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Series D: International Relations Activities. 1961-1992

Box 60, Folder 5, International Rescue Committee, 1975-1977.

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background notes

Singapore

department of state * august 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Singapore

GEOGRAPHY

Lying at the southern extremity of Asia at the tip of the Malay peninsula, Singapore is separated from the mainland (Malaysia) by the Strait of Johore, which is traversed by a 3/4-mile-long causeway carrying a road and railway, and from the Republic of Indonesia by the Singapore Strait. The country is a focal point for Southeast Asian sea routes. Its total land area includes one large island and about 40 nearby islets. The diamond-shaped main island measures 26 miles at its broadest, from east to west, and 14 miles from north to south.

Much of Singapore is lowland and originally consisted of swamp and jungle. Now mainly urban and industrialized land, its geographical features are built to a minor scale. The highest point on the main island, Bukit Timah (Hill of Tin), is only 581 feet above sea level; and the longest river, the Sungei Seletar, extends only 9 miles. A central plateau of about 12 square miles contains a water catchment area and natural reserve. The city of Singapore lies on the southern part of the island and for the most part covers land reclaimed from swamp and sea.

Singapore's climate is characterized by high temperatures, high humidity, and copious rainfall. The average maximum temperature is 87° F; the average rainfall is 96 inches. There are no pronounced wet or dry seasons.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 225 sq. mi. CAPITAL: Singapore (pop. 1.4 million).

People

POPULATION: 2.2 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1.4% (1974). DENSITY: 9,778 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 74% Chinese, 14% Malay, 8% Indian and Pakistani. RELIGIONS: Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Hindu, Christian. LANGUAGES: Malay, Chinese dialects, Tamil, Hindi, English. LITERACY: 75%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 62 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Parliamentary republic. INDEPENDENCE: August 9, 1965. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1965.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–President (Chief of State, 4-year term), Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*–unicameral Parliament (65 members, maximum 5-year term). *Judicial*–High Court, Court of Appeal.

POLITICAL PARTIES: People's Action Party (PAP), scattered opposition parties. SUFFRAGE: Universal and compulsory.

FLAG: Two horizontal stripes, red over white, with a white crescent and five stars in the upper left.

Economy

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP): $5.3 billion (1974). ANNUAL REAL GROWTH RATE: 7%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $2,376. PER CAPITA REAL GROWTH RATE: 5.2%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 7%. *Acres per capita* 0.02%. *Labor* 21%. *Products*–tobacco, vegetables, fruits, some rubber and coconut palms.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 35%. *Products*–petroleum refining, oil exploration, ship repair, rubber processing, light industry. TRADE: *Exports*–$5.897 billion (1974): transit goods, such as rubber, timber, and coffee; and local goods, such as electrical machinery and textiles. *Partners*–Malaysia $978 million, U.S. $875 million, Japan $671 million. *Imports*–$8.502 billion (1974): rice, machinery, manufactured products. *Partners*–Japan $1.522 billion, U.S.$1.191 billion, Malaysia $1.119 billion.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE (floating since June 1973): S$2.26=US$1 (May 1975).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and its specialized agencies, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Five Power Defense Arrangement.

PEOPLE

Singapore is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Two-thirds of the population is concentrated in the 37-square-mile area of the city of Singapore and its environs along the sourth-central coast.

The annual rate of population growth fell from 2.5 percent in 1965 to 1.4 percent in mid-1974. The government conducts a vigorous family planning program and has offered certain financial incentives to smaller families. Half the population is less than 21 years of age and one-third is less than 10 years of age.

Health standards are high. There is approximately one physician per 1,380 people.

Singapore has a varied linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage. Malay is the national language, but Chinese, English, and Tamil are also official languages. English is the language of


Peninsular Malaysia
Johor Baharu
Causeway
Sembawang
Naval Base
Woodlands
Kampong Kranji
Bukit Mandai Village
Punggol
Pulau Ubin
Pulau Tekong Besar
Sungai Johor
Johore Strait
Nee Soon
Bukit Panjang
Serangoon
Changi
Choa Chu Kang
Singapore Island
Yan Kit
Singapore International Airport
Bukit Timah Village
Toa Payoh
Jurong
Tuas
Bedok
Queenstown
Singapore
Pasir Panjang Village
Pulau Ayer Chawan
Keppel Harbour
Pulau Brani
Sentosa
Pulau Bukum
Pulau Semakau
Pulau Senang
Singapore Strait
Main Strait
Indonesia
Pulau Batam
Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative
Singapore
Railroad
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administration and is widely used in professional and business circles and in schools.

The government aims to provide at least 10 years of education for every child. Primary and secondary school students number over 500,000, or nearly 25 percent of the entire population. Enrollment at the University of Singapore is 5,356, at Nanyang University 2,483, and at Singapore Polytechnic 6,832. The overall literacy rate is more than 75 percent, but for persons under 35 years of age it exceeds 90 percent.

There is religious freedom in Singapore. Although the country's Chinese adhere to a variety of religious faiths, almost all the Malays are Muslim. There are also Hindus, Sikhs, Taoists, Buddhists, Confucianists, and Christians.

HISTORY

The history of Singapore dates from the 11th century. However, Singapore did not assume importance until the 19th century. The founder of modern Singapore was Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, who arrived there in 1819 as an agent of the British East India Company. In 1824 the British purchased Singapore Island, and by 1825 the city of Singapore had become a major port, with its trade exceeding that of Malacca and Penang (in Malaya) combined. In 1830 Singapore, Penang, and Malacca were combined as the Straits Settlements to form an outlying residency of the British East India Company, and in 1867 the Straits Settlements were made a British Crown Colony. This arrangement continued until 1946.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the advent of steamships launched an era of prosperity for Singapore as transit trade expanded throughout Southeast Asia. In the 20th century the automobile industry's demand for rubber from neighboring countries and the packaging industry's need for tin helped make Singapore one of the world's major ports. It is now fourth largest in the world in terms of tonnage handled annually.

Provision for Singapore's defense began in 1921 when the British constructed a naval base, which was soon supplemented by an air base. However, the Japanese succeeded in capturing Singapore in February 1942, and the island remained under Japanese occupation until September 1945 when it was recovered by the British.

In 1946 the Malay states and Penang and Malacca were united in the Federation of Malaya. Singapore remained a British Crown Colony. At the time the British deemed it unwise to include Singapore in the union, mainly because of its predominantly Chinese population. In 1959 Singapore became internally self-governing, and in 1963 it joined with the Federation of Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak (the latter two were former British Borneo territories) to form Malaysia.

Indonesia adopted a policy of "confrontation" against the new federation, charging that it was a "British colonial creation." It severed trade with Malaysia, a move which particularly affected Singapore, since Indonesia had been Singapore's second largest trading customer. At the end of "confrontation" in the summer of 1966, Indonesia resumed trade with Singapore.

After a period of friction between Singapore and the central government, Singapore separated from Malaysia on August 9, 1965, and became an independent republic.



Singapore, one of the world's major ports, is now the fourth largest in the world.

TRAVEL NOTES

Clothing–Lightweight clothing, such as that worn in the eastern part of the U.S. in summer, is appropriate.

Customs–U.S. citizens who visit temporarily for business or pleasure are not required to have visas. Check with the nearest Singapore Embassy for customs, currency, and visa requirements for long-term residence. At present, a limit of $2,000 in Singapore currency can be imported.

Health–Current smallpox and cholera inoculations are presently required; however, no other special health precautions are necessary. Adequate medical care and medications are available.

Telecommunications–Modern telephone and telegraph facilities are available.

Transportation–Singapore is served regularly by major airlines. The country is also linked by road and rail to Malaysia and Thailand. Taxis are readily available in the capital.

GOVERNMENT

According to the Constitution, as amended in 1965, Singapore is a republic with a parliamentary system of government. The President is elected every 4 years by the Parliament, but his position is primarily ceremonial. Political authority rests with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is the leader of the political

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party or coalition of parties which has the most seats in the Parliament.

The unicameral Parliament consists of 65 members elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The maximum term of any one Parliament is 5 years. Since 1959 voting has been compulsory.

Judicial power is vested in a High Court and a Court of Appeal. The High Court exercises original criminal and civil jurisdiction and appellate criminal and civil jurisdiction from subordinate courts. Its Chief Justice and six judges are appointed by the President. Appeal can be made from the High Court to the Court of Appeal, which exercises appellate criminal and civil jurisdiction. Further appeal can be made in certain cases from the latter court to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council at London.

Principal Government Officials

President—Benjamin H. **Sheares**

Prime Minister—**Lee** Kuan Yew

Other Ministers

Communications and National Development—**Lim** Kim San
Culture—**Jek** Yuen Thong
Defense—**Goh** Keng Swee
Education and Health—**Toh** Chin Chye
Environment and Law—**Barker,** Edward W.
Finance—**Hon** Sui Sen
Foreign Affairs—**Rajaratnam,** Sinnathamby
Home Affairs—**Chua** Sian Chin
Labor—**Ong** Pang Boon
Science and Technology—**Lee** Chiaw Meng
Social Affairs—**Othman** bin Wok

Ambassador to the U.S.—Ernest Steven **Monteiro**
Ambassador to the U.N.—T. **Koh**

Singapore maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1824 R St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20009.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The ruling political party in Singapore (in power since 1959) is the Socialist moderate People's Action Party (PAP), headed by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. In general elections held in 1963, the PAP won 37 of the 51 seats in Parliament. In October 1966 the opposition Barisan Socialist Party (BSP) members resigned, leaving the PAP as the sole party represented in Parliament. In the general elections of April 1968 the PAP won all 58 seats—51 of them without opposition.

In the September 1972 general elections the PAP again swept the boards, winning all 65 seats in the expanded Parliament. The PAP received 70 percent of the popular vote; the rest was divided among four opposition parties (including the BSP). The last presidential election was held in 1974.

ECONOMY

Singapore's strategic location and industrious population have given the country an economic importance in Southeast Asia far in excess of its size. Following independence its economy expanded rapidly. Between 1965 and 1970 GDP increased by 80 percent, and during 1968-72 the growth rate averaged some 14 percent annually. In 1973 the rate of growth declined to 10 percent, bringing the GNP to $3.9 billion and the per capita income to $1,806 (the highest in Asia after Japan).

Foreign trade and shipping reached record levels over the past decade. Expanding from its traditional reliance on entrepôt (warehouse and transshipment) trade, Singapore has industrialized at a phenomenal rate. Shipbuilding and repair and electronics have been among the leaders in this sector. The upsurge of petroleum exploration and production in Southeast Asia has made Singapore a center for supporting regional exploration activities. The number of tourists visiting Singapore multiplied, and new hotel construction paced a general building boom.

In 1974 the momentum of economic growth generated over the past decade diminished substantially as the effects of worldwide inflation and

recession began to be felt in Singapore. Real growth in that year declined to about 7 percent. GNP totaled $5.3 billion, with per capita income reaching $2,376. Foreign exchange reserves rose 7.1 percent to $2.487 billion. The government budget for 1974 showed a slight surplus of $45 million.

Singapore's principal economic role in Southeast Asia continues to be the

—processing, packaging, and marketing of the raw materials of the region: rubber, timber, coffee, spices, copra, and rattan;

—distributing within the region the manufactured products of industrialized countries; and

—conducting activities related to trade, such as banking, shipping, insurance, and storage.

Agriculture

Agricultural activity in Singapore is limited by the lack of land suitable for cultivation. Land is devoted primarily to the intensive cultivation of vegetables and other food crops, and a small portion is also reserved for rubber and coconut palms. Singapore is virtually self-sufficient in pork and poultry.

Although rice is the principal food consumed, it is not grown domestically, so all the island's requirements must be met with imports.

Most of the land consists of small plots that are privately cultivated. Tobacco is rotated with vegetables as a cash crop, and there is some cultivation of pineapples, bananas, papaya, and other tropical fruits. As a result of intensive cultivation methods and the skill employed by farmers, yields are high.

Trade

In the past as much as two-thirds of Singapore's imports and exports consisted of transiting goods. With rapid industrialization, however, the relative importance of the entrepôt sector has declined. The trade pattern reflects a shift toward the importation of capital goods and raw materials for industry and the exportation of locally manufactured products.

Import and export figures listed in the profile exclude Indonesian trade, which is not reported. In 1974 the United States ranked second among Singapore's sources of imports, representing about 14 percent of the total. Imports were mainly machinery and other manufactured products. Singapore's exports to the United States were mainly crude rubber, electrical machinery, and textile products.

U.S. Investment and Assistance

U.S. private investment is playing an increasingly important role in Singapore's rapid economic expansion, particularly in the petroleum industry, in general manufacturing, electronics, and in the modernization of regional distribution facilities. U.S. firms' activities also include shipping, banking, hotels, insurance, importing and exporting. The resident U.S. business community was estimated to be about 8,000 in 1971, including dependents. Total U.S. investment to date in Singapore is believed to exceed $575 million, with more in prospect.

There is no bilateral program of U.S. assistance to Singapore, although an A.I.D. investment guarantee agreement is in effect.

Industry

Recognizing that active trading alone could not provide enough new jobs for the growing population, the government's development policy throughout the past decade has placed major emphasis on industrialization. Separation from Malaysia precluded realization of a large national market and resulted in emphasis being shifted from import substitution toward export manufacturing. To support this policy the government introduced new and remarkably successful financial incentives for export-oriented industry. New labor legislation enacted in 1968 eliminated costly fringe benefits, put an end to labor unrest, provided for wage stability, and gave employers more flexibility in hiring and firing.

Several institutions played a key role in carrying out the industrialization policy. The Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) was responsible for industrial financing. The Jurong Town Corporation was charged with developing industrial estates. Its major achievement to date is the Jurong Industrial Estate, a government-planned satellite community devoted to manufacturing, which has more than 350 new factories in production and many others in various stages of completion. The Economic Development Board (EDB) has organized a massive program to promote foreign investment in Singapore and has set up a network of offices in Europe, Japan, and the United States. (Its offices in the United States are located in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco.)

These efforts resulted in a dramatic increase in the level of both foreign and local investment. Since 1962 the manufacturing sector has grown an average of 20 percent a year. During this period manufacturing has increased in importance in relation to



Land of Eternal Summer; this is a country where vegetation is lush and tropical and where seasons are nonexistent.

other sectors of the economy from 9.8 to 20.7 percent of the total. Extensive petroleum refining operations make the petroleum industry the largest in Singapore. It is closely followed by transportation equipment (including ship repair), textiles, electrical machinery, and food industries.

Housing and building construction have been expanding rapidly in recent years, with the former concentrated in large-scale public housing projects. It was estimated in 1970 that one-third of Singapore's population was housed in government-built apartment complexes. A steadily growing influx of tourists has also resulted in recent years in a hotel construction boom, though present facilities are now considered more than adequate to cope with the demand.

Singapore's efforts to industrialize have met with such remarkable success that government policy now favors capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive industries. Particular emphasis will be placed on attracting investment in an industry with modern technology to upgrade the skills and productivity of Singapore's workers.

Labor

Singapore has a work force of approximately 800,000. The National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), which is the sole trade union federation, has about 167,000 members. There is extensive legislation covering general labor and trade union matters and an Industrial Arbitration Court to handle labor-management disputes. In recent years industrial peace has prevailed in Singapore, and labor-management relations have generally been harmonious.

In the recent period of rapid economic expansion, Singapore has achieved virtually full employment, and in fact in some sectors there is a labor shortage. About 100,000 non-Singaporeans have been admitted on temporary work permits, mostly from neighboring Malaysia, to help ease this shortage.

Transportation and Communications

Situated at the crossroads of international shipping and air routes, Singapore serves as a center of transportation and communication in Southeast Asia. With the fourth largest harbor in the world, the port of Singapore handled a total of 60.4 million freight tons of cargo in 1974. In the field of civil aviation, the international airport at Paya Lebar is capable of handling any aircraft now in world service. Singapore is served by major airlines that operate in all parts of the world. The country is also linked by road and rail to Malaysia and Thailand. Telecommunications and telephone facilities are modern and comprehensive, providing high quality communications with the rest of the world. Radio and television stations are government owned and operated. There are daily newspapers in English, Chinese, and Malay, which are privately owned.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In world affairs Singapore maintains a nonaligned posture with respect to major world powers and seeks cordial relations with all nations. As a small country, heavily dependent on trade with the outside world, Singapore has a special interest in maintaining wide contacts abroad. A former British possession, it participates actively in the British Commonwealth. It is also a member of the United Nations and several of the U.N. specialized agencies. Singapore supports the concept of Southeast Asian regionalism and from its inception in 1967 has played an active role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Although it relies primarily on its own defense forces, which have been enlarged and strengthened in recent years, Singapore is also a member of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (with Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia). Designed to succeed the former defense role of the British in the Singapore-Malaysia area, the Five Power arrangement obligates members to consult in the event of external threat and provides for the stationing of Commonwealth forces in Singapore. British and New Zealand units are presently stationed in Singapore under this agreement. However, the British have announced that all their forces will be removed from Singapore by early 1976. (The Australians maintain two squadrons of fighter aircraft in neighboring Malaysia under the Five Power Defense Arrangement.)

U.S.-SINGAPORE RELATIONS

The United States has maintained formal diplomatic relations with Singapore since the latter became independent in 1965. Singapore's efforts to maintain economic growth and political stability and its active participation in regional cooperative movements are in harmony with U.S. policy in the region and form a solid basis for amiable relations between the two countries. The growth of U.S. investment in Singapore and the increasing numbers of Americans living in Singapore enhance the opportunity for contact between Singapore and the United States. Also, more and more Singaporeans are coming to the United States to study or visit.

The U.S. Government sponsors several visitors from Singapore to the United States each year under the International Visitor's Program. The U.S. Government also supplements the salaries of several American professors at the University of Singapore, provides scholarships for Singapore graduate students at American universities, and sponsors occasional cultural presentations in Singapore.

Private American organizations such as the Asia Foundation, the East-West Center, and the Ford Foundation are also active in sponsoring exchanges involving Singaporeans.

The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, has made several visits to the United States, most recently in May 1975, when he was entertained at the White House by President Ford.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—John H. Holdridge
Deputy Chief of Mission—William B. Grant
Economic/Commercial Officer—Felix S. Bloch
Public Affairs Officer—Gerald Stryker
Consular Officer—Bobby L. Watson

The U.S. Embassy in Singapore is located at No. 30 Hill Street, Singapore 6.

Ethics After Auschwitz

Franklin H. Littell

Ten years ago, in an address to an audience of German students, Peter Lotar, author of *Das Bild des Menschen*, raised the question of how the years of the Third Reich's power and crimes shall be dealt with.

> How can we build the future when we are not finished with the past? How can we avoid the old mistakes when we don't even recognize them yet? We have a choice: do we intend to freeze fast in self-deception? or do we intend to carry through the cleaning up of ourselves and thereby grant ourselves and our children a full, new life?

