Series C: Interreligious Activities. 1952-1992
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A10-Thursday, March 18, 1971
Clergy, educators to participate in interfaith seminar

An interfaith seminar for clergy and educators was held in New York City on Tuesday, March 17, at the Union Theological Seminary. The event was sponsored by the Union Theological Seminary, the Religious Education Association, and the American Academy of Religion. The seminar was co-sponsored by the New York City Department of Education and the New York City Department of Housing and Urban Development.

The seminar was attended by approximately 200 people, including clergy, educators, and laypeople from various faith communities. The seminar was divided into three sessions, each focusing on a different aspect of interfaith dialogue.

Session 1: Theological Foundations of Interfaith Dialogue
Session 2: Practical Strategies for Interfaith Dialogue
Session 3: Case Studies of Successful Interfaith Dialogue

The seminar concluded with a panel discussion on the future of interfaith dialogue in New York City. The panelists included Dr. Richard Hays, professor of New Testament at Yale Divinity School; Rev. Dr. Paul J. G. Reid, director of the Office of Religious and Interfaith Affairs at the New York City Department of Education; and Dr. Ruth L. Trost, executive director of the New York City Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Further information about the seminar can be obtained by contacting the Union Theological Seminary at 65 West 126th Street, New York, NY 10027, or by calling (212) 662-9000.

The seminar was co-sponsored by the New York City Department of Education and the New York City Department of Housing and Urban Development.

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
The Union Theological Seminary
65 West 126th Street
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Dear Marc,

Thank you for your letter of August 12. I note that the date December 14-16 is acceptable to you.

With regard to the meeting place, it seems to me obvious that the suggestion not to meet in Rome is due to Rijk's desire to meet under conditions of greater freedom. I think he was very unhappy with the censorship exercised in Rome on our agreed communiqué and he believes probably that any interference on the part of the Secretariat of State is more difficult if we meet in another place. He made such remarks to my colleague Becker some time ago. I do not see why we should oppose his suggestion.

I have taken note that you will make some suggestions concerning Arthur Hertzberg's memorandum. As I shall be out of town for several weeks it will be difficult for me to react. However, if you all agree on the changes, I would probably have no difficulty to accept them too.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Gerhart R. Riegler
August 15, 1971

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, Director
Interreligious Affairs Department
The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Marc:

I set great store by the fact that we emerged from that thing on July 28 as friends.

As I told you then, but we could not discuss for lack of time, there was more behind it than I personally could control.

Anyway, I believe that the Committee will go on to schedule further hearings in the fall, and I suggest that we meet again before then and coordinate our thinking.

By that time JR will be permanently resettled in Beirut, and I shall have run quite a different gauntlet, successfully I pray, at the Vatican meeting in Paris.

This is not an easy business, Marc, and I am counting on your understanding it is a Tudor court.

One more thing for now, and it is painful. For being associated with that nuanced statement according to which -- if carefully read -- "we" can favor everything Israel favors after some formalities, I have been receiving ten to thirty hate-letters from the Jewish community every day.

As ever yours,

James Kritzeck
Director
I am very pleased to be here at the opening of The American Jewish Committee's 65th Conference. I was asked to provide, if I could, a tour of the horizon. There are many ways of trying to deal with the future. The important caveat is that nobody can predict the future, particularly in the sense of trying to predict events. Rather, what you do is to deal with major secular trends which are long-running forces in a society and basic structural changes in the kinds of arrangements people create in order to manage their lives. What I would like to do, therefore, is to identify some of the major secular trends in society as the overall canvas of social change and talk a bit about certain structural problems in American society.

Now there is an old and honorable history of futurology. Perhaps one of the earliest was the Marquis de Condorcet, a remarkable man who lived at the time of the French Revolution. In his book, "A Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind," he predicted the fact that every society would have social insurance and that there would be some way of providing for periods of unemployment. He predicted the end of Colonial Empires and the rise of democracy. He predicted the rights of women. These, he said, were secular irreversible trends in society which came out of men's consciousness of new notions of justice, new notions of rights.

Another remarkable French writer, Alexis de Tocqueville, who came to America in the late 1820's, said that democracy, which during the age of monarchy was still a suspect doctrine, would spread throughout the world. The key to the future, he said, was the notion of equality, the idea that what the few have today the many will want and claim tomorrow.

There is a different kind of analysis of a secular trend to be found in the writings of one of the founding fathers of modern sociology, Max Weber. Weber predicted the spread of rationalization, the spread of the idea of efficiency, specialization, the division of labor—what he called bureaucratization. For many, bureaucratization represented the future. He said the future is not a conflict between socialism and capitalism. These are two phases of bureaucratic systems, and the nature of bureaucratic life would be a major problem of the mid-twentieth century.
If one looks at these predictions of secular trends, it is quite clear that the criss-crossing of equality and bureaucratization framed much of the conflicts of the 20th century. On the one hand, the desire for equality within people's organizational lives increases bureaucratization and, on the other hand, people struggle, in a sense, against this to realize equality.

I shall not try in any way to match perhaps the scope and power of the kinds of predictions of de Condorcet or de Tocqueville or Max Weber. I think, however, that there are certain major secular trends which, in the next thirty or so years, will be working themselves out in the society. These trends are no mystery. They don't arise out of the blue. They arise out of life situations and, in effect, they have, in their own way, an irreversible power.

The first obvious trend is the desire for participation. People do not want to be excluded from the decisions which affect their lives. This desire for participation, and the efforts to work out modes of participation, clearly is becoming one of the major political and sociological problems of the last period of the twentieth century.

There is a second element which, to some extent, contradicts this and frames a new kind of tension in the society. Increasingly there is a technical basis of knowledge—whether it be designing a health program or laying out cities or trying to deal with the complexities of a large-scale civilization—and the fact that technical knowledge increasingly becomes a component of the basis of decision-making creates a contradiction within the whole desire for participation.

The third major trend within American society, and to some extent in advanced industrial societies, is a trend toward hedonism, a desire for pleasure, for leisure, for certain kinds of amenities, sensations, novelties, and excitement of life. In its own way this frames a whole set of cultural problems for society which are not as easy to manage as are some of the political problems.

