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MS-603: Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum Collection, 1945-1992.

Series C: Interreligious Activities. 1952-1992

Box 23, Folder 5, Hendricks, Steve - "Religious & Political
Fundamentalism: Links Among Beliefs & Behavior" [a proposal for
funding], 1974.

March 15, 1974

Sherwood Sandweiss

Milton Himmelfarb

Steve Hendricks -- Center for Political Studies/
Institute for Social Research/University of Michigan
(your memo of March 13)

Am I hallucinating, or did you and I discuss this on the
phone? I think I told you, more or less, that in my opinion
Hendricks is flogging a dead horse and that the AJC should not
put money into this enterprise,

I am giving it to Marc Tanenbaum.

MH:rg

cc: Marc Tanenbaum ✓

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date March 13, 1974
to Milton Himmelfarb
from Sherwood Sandweiss
subject Steve Hendricks - Center for Political Studies/
 Institute for Social Research/University of Michigan

Some time ago I sent you a proposal including questionnaire and bibliography of Steve Hendricks at the University of Michigan. In my note to you I asked you about possible AJC support in one form or another for this interesting study of Religious and Political Fundamentalism...The Links Among Beliefs and Behavior (copy of my original memo enclosed.)

If you do not see a way of aiding this project from your departmental perspective, would you please share it with Marc Tanenbaum, and if he is not interested, please return it to me.

Marc will be here on April 3rd and I wanted to ask him about it after you have talked to him, or if you would prefer, I will speak to him directly about it.

This is my only copy and therefore I would like to have it back before April 3rd. Thanking you in advance.

Regards.



SS/bm

cc: Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum ✓

encl.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date January 25, 1974
to Milton Himmelfarb
from Sherwood Sandweiss
subject A Study of Religious and Political Fundamentalism:
The Links Among Beliefs and Behavior

Under separate cover I am sending you a proposal, prospectus for research and questionnaire of Steve Hendricks, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. He is a very impressive scholar, currently working at the Institute for Social Research at U. of M.

The subject of his research is Religious and Political Fundamentalism: The Links Among Beliefs and Behavior. I have met with Steve and am very impressed with him. Inasmuch as the research could have some application to our own AJC interests, I am wondering whether you would be interested in contacting him further about this project. I suggest that you share it with Marc Tanenbaum, who would also be interested in this research.

Perhaps AJC would want to be involved with it directly or at a later date want to utilize a popularized version of the findings. You may write either directly to Steve whose letter to me is attached, or to me directly if you have any further question.

This is the only copy I have and I would appreciate your returning it to me if you are unable to use it.


Regards.

Note to be mentioned.

Woody

SS/bm
encl.
cc: Marc Tanenbaum

Sandness
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Steve Hendricks
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

3409H City Center Building
Institute for Social Research

I. Subject of the Study¹

This research concentrates on the empirical "overlap" between socio-political and religious conservatism among white Americans. It is a well established fact that fundamentalist Protestants are over-represented among both the elite and supporters of right-wing causes in the United States.² But the relationship can be understood fully only if the religious groups from which many rightists are drawn are subjected to investigation, and here the evidence is considerably more shaky. Most work in the sociology and psychology of religion has focused on attitudes that are fairly closely linked to Christian ethics, such as racial and religious prejudice.³ This study, while including such items, pushes beyond this concern to examine more overtly political attitudes and the development of secular ideologies among fundamentalists, a field that has received scant attention.⁴

In the present work several varieties of political alienation and conservatism; the respondent's degree of ideological constraint and sophistication; and the nature and extent of the individual's political participation serve as the primary dependent variables. Three partially alternative, but interlinked explanatory models will be tested to account for various socio-political "types" among fundamentalists. The first of these, termed the religious ideology model, looks for discriminating factors among the components of the individual's religious belief and behavior system.⁵ The second, a cognitive structure model, seeks to explain the overlap between religious and secular "fundamentalism" by means of the similar appeal each holds for the "dogmatic" mind.⁶ The status discrepancy model also deemphasizes the independent impact of religion, but seeks to predict the appeal of rightist thinking to fundamentalists according to certain status characteristics prevalent among them.⁷

Since all three models are prominent explanations for the rise of the "radical right," the Wallace constituency, or even the "silent majority," the present study allows one to control for competing models and isolate the independent impacts when they occur. In addition the process through which more "basic" social and psychological factors are translated

into religious and political behavior can be traced.

II. Significance of the Study.

The present research attempts to bridge an unfortunate gap between the sociology and psychology of religion and the work dealing with the determinants of political alienation, ideology, and participation. In doing so it confronts some of the more interesting theoretical puzzles in social research. Among others are the following.

A] Traditionally alienation has been considered primarily in terms of individual level incapacities and isolation.⁸ Only in the late sixties did the phenomenon of group level or subcultural alienation receive some attention, and even then interest was concentrated on the alienation of students and Blacks.⁹ In the proposed research I hope to extend this perspective to the rightist alienation of individuals in close-knit religious groups. This will entail a consideration of alienated incapacity, a concept stemming from the "mass society" literature, and a possible motive for joining sectarian groups, but not a characteristic of religious or political activists.¹⁰ That in turn will have to be distinguished from alienated "rejection" which may be promoted by the sectarian¹¹ and orthodox aspects of the fundamentalist congregation.

B] In spite of its wide use in the sociology of religion, the "church-sect" continuum has probably spurred more ideal typical theorizing than empirical research. The groups on which this study focuses combine characteristics of the sect with the more secular "denomination." Crucial to the predictions about the political behavior of the fundamentalist is the degree to which his religious teachings stress withdrawal or evangelical involvement in the secular world. This may be a crucial variable in distinguishing alienated withdrawal from rightist activism.

C] The evidence from national opinion surveys has established fairly clearly that ideological differentiation and constraint are positively correlated with measures of social status such as education.¹² Yet fundamentalists as a group have relatively low levels of education

and nonetheless manifest high levels of constraint in reference to religious subjects.¹³ Whether this belief system serves as a "surrogate" for secular education and is "generalized" into secular conservatism is of course one major interest of the present research.

D] In the past research dealing with problems of cognitive consistency and dissonance has suffered through an inadequate consideration of the relative centrality or salience of belief elements.¹⁴ In much the same way, scholars looking for links between religious beliefs and secular attitudes have largely ignored the interactive impact of religious salience with the content of the beliefs.¹⁵ By concentrating on individuals for whom religion is highly salient, the links and reactions to dissonance can be specified with considerably greater clarity than in past research.¹⁶

E] The literature utilizing some form of status inconsistency concept to explain political attitudes and behavior falls largely into two categories. On one hand, cross-pressure hypotheses predict moderation among those subjected to conflicting normative demands and levels of respect.¹⁷ In contrast status discrepancy or "crystallization" hypotheses find seeds of extremism among the same individuals.¹⁸ Fundamentalists constitute an especially interesting group in light of these contradictory expectations, since the sectarian aspects of their religiosity and the increasing secularization of the culture makes them especially susceptible to conflicting demands and perceptions of overall status decline. Whether such "discrepant" individuals constitute the recruitment base for extreme conservatism or the most moderate elements of the fundamentalist congregation is a key question in the present work.

F] Finally, a somewhat more socially relevant aspect of the present work is its focus on individuals for whom social and cultural change poses severe psychological problems. It seems that this particular reaction to "future shock" may be on the increase as change becomes increasingly rapid and society increasingly complex.¹⁹ The attempt to move churches toward social activism has been largely rejected by whites. Conservative movements in mainstream denominations and the

seeming growth of fundamental denominations indicate that the face of American Protestantism may be turning decidedly toward the right. The political impact of this change may be no more than to reduce the resources available for programs of social change. But the tremendous growth of parochial education among fundamentalist congregations in recent years bears a more ominous tone. Such schools seem more than a short-term reaction to integration in the public system. The curricula and teaching methods reflect a total rejection of cultural pluralism and freedom of thought. It may very well be that the future of technocratic society includes a strong component of religious revival. The question then becomes what sort of values are likely to underly that growth. The answer, I'm afraid, is not necessarily in the realm of toleration and humanism.

III. Plan of the Project

The data analysis in the research is to be based on two samples. Already available is the national sample of whites from the 1972 National Election Study by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. These data include responses from about 240 professed members of fundamentalist denominations. [Excluding Southern Baptists; a separately coded group of about 300 respondents.] In spite of the dearth of religious items in the national study, this sample allows one to compare fundamentalist identifiers with mainstream Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and those without a formal religious affiliation. Dividing the Protestants into fundamental and mainstream groups allows a better measure of religiosity than the common practice of aggregating all Protestant respondents, but the measures of religiosity are simply insufficient, and the internal cleavages within the fundamentalist category too broad to allow tests of all three models.

Thus, the major data collection tasks for the research lie in the local sample of fundamentalists from southeastern Michigan. This group will be drawn from between four and ten congregations spanning several dimensions of church organization and theological position. The total sample size will depend upon available funding, but will probably include about three hundred respondents.

The questionnaire instrument for the local sample is included with the prospectus. The items were chosen to allow a simultaneous test of all three models, and to allow comparisons with the national sample mentioned above. It is designed for either paper-pencil or interview format. In either case the questionnaire will be supplemented by open-ended interview items dealing with the individual's perception of major political and social problems in the United States.



IV. Statement of Costs

The primary funding needs are in the area of survey sampling.

1] Preparation and Duplication of Questionnaire	\$300.00
2] Preparation of Data for Analysis (Codebook Preparation, keypunching, etc.)	\$300.00
3] Interview Costs @ \$4.00 per interview (Includes token donation of \$1.00 per interview to the Church and \$3.00 per interview payment to interviewer.)	\$1200.00
4] Travel costs for interviews @ 1.00 each	<u>\$300.00</u>
TOTAL SURVEY SAMPLING COSTS	\$2100.00

NOTES

1. This is a severely condensed version of arguments presented in a research prospectus prepared for the dissertation committee. For the most part the works cited are for illustrative purposes only, but the bibliography is largely complete. A more complete version of the research and its theoretical antecedents is available from the author.

2. See Chesler and Schmuck (1969); Grupp (1969); Lipset and Raab (1970); Orum (1972); Rohter (1969a; 1969b); Wolfinger et al (1964).

3. See Adorno et al (1950); Allen and Spilka (1967); Allport (1966); Allport and Ross (1967); Bahr et al (1971); Blum and Mann (1960); Evans (1952); Feagin (1964; 1965); Glock and Stark (1966); Maranell (1967); Martin and Westie (1959); Middleton (1973); Photiadis and Bigger (1962); Wilson (1960).

4. Among the exceptions are Anderson (1966); Gibbs, Mueller and Woods (1973); Johnson (1962; 1964); Lenski (1961); Lipset and Raab (1970); Rohter (1969a; 1969b); Rokeach (1969a; 1969b); Summers et al (1970).

5. The major theoretical development of the religious ideology model has been undertaken by Glock and Stark and their colleagues at the University of California Survey Research Center's Research Program in Religion and Society. See Glock and Stark (1965; 1966); Glock et al (1967); Stark and Glock (1968).

6. This model is derived largely from Rokeach's work. See Rokeach (1960; 1968).

7. The principal application of the status discrepancy framework to political conservatism is Bell's edited volume, (1963b).

8. The primary examples are cited by Seeman (1959). Olsen (1969) makes a distinction similar to the one made here between incapacities and rejection.

9. See Coser (1964); Pinard (1968); Von Eschen, Kirk and Pinard (1970).

10. See Grupp (1969); Keedy (1958); Schoenberger (1968).

11. See Wilson (1967; 1970); W. Stark (1967).
12. See Converse (1964; 1972).
13. See Stark and Glock (1968).
14. See Rokeach (1968).
15. See Gibbs, Mueller and Wood (1973).
16. The argument is directed essentially toward reduction of error variance. See Willer (1970: chapter six).
17. See Hunt and Cushing's discussion of the literature. (1972)
18. The status discrepancy literature could be cited for pages. Lenski (1954; 1956) coined the term "status crystallization." Geschwender (1972), Jackson (1967), Merelman (1968), Rokeach (1968), and Triemann (1966) attempt in one way or another to link status discrepancy concepts to psychological variables, primarily those tied to cognitive balance models. (See Abelson (1967).)
19. See Kelley (1973) and Streiker and Strober (1973). For somewhat contrary views see Stark and Glock (1968: 203) and Bibby and Brinkerhoff (1973).



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RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FUNDAMENTALISM:

The Links Among Beliefs and Behavior

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES
[A Prospectus for Research]



J. Stephen Hendricks

January 12, 1974

INTRODUCTION

Let us all thank whatever God we severally worship that there is so large a remnant of the really true believers still left. We honor them. We need their steadying adherence to the rock of reverence, and their aspirations of unwavering obedience to the ancient and divine commandments. We desperately need their unshakable confidence in absolutes, eternal principles and truths, in a world of increasing relativism and transitoriness in all things. We admire them. In fact, as will become clear tomorrow, the young man I admire most of all those America has produced was a fundamentalist Baptist missionary named John Birch....

-Robert Welch¹

Though his distaste at the thought would no doubt rival the scholars with whom he's placed, the founder of the John Birch Society is in agreement with a major tenet of "liberal" social science in the United States. With a rather extraordinary consensus social researchers tend to accept the assertion that religiosity, especially of the fundamentalist variety, leads rather directly to conservative secular beliefs. Unfortunately, like so many of our hard-won generalizations, the need to specify and qualify the assertion hasn't disappeared with its universal acceptance. Indeed, I hope to show that its unquestioned acceptance has tended to paper over some of the complexities of the relationships involved.

Before turning to those complexities, however, let's consider some of the evidence on which the generalization is based. Unlike the situation in European social science, most of the empirical support for the theory comes in the United States, not from studies of the religious, but from studies of rightists. A wide variety of work indicates that white Protestant fundamentalists are heavily represented among both the elites and supporters of far right political groups. While the majority of these studies is concerned with the "radical right," more conventional forms of conservatism receive strong support from fundamentalists as well.²

But one's interest in looking at the overlap between religiosity and conservatism may just as easily come from the religious side. In other words, what factors make only some fundamentalists susceptible to various rightist appeals? There is some evidence to suggest that fundamentalist right-wingers differ from their political allies in predictable ways. The converse of the question is how political fundamentalists differ from their less political religious brethren. In that case, of course, samples of religious identifiers rather than rightists are called for, and here the evidence is either confused or non-existent.

A recent compilation of empirical work dealing with the links among religious identifiers indicates that out of almost two hundred tests surveyed in the literature, less than half managed to establish the hypothesized relationship between some aspect of religiosity and some form of conservatism.³ Not a very satisfying result to say the least. But which of a multitude of influencing factors lead to such discrepancies? The research outlined here is meant to provide some of the answers. By concentrating on white Protestant fundamentalists, a group that is demonstrably attracted in disproportionate numbers to rightist extremism, I hope to illustrate some of the problems of previous work and to sort out some of the empirical and theoretical anomalies.

