




THE JACOB RADER MARCUS CENTER OF THE
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Preserving American Jewish History

MS-603: Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum Collection, 1945-1992.

Series D: International Relations Activities. 1961-1992

Box 56, Folder 10, Camp David - Israel-Egypt peace treaty, 1978-1979.



NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT BY RICHARD MAASS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF CAMP DAVID SUMMIT CONFERENCE

We join in congratulating President Carter, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin for the historic breakthrough on the road to Arab-Israel peace that they achieved at Camp David.

The leadership and perseverance of President Carter and the statesmanship and dedication to peace displayed by the Israeli and Egyptian leaders helped overcome many difficulties to produce the present framework for peace in the Middle East. Israel's leaders have once again demonstrated their deep yearning for peace by their readiness to make major concessions and take substantial risks for the sake of reaching a lasting agreement.

However, obstacles still remain before this blueprint can be translated into an enduring edifice of peace. Further progress now requires the prompt and effective participation of Jordan, the practical endorsements of moderate Palestinians and the constructive support of Saudi Arabia.

We deplore the negative voices already being heard in the Arab world. We hope and pray that they will come to realize that only through a renunciation of war and a readiness to follow the Egyptian example of recognition and normalization of relations with Israel will lasting peace come to the strife-torn Middle East.

9/18/78
78-960-107

September 24, 1978

"CAMP DAVID: A BORN-AGAIN EXPERIENCE"

WINS RELIGION COMMENTARY

RABBI MARC H. TANENBAUM* OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Much has been made of religious features that surrounded the Camp David summit meeting, and rightly so. But reflecting on the entire experience, it seems to me that the world has just been exposed to a unique and perhaps unprecedented evangelical model of doing politics. In fact, it may be in order to suggest that we cannot really comprehend what happened at Camp David unless we are prepared to understand it as a foreign-policy version of the born-again experience, both with its virtues and its weaknesses. In physical environment, Camp David suggested the rustic, open setting of a tent camp revival meeting. The sessions began with a call to prayer from the world congregation. Both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin came to the tent meeting burdened with their worldly maximalist claims, at first refusing to compromise. President Carter, long experienced as a Baptist lay preacher, then spent sixty hours testifying to each of the sinners. Give up the old man, put on the new man. By Thursday night, they were backsliding. The President persisted in testifying and precipitated a crisis by Sunday morning. Shortly thereafter, the conversion to a new point of view happened. They were born again, ratified by two visionary agreements that no one thought possible. President Carter climaxed the conversion experience with his evangelical testimonies about peacemakers in his speech before Congress. The problem about born-again experiences is that while they can effect change, they can also be 24-hour sensations. The real test is whether the agreements can be made to stick beyond the camp meeting, and that calls for patience, prayer, and ongoing hard work and good will.

*Rabbi Tanenbaum, who is National Interreligious Affairs Director of the American Jewish Committee presents a weekly religion commentary over WINS-Westing-Broadcasting System.

Camp David Peace Conference
Fonerbaum

DAD/TA

memorandum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date November 9, 1978
to Area Directors and Executive Assistants, Staff Advisory
Committee and Domestic Affairs Department
from Milton Ellerin
subject ARAB-AMERICAN REACTION TO CAMP DAVID

We believe you will find the attached summary of Arab-American reaction to the Camp David accords of interest.

While admittedly incomplete in that we were unable to monitor the reaction of all Arab-American and pro Arab-American groups, we believe they are reflective of the overwhelming majority of pro-Arab groups. Even if, as it now appears likely, Egypt and Israel sign a peace treaty, Arab propaganda in the months ahead will, in all probability, closely adhere to the themes delineated in Sheba Mittleman's report.

I urge Area Directors to keep us informed about:

- (1) Media attention to community visits by officials of Arab states, PLO representatives or functionaries of Arab-American organizations.
- (2) Media coverage of statements on the Middle East by Arab-American organizations in the communities covered by your office.

ME:en
Attach.

#78-970-13

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date October 27, 1978
to Milton Ellerin
from Sheba Mittleman *SM*
subject Arab Americans Reaction to Camp David

Reaction of Arab-Americans to the agreement reached by Egypt and Israel at Camp David ranged from mildly critical to violently hostile; there was no organization that commended Camp David without qualification. There was strong criticism of both the negotiating process as well as the result achieved, and many doubts were voiced over whether the Camp David agreements could lead to a real peace especially because the P.L.O. was not invited to take part. Comment on President Carter's role was generally coupled with the demand that the U.S. must use its influence to change Israeli policy. While I have not been able to examine all Arab-American organizations, the following reactions have appeared:

1- The National Association of Arab-Americans, the umbrella organization which claims to be the voice of the Arab-American community welcomed the "progress toward peace," and commended President Carter on his initiative, according to Action, September 25, 1978.

However, at a press conference on September 8, 1978 Hisham Sharabi, current N.A.A.A. president, issued a statement on behalf of several Arab-American leaders, which said that there could be no real peace without the Palestinians, who did not participate in the Camp David discussions. (Action, 9/18/78; N.A.A.A.'s Focus 10/1/78)

An editorial in N.A.A.A. paper Focus (10/1/78) referred to the "disappointing conclusion" of Camp David, insisting that no Israeli commitment was obtained on the critical issue: withdrawal from the West Bank and Palestinian self-determination. Reiterating the N.A.A.A. view that Israel must change its policy in order to be recognized by the Arabs, the editorial noted, "it was regrettable that President Carter chose to take Mr. Begin's intransigence at face value and shift the pressure to Mr. Sadat." In an interview with an Atlanta newspaper, one prominent N.A.A.A. member, Alexander Simon reiterated the view that the three main issues to be settled were: the question of a Palestinian Homeland, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and recognition of the P.L.O.

Regarding the U.S. role, the N.A.A.A. welcomed the idea that the U.S. would be a "full partner" in the negotiating process, but strongly urged the U.S. to use all its available leverage on Israel in order to elicit a change in Israeli policy on the territories and the Palestinians. They also referred to President Eisenhower as a model for Carter. (In 1956 during the Suez Crisis Eisenhower, without fear of domestic political repercussions, pressured Israel into withdrawing from the Sinai. The News Circle, August 1978)

2- Dr. M.T. Mehdi, President of the American Arab Relations Committee, claimed that no progress was achieved at Camp David because the "real issues" of the Middle East conflict -- "the rights of Palestinians to return to their land with sovereign power and Jerusalem" -- were not discussed. In his newspaper, Action (September 25, 1978), Mehdi charged that Sadat was a "fool" who "completely capitulated to Israeli demands," while Carter's address to Congress was a "great deception." Mehdi also called on his readers to write to President Carter to invite Yasir Arafat to the White House in order to get the real Palestinian view of the issue; in the past, Mehdi has taken the most extreme position, insisting that Jews in Israel should leave in order to allow Palestinians who emigrated to go back to their homes in what is now Israel.

Mehdi severely condemned the proposal that the U.S. build new airbases for Israel which could cost \$1 billion. "This means that American tax payers will pay Israel about \$3 million a day so that Israelis will pull out of the land they had occupied by force." Mehdi has stressed this point on local radio interviews as well.

3- The Palestinian Human Rights Bulletin (October 1978) printed a special issue containing four reactions to Camp David. These were: the speech by Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota on the floor of the U.S. Senate, September 19, 1978; an article by Professor James Zogby (director of the Palestine Human Rights Campaign, which publishes the Bulletin) and Professor Ed Gold of the University of Maryland; a piece by Professor Ibrahim Abu-Lughod of Northwestern University; and the view of Kareem Khalof, mayor of Ramallah.

The common theme of these four articles was that the Camp David agreements did not in fact represent a step toward peace, but rather contain the seeds for renewed violence in the area. Senator Abourezk, an outspoken advocate of Palestinian rights, condemned President Sadat for concluding a separate peace with Israel (something which Sadat himself termed "reprehensible" last year) at the expense of the Palestinians. He termed the Camp David accords "the ratification of the expansionist dreams of Israel," because of "continued denial of self-determination for the Palestinians." Abourezk calls the proposed West Bank Administrative Council nothing

more than "a Quisling government." Finally, he asserts that these agreements will foment radicalism in the Arab world "since it is the only real alternative left to people who have been denied a normal political outlet." He did not refer to the PLO at all.

Professors Zogby and Gold claim that the Camp David agreements represent the victory of U.S. efforts "to fragment and polarize the Arab world; and to neutralize the Palestinian national movement, by creating an Israeli dominated 'Pax-Americana' in the Middle East." They see a new "cold war alliance" emerging between Israel, the U.S., and Egypt "over the backs of the Palestinian people," which cannot lead to peace. Zogby and Gold also refer to "the international consensus" that supports the aspirations of the Palestinians. This phrase is used by other Arab groups (especially the N.A.A.A.) to refer to the U.N. resolutions which call for recognition of the P.L.O. as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people as well as the "right to return to their homeland." Thus it is claimed that the U.S. cannot hope to bring about peace in the Middle East by creating frameworks such as those of Camp David which do not conform to this "consensus."

The article by Professor Abu-Lughod (a Palestinian born political scientist and Vice-President of A.A.U.G.) also appeared in the Chicago Sun Times (9/25/78). (Last year, Abu-Lughod, a member of the P.L.O. National Council, was one of those reportedly mentioned by Sadat as a possible representative of the P.L.O. in negotiations with Israel). Abu-Lughod criticized the Camp David accords for proposing "a castrated entity" which did not begin to fulfill the terms of the "international consensus." According to him, Palestinian rights include "their right to return to their homes and lands in Palestine and to an independent Palestinian state therein" only granting these rights would end "sixty years of struggle by the Palestinians to build a sovereign state." According to Abu-Lughod the results of Camp David will be crisis and polarization in the Arab world, and eventually to "violent peace." He concludes by ridiculing the U.S.: "New flareups will have costs not only to the people of the area but also to those who fancy themselves as 'full partners' in the Middle East quagmire."

Although it is unclear whether these viewpoints are representative of the entire Arab-American community, several conclusions may be drawn from the above and several trends anticipated.

