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MIDDLE EAST ISSUES OF AJC CONCERN

U.S.-Israeli Relations and the Peace Process

Recent months have witnessed increasingly close cooperation between the two countries in strategic planning, intelligence, and other defense related areas, the beginnings of unprecedented economic ties through the new Free Trade Area Agreement, and supportive measures by the U.S. to help Israel revitalize its economy, including the provision of all new aid in the form of grants rather than loans. Moreover, both the Reagan Administration and the Government of Prime Minister Shimon Peres are actively seeking ways to encourage King Hussein of Jordan to enter into direct negotiations with Israel.

Nevertheless, serious differences have developed between Washington and Jerusalem -- as well as within the respective governments -- as to the appropriate tactics to achieve this result. Among these issues are:

1. Supply of advanced aircraft and other arms to Jordan. The Reagan Administration contends that Hussein needs these weapons to demonstrate that he has credible U.S. backing to defend himself against Syria, which opposes the peace process. Israel, the majority of Congress and groups such as AJC contend that the U.S. has other ways to demonstrate its commitment to Hussein and that arms shipment should be deferred until after Hussein has ended the state of belligerency with Israel and actually begins direct negotiations.

2. The steps leading to negotiation and the role of the PLO. While Hussein says that he hopes for the start of negotiations "before the end of the year," he insists that he needs the backing of Palestinians -- specifically Arafat's wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization -- before he can proceed, as well as the "cover" of an international conference with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the PLO to neutralize Syrian and Soviet opposition. Hussein contends that his February 11 agreement with Arafat already represents PLO acceptance of the principle of negotiations with Israel and linkage of any Palestinian entity to Jordan, which would be in accordance with the Reagan initiative of September 1982. Israeli and American critics point out that the PLO has failed to say so explicitly and has not renounced its goal of an independent Palestinian state. Moreover, the increasing incidence and escalation of Palestinian terrorist attacks, including some sponsored by Arafat's own al-Fatah, raise serious doubts as to Arafat's readiness for peace.

Both the United States and Israel oppose a broad international conference that would bring in the Soviet Union -- which still has not restored the diplomatic relations with Israel which it broke off in 1967 -- and other potentially disruptive forces. However, there is disagreement between them over other preliminary steps proposed by Hussein. The King's scenario is as follows: (1) preliminary discussions between the United States and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; (2) PLO acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which outline the basis for Arab-Israel peace; (3) American recognition of the PLO; (4) an international peace conference involving the five permanent Security Council members (U.S., USSR, China, France, Great Britain), the Arab states, the PLO and Israel.

King Hussein's path toward direct negotiations with Israel is a long and convoluted one that contains many junctures at which the entire process is subject to failure. Indeed, the Israel Government opposes the entire concept of preliminary U.S.-Palestinian discussions from which Israel is excluded. It also opposes participation of identifiable members of the PLO, although Peres and Foreign Minister Shamir disagree on what other Palestinians might be acceptable. Some State Department officials would be even more flexible in their interpretation, accepting individual Palestine National Council members, who while nominally connected to the PLO are not involved in terrorist acts and profess a desire for peace with Israel.

3. The U.S. and Israel also disagree over the wisdom of supplying additional arms to Saudi Arabia. The United States contends that the Saudis need the weapons for their own defense and to help counter potential threats to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, Washington regards the Saudis as an element for peace and stability. Israel and its supporters in Congress point out, however, that far from being a force for peace, the Saudis have been paying for the Soviet weapons purchased by Syria and the PLO. Moreover, they note that Saudi Arabia denied defense facilities to the U.S. and has tried to discourage other Arab states from entering into close cooperation with the U.S. in the defense of the Gulf. In the absence of peace, provision of additional arms to nearby Arab states such as Saudi Arabia will require Israel to expend additional scarce resources to maintain the military balance. The recent $4 billion British arms sale to Saudi Arabia compounds the problem, since the British and French place less constraints on their sales than does the U.S.

4. Response to terrorism. While both the U.S. and Israel are committed to fighting international terrorism, the Administration, responding to State Department fears of an anti-American backlash in the Arab world, refused to veto a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Israeli air strike on PLO headquarters in Tunisia, even though President Reagan had earlier termed the Israeli action an understandable "expression of self defense" and a "legitimate response to terrorist attacks." Israel had hoped that the U.S. would veto the UN

condemnation, especially since Secretary of State Shultz in a major address last year called for a more active policy to counteract terrorism, including pre-emptive and retaliatory action even if civilians might be killed in the process. Moreover, Israel Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin insists that the only Tunisians killed in the raid were persons working for the PLO. The U.S. use of military aircraft to capture the pirates who had killed an American on the Achille Lauro may hopefully signal a greater convergence of U.S. and Israeli views on combatting terrorism.

Israeli Domestic Issues

Although the Israeli economy is showing signs of improvement -- including a decline in its rate of inflation and in the trade deficit -- these have come at the expense of a drastic austerity program which has resulted in increased unemployment, which has exacerbated existing social tensions, especially between Israel's Ashkenazim and the Oriental communities. Most of these Middle Eastern Jews are on the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder and are concentrated in the development towns, which have been especially hard hit by dismissal of employees and closing down of factories.

We are also concerned over recent manifestations of intolerance and anti-democratic tendencies. The polarization of Israelis into militant Orthodox versus secularists has been aggravated in recent months by such issues as the efforts to incorporate Orthodox demands into the Law of Return, the controversy over the Jewish identity of recent Ethiopian immigrants, and the opposition to construction of a Mormon educational center in Jerusalem. In addition, the recent escalation of Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israelis within Israel's pre-1967 borders, as well as in the territories under Israeli military administration, has added to Israelis' mistrust of the Arabs in their midst, and has added fuel to the growing strength of Meir Kahane's racist and anti-democratic campaign against the Arabs.