Fourthly, in many respects the framework for so much of the communal problems of the society, is the fact that there is, increasingly, an effort to articulate politically the economic goals of the society. One hundred eighty or so years ago, people sat down and created a framework for political organization. But nobody sat down at that time and voted in the economic system. Nobody sat down and voted in a society which ripped up all the traditional arrangements, family, family businesses, traditional ways of life, village ways of life, etc. One hundred or one hundred fifty years ago, 95 per cent of the people in this country worked or lived near farms. Today 5 per cent of the people in this society work on farms and support the other 95 per cent.

Nobody voted for that procedure, and yet it has enormously transformed our lives. However, increasingly people today no longer want to have that kind of decision simply thrust upon them, and the
effort to articulate economic and social goals becomes, in effect, as important as creating a polity a century ago. These, then, are the major secular trends of the society.

If we turn now from this kind of large-scale view and try to deal with the more specific directives of change, there is one overriding fact about American society today which becomes crucial; and this is the problem of how we exit from the war. No predictions of any kind have any meaning without taking into account what happens to this country after the end of the Vietnam war.

What is most striking and becomes a crucial test of any society is the way in which it handles a defeat in war. This is particularly true of one which has never been defeated in wars and which has always had an enormous sense of omnipotence about its strength, its ability to build and grow. Every society which has gone through the cracks and fissures which have led to revolution or disintegration has done so after a humiliating defeat in war.

For example, if one goes back to the Russian Revolution, in many ways it is quite clear that the sources of the Russian Revolution lay in the fact that in 1904 Japan defeated Czarist Russia and cracked the whole administrative basis of that society.

The fundamental problem for this society is how do we exit from a war which has created the most terrible problem for this society. Because if there is anything which has led to the questioning of the moral foundation of that society, it is the question of how did we get into the war and how do we get out of it.

How does one explain this war? There will be an enormous debate in the next ten years or so. Was the war simply a set of political mistakes by people who never had the historical foresight and simply went from issue to issue, making serious mistakes along the way? Was an aspect of American national style and power playing a role on the world economy for the first time, or is it deep in the nature of American society and American imperialism? Does it grow out of certain inexorable aspects of the system? These are the questions which every serious person has to confront.

Equally important is understanding how we exit from it. Is there going to be an amnesia in which we simply say it's been a horrible, traumatic experience; let's forget about it and come together, and in some sense pave it over, or will there be a sharp division? Will there be people standing up and making accusations, saying we demand trials; we demand an accounting; we want to have some way of understanding what is going on?

Exactly what will happen we don't know. There are definite implications in this for both political parties. And the question of how we come out of the war is going to radically affect all the politics
of the '70's, and it is going to affect all the other decisions which follow in its wake.

Let me turn now to certain problems of the domestic politics of this country. Many components which have arisen and proceeded, to some extent independently, have been pulled together and synchronized by the war itself. When the war ends all these other deeper turbulent elements will come to the fore again and have to be confronted. They are already in front of us; to some extent we have been unable to deal with them because of the war.

The fundamental problem on the political scene is essentially that in the last twenty or so years we have become a national society for the first time. It may seem strange to think of this as a national society. We have always been a nation with a sense of national identity. But we have not been a national society in which the impact in one part of the country has immediate repercussion in every other part.

We have become a national society in two fundamental ways: through the revolutions in transportation and communication—the very fact that we have a national popular culture through television, and that we have jet planes which can take us from coast to coast in about five hours. A national society has meant certain extraordinary changes in the whole structure of American life which we still haven't been able to manage. We can no longer ignore the different impact of these problems as they arise in any part of the society.

Thirty or forty years ago, we created the mechanisms for managing a national economy. What the New Deal did was to recognize that we had become a national economy. When the depression hit, we lacked mechanisms to handle the problems of a national economy. What Franklin Delano Roosevelt did, in an experimental way, was to create them through the Banking Act of 1933 and through the creation of agencies to regulate financial markets, such as the SEC. The NLRB was set up to regulate labor relations. The mechanisms of a fiscal and monetary policy were instituted which would in a sense allow the government to create certain kinds of gyroscopes or balances in the economy itself. Therefore, what we had was the creation of a national economy and a fairly quick response to the problems of managing it.

In the last fifteen or twenty years we have had the problems of a national society, and the first fumbling efforts to deal with it were under way when they were, in a sense, undercut by the war. The problems of a national society were fairly obvious ones—health, education, welfare, managing the environment, planning of cities and roads—the entire infra-structure and social health of the society.

Under the Constitution, these problems have in the past been in the hands of the states, which were inadequate to deal with them, just as they were inadequate to deal with the problems of a national economy. Clearly the question of welfare is the most flagrant evidence of this. One out of every eight families in New York City is on welfare; in Boston proper, one out of six is on welfare; and these extraordinary burdens cannot be handled by these particular entities themselves.
We have tried, but not very well, to create the framework of a national society in which elements such as the creation of a healthcare system, education through Federal funding and welfare through a national welfare scheme, would be handled by these particular mechanisms. Unless we do something fairly soon, we will be in more and more trouble in this regard. But even if we are to create the mechanisms of a national society as we created the mechanisms of a national economy, there are still many problems which follow in its wake.

There is, if you will, an extraordinary disjunction between the economy and the politics of this country. This has been a marvelous economy and a marvelous technology in the sense of being able to produce large varieties of goods and being responsive to consumer demands. But the political institutions of this society in a sense are the institutions inherited from Elizabethan England. We have an extraordinary disarray—not decentralization, but disarray—of municipalities, townships, counties, districts, etc.

Public administration is important in this fundamental sense. A society is meaningful to its people if the agencies of government can provide effective services, if people feel that the basic elements of delivering the mail, taking care of the garbage, providing clean water and having clean air are taken care of by those to whom one pays taxes. If one has a complete disarray of the instrumentalities of effective services, then you have a sense of disorientation on the part of the people. Something is wrong. The streets are dirty. Water is impure. Things don't get cleaned up, etc.