(1) There appears to be a consensus among these groups that Israel is the one who must now make the concessions in order to achieve peace. They also see the United States as the one party with the duty and the means to put leverage on Israel in order to get concessions. Types of

leverage mentioned include the withholding of arms, of money (both U.S. government funds and private contributions such as tax-exempt Jewish donations), of technical assistance. Thus, it may be anticipated that Arab American organizations (especially the NAAA through its new publication, Focus, and its contacts in Washington) will encourage their members to make their views on U.S. Middle East policy known to local congressmen, senators and other officials, and to urge stronger U.S. action. This view was also expressed by a Jordanian journalist at a West Coast Arab American dinner. "Israel is not a great danger to us because sooner or later it is going to vanish too. Our problem is the U.S. government...." (The News Circle, August 1978)

(2) There is also agreement among all groups that sooner or later, the U.S. must recognize the PLO, even without any PLO acceptance of UN resolution 242 or changes in their charter to eliminate calling for the destruction of Israel. At present, no other group is recognized as having authority to represent Palestinians.

(3) It is to be anticipated that propaganda campaigns stressing the need to include the PLO in any peacemaking process will continue, since this is considered a gap in the Camp David agreements. One tactic is to point to the biased UN resolutions on the Middle East as the outline of an "international consensus." Other propaganda themes include undermining the image of Israel as a democratic state and increasing sympathy for Palestinian rights by reporting allegations of Israeli "torture" and mistreatment of Arabs in occupied territories.

(4) There has been new emphasis on the amount of American aid going to Israel, especially depicted as being "taxpayers' money." Arab American organizations are asking members to question why their money should be going to support a state whose policies conflict with U.S. policy (i.e. Israel is intransigent).

SM:sm

cc: Mark Brandriss
George Gruen
Ira Silverman

*Camp David Israel -
Egypt*

LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES

To the Editor:

December 17 was to have seen the just fruit of the Camp David deliberations. Yet, the day is almost gone, and the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel remains unsigned.

I fully understand that President Carter feels cheated of the well-deserved glory of a peacemaker. Yet, I cannot follow him in blaming Israel for the present deadlock. Though President Sadat has tried to impose new, perplexing terms, Mr. Carter calls him "very generous." Though the government of Israel stands ready to sign the treaty as it stands, Mr. Carter holds that it is entirely up to Israel whether there will be peace or not.

Assuredly, Mr. Begin and his cabinet are not angels, nor is Mr. Sadat a villain. Still, the fault for today's impasse lies with Mr. Sadat and his dismal conditions. The fault also lies with Mr. Carter for not having seen the fatal character of the new stipulations and thus having supported Mr. Sadat in his demands.

Mr. Sadat wants the peace treaty to be linked to the establishment of self-rule on the "West Bank" and the Gaza strip. No ambassadors are to be exchanged, in other words, no full diplomatic relations established till autonomy for Palestinian Arabs is in sight. Most odiously, the peace treaty with Israel is to be subordinated to Egypt's military alliances with other Arab nations.

Israel has to reject such "amendments" as suicidal. Apart from the fact that a conditional peace treaty is not a real one, it could even prove to be a deathtrap. For instance, if Egypt's "defence pacts" take precedence over the peace treaty, Syria could easily declare that Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights (from which Syria's forces used to bombard Israeli settlements below) was really an act of aggression. She could go to war and call on Egypt to come to her aid. Israel would have to blame herself for having made this onslaught possible by turning over to Egypt all of Sinai, together with most modern airfields for a mere document in return.

I sympathize with President Sadat for being pained by his isolation from other Arabs, for being even considered a traitor. But no clever devices will restore Egypt's name and historic role in the Arab world, only a well-working peace.

I sympathize, too, with President Carter in his frustration over seemingly misspent efforts. Still, an American President may not act the way most of us did when we were little boys. When the game did not go as we expected, we declared: "I won't play anymore!" picked up our marbles and ran off.

If this Administration wishes to be true to the moral leadership in the world, God's providence seems to have conferred on it, it must stand by Israel, a state small and often maligned. The Administration must be true to the friendship we have traditionally offered to the reborn Jewish state.

John M. Oesterreicher

Msgr. John M. Oesterreicher
Distinguished University Professor,

South Orange, N.J., Dec. 17, 1978. Seton Hall University



*Camp David Arab-Jewish
Rel.*

NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR RELEASE AFTER 12 NOON
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

NEW YORK, September 22...A leading expert on the Middle East and North Africa said today that the Camp David meeting had "effected no major change" in the situation of the hundreds of thousands of Jews who fled Arab countries to escape persecution.

Speaking at a news conference at the headquarters of the American Jewish Committee, Dr. Maurice Roumani, Professor of Political Science and Mid-East Affairs at Ben Gurion University in the Negev, stated: "Three months from now, if the other Arab states join in an agreement, we will be able to say that this is not just a tactical move but something indicating a turning point in Arab-Jewish relations."

Dr. Roumani, born in Libya and one of the founders of WOJAC (World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries), described those Jews as "an overlooked piece of recent history," and urged that they be granted reparations in the current peace negotiations.

"Their plight has been ignored," he said. "Their hardships of displacement resulted in their slow absorption in the Israeli social and economic system, while the Arabs who left Palestine receive assistance from many sources — like UNRWA, the USA, Britain and even Israel."

Dr. Roumani stated that the conflict in the Middle East was "not so much territorial as attitudinal." In 1948 the Arabs, he said, had six million square kilometers of land, as compared with the 20 thousand held by Jews, in the newly established State of Israel.

Despite this vast disproportion, Dr. Roumani said, the Arabs are seeking to constrict the Jews even further, acting in the spirit of the medieval rulers who penned Jews into smaller and smaller confines."

"It is not only the property of 850,000 Jews which has been confiscated, expropriated or destroyed by the Arabs," Dr. Roumani asserted, "but their human rights and lives were constantly threatened."

- more -

The handful of Jews left in Syria and Iraq, Dr. Roumani said, "are suffering a slow death-in-life, as hostages of the governments, and scapegoats for the inequalities of the regimes and the ire of the incited masses."

WOJAC was established by representatives of Jews in Arab countries in Paris three years ago. It seeks to emphasize that Resolution 242 of the UN Security Council, calling for "a just solution of the refugee problem," must necessarily refer to Jewish and Arab refugees alike. It intends to advance this view at forthcoming UN and other forums, as well as the idea that the only feasible solution to the refugee problems for both sides is to consider the Arab Palestinians as having been exchanged for the Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, in those territories that comprise the State of Israel.

In the United States, WOJAC has Chapters in Detroit, Ann Arbor, Dallas, Houston and on Long Island.

Founded in 1906, the American Jewish Committee is this country's pioneer human relations organization. It combats bigotry, protects the civil and religious rights of Jews at home and abroad, and seeks improved human relations for all people everywhere.

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
*Camp David
Arise Jewish
Rel.*

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
165 East 56th Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
15 East 84th Street
New York, N. Y. 10021

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI BRITH
315 Lexington Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10016

The attached "Questions and Answers on the Camp David Agreements" are being sent to you for your information. You are also free to reproduce them. The Questions and Answers were prepared for the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council by a joint committee of Middle East experts: Dr. George E. Gruen of the American Jewish Committee, Phil Baum of the American Jewish Congress, and Ken Jacobson of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.





QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

on

CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS

prepared by

Dr. George Gruen, American Jewish Committee
Phil Baum, American Jewish Congress
Ken Jacobson, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

- Q: What was agreed to at Camp David?
- A: There were two agreements. One provides the framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel by mid-December, 1978. The other sets out the basis for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, providing for bilateral peace treaties on the Egyptian-Israeli model with each of the neighboring Arab states, as well as special arrangements for the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza with the participation of the Palestinian Arabs in the process. Each agreement stands on its own; the bilateral Egyptian-Israel peace treaty does not depend on the comprehensive framework agreement.
- Q: How was the issue of sovereignty resolved in the Sinai?
- A: Israel recognizes Egyptian sovereignty over all of the Sinai up to the internationally recognized border that existed between Egypt and Palestine under the British Mandate.
- Q: How was the issue of sovereignty resolved on the West Bank?
- A: There is no reference to sovereignty on the West Bank. Negotiations between Israel and the other participants will take place during the five year transition period to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors.
- Q: What happens to the Israeli military presence in the Sinai?
- A: All of the Israeli armed forces must be withdrawn from the Sinai and the air fields will be turned over to Egypt for civilian purposes only. (Although not mentioned in the agreement, the United States will aid Israel to build two military bases in the Negev to replace those given up in Sinai.)

(more)

Q: What happens to the military presence in the West Bank?

A: The Israeli military government will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations determined by Israel. This will be the only military force in the West Bank/Gaza. The agreement does not limit such forces to the five year transitional period. Local Palestinian Arabs will be in charge of local police matters, with Israel concerned only with external security.

Q: What about other security measures in the Sinai?

A: The Sinai will be divided into zones in which limits on the nature and size of military units and armaments are stipulated. Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance.

A United Nations force will be stationed in the Rafiah salient (where the settlements are now located) and in the Sharm-El-Sheikh area. In contrast to the 1957 agreement, these forces can only be removed by a unanimous vote of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and thus the United States could veto such a removal.

Q: What happens to the settlements in the Sinai?

A: The Knesset will vote before the end of September on the principle of dismantling the settlements in the Sinai. Each member of the Knesset will be permitted to vote his own conscience rather than be subject to the rules of party discipline.

Q: What about the settlements on the West Bank?

A: No reference is made to them but presumably their disposition would be included in the decisions on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. There was agreement on a moratorium on constructing new settlements in the West Bank, but there is an ambiguity on the length of the moratorium. A U.S. official has said there will be a moratorium during the negotiations on the modalities to establish a self-rule council. Israel maintains that the moratorium is for a period of 90 days.

Q: What about navigation rights?

A: The Sinai agreement provides for free passage by Israeli ships through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, and, for the first time, Egypt concedes that the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways open to all nations.

Q: Will there be normal relations between Egypt and Israel?

A: Yes. When the Israeli interim withdrawal is completed, which will be no later than nine months after the treaty is signed, the process of normalizing relations will begin with implementation to be completed no later than

three years after the signing of the treaty. Normal relations will include full recognition, which would include diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, an end to economic boycotts and to barriers to the free movement of people and commerce and mutual protection of each other's citizens by due process of law.

