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Box 43, Folder 11, Rauff, Walter [Wiesenthal Center Report on Church Connection], 1984.



## SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER

### STATEMENT BY RABBI MARVIN HIER, DEAN OF THE SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER--WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 1984

AT NEW YORK PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 1984  
NEW EVIDENCE SHOWS RAUFF HAD CONNECTION WITH HIGH  
CHURCH OFFICIALS


We would like to put on record, this morning, new evidence that makes it difficult to believe the Vatican's contention that Nazi War Criminal Walter Rauff was given refuge in Rome for a year and a half beginning in 1947, without the knowledge of important Church officials, or that he stayed there without anybody knowing who Walter Rauff really was.

The new evidence we have produced, after a four-month investigation, does not support their claim. A secret United States Government interrogation report on Walter Rauff shows that he had a close working relationship with Monsignor Don Giuseppe Bicchiera and Cardinal Ildefonso Schuster. This relationship began in December 1943 and lasted until the end of the War in 1945.

The report and other documents show that Rauff held meetings with these Church officials on numerous occasions in his capacity as head of the S.D. in Northern Italy.

These were no ordinary churchmen. Cardinal Schuster was one of the most respected and powerful leaders of the Church. He was mentioned as a possible successor to Pope Pius XI. Msgr. Bicchiera was both a priest and a lawyer, charged with conducting the surrender negotiations on behalf of the Cardinal --both with Mussolini and the Nazis. These negotiations, according to Sister Pascalina (Pope Pius XII's aide and confidante) were carried out through the Archdiocese of Milan at the specific request of Pope Pius XII.

Walter Rauff became a key figure in those negotiations, since he served as adjunct to SS General Karl Wolff, the highest ranking SS officer in Italy. That



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
Rauff had a close relationship with Bicchiera1 is further evidenced by his disclosure of having exchanged personal gifts with Bicchiera1, and by Cardinal Schuster's journal entry which discloses that Rauff circumvented an order from Gestapo Chief Harster to arrest Bicchiera1.

This information, coupled with the fact that Rauff was known even to Allen Dulles of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) when Rauff traveled to Switzerland in February 1945 to negotiate with a Swiss Intelligence official, strongly suggests that he was known by officials of the Church with whom he regularly communicated for a period of two years.

We believe that Walter Rauff, when he escaped from Rimini Detention Center on December 29, 1946 and made his way to Rome, was a very desperate man in search of refuge.

During those difficult days Rauff, a shrewd and cunning man, must have used the Church connections that he had carefully cultivated over a two year period. Surely it is reasonable to conclude that Rauff would have told the priests who helped him all about his good standing with Bicchiera1 and Schuster. Indeed, it is even possible to believe that Schuster and Bicchiera1 knew about Rauff's long stay in Rome in "convents of the Holy See" -- as he described his refuge to a Chilean court in 1962.

It is also reasonable to presume that Pope Pius XII would have known about Walter Rauff as he monitored the ultimately fruitless negotiations for the surrender of Nazi-occupied Italy. We believe the Vatican has a grave responsibility to, once and for all, clear the air by investigating the facts pertaining to Walter Rauff's stay in Rome and to make public all the pertinent documents -- specifically all the communications Cardinal Schuster sent to the Vatican; the names of the priests and officials who dealt with Walter Rauff in Rome, and; the source from



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whom, Rauff received his financial support and passport documents. This, after all, is not a theoretical exercise we are engaged in. Walter Rauff is no relic of an ancient civilization. He symbolizes all that is corrupt and evil in man and it is the moral duty of all who may have wittingly or unwittingly aided and abetted his escape to bring out the truth about this murderer of 250,000 men, women and children.

Recently, the Vatican has shown its great influence with President Pinochet by getting Chile to grant safe passage to the four terrorists who murdered the Governor of Santiago. Pinochet bowed to Vatican pressure without regard for the normal due process of law. It is surely the responsibility of the Church to show similar concern in the case of one of the most notorious Nazi War Criminals for whom they provided shelter.

The Vatican's stake is greater than the member nations of the European Parliament who two and a half months ago voted unanimously to formally ask Chile to expel Walter Rauff so that he can stand trial in West Germany. Failure to respond to this call of conscience can only be taken as further evidence that there are those in the Vatican with something to hide in the case of Walter Rauff.

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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT RABBI MARVIN HIER AT THE SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER'S NEW YORK OFFICE AT (212) 370-0320.

Simon Wiesenthal Center

AMERICAN JEWISH  
Investigative Report  
ARCHIVES  
on

SS COL. WALTER RAUFF:

THE CHURCH CONNECTION

1943-1947

## Declassified Documents Reveal Close Relationship Between Nazi War Criminal Walter Rauff and High Church Officials, Reveal New Details on Gassing of Jews During WWII

Confidential United States government documents released to the Simon Wiesenthal Center, covering a wide range of issues, detail a substantial and ongoing relationship between Nazi war criminal **Walter Rauff and high officials of the Catholic church during the second world war**. They further reveal heretofore unknown information about the **mass gassing program** under Rauff's supervision in 1942

In a May 1942 report to Walter Rauff – then an SS Obersturmbannführer – Rauff was warned that the true purposes of camouflaged “Death Vans” would eventually leak out “ *we shall not be able to keep this camouflage secret a very long time* ” (See Fact #2) A modification of the mass killing procedure was suggested in the same report

*“The gassing is not done in the right manner In order to get the work over as quickly as possible, the driver gives full gas Through these measures the people to be executed die from suffocation and not as foreseen by being put to sleep My method has proved that by releasing pressure on the lever at the right time death comes more quickly distorted faces and excretions which have been previously seen, are not more to be observed I am leaving for Group B where you can forward me further information”*

*Signed, SS Untersturmführer Becker*

Other documents show that OSS agent (later CIA chief) **Allen Dulles was aware of Rauff's February 1945 trip to Switzerland where he met with a high-ranking Swiss intelligence official** (see Fact #8) They also show that in 1947 the U S government tried – apparently without success – to enlist the intervention of the **Holy See** by detailing the charges of the La Vista Report to stop the abuse of church relief agencies by “*secret agents*” and “*unscrupulous persons engaged in illicit and clandestine activities*” (see Fact #3)

Additional documents further reveal that 20 Nazis who escaped from the allied detention center in **Rimini** on July 22, 1946 (*the same camp Rauff escaped from five months later*) were traced to **an escape route linked directly to Vatican officials**. The report shows the escapees making their way to Rome where they acquired Red Cross visas and letters of recommendation from the Vatican As a result of this, the C I C agent making the report stated that a similar chain exists “in every nation's Vatican delegation” This agent recommended to his superiors that a “**complete curtailment of passport services of the International Red Cross be considered**, and that a policy of action against refugee agencies which are trafficking in illegal immigration also be considered” (See Fact #16)

### Rauff and the Church

The 1945 U S Intelligence Report on Walter Rauff asserted Rauff was a dangerous man who brought with him “ *political gangsterism to stream-lined perfection* ” and “ *ever-lasting malice towards the Allies* ” The Report said that Rauff would be a “*menace if ever set free, and failing actual elimination he's recommended for lifelong internment*” (see Fact #13)

Rauff told his interrogators that he had numerous meetings and exchange of letters with **Monsignor Don Giuseppe Bicchierai** as well as with the **Archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Ildefonso Schuster**, between 1943-1945 (see Facts #1 & #4) (Schuster, who was the Cardinal of Milan from 1929-1954, was a powerful figure in the Church. He was, at times, considered a possible candidate for the Papacy, and was known as a fiery opponent of Communism ) (See Fact #14) Rauff asserted that as the top SD officer in Northern Italy it was essential for him to establish "official contact" with the Church in order to maintain "a direct exchange of views " (See Fact #5) He described Bicchierai as secretary to Cardinal Schuster and as a person who "wields great influence" on the Cardinal's "political outlook," in particular, and the clergy, in general (see Fact #6)

In his post-World War II memoirs, Cardinal Schuster said that Rauff had thwarted a Gestapo order to arrest Bicchierai (see Fact #7) Other sources show that Bicchierai in turn helped obtain a Red Cross visa to Switzerland for one of Rauff's informers (see Fact #9) Noted historian and former British Intelligence officer, Sir William Deakin, flatly stated that "Bicchierai and Schuster had more than a correct relationship with the Germans " (See Fact #11) **In fact, Pope Pius XII entrusted Schuster—a close personal friend of the previous Pope, Pius XI—to represent the Vatican in various surrender proposals involving both Mussolini and the Germans during 1944-1945** (see Fact #12) After WWII, Cardinal Schuster warned that Europe "absolutely needed" Germany, because without her, Russia would reach across Europe to threaten France and England (see Fact #14)

In a chapter dealing with Walter Rauff, Frederick Jarschel, a former member of the "Odessa," using the pen-name of Werner Brockdorff, stated in his book, "Flucht vor Nürnberg," that Walter Rauff established **contact with the Vatican in 1943** when he was stationed in Rome. Later, as security chief in Northern Italy, he enlarged upon those connections and remained in constant touch with Bishop Hudal, even after the occupation of Rome by the Allies. The book also claims that Rauff sought the help of clergy in Northern Italy to help him escape, and that later in 1945 **Catholic priests visited him in San Vittore prison** to arrange for his transfer to the 15th U.S. Army hospital in Milan. Those priests then began discussing a number of ways through which Rauff could escape. However, before the plan could be implemented, he was evacuated to a U.S. camp near Ghedi. The author also claims that Rauff had been aided by the office of Cardinal Siri of Genoa, whose secretary provided money and Red Cross documents to Rauff (See Exhibit "J", Pages 1-3) (Note: While it would be proper to be wary of this source, Simon Wiesenthal has said that Jarschel's assertions have generally proven to be accurate )

### Wiesenthal Center Statement

In light of these new revelations and Walter Rauff's personal testimony given in a Chilean court in December 1962 (that he received help from "a priest" to escape from authorities in Northern Italy, and was "housed in convents of the Holy See for more or less a year and a half" starting in 1947, and later, "with help of the Catholic church my family was able to come from the Russian Zone in Germany to Rome," see Fact #15), **the Simon Wiesenthal Center renews its call on Pope John Paul II to launch an immediate and full investigation of the Rauff issue.** Previous assertions by Vatican historians that Walter Rauff was treated as just another refugee simply defy the growing body of evidence. *For, is it possible that Walter Rauff—a desperate man fleeing from authorities—would have failed to utilize the names of powerful church officials whom he knew on an intimate basis in order to help secure refuge? Is it not likely that those who housed, fed, and employed Rauff in Rome for a year and a half did so—at least in part—because of Rauff's established relationship with these higher church officials?*

The Vatican can help set the record straight as to **which church agencies aided Rauff and his family**, and as to whether he had any **direct or indirect contact with Cardinal Schuster and/or Monsignor Bicchiera** following World War II. Such information will help solve the puzzle of how a murderer of 250,000 innocent men, women, and children, and an oppressor of the civilian population of Northern Italy – was able to escape the bar of justice, find shelter in Rome, and eventually find his way to safety and freedom in South America.

It has been over 20 years since Walter Rauff's past was first brought to the attention of the Chilean authorities. In recent months, there has been a renewed international effort to make this criminal stand trial; but to date, this effort has not produced the desired result. Chile continues to claim that various legal technicalities stand in the way of either extraditing or expelling Rauff. Yet, the same authorities recently deported four terrorists who gunned down the governor of Santiago in January 1984, and provided them safe passage to Ecuador—all at the behest of the Vatican. We, therefore, also ask the Vatican to use its considerable influence with President Pinochet to assure that the forces of justice and morality, which were overlooked nearly 40 years ago, are served by the swift expulsion of this mass murderer.



