehigkeit zu trauern (Piper, Munich: 1967).

31. IfD I: 131.

are divided with Israel: 55 percent of the respondents to a 1974 survey thought Jewish ties to Israel were more important to them than their ties to Germany, while in the U.S. only an average of 30 percent thought so, between 1964 and 1977 (see Table 1). However, when asked their sympathies in the Middle-East conflicts, Germans' responses were almost identical to Americans' (although sometimes a little lower; see Table 1). The ratio of support for Israel over the Arab states in the U.S. rose from 25 to 7 in 1964 to 53 to 7 in 1974, and it rose in Germany from 25 to 15 in 1965 to 50 to 7 in 1974.³² Here again, it is possible to interpret these results as having little to do with anti-Semitism, and indeed, as being ethnocentrist; for Israel may be viewed as a western democracy in conflict with non-democracies, or worse, as a white people against brown.

Indeed, one can argue that since the Holocaust, ethnic prejudice has acquired new objects in Germany, especially in the migrant Guest Workers. A quick glance at Table 2 puts some of the previously-mentioned findings about anti-Semitism into this perspective. In various surveys, Germans have been asked their views of a number of characteristics of certain ethnic groups and other nationalities, and for some of these characteristics, self-anchoring responses about the respondent himself or "the Germans" are also available. Almost without exception, there are no instances in Table 2 in which the Germans, or the respondent, are not viewed in a stereotypically better light than other

32. Lipset and Schneider, pp. 16-17, 36; Sallen, question 72; IfD IV, p. 473; VI, p. 292.

groups (blacks are seen as less cowardly, and the English are seen as slightly more devout). This result probably proves nothing more than that these stereotypes are stereotypes; unless shown otherwise by cross-national empirical comparisons, one would assume that the results would be similar in other countries. However, if we compare the Jews who, among the groups shown, were probably historically the greatest object of prejudice in Germany, we find that the only groups seen in a consistently worse light are the Guest Workers (and their constituent groups, Turks, Yugoslavs, and Italians) and the Russians. The Americans, British, Japanese, and even blacks are sometimes seen as having better, sometimes worse, qualities than the Jews. The Guest Workers, and each important group of Guest Workers for whom there are data, are considered less intelligent, less industrious, less helpful, and less clean than Jews; moreover, more Germans would not marry a Turk, Yugoslav, or Italian (but also not a black or Japanese) than would not marry a Jew. (However, most of these latter data come from different time points.)³³

Again, the two standard explanations may apply here that there are few Jews still in Germany to be objects of prejudice and that anti-Semitism has been officially de-legitimated; but there is no good way to take these factors systematically into account, nor have we seen any indication that they have had a visible and regular effect on the previous questions. Moreover, these data concern relatively "benign" social prejudice and do

33. IfD III, pp. 216-17, 560; IV, pp. 95, 436, 440, 442, 452; V, pp. 494-95, 554, 587; Sallen, questions 24-57.

not necessarily translate into "malignant" political prejudice; but there are other indications that potential political prejudice exists against Guest Workers, at least in a reduced or latent state. Germans see the presence of Guest Workers as an increasingly serious problem, although this opinion seems to have remained in the minority for the present: 32 percent of the respondents in 1964 and 36 percent in 1971 saw them as a "serious problem for us," and 55 percent of the respondents in a 1975 survey fully agreed (an additional 28 percent partially agreed) that "it is to be feared that in the future the Guest Workers will become a serious problem for us."³⁴ However, according to our analysis thus far, there is no reason to look for German "exceptionalism" on this point: every Western, industrialized country has migrant workers (of internal and external origin) who form an "underclass" willing to do work spurned by middle-income workers, and each of these countries faces at least some economic uncertainty for the future. However, (a) we have seen that prejudice only reached crisis proportions in Germany when it became fully politicized and was borne by a successful anti-democratic radical party, and (b) the evidence we have seen to now gives no cause to think that any such political movement immanently threatens to acquire a significant degree of power.

The Structure of Anti-Semitism in Post-Nazi West Germany

In an important article, S.M. Lipset and W. Schneider summarize the known research findings on anti-Semitism in the United

34. IfD V: 493; VI: 154.

States since the 1930s and extend detailed analyses to the mid-1970s.³⁵ We have already compared some of the opinion trends from Germany with those for the United States; it may help to maintain a comparative perspective by beginning our account of the structural factors underlying anti-Semitism in West Germany within the context of Lipset and Schneider's findings from America. As is well known, the better educated are much less anti-Semitic than the worse educated in the U.S., and no other measure of social status (e.g. income, occupation) can "account" for this relationship;³⁶ moreover, it is likely that a good portion of falling levels of anti-Semitism in America are due to rising levels of formal education in the population. Age, too, plays an important role. In general, the young in America are less anti-Semitic than the old; and older liberals are less anti-Semitic than older conservatives (ideology plays no role in anti-Semitism among the young).

However, in what they call a "critical reversal," Lipset and Schneider find that at least by the mid-1970s the better educated emerged as more anti-Israel than the worse educated (the better educated were formerly more pro-Israel), and young liberals became more anti-Israel than either young conservatives or the

35. Lipset and Schneider.

36. Cf. the debate about the reasons for education's effect on anti-Semitism and Selznick and Steinberg's critique of the psychodynamic interpretation in The Authoritarian Personality: namely, that education acts to socialize people into the "higher" Enlightenment culture, largely by increasing their cognitive sophistication. G.J. Selznick and S. Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice (New York, 1969), pp. 135-69; and T.W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950).

old of any ideological persuasion. This recent emergence of anti-Zionism, particularly among the well-educated young left, it is speculated, is probably traceable to the polarization of American politics since the mid-1960s and is consistent with the New Left's critique of militarism and America's role in the world (especially in the Third World).³⁷ None of these findings will be foreign to the most casual observer of political change in the West during the last twenty years, but it should alert us, above all, to certain dangers in interpreting the German scene in a non-comparative framework. In particular, the otherwise attractive thesis becomes questionable that the young New Left in Germany became anti-Zionist (which is sometimes seen as disguised anti-Semitism) because they were reacting against the philo-Semitism of their parents--in both cases because they have not come to terms with their sense of guilt about the Nazi past: quite possibly this factor plays some role, but it is probably subordinate to broad changes which are taking place in all Western societies.³⁸

37. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that young black militants and, apparently, young Jewish leftists both take this stand. It should, of course, be re-emphasized that anti-Zionism is not the same as anti-Semitism: in fact, the young black militants are the only one of the anti-Zionist groups just mentioned which shows appreciable signs of true ideological anti-Semitism. See Lipset and Schneider.

38. Indeed, the picture of philo-Zionist conservative parents and anti-Zionist leftist youth in Germany may not even be empirically accurate: in 1973 those under 30 were 14 percentage points more sympathetic than those over 60 to the Israelis as against the Arabs in the Middle East conflict; and in 1975, SPD supporters were 11 percentage points more likely than CDU-CSU supporters to say that Germany should work as closely as possible with Israel. See IfD V, p. 593; IfD VI, p. 279.

Aside from the more complex opinions on Israel and Zionism, most studies of anti-Semitism in West Germany reveal the same patterns for age and education as do the American studies. In perhaps the most comprehensive recent empirical study in Germany, it was found in 1974 that those with a university degree were a full 35 percentage points less anti-Semitic on a general scale than were those with just a grammar school education (Volksschule ohne Lehre), and that those under 30 were 18 percentage points less anti-Semitic than those over 55.³⁹ In general, the peripheral segments of society tend to be the most anti-Semitic, just as they tend to be least politically tolerant or liberal: those in rural areas, the petty bourgeoisie and sometimes workers (especially if they are not in the unions), those in the southern provinces, and as pointed out, the old and poorly educated.

These demographic patterns naturally remind one of the sociological base of support for the Nazis in the 1920s and 1930s (although these demographic patterns tend to be about the same in all Western countries); and indeed, disturbing patterns of political anti-Semitism emerged during the most recent period of mild political radicalization in Germany in the late 1960s, when the neo-fascist National Democratic Party (NPD) nearly cleared the 5 percent hurdle required for representation in Parliament in the 1969 federal elections. Thus, while only 11 percent of the respondents with an opinion in a 1969 survey believed that "the

39. Sallen, pp.310-11. Sallen also finds that occupation, income, and size of place of residence have large impacts, but they would probably be much reduced if educational level were taken into account; pp. 309, 314-14.

Jews once again have too much power and influence here" (19 percent thought it was partly true, and 69 percent did not believe it), this position was taken by 36 percent of those who said they would vote for the NPD and 23 percent of those who welcomed the NPD's electoral gains, by 18 percent of those who said their economic situation had worsened in the past year, 16 percent of refugees or expellees from the East, 15 percent of those who were dissatisfied with the performance of the government, 14 percent of those who favored outlawing the German Communist Party, and--significantly--by 17 percent of those who favored an end to war-crimes trials and 20 percent of those who thought that "the Guest Workers harm us more than they help [nuetzen] us."⁴⁰

Do these findings mean that political anti-Semitism is still flourishing in West Germany? There are three questions here: (a) can we identify a coherent political anti-Semitism or neo-Nazi ideology in the general public, (b) if so, is it widespread, and (c) is it increasing or decreasing over time. The first question can be answered by taking a set of relevant ideological survey questions and asking whether people tend to respond the same way to certain questions--that is, whether the questions tend to hang together in ideological "clusters." We can do this with factor analysis, a technique which searches the correlations among all the questions (variables) used in an analysis and computes a smaller set of new, mutually independent variables (factors) which summarize the main clusters in the data. Table 3 shows a factor analysis of such a set of ideological variables taken from

40. My own calculations from IfD survey number 2052, May 1969.

the 1969 survey just cited.⁴¹ I have suggested that, due to the pattern of factor loadings, the factors could be called Main-Stream Partisanship, National Socialist Ideology, and Voelkische Ideology, respectively; and the results allow us to make several important observations about the ideological structure of these questions. (1) National Socialist ideology continues to exist as an identifiable cluster of opinions, and anti-Semitism is one important element of this cluster; but this ideology is not related to main-stream politics in West Germany today and only weakly to a milder kind of patriotic or voelkische ideology. (2) However, contemporary neo-fascism, as represented by sympathy with the NPD, and anti-communism are not strong components of this National Socialist ideology;⁴² instead, it is most strongly characterized by concern with issues remaining from the historical Nazi regime (war crimes and the statute of limitations) and by racist xenophobia (anti-Semitism and prejudice against Guest Workers).⁴³

41. The number columns are correlations ("loadings") of each ideology question with each of three summary factors; and by inspecting which question hang together in which factors, we can give the factors names. The correlations or loadings can vary from 1.00 to -1.00, where 1.00 is a perfect positive correlation, -1.00 a perfect negative correlation, and .00 no correlation at all. In general, for this kind of data, a loading with a magnitude above .60 is very high indeed, and a magnitude above .40 is still quite strong.