The same normalization of relationships would take place between Israel and other Arab states who joined in signing peace treaties with her within the framework for peace in the Middle East -- the second agreement.

Q: What role would the Palestinians play?

A: The delegations of Egypt and Jordan charged with negotiating with Israel the modalities for establishing an elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza may include not only Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza but other Palestinians as mutually agreed by all the parties. (This in effect gives Israel a veto on PLO officials outside the West Bank.)

AMERICAN JEWISH

The Israel-Jordan negotiations on a treaty "must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements" and "the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future." The agreement then spells out in detail what this means -- participating with Israel, Egypt and Jordan in negotiating the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues; permitting the elected representatives of the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants to vote on any agreement resulting from such negotiations, providing for elected representatives of the inhabitants of this area to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of such agreement, and joining in negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

Q: What about immigration of non-resident Palestinian Arabs?

A: During the transitional period, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Arab self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons who left the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, and Egypt and Israel will work with each other and other interested parties on procedures to resolve "the refugee problem."

Q: What role would Jordan play?

A: Jordan, if it agrees to do so, would participate in negotiating the resolution of the Palestinian problem; the five-year transitional arrangements; the modalities establishing the self-governing authority; the final status of the West Bank; a peace treaty with Israel which would include the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. It would also maintain liaison together with Israeli and Egyptian officers, with a "strong" local police force; and participate with Israel in joint patrols and the joint manning of the control posts to assure the security of the borders between the West Bank and Jordan.

Q: What role would the United States play?

A: The framework for peace states that the United States will be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the implementation of the agreements and the timetable for carrying out their obligations. As mentioned earlier, the United States also will build two air bases in the Negev. Secretary Vance's trip to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria is evidence that the United States will continue to play an active role in the negotiating process.

Q: What is the role of the United Nations?

A: As mentioned earlier, United Nations forces will be stationed in two zones in the Sinai.

The Security Council will be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council would be asked to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. The peace treaties are not conditioned upon such actions.

Q: Who "won" and who "lost"?

A: While each side made concessions, it is unproductive, indeed, harmful, to attempt to score the agreements like a prize fight. The agreement is a victory for peace. If treaties are successfully concluded and implemented, all the parties and peoples of the Middle East will benefit. The agreements also mark a victory for the counsels of moderation and pragmatism against the voices of dogmatism and fanaticism.

Q: What's the effect on American interests?

A: This is a victory for the American policy objective of seeking to achieve a stable and peaceful Middle East that will be less vulnerable to extremist, especially Communist, "adventurism." It reinforces the unique role of the United States as the only major power trusted by states on both sides of the Arab-Israel conflict, and thus represents another setback for Soviet policy in the middle East.

September 20, 1978

zc

78-960-115

Carter and Begin at Shabbat dinner

Jerusalem Post Staff

THURMONT, Maryland. — Prime Minister Menahem Begin, holding the traditional silver cup filled to the brim with kosher red wine, chanted the Kiddush during Friday night's Sabbath dinner at Camp David's Hickory Lodge as U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis — all wearing kipot — stood solemnly around the table and looked on.

The entire Israel delegation attending the summit talks, including the secretaries and security officials, as well as Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Defence Minister Ezer Weizman, was also at the two-hour dinner, singing the Sabbath songs.

As each song was started, Begin would explain to the U.S. president and his wife, Rosalynn, its meaning and significance.

Eli Rubinstein, Dayan's

religious aide, led the group in the blessing over the challah and the Birkat Hamazon, the grace after meals.

The idea of inviting Carter and the other American officials to the dinner was Begin's. During a private meeting between the American and Israeli leaders earlier in the day on Friday, Begin had asked Carter whether he wanted to join the Israeli delegation for dinner.

(Kosher caterers have provided special meals for the Israeli delegation throughout the conference. They went out of their way to make certain that the Sabbath dinner would be perfect, and that all the traditional foods would be available.)

According to Israeli sources present during the dinner, the President, who is a deeply religious Christian, was impressed. The strong religious convictions of Begin, Carter and Sadat have created a common bond of sorts between the three leaders.

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

OF B'NAI B'RITH

315 Lexington Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM

To: National Civil Rights Committee

From: Arnold Forster

Date: September 29, 1978

Subject:

Zev Furst, our representative in Israel, prepared the attached memorandum after observing the long and exhausting seventeen hour Knesset debate. As much as it does their political judgments, the memorandum reveals the emotional reactions of the Israelis to the Summit meeting at Camp David. And it is worth your time.

AF:lg
Attachment

cc: Middle Eastern Affairs Committee



MEMORANDUM

To: Benjamin R. Epstein and Arnold Forster

From: Zev Furst

Subject: Knesset Debate on Camp David Agreement

The drama in yesterday's Knesset debate lay not in the ultimate vote but rather in the new political map which may be emerging in Israel. Prime Minister Begin's old and trusted allies, the "fighting family," deserted their teacher and mentor during his finest hour. Listening to the 17-hour marathon debate (it began at 10:30 A.M. and ended at 3:30 A.M. the following morning), the irony of what was happening to Menachem Begin was apparent from the facial expressions of every Knesset member as they each listened to the 80 speakers (2/3 of the Knesset).

The final vote came as no surprise. Eighty-four supported the Camp David agreement and the dismantling of the settlement in the Rafiah Salient, 19 against and 17 abstentions. However, while 50 members of the Likud coalition voted in favor, a majority of the Herut faction, Begin's political base, either sustained or voted against. It was the Labor Party that gave Begin an absolute Knesset majority.

The drama began unfolding three days ago as Menachem Begin presented to the Knesset the agreements negotiated at Camp David, and asked for Knesset support. As Begin mounted the rostrum that day, the full force of tension, frustrations and agony came pouring out of the mouth of Geula Cohen, Begin's old comrade in arms, who accused the Prime Minister of sacrificing the interests of the Jewish state and endangering the continued existence of Israel as a sovereign state.

For a week since the Camp David accords were announced at the joint White House press conference, Gush Emunim and settlers of the territories -- not only in the Rafiah Salient, but in the Golan and in Judea and Samaria as well -- have been staging demonstrations, trying to create illegal settlements and hurling charges that Prime Minister Begin abandoned his electoral commitment to the people of Israel and sold out the interests of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel (the territories). These demonstrations were small; yet they expressed the gut fear, agony and apprehension of the unknown future which was shared by Israelis from all shades of the political spectrum.

There were many poignant moments during the course of the past week. Television reporters who interviewed settlers in the Rafiah Salient, caught a glimpse of the trauma that had affected many of the residents there since the announcement of the Camp David agreement. These settlers were not members of Gush Emunim or other radical fringe groups on the Israeli political spectrum. They were, in the Israeli milieu, the implementers of classic Zionist ideology -- those that left the cities to settle the land at the behest of the former Labor government; they were Israel's chalutzim -- pioneers. And, now, these normal and average people (or perhaps they are not average, but really Israel's finest) who certainly never supported Mr. Begin's political philosophy and who did not want to be the "obstacle to peace" were finding themselves being asked to abandon their homes and their means of sustenance because of considerations of Real Politics. A woman with three children, all of whom were born in Sadot, in the Rafiah Salient, readily admitted that she would abide by the government's decision but she could not accept in the future any promise from the government.

I thought I understood Israel until this past week. The depth of emotional commitment to certain concepts inherent in Zionism surprised me. Never in the history of Zionism has a settlement been voluntarily abandoned. And now, the

people of Israel were being asked to accept what had hitherto been the unthinkable. While undoubtedly some people used this emotional commitment for political motives, the Israeli in the street who had no axe to grind nevertheless was faced with a profound moral dilemma and anguish -- that a basic philosophical, ideological and fundamental point on which he or she had been brought up to accept was now being thrown away. The choice was harsh: a possible (even probable) peace with the largest country in the Arab world at the price of casting aside and negating a basic tenet on which the state was built and accepting very serious risks to the security of Israel, or foregoing this opportunity for peace after 30 years of war and bloodshed. The Prime Minister was brutally candid: If the Knesset refused to dismantle the settlement in the Rafiah Salient, there would be no peace agreement with Egypt.

The debate in the Knesset yesterday revolved around this one fundamental question. After all was said and done, while there were very serious questions about the actual agreement which Begin brought back from Camp David, the moral dilemma of which choice was the right one, lay at the center of every Knesset member's speech. Let us not be fooled; whichever way the Knesset would have decided, a fundamental principle would have been compromised.

Members of the Opposition and even within Begin's own party, challenged the efficacy of the Camp David agreement. Charges were hurled that the seeds of a Palestinian state had been planted by Camp David; that what Israel gave to Sadat was a precedent that would be demanded by Hussein and Assad in future negotiations; if Israel gives up the settlements in the Rafiah Salient, will not the settlements of the West Bank be next and indeed, Jerusalem after that?

The Labor Party voted with the government. They criticized the agreements using of course the above argument. It was the role in this drama of those within the Likud who opposed the agreements to direct their attack not at the specifics of the agreements but rather at Menachem Begin, the man. Some of his comrades in arms rose to speak more in sadness than in anger; others attacked Mr. Begin using terms of "traitor," "turncoat," and other epithets reserved in the past for attacks on the greatest enemies of Jabotinsky. To these members of the "fighting family" of Menachem Begin, the problem was not that they had deserted Begin, but rather that Begin had deserted them and the principles of the movement he has led over the past 35 years.

There were others in the Knesset who rose to speak unstintingly in support of the Camp David agreement, referring to it as the breakthrough on the way to a peace. Yet, rather than resuming the euphoria of November, 1977, everyone in yesterday's drama believed that Israel was being asked to pay a very heavy price and take some very serious risks to attain peace. It was a sombre but historic occasion.

The Knesset debate, in the final analysis, reflected Israel's national trauma. It reflected those who absolutely rejected the agreement; it reflected those who were troubled by the moral choice and either opted to support the agreement because peace is paramount or those that were against the agreement because Israel was being asked too high a price, to forego its historic rights; it reflected those who believed that Egypt is the key to peace in the region and well worth the risk. In this respect the Knesset drama yesterday portrayed a true picture of Israel.

