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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date November 26th, 1978
to Abe Karlikow
from Sergio Nudelstejer
subject Arab Activities in Mexico

These last few days we have felt in Mexico intense anti-Israeli and pro-Arab activity, by the office of the Arab League in Mexico and by the office of the PLO.

- 1) As we approach the date of November 29th, the PLO was able to organize in the Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales de la UNAM (Faculty of Political and Social Science of the National University of Mexico) and under the auspices of the Center of International Relations, a seminary which will take place November 27 through November 30th on the following subject: Palestine: Conflicts and Perspectives. Among the participants to said seminar, are University Professors of the leftist wing and quite pro-Arab, and one of these is Marwan Tahbub, representative of the PLO in Mexico. It is out of the question that this seminary will attract a number of students and teachers and will be used as an anti-Israeli platform.

You will find included in this memo a copy of the full program.

- 2) Some newspapers have been publishing a series of open, pro-Arab articles and editorials, in which is felt the hand of the PLO office. Among these articles, is one under the title of: Campo David: Paz Ficticia. Unidad Arabe contra el Sionismo. (Camp David: Fictitious Peace. Arab unity against Zionism), written by Carlos Sanchez Cárdenas and he says in one of the paragraphs,

"...Tel Aviv is set on continuing this devastating action that has resulted in the expulsion of the palestinians from their own land and in the erasing of Palestine as a nation....."

"...Zionism is a racist, sectarian, colonizing movement, characterized by fanaticism, hatred, expansionism and aggression...a standing of imperialism, endowed with all kind of media to protect the imperialistic monopoly and thus, exploit all the Arab region, its natural resources and riches and cause division among the Arab nations....."

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date
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subject

-2-

"...the Zionist imperialist attack has reached such a state of fierceness that it affects all Arabs, independently of their ideologies, political systems and economical ones....."

Enclosed, please find xerox copy of mentioned article.

- 3) At the same time, appeared an issue of Bulletin #80 of the so-called Asociación de Amigos de los Pueblos Arabes (Association of Friends of Arab Nations), which is published by the office of the Arab League in Mexico. This bulletin is terribly poisonous, openly anti-Israeli, anti-Jewish and anti-American, and in this issue it publishes an extensive and violent editorial in which one of its paragraphs states:

"...Israel and the United States are the natural born enemies of the Arab people: they deprived the Palestinians of their land and threw them out into the wilderness with the genocidal purpose of extinguishing them. To the great misfortune of the Imperialists, the Palestinians survived all this wickedness and are fighting now for their destiny and to recover their occupied land, taken from them by the Jews and their Yankee accomplices....."

On page 6 of the same bulletin, they reproduce our article on Pope John Paul II written by Rabbi Tanenbaum, with biting criticism and saying:


"POOR CHURCH AND POOR CATHOLICS, JUDAISM HAS DOMINATED THEM"


Enclosed please find a xerox copy of said bulletin.

On Mr. Nudelstejers absence, signed by Ethel E. Guttman

c.c. to Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum

to David Geller





Community Services & Membership Dept.


Special Programs Dept.

The American Jewish Committee, 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Prepared By Sheba Mittelman

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WHO ARE THE ARABS?

An Information Packet

Introduction

For many years, the need to help establish a Jewish state, and to protect it from a multitude of threats to its existence and viability, has concentrated the attention of the American Jewish community on the Israelis, to the virtual exclusion of the 100 million Arabs in the surrounding states. But if the recent moves toward peace in the region are to succeed, normal relationships will have to be established between Israel and her Arab neighbors. The purpose of this discussion guide is to stimulate American Jews to think about and learn about the Arab peoples.

Discussion leaders will find the principal themes for consideration in this Introduction. Detailed questions relating to these themes follow.

For most of the past 30 years, American Jews have thought of the Arabs as the "enemy," a great undifferentiated group of nations on the other side of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At least since 1973, however, it has become clear that there are vast differences among the Arab states. A few -- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Arab Emirates -- control the largest known petroleum reserves in the world, a source not only of great wealth, but of growing political power in both the industrialized and less developed world. (On the other hand, this wealth and power have generated serious social and political problems for these countries which have suddenly been catapulted into the modern industrial age.) Others are extremely poor and underdeveloped, and face ever-increasing difficulties feeding their rapidly-growing populations.

To understand today's Arabs, and the various forms of their self-identification, one must examine how their history contrasts with their situation today. Who, then, are "the Arabs"? Two authorities on the Arabs say:

All those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Mohammed and the memory of the Arab Empire, and who in addition cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession. (Mohammedanism, by H.A.R. Gibb)

Whoever lives in our country, speaks our language, is brought up in our culture and takes pride in our glory is one of us. (Cited by Bernard Lewis in The Arabs in History)

Both Gibb and Lewis analyze several unifying factors which helped create

what Raphael Patai, in The Arab Mind, calls the Arab core of the Middle East. Among them, two stand out: Islam, the religion which originated in the Arabian peninsula, and Arabic, the language of the Koran, inextricably tied to the religion, which became the common language of the region. Both the language and the religion swept through the Middle East in a wave of conquests which created "A Golden Age of Arab Culture" from the eighth to thirteenth centuries. (See UNESCO Courier articles attached.)

The role of history in shaping the modern Arab world cannot be underestimated. S.D. Goitein, in Jews and Arabs, points out that whereas the Jews were exiled from their homeland and scattered for millenia throughout the world, the Arabs were, in a sense, exiles on their own soil until quite recently. By the thirteenth century, the Arab peoples -- except for some tribes in inaccessible desert and mountain areas -- had lost their political independence and no longer controlled their own affairs. The Islamic Empire was split, again and again, into local dynasties, first under the Persians, then under various Turkish rulers -- the Seljuqs, the Mamelukes, and finally the Ottomans. (Even though the Ottoman Turks were Muslims, the Arabs considered them interlopers and oppressors.) Such historic memories are one basis for the emergence of modern Arab nationalism early in this century, and for its growth to this day.

Arab political aspirations emerged at different times in different places. Most of today's 21 Arab states are less than 30 years old. Only the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was an independent nation before World War II; until the 1950s and 1960s, most of the others suffered some form of colonial domination (by the French in North Africa, Syria, and Lebanon; by the British in Palestine), or were protectorates of the British (in Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, Aden, and the Persian Gulf). This legacy of colonialism has markedly affected Arab attitudes toward Western culture and ideologies, as well as toward the two superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (The discussion leader may ask whether Saudi Arabia's pro-American attitude may be explained by its never having been a Western colony.)

Rapid change and conflicting ideals are facts of life in the Arab world today, where old customs and laws often stand in the way of the pressure to reach into the twentieth century. (As an example of the havoc wrought by such tensions between religious tradition and modern social and political experience, the discussion leader may encourage the participants to talk about Lebanon.)

The old morality and way of life are increasingly challenged -- in the schools and universities, on television, and through other channels -- by science, technology, and modern ideologies. Oil-rich states spend fortunes sending their promising young people to Western universities to learn new technologies, but in addition to substantive knowledge these students have been exposed to new ways of living. The young Saudi who has played football and been a campus leader at the University of Southern California will see society differently when he returns to Riyadh than when he left.

Politically, most Arab nations are looking for ways to harness competing loyalties -- to a religious group, or a village, to the army or to a single leader -- to the building of a modern state. Hence the emphasis on the pan-Arab ideal on the one hand, and the separate nationalism of the individual Arab states, each with its own political regime, on the other. (Military dictatorships like Syria, Iran, and Yemen are obviously not about to join politically with traditional monarchies of Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates,

despite the rhetoric of unity common to all of them. In addition, there is the contrast between the enormous wealth of some Arab states and the abject poverty of others. The rich states must decide how to use their wealth, where to distribute it, and how much to lend to less fortunate neighbors.

After President Anwar el Sadat's visit to Israel in November, 1977, the Camp David agreement in September, 1978, and the negotiations between Egypt and Israel in Washington in October, 1978, the Arab world appears, at last, to be coming to grips with a problem that has ignited four wars in the past 30 years. Until now, modern Israel has been viewed as an unwelcome foreign presence in the Middle East. If peace comes, it will be necessary for both Arabs and Israelis to accept one another.

The discussion should review the differences between Israel and the surrounding states, especially to the political meaning of Israel's Western-type democracy, as well as the issue of Jewish identity in these surroundings, and consider how -- after 30 years of hostility -- the Jews in Israel and the Arabs in the surrounding states can learn to live as neighbors.



WHO ARE THE ARABS?

Discussion Guide #1

1. Why is it important for us to know who the Arabs are?
 - Their oil reserves
 - Their money
 - The American strategic interest
 - The geographic link to oil
 - Their great number
 - Because the conflict in the Holy Land touches all peoples

2. How do you see Arabs? What are your mental associations with them? (TO THE DISCUSSION LEADER: Please encourage participants to share personal experiences.) Are they:
 - Strange or exotic
 - Bedouin, desert nomads
 - Hospitable
 - Backward
 - Hypocritical
 - Terrorist and violent

3. What are the major unifying forces in the Arab world today?
 - Religion -- pan-Islamism
 - Nationalism -- pan-Arabism
 - Culture
 - Historical experience
 - The conflict with Israel

4. What are the main divisive forces in the Arab world?

- Economic problems: wealth and how to use it
- Widespread poverty
- Ideology: views of the West, Marxism, Modernity
- Religion
- The quest for political power by individual states

How have all these problems come to a head in Lebanon?

5. What would you say are the main problems confronting the Arab states today?

- War
- Economic development
- Revolution
- Modern culture
- Poverty in the midst of wealth

6. Western-educated bureaucrats serve as spurs to social change in the Arab world. How does exposure to European and American ways of life affect attitudes of these young Arabs toward their societies at home?

7. The creation of the State of Israel presented special problems to the Arab world, as did the establishment of the new independent states in the twentieth century. Is the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict a clash between:

- Different political systems? Is Israel different as a state?
- Conflicting national movements, such as the Zionist movement, the Palestinian national movement, etc?
- Religious and cultural differences between Jews and Arabs?
(note differences between Jews and Arab Muslims and Arab Christians.)

8. How has the historical experience of the Jewish people as a minority in Muslim Arab society affected relations with the Arabs? How does this compare with present relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel today?

9. What do you expect in the future?

Do you believe there will be real peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors?

Can you speculate on what kind of peace it will be?



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THE ARAB-AMERICANS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS

A Fact Sheet

by Sheba Mittelman

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

Trends Analysis Division

Domestic Affairs Division

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
Institute of Human Relations
165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

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INTRODUCTION

On December 15, 1977, President Carter invited 16 leaders of major Arab-American organizations to the White House to discuss his Middle East policy. It was the first such meeting, and invited leaders hoped it would initiate an ongoing dialogue with the White House.

The Arab-American spokesmen voiced support for Mr. Carter's peace efforts, but urged that he use his leverage to make Israel respond to the recent overture of the Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat. They also proposed that the U.S. recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) and include it in the peace-making process. Concerning this point, President Carter explained that the P.L.O. would first have to accept UN Resolution 242, thereby implicitly recognizing the State of Israel; the Arab-Americans replied that the U.S. should not let itself be bound by Israel's position vis-a-vis the P.L.O., but should act in its own interests to attain a just peace.

The December meeting, as well as one held during the preceding month by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance with a similar group, showed Arab-Americans in a new role on the American political scene. The community, numbering approximately 2 million, is articulating its views on U.S. Middle East policy and the Arab-Israel conflict with growing sophistication. Its organizations, together with pro-Arab businessmen and political consultants, form the core of an evolving Arab lobby with considerable potential influence on American policy -- a new challenge to pro-Israel sentiment in the U.S.

Political activity by organized Arab-American groups is a recent phenomenon. Until a decade ago, Arab-American organizations were mainly social and cultural and were divided, for the most part, by religious allegiances and places of origin. But when the Arab countries suffered inglorious defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, community leaders in the U.S. found it necessary to counter the image of the "cowardly Arab" in the mind of the American public. And after the massacre of Israeli athletes by Arab terrorists at the Munich Olympics in 1972, when the U.S. Government intensified surveillance of Arab-American groups suspected of terrorist connections, concerted action was taken in response to what was perceived as harassment and political intimidation.

Prominent businessmen, lawyers and professors organized the National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA) to stimulate and coordinate political activity by the existing social and cultural groups. The NAAA has become increasingly vocal, though it is relatively moderate in its attitude toward Israel; it is now one of the two most prominent Arab-American organizations. The other is the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, a more radically anti-Israel group, which combines its political goals with a strong cultural emphasis.

The two groups, together with a good many smaller ones, seek to bridge old religious and national divisions and create a sense of Arab-American solidarity.

Some internal friction remains; the older settlers, Lebanese and Syrian Christians whose families came here early in the 1900's and have since done well, do not always see eye to eye with more recent arrivals: Palestinians, Egyptians and Syrians, many of them Muslims and political radicals. However, the different groups seem to agree on what role Arab-Americans can play in promoting a more "even-handed" U.S. policy in the Middle East. "When you've got the President and members of Congress raising questions about Israeli settlements, then it's become respectable," says John P. Richardson, the public affairs director of the NAAA. "In the past, American Arabs, who are mostly conservative Lebanese, bit their tongues."

All of the Arab-American groups take the same approach to Zionism and the Arab-Israel conflict. For some time, they have publicized alleged human rights violations by Israel in the administered territories, making the most of President Carter's emphasis on human rights. They have widely quoted and publicized speeches by prominent Israelis critical of their government--for example, Israel Shahak, Chairman of the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights, who has called for reorganization of Israel as a non-Zionist state, and Felicia Langer, a member of the Israeli Communist Party and an attorney who represents many jailed Palestinians in Israeli courts. Most recently, the Arab-American groups have challenged the wisdom of large-scale U.S. aid to Israel, which, they say, encourages Israel to retain conquered territories, and have argued that Israel violates American rules and conditions for the use of arms.


Most of the groups take care to emphasize that they oppose only Zionism, not Judaism, and to avoid using anti-Semitic slurs. Instead, they try to weaken support for Israel by stressing the difference between Zionist political ideology and the Jewish religion, thereby seeking to raise doubts about the loyalty of American Jews to Israel.

(In this effort, they cooperate with Jewish anti-Zionists like Rabbi Elmer Berger, President of American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, and Dr. Alfred Lilienthal, leader of the American Council on the Middle East, and ad hoc federation of militant anti-Israel organization.)

The more moderate groups, such as the NAAA realize that Israel is not about to disappear. However, there is widespread sympathy for the P.L.O.'s goal of a "secular democratic" state in Palestine to replace the existing "racist, Zionist regime." Also the groups unanimously claim that "Zionist propaganda" distorts the information the American public gets about the Arab-Israel conflict, and are determined, through their efforts, to alter the balance.

The listing below includes the most prominent and numerous among nationwide Arab-American organizations. Many of these named have local branches, or affiliates with similar names, which are not necessarily mentioned here. Also noted are some national associations, not themselves Arab-American, that support the Arab cause. Groups listed are U.S. organizations; groups registered with the U.S. Department of Justice as agents for foreign governments, such as the League of Arab States or the Arab Information Offices in American cities, are not included.

An index of all organizations mentioned will be found at the end.



ARAB-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS

National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA)

President: Prof. Hisham Sharabi

Headquarters: Washington, D.C.

Founded: 1972

Publication: The Voice (monthly)

Organized "to fill the absence of an effective political action group" in the Arab-American community, the NAAA has become the community's chief political voice. An umbrella organization, it consists of some 1,600 church, social and charitable groups and an estimated 4,000 individuals all over the U.S. According to its former president, Richard Shadyac, a Washington lawyer, the NAAA depends solely on membership dues for its funds (Congressional Quarterly, 1975). Its operating budget is estimated at \$200,000 (John Maclean, Chicago Tribune, March 5, 1978).

The newly elected president is Prof. Hisham Sharabi of Georgetown University. A noted historian, Prof. Sharabi holds the Umar Al-Mukhtar Chair of Arab Culture (which was established with a \$750,000 gift by the Libyan government) and serves on the executive committee of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. He succeeds Joseph Baroody, a public relations executive in Washington, D.C. and a member of a prominent family of Lebanese origin.

Spurred by its new director of public affairs, John P. Richardson, recently registered as a lobbyist, the NAAA has of late stepped up its presentations to Congressmen and other public officials, hoping to serve as an alternative source of information to the Israel lobby. Its viewpoint is described as "first and foremost American."

Messrs. Baroody and Shadyac have praised President Carter's position on the rights of Palestinians and have urged him to use available leverage on Israel to achieve peace, "since political realities are such that Israel could not pursue policies unacceptable to this Administration." Mr. Baroody asserts that Israel, while receiving sizeable U.S. aid "builds illegal settlements" and rejects the most generous peace proposal it may ever get from the Arabs...." He adds: "We don't think this situation is in America's national interest and we doubt that many Americans do."

The NAAA has recognized the P.L.O. as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and has opposed arms transfers to Israel. On April 8, 1978, Mr. Richardson told the Washington Post that the organization would seek a Federal Court injunction to stop such arms deliveries, on the grounds that Israel had violated the Arms Export Control Act by using American weapons during its incursion into southern Lebanon.

In an editorial in The Voice (March 1978), the NAAA described its strategy and objectives:

It is imperative for us to organize in order to enable United States policymakers to act toward achieving a just settlement in the Middle East without the fear of domestic reaction...in order to provide a healthier climate in the United States for freedom of expression on issues relating to the Middle East. President Carter hesitates to utter one word: "self-determination," ... because financially-potent Zionist organizations will not tolerate the enunciation

Besides political activities such as mounting letter-writing campaigns and encouraging Arab-Americans to run for public office, the NAAA sponsors workshops and cultural events designed to generate pride in the Arab heritage and to combat anti-Arab prejudice. The organization recently sued the Marriott Corporation for alleged discrimination against Arab employees; the case was settled out of court.

One of the NAAA's most active chapters is the Greater Cleveland Association of Arab Americans (GCAAA). Joanne McKenna is the group's president. According to The News Circle, an Arab-American publication in Los Angeles (December 1977), GCAAA is a volunteer organization with no salaried personnel. It claims to represent 25,000 Greater Clevelanders of Arabic descent: Christians, Muslims and Druzes; Lebanese, Syrians, Palestinians, Egyptians, Iraqis and Jordanians.

The stated purpose of the organization is to express pride in the ancestral language and culture and to give voice to discontent with U.S. Middle East policy: "We declare the independence of the U.S.A. from allegiance to a foreign power or foreign-interest lobby...and are dedicated to peace with justice, to America's geopolitical and economic interests and to international understanding." GCAAA has recently participated in a workshop sponsored by the U.S. Department of State and the Council on World Affairs. It presents programs on Middle Eastern culture in local churches and has been featured in interviews on radio and TV.

Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG)

President: Fouad Moughrabi, Associate Professor of
Political Science, University of Tennessee

National Office: Detroit, Mich.

Founded: 1967

Publications: Information Papers series; monographs;
Bulletin (monthly)

AAUG, with 15 chapters across the country, is one of the most influential secular Arab organizations. Its 1,400 members are mainly professors and other academics, lawyers, doctors and engineers.

The AAUG sponsors symposia, speakers and publications that profess to "correct distortions and bias" and provide "alternative sources of information and knowledge" about the Middle East. Its monographs and information bulletins, often written by respected scholars such as Professor Ibrahim Abu-Lughod of Northwestern University, deal with issues like the assimilation of Arabs in the United States, or the negative stereotypes of Arabs as "backward and Oriental despots." But there also are anti-Israel propaganda papers with titles like "Legal Status of Israel and the Occupied Territories," which depict Israel as a "racist, colonial state," and Zionism as "the enemy."

The AAUG strongly supports the P.L.O., reflecting, perhaps, the large number of Palestinians among Arab intellectuals. It has endorsed the use of force in "liberating" Palestine as well as the creation of a secular democratic state there, and has often invited P.L.O. officials to address its conventions. At its October 1977 convention, the organization went on record against "pressures of reactionary Arab regimes pressing for American liquidationist solutions."

Several prominent AAUG members met with Secretary of State Vance on November 18, 1977, to discuss U.S. peacemaking efforts in the Middle East. Professor Moughrabi, its president, and Abdeen Jabara, a Detroit lawyer and pro-Palestinian activist, presented a summary of AAUG's position which condemned Israeli air raids in Lebanon as "wanton and unjustifiable murder," called for a moratorium on arms shipments, assailed Israel's continued founding of settlements in the administered territories, and called on the U.S. to recognize the P.L.O. as the sole representative of the Palestinian people "without prior conditions," i.e., without recognition of Israel by the P.L.O.

American Lebanese League (ALL)

President: Paul Corey

Chairman: Dr. Elias Saadi

Founded: 1976

Headquarters: Columbus, Ohio

Formed during the Lebanese War, ALL seeks to "influence U.S. policy to foster the continued independence of Lebanon and to secure the unity of all its people." It is chartered as an educational and charitable nonprofit organization.

ALL's president, Paul Corey, is a businessman; its chairman, Dr. Elias Saadi, is a physician. Both have repeatedly met with President Carter. In public statement, they have stressed that the unique political and social character of Lebanon must be maintained. A statement supporting the joint U.S.-Soviet communique of October 1, 1977, which called for resumption of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East, declared:

"...Firm steps taken now to resolve the Palestinian problems will also help secure Lebanon's territorial integrity, thus stabilizing the entire Middle East and protecting America's vital interest there."

The organization has been careful not to spell out its position on the Arab-Israel conflict. However, in connection with reports of cooperation between the Lebanese Christian militias and Israel, it has by implication recognized a congruence of interests between Israel and Lebanon. The nature of ALL's ties with other Arab organizations is unclear; after participating in the December meeting with President Carter, Dr. Saadi and Mr. Corey would not join in the statement released to the press by the other groups, but issued a statement of their own, without mention of the P.L.O.

National Federation of American Syrian Lebanese Clubs (NFASLC)

President: Sam Saad (LaGrange, Ill.)

Founded: 1950

The NFASLC, an umbrella organization currently encompassing three regional federations (Midwest, Southern, Western) and 200 local Syrian-Lebanese clubs, was politically active during the 1950's, sending memoranda on aid to Lebanon and Israel to the State Department, inviting Arab ambassadors to speak at meetings, and organizing tours to Syria and Lebanon. However, it was then unable to mobilize the Arab-American community to sustained political action, and its efforts in that field gradually fell dormant. During the past year, the group has tried to resume political action; its president Sam Saad, took part in the December meeting with President Carter.

One of the leading members of the NFASLC's Midwest Federation is Minor George, an Ohio businessman with outspoken pro-Palestinian views, who declared at a press conference in 1975: "There never was a more saintly, godly man than Yasir Arafat." Mr. George is a past president of the NAAA and currently heads its membership drive.

The local clubs affiliated with NFASLC were set up during the 1920s and 1930s to raise funds for needy Syrian Lebanese in the U.S. Their activities are mostly charitable and cultural. Lately, they have sent funds to the Middle East -- among other purposes, for exchange scholarships to bring Arab students to American universities.

American Ramallah Federation (ARF)

President: Mike Saah (Falls Church, Va.)

Headquarters: Detroit, Mich.

Founded: 1959

Primarily a cultural, educational and social organization, the Federation consists of 15 local clubs, representing approximately 12,000 "Ramallahites"--Christians who trace their origins to the city of Ramallah in the West Bank territory, and who have emigrated from their old homes, many after 1948. The clubs maintain links with Ramallah by raising money to support needy families, hospitals, and scholarships for study abroad. The ARF sponsors workshops, films and lectures in the hope of "contributing to the understanding of the Palestinian problem."

Action Committee on American-Arab Relations (ACAAR)

Secretary General: Dr. M.T. Mehdi

Headquarters: New York, N.Y.

Publication: Action (bi-weekly)

Although the ACAAR claims to have 20,000 members, it is a two-man operation by Dr. Mehdi and Dr. William Small, Professor of Mathematics at the State University at Geneseo, N.Y., and is currently having financial troubles. Dr. Mehdi, an Iraqi, is a skilled professional propagandist, who lectures before church groups and has appeared on local radio and TV spots as an "Arab expert." Dr. Small describes himself as an "American Palestinian Arabist"; he has called for the dismantling of Israel.

The organization's newspaper, Action, prints vicious attacks on Israel and Zionism. A recent editorial said Menahem Begin's becoming Prime Minister of the Jewish State was "as obnoxious as if Eichmann had become the Chancellor of West Germany," and added that Mr. Begin should be tried as a war criminal for his Irgun activities. When President Sadat visited Israel, Dr. Mehdi labelled him "a well-meaning fool," who misunderstands "the insatiable appetite of the Zionists." Dr. Mehdi has insisted on the right of Palestinians to repatriation in Palestine, and has asserted that recognition of Israel by the Arab states would be "presumptuous" and not binding on the Palestinians. He has also blasted a new Holocaust study program in the New York City public schools as "an attempt by the Zionists to use the city educational system for their evil propaganda purposes."

Dr. Mehdi was not invited to the meetings with Secretary Vance and President Carter, but in July 1977 met with William Quandt of the National Security Council and left several messages for the President, urging U.S. recognition of the P.L.O. and suspension of military aid to Israel.

Housed in the same office as the ACAAR is a group called Federation of American-Arab Organizations, of which Dr. Mehdi is Executive Director.

Federation of Islamic Associations in the U.S. and Canada (FIA)
National President: Dawud Assad (New Jersey)
Headquarters: Dearborn and Pontiac, Mich.
Founded: 1953
Publications: The Muslim Star; books
Publication Chairman: Nihad Hamed (Michigan)

An umbrella for approximately 200 Muslim groups, the Federation is primarily a religious and educational organization. It sponsors youth programs and scholarships for the study of Islam, and its president, Dawud Assad, who is a mechanical engineer, reportedly plans to build an Arabic school in New Jersey with support from Saudi Arabia.

The FIA has always had close connections with Arab governments. It has held receptions for Arab ambassadors and has sponsored talks by Arab League representatives through the Arab Information Center (the public relations arm of the League of Arab States, registered as a foreign agent). In January 1978, the organization reaffirmed its recognition of the P.L.O. and its support for the "just cause of the Arabs," including the right to liberate their land by any means from the "expansionist, settler Zionist regime." President Carter was urged "to scrutinize efforts by the Israeli lobby and Zionist alien element that may be detrimental to the good and welfare of our United States."

Muslim Students Association of the U.S. and Canada (MSA)
Headquarters: Plainfield, Ind.
Founded: 1962
Publications: Islamic Horizons (monthly); Al-Ittihad (quarterly)

Though a student organization, the MSA works outside the universities. It has 166 chapters in the U.S. and Canada, claims to represent 6,500 persons, and seeks to promote Islamic knowledge, attitudes and commitment. Its activities are mainly religious, charitable and social. Recent conferences sponsored by its regional units have focused on themes such as "Becoming Better Muslims" and "The Muslim Family."

Affiliated with the MSA are several professional bodies: Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers; Association of Muslim Social Scientists; Islamic Medical Association. These groups are planning to build a new Islamic Center in Plainfield, Ind. which would include the MSA's headquarters.

The Association's monthly, Islamic Horizons, includes news briefs dealing with international politics. An editorial in February 1978 disapproved of Egyptian President Sadat's peace efforts, and went on: "The nature of the (Arab-Israel) conflict is ideological and the only guarantee for a just and lasting solution is the Islamization of the societies in Muslim lands." The editorial further said it was a "historical fact" that European powers and Zionists had conspired to dismember the Muslim lands and obliterate the Muslim ummah (nation). Other editorials have protested

"racist Zionism" and the "Judaization of Jerusalem."

An article in Islamic Horizons reported on an International Students' Conference held in Libya, in which an MSA representative participated as an observer: "The delegates unanimously condemned President Sadat's visit to occupied Jerusalem (as) a humiliating gesture that bore shame to Arabs." There was no mention of Israel, only of "Zionism in Palestine."

Palestine Human Rights Campaign (PHRC)

Chairperson: Prof. James Zogby

Headquarters: Washington, D.C.; Walnut Bottom, Pa.

Founded: 1976

Publication: Palestine Human Rights Bulletin (monthly)

The PHRC's stated objectives are "to promote investigation and publication of incidents and lend support to victims... (to) secure enforcement of existing internationally recognized norms of human rights and fundamental freedoms for the Palestinian people." All of the group's activities are calculated to publicize allegations of torture and human rights violations by Israel.

The PHRC's chairperson, Dr. James Zogby, Professor of Religion at Shippensburg State College in Shippensburg, Pa., is also a vice-president of the AAUG and an outspoken advocate of Palestinian self-determination. The group has the support of some noted dissidents, such as Daniel Berrigan, former priest and anti-war activist, who has criticized Israel as a "colonialist settler state."

Besides publishing its own monthly, the PHRC distributes materials suitable for propaganda use to NAAA, AAUG and other organizations, which in turn circulate it to their membership. A recent item of this kind was an article from the London Sunday Times alleging torture of Arab prisoners in Israel.

In October 1977, the PHRC sponsored an appearance by Israel Shahak, head of the League for Human and Civil Rights in Israel, before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees. Dr. Shahak denounced Israel's policies in the occupied territories as "racist exploitation." Most recently the group has taken up the case of Sami Esmail, an American citizen of Palestinian origin. He was arrested in Israel on December 21, 1977, and is being tried there on charges of attending a terrorist training camp in Libya as a P.L.O. member. (Israel has outlawed such activities and maintains the right to prosecute them even if carried on outside her territory). A defense committee has been organized at Michigan State University, where Esmail had been a graduate student.

Organization of Arab Students (OAS)

Founded: 1951

Publication: Arab Student Bulletin

With branches at most major universities, the OAS claims to represent all Arab undergraduate and graduate students in the U.S. -- some 18,000 as of 1976-77, according to an estimate of the American Friends of the Middle East. Though it ostensibly is an academic and cultural organization designed to assist students, its chapters have always engaged in political activities -- among other things, serving as distributors for propaganda published by the Arab Information Center.

Several hundred OAS members demonstrated in Washington against President Sadat's visit to Israel and denounced his recognition of the "Zionist" state. Chapters conduct campus forums and discussion groups in which the Arab cause is advocated, organize letter writing campaigns opposing Israel and her policies, and distribute posters and other materials equating Israelis with Nazis. These tactics have led to some violent confrontations with activist Jewish students, most recently on the University of Michigan campus at Dearborn.

The OAS is often joined in its propaganda activities by Solidarity groups and "liberation front" organizations opposed to what is called the "imperialist-reactionary-Zionist alliance" -- for example, the Black Panther Party, and Eritreans for Liberation.

Arab American Association (AMARA)

President: Frank Maria

Headquarters: Boston, Mass., Chapters in Lowell and Lawrence, Mass.; Providence, R.I.; Manchester, N.H.

Founded: 1961

AMARA was formed through reorganization of the dormant Eastern Federation of American Syrian Lebanese Clubs. Its main activity has been fund-raising for Project Ryaiat and the Musa Alami Project in Jericho -- Palestinian charities which aid orphans, hospitals and schools. The group has set up a United American Arab Appeal, in imitation of the United Jewish Appeal.

AMARA's president, Frank Maria, a management consultant, is also head of the Department of Middle East Affairs of the Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America. He has used this position to solicit sympathy for the P.L.O. in church conferences and to spread anti-Israel propaganda at meetings of the National Council of Churches. His talks reiterate the theme that the Palestians were driven from their homes by Israeli guns in 1948 and 1967. In a recent TV interview in Boston, he declared: "Palestinian extremism at its worst pales into insignificance before Israeli 'terrorism.'"

Palestine Solidarity Committee (PSC)

Headquarters: New York, N.Y.

Founded: 1976

Publication: Palestine!

The size and organization of the PSC are not known. The prime movers, Sheila Ryan and Milt Taam, appear to be pro-P.L.O. activists with Communist connections. Handbills and other literature distributed by the group (including items from the PHRC) score "U.S. imperialism in the Middle East" and endorse "the struggle of the armed masses in Palestine."

The PSC's main activities have been to sponsor a counter-march to the Salute to Israel Parade and to feature P.L.O. speakers. The group has been joined in a "Palestine Action Coalition" and in anti-Israel demonstrations by radical groups such as the Socialist Worker's Party, Youth Against War and Fascism, the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, the Native American Solidarity group and a number of Irish Republican clubs.

AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS SYMPATHETIC TO THE ARAB CAUSE

American Friends of the Middle East (AFME)

President: Virgil C. Crippin

Headquarters: Washington, D.C.

Founded: 1951

Publication: AMIDEAST

American Friends of the Middle East is the oldest U.S.-Arab mutual-understanding group. It has about 1,000 members and maintains offices in both the U.S. and the Mideast.

AFME's purpose is to improve U.S.-Arab relations through education and information programs. It supervises student exchanges, prepares Arab exchange students in its overseas offices, and offers counseling services for Arab students in several cities here. Its newsletter describes these educational programs.

AFME is anti-Zionist and publishes pamphlets purporting to counter Zionist "misinformation." Its spokesmen have attacked "special interest groups" for political activities on behalf of Israel.

Americans for Justice in the Middle East (AJME)

Acting President: Charles Oliver

Headquarters: Beirut, Lebanon

Publication: AJME News

AJME, described as a "voluntary organization of concerned citi-

zens" in Beirut, promotes American sympathy with the P.L.O. in order to change "misguided" U.S. policies. It was founded after the 1967 Middle East War, and its first president, Father Joseph Ryan, an American Jesuit, was an outspoken anti-Zionist. Charles Oliver, the current acting president, is an American businessman in Beirut. The group says the bulk of its funds is provided by memberships and contributions from the U.S. and the Middle East.

AJME arranges meetings between P.L.O. leaders and Americans touring the Middle East. Its newsletter prominently features interviews with Palestinian leaders, especially Marxist-leaning "progressives." The organization also distributes the Journal of Palestine Studies, a quarterly published by an Arab research organization, the Institute for Palestine Studies, which contains articles by noted scholars on the Middle East as well as P.L.O. sympathizers.

The literature distributed by AJME consistently describes Zionism in such terms as "a European nationalist and colonizing movement (which) precludes the possibility of peace based on any notion of justice for the indigenous Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel and its occupied territories." An article in the Spring, 1978, AJME News equated South African apartheid with Zionism. Another recent article, on the efforts of Zionist leaders to rescue Jews during the Second World War, depicted the would-be rescuers as collaborators with the Nazis.

In ads and in open letters to President Carter, AJME has lately proposed that arms aid to Israel be stopped, has urged the U.S. Government to recognize the P.L.O., and called on it to resist the pressures of the "Zionist lobby."

American for Middle East Understanding (AMEU)

Executive Director: John Sutton

Headquarters: New York, N.Y.