Summary of Facts and Documents  
Simon Wiesenthal Center  
Investigation on  
Rauff and the Church

- 1 Confidential United States government documents released to the Simon Wiesenthal Center disclose that Walter Rauff had a close working relationship with leading members of the Catholic church in Northern Italy during World War II (See Exhibit "A", Page Two, section marked [u], U S Interrogation Report )
- 2 Documents reveal heretofore unknown details of the mass gassing program initiated under Rauff's supervision of 1942 The document discussed the camouflage used to make 'gassing' vans look ordinary, and the best method to be used in the "gassing" procedure (See Exhibit "B" Report by SS Untersturmfuehrer Becker to SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff, May 15, 1942 )
- 3 The U S State Department authorized an official complaint to the Secretariat of State of the Vatican asking the intervention of the church in looking into the charges detailed in the La Vista Report to stop the abuse of church relief agencies by "secret agents" and "unscrupulous persons engaged in illicit and clandestine activities" This complaint was transmitted to the Vatican in the form of an "Oral Message" in August 1947 (See Exhibit "C" )
- 4 The report on the interrogation of Rauff by United States C I C agents in 1945 indicated that he held numerous meetings from 1943-1945 with Monsignor Don Giuseppe Bicchierai and Cardinal Ildefonso Schuster, Archbishop of Milan (See Exhibit "A", Pages One and Two, "Bicchierai" and Page Six, also Exhibit "D", Pages One through Four )
- 5 Rauff revealed that as head of SIPO and SD of Northern Italy it was essential for him to establish "official contact" with the church in order to establish "a direct exchange of views" (See Exhibit "A", Page Two, section marked [u], first paragraph, and Exhibit "A," Page Eight )
- 6 Rauff stated that Monsignor Bicchierai never received money from him apart from the small presents he gave him on special occasions (See Exhibit "A", Page Two, paragraph marked [u] ) Bicchierai was secretary to Cardinal Schuster and administrator of the ecclesiastical pension fund in Northern Italy, and, according to Rauff, "wields great influence" with the clergy in general (See Exhibit "A", Page One, paragraph marked [1] )
- 7 Documents show that Cardinal Schuster, a close friend of Pius XI, held meetings with Rauff during the war Schuster wanted to arrange for the surrender of German forces to take place at the Archdiocese (See Exhibit "D", Pages One and Two ) In a book written by Cardinal Schuster in 1946, he revealed that Gestapo Chief General Harster once issued an arrest order for Monsignor Bicchierai but that Rauff prevented the order from being executed (See Exhibit "E" Pages One and Two Cardinal Schuster's monograph, *Gli Ultimi Tempi Di Un Regime*, Milan, 1946 )
- 8 Walter Rauff traveled to Switzerland during the war to meet with Professor Hussman of Swiss Intelligence (see Exhibit "A", Page Three, section (g), second paragraph) with the knowledge of Allen Dulles (Exhibit "A", Page Four, second paragraph) of the OSS, who later became director of the CIA

- 9 Monsignor Bicchieri was instrumental in helping to secure a Red Cross visa to Switzerland for his close friend Benuzzi, who was one of Rauff's informers (See Exhibit "A", Page Five, second paragraph )
- 10 In 1945 Monsignor Bicchieri became president of Caritas, a Catholic relief agency helping refugees He remained in that position until 1983 (Source telephone communication with the Archdiocese in Milan, April 1984)
- 11 Sir William Deakin, author of *The Brutal Friendship*, the story of Mussolini and Hitler, and a former member of British Intelligence, stated, "Bicchieri and Schuster had more than a correct relationship with the Germans" (Source telephone communication between Wiesenthal Center officials and Sir William Deakin, March 1984 )
- 12 Pius XII sent a message to Mussolini's mistress that any plans for surrender should be directed by Mussolini through the Archdiocese in Milan, who would in turn be in contact with him Thus, the Bicchieri-Schuster negotiations were conducted at the behest of the Pope (See Exhibit "F," Pages One and Two Murphy *La Popessa* New York Random House, 1983 )
- 13 A U S Intelligence Report on Walter Rauff asserted that he was a dangerous man who brought with him " political gangsterism to streamlined perfection " and " everlasting malice towards the Allies " (See Exhibit A, Page 7, paragraph marked (d) )
- 14 Cardinal Schuster, who served as Cardinal of Milan from 1929-1954, was a powerful figure in the Church He was, at times, considered a possible candidate for the Papacy, and was known as a fiery opponent of Communism Shortly after World War II, Cardinal Schuster warned that Europe "absolutely needed" Germany (see Exhibit "G," Pages One and Two)
- 15 Rauff told a Chilean court in December 1962 that he received help from "a priest" to escape from authorities in Northern Italy He also said that he was "housed in convents of the Holy See for more or less a year and a half" starting in 1947 Later Rauff asserted that, "with the help of the Catholic church my family was able to come from the Russian Zone in Germany to Rome " (See Exhibit H, Pages One and Two )
- 16 A confidential C I C report on the "Investigation of Illegal Movements," traced the route of 20 Nazi prisoners who escaped from the Rimini Detention Center on July 22, 1946 This escape route was directly linked to the Vatican In addition, the C I C report labelled the International Red Cross as "a haven for the passage of agents" The report recommends "curtailment of passport services of the International Red Cross" (See Exhibit "I")
- 17 Bishop Alois Hudal, the pro-German bishop under whose protection Rauff lived while in Rome in 1947, wrote in his diary, "Nobody, especially in September of 1944, wanted to give an answer to what's going on " The footnote to this passage read, "One exception was made amongst the leaders of the Church of Italy The Cardinal from Milan, Schuster, who in 1944 publicly warned the allies on the consequences of not supporting the Germans against the Soviet Union " (Source Diary of Bishop Hudal )

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Original documents  
faded and/or illegible



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COMBRASCU appeared to possess a very extensive information service in ITALY, which he offered to place at Source's disposal in the interests of fighting Communism. COMBRASCU claimed to control 10,000 armed supporters in MILAN ready to suppress any Communist or Partisan revolt. In exchange for his collaboration, COMBRASCU made the following demands:

- a) The arrest of Communist opponents named by him.
- b) The avoiding of any destruction and unnecessary bloodshed in the event of a withdrawal.

Source agreed to both points.

COMBRASCU is stated to have mentioned to Source that he had collaborated with SID on the same basis until Sep 44. After this date his collaboration with SID had ceased owing to the fact that the information he supplied was never acted upon.

COMBRASCU claimed to have no foreign connections at all. He also claimed any financial support on the part of the Allies. His movement was supposed to be the "COMBRASCU" movement which claimed to control 10,000 supporters, particularly South of MILAN, who carried out anti-Communist activities.

"SCALA" lived for a long time in SWITZERLAND. He entered that country illegally after the disappearance of HENRIZZI (Mar 45), and Source believes it was he who reported the presence of HENRIZZI somewhere between LOCARNO and CHIASSO. He made a further attempt later on to contact HENRIZZI (end Apr 45) but was unsuccessful. Source states that "SCALA" was not an agent of his, but only a collaborator of COMBRASCU. The last information Source had of "SCALA" was on 28 Apr 45, when the latter made a telephone call from an unspecified German unit, where he had apparently made an attempt to confiscate the weapons. In view of this fact Source considers that "SCALA" collaborated openly with the GEM.

The information supplied by COMBRASCU was concerned exclusively with the activities of Communists and corrupt Fascists, but after a certain time the information became unreliable. As a specific instance Source mentions the occasion when COMBRASCU denounced a number of persons as active Communists. Their arrest and subsequent interrogation showed them to be Christian-Democrats, Socialists or quite harmless people, all of which were later released.

As a reward for his collaboration, COMBRASCU was given a permit to run a car and supplied with a certain amount of petrol. He was also issued with a permit to carry arms. Source affirms that neither COMBRASCU nor "SCALA" ever received any money from the SD.

a) BIOCHIERAY

1) Personal Details

BIOCHIERAY comes from a good MILAN family. He studied law, and after completion of his studies became a lawyer in the service of the Church. He became a priest at the age of 25.

BIOCHIERAY is a realist of more than average intelligence. He has advanced ideas and a great deal of understanding for technical developments. He drives his own car and has invested his money in a number of new technical gadgets. He is in far closer touch with daily life than most other priests and is very adapted to undertake special jobs. He is, for instance, administrator of the ecclesiastical pension fund in N ITALY, and as such wields great influence with the middle and lower sections of the priesthood in N ITALY.

BIOCHIERAY has great

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11 MAY 1964

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BIOCHIERAI has great political ambitions and is able to exert a not inconsiderable influence on the political outlook of Cardinal SCHUSTER. Politically, BIOCHIERAI is a Christian-Democrat, an anti-Fascist and anti-Communist, but tolerant towards the other political parties. He has travelled extensively in SWITZER, but not in GERMANY.

11) Financial Position

Source has the impression that BIOCHIERAI is very adroit in financial matters and not indisposed to make a handsome living for himself. Source considers him wealthy. BIOCHIERAI never received any money, either from Source personally or from unit funds, apart from small presents on special occasions. Source is unaware to what extent BIOCHIERAI profited from his intervention and subsequent release of prisoners, but Source suspects that now and then he derived some profit from the transaction. Source is certain, however, that the Church as such gained material and political advantages as a result of its successful interventions on behalf of prisoners.

111) Source's First Meeting with BIOCHIERAI and Subsequent Arrangement

The nature of Source's work made it essential for him to have some sort of official contact with the Church in order to establish a direct exchange of views on every day matters. The Church, too, had every interest in establishing contact with the SD in order to provide for direct intervention with the highest authority on matters of special importance.

Source informed DEWUZZI of his intention of establishing an official contact with the Church, and DEWUZZI offered to put Source in touch with his friend BIOCHIERAI. This offer was accepted, and the three had their first meeting on 27 Dec 43. Source has no information regarding the previous associations between DEWUZZI and BIOCHIERAI but has no doubt that in introducing BIOCHIERAI DEWUZZI hoped to have the protection of the Church if things went wrong later on.

The result of this and subsequent meetings was that BIOCHIERAI obtained from Source several concessions resulting in an improvement of the amenities at SAN VITTORE Prison (holding of church services, installation of a public address system and provision of foodstuffs).

A further concession granted to BIOCHIERAI concerned the treatment of priests imprisoned at SAN VITTORE on charges of supporting the Partisans, espionage, carrying of weapons and making speeches hostile to the Government. The agreement reached between the two provided that instead of imprisonment at SAN VITTORE, priests charged with the above crimes were released at the ecclesiastical lunatic asylum at OESANO BOSCONO for definite or indefinite periods and released after consultation between Source and BIOCHIERAI.

In due course, the scope of BIOCHIERAI's intervention was increased by the inclusion of ordinary prisoners of all political shades. The number of prisoners whose release was demanded by BIOCHIERAI grew out of all proportion, and eventually an agreement was reached whereby political prisoners were exchanged for German troops captured by the Partisans.

Source cannot remember the numbers of prisoners exchanged, or released, as a result of BIOCHIERAI's intervention, but the number is said to be considerable. The number was particularly great on special occasions (Easter, 20 Apr, Christmas, etc), when Source granted an amnesty for political prisoners.

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(e) Violilla MAS

At one time the above organization planned to establish an Intelligence Service in SWITZERLAND. It was to have worked in conjunction with smuggling organization, but the scheme was never carried out. The film star, VALENTI Cavaldo, was also connected with the organization, which was run on amateurish lines, and had its HQ at LANZO D'INVERI.

(f) MARINOTTI and the Undertaking "WESTWIND"

MARINOTTI, manager of ENIA VISOCHE, was serving a short term of imprisonment during the course of which he expressed the wish to go to SWITZERLAND in order to contact some Allied representatives. His aim was to open negotiations with a view to saving the industry in N ITALY from destruction, but he wished to carry out his mission with the knowledge of the German authorities.

MARINOTTI's plan was approved, because it was decided to make use of his visit to SWITZERLAND in order to contact Allied political circles in that country. The scheme was given the cover name "WESTWIND" and placed under the personal direction of HARSTER.

MARINOTTI went to SWITZERLAND, and the first results looked promising. After one of MARINOTTI's visits across the border, a meeting took place at CERUGBIO between HARSTER, MARINOTTI and Source. The meeting was also attended by a Swiss lawyer, KRUTTER (or GRUTTER), allegedly a close collaborator with the British or American Intelligence Service. As a result of the progress made, HARSTER went to BERLIN in order to obtain permission to continue the discussions. BERLIN's attitude was not encouraging and the scheme was abandoned.

Source states that MARINOTTI did not bring back any information from SWITZERLAND other than that connected with the negotiations. He is aware, however, that one of MARINOTTI's former collaborators, Count COMITA (?) is alleged to have worked for the British Intelligence Service, but that the two had had differences of opinion and no longer saw one another.

Source has no information regarding the present whereabouts of MARINOTTI but presumes him to be in SWITZERLAND.

(g) PARILI

On 15 Feb 45 SS Obergruppenfuehrer WOLFF expressed the wish to have some means of establishing contact with the Allies in SWITZERLAND. Source discussed the matter with ZIGER, and it was agreed to nominate PARILI, whom ZIGER knew in a purely personal way from GENOVA. ZIGER had never had any intelligence dealings with PARILI before. PARILI was keen on the proposal, as he himself was interested in the preservation of Upper ITALY. WOLFF and HARSTER agreed to PARILI's nomination, and from then onwards the negotiations followed the already well-known course.

Source himself took part in these negotiations, going to SWITZERLAND (LUGANO) end Feb-Beg Mar 45 accompanied by ZIGER, where he negotiated with Professor HUSSENER and Major WEDEL of the Swiss Intelligence Service. He was obliged to explain to the Swiss representatives why WOLFF's visit to BERLIN had taken longer than expected. At the same time, Source was handed a list of prisoners held by the SS and on whose behalf the Swiss representatives wished to intervene. Source states that if they had not yet left his area, all the prisoners on the list were set free. This was the only time Source is stated to have gone to SWITZERLAND.

