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The American Jewish Committee

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*F.Y.D.
Marc Tarenbaum*

December 6, 1982

To: Chapter and Unit Chairpersons
and Area Directors

From: Shrub Kempner

Attached for your information is the interim report of the Defense and Arms Limitation Committee which I presented to the National Executive Council in Los Angeles. Our committee is now hard at work completing a final report of our recommendations which will be submitted to you as soon as possible, hopefully by early March. This will allow time for the chapters to review our recommendations in preparation for the Annual Meeting at which time your input and the Defense and Arms Limitation Committee's recommendations will be presented for final agency decision making.

Shrub

HLKJR:mb
enclosure

82-900-124

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DEFENSE AND ARMS LIMITATION COMMITTEE

Report of the Chairman, Harris L. Kempner, Jr.

AMERICAN JEWISH
to the

National Executive Council

Friday Afternoon, November 5, 1982



82-900-118

Introduction and Rationale

First, a little background. In May 1982, acting on the recommendations of the Board of Governors, Maynard Wishner appointed a Committee on Defense and Disarmament, chaired by me. The Committee later changed its name to Defense and Arms Limitation. We were charged to determine whether AJC should be involved in defense and arms limitation matters, and if so, to attempt to recommend possible policies.

Indeed, no official AJC consensus about even entering the area of defense and arms limitations had been crystallized when the Defense and Arms Limitation Committee (DALC) got underway in mid-June, 1982. The Committee strongly believes that the issues warrant a high place on the AJC agenda. AJC, we feel, can help to contribute to an informed debate on these issues in the Jewish community and in ongoing dialogues with non-Jewish groups with whom we work.

In fact, our Committee came up with as many reasons for AJC involvement in defense and arms limitation issues as there are members of the Committee. First, there was paramount concern for human survival, a moral and political concern for peace and a stable world. The Committee also recognized a relationship between the extent of defense spending and its significance for our social policy concerns, although, as you will see, our formulations are not typical. We have also taken into account the positions taken by American churches and other Jewish groups. We do not feel compelled to speak out simply because they have, nor necessarily with the same ideas. These issues are far too complex to join without the thorough research that AJC usually gives such issues.

The Committee has begun to try to deal with the Jewish religious dimensions of this issue. No clear Jewish doctrine, however, can help decide between START and SALT and freeze on the one hand and the crucial importance of maintaining the deterrent and building American defenses. Are nuclear weapons immoral as such? The Jewish principle of "choose life" and that rescue of life takes precedence over all other precepts would appear to dictate elimination of nuclear weapons. But Judaism is not pacifist, and a strong defense, one can believe, may require an assured nuclear deterrence. Just as other groups are split so Jews with a conscience will be. Human survival is at stake, but moral men can and do differ on how best to ensure survival. What can be said is that moral and political imperatives drive the AJC to become engaged in the issues concerned.

Another dimension of our considerations is that Israel is clearly affected by United States' decision in defense and arms limitation. For example, we cannot but be concerned about the effect of the Soviet capacity for regional intervention or America's ability to defend its interests in the Middle East. Two viewpoints emerged in the Committee's deliberations. Most argued that our commitment to Israel is not credible and enforceable without a strong defense. Indeed, with the Soviet achievement of superiority in land-based missiles, our nuclear strength is no longer a credible deterrent against Moscow's regional adventures unless we build up our conventional

strength. Others contended that our concern for Israel should not mislead us into supporting Pentagon programs (in fact, there may be a competitive-relationship between DOA's and Israel's claims on the defense budget) and that support for Israel derives from shared interests and values, not strategic considerations.

So, the Committee on Defense and Arms Limitation had multiple reasons for recommending AJC involvement. The Board of Governors recently agreed with our Committee. We, for the most part, have also arrived at certain shared goals of defense and arms limitation policies. We accept that the United States must work persistently at achieving arms limitations agreements, but in the context of an underlying concern for United States' security interest in the broadest sense, and in a manner calculated to further our foreign policy interests. Defense and disarmament policies should be directed at supporting America's foreign policies in many of which -- Israel, human rights, Soviet emigration -- the AJC has been involved for generations.

From this standpoint an adequate military capability is essential to defense of our vital interests and those of our allies (including Israel). At the same time, the Committee believes that AJC should constantly remind our leaders that defense strategy and policies must aim at minimizing the risk of war and must encompass a readiness to negotiate for nuclear arms reductions.

We are all agreed that it is vital to take steps to increase world stability, and to lessen the likelihood of nuclear war.

So, we agreed that involvement in these complex issues is useful, perhaps even necessary, for the AJC. Moreover, certain ultimate goals were shared by most of the Committee. We began to split company, however, when we debated on how best to achieve these goals. AJC can justifiably pride itself on being an organization whose members represent a broad spectrum of opinion on all issues. Well we have every shade of opinion on the Defense and Arms Limitation Committee. We're happy to report that everyone is still talking to everyone else -- and only occasionally through clenched teeth.

We've managed to come up with some important areas of agreement concerning methods and specific issues, although there is much on which we have not, and may never, reach consensus, and there are still important areas that we have not yet explored.

I should point out at this time that one member of the Committee, James Marshall, wanted AJC to look at the problem of defense in a different frame of reference than did most other members of the Committee. He proposed centering our attention on the psychological processes, programs and drives that make war more likely, and the further development of conflict resolution skills. While the Committee agreed that Mr. Marshall's thinking should be a component of any AJC statement of views on the subject, it should not be the sole frame of reference for our thinking in this area. Since

Mr. Marshall cannot be with us today and we feel that his views would be of interest to you, we have provided you with copies of a statement of his position.

Before I get into the discussion of the issues, I want to talk a little bit about process, both for today and what we envision in the next months.

The Process

It is not our intention here today to ask this body to arrive at any definitive positions on any of the matters that we will consider. The Committee has not completed its work. It has had time for only a few substantive meetings at which we have begun the process of framing a set of principles on which to base agency policy. This is, therefore, an interim report, not a final integrated statement of views, even in those areas where I will report some conclusions or clear direction have emerged. Moreover, we think that the chapters must be part of this decision-making process and attempt to arrive at consensus, that they must join in the agency debate before any definitive policy is made by AJC. The national committee in the weeks ahead hopes to provide policy guidance and materials for chapters such as those we have been using during our process of self-education. This NEC session is an important first step. The timetable we have set for ourselves calls for our sending recommendations and background materials to the chapters by March and full discussion and decision making at the Annual Meeting in May '83.

Perhaps the most important contribution the AJC can make is to clarify issues and raise the level of discourse. Perhaps we can go further and help fashion a consensus on specific policies. This remains to be seen. In any event, this discussion today will help give direction to this Committee's work and to the explorations by the chapters. From this meeting onward, you are helping us, and, hopefully, vice versa.

The Issues

Let me now set some of the issues and policy options in a very broad brush. Two broad sets of issues come into play. The first set is concerned with limiting nuclear weapons and the relation of arms control to overall security. The second set is concerned with defense capabilities and how the size and direction of the Defense Department budget affects other national goals. For example, there are pressures to cut the defense budget in order to release resources for social needs -- the guns vs. butter argument.

Recent focus has been on the former set of issues -- security and/or limits to nuclear arms. There are the calls for a freeze (the referenda

in nine states), debates over START vs. SALT, first use of nuclear weapons, the comprehensive test ban, nuclear proliferation, etc.

It may be useful here to describe briefly two of the major approaches to the issues of security and weapons limits. One approach says, essentially, that arms control is the primary road to peace and national security. Marginal Soviet advantage is irrelevant, because each side has the power to devastate the other. This view argues that the more arms, especially nuclear, the more risk of nuclear war breaking out by miscalculation or misapplied strategy.

The opposite side sees a credible deterrence as the primary road to security. This view would tend toward building American defenses to minimize the risk of war through Soviet adventurism. A freeze, SALT, a test ban or other arms limitation, they believe, cannot be considered in isolation but must be approached in the broader context of the military balance. This is, of course, once over very lightly on a set of very complex issues. The two sides were well represented on the Committee, but our job was to try to develop principles of agreement.

On the issue of security and limitations and the context for discussion of arms limitation, the following principles are those on which the Committee had substantial agreement, although in each case there were dissenters from the majority view.

- The security of our nation rests on its having a strong economy and a just society, as well as on its military power.
- We tend to think of power in terms of weapons of physical force, that is, military weapons. We must, however, remember that the weapons of government, of sovereignty, of power, also include economic and psychological weapons. In other words, power consists not only in physical force but also in economic and psychological strength.
- Defense and arms control policies must be assessed in terms of the nation's foreign policy aims and our ability to implement them.
- The United States must maintain the necessary military and geopolitical balance that does not tempt aggression against us or our allies and which also deters political pressures against our vital interests and those of our allies.
- In maintaining that strength the United States must always be mindful that preventing war is a moral and political imperative.
- Arms control must include negotiations aimed at reducing nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their worldwide abolishment. This must be an integral part of America's security policy.

- America should work toward reduction of nuclear arsenals even if this entails substantial and costly increases in conventional weapons.
- A sound defense strategy and a policy aimed at reducing reliance on the nuclear option cannot avoid coming to grips with concerns about the adequacy of the West's conventional strength, including its manpower needs. The arms control debate, if it is to have practical impact, must address the issues of the conventional arms balance and the distinct probability that less nuclear arms means more dollars for defense.

To repeat, we have already alluded to the issue of defense spending as it relates to the possible need for increases in conventional weapons. We have said that we would, under proper safeguards, be willing to pay the price for reduction of nuclear arms even if it means more money spent for conventional weapons. This relates directly to a summary of agreed-upon principles for discussion of the other broad issue -- that of how defense spending affects other national priorities.

The Committee thought that while close scrutiny of defense budgets (and other government spending) was very important, it was not convinced that savings in defense would necessarily be available for social programs. Nor should this be linked conceptually in the argument. Linkage of the guns and butter (defense programs vs. social programs) not only entangles the issue in fruitless controversy but it pushes us into a fallacy of false alternatives. In fact, we felt that defense spending is the most clear and justifiable use for government revenue, as the founders themselves realized. Having said that, everyone is for elimination of waste, and the defense budget as other aspects of the United States budget must be examined so as to eliminate waste. But it is a fallacy to think that the major issue with respect to defense is waste. The issue is what is the money being spent for -- what weapons, etc. -- and what the purposes of the spending are conceived to be.

The principle to which almost all the Committee agreed thus far was articulated as follows:

- the adequacy of defense spending should not be measured in comparative terms of "reordering priorities" or tapping presumed defense savings for social programs. The economy must and can afford both a strong defense and resources necessary to meet vital economic and social needs. The case for social programs should be argued on its own merits as should the case for a stronger defense.

Now to move to our most specific discussions of arms limitation -- the nuclear freeze (or moratorium).

The Committee has not reached consensus on this, or rather, it reached several types of consensus on this issue. Some members of the Committee feel that we have not heard sufficient expert testimony on key aspects of

this complex issue to make a judgment. We have not, for instance, dealt with the relative merits of START vs. SALT II, and related matters.

However, let me give you an overview of the issue as we have grappled with it.

None of us opposed a freeze -- the question persistently raised was when a freeze might be justified and how it could be implemented. In the main, with one exception, we did agree that a freeze must be at least mutual and verifiable. The differences came when we began to discuss timing of a freeze. Since the overriding goal was to reduce risks of nuclear conflict, we began to discuss freeze in the context of arms reduction negotiations. Here the Committee divided into four categories -- freeze before the talks, freeze as a first step in the talks, freeze during the talks and freeze after the talks are concluded.

Some partisans and one committee member urge an immediate, unilateral freeze by the United States as the best avenue toward stability. Other proponents and a third of the Committee call for negotiated, verifiable and mutual freeze with special attention to the most destabilizing weapons as a first step to negotiated reductions. This position is similar to the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution in the Senate and Zablocki in the House, which call on the superpowers to "freeze the production, deployment, and further testing of nuclear arsenals, and then to negotiate major reductions in the massive arsenals."

Proponents of a freeze as a first step put particular stress on blocking the deployment of certain new weapons systems -- the MX, the Trident submarine missile and the cruise missile -- which they argued, would destabilize the nuclear balance. As weapons accuracy increases, warning time shortens and drives nations to adopt a strategy of launch-on-warning. Opponents of a first step freeze argue that this timing of a freeze vitiates the requirements of deterrence, in particular the survivability of the deterrent. "An immediate freeze," they say, "would eliminate any Soviet incentive to reduce the existing arsenal, particularly in areas where the Soviets have the advantage -- land-based ICBMs and intermediate range SS-20s." There is bound to be a delay as complex negotiations proceed -- what would be frozen, how verified, how to quiet concerns about Soviet deception. Meanwhile, Congress will be reluctant to modernize because of cost of developing weapons which, at best, would serve as bargaining chips.

Thus, some felt that a freeze should come later during negotiations of reduction talks as one of the interim steps toward a full fledged arms reduction agreement. In effect, the policy could be to advocate parallel action for negotiation on substantial reductions (START) and for a mutual, verifiable freeze to inhibit unrestrained increases in nuclear inventories. About one-third of the Committee came to rest with this attitude.

Finally, about one-third agreed with the concepts embodied in the Administration supported Broomfield resolution (which won a bare two vote margin). This

proposed to freeze strategic nuclear forces at "equal and substantially reduced levels" only after full agreement on reduction. This was also the Jackson-Warner side in the Senate.

The direction our Committee seems to be taking is that a freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear warheads has to be negotiated in depth and detail at various levels, as is not the case in the Geneva discussions. So, in a poll of those present at our September 17th meeting, almost one-third supported a mutual verifiable freeze now, but almost two-thirds (pretty evenly divided) said that a freeze should only occur in tandem with or after the negotiations for substantial reductions of weapons now in place. This two-thirds would have voted "no" on most of the freeze initiatives as they were framed on ballots around the country this week.

There are members of the Committee who feel that no meaningful debate on defense spending and nuclear arms reduction can avoid such questions as: should deployment systems be separated out of negotiations on reduction of strategic nuclear weapons? What about "first strike"? Should this be a primary objective for arms control negotiations? What about expenditures for civil defense against the event of nuclear war? What about nuclear proliferation questions? These are a few of the many unanswered questions with which the Committee may decide to grapple.



DER ERZBISCHOF VON WIEN

Vienna, November 19, 1982

During the past year, I have been meeting with worldwide scientific leaders in an effort to formulate a statement that could be given to religious leaders worldwide for their moral judgement and, hopefully, for transmission to their followers. The first meeting with the scientists took place here in Vienna last February and was followed by meetings at the Royal Society in London in late March and at the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in the Vatican in early June. Just recently, we had a meeting of over sixty scientists from thirty different countries, most of them Presidents of their National Academies of Sciences or Nobel Laureates, to elaborate a final statement on the nuclear threat to humanity. I am enclosing a copy of this statement.

It was also our intention that it would not only sent to other religious leaders throughout the world, both Christian and non-Christian, but that we would convoke a significant number of them in Vienna for a meeting on January 13 - 15, 1983, at which there would be present about eight worldwide scientists who would discuss and elaborate upon the enclosed statement. We would then hope that each religious leader could pass his own moral judgement on the subject and do whatever seems appropriate to him to bring his message to the attention of his followers. This joint action of scientists and religious leaders would seem the best possible means of reaching the widest possible audience with a message that is both morally justified and scientifically correct. I personally believe that this is the greatest moral challenge that has ever faced humanity in its history and that we must do our best to try to avert the possibility of nuclear holocaust for all of humanity in the days ahead.

I would be very happy if you could accept an invitation to this meeting on January 13 (evening) - 15 (noon) 1983 at the Hotel Intercontinental, 1030 Wien, Johannesgasse 28. We have both rooms and a meeting place reserved there and will be happy to take care of all the expenses for the meeting. We do not have enough to cover travel costs, except in cases where someone otherwise could not come.

We expect that there will be worldwide press coverage. I would appreciate it very much if you would let me know as soon as possible whether or not you can attend.

With many thanks for your collaboration which I would appreciate very much, and looking forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely yours,

Card König



September 24, 1982

DECLARATION ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

Presented to His Holiness the Pope by an assembly of Presidents of Scientific Academies and other scientists from all over the world convened by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences.

I. PREAMBLE

Throughout its history, humanity has been confronted with war, but since 1945 the nature of warfare has changed so *profoundly* that the future of the human race, of generations yet unborn, is imperilled. At the same time, mutual contacts and means of understanding between peoples of the world have been increasing. This is why the yearning for peace is now stronger than ever. Humanity is confronted today with a threat unprecedented in history, arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of nuclear weapons. The existing arsenals, if employed in a major war, could result in the immediate deaths of many hundreds of millions of people, and of untold millions more later through a variety of after-effects. For the first time, it is possible to cause damage on such a catastrophic scale as to wipe out a large part of civilization and to endanger its very survival. The large-scale use of such weapons could trigger major and irreversible ecological and genetic changes, whose limits cannot be predicted.