The research prospectus is divided into three parts, each of which is a condensation of arguments to be presented in the dissertation itself. In the next section I'll consider the various dependent variables in the proposed project. Three forms of conservatism that have been related to religiosity are outlined, and three sets of indicators are discussed. By considering combinations of attitudes and behavior in the latter set, the various types of conservatism can be operationalized.

The second major section is concerned with three explanatory frameworks into which the dependent variables can be placed. Since each puts crucial emphasis on different links between fundamentalism and secular conservatism, they are to some extent alternative models that allow simultaneous tests of competing theories.

But at critical points the explanations derived from each are complementary. The variables in the religious ideology model, for example, may be seen in some cases as more exact specifications of cognitive structure and social status characteristics that comprise the other two models. Unfortunately because the simultaneous tests of competing hypotheses must await data collection, any attempt to fashion an overall explanatory structure is reserved for the dissertation itself.

The third section of the prospectus deals primarily with problems that sampling and instrumentation confront in research such as this. To maximize variance and controls while minimizing cost, two samples will be utilized. A primary group of respondents drawn from fundamentalist congregations in southeastern Michigan will be combined with data from the 1972 national Election Study conducted by the Institute for Social Research. This secondary sample provides numerous checks for the local sample, as well as data for comparisons of fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists. Given the deviant nature of the groups that form the focus of this research, one faces a series of data collection problems. These are discussed in the final section of the text.

Finally, in outlining the prospectus as a whole, I should note two further aspects. The proposed questionnaire instrument for the local sample is included in the appendix for the reader's information. Second, the bibliography included here constitutes what I feel to be a fairly complete list of relevant literature from the various theoretical viewpoints considered in this study. I'd appreciate the reader bringing to my attention any obvious omissions.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Let's consider for a moment the variety of meanings attributed to "conservatism" when it's related to religion. The simplest way to approach the question, I think, is in terms of the familiar "church-sect" typology that structures so much of the theory in the sociology of religion.⁴

On the "church" side is what one might term "ecclesiastical" conservatism, stemming from an institution's mutually supportive relationships with other institutions and structures in the existing social order. It's a social integrative form of conservatism, serving to reinforce secular values by giving them religious sanction. In the case of the Catholic Church and the mainstream Protestant denominations in the United States this includes at least a nominal commitment to social and cultural pluralism. But such tolerance goes only so far. In spite of recent efforts to enlist the churches in the struggle for social justice, there is little doubt that religious identifiers as a whole continue to support traditional values and social structure to a greater degree than others.⁵

But what of sectarian groups? Is their religiosity conducive to this sort of ecclesiastical conservatism? Most scholars think not. Indeed, a major distinguishing characteristic of the sect is its rejection of central aspects of secular culture.⁶ Far from providing religious sanction for secular values, the pure sect often calls for withdrawal from concern with this veil of tears in favor of a preoccupation with a better life to come in the hereafter.

The "conservative" nature of such a reaction can be understood only if one considers the "natural" leftist politics of the low status individuals attracted to sects. The typical other-worldly orientation can be interpreted as a coping mechanism for the "have nots" that divert their attention from social change. The impact of sectarianism then, is in terms of providing an alternative to political action. It's the conservatism of non-involvement, of apathy, or what Almond and Verba termed a "subject" orientation to the political system.⁷

But sects are rare and somewhat fleeting phenomena. A few Protestant denominations in America retain strong sectarian characteristics, but almost all have made substantial compromises with secular values in order to survive. This accommodation, or even exaltation of secular values leads us to still a third form of conservatism that seems to combine elements of both the "ecclesiastical" and "sectarian" types. This "evangelical" conservatism is committed to the preservation of traditional norms and statuses, but the values on which it's based bear the strong flavor of parochial sectarianism.

It's the "conservatism" of the Temperance movement,⁸ of groups that seek to ban objectionable materials from public libraries and school curricula; of active intolerance; of loyalty oaths; of Joe McCarthy and George Wallace. It's anti-urban and anti-foreign. In its extreme form it's the conservatism of the radical right, devoted to salvaging the statuses of declining groups by abolishing the Bill of Rights and halting or reversing social change.⁹

In considering the dependent variables for the research, keep these three ideal typical forms of conservatism in mind. The variables below fall into three major categories; political behavior, substantive rightist beliefs, and social and political alienation. By considering various combinations of each, these forms of conservatism can be delineated.

1) Political Behavior

At the end of a causal chain beginning with social and psychological characteristics, and moving through attitudes, lies the observable behavior in which the individual engages. In some senses these are the ultimate dependent variables of the research. They are relatively familiar so in order to conserve space, I'll comment on these indicators rather briefly. On one end of a scale of involvement is the individual's consumption of political information, level of informal discussion of political questions, and voting. Toward the other end are attempts to influence others' votes and the decisions of public officials, and long-term involvement in organized political groups.

The "guttmanesque" quality of this conventional type of political participation is well-known.¹⁰ While such relatively "unstructured" political acts as writing letters to newspapers are included in this category for the present research, one can reasonably assume that individuals can be placed on a single dimension of political commitment. But other classifications are also possible, including the individualistic or collective nature of the behavior; the focus ranging from national to local institutions and issues; the "extremist" nature of the person's political memberships, if any; and the specificity of the behavioral commitment, from single issues to broad-guaged policy preferences linked to a coherent political ideology.

2) Substantive Rightist Beliefs

The level of political participation obviously distinguishes sectarian withdrawal from the other types of conservatism, at least on a dimension of behavior. It's the task of this and the third category of dependent variables to distinguish among the three forms on a series of attitudinal dimensions.

The variables included in the category of substantive rightist beliefs serve a couple of functions. First, the variety of stimuli chosen to operationalize the attitudes allows conservatism to be defined on a number of issue dimensions. Second, through the empirical correlations among beliefs, one is provided with a way to operationalize various ideological orientations. Since the evangelical conservatism of the radical right is of special interest in this research, the issues were chosen to provide a rather complete delineation of this belief system.

These include:

- A) Perception of wide-ranging subversion by clandestine leftist conspiracies.
- B) Dichotomization of political issues into conflicts between good and evil.
- C) Attribution of social problems to a simple decline in morality.
- D) Chauvinistic nationalism in the form of beliefs that America is inherently superior to other nations.

E) Isolationism combined with belligerence in foreign policy issue positions.

F) Global economic conservatism in the form of opposition to government intervention in social welfare and economic fields, based on a commitment to the necessity for unfettered free enterprise.

OR

G) Selective economic conservatism that opposes the distribution of benefits to the most deprived groups, but accepts government intervention for the benefit of the mainly white lower middle class.

The reason for the alternatives in the last two issue positions lies in the somewhat separate wings of political conservatism of the United States. The Goldwater Republican Right and the organized radical right represented by the Birch Society and its allies tend to carry their conservatism into fiscal areas. But the right wing "populists" that comprise the major constituency for a Wallace appeal are considerably less likely to endorse such positions as a flat-rate income tax.¹¹

One might expect that the predominantly low status individuals who populate fundamentalist congregations to fall primarily into the "populist" category. Wolfinger and his colleagues, for example, found that those who attended Fred Schwartz' "Anti-Communist Leadership School" from religious motives were considerably more liberal on economic issues than other "students."¹²

But somewhat more reliable evidence comes from Lipset and Raab's study using a national population sample.¹³ They found that fundamentalist Protestants were slightly more likely to fall into the "right radical" than the "redneck" (right-wing populist) category, defined in terms of anti-democratic and social welfare attitudes. (28% vs. 22%).

Probably the most striking thing about this data, however, is not the relative appeal of these two extremist positions for fundamentalists, but a comparison of their overall ideological orientation with other religious identifiers. While half the fundamentalists fall in one or the other anti-democratic category,

only thirty-five percent of the mainstream Protestants and thirty-three percent of the Catholics were so classified. Interestingly enough, the "old guard" category (ecclesiastical conservatives) were slightly more prevalent among mainstream Protestants than fundamentalists, but by an almost negligible amount (10% vs. 7%). But even with their fewer numbers in this category and among the "consistent liberals", fundamentalists are slightly more likely to hold some extreme ideological orientations. (61% vs. 56% for mainstream Protestants and 52% for Catholics.)

Lipset and Raab's simple typology can provide only a starting point, however. It fails to include either a behavioral component or adequate indicators of ideological orientations. Perhaps most important from the viewpoint of this research, it fails to include any consideration of sectarian withdrawal as a form of political orientation. To extend their analysis one must turn to still another set of dependent variables.

3) Political and Social Alienation.

Even by Lipset and Raab's generous definition of ideological constraint, about two out of five fundamentalists in their sample don't fit into any of the four categories. This "other" group contains a number of moderates, of course. But it also contains probably a greater number of individuals for whom politics is not a salient enough topic to drive them to strongly held opinions of any kind. Given the multi-dimensional operationalization of ideology and the low levels of political participation in any mass population, the attitudes and behavior I've discussed so far characterize at most a substantial minority of fundamentalists.

The attitudes in the political and social alienation category at times underly the substantive beliefs and participation above, but not always. Most are more widespread in the general population, and don't depend upon the relatively high levels of information associated with the individual policy positions above, much less ideological constraint and activism. In some cases these attitudes even represent an endpoint from which substantive political beliefs and participation are unlikely to develop.


To see how this happens, consider again the three ideal typical forms of conservatism considered here. Ecclesiastic conservatism is by definition allegiant, since it stems from religion's commitment to the existing secular society. It's only when one considers types that are related to sectarian characteristics that alienation assumes some theoretical importance.

Unfortunately, its introduction leads to several complications, most of which come from ambiguities inherent in the term alienation. From the literature associated with this popular concept one must conclude that it leads on the one hand to the withdrawal characteristics of sectarian conservatism, and on the other to the activism of the evangelical type.¹⁴

To deal with this predictive contradiction it's helpful to distinguish two dimensions of meaning in the term "alienation." On one axis is the focus of the attitude from global to highly specific. The individual's beliefs about the social environment and life in general are at the global end. Explicitly political attitudes, even those dealing with the political system as a whole are considerably more specific. And opinions about political institutions or groups fall toward the other end of the dimension.

On the second axis is the form of the alienated relationship between the individual and the object. On one hand are conceptions of alienation that stress the individual's incapacity in influencing, understanding, or relating to some object. On the other are attitudes of rejection or negative affect toward it.¹⁵

Alienation



(Figure 1)

Several points should be noted about this scheme. First attitudes of incapacity such as powerlessness, whether on global or more specific levels, are not conducive to either ideological development or political participation. To the extent that these attitudes are present, whether promoted by the individual's religiosity or not, withdrawal is predicted.¹⁶

If anything however, the most global of either form of alienation is likely to be diminished by sectarian religiosity. An individual who feels utterly incapable of influencing the course of events or who is distrusting of all around him may find an antidote to the alienation in the relatively small, intensely caring atmosphere of the fundamentalist denomination.

This doesn't mean, of course, that fundamentalist religiosity is necessarily "non-alienating", since more specifically focused alienated attitudes may flourish in such an atmosphere. One might argue for example that political, if not more general social incapacity, is promoted by a premillennial theology that looks forward to divine intervention in world politics at any time. And on the rejection side, the sectarian group maintains cohesion partly through specification of some highly devalued groups, institutions, or values.

Whether such incapacity and rejection is manifested in political terms is obviously a crucial question in predicting ideological constraints and participation. But since there is some overlap in the groups and institutions rejected by evangelical political conservatism and fundamentalist religiosity, these attitudes are relevant to the present work even when an explicitly political focus is missing. Fundamentalism per se may not be crucial in producing the constraint and participation of the radical rightist, but may instead promote a climate of opinion where such a development is promoted by other factors.

This is especially likely with forms of alienated rejection based at least in part on purely religious criteria such as anti-semitism and anti-Catholicism. Either or both may be promoted by fundamentalist religiosity, but usually not in explicitly political

terms. (See Religious Particularism Below.) What translates such prejudice into politically relevant attitudes and behavior is of course the major focus of this research.¹⁷

Conclusion

What I've tried to do here is convey the complexity of the overlaps between religious fundamentalism and secular conservatism. A sort of "establishment" conservatism common to most types of religious structures in American society can be distinguished from various anti-establishment, sectarian forms. These latter two reactions to secular culture form the primary focus of this research.

In some cases the impact of sectarian religiosity promotes withdrawal from the political system. It may be an explicit prohibition of the theology, as with the Jehovah's Witnesses; or it may be considerably more subtle. Various premillennial sects that stress the imminent return of Christ and the determination of world events by Biblical prophecy are such examples.¹⁸

But denominations grow from sects. And with that development comes a change in attitudes toward secular society. Probably the most crucial is the disappearance of prohibitions against secular participation. Alienated rejection becomes more focused. Selected secular values are accepted and even elevated to religious principles. The rugged individualism of nineteenth century economic America has its counterpart in a religion that stresses individual salvation through faith to the exclusion of the social obligations of Christians. Where social responsibilities have been recognized at all, it has usually taken the form of individual moral reform movements rather than calls for social structural change.¹⁹ The evangelical conservatism that seems associated with this form of religiosity has a strong component of cultural traditionalism and alienated rejection, but the alienated incapacity of sectarian withdrawal is missing.

The three explanatory models in the next section are aimed at filling in the links between these forms of conservatism and fundamentalist religiosity that I've hinted at in this section. Each has been designed with two basic parameters in mind. First,

since we do know that fundamentalists are overrepresented among the ranks of rightists of various sorts, the model must be capable of explaining this overrepresentation. Second, the variables in each model must offer some hope explaining the differential reactions of fundamentalists. The first set of questions involve comparisons of fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists. The second set entails internal comparisons.



THREE EXPLANATORY MODELS

The three models presented below may be viewed in some ways as alternative explanatory frameworks for the dependent variables above. The religious ideology model is composed of a series of dimensions of religiosity that taken together provide numerous hypotheses about the links between religious and political fundamentalism. Its most distinctive quality is that it takes religious belief and behavior seriously as factors determining secular variables. In contrast, the cognitive structure model views the overlap between the religious and political right as the result of the similar appeal each has for the "closed" or "dogmatic" mind. In its strongest form any relationship between religiosity and secular conservatism is considered spurious. The third framework, termed the status discrepancy model, steps back still another step to consider the impact of social variables on religious and secular beliefs. It sees the link between religiosity and political conservatism stemming from the shared status characteristics of rightists and religious fundamentalists.

But these three models can also be viewed as complementary. In some ways the religious ideology model represents specific applications of the more general concepts in the cognitive structure and status discrepancy models. And unless and until sufficient evidence is brought out by the proposed research to establish clearly the preeminence of one or two of the models, the three can be seen as causally linked. Social environment (past and present) influences overall cognitive structure which in turn influences various dimensions of religiosity. The chain of causality includes both independent and interactive relationships within and between the three models.

The complexity of such an overall framework is obvious. But I would argue that the proper manner for reducing such complexity is through empirical testing, not through ad hoc assumptions that exclude one or another model from consideration, a common practice in the literature.

Religious Ideology Model.

