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Preserving American Jewish History

MS-603: Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum Collection, 1945-1992.

Series D: International Relations Activities. 1961-1992

Box 54, Folder 4, Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS]
to Saudi Arabia, 1981.

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
13TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
BUDGET

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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August 24, 1981

Dear Friend:

As someone vitally concerned about the survival of the State of Israel, I don't have to tell you how critically important it is to stop the sale of AWACS and other sophisticated weapons to Saudi Arabia.

Just today, the Reagan Administration indicated that it intends to go through with the Saudi sale by submitting its proposal to the Congress. A majority of both the Senate and the House must now vote to disapprove this palpably pernicious proposal in order to prevent it from going through. I must tell you that never before has an Administration-sponsored arms sale been rejected by Congress. Consequently, while it is true that Israel has many friends in Congress, the battle to stop this sale will only be won if we in the American-Jewish community can mobilize significant public support against it.


As you are probably already aware, for the past few weeks I have been circulating petitions against this sale throughout this community. I plan to submit the petitions, which have so far been signed by over 10,000 people, to Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill and Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker when Congress reconvenes in September.

The culmination of our petition drive will be a mass rally which is scheduled for Tuesday, September 8, at 7:30 p.m., at Lincoln High School, which is located on Ocean Parkway between West Avenue and the Belt Parkway.

I sincerely hope that you'll be able to join former Vice President Walter Mondale, Senators Moynihan and D'Amato, Governor Carey and Mayor Koch, and a number of other political and community leaders -- all of whom I've invited to participate in the rally -- on this important occasion.

Only through a concerted effort can we hope to muster the kind of public support necessary to stop this sale. I urge you to join me on Tuesday, September 8, to lend your voice to this important battle to preserve and protect Israel -- our only reliable democratic ally in the Middle East, and an enormously significant strategic asset as well.

Sincerely,



STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
Member of Congress



ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

ההסתדרות הציונית של ארצות הברית

Zionist Organization of America



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CABLES: ZIONISTS, NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

August 17, 1981

To: ZOA leaders and friends.

Re: SAUDI ALERT!

Status Report -- Sale of AWACS and F-15 enhancements to Saudi Arabia.

Dear Friends:

As this is being written, relations between the United States and Israel are strained. With a cease fire in effect on the Israel-Lebanon border, friends of Israel on Capitol Hill are hopeful this cooling off abroad will also lead to a less emotional atmosphere in Washington.

There is a curious contrast between the positive attitude of the President toward Israel and the harsh public words -- and even more critical private statements -- elsewhere in the Administration. The repeated delays of F-16 shipments, the vote in the U.N. Security Council to "condemn" Israel, and the personal attacks on Israel's leadership are of concern. Hopefully, when Congress returns after Labor Day, attention will be directed to Prime Minister Begin's visit to Washington and there will be an opportunity for clarification and renewed understanding.

"REAGAN LAUNCHES BLITZ FOR SAUDI ARMS SALE"

This is the headline in the Washington-Post. The report included this opening paragraph:

"President Reagan opened his campaign to win one of the toughest fights awaiting him in Congress this Fall by reaffirming yesterday his intention to sell sophisticated AWACS radar reconnaissance planes to Saudi Arabia.

The President called the sale an essential element of his Middle East policy and asked members of Congress not to make up their minds about the sale until they have heard his arguments supporting it."

Although the State Department had announced that the notification process advising Congress that the Administration intends to sell Saudi Arabia a \$5 billion would not begin until Congress returned from its present recess on September 9th, this date has now been advanced to August 24th. Thus, the Administration has made clear, in advance of Prime Minister Begin's visit to Washington, that it intends to pursue its policy of selling advanced military aircraft and equipment in spite of considerable congressional opposition.

If the Administration does in fact, keep to the August 24th date, it will begin a 20-day "informal" period in which Congress will study the sale. That period is followed by the "formal" notification. The Congress, under Sec. 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, then has 30 days to block the sale. That requires a majority of both the House and the Senate approving a resolution of disapproval.

A majority of both houses of Congress is now on record against the AWACS/F-15 enhancement package. This opposition has forced the Administration repeatedly to postpone submitting the sale to Congress. Important spokesmen for the Administration have indicated that they would not attempt to promote the sale unless they felt confident they could win on this issue. However, there is no evidence that the Administration now has the votes. Please note the following:

- A. U.S. Senate -- Fifty-four Senators (20 Republicans and 34 Democrats) sent a letter to the President on June 22nd urging him not to submit the Saudi Arms Package to Congress because it is not in the best interest of the United States. A 55th added his name in early July.
- B. House of Representatives -- 248 Representatives (75 Republicans and 173 Democrats) so far have cosponsored a resolution of disapproval introduced by Representative Clarence Long (D-MD) and Norman Lent (R-NY).

Outlook: The Administration has just begun to intensify its lobbying to win approval of the arms package. Not all the names on both lists are "solid" votes, and we need to improve our position. While it is true that President Reagan has demonstrated extraordinary skill and influence by the overwhelming victories he has enjoyed in Congress, there are those who believe that the sale of armaments to Saudi Arabia is quite a different issue. Members of Congress who did support the President on domestic issues may not be that easily swayed on the issue of America's sophisticated secret weapons, being sold to a questionable ally like Saudi Arabia.

Our objective remains the same: To make the American people aware of the issues so that the Congress of the United States will reject the package if it is submitted. The oft-delayed, multi-billion dollar arms package is anticipated to include, in addition to the five aerial surveillance aircraft (AWACS), seven KC-135 jet refueling tankers, 62 pairs of conformal fuel pods for the Saudi's yet-to-be-delivered F-15's, approximately 1,200 AIM-9-L advanced Sidewinder missiles, and about a dozen ground radar stations.

In his recent communication to you, Ivan J. Novick, National President of the ZOA clearly stated:


"The issue you and I must face - squarely, and with all the skill and intensity we can muster - is whether we will stand by and let this happen."

Whether or not the Administration will succeed will depend upon our ability, as American citizens, to gather support from fellow Americans who share with us serious concerns that the proposed sale to Saudi-Arabia is not good for America, not good for Israel and not good for peace in the Mid-East. Inasmuch as the

Administration appears to have set an earlier date for its campaign seeking approval by Congress of the Saudi Arms package, we urge that you communicate your concerns to friends and neighbors, so that they too understand what is involved. In addition, it is important that you proceed energetically and expeditiously to follow the Recommended Action guidelines enclosed.

Best regards.

Cordially yours,


Paul Flacks
National Executive Director


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AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES
RECOMMENDED ACTION

1. Please thank the cosponsors of the Long-Lent resolution of Disapproval. Those who have not yet spoken out against the sale or cosponsored the resolution should be urged to do so at once.
2. Senators who have signed the letter to the President in opposition to the Saudi Arms Package should be thanked and reinforced. Those who are not on record as opposed to the sale should be urged to speak out.
3. Read carefully the data and analysis contained in the "Defense Monitor" which is included in this special mailing to you. It should be the basis for your communications to members of Congress, to the media, as well as "Letters to the Editor."
4. The White House telephone number is: 202/456-1414. The views of American citizens are welcomed.
5. Embark on a crash-program to obtain thousands of signatures on the petition enclosed. This represents the sentiments "of the people" in communities throughout the country and will have an important effect on the White House.
6. Initiate communications to your own Senators and congressmen which will include the personal signatures of Presidents of local organizations. This has a very dramatic and important effect, because it indicates in a very significant way how the constituents feel regarding the sale to Saudi-Arabia.

ZOAA

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
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4 East 34th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPT. 

ACTION

GUIDELINES

ZOA IS SPEARHEADING NATIONAL PETITION CAMPAIGN SO THAT THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS CAN VOICE THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SALE OF AWACS AND F-15 ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA

Join in this effort!

1. Reproduce the petition. Do it today. Blanket your company with it.
2. Here's what to do to make this campaign succeed:
 - A. Organize "NO SALE" Committees. Station them at strategic traffic locations.
 - a. Set up tables on busy corners and at public events.
 - b. Establish "NO SALE" booths in shopping centers.
 - c. Go door-to-door, from street to street.
 - B. Obtain 100% participation from Synagogues and Temples. Ask Rabbis to cooperate by urging support from the pulpit.
 - C. Contact the Christian community - ask them to do the same.
 - D. Get cooperation from other Jewish AND non-Jewish organizations.
(Note: All Veterans organizations are concerned about U.S. military secrets falling into the hands of the Soviets)
 - E. Invite YOUTH GROUPS to become involved; they can be absolutely magnificent in such a campaign. **INCLUDE THEM!**
3. Focus attention by press interviews and statements. Ask for Radio/TV time.
4. Add any of your own excellent ideas.

WE CAN BEAT THIS SALE!

GET INVOLVED!

THIS BATTLE CONCERNS EVERYBODY!