Science can offer the world no real defense against the consequences of nuclear war. There is no prospect of making defenses sufficiently effective to protect cities since even a single penetrating nuclear weapon can cause massive destruction. There is no prospect that the mass of the population could be protected against a major nuclear attack or that devastation of the cultural, economic and industrial base of society could be prevented. The breakdown of social organization, and the magnitude of casualties, will be so large that no medical system can be expected to cope with more than a minute fraction of the victims.

There are now some 50,000 nuclear weapons, some of which have yields a thousand times greater than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. The total explosive content of these weapons is equivalent to a million Hiroshima bombs, which corresponds to a yield of some three tons of TNT for every person on earth. Yet these stockpiles continue to grow. Moreover, we face the increasing danger that many additional countries will acquire nuclear weapons or develop the capability of producing them.

There is today an almost continuous range of explosive power from the smallest battlefield nuclear weapons to the most destructive megaton warhead. Nuclear weapons are regarded not only as a deterrent, but also as a tactical weapon for use in a general war under so-called controlled conditions. The immense and increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and their broad dispersal in the armed forces, increase the probability of their being used through accident or miscalculation in times of heightened political or military tension. The risk is very great that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, would escalate to general nuclear war.

The world situation has deteriorated. Mistrust and suspicion between nations have grown. There is a breakdown of serious dialogue between the East and West and between North and South. Serious inequities among nations and within nations, shortsighted national or partisan ambitions, and lust for power are the seeds of conflict which may lead to general and nuclear warfare. The scandal of poverty, hunger, and degradation is in itself becoming an increasing threat to peace. There appears to be a growing fatalistic acceptance that war is inevitable and that wars will be fought with nuclear weapons. In any such war there will be no winners.

Not only the potentialities of nuclear weapons, but also those of chemical, biological and even conventional weapons are increasing by the steady accumulation of new knowledge. It is therefore to be expected that the means of non-nuclear

war, as horrible as they already are, will also become more destructive if nothing is done to prevent it. Human wisdom, however, remains comparatively limited, in dramatic contrast with the apparently inexorable growth of the power of destruction. It is the duty of scientists to help prevent the perversion of their achievements and to stress that the future of mankind depends upon the acceptance by all nations of moral principles transcending all other considerations. Recognizing the natural rights of human beings to survive and to live in dignity, science must be used to assist humanity towards a life of fulfillment and peace.

Considering these overwhelming dangers that confront all of us, it is the duty of every person of good will to face this threat. All disputes that we are concerned with today, including political, economical, ideological and religious ones, are small compared to the hazards of nuclear war. It is imperative to reduce distrust and to increase hope and confidence through a succession of steps to curb the development, testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons systems, and to reduce them to substantially lower levels, with the ultimate hope of their complete elimination.

To avoid wars and achieve a meaningful peace, not only the powers of intelligence are needed, but also the powers of ethics, morality and conviction.

The catastrophe of nuclear war can and must be prevented, and leaders and governments have a grave responsibility in this regard. But it is humanity as a whole which must act for its survival; it faces its greatest moral issue, and there is no time to be lost.

II. In view of these threats of global nuclear catastrophe, we declare:

- Nuclear weapons are fundamentally different from conventional weapons. They must not be regarded as acceptable instruments of warfare. Nuclear warfare would be a crime against humanity.

- It is of utmost importance that there be no armed conflict between nuclear powers because of the danger that nuclear weapons would be used.
- The use of force anywhere as a method of settling international conflicts entails the risk of military confrontation of nuclear powers.
- The proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries seriously increases the risk of nuclear war and could lead to nuclear terrorism.
- The current arms race increases the risk of nuclear war. The race must be stopped, the development of new more destructive weapons must be curbed, and nuclear forces must be reduced, with the ultimate goal of complete nuclear disarmament. The sole purpose of nuclear weapons, as long as they exist, must be to deter nuclear war.

III. Recognizing that excessive conventional forces that increase mistrust and could lead to confrontation with the risk of nuclear war, and that all differences and territorial disputes should be resolved by negotiation, arbitration or other peaceful means, we call upon all nations:

- Never to be the first to use nuclear weapons;
- To seek termination of hostilities immediately in the appalling event that nuclear weapons are ever used;
- To abide by the principle that force or the threat of force will not be used against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state;
- To renew and increase efforts to reach verifiable agreements curbing the arms race and reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. These agreements should be monitored by the most effective technical means. Political differences or territorial disputes must not be allowed to interfere with this objective;
- To find more effective ways and means to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers, and in particular the superpowers, have a special obligation to set an example in reducing armaments and to

create a climate conducive to non-proliferation. Moreover, all nations have the duty to prevent the diversion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

- To take all practical measures that reduce the possibility of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation or irrational action;
- To continue to observe existing arms limitation agreements while seeking to negotiate broader and more effective agreements.

IV. Finally, we appeal:

1. To national leaders, to take the initiative in seeking steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war, looking beyond narrow concerns for national advantage; and to reject military conflict as a means of resolving disputes.
2. To scientists, to use their creativity for the betterment of human life and to apply their ingenuity in exploring means of avoiding nuclear war and developing practical methods of arms control.
3. To religious leaders and other custodians of moral principles, to proclaim forcefully and persistently the grave human issues at stake so that these are fully understood and appreciated by society.
4. To people everywhere, to reaffirm their faith in the destiny of humanity, to insist that the avoidance of war is a common responsibility, to combat the belief that nuclear conflict is unavoidable, and to labor unceasingly toward insuring the future of generations to come.


Participants in Conference on Nuclear Warfare
at
The Pontifical Academy of Sciences
Vatican City
23-24 September, 1982

1. E. Amaldi	Italy	M. Lora-Tamayo	Spain
I. Badran*	Egypt	T. Malone (SC)	USA
A. Balevski*	Bulgaria	G.B. Marini-Bettolo*	Italy
D. A. Bekoe (Ghana)*	International Council of Scientific Unions	M. Menon* (SC)	India
F. Benvenuti	Italy	G. Montalenti	Italy
O. Bikov	Russia	M. Peixoto	Brazil
B. Bilinski	Poland	J. Peters	Belgium
C. Chagas (Brazil)*	Vatican	G. Porter	England
B. Dinkov	Bulgaria	F. Press*	USA
G. Hambraeus*	Sweden	G. Puppi	Italy
T. Hesburgh (SC)	USA	B. Rifai	Indonesia
H. Hiatt (SC)	USA	W. Rosenblith	USA
D. Hodgkins (England)*	Pugwash Conference	P. Rossano	Italy
S. Hsieh	Taipei	P. Rudomin*	Mexico
A. Huxley*	England	B. Rysavy	Czechoslovakia
S. Iijima	Japan	I. Saavedra	Chile
S. Isaev	Russia	V. Sardi*	Venezuela
P. Jacquinet* (SC)	France	T. Shin	Korea
W. Kalweit	E. Germany	E. Simpson*	South Africa
M. Kazi	Pakistan	J. Sirotkovic*	Yugoslavia
S. Keeny (SC)	USA	L. Sosnovski*	Poland
K. Komarek	Austria	O. Stoppani*	Argentina
F. Konig (SC)	Austria	J. Szentagothai*	Hungary
J. Labarbe	Belgium	S. Tahneberger	E. Germany
J. Lejeune	France	C. Townes	USA
L. Leprince-Ringuet	France	E. Velikhov* (SC)	Russia
R. Levi-Montalcini	Italy	W. Watts*	Ireland
		55. V. Weisskopf (SC)	USA

* President of national academy of science (17), national academy of engineering (Hambraeus), or equivalent (Bekoe and Hodgkins).
Total: 20.

(SC) Members of Steering Committee. In addition to those indicated here, there are three: C.F. Von Weizeacker, West Germany; K. Husimi, Japan, and M. Perutz, England.

F.Y.I.
Marc Tanenbaum



83-900-34

INTRODUCTION: RATIONALE FOR AJC INVOLVEMENT

In May 1982, at the recommendation of the Board of Governors, AJC President Maynard Wishner appointed a Committee on Defense and Disarmament chaired by Harris L. Kempner, Jr. The Committee, which later changed its name to Defense and Arms Limitation, was charged with determining whether AJC should be involved in defense and arms limitation matters, and, if so, with recommending possible policies.

Much time and effort was spent deciding whether the AJC should actively study the issues of defense and arms limitation. Although the reasons given for recommending AJC involvement were as varied as the membership of the Defense and Arms Limitation Committee (DALC), the Committee emphatically concluded that these issues warrant a high place on AJC's agenda. The DALC also agreed that an American Jewish Committee study could contribute to an informed debate on these vital issues, both within the Jewish community and in its ongoing dialogues with groups outside the Jewish community.

The Committee's initial motivation for recommending that defense and arms limitation issues should receive a high priority on the organization's agenda stemmed from our paramount concern for human survival and for a peaceful and stable world. Such concerns require that we support policies which will decrease the risk of war.

The Committee also recognized the domestic political and economic importance of these issues. For example, we took into account the significant connection between defense policies, specifically defense

expenditures, and our social policy concerns, although the majority of the Committee believed that the typical formulation of this issue as "guns versus butter" was not a useful analytical framework.

Another dimension of our considerations was the fact that United States defense and arms limitation decisions and policies directly affect the conduct and security of other countries. For example, we must be concerned about both America's and the Soviet Union's ability to intervene in events in other parts of the world, including the Mideast and the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Soviet capacity for regional intervention and America's ability to deter such intervention and, if necessary, to defend its vital interests in the Middle East, the Committee agreed, should heighten AJC's interest in defense policies.

The Committee also considered the relationship between American defense policies and Israel in the context of our broader concerns. Two viewpoints emerged in our deliberations. Most argued that U.S. commitment to Israel is neither credible nor enforceable without strong American defense capabilities. Supporters of this view believe that if the Soviets achieve superiority in land-based missiles, our nuclear strength is no longer a credible deterrent against Moscow's regional adventures. They argue that if the United States adopts policies which lessen the reliance on our nuclear forces to deter Soviet intervention in the Middle East, the Soviet's clear superiority in conventional forces must be countered, in all likelihood, by an increase in American conventional forces. Otherwise, we cannot maintain our ability to protect the vital interests of the United States in the Middle East.

A few members of the Committee, while conceding that there is a relationship between American defense policies and Israel, argue that our concern for Israel should not be used to justify our support for a strengthened American defense effort. They argue that U.S. defense capability is adequate, and that U.S. support for Israel is derived from shared interests and values, not from strategic considerations. They also contend that there may be a competitive relationship between programs advocated by the Pentagon and those helpful to Israel.

The Committee has also taken into account debates and positions of American churches and other Jewish organizations, but we do not feel compelled to speak out just because they have, and we realize that we may have differing views.

Finally, the Committee had to try to integrate Jewish religious concepts with these complex issues. We concluded that no clear Jewish doctrine can decide between START and SALT and freeze on the one hand, and the crucial importance of maintaining a deterrent to war and building American defenses on the other hand. Are nuclear weapons immoral as such? The Jewish principle of "choose life" and that rescue of life takes precedence over all other precepts could be used to argue for the unilateral elimination of nuclear weapons. But Judaism is not pacifist. It recognizes the primary need to defend oneself. It teaches that lives can be risked to save lives -- the essence of a strong defense and assured deterrence. Thus, just as other groups are split so Jews of conscience will be. Human survival is at stake, but moral men can and do differ on how best to ensure survival. What can be said is that moral and political imperatives drive the AJC to become engaged in the issues concerned.

The Committee on Defense and Arms Limitation thus had multiple reasons for recommending AJC involvement. The Board of Governors at its June 1982 meeting agreed with the Committee as to the importance of AJC's involvement and authorized this Committee's efforts to arrive at policy recommendations.

THE GENERAL ISSUES

Although the Committee had some significant disagreements on the many complex issues studied, for the most part it shared certain common goals for national defense and arms limitation policies. It agreed that the United States must work diligently to achieve enforceable arms limitation agreements and that such agreements must be made in the context of an underlying concern for the national security interests of the United States in the broadest sense. Such agreements should be negotiated and made in a manner calculated to be consistent with the foreign policy interests of our country.

The Committee, in general, concluded that an adequate* military capability is essential to defense of U.S. vital interests and those of its allies. At the same time, it called upon AJC to remind the leaders of our government that defense strategy and policies must aim at minimizing the risk of war and must encompass a readiness to negotiate for nuclear arms reductions. In this context, we all agreed that it is vital to take steps to increase world stability and to lessen the likelihood of war, especially in a nuclear age.

* An "adequate" military capability is defined by the majority of the Committee on page 8 of this report as requiring: "The United States to maintain the necessary military and geopolitical balance that does not tempt aggression against us or our allies and which also deters political pressures against our vital interests and those of our allies."

It should be noted that at least one member of the Committee, James Marshall, wanted AJC to look at the problem of defense in a different frame of reference than did most other members of the Committee. He proposed centering AJC's attention on the psychological processes, programs and drives that make war more likely, and on the further development of conflict-resolution skills. "Let others deal with military might," Mr. Marshall said. "Confrontation is not the way to peace." While the Committee agreed that Mr. Marshall's thinking should be a component of any AJC statement on the subject, it did not feel that it should be the sole frame of reference for AJC's thinking in this area.

The issues and policy options involved in the DALC's attempt to deal meaningfully with defense policies and arms limitation were, of course, varied, complex, and controversial. This report will briefly describe some of the most important of them in order to provide an analytic framework for AJC policy formulation.

The Committee focused, in general, on two major sets of issues. The first deals with the issues and policies involved in any attempt to limit nuclear weapons and the relationships between arms limitation policies and the security of the United States.

Recently, much attention has been directed at this type of issue. The numerous calls for a nuclear-freeze agreement, referenda on this subject in nine states, current debates over START vs. SALT, the comprehensive test-ban treaty, and the renewed discussions of methods to prevent nuclear proliferation are obvious examples of the issues raised under this general heading of security and arms limitations discussions.

The second major area of issues flows from policies and decisions made with respect to the first general area. This second area deals with the defense capabilities of the United States and how the size and direction of our national security and defense budget affects other national goals.

Illustrations of this type of issue are numerous. For example, the current administration's desire to increase defense spending over that of past administrations, and the countervailing pressures to reduce the defense budget in order to release resources for social needs are but two. This classic argument was given considerable analytical attention by the Committee because it felt that clarification of these issues was vital to the establishment of a set of principles on which to base any national defense and arms limitation recommendations. This is particularly so given the political decision-making environment we may face in which resources devoted to defense may be perceived as harmful to social programs.

Defense Policy and Arms Limitation

In the general area of security and weapons limitation there were two approaches which attracted major support within the Committee.

A minority of the Committee believes that arms limitation is the primary road to peace and national security, arguing that any marginal Soviet advantage in nuclear or conventional weaponry is irrelevant because each side has the power to destroy the other. In addition, this view believes that any increase in armaments, especially new nuclear systems, increases the risk of war breaking out by miscalculation, misapplied strategy, or accident.

A significant majority of the Committee, on the other hand, believes that a credible deterrent is the primary road to both national security and

the most effective way to minimize the risk of war. This approach would favor an American arms limitation policy designed to minimize the risk of war by deterring the Soviet Union from believing that it can achieve its goals by military means. Technical arguments over whether each side has enough nuclear explosives to destroy the other beg the basic issues and the real goal of defense and arms limitation policies. The proper goal is to have a sufficient deterrent force so that no sane Soviet leadership could believe that they have a chance of "winning" a nuclear confrontation. The majority view recognizes that this strategy should not be influenced by paranoia about the intentions or capabilities of the Soviets or other nuclear powers but must be governed by the appraisal that the Soviets have very different goals than most democracies.

Thus, a majority of the Committee believes that the issues of a freeze, SALT, START, test-ban treaties, or other arms-limitation agreements cannot be considered in isolation but must be approached in the broader context of deterrence and maintaining the military balance, and in that sense are corollary issues.

Although in each case there were dissenters from the majority view, the following principles were adopted by a substantial majority of the Committee:

- * * The security of our nation rests on its having a strong economy and a just society, as well as on its military power.
- * * Power is generally thought of only in terms of weapons of physical force, that is, military weapons. We must remind ourselves that the weapons of government, of sovereignty, of power, also include economic and psychological weapons. Power, therefore, consists not only in physical force but

but also in economic and psychological strength.

