



THE JACOB RADER MARCUS CENTER OF THE
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Preserving American Jewish History

MS-603: Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum Collection, 1945-1992.

Series D: International Relations Activities. 1961-1992

Box 54, Folder 6, American-Israeli relations/Middle East, 1981-1984.



*mgue
Tanenbaum*



TUFTS UNIVERSITY
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Administered with the cooperation of Harvard University

Dear Colleague:

As per Prof. Ra'anan's request, please substitute the attached modifications for the indicated sections in the summary of the Middle East consultation previously sent to you.

January 4, 1983

Sincerely,
George

Dr. George E. Gruen
Institute of Human Relations
165 56th Street
New York, NY 10022

Dear George:

Following our two lengthy telephone conversations, yesterday and today, I am summarizing their contents:

- (1) We were able to elucidate the factors responsible for the misunderstanding concerning distribution of a "Summary" (under your covering letter of December 20), which reached me yesterday;
- (2) We agreed that, under the circumstances, the appropriate action is for you to send all the recipients of that "Summary" of Discussion of November 11, a corrected copy of the gist of my remarks, to ensure that my views are reflected as precisely as possible, together with a copy of this covering letter;
- (3) I am, therefore, enclosing corrected copy to replace pp. 18, 19, 20 (top 2 lines), 30, and 31 (top 8 lines) of your "Summary."

I believe that a sensible and fair conclusion was reached; I appreciate your understanding and helpful concern.

Cordially yours,

Uri Ra'anan

Uri Ra'anan
Professor of International Politics
Chairman, International Security
Studies Program

UR/hn
enclosures

Medford, Massachusetts 02155
617 628-7010
Cable: FLETCHER

Prof. Uri Ra'anan stressed that it was misleading to speak of "The Reagan Plan," when, actually, at least 4 official documents existed, with mutually incompatible statements on core issues, all issued within a two-week span (the "Talking Points" sent to the parties, the President's speech, and two policy statements by Secretary Shultz). The New York Times and the Israeli Labor Party, for instance, reacted somewhat favorably to "The Reagan Plan," at a time when only the text of Mr. Reagan's address was in the public domain, and the two were assumed to be identical.

Thus, the President stressed that territorial concessions should be proportionate to the extent of "true peace" (Fez offering only non-belligerency), of "normalization" (considering the very meager extent of Egypt's "normalization" since the return of Sinai), and of "security arrangements" (i.e. "on the ground" rather than paper "guarantees"). With such reciprocity in mind, territorial changes beyond the former "Green Line" evidently were expected to exceed the "insubstantial changes" envisaged in the "Rogers Plan;" indeed, the Times Editorial assumed as much. The "Talking Points" and the first Shultz statement, however, omitted "normalization" as one criterion for the extent of withdrawal, and his second statement omitted "security arrangements" as well (referring vaguely to "quality of peace" only).

On Jerusalem, Mr. Reagan emphasized that it "must remain undivided," albeit "its final status should be decided by negotiations;" the "Talking Points" omitted the reference to "undivided" Jerusalem, adding, instead, a demand for the participation of East Jerusalem Arabs in elections to the Arab Autonomy Authority, to which Secretary Shultz added an emphatic "we do not recognize unilateral acts with respect to final status issues"--an apparent rebuttal of the President's verb "remain."

Mr. Reagan equitably used the same phrase--we "will not support"--both concerning "the establishment of an independent Palestinian state" and "annexation or permanent control by Israel" as far as administered territory is concerned. The "Talking Points," however, used an unqualified "we will not support" only for the latter contingency, while, for the former, they added the important rider "in those negotiations" (for a final settlement), qualifying this still further by stressing that (with regard to "the formation of a Palestinian state") "the outcome... must be determined by those negotiations."

On settlements, the President opposed only "the use of any additional land" for this purpose, but did not demand a "settlement freeze," arguing merely that it "could create the confidence needed for wider participation" in autonomy negotiations. The "Talking Points," however, did call specifically for a "real settlement freeze," without any qualification, adding that "we will not support their continuation as extraterritorial outposts" (a compromise proposal made originally to President Sadat in an effort to sidestep the thorny sovereignty issue regarding the Yamit villages). Mr. Shultz, like the "Talking Points," ruled out such a possible compromise.

On this issue, incidentally, it was misleading to lump together under a single heading the

settlements concerning which a large degree of national concensus prevails in Israel -- i.e. those in the Lower Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion, Merchav Yerushalayim, and the southern tip of the Gaza area (as well as the Golan) -- and others.

With regard to explanations concerning four mutually incompatible policy statements in a two-week period, manipulative tendencies, at any rate, did not appear to be the answer, since Secretary Shultz's statement to the UJA, for instance, was far less likely to suit the tastes of the audience than Mr. Reagan's speech. A number of bureaucrats had claimed authorship of the "Plan." Perhaps, for once, they were all right, which might go some way toward explaining the resulting confusion. At any rate, under the circumstances it might be premature to describe the product as "Policy." Israeli newspapers were consoling themselves with the hope that this factor might leave room for greater flexibility; however, realistically, this was far more likely to mean room for pressure in the direction of a blueprint à-la-Fez, than a genuine peace meeting even the minimalistic expectations of Israeli "doves."



Prof. Ra'anan expressed concern over our ingrained lack of patience and our obsession with finding "quick fix" (or technical) "solutions" for very serious political and security problems. A poignant example was the unthinking repetition of terms like "demilitarization" and "peace-keeping forces" to deal with heavily populated territories, despite the bitter lessons of very recent history (UNIFIL!), and despite the revolutionary transformations wrought by state-of-the-art weapons technology. The time was past when one could patrol the entrances to population concentrations to ensure effective "demilitarization," i.e. keep out artillery, armor, and planes. The Precision-Guided Munitions included minituarized, light, individually-operated weapons of lethal accuracy and quite considerable range that conventional supervision of the approaches could keep out only of unpopulated desert regions (where, by definition, anything that moved was hostile). In heavily-populated areas, such weapons could and would be smuggled in without serious problems; it was doubtful whether any modality could prove successful under such conditions, other than, perhaps, an on-the-spot, ongoing, military and intelligence "presence." However, if only for economic reasons, such tasks could not be placed exclusively upon the shoulders of a small standing army. Obviously, this posed a dilemma between political and security considerations, but that was no reason for pretending the problem did not exist. Non-feasible "quick fixes" of a "technical" nature would only aggravate the situation "on the ground" and this would exacerbate further American-Israeli relations (certainly over the longer run, even if acceptance of a "non-solution" brought momentary alleviation).

On another point, he was appaled by the fact that a Peace Treaty with Lebanon was being brushed off as an unreasonable demand (and so light-heartedly at that). Have "Doves" not been insisting that "peace for territory" is the magical formula? Yet, this is the one place where there are no territorial claims and where complete withdrawal for complete peace is offered. Those opposing a Peace Treaty as "excessive," therefore, should at least admit to themselves that they are offering proof, in effect, for the view of Tehiya that "peace for territory" is a very selective formulation, if not a snare and a delusion.

In response to a question by Maynard Wishner whether Premier Begin's policy on settlements foreclosed future flexibility, Prof. Ra'anan expressed surprise that the sacrifice of the Yamit area had been forgotten so quickly (an area considered vital alike by Labor and Likud cabinets). Yaniv added that, according to American estimates the total number of Israeli settlers in the territories was only 25,000. Prof. Ra'anan pointed out that a high percentage of these lived in the regions that the Labor platform, too, would retain under a compromise (the Lower Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion -- Jewish-owned land prior to 1948, the Jerusalem Environment, Golan, and the southern tip of Gaza). Mr. Wishner wondered, however, whether the figure of 100,000 settlers by the end of the decade, projected by Meron Benvenisti, would constitute a "critical mass."

memorandum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date December 24, 1981
to Abe Karlikow
from M. Bernard Resnikoff
subject



I thought you might be interested in this remarkable letter sent to President Reagan from the Director of Bridges for Peace.

Your comments and reactions are most welcome.

cc: ✓ Marc Tannenbaum
Hyman Bookbinder



גשרים למען השלום

Clarence H. Wagner, Jr., Director

Editor of "Dispatch from Jerusalem"

November 12, 1981

President Ronald Reagan
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan,

I am writing to you as an American and a Christian who has lived and worked in Israel and the West Bank for the past five years. I am concerned by the implications by Arab leaders that the Palestinian Arab people are being maltreated by Israel with the cooperation of the United States, and that 'nothing' is being done to aid the 'plight of the Palestinian people' which, according to the Arabs, is the crux of the instability of the region.

It should be noted that the Palestinian Arabs have received fair treatment, as well as medical, educational, social, economic, agricultural, and technological services and advancement under the authority of Israel. The surrounding Arab nations, who encouraged the Palestinian Arabs to leave in 1948, have corralled them in refugee camps in their countries, despite Arab oil wealth that could be used for aid and resettlement. I strongly object to the fact that the Arab leaders have used the Palestinian Arabs as a tool against peace with Israel and a wedge between Israel and the rest of the world. The 'plight of the Palestinian people' has been created by the Arab nations at the expense of the Palestinian people, Israel, and Middle East peace.

King Hussein of Jordan, recently in the U.S., asked you to attend to the 'rights' of the Palestinian people (as though nothing is being done), and assist in the efforts to implement the Saudi Arabian 8-point Peace Plan which calls for the establishment of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza under the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

Inherent in this request is the 'appearance' that the Arab leaders really want to help their Palestinian 'brothers', while the U.S. and Israel are blocking the path of peace, should you reject the plan. Is a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza under the leadership of the PLO a viable alternative to peace?

If King Hussein really believes in the establishment of an independent Palestinian Arab State in the West Bank, why did his country annex this area as part of Jordan after their 1948 invasion of Israel? That area was partitioned by the U.N. to be Arab Palestine which was agreed upon by Israel, but not by Jordan or the other Arab nations. Certainly, a West Bank/Gaza state was an option available between 1948-1967, yet NO Arab state assisted. . .Why?

If King Hussein believes the PLO is a respectable organization worthy of a leadership position, why did he drive them out of Jordan in 1970, killing over 5,000 Palestinian Arabs in the expulsion?

If this is a 'peaceful solution', why does the PLO and the Palestine National Council state in their Ten Point Program of June 8, 1974 that it would accept a West Bank/Gaza state only as an interim 'fighting authority' that still would not permit 'recognition, conciliation, or secure borders' with Israel?

If the PLO is a viable choice, as the leaders of this peace plan state, then why did a PLO leader, Farouk Kadoumi, state as late as July 30, 1981 in the West German magazine Stern, that, "We shall never allow Israel to live in peace. We shall never allow it total security. I shall make it perfectly clear to you, we shall never recognize Israel."

It is evident that an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza is NOT a peaceful solution and NOT a workable alternative. It is also a fact that Arab leaders, outside of Egypt, have been the speakers of a great deal of rhetoric with no tangible or concrete action on behalf of peace with Israel or assistance to their Palestinian 'brothers'. When they were invited to join the Camp David talks and demonstrate concrete and peaceful participation, they rejected any possibility of involvement and set out to sabotage Camp David, beginning with a boycott of Egypt and the call for a 'jihad' (holy war) with Israel. And, they continue to finance and support the action of the PLO.

While the Arabs have literally stood in the way of peace and initiated four wars with Israel, Israel has been seeking peace in earnest since her first day of independence. It is evidenced by her Declaration of Independence in which the people of Israel extend the hand of friendship to her neighbors. The United States has always supported Israel in this quest for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Now, more than ever, is the time for the U.S. to join hands with her partners in Camp David who are working towards peace and not chase after plans presented by Saudi Arabia and Jordan who merely talk about peace. Instead of dragging Israel and Egypt towards a Saudi Arabian 'peace' plan that is unworkable, it is time for the U.S. to coerce Saudi Arabia and Jordan into Camp David that is working.

I have lived in the Middle East for five years and can attest to the fact that the autonomy plan as proposed in the Camp David Agreements is the best and most viable alternative given today's circumstances. In the framework of Camp David, the autonomy talks must resume with the full fanfare of support and involvement by the United States to assure an orderly and peaceful environment for the Palestinian Arabs and security for Israel. Jordan must be included and together, with Israel and Egypt, they must help develop the autonomous region with the cooperation and wisdom that will insure security and prosperity for all.

The Arab countries say they cannot join Camp David because it does not speak to the 'rights' of the Palestinians and that the Palestinian Arabs are not being represented or involved in the autonomy negotiations. Then they present the PLO as the 'sole representatives of the Palestinian people,' which is a misrepresentation of the true facts. The people of the West Bank and Gaza are Palestinian Arabs (who in fact fear the PLO), and are to be represented as part of the autonomy implementation, transition, and settlement. The only ones being excluded are the terrorists, the PLO.

It is time for the United States to show her guidance and strength towards peace. I implore you to establish a strong Middle East policy which secures Israel and reaffirms U.S. leadership in Camp David. Utilize our influence to bring Jordan and Saudi Arabia into the Camp David framework. Establish the direction towards an autonomy plan that secures Israel while providing the Palestinian Arabs with economic and political security. The Saudi Peace Plan, which advocates a three-month transition into a Palestinian State under the leadership of the PLO, will only insure disastrous results for the peoples of the West Bank and Gaza and set the stage for the ultimate purpose of the PLO: The destruction of Israel.

Sincerely,

Clarence H. Wagner, Jr.
Executive Director

CHW:amh
cc:file



ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

JACOB AND LIBBY GOODMAN ZOA HOUSE • 4 EAST 34TH STREET • NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016 • (212) 481-1500

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

December 23, 1981

Dear ZOA Leader:

I would like to share with you a letter I recently sent to President Ronald Reagan as I feel it is incumbent upon me to keep our leaders properly informed.

While the contents of this letter are not recommended for publication or public distribution, the information is necessary in order for you to be cognizant of specific areas of concern to our organization, as well as the Jewish community.

May I take this opportunity to extend to you my personal best wishes, and at this Chanukah season let us hope that the New Year will bring blessings of peace to all of us.

Cordially yours,



Ivan J. Novick
President

IJN/meb
enclosure

Zionist Organization of America

JACOB and LIBBY GOODMAN ZOA HOUSE • 4 EAST 34th STREET • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016 • (212) 481-1500

Office of the President

December 14, 1981

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Permit me to express my appreciation for being invited to participate in the highly significant meeting with you, Vice President Bush, senior members of your Administration, and selected leaders of the Jewish community. I am positive that the timeliness of this meeting will result in better understanding and appreciation of our respective views. I compliment Mrs. Elizabeth Dole for her initiative and foresight in convening the initial meeting preceding this dialogue, in which I was pleased to have been included. May I also thank Mr. Jack Stein for his input and cooperation.

Mr. President, when your Administration took office, the mood of the American people reflected optimism and a sense of expectancy. This included a significant number of American Jews who are not nominal adherents of the Republican Party. Those who are staunch supporters and consider themselves special friends of yours, must acknowledge a sense of regret in the turn of recent events.

When the organized American Jewish community, through the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, assumed a policy position that the sale to Saudi Arabia was not in America's best interest, it was a position that was taken from an independent point of view. It would be inaccurate to conclude that the American Jewish community was reacting to outside influences.

During our meetings, you and other officials spoke candidly about your concern that manifestations of anti-Semitism surfaced during the Saudi debate. Certainly the Administration cannot be held responsible for anti-Semitic attitudes that may, unfortunately prevail within the general community. However, it was insensitive of those involved not to have understood the potential reaction if certain political tactics were pursued.

The reassurances that we have received are comforting, but nevertheless it is important for us to determine precisely what took place, as well as the motivation and the consequences of these actions. At our meeting, Mr. Meese pointed out that the Attorney General's interest in stemming anti-Semitism was a high priority. I trust that his findings will be made known to all of us who share deep concern over this serious trend in the general community. Your promise to publicly address this subject is appreciated and we look forward to this at an early date.

Mr. President, as one who prefers to examine events from a positive point of view, I am perplexed by the actions of your predecessors during the AWACS campaign. At a moment of great tension and sensitivity, they were invited by the Administration to advocate the sale to Saudi Arabia. While you cannot be responsible for their words,

.../2

The President
December 14, 1981
Page Two

I respectfully suggest that you were free to react to them. Therefore, when American citizens were singled out because the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia was in difficulty, your public rejection of this tactic would have been welcome, not only in defense of Jews, but in support of our democratic process.

With deep disappointment I witnessed American officials, past and present, casting shadows of doubt on the integrity of American Jews, while paying homage to Saudi Arabia and sending signals of approval to the terrorist PLO. I am sure that you agree that no American official should inhibit the right of American citizens to express their views on any issue that concerns our nation. For any group to abdicate this responsibility, not only damages the Administration in office, but jeopardizes the basic precepts and democratic traditions of a pluralistic society on which our great nation was founded.

In the context of this discussion, may I refer to the charges made regarding a "Jewish lobby." May I suggest that the so-called "lobby" is a mere shadow in comparison to the full force of the Arab influence being exerted in the United States today. It is a fallacious suggestion that "Jews run foreign policy." The display of arrogance by representatives and spokespersons of the Saudis make it abundantly clear how influential they are today. Further, is it proper to compare the right of American citizens to express themselves with that of representatives of a foreign power?

The recent "peace" proposals offered by Saudi Arabia are subject to wide interpretation. It is questionable whether they were intended to create peace in the Middle East, much less whether they are capable of doing so. This was quickly revealed during the recent Arab summit meetings, when the very hint that Israel should be accepted sent waves of revulsion through Arab ranks. It was again apparent that so-called Arab "unity" is intended not to make peace with Israel, but to determine the best method of dismantling the Jewish state.

The Saudi initiative raises questions: We have heard much of the need to be sensitive to Saudi pride. It has been said that Saudi Arabia calls the signals for the other Arab states. Why then was the Saudi plan rejected by the Arab summit? Why would the Saudis risk being embarrassed by this lack of support or by their failure to demonstrate their power and influence? Would it not be encouraging if Saudi Arabia followed in the footsteps of Sadat, who found that the road to peace leads to Jerusalem?

Mr. President, the dismemberment of Israel -- be it by armed conflict, economic pressure, or political maneuver -- is unacceptable to the State of Israel, as it is unacceptable to the Jewish people, all of whom share a concern for the welfare of the Jewish state. And, it should be unacceptable to the United States which has a vested and moral interest in maintaining Israel's strength, security and viability.

Therefore, Mr. President, I applaud your reaffirmation that the United States will not deal with the PLO. Furthermore, Saudi initiative, now or in the future, cannot be tied to the stipulation that the PLO be included or involved in negotiations. The PLO is a terrorist organization, and Israel and the democratic world should not be expected to deal with it. If Saudi Arabia insists on PLO involvement, does this not indicate that it hopes to achieve by political means what has escaped the Arabs through acts of violence against Israel for the past 33 years? Even if Saudi Arabia acknowledges that Israel does "exist" it is not the same as stating that Israel "should" exist.

The President
December 14, 1981
Page Three

Nor does this confirm that it recognizes Israel as a legitimate sovereign state on the basis of legal, historical and moral grounds.

You have spoken forthrightly, Mr. President, by condemning international terrorism. Vice President Bush has described Qaddafi as "the world's principal terrorist." Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., has just stated "We no longer believe that a double standard with respect to international lawlessness and terrorism ... is a contributor to international peace and the rule of law, which we all seek to espouse."

I share the Administration's reaction to the repugnant threats that recently emanated from Libya. And yet, can we overlook Yasir Arafat, whose "hit squads" carried out threats of violence against Israel and throughout the world and who has been supported by Qaddafi? The international community has given Arafat an image of respectability. This encouragement has served to legitimize his acts of terrorism, thereby emboldening him and other terrorists, including Qaddafi.