Founded: 1966

Publication: The Link (bimonthly)

AMEU is a non-profit organization whose stated aim is to create better understanding of how Middle East affairs affect the interest of the U.S. Its journal, The Link (estimated circulation 40,000) reprints articles sympathetic to the Arab view vis a vis Israel. Thus, in a recent issue Rabbi Elmer Berger extolled a book containing an Arab critique of Zionism. The volume distinguished between a "religious or genuinely messianic variety" of Zionism, which the author found unobjectionable, and "political/nationality ideology codified in Israeli law and practice," which was labelled "racist." Such books are offered to readers at a discount, in order to balance what is scored as biased and superficial media coverage of Middle East news.

AMEU is linked to church groups through its directors, who are associated, for example, with the Presbyterian Synod and with the Catholic Near East Welfare Association, a missionary and refugee relief organization. Between 1968 and 1973, AMEU reportedly received over \$400,000 from the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) to support its pro-Arab public relations activities (The Washington Post, January 9, 1975).

American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA)

President: Peter Gubser
Headquarters: Washington, D.C.
Founded: 1967
Publication: ANERA

ANERA was organized to serve as a national coordinating agency for nongovernmental American contributions to Arab refugee relief. It has absorbed several earlier relief groups, such as American Middle East Rehabilitation, Inc., and Pal-Aid International.

In its newsletter, ANERA describes itself as a nonprofit charitable organization, which seeks to broaden American assistance "in cash and kind" to "Palestinian refugees and other needy individuals in the Arab world," as well as "to increase American understanding of the Palestinian refugee problem." To the latter end, ANERA officers have taken part in seminars, given public lectures and published articles stressing the suffering of the uprooted Palestinians. Anti-Israel propaganda is generally avoided. John P. Richardson, noted earlier as public affairs director of the NAAA, is a former president of ANERA. The current president, Peter Gubser, is a social scientist and former assistant of the Ford Foundation in Lebanon.

A large portion of ANERA's support comes from major oil companies in the form of tax-free charitable contributions. In 1973, six days after the oil embargo began, Gulf Oil Corporation contributed \$2.2 million -- ANERA's largest corporate gift to date. An investigation by a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee in 1975 found that other gifts had come from Standard Oil of California, Standard of New Jersey, Mobil and ARAMCO. ANERA has issued no detailed accounting of how it used these funds; the main recipient was the Palestine Red Crescent Society (the Arab counterpart of the Red Cross), together with orphanages, hospitals, vocational training institutions, and Birzeit College on the West Bank.

American Palestine Committee (APC)

Chairman: Norman Dacey
Headquarters: Bridgeport, Conn.
Founded: 1971

The APC is a personal vehicle of Norman Dacey, the well-known nonfiction author (How to Avoid Probate), and appears to have been formed to give added status to his frequent letters to editors and

his paid ads in newspapers. Names of members are not disclosed, purportedly for fear of harrassment by pro-Israel interests.

Mr. Dacey has been extremely active in support of the Arab cause and has cooperated with leading Arab and pro-Arab propagandists in the U.S. His material has appeared in journals that endorse Palestinian terrorism, such as Free Palestine (a monthly published in Washington, D.C., by Friends of Free Palestine, the unofficial mouthpiece for the P.L.O. in this country) and Middle East Perspective (published by Alfred Lilienthal, a long-time pro-Arab apologist in the U.S.).

The APC's most recent action was to publish three CIA reports which it had obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, dealing with Israel's inadvertent attack on the U.S.S. "Liberty" during the 1967 war (Christian Science Monitor, November 3, 1977). In a series of large ads, Dacey accused the American government of concealing the truth and charged that the Israelis' action had been deliberate. He failed to publish a fourth, crucial CIA document he had obtained, which concluded that the attack had been accidental.

Mr. Dacey recently joined Dr. M.T. Mehdi and Mr. Lilienthal in a statement to President Carter, urging that aid to Israel be cut off because of alleged human rights violations.



SUMMARY

As the data just reported clearly show, the newly awakened political activism of Arab-Americans bears watching. Groups that once served purely charitable or cultural aims are increasingly functioning as catalysts for community action on political issues. No longer content just to collect donations for the Lebanese or Palestinian homeland, Arab-Americans have begun to inundate their Congressmen with letters and telegrams on issues like the Palestinian's human rights, the P.L.O., arms sales to Israel and the Arab states, Israeli settlements, and anti-Arab discrimination in the U.S. They seek meetings with the President and his aides and contribute to the election campaigns of sympathetic candidates.

These activities, combined with concerted local efforts, could create an effective Arab lobby. True, the Arab-American community is numerically small; but its political clout is enhanced by the power and money of American businesses which, out of self-interest, advocate a pro-Arab posture for the U.S. Thus, the Jewish community in the U.S. must reckon with increased competition from Arab-Americans and their friends over the formulation of American policy.

Prepared by Sheba G. Mittelman

May 1978

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date
to Area Directors and Executive Assistants
from Ira Silverman
subject Programming Guidelines for Jewish-Lebanese Christian Dialogue

BACKGROUND

Several AJC chapters have already become involved in organized dialogues with local American-Lebanese Christian groups or individuals in their communities. Others have expressed a desire to begin programming in this area. It is important to clarify AJC goals and interests in this relationship.

We have a genuine humanitarian concern to ensure the survival of the Christian community in Lebanon and to provide relief to those who have suffered from the tragic violence in that country. We have a general interest in overcoming stereotypes and ingrained prejudice - and, of course, anti-Jewish hostility - through encounter and dialogue with a variety of ethnic groups in the United States, including Arab Americans. A substantial segment of the latter are Christians of Lebanese origin.

The AJC also has specific goals relating to the security of Israel. We hope that voices in the Arab American community will speak out forcefully against Palestinian extremism, and help counter what appears to be the growing respectability of the PLO in American public opinion. We believe it important to expose the destructive role of the so-called Syrian "peacekeeping" forces in Lebanon. We want to demonstrate that Arab American opinion on the Middle East is far from unified in advocacy of the PLO, as PLO supporters in the U.S. seek to have Americans believe, but is in significant measure anti-PLO.

It is this general humanitarian concern for the future of the Lebanese Christian community and our more specific goals relating to Israel's security that afford the opportunity for exploring cooperation with Lebanese Christians in the United States.

American Lebanese Christians have their own agenda. Obviously, they are primarily concerned with preserving the physical safety and political continuity of the Christian community in Lebanon, under attack by the PLO and Syria. They, too, are interested in providing relief aid to their co-religionists suffering from the violence in Lebanon.

Although the goals of American Jews and American Lebanese Christians converge on a number of issues, we must recognize that while some Lebanese Christians look upon Israel and American Jews as allies in the context of the conflict in Lebanon, others see Israel as a major source for that country's trouble. Thus, one cannot assume that all Lebanese Christians are necessarily pro-Israel.

Moreover, it must be kept in mind that a sudden change in the political and military

situation in Lebanon could alter prospects for continued dialogue and cooperation. For example, many of the Christians believe that they will not be safe unless something is done to neutralize the disruptive power of the 400,000 Palestinians in Lebanon. They may, therefore, support proposals to pressure Israel to accept the return of most of the Palestinians either to Israel itself, or to a Palestinian West Bank-Gaza state. This would be resisted by Israel and most American Jews.

It is for these reasons we believe that dialogue with American Lebanese Christians should be undertaken, but we must be careful in our choice of Lebanese partners. AJC should seek to maintain a low profile, and develop the dialogue under inter-religious, rather than political auspices. While AJC may be helpful in getting media attention or providing a forum for the public positions or statements of pro-Israel or anti-Syrian and anti-PLO Lebanese, we should avoid both the appearance and the reality of manipulation by either group. We should also be cautious about developing organizational or fund-raising skills which may, in future circumstances, be used against us.

ACTION PROPOSALS

With the above in mind, the following action proposals and guidelines are recommended for consideration by chapter leaders and staff:

1. Assemble information about the Arab Christian community in your area. ("Arab-Americans and Their Organizations," by Sheba Mittelman, is enclosed.)
 - a. Data should include: Size of community; its visibility; specific religious affiliations; ethnic composition; civic structure; economic and social structure; leadership composition; local affiliation with national organizations. (Judi Banki's description of pro-Arab sentiment in the Christian Church will soon be forwarded to you.)
 - b. Ascertain whether any AJC chapter leaders or their Jewish friends have business or social contacts with Christian Lebanese.
 - c. Review what we have learned from previous local encounters with Christian Arabs.
2. Initiate quiet, unpublicized interaction with Lebanese leaders, utilizing available contacts. Exploratory conversations should identify specific areas of common concern.
3. Discuss possibilities for cooperation such as:
 - a. Sharing expressions of concern for the security of the Christian community in Lebanon. (Encourage supportive statements by other religious leaders, Christians and Jews.)
 - b. Cooperating in efforts to raise funds for food, clothing and medicine for displaced Christians in Lebanon.
 - c. Dialoguing in regard to Israel's role in defending the security of Lebanese Christians.

/more/

- d. Encouraging letters-to-the-editor by Lebanese deploring role of PLO and Syria.
- e. Exploring the possibility of an interfaith visit to Israel: Visit to the Good Fence; meetings with government and Christian leaders regarding plight of Lebanese Christians.

*Before launching any activity, please provide me with the following information: Names of Arab Christians; how contact was established; how you expect to proceed. Suggested new programs and public activities that emerge from local dialogues should be referred to me for discussion with Foreign Affairs Department and Interreligious Affairs Department staff.

A chapter Response Sheet is attached for your convenience.

IS/br

Enclosures: "Arab-Americans and Their Organizations" and attachments; Excerpts from "A Guide to Interreligious Dialogue"; Excerpts from Kanter memo; Summary of Malik speech to Interreligious Affairs Commission.

cc: Harold Applebaum
George Gruen
Sheba Mittelman
Judi Banki
Susie Schub
Marc Brandriss

#78-310-94

AMERICAN LEBANESE LEAGUE

President (1978-79) - Robert Basil, a former Pentagon official, now a private consultant.

Executive Director - Monsignor Elias el-Hayek, Maronite priest, formerly Professor of Law at University of Notre Dame

Formed in 1976 during the Lebanese War and chartered as an educational charitable non-profit organization, A.L.L. now claims 9,000 members and 75 affiliated groups in 40 states (Washington Post, 7/6/78; 8/20/78). Following Basil's election in May, the A.L.L. began a nation-wide campaign to expand its membership and activities in the Lebanese-American community which is estimated to be 85 per cent Christian. A.L.L. now runs a Lebanese-American Information Office in Washington, D.C. under the direction of Msgr. el-Hayek.

The A.L.L. has, in the past year, repeatedly urged President Carter to "take emergency action through the UN and other channels to stop Syrian actions in Lebanon" which they view as an attempt by Syria to establish hegemony over Lebanon and its Christian communities. The A.L.L. has close ties with the Maronite community in the U.S. and has arranged meetings between Dory Chamoun (son of Camille Chamoun, leader of the National Front in Lebanon), Charles Malik, former Lebanese Ambassador to the U.S. and U.S. Congressmen. Because of its political stance on Lebanon, A.L.L. has come into conflict with the NAAA and Senator James Abourezk (an Orthodox Christian) who have publicly supported the Syrians in their battle against Israel and the "private militias." (see attached articles)

Unlike other Arab-American groups, A.L.L. has supported the Camp David accords. The A.L.L. perceives Syria and the P.L.O. as threats to a "free, open and pluralistic society in Lebanon," a viewpoint which has led to limited cooperation with the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (the Israel lobby) in Washington.

Hearing Arab-Americans Now

WASHINGTON—For the last 30 years, the principal American constituency addressing itself to United States Middle East policy has been the American-Jewish community. Its role, understandable in the light of Jewish experience, has been played vigorously, occasionally noisily, and with almost total success: Americans have come to see the Arab-Israeli conflict largely from a pro-Israel point of view.

The American-Jewish perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as its definition of America's interest in the region, has been presented as the only valid one. Differing opinions have been suppressed; criticism of Israel has been denounced as anti-Semitic (an accusation with a chilling effect equivalent to being called "soft on Communism" during the McCarthy era). New voices are now being heard that reject a one-sided explanation of American interests and goals in the Middle East and that are not likely to be silenced by accusations of anti-Semitism. One of these is the voice of the Arab-Americans.

Whether their forebears came from Lebanon three generations ago, or they themselves are recent immigrants from Yemen or Palestine, Arab-Americans are Americans above all. The interests of their new homeland are foremost in their minds. Most are of Lebanese or Syrian ancestry, and are members of Catholic or Orthodox denominations, although there is a substantial Moslem community. There are between two million and three million Arab-Americans living in the United States today, with major concentrations in Detroit, Los Angeles and Chicago.

Over the last few years, a number of factors have made Arab-Americans more visible and outspoken. One was the credible showing of Arab armies in

By Hisham Sharabi

the 1973 war, followed by the oil embargo, which showed the world that the Arabs were not to be taken for granted. Arab-Americans, especially the younger generation, began to discover their roots and an identity in which they took pride.

Another factor was growing resentment at negative images of Arabs in the United States. They were one of the few groups still singled out for ethnic and cultural stereotyping, with particular emphasis on a leering figure in desert robes, either squandering money or holding the West hostage over oil, or both. How would Jewish-Americans react to a headline saying, "Jews Buy Bank in California"?

Finally, Arab-Americans discovered that they have an important role to play in influencing United States policy toward the Arab world. They regard themselves as a bridge between America and the Arab world, a natural "go-between" community. They began to organize and today there are several Arab-American organizations active on the national scene. The National Association of Arab Americans is the principal political-action organization. The Association of Arab American University Graduates is the principal academic and cultural group. There are numerous charitable groups helping Lebanese and Palestinian refugees.

There are now six Americans of Arab ancestry in Congress. Witnesses representing the Arab-American perspective on Middle East policy are now regularly invited to testify before Congress. A lawsuit filed in Federal court in Washington by the National Association of Arab Americans alleg-

ing Israeli violation of the Arms Export Control Act by using American-supplied weapons in its invasion of southern Lebanon in March may have been a factor in Israel's recent pullout of its troops from Lebanon. A year ago, Arab-Americans made a national issue out of an ethnic slur in public by a Federal Trade Commissioner against consumer advocate Ralph Nader, who is of Lebanese ancestry.

The United States is now experiencing dramatic changes in its relationship to the Middle East because of the Arab world's economic and strategic significance and changing perceptions of the moral issues involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel no longer has an exclusive claim on the American conscience. Arab-Americans support President Carter's willingness to address the Palestinian issue but are uneasy about Administration backtracking in the face of Israeli lobby pressures. The Arab-American community is deeply troubled by continuing violence in Lebanon and is urging a more active American role. On balance, however, Mr. Carter's efforts to articulate the American interest in the Middle East are winning friends in the Arab-American community.

Arab-Americans, by and large, are resigned to a special American relationship with Israel, but they do not accept the exclusion of normal and healthy American relations with the Arab world. At this historic turning point, when American relations with the Arab world are entering an important new phase, Arab-Americans have a special role to play. Now that they have found their voice, it is fortunate that America is finally in a listening mood.

Hisham Sharabi is president of the National Association of Arab Americans.

NEW YORK TIMES June 27, 1978

The Lebanese Ask That They Be Left Alone . . .

To the Editor:

Hisham Sharabi's article on the Op-Ed page of June 27 makes certain representations which are totally inadmissible as they concern the Lebanese-American community. It is true that most Arabic-speaking Americans are of Lebanese descent, but it does not follow that the Lebanese are Arabs or that their interests are the same as those of the Arab countries whose cause Sharabi espouses.

The Lebanese-Americans do not share the Arabs' enmity toward Israel; nor do they identify with the Palestinian cause.

The Lebanese have been made refugees in their own land by their insistence on a separate particularity from the Arabs around them. For Sharabi to claim that the Lebanese-Americans are Arabs is a deceptive statement calculated at capitalizing on the reservoir of good will which the Lebanese-Americans have built in this country over the decades.

The Lebanese cannot accept total political or cultural assimilation with the Arab world; to do so would be no

less than committing cultural suicide. The Lebanese are insisting that their separate particularity be recognized by their neighbors, be they Arabs or Israelis.

The 2.5 million Lebanese-Americans are deeply saddened by the strife in Lebanon, and by the dissolution of Lebanese sovereignty over Lebanese soil. We call on all concerned, especially our American Government, to help disarm the Palestinians in Lebanon, thereby bringing Lebanon back to a semblance of its former self as a free and democratic country.

Is it just for the Arabs to insist on Palestinian self-determination and deny that same principle when it is advanced by the Lebanese? The Lebanese ask that they be left alone by the Palestinians, the Syrians and the rest of the Arabs — left alone to determine their own destiny by the same free electoral process which had governed their internal relations.

MICHAEL S. SAHADY
Vice President

American Lebanese League
— Fall River, Mass., June 29, 1978

NEW YORK TIMES July 13, 1978

September, 1978

ALL DIMENSIONS

American
Lebanese
League

Lataif Responds to Abourezk Statement to Assad

Below are the full texts of Senator Jim Abourezk's statement to Syrian President Assad, and Attorney Lawrence Lataif's critical letter in response to Abourezk:

Statement of Senator James Abourezk to Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad-July 5, 1978-

I fully recognize the burden that has been placed on your country in its role as peacekeeper in Lebanon, especially in view of the continuous threat to the peace which results from the provocation by Israel and the private militias with which they are allied in Lebanon, resulting in the difficulties presently faced by the peacekeeping force.

Understanding this, I make this urgent plea that you use your good offices to prevent the injury and death of innocent civilians in the areas of combat in Lebanon where peacekeeping forces are using arms against those private militias who are seeking to upset the truce.

Senator James Abourezk
3321 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Jim:

I read with dismay your statement of July 5, 1978 to President Assad of Syria. I was distressed by your attempt to justify the Syrian slaughter of the Christian population of East Beirut by referring to "provocation by Israel and the private militias". To accuse the private militias in Lebanon of "seeking to upset the truce" at the very moment when Syria was decimating the civilian population of East Beirut is, in my view, unconscionable.

In making this statement, you have betrayed the trust placed in you by the thousands of Lebanese-Americans from whom you and your supporters sought and accepted tens of thousands of dollars for your political campaign.

You have aligned yourself with those forces who are seeking to destroy Lebanon for their own purposes. All Lebanese people - both Christians and Moslems need expressions of support for their national reconciliation which must take place. Their cause is only harmed when public figures such as you make statements designed to discredit those who are attempting to preserve their country. Israel has caused much havoc and agony in the Middle East. However, it was particularly distasteful for you to take a slap at the only force in the world which can, and did, stop the massacre of the civilian residents of East Beirut. Is there any hope for peace in the Middle East if Arabs insist on unrelenting and irrational hatred of Israel?

The Lebanese, particularly the Lebanese Christians, have traditionally been supportive of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and of Pan-Arab unity. But the Lebanese people cannot and should not tolerate the supremacy of Pan-Arabism or Palestinian rights over their own unquestioned national rights to sovereignty and independence.

Your statement is the most recent evidence that, as one who claims to be a leader of the Arab-American community you have been tragically out of step with the legitimate interests and aspirations of the people of Lebanon and of Lebanese-Americans.

I urge you to reconsider your position on this matter and to make a public statement in support of the Lebanese people and their national rights.

signed
Lawrence P. Lataif □

GROUND RULES FOR DISCUSSION

(Reprint from A Guide to Interreligious Dialogue,
by the American Jewish Committee, 1966)

1. Make it your business to know your own beliefs.
2. Do all you can to understand the viewpoint of the people on the other side.
3. Assume that the others are speaking in good faith. Interpret their beliefs and attitudes in the best possible light, not the worst.
4. Frankly face issues that divide the two sides. Try to understand them; don't pretend they don't exist.
5. Keep an open mind; don't let your ideas about the other side get frozen at any point.
6. Within the limits of relevance, let the discussion go where it needs to go. Don't try to decide in advance just where it should lead.

NOTE:

Apart from religion, the more the participants' interests and backgrounds resemble one another, the better. Experience has shown that persons who have much in common are least likely to get sidetracked into controversies over extraneous matters.

For the same reason, it's a good idea to make sure that the two sides will be reasonably similar in education, social status and life style.

EXCERPTS FROM SANFORD KANTER'S OCTOBER 24, 1978 MEMO TO MEMBERS OF THE HOUSTON CHAPTER EXECUTIVE BOARD RE: MEETING OF CHAPTER BOARD MEMBERS WITH HOUSTON LEBANESE LEADERS.

The meeting on October 20, 1978, was a success and is scheduled to be followed up by a meeting of from 15-20 from each community, Jewish and Lebanese, around the middle of November - at St. George Orthodox Church. The foundation for ongoing joint action was laid on October 20, and the objectives of the November 14 meeting are to broaden the base in each community and to lay out specific organizational and action plans.

Noel Graubart initiated the discussions, and the whole venture is founded upon Noel's long-time, personal relationship with influential Houston Lebanese. Trust between individual human beings was the heart and soul of the meeting.

The Lebanese present were: Ron Mafrige, in real estate; Ralph Abercia, attorney; and Ellis Antone, in real estate. Initially, until they can develop the idea within their own community, the Lebanese present did not want their names used in press releases.

As background for the October 20 meeting, I had supplied Noel with the "Statement by Robert A. Basil, President American Lebanese League Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate" and "Behind the Sterotypes in Lebanon," a background memorandum from the National AJC. Each of the participants had a copy of the documents before him.

Noel Graubart started off the meeting with introductions and a statement of his personal feelings about the Lebanese situation, finishing with a reading of several paragraphs of Robert Basil's statement before the Senate Committee which expressed particularly well what all in the room felt. Thereafter, for three hours, the exchange of opinion and expression of emotion flowed openly and deeply.

There was no agenda. The discussion did not follow a line of reasoning from point to point. What can be called the chemistry of human beings, interacting with heart and soul as well as mind, was more important than any particular statement. The Jews expressed their concern, their empathy, and extended a helping hand. The Lebanese responded as follows:

Ellis Antone stressed the need to concentrate on the "Human Rights" issue, the human rights of all the Lebanese, without discrimination as to Christian or Muslim. Even though the American Lebanese have an organization, they have an organizational problem, and because of their political fragmentation, it being forbidden to discuss politics at American Lebanese meetings, so we must avoid the "political" issues. Mr. Antone said, "We have a big thing here today."

Ron Mafrige stressed the communications need, the need of the American Lebanese to use the media to get a hearing before the American public and elected representatives. He asked for "a well-publicized joint effort." Mafrige also commented on the organizational problem, using as an example the inability of American Lebanese to get aid through to their people. He cited the case

of the collection and donation of money, food, clothing, etc. and the fact that only about one tenth ever got through to the people, with the rest ending up in the black market. Again, when the American Lebanese tried to help with money, they were forced to physically send an American to bring it directly to the people in need. Mafrige said that he was "very enthusiastic about our meeting" and that "this is what has been needed."

Ralph Abercia, with tears in his eyes, also stressed the need for help in connections to the media. He believes that local action in Houston can get attention and serve as an example for other communities. He also stressed that it must be a Human Rights campaign and must not, although Christians dominate the Houston Lebanese community, turn out to be anti-Moslim. Abercia said that "the spirit of cooperation shown here can be an example" and "at the very least we shall improve relations here in Houston." Abercia, with great emotion, also said that "the Houston Lebanese can be of help to you in the future. We do not make a temporary alliance, but when we make friends, it is friends for life. This is an historic meeting."

Noel Graubart was asked by the Lebanese to bring their greetings and a token of respect from them to Charles Malik, former Ambassador from Lebanon to the UN. Mr. Malik will be attending the AJC NEC meeting in Boston. (I have informed the Interreligious Affairs Department at National AJC; they are sponsoring Mr. Malik, to inform them and to ask them to facilitate the meeting between Noel and Malik.)

Ralph Abercia and I were delegated to coordinate the developing relationship. A specific time and place for the expanded meeting was set at the October 20 meeting, but Abercia called this morning to say that a conflicting church meeting on the same day, which he had mentioned on October 20 but dismissed as unimportant, he had underestimated, and that we had best settle on the next day or the day after. Mr. Abercia promised to call me tomorrow.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING

INTERRELIGIOUS AFFAIRS COMMISSION DINNER

October 26, 1978

Under the Chairmanship of Miles Jaffe, the Interreligious Affairs Commission of AJC, at its dinner meeting on Thursday, October 26, 1978, was witness to another historic breakthrough in ecumenical relations, (beginning with what was probably the first American Jewish dinner ever to have grace said in Arabic). One of its two speakers, Monsignor Elias el-Hayek, Executive Director of the American Lebanese League, delivered the brief prayer. Dr. Charles Malik, former President of the General Assembly of the United Nations and former Foreign Minister of Lebanon, spoke as a Lebanese Christian, concerned with the destruction of his people and his nation, in the face of almost universal indifference and silence. He remarked that it was ironic that the first Middle East leader to speak out about this destruction was the Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, followed only recently by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. Dr. Malik said that Lebanon, since 1840, has been the constant object of attack, and that the present tragedy is the result of direct outside intervention. He asked whether it was not strange that Christians in America and in Europe were silent about this destruction, and suggested that two responsible factors were the economic interest of the West in Arab oil, and a feeling that Christians in the Middle East are expendable.

Dr. Malik went on to say that certain forces have poured millions of dollars into America and Western Europe to support publicity molding public opinion of the forces trying to destroy his nation. He did not name these forces because, he said, everyone knew who they were. Dr. Malik stated that no society in the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, was free or democratic, that it was the only nation other than Israel to have a prosperous middle class, that before the present cycle of destruction Beirut had been the leading center of intellectual development and commerce in the Middle East, and that it was Christian Lebanese who translated the Bible into Arabic. He asked the question, does the United States, at the zenith of its power and influence in the Middle East, take the responsibility, "at one of the most mysterious and significant moments in the history of the world" to let slip away the opportunity for making peace between all the children of Abraham, and not only between Moslems and Jews. Only when Jews, Christians, and Moslems are secure, and the whole region is Abrahamic, can there be peace in the world.

Dr. Malik concluded by saying that the land area from Turkey to Egypt is the most important land bridge in the history of the world; that it contains five peoples (Israelis, Palestinians, Lebanese, Jordanians, and Syrians), and that a just solution for all of them on this one valuable piece of real estate must be found through American, British and French leadership. He particularly called on President Carter to lead the way in this, as he did recently at Camp David.

Monsignor Hayek, in his brief but impassioned remarks, charged Syria and its President Assad, in the guise of an Arab peace-keeping force, of seeking to destroy the nation of Lebanon, and absorb it into a Greater Syria. In one recent week, Monsignor Hayek stated, 800 people were killed in Lebanon; 200 wounded; and 350,000 became refugees. In the face of this savage behavior, he said, the American media was hesitant, perplexed and disinterested. The Syrian Army, he added, entered Lebanon with American consent, fought against the rebuilding of an independent Lebanese army, violated all Lebanese laws, as well as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and has beaten, imprisoned and assassinated hundreds of Lebanese civilians.

After remarks by Mr. Jaffe, expressing what was obviously the overwhelming sentiment of the packed room, which received Dr. Malik with a standing ovation, Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, Director of AJC's Interreligious Affairs, summed up his sense of the evening by stating that American Jews would not sit by while the innocent men, women and children of Lebanon were being annihilated. He compared the indifference of the world to Lebanon's plight to the past slaughter of Armenians, the Holocaust, and the present fate of the Cambodians and Vietnamese boat people. He also announced that the Interreligious Affairs Department would be sponsoring in the Spring of 1979, the first national conference bringing together leaders of American and Arab Christian, Jewish and Moslem communities and institutions in the United States and that it was his hope that this would be only the beginning of a process which would help to impress on American Moslems the importance for a climate conducive to religious pluralism and freedom in the entire Middle East.

AJC chapters will be asked to help organize similar dialogues with Arab Christians and Moslems in their local communities, based on background materials provided by the IAC.

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10/27/78

Reported by Inge Lederer Gibel

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
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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
Community Services and Membership Department

CONDUCTING AN AJC DISCUSSION PROGRAM

NOTE

AJC discussions take place in a number of settings, e.g., executive board meetings, workshop or round table sessions at annual meetings. The present manual, however, deals only with "home" discussion group programs.

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

I. PURPOSE

AJC's policies and the program that implements them are devoted to gaining security for Jews in America and abroad on a basis of full equality and acceptance. AJC's discussion program is one means by which it:

• Informs members and prospective members about its policies and program and heightens their understanding of them.

• Prepares members for an active role in the communities through chapters and units.

• Develops new leadership within chapters and units and, by the same token, within AJC nationally.

This is not "indoctrination." Indoctrination produces doctrinaires who imagine they have a monopoly on the "truth" about Jewish life as a whole or about any of its aspects. AJC is interested in producing responsible community workers and leaders whose convictions are continually tested in "the free market place" of ideas. A discussion is such a free market place by definition. Hence no effort is made to "sell" a particular point of view. Discussion guides and other materials provided by the national office try to give a fair picture of the various points of view on the topic so that discussion participants may make their own judgments. AJC believes that such judgments will favor AJC policies and its programs if the latter are sound and effective.

Many prospective members attend AJC discussions and a majority of them do become members. But this is a by-product of the discussion program and not one of its major purposes. It should be made clear at the outset that AJC's discussions are an educational, not a recruitment program. (But see more on this below.)

Two of the three purposes listed ("prepare members for an active role" and "develop new leadership") cannot be carried through by the discussion program itself. Chapters and units should enlist discussion participants in chapter committees and programs. Otherwise discussion programs take on the nature of talk for talk's sake. On this basis, they cannot be successful.

II. PARTICIPANTS

AJC has found in practice that educational needs vary with age plus previous experience in Jewish community affairs. Indeed, more sophisticated members are apt to reject any program designated as "educational." They are more interested in discussing policies and programs on an "executive" level for the purpose of making decisions on them than in receiving high level training in social action for dealing with intergroup relations problems. The best setting for this is the executive board meeting, meetings of various functional committees or AJC's Leadership Training Institutes. Thus, discussion programming that mixes more informed members with less informed is apt to work at cross purposes. More informed members are dissatisfied with the "elementary" level of the program. Younger members are non-plussed by discussions that take for granted a great deal of information and insight that they do not as yet possess.

Of course, a number of older members in every chapter and unit may not be active in communal affairs, Jewish or general, and their educational requirements can and should be met by regular discussion programming. Most programs, especially those consisting of more than one discussion group, invite these older members to participate along with younger people. In this case, there is homogeneity of educational need. But other programs set up groups for the benefit of older members exclusively.

In several chapters, women members of AJC conduct their own discussion groups. This is an aspect of a special effort to enhance the participation of women in AJC programming.

Occasionally the need for homogeneity among discussion participants gives rise to fears that people of similar backgrounds will be too "like-minded" for a successful discussion experience. In practice, you will find that this like-mindedness exists only on a superficial level. Any discussion that probes beneath the surface of opinions will reveal an astonishing amount of "different mindedness."

III. ORGANIZATION

Membership Education Committee

Organization of an AJC discussion program begins with the establishment of a specific chapter or unit committee which assumes overall responsibility for setting up the program and administering it. For this purpose a number of

chapters have created membership education committees or have assigned membership education to program committees as one of their major responsibilities.

More specifically, the membership education or program committee acts to:

- (1) Select the home where the first organizational discussion meeting is to take place and the people who are to invite the participants. Thereafter, it aids in the selection of homes for subsequent meetings.
- (2) Select at least the first topic to be discussed and thereafter proposes additional topics for consideration by the group. Or it may set forth all the topics for an entire season of meetings. Whether the one approach or the other is used depends on the nature and needs of the group or groups that are organized. In either case, selection is primarily based on the discussion topics for which materials are provided by the national office or which are to be found in the Checklist of Additional Discussion Guides. But selection is not rigidly limited to such topics. Groups must feel free to discuss what is of greatest interest to them. However selected, topics must have relevance to AJC's general area of concern as well as to the local concerns of chapters and units.
- (3) Choose the discussion leaders. Here again the choice may be for the first meeting only and the committee may thereafter take a hand in helping the group select leaders for subsequent discussions from among its own members. However this is done, the committee's basic concern for effective discussion leadership must not be lost to view. Hence the committee should, if possible, evaluate in advance discussion leadership prospects likely to be available in any group.

In this connection experienced outside discussion leadership should be considered - particularly for the first meeting. Don't hesitate to do this if you are in doubt as to the availability of effective leadership within your committee, the discussion participants, or the chapter as a whole. After all, effective discussion leadership is produced by experience in discussions, not by reading manuals. It should also be borne in mind that a discussion leader is essentially an expert on leading discussions and not on the topic under discussion. The leader will acquire the necessary topical knowledge from the discussion guide.

- (4) Arrange for the training of discussion leaders. (See below.)
- (5) Select a leader or knowledgeable member of the chapter to attend discussion meetings to answer specific questions on AJC or chapter policies and operations as well as to act as a resource person on the topic itself.

(6) Publicize the program, follow-through on securing attendance, keep an attendance record.

(7) Make certain that the proper physical arrangements are made and the right procedures followed for the comfort and ease of operation of the discussion group. This task may be assigned to a member of the committee who attends discussion meetings for this purpose or to the discussion leader.

(8) Evaluate the strong points and weak points of each discussion meeting as a guide to future operations. This task, which partly depends on discussion group reactions to questionnaires, can also be assigned to the committee member responsible for proper physical arrangements and procedure. Final evaluation includes the reactions of the discussion leader as well as the resource person and is a task for the committee as a whole performed, among other tasks, at its regularly scheduled meetings.

(9) Determine how non-members are to be given an opportunity to join AJC. Although discussion programs are not a membership recruitment device, in practice many non-members do wish to join. They can be given the opportunity to do so without in any way compromising the basic educational character of the program. (Note the reference to the need of a resource person to answer specific questions about AJC. These questions are inevitable and represent a step towards membership.) Ways of doing this include:

(a) Informal, personal discussion on membership with individuals by the hostess or host, a member of the membership education or program committee, or the discussion leader. This is most often done in response to interest shown by the prospective member.

(b) Devoting a portion of a regular discussion meeting to explaining AJC, with major emphasis on its local chapter or unit activities, and the role of members in conducting and supporting these activities. This, too, is done in response to an articulated or felt need and is never dogmatically imposed on the group.

(c) Devoting an entire session to the above procedure - under the same conditions. In this and the previous case, it is often best to ask some chapter leader, well acquainted with AJC nationally as well as locally, to make the presentation and conduct the questioning and discussion.

(In connection with the above, make it a practice to have application cards and literature on AJC available at every meeting.)

(10) Report on the progress and problems of the discussion program to the chapter or unit executive board and enlist its aid in

stimulating further growth and in creating opportunities for bringing the more active elements of the discussion program into the chapter or unit framework for community operations.