- * * Defense and arms control policies must be assessed in terms of the nation's foreign policy aims and our ability to implement them.
- * * The United States must maintain the necessary military and geopolitical balance that does not tempt aggression against us or our allies and which also deters political pressures against our vital interests and those of our allies.
- * * In maintaining that strength the United States must always be mindful that preventing war is a moral and political imperative.
- * * Arms limitation must include negotiations aimed at reducing nuclear weapons. This must be an integral part of America's security policy.
- * * A sound defense strategy and a policy aimed at reducing reliance on the nuclear option cannot avoid coming to grips with concerns about the adequacy of the West's conventional strength, including its manpower needs. The arms control debate, if it is to have practical impact, must address the issues of the conventional arms balance and the distinct probability that less nuclear arms means more dollars for defense.
- * * The United States must work toward reduction of nuclear arsenals even if this were to entail substantial and costly increases in conventional weapons.

This leads directly to discussion of the other broad set of issues -- that of how defense spending affects other national priorities.

Defense Spending versus Spending for Other National Priorities

Even if consensus is reached on a set of concepts and basic principles which can be used to guide development of more specific recommendations for national arms limitation and defense policies, effective implementation of any policy requires some consensus and understanding of the resource allocation questions raised by any possible set of specific policy recommendations. The large, complicated, and heterogeneous democracy we live in has many competing and powerful interests arguing for as large as possible slices of the federal budget. Thus, any failure to deal with the whole host of issues which have been labeled the "Guns-vs.-Butter" debate may doom to failure even the best possible arms limitation and security policies.

The principles to which almost all the Committee agreed were articulated as follows:

- * * The maintenance of an "adequate" defense is government's primary responsibility. Whatever our different views on the definition of an adequate defense, the Committee agreed that expenditures necessary to maintain it should have first call on the federal budget.
- * * The adequacy of defense spending, while debatable, should not be measured in comparative terms of "reordering priorities" or tapping presumed defense savings for social programs. When the minimal needs of "adequate" defense are satisfied, monies should then be considered available for the other activities

of government. The case for social programs should be argued on their own merits as should the case for a stronger defense than the minimum deemed "adequate."^A

* * Close scrutiny of defense budgets (and other government spending) to eliminate waste was vital in the Committee's view. The Committee, however, felt that it was a fallacy to think that the major issue with respect to defense spending is waste. The issue is what is the money being spent for -- what weapons, etc. - - and what the purposes of the spending are conceived to be. Moreover, the Committee was not convinced that savings in defense would necessarily be available for social programs. Nor should this be linked conceptually in the argument.

The Committee recognized that the above-articulated principle at first glance leaves us open to the charge that we are denying any link between the level of defense spending, social programs, and the state of the economy. Obviously, we recognize that while there is no direct one-for-one relationship between defense spending and domestic spending, the size and shape of the defense budget does have an effect on other economic and social issues. However, to reemphasize, the purpose of the above principles are to make clear the Committee's belief that whatever one's views as to what constitutes an "adequate" defense establishment, the maintenance of defense expenditures necessary to achieve any agreed-upon definition of an "adequate" defense would have first call on the federal budget.

^A The following analogy may clarify this process. Hypothesize that you have a pitcher of water marked "all government revenues," and ten or so glasses to be filled, with labels such as "defense spending," "Medicare," "AFDC," "debt reduction," etc. The Committee would call for the glass marked "defense spending" to be partially filled to a minimal "adequate" level first, before decisions are made about filling the other glasses even though such action might leave some glasses not completely filled.

Nevertheless, if one believes, as we do, that an adequate defense has first call on the federal budget this imposes a high degree of responsibility on our civilian and military policy-makers to make sure that these funds are not wasted. The following recommendations are illustrative of this point:

- 1) The Committee questions whether the proposed build-up in the Civil Defense Program over the next seven years is necessary for an "adequate" defense and urges thorough Congressional debate on the issue.
- 2) Given the drastically escalating costs of many modern conventional weapons systems, we urge that better management contracting and accounting procedures be imposed on the Defense Department and its contractors.
- 3) We also call on the President, and especially Congress, to use their oversight powers to reduce the influence of rivalry and jealousy on the defense decisions re weapons systems and manpower policies.
- 4) The Committee believes that ways must also be found by Congress to deal with the treatment of many military-basing and weapons-systems decisions as part of a military pork barrel. (For example, how greatly should decisions as to the relative merits of the C5A Galaxy and the Boeing 747's acquisition for a military airlift capability be influenced by the relative political strength of the members of Congress in whose districts the airplanes' components are manufactured?)

The recommendations implicit in this section require a reversal of the increasing trend towards political partisanship and politicization of debates on defense spending.

The Issue of a Mutually Verifiable Bilateral Nuclear Freeze

Perhaps no current international issue in the area of strategic nuclear arms has generated the interest, public debate, and attention as the issues revolving around whether the United States should attempt to negotiate an immediate mutually verifiable freeze on strategic nuclear systems with the Soviet Union.

None of the Committee members opposed a freeze -- the question persistently raised was when a freeze might be justified and how it could be implemented. In the main, with one exception, the Committee agreed that a freeze must be at least mutual and verifiable. The differences came when we began to discuss timing of a freeze. Since the overriding goal is to reduce risks of nuclear conflict, the freeze was discussed in the context of arms reduction negotiations. Here the Committee divided into four categories -- freeze before the talks, freeze as a first step in the talks, freeze during the talks and freeze after the talks are concluded.

One Committee member urged an immediate unilateral freeze by the United States as the best avenue toward stability. A third of the Committee called for a negotiated, verifiable and mutual freeze with special attention to the most destabilizing weapons as a first step to negotiated reductions. This position is similar to the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution in the Senate and Zablocki in the House, which calls on the superpowers to "freeze the production, deployment, and further testing of nuclear arsenals, and then to negotiate major reductions in the massive arsenals."

Proponents of a freeze as a first step put particular stress on blocking the deployment of certain new weapons systems -- the MX, the Trident submarine

missile and the cruise missile -- which they argued would destabilize the nuclear balance. As weapons accuracy increases, warning time shortens and drives nations to adopt a strategy of launch-on-warning. Opponents of a first step freeze argue that this timing of a freeze vitiates the requirements of deterrence, in particular the survivability of the deterrent. "An immediate freeze," they say, "would eliminate any Soviet incentive to reduce the existing arsenal, particularly in areas where the Soviets have the advantage -- land-based ICBMs and intermediate range SS-20s." There is bound to be a delay as complex negotiations proceed -- what would be frozen, how verified, how to quiet concerns about Soviet deception. Meanwhile, Congress will be reluctant to modernize because of cost of developing weapons which, at best, would serve as bargaining chips.

Thus, some felt that a freeze should come later during negotiations of reduction talks as one of the interim steps toward a full fledged arms reduction agreement. In effect, the policy could be to advocate parallel action for negotiation on substantial reductions (START) and for a mutual, verifiable freeze to inhibit unrestrained increases in nuclear inventories. About one-third of the Committee came to rest with this attitude.

Finally, about one-third agreed with the concepts embodied in the Administration-supported Broomfield resolution (which won a bare two vote margin). This proposed to freeze strategic nuclear forces at "equal and substantially reduced levels" only after full agreement on reduction. This was also the Jackson-Warner side in the Senate.

In summary, the majority of our Committee believes, therefore, that a freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear warheads has to be negotiated in depth and detail at various levels, as is not the case in the Geneva discussions. A freeze should only occur with or after the negotiations for substantial reductions of weapons now in place. The majority of the Committee would have voted "no" on most of the freeze initiatives as they were framed on ballots around the country in November 1982 since most of them call for a freeze as a first step.

Nuclear Proliferation

The Committee believes that the issue of nuclear nonproliferation is also corollary to our broader concern about minimizing the risk of nuclear war and a special concern about terrorists acquiring nuclear devices.

We believe that AJC should urge the Administration to give high priority to implementing the policy articulated in the President's July 1981 statement and to carrying out the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Other actions AJC might advocate are:

1. Tighter national and international controls on disposal of spent fuel.
2. In the Nuclear Suppliers Group and in the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the U.S. should press for "full scope safeguards" -- international inspection of all nuclear facilities -- which would require strengthening the IAEA safeguards system.
3. Support by the Administration for the idea of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East patterned on the Treaty of Tlatelolco for Latin America.

STRATEGY, POLICY AND PROGRAMS TO THE THREAT WE FACE

REMARKS TO THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE AND ARMS LIMITATION

by

DOV S. ZAKHEIM
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(POLICY)

January 19, 1983

The Torah tells us that when Jacob sensed the imminent approach of his brother -- and deadly enemy -- Esau, he "was greatly afraid and was distressed." The classic commentators, noting the redundant verbiage, point out that "he was afraid that he might be killed, he was distressed that he might have to kill others." That principle, the recognition that one has to defend oneself coupled with a concern not to attack others, underlies the military strategy of the United States, and, indeed, of every peace loving power. I welcome the opportunity to discuss our strategy, policy and programs with this Committee. I propose to do so along the lines of Jacob's threefold approach to coping with the threat posed by his brother.

The Torah tells us that Jacob first planned for war by dividing his camp in two. He then prayed to God. And he then sought to propitiate Esau by sending gifts, to demonstrate the wisdom of their living together in peace. Strategy, negotiation, prayer -- these are still viable approaches to the defense of one's homeland. The first two are matters common to all concerned citizens; I shall, however, address the third from a peculiarly Jewish viewpoint -- for indeed there is one -- and a consistent one at that -- as is appropriate before a body such as this which articulates the concerns of our community to the nation and the world at large.

Two years ago, American voters elected Ronald Reagan as their President in part because of his strong commitment to revitalizing our national defense. Since November 1980, however, economic and political pressures have put the Administration to the test of demonstrating the sincerity of that commitment. I believe that we have done so, because the underlying reasons for that commitment -- the ominous trends pointing to a disparity in military power between the Soviet Union and the United States -- have certainly not disappeared. Indeed, if anything, recent events demonstrate that no contingency, however small, can be totally dismissed outright, and that readiness and strength are a prerequisite to the successful protection of our own interests worldwide.

I should like, therefore, briefly to outline for you our assessment of the nature of Soviet military developments, our formulation of a strategy to cope with those developments, and the programs that we have supported in order to realize the strategy we pursue.

This Administration perceives that there has been a significant shift in the balance of power between the United States and Soviet Union since the beginning of the 1970s.

In the early 1960s we enjoyed a considerable advantage in strategic nuclear forces while our conventional forces, though outnumbered in certain areas, notably Europe, nevertheless were acknowledged to be superior because of the considerable progress that we and our allies had achieved in applying technology to military weapons systems.

The times have certainly changed, perhaps most markedly with respect to the realm of strategic nuclear forces. No longer can we seek, much less achieve, the superiority we enjoyed in the 1950s, which permitted us to adopt a policy of "massive retaliation," even in response to a conventional attack upon the U.S. or its allies. Today we are trying to maintain parity with the Soviets' awesome might.

Why this change, and how did it take place? The answer is that while we chose to maintain our strategic offensive forces at roughly the level they had achieved by the end of the 1960s, the Soviets expanded their arsenal in both quality and quantity and we simply did not keep pace with them. They expanded their land based missile force and hardened their protective silos, while we chose to restrict improvements to the yield and accuracy of our own missile forces so as not to threaten the USSR with a sudden disarming first strike. But while we in effect created a sanctuary for Soviet ICBMs, they developed greater accuracies for their missiles, and incorporated MIRV technology far earlier than we had anticipated. Thus the Soviets placed themselves in a position to threaten to destroy a very large part of our force in a first strike while retaining overwhelming nuclear force to deter any retaliation we might carry out.

While we were the first to deploy ballistic missile submarines, the Soviets quickly followed suit. They also improved -- and are improving -- their anti-submarine warfare capabilities. They have modernized their bomber force -- with Backfire and now Blackjack. They improved upon what for some time has been the largest, most complex air defense system in the world, while ours was permitted to decline. Thus, in addition to their threat to our ICBM force, they can seriously weaken the effect of a bomber attack on their homeland, and have developed as well a vast civil defense complex. The situation is one of imbalance, and consequently, of a U.S. deterrent that is rapidly losing its credibility.

It is these concerns that have prompted the President's strategic forces program. Without the MX missile, our ability to retaliate promptly against a Soviet missile threat is questionable. Without an improved B-1 bomber we will be left with aging B-52 force whose ability to penetrate Soviet airspace will be highly dubious by the end of this decade. Without a revitalized air defense program we will create new incentives for Soviet penetration of our airspace by means of the bombers they are developing. Without improvements in command and control, we would be at a severe loss to identify and respond to an initial attack and to continue to function coherently in its aftermath.

At this point, let me digress to a topic that is foremost in the minds of many, including this committee. I refer to the issue of a freeze on the development of strategic nuclear systems.

Needless to say, the concerns to which the programs I mentioned are addressed render irrelevant approaches that emphasize the freezing of nuclear weapons. We do not doubt the good intentions of those in the West who advocate a freeze, just as we do not doubt that the Soviets and their friends hope to exploit those good intentions. At bottom, however, is a simple question: Can a freeze achieve what its proponents seek? That is, can it reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and the threat to the security of the West? Upon examination, the answer, unfortunately, is a resounding no. Given the nature of our adversary, whose buildup has been as relentless as his propaganda, who increased his strategic nuclear arsenal's capability without reference to our own level of activity in this sphere, we cannot assume that any self-imposed restrictions on the modernization of our own forces will be reciprocated in any way. To the extent that it is not reciprocated, and the Soviet Union continues its own unabated buildup, the risk of nuclear war -- or, at a minimum, nuclear blackmail -- would increase, not decrease in the face of a freeze.

Our goal -- and the reason that we deploy nuclear weapons of any kind -- is to deter nuclear war, not to fight one. Our position is exactly that which your report recommends; namely, that our strategy and policies must aim at minimizing the risk of war and must attach priority to negotiating arms reductions. We do not believe that there can be any winners in a nuclear war -- although Soviet writings constantly argue that there can be -- and that it is they who will win. The deployment of nuclear weapons has been an effective deterrent until now against war and blackmail. We hope it will continue to deter well into the future.

Let me address specifically some of the concerns of freeze advocates. First, they correctly point to the horrors of nuclear war. But a freeze will do nothing to reduce the likelihood of such a war.

All it will do is prevent the modernization of our forces which -- particularly in the case of our bombers and land-based missiles -- are considerably older than those of the Soviets. A freeze will therefore prevent us from making our stockpile safer and more survivable.

The Soviet buildup is awesome -- some examples: The number of attacking Soviet warheads is 4-5 times the number of American silos. Their ICBMs can lift four times the throw-weight of ours. But these measures are constantly being argued back and forth.

Let me therefore give you a different one -- one that indicates intentions and points to where a unilateral freeze should take place. In the last 10 years, the USSR has spent 240 billion more dollars than the U.S. While we restrained the growth of our strategic and theater nuclear missiles -- we actually reduced our nuclear stockpile of warheads -- and did so unilaterally -- the Soviets deployed three new classes of ICBMs and the SS20s that are menacing Europe.

Henry Kissinger recently wrote that never in the history of the world has a nation achieved this kind of military preponderance and not translated it into geopolitical gains. Harold Brown, of the previous Administration, echoed similar worries. Kissinger's remark goes to the heart of the freeze issue. A preponderance of force makes war more likely. Few nations have gone to war when they thought they would lose. "The Mouse That Roared" was only a movie -- but the Kaiser's Germany, Hitler's Germany, and a host of nations stretching back to the Biblical Philistines went to war because they thought they could win.

Now is especially the wrong time for a freeze. Our land-based missiles are vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs, and our land-based systems are meant to provide a prompt retaliatory capability that neither submarine launched missiles, nor bombers, nor cruise missiles can provide. Of course, a freeze would limit development of these three other elements of our capability as well. It is noteworthy, in fact, that those who oppose the MX missile also oppose the B-1 bomber, and also oppose the new Trident II missile. Yet our inability to develop these systems loses us the essence of the Triad, which is to hedge against the sudden vulnerability of any of its component elements. A freeze would leave our bombers and even our cruise missiles vulnerable to Soviet air defenses -- which can be upgraded without becoming nuclear; our submarines would be vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated anti-submarine warfare techniques which again, are not nuclear. And, of course, the freeze would preserve for all time the imbalance that exists with respect to land-based ICBMs. Thus, the freeze would enable the USSR to build upon its current superiority by developing even more capable counters to those of our systems, in which our second strike deterrent resides. You might ask, why do we not develop a counter to Soviet ICBMs to minimize their lead just as they will develop counters to minimize our potential in other strategic categories? The answer is simple -- to counter ICBMs you need an anti-ballistic missile capability. No freeze would permit developments that currently are already forbidden by treaty. We would lose on all counts -- and the Soviets can be sure to take advantage of a situation that will leave us -- and our friends -- powerless before them. Would the Soviet Union have desisted from intervening in the Middle East in 1973 had it been superior in nuclear weapons? Would we have opted to go to DefCon 3? Where would Israel be today? That, my friends, is where a freeze will lead.