At first glance this would seem another simple, if somewhat blunt, demand that a people mend its ways. We remind ourselves that ten years ago the *Bundesrepublik*, years after the *Deutsche Wunder* was the talk of the world, was still trying to come to terms with the sources and nature of its "old mistakes." This dimension of the statement was not unimportant for a society which, especially among youth and students, was beginning to live through many of the ideological and practical crises of the encounter with sectarian Marxism. The Baader-Meinhof gang and its activities still waited in the wings, but already the universities and *Gymnasien* were beginning to experience the conflicts many in England and the USA had worked their way through in 1936-40, years when Germany had cut itself off from the chief intellectual currents and mainstream of historical events. To this day—and this is one of the high prices the Germans are paying for the "lost weekend" of 1933-45—the struggle with issues raised by "United Front" theories and sectarian Maoist, Stalinist, Fidelist, Trotskyite, and other groups has not been resolved among German youth and students. To a person coming from the West much of the intense political conflict of the left-wing youth and student organizations in Germany seems like a memory of a bad black-and-white movie suffered through forty or thirty-five years ago. The anti-Semitism of the German "New Left" dredges up vivid memories for those who have not undergone a lobotomy of the memory circuits, memories of the *Hitlerjugend* (H.J.) and the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (BDM).

But the substantial question raised by Lotar (author of one of the best morality plays of this generation, a play based on encounters with conspirators rounded up after the July 20, 1944, attempts on Hitler's life) has to do with the meaning of life itself: "How can we build the future when we are not finished with the past?" We must attend to that question if our decisions in the present and actions for the future are to be as critically enlightened as possible. Contempt for history and ecstatic embrace of the present sensational moment distort many of the communities—including academic communities—in which we live. We must therefore make a covenant, both personal and professional: We will study those times. We will remember.

In America the first academic seminar on the Holocaust was taught by Marie Syrkin at Brandeis University in 1957. The first academic seminar on the Church Struggle was my graduate seminar at Emory University in 1959. The first scholars' conference that brought together students of the experience of the two communities, Jewish and Christian, under the assault of Nazism was our International Scholars' Conference at Wayne State University in Detroit in 1970. I mention these facts partly because a conference was held in New York City in 1974 that claimed to be the first interfaith conference on the Holocaust, and the record should be kept straight. More important, however, we should be aware that we are no longer working, as individuals or as a group, in an unoccupied hall in

FRANKLIN H. LITTELL is professor of religion at Temple University. This article is based on an address he delivered in New York on March 21, 1974, at the Annual Conference on the Holocaust and the Church Struggle.

which the echoes of our own voices reverberate against the walls and empty seats. A recent survey turned up some three hundred institutions holding occasional courses, classes, seminars, and research programs on the Holocaust and related phenomena.

Related phenomena"—there the theoretical issue is raised. How shall we understand "related phenomena"? Are the Holocaust and the Church Struggle so related, or are we in truth trying to harness two separate and distinct sets of phenomena, as has been suggested. A letter from Eberhard Bethge, Bonhoeffer editor and biographer, is reassuring on this score. Bethge states that the study of the Church Struggle cannot today be carried forward except in the context of the Church's relation to "the Jewish question" and its resolution in the Holocaust. Robert McAfee Brown has noted that the difficulty of relating the two fields of study today is related to "that very failure, namely, that during the Nazi period the connection between the church struggle and the murder of the Jews was not clearly perceived." That is precisely the point: Any further consideration of the Church Struggle, neglected as it still is in most seminaries and by most church publishing houses, would simply result in a spirit of triumphalism were it not yoked unbreakably to the experience of the Jews in the Holocaust.

The two events were not symmetrical. This must be said forthrightly and be strongly maintained against all peddlers of "cheap grace" (for example, A.C. Forrest, who has attempted to use the martyrs of the Church Struggle to absolve Christendom of its guilt of commission and omission during the Holocaust). There were six million Jewish victims and, at most, twelve thousand who perished as Christian resisters in the Nazi concentration camps. Eberhard Bethge recently stirred considerable controversy by pointing out that even the Confessing Church, the backbone of such resistance as the German Protestants offered, lost over 1,200 activists during the military campaign against Russian "Bolshevism," and less than fifty as clear-cut opponents of the Hitler regime. At Barmen (May, 1934) the resisters made no mention of the Jewish issue, and even in the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt (October, 1945)—when the opening of the Death Camps had already informed the world of the enormity of the Holocaust—there is no mention of the crime against the Jewish people. After years of work on the Church Struggle, and with all admiration and affection for those courageous persons in the Christian minority—some of whom I have been privileged to count as friends—who did not apostatize with most of the *Kulturchristen*, I have been forced to the conclusion that the "Alpine event" (Bialik's term) was the Holocaust; the Church Struggle was a footnote to it. I speak of Christian history, and not just something that happened to the Jewish people. As Gerd Korman put it, quoting Elie Wiesel, in his *Hunter and Hunted*: "Today we know that all roads and all words lead to the Holocaust. What it was we may never know; but we must proclaim, at least, that it was, that it is."

We come to the matter of telling the story, of why the event must be remembered, and why it must be told to coming generations. Of this idiom, the story, men like Elie Wiesel and Abba Kovner are masters, but academics too have a part in storytelling. Unless we remember with understanding, unless we are brought to direct encounter with our present, our scholarly research is mere "sound and fury, signifying nothing."

As we study in a mood of moral earnestness, as well as with intellectual discipline, what we find hits us at many levels and in many ways. A German Catholic resister, Joseph Ernst Füst Fugger von Glött, tells the story of one of his own experiences. Before 1933, before the Nazi accession to power, he visited a friend in Italy. His friend complained bitterly of the corruption and of Mussolini's brutal, fascist government. Whereupon Fugger responded, "Why do you put up with it?" and commented that such a thing could never happen in Germany. Relating the story years later Fugger commented that he had yet to learn what Germany was capable of.

I agree with those who warn against facile analogies in the study of history, and I agree too that USA 1975 is not Germany 1933. But there are other ways of breaking the morale of a people besides a lost war, inflation, depression, massive unemployment, and a solitary burden of war guilt. One of those "other" ways might very well be a lost war, inflation, depression, massive unemployment, and a painful, never successfully suppressed sense of guilt. In time of crisis a great deal depends upon the basic loyalty and integrity of those who exercise the stewardship of power and decision-making. Here too we have had our own American experiences.

Of course analogies are easy, and in this case they may confuse rather than inform. The Holocaust—Nazism's supreme achievement—was unique. In a technical sense the Holocaust was but one major event in the twentieth century, the Century of Genocide. If we speak only of "genocide," what of the fate of the Kurds today? From what we know of the fascist clique that runs Iraq, the current reports of genocide are quite credible. It would be easy to subsume the whole matter of the destruction of European Jewry under the rubric "genocide," particularly since the term "genocide" as well as the Genocide Convention of 1948 arose out of the Holocaust. For example, how shall we handle this year's sixtieth anniversary of the Armenian massacres? Armenians maintain, not without ample evidence, that the "first Holocaust" of the twentieth century was experienced by the Armenians. In its dying throes the Holy Muslim Empire deliberately slaughtered over half of the inhabitants of Armenia, the most ancient Christian nation in the

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documents for his chronicle of the last days of the Warsaw Ghetto, *Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto*, a Jewish scholar may be as "clinical" and "objective" as he or she pleases, for his or her own life has been pledged to give a bona fide. Not all Jews would agree. Dr. J. Presser, when he had finished his great work, *The Destruction of the Dutch Jews*, concluded: "...one thing has become clear to me while writing this work: no single Jew who has lived through that period can think dispassionately about the events here recorded." But a Jew has the right, I would maintain, to try to do so if he wishes.

I question whether a Christian has the moral right to adopt that stance, just as I question that the various familiar rubrics of generalization and abstraction have offered ways of telling the truth about what happened. The Christian scholar may not forget Søren Kierkegaard's story of the professor who was driven above all by a quest for "objectivity." If he could have observed the crucifixion of Jesus he would have asked, if possible, to have it repeated so that he could be sure to give as accurate and detailed a description of the event as humanly feasible. We who are professing Christians may not deal with the crucifixion of European Jewry in such a way. The Holocaust is a river of fire that flows across our whole history, both communal and individual, and it compels us either to keep silent or to begin anew with totally fresh categories of thought and ways of acting. To continue with Kierkegaard, a Christian auditing is needed—and the auditor is himself a condemned man.

> Do you now know that there comes a midnight hour when all must unmask?
> Do you suppose that life will forever suffer itself to be treated as a joke?
> Do you suppose that one can slip out a little before the midnight hour?

That life is a joke is the testimony of the twelve major denominational publishing houses studied by Gerald Strober over a ten-year period, 1961-71, in his book, *Portrait of the Elder Brother: Jews and Judaism in Protestant Teaching Material*. The story of the Holocaust, the most important event in recent Christian history, is simply suppressed. Henry Friedlander, in his major study of college and university textbooks, published in *The German Church Struggle and the Holocaust, 1933-1945*, showed that the major textbooks in modern European or twentieth-century German history also, and again almost without exception, suppress the subject. Professor Friedlander, from his position, was able to expose the lack of proportion, the neglect of scientific attention to evidence, the failure of true balance and objectivity revealed by such suppression. A scholar who is also a Christian, however, must ask whether many of these writers of textbooks are simply gentiles who share the embarrassment and averted gaze of perpetrators and spectators, or whether some are Christians who cannot yet bring themselves to deal with an event that challenges the credibility of Christianity as has nothing else in two thousand years.

Study of the Church Struggle and Holocaust must be built around two foci: (1) a commitment to the most strict canons of research, analysis, and writing that the various academic disciplines of the modern university can mount; (2) a commitment to let the stories of our recent history play upon our minds and consciences to the improvement of our moral earnestness and actions. In advancing such study, ours is not a solely antiquarian and antiseptic interest, one more of the games academics play. Nor do we meet as concerned persons to moralize with sweeping analogies, or even to pass resolutions, comparing what has happened since 1969 in America to what happened during the last days of the Weimar Republic. But we would be blind indeed who, remembering the subversion and destruction of Weimar, did not shudder to reflect upon contemporary revelations of illegal and disloyal activities by, for example, the FBI, the CIA, the Attorney General, and the former President of the United States. They took oaths to uphold the Constitution "against all enemies, foreign and domestic," and they broke their oaths. To some this may be at the level of "stealing chickens," as one columnist recently put it. But to the less frivolous it is an ominous development.

We have the right as concerned citizens, which was our condition before any of us ever consciously associated with the university or the church (or synagogue), to nourish the hope that our work will help to bring the era of genocide to an end. But we must first let the documents and the stories speak fully to us before we assume we have the data fixed in time and space.

Consider a story that sets a seal of moral responsibility upon our study of the Holocaust. In the last days of World War II Rabbi Samuel Rose, eighty-nine, of Denver, Colorado, received word that his son, Major General Maurice Rose, had been killed in Germany. Rabbi Rose sat down heavily, grasping his cane, and said: "It is well that since this had to be, it happened in the week of Passover. As Jehovah said, 'When I see the blood, I will pass over you.' He spoke not only to the Jews but to all peoples—to the gentiles, to Americans, to Germans, to all peoples. And so, may Jehovah accept this sacrifice, and see the blood and pass over all peoples for their sins, at this Passover time, for my son's sake."

In the name of the Isaacs for whom no rams were caught in the thicket, in memory of the six million for whom the waters refused to part, in respect for the few thousand Christian martyrs who gave some of us here a right to speak, if not too loudly, about the past, let us dedicate ourselves to clear thinking and responsible research, but above all let us dedicate ourselves to this covenant: We will remember, the story will be heard, we will tell it to our children and children's children.

The easy way to deal with the rise of Nazism and the enthusiastic response it for years evoked from baptized Christians is to interpret what happened as a return to the Age of Persecution. In this vein apologists now describe Nazism as "neopaganism," refer to the sufferings of the churches under Roman Emperors Nero, Valerian, Decius, and Diocletian, and paint a picture in which European Jewry suffered terribly, to be sure, but the Christian churches also bore repression and persecution. That was not the way the great majority of churchmen saw it at the time, and it is no act of good faith to try now to discern a pattern of apologetic excuse along those lines. Most of the baptized, including most top leadership in the churches, enthusiastically supported Hitler's self-portrayal as an enemy of "atheistic Communism"; most of them made no protest against terrorism, sadism, and mass murder.

On November 8, 1938, according to a conservative report, 191 synagogues were burned, 76 more were fully destroyed, 815 Jewish businesses were destroyed, 7,500 businessmen plundered, and 171 houses were burned. On July 17, 1939, Bishop Otto Melle of the German Methodist Episcopal Church told a group of visiting American Methodists: "Hitler is God's man for Germany." It is a hard thing, if needful, for a Methodist to have a memory! The first problem of twentieth-century Christianity is not persecution but wholesale apostasy. Until we face that truth neither our Christian education (or reeducation!) nor our periodization of history (including eschatology) will be sound.

The typical faces of this age of Christianity are the lawless policeman, the disloyal general, the corrupted scientists, the sadistic surgeons—apocalyptic types produced by a Christian community that has lost its rudder and has no life and authority as a counterculture. When the salt lost its savor in Germany, the fate of the Jews was sealed. In a sound Christian profession after Auschwitz it will be acknowledged that the vast majority of the martyrs for the true Lord of History in the twentieth century were Jews.

Already in 1933 Dietrich Bonhoeffer commented that on the Jewish question many of the keenest minds among the church people had "lost their heads and their whole Bible." The practical question for the churches is how to find their way back to the center, and it will take something vastly more powerful than "civil religion," "natural epiphanies," and other fads and fancies to accomplish that earthmoving job. It is a task for heavy equipment, as it were, and so far most of our efforts have been confined to isolated individuals of good will, working with shovels and buckets.

Reflecting upon the horror of the Holocaust and meditating upon the benefits of the Church Struggle, one is inclined to start with the pledge that it must not happen again. From that decent and humanitarian concern we move back to the old stance: that the little minority of Jews needs the Christians, in order that the gentile world may stay its hand from innocent blood. But this is the wrong *blik*, however well meant; it leaves the Christians in a position of strength, with the Jews dependent upon their good will and definition of terms. Actually, religious and cultural vitality is far stronger in the Jewish community today than among the Christians. The truth is far more basic; the Christians need the Jewish people, not only needed them in the past for the foundations of the faith, but need continuing interaction with the Jewish people for the sake of authenticity today. It may be that Jewish self-definition requires no distinction between "Christians" and "gentiles"; Christian self-definition cannot be achieved without continuing reference to the Jewish people. Whenever a Christian self-definition has been attempted without that reference, as in some other ethnic and cultural setting apart from the Jewish, Christians have slipped into heresy and from heresy into great wickedness. Today, after the worst rebellion and denial of God in our entire history, we Christians desperately need to go up to Jerusalem again.

Just as it is dangerous for Christians to seek severance from the essential Jewishness of Christianity, so even the study of the Church Struggle ought never to be pressed without major attention to the Holocaust and its meanings.

Although we salute and praise cooperation between Jews and Christians, also in study of the Holocaust and the Church Struggle, we cannot get away from the truth that our relationships to the event are vastly different. Even the tones of voice that are options for us may differ.

A Jewish scholar, particularly one who is himself a survivor, has the moral right to pursue studies of the Holocaust in the mood and style of clinical objectivity. (Whether or not clinical reportage is a useful form of communication is a technical question not here at issue.) Like Emmanuel Ringelblum, assembling the





Janice Stapleton

world. Michael Arlen, Jr., has pointed out in his survey of that tragic episode published in the *New Yorker* in February, 1975, that the genocidal policy of Enver Pasha was made possible by modern technology. The telegraph enabled wholesale murder to be launched simultaneously throughout the Ottoman Empire. The telegraph also made it possible for lying reports to be issued to the outside world, in several languages, denying the facts. To the telegraph, the Nazis added the misuse of radio. Now we have TV.

But the method of analogy, like generalizations and abstractions about "man's inhumanity to man," is morally unacceptable. Scientifically there are analogues; morally, the generalization is false. Jacob Katz refers to the Holocaust as a "novum"; Uriel Tal, after a review of its antecedents, calls it "unique"; Roy Eckardt calls the Holocaust "uniquely unique." The point is that sociological or historical analysis may lead to the conclusion that the Holocaust was simply the most appalling activity of a genocidal era, and morally such a generalization is obscene. As Wolfgang Gerlach puts it in an unpublished dissertation on the subject, to treat the Holocaust as one manifestation of a general problem misses the main point:

> ...It would be to argue in lively fashion something like a husband who has difficulties with the spouse entrusted to him and now wishes to claim that he is experiencing "the problem of women"—since his wife is a woman. He has obviously not noticed that at the point when he married this one woman the question which arose for him was the problem of marriage. Thus the relationship of the peoples of the world to the Jews is something quite different, for example, from the relationship of white Americans to the Negroes.

The Holocaust may be a "plumb line" held for comparative purposes against other cases of mass murder. It may not be bracketed finally with them.

We are brought back forcibly to the original point: The Holocaust compels each of us, and expecially those with membership in the Christian church, to ask where he was and where he is in relationship to the Holocaust. Six million Jews were murdered efficiently and scientifically by baptized Christians in the heart of Christendom. This is an event comparable in holy history to the Exodus, Sinai, Golgotha, the profanation of the Temple by Titus, the fall of Rome, the fall of Constantinople. To treat it as merely another vivid illustration of the effects of race prejudice, anti-Semitism, or neopaganism ("secularism"?) is both banal and spiritually blind.

The closest thing to "the Holocaust," at least so long as Israel can keep standing off the Muslim crusade of the Arab League, was what happened in 1894 and 1915 to the Armenians under the Turks. But even the sixtieth anniversary of the Armenian massacres does not entitle us Christians to flee again into generalizations and abstractions. There are, to be sure, certain important parallels between what Christendom in decline did and allowed to be done to European Jews and what the "Holy Muslim Empire" in collapse did to over half of the oldest Christian nation in the world. The inability of a unitary Islam to deal rationally and fairly with a "foreign body" in its midst is not unlike the inability of a unitary Christendom to cope with the rational claims of modern pluralism. But the problem of a militant, nationalistic Islam is not our first concern here. We must set our own house (Christendom) in order, and hope for the emergence of Muslim scholars capable of analytical and self-critical study of ideological massacres and crusades. Martin Buber, speaking as a Jew, commented in the early years of Nazism that "the significant fact that this hour is a test of Christianity is not our concern; what concerns us is that this hour is an ordeal by fire for Jewry."