This is the most straightforward explanatory framework I'll consider.²⁰ It's straightforward in the sense that the links between religious fundamentalism and political conservatism are seen stemming rather directly from a conscious application of religiosity to secular concerns. At the same time, however, it's the most complex model in terms of the number and interactions of the variables. For that reason I'll outline the major points of the argument before considering the variables in detail.

The emphasis on individual salvation and supernaturalism and the corresponding neglect of the social responsibilities of Christians in fundamentalist theology is viewed as crucial in leading to secular conservatism and alienation. Modifying this relationship between "orthodoxy" and conservatism is the "salience" of religion for the individual; the level of "particularism" or exclusive validity the individual ascribes to his version of religious truth; and the conscious connections the person draws between religious and secular issues.

From this overall argument, four major categories of variables are derived; orthodoxy, salience, particularism, and the social consequences of religious belief. I'll discuss each in turn.

Orthodoxy:

The primary elements of the fundamentalist belief system fall into the orthodoxy category. They include an overriding supernaturalism manifested in a literal interpretation of Biblical scripture such as a belief in the divinity of Jesus; of past and present miracles as the result of divine intervention; and a perception of God and Satan as separate anthropomorphic deities engaged in constant struggle. One's personal relationship with God is maintained through faith and prayer, while vigilance must be maintained against the traps Satan lays for the individual in the secular world. Orthodoxy's most central value is belief in individual salvation through faith alone, where salvation is interpreted in concrete "life after death" terms.

According to the model the direct impact of orthodoxy on secular variables takes place through several mechanisms. First, the "pie in the sky" attitude characteristic of the belief system minimizes concern with the present world and its problems. The emphasis on faith and minimization of the impact of works on salvation supposedly reduces the value of social responsibility. In short the orthodox position is that "being my brother's keeper" refers to his spiritual, not physical, self.²¹ Finally, in a broader sense the supernaturalism of orthodoxy inhibits acceptance of "scientific" perspectives that a modern society supposedly requires among its members in order to function effectively.²²

So much for the theory. How well does it square with empirical evidence? The answer isn't easy to find since orthodoxy is correlated with social and psychological characteristics and other religious variables discussed below. Trying to sort out an independent impact is difficult indeed. And when one adds the differences in precise conceptualizations, operationalizations, and samples in the available research, generalization is quite difficult. Nonetheless, a limited consensus has begun to form among those looking at the relationship between orthodoxy and secular conservatism.

The consensus is that while orthodoxy is negatively associated with liberalism of practically any kind, its relationship to conservatism and alienation of various sorts is much more problematic. Wuthnow reports that out of fifty-eight studies linking measures of orthodoxy to indicators of social and political conservatism, 41% found the hypothesized positive relationship, but another 48% found no relationship at all.²³

I'd suggest that this almost even division in findings can be accounted for primarily by three factors.²⁴ First as Gibbs, Mueller and Wood point out, there has been a tendency to assume that anyone who has looked for a relationship between orthodox and social conservatism has found one, while the evidence indicates that it holds primarily in samples where religion is

highly salient to the individual.²⁵ Second, in his review of the literature Wuthnow concludes that "only when orthodoxy is combined with 'fundamentalistic' or 'particularistic' views does it show frequent correlations with conservative secular attitudes."²⁶ Finally, the degree to which orthodoxy affects secular beliefs depends upon the conscious implications for social attitudes that religious belief holds. Some issues have obvious religious aspects. Others are more purely secular. The extent to which the individual generalizes religious belief to secular issues is obviously crucial.

These three sets of attitudinal variables; salience, particularism, and social consequences of religious belief comprise the remaining components of the religious ideology model.

Salience.

Gibbs, Mueller and Wood concentrate on the impact of religious salience in combination with levels of orthodoxy, its major function in this research as well. But this study extends their analysis and conceptualization in several ways. First, one may distinguish between two broad categories of religious salience; cognitive centrality and behavioral commitment. It will be obvious below that, while correlated, the variables in these two groups focus on somewhat distinct phenomena and can be expected to relate differently to the dependent variables in this research. The three authors' measure of salience combines indicators from both domains, but does not allow a comparison among them. Second, although an interactive relationship with orthodoxy seems to hold the most promise for explanation, a large body of research has focused on the independent impacts of salience on prejudice and intolerance, a possibility ^{that} won't be excluded from this model. Finally, the salience of "religion" is far too vague a term to operationalize successfully. One has to consider which aspects of religious belief and practice serve as stimuli. I hope to show that the choice is crucial when predicting the impact of salience on secular beliefs.

Cognitive Centrality.²⁷ Probably the most utilized measure of cognitive centrality is Gordon Allport's "intrinsic" orientation to religion. The genesis of this theoretical construct says a great deal about its utility and weaknesses. In the late forties and early fifties Allport and his colleagues were disturbed by an increasing weight of evidence that suggested greater intolerance and prejudice among members of churches than among non-members. By assumption rather than empirical test he discounted the possibility that this relationship stemmed from religious beliefs themselves. Instead, he proposed to distinguish between the individual who internalized Christian beliefs and used them as a guide to behavior, from the person whose religiosity was primarily "extrinsic." The latter type Allport maintained was less committed to "true" religion. Instead, they used their religion as a means to achieve secular status and as a comfort in times of crisis. Rather than accepting the values of universal love and toleration that Allport assumed were the major contents of religious messages in churches, these individuals retain an "un-Christian" parochial commitment to, at most, those with whom they agree.²⁸

What this amounts to of course is an independent impact hypothesis in which salience is proposed to relate directly to a variety of secular attitudes included in this research. Unfortunately, it confronts some rather severe problems on both theoretical and empirical levels. Among them are the following:

1) The distinction between intrinsicity and extrinsicity is not, as Allport maintained, a unidimensional continuum. If it were one should be able to distinguish a single empirical factor with the two orientations loaded at opposite ends. But it simply hasn't happened. In practically all studies using the measures Allport proposed the correlation between intrinsic and extrinsic orientations has been quite low.²⁹ In other words individuals are often intrinsic and extrinsic.

To deal with this problem Allport and Ross imply that such "indiscriminately pro-religious" individuals are in reality

even less committed, or certainly no more committed than the purely extrinsic individual.³⁰ This allows them to "explain" why people who are high on both sub-scales are easily as prejudiced and intolerant as the pure extrinsics. But such a position seems little more than an attempt to salvage the original formulation. I'd propose instead that the two variables measure the cognitive centrality of separate aspects of religiosity, Christian belief on the one hand and religious group membership and personal comfort on the other.

2) Contrary to predictions of the independent impact hypothesis, intrinsity alone seems to bear a near zero relationship to secular attitudes.³¹ It seems that without a specification of the beliefs that are internalized, the impact of intrinsity is problematic. Extrinsity has a slightly better track record for independent impacts. In most samples extrinsity is positively related to prejudice and intolerance.³² But even here the nature of religious beliefs seems to be a crucial interactive factor. In one study of Baptists and Unitarians, for example, Strickland and Weddell found that an extrinsic orientation was positively related to prejudice in the former group, and negatively related in the latter.³³

3) So much for independent impact hypotheses. What about interaction with orthodoxy? It seems that virtually all kinds of cognitive centrality measures relate positively to orthodoxy. But the correlations are generally low enough to avoid severe problems of multicollinearity. And though Gibbs, Mueller and Wood were among the first to make the salience variables explicit in their research, it's apparent from looking at earlier work that it is at work in the empirical differences found between clergy and parishioners, northerners and southerners, fundamentalists and mainstream Protestants.³⁴

As the three authors point out, if one is to find a relationship between religious and secular beliefs it's imperative to find a group for whom religion is important. Cognitive centrality

may not provide much in the way of an independent explanation for the secular variables considered here, but it's crucial in determining the relationships among other variables. Fundamentalists provide an interesting test group.

Behavioral Commitment. The other major category of religious salience refers to the commitment an individual makes to religious objects in his or her behavior. In much the same way that intrinsity and extrinsity were distinguished as the cognitive centrality of different aspects of religion, one may differentiate measures that focus on private and independent religious activities, and behavior that is primarily socially structured and public.

Measures of the former aspect of behavioral commitment center on prayer and meditation; reading about and discussing religious topics outside the church; and adherence to religious ritual even when it conflicts with secular norms. In contrast to such "private devotionalism", "communal participation" variables concern the individual's commitment to organized religious activity; financial sacrifice made for the church; and the degree to which a person's networks of social interaction are primarily limited to co-religionists.

As far as any independent impact of private devotionalism is concerned, the literature is largely silent. The few studies that have sought an independent impact have been largely disappointed. Over two-thirds found no relationship to secular conservatism, and the remaining studies showed a negative relationship.³⁵

Communal participation on the other~~h~~and has received unbounded attention. Indeed, it was the early findings that churchgoers are more prejudiced than those who never attend church that spurred Allport's original hypotheses. In terms of an independent impact it seems fairly well established that, in mainstream denominations at least, a curvilinear relationship holds between communal participation and measures of alienated rejection such as intolerance and prejudice. Those who are heavily involved in religious activities, to an extent considerably beyond regular weekly attendance are more tolerant than the more marginal but still active members.³⁶

Whether this relationship holds for fundamentalist congregations can at least be questioned at several points. First the average level of participation is considerably higher than in mainstream denominations. One might argue that the social status associated with simple membership in a fundamentalist congregation may not be sufficient to attract the individuals drawn to marginal membership in mainstream denominations. The marginal fundamentalist when he does exist may be cross-pressured, rather than alienated (See status discrepancy model below.) Second, there is little in the quality of fundamentalist orthodoxy that would lead one to expect greater exposure to produce social tolerance. Unfortunately, whether these factors alter the relationship must remain unanswered for the present. No published studies exist to answer the question.

The importance of the question should be clear if one considers the varieties of conservatism under consideration here. It touches on a central concern; what factors influence the availability of fundamentalists for evangelical conservative mobilization? One might argue that an individual who is heavily committed to sectarian religious activities and primary groups is less likely than one whose ties are more secular in content to develop a coherent political ideology and high levels of participation. According to such an hypothesis evangelical conservatism would be concentrated among those with less than total religious commitments.

But as attractive as such an hypothesis is, it contains an assumption that is at least questionable. Individuals are assumed to have only a fixed and substantially equal amount of time and resources to devote to religious and secular activities. Religion and politics then become to some extent alternative modes of behavior, and the crucial variable in predicting right-wing activism among fundamentalists is the ratio of religious to secular activities. At least in mainstream denominations however, communal participation is positively correlated with political activism. Politics and religion are coincident not alternative behaviors. If this is true among fundamentalists as well, it may be that the most committed members are most prone to rightist mobilization. In that

case, the crucial variables concern the absolute levels of religious and secular participation, not their relative weights.³⁷

Religious Particularism.

The third major category of variables in the model are attitudes which stress the exclusivist rather than pluralist nature of religious truth, and assert that only those individuals who accept a fairly precise set of beliefs are correct in their interpretation.³⁸

These attitudes and the category below serve as major linkage structures between purely religious and purely secular beliefs. Particularism is highly related to both orthodoxy and salience. And not surprisingly it has been found to relate to a wide variety of measures of prejudice, intolerance, and conservatism.³⁹

Several questions arise in connection with the linkage hypothesis, however. First, is there an independent impact of religious particularism, or is it simply another term for the combined impacts of orthodoxy and salience? The religious ideology model asserts such a linkage function. It is rough religious particularism that the illegitimacy of numerous groups, institutions, and social processes are established. But evidence is contradictory and the question continues to be a major point of contention in the sociology of religion.⁴⁰

Second, what is the mechanism through which religious particularism is translated into a sort of social particularism. Glock and Stark, the major proponents of the religious ideology model, leave the question unanswered in the case of anti-semitism by simply maintaining that religious hostility to Jews "spills over" into secular anti-semitism.⁴¹ But this sort of metaphor hardly seems an adequate explanation.

Finally, one can argue that the relationship between religious particularism and secular prejudice and conservatism is the result of other non-religious variables affecting both. This of course is simply a secular version of the first objection above, but it is a criticism that gets to the heart of the religious ideology model. How can one maintain that it is religious

beliefs that produce secular attitudes?

It's a difficult question and a critique that is especially popular among social scientists who reject any impact ideology might have on mass behavior. But I suspect that in its present form the controversy is ultimately unresolvable. One can always maintain that correlations between religious and secular attitudes are the result of some unmeasured more "basic" variable. The proponent of the religious ideology is then placed in the position of proving the negative.

But if one cannot totally exclude alternative explanations from the religious ideology model, possibilities exist for at least reducing the uncertainties associated with them. The social consequences dimension of religiosity below provides another link between purely religious with secular attitudes, while the cognitive structure and status discrepancy models provide two major alternatives to the religiosity model as a whole.

Social Consequences of Religious Belief.

These variables are in some ways the most crucial in the religious ideology model. It is one thing to show a correlation between religious and secular conservatism. It is quite another to estimate the degree to which an individual consciously applies religious orientations to secular domains. And without the latter, one confronts a large chasm over which any sort of inference must try to leap.

Unfortunately in spite of considerable concern with the "consequential" dimensions, the relatively low salience of religiosity in most samples has made it difficult to develop reliable attitudinal indicators. Added to this is the economics of research that has necessitated an overriding concern until recently with the complexity of purely religious attitudes. This has meant that the major interest has centered on beliefs with fairly explicit religious content. (e.g. approval of Bible reading in the schools; attitudes toward clerical involvement in social protest.)⁴² Thus, the would-be researcher is left without much guidance in formulating theoretical distinctions and indicators.

The thrust of most work in the past has been toward outlining the depth and breadth of the respondent's conception of Christian ethics. But the present research is concerned with attitudes about politics and society in a considerably broader sense. To link religiosity to pure secular attitudes toward such objects, I've chosen to present the respondent with a hypothetical situation in which the United States "experiences a real religious revival." A variety of possible social results of such an occurrence is then presented and the individual is asked to estimate the probability of each.

The content of the responses touch on most of the issues raised in connection with the dependent variables above. They include cultural and economic aspects of substantive rightist belief, alienated rejection of religious and racial groups, and beliefs about the level of conflict in such a "Christian" society.

Obviously one faces a problem of rationalization in attitudes such as these. Christianity has more than once been used as an after the fact justification for beliefs stemming from other values. In order to establish the causal impact of religiosity it's necessary to show that one's religious identity outweighs other roles in influencing secular beliefs. In view of this I've included several items that ask the respondent to choose the most important basis for attitudes such as anti-communism. Among the choices are both secular and religiously linked values.

Through these and other items that use the respondent's religiosity as stimuli, I hope to take measurement of the social consequences of fundamentalism a few steps farther than has been attempted in the past.

Conclusion.

In summary, the religious ideology model delineates several dimensions of fundamentalist religiosity. Taken together these sets of variables link purely religious orientations to secular attitudes and behavior. It's an attractive model since the overrepresentation of fundamentalists in rightist groups is

explained quite parsimoniously. And at the same time, internally distinguishing characteristics among fundamentalists are provided.