One of the fundamental reasons for this kind of disarray is the political structure itself. If we have a national society, what then becomes the meaning of the structure of fifty individual states, all of whom are odd-shaped entities, having inadequate tax bases, and unable to handle affairs of this kind? Or look, for example, at the county structures. There are ten thousand counties in this country, over five hundred of which have less than twenty-five thousand persons. They are unviable as economic entities.

We have something like thirty-eight thousand independent school districts in this country, about fifteen hundred of which have no pupils at all, but exist as tax-evasive devices. Another fifteen hundred have under fifty pupils. These are wasteful, costly, inefficient, and reflect a complete disarray of a political structure.

So one of the problems of the next twenty years is a very simple one: to determine what is an effective social unit. What size and scope should it have and what kind of social problem should it handle? What is legitimately and best left to the neighborhoods? What to townships? What to municipalities? What to metropolitan areas? What to regions, and what to the Federal government?
There is another equally important dimension to the nature of a national society, and we see its results in the last ten years, created in large measure by the war. This is the fact that for the first time this country has had to face what in Europe has usually been called "mobilization politics," namely, the effort to create direct pressure on government. This is as a result of the revolutions in transportation and communication. Now it is possible to bring two hundred thousand people at one time into the national center of government to try to mobilize direct pressure on a political system. Sometimes we invite repression in this way; furthermore, we do not have mechanisms to deal with this, other than police methods. Dealing with this kind of mobilization politics is going to be a very real problem of the national society in the next thirty years.

Let me turn now to a different kind of framework. Not only do we become a national society in a variety of ways, but we also become a communal society in two fundamental respects. In the first place, the market is no longer the basis upon which goods can be distributed in important areas of people's lives. Secondly, more and more the nature of needs now get translated into rights, and these rights get translated into claims upon the community itself. And these become translated into the notion of group rights, which to a considerable extent raises a very real problem against the historic individualism of American life itself.

Let me take two or three major dimensions of this idea of a communal society. The first is the fact that increasingly we have what I have called non-market decision-making. The function of a market in many respects is important. It is responsive to consumer demands given a distribution of income which exists at any particular time. The virtue of the market decision is that it tends to disperse responsibility. There is no one to blame for changes of shift in taste.

For example, the loss of jobs in the textile industry is in large part attributable to the lower marrying age of young people. If you marry at an early age, it means less dressing up and less going out. It means there is a shift to lower purchases. It means you no longer buy clothes; you buy houses, cars and durables, and any marketing man knows that very quickly. The important consideration is that a market decision is dispersed in its effect and blame is difficult to place. After all, you can't blame the youth of America for this.

On the other hand, non-market decisions are not dispersed in their effect or responsibility. They are made by public authorities, and you know who to blame. You blame city hall because the decisions are open and visible.

In effect, a decision as to where a road is to go, through a ghetto or through a rich section of town, where to put a jetport, how to lay out a city—all these are public decisions made not through the market but through communal agencies. And if there is an increase in tension in this country, it arises from the very fundamental structural fact that there has been a shift in the locus of decision-making, a shift
Public decisions come about for very obvious reasons. They are inexorable insofar as they arise out of an increasing interdependence of life. Individual decisions have very different consequences when they become aggregated as multiple decisions. For example, each person finds his own automobile a great source of convenience and mobility. As an individual fact, the automobile is fine. As an aggregate and collective fact, it is a daily purgatory on the roads. The translation from the time when a few could have cars to the time when it becomes the basic mode of transportation makes an aggregate effect. More and more you get a change from individual to aggregate effects.

Then there is the second aspect: that the decisions of one or two parts have effects upon the others, so that the pollution of the air is in a large measure the result of the aggregate effect of automobiles, or the spillovers of economic growth from various firms who despoil the water and the air. And how do you regulate this, other than through political decisions? Individual firms cannot and will not do it. No individual firm will simply clean up its own pollution, because it puts itself in a competitive disadvantage to other firms. We can only do so by common rules that are in effect political decisions.

And thirdly, there is the problem of so-called public goods. More and more the kinds of goods that we have in the society cannot be purchased individually, but are purchased collectively. In the seventeen nineties each man bought his own musket when he went into the army. That was a private good. No man does that today. It is a public good bought by the Defense Department. In the same way, the purchase of schooling and health are public goods in effect to be purchased in and through communal mechanisms.

So you have an extraordinary shift of social life in America which is part of the growing interdependence, derivative in great measure from a national society which shifts its locus of decision-making. This in effect means that there is going to be more and more conflict in the society.

On top of this comes the second element which derives from the civil rights revolution: a claim for rights based on membership in a group. Now this has been the most extraordinary reversal on the part of the black community. If one goes back to the 1954 decisions of Brown v. Board of Education, which was the basic Supreme Court decision that struck down the separate but equal doctrine and in effect made integration the basic law of the land, the whole claim of the black community at the time was essentially that they wanted to be treated as individuals. They wanted to be treated not on the basis of a common attribute, which is what segregation did, but on the basis of their individual attributes themselves, their basic individual merits.
Finding out that even this led to a certain degree of disadvantage, they shifted their claim to group rights, and the idea that one should now have a prerogative based on membership in a group. The difficulty of this is very simple. It is not a matter of right versus wrong, but right versus right. The nature of all political tragedy is that it always involves a conflict of rights, not a question of right versus wrong.

Sixty or so years ago, if one wanted to become a principal of a school, one had to use political pull. The claim came that this was wrong, and then you had a principle of merit, based upon examination. Those who were best qualified on the basis of merit would--sometimes after a wait of ten to twenty years--become a principal.

We have the claim that, since there are black schools and the identity of the black children is at stake, there should be a black principal to deal with them. What then of the man who passed an examination and waited ten years as a matter of right and merit to claim his position? What does one do? Clearly there are no easy answers, because it is not a matter of right versus wrong. You have a conflict of right versus right in this way, and there are no sure guides even in political philosophy to deal with these questions.

How does one deal with these questions? It seems to me there is only one basic way, bargaining, and in itself this is not a panacea to deal with questions of this sort.

Although we are groping toward it, we do not have as yet the mechanisms of bargaining on the local levels. One of the problems of the future will be to work out the mechanisms of bargaining in the society as a whole.