Our immediate problem is not Islam, but Christendom, although Israel is a "crisis of faith" for both Muslims and Christians of traditional type. Speaking as a Christian historian and theologian, I find my problem precisely in the fact that in the time of temptation and testing most Christians apostatized and went over to the Adversary. My immediate political problem may be the ruin of the U.N. and its tributaries by the reckless politics of the Communist and Arab League alliance and their bloc voting; my theological problem is closer to home. There was only one other period of church history with a comparable measure of mass apostasy, and that was the period when, in the eighth and ninth centuries, millions of Christians in North Africa and Asia Minor (the heartland of Christendom) went over to a militant and colonialist Islam. Some Christians were martyred; more dug in and wintered through; most of the baptized apostatized and accepted Islam as the final revelation and Mohammed as the last of the prophets.

(4)

background notes

Malaysia

department of state * january 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Malaysia

GEOGRAPHY

Malaysia occupies the southern half of the Malay Peninsula and the northern quarter of the neighboring island of Borneo. The two parts are separated by about 400 miles of the South China Sea.

West Malaysia, the mainland, has an area of about 51,000 square miles. A range of steep forest-covered mountains runs north and south along the center of the peninsula, flanked on the east and west by coastal plains. West Malaysia shares a land border with Thailand in the north and is separated from Singapore in the south by the narrow Johore Strait. About 80 percent of the area is covered by tropical jungle, the rest by extensive rubber plantations and other agricultural holdings. The coastline in the west is largely mangrove and mud flats with infrequent bays and other indentations. The east coast is a continuous stretch of sand and surf bordered by tropical vegetation. The total coastline is more than 1,200 miles long.

East Malaysia consists of the States of Sarawak and Sabah (formerly North Borneo). It shares the island of Borneo with the provinces of Indonesian Kalimantan. Sarawak, with its capital at Kuching, is about 500 miles long and a maximum of 150 miles wide with a total area of nearly 48,000 square miles. A broad, frequently swampy coastal plain, crossed by a number of wide rivers, merges into the jungle-covered hills and mountains of the interior. Sabah has an area of about 29,000 square miles. Its narrow coastal plain gives way to a mountainous, jungle-covered interior culminating in Mount Kinabalu, the highest peak in Malaysia at 13,455 feet. The capital of Sabah is the seaside city of Kota Kinabalu (formerly Jesselton).

The average daily temperature throughout Malaysia varies from about 70°F to 90°F, although in the higher elevation areas temperatures are lower and more variable. Malaysia experiences annually a southwest and a northeast monsoon. Annual rainfall averages 100 inches although it varies considerably in different locations and from year to year.

The stripes in Malaysia's flag represent the equal membership of the 13 States in the federation and the Fed-

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 128,553 sq. mi. (slightly larger than N. Mex.). CAPITAL: Kuala Lumpur (pop. 500,000). OTHER CITIES: Penang, Ipoh.

People

POPULATION: 12.1 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.7%. DENSITY: 80 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 44% Malay, 36% Chinese, 10% Indian, others. RELIGIONS: Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian. LANGUAGES: Malay, Chinese dialects, English, Tamil. LITERACY: 50%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 63 yrs.

Government

TYPE: Parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch. INDEPENDENCE: August 31, 1957. CONSTITUTION: 1963.

BRANCHES: *Executive*–Paramount Ruler (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Cabinet. *Legislative*–bicameral Parliament (58-member Senate, 154-member House of Representatives). *Judicial*–Federal Court, High Courts.

POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 13 States. POLITICAL PARTY: National Front (Barisan Nasional). SUFFRAGE: Universal adult.

FLAG: 14 horizontal red and white stripes with a yellow crescent and star on a dark blue field in the upper left corner.

Economy

GNP: $8.7 billion (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 6%. PER CAPITA INCOME: $715.5. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 4%.

AGRICULTURE: *Labor* 59%. *Land* 12%. *Acres per capita* 0.8%. *Products*–rubber, palm oil, timber, cocoa, rice, pepper, pine.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* na. *Products*–steel, automobiles, electronics.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Tin, oil, copper, timber.

TRADE: *Exports*–$4.5 billion (1974): natural rubber $1,283 million, tin $673 million, timber and logs $652 million, palm oil $482 million. *Partners* (1973)–Singapore (23%), Japan (18%), US (11%). *Imports*–$4.37 billion (1974): machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, manufactured goods. *Partners* (1974)–Japan (21.2%), UK (9.7%), US (9.3%).

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: M$2.49 = US$1 (Nov. 1974 floating rate).

US AID RECEIVED: *Total*–$22.3 million (1974): P.L. 480, $100,000; Peace Corps, $3.2 million; military assistance credit sales, $18.8 million; military assistance program grants, $200,000.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Asian Development Bank (ADB), ASEAN, Five-Power Defense Arrangement, British Commonwealth.



eral Government. The dark blue stands for the unity of the Malaysian people and the star for unity of the States. The crescent symbolizes Islam. Yellow is the color of royalty.

PEOPLE

Population distribution is uneven; most of the people live in West Malaysia. About 45 percent of the people are under 15 years of age.

Malaysia has a polyglot population composed of several ethnic groups, of which the Malays are the single largest group. They are predominantly rural and control much of the political and social life of the country. They are Muslims and speak the Malay language.

Thirty-six percent of the population are Chinese whose ancestors came to Malaysia during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Chinese are mainly urban dwellers and, by virtue of their predominate role in trade, business, and finance, possess a great deal of Malaysia's economic power. They speak a variety of Chinese dialects (Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkien, Teochew, and others); educated Chinese also speak Mandarin. The majority are Confucianists, Taoists, Buddhists, and Christians.

Malaysians of Indian descent make up 10 percent of the population. Their ancestors came from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, primarily as laborers on rubber plantations around the turn of the century. Descendants of Hindus, Buddhists, and Muslims, they continue to speak various Indian languages (Tamil, Punjabi, and Sinhalese).

Although non-Malay indigenous tribal peoples comprise only 8 percent of the total population, they make up more than half the population of Sarawak and about two-thirds that of Sabah. The non-Malays are divided into several ethnic groups and inhabit distinct territories, but they share some general patterns of living and culture. Until the 20th century most were animists, but a great number have since become Christians.

About 60-70 percent of the people of Malaysia speak Malay, with wide differences in facility. English is widely used in government and business. Literacy rates range from 25 percent in East Malaysia to more than 50 percent in West Malaysia. Some of

the indigenous peoples of East Malaysia and the aboriginal people of West Malaysia have adopted elements of the Malay culture and Islam. Otherwise there has been limited cultural assimilation among the various ethnic groups. The Chinese, Malays, and Indians, while considering themselves Malaysians, tend to maintain their own cultural identities. They do, however, develop ties through association in educational, sporting, and cultural organizations.

HISTORY

The early Buddhist Malay kingdom of Srivijaya, based in east Sumatra, dominated much of the Malay Peninsula from the 9th to the 13th centuries. The powerful Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit, based on Java, gained control of the Malay Peninsula in the 14th century. The conversion of the Malays to Islam, beginning in the early part of the 14th century, was accelerated with the rise of the state of Malacca under the rule of a Muslim prince.

The arrival of the Portuguese in Malacca in 1511 marked the beginning of European expansion in this area as the power of the sultanates declined. The Dutch ousted the Portuguese from Malacca in 1641 and in 1795 were replaced in turn by the British, who had occupied Penang in 1786.

Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles founded a British settlement at Singapore in 1819. In 1826 the settlements of Malacca and Penang were combined with Singapore to form the Colony of the Straits Settlements. In the 19th and early 20th centuries the British concluded treaties establishing protectorates over the nine Malay States on the peninsula. Four of these States were consolidated in 1895 as the Federated Malay States.

West Malaysia, then known as Malaya, enjoyed a century of prosperity with the gradual establishment of a well-ordered system of public administration, extension of public services, and development of large-scale rubber and tin production. This period was interrupted by the Japanese invasion and occupation from 1942 to 1945.

The Federation of Malaya was established from the British territories of peninsular Malaysia in 1948. The British colonies of Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (North Borneo) joined the Federation of Malaya to form Malaysia on September 16, 1963. The Sukarno government of Indonesia objected to the formation of Malaysia and conducted a program of "confrontation" against the new State which included economic, political, diplomatic, and military offensives. This "confrontation" continued through Singapore's withdrawal from Malaysia on August 9, 1965, and ended only after the fall of the Sukarno regime in 1966. Relations between Malaysia and Indonesia have subsequently become very cordial.

After World War II the local Communists, almost all Chinese, expanded their influence and made plans for an armed struggle. A "state of emergency" was declared in June 1948, and a long and bitter guerrilla war ensued.

The "emergency" ended in 1960 as Malaya, in partnership with the United Kingdom, gained the distinction of being one of the few countries in the world to control a large-scale Communist uprising. However, what remained of the Communist force regrouped in Southern Thailand and over the years was able to rebuild its strength. In the past few years, small bands of Communist guerrillas have once again been encountered in the northern portion of West Malaysia, and in light of Communist successes in Indochina appear to have renewed their efforts. However, government forces are apparently well in control of the situation. A small-scale Communist insurgency in the East Malaysian State of Sarawak has also been contained, and in 1973-74 skillful government counter-guerrilla activities resulted in the surrender of most of the insurgents there.

GOVERNMENT

The country has a constitutional monarchy, nominally headed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or Paramount Ruler. The Ruler is elected for a 5-year term by the Sultans of nine States of West Malaysia from among their own members. He performs the duties of a constitutional monarch and is the leader of the Islamic religion for Malaysia.

TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—Tropical, except in the highland resort areas. Light clothing should be worn.

Customs—Tourist visas may be obtained upon arrival. Business visitors should have valid visas issued by Malaysian authorities (or British authorities where Malaysia has no representative of its own). All must have inoculations against smallpox and cholera.

Health—Kuala Lumpur is generally free from most diseases commonly associated with the Far East. Tap water from the municipal water system is considered safe. The use of malaria suppressives at all times is recommended. Children and young adults should also be inoculated against diphtheria and polio.

Telecommunications—Telephone service to the US is available 24 hours a day and, except for the Christmas season, requires no advance booking. Telegraph service is also available.

Transportation—The modern Subang International Airport is 12 miles from Kuala Lumpur, and many daily flights connect the capital with Singapore, Bangkok, and Hong Kong. Daily train service connects Kuala Lumpur with Penang, Singapore, and Bangkok. Bus transportation is available. Taxis are metered and fares are reasonable. Traffic moves on the left.

Executive power is vested in the Cabinet, led by the Prime Minister, the leader of the political party that wins the most seats in a parliamentary election. The Cabinet is chosen from among the members of Parliament and is responsible to that body.

The bicameral Parliament consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Of the 58 members of the Senate, 26 are elected by universal adult suffrage (two from each State) and 32 are appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. All sit for 6-year terms. Representatives of the House are elected in single constituencies by universal adult suffrage. The 154 members in the House of Representatives—114 from the States of West Malaysia and 40 from the States of East Malaysia—are elected to maximum terms of 5 years. Legislative power is divided between Federal and State legislatures.

The Malaysian legal system is based on English common law. The Federal

READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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Court, the highest court in Malaysia, reviews decisions referred from the High Courts and has original jurisdiction in constitutional matters and in disputes between States or between the Federal Government and a State. West Malaysia and East Malaysia each have a High Court.

The Federal Government has authority over external affairs, defense, internal security, justice (except Islamic and native law), Federal citizenship, finance, commerce, industry, communications, transportation, and other matters. The States of East Malaysia enjoy guarantee of States' rights with regard to immigration, civil service, and customs matters.

The heads of the 13 States in Malaysia are titular rulers. Effective executive power in the States rests in the hands of the Chief Ministers. The Chief Ministers and the members of their State cabinets are selected from the State legislatures and operate under a parliamentary system.

Principal Government Officials

Paramount Ruler–Yahya Petra ibni Sultan Ibrahim

Prime Minister; Minister of Defense; Minister of Finance; Minister for Coordination of Public Corporations–Datuk Hussein bin Onn

Other Ministers

Foreign Affairs–Tunku Ahmad Rithauddeen

Communications–Tan Sri V. Manickavasagam

Trade and Industry–Dato Hamzah bin Abu Samah

Labor and Manpower–Dato Lee San Choon

Agriculture and Rural Development–Inche Ghafar bin Baba

Transport and Public Works–Datuk Haji Abdul Ghani Gilong

Health–Tan Sri Lee Siok Yew

Lands, Mines, and Special Functions–Datuk Haji Mohamed Asri

Home Affairs–Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie

Information and Special Functions; General Planning and Socio-economic Research–Dato Abdul Taib bin Mahmud

Local Government and Environment–Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui

Primary Industries–Dato Musa bin Hitam

Welfare Services–Puan Hajjah Aishah Ghani

Power, Technology, and Research–Tuan Haji Mohamed bin Ya'acob

Culture, Youth and Sports–Dato Ali bin Haji Ahmad

Education–Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamed

Law and Attorney General–Tan Sri Abdul Kadir bin Yusoff

Housing and New Villages–Inche Michael Chen

Chairman of PETRONAS–Tengku Tan Sri Razaleigh

Minister Without Portfolio–Inche Mohamed Khir Johari

Chargé d'Affaires to the U.S.–Inche Anaitullah Karim

Chargé d'Affaires to the U.N.–Inche Agit Singh

Malaysia maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2401 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The principal political force in Malaysia for many years was the Alliance Party, a coalition of parties representing the three major ethnic groups of the country–the United Malays National Organization, the Malaysian Chinese Association, and the Malayan Indian Congress. Several legal opposition parties exist. Communist parties are not legal.

The Alliance provided stable and effective government for the former Federation of Malaya, and its enlarged successor, the National Front, continues to perform the same function for Malaysia today. The Alliance scored an impressive victory in the elections of 1964 and, together with its counterparts from East Malaysia, held more than a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives.

The 1969 election showed a gain of strength by opposition parties in West Malaysia. This election was not completed in East Malaysia, however, because of the eruption of racial disorders in the Kuala Lumpur area on May 13, 1969, which led to a temporary suspension of parliamentary democracy and the postponement of elections in East Malaysia until July 1970. At that time the Alliance parties won a thorough victory in both East Malaysian States.

With the suspension of parliamentary democracy in 1969, a "National Operations Council" (NOC) was created, composed of nine members headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, and given full power to restore normal conditions in the country.

Normal parliamentary government was restored in February 1971, although certain "sensitive" topics may no longer be discussed in public or in Parliament.

The presently governing National Front (Barisan Nasional) was formed in 1973 and includes both members of

the Alliance Party as well as former opposition parties. The National Front was successful in all of the States in the general elections of August 1974, winning better than 70 percent of the popular vote. Of the 154 seats in the House of Representatives, 135 are held by the National Front and 19 seats by three opposition parties.

Following the death of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak in London in January 1976, Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Hussein bin Onn became Prime Minister in accordance with Malaysian constitutional processes.

ECONOMY

Malaysia has one of the most impressive economies in Asia, third only to Japan and Singapore. Main factors contributing to this growth in the past have been the expanding level of investment, increased production of export commodities, and a healthy atmosphere for domestic and foreign private investment. The rate of private investment, for example, was over 9.5 percent of the GNP in 1973. The export sector is critical to the economy; it represents over 52 percent of GNP.

Malaysia's financial position is sound. Its foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to finance about 5 months of retained imports at current levels. Annual debt service payments represent a relatively low percentage of total export earnings. Exports of four major commodities—rubber, tin, timber and logs, and palm oil—constitute over two-thirds of gross export earnings.

In 1975 Federal Government revenues totaled $1.9 billion; ordinary expenditures reached $2 billion, and developmental expenditures surpassed $760 million. The deficit, which after various adjustments totaled $857 million, was financed by domestic borrowing supplemented by borrowing $300 million from abroad.

Agriculture and Natural Resources

The predominant sector of the Malaysian economy is agriculture. In recent years it accounted for about 30 percent of the GNP, provided employment for about 50 percent of the economically active population, and contributed around 55 percent to Malaysia's export earnings. Agricultural production increased 5.4 percent in 1974.

Natural rubber continues to be the most important contributor to the Malaysian economy. In 1974 it accounted for about 30 percent of gross export receipts and a little over 17 percent of the GNP. Lower than aver-

National Mosque and Parliament Building (background) in Kuala Lumpur



age rubber prices and demand caused a drop in rubber export earnings compared to previous years. In order to stabilize its natural rubber earnings, the government is considering a rubber price stabilization and buffer stock scheme. The Rubber Research Institute of Malaya has continued its excellent work in developing better, more productive rubber trees and more economic methods of collecting and processing the latex. Malaysia's natural rubber is in a good competitive position compared with synthetic rubber, and following a slump in 1974, current prices (1975) are good. Among the main purchasers of Malaysian rubber in recent years have been the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., the Federal Republic of Germany, and the People's Republic of China.

Malaysia remains the world's leading exporter of tin, and its hardwood timber is also a leading foreign exchange earner.

The government has adopted a policy of diversification of economic activities with emphasis on the agricultural sector. It has emphasized, with success, cultivation of the oil palm, and Malaysia is now one of the world's largest producers of palm oil.

Malaysia also produces large quantities of pepper (from Sarawak) and coconut products. A government program of price supports and production subsidies is followed to increase the production of rice. West Malaysia now produces about 80-85 percent of its yearly rice needs. East Malaysia, however, relies greatly on imports for its requirements.

Petroleum production has increased, and Malaysia hopes to develop its exports of petroleum to a significant level in the future. The government has set up a National Petroleum Company, PETRONAS, which is authorized under the terms of the Petroleum Development (Amendment) Act, 1975, to acquire effective control of foreign companies through the issuance of management shares. Pending resolution of negotiations with PETRONAS by foreign companies, new exploration and production have come to a virtual standstill.

Industry

Malaysia historically has been an importer of manufactured goods, concentrating its energy on the export of raw materials. Before independence only a few local industries were developed, and engineering industries were limited to repair work and the manufacture of spare parts. After independence in 1957 the government promoted industrialization to provide employment for the rapidly expanding labor force and to protect the economy from an excessive dependence on exports of primary commodities. Now manufacturing is a rapidly growing factor in the economy. Its contribution to GDP rose from 13.4 percent in 1970 to nearly 18 percent in 1973. Industrial production increased 11.3 percent in 1974 over the previous year.

The government has an aggressive strategy of industrial development which encourages foreign interest and participation. Several government organs have been established to assist domestic and foreign investors as well as to furnish equity and participate in ownership of selected industries.

Development Programs

The economic development programs of Malaysia devote large sums to the planting of higher yield rubber. The government is also committed to the diversification of its economy to reduce its heavy dependence on rubber and tin and the uncertainties of the world market price for these two commodities. The government has encouraged agricultural diversification, land settlement programs, and rural development.

In 1975 the government continued to pursue its New Economic Policy, a policy of eradicating poverty in general and bettering the relatively poorer economic position of the Malay portion of the population. Development expenditures in recent years have exceeded $500 million annually. This policy is expected to be continued under the third Malaysian plan (1976-80).