COSPONSORS OF H. CON. RES. 118 - THE LONG-LENT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL

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Tom Bevill
Richard Shelby
*Albert Lee Smith

ALASKA

*Don Young

ARIZONA

Morris Udall

CALIFORNIA

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*Ken Kramer
Patricia Schroeder
Timothy Wirth

CONNECTICUT

*Lawrence DeNardis
Samuel Gejdenson
*Stewart McKinney
Toby Moffett
William Ratchford

FLORIDA

Bill Chappell
Dante Fascell
Don Fuqua
Andy Ireland
William Lehman
Dan Mica
Claude Pepper
*E. Clay Shaw

GEORGIA

Billy Lee Evans
Wyche Fowler
Charles Hatcher
Elliot Levitas

HAWAII

Daniel Akaka
Cecil Heftel

ILLINOIS

Frank Annunzio
Cardiss Collins
*Tom Corcoran
*Phil Crane
John Fary
*Henry Hyde
*John Porter
Paul Simon
Harold Washington
Sidney Yates

INDIANA

Adam Benjamin
David Evans
Floyd Fithian
Andrew Jacobs
Phil Sharp

IOWA

Herkley Redell
Tom Harkin

KANSAS

Dan Glickman
*Bob Whittaker
*Larry Winn

KENTUCKY

William Natcher
Carl Perkins

LOUISIANA

John Breaux
Gillis Long
Buddy Roemer
W. J. Tauzin

MAINE

*David Emery
*Olympia Snowe

MARYLAND

Michael Barnes
Beverly Byron
Roy Dyson
*Marjorie Holt
Steny Hoyer
Clarence Long
Barbara Mikulski
Parren Mitchell

MASSACHUSETTS

Edward Boland
Brian Donnelly
Joseph Early
Barney Frank
*Margaret Heckler
Edward Markey
Nicholas Mavroules
Joseph Moakley
James Shannon
Gerry Studds

MICHIGAN

Donald Albosta
James Blanchard
David Bonior
William Brodhead
John Conyers
George Crockett
*Jim Dunn
William Ford
Dennis Hertel
Dale Kildee
*Carl Pursell
*Harold Sawyer
*Mark Siljander
Bob Traxler
Howard Wolpe

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*Arlen Erdahl
*Bill Frenzel
James Oberstar
Martin Sabo
Bruce Vento
*Vin Weber

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Bill Clay
Ike Skelton
Harold Volkmer
Robert Young

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Pat Williams

NEBRASKA

*Hal Daub

NEVADA

Jim Santini

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Norman D'Amours

NEW JERSEY

*James Courter
Bernard Dwyer
*Millicent Fenwick
James Florio
*Edwin Forsythe
Frank Guarini
*Harold Hollenbeck
James Howard
Bill Hughes
Joseph Minish
*Matthew Rinaldo
Peter Rodino
Robert Roe
*Marje Roukema
*Chris Smith

JULY 1981 U.S. SENATE
LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
OPPOSING SAUDI ARMS
PACKAGE

NEW YORK

Joseph Addabbo
Mario Biaggi
Jonathan Bingham
*Gregory Carman
*William Carney
Shirley Chisholm
Thomas Downey
Geraldine Ferraro
*Hamilton Fish
Robert Garcia
*Benjamin Gilman
*William Green
*Frank Horton
*Jack Kemp
John LaFalce
*John LeBoutillier
*Gary Lee
*Norman Lent
Stanley Lundine
Matthew McHugh
*Raymond McGrath
*Guy Molinari
Henry Nowak
Richard Ottinger
Peter Peyser
Charles Rangel
Frederick Richmond
Benjamin Rosenthal
James Scheuer
Charles Schumer
Stephen Solarz
Ted Weiss
*George Wortley
Leo Zeferetti

NORTH CAROLINA

Ike Andrews
*Bill Hendon
Walter Jones
Stephen Neal

NORTH DAKOTA

Byron Dorgan

OHIO

*John Ashbrook
Dennis Eckart
*Willis Gradison
Tony Hall
Thomas Luken
Donald Pease
Bob Shamansky
*Lyle Williams
Ronald Mottl

OKLAHOMA

*Mickey Edwards
Glenn English
Jim Jones
Dave McCurdy
Mike Synar
Wes Watkins

*Republicans

OREGON

Les AuCoin
James Weaver
Ron Wyden

PENNSYLVANIA

Eugene Atkinson
Don Bailey
*Lawrence Coughlin
*James Coyne
William Coyne
*Charles Dougherty
Bob Edgar
Allen Ertel
Thomas Foglietta
William Gray
*Marc Marks
*Don Ritter
Doug Walgren
*Robert Walker
Gus Yatron

RHODE ISLAND

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SOUTH DAKOTA

Thomas Daschle

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William Boner
Marilyn Bouquard
Harold Ford
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Quentin Burdick (D-ND)
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William Cohen (R-ME)
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Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY)
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Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ)
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Chris Dodd (D-CT)
David Durenberger (R-MN)
Thomas Eagleton (D-MO)
J. James Exon (D-NE)
Wendell Ford (D-KY)
John Glenn (D-OH)
Slade Gorton (R-WA)
Charles Grassley (R-IA)
Gary Hart (D-CO)
Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
Paula Hawkins (R-FL)
S. I. Hayakawa (R-CA)
Howell Heflin (D-AL)
John Heinz (R-PA)
Walter Huddleston (D-KY)
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Henry Jackson (D-WA)
Roger Jepsen (R-IA)
Bob Kasten (R-WI)
Edward Kennedy (D-MA)
Carl Levin (D-MI)
Spark Matsunaga (D-HI)
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George Mitchell (D-ME)
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Paul Tsongas (D-MA)
Lowell Weicker (R-CT)
Harrison Williams (D-NJ)
Edward Zorinsky (D-NE)

Sen. Claiborne Pell
(D-RI) also associates
himself with this letter



THE DEFENSE MONITOR

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I.S.S.N. #0195-6450

Vol. X, Number 4

1981

The U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia: Investing in Stability or Disaster?

Defense Monitor in Brief

- Saudi Arabia is the Number One U.S. arms customer. It has purchased some of our most advanced weapons.
- The proposed sale of five AWACS aircraft, seven tanker aircraft, and armaments for 60 previously purchased F-15 fighter aircraft would add to Saudi Arabia's offensive military capability and would not meet any new Saudi defense need. It would heighten regional tensions.
- Saudi Arabia has hired the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to build a vast array of military and civilian projects at a cost of \$24 Billion.
- U.S. military and civilian military engineers are so deeply involved in the Saudi military structure that we may be drawn into combat in the area at a time not of our choosing.
- The U.S.-Saudi Arabian "arms for oil" relationship fuels the Middle East arms race and increases the likelihood and destructiveness of war in the area. The introduction of Soviet arms and Soviet military activity also increases the likelihood of war in the region.
- Saudi Arabia is being militarized with the world's latest, most complex weapons. Saudi Arabia ranks sixth in world military expenditures and spends more on the military per citizen than any other country. Saudi Arabia does not have the manpower or the know-how to maintain and operate many of the U.S. military systems already provided.
- Saudi Arabia is a major supporter of and source of funds and arms for the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.).

Every year U.S. leaders restate the depth of American military commitment to Western Europe, Japan and Israel, but the fact is that since 1975 Saudi Arabia has been the leading customer for U.S. arms.

American military sales to Saudi Arabia have skyrocketed from \$300 million in 1972 to \$6.5 Billion in 1979. Saudi Arabia has accounted for 36% of all U.S. foreign military sales since 1973, or \$34 Billion.

Besides selling and delivering Billions of dollars of increasingly sophisticated weapons to Saudi Arabia each year, the United States also sells Billions of dollars of military construction and military training.

It is time for the Congress and the American people to take a close look at the U.S. role in the arming of Saudi Arabia. The United States may already be in a position where it cannot reduce or even alter its military programs in Saudi Arabia without making the Saudis unhappy. Saudi leaders seem to view the arms relationship as the major test of U.S. reliability and commitment.

Military relations have been the leading edge of American involvement with Saudi Arabia. From the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1947 through 1979, Saudi Arabia purchased \$56 Billion in U.S. products; of that, 55% was spent on military arms and services.

Through an extensive military relationship, the U.S. hopes to ensure the continued supply of Saudi oil—an "arms for oil" deal—and to counter Soviet involvement in the region.

The United States is increasingly relying on Saudi Arabia as a key ally in the Persian Gulf region. Yet tensions mount as the U.S. and Saudi Arabia draw closer militarily while the political gap between them widens.

One of the last acts of the Carter Administration was to notify Congress that it had offered to sell to Saudi Arabia an additional \$2 Billion in military equipment and services. One of the first acts of the Reagan Administration was to approve the sale of new armaments to Saudi Arabia for soon-to-be delivered U.S. F-15 fighter aircraft. The

Facts about Saudi Arabia

Geography

Area: about 1,448,000 sq. miles (1/3 size of continental U.S.); 98% desert.
Coastline: 1,560 miles.

People

Population: 10,112,000 (January 1981)
Ethnic Divisions: 90% Arab, 10% Afro-Asian.
Religion: 100% Muslim.
Literacy: 15-25%.
Labor Force: about 3,337,000; one-half are foreign workers.

Government

Type: Monarchy.
Legislature: none.
Constitution: none.
Political Parties: none.
Suffrage: none.

Economy (1979)

GNP: \$77 Billion; \$9,500 per capita (16th highest in world).
Exports: \$58 Billion (99% petroleum and petroleum products); customers: W. Europe 50%, U.S. 16%, Japan 15%.
Imports: \$28 Billion; suppliers: U.S. 25%, W. Europe and Japan 62%.

Military

Budget: \$20.7 Billion (1980); \$2,500 per capita (highest in world).
Manpower: 73,500 total (47,000 regular army; 20,000 National Guard; 6,500 Frontier Forces).
Weapons: 380 tanks; 500 armored personnel carriers; 14 naval craft; 136 combat aircraft; TOW, Dragon anti-tank missiles; Hawk, Crotale surface-to-air missiles; Maverick air-to-surface missiles; Sidewinder, Red Top, Firestreak, R-530 and R-550 Magic air-to-air missiles.
On order: 60 F-15 fighter aircraft; 520 tanks; 200 armored personnel carriers; corvettes, missile boats; Sidewinder, Maverick, Harpoon, Exocet, Redeye, Shahine, Crotale, and Improved Hawk missiles.

Sources: CIA, State Dept., IISS

Chart prepared by the Center for Defense Information.

Reagan Administration has also made known its desire to establish permanent American military bases in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region.

Yet at the Islamic Conference sponsored by Saudi Arabia in January 1981, the Saudis called for a "jihad" or holy war against Israel. They condemned what they described as the increasing rivalry of the superpowers in the area.

The Reagan Administration, instead of focusing on peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as the number one priority in the Middle East/Persian Gulf, is focusing on countering the Soviet Union. President Reagan indicates that he views weapons transfers as one of the most important and effective instruments for gaining influence abroad. This increased emphasis on arms transfers is likely to bring about a deepening of the U.S.-Saudi Arabian military relationship and raise the possibility of confrontation with the USSR.

The U.S. has become deeply involved with a regime in Saudi Arabia that could drag us into a war not of our choosing, restrict our future freedom of action and compli-

cate the pursuit of peace and stability in the Middle East. U.S. dependence on Saudi Arabia has been overstated. Alternatives exist to reliance on military initiatives to try and ensure the flow of oil to the United States.


The Tangled Web: Elements of U.S. Involvement

The United States historically has sold only older military equipment to all but its closest allies, but it has been supplying Saudi Arabia with increasingly sophisticated weaponry.