Nevertheless, while preparations are now being made for the continuation of the negotiations with Egypt, Israel's future political map is somewhat uncertain. For, in yesterday's debate, it was Lyova Eliav's left wing, peace party, Shelli, and David Ben-Gurion's Labor Party which came to the support of Menachem Begin. It


was Begin's political base, Herut, which attacked him; only the Liberal faction of the Likud which supported him. What effect this will have on Israel's domestic political future, and indeed upon the Prime Minister of Israel, remains to be seen.

The paradoxical and sometime comical nature of Israeli politics was also once again apparent. The man charged with directing Israel's Information efforts abroad, Zaloman Shoval, abstained; it is difficult to understand how he can now explain to the world the policies of the government of Israel. Or, Begin's hand-picked Speaker of the Knesset, Yitzhok Shamir, who refused to go along with his political leader and also abstained. Or, finally, Moshe Shamir, a former member of Hashomer Hatzair and defender of Josef Stalin in the past, who was heard accusing Mr. Begin of compromising the security interests of Israel and undermining Zionist principles; he voted against.

I think that the Knesset rose to the occasion yesterday notwithstanding the long and weary speeches which two-thirds of the members decided were necessary. Mr. Begin was at his finest hour. The Knesset played out the historical drama and the people of Israel closed their television sets at 4 o'clock in the morning not knowing whether the risk was worth the price, but with the hope that Israel may be a giant step closer to peace. Never before, since the re-creation of Israel in 1948, have the prayers of the community here been more meaningful than what they will be this year when people gather in synagogues on Rosh Hashanah to pray for a peaceful New Year.

ZF: lg

September 28, 1978



ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

OF B'NAI B'RITH

315 Lexington Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016

*File
Israel - Egypt
Camp David*

MEMORANDUM

To: ~~ADL Regional Offices~~
From: ~~Arnold Forster~~
Date: ~~September 26, 1978~~
Subject:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION


National Commission

BENJAMIN R. EPSTEIN

Attached for your careful study and use is an analysis of the results of the Camp David meeting of Egypt, Israel and the United States. Prepared by Ken Jacobson of our Middle Eastern Affairs Department, it is available to use when called upon for an ADL evaluation of the historic event. But please do not release it for publication; if and when that is done, it will be from the National Office.

AF:am
Attachment

cc: Middle Eastern Affairs Committee
CRCs



[start]

Original documents
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The Camp David Accords: An Analysis

by Kenneth Jacobson
Assistant Director, Middle Eastern Affairs Department
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

The Camp David accords constitute the most significant step toward peace in the Middle East in more than 30 years. This would appear certain even while recognizing that difficult days still lie ahead, that the accords could yet produce results disturbing to many Israelis, that in the worst of scenarios the agreements could unravel.

The accords are of great significance primarily because they provide for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within 90 days. Israel has sought such a development ever since its creation in 1948 and its imminence is surely historic. Without Egypt, as has frequently been noted, the Arabs cannot mount a credible military threat to basic Israeli security.

Yet few, if any, envisioned this kind of success at Camp David. Indeed right up to the convening of the summit, sources on all sides were projecting either failure or success merely in terms of the creation of a mechanism to set the faltering negotiations into motion once again.

What happened? Aside from Jimmy Carter's personal influence, which has received a great deal of media attention, what factors went into producing this unexpected success? And what impact will these factors have on the prospects for further success?

The most important factor leading to the accords was the willingness of all parties, while continuing to seek a comprehensive settlement, not to be slaves to the idea. For Menachem Begin this was no particular problem. He had repeatedly called for a comprehensive solution, but along the way he made any number of statements and proposals (such as his pre-Camp David idea for a partial permanent settlement with Egypt) which indicated he could be satisfied with far less.

For Anwar Sadat and Jimmy Carter it was another matter.

Let us recall that when Sadat went to Jerusalem last November there was much comment that he had done so out of a sense that Egypt's future mattered most, that Carter's insistence on a comprehensive solution at a Geneva conference with a Soviet presence was leading to deadlock and even war. Events of the ensuing ten months, however, made it less clear what Sadat's motives were. In particular, his withdrawal from negotiations in Jerusalem in January and his refusal after the Leeds Conference in July to negotiate until Israel agreed in advance to full withdrawal from the territories, indicated that he was looking to carry water on both shoulders -- to be the hero of the Egyptian people by winning the Sinai and peace, to be the hero of the pan-Arab cause by gaining all the territories and a Palestinian state. It seemed that he hoped to accomplish this diplomatic legerdemain by the magic of his trip to Jerusalem and by the pressures of the Americans following the triumph of the trip. What such an approach ignored was that all Israel -- not only Menachem Begin -- would never capitulate to such extreme demands, Sadat the hero notwithstanding.

Thus, at the time of Camp David, Sadat was increasingly being forced to decide what he wanted from his decision of November -- to stick to pan-Arab demands which meant his moving back into the Arab fold and watch his "initiative"

go down the drain, or to seek more realistic goals which meant gaining an accord for Egypt and getting as much as he could for the Arab world without being shackled by the impossible task of getting everything for them. He chose the latter course which, in retrospect, makes his trip to Jerusalem last November the historic and irreversible decision that everyone labeled it 10 months ago.

For the Carter Administration, it is both ironic and a sign of growing maturity that its most glorious moment came with the final defeat of its original approach to Middle East peace -- the comprehensive solution formula. The Administration's abandonment of its approach began after about a month of lukewarm American reaction to the Sadat trip to Jerusalem. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in January came up with a high-sounding theory of concentric circles, whereby Israel and Egypt would first make progress, then they would attract other moderates such as the Jordanians and moderate Palestinians, and finally the Syrians and Russians would complete peace at a kind of Geneva Conference. The political science language aside, the U.S. was beginning to say, in light of Sadat-Begin in Jerusalem, that it no longer was advocating unlimited devotion to the comprehensive solution idea.

The culmination of this progress occurred, of course, at Camp David. Sadat has committed himself to working for an agreement on the West Bank and Gaza and he has suggested that if Jordan and the Palestinians don't join the process, he will negotiate for them. Whether or not this happens, the crucial fact remains that a peace treaty seems imminent between Israel and Egypt irrespective of developments on the West Bank. And Jimmy Carter has been a major contributor to this remarkable development.

A second factor which was necessary for success was the major risk-taking concessions of Menachem Begin, which began last December and culminated at Camp David. First and foremost, his decision in December to return the sovereignty of the Sinai to Egypt (for which many Labor opponents criticized him) gave Sadat the incentive to continue the process; and Begin's decision at Camp David to give up the three Sinai airfields and allow a Knesset vote on the Sinai settlements in effect gave Egypt everything and sharpened the decision described earlier that Sadat had to make. It should be mentioned that Begin's concessions in the Sinai went a good deal beyond that of strategists in past Israeli governments; in exchange for peace, however, the Israeli people will undoubtedly support it.

Begin's movement on West Bank issues are of equal importance in that they reflect a true willingness to compromise and offer enticements to parties which also are interested in compromise. This movement took place in three stages, beginning in December, continuing in July at Leeds, and culminating in Camp David. It started with the 26-point proposal which granted self-rule to the Arabs of the West Bank, called for the withdrawal of the military government, and left open the question of sovereignty. It advanced substantially at Leeds when foreign minister Dayan informed the Egyptians that Israel would discuss the sovereignty matter after the transitional period and, if the Egyptians were unhappy with the self-rule plan and preferred territorial compromise, Israel would consider that as well. So it was that by the time Camp David began, Israel had already indicated that it was amenable to geographical or functional compromise and the choice lay with Sadat. At Camp David, Israel rounded

out its earlier concessions by offering to withdraw its military forces to security areas, to apply U.N. Resolution 242 in all its parts, and to recognize the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." In the final analysis, Israel is offering the Arabs of the West Bank an opportunity to control their day-to-day lives without endangering Israeli security. No Israeli leader could have gone much further since the main issues on which Israel did not concede -- complete withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the area and the creation of a Palestinian state -- are part of the Israeli consensus.

Jimmy Carter's decision to act as "full partner" in the Camp David talks was yet another factor in producing success. This seems to have been particularly true in helping to break the deadlock which existed until Camp David -- Egypt's insistence that Israel agree to total withdrawal on the West Bank versus Israel's insistence that it never could do so. On this point Israel got its way (indeed no Israeli government could agree to the Egyptian demand), but in exchange Sadat seems to expect American support for Arab positions on all the vague points embodied in the framework for West Bank peace. This was particularly manifest on the momentous Sunday night in the White House some 10 days ago when Sadat called on the President to continue to play his "indispensable" role as "full partner."

Finally, underlying all the above-mentioned factors as a moving force toward peace, was the Soviet menace in the Middle East. It is clear from the long history of Jewish-Arab relations in the 20th century, that the best hope for accord occurs when the Arabs perceive that the need to unite against an external danger supersedes the need to wage ideological warfare against Zionism. And today, with the Soviet Union gaining influence in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen and possibly Iran, and, as a result, with Egypt eager to align with moderate anti-Soviet forces -- even including Israel -- that very situation exists. And so the vision of a Middle East alliance of moderate nations, supported by the United States, began to take shape at Camp David.

With the success of Camp David, two questions arise: Will it hold up? Will it bring in other parties for a broader peace?

The factors described above should contribute to positive responses to these questions. At the same time, there are countervailing forces at work which leave many things in doubt. Certain temporary observations are offered here:

-- Sadat has indicated that he will follow through on his commitments at Camp David no matter what his Arab neighbors say or do; the urgent sense of independence which seems to pervade Sadat's thinking gives cause to heed his remarks whatever Arab pressures follow. His decision to free himself from the comprehensive solution was undoubtedly well-thought out and suggests seriousness and steadfastness. And the support he received at home from the public and from the military will undoubtedly stiffen his resolve.


-- Sadat, in his remarks concerning America's role as full partner, is seeking to lure the Jordanians and the Saudis into the process by suggesting that even though they didn't get all they wanted on paper, the American presence will help make a different reality on the ground.

-- The Soviet menace concerns the Jordanians and Saudis at least as much as it does Sadat. Faced with the choice of joining the moderate camp or abandoning it for the radical camp of Syria-Iraq-Libya with Soviet backing, Jordan and Saudi Arabia may well accept less from Israel for the protection of the American-sponsored umbrella.