U.S. Trade and Investment

In 1974 Malaysia's exports to the United States totaled $636 million, principally tin ($201 million), rubber ($139 million), palm oil ($59 million), and wood ($14 million). Imports from the United States amounted to $430 million, mainly machinery and transport equipment ($205 million), chemicals ($53 million), and manufactured goods ($48 million).

The United States is among the leading sources of foreign private investment in Malaysia. Current estimates place U.S. private investment at more than $461 million in fields ranging from oil exploration and timber processing to the manufacturing of textiles and sophisticated electronic components. Prospective investors in Malaysia now should take into account the 1975 Industrial Coordination Act, which requires manufacturing companies in Malaysia to obtain a license from the government. It is likely that the act will be used increasingly to insure the employment of indigenous Malay citizens *(bumiputra)* in manufacturing and other firms.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In world affairs Malaysia has moved toward a nonaligned posture in recent years by expanding relations with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries and by establishing ties with North Viet-Nam, North Korea, and the P.R.C. At the same time Malaysia has also maintained close and cordial relations with Western countries, particularly its traditional allies—Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

As a former British possession, it participates actively in the British Commonwealth. It is also a member of the United Nations and its major specialized agencies.

Support for regional cooperation is one of the main elements of Malaysian foreign policy, and Malaysia has played a very active role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from its inception in 1967.

In recent years the Malaysian Government has advocated a concept of Southeast Asian neutralization as a goal for the countries of the region, calling for the eventual creation of a zone of "peace, freedom, and neutral-

ity" in the region which would be recognized or guaranteed by the major powers. The proposal contemplates the withdrawal of foreign military bases from the region when they are no longer required for regional security.

While relying for external security primarily on its own defense forces, Malaysia is also a member of the Five-Power Defense Arrangement (with Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore). Designed to succeed the former defense role of the British in the Malaysia/Singapore area, the Five-Power Defense Arrangement obligates members to consult in the event of external threat and provides for the stationing of Commonwealth forces in the area. Under this agreement Australian air units are presently stationed in Malaysia.

U.S.–MALAYSIA RELATIONS

The United States welcomed the formation of Malaysia in 1963 and has maintained diplomatic relations ever since. Malaysia's helpful efforts to contribute to stability in Southeast Asia, the growth of U.S.-Malaysian economic ties, Malaysia's role in ASEAN, its self-reliant drive to develop its economy while combating two Communist insurgencies, and its participation in the Five-Power Defense Arrangement are in harmony with U.S. policy and form a solid basis for U.S.-Malaysian friendship.

The two governments have engaged in close consultations on the matter of U.S. programs for the disposal of surplus strategic stockpiles of tin and rubber. The United States has consistently sought to carry out its stockpile disposal programs in a way that would avoid serious effects on the economy of Malaysia and other producing countries.

U.S. friendship and support for the Malaysian developmental effort are demonstrated through the Peace Corps program, a Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) program, a military assistance program which provides training for Malaysians in the United States, a Fulbright educational exchange program initiated in 1963, and a cultural exchange program. The United States also seeks to promote U.S. trade and investment in Malaysia to the benefit of both countries.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador–Francis T. Underhill, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Mission–Robert Dillon
Political Affairs Officer–Frank Bennett
Economic Affairs Officer–Dawson Wilson
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)– Haynes Maloney

The U.S. Embassy in Malaysia is located in the A.I.A. Building, Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur.

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INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, INC.

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1977 MOST ACTIVE YEAR FOR IRC SINCE FOUNDING

CITIZENS COMMISSION ON INDOCHINA REFUGEE PROBLEMS DEPARTING FEBRUARY 9

New York, January 27- The past year was the most active period of the International Rescue Committee since it was founded in 1933 to help anti-Nazis escaping from Hitler's Germany, according to a 1977 report issued by the IRC. Relief and resettlement services were provided for refugees from 30 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

"The major program during 1977 was for Indochinese refugees," Leo Cherne, Chairman of IRC, stated. "Since last October, the flow of boat people alone fleeing from Vietnam has averaged 1,500 a month. In addition, between 2,000 and 3,000 Laotians have been crossing the Mekong River into Thailand every month. IRC medical teams have the responsibility for 60,000 of the 100,000 Laotian, Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees in Thailand camps. IRC is also active in the resettlement of Indochinese entering the United States and other countries, and has sponsored more than 20,000 of the refugees since May 1975."

In issuing the report, Mr. Cherne announced the formation of a citizens commission which will depart for Southeast Asia on February 9 to study the problems of Indochinese refugees, the boat people in particular. The group, headed by Mr. Cherne and William J. Casey, former Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, will visit refugee camps and government officials in Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong,

- more -

Malaysia and the Philippines. The commission will consist of 12 lay and religious leaders, including some IRC board members.

The IRC report stated that other major refugee groups assisted by IRC in 1977 included Russians, East Europeans, Cubans, Chileans, Haitians, Chinese, Kurds, Angolans and Ugandans. A relief and medical program for Angolan refugees in Zaire was started in January 1977, and a medical program in Kenya for Ugandan refugees was started in September 1977. A clinic in Nairobi, staffed by Ugandan doctors in exile, is now serving an average of 50 refugees a day, about half of them children.

During 1977, IRC provided financial aid, counseling and resettlement services for more than 1,000 Russian refugees in western Europe; about 400 came to the United States under IRC auspices. Among refugees from other East European countries helped by IRC are Czechoslovak dissidents who signed the "Charter 77" manifesto appealing to the Communist government for greater respect for human rights. In late 1977, ten of the Czech dissidents and their families were given asylum in Austria, where IRC has been providing them with maintenance and resettlement assistance.

IRC is the leading American nonsectarian agency helping refugees escaping from persecution and violence in totalitarian countries. IRC is supported by contributions from individuals, foundations, companies, labor unions and civic groups. The basic elements of IRC's work consists of emergency aid (food, clothing, shelter, medical care), resettlement services, educational support, vocational training, self-help projects, assistance with asylum problems, family counseling and child care.

American Embassy
Singapore
April 12, 1977

HEALTH AND MEDICAL INFORMATION SHEET

HEALTH HAZARDS

Health conditions are better in Singapore than in most other tropical countries. Water may be safely drunk from the tap and food prepared in hotels, restaurants or private homes may be safely eaten.

MEDICAL SERVICES AND FACILITIES

An adequate number of competent doctors, most of them British-trained, practise in Singapore. Those most frequently used by Embassy personnel are:

A group of American Seventh Day Adventist physicians practising at Youngberg Memorial Hospital, 309 Upper Serangoon Road (tel: 889271). One of the doctors is on duty at all times.

Drs. Trythall, Hoy, Davies, Hangchi (Pte) Ltd., a group of British and Singaporean physicians and surgeons with offices in Shaw House, Orchard Road (tel: 376633) and in the 6th floor, Clifford Centre, Raffles Place or Collyer Quay (tel: 93222). Regular office hours are 0900-1630 Monday through Friday, and 0900-1230 Saturdays. On Sundays and holidays the Shaw House office only is open between 1000 and 1130. In addition, one of the doctors is on duty at all times at Jurong Hospital, 241 Coronation Drive (tel: 650-611).

Hospitals most generally used by Americans in Singapore are:

Gleneagles, 5 Napier Road (tel: 637-222)
Youngberg Memorial, 309 Upper Serangoon Road (tel: 889-271)
Mount Alvernia, Thomson Road (tel: 538844)

OPTOMETRISTS AND OPTICIANS

Dr. F. J. Isaacs, Specialists' Centre Bldg., Orchard & Somerset Roads (tel: 371-962)
Dr. Arthur Lim, Tanglin Shopping Centre, 4th floor, (tel: 373568/370467)

DENTISTS

Dr. Patrick Chin, 7th floor, Specialists' Centre (tel: 235-1879)
Dr. Robertson, Choo, Oehlers & Lee, 430-434 Tanglin Shopping Centre (tel: 373-833)
Dr. S. T. Quek, 239B-1 Holland Road Shopping Centre (tel: 668-095)

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Additional information and names of specialists can be obtained from the Administrative Office during normal working hours and from the Embassy Duty Officer (tel: 30-251) after hours.

1) boat people (2) Cambodians; (3) Sikhs (since 1975) x copy

JOINT VOLUNTARY AGENCY OFFICE

สมาพันธ์อาสาสมัคร โครงการอพยพผู้ลี้ภัยอินโดจีน

5 CONVENT ROAD, BANGKOK THAILAND. TEL. 234-7476

๕ ถนนคอนแวนต์ กรุงเทพมหานคร โทร. ๒๓๔-๗๔๗๖

TO: Tom Barnes DATE: 20 December 1977

FROM: RD Ron Drago SUBJ: Final Pre-Screening Results

The following are the pre-screening results to date:

1. Overall Results

Camp	Potentially Qualified	Not Qualified	Not Registered	Total
Chieng Kham	210	34	2,622	2,866
Mae Charim	463	1,498	7,620	9,581
Ubol	5,179	2,992	1,820	9,991
Uttaradit	223	350	1,167	1,740
Surin	1,813	1,082	1,905	4,800
Kamput	587	992	478	2,057
Trat	190	223	126	539
Sikhiu	406	880	106	1,392
Chieng Khong	1,115	617	3,308	5,040
Ban Nam Yao	2,657	1,747	9,281	13,685
Nongkhai - Lao	5,632	4,243	1,789	11,664
Nongkhai - Hmong	3,579	932	2,118	6,629
Aranyaprathet	1,182	2,329	489	4,000
Loei	9,109	2,754	273	12,136
Pre-screened Total	32,345	20,673	33,102	86,120
Pre-screened %	38%	25%	38%	100%

2,500 Viet (Laotian)

2. Percentage of Population Pre-screened

September 1 Population*	Pre-screened	%
86,120	86,120	100%

* Excludes Songkhla, Laem Sing and 3,140 Cambodians at Aranyaprathet

3. Potentially Qualified by Category

Camp	Cat I	Cat II	Cat III	Cat IV & Mixes	Total
Chieng Kham	0	157	53	0	210
Mae Charim	62	56	324	21	463
Ubol	442	454	4,206	77	5,179
Uttaradit	1	10	209	3	223
Surin	141	8	1,616	48	1,813
Kamput	60	0	527	0	587
Trat	76	0	90	24	190
Sikhiu	162	31	175	38	406
Chieng Khong	68	286	633	128	1,115
Ban Nam Yao	466	130	2,053	8	2,657
Nongkhai - Lao	996	629	3,810	197	5,632
Nongkhai - Hmong	946	203	2,185	245	3,579
Aranyaprathet	187	1	971	23	1,182
Loei	2,956	602	5,357	194	9,109
TOTAL	6,563	2,567	22,209	1,006	32,345
% of Pot Qualified	20%	8%	69%	3%	100%
% of Total Pre-screened	8%	3%	26%	1%	38%

4. Non-Qualified Category I-Bs (Married Siblings)

Camp	Cat I-Bs
Chieng Kham	0
Mae Charim	188
Ubol	171
Uttaradit	4
Surin	100
Kamput	31
Trat	6
Sikhiu	202
Chieng Khong	43
Ban Nam Yao	1,550
Nongkhai - Lao	658
Nongkhai - Hmong	305
Aranyaprathet	120
Loei	1,217
TOTAL	4,595

% of Pot Not Qualified	22%
% of Total Pre-screened	5%

5. Ethnic Breakdown - Potentially Qualified

	Khmer	Vietnamese	Lao	Hmong	Total
Cat I	464	162	1,438	4,499	6,563
Cat II	9	31	1,083	1,444	2,567
Cat III	3,204	175	8,016	10,814	22,209
Cat IV & Mixes	95	38	274	599	1,006
TOTAL	3,772	406	10,811	17,356	32,345
% of Pot Qualified	12%	1%	33%	54%	100%

HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1977

A STUDY MISSION REPORT

Prepared for the Use of the

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

Ninety-Fifth Congress

First Session

December, 1977

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UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
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INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade the humanitarian problems of the Indochina Peninsula were a matter of primary concern to the Subcommittee on Refugees, which earlier this year was blended into the newly established Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. Senator Kennedy, who served as Chairman of the former Refugee Subcommittee, is the ranking member of the new Subcommittee, and he continues his active interest in a broad range of international humanitarian affairs, including the people problems resulting from the Indochina war.

The report which follows updates a volume issued by Senator Kennedy and the Subcommittee on Refugees on May 17, 1976, entitled Aftermath of War: Humanitarian Problems of Southeast Asia. This report reviewed the situation in Vietnam and Laos, the plight of displaced persons from the Indochina Peninsula in Thailand, and the resettlement of Indochina refugees in the United States and other countries in 1975-76.

In light of the continuing Congressional and public interest in the serious humanitarian problems of Southeast Asia, the generally acknowledged responsibility of the United States to help resolve these problems, and the President's recently announced program to parole additional Indochinese refugees into the United States,

Senator Kennedy, in consultation with the Committee Chairman, dispatched a special Study Mission to the field during August 1977. The Study Mission was composed of Mr. Dale S. de Haan, a Counsel to the Subcommittee; Mr. Jerry M. Tinker, a Professional Staff Member to the Subcommittee; Mr. Wells C. Klein, Executive Director of the American Council for Nationalities Service, New York; and Dr. Glenn W. Geelhoed, Associate Professor of Surgery at the George Washington University Medical Center in Washington, D.C.

The team traveled in Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore, assessing the humanitarian problems that remain in the aftermath of the Indochina war. In addition to visits in the field to refugee camps, the team held extensive consultations with governmental officials, United Nations officials, United States Embassy personnel, and representatives of the voluntary agencies.

The following is a preliminary report of the Study Mission's findings in the field, and recommendations for United States policy.

I. RELIEF AND REHABILITATION IN THE INDOCHINA PENINSULA

As emphasized in previous reports of the Subcommittee on Refugees, one of the most tragic and, perhaps most enduring legacies of the Indochina war has been its cumulative impact upon the lives and society of the people throughout the region. The cruel statistics of the war's human toll, and of its impact upon the land and social fabric of the countries involved, are matters of record -- and cannot easily be forgotten.

Nearly three years after the end of the war, many of the humanitarian problems produced by the conflict continue to fester in various degrees. Recovery is still in process. Families dislocated by the war are still returning to their villages or moving to "new economic zones", in order to normalize their lives. The crippled and the maimed, orphans and widows, and thousands of other war victims still need help. The land is still being renewed. And, housing, schools, medical facilities, and whole villages are still being rebuilt in the war-ravaged countryside. Although needs and conditions have varied within each country of the area, as well as the policies and programs of each government -- especially in Democratic Kampuchea, which has largely been closed off to the world -- all of the governments of the area have broadly shared similar chanllenges and tasks in meeting the problems of their societies brought on by the war.

In recent months, especially, the difficulties of post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction have been seriously compounded by growing food shortages, brought on by drought,

a series of other natural disasters, and the dislocations of war. Far reaching Governmental efforts to reorganize the social and economic structure of the countries involved have been a contributing factor. And basic economic factors have also hampered recovery efforts. The false economies of war with massive foreign assistance and extensive food and commodity imports have collapsed, and, as a result, serious economic strains have developed in both the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Lao People's Democratic Republic.

The paragraphs below summarize some current problems in Vietnam and Laos, and update some earlier observations in a May 17, 1976 report of the Subcommittee on Refugees -- Aftermath of War: Humanitarian Problems of Southeast Asia.

A. Laos.

Based upon the Study Mission's brief visit to Laos, and official reports from the United Nations and other sources, it is clear that a critical food and economic crisis is confronting the government and people of Laos.

Due to a combination of factors -- serious drought, dwindling foreign assistance, and adverse developments in the management of the economy -- Laos has verged close to bankruptcy. The situation has seriously hampered the efforts of this already impoverished country to recover from the ravages of war. It is also threatening to produce famine conditions in many areas of the countryside. In turn, these growing food and economic problems are contributing factors to the increased

flow of refugees into Thailand.

Food shortages are one of the most pressing problems confronting the Laotian government, which last summer turned to the United Nations for assistance. As a result of rainfall deficiency during the 1977 agricultural season (May to October), the entire country has experienced a serious drought. Especially in the southern region, around Savannakhet and Champassak, rainfall was down from a normal 307 mm. to less than 72mm. in June. Given the consequent agricultural damage, the government designated a Coordinator of Emergency Assistance within the Ministry of Agriculture and requested that the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) coordinate outside assistance.

During the summer of 1977 a UNDP mission toured various provinces of Laos, and a second team is currently in the field. The precise scope of food needs in Laos remains unclear. Some estimates on food import needs run as high as 367,000 tons over the coming year. But whatever is the accurate estimate, there is no doubt that serious food shortages exist, and that "pockets" of severe malnutrition and famine conditions will surely develop, unless something is done fairly soon.

The deteriorating food situation was fully confirmed in a November 11 letter to Senator Kennedy from the Department of State. The Department's letter states that "the food situation in Laos is becoming increasingly severe, and is several times more serious than in Vietnam."

Pockets with food shortages have always been part of the pattern in Laos. in part because of logistical problems in moving any surplus food from one area to another. However, the current situation far exceeds any "normal" pattern.

Aside from appealing for emergency food assistance in behalf of Laos, the UNDP is supporting other efforts of the Lao Government to deal with the agricultural crisis affecting most of the Country. These efforts include the provision of seeds for replacement crops in drought-affected areas, and of fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation equipment.

In terms of emergency food needs, a UNDP report of August concluded that "to prevent famine conditions arising as a result of the drought, it is obvious that advance measures will need to be taken to provide foodstuffs, particularly rice, as well as vegetable oil and condensed milk." The report found that existing rice stocks, coupled with whatever amounts were harvested this year, would probably be sufficient to meet most food needs until March 1978, although the report noted that serious shortages already existed in certain areas.

Laos is plagued, as it has been for years, by endemic health problems, including malnutrition, and the growing food shortages threaten to exacerbate these problems. Various international agencies are working in Laos, most importantly the World Health Organization and UNICEF. But massive health needs will remain for many years to come. And the medical infrastructure that exists has yet to recover from the damages of

war, the lack of personnel, and the disruption in the flow of outside medical supplies and equipment.

B. VIETNAM

Because of limited time and other factors, the Study Mission regrettably was not able to visit Vietnam in order to review humanitarian problems and needs, and the efforts and progress of the Vietnamese people in rebuilding their country and normalizing their lives. However, there is little doubt today, that, over the past thirty-two months, the Vietnamese have made some meaningful progress in meeting some of the most pressing rehabilitation and reconstruction needs that existed in the aftermath of the war. Steps are also underway to deal with long-term reconstruction needs. Vietnam has accomplished much of this by relying heavily on its own resources, but it has also welcomed the foreign assistance from many countries and various international organizations.

The most urgent priorities of the Vietnamese Government have remained more or less the same since the end of the war: the provision of sufficient food; the creation of jobs; the resettlement of displaced persons; the clearing and rehabilitation of war-ravaged agricultural lands; and the rehabilitation of war victims.