Mr. President, I agree with Secretary of State Haig that there cannot be a double standard. I suggest that there are no shades of acceptable differences between "moderate" terrorists and "radical" terrorists. Is it not time for the United States to condemn Arafat by name for his contribution to international lawlessness and terrorism?

In my quest to identify Arab "moderates", I submit a yardstick for your consideration. How would Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria and Iraq respond to these concepts:

- a) Accept the permanent legitimacy of Israel as a viable state on the basis of legal and historical right;
- b) Fully support the Camp David Accords;
- c) Recognize that Jerusalem undivided is the capital of Israel;
- d) Accept that Jordan is a Palestinian state;
- e) Denounce the terrorist PLO, and encourage the moderate Arabs to meet with Israel in the furtherance of peace in the area;
- f) Accept the principles of democracy and give freedom to their people.

Once we apply the above "litmus test" to the Arab nations, the difference between "moderates" and "radicals" fades and clearly reveals which nations are America's friends and which can be depended upon to support our policies and positions in the Middle East.

Mr. President, I respect your role as an honest broker, working to attain a peaceful world. But please consider that evenhandedness in our friendships with other nations may not always be practical, desirable or necessary. Those who have already proven their friendship by policies and precepts that are compatible with our own, deserve and require America's full support and understanding. However, while we continue to encourage others to turn to us in friendship, they should not be the beneficiaries of American support in advance of proven and concrete deeds.

The President
December 14, 1981
Page Four

The recent announcement that the United States and Israel have taken steps to strengthen cooperation against threats to peace in the Middle East was a reaffirmation of your position as expressed to us when we met. This is an optimistic and positive beginning and is an encouraging step in the right direction.

By this agreement, your Administration has enunciated a principle of partnership between the United States and Israel. In an area of continued instability, the mutuality of interests shared by the United States and Israel lead to the inevitable conclusion that the deep-rooted friendship that has passed the test of time, will be enhanced by this agreement. Now the United States should follow through in a concrete manner, so that at an early date more substantive ties between these two democratic nations will be established.

The Arab world should view this important development as a tangible relationship between the United States and Israel that reaffirms a long-standing commitment to Israel's security and future as an important friend and strategic ally of the United States.

Consistent with your views regarding world terrorism, human rights and a strong America, this should now be followed by your call to the Arab masses, urging them to seek the ways of peace through moderation. Let the Arab Palestinian people reject the dreary assumption that their fate and future destiny lie only in the hands of terrorists. It should be fully understood that under no circumstances will the United States ever include representatives of terrorist organizations at the negotiating table. Urge them to travel the road to peace by seeking moderate leaders who understand that this goal is not attainable by the destruction of another land and its citizens.

This clarion call from the President of the United States would be bold, imaginative, and an historic act of honesty, decency and in America's best tradition. Hopefully, this may motivate important Arab states to finally move in our direction. If they are responsive, your initiative may influence the entire course of Middle East history, and perhaps, even world destiny.

Although this letter is more extensive than I anticipated, the issues are so vital to our country that I felt compelled to fully share my thoughts with you. I have taken the liberty of providing copies of this communication to Vice President Bush and those members of your Administration who shared the dialogue with us on November 19, 1981 at the White House.

Mr. President, please be assured that I share with you the pursuit of our common objective, which is the upbuilding of our great nation, making it secure, and having it serve as the moral leader in a world that requires your guidance and strength.

With all good wishes.

Very respectfully yours,

Ivan J. Novick
Ivan J. Novick
President

LJN:kyb

INSTITUTE ON American Jewish - Israeli Relations

Chairman Israeli Board: S.Z. Abramov

A. Reminder:

The meeting of the Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations on Thursday, 31 January will start at 5p.m. sharp.

Taxis will wait to take you from the King David to the Ramada Renaissance hotel at 4.40p.m.

We are looking forward to your presence.

Thurs. p.m.

Techolsky - hi-tech

Bruno - short-term

GNP - lower growth - 3% per annum (83-1-2%) vs. rising living standards (5%); inflation; balance of payments

- 84 - better year - 7% fall in consumption - exports increased - 12% increases / imports decreased

- improve d/b; - invested less, private sector saved more / public sector deficit - 10-15%; - 84 - accelerate inflation rate [130% inflation - 84 -> 450% inflation] Jan 85 - price stability

- Deficit high, inflation falling - index bonds / no Fed. Reserve to control money flow

- \$2 - 2 1/2 b. cut in deficit - expenditure cuts? or tax increases? (highest in world)

defense, social services, subsidies - cut \$1 b. / cut in subsidies (2nd package)

- wage-price freeze (1st pkg.) - 17% inflation rate / at cost of balance of payment

- 2nd pkg. - eliminate subsidies - Histadrut agreed to absorb price increase

- more drastic steps? political consequences / Constraint - Histadrut elections in May

(Viennese - serious, not desperate)

ISENSTAT - U.S. - IMF for Israel

- \$800 m. / 84 b. - 86 / Conditions on foreign and - internal econ constraints - RR will not approve and w.o. compensation

- not free lunch - change social, econ fitn. - free market, conserv image - mold Israel in that image

- real sacrifice - threat to Israel's independence

- 1948-60 - distant yrs - growth years / Truman - arms length 12 yrs / Ike - chilly U.S. - Israel - Baghdad Pact

- Ike forced unilateral Israel withdrawal - U.S. aid - \$60/yr. (10ans) - even hand edness / Israel - model economy - 7-9% growth rate

1950s - wage, Capital indexation -

2

II - 1961-1980 - evolving yrs. - strained yrs. economy
political closer relations - JFK - broke arms embargo, hawk missile
LBJ - sophisticated weapons - Eshkol visit - 1967 - Complete war - UN 242

- 1973 - Nixon airlift - 6,000 flights, 72 tons equipment, troop alert
- (1972 - \$400 m. aid) 1973 - \$2.2 b. voted - very large foreign aid
- 1974-81 - \$18 b. - 12 X '48-73 (3 times as long)
- 1980 - favorable return loans, unique support, concessions
J Carter - warm, aid increase - oil supply guaranteed
- Improved polit relat. - economy began to worsen
- 1964 - inflation rises 66 - recession
- Cost Egyptian peace treaty - 73 increase defense spending / pre-73 - 6%
74-75 - 30% defense
- Israeli economy never recovered from 73 war - \$23 b. owed U.S. for weapons since 73 war

7.3 b. military loans -

- 74-77 - 18% debt increase
- III 79-80 STRATEGIC ALLIANCE yrs - ECIA MISMARKETED yrs.
- Israel strategic allies - 1981 - U.S. mutual security - strategic mechanism
- use U.S. aid to develop have / joint milit exercises / \$1.7 → \$2.6 b. (85)
- aid as grants not loans / ETA - historic - duty free - 1st time signed 74
- '77 - beginning to recover from 73 war - gap bet. consumed - produced
- 1980-83 - consumption increased 3x what it produced - w.o. increase production - Ahdor period

Israel persons long evul
Strategic alliance - U.S. built up thru loans, not grants / also helped Arabs
no increase w.o. economic plans restructure economy - Congress will follow White House

- U.S. deficit problem - \$40 b. domestic cuts - small bus, farmers wealth care
- U.S. - Egyptian aid relationship - \$1 b. increase - tandem - over 50% U.S. aid to Egypt + Israel
- averting Chrysler, N.Y. insolvency - strict conditions -
- N.Y. fined 1000s employees - cut Social Services wage reductions
- Chrysler - Rocardo fined / uncour - \$1 b. wage return / fuel efficient car
- Seattle Forum Relations - aid of major changes in economy,
- U.S. economists - agree U.S. aid won't help unless econ. reform

- ① MANDATORY - ① peal budget cuts - \$2 b. '85 fiscal year - 2/3 debt service defense
- (increase unemployment, lower standard of living as of 82)
- ② reduce subsidies - artificial consumption
- ③ devalue shekel - compet
- ④ cut wage restraint - increase exports - restrain underlying inflationary pressure
- ⑤ modify indexation - govt bonds
- ⑥ Monetary reform -

NON-MANDATORY - dollarization of shekel - stabilize Exchange Rate
① who monitors agreement - IMF? U.S.?
② how given? - emergency in '85 - add to base in '86 (\$1 1/2 b.)
③ how distribute 750 m. now, balance in priority payments, if Israel meets milestones
④ political links to aid? - don't think Rf tie to polit aid directly - timetable linked to sales arms plug to Saudis

INSTITUTE ON
American Jewish - Israeli Relations

Chairman Israeli Board: S.Z. Abramov

31 January 1985

To the Members of the
Advisory Board

The crowded Agenda of our Thursday, January 31, 1985 meeting may leave us no choice but to cut down the time allotted to the item devoted to the Institute activities.

Should this happen, the oral presentations will be very brief. We hope that the attached report will serve as a substitute.

- ③ - end-run to Congress? - Some increased aid - \$500 m, rearmament of bitterness, loss of good-will w. Amer. public [\$6.8 b - 1.2 b.
- severe inflation only attacked early, sacrifices, before next election
 - (Keynes - we all die in long run)
 - reap gain, w.o. benefits
 - > inflation - break forcefully
 - > SIS Saenpca 12-18 us, - tell public - if delay inflation, prepare
 - not prophet doom, gloom - world climate favorable,
 - FTA - increase investments, Mecca hi-tech in world, duty free / PCo broken / OPFC plunge /
 - EEE - increase -
 - > could be golden years for Israel - high growth, low inflation



ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

Max Lernerbaum

"MONEY IS CHEAPER THAN BLOOD"

(Press Summary, January 10, 1982)

The Israeli cabinet voted this week to pay 4.1 billion Israeli shekels in compensation to Sinai settlers for their homes, property, investments and incomes. This figure was approved by a narrow margin after Deputy Premier and Agriculture Minister Simcha Ehrlich proposed terms to end months of inconclusive negotiations between the government and the settlers. The sum decided upon is twenty percent more than was previously offered.

The compensation figure raised many questions regarding the national treasury's ability to pay and whether all the settlers would, in fact, evacuate in accordance with Israel's timetable for withdrawal from Sinai.

Asher Wallfish and David Landau (The Jerusalem Post) reported that the government's rationale was that "money is cheaper than blood" if it would ensure the peaceful evacuation of the settlements where militants are said to be preparing to oppose evacuation by all necessary means. According to Wallfish and Landau, Prime Minister Menachem Begin personally "laid all his prestige on the line, begging and pleading with his colleagues to approve the increase," and arguing that "cabinet refusal to pay higher compensation for evacuation would entail a bloody price in internecine warfare." Nevertheless, those ministers who fought the increase, led by Housing Minister David Levy, retorted that the compensation fees would not change the plans of the extremists who oppose withdrawal from Sinai on ideological grounds, such as the stalwarts of the Greater Israel Movement, who will have to be removed by force after the permanent residents have pocketed their compensation fees and moved elsewhere.

Yitzhak Oked (The Jerusalem Post) appeared to support Levy's fears in a report from Tel Aviv of remarks by Avi Farhan, an activist in the Movement to Stop the Withdrawal from Sinai. Farhan stated that "We are happy that the issue of compensation for the Sinai settlers is over." Now that the air has been cleared, the "real fight" will start, because "we can't be bought with money."

Money, however, remained a major issue since Treasury Minister Yoram Aridor argued during the cabinet discussions that the budgets of various ministries would have to be cut in order to pay the increased

compensation. He claims that the twenty percent increase offered to the settlers more than equals the total amount he had saved by previous cuts in various ministry budgets. The Jerusalem Post's economic reporter Shlomo Maoz added that the government decision to increase the compensation payments came just as Aridor was about to present the 1982-83 budget, "which entailed a shift in his battle against inflation," calling for a cut of five percent in real terms in all areas of government spending, except defense and debt servicing. "Now, with the higher compensation payments, stunned Treasury officials are concerned that last year's achievements may be wiped out and next year's new strategy may not get off the ground," Maoz reports.

The Jerusalem Post (in an editorial) finds "one virtue to the Cabinet's decision...to increase the compensation to be paid to the settlers in Yamit. It is a decision. It clears the air. Whether it will also prevent a confrontation with the settlers who are holding out for political and ideological reasons will only emerge in the coming weeks. And Mr. Begin, without whom the decision could not be made, was certainly right in arguing that the cost of assuring the peace agreement with Egypt cannot be measured only by the Treasury's ledger books." The newspaper, however, argues that "the sums are as obscene as were the settlers' arguments." The newspaper suggests that "the Cabinet throughout its handling of the Sinai settlers' relocation issue upheld the value of peace, but it has distorted every other value."

Uzi Benziman (Ha'aretz) quotes Prime Minister Begin telling his cabinet ministers that "after my death, I will be remembered as the one who prevented a fratricidal war because of Yamit." Benziman notes that Mr. Begin also takes pride in the fact that his government differs from previous Labor governments by virtue of its current policy of softness in internal matters and firmness on external issues.

Benziman provides an interesting word-by-word description of the cabinet meeting during which Mr. Begin is also reported to have said to his fellow ministers that "the evacuation of the settlements from Yamit is painful -- but evacuation day will not be a day of mourning. The fulfillment of the peace treaty is not a day of mourning. The peace treaty is a good document that has withstood the tests of (the bombing of the nuclear reactor in) Baghdad, Beirut, the Jerusalem Law, the Golan Heights Law, and the Litani Campaign (when Israel invaded Lebanon during the peace negotiations with Egypt), thereby achieving a revolutionary change, which is why the day on which the withdrawal is completed will not be a day of mourning. I will not mourn, but that does not mean we must approve of force. There is no need for bloodshed. Everyone knows, without being a great strategist, that if the army brings a very large force to Yamit there will not be the loss of even one drop of blood, but does that mean that we would like to see ten soldiers dragging one woman or a baby to a bus? "

Davar (in an editorial) takes strong exception to the Prime Minister's role in his policy of softness on internal matters and firmness in external issues, and describes the statement as a "bad joke" considering the price Israel has had to pay for peace with Egypt. In the opinion of Davar, the heavy price of total withdrawal from Sinai that Israel paid for peace does not indicate "firmness in external issues" nor does the compensation offered to the settlers indicate "softness in internal matters" but rather simple surrender to blackmail.

The newspaper finds the government's way out of the problems in Yamit to be "very expensive and at the expense of vital aid to the needy... by virtue of its own fault [the government] is paying today much more than it could have in the past--just as happened in the negotiations with Egypt."

The editorial concludes with the admonition that the government must now take command of events and enforce law and order in Yamit, including an increase in the rate of evacuation, decisiveness in dealing with the Movement against the Withdrawal from Sinai, and preventing members of the movement from taking control of evacuated property. "From the financial aspect, the government has confirmed that the Yamit settlers are more equal than others. The government should not now prove that the same is true as far as observance of the law is concerned."

Dov Ganechovsky (Yediot Acharonot) calls the increased compensation to the Sinai settlers nothing less than "highway robbery" and suggests that Treasury Minister Yoram Aridor was never so right as when he opposed the government decision. Ganechovsky claims that the government offer proves that might makes right. "Aridor's failure to stop this pilferage of the public cash box is also our failure. We have failed not only because it has been proven again that he who has power, the big mouth, and friends in government can get much more than he deserves. We have failed because what happened in the government yesterday proves that we can forget about achieving a reasonable economic policy with this crew. Whoever hoped that the budget might be cut and government expenditures reduced ought to forget about it."

Ganechovsky concludes with the warning that if there will be any budgetary cuts they will probably be at the expense of the weaker strata of society and those "who are not able to burn tires and homes, create disturbances and frighten government ministers."

Yosef Waxman (Ma'ariv) quotes Israel's Deputy Premier and Agriculture Minister Simcha Ehrlich who told him that he does not consider the conclusion of the evacuation negotiations as either a success or failure, but rather that the time had come to conclude the negotiations and "both the government and the settlers knew it."

Mr. Ehrlich is the chairman of the ministerial committee on compensation for the Yamit region settlers, and he had set January 13 for the conclusion of the negotiations, since he would have to go abroad after that date.

Mr. Ehrlich explained that 1400 families would get the 4.1 billion shekels, including the increase of twenty percent, or 700 million shekels, that he had suggested, which was a small price to pay compared to "the great cost of peace" with Egypt. "The increase is not frightening and will be only a small percentage of the government's new budget," he said.

The editorial in Al Hamishmar criticizes the very nature of the compensation payment to the Sinai settlers since the majority of them had invested no more than miniscule sums. Most of the money that had been invested in Sinai over the years came from the Israeli Treasury in the form of very low interest rates and magnanimous credit terms, including grants, heavy subsidies and tax benefits. The Sinai settlers "reached an agreement with Minister Ehrlich and with the lunatic camp in the Israeli government that clearly indicates that the more you yell; the more you break the law; how you act or threaten to act, increases your chances of obtaining fat compensation in place of the flow of the presents received in the past from the state, i. e. from all of us."

Al Hamishmar warns, however, that the government decision does not ensure an end to the demands, which are certain to be followed by requests from various pressure groups among the Sinai settlers for further increases of millions of Israeli shekels.

At the week's end, two coalition Knesset members proposed private bills that would levy a special tax on Israel's population to pay the high cost of compensation and to bring home to all of Israel's citizens the high cost of peace that each has been called upon to pay in the return of Sinai to Egypt and peace with Israel's largest Arab neighbor.

Edited by Lois Gottesman

Davar is affiliated with the Histadrut and the Labor Party.

Ha'aretz is an independent liberal newspaper.

Ma'ariv and Yediot Acharonot are independent but traditionally Likud-

Al Hamishmar is affiliated with the Socialist Mapam Party.

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February, 1982

The enclosed article in the current "New York Review of Books" by Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg of Temple Emanu-El of Englewood, New Jersey, professor of history on the faculty of Columbia University, and immediate past president of the American Jewish Congress deserves your close attention.

A careful reading of Dr. Hertzberg's analysis might be useful in determining whether a reappraisal should be made not only on our posture toward the Begin administration, but on the question of whether self imposed silence by the American Jewish community is counter productive to the welfare of Israel and the Jewish cause.



The American Jewish Committee

FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

THE SEPHARDI-ASHKENAZI GAP IN ISRAEL

Three Aspects of the Issue

The problem of the "gap" between Ashkenazim and Sephardim in Israel is one receiving increasing attention in the United States as in Israel: e.g., there was a recent discussion about this by the Foreign Policy Association in New York.

Giving acuteness to the subject was the recent shooting of a Sephardic youth in the Tel Aviv suburb of Kfar Shalem.

Three papers present a spectrum of views on the subject. First, an Israel Office report on the incident and its consequences, Kfar Shalem Is Not Miami.

Second, a commentary prepared for AJC by a veteran observer on the Israeli scene.

Finally, the Foreign Affairs Department asked Inge Lederer Gibel of the Interreligious Affairs Department - knowing of her longtime interest in the subject - to interview successful Sephardim in Israel and to get their outlook. We also asked Ms. Gibel to present some of her own, personal views and conclusions on what could be done to alleviate this urgent problem, over and above certain activities in which our Israel Office already is engaged.

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January 31, 1983

#83-550-7



REPORT

From the Israel Office of the American Jewish Committee

Rehov Ethiopia 9, Jerusalem 95 149 Tel. 228862, 233551 Cable: Wishom, Jerusalem

KFAR SHALEM IS NOT MIAMI

Thousands of miles and oceans apart, in Miami and Tel Aviv, two young men were shot by police officers engaged in their appointed tasks. Both incidents brought to the surface tensions which have long accumulated in areas whose inhabitants live in conditions of distress.

Except for the coincidence that both shootings took place at about the same time, they cannot be compared. If there were those who thought that the shooting in Tel Aviv's Kfar Shalem quarter would turn into an ethnic or race riot, they were wrong.