On the other hand, pan-Arab pressures are at work on Jordan and Saudi Arabia to reject Camp David (already we saw evidence of this during the post-Camp David Vance trip). For Jordan, the pressures take military form from the north from Syria and financial from the south from Saudi Arabia. For Saudi Arabia, the problem is whether it is willing to yield its hard-earned position as pan-Arab leader and conciliator by abandoning its demands for Jerusalem and full Israeli withdrawal in exchange for an alliance against the Soviet menace.

We have no clear answers to these questions at this time, and may not have any for some time to come. Both Jordan and Saudi Arabia may continue for some time to attack Camp David without foreclosing the option of joining the process.

Still, what is significant, and what again makes Camp David a truly remarkable achievement, is that irrespective of what these parties do, Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat will be moving toward peace. Whether full peace can emerge from this beginning or whether sometime down the road the whole thing will come unglued, also is in the realm of the unknown. But for now, it is clear that peace has won a major victory.



Loose ends after Camp David

CARTER, BEGIN, SADAT EXCHANGE LETTERS

Full texts of nine letters between Israel, Egypt and the United States released by the White House on Friday. All letters from Mr. Carter are dated September 22 1978, all the other letters are dated Sept. 17 1978.

TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN:

I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after my return home I will submit a motion before Israel's parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the following question:

If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you in favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas?"

The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free from the usual parliamentary party discipline to the effect that although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both of the government and the opposition benches will be enabled to vote in accordance with his own conscience.

TO PRESIDENT SADAT FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the latter's decision.

In this connection, I understand from your letter that Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotiations on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT SADAT:

In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the settlements:

1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty.

2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty.

3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "framework" shall be void and invalid.

TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, describing how you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's letter to me on this subject.

TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT SADAT:

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem.

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored.

2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.

3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian People in the West Bank.

4. Relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the city are null and void and should be rescinded.

5. All peoples must have free access to the city and enjoy the free exercises of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination.

6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives.

7. Essential functions in the city should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the city shall be undivided.

TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN:

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 — Israel's parliament (the Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "The government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the state to any part of the Eretz Israel Land of Israel — (Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel.

TO PRESIDENT SADAT FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, setting forth the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost of the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969.

TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT SADAT:

In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the implementation of the comprehensive settlement.

To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian People, Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian People.

TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:

I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:

A. In each paragraph of the agreed framework document the expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs."

B. In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.

[end]

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Zionist Organization of America

ZOA HOUSE • 4 EAST 34th STREET • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016 • (212) 481-1500

Office of the President

September 18, 1978

TO MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
REGIONAL AND DISTRICT LEADERS

Statement on Camp David Summit


Dear Friends:

Enclosed please find my statement on the just concluded Camp David Summit.

There are many details yet to be disclosed and questions to be answered. We will, of course, keep you advised as the negotiations between Israel and Egypt continue.

Best regards.

Cordially,



Ivan J. Novick
President

IJN:kyb
Enclosure

STATEMENT

by

IVAN J. NOVICK, PRESIDENT
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

With a deep sense of satisfaction we welcome the joint announcement by Prime Minister Begin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt that a framework for negotiations between Israel and Egypt has been established.

Prime Minister Begin, his cabinet and advisors, deserve high praise for their perseverance in spite of great obstacles. They submitted very realistic and far-reaching proposals for an overall peace. If the people of Israel ratify the decision of their leader, it will be because they are convinced it will safeguard the rights and security of the Jewish State and fulfill the aspirations of Zionism upon which it is founded.

It is clear that Prime Minister Begin's position has been vindicated by his refusal to make premature concessions which would have seriously restricted his ability to negotiate.

While we pray that the forthcoming negotiations shall be successful, the lessons of the past must be kept clearly in focus.

Only a strong Israel was able to convince Sadat that it is in his own interest to seek the option of peace, instead of pursuing the alternative of war.

Only because the leaders of Israel refuse to capitulate to pressure and threat, were they met at the negotiating table as equals.

Only because the people of Israel and the Jewish people everywhere maintained self-respect and pride, and confidence and faith in their destiny, did their adversary choose the path of compromise.

As details of the agreement are made known, and as Egypt and Israel, in the spirit of Camp David, continue to negotiate, we acknowledge with respect the initiative and guidance of President Jimmy Carter.

His resolve to seek solutions to difficult problems served all parties. His recognition that a strong Israel is vital to the peace process is an enlightened conclusion which we applaud.

In the days ahead we trust that the President will continue to exercise his good offices as a mediator, permitting the leaders of the countries involved to continue their face-to-face negotiations. This is the only realistic process upon which lasting agreements can be based.

September 18, 1978

Camp David Peace Initiative
Sumner

NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
THURSDAY, OCT. 12, 1978

STATEMENT BY RICHARD MAASS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
ON THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN PEACE TALKS STARTING IN WASHINGTON TODAY

"We hope and pray that the negotiations under President Carter's auspices which begin in Washington today between the representatives of Egypt and Israel will quickly succeed in transforming the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel into a formal treaty of lasting peace.

"The most immediate threat to peace in the Middle East today is the tragic conflict in Lebanon. This grim reality has been underscored in recent days by the gruesome scenes of Lebanese Christian civilians being mercilessly gunned down by Syrian "peace-keeping" forces in Beirut as the Christian refugees sought to flee their bombarded homes. We urge our Government to redouble its international efforts to insure that the Security Council ordered cease-fire is scrupulously observed, that the Syrian occupation forces be withdrawn, and that effective measures be taken to reestablish Lebanon's unity in a manner that protects the rights of the diverse religious and ethnic population groups within Lebanese society and assures that Lebanon not be used as a base for attacks against Israel or its other neighbors.

"The Camp David Framework for Peace in the Middle East opens the door to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and moderate Palestinians to join the peace-making process. We urge the United States to continue to make it clear to them that only through direct negotiations with Israel can they achieve their legitimate objectives and that the rejectionist policies of Soviet-backed Libya and Iraq are destructive of their own true interests. We trust also that the wavering Saudis will also throw their weight behind the forces for lasting peace in the Middle East."

10/10/78
7 8-960-128

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

F. Camp David

date October 25, 1978
to Miles Zitmore- Dallas Office
from George Gruen
subject Community Relations Implications of Peace Between Egypt and Israel

Now that the holidays are over, I hasten to acknowledge your thoughtful memo of October 13 on the community relations implications of peace between Egypt and Israel.

As you will see from the set of four op-eds which we prepared and Sonya Kaufer distributed on October 18, we are already pushing some of the very themes you suggested under heading I.

We are also moving forward on interpreting the Jerusalem question and the WOJAC and PLO and related issues.

We have had some preliminary discussions on both the lay and staff levels of what we might do contribute to fostering a climate of increasing American economic investment in Israel and Egypt as well as the possibilities of some joint projects. But this is a complicated subject that we want to examine quietly before we become more directly involved in public. Since you have had considerable experience in Dallas I would welcome additional thoughts from you as to the ways in which AJC chapters might usefully be involved.

Much of the preliminary work must be done with great discretion. For example, a leading Israeli official has expressed an interest in the names of American Jews who would be prepared to invest in Egypt! If you have any suggestions, please call me. This is an indication that the Israelis realize the indirect benefits to Israel of helping Sadat overcome the tremendous obstacles that face Egypt as it begins to turn from a war to a peacetime economy. By the way, one should not minimize the difficulties that Egypt faces and there is a danger that the Egyptian people and more importantly, the army officers, will become disillusioned if there is no rapid improvement in the economic situation.

In encouraging American-Jewish investment in Egypt we must also be aware of the dilemma that by offering Jewish help we on the one hand strengthen the image of Jewish economic clout, but on the other hand raise the danger that if not many American Jews invest in Egypt or if the investments turn sour, that American Jews and indirectly,

MEMORANDUM

Israel will be blamed for the failure of Egypt's economy to achieve miraculous development. You will recall that Anwar Sadat once stated in Washington that he could not buy a radio set after 1948 because the Zionist Jews who controlled the Egyptian economy did not wish to sell it to him. (Sadat is not the only Egyptian with such views. When I was in Egypt in February, 1977 with the Interreligious Study Mission, the Coptic Bishop Samuel told us that it was natural that there was anti-Semitism in many countries because the people resented the Jewish control of the economies of their countries.)

GEG/el

cc: Harold Applebaum
Will Katz
Morris Fine
Ira Silverman
Mort Yarmon
David Geller
Marc Tannenbaum ✓
Hy Bookbinder
Bert Gold



Camp David

NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, Dec. 14....The American Jewish Committee today urged President Carter to "continue his efforts toward peace in the Middle East based on the agreements reached at Camp David, and not to superimpose on those agreements the added demands that Egypt has proposed since that conference, and that Israel has found it necessary to reject."

Bertram H. Gold, AJC's Executive Vice President, in a statement, pointed out that the negotiations since the conclusion of the Camp David meeting have "changed from drafting a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt to a virtual re-writing of the Camp David agreements."

"There was no mention of linkage at Camp David;" Mr. Gold declared, "there was no reference to a timetable for elections in the administered territories; and there was no inkling of subordinating the long-sought and agonizingly negotiated Israeli-Egyptian agreement to the policies and intentions of parties sworn to hostility towards Israel."

The full text of Mr. Gold's statement follows:

"The American Jewish Committee urges President Carter to continue his efforts toward peace in the Middle East based on the agreements reached at Camp David, and not to superimpose on those agreements the added demands that Egypt has proposed since that conference, and that Israel has found it necessary to reject.

"During the past four weeks the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations have been characterized by a steady rise in demands by Egypt to tie the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty to commitments to be made by Israel on the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, Egypt now demands that its obligations under the proposed peace treaty with Israel not preclude her from participating in hostilities against Israel in case fighting breaks out between Israel and other Arab states who are still in a state of war with the Jewish state.

"Israel has attempted to meet Egypt half-way in this process, to the point where actions to be taken in relation to the West Bank and Gaza issues and the commitment of Israel to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East have become an essential component of the bilateral treaty draft. What is being discussed now is the preparation of a treaty draft that would represent a departure from the Camp David agreements, which consist of two separate and distinct frameworks. There was no mention of linkage at Camp David; there was no reference to a timetable for elections in the administered territories; and there was no inkling of subordinating the long-sought and agonizingly negotiated Israeli-Egyptian agreement to the policies and intentions of parties sworn to hostility towards Israel.