The notable exception to meaningful progress in meeting these human needs, lies in the agricultural sector, even though food production has always been the first priority of the government. However, food production has fallen short of

government goals. The causes are many, including some associated with the dislocations of the recent war. But they also include the government's apparent mismanagement of the agricultural sector, which has resulted in much internal debate and the creation of a special inter-ministerial council to give new direction and priority to food production and general agricultural development.

And adding very heavily to the growing food crisis in Vietnam, has been a series of natural disasters. During the 1976-1977 winter, Vietnam was struck with severe disasters. Almost simultaneously, devastating floods, severe drought in the southern provinces, and unusually cold temperatures in the north, destroyed rice seedlings and crop potential. Persistent drought over much of Vietnam during last summer followed these earlier diaster seriously damaging the summer-autumn rice crop. On top of all of this, typhoon Sarah struck four northern delta provinces in July, leaving behind it crop and other damages officially estimated at some $100,000,000. And several weeks later, in September, typhoon Dinah struck the south central provinces, leaving damages officially estimated at some $35,000,000.

Other factors contributing to food shortages have been insufficient food assistance from other countries, and a continuing foreign exchange shortage which has sharply curtailed the purchase of needed fertilizer, pesticides and various agricultural equipment.

A resolution recently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly took note of Vietnam's urgent need for food and related humanitarian assistance, and, like Laos, Vietnam is listed among the "most seriously affected countries". Depending on what measure is used for a daily rice/grain ration, over the next several months Vietnam's food grain import needs run as high as 2,000,000 tons.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

Humanitarian needs resulting from the recent war persist in Laos and Vietnam. But so does a new disaster resulting from the growing food shortages in both countries. The United States should be mindful of these people problems and fully support the efforts of the international community to render assistance.

II. REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The final stages of the Indochina War in 1975, with its spreading conflict and political upheaval, produced an inevitable tide of refugees -- people fleeing violence and conflict and uncertainty over the future. Since then, some 350,000 persons have left Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos, leaving their homelands in several phases and under differing circumstances. Close to half of this number left Kampuchea and southern Vietnam during the governmental collapse and American evacuation of these countries in 1975, and nearly all of this group and many thousands of others are now resettled in the United States, France, Canada, and other countries.

However, some 100,000 refugees, mainly from Laos, remain unsettled in Thailand, and the influx continues everyday. Additionally, thousands of "boat people" from Vietnam are scattered throughout Asia, and their numbers also are growing every day. During 1977, the refugee flow has averaged some 1,500 people per month. And, as a new year approaches, there seems to be no end in sight to this flow, currently at 5,300 a month.

Although the refugee movement over the past two years differs in some respects from the first wave of refugees in the early months of 1975, the basic problems the more recent refugees

have posed for the host countries and the international community have remained much the same. However, resolving these problems -- through local settlement in the host countries, resettlement in other countries, and voluntary repatriation -- is becoming increasingly difficult with the passage of time. And given the continuing exodus from the countries of the Indochina Peninsula, new efforts will surely be needed by all parties concerned to help resolve a new crisis of people now building in Southeast Asia.

A. Refugee Problems in Thailand.

Statistically, the refugee problem in Thailand remained much the same during 1976 and the early months of 1977. Apart from the relatively small number of boat people in refugee areas along the coast, the number of refugees in camps along the Lao-Kampuchean border hovered around 80,000 -- the number of new arrivals not exceeding by much the number leaving for resettlement overseas. However, the number of overland refugees from neighboring Kampuchea and Laos has dramatically increased in recent months. Since last summer, the monthly influx, by official count, has averaged about 3,600 per month, nearly all of them from Laos. Again, by official count, as of mid-December, the number of residual refugees numbered close to 100,000. Well over three fourths of these people are from Laos. The remainder are mainly from Kampuchea. Only a few thousand are from Vietnam.

In addition to the refugees in camps, there is also an out-of-camp population of undetermined numbers. This group -- which some officials estimate to be about 10 to 15 percent of the camp population -- consists of displaced persons who have evaded Thai border patrols and live illegally with relatives or friends, usually in the more remote areas of the border districts. Many of these refugees have obtained identification papers and have resettled themselves.

In the early days of the refugee movement into Thailand,

neither the Thai Government nor the international community were prepared to respond adequately. However, over the last couple of years an effective refugee care and maintenance program has been established, as well as an active overseas resettlement effort.

Since August 1975, following an appeal from the Thai government, the refugees in the main have fallen under the mandate of the UNHCR. The UNHCR continues its special operation to receive and coordinate all international contributions in behalf of the refugees, and to work with the Thai Government and others in developing lasting solutions to the refugee problem -- including local settlement, overseas settlement, and voluntary repatriation.

Thus far, the cooperative effort between the UNHCR and the Thai Government has been geared to care and maintenance among the refugees, some self-sufficiency projects, overseas resettlement and related services. The Thai Government has generously supplemented UNHCR contributions with services and land. The Thai Government contributions more than match outside resources.

The refugees have been grouped in camps situated mainly along Thailand's northern and eastern borders. Thai officials suggest this was done to facilitate the accomodating of the refugees and the distribution of relief supplies, as well as for security reasons. Over the past year, the number of camps under UNHCR auspices have been reduced from 20 to 15, and the process of up-grading camp conditions which began in early 1976 has now been satisfactorily completed.

THAILAND

Area ..... 514,000 sq. km
Estimated population 42,960,000 (mid-1976)
Population density ..... Approx. 83.58 per sq. km
Rainy season ..... May to October



In cooperation with the UNHCR and the Thai Government, a number of voluntary agencies have carried out relief work in the camps since the summer of 1975. Initially, these agencies focused their efforts on helping to meet immediate relief needs, including medicine and food. Since early 1976, they have assumed a major responsibility for establishing and maintaining essential health care in the camps. They have also been promoting various special projects, including self-help projects in education and vocational training, handicraft production, kitchen gardening, and small-scale animal husbandry. However, given camp conditions, and the reluctance of Thai authorities to ease many of the constraints placed upon the refugees, the voluntary agencies' effort to help them attain greater self-sufficiency has met with only modest results thus far. For example, the limited supply of water and the infertile soil in most camps, makes it difficult for agricultural projects to prosper. And the Thai Government's restrictions on the movement of the refugees have hindered their gainful employment outside of the camps. Until the Thai Government actively launches a local settlement program -- in which the voluntary agencies can hopefully maximize their expertise in helping the refugees to normalize their lives -- the best these agencies can do is to contribute to a humane "holding pattern". And for this, their presence remains crucial in the camps.

In addition to assisting refugees in the camps, some voluntary agencies are also active in the onward movement of refugees for resettlement overseas. This is particularly true for refugees headed for the United States. However, of key importance in the onward movement of refugees is ICEM. Since 1975, this intergovernmental organization has maintained an active field office in Bangkok to counsel refugees, to facilitate their onward movement, and to arrange for their transportation to the countries of resettlement. ICEM also works closely with the UNHCR and other interested parties to encourage the opening of resettlement opportunities in other countries, and maintains close working relations with the governments of these countries and with any voluntary agencies which may be involved in the resettlement process.

The program in behalf of displaced persons from the Indochina Peninsula in Thailand is an important humanitarian effort. On balance, the quadripartite working arrangement among the Thai Government, UNHCR, ICEM, and the voluntary agencies, has been working remarkably well. It is a commendable example of what can be done in a difficult situation to help homeless people in need. And it deserves the full support of the United States and of all others concerned about the humanitarian problems resulting from the recent war and about the progress and stability of Southeast Asia.

(1) Camp Conditions in Thailand.

As noted above, the year-long task of up-grading camp conditions in Thailand was completed in early 1977. In the main, the camps are now quite satisfactory, despite some over-crowding and occasional shortages of medical and other supplies. Moreover, despite some inevitable bureaucratic tangle and petty corruption, the Thai administration of the camps also seems to be adequate.

The Study Mission visited a number of refugee areas in northeastern and southeastern Thailand last August. The following paragraphs record some observations.

Nong Khai. The Nong Khai camp lies only a few miles south and east of the principal Mekong River crossing between Laos and Thailand. It was one of the first camps established, and is now one of the largest in the country. Some 18,000 refugees were ethnic Lao, and the remainder were Meo. Both groups have chosen to live in separate areas of the camp, and have separate but equal dispensaries and other services. Some 7.5 baht (approximately 30¢) per person per month is available to cover basic care and maintenance costs among the refugees.

Both the voluntary agency personel and local Thai officials exhibited concern for the refugees and sensitivity to their problems and needs. And within the constraints of funds available, camp personnel have been establishing programs to help the refugees live as normal a life as possible under the circumstances.

One such program has been the effort to up-grade medical

services in the camp by establishing a training program for paramedics recruited among the refugees. It began last year with a class of 34, and with the likely assumption that not many trainees could be persuaded to complete the program and stay to help their fellow refugees, if resettlement overseas became a viable alternative. Today, however, the group totals nearly 100, and so far none have left for resettlement elsewhere. During the Study Mission's visit, a simple building was being constructed to house the program. In the meantime, the trainees were using the small church and school in the camp. The paramedic course has three levels. The first involves training in basic nursing, bacteriology, paracytology, and pharmacology and general theory. The second involves practical experience in the camp. The third level involves more advanced theory and instruction in nutrition and medical treatment. Today, as compared to the surrounding areas in northeastern Thailand, the Nong Khai camp can almost be considered to have a surplus of medical manpower.

The training program for paramedics, as well as the camp's general health services and facilities are under the supervision of a physician from the International Rescue Committee, an American voluntary agency.

The physician reports that there have been no epidemics or really serious medical problems in the camp, and that cases needing special care are referred to nearby Thai hospitals. She expressed a special concern over the mental health of the refugees and the growing psychiatric and functional problems

particularly among young women. In duscussing health needs, one telling comment came from a refugee who said that there were health problems, but that medicine could do very little for them: "the best thing that could happen to us would be a change in circumstances."

On a typical day, the camp is bustling. People are milling around and talking. Youngsters are playing in the streets and fields. The many small shops are busy. And so are the small cafes. In the Meo section of the camp, women are busy making and selling handicrafts. Other refugees are tending small gardens or preparing the evening meal. A blacksmith and his family are at work. And for a small fee, young people are standing ready to carry visitors and others on "bike-wagons" from one end of the camp to the other.

The refugees are friendly to visitors and seem happy enough. But as in the case of all homeless people, such cursory impressions do not tell the full story. The refugees in Thailand are not living a normal life and are anxious over the future. They talk of overcrowding and a lack of privacy. They talk of their idleness. They seem hungry for recreation and entertainment, and especially for useful work. Camp personnel have sought to encourage the latter, by cutting rations and trying to get the refugees to supply some of their own foods though self-help agriculture projects. Some refugees have responded to this by planting small gardens, digging fish ponds, and raising chickens and pigs. However, given the nature of

the refugee population and especially the lack of land, such efforts will remain very limited.

Random interviews with refugees at Nong Khai and elsewhere suggest a complex of motives and fears for their leaving their homeland. Economic reasons -- including rampant inflation, increased taxes on rice, changes in the economic system, growing food shortages, and so forth -- were cited by most refugees. Others were apprehensive over the new political climate in Laos. They felt uncomfortable with the "seminars" of the New Government. They feared "re-education". They had problems with the new Government's policy requiring the labor of all Lao citizens on special work projects. And a significant number of the refugees cited family ties outside of Laos, usually involving the extended family in Thailand,
but sometimes involving Laotian nationals, resettled overseas.

Few refugees talked optimistically about the future. None spoke of returning to Laos at this time, but maybe later when things stabilized. Some spoke of going to the United States and Australia, in some cases, at least, for family reunion purposes. But the bulk of the refugees seemed resigned to remaining for local settlement in Thailand. They were getting impatient, however, over their lengthy and confined stay in the camps.

Loei. In contrast to Nong Khai, the camp near Loei is composed almost entirely of Meo refugees -- many from General Vang Pao's once "secret army", who were flown out of Laos in 1975 by the Central Intelligence Agency. Over 12,000 refugees live in this very permanent-looking and well-built camp, which is run by several Thai officials and teachers from the neighboring district town. Located in the mountainous area of north-central Thailand, Loei resembles the terrain in which the Meo are accustom to living, and this has attracted a flow of Meo refugees from other camps, including Nong Khai.

The problems of Loei are not dissimilar from those in other camps: over-crowding; food rations being cut slightly; idleness and the inability to get work passes. A voluntary agency physician from World Vision has been organizing the medical services for the camp, placing priority on education in preventive medicine rather than delivering curative treatment. Some medicines are, of course, available through the UNHCR and the Thai Red Cross, but they seem to be dispensed rather sparingly. Some months ago 30 babies died of an epidemic of respiratory complications, but this has been the only serious medical problem reported.

In looking to the future, many refugees have expressed a strong desire to resettle overseas, especially in the United States, where at least some have relatives and where they know that their former leader, General Vang Pao, is resettled.

However, the bulk of them appear willing to accept local settlement in the moutainous terrain of northern Thailand, and want to get on with the work of normalizing their lives. And, for most, this would be the more humane and appropriate solution by far.

Many of the leaders of Vang Pao's army remain in the camp, with former officers giving leadership and organization to the camp. They have remained, they said, "to take care of our people." Other officers stayed because they could not leave with more than one wife and their extended families.

In summary, the Loei camp appeared to be slightly crowded, but a highly organized settlement for Meo families -- most of whom would be content to remain in Thailand, if only they had more land to farm and more room to move.

Aranyaprathet. Now holding over 7,000 refugees from Kampuchen, Aranyaprathet was originally designed to house some 4,000 refugees. However, in August 1977, the camp population jumped by 3,000 as the Thai government rounded up people of Khmer descent who were living in areas which have become the focus of violent dispute between Thailand and Kampuchea. In response to escalating border clashes, Thai military authorities launched a program to control ethnic Khmer living amongst the Thai population. This relocation, say some observers, is somewhat similar to the measures taken by the United States in World War II among Japanese-Americans. The measures have been criticized

by many, and the UNHCR has refused to accept these Khmer residents as "refugees" under its mandate.

However, the Khmer relocatees in the camp voiced little strong feelings against the move, in part because tensions in Thai villages had made it increasingly difficult to live peacefully. To some extent they viewed this relocation as temporary "protective detention."

The problems confronting the camp are similar to others, with a few exceptions. Water, for example, is a serious problem because of the drought and the lack of wells. The sudden overcrowding in August meant that a water supply adequate for 4,000 people had to accommodate 7,000, forcing some refugees to barter or to buy water at one baht per tin. Food rations have dropped slightly, but no malnutrition was apparent. And, unlike several other camps, there is little internal organization or leadership structure within the camp, and that which has emerged has been suppressed by Thai authorities.

The medical needs of the camp are being met through the work of a French physician and a local staff that appears adequate for the needs of 4,000 -- although overtaxed by the addition of 3,000 new arrivals.

The remaining population of Khmer refugees in Aranyaprathet is largely composed of rice farmers whose only desire is to farm. Most of the urban Khmer -- shopkeepers, military officers, professionals -- have long since left for resettlement overseas. The problem the remaining Khmer refugees pose for the Thai government are considerable -- given the continued tensions

along the border with Kampuchea, the continuing incidents of violence, the emergence of guerrilla forces among some Khmer in Thailand, and the tensions between local Thai villagers and the Khmer-Thai residents. The integration and local settlement of Khmer rice farmers now in the Aranyaprathet camp will clearly not be an easy task for the Thai government.

(2) Policies and Practices of the Thai Government.

The presence of refugees in Thailand and the continuing heavy influx, has been, and continues to be, a heavy economic social and political burden on Thailand. The refugees pose delicate diplomatic problems as well. As noted in the 1976 report cited earlier, in the main, Thailand has commendably sought to fulfill internationally recognized standards for assisting and protecting refugees -- even though Thailand is not a signatory to the United Nations Refugee Convention of Protocol. At the same time, however, Thailand has not approached this task with a great deal of enthusiasm, and it has sought at every step of the way to discourage further movement into the country.

Responsibility for the Thai Government's program has rested with the Ministry of the Interior, acting since last year under the general supervision of the National Security Council. From the beginning, senior ministry officials have recognized that Thailand has three alternatives in dealing with the refugee presence: (1) voluntary repatriation, which many officials still see as "an ultimate goal" for many refugees; (2) resettlement in other countries, such as the United States and France; and (3) the continued presence of certain numbers of refugees "under controlled circumstances," with a view toward local settlement.

With the passage of time, voluntary repatriation has ceased to be an immediately realistic alternative. Overseas resettlement

helps Thailand. But local settlement is clearly inevitable for a substantial number of the refugees. For several categories of refugees, local settlement is not only the most realistic, but perhaps also the more humane solution. This is especially true for many Meo farmers and villagers, as well as Lao shopkeepers and tradesmen.

The Government has always recognized the need for some local settlement, and has agreed, in principle, with UNHCR's proposals for the local settlement of refugees; the only question is timing. The Thai government has progressively encouraged self-sufficiency among the refugees in camp, but has shied away from implementing local settlement, as long as the influx of people continues. Rightly or wrongly, the Thais have feared that moving on a program of local settlement would simply encourage a heavier influx.

As noted earlier, an immediate hurdle in developing a local settlement scheme is the pressure on land in Thailand. Good agricultural land is now scarece, including government-held land, without encroaching on wilderness areas or game preserves. Thai officials are very concerned -- and mention it frequently -- about the resentment local Thais express over giving refugees free title to public lands, which the local Thais would like to exploit, and have been prevented from doing so in the past.

As a result, Thai authorities are considering local settlement for the refugees in the larger context of general rural development and programs which will benefit both local Thai villagers as well as the refugees.

Cost estimates for such an undertaking very considerably, depending on the number of people involved and the specific contents of any local settlement program. One estimate involving up to 50,000 refugees puts the cost of an integrated rural development project at some $30 million per year over a three to four year period. Other estimates run considerably lower than that.

As the refugee problem drags on, and pending some action on local resettlement, the Thai Government will continue care and maintenance and encourage self-sufficiency in the camps. They will also try to promote more resettlement opportunities overseas.

Coupled with Thailand's generally humane approach to the refugees who are presently living in the country has been an active policy to discourage any new arrivals. This policy has been there from the beginning

of the refugee influx, but has progressively hardened with the passage of time. Since 1975, the Thais have sent up a variety of negative signals, sometimes dramatically, to make their point; governmental statements, occasionally stopping alleged refugees at the Mekong River border, occasionally turning boat people back out to sea, and so forth.