42. This finding supports at least the first part of the thesis developed by Lutz Niethammer that the NPD does not seek to revive historical National Socialism or its old expansionistic or racist goals, but rather represents a new kind of fascism which seeks to conform (anpassen) with the Bonn system and the Western alliance. Angepasster Fascismus: Politische Praxis der NPD (Frankfurt, 1969).

43. Sallen also finds that anti-Semitism was strongly related to

The second and third questions, whether political anti-Semitism is widespread and growing in West Germany, have already been partly answered earlier in the negative. Although, as we have seen, support for a statute of limitations on war-crimes and intolerance for a communist party's right to exist were relatively strong, they have also been slowly declining; open prejudice against Guest Workers has remained a minority position; and most importantly, support for old Nazism or neo-fascism (the NPD) has been miniscule. Moreover, like anti-Semitism, these views have for the most part been restricted to the margins of German society, to the old, the poorly educated, the rural and those in small towns. However, during the economic downturn in Germany in the late 1960s, this right-wing political radicalism⁴⁴ and ethnocentrism was disturbingly related to individual perceptions of personal economic decline--that is, scapegoats were sought in the process of protest. But this pattern seems not to have repeated itself in the more serious economic difficulties since the mid-1970s: if scapegoats were to be sought, they surely could have been found in Israel (and perhaps the Jews), which was blamed by the oil-rich Arab states as the source of the Middle East conflict. Just as we have seen that Americans did not blame Israel or the Jews for the oil crisis, the Germans did not turn against Israel for this reason. In November 1973, the Institut fuer

a scale of anti-democratic tendencies and to a scale of racist opinions in 1974; op. cit., pp. 262, 317-318.

44. See Klaus Liepelt, "Anhaenger der neuen Rechtspartei: Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion ueber das Waehlerreservoir der NPD," Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 2, 1967, pp. 237-271.

Demoskopie asked, "The Arab states have now restricted oil deliveries to Western Europe. By this restriction they mean to bring the West European states more strongly to the side of the Arabs in the future....What is your opinion?" Only 16 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, "I think we should no longer support Israel in this conflict. Only in this way will we again get enough oil;" while 57 percent said, "I think we must not give in to the Arabs now. The West European countries must unite against the Arab demands even if the Arabs ship less oil because of it."⁴⁵

West German anti-Semitism in Perspective

We are now in a position to make a few noncomprehensive concluding remarks.

(1) If our analysis is correct that modern anti-Semitism becomes dangerous primarily when it becomes politicized--and more particularly, when it becomes connected to a radical anti-democratic movement--then we can point to at least two reasons for not becoming overly alarmed at the levels of popular anti-Semitism still displayed in West Germany today. First, as we have seen, the West German political culture has converged to a very great extent to that of countries with much longer liberal democratic traditions; and although we did not examine the data here, it can be shown that the younger generations and the better educated adhere most strongly to liberal democracy--a good sign

⁴⁵. IfD V, p. 596. No age groups, political party supporters, or groups which used different kinds of energy deviated from these aggregate results by more than a few percentage points.

in the light of German political history. In addition, political anti-Semitism today is mainly connected to the old, discredited historical Nazi regime, and only weakly to more recent forms of neofascism; nor have we found evidence in our limited analyses of anti-Semitism in the New Left. (The New Left may be anti-Zionist, but if so, the Germans would not be unique in Western societies; and given its probable roots in anti-militarism and--confused--anti-imperialism, this anti-Zionism is unlikely to become domestic anti-Semitism.)

(2) Almost all aspects of anti-Semitism itself are declining in West Germany today. One probable reason for this decline is the change in political culture just mentioned, in which West Germany has "caught up" with the rest of the West. Moreover, West Germany has participated in the broad changes which have taken place in virtually all Western societies. Studies have shown that liberalization has also occurred in other Western societies since the height of the cold war;⁴⁶ and the parallel rise of the New Left and the more liberal younger generation throughout Western societies is plain to see.⁴⁷ We have not been able here, however, to disaggregate the effects of the entry of

46. Cf. Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, (Princeton, 1977); James A. Davis, "Communism, Conformity, Cohorts, and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972-73," in American Journal of Sociology 81, 3, 1975, pp. 491-513; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett, Jr., and J. Allen Williams, Jr., Tolerance for Nonconformity (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco: 1978).

47. I would maintain this view for the present despite the insightful analyses of new weak points and dangers which accompany these changes. See, e.g., Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York, Basic Books: 1976).

new, more liberal, generations into the population, rising levels of education, and historical changes in the opinions of the whole population. My research on political culture would indicate that all factors contribute, but in the present case of anti-Semitism, the question will have to remain open. Finally, it now seems clear that by the time the American television program, "The Holocaust" was broadcast, West German anti-Semitism had already been in decline for a long time: I tend to think that the show reinforced pre-existing opinion trends and that the population was rather open to this sort of reinforcement. I might also add that although I find the psychological theory concerning the "unmastered guilt from the past" (unbewaeltigte Vergangenheit) attractive and enlightening, I think (a) that it sets standards for a society which are difficult enough for a patient in psychoanalysis to meet, and (b) that satisfactory social change can (and probably has) come in a much less profound way by simple passage of time and generational change in a stable democratic institutional and cultural setting.

(3) All this said, a very serious potential danger continues to exist in West Germany--as in other Western democracies--that scapegoats will be sought during crises: our analysis has suggested that levels of prejudice or hostility to certain groups need not necessarily be high in normal times for tragedy to result from a crisis. In order for social analysis to do what it can to help alert against some future Holocaust, it must perform several tasks: (a) It must be able to see a crisis coming, to monitor its progress, and to suggest what can be done to help

moderate it. (b) It must discern which groups are particularly susceptible to being made scapegoats in a crisis and to suggest ways of keeping them out of danger or of their protecting themselves. In particular, the suggestion made by Lipset and Schneider is useful that objective social conflict be treated differently (conflict resolution sought) than subjective scapegoating (education of real interests may help here, if the crisis has not progressed too far). And (c), we must remain open to the possibility that the Jewish Holocaust was not "logically" unique to Nazi Germany, but that it could happen again in another place or to another target (e.g. migrant workers) for new and unforeseen reasons.




Figure 1




Table 1

	1937	38	40	42	44-6	49	50/59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	69	70	71	73	74	75	76	77
<u>Jews have too much power/influence in</u>																							
America		42	34	51	55-8					17	..	11								3	26	19	
Germany														13	..	9	..	6	..	18			
<u>Would not marry a Jew</u>																							
America							57			37													
Germany						70	..		54														
<u>Vote for Jew in own Party</u>																							
America	49						72						80										
Germany							31																
<u>Jews keep others out of business</u>																							
America												51								27			
Germany								44				42								53			
<u>Jews use shady practices, dirty tricks</u>																							
America												42								21			
Germany																				53			
<u>Jewish ties to Israel more important</u>																							
America												30								34		27	
Germany																				55			
<u>Support Israel-Arabs</u>																							
America												25-7								53-7			
Germany												24-15	55-6	45-7	...	50-7							

(36-5)

Table 2

	<u>Self</u>	<u>Germans</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Guest-workers</u>	<u>Turks</u>	<u>Yugoslavs</u>	<u>Italians</u>	<u>Blacks</u>	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>Americans</u>	<u>Russians</u>										
	1957	74	49	60	61	65	74	64	71	75	75	64	75	72	75	61	70	62	58	62	70	58
<u>Intelligent</u>	--	90	--	52	--	--	46	8	9	--	--	23	--	36	--	--	57	--	--	--	28	--
<u>Industrious</u>	46	92	--	52	--	--	71	22	43	--	--	24	--	35	--	--	80	28	24	26	21	--
<u>Peace-Loving</u>	--	77	--	--	14	--	53	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	19	--	--	--	8	--
<u>Helpful</u>	41	71	--	--	25	22	59	15	27	--	--	--	--	48	--	--	--	--	44	47	--	13
<u>Not Clean (-)</u>	--	6	--	--	--	--	27	30	41	--	--	56	--	20	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<u>Would not Marry (-)</u>	--	--	70	--	54	--	--	--	--	82	62	--	70	--	80	67	--	--	--	--	--	--
<u>Devout</u>	21	--	--	--	--	--	45	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	29	16	20	--	16
<u>Cowardly (-)</u>	--	28	--	19	--	15	38	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<u>Artistically Talented</u>	--	73	--	39	--	--	69	--	--	--	--	--	--	33	--	--	--	44	--	--	--	--

Table 3

The Structural Position of Anti-Semitism
In West German Ideology, 1969
 (Factor Analysis)

Variables	<u>Factors (names)</u>		
	Partisanship	N. S. Ideology	Voelkische Ideology
Rating of Chancellor Kiesinger	-.72	-.08	.12
Rating of Grand Coalition	.45	.18	.05
Kiesinger vs. Brandt	.57	.18	-.06
Prefer Security or New Ways	.64	.13	.02
Opinion of Army	-.45	.09	-.20
Forbid Communist Party	.36	.25	.13
Greet NPD Success	-.14	.26	.06
Statute of Limitations on War Crimes	.10	.52	.01
Remember Others' War Crimes	.07	.46	.11
Jews Have Too Much Influence	-.02	.42	.15
Guest Workers Harmful	.08	.46	.04
Love Volk and Vaterland	.32	.39	.74
Favor Youth Patriotism	.31	.36	.63
Percent total variance	18%	10%	7%
Percent common variance	60%	26%	14%

Source:

My calculations from Institut fuer Demoskopie survey number 2052, May 1969.

The American Jewish Committee

CONSULTATION ON ANTI-SEMITISM

November 17, 1980
New York City

AGENDA

Welcome

Maynard Wishner

Introduction

Paula Hyman, Chairperson

American Anti-Semitism: The Comparative Historical Context

Michael Dobkowski

Updating the Polls

William Schneider

Discussion

LUNCHEON

Holocaust Consciousness and the Study of Anti-Semitism

Ismar Schorsch

Discussion

When is Political Conflict Anti-Semitism?

Steven P. Cohen

Discussion

Summation

Paula Hyman

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November 17, 1980

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Sholom Comay, Chairman
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Historian, Author

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Emeritus, AJC

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November 17, 1980

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Milton Himmelfarb
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The American Jewish Committee



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OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT

November 5, 1980

TO: Participants in AJC Consultation on Anti-Semitism
FROM: Bertram H. Gold

I was pleased to learn that you will be attending the American Jewish Committee's Consultation on Anti-Semitism scheduled for Monday, November 17, from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., at our offices in New York. In connection with that meeting, I am enclosing an agenda, a list of expected participants and two earlier background pieces prepared by William Schneider,

I am especially regretful that I will not see you at the meeting; as a result of a freakish fall down a flight of stairs, which left me with a broken leg and shoulder, I am immobilized at home and cannot join you. I nevertheless appreciate your participation and know that the day will be a highly productive one.