We do have an arms control policy, however, and it complements our strategic forces program. Our approach to arms control is that we seek to achieve agreements that diminish the risks of war and help to reduce the threat to our security and the security of our allies. Cosmetic agreements -- those that merely legitimate a further buildup of Soviet military power -- are not in our national interest. In sharp contrast, an agreement that reduces substantially the weapons on both sides -- particularly the most threatening and destabilizing ones -- in an equitable and verifiable manner would constitute a major step down the long road to diminishing the likelihood of conflict at all levels of violence. That we remain unalterably committed to this was confirmed by the President's announcement of our far-reaching "START" initiative, and of the subsequent negotiations that we have undertaken with the Soviet Union.

Let me turn briefly to that other nuclear realm, that of intermediate range nuclear forces. You are all familiar with our proposal not to proceed with the deployment in Europe of Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground launched cruise missiles if the Soviets would dismantle the 333 SS-20 multiple warhead mobile missiles and their SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate range missiles.

The Soviets have responded with a series of ploys that seek to divide the United States from its European allies. They would withdraw SS-20s behind the Urals, where they could still hit Europe, while no U.S. missile would be available to retaliate from European soil. They would balance their missiles against those of the British and French, effectively eliminating a European based nuclear umbrella for the non-nuclear Europe NATO allies. They would promise no first use -- a promise as easily broken as it is made; while a similar promise by the U.S. would be an invitation to the Soviet use of its conventional force superiority to blackmail Western Europe. It is we who have unilaterally reduced our warheads in Europe; by a thousand in 1979. No number is better than zero in the realm of arms control -- if the Soviets are as serious as they say they are, they will agree that eliminating the missiles that threaten Western Europe, together with those that could threaten them, is the only prudent course to take.

I have been quite grim about the current state of the nuclear balance, and have pointed to the urgent need for implementing our strategic program in particular. The problems are no less awesome and the need to implement our solutions no less urgent, in the conventional sphere.

Let me turn first to the nature of our problem, and then describe the strategy and programs that we hope will go a long way to solving it.

We no longer have the luxury we once did of assuming that we could defeat an adversary anywhere we might have to take him on. Perhaps in the past we didn't have that luxury either. But now we know we do not have it. We confront a Soviet Union that has not sacrificed its superiority in manpower and in quantities of equipment while, at the same time, it has significantly improved upon the effectiveness of that equipment. Whether one discusses tanks such as the T-72 and T-80 (whose armor and firepower at a minimum matches those of Western tanks), personnel carriers, a host of air defense missiles, or more mundane items like engineering equipment, one is stunned by the tremendous advances in quality that the Soviets have realized. With it all, the Soviets maintain their quantitative advantage -- for example, the Warsaw Pact has a 3 to 1 advantage in tanks over NATO.

These qualitative advances have perhaps been most significant in the spheres of maritime forces and tactical aviation, for they have permitted the Soviets to assume new military missions that previously were beyond their capability. Soviet air forces are now capable of the sorts of interdiction and airmobile missions that Western air forces previously had reserved for themselves. Soviet warships such as the nuclear powered Kirov -- the world's largest and most powerful battlecruiser -- the Oscar missile submarines and the Kiev class-carriers now not only provide the USSR with an anti-carrier threat but also enable the Navy to support adventures by their surrogates in areas such as Africa, raising the stakes for the U.S. if it hoped to

intervene. Finally, the Soviets have developed the large and capable air transport fleet that was so prominent in the attack upon Afghanistan and the lift of supplies to Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa War of 1977-78.

As a result of these developments, and of clever Soviet use of Cuban and East German surrogates, not to mention the invasion of Afghanistan and the massing of about 25 divisions along the borders of Soviet Central Asia, we have been forced to reevaluate both our strategy and our programs in order to respond to the demands that the protection of our allies, interests and citizens abroad place upon us. We have reached a number of conclusions:

- First, and most obviously, whatever our strategy we must build up our forces in both quality and quantity beyond their current levels.

- Second, we can no longer be rooted in a fixed, easily predictable strategy such as "1 1/2" or "2 1/2" wars that on a grand scale virtually telegraphs to Soviet planners what our every move might be.

- Third, we cannot permit the defensive posture from which we operate in peacetime to color our wartime operations. We will never start a war. But if the Soviets do want to start one, they cannot expect us to remain on the defensive throughout the campaign. We reserve the right to counterpunch, when and where it might be to our advantage.

- Fourth, and following upon the preceding point, we must be more flexible in our ability to cope with threats worldwide. There is no guarantee, for example, that were we required to commit forces in the Persian Gulf, other potential adversaries would sit by and await its outcome before they acted against our interests elsewhere. Indeed, they might be encouraged to act at a time when they perceived us to be preoccupied by another contingency. Only a more flexible strategy can enable us to maintain a deterrent that is credible in all regions to which we might have to commit forces.

- Fifth, Europe must remain the centerpiece of our strategy. It is a common misperception that for some reason we are downgrading our commitment to defend Europe. This notion is patently absurd. Why should we be so concerned about the Persian Gulf, whose petroleum is far more vital to Europe's economies than to ours, if Europe has become less important to us?

- Sixth, we cannot tolerate the erosion of our maritime strength. What we must have is the ability to dominate those waters -- and not every ocean or sea -- that are of vital importance to us. I should add that I mean not merely warships, but the sealift that many of those warships would be expected to protect.

How are we realizing our strategy? We are fielding new land systems -- the M-1 tank, the M-2 and M-3 Bradley armored fighting vehicle systems, the Patriot air defense missile, the Apache attack helicopter -- to name just a few. These systems, coupled with the improvements that we anticipate in the forces of our allies and friends, will enable us to offset the quantitative advantage that the Soviets have in land forces systems, and to cut into the ratio of production in areas such as the fielding of new tanks, which currently favors the Soviets by about 2.5 to one.

We are planning to build two additional aircraft carriers, and to re-introduce four battleships to the fleet. By the way, the battleships are not ancient at all, as some claim. All four have about 12 or fewer years of service life. We will then be able to bring to bear significant sea based firepower against onshore targets in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, we will be able to maintain important deployments without subjecting our crews, and the systems they man, to impossible strains that arise from overworking in stressful environments far from home.

We are continuing the modernization of our tactical air forces, and are seeking economies in the process of doing so. Again our goal is to cut into Soviet production advantages, that with respect to what we call "Tac Air," currently are as great as 2.3 to 1 in the fighter production category.

Finally, and critically important to a strategy that emphasizes flexibility, we are enhancing our ability to lift forces to remote areas both by land and sea as quickly as possible. Lift is the key to the effectiveness of our Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. We are asking for additional procurement of the world's largest airlifter -- the C-5 -- whose capability was most demonstrably underlined during the airlift to Israel in 1973. We are also planning to acquire over 40 KC-10 tanker planes. Because larger airlifters can be refueled in the air, the acquisition of the KC-10s means that C-5s and the somewhat smaller C-141s needn't land on their way to the Middle East. Landing is time consuming, and can often result in unexpected breakdowns. On the other hand, if aerial refueling is possible, airlifters can load up with more cargo, relying on refueling rather than on the capacity of their own tanks.

We are also proceeding apace with improving our ability to reinforce by sea. For example, we are buying -- at bargain prices -- eight ships that can move at 33 knots -- some 40 land miles an hour. These ships could carry equipment for an entire U.S. mechanized division to the Persian Gulf in about two weeks.

A few words about the readiness of our forces is also in order:

We inherited defense budgets that had been grossly underfunded and that had been paid for by sacrificing the training, manpower and facilities programs that constitute the readiness of our forces. In the past three fiscal years, we have increased readiness funding by 8.9, 9.2 and 5.6 percent respectively. Funding for spare parts and other materiel readiness requirements have increased by 14.5, 14.1 and 7.5 percent over the same period. Recruiting has reached or exceeded service objectives over the past year, while retention, critical to a professional force, has gained considerably over the past two years, rising to 70 percent from about 55 percent just two years ago. The number of substantially ready major units has increased by 32 percent since this Administration took office; the percentage of mission capable aircraft has increased; so too have command operationally ready ship levels and naval aviation squadron readiness, flying hours, and sustainability funding and stockage levels. I have spoken at some length, and am

prepared to provide even more detail, about our program and why we have framed it the way we have. We recognize that at a time of economic strain, we must do our utmost to promote efficiencies. In striving for these efficiencies we have taken several steps.

- We are being honest about costs:

- For the first time, DoD uses inflation factors that reflect defense industry prices and are not kept artificially low, as was the case in the past.

- For the first time, too, we have mandated the development of independent cost estimates, and for the first time we have used them, as for example, with respect to a new powerful air-to-air missile, the AMRAAM.

- We actually forced a contractor to cut back on his asking price in the midst of a program. The Secretary of the Navy argued that McDonnell Douglas was overpricing the F-18; he threatened to cancel the program; the F-18's price came down.

- We are reexamining contract procedures and have voided certain contractors' claims.

- We have eliminated some sixty costly programs, and severely cut back on others.

- We have initiated multi-year procurement of weapons systems, to reduce their costs.

- We have cut back on waste and fraud -- even our severest critics acknowledge that we have done much in this regard -- especially with our new "hot line" and the new defense criminal investigative service.

- We have pressed ahead with cross-service programs and approaches, including initiating a new unified command -- the first such action in eight years. This command, Centcom, will focus on the needs of our rapidly deploying forces without regard to particular service interests. I should also note the recent Air Force/Navy agreement on cooperation on sea control -- the first such agreement (with teeth) that the Services have ever reached regarding this mission.

- We have fought valiantly -- and often successfully -- to win Congressional approval for programs that were right -- such as the C-5 and not the Boeing 747 -- and not based on constituency concerns. But for this we need the help of the informed public.

But let me draw your attention to two key points:

First, any set of reforms take time to work. We are now operating with a budget that is primarily the reflection of decisions taken by the previous Administration. We are bearing the brunt of financing programs that they underfunded. We must recognize that, just as we retain direct discretion over some 15 percent of our new programs in any one year, so too can our efforts at reform be realized in only limited form in any given year. Only this year will the fruits of our own budgets -- of two years ago -- and of the reforms that accompanied them, begin to be manifest. We have already

begun to evaluate results, and will press on with our determination to exact maximum value for every dollar we spend. For we recognize that while domestic economic factors will constrain our budgets, the risk of our security is external, and is indifferent to those factors.

My second point derives from the recent experience of the British and Israelis. It is that cheap systems, even in quantity, may not compensate for quality hardware. The Israelis devastated the Syrians with F-15 and F-16 combat aircraft; the British surface fleet suffered from the absence of early warning and deep intercept capabilities that are integral to our aircraft carrier strike forces. Training, readiness and first class systems remain the key to military success. We have increased our readiness in the last two years -- this is one of the few areas in which results begin to show quickly -- and we are determined to match that readiness with the most capable systems that all the world's leading fighting forces would love to have.

I should now like to turn to the last element of this discussion -- the religious aspect. Here I speak as a committed Jew, and my sources are not military analyses but the Tractates of the Talmud and laws upon which our religion is based, and which have sustained us through Holocausts past.

The Bible is quite unequivocal about war. The Book of Deuteronomy explicitly discusses who is to go to war, and how war should be conducted. We are not, and never have been, a pacifist religion. Moreover, the great codifier Maimonides, as well as the commentaries on his own work, the Mishneh Torah, cite two key points:

First - that the king has the power to tax his people for the needs of war; and,

Second - that this law applies to both Jewish and non-Jewish regimes. No one has ever disputed this principle. Neither have modern Jewish thinkers, including the sources of the Conservative and Reform movements. The issue is not one of consensus but of unanimity -- the Jew has the right to fight, and the obligation to contribute to the cost of fighting.

Finally, Judaism is also unequivocal about the nature of Pikuach Nefesh -- the imperative to save life. We are taught that we can risk lives to save lives -- the essence of deterrence. The principle appears in Tractate Eruvin, where the Talmud rules that in an instance where a settlement is threatened on the Sabbath by the possibility that aggressors will demand tribute -- and not threaten lives -- it is nevertheless permitted to violate the Sabbath in order to arm the forces and forestall even the remote possibility that lives will be endangered. Later commentators -- Maimonides, Rabbi Joseph Karo, Rabbi Moses Isserlis, and more recently the Chofetz Chaim ruled that even if it appeared that an enemy might demand tribute, which in turn might, however remotely, lead to resistance that could cause bloodshed, the Sabbath could be violated and the military could arm. Thus, the principle of armed deterrence applies in the clearest possible way -- though war could come because of rearmament, and though lives could be lost, it is permissible to violate the Sabbath in order to deter war in the first place.

The Chofetz Chaim writes that this law applies to all societies, not just ancient Israel. The principle is clear -- we must be armed to deter, not disarm for fear of loss of life, only to be at the mercy of an aggressor. The Pikuach Nefesh imperative tolerates no such risk.

Our defense budget in fact accepts some risk -- we cannot avoid doing so without skewing our defense expenditures well beyond the levels that our body politic will tolerate. But on strategic matters, where the fate of the world hangs in the balance, the imperative comes to the fore. We must minimize risk according to that principle -- that as Jews, we cannot allow ourselves to take such chances. And not modernizing our deterrent -- whose very term implies a defensive posture -- is taking a chance -- a chance that those who seek the destruction of our society as Americans, and of our religion as Jews -- will not follow through in the way of every tyranny that preceded them; a chance that puts at risk our lives and those of our children; a chance that is contrary to the teachings and principles of the religion that has sustained us since Abraham first recognized that there is a power greater than that any man can create.



cc: Harold Applebaum
Gene DuBow
Marc Tanenbaum
Jim Rudin

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date 16 December 1982

to Phyllis Sherman

from Jon Levine *JL*
Harriet Bogard *HB*


subject Nuclear Disarmament

Attached is a memo and a copy of the statement on Nuclear disarmament adopted by the Executive Board of the Chicago chapter at its November 18 meeting.

We ask that this statement be considered by the Committee on Defense and Arms Limitation as it drafts its final statement on Nuclear disarmament. You will note that it calls for a freeze to be followed by arms reduction. Our committee considered the reverse order carefully but was persuaded by the arguments that there in fact exists a balance of nuclear power with the Soviets, even when the strengths and weaknesses of the triad strategy are taken into account. Thus, an immediate freeze would not put the U.S. at a disadvantage.

Please keep us informed about the Committee's actions on this issue. It is possible that we would prepare a "brief" for one of the Chicago members of the Committee to present, should the occasion arise.

Best regards.



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date December 14, 1982

to Harris L. Kempner, Jr., Chairman, Defense and Arms
Limitation Committee

from Marshall L. Zissman and Stephen R. Comar

subject Chicago Chapter's Statement on Nuclear Proliferation

Early in 1982 the Chicago Chapter became aware of the mainline Churches' concerns about nuclear proliferation.

The Interreligious Affairs Commission, chaired by Stephen R. Comar, decided to educate itself about the problems of nuclear proliferation so that they could prepare a rational and informed statement that addressed nuclear disarmament issues.

To achieve this, the Commission invited several experts to discuss the various aspects of nuclear disarmament. They heard: Bruce Buursma, Religion Editor of the Chicago Tribune, who discussed the position of the mainline churches regarding nuclear proliferation; Dr. David Joravsky, Chairman of the History Department of Northwestern University, who examined the Russian view of Nuclear Power; Jack Mendelsohn, Deputy Assistant Director, Strategic Program Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Dr. Arnold Kanter, Director of Policy Planning, Bureau of Political Military Affairs of the U.S. State Department and Rabbi David Saperstein, Director and Legal Counsel of the Religious Action Center of UAHC, Washington, D.C.

The IAC also participated in Ground Zero week in Chicago. Ground Zero is a bipartisan organization that is concerned with the lack of a national consensus and direction on nuclear war. It believes that a public education program on this issue is a top priority.

IAC examined the nuclear issue in a logical manner and decided that it would be appropriate to have a statement supporting nuclear disarmament coming from a Jewish organization that has a deep concern about the welfare of Israel. The Commission also decided that there should be no linkage between the ability of the United States to support social programs and have an adequate conventional defense.