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HEADQUARTERS

(800TH CIC DETACHMENT)  
APO 604

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Auth US Army

Initials  
Date 1 MAY 1945

"g" Force, Verona  
3 May 1945

SUBJECT: Interrogation of SS Officers.  
TO: Commanding Officer, "g" Force, Verona.

File 10-216719

1. Pursuant to your request (Colonel Walter BAFF) SS Chief for Northwest Italy, his adjutant, Captain Hans KRIEGER of the SS, and 1st. Sgt. Walter BASTA of the SS, who had fled this detachment from Milan in the evening of 30 April 1945 after surrendering to American officers there, were subjected to brief initial interrogation by Special Agents Alvin E. Sawyer, Jr., and Gordon H. Hocking of this Detachment for information of immediate CI interest. Results of the interrogation are given in this report.

*Quoted*

2. Colonel Walter BAFF, son of Otto BAFF and Anna BAFFENBERGER, was born on 19 June 1908 in Lothen, Imbitt, Germany. He declared that on the evening of 27 April 1945 he had made an arrangement with Capt. S.G. Bendric, HQ, 6777 Regiment, GCS, APO 512, in Milan in order to avoid further bloodshed in Milan. BAFF claimed to have had talks with the Milan GIC with the same end in view. He further stated that his officers on this detachment were as mentioned by Capt. BASTA and Mr. BULLER, Allied agents in Switzerland. BAFF stated categorically that he would never give any information dealing with the operations or personnel of SS or SS in this or any other region.

3. Captain Hans KRIEGER, son of Hans KRIEGER and Gertrude GARDNER, was born on 2 February 1907 in Munich, and is the adjutant of Col. BAFF. KRIEGER told the same story of arrangements made between the GIC and the German command in Milan. He stated that he had no connection with the SS, though he knew it had offices in Verona, Bologna, Milan, Venice, Genoa, and Turin. Lt. Col. BASTA was Chief of the SS in Genoa; Capt. SCHMIDT had a corresponding post in Turin. In Verona, Stenhammery WILSON was adjutant for General BAFFER, Stenhammery WILSON was head of Abteilung VI; Dr. KRASCHKE was head of Abteilung IV and V. In Milan, 1st Lt. KRIEGER was in charge of Abteilung VI. KRIEGER claimed to know nothing of operational plans of the SS or its ulterior intentions in Italy.

4. 1st. Sgt. Walter BASTA is the son of Joseph BASTA and Maria WEINIGER, born in Bagnolimbardo, Province of Trento, Italy, on 18 November 1908. He is an official dependant directly on General BAFFER, who has been operating as a spy-master and political manipulator from Carnobbio, Province of Sondrio. BASTA indicated that he would be willing to collaborate fully with Allied intelligence. It is considered likely that BASTA should prove of interest to higher headquarters.

5. The three German officers either would not or could not offer information of immediate operational CI interest. They were lodged at the Albergo Academia in Verona under GIC guard the night of 30 April-1 May 1945. On 1 May 1945,

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Source admits he had other plans for DEBUZZI, who he hoped to use after a German withdrawal from N ITALY, either as an intelligence collecting agency in SWITZERLAND, or as an intermediary between GERMANY and N ITALY, or both. This, according to Source, was the main reason why he wished to preserve DEBUZZI, and why he frowned upon his frequent visits to SWITZERLAND, without, however, actively opposing them.

With a view to avoiding the consequences of the anticipated Allied occupation of N ITALY, DEBUZZI made preparations for crossing into SWITZERLAND. He did this with the help of DICCHIARA and BERGOL, Swiss Consul General at MILAN/COMO, by having himself nominated as "legate to the Italian Red Cross." In this capacity he intended to supervise the general welfare of Italian Jews interned in GERMANY and, if necessary, to submit complaints to the appropriate authorities in SWITZERLAND. From the German side, no obstacles were put in his way, and DEBUZZI was repeatedly granted exit and entry permits for his visits to SWITZERLAND. DEBUZZI obtained his visa personally from the Swiss Consul General, with the assistance of the Church and the Red Cross.

The financial aspect of the probability that DEBUZZI would take refuge in SWITZERLAND if N ITALY were occupied by the Allies was discussed between Source and HERSTER. It was agreed that a special account should be opened in favour of DEBUZZI, to be maintained by D&S VERONA, and credited with 500 Swiss francs monthly. It was also agreed upon that the total amount accumulated should be paid to DEBUZZI in one lump sum as soon as he took his final departure from N ITALY, but only in a condition that he settled down permanently in SWITZERLAND. DEBUZZI has never drawn any money from this account, and up till Feb 45 never received any payments from Source on account of his visits to SWITZERLAND. Source has no information on what happened to this account but states emphatically that DEBUZZI has no claim to it, as the OSS administration never released the amount.

2) DEBUZZI's Contacts in SWITZERLAND

The following are the names of people in SWITZERLAND DEBUZZI visited from time to time:

- Bishop of LUZANO
- Police Chief of the Canton of TESSIN
- Col. DGV of the Red Cross
- Sally MEYER - American citizen at BERG
- VALLERIE - the "alleged" representative of Sally MEYER
- JONES (?) - member of American Consulate at LUZANO, at DICCHIARA's request.

Source reaffirmed that apart from Jewish and Red Cross matters, DEBUZZI never reported any details of his business with the above.

21) DEBUZZI's Last Visit to SWITZERLAND

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEBUZZI informed Source after returning from one of his visits to SWITZERLAND in Feb 45 that he had had an appointment with Sally MEYER or his representative, but that neither had turned up at LUZANO. DEBUZZI then told Source that he intended to apply for a special permit to travel to BERG in order to meet the above. He thought he could obtain this special permit with MEYER's assistance.

/On Tuesday,

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
UN 11 MAY 1983  
BY FOR USAINSCOM FOPD  
Auth Para 1-603 DoD BRCC. 1-R

OSDT/BO/1548/CD 11

2 and 3 N.U.

Two Italian agents.  
No description available.  
Records: Were to be installed independently in two shops selling electrical goods in MILAN, one of which is believed to have been in Corso BUENOS AIRES, as cover for installation of WT sets. Both later removed from Post-occupational network (reasons for removal forgotten).

(e) Informants

BARRACCI

Italian (?) girl.  
No description or information available.  
Last known to be in MILAN.

BENIZZI

Italian. Chief political informant to Source. Not ID.

BUCCHERAI

Italian priest. Source's connection with Cardinal SCHUSTER.  
Present whereabouts unknown.

DOGAR Marietta (?)

Italian (?) girl.  
No description or information available.

alias "Countess"

SAN SEVERINO

Present whereabouts unknown.

"Giorgio"

Italian. General situation and political informant for Aussonkomento MILAN.  
No description available.  
Last known to be in MILAN.

CONTRACCI

Italian Professor, Medical Faculty of MILAN University.  
Freemason and collaborator with Source on anti-Communist matters.  
Last known to be in MILAN.

KARWAT

German. Business man in COM. Worked in SWITZERLAND for ED.  
Last known to be in SWITZERLAND.

MAJOREK Anja

Danese.  
No description available.  
Records: Was sent on special mission to SWITZERLAND by Lt VI RSM, via Insancomando MILAN, but was refused visa. Was originally Finnish nationality but became naturalized Italian after second marriage. Husband remained in S ITALY.  
Private Address: Hotel "LAZA", MILAN, I.G.

PARTI

Italian Baron. **CONFIDENTIAL**  
No description available.  
Records: Was used as intermediary for Armistice negotiations with DILLAS.  
Last known to be in SWITZERLAND.

UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 11 MAY 1983  
BY CDR USAINCOM F0P0  
Auth Para 1-63 DoD 5200.1-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 1 May 40, and at his own request, Source was transferred back to the Navy, as CO of the 39th Minesweeping Flotilla operating between CHERBOURG and CALAIS. Source was promoted to the rank of Lt-Comdr in Apr 41.

Source returned to the SD Hauptamt BERLIN, Amt IID in Jun 41, but in Sep 41 moved to another assignment in all matters of communications in the Protectorate. Source remained in this job till Jun 42, when he returned to the SD Hauptamt BERLIN.

In Jul 42 Source was appointed head of the SD Einsatzkommando APTEL, but his staff was unable to go beyond ATHENS, and Source flew to SOFIA for a personal interview with [redacted]. It was decided that the arrival of the SD Einsatzkommando had been too long delayed to be of any value, and Source returned to BERLIN with his staff.

In Nov 42 Source went to TURIN with an SD Einsatzkommando, somewhat reduced in size, and remained there till 10 May 43, when he flew over to ITALY with his staff.

Source was appointed CO of the Einsatzkommando CORSICA in Jul 43. On 8 Sep 43 Source flew to BOLZANO to see SS Gruppenführer HARSTER, who appointed Source CO GRUPPE OBER ITALIEN WEST OF THE SIPO AND SD, with HQ in MILAN. Source arrived at MILAN [redacted] on [redacted].

(a) Assessment

Source is a typical member of the SD Morale who has brought his own [redacted] to bear on his work. He is not very intelligent, he regards his past activities as a matter of course. He was at first most uncooperative during interrogation and refused to lay his cards on the table. His contempt and everlasting malice towards the Allies are but slightly concealed. Source is considered a menace if ever set free, and failing actual elimination, is recommended for life-long internment.

Reliability: Good

2. GRUPPE OBER ITALIEN WEST OF THE SIPO AND SD

(a) Formation

When Source flew to see HARSTER at BOLZANO on 12 Sep 43, he was given the task, together with [redacted] of organizing the SIPO and SD set-up in the Western part of Upper ITALY. The original scheme was that Source should take over the area of TRIESTE and LIGURIA, with provisional HQ at TURIN, whilst MULLER was to be responsible for LOMBARDY, with HQ at MILAN. During the night 12/13 Sep 43, MULLER became incapacitated through a strong attack of rheumatism and was unable to make the journey. Source was therefore commissioned by HARSTER to carry out alone the task of establishing the SIPO and SD network in NW ITALY (see App "A").

Source arrived in MILAN on 13 Sep 43, with a staff of 35, including technical personnel (drivers, interpreters, WT operators, etc) and began establishing the Aussehenkommando, MILAN, with BARBECKE in charge.

About 10 days later Source went to TURIN, and with part of his original staff plus reinforcements set up Aussehenkommando TURIN, under SCHEIDT.

With the arrival of further reinforcements, Aussehenkommando GENOVA was established at Gen Dec 43, under HEINIKOFF.

UNCLASSIFIED  
1 MAY 1963  
RDR-USANSKOM FORM  
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R


APPENDIX "A"

CONFIDENTIAL

OSDIO/SC/156C/ED 11.

CHAIN OF COMMAND GROUPS OVER ITALY AND WEST OF THE SIPO AND SD

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 11 MAY 1983  
BY CDR USAINSCOM/PMP/ST  
Auth Para 1-603 DAD 52001.1-8



REC'D - 8 JUN

1207

~~Feldpostnummer 1270~~

Kiev, 16.5.42

B. Nr 40/42

TO  
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer R a u f f  
Prinz-Albrecht Str. 8  
Berlin

*Q. y. . . . . 101 -*

*1/00*

The taking over of vehicles by Groups D and C is finished. While the vans of the first group can be utilized in not too bad weather, the cars belonging to the second group (SAURER) are absolutely immobilized in rainy weather. For instance, often it has rained for half an hour, these vehicles cannot be used in absolutely dry weather. The only question is whether these vehicles can be put into action only on the execution spot.

First, a vehicle must be brought to this place, what is only possible in good weather. The execution spot is generally stationed 10 to 15 kms from main roads and due to such location already of difficult access, but in wet weather absolutely impossible to reach. If those to be executed are driven or conducted to this place, they notice at once what is wrong and become frantic, which is most of all to be avoided. There is only one solution: to gather them on the same spot and then to drive off.

As for the vehicles of Group D, I had them camouflaged as cabin trailers by putting on them little windows, one on every side of the small vans and two on every side of the big ones, like windows which are seen on pleasant houses. But the vehicles were so well known that not only the authorities, but also the civilian population, called them "Death Vans." My opinion is that we shall not be able to keep this camouflage secret a very long time.

On the way up from SIMFEROPOL to TAKANROG, I had brake troubles with the vehicle "SAURER", which I was conveying over there. At the S.K in MARIUPOL, it was found out that the "brank clutch" (manchette) of the combined Oil and Westinghouse brakes, was broken in several places. Through persuasion and bribery I obtained from the H.K.P (Army Motor Pool) to have a pattern made, after which two brake clutches have been cast. When I arrived some days later at Stalino and Gorlowka, the drivers of the vehicles there complained of the same trouble. After an interview with the commanding officer of the Commando, I returned to Mariupol to have another branke clutch made for these vehicles. It has been agreed that two brake clutches will be cast for these vans; six brake clutches will stay in reserve in Mariupol for Group D; and six will be sent to SS Untersturmfuehrer ERNST in Kiev for the vehicles of Group C. With regard to Groups F and A, the brake clutch can be obtained through Berlin, as the transportation from Mariupol to the north seems too hazardous and would take too long. Small repairs of vehicles will be handled by Commando technicians; that is to say, repairs will be made in their own workshops.