But the framework can't stand alone. Even if the links between religiosity and conservatism are unequivocally demonstrated in line with the model, the responsibility remains to test alternative hypotheses and to trace the links "back" to more basic psychological and social characteristics.⁴³ To do that I'll turn to the next two models.



The Cognitive Structure Model

If one steps back from the content of religiosity itself and looks for alternative explanations for the overlap between fundamentalism and secular conservatism, two major models stand out. The first developed from the early post-war theories of the "authoritarian personality." The second, originally meant to deal with McCarthyism in the fifties, focuses on social status and demographic correlates of religious fundamentalism and rightism.

The early authoritarianism model, as useful and influential as it was, suffered from two rather severe inadequacies.⁴⁴ First, the psychoanalytic personality model used by the early theorists tends to lock one into a rather static explanatory framework. If authoritarianism is a personality trait, and if one views personality as largely formed through childhood experiences, as the early authors did, it's difficult to see how attitude change takes place. Second, the lack of distinction between the structure and content of the cognitive system led early researchers to fuse rightist and authoritarian characteristics into a single concept.

Rokeach's model of the "closed mind" was designed to avoid both of these problems while retaining the more useful aspects of the authoritarianism model.⁴⁵ First, a cognitive system concept derived largely from theories of cognitive balance and dissonance replaced the personality as the central explanatory framework.⁴⁶ This allows one considerably greater power in discussing the impact of recent experience on beliefs since the cognitive model is designed explicitly to deal with information processing and attitude change. Second, Rokeach's major distinction between the structure and content of belief systems enabled him to develop a model of cognitive structure into which both left and right-wing extremists fit.⁴⁷

Three aspects of Rokeach's model are critical for this research. They allow one both to imbed religious ideology in a more comprehensive psychological framework, and to derive alternative explanations for attitudes and behavior that do not focus on purely religious variables. The first aspect is the classification

of substantive belief elements along dimensions of relative centrality in the cognitive system.

According to Rokeach three somewhat arbitrarily defined "regions" exist on these dimensions. At the center are various primitive beliefs that provide the soil from which the total belief system is derived. They are roughly analogous to axioms in a mathematical system; beliefs about the self, environment, and the meaning of life that the individual is not prepared to question except in the most extreme circumstances. They act instead as structuring elements for incoming information.⁴⁸

Included in this category are values such as salvation, equality, freedom, and obedience, though their relative centrality varies across individuals.⁴⁹ Included also are the attitudes associated with personal efficacy and general orientations toward others (e.g. interpersonal trust). The generality of these elements is crucial since as one becomes more specific these variables merge with some of the alienation items described as dependent variables above.

In a more intermediate region are beliefs about authority, both positive and negative, that provide an evaluative mechanism for the tremendous amount of information which defies independent verification. Such beliefs concern not only the verifying scope of authority, from highly general to highly specific, but also the acceptance or rejection of those adhering to various authorities' pronouncements.

Finally, in a large peripheral region are the innumerable concrete, specific attitudes derived from the more basic orientations above. This region includes most of the dependent variables in this research.

The second relevant aspect of Rokeach's model is the dogmatism "dimension" through which the openness or closedness of the belief system is measured. He maintains that characteristics of the links among belief elements are largely independent of their content.

The structural characteristics of the closed or dogmatic belief system include a relatively simple, highly constrained, set of elements in which the inference route from primitive central elements to specific peripheral attitudes is rapid and certain; an accentuation of differences between valued and devalued belief elements; a greater differentiation of elements among what believes than among the elements one rejects, (a tendency toward negative stereotyping); a denial of cognitive dissonance through various avoidance mechanisms rather than reconsideration of beliefs; perceptions of external threat; an extreme reliance on wide ranging external authorities for verification; and a rejection of those whose beliefs do not square with one's own.⁵⁰

Finally, a third important aspect of Rokeach's model is his contention that an individual's belief system can be characterized by the relative salience of past, present, and future orientations. Though it's unclear what a "healthy" integration of these perspectives consists of other than some sort of Platonic balance, it is fairly clear what a "pathological" orientation is. From the standpoint of this research the most important dysfunctional integrations represent flights from the present into preoccupation with either the past or the future. A belief system where a remote or idealized past is extremely salient as both a valued state and as an authority object is of course characteristic rightist extremism. And perhaps the most common preoccupation with the future outside social utopianism is the "pie in the sky" attitudes characteristic of religious fundamentalism.⁵¹

The relevance of the other aspects of Rokeach's model to religious ideology should also be obvious. The cognitive salience of religiosity is a specific application of the center-periphery concept. Religious particularism is clearly linked to dogmatic belief structures. Aspects of both orthodoxy and social consequences of religious belief illustrate an extremely wide scope attributed to religious authority.

For the cognitive structure model to function as an independently adequate explanation of the overlap between religious

fundamentalism and the secular variables considered here, however, two major hypotheses must be confirmed. First dogmatic individuals must be disproportionately concentrated among both fundamentalists and rightists, a prediction that is generally supported by available evidence.⁵² Second, generalized dogmatism must serve as the link to rightism and alienation among fundamentalists and must eliminate any impact of religious variables when controlled. This hypothesis has simply not been tested sufficiently in high salience samples to reach a conclusion on its validity.⁵³ Further, there is some reason to believe that right wing activists might be lower in dogmatism than those who withdraw from political concerns altogether. There isn't much evidence available on these points, however, since the extremes of dogmatism have been largely neglected, in much the same way that extreme fundamentalists have been neglected, in favor of looking at more population representative samples.

It's most likely of course that reality lies somewhere in that uncomfortable region between our neat "either/or" theories. But until a sufficient number of variables are measured in specially designed samples, trying to pin down the relative power of the alternative explanations is impossible.

The Status Discrepancy Model.

The last model considered here moves away from the purely psychological factors associated with the cognitive structure model, and instead begins with the social statuses the individual fundamentalist occupies. Like the cognitive structure model, explanations based on status characteristics deemphasize the independent impact of purely religious ideas. The greater appeal of the radical right to fundamentalists is seen as stemming from status problems these individuals experience in the modern world.

Of course attempting to "explain" attitudes on the basis of social status variables inevitably entails an explicit or implicit cognitive model. I hope to show how the introduction of various psychological variables, including those discussed above, strengthen the basic social status model.

Two major variants of the status discrepancy model are current in the literature. One group of hypotheses focuses on an overall decline in status associated with the roles the individual holds. A second set is concerned with conflicts among an individual's multiple roles.

Probably the most intense efforts to explain secular conservatism, especially of the extreme type, from a sociological standpoint have focused on some variant of a status decline hypothesis. In a period of rapid social change, such as that following the Second World War, traditional status structures supposedly undergo severe strains. Respect for traditional roles declines in favor of those that best fit into the newly developing modes of social organization. People living in small towns and rural areas, the "old" middle class of small businessmen, those with modest levels of formal education, relatively unskilled working class whites, and traditionally religious individuals are all seen as potential recruits for movements that oppose this "disestablishment process."⁵⁴ When these declines in status coincide (i.e. where statuses are consonant) the probability of mobilization supposedly rises. In fact these hypotheses aim more at delineating a status set syndrome than at looking at inconsistencies among an individual's statuses. The "discrepancy" is between the individual's perceived prestige and what he remembers or idealizes it to have been at some former time.

The second category of status variables focuses on discrepancies of a different sort. Rather than the differential between the ideal and the actual the individual perceives, role conflicts refer to the inconsistent demands and rewards associated with multiple statuses. Unlike the status decline hypotheses, these aim at the individual caught between conflicting demands.

The relevance of role conflicts for political attitudes was first noted by Berelson and his colleagues in the early election studies.⁵⁵ Working from a strong pluralist bias, these scholars looked fondly to "cross-pressures" as factors leading to

moderation, apathy, and resistance to extremism. Only some years later did Lenski note that the effect of cross-pressures may be precisely the opposite. Looking for an explanation of liberal political attitudes he focused on what he called "status crystallization." These inconsistencies he maintained produce cognitive dissonance and indirectly produce behavior aimed at social change. Most such conflicts supposedly lead to left wing reactions, (e.g. the aristocratic revolutionary). But there's evidence that some, especially those involving a loss of prestige in one set of statuses (e.g. specific status decline) lead to rightist orientations.⁵⁶

So which is it? Do role conflicts lead to moderation or extremism; conservatism or liberalism; activism or withdrawal? It seems necessary to consider the way an individual integrates statuses in his own mind to answer the questions. And if that much is granted, the same has to be said about the status decline hypotheses. From an observer's viewpoint it seems obvious that the statuses associated with fundamentalism have declined in recent years. Just as it seems reasonable to assume that the college educated or middle class fundamentalist faces rather severe inconsistencies in statuses. But it's by no means certain that the individuals involved share these perceptions. Without a cognitive component that includes measures of subjective status discrepancies in addition to the more "objective" indicators, the model rests on shaky foundation.

Rokeach's cognitive structure model provides a convenient key. One can argue for example that an individual's preoccupation with the past is reciprocally linked to perceptions of status decline. Likewise, dogmatic cognitive structure presumably inhibits the ability to deal with dissonance associated with status decline or role conflicts. Finally, Rokeach argues that one must compare the relative centrality of statuses and reactive behavior to reach a reliable prediction about the individual's adaptation to status discrepancies.⁵⁷

This last path was developed independently by Hunt and Cushing in an analysis of political attitudes.⁵⁸ They suggest that

the crucial variable in distinguishing between a "cross-pressured" and an "alienated" response is the individual's attachment to the social environment. For the individual deeply involved in conflicting statuses, moderation is the predicted response. The "marginal" individual on the other hand, "lacking attachment to solidary groupings which might diminish his stress and frustrations, is likely to be available for pursuit of goals that entail fundamental change in the social order."⁵⁹

Unfortunately, though instructive, the Hunt-Cushing model encounters some difficulties when applied to fundamentalists. I argued above for example, that high levels of communal participation may be interpreted as either coincident or alternative to rightist extremism, depending upon the secular involvement of the individual. But unlike Hunt and Cushing, one of my suggestions was the fundamentalists with the highest levels of secular attachment were most prone to rightist extremism. The difference lies in the fact that the authors assume that group involvement of any kind is inherently integrative. When one considers deviant cultural groups' relation to society as a whole, however, such an assumption may not be warranted. (See the discussion of sectarian rejection above.)

Another difference between the Hunt-Cushing prediction and one possibility I've noted is in terms of consonant statuses. They argue that in the presence of high attachment such individuals are pushed toward extremist reactions. But in spite of the attraction of such an hypothesis in terms of status decline, one might argue that the low statuses consonant with fundamentalism are more likely to generate political withdrawal than extremism.

These are only a few of the questions associated with the links between cognitive structure and status characteristics among fundamentalists. I don't want to leave the impression that it's only religious status that is important, however. Indeed, when combined with the model above, the cognitive structural characteristics influence the importance of religiosity on an individual level. The status discrepancy model need not rely on religious

statuses at all if they are unimportant compared to secular status.

Conclusion

In this section I've outlined the major variables in each of the three explanatory frameworks. If research were available to exclude some of the numerous possible variable combinations, I would continue with a discussion of the relative importance of each model in producing the forms of conservatism of interest here. But the paucity of empirical work and a lack of space in this prospectus forces me to curtail that development here. Instead, I'll now turn to the sampling and instrumentation problems associated with testing the three explanatory models in a manner that allows construction of such a combined model.



Sampling and Instrumentation

Throughout the preceding discussion I've intentionally left the operational specification of fundamentalism rather vague. This is partly because its meaning encompasses each of the dimensions of the religious ideology model, and a simple definition is therefore impossible. But I've also moved back and forth rather easily between direct measures of religiosity such as orthodoxy, salience, and particularism, and indirect indicators such as denominational affiliation. This is an especially important distinction, largely determining the sampling techniques in the present study. Figure II presents a four-fold classification scheme based on the distinction. The horizontal dimension refers to the individual's adherence to fundamentalist belief and practice, while the vertical axis applies the same test to denominations as a whole.

Individual Behavior and Belief	
Denominational Category	
	FUNDAMENTALIST
FUNDAMENTALIST	2
NON-FUNDAMENTALIST	3
	NON-FUNDAMENTALIST
FUNDAMENTALIST	1
NON-FUNDAMENTALIST	4

Happily, the two variables are strongly correlated. Individuals falling in the first quadrant are especially rare, while fundamentalists in mainstream denominations sometimes constitute a rather large minority. But most individuals tend to follow denominational lines, falling into quadrants two and four.

In the best of all possible worlds, research should allow comparisons among all four quadrants.⁶⁰ Resources for research being what they are, however, some compromise is usually necessary. Since the major focus of this study is on fundamentalist identifiers, the independent sample will concentrate exclusively on comparisons

along the horizontal axis. Taken alone, however, such a sample leads one into the generalization problems associated with a case study. To reduce this exclusive reliance, the Center for Political Studies 1972 Election Study sample of whites will also be used. These data provide only the barest measures of religiosity beyond denominational affiliation. But this still allows one to analyze individuals along the vertical axis. And as meager as the measures of religiosity are, reported church attendance and frequency of prayer allows one to separate fundamentalists for whom behavioral commitment is low, a group that's somewhat difficult to find in samples of church members.

The national sample then serves two basic functions in the research. Mainstream Protestants, Catholics, and Jews provide data for comparisons to Protestant fundamentalists. In addition, the 239 individuals who claim affiliation to some fundamentalist denomination, and the three hundred or so Southern Baptists provide a standard against which the characteristics of the local sample can be assessed.

But its utility shouldn't be overestimated. After all, except for the few salience measures and denominational affiliation, there is little in the data set to gauge religiosity. And in order to retain a sufficient number of cases it's necessary to copy the sin of those who aggregate all Protestant denominations for comparative purposes. Though the 25 denominations in the fundamentalist category are relatively homogeneous relative to mainstream denominations, significant cleavages are dissolved through aggregation. In addition to the numerous characteristics associated with relative sectarianism, fundamentalist denominations can be divided rather easily into "pentecostal" or "charismatic" and "evangelical" wings. Though they share a common rejection of "established" religion, these groups differ sharply on the place of ecstatic religious experiences. Pentecostals stress experiences such as tongue speaking, faith healing, the "infilling of the Holy Ghost", and so on. Evangelicals are considerably more oriented toward impulse control, and probably more likely turn to rightist extremism.⁶¹

Since these characteristics vary not only by denomination, but also across congregations in a single denomination, the national sample can't possibly provide sufficient information to allow in depth analysis. As I've noted repeatedly, the only way to test the alternative models presented here is to apply them simultaneously in a single sample. From two directions, then, one comes to the necessity for the "local" sample. The remainder of this section is devoted to a consideration of problems associated with this data source.