As part of this aspect of communal society, we have the whole problem of the blacks in this country and the question of what is happening to them. There are, it seems to me, two fundamental aspects of the black situation in this country. One is the fact that increasingly the central cities of this society will become black enclaves. The trends are startling.

This has become a metropolitan society, in that about 70 per cent of our people now live in metropolitan areas. But since the 1950's, although the central cities drew about 6 million, the suburbs drew 32 million, and the small towns and rural areas of the society drew only 9 million. In the last decade, New York lost 1 per cent of its population; Chicago 6.3; Detroit 10.6; Philadelphia 3.8; Baltimore 4.7; Cleveland 15.6 per cent of its population; Milwaukee 4.3; San Francisco 4.9; St. Louis, 19; Pittsburgh 15.2 per cent. And these trends continue.

By 1985, it is estimated that about half of the population of this country will be living in the suburbs. There has been a small gain in central cities, due largely to the great influx of blacks as the whites have left. Today about 23.2 per cent of the central cities are
black. By 1985, about 35 per cent of those in central cities will be black.

By 1985, more than ten and possibly even twenty major cities in this country will be predominantly black: Washington, D. C., which passed the mark about a decade ago; Newark, which passed it in the last census; Oakland, Detroit, Baltimore, St. Louis, Cleveland, and probably New Orleans, Memphis, and Atlanta will become black cities. This means that these cities, unable to sustain themselves economically, are going to sink more and more into a mire and only the Federal government will be able to take them out of it.

A second major trend is a deepening schism inside the black community itself. In terms of professional and technical employment, the amount of black entry into these areas has been absolutely extraordinary. There has been a greater increase of blacks into professional and technical groups in a shorter period of time than any other ethnic group in American history.

In the last decade or so the number of blacks in the total population has increased 109 per cent as against 41 per cent of the white population. The blacks today account for 6.5 per cent of the total employment in professional and technical groups compared to less than 4.5 per cent in 1960, almost a 50 per cent increase in one decade alone. The number of black managers, officials and proprietors has increased 43 per cent in that period of time as compared to 12 per cent for the whites.

In terms of income, particularly in the Northeast, there is almost no difference between a young white married professional and a young black professional. But what you do find is that the number of those in the poverty group in black families headed by women has increased enormously. They have increased 24 per cent in the last decade. Between 1959 and 1968, there was an absolute increase of 609,000 black family members with children classified as poor. You find that about half of all families with children classified as poor—taking out the senior groups in the population—were black families. Therefore, you find a deepening schism within the black community itself, which becomes a problem for society.

We come now to the whole problem of the culture of the society itself. Cultural changes are much more diffuse, less subject to management, than structural changes. It is not very easy but relatively easier, to handle structural changes because these involve rearrangement between groups in the society. Cultural changes arise out of habits, desires and new visions of life, etc. To that extent, they are both positive and negative in their effect and are harder to turn around.

We have heard of adversary culture and counter culture. The counter culture has a very different source than the so-called high culture of the society, because if there is anything which is really under-
mining the value system of this country, it is the very nature of the
business system itself. Oddly enough, there is a fundamental contra-
diction in the very nature of American capitalism. This contradiction
is shot through the entire society, and increasingly creates a frame-
work for a long-range problem of disintegration.

This arises from a disjunction between the historicProtes-
tant ethic and a new hedonism, and it results in a curious bifurcation
in the business community itself. On the one hand the business commu-

nity wants people within the sphere of production to work hard, to be
concerned with careers, to engage in gratification and all the other
traditional values which go with society. At the same time there is a
furious promotion of hedonism—the idea of simply going in for kicks,
pleasure and all the elements which a hedonistic society creates.

Now the counter culture, even though it claims to be an ad-
versary culture, is really an extension of hedonism. It is an extension
of the whole element of what I would call the change from the rotes-
tant ethic to the psychedelic and bizarre.

I am not saying it is necessarily wrong, but you cannot have
a society which lives in this kind of bifurcation. You have here a
fundamental split in the value systems of the society which are promo-
ted by the basic business institutions of the society itself.

A second aspect of the society which has been characteristic
of the last decade and a half is what I have called the democratiza-
tion of genius. More and more people are making claims for themselves
for what in the past has been granted to genius alone. What I mean is
this: Western society, Western culture as a whole has always had a
respect and a certain sense of awe for the great artists and writers.
It has always allowed those persons to live outside—to be exempt from--
the conventions of the society.

As part of what I call a false drive to individualism, today
everybody takes over the right of becoming a genius—even though they
are not—and reserves the right to exempt himself from the norms. If
the whole society changes its norms, it would be a very different so-
ciety. You can't have conventional norms and have people exempt them-
selves from these norms. This has all kinds of consequences.

The most important, it seems to me, is the notion of general
standards. People no longer say a play is good or bad, but rather
what does it do for me? How do I respond to it? Every critic today
writes in these terms. If he is a great critic, you may be interested
in what it did for him, although the traditional critic would be apt
to say "there is a sense of excellence, or a sense of trash," and
these are the distinctions I make. Today what you find fundamentally
is this exemption from the notion of standards. This is part of a
hedonistic society.
Another trend we have is what I would call the rise of a discretionary social behavior, just as you have in the economy something called discretionary income. Discretionary social behavior has some extraordinary elements, particularly in terms of my own discipline of sociology. By and large sociology normally was able to say that people vary from one another on the basis of certain attributes, usually demographic attributes—distinction of age, kind of work they do, whether they live on farms or in cities—and these are patterned in particular ways. Any good politician knows how Catholics vote as against how Jews vote and how the educated vote as against non-educated people.

What is happening is that the entire social structure of the society is being shaken up and these fundamental demographic attributes no longer work. The question of whose children will take pot, who will attend Woodstock, who will engage in orgies, who in a sense will come out for some kind of permissivism or not, is no longer attributed to certain demographic values itself. What they are attributable to is a certain complicated set of lines, which I cannot go into here.

These, it seems to me, are long-run trends. I would assume that in the next ten years there will be a striking reaction against them. I would assume that what is already beginning to happen is that the notions of middle America will begin to assert themselves, and you will begin to get a strong reaction to these trends for two reasons: one is the sense of affront which many people feel to these things, plus the fact that there is something in the very nature of any movement which seeks excitement which causes it to go to an extreme and burn itself out after a period of time.