*✓ Murder list*

*Rauff desk. 100-44-11*

~~SECRET~~

RECORDED AND INDEXED  
*YN*

States Military Academy in 1935. He is now an intelligence officer with the 15th Army. He received the Air Medal in February for aerial reconnaissance work accomplished last summer. He also holds the Bronze Star. His wife is the former Margaret Jenkins of Washington. —Editor's note

Due to the uneven terrain in the region and the very bad state of the roads, the joints and rivets become loose within a very short time. I was asked if, in such cases, the vehicles must be taken to Berlin. Transportation to Berlin would be too expensive and would require too much gasoline. To save such expenses, I gave the order to solder the small, leaky spots, and when this could not be done, any more, to inform Berlin at once, by radio that the vehicle Pol. No. . . was out of working order.

Furthermore, I ordered, during the gassing, to keep all the men as far away as possible, in order that they could not eventually be injured by gas fumes. On this occasion I wish to draw your attention to the fact that after the gassing several Kommandos let their own men unload the van. I have drawn the attention of the Commanding Officers of the concerned S.K. to the atrocious spiritual and physical effect that this kind of work may have on the men, if not just now then in the future. The men complained to me that they got headaches after every van-unloading. Anyhow, this order is not observed, as it is feared that the prisoners chosen for this work will use the opportunity to try an escape. In order to prevent the men from being injured, I should be obliged if orders were given accordingly.

The gassing is not done in the right manner. In order to get the work over as quickly as possible, the driver gives full gas. Through these measures the people to be executed die from suffocation and not as foreseen by being put to sleep. My method has proved that by releasing pressure on the lever at the right time death comes more quickly and the prisoners slip peacefully away. Distorted faces and excretions, which have been previously seen, are not more to be observed.

I am leaving in the course of the day for Group P, where you can forward me further information.

Sgd: B E C K E R  
SS-Untersturmfuehrer

SECRET

States Military Academy in 1935.  
He is now an intelligence officer  
with the 15th Army. He received  
the Air Medal in February for  
aerial reconnaissance work accom-  
plished last summer. He also holds  
the Bronze Star. His wife is the  
former Margaret Jenkins of Wash-  
ington.—Editor's note

EXHIBIT "B"  
Page Two

TOP SECRET

Vatican City, August 29, 1947

Dear Red:

With reference to your top secret letter of July 23, I gave today to Monsignor Walter Carroll, Secretariat of State of the Holy See, the "Oral Message", copies of which are attached. I understand that the Embassy, Rome, will take similar action vis-a-vis the Italian Government in the next few days.

It was not possible to be more specific because of the need to protect our sources of information and our investigators who still have important work in progress. Also, I felt that my action should be tempered somewhat because officials in the Vatican have betrayed to me on several occasions their sensitiveness over the amount of private American capital which has gone into the financing of illegal emigration.

Monsignor Carroll has promised to bring this matter to the attention of the top Catholic activities interested in aiding displaced persons and, in due course, to give me something in reply to the "Oral Message". I have asked him if possible to see that consideration of this matter extends down to the type agencies mentioned in LaVista's report, although such agencies, he said, are not connected with the Vatican. I will report by despatch with copies to Bern and Rome when I receive a reaction to our representations of today.

Yours sincerely,

J. Graham Parsons

Enclosure:  
Copies of "Oral  
Message"

Walter C. Dowling, Esquire,  
Division of Southern European Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

800 Emigration, Illegal  
into Italy

EXHIBIT "C"  
Page One

ORAL MESSAGES

The Assistant to the Honorable Myron C. Taylor stated that acting under instructions from Washington he was bringing the following matter informally to the attention of the Secretariat of State of the Holy See.

The United States Government has been and continues to be deeply concerned with the problem of displaced persons and it will be recalled that as recently as August 21 the President himself referred publicly to the continued efforts of the United States for further assistance to such persons.

This concern, however, has not been limited to the purely humanitarian aspects of one of the most tragic consequences of the late war but has extended also to another aspect of international significance, that which has to do with the control of the movements of persons across national frontiers and, more particularly, into the Western Hemisphere and the United States itself. In this connection it is recognized that the proper identification and documentation of persons who profess to be displaced persons is a problem of peculiar difficulty, the solution of which is not only vital to the individuals themselves but is also a matter of moment to the nations whose borders they are thus aided to cross.

Mr. Parsons then said that information reaching the United States Government indicated that unscrupulous persons, often engaged in illicit and clandestine activities, had been able increasingly to secure documentation for travel through the unwitting assistance of charitable organizations and governments and institutions cooperating therewith.

therewith. One recent estimate, prepared after exhaustive investigation, of the movement through an important European area of persons documented by emergency procedures indicated that ten percent of such persons were secret agents, many of them destined for the Western Hemisphere and the United States. Such wholesale victimization of agencies engaged in humanitarian work not only tends to throw discredit on their praiseworthy efforts to alleviate human suffering but also, if long continued, might reach such proportions as to be a threat to the development and maintenance of world order.

Under these circumstances, the United States is actively interested in further precautions against illicit travel of the nature mentioned and to this end it has sought the cooperation of other governments. The matter is brought to the attention of the Holy See in the hope that it too may be willing to examine the problem and consider such steps as may prove desirable to the end that the integrity of nations may be preserved from infiltration by unfriendly agents and that the charitable and benevolent work of assisting bonafide displaced persons, in which the Holy See and the United States have a common interest, may not be prejudiced.

Secret negotiations with Field Marshal Alexander were about to 'come into port', a solution which would avoid a massacre and 'which would leave hope for interesting developments. It would make it possible to save Mussolini, who would be useful in the future for the struggle against Bolshevism. He was awaiting an emissary tomorrow with a reply which should allow him to put before the Duce concrete and satisfactory proposals already completely defined.'

Rahn had wished hitherto to keep the matter secret, because if any other separate move got in the way or Berlin learnt of the existing negotiations, everything could be shipwrecked. Rahn would get in touch again at the opportune moment, and would ask Mellini to accompany him to Milan. Mellini commented later, 'I do not know what to think of all this.' He telephoned the Duce in Milan. The latter asked for news. 'I replied that there was nothing special to relate. I told him that Rahn intended to come to see him in Milan during the next days to make an interesting communication to him. He did not seem to be interested.'<sup>16</sup>

The last formal communication between the representative of the German government and the Salo authorities closed the cycle of their relations in impeccably bureaucratic style. In a minute, dated April 25, Mellini wrote

'Ambassador Rahn informed me yesterday that he had heard from General Wolff in Milan (*sic*) that the Minister of Finance is making difficulties in paying the known war contribution for the German Armed Forces for the current month. He has asked me to point out to you, Duce, how a refusal of the Italian government to pay the war contribution at this moment would, after so many efforts made in common, result in creating an unfavourable atmosphere in the whole German military circle at a moment when the Embassy and the military commands are seeking to do everything possible to avoid further unnecessary damage to Italian territory, and to defend it against invasion.'<sup>17</sup>

In the clash of civil war and contending armies, the neutral enclave of the Milan Curia might at some critical stage afford a haven for parley. Cardinal Schuster saw an historical rôle awaiting him as the mediator in the closing stages of the struggle in North Italy, and actively sought to pursue such a function. The Cardinal had busily established early contacts with the Germans. In February 1945 one of his personal secretaries, Don Bicchiera, had been instructed to initiate talks with the Germans, and on their side, Colonel Rauff, Wolff's subordinate in Milan, received similar orders. It was shortly afterwards that the 'Sunrise' negotiations started in Switzerland, and these ecclesiastical links were henceforth to serve the Germans both as a cover and a last resort, particularly in territorial arrangements with the Italian Resistance. It was however the constant hope of the Cardinal that the formal sur-

render of the German authorities on Italian soil would take place in his Palace in Milan

On April 3 Don Bicchieri had handed a memorandum to Rauff for transmission to Wolff and Dollmann, offering the mediation of the Church. Parallel with these links with the German military authorities through Rauff and intermittently on his personal account with Dollmann, the Cardinal welcomed a separate contact with Rahn, whose staff approached another of Schuster's secretaries, Don Corbella, early on April 9, with a request that he should get in touch with the Committee of Liberation and sound them on possible surrender terms.<sup>18</sup> The Christian Democrat representative, Achille Marazza, was empowered to act on the Italian side with the knowledge of the Allies through their local military representatives now living underground in Milan. Indeed each of these feelers seems to have been known both to the German and Allied Intelligence services. It remains a mystery how far the Italian Fascist authorities had any warning, intent as they were on making their own approaches to individual Resistance leaders.

The visit of Wolff to Berlin was reflected in a momentary coolness on the part of the German subordinate authorities in Milan. If the Swiss 'plot' failed, there would be victims, and traces to cover hastily. The 'circle of the Hotel Regina', the German headquarters in Milan, became 'impenetrable and hostile'.

After the return of Wolff to Italy, events moved however with speed and in perplexing fashion. The several German contacts with the entourage of the Cardinal seemed to spring spontaneously to life, perhaps as a German diversionary action in regard to operation 'Sunrise', and a last-minute insurance during the transitional hours. The timetable was dictated, as for many months past, by the rising tempo of the Allied advance. The crossing of the Po on April 21 marked the beginning of the end, and the criss-cross of messages and private meetings was intensified.

The Committee of Liberation was showing impatience at the lack of any concrete move from the German authorities. Like the Cardinal, the Committee was anxious, for its own prestige, to treat as an independent agency with the Germans before the arrival of the Allies in Milan. Marazza had already warned Don Corbella on April 15 that, once broken off, negotiations could not be easily resumed. The same day, Rahn instructed his private secretary and also the German Consul in Milan<sup>19</sup> to keep these contacts open. The latter held a meeting with Don Corbella who read out the terms of the Committee of Liberation, whose representatives were still prepared to meet the Germans in the presence of Cardinal Schuster.<sup>19</sup>

The essential point on the German side was to preserve just enough confidence on the side of the Church and the Liberation Committee to remain in contact. As Corbella was told, 'Today the German Ambassador is not in

<sup>18</sup> Consul Wolff. Not to be confused with the commander of the SS

a position to negotiate directly with the Committee of National Liberation as the Nazi régime still exists in Germany.' One must wait for the moment when the German authorities in Italy could act on their own. Meanwhile there must be maximum secrecy. The Germans even suggested that rumours should be spread that no agreement would be possible, even for the defence of Milan.

As a German Military Intelligence report, dated April 15 from Milan, stated:

'Within the next few days Cardinal Schuster will submit the following plan to Major-General Wolff. The city of Milan will not be defended by the Germans but in the course of eventual withdrawal operations will be methodically and promptly evacuated. It will on no account be made into a centre of resistance. If Allied troops advance right up to the city, any German troops still in Milan will not resist but surrender. No factories, electricity plants, etc. are to be destroyed in Milan only lines of communication. No hostages will be taken and deported in Milan. The Germans will bring pressure to bear on the Fascist police to prevent their taking hostages. On the outskirts of Milan too, no factories are to be destroyed.

'If the Germans will give binding assurances on these points, the Cardinal is ready to do all he can (he is thinking particularly of a solemn public appeal) to influence the opposition groups and particularly the partisans not to take any action against the Germans before and during their retreat. This would apply only to Germans, not to Fascists.'

The German author of this report commented on the Cardinal's plan as related to the general scene in Milan:

'At the present moment it is useless to wish to negotiate with the National Liberation Committee. The Committee consists of ambitious individuals whose interests are determined—more and more strongly the longer they exist—purely and simply by the interests of the Party they belong to at the present moment. They are all thinking of securing their Party a suitable platform for the future, especially against Communism. Therefore none of them are inclined, even in the interests of unity and of the Italian people, to make compromises which might now or later bring public discredit on them and their Party—such as negotiating and coming to terms with the Germans at the crucial moment. The members of the Committee are already at loggerheads, suspecting, accusing, and spying on each other. However, if the Allies brought pressure to bear on the Committee, it would—though unwillingly—submit to them. The only thing to do therefore is to negotiate direct with the Allies.

'But it is different with the Party hangers-on. Apart from a relatively small number of confirmed Communists, the majority of the opposition parties' followers and of the members of the partisan bands, including the Communists, are not ready to commit themselves seriously and absolutely. An

indeed certainly, that the Cardinal and Don Biccherai wanted somehow to force me to suggest that the negotiations with the Germans, which had no serious character, were going well so as to overcome resistance and difficulties arising out of this Mussolini could alone decide, and he consulted no one. He spoke with bitter words when he learnt, or pretended to learn—because it was impossible that he did not know—and said that he would protest.