LOCAL SAMPLING

The difficulties of deriving a random or even empirically representative sample from fundamentalists as a whole are so numerous that such a strategy would probably have to be rejected even if it were appropriate for this research. But the focus of this study is not necessarily a faithful empirical description of fundamentalism in southeastern Michigan in the early seventies. Instead, it is aimed at specifying the links among attitudes and behavior over the widest possible range of fundamentalists' characteristics. Following the argument of David Willer, this sort of theoretical problem calls for a "scope" sample.⁶² I won't get into the technical aspects of such a method here. But in its simplest terms scope sampling is similar in logic to an analysis of variance experimental design in which one attempts to "fill the cells" with approximately equal numbers of cases, regardless of their empirical frequency in the "real world". If possible this is accomplished through stratified random sampling with disproportionate sampling fractions. The aim is to achieve a relatively flat distribution across the whole range of whatever variables are of interest.⁶³

In the local church member sample a two stage technique will be used. Between four and ten congregations will serve as the base for the study. These groups will be chosen to maximize the variance on a number of characteristics including social class of members; the "charismatic" dimension; rural to urban residence; the degree to which the church represents a dominant or deviant cultural force in the community; and a number of other "sectarian" character-

I hope to be able to draw random samples of thirty to fifty respondents from the membership rolls of each congregation. The multiple congregations will guard against too homogeneous a sample, while the relatively large sampling fractions within each congregation will both cut costs and allow limited use of congregational type for analysis purposes. The final sample size between approximately one hundred twenty and three hundred will be determined by the amount of reliable variance found in the early stages of data collection, funding, and availability of gasoline.

Sampling from church membership rolls and questionnaire administration in the respondents' homes has several advantages. First such rolls presumably reflect greater variance in religiosity than comparable samples from auxiliary church organizations such as Church School classes, social fellowships, or other groups of the most committed members. Such rolls also often contain demographic information that may allow stratification prior to sampling. And making contacts outside the church atmosphere reduces the danger that the setting will trigger the connections we are looking for between religious and secular ideas.

Of course with the advantages of this sampling method come the costs. It is by far the most time-consuming way to gather the data, and it is by no means certain at this point that cooperation on the part of the churches will be sufficient to allow it. If not, the questionnaire is constructed so as to allow group administration.

Questionnaire Administration.

The actual data collection phase involves a number of obstacles. First, I expect to run into a considerable amount of suspicion and hostility toward secular academics. Since contact will be made through the churches, it's imperative that pastors, lay governing boards, and ultimately the respondents themselves be convinced that the research is not aimed at discrediting their religious beliefs. To this end, the study will be presented as a

public opinion poll directed toward those who are usually excluded from national surveys due to their small numbers, and second as an opportunity for the respondent to express his or her opinion on a number of social issues. The focus on the impact of religious on secular beliefs, while not disguised, will not be stressed.

The questionnaire itself, included in the appendix, is designed for either paper/pencil or interview format. This is necessitated by the uncertainty associated with administration procedure. In the optimum setting, individual contact in the individual's home, it will be done in paper/pencil format supplemented by some open-ended interview questions.

A written questionnaire format has obvious disadvantages, especially when dealing with low-education respondents. But except in extreme cases I anticipate that its speed and lack of researcher-respondent interaction outweighs these problems, especially in the case of many of the agree-disagree items that express extreme attitudes that a respondent may hesitate to endorse verbally to a stranger, particularly one connected to a "liberal" educational institution.

Where possible the information in the questionnaire will be supplemented by a pre-administration interview in which open-ended items dealing with the respondent's perception of major national problems will be assessed. After administration of the questionnaire a second set of interview questions will be administered as probes allow the respondent to elaborate on social attitudes and behavior reported in the instrument. The total administration time is estimated at an hour and a half to two hours.

Several criteria guided the selection of the items. The primary goal of course was to measure adequately the variables associated with social status, religiosity, cognitive structure and socio-political attitudes. In line with standard procedure I've included multiple measures of all variables, which, while lengthening the questionnaire considerably, seems essential if one is to have much confidence in closed-end items filled out by the respondent.

For comparative purposes I've included as many items as

possible from the 1972 Election Study. In addition many of the items and scales taken from such authors as Rokeach, McCloskey, and Stark and Glock have been used in national samples from which normative distributions are available.⁶⁵

In many cases, however, items are simply not available from other studies for one reason or another. I've already mentioned that measures dealing with the social consequences of religious belief are in short supply. The bulk of those included here are original questions. Other problems are linked to the fact that fundamentalists are a rather distinctive group for whom items designed for larger more diverse populations may be inappropriate.

For example, standard orthodoxy measures taken alone simply don't provide enough variance among fundamentalists.⁶⁶ It's necessary to extend the scales to include more extreme orthodox statements to differentiate among individuals. The same is true of other measures of religiosity such as cognitive and behavioral salience, and particularism.

Perhaps the greatest problem in using standard items arises in connection with measuring alienation. I've argued elsewhere that the distinctive nature of fundamentalist dogma and sectarian religious organization make many alienation items inappropriate.⁶⁷ For example, a popular measure of personal efficacy asks the respondent to gauge the degree of external control in his life. Are most things his own doing, or do things depend on "luck?" Even the religious individual who feels totally at the mercy of divine whim will be unlikely to term that control, "luck." In the instrument for this research, such terms have been removed and replaced with less offensive words such as "fate."

In a similar vein, interpersonal distrust is often measured by items that tap a global rejection of all others, a sort of existential loneliness syndrome. A more important attitude for members of sectarian groups is the rejection of those outside a religious elect. Indeed, as I argued above this sort of alienation is promoted by a sect in order to counter the more global distrust. Since the primary focus of this research is not alienation toward members of one's religious group, but alienation from the larger

society, these items have been altered to make the secular nature of the stimulus explicit.



CONCLUSION

Interest in political belief systems in the mass public has been the driving force in the development of behavioral perspectives in political science. But partly because of an underlying concern for predicting imminent electoral events, resources have been concentrated primarily on descriptions of the American electorate as a whole. This research is aimed in a different direction. Religious fundamentalists don't constitute a particularly crucial group in terms of their numbers in the national electorate. But theoretical importance is not necessarily measured in those terms. Here are groups that seem to contradict or qualify a rather substantial number of suppositions in conventional wisdom about mass behavior and belief systems.

We've tended to assume that the positive correlation between social status and ideological constraint represents a certain inability on the part of those with low levels of formal education to conceptualize complex sets of information.⁶⁸ Yet here are individuals with rather low average levels of formal education who hold complex, highly constrained religious beliefs. Low economic status is traditionally associated with leftist political orientations. Yet fundamentalists are considerably more conservative on even economic issues than low status non-fundamentalists.

Alienation is usually considered in terms of individual isolation of one kind or another. But fundamentalists, like other deviant groups, force one to expand this perspective to include collective alienation, a phenomenon that is considerably more relevant to politics than pure isolation or individual level incapacities.⁶⁹

Finally, in a more socially relevant vein, it might be argued that in an era of increasing "future shock" in our society a prime subject for investigation are the adaptations individuals make in Robert Welch's words, "to the increasing relativism and transitoriness in all things." Religious fundamentalism represents an extreme reaction, but one that is possibly increasing rather than

declining in importance.

Whether the growth on the "right" of American Protestantism represents a significant pool of recruits for a resurgent radical right in the seventies is an important, if complex, question. Already the commitments of mainstream denominations to social programs have been reduced in the face of increasing conservative hostility within the churches. The "charismatic" movement may be seen in some sense as an understandable, and possibly beneficial, emotive outburst in an overly secularized religious establishment. But its anti-rational aspects; its emphasis on other-worldly salvation and ^{de-}emphasis on the efficacy of social action in solving problems; in the extreme, its preoccupation with demon possession; and its appeal to the young are not hopeful signs for those who look forward to a more tolerant, humane society in the next generation.

The research outlined in this prospectus is devoted to tracing the paths that link these and other religious beliefs to that special form of social intolerance that religiously based prejudice represents.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Welch (1961). I've adopted this hybrid footnote style to facilitate reading both the text and the notes. The exact citations are found in the bibliography.

2. Not surprisingly most of this work is of a descriptive, journalistic nature, focusing on the various rightist movements that have sprung up since the late forties. (Roy (1953); Overstreet and Overstreet (1964); Forster and Epstein (1965, 1967); Rodekop (1968).) Much of the more theoretical work has focused on the genesis of anti-semitism specifically (Adorno et al (1950)) or on the growth of McCarthyism in the fifties (Bell (1963b).) The best introduction to the radical right generally comes from three volumes, Bell's edited work on the subject, (1963b); Schoenberger's collection of empirical studies (1969); and Lipset and Raab's recent history of rightist extremism in the United States (1970).

In terms of specific research findings, Grupp (1969) found that members of fundamentalist Protestant denominations are overrepresented in the John Birch Society by a ratio of about two to one compared to their prevalence in the national population. (20% vs. 10%). About the same ratio and percentage emerged from Wolfinger and his colleagues' (1964) study of Fred Schwartz' Anti-Communist Leadership School in San Francisco. Chesler and Schmuck's study of midwestern "super-patriots", a group drawn from right-wing organizations, letters-to-the editor writers, and other sources were found to be "religiously fundamentalistic and pietistically moralistic." (1969:183) Using attitudes rather than simple denominational affiliation, (See Sampling and Instrumentation, below), they found that 72% of those falling the super-patriot group were "fundamentalistic" compared to 49% of the "conservatives" and 32% of the "moderates." Rohrer's (1969, 1969a) study of rightists and non-rightists in the Pacific Northwest revealed the same tendency. Forty-two percent of the rightists belonged to fundamentalist denominations compared to 17% of the non-rightists. And two attitude scales measuring "fundamentalism" and "radical rightism" cor-

related positively ($\gamma = .31$).

Each of these studies base their conclusions on rather bizarre samples from either rightist organizations, or some other activist group. There is some additional evidence drawn from more population representative samples. Orum (1972) found that George Wallace's supporters in 1968 in Atlanta were considerably more likely to come from fundamentalist denominations, and tended to be the most active members of those denominations, relationships that held up in the face of rather extensive socio-economic controls. Lipset and Raab (1970) classified individuals from a nationwide sample into four categories of extreme political belief. Among them were the "right radicals" who held conservative economic views coupled with a distrust of "pluralist" political processes. Fundamentalists constituted 46% of this group, but only 27% of the religious identifiers in the sample.

3. See Wuthnow (1973).

4. The literature dealing with the church-sect typology is voluminous. Unfortunately this is partly due to the fact that it's one of those concepts, like "power" in political science, that becomes increasingly slippery as it becomes increasingly specific. This doesn't cancel its heuristic utility, of course. Niebuhr (1929), Martin (1962) and Wilson (1967: 27-45) made significant contributions in revising Troeltsch's original ideal-typical formulation (1931: volume one 431-5) to fit an intermediate type, the denomination. But as Johnson (1973) points out, these efforts have been more in the form of propping up the original historical taxonomy than attempts to reformulate it in terms of analytic properties. The attempts he notes to follow an analytic path haven't been conspicuously successful. (See Berger (1954); Johnson (1958); Moberg (1962); Gustafson (1967); Yinger (1970: 251-81).) Not surprisingly a new generation of scholars has suggested junking the taxonomy altogether. (See Eister (1967); Goode (1967).) The problem seems similar to that surrounding "power," a concept that lumps quite distinct phenomena together on the basis of a few similarities.

Fortunately, this research doesn't stand or fall on the

basis of a critical distinction between church and sect. Its use here is based on a relatively non-controversial aspect of sectarianism, the rejection of some part or all of secular culture, and the "exclusivist" nature of the commitment required for sectarian membership. (See Johnson (1973:133).)

5. Mainstream denominations are not of course "churches" in Troeltsch's terms. But the notion that "liberal" denominations are major sources of leftist protests seems more a fantasy of fundamentalists, or the hopes of some clergy in the sixties than an accurate description. For evidence of the splits between clergy and lay members of mainstream denominations see Glock and Stark (1965; 1966); Glock et al (1967); Kersten (1970); Hadden (1969); Kelley (1972); Campbell and Fukyama (1969); Nelsen (1973b); Quinley (1970); and Wood (1970).

6. See V. Stark (1968:11). This touches on a central concern of this research; the degree to which religiosity is socially integrative. Parsons (1963) and various work derived from a Parsonian framework tends to stress such an integrative function. But such an analysis tends to ignore the other possibility, that of organized deviance. The reader familiar with Parsonian formulations will recognize the problems with such a functionalist bias.

7. At least since Marx and Engels commented on the narcotizing effect of religion, the alternative nature of sectarian religiosity and radical political action has been a focus for speculation among social theorists. (See Yinger (1957:170-3) and Pope (1942:37). Unfortunately, the speculation hasn't resulted in a coherent explanatory structure.

This is partly due to the necessity for testing the hypothesis in some "deprived" sample. Gary Marx' (1967) study of the impact of religious belief on militancy among Blacks is probably the best example. (See also Aberbach and Walker (1970).) But it, like most other work has concentrated on left-wing movements. When one shifts attention to rightist reactions, the question becomes considerably more complex since such groups' goals are not necessarily antithetical to sectarian religiosity.

As far as I know only one American study has focused on factors that lead individuals to choose rightist organizations OR sectarian religions to alleviate feelings of deprivation. Photiadis and Schweiker (1970) found that among a group of small town businessmen attitudes toward both groups were positively correlated, indicating a coincident, not an alternative pattern. But the "pure" sectarian tended to be more anomic than the pure rightists. The authors concluded that those who perceive normative order in society and feel themselves to be part of it are more likely to join authoritarian political organizations than sectarian churches. (1970:232). See also Keedy (1958).

Of course, this work is only partly relevant to the proposed research since the groups to be studied are limited to religious identifiers. The concern here is not between secular rightism and an apolitical orientation, but between the individual who combines religiosity with a positive ideological orientation and one whose religion is a substitute for politics.

8. See Gusfield (1963) for an excellent historical treatment of the links between pietistic Protestantism and the Temperance movement in terms of the status decline model discussed below.

9. The fact that I've used "religious" labels for these forms of conservatism doesn't indicate that they may only stem from religious beliefs. Alan Westin (1963) used the same descriptive, but non-analytic device when he termed Birchers and their allies "right fundamentalists." In spite of the suggestion of similarities between the two, the links between fundamentalism and conservatism are to be demonstrated through empirical test rather than through assumption.

10. See Milbrath (1965) for a thorough discussion of the varieties of conventional participation and their "scalability" in a mass population.

11. The distinction between these two issue positions within conservatism is well recognized in the literature. Lipset has practically made a career out of applying it to various sub-

stantive situations. (See Lipset (1955; 1962; 1963: chapter four); Lipset and Raab (1970: chapter eleven).) Converse and his colleagues use it as a major distinguishing characteristics between the Wallace and Goldwater constituencies. (See Converse et al (1969).)

12. See Wolfinger et al (1964:282-84).

13. See Lipset and Raab (1970: 428-83).

14. In spite of its central theoretical place in the current research, the complexity and ambiguities of the alienation concept dictate that a thorough discussion of the concept be reserved for the dissertation. But a few points can be made to place the use of the term here in context. First, in this research alienation fits into the "subjective" attitudinal tradition of Kenniston (1965) and Seeman (1959; 1971) that Aberbach (1969) distinguishes from the "objective" Marxist tradition, a viewpoint that sees alienation existing independent of attitudes.