The Position of Jews in Arab and Islamic Countries

AJC has been engaged in intensive efforts to safeguard the rights of Jews in Arab and Islamic countries who continue to face hardships ranging from restrictions on their freedom to emigrate (in Iran, Syria, and Yemen) to threats to their physical safety, such as recent kidnappings in Lebanon and a recent violent attack in Tunisia.

Questions for Discussion

1. Under what circumstances should the American Jewish Committee modify its current position of opposing arms sales to Jordan?

2. What can the AJC do to help the U.S. Government increase public understanding of the need to counteract terrorism?

3. What additional programmatic steps should be taken to combat the growth of Kahaneism and other anti-democratic tendencies in Israel? On the positive side, what should the AJC do to promote democratic and pluralistic values which will foster a climate of tolerance and respect for diversity in Israel?

4. What can AJC membership do to strengthen the efforts to publicize the plight of Jews under Arab and Islamic rule and in appealing to Arab and Islamic governments to ease the conditions of its Jews and permit them to emigrate?

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George E. Gruen & Harry Milkman,
Israel & Middle East Affairs Division,
International Relations Department

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DRAFT

STATEMENT ON ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Recent actions taken by the United States Government have reinforced America's unshakeable commitment to the State of Israel. In a major address to the United Nations General Assembly commemorating the 40th anniverary of its founding, President Reagan referred to "the total inversion of morality in the infamous Zionism-is-racist resolution" -- which was adopted exactly ten years ago -- as one of the UN's most serious failures. The threat of a U.S. boycott of the UN was instrumental in blocking an Arab-sponsored effort to revoke Israel's credentials in the world body, and in convincing the General Assembly to deny an invitation to terrorist leader Yasir Arafat to address its 40th anniversary session. The American delegation to the Nairobi conference marking the end of the UN's Decade for Women succeeded in preventing a reference to Zionism in the final 'forward-looking strategies' document which would have characterized it as a form of racism.

The United States Government's steadfast adherence to the principle that only direct negotiations between Israel and the neighboring Arab states will bring a just and lasting peace has been effective in moving the Arab states closer to the negotiating table, where Israel eagerly awaits their arrival. The Administration's strategy of encouraging the leaders of both Israel and Jordan to seek an acceptable forum for negotiations, while pressuring neither to make prior concessions, has helped the parties to approach an agreement on their own. Furthermore,

the Administration's agreement, under strong Congressional pressure, to postpone the sale of sophisticated weapons to Jordan until March 1, 1986 has served as a clear message to King Hussein that he must enter direct negotiations with Israel before being eligible to receive additional potentially offensive military hardware from the U.S.

We welcome the most recent exchange of conciliatory statements between Jerusalem and Amman. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres has reiterated Israel's offer to meet directly with King Hussein at any place agreeable to the King. Mr. Peres has also agreed in principle to King Hussein's request that there be an international forum for negotiations, provided that direct negotiations with Jordan take place within that forum, and that the Soviet Union re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel as evidence that it is finally prepared to play a constructive role in facilitating the peace process. Mr. Peres has also invited the participation of peacefully-intentioned Palestinians in the talks that will determine their future.

We applaud the overwhelming vote of support for Prime Minister Peres's initiative in the Knesset. It is but the most recent expression of Israel's long-standing commitment to seek peace through negotiations.

King Hussein of Jordan has also acknowledged the "positive spirit" of Peres's UN address, and is reportedly pressing the PLO to abandon its rejectionism and terror tactics, if it is to become an acceptable nego-

tiating partner. We call upon the King to display the courage to finally divorce himself from Yasir Arafat and his terrorist organization, in view of the PLO's continuing refusal to renounce "armed struggle" against Israel.

An American-Israeli consensus has emerged on the need to take vigorous measures in the war against international terrorism, as was most recently demonstrated by the American interception of the Egyptian airliner carrying the pirates of the Achille Lauro and their PLO-affiliated commander. American and Israeli perseverance in the face of terrorism serves to teach those with grievances that they can only hope to redress them by peaceful means, and not by acts of terror. We call upon the other nations of the free world to work with the United States in developing a coordinated strategy to combat international terrorism.

We are distressed by the increased incidence of terrorism within Israel and against Israelis and Jews abroad. We are also distressed by those who seek to exploit the fear of terrorism in order to arouse anti-Arab sentiment in Israel and in the United States. We deplore the vicious anti-Arab campaign conducted by Meir Kahane in Israel, as well as the murder of an Arab American, Alex Odeh, in Santa Ana, California.

In addition to the Kahane phenomenon, we are troubled by other signs of polarization within Israeli society along ethnic and religious lines. The American Jewish Committee, which is committed to promoting the values of pluralism and democracy, pledges to redouble our efforts,

together with appropriate partners in Israel, to foster a climate of tolerance and mutual respect among the diverse groups that comprise Israel's society, so that it will truly fulfill its founders' dreams of establishing a nation that will be a creative synthesis of the ancient Prophetic ideals with modern democratic values.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 19 SEPTEMBER 1984

ISRAEL, LEBANON AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN POLITICS

with
Thomas L. Friedman
Jerusalem Bureau Chief of The New York Times

In Beirut it was not physical violence--being shot at, for instance--that was the most frightening experience for Thomas Friedman but coming face to face with violent religious extremists, realizing that, in the Arab world and Israel, the extremists were now the parties with which one had to contend while the political moderates, although probably still a majority, were on the run, unable or unwilling to defend their values.

Why are the extremist groups now winning? Mr. Friedman suggests five reasons. First, the extremists are ready to go "all the way" and use whatever is necessary to achieve their goals: "Crime pays and absolute crime pays absolutely." The extremists know what they want, they play by their own rules, and they have proven that they will use force to maintain their power. In the face of such violence, moderates yield to the militants and those who can afford to leave do so.