The U.S. has agreed to sell to Saudi Arabia 60 F-15 Eagles, the U.S. Air Force's best fighter plane, hundreds of the U.S. Army's main battle tank, the M-60, and thousands of America's first-line tactical missiles.

The F-15 Package—A Bad Deal

The most controversial issue in the U.S.-Saudi relations recently has been the Saudi request for additional



equipment and aircraft to supplement the F-15s they have on order. The original Saudi request was for bomb racks, fuel tanks, air-to-air missiles and aerial refueling aircraft.

The Carter Administration refused to approve the sale, keeping a promise made to Congress in 1978 that the firepower and range of the F-15s sold to Saudi Arabia would not be enhanced in the future.

Shortly after coming to office, however, the Reagan Administration announced that the U.S. had decided to sell all of the items except the bomb racks.

The fuel tanks would nearly double the range of the F-15, bringing Israel well within striking range. The AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles can be fired at an enemy plane from any direction, not just from behind as is the case with less advanced heat-seeking missiles, a tremendous advantage in aerial combat. The KC-135 tanker aircraft will further extend the range of the F-15.

Reagan Administration spokesmen cite changed conditions since 1978 as the rationale for the sale: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution and war with Iraq, and Soviet involvement in South Yemen and Ethiopia.

But the new armaments would not enable the Saudis to cope with a major Soviet assault; the Iraq-Iran conflict has resulted in closer Saudi relations with Iraq while depleting Iran's military and economic resources; Saudi Arabia does not need America's latest and best weapons to deal with South Yemen or Ethiopia. Besides, the Soviets have not provided the quantity or quality of arms to either of those nations that the U.S. has sold to Saudi Arabia.

No To The F-15 Package Sale

"It is clear that whatever weapons we sell to Saudi Arabia, they will continue to use the oil weapon against us. The United States must not repeat the errors it made in Iran by selling too much advanced weaponry to an unstable client faced with internal discontent rather than external threats. This proposal is ill-advised, will not enhance Middle East stability or U.S. interests."

Congressman Richard Ottinger
April 1981

"I must say flat out that I am mystified why the United States would give the Saudis AWACS. Israel's value as a strategic and reliable democratic asset to the United States and the free world is beyond dispute. For this reason, our commitment to Israel's security is resolute and unwavering."

Congressman Jack Kemp
April 1981

"It would be irresponsible for us to help them (the Saudis) prepare to defeat a sophisticated air threat, for which the AWACS was designed and which has a low probability of occurring, when they are incapable of handling the more elementary threats of insurrection and guerilla warfare that are highly probable."

Stansfield Turner
Former Director of CIA
April 1981


The proposed sale is not necessary to meet any new Saudi defense need. It provides relatively unimportant improvements in Saudi Arabia's defensive capabilities while providing significant new offensive capability. The sale will make little difference in Saudi Arabia's ability to protect its oil fields or to combat a Soviet thrust into the region.

The sale will exacerbate the Middle East arms race, create new tensions and worsen what the Administration perceives as "deteriorating security conditions." Instead of deterring nations such as Iraq, Iran or Israel, the new armaments might induce a pre-emptive attack. Clearly, the sale will give South Yemen a convincing argument when it approaches Moscow for new aircraft and air defense weapons.

Unfortunately, the same argument can be made by Israel in future requests for military assistance from the U.S. Anticipating such a request, Administration officials have offered to loan Israel an additional \$600 million to buy American weapons in 1983 and 1984.

Israel has indicated that it will need 15 new F-15s to match the aircraft to be sold to the Saudis, but because of financial conditions, Israel is requesting the aircraft as a gift, not a loan.

The U.S. has worked itself into the position of having to help enhance Israeli air defense capabilities in order to better guard against a possible attack by the Saudi F-15s which we are providing. Once again, the United States is arming both sides of a potential conflict.



Adding AWACS

A month after announcing an intention to sell the missiles, fuel tanks, and tanker aircraft, Reagan officials announced that the U.S. was adding five E-3A Sentry AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft to the package. While the Saudis may need to improve their air defense capabilities, it is a mistake for the United States to offer to sell to Saudi Arabia five of its most technologically advanced aircraft.

The AWACS—basically a Boeing 707 with sophisticated radar and command equipment on board—is America's best intelligence gathering aircraft. It has radar to detect both low and high altitude aircraft, as well as naval vessels, at distances of 250 to 350 miles. It can also command and control combat strike aircraft against other aircraft and against ground targets. The radar can track 600 targets simultaneously and the computer on board can identify and interpret over 240 targets simultaneously.

Four U.S. AWACS aircraft have been operating in Saudi Arabia since the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980. Built originally to control the air battle over Europe, the United States' current fleet of 23 AWACS aircraft is inadequate for U.S. military needs. Nevertheless, the Reagan State Department is willing to sell five AWACS to Saudi Arabia and to keep the four presently there in place until delivery can be made, probably starting in 1986.

The AWACS sale raises the danger that American secret high technology could be lost or compromised through espionage, combat, or a sudden change in the Saudi government. U.S. secret AIM-9L missile technology would be similarly endangered by the proposed package sale.

The AWACS sale would also increase the chance of Americans becoming directly involved in or killed in Saudi combat operations. U.S. military personnel are operating the AWACS planes now in Saudi Arabia. White House officials have stated that 30 U.S. Air Force crewmen and 410 U.S. civilian technicians would be kept in Saudi Arabia

for the next 20 years to man and maintain the AWACS aircraft and to train Saudis. The important military role of the AWACS aircraft makes it a probable first target for any enemy planning an attack on Saudi Arabia.

Lastly, the AWACS sale would increase the danger to Israel. The fact that the Saudis have to rely on Americans for the operation of the aircraft lessens the immediate threat to Israel. But in the future these planes could allow Saudi Arabia to closely monitor Israeli military actions and even to assist or direct the air combat operations of other Arab powers.

Promises to Keep

"Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would increase the range or enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15."

Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown
May 1978

"You will recall that, at the time of the original purchase of the planes in 1978, the Congress was given explicit and unequivocal assurances that offensive equipment, including fuel tanks and bomb racks . . . would not be transferred to Saudi Arabia.

"The Saudis have called the sale yet another 'test' of our friendship for them. Friendship is reciprocal. While they are not reluctant to make demands upon us, the Saudis nonetheless continue to attack President Sadat and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as well as making repeated calls for holy war (jihad) against Israel."

Letter from 19 Members
of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee to
Sec. State Haig
February 1981

"There are those who say that the new Administration should abrogate the pledges of its predecessor. To do so would raise serious questions about the reliability of our word as a great power and a guarantor of the peace process in the Middle East. . . .

"Instead of making Saudi Arabia a greater military threat to Israel, we should be seeking a Saudi Arabia that is a force for peace between Israel and the nations of the Middle East."

Senator Edward Kennedy
February 1981

"We must rebuild our lost reputation for trustworthiness. We must again become a nation that can be relied upon to live up to its commitments."

Ronald Reagan
September 1980

Promises to Keep

Congress was given explicit assurances in 1978 by the Carter Administration that equipment such as that now being offered by Reagan appointees would not be provided at any time to Saudi Arabia. These were the solemn pledges of the President of the U.S. Our reputation for honoring our word will be questioned if President Reagan chooses to ignore them.

It would not be surprising if Reagan eventually asks for approval of the sale of bomb racks as well. Reagan officials have said that the bomb racks will be a subject of further discussion and that the U.S. will carry out a "technical study with the Saudis to determine their air-to-ground requirements."

In addition to the Billions of dollars of weapons sales and deliveries to Saudi Arabia, there are lesser known but important elements of U.S. military involvement with

Major Elements of U.S. Military Involvement in Saudi Arabia

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Activities—\$24 Billion

The Corps is managing the construction of Saudi Arabia's military infrastructure, including the building of military cities, naval bases, air bases, service headquarters and academies, training facilities, medical facilities, schools, housing. Training activities include \$1.2 Billion Saudi Ordnance Corps Program (advice and training in logistics management).

Saudi Naval Expansion Program—\$6 Billion

Procurement of ships, missiles, other equipment; construction of 2 naval bases, an academy, headquarters and repair facilities; training program. Weapons include corvettes, patrol boats, mine-sweepers, Harpoon missiles. Managed by U.S. Navy.

Saudi Arabian National Guard Program—\$4 Billion

Equipping and training of 8 combat and one logistics battalion of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (internal security forces); construction of 2 military cities, a headquarters, training facilities. Weapons include V-150 armored cars, howitzers, 81-mm. mortars, 20-mm cannons, TOW anti-tank missiles. Managed by U.S. Dept. of Army Material Development and Readiness Command.

"Peace Hawk" Program—\$4 Billion

The "Peace Hawk" program is a package deal with the U.S. for the purchase of F-5 fighter planes, the maintenance of the planes by the U.S., and training by the U.S. of Saudi fighter pilots, mechanics, etc. "Peace Sun" will be a similar program for F-15 aircraft.

Source: DoD

Chart prepared by the Center for Defense Information.

Saudi Arabia: the activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Saudi Naval Expansion Program, and the Saudi Arabian National Guard Program.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is employed by the Saudi Arabian government to work on projects costing \$24 Billion. The Corps acts as a manager for the Saudi government, awarding contracts for design and construction, then overseeing the entire operation. Nearly one-fifth of all U.S. Army Corps of Engineers activities are in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi projects tie up the Corps and divert it from needed enterprises in America.

Taken together, the Corps of Engineers projects in Saudi Arabia rival the U.S. MX missile system construction programs, but are almost unknown to members of Congress and the public.

The largest project, and the most questionable, is the King Khalid Military City; a self-contained military base and city being built in the middle of wasteland desert. Originally planned as a \$3 Billion project, costs are now estimated to be at least \$8.5 Billion, or more than \$100,000 for each of the 70,000 people it can house when completed in the late 1980's.

The extravagances of the project are obvious, but even worse is that the U.S. Army would advise the Saudis to build the city in the first place. It will contain everything of military value in one central location and be a "sitting duck" for any enemy attack.