- (11) Maintain continuous liaison on needed services (materials, training, dealing with operational problems, field consultation with CSD's membership educational specialist.)

Starting the Discussion Group

("Word of Mouth" invitations)

Typically, discussion groups are initiated by one or two individuals or couples (which often includes the hostess of the house where the group will meet) who invite their friends. (*) They also extend invitations on the basis of a chapter or unit membership list. This latter selection is made in accord with the neighborhood in which the group will customarily meet, homogeneous age levels and interests. Invitations should be made personally as far as possible (personal encounters, telephone calls) backed by mail.

(Mail)

By "word of mouth" or by mail, invitations feature participation in discussion of a specific topic of vital interest. (Selection of this topic is one of the duties of a membership education or program committee. See above.) A bid to discussion in general terms will not arouse much interest. Neither, in many cases, will an invitation to participate in forming an ongoing discussion group. (The desire to do so is produced by a successful discussion experience at the first meeting plus a description of the nature, procedure and topical range of the discussion program.)

Keep the mailed invitation brief. It should: (a) Announce the topic; (b) Give some idea of the implications of the topic -- usually by asking two or three subsidiary questions; (c) Indicate date, time and place of the meeting plus names of the discussion leader and hostess; (d) Enclose a return card; (e) Enclose background material for discussion in cases where such material is available.

(Follow-up)

The return card enclosed in the mailed invitation is one form of follow-up. Telephone follow-up is even more important and calls should be made both to those who haven't responded and those who have. These calls should be scheduled for the week during which the meeting is to be held. A second, "reminder" mailing -- usually a post-card -- can also be used. It is worth noting that most failures to turn out a good attendance at a discussion meeting, the first or subsequent ones, are due to poor "selling" and haphazard administration.

*Such invitations ordinarily reach more non-members than members.

(The Organization Meeting)

The following agenda and procedure is recommended on the basis of past experience:

(1) Open the meeting with a few words of welcome by the hostess or host who then introduces one of the conveners of the meeting or a member of your membership education or program committee to set forth the nature of the meeting. (If a chapter leader is present, he or she should also be introduced.)

(2) In a brief talk (5 minutes maximum) describe the program along the following suggested lines:

(a) For more than 50 years, AJC - both here and abroad - has devoted itself to achieving a secure, creative Jewish life by combating anti-Semitism, removing any bars to the full social acceptance and economic opportunity of Jews, building inter-group understanding among all sections of the population, aiding Jews to heighten their understanding of the problems that confront them from without as well as their understanding from within of themselves as Jews.

(b) As one means of achieving this two fold understanding, AJC conducts discussion programs throughout the country under the aegis of its chapters and units. (An average of 30 such groups operate year after year.) These programs are not "institutional." Our purpose is not to indoctrinate but to educate. Thus, AJC's discussion program is a service, offered to members and non-members alike, and conducted as impartially as we know how.

(c) Consequently, when a discussion group is dealing with any topic concerning which AJC has a viewpoint, it gets information on this, but it also is informed about competing viewpoints. With these before it, the group exchanges opinions and tries to formulate a viewpoint of its own. AJC believes that its viewpoints are sound, of course, and that what it does to implement these viewpoints in action is effective. If this is so, your own judgments will confirm it.

(d) Another distinctive quality of AJC discussions is the fact that they are not -- cannot be -- mere "bull sessions" or a mere exchange of "curbstone" opinions. On most subjects discussed, AJC contributes its long working -- and thinking -- experience.

(e) AJC discussions are as informal as they can be without becoming chaotic. Participants are not talked at except to set the stage for discussion, and then only briefly. They are expected and encouraged to do the talking themselves with the aid of the discussion leader.

(f) The only restriction, if so it can really be called, is that discussion topics must be concerned with Jewish life -- the life of the Jewish community, here and abroad, and your own life as Jews.

(g) What is the goal of AJC discussions? In general to enhance your understanding of Jewish affairs and your self-understanding as a Jew as well as to give you an opportunity to examine your convictions about these things in the light of the convictions held by others and under the test of informed points of view (and the data on which they're based) held by AJC and other organizations, leaders, students, and so on. For some members of the discussion group, it may specifically lead to a desire to engage in social action on the basis of convictions and information sharpened and increased in the discussions.

(h) But the best way of describing our discussion program is to have a discussion. After we have finished, you'll have a chance to express your reactions and to decide on whether you'd like to continue such discussions.

(i) As your discussion leader on the topic of _____, I introduce _____
(Give some particulars about the discussion leader's background.)

(3) The discussion is opened by the leader.

(4) About midway in the discussion, a recess of about 15 minutes is taken for refreshments. The hostess announces this.

(5) After conclusion of the discussion, the meeting is taken over again by the membership education or program committee member who gave the preliminary talk. The task now is to secure decisions on the following:

(a) Does the group wish to meet regularly for the type of discussion held this evening? (Don't use up too much time for answers to this question or there will be little or none for handling the remaining business. Judge when pro and con opinions appear to be fairly representative and announce the consensus.)

(b) Where should the next meeting be held? When?

(c) What is to be the topic? (Offer topic suggestions from the discussion guides already sent to you in the "package" and from the Checklist of Additional Discussion Guides. Don't simply throw titles at the group. Explain the content of each discussion in a few words. If possible, try to get the group to select several discussion topics. This will make your committee's future planning a great deal easier.)

(d) Who is to be the discussion leader? (Shall he be selected from the group itself? Provided by the membership education or program committee? Selected from the community at large? In any of these cases, but especially the first, does the group prefer to have its discussion leader rotated for each meeting?)

(e) Would the group like to have an "expert" (on subject matter) present to conduct or participate in some of its discussions? (Such experts would be obtained from the chapter or unit, the national organization, or the local Jewish and general community.)

(f) How are invitations to meetings and follow-ups to be handled? By the membership education or program committee? By members of the group? (It is important to clarify these responsibilities.)

(g) How large should the group be? (Explain why 25 - 30 is regarded as normal by most groups -- because it allows for maximum participation and avoids the danger of becoming a lecturer-audience type of meeting. Determine, on the basis of local experience, how large a registration is needed to guarantee an average attendance of 25 - 30. If present registration is not adequate, ask for suggestions as to additional participants to be approached on a personal basis. In this connection two questions typically arise. One of them is: What shall we do if our group goes beyond the ideal maximum of thirty? Suggest that if it goes far enough beyond, organization of an additional group will be considered. And the other one is: Can I invite my Gentile friends? Suggest that such participation, certainly on a continuing basis, imposes considerable restraint on discussions -- most of all on those dealing with Jewish attitudes towards Gentiles. Our groups's success depends on our ability to really "let our hair down." But there is no rule about this. The group should make its decision on the basis of common sense.)

(h) How often shall we meet? (Explain that monthly meetings have proven the best practice in most chapters. More frequent meetings are burdensome. Participants have other meetings to attend. Less frequent meetings lose continuity and interest.)

(i) Should refreshments be served? (The answer is yes, but emphasize the need for limiting refreshments pretty much to coffee, tea and cake. Some discussion programs have been wrecked because of culinary rivalry, which soon becomes a great burden to hostesses.)

IV. RUNNING THE DISCUSSION

(1) Preparation by the Discussion Leader. As already indicated, a discussion leader is not, primarily, an expert on the topic under discussion. His task is, rather, encouraging participants to air their opinions and to keep the discussion in progressive motion from a definite beginning to at least a reasonably definite conclusion. To do this, a discussion leader does need a general knowledge of the topic and a particular knowledge of its several parts, including the major and subsidiary questions that need to be considered by participants and the various facts and points of view that must enter into this consideration.

Hence it is essential that leaders study carefully the discussion guides and the background materials (when available) provided by national AJC. Some guides contain a bibliography. If possible, some of its listed items should also be read.

AJC's guides are designed to help the leader set forth the problem as a whole (Introduction) and thereafter to deal with all the major areas of the problem in a logical progression. Each major area also embraces a number of subsidiary questions, designed to develop the discussion on major areas, to broaden and deepen the discussion, and sometimes to probe the attitudes that underlie opinions. Each major area also contains, when necessary, factual data and pro and con viewpoints for consideration by discussion participants.

Unavoidably the guides do not contain any material on local conditions or problems. These are always of paramount interest to any group. They normally contain too much material for discussion at any one meeting, and groups, particularly those newly organized, are not always willing to stay with one subject. Finally, AJC does not regard itself as the repository of all possible wisdom on any subject and the guides, no matter how much material they contain, may have overlooked some questions that need asking, some data that needs presenting.

A vital part of the leader's preparation, consequently, is to get the local picture into the discussion, to select (or reduce) the areas and questions that can be discussed at a single meeting, and to make any additions to the discussion he considers necessary.

In some chapter programs, this part of the discussion leader's preparation is carried on at a committee meeting -- this could be your membership education or program committee or a special subcommittee established by them -- which is held before the discussion meeting. This is a very effective procedure, not only for getting the guide into the exact shape wanted, but also for briefing the chapter leader or member who is to act as discussion resource person, and for assigning discussion "kick-off" and stimulator roles to members of the committee who may also participate in the discussion meeting.

Whether the leader prepares himself individually or in consultation with a committee, he should: (a) decide on a provocative "kick off" question or statement. Make it local and contemporaneous if at all possible; and (b) prepare a simple, one-sheet listing of the discussion areas and questions finally

decided on for easy use, relying on the AJC guide itself for introductory material, factual statements, pro and con views.

(2) Running the Discussion. Here are some things for the AJC discussion leader to bear in mind:

(Length of Meeting)

Start meetings promptly even if all participants have not yet arrived. The average meeting runs about two hours, including about 15 to 20 minutes for a refreshment break. If the interest of the group warrants it, the discussion can be prolonged somewhat. But only somewhat. The old stage maxim "leave them laughing" is very sound practice. If the desire to continue the discussion is insistent, suggest that the next meeting also be devoted to the topic.

(Use of the Resource Person)

The knowledgeable chapter member or leader attending your meeting -- and it is important that such a person do attend -- is there to deal with questions concerning AJC (or the topic itself if he has special knowledge about it.) In some cases, a local or national expert, professional or lay, on the topic discussed will also be present. Refer all relevant questions to them, but remember that these persons are not present to give speeches or to run the discussion. It is important, therefore, to discuss his role with a resource person prior to the meeting.

If no resource person is present, do not feel compelled to know the answers to all questions. Refer to the participants themselves for answers. If none are forthcoming, promise to get the information needed for a report to the group at its next meeting.

(Timing the Discussion)

Apportion the time for discussing each area on the basis of your judgment as to their relative importance or interest potential. There is no need to be rigid about this scheduling in practice, but avoid overemphasis on any one point, particularly if the discussion is becoming repetitive and is dealing with minutiae. Introduce new questions or considerations and keep the discussion moving.

(Managing the Discussion)

There is no need to be dogmatic, either, as to whether discussion participants should talk to each other or whether they should direct all their remarks to you. In practice, you will find that participants will do both. Your criteria should be: Is the discussion progressing? Are all participants getting a chance to talk?

(Summarizing)

It is worth repeating: Summarize the discussion within each area considered and summarize the discussion as a whole at the end. This is one of the most effective tools at your disposal for preventing "circular" discussion -- the discussion that participants say "got nowhere." Occasionally, participants

are apt to feel this way even if the discussion, objectively evaluated, did produce a strong educational outcome. When this happens, it is because participants have not been given a picture (or "feed-back") of what they have actually said and learned.

(Problem Participants)

In every discussion there are participants who tend to monopolize or derail the discussion. Here are some brief suggestions for dealing with them according to the types most frequently encountered:

(a) The Indefatigable Repeater. This type "gets into the act" as often as possible -- his vocal organs are tireless and his supply of opinions inexhaustible. To prevent him and others like him from making the discussion revolve about themselves exclusively, simply call on others. But don't do this until it is quite clear that they have had their due share of discussion time.

(b) The Listener. But what if other participants do not offer to talk up? Pick out one of these known by you to possess information or convictions on the topic and ask for his opinion. Otherwise, ask for other expressions of opinion from the group in general. But do not insist or prod too much -- this can result in embarrassment and even deeper silence. Those who remain silent no matter what you do, should be talked to informally during the refreshment break. Often you will find that they do have definite views and you can then encourage them to speak up when discussion resumes.

(c) The Orator. This type tends to make speeches instead of statements and is, perhaps, the most common problem encountered by discussion leaders. Also the most vexing, because cutting him off looks like gagging him. Let him speak for a time, then seize on one of his statements for an opportunity to interrupt on the basis that the statement is an important one that should not be passed by but considered -- right now -- by the group. (This may occasionally require you to exercise some ingenuity in interpreting the actual statements as something that advances the discussion.) Orators are far more apt to feel flattered than "gagged" by this procedure.

(d) The Rambler. Essentially, this is another orator but one who specializes in wandering from the point. Handle him the same way. Bring the discussion back to the topic.

(e) The Purveyor of Dubious Information. This type cites facts, statistics and other points of information which seem incomplete, doubtful, or downright erroneous. Question him closely about the sources of his information. Call on other participants to confirm or challenge him. But note: it is not always possible to determine matters of fact. When there is a reasonable question about it, avoid argument. A fact is a fact or it isn't, and no amount of opinion can decide this. It must be researched. If the fact in question is important enough, offer to have this done.

V. NATIONAL SERVICES

(1) The National Community Services & Membership Department is eager to serve your discussion program by:

Providing the guides and other materials you need.

Consulting with you on problems encountered in organizing discussion groups, administering them, and maintaining a high interest level.

Maintaining a flow of inter-chapter and unit information on AJC discussion programs (e.g., what procedures have proved successful? What tools have been most useful? What topics do groups want to discuss and what materials do they need? How have problems been solved?)

Helping to set up training sessions for discussion leaders under expert leadership selected locally or provided by CSD's membership education specialist.

(2) To make it possible for the Community Services Committee to provide these services, your own membership education or program committee must, in addition to keeping in constant touch with us:

Furnish a complete list of membership education or program committee officers and members, and keep it up to date.

Furnish basic data on its discussion group or groups. (Leaders. Size. Character of participants. Topics discussed or scheduled for discussion. Type of discussion procedure followed -- rotating lay discussion leaders? Expert leaders from outside? Expert resource people from other organizations? Lecture plus discussion? Use of audio-visual materials?)

Transmit evaluations of discussion group performance.

Make suggestions for improving national services.



REPORT

From the Israel Office of the American Jewish Committee

Rehov Ethiopia 9, Jerusalem 95 149 Tel. 228862, 233551 Cable: Wishom, Jerusalem

Marc Tannenbaum

VAN LEER INSTITUTE SEMINAR ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE ARAB-ISRAEL WAR

After the late President Anwar Sadat came to Jerusalem in 1977, the danger of another Arab-initiated war appeared to be receding. Sadat, in his famous speech before the Knesset, said that he was ready to accept Israel as a permanent neighbor, and that it was his desire to see to it that the Yom Kippur war would be the last war in the Middle East. When the Camp David Accords were finally signed after long and difficult negotiations, every Israeli saw Sadat, Begin and Carter shaking hands on television, and heard their vows that peace "would last forever" and that there would be no more bloodshed in the Middle East.

Israeli commentators and analysts had noted that ever since 1948 every war with the Arabs had been initiated and led by Egypt. Egypt was the leading Arab power, and assuming that Egypt would no longer go to war with Israel, it was safe to assume that there was no substantial danger of other Arab countries initiating hostilities. The analysis of Sadat's motives for coming to Israel in order to end the state of war between Egypt and Israel led to the same conclusion: it was assumed that Sadat had finally realized that Egypt could never hope to defeat Israel by military force, for Israel is simply too strong. In any case, the United States would see to it that Israel maintained her military edge over the Arab states. Even the Soviet Union was not opposed in principle to Israel's existence. True, in every war except the 1948 one (when the Israelis obtained military equipment from Czechoslovakia through the initiative of the Soviet Union) the Arabs had fought with Soviet weaponry. Nevertheless, this had never produced a military victory for them. So Sadat had given up the the hope of defeating Israel by sheer military force.

However, after the peace agreements were signed, as the months and years went by, it became clear to Israelis that the autonomy talks were stalled, with very little hope for eventual agreement. Each side had a completely different definition of autonomy. This meant that the West Bank problem would remain unsolved, and doubts began to grow about whether it would be possible to do so in the future. This also meant that Palestinian hostility to Israel would continue unabated, and so would Palestinian terrorism. Furthermore, Syrian and Iraqi hostility to Israel would persist, and, with Egypt at peace, Israelis began to see the potential danger of what is called "the eastern front." Jordan became even more hostile and concluded a de facto alliance with the PLO because of developments on the West Bank. As Israel began to develop a civilian administration under Professor Milson, Jordan and the PLO combined in fierce opposition to the new Israeli policy. At the same time, the terrorists in southern Lebanon increased their military strength, which had been growing since the ceasefire of July 1981. It became clear to Israelis that sometime,

sooner or later, and perhaps rather sooner than later, the ceasefire would be broken by the terrorists either on the Lebanese-Israeli frontier, or on the Jordanian frontier, or somewhere in Europe or elsewhere in the world, and Israel would have no choice but to hit hard at the terrorist bases in Lebanon. This might provoke the Syrians to join in the fray, the more so since it became clear that the long-term Israeli objective in Lebanon was to remove both Palestinians and Syrians so that Christians and Lebanese nationalists could take over the government of that country once again.

Then came Sadat's murder and President Mubarak's assumption of power. Since he took office, he has been seen by Israelis to be returning to the Arab fold. Mubarak made hostile remarks with regard to Palestinianism and the future of the West Bank. Israelis began to foresee a freeze in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process after April 1982 when the last bit of the Sinai would be returned to Egypt.

The result of these developments has been some new thinking in Israel to the effect that another war may loom in the future, perhaps not immediately, but with a fair degree of certainty within the next 5-8 years.

The Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem brought together some of the best Israeli experts on the Arab world, Middle East strategy and international affairs to discuss the possibility of another war and of the circumstances, inasmuch as one can predict them at this time, in which such a war might be fought.

Professor Itamar Rabinovich, head of Tel Aviv University's Shiloach Institute, noted that the Arabs had launched the 1973 war because of their frustration with what they perceived as a deadlock in diplomatic efforts to get Israel to withdraw from Arab territories. The major purpose of the Arab offensive on Yom Kippur had been not to reach Tel Aviv—though that would have been a welcome success if it had proved possible—but rather to create enough military momentum to get the stalled political process moving in the Arabs' direction. Professor Rabinovich believed that should a similar situation arise in the future, the Arabs might undertake the same type of initiative. If the Arabs perceive a complete deadlock over autonomy, the future of Palestinian self-determination, the future of the West Bank, and the future of East Jerusalem, then it is quite possible they would decide that a military confrontation is their only option to get the political process moving again, in the hope that the United States and the Soviet Union would finally impose a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict which would favor the Arabs.

Ex-Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces and present Member of the Knesset Mordechai Gur agreed that in the event of a future military conflagration, the U.S. and the USSR, frightened that hostilities might escalate into nuclear war, would unite in enforcing a solution which would not be to Israel's advantage. This situation will come about if Israel continues to believe that a Palestinian state must replace Jordan, if Israel continues to strive for the establishment of Lebanon as an exclusively Christian state, and if there is no real progress in the direction of a fair solution of the Palestinian problem.

Professor Gabriel Ben-Dor of the Political Science Department of Haifa University commented that the prophesy of a future war may be self-fulfilling. If we assume that there is going to be another round of Arab-Israeli fighting, then we shall behave in such a way as to make this more and more likely. He also argued that it is

a mistake to equate peace with normalization of relations. Israel had asked for far too much from Egypt in the area of normalization, as though mutual tourism, joint sports events, etc. were really of decisive importance. A strategic balance between Israel and any one of her neighbors, based on agreed security arrangements, is far more important for the preservation of peace than all the various elements that are now called "normalization." He believed, optimistically, that as a result of future war, both sides, Israelis and Arabs, might become more realistic and more compromising. He felt that the Yom Kippur War had produced such a development.

Professor Yehoshua Porat of the Hebrew University, an expert on the Palestinian Arabs, believes that present government policy on the West Bank is bound to lead to war. The very limited municipal autonomy proposed by the present government gives no serious, constructive outlet to Palestinian nationalism on the West Bank; therefore, civil disobedience is bound to grow, and repression is bound to increase, too. If the present government eventually annexes the whole of the West Bank, a real casus belli will be created. In any case, the annexation of the West Bank will produce a Rhodesian situation whereby the minority will rule through the national parliament whereas the majority (the Arabs) will have only municipal autonomy.

A. Har-Even, the Middle East expert of the Van Leer Institute, analyzed the Arab military coalition which was created to wage war with Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973. The decision to go to war had always been taken by the Arab states on political rather than military grounds. Each time they had hoped in their heart of hearts to defeat Israel, but they knew that if they could get some political benefit from the war, that would be sufficient. Israel had always relied on deterrence, but they had never been successful in preventing Arab attacks. The success of Israeli deterrence had been partial, such as the prevention of all-out air attacks on Israeli civilian centers, etc. It will be difficult for a new Arab military coalition to come into being because Egypt is out of the picture just now. However, if, at the end of two years or so, the political process reaches a complete impasse, then it is possible that the other Arab states might establish a military coalition even without Egypt. The question is, which Arab country might lead such a coalition. Har-Even noted that Saudi Arabia has a great deal of political influence but little military strength. Syria's leader, Hafez Assad, as the head of a minority group within his own country, was not in a position to undertake a military initiative. Iraq was probably ruled out as long as she was engaged in war with Iran. To everybody's surprise, the conclusion was that Jordan might take the initiative in setting up an anti-Israel military coalition, because of her geographic situation, the fact that she is relatively close to Israel's population centers and to the West Bank and Gaza, which are the main centers of the Palestinian problem and the Palestinian resistance to Israel. In his view, Jordan is the key state for peace or for war. Without her, and without Egypt, it will not be possible to construct a pan-Arab military front.

General Shlomo Gazit, former head of Military Intelligence and currently President of Ben Gurion University in Beer Sheba, thinks that Egypt must still be regarded as the exception to the Arab consensus. That Arab consensus is still no peace, no recognition, no negotiations, until and unless Israel agrees in advance to return to the pre-1967 borders, and to the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in the now occupied territories and at least half of Jerusalem. At the same time, Gazit thought that the danger of war breaking out is not high as long as Egypt remains outside the Arab military coalition. The Egyptian armed forces are in the midst of the prolonged

process of changing from Soviet to western military equipment and they will not be in a position to fight for a considerable period of time. Syria will not wish to initiate a war the military results of which are not clear to her in advance, the more so since the present regime is not very firmly based. Iraq will be in trouble with Iran and the Persian Gulf states for quite some time to come. If war does occur, the country that stands to lose most is Jordan. There is no political or military incentive for Israel to occupy by conquest any Arab capital, with the exception of Amman — since there are important people in the present Israel government who believe that Israel should help Mr. Arafat to establish his Palestinian state in Jordan with Amman as its capital. Israel, too, is bound to suffer considerably from another war, which is likely to produce very many casualties. The Israeli capacity for absorbing relatively large numbers of casualties is in serious doubt. The Arabs know this and they will wish to hit as many Israeli civilian population centers as possible. The political purpose of Arab warfare, if it does happen, will be to create a breach between Israel and the United States, and, from their point of view, the chance of a solution being imposed, a solution which will favor the Arabs.

General Aharon Yariv, another former head of Israel Military Intelligence, and at present Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, noted that there are two things Israel must do: She must maintain her present defense budget for the foreseeable future, and she must attempt to promote a solution to the Palestinian problem. He felt that unless those two things are done, Syria, rather than Jordan, would take the initiative in constructing an Arab military coalition for the purpose of initiating a new round of warfare. He thought it quite possible that within the next five years Syria would take this initiative, and Israel, as in the past, would have no choice but to launch a pre-emptive strike. Israel would do this only if there is absolute certainty that Syria and her military allies are about to attack. The Israeli pre-emptive strike would take the form of a total air attack on every Arab country preparing for war against Israel. Yariv observed that the Syrian army has been seriously strengthened in the last few years. In case of war, Israel would suffer relatively high numbers of casualties, and the 40 Israeli villages on the Golan Heights would provide an easy target for the Syrians. Moreover, once the all-out war ends in the same kind of United Nations ceasefire, the Syrians were quite likely to continue fighting a war of attrition, as did the Egyptians some years ago. Israel must be careful above all to see to it that a Yom Kippur War-type situation—an Arab surprise attack—is not repeated, for such a sneak attack not only would have dangerous military consequences, but would make it possible for the Arabs to achieve political progress in spite of a military defeat on the battlefield.

Simcha Dinitz, ex-Ambassador to Washington and presently Vice-President of the Hebrew University, and Dr. Amnon Selah, the expert on Soviet affairs at the Hebrew University, both concluded that Israel must do whatever she can to prevent renewed fighting by being as flexible as possible in regard to the outstanding controversies with the Arab world, so that, if the Arabs did start a new war against her, it would generally be accepted in the Western world that Israel was not guilty of total intransigence and of providing a provocation for war. There is the very concrete danger that as a result of renewed Arab-Israeli warfare, whatever the result, the United States would join with the Soviet Union in imposing a solution which will not be to Israel's liking. As shown after every round of warfare in the past, even an overwhelming military victory is no guarantee of progress in the direction of political positions that Israel favors.

Dr. Zvi Lanir of the Tel Aviv University Center for Strategic Studies analyzed the projected balance of power between Israel and potential Arab confrontation states. He mentioned the three elements which are generally regarded as becoming critical for Israel: (1) The quantity of arms: economic constraints are bound to limit Israel's acquisition of arms severely, in comparison with quantities likely to be obtained by Arab states. (2) As the Arab states acquire sophisticated Western arms, Israel's qualitative advantage is being eroded, because she has always been in possession of superior Western equipment whereas the Arab states had Soviet weapons. (3) As military strategy and technology become more sophisticated and complicated, the quality of the individual soldier becomes less important in terms of the outcome of a war, and thus another Israeli advantage is likely to be blunted during the next few years. However, Dr. Lanir disagreed with these pessimistic forecasts. In his opinion, even if one side did not have a quantitative advantage, but had sophisticated, ultra-modern military equipment and even if the other side has equally modern equipment, the outcome of a war during the 1980's will still be decided by the performance of the military command, both in the overall picture and in specific battle areas. Dr. Lanir believes that in this vital area, Israel is likely to maintain a decisive advantage. Furthermore, he believes in the effectiveness of small units with tremendous mobility and fire-power, and in this area Israel excels. Also, Dr. Lanir is convinced that the maintenance of ultra-modern technological systems is of decisive importance. In this area, the Americans come to Israel to learn how to maintain such systems, and Israel is bound to retain this edge over the Arab countries. As another positive element from Israel's point of view, Dr. Lanir mentioned that in his view, the transition from Soviet to Western weaponry is bound to take quite a good number of years, though he believes that in many areas Soviet equipment was not in fact inferior to the western equivalent. For some years the Russians have been as good as the West in the area of artillery and tanks, and at the present time the MIG-21 is as good as the American F-15.

As increasingly sophisticated weaponry accelerates the speed of battle, the quality of the individual soldier is not becoming less important, as is so often argued. This is particularly true in relation to the lower and middle echelon officers, and this Israeli advantage has already been mentioned. The manifold aspects of computerized warfare bestow a tremendous advantage on Israel, at least in the 1980's.

Dr. Lanir then compared differing military strategies the Arab states are by and large riveted to the strategy of immobility which implies maximum use of artillery and missiles. Israel stresses mobility, speed and punch, which implies maximum use of the air force, tanks and special units. The Israeli strategy gives the Israeli local commander the edge over his Arab counterpart.

From this point of view, Israel will have to avoid making the mistakes she made in the past, the major example of which was the Bar-Lev Line at the Suez Canal where Israel adopted the strategy of immobility. When you maintain such a line, you cannot hope to disturb the enemy's military balance, and that is what Israel will always have to do, and where her military success lay in past wars ever since 1948.

During the Yom Kippur war the Egyptians crossed the Canal, an exercise which they had rehearsed hundreds of times. Once they were on the other side, they engaged in defensive warfare, in terms of their doctrine of immobility. As a result of this, they


finally succumbed to the mobile tactics of our tanks, once we had gotten over the surprise, and to the constant pounding of the Israeli air force, which made it possible for General Sharon to cross the Canal in the eastern direction and approach Cairo. These battles basically demonstrated the advantage of Israeli strategy and expertise over that of the Arabs at that time. If Israel continues to develop her special expertise and her particular advantage in warfare over the Arab states, there is every reason to believe that in the 1980's, too, she will be able to defeat any Arab combination.

April 22, 1982

Gershon Avner



A Research Report from
The American Jewish Committee's
Information and Research Services



Arab Influence?
What Elites in Atlanta
and Ten Other Cities Think

SUMMARY

To assess Arab influence in the United States, in the spring of 1984 the American Jewish Committee arranged for intensive interviews with a cross-section of the business, civic, and political leadership of Atlanta.* For comparison, leaders in ten cities where Arab influence is less likely to be found were likewise interviewed. Questions were asked about U.S. foreign policy, the Middle East, Israel, and American Jews, as well as about the Arab states, business with Arabs, and Arab presence and influence locally.

Our findings do not confirm a hypothesis that there is substantial Arab influence, preference for the Arab cause, or belief that trade with the Arabs is of major economic consequence for the United States.

In Atlanta an Arab presence in the commercial life of the city is felt, but is not seen as especially significant.

In all eleven cities the most serious worry was over a possible nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union and anything that might tend to lead to such a confrontation, such as a Middle East crisis.

Atlantans were less enthusiastic than other elites about United States involvement abroad in general. This may help to account for a certain degree of coolness on the part of white Atlantans toward Israel and toward the closeness of American Jews with Israel.

* The Committee also commissioned two other, related Atlanta studies, the first of opinion generally and the second of Jewish elite opinion. These will be reported on subsequently.

More than a third of white elites in all eleven cities think that the close feeling of American Jews for Israel is bad--probably because the elites also think that Israel and American Jews disproportionately affect United States policy on the Middle East. On the other hand, the majority rate Israel as the United States' most reliable ally in the Middle East and believe we should give high priority to Israel's security.

A third of our Atlanta elites were black, and blacks are known to have a special affinity for Third-World nations. We found, as other studies have also found, that blacks are pro-Israel but less so than whites, and more pro-Arab than whites. Blacks are more inclined than whites to see Jews as having disproportionate local influence. But blacks, too, see Israel as a more reliable ally than the Arabs. And more than whites, blacks think it good that American Jews have close ties with Israel.

Arab Influence?

What Elites in Atlanta and Ten Other Cities Think

Introduction

Since the Arab oil boycott of 1974, prudence has required American Jews to be concerned about Arab influence. To determine whether Jews were adversely affected, in that year the American Jewish Committee resumed systematic opinion polling. We also commissioned polling of strategic subgroups: foreign-policy professionals, trade-association officers, black grass-roots leaders.

Still, an answer to the question of Arab influence in the United States has remained elusive. In the spring of 1984, responding to concerns expressed by AJC members in Atlanta, we commissioned the Kane & Parsons polling organization to ask various elites in that city about the presence or absence of Arab influence. Atlanta has been called the capital of Black America; its mayor, Andrew Young, has courted Arab investment, and Arabs are a felt financial presence there. In order to determine whether what was discovered in Atlanta was specific to it, Kane & Parsons also interviewed elites in other cities throughout the United States where there is a smaller likelihood of Arab influence.

The sample

During March and April 1984, 122 face-to-face interviews were conducted in Atlanta, and 53 in ten control cities¹ throughout the country. The people interviewed were leaders in business,

1.

Albuquerque, Birmingham, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Denver, Hartford, Memphis, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and San Diego.

trade and finance, the media, law, education, religion, politics, labor, and various public-policy and civic groups.

In Atlanta two thirds of the leaders were white and a third black. More than half were between the ages of 35 and 49. One of four blacks but only one of ten whites was a woman. Of whites the greatest number were in business and finance, while of blacks most were in political, civic, and other non-profit fields. Most Atlanta whites identified themselves as Republicans and tended toward conservatism in domestic matters, while blacks, all Democrats, tended toward liberalism.

The 53 leaders in other cities were somewhat older on average. More were in the media, few were black, and one of eight was a woman. The greater number called themselves Democrats. In domestic affairs they ranged from mildly conservative to mildly liberal.

The Questions²

In addition to probing for feelings about an Arab presence locally, the interviews sought to ascertain attitudes toward American Middle East policy, foreign policy in general, Israel, and American Jews.

Foreign influence locally

Asked about the importance of various countries or regions for their communities, Atlanta and the control cities differed somewhat in their responses. For the elites of all cities, Japan and Western Europe were most important. For Atlanta, Latin America was less important than the Arab world.

2.

A copy of the questionnaire is appended.

As to the future, most Atlanta elites wanted closer business ties with Japan and Africa, while blacks more than whites expressed interest in the Arab world. In the control cities Japan and Western Europe were rated as more desirable business targets than the Arab world or Africa. But when it came to cultural and civic life, it was Western Europe that had the greatest presence everywhere (Tables 1, 2, 3).

Table 1

I'd like you to evaluate the importance to the Atlanta (other city) area of investments by and trade with the following:

	<u>Atlanta</u>				<u>Other cities</u>	
	<u>Very important</u>		<u>Somewhat important</u>		<u>Very important</u>	<u>Somewhat important</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>		
	<u>Per cent</u>					
Arab world	32	57	58	38	32	49
Japan	74	75	22	25	74	23
Western Europe	77	62	18	35	59	32
Latin America	26	54	62	41	34	55

Table 2

Where should the political and business leadership put its emphasis if it wishes to establish closer ties to foreign investors and/or markets? Rank countries in descending order, 1 to 5.

	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	
	<u>Median rating</u>		
Japan	2.70	2.43	1.92
Western Europe	2.84	3.57	2.38
Latin America	3.05	3.32	3.02
Africa	3.16	2.57	4.06
Arab World	3.27	3.11	3.54

Table 3

From your personal experience which has the greatest presence in your civic and cultural life?

	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	
	<u>Areas receiving over 10 per cent</u>		
Western Europe	77	68	59
Latin America	8	16	30

Perceptions of Arab influence

The Atlanta elites' attitudes toward Arab influence were neutral. The top leadership did not feel Arabs were taking over, nor was it uncomfortable with Arab investment in the Atlanta economy. Whites gave a low rating to Arabs as foreign investors, while blacks appeared to be considerably more convinced of the growth of Arab investment. Atlantans were generally more convinced about a growing local economic significance of all areas, including the Arab world, than were elites in the control cities. Investment by Arab countries was seen by the latter as much less important or evident than investment by Japan or Latin America (Table 4).