"The process of the past three months thus has changed from that of drafting a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt to a virtual re-writing of the Camp David agreements.

- more -

Richard Maass, President; Maynard I. Wishner, Chairman, Board of Governors; Morton K. Blaustein, Chairman, National Executive Council; Howard I. Friedman, Chairman, Board of Trustees

Bertram H. Gold, Executive Vice President

Washington Office, 818 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 • Europe hq.: 41 rue Paul Doumer, 75016, Paris, France • Israel hq.: 9 Ethiopia St., Jerusalem, 95149, Israel

Mexico-Central America hq.: Av. E. Nacional 533, Mexico 5, D.F.

"It is this process that Israel has found itself compelled to resist, even as she worked out a series of compromises that she deemed compatible with the Camp David agreements. But then, in the last few weeks, Egypt began to pile demand upon demand. It seemed that every Israeli concession led to new and stiffer Egyptian demands.

"Throughout this period, the United States has looked kindly upon Egyptian policy and, to a large extent, supported it. This holds particularly with regard to a detailed timetable for elections on the West Bank and Gaza. Mere willingness by Egypt to negotiate about her own escalating demands was greeted by Washington as flexibility, generosity and readiness to compromise. At the same time, major Israeli concessions were received at the White House or State Department either in silence or acknowledged by perfunctory comments of approval. In effect, the role of Washington in the past three months has subtly but clearly changed from that of mediator to advocate. And, in sharp contrast to his creative efforts at Camp David, President Carter's repeated expressions of impatience and frustration, either explicitly or implicitly addressed to Israel, have been neither appropriate nor helpful. This change in the American role has eroded the high confidence and the unprecedented willingness to take risks for peace that Israel exhibited at the conclusion of the Camp David summit and in the initial period of the peace treaty negotiations.

"Against this background, we believe the most important contribution to a successful pursuit of the negotiating process is for the United States to exhibit the kind of patience and understanding for the problems of both sides that is indispensable for the success that we all seek in the interest of the United States, the two countries concerned, and of peace in the Middle East."

12/14/78
78-960-171
A,EJP, FOR, COL, NPL, NPE



NEWS

FROM THE

COMMITTEE

Camp David

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT BY RICHARD MAASS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT AT THE CONCLUSION OF CAMP DAVID SUMMIT CONFERENCE

We join in congratulating President Carter, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin for the historic breakthrough on the road to Arab-Israel peace that they achieved at Camp David.

The leadership and perseverance of President Carter and the statesmanship and dedication to peace displayed by the Israeli and Egyptian leaders helped overcome many difficulties to produce the present framework for peace in the Middle East. Israel's leaders have once again demonstrated their deep yearning for peace by their readiness to make major concessions and take substantial risks for the sake of reaching a lasting agreement.

However, obstacles still remain before this blueprint can be translated into an enduring edifice of peace. Further progress now requires the prompt and effective participation of Jordan, the practical endorsements of moderate Palestinians and the constructive support of Saudi Arabia.

We deplore the negative voices already being heard in the Arab world. We hope and pray that they will come to realize that only through a renunciation of war and a readiness to follow the Egyptian example of recognition and normalization of relations with Israel will lasting peace come to the strife-torn Middle East.

9/18/78
78-960-107

None - return to Airc -
[Signature]

12/14/78

TO: Edward Sanders

From: Hy Bookbinder

RE: Current Impasse on Egyptian-Israeli Treaty

I have already discussed with Marvin Feuerwerker the substance of this memo, but wanted to get it in writing for you so that it would be on your desk the moment you return from Israel. My comments below have been discussed this morning with Bert Gold and they reflect the position of our officers.

There is great distress -- a better word would be outrage -- over the developments of the last 24 hours. These hours have produced one of the worst cases of unequal treatment of Israel and of general overkill that I have ever observed. All of the headlines and broadcast reports paint Israel this morning as the party that is making final agreement impossible, as the one who is rejecting terms that Egypt and the US have agreed upon, etc., etc.

Apart from the substance of the immediate differences, it is simply impossible to understand why the President of the US should choose to excoriate Israel for its present position when there was almost total silence during the past two weeks when it was Egypt who was saying "No" to the proposed treaty while Israel's cabinet had approved -- albeit with serious misgivings -- that treaty. It was Egypt who was making new demands. And in the last 24 hours, when Egypt adds even additional demands -- very critical ones, as we shall note -- why should the US lose its temper and its patience without giving the Israeli cabinet and people at least a few days to explain its position and its counter-proposals? We all know how much better it would be if the parties could make the December 17 deadline. But is making that target date more important than getting a treaty and an understanding which both parties could genuinely agree with and live with?

I do not, of course, have access to detailed information which would permit a fuller and totally reliable judgement, but from what I sense is the situation, Sadat has now added two most critical demands:

1) Egypt would make the exchange of Ambassadors contingent upon the actual implementation of self rule. Thus, he refutes the contention that any timetable for self rule would only be a goal and would not affect Israeli-Egyptian agreements as such. After all, it is the beginning of genuine diplomatic relations that constitutes the only meaningful thing the Israelis get out of the treaty. This latest demand means that the linkage being sought by Egypt -- and presumably by the US now -- would be an absolute one, making the treaty implementation totally conditional upon Palestinian developments.

2) Egypt evidently now demands that Article 6 be interpreted to mean that Egypt's commitment to no-war against Israel would apply only after there is complete peace among all parties in the area. That, however, is the essence of Article 6. If there were in fact a comprehensive peace in place, why would Article 6 be needed?

As you know, Ed, the Jewish community has had some serious problems with administration policy in recent weeks. But it has chosen to be relatively silent and hopeful that it will all work out right. But these latest developments might very well lead to a major resistance and outcry. The statement of majority leader Byrd only adds to the anguish, especially since he went to the Middle East as an emissary of the President. I urge the immediate review of the present stance of the White House and a modification of this anti-Israeli campaign.

NEW YORK, Dec. 14....The American Jewish Committee today urged President Carter to "continue his efforts toward peace in the Middle East based on the agreements reached at Camp David, and not to superimpose on those agreements the added demands that Egypt has proposed since that conference, and that Israel has found it necessary to reject."

Bertram H. Gold, AJC's Executive Vice President, in a statement, pointed out that the negotiations since the conclusion of the Camp David meeting have "changed from drafting a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt to a virtual re-writing of the Camp David agreements."

"There was no mention of linkage at Camp David;" Mr. Gold declared, "there was no reference to a timetable for elections in the administered territories; and there was no inkling of subordinating the long-sought and agonizingly negotiated Israeli-Egyptian agreement to the policies and intentions of parties sworn to hostility towards Israel."

The full text of Mr. Gold's statement follows:

"The American Jewish Committee urges President Carter to continue his efforts toward peace in the Middle East based on the agreements reached at Camp David, and not to superimpose on those agreements the added demands that Egypt has proposed since that conference, and that Israel has found it necessary to reject.

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"Israel has attempted to meet Egypt half-way in this process, to the point where actions to be taken in relation to the West Bank and Gaza issues and the commitment of Israel to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East have become an essential component of the bilateral treaty draft. What is being discussed now is the preparation of a treaty draft that would represent a departure from the Camp David agreements, which consist of two separate and distinct frameworks. There was no mention of linkage at Camp David; there was no reference to a timetable for elections in the administered territories; and there was no inkling of subordinating the long-sought and agonizingly negotiated Israeli-Egyptian agreement to the policies and intentions of parties sworn to hostility towards Israel.

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- more -

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Bertram H. Gold, Executive Vice President


Washington Office, 318 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 • Europe hq.: 41 rue Paul Doumer, 75016, Paris, France • Israel hq.: 9 Ethiopia St., Jerusalem, 95149, Israel
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"It is this process that Israel has found itself compelled to resist, even as she worked out a series of compromises that she deemed compatible with the Camp David agreements. But then, in the last few weeks, Egypt began to pile demand upon demand. It seemed that every Israeli concession led to new and stiffer Egyptian demands.

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"Against this background, we believe the most important contribution to a successful pursuit of the negotiating process is for the United States to exhibit the kind of patience and understanding for the problems of both sides that is indispensable for the success that we all seek in the interest of the United States, the two countries concerned, and of peace in the Middle East."

12/14/78
78-960-171
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The New York Times

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1978

ESSAY

"First Peace" First

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — President Carter spent more than a year trying to bring about a Geneva-style "comprehensive" peace agreement in the Mideast — with Soviet representatives present and the radical Arabs having veto power over Egyptian actions — and failed.

At Camp David, by acceding to the non-comprehensive approach that both Israelis and Egyptians wanted — a "first peace" between those two nations, with another, separate, agreement for West Bank autonomy — the President started to succeed.

Today the completion of that "first peace" is threatened by Mr. Carter's renewed attempt to go "comprehensive," to force the Israelis to give up the West Bank and thus to establish the homeland for Palestinian Arabs that Israelis see as a knife in their side.

Here is how the preliminary accords have been endangered. President Carter sent State Department Arabist Harold Saunders (you remember him — he arranged the sellout of the Kurdish people at the behest of Mr. Kissinger and the Shah) to assure Jordan's King Hussein that his hope for the ultimate removal of Jewish settlements from the West Bank was not misplaced.

News of that Saunders-Hussein meeting, with its suggestion of withdrawal from an area the Israelis have no intention of abandoning, caused the Israelis to make a point of "thickening" their West Bank settlements with new settlers, as they had every right to do.

Those West Bank settlements are vital to Israel's security. Jordan claims that area by right of conquest in 1948; Israel claims it by right of history and in repelling an aggressive war in 1967; the P.L.O. claims it, too. Israel, by asserting its claim with the presence of Jewish settlers, makes possible a living-together compromise in that area under an autonomous local government — an effective neutralization. Even a hint of abandonment of Israel's claim would insure creation of a state capable of shelling Tel Aviv.

The Egyptians understand that Mr. Sadat has tacitly accepted the West Bank settlements, just as he refused to accept Israeli settlements in Egypt's Sinai, where Israel does not claim sovereignty and has agreed to leave. That was why Mr. Sadat's reaction to the "thickening" of West Bank settlements was at first muted.