There is, however, a demographic aspect in the last ten years which is equally important to understand. From 1950 to 1960, the age group between fourteen and twenty-one did not increase at all in proportion to the rest of the society. In 1960 and 1970 as a result of the baby boom after World War II, it increased in one decade by 44 per cent. You had a huge tidal wave of young people coming into society with all the extra tensions, competition and anxieties about getting into schools, the war and so on.

In the next decade you will find a stabilization as they move into society. By and large the tension created by this huge tidal wave is for the moment finished because since 1956 you have had a downturn of the birth rate of this country, and in the next decade you will not have this kind of demographic bulge.

So in the next ten years, I would assume that for political, sociologic and demographic reasons there will be a reaction, a very sharp reaction in some cases, to the cultural phenomenon we have had in the past. This may even lead people to a certain defense of the culture because of the kind of attacks made on it. I make no judgments either way. I would say that the deeper tendencies of the culture will reassert themselves, not just because of the level of ideas, but, also,
because of the level of the market forces. This is a society which is basically becoming a hedonistic society created by the whole business culture and will consequently generate these kinds of cultural excitement and change.

Finally, let me take up one more topic. I would assume that in the next ten years, apart from the Vietnam war debate, there is going to be a very ferocious political debate in this country, which I think is all to the good, on the question of what kind of society does one want. To what extent do we want to keep the old goals in society?

This has been a business civilization for the fundamental reason that business has met the desires of most people for more goods and for a higher standard of living. It has been the prime institution of this society because of its success in turning out goods for people. Now, the first very real question on the minds of most people is what are the consequences of further growth, particularly if technological growth is unchecked? Secondly, what happens when you have a conflict between the consumer needs and market efficiencies? Thirdly, what are the social responsibilities of a business corporation, other than simply the maximization of profit?

In effect I come back to one of the first problems I dealt with, namely that nobody voted in this economy. Nobody voted two hundred years ago as they created a political structure. But in the nature of increasing consciousness and as a result of the fact that we have to make more and more communal decisions, what is going to happen is a politicalization of all economic forces in the society. The fact that every President of the United States, Republican or Democratic, talks about goals and priorities necessarily means that you have to become more explicit about what is it that you want, and at what cost, and to whom, and what is to come first?

Should more goods and more public goods come first? Should we have in effect a greater effort to redress the right of blacks at the expense of growth or not? You will have these issues which are now coming to the fore.

In effect we have a return, if you will, to the public philosophy. But there is now a very real question which comes from this, namely, are we still a common community trying to solve our problems by a debate about principles of relative justice? Do we still have an allegiance to a notion of common community, or are we so divided into hostile camps by irreconcilable tensions either created by the war, or by the nature of community strife, that issues can only be decided by force? These are open questions we all have to confront.

If I am asked to sum up the problems of the future, I am reminded of a remark of Gibbon in his history of the Roman Empire when he described what happened after the age of Constantine. He said "And now Rome passed into an intolerable phase of its history"--an intolerable phase which lasted for two hundred fifty years.
Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum  
The American Jewish Committee  
165 East 56th Street  
New York, New York 10022

Dear Rabbi Tanenbaum:  

A copy of the lecture given at the Cincinnati conference is enclosed. As you know I had to concoct the original title before I had worked out the presentation, and therefore I have now taken the liberty to substitute a new title which is more in line with the paper that actually did emerge. Also you will note some other changes that I was able to make when there was a bit more leisure to contemplate and organize. However I think you will find that the basic content is the same as in the original, and hope that it will be satisfactory for whatever publication project you may have in mind. I would appreciate being kept informed as your plans in this regard develop.

The check arrived and was much appreciated.

Very sincerely,

Frank Reynolds
Assistant Professor of History of Religions and Buddhist Studies

FR:dlw
HOLY PEOPLES

A History of Religions Perspective

At the outset I must confess that I was both very surprised and very pleased to be asked to participate in a conference designed to facilitate an interchange and dialogue between Jewish and Southern Baptist scholars. I was surprised since my primary area of philological specialization within the history of religions is not in any of the western traditions, but rather in Buddhism and Southeast Asian studies. But at the same time, I was delighted since I not only have a strong personal interest in the success of such a dialogue, but also am fascinated and intrigued by the theme which you have chosen to discuss. There is no topic of greater importance to an historian of religions, whatever his particular area of specialization, than the ways in which communities experience and express their identities and destinies as Peoples of God or, to use a term which has a somewhat broader reference, as Holy Peoples.

Actually every religion about which we have any knowledge has been expressed in and through a community which has conceived of itself as a Sacred or Holy People. This is as true of the religions which are found among primitive peoples as it is of Christianity, and it is as true of eastern religions as it is of Judaism. And what is more, the way in which various religions have appropriated and expressed the deeper meanings of their own communal life has been of crucial importance both in determining the inner structure and dynamics of each religion, and in influencing the ways in which it could respond to its eternal environment. There are,
in other words, as many unique and distinctive ways of living as a Holy People as there unique and distinctive religions.

Yet it is also true that it is both possible and useful to distinguish, within this great diversity of sacred communities, various sets of traditions which share important characteristics. For example, in certain circles it is common practice to differentiate between the ways in which the meaning of being God's People has been experienced and appropriated within the so-called Abrahamic religions (i.e., in Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and the ways in which the notion and sense of being a Holy People has been felt and articulated in other religious groups outside the Abrahamic context. And at one level, and for certain purposes, this distinction, supported as it is by the direct and commonly recognized historical continuity of the three Abrahamic faiths, is both valid and helpful. However in my paper this evening I would like to take a rather different tack, and one which is more radically cross cultural and typological. Following the basic methodological leads suggested in the work of Max Weber and Joachim Wach, I would like to discuss three primary types of sacred or semi-sacred community, each of which appears in both the eastern and western worlds.¹ The first of these is what I will call the "ethnic" type of religious community, the second is what I will refer to as the "founded" type, and the third is the type which is associated with the modern nation state.