Table 4

Has the economic significance of (each of the following) within the Atlanta (other city) area been growing, staying about the same, or decreasing?

	<u>Atlanta</u>						<u>Other cities</u>		
	<u>Growing</u>		<u>Same</u>		<u>De-creasing</u>		<u>Growing</u>	<u>Same</u>	<u>De-creasing</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>			
Arab world	54	74	34	24	8	--	29	60	10
Japan	89	69	11	31	--	--	71	28	2
Western Europe	54	46	42	49	4	3	31	58	8
Latin America	43	33	49	49	5	15	44	51	2

Per cent

Foreign-policy concerns

The primary foreign-policy concern of all elites was the threat of Soviet-U.S. conflict and possible nuclear war,³ followed by energy dependence on the Middle East, an unfavorable trade imbalance, and Third World instability and dependency.

While relations with Israel, as such, are not judged to be of major importance for the United States, the Middle East is regarded warily as a possible source of major conflict involving the U.S. Atlantans (blacks more than whites) are more likely to see U.S. involvement in the Middle East as a source of trouble than are leaders in other cities. The situation is reversed in regard to the threat of Communism, which Atlantans (blacks even less than whites) are somewhat less likely to see as an important issue than are elites in other cities (Table 5).

Table 5

What would you say are the two or three most important international issues the United States is facing today?

	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	
	<u>Per cent</u>		
U.S. involvement in Middle East	18	29	8
U.S. relations with Third World	7	21	9
Communist threat generally	10	3	15
Nuclear war, arms race	45	34	57

3. This is also the main concern of foreign-policy specialists. See United States Policy and the Middle East, Council on Foreign Relations, 1982, and American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1983, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1983.

Still, elites generally endorse strong opposition to Communist expansion, support a stronger American defense capability, and believe that shared democratic values should be an important consideration in dealings with other countries.

As to protecting American jobs and businesses against foreign imports, there was a clear split between blacks and whites. Whites, by a margin of 2 to 1 in Atlanta and 3 to 2 elsewhere, rejected protectionism. Atlanta blacks favored it, even to the extent of import quotas and tariffs (Table 6).

Table 6
Foreign policy goals for the United States

	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	
	<u>Per cent</u>		
American jobs and businesses should be protected more, even by quotas and tariffs	19	55	40
We should keep ahead of Russians in strategic nuclear weapons	77	53	60
It is in our national interest to contain spread of Communism	91	68	85
The sharing of democratic values should be an important consideration in guiding our relationships with other countries	82	92	92
Our interests are global. To protect them and to prevent conflicts from expanding, we must be prepared for involvement virtually anywhere.	57	40	72

United Nations

Asked whether they agreed with the United States' decision to withdraw from UNESCO at the end of 1984, half of all leaders said yes. In Atlanta three quarters of blacks said no, in contrast to fewer than a quarter of the whites. Only one of three Atlanta whites thought the U.N. was dominated by Third World countries, and only one of eight blacks thought so.

Israel

In Atlanta and the control cities half of the whites placed the blame for the failure to achieve a Palestinian/Israeli solution equally on both Israel and the Arabs. The other half, by 2 or 3 to 1, blamed the Arabs more than Israel. Blacks were less willing to blame the Arabs (Table 7).

Table 7

On balance, and again recognizing the complexity of the issues involved, are the Israelis or the Arabs more to blame for the absence of a permanent peaceful solution to the Middle Eastern crisis?

	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Israelis are more to blame	16	13	13
Arabs are more to blame	35	13	36
Both (vol.)	45	66	47

Shown a list of explanations for "the severity of the problems in the Middle East," 8 of 10 respondents chose "the Palestinian

issue." Other frequently-mentioned reasons were Arab radicalism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the multiplicity of religious and ethnic groups in Lebanon. Black respondents blamed Israel more, and the Arabs somewhat less, on the whole, than white respondents did. White Atlantans blamed "Israelis" more (Table 7), but "Israeli intransigence" less (Table 8), than elites in other cities.

Table 8

I am going to pose several circumstances that have been suggested as explanations for the severity of the problems in the Middle East and would like your assessment as to the significance of each.

	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Palestine issue	84	84	86
Arab radicalism	80	74	81
Islamic fundamentalism	77	66	74
Multiplicity of competing groups in Lebanon	76	90	74
Israeli intransigence and ambitions	60	84	68
PLO hardline position	53	58	60

United States policy

There was general agreement that the three major United States concerns in the Middle East should be avoiding war with the Soviet Union, securing a just peace between Israel and the Arabs, and keeping open the Suez Canal and the other shipping lanes.

Most were critical of United States policy as too one-sided in favor of Israel, blacks 15 per cent more than whites (Table 9).

Table 9

Some people have suggested that the U.S. is not even-handed and balanced in its Middle Eastern relationships. In your view has the U.S. been too one-sided in favor of Israel, too one-sided in favor of the Arabs, or fair to both?

	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	
	<u>Per cent</u>		
One-sided toward Israel	64	79	60
One-sided toward Arabs	--	--	--
Fair to both	29	18	34

On the other hand, when asked to name the most reliable ally of the United States from among four Mideastern countries, three fifths (blacks, three quarters) put Israel at the head of the list. None of the Arab countries came close (Table 10).

Of the countries on the card, which one do you feel is now or is potentially the most reliable ally of the U.S.?

Table 10

	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Egypt	10	13	9
Israel	61	74	72
Jordan	1	3	4
Saudi Arabia	24	74	13

Four of five black elites called maintaining the security of Israel a priority or important goal for the United States, somewhat more than white elites (Table 11).

Table 11

Please rate--as a priority concern or as an important but not a priority--the following 17 objectives regarding the Middle East. (Five highest ratings reported.)

	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>	<u>Atlanta</u>		<u>Other cities</u>
	<u>Priority</u>			<u>Important</u>		
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>		<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	
<u>Per cent</u>						
Avoiding U.S.-Soviet military conflicts arising from local wars	72	84	79	22	8	21
Keeping Red Sea, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, & Suez Canal shipping lanes open	68	76	62	26	13	28
Securing a just peace between Israel and the Arabs	53	63	53	34	32	34
Maintaining security of Israel	37	40	47	41	45	26

Palestinian question

No more than the foreign-policy experts (see note 2, p. 2) could the elites of this study agree on a solution to the Palestinian question. Of the various alternatives presented, a small plurality--less than a third--chose a connection with Jordan and self-government in the West Bank and Gaza. Two of five blacks chose a binational state, to include present-day Israel.

As to bringing Palestinians and Israelis together, leaders were almost equally divided on what would work: an international conference, direct consultations with the PLO, asking Hussein of Jordan to act as intermediary, pressuring Israel, or pressuring the PLO. About half felt that Arafat's defeat in Lebanon had created a better climate for more moderate Arabs to negotiate.

American Jews

In Middle East policy, the elites attributed greatest influence to the media, Israel, and American Jews. But in foreign policy generally and in local affairs, elites in all cities considered the most influential groups to be the media and business.

In Atlanta local affairs, whites saw Jews as less influential than blacks, and blacks saw Jews as slightly more influential than blacks (Table 12).

Table 12

Many groups,⁴ both domestic and foreign, are perceived to have varying degrees of influence in the formulation of governmental policies. We are interested in your views as to who influences U.S. foreign policy generally, who influences our Middle Eastern policy specifically, and who has special influence within the (name of city) area. Rate from 10 to 1 in descending order.

	<u>Atlanta</u>						<u>Other cities</u>		
	<u>Foreign policy</u>		<u>M.E. policy</u>		<u>Local affairs</u>		<u>Foreign policy</u>	<u>M.E. policy</u>	<u>Local affairs</u>
	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>	<u>Wh.</u>	<u>Bl.</u>			
	<u>Median ranking of 9 highest groups</u>								
Media	7.93	8.38	7.97	8.11	8.01	8.59	8.17	7.70	7.94
Financial institutions	7.84	8.09	7.42	7.71	7.86	7.78	8.08	7.42	7.98
Industry	7.42	8.24	6.63	7.38	7.62	8.11	7.74	7.11	7.89
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT	7.39	7.78	8.35	8.16	5.75	5.69	7.15	8.04	5.11
West European governments	7.15	7.78	6.51	7.19	5.32	5.30	6.74	6.25	4.75
U.S. JEWS	6.83	7.35	8.39	8.33	5.90	7.00	6.40	7.66	5.98
Political parties	6.53	7.03	6.37	6.69	5.88	6.46	6.45	6.43	6.17
Arab governments	6.46	6.38	7.55	7.14	5.00	4.84	5.94	7.06	4.15
U.S. blacks	4.33	4.27	3.69	3.54	6.67	6.78	4.13	3.42	5.00

4.

The media, major unions, major corporations, major financial institutions, political parties, Western European governments, Arab governments, the Israeli government, the Japanese government, Latin American governments, African governments, U.S. Catholics, U.S. Jews, U.S. blacks, U.S. Hispanics, U.S. women.

In past American Jewish Committee opinion polls, Jews have consistently figured well below Arab interests and below the Catholic Church on the list of groups considered to have too much power in the United States. About 9 per cent of Americans think Jews have too much power (Table 12A).

Table 12A

Which, if any, of the groups listed do you believe have too much power in the United States?

	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1980</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1981</u>	<u>Mar.</u> <u>1982</u> [*]	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1983</u>	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1984</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>				
Oil companies	**	70	**	60	**
News media--TV and newspapers	**	**	**	**	50
Labor unions	45	46	43	50	50
Business corporations	42	**	42	38	51
Arab interests	**	30	24	36	30
Blacks	16	14	12	12	13
Anti-abortion groups	14	**	**	**	**
Pro-abortion groups	13	**	**	**	**
Catholic Church	13	9	8	11	10
Evangelical Protestants	11	10	9	6	**
JEWS	8	11	9	10	8
Hispanics	5	**	**	**	4
ZIONISTS	4	**	**	**	**
None of these	9	4	8	10	6
Don't know	14	9	13	1	6

* March 1982 "political influence" instead of "power."

** Not asked.

To determine perceptions of conflicts of loyalty, the elites were asked about the attachment of various groups to their "homelands" (Table 13).

Table 13

We'd like to know your sense of the closeness of some ethnic groups with their "homelands," actual or symbolic. For each group I name, which of these categories best represents your view: they have close ties to () and that is good for the U.S.; they have close ties to () and that is bad for the U.S.; they don't have close ties to () and that is good for the U.S.; they don't have close ties to () and that is bad for the U.S.; or, it doesn't matter one way or the other.

	Close/ good		Close/ bad		Not close/ good		Not close/ bad		Does not matter		Not sure	
	Wh.	Bl.	Wh.	Bl.	Wh.	Bl.	Wh.	Bl.	Wh.	Bl.	Wh.	Bl.
	<u>Per cent</u>											
<u>Atlanta</u>												
Blacks-Africa	36	34	6	3	16	11	8	45	33	8	1	--
Greeks-Greece	58	58	4	3	4	3	4	3	25	29	6	5
Irish-Ireland	36	58	19	5	18	5	1	--	23	24	3	8
Italians-Italy	45	58	3	5	15	3	3	3	30	29	4	3
JEWS-Israel	44	66	43	26	3	--	1	3	7	5	3	--
Poles-Poland	45	58	4	3	14	8	7	11	23	21	7	--
<u>Other cities</u>												
Blacks-Africa	19		6		23		15		28		9	
Greeks-Greece	49		9		4		2		26		9	
Irish-Ireland	47		25		--		4		19		6	
Italians-Italy	48		14		2		4		25		8	
JEWS-Israel	59		34		--		--		4		4	
Poles-Poland	59		15		9		--		13		4	

Note that two fifths of the Atlanta white elite and a third of the elites in the other cities considered American Jewish ties with Israel to be bad. In 1974 only an eighth thought that those close ties were bad (Table 13A). The rise between 1974 and 1984 may well be linked to the elites' dominant feeling that American Jews have too much influence on United States policy on the dangerous Middle East.

Table 13A*

We'd like to know your sense of closeness of some ethnic groups with their "homelands," actual or symbolic. For each group I name, which of these categories best represents your view: they have close ties to () and that is good for the U.S.; they have close ties to () and that is bad for the U.S.; they don't have close ties to () and that is good for the U.S.; they don't have close ties to () and that is bad for the U.S.; or, it doesn't matter one way or the other.

	<u>Close/ good</u>	<u>Close/ bad</u>	<u>Not close/ good</u>	<u>Not close bad</u>	<u>Does not matter</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>				
Blacks-Africa	22	10	10	8	46
Greeks-Greece	22	9	10	6	50
Irish-Ireland	31	5	9	4	49
Italians-Italy	30	8	9	3	48
JEWS-Israel	29	13	8	4	43
Poles-Poland	22	5	9	5	56

* 1974.

Though blacks were less pro-Israel than whites, they were more approving of a Jewish tie to Israel, two thirds thinking it good for the U.S. and only a little more than a quarter seeing it as bad. Is it that blacks admire the relationship between Jews and Israel and see it as a desirable model for a relationship between American blacks and Africa?

Concluding note

The Atlanta white elite is somewhat more cool than elites in other cities toward Israel and American Jewish closeness to Israel. That may be because the Atlanta white elite is more subject to Arab influence. A likelier explanation is that the Atlanta white elite is also somewhat more isolationist--more opposed to involvement abroad in general--than other elites.

About black elites, what we have found in Atlanta agrees with what has been found in other studies. Blacks feel a kinship with Africa and the Third World. While blacks are more pro-Israel than pro-Arab, they are less pro-Israel and more pro-Arab than whites.


On the other hand, in Atlanta the black elite believes more than the white that the closeness of Jews to Israel is a good thing, that Israel is a reliable ally of the United States, and that the United States must consider the security of Israel to be a priority.

Geraldine Rosenfield
November 1984
84/180/20

Kane, Parsons & Associates
1995 Broadway
New York, New York 10023
(212) 799-4100

P.N. #1356

CARD 1
SEX: Male----- 5-1
Female----- 2



(1-3)

RACE: White----- 6-1
Black----- 2

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION:

Albuquerque----- 8-Y
Atlanta----- X
Birmingham----- 0
Dallas-Forth Worth- 1
Denver----- 2

Hartford----- 3
Memphis----- 4
Milwaukee----- 5
Pittsburgh-- 6
St. Louis--- 7
San Diego--- 8

SECTOR:

Business/trade----- 7-1
Financial----- 2
Media----- 3
Political----- 4
Religion----- 5
Law----- 6
Education----- 7
Civic/social ser-
vice/professional/
public policy
organizations--- 8
Labor----- 9
Misc. other----- 0

Interviewer: _____

Merch, 1984

Good morning/afternoon/evening. Thank you for agreeing to meet with me to discuss important international issues. To begin...

1. What would you say are the two or three most important international issues the United States is facing today? (PROBE FOR FULL RESPONSE INCLUDING SIGNIFICANCE OF ISSUES AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THEM)

Issue #1

Issue #2

Issue #3

2a. As a matter of national policy our political leaders assign priorities to our relations with particular countries and/or regions. We are interested in your assessment of what those priorities ought to be from strategic/political as well as from economic perspectives. (HAND RESPON- DENT SELF-ADMINISTERED FORM I) The form I have just handed you contains a listing of countries and regions. Please indicate the priority you would assign to each by circling the response categories that best reflect your views. Keep in mind that there are two headings: strategic/political and economic.

2b. Many Americans have expressed concern that local or regional antagonisms run the risk of involving the super powers, and that the danger of nuclear confrontation is ever-present. (HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD A). Please rate the regions on the card in descending order of potential for major power confrontation. Start with the area you feel is the most dangerous and conclude with the one you feel is least likely to blow up.

	RANK
a. Mexico	12-
b. Southeast Asia	13-
c. Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc.)	14-
d. The Middle East	15-
e. Central America	16-
f. China/Taiwan	17-
g. South America	18-
h. South Asia (India, Pakistan, etc.)	19-
i. Western Europe	20-
j. Greece/Turkey	21-

2c. I am going to read a list of possible foreign policy goals for the United States in the form of statements. For each, please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, but with reservations, disagree, but with reservations, or disagree strongly.

	Agree Strongly	Agree With Reservations	Disagree With Reservations	Disagree Strongly	Not Sure/Depends/Neutral (VOL.)
American jobs and businesses should be protected more than they now are, even if that means imposing restrictive import quotas and/or tariffs-----	22-1	2	3	4	5
We should keep ahead of the Russians in strategic nuclear weapons-----	23-1	2	3	4	5
It would be a mistake to make a major effort to improve relations with those countries that are unfriendly to us-----	24-1	2	3	4	5
It is in our national interest to contain the spread of Communism-----	25-1	2	3	4	5
The sharing of democratic values should be an important consideration in guiding our relationships with other countries-----	26-1	2	3	4	5
We should do whatever is necessary to insure access to energy supplies-----	27-1	2	3	4	5
Our interests are global; to protect them and to prevent conflicts from expanding, we must be prepared for involvement virtually everywhere-----	28-1	2	3	4	5

2d. The U.S. has announced its intention to withdraw from UNESCO at the close of 1984 and to provide no further funds to that organization after this year. Do you agree or disagree with the U.S. move?

Agree-----	29-1
Disagree-----	2
Not sure-----	3

2e. In assessing U.N. operations and procedures some people contend that it is now dominated by the Third World at the expense of the industrialized nations, while others believe that the superpowers continue to predominate and that Third World influence is more apparent than real. Which position comes closer to your view of the U.N. --- is it dominated more by the Third World or by the superpowers?

Third World-----	30-1
Superpowers-----	2
Other (VOL.)-----	3
(WRITE IN)	
Not sure-----	4

Let's turn now to a discussion of the situation in the Middle East.

3. In your judgment, what are the underlying causes of the continuing tensions and instabilities within the Middle Eastern region? (PROBE FOR CLEAR AND FULL RESPONSE)

31-

32-

33-

4a. I am going to pose several circumstances that have been suggested as explanations for the severity of the problems in the Middle East and would like your assessment as to the significance of each. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD B) Please select one of the categories on the card for each factor I pose.

	The Single Most Impor- tant Factor	One Of Several Major Factors	A Con- trib- uting But Not Major Factor	Not An Impor- tant Factor	Not Sure
Arab radicalism (Libya, Iraq, etc.)-----	34-1	2	3	4	5
Arab Fundamentalism (Iran, etc.)-----	35-1	2	3	4	5
Israeli intransigence and ambitions-----	36-1	2	3	4	5
The war between Iran and Iraq-----	37-1	2	3	4	5
The Palestinian issue-----	38-1	2	3	4	5
Soviet expansionism-----	39-1	2	3	4	5
Syrian territorial ambitions-----	40-1	2	3	4	5
Soviet interference-----	41-1	2	3	4	5
The inability of the Arabs to cooperate with one another-----	42-1	2	3	4	5
The unwillingness of moderate Arab leaders to take risks-----	43-1	2	3	4	5
The hard line position of the PLO-----	44-1	2	3	4	5
The multiplicity of religious and other competing groups in Lebanon-----	45-1	2	3	4	5
U.S. interference-----	46-1	2	3	4	5

4b. On balance, and again recognizing the complexity of the issues involved, are the Israelis or the Arabs more to blame for the absence of a permanent peaceful solution to the Middle Eastern crisis?

Israelis are more to blame-----	47-1
Arabs are more to blame-----	2
Both (VOL.)-----	3
Neither (VOL.)-----	4
Not sure/depends, etc.-----	5

4c. Which condition is most likely to insure peace within the Middle East -- Israeli military superiority over the Arabs, Arab military superiority over the Israelis or a balance of military power between the two sides?

Israeli military superiority-----	48-1
Arab military superiority-----	2
A balance of military power between the the two sides-----	3
Not sure/depends (VOL.)-----	4

5a. What do you see as the primary role, if any, for the United States today in the Middle East?

49-

50-

51-

5b. I'd like you to rate each of the following objectives regarding the Middle East as you feel they should apply to the U.S. For each, please tell me whether it should be a priority concern, an important but not priority goal, only a secondary consideration or none of our business.

	Priority Concern	Important But Not Priority	Only A Secondary Consideration	None Of Our Business	Not Sure
Securing a just peace between Israel and the Arabs-----52-1		2	3	4	5
Containing the influence of individuals such as Khomeini and Kadhafi-----53-1		2	3	4	5
Preserving solidarity with our NATO allies and Japan-----54-1		2	3	4	5
Avoiding the danger of U.S.-Soviet military conflicts arising from local wars-----55-1		2	3	4	5
Keeping Mediterranean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf shipping lanes and the Suez Canal open-----56-1		2	3	4	5
Putting pressure on Israel to negotiate with the PLO-----57-1		2	3	4	5
Restricting Soviet influence in the region-----58-1		2	3	4	5
Securing adequate supplies of Saudi and Persian Gulf oil at stable prices-----59-1		2	3	4	5
Maintaining the security of Israel-----60-1		2	3	4	5
Aiding in the emergence of a Palestinian national homeland-----61-1		2	3	4	5
Supplying defensive arms to Israel--62-1		2	3	4	5
Helping to resolve the dispute between Iran and Iraq-----63-1		2	3	4	5
Bringing together the antagonists in Lebanon to help achieve peace and stability-----64-1		2	3	4	5
Preventing instability in and the radicalization of key Arab states-----65-1		2	3	4	5
Returning territories taken by Israel in the 1967 war-----66-1		2	3	4	5
Internationalizing Jerusalem-----67-1		2	3	4	5
Supplying defensive arms to friendly Arab states-----68-1		2	3	4	5

5c. The situation in Lebanon has deteriorated into what most observers regard as a debacle. (HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD C.) In your view, which one of the explanations listed on this card is most responsible for the present state of affairs? And which one of the explanations would you say is second in importance?

	Most Important	Second Most Important
a. Syria's determination to maintain a major military presence in Lebanon and/or its support for left-wing Lebanese factions--69-1		70-1
b. Israel's 1982 incursion into Lebanon which was the catalyst for the events that followed-----2	2	2
c. The weakness of the Lebanese government and its inability to reconcile the conflicting demands of the country's many factions-----3	3	3

5c. (continued)

	Most Important	Second Most Important
d. The vacillating Middle Eastern policy of the Reagan Administration-----	4	4
e. The military and economic support provided by the USSR for Syria's expansionist aims in Lebanon-----	5	5
f. The failure of moderate Arab governments to establish and maintain a legitimate Lebanese government-----	6	6
g. The irreconcilable objectives of the multiplicity of Lebanese constituencies--	7	7
Other (VOL.)-----	8	8
[WRITE IN]		
Not sure/depends/miscellaneous vague responses/all, etc. (VOL.)-----	9	9

6a. Some people have suggested that the U.S. is not even-handed and balanced in its Middle Eastern relationships. In your view, has the U.S. been too one-sided in favor of Israel, too one-sided in favor of the Arabs or fair to both?

One-sided toward Israel-----71-1	Fair to both-----	3
One-sided toward Arabs----- 2	Not sure/depends (VOL.)----	4

6b. A shared commitment to Western democratic values, strategic considerations and domestic politics have been the bases of our support for Israel since its inception. Some have suggested that economic realities justify a reexamination of our relationships in the Middle East. How do you feel about this? Where should we be headed? (PROBE FOR EXPLANATION BEHIND RESPONDENT'S PERSPECTIVES).

72-

73-

74-

6c. Of the countries on the card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD D), which one do you feel is now or is potentially the most reliable ally of the U.S.? And which one is now or is potentially the least reliable U.S. ally?

	Most Reliable	Least Reliable
a. Egypt-----	75-1	76-1
b. Israel-----	2	2
c. Jordan-----	3	3
d. Lebanon-----	4	4
e. Saudi Arabia-----	5	5
None (VOL.)-----	6	6
Not sure-----	7	7

7a. Let's turn now for a moment to the issue of the Palestinians. One of the chief points of contention between the Palestinians and the Israelis is the Palestinian aspiration for a homeland. Which of the statements on the card (HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD E) most closely approximates your view on this subject?

a. An independent Palestinian state should be created in the West Bank and Gaza-----	77-1
b. Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza should be granted self-government in association with Jordan-----	2
c. A bi-national state should be created, including present-day Israel, in which Palestinian Arabs and Jews would share power-----	3
d. Israel should keep the West Bank and Gaza and present-day Jordan should become the Palestinian state-----	4
e. The issue has been exaggerated and will eventually be resolved peacefully without creation of a Palestinian state-----	5
Miscellaneous other (VOL.)-----	6
Not sure/depends (VOL.)-----	7

7b. How might the United States seek to bring about a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict? (HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD F)

- a. Start direct consultations with the PLO, paralleling those with moderate Arab states and Israel, aimed at persuading it to negotiate with Israel-----78-1
- b. Urge an Arab consensus for King Hussein of Jordan to serve as representative of the Palestinians in negotiations with Israel-- 2
- c. Press Israel to negotiate with the PLO for a settlement----- 3
- d. Refuse to deal with the PLO until it recognizes Israel's right to a secure existence----- 4
- e. Deal directly with Jordan and Palestinian leaders other than the PLO----- 5
- f. Convene a broad international conference including the Soviet Union and PLO representatives, to work toward a comprehensive Middle East agreement----- 6
- Miscellaneous other (VOL.)----- 7
- Not sure/depends (VOL.)----- 8

7c. As you know, there have been convulsions in recent months within the PLO, and Yasir Arafat's leadership has been strongly challenged. Does the splintering within the PLO represent increased or decreased opportunities for an accord to be reached involving Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and ultimately Syria?

- Increased-----79-1 (ASK Q. 7d)
- Decreased----- 2 (ASK Q. 7d)
- No difference----- 3 (SKIP TO Q. 8a)
- Not sure----- 4 (SKIP TO Q. 8a)

(IF "INCREASED" OR "DECREASED" IN Q. 7c, ASK Q. 7d; OTHERS SKIP TO Q. 8a)

7d. Why do you say that? What are the likely consequences of these developments? CARD II

5-

6-

7-

(ASK EVERYONE)

To this point, we have focused on the international aspect of the Middle Eastern situation. Let's turn now to some domestic considerations.

8a. I'd like you to evaluate the importance to the (INSERT CITY) area of investments by and trade with several regions or groups. For each, tell me whether it is very important, somewhat important or not at all important. (RECORD BELOW UNDER Q. 8a -- IMPORTANCE)

	Q. 8a IMPORTANCE				Q. 8b DYNAMIC			
	Very	Some- what	Not at All	Not Sure	Grow- ing	Same	De- creas- ing	Not Sure
The Arab world-----	8-1	2	3	4	12-1	2	3	4
Japan-----	9-1	2	3	4	13-1	2	3	4
Western Europe-----	10-1	2	3	4	14-1	2	3	4
Latin America-----	11-1	2	3	4	15-1	2	3	4

(FOR EACH "VERY" OR "SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT" IN Q. 8a)

8b. Has the economic significance of (INSERT GROUP NAMED IN Q. 8a) within the (CITY) area been growing, staying about the same or decreasing? (RECORD ABOVE UNDER Q. 8b -- DYNAMIC)

8c. Where should the political and business leadership of the (INSERT CITY) area put its emphasis if it wishes to establish closer ties to foreign investors and/or markets? (HAND RESPONDENT SHOW CARD G). Please rank the countries/regions on the card from 1 to 5 in descending order. If you don't believe closer ties should be sought with one or more of them, please say so.

	Rank	No closer ties
a. The Arab World	16-	21-1
b. Japan	17-	2
c. Western Europe	18-	3
d. Latin America	19-	4
e. Africa	20-	5

8d. From your personal experience, which of the four (READ LIST) has the greatest presence in the civic and cultural life of (INSERT CITY)?

The Arab World-----	22-1	Latin America-----	4
Japan-----	2	None/other/all (VOL.)---	5
Western Europe-----	3	Not sure-----	6

9. Many groups, both domestic and foreign, are perceived to have varying degrees of influence in the formulation of governmental policies. We are interested in your views as to who influences U.S. foreign policy generally, who influences our Middle Eastern policy specifically and who has special influence within the (INSERT CITY) area. (HAND RESPONDENT SELF-ADMINISTERED FORM II) This sheet contains a list of groups with 10-point rating scales next to each. Using 10 as maximum and 1 as minimum influence, please circle the numbers that best reflect your judgments as to where influence resides.

10a. We'd like to know your sense of the closeness of some ethnic groups with their "homelands," actual or symbolic. For each group I name, which of these categories best represents your view; they have close ties to (COUNTRY/CONTINENT) and that is good for the U.S.; they have close ties to (COUNTRY/CONTINENT) and that is bad for the U.S.; they don't have close ties to (COUNTRY/CONTINENT) and that is good for the U.S.; they don't have close ties to (COUNTRY/CONTINENT) and that is bad for the U.S.; or, it doesn't matter one way or the other.

GROUP	COUNTRY	Not		Does			
		Close/ Good	Close/ Bad	Not Matter	Not Sure		
Blacks	Africa-----	23-1	2	3	4	5	6
Greeks	Greece-----	24-1	2	3	4	5	6
Irish	Ireland-----	25-1	2	3	4	5	6
Italians	Italy-----	26-1	2	3	4	5	6
Jews	Israel-----	27-1	2	3	4	5	6
Poles	Poland-----	28-1	2	3	4	5	6

10b. In your judgment, have American Jews had a disproportionate role in the establishment of Middle Eastern policies?

Yes-----	29-1	(ASK Q. 10c)
No-----	2	(SKIP TO Q. 11a)
Not Sure-----	3	(SKIP TO Q. 11a)

(IF YES IN Q. 10b, ASK Q. 10c; OTHERS SKIP TO Q. 11a)

10c. What have been the consequences of that role? What, if anything, would you recommend be done about it?

_____ 30- _____

_____ 31- _____

_____ 32- _____

(ASK EVERYONE)

11a. We would like to know how and where people obtain information about Middle Eastern issues. I'm going to read a number of sources that you may use. For each source I name, please tell me whether it is an extremely valuable, somewhat valuable, only minor, or unused information source for you personally (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH SOURCE)

	Extremely Valuable	Somewhat Valuable	Minor	Unused	Not Sure
Your local press-----	33-1	2	3	4	5
The Wall Street Journal-----	34-1	2	3	4	5
The Washington Post-----	35-1	2	3	4	5
The New York Times-----	36-1	2	3	4	5
Foreign newspapers and/or magazines----	37-1	2	3	4	5
General news magazines-----	38-1	2	3	4	5
General business magazines-----	39-1	2	3	4	5
General international affairs publica- tions, such as Foreign Affairs-----	40-1	2	3	4	5

Q. 11a. (continued)	Extremely Valuable	Somewhat Valuable	Minor	Unused	Not Sure
U.S. government publications-----	41-1	2	3	4	5
Trade and professional publications----	42-1	2	3	4	5
Specialized business newsletters-----	43-1	2	3	4	5
Scholarly publications-----	44-1	2	3	4	5
Publications of Research Organizations--	45-1	2	3	4	5
Television or radio-----	46-1	2	3	4	5
Travel abroad-----	47-1	2	3	4	5
Conferences, seminars and other meetings-----	48-1	2	3	4	5

Personal contact with people in your own organization in the course of your work-----	49-1	2	3	4	5
Personal contact with Americans-----	50-1	2	3	4	5
Personal contact with people from other countries-----	51-1	2	3	4	5

11b. Have you had occasion to talk with foreign nationals, either here or abroad, during the past 30 days?

- Yes-----52-1 (ASK Q. 11c)
- No-----2 (SKIP TO Q. 11d)
- Can't recall-----3 (SKIP TO Q. 11d)

(IF YES IN 11b, ASK Q. 11c; OTHERS SKIP TO Q. 11d)

11c. From which country (countries) were the foreigners with whom you spoke?

_____	53-
_____	54-
_____	55-

(ASK EVERYONE)

11d. With whom have you discussed the Middle Eastern situation most seriously? (PROBE FOR POSITION AND ASSOCIATION OF INDIVIDUAL, NOT NAME)

_____	56-
_____	57-

(ASK Q. 11e ONLY WITHIN ATLANTA AREA. ALL OTHERS SKIP TO CLASSIFICATION SECTION.)

11e. If you needed reliable information about a Middle Eastern issue, which one of the individuals on the card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD H) would you be most likely to seek out for an informed, trustworthy perspective?

- a. Wyche Fowler-----58-Y
 - b. Marvin Goldstein-----X
 - c. Burt Lance-----0
 - d. John Lewis-----1
 - e. Elliot Levitas-----2
 - f. Dillard Munford-----3
 - g. Dan Papp-----4
 - h. Ken Stein-----5
 - i. Hal Suit-----6
 - j. Andrew Young-----7
 - Other (VOL.)-----8
- (WRITE IN)
- Any/None (VOL.)-----9
 - Not sure-----59-Y

Now, just a few more questions for classification purposes only.

A. Please tell me into which of the following categories your age falls.

Under 30---60-1	40-44-----	4	55-59-----	7
30-34-----	45-49-----	5	60-64-----	8
35-39-----	50-54-----	6	65 and older----	9
			Refused (VOL.)---	0

B. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Less than a college degree-----61-1
- Undergraduate degree only-----2
- Master's degree-----3
- Professional degree (M.B., M.D., D.D.S., etc.)-----4

(IF OTHER THAN "LESS THAN COLLEGE DEGREE")

C. From which college/university did you receive your undergraduate degree? 62-
63-
64-

(IF "ADVANCED DEGREE")

D. (And) where did you receive your (ENTER ADVANCED DEGREE)? 65-
66-
67-

E. On matters of domestic policy (the economy, social issues, etc.), do you generally consider yourself to be (READ CATEGORIES AND RECORD BELOW UNDER Q. E -- DOMESTIC POLICY)

	<u>Q. E</u> Domestic Policy	<u>Q. F</u> Foreign Policy
Very conservative-----	68-1	69-1
Somewhat conservative-----	2	2
Middle of the road-----	3	3
Somewhat liberal-----	4	4
Very liberal-----	5	5
Radical-----	6	6
Refused/other/not sure/depends (VOL.)-----	7	7

F. And on matters of foreign policy, do you generally consider yourself to be (READ CATEGORIES AGAIN AND RECORD ABOVE UNDER Q. F -- FOREIGN POLICY)

G. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican or a Democrat? (IF RESPONDENT IS POLITICIAN AND PARTY IS KNOWN, RECORD, BUT DO NOT ASK)

Republican-----	70-1	(SKIP TO Q. I)
Democrat-----	2	(SKIP TO Q. I)
Independent (VOL.)----	3	(ASK Q. H)
Other/refused (VOL.)--	4	(SKIP TO Q. I)

(IF "INDEPENDENT IN Q. G, ASK Q. H; OTHERS SKIP TO Q. I)

H. Are you generally more in sympathy with the programs and policies of the Democrats or the Republicans?

Democrats-----	71-1
Republicans-----	2
Neither/both/no difference/not sure/refused-----	3

(ASK EVERYONE)

I. What is your religious preference? (If Protestant, determine denomination and record in "Denomination" column.)

		<u>Denomination</u>	
Protestant-----	72-1		
Catholic-----	2	Baptist-----	73-1
Jewish-----	3	Southern Baptist-----	2
Moslem/Muslim----	4	Methodist-----	3
Other-----	5	Presbyterian-----	4
None-----	6	Lutheran-----	5
Refused-----	7	Episcopalian-----	6
		Other-----	7

(WRITE IN)

J. From a theological standpoint, do you consider yourself conservative or liberal?

Conservative-----	74-1
Liberal-----	2
Middle of the road/moderate (VOL.)-----	3
Progressive (VOL.)-----	4
Traditional (VOL.)-----	5
None/neither/nothing (VOL.)-----	6
Not sure-----	7

K. With which organizations, if any, are you especially active? (DO NOT READ LIST BUT PROBE FOR TYPE IF YOU ARE UNCERTAIN)

- Political/social cause organization (Sierra Club, NAACP, NOW, etc.)-----75-y
- Political party-----X
- Business/trade association-----0
- Professional association-----1
- Chamber of commerce-----2
- Service organization (Rotary, Kiwanis, etc.)-----3
- Religious institution/organization-----4
- Athletic/sports organization-----5
- Artistic/cultural/educational organization-----6
- Philanthropic organization-----7
- Miscellaneous other -----8

(WRITE IN)

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY

Mr. _____
 Miss _____
 Mrs. _____
 Ms. _____
 (NAME OF RESPONDENT)

THIS IS A BONA FIDE INTERVIEW AND HAS BEEN OBTAINED ACCORDING TO QUOTA AND ALL INTERVIEWER SPECIFICATIONS.