Four of Seeman's five categories of alienation find their way into this work; powerlessness, normlessness, meaninglessness, and isolation. Self-estrangement, as Seeman noted, is almost impossible to deal with in attitudinal terms without using a psychoanalytic framework that is largely avoided here. (See Fromm (1955).) (See the discussion of the Cognitive Structure model below, for further comments on psychoanalytic explanations.)

Unfortunately, as I've noted elsewhere, (See Hendricks (1973).) the conventional conceptualizations of alienation tend to mix Seeman's neat types. In particular, mass society theorists have managed to impose a rather bizarre conception of existential isolation on all forms of alienation. (See Srole (1956); Dean (1960; 1961); Kornhauser (1960).) As Pinard (1968) and Gusfield (1962) point out, however, this view reveals an extreme pluralist bias that ignores the possibility of alienated collectivities. Since the focus of this research is on members of somewhat deviant religious and political groups the point is well taken. (See also Von Eschen, Kirk and Pinard (1971).)

15. Olsen (1969) makes an identical distinction referring specifically to political alienation. The framework is also similar

to Keniston's formulation at several points. (1965: 454). He too considers the object or focus of the alienation. And through consideration of the "modes" of alienation, he can distinguish between rejection and incapacity.

In terms of empirical work, early research focused to a great degree on incapacities. (See Lane (1962); Dean (1960; 1961); Litt (1962).) This is hardly surprising given the political tenors of the late fifties. But with the growth in protest in the sixties, attitudes of alienated rejection excited more interest. The most utilized measures of alienation in political terms, efficacy and trust, reflect this distinction. (See among others Aberbach (1969); Agger et al (1961); Thompson and Horton (1960); Muller (1968); Seeman (1966). In terms of more general rejection of democratic principals see McClosky (1958) and Prothro and Grigg (1960).)

16. Following Aberbach (1969), I suspect that the whole question of the relationship between feelings of powerlessness and social behavior has been confused by a confusion of incapacity and rejection, and a lack of attention to the focus of the alienation. Though it's difficult to tease a generalization out of the confused literature, it seems irrefutable that the attitudes are independent to some extent. (See Finifter (1969).) Feelings of powerlessness are associated with sporadic participation in social groups. (See Dean (1968); Allen and Spilka (1967).) But distrust, especially that focused on outgroups may actually be increased or sustained by social participation. (See Neal and Seeman (1964); Coser (1964); Bolton (1972).)

I don't have the space here to develop the cognitive balance model that I believe can account for these differential impacts and the links between feelings of powerlessness and distrust. That task is reserved for the dissertation. Suffice to say here that various forms of incapacity are seen as dissonant psychological states that give rise to withdrawal from the dissonant situation or translation into rejection. This scheme correctly predicts the low levels of powerlessness coupled with high levels of rejection

among right-wing extremists. (See Wolfinger et al (1964:288); Schoenberger (1968); and Grupp (1969).)

17. The question of whether fundamentalists are more or less anti-Semitic than other Christians is a matter of some dispute. (See Middleton (1973); Glock and Stark (1966); Adorno et al (1950); Carrol and Hoge (1973); Berliner (1946); Blum and Mann (1960); Evans (1952); Lipset and Raab (1970: chapter eleven).) But there is little doubt that they are considerably more anti-Catholic. (See Lipset and Raab (1970: chapter eleven.) It may be that fundamentalists attachment to Biblical prophecy places Israel and Jews in general in a more favorable light than that found in mainstream churches. That at least is one possibility included in the social consequences dimension of religiosity discussed below.

18. See Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956).

19. See Hofstadter (1963; 1965) and Gusfield (1963).

20. The framework as a whole is most closely associated with Glock and Stark and their colleagues at the University of California research project in religious behavior. (See Glock and Stark (1965; 1966); Glock et al (1967); Stark and Glock (1968); Stark et al (1971).) The other major contribution to the model comes from Gibbs, Mueller and Wood's (1973) excellent study of the impact of religious salience on the relationship between orthodoxy and social attitudes. But the model as a whole was constructed for this research. The "dimensions" of religiosity that I will discuss should not be considered unidimensional scales in either a "guttman" or factor analytic sense. That possibility will be investigated in the dissertation of course, but for the present reference is to theoretical dimensions only.

21. Stark and Glock (1968) found that orthodoxy was largely unrelated to their measure of Christian ethicalism. But Davidson (1972) presents even more negative evidence. In his sample of midwestern Protestants he found a fairly strong negative relationship between "vertical"(orthodox) and "horizontal" (ethical)

beliefs. The former was positively related to reported growth through religion, while the latter was positively related to liberal political action.

22. This might seem at first to be the least politically relevant of the fundamentalist's attitudes. But in reality it may be one of the most readily tapped in the course of political mobilization. In recent years it has taken the form of opposition to "evolutionism" and behavioral science in the public schools. And in conjunction with the strong tendencies toward Puritanical moral standards, has spurred attacks on sex education. Perhaps coincidentally in line with the integration of the public schools, fundamentalists have increasingly turned to private church related education. In fact, the decline in parochial education among Catholics has been matched by a surge in Protestant based "fundamental" schools from elementary through high school. Such schools usually are organized only after severe struggles over school policy in the local community. Two local congregations with their own schools are included in the sampling frame for this research.

23. By far the largest single category of studies included in the bibliography are those linking doctrinal orthodoxy to some form of conservatism. Their vastly different indicators and samples means that treating them in any detail here would require considerably more space than I have available. While an extensive discussion of the relationship is planned for the dissertation, the reader is referred to Wuthnow's (1973) excellent review and the various studies cited in the other notes and bibliography for the present.

I should note, however, that the plausibility of a negative relationship between orthodoxy and conservatism is largely dismissed in this research, in spite of Wuthnow's finding that eleven percent of the studies he surveyed found such a relationship. That can be accounted for primarily by three factors. First an extremely restricted definition of conservatism such as Republican Party preference. Second, bizarre samples not characteristic of church

members as a whole. (See Strommen (1963; 1967).) And third, in line with Dittes' (1969:629) suggestion, it may be that orthodoxy is curvilinearly associated with conservatism. This last possibility I think is somewhat remote. More likely such a relationship is due to the impact of religious salience in interaction with orthodoxy. (See Salience discussion below.) But it will be tested in the present research nonetheless.

24. Another possibility is that background characteristics such as social status produce a spurious relationship between orthodoxy and conservatism. This is essentially the argument of both the status discrepancy and cognitive structure models below. But evidence suggests that such impacts are not simple. Feagin (1964); Allport and Ross (1967); Glock and Stark (1966); Keedy (1958); and Stouffer (1955); and Anderson (1966) find that status controls reduce but do not eliminate the relationships. And in some forms of conservatism, especially economic, imposition of controls may actually increase the relationships. (See Lipset (1964: 126) and Allport and Ross (1967:434).)

25. See Gibbs, Mueller, and Wood (1973:36).

26. See Wuthnow (1973:126).

27. Variables in this category include not only intrinsicity and extrinsicity discussed below. Their relatively low correlation with orthodoxy make them prime indicators for the interactive hypotheses discussed here. But other measures that tap the salience of specifically fundamentalist belief include the level of biblical knowledge (Willis (1968)), the reports of religious experience (See Stark and Glock (1968) and King (1967).) and a comparison of various terminal values including salvation. (See Rokeach (1969a; 1969b).)

28. See Alport (1959; 1963; 1966) and Allport and Ross (1967). Dittes (1969:631-6) relates the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction to numerous other authors' differentiation between religiosity committed to Christian belief and that linked to the institutional forms. See Lenski (1961); Allen and Spilka (1967); Edwards (1946).

29. See Feagin (1964); King and Hunt (1967); Carrol and

Hoge (1973); Allport and Ross (1967); Strickland and Weddell (1972); Dittes (1969: 631-33.).

30. Allport and Ross (1967: 439).

31. See Carrol and Hoge (1973); Photiadis and Bigger (1962); Strickland and Weddell (1972); Strickland and Shaffer (1971).

32. Allport and Ross (1967); Feagin (1964); Wilson (1960). A similar finding is reported in Lenski (1961) and Allen and Spilka (1967).

33. Strickland and Weddell (1972).

34. Seem among others, Bahr et al (1970); Johnson (1964; 1966; 1967); Wood (1970); Stark et al (1971); Kersten (1970); Hadden (1969); Quinley and Mitchell (1965); Salisbury (1962); Maranell (1967); Carrol and Hoge (1973); Summers et al (1970).

35. See Wuthnow (1973:122). The low level of relationships may be due in part to the low salience of religion outside the organized churches in mainstream denominations. Whether this is true in fundamentalist denominations hasn't been investigated in depth.

36. See Streuning (1963: Chapter Nine); Friedrichs (1959); Pettigrew (1959); Tumin (1958). Other work looking at the links between conservatism and behavioral commitment include Anderson (1969); Campbell and Fukyama (1970); Hadden (1969); Johnson (1962; 1964); Lenski (1961); Lio (1969); Maranell (1967); Martin and Westie (1959); Photiadis and Bigger (1962); Stouffer (1955); Adorno et al (1950); Summers et al (1970); and Vanecko (1967).

37. There's practically no hard evidence on this point, but Grupp (1969) reports that fundamentalist Birch Society members are more likely to report regular church attendance than members of mainstream churches. The former group's attendance, however, (about 75%) is about average for fundamentalists based on data from the 1972 National Election Study by the Institute for Social Research.

38. Religious Particularism is a term taken from Stark and Glock's research. See Stark and Glock (1968: 64-9).

39. See Glock and Stark (1966). Similar measures are found in King's (1967) "religious dogmatism"; Putney and Middleton's (1961) "religious fanaticism"; and some aspects of Brown and Lowe's (1951) inventory of religious belief (See L. B. Brown (1966).)

The major thrust of the work has been toward explaining religious and racial prejudice. The generally low levels of particularism and salience in mainstream samples hasn't allowed a thorough test of the hypothesis in more remote domains. (See Gibbs, Mueller and Wood (1973); Bahr et al (1971).)

40. See Middleton (1973) and Glock and Stark's comments following the article.

41. See Glock and Stark's reply to Middleton (1973).

42. See Gibbs, Mueller and Wood (1973); Davidson (1972).

43. Allport and Ross (1967:435) makes a point worth quoting in this context.

"At this point, however, an important theoretical observation must be made. Low education may indeed predispose a person toward an exclusionist, self-centered, extrinsic religious orientation and may dispose him to a stereotyped, fearful image of Jews. This does not in the least affect the functional relationship between the religious and the prejudiced outlooks. It is a common error for investigators to 'control for' demographic factors without considering the danger involved in doing so. In so doing they are often not illuminating the functional (i.e. psychological) relationships that obtain."

What this means is that the religious ideology model is crucial in this research in two ways. The overlap between fundamentalism and conservatism may be "explained" in the sense that the covariance is independent of other factors. But even if its explanatory power is weakened by other controls, the simple empirical links between religious and political beliefs and behavior are worthwhile outlining for descriptive purposes. (For a contrary view that stresses the need to follow Campbell and Stanley's "canons of

causality" in outlining the impacts of religiosity, see Bouma (1971).)

44. See Adorno et al (1950). For the most influential criticism of the early model see Christie (1954). See also Rokeach (1960).

45. Rokeach (1960).

46. See Rokeach (1968: 820108) for a discussion of the links and distinctions between his framework and other cognitive balance theories. For a more thorough introduction and interesting examples of cognitive balance theory in terms relevant to the research problems pursued here, see Abelson (1967); Abelson et al (1968); Bennett (1971); Festinger (1954); Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955); Festinger, Reicken, and Schachter (1956); Heider (1946); Katz (1960); and Rosenberg and Abelson (1960). Bem (1970) provides an interesting "Skinnerian" approach to cognitive balance phenomena that attempts to avoid the problems of motivation inherent in it.

In the dissertation I intend to expand the treatment of cognitive balance theories considerably in terms of its relationship to dogmatic belief systems and its predictions about reactions to alienation.

47. I realize the thrust of this statement betrays an "establishment liberal" stance that I share with Rokeach. It's only a half-step away to declare that extremists of all sorts share certain "undesirable" personality characteristics. (See McClosky (1958); McClosky and Schaar (1965).) We've perhaps made the error of the early authoritarian personality theorists more indiscriminate, but the political bias of the concept is now aimed at both left and right.

I think, however, that the formulation can be defended on grounds other than its appeal to readers of the New Republic. First, the labels Rokeach attaches to the phenomena (and I will continue to use) embody a normative component. Dogmatism is an undesirable trait that few will defend. But call it "principled thinking" and its aspects are no longer so abhorrent.

Once this much is granted, the reasons for links between

extremism and a "closed mind" are easier to state without raising hackles. In order to hold extreme beliefs a certain amount of cognitive closure is necessary. Moderates, even of a militant civil-liberties variety are afforded the luxury of open mindedness in the United States. The lower scores on Rokeach's dogmatism scale is evidence of greater tolerance, or greater "scatter-brainedness", depending on one's viewpoint.

48. See Rokeach (1960: Chapter four; 1968: Chapter one). Though he largely avoids discussions of "personality" Rokeach's "primitive beliefs" function much as personality variables are usually conceived to operate. They are formed early, modified little through subsequent experience, and generally are seen more in an independent than a dependent role in any model of behavior.

49. Such evidence ties us back to the cognitive centrality of religious versus secular values. In the local survey (see Sampling and Instrumentation, below.) respondents are asked to rank order eight of Rokeach's "terminal" values, including salvation and a selection of secular values. (For a different methodological approach to the same problem see Rokeach (1969a; 1969b).)

50. See Rokeach (1960: Chapter four). The fifteen dogmatism items taken from Rokeach's original sixty for this study were selected from the most highly loaded in Trohldahl and Powell's (1965) subsequent factor analysis of the items to yield an undimensional scale. (See Robinson and Shaver (1970:351).)

51. It would be fascinating to pursue the conflicts and compatibilities of past and future orientations in belief systems. Obviously the two preoccupations can coexist, as in the case of the traditional religious individual whose future orientation is exclusively focused on a life after death. Cyclical theories of history may provide another way of reconciling the two. Unfortunately, research is lacking in this particular aspect of Rokeach's theory. (See Rokeach (1960: Chapter twenty).)

52. Rokeach (1960: 101-32) provides the most direct evidence on both of these points. But numerous other works support the contention through various measures of authoritarianism and dogmatism.

On the political side are McClosky (1958; 1964); McCloskey and Schaar (1965); DiPalma and McClosky (1970); Lutterman and Middleton (1970); Kaufman (1957); Roberts and Rokeach (1956); Tumin (1958); Sokol (1968); McDill (1973); Bennett (1971).

On the religious side among others, see Fendrich and D'Anotonio (1967); Fisher (1964); Gregory (1957); Loomis and Beegle (1957); Jones (1958); Martin and Nichols (1962); Martin and Westie (1958); Monaghan (1957); Photiadis and Johnson (1963); Ranck (1957); Raschke (1973); Salzman (1953); Spilka (1958); Stark (1971); Strickland and Shaffer (1971); Swindell and L'Abate (1970); Thouless (1935); Wilson and Kawamura (1967); and Wilson and Miller (1968).)