Second, extremists understand the importance of language and agendas. For example, during the 1967 war, Israeli extremists pressured successive Israeli Cabinets to use the names Judea and Sumaria when referring to the West Bank. The names evoke biblical history, and for these Jews there is no question of whose land it is. The extremists avoid labeling the area the "West Bank" which has neutral overtones and leaves open the possibility of debate.

Third, the extremists are willing and quite able to simplify their positions into brief cliches. When an Israeli extremist is asked why Israel should keep the West Bank, he replies simply, "'It's ours.'" Similarly, an Arab extremist, in explaining why he won't settle for half of Palestine, says simply, "'It's all ours.'" The moderates in both cases will give long, involved replies that don't stand a chance against a short two or three word response. The media responds to simplicity, and the extremists are adroit

at exploiting the media.

Fourth, extremist violence has a vastly wider base than we care to think. Extremists remove all distinctions between groups of people, and without distinctions violence is easier to carry out and rationalize. So it is not the rise of the extremist fringe but of an extremist center that is most worrisome.

Fifth, extremism feeds on itself, on frustration, on insensitivity, and there is an abundance of all three today in the Middle East. Mr. Friedman describes the process as a chain reaction: extremists relate and respond best to other extremists and their activities. In disregarding distinctions that exist among their enemies, extremists treat entire groups as a single unit, offending them and evoking hate from all factions. When these groups see that all political alternatives have been exhausted without producing successful results, they yield to a sense of impotence that produces intense frustration which, in turn, encourages the continuance of extremist activities.

Mr. Friedman concluded on a pessimistic note. Lebanon, where there is no longer a political center and politics consists of uncontrollable, competing extremist groups, is a microcosm and a harbinger of things to come. He is fearful that the trends in Lebanon are spreading to other areas in the Middle East.

COMMENT

Does the media contribute to extremist groups by giving them excessive coverage? The extremists know how to exploit the media, said Mr. Friedman, but the media is not the source of extremism.

What's happening to the quality of religion under the threats of violence? Certain values are emphasized or de-emphasized to suit the needs of the extremists. History and texts are used as a tool to pervert ethics and to rally followers.

Is the failure of the U.S. to be "streetwise" in handling the Lebanon situation a problem of the present administration? It is extremely difficult for any administration (and the U.S. soldier) to understand the Lebanese environment. In Lebanon, there is no sense of community or national identity. American culture prepares us for a black and white distinction between good and evil, leaving us ignorant of the subtleties that exist in cases like Lebanon.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1984

EAST-WEST RELATIONS: ARE WE HANDLING THEM RIGHT?

with

Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Guest Scholar, Brookings Institution

Is the U.S. handling East-West relations right? Mr. Sonnenfeldt contends that the overall answer must be positive for, whatever our fears and conjectures about the future might be, we can look back on forty years when the explosiveness of the huge military power has not been used. That in itself is a significant achievement. The problems of East-West relations involve other actors besides the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the diversity and national aspirations of these actors complicate the issues.

Even in periods of relative consensus in the U.S. as to what should be our purpose with respect to the Soviet Union, we have had a good deal of trouble defining that purpose. Some people look back to the containment period of the late 40s with nostalgia. But a good many then thought the containment policy excessively militant; others found it defeatist, having the effect of legitimizing Soviet acquisitions in Eastern Europe. Still others thought it intrinsically impossible for the Soviet system to mellow, whether contained or not. The grand solutions--such as German unification and the Baruch plan for international energy management--failed to materialize because they would have required changes within the Soviet system itself, changes the Soviet elite could not accept. Was the U.S. mistaken to lay out notions of broad settlements because it presupposed something accomplishable? Sonnenfeldt believes that it was and adds that excessive expectations did, and still do, exist.

The most comprehensive effort to normalize East-West relations occurred during the 70s. This involved formal recognition by the U.S. of the Soviet Union as a superpower with global interests; modest measures of arms control; forms of crisis management; some economic opening and other contacts with the Soviets as a means of leverage and as incentives for restrained international conduct; an opening to China to show the Soviets

it could not build its policy assumptions indefinitely on the supposition of U.S.-China hostility; a modest opening to Eastern Europe; and, most importantly, maintenance of a military balance. All this may sound formidable but it was extremely modest.

In some ways, detente of the 70s was based on inaccurate assumptions, especially in Moscow, which thought the U.S. weaker than it was because of Watergate. So they pushed too hard for superpower status and for security. U.S. opinion swung away from detente because the Soviets did not take human rights seriously into account in their own country or in Eastern Europe. The political left in the U.S. felt the arms control agreements had no impact on defense budgets and the right felt they had no impact on Soviet arms control. Fear of nuclear war did not act as a catalyst for broad settlements but sometimes even provided the backdrop for "games of chicken to see who would flinch first, under the fear of holocaust."

The U.S. must deter expansion of Soviet power and continue to prevent war simultaneously. If either is pressed to extreme, the other will suffer. To keep a balance between the two, Mr. Sonnenfeldt advocates a continuous dialogue with the Soviet Union; a realistic approach to arms control; encouragement of change in Eastern Europe; and avoidance of ambitious hopes of what can be accomplished.

COMMENT

When asked to comment on the implications of East-West relations in the Third World, Mr. Sonnenfeldt sees the danger of U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation in particular places on the globe--Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, the Middle East (but not in Namibia)--rather than in abstractions about weapons development or the failure to make certain arms control agreements.