There were contacts between Cardinal Schuster and numerous German emissaries and also from Mussolini. They even reached journalistic circles even the Fascist papers. It is impossible to rule out that Mussolini was informed reasonably accurately on the state of affairs. He had been in Milan for three days.<sup>33</sup>

Graziani, at his trial, dissented strongly. The Duce's links with the Cardinal had been 'through others', and at no time did he believe that surrender talks were in progress. Graziani had himself offered to go to the Cardinal on April 18, and Mussolini had agreed. The purpose of the meeting, which took place on April 22, was 'to find a way out'. The conversation however did not touch on politics, and the Cardinal's 'indifference' was clear to Graziani at the conference on April 25.<sup>34</sup>

On leaving the Palace, Mussolini had undertaken to give an answer to the Committee within an hour.<sup>35</sup>

In the Cardinal's study, the rest of the company awaited the reply from the Prefecture.

Shortly after seven o'clock, the German Consul in Milan arrived to ask for an extension of the time limit for the surrender, adding that General Wolff confirmed that arrangements 'were being made'.<sup>36</sup> Apparently Colonel Rauff telephoned almost at the same time to say that he had also been in touch with the General, who would now reach Milan late next morning. The parallel deception on the German side was to be maintained up to the last.

Among the Committee of Liberation representatives, there was mounting confusion and doubts. The spectacle of Mussolini remaining at large during the last hours before a general insurrection, and uncertainty about whose hands he might finally fall into, produced considerable alarm.

Sandro Pertini, the Socialist representative on the Liberation Committee, rushed during this waiting hour to the Prefecture, hoping to be in time to oppose any surrender talks with Mussolini except on the basis of treating him as a prisoner of war, and 'then perhaps he should be handed over to the Allies. We must abide by what had been decided by the Liberation Committee at a previous meeting'.<sup>37</sup>

These remarks were apparently overheard by an emissary of the Fascist military commander in Milan, who had also appeared with the task of trying

to negotiate a local hand-over. He hastened to the Duce's office with this unnerving report.<sup>38</sup>

The scene on Mussolini's return to the Prefecture had been witnessed, among others, by the Fascist Party Secretary for Milan.

'I saw Mussolini jump out of the car, and walk quickly towards the staircase, where he suddenly stopped short and turned to the German officer commanding his escort, and said to him in a loud voice "Your General Wolff has betrayed us." The German officer made a gesture of amazement, stroking his chin'.<sup>39</sup>

Mussolini then shut himself in his office. The illusion that a certain liberty of action remained to him was hard to dissolve. His elemental fear was that of a trap, and the repetition of an arrest as had happened nearly two years previously, in July 1943, at Villa Savoia. The smell of treachery was omnipresent. As he told Graziani 'an attempt has been made this very night in Milan to put me in the bag together with the whole government'.<sup>40</sup>

The partisan insurrection was now flaring across Lombardy and Piedmont. How could any guaranteed surrender of the Fascist armed forces and the Party formations take place in this climate of savage anarchy?

Two courses only seemed to remain open to Mussolini. A last stand in Milan, or a move to the symbolic redoubt of the Vallèline. He was now isolated both from any control over events, and from all contact with reality. A futile dialogue ensued in the emptying offices and corridors of the Milan Prefecture. The faithful were still gathered, loyal and without a lead.

With his usual and familiar abruptness, Mussolini ordered an immediate and unplanned departure for Como, and away from the city which suddenly appeared as a trap. A column of ten cars was hastily assembled by the reliable German escort. There were untidy farewells in the courtyard of the Prefecture. The Minister of Justice, Presenti, was left to hold the crumbling fort.

Mussolini departed in the company of Bombacci. The two men had been revolutionary Socialist schoolmasters in the Romagna over thirty years before. The one had become the Duce of Fascism, the other a failed Communist agitator and latter-day adviser in adversity to his former colleague. Bombacci seems to have had a ferocious sense of the occasion. It is said that, when joining Mussolini in his car, dressed in striped trousers and clutching a small suitcase, he suddenly turned to the Duce's son. 'What else would I need? I am expert in such matters. I was in Lenin's office in Petersburg when the White troops of Yudenitch were advancing on the city and we were preparing to leave, as we are doing today'.<sup>41</sup>

The Italian and German escort followed with Graziani in the second car.

Party and Armed Forces from their oath of allegiance. He wanted no bloodshed in Milan. He was leaving for Como. Pavolini would give any further orders.<sup>42</sup>

Graziani wrote the last sentence of the account in his notebook: 'Eight o'clock. Departure with the Duce for Como.'<sup>43</sup>

This exiguous convoy, which pulled out from the Milan Prefecture at eight o'clock on the evening of April 25, 1945, represented the last historical act of Italian Fascism.

A few minutes later, a telephone call came to the Prefecture from the Cardinal's Palace asking for the Duce's reply to the terms presented earlier by the Committee of Liberation. The Prefect Bassi answered: 'The Duce had left. There would be no surrender and no negotiation.'

The rearguard of the Fascist authorities, the Minister of Justice, Pisenti, the Prefect Bassi and the Chief of Police, General Montagna, waited throughout the night in the darkened rooms of the Prefecture. At dawn on April 26 the building was occupied without incident by Finance Guards, a body which had long since rallied clandestinely to the Resistance and whose discipline and network of communications had rendered a decisive service in the hour of insurrection.

In the early hours the remaining Party formations, the last armed concentration of Fascism, assembled their transport in the main arteries of the city and pulled out in column towards Como, and to an ultimate and unknown destination.

At 8 a.m. on April 26 the Partisans broadcast for the first time on Milan Radio.


The German authorities in Milan played the tragic comedy to the end. At noon on April 26 Rauff came to the Archbishopric to report that Wolff was prepared to come to Milan, but needed an escort to take him on to Bolzano. His journey thence was indispensable in order to carry out the German surrender. Cadorna sent a party to Villa Locatelli, but it failed to get through, and Wolff, with American help, was smuggled back into Switzerland.

That evening Rauff called on the Cardinal for the last time. The bluff was exposed. The Germans were treating with the Allies in Switzerland. There was no need any more for separate negotiations in Milan. 'I regret that His Eminence cannot preside as a direct mediator.'<sup>44</sup>

The Cardinal had prepared a speech to deliver to the world on the solemn occasion of the end of hostilities in Italy. It was to be delivered at 10 o'clock that evening. It had been prepared after General Wolff had asked the Cardinal to send him an escort to bring him that evening, April 26, to sign the capitulation at the Palace. He was awaited in vain. On the previous day, how-

# The Brutal Friendship

Mussolini, Hitler and the fall of  
Italian Fascism by F. W. Deakin



Deakin, Frederick William Davenport, 1913-

# THE BRUTAL FRIENDSHIP

AMERICAN JEWISH  
MUSSOLINI, HITLER  
ARCHIVES  
AND THE  
FALL OF ITALIAN FASCISM

by  
F. W. DEAKIN

HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS NEW YORK AND EVANSTON



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EXHIBIT "D"

Page Six

Schuster, Card. I. Gli Ultimi Tempi Di Un Regime, Milano 1946.

Document LXXIX. Page 148-149.

English Translation:

Don Bicchierai presented to Rauff a personal consideration:

"How can the German political leaders be excused from the qualification of war criminals when they have aimed only on the bluff, bringing their country to ruin? I think that all the Germans desire surrender, and maybe yourself. If this is not happening, it is because of the rigid sense of discipline misunderstood, so that we do not find men that know how to take the responsibility of such courageous act."

Rauff answered:

"I can assure you, although as far as Italy, there are these men."

On the same page #149:

Wolff reentered Germany. Probably General Harster, Chief of Gestapo in Italy, had a feeling that his supervisor worked toward surrendering. Appears undoubtedly that, during the preceding days of the insurrection General Harster issued an arrest warrant against Don Bicchierai and Captain Ghisetti." But Colonel Rauff would not have carried it out or he would have prevented to happen.

I. CARD. SCHUSTER  
ARCIVESCOVO DI MILANO

AMERICAN JEWISH  
ARCHIVES

GLI ULTIMI TEMPI  
DI UN REGIME

STANFORD LIBRARIES

EXHIBIT "E"  
Page Two

EXHIBIT "E"  
Page Three

TUTTI I DIRITTI SONO RISERVATI

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## PREFAZIONE.

Questa pubblicazione contiene solo alcuni dei molti documenti dell'Archivio Arcivescovile intorno a questioni recenti ed affari di carattere pubblico. Non è quindi una storia.

Altre carte d'indole privata, come raccomandazioni per condannati a morte, al carcere, ecc., si omettono.

A cagione delle molteplici occupazioni dell'Arcivescovo durante questi tempi, non ho potuto prendere nessuna nota. Gran parte di questa eccezionale forma di attività pastorale per la salvezza del nostro popolo, si è svolta durante i ripetuti colloqui avuti nel semestre scorso coll'Ambasciatore Germanico, col Console Generale del Reich a Milano, colle Autorità Partigiane, col Maresciallo Graziani, e finalmente col Duce medesimo, la vigilia della sua caduta.

Anche adesso mi manca però il tempo per poter stendere più diffusamente le mie memorie. L'Arcivescovo di Milano non può concedersi davvero il lusso di scrivere delle autobiografie!

Per aderire tuttavia alle numerose richieste di autorevoli personaggi, ai quali preme che venga giustificata anche in questa occasione l'opera benefica della Chiesa dinanzi ai popoli, consento che vengano pubblicati in una specie di Libro Bianco almeno alcuni documenti. Essi proiettano sufficiente luce sull'opera abbastanza vasta ed intensa svolta nell'Arcivescovado di Milano durante questi durissimi mesi in cui il Regime si agitava negli spasmi della sua agonia (1).

Se questa forma di attività episcopale ha avuto qualche utile risultato per la nostra Italia, ne sia lode a Dio che ha avvalorato i nostri sforzi.

Milano, Ascensione del Signore, 10 maggio 1945

† ILDEFONSO Cardinale Arcivescovo

(1) Trattandosi il più delle volte di corrispondenza diplomatica, ai vari personaggi allora al Governo vengono attribuiti titoli e forme protocollari e cancelleresche richieste dal diritto vigente.

Contemporaneamente, il Capitano Ghisetti, si poneva a contatto d'accordo con Don Bicchierai, col Colonnello Dolmann (elemento di congiungimento fra il gen. Wolff e il Maresciallo Kesserling sostituito poi dal Gen. Wietinghoff, comandante delle truppe combattenti).

Durante il mese di marzo vi furono altri contatti, sia con elementi diplomatici, come con elementi della Wehrmacht. Ma da tutti questi rapporti scaturì chiara la convinzione, che ogni riuscita dipendeva dagli elementi delle SS. che controllavano minutamente ogni branca tedesca, e specialmente dal Gen. Wolff.

Intanto questi contatti non erano sfuggiti ai servizi informativi alleati e a quelli tedeschi. Mentre durante la Settimana Santa (ultima di marzo) il servizio Alleati faceva domandare ad alcuni loro agenti se vi erano veramente in corso passi dell'Arcivescovo presso i tedeschi per ottenere la resa, pure nella stessa settimana giungeva notizia che il C. S. Tedesco faceva sorvegliare più attentamente l'attività della Curia, e particolarmente quella del Sac. D. Bicchierai.

Per altro, il 30 marzo, un lungo colloquio con l'avv. Marazza (si noti che il 28 vi era stata un'adunanza del C.L.N.A.I. alla presenza del Delegato alleato e del Sottosegretario per le Terre Occupate) dava modo di più chiaramente comprendere il punto di vista alleato.

Pochi giorni dopo, e quindi molto tempo prima che venisse iniziata l'offensiva sul fronte italiano, e precisamente il giorno 3 aprile fu portata al Colonn. Rauff una breve memoria approvata da S. E. Em. (1) e che si può così riassumere.

« Non deve avvenire nessuna distruzione di impianti e linee elettriche e di tutte le reti di distribuzione, come pure non deve essere distrutto alcuno stabilimento di qualsiasi genere e natura (questo tanto in città che fuori) »

Non devono essere presi ostaggi e deve essere impedito che prendano le autorità della RSI, come pare sia in progetto.

Milano deve essere esclusa da ogni combattimento stradale. Ma deve diventare posizione riccio. Quindi, in caso di aggiramento, dovrà essere accettata la resa.

(1) Il di precedente, 2 aprile, domenica delle Palme.

Tali concetti venivano esposti in modo categorico. Inoltre si aggiungeva:

« La Chiesa non può entrare in merito a progetti tecnico-militari di qualunque tipo (ritirate, resa, ecc.). Tuttavia, per il bene comune essa può fare opera di mediazione, ma solo per quanto possibile, cioè facilitando incontri o inoltrando proposte »

Si domandava poi una prova di « buona volontà » con mitigazione di Polizia, scambi; scarcerazioni, ecc.

Nella memoria che doveva essere consegnata al generale Wolff fu fatto notare, che per iscritto non si poteva dire di più a causa delle sanzioni stabilite dal Fuehrer per chi incitava alla resa.