Israel, it should be recalled, has known such racial tension in its young history. In the 1950's, a rumor spread rapidly through a slum area in Haifa, Wadi Salib, that a local inhabitant had been shot and killed by police who had apprehended him for questioning. The fact that the victim was only injured did not prevent the slum dwellers from rampaging in the streets, overturning cars and destroying property.

Wadi Salib, as informed Israelis remember, was perhaps the first time that Israel's disadvantaged population raised the cry of those who have since come to be known as the "Second Israel." This is the term for some ten percent of Israel's population, or about 350,000 men, women and children who were never successfully absorbed into the mainstream of Israeli society. They or their parents came to Israel in the mass migration of Jewish refugees from Arab and Islamic countries following the 1948 War of Independence. Most of those immigrants, numbering more than 700,000, lived through the difficult years of the new state's economic hardship and became productive citizens. Many others, however, remained behind and almost forgotten in such depressed areas as Wadi Salib, Kfar Shalem and others.

Israel also absorbed hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants from Europe (Ashkenazim) who had been left homeless and displaced by the Holocaust. These people too endured the hardships of the early years of the State. They too had to build for themselves new and productive lives. Most succeeded far better than

their brethren from North Africa, Asia and the Middle East (commonly called Sephardim), for various reasons. Perhaps it was because they were received by a veteran European population and into a European-oriented culture. Also, those who emigrated from the Arab countries were handicapped by the failure of their own leadership and elite to accompany them to Israel.

Today, Israel's Jewish population is almost equally divided between those of European origin and those of Middle Eastern origin, with the exception that the latter suffer from a higher rate of disadvantage. This condition is commonly known in Israel as the social gap.

In recent years, political interests have tried to make the most of a situation that has often been near the boiling point since the Wadi Salib riots first erupted. More than anyone else, Menachem Begin, as the former opposition leader before becoming prime minister five years ago, always knew how to obtain the support of the Oriental Jewish population. Despite Mr. Begin's own Polish origin, he has always represented to the Oriental Jews their dissatisfaction with the Ashkenazi establishment.

In the last national elections in Israel, Mr. Begin made political hay out of an unfortunate statement by a popular performer at an outdoor Labor Alignment election gathering, who referred to Oriental Jews by a slang term that later cost Labor party head Shimon Peres many votes.

Yet, Mr. Begin's ascension to power as head of Israel's ruling establishment has not lost him his popularity among Oriental Jews. Among one of the popular beliefs that reinforces this fact is the assumption that Oriental Jews have a special dislike for Arabs and therefore subscribe to Mr. Begin's hardline policies. Moreover, it was Mr. Begin's election promise in 1978 which led to the joint government-Jewish Agency program known as "Project Renewal," which has since undertaken at a cost of more than \$1.2 billion to rehabilitate all of Israel's 160 distressed neighborhoods. Half of that sum is to be raised by Jewish communities throughout the free world that contribute to the Appeals on behalf of Israel.

Kfar Shalem, the distressed neighborhood where Shimon Yehoshua, 26, was shot dead last week by a police officer, is one of those communities inhabited by Oriental Jews who feel that opportunity will not knock at the doors of their overcrowded and dilapidated homes. Yehoshu 's large family had chosen to expand their

lodgings by illegal construction on publicly-owned property. This phenomenon has reached almost plague-like proportions in the Tel Aviv area and has become an encroachment on the quality of life that the city fathers are trying to preserve and better.

According to the reports appearing in the press, city officials sent workmen, accompanied by police, to demolish the illegal building constructed by the Yehoshua family, after proper legal action, including notice to the family of the municipality's intentions. The demolition crew and the police were confronted by the family and onlookers who asked that the demolition be postponed until other members of the Yehoshua family returned from court with a staying order that they claimed was being approved. When the city officials refused to wait, Shimon Yehoshua raised a pistol and fired several shots. The police claim that he shot at the workmen. Others say that the shots were fired into the air. In any event, a police officer responded by drawing his own weapon and firing it at Shimon. Prior to the gunfire, the workmen and police had been pelted from the rooftop of the building in question by bottles, rocks and other projectiles.

The death of the young man shocked all of Israel. It was followed by a rash of vandalism carried out by unknown persons against property in the upper class neighborhoods of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, including such obscenities as daubing swastikas and the word "Ashke-Nazi" upon cars and even a synagogue. Also, threats were made on the life of Tel Aviv's Mayor Shlomo Lahat, who publicly defended the right of the police to protect municipal employees engaged in their duties. These acts also shocked Israelis.

There were, however, no riots. The events of Wadi Salib did not return as some spectre from the past. The acts of vandalism subsided almost immediately. Kfar Shalem became just one more episode with tragic consequences for just a few. One of the reasons for this turn of events has to do with the nature of the conflict in Kfar Shalem. For some time now, residents of many distressed neighborhoods have been claiming that their communities are being diminished by government housing programs that attract the residents to heavily subsidized housing schemes across the pre-1967 lines on the West Bank. These slum residents are anxious to rehabilitate their own neighborhoods in areas in areas that they believe will become prime real estate once the inhabitants have been evacuated. The authorities, however, made a point of their argument that the Yehoshua family had been offered a host of housing alternatives in the Kfar Shalem area, but without response. The fact is that Israel's metropolitan areas have a problem of illegal construction unknown in modern cities. Had the city of Tel Aviv waited

for the staying order to arrive, it is very likely that the building would never have been torn down in the foreseeable future, despite previous permission to do so in accordance with the law.

Another aspect was the unanimous vote in the Knesset, supported by both major parties, with the exception of the Communist party, and notably the only such consensus in the current term, that defused the volatile situation by standing by the city and the police in the action that resulted in the death of one person.

It is not unlikely that an explosion of ethnic rage may happen someday if the social gap in Israel continues to grow unchecked. But it did not happen last week, nor is it likely to happen in the near future. If anything, the incident in Kfar Shalem has proven the maturity of Israel's population and its ability to weather such tragic events. No doubt the present constellation with Mr. Begin, the idol of the distressed, in power has been a contributing factor to the stability of the situation.

Edited by Lois Gottesman

January 27, 1983



THE KFAR SHALEM INCIDENT:

What Does It Tell Us about Oriental -
Ashkenazi Relations in Israel Today?

This report was prepared for the American Jewish Committee
by a veteran observer of the Israeli scene.

The Kfar Shalem event is almost an incidental part of a much deeper situation that is developing in Israel, namely, the increasing polarization of Israel's Jewry on an ethnic basis: "Oriental" versus "Ashkenazi". (These are the popular labels used to differentiate Israeli Jews of Middle Eastern and North African origin, on the one hand, from those of European and North American origin, on the other.)

The fact is that the Kfar Shalem event is altogether typical of what happens in slums all over the world. If you have had a chance to read the newspaper accounts and commentaries, you are aware that a major point was made of the difference in official treatment accorded to Kfar Shalem (read "slum") residents and -- say -- North Tel Aviv (read "upper class") residents. Of course, what makes all this an ethnic issue is the fact that the vast majority of residents in neighborhoods like Kfar Shalem are Oriental Jews, and the vast majority of residents of neighborhoods like North Tel Aviv are likely to be Ashkenazi.

Some observers contend that this is analogous to the division found in the United States between the affluent white neighborhoods and Black slums. But in another generation, when the distinctions in Israeli society are likely to be economic rather than ethnic (see below), the problem will remain that the good neighborhoods get good treatment from the city officials, and the bad neighborhoods get bad treatment from the city officials.

What reinforces the ethnic dimension of the Kfar Shalem event is this growing polarization between Oriental and Ashkenazi. Whether or not this polarization is really growing in an objective rather than subjective sense is a matter of speculation because there have not yet been any serious studies of the situation. There are certainly many contradictions in this seeming polarization, but the fact is that today one hears much more about "polarization". There are many more vocal "demands", mostly in the political sphere. One question is: What proportion of the Oriental community is speaking up?

There does not seem to be evidence of any significantly large degree of effective organization in the Oriental community. To cite two examples of this. There were no riots or big demonstrations following the Kfar Shalem event, dramatic though it was because of the death of the young man there. Is this passivity on the part of the residents? Why were there not demonstrations and organized protests on the part of Oriental Jews elsewhere in Israel?

The second example is in the political sphere. We now have a political party -- Tami -- specifically and expressly organized to get the votes of the Oriental community. Tami hasn't done too well thus far. (It won only three out of the Knesset's 120 seats and attracted support mainly among Jews of Moroccan origin.) Some analysts believe it will do less well in the future, because the old parties will succeed in re-attracting the Oriental votes they lost to Tami. In this connection, going back a bit in Israeli political history, one can ask: What happened to the Black Panthers and the Blue and White parties of Oriental inspiration?

Where do we see evidence of demands for a bigger share of society's rewards? In the political sphere, both in governmental politics and in public organizations. There can be no question of the fact that the Herut party has given the Oriental community far more public recognition than Herut's predecessors. There are more Oriental ministers and deputy-ministers. There are far more members of Knesset from the Oriental community from Herut ranks. Where Tami controls a ministry (e.g. Welfare and Labor), there is a ruthless replacing of Ashkenazim by Sephardim. This is in the best tradition of Tami's Ashkenazi predecessors, who rewarded the party faithful. The question is to what extent ethnic rather than political partisanship was a factor in the selection process.

In the recent World Zionist Congress, Tami and the World Sephardi Federation made a major bid -- partially successful --

for greater representation on every level. They got an additional place on the Zionist Executive, to serve either without portfolio or as Head of Project Renewal, or both. (The word "Sephardi" - literally referring to Jews of Spanish origin, is now often used as a synonym for "Oriental" Jews or for all non-Ashkenazi Jews.)

Right now, that makes up most of the evidence of organized efforts by the Oriental community, and it isn't much. Nor does one see signs that would indicate a rapid development in this area.

Now a look at the Ashkenazi side of the coin. Yes, one hears more expression of concern. The traditional "progressive" elements express worry about polarization, without being able to define what it is, and certainly without doing very much about it. The traditional "anti" - elements -- and they are not very numerous -- make cracks like "If only I were born in Morocco, I would get this or that (job) (scholarship) (other benefit)." The great majority of Ashkenazim go about their business, and don't see -- certainly do not express concern about -- any special problem of polarization.

To all of the above must be added a major qualifying factor of which most observers of the Israel scene tend to lose sight. I speak about Oriental-Ashkenazi inter-marriage. The ethnic inter-marriage rate is now up to about 23 percent and going up. There will certainly be class distinctions based on economics a generation from now. It may even have an ethnic dimension. But it will be largely economic, because there won't be that many pure Sephardim and pure Ashkenazim left. The population is destined rather soon to become Israeli, whatever that is culturally, but certainly a "mix" of Oriental and Ashkenazi.

The gap is big: economically, in educational achievement (and the two are certainly linked), in leadership roles (meaning, in one sense, in terms of public recognition). The Oriental community has certainly made progress from an educational and economic viewpoint. But the Ashkenazim have made even greater progress.

Where do we go from here? First, we have a bad problem in Israel: a serious social and economic gap between two halves of the Jewish population. But the continuing and increasing intermarriage rate will remove the ethnic aspect of this gap.

Second, discrimination and prejudice, as we know the terms in the United States, are not the basic causes of the gap; and certainly not overt discrimination.

The Kfar Shalem business is more important in the "have" and "have not" context than in the purely ethnic context. The problems are more those related to the moving of families as part of slum clearance and rehousing, than of the Oriental-Ashkenazim confrontation. The Kfar Shalem family in question was offered alternative housing, which they rejected -- from their point of view, understandably -- because of their felt need to be near family and "their meager budgets for housing (many pay nothing for housing in their present slums). This complex of problems called "slum clearance" could undoubtedly be handled better, with greater sensitivity.

Now back to what really is the ethnic issue: an Israel in which roughly 45 percent of the population has far more of the society's benefits -- material and other -- than the other 55 percent. In my view, the American Jewish Committee can make a great contribution to Israel and to American Jewish community understanding of Israel by making some studies that begin with sympathy for the problem, and not with an attitude (which I see growing in the United States) of putting Israel on trial.

- What really are the dimensions of the economic gap and the factors involved therein?
- What are Ashkenazi attitudes today, taking into account also the inter-marriage phenomenon?
- Self-image studies in the Oriental community.
- The impact of Project Renewal on citizenship, community participation, self-image and the lessons to be learned from the Project Renewal experience.
- Specialized studies on such subgroups as the Oriental population in the Israel Defense Forces, eg., what ranks have they attained, how well are they integrated in various units, and what effect has army service had on Oriental-Ashkenazi mutual attitudes?
- Sephardim abroad are very vocal about what is happening to the Oriental community in Israel. What is the impact of organized diaspora Sephardi intercession in Israel?

Three Israelis -- Three Successful Sephardim Speak of
Themselves, Their Land, The Future

by

Inge Lederer Gibel *

Israeli scholar, Professor Daniel Elazar, has suggested that perhaps 70% of Israeli Sephardim (North African and other Jews of non-European origin or heritage) have made it into the Israeli middle class. Other estimates - e.g., that of Dr. Sami Smooha of Haifa University, a noted expert in this field - would suggest that only 40%, as against 90% for Ashkenazim, have achieved middle or upper middle class status.

Withal, there is no question but that there has been some improvement in income level for Sephardim in the last decade and, to a significantly lesser extent, an improvement as well in educational aspirations and achievement.

What follows are three Sephardi "success stories," interviews deliberately focused on individuals of different ages and status. In one case, that of Rafi A., I have known the subject and his family for the past decade. A similar period of time has elapsed since I first met Ram C., although the relationship in this case has been extremely limited. In the case of Drora S., the meeting was arranged by a mutual acquaintance with the interview in mind. Where needed (although all three speak and understand varying degrees of English), the translator used was trusted by both subjects and interviewer.

The interview with Drora S. was in the translator's home, with her present only part of the time; with the two men, each in their own home and family setting, with other family members occasionally interjecting their own remarks. Each interview lasted formally for about two hours, although the occasion was broadened into a wider discussion for a period of about five hours each.

* - Ms. Gibel is program specialist in Interreligious Affairs, The American Jewish Committee. She writes frequently on Israel and the Middle East and intergroup relations for a wide variety of publications. The interviews referred to alone were done in Jerusalem, December 1982.

Drora S., Graduate Student Hebrew University, Political Science

Drora is a sabra from Rehovot, daughter of parents still living there, born in Baghdad. She is 25, slender, pretty, not especially Sephardi in appearance. She tells me with great enthusiasm (which seems to contain a bit of "I dare you to think otherwise") how much she loves Israel, jokes that every Iraqi claims to come from Baghdad, while in fact many were peasants from the countryside.

We discuss the nature of prejudice, the difference between natural preference and discrimination. Arabs like blondes, she says, so do Sephardim, people always like the opposite of what they are, what's wrong with that? Is it also possible, I ask, that Israeli society creates a feeling in Middle Eastern people that it is preferable to be blonde? She nods her head vigorously and begins to tell me her story.

Her mother came from a very wealthy, upper class home; her father the middle class. After they left Iraq he established himself in a small business, her mother stayed home and raised the family of three children. Drora's primary and junior high school years were occasionally marred by a realization that teachers often favored Ashkenazi pupils of lesser ability, assumed that Sephardi children (by appearance or recognizable family name) were intellectually inferior. Drora blames "Westernization" for increasing attitudes that "Sephardi culture is inferior."

When Drora did her army duty, in a Nachal unit, she became aware that although her unit was "integrated" there was a split, "A Beethoven group and a poker group." Sides were frequently taken in discussions along ethnic rather than individual lines.

Is it true, I ask Drora, that Iraqis are considered, and consider themselves, more successful and different from, say, Moroccans? She disagrees, and says that discrimination against all Sephardim is more common than some ethnic groups, i.e. Iraqis, like to admit. Her uncle, for example, is a career officer, a major, and although he never complains there are those in the family who feel he has been passed over for promotion by less gifted Ashkenazi superiors. His wife once gave a party for her husband's fellow officers and wives to show "we are on just as high level as you." On the other hand, Drora says, her mother has never believed that discrimination exists.

Although Drora has recently gone on her first "peace demonstration," she has great sympathy for Menachem Begin, who she feels is unjustly accused of exploiting Sephardim; that "the people feel he really likes and accepts them as they are," and resent Labor's rejection of them.

On the question of attitudes toward Arabs in her family, she tells of her grandmother, who was hurt in pogroms in Iraq, had her house burned and lost much of her property, who says, "I wish Baghdad would burn down,

and all its people with it." But her father, who had totally different experiences growing up in Iraq, feels very close to Arabs, hopes for Israel to be part of a Middle East region at peace. She tells me that even people like her grandmother, "don't hate Arabs the way Jews like you hate Germans."

Drora lives with a German young man who is working as a chef at a luxury hotel in Jerusalem. Her family doesn't know they live together, only that he is her boyfriend. Her father's reaction, "He's all right, but even a Muslim would be better. We are closer to Muslims; we have the same sense of honor and the same sense of dignity."

She decided to go to university with her family's full support, fulfilling her father's dream. She worships Naomi Chazan, the professor who encouraged her actively to go on to graduate school and contrasts this with her experience when she applied, as an undergraduate, to the H.U. school of social work. She says she wouldn't feel so bad if in her experience, and that of her friends, the overwhelming majority of social workers the school is turning out weren't Ashkenazi, with the wrong attitudes, and lack of understanding for their prospective clientele, most of whom will be Sephardi.

What needs to be done in Israel, I ask her, and can she still tell me, as she did when we began talking, that she "loves Israel and feels positively about the future." You don't stop loving your family because they're not perfect, she responds. However, she worries about the coming "war between the Jews," if things do not change. How can they change? Education, she feels, is the main key -- the emphasis on European or Western studies and culture needs to be shifted to the Middle East from the earliest grades. She claims that even in "bagrut" classes (college preparatory) there is almost no education on Middle Eastern culture or history, let alone any Islamic studies program. Drora says, "Even if we had no Holocaust, we have a history to which no attention is paid in the schools." Obviously, her concern covers both the ethnocentricity of Western Jewish history and culture being pushed in the schools to the exclusion of anything relative or positive about the Oriental communities, as well as the larger, if, to her, secondary question of encouraging an understanding of the Arab and Islamic world surrounding Israel. "I'm tired of the stereotypes," she says, "all Ashkenazim don't listen to Bach -- but they listen to American rock and despise Arabic music." She believes that teachers' attitudes more than grades determine which children are encouraged and helped to get into more prestigious college preparatory high school programs, that Sephardi names and dark skins determine teachers' assessments (even some Sephardi teachers) more than other important factors.

If Drora and her boyfriend marry they may go outside the country for awhile, as he wants "to travel while he is young." She has told him that she would not go to Germany and she would always want to come back to Israel.

Rafi, A., Bank Manager

Rafi was born forty years ago, in Fez, Morocco. His father, a middle class businessman with strong Zionist convictions, convinced his mother, a primary school teacher from a higher class family, to make the illegal journey to pre-state Palestine when Rafi was about 4, his brother two years older, and the baby, a sister, 2. Four other siblings were born in Israel and all have done army service, including the girls. They came originally to Pardess Hanna; after the exodus of Arabs from West Jerusalem during the War of Independence they were given a large and comfortable house in what had been until then the fashionable Arab quarter of Bakka; the parents and youngest brother, still unmarried continue to reside there.

Rafi is a cheerful, stocky man of virile appearance and a markedly Arabic accented Hebrew. I have seen him once at the branch of the major Israeli bank he manages in Jerusalem; even the suit and tie and more subdued manner there did little to make him look more typical of my stereotype of what bankers look like; Rafi looks like a prizefighter.