Is a loan default in Eastern Europe effective leverage in dealing with the Soviets? "Debtors have more leverage than creditors!" said Mr. Sonnenfeldt. Eastern Europe is not a natural economic entity; the countries there are reducing their dependence on the Soviet Union. Is a grain embargo effective leverage? It would be wiser for the West to induce the Soviets to make more investment in agriculture, rather than see them sell their petroleum to buy grain. Such investment in agriculture would put strains on the priorities the Soviets have set for themselves in their resource allocations.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 3 OCTOBER 1984

CHINA IN THE GREAT POWER TRIANGLE

with
Donald S. Zagoria
Professor of Government, Hunter College

The changes inside China since the death of Mao in 1976 have had a fundamental impact on domestic and foreign policy and are, in Dr. Zagoria's view, irreversible. The degree of flexibility and experimentation shown by the recent Chinese reforms far surpass that of the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin over thirty years ago.

Deng Xiaoping is at the heart of the reforms in China. He initiated the de-collectivization of agriculture and instituted the so-called "household responsibility system," under which output has risen thirty-six percent over the past five years. Peasants are allowed to retain all profits after they have met their quotas. Such incentives have created a new economic class of rich peasants in the countryside.

In the industrial sector, the old Stalinist priorities on heavy industry and defense have been replaced by a new emphasis on light industry, consumer goods, agriculture and raising the standard of living. Central planning still exists, but factories can sell their excess products directly to the market rather than to the state and use the profits for bonuses, new technology, new plant, marketing, etc.

At the macro-economic level, there is a growing tendency toward indirect economic levers rather than direct planning. In some areas, a price system is being used. The economy has opened up to the West in an effort to expand trade. Special economic zones have been created for foreign investment. Although leaders are willing to experiment with the economy and there is popular support for changes, Dr. Zagoria does not want to exaggerate the reforms. China is still a communist country: there are no free elections, the media is strictly controlled and labor camps for those with different political ideologies still exist.

Despite the achievements of Deng's reforms, there are formidable obstacles that could block more extensive changes. There is no coherent plan for a quasi market economy as price reforms are being cautiously examined. Experts are confronted with the questions: is there a market socialist economy of the Yugoslav variety in the future? can the capitalist

economic zones be combined with the state controlled economic zones? Social tensions have already erupted and are growing between the more affluent rural areas and the urban centers because the workers and intellectuals feel they are not keeping up with recent increases in peasant income. However, one can be cautiously optimistic. Deng has restored the faith of the people that had deteriorated under Mao's political and economic failures and has shown that he is determined to keep up the reforms. Nothing succeeds like success itself, and China has been growing eight to ten percent over the past few years.

Turning to China's role in the Great Power Triangle, Dr. Zagoria predicts that there will be no alliance of any two against the third. A tactical detente exists between China and the Soviet Union, with an increase in trade and cultural exchanges and a reduction in polemics. Both countries must "cool things off" because China must concentrate on modernization and remain flexible to get concessions from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The Soviets want to break up what they see as a U.S.-China alliance against them. Geopolitical competition will increase between China and the Russians in areas such as Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Mongolia, India, Pakistan. The three Chinese demands for better relations--withdrawal from Afghanistan, disengagement from Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, reduction of Russian forces on the Chinese border--are not likely to happen, and military strategic competition between the two countries is bound to grow. U.S.-Sino relations are a different story: a mutual interest in increased trade and a peaceful Asia, along with a common fear of Russian expansionism, have improved relations.

COMMENT

What are the structural communist party differences that have allowed the Chinese to be flexible while the Soviets have remained rigid? The Russians have a siege mentality, a fear of being surrounded by hostile nations. They have no geographic boundaries. Military power is an intricate part of their history, which accounts for their defense psychology. In addition, fifty percent of the population is non-Russian. On the other hand, the Chinese do not have an ~~inferiority~~ complex, have no history of being invaded, are not defensive, and have no minority problem.

How will the takeover of Hong Kong affect future reforms? Dr. Zagoria foresees some difficulties for the Chinese in the area. They want to be selective in what ideas they take from the West. They must realize that, once the door is opened, they will get a "dose" of both the flaws and the vitality of Western society.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 17 OCTOBER 1984

THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT OVER PALESTINE

with

Joan Peters

Author of From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine

There has been an inversion of history. So concludes Joan Peters, author of From Time Immemorable: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine, after seven years of research in the Middle East. Her research showed that crucial alleged facts and assumptions that are the basis of the Arab moral and historical claims concerning Palestine are fundamentally unsound. There is an enormous amount of evidence available on the period of Turkish rule of Palestine and British stewardship of Palestine. From the evidence, it is possible to do original research into historic and modern migration patterns of Arabs and Jews in the region. The result of such intensive, careful research yields evidence for an Arab-Jewish, as opposed to an Arab-Israeli, conflict.

When these essential but previously unconsidered factors are put into context, a whole new set of premises emerges. Contrary to popular belief, the Jews did not displace a teeming native Arab population from an ancestral homeland. Actually, the reverse took place. Arab immigrants moved in a natural migration pattern or they were imported under the Turks and later under the British. In historic Palestine and well into the twentieth century, Palestinian Jews and Christians were terrorized and often driven from their homes by traditional Muslim mob violence directed at religion and not at nationalism.

The British facilitated illegal Arab immigration from Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya and Sudan into western Palestine between the first and second world wars. The immigration was rapid and played a great role in preventing a Jewish majority, which would, in turn, have established the mandated Jewish national homeland into the Jewish state.

During World War II, the British government barred Jewish entry into Palestine, declaring the land "overfull." At the same time, the British government in Palestine officially imported tens of thousands of Arab immigrant workers. Consequently, those who

were termed "native Palestinian Arabs," from time immemorial excluded from their homeland, often were Arab newcomers or "instant natives." The Arab "refugee" was often someone who had lived for a total of two years prior to 1948 in the land that became Israel. Thousands of the reported Arab "refugees" in 1948 had not fled from Israel at all but instead were needy itinerants from all over the Middle East who, according to United Nations records and documents, were identified as refugees from Israel in order to receive the available benefits.