Tuttavia la parola « resa » era stata intenzionalmente sottolineata in rosso. Già in altra conversazione, don Bicchierai aveva presentato a Rauff una personale considerazione del seguente tenore:

« Come possono essere sensati dalla qualifica di criminali di guerra i capi politici tedeschi che hanno puntato unicamente sul bluff, portando alla rovina il loro paese? » La frase aveva trovato una scarsa reazione, anzi quasi un consentimento. Questa volta più arditamente fu insinuato:

« Io penso che tutti i Tedeschi desiderino la resa, e forse voi stesso. Se ciò non avviene, si deve forse imputare ad un rigido senso di disciplina male intesa, cosicché non si trovano uomini che sappiano prendere la responsabilità di un tale atto coraggioso ». Al che fu risposto da Rauff: « Io posso assicurare che, per quanto riguarda l'Italia, questi uomini ci sono ». Analoghe comunicazioni con la consegna della memoria fu fatta al colonnello Dolmann dal capitano Ghisetti.

Don Bicchierai ebbe modo di conferire successivamente più volte e a lungo con l'avv. Marazza e di avere tutti gli elementi di dettaglio relativi al trattamento dei prigionieri per un'eventuale resa incondizionata. Si pregava di accelerare i tempi. Il Marazza era stato delegato dal C.L.N.A.I. per tali trattative e si teneva pronto ad ogni intervento, anche entro due ore, col generale Cadorna e con altri, se fosse stato necessario. Venivano controllate intanto le numerose iniziative private, che finivano per convergere verso la Chiesa.

Wolff era stato chiamato in Germania. Probabilmente il generale Harster, Capo della polizia tedesca (Gestapo) in Italia, aveva avuto sentore di questo svolgimento del suo superiore verso la resa.

L'ambiente dell'Hotel Regina era diventato impenetrabile o pressoché ostile. Risulta in modo sicuro che, nei giorni precedenti all'insurrezione, era stato emesso da parte del generale Harster un mandato di arresto contro don Bicchierai e contro il capitano Ghisetti. Ma il colonnello Rauff non l'avrebbe eseguito, e avrebbe impedito che fosse eseguito.

noble city which belongs to all times and all places, into a field of battle and thus perpetrate an act as inglorious militarily as it is abominable in the eyes of God?" the Pope asked

The tides of battle by then had turned sharply against Germany and Italy. In less than three months, on June 4, the Allies marched into Rome and the Nazis fled in retreat.

Pascalina, whose prayers from the start were for the Allies (except on the occasion of Hitler's attack on the communists), "felt enormous relief."

"I had sympathized with His Holiness throughout in maintaining the Holy See's historic position of neutrality in warfare," she said. "But in my daily prayers to Jesus, I begged Our Lord that Hitler and Mussolini be defeated. I told His Holiness of my prayers and hope early in the war. Every day thereafter the Holy Father prayed along with me for the same intentions."

In mid-July, some six weeks after Allied forces had liberated Rome, Pascalina had a strange caller. Mussolini sent his mistress, Clara Petacci, as his secret emissary. The woman came in disguise during the night, hoping to strike a deal for the crumbling dictator.

Signora Petacci asked Pascalina to intervene with the Pope in behalf of Il Duce. Mussolini remained in command of the neofascists who were fighting alongside the Nazis in northern Italy. But Petacci said he was ready to sell out the Führer if the Pope would act as his intermediary with the Allies.

Pius was incensed with Pascalina when she later told him of her meeting with Petacci.

"You spoke alone with that woman, without my knowledge and permission?" the Pope shouted angrily. "Petacci is Mussolini's mistress! They have been living together for years in mortal sin!"

"Holiness, how do you know the truth of such scandal?" the nun asked softly. She had learned of late not to lose her temper when the Pope lost his.

"Ask anyone in the Vatican. Ask those among the hierarchy!" Pius retorted impatiently.

"And what do you suppose they whisper about us, Holiness?" she queried. "I have been living under your roof since I was a young girl. We know that in God's eyes, our lives are pure. Yet who, even among the Sacred College of Cardinals, believes the truth about us? Why, then, Holiness, are you so quick to judge others?"

The Pope was at a complete loss for reply.

The nun took Pius's hand and raised it to her lips. "Holiness, let us hope and pray that we are not the only decent people alive," she said quietly. "Even though you are Pope and I a nun, we are not the best of humans, nor the worst either."

Pius appeared chastened, but he was obviously still confused. "Why did this woman come to you?" he asked.

"Signora Petacci came with a message from Mussolini himself," Pascalina replied. "Il Duce is seeking your intervention in the war. He is hoping for some sort of Italian political solution."

"Does Hitler know of this?" Pius asked.

"No, he does not," the nun said. "Signora Petacci assured me that Mussolini has had little conversation of late with Hitler. Il Duce is now totally disenchanted with the Führer. He has called Hitler's attack on Russia 'megalomaniacal.' According to Petacci, Mussolini considers himself little more than a prisoner of the Germans. He realizes that his own star is waning. Il Duce is in his sixties and she tells me that he is a very depressed man."

"I will not see Mussolini!" Pius said firmly. "Nor will I talk with him!"

"Mussolini is repentant," Pascalina reminded the Holy Father. "He was baptized a Catholic. Though he became an atheist, you, as Holy Father, cannot refuse to help bring him back to Almighty God."

"Mussolini is a wily devil!" the Pope retorted. "Whenever he is down for the moment, he will conceive of any trick to regain power. The Holy Father will not serve as Il Duce's pawn!"

"But will you aid him some way?" she asked quietly, almost imploring the Pope's help.

For a long moment Pius was in deep thought. He then told Pascalina. "Tell this Petacci woman to have Mussolini contact the archbishop of Milan with his plan for peace. If there is merit in the peace proposal, I will carry forth from there on. That, my dear Mother Pascalina, is the most I will do for Mussolini, or for any of those other architects of war, be they Hitler, Stalin, Roosevelt, or Churchill."

At Pascalina's suggestion Clara Petacci advised Mussolini to present his peace proposition to the archbishop of Milan. Il Duce sent his son, Vittorio, with a plan aimed at opening negotiations with the Allies.

The archbishop was sufficiently impressed, and he forwarded the

proposal to the Vatican. Since the nun was in on the scheme from the start, Pius suggested that she consider the plan carefully before he would even give it a moment of his time

What Mussolini was essentially seeking was sanctuary somewhere in the West for himself, his wife and children, and his mistress, Clara. If it were to be granted, the dictator, disgraced and tired of war, was prepared for what was tantamount to unconditional surrender.

"Mussolini is prepared to give up," Pascalina advised Pius. "Holiness, I suggest you forward the proposal to Allied headquarters. It will help greatly to shorten the war and save many lives."

After studying Mussolini's proposal the Pope agreed reluctantly with the nun's idea. Pius sent the papers along to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commanding general of the Allied forces. He included a covering letter, written in his own hand, urging the Allies to accept Il Duce's offer.

In a matter of days Eisenhower wrote the Pope a curt reply, summarily rejecting the entire proposal.

"His Holiness felt General Eisenhower was telling the Holy See to mind its own business," Pascalina recalled. "While the General's letter was polite, it was cold. Eisenhower implied that the Allies had Hitler and Mussolini in their iron grasp and they were not going to show any mercy."

Pascalina reported the Allies' rejection at once to Clara Petacci. It required much effort on the nun's part to reach the woman by phone at Mussolini's hideout in Milan.

That was the last contact Pascalina had with Petacci until late April 1945, when correspondence from her arrived at the Vatican.

"I am following my destiny," Petacci wrote Pascalina in her note of April 25. "I don't know what will become of me, but I cannot question my fate."

By the time the letter was received, Pascalina was well aware of what had happened to Petacci. Mussolini had told her to leave Milan with him in a ten-car caravan the same day she wrote the nun. Il Duce was to make a final stand with his remaining neofascist army somewhere in the north of Italy.

The dictator had also instructed his wife and children to remain behind in Milan. He left his family several documents, including letters to Churchill, which he hoped would provide safe passage for them to a neutral country.

"If they try to stop you or harm you," Il Duce instructed his wife, "ask to be handed over to the English."

At dawn on April 26, Mussolini and Petacci, riding in an Alfa Romeo with Spanish license plates, started up the winding west shore of Lake Como. They drove through heavy drizzle for more than twenty-five miles, then stopped at a hotel to await the arrival of some three thousand fascist troops.

After pacing the floor in vain for more than twenty-four hours, Mussolini ordered his caravan to continue north without the additional troops. It was his final command. As Il Duce and his companions approached Dongo, bands of Italian antifascists attacked without warning. Their caravan was surrounded, and all were quickly captured.

Numbers of extremists, wild with exhilaration from their great coup, demanded Mussolini's immediate execution. Some were also screaming for Petacci's life. Others, cooler-headed, wanted Il Duce and his mistress turned over to the Allies.

The fate of Mussolini and Petacci was resolved on April 28 when a three-man execution squad quite unexpectedly took matters into their own hands. The terrorists mercilessly gunned them both down.

The bodies of Mussolini and Petacci were taken back to Milan, then strung up by their feet in the Piazza Loreto. For days they remained hanging, their heads dangling to the ground. "A lesson for all who would persecute the human race to see and learn by," Cardinal Tisserant remarked to Pascalina as he pointed in glee to photos of their hangings in a Rome newspaper.

Two nights later Hitler committed suicide. In a week, on May 7, 1945, World War II in Europe was over.

Though the free world was delirious with joy, Pascalina brooded over the scars that the ravages of warfare had left upon the Holy See, most particularly upon the Pope himself. Both his physical and mental health had deteriorated. Though Pius had always showed a hopeful face to the world, the nun had often found him brooding alone in his private quarters. He had eaten less and less, and slept poorly. A man over six feet tall, the Holy Father was an emaciated one hundred and thirty pounds.

Looking back, the nun, at eighty-seven, paused and her eyes grew misty with the sorrow that still remains. As Pius XII's closest confi-

**PH H. WELSH,  
ELECTRICAL ENGINEER, 72**

Electrical Expert at  
Brooklyn Yard Dies—  
Held Highest Rating

PH H. Welsh, of 201 Clinton Avenue, Brooklyn, former electrical engineer of the New York Naval Shipyard, died yesterday in St. Joseph's Hospital, Brooklyn, after a long illness. He was 72 years old.

Welsh began his forty-four-year career in the yard in 1901, became supervising draftsman and chief of the electrical section of the central drafting office and later head of the consolidated electrical section.

In 1943, he became head of the electrical engineering section, which he achieved the highest rating in any electrical design section in a Government navy yard. His work included development of the electrical systems for the ships Missouri, North Carolina and Washington.

Welsh belonged to the Saint DePaul Society, the Holy Name Society and the Archbishop's Council of the Knights of Columbus.

He leaves his wife, Mrs. Helen Welsh, and two sons, the Rev. Robert E. Welsh of the Catholic College of the Brooklyn Diocese and the Rev. Brother Charles Welsh of the Christian Brothers.

**MRS. AGNES H. LINCOLN**

Special to The New York Times.  
TONINGHAM, Conn., Aug. 30.—Mrs. Agnes Harrison Lincoln, painter and lecturer in art, died yesterday at the home of her son, John Ware Lincoln, in Lincoln, Mass. She was 72 years old.

Mrs. Lincoln, who studied at the Art Students League in New York and the Art Institute in London, was especially known for her floral paintings. Her pictures were exhibited at the Arden Gallery, New York; the Mystic Art Gallery, the Corcoran Gallery in Washington, the Pennsylvania Academy in Philadelphia and the Stage Art Institute.

Last winter she gave a series of art lectures in the Westchester Library and a lecture for children in the Stony Brook Library.

She leaves also three grandsons.

**Cardinal Schuster Is Dead at 74;  
Archbishop of Milan Since 1929**

Head of Ambrosian Rite Was  
Elevated by Pope Pius XI—  
Asked Support for E.D.C.

Special to The New York Times.  
ROME, Aug. 30.—Ildefonso Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop of Milan for the last twenty-five years, died of a heart ailment early this morning in the Seminary of Venegono. He was 74 years old.

He was passing some time at Venegono recovering from a heart attack he had suffered a week ago. Before dying he humbly asked his flock to forgive his sins of commission and omission.

The Cardinal's death reduces the Sacred College of Cardinals to sixty-eight members, or two less than the plenum of seventy, which was reached at the consistory of Jan. 12, 1953. The other Cardinal who died after that date was Massimo Cardinal Masini, Prefect of the Supreme Tribunal of the Signatura. He succumbed last March 6.

Cardinal Schuster was one of the outstanding churchmen in Italy. As long ago as the election of Pope Pius XII, fifteen years ago, he was regarded as a possible choice for the papal throne.

The College of Cardinals is now composed of twenty-four Italians and forty-four other nationals, including four from the United States.

**A Fiery Spirit**

Cardinal Schuster was a slim, frail-looking man. He had indomitable will, a fiery spirit and the restless energy of a crusader or apostle. As Archbishop of Milan he was head of the Ambrosian Rite of the Catholic liturgy. This rite, also called the Milanese, which exists only among the 3,000,000 Catholics of the largest Italian diocese in point of numbers, dates back to St. Ambrose, who lived 1,600 years ago, shortly after Emperor Constantine the Great by the Edict of Milan had declared that Christianity was tolerated throughout the Roman Empire.