Certainly the most common type of sacred community within the history of religions is that in which no basic distinction is made between the

¹The best discussion of the method and the most comprehensive attempt to utilize it in the interpretation of religio-historical data is found in Wach, Sociology and Religion (Phoenix Books; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944).
ethnic, social community on the one hand, and the sacred or religious community on the other. And yet despite their wide distribution both chronologically and geographically, these traditions have a great deal in common. At one level practically all of these traditions incorporate various myths and legends and rituals which affirm that the communal order which encompasses all the members born into the society, and informs all of the really important aspects of their lives, was brought into being by the gods and the ancestors "in the beginning." And at a somewhat different but closely related level they tend to include myths, legends and rituals which recount the establishment, in the primordial or very ancient times, of a strong and intimate bond between the life of the total community and the particular land or territory which it occupies. And, to call attention to just one more equally important dimension, these traditions tend to assume that by remaining faithful to those basically sacramental responsibilities which maintain and extend the life of the society as a whole men are, at the same time, establishing the basis for their own personal religious fulfillment.

This ethnic type of religious community in which there is comparatively little differentiation between the religious and other forms of cultural and social life has been almost universally dominant in the

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3See, for example, Ananda Coomaraswamy's discussion of the Dharmic order in Hinduism which appears in his Hinduism and Buddhism (New York: Philosophical Library, n.d.), pp. 19-25.
context of primitive peoples, and has been strongly represented in many post-urban, literate contexts as well. The ways in which these more compact forms of sacred community have been conceived and embodied in various primitive traditions have been vividly described in numerous anthropological studies ranging from W. E. H. Stanner's discussion of the Australian Murumbutu to the work of Marcel Griaule and his colleagues on the Dogon tribes of West Africa.\(^4\) And at the level of the so-called classical or great religions Joseph Kitagawa has convincingly demonstrated his contention that in Hinduism the sacred community is constituted by the specifically Indian caste system, that in Chinese religion the locus of the sacred community is to be found in the specifically Chinese family system, and that in Japanese religion it is the Japanese people as such which has constituted the Holy Community.\(^5\)

Even in the various situations in which ethnic religious communities have held the dominant position, other kinds of religious groups such as secret societies have coexisted within or alongside them. However during the middle centuries of the first millennium B.C. certain important religious and cultural changes took place which involved, among several other closely related elements, the emergence of a new "founded" or "cosmopolitan" type of Holy People. These changes occurred at roughly the same time in many different areas of Eurasia, including Greece, the

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Middle East, Iran, India, and (somewhat later) China, and in each case were expressed in very distinctive local forms. Nevertheless in nearly every instance they included the emergence of a new sense of individual freedom and responsibility on the one hand, and a more self-consciously universal outlook on the other. They included, also, the appearance of a more radical sense of ontological transcendence and a closely related tendency to bring into question the religious significance and meaning of ordinary personal and social existence. At the level of practical religious expression these changes included the recognition of a more clear-cut distinction between "mere" outward action and ritual, and the kind of inward intention and ethical behavior which came to be regarded, in some circles at least, as the locus of true religion. And finally at the communal level -- which is the primary subject of our discussion -- these other kinds of changes were closely correlated with the emergence of new patterns of institutional life including both specifically religious communities and new imperial forms of political order.

In many cases the older established traditions were able to adapt to the changes which were taking place and to coexist with, or to incorporate, many of the new forms of thought and practice without losing their basically ethnic communal structure. Certainly this kind of


adaptation took place in Hinduism where the new salvation orientations of the sages and yogins who gave up the household life, as well as the traditions of the later Bhakti and Tantric cults, became accepted supplements to the more traditional religious ethos which was dominated by caste consciousness and the performance of caste responsibilities. And at the same time certain classic syntheses were worked out including not only the ashrama system according to which one moved from a stage of life in which caste duties were required to a final stage in which salvation was achieved through renunciation, but also the very famous and influential message propounded by the Bhagavadgita in which it is maintained that the renunciation which brings true salvation does not involve the rejection of caste duties as such, but rather the rejection of any worldly fruits that might be gained as a result of their performance. Also in the Chinese and Japanese contexts supplementary religious traditions (certain forms of Taoism and Buddhism in China, and Buddhism in Japan) became accepted as an integral part of systems which, though more complex than before, retained their basically ethnic ethos. And in Judaism -- which must certainly be included among the predominantly ethnic traditions -- many of these new elements became established in the normative tradition through the impact which was made by the great Biblical prophets and their schools, by the apocalyptists and scholars of the Hellenistic period, and much later, by the great mystics of medieval Judaism.

However in several scattered but very important instances these new religious tendencies came to be very forcefully expressed in new, founded

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8 The full ashrama ideal involves four successive stages including (1) the stage of studentship, (2) the stage of household life when caste duties must be performed, (3) the stage of the forest dwelling in which one breaks away from worldly life and (4) the stage of the sannyasin through which moksha or final release is achieved.
communities which broke away from their parent traditions and became effectively cosmopolitan in their approach and appeal. In India and the Far East the classic example of such founded or cosmopolitan traditions is, of course, Buddhism, which broke away from Indian Brahmanism and eventually became a powerful religious force throughout practically all of Asia and, in recent times, has spread into the Western world as well. And in the Middle East the most notable examples of such founded or cosmopolitan traditions are Christianity and Islam which broke away from their early involvement with the Judaic and Arabic traditions and established themselves over broad areas of the Western world, Africa, and Asia. In each case these traditions grew out of the charismatic leadership and soteriological message of a clearly historical founder, and as the result of their great missionary zeal became established within or alongside their parent tradition. And then in a relatively short time (very short indeed in the Muslim case) each of these traditions became associated with a great Imperial regime and finally, went on from that point to further extend its missionary endeavors and to become established and indigenized in a great variety of ethnic and social environments.9