There are numerous examples of waste and extravagance which serve neither U.S. nor Saudi interests: a \$2.5 Billion military academy for a cadet corps of only 1500 men, a naval academy built for a class of 500 at over \$1 Billion, a \$500 million headquarters for the Ministry of Defense, lavish officers clubs and VIP villas.

Castles Made of Sand


"Any member of Congress who has had trouble getting a harbor in his district dredged or a dam repaired would be intrigued to learn that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is building a \$7 Billion military city, complete with air conditioning, a swimming pool, indoor and outdoor firing ranges, riding stables, a stadium and a race track in the middle of the Saudi Arabian desert."

Congressman Gerry Studds
February 1980

Saudi Naval Expansion Program

The Saudi Naval Expansion Program is a \$6 Billion effort to build the Saudi Royal Navy. It includes the procurement of 29 surface ships and naval craft, missiles and other weapons, the construction of two naval bases, a naval academy, naval headquarters, and ship repair facilities.

A Rival for the MX: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Projects in Saudi Arabia



ties, and a naval training program. The U.S. Navy is employed by the Saudi Government as overall program manager.

While the program will give the Saudis one of the better navies in the region, it will not give them the ability to protect the transportation of their oil or to match Soviet naval forces. Indeed, the Saudi expansion may give the Soviet Union a rationale to either expand its own naval strength in the area or to send new, more advanced naval weapons to nations such as South Yemen and Ethiopia which are antagonistic to Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabian National Guard Program

The \$4 Billion Saudi Arabian National Guard Program began in 1973 as a relatively modest attempt by the U.S. to equip and train four combat battalions of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The program was expanded in 1978 to include four additional combat battalions and one logistics battalion.

The National Guard was set up in the 1950s as a loyal, tribal-based force with the mission of maintaining internal security, or more accurately, preserving the power of the Royal Family.

Little has been said about the propriety of the United States training and equipping Saudi Arabia's internal security forces, despite U.S. complaints about Soviet control over the security forces of its "client states." The United States Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974 to prohibit the training of foreign police forces, but still permits training of "military" units regardless of their actual purpose.

<i>Project</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Cost Estimate</i>
King Khalid Military City	Al Batin	\$ 8.5 Billion
Tabuk Military City	Tabuk	\$.2
Khamis Mushayt Military City	Khamis Mushayt	\$ 1.1
Al Qasim Military City	Al Qasim	\$ 1.8
Al Hasa Military City	Al Hasa	
King AbdulAziz Naval Base	Jubail	\$ 2.7
King Faisal Naval Base	Jidda	\$ 1.0
Dhahran Air Base	Dhahran	\$ 1.5
Taif Air Base	Taif	
Khamis Mushayt Air Base	Khamis Mushayt	
King AbdulAziz Military Academy	Riyadh	\$ 2.5
Naval Academy	Jubail	\$ 1.0
Ministry of Defense Headquarters	Riyadh	\$.5
National Guard Headquarters	Riyadh	\$.3
Air Force and Navy Headquarters	Riyadh	\$.1
Ordnance Corps Program (training)		\$ 1.2
Total (including miscellaneous)		\$24 Billion

Source: DoD

Chart prepared by the Center for Defense Information.

Arms For Oil

In its military relations with the United States, Saudi Arabia wants to have its cake and eat it too. The Saudis want modern U.S. weapons, high technology and managerial skills, as well as *implicit* American military protection. But at the same time, they want to keep a respectable distance from the U.S.

The Saudis say: militarily treat us as your close ally; give us large quantities of your newest and best weapons; train our soldiers; build our military infrastructure; make clear to our enemies that the U.S. will not stand idly by if Saudi Arabia is attacked; but, do so very quietly so as to avoid antagonizing our Islamic brothers. Do so even though we will not grant American forces formal access to our military facilities. Do so even though on most political issues outside of the superpower struggle we are at odds. Do so even though we must side with the Arab world when conflicts arise with U.S. interests.

For many Americans, however, there is an overriding reason to sell huge amounts of weapons to Saudi Arabia: to ensure the flow of oil from the world's largest producer to the world's largest consumer at "reasonable" rates. Saudi Arabia provides about 11% of the oil consumed in the U.S. It provides about one-third of the oil consumed by our NATO allies.

The U.S. government seems to encourage the simplistic barter arrangement of arms for oil. For example, within one week of the Saudi announcement in July 1979 that oil production was to be increased, the U.S. State Department recommended an additional \$1.2 Billion for the Saudi Arabian National Guard Program.

There are some advantages to the "arms for oil" deal. These include the profits made by private U.S. corporations, the balance of payment benefits to the U.S. economy as a whole, jobs for American citizens, and cheaper military equipment for the U.S. through longer production lines. But these short-term financial gains are likely to be outweighed by long-term political and military costs to the U.S.

There are many dangers for the United States and Saudi Arabia in the "arms for oil" deal. It fuels the arms competition between rivals in the volatile Middle East/Persian Gulf region, increasing the likelihood and destructiveness of future wars. It can alienate other Islamic nations and segments of the Saudi population which oppose the large foreign contingent that accompanies major U.S. arms sales. It invites larger Soviet arms sales to and Soviet military involvement in South Yemen and the area in general.

Big Commitments

Military sales agreements involve a large and long-term commitment from the United States. Through 1980, the U.S. had signed \$35 Billion in military contracts with Saudi Arabia, but had delivered only \$11 Billion in goods and services. The process of implementing a major arms sale—procurement, construction, training, maintenance,

logistical assistance—can involve a decade or more and thousands of American military and civilian personnel.

There are approximately 40,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia of which about 10,000 are engaged in military-related activities. The military total includes about 1,000 U.S. military persons, 750 Pentagon civilian employees, 1,500 Defense Department dependent children and spouses, plus thousands of private U.S. citizens working on U.S. government and private military contracts.

If Saudi Arabia becomes embroiled in a war or civil disruption, the United States will have to protect its nationals. Experiences in Vietnam and Iran have shown that this is no easy task.

Moreover, there are so many Americans so deeply involved in the operation of the Saudi military that the danger of their becoming directly involved in combat is great. Americans perform such vital functions as operation of communications and logistics systems, radar tracking and electronic intelligence monitoring.

The United States must also consider the possible loss of U.S. technological advantages and military secrets—such as those embodied in the AWACS aircraft—in the event of another Middle East war or the overthrow of the present Saudi government.

Americans should not forget the loss in Iran of very sensitive U.S. listening and monitoring posts, and of secret F-14 fighter aircraft and Phoenix missile technology.

Militarization of Saudi Arabia

There is also the danger of some Saudi Arabian leader using America's latest weapons and technology in a fashion antagonistic to the U.S., such as an attack against Israel or against a popular domestic movement.

The "arms for oil" deal has already led Saudi Arabia to become overly militarized with too sophisticated weapons. *Saudi Arabia spends more on defense per citizen than any other nation—\$2,500 each in 1980. That is twice Israel's per capita military expenditure and nearly four times that of the United States.*

Saudi Arabia's Climb Up the Military Spending Ladder

Year	Rank in World Military Expenditures	\$ Billions
1970	#35	\$.4
1972	#23	\$.9
1974	#19	\$ 1.8
1976	# 8	\$ 9.0
1978	# 7	\$13.2
1980	# 6	\$20.7

Source: IISS

Chart prepared by the Center for Defense Information.

Saudi Arabia's 1980 military budget of \$20.7 Billion was the sixth largest in the world, slightly bigger than France's and roughly equal to the combined military spending of the rest of the nations of the Middle East/Persian Gulf. The Saudi military budget increased 46% in 1980 and takes up about one-quarter of the country's oil-fed gross national product.

The American military programs, by creating an excessive military establishment and foreign presence in Saudi Arabia, may have the opposite effect of enhancing stability. Given the vastly different social, cultural and political environment in Saudi Arabia, huge new American military programs might stimulate political upheaval.

Many of the problems which led to the downfall of the Shah of Iran exist in Saudi Arabia. A secret CIA report leaked to the press warns that the Royal Family is in danger of losing control within the next few years. As in Iran, there is a dissatisfaction with too much westernization, corruption and militarism. As in all nations of the Gulf, there are strains of modernization versus tradition.

Too rapid modernization of traditional societies, such as in Iran and Saudi Arabia, can produce a backlash that could topple the government and radically change the orientation of the policies of such countries. The Islamic counter-revolution in the entire Persian Gulf area is a force that U.S. and Saudi policy must reckon with or recent history may well repeat itself in Saudi Arabia.

Perhaps the gravest danger to the Saudi Royal Family, however, is the Saudi military, particularly the officers ranks of the regular armed forces. There have been eleven coup attempts and five mass defections from the armed forces reported by outside sources since 1977.

Many of the Saudi officers are American-trained and -educated. They are unhappy with Royal Family control and with the rivalry with the National Guard. They tend to push for a faster pace of modernization. It is ironic that the U.S. may be equipping and training the force that may eventually overthrow the House of Saud. A new military regime might be receptive to the United States, but military control may be just the thing that would spark an Iran-type revolution in Saudi Arabia.

U.S. Military Intervention in Saudi Arabia

Will the U.S. Go to War for Saudi Arabia?

The United States does not have a security treaty with Saudi Arabia. The U.S. is in no way legally bound to fight for Saudi Arabia. American officials rarely comment for-the-record on American commitment to the defense of Saudi Arabia.

Yet the level of U.S. involvement in the military affairs of Saudi Arabia indicates that Saudi Arabia is de facto one of America's closest allies. It seems certain that the United States would go to war to protect Saudi oil, and possible that the U.S. would fight to preserve the political power of the Royal Family.

Will the U.S. Go to War for Saudi Arabia?

"Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

President Jimmy Carter
January 1979

Congressman Hamilton: "Is the U.S. prepared to go to war to protect Saudi oil?"

Secretary Crawford: "We regard the maintenance of the integrity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as vital to American interests in the Middle East, and we should be prepared to act in implementation of that consideration."

Congressman Lee Hamilton and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State William Crawford
March 1979

"For the defense of Saudi Arabia we will do anything."

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
July 1980

"That area, Southwest Asia and the Gulf, is and will be the fulcrum of contention for the foreseeable future. Our vital interests are involved there, as are of course the vital interests of our allies and of the independent nations of the region, and we will confront by military force, if necessary, any Soviet or Soviet-inspired threat to those combined interests."