Length of Interviewing Time: _____

(STREET ADDRESS)

Minutes


(CITY/TOWN)

Validated by: _____

Date: _____

(STATE) (ZIP CODE)

() --
AREA CODE (TELEPHONE #)





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TRENDS ANALYSES REPORT

AD HOC GROUPS:
NEW PLEADERS
FOR THE ARAB CAUSE

by Sheba Mittelman

October 11, 1982



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, Institute of Human Relations, 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

With the outbreak of hostilities in Lebanon on June 6, 1982, a number of ad hoc anti-Israel groups emerged on the American scene. This report identifies the most active groups, focusing on those that attracted national attention. Where possible, names and addresses of organizers and organizations are provided, since these often shed light on the behind-the-scenes coordination that exists among many of these groups. In numerous cases, long-time pro-PLO activists on the left were discovered to be operating under new cover names.

These ad hoc groups engaged in a wide variety of activities--placing large newspaper ads, distributing leaflets, holding street rallies and teach-ins-- all aimed at encouraging public sympathy for the Lebanese civilians suffering from the aftermath of recent events and for Palestinians. In all of their activities several issues were frequently stressed:

-- Alleged atrocity stories and indiscriminate bombings were highlighted in an effort to portray Israel as criminal, inhumane and immoral. Although pro-Palestinian groups have for some time used terms like "genocide" and "holocaust" in their literature to refer to Israel's policy toward Palestinians, such language appeared more prominently in current ads and statements. For example, there were widespread comparisons of Beirut to the Warsaw Ghetto of 1942, the message being: Jews, with your history, you should know better.

-- The US was bitterly criticized for allegedly giving Israel a "green light" for the attack and for continuing to supply Israel with large amounts of military and economic aid. There were many demands for a cutoff of aid to induce Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, buttressed by the assertion that commitments of massive quantities of aid to Israel in a time of economic difficulties here in the US are detrimental to American interests.

-- The broader issue of the need to solve the Palestinian problem was consistently linked to the Lebanon situation. Pro-PLO activists renewed their long-standing demand that the US change its policy and deal directly with the PLO, without waiting for PLO recognition of Israel. Indeed, several groups supported the idea of replacing Israel with a "secular, democratic" Palestine.

-- Considerable emphasis was placed on the need for Americans to change their attitudes about Arabs in general. Some groups claimed that latent anti-Arab racism is responsible for lack of American concern for the innocent victims of Israel's attacks in Lebanon.

One significant development was the increase in cooperation in some areas between Jewish critics of Prime Minister Begin's policies

and anti-Israel groups. A distinction should be made between anti-Zionist Jews--such as Noam Chomsky, Elmer Berger and others--who have long been critics of Israel and who have in the past publicly joined with pro-PLO groups, and those Jews who remain pro-Israel but have now come out publicly in opposition to the Lebanon war.

As a result of the war, and in particular as a result of the heavy bombing of West Beirut, there was growing cooperation among various pro-peace and disarmament groups and pro-Palestinian organizations. Some of these groups announced their intention of mounting their own "commissions of inquiry" into Israel's conduct of the war and its use of American-made weapons in Lebanon.

The activities of the ad hoc groups bolstered the broad scale efforts of the Arab-American community to influence American public opinion. Mainstream Arab-American organizations shared materials with many of these groups, and in some cases, especially on the local level, coordinated the ad hoc groups. The most prominent of these national organizations are:

-- The National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA), headquartered in Washington, D.C. is the registered lobby of the Arab-American community; its current president is Robert Joseph, a Pittsburgh businessman

-- The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), also based in Washington, D.C., directed by former Senator James Abourezk

-- The Association of Arab-American University Graduates, based in Belmont, Massachusetts, has long advocated a "secular democratic state" in Palestine

-- The Palestine Congress of North America, based in Washington, represents Palestinians in the US and supports the PLO

These organizations, some of which had begun to organize the Arab-American community on the grass roots level as long as 10 years ago, are now poised to reach out to other ethnic, church, civil rights and community groups in order to capitalize on what they perceive to be a turning point in American sympathy for Israel. (The national Arab-American organizations will be dealt with in greater detail in a separate study.) NAAA claims to have collected thousands of signatures on a National Petition to Save Lebanon. Along with ADC, NAAA is lobbying for passage of Concurrent Resolution #359, introduced by Congressman Nick Rahall II (D-W.Va.), himself an Arab-American, which calls for a suspension of "all deliveries of military equipment and all military sales financing to all combatants in the region."

While they have not been successful in such lobbying efforts to date, pro-Arab organizations now sense a greater receptivity to their

ideas as a result of Israel's unpopular actions in Lebanon. Questions and doubts about the justice of Israel's course and US support for its policies are being raised more frequently, particularly in liberal circles where Israel's image as a moral nation has been badly tarnished. The ad hoc groups, promoting the image of Israel as aggressor, have helped to create a new climate of criticism and anger about Israel's policies. This mood could in the long run pave the way for a real change in US policy toward Israel.

As long as Israeli forces remain in Lebanon and the violence continues, the Jewish community and Israel's friends in the US can expect these and other ad hoc committees and organizations to continue their efforts to sway American opinion. There is evidence that Palestinian activists, convinced of the destruction of their military option, are now gearing up for a major public relations campaign in the US. For the supporters of Israel in this country, the propaganda war is just beginning.

SM:ka
September 28, 1982
82-970-11



**AD HOC COMMITTEE IN DEFENSE OF THE
PALESTINIAN & LEBANESE PEOPLES**

P.O. Box 1499
Ansonia Station
New York, NY 10023

The Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of the Palestinian & Lebanese Peoples first emerged in an ad in The New York Times, June 27, 1982, signed by over 200 people. The list included a large number of professors and prominent writers, as well as several long-time activists for the Palestinian cause, including former Senator James Abourezk, the Berrigan brothers, former US attorney general Ramsey Clark and Rev. Jesse Jackson. The ad headlined "Death and Devastation in Lebanon" condemned "Israeli aggression," "the inhuman assault on the civilian population" and American support for Begin's policies. The last paragraph urged Americans "to affirm that the national rights of the Palestinians are central and indispensable to any resolution of the endemic state of conflict which exists between Israel and the Palestinian people."

A subsequent ad (July 11), also in The New York Times, featured allegations of Israeli torture of captured Palestinians under the heading "War Crimes in Lebanon."

According to a report in the New York Post, July 27, 1982, the post office box in Ansonia Station is registered to Mariam Said, wife of Prof. Edward Said, a writer and member of the Palestine National Council (the so-called parliament of the PLO).

According to the Los Angeles Times, July 17, 1982, Prof Said and Ralph Schoenman, a writer based in New Jersey, were the organizers of the committee, which has apparently never met formally as a group.

The ads also appealed for contributions to defray the advertising costs, to pay for medical supplies for West Beirut and to "launch an inquiry into the conduct of the war and the treatment of refugees and prisoners."

No ads have appeared with this name since the beginning of August.

**AD HOC COMMITTEE OF TRADE UNIONISTS TO OPPOSE
THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON**

P.O. Box 676
Old Chelsea Station
New York, NY 10011

An ad with 150 signatures sponsored by the Ad Hoc Committee of Trade Unionists to Oppose the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon appeared on September 5, 1982 in The New York Times. Headlined "Labor Speaks

Out On Lebanon," it asserted: "as trade unionists we cannot and will not stand for the identification of the trade union movement and workers of this country with Israeli actions in Lebanon." This statement was apparently a response to one adopted by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on August 5, 1982, which strongly supported Israel and stated that the Israeli action in Lebanon was "entirely justified on security grounds." (The AFL-CIO statement was reprinted in The New York Times on August 15, 1982.)

Some members of the Ad Hoc Committee are also endorsers of the November 29 Coalition, which circulated the trade unionists' statement.

The Ad Hoc Committee advertisement called for an end to US arms deliveries to Israel, saying that "at a time when unemployment is the highest in over 40 years, we cannot justify arms and aid to Israel totalling more than \$7 million/day. This subsidy has made it possible for Israel to carry out the destruction of major cities, schools and hospitals in Lebanon, while for lack of funds, our own cities, schools and hospitals are deteriorating and crumbling."

AMERICAN JEWS OPPOSED TO ISRAELI AGGRESSION

Box 49
5825 Telegraph Avenue
Oakland, CA 94609

17 members of Jews Against the Israeli Massacre in Lebanon signed an ad in The New York Times on August 8, 1982 placed by American Jews Opposed to Israeli Aggression, based in Oakland, Ca. Among the signers of this ad were Hebert Aptheker, a member of the Communist Party USA and editor of their journal, Jewish Affairs; Noam Chomsky, Professor of Linguistics at MIT and noted opponent of Israel and others--including professors, doctors, lawyers, many of whom were identified as members of the New Jewish Agenda (a national organization of progressive Jews who support Israel but are critical of Begin's policies). The ad's opening copy asserted that "We cannot be silent" and stated that "we are American Jews who are appalled by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and by the fact that the killing and destruction are being carried out with the political support and military aid provided by the U.S." The group rejected the assumption that American Jews support Israel no matter what it does and expressed solidarity "with the tens of thousands in Israel who have demonstrated their opposition to the inhuman and brutal policies of their government."

The ad called on the U.S. to halt sales and shipments of all arms "to the combatants in Lebanon."

AMERICANS CONCERNED FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Washington, D.C.

This name was used by Franklin Lamb, a former member of the Democratic National Committee (now wanted for fraud by the FBI for charging phone calls to other people's accounts.) Claiming he was on staff of the Library of Congress, Lamb and two friends called congressional staffers in July offering them a free fact-finding tour of Beirut. Reports omitted the fact that the trip was sponsored by the Palestine Red Crescent Society, an arm of the PLO, run by Yasir Arafat's brother.

This group attracted attention when a UPI story of August 7 reported that a "US Congressional delegation charged Israel used a U.S.-built vacuum bomb" in Beirut. Lamb's group consisted of one Congressional staffer and had no official authorization from Speaker O'Neill or Senate Majority Leader Baker to go abroad. Susan Hedges, a friend of Lamb's who portrayed herself as an aide to Senator James McClure, was reported to be the source of the information about the so-called vacuum bomb, which according to Pentagon officials, does not exist. (The New Republic, Sept. 6, 1982.)

AMERICANS FOR PEACE

P.O. Box 57042
Washington, D.C. 20037

A series of ads appeared in The Washington Post and The New York Times the week of June 22 under the sponsorship of Americans for Peace. The post office box is rented to Hatem Hussein, formerly Director of the Palestine Information office in Washington, the official arm of the PLO in the U.S. (Hussein has now joined the PLO's UN staff.) The ads featured photographs of children and were headlined "Stop U.S. Weapons to Israel" "Stop Israel's war of genocide."

THE ARAB WOMEN'S COUNCIL

P.O. Box 11048
Washington, D.C. 20008

The Council first surfaced in June, 1982 (although it is unclear whether it was organized before or after the date Israel Defense Forces moved into Lebanon). It comprises 104 women: 24 wives of Arab Ambassadors and 80 Arab-Americans including housewives and students.

The president of the Council is Nouha Alhegelan, wife of the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. and its executive secretary is Hala Maksoud, wife of Clovis Maksoud, the Arab League representative to the UN.

The Council's activities have included mailings to prominent American women urging them to "use your influence to stop the genocide" in Lebanon; full page ads in newspapers around the country; a 20-city speaking tour including radio and TV interviews and meetings with political leaders; and an eight-day hunger strike in Lafayette Park across from the White House.

The Council also apparently serves as a channel for money and information to a group called Peace Corps Alumni for Middle East Understanding. (see below)

Most of the Council's activities were coordinated by Gray & Co., a Washington-based public relations firm headed by Robert Keith Gray, a long time friend of President Reagan. Gray, who is registered as a foreign agent to represent the Kuwait Petroleum Company in the U.S., arranged meetings for Mrs. Alhegelan with Nancy Reagan and National Security Adviser William Clark, as well as wives of US Senators and Congressmen.

COMMITTEE FOR A DEMOCRATIC SECULAR PALESTINE

P.O. Box 326
New York, NY 10014

This name appeared on a flyer distributed in June shortly after the beginning of the war in Lebanon. The text of the flyer began with the statement, "Menachem Begin has the bomb." Condemning Israel as "a colonial settler state" supported by "American corporate interests" that fear the threat of the Iranian and Palestinian revolutions, it said Israel "can never be at peace...and will always be a smoldering fuse on the nuclear powder keg." It ended with the demand for "No U.S. troops or arms to the Middle East."

Nothing more is known about this group.

CONCERNED AMERICANS FOR PEACE

P.O. Box 5305
Terminal Annex
Los Angeles, CA 90054

The origin of Concerned Americans for Peace has remained a mystery since the appearance of full-page ads under its sponsorship, published simultaneously on July 11 in six major newspapers around the country. Headlined "The People of Lebanon, Innocent Victims of a Senseless War," the ad urged readers to write their Congressmen to take immediate action to stop the "merciless killing" of innocent civilians, and listed six relief organizations to which people could donate contributions for Lebanon.

The ads stirred considerable controversy when the relief agencies-- including the American Red Cross, CARE, Save the Children, and others-- announced that they had not authorized the use of their names in the ad, and publicly dissociated themselves from the political views expressed.

Subsequently, it was learned that no such group had rented any post office box in Los Angeles.

Newspaper reports disclosed that the ads had been placed through the Bernard Hodes Agency in Los Angeles for a client named Craig Lane and cost approximately \$120,000. Payment for the ad was made from a Swiss bank and there was some speculation in the press that PLO funds were involved. According to The New York Times (July 14), the names Ralph Martin and John Kelley were submitted to the Chicago Tribune when the paper requested the names of officers of the group. There is no further available information on these individuals.

JEW'S AGAINST THE ISRAELI MASSACRE IN LEBANON

P.O. Box 367	also	51 East 42nd Street
Midwood Station		Room 417
Brooklyn, NY 11230		New York, NY 10017

According to an article in The Guardian, (self described "independent radical" publication), Jews against the Israeli massacre supports Palestinian self-determination and the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. Five people affiliated with JAIMIL were arrested for trespassing after a sit-down strike at the Israeli consulate in New York on July 31. The protesters had demanded the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the right to visit detained Palestinians. Most of the supporters are apparently anti-Zionist Jews from the New York and Berkeley areas; their funding sources are unknown.

This name appeared in the list of endorsers for the November 29 Coalition March on Washington. A JAIMIL flyer distributed endorsing the November 29 Coalition March on Washington identified "4 Points of Unity" as:

- Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon
- No U.S. arms to Israel or other Middle East countries
- Support for the Palestinians right of self-determination
- Acknowledge the "Palestinian people have recognized the PLO as their representatives."

Prof. Stuart Scharr, the coordinator of this group, is also associated with The National Emergency Committee on Lebanon.

NATIONAL EMERGENCY COMMITTEE ON LEBANON

P.O. Box 1757
New York, NY 10027

The National Committee on Lebanon appeared as sponsor of an ad in The New York Times on July 25, 1982, which asked rhetorically "After Dresden, after Warsaw, after Hiroshima, must Beirut be destroyed?" Twenty-nine prominent people signed the ad, including actress Melina Mercouri, peace activist Rev. William Sloan Coffin, and Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young.

The listed P.O. box number in New York is used by the Palestine Solidarity Committee (PSC), a small group which supports the PLO as the "chosen representative" of the Palestinians. According to informed sources the PSC has, in the past, received money from the PLO. A PSC staff member, Sheila Ryan, long active in leftist causes, is also the coordinator of the Emergency Committee. According to the Los Angeles Times (7/17/82), Ryan said that the National Emergency Committee was formed after a rally in New York on June 24, and that various Arab-American groups, including the Palestine Congress of North America and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, are participating.

Several peace activists and pro-disarmament groups have also been attracted to the National Emergency Committee; the July 25th ad carried the New York phone number of the People's Anti-war Mobilization.

The National Emergency Committee also sponsored lectures by Dr. Chris Giannou, a Canadian surgeon who returned from Lebanon with charges of Israeli atrocities. The Committee favors a ban on arms shipments to the Middle East. It has circulated fact sheets on the Lebanon situation, identical to material compiled by the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, based in Boston, a pro-PLO group.

PALESTINE-LEBANON COMMITTEE OF THE NOVEMBER 29TH COALITION

P.O. Box 115
New York, NY 10113

The November 29 Coalition comprises approximately 100 pro-Palestinian groups in the U.S., mostly on the left of the political spectrum. The Coalition surfaced in 1981 and takes its name from the date proclaimed by the UN as the "International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People."

Under the rubric of the "Palestine-Lebanon Committee," the Coalition sponsored teach-ins and rallies opposed to the "U.S.-Israel Invasion of Lebanon." One meeting in New York at the end of July featured Zehdi Terzi, the PLO representative to the UN, and drew 1,500 people. A "March on Washington" on September 11 drew 2,800 people, according to The New York Times (9/12/82), but it received very little press coverage.

**PEACE CORPS ALUMNI FOR MIDDLE EAST
UNDERSTANDING**

Washington, D.C.

The Peace Corps Alumni for the Middle East first emerged June 25, 1982. It contacted 80,000 former Peace Corps volunteers by letters, postmarked in Washington and carrying a meter number registered to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington. The letters described the organization as composed of Peace Corps volunteers and staff who served in the Middle East, and they urged recipients to "write to your congressmen, senators, White House and State Department and voice your outrage and opposition" to the Israeli "invasion of Lebanon." The letters also urged a substantial cut in U.S. economic and military aid to Israel.

The letters were signed by one Lili Wilson-Hishmeh, whose husband, George Hishmeh, is an officer in the U.S. International Communication Agency.

The New York Post reported on July 23, 1982 that the office of the Executive Director of the Peace Corps referred callers requesting information about the alumni group to the Arab Women's Council, which is headed by the wife of the Saudi Ambassador.

Congressman Barney Frank (D.-Mass.) wrote to Attorney General William French Smith on August 11, formally requesting that the Peace Corps Alumni register with the Justice Department as a foreign agent, since the group is working in conjunction with Saudi Arabia to sway American public opinion. At the time of this writing, no determination has been made about whether or not the group must register.

Lili and George Hishmeh are active members of the National Association of Arab Americans, the registered lobby group of the Arab American community. George Hishmeh was on the board of directors from 1978 to 1981.

35 cents per copy
Quantity price on request

Massarwa Must Go
Letter Writing Campaign Instructions

Our goal is to convince the Israeli government that it is inappropriate to appoint a non-Jew to represent the Jewish State. The campaign is not a personal attack on Muhamed Massarwa. It bears his name only because he is the first non-Jew appointed as an Israeli consul general. A press release describing our position is attached.

1. If you live in the U.S., address your letters to:

Mr. Moshe Arad
Ambassador of Israel
3514 International Drive NW
Washington, DC 20008

- If you live outside the U.S., address your letters to:

Mr. Shimon Peres
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hakirya Romema
Jerusalem, Israel

2. A simple note placed in an envelope, or written on a postcard or aerogramme, saying:

MASSARWA MUST GO

will suffice because the Israel Embassy and Foreign Ministry are well aware of this campaign. You needn't even sign it. Israel will know from the different postmarks and handwritings that this campaign is massive. However, you may write a letter as detailed as you wish. Hopefully, Israel will respond to some of these letters.

3. Send one letter to the Israeli government every week. (Mail one letter every Monday morning; that's an easy routine to remember.) Our purpose is to flood Israel with mail.

Israeli officials have boasted that no one cares about the appointment of an Arab to a diplomatic post. If they receive just one letter a day, Israel will no longer be able to say no one cares. If they receive a flood of mail, they will, at least privately, acknowledge their mistake. One letter per person per week, consisting of just 3 words, will be a mighty powerful message.

4. Photocopy these papers and distribute them to friends and relatives the world over. Ask them to help us by writing letters weekly, and by passing this on to their friends and relatives, together with a personal note asking them to write. Ask your local rabbi to announce the campaign from his pulpit and include it in your synagogue bulletin. Ask your local newspaper to carry the story.
5. We would appreciate hearing from you to learn of your successes and to assist with any problems. Just drop us a note or call:

Massarwa Must Go
P. O. Box 29614
Atlanta, GA 30329
404-952-3304

January 1, 1988

"MASSARWA MUST GO", SAY ATLANTA JEWS

Atlanta - Opposition is growing against the appointment of Muhamed Massarwa, an Arab, as Israel's Consul General to Atlanta. Since taking his post in September, he has upset Jews with his inability to feel the history, religious, and cultural aspects of the people Israel.

Massarwa says he doesn't perceive Israel as a Jewish state, and sometimes refers to it as "Palestine-Israel".

He hopes that the words of Israel's national anthem, "Hatikva", will be changed to reflect the existence of an Arab population within Israel and that symbols such as the Jewish star and the menorah will be counterbalanced by Arab symbols.

Massarwa is frequently invited to Jewish affairs because of Israel's connection to Judaism. Yet, his lips do not move when Hatikva is sung.

Unlike his predecessor, who used every opportunity to preach Aliya (Jewish emigration to Israel), Massarwa claims promoting Aliyah is not the function of the Israeli consulate. He does not give the impression of being a Zionist.

"We are asking Jews all over the U.S. to inundate the Israel Embassy in Washington with mail denouncing the appointment of a non-Jew to represent Israel," says Jay Starkman, spokesman for the "Massarwa Must Go" campaign. Jews outside the U.S. will write to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem.

"Mr. Massarwa may be loyal to the political entity of Israel, and he would be well qualified," says Starkman, "if Israel were a melting pot, an ordinary country. But Israel is a unique phenomenon -- a culmination of millenia of Jewish praying for a return to the Promised Land, as reflected in Israel's Law of Return, which applies only to Jews. As such, the appointment of a non-Jew to represent Israel is wholly misplaced."

As an example, Starkman cites the recent Arab rioting in Israel. He notes that it was the Jewish consul, Arthur Koll, who issued an Israeli government statement on the matter. On a practical level, Massarwa has been placed in an ambivalent and ultimately intolerable situation. The Israeli government must acknowledge this.

The group hopes that Israel's Foreign Ministry will recall Massarwa. At a minimum, the letter writing campaign will make Israel's Foreign Ministry aware that a non-Jewish consul general is unacceptable to many Jews, and that makes him an ineffective diplomat.

The campaign is not a personal attack on Muhamed Massarwa. It bears his name only because he is the first non-Jew appointed as an Israeli consul general.

Those wishing to help in this campaign should write to Massarwa Must Go, P.O. Box 29614, Atlanta, GA 30329.

Massarwa talks to local rabbis

At the recent meeting of the Atlanta Rabbinical Association, Consul General Mohamed Massarwa dialogued with its members. His opening comments were in Hebrew. The question and answer period was in English.

There are two problems, Massarwa said, which are opposite sides of the same coin. The first is Israel's relationship to other Middle East countries. The second is the status of Arab citizens within the State of Israel. "Should we (Israel) fail to integrate Arabs and Jews in Israel, we would endanger the integration of Israel into the Middle East," Massarwa said.

Massarwa pointed out that the Arab minority in Israel is unique. It became a minority as a result of a historical process: the U.N.

Partition Resolution and Declaration of the State of Israel in 1948. Until then, Palestinian Arabs were a majority in Palestine. As of 1948, those who lived within the Green Line, the pre-1967 borders of Israel, became a minority in their native land. While Arabs are a minority within Israel, they perceive themselves to be the Arab majority in the Middle East.

"Israeli Law grants Arabs equal rights. Israeli Arabs (certainly in his own village) look to compare themselves with their Israeli neighbors more so than with Arabs in other nations. Arab citizens live. They pay taxes, and then they are entitled to all the rights of citizenship.

"Israel," Massarwa affirmed, "is my country. I do not perceive

it as a Jewish state.

"Situations have changed within the past two decades," he said. "There is a movement toward peace with Israel within the Arab world. The peace treaty with Egypt is but the first step. Within Israel there is an acceptance of the rights of the Palestinians. Golda Meir's famous statement some years ago when asked about the Palestinians said, 'Who are the Palestinians?' No responsible Israeli leader would ask this today."

He was asked how he psychologically handles living as an Arab citizen in a country in which the national anthem is "Hatikva," with its statements of Jewish hopes and aspirations, and has on its flag a Jewish star, a symbol of the Jewish People. He answered that he hopes that the day will come when the words of "Hatikva" will be changed to reflect the existence of a loyal Arab population within Israel, and that symbols such as the Jewish star and the menorah will be counterbalanced by Arabs in both as well.

The consensus with the Atlanta Rabbinical Association members was that the appointment of Massarwa as consul general is an effective rebuttal of the infamous U.N. resolution that Zionism is racism.

New Israeli consul has rare perspective

By Michael Widianski
Journal-Constitution Correspondent

KAFR KANA, Israel — Mohammed Khalid Masarwa, whose appointment as consul general in Atlanta makes him the first Arab designated to head an Israeli diplomatic mission, is not quite a member of the Israeli establishment, but he is no stranger to the corridors of power either.

The lawyer was twice elected chairman of the Local Council in Kafr Kana and is director of Wadi Ara Planning Commission, responsible for zoning and building permits for 100,000 Arabs living in 14 Galilean villages and the city of Um Al-Fahem. It is the largest planning commission serving Israel's 700,000 Arab citizens.

Masarwa, 44, a Moslem whose family emigrated from Egypt in the 19th century, will bring unconventional views on Palestinian self-determination to his diplomatic posting as consul general in Atlanta.

"I believe that Palestine-Israel is the homeland of two nations and that both have the right to live there as they see fit," Masarwa said in an interview with the Israeli weekly, Koteret Rashid.

"Since the Jews have attained political fulfillment," he continued, "the time has come to grant the Palestinians the right to fulfill themselves in a portion of the land where they can live in a constructive way and in peace."

Masarwa, a father of three, holds a law degree from Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where he led the Arab student organization for three years. Fluent in both Hebrew and Arabic, Masarwa is brushing up on his English before taking up his Atlanta post sometime this summer.

In his law office, Masarwa's secretary answers the phone in Hebrew, but at his home in Kafr Kana the phone is answered in Arabic. Masarwa finds no difficulty balancing his dual heritage as an Arab and as an Israeli.

"I am an Arab, part of the Arab nation and the Palestinian people, and an Israeli citizen by choice," he said.

"Even if I were offered the

chance to live in an Arab country, I wouldn't give up my Israeli citizenship, despite the problems," he added. "It's my homeland. It's a partner for equality and peace. It's a democratic society with many partners for peace."

Masarwa, who supported the Israeli Labor Party in the 1977 and 1981 elections, was the No. 6 candidate on Ezer Weizman's Yehad Party in 1984 parliamentary elections and failed to win a seat.


When Weizman's party merged with the Labor Party a few months ago, Masarwa was designated for the 61st place on Labor's list of parliamentary candidates. This means that Labor would have to win an absolute majority of Israel's 120-member Parliament in a future election for Masarwa to gain a seat.

Masarwa has advocated a form of compulsory national service for Israeli Arabs who, except for Bedouin and Druse, are exempt from military conscription. Masarwa said this proposal was meant to silence Jewish critics who claim that Arabs are not entitled to full citizenship rights since they do not serve in the army.

But recently Masarwa modified his views, commenting that the Jewish establishment must make a simultaneous commitment to spur economic and educational development in Israel's neglected Arab community.

Masarwa said he is looking forward to his posting in Atlanta and sees no difficulty in participating in social functions with the Jewish community in the area. "There are social functions and political functions in the job," he said. "In the social functions, traditional Moslem tolerance will allow me to maintain ties.

"I see it as a mission not only in the formal sense but in the larger sense. I see myself as a representative of the Israeli people, Arabs and Jews, and my intention is to spur a correct and deep dialogue with the Jewish and Arab communities in the United States. I see this as a breakthrough for Arab intellectuals in Israel, for Arab intellectuals to be full partners in Israeli institutions."



מכון ון ליר בירושלים

THE VAN LEER JERUSALEM INSTITUTE

معهد فان لير في القدس

A COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMME ON

ARAB-JEWISH AND ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

A Provisional Report

on

The first two years of the programme
(1983-1985)

Alouph Hareven


December 1985

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A Comprehensive Educational Programme
on Arab-Jewish and Arab-Israeli Relations

A Provisional Report for the years 1983-1985.

Three difficult problems

The programme we describe in this report deals with three interrelated issues, which are difficult to resolve:

- * First are the difficult and complex relations between Jews and Arabs within Israel and between Israel and her Arab neighbours.
- * Second are the attitudes of the Israeli public, and of the young generation in particular, towards this reality;
- * And the third is the question whether and how we should cope with these two problems in our schools. To this last question we shall devote the greater part of our report, but we begin with a brief outline of the first two issues.

Israel and the Arabs: From Polarization to Pluralist Relations

Prior to the establishment of Israel and during its first generation, the relations between Arabs and Jews were characterized by the single keyword 'conflict' (Arab-Jewish conflict until 1948, and thereafter also Arab-Israeli conflict). At the time of the British Mandate relations between Jews and Arabs did not consist only of conflict. However, during the first two decades of the State, many Israelis gradually came to perceive conflict as the sole relationship between the two people. By the mid-sixties, the relation between Israel and her neighbours could be regarded as one of almost complete polarization: closed borders without any mutual contacts between the people, an all-Arab consensus on the impossibility of accepting the existence of Israel, and agreement, at least verbal, that the Jewish State should one day be destroyed.

Now, in the mid-eighties, reality is no longer as polarized as it was two decades ago. Since the Six-Day-War, and more so since the Yom-Kippur-War, processes of change are taking place and the phrase

"the Arab-Israeli conflict" no longer describes these relations adequately as it did twenty years ago.

At the present time we can distinguish between at least four types of relations:

1) Peaceful relations. Since 1979 there is peace between Israel and Egypt. True, this is a peace encumbered with problems, and both parties have harsh complaints about its course: Israel criticizes the paucity of common endeavour within the peace framework, while Egypt is sharply critical of what it perceives as Israel exploiting peace for unilateral activities in the Administered Territories and for waging war in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the two basic elements of peace endure - there are direct contacts between the parties, including direct talks on controversial matters, and arrangement in Sinai for the prevention of preparations for war are respected. Over one hundred thousand Israelis have visited Egypt, though the number of Egyptians who visited Israel is negligible. One can say about the relations between the two countries that, despite the serious problems as yet unresolved, peace serves long-term national interests of both Egypt and Israel.

2) Relations which are neither peace nor war. With a number of Arab States, Israel has relations half way between peace and war.

* Morocco. This country helped establish the preliminary contacts between Israel and Egypt, before Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Public personalities from Israel have visited Morocco openly. Israeli tourist offices openly advertise trips to Morocco.

* Jordan. Direct talks between Israeli leaders and King Hussein have taken place for some twenty years. Since June 1967 the bridges between the two countries are open to the movement of Arab people and of commerce. According to some estimates several hundred million dollars' worth of exports from Israel pass through the bridges every year. Since 1970 Jordan also takes

good care to keep the border quiet and to prevent terrorist raids across it.

- * Lebanon. Israel maintains direct contacts with Christians, Shi'ites and Druze across the frontier, to assure common interests.
- * Other countries, such as Tunisia, Sudan and Oman have on several occasions expressed openly their support of the political process as sponsored by Egypt.

3) Mutual relations with Arabs in Israel-controlled areas.

- * 650,000 Arabs are Israeli citizens, on the legal basis of civic equality. According to Israeli security authorities, 99.9% of this population, have never done anything harmful to the State and its security. True, the mutual relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority are encumbered by several serious problems. But most of these problems can be dealt with through the democratic processes of Israel. It is certain that since abolition in 1966 of Military Government over Israel's Arabs they changed from being passive citizens, resigned to their fate, into active citizens who increasingly realize their civic rights and struggle daily for their fulfillment.
- * One and a quarter million of Arabs in the Territories live under Military Government since 1967. Most of them are certainly not happy with this situation. However, since 1967, complex mutual relations have developed between this population and Israel, in contrast to the complete absence of any relations during the nineteen previous years. 70,000 Arabs from the Territories are working in Israel. Extensive relations exist also in the spheres of commerce, tourism, health and education. No matter what a future political solutions may be, a return to the total separation that prevailed before 1967 is hard to imagine.

4) Conflict relations. A state of acute conflict still endures between Israel and a number of Arab countries, among which Syria, Iraq and Libya are outstanding. The same applies to relations between the PLO and Israel.

What are the new elements of the present situation, as compared with that which existed twenty years ago?

- First, the very change from unrelenting conflict to a plurality of relations (peaceful relations, civic relations, intermediate relations between war and peace, conflict relations); a change that requires us to differentiate among different Arab countries, as well as among different Arab groups, according to their specific interests and attitudes towards Israel (Whereas in the past there was no need for such differentiation, when we grouped them all under the sole heading "conflict - enemies").

- Secondly, the complexity of the present situation. This is no longer a reality that can be perceived in terms of a single dimension of conflict.

- And thirdly, the ambiguity of this situation: What we knew twenty years ago was the singular certainty that we were in conflict with all our neighbours. In the present situation we are neither at peace with all our neighbours, nor in total conflict with all of them. The complexity and the changing relations, both contribute to the element of uncertainty.