Actually, in the course of their history these founded religions have again and again lost sight of their ecumenical ideals and have tended to become domesticated rather than simply indigenized in the various areas where they have become established. In the case of Buddhism, which has had no supra-national locus of authority such as the Papacy, and no

centralizing ritual such as the Muslim Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca which every Muslim is at least theoretically obliged to undertake), the tendency toward parochialization has become so strong that it has become very difficult to specify what many of the various national forms of Buddhism have in common; for example it has become almost essential to speak of Sinhalese Buddhism as one thing and Tibetan Buddhism as another, and to recognize that Chinese and Japanese Buddhism are quite different from either and, for that matter, from one another. In the Christian case the Ecclesia was very early divided into Latin and Greek components, and in more recent centuries (especially during the thirteenth to eighteenth centuries) the divisions between various national and cultural groups became increasingly common and vitriolic. And in the case of the Muslim Ummah it is only necessary to refer to the early break between the Arabic and Iranian traditions, and to point to the vivid comparison of Islam in Indonesia and Morocco which has been given by Clifford Geertz in his recent Terry lectures. However in spite of these very obvious empirical deviations from the ecumenical ideal it must also be recognized that neither the Buddhist Sangha, nor the Christian Ecclesia, nor the Muslim Ummah has ever completely relinquished its basic sense of its own unity and universality.

Although the notion of sacred communities is still primarily associated with either ethnic religious communities or religious communities of the founded or cosmopolitan type, any perspective which takes recent developments


11 In this connection it should be noted that during the twentieth century important ecumenical movements have developed within each three of these traditions.
seriously must also recognize the presence of the newer national communities which have assumed the role of Holy Peoples. Though most of these national communities (which some scholars consider to be semi or even pseudo religious, rather than sacred in the true sense) have roots which extend far back into the past, they have emerged in their fully national form only in modern times. In the West they began to make their appearance in the late Middle Ages, and in Asia, Africa, and Latin America they have come upon the scene much more recently.

However one may ultimately choose to evaluate the authenticity and worth of the religiously charged symbols and conceptions which have contributed a sense of identity and vocation to various national groups, their presence can hardly be questioned. In many cases, for example, a particular variant of one of the classical religious traditions has provided the religious dimension in the life given national community. In Europe during the earlier centuries it was generally a particular form of Christianity which served in this kind of way. In Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was traditional Shinto which provided the religious basis on which much of modern Japanese nationalism was built. And, more recently still, a Zionist form of Judaism has given a religious dynamic for the development of a national community in Israel, whereas in Pakistan the Islamic tradition has been cast in a similar role. Many other examples could be cited, but perhaps none is more interesting than the case of Ceylon where the post-independence attempts to enhance the Sinhalese sense of national community were

12 The impossibility of maintaining an effective national state without relying upon a religiously grounded sense of identity and purpose is discussed in William Hocking in *The Coming World Civilization* (New York: Harper, 1956).
vividly illustrated by the celebrations which were held in 1956 to commemorate the anniversary of three supposedly simultaneous events -- the entry of the Lord Buddha into Nirvana (and hence the beginning of the Buddhist era), the landing of Vijaya and his followers on the island of Ceylon (and hence the establishment of the Sinhalese race) and the formation of the original Sinhalese kingdom.

At the same time, in many other situations emerging national communities sought to ground their common life in religious or semi-religious orientations which were spun off, so to speak, from the classical traditions. For example in France, after the Revolution, an attempt was made to establish a new religion of reason as the basis for a kind of national life in which the values of liberty, equality, and fraternity could be actualized. In America, as Robert Bellah, Sidney Verba and others have recently pointed out, a powerful tradition of "civil religion" has developed which draws heavily upon classical Christianity, but can be clearly distinguished from it. And in Russia and China the role which the semi or pseudo religious symbols and conceptions of Communism have played, and continue to play, is perhaps even more evident.

Obviously the religious sources from which these various national communities have drawn in their efforts to establish a basis for their national life have been very diverse indeed. And an appreciation for this


14 An important discussion of the religious significance of both nationalism and communism is included in Paul Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
diversity could be greatly enhanced by citing further examples. However
the point which is crucial for our present purposes is that however
different these various situations may be, they are held together by the
fact that in each case the struggle to achieve a truly national community
has been closely bound up with that community's efforts to discover and
to implement its vocation as a Holy People.15

Though this typology of ethnic, founded and national religious
communities which I have proposed is one which seeks to be reasonably
comprehensive, I do not intend to imply that all forms of sacred community
can be encompassed within it. For example the followers of mystery and
gnostic cults, and modern communities such as those associated with the
new Soka-Gakkai sect in Japan are not easily subsumed under any one of
the three rubrics. Moreover, though I have tried to depict some of the major
distinguishing characteristics of the three types through the descriptions
and examples given, I do not mean to imply that they are mutually exclusive
or, for that matter, that any one of them can be found unambiguously em-
-bodied in any particular historical situation. In fact, even the most
classic examples of each type exhibit at least some atypical elements or
aspects. However in spite of these limitations this kind of typological
approach has an important contribution to make both at the historical and
more contemporary levels of concern. As I hope the previous discussion
has made clear, it provides a way for the scholar who is interested in the
whole range of religious history to relate and to interpret a great deal of
religious and sociological phenomena which might otherwise appear to be

15An interesting though rather inadequate discussion which is carried
through from a strictly social science perspective can be found in David
Apter's essay on "Political Religion" in Geertz, ed. Old Societies and New
States (Chicago University; Committee for the Comparative Study of New
quite heterogeneous and unconnected. But in addition it also establishes
a perspective from which those who are primarily interested in the present
religious situation can interpret the ways in which various living religious
traditions are confronting the problems of communal identity and meaning.
To be more specific, it makes it possible to pinpoint certain basic
differences in the way in which this confrontation is taking place in the
traditions which are of primary interest to us at this conference, namely
Judaism and Christianity in America.