When Rafi was fifteen years old, an apprentice to a mechanic, he saw a newspaper ad for a vocational boarding school offering free board and tuition to young men with the necessary aptitude - and a willingness to serve an extra year of army duty after graduation. At 20 he met his wife, Rachel, from the notorious Musrara section, and they soon married. When he was 25 he joined the bank and has steadily climbed its career ladder. The A.'s have four children; a daughter of 16, a son of 14, the apple of his eye, student at one of the most prestigious Jerusalem college preparatory high schools, and two smaller sons of 9 and 2½. The interview takes place in his home in Ramot, a comfortable apartment of four bedrooms, a small dining room and tiny living room which are immaculately kept and decorated by Rachel, a gifted needlewoman and cook, who has never worked outside their home. Last year they took a six week vacation in France, Canada and the United States (from Los Angeles to New York) and the compact room divider which separates salon from dining area is well stocked with a large color TV, tape deck, stereo and liquor. This is a solidly middle class, middle income home and Rafi is a highly family, home oriented man, reflecting closely his own upbringing, although he and Rachel are less observant than his parents.

As Rafi recalls growing up in Bakka, where a majority of the population were Sephardim resettled into the old Arab homes that had been abandoned, he mentions that his elementary school had only Ashkenazi teachers (except for gym) and that children from an adjacent Ashkenazi neighborhood attended in equal numbers.

Rafi points out that the "maabarot" were only built in Baaka and other areas in 1952, when the large wave from Kurdistan, Iraq and Morocco needed immediate housing.

Some from the maabarot children went to his school, but most went to religious schools. I ask Rafi why his father, whom I know to be quite orthodox, did not send him to religious school (Israel has a dual system) and he responds that he believes an older brother of his father's persuaded him the secular school was better. "Furthermore, father was not so 'dati' in those days; in Morocco synagogues were not only for religion, they were communal meeting places for the men."

Looking back, Rafi reflects that the European teachers in the schools, dedicated to making "Israelis" out of Sephardi youngsters, were really, unconsciously, trying to make them "European." "If there had been Sephardi teachers, there would have been more balanced emphasis on both cultures." While Rafi admits that many of the more educated Sephardim went to France and other parts of the world, while the less educated, particularly from 1952 on, came to Israel, he insists that ". . . many Iraqis, some Moroccans," did have the cultural and educational skills to make good teachers, but for some reason were never used.

Rafi has mixed feelings about whether or not there has been overt or covert discrimination in Israel, or whether it is simply a question of well intentioned mistakes. He, like his father, is a life-long "Ben Gurion man." He was one of the active supporters of Rafi (the political faction which withdrew from Mapai) and one of the organizers of Yigal Yadin's Dash movement. He loves Israel; he and his family, he says, would never leave, and he has often, over the years, teased the interviewer about her "radical politics." Nevertheless, he has some strong criticisms of past Israeli policies and attitudes.

"I'm sick of hearing about the cave dwellers from the Atlas Mountains. The truth is that many people who were brought here in the 50's wound up living in worse conditions than those they had left behind."

On the other hand, he remembers his army days with fondness (he finished his main service after 1966, but of course, like all Israeli men up to their fifties, does his regular once a year miluim and was called up for service in Lebanon during the latest crisis). "The army served as a melting pot and I got along fine with my Ashkenazi buddies, kibbutzniks, moshavniks."

He feels that the ethnic problem was aggravated by so many immigrants coming at one time, in the early fifties, "when we were in such bad economic shape. Without this we'd be a normal Western country." How does he define "Western"? "It's not America -- there is a problem when we speak of liberalism or socialism, as opposed to the political framework of Arab countries, compared to democracies. I want to see a new synthesis of the best of both."

I ask Rafi if he is familiar with the famous Katz Commission report -- he is -- and how he explains the continuing exceptionally high rate -- almost a decade after Katz completed his task -- of poverty, illiteracy, crime and

prostitution among North African youth. If one rejects, on the one hand (and many Israeli civil servants of Ashkenazi background interviewed by me over the years unfortunately do not) the concept of this population's innate inferiority, and, on the other, a policy of deliberate discrimination, what is the answer?

Rafi speaks of the Yemenites, how well they have assimilated. He suggests this is largely related to the fact that they were a smaller group and that their "collective personality" was more "modest and subdued" than that of the North Africans. "The Iraqis who came were largely from the merchant class and with money, so they were absorbed into commerce and middle level management and did well.

"Moroccans came in three major waves: in '48, '52, '56." Those who came in 1948 were well absorbed (including his family for although his father never rose above minor civil servant status and his mother worked for many years cleaning offices, never letting anyone forget that "in Fez I had maids," the brothers and sisters have all done well and share Rafi's middle class, professional status.) They found housing in deserted Arab quarters, many of which had been middle and upper middle class and a major building boom made jobs plentiful.

"Those who came in the '52 aliyah were sent straight to maabarot (the tin shack and quonset hut and even tent neighborhoods which housed them for many years.) They felt themselves to be in cages . . . and with that group came the problems. Family structure broke down . . . Rafi's wife, Rachel, who has been serving tea, coffee, small delicacies and listening quietly, becomes quite aroused at this point in Rafi's story. I know something of their history, know that his family and even hers considered he was marrying "down," that her family still lives in the despised Musrara section, one of the breeding grounds for the original Black Panthers, and that she rarely expresses a political opinion. The translator tells me later that although she has known this family intimately for many years, she was shocked to hear Rachel's story, as it had never been referred to before. There is always a fierce pride to Rachel, now there is anger as she tells about how her father committed suicide during this period because he couldn't find a job and had to send his children out to work.

"Many began to speak of going back to Morocco," Rafi continues. "They were shocked to learn that their belief that unless you had four or more children you had achieved little was despised in Israel."

But even worse was to come, in Rafi's opinion. For then the Shikunim -- the large public housing projects "began to be built, which were even worse than the maabarot, because there, at least, they had a little garden, to pull out a few leaves of 'nana'."

One can't interview a banker without asking his opinion of the economy. Rafi responds that the economy must be looked at in two parts -- the state economy and personal economy.

"Since the Likud, the individual economy has risen, has improved. That is, in the perception of the average person, more things are available and there is more money to buy them.

"The state economy is getting worse. We're falling into terrible debt, although we don't fall to the level of Mexico or Poland. Our external debt is getting huger every week; why do they continue to lend us money; that's the big question? Because Israel's record of repayment is the best in the world. There is confidence in the world and in America that if peace is achieved by Israel there will be a strong independent economy.

"The government attitude today, inside the country, is give the people bread and circuses. It's a miracle that a country where inflation is over 100% hasn't gone even further in the direction of Argentina . . . Because of that people looking on from the outside say there must be a game going on . . . Mexico has a low standard of living; in Israel our standard of living is so high . . . we have no problems, we live well. As long as the country continues to get money from America . . ."

Rafi is optimistic for his children's future but worries about the Likud government. They are, he believes, moving in the direction of South American governments, "which won't allow the people to speak freely."

As long as Begin lives, Rafi believes, the people will vote for him. Without Begin? He brightens. Navon could do it. Maybe Weizman. Sharon could only win if he gets the support of Levy, Shamir and Aridor, and that is highly unlikely.

Ram C., businessman

Ram gives his age as 45 but I know from other sources that he is 50. I understand the reason for this bit of vanity: his second wife is a much younger woman with whom he has started a new family, including a boy of 4 and a baby of six months. When they receive us in their luxurious (even by American standards) and well furnished home with good prints on the wall, fine antique cooper, silver and brass trays and other implements, a beautiful marble floor replacing the ubiquitous Israeli tile in the salon of their Ramat Eshkol flat, they are both dressed in fashionable jogging suits, he having just come from a yoga class, she from aerobics.

Although he is charming and hospitable, and although his wife is a very traditional young woman who delights in serving him and staying in the background, this is my most difficult interview. He is clearly pleased he is being interviewed as an example of a "successful Sephardi." It is less clear whether he approves of the interviewer, an independent and, from his perspective, aggressive woman, who asks, perhaps, too many probing questions, until he firmly states "I don't discuss politics."

Ram has a very lucrative business, offering maintenance contracts to offices and new housing developments. When I suggest that although I have no intention of asking his income, but would it be correct to suggest that he is in a very high income bracket, definitely "upper middle class," he smiles affirmation. His wife's last birthday present was a new Volvo, not a cheap gift in a country like Israel, where automobiles are twice as expensive as in the U.S.

He was born in Tangier. His father brought the family to pre-state Palestine in 1947 and Ram thinks there was some connection to conditions after the Spanish Civil War. His father was a traditional Jew with strong Zionist commitment, whose first job was as a hired laborer, building crates for oranges in the Moshav Be'er Yaacov. Eventually there were nine brothers and sisters. Ram was in the left-wing Hashomer Hazair Youth Movement and remembers his father tearing up the "Marxist books" the movement gave him to study. He lived for a while on one of the HH kibbutzim.

He completely rejects any notion of discrimination in Israel and insists he never experienced it nor felt any difference between himself and Ashkenazi friends and colleagues. He is quite adamant about this point, almost sullen. However, when assured by the interviewer that his response will be recorded as given, he becomes more relaxed and volunteers that although he is sure discrimination never existed in the army, he does sometimes brood over an incident that occurred in 1966 - when he worked in civil service and was passed over for a promotion while a less qualified Ashkenazi colleague received it. Perhaps the problem exists, he suggests, but it is definitely not the norm. "Israel is just like other societies, where people don't like each other because they are different."

He scorns the Black Panthers. "They are people not working, not involved, never tried to raise themselves." He suddenly adds, "Like America, blacks and whites in Israel don't get along sometimes."

Again he tells me he won't discuss politics (my reputation precedes me) and then comments, "It's healthy for a country when there is a rotation; first the left, then the right."

Ram makes it clear that he approves mightily of the Begin/Aharon government, that he voted for Likud, intends to vote for it again, and will make sure his wife continues to vote Likud (the latter said with a fond smile at his spouse).

He then, in what I find not at all atypical among many Israelis who have no strong ideological commitment and who I find more pragmatic than American voters, tells me that "the majority in this country -- even those who support Likud -- believe that a Palestinian state is inevitable; the question is how and when. This is certainly true in the circles in which I move -- mostly people who vote Likud."

Then how can he plan to move to the villa in the occupied territories he is presently completing? He laughs, tells me, "I will be a pawn for peace, and make a profit too. Remember Yamit?" He says this like a reasonable business man, not a cynic.

His wife, who has laid out a tempting spread, quietly interjects that although she did vote Likud as he instructed her, if "Ezer Weizman really comes back into politics, I will vote for him."

Ram is serenely confident about the future although he says, "life is good but it could be better. People owe too much money." He expects his children to go to university. It pleases him that he can do so much more for his children than his parents were able to do for him.

NOTES AND CONCLUSIONS

Drora S., Rafi A. and Ram C. may be considered typical of many Israelis of Afro-Asian heritage, either first generation Sabras or transplanted at an early age, who belong to the forty percent of Sephardim that escaped the culture of poverty which traps so many of their brethren.

It should be pointed out, however, that this writer had to go outside the circle of intellectuals and academics she has known in their community over the years, as on the whole they are far less sanguine, if equally successful in economic and social terms, than my three subjects. American Jews who care about Israel and wish to better understand the real significance of the widely misunderstood and misinterpreted Sephardi support for Begin, on the one hand, and its disaffection from the Labor party, on the other (and the two are not by any means the same thing) will, I believe, have to begin talking and listening to different people than those who have been their interpreters of the problem, when it was referred to at all, in recent years.

Over the past seventeen years I have had the unique opportunity of interviewing "everybody who is anybody" in the Sephardi community in Israel: eg., Yitzhak Navon, when he was still a member of the Knesset and one of Ben Gurion's right-hand aides; Charlie Biton, the Black Panther, who finally made it to the Knesset by way of the Communist party! In people like journalist Nissim Rejwan and sociologist Sami Smooha, as "the problem" was denied and suppressed, denounced and dismissed, I have seen the growing rage, cynicism and frustration toward both the Israeli Left and Right, of people who are "successful," but increasingly bitter.

My recent interviews with some of the young intellectuals and leaders of Tami, the new Sephardi party led by Aharon Abuhatzzeira are a case in point that should be closely observed. Perhaps their feeling toward the present government can best be summed up by a now famous scene, flashed over Israel TV one evening from the Zionist Congress debacle, showing one of these young Tami men shaking his fist in the face of a Likud leader and screaming "We put you in power, and we're going to kick you out."

This does not mean that he, or the intellectuals and academics presently unwilling to be involved with any political movement or party are going to move toward Labor, and American Jews should understand why. These Sephardim know perfectly well the

Labor-oriented sources of the stories occasionally breaking into Western media, whether Jewish or secular, about the alleged great unwashed tidal wave of Sephardi hard-hats, who support Begin because they hate Arabs. They know, as do most informed people, that Sephardim are noticeable by their absence from the movements that best symbolize this spirit, particularly Gush Emunim. They know, what Labor leaders -- and others on the Left, to their shame -- refuse to deal with, or, worse yet, still defend -- that the Labor movement, out of ignorance, and sometimes out of prejudice, was largely responsible for the conditions which created the famous "gap."

Finally, they know in their gut what this writer heard first-hand from many labor-affiliated, Ashkenazi leaders, beginning in 1966, when the Government of Israel arranged dozens of appointments for me, over a period of a month, with politicians, educators and others who could answer questions I was raising in relation to this subject. Even then, Sephardi leaders I met with, including Navon, assured me that the problem was real, was growing, would explode if not addressed. The Ashkenazi response ranged from denying a problem to suggestions that "moroccan brains are smaller," to the pious assertion that "It will take ten generations for them to catch up with us." Nor are Sephardim unaware of the fact that one of the major reasons for Golda Meir's government's drive to bring Russian Jews to Israel was the concern that "we not become a black nation." Whether the word "black" was used, or whether the code word "Levantine" sometimes was employed, just such rationales were shared with me, when (as a new AJC staff person whose very different attitudes and sympathies were unknown to the speakers at the time) I had meetings with Israeli officials in the early and middle seventies.

What can Disapora Jews do about this problem, which has recently take on some new, urgent and sinister overtones, with the unfortunate outbreak in Israel of wall sloganeering against "Ashkenazim," and toward solutions? I would make the following modest suggestions.

1. Every leadership delegation traveling to Israel should allow a minimum of one day to meet with Sephardi leaders representing a broad grouping of politically affiliated and unaffiliated, establishment and non-establishment, academic and professional individuals. Sources must be found who are trusted in the Sephardi community, and who are serious about its importance. Our leadership in the past has been exposed only to a minimal number of Sephardim. Nor should one accept the argument that "they don't speak English," or that the "WOJAC speaks for them." Neither is true.

2. AJC should explore sponsorship of seminars, perhaps in cooperation with other Jewish agencies and institutions, where Sephardi leaders will have an opportunity to address the questions they feel important, and those to which they feel related. American Jewish leaders should participate with these.

3. American Jews, particularly those who have experience with fighting racist, religious or ethnic stereotypes in this nation, can help set a tone that would, I believe, over a period of time, make a meaningful contribution to raising the level of the discussion. Sitting in over the last decade on a number of semi-public and private meetings under AJC auspices in which Israelis of European or Western extraction expressed, in dubious terms, their sense of Sephardi intellectual capacity or cultural development, it has been disturbing to note that these assumptions, on the whole, have not been challenged, whether out of politeness or lack of knowledge.

One doesn't have to be Sephardi to recognize that there has been a tendency in Israel to exalt everything "Western," and denigrate everything "Eastern." American Jews need to become more familiar with -- and should raise questions about -- what is taught in Israeli schools about Sephardim, and with teacher attitudes -- as the interviews above suggest. Nor is it necessary to reverse the bias -- not all Sephardi cuisine is superior to all Ashkenazi cuisine any more than every Eastern European Jew comes from a personal heritage combining the Baal Shem Tov, Einstein and Chagall. It would be helpful, however, if we demonstrate some healthy skepticism to those Israelis who have dominated the information we have been fed on this issue, in our future contacts.

As has been said in a different context, only Israelis can vote in Israeli elections, only they can finally determine the shape and health of their society. But if American Jews who support Israel financially and politically do have a right, indeed a responsibility, to dissent from policies they believe are harmful to Israel's long term self interest, then surely the question of the condition, treatment and attitudes of Israel's majority population, the Sephardim, is one with which we must become familiar and to which we must address ourselves.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date February 2, 1984

to Marc Tanenbaum

from George Gruen

subject Report on Carter Middle East Consultation

In converting this from ~~an internal memorandum~~ an internal memorandum to a general report, I decided to omit my concluding paragraph in which I wrote; in view of Carter's continuing interest in forging a bipartisan citizen coalition behind his ideas for Middle East peace, "I therefore believe that discussions should be held to examine how we can best channel this interest in a positive direction and prevent it from becoming a new source of acrimony between Israel and the United States."

I think you might want to incorporate this idea in your covering note to our people.



P.S. In terms of institutional credit, you might want to note my intervention regarding the Fez declaration as inconsistent with U.S. peace efforts (pp.8-9.)

**THE CARTER CENTER MIDDLE EAST CONSULTATION:
What Significance for U.S. Peace Efforts?**

By **DR. GEORGE E. GRUEN**
Director, Middle East Affairs



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**THE CARTER CENTER MIDEAST CONSULTATION:
What Significance for U. S. Peace Efforts?**

**by George E. Gruen
Director, Middle East Affairs**

The inaugural project of the Carter Center of Emory University was a four-day Middle East Consultation, which brought together an impressive array of "policymakers and scholars" to discuss "the region's present and future condition." The objective, as stated in the official program, was that "by bringing together people of reflection and action, the Carter Center hopes not only to encourage better understanding of the issues facing the Middle East, but to generate practical suggestions for salutary change."

This report is a personal assessment of the extent to which the conference, held in Atlanta, Georgia in November, 1983, met its stated objectives. I will evaluate the positive and negative features of the consultation, the follow up activities that are being planned, and the problems, challenges and possible opportunities that are likely to emerge as a consequence of the declared intention of former President Jimmy Carter, with the active support of former President Gerald Ford, to influence American public attitudes and governmental policies with regard to Middle East issues.

The consultation consisted of ten public sessions on the following topics: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Soviet Interests in the Middle East, Syria, Jordan, The West Bank, Israel, The Palestinian Community, Summation. The subject of United States Interests in the Middle East was dealt with in brief remarks by Carter and Ford at the formal dinner on Sunday evening.

All these sessions and the dinner were open to the media. Cable Network News taped the sessions. Attendance was by invitation only, and separate tickets were needed for admission to each event. The "specially invited guests" from out of town, such as myself and other academic and institutional representatives with Middle East interests, were able to receive tickets to all the sessions. Students and faculty from Emory and members of the Atlanta community had to apply for tickets on a session by session basis, subject to availability.

The only non-public discussions were during the luncheons provided for the conference participants. According to several Israeli and American participants with whom I spoke, no diplomatic breakthroughs or even significant departures from publicly stated positions developed during these private sessions. It is possible that Carter or Ford had some important conversations on a one-to-one basis with some of the foreign diplomats. There is always in diplomacy what is known as the back channel, but I would be surprised if the foreign participants chose to relay important messages to the United States Government via either of the two former presidents.

Relevance and Focus of the Conference

This brings me to the question of the relevance of the consultation to the central issues in the Middle East today. As the above listing of topics makes clear, the Carter Center Consultation focused on Jimmy Carter's perceived priorities: the need to bring about full compliance with the provisions of the Camp David Accords and to seek ways to move toward a comprehensive Arab-Israel peace by broadening participation in the Camp David process to include Palestinian and Jordanian representatives, and, eventually, the Syrians and Lebanese as well.