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
March 1981

In recent years and months, the American military commitment to Saudi Arabia has grown stronger. The Carter Doctrine, enunciated in January 1979, was a clear statement of U.S. willingness to use military force to protect oil supplies in the Persian Gulf region.

American military initiatives have further indicated U.S. intention to use force if challenged in the area:

- the continuous stationing of about 30 ships in the Indian Ocean, including two aircraft carriers,
- the decision to create a separate and independent command for operating forces in the Persian Gulf,
- plans for establishing a permanent fleet in the Indian Ocean,
- the search for numerous military bases in the area,
- the prepositioning of weapons and supplies in the Indian Ocean on board special warehouse ships,
- naval exercises carried out in the Indian Ocean with Western allies,
- ground force exercises conducted in Egypt with Egyptian troops,
- the myriad of activities associated with the establishment and equipping of the Rapid Deployment Force.

Closer Military Ties

Saudi-American military relations have taken on a new dimension since the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran conflict. To an extent never before seen, the U.S. has assumed direct military responsibility for Saudi Arabia.

At the end of September 1980 the United States dispatched a guided missile cruiser to Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia's main oil port, and sent four of the U.S.'s 23 AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia along with a ground radar station and crew, and an Air Force communications unit. Additionally, a top Pentagon air defense specialist was sent to examine Saudi air defenses and to coordinate the operation of the U.S. units with Saudi radar, communications, and air defense units. American officials even expressed willingness to send U.S.-manned F-15s if Saudi oil fields were threatened. The number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia nearly doubled.

The deployments are a big step toward injecting U.S. military power into local and regional conflicts to ostensibly protect the flow of oil. If the Iraq-Iran war should spill over into Saudi Arabia the U.S. military would probably be intimately involved in Saudi combat operations.

War for Oil

If the United States does go to war in the Middle East region, Saudi Arabia is a likely battlefield. Saudi Arabia's size, location, economic and political importance, and high level of military involvement with the U.S. all contribute to such a likelihood.

There are several circumstances under which Saudi Arabia might ask for American military combat assistance. The most commonly cited circumstance, a direct Soviet invasion, is not probable. The Soviets would be undertaking a military operation many times more difficult than their invasion of Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia is over three and one-half times the size of Afghanistan, is better armed and is more difficult to get to. Further, the negative political and economic repercussions would be enormous. Most importantly, such an attack would risk war with the U.S. with a chance of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.

Assault by another Gulf state is more likely. Twice in the past four years, the United States has rushed military equipment and deployed naval forces in the area to assist Saudi-backed North Yemen in conflicts with Soviet-backed South Yemen. The next time the proxy war could perhaps expand into direct superpower military conflict.

Internal upheaval in Saudi Arabia may be the most probable scenario in which the Saudi leadership would ask for U.S. combat assistance, but it is the mission for which American forces are least suited. U.S. intervention might prove more disruptive than stabilizing by further inciting Saudi dissidents against the Royal Family. There is little the use of American military force can do to protect Saudi Arabia from internal threats.

The U.S. might decide to unilaterally seize Saudi oil fields. Such a seizure could be the result of a Saudi oil embargo, a serious break in Saudi-American foreign relations, or American perceptions that the Royal Family was

losing control or could no longer guarantee oil delivery.

Such a U.S. military action would probably be futile and counter-productive. There is no way to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil from Saudi Arabia to the United States.*

The United States could muster the military power to seize Saudi oil fields, but it would be very difficult to take the oil fields intact. The Saudis have stated that they would destroy their oil facilities before surrendering to an invading power. It would be hard to maintain the security of the fragile system of wells, pipelines, pumping stations, refineries, and tankers for an extended period of time in a hostile country.

It would take an enormous effort and more manpower and special materials than the U.S. currently has available to maintain a significant level of oil production without local assistance. The logistics pipeline required to keep such an operation going would be huge and costs would negate the oil benefits derived.

U.S. Military Bases in Saudi Arabia

While the Carter Administration repeatedly emphasized that the U.S. only wanted "access to military facilities" in the Persian Gulf region, Secretary of Defense Weinberger has made clear that the U.S. now is seeking permanent military bases.

Saudi Arabia is considered the most desirable spot for American military bases. Saudi military facilities are built to U.S. specifications and designed to accommodate American weapons, which comprise about three-quarters of the Saudi stockpile.

The Saudis, however, have rejected American advances, fearful of a negative reaction from both at home and from neighboring Arab states. The new Administration apparently hopes that by providing the Saudis with any military equipment they desire—particularly the F-15 package—the Saudis will relent.

If the United States had permanent military bases and large military forces stationed in Saudi Arabia, America would be more likely to become involved needlessly and rashly in regional conflicts.

Permanent U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia could have led to an expansion of or more direct U.S. participation in the Yemen conflict in 1979, the current Iraq-Iran war or any future conflicts in the area.

The United States would be in an awkward position if another Arab-Israeli war was to break out. The Saudis have participated on a limited scale in previous wars against Israel. The experience of the Soviet Union with Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-78 shows that instead of being able to manage a conflict between two "client states," the superpower is more likely to be forced to make a choice. Indeed, a retaliatory or pre-emptive strike in Saudi Arabia by Israel would probably involve American casualties.

*For a detailed description of U.S. military capabilities in the Middle East, see "The Oil Crisis: Is There a Military Option?", *Defense Monitor*, December 1979.

The United States is already establishing an extensive network of military facilities to which it could have access in the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. has obtained permission to use, and is starting construction at, some 18 different air and naval facilities in Egypt, Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is, in effect, an operational U.S. Navy base capable of receiving an entire navy carrier battle group, of landing KC-135 tankers, and soon will be able to handle B-52s.

Reagan appointees seem to believe that "more is better." There are serious drawbacks to such thinking. Any increase in military capability associated with a much larger and much more visible American military presence is likely to be offset by a political backlash and loss of U.S. political influence in the region.

Permanent U.S. bases would be a dangerous and provocative initiative. The more bases the U.S. establishes, the more the Soviets are going to be drawn into the region.

With or without a permanent U.S. military presence, the Soviet Union *would* be able to disrupt the oil flow (at the risk of disastrous war with the West and severe consequences for its own economy) and *would not* be able to seize, maintain, and operate the oil fields for their own benefit.

The U.S. is putting itself in a position where it is going to be devoting large resources to protecting its base structure itself and not protecting oil supplies or stopping Soviet aggression.

The Saudi Military

Saudi Arabia is neither willing nor able to be the military protector of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. Given the huge sums of money Saudi Arabia has spent on its military in the past decade, the relatively modest size of its weapons arsenal is surprising. The reason is that most of the funds have not gone to weapons acquisition. Since 1973, Saudi Arabia has devoted approximately 50% of its military budget to construction, 30% to training and 20% to hardware.

There are two notable aspects to the Saudi military. First is the structural separation of the 47,000-man regular armed forces and the 20,000-man National Guard. The two forces have separate missions, training, logistics, funding, and chain of command. Indeed, they are rival forces run by rival princes competing for the most modern American equipment.

Second is the degree to which the Saudi military is dominated by foreign specialists. There are about 30,000 foreigners involved in the daily training, maintenance and operation of the Saudi military. That is nearly one foreigner for every two members of the Saudi forces. There are reports that two Pakistani divisions (20,000 troops) will either be sent to Saudi Arabia to bolster Saudi troops or will be stationed in Pakistan as a mercenary rapid deployment unit.

The large number of foreigners reflects the main prob-

lem with the Saudi military: lack of trained manpower. Recruitment is difficult because the Saudis have such a small, unskilled labor force from which to draw. The competition for personnel from other sectors of the economy is strong. It will be many years before Saudi Arabia has the military people with the technical proficiency to use and maintain all of the large number of advanced weapons the U.S. and others are supplying.

Given Saudi technical deficiencies, why rush into Billions of dollars of new projects instead of moving at a pace consistent with Saudi absorption capacity? Saudi Arabia should continue its past tradition of relying on diplomacy and economic aid to provide for its security, not further military buildup.

Our Close Ally?

The United States and Saudi Arabia are experiencing increasing frictions in their relations. This is in part due to Saudi efforts to exert leadership in the Arab world. The Saudis perceive that this task requires that they put distance between themselves and the United States, just as Iraq sees that an increased regional role for itself requires greater independence from the Soviet Union.

The Saudis are trying to create a more unified Moslem front, sometimes at the expense of relations with the U.S. At the Islamic Conference in Saudi Arabia in January 1981, Saudi King Khalid declared, "Our loyalties must be neither to an Eastern Bloc nor to a Western Bloc."

The F-15 package has been a particular sore spot, with the Saudis claiming the sale is a test of the entire Saudi-American relationship. Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Faisal Alhagelan has threatened, "If our request will not be responded to positively, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would consider all other possible sources to obtain the necessary means to defend itself. Nobody has a monopoly on relations and friendship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." The Reagan Administration has apparently listened closely and is determined to take and pass the test.

Saudi Arabia vs. Israel

Israeli-American relations have always been at the heart of U.S.-Saudi frictions. At the Islamic Conference, Saudi Arabia created an uproar in the U.S. by declaring that the Arabs must deal with Israeli aggression by any means available, including military force, and calling for a "jihad" or holy war against Israel. Any military equipment sold by the U.S. has a stipulation by law that it will not be used against the U.S. or its allies. Yet, Saudi Arabia will not promise such limits.

Saudi Arabia continues to take a leadership role in opposing the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are at loggerheads over the issues of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian autonomy and the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.). Saudi Arabia is a major source of funds for the P.L.O.

Russians and Israelis?

"To the Saudis, there are only two threats in this world—international Communism and Israel. The first helps to reinforce our friendship with America, while the second is a threat to that friendship.

"The second is far more tangible and more in evidence than the first, and an actual danger is obviously worse than a potential danger.

"The more support the U.S. gives to Israel the better is the climate for the Russians in the region. Israel is the opening through which the Russians slip into the Arab world."

Sheik Ahmed Yamani
Saudi Minister of
Petroleum
April 1981

deployment forces and search for military bases throughout the region. They appear to believe that they can rely primarily on traditional economic and trade incentives to keep the oil flowing. The U.S. should learn a lesson from West Germany which announced in early May 1981 that it would not waive its ten-year old ban on arms sales to areas of international tension and refused to grant Saudi requests for tanks, missiles and other weapons.