Best wishes,

BHG:ls
encs,

80-975-98

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ANTI-S - OLDEST FORM OF RACISM
- JEWS - TC - CONSCIENCE OF A RAKING
STREET -

NAZI SLAVE ETHIC - XFY JEWISH TRICK

- JEWS ONLY SURVIVE
~~ETHNIC~~ NOKY, JESUS, MANY ETHNIC, FALLO
ABLE PRIZE WINTERS
- HEP - (RISK -) ACCORDS - ANXIETIES
- ISRAEL - PROMINENT - (CHOOSE SOMEONE ELSE)

POUS - AMERICANS - $\frac{1}{3}$ -
RIGHT -
LEFT - IDEOLOGY -
BLACKS

1973 - ARAB MURDER

3rd WARR

SOVIET UNION - CONGRESS

PRES.

EEC

background

-2-

SEVENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING of The American Jewish Committee

ANTI-SEMITISM: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES IN 1980

FRIDAY, MAY 16, 1980 12:30 P.M.

AJC has been concerned about recent trends which suggest that anti-Semitism is gaining ground among some important segments of American society. We have witnessed the increasing propagation of the themes that American support for Israel is not in this country's best interest; that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America; that Zionism equals racism. The anti-Semitic press, in a calculated effort to stir up hatred of American Jews, constantly savages Israel and Zionists.

Anti-Semitic incidents and vandalism against synagogues, Jewish institutions, and individual Jews have taken a quantum upturn in the past 12 months. A revived Ku Klux Klan in the South vents its spleen more against Jews than blacks; and American Nazis, somewhat debilitated since last we met, persist in their activities.

Single issue politicians and pressure groups concerned over issues such as prayer in the public schools are becoming increasingly strident and active in the current campaign. A recent Christian/Jewish symposium evoked a warning by prominent Christian clergymen that Christian Americans are increasingly opposed to the "secularization" of American life. This they attribute to Jews who have been active advocates of strict separation of church and state. Thus Jews are perceived by many Christians as having prevented them from the "public celebration of their symbols."

Fundamentalist clergymen, utilizing vast "Christian radio and t.v. networks," and newly-founded political action groups, actively lobby for those issues which are perceived to be in the Christian interest, endorse some candidates and actively campaign to defeat Congressmen whose public positions are not in consonance with their goal of a Christian America.

There is no doubt that the Andrew Young resignation exacerbated existing strained relationships between blacks and Jews, and in its aftermath evoked a disturbing amount of unadulterated anti-Semitism by some recognized black leaders. Additionally, there has been a patent effort by several prominent blacks to curry favor with Arab governments and the PLO.

Existing poll data, however, seem to be much less foreboding. Among several of the findings of a recent Yankelovich Poll conducted for AJC was that among groups said to have excessive power over U.S. policy, Jews ranked lowest in a list of nine. A Gallup Poll, also conducted for AJC in September 1979, reveals that 50% of all Americans rejected the notion that Jews are more

(over)

loyal to Israel than to America. (29% felt they were, 21% had no opinion.)

Nevertheless, large numbers of black leaders, according to a Harris Poll released in late 1979, maintain negative stereotypes about Jews.

Some questions we will consider:

1. To what extent do the poll findings coincide with our own perceptions of anti-Semitism today?
2. Is there any significant sentiment in our communities to the effect that Israel's interests are currently in conflict with U.S. interests? If so, do we perceive that American Jews are being blamed for unduly influencing American foreign policy?
3. In the context of the growing effort to reinstitute prayer in the public schools and the effort by certain Fundamentalists to focus on "Christian" issues and elect God-fearing Christians to public office, have there been manifest conflicts between the Christians and Jews in your community?
4. What is the status of black/Jewish relations in your community?



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date August 4, 1980
to Staff Listed Below
from David Harris
subject CONSULTATION ON ANTISEMITISM

Please review the various draft materials prepared by Paula Hyman of Columbia University, who is assisting us in the planning of the Consultation on Antisemitism, to be held at AJC on Monday, November 17, 1980.

Any comments or suggestions for the draft description, letter or list of participants would be most welcome. I would appreciate receiving your comments by Monday, August 11th.

DAH:ls
 encs.

SENT TO:

Milton Ellerin
 Bert Gold
 Milton Himmelfarb
 Selma Hirsh
 Irving Levine
 Samuel Rabinove
 Geraldine Rosenfield
 Seymour Samet
 Phyllis Sherman
 John Slawson
 Marc Tanenbaum ✓

• Consultation on Antisemitism

Draft

The American Jewish Committee is planning to hold a one-day consultation in November, 1980 on contemporary American antisemitism. Long interested in the study of antisemitism, the AJC has sponsored scholarly investigations of the subject for more than three decades and conducts regular polls of public attitudes towards Jews and Israel. Recent trends in the polls as well as the unusual support manifested for overtly antisemitic candidates in two local elections suggest the need to evaluate the nature of antisemitism in America today.

The aim of the consultation is to provide both scholars and community relations specialists with an informed assessment of antisemitism in America and to stimulate further information gathering and research in this area. The consultation will evaluate the extent and significance of antisemitism within the context of current social, political, and economic conditions in the U.S. To meet these goals the AJC will bring together sociologists, political scientists, economists, historians, pollsters, and community leaders.

The interdisciplinary nature of the consultation will provide the expertise necessary to determine the conditions which lead to the expression of antisemitic attitudes and of overt antisemitic behavior. The AJC is concerned to develop a working definition of antisemitism which will distinguish between manifestations of prejudice and of stereotypical thinking and normal conflicts of interest between groups contending in the political arena over issues of either domestic or foreign policy. The consultation will explore the ways in which antisemitism can be injected into political conflict as well as the purposes of such manipulation. It will attempt to locate sources of potential group tension and of antisemitic prejudice and activity by examining a number of key areas such as the impact of rapidly growing single-issue interest groups, the rise of fundamen-

talism, the linkage of Jews and Israel, and the relations between Blacks and Jews.

After discussing the strength and potential of American antisemitism, the consultation will investigate the state of analysis of antisemitism. Reviewing the literature in the field, it will assess the usefulness of the prevailing approaches to the subject and will suggest the gaps in our knowledge of how antisemitism functions on the societal level. While psychological factors were emphasized in such pioneer works as The Authoritarian Personality, it has become evident that the precise socio-political and economic factors which contribute to the expression of antisemitism merit further attention. Consultation participants will consider both the types and subjects of research which will expand our understanding of antisemitism in America.



CONSULTATION ON ANTISEMITISM

DRAFT LETTER

The American Jewish Committee is pleased to invite your participation in a one-day consultation on contemporary American antisemitism, to be held on November 17, 1980. Limited to a select group of scholars, pollsters, and community relations specialists, the consultation is designed to share information and thinking on two related issues: the nature and extent of antisemitism in the U.S. and the state of analysis of antisemitism.

The AJC is concerned to develop a working definition of antisemitism which will distinguish between manifestations of prejudice and of stereotypical thinking and normal conflicts of interest between groups contending in the political arena over issues of both domestic and foreign policy. The consultation will explore the ways in which antisemitism can be injected into political conflict as well as the purposes ~~of~~ such manipulation, Sur-veying the extent of American antisemitism, consultation participants will attempt to locate sources of potential group tension and of antisemitic activity.

The consultation seeks as well to develop a preliminary research agenda for the study of antisemitism. Reviewing the literature in the field, it will assess the usefulness of approaches utilized in earlier studies. While psychological factors were emphasized in such pioneer works as The Authoritarian Personality, it has become evident that the precise socio-political and economic factors which contribute to the expression of antisemitism merit further attention. Consultation participants will consider both the types and subjects of research which will expand our understanding of antisemitism in America.

We look forward to your participation in the consultation.

CONSULTATION ON ANTISEMITISM

PRELIMINARY LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Prof. Michael Dobkowski
Dept. of Religious Studies
Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Geneva, New York 14456

author of most recent history
of American antisemitism

Prof. Naomi Cohen
Dept. of History
Hunter College

writing book on antisemitism in
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historiography of antisemitism

Prof. Paul Ritterband
Dept. of Sociology
C.U.N.Y.

Prof. Sigmund Diamond
Dept. of Sociology
Columbia University

Prof. William Schneider
Dept. of Social Relations
Harvard University

Prof. Thomas Pettigrew
Dept. of Social Relations
Harvard University

specialist on prejudice

Prof. Herbert Gans
Dept. of Sociology
Columbia University

specialist on mass media and
American Jews

Prof. Joseph Rothschild
Dept. of Political Science
Columbia University

specialist on study of ethnic
conflict

Prof. Michael Walzer
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton University

political theorist

Prof. Nathan Glazer
Harvard University
School of Education

Herbert Bienstock

Ben Wattenberg

Bayard Rustin

Preliminary List of Participants

Prof. Rosemary Ruether
Garrett Evangelical Seminary
Evanston, Illinois

author of Faith and Fratricide

Prof. Richard Lowery
Dept. of Psychology
Vassar College

Dorothy Rabinowitz

Martin Peretz
DEpt. of *Script Studies*
Harvard University

editor and publisher of New Republic

Prof. Alan Dershowitz
Harvard Law School

or

Prof. Richard Stone
Columbia Law School

or

Prof. Louis Henkin
Columbia Law School



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date March 20, 1980
to Area Directors
from Bert Gold
subject Anti-Semitic Survey

The accumulation and analysis of information about anti-Semitic activities and trends in communities served by our area offices is an important aspect of field staff responsibility.

The attached questionnaire asks you to summarize anti-Semitic activities in your area during the first three months of 1980, and we shall be soliciting follow-up reports from you on a quarterly basis.

Your responses will be of great value to the Trends Analysis Division.