While this remains a noble objective, one got a sense that the conference organizers were somewhat out of touch with current Middle East realities. Since the conference was first planned more than a year ago, the organizers might not have anticipated the fighting in Tripoli between pro- and anti-Arafat elements in the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was in the headlines at the time the conference met. However, the deepening split within the PLO had been widely predicted by Middle East analysts in the aftermath of the PLO removal from Beirut in August 1982.

Since the Iran-Iraq war has been raging for more than three years, the failure to devote even one session to the Persian Gulf conflict seems inexplicable. Indeed, Professor Udo Steinbach, the director of the Deutsches Orient Institut, in Hamburg, made a point of noting that the threatened escalation of the Iran-Iraq war to the closing of the Straits of Hormuz and the subsequent interruption of oil supplies would have far more wide-reaching economic and political consequences for Western Europe and Japan than the likely developments on the Palestinian issue. He added that the relative strategic positions of the United States and the USSR could also be profoundly affected by changes in the Iraqi or Iranian regimes. (The explanation I was given by a conference organizer for the omission was that since one could not cover everything, they decided to "concentrate on the core issues." I suspect that there may have also been a psychological factor at work. Camp David was President Carter's outstanding foreign policy success. Any discussion of the Iran-Iraq war would inevitably involve a discussion of the Khomeini regime's policies, including the holding of American hostages for 444 days, and their release thirty minutes after Ronald Reagan's inauguration. Not exactly a subject Jimmy Carter would be eager to recall!)

The extent to which the Middle East has changed since the Carter presidency was revealed in other ways as well. After one passed through the metal detectors at the entrance to the main lobby, one was greeted by a large photo-display of scenes from Camp David and other meetings of President Carter with Middle East dignitaries. The first larger than life color photo showed a smiling Jimmy Carter shaking hands with a smiling Hafez al-Assad. This was at their meeting in Geneva in May 1977 during the brief American-Syrian honeymoon. In contrast to the smiling Assad of 1977, the Syrian representative at the consultation, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Farouk al-Sharaa, launched into a vitriolic tirade against the United States Government for its allegedly aggressive stand toward the Arab world and its joining with Israel in plans to

threaten Syria. President Carter himself interrupted one session to announce that he had just been handed an AP dispatch that Syria had called up its reserves and ordered a general mobilization.

Much of the discussion during the conference concentrated on how one could bring about a resumption of the Camp David peace process. It was left to former Ambassador Philip Habib to stress in the concluding session that while he shared the desire to achieve a comprehensive peace, unless immediate steps were taken to resolve the crisis in Lebanon, there would not be any Lebanon left by the time talks for a comprehensive peace got underway.

Intellectually Stimulating but Diplomatically Sterile Talks

Academically, the discussions were certainly interesting and it was a unique experience to attend a four-day seminar in which the professors were two former Presidents of the United States, who took an active role in subjecting the speakers to questions and at times even tough cross examination. However, from the standpoint of making diplomatic progress the format and composition were not likely to bring success. The presence of the public and representatives of the media made it difficult for the governmental speakers to go beyond their official positions. For example, when Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan was asked whether in view of the intensive fighting within the PLO, his brother King Hussein was now more ready to work with West Bank Palestinians to create a negotiating team bypassing Yasir Arafat, Hassan said that it would not be appropriate for him to comment on this in public, especially since it might appear that he was trying to take advantage of Arafat's misfortune. He added that he had also to consider the fact that Jordanian diplomats had been attacked in three countries in the past few weeks by a "group that is expert in terrorism" (identified by others as the Syrian-backed Abu Nidal group that had defected from al-Fatah a decade ago).

Moreover, the American participants, while quite distinguished comprised as Who's Who, or more precisely a Who Was Who of American diplomacy in the Middle East, including former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; Ambassador Philip Habib; Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz; former National Security Advisor, Dr. Zbigniew Brezezinski; Dr. Joseph Sisco, former Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Dr. William Quandt and Dr. Harold Saunders, formerly of the National Security Council and Department of State. Yet not one of the official participants was a current member of the Reagan Administration. Thus, the absence of any senior member of the present administration undercut whatever aspirations former President Carter may have had that the Carter Center Consultation would somehow serve a real diplomatic purpose, and not only from a public relations and public education role.

The absence of any formal Israeli governmental representative also militated against the conference serving as a channel for diplomacy. In addition to retired diplomat Gideon Raphael, and former Jerusalem Vice-Mayor Meron Benvenisti, there were several Israeli academic participants, including Prof. Itamar Rabinovich, Director, Dayan Center of the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University; Prof. Yehoshua Porath, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem; and Prof. Haim Shaked currently at the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami. They did a good job in

clarifying the issues, but they were generally Israelis of the opposition Labor Alignment or even more dovish in their personal views. At his concluding press conference, President Carter said that the governmental representatives from Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia had privately expressed their appreciation to him for the opportunity of hearing Israeli views firsthand. At the concluding public session, however, after Carter had noted that he was pleased that the Arabs didn't walk out when the Israelis spoke, the Syrian delegate stressed that he came only because this was an "academic" gathering and that the Israelis were not official governmental spokesmen.

Controversy Over Israeli Policy

There was some difference of opinion among Jewish observers at the conference as to whether or not the Israel Government acted wisely in declining to send an official participant. President Carter had invited Prime Minister Begin to attend or to designate someone when Carter had visited Jerusalem in March 1983. The official explanation for Israeli non-participation was the alleged participation of PLO members. Both the State Department and President Carter denied that any PLO member was invited to participate in the conference. Professor Walid Khalidi, a Palestinian-born political scientist at the American University of Beirut who is currently at Harvard, led the discussion on the Palestinian Community. Professor Khalidi, who has in articles in Foreign Affairs advocated the creation of a West Bank Palestinian state that would live in peace with Israel, emphasized several times that "I represent no one but my own conscience," but added that he believed that the personal views he expressed were shared by a majority of the Palestinian people. Professor Khalidi, an articulate advocate of Palestinian nationalism, concedes that he has met numerous times with Arafat, but insists that his objective was to convince the PLO leader to renounce terrorism and accept coexistence with Israel. Khalidi denies the Israeli charge that he is a formal member of the Palestine National Council, the PLO's legislative body.

I doubt that the Israeli decision not to participate officially was based solely on the technical question of whether Professor Khalidi or Professor Nafez Nazzal of Bir Zeit University, who was a panelist in the discussion of the West Bank, were formally affiliated with the PLO. I believe the Israelis felt that the Begin and Shamir policies would be the focus of criticism during the conference and they did not wish to dignify such a conference by official participation. Indeed many speakers, including Carter, Ford and Brzezinski, repeated the charge that the Begin government had departed from the letter and spirit of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 with regard to the West Bank, and had violated the alleged commitment regarding an unlimited freeze on settlements, which Carter claims (and Begin denies) was given by the Prime Minister at Camp David. (Sol Linowitz, in an op-ed article, "Questioning Begin's Credibility," Washington Post, June 16, 1983, attempted to defuse the issue by attributing it to an honest misunderstanding, but it apparently still rankles Jimmy Carter.)

The prominence given to the West Bank settlements issue was reflected in the fact that this was one of two sessions--the other was on Soviet Interests in the Middle East--held in the Glenn Memorial Church Auditorium, which has a seating capacity of about 2,400. The other sessions were in the much smaller

Woodruff Medical Center Administration Building Auditorium, which has a capacity of only 500. I was told that this reflected the organizers' estimate of which sessions would attract the greatest public interest and demand for tickets. My hunch is that the decision also reflected Carter's own sense of priorities and the two issues on which his administration differed significantly from that of President Reagan. Carter in fact criticized the Reagan Administration for retreating from the Carter position that the settlements were "illegal." (Reagan has called them legal but lately has called for a freeze to induce the Jordanians to enter negotiations.)

Projections of Demographic and Political Trends on the West Bank

The major presentation at the West Bank session was by former deputy mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti, who outlined the findings of his data base study of developments in the West Bank. The actual statistics he presented provided a mixed picture. On an individual basis, the Arabs were prospering, building much new housing and benefitting economically from the Israeli settlement activity, as well as from remittances from Palestinians working outside the territories. Virtually none of the new Jewish settlements were ideologically motivated or depriving Arabs of arable land. They were either urban or suburban, serving as bedroom communities for Israelis who commuted to work in Israel within the Green Line (the pre-1967 Armistice Demarcation Line). Benvenisti noted that the rate of Arab emigration was less under the Israeli administration than it had been under the Jordanian, and he predicted that despite continued Israeli settlement activity there would be no significant change in the ratio of Arabs to Jews either in the territories or in the entire region from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River over the course of the next ten to twenty years.

But against these relatively optimistic figures, Benvenisti set the fact that there has been stagnation in the communal and political life of the Arabs in the territories, and he ended with a dire prediction of growing turmoil and strife unless there was a change in current political policies and actions. Benvenisti was followed by Nafez Nazzal, a political scientist from the West Bank's Bir Zeit University, who is currently a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania. Nazzal painted a grim picture of the repression and suppression he said was being inflicted upon the Palestinians by the Israeli military authorities, contended that there was no legal way for Palestinians to seek redress from the Israelis' arbitrary actions, and concluded with a passionate appeal for American help to assure the Palestinians of their human rights. His remarks brought the strongest and most sustained applause for any speaker at the conference.

Limited Opportunity to Present Israeli Position

There was no time for questions at the conclusion of the West Bank session, so it was not possible for anyone in the audience to challenge Nazzal's sweeping charges or to point out, for example, that the Arabs have in several instances brought cases to the Israel High Court of Justice and succeeded in obtaining court orders revoking planned land confiscations. The Israeli authorities have also taken measures to curb vigilante action by extremists among the Israeli settlers.

Carter announced that questions regarding the West Bank settlements and the situation of the Palestinians could be raised at the following sessions devoted to Israel and the Palestinian Community. But since those were held in the smaller auditorium and required other tickets, few of those at the session in the church had the opportunity to hear Gideon Raphael, the former director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, present the Israeli perspective.

After noting that he was not an official government spokesman, but only a retired diplomat, Raphael presented what he said was the broad consensus within Israel. He emphasized the extent to which conflict and turmoil in the Middle East stemmed from local disputes that had nothing to do with the Arab-Israel conflict or the Palestinian issue. He noted the danger of the superpower rivalries, and stressed Israel's desire for peace, its readiness to compromise in negotiations, and its commitment to the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon.

Raphael expressed appreciation for Crown Prince Hassan's concern over the spread of terrorism and suggested the creation of an Alliance to Counter Terrorism (ACT). He also repeated an Israeli proposal that the Middle East become a nuclear free zone and suggested that the Carter Center might well be the venue for academic discussions on how to curb the dangerous arms race and prevent nuclear proliferations in the Middle East. Raphael did not specifically respond to the Benvenisti or Nazzal presentations, but emphasized that the root cause of the Palestinians' plight was their refusal to negotiate. He quoted Abba Eban's remark that "the Palestinians have never missed a chance to lose an opportunity."

Raphael did respond specifically to some of the Arab remarks. For example, the new Saudi Ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, had complained that Israel's refusal to heed a request relayed by U.S. envoy Robert McFarlane that Israel delay its withdrawal from the Shuf mountains by 72 hours had allegedly resulted in the scuttling of a delicate Saudi effort, in which he was involved, to bring about an agreement between President Amin Gemayel and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Raphael noted that Israel gets blamed no matter what it does--the Arabs complain that Israel refuses to withdraw from the West Bank and then complain again when Israel does withdraw from the Beirut area. Many speakers had earlier commented on the diplomatic skills of the articulate, suave, slender, Western-dressed Prince Bandar, who belied the traditional stereotypes of the Saudis, and who had played an effective behind-the-scenes role in Washington during the AWACS fight. Raphael picked up on this and noted that if Prince Bandar had personally come to Jerusalem, instead of relying on the Americans to relay his messages, the Israel Government would surely have "succumbed to his irresistible charm" and agreed to delay the Shuf withdrawal.

Suave Saudi Envoy Reiterates Opposition to Israel

Despite his excellent English and moderately phrased language, the essence of Prince Bandar's message was quite negative from the Israeli point of view. His address was the only text made available to the press. When one reads it carefully one finds a subtle restatement of the Saudis' traditional rejection of a Jewish state as alien to the concept of Islamic sovereignty. Following a plea

for the West to understand their deep commitment to Islamic values and to stop looking at the Saudis simply in terms of their oil and strategic location, the new Ambassador implicitly compared Israel to the short-lived Crusader Kingdom in Palestine:

American attitudes and policy toward the Middle East often seem to have little sense of what is deeply rooted, proven and abiding in our part of the world -- which peoples and institutions have verified themselves there over the course of many centuries and which have their own broad-based staying power in the region. And what, in contrast, is a passing transplant, dependent on permanent and ever-increasing artificial respiration from outside -- yet unwilling or unable to become a part of the area and to respect the longer-term realities there.

In a much earlier period, the European Crusades were able to maintain a costly, bloody and precarious presence of sorts on and off for about a century at the eastern edge of the Mediterranean. But that is hardly any time at all in history and as the abiding patterns in our part of the world must be measured.

(Significantly, the text released by the Saudi Information Office did not contain his remarks about the Israeli withdrawal from the Shuf.)

Clash Between Syrian and Lebanese Representatives

Syria's attitude to Lebanon evoked an interesting exchange among the Syrian, Lebanese and Israeli speakers. Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Farouk al-Sharaa complained that the Lebanese-Israeli agreement of May 17 not only threatened Syria's security but violated Lebanon's sovereignty by permitting continued Israeli reconnaissance flights over Lebanese territory. Dr. Wadi Haddad, the Special Advisor for National Affairs to the Lebanese President, responded that while Lebanon would be sensitive to the security concerns of neighboring Syria, no one had a right to tell Lebanon with whom to conclude agreements and how to preserve its national interests. The Syrian delegate insisted that Syrian forces were in Lebanon not as occupiers but at the invitation of the Lebanese, and would withdraw only after the Israelis had concluded an unconditional withdrawal without any political gains. The Lebanese delegate, in response to a question from Carter as to whether the Lebanese Government had specifically requested the withdrawal of the Syrian as well as the Israeli forces, responded that the Lebanese Government had done so "many times," the most recent being a letter from President Gemayel to President Assad "on the eve of the Geneva reconciliation talks."

When his turn came, Gideon Raphael noted that the Syrians had never formally recognized Lebanese sovereignty by establishing an embassy in Beirut. As regards the matter of Israeli overflights, he revealed that when the Syrian forces first entered Lebanon in 1976, the Syrians had directly assured Israel that their forces were entering only as "peacekeepers," that they would not threaten Israel's interests, and that the Syrians agreed specifically not to

interfere with the continuation of Israeli aerial reconnaissance flights. Raphael added, "I know, because I was the recipient of President Assad's message." Mr. al-Sharaa did not respond.

Sharp Exchange Over Soviet Intentions

On the Soviet Union, while Reagan sees the Russians as our main adversary in the region, Carter spoke glowingly about the value of the October 1, 1977 U.S.-Soviet joint communiqué, which was to serve as a basis for Soviet cooperation with the U.S. in co-chairing a Geneva Conference to bring about a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israel conflict. Although the Geneva conference has not been resumed, Carter in Atlanta continued to advocate a cooperative rather than confrontational approach to the Soviet Union. It was on this issue that former President Ford openly differed with Carter. After Soviet Embassy Counselor Alexander Zotov had delivered a speech emphasizing Moscow's peaceful intentions, its eagerness to resume the kind of cooperation that had been symbolized by the October 1977 joint communiqué, and had professed a reluctance to ship arms to the Middle East, President Ford sharply questioned Zotov as to how his protestations of peaceful intentions squared with Moscow's actual conduct. Ford cited the rapid and massive Soviet resupplying of Syria with the most sophisticated surface to air missiles and other armaments, which had contributed to the recent hardening of Syria's position on Lebanon and its growing militancy. UCLA Professor Steve Spiegel commented that the Soviet statement reminded him of the song from "Oklahoma," "I'm just a girl who can't say no."

Is the Fez Declaration Compatible with Camp David?

A recurrent theme of the consultation was that "time is of the essence" and that the peace process should not be allowed to drift simply because of the approaching American elections. At the opening session on Sunday afternoon, Usamah al-Baz, Political Affairs Advisor to the Egyptian President, suggested informal preliminary talks to determine on what points there was agreement and then leave to more formal sessions the issues in dispute. In his remarks at the dinner that night President Carter endorsed this idea. Even though the Lebanon War had captured the headlines at the time he travelled through the middle East last March, he said, most of his discussions had centered on dealing with the root causes of the Arab-Israel conflict. Despite predictable differences on details, he said that in his discussions with Middle East leaders he found a "surprising degree of compatibility in the principles" contained in Security Council resolution 242, the Camp David Accords, the Reagan initiative and also the Fez Arab League Summit resolutions. He believed this provided the basis for finding common ground to make peace. President Ford also endorsed the idea of putting all these four items in the hopper as a basis for resuming talks.

During the brief question period, I asked for clarification from the two former presidents regarding the assumed compatibility of the Arab League's Fez declaration with the other three bases of the American-sponsored peace process. I pointed out that the Sinai Agreement of 1975, concluded with the help of President Ford, and the Camp David Accords under President Carter were based upon Resolutions 242 and 338 and had involved direct Egyptian-Israeli negotiations with American assistance. Similarly, the Reagan initiative, while

calling for Israeli concessions, called on the Arab states to clearly recognize Israel and enter into direct negotiations with her. This approach was in marked contrast to the Fez statement which simply set out the list of Arab demands against Israel and called for the creation of an independent Palestinian State, but did not provide for any active commitment by the Arab states to recognize Israel or enter into negotiations. The elliptical Fez statement that "the UN Security Council guarantees the security of all states in the region," I added, did not reassure Israel in view of the failure of the UN to assure the security of Afghanistan or bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war. I therefore wondered how they could find the Fez declaration compatible with the active negotiating approach they had successfully pursued in their efforts for peace?

President Ford replied that he was merely suggesting that the Fez declaration be listed together with the other elements as "a bait to hook" the Arabs to agree to come to the bargaining table, and then substantive negotiations could begin. He agreed that the Fez declaration was not an "operative" basis for negotiations. President Carter added that the Fez declaration "was too general to suit me personally," but that if the Israelis wanted to say they were coming on the basis of 242 and Camp David, and some Arabs said they were coming on the basis of Fez, and others preferred the Reagan initiative, that was all right as long as they agreed to meet together. The crucial thing, he repeated, was the readiness of the parties to negotiate.

Several persons came up to me afterwards to thank me for having pointed out the inadequacies of the Fez declaration. Sol Linowitz and Gideon Raphael later underscored this point in their own remarks as well. They pointed out that if Resolution 242 or the Camp David Accords were diluted or tampered with, the Israelis would refuse to participate and no further negotiations could proceed.

President Carter Criticizes Arab Intransigence

It seems that our criticisms had some effect on President Carter's thinking. After Professor Khalidi said that one "did not need to know how to decipher hieroglyphics in order to understand that the general thrust of the Fez declaration was in the direction of movement toward recognition of Israel," President Carter interrupted to say that this was not enough. The Arabs had to recognize Israel in clear language that the man in the street would understand. When Khalidi said that he realized that it would be hard for the Israeli leaders "to sell" the Fez declaration to their people, Carter interrupted again to say testily, "and I don't think they should buy it either!"

Despite Carter's criticism of the Israeli Government's settlement policy and Begin's interpretation of Palestinian autonomy, which Carter contended were contributing factors to the failure of King Hussein or the Palestinians to enter the Camp David negotiations, the former President conceded that not all the blame fell upon Israel. While the United States could and should play an active role in facilitating the peace process, the prerequisite for a successful outcome was the willingness of at least two parties to negotiate. There was no way, he said, "that our country can force itself upon the parties if they are unwilling to negotiate."