From this perspective which we have tried to establish the Jewish
community in America appears as a traditional religious community which
is now being confronted with new situations which pose serious challenges
to its ethnically oriented self-conceptions and modes of life. Perhaps
the most important element in the situation is the fact that in the
American context Jews are experiencing a new kind of external environment,
quite different from that which brought centuries of repression and per-
secution in Europe. In the new American situation the pressures of re-
pression and isolation with which Judaism had learned to live, are being
largely replaced by the attractions of assimilation which pose very differ-
ent, but equally serious questions for the maintainance of communal identity
and for long term survival. And at the very same time American Jews, like
their fellows the world over, are being forced to come to grips with the
problems and possibilities posed by the awesome events which have occurred
during the last thirty years in Germany and the Middle East. On the one
side the traumatic experience of the Nazi Holocaust has forced a radical
reconsideration of the traditional ways in which the Jewish community
has conceived of itself as a Chosen People. And on the other side the
emergence of Israel as an independent "new nation" has raised a whole range
of intellectual and existential issues focused around the problem of what it means and what is required to live as a People of God. In these contexts, and in many other respects as well, the crucial problem appears to be one of maintaining the integrity and rich texture of traditional Jewish religion and culture, while at the same time responding creatively to the new needs and possibilities which are being evoked by the varied and seemingly contradictory experience of contemporary Jews.

Given the kind of typological perspective which we have proposed, the issues confronting the Christian community, and more particularly the Southern Baptist community, present themselves rather differently. Viewing the situation from this point of view, it is quite evident that Southern Baptists have traditionally lived with an implicit tension between their image of themselves as a cosmopolitan or universal religious group whose sole criterion for membership was a specifically religious confession of faith, and their obviously very deep involvement in the very parochial ethos of the American South. As in many other situations both within Christianity and within the other founded religions, this tension long remained implicit and received very little self-conscious consideration. However in recent years the presence and significance of this kind of ambiguity has been brought into the foreground as a result of the new values which are seriously undermining a great many aspects of Southern culture and social tradition, and threaten to cause still greater disruption in the future. In the midst of this rapidly developing crisis situation Southern Baptists, along with many other American Church groups, are being increasingly driven to undertake a fundamental reassessment of the relationship between the cosmopolitan and parochial dimensions of their own existence, and in the process to radically
reformulate their own conceptions of what it means to live as a People of God who are in the world, but not of the world.

Finally our analysis of the various types of sacred communities clearly suggests that any attempt to understand the ways in which the traditional religious communities in America are confronting the problems of communal identity and meaning will necessarily involve a consideration of the way in which they are responding to the powerful heritage of American civil religion. And more specifically it will involve a consideration of the way in which these communities are relating their own role as Peoples of God to the nation's conception of itself as the New Israel whose Manifest Destiny is to usher a new world order in which democracy, peace, and freedom will prevail. To be sure the Vietnam catastrophe and a variety of serious internal crises at the present time seems to be seriously eroding the foundations of this heritage of American Messianism. However the image of America as a specially chosen nation is an image which is still very much with us; it is one which, from an historical perspective at least, has been fostered more than it has been challenged by the traditional religious communities; and it is one which will have to be seriously taken into account if any really meaningful reconsideration of communal ideals and forms is to be pursued either in American Judaism or in American Christianity.

Throughout our discussion thus far we have, for the most part, concentrated our attention on the important differences between various types of religious communities. And in my
judgement, a recognition of the basic structural differences which do, in fact, separate different types of religious communities, at both the historical and contemporary levels, is of crucial importance in establishing the kind of context within which a fruitful dialogue between Jews and Southern Baptists might emerge. However, by way of conclusion, it is also important to at least take note of the fact that, viewed from a somewhat different but equally valid perspective, the basic problem which confronts both groups is one which they share with each other and, for that matter, with practically all other living religious communities as well. Stated very simply, it is the problem of maintaining the kind of continuity and order upon which any profound sense of shared existence depends, while at the same time affirming the new drive for freedom and spontaneity which is a primary characteristic of "modernity." 16

The struggle to maintain a balance between the dimensions of order and freedom is, of course, leit motif which runs through the entire history of religions, and is one which can be discerned with particular clarity in a variety of historical situations in which there has been a rapid acceleration in the pace of religious and cultural change. 17 However it is also true that in the modern world the need to reconcile these two basic human and religious concerns has come to the fore with a new ferocity. 18

16 An intriguing discussion of the relationship between the traditional and modern contexts which highlights the new emphasis on the individual and his freedom is found in Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus tr. by Mark Sainsbury (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), esp. pp. 231-34.

17 A somewhat similar distinction between symbol systems which are "locative" and those which are "open" is made and discussed by Jonathan Smith in an intriguing essay on "The Influence of Symbols on Social Change: A Place on which to Stand," Worship, Fall, 1970, pp. 427-474.

18 For another discussion of the contemporary situation which is set in similar terms see Joseph Kitagawa, "Chaos, Order and Freedom in World Religions," in Kuntz, ed., The Concept of Order (Seattle: University of Washington, 1967).
In the more specifically religious sphere the great classical traditions, whether they be those of Judaism or Christianity, Buddhism or Islam, Hinduism or Japanese religions, have become increasingly polarized between the defenders of old, out-dated conceptions of order, on the one side, and the exponents of a new and often undisciplined drive for freedom on the other. And at the same time that these struggles have been gaining in intensity the traditions themselves have gradually been losing their hold upon the imagination, and hence upon the lives of the great bulk of their ordinary adherents. Moreover in the religio-political realm the same kind of polarization is evident not only in the West, but also in many of the new nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and to some extent within the Communist world as well. The authoritarian forces which seek to defend the outmoded orders of hierarchy and privilege are pitted against those who, under the banner of freedom and modernity, seek to break all of the ties which give to men their sense of stability and identity. And in the midst of these increasingly acrimonious struggles ordinary citizens have become more and more disillusioned.

Looking at the contemporary world with this problem in mind, it is difficult to be confident concerning the future of either the classical religious communities, or even the future of the more traditionally oriented nation states. Nevertheless, as an historian of religions who is very much aware that living religions are always open to new discoveries, I am convinced that the situation is by no means hopeless. To be sure what is needed is no less than the discovery of a new sense or senses of what it means to be a People of God, a People whose life is grounded in the past but open to the future, a People for whom order is not opposed to new forms of freedom, but serves rather to identify, support, and sustain
them. Whether or where such a new discovery of authentic communal life can emerge in the context of any given tradition is, of course, impossible to predict. However the task of sensitizing ourselves to such a possibility through an encounter grounded in a realistic appreciation of the differences which separate us—is, I would suggest, the most important aspect of the deliberations which lie before us.