BG/br
 Attachment

cc: Eugene DuBow
 Seymour Samet
 Milton Ellerin
 Harold Applebaum

#80-310-20

QUARTERLY SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF

ANTI-SEMITIC ACTIVITY

Please summarize anti-Semitic activity that has come to the attention of your office during the period January-March, 1980:

1. Overt Incidents

- a. Vandalism aimed at Jewish institutions or individuals
- b. Anti-Semitic demonstrations, leafleting
- c. Personal appearances by leaders of extremist organizations

2. Anti-Semitism in Public Discourse

- a. Scapegoating of Jews as consequence of intergroup conflicts
- b. Criticism of Jewish officials or political candidates focusing on their religious affiliation
- c. Anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish comments:
 1. By public officials or other "influentials"
 2. In editorials, columns, op ed pieces in press, radio, television, letters-to-the-editor
 3. In minority and ethnic communities
 4. On college campuses (speakers, conferences)

3. Discrimination

- a. Exclusionary incidents or practices in executive suite, social clubs, fraternities
- b. Denial of rights of Sabbath observers
- c. University practices excluding or limiting admissions of Jewish students or appointments of Jews to faculty or administration

4. Efforts to Christianize America

- a. Campaigns to elect "Born Again" or "God-Fearing" Christians to public office
- b. Campaigns by "Christian Lobbys" in pursuit of legislative objectives
- c. Publication of Christian Yellow Pages or Business Directories

Please evaluate incidents that you perceive to be of significance and indicate any countermeasures undertaken.

Copies of your report should be sent to Milton Ellerin and Harold Applebaum. The due date is Friday, April 25.

M.T.

AS-03

Task force to fight Suffolk anti-Semitism

10-28-80

By STEWART AIN and JOHN MELIA

A special task force has been created following a wave of anti-Semitic incidents and threats that has struck Long Island's Suffolk County in recent months.

The task force, which will coordinate increased police patrols around Jewish institutions in the county, won the immediate support of Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, interreligious affairs director of the American Jewish Committee.

"I think it's tragic that this has to happen, but it's absolutely essential to combat antihuman and anti-Semitic forces," he said.

Tanenbaum said also that "one ought not to understate the magnitude" of anti-Semitism. He said there is "international anarchy brewing" and called on Christians and Jews alike to join forces and fight the "twisted minds" that commit anti-Semitic acts.

The task force announced yesterday by Suffolk County Executive Peter Cohalan was created at the urging of Rabbi Gabriel Maza, president of the Suffolk County Board of Rabbis.

"THERE HAVE BEEN acts of vandalism and terror against Jewish houses of worship," Cohalan said. "These are clearly acts of anti-Semitism and a violation of human rights and dignity."

On one occasion, Suffolk police provided two officials with bulletproof vests after death threats had been made.

Saying that he "abhorred these senseless acts," Cohalan called on the community to "assist the police to bring these people to justice."

Maza, who had told Cohalan last week that his board would organize civilian patrols if nothing was done by the county, said, "The results have to be seen. You can't celebrate when something is established; the results are what count."

Praising Cohalan and calling his statement "exemplary," Melvin Cooperman, regional director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, said, "The assigning of police is a fine fulfillment of public trust. The perpetrators will not go unapprehended. They will not act with impunity. The situation is taking a dimension of powerful concern by the community."

"It's a start," said Robert Tucker, vice chairman of the Long Island board of the ADL. "There's not much you can do."

THE RASH OF vandalism and terror, which included a death threat against Huntington Supervisor Kenneth Butterfield, began Aug. 16 when the annex to the Lake Grove Jewish Center was burned to the ground by arsonists. More than 100 families have quit the congregation out of fear since the incident, according to Rabbi Reuben Luckens, spiritual leader of the congregation.

Butterfield, who is not Jewish, was threatened after presiding at ceremonies renaming a town street after Hadassah, the Jewish women's philanthropic group.

Police said his wife received an anonymous call saying, "I'll get your husband. I've got a sniper and I'll get the Jews, too."

Cops provided Butterfield and State Sen. James Lack with bulletproof vests when they rode in a town parade shortly after the threat.

Another incident occurred on the first day of Rosh Hashanah last month when vandals broke into the Hebrew Academy of Suffolk County in Hauppauge and flooded the school with four inches of water from a garden hose hooked to an outside faucet.

There have also been thefts of sacred silver objects from county synagogues, and Rabbi Maza said vandals had etched crosses into the lawn of the Deer Park Jewish Center.

November 2, 1980

"EPIDEMIC OF ANTI-SEMITIC VANDALISM"

WINS RELIGION COMMENTARY

RABBI MARC H. TANENBAUM* OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

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"It's a scary think to come to your own school which you think is safe and where you've always had happy times and find this racial attack." Those pained words were spoken last week by a senior student at Great Neck North Senior High School in Long Island, New York, when he and fellow students found their school building spray-painted with swastikas, obscenities, and tall "KKK" letters standing for the Ku Klux Klan. That Nassau County vandalism was paralleled by an epidemic of anti-Semitic incidents and threats in Long Island's Suffolk County in recent months. Similar outbreaks of anti-Semitic vandalism have taken place in other parts of the United States, quite possibly in imitative behavior of neo-Nazi and PLO violence in France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and elsewhere. In August, the annex to Lake Grove Jewish Center was burned to the ground, and more than 100 families quit the congregation out of fear since the incident. Rabbi Ralph Luchens reported that there isn't a synagogue in Suffolk that hasn't been hit by vandalism, harrassment and threats. Suffolk police have informed us that they believe these are not the pranks of teen-age vandals, but appear to be the sophisticated work of adults who are organized. The response of Suffolk County Executive Peter Cohalan was exemplary. He immediately condemned these as "acts of anti-Semitism and as a violation of human rights and dignity." Cohalan then set up a special task force to coordinate increased police patrols around Jewish institutions. Mr. Cohalan and the police deserve and require the cooperation of every citizen. It is in order to recall British statesman Harold Laski's warning, "The burden of our history is unmistakable - the enemy of the Jew is the enemy of freedom. Those who organize the pogrom of today will attack tomorrow the general foundation of freedom."

*Rabbi Tanenbaum, who is national interreligious affairs director of the American Jewish Committee, presents a weekly religion commentary over WINS-Westinghouse Broadcasting System.

rpr

80-700-70

TRENDS ANALYSES REPORT

Anti-Semitism in America: A Balance Sheet

Discrimination Division,
Domestic Affairs Department

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Institute of Human Relations, 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA: A BALANCE SHEET

Over the past 12 months, incidents of vandalism and other malicious acts against synagogues and other Jewish institutions in the United States have increased sharply, almost tripling the figures for a year ago. These manifestations widely covered by the press and the electronic media, have stirred understandable fears in the American Jewish community which, even before the recent outbreaks, has felt itself beleaguered on a number of political and ideological fronts.

Certainly all of these disturbing events must be carefully studied. The American Jewish Committee, through its network of chapters and units and its national Trends Analyses Unit constantly monitors happenings that threaten, or appear to threaten, Jewish security. But AJC investigations and analysis to date indicate that it would be a mistake to interpret the recent outbreaks as signaling a new and dangerous wave of anti-Semitism in the United States. On balance, AJC studies indicate the Jewish position in the U.S. remains secure.

How then are the 377 reported anti-Semitic incidents in 1980 to be read -- particularly in the absence of reliable indicators in this area? One answer is to consider these occurrences in the perspective of other events taking place in this country and abroad.

According to AJC files, the majority of the anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S. took place after a widely publicized bombing of the rue Copernic Synagogue in Paris, on October 3, 1980, that left four dead and a dozen wounded. That outrage is believed to have been the work of Arab-inspired terrorists, a part of their campaign against Israel. But no discernable political motivation has surfaced in the American incidents. Indeed, in those instances where arrests were made, the overwhelming majority of the culprits proved to be young white teenagers, unaffiliated with any known hate groups and entirely uninvolved politically. Indications are that their behavior was triggered by the notoriety of the rue Copernic bombing and a few local incidents rather than religious and political motivations and that choice of Jewish targets was more imitative than a conscious and personal expression of anti-Semitic sentiment.

This is not the first time since World War II, that the American Jewish community has experienced a rash of anti-Semitic incidents. Reports of such incidents have waxed and waned over the years. In the two months following the widely publicized desecration of a synagogue in Cologne, Germany on Christmas day in 1959, there were 650 recorded cases of swastika daubings on synagogues and other Jewish institutions in the United States. Then, too, most of the apprehended culprits proved to be psychologically troubled teenagers imitating what they saw in the newspapers and on TV.

The American Jewish Committee sponsored an intensive investigation of the teenagers arrested for swastika daubings in the New York area. In a report entitled Why the Swastika? A Study of Young American Vandals, published by the AJC in January 1962, the investigators concluded: "Most of the episodes were not meaningless mischief, but eruptions of latent anti-Semitism which persists in the American community. Usually buried and under control, this prejudice apparently can be precipitated into the open by factors such as [...youth unemployment, intergroup tensions and competition]." The report also noted, that inflammatory treatment of the issue by the media can fan imitative incidents and stressed "the exercise of restraint in news coverage.... The reporting of episodes in the context of the personal or social pathology they reflected might have reduced the impact on vulnerable children."

The current outbreak of anti-Semitic vandalism must be viewed against the alarming increase in all kinds of crimes in the U.S. over the past several years. In 1979, crime took its biggest jump since the recession years of 1974-75; it has been estimated that there is a theft every 4.8 seconds and a burglary every 10 seconds, day-in and day-out, throughout the year. Religious institutions have become prime targets for thieves hoping to turn valuable religious objects into cash. Synagogues have been hit by such break-ins; but so have a great many churches. Arson, vandalism, and senseless violence are also sharply on the rise, and in this climate it is inevitable that some of the victims should be Jewish.

Deputy Inspector Kenneth Carey and Detective Sergeant Howard Mandell of the Nassau and Suffolk County police departments on Long Island, where several synagogues and cemeteries were defaced, told AJC leaders that the police had found no signs of instigation by organized extremist hate groups, and the AJC's own monitoring of local and national anti-Semitic groups supports these conclusions. One young culprit, when pressed as to why he had soaped swastikas on car windows in October 1980, explained: "I considered it a prank. My intentions were not ones of defiance or discrimination. I did not realize the sensitivity of this act or the offensive nature that would cause such resentment or mental anguish."

Detective Sergeant Mandell said that almost all of the 20 or so individuals arrested for anti-Semitic vandalism on Long Island have been white boys between 14 and 16 years old. "They tend to come from a lower-middle-class background. They tend to have a ne'er-do-well mentality. They have not succeeded in what they want to do. They are looking for a scapegoat for their own failures."

The role of the media in encouraging such incidents has been widely debated. Van Eisenhut, managing editor of the Oregon Statesman-Journal, denies that reporting such acts increases their frequency: "That is not really true of course. They continue, in fact increase, if not exposed." But many law enforcement officials disagree. Patrick J. Murphy, Chief of Operations of the New York Police Department believes that "the incidents feed off each other. The kids read about themselves...and any dope can see himself immortalized." Police officials in Los Angeles also feel that too much publicity for the graffiti smearers stimulates the "crazies." And the AJC's own investigations also suggest that widely publicized anti-Semitic incidents trigger imitative acts.