53. Several studies of some utility do exist, however. Gilmore (1969) found that among Pentecostals, dogmatism is an important predictor of various conservative social attitudes. In this group at least, the intensity of fundamentalism was not associated with dogmatism. But this was probably due to small sample size and limited variance in religiosity. Strickland and Weddell (1972) found that measures of intrinsity were not related to racial prejudice, but negatively related to dogmatism, which in turn was a strong positive predictor of prejudice. Carrol and Hoge (1973) report that in a sample of Presbyterians and Methodists in the North and South status concern and dogmatism were stronger predictors of anti-Black and anti-Semitic attitudes than religious belief variables. And the latters' influence was reduced to insignificance with the former variables controlled. Photiadis and Schweiker, in work cited above, found that authoritarianism is associated with positive attitudes toward both politically authoritarian and sectarian religious organizations. Middleton (1973) in secondary analysis of Glock and Stark's national sample, (See Glock and Stark (1966).), concludes that the direct religious impact on anti-Semitism is wiped out by controls for dogmatism and various measures of secular alienation. But such findings shouldn't obscure Allport and Ross' point noted above (See footnote 43.).

54. The essays by Bell, Hofstadter, Parsons, and Lipset in Bell (1963) provide the best theoretical introduction to the status decline hypotheses. Stouffer (1955); Trow (1958); Lipset (1959); Kornhauser (1960); McDill and Ridley (1962); Gusfield (1963); Photiadis and Schweiker (1970); Kessel (1968); Wolfinger et al (1964); and Koeppen (1969) all use one kind of empirical data or another to test status decline hypotheses. But without an adequate psychological component to test the degree of status concern the individual manifests, the evidence is decidedly mixed. (See Carrol and Hoge (1973).)

55. See Berelson et al (1954). Also see Campbell et al (1960).

56. See Lenski (1954; 1956); Kenkel (1956); Rush (1967). Actually, as the parenthetical example indicates, there are close ties between status decline and role conflict hypotheses. (See Lipset (1959; 1963); Wolfinger et al (1964); Koeppen (1969); Rohter (1969). Unfortunately, those links; the ties between status and cognitive inconsistencies; (See Geschwender (1972); Merelman (1968).); and the intricacies of status "crystallization" or role conflict versus cross-pressure hypotheses, (See Hunt and Cushing (1972); Eitzen (1972); Segal (1969).) are beyond the scope of this prospectus. Those tasks, like so many others here, is reserved for the dissertation. I'll attempt only to outline the major features of the argument here.

57. See Rokeach (1968: 82-108). Actually, Rokeach is one of several scholars who have noted the need to consider cognitive interaction in status discrepancy hypotheses. Geschewender (1972) has explored the issue most directly. His argument centers first on similarities in formal organization of the status and cognitive inconsistency theories and second on the utility of cognitive dissonance to sort out the predictive problems of status discrepancy hypotheses. For examples of combined applications of status and psychological variables, see Jackson (1967) and Trieman (1966).

58. See Hunt and Cushing (1972).

59. See Hunt and Cushing (1972:326). Their study falls somewhere near the center of a dimension running from a primary concern with objective status variables and formal memberships to studies stressing the psychological aspects of attachment and salience. McNall (1969) and Wolfinger and Greenstein (1969) take the most "Durkheimian" approach by looking at the impact of social disorganization and cultural structures. Nie, Powell and Pruitt (1969a; 1969b); Alford and Scoble (1968); Seeman (1966); and Neal and Seeman (1964) all focus on the mediating and generally socially integrative effects of formal group memberships. Their concern with psychological integration is relatively minimal and belief systems are assumed on the basis of social status characteristics. The last of these studies is especially interesting in terms of this research. The authors found that participation in union activities reduces feelings of powerlessness, but not distrust. (See discussion of the differential impacts of sectarian participation on forms of alienation above.)

On the other end of the scale, Merelman (1968), along with Rokeach is primarily concerned with the measurement of psychological salience. He compares the impacts of conflictual and consonant primary groups on ideological development and activism among college students. He finds that consonant statuses produce greater politicized conflictual situations are more likely to develop ideological orientations than those in congruent but depoliticized environments.

60. See Glock and Stark (1965; 1966) Stark and Glock (1968); King (1967; 1969); King and Hunt (1972); Rokeach (1969a; 1969b); Allport and Ross (1967); Gibbs, Bueller and Wood (1973).

61. For a comparison of "pentecostals" and "evangelicals" or "holiness" groups, see Wilson (1970:48-92) and Wilson (1967: 106-60). This distinction will be one focus of discussion in the dissertation.

62. See Willer (1970: chapter six).

63. It should be noted, however, that representation of an adequate scope of the variables is the primary goal of sampling. When necessary a random draw will be sacrificed to achieve that goal.

64. These include whether or not the local congregation is linked to a larger denomination and the quality of that link; the degree to which the church stresses abstention from secular pleasures; and the place of Biblical prophecy in the church's teaching.

65. Most of these items are found in Robinson and Shaver (1969) and Robinson, Ruck and Head (1968).

66. See Stark and Glock for the basic items used here. They've been supplemented, as have the other religiosity measures, by more extreme items dealing with specific variants of fundamentalist doctrine.

67. See Hendricks (1973).

68. See Converse (1964; 1972).

69. See Pinard (1968); Gusfield (1962).

70. This is a point of considerable contention. Bibby and Brinkerhoff (1973) maintain that the seeming growth of conservative denominations is primarily due to periodic recommitments of back-slidden former members. Stark and Glock (1968:203) follow a similar line by maintaining that both conservative and liberal churches are declining in membership, the latter slightly faster because, although they benefit by gaining individuals from lower status, conservative congregations, they lose liberals already in their midst even faster. But Kelley (1972) and Streiker and Strober (1972) argue that the most conservative churches and the conservative wings in mainstream churches are growing considerably and more and more reflect the views of Christians in the United States.

The positions are not necessarily contradictory, of course. But a lack of hard and reliable data on the church affiliation of Americans makes reaching some conclusion almost impossible. Nonetheless, impressionistic evidence indicates at least that fundamentalism is not declining as fast as liberal Protestantism. The recent history of Missouri Synod Lutherans and the Presbyterians indicate the renewed power of church conservatives. The growth of the "charismatic" movement in terms of both pentecostal denomination growth and its influence even in the Catholic Church should be noted.

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AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

STUDY OF VALUES PROJECT

QUESTIONNAIRE

זכר אלה יעקב וישראל

We would like to begin by asking some questions about you and your family. The answers to these questions are used simply to group people with similar backgrounds together. Please remember that your replies are STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, and will not be used to identify you personally. If you will be careful to answer all the questions as accurately as possible, it will be a great help. Thanks very much.

- 1) Are you....? ☐ A Man ☐ A Woman (Check One)
- 2) Are you ...? ☐ Married ☐ Single ☐ Widowed ☐ Divorced ☐ Separated
- 3) If you have children living at home, please put their ages in the blanks below.

- 4) What is your age? ☐ 25 or under ☐ 26 to 30 ☐ 31 to 35 ☐ 36 to 40
☐ 41 to 45 ☐ 46 to 50 ☐ 51 to 55 ☐ 56 to 60 ☐ 61 to 65 ☐ Over 65

- 5) What is your occupation. Please explain as completely as possible including whether you are self-employed or work for someone else. If you are retired, please indicate that and say what you did before retiring.

- 6) What about your husband or wife? What is their occupation?

- 7) Does anyone in your family belong to a Labor Union? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, who is that? _____ (fill in the blank)

- 8) What has your family's income been in the past year? ☐ \$3000 or Less

☐ \$3001-\$3999 ☐ \$4000-\$5999 ☐ \$6000-\$7999 ☐ \$8000-\$9999

☐ \$10,000-\$11,999 ☐ \$12,000-\$14,999 ☐ \$15,000-\$19,999 ☐ Over \$20,000

- 9) How many peoples' incomes does this represent? ☐ One ☐ Two ☐ Three or more

10) Have you or your spouse been out of work in the past year? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, put the number of weeks on this line. _____ weeks

11) How far did you go in school? ☐ 6 grades or less ☐ 7 to 11 grades

☐ High School Graduate ☐ Vocational training after high school

☐ Some College Which College? _____ (fill in the blank)

☐ College Graduate Which College? _____ (fill in the blank)

12) Where did you spend most of your time growing up?

_____, _____
City or Town State

13) How long have you lived in Michigan? _____ Years (fill in the blank)

14) If you lived somewhere before coming to Michigan, put the town and state on these blanks.

_____, _____ For how long? _____ years.
City or Town State

15) There has been some talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the MIDDLE CLASS or to the WORKING CLASS. How do you feel? (Check One.)

☐ I think of myself as belonging to the WORKING CLASS.

☐ I think of myself as belonging to the MIDDLE CLASS.

☐ Though I don't think of myself as belonging to any certain class, I feel closer to the WORKING CLASS.

☐ Though I don't think of myself as belonging to any certain class, I feel closer to the MIDDLE CLASS.

☐ I just don't think that either working class or middle class applies to me and my family.

16) What about your family when you were growing up?

☐ Working Class ☐ Middle Class ☐ Neither

17) When you were growing up would you say your family was...

☐ Pretty well off financially ☐ About Average

☐ Had trouble making ends meet ☐ Can't really say

Here are some groups that you may or may not belong to. If you ARE a member of a group, we would like you to put an X or a check mark (✓) in the space that comes closest to how active you feel you are in it. If you ARE NOT a member of a certain group, just leave it BLANK and go on to the next one. We have included examples of some of the groups to give you an idea of what we have in mind.

	NOT VERY ACTIVE	FAIRLY ACTIVE	VERY ACTIVE
A) Veterans' Organizations American Legion, VFW			
B) Fraternal Lodges Masons, Elks, Moose			
C) Business Groups Chamber of Commerce, BBB			
D) Professional Groups Nursing Association Teachers' Association			
E) Farm Organizations Farm Bureau, NFU			
F) Athletic Clubs or Teams			
G) Cooperatives Farm Co-ops, Credit Unions			
H) Political Clubs, Organizations, or Study Groups			
I) Charity Groups Red Cross, United Appeal			
J) Civic Groups PTA, League of Women Voters, Jaycees			
K) Special Interest Groups or Lobbies National Rifle Association			
L) Ethnic or Nationality Associations League of Polish Americans			
M) Labor Unions UAW, UMW			
N) Church or Religious Groups			

Some people are very active in politics, while others spend their time in other activities. In the questions below simply put a check or an X in the column that best expresses how often you engage in the activity.

	ALWAYS	MOST OF THE TIME	SOMETIMES	SELDOM OR NEVER
a) Voting for President				
b) Voting for Congress				
c) Voting for Governor				
d) Voting for State Legislature				
e) Voting in Local Elections				

	OFTEN	SOMETIMES	ONCE IN A WHILE	SELDOM OR NEVER
a) Watching television programs dealing with politics and political issues				
b) Talking to your friends about politics				
c) Discussing politics with members of your family				
d) Reading about politics in newspapers and magazines				
e) Wearing a campaign button or putting a bumper sticker on your car				
f) Working for a party or candidate in an election				
g) Giving money to a political party or candidate				
h) Going to political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that				

(CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)

	OFTEN	SOMETIMES	ONCE IN A WHILE	SELDOM OR NEVER
i) Writing a letter or sending a telegram to a public official giving your opinion about something that should be done				
j) Writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper or magazine giving a political opinion				
k) Attending meetings of a group interested in public affairs				

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all? (Check one.)


☐ Most of the time
 ☐ Some of the Time
 ☐ Only now and then
☐ Hardly at all
 ☐ Can't really say

Here's a different kind of question. Listed below are eight values that many people consider important in their lives. We would like you to put a ONE (1) by the value that you feel is MOST IMPORTANT to you; a TWO (2) by the value you feel is NEXT MOST IMPORTANT to you; and so on until you put an EIGHT (8) by the value you feel is LEAST IMPORTANT in your life of those in the list. BE SURE TO PUT A NUMBER BY EACH OF THE VALUES. If you can't decide between two values, make your best guess and go on.

- ☐ A World at Peace (free of war and conflict)
- ☐ Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all, equal chance)
- ☐ Happiness (contented life)
- ☐ Freedom (independence, free choice about things)
- ☐ Salvation (saved, eternal life)
- ☐ Pleasure (an enjoyable life)
- ☐ Inner Harmony (freedom from inner conflict)
- ☐ National Security (freedom from attack)

In this section are a series of statements that we would like to know whether you AGREE or DISAGREE with, and how strongly you feel about the statement.

Underneath each statement is a scale that looks like this:



We would like you to put an X on the line at the point that comes closest to the way you feel about the statement. You can put an X BETWEEN OR DIRECTLY ABOVE the labels on the scale.

For example, if the statement were: I prefer winter to summer, I would put an X between undecided and disagree somewhat as it is shown above. But if the statement were: The sun will rise tomorrow, I would put an X above agree strongly over on the left.

Work quickly, but don't rush. We are interested in your overall impression of the statement. There are not any "trick" questions, so you should have little trouble with most of the statements.

BE CAREFUL: In some cases the DISAGREE STRONGLY end is on the left and AGREE STRONGLY is on the right. Be sure to look at the scale before making an X.

Thanks again for your cooperation.