As early as August 1975, Thai authorities declared that all incoming refugees would be considered "illegal immigrants" subject to law and expulsion. The system established to implement the declaration had most arriving refugees detained by border police for illegally entering Thailand and fined 200-600 baht ($10 to $30) per adult. If they could not pay this fine, the refugees were to be detained in special centers, usually for two to three weeks to "work off the fine." Upon release, the refugees were to be handed over to immigration officials who would admit them to camps -- which are usually adjacent to or nearby the detention facilities.

The refugees would then fall under the mandate and competence of the UNHCR. Most new arrivals would end up in the camps.

Declaring incoming refugees as "illegal aliens" and establishing a system to implement the declaration, seems to have done very little to discourage new arrivals. In recent months, therefore, the Thai Government has revised its approach. The Government has now declared its intention to separate "economic migrants" from among the new arrivals and from those who fall under the mandate and competence of the UNHCR. Quite apart from the UNHCR program, the Thai Government would assume full responsibility for the future of the "economic migrants". After extensive consultations, the Thai Government and the UNHCR signed an agreement on July 22, 1977, further defining the principles and programs to be followed in implementing the humanitarian assistance program in behalf of displaced persons in Thailand. A statement accompanying the agreement noted: "It is recognized that a distinction must be made between persons who qualify as being within the competence of UNHCR and those who leave their country of nationality or habitual residence for reasons of personal convenience, for example, economic migrants, or persons who are not bona fide refugees."

No one can quarrel with such an objective statement, which is clearly in accord with both the spirit as well as the letter of international law and practice. The only question is how this statement will be implemented by Thai authorities. And this remains unclear.

However, from past experience, it would appear that the Thai government is once again attempting to send negative signals to discourage new arrivals, rather than establishing a system to return some of these people en masse. Moreover, there appears no intention on the part of Thailand to close its borders. In fact, Thailand anticipates new arrivals and has asked the assistance of the UNHCR in developing guidelines and procedures to implement a legitimite screening process to sort out "economic migrants". Again, the precise course of action remains unclear.

The ambivalence and uncertainty Thai authorities feel toward the arrival of tens of thousands of Indochina refugees is understandable, and it is attributable, at least in part, to the bitter history they have experienced with refugees from Vietnam in 1954 and, earlier, from Burma. It also reflects a deepening concern over the internal impact of the growing number of refugees. In this connection, some Thai officials are especially concerned about the security aspects of the refugee influx. Many of these officials have expressed the fear that Laos and Kampuchea are exploiting the influx into Thailand to infiltrate spies and saboteurs in support of the continuing Communist insurgency. At the same time, however, there is

evidence that local Thai military and police commanders are using some refugees to spy on Laos and Kampuchea and that some token support is available to resistance activities in these countries. Official Thai Government policy expressly forbids this. Nonetheless, local officials seem lax in enforcing the policy in some areas. Moreover, there also appears to be some private support for refugee involvement in resistance activities, especially in Laos.

B. The "Boat People" from Vietnam

One of the more pressing and dramatic humanitarian problems in Southeast Asia involves the growing number of Vietnamese citizens who, for a variety of reasons, have been moving by boat from their native land in search of resettlement opportunities in other countries.

This is not a new problem. It began in the closing months of 1975. Initially, the number of "boat people" was relatively small, and no major difficulties confronted the international community in protecting the rights and meeting the needs of these refugees. But as the months wore on and the number of boat people rapidly grew, the difficulties mounted and serious problems suddenly confronted many governments in Asia and the international community as a whole.

Thailand, Malaysia, and other countries in the area were providing safe havens for the boat people; but they were doing so on a temporary basis and with the assumption that the refugees would be resettled elsewhere. But by early 1976 the number of resettlement opportunities was not keeping pace with the growing number of boat people in safe havens. Serious backlogs were developing. And more and more, Asian governments were refusing safe haven to new refugees and were forcing boatloads of homeless people back to the open sea. This was endangering the lives of many refugees, and undoubtedly was adding to the countless number already losing their lives at sea.

And it was also serving to prejudice the willingness of captains of passing ships to rescue refugees from the many boats floundering on the high seas.

The boat people, like all other displaced persons from the Indochina Peninsula, are covered by the mandate of the UNHCR As their plight became more desparate, and with the initial humanitarian goal of promoting temporary safe havens and the protection and care of these homeless people, the UNHCR began appealing in behalf of the refugees to the governments of many Asian countries and to international maritime organizations and the flagships of many nations. And finally, on July 28, 1976, the UNHCR also found it necessary to issue the first of several international appeals for permanent resettlement opportunities for the boat people from Vietnam.

The record is clear that for many, many months governments were reluctant to support fully the efforts of the UNHCR, and they were slow in responding to the Commissioner's appeals for help. And in some degree this situation continues. This is not to suggest, however, that no meaningful progress has been made in resolving the problem of the boat people and in meeting their humanitarian needs. Over the past six months especially, important steps to this end have been taken by a number of countries, in cooperation with the UNHCR, ICEM, various private voluntary agencies, and others. New assurances of at least temporary safe haven for the boat people have been given by various Asian countries, and the United States and others have expanded their offers of resettlement opportunities for the refugees.

Table 1 : Boat Case Refugees

Locations	Total Arrivals, 1977	Residual No. Seeking Resettlement
Thailand	4,010	978
Malaysia	5,896	2,638
Philippines	1,176	536
Japan	791	305
Indonesia	712	164
Hong Kong	730	219
Singapore	202	6
Korea	91	1
Taiwan	63	0
	13,671	4,847

Source: Dept. of State
December, 1977

Attitudes, conditions and problems involving the boat people vary considerably among the host countries of Asia. However, many factors, including traditional attitudes towards immigration, have mitigated against an enthusiastic welcome for the boat people in nearly all of these countries. So it is not surprising that many Asian ports have had some serious difficulties in wrestling with the issue of what to do with Indochinese refugees arriving on their shores. In addition to Thailand, the Study Mission visited two other countries receiving boat people -- Malaysia and Singapore.

Malaysia. A glance at the map of Southeast Asia quickly reveals why Malaysia is a primary destination for many boat people from Vietnam. Only 250 miles south and west of the southern tip of the Camau peninsula of Vietnam, the east coast of Malaysia is in relatively easy reach of small craft loaded with Vietnamese refugees. As of mid-December 1977, some boat people have been granted safe haven in Malaysia, a jump of 2,000 in little more than a month.

Malaysia has accepted for resettlement some 1500 Muslim refugees, of Cham origin, from the Indochina Peninsula. But like most other countries in the area, Malaysia has viewed with some alarm the landing of boat people on its shores. Apart from regional foreign policy and domestic security considerations, Malaysia, again like most other countries in the area, have had a number of concerns: that providing a safe haven for boat people will only encourage more to come; that local economic, political and social circumstances make it difficult to absorb

ethnic minorities, or even to host them on a temporary basis; and that Malaysia does not have the means to help the refugees. Moreover, a common view in Malaysia and elsewhere is that many of the boat people, if not most of them, leave Vietnam out of needless fear and mainly for economic reasons and that such potential migrants should try to work out their futures within their own country and work to better their homeland.

Such attitudes and concerns, of course, have not stemmed the flow of boat people. And to cope with the truly humanitarian and purely practical problems posed by the landing of these people on Malaysian shores, the Malaysian Government has softened considerably its earlier views on helping the refugees. Good working relations seem to exist between the Government and the UNHCR Representative in Kuala Lumpur, and among all others involved in helping the refugees. The costs of the program in Malaysia as elsewhere, are funded largely by the UNHCR and contributions to his Office from the international community.

In the main, safe haven is routinely provided the hundreds of boat people who are reaching Malaysia. This policy is based largely on a UNHCR "guarantee" of onward movement -- and permanent resettlement in other countries. The Malaysia Red Crescent Society has effectively assumed the major responsibility for the daily care and maintenance of the boat people, who are clustered at various points on the Malaysian coast. The Society also assists in the onward movement of the refugees and maintains a transit center in Kuala Lumpur. In cooperation with

UNHCR and all parties concerned, ICEM plays the primary role in the movement of the refugees to resettlement opportunities in other countries.

Singapore. Since the problem of boat people arose nearly two years ago, Singapore has proabably taken the hardest line of any Southeast Asian country against the granting of safe haven, even on a temporary basis. For most of this period, and on a rather routine basis, boatloads of refugees approaching Singapore have been turned back to sea. Others have been allowed to anchor, but only temporarily for provisions and repairs, and with no disembarkation rights for the refugees on board. The same policy on disembarkation has also been applied to any refugees who were rescued on the high seas by ships calling at Singapore. Singapore's official policy has always been to grant safe haven to any refugee, if another country guaranteed in writing that it would take the refugee for resettlement. But Singapore has really done very little to promote this end. In fact, with the island Republic, a resettlement guarantee is never much of a possibility, let alone an option to consider.

In justifying its rather harsh and rigid attitudes toward the boat people, Singapore cites factors similar to those noted above in the case of Malaysia. Singapore also stresses its high population density, its smallness, its lack of natural resources, and so forth.

In recent weeks, following adverse publicity and diplomatic pressure, some Singapore officials have suggested that the island Republic would quietly ease its stand against the boat people; and that Singapore, like other Asian countries, would now grant safer haven to refugees, based on a UNHCR guarantee of onward movement and permanent resettlement in other countries. As of mid-December, however, little or nothing has been done to accomplish these goals.

Thailand, other countries. From the beginning, Thailand has been reluctant to provide safe haven to boat people, but usually, has done so on the assumption they would be resettled in other countries. However, in recent weeks, as the number of boat people dramatically increased, Thailand's humane policy apparantly has been caught up in its hardening attitude toward the influx of all displaced persons from the Indochina Peninsula. As a result, Thailand has turned back to the open sea a number of boats loaded with refugees. Whether or not this is a temporary development is difficult to determine. But, hopefully, Thailand will reconsider the recent direction of its policy toward the boat people. And hopefully, as well, the UNHCR and the international community will render whatever assistance is needed to help Thailand deal with their difficult problem.

As to the situation in Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere in Asia, no serious problems currently exist. Temporary safe haven is generally provided, based on UNHCR guarantees of onward movement and permanent resettlement in other countries.

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Much time has passed and many serious problems have been resolved since the plight of the boat people became a matter of serious international concern nearly two years ago. But some of these people are still not guaranteed safe haven in some countries. The captain of some passing ships still ignore their floundering boats at sea. And given the veritable surge of boat people in recent weeks and months, and the continuing exodus from Vietnam, resettlement opportunities are probably needed more today than ever before.

In his November 14 statement to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadruddin Aga Khan, spoke of the continuing problem and needs of the boat people.

> It was on their behalf that, on 3 October, the Secreatary-General of the International Maritime Consultative Organization and I jointly appealed to ship-owners to observe the traditional rules of rescue of persons in distress on the high seas. It is my additional duty to appeal again to the countries of the area to let these persons disembark until more durable arrangements can be made, locally or elsewhere. I would also urge as wide a number of countries as possible to open their doors and grant resettlement opportunities. To do less, would be to turn our backs on humanity.

Local settlement is hopefully a viable alternative for at least some of the boat people arriving in safe havens. But, clearly, the offering of resettlement opportunities by a "wide number countries" continues to be a crucial element in meeting this on-going humanitarian problem. Ample resettlement opportunities help to encourage both open safe havens and the rescue of people in distress on the high seas.

C. U.S. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS; INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Thailand and the other host countries have looked to other nations, especially to the United States, for help in dealing with the growing problem of displaced persons from the Indochina Peninsula. American assistance so far has consisted mainly of these elements: 1) contributions to the UNHCR for care and maintenance and international resettlement purposes among the refugees; 2) diplomatic support for UNHCR efforts and objectives and the related works of other international organizations; 3) support for voluntary agencies; and 4) the permanent resettlement of refugees in the United States.

Since 1975, the United States has expended at least $400,000,000 to assist in the care and maintenance, processing, movement, repatriation, and resettlement of displaced persons from the Indochina Peninsula. The bulk of these funds -- over $300,000,000 covered the evacuation and movement of Indochinese displaced persons in 1975, their care and processing for onward movement in reception areas in the Pacific and continental United States, and their initial resettlement in communities across the country. The remainder has been used in part to cover various costs associated with subsequent parole programs. Contributions to the UNHCR, for his special operation in behalf of displaced persons from the Indochina Peninsula, so far total some $22,500,000. An additional contribution of some $8,500,000 is planned in 1978. The UNHCR program currently includes care and

maintenance, international resettlement travel, and repatriation services. The American contribution has been covering nearly 70 percent of the UNHCR cash budget. Additional funds have been made available to other international bodies, including ICEM and ICRC, as well as to private voluntary agencies. The expenditures outlined above do not include the costs incurred by the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program. This program, which is administered by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, assists refugees resettling in the United States. Some $203,000,000 had been expended for this purpose at the close of fiscal year 1977. Some $124,000,000 more is being made available for the current fiscal year.

The offering of resettlement opportunities to the displaced people in Southeast Asia has probably been the most important and tangible element in the American response to the refugee problem in Southeast Asia. As of Mid-December, 1977, some 148,355 refugees had resettled in the United States. The bulk of these people -- at least 130,000 -- are from Vietnam. Some 10,000 more are from Laos. And the remainder are from Kampuchea.

With relatively few exceptions, the refugees have been entering the United States under the Attorney General's parole authority in Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. This authority enables the Attorney General, "for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest", to bring into the country unspecified numbers of people without regard to the numerical limitations on regular immigration into the United States. The use of the authority

in behalf of refugees and special migrants is normally conditioned on a positive recommendation from the Secretary of State and satisfactory consultation with the Judiciary Committee of Congress.

During 1975, various parole orders authorized the entry of 134,000 refugees. By the end of the year, however, pressures began mounting for additional resettlement opportunities. Finally, in the late spring of 1976, after a great deal of controversy and debate, the so-called "Extended Parole Program" authorized the entry of some 11,000 more refugees, mainly displaced persons from Laos in Thailand. But the pressures soon mounted again for still additional resettlement opportunities in the Un States, especially for the growing number of boat people from Vietnam. For many weeks and months, there was a great deal of reluctance, both within the Executive Branch and Congress, to recognize these pressures, let alone to deal with them in any positive way. It was not until December 1976 that the United States indicated a certain willingness to accomodate a relatively small number of boat people through the regular admission provisions of the immigration laws, and it was not until the early spring of 1977 that a program for this purpose was finally implemented. By that time, however, the refugee problem was reaching serious proportions in the veiw of many observers, including Members of Congress, and the special program for boat people was clearly a token American effort at best. Something more had to be done.

In recognition of a building crisis in Southeast Asia,

proposals for a new parole program soon began circulating within Congress and the Executive Branch. One of these proposals, submitted to the President for his consideration in June, involved the parole of an additional 15,000 refugees from among the displaced persons in Thailand and the boat people scattered throughout Asia. Reflecting the views of many in the private sector and others in Congress, on July 1, Senator Kennedy wrote to the President as follows:

> Given the growing number of these homeless people and the demonstrated need to maintain some flexibility in meeting our humanitarian responsibilities toward them, I want to recommend that the Attorney General be able to exercise his parole authority on a continuing basis over the coming months and without a specified ceiling on the number of entries into the United States. Hopefully, as well, the United States will work more closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration to promote resettlement opportunities in other countries, and will continue to support the material assistance and rehabilitation program of the UNHCR among the displaced persons who remain in Thailand.

On August 11, 1977, the Attorney General, after consultation with Congress, announced a new parole program for 15,000 refugees -- with some 7,000 numbers allocated for boat people in Asia, and some 8,000 numbers for refugees in Thailand. As of mid-December, some 2,700 refugees have entered the United States under the new Indochinese Parole Program, which will continue well into 1978. Needless to say, the 15,000 "quota" was quickly filled. And given the continuing movement of new displaced persons from the Indochina Peninsula, especially boat people, pressures once again were building to add new numbers to the program announced in August.

Overall, since 1975, the United States has responded generously in helping to meet the needs of the displaced persons in Thailand and the boat people scattered throughout Asia.

In the main, however, this generous response has been developed on an ad hoc basis, and usually with a tinge of reluctance. More often than not, pressures have had to build at home and in the field, before some action was taken. And sometimes an action taken has been haphazard or belated, and has even created more problems than it solved. In short, we have been responding to the refugee problem without much thought planning, and without the framework of a coherent and consistent policy to guide our national actions in behalf of those in need.

Nothing has illustrated this more, perhaps, than the series of parole programs, which by fits-and-starts have attempted to

carry out our national humanitarian responsibilities toward the refugees. But these programs have not met realistically their intended purpose. Most of them have been oversold in terms of resolving the refugee problem in Southeast Asia. And the manner in which they have been announced and implemented have often misled the host countries in Asia and the refugees themselves. And some observers have even suggested this has needlessly encouraged the flow of more refugees. Moreover, the parole programs have been implemented without much regard for other possible alternatives open to refugee families, and without a sufficiently active consideration of UNHCR efforts and objectives to promote durable solutions in the field, including local settlement and voluntary repatriation. No host government will face the hard choices it needs to make in dealing with their residual refugee problems, if there are illusory promises that someone else will take the refugees off their hands. This has applied especially to the mounting refugee problem in Thailand.

In recent weeks, the Administration, much to its credit, has sought to reverse the needless drift in the American approach to the refugee problem in Southeast Asia. When the new Indochinese Parole Program was announced last August, the President also directed that an inter-agency task force be established to chart some longterm policy guidelines and alternatives for action. In hearing testimony a few weeks later, Under Secretary of State Philip Habib, who chaired the task force, told Senator Kennedy that a comprehensive policy and approach was

being developed, and that consultations with Congress would follow before the end of the year.

Nothing very definite has emerged thus far, at least not for the public record. But the basic ingredients of a longterm and realistic policy toward the ongoing problem of displaced persons from the Indochina Peninsula are increasingly clear.

For one thing, the United States must keep its doors open. We have a continuing responsibility to offer resettlement opportunities to a reasonable number of refugees. Given the demonstrated need over the past couple of years to maintain some flexibility in this regard, the Attorney General should exercise his parole authority on a continuing basis and without a specified number of entries into the United States. A formula for this purpose should be worked out in consultation with Congress, and in the context of the number of refugee entries from other areas, where people also have legitimate claims upon the attention and concern of the United States. The number of entries for Indochinese refugees should respond to the ebb and flow of their movement and demonstrated resettlement needs, and not to some arbitrary "quota" which, inevitably and sometimes needlessly, is always immediately filled. Especially for refugees in Thailand, the principal, but not exclusive, criteria for parole eligibility should be the traditional American concern for family reunion. Given the special nature of the boat people problem, however, a more general humanitarian criteria should apply to these refugees. The current criteria, a left-over from 1975, are no longer appropriate or useful if, indeed, they ever were.

Since 1975, public debate and our ad hoc national responses to the refugee problems in Thailand and Asia have stressed parole programs and the resettlement of refugees in the United States. As a nation, we do have a continuing responsibility in this regard, but we must not focus on it to the exclusion of other important alternatives. We must be more balanced in our policy and approach.