From a psychological point of view coping with the reality of the mid-eighties requires an ability to grasp more complex situations, as well as a capacity to deal with ambiguous conditions, fraught with uncertainty. When we meet an Arab whom we do not know - he may be an Israeli citizen who speaks Hebrew and is law-abiding, or a Palestinian living under Military Government and feeling nationally frustrated, or an Egyptian with whose country we are at peace, or a Syrian who is at war with us, or a member of a Palestinian organization intent on murdering Israeli citizens. Is it, then, surprising that many Israelis find it hard to come to terms with this situation?

Israeli public opinion and the reality of Arab-Israeli relations

Probably a considerable number of Israelis still lag twenty years behind, in their perception of Arab-Israeli relations. They perceive the present in terms that held true twenty years ago, but which today are no longer fully adequate. Their view of reality is still polarized, a black-and-white perception of total conflict with all Arabs whoever they may be, believing all Arabs to be implacable enemies, dangerous and totally untrustworthy. The peace with Egypt is regarded as not being a true peace. The Arab citizens of Israel are regarded as threat to the security of the State. The peace with Egypt is described as a false peace. The key figure in relating to the Arabs is the terrorist who out of nationalistic motives murders Jews indiscriminately - a boy kidnapped outside his home, couples visiting nature reserves, soldiers hitch hiking.

What many Israelis have experienced is the reverse of the what could be expected. The peace with Egypt, the development of informal relations with several Arab countries, and the common citizenship with the Israeli Arabs, instead of strengthening the sense of movement towards a less painful relationship, have in recent intensified years the patterns of fear, anxiety, hatred and distrust of Arabs generally. A somewhat paradoxical situation has evolved: people cling intensely to perceptions of total conflict and total polarization, as these organize for them a world of which they are certain. A world in which one knows that all Arabs are enemies is a world one knows with complete certainty; hence a world with which one feels one can cope. As against this, a world in which there might be some Arabs who are not hostile, while there are also Arabs who murder Jews, is an ambiguous world, and many find it difficult to cope with such uncertainty.

These attitudes find their expression also among young people and in the class. Among a considerable number of young people the prevailing ideas about the Arabs focus in a number of negative stereotypes. Any educator entering a class in recent years and asking

pupils what are the first words coming to their minds in association with the word "Arab," generally receives answers such as "dirty", "stinking", "primitive", "enemy", "violent", "terrorist", "untrustworthy". Only rarely will a pupil say: "An Arab is also a human being."

These negative attitudes among the young (but also among adults) find their strongest expression with regard to the Arabs who live under Israeli rule. All pupils now in school were born since 1967. They do not know what is the "Green Line", dividing Israel from the Territories, and for them there is no difference between an Arab living in Haifa and one who lives in Nablus. Most of them simply are not aware of the differences in status and in identity between Arab citizens of Israel and Arabs living in the Territories under the Military Administration of Israel. Neither do they know that one of the basic principles of the State is civic equality. They often react with surprise and rejection, when they learn that the Israeli Arabs are citizens with equal rights.

Three principal anxieties trouble young Jews in Israel in regard to Arabs. First, there is the existential fear of Arabs as murderers.

Since in recent years most of the victims of terrorist attacks were young Israelis, young people regard themselves as potential victims to such attacks. Many therefore project the image of murderers upon all Arabs. Secondly, many are concerned about the demographic balance - that the Arabs, because of their higher birth rate, may eventually become the majority. And thirdly, mainly among religious youth, there is the - rather astonishing - fear of assimilation (of the majority inside the minority!) through mixed marriages.

These negative attitudes - stereotypes locked on fears - lead to a search for simplistic, one-dimensional solutions, which will put an end to the problem, once and for all. This is expressed in a range of extremist attitudes, the more "moderate" among which question the need to maintain the equal rights of the Arab citizens of Israel, whilst the more extreme ones favour Meir Kahana's proposal to expel all Arabs

from Israeli territory. How many young people are hold such views? In our estimate about one half of all young people, and perhaps more. This estimate is confirmed by two surveys carried out by the Dahaf Institute for the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (VLJI). The survey on "Attitudes of Adolescents to Democratic Values," in September 1984, revealed that only some 40% of all young people are in favour of equal rights for the Arab citizens of the State. The survey on "Political Views of Adolescents," in May 1985, revealed that 11% would vote for Kahana, whilst 42% support his views. In other words: Kahana's approach had a considerable support even among young people who intended to vote for other lists.

These, in broad outline are, the two difficult issues that bring us to the heart of the subject with which we are concerned: the educational problem.

Why did the educational system not deal with this issue for thirty years?

For over thirty years the educational system refrained from dealing comprehensively with the question: should we include in the educational process elements concerning Arab-Jewish relations in Israel and relations between Israel and her neighbours? References to these subjects were randomly scattered in some textbooks. But what characterized the educational process as a whole was that in twelve years of schooling - or fourteen, if we add the kindergarten years - these subjects were not part of the educational programmes.

There certainly were some teachers who, at their own initiative, raised in the class questions which concerend the Arab minority in Israel and Israeli-Arab relations. In 1979 a textbook entitled "The Arab-Israeli Conflict" was introduced in some secondary schools, as an optional subject for studies in civics towards the matriculation examination. However, the greater part of the system remained indifferent to Arab-Jewish relations.

It is difficult to answer the question why the educational system had never examined the question comprehensively prior to the early eighties. This may be partly explained by the fact that for most of this period - or at least until the mid-seventies - we still lived in almost total conflict with our neighbours. We have already mentioned that total conflict is easier to comprehend than the complex and ambiguous situation in which we live today. Since the view prevailing in past decades was relatively simple and uncomplex, there was perhaps little to teach: it was an almost generally accepted view that all Arabs were enemies who wanted to destroy us. Possibly it seemed that there was little to be taught.

Teaching becomes necessary when a certain differentiation must be acquired. When all Arabs - or their overwhelming majority - are perceived as enemies, there is no need for any differentiation. There might, however, be a need for indoctrination: education of the young to understand the aims of the Zionist endeavour, why we established a State, how the conflict between the two peoples arose, and how it was conducted. At certain periods, and mainly after the Yom-Kippur-War, anxiety was expressed that the young generation might lose its Zionist faith and that it was ignorant of the history of the conflict. This was the reason for the establishment, in those years, of Institutes for Zionist Education, which were to clarify Jewish and Zionist values in secondary school classes, and for the preparation of the textbook on "the Israeli-Arab Conflict". Today we may doubt whether at that time the belief of young people in "our right to the land" had indeed weakened, and whether the anxieties about youth attitudes on that

issue were not somewhat exaggerated.* Be that as it may, Zionist education strengthened the belief in our right.

As for the study of the history of sixty years of the conflict (1917-1977), it encouraged the conviction that the Jewish side had always been prepared to negotiate a compromise with the Arabs, who rejected all proposals, whether suggested by other states and international organizations or directly by the Zionist organizations and later by Israel. As the Arab side persisted in its refusal to negotiate with Israel and to accept its existence, both educational elements - the Zionist one and the conflict one - complemented each other to a considerable degree.

During the past decade new questions arose on two levels: on the external one - as a result of the development of mutual relations between Israel and some of her neighbours, and especially since the Peace Treaty with Egypt; and on the internal one - as the Arabs in Israel emerged from the largely passive role they had occupied, during the first two decades of Israel, and started to struggle for their civic rights, a struggle that found its first symbolic expression in March 1976, with "the Day of the Land." The issue of mutual relations in a Jewish State, between a Jewish majority and an Arab minority, gradually became one of the central problems concerning the future identity of Israel. A Jewish State, based in, accordance with the Declaration of Independence, on civic equality, is one interpretation of Jewish identity; whereas a State in which the Jewish citizens enjoy

* In 1974 the Institute for Applied Social Research prepared, at the request of the Ministry of Education, a comprehensive survey on youth attitudes. The findings of the survey contained little that could support anxiety as to the sense of national identification of young people. However, in retrospect, it appears strange that the survey tried to examine in great detail the attitudes of the young people with regard to aspects of Judaism and Zionism, but no attempt was made to discover attitudes on the subjects of democratic values and democratic behaviour.

superior privileges over a weaker minority - expresses thereby an entirely different sort of Judaism.

An Initiative for a Comprehensive Programme

In the years 1977-1980 the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute conducted a project concerning the Jewish identity of Israel. One of our principal conclusions was that the relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority was one of the three or four critical issues for the future identity of Israel. The Institute began its involvement with this issue in 1980, when we held a conference under the heading "Every Sixth Israeli - the relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel." A year later, a book was published under this title. At the same time we commissioned the Dahaf Public Opinion institute, under the direction of Mrs. Mina Tsemach, to prepare a survey on attitudes of the Jewish majority towards the Arab minority. The survey (1980) revealed that the Jewish public was divided into three groups: the moderates, whose attitude to the Arab citizens of Israel was principally egalitarian - they constituted about 15%; the extremists whose attitude to the Arabs in Israel was principally racist and intolerant - these likewise made up some 15%; and between these two, a group constituting approximately 70%, who can be called ambivalent: those having mixed stereotypes of the Arabs - both positive and negative - and whose views were also inconsistent; on the one hand they were in favour of equal rights for minorities all over the world, and on the other they were afraid of and even antagonistic to the application of this principle to the Arab minority in Israel. This division into three groups was to appear again in later surveys, in which the proportions of the groups would be changing; but the third group always remained the largest.

In 1981 the VLJI initiated discussions on the educational dimension of Arab-Jewish relations. A number of institutions were already active in this sphere - among these Givat Haviva, the School for Peace at Neve Shalom, Beith Hagefen in Haifa and the Interns of

Peace. All these organizations were mainly involved in organizing meetings between Jewish and Arab pupils, as a principal educational effort. Each of these meetings lasted from one to three days, and it seems to have been the main educational activity on Jewish-Arab relations at that time. The number of Jewish and Arab participants in these meetings was probably no more than two thousand annually - out of over one million pupils in the educational system in Israel. (Even today the number of participants in such meetings is not significantly larger). In contrast to these small islands of well meaning activity, resulting from local initiatives, the Ministry of Education itself had no programme of its own on how to cope with this crucial problem. The textbook on "The Arab-Israeli Conflict," which was introduced into some secondary schools in 1979 became outdated as a result of the establishment of peace with Egypt. In any case, it probably never reached more than one quarter of all secondary school pupils. Although the subject "Relations between the majority and the minority in Israel" did appear on the list of scheduled programmes in civics, which the Curricula Department intended to develop, it had been shelved for several years.

The question we discussed with officials at the Ministry of Education, at that time, was as follows. An Israeli pupil was likely to study for twelve years, without devoting a single hour to the issue of relations between the majority and the minority in Israel and between Israel and her Arab neighbour. If a subject was not taught, this possibly implied that it was unimportant, or that it could be ignored. Was this the Ministry's intention?

At the end of 1981, the Chairman of the Pedagogic Council, Mr. David Pour, appointed a Commission of about a dozen members, Jews and Arabs, most of whom were officials of the Ministry and others representing several bodies, including the VLJI. The Commission was headed by the Deputy Director General, Mr. Arie Shoval. The Commission held its sessions for more than one year. In the summer of 1983 it presented to the Pedagogic Council a Report, which the Council

endorsed in September 1983, subsequently publishing it as Guidelines on Education for Coexistence.

On February 1, 1984 the Director General of the Ministry of Education, Mr. Eliezer Shmueli, issued a Circular on Education for Coexistence, summarizing the guidelines published by the Shoval Committee. Concurrently to these activities, the Director General of the Ministry of Education requested the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, to accept the task of helping the Ministry implement the programme. Since 1983, in coordination with the Ministry of Education, the VLIJ has become the centre of a whole range of educational activities, aiming gradually to implement the guidelines of the programme.

The Guidelines for the Comprehensive Programme

The first question is: Why should it be necessary to educate on these issues? The answer is that this is above all an existential need. Arabs will always be part of Israeli society, and our neighbours across the borders will always be Arabs. In popular terms: this is the neighborhood, in the world, in which we live, and these are our neighbours. Hence, it is inconceivable that a young generation will grow up who are almost completely ignorant about their neighbours. A generation growing up in ignorance will act towards their Arab neighbours on the basis of prejudices only, thereby compounding the difficulties of an already complex reality. Hence the need for an education seeking to provide the next generation with essential concepts that will enable them to cope better with a reality of which they are part.

The next question is: What will be the aims of education in these fields? The Guidelines outlined three basic directions:

* To educate for relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel on the basis of civic equality. We regard equal rights for all citizens as one of the deep values of Israel since its establishment. This

principle is also repeated in the Basic Guidelines of all Israeli Governments in the past decade, including the Likud Governments and present the Government of National Unity. We consider this principle as one on which there exist an almost complete parliamentary consensus.* This essential principle of democracy converges with the ancient Jewish code of one law for all - the Jew and the non-Jew.

* To educate on how to live in Israel as a multicultural society, in which no culture is superior or inferior. This aim extends farther than Arab-Jewish relations alone. Among Jews as well as among Arabs, there exist several cultures. In a world constantly becoming smaller, the intercultural encounter is becoming an integral part of everyday life. People from different urban and rural communities, orthodox and secular, of different faiths, and of different nationalities, are daily coming into contact with one another with increasing frequency. Clearly, one of the skills which future generations must develop is that of dialogue with members of other cultures, on a basis of mutual respect.

Of course, there is an implicit difficulty in this proposition of mutual respect among cultures. Most cultures were originally ethnocentric, believing in their own cultural supremacy in the world, and looking down upon other cultures as being inferior, barbarian, primitive or simply "goyim". Almost to this day, peoples of most cultures believes that they are "a Chosen People" and that all other people are somewhat less civilized. The fact that we Jews have appropriated this title explicitly for ourselves does not diminish the

* Except for Kahana's "Kach" movement, whose aim is to expel the Arabs from Israel and to a certain extent also the Tehiya Movement, which would grant equal rights to the Arabs, on condition that they serve in the army.

intensity of the self-regard of other peoples, who for centuries have - firmly believed that they and nobody else are the world centre of civilization. Education to live in a multicultural society - and in a multicultural world - must therefore cope with tensions between the ethnocentric view - which is common to most cultures - and the need to develop a new respect for other cultures as they are.

* To educate on relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours as a pluralistic experience and not one confined only to conflict. The Ministry of Education has proposed that the term "the Arab-Israeli conflict" should be replaced as a central subject of study by the term "the relations between Israel and her neighbours" or "Arab Israeli relations." The term "conflict" indicates a single content for all relations between Israel and the Arabs. On the other hand, the term "relations" comprises all the possibilities - from relations of peace and civic equality to conflict and war, together with a dynamic perception of possible change from one situation into another.

Each of the three principal goals is difficult enough to attain by itself. They are, of course, interrelated. One cannot deal with mutual relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel separately from the relations between Israel and her neighbours. And it is impossible to educate for civic equality and pluralistic relations with neighbouring societies, without complementing it with mutual respect between cultures.

How, then, can we achieve three particularly difficult aims, on the road to which we have to cope with a complex reality, as well as with prejudices and deep anxieties? Such goals cannot be reached through a single programme. Therefore the Guidelines specify that education in these subjects must become an integral part of the process of education, from kindergarten to university.

At each of these stages, at the pre-school age, in the elementary school and at the intermediate and secondary levels, the pupil should encounter elements relevant to the three goals. This will be

implemented by weaving the three subjects into different fields of study, such as conversations of the kindergarten teacher with the children and stories she will read to them; in elementary schools geography lessons on neighbouring Arab and Jewish communities; multicultural themes in the intermediate studies; in secondary schools programmes in civics - on the relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority and on the relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours.

During the first two years of activities of the Van Leer Institute in this field, we have advanced in four main areas:

* The first is the gradual development of a curricula, with the intent of eventually achieving a continuity of programmes to be integrated into the educational process, from kindergarten to university.

* The second is the development of frameworks of teacher training in this new educational field.

* The third is the preparation of a TV Series designed for the whole family, on mutual relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel.

* And the fourth is the encouragement of writers of children's literature to write stories and books relating to our three principal themes.

From the very beginning we assumed that, as is true for every comprehensive programme in education, this one too would require several years to be completed. The optimists said five years, the pessimists - at least eight. We are therefore still at an early stage, the road, and a considerable part of our work still consists of learning and re-learning as we progress. What, then, have we achieved, and what do we still have to attain, after two years' work? And what are the major problems we still encounter?

Curricular Programmes

Secondary education. In this field we have progressed farther than on the other levels. These are the programmes we have developed so far:

- The Arab citizens of Israel. This is an optional programme for the matriculation examinations in civics, developed by the VLJI in cooperation with the Curricula Department in the Ministry of Education. Its main concerns are: becoming acquainted with Arab society in Israel and learning to cope with the principal dilemmas of the relationship between Arabs and Jews. The programme was experimentally introduced into schools for the first time in 1982, accompanied by an evaluation process, resulting in a revised edition published in 1984.

- "At a Crossroads". This is a programme of informal education (sessions with the class teacher, group discussions), parallel to "The Arab citizens of Israel". The programme was prepared by the Institute for Coexistence together with the VLJI. Its advantages are that it comprises a great number of modular activities which a teacher can apply in a flexible way. This programme is in its first year, still at the experimental phase.

- Israel and her neighbours. This is an experimental edition, prepared by the VLJI, of a Reader, which will be introduced into a number of schools during 1986. The subject is Arab-Israeli relations as a pluralistic experience. The Reader consists of chapters dealing with the following issues: the Middle East as a regional system, Israel and Egypt, Israel and Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians, Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon. Each chapter refers to the historical, strategic, political and economic dimensions. The complexity of the programme poses a certain challenge to the teacher, and at the time of writing we still await the results of the experiment.

- "A place on the earth". This is a Reader of Hebrew translations of stories by Egyptian, Palestinian, Lebanese, and other Arab authors. The Reader was prepared by the VLJI, and the selection of the stories was made jointly with the Curricula Department of the Ministry of Education. The Reader is intended to serve as a experiential tool for understanding different cultures of Arab societies, apart from the dimension of conflict with Israel (of which the pupils are anyway aware). The stories in the Reader are on subjects such as: family life, the status of women, tensions between town and village, the role of religion, tradition and modernity. This Reader too will be introduced experimentally into school's in 1986.

- "The educational encounter". This guide, published by the VLJI together with the School for Peace at Neve Shalom, deals with the educational process involved in the organization of meetings between Arab and Jewish pupils. The process has three stages: the preparation of the class before the meeting, the structure of the meeting itself (which starts with personal acquaintance and eventually moves to discussion of political issues), and follow-up activities, after the meeting. This is the only publication in Israel, which deals with the didactics of such meetings. As far as we know, most institutions in the country, which hold such meetings, make use of it.

- "Beloved is the man created in the image of God". This programme was developed by the "B'enei Akiva" religious youth movement, together with the Department for Religious Studies at the Ministry of Education. It is concerned with the attitude of Judaism towards minority groups.

The Intermediate Level. For this level there exists so far only one experimental programme, called "Neighbours," prepared by Interfaith Committee in Jerusalem. The programme, prepared in concert with the Curricula Department, is being tried out in a number of schools. It consists of teaching modules which can be applied singly and jointly.

Elementary Education. At this stage only two programmes are being developed:

- A collection of Hebrew stories on relations between Arabs and Jews. The intention is for the stories to provide the pupils with an experiential element, which will facilitate discussion of ideas and feelings associated with the stories. The programme was developed jointly by the VLJI and the Curricula Department.

- Acquaintance with neighbouring communities (geography programme). The programme seeks to promote mutual acquaintance between Jewish and Arab neighbouring communities. A model of this programme is being developed experimentally in the Western Galilee, by a team of Jewish and Arab educators. This is a joint programme of the VLJI and the Curricula Department.

The brochure "What answers?" In addition to the teaching programmes, the VLJI prepared an 80-page brochure providing teachers with answers to questions on Arab-Jewish relations which often recur in classes. We received more than one hundred replies and comments from schools and teachers, to the experimental edition of the pamphlet. These helped us produce the present edition, to which we gave a wide distribution throughout the educational system. The booklet deals with problems such as: What should be our attitude to the Arabs? Is Israel capable of defending herself? Is the peace with Egypt genuine? Facts about the Arabs in Israel; how should we react to the recent wave of terrorist violence? This booklet is not a teaching programme. The need for it arises from a situation, in which many teachers face such questions in class unexpectedly, without prior preparation.

What have we not yet achieved in the field of curricula?

- We are still far from completing the continuity of curricula from kindergarten to university. To achieve this we shall require at least another two to three more years.

- In particular we should mention gaps in the following areas:

* As yet we lack materials for kindergarten, elementary and intermediate levels.

- * The religious school system is still reluctant to accept the new curricula and to adapt them to its special requirements.
- * Progress in the preparation of parallel curricula in Arabic, for use in Israeli Arab schools, is still very slow. Probably only in 1986 shall we complete the first experimental programme in civics, on Arab-Jewish relations. The programme is at present being prepared at the Arab-Jewish Centre at Haifa University, in cooperation with the VLJI and the Curricula Department.
- * We have not yet developed curricula for special pupil populations, whom we define as being more resistant to our subject than the Israeli average. We are only making our first steps in this area.
Beyond the specific programmes already developed and which will eventually be developed, we face yet another problem: By which method should the subject of Jewish-Arab relations be incorporated into existing curricula - such as the study of Judaism, history and geography.

Teacher Training

Before they enter the classroom, a considerable effort must be invested in the preparation of teachers for education in these themes.

We can distinguish between three groups of teachers:

- * A minority (comprising of several thousands) who express motivation to cope with these subjects, especially in response to the growth of support for Meir Kahana's views amongst pupils;
- * A group which probably constitutes the majority of teachers (comprising of several tens of thousand) who are ambivalent about this subject and therefore reluctant to face this difficult problem in class;

- * And a third group of teachers (to which also thousands belong) who oppose the introduction of the subject into school, and who express, in the teachers' common rooms and even in front of the pupils, their support of racist attitudes approaching, or even identical with those of Kahana's Kach movement.

So far, most of the teacher training has been involved the first group. Most of this effort has been initiated by the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and other organizations outside the Ministry of Education. The initiative of the Ministry itself was quite limited, and the Teacher Training Department of the Ministry has, at least during the first two years of the programme, not been particularly enthusiastic about starting such programmes of its own.

Several frameworks of teacher training have been developed so far:

- Seminars for becoming acquainted with curricular programmes.

Generally these last one or two days, dedicated to a specific programme, such as the curriculum "The Arab Citizens of Israel", in which about one thousand teachers have participated. It remains still uncertain how many of these teachers do actually introduce the curriculum into their classes. We are these days conducting a survey to clarify this question.

- Annual extension studies for secondary school teachers.

In 1984/85 the School of Education at the University of Tel Aviv held a course for teachers, who devoted one day each week throughout the academic year to this subject. Some sixty Jewish and Arab teachers took part in this programme which provided them with some basic knowledge and didactic elements on how to cope with Arab-Jewish relations in school. The programme was successful on two levels. First, it provided the teachers with information and certain skills. Secondly, personal and professional contacts between the Jewish and Arab teachers to developed and also between their schools. In view of the success of this model, similar courses have been introduced this

year in the Schools of Education at the Universities of Jerusalem and Haifa, in addition to the course in Tel Aviv.

- Introduction of the Arab-Jewish subject into training programmes for teachers and school principals.

In the School of Education at Haifa University all student teachers, Jewish and Arab, are required since 1984/85, to take a course in this subject each year. The course, of two hours a week, consists mainly of workshops for the clarification of mutual attitudes and of teaching methods in class. As from 1985/86, the Haifa School of Education will include this chapter also in its annual course for school principals (both Arab and Jewish). A number of teacher colleges have likewise begun to include the subject in their curricula, among these are the Yellin College in Jerusalem, the Kibbutzim Seminar in Tel Aviv and the Oranim College.

- Structured meeting between Jewish and Arab teachers. The VLJI has accorded a priority to structured meetings between Jewish and Arab teachers over meetings between Arab and Jewish classes. The reason is that, in view of the cost of such meetings, the investment in teachers' meetings is more productive than meetings between pupils. In the summer of 1985 we tried out three structured meetings of Jewish with Arab teachers. Each meeting was attended by some thirty teachers, one half of them Jews, the other half Arabs. Each lasted four consecutive days and was held at a guest house out of town. The meeting consisted of two parallel processes: one of becoming acquainted with each other ("Who am I?"), and a process of discussing together a common professional problems. Each meeting focused on one such problem: the preparation of a geography curriculum on neighbouring Jewish and Arab communities, acquiring the "Magic Circle" method (an American method for developing self-expression and awareness of others); and the teaching of civics. There have been followup activities for each meeting.

For the majority of their participants these meetings were a new existential framework, within which Jewish and Arab teachers gathered

for the first time, on an equal basis, to deal with a common professional problem. Our preliminary evaluation is that this intensive process is perhaps the most effective framework for working with teachers. Through it, in a few days, certain achievements can be reached in the cognitive and the emotional, while practical results were derived through followup activity in schools and classrooms. We plan to hold at least fifteen more such meetings, during 1986, eventually hoping to reach hundreds of teachers each year.

- In-school seminars for teachers. Since 1985 we have been encouraging schools to form teams of teachers, who meet for intensive seminars on this subject. A growing number of schools are requesting this kind of training.

- Courses for youth leaders. Since 1985 the VLJI has been encouraging youth movements to organize seminars for their youth leaders on Arab-Jewish relations, helping them with basic knowledge and didactics in this field.

What have we not yet achieved in the training of teacher students and of teachers? The problems we face concern both the scope and the quality of our activities.

As regards scope, despite the evident increase in activities of several types, probably no more than two or three per cent of all teachers in Israel have so far participated in any type of training activity on Arab-Jewish relations.

The broadening and deepening of teacher training depend on the availability of additional resources and on the Ministry of Education granting priority to this effort. There are some indications that the Ministry may indeed move in that direction during 1986.

An even more difficult question concerns the quality, or depth, of training activities. The measure of success is the extent to which teachers are subsequently prepared to initiate educational activities

on this subject in school and class, and the effect of such work among the pupils.

The essential difficulty lies in the teachers' own psychological makeup. In one of the courses, after a lecture on the outlines of education for coexistence, a senior teacher stood up and asked the following question: "My family has lived in this country for five generations. Members of my family have been slaughtered by Arabs in the twenties and thirties. Relatives of mine were killed in the wars of the Arabs against Israel. Tell me how, after all this, do I change myself?" One can respect the candor of this question, but one may also wonder whether this is not also a protestation: "After all this experience, I am not prepared to change my mind."

Even teachers who come to the courses out of an inner conviction, are also still prone to uncertainties as to how to cope with this subject in class. Daily reality does not make their task any easier. Each terrorist activity, conducted against Jews, becomes a kind of symbol negating the aims of our educational programme, a symbol confirming for many that in reality there is nothing but conflict, violence and the impossibility of developing any trust.

One of the most difficult question is: how to work with teachers (and how will they work subsequently with their pupils) on the complex problem of fears - prejudices - and behavioural values? The question is still new to all of us, and we have as yet no well tested answers. At this initial stage it seems to us that where fears are concerned, we should learn to focus them, rather than leave them projected over the entire Arab population. As regards prejudices - education should lead to differentiation, i.e. dismantling of negative stereotypes through learning to differentiate among different groups and among different individuals; for instance - between the few individuals who commit murder and the majority who do not, many of whom are probably critical of such actions. With regard to values - we expect the teacher not be neutral, but to represent a system of firm values which

differentiate between solutions which are acceptable and unacceptable.

Another story illustrates this point. At the end of an annual course on Arab-jewish relations a teacher said: "What I learned during this year is that the matter is very complicated and that there are many possible solutions. The only thing I can do is to present my class with all the possible solutions." Initially, it seems that the teacher is right; for surely on a deeply controversial political issue teaching should not be confined to a single solution. Yet we believe that the teacher, when discussing with the class alternative solutions, should examine them in the light of firm values, such as the principle of civic equality. A teacher who remains value neutral implicitly creates a situation where any solution may appear to be legitimate.

An Educational Television Series

At the initiative of the VLJI, Educational TV is preparing a regular series, for families, on relations between Arabs and Jews. This should be a bi-lingual series, appealing in form and content to the widest possible public, both Jewish and Arab.

The planning of the series has raised many hard questions. The principal dilemma is how to produce a programme that aims to attract the widest possible public (and therefore should be of a popular character), and yet would implicitly transmit the educational message regarding differentiation, dismantling of prejudices, dissipating fears, and respecting the different person and his culture.

A TV series is important to us for several reasons. Primarily, because it should reach a wide public. Secondly, because we hope the series will establish and legitimize an existential framework where Jews and Arabs meet on an equal basis, become acquainted with each other, and clarify different life problems (not only such as deal with the relations between the two peoples); a programme in which both sides treat each other with respect - and humour. Thirdly, the

series, which we hope will appeal to the entire family, should reinforce at home what pupils learn in school.

Educational TV is still seeking a successful formula for the production of the series. If such a formula is found, broadcasting of the series will probably start sometime during year 1986.

Literature for young people

It is a common experience in education that literature may substantiate for pupils experiences in a way which purely academic learning does not usually achieve. This is because literature usually deals with specific people and their individual experiences, whereas academic writing usually deals with generalizations and abstract concepts. In the curriculum on "The Arab citizens in Israel" we included several literary, or quasi-literary pieces, in the form of personal testimonies, which express the experiences of Israeli Arabs in personal terms. Even pupils with radical nationalistic attitudes admitted that on reading those pieces they had become aware of human dimensions of which they had hitherto been ignorant.

When we sought stories on interaction between Jews and Arabs, for different age groups, we discovered that most of these had been written before Israel was established or during its first decade. The reality with which these stories deal is in many respects quite different from the present situation. In many of those stories the Arabs - as well as the Jews - are mostly stereotypes. Such stories cannot fulfil the educational aims which we have set for our programme. The VLJI seeks, therefore, to encourage Jewish and Arab authors to write books and stories, for young people, humanizing the interaction between the two people (even in conflict situations).

The first book written as a result of this initiative is "Nadia" by Mrs. Galila Ron-Feder, a best selling author of books for adolescents. The story concerns a fourteen year-old Israeli-Arab girl who attends a Jewish boarding school. Young people and adults (Arab and Jewish) who have read the book reacted to it in different ways,

ranging from empathy with the girl to criticism of her behaviour in different circumstances. The book can serve to initiate discussion in class, and a teacher's guide for that purpose is being developed.

At the initiative of the "Aba Productions Company," a film based on the book is being produced. It will probably be ready for showing early in 1986. Almost certainly the film can also serve as educational material in schools.

Other authors have undertaken to write for different age groups, from early childhood to adolescence. During 1986 several more books and stories in our fields of interest will be published.

The first two years: A summing up and evaluation

A provisional report must be somewhat unsatisfactory. It outlines the beginnings of a road, without making it possible as yet to evaluate the results, not even of specific projects. Two years are too brief a period for a solid assessment. Nevertheless, we shall try sum up briefly what we consider the principal achievements, as well as the principal problems, of the Comprehensive Programme as a whole.

The first achievement is that the Ministry of Education has given official legitimization to the subject, thereby placing it on the agenda of the educational system, with a rather a high visibility. The Ministry has recently emphasized - at least on the level of intentions - that the subject has a high priority (democracy and coexistence are the central themes for education in 1986). Though this achievement is on the formal level, without it educational activities could not have been initiated on such a large scale, throughout Israel.

A parallel achievement is that, together with other organizations, we have established throughout Israel "islands of initiative," where relevant educational questions are asked, and where at least partial and provisional answers are given. The questions now asked throughout the system are such that have seldom been raised until recently.

A further achievement is that we have given within the framework of the programme, a priority to educational processes having a cumulative effect over one time events of limited influence. In the past there was a tendency, in education, to deal with Arab-Jewish relations by ritual and folkloristic activities. Today there is a growing number of educators who understand the complexity of the subject - the complexity of the different Jewish and the Arab experiences - and the immense complexity of the resulting interactions between the two people.

A core group is emerging of Jewish and Arab teachers, who have gone through different formative experiences in these subjects, and who presumably will be leaders of the comprehensive approach within the educational system.

A fourth achievement is that within the educational system existential frameworks are being formed, in which Jewish and Arab teachers, for the first time, share common experiences on an equal basis, both personally professionally. There is a good chance for an expansion of such activities. This evolving model of mutual relations between teachers may eventually serve as an example for other professional groups in Israel as well.

Compared to what existed a few years ago - or rather did not exist - we have succeeded in establishing a rather wide network of educational activities. But relatively to the urgency of the problem within Israeli society and among the young generation in particular, these achievements are still limited, both as regards their scope and their depth.

What, then, are the problems we face at the end of the first two years of the Comprehensive Programme? In this first summing up, we shall limit ourselves to an outline of several crucial problems, for which we still seek solutions:

The role of the Ministry of Education. By entrusting the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute with the implementation of the programme, the Ministry of Education has in effect externalized the responsibility

for coping with the problem. One can understand the different motives of the Ministry, with some political considerations that were initially involved, and the hope that a non-government body, with external sources of funding, would possibly be more flexible in its activities and achieve a greater momentum than any internal department of the Ministry, undertaking the same responsibility.

Nevertheless, it is an abnormal situation, where an outside organization is entrusted with the responsibility for the implementation of a programme which the senior direction of the Ministry acknowledge as having a priority. This might imply a certain ambivalence towards the subject on the part at least some of the senior staff of the Ministry, and an internal difficulty of changing priorities in the allocation of funds from the Ministry's own budget. During the first two years of the programme, the role of the VLJI was probably useful. But the success of the programme will eventually depend on whether the Ministry of Education and its departments will internalize the projects developed by the VLJI, including them within its own budget, and whether the VLJI will within the next few years be gradually relieved of this responsibility.

In the past, when other issues were accorded priority - for instance, the Heritage of Eastern Jewish communities, or Bar Mitzva Studies - the Ministry knew how to organize itself to attain these objectives and to earmark for them the necessary funds. It is true that during the past few years the Ministry has experienced the severest budget cuts it has ever known. Even so, sooner or later the Ministry will have to start the process of taking over the programme. Negotiations to this effect are currently taking place, and the initial indications are that the Ministry will probably establish a budget of its own for the subject and appoint an official to take charge of the implementation.