In November 1980, the American Jewish Committee convened an all-day consultation on anti-Semitism, bringing together a group of respected social scientists, to discuss the history, politics and psychology of group hatred. Several of the experts stressed that historically anti-Semitism has constituted a powerful threat to Jews only in those countries where it has enjoyed government sanction and been institutionalized in the laws and tradition of the land. Institutionalized anti-Semitism has never existed in the United States; and the American egalitarian tradition makes it most unlikely that it can achieve such respectability. The conferees did express concern, however, about the "internationalization" of anti-Semitism in the United Nations and its contribution to intergroup conflict in the U.S.

It is also important to remember that reports of anti-Semitic incidents cannot be used as the sole indicator of anti-Jewish feeling in the U.S. today. To determine the state of Jewish security, it is also necessary to examine the position of American Jews economically, politically and socially, and to contrast it with their position in earlier decades.

Organized anti-Semitism in the U.S. achieved its greatest public acceptance before the Second World War, when an estimated 250 to 300 militant hate groups were plying their wares. Organizations like the German American Bund, the Christian Front, Christian Mobilizers and the Order of '76, all blatantly pro-Fascist or pro-Nazi as well as anti-Semitic, are gone, and no organized hate groups have any appreciable political or social influence in this country.

The various Ku Klux Klans and neo-Nazi groups, whose provocative antics receive media attention far beyond what their numbers and strength warrant, are factionalized bands with feuding leaders competing among themselves for the spotlight. They have failed to attract a single influential American to their ranks. Most knowledgeable observers estimate Klan membership today at 10,500 nationwide, compared to 2-5 million in its heyday in the 1920s, and 50,000 as recently as the 1960s.

David Duke, one Klan spokesman on scores of radio and national television programs, resigned as head of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan after an unsuccessful attempt to sell his faction for a reported \$35,000 to his rival, Bill Wilkinson. The neo-Nazis number less than 2,000, nationwide.¹ And no one, since the death of George Lincoln Rockwell, founder of the American Nazi Party, in 1967 has managed to unite them. (Frank Collin, who achieved notoriety during the Skokie incident, was ousted from the National Socialist Party of America after his arrest and conviction for sexually molesting young boys).

1

Even these numbers may be vastly inflated. The Columbia Journalism Review has documented how the media is duped into inflating Klan and Nazi membership figures and providing coverage of staged media events.

The underlying danger of these groups remains their potential for inciting others to violence. The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime held hearings in December 1980 on reports that the KKK has established paramilitary training camps in at least six states. Testifying before the hearings, Professor Ted Gurr of Northwestern University stressed that a "vigorous official response, within the framework of law, is essential if the resurgence of anti-democratic activities in the United States is to be checked....Official responses which are tolerant, apathetic, or simply ineffective are likely to encourage more extremist action."

There is no individual of stature on the political scene today who is an overt anti-Semite. The three members of hate groups who did run for office in 1980 were all unsuccessful. Grand Dragon Tom Metzger, who won the Democratic primary for California's 43rd Congressional District, the nation's most populous, by 318 votes, lost the general election by an 8-to-1 margin.²

In the Republican primary for North Carolina State Attorney General, Harold Covington, an avowed neo-Nazi, captured 43 percent of the vote, losing to a well-qualified former Federal prosecutor. There have been various explanations for Covington's strong showing, but little evidence that the vote signaled an embracement of Nazi ideology by the citizens of North Carolina.

Klansmen and former Nazi Gerald Carlson won the Republican primary for the 15th Congressional District in Wayne County, Michigan by a margin of 55-to-47 percent over James Caygill, the official party candidate, running on a promise to "contain the black race, to reassess white superiority." He lost the general election to incumbent William D. Ford, and when he tried in March 1981, to run as a Republican for the 4th District Congressional seat vacated by Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman, he lost overwhelmingly. Nevertheless, the fact that a sizeable number of Americans were willing to support the political aspirations of three avowedly anti-Black and anti-Semitic candidates is just cause for concern.

The 1980 election campaign was virtually free of anti-Semitism.³ Indeed, more Jews than ever before -- 6 Senators and 27 members of the House of Representatives -- were elected to the U.S. Congress in 1980,

²The disturbing fact about Metzger's success in the primary is that so many people voted for him despite his known Klan affiliation. He ran a populist-oriented campaign as a conservative Democrat and small businessman, effectively pinpointing genuine concerns of the people of the 43rd District.

³Lyndon LaRouche, head of the right-wing U.S. Labor Party, ran as a Democrat for the Presidency and won enough primary votes to qualify for federal matching funds, but anti-Semitism is only peripheral to the major focus of his philosophy.

and the number of Jews serving in state legislatures and other political offices is too large to accurately track. At the same time, many Americans have watched with misgivings the growing political influence of certain evangelical groups, particularly those affiliated with Moral Majority, which has promulgated "minimal moral standards, dictated by the Bible," against which candidates for public office are to be judged, and which insists that there is only one moral position on such issues as abortion, homosexual rights, prayer in the schools, gun control, capital punishment and similar issues.

The National leadership of Moral Majority and other evangelical political organizations go to great pains to disclaim any anti-Semitic bent. But state and local chapters of these organizations are frequently less sophisticated in their thinking about Jews. For example, the Rev. Dan C. Fore, head of the New York Chapter of Moral Majority, assured a reporter for the New York Times on Feb. 5, 1981, "I love the Jewish people deeply. God has given them talents He has not given others. They are His chosen people. Jews have a God-given ability to make money, almost a supernatural ability to make money. They control the media, they control this city."

Jews and other concerned citizens will be watching carefully in the coming months as political Evangelicals focus their attention on local legislators and issues. Many state representatives have already received voting questionnaires from Moral Majority and some observers believe this kind of subtle pressure is likely to stifle freedom of debate on a number of important social issues.

One of the most valuable tools for gauging public attitudes toward Jews and other groups is the public opinion poll. The American Jewish Committee has been taking the public pulse on issues of Jewish concern for many decades and is therefore in a position to make objective comparisons over many years.

In 1946, 58 percent of the non-Jews polled said that Jews had "too much power in the U.S." By 1974, notwithstanding the Arab oil embargo and the gasoline lines, the respondents who agreed with this statement had dropped to 37 percent and the decline has continued to 26 percent in 1975, 19 percent in 1977, 12 percent in 1978. In October 1980, just before the Presidential election, it was down to 8 percent. There has been some fluctuation in the support for Israel, however, particularly, among the college-educated and among Blacks.

Professor William Schneider, who prepared a paper on Anti-Semitism and Israel: A Report on American Public Opinion in 1978, also noted an increase, since 1974, in Black anti-Semitism, especially among younger and better-educated Blacks, an observation supported by a Louis Harris survey, conducted for the National Conference of Christians and Jews in October 1978, which also found that Black leaders as a group hold more negative stereotypes about Jews than the Black population as a whole. In October 1980, a poll conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly and White asked: "If war broke out between Israel and other Arab nations, with whom would your sympathies lie?" Thirty-four percent of the non-white respondents said they would be more sympathetic toward Israel, as against 45 percent of the total number queried, and 53 percent of the college-educated.

There are, in every poll, some respondents who are more sympathetic to Arabs than to Israel in the Middle East conflict, and some who believe that Jews have too much political influence. Nevertheless, repeated polling over the years underscores the fact that the vast majority of Americans are favorably disposed toward their Jewish fellow citizens.

In the arts, sciences, business and the professions the same acceptance is evident. In 1970, the last year for which such data are available, 19 percent of the faculty at elite colleges and universities were Jewish, marking a steady increase since World War II. Sixty-four percent of the entire Jewish work force is employed as professionals or executives.

It would be wrong, however, to discount the long-term effect of certain disturbing events, particularly the transformation of the United Nations into a sounding board for anti-Israel and anti-Semitic rhetoric and the attempts by some bigots in Europe and the U.S. to deny the Holocaust ever really happened. In 1979, one such group, based in Torrance, California, which calls itself the Institute for Historical Review, hosted a Revisionist Convention at Northrop University in Los Angeles, expressly to promote the idea that the Holocaust was a myth. Willis Carto, the motivating force behind the rabidly anti-Semitic Liberty Lobby, and its official newspaper The Spotlight (paid circulation, 281,000) praised the speakers for their dedication to the truth and offered a reward of \$50,000 to anyone who could prove the Nazis operated gas chambers to exterminate the Jews.

The second Annual Revisionist Convention was held at Pomona College in Claremont, California in August 1980, and a third is scheduled to take place in June at the University of California's Lake Arrowhead Conference Center. (Despite public protests, the University's President and the Board of Regents do not feel they can break the signed contract). The Institute publishes a scholarly-looking quarterly entitled, The Journal of Historical Review.

These developments, like every reported case of overt anti-Semitism, obviously require constant vigilance. Though every objective assessment indicates that American Jews continue to enjoy a secure and respectable status in this country, history underscores the risks of complacency. But effective counteraction requires that reason dictate strategy. It calls for meticulous factfinding, in-depth assessment of all available information, and careful planning to deal with both immediate events and potential dangers. The American Jewish Committee's ongoing program in this area includes:

Monitoring: AJC chapters and the national office keep constant watch over the activities of all known hate groups in the U.S. as well as their covert supporters. The Committee tracks reports of anti-Semitism anywhere in the country, compiling data that make it possible to separate rumor from fact, and determine whether such manifestations are part of any organized pattern or plan.

4

At least two people, Mel Mermelstein, a survivor of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp and Simon Weisenthal, the Nazi-hunter, have filed claims for the money.

The AJC also monitors the national and international political scene, gathering the background information essential to effectively combat Arab propaganda, Soviet anti-Semitism, religious cultism, right- and left-wing extremism and other threats to Jewish security.

Evaluation: The Committee sponsors conferences of social scientists, law enforcement specialists and historians to assess national and international events and determine their impact on Jews in this country and abroad. AJC-sponsored public-opinion polls periodically test the way the general public feels about Jews, Israel, social and economic issues affecting the status of Jews in this country and abroad. AJC national and foreign staff conduct frequent on-the-scene studies of anti-Semitic outbreaks in Europe and South America. AJC leaders regularly review all the available data and determine what specific response or action is required.

Cooperation: The AJC meets regularly with Federal, state and local law-enforcement officials to review events and trends that suggest possible anti-Semitic components and discuss ways to deal with them. The Committee works closely with other Jewish organizations and with concerned non-Jewish religious and civic groups to share information and plan necessary counter-measures in the face of anti-Jewish manifestations.

Public Education: Committee briefings for investigative reporters and the media generally have sparked important exposes of the Klan and other hate groups. AJC chapters are working to educate young people and the general community about the dangers of anti-Semitism. AJC-sponsored interreligious conferences are alerting Evangelical and other Christian leaders to the threat to religious pluralism inherent in some recent political drives. AJC backgrounders, pamphlets and reports have helped inform and alert the Jewish community and the general public on issues of concern to Jews, and to mobilize intelligent and effective responses to specific provocations.