The attached statement was developed over a period of 10 months and was adopted at the Chapter's November 18 Executive Board meeting. The Chapter asks that it be considered as a model to be used in preparing agency policy.

cc: Eugene DuBow, Harold Applebaum, Robert Jacobs, Marc Tanenbaum
Jim Rudin, Phyllis Sherman, Jon Levine and Harriet S. Bogard

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, CHICAGO CHAPTER

Interreligious Affairs Commission

Statement on Nuclear Disarmament

November 18, 1982


As a concerned Human Relations organization we feel a sense of responsibility to protect ourselves, our children and the civilization we cherish from the ravages of nuclear war. We firmly believe that nuclear war in any form can lead to the destruction of all we hold dear. The threat of annihilation hanging over us is morally and spiritually destructive. Time is running out and we must convey a desperate sense of urgency to the leaders of our government to deal with this issue at once.

We are convinced that the surest way to prevent a nuclear war is to put a stop to the nuclear arms race.

Therefore we propose the following:

1. We strongly urge the United States government to put forth a sincere and realistic proposal that begins with a mutually verifiable nuclear freeze, (between the two superpowers and eventually including all nuclear powers), to be followed by steep nuclear arms reduction with a limit on the number of nuclear weapons, leading to the ultimate goal of the elimination of all nuclear weaponry.
2. We reject unilateral disarmament as dangerous and unrealistic and we recognize the necessity that the United States must protect our national safety through an adequate defense system.
3. We want our nation to be able to turn a significant portion of our resources away from the tools of destruction toward the improvement of the quality of life.
4. We will encourage similar efforts by other organizations and join with other groups that share our goals and philosophy.

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Samuel Weintraub
Interreligious Affairs
Department
American Jewish Committee

July 1982

The following report examines official positions of various Jewish and Christian organizations vis-a-vis the nuclear arms race. It considers the period since the Congressional SALT II debate--that is, roughly, the last five years--and consists of two parts. Part I investigates resolutions, study documents, and other statements about nuclear weapons through separate discussions of each denomination. Included as well is a brief synopsis of the major interfaith coalitions involved in disarmament. Part II defines the major religious positions, popular supporting arguments, and significant trends in religious disarmament activism. It may also be utilized as a summary of the considerably longer first section.




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PART I - CHRISTIAN AND JEWISH POSITIONS

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

More than one of every four Americans is a Catholic. That the religious leaders of such a segment of the population should even contemplate condemning a central premise of America's defense policy is a religious and political development of momentous consequence. Yet that is exactly what is in process today.

Something is stirring in the Roman Catholic Church in the United States that portends an explosion between church and state that will make the abortion issue, the school-aid controversy and the tax-exempt status of churches look like a child's sparkler on the Fourth of July...

Stated simply, the church in the United States is becoming a 'peace' church.

Over the past decade, the Roman Catholic Church, in the United States and abroad, has questioned increasingly the growth of nuclear weapons. Papal and Vatican Conciliar statements have condemned nuclear arms, blasted the rationale that they provide any meaningful security, and encouraged various disarmament initiatives. In the United States, such official bodies as the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) have supported SALT II, questioned the policy of deterrence, and reevaluated traditional peace theologies. Similar, and even more radical, disarmament statements have come from the local diocesan and parish level. The following surveys this activity:

The Second Vatican Council of 1965 may be regarded as the genesis of modern peace trends in the Catholic Church. As the

U.S. Bishops' Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace reported, "(The Council's) Pastoral Constitution on 'The Church in the Modern World'...has a unique status among recent statements, since it has set the theological framework for Catholic thinking about contemporary warfare"³. The Constitution first asserted that the devastating potential of "scientific weapons...compels us to undertake an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude". It followed with an initial articulation of this attitude, which, because it has inspired later Catholic activity, we will quote in part directly:

Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.

...Whatever be the case with (the policy of nuclear) deterrence, men should be convinced that the arms race in which so many countries are engaged is not a safe way to preserve a steady peace. Nor is the so-called balance resulting from this race a sure and authentic peace. Rather than being eliminated thereby, the causes of war threaten to grow gradually stronger. While extravagant sums are being spent for the furnishing of every new weapon, an adequate remedy cannot be provided for the multiple miseries afflicting the whole modern world.

This Second Vatican document influenced later Catholic teaching by its clear condemnation of the use of nuclear weapons, and by raising the moral problems of strategic deterrence. The same themes were expounded in subsequent Papal statements and activities. In particular, they were detailed in a 1976 report of the delegation of the Holy See to the UN entitled "Strengthening the Role of the UN in the Field of Disarmament".

The report firstly condemns the arms race "unreservedly... (it) is, in fact, a danger, an injustice, a mistake, a sin and a folly". Strategically, the arms race is criticized for providing only a "false security"; ethically, it is denounced because "the damage caused is disproportionate to the values we are seeking to safeguard". Further, the nuclear arms race is

blamed for provoking a smaller, conventional arms race among developing nations, thus retarding their economic growth and encouraging authoritarian regimes.

In its concluding section, "The Reduction of Armaments", the Holy See report urges gradual, internationally controlled and verifiable disarmament. Specifically, it recommends

- strengthening the international policing role of the UN, including measures against terrorism;
- access by the developing nations to disarmament negotiations;
- prohibiting access to "drawing rights" to any developing countries which increase their military budgets; and
- priority access to international financing for countries which reduce their military expenditures in favor of social programs.

Active Vatican concern with the arms race has continued into the 1980's. In November, 1981, Pope John Paul II wrote President Ronald Reagan and Premier Leonid I. Brezhnev expressing "vivid interest" in the outcome of their Geneva disarmament consultations. The following month, the Pope sent a high-level delegation of scientists to the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain to explain the ultimate impotence of medical intervention in case of nuclear war⁴.

In January, 1982, the Italian Jesuit review Civilita Cattolica, whose major editorials are reviewed by the Vatican, argued that nuclear weapons invalidated the "just war" concept⁵. It stated that the two justifications developed by the late Pope Pius XII for modern war--that it be limited to defense needs and that its destruction be controllable--were impossible in the atomic age.

Most recently, Pope John Paul II sent a personal message to the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament. (June, 1982). The message deplored the arms race and advocated mutually verifiable and progressive arms reduction as well as precautions against possible errors in the maintenance of nuclear weapons⁶. The letter also claimed that "Discussions based on equilibrium--

certainly not an end in itself but as a stage on the way to progressive disarmament--can still be judged to be morally acceptable". Finally, the Pope appreciated the "deep and sincere desire for peace" of the burgeoning international peace movements.

In the United States, the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) have seconded the Vatican's pronouncements and addressed its call for "an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude". Firstly, in a 1968 Pastoral Letter, "Human Life in our Day", the American Bishops declared that pursuing nuclear superiority only fueled the arms race and brought in effect "a decrease in both stability and security"⁷. "To Live in Christ Jesus", a 1976 Pastoral Letter, asserted that the policy of deterrence, when it involves a threat against civilian populations, is immoral. This statement marked the first official US Catholic criticism of the mere possession of nuclear weapons. The need for verifiable arms control, and their eventual abolition, was reiterated by the USCC Administrative Board in a 1978 statement issued in anticipation of the first UN Special Session on Disarmament and the Congressional SALT II debate⁸.

Thus far, the major official statement of U.S. Catholic disarmament policy is the lengthy testimony of Cardinal John Krol of Philadelphia before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 6, 1979⁹. Cardinal Krol endorsed SALT II in testimony authorized by the USCC Administrative Board, a group of 45 Bishops who speak for all U.S. Bishops between their general meetings. The central moral and strategic propositions affirmed by the Cardinal include:

1. "Catholics reject means of waging or even deterring war which could result in destruction beyond control".
2. The doctrine of strategic equality ensures the continued escalation of the arms race. Negotiated reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons must be the overriding U.S. policy.

3. "SALT II...represents a limited but acceptable agreement which constrains...nuclear forces (and) does not jeopardize U.S. security, and can be the beginning of a continuing and necessary process for obtaining meaningful and progressive reductions." The Church supports all such bilateral and legally sanctioned agreements. "Narrow and technologically oriented insistence upon exploitation of new nuclear options" must be restrained; in particular, deployment of the MX and Trident II should be deferred pending their possible inclusion into a SALT III treaty.

4. Catholics must renounce unilaterally the right to use, or the threat to use, those nuclear weapons still allowed under arms control agreements.

5. Nuclear deterrence must be "a temporary resort, designed to be self-eliminating, not self-perpetuating"¹⁰. "The moral attitude of the Catholic Church would almost certainly have to shift to one of uncompromising condemnation of both use and possession of such weapons", should deterrence lose its moral or strategic justification.

The last two years have witnessed, on the part of many Catholic leaders, the kind of shift about which Cardinal Krol warned. In the wake of the failure of SALT II, and of Reagan administration talk about first-strike strategies and protracted nuclear wars, both individual Bishops and Catholic organizations have changed their stances on disarmament. Many now soundly criticize U.S. policy, and question whether any policy of deterrence will prevent future nuclear conflicts or advance arms reduction. The following surveys only a small percentage of recent speeches, pastoral letters, articles, resolutions, et al., in which Catholic leaders and groups have challenged U.S. policy.

To date, over half of the 280 active U.S. Bishops have signed a national Catholic petition for a bilateral freeze. As of December, 1981, fifty Bishops had joined Pax Christi, the

international Catholic peace movement, and would appear to support that organization's call for some unilateral disarmament¹¹. (Pax Christi also broke with the official NCCB position on SALT II, which it opposed for equalizing rather than diminishing the arms race.)

In November, 1981, Archbishop John Roach of Minneapolis-St. Paul, in his Presidential Address to the annual Bishops' meeting, declared that "on a global scale, the most dangerous moral issue in the public order today is the nuclear arms race... The Church needs to 'no' clearly and decisively to the use of nuclear weapons"¹². In April, 1982, Auxiliary Bishop P. Francis Murphy of Baltimore told the Maryland House Judiciary Committee that the Bishops of Baltimore, Washington, D.C. and Wilmington, Delaware, and their one million followers, favor a bilateral nuclear freeze. Specifically, Bishop Murphy endorsed a Maryland House resolution--similar to the U.S. Senate's Hatfield-Kennedy resolution--which demands a mutual freeze on "testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons", and for US-USSR disarmament talks "without preconditions regarding other issues"¹³.


Almost all of 600 nuns at the September 1981 Leadership Conference of Women Religious opposed production and deployment of the MX missile, the neutron bomb and other "planned instruments of destruction"¹⁴. The Conference represents most American Catholic women's Orders and is the official liaison between Congregations of Women Religious in the U.S. and the Sacred Congregation of Religious in Rome. The National Council of Catholic Women, a conservative body that opposed the ERA, has also voted to "work tirelessly for disarmament and the abolition of all nuclear weapons"¹⁵.

We can also surmise the pro-disarmament sensitivities of America's Catholics by the strong critical reaction to Cardinal Cooke's December 1981 statement that "a strategy of nuclear deterrence can be morally tolerated if a nation is

sincerely trying to come up with a rational alternative"¹⁶.

The subsequent reserve of Cardinal Cooke and other conservative Bishops may indicate defensiveness in the face of growing Catholic support for disarmament.

Finally, we should note that in 1980 the NCCB established an ad hoc Committee on War and Peace. The Committee is chaired by Archbishop Joseph Bernardin of Cincinnati and contains leading NCCB liberals and conservatives. It is developing a major, reformulated theology of peace, and will specify "stringent limits on the use of force in the modern age"¹⁷. As Archbishop Bernardin has noted, "it probably will be the moral problem of nuclear war which will present the Committee its most challenging task"¹⁸. The Committee's report will be proposed as a Pastoral Letter to the November 1982 NCCB general meeting.



MAINLINE PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS

American Protestant denominations are also grappling with the moral and political dilemmas of nuclear armaments. The positions of these Churches vary, and range from a general abhorrence of nuclear war to specific proposals for unilateral U.S. disarmament. In addition, different Churches are at different stages in their discussion of nuclear weapons. Some have just taken up the issue, while others have developed detailed resolutions and scholarly theological reflections. It will thus be most instructive to consider the statements of each denomination separately.

LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA

The Lutheran Church in America (LCA), largely based in the East and Midwest, expresses political positions through "Social Statements" adopted at Biennial Conventions. The Church's guiding position on nuclear arms is found in "World Community: Ethical Imperatives in an Age of Interdependence" a Social Statement approved in June 1970. It declared

It is clearly time for a rethinking of the meaning of national security. In view of the overkill capacity now possessed by the superpowers, national security can no longer be defined in terms of either nuclear superiority or even nuclear stalemate. The common threat which such weapons hold for all mankind teaches that their continued development can only undermine security. It is now necessary both to create an international legal framework within which arms control can be brought about and to help nations perceive that their safety must be conceived in more than military terms.

(Until a truly comprehensive multinational framework is created), the U.S. should be encouraged to undertake such unilateral initiatives as may contribute to a climate more hospitable to the limitation of arms. (my emphasis)

The statement then links the need to end arms proliferation with combatting economic and political injustice,

as both contribute to international despair and violence.

The spirit and recommendations of this Statement have informed subsequent LCA disarmament activity. In 1979, for example, the Church's Division for Mission in North America urged the U.S. Senate to ratify the SALT II agreement, which it felt "translates (the Social Statement's) policy...to a concrete situation"¹⁹. Currently, the LCA is undertaking a major reevaluation of war and peace from theological and political perspectives. Thus far, the Division for Mission in North America has produced a preliminary pamphlet, "War and Peace" to help Church members engage in discussion. While this document does not articulate official Church policy, its reflections on nuclear arms are noteworthy.

Firstly, "War and Peace" rejects the doctrine of the Just War as useless, "causatively,..because nuclear warfare presents a qualitative leap beyond what we have known in the past as warfare...theologically...because there is no way of knowing what constitutes justice in the civil community from within the Just War theory"²⁰. Further, it argues that, because of their threat to human survival, nuclear weapons erase traditional distinctions between victory and defeat. The pamphlet concludes by urging a political "repentance" from economies based on high military expenditures and preparedness.

AMERICAN LUTHERAN CHURCH

The American Lutheran Church (ALC), based primarily in the Western half of the United States, has also considered the issues of disarmament. A 1981 resolution, "Arms Escalation and National Security", adopted by the American Lutheran Church Council, proclaimed a commitment to "peacemaking...as second only to evangelism as a priority for the ALC". Strategically, the resolution

--argued that arms escalation threatens national and global security;

--urged resumption of SALT talks;

--asked the "United States government to abide voluntarily by the arms limitation agreements reached in SALT II as a sign of good faith to the Soviet Union and the global community;

--claimed that increases in U.S. military spending compound inflationary pressures and impede our care for the world's poor;

--recommended that ALC congregations participate in Ground Zero, the nationwide educational action about nuclear warfare held April 18-25, 1982.

Following this resolution, in March, 1982, the nuclear freeze campaign (see page 34) was endorsed by the Southeastern Minnesota District, largest ALC district with 240,000 members²¹. Related statements urged District members to oppose increases in military spending, particularly for the B-1 Bomber, MX missiles and the neutron bomb, and to seek a restructuring of national priorities to meet human needs. In addition, the national ALC was asked to hire a full-time staff person to work on disarmament.

Also in March, representatives of the Southwestern Minnesota District voted overwhelmingly to support a bilateral freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons, and on the development of aircraft designed to deliver those weapons.²² Finally, we should note that ALC Presiding Bishop David W. Preus joined other world Lutheran leaders at the May 1982 Moscow Peace Conference, called by the Russian Orthodox Church. In deciding to attend, Bishop Preus stated that the importance of peacemaking overrode his fear of Soviet propaganda manipulation²³.

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST

The United Church of Christ (UCC) is one of the most socially liberal Protestant denominations. Since its founding in 1957, the UCC has issued many statements concerning Peace and Arms Control. These statements, summarized in the appended index, include some of the most detailed disarmament resolutions of

any American religious organization. In this report, we will discuss only two recent developments: 1)disarmament Pronouncements of the UCC's Twelfth General Synod (1979),and 2)events at the Thirteenth General Synod (June 1981), where assembled delegates voted to become a "peace church".

In "Reversing the Arms Race", the 1979 Pronouncement, Synod delegates exhorted the U.S. government to "take the lead in turning nations toward reversing the arms race"by

--placing priority on reversing the arms race in funding, in political strategy at home and abroad, and in the education of its people;

--taking independent initiatives toward disarmament and challenging other nations to do the same (my emphasis)

--limiting the foreign sale of weapons and of sophisticated military technology;

--converting from a "war-time" to a "peace-time" economy, thereby decreasing inflation and developing jobs that serve human needs; and

--approving arms limitation treaties, such as SALT II, that help lessen the arms race (which is assailed for increasing international insecurity and human rights violations).