On the final day of the conference the Syrian delegate said that Syria was ready to negotiate a just and lasting peace but did not know what were the borders of the state of Israel, those of the 1947 UN partition plan, the 1949 armistice lines, the post-1967 borders, the area including southern Lebanon, or the area extending from the Nile to the Euphrates? President Carter interrupted him to say, "You know who the leaders of the State of Israel are and where they are. I can assure you personally that if Syria is prepared to negotiate with Israel on the basis of Camp David or without preconditions, the Israeli Government will be there to negotiate with you. When you are at the negotiating table then you can discuss the borders."

Carter and Ford Stress Presidential Authority in Foreign Policy

Both Presidents Ford and Carter talked about the need for an American President to have the power and flexibility to "stir the pot," in Ford's words, and to exercise leverage upon the parties--as he said President Eisenhower did in 1956 when he forced the Israelis to withdraw from Sinai and as Ford himself had done when he recalled Secretary Kissinger and proclaimed a "reassessment" to prod the Israelis and Egyptians to stop their "nitpicking" and agree to the Sinai II agreement. What Ford did not mention was that after threatening to use the stick, the United States achieved agreement by using the carrot--offering the parties political assurances, considerable additional aid and the presence of U.S. observers to monitor compliance with the agreement. (It should be remembered that although Eisenhower had called for Israeli's withdrawal in November 1956, it was not until four months later, after Israel had obtained U.S. and UN guarantees of its right to freedom of navigation and a UNEF peace-keeping force had been stationed along the Gaza Strip and Sinai that Israel actually withdrew its forces. This arrangement maintained peace for over a decade until challenged by Abdul Nasser in May 1967.)

At a press conference at the end of the consultation, President Carter declared that the talks had "far exceeded our own expectations" and that he and President Ford felt encouraged to continue their efforts to promote peace in the Middle East. The basic thrust of this cooperative effort of the two former presidents had already been outlined in their joint article, "A Time for Courage in the Middle East," in the Readers Digest, February 1983.

In terms of follow up after the Consultation, Carter said that a definitive report detailing issues discussed at the conference, particularly Palestinian autonomy and Israel's security concerns, would be released to all the parties and also be given to the Reagan Administration. A conference source told me that there were plans for an eventual hardcover volume containing academic papers and major addresses, intended for a scholarly audience, as well as a paperback summarizing President Carter's impressions, for widespread popular distribution.

Plans to Create a Bipartisan Constituency to Back U. S. Peace Efforts

A recurrent theme stressed by both former presidents was the need to create a bipartisan or non-partisan American popular constituency to strengthen the President's hand in his efforts to promote a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. They and former U.S. diplomats and Arab represen-

tatives frequently alluded to the difficulty the United States Government faced in taking Middle East initiatives during a presidential election year, as well as the tendency of Congress to tie the hands of the Executive Branch. While I did not hear anyone explicitly use the term "Jewish lobby" or "pro-Israel lobby", there was no doubt that this was what some speakers had in mind when they talked of the need to create a constituency to neutralize the power of special interest groups, especially during an election year.

In addition to use of the print media, thought is being given at the Carter Center to preparation of audio-visual materials. The ten public sessions of the conference were taped in their entirety by Cable Network News and CNN aired excerpts each evening and ran the whole series in Atlanta the following weekend. How much long-term interest there will be in the media remains to be seen. The CBS reporter who was assigned pool coverage of the opening day's sessions for the networks told me that the only item carried by the network was an excerpt of the opening press conference in which the two Presidents urged the Reagan Administration to "keep its cool" in Lebanon and not take rash retaliatory action for the killing of the U.S. forces there. The networks were not interested in the reminiscences of two former presidents. USA Today featured a front-page picture of the two presidents together. There were a couple of stories in the New York Times and other major newspapers.

In Atlanta itself the consultation was a big story each day, but it had to compete in space with stories of picketing by students and residents wearing buttons saying "Stop the Carter Expressway," and reports on public hearings into the desirability of building a four-lane Presidential Parkway through a park and residential area to provide access to the projected Carter Presidential Library. This is also to provide a permanent facility for the Carter Center.

While many Atlantans were pleased with the attention their city received as a mecca for diplomats and scholars flocking to the Carter consultation, at least one taxi driver was unimpressed. When I asked him whether he had heard about the consultation, he said that he had briefly but couldn't recall much about it. When I asked him what he thought about the Carter-Ford effort to promote Middle East peace, he responded, "they've had their turn, let them go off and play golf and give someone else a chance."

However, I believe it is most unlikely that Jimmy Carter will take this advice. Throughout the consultation he displayed the same capacity for hard work, the determination to pursue his objectives, and the passionate dedication to what he believed to be just that characterized his efforts at Camp David. A high level State Department official with whom I spoke several weeks later, confirmed that former Presidents Carter and Ford had already come to Washington to discuss the Middle East consultation with Reagan administration officials.

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REPORT

From the Israel Office of the American Jewish Committee

Rehov Ethiopia 9, Jerusalem 95 149 Tel. 228862, 233551 Cable: Wishom, Jerusalem

Messianic Terror

(Press Summary - March 11, 1984)

Persistent rumors have indicated that a Jewish underground terror movement is allegedly responsible for the series of attacks in recent years on Arab lives and property in the administered territories occupied by Israel since 1967. There are those who would trace a connecting line from the most serious incident in June 1980, when parallel attempts on the lives of several West Bank Arab mayors resulted in the permanent crippling of two leading mayors, to the most recent incident, earlier this month, when armed assailants opened fire on an Arab passenger bus travelling in the West Bank. No one was killed but several passengers were wounded.

These incidents also include a number of bomb attacks on Moslem and Christian places of worship culminating in the most serious attempt, just a few weeks ago, to set off bombs on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, site of the El Aksa Mosque. The latter is among Islam's holiest sites, after Medina in Saudi Arabia, as well as the location revered by many Jews, since it is where Solomon's Temple stood. The area is controlled by the Arab Waqf, the Moslem trusteeship of religious property, and is considered by many observant Jews to be "out-of-bounds" until the coming of the Messiah because of its holiness that may not be trespassed by Jews in their current state of "impurity". Nevertheless, a number of nationalistic-minded Jews have been lobbying for control of the Temple Mount because of its historic significance. They claim that Israel's control of Jerusalem is not complete without the Temple Mount.

The attempt to set off explosives on the Temple Mount recalled an earlier incident over a year ago when an immigrant soldier from the U.S. attempted to "capture" the Temple Mount with the aid of his M-16 rifle, but was disarmed by Israeli police after some indiscriminate

shooting in which he killed a Waqf guard. The soldier who was eventually brought to trial appeared to be emotionally disturbed and motivated by some Messianic "calling".

Recently, a group calling itself "T.N.T.", or "Terror Against Terror" began taking credit for some of the attacks on Arabs, including those against Moslem and Christian places of worship. A Jewish underground movement that had the same name existed several years ago, but was disbanded by Israeli police following evidence that it was planning an insurrection. The police do not believe that there has been a revival of the outlawed movement. In fact, the authorities have persistently denied that there is any evidence that an organized Jewish underground aimed at the Arabs of the West Bank exists. The sporadic attacks recorded in recent years have been attributed to a variety of misguided individuals.

Critics of the Israeli government soon concluded that the police were purposely not investigating the attacks on Arabs and accused the authorities of condoning the violence believed to be the work of West Bank Jewish settlers. The argument most widely used was that Israel's security forces were highly successful in tracking down Arab terrorists but had shown total ineffectiveness in finding Jews suspected of terrorizing Arabs. This accusation received support from the publication of the Karp Report (see AJC Press Summaries of February 12, 1984 and May 22, 1983) sponsored by the office of Israel's Attorney-General, which concluded that the Israeli police had not pursued the prosecution of cases involving acts by Jewish settlers against Arabs on the West Bank.

As if prodded by the Karp Report, Israeli security forces recently achieved some success in pursuing the prosecution of Jews accused of attacks on Arabs. Only a few weeks ago, the police charged a Jewish West Bank settler and his accomplice of the fatal shooting of a young Arab girl, and just this past week the police made two major arrests related to the recent attack on the Arab passenger bus in the West Bank and the attempt to blow up El Aksa Mosque.

Both arrests have resulted in what appears to be a dramatic change of direction in the investigation. In both instances, those arrested are not West Bank settlers nor is there an indication of the existence of classic underground movement behind either of the parties involved. In each case, the investigation is under wraps and court orders have prohibited the Israeli press from publishing any identifying information about the subjects. For the most part, however, interest in the press focused on those suspected of attempting to place explosives on the Temple Mount. The same suspects are said to have admitted to at least one attack on a mosque that was never reported to the police.

Shuki Ben-Ami, writing in Al Hamishmar, reports that the four suspects in the armed attack on the Arab bus are dissident members of Rabbi Meir Kahane's "Jewish Defense League", known as "Kach" in Israel, and that at least two of the four arrested allegedly came to Israel from the United States "with the very clear intent of carrying out attacks against the Arab population of Judea and Samaria". According to Ben-Ami, the Israeli police are investigating "who is behind the group, whether its members were organized back in the United States, where did they train and who is financing their activities." He also notes that the police have contacted their colleagues in the New York City Police for information regarding any record of the suspects' activities in the United States.

But, as mentioned earlier, almost all attention in the press related to those allegedly responsible for the Temple Mount incident. Perhaps it was the initial announcement by Israel Radio that resulted in the attention that these suspects have been receiving. Although their identities are not yet known, they were initially described by the State radio as a group of timhonim (eccentrics), unlikely to be terrorists. In fact, as details have emerged, they are a quasi-mystical group of cult-like people who call themselves the B'nai Yehuda (children of Judah) and dress in biblical fashion.

Ben Landy, writing in a supplement of the Jerusalem Post, noted that "in some circles, they were known for their drug dealings, while to others they were known for their philosophical outbursts regarding the coming of the Messiah." He reported that "they would walk with

their faces to the sun even if it meant walking backwards".

While their religious sentiments appear to indicate that they shared ultra-Orthodox beliefs, Ilan Bachar, writing in Ma'ariv, has discovered that the members of the cult being held by the police "eat milk and meat together and smoke on the Sabbath", contrary to the tenets of Orthodox Judaism.

The police are holding three members of the cult and are looking for two others, including one of the ring leaders, owner of a gun shop in Jaffa, who is believed to have taught the others the use of weapons and explosives. They are all Israeli-born and until four years ago lived near Tel Aviv and then moved to Lifta, an abandoned Arab village on the outskirts of Jerusalem. There, without the benefits of electricity, running water or other modern facilities, they lived their strange existence, until their arrests last week.

Danny Rubenstein, a columnist of Davar, published by the opposition Labor Party, writes that Israel's security forces and police have managed "in a very short time...to uncover a row of suspects involved in 'Israeli terror'...(including) those suspected of shooting the young girl, Aisha el-Bahash, in Nablus...;the suspect who threw the grenade that killed Emil Grunzweig...; members of the Kach movement who are being interrogated with regard to dozens of attacks against Arabs by the underground Terror Against Terror (T.N.T.), and those...of B'nai Yehuda who will be charged with the attempted attack on the El Aksa Mosque."

With the exception of the shooting of the child in Nablus, Rubenstein finds that all of the other cases do not involve settlers. "The other suspects", he notes, "are only connected in a round-about way to the settlements. Rabbi Kahane's people, who move about between Kiryat Arba and the Katif region in Gaza and between the settlement in Shilo and Jerusalem, are accused of acts of revenge against Arabs, but they are not an integral part of the settler's society that is based on people of 'Gush Enunim'. Also Yona Avrushmi who is accused of throwing the grenade that killed Emil Grunzweig is not a settler, except that his place of employment

was in the Ofra settlement and his employers are helping him with the costs of his defense. The "Tribe of Judah" cult from the deserted village of Lifta have no connection with the settlements.


Rubenstein now believes that the police are close to solving most of the terrorist acts against Arabs in the past year and which have been attributed to T.N.T. But he fears that the most serious act of all, the attack on the West Bank mayors, will never be solved, although that incident preceded all the others and "opened the chain of Israeli terror", that has since followed. He suggests that the investigation by Israel's security forces "clearly leads" towards a group of settlers but there is insufficient "legal proof of their guilt".

While Rubenstein admits that "it is not fair to point an accusing finger towards the settlers and to blame them in general for the responsibility of Jewish terror...they cannot shake off their responsibility for the atmosphere of disregard for the law...and the permissive attitude to pay the Arabs back...which they created and nurtured in recent years." In Rubenstein's opinion, had Israeli authorities taken a harder line after the attempt on the lives of the West Bank mayors, they would not be faced today with such extremist acts as performed by Rabbi Kahane's followers and the mystics from Lifta "who have been trying to be more forceful, more nationalistic (and) more extremist than their teachers, the settlers."

Yosef Tzuriel, a Ma'ariv columnist, who often brings the viewpoint of West Bank Arabs to the Jewish reader, spoke to a number of West Bank Arabs with regard to the recent arrests of Jews suspected of attacks on Arab targets. Among these was Basam Shaka, the ousted mayor of Nablus, who lost his two legs in the June 1980 attack on West Bank mayors. Asked if he was pleased by the recent arrests, Mr. Shaka answered that "this is a good beginning" but that there was no reason to congratulate the authorities

because "it is their job to apprehend criminals and bring them to court". According to Mr. Shaka, his experience has been that the security forces "do not have much desire or interest in revealing all the facts and all the truth". As proof, Mr. Shaka cites the Karp Report. "See what your own Knesset members say and you will understand everything." In any event, Mr. Shaka does not believe that Palestinians will have more faith in the Israeli authorities, at least not until "they discover who placed the explosives under my car and was responsible for my loss of my two legs."

Tzuriel suggests that Mr. Shaka's conclusion is probably the same view held by "very many" Israelis.



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

STAFF ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Meeting of October 26, 1982

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Present:

Donald Feldstein, Chairman
Harold Applebaum
Lee Billig
Eugene DuBow
Arthur Feuer
Bert Gold
Amy Goldberg
Lois Gottesman
Milton Himmelfarb
Selma Hirsh
Abe Karlikow

Sonya Kaufer
Haskell Lazere
Irving Levine
Yehuda Rosenman
Marilyn Rothman
Seymour Samet
Philip Shamis
Phyllis Sherman
Marc Tanenbaum
William Trosten
Mort Yarmon

I. REPORT ON ISRAEL TRIP (Attached)

II. MIDDLE EAST POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR AJC

Dr. Feldstein defined the purpose of the SAC discussion: to provide a forum for sharing the views of staff; to identify issues and strategies that could help to move us forward during the NEC Middle East debate on November 7.

The discussion focused on the following questions:

- a. Can a "middle ground" position, reflecting the diverse views of AJC leadership, be defined?
- b. What can AJC do to reverse the apparently growing alienation from Israel: in the Congress; in American public opinion; in the Jewish community?
- c. How can AJC express policy differences with Israel without either impeding our ability to maintain access to the Begin government or contributing to the impression that American Jewish support for Israel is eroding.

In assessing the objectives of the Begin government, most participants agreed that both the government and the people of Israel share a commitment to negotiate on all issues. However, some asked whether Begin's Revisionist ideology provides grounds for questioning his commitment to a territorial accommodation.

Since most Israelis support both a tough bargaining posture and an ultimate exchange of territories for peace, it was suggested that Israel will at some point engage in an agonizing debate. At issue will be conflicting perceptions about the impact of territorial expansion on Israel, both as a Jewish state and a democratic society. However, this issue will not be fully joined until Arabs signal their readiness to negotiate.

Considerable concern was expressed about the possibility of increased dichotomy between the US and Israel based on calculations of divergent interests. One consequence could be the resurfacing of the dual loyalty issue.

A consensus developed during the discussion in support of a three-pronged response to Middle East problems, consisting of:

- a. support for an accommodation exchanging territories for peace;
- b. support for Palestinian rights;
- c. these positions, plus advocacy of a freeze on settlements, would be conditioned on the willingness of Jordan and/or responsible Palestinians to enter into the peace process by recognizing and negotiating with Israel.

The above position could be projected as being generally supportive of President Reagan's peace plan while reserving the option of criticizing specific segments of the proposal. However, in interpreting this position to the Administration, we would emphasize the importance of US pressure to bring the Arabs to the negotiating table.

There was further agreement that AJC should continue to underscore our support for an independent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces.

It was the sense of the group that these policies may provide a middle ground position acceptable to AJC leadership. It would also provide a framework for conveying AJC's commitment to the peace process to our disparate audiences and constituencies: Israel, the US government, religious and ethnic communities, AJC members and American Jews, and the media.

It was also recommended that we should continue to use public opinion polls and Jewish attitude surveys to monitor reactions to Middle East issues.

HA/br
Attachment

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REPORT ON ISRAEL TRIP

Donald Feldstein summarized his impressions of Israel following his week-long visit accompanied by Maynard Wishner and George Gruen.

1. He described the mood in Israel as "post-cathartic." The nation is marking time pending the outcome of the inquiry on the massacre.
2. The political climate has been polarized by the bitterness of the rhetoric between the government and the opposition.
3. Although world public standards suggest that the government had the right to move into Lebanon, there is nevertheless widespread disagreement as to whether the political price of the incursion actually outweighed the security achievements and whether it was morally right by Israel's own standards.
4. Some elements from the religious parties have begun to suggest that lives are more valuable than land, and this may affect the future of the governing coalition.
5. Begin continues to demonstrate strong support (55%) in the polls. Leaders of the labor opposition are not perceived as offering an attractive alternative.
6. The core of Begin's support comes from the Sephardic community. The liberal segment of the electorate is strongly alienated from the Sephardim. Some of this is manifested through ethnic slurs.
7. There is a perception within the Begin government that the Reagan plan is dead.
8. Some critics of the government fear that the settlements policy is draining the Jewish majority in Jerusalem and the Galilee.
9. There is concern about possible loss of economic aid from the US as a consequence of policy differences.
10. Begin is motivated by the image of a "lonely" Israel confronting a hostile world community.

In their meeting with the Prime Minister, the AJC group stressed the need for Israel to enhance its peace-seeking image.



ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

Marc Janerbaum

REQUIEM FOR CAMP DAVID?

(Press Summary, February 7, 1982)

Israelis had little reason to rejoice over the recent visit to the U. S. by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. The successor to the late Anwar el-Sadat avoided mention of the Camp David accords, while he championed the Palestinian cause on every occasion in his ceremonial appearances in the U. S. Capitol. Only when pressed did Mr. Mubarak pay lip service to Camp David, but not before he excused himself for "forgetting" to mention the basis for the Egyptian-Israeli understanding that some Israelis fear will be dissolved after the withdrawal from Sinai in April.

Gideon Sammit (Ha'aretz) assesses U. S. reactions to the Mubarak visit and finds a number of surprising Egyptian moves that raised a few eyebrows in the U. S. Capitol. On the eve of his departure for the U. S., Mr. Mubarak invited the return of 66 Russian technicians to Egypt and opened his country's border with Col. Qaddafi's Libya. It was, Sammit notes, as if the Egyptian President had purposely waved a red cloth in the face of his American hosts who are still trying to comprehend why the Egyptians have been the major obstacle to any headway in the autonomy talks, despite Israeli intransigence on various issues. American uneasiness was, however, placated by U. S. Ambassador to Egypt Alfred Atherton who suggested that Egypt be allowed to pursue a path that will achieve credibility in other Arab capitals. The U. S. is now ready to accept the Egyptian role in the Arab world even at the expense of the Administration's strategic role for Egypt in the Middle East. Mr. Mubarak thus succeeded in cooling U. S. hopes for some kind of autonomy agreement before April and came away with tacit agreement for his policies and style.