Combatting anti-Semitism has been the American Jewish Committee's first concern for seventy-five years. It will always be the primary focus of the American Jewish Committee's activities and program.

Prepared by Alisa H. Kesten, Milton Ellerin and Sonya Kaufer
March 30, 1981
81-970-4

ANTI-SEMITISM: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES IN 1980

AMERICAN JEWISH
GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
ARCHIVES

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Guidelines for dealing with local manifestations of anti-Semitism must, of necessity, be in the nature of generalizations. Time, place, and circumstances may dictate different tactics and strategies regardless of similarities in the character of the incident. Yet it is also true that many community situations can be handled effectively by techniques and tactics which have proven successful over the years. Seek out intergroup relations professionals. They can be invaluable in determining whether the matter under consideration requires specialized handling or if the experience in other communities can be successfully adapted to the matter at hand.

In addition, religious and civic leaders are often available as resources, especially if ongoing relationships have been previously established. Such rapport is helpful not only in developing an effective response to anti-Semitic incidents, but in the totality of AJC concerns.

A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

- (1) Whenever feasible, implementation of the "quarantine treatment" (unnecessary publicity) should be a cardinal principle. Do not publicize the event if it is within your capacity to control the situation. With rare exception, the less publicity about an anti-Semitic incident, the better.
- (2) Be sure of the facts. When you first learn of an incident, attempt to determine accurately the who, what, when, and where of the incident.
- (3) In every case involving an anti-Semitic incident notify the AJC area director as soon as is practical. Share with the director duplicate copies of anti-Semitic material where available.
- (4) Do not attempt to solve the problem on your own. The likelihood is that a similar incident has occurred before. AJC experiences can be helpful in determining how to handle the matter.
- (5) Never debate the merits of a bigot's statement. Expose fallacious reasoning rather than attempt to refute specious argument.
- (6) If circumstances require some comment (a letter to the editor, which if unanswered, might persuade the uninformed) frame the reply in a positive manner and avoid repetition of the calumnies.

- (7) Do not attempt any action which would deny a bigot his constitutional rights (freedom of speech, etc.).
- (8) Avoid making statements or taking extreme actions which may attract attention to or sympathy for a bigot.
- (9) Wherever possible, take measures to insure that the Jewish community response is not dictated by extremist groups.

B. WHERE A JEWISH INSTITUTION OR SYNAGOGUE OR CEMETERY HAS BEEN VANDALIZED

- (1) Notify the police as soon as possible. Do not disturb the physical appearance of the desecration or touch anything of a possible evidentiary nature until the police have conducted their examination.
- (2) Where possible, avoid undue publicity. Experience demonstrates that publicized acts of vandalism, anti-Semitic or otherwise, frequently inspire imitative acts.
- (3) If the act of vandalism is such that it cannot be ignored in the press, utilize the incident to inspire condemnatory editorials in the local press, timely sermons by the clergy, programming in the schools and appropriate expressions from community influentials.
- (4) Remain calm and attempt to prevent Jewish community hysteria. It should be noted that Christian churches and cemeteries are also frequently vandalized.
- (5) Maintain frequent contact with the police, and/or elected official to ensure that the matter receives full investigative attention.

C. WIDESPREAD DISTRIBUTION OF ANONYMOUS ANTI-SEMITIC LITERATURE IN PUBLIC PLACES (PARKING LOTS, SHOPPING MALLS, MAIL BOXES, ETC.)

- (1) Secure samples of the literature.
- (2) Report the matter to the local police and make the evidence available to them.
- (3) Bring the matter to the attention of the local prosecuting officials (district attorney), with the request that they determine if such distribution might be in violation of municipal ordinances (anti-littering, public nuisance, etc.).

- (4) Speak to the manager of the premises and suggest that professional advice be sought to prevent similar incidents in the future.
- (5) Do not permit incident to be regarded solely as a Jewish concern. If a public response becomes necessary, encourage it from a broad cross-section of the community.

D. THE RECEIPT OF UNSOLICITED ANTI-SEMITIC MATERIAL THROUGH THE MAIL

- (1) Report the matter to the U.S. postal officials for determination of possible violation of Federal law. While such mailings are rarely prohibited, nevertheless by reporting the matter to the Post Office, you enhance the possibility that some action will be taken (Originals, plus the envelope in which the material was mailed, should always go to the Post Office officials).
- (2) Even if subsequent events indicate that the mailing was widespread and indiscriminate, avoid giving the matter publicity. In the rare instance, where facts and circumstances dictate that the subject matter of the anti-Semitic mailing cannot be ignored, then the public probably should be informed. Again, an appropriate response should avoid mention of the original allegations but instead should convey positive data bearing on the allegations in the offensive material.

E. WHEN THERE IS A RESURGENCE OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (KLAN RALLIES, DEMONSTRATIONS, RACIAL INCIDENTS, RECRUITMENT, AND WIDESPREAD REPORTAGE IN THE LOCAL MEDIA)

- (1) Develop a widespread and broad-based campaign which stresses the unChristian, unAmerican character of the Klan. For this purpose, ready and willing allies can be found in the media, the clergy, schools, civic groups and community influentials.
- (2) Avoid the notion that this is an exclusively Jewish effort.
- (3) Avoid demands or actions which would deny Klan members their Constitutional rights but focus on legal remedies and actions.
- (4) Insist that authorities rigidly enforce the law as it relates to Klan activity (preservation of the peace, protection of the rights of others, enforcement of anti-mask legislation where it exists, etc.)
- (5) Create a legal committee in the private sector to examine state statutes and municipal ordinances and to recommend additional legislation which would constitutionally circum-

scribe Klan activities - i.e., municipal ordinances banning possession of firearms at public demonstrations, etc.

- (6) Keep publicity to a minimum.

F. NAZI MARCHES AND DEMONSTRATIONS

- (1) Recommendation identical to anti-Klan. (E. above)
- (2) Seek to restrain extremist elements within the Jewish community from provoking a riot. Do utilize scheduled Nazi activity for "positive programming."
- (3) Avoid counterdemonstrations which will lead to confrontations and/or the possibility of a riot and widespread publicity. If a counterdemonstration is unavoidable or deemed desirable, schedule it at a different time and place from the scheduled Klan rally.

ME:en

#80-970-6
May 16, 1980

March 6, 1979

MEMORANDUM

TO: Milton Himmelfarb, American Jewish Committee
FROM: William Schneider, Harvard University
RE: Update data on anti-Semitism and Jewish attitudes

This memorandum updates my December 1978 report to the American Jewish Committee on "Anti-Semitism and Israel." As noted on p.16 of that report, Louis Harris and Associates carried out a national survey in the fall of 1978 on behalf of the National Conference of Christians and Jews. The results of the NCCJ survey are now available from Harris in a report entitled, "A Study of Attitudes toward Racial and Religious Minorities and toward Women" (Study No. S2829-B). Harris surveyed a national sample of 2,405 respondents between October 8 and 22, 1978. The sample included 843 white Protestants, 450 non-Hispanic Catholics, 86 Spanish-Americans, plus special oversamples of 732 blacks and 281 Jews (see Appendix A, "Methodology," pp.117-127 of the Report). In reporting responses for the total U.S. public, the black and Jewish oversamples were weighted downward to represent their estimated proportions of the U.S. adult population. Harris also interviewed 265 "community leaders," "corporate leaders," and "national black leaders." Roughly two-thirds of the public and leadership interviews was devoted to racial attitudes and racial issues, including affirmative action. About 20 percent of the questionnaire was taken up with questions concerning women, "Spanish-Americans," Catholics, and Jews, with about equal attention to each. The interviews opened with questions

concerning women and Spanish-Americans, then turned to racial attitudes, and finally went into attitudes concerning Catholics and Jews.

The results include a number of interesting findings concerning anti-Semitism and Jewish attitudes. There are also some findings which are puzzling, disquieting, and open to challenge. I will discuss them under two headings: first, anti-Semitism and attitudes toward Jews, and second, the reported attitudes of Jews.

Attitudes toward Jews

The 1978 NCCJ survey asked non-Jewish respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with eight stereotypes concerning Jews. Four positive stereotypes were intermixed with four negative stereotypes in order to reduce response set. All eight stereotypes had been included in the December 1974 Harris survey of American public opinion toward Jews and Israel, as well as a 1976 Harris survey on the same subject which has not been made public but from which findings are cited in the 1978 NCCJ report. The following are the trends showing agreement by non-Jews with the four negative stereotypes:

NON-JEWISH RESPONDENTS			
Percent "agree"			
Negative stereotypes about Jews:	<u>1974</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1978</u>
1. When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will choose money.	34%	30%	34%
2. Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America.	33	30	29
3. Jews are irritating because they are too aggressive.	31	29	27
4. Most of the slumlords are Jewish.	21	20	20

The data do not show any significant changes in anti-Semitic attitudes over this four-year period. The trend on statement #1 is inconsistent, while statements #2 and #3 show slightly decreasing anti-Semitism. There is nothing here that contradicts the argument made in the December report that acceptance of anti-Semitic stereotypes has been declining slowly since World War II.

However, the four positive stereotypes reveal quite a different trend:

Positive stereotypes about Jews:	NON-JEWISH RESPONDENTS		
	Percent "agree"		
	1974	1976	1978
1. Jews have suffered from persecution through the centuries.	85%	87%	75%
2. The same people who would like to keep the Jews down would also like to keep other minorities down.	74	75	62
3. Jews have supported rights for minority groups more than other white people.	36	36	29
4. Jews have to work harder because they are discriminated against in so many places.	34	35	26

These figures show a sudden, marked decline in agreement with positive statements about Jews in 1978, a trend that was not foreshadowed in the 1976 survey. (Disagreement with each statement also increased in the 1978 survey -- that is, the decline in agreement is not accounted for by an increase in "not sure" responses.)

This shift is very likely related to the following change in the level of anti-Semitism perceived by both Jews and non-Jews in the 1978 survey:

TOTAL PUBLIC			JEWS ONLY		
1974	1976	1978	1974	1976	1978

In general, do you feel Jews around here are discriminated against, or not?

Percent "discriminated against"	22%	21%	7%	49%	50%	18%
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Do you feel that anti-Jewish feeling is on the rise around here today, is diminishing, or is about the same as it has been?

Percent "on the rise"	12%	11%	8%	43%	42%	21%
Percent "same"	55	57	55	43	45	66
Percent "diminishing"	20	20	21	10	10	10

These figures show a simultaneous decline in the level of anti-Semitism perceived by both Jews and the public at large. The percentage of the public saying that Jews are discriminated against fell suddenly by two thirds in the 1978 survey. The rate of decline was almost exactly the same among Jewish respondents between 1976 and 1978. In the public at large, there was a slight decrease in the percentage saying that anti-Jewish feeling was "on the rise" between 1976 and 1978; among Jews, the percentage who felt that way was cut in half.