The relations with wider issues. The Arab-Jewish question is not an isolated educational issue. Many of its dimensions connect it with larger problems, among which the principal ones are:

- How should we educate to respect other persons, even when they are different from ourselves in identity and culture? This may be one of the central issues in education for democratic behaviour. In other words: only a person who respects other people, regardless of differences, can also respect them when they are Arabs (if he is Jewish) and when they are Jewish if he is an Arab.
- A parallel question is: How should we cope with the anxieties of teachers and pupils regarding the Arabs - and beyond this, the distrust among some of them, of Israeli democracy, a distrust in its capability to defend its citizens. Or in other words: lack of confidence on the part of adults and youths in our own ability to defend ourselves).
- This problem is associated with the question of Israel's Jewish identity. How does the Jewish majority behave toward the Arab minority, and what are the Jewish values on which this behaviour is based? Must we behave according to the ancient precept "The best of the Goyim should be killed"? Or according to the equally ancient precept "Beloved is man because he was created in God's image"? As long as the educators remain ambivalent on this problem, a double message will be conveyed to the class.
- Perhaps the most difficult problem is that of the future of the Administred Territories. How should an educator cope with questions concerning the equal rights of Israel's Arab citizens, while for nearly twenty years Israel has been ruling over one and a quarter million Palestinian Arabs in the Territories, on a non-egalitarian basis? Many of the adults among us still regard this situation as a temporary result of the Six-Day-War, pending a political settlement. But for the young people who have grown up in the past two decades, this is the only situation they know and they therefore regard it as permanent. Because this is the most controversial subject

in Israeli politics it is for an educator an extremely difficult issue. We can understand why many educators prefer to avoid this question altogether. But with equal justification we may ask: can an educator entirely ignore a problem which in the coming years will continue to be at the centre of public life in Israel and at the centre of our relations with our neighbours?

In our view, an educator who really wishes to cope with this problem should present the principal alternatives - that of annexation versus that of territorial compromise - simultaneously examining their advantages and their disadvantages, together with the prices attached to each solution, also in terms of moral values. The minimum that a teacher should aspire to achieve is to train his pupils to think about such problems in terms of alternative solutions, their price, in the words of the ancient Jewish precept - "hakol tsafuy veharashut netuna" - "all can be foreseen and choice is permitted".

- The problem of Arabic Studies. In this survey we have not touched the complex question of teaching the Arabic language in Jewish schools. We have refrained from this because of our assumption that acquiring a foreign language - especially with the stress on grammar - is not in itself necessarily the key to understanding and tolerating another people. Many pupils who have learned Arabic remain unchanged in their negative attitudes toward Arabs. (We may assume that this is the case too with at least some of the Arabic teachers themselves). At the same time it is certain that the study of a foreign language together with the study of the culture (in the anthropological, and not merely the folkloristic sense of the term) may help develop new attitudes towards another people. In other words: Let us not concentrate on the language alone,

but also on the people who speak it and on the ways in which they cope with human problems (in the family, the community, the society, the state).

Today about forty per cent of the Jewish pupils are learning colloquial Arabic in the middle years of their schooling. Most of them do not proceed subsequently to learn literary Arabic, and by the time they finish school the majority forget what they have learned. In this respect the investment in teaching colloquial Arabic appears to be probable waste of time and resources. As against this, the number of pupils who advance to learn Arabic of the media and literary Arabic, to the level of matriculation examinations, is less than two thousand a year.

In consultation with the IDF and with the VLJI, the Ministry of Education recently appointed a senior officer, on loan from the IDF, for the purpose of a thorough reorganization of the teaching of Arabic and its enhancement. It will be necessary to re-examine the premises on which the study of Arabic has been based until now, and proposals for several fundamental changes will probably be made. For example: it may be preferable to utilize the hours - apparently wasted in terms of achievements in learning spoken Arabic - for a study of Arab culture; or that the study of Arabic should be combined with a preliminary study of Arab culture. We may assume that during 1986 the first outline, of an overall change in this field will be implemented. But overall it will take many more years to achieve the necessary change of direction. We may eventually arrive at obligatory study of Arabic and Arab culture in all schools. There is some discussion at the Knesset about passing a law to that effect. But even with such a law it will still be a long way for its aim to be fully realized.

The problems of Arab education in Israel. It is a basic principle of the Comprehensive Programme that education on mutual relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel must take place simultaneously in the Jewish and the Arab schools. There exists, however, an evident asymmetry between the two, because Arab pupils are obliged to learn the Hebrew language, Hebrew literature and the history of the Jewish people, while most Jewish pupils do not study parallel Arab subjects. There does, nevertheless, exist a symmetry of non-action, in that most Arab and Jewish teachers have so far never engaged their classes with questions concerning the mutual relations between the two peoples, and especially between the Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel.

Just as in Jewish education an inquiry into this matter leads us in to wider questions than the Arab-Jewish issue so also among Arab educators difficult problems arise whenever mutual relations between the two people are discussed as an educational issue. The first question concerns the conditions of Arab education in Israel as compared with Jewish education. As long as Arab educators and pupils regard Arab education in Israel as disadvantaged in comparison with Jewish education, due to unequal allocation of resources, this creates a visible problem for the teaching of civic equality. It is true that Arab education in Israel is making steady progress and many Arab schools and their pupils show impressive achievements. It is also true that like Jewish citizens Arab citizens too do solve some of the educational problems within their own communities. For example, in several localities they have built new school premises, without recourse to government aid. Also, during the last few years the Ministry of Education has allocated to Arab education proportionately larger funds than in previous years. And yet the sense of inequality between the two systems still endures.

The second problem for Arab educators lies in two interrelated fields. One concerns the extent to which an Arab teacher feels free to talk about civic issues in class. And the second is the problem of the identity of Israel's Arab citizens. The Arab teacher in Israel is

under strong and unavoidable tension between two opposite forces. On the one hand, he must appear credible to his pupils and in his community, with regard to the way in which he presents the subjects of identity and of civic rights. On the other hand, Arab teachers fear that whatever they say may be reported detrimentally to the Shin Bet - Israel's internal security service - with subsequent risk to the tenure of their jobs. A teacher caught in this dilemma often adopts a neutral attitude, by avoiding altogether the teaching of significant civic issues - for fear of being rebuked by either side.

To this day the Israeli educational system is not quite certain how to deal with these tensions and how to strengthen the Arab teacher's willingness to deal fairly with the complex problems of mutual relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. In 1983 the Director General of the Ministry of Education published a Circular encouraging Arab teachers to take pride in teaching Arab national culture in their classes. We have already noted before that there exists sometimes a discrepancy between the Ministry's declared intentions and their application in the field. And thus there still remains the unresolved need to develop ways that will enable Arab teachers to deal with mutual relations and civic equality, while maintaining a fair balance between loyalty to Israel and to their Arab identity. This is certainly a difficult problem, but to evade it would mean that these issues would not be dealt by the schools, but by persons who do not support the principle of fair balance. One of the ways to progress in this matter is to set up joint workshops of Arab and Jewish educators, who will develop together methods of teaching civics, in both Arab and Jewish classes.

The interaction between the educational problem and political issues. Thus far we have discussed the educational problem concerning relations between Jews and Arabs as a separate issue, examining dilemmas as they arise mainly during and within the educational process. It is however impossible to conclude this summary, without

considering the educational issue within the wider framework of its interaction with the political system.

We often hear that the entire educational effort in this difficult area is of only marginal significance, compared to the influence of words and deeds in the political field. What is the effect of educators and textbooks compared with the pronouncements of leaders, whose message often contradicts the aims of education? What is the influence of curricula, trying to deal with the culture of neighbours, as a human culture, when almost daily there are acts of violence, committed for political reasons, by persons belonging to that other culture? What leaves a deeper emotional impact - war in Lebanon and a bombing raid on Tunis? Or peace with Egypt and implicit understandings with Jordan?

In a sense, the daily reality of Arab-Jewish relations, as presented by the media, also serves as a sort of school: not intentionally pedagogical, not systematic, not always consistent in its message. Yet this is a school whose messages are powerful, occasionally deeply disturbing and to many of us even threatening. What should be the educator's task in light of this reality? Should he give up his educational responsibility and leave it in the hands of political leaders? Or just to the contrary, because the political system is not by intention an educational system, and because it carries many contradictory messages, it is precisely the task of the educator to help next generation acquire some essential skills: in coping with this complex reality?

The educational system is not responsible for the solution of political problems. But it is responsible for the education of the next generation to a life in a complex, difficult relationship, in which not all problems can easily or quickly be solved. Therefore it is imperative for the teacher to deal in class with questions concerning the relations between Jews and Arabs, seeking to help his pupils develop the capacity for differentiation among different Arabs, different Arab States and Arab nations, and different interests, some

of them converging, some diverging; a differentiation without which we might all regress to total conflict with all our Arab neighbours. It is the educator's task to discuss these questions not only in general or historical terms, or as background material; but also with reference to daily events, seeking to place them in the wider framework of mutual relations, common and conflicting interests, alternative options and their prices. The problem is not only "how to react" to a terrorist attack, to King Hussein's speech, to a meeting between Israeli and Egyptian Ministers; but also how to place these events within a wider context, assign them a meaning that relates them to the principal frameworks and processes with which and within which we live. In other words: how to make of today's event a lesson for tomorrow.

The immense difficulty which the educational system faces is that in the course of one generation many teachers - perhaps the majority - have developed a neutral and defensive attitudes to the discussion of political issues in the class, including issues concerning the relations between Jews and Arabs. And indeed, how should the educator find the right balance between his own political convictions and his duty to present in class the wide range of different political views as they exist now in Israel? Educators in Israel - and especially those who train future teachers - will eventually have to cope with this dilemma.

To conclude, we return to an old educational truth, that as with any other educational project, the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Programme, on which we have been working for the past two years depends on the teachers' will that it should succeed. After two years we still remain without answers to two essential questions. Will a significantly large number of teachers in Israel dare to educate the young generation to the complex and changing relations with our Arab neighbours? And will the educational system be capable of translating its intentions into meaningful activities, in terms of budget and

programmes concerning curricula, teacher training and school activities? Ultimately, this is a question of leadership.



Who Opposes Treaty?

Much of the current opposition to the historic, long-awaited progress toward the reduction of nuclear arms comes from Jewish-American sources. Jewish-American columnists and others lambast Mikhail Gorbachev because he has not bowed to their demands, demonstrations and agitation to allow more Jews to leave Russia.

One can understand the desire of American Jews. But in this instance, as in many in the past, this good cause should not be placed above all other interests. It shouldn't be allowed to bar progress between the superpowers on reducing nuclear arms.

The best chance Washington has to influence domestic policies in Moscow is through a lessening of tension and the achieving of a better relationship. The encouraging process now in progress between President Reagan and Gorbachev offers realistic hope in this direction. Some progress has already been made.

Yet some would block any agreement between the superpowers until they get everything they demand. While all Americans favor free travel and emigration, it's nevertheless true that this condition doesn't exist in most of the other countries of the world. It has never existed in Russia, nor in most other countries.

Traditionally, arms agreements between nations don't include one leader demanding the other change his country's domestic policies.

But just as in dealings with Israel, Jewish-American interests, dominant in Congress and the media in this country, sometimes elevate their interests and desires above overrid-

ing national or international interests. While one can understand this, the potential cost could be considerable when dealing with such monumentally important issues as reducing nuclear arms.

There's much wrong in the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev is no saint. There is much the U.S. and Russia still disagree on. But anyone who can't see the improvement in the atmosphere, and in hopes for peace, since Gorbachev took the helm in Moscow, isn't trying.

The late Senator Henry Jackson, of Washington, influenced by the Jewish-American lobby, once succeeded in passing a bill barring U.S. grain sales to Russia until Moscow allowed more Jews to leave Russia.

The result: U.S. farmers were hard hit; the Russians greatly reduced their grain purchases in this country. They also reduced the emigration of Jews. Our farmers and exports have never completely recovered from this well-meaning folly.

Similarly, we can't allow the understandable desires of any special group in America today to sabotage the hopeful, crucially important nuclear arms reduction process now underway.

One hopes American Jews get their way with Moscow. Everyone in the U.S. government has been striving to help them for decades, constantly prodded. But the world can't condition progress on nuclear arms reduction on demanded changes in Soviet emigration policies. We must strive for both, in a realistic manner.

*dc Harris
Sklar
Tannenbaum
Atlanta Daily World
1/31/87*

March 12, 1987

Dear Marc,

The enclosed article has some relevance to today's New York Times report on antisemitism in Japan and might be of interest to you & your staff (especially pp. 11 ff.).

The article is scheduled to appear shortly in Elie Kedourie's Middle Eastern Studies.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Bucher

cc Tanenbaum

*cc Vida
Goldgar
file
Massarwa*

JAL

BERT WEILAND

135 Ashleigh Terrace Marietta, Georgia 30062

January 9, 1988

Ms. Sherry Frank
Southeast Durector
American Jewish Committee
3355 Lenox Road, Suite 880
Atlanta, GA 30326

Dear Sherry:


Rhoda and I are greatly disturbed after reading the article in todays, (Jan.9, 1988), Atlanta Journal-Constitution. We feel strongly that the letter writing campaign being promoted by one Jay Starkman, demanding the ouster of Consul Massarwa because he is an Arab, is absolutely demeaning to all Jews.

For the first time in our history Israel has given we Jews a "home address". It is and address proudly rooted in democracy and consideration of all citizens of Israel. If we, as Jews, were to refuse to accept any demonstrably loyal citizen of Israel because his lineage is Arab would be tantamount to agreeing that Jews should not be allowed to participate fully in the affairs of the United States of America because America is a "Christian Nation".

We had the privilege of hearing Mr. Massarwa speak at The Temple one evening shortly after he had assumed his position here in Atlanta. He is obviously a learned man and we felt some special pride in "our" Israel for having the courage of her conviction that a loyal Israeli, trained in the diplomatic corps, can be a good and useful representative of that nation be he Arab or Jew.

Sherry, we will appreciate it if you can forward either this letter or at least our very strong feelings on this matter to the proper authority. We feel ashamed of the Starkmans in our midst whose thinking remains ever small and narrowly constricted. They offer no constructive contribution to a better image of Israel.

Sincerely,



Bert Weiland

CSR

THE
COLLEGE OF
SAINT ROSE
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12203

1/9/88

Dear Rose,

Thank you for accepting to speak
at Saint Rose. I am anxious
to meet with you and hear your
speech.

Enclosed is some material on
my book and work. Please include
me on your mailing list.

Thank you for everything.

Yours in Shalom.

Dr. George P. Tsamir
Division of Int. Affairs
(518) 869 6790

Respectfully,

the fourth annual
ERASMUS LECTURE

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I will attend. Please send me one (1) ticket.

My guest and I will attend. Please send me two (2) tickets.

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Address _____

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Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger

Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger was in 1981 named Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith by Pope John Paul II. He is also President of the International Theological Commission and the Pontifical Biblical Commission.

Born in 1927, Joseph Ratzinger was ordained to the priesthood in 1951. After completing his doctoral work at the University of Munich, he taught theology at Freising, Bonn, Münster, Tübingen and, for eight years, at Regensburg. In 1977 he was named Archbishop of Munich, and in the same year was created Cardinal by Pope Paul VI. His many publications include *Introduction to Christianity, Dogma and Preaching, The God of Jesus Christ*, and, most recently, *Principles of Catholic Theology*.

11/27
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by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger

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in Conflict:
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PLACE
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Linking Christians and Muslims

By GEORGE E. IRANI

There are today more than one billion Muslims worldwide with three million in the United States. The turning point in Catholic-Islamic relations came, as it did with Judaism, with the Second Vatican Council; and, as with the followers of the Jewish faith, the Church began its dialogue with Muslims with an acknowledgment of past hostilities.

Regarding Islam, Vatican II declared that, "although in the course of the centuries, many quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Muslims, this most Sacred Synod urges all to forget the past and to strive sincerely for mutual understanding."

Since then, Christians and Muslims have been meeting and clarifying the common ground between the two world religions: morally, both are opposed to materialism; doctrinally, both believe in the same God, Creator of heaven and earth; both recognize Jesus as a great prophet, Mary as his Mother, and Joseph as Mary's esteemed husband (Issa, Maryam and Yussuf are common Muslim names).

A spectacular impetus was given to the dialogue in August, 1986 when Pope John Paul II visited Morocco. This was not the first time the pontiff had visited an Islamic country. He had been to Turkey (1979) and Pakistan (1981), and, subsequently, he would meet Muslims in Ghana and the Philippines. But Morocco was special and the King, who bears the title "Commander of the Faithful," was the ideal choice in the Pope's quest to improve the Church's relations with Islam.

Addressing a crowd of 80,000 young Muslims in Morocco, Pope John Paul stressed the religious and conciliatory nature of his visit. The Pope emphasized the dangers created by fundamentalism and highlighted the

Our Neighbor's Faith

By
George
Irani



commonalities of the two faiths.

Ten years ago, I left Lebanon for Europe and the United States. The Land of Cedars has been plagued by violence for the last 12 years. Before the war, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon had lived peacefully for more than a century. The Vatican has always perceived Lebanon to be the example of coexistence among the followers of different beliefs.

Many countries and societies are losing today their homogeneous character to become heterogeneous "melting pots." For instance, in countries like France, we have a new type of citizens who are French by birth but who also speak Arabic and are Muslims. These are the children of the North African immigrants who came to France in the colonial era.

The same occurred in Germany with the Turkish workers who came to seek jobs in Germany. There, too, a new type of citizen came out. He was not anymore Protestant or Catholic, but a German of the Muslim faith.

Both Pope Paul VI and John Paul II believed that Lebanon could be the ideal example of co-existence. Since 1975, the Vatican has relentlessly sought the help of

other powers to save Lebanon. By saving Lebanon as a whole, the Vatican hopes to save the Christians. So, dialogue between Christians and Muslims was and still is the major imperative in the Church's approach to the strife in Lebanon.

When I lived in Los Angeles, I participated in the Catholic-Muslim dialogue group sponsored by the Ecumenical and Inter-religious Affairs Commission of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles. A productive relationship was established between Catholics and Muslims, and, as a result, several joint projects were undertaken. For instance, in September, 1983 the two groups jointly issued a document on the significance of marriage in Islam and Roman Catholicism. More recently, Muslims and Catholics were discussing the impact of the U.S. Constitution on religious freedom in America.

It is my hope that such a dialogue can be established in Albany. Both communities have a lot to offer; and, this dialogue, if ever instituted, could serve as an excellent complement to the beautiful and exemplary relationship between the Diocese of Albany and the Jewish community.

Finally, as a Christian who came from the Middle East, a dialogue between Catholics and Muslims could be of great help. First, the fate of ten million Christians still living in the Middle East could become less precarious. Second, American Catholics could act as a credible bridge between Muslim and Jewish communities. Finally, the Children of Abraham could prove through dialogue what they failed to achieve through the sword.

(Editor's note: The author was born in Lebanon and teaches political science at the College of Saint Rose in Albany. He is the author of "The Papacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1962-1984.")

for the anecdotes, the close-up impressions of major U.S. political figures and for the story of O'Neill's colorful life, which, although much of it was spent in public office, is little known.

He does not let readers too far into his own house, commendably shielding his family, as he did throughout his career, from public attention. Novak, who perpetrated other "autobiographies" of Lee Iacocca and the Mayflower Madam, obviously does not press his subjects.

Happily for O'Neill, history will compare him most often with Ronald Reagan, another genial Irishman, with whom he fought incessantly from 1981 to 1986. Hardly a single Reagan decision — on the federal budget, taxes, arms control, the contras — went unchallenged by O'Neill.

The two men were as opposite as two human beings can be. Reagan was the dashing former Hollywood personality riding in from the West to clean up Washington, and O'Neill was caricatured as the big-city, bleeding heart, big-spending pol who was crippling the United States.

O'Neill won — although he was frequently handicapped by craven House members, whose institutional independence he had fought for in the 1970s, and which backfired in the 1980s when they voted with Reagan.

The strongest section of this light-hearted romp through politics in Congress and the Massachusetts legislature focuses on O'Neill's rise through the ranks. A Boston College graduate with an ability to make friends and keep them, O'Neill contends that he was ideally suited for the House.

O'Neill sounds most proud of his ability to get along with people whose politics he opposed. Sam Rayburn's introductory lesson to the freshman representative from Cambridge in 1952 was, "To get along, go along," and O'Neill rarely forgot it.

But to assert that loyalty is the best policy, as he often does here, is to encourage the benign conspiracies that greased the wheels for O'Neill and other urban Democratic machine politicians — the dead voters, straw candidates, hidden scandals, bribes and blackmail. They make colorful anecdotes, but poor

Jim McManus is NCR's Washington Bureau chief.

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Massachusetts or Nazi Germany? Any | O'Neill never forgot his working-class

Playing papal politics in the Middle East

The Papacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1962-1984

By George E. Irani
Notre Dame Press, 224 pages,
\$22.95

Reviewed by JOHN M. SWOMLEY

IN THE Middle East, Catholics are a minority in a region dominated by one Jewish and various Islamic states. The Vatican's interest, which is first and foremost the protection and welfare of Catholics, must take account of certain facts:

- The Second Vatican council's "Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions," which repudiates anti-Semitism and requires a new respect for and dialogue with Jews.

- The presence of substantial church possessions, which include land, church buildings, schools and monasteries in Arab lands, as well as institutions in Israel.

- The Vatican's location in Italy, where it must function in the context of Italian foreign policy and economic interests.

- The continuing state of war, refugee camps and national rivalries.

- The overwhelming presence of Muslims and therefore the necessity of dialogue.

- The existence of Israel, which is a "nation with a religious mission."

In this complex situation, George Irani has engaged in a pioneer study of papal goals and diplomacy, using Middle East resources because Vatican archives were not readily available. Irani, director of International Student Advisement at the University of Southern California and author of numerous articles on Middle East topics, has divided his book into

John Swomley is a professor emeritus of social ethics at St. Paul School of Theology in Kansas City, Mo.

three sections, the first of which is the "Israeli-Palestinian Dispute."

The Vatican, in order to maintain a Catholic presence in Israel, has to have a strong institutional connection with the Holy Land. It has, therefore, created two important institutions, Bethlehem University and the Pontifical Mission for Palestine. It has not, however, recognized Israel, other than to acknowledge its right to exist. As Irani notes, it must take into account the views held by its related churches in the Arab countries, the Greek Catholic, Maronite and Coptic, among others. It also does not want diplomatic relations so long as the war continues, the fate of the Palestinians has not been settled and the status of Jerusalem and the Holy Places is uncertain.

In the second section, Irani discusses the Holy Places and Jerusalem. He writes that the papacy proposed the internationalization of Jerusalem in order to guarantee access to the Holy Places. However, when it appeared that a majority of the members of the United Nations "were from the non-Catholic Third World," the papacy dropped that proposal and called, instead, "for a special status with international guarantees." Jewish leaders saw this as a rebuke to Israeli sovereignty. Israel's chief rabbi said, "We are astonished by the fact that the Vatican never issued the slightest protest when the Holy Places in Jerusalem were in Jordanian hands" and when they "refused access to Jews. . . ."

The third section discusses papal action with respect to the Lebanese war that began in 1975. The war is a result of a complex mixture of Christian militias, Syrian and Israeli forces, a large Palestinian presence, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the peace process, the shattering of Arab unity by the U.S. peace initiative that produced the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and the U.S. military intervention in support of Israel and Christian forces in Lebanon.

The Vatican's position was dictated by

its desire "to save Lebanon as a sovereign entity in order to save the Christians" as a major presence in Lebanon. The Christian groups were divided, and there were allegations "that the Holy See advised the Maronite monks to fund the training of the militias through the Phalangist party." The pope sent intermediaries to Lebanon to try to unite Christian groups, to try to prevent partition of Lebanon and to encourage Christian-Islamic coexistence.

Irani reports that the Vatican sought support from the American Catholic hierarchy. He quotes a Vatican official in Lebanon as saying in 1983 that a report issued by Cardinal Terence Cooke "had great influence in getting the State Department perspective on the right track. It shaped their policy to a great extent and the policy of Congress."

Although the Vatican may have succeeded in influencing the Reagan administration, it failed to unite the Christians in Lebanon or to preserve the Christian-Islamic dialogue. In fact, many Lebanese Christians felt drawn into alliance with Israel against the Palestinians and the Arab world.

One of the great tragedies of the Lebanese war was the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila by Christian militias with Israeli support. The pope publicly condemned the massacre, but very little appears in the book about the Vatican connection or lack of connection with the Christian militias and the Phalangists. Irani says that "the Holy See's apostolic nuncios were forced to play an active role in the internal political process" that led to "misunderstandings" with "some of the Lebanese protagonists," but this is not amplified.

This book provides an excellent insight into Vatican diplomacy, its idealism mingled with partisan interests, and its limitations as a religious force in the midst of political and military rivalries. ■

Professor: U.S. more aware of what is Arab reality

By Sharon Gazin
Knickerbocker News Education Writer

Until recently, terrorists, veiled women, oil-rich sheiks and camels were among the stereotypes Americans mentioned when questioned regarding their images of Arabs, a College of Saint Rose professor said.

Now, Americans are becoming more informed about events in the Middle East, according to George Irani, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the college in Albany.

The Lebanese-born Irani is the author of "The Papacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1962-1984."

In an interview, he said the tide of American public opinion began turning with the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and was reinforced by recent comments by Pope John Paul II that Palestinians are entitled to a homeland.

"The Pope stated in Miami (this fall) that as the Jews are entitled to have a homeland, so are the Palestinians," Irani said.

"The Catholic Church has become more and more aware of the question of stereotyping Arabs," Irani said.



Knickerbocker News/Roberta Smith

CENTER DIRECTOR — George Irani, a professor of the College of Saint Rose, heads its Middle East Studies center.

"To debase someone, you have to dehumanize him," Irani said, adding at one time, many Americans appeared

convinced that most Arabs were terrorists.

"The Israeli invasion of Lebanon changed some of that," he said.

"Americans watched the siege of Beirut, watched the military shooting civilians. It was a very aggressive war. People began to understand Israel is not a light unto nations."

Irani, who covered the Lebanon conflict as a journalist for an Italian television network, said Americans — particularly Roman Catholic bishops — have expressed concern for the more than 10 million Christians living in Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, Jordan and Syria.

Irani is the second director of the center, founded this year by Saint Rose professor Nabeel Khoury.

Activities at the center planned for 1988 include talks by a Lebanese ambassador and a Palestinian educator, and discussions of the Iran-Iraq War and religious fundamentalism in the Middle East. Rabbi Marc Tannenbaum will speak Jan. 22 at the college center.

Irani said Jews in the United States are beginning to realize that the number of Arabs living in Israel constitutes a demographic challenge to Israel's future as a Jewish state.

"It raises the whole threat of democracy or Jewishness," he said, adding that if Israel is a true democracy, Arabs must be allowed to vote and to hold seats in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament.

12/22/87 p. 4A

and Third World development in both the United States and the Arab world. In 1977, shortly after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem, Hagopian was one of several prominent Arab Americans invited to the White House by President Carter, who hoped to develop support among Arab Americans for the Sadat initiative. Two years later, she was chosen by UNESCO to develop a specialized guidance and counseling system for a Palestine Open University feasibility study. Planning for the Open University, which was going to be located in Beirut, ended in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon.

Changing Views on the Middle East

Hagopian thinks that the AAUG has modified its position on the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1970s, when, she says, "it argued in favor of a democratic, secular state for Jews and Palestinians, and for the Arab states too." But then, "reality hits you in the face," she says. "Both the Jews and the Palestinians need to go through a period of 'national identity,' when they can feel secure in their own nation. I would accept the two-state idea (a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza next to Israel) as the minimal solution to the Mideast conflict. Later, when things calm down, Israel, the Palestinian state, and the Arab states may all want to join together in a mutually beneficial economic federation."

AAUG members and other Arab Americans are not the only ones who appear to be re-evaluating their views, Hagopian says. Over the past 10 years there appears to have been a major transformation in how the dispute is viewed by some non-Arab Americans. "They're now more likely to favor a policy which recognizes Palestinian as well as Israeli national rights. And people in the peace movement are starting to realize that to be against nuclear war means dealing with the fact that Israel has a nuclear capability."

She's encouraged that individual American Jews and groups like New Jewish Agenda have been willing to criticize Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. "They have become a new Jewish conscience by returning to the liberal tradition of the Jewish people, who were in the forefront of the anti-war and the civil rights movements," she says.

Hagopian insists that Americans do not have to forget about Jewish suffering and the holocaust in order to bring the Palestinians into their consciousness. "We don't want to create hatred of 'the other'—of the Jews or the Israelis. It's time to promote a rational voice for sanity on the Middle East. We just can't go on with this historical cycle of destroying one group of people to right the wrongs committed against another."


Andrea Barron, a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at American University in Washington, DC, is a member of Washington Area Jews for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace (WAJIPP) and New Jewish Agenda.

Book Review

The Papacy in the Middle East

By George E. Irani. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986. 218 pp. \$22.95 (cloth).

Reviewed by Rosemary Radford Ruether.



The arcane language of Vatican pronouncements and the secrecy which surrounds their formulation discourages most Americans from seeking to understand Vatican diplomacy. Nevertheless, George Irani argues in his recent book on the subject, all who are concerned about justice in the Middle East may have an unexpected ally in the Vatican.

Irani focuses on three primary areas: Palestinian national rights and the state of Israel; Christian shrines in Jerusalem and the status of the city; and the Lebanese civil war. In each case, Irani demonstrates there is consistency in Vatican positions, but at the same time they have evolved over three decades of changing realities.

Vatican Reaches Out to Jews

During the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church attempted to make amends for past anti-Semitism by rejecting any Jewish collective responsibility for the death of Jesus. The Pope also appointed a Commission for Relations with Judaism to remove anti-Jewish references from Catholic liturgical and catechetical materials and to pursue on-going dialogue with Jewish clergy and laity. The present Pope John Paul II has also been particularly active in ecumenical outreach to Jews, visiting the death camps in Poland and the synagogue in the Jewish quarter in Rome. The Vatican's relationship to the state of Israel is, however, vastly complicated by sustained Jewish criticism of alleged papal passivity in the face of Nazi persecution of Jews before and during World War II. Recently Pope John Paul II was also strongly criticized by Jews for agreeing to meet with Austrian President Kurt Waldheim. Some Jewish spokesmen have proposed that the Pope make amends by extending Vatican recognition to the state of Israel.

From the Vatican point of view, this demand constitutes a highly inappropriate confusion of the Vatican's relationship to Judaism as a world religion and its relationship to Israel as a nation-state, which, by not defining its borders, has not complied with an elementary require-

ment for diplomatic recognition. The Vatican bristles at Zionist insistence that Jewish identity is, simultaneously, religious and national, and that the two cannot be separated.

Palestinian Rights Stressed

Irani outlines Vatican steps over the past 20 years, culminating in a declaration of support for Palestinian self-determination. The Vatican has set up Bethlehem University to help maintain an educated Palestinian community on the West Bank. It also established a Pontifical Commission for Palestine, which oversees humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. Pope John Paul II also met with chairman Yasser Arafat in September 1982, a meeting which in effect constituted recognition of the PLO as the national representative of the Palestinian people.

A second area of Vatican diplomacy—the status of Jerusalem and its Christian holy places—has become increasingly tied to the first issue of Palestinian national rights. In the 1940s, the Vatican maintained the view that, more than Jews, Muslims, or other Christians, Catholics had a primary right to the city and its shrines. This has changed to an ecumenical view that regards all three monotheistic religions as having equal rights. The focus has become the internationalization of the city, and international guarantees of the religious and civil rights of persons and institutions of all three faiths there. The Vatican has thus come to oppose any one religion, or a nation-state representing one religion, dominating the affairs of the city. Pope John Paul II in particular has stressed the idea of making Jerusalem an example of peaceful coexistence by all three faiths.

Vatican's Role As Peace Broker

Concerning the Lebanese civil war, the Vatican has three main goals: support for the Lebanese experiment as a model of Christian-Muslim coexistence; opposition to partition of Lebanon into separate Muslim and Christian states; and protection of the rights of Palestinian refugees. This has led to conflicts with Maronite Christians who had expected Vatican backing in Lebanon's civil war. The Vatican has strongly opposed the Maronite alliance with Israel, which it saw as harmful to Christian-Muslim relations throughout the Middle East.

Irani depicts the Vatican as an important player in Middle East politics, supporting the moderation and universal justice that must underlie Middle East peace. Irani, an advocate of secular, pluralistic systems in which will enable people of differing religious backgrounds to live together peacefully, suggests that the Vatican has become an effective ally in this quest.

Rosemary Radford Ruether is a professor at Garrett Theological Seminary and Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois.

Massarwa

Tanenbaum original PR

4

The Atlanta Journal WEEKEND The Atlanta Constitution

SATURDAY, JANUARY 9, 1988

A

Ouster of Israeli envoy in Atlanta sought

As an Arab, he should not hold the post, letters say

By Deborah Scroggins

Staff Writer

The never easy course of counseling moderation in the Middle East is turning into a high-wire balancing act for Atlanta's Israeli consul, Mohammed Khalid Massarwa. When appointed in February, he became the first Arab to head an Israeli diplomatic mission.

As news of rioting in Israel's occupied territories has engulfed the consulate, the 44-year-old former lawyer has become the target of an Atlanta letter-writing campaign seeking his removal because he is not Jewish.

"It's nothing personal against him," said Jay Starkman, the Atlanta accountant who has organized the "Massarwa Must Go" campaign. "We just think it is totally inappropriate for an Arab to be representing Israel."

Starkman said several hundred Orthodox and Conservative Jews have joined him in asking Jews around the world to inundate the

Israeli Embassy in Washington with mail denouncing Massarwa's appointment.

"That's the whole problem. It's never anything personal with these people," Massarwa said. "But Israel is a democracy, an absolute democracy, and that includes room for people with all kinds of ideas."

He said the violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip troubles him far more than the letter-writing campaign.

"We — well, I don't know why I say we — I have no part of that anymore. I am very sorry about the violence, about the teenagers throwing stones, and I wrote the foreign minister about that," he said, "because we must keep order and we must express our ideas in a peaceful way."

Yet Massarwa is optimistic about the outcome of the disturbances, which he hopes will show Israel, Palestinian leaders and Arab nations that they cannot delay in negotiating a solution for the governance of the occupied territories.

"Although the conflict continues between my state and my nation, someone must hold up the

light," Massarwa said. "All of us will destroy ourselves and our nations if we continue to swim with the stream of hatred and bloodshed and violence."

"I think it takes a kind of wisdom to swim against the stream," Massarwa said.

Representatives of the American Jewish Committee, the Atlanta Jewish Federation and other Jewish leaders said they like Massarwa and oppose his removal.

"I feel terrible for Massarwa," said Sherry Frank, Southeast director for the American Jewish Committee. "The Arabs must not know what to do with him, and a small group of Orthodox Jews doesn't know what to do with him either."

Massarwa admitted that the Arab community had received him with some consternation. He laughed as he told of his first meeting with a Palestinian in Atlanta.