Yosef Priel (Davar) suggests that all the signs in recent weeks indicate that Camp David is suffering its final death throes. The past week will be recalled as the decisive moment in the failing health of Camp David. "The U. S. hammered three more nails in the coffin of this process and by the week's end it was apparent that the only remaining question was when the end will come."

Priel claims that the U. S. erred in its original estimation that both Israel and Egypt were interested in achieving progress in the autonomy talks before the withdrawal from Sinai. The Administration reasoned that Israel would try to obtain some agreement before April 26, in the knowledge that there would be no more leverage over the Egyptians after that date. The U. S. also assumed that the Egyptians were anxious for some arrangement that would show that they had not overlooked the Palestinians in the effort to get Sinai back under Egyptian administration.

The recent visit to the Middle East by U. S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig upset the apple cart when it became obvious that neither side is in a rush to agree on an autonomy plan for the Palestinians. The Israelis indicated that the future of the West Bank and other territories had not been resolved in the fourteen years since the 1967 Six Day War, and there was no reason to hurry because the territories would remain with Israel after April. As for the Egyptians, Priel explains that President Mubarak is engaged in an effort to free himself from his predecessor's image. "Every step Mubarak takes is compared to Sadat's and this does not make it any easier for him. When Mubarak receives the remaining area of Sinai, the Sadat era of the peace process will end.... But if he had signed an autonomy agreement, he would have been endorsing Sadat's policies, instead of forming his own..."

Priel explains that the "Sadat syndrome" accompanied Mr. Mubarak to Washington, where he reportedly asked Ambassador Sol Linowitz how Americans would react to his image on their television screens when they saw that he was not a second Sadat. The new Egyptian President chose the opportunity of his Washington visit to disassociate himself from Sadat by stressing the controversial Palestinian problem. Mr. Mubarak decided to appear as a leader of the Arab cause, and not only as President of Egypt. "His call for a Palestinian entity, in other words for an independent state, left no doubt as to what Mubarak thinks of autonomy. He did not even refer to Camp David. That term now belongs to the past. It is gone and has become an unmentionable."

Dr. Herzl Rosenblum (Yediot Acharonot) claims that Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin thought he would be given a free hand in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip in exchange for his "wholesale" return of the Sinai peninsula to Egypt, as the price for Egyptian consent. But even Mr. Begin had second thoughts about Egypt's role and when he sought to pack his bags while attending the talks in Camp David it was Ezer Weizman, Ariel Sharon and the late Moshe Dayan who convinced him to stay and sign. "If Begin was still able to withstand the pressures of Sadat and Carter, he couldn't hold out in the confrontation with his three generals who persuaded him to accept the Camp David accords."

Rosenblum suggests that Mr. Begin made "the mistake of his life" when he agreed, because it was not long after that he realized the Egyptians, led by Sadat, were not to be satisfied by the return of Sinai, but were anxious to achieve "the full rights of the Palestinians" and gain the return of all the territories taken by Israel in the 1967 war, before attempting to strangulate Israel through a coordinated Arab front.

Rosenblum explains that Egypt's real intentions became clear when the late Anwar Sadat suspended the autonomy talks almost as soon as they were underway. Without a foothold in Sinai, Sadat realized that it would be best to wait until after April 1982, when he would be "free" to deal with Israel on his own terms. "That is why Mubarak has now opened up on the eve of the decisive date and is already saying what his predecessor avoided, which is that 'the Palestinians are the heart of the problem' and that they have the right to 'self-determination.' This is also the reason why Mubarak has begun to gather the Arabs of the world around him by his overtures to Libya, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and even the Russians in order to purchase more and more weapons from both the West and the East, to be used against whom?", we may ask.

The editor of Yediot Acharonot advises Mr. Begin to take the necessary steps to avoid a "tragedy." In guarded terms, Rosenblum appears to suggest that Israel should reconsider its obligations under the terms of the Camp David accords and halt the withdrawal from Sinai before it is too late.

The editorial in Hatzofeh accuses the Egyptian President of deviating from the Camp David accords by calling for a dialogue between the U. S. and the Palestinians whose right to their own national entity he supports. The newspaper notes that the Camp David accords agree on autonomy rather than self-determination and no Palestinian state is envisioned.

Hatzofeh discerns a change in style between Sadat and Mubarak. The former always claimed that he was not authorized to speak for the Palestinians, while Mr. Mubarak does not miss any opportunity to express his concern for a Palestinian free and national entity. It is obvious that "Mubarak wants to form an independent Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem."

The newspaper calls on Israel to see things as they are and to avoid deceptive wishful thinking that allows the Egyptians to indulge in their efforts to deviate from Camp David. The editorial calls on Israel to take Mr. Mubarak's statements seriously and react accordingly, both "simply and forcefully."

At the week's end, Mr. Mubarak was reported in the Israeli press as having assured Jewish leaders in the United States of his commitment to Camp David. The question in Jerusalem that remained to be decided is how "forgetful" was Mr. Mubarak during his stay in Washington.

Edited by Lois Gottesman

Davar is affiliated with the Histadrut and the Labor Party.

Ha'aretz is an independent liberal newspaper.

Yediot Acharonot is independent, but traditionally Likud-oriented.

Hatzofeh is published by the National Religious Party.



Marc Tanenbaum

**THE GOLAN HEIGHTS CONTROVERSY:
SYMPTOM OF A DEEPER CRISIS IN U. S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS**

by GEORGE E. GRUEN
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AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

A Foreign Affairs Department Background Memorandum

American Jewish Committee
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The Golan Heights Controversy:

Symptom of a Deeper Crisis in Israel-U. S. Relations

A Foreign Affairs Department Background Memorandum

by George E. Gruen

This paper details the background and events leading up to the decision by the government of Israel on December 14, 1981 to extend Israeli law to the Golan Heights, and the subsequent reactions by the U. S. government.

The paper deals with:

- The strains in U. S.-Israel relations that have emerged over the past few months.
- The growing unease and uncertainty in Israel as a result of shifts in the geopolitics of the Middle East.
- The response of the American government to the Golan action.

The recent angry exchanges between Jerusalem and Washington, and the charges that each side is acting unilaterally in ways that are harmful to the other's vital interests, reflect a general sense of questioning and uneasiness as to the predictability and reliability of the other's commitment to shared objectives.

The controversy sparked by Prime Minister Menachem Begin's sudden move to apply Israeli "law, jurisdiction and administration" to the Golan Heights is thus only symptomatic of a deeper malaise. The current acrimony stands in sharp contrast to the spirit of cooperation proclaimed three months ago.

Strains in U.S.-Israel Relations

After the conclusion of his meetings with President Ronald Reagan in Washington in September, Prime Minister Begin told American Jewish leaders in New York on September 12 that the discussions had marked "a turning point" in the relations between Israel and the United States. Unlike previous administrations, President Reagan had openly referred to Israel as a "friend and ally." Begin added that during the White House talks, Reagan had stressed that the alliance was of mutual benefit and not "one way traffic." The Prime Minister stressed that while friendship might be one-sided, alliance involved "a partnership, common values and a community of interests we have to defend."

Prime Minister Begin added that the third and highest stage of relations between states was that of strategic cooperation. He expressed confidence that before the end of the year a Memorandum of Agreement on Strategic Cooperation would be signed between Israel Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and U. S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.

The practical discussions on defense cooperation were, however, put in the deep freeze during the Reagan Administration's all-out struggle to gain Congressional approval for the proposed AWACS and F-15 enhancement sales to Saudi Arabia. While politely declining to interfere in a U. S. domestic struggle between the executive and legislative branches, Prime Minister Begin made it abundantly clear, when asked, that Israel did not share Washington's benign assessment of Saudi Arabia. Israel saw itself facing a serious threat from the sale of sophisticated weapons and intelligence gathering equipment to Saudi Arabia, a declared enemy of Israel, a supporter of the PLO, and an opponent of Camp David.

The Reagan Administration's insistence on pushing through the sales, in contravention of a specific pledge not to do so made to Congress by the previous Administration, was taken in Jerusalem as a sign that the word of the United States could not be relied upon. The Administration argument that changed circumstances--the overthrow of the Shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war--had caused the previous pledge to Congress to be outdated, deeply troubled the Israelis. The more the Reagan Administration described Saudi Arabia as the linchpin in U. S. efforts to form a "strategic consensus" of friendly states in the region, praised the Saudis' behind-the-scenes efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, and claimed to see positive elements in Crown Prince Fahd's "peace" plan, the more worried and annoyed the Israelis became.

The Reagan Administration also appeared somewhat lukewarm in its support for the Camp David Accords. The President failed to appoint a special representative to replace Ambassador Sol Linowitz in the Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks and did not invest the extraordinary personal attention in the negotiations that President Carter had. While the Reagan Administration encouraged West European participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to be set up in Sinai with the ostensible objective of broadening international support for the Camp David process, the suspicions of the Begin government about the Europeans' true intentions were heightened when they issued statements linking their participation in the Sinai force with their position enunciated earlier in Venice, calling for Palestinian self-determination and the association of the PLO in the peace talks.

The Israeli threat to veto the Europeans' participation, as it was entitled to do, resulted in further consultations between Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir on an agreed set of principles for the MFO and an endorsement of Camp David. The Europeans quietly agreed to these terms but then the Israeli Cabinet insisted that they publicly subscribe to them and in effect renounce the Venice Declaration. (As of this writing the question of European participation has not yet been resolved.)

Nevertheless, the impression grew in Jerusalem that once Israel had completed the withdrawal from Sinai next April 25, new pressures would be

mounted by the Europeans and by America's new friend and ally--the Saudis--to abandon the Camp David process and look for a new international forum to impose total withdrawal and create a Palestinian state. PLO leader Yasir Arafat initially indicated support for the Fahd plan. After meeting with Brezhnev and witnessing the official raising of the PLO office in Moscow to embassy status, Arafat reportedly conveyed a message from the Soviet leader to the Saudis to the effect that if Saudi Arabia would open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Moscow would lend its support to the Fahd plan. (The latter calls for a new international conference with Soviet participation to impose its terms on Israel.)

Growing Unease in Israel

The tragic assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in October raised yet another major element of uncertainty for Israel. Even while Sadat was alive and appeared in full control this past summer, many Israelis were wondering whether Begin had been wise to commit Israel to total withdrawal from Sinai, including the relinquishing of airbases and the dismantling of Yamit, Neviot and other Jewish settlements. Neither the Jordanians nor the West Bank Palestinians had agreed to join the Camp David process despite early optimistic expectations that they would. Moreover, it was widely anticipated that once the Sinai had been returned, Sadat would redouble his efforts to restore friendly relations with other Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia. This was one reason he was reportedly so eager to obtain an Israeli agreement on principles regarding Jerusalem that would satisfy Arab and Muslim sensibilities.

While President Hosni Mubarak has given every sign both publicly and privately--as in his meeting with AJC officers in Cairo--that he intends to fully implement the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, concern has remained in Israel as to whether Mubarak will be able to consolidate his position and whether, once he has done so, he would seek to set his own distinct stamp on Egyptian policy. Although he is unlikely to undertake the dramatic reversal of alliances that Sadat pursued in switching from a pro-Soviet to a pro-American orientation, Mubarak has already hinted that he will make some changes, at least in emphasis. For example, he has refrained from the verbal abuse of other Arab leaders that Sadat engaged in. Mubarak has also opened contacts with leftist writers and politicians in Egypt and has publicly underscored that Egypt regards itself as a "non-aligned" country. Thus once Egypt no longer needs the full backing of the United States to press Israel to return the rest of Sinai, Mubarak may be tempted once again to play the two superpowers off against each other.

In this superpower bidding for Egyptian, Saudi and Jordanian and eventually Syrian friendship, one major "card" the U. S. is presumed to have is Israel's dependence on U. S. political, economic and military support. There is thus a natural fear in Israel that an American administration will be tempted to use pressure on Israel as a means of courting Arab favor.

There has also been growing concern expressed in Israel that given the Sinai precedent of full evacuation for peace with Egypt, the Arabs will press for nothing less with regard to Syria, and eventually even the West Bank.

Background to the Golan Heights Law

There has long been a broad consensus within Israel that Israel should not relinquish control of the Golan Heights, which the Syrians had used for 19 years to shell Israeli settlements below and to divert the vital headwaters of the Jordan River. The resistance of some of the Sinai settlers to withdrawal was recently reinforced when groups of squatters came from the Golan to Sinai. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, who is charged with completing the evacuation from Sinai, and Prime Minister Begin were thus facing the prospect of a serious and possibly bloody confrontation in April. By passing the Golan law now, the Knesset has helped reassure the Israeli public and declared to the world that the arrangements for peace with Egypt are not a precedent with regard to Syria.

Why did Begin choose the present moment to act? In addition to the factors already cited, there has been speculation that some or all of the following may also have played a role in his decision: 1. President Assad's rejection of the Fahd plan and his public reiteration that Syria would not make peace with Israel even if the Palestinians did, meant that there was no prospect in the foreseeable future for a negotiated peace with the Syrians. 2. The failure of the Habib mission to bring about the removal of the Syrian missiles from Lebanon, which Begin had already pledged to remove last April, meant that Israel had to signal the Syrians and the Americans that Israel's patience was not without limits. 3. With the Arab world in disarray after the Fez summit fiasco, with Syria allied to Libya, whose leader was being accused in Washington of planning the assassination of the Reagan Administration leadership, and with Syria's Soviet ally preoccupied with events in Poland, the time may have seemed opportune to legally incorporate the Golan into Israel.

This action simply implemented the decision that had already been approved by the Knesset on August 5, 1981 when the guidelines of the new Begin Government were adopted, authorizing the Government to act whenever it considered the moment appropriate. (To those who objected that Begin had rammed the legislation through the Knesset with unseemly haste, Government spokesmen countered that technically Begin did not even have to bring the matter to the Knesset, but did so to demonstrate the extent of the measure's popular support.)

The law which was passed by the Knesset on December 14, 1981, by a vote of 63-21, states that "The law, jurisdiction and administration of the state shall apply to the Golan Heights..." and charges the Minister of the Interior with implementing the law. While there is no explicit mention of extending Israeli sovereignty to the Golan, critics say the application of Israeli law is tantamount to outright annexation. However, Israel maintains that the option of negotiations with Syria "without preconditions" remains open, thus implying that when circumstances warrant, the Golan law need not prove an obstacle.

Some argue that Israel wanted to demonstrate that it can act independently and is not in America's pocket. Thus in the attacks on the Osirak atomic reactor in Baghdad and the PLO headquarters in Beirut, Prime Minister Begin demonstrated that when he felt Israel's vital security interests were involved, he was prepared to take actions that might be internationally unpopular. When the United States responded by withholding scheduled arms deliveries to Israel and other Western democracies condemned Israel, Begin and many other Israelis believed this reflected the double standard to which Israel was subjected and possibly even

worse--this again demonstrated the Gentile world's traditional indifference to Jewish vulnerability and suffering. It was the solemn duty of the Sovereign State of Israel to show the world that Jews are no longer defenseless in the face of hostile threat. If one understands the psychological background of a Holocaust survivor then one can also understand why a vitriolic attack by the Prime Minister of the Jewish State on Chancellor Schmidt or on the United States Government can be very popular among certain segments of the Israeli population. There is a similar swelling of pride in an assertion of independence in such a statement as the Prime Minister's that "the people of Israel have lived 3,700 years without a Memorandum of Understanding with America and will continue to live without it another 3,700 years."

One should add that many Israelis had their doubts about the value of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), since the U. S. Defense Department had been reluctant to be too openly identified militarily with Israel for fear of antagonizing the "moderate" Arabs whom the U. S. was courting. Consequently, the MOU was largely a framework with the actual extent of cooperation to be spelled out in subsequent meetings--which have now been deferred and may be cancelled because of the controversy over the Golan action.

Others in Israel were concerned that the MOU unnecessarily provoked the Russians by spelling out that it was intended to "deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region." The intention of this language from the American standpoint was to reassure the Arabs that the United States was not plotting together with Israel against them. Indeed, Washington officials point out that Prime Minister Begin during his September trip had emphasized that Israel did not want any direct American involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict, which Israel would handle with its own forces exclusively, but that as fellow democracies Israel and the U. S. should cooperate against Soviet and other external threats to freedom.

U. S. Reactions to the Golan Law

When the Reagan Administration suspended the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding in response to the Israeli action on the Golan, Israel pointed out that this was inappropriate, since the Golan was part of the Arab-Israel conflict and not part of the superpower rivalry. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger conceded that technically this was correct, but that the spirit of the agreement was certainly violated. The MOU in fact begins by reaffirming "the common bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel..." and notes their decision "to establish a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance their national security."

Consequently, Mr. Weinberger concluded that "the making of an agreement of that kind implies a certain understanding with respect to the kinds of actions that each partner to that agreement will take with respect to the interests of the others." Moreover, since the U. S. Government believed that the Israeli action violated the spirit if not the letter of U. N. Security Council Resolution 242 this was something "that would be very harmful to our interest in trying to bring peace to the region."

Former President Jimmy Carter called Israel's Golan Heights action "a tragic mistake." Harold Saunders, who had been Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs at the time of Camp David, told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on December 17 that Israel's action was "destructive of the peace process" because it was a unilateral act. The essence of the Camp David process was not to take unilateral acts but to seek to negotiate all steps. Consequently, he said, the Golan action undermined Egypt's credibility because Egypt was trying to convince other Arab countries that the way to achieve their goals was through negotiations with Israel.

One of the major objections to Israel's move, stated by Mr. Carter and echoed by many editorial comments, was that it "precludes any negotiation with one of Israel's neighboring states, Syria." This would appear to be an exaggerated judgment. First of all, the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution of December 17 "decides that the Israeli decision...is null and void and without international legal effect;..." Moreover, in supporting this resolution on behalf of the United States, Ambassador Charles Lichenstein reiterated that "the United States does not accept as valid unilateral acts designed to alter the status of the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 conflict," adding that the U. S. had "strongly urged" the Government of Israel not to take action with regard to the Golan as far back as the summer of 1980.

The United States was, however, "acutely aware that the future of the Golan Heights involves a number of sensitive issues for both Israel and Syria." These can only be resolved, he said, "by negotiations within the framework of U. N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." In other words, the United States Government appears to acknowledge, as did two former U. S. Presidents who visited the area, that Israel's security concerns must be met and that the Golan must never again be permitted to serve as a base from which Syria can threaten Israel. Whether this is to be achieved through demilitarization, through international police forces as in Sinai, or through some territorial adjustments remains to be determined in the course of negotiations. Should the Syrians remain adamant in their refusal to make peace with Israel, Israeli forces have an acknowledged right under resolution 242 to remain on the Heights as an occupying power until such time as "secure and recognized borders" are negotiated between Syria and Israel.

The only effective change that the new Knesset law makes is that the Military Government has been replaced with a civilian administration. The 12,000 Druze inhabitants of the area now have the option of obtaining Israeli identity cards if they so choose. The Israeli settlers in the region also will have Israeli domestic legislation applied to them. They will, for example, be required to wear seat belts when driving in the Golan and will have the dubious privilege of paying Israeli license fees for use of radios and television sets. As far as the outside world is concerned the Israeli law changes nothing in terms of international law.

But what of the political consequences? It should be recalled that for many years the late Moshe Dayan declared that he preferred control of Sharm el-Sheikh without peace with Egypt rather than peace with Egypt without Sharm el-Sheikh. Yet when President Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem and offered Israel permanent peace and normalization of relations, Dayan was one of the most ardent advocates of acceding to Sadat's demand that Israel withdraw from Sharm el-

Sheikh. A formula was found whereby Israeli freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran is to be assured by the stationing of a Multinational Force at Sharm el-Sheikh, which cannot be removed without explicit Israeli approval. This arrangement was approved by the Knesset.