The findings of Ms. Peters' research led to some startling conclusions. The Arab leaders' traditional manipulation and oppression of their own peoples, a sinister intrigue that was assisted by British duplicity, prepared the synthetic moral grounds for what is known today as the Palestinian problem.

To know what self-determination means between the Arabs and Jews, one must know the true history of Palestine. It is history that is used to invoke the moral claim of the PLO charter. History must be investigated and findings need to be looked at objectively. "When one sees that the history rebuts the claim, it cannot be allowed for the same claim that was used to invoke the moral responsibility to be used and rebutted at the same time," declared Ms. Peters. The solution is not simple, but the truth and logic of the Palestinian problem are evident.

COMMENT

When asked what she expected from her book, Ms. Peters replied that, with new evidence put into context, there is a need for reassessment of what justice is for both sides. She hopes her book will be useful in finding a settlement.

Why haven't the neighboring wealthy Arab countries with small populations absorbed the Arab "refugees?" Ms. Peters feels that the fundamental problem still exists: there is a Jewish state in the midst of the Muslim world and the Arabs must keep their hostilities directed against that Jewish state. Their claim as "refugees" serves as a propaganda tool which works to their benefit in the continuing conflict.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 30 OCTOBER 1984

CAN THERE BE PEACE WITH SANDINIST NICARAGUA?

with

H. Joachim Maitre
Professor of International Relations, Boston University

With the November 4 elections in Nicaragua, attention has been drawn to the internal affairs of that Central American country. The debate over progress to democracy in Nicaragua has taken a new turn. There is more criticism in the U.S. than there has been heretofore. One wonders how there can be "free elections" while there is neither freedom of the press nor freedom of assembly. For many Nicaraguans, the government is a hoax; they bitterly joke that there is one difference between the constitutions of the U.S. and Nicaragua: in both countries there is freedom of speech and assembly, but only in the U.S. is there freedom after the assembly.

Prominent Nicaraguan citizens have accused the Sandinista government of widespread corruption and of flouting the ideals of Marx and Lenin. In an article in The New Republic, Robert Leicken recently accused the ruling clique of abusing the mandate given to them by the rebellion in 1979. One is reminded of past allusions--and delusions--on the roads to socialism in Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, Castro's Cuba and, last but not least, Ho's Vietnam.

In an attempt to gain support, the Sandinistas lowered the voting age to sixteen in the belief that the youth of Nicaragua would guarantee an overwhelming victory in the coming elections. They seem to have miscalculated. During the annual Rally for Independence in September, a group of young Nicaraguans jumped the border into Costa Rica asking for asylum. For students to take such a drastic step without consulting with their parents and teachers, there must be something wrong on the road to justice in Nicaragua.

Speculating about the November 4 elections, Professor Maitre referred to a

quote by the leader of an unsuccessful protest march against the East German people by its people, "Now that the people have forfeited the government's trust, it is time for the government to elect itself a new people." Professor Maitre feels this will happen in Nicaragua.

Obviously, the Sandinistas will control and win the elections. In that case, can there be peace with Sandinist Nicaragua? Opinion alone will not suffice. Proof is needed that the Sandinistas are not aiming for peaceful rule in Nicaragua and in Central America. No such proof is to be found in the party program. However, at a June conference, the socialists were told by a leading commandante of the Sandinista junta that a union between the parties had to be struck to do away with all pretense of a so-called pluralist democracy.

It is best to listen to the observations of Nicaraguans who are not in a party position, in analyzing the situation. In a recent New York Times article, a leading Bishop stated that the elections serve only as a smoke screen behind which there is nothing but sheer will to power. He goes on to say, "After five years of euphoric illusion, revolutionary myths and painful deviations, Nicaragua is now a living lesson for the entire continent. Once again, it is proven that the ideological dogmatism and materialistic schemes do not meet human needs. Sandinista mechanisms for domination deny the fundamental rights of all peoples. Man is nothing more than an instrument of labor--one more soldier for the goal of world domination...peace efforts could cost all eternity."

COMMENT

Is any country within its rights to do what the U.S. has done in Nicaragua? In reply, Mr. Maitre pointed out that the 1979 revolution drew support from the U.S. in the form of $170 million in economic aid. In 1979, the Sandinistas pledged free elections in one year, but soon after they embarked on exporting their revolution by supplying arms to the guerrillas in El Salvador. The U.S. explanation for its support of the Contras is to stop the export of arms from Nicaragua.

Assuming that Nicaragua behaved "properly" in foreign affairs (i.e., according to U.S. standards), would there be any reason for the U.S. to accept the Sandinista regime? The U.S. would probably accept the regime unless a "rollback policy" seemed preferable to "containment." The U.S. will not tolerate the Sandinistas exporting revolution.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 8 NOVEMBER 1984

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS

with

Sally Shelton, Vice President-Economics, Bankers Trust Company

and

William E. Colby, Senior Adviser, International Business-Government Counsellors

In 1979, Willy Brandt's North-South Commission recommended transfer of resources of some $60 billion a year over several years for the development of the less developed world. In recent years, over $300 billion has been pouring yearly into Latin American countries in the form of loans. The transfer of resources stemmed from the oil crisis and the large amounts of available OPEC money, which the banks recycled to enable the developing countries to buy oil. The problem now is that the carrying charges on the debts are a huge burden on the borrowing countries; when the dollar went up and the economies had a recession the burden became enormous. It takes forty per cent of export revenue to carry the debt.