The Cardinal, politically, was an outspoken man of the right and a conservative. In pastoral letters and notices to his parish he thundered against communism.



Associated Press  
Cardinal Schuster

He told his flock without circumspection that he refused to order prayers to be said for rain in his diocese unless the people mended their immoral ways.

Earlier this summer, he warned parents not to become dupes of Communist propaganda by sending their children to Communist holiday camps where "their souls are poisoned for a piece of bread."

During World War II, Cardinal Schuster arranged a meeting between Mussolini and the leaders of the Italian Partisans in an attempt to reach an arrangement with the Allies. Nothing came of it because the Partisan leaders insisted on nothing short of unconditional surrender. Shortly afterward, Mussolini was surprised in flight by Partisans at Dongo on Lake Como and was executed.

Cardinal Schuster, whose full name was Alfredo Ludovico Ildefonso Schuster, was born in Rome on Jan. 18, 1880. He was of Swiss origin. He entered the Monastery of St. Paul Outside the Walls in 1891. He began his novitiate as a member of the Benedictine congregation of Cassino in 1903 at which time he changed his name to Don Ilde-

**GEORGE H. REEVES  
OF CHASE BANK, 59**

Institution's 2d Vice President  
and a Well-Known Bond  
Specialist Dies Upstate

Special to The New York Times.

RODUS POINT, N. Y., Aug. 30.—George H. Reeves, second vice president of the Chase National Bank of New York, died here today at the age of 59. He had been visiting the home of a former bank associate, Arthur M. De Meblan.

Mr. Reeves, who lived at 27 Stener Avenue, Great Neck, L. I., was widely known in Wall Street bond and investment circles. He began his financial career in 1916 when he joined the Equitable Trust Company's bond department.

He specialized in bond work also for the Chase Securities Corporation, the Chase Harris Forbes Corporation, and since 1933 for the Chase National Bank. He was promoted to the position of second vice president of the bank in 1940.

Born in East Orange, N. J., Mr. Reeves studied at the Irving School, Tarrytown, N. Y. He served as a second lieutenant in the Infantry during World War I.

He is survived by his widow, Hazel M. Reeves; a daughter, Mrs. Gloria R. Hoyt of Port Washington, L. I.; a son, George H. Jr. of Manhasset, L. I.; and four grandchildren.

**EX-DETECTIVE, 75, DIES**

John Goggin of Identification Unit Had Prodigious Memory

John J. Goggin of 194 Fremont Avenue, Grant City, S. I., who retired in 1947 as a detective in the Police Department's Bureau of Criminal Identification, died Saturday at his home. His age was 75.

Mr. Goggin was with the bureau for forty-one years. Known as its "camera eye," he would identify an eight criminal in the police line-up after not having seen them for twenty years. Famed for his prodigious memory, he also could recall the number of his file.

Surviving are his widow, Mary; a son, John J. Jr.; two daughters, Mrs. Gladys Sandburg and Mrs.



ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXHIBIT "H"

Santiago, 5 of Dec 1962, Herman Julius Walter Rauff Bauermeister entered into an appearance in court, who was born in Germany, a widower, who reads and writes, residing in Punta Arenas, and under the promise to tell the truth he declared:

I arrived in Chile for the first time in 1923 (? 1925) in circumstances in which I was a cadet in the German navy I arrived on board the [Crucero Alemán Berlin]

This ship arrived at Valparaíso and afterwards made a landfall in Corral and in Punta Arenas We returned to Germany between March and April of 1926 I continued in my course as a seaman and I obtained the rank of captain of a corvette

War was declared in Sept of 1939 and I naturally participated in it as a German citizen, and I served during the war in the navy and also in the information services I had various superiors and I remember the last one which was general Wolff.

I never have directed concentration camps and no intervention have I had in the death of Jews I have not exterminated anyone in gas chambers although I have fought in battle On this point I am completely innocent

On April 30 of 1945, in circumstances in which I found myself in Milan I was detained by the American troops. ~~I was captive 20 months, or rather, until Dec. 29, 1946.~~ At that time I was a German soldier but I must declare that seamen also are called soldiers At that time complying with the information service I was wearing the uniform of the SS which means, translated to Spanish "Security Body "

During the time of my detention, which was naturally after the war, I was interrogated by English and American officials of the information Service in various concentration camps in Italy In circumstances in which I found myself in Rimini I ran away from the concentration camp and I went to Naples. There a Catholic priest helped me to go to Rome where I stayed more or less a year and a half and always in convents of the Holy See I worked as an auxiliary teacher of French and mathematics in [Un Ortelinato -- orphanage? the word isn't in my dictionary] that is called "Vía Pia" in Rome. With the help of the Catholic Church my family was able to come from the Russian zone in Germany to Rome Reunited with my family, I went to Damascus (Syria) with the agreement of the Syrian state Afterwards I was with my family in Ecuador where I was 9 years from 1949-1958 I worked as a traveling salesman in a firm that represented the Bayer Company From Ecuador I sent my sons to Chile for them to study, one in a military school [ the bottom line is cut off the page ] their studies because they couldn't be accepted officially in the course because they were both foreigners

In February of 1958, I came from Ecuador to Chile to see my sons and after 3 weeks I returned to Ecuador This took place on a vacation period

Finally Oct 26, 1958 I decided to settle definitively in Chile with family, and I went directly to Magallanes, where I worked as manager of the Sara Braun commercial Society Ltd My family stayed in Santiago and to unite myself with the family I returned to Santiago in August of 1959 and I worked in the import firm of Goldmann, Jansen and Cia Ltd In charge of this firm, I made a trip with my wife to Germany from April to June of 1960 I was in Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, [Muelheim?], Kiel, Hannover I must make clear that in all these cities existed agencies of the firms that I was representing The police never took me prisoner and I have travelled at all times with the passport that the tribunal shows me On the passport there is [constancia - stamps?] of all the countries that I have been through And although said passport I obtained in the German embassy in Quito June 19 1953,

This certificate whose German name was just imprinted corresponds in Spanish to

EXHIBIT "H" - TRANSLATION



CONFIDENTIAL  
SECRET  
REF ID: A66 22, 23, 24

*Handwritten signature*

AMERICAN JEWISH  
ARCHIVES

Case No. 411  
23 December 1946

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Subject:** Operation Greif.

**Re:** Investigation of alleged migration movements.

1. On 25 July 1946 this office was notified by telephone that the office of CI, AFSA, had been advised by the United Communication Camp that some 40 prisoners had escaped from the confines of the Camp on 22 July 1946. A request was made to this office to institute a search for the escapees among them there were 20 German CI prisoners. Pursuant to a request from the Supervising Agent, this office, an investigation was initiated to find and apprehend any or all of the escapees.

2. On 27 July 1946, a confidential and reliable informant of this office was contacted by a person then unknown who claimed that he came from a certain FRANK which name has been known by this office and by the informant to be the cover name for HAAS, Carlo, Chief Reichit Inn, SD. The informant was instructed to meet the messenger and to determine his identity and the location of HAAS. On 23 July 1946 the informant met the messenger and found him to be one VORDEPER, Hans, who was in the company of another person qualified as QIANMI. The informant determined from VORDEPER and QIANMI that Carlo HAAS had instructed them to proceed to Rome after their escape and to contact the informant who would aid them in their projects of emigration to South America which HAAS would finance. VORDEPER and QIANMI also stated to the informant that HAAS would be coming to Rome and that they might be surveilled and apprehended upon contacting HAAS and other escapees.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Vite #74, Rome, who used the cover name of ASTRA, a palmistry and crystal expert. Informant #1 made contact with two men of the Astra Group who told him to return in two days. In two days Informant #1 was instructed that he was to appear at the offices of the International Red Cross where he was to get a passport form in triplicate which he was to fill in. Informant #1 was given the false name of BAUCHECH, Mirko and his description and parental data which had been procured by the Astra men. These men procured the false name and relative data from the files of the International Red Cross where they found the name of a missing or a dead person who fitted the description of Informant #1. Informant #1 filled out the passport form and brought them to the office of the Secretary of the International Red Cross who took his fingerprints (one finger with plain ordinary ink) and told Informant #1 to return two days later. In addition to his instructions to return in two days Informant #1 was instructed to obtain two letters of identification to be used in the issuing of a passport. Informant #1 obtained a letter, exhibit #3, from the Vatican from Monsignor Antonino ROMECC identifying the bearer as BAUCHECH, Mirko when he was in reality another person. This letter was arranged by the Astra Group. In addition Informant #1 procured a letter from the Italian Red Cross which stated that the bearer was BAUCHECH, Mirko when in reality he was not. Informant #1 returned to the International Red Cross and received a passport in the name of BAUCHECH Mirko which was issued to him on the basis of the letters of identification.

7. The Astra Group then placed the aforementioned person in contact with an official of the Spanish Embassy in Via Botteghe Oscure who referred them to the Spanish Consulate in Via Campo Marzio #34 for a visa. In the Spanish Consulate the aforementioned persons were given a form to fill out (exhibit #4) and were given the following instructions. Each person was to fill in the name which was on his passport but was thereafter to fill in the exact truth of his past history. The forms were received and taken away to be filled in. The aforementioned group returned to the Spanish Consulate where they learned that it would take fifteen days to receive a visa.

8. The surveillance of the entire group was continued and it was learned that FUETING had made contacts with a Baronessa CARBONELLA who is the property owner of the CIMES Company which has branch offices and agents in South America. It was further learned that FUETING was to become a South America representative for the CIMES after the receipt of his passport and visa. FUETING received 60,000 lire from Baronessa CARBONELLI for expenses until he arrived in South America.

9. On 14 August 1946, the above group decided that they would not wait for HAAS but would go to Genoa to obtain passages to South America with or without the visa. Consequently, the surveillance was stopped and LUDWIG, FUETING, VORHOEPLER and a person named SCHWICHTENBERG were arrested in the act of leaving Rome. In each case each individual was found to be an

3  
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escapee excepting SCHWITZBERG where it was found that he was in Italy illegally and found to be in possession of false discharge permits from Concentration Camps which he was supplying to German escapees as they appeared at the former German Embassy to the Vatican on Via Pavia. The investigations of the above persons revealed that KETTLER was in Genoa and was in contact with another escapee named INVERA, Aldemare. A trip to Genoa was organized to search for KETTLER and INVERA with the permission of the respective zone commanders. KETTLER and INVERA were captured (see report under Subject: INVERA). On this same trip leads on the location of HAAS, Carlo were developed in the area of Parma and he was captured by the Agents of this office in Bologna on 14 September 1946. KETTLER, INVERA and HAAS were brought to Mass for interrogation.

10. The interrogations of all persons concerned revealed the following interesting facts. All persons concerned after having originally escaped appeared in the office of Dr. NIX, Willy, Head of the Free German Committee in Italy and were supplied with identification papers and journey papers despite the fact that Dr. NIX was fully aware that in each case the person requesting the documents was wanted. It was further learned that these persons then made contacts with Padre BAYER with the help of NIX or with the help of Baron VON FROHLICHSTHAL who then succeeded in making a contact for these persons with persons who would interest themselves in feeding, lodging and providing necessary papers for emigration. It was found that the chain of Dr. NIX to FROHLICHSTHAL to Padre BAYER to a Harold McCaa who provided escapees with concentration camp documents ended up with persons like Baronessa CARONELLA or Padre Don Carlos of the Vatican who succeeded in providing jobs for the escapees in South America.

11. The chain of refugee to Dr. NIX to Baron VON FROHLICHSTHAL to Padre BAYER to EMBECK to Baronessa CARONELLA to Padre Don CARLOS presented such a large flow of German emigrants that each individual was examined separately. The examination showed that Dr. NIX, Willy, who has been known since the Allied occupation of Rome as the head of the Free German Committee, is well known in intelligence files. Dr. NIX has registered his organization with Italian authorities but has not continued its activities along its declared lines. Dr. NIX has not a consular office but has attempted to obtain consular rights for his office and has continually issued documents which required consular jurisdiction. Dr. NIX has further failed to live up to the obligations of his organization in the submitting of the names of all applicants for check by Italian and Allied authorities. Proof of the latter is the fact that the group mentioned earlier in this report was registered with the office of Dr. NIX and was never reported. In addition, confidential informants sent to Dr. NIX reported that he has been receiving money and visits from Communist-Yugoslav elements. (Information in this instance not verified by other sources). However, the construction and purpose of the NIX organization was found to be most similar to the organization broken up in Stuttgart, Germany, which was found to be a front for Moscow espionage as reported by AP September 2, 1946 at Frankfurt. (It is entirely possible,

4  
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5

therefore, that KIK who is an important link in the German emigration could be serving a similar function).