It is not inconceivable that if President Assad had a genuine change of heart or if another Syrian leader ready to make peace with Israel emerged a new arrangement could be negotiated that would protect Israel's security and also serve the needs of a peaceful Syria.



December 23, 1981

81-100-165

**A Study of Attitudes Toward American
Jews and Israel**

**AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES**

Conducted by

The Roper Organization, Inc.

February 1987

for

The American Jewish Committee

#87-185

Table 1

Turning for a minute to the situation in the Middle East, at the present time do you find yourself more in sympathy with Israel, or more in sympathy with the Arab nations?

	1987 Feb.	1986 June	1985 Apr./ May	1984 Jan.
More with Israel	48%	53%	42%	44%
More with Arab nations	8	8	10	8
Not sympathetic with either side (vol.)	23	19	23	21
Sympathetic equally with both sides (vol.)	7	8	11	12
Don't know/No answer	14	11	12	13

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample.

Table 2

I'm going to mention the names of some foreign countries. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether or not you think that country is or is not a reliable ally of the United States. First, (name country) (Ask about each one)

	1987 February			1986 June			1985 Apr./May			1984 January		
	Is a reliable ally	Is not a reliable ally	Don't know/No answer	Is a reliable ally	Is not a reliable ally	Don't know/No answer	Is a reliable ally	Is not a reliable ally	Don't know/No answer	Is a reliable ally	Is not a reliable ally	Don't know/No answer
Canada	88%	3%	8%	90%	4%	7%	90%	3%	7%	91%	4%	6%
West Germany	61	18	21	61	22	17	63	18	19	65	16	19
France	54	27	20	54	31	15	60	23	18	61	20	18
Israel	49	29	21	52	32	17	53	25	22	54	24	23
Egypt	29	41	31	31	43	26	35	33	32	37	31	33
Jordan	17	44	38	18	47	36	19	39	43	17	39	44
Syria	6	61	33	4	72	25	8	52	40	7	61	32

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample.

Table 3

As you probably know, in November of 1986 it was disclosed that the U.S. Government had sold weapons to Iran. Part of the profit from these sales was used to help fund the Contra Forces in Nicaragua. This situation has caused a great deal of concern both in the U.S. and abroad.

Here is a list of individuals and groups said to be involved in the situation. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Would you please read down the list and call off who you think is most to blame for the situation?

	1987 February
President Reagan's advisors	47%
President Reagan	43
Lt. Col. Oliver North	21
Individual arms dealers	15
Terrorists	14
Iran	14
Nicaragua	8
Israel	5
Saudi Arabia	4
None of the above (vol.)	2
Don't know/No answer	12

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample.

Table 4

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States.

	1987 Feb.	1986 June	1985 Apr./ May	1984* Jan.
Agree	24%	24%	27%	25%
Disagree	49	46	47	50
Don't know/No answer	26	31	26	25

*Asked of and based on one-half of the sample.

Note: Figures represent percent of total sample, unless otherwise indicated.

Table 5

(HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Which, if any, of the groups listed on this card do you believe have too much power in the United States? Just call off the letter in front of the groups.

	1987 Feb.	1986 June	1985 Apr./ May	1984 Jan.
Business corporations	42%	44%	49%	51%
Labor unions	33	44	45	50
News media	38	40	42	50
Arab interests	20	28	30	30
Orientals	12	12	11	*
Blacks	11	11	13	13
The Catholic Church	9	10	11	10
Jews	7	8	8	8
Hispanics	5	6	*	4
None	9	7	7	6
Don't know/No answer	8	7	6	6

*Not asked.

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample.

Table 6

Here is a list of some things that have been in the news in recent months. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Would you read down the list, and for each one tell me whether it is something you have read and heard a lot about, or a little about, or practically nothing about? First, (read item). (ASK ABOUT EACH ITEM)

1987
~~1986~~
February


	A lot	A little	Practically nothing	Don't/Know No answer
The proposed trillion dollar federal budget President Reagan submitted to Congress	38%	42%	17%	3%
The U.S. sales of arms to Iran with the profits going to the Contras in Nicaragua	67	23	8	2
The Ivan Boesky insider trading scandal on Wall Street	29	34	33	4

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample.

Table 7

Ivan Boesky, a leading Wall Street investment banker, has been charged with "insider trading." This means he used confidential information, not available to the general public, to buy up shares of stock in companies about to be acquired by others. This illegal activity allowed him to sell back the shares at a much higher price, once the confidential information became public.

There has been a great deal of discussion about the factors that lead to this type of scandal. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Would you please read down the list and call off which, if any, of the factors you think is most to blame for this type of scandal?



1987
February

Personal greed and avarice	55%
Lack of ethics in business	43
Insufficient governmental regulation and enforcement	28
The moral decline of society	21
The capitalist system	10
The Yuppie mentality	3
A Jewish background	1
A Catholic background	1
None of the above (vol.)	1
Don't know/No answer	15

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample.

Table 8

Reported sympathy with Israel and with the Arab nations, by subgroup, in percent.

February 1987

Subgroup	Israel	Arab Nations	Not with either side (vol.)	Equally with both sides(vol.)	Don't know/ No answer
Total	48%	8%	23%	7%	14%
Sex					
Males	50	10	22	6	11
Females	46	7	23	8	16
Age					
18-29	49	10	23	5	13
30-44	48	8	23	7	13
45-59	45	6	26	9	14
60+	49	8	19	8	15
Race					
Whites	51	8	22	7	12
Blacks	24	11	32	9	24
Household Income					
\$15,000	43	8	23	7	19
\$15-24,999	51	8	23	6	12
\$25-34,999	49	11	21	8	11
\$35,000+	54	9	21	7	8
Political Affiliation					
Democrats	47	9	25	7	13
Republicans	55	9	17	6	13
Independents	43	7	26	10	14
Political Philosophy					
Conservatives	51	8	22	6	13
Moderates	45	8	24	9	15
Liberals	48	11	22	8	10
Education					
College	51	10	22	9	8
High School Graduates	50	8	22	5	15
Non-High School Graduates	39	6	25	9	21
Occupation					
Executives/Professionals	55	11	22	7	6
White Collar Workers	47	10	21	9	12
Blue Collar Workers	44	6	27	5	17
Homemakers	49	8	19	10	14
Religion					
Protestants	48	7	23	7	15
Catholics	44	11	22	9	14

Table 9

Reported reliability of Israel as an ally, by subgroup, in percent.

<u>Subgroup</u>	<u>February 1987</u>		
	<u>Is a reliable ally</u>	<u>Is not a reliable ally</u>	<u>Don't know/ No answer</u>
Total	49%	29%	21%
Sex			
Males	57	27	16
Females	42	32	26
Age			
18-29	46	35	18
30-44	51	29	20
45-59	52	26	23
60+	49	26	25
Race			
Whites	51	29	21
Blacks	40	36	24
Household Income			
\$15,000	39	30	31
\$15-24,999	50	29	21
\$25-34,999	49	33	17
\$35,000+	59	27	14
Political Affiliation			
Democrats	48	30	22
Republicans	56	27	16
Independents	44	32	24
Political Philosophy			
Conservatives	49	31	20
Moderates	48	29	23
Liberals	56	28	16
Education			
College	61	24	15
High School Graduates	41	36	22
Non-High School Graduates	40	28	33
Occupation			
Executives/Professionals	59	25	16
White Collar Workers	48	36	16
Blue Collar Workers	43	31	26
Homemakers	47	29	24
Religion			
Protestants	47	30	23
Catholics	49	33	18

Table 10

Percentage of respondents reporting that Israel is most to blame for the Iran-Contra situation, by subgroup.

February 1987

<u>Subgroup</u>	<u>Israel is most to blame</u>
Total	5%
Sex	
Males	6
Females	4
Age	
18-29	4
30-44	4
45-59	5
60+	7
Race	
Whites	5
Blacks	4
Household Income	
\$15,000	7
\$15-24,999	5
\$25-34,999	4
\$35,000+	4
Political Affiliation	
Democrats	4
Republicans	6
Independents	4
Political Philosophy	
Conservatives	6
Moderates	4
Liberals	4
Education	
College	5
High School Graduates	4
Non-High School Graduates	5
Occupation	
Executives/Professionals	4
White Collar Workers	4
Blue Collar Workers	5
Homemakers	3
Religion	
Protestants	4
Catholics	6




Table 11

Percentage of respondents who agree or disagree with the statement, "Most Americans Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States," by subgroup.

February 1987

<u>Subgroup</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Don't know/ No answer</u>
Total	24%	49%	26%
Sex			
Males	27	49	25
Females	22	50	28
Age			
18-29	23	52	25
30-44	25	52	23
45-59	22	47	31
60+	27	45	28
Race			
Whites	24	52	25
Blacks	29	34	38
Household Income			
\$15,000	23	43	34
\$15-24,999	26	46	28
\$25-34,999	25	53	22
\$35,000+	23	59	18
Political Affiliation			
Democrats	25	49	26
Republicans	24	54	22
Independents	23	45	33
Political Philosophy			
Conservatives	26	48	26
Moderates	24	49	27
Liberals	20	57	22
Education			
College	19	59	22
High School Graduates	26	48	26
Non-High School Graduates	30	35	36
Occupation			
Executives/Professionals	22	60	18
White Collar Workers	21	56	22
Blue Collar Workers	27	40	34
Homemakers	26	50	23
Religion			
Protestants	26	45	29
Catholics	23	52	25

Table 12

Percentage of respondents reporting that they believe Jews have too much power in the United States, by subgroup.

February 1987

<u>Subgroup</u>	<u>Jews have too much power</u>
Total	7%
Sex	
Males	10
Females	5
Age	
18-29	5
30-44	8
45-59	8
60+	8
Race	
Whites	7
Blacks	11
Household Income	
\$15,000	6
\$15-24,999	8
\$25-34,999	6
\$35,000+	8
Political Affiliation	
Democrats	7
Republicans	8
Independents	8
Political Philosophy	
Conservatives	8
Moderates	7
Liberals	6
Education	
College	8
High School Graduates	6
Non-High School Graduates	8
Occupation	
Executives/Professionals	8
White Collar Workers	4
Blue Collar Workers	10
Homemakers	4
Religion	
Protestants	7
Catholics	8

Table 13

Reported amount of reading and hearing about the Boesky insider trading scandal, by subgroup, in percent.

February 1987

<u>Subgroup</u>	<u>A lot</u>	<u>A little</u>	<u>Practically Nothing</u>	<u>Don't know/ No answer</u>
Total	29%	34%	33%	4%
Sex				
Males	34	32	29	4
Females	24	26	36	4
Age				
18-29	20	35	42	4
30-44	27	38	31	4
45-59	32	36	27	4
60+	39	26	29	5
Race				
Whites	31	35	32	3
Blacks	19	31	38	12
Household Income				
\$15,000	21	29	42	7
\$15-24,999	26	37	33	4
\$25-34,999	32	36	28	4
\$35,000+	38	36	25	2
Political Affiliation				
Democrats	28	35	32	5
Republicans	31	37	29	3
Independents	28	32	36	4
Political Philosophy				
Conservatives	30	34	31	4
Moderates	28	36	32	4
Liberals	30	34	32	4
Education				
College	38	40	20	2
High School Graduates	26	30	39	4
Non-High School Graduates	16	31	44	9
Occupation				
Executives/Professionals	38	38	22	2
White Collar Workers	28	40	29	3
Blue Collar Workers	21	32	41	7
Homemakers	23	34	41	2
Religion				
Protestants	27	36	33	4
Catholics	28	32	35	5

Table 14

Percentage of respondents reporting that a Jewish background is most to blame for a Boesky-type scandal, by subgroup.

February 1987

<u>Subgroup</u>	<u>A Jewish Background</u>
Total	1%
Sex	
Males	1
Females	2
Age	
18-29	1
30-44	1
45-59	2
60+	1
Race	
Whites	1
Blacks	2
Household Income	
\$15,000	2
\$15-24,999	*
\$25-34,999	1
\$35+	2
Political Affiliation	
Democrats	2
Republicans	1
Independents	1
Political Philosophy	
Conservatives	2
Moderates	*
Liberals	1
Education	
College	1
High School Graduates	2
Non-High School Graduates	2
Occupation	
Executives/Professionals	1
White Collar Workers	2
Blue Collar Workers	2
Homemakers	1
Religion	
Protestants	2
Catholics	1

* Less than one half of one percent.

A Study of Attitudes Toward American
Jews and Israel



Turning for a minute to the situation in the Middle East, at the present time do you find yourself more in sympathy with Israel, or more in sympathy with the Arab nations?

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

	1986 June	1985 Apr./ May	1984 Jan.	1987 February
Sympathies are:				
More with Israel	53%	42%	44%	48%
More with Arab nations	8	10	8	8%
Not sympathetic with either side (vol.)	19	23	21	23%
Sympathetic equally with both sides (vol.)	8	11	12	7%
Don't know	11	12	13	14%

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample.

I'm going to mention the names of some foreign countries. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether or not you think that country is or is not a reliable ally of the United States. First, (name country).

	<u>June 1986</u>			<u>Apr./May 1985</u>			<u>Jan. 1984</u>		
	Is a reliable ally	Is not a reliable ally	Don't know	Is a reliable ally	Is not a reliable ally	Don't know	Is a reliable ally	Is not a reliable ally	Don't know
Canada	90%	4%	7%	90%	3%	7%	91%	4%	6%
West Germany	61	22	17	63	18	19	65	16	19
France	54	31	15	60	23	18	61	20	18
Israel	52	32	17	53	25	22	54	24	23
Egypt	31	43	26	35	33	32	37	31	33
Jordan	18	47	36	19	39	43	17	39	44
Syria	4	72	25	8	52	40	7	61	32

<u>February 1987</u>		
Is a reliable ally	Is not a reliable ally	Don't know
88%	3%	8%
61	18	21
54	27	20
49	29	21
29	41	31
17	44	38
6	61	33

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample.

(Respondent shown card) Which, if any, of the groups listed on this card do you believe have too much power in the United States? Just call off the letter in front of the groups.

	1986 June	1985 Apr./ May	1984 Jan.	1987 February
Business corporations	44%	49%	51%	42%
Labor unions	44	45	50	33%
News media	40	42	50	38
Arab interests	28	30	30	20
Orientals	12	11	*	12
Blacks	11	13	13	11
The Catholic Church	10	11	10	9
Jews	8	8	8	7
Hispanics	6	*	4	5
None	7	7	6	9
Don't know	7	6	6	8

* Not asked.

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample.

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States.

	1986 June	1985 Apr./ May	1984* Jan.	1987 February
<u>Most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America</u>				
Agree	24%	27%	25%	24%
Disagree	46	47	50	49%
Don't know/no answer	31	26	25	26%

* Asked of and based on one-half of the sample.

Note: Figures represent percent of total sample, unless otherwise indicated.

1. I'm going to mention the names of some foreign countries. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether or not you think that country is or is not a reliable ally of the United States. First, (name country). (ASK ABOUT EACH ONE)

	<u>Is reliable ally</u>	<u>Is not reliable ally</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
a. Canada	88%	3%	8%
b. Syria	6	61	33
c. West Germany	61	18	21
d. Israel	49	29	21
e. Egypt	29	41	31
f. France	54	27	20
g. Jordan	17	44	38

2. Turning for a minute to the situation in the Middle East, at the present time do you find yourself more in sympathy with Israel, or more in sympathy with the Arab nations?

More with Israel	48%
More with Arab nations	8
Not sympathetic with either side (vol.)	23
Sympathetic equally with both sides (vol.)	7
Don't know	14

3. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Which, if any, of the groups listed on this card do you believe have too much power in the United States? Just call off the letter in front of the groups.

a. Business corporations	42%
b. Arab interests	20
c. Blacks	11
d. The news media--TV and newspapers	38
e. Jews	7
f. The Catholic Church	9
g. Orientals--Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Vietnamese, etc.	12
h. Hispanics	5
i. Labor unions	33
None of these	9
Don't know	8

4. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States.

Agree	•	24%
Disagree		49
Don't know		26

5. As you probably know, in November of 1986 it was disclosed that the U.S. Government had sold weapons to Iran. Part of the profit from these sales was used to help fund the Contra Forces in Nicaragua. This situation has caused a great deal of concern both in the U.S. and abroad.

Here is a list of individuals and groups said to be involved in the situation. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Would you please read down the list and call off who you think is most to blame for the situation?

	Feb 1987
a. President Reagan	43%
b. President Reagan's advisors	47
c. Lt. Col. Oliver North	21
d. Individual arms dealers	15
e. Terrorists	14
f. Saudi Arabia	4
g. Israel	5
h. Iran	14
i. Nicaragua	8
None of the above (vol.)	2
Don't know	12

6. Here is a list of some things that have been in the news in recent months. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Would you read down the list, and for each one tell me whether it is something you have read and heard a lot about, or a little about, or practically nothing about? First, (read item). (ASK ABOUT EACH ITEM)

	February 1987			
	A <u>lot</u>	A <u>little</u>	<u>Practically nothing</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
a. The proposed trillion dollar federal budget President Reagan submitted to Congress	38%	42%	17%	3%
b. The U.S. sales of arms to Iran with the profits going to the Contras in Nicaragua	67%	23%	8%	2%
c. The Ivan Boesky insider trading scandal on Wall Street	29%	34%	33%	4%

7. Ivan Boesky, a leading Wall Street investment banker, has been charged with "insider trading". This means he used confidential information, not available to the general public, to buy up shares of stock in companies about to be acquired by others. This illegal activity allowed him to sell back the shares at a much higher price, once the confidential information became public.

There has been a great deal of discussion about the factors that lead to this type of scandal. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Would you please read down the list and call off which, if any, of the factors you think is most to blame for this type of scandal?

February 1987

- a. The capitalist system 1050
- b. Lack of ethics in business 43
- c. The moral decline of society 21
- d. A Jewish background 1
- e. Insufficient governmental regulation and enforcement 28
- f. The Yuppie mentality 3
- g. A Catholic background 1
- h. Personal greed and avarice 55
- None of the above (vol.) 1
- Don't know 15

order switched



News Reports Appearing in New York Times
and Washington Post during Period that
Roper Poll was in Field (February 14-28, 1987)

- Feb. 14 Front page news as Martin Siegel pleads guilty to charges that he participated in an information swapping and stock trading scheme.
- Feb. 15 Rabin defends Israel's decision to ship arms to Iran "to try to open contacts with our enemies."
- Feb. 15 Washington Post story on Pollard as Israel's master spy.
- Feb. 17 Israel Grossman, lawyer, arrested on charges of stealing inside information and passing it on to friends.
- Feb. 17 Shamir and Shultz disagree over usefulness of an international Middle East peace conference.
- Feb. 18 Shamir (in U.S.) and Congress agree on procedures of investigation of Israeli role in Iran-Contra affair.
- Feb. 18 Government prosecutors say Pollard dealt a very serious blow to national security.
- Feb. 20 Dennis Levine gets 2-year jail term.
- Feb. 22 Washington Post story on Israel's relationship with South Africa vis-a-vis the U.S. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.

- Feb. 26 Peres meets with Egyptian President Mubarak to discuss new idea for getting peace talks started. Shamir disapproves.
- Feb. 26 Release of Tower Commission Report.
- Feb. 26 Analyses of Israel's role as described in Tower Commission Report.
- Feb. 27 Rabin denies Tower Commission claim that Israel had proposed sending military instructors to Nicaraguan rebels.
- Feb. 27 Pollard claims that he was told by his contacts that his spy activities were approved at the highest levels of the Israeli government.