"He just stared at me, he was in shock, 'How can this be?'" Massarwa recalled. "But then I asked him, 'Well, what would you rather have us do, live our own lives, on our own land in Israel, or become refugees in other Arab countries?'"

THE ATLANTA BLACK/JEWISH COALITION

Thursday, January 14, 1988

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(mfa Krosch)



Charles R. Crane's Crusade for the Arabs, 1919-39

"The

CHARLES R. CRANE

aptly nicknamed Harun al-Rashid,
affectionately"

-The Arab Awakening,George Antonius, 1938^{1/}


AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

Charles Crane* was the American symbol of friendship and support for the Arab cause in the Near East during the inter-war period. He achieved this status in 1919 as co-head of the Commission of Inquiry which President Wilson, while at the Paris Peace Conference, sent to the region in order directly to ascertain the political wishes of the former Turkish subjects.^{2/} The Commission strongly endorsed the Arab nationalist view that France should be kept out of the Levant, and that the Zionists should be curbed in Palestine.^{3/} Although its report was shelved and not made public, even unofficially,^{4/} until late 1922,^{5/} the very despatch of the Commission was seen by many as indicating American approval of the Arab struggle for self-determination. For example, soon after the completion of the Commission's work, Crane received a letter^{6/} from "the President of the Arabic Association and the Delegate of Palestine" which stated:

The Arab inhabitants of Syria and Palestine will never forget your kind deeds, for presenting their rights to the American nation and changing to good the general idea of the West concerning our cause....We are sure that you still are struggling for our cause.

Crane, indeed, continued "to struggle" for the Arab cause. As a private, independently wealthy citizen,^{7/} he cultivated his relations with the Arabs throughout the next two decades by sponsoring an active program of "practical philanthropy,"^{8/} whose most impressive result was the discovery of oil in eastern Arabia. With the advent of Hitlerian Germany, Crane, in what was to be a final burst of energy, worked in Europe and the Near East to organize a purposeful effort by the Vatican, the Arabs, and Germany to counter the "Jewish menace" to the Christian and Islamic worlds.^{9/} Despite his denial to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, he probably did finance arms purchases in 1938 by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who was then leading a revolt against British rule in Palestine.^{10/} Earlier, in 1922, when popular anti-French demonstrations erupted during Crane's visit to Damascus, he was accused by the French of provoking and financing revolt in Syria.^{11/}

Crane exercised an important influence on the personal attitudes toward the Middle East of many leading Americans, such as Barnard's Virginia Gildersleeve, who would take an important part in efforts of the 1940's to persuade the U.S. Government to favor Arab over Zionist goals in Palestine.^{12/}

Crane's focus on Arab affairs came relatively late in his remarkable career, which also concentrated, in its international aspects, on two other great branches of the human family, the Slavs and the Chinese.^{13/} President Wilson tried unsuccessfully for a full year, 1913-14, to convince him to go as U.S. Ambassador to Russia, which he had been visiting and studying for decades.^{14/} After the Bolsheviks came into power in November 1917, Crane played a key role in Wilson's fateful decision, of August 1918, to intervene in

Russia in order "to rescue" Czech troops there; it was he who introduced Thomas Masaryk to Colonel House and the President in June 1918, and who worked with that future President to overcome Wilson's hesitancies.^{15/} Masaryk's son, Jan, would write Crane on August 7, 1928, that the Masaryk family referred to him as the "godfather of Czechoslovakia."^{16/} Charles' son, Richard, was the first U.S. Minister to that country.

Crane was twice appointed U.S. Minister to China, whose interests he championed, particularly as against Japanese designs. The first appointment was in 1909, by William Howard Taft; however, that President recalled his outspoken Minister even before he could arrive at post.^{17/} Crane did succeed in serving as President Wilson's Minister in Peking, 1920-21; and, in 1931, he was officially appointed by the Chinese as "Honorary Adviser to the Nationalist Government."^{18/}

In domestic affairs, too, Crane was a familiar political and cultural figure at both the national and local levels. In addition to having been Woodrow Wilson's Deputy Finance Chairman for his two Presidential campaigns, he was Chairman of the Mayor of Chicago's Commission on Unemployment and served as an officer in both the Municipal Voters' League and Senator Robert LaFollette's National Progressive Republican League. Following the loss of close family in a movie house fire, Crane sponsored the Freeman Report, which led to the passage of the country's first theater fire laws at the turn of the century. Other noteworthy activities included: endowing a seminal, pioneering program of Russian studies at the University of Chicago; serving as a founding director of the Marine Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, and as a Trustee for the two American Protestant missionary colleges at Constantinople. He

received honorary doctorates from Harvard and Wisconsin. Among Crane's many, sustained friendships were, to limit the illustrative list to Americans: Henry Ford and George Westinghouse; Charles W. Eliot and A. Lawrence Lowell; John Dewey and Alexander G. Bell; Jane Addams and Lillian Wald; Norman Hapgood and Ida Tarbell; Louis D. Brandeis and Adolph Ochs. He was an honorary pallbearer at Woodrow Wilson's funeral.^{19/}

In sum, Charles Crane was a significant American figure, whose impact on his world has left a discernible legacy on our own. The purpose of the present paper is to provide a basis for systematic examination and evaluation of Crane's work, with particular reference to matters impinging on Near Eastern affairs.

II

When Crane returned to Damascus for a visit in 1922, he naturally received an enthusiastic reception by the local Arab leaders, who took the occasion to organize mass protests against France, which had forcibly occupied Syria in 1920.^{20/} Crane was swiftly and discreetly ushered out of the area. Shortly thereafter, he learned from a Cairo source that the French military authorities were accusing him of having provided funds to one of the leading Syrian nationalists, Shabandar, for use in financing the violent demonstrations; and, that there were reports, formally denied by the French, that he had been sentenced in absentia to twenty years' imprisonment.^{21/} The episode did not hurt his image in the Levant as a staunch defender of Arab rights.

It was during the course of this 1922 visit that Crane received

an invitation from Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, one of the sons of the leader of the Arab wartime rebellion against Turkey, King Hussein of the Hejaz, to visit his father^{22/} at Jiddah. This was accomplished in 1923, at which time Crane was shown Hussein's (doctored) version of his famous correspondence, in Arabic, with Sir Henry McMahon; at the time of the correspondence, 1915-16, McMahon was British High Commissioner in Egypt. This version had it that McMahon expressly included Palestine within the territory of the independent Arab state(s) which he said the British Government would support, if Hussein were to lead an effective revolt against the Ottoman Turks. Crane subsequently was to use this material to make the case in the United States that England had promised Palestine to the Arabs a full two years before the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917^{23/}. Also of interest is a letter he wrote Antonius on September 22, 1936:

I have just had a visit with one who knows Near Eastern affairs very well and also British Near Eastern politics. He says that the Foreign Office has no copy of the papers and promises sent to Hussein. I suppose the original has been stolen and probably every effort in the world will be made to get hold of Hussein's copy. This man confirmed Hussein's statement to me of the Government's effort, through Lawrence, to get back Hussein's papers....it is more important than ever that the photostatic copies be as widely and as wisely distributed as possible....

Of course, when Great Britain in 1939 finally did publish the actual correspondence, it was at variance with Hussein's version and was sufficiently ambiguous as to permit the English to contend that Palestine was, indeed, excluded from the independent Arab state(s) envisaged by McMahon^{24/}.

A final note on Crane's contacts with the Hussein family: as late as 1929, when he was over seventy years of age, Crane undertook what was, for a non-Arab, a near unprecedented, arduous overland trip

from Baghdad into the Wahabi desert to visit King Abdul Azis ibn-Saud. In Baghdad, Crane was the guest of honor of Iraq's King Faisal^{25/}, a friend since 1919 and another of King Hussein's sons. The Saudi and Hussein families were long bitter enemies, and ibn-Saud a few years earlier had succeeded in displacing Hussein from the Hejaz. During the course of his trip, while near the Kuwaiti border, Crane's party was attacked, evidently by an independent band of tribesmen, and his travelling companion, the Reverend Henry Bilkert, was shot dead; Crane himself escaped unhurt but cut short his trip and left the area. Soon thereafter, on February 20, 1929, he received a message from Ibn Abdul al Faisal expressing Saudi distress that, "the friend of the Arabs should have been attacked in Arabian lands" and blaming Iraq for having allowed the attack to occur.

III

Crane's personal, direct contacts with the leaders of the Yemen and Saudi Arabia began in the late 1920's, when neither was diplomatically recognized by the United States. In 1927, he served as "unofficial intermediary" for the U.S. representative at Aden, J. Leder Park, in an attempt to elicit from Yemen's Imman Yahya, a request for a treaty of friendship and commerce^{26/}. While Washington quickly squashed Park's initiative as premature^{27/}, Crane did develop a good relationship with the Imman and initiated a series of personally financed public works projects and minerals surveys^{28/}. In 1931, Crane personally met ibn-Saud, who accepted his offer to finance a survey for water resources^{29/}. Accordingly, K.S. Twitchell,

an American engineer who had been conducting the Crane-financed surveys in Yemen, was despatched to Saudi Arabia, where he soon pointed out to the King the likelihood that there were substantial oil deposits in eastern Arabia. Ibn-Saud authorized Twitchell to seek out commercial arrangements, as a direct result of which Ibn-Saud signed his first oil exploration contract, in May 1933, with Standard Oil of California. Impressively, Crane, while allowing the data collected at his expense to be used freely by Standard Oil and others, steadfastly declined lucrative "offers of participation" in the commercial arrangements they had with Saudi Arabia; he explained that his interests from the start were purely philanthropic and would remain that way. This led Twitchell, in his 1947 work, Saudi Arabia, to write his dedication as follows:

To the memory of CHARLES R. CRANE the great American whose practical philanthropy was the foundation of the present development of the kingdom of his esteemed friend, King Abdul Azis Ibn-Saud.

Crane's relations with both the Imam and the King enabled him to play a mediating role in the territorial clashes between the two which, in 1934, threatened to expand into full-scale war. His appeal to Arab solidarity apparently was of some influence in the successful de-fusing of the confrontation, as suggested by the substantive and appreciative report sent to Crane by the King on the details of his settlement with the Imam.^{30/}

Of course, the Palestinian problem figured importantly in the discussions Crane had with the Saudi king. During his March 1931 visit, with Antonius serving as interpreter and recorder, Crane stated that, "Russia was really in the grip of Jews and foreigners.... the King...added that he had realized for some time that the Jews were powerful in Russia."^{31/} In 1933, the King's Minister in Cairo

participated in a "Muslim Committee" that Crane was attempting to organize there with a view to its entering into formal discussions with the Vatican for the purpose of carrying out a program of "cooperative action...against the communistic, atheistic onslaught." ^{32/} Crane, in November 1933, advised his seven-man organizing group, as recorded by Antonius, that

The endeavor on the part of the Jews to return to Asia after an absence of nearly 2,000 years...was but another phase of an organized campaign against faith and religion....About a fortnight ago...he had a conversation with the Papal Secretary [Cardinal Pacelli, the future Pope Pius XII]. He found the latter very receptive and interested in the idea.... He [Cardinal Pacelli] went as far as to suggest that the Grand Mufti might meet the Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem and initiate conversations.

Antonius goes on to report that the Muslim representatives assured Crane that they would "appoint an authoritative committee to go into the matter and initiate conversations with the Catholic Church."

Following his return to Rome from Cairo, Crane held further meetings at the Vatican, where he had "a day with the Nuncio who was going down to Egypt, Palestine and countries nearby, and his instructions were to get in touch with this Muslim Committee and work out some practical methods of proceeding." ^{33/} There is no evidence in the material available to the present writer that this Muslim-Vatican dialogue ever actually got started as a direct consequence of Crane's efforts.

Crane met with Reich Chancellor Hitler in Berlin on October 6 as a preliminary step to his meetings in Rome and Cairo. The session was arranged for him by U.S. Ambassador William Dodd, a former Professor of History at the University of Chicago, pursuant to Crane's request contained in a letter of September 17:

I have important engagements in Rome the latter part of October with the highest Prelates there [on "the Jewish problem"] and incidental matters. Before going there I wish very much that I could have a heart to heart talk quietly with Mr. Hitler.

In a letter which apparently crossed with Crane's, Ambassador Dodd had written him on September 16^{34/} that,

When I have occasion to speak unofficially to eminent Germans, I have said very frankly that they had a serious problem but that they did not know how to solve it. The Jews had held a great many more of the key positions in Germany than their numbers or their talents entitled them to....

On November 5, 1933, Crane wrote Eswell that Dodd "arranged for me to have a full free talk with the Reichschancellor." Following his meeting with Hitler, Crane made highly complimentary remarks to the press about him, including that his "gestures and point blank statements remind me of Theodore Roosevelt."^{35/}

Crane would be a repeat guest of Dodd's at Berlin. For example, he wrote on June 18, 1934: "Dr. Dodd has asked me to come and stay with him...and has promised some good interviews." On July 24, 1935, he wrote Dodd: "I am especially indebted to you for the nice luncheon party and the cordial talk with Dr. Schacht....I think that Germany is now well around the corner with her morale higher than the morale of any other people in Europe." That Dodd had an extra-curricula interest in Crane's philanthropic activities is evident in a letter the Ambassador wrote him on September 19, 1935, asking on a private and confidential basis that he consider endowing a chair at the University of Virginia for the teaching of "objective" U.S. and world history.

IV

As in the case of Crane's discussions with ibn-Saud, his exchanges about Palestine with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, and other Arab leaders in the Levant, as recorded by Antonius, turned on the general agreement that there was, in 1931,

a real menace directed at Islam and Christianity, and that it was essential that the aims and motives of the Soviet leaders be made known and understood.... [Crane went on to say that] in the particular case of Palestine, this question took on a particular significance, because of the fact that the Jews who had designs on Palestine were closely in sympathy with the subversive aims of the Soviets.

In 1933, Crane told the Mufti that,

it was a matter of common knowledge (which the experience of Russia had amply demonstrated) that the political Jews everywhere aimed at the eventual destruction of religious life. The only Church in the West which seemed to him to be fully alive to that danger, and to possess the necessary powers and organization to deal with it, was the Catholic Church....

As late as July 20, 1938, when the Mufti was clandestinely leading an armed revolt against British rule in Palestine, Crane wrote Antonius: "I enclose a little check for the Grand Mufti which please give him to use as he thinks best." Despite this action, he would on October 6, 1938, write Mrs. Cordell Hull: "Please also tell Cordell that...my relations with [my Moslem friends] have been entirely peaceful and cultural (water works, bridges, roadways, etc.), and I have never spent a penny for any kind of military equipment." On the basis of this evidence alone, one would have to be skeptical about the truth of other denials by Crane that he financed illegal arms purchases - for the Syrian, Shabendar, in 1922, as noted above; and, for the anti-Bolshevik Cossack General, Kalidin, in 1917-18,

as was "the suspicion among American officials then serving in
Russia."^{36/}

V

The other side of Crane's Near East coin, and which gave his work in that region much of its context and energy, was his profound concern about the "Jewish menace" to the established, religious-based civilizations of the world, with the Anglo-Saxon people at the center.^{37/}

It is not a question of whether, but to what extent, Crane was actively engaged in the dissemination of antisemitic materials, generally of the kind most closely associated with the output of Tsarist Russia. Even prior to the period of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, when the production of these materials flowered with publication of the gross forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,^{38/} Crane is known to have distributed "Yiddish literature", as acknowledged by his friend and future Secretary of the Interior under Taft, Walter L. Fisher, who "greatly enjoyed" it. By 1910, Crane had latched on to the Protocol's core idea, that there was a millenia-old Jewish-Freemasonry conspiracy to dominate the world. This is brought out most clearly in a letter to him of August 27, 1910, from his good friend, the British writer and Ambassador, James Bryce, who was about to depart on a trip to Latin America:

I will do my best to make inquiries and ascertain anything I can with regard to the singular masonic movement. From time to time I have heard things about its influence in Eastern and Southern Europe, but never, so far, in Latin America. Some of the other facts you tell me, especially regarding the Jews, are quite new to me. I suppose [the masonic movement] has everywhere a strong anti-clerical and in some cases even anti-religious character. The Roman Church, of course, everywhere opposed it.

Not bashful about his views, Crane directly wrote President Wilson on February 10, 1913, that, except for Brandeis, "all of the other important Jews are first Jews and then Americans and do not hesitate to sacrifice real American interests at any time for what they conceive to be Jewish ones.^{39/}" In writing this, Crane presumably had most in mind Jacob Schiff, who, since at least 1909, had been his bete noire. He blamed Schiff for his recall by President Taft as U.S. Minister to China.^{40/} That action, he felt, was the result of a Japanese-Jewish cabal against him, because he had been an outspoken defender of Russia and an opponent of the 1905 indemnification award to Japan by mediator Theodore Roosevelt; and, because he defended Chinese interests against the combined efforts of the Japanese and Jewish New York bankers, such as Schiff, to raid that country's resources. As Crane on June 13, 1933, would write Colonel House:

I seemed to be the only outspoken friend the Russians had... anti-Semite, - it ought to be a title of honor... [Taft] was hypnotized by Teddy's doctrine of giving the Jews at least all they wanted....

Also, soon after the incident of the recall itself, Crane wrote his associate and adviser on Chinese affairs, Thomas F. Millard, that it was the Schiff/Warburg group of "Hamburg Jews" which got Taft to fire him; Millard fully agreed, perhaps in part because it was with his guidance that Crane had given an impolitic speech in New York on the China question, a speech which contributed to Taft's disillusion with him. Still again, on April 5, 1916, Crane wrote that the German Jews

with Mr. Schiff at the head...have for a long time controlled the bridge between Russia and America and so the 98 million Christians here have had no relations with the 170 million over there [The U.S. having had broken relations with Russia under President Taft as a result of Tsarist discrimination against American Jews].

Crane maintained that the Bolshevik Revolution represented "not a revolution but a conquest" of Russia by the Jews. From the time of that event, he would see the Jews as a monolithic group: "The right wing of fine Jews which charm our intellectuals cut no ice in the organization (even in Palestine), the left wing running right over it as it does everything and everyone else, but the right wing has to keep mum, however much it disapproves." In a remarkable display of ideology overriding what had hitherto been a warm friendship, Crane also could now say of Lillian Wald, that she

played a very important role in bringing about the Russian Revolution. Tretsky was always in touch with her and followed her orders. She always could get any amount of money from the Schiff-Warburg family, and the night before Tretsky sailed for Russia, he and Jacob Schiff had a secret meeting at Miss Wald's, and Schiff turned over fifty thousand dollars to Tretsky to use shepherding his flock to Russia.

Interestingly, this story is similar to that contained in a (forged) document, published in 1919 by a monarchist journal at Reston-on-the-Den, which was attributed to "the American Secret Service" and allegedly proved that the Bolsheviks received a large subsidy from Schiff to carry out the revolution. Going back even further, Protocols folklore includes the myth that

The Russian Government had learned that at meetings of the B'nai B'rith in New York in 1893, Jacob Schiff had been named chairman of the Committee on the revolutionary movement in Russia.

The distinct - and intriguing - possibility should not be overlooked that the "American Secret Service" source of the Russian monarchist article is the very same as the "State Department Secret Police" source that Crane, in a letter of February 5, 1921, used as the basis for the above-cited story of Schiff giving Tretsky fifty thousand dollars. In fact, a certain U.S. Army Intelligence officer

based in New York late in the war, Harris A. Houghton, M.D., is generally credited with having published the first American edition of the Protocols, under the title The Jewish Peril; he did so, anonymously, in 1920. Houghton had obtained the material during the war from an ex-Tsarist agent, Boris Brasal, and, in 1919, sought support for its broad dissemination; he also conducted a press briefing on it on February 9, 1919, in New York.

Crane at that time was in the city and, particularly given his own interests, may well have known of Houghton's efforts. Moreover, he and Houghton had several mutual acquaintances. For example, they both knew Maurice Leon, who was a Jewish lawyer in New York who helped Brasal, Houghton and, later, Henry Ford to identify "German Jewish traitors" to the ^{47/}U.S.; and, they knew C.C. Daniels, the brother of Wilson's Secretary of the Navy, J. Daniels - C.C. not only had Houghton as his family physician but also helped Crane's friend, Ford, carry out his antisemitic campaign as a paid staff-member ^{48/}. Given these facts, and recalling that Crane was intimately involved in Kalidin's anti-Bolshevik cause, which was based precisely in the Cossack region where the monarchist journal was published, one cannot discount the likelihood that he and Houghton cooperated in having Protocol material "as widely and as wisely distributed as possible" ^{49/}. Their common goal was to alert the U.S. to the true significance of the Bolshevik movement in Russia and the need actively to oppose it.

Finally, it should be noted that even in 1926, when many leading Americans had long rejected Ford's antisemitic campaign ^{50/}, and Ford himself was on the verge of disowning it ^{51/}, Crane on November 18 was still / sending him

additional propoganda, "thinking that it might possibly be of interest to you or to your editor. "

VI

Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, Crane was able to speak in positive terms about individual Jews and even about a world Jewish political role for the Jewish people, such as their serving as a "natural bridge between Europe and Asia."^{52/} This tinge of pre-Zionism was consistent with Crane's September 30, 1914, recounting of his recent conversation with President Wilson:

I discussed...the situation of the Jews of the world and what we should try to do for them when peace comes. This I had gone over with Mr. Brandeis /the head of the American Zionists/ on my last visit with him. He is fast becoming the most important Jew in the world...inspired with longing to serve his race and especially the poorest and most down-trodden....

This drawing of distinctions, as has been noted, ended with the Revolution, and, by the time of the First Administration of Franklin Roosevelt, Crane would write Fortune magazine on May 30, 1933, to complain about "Felix Frankfurter - the very efficient eyes and ears of Brandeis - right in the center of everything...." Similarly, he would write to Colonel House on February 4, 1933, that

It looks as though Franklin has fallen entirely into /Jewish/ hands. With Felix Frankfurter in the center of the Administration, as a sort of Benes, the really last word will come from the Supreme Court /i.e., Brandeis/ and the race's enormous capacity for mischief will be exercised everywhere without a whisper or an opposing gesture from us.

The issue of U.S. immigration laws was a major focus of Crane's attention during the 1920's and 1930's. He fought for tightening these laws:^{53/}

If there were a Jewish quota, as there should be, the

numbers of course would be very small, but they evade the letter of the law by coming in under national names.

In the 1930's, he warned against Jewish efforts to control the office of the Labor Secretary "on account of its influence on immigration." ^{54/} On January 28, 1936, he wrote the President on the subject of

a movement underway to bring something like a 100,000 Jews out of Germany....There are 100,000 too many people in Palestine already and...the Jews now own most of the valuable land. The place of all places for the Jews to go is Russia.

In a letter of May 24, 1933, published by the New York Times, Crane wrote that

The Germans are the best informed about conditions in Russia....The Nationalist Government is going to block the Communists....Palestine is wide open to Communist refugees.

A major disappointment to Crane was Roosevelt's 1933 diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union - an act which Crane dubbed "Jewish recognition." ^{55/} He would write Lowell on November 29 of that year: "It seems to me that Germany has practically taken over the moral leadership of the world." However, in June 1937, following a visit to the U.S.S.R., Crane remarkably changed his tune. He now pronounced that the Russian people had regained control of their country; Russia, he wrote Roosevelt on October 24, 1937, has a "new permanent wave which I think will set quite a fashion in the next forty or fifty years."

Knowingly or not, Crane, by this reversal of position, prepared the ground for what otherwise would have been ^{for him,} had he lived a bit longer into 1939, a total disaster: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Here was a vivid justification, if one can be found, for Virginia Gildersleeve's calling Crane a "genius," if an "unusual and eccentric"

one. In this instance, with Hitler in 1939-41 embracing not only the Russians but also the Grand Mufti, the foresightful Crane, had he been able to observe these events, could only have basked in the delusory glory of seeing the apparent fulfillment of his fondest dreams: the drawing together of his beloved Russian people with those of Germany and the Arab world as a core Christian-Muslim coalition against the all-pervasive forces of the Jewish-Freemason conspiracy.^{56/}



FOOTNOTES *

1. This work is generally still accepted as the standard English-language history of the Arab nationalist movement. For example, The High Walls of Jerusalem, RSanders, 1983, p.688: "As for the Sherif Hussein, the Hejaz, and the Arab revolt, the standard work is Antonius." A Christian Palestinian Arab, Antonius was not only a writer but, as pointed out by RLacey in his Kingdom, 1982, a significant actor in his own right in this movement. He served after the war as Secretary to General Gilbert Clayton of the British Occupation Administration, and he was the Secretary to the Arab Delegation at the 1939 negotiations in London. It should also be noted that Antonius was in the employ of Charles Crane; for example, see Crane's letter of January 24, 1934, and Antonius' letter of April 3, 1938. The Harun al-Rashid in the dedication was the patron of a brilliant period of culture at Baghdad. (VGildersleeve's Many a Good Crusade)
2. The Commission's other leader was Henry C. King, President of Oberlin College.
3. The text of the report is contained in The Paris Peace Conference, U.S., State Department, Vol 12, pp 745ff.
4. As explained by William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State, in a letter to Crane of October 30, 1919: "I have read every

*Unless otherwise indicated, all unpublished sources listed herein are to be found in The Papers of Charles R. Crane, at the Bakmetev Archives of the Columbia University Library.

word of your report, which, by the way, is a masterly document. I do not believe, however, that there is the slightest possibility of your conclusions being adopted by the Senate."

5. In a letter to CRC of July 6, 1922, ex-President Wilson authorized RSBaker's making "public the report on Syria. Indeed I think this is a very timely moment for its publication." The text of the report appeared in Publisher and Editor, December 1922.
6. This 1919 letter (day/month unspecified) was from Abdel-Kader Masaphen. The recommendations of the King-Crane Commission were a standard feature of Arab appeals to the West to curb Zionism. For example, see ibn-Saud's 1938 message to President Roosevelt, and the Arab Office (Washington) publication, Palestine: The Solution, 1947.
7. The Chicago-based Crane Company, which is still in existence, manufactures metals. Especially after "irreconcilable" policy disagreements in 1890 with his father, as a result of which he "retired from business," Crane largely was freed of day-to-day office burdens and was granted a liberal financial arrangement. (For example, CRC letter of May 11, 1890). However, he continued to have business interests and, in 1898, was instrumental in helping George Westinghouse obtain a \$4million contract with the Russian Government for installation of airbrakes on the Trans-Siberian Railroad - a landmark in U.S.-Russian commercial relations.
8. For "practical philanthropy," see the dedication in Saudi Arabia, KSTwitchell, 1947; and, Section III in the present text.

9. See Section III in the text.
10. See Section IV in the text.
11. See Section II in the text.
12. For example, Many a Good Crusade, op cit, pp 171ff and 407ff, in the 1980 edition; and, American Protestantism and a Jewish State, Fishman, 1973, p 85. As did Crane before her, Gildersleeve served as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the American College for Girls at Constantinople.
13. Crane's selections of these off-the-beaten-path lands followed naturally from the impulse behind his inveterate travels: as a young man suffering from "melancholy" and "nervous illness", he began to travel "not for tourism or study, but for excitement."
14. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ASLink, ed., 51 Volumes, to date, Vol 28, p 353 and Vol 30, p 46.
15. Ibid, Vol 48, p 273; Vol 49, p 154. Also, The Making of a State, TGMasaryk, 1969, pp 273, 275.
16. Jan was then married to one of Crane's daughters, Frances.
17. Taft acted, because of Crane's "inability to curb his tongue in public and his headstrong desire to shape rather than execute policy." (William Howard Taft, DAnderson, 1968, p 245)

18. Telegram to CRC from the Chinese Government, January 16, 1931.
19. Communication from Mrs. W. Wilson, February 23, 1924.
20. CRC Memoirs (unpublished), p 343.
21. Letter to CRC, June 11, 1922.
22. CRC letter , January 8, 1923.
23. For example, letter to Congressman Fish, Jr., May 19, 1933.
24. For the authoritative text of the correspondence, and the respective views of the British Government and the Arab Delegation in London at the time, see UK Foreign Office: Miscellaneous Papers #3 (1939), CMD 5957. For a comprehensive overview of the controversy surrounding the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, see Scholarship and the Diplomatic Roots of Israel, by Frank W. Brecher, in Jewish Social Studies, Spring 1985.
25. CRC letter, January 4, 1929. Crane had been a good friend of Feisal's since their 1919 meeting in Damascus, and he kept a bust of that leader in his home.
26. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, U.S., State Department, Vol III for 1927, p 825, telegram from Vice-Consul Park, March 15, 1927; also, letter to Crane from Park, July 27, 1927.

27. Ibid, pp 826-7: the State Department advised Park on May 20, 1927, that the U.S. is "not yet prepared to accord formal recognition to the native states which have been established in the Arabian peninsula since the World War," because of unsettled political conditions and "the unimportance of American interests." On February 10, 1931, the U.S. decided to/decline to recognize Yemen, but, as regards to Saudi Arabia, the State Department informed the U.K. that, "there appears to be no reason, however, why this Government should not recognize the Government of King Ibn Saud, provided that it is possible to obtain certain assurances from that Government," such as Most Favored Nation economic treatment and justice for foreigners. (Ibid, Vol II for 1931, pp 547-50). Recognition was extended in May 1931, and one can reasonably conclude that Crane played a facilitating role in this development. It was not until February 1940 that the U.S. appointed an Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, although resident in Cairo. (Ibid, Vol IV for 1939, pp 824-8)
28. Letter from Imman Yahya of Yemen, December 27, 1927; and, KSTwitchell's Saudi Arabia, op cit, passim.
29. After his 1931 visit, Crane described the King, as follows:
"a fine type, much like Father Crane, Edison, Ford, Westinghouse - the great natural human brain entirely unspoiled by education except the education of vital experience." For the/text's discussion of Crane's philanthropic work in Arabia, see Saudi Arabia, op cit, pp 143ff.
30. CRC letter, June 18, 1934.

31. Antonius' notes on Crane's trips of the 1930's to Saudi Arabia and the Levant are separately filed in CRC Papers.
32. CRC letter, May 13, 1933; and, Antonius' report of December 20, 1933, on Crane's Cairo meeting of November 24, 1933. The seven-man group which met with Crane included, in addition to the Saudi representative, al-Sabiq, Rashed Rida (newspaper editor), Shafik Pasha (Oriental League), al-Bakri (religious leader), Wali Pashi (ex-Cabinet Minister), Abdel-Rezek (theologian), and al-Marghi (past and future rector of Al-Azhar).
33. CRC letter, January 31, 1934.
34. Dodd's view on the power of the Jews in Germany was remarkably similar to that of President Roosevelt, as reported by David Wyman, who refutes the alleged facts underlying that view. (The Abandonment of the Jews, DWyman, p 313 of the 1985 Pantheon edition).
35. As reported in an obituary on Crane published by the New York Herald Tribune, February 16, 1939.
36. "It was the suspicion among American officials then serving in Russia that Mr. Crane himself was at that time giving private financial support to Kalidin." (Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, GKenan, 1956, Vol I, pp 176-7). Kenan goes on to say that, "it would not be unreasonable to suppose that Crane, too, urged [U. S.] governmental support to the Kalidin-Alksyely movement....";

and, that such private support as Crane's lacked "legal authorization."

37. Crane, himself, was not concerned about the dogma of any particular religion or denomination (he was by family background a Presbyterian), but rather about "the great spiritual movements of the world." (CRC letter, November 10, 1926)
38. Warrant for Genocide, N. Cohn, 1969, passim. It should be noted that neither here nor in any of the following references to published material concerning the Protocols, Ford's antisemitic campaign, etc., is Crane's name mentioned.
39. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, op cit, Vol 27, pp 107-8.
40. CRC letters of November 26, 1909; April 5, 1916; December 12, 1923. Also, letters from Thomas F. Millard of October 25, 1909; and Charles W. Eliot of January 12, 1915.
41. CRC letter to President Coolidge, October 22, 1926. Similarly, in a speech of February 2, 1922, at the National War College in Washington, he maintained that Jews were the "proprietors of the Far Eastern Republic" and the "backbone" of the Soviet's central government and its machinery. Many other examples are available of Crane's effort to equate the Bolsheviks with the Jews, who represented a threat to dominate the world and, therefore, should be actively opposed by the U.S. and the world's civilizations.
42. CRC letter, February 21, 1931, reporting on what he had just told Arab leaders in Jerusalem.

43. CRC letters of February 5, 1921, and December 14, 1934. Despite this, he could still write Wald a most friendly letter on February 8, 1935, in which he confesses that, "I have felt very definitely out of the world for several years and not very much interested in it." In one of fate's coincidences, Crane in March 1917 happened to take the same ship from New York as did Trotsky, both heading, for opposite reasons, to post-Tsarist Russia; Crane frequently drew on his alleged direct observations of Trotsky and his friends during this voyage (Trotsky was taken off the ship at Halifax by the British, who retained him for a few weeks) to buttress his criticisms of the Bolsheviks, whom he regularly referred to as "New York East Siders."
44. Warrant for Genocide, op cit, p 126.
45. The Truth About the Protocols of Zion, HBernstein, 1935, p 38; the author notes that, "Schiff was never an officer or chairman of any Committee of the B'nai B'rith."
46. For material on Houghton, see Ibid, passim; and, the press clips in the file on Henry Ford at the American Jewish Committee library, particularly the series by NHapgood in Hearst's International, June-November, 1922.
47. Ibid, and, re the Crane-Leon connection, see Gottheil letter to CRC, July 5, 1913.
48. AJC files, op cit.

49. Section II of the present text, the quotation regarding Crane's view of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence.
50. On January 16, 1921, many leading Americans, including President Wilson and Henry C. King, signed a press statement objecting to Henry Ford's antisemitic campaign. Crane, at the time, was in China. Upon his return, he developed a closer relationship with Ford, who reportedly said of him (CRC letter of January 25, 1926) that "I was the only one who really understood him." Crane, in 1922, failed to get Eliot to invite the Fords for a visit, Eliot explaining, in an August 3 letter to Crane, that, among other objections, "I should feel rather queer inviting [the Fords] to come over to see me...his anti-semitic campaign has seemed to me positively pernicious." Of course, in the 1920's, Hitler decorated Ford and incorporated the Protocols into his own writings.
51. He did so in a 1927 letter to the American Jewish Committee under the pressure of a law suit by the above-mentioned HBernstein.
52. CRC letter, March 2, 1916.
53. CRC letter to Saturday Evening Post, November 18, 1926.
54. CRC letter, December 2, 1932.
55. CRC letter, October 21, 1933.

56. In the 1930's, Crane frequently gave it as his view that London and Washington had already been captured by the Jews; and, that Palestine was no longer a "British mandate" but a "Jewish mandate."