In this connection, the time is past due to encourage and promote more actively the local settlement of refugees in the host countries, especially in Thailand. Thailand is prepared to move in this direction, in the context of general rural development which would also benefit its own citizens. And, recognizing Thai sensibilities in this difficult situation, the United States must be prepared, diplomatically and financially, to join others in the international community in lending support to such local re-settlement efforts.

American policy must also acknowledge the possibility of voluntary repatriation among certain refugees, especially among Lao nationals in Thailand. As noted elsewhere in this report, field interviews with some of these refugees suggest they would willingly return to their homeland if conditions stabilized, especially in the economic field. For many of the newer refugees, if not for a majority of them, economic motives strongly influenced their decision to leave their homeland. For many of these people,

voluntary repatriation may not be out of the question, if and when conditions permit it. Thailand, for example, does not want to take any action that would foreclose this option, and for such reasons, at least in part, Thai authorities are terming most new arrivals as "economic refugees" and classifying them as "illegal immigrants". Such designations dissipate some of the political onus connected by formal refugee status under the UNHCR's mandate. The United States must be understanding of this, even as we must be vigilant that no one, regardless of his classification, is forcibly repatriated. Voluntary repatriation will only become a viable and humane option for certain numbers of refugees with the general agreement of all parties concerned and with real assurances for the care and protection of the displaced persons when they return. And should voluntary repatriation occur, hopefully it will be carried out under international auspices.

Any comprehensive American approach to the refugee problem in Southeast Asia should be fully supportive of UNHCR objectives and should be pursued in concert with others in the international community. And we should also be mindful of the humanitarian problems which fester within the countries of Indochina -- not only because they contribute to the refugee problem in Thailand and other countries, but also because of our responsibilities as a nation in helping the people of the Indochina Peninsula to rebuild their homes and normalize their lives.

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As to the general international response to the refugee problem in Southeast Asia, the host countries in the area, of course, are clearly bearing some heavy burdens -- especially Thailand. Some countries, including Australia, Norway and Japan, have been contributing to the UNHCR special operation -- and a number of countries, notably France, have also been providing resettlement opportunities to the refugees. Hopefully, the response of the international community will improve in the weeks and months ahead.

Table 2: Locations of Resettlement of Indochina Refugees, May 1975 thru December 1977

Location	Total Resettled	No. Boat Cases
United States (*130,000 from 1975)	148,355*	3,569
France	37,353	1,400
Canada	6,951	297
Australia	4,278	1,199
Malaysia	1,400	--
West Germany	961	43
Belgium	936	32
United Kingdom	548	119
Denmark	522	--
Austria	223	22
Italy	214	0
Norway	196	84
New Zealand	466	215
Hong Kong	154	--
Netherlands	143	70
Philippines	150	--
Switzerland	82	78
Israel	66	66
Others	151	31
Total	203,149	7,225

III. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

As suggested in previous reports of the former Subcommittee on Refugees, the arrival of Indochina refugees, and their resettlement in communities across the United States, has continued one of the oldest themes in our Nation's history. The bulk of these people have come here under trying and difficult circumstances -- more trying and difficult, perhaps, than those attending any other recent movement of people to our country. But like others who have come before them, these new arrivals have been hard working and conscientious and despite many hurdles, they have been making extraordinary strides in building new lives in a new land.

The goodwill and understanding of many Americans has been, and continues to be, an important ingredient in the resettlement process. So does the help of several national voluntary agencies and their local affiliates, and many state and local public agencies. And of crucial importance, is the federally sponsored and funded Indochina Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP), initially established by Congress in 1975 and extended this past year.

The paragraphs below comment on the refugee movement to the United States, the resettlement process, and the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program.

A. Refugee Profile.

As of December 1, 1977, some 148,355 Indochinese refugees had resettled in the United States. The bulk of these people, at least 130,000, are from Vietnam. Some 10,000 are from Laos. And the remainder are from Cambodia.

With few exceptions, the refugees entered the United States under the Attorney General's parole authority in Section 212 (d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. The use of the parole authority continues, and additional thousands of refugees, including many family reunion cases, will be entering the United States in the weeks and months ahead.

Available data compiled by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) indicates that refugee families have resettled in all parts of the country. The largest communities, however, are found in California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Louisiana (Table 4). The HEW data suggests that the refugee population is about equally divided between males and females. Moreover, it is a relatively young population. Recent surveys indicate that at least 40% of the refugees are children, 14 years of age and under. Nearly 50% are between 15 and 44 years of age. Little more than eight percent are between 45 and 64 years of age, and less than two percent are age 65 and older. The refugees come from a broad spectrum of occupational backgrounds. And in terms of educational levels, about 50 percent of the heads of household have at least a secondary school education, and about 25 percent are college/university graduates.

TABLE 3

Indochinese Refugees in the United States

December 1, 1977

Resettled under Special Parole Program	129,792
Resettled under Humanitarian Parole Program	528
Resettled under Special Lao Program	3,466
Resettled under Expanded Parole Program	11,000
Resettled under "Boat Cases" Program (as of August 1, 1977)	914
Resettled under 15,000 Indochina Parole Program 1977	2,655
	148,355

TABLE 4

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES BY STATES

Rank	State	INS Report Jan. 1976	INS Report Jan. 1977	Adjusted* Jan. "77 Total
1.	California	24,692	34,222	36,196
2.	Texas	9,033	12,001	12,804
3.	Pennsylvania	6,744	6,828	7,136
4.	Louisiana	3,368	5,918	6,350
5.	Virginia	4,641	6,056	6,320
6.	Washington	4,173	5,094	5,362
7.	Florida	4,450	4,875	5,102
8.	Illinois	3,585	4,114	4,344
9.	New York	3,704	4,029	4,308
10.	Minnesota	3,464	3,679	3,856
11.	Oklahoma	3,088	3,467	3,594
12.	Ohio	2,773	3,018	3,124
13.	Maryland	2,417	2,910	3,034
14.	Oregon	1,958	2,821	2,966
15.	Iowa	2,308	2,815	2,912
16.	Missouri	2,678	2,762	2,874
17.	Michigan	2,346	2,662	2,805
18.	Colorado	1,909	2,373	2,542
19.	Hawaii	1,678	2,395	2,508
20.	Wisconsin	1,747	2,284	2,414

*Adjusted to include 914 refugee "boat cases" with known State locations (as of August 1, 1977), 4,012 other refugees whose State location has not been ascertained, and 2,655 of Indochina Parole Program (15,000) as of Dec. 1, 1977.

TABLE 4 (continued)

Rank	State	INS Report Jan. 1976	INS Report Jan. 1977	Adjusted Total
21.	New Jersey	1,622	1,871	1,947
22.	Kansas	1,576	1,778	1,873
23.	Indiana	1,749	1,775	1,868
24.	Arkansas	1,663	1,531	1,602
25.	Georgia	1,292	1,477	1,568
26.	Massachusetts	1,198	1,379	1,431
27.	Nebraska	1,114	1,357	1,417
28.	North Carolina	1,009	1,357	1,404
29.	Connecticut	976	1,259	1,340
30.	Alabama	1,170	1,217	1,253
31.	Arizona	1,153	1,114	1,171
32.	Utah	654	992	1,053
33.	Kentucky	845	1,007	1,043
34.	Tennessee	898	970	1,026
35.	South Carolina	749	931	979
36.	New Mexico	751	728	785
37.	Nevada	394	559	576
38.	Rhode Island	202	520	537
39.	District of Columbia	406	396	523
40.	South Dakota	459	467	494
41.	Guam	720	451	469
42.	Mississippi	407	393	411
43.	Idaho	301	349	366
44.	North Dakota	344	332	351

TABLE 4 (continued)

Rank	State	INS Report Jan. 1976	INS Report Jan. 1977	Adjusted Total
45	Montana	205	333	349
46	Maine	328	296	312
47	Alaska	85	286	301
48	West Virginia	214	191	197
49	Delaware	144	173	178
50	New Hampshire	143	124	132
51	Wyoming	124	86	95
52	Vermont	96	86	88
53	Puerto Rico	21	35	35
54	Virgin Islands	13	15	15
55	To Unknown State	359	616	615
	TOTALS	114,140	140,774	148,355

B. RESETTLEMENT PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS

Overall, the Indochinese refugees have been energetically tackling the task of building new lives and learning new ways in a different and sometimes difficult society. The resettlement process is never easy for any group of refugees, and it has not been for most Indochinese.

Direct responsibility for helping the refugees normalize their lives in their adopted communities has fallen upon the voluntary agencies and local sponsorship groups. They have helped the refugees overcome many of the immediate hurdles -- such as finding housing, household furniture and goods, food and clothing, and helping with the myriad of other things that go into establishing a home in a new community.

The longer-term resettlement problems have inevitably been more difficult and tenacious for many Indochinese refugees -- particularly the problems of obtaining satisfactory jobs, learning English and new skills, adjusting to new and different cultural norms, and settling into the life of a strange community. The refugees from Indochina also faced a number of hurdles that have occasionally made the resettlement process more difficult. Not the least has been serious language and cultural barriers for some. And, unlike Cuban and many other refugee groups who have come to the United States in recent years, there was no indigeneous ethnic community here which the Indochinese could look to for guidance, help or linguistic or cultural kinship.

The adjustment process was not made any easier by the policy of the President' s Refugee Task Force in 1975 to spread the refugees across the country as speedily and as widely as possible, in order to close the camps as quickly as possible. Such haste did not allow for adequate resettlement planning and programming, and the "breakdowns" and frequent movement of many refugees subsequently, are evidence of this.

Several surveys have been taken among the refugees about problems they have faced. Generally, the difficulties cited most are: learning English, getting jobs, finding housing and managing money. Other problems relate to cultural problems and social activities. Depression and psychological problems of adjustment have been reported by some refugees, as noted below.

But despite many hurdles, the resettlement process has proceeded at a rate surprising to most, and against heavy odds.

C. INDOCHINA REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (IRAP).

Federal support for the resettlement process has come through the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program, as established in the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. The basic goal of IRAP -- initially administered by the President's Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees, and since 1976 by a special Task Force in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare -- has been to help the refugees help themselves to become productive and contributing members of their adopted communities across our land. Given the economic and other constraints within our country, there has been no magic formula to accomplish this goal easily and quickly. And the chaos of the

of the 1975 evacuation from the Indochina Peninsula, and the lack of direction and leadership in the early stages of the program, did not help matters along.[1]

Since the beginning of IRAP in 1975, some $203 million in federal funds have been expended through September 30, 1977, when the first program expired. Recent Congressional action on legislation offered by Senator Kennedy and other Senators [2] has extended IRAP for an aditional four years, to be phased out by fiscal year 1981. This extension, signed into law by the President on October 28, 1977 (P.L. 95-145), recognizes the continuing federal responsibility for helping the refugees resettle in local communities -- including those refugees still arriving under the extended parole program.

Next year, under the IRAP extension, an estimated $114 million will be obligated to provide a continuing 100% federal reimbursement to State and local governments for costs involved in the program -- for welfare, medicaid, and other programs. In addition, some $10 million will be available in 1978 for the "special projects" of the voluntary agencies, with $15 million more

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[1]For a review of the many serious problems during the initial stages of President Ford's resettlement program for Indochina refugees, see the Subcommittee on Refugees staff reports, Indochina Evacuation and Refugee Problems, Part IV, June 19, 1975 and July 8, 1975; Subcommittee hearings during 1975; and Chapter 3 of Aftermath of War: Humanitarian Problems of Southeast Asia, a staff report issued 5/17/76.

[2]Senator Kennedy's IRAP bill was cosponsored by Senators Humphrey, Cranston, Hayakawa, Johnston, Anderson, Pell, Moynihan, Inouye, Matsunaga, and Bumpers.

authorized over the following years, to help the refugees find employment, up-grade skills, learn English, and other programs that will help them become self-reliant.

In succeeding years, IRAP reimbursements to State and local governments will be phased down to 75% in fiscal year 1979, 50% in 1980, and 25% in 1981. Table 5 provides an estimation of each year's expenditures under the IRAP program.

Under the IRAP extension, the Refugee Task Force will continue to function under the aegis of HEW's Social Security Administration as a special unit. It currently employs a staff of 35 at the central HEW office, and a field complement of 29 in the ten HEW regional offices. It remains the responsible agency of government for administering the IRAP program.

The IRAP extension legislation also contained provisions that allow Indochinese refugees to adjust their status from "parolees" to "permanent resident alien" without regard to annual visa limitations. All refugees who have been physically present in the United States for two years are eligible, and this time is also to be used for purposes of computing the five years' residence required for application for citizenship.

Currently, some 130,000 Indochinese refugees are eligible to immediately apply for adjustment of status. However, because the law was effective on the date of enactment, the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not have sufficient time to develop implementation procedures. These are now in process, and INS has undertaken to clear the way for the expeditious handling of adjustment of status applications. It has authorized its

Table 5: Projected Funding of the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program

fiscal year	total
1978	$114.1 million
1979	91.0
1980	45.0
1981	20.0
	270.1
plus special projects	25.0
total	$295.1 million

field offices with high-volune situations to adopt abbreviated processing procedures in line with those used in the Cuban adjustment program.

D. RESETTLEMENT: A PERSPECTIVE TO DATE.

From the perspective of two and a half years of experience with the resettlement of Indochinese refugees in the United States some observations can now be made as to the effectiveness of the resettlement program.

Overall, it has been remarkably effective, despite the trauma of the evacuation and the ineptness of early resettlement planning noted above. It is important to remember that the Indochinese refugees in 1975 were the largest number of refugees ever to arrive in the United States in such a compressed period of time, and that 1975 was the first time that refugee camps were established in this country. Furthermore, the refugees arrived during a period of serious economic recession and high domestic unemployment. The previously noted dispersal policy and pressure to empty the camps at the expense of resettlement planning also contributed to resettlement problems.

However, despite these factors, and the significant cultural differences between the Indochinese refugees and their new neighbors in the United States, the record shows remarkable progress toward self-sufficiency. The single most telling index

of this success are the statistics showing refugee employment higher than the national average.

(1) Continuing Refugee Programs.

Resettlement problems -- or the problem of achieving full refugee economic and social self-sufficiency -- continue to exist, particularly among the later arrivals under the "Lao Parole Program" and the "Extended Parole Program." Such problems are inevitable in the process of integrating a new and different group of people into an established social structure. They should not be considered an index of failure or deficiency in the resettlement program. Rather, such problems must be addressed and resolved, both in fairness to the refugees as well as to insure cost effectiveness in our national endeavor, public and private, to resettle these new arrivals to our land. Recent Congressional approval of the IRAP extension clearly represents such a national commitment.

Reviewed below are some of the continuing programs and problems involved in the resettlement effort.

a. Employment and Welfare. Two inter-related considerations involved in the resettlement process are employment and welfare. The statistics on each say a great deal about the progress of resettlement. In the early days of the program, both rates were very high -- ranging around 20% unemployment, sometimes higher, and up to 30% to 40% of the refugees receiving some form of

welfare assistance. In recent months, there has been a remarkable decline in the unemployment rate, as well as a small drop in the number of refugees receiving welfare assistance. This trend is, as noted earlier, a remarkable tribute to the energy and persistence of the refugees in finding jobs -- even low-level or entry jobs. Yet, since they earn an insufficient sum to sustain typically large families, many are still forced to seek some welfare benefits, such as food stamps.

The statistics speak for themselves: for the first time since the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program began the number of refugees receiving at least part of their support from cash assistance decreased (between May and August 1977). As of September, only 50,771 refugees -- or 34% of the refugee population -- were receiving some cash assistance, representing a reduction of 1.2% from the previous reporting period. A further reduction is anticipated.

At the same time studies show that all but about 14% of refugee households receive wage or salary income, suggesting that as hard as they may be working, the size of their households still requires some reliance on supplementary cash assistance or food stamps.

In contrast, refugee employment rates are better than the national average, and much lower than in some areas of the United

States. As of September, the unemployment rate for males was only 4.9%, and just 6.8% for females. This compares to the national average of 7.1%. The availability of seasonal employment during the summer may have accounted for some of this refugee employment, but a subsequent preliminary report suggests the trend is continuing.

b. Employment and Special Training Projects. Since last year, a belated effort has been made by the HEW Task Force to more actively fund "special projects" of the voluntary agencies and State and local governments to provide special training programs for refugees, to upgrade language and employment skills. Currently, there are 62 English language and vocational training projects in 39 States and Guam, being funded at a cost of $7 million through the IRAP program. To date, over 7,000 refugees have received language training -- usually on-the-job English training -- and 3,300 have been enrolled in vocational training. By late summer 1977, over 5,000 refugees had been placed in jobs through these projects, an increase of 3,000 from the last reporting period.

Under the recent extension of the IRAP program, Congress specifically authorized an additional $25 million for "special projects," with $10 million appropriated for fiscal year 1978. In making "special project" funds available, Congress has recognized the strong work ethic among the Indochinese refugees

as a stable foundation upon which to build effective economic self-sufficiency and reduce reliance on welfare assistance. This is the first time in any refugee resettlement program that Congress has authorized "front end" assistance to deal with generic problems inhibiting self-sufficiency. The effectiveness of programing under the IRAP extension will have an important bearing on funding for future refugee resettlement programs.

c. Mental Health Projects. Given the chaotic and often tragic circumstances under which most Indochina refugees have come to the United States -- the cultural and social changes involved in their abrupt uprooting -- it was inevitable that some mental health problems would affect many refugees. Depression among the refugees has frequently been reported by resettlement workers, and from the early days of the program projects have been funded to help meet the special mental health needs of the refugees.

Treatment of depression and other mental health problems through conventional western therapy was found difficult and sometimes wholly ineffective because of language and cultural factors. To explore new approaches to this problem, the Refugee Task Force funded five projects in San Francisco, Seattle, Denver, Boston and Columbus, Ohio. The projects have been completed, and in August 1977 the Task Force and the National Institute of Mental health held a two-day conference in Denver to assess the findings.

According to the Refugee Task Force report, all five projects, plus two others in Los Angeles and Sacramento, California, used similar approaches in training bilingual paraprofessionals -- to provide direct services for the refugees, such as counselors, problem identifiers, referral sources, interpreters, and cross-cultural resources. All seven projects found similar problems: depression, anxiety, and a variety of psychosomatic and somatic illness. Continuing work was found needed in crisis intervention, the training of more paraprofessionals, and perhaps development of community support networks including day care, health care, employment, and education interrelated with mental health services.

d. Professional Training Programs. The program for training and licensure of physicians and dentists has proceeded remarkably well over the past two years, and most trainees have successfully passed their required examinations. Indeed, the rate of success of the Indochina professionals has exceeded expections of thos involved in the U.S. Public Health Service program.