In August 1982, the inevitable occurred. Mexico could not pay its debt. It was a major crisis for the banks involved. Soon other countries found themselves unable to pay their debts. The banks negotiated and settled for rescheduling the loans. The impact of the debt on the economies of these countries influences their internal politics. In Latin America, there is a population growth of about three per cent, so those countries not expanding by at least three per cent are getting progressively poorer. At the same time, the austerity programs implemented (increase in exports, reduction in imports, limits on the growth of wages) create pervasive problems. Wages indexed up eighty per cent relative to inflation, as advised by the IMF, have resulted in the decline of real wages by twenty per cent.

This is a formidable problem for any type of government. Recently, Latin America has been turning away from authoritarian, military government toward civilian, democratic governments. It is dangerous for a civilian government, in transition from an authoritarian government, to exert on the working class the pressure demanded by austerity programs. Economic instability can make democratic governments vulnerable to demagogues who can use unstable conditions to defy the IMF and repudiate their debts.

So What practically can we do? Serious international negotiations are needed to work out debts. There must be movement of more capital, not capital to pay debts but capital for growth. Although small local and regional banks will not lend more money, the larger banks, to protect their investments, will.

Private investment can move capital, but for the last ten years private investment in Latin America has been consistently denounced. The developing countries are not interested just in the capital; they want the training and the technology too. An increase of exports from lesser developed countries can help the situation, but to what countries can they sell their exports? To protect their own industries, developed countries discourage trading in certain products.

The real crisis, in Mr. Colby's view, is not a debt crisis but a political crisis. We could see Latin America move ahead to a whole new dimension of growth capabilities. Brazil, for instance, could have the same kind of growth experience that the U.S. enjoyed in the 1880s and 1890s. After all, we too had political corruption and social problems, and we did a lot of growing on foreign capital. We can help Latin America experience growth or we can close our eyes and let the demagogues take over.

COMMENT

What happens if a demagogue takes over and a country defaults? Ms. Shelton said that it depends on what kind of moratorium on debt repayment is declared and what the political conditions are. Chile cannot make payments on its debt and will not be able to do so for two more years. Arrangements can be made for rescheduling, but if there is no willingness to come to an agreement, the lending banks will claim property, bank accounts and real estate in this country.

Where do we go from here? Ms. Shelton said that we are by no means out of the woods. Major obstacles lie ahead. To start overcoming them, the government must get more involved, and our markets must become more accessible to Latin American countries. IMF conditions must be relaxed and set in a more reasonable time frame for achieving targets. Pressure must be applied to debtor countries to attract investment, both domestic and foreign. Patching things together could get us through the next few years.

N.S. Sally Shelton, who was to have given the presentation, was unavoidably detained at a business conference, so William Colby gave the presentation before Ms. Shelton arrived to participate in the discussion period.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 19 NOVEMBER 1984

THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

with

Anthony Lake
Five College Professor of International Relations, Mount Holyoke College

Partisanship in politics has affected U.S. foreign policy. With that statement, Anthony Lake argued five points to substantiate his thesis: First, over the past twenty years or so, the U.S. has been much less consistent than previously in pursuing a foreign policy that reflected a sense of enduring national interests. The twists and turns of foreign policy have tended to reflect patterns of U.S. domestic policies. New Presidents insist theirs will be a new foreign policy, making the U.S. the only country in the world that changes its national interests every four years. Since it takes eighteen months for a new adviser to get over the doctrines of campaign rhetoric and reach a period of pragmatism, which period lasts about a year before the beginning of another campaign, our allies and the Soviet Union find it hard to understand what U.S. foreign policy really is.

Second, the U.S. can afford such a pattern less and less in a world of diffused power. The U.S. twenty five years ago was in a position of extraordinary power in the world. In absolute terms, U.S. power is much greater today but, in relative terms, it is not. Other nations have developed economic and military power.

Third, the relative confusion in U.S. foreign policy reflects a systemic change in how we make foreign policy in U.S. society, a change which we have not yet fully recognized. Today's foreign policy elite tends to spend most of its time attacking one another on doctrinal grounds rather than looking for common grounds.

Fourth, foreign policy is produced not by Washington and not by bureaucratic politics alone but by the whole U.S. society. Over the past twenty five years or so, every institution involved in U.S. society that is involved in the making of foreign policy has become more torn by ideological and partisan hostilities. Making a distinction between democratic debate that tends to debate issues for the sake of the issues themselves and

partisan debate that tends to twist those issues for partisan advantage, Dr. Lake did not argue against more debate on foreign policy issues but how to debate those issues.

Congress is much more involved in foreign policy but is not more responsible. It is much more willing to "take on" a President but finds it much easier to posture and then "duck" on foreign policy issues, leaving the President to take the responsibility.

And last, Dr. Lake finds no easy answers to the problems. It is not possible to go back to some golden age of the late 40s and 50s when there was a consensus and a general doctrine that guided U.S. foreign policy with less ideological warfare.

To sum up, the President is trapped by promises of easy success; the public rewards easy promises and then gets disillusioned; the foreign policy elite is more interested in their careers; the Congress and press are increasingly more involved but not willing to take responsibility.

COMMENT

Is it possible to concentrate authority for formulating foreign policy in one agency? It is possible, but Dr. Lake does not believe it should be in the State Department but in the White House. The Secretary of State must be the President's main spokesman: the White House should make the policy and that policy should be run by the State Department.

In other responses to questions, Dr. Lake deplored the practice of those members of Congress who go abroad and try to persuade foreign governments not to go along with settlements the President is trying to negotiate. Foreign governments get tired of American "spokesmen" coming to them saying, "You must understand we're a democracy, so I'm going to negotiate a treaty with you and then go back to my government and try to get it approved. Meanwhile, you stay by its terms."