A study by the Solar Energy Research Institute, carried out at the request of President Carter's Deputy Energy Secretary, states that *the United States could virtually eliminate the need to import oil by the end of the century by making heavy investments in energy efficiency and the use of renewable resources.* This may be a better long-term alternative for the U.S. to pursue than an expensive military buildup.

Alternatives to Oil Dependence

"Investments that increase the efficiency of energy use, and investments that harness renewable sources of energy, are among the soundest investments America can make over the next twenty years. It is possible to construct a plausible, practical and economically attractive sequence of events that would allow the productivity of the average American worker to increase ... while reducing national consumption of energy by nearly 25 percent. Oil imports might be virtually eliminated."

From "Building a
Sustainable Future"
Solar Energy Research Inst.
April 1981

An Indispensable Friend?

Many Americans feel that Saudi Arabia is an indispensable economic ally. Yet, there is no compelling reason to believe that Saudi Arabia would drastically cut its oil supplies or drastically raise its oil prices just because the U.S. altered its arms transfer policies. The U.S. would probably only face severe changes in Saudi oil policy if the U.S. completely cut off all military goods and services to Saudi Arabia, including spare parts.

Saudi Arabia has reasons to be "moderate" which have nothing to do with friendship with the U.S. or the level of U.S. arms sales. As the largest oil producer, Saudi Arabia wants to ensure that prices rise no higher than the level consistent with high demand. The Saudis want to sell the maximum amount of oil at the highest price without encouraging the West to develop alternative energy sources too quickly.

Saudi Arabia is the key to the OPEC oil cartel. As the key member it keeps millions of barrels of oil from the world market and makes Billions of dollars more than if a free market situation existed. There is nothing wrong with Saudi Arabia acting in its own perceived best interest, but it should be realized that the Saudis are not just doing the Western nations a favor.

Moreover, Saudi oil is not vital to the United States. It would be inconvenient but we could survive without it. In recent testimony before Congress, Lt. General P.X. Kelley (Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force) stated, "Since the United States imports roughly 13% of its oil requirements from the Persian Gulf states, there is little doubt that if forced to do so we could find alternatives." There is no reason for the U.S. to subordinate its interests to those of Saudi Arabia.

General Kelly also noted that the West Europeans and Japanese *would* have trouble finding alternatives if oil deliveries were cut off. The Europeans and Japanese are not so worried, however, about the safety of their oil supplies that they find it necessary to establish rapid

Fighting for the American Way?

If American soldiers do become involved in combat on Saudi Arabia's behalf, they will not be "fighting to make the world safe for democracy." Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. There is no constitution, no legislature, no political parties, no political organizations, no suffrage or public voice in the selection of leaders. Direct criticism in the press of the principles of government, the Saudi leadership or its authority is not allowed.

Most Americans in Saudi Arabia reside in isolated compounds where they can live in more familiar conditions. In Saudi Arabia, possession of or drinking liquor is prohibited. There are bans on bicycles and radios. Marrying a foreigner without the permission of the Saudi government makes a Saudi woman an adulteress, punishable by death. A Saudi who renounces the Islamic faith can be put to death.

The United States should respect the social and cultural practices of other nations and not try to impose its own values on others, but the U.S. should also be hesitant to tie itself too closely to regimes which actively suppress traditional American ideals.

Conclusions

- The United States should undertake a serious review of its military relationship with Saudi Arabia. The U.S. should rely far more on diplomatic and economic initiatives, not such a purely military response to the complex and explosive problems of the Middle East/Persian Gulf region.

- In U.S.-Saudi relations, the primary trade has been "arms for oil." However, alternative U.S. energy policies could significantly diminish American imports of Saudi oil, and at less risk to American lives.

- The U.S. should temporarily suspend *major new* weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. With \$14 Billion of military goods and services still in the pipeline and Saudi technical skills at such a low level, there is no need to rush into new orders. In the future, the U.S. should cut back military sales to a level more consistent with Saudi absorption capacity.

- It would not be in the interest of the U.S. to sell AWACS aircraft, aerial refueling aircraft, advanced air-to-air missiles, and fuel tanks to Saudi Arabia. None of the items, especially the AWACS planes, are essential to the Saudi military.

- The U.S. should postpone any new Army Corps of Engineers projects in Saudi Arabia until after an intensive Congressional investigation and debate of past, present and future Corps activities and their implications for American foreign policy.

- The U.S. government should impose tighter restraints on the type of activities that U.S. government and private persons perform for foreign military forces.

- The U.S. should not seek permanent American military bases in Saudi Arabia. Such bases could engender hostility from most of the Arab world toward both the United States and Saudi Arabia, could increase the risk of direct U.S. involvement in regional conflicts, and could spur expanded, more permanent Soviet military involvement in the area.

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date August 28, 1981
to Bert Gold
from Judith H. Banki
subject Christian Allies on AWACs Issue

JHB/mr

You asked for suggested names of firm and/or potential Christian allies who might participate in or lend their names to a non-sectarian committee against the AWACs sale. The most obvious that come to mind are:

Dr. A. Roy Eckardt
College of Arts and Science
Dept. of Religion
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, PA 18015

Dr. Franklin H. Littell
Temple University
Dept. of Religion
Philadelphia, PA 19122

Dr. Arnold T. Olson
6126 Park Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55417

Bishop John Spong
Episcopal Diocese of Newark
24 Rector Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102

There is little doubt we could get Fr. Flannery, Msgr. Oesterreicher, Sister Rose Thering, and the Rev. Isaac Rottenberg, but they may be too publicly identified with Israel.

Needless to say, names like Bishop Paul Moore and Fr. Ted Hesburgh would carry a great deal of weight, but check with Marc as to where they stand on this issue. Check with Jim Rudin about Fr. Bob Drinan and Sr. Ann Gillen. Inge may be able to provide the names of some Christian women leaders.

JHB:mr

cc
✓ M.H. Tanenbaum

MEMORANDUM

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date August 20, 1981
to Area Directors
from Sonya F. Kaufer
subject Op-ed

The State Department is scheduled to submit the AWACS proposal to Congress Monday August 24th, which means the next few weeks will see a lot of discussion of the subject.

Please put the attached op-ed to good use as quickly as possible.

Thanks,

sfk/dr
81-965-13
att.

Sonya Kaufer

CONGRESS SHOULD REJECT THE AWACS SALE

The State Department has submitted to Congress a proposal to sell AWACS and other sophisticated weaponry to Saudi Arabia. More than 55 Senators and 248 Representatives -- a majority in each House -- have indicated their opposition to the sale.

The objections are based on the following facts:

-- AWACS, the sophisticated Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft, incorporate several top-secret American electronic and other devices. The Saudis' ability to protect military secrets is notoriously poor. Giving vital equipment to that feudal regime risks having our secrets fall into enemy hands.

-- The U.S. already deploys AWACS in defense of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf oil lanes, but in such use the weapons remain under American control.

-- The Saudis make no secret of their continued hostility to Israel. Given the AWACS' capability to spot planes 400 miles away and track ground troop movements within a 300-mile radius, putting the weapon in Saudi hands would seriously jeopardize Israel's security.

-- Saudi Arabia has made the sale of this advanced weaponry to them a "test" of American friendship, and threatens to seek arms from other countries, including the Soviet Union, if the sale falls through. Submission to such political and economic blackmail by the Saudis could set a dangerous precedent for American policy making.

The AWACS sale is not in America's best interest. It should not be approved.

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August 25, 1981

CABLES: ZIONISTS, NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

TO: ZOA Leaders

SUBJECT: SAUDI UPDATE

In a startling press release in the New York Times, Sunday, August 23, 1981, the following was stated in the lead paragraph:

"If the United States sells 5 advanced radar monitoring planes to Saudi Arabia, it will have no power to prevent them from being used against Israel, American officials say. According to the officials, the plan put forward by President Reagan to sell AWACS, would give the United States no explicit or inherent legal control over their use."

This latest development should give all those who have questioned the Administration's decision to sell Saudi Arabia a sophisticated arms package, new reason to express their opposition and to urge others to do so.

The full report is reproduced on the reverse side of this letter. After you read it, we urge that you do the following:

1. Members of Congress who have indicated their opposition to the Saudi sale must be told that you support their position and that you urge them to remain firm in the face of forthcoming Administration pressures. Do not take for granted Israel's best friends. They all need to hear from you with encouraging words. Unless they remain firm, there is no chance of defeating the proposed sale. Your expressions now must be voiced.
2. Members of Congress who have not made up their minds -- or in fact, have even indicated they may support the Administration -- require a very special effort on your part. The influence of home-town constituents cannot be underestimated. But unless they hear from the citizens who elect them to office, they will not resist the influences from the White House.

There has been a flurry of statements from various Administration officials boasting that there is no chance to defeat the sale. We believe this to be wishful thinking. This is part of political psychology and while we know that the battle will be difficult, in our view the Administration has a long way to go before it can claim victory. How you react -- and act -- will make the difference

Cordially yours,

Paul Flacks
National Executive Director

PF:pb

082581

(SEE OTHER SIDE)

U.S. AIDES CONCEDE SAUDIS BAR LIMITS ON USE OF AWACS

But Officials Deny Radar Jets Would Represent a Serious Peril to Israeli Security

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 — If the United States sells five advanced radar monitoring planes to Saudi Arabia, it will have no power to prevent them from being used against Israel, American officials say.

According to the officials, the plan put forward by President Reagan to sell the Airborne Warning and Control System planes, known as Awacs, would give the United States no explicit or inherent legal control over their use. Nor has the Saudi Government agreed to restrictions on the use of those planes or of the high-performance fighters that are also being sold to the Saudis, the officials say.

They contend, however, that a possible threat to Israel would not be significant and that the Americans would "assert a high degree of control" because of the need for maintenance and technical support that they are expected to furnish for many years.

Controversy Appears Enhanced

These factors are likely to increase the level of controversy when Congress begins debate next month on the \$8.5 billion military equipment sale proposed by the Reagan Administration.