In support of these demands, the Synod's Pronouncement offered that

1. Nuclear stockpiles need no further development as they can already destroy every major city in the world;
2. The huge sums spent on arms could provide the poor with food, housing, health care and education;
3. There is no security in weapons whose mere "first-use" would kills millions of people; and
4. The export of nuclear technology increases arms proliferation and the danger that human fallibility may cause serious accidents.

At the Thirteenth General Synod of the UCC (Rochester, New York, June 1981), delegates voted overwhelmingly to make world peace the overriding Church priority for four years. A resolution entitled "Peace Church" urged "all segments of the UCC to become a peace church". Disarmament per se was addressed in three other Synod statements:

The "Peace Priority Goal" enlists all parts of the Church in study and action so that "the dependence of the United States and world economies on the production of armaments be reversed... (and) human and material resources be used to promote the quality of life for all persons". The resolution "Broken Arrow" encourages disarmament by the negotiation of all existing and developing nuclear powers. It promotes nuclear disarmament "even if this process must begin with unilateral initiatives on the part of the United States". Finally, the resolution "Peace and the Resolving of Conflict" articulates a fundamental connection between economic and social inequalities and armed conflict. UCC members are asked to study conflict resolution, and the U.S. Congress is petitioned to establish a national academy of peace and conflict resolution.

In the wake of the Thirteenth General Synod, UCC leaders have continued their disarmament activism. The Board of Directors of its Office for Church and Society has supported the Geneva disarmament talks, and suggested that the USSR dismantle some SS-20 missiles, and the U.S. "reverse the present NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and Cruise missiles in NATO countries"²⁴. The Board has also praised a "partner Church", the Evangelical Church of the Union in Germany, for helping organize a huge 1981 disarmament rally in Bonn; UCC resources were pledged to build a similar peace movement in the United States²⁵.

UNITED METHODIST CHURCH

At its 1980 General Conference, the United Methodist Church adopted two statements bearing on the arms race. The first of these, "The United Methodist Church and Peace", began by alerting Church members that "the momentum of the race never slackens, and the danger of a holocaust is imminent. Meanwhile, millions starve, development stagnates, and international cooperation is threatened". Large military expenditures are blamed for the sacrifice of "food, health, social services, jobs and education".

Positively, the resolution calls for comprehensive disarmament negotiations among all nuclear nations. These talks should anticipate the eventual, internationally supervised dismantling of all existing stockpiles. In addition, "serious consideration should be given by nations to unilateral initiatives which might stimulate the reaching of international agreements" (my emphasis). Nuclear-free zones are also lauded.

A second resolution, "Social Principles", calls for a reduction and control of the manufacture, sale and deployment of all armaments, and condemns "the production, possession or use of nuclear weapons" (my emphasis).

Finally, in November 1981, the United Methodist Bishops, in a statement entitled "A Call to Nuclear Disarmament and Peace with Justice" hailed recent disarmament statements of President Ronald Reagan and Premier Leonid Brezhnev. The Bishops urged the pursuit of the Geneva talks with "diplomatic skill and moral conviction". "All other issues", the statement asserted, "pale before this ultimate and immediate possibility (of nuclear holocaust)".

EPISCOPAL CHURCH

Over the past six years, the Episcopal Church has issued various, general statements about disarmament. The following synopses summarize their major points:

A 1976 Resolution of the General Convention commended the SALT talks, and suggested that the United States, "having led in the development of nuclear power, should also lead in its effective utilization and control".

The Executive Council of the Church, in a 1979 resolution, blanketly condemned "the escalation of the sale of armaments... to the developing and dependent nations" and supported "all international proposals and conferences" regarding arms reduction.

In 1980, a formal statement of sixty Episcopal Bishops deplored the "devastating personal and economic effects" of the

arms race. They petitioned President Reagan to propose a mutual halt in the "testing, production and further deployment of all nuclear warheads, missiles, and delivery systems".

The Primates of the Anglican Communion, in 1981, declared a "strong identification" with the Final Documents of the (1978) United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. They particularly hailed the Documents' proposals for ending nuclear arms testing and conventional arms procurement. The Primates further endorsed Dr. Kurt Waldheim's suggestion that all nations devote 0.1% of their defense budgets to disarmament research and education.

The Episcopal Church has also undertaken an internal program of peace education and activism. In 1980, a Joint Commission on Peace was established under the chairmanship of Bishop William C. Frey of Colorado. The Commission will submit to the 1982 General Convention a "theological statement to stimulate discussion within the Church, seek to identify the international and domestic implications of current U.S. policy and suggest educational and pastoral programs for the Episcopal Church which will facilitate its ministry of peace and reconciliation"²⁶. Finally, the (national) Arms Race Task Force of the Episcopal Urban Caucus is quite active. Through local Church programs, the Task Force seeks to link the issues of arms reduction with the quality of urban American life.

UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE U.S.A.

In 1975, the 187th General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. commissioned its Advisory Council on Church and Society to "reassess the concept of peacemaking and the direction of our country's foreign policy". The Council's subsequent study, "Peacemaking" the Believers' Calling", was adopted at the 192nd General Assembly in 1980. While the document contains little endorsement of specific disarmament

measures, it is important for having inspired later UPCUSA "peacemaking" activities. We will therefore summarize its major assertions vis-a-vis disarmament.

The arms race is linked throughout the paper to global economic and political interdependence. For example, "Peacemaking..." quotes the 1978 statement of the World Council of Churches Switzerland Conference on Disarmament, which condemned the international arms race for wasting human and material resources, aiding repression, violating human rights, and promoting violence. Further, "SALT treaties propose limits to nuclear escalation in managing and maintaining parity, but they miss the chief issue, which is looking toward disarmament"²⁷. "Peacemaking..." concludes by upholding a host of UPCUSA resolutions from the 1960's and 1970's. Internationally, these advocate a cessation of nuclear weapons testing and proliferation. With regard to U.S. policy, they support the ratification of SALT II, elimination of biological and chemical warfare programs, reduction of military expenditures and any unilateral disarmament which might stimulate international weapons control.

In 1981, the 193rd General Assembly approved two more disarmament resolutions. The first of these endorsed a "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race", the national campaign for a bilateral freeze (see page 34). The second petitioned the Reagan administration to forswear first-strike use of nuclear weapons. Such a pledge, the resolution maintained, would begin to "delegitimize" nuclear war, and might inspire a reciprocal Soviet agreement.

REFORMED CHURCH OF AMERICA

The Reformed Church of America, under the direction of its Office of Social Witness, has been outspoken and active in the American disarmament movement. In 1980, a major study of its

Theological Commission, "Christian Faith and the Nuclear Arms Race: A Reformed Perspective" asserted that

The nuclear arms race may well be regarded as the penultimate subject of our time. There is no greater affront to the Lord and Giver of Life, no more convincing evidence of human enslavement to the dark powers of this age, and no more urgent cause for the Church's prophetic witness and action. 28

Politically, the study endorsed a "full and general prohibition of nuclear arms testing; development and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems; production and accumulation of chemical and radiological arms as well as other weapons of mass destruction"²⁹. Over the last two years, following the distribution of this study to Reformed Churches, numerous local Congregations have participated in the national bilateral freeze campaign (see page 34).

In addition, General Synods of the Reformed Church in 1979, 1980, and 1981 urged affiliated Congregations to study the "devastating social and personal consequences of the arms race" and to engage in meaningful peacemaking activity.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

The disarmament concerns of the National Council of Churches, coordinating body for 32 American Protestant denominations, may be followed through several key statements.

In March 1979, ten members of the NCC National Council and Governing Board met in Geneva with ten Soviet Orthodox and Evangelical leaders for an ecclesiastical peace summit. The Conference produced a lengthy theological and political statement entitled "Choose Life". Therein, the twenty delegates pledged to

- press for approval of the SALT II accords;
- urge a "full and general prohibition of nuclear arms testing, the development and deployment of new nuclear

weapons systems, and the production and accumulation of chemical and radiological arms as well as other weapons of mass destruction";

--to support the disarmament role of the UN; and

--to call upon their Churches to allocate staff and financial resources for disarmament. 30

In 1981, the Governing Board of the NCC adopted a resolution in support of a national petition for a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze. The resolution noted with dismay the abeyance of the SALT II accords, and heightened superpower and international tensions. Politically, the statement

--urged "both the United States and the Soviet Union to halt the nuclear arms race now by adopting promptly a mutual freeze on all further testing, production and deployment of weapons and aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons";

--supported "initiatives by either or both (superpowers) that would demonstrate good faith and make it easier for the other to take similar steps" until a freeze may be arranged; and

--called upon affiliated denominations and their judicatories and Congregations to consider supporting the national freeze campaign.

Most recently, disarmament and general "peacemaking" were major themes at the May 1982 meeting of the NCC Governing Board. In its "1982-1984 Triennial Framework", the Board decided to make peace education and activism "the urgent conceptual theme of the Triennium, which will infuse and integrate our Council's tasks". A resolution on "Pursuing Peace with Justice" gave further articulation to peacemaking as "the priority theme of this Triennium". It appreciated the "dramatic" inspiration of American and foreign peace groups, and encouraged the Council and all member Churches to devote "human and material resources... toward peace with justice". Programmatically, it declared May 23-29, 1983 as a "Week for Pursuing Peace with Justice". "Week..." organizers will invite NCC communions and other religious bodies to participate in educational and religious activities about world peace.

In terms of disarmament, the May meeting adopted the most comprehensive NCC resolution to date, entitled "Swords into Ploughshares: The Churches' Witness for Disarmament II". Written in anticipation of the Second Special UN Session on Disarmament, the statement

- strongly supported the Second Session, and the importance of the UN as a "unique and viable structure for significant disarmament efforts";
- called for new initiatives by the United States at the Second Special Session, including (a) a declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons, (b) a willingness to place a freeze on the production and deployment of strategic nuclear weapons, (c) a declaration of its willingness to proceed rapidly to the ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- advised member NCC communions to allocate more human and financial resources to disarmament education and action; and
- commended the disarmament activism of NCC Churches, and of popular movements, especially in the United States and Western Europe.



WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

In May, 1980, The World Council of Churches (WCC) Conference on World Mission, meeting in Melbourne, Australia, advocated "a cessation worldwide of the research, testing and production of nuclear weapons now in existence". Shortly thereafter, the Central Committee of the WCC, hearing the "message from the Melbourne Conference", adopted a "Statement on Nuclear Disarmament".

This statement, to date the major WCC resolution on the arms race, began by noting sadly events of the past few years: US-USSR tensions, and armament stockpiles, had increased; NATO had decided to deploy new missiles with counterforce qualities; and the United States, in August 1980, had enunciated a policy which contemplated "limited" nuclear wars. In light of these events, the WCC Statement advised a prompt ratification of SALT II, and urged all nuclear powers to

- "freeze immediately all further testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons";
- initiate talks to reduce nuclear stockpiles; and
- conclude speedily a comprehensive test ban treaty.

BAPTISTS

Both the American Baptist Churches, and Southern Baptist Convention, have become increasingly outspoken about the issues of disarmament.

The American Baptist Churches, to begin with, chose the occasion of the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (May 1978) to issue a "Resolution on Disarmament". In this resolution, the General Board of the American Baptist Churches asserted that "the international arms race continues to escalate, threatening world peace, diverting limited resources essential for meeting human needs, and distorting the world's economies". Strategically, the statement

- strongly supported the UN Special Session;
- called upon the United States government to "work tirelessly for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and substantial progress on SALT II" and to inspire other countries towards disarmament by unilateral national restraint on weapons development and sales; and
- enjoined ABC members to participate in disarmament education and political action.

Later American Baptist Churches statements have continued to criticize the nuclear arms buildup. In December 1981, the 37 executive ministers (regional officers) of the American Baptist Churches, finding no justification "in Scripture or tradition" for nuclear weapons, urged all nuclear nations to "stop the production of nuclear weapons, to dismantle those that exist, and to join in a program of mutual inspection"³¹.

The Southern Baptist Convention, coordinating body for the nation's largest Protestant denomination of 13.5 million members, has also begun to address disarmament. In June 1978, 23,000 messengers to the Convention's Annual Meeting adopted a "Resolution on Multilateral Arms Controls". The resolution exhorted Congress to move in "imaginative and reconciling ways

to seek mutual agreements with other nations to slow the nuclear arms race". Furthur, nuclear nations were implored to shift funds from nuclear weapons to basic human services. The 1979 annual meeting, in a "Resolution on Peacemaking", advocated ratification of SALT II and again urged Congress to make "great strides in multilateral arms reduction".

Resolutions of the 1980 and 1981 Annual Meetings were somewhat more conservative. In light of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and the taking of American hostages in Iran, these resolutions recognized the "conflict (between) longing for world peace and the gnawing need to prepare deterrents to war". Their appeals were mostly limited to "teaching and praying (for peace) in our homes and Churches". The disarmament resolution of the June 1982 Annual Meeting is again more activist. It encourages Southern Baptists to work for peace "not only through preaching, teaching and praying...but also through involving ourselves in the political process". Furthur, it advocates programs of mutually verifiable conventional and nuclear disarmament, and prayed for the success of the (concurrent) Second Special UN Session on Disarmament.

There are also indications of regional and grassroots support for disarmament among Southern Baptists³². Seven State Conventions have passed peace statements, for example. In 1979, the first Baptist Peace Convention drew 400 participants and endorsements from such distinguished Southern Baptists as then-President Jimmy Carter, evangelist Billy Graham, and three past Presidents of the Convention. Finally, the Baptist Peacemaker, organ of the denomination's peace movement, has become increasingly popular and widely-read.

THE HISTORIC PEACE CHURCHESSOCIETY OF FRIENDS (QUAKERS)

(Unlike most religious groups, the Quakers do not determine social policies by voting on resolutions at national assemblies. Individual Meetings may adopt a resolution by consensus, but there is no formal, national process of public statement. Therefore, to discern some representative Quaker attitude toward disarmament, I will examine submissions of the Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC), which enjoys nongovernmental observer status at the United Nations:)

In May 1980, FWCC Representative Stephen Thiermann presented "Disarmament and Development in the Second Disarmament Decade" to the UN. This report stressed the relationship of the arms race to international under-development, i.e., food shortages, energy and raw material scarcities, environmental constraints, political inequalities, etc. It urged a reexamination by all member states of the economic and social costs of their armaments, and claimed

For the decade ahead the Disarmament Commission should reject in the most vigorous terms the commonly held perception that the production of arms is an economic activity like any others. Not only has the runaway arms race, nuclear and conventional, become a central danger to national security, but it threatens to jeopardize the prospects for a more equitable redistribution of world resources and the achievement of a new international economic order. 33

On May 28, 1981, Thiermann wrote the UN Disarmament Commission in support of a "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race", the national U.S. "Freeze" campaign (see page 34). Thiermann implored the Commission to pressure all nuclear nations to approve similar freezes.

Finally, in a submission to the June 1982 Second Special UN Session on Disarmament, the FWCC called for

--the renunciation by all nations of further testing and development of nuclear weapons;

--the completion of total test ban treaties and a general Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament, encompassing the development and stockpiling of chemical weapons, establishment of nuclear-free zones, control of the arms trade, and acceptable methods of verifying compliance; and

--a full discussion of the relationship of disarmament and development.

Quaker assemblies within the United States have echoed the attitudes of the FWCC. A "Statement of Legislative Policy", approved by the Friends Committee on National Legislation in 1977, advocated unilateral U.S. initiatives to end nuclear weapons testing, production, stockpiling and foreign sales. A called Meeting of the Friends General Conference, in 1981, petitioned President Reagan and Premier Brezhnev to freeze the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons, renounce first use, and "give immediate consideration to the proposal by George Kennan for an immediate fifty percent reduction in nuclear arms".³⁴

MENNONITES

The main Mennonite statement on disarmament, "Resolution on the World Arms Race", was adopted by the Peace Section (U.S.), Mennonite Central Committee, in 1978. It argued, firstly, that the two superpowers' "obsession with 'national security' through military might...has ironically served only to increase insecurity". Both superpowers were further criticized for "squandering" financial and natural resources on military expansion, and "infecting" the globe with "their sickness of militarism". The final affirmations of this statement included

1. The concept of nuclear deterrence, "which involves a trust in nuclear weapons, is a form of idolatry".

2. All nations are called upon to renounce the research, development, testing, production, deployment and actual use of nuclear weapons. Mennonites must commit themselves to "resist these activities in the United States":

3. The "profligate spending of federal tax monies in this deadly enterprise" of conventional and nuclear arms production is deplored. "We support those who resist the payment of taxes for military purposes and call upon all members of the Church to seriously consider refusing the military portion of their federal taxes".