Every President since World War II has come into office saying that the Secretary of State is going to be in charge of foreign policy, but not one has been able to do it. The State Department does not have a political constituency. More and more issues affect farmers, labor unions, etc., and all the other government departments have their political constituencies but State is in a weak political position without a political constituency. Presidents look more and more to National Security Advisers to help frame the issues in the political terms they want.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 27 NOVEMBER 1984

HOW TO COPE WITH THE SOVIET THREAT

with

Richard Pipes
Baird Professor of History, Harvard University

Are the Russians behaving or are they not behaving? How do you get them to behave? The detente people believe that if you use positive stimuli you get positive responses; the hawks believe that if you are tough you will get positive responses. But neither approach works. We have to find out not only how to stop them from being aggressive but also why they are aggressive in the first place. Then you go back to history, then to ideology, then to the structure of the Soviet system. Why does the Soviet system have problems and how can we exploit these problems to make the Soviets less of a threat? Professor Pipes' thesis is: the Soviet system as it has existed, especially since Stalin came to power fifty years ago, is ruled by a small elite that enjoys extraordinary privileges and powers which it has no right to enjoy even in terms of its own constitution, and the only way it can enjoy them is by creating artificial tensions, i.e., a continuing warlike condition. There is always a warlike hysteria, an essential for the elite to maintain itself in power.

The world crisis we have had since World War II is basically conditioned, in Professor Pipes' opinion, by the need of the Soviet Union for this kind of tension. He is optimistic in thinking the Stalinist system has reached a kind of dead end, both political and economic. It no longer works. In many respects, the Soviet Union has economically fallen behind and, further, it faces a threat of falling behind militarily. The political setup that Stalin created no longer does its job because it is concerned with its own survival.

If this is the case and we deny the Soviet Union economic assistance, if we deny it political legitimacy by making concessions to it, if we make it expensive for the Soviets to try to compensate for internal favors by external aggression, then Professor Pipes believes it may be ready in the foreseeable future to follow the path of post Maoist China. There are forces in the Soviet Union making for change. If we withhold economic

assistance we help these forces. Professor Pipes looks forward to the day when forces inside the Soviet Union make it imperative for these changes to take place.

COMMENT

Is there any alternative way to get the Soviets to define their legitimacy and their competence with us on grounds other than military? Our transfer of technology and capital to the Soviet Union, according to Professor Pipes, makes it easier for the Soviet Union to develop militarily. Soviet resources are limited. Since the early 70s, the Soviets have found that they don't have enough to go around. There are three sectors of the economy--capital investment, consumer and military--and the Soviets do not dare touch the consumer sector. The capital investment sector is growing less rapidly, with some of the slack taken up by western assistance. The economists and the military are very worried about the future of the economy.

Rates of economic growth are rapidly falling. Workers are not working properly. The Soviet Union is a giant conglomerate with all the problems of a conglomerate. These problems have to be solved by decentralization and by giving inducements to peasants. If we give them high technology, we allow them to substitute technology for the worker and retain their rigid system. We have a marginal role but it is an important role. The Soviet Union can survive the way it is and the system can go on the way it is but it cannot maintain its enormous global ambitions and maintain the system.

The system simply does not generate enough to maintain all the responsibilities that the State assumes. The military, Party people and Security people are against reform. The engineers, scientists and economic managers are for it. There is a need to stimulate initiative, for where there is initiative the system works well. Take the construction worker who moonlights and works on his own or the farmer who brings in his crop on time when he gets paid for it.

In further comments, Professor Pipes pointed out how the Soviets have developed higher education which produces engineers, for instance, who can build bridges as well as we can. But when it comes to social problems the government believes in "fairy tales" from the mid 19th century that have no bearing on modern life. It is impossible to challenge the Party doctrine on any subject.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 5 DECEMBER 1984

STRATEGIC DEFENSE OR NEUTRALIZATION OF GERMANY

with

Freeman Dyson
Professor of Physics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

The Austrian State Treaty of May 1955 is the greatest achievement in arms control in the years since World War II, according to Professor Dyson. It is more important than the ABM and SALT treaties, which deal with weapons rather than with people. Until 1955, Austria had been divided into zones of occupation: Soviet troops in the eastern zone, American, British and French troops in the western zones, with a divided regime in Vienna similar to the divided regime in Berlin. The treaty abolished all of this. All foreign troops were removed, perpetual neutrality was pledged in the constitution, and Austria was established as a free, neutral and independent state. Today Austria is a prosperous, stable and westernized state, and despite its proximity to the USSR, there have been no signs of Soviet dissatisfaction in the thirty years since the signing of the treaty.

This happy state of affairs raises several questions: what was the price paid to achieve it? why did the Soviet government accept it? would a similar treaty bring similar results elsewhere? The price paid was quite small: Austria paid the USSR a substantial sum of cash and wrote into its constitution a pledge of perpetual neutrality. The Russians were happy because the treaty pushed back the border of the NATO alliance by one hundred miles.

For the Soviet Union the problem of Germany tends to dominate all considerations. So long as missiles are deployed in Germany, there is no point in talking about missiles anywhere else. Professor Dyson suggests that an escape from the stalemate on strategic arms negotiations might be the "Austrianization" of Germany.

Professor Dyson proposes a treaty similar to the Austrian Treaty of 1955. Such a treaty would include: withdrawal of all foreign troops from German territory, east and

west; withdrawal of the two German governments from their respective alliances; constitutional pledges of permanent neutrality from both German governments; prohibition of nuclear weapons and nuclear capable delivery systems from German territory; prohibition of the use of force to reunify Germany; and finally, if the two governments peacefully agree to reunify, all obligations under the treaty devolve upon the successor government.

An agreement such as this would achieve two principal aims of NATO: the removal of Soviet troops and the removal of the SS-20s from German soil. Whether or not the Soviets would accept the withdrawal of its forces and missiles as a reasonable price to pay for similar withdrawals of NATO forces and Pershing IIs, no one can predict--one can only hope.