Although a small majority of senators and representatives of both parties have signed letters opposing the Saudi sale, qualified Congressional sources believe that some will yield to pressure from Mr. Reagan. The outcome is therefore difficult to predict.

The President demonstrated impressive mastery earlier this year in dealing with Congress on tax legislation and the budget. He will now face a potentially serious challenge to his prestige and authority in trying to shepherd the Saudi arms package through the complex process of Congressional review.

The United States Government is also poised at what might be the start of a new approach toward a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia. Under a law enacted in 1974, Congress has the power

to veto the Saudi arms sale. President Reagan will give written notification of the sale on Monday. On Sept. 9, when Congress returns from a recess, a 20-day period of what is called informal notification will begin. This will be followed by a formal 30-day period of review. If both houses of Congress adopt a concurrent resolution of disapproval before the 30-day period elapses, the sale cannot be carried out.

White House officials say their tactics will be to seek a defeat of the resolution in the Republican-controlled Senate, thus rendering the issue moot in the Democratic-controlled House.

The issue has raised several questions. Some people, notably Adm. Stansfield Turner, former Director of Central Intelligence, have expressed concern that the secret military technology in the radar planes and other equipment might fall into the hands of the Soviet Union if a revolution were to overturn the Saudi Government. It has also been argued that the very magnitude of the military sales might help generate political unrest.

Four U.S. Planes Used Since 1969

A Defense Department official said last week that the Congressional debate might in the end be decided not on the question of whether the planes threatened Israel, but on the broader political question of how damaging a failure to support the President might be.

The official said United States influence in Saudi Arabia would be greatly reduced by a Congressional veto. The sale is also regarded by the Administration as a substitute for a more formal military relationship that the Saudis, at least for now, will not permit.

American officials who advocate the sale deny that it poses a serious threat to Israel. It is now clear, however, that the Administration cannot offer Israel or its supporters guarantees on that score.

"We will not exercise operational control or command," a senior official said with regard to the radar planes.

Nor, contrary to the implications of some statements made last spring, will United States personnel necessarily be involved in operational flights after a brief training period. The radar planes, which are modified Boeing 707's, require a flight crew of 4, and 13 technicians to service the electronic equipment.

No Problem in Training Crews

American officials say that the Saudis will have no difficulty in providing flight crews and that the first electronic crews will also be trained by the time the planes begin to arrive in Saudi Arabia in 1985.

In an attempt to disarm or to silence critics, some American officials seemed to imply last spring that the Saudis could not operate the radar planes without United States permission or support.

Statement Is Now Qualified

Other, more expert, officials have not made such sweeping statements. One said the Saudis could not operate the planes for "a sustained period of time" without American approval.

Israeli officials express doubts that a withdrawal of technical support would promptly ground the planes. In any case, the Israelis contend, Middle East wars tend to be short and the Saudis would have the capacity to harm Israel.

United States officials have also said that it would be "tactically foolish" and even "suicidal" for the Saudis to operate the planes in the northwest, where

they could monitor Israeli activity.

The Israelis respond that it would be difficult for them to shoot down a radar plane even if it were flying relatively close to Israel and that, for a number of reasons, these planes in conjunction with F-15 fighters do present a threat.

One More Credible Air Force

"It does not decisively change the military balance," an Israeli official said, "but it certainly changes the balance because it puts a whole new player on the board, adding one more credible Arab air force where one did not exist before."

In any event, United States officials said the agreement with Saudi Arabia covering the arms transfer contained no explicit Saudi promise not to use the planes against Israel.

"I don't see," said an official, "how they could agree to such a thing because of considerations of dignity and sovereignty."

Last April, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. told leaders of Jewish organizations concerned about the Saudi deal to "keep your powder dry until you see the bottom line."

The complexity of the military, technical and legal questions raised by the proposed arms sale has left the bottom line in less than perfect focus, and the forthcoming debate may consume a great deal of powder.

See other side

The New York Times

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Wednesday, August 19, 1981

No. 159

SAUDIS LAUNCH PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN ON BEHALF OF AWACS

WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 (JTA) -- A 16-page publication, which urges support for Saudi Arabia's request for U.S. AWACS reconnaissance planes on grounds that Israel might bomb Saudi Arabian oil fields to demonstrate its independence of United States aid, has been distributed to capital opinion makers by a Washington lawyer who is counsel to the Saudi Embassy here.

The pamphlet, printed on glossy paper and containing color photographs and maps, was distributed to members of Congress and the press by Frederick Dutton, who served President John Kennedy as a White House aide. His office said 7,500 copies of "Why Saudi Arabia Needs AWACS" have been distributed. Dutton is registered as a Saudi agent in the United States.

The sale of the AWACS and other military equipment to the Saudis has been proposed by the Reagan Administration which has been served notice of opposition by a majority of Senators and Representatives. A majority vote of both Houses is required to block such weapons sales.

The pamphlet cited Israel's June 7 bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor in Baghdad, and noted that an Israeli strike at Saudi oilfields would not involve a much longer flight.

The pamphlet disputed statements by Israeli officials that the AWACS could be used to scan and photograph Israel's defenses on behalf of such Arab enemies as Iraq. The pamphlet contended that the AWACS radar equipment could not take photos, see tanks or other ground targets, detect low-flying planes beyond 200 miles or collect electronic data. The pamphlet said the AWACS' only function would be to detect air or naval attacks on Saudi Arabian oil installations in time for Saudi planes to provide an effective defense.

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Ghost Story

In the end, in the AWACS controversy, the Reagan Administration is asking Congress to approve the sale of five advanced radar planes to Saudi Arabia on the basis of trust.

Trust the Saudis, the Administration says, to honor their reported but still unrevealed agreement not to use the planes in "unauthorized" ways, which means against Israel. Trust that the presence of American aircraft technicians in Saudi Arabia for years to come would insure that the planes wouldn't be used for unintended purposes and wouldn't fall into hostile hands. On acceptance of these articles of faith approval of the AWACS deal depends.

We have no wish to impugn the honor of the Saudis, or to question the sincerity of the Administration, or to cast doubt on the credibility of government-to-government agreements. We support the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 interceptors, ground radar stations and most of the other paraphernalia considered necessary to provide an effective air defense system. But, in the matter of the AWACS, we regard the promises and assurances that have been given with a deep and foreboding sense of skepticism.

Plainly put, the Airborne Warning and Control System planes with all their sensitive and secret equipment are not essential to Saudi Arabia's air defense efforts. Less advanced but still effective airborne radar systems like the Hawkeye, which Israel has and Egypt is soon likely to get, would serve the same purpose. So, for that matter, would the continued operations of U.S.-controlled AWACS planes already in Saudi Arabia. But the Saudis demand control of their own AWACS, and the best that the Administration can do is say, don't worry, these things are so complex that the Saudis will never be able to run them without Americans. That is arrogantly and paternalistically presumptuous. It is probably also quite wrong.

We cannot share the Administration's implicit

confidence that the current Saudi regime will remain either indefinitely in power or undeviatingly friendly to the United States—[considerations that go to the very heart of how secure the AWACS might be or how they would be employed. The future stability of Saudi Arabia is by no means a settled question. Alignments in the Middle East have been known to change overnight. The specter of the late shah is known to haunt the House of Saud. If Washington is awake, it would see that ghost as well.

Finally, we are disturbed by the open disagreement between the U.S. and Saudi governments over the purpose of the proposed arms sales, including AWACS. U.S. officials say the package is to help the Saudis defend themselves against Iran and against Soviet-sponsored threats to their security. Yet, just a few months ago, a high Saudi official again listed Israel as his country's first enemy, and announced that defense of the Islamic holy places had priority in Saudi military planning. Mecca and Medina are a long way from the Persian Gulf, where the AWACS are intended to patrol, and far closer to the Red Sea—and Israel—than they are to the oil fields.

The proposed AWACS sale stands for now as the biggest foreign-policy mistake made by the Reagan Administration. It is a mistake that could easily have been avoided with a polite but firm rejection when the Saudis first demanded the aircraft. Now the Administration is stuck with trying to sell a bad idea to a dubious Congress.

If the sale goes through, the United States is likely to gain little more than a marginal improvement in its relations with Saudi Arabia. If the sale is blocked, this country could face the punitive wrath of the world's biggest oil exporter. That prospect is daunting, but it does not seem to us sufficient reason for Congress to come to the rescue of the Administration by giving endorsement to its blunder.

The New York Times

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The Awacs Deal Is No Bargain

The Reagan Administration, which prides itself on driving hard bargains abroad, has now formally proposed what looks like a sweetheart deal with the Saudis. They would get Awacs radar planes as part of an \$8.5 billion package brimming with the most advanced arms. What would America get in return? On present evidence, too little. It's good that Congress has until Oct. 30 to examine the fine print, for unless Mr. Reagan can make a better case for it, this deal is no bargain.

The deal, to begin with, involves much more than electronic spy planes. The five Awacs planes would complement F-15 fighters America has already agreed to supply. And these would be given extended range and armed with Sidewinder missiles.

All that muscle is relevant to one supposed benefit of the deal: it would deter possible attack on vital Saudi oilfields. By whom? Southern Yemen or Ethiopia, the Administration says. But these backward Soviet clients pose a meager threat indeed, hardly enough to justify selling such advanced arms to one side in the volatile Middle East.

Is there, then, some other security benefit? Well, it is hinted in Washington, Saudi air power could deter a Soviet advance into the Persian Gulf. Yet if there were any such thrust, everyone knows America would respond directly. Besides, the Saudis shrug off the Soviet peril and say they need to deter a quite different adversary — Israel.

There is yet another supposed benefit of the sale: it would ingratiate America with the House of Saud. But why is that necessary? True, the Saudis have been a restraining force within OPEC — but that suits their own interests. Their moderation has already been rewarded with the flock of F-15's. If Con-

gress vetoes the new arms deal, would the Saudis turn to the godless East for their defense needs? Not even the Administration claims that.

For this tricky arms deal to become attractive, more is required from the Saudis. If they are to get the most advanced weapons system, they should also be active peacemaking partners in the Middle East. The prize sought by successive Administrations is open acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist. Yet even now, the Saudis' Prince Fahd outlines a "peace" plan that again asks the impossible and again scorns the attainable, a compromise settlement rooted in the Camp David accords.