4. Mennonites are committed to "finding ways to give our resources to the poor and to withhold them from the arms race".

CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN

The Church of the Brethren approved a major disarmament resolution at its 1980 Annual Conference. The resolution lamented the international diversion of resources to the "devastating war machine" and its "mad cycle". It recommended "bold and creative initiatives such as a unilateral decision by our government to terminate all nuclear tests and the production of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. In turn, we appeal to the Soviet Union to reciprocate in order to halt the rush toward a nuclear holocaust".

THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS (MORMONS)

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) has also become somewhat outspoken about nuclear disarmament. The (1980) Christmas "Message" of the Church's three-member First Presidency expressed dismay at the "unrestricted building of arsenals of war, including huge and threatening nuclear weaponry", and called for national leaders to negotiate in good faith. The use of nuclear weapons was similarly deplored in the 1981 Easter Message of the same group.

However, it was the Reagan administration's intention to deploy the mobile MX missile system in Utah and Nevada which provoked the first detailed, political statements from the Mormon leadership. A "Statement of the First Presidency on the MX", telegraphed to President Reagan in May 1981, declared

...Its planners state that the system is strictly defensive in concept, and that the chances are extremely remote that it will ever be actually employed. However, history indicates that men have seldom created armaments that eventually were not put to use.

We are most gravely concerned over the proposed concentration in a relatively restricted area of the West... one segment of the population would bear a highly disproportionate share of the burnden, in lives lost and property destroyed in case of an attack, particularly if such were to be a saturation attack.

As religious observor Robin Gallaher has noted, this Mormon statement is especially significant because of the Church's influence in the Southwest, and because it rarely addresses political questions.³⁵

REVERAND BILLY GRAHAM: "A CHANGE OF HEART"

(Reportedly³⁶, some traditionally conservative Evangelical Christians are supporting nuclear disarmament. For example, the National Association of Evangelicals has issued statements criticizing the arms race. While those documents were unavailable as of this writing, I was able to collect statements by the Evangelist leader, the Reverend Billy Graham. Rev. Graham, a Southern Baptist preacher once identified with virtually uncritical patriotism, is an important example of increasing Evangelical concern with nuclear armaments. Because of his great influence, we will follow Rev. Graham's evolution vis-a-vis disarmament:)

In a now famous interview, "A Change of Heart"³⁷, Rev. Billy Graham shared his growing doubts about nuclear weapons. He credited a 1978 visit to Auschwitz with having inspired this reevaluation: "We can be capable of unspeakable horror, no matter how educated or technically sophisticated we are. Auschwitz is a compelling witness to this." Rev. Graham advised that Americans see themselves as "global citizens", and appreciate disarmament as their international obligation. In particular, he commended the growing disarmament activism of Evangelicals.

Strategically, Rev. Graham did not favor unilateral disarmament, but admitted that "we must sometimes be willing to take risks (within limits) as a nation." He supported SALT II, despite the fact that it leaves untouched "some of the worst and most sophisticated weapons (such as the Cruise missile, Trident, and the MX system)". Ultimately, Rev. Graham concluded, "SALT II should give way to SALT III. I wish we were working on SALT X right now! Total destruction of nuclear arms! "

Rev. Graham has expressed similar sentiments in more recent statements. At a news conference after being awarded

the Templeton Foundation Prize (March 1982), he declared that disarmament must be universal and led by the superpowers. Further, he advocated the ultimate destruction of all atomic, bio-chemical and laser weapon technologies³⁸. In a later interview (April 1982), Rev. Graham indicated that he was undecided about the nuclear weapons freeze, and about the morality of nuclear deterrence. Nonetheless, "...we have the ability to destroy all the people on this planet in a matter of hours. So this brings up a moral question the world has never really faced before"³⁹.



JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS (REFORM)

Over the past two decades, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC) has been one of the Jewish organizations most active in encouraging nuclear test bans, nonproliferation treaties, and multinational arms control agreements. Since the SALT II debate, its General Assembly has adopted two statements on disarmament.

In 1979, a "SALT II" resolution supported that treaty as the "most realistic possibility presently available for checking a wasteful and potentially catastrophic nuclear arms race". However, the SALT talks were recognized as only the beginning of a long series of necessary arms reductions.

A 1981 resolution, "Control of Nuclear Arms", condemned the arms race for "exhausting much of the world's resources, (and) impoverishing hundreds of millions of people". Further, the resolution

--commended President Reagan's October 1981 statement favoring the reduction of nuclear weapons for use in Europe;

--urged the US and USSR to renew "with utmost urgency" SALT or START negotiations, in order to initiate arms reduction through a "phased and verifiable pattern";

--called for a mutual US-USSR decrease of existing nuclear arsenals "across the board by 50% under verifiable circumstances...with the goal of total elimination";

--appealed to all nuclear powers for a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons; and

--urged the United States to assume "vigorous world leadership" in achieving nonproliferation treaties, and supported legislative proposals to deny nuclear technology to nations without demonstrated "ability or intention to use that technology responsibly".

CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS (REFORM)

In June 1978, at its 89th Annual Convention, the Central Conference of American Rabbis adopted a resolution expressing alarm over the Neutron Bomb. The delegates joined then-President Jimmy Carter in his anxiety over a weapon which would destroy people while saving property, and endorsed the President's "courageous efforts" to postpone development of the bomb.

RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY (CONSERVATIVE)

The Rabbinical Assembly approved its first major resolution on nuclear disarmament, "Nuclear Weapons", at its May 1982 Convention. As its motivation, the resolution cited concern both over the "overwhelmingly lethal" US and USSR arsenals, and over the proliferation of nuclear arms, which has enabled even "unstable, aggressive and terrorist governments to... endanger the stability and survival of mankind". Strategically, it called on the United States to "pursue vigorously the SALT Talks...with the goal of achieving a mutually verifiable nuclear reduction treaty, an end to proliferation of nuclear weapons, and an ultimate multilateral scaling down of nuclear arsenals". The statement also urged an immediate bilateral freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons.

UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA (UOJCA)

The UOJCA has to date no formal resolution about the arms race. However, a group of Orthodox Rabbis are now preparing a statement on religious and political aspects of disarmament.

SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA

The Synagogue Council of America is the national coordinating agency for the Conservative, Orthodox and Reform Rabbinic and Congregational organizations. On May 13, 1982, the Executive Committee of the Council adopted a statement on "The Dangers of Nuclear Armaments" which began by affirming

While we are not survivors of Hiroshima, as Jews we are survivors of Hitler's holocaust and experience a special sense of responsibility to raise our voices lest we drift into a nuclear holocaust which would spell the doom of all mankind.

The statement continues with a condemnation of further nuclear arms development, as "existing weapons can already render the globe uninhabitable". It repudiates "misguided experts" (who) cling to the myth that nuclear war is winnable". Strategically, the statement urges a mutual reduction of nuclear arms and stockpiles. Unilateral disarmament is rejected, as it would invite "nuclear blackmail or outright aggression". However, mutual, bilateral programs "would represent a giant step forward toward alleviation of hostility and tension" and free resources to fulfill human needs.

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

In April, 1982, the Biennial Convention of the American Jewish Congress adopted a resolution on "Nuclear Arms Limitation". The resolution claims that "there can be no more important political objective than the avoidance of nuclear war between the nuclear superpowers". Specifically, it urges three principles upon the United States government:

1. "The foremost political priority of the United States must be to achieve an agreement with the USSR on the control, limitation and destruction of nuclear weapons, beginning with the mutual cessation of nuclear weapons development."

2. "We must reject the myth that nuclear war can be limited or won, as well as the delusion that civil defense programs can assure our survival in a nuclear war."

3. "(Disarmament negotiations) must...start immediately and continue uninterrupted regardless of other sources of political tension between the parties involved in negotiations."

REGIONAL, LOCAL AND AD.HOC ORGANIZATIONS

Regional and local Jewish bodies have also addressed nuclear disarmament. In January 1982, two of the largest regional Rabbinic organizations endorsed a California "Freeze Initiative" which advocates an immediate, bilateral cessation of the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons⁴⁰. These two groups were the Pacific Association of Reform Rabbis, whose 200 members form the western organization of the Reform Rabbinate, and the Board of Rabbis of Southern California, consisting of 200 Orthodox, Reconstructionist, Reform and Conservative Rabbis. In May 1982, the Chicago Board of Rabbis, also comprising all four branches, called on the United States government "to pursue vigorously at all international forums the goal of ending the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ultimately banning nuclear armaments"⁴¹.

Disarmament activism also encompasses other established and ad hoc Jewish groups. For instance, the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia has advocated a freeze in the nuclear arms race⁴². The Baltimore Jewish Committee on Nuclear Disarmament was formed in May 1982 to organize local Jews in support of multilateral reductions⁴³. Also in May, more than 100 distinguished Jewish Americans, including dozens of Rabbis, three Congressmen, four Nobel prize winners and leaders of Jewish organizations signed a public "Shalom Aleichem"

statement. The statement declared that thermonuclear war negates all categories of "winning and losing", "just and unjust", and urged all American Jews to address the need for disarmament.



INTERFAITH DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES

Thus far, this report has considered the disarmament positions of various individual Church and Synagogue groups. However, a great deal of organized religious activity vis-a-vis the arms race occurs in an interfaith context. The following highlights some notable examples of this ecumenical work.

As the individual denominations, interfaith disarmament coalitions have been most active since 1978 (when SALT II became a major Congressional issue). In January of that year, a "New Year's Pastoral Letter on Human Survival" protesting nuclear proliferation was signed by seventy national Protestant, Catholic and Jewish leaders. The Letter initiated several organized religious actions before the first UN Special Session on Disarmament (May and June 1978)⁴⁴. When the Special Session opened, a wide spectrum of 100 prominent Christians--including for the first time Protestant, Evangelical and Roman Catholic Charismatic leaders--advocated the abolition of nuclear weapons. The group also petitioned the United States government to take "meaningful unilateral and multilateral initiatives toward the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. Other nations' desires for disarmament, peace and survival could then be tested in the pressure to reciprocate"⁴⁵.

In October, 1978, 150 leaders of the three major faiths formed a "Religious Committee on SALT"⁴⁶. By the following Spring, the Committee comprised 22 religious organizations. It sought to mobilize the American religious community in support of SALT II as a practical, although imperfect, disarmament measure⁴⁷. During the same period, religious bodies formed half of the thirty sponsoring organizations of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, which also lobbied for SALT II ratification.

More recently, several religious groups have promoted the "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race". The "Call", a national petition, warns that "as each side deploys deadlier, more accurate 'counterforce' missiles, there will be greater pressure on the leaders on each side to strike first in a crisis-- unleashing an exchange that would kill most of us and destroy civilizations". It demands that President Reagan "propose to the Soviet Union an immediate and permanent bilateral freeze on all further testing, production and deployment of nuclear weaponry, as the essential first step toward ending the peril of nuclear war".

"Call" sponsors, who include many religious, citizen's, labor and other organizations, hope to obtain hundreds of thousands of signatures nationally. Religious endorsers thus far include the National Council of Churches, Pax Christi, the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, and independent "Peace Fellowships" within the Baptist, Catholic, Episcopal, Jewish, Lutheran, and Methodist communities.

In connection with the recent Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (June 1982), thirty five leaders of the world's major faiths appealed to member UN states to "freeze and reverse the arms race as a first step toward disarmament"⁴⁸. Finally, to date over 125 religious leaders and organizations have endorsed the Hatfield-Kennedy resolution which advocates "a mutual and verifiable freeze on testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems"⁴⁹.

This national ecumenical disarmament activism has many parallels on the state level. Again, to cite but a few: In Southern California, the top executives of twelve Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish denominations have supported a statewide

initiative for a bilateral freeze (see page 31)⁵⁰. The fifteen Protestant groups of the Northern California Ecumenical Council have backed a similar proposal⁵¹. In February 1982, North Carolina Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Bahá'ís formed a disarmament coalition with three foci--political action, community education and worship⁵². In April 1982, 100 Protestant, Catholic and Jewish clergy founded the Indiana Clergy for Nuclear Disarmament. The group has promoted a bilateral freeze on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons, dispensed information about the arms race, and organized prayer vigils in connection with the Second UN Special Session⁵³. Finally, in Nevada, 69 Jewish, Protestant and Catholic leaders have joined the Nevada Conference of Churches in opposing the MX missile system, renouncing nuclear war, and endorsing a "policy of strength through peace (and) nuclear disarmament"⁵⁴.



PART II - CONCLUSION

By and large, the religious groups discussed in the preceding report are articulating increasingly detailed and critical positions about the arms race. The following conclusion evaluates the proposals and rationales of these positions, and describes important trends in religious disarmament activism. For reference purposes, pages of the preceding section will be noted parenthetically.

On some points, virtually all of the religious communities agree. They abhor the use of nuclear weapons, and call for some multilateral and verifiable arms reduction with complete abolition as a long-term goal. There is little approval of strategic superiority or parity. Further, almost all of these denominations have encouraged internal education and/or political action about nuclear arms.

With regard to specific disarmament measures, there is also some apparent unanimity. For example, an overwhelming majority of these organizations endorsed SALT II, and for the same, basic rationale; the treaty was valued for constraining the arms race without jeopardizing U.S. security, and for possibly beginning a long-range process of complete disarmament. However, support of SALT II was frequently qualified. Many statements viewed the treaty as an acceptable but very limited first step towards full disarmament. For example, while the Religious Committee on SALT urged vigorous ratification of the Talks (33), it nonetheless saw the treaty "as a practical, though imperfect, move toward disarmament"⁵⁵. Other groups bemoaned the SALT emphasis on parity, rather than reduction, or its exclusion of the MX, Trident, and other formidable weapons systems (15,26)

Other, more sweeping, disarmament initiatives--while not receiving near-unanimous support as SALT II--are still attracting growing religious approval. These include several multilateral and unilateral measures, to which we now draw our attention.

Most popular among these measures are "freeze" arrangements whereby the two superpowers agree to some legally sanctioned, reciprocal and verifiable arms reduction. The specific texts of these freeze appeals are varied. However, most either closely follow, or directly endorse, the "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race". The "Call", a national petition, promotes "an immediate and permanent bilateral freeze on all further testing, production and deployment of nuclear weaponry" (34). "Call" religious signatories include the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (15), the National Council of Churches (17), the Reformed Church in America (16), and the Friends World Committee for Consultation (22). Similar freeze proposals have been advocated by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (28), the Rabbinical Assembly (29), sixty leading Episcopal Bishops (14), and one half of the 280 active American Roman Catholic Bishops (5). Freeze campaigns have also been supported by regional and local religious organizations (10,31), ecumenical disarmament coalitions (34-5), and grassroots "Peace Fellowships" within the three major faiths (5,34).

Occasionally, the freeze proposal is augmented by more extensive disarmament demands. For instance, both the UAHC (28) and the Friends General Conference (Quaker,23) have urged a freeze including George Kennan's proposal for an immediate, fifty percent reduction in nuclear arsenals. The Mennonite Church has exhorted all nations to completely renounce the "research, development, testing, production, deployment and actual use of nuclear weapons" (24), while the executive ministers of the American Baptist Churches have advised that all nations "stop the production of nuclear weapons, dismantle

those that exist, and join in a program of mutual inspection" (20). Other organizations advocate freeze talks without preconditions and regardless of other political tensions (6,30,31).

Concern with arms buildup and international tensions has inspired some religious bodies to recommend unilateral disarmament. The Governing Board of the National Council of Churches, for example, has encouraged initiatives by either superpower which would "demonstrate good faith and make it easier for the other to take similar steps" (17). Similarly, the United Methodist Church has urged all nuclear nations to consider independent initiatives (13). Unilateral U.S. steps--until comprehensive multinational agreements are reached--were endorsed by the Lutheran Church of America as early as 1970 (8). More recently, the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. has petitioned President Reagan to forswear first-strike use (15), and the American Baptist Churches have counseled "individual (U.S.) national restraint" in weapons development and arms sales (20).

As might be expected, the historic Peace Churches have also promoted unilateral disarmament measures. In 1977, the Friends Committee on National Legislation advocated U.S. initiatives to end nuclear weapons "production, testing, stockpiling, and foreign sales (23). The Church of the Brethren, in 1980, urged the United States to pursue "bold and creative" initiatives by terminating all testing and production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems (24).

It is noteworthy that while many religious organizations do not formally endorse unilateral disarmament, there is little official opposition to such policies. This underscores the pro-disarmament sympathies of the religious community, as more conservative positions, such as Cardinal Cooke's support of deterrence, have met with pronounced criticism.