Baron VON FROELICHSTEIN: This person has been found to be a source of unlimited help to German refugees in Italy regardless of the character of the refuge. This person with Dr. KIK has been an important link in the chain of these refugees because of his strong Vatican connections.

Padre KIK: This Vatican representative concerns himself with the German refugee action of the Vatican. He has been in close contact with the elements who have been using the former German Embassy to the Vatican, Via Pieve 21, Rome, as a lodging or forwarding address. He has further been most useful in supplying food and letters from the Vatican which has been of tremendous help in this chain.

Hans KIK: Recently captured attempting to cross the border on documents issued by Dr. KIK. Above mentioned individual was part of chain which supplied false documents verifying that bearer had been released from a concentration camp. Above individual was engaged in this work with one VON HORN alias PIERONI, still at large, who is mentioned in the AFHQ cable CIC, number 1271680 dated 101758 B, as the organizer of a subversive group in Germany and Italy. In same cable one Carl Heinz HANS was reported as having come to Italy at request of VON HORN. HANS was used by this Agent to penetrate KIK and to contact HORN and VON HORN. HANS reported KIK activity with communist Yugoslavs and returned to Germany on KIK's documents. HANS failed to contact HORN or VON HORN. HANS' interrogation confirms part of German emigration chain.

Germana CARONELLI: Proprietor of CIMA, import and export company with center in Rome, Via Giovanni Battista Vico 22 and sub-office in Milano. CIMA found to be in liquidation state yet CARONELLI offered representation to FUSTIG in Colombia and advanced him 60,000 lire. Superficially manufacturer for refugee Germans is cunning and undoubtedly conscious of her part in the emigration chain. (See files under CARONELLI for further information).

Padre Don CARLOS: Vatican representative with connections in South America Consuls particularly Colombia and connections with business firms in South America. This person referred Germans mentioned above to one George FORNOFF, Calle Sanies 98, Barcelona, Spain (undoubtedly letter drop or relay point) who was to aid bearers of letters to proceed to South America. These latter two persons, with all their contacts complete the German emigration chain which funnels all of its clients through the I.R.C. Since this chain in the German activities was developed, an investigation was conducted to determine whether or not similar chain existed in other nationality groups. It was developed that a similar chain exists in the Free Austrian Committee, in the Russian Vatican Delegation (Russicum), in Yugoslav circles, in Polish Vatican circles, in Hungarian circles, in Swedish circles and in practically every Nation's Vatican delegation. In each instance it was found that each delegation funnels its refugees through the I.R.C. Consequently, a closer investigation of the International Red Cross activities was initiated.

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12. A reliable informant in the International Red Cross revealed that many of the persons working in the International Red Cross are definitely pro-German and pro-Yugoslav, and do not appear to be other than agents of their respective national delegation. The informant in the International Red Cross stated that on many occasions Yugoslavs have succeeded in being issued two and three passports with the excuse that they have lost their passports. The investigation of the I.R.C. further revealed that a close supervision of the application is not given and that too much reliability is placed upon the letters of identification issued by Vatican delegates. A reference to paragraph 6 of this report reveals that certain contact groups are able to obtain access to files of the I.R.C. and are able to pick out names of missing or dead persons whose names are placed on passports for persons not wanting to be recognized. The investigation reveals that the I.R.C. is very loosely run and is very probably a haven for the passage of agents since the I.R.C. passport is recognized in many countries. Proof of this lies in the fact that this Agent has run two persons through the IRC under false names and an attempt was made to uncover either individual. Further proof of this fact lies in the passports issued to Georgians who formerly were Allied with the German Army in sabotage and espionage against the Allies. This Agent is currently investigating the receipts of two such passports, one DADIARI, Michel and one Prince Tonquis DABCHSELIANI, formerly connected with ARNEBERG 2, Paris. These two latter cases have obtained visas to American countries and have been stopped by this office. In addition, requests made from Vatican clerical representatives of either the Russian or Yugoslav delegation for passports for refugees have been too readily available. Hundreds of cases of individuals not properly identified have been handled by the I.R.C. Spot checks of local refugee camps showed that at least one in every five persons possessed an IRC passport. In many cases the passports were found to be made out in names different from the actual name of the bearer.

#### PART II

13. This investigation has shown definite trends of interest in the emigration movements and the accessibility of the I.R.C. by many nations. The following examples are cited for reference.

14. On June 7 and June 19, 1946, one JAKET OTT and one FRIEDRICH, Omas refugees made application to the IRC for passports to be used in emigration to the U.S.A. An examination of the documents possessed by both it was revealed that each was attempting emigration to the U.S.A. sponsored by the American Joint Distribution Committee. Each claimed to be a Polish Jew despite the fact that this Agent believed them to be Slavs. In each case this Agent found that each was guaranteed his welfare by an American if he could emigrate. It was strange, however, that in each case each individual possessed telegrams and letters which led this Agent to the conclusion that the American sponsor did not know the individual as the documents would indicate but rather that the American individual had supplied a family history and data to the individual for use either at the request of the AJDC or some other agency to facilitate his emigration.

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

23. This Agent recommends that the investigation of the various incidents mentioned in this report be continued, and that requests be made of all commands for any further information on these incidents. This Agent further recommends that a complete curtailment of passport services of the IIC be considered and that some policy of action against those refugee agencies which are trafficking in illegal immigration be considered. This Agent further recommends that higher headquarters set a policy in cooperation with the Danish Authorities for the treatment of dangerous refugees in this theater.

AMERICAN JEWISH  
ARCHIVES

EDD J. BROOKS,  
Special Agent, C.I.A.



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Original documents  
faded and/or illegible



Werner Brockdorff

# FLUCHT VOR NÜRNBERG

Plane und Organisation  
der Fluchtwege der NS-Prominenz  
im »Römischen Weg«



waren. Die regionalen faschistischen Sicherheitsorgane hatten sich zum großen Teil mit dem italienischen Untergrund verbündet oder versuchten, sich durch Zuträgerei einen guten Übergang zu verschaffen. Mit dem weiteren Vormarsch der Alliierten in Italien verschärfte sich zudem die Unzuverlässigkeit der italienisch-faschistischen Behörden, so daß letztlich nur noch auf die »Schwarzen Brigaden« Verlaß war, während das Sicherheitssystem vollends in deutsche Hände überging, das heißt, in die Hände von Walter Rauff.

Als SD-Chef von Norditalien führte Walter Rauff neben seiner offiziellen Tätigkeit vor allem drei mehr oder weniger geheimnisvolle Vorhaben durch.

Erstens baute er seine Kontakte zum Vatikan weiter aus, hielt ständige Verbindung zu Bischof Dr. Hudal, und dies auch nach der alliierten Besetzung Roms, schließlich gewann er norditalienische Geistliche zur Mitarbeit beim Aufbau seiner Fluchtwege. Vor allem schaltete sich der Jesuiten-Orden ein, der über die Fronten hinweg die Verbindung zwischen Rauff und Rom aufrechterhielt. ✕

Zweitens unternahm Rauff zahlreiche geheimnisvolle Fahrten nach Südtirol, die mit seinen Dienstobliegenheiten nichts zu tun hatten. Es gelang mir trotz intensiver Forschung nicht immer, die Gründe für alle diese Reisen zu erkunden, obgleich ich mich allein zu diesem Zweck einige Monate in Südtirol aufhielt und mit zahlreichen Personen gesprochen habe, die damals am Rande dieses Geschehens beteiligt waren. Immerhin konnte ich einwandfrei die bereits geschilderte Zusammenkunft zwischen Rauff und Bormann in Meran klären.

Weiterhin steht fest, daß zwei Südtiroler Burschen im Alter von etwa 20 und 23 Jahren eine gewisse Rolle bei Rauffs geheimnisvoller Tätigkeit gespielt haben. Sie reisten häufig zwischen Abazzia (Opatja) und Meran hin und her und trafen sich jeweils an verschiedenen Orten mit Rauff. Da in Abazzia die Hauptvertriebsstelle des Unternehmens »Bernhard« (falsche Pfundnoten) lag, die später nach Schloß Labers bei Meran verlegt wurde, müssen hier kausale Zusammenhänge vermutet werden. Als sicher habe ich feststellen können, daß sich Walter Rauff dreimal in einem Gasthof bei Trento mit den beiden Südtirolern getroffen hat, die ihm dabei fünf etwa eineinhalb Meter lange Blechkanister übergaben, in denen sich der äußeren Beschreibung nach falsche Pfundnoten befunden haben konnten. Eine andere Erklärung kann ich weder für die nicht dienstlich begründeten Fahrten Rauffs noch für die Reisen der beiden Südtiroler und noch weniger für die Übergabe der Behälter finden. Rauff fuhr mit diesen Behältern nach Meran, Bozen und vor allem in kleinere Dörfer Südtirols. Einen dieser Behälter habe ich in einem entlegenen Bauernhof gefunden. Er war aber leer, oder richtiger gesagt, der Bauer hatte darin seine Butter zum Kuhlen aufbewahrt. Über die Herkunft des Behälters befragt, sagte der Bauer, daß er ihn von einem jungen Mann aus dem Dorf erhalten habe. Jener junge Mann aber war seit Ende des Krieges spurlos verschwunden. Ob es sich dabei um einen der beiden Südtiroler gehandelt hat, ließ sich nicht feststellen. Man kann mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit annehmen, daß Walter Rauff im höheren Auftrag in Südtirol Reserven angelegt hat, die dann allerdings nur zu einem geringen Teil wieder

Luvomi stoberte Rauff nach langerer Suche in seiner Mailander Wohnung auf und machte ihm den Vorschlag, die Akten auszuliefern, er könne sich dafür die Freiheit und allenfalls die Flucht erkaufen. Erst in diesem Augenblick erkannte Rauff, welche Trumpfe ihm der Zufall in die Hände gespielt hatte. Er gab Luvomi zu verstehen, daß er an dem Archiv nicht interessiert sei, aber dennoch einen bestimmten Preis fordere. Rauff dachte sofort daran, den späteren Römischen Weg nicht nur auf den Klerus, sondern auch auf die kommunistischen Partisanen aufzubauen.

Während Rauff am nächsten Tag in die Innenstadt fuhr, um sich wieder mit Luvomi und anderen Gesprächspartnern zu treffen, wurde er auf der Straße erkannt und von einer US-Streife verhaftet. Im Stadtgefängnis San Vittore war Rauff kein Unbekannter, und die dort herrschenden Partisanen empfingen ihn auf ihre Weise. Sie ahnten nicht, daß jener Walter Rauff, den sie gerade zusammenschlugen, dabei war, mit ihnen ein makabres Geschäft abzuschließen. Die GI's sahen dem Treiben teilnahmslos zu. Für sie war das nichts Neues; sie hatten in Italien schon andere Dinge erlebt.

Rauff dachte in diesen Minuten daran, daß sich seit der Kapitulation und seinem Untertauchen seine klerikalen Helfer nicht mehr gemeldet hatten, und er war sicher, daß sich Rom von den Fluchthelfen distanzieren werde.

Aber gerade in diesem Augenblick tauchte ein Pater auf, der von den Partisanen zuerst mit lautem Hallo begrüßt wurde, dem sie aber bald eine gewisse Achtung entgegenbrachten. Der Pater wollte Rauff mitnehmen und redete darüber mit ihnen. Überraschenderweise waren die Partisanen damit einverstanden. Aber gegen diese Lösung protestierten nun die amerikanischen Soldaten. Der Pater brachte es dennoch fertig, daß Rauff wenigstens in das 15. US-Lazarett in Mailand eingeliefert wurde. Dort besaßen die Patres eine Reihe von Möglichkeiten, jemandem zur Flucht zu verhelfen.

Aber der Zufall wollte es, daß in der gleichen Nacht ein Teil des Lazarets von deutschen Verwundeten geräumt und die Gefangenen in das US-Camp nach Ghedi verlegt wurden.

Am nächsten Morgen stand Walter Rauff am westlichen Drahtverhau des Lagers. Er konnte mit bloßem Auge jene Scheune sehen, in der sich die Reste des faschistischen Partei-Archivs befanden.

Noch eine Überraschung erwartete ihn an jenem Morgen. sein ehemaliger Adjutant Hans Heim war Lagerkommandant hier geworden. Das Wiedersehen war herzlich, aber Heim, der Pflichtgetreue, dachte nicht daran, seinem ehemaligen Chef zur Flucht zu verhelfen. Dafür hatten andere bereits Rauffs Spuren aufgenommen. Bevor die Jesuiten überhaupt wußten, wo sich Rauff befand, hatte Luvomi dies festgestellt und schickte schon am Mittag des ersten Tages eine schriftliche Botschaft an Rauff, die allerdings unmanuven Charakter trug. Rauff war trotzdem einverstanden und wurde noch in der gleichen Nacht aus dem US-Lager befreit. Mit einer roten Armbinde dekoriert, fuhr er in Gesellschaft von sechs Partisanen nach Mailand zurück und bezog seine alte Wohnung. Vor