That may be double talk meant to mollify Arab radicals. The Saudis did, after all, work quietly with the United States and Israel in bringing about a cease-fire in Lebanon. Still, Israelis can be excused for fearing otherwise should the Saudis acquire a real offensive capacity.

Could American weapons be used against Israel? The Administration has not yet showed this to be impossible. It says no, but knows perfectly well that arms sale promises can be as insubstantial as the rings of Saturn. Israel, too, was bound by a weapons pledge — and yet loosed American-built planes on Baghdad and Beirut.

For that matter, how much are American promises worth? Just three years ago, Congress approved selling 62 F-15's to Saudi Arabia on the express condition that their offensive range would not be extended. Now the Administration wants to untie that string.

Neither Ronald Reagan nor Jimmy Carter have seriously pressed for Saudi concessions when their leverage was strongest — before delivering sophisticated weapons. Until and unless it is shown that the new Saudi package really is a bargain, Congress ought to say no.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date August 27, 1981
to Marc H. Tanenbaum
from Judith H. Banki
subject Below

JH/mr

As you requested, here is the gist of the meeting held with Bert Gold and department heads this afternoon to coordinate AJC action re: the sale of AWACs to Saudi Arabia.

Bert began by giving some of the overall political considerations, noting that efforts should be concentrated on the Senate, since if the Senate disapproves, there is more likelihood the House will disapprove. He said "word has been received sharply and clearly" that there will be "serious consequences" if Israel pushes and wins on this issue; the administration perceives that presidential prestige is at stake. However, Israel has not altered its firm opposition, and there is no sign of a compromise at present. Bert said we had "gone too far to back off," and must oppose the AWACs deal. There was some further discussion of strategy, including the agreement that our approach should be to weaken the myth of Saudi "moderation" and their image as friends or allies. Harold Applebaum then called upon the various departmental representatives for names of people who could be helpful as opinion-molders, or who could stimulate letter writing.

There were really two kinds of names being looked for: (1) people who were themselves influential but who, for obvious reasons, would not fit into a larger coalition; (2) well-known allies who would participate in or lend their names to a non-sectarian committee against the AWACs sale which Bert says someone is putting together in Washington. Bert requested that a list of potential names for the latter category be on his desk by Monday.

I replied that you could probably get through to Falwell and people such as Ken Kantzer in the first category, and, as you can see from the attached memo, I suggested the names of some longstanding friends for the second category.

I doubt if we shall get much support from the liberal Protestants on this issue, because, although they should be opposed to the spread of military technology on classic liberal grounds, I think the anti-Israel bias is too strong among segments of that community. However, I have suggested some possible names, with the caveat that they be checked with you or Jim before being approached.

Please check over the memo to Bert and add other suggestions you may have.

JHB:mr

- Enc. - cc: I. Gibel, J. Rudin, Z. Shuster

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
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Portland, Oregon 97205
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Date 8/21/81

To: Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum

From: Laurie Rogoway

XX For your information

 Please talk to me about
this

 Returned as requested

 Your comments, please

 Per your request

REMARKS:

Belatedly, but better late
than never.

N. Y. rabbi defends Israeli raid as an act of self-preservation

By LEWIS H. ARENDS JR.

Statesman-Journal Reporter

PORTLAND — A New York rabbi defended the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear power plant at a Portland audience Friday.

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, director of interreligious affairs for the American Jewish Committee, spoke to about 200 people attending a luncheon of the City Club of Portland in the Benson Hotel.

He said it was impossible for Jews, who had faced extinction with the Nazi Holocaust, to wait while a stated enemy built a nuclear bomb to be dropped on Israel.

It was common knowledge, Tanenbaum added, that Iraqi leaders had been spreading word in the Arab world that the "peaceful" plant included technology to build a bomb. The bomb would be used to destroy Israel, the rabbi said the leaders had stressed.

He said such a weapon would destroy about a third of



RABBI TANENBAUM

the country's 3 million residents. To allow that threat was "intolerable to Jewish consciousness," he said.

To a question as to why Israel did not try diplomatic means, he said it had "sent dozens of missions" over the past two years asking France not to send enriched uranium to Iraq. France went ahead with shipment because it was guaranteed an uninterrupted petroleum supply in return, Tanenbaum said.

IN POINTING to the military precision which limited loss of life and made the raid before radioactive material was in place, he joked that the United States "should have rented an Israeli general for the push into Iran." He said the captives would not have spent 444 days in Iran in that case.

The rabbi's main talk dealt with the freedom of the United States and the refugee problem around the world. He said only 19 nations still "uphold civil and political human rights.

"We take for granted this liberty at our peril," he said. Of the 16 million refugees around the globe, he said up to three-fourths of them would be delighted to come to this country. "That is what the U.S. means to the world," he said.

THE RABBI HAS been consultant to the U.S. government in such diverse areas as youth and the aging. He also has made four trips to Southeast Asia on behalf of the International Rescue Commission.

He told of a 1978 visit to a Thailand camp that had been a former political prison.

"There were 980 people packed in there. There were small cells where six or seven people slept on mats on the floor."

The only art or decoration he saw in the camp was a charcoal drawing of the Statue of Liberty on a brick wall.

"WITH ALL THE imperfections, this remains the greatest nation," he said.

He condemned the "self flagellation, dumping on self" which has led to "deep moral depression" in this country. "It (the United States) is a bastion, the last best hope of democracy and liberty in the world."

The strength of the nation owes much to the ethnic and religious plurality, he said. He told of an incident during another trip to Southeast Asia as an example of society with no concepts of human rights.

A BOATLOAD OF 250 ethnic Chinese had been traveling for five or six weeks from Vietnam, he said. When they attempted to land in a Malaysian area that is predominantly Muslim, they were attacked by villagers shouting "infidels, heretics, pig eaters" and their boat shoved back, he said.

The boat struck a reef and split open. Tanenbaum and a United Nations official with him were able to rescue only 12 or 15 of the people from drowning.

"You have no right in God's name to destroy human life because they don't share your view of truth," Tanenbaum said.

"EVERY LIFE is of infinite preciousness. My conviction is that we are here as brothers and sisters in God's human family. We are here to love and care, to be present in the hurts and to celebrate the joys."

Tanenbaum is in Portland for a series of meetings with the Christian and Jewish communities. He will speak at 11 a.m. Sunday baccalaureate at Lewis & Clark College.

NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, August 24 ... The American Jewish Committee today called upon both Houses of Congress to disapprove the proposed sale of AWACS and other sophisticated weapons to Saudi Arabia, as proposed this morning by the State Department.

Bertram H. Gold, Executive Vice President of the human relations agency, pointed out that more than 55 Senators and 248 Representatives -- a majority in each House -- already had indicated opposition to the sale. Mr. Gold cited these reasons for such opposition:

-- AWACS, the sophisticated Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft, incorporate several top-secret American electronic and other devices. The Saudis' ability to protect military secrets is notoriously poor. Giving vital equipment to that feudal regime risks having our secrets fall into enemy hands.

-- The U. S. already deploys AWACS in defense of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf oil lanes, but in such use the weapons remain entirely under American control.

-- The Saudis make no secret of their continued hostility to Israel. Given the AWACS' capability to spot planes 400 miles away and track ground troop movements within a 300-mile radius, putting the weapon in Saudi hands would seriously jeopardize Israel's security.

-- Saudi Arabia has made the sale of this advanced weaponry to them a "test" of American friendship, and threatens to seek arms from other countries, including the Soviet Union, if the sale falls through. Submission to such political and economic blackmail by the Saudis could set a dangerous precedent for American policy making.

Founded in 1906, the American Jewish Committee is this country's pioneer human relations organization. It combats bigotry, protects the civil and religious rights of Jews at home and abroad and seeks improved human relations for all people everywhere.

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Maynard I. Wishner, President; Howard I. Friedman, Chairman, Board of Governors; Theodore Ellenoff, Chairman, National Executive Council; Robert L. Pelz, Chairman, Board of Trustees.

Bertram H. Gold, Executive Vice President

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CSAE 1707

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date August 28, 1981
to Bert Gold
from Judith H. Banki
subject Christian Allies on AWACs Issue

JHB/mr

You asked for suggested names of firm and/or potential Christian allies who might participate in or lend their names to a non-sectarian committee against the AWACs sale. The most obvious that come to mind are:

Dr. A. Roy Eckardt
College of Arts and Science
Dept. of Religion
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, PA 18015

Dr. Franklin H. Littell
Temple University
Dept. of Religion
Philadelphia, PA 19122

Dr. Arnold T. Olson
6126 Park Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55417

Bishop John Spong
Episcopal Diocese of Newark
24 Rector Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102

There is little doubt we could get Fr. Flannery, Msgr. Oesterreicher, Sister Rose Thering, and the Rev. Isaac Rottenberg, but they may be too publicly identified with Israel.

Needless to say, names like Bishop Paul Moore and Fr. Ted Hesburgh would carry a great deal of weight, but check with Marc as to where they stand on this issue. Check with Jim Rudin about Fr. Bob Drinan and Sr. Ann Gillen. Inge may be able to provide the names of some Christian women leaders.

JHB:mr

cc
M.H. Tanenbaum

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Washington, D.C.

30 June 1981

Read Admiral Gene R. La Rocque
Center for Defense Information
122 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Dear Admiral,

Thank you for the copy of the "Defense Monitor"
which I found very interesting, and - of course -
helpful.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Ephraim Evron
Ambassador

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

July 15, 1981

Dear Friends:

We thought you would be interested in the enclosed study "The U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia: Investing in Stability or Disaster," prepared by the Center for Defense Information. We think you will agree that it is a remarkably comprehensive examination of the U.S.-Saudi military relationship and makes a compelling case that the proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of A-7 aircraft, tankers for aerial refueling and additional lethal equipment for F-15 fighter-bombers is not in the interest of the United States or of peace in the Middle East.

If you would like additional copies of this issue of the Defense Monitor for your membership, you may obtain them directly from C.D.I., which is located at 122 Maryland Avenue N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

C.D.I. is a non-partisan, public interest research organization with a staff of military experts headed by Rear Admiral (rtd.) Gene LaRocque.

Sincerely,

Rep. Jonathan Bingham Rep. Stephen Solarz Rep. Ben Rosenthal