There is no obvious explanation for this rather sudden shift in perceptions. Given the timing of the survey (mid-October 1978), it may be that the mood of the public -- and of Jews -- reflected the optimism of the Camp David summit, which had ended in apparent success only a few weeks before. In any case, the data do suggest that the decline in the acceptance of pro-Semitic stereotypes in 1978 does not signify an increase in anti-Semitism, since agreement with the negative stereotypes hardly changed. Instead, the decrease in "sympathy" for the Jews seems to be related to a decrease in the perception of Jews as a disadvantaged or persecuted group.

I would agree here with the interpretation offered by Harris in his report to the National Conference: "Fundamentally, what has happened is that far more non-Jews now tend to think that Jews have it made and therefore do not really require allies in the non-Jewish community to fight anti-Semitism when it might appear." However, the finding that Jews see themselves as facing less discrimination and less anti-Semitism warns against drawing a too-hasty conclusion that Jews are being "deserted" by non-Jews.

Responses to the stereotypes may be broken down by race for 1974 and 1978. In the case of the four positive stereotypes, both whites and blacks followed the trend of decreasing agreement. However, an interesting racial difference appears in the case of the four negative stereotypes:

	Percent "agree"				
	NON-JEWISH				BLACK
	WHITES		BLACKS		LEADERS
Negative stereotypes about Jews:	1974	1978	1974	1978	1978
1. When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will choose money.	32%	32%	48%	56%	81%
2. Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America.	33	28	34	37	50
3. Jews are irritating because they are too aggressive.	32	27	25	29	65
4. Most of the slumlords are Jewish.	20	17	37	41	67

White anti-Semitism, in the form of agreement with these negative stereotypes, seems to have declined slightly between 1974 and 1978. But black anti-Semitism actually rose according to these same measures. All of these measures are strongly correlated with education (report to the AJC, pp.59-70), but it can hardly be the case that education among blacks decreased between 1974 and 1978. My report to the AJC indicated that both black and white

anti-Semitism appears to have decreased between 1964 and 1974 (pp. 88-93), but white anti-Semitism decreased much faster, a trend which left blacks relatively more anti-Semitic than whites in 1974 (Figure 4b, p. 92).

The 1978 survey gives evidence for the first time that black anti-Semitism has been increasing absolutely. I also reported that, among blacks in 1974, anti-Semitism was inversely related to age, that is, it was strongest among younger black respondents (p.94). Since the latter group includes the best educated, least religious, and most politically conscious blacks, it was argued that there may be an important political and ideological component to black anti-Semitism (p.94). This argument is supported by the 1978 NCCJ survey, which shows shockingly high endorsement of negative stereotypes about Jews by the 53 "national black leaders" interviewed by Harris. This is not the anti-Semitism of ignorance or religious bigotry; it is the anti-Semitism of political conflict and confrontation.

The NCCJ survey asked one question about the perceived roles of different groups and institutions in supporting racial equality:

For each of the following groups and institutions, would you tell me if you feel it has really been interested in seeing blacks achieve full equality in the U.S., has been indifferent to black equality, or has tried to prevent blacks from achieving full equality.

Twenty groups and institutions were listed, including large corporations, newspapers, universities and colleges, labor unions, the federal government, the Supreme Court, white Protestant churches (tenth on the list), the Catholic Church (sixteenth), and "Jewish groups" (seventeenth). The following table shows the perceived support for black equality by the three religious groups on the list.

Role of . . . in promoting black equality:	PUBLIC 1978			LEADERSHIP 1978		
	Whites	Blacks	Jews	Comm- nity Leaders	Corpor- ate Leaders	Nat'l Black Leaders
<u>Jewish groups</u>						
Really interested	23%	18%	50%	34%	50%	39%
Indifferent	29	32	30	39	26	31
Tries to prevent	7	13	4	7	9	16
<u>The Catholic Church</u>						
Really interested	39%	28%	25%	43%	45%	37%
Indifferent	27	32	31	33	39	46
Tries to prevent	4	10	8	5	2	8
<u>White Protestant Churches</u>						
Really interested	33%	12%	17%	27%	37%	6%
Indifferent	34	40	32	46	41	65
Tries to prevent	11	24	19	14	14	23

The perception of Jewish groups as strong supporters of black equality is high among Jews but not among whites and blacks in the public at large.

Whites tend to see Jewish groups as less supportive of black equality than either the Catholic or Protestant churches, in large part because so many whites (41 percent) say that they don't know whether Jewish groups support blacks. All groups except for the Jews themselves perceive Jewish groups as more opposed to black equality than the Catholic church and less opposed than white Protestant churches. Still, the proportions saying that Jewish groups "try to prevent blacks from achieving full equality" are not high, even among blacks and black leaders (13 and 16 percent, respectively), while about one quarter of blacks and black leaders see white Protestant churches as opposed to black equality. On the other hand, only 18 percent of the black public say that Jewish groups are "really interested" in seeing blacks achieve full equality. This figure rises to 39 percent among national black leaders. Thus, there appears to be

some consciousness of Jewish commitment to civil rights among black leaders, who nevertheless are willing to endorse negative stereotypes about Jews. When offered the statement, "Jews have supported rights for minority groups more than other white people," a statement which presents an invidious comparison, only 28 percent of white respondents agreed in 1978, while 38 percent of blacks and "a majority" of black leaders agreed. Jewish support for civil rights, which is duly recognized by black leaders, does not seem to inhibit the expression of open anti-Jewish hostility; indeed, many argue that Jewish involvement in the civil rights movement is partly the cause of black anti-Semitism.

Finally, a curious result. The NCCJ survey asked two questions about affirmative action for seven different groups -- women, the physically handicapped, Spanish-Americans, Catholics, Jews, Vietnam veterans, and blacks (in that order): "All in all, do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs in industry for (group), provided there are no rigid quotas?" and "Do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs in higher education for (group), provided there are no rigid quotas?" The results show that a majority of the public, both black and white, favors affirmative action in both industry and higher education for all these groups:

Percent in favor of affirmative action

1978

For . . .	<u>In industry</u>		<u>In higher education</u>	
	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Blacks</u>	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Blacks</u>
The physically handicapped	87%	88%	85%	91%
Vietnam veterans	73	83	73	85
Women	68	86	70	90
Blacks	67	89	68	91
Spanish-Americans	65	77	68	83
Catholics	51	63	54	71
Jews	51	59	53	67

No more than 22 percent of whites and 13 percent of blacks opposes any of these fourteen affirmative action programs. Blacks tend to be more favorable than whites to every affirmative action program, including those for Jews. Both blacks and whites are slightly more supportive of affirmative action in higher education than in industry for all of the groups concerned. But the truly striking finding is how much support each of these programs elicits. Majorities support affirmative action programs for Catholics and Jews, who are normally not considered disadvantaged groups and are certainly not among the "scheduled castes" designated by the federal government. Only 17-18 percent of whites and 11-14 percent of blacks volunteered the response that affirmative action programs are "not needed" by Catholics and Jews.

One factor contributing to the high level of support for affirmative action is surely the inclusion of the clause, "provided there are no rigid quotas," in the question. Research by S.M. Lipset and myself has shown that the American public is willing to support programs of compensatory action to help previously disadvantaged minority groups catch up to the prevailing competitive standards of society, but the public draws the line at preferential treatment whereby competitive standards are suspended for certain groups (Lipset and Schneider, "The Bakke Case: How Would It Be Decided at the Bar of Public Opinion?" Public Opinion, Vol. 1 (March/April 1978), pp. 38-44). The Harris questions cited above leave "affirmative action programs" totally undefined except in terms of what they are not -- namely, quotas. By explicitly excluding quotas, which are the most widely recognized form of preferential treatment, the Harris questions raise public support for affirmative action. Moreover, questions asked just before these two in the interview tended to provide positive

interpretations of "affirmative action": " . . . special programs to make sure that women and minorities are given every chance to have equal opportunities in employment and education," " . . . special training and advice to women and minorities so that they can perform better on the job," and "affirmative action programs helping women and minorities in employment and education."

Probably the most important information that can be gained from these questions is the ranking of the seven groups inquired about. The group seen as most deserving of "affirmative action programs" is the physically handicapped. This result suggests that the public tends to interpret affirmative action as essentially special help. White respondents ranked Vietnam veterans as the next most deserving group, with women, blacks, and Spanish-Americans -- the three groups most frequently included in government and university affirmative action programs -- just below them on the list. Interestingly, blacks put women and blacks at the top of the list but were somewhat less favorable to affirmative action for Spanish-Americans. The two lowest-ranked groups were, as noted, Catholics and Jews, although still a majority favored "special help" for them. Other NCCJ questions reveal that only 7 percent of the public feel that there is discrimination against Jews and only 4 percent feel that there is discrimination against Catholics. When each group is mentioned, the public probably asks how much "special help" each group needs and deserves. It is likely that all seven groups are seen as deserving, and so a majority supports affirmative action for each. The ranking appears to be in terms of need, and by this criterion, Catholics and Jews are at the bottom of the list.

Attitudes of Jews

The most disturbing results of the NCCJ survey concern the attitudes of Harris's Jewish oversample. Harris presents several instances of Jews being more anti-black than non-Jewish whites. Only a few examples are given, but they all occur on questions of basic racial prejudice and not on more complex questions concerning affirmative action. To wit:

(1) On p.42 of the NCCJ report, Harris displays a full breakdown of responses to the following question: "Would you like to see the children in your family go to school with black children or not?" Here are the answers.

Would you like to see children in your family . . .	White Respondents, 1978			
	All Whites	White Protestants	White Catholics	Jews
Go to school with blacks	32%	30%	35%	21%
Not go with blacks	14	16	11	21
Already go to school with blacks (volunteered)	20	21	19	18
Makes no difference (vol.)	30	30	31	33
Not sure	4	3	4	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The results show Jewish respondents less likely to say that they want their children to go to school with blacks (21 percent of Jews, 32 percent of non-Jewish whites) and more likely to say that they do not want their children to go to school with blacks (21 percent of Jews, 14 percent of non-Jewish whites).

(2) All other examples are simply cited by Harris on p.87 of his report, but no complete tabulations are provided. Harris asked, "Would it upset you personally a lot, some but not a lot, only a little, or not at all if blacks moved into this neighborhood?" In the total white

population (presumably including Jews), 39 percent said that they would be upset if blacks moved into their neighborhood. The 39 percent figure is the sum of three responses: would be upset "a lot" (14 percent), "some but not a lot" (14 percent), and "only a little" (11 percent).