Of 96 refugees identified as dentists, 55 have already passed Part I of the National Board Examinations on Basic Science, with 44 succeeding on the first try -- an unusually high percentage. Of the 55, some 15 have also passed Part II, the clinical test, with 9 succeeding on the first try.

Refugee physicians have also made substantial progress towards practicing medicine in the United States. Their training

program can be a model for future training of professional refugees entering the U.S.

e. Education Programs. Under Title II of the Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1976, some $18.5 million has been dispersed to local school districts to meet the special education requirements or burdens posed by Indochinese children. An additional $10.2 million will soon be dispersed by the Office of Education in HEW under Title II of the Act to provide grants to State and local public education agencies for English, occupational, and related training programs for adult Indochinese refugees. These funds are in addition to those authorized under the IRAP program for "special projects."

In this connection, it is unfortunate that there has been only limited coordination within HEW -- between the Task Force and the Office of Education -- on the use of these funds, and absolutely no coordination with the voluntary resettlement agencies. This problem of the left hand not knowing what the right is doing has plagued the resettlement program from the beginning.

d. Special Programs for Meo (Hmong) Refugees from Laos. A major concern of the voluntary agencies recently has been the resettlement of several thousand Meo refugees from Laos. These refugees were largely hill tribesmen, ethnically quite distinct from the lowland Lao, with totally different cultural and economic

backgrounds. While they have energetically sought to adapt to their new surroundings, their effective integration into American society is particularly difficult because of vast differences between traditional Meo culture and contemporary American society. As a result, special programs have been proposed to help them.

Of particular concern are the Meo women, whose traditional role in a rural Asian society relates primarily to marketing, housekeeping and the raising of the children in an agricultural setting. These roles are now denied them in the United States, and with no wood to gather for the evening fire, many have sat idle hours in small apartments in big cities. And because there is really no Meo community in the United States to provide group support, the denial of these traditional roles, without the substitution of new activities, has resulted in a growing social problem among many women.

The Task Force and the voluntary agencies are making special efforts to deal with resettlement problems among the Meo refugees. With refugees from Laos, including Meo, still entering the United States under the current parole program, additional stress will be required on these special programs. Some of the "special project" funds of the voluntary agencies will need to be directed in support of them.

f. Family Reunion Problems. An additional source of frustration and depression for many refugees relates to their

separation from close family members who have either remained in their native lands or have gone to other countries. Indeed, family reunion problems seem to be greater among the Indochina refugees than among any other refugee group that has come to the United States. Inevitably, these problems contribute to personal anguish and inhibit the adjustment process of many refugee families. This is even more true for the refugees who are ambivalent about staying in the United States -- and some 400 continue to express a personal desire to be repatriated, to join family members in Indochina. They have registered with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for repatriation, however little progress has been achieved over the past two years in facilitating their return. This remains a crucial humanitarian issue to be resolved between the United States and the countries of Indochina.

E. RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM FOR NEW ARRIVALS

Following consultations with Congress, the Attorney-General authorized on August 11, 1977 a new parole program for 15,000 Indochina refugees, insuring that new arrivals will continue to enter the United States through the coming year. The basic structure and process for handling these additional refugees -- their transportation, reception and resettlement -- is relatively well established. The Department of State and the Immigration Service are responsible for identifying eligible refugees and processing them to the United States. The voluntary agencies are

the sponsoring organizations charged with receiving and placing them in homes in the United States. HEW and State and local government agencies are responsible for back-up welfare services. But with these many separate elements involved in the resettlement process, there is obviously a need for more effective coordination among all those involved in the resettlement effort.

The current absence of coordination, such as existed under the 1975 Inter-agency Task Force, and the lack of a focal point for domestic resettlement policy formulation, is a serious fault which today impinges upon the cost effective use of resettlement funds.

Unfortunately, the HEW Task Force as now constituted is at too low a level to command coordination even from within the Department. The lack of adequate consultation on the use of the $10.2 million being allocated by the Office of Education is symptomatic of this. Not only is there a need for a focal point at the federal level, there is also a clear need for more structural coordination between the federal government, local authorities, and the voluntary agencies.

Since it is increasingly clear that the United States will be involved with Indochina refugee resettlement for some time to come, and most likely with other refugee groups as well, it is imperative that we begin to address some of the bureaucratic problems of coordination.

The evidence of the need for better coordination and

planning can be seen today in a host of small, but important, considerations that get lost -- such as a refugee child arriving from Indochina in mid-winter without shoes, or inadequate advance notice of program changes or expenditures. Conversely, when there is an effort at coordination, even without a formal structure, many problems have been minimized. Most recently, HEW, the Immigration Service, the Department of State, the voluntary agencies, and the Child Welfare League of America, all met and agreed upon a formula which, for the first time, establishes a government policy for the movement of unaccompanied refugee children to the United States, and for their proper care and protection once here. Such coordination not only avoided many problems by anticipating them, it worked to the benefit of all concerned -- most especially the refugee child.

F. CONCLUDING NOTE.

In many respects, the Indochina refugee resettlement program has both passed and entered a crucial phase. The early days of influx and confusion, of catching-up and reacting, have ended and more established procedures and programs have taken their place. The IRAP program has been extended, but with a view to its successful termination in four years, and the absorption of the refugees into the mainstream of American society. Earlier refugees are now contributing members of their communities, even as new refugees are arriving.

The new phase of the resettlement program will surely contain as many challenges and problems as the earlier phase. But none can doubt that a remarkable degree of success has been achieved. This reflects the contributions and the dedication of many, most especially the refugees themselves.

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THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE IN 1977

(A Summary of IRC Activities on Five Continents)

The Gulf of Siam and the South China Sea were scenes of human disasters of tragic dimensions in 1977. Thousands of refugees, fleeing Vietnam and Cambodia in fragile boats, drowned in stormy waters. Passing ships frequently ignored their pleas for rescue. Many had reached the shores of Asian countries only to be pushed or towed out to sea to continue their search for a sanctuary. Yet, thousands managed to land in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and even Australia in spite of hostile receptions. In Thailand, they were sent to crowded camps to join 100,000 other Indochinese refugees. Laotians crossing the Mekong River were the most numerous of the camp refugees.

Although IRC devoted a large measure of its relief and resettlement effort to the Indochinese, many other refugee groups were helped during 1977, among them Russians, Cubans, Chileans, East Europeans, Haitians, Kurds and Chinese. New relief and medical programs were started for Angolan refugees in Zaire, and for Ugandans and Ethiopians who had fled to Kenya. The basic elements of IRC's refugee work consisted of emergency aid (food, clothing, shelter, medical care), resettlement services, educational support, vocational training, self-help projects, assistance with asylum problems, family counseling and child care.

THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE CRISIS: By October 1977, an estimated 4,000 Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian refugees were escaping every month by land and sea to Thailand alone. Hundreds more, the "boat people," were managing to reach other Asian lands. Estimates of those who drowned - many had been pushed back to sea by unfriendly countries - ran from 30% to 50% of those escaping. Reports from Hong Kong told of "death notices," issued in Hanoi, directed at those attempting to flee.

Nevertheless, the desperate attempts to escape continued at the rate of 500 to 1,500 a month for boat people alone. On November 30, an Associated Press dispatch from Khlong Yai, Thailand, reported: "Forty-nine sick and hungry refugees, half children, sat in silence or wept uncontrollably on the deck of the weatherbeaten 30-foot fishing boat that had brought them from Phuquoc, off the west coast of Vietnam, through the dangerous waters off Cambodia. Naked children were crawling about the small cabin, and an infant fed at its mother's breast. A 6-year old boy had pneumonia. A young couple said they wanted to name their daughter Freedom, if the voyage ended in freedom for the family."

But their hopes were not to be realized. "Most of the men, women and the 25 children broke into tears," the Associated Press dispatch stated, "when Thai officials ordered them back to sea."

The plight of the children, to whom IRC devotes special care, was described in a New York Times article: "For the children, the boat trips are frightening and remain alive in their nightmares. For all children questioned, the trips are days and nights of terror, whether they take less than a week or many weeks. The refugees' reception wherever their boats arrive, if they arrive, is incomprehensible. It is hard for parents to explain to children, whom they have told they left their country to find freedom, why all their time is spent under police supervision in crowded and uncomfortable barracks, shacks or unused factories."

In Thailand, IRC teams of doctors, nurses and paramedics were responsible for the medical care of half the refugees in the camps. A program to train Indochinese refugees to serve as paramedics was started, in keeping with IRC's traditional emphasis on self-help. By year's end, the camp population had reached 100,000 and was growing, in spite of a U.S. decision to admit 10,000 of the refugees in Thailand (and 5,000 boat people from other countries). IRC teams also served all other voluntary agencies in the resettlement effort in Thailand.

In the United States, ten IRC offices continued to provide resettlement services for the Indochinese it had sponsored. Since April 1975, IRC has assumed responsibility for more than 20,000 of the refugees. The goal is their absorption into the social and economic fabric of American life, employment at adequate wages, proper housing, educational support, child care, language and vocational training. In Paris, the IRC office helped many of the 1,000 Indochinese being admitted to France every month.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EAST EUROPE: Departures of refugees from the Soviet Union increased substantially during the latter part of 1977. The weekly average of those reaching Vienna climbed to 400 a week, compared to only 275 a week during 1976 and the first months of 1977. About half of the refugees went on to Israel; the others sought asylum in western countries, primarily the United States. Among them were prominent dissidents - scientists, writers, artists, educators - and IRC assumed the resettlement responsibility for many of them.

Financial aid, counseling and resettlement services were provided by IRC for more than a thousand of the Russians in Western Europe, primarily in Rome, Vienna, Munich, Paris and Brussels. Some 400 of the refugees came to the United States under IRC auspices; many were accepted for resettlement by the Jewish Family Service groups. Although the majority of the Russians are Jewish, quite a few belong to other denominations.

A special effort was made by IRC to relieve the plight of the Russians in the ghetto of Ostia, near Rome. An article in Time magazine described their ordeal as follows: "The refugees live huddled in sordid rooms, often ten to a flat, barely subsisting on the sale of old clothes and other belongings brought from Russia. Some have been lucky enough to get occasional jobs as seamstresses and ditchdiggers at substandard pay. Others earn a few lire by doing errands and carrying packages....." Near the end of 1977, the long suffering of the Russian refugees in Italy was eased by a decision of immigration authorities to admit those with relatives in the United States as well as others qualifying on "humanitarian" grounds.

In addition to refugees from the Soviet Union, several hundred Albanian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Rumanian, Polish and Yugoslav refugees were helped by IRC to come to the United States. Many more were assisted in Europe, among them Czechoslovak dissidents who signed the "Charter 77" manifesto appealing to the Communist authorities to show greater respect for human rights. The signers included leading intellectual, scientific and cultural leaders of Czechoslovakia. During the latter part of 1977, ten of the dissidents and their families were given asylum in Austria where, at the request of the Austrian government, IRC provided maintenance and resettlement services.

AFRICAN REFUGEES: The conflict of opposing forces within Angola following its independence from Portugal in 1975 led to a massive refugee exodus. In 1977, there were more than 500,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire alone, including those who had become refugees when Angola was under Portuguese rule. The most deprived among them are those who fled from the northern Angolan enclave of Cabinda, now controlled by Cuban troops. About 36,000 Cabindans, including thousands of children, are barely surviving. Many die from malnutrition, malaria, tuberculosis and intestinal diseases. The pastor of a local church said that the simplest wooden coffins were a luxury that could no longer be afforded, and he had even run out of blankets to wrap the dead for burial.

Early in 1977, IRC initiated a relief program to bring food, nutritional supplements and emergency medical care to the refugees. More than 100,000 pounds of rice, beans, salt, fish, powdered milk and canned meat have been distributed by IRC, in addition to supplies such as blankets, soap and plasma. IRC also sent a doctor to work in the refugee areas. She regularly visits distant refugee sites where clinics are not available.

The exodus of Ugandans fleeing from General Idi Amin's reign of terror increased in 1977. The reason for the flight was documented in a report published in May by the International Commission of Jurists and delivered to the United Nations. "The death total in the first two years of President Amin's regime was at least 80,000 to 90,000," the report stated. "Many sources believe that the figure is now well over 100,000. Arbitrary killings, tortures, disappearances and other gross violations still continue on a substantial scale. There has been a total breakdown in the rule of law."

Thousands of the refugees have fled to Kenya, among them many of Uganda's cultural leaders and professional people. In the fall of 1977, IRC established a medical program in Kenya with a central clinic in Nairobi staffed by Ugandan refugee doctors and nurses. Refugees from Ethiopia were also helped. Medical services were brought to refugees in outlying settlements, and teachers were employed to serve in Kenyan schools which Ugandan children attend. In December, the gravity of the genocidal repression inside Uganda was reflected in a New York Times editorial that included the following passage:

"By the most conservative estimates, Idi Amin's police and army have slaughtered more than 100,000 Ugandans; some responsible observers place the figure at 300,000. Only a few of these victims can in any sense be described as enemies of the regime. By the scale and capriciousness of its official murder, Idi Amin's Uganda is in a class by itself."

LATIN AMERICAN REFUGEES: Three totalitarian countries in Latin America - Cuba, Chile and Haiti - accounted for most of the refugees assisted by IRC during

1977. The majority of refugees leaving Cuba for Spain and the United States were elderly people. In Spain, the IRC office in Madrid continued to provide emergency assistance and resettlement services for the refugees there, and close to 500 of them came to the U.S. under IRC auspices.

Since the exodus from Cuba began in 1959, more than 800,000 refugees have entered the United States alone - about 10% of Cuba's total population. Some 260,000 came by the Havana-to-Miami airlift which was stopped by Castro in 1973. In announcing the airlift in September 1965 President Lyndon Johnson, standing at the foot of the Statue of Liberty, said: "I declare to the people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here will find it. The dedication of America to our traditions as an asylum for the oppressed will be upheld."

Because of its long association with Cuban refugee problems, and growing international concern with human rights issues, IRC intensified its efforts in 1977 to obtain the release of at least some of the thousands of political prisoners in Cuba. Many had been jailed, in solitary confinement, during the 18 years of the Castro rule. In March, IRC issued a public amnesty appeal in behalf of the prisoners. The statement pointed out that their treatment, and the structure of Cuba's penal system, follows Soviet techniques, and said, "What is most appalling in the case of Cuba's prisoners is the unconscionable length of incarceration those opposed to the government have to suffer."

In 1976, about 1,000 Chileans were admitted to the United States as refugees, 276 of them under IRC sponsorship. All had been political prisoners who had been released from jail by the military junta that has ruled Chile for the last four years. In February 1977, IRC established a presence in Buenos Aires to facilitate the emigration of Chileans and some other South American refugees who had obtained temporary asylum in Argentina. Many had undergone torture in Chile and urgently need medical care. The United States offered to admit 200 refugee families from Argentina, but their rate of arrival was exceedingly slow.

Employment has posed problems, stemming mainly from the general economic picture as well as the lack of English on the part of virtually all the Chilean refugees. Valuable help was received from volunteer English teachers, from doctors and dentists who donated their services and from trade unions which obtained jobs, collected clothing and helped place refugees in training programs. Integration is a longer process for the Chileans than, for example, the Cubans, since there is no older Chilean-American community into which they can blend. Many are preoccupied over the fate of families and friends left behind, and IRC is constantly being asked to help in this respect.

While some reports from Haiti indicated a "moderation" of the harsh oppression of the late "Papa Doc" Duvalier and his son and successor, Jean-Claude, many Haitians did not share this optimistic evaluation. Among them were 61 persons who crowded into a leaky boat and endured 30 days at sea before reaching Florida in August 1977. Another boat with 17 escapees arrived later in Florida, and a third pulled into Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba with more than 100 refugees.

The Haitians, in refugee terms, are among the poorest of the poor. They are afflicted with the problems faced by all refugees in a new and alien culture at a time of high unemployment, especially among the blacks. In addition, they are more often than not denied refugee status because their motivation is deemed inadequate. Many therefore need expert help in deportation and adjustment-of-status proceedings, a service IRC is often called upon to provide. IRC also made available emergency aid, job placement and family reunion assistance for the refugees.

HONG KONG: An estimated 4,000 refugees from China escaped to Hong Kong during 1977, about the same number as in 1976. There are no official figures, as the escapees try to slip in secretly in order to evade deportation to China by the Hong Kong government, which announced its policy of returning refugees in 1974. Most of the Chinese refugees are young "freedom-swimmers," but many consist of family groups escaping in boats and rafts. The swimmers struggle across the wide and turbulent bays separating China from Hong Kong. The fact that hundreds drown in attempting to reach Hong Kong is dramatic evidence of their strong motivation. Still others manage to cross the land border.

In 1977, IRC continued its broad-ranged refugee program started in 1961 in Hong Kong. At five day nurseries, IRC provided food, recreation, hygienic training and pre-school education for 909 refugee children - giving mothers the opportunity to work and thereby bringing in added income for the needy families. Two hostels were maintained to accommodate new refugees until they are able to become self-supporting. General counseling and job placement for the newcomers was a major activity of the hostel staff, who were helped by volunteers from the Junior Red Cross. Cash assistance, clothing, other forms of emergency aid and emigration services were also provided for the refugees.

Hong Kong is a thousand miles from Vietnam. Nevertheless, 977 boat people from Vietnam managed to reach this distant port. Some of them whose boats had foundered had been rescued by passing ships. Most of the refugees were resettled in the United States or awaiting clearance, and some moved on to France. IRC assisted the Vietnamese during their stay in Hong Kong and joined other voluntary agencies in resettling those coming to the United States.

OTHER REFUGEE GROUPS: In early 1977, the United States government decided to permit an additional 300 Kurds stranded in Iran to come to the United States. (About 400 had been admitted in 1976.) IRC again agreed to participate in the resettlement program, and accepted responsibility for 75 of the newcomers. Altogether, refugees from the following countries were helped by IRC during 1977: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, Burma, Cambodia, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iraq (Kurds), Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Poland, Rumania, Somalia, Soviet Union, Syria, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yugoslavia. None of the refugee groups helped by IRC in 1977 were able to return home; on the contrary, all the countries they had come from have continued to produce refugees. Thus the present commitments of IRC continue into 1978.

IRC FREEDOM AWARD: On August 4, 1977, the Freedom Award of the International Rescue Committee was presented to Hubert H. Humphrey. The plaque, signed by Leo Cherne, Chairman of IRC, Angier Biddle Duke, Honorary Chairman and Leonard H. Marks, President, was inscribed: "For Distinguished and Courageous Service in the Cause of Freedom." The acceptance speech of Senator Humphrey included the following passage:

"The International Rescue Committee came into being at a time when rescue was desperately needed, and it still has a vital role to fill. What America means above all is freedom, and that is why the IRC is so relevant to our times. We have maintained fidelity to the hope and pride of one of the greatest symbols of freedom and sanctuary here in America - in the being of this International Rescue Committee."