But the Carter Administration went through the roof at Israel's public reassertion of its right to settle in the face of the Saunders provocation. Since Mr. Sadat could not allow himself to be seen in the Arab world as any less militant on behalf of the Palestinians than Mr. Carter, he was drawn into upping the ante. The Egyptian called for the stronger tying-together of the specific first-peace agreement between Egypt and Israel with the general "framework of peace" agreement about the West Bank, adding his demand for a deadline on Israeli withdrawal of military forces from lands retaken in 1967.

That "linkage" of a solid deal with an ephemeral deal is a trap into which the Israelis will not step. Neither Egyptians nor Israelis have control over how soon an agreement can be reached with local Palestinians or King Hussein on West Bank autonomy. By tying that "iffy" West Bank negotiation with the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, Mr. Sadat and Mr. Carter would achieve exactly what Israel is determined to avoid — a "conditional" peace treaty.

Here's the trap: by its Egyptian treaty, Israel would be required to dismantle its bases in the Sinai and begin to turn the territory back to Egypt. But if that treaty were made conditional on a West Bank agreement, then unless Israel caved in to radical Arab demands, the Egyptians could legally claim that its treaty requirements have not been met; Mr. Sadat could then call the peace off. That's why Israel's desire for a clean first peace, unencumbered by "ifs" and loopholes, is so important. The "linkage" — the loophole that would allow Egypt to keep the Sinai without a peace if Palestinians, in terror of Mr. Arafat, refuse to cut a West Bank deal — is a central issue.

Amazingly, it is not Mr. Sadat who has re-introduced the issue that was successfully finessed at Camp David. The heat to write in the loophole comes from Mr. Carter, with his born-again "comprehensive" scheme, endangering the first peace by trying to force Israel to tie that treaty to the abandonment of its West Bank claims.

Evidently Mr. Carter has forgotten why Camp David succeeded: only because Mr. Sadat and Mr. Begin agreed to the principle of a solid, stand-by-itself first peace. By turning the clock back to 1977, the President is undermining everyone's best recent efforts.

White House insiders hint that the reason for the "linkage" pressure is to placate the Saudis, who have turned thumbs down on Camp David; this leaning on Israel is supposed to be in our interest.

But think about our strategic position: With 4,000 Soviet nationals now running Afghanistan; with the Shah of Iran seriously weakened; with Pakistan about to send a man to Moscow to negotiate an accommodation; with a powerful Cuban military force in Ethiopia capable of moving on the Mideast oil fields — would it not be a sound strategic move for the United States to establish reliable bases in the only democracy in the area?

**NATIONAL HEBREW
COMMUNITY RELATIONS
ADVISORY COUNCIL**

55 WEST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10036 • Longarea 4-3453

December 15, 1978

TO: NJCRAC and CJF Member Agencies

FROM: Rabbi Israel Miller, Chairman, and Bennett Yanowitz, Vice Chairman,
NJCRAC Israel Task Force

RE: Action Recommendations on the Administration's Posture

Deeply concerned by the shift of the Administration from that of mediator to that of advocate of Egypt's new demands, an augmented Israel Task Force Strategy Committee met this morning in emergency session and made the following assessment and recommendations for action.

Assessment

At Camp David the President, demonstrating patience and understanding of the problems of both sides, sought and found the common ground that led to the Camp David agreements. That role, essential for any mediator, apparently has been discarded and replaced by a new posture as the advocate of Egypt.

The United States has taken this stance despite the fact that the Israeli cabinet approved the draft treaty and annexes agreed upon November 11 in the Blair House negotiations -- the draft was originally prepared by the United States. Sadat not only rejected the Blair House treaty but interposed new demands. The Administration chose to soft-peddle this rejection and instead focused on the concerns of the Israeli Cabinet about a timetable for elections of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Administration supports a position that would make the Egyptian-Israeli treaty hostage to those who are opposed to the Camp David agreements. The Blair House treaty links the interim withdrawal of Israel's forces from most of the Sinai to normalization of relations, including the exchange of ambassadors. Instead of

reconciling the Egyptian-Israeli differences over the timetable issue, the Administration-backed proposal of Sadat would break that linkage of the treaty and instead would link the exchange of ambassadors to the West Bank and Gaza elections, which are external to the treaty. It gives the Jordanians and Palestinians power to sabotage the Sinai treaty.

Moreover, the U.S. has agreed to an exchange of letters between Sadat and the U.S. that would give Sadat an escape clause from Egypt's existing treaty obligations with other Arab countries to join them in wars against Israel.

These issues are hardly "minor"; they speak to the essence of the treaty.

Recommendations

What is needed at this time are significant and authoritative voices coming from every sector of American society taking strong exception to the Administration's new posture and urging the President to return to his productive role as mediator rather than advocate. This campaign has to demonstrate to the Administration that neither Israel nor the Jewish community is alone in its concerns. We anticipate that these recommendations will be the first stage of an escalating campaign. Therefore we recommend the following:

1. We urge immediate meetings with media opinion-molders in your community -- editors, columnists, newscasters, etc. -- to elicit their support in explaining to the general public the themes outlined in this paper.

2. Individuals and committees should seek out known friends of Israel and the Jewish community -- state and local public officials; labor; businessmen; Christian clergy; well-known academicians -- to make public their views through news story statements, radio and television talk shows and interviews and Op-Ed articles in the daily press.

3. In line with the previous paragraph, special efforts should be made to additionally urge congressmen and senators, particularly those holding leadership positions in the Congress, to speak out.

4. Because of the complexity of these issues, interpretive meetings for Jewish community leadership should be arranged. The Israel Task Force is prepared to assist in providing knowledgeable speakers.

Background

There were five Egyptian demands brought by Secretary of State Vance to Jerusalem with Administration backing. The NJCRAC Israel Task Force subcommittee

believes that those demands relating to a target date and the exchange of ambassadors are the most critical, followed by the new demands set forth regarding Article VI.

Target Date and Exchange of Ambassadors

During the negotiations of the treaty, Egypt has insisted on a target date for the election of the Administrative Council on the West Bank and Gaza. Originally Egypt had demanded that the target date be tied to the date prescribed by the treaty for the completion of Israel's interim withdrawal nine months after the signing of the treaty. Israel's concern was that if the election did not take place on schedule Egypt would not undertake its obligations under the treaty in regard to normalization including the exchange of ambassadors. The "major concession" that Sadat is making is, to delay the exchange of ambassadors until elections are held 12 months after signing of the treaty rather than nine months. In either case the implementation of the Sinai treaty is conditioned by the success of West Bank negotiations, contrary to the Camp David agreements.

Israel's critics contend that Israel will not accept a target date because she does not want to implement the autonomy plan. The fact is that Israel proposed the autonomy plan with the full intent of carrying it out. The autonomy plan, however, is predicated on the cooperation and participation of those who will constitute the self-governing authority -- the Palestinian Arabs -- and the nation with whom Israel will ultimately conclude a peace treaty defining the borders and future status of the West Bank -- Jordan. Both the Jordanian and the Palestinian Arabs have rejected and condemned the Camp David accords. Even if they were to participate in such negotiations, they could effectively obstruct agreement on elections because of their recognition that by doing so they could block the implementation of the Sinai treaty.

Article VI

Article VI of the draft treaty -- the so-called "superceding clause" -- provides that in the event of a conflict between this treaty and other treaty obligations of the parties, this treaty would be binding without qualification or exception. We see nothing unusual in a treaty of peace nullifying those parts of agreements previously entered into for the purpose of pursuing the very conflict the treaty intends to end.

Egypt has agreed not to change the language of the treaty -- an apparent concession. Instead, Egypt would require, with Administration-backing that Article VI would only come into force if either Israel or Egypt is the victim of attack, but would not be binding if one party is adjudged the aggressor in a war with a third party having treaty obligations with the other. For example, if Syria launched an attack to regain the Golan Heights and Israel responded as it did in the Yom Kippur War, Egypt might hold that Israel was the aggressor since it is Egypt's position that the Golan was taken by Israel in a war of aggression. Thus, the letter demanded by Egypt would vitiate the effect of Article VI.

In addition to these three demands, Egypt has also demanded:

Egypt Liaison Office in Gaza -- Egypt insists on establishing a liaison office in Gaza -- i.e., establishing its presence with concomitant political ramifications.

Mandatory Review -- Egypt is demanding a mandatory review of the security provisions of the treaty after five years. This clearly tends to undermine the perception of the treaty as permanent and binding.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
165 East 56th Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
15 East 84th Street
New York, N. Y. 10021

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI BRITH
315 Lexington Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10016

The attached "Questions and Answers on the Camp David Agreements" are being sent to you for your information. You are also free to reproduce them. The Questions and Answers were prepared for the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council by a joint committee of Middle East experts: Dr. George E. Gruen of the American Jewish Committee, Phil Baum of the American Jewish Congress, and Ken Jacobson of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.



NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

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9/18/78
78-960-107

Camp David Israel-Egypt

NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE

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MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR RELEASE AFTER 1 P.M.
THURSDAY, SEPT. 13, 1979

NEW YORK, SEPT. 13....Yehuda Blum, Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, predicted today that the U.N.'s 34th General Assembly would be "used by the Arab rejectionist states and their supporters as a battleground against the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty and the Camp David Accords."

Professor Blum spoke at a luncheon for the press at the national headquarters of the American Jewish Committee here.

The "Baghdad belligerents" would do everything in their power, he said, to "distract the representatives of the international community from the major problems facing the world, in order to try to sabotage the ongoing peace process in the Middle East."

"The latest expression of their intentions," he continued, "is to be found in the Final Document pushed through last weekend at the Non-Alligned Summit at Havana."

Declaring that "on the Middle East, that document is virulently anti-peace, anti-Israel, anti-Semitic and anti-American," he said that "it fits in entirely with the rejectionists' strategy of monopolising the Security Council ever since the signing of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in March of this year, and trying to manipulate it in an effort to subvert the peace process."

Ambassador Blum predicted that "these efforts are likely to intensify as the bonds of peace between Israel and Egypt grow ever closer and stronger." He added: "They will also intensify as it become more apparent that the current talks on autonomy for the Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District are moving towards a successful conclusion."