Only the summary figure is given for Jewish respondents: "46% of all Jews say they would be upset if blacks moved into their neighborhoods" (p.87).

(3) Another question: "Generally speaking, do you favor full racial integration, integration in some areas of life, or separation of the races?" Harris sums the percentages who say they favor "integration in some areas of life" and "separation of the races" and calls this figure the percentage who "oppose full integration." The results show that 25 percent of Jews favor "full racial integration," compared with 35 percent of all whites. The percentage of Jews who "oppose full integration" (more precisely, who do not favor full integration) was 63, compared with 58 percent of all whites (p.87).

(4) No figures were given for the following finding: "Jewish parents hold more to the belief that blacks in the classroom with their children will hold back the learning process for their own offspring than do non-Jewish whites" (p.87). The exact question was as follows: "It's been said that if black children all went to school with white children, the education of white children would suffer. The reason given is that the black children would hold back the white children. Do you believe that or not?" Among all white respondents, 26 percent said this would happen and 67 percent disagreed (p.41).

(5) Jewish responses are shown in two other places in the NCCJ report. One is in connection with anti-Catholic attitudes. Respondents were given the stereotype, "Catholics tend to favor their own." Harris

reports that "this charge is believed by 63-23% among white Protestants, by an even higher 68-21% among Jewish people, and by a lesser 57-15% among blacks" (p.77). Another anti-Catholic statement is given: "Catholics tend to be narrow-minded, under the influence of church dogma." Among white Protestants, 33 percent agreed and 50 percent disagreed, while 42 percent of Jewish respondents agreed and 50 percent disagreed. Among blacks, 30 percent agreed and 32 percent disagreed, with 39 percent not sure (p.77). Thus Jews also appear to be more anti-Catholic than white Protestants.

(6) However, Jews show up as more liberal in their attitudes toward women: "There has been much talk about changing women's status in society. On the whole, do you favor or oppose most of the efforts to strengthen and change women's status in society?" The total public favored such efforts, 66 to 20 percent. White Protestants were 60 to 25 percent favorable, white Catholics were 74 to 14 percent favorable, and Jews were 77 to 13 percent favorable (p.64).

Harris is fairly cautious in interpreting his findings concerning Jewish racial attitudes. He observes on p.87, "It is fair to conclude that as a group, Jews are not today in the vanguard of non-black people pressing for integration and progress for blacks." He goes on to draw attention to the evidence that "for their part, blacks hold attitudes toward Jews which are considerably less tolerant and sympathetic than is the case with the rest of the non-Jewish public." And in his "Overview" where he summarizes the principal findings: "Blacks tend to be more anti-Jewish than any other group. Jewish attitudes toward blacks have also tended to harden. The entire area of black-Jewish relations is one that is still in sore need of attention by organizations who are promoting

greater understanding between the races and religions" (p.xvii).

Given the historical identification of Jews with racial liberalism and the civil rights movement, the findings of the NCCJ survey are deeply disturbing. I cannot recall any other survey which shows Jews to be more anti-black than other whites. Before jumping to alarming conclusions, however, a few methodological problems must be considered -- sample size, comparability of Jews with other whites, and sampling procedure.

(1) Most national samples these days number 1,000-1,500 respondents. With Jews fewer than 3 percent of the U.S. population, the number of Jewish respondents sampled is almost always less than fifty. Even if sampling procedures were perfectly random, answers from such a small number of respondents would be subject to a great deal of random variation, -- not bias, but purely random "sampling error" in the technical sense. As a result, few standard national surveys report responses for Jews. In the few cases when Jewish responses have been reported -- local surveys in heavily Jewish areas and election day surveys with much larger sample sizes -- Jews have, to my knowledge, always been more Democratic and more liberal than other whites. Harris oversampled Jews in the 1978 NCCJ survey (as he did in his 1974 and 1976 surveys, which dealt with anti-Semitism and Israel but not race), drawing a sample, as noted, of 281. Thus in purely numerical terms, if Harris's Jewish oversample were a random sample of all Jews in the U.S., their responses should be more stable (that is, less subject to random sampling variation) than Jewish samples of smaller size.

I performed a chi-square test on responses to Q.6b (whether respondents wanted to see their children go to school with blacks), comparing the responses of Jews and non-Jewish whites. The results showed that it is quite unlikely -- less than one chance in a thousand -- that the dif-

ference between Jewish and non-Jewish whites in Harris's sample is attributable to sampling error alone, given the magnitude of the difference and the size of the samples. Chi-square tests could not be performed on the other Jewish-non-Jewish differences, since the full tables were not given in the report and since most comparisons were between Jews alone and all white respondents together. However, it is likely that all the differences are statistically significant, given the size of the Jewish oversample (that is, it is extremely improbable that they were produced by random sampling error).

(2) Is it fair to compare Jews with all other whites? After all, the distribution of the Jewish population, sociologically and geographically, is quite different from the distribution of the non-Jewish white population. Most Jews live in urban areas, particularly the New York metropolitan area, where there has been a great deal of racial conflict in recent years. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to compare the racial attitudes of Jews with the racial attitudes of other whites who live in the same places.

I would strongly recommend against such a control. One reason is that once you begin applying controls to obtain "comparable" samples of Jews and non-Jewish whites, there is no end to the adjustments that might be made. Should the samples be matched in terms of urban-rural residence? Region of residence? Education? Occupation? Age? These kinds of adjustments are very risky and must have a strong theoretical justification. A second argument is that such controls would probably make the findings appear worse for Jews. The most racially prejudiced whites are not urban dwellers, but rural residents, Southerners, and less well educated whites. For instance, the NCCJ survey showed 21 percent of Jews saying that they did not want their children to go to school with blacks. The percentages giving this same response were 23 among Southern whites, 19 among rural

whites, and 24 among whites who did not attend high school. On the other hand, the percentages who said they did not want their children to attend school with blacks were only 11 among Eastern residents, 5 among Westerners, 15 among urban dwellers, 13 among suburbanites, and 9 among the college-educated (p.42). Jews are, of course, disproportionately underrepresented among Southerners, rural dwellers, and the less well educated, while Jews are more likely to be urban and suburban dwellers, residents of the Eastern and Western regions of the country, and college-educated. Selecting only those whites who are socially and demographically comparable to Jews would therefore produce a much more liberal sample of non-Jewish whites.

(3) The one criticism that would seem to me to be most relevant concerns Harris's sampling procedure. Is there any indication that Harris's sampling procedure produced some kind of systematic bias rather than a truly random sample of American Jews?

It is extremely difficult to devise a reliable procedure for drawing a random sample of American Jews. The U.S. Census provides no information whatever on Jews. Not the least serious problem is that of deciding who should be considered Jewish. The most accurate procedure is probably the one used in most standard samples of the U.S. adult population. This is to draw a random sample of American adults and ask them to classify themselves by religion: "Are you Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or something else?" Those who claim to have no religious affiliation (a small number) can then be asked, "In what religion were you raised?" Most pollsters have devised very careful and accurate procedures for drawing random samples of the total U.S. population, and in most cases, Jews are represented in just about the right proportion. Since Jews fall into the sample purely at random (like everyone else), this procedure involves no systematic bias.

The problem with this method, as noted, is that you don't get enough Jews in the sample. With numbers smaller than 50, even if the sampling procedure is perfectly random, sampling error is still a problem. In order to obtain a sample of 281 Jews by this method, a national sample of almost 9,400 Americans would have to be obtained (3% of 9400 = 282) -- a tremendously expensive and inefficient exercise.

What did Harris do in the NCCJ survey? The report gives only a brief explanation of the sampling procedure:

Because it was clearly important to examine Jewish attitudes in some detail, and because Jews represent only 3% of the population, it was necessary to supplement the number of Jewish interviews that would be conducted in the cross-section. A special oversample of Jews, 32 sample points, with 7 interviews in each, was therefore developed using data on the distribution of the Jewish population from the American Jewish Yearbook. A total of 281 interviews were conducted with Jews in the cross-section and oversample. (pp.118-119)

Thus, Harris's total sample of Jews appears to have included about 57 interviews conducted as part of the regular national cross-section, plus the oversample of 224 Jewish respondents (32×7). In drawing the oversample, Harris appears to have identified sampling points with heavy concentrations of Jews, and his interviewers were very likely instructed to go out and look for Jews. Two sources of bias emerge in such a procedure: (1) Jews are sought only in heavily Jewish neighborhoods and not elsewhere, and (2) interviewers look for signs of Jewish identification before selecting an eligible respondent -- a "Jewish-sounding name," a mezuzah on the doorpost, the proper smells coming from the kitchen, or whatever. (My guess is that Harris did not tell the interviewers to sample the neighborhood randomly and then see how many Jews turned up. It is more likely that the interviewers were instructed to find seven Jews at each sampling point.)

Thus, the oversample probably included mostly easily identifiable

Jews who live in heavily Jewish neighborhoods. There is good reason to believe that such Jews are not representative of the total Jewish population. Surveys of Jews in New York City, such as one which I conducted of Democratic mayoral primary voters in 1973, and precinct analyses of Jewish voting behavior suggest the following relationship: older, poorer, and less well educated Jews -- who also tend to live in heavily Jewish neighborhoods and to be more religious and therefore more easily identifiable as Jews -- tend to have more "conservative" attitudes on racial issues, when compared to younger, wealthier, and better-educated Jews who often do not live in heavily Jewish neighborhoods and may not be easily identifiable as Jews. I will not go into the complex reasons why this relationship holds, except to indicate (1) similar divisions are found in other white ethnic groups, and (2) the cleavage is much more pronounced on racial issues than in other areas of politics.

Of course I have no data with which to demonstrate that Harris's oversample is in fact systematically biased. It seems to me that we should request more information about the Jewish respondents in the NCCJ poll. At best, I would like to get a copy of the raw data on cards or tape. Otherwise, I would like to inspect the complete marginals from the survey (that is, the distribution of responses to all questions) for the Jewish cross-section sample and the Jewish oversample separately. At the very least, we would want to look at the demographic characteristics of the two Jewish samples (age, education, income, occupational status, partisanship, etc.). (There is no evidence that Harris asked any questions about the religious observance of either Jews or Christians.) Since the actual parameters of the U.S. Jewish population are unknown, we could not undertake any definitive tests to demonstrate sample bias. However, we could probably

recognize gross biases, and we could also compare the Jewish oversample with characteristics of Jews interviewed in this and other cross-section samples. Finally, we might be able to obtain more detailed information about the sampling procedure, instructions to the interviewers, and identification of the 32 sampling points used in the Jewish oversample -- with the cooperation of the Harris organization. If the National Conference of Christians and Jews is serious about using its data to promote brotherhood, then they ought to be willing to endorse an inquiry into these matters.