People like me don't have any say about what the government does.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Movies that offend any sizeable religious group should be banned.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Politics and religion are completely separate parts of my life. My religious beliefs have hardly anything to do with what I think about politics.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

To decide whether one can trust a person, it's a good idea to find out if they are a Christian before anything else.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Loving one's neighbor means that a Christian should actively work to do away with racial prejudice and poverty in society.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

I often wish that this country showed more respect for those with strong religious beliefs.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

In spite of everything that has happened, President Nixon and former Vice-President Agnew deserve our respect for their strong stands against those that want to destroy America.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Unfortunately a person's worth often passes unrecognized by our society no matter how hard he tries.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

People who hate our way of life should still have a chance to be heard through newspapers, television, and radio.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Unhappiness is the direct result of God punishing us for our sins.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

A person who does not belong to a church must at heart feel very insecure.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't understand what's going on.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

There are two kinds of people in the world; those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Miracles may have occurred in the Bible, but they don't happen today.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

A person who does not believe in God is probably not a good American.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

One of the most important duties of Christians is to oppose Communism and Socialism in whatever way they can.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

It's hard to find many people anymore who really believe in the principles that America stands for.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

A book that contains wrong political views does not deserve to be published.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

If something grows up over a long time, there will always be much wisdom in it.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The truly religious person believes honestly and whole-heartedly in the teachings of his church.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Regulation of business by government usually does more harm than good.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

There is practically NO difference in what different Protestant Churches believe.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

We can be thankful for a free press that exposes corruption in government like the Watergate scandal.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

It is undoubtedly true that Jesus was the Divine Son of God.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Politics is not very important to me since the Second Coming will soon do away with nations as we know them today.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Most people just don't know what's good for them.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

A person can be religious without being a member of any church.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

When the country is in great danger we may have to force people to testify against themselves even if it violates their rights.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Being "My Brother's Keeper" refers to spiritual things, not to making sure everyone in society is physically cared for.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Americans are more democratic than other people.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

It is only when a person devotes himself to a cause or an ideal that life becomes meaningful.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

People without religious beliefs can lead just as moral and useful lives as people with religious beliefs.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

We must respect the work of our forefathers and not think that we know better than they did.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thinking.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The highest form of government is a democracy, and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who best know what they are doing.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

I believe that there is a physical Hell where men are punished after death for the sins of their lives.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to betrayal of our own side.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Most people have very little confidence in others.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Freedom does not give anyone the right to teach foreign ideas in our schools.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

No matter how much most people talk about spiritual things, they are really just out for all the material possessions they can get.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

It is often best to reserve judgement about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The trouble with letting certain groups of people into a nice neighborhood is that they gradually give it their own atmosphere as more of them move in.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

I often feel that average people like myself are not getting a fair shake in America today.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

People we call mentally ill are often really possessed by Satan's demons, and could be cured if they accepted Christ as Savior.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

I prefer the practical man anytime to the man of ideas.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Prophecies in the Bible provide the best possible guide to what is going on in the world today.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

I would not trust any person or group to decide what opinions can be freely expressed and what must be silenced.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit when he's wrong.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

No matter what some people say, there are certain races in the world that just won't mix with Americans.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

People ought to pay more attention to new ideas, even if they seem to go against the American way of life.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Generally speaking those we elect to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

One good reason for belonging to a church is that it helps to establish a person firmly in the community.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

I firmly believe that Biblical miracles happened just as they are told in the Bible.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The Federal Government is gradually taking away our basic freedoms.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Just because an idea has been around for a long time doesn't mean it is true.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

In many ways equality has gone too far in this country.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

I don't mind a politician's methods if he manages to get things done.

:	:	:	:	:
DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNDECIDED	AGREE	AGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

:	:	:	:	:
DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNDECIDED	AGREE	AGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Political Parties are only interested in people's votes, but not in their opinions.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The United States should give help to foreign countries even if they don't stand for the same things we do.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

In doing business, it's best to stick to members of one's own church if possible, since one can't generally be sure that people are trying to deal fairly.

:	:	:	:	:
DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNDECIDED	AGREE	AGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Everyone except the old and handicapped should have to take care of themselves without social welfare benefits.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Unhappiness is the direct result of God punishing us for our sins.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The American form of government is the highest form and other nations would do well to copy it.

:	:	:	:	:
DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNDECIDED	AGREE	AGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Life would be pretty dull if society didn't change its ideas and ways of doing things from time to time.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The Bible's story of creation teaches many important things, but scientific theories are probably closer to what really happened.

:	:	:	:	:
DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNDECIDED	AGREE	AGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

We can be thankful that the government protects the working man and the consumer from big business through things like minimum wage laws.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The Devil really exists and lays traps for us in our daily lives.

:	:	:	:	:
DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNDECIDED	AGREE	AGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

It is important to me to find someone who can tell me how to solve my personal problems.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

There may not be many people in the United States who claim to be Communists, but there are many others who secretly share the Communists' goals.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The main reason I am a member of a church is that it gives me a feeling of security in this troubled world.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Most of the ideas that get printed these days aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Even though the Bible is an important guide for our conduct, it must be applied differently in different times.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Churches talk too much about money and not enough about being saved.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

It's better to stick by what you have than to be trying new things you don't really know about.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

A person who is not willing to follow all the rules of the church should not be allowed to belong.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Even though it might be unpleasant at times, I feel I have a duty to witness to my unsaved friends about Christ.

:	:	:	:	:
DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNDECIDED	AGREE	AGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

In the past forty years the United States has moved dangerously close to Socialism.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Real Christians no longer get the respect in society that they used to.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

It isn't so important to vote when you know that your party doesn't have any chance to win.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

I enjoy giving money to the Church.

:	:	:	:	:
AGREE	AGREE	UNDECIDED	DISAGREE	DISAGREE
STRONGLY	SOMEWHAT		SOMEWHAT	STRONGLY

Here are some groups that some people say have too much influence in American Society, while others feel they have about the right amount of influence, and still others feel have too little influence. Simply put a check mark or an X in the column that best expresses the way you feel.

	TOO MUCH INFLUENCE	ABOUT RIGHT AMOUNT	TOO LITTLE INFLUENCE	DON'T KNOW
Labor Unions				
Poor People				
Jews				
Big Business				
Working People				
Atheistics and Agnostics				
Conservatives				
People who live in small towns				
Protestants				
Black People				
Liberals				
Newspaper and Television Reporters				
White People				
Hippies and Radicals				
Police				
Catholics				
Young People				
Democrats				
Republicans				

If the United States had a real religious revival what do you think would happen?

(Put an X to the left of each of the statements in the space that best expresses your opinion.)

DEFINITELY TRUE PROBABLY TRUE PROBABLY NOT TRUE DEFINITELY NOT TRUE

				A. Welfare would no longer be needed since Christians would take care of their own families and work to better themselves.
				B. The United States would have nothing to do with countries like Russia and China that are ruled by atheists.
				C. Unions would no longer be needed since employers would "do unto others as they would have others do unto them."
				D. We would have a society in which everyone would work as hard as they could for the benefit of others and would ask only enough in return to live a simple, comfortable life.
				E. Our society would be completely integrated with Blacks and Whites living in harmony in the same neighborhoods.
				F. The Jews would not have such an easy time in getting the American government to support Israel.
				G. Congress would pass strict laws against un-Christian ideas and activities like gambling, prostitution and pornography.
				H. Americans would be better off spiritually, but our society would not change very much.
				I. People would be given the choice of becoming Christians or finding somewhere else to live.
				J. The death penalty would be restored in line with the Bible's ideal of an eye for an eye.
				K. Teachers in our schools who don't accept Christ as Savior would be replaced by those who do.
				L. The Pope would have a harder time getting along with America.

Please read each of the following statements and tell whether you think it came from the BIBLE.

"Though shalt not suffer a witch to live." ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't Know

"Let your women keep silence in the churches for it is not permitted unto them to speak." ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't Know

"For I the Lord thy God am a Jealous God visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me." ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't Know

"Blessed are the Strong, for they shall be the Sword of God." ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't Know

"For it is easier for a camel to go through the needle's eye than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God." ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't Know

Which of the Following were OLD TESTAMENT PROPHETS?
(Check all those whom you believe were Old Testament prophets.)

☐ Elijah

☐ Paul

☐ Deuteronomy

☐ Leviticus

☐ Jeremiah

☐ Ezekial

☐ None of These

Here are several questions about issues facing the country today. Imagine that all the people who feel strongly one way or the other about an issue are at the ENDS of the line underneath each question, at ONE or SEVEN. People who agree with some of the arguments on each side then fall at the point marked FOUR. We would like you to circle the number on each line that best expresses the way you feel. Feel free to use all the numbers between ONE and SEVEN. If you haven't been concerned enough about an issue to form an opinion one way or the other, just check the DON'T KNOW response below the numbers.

Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think that the government should just let each person get ahead on his own. How do you feel?

Government See to
Job and Good
Standard of Living


Government Let
Each Person Get
Ahead on His Own



As you know in our tax system people who earn a lot of money already have to pay higher rates of income tax than those who earn less. Some people think that those with high incomes should pay even more of their income into taxes than they do now. Others think that the rates shouldn't be different at all--everyone should pay the same portion of their income no matter how much they make. How do you feel?

Have the Same Tax
Rate for Everyone


Increase the Tax Rate
for High Incomes



Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic place of Blacks and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should make no special effort to help minorities, since they should help themselves. How do you feel?

Government Should
Help Minority Groups


Minority Groups Should
Help Themselves



Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel that a woman's place is in the home. How do you feel?

Women's Place is
in the Home

Women and Men Should
Have an Equal Role
in Running Things




Don't really know

Some people are concerned with doing everything possible to protect the rights of those accused of crimes. Others feel that it is more important to stop crime even at the risk of reducing the rights of those accused of crimes. How do you feel?


Protect Rights of
Accused

Stop Crime Regard-
less of the Rights
of Accused



Don't really know

Here's a slightly different question. We hear a lot of talk these days about Liberals and Conservatives. On the scale below where would you put yourself, or don't you feel that it applies to you?



Very
Liberal

Liberal

Slightly
Liberal

Moderate
Middle
of the
Road

Slightly
Conserva-
tive

Conser-
vative

Very
Conser-
vative

I don't think any of these
terms applies to me.

Which of the statements below comes closest to the way you feel about the state of MORALS in this country at the present time? (Check One.)

- ☐ They are pretty BAD, and getting WORSE.
- ☐ They are pretty BAD, but getting BETTER.
- ☐ They are pretty GOOD, but getting WORSE.
- ☐ They are pretty GOOD, but getting BETTER.
- ☐ They are the SAME AS EVER.
- ☐ Can't really say.

Of the following, the WORST thing about a Communist society is: (Check One.)

- ☐ That people cannot read and express themselves as they like.
- ☐ That only one political party controls the government.
- ☐ That people can't practice their religion freely.
- ☐ That the rulers do not believe in God.
- ☐ That people cannot own their own businesses.
- ☐ Can't really say.

All in all would you say that the country is in very good shape, fairly good shape, poor shape, or that something is very wrong? (Check One.)

- ☐ Very Good Shape ☐ Poor Shape
- ☐ Fairly Good Shape ☐ Something is very wrong.
- ☐ Can't Say

Looking ahead to the next five years, do you think that things in this country will get much better, somewhat better, somewhat worse, or much worse? (Check One.)

- ☐ Much Better ☐ Somewhat Worse
- ☐ Somewhat Better ☐ Much Worse
- ☐ Can't Say

In dealing with strangers, one ought to be cautious until they have shown themselves to be trustworthy. (Check One.)

Agree Disagree Can't Say

If you had a chance to work for a political candidate whose ideas were the same as yours, OR working on a project for your church, which would you choose? (Check One.)

Political Candidate Church Project Unsure

Think of your FOUR best friends. How many of them are members of your Church congregation? (Check One.)

Four Three Two One None

Considering your income do you feel your contributions to the Church are...? (Check One.)

Very Generous About Average
Above Average Somewhat Less than Average

Which of these statements comes closest to the way you feel about the power of the United States in the world today? (Check One.)

The United States is losing power, and this disturbs me VERY MUCH.
The United States is losing power and this disturbs me SOMEWHAT.
The United States is losing power, but this doesn't disturb me very much.
The United States is becoming MORE powerful.
The power of the United States is STAYING ABOUT THE SAME.
Can't really say.

How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right: (Check One.)

Just about Always.
Most of the Time.
Some of the Time.
Just about Never.

How great a danger do you feel that American Communists and other radicals are to this country at the present time? (Check One.)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> A Very Great Danger | <input type="checkbox"/> Hardly Any Danger |
| <input type="checkbox"/> A Great Danger | <input type="checkbox"/> No Danger |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Some Danger | <input type="checkbox"/> Can't really say. |

Which of these statements comes closer to the way you feel? (Check One.)

- ☐ As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are victims of forces we can neither understand nor control.

OR

- ☐ By taking an active part in political and social affairs people can control world events.

The many types of Christianity indicate that: (Check One.)

- ☐ There are many ways of reaching salvation and being a Christian.
- ☐ Most people don't understand the true meaning of Christianity.

Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people who know what they're doing, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing? (Check One.)

- ☐ Definitely know what they're doing.
- ☐ Probably know what they're doing.
- ☐ Probably DON'T know what they're doing.
- ☐ Definitely DON'T know what they're doing.
- ☐ Can't really say.

Do you think it's better to plan your life a good way ahead, or would you say that life is too much a matter of fate to plan ahead very far on your own. (Check One.)

- ☐ Better to Plan Ahead. ☐ Better to trust to fate.

Would you say the government is run pretty much by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? (Check One.)

 A Few Big Interests For Benefit of All Don't Know

Out in the world, would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves? (Check One.)

 Trying to be Helpful Looking out for Themselves

When you are faced with a decision about some social issue, how often do you seek guidance from religious teaching or others in your church? (Check One.)

 Regularly Often Now and Then Seldom or Never

How long have you been a member of your present Church?

 Years (Fill in the Blank)

If you have gone to your Church for less than five years, did you attend another Church before that time?

 Yes, I attended the Church in ,
 denomination city or town
 . (Fill in the blanks)
 state

 I did not attend church before joining my present congregation.

Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it? (Check One.)

 Waste a Lot of Money Waste Some of it Don't Waste Very Much

Do you think that most of the people you know only slightly would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

 Would Try to be Fair. Would Try to take Advantage.

Thinking of the government as a whole and not any certain party or group, do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think that hardly any of them are crooked at all? (Check One.)

☐ Quite a few are crooked.

☐ Not very many are crooked. ☐ Can't say.

☐ Hardly any are crooked.

If you were to join a Church group, would you prefer...? (Check One.)

☐ A Social Fellowship

☐ A Bible Study Group

☐ Can't say.

Is the money you give your Church...? (Check One.)

☐ A Planned Amount (per week, per month, etc.)

☐ Not Regular, but fairly often.

☐ Not Regular, but several times a year.

☐ With prices the way they are today, I can only afford to give money to the Church once in a great while.

Do you think that a belief in Jesus Christ as Savior is...? (Check One.)

☐ Absolutely necessary for salvation.

☐ Would probably help in salvation.

☐ Probably has nothing to do with salvation.

Do you think that being a member of your faith is...? (Check One.)

☐ Absolutely necessary for salvation.

☐ Would probably help in salvation.

☐ Probably has nothing to do with salvation.

Do you think that being completely ignorant of Jesus, as might be the case for people living in other countries...? (Check One.)

☐ Will definitely prevent salvation.

☐ May possibly prevent salvation.

☐ Probably has no influence on salvation.

Christians differ in terms of how much time they spend in religious activities. We would like you to look at the activities below and put an X in the space that applies to you. Please be as accurate as possible, thinking about time you REALLY spend, not how much time you feel you should spend. If you DON'T do a certain thing at all, just leave it BLANK.

AT LEAST EVERY WEEK	ALMOST EVERY WEEK	ABOUT ONCE A MONTH	SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR	
				A) Sunday Morning Services
				B) Sunday School
				C) Sunday Evening Service
				D) Bible Study Group
				E) Religious Service Group like a Missionary Alliance or Christian Business Group
				F) Lay Organizations for the Church like a building or finance committee
				G) Witnessing to the Unsaved
				H) Prayer Meetings

SEVERAL TIMES A DAY	AT LEAST ONCE A DAY	SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK	ONCE A WEEK	LESS THAN ONCE A WEEK	
					A) Private Prayer and Religious Thinking
					B) Reading the Bible
					C) Reading Religious Material other than the Bible
					D) Listening to or Watching Religious Programs on Radio or TV