"The autonomy proposal now being discussed," he stated, "offers Arab residents of the territories concerned greater opportunities for autonomy than anything they have ever experienced in their history. It offers them the prospect of governing themselves, and of enjoying peaceful co-existence and prosperity alongside their neighbors. It offers them a secure future, free from terror."

9/12/79
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A, EJP, FOR, COL NPL

IS THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY WORTH THE COST TO THE U. S.?

A Foreign Affairs Background Memorandum

by George E. Gruen

Recent headlines have emphasized and even exaggerated the cost to the American taxpayer of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. What needs to be made equally clear are the substantial benefits to the United States in both economic and political terms.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown put the Carter Administration's case for the aid requests succinctly: "Peace and security are not inexpensive, but war and insecurity are even more so." Congressional leaders have expressed their general support. Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R.-Tenn.) called the extra aid "a real bargain," and House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D.-Texas) said Congress would "look kindly" on additional assistance to Egypt and Israel "to provide the glue" to hold the treaty together.

Nevertheless, some Americans are asking how much the final price tag will amount to and whether we are not being overly charitable in view of our many unmet domestic needs.

Typical of skeptical comments is a recent letter in the Washington Post (March 19, 1979) by Raymond L. Stevens of Greenbelt, Md. who characterizes President Carter's "Mideast tour de force in shuttle diplomacy" as the latest "caper of an administration desperate for a 'victory,'" to cover its failure to solve the urgent domestic problems of inflation, energy and unemployment. Mr. Stevens bluntly asks: "A peace treaty...seems to make for great media excitement, but what's in it for the American people?"

These are legitimate questions, but a sober examination of the options and alternatives leads to the conclusion that the proposed United States aid to buttress the Egyptian-Israeli agreement is a modest investment in view of the high stakes involved for our national interests in promoting the peace process in the Middle East and countering Soviet and radical threats.

Not Charity but Fire Insurance

Indeed, this U. S. aid is not charity, which we can choose to give or withhold at our discretion. Rather, we should regard our aid as insurance to lessen the risk of a costly new conflict, just as fireproofing and insuring a home costs far less than a catastrophic conflagration.

How much money is actually involved? The totals of \$13 billion to \$15 billion published in the press are highly exaggerated, mixing old and new aid, grants and repayable loans, White House Press Secretary Jody Powell stated on March 27, claiming that direct new cash outlays would total only \$1.47 billion, spread over three years. (Current aid has been running at about \$1.8 billion to Israel and \$1 billion to Egypt, mostly in credits.)

More than half of the new aid is to help Israel redeploy its defense forces. These high costs are largely the result of Egypt's insistence, backed by the U. S. Government, that Israel totally and rapidly relinquish its airbases and other vital installations in Sinai. Most of the supplemental American aid to Israel will help pay for construction of two airbases in Israel's Negev desert to offset the loss of the sophisticated Sinai bases. Israel Defense Minister Ezer Weizman stressed that the United States was not being asked "to foot the bill for everything...We shall tighten our belts and do our bit too." The heavily taxed Israelis already spend 27% of the budget on defense.

Moreover, only \$800 million of the \$3 billion in new aid to Israel will be a grant, the rest will be long-term loans. Secretary Brown announced on March 27 that more than 80% of the total aid to Egypt and Israel will be "fully repayable loans at current interest rates."

The U. S. military and economic aid is also intended to enable both Egypt and Israel to strengthen their capacity to counter threats from radical, Soviet-armed opponents of the American-sponsored peace process.

How much additional aid may ultimately be charged to the American taxpayer will depend on several imponderables: 1) Will the oil-rich states of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait continue to provide their annual subsidy to Egypt, currently running at between \$1 billion and \$2 billion? 2) Will Presidents Sadat and Carter persuade the industrial states of Western Europe, as well as other developed nations, such as Japan, to help underwrite the economic and social reconstruction President Sadat has promised the war-weary Egyptian people? 3) Will American businessmen accept the Egyptian and Israeli offers to invest in their countries?

Enhancing U. S. Role as Partner in Peace Process

Experience shows that even if America has to carry the brunt of this foreign aid burden, it is well worth the price of assuring peace. It permits the U. S. to maintain its unique role as trusted mediator and "full partner" in the peace-making process. It helps diminish Soviet influence in the area.

At the time of the Sinai Disengagement Agreement in September 1975, the United States combined political assurances with pledges of substantial aid to Israel and Egypt to bridge the differences then between the parties. The establishment of a U. S. observation post in the Sinai, aerial surveillance and other impartial U. S. mechanisms for monitoring compliance provided crucial elements to overcome Egyptian-Israeli suspicions and instill mutual confidence that the benefits outweighed the risks.

In retrospect it is clear that the three and one-half years of experience gained in maintaining the Sinai accord without a single armed clash between Egyptian and Israeli forces helped lay the groundwork of trust for the peace treaty just signed. The \$3 billion annual "fire-insurance premium" thus proved to be money well spent. The slightly higher premium we will have to pay for the formal Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty will still be only a tiny fraction of one percent of our Gross National Product, currently running at an annual rate of over \$2.2 trillion (\$2,215 billion).

As already noted, the net outflow will be far less than \$5 billion annually. Not only will the major portion of the amount eventually be repaid as loans, but most of the aid will immediately be used to purchase American military and electronic equipment as well as surplus agricultural commodities. American corporations will also receive the contracts for most of the construction and other ancillary materials, creating employment for over 100,000 American workers, including some who otherwise might have been laid off because of the cancellation of defense orders from Iran.

How Israel Effectively Aids the U. S.

It should also be remembered that U. S. help to Israel is a two-way, not a one-way street. Democratic Israel has played a crucial role over the years as a dependable ally of America by resisting Communist-backed radical takeover of the region and defeating Soviet-armed Arab attacks. For example, in 1958 and 1970 Israeli action helped Jordan's King Hussein survive the threats against him. In the spring of 1977 Prime Minister Menachem Begin provided timely Israeli intelligence warning of Libyan-backed plots to assassinate the Egyptian president and the leaders of the Sudan and Saudi Arabia.

Major General George Keegan, former chief of U. S. Air Force Intelligence, has pointed out that "For every dollar of support which this country has given to Israel, we have gotten a thousand dollars' worth of benefits in return," through access to captured Soviet equipment and other intelligence information that "prepares us to cope with Soviet forces and Soviet equipment around the world."

The overriding consideration, however, is the importance for all Americans of avoiding war and encouraging peace in the Middle East. Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated on March 18 that the direct economic cost to the United States of the past four Arab-Israeli conflicts, including the shut-off of oil, totalled \$27 billion. A study conducted by the Library of Congress in 1975 concluded that a six-month oil embargo of the magnitude of the 1973 Arab embargo would result in an increase in U. S. unemployment of a million to a million and a half and a loss in Gross National Product ranging from \$39 billion to \$56 billion.

Detering Aggression Improves Chances for Peace

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement does not in itself guarantee a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, but it is a necessary first step. The enemies of the Egyptian-Israeli accord are already beginning to marshall their forces. If Jordan and Saudi Arabia decide to join together in an Eastern Front with militantly hostile Syria and Iraq, Israel will have arrayed against it over \$20 billion in advanced equipment including over 1,000 combat aircraft, more than 5,400 modern tanks, 4,200 heavy artillery and 150 SAM missile batteries.

Israel has always had to rely on the qualitative advantage of its personnel in training and motivation to overcome the numerical superiority of its foes. With Israel's warning time sharply lessened by the forthcoming withdrawal from Sinai, the new American early warning radar, aircraft, missiles and other sophisticated equipment will play a crucial role in enabling Israel to deter and if necessary repel attack with its own forces. (Speaking with Congressmen on March 27, Prime Minister Begin reaffirmed the pledge made by previous Israeli leaders: "Never will Israel ask American boys to come and endanger their lives for our independence.") If Egypt remains true to its commitments in the peace treaty with Israel, this will hopefully serve as a further deterrent to extremist Arab ambitions against Israel.

Steadfast American commitment to Israel and to a peaceful Egypt may finally convince the other Arab states and the Palestinians that war is futile and that the only way they can achieve their legitimate aspirations is through negotiations. By reinforcing that message the latest American aid package truly serves the national interests of the American people and of all who seek peace in the Middle East.

March 29, 1979

Dr. George E. Gruen is Director of Middle East Affairs in the Foreign Affairs Department of the American Jewish Committee. He has taught international relations and Middle East policy at Columbia University and the City University of New York.

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A, COL, EJP, INT, NPE, NPL, REL, FOR

→ M Tannenbaum

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
1003- Securities Bldg.
Seattle, Wa. 98101
622-6315

DATE April 11, 1979

TO:

Harold Applebaum

FROM: TERRY KULKA

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For Your Approval

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ARCHDIOCESE OF SEATTLE
907 TERRY AVENUE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, 98104

Israel Egypt Treaty

APR 6 REC'D

March 29, 1979

Dear Friend:

Please find enclosed a copy of Archbishop Raymond G. Hunthausen's letter to Roman Catholic pastors in Western Washington concerning the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. Know that I join my own good wishes and prayers with his.


Very sincerely,

Roger G. O'Brien

Rev. Roger G. O'Brien
Ecumenical and Interfaith Officer

enc.





OFFICE OF THE ARCHBISHOP

ARCHDIOCESE OF SEATTLE

907 TERRY AVENUE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, 98104

APR 6 REC'D

March 26, 1979

Dear Father:

The signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt this week is a momentous and historic occasion not only for those two countries and for the world community, but for all of us whose faith is so intimately linked with the religious traditions rooted in the Holy Land.

I ask you to give thanks for this event in the Prayer of the Faithful next Sunday at all your liturgies, and to pray God's blessing on the parties to this significant peace agreement.

The landmark declaration on Non-Christian Religions of the Second Vatican Council asked that the historic quarrels between Christians and Muslims be put aside in favor of dialogue, and praised the common spiritual heritage which links us together with our Jewish sisters and brothers. Sunday next should be an occasion for us to celebrate what hopefully will be a major first step in this process of establishing mutual understanding and respect.

May God's peace endure in the Middle East, and may you and your parishioners rediscover its power in your lives this Holy Week.

May God be with you. His joy. His peace. His love.

Fraternaly yours in Christ,

Raymond G. Hunthausen
Archbishop of Seattle