Before examining the rationales of the various disarmament positions, we should cite other demands of several resolutions.

Firstly, some groups tie their disarmament proposals with appeals to curb the sale of military technology and weapons to developing nations (3, 13, 23, 28). Likewise, some resolutions endorse nuclear-free zones (13, 23).

In addition, many Jewish and Christian statements have lent disarmament activism an internal political importance rare within religious organizations. Education and political action about the arms race have become a top agenda item of several bodies (9, 12, 21). Religious groups and leaders as diverse as Pope John Paul II (4), the American Lutheran Church (10), the United Church of Christ (12), and the Reformed Church in America (16) have offered spiritual blessings and material commitments to disarmament movements.

Various arguments are presented in support of religious disarmament positions. These differ not only from denomination to denomination, but within the resolutions of individual groups. There are, however, certain rationales which predominate in the statements discussed above. The following summarizes these arguments, in order of their recurrence:

1. First and foremost, nuclear arms are condemned because of their potential for mass slaughter and destruction, which cannot be justified by any values their use seeks to preserve. Nuclear war, wherein a single first strike and retaliation would kill millions, cannot be "limited", nor "won" or "lost" (11, 31). Neither could medical professions and civil defense programs assure human survival in a nuclear war (3, 31). Doctrines of strategic parity or deterrence thus provide only a false security (4, 8, 23).

2. Many statements stress the relationship of the arms race and global underdevelopment, i.e., food shortages, energy and raw material scarcities, environmental constraints, et al. (2, 12, 22, 26). Nuclear arsenals are denounced for diverting

needed human and material resources. Their extensive development leaves the battles against world hunger, disease and illiteracy underfunded, and thus aggravates the misery of the world's poor. Further, military expenditures compound inflationary pressures, and create artificial war economies which injure human services and other nonmilitary sectors.

3. Armaments are held responsible for frustrating political equality, as well as economic growth. According to this logic, superpower arms competition provokes, among developing countries, a parallel arms race and resultant militaristic and authoritarian regimes (3, 8, 11, 15, 22). In the same vein, several groups advocate arms trade control to deny nuclear weapons and technology to "irresponsible", "unstable", "aggressive", and "terrorist" governments (3, 11, 28, 29).

4. Those organizations urging unilateral U.S. initiatives cite various rationale. Often these involve a "challenge" or "stimulation" to other nations to do the same (11, 13), or the creation of a "climate more hospitable to arms limitations" (8). One resolution petitions the Reagan administration to forswear first-strike use as an "important first step to deligitimatizing nuclear war" (15).

5. Several groups attribute their increasingly radical disarmament resolutions to recent political events. Their resolutions mention for instance the failure of SALT II ratification (5, 17), intimations from the Reagan administration about "limited" nuclear wars (5, 19, 30), or simply the increased superpower tensions and weapons stockpiling (17, 30).

6. American denominations have also been moved to bolder positions by the inspiration of their European counterparts. For examples, we may cite Vatican influence on American Catholic peace activism (4-6); the joint efforts of American and European Lutheran leaders at the 1982 Moscow Peace Conference (10); and the recent "Pursuing Peace" resolution of the National Council

of Churches, which was "challenged, encouraged and strengthened" by the disarmament work of Christian groups abroad (17).

As we survey American religious disarmament statements of the past several years, several trends become apparent. Firstly, religious organizations are growing more critical, both of the arms race, and of U.S. nuclear weapons policies. Increasingly, they are challenging any further testing, production, stockpiling, sale or use of nuclear arms.

The Catholic Church is a good case in point. Vatican II opened its modern disarmament debate with a general condemnation of the use of nuclear arms (2). Subsequent Catholic statements, from the Vatican and the United States, denounced more thoroughly the testing, development and deployment of these weapons, and repudiated strategic superiority or parity (2-4). In recent years, Catholic leaders have become yet more militant, and rejected deterrence policies and the mere possession of nuclear arms (5-6).

Similar, critical outspokenness has surfaced in virtually all of the religious groups discussed above. For now we mention only a few examples, such as the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, which has extended its general appeal for bilateral reductions with calls for a fifty percent cut in US and USSR stockpiles, and for an arms freeze by all nuclear nations (28); the United Methodist Church, which recently condemned the mere possession of nuclear weapons (13); and the United Church of Christ, which voted in 1981 to become a "Peace Church" (11).

It is instructive to note not just the substance of disarmament positions, but also their increasingly skeptical tone. Even statements supporting U.S. policies are often tendered with weighty qualifications. Thus the Catholic Bishops, in their 1979 U.S. Senate testimony, offered that any policy of deterrence had

to be a "temporary resort...self-eliminating, not self-perpetuating"; should deterrence lose its moral and strategic justification, the Church would shift to "uncompromising condemnation of both use and possession of such weapons" (5)⁵⁶. Similarly, religious support for SALT II was often guarded and conditional, as described above (36). Indeed, many resolutions endorse specific disarmament measures only as steps toward the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.

Religious organizations are also developing sophisticated, strategic studies of nuclear weapons issues. At times these are published with theological reflections. Such documents include the high-level study of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, which explained the inadequacy of medical intervention in nuclear war (3); the pamphlet "War and Peace" of the Lutheran Church of America (9); and UN submissions, relating global development and disarmament, of the Friends World Committee for Consultation (22-3). These studies symbolize the growing confidence and commitment of religious groups to political involvement in disarmament.

Religious concern with the arms race is further indicated by the activism of traditionally conservative or nonpolitical denominations. We observe this development, for instance, in the critical pronouncements of Evangelicals (26), and in the resolutions of the Mormons (25), and the Southern Baptist Convention, which decided in June 1982 to work for peace "not only through preaching, teaching, and praying...but also through involving ourselves in the political process" (21).

The arms race has also prompted a resurgence of independent Jewish and Christian peace groups. We have described for example the increased identification of American Bishops with Pax Christi, the Catholic peace movement (5-6), the growth of the peace journal, the Baptist Peacemaker (21), and the work of grassroots "Peace Fellowships" within the Jewish, Episcopal, Lutheran, Baptist and Methodist communities (34). With regard

to disarmament, these groups usually urge unilateral U.S. initiatives and other measures more radical than those endorsed by the official Church or Synagogue leadership.

Finally, nuclear weapons have inspired within several faiths a basic reevaluation of war and peace theologies. These reevaluations stem from concern that nuclear arms have rendered traditional "just war" concepts obsolete. Again, Catholics have led in this area. The Second Vatican Council called for an "evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude" (2), and subsequent Catholic statements have heeded that charge. For example, in 1982 a (Vatican-approved) Jesuit statement argued that nuclear weapons invalidated the "just war" concept because their destruction cannot be controlled (3). In the United States, a National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee is preparing a reformulated theology of peace, with particular attention to the moral problems of nuclear war and the need for stringent limits on nuclear weaponry (7).

Other faiths are producing similar, religious analyses of war and peace in the atomic age. The Lutheran Church in America has already called the just war concept "useless" because--among other reasons--the nuclear potential for destruction erases conventional distinctions between victory and defeat. Other theological reassessments are being pursued by religious leaders and groups as diverse as the Episcopal Church (14), Reverend Billy Graham (26-7), and the Reformed Church in America (16).

The involvement of religious communities in the public disarmament debate is growing, and its potential is powerful. The organizations described herein, whose followers represent over one quarter of the U.S. population, are issuing increasingly decisive statements, allocating staff and financial resources for

disarmament, and otherwise establishing the arms race as a paramount political concern. The possibility for religious influence of public attitudes is particularly strong in those denominations whose leaders exercise some authority over personal morality, i.e., Roman Catholics, Evangelicals, Orthodox Jews, Southern Baptists, etc. We might speculate for instance on the potential impact of the U.S. Catholic Conference statement, requiring all believers to renounce nuclear war, in a nation whose armed forces are twenty five percent Catholic.

For the time being, Christian and Jewish organizations will continue to produce resolutions, political studies and theological assessments of nuclear weapons. Whatever their final conclusions may be, it is likely that they will continue to affect public opinion, and form a major chapter in the history of ecclesiastical involvement in political affairs.



NOTES

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- ²³ Religious News Service, "ALC's largest district..."
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⁴¹"Rabbis Call for Halt to the Nuclear Arms Race", Jewish Telegraphic Agency, May 12, 1982.

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⁴⁸Religious News Service, "Leaders of world's faiths urge U.S. member nations to 'reverse the arms race' ", RNS, March 30, 1982, p. 4.

⁴⁹Larry Chesser, "Congress push for freeze on nuclear weapons wins support of church groups", RNS, March 12, 1982, p. 2.

⁵⁰Russell Chandler, "Religious Groups Back Arms Freeze", Los Angeles Times, January 15, 1982.

⁵¹Religious News Service, "California church council asks Reagan and Brezhnev to halt nuclear arms race", RNS, September 28, 1981, p. 7.

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⁵³Religious News Service, "Indiana clergy organize to promote disarmament, back a nuclear freeze", RNS, April 6, 1982, p. 2.

⁵⁴Religious News Service, "MX missile opposition grows more widespread among Nevada's clergy", RNS, August 17, 1981, p. 5.

⁵⁵Religious News Service, May 10, 1979, p. 2.

⁵⁶In fact, as described on pages four to six, that shift has already occurred for many Bishops and Catholic organizations.



P Pacific and Asian American Concerns

- GS10 **Pacific and Asian American Ministries** (6/30/75, p. 38)
Establishes relationship between UCC and PAAM; sets forth program goals; encourages ecumenical involvement; authorizes funding to provide adequate staffing and programming for two biennia.
- GS13 **Redress/Reparation to Japanese Americans** (7/1/81)
Affirms redress/reparation to victims of evacuation/incarceration resulting from Executive Order #9066, including monetary compensation, exposing racist legal judgments, overturning decisions, and exonerating parties to those cases; calls for supportive OCIS testimony before the US President's Study Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act.


Peace and Arms Control

- CCSA **Freedom, Security and Atomic Weapons** (1/31/58)
Endorses arms reduction negotiations; advocates UN police force; calls for vigorous pursuit of international understanding through study, travel, and cultural exchange; urges strong support for the UN; deplores racial segregation; calls for commitment to world economic development.
- CCSA **Christians and the Arms Race** (1/31/60)
Comprehensive analysis of the arms race; encourages negotiation of arms limitation treaty; calls for church action in seven specific areas; supports international systems of courts, laws and police; urges increased efforts to alleviate poverty in the Third World.
- CCSA **Nuclear Testing** (6/22/63)
Supports the development of a nuclear test ban treaty.
- GS4 **Nuclear Testing** (7/10/63, p. 98)
Adopts CCSA statement of 6/22/63 as GS policy statement.
- CCSA **New Directions in US Foreign Policy** (2/3/65)
Declares war irrelevant as an instrument of national policy; calls for disarmament; urges long-term funding for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
- GS5 **Actions on the Report of the Council for Christian Social Action** (7/5/65, p. 82)
Declares war is incompatible with Christian teaching; calls for long-term funding for US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
- CCSA **On Anti-Ballistic Missiles and the Arms Race** (1/30/67)
Urges US to seek Soviet agreement for an indefinite moratorium on the deployment of major anti-ballistic missile systems.

CCSA **Special Ministry in International Security and Arms Control** (1/31/67)
Urges creation of a full time NCC ministry in relation to international security and arms control policy.

GS7 **National Priorities and Arms Control** (6/30/69, p. 71)
Urges Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; non-deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems; an end to testing of Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicles; ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol against use of chemical and biological warfare; change from military to human priorities.

GS7 **Peace Education** (7/2/69, p. 138)
Calls for the development of peace education and action throughout the church that will enable concerned persons to participate more effectively in the making of peace.




CCSA **Needed—An Expanded Peacetime Economy** (12/3/70)
Calls upon government to plan for conversion from war to peacetime economy and proposes action in specific areas.

CCSA **Economic Priorities** (12/3/70)
Encourages and supports efforts to shift US spending from military to domestic expenditures.

GS8 **Priority 3: Peace and US Power** (6/28/71, p. 41)
Comprehensive statement on enabling US power to serve humane ends and contribute to world peace; calls for new education for peace ministries, programs enabling a global perspective on peace and justice; support for indigenous liberation movements; recognition of People's Republic of China and its admission to the UN; recognition of white minority's abuse of wealth, power, and natural resources; support for non-military solutions to problems; commitment to arms limitation and disarmament; US ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol; condemnation of indiscriminate weapons; abolition of the draft; education regarding the Middle East; support for relief efforts for Arab refugees; reordering of national priorities so that justice, development, liberation, health, education, and life-giving environment will predominate; assure access to competent draft counseling for youth; support for individuals and families victimized by war or suffering because of their objection to war; humanitarian response to the needs of veterans; resolute support for amnesty and the giving of sanctuary to war resisters.

GS8 **Thanks for the Courage and Witness of Philip and Daniel Berrigan** (6/29/71, p. 76)
Expresses thanks for the witness in opposition to war of all those who have opposed with sacrifice and nonviolent civil disobedience the use of US power in Indochina, especially Philip and Daniel Berrigan and all who suffer in prison for their opposition to war.

- GS9 **The Federal Budget** (6/26/73, p. 50)
 Urges shifting the budget priorities and processes of the federal government and of private industries from military to human needs.
- OCIS **The Church's Witness on Disarmament** (4/28/77)
 Endorses UN Special Session on Disarmament; calls for moratorium on nuclear-fission weapons and new strategic weapon systems; calls for a no-first-strike policy and a policy of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states; urges UCC education and action on disarmament.
- GS11 **World Peace Tax Fund** (7/4/77, p. 51)
 Supports legislation establishing a World Peace Tax Fund and urges UCC constituency action.
- GS11 **Disarmament** (7/4/77, p. 52)
 Urges Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II and III; halt in development and deployment of new strategic weapons systems; completion of a test ban treaty; renunciation of first strike weapons; prohibition of chemical weapons; conversion from military to peacetime economy.
- GS12 **Pronouncement on Reversing the Arms Race** (6/25/79, p. 44-45)
 Comprehensive statement in support of disarmament; calls for educational resources, increased funds for work on arms reduction through OCIS, establishment of a national center for research and training in peaceful methods of conflict resolution; urges local church and individual action.
- OCIS **Chemical Weapons** (12/80)
 Urges US-Soviet negotiation of a treaty banning chemical weapons and providing for destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and production equipment; urges opposition to funding binary and chemical weapon production.
- GS13 **Opposition to the Resumption of the Production of Weapons of Chemical Warfare by the United States Government** (7/1/81)
 Calls for defeat of any attempt to fund production of chemical weapons; calls on Conferences and UCC members to communicate opposition to chemical weapons to US President and Congress.
- GS13 **Peace and the Resolving of Conflict** (7/1/81)
 Calls for disciplined study of causes of conflict and of peaceful action to prevent or resolve it; declares establishment of *National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution* a high priority; calls for public consensus before national mobilization or introduction of new weapons systems.



- GS13 **Calling Upon the UCC to Become a Peace Church** (7/1/81)
Calls on all segments of UCC to become a peace church; encourages all nations to convert resources used for military purposes to peaceful uses; encourages all governments to settle disputes through peaceful diplomacies.
- GS13 **Broken Arrow** (7/1/81)
Affirms commitment to disarmament through negotiation; calls on UCC President to communicate to national leaders desire for nuclear disarmament, including unilateral initiatives on the part of the US.
- GS13 **Objections to Proposed Changes in the US Federal Budget** (7/1/81)
Opposes increases in military budget.
- EC **Corpus Christi Submarine** (7/2-3/81)
Expresses outrage at naming of a US nuclear submarine the Body of Christ.

Peace Corps

- CCSA **Christians and the Peace Corps** (6/22/63)
Commends the Peace Corps and urges UCC members of all ages to consider volunteering two years of service.

Population & Family Planning

- CCSA **Responsible Parenthood and the Population Problem** (1/30/60)
Declares responsible family planning a clear moral duty; calls for distribution of reliable information and contraceptive devices; emphasizes need for family planning in economically less developed countries; urges study.
- CCSA **New Directions in US Foreign Policy** (2/3/65)
Calls for international family planning programs and an international clearing house of information and research; population control should be incorporated into US foreign aid policy and UN programs of economic and social development.
- GS6 **Population Control** (6/26/67, p. 70)
Calls for support of local community programs; encourages UCBWM to continue educational efforts on global scale as a high priority; urges US government cooperation in birth control efforts.
- EC **Forced Sterilization** (10/31/73)
Condemns the practice of illegal and involuntary sterilization of human beings; calls for legislation requiring a complete explanation of personal rights be given to the patient before a sterilization procedure may be performed.