From a broader perspective, the neutralization of Germany would be a revolutionary development in European politics representing a move away from military confrontation and toward a new international order. The balance of power would remain stable, with two neutral states at the center of Europe. Concluding with a "cosmic unity" philosophy, Professor Dyson proposed the neutralization of Europe--Western European states as well as Eastern bloc countries--as the road to travel after the neutralization of Germany.

COMMENT

Who should make the first move and when should it be made? Professor Dyson replied that he did not know who should initiate the discussions. He suggests that the first step should be to raise the question publicly and see what reaction it produces.

When asked what his long term view of NATO was, Professor Dyson responded that, in the long run, alliances are not very good. The countries that have the best track record of defending themselves are those that stand alone.

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SUMMARY OF THE CRIA CONVERSATION OF 20 DECEMBER 1984

THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL

with

Leslie H. Gelb
National Security Correspondent, The New York Times

Will there be real changes on the arms control front? In reply, Mr. Gelb listed all the issues he feels the administration has to address in preparing for the forthcoming meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko.

First, there's the key defense budget items--the Strategic Defense Initiative and the MX missile--the administration believes are so critical to successful negotiations but which it knows will be in trouble in this Congress and over the next several years. Then there's the whole question of defensive systems. Some years ago, the Soviets asked us to ban space shuttles and we declined, saying they were for peace. Today the Soviets have a space shuttle. All this seriously complicates anything one might do with antisatellite weapons. Do we want to develop a ballistic missile defense system to protect just missiles or one to protect population? an air defense system?

Consider the relationship of defensive systems with offensive systems. Some in the administration want to keep the two systems absolutely separate, while others say we have already told the Soviets that we will discuss both. So are the defensive systems bargaining chips? So there's the relationship, within the offensive systems, on medium range missiles to intercontinental range missiles, separated in the last several years into two difference negotiations. The Russians have indicated they have no interest in merging the two, although Mr. Gelb feels merging would be a way out of the dilemma on both sides.

And what to do about sea launched cruise missiles, which are not included in any of our proposals. The U.S. plans to deploy 2,000 of these missiles with nuclear warheads over the next few years. The Russians will do exactly the same thing. And what about the Backfire Bomber, considered by some a medium range and by others an intercontinental range bomber? It was fought over at SALT and a separate agreement was decided on. The Reagan administration has included it in its START proposal on intercontinental range forces, but that will not be acceptable to the Soviets.

What to do about existing treaties which have lapsed? SALT I was ratified and is generally observed by both sides; SALT II was not ratified but neither side has violated its terms. Next year we face a decision as to whether to destroy two Poseidon submarines as we deploy a new Trident submarine. Some strong forces in the administration are against such a move; others say we must not destroy forces without an agreement.

On the verification demands the administration has made, Mr. Gelb feels the Soviets will have to understand that the future of arms control hinges on more provisions for verification. And unless Soviet violations of existing treaties are cleared up, there won't be any more treaties. Should the USSR complete the big radar under construction in central Russia, facing the directions it now faces, it will be in violation of SALT, although the Soviets claim it will not be. If they violate any treaty, we should withdraw from that treaty. A stopgap interim agreement could reaffirm the antiballistic missile treaty, cut off the competition in the antisatellite area, and find a modest way of combining the Soviet START proposal with our own.

Although Mr. Gelb's analysis, by his own admission, paints the bleakest of pictures, he is not a gloomy pessimist. The process is getting started again, and that's good. The health of the economy and national security problems are practical necessities in resuming arms control talks.

COMMENT

Will a new process get going as a result of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting? Although the two sides will not make any concessions they have not already planned, there is a serious interest on both sides in reducing tensions for reasons that have little or nothing to do with arms control: economic concerns, political concerns, internal politics. U.S. focus will be on START, the Soviet on stopping ASAT and underground nuclear testing and on obtaining a declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons. Neither side will agree to the other's priorities, but both sides will agree to continue to do business and avoid failure.

Should the talks be expanded to include our allies and the Warsaw Pact countries? The allies as members of the negotiating teams would not help at all, in Mr. Gelb's opinion; they would only add voices at the table with interests but not the necessary power and responsibility.

NEAR EAST REPORT

WASHINGTON WEEKLY ON AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST VOL XXX NO. 4 JANUARY 27, 1986

EDITORIAL

Still Waiting

Regular readers of *Near East Report* may note that this is not the first time that an NER editorial has carried the headline "Still Waiting." We don't use it again today because it is a catchy phrase—it isn't—but rather because it expresses our continuing frustration over King Hussein's reluctance to sit down and negotiate with Israel.

Perhaps the latest round of meetings in Europe will result in an announcement of the King's determination to join Israel in negotiations. But, so far, there is no evidence to that effect. On the contrary, the King seems to be continuing along the path toward *rapprochement* with Syria rather than Israel. We still do not know what transpired during that meeting last month between Hussein and Hafez Assad. We do know, however, that Damascus was not dismayed about its outcome. That in itself is a reason for pessimism.

Nevertheless, Israel's Prime Minister Shimon Peres remains committed to the Jordan-Israel peace process. Speaking on television on Jan. 17, Peres was upbeat. He conceded that King Hussein has not committed himself to peace but asserted that he would continue to work with the United States to bring Hussein around. Asked if Hussein was incapable of making peace, Peres said: "Such statements were made about all sorts of people including Sadat, but it turned out that he hedged until the moment that he stood up on his own two feet and walked." He said that he would not give up on Hussein or peace. "I will pursue this," he said.

It surely has not escaped Hussein's notice that, in Shimon Peres, Israel has a prime minister who is dogged in pursuit of a peace settlement with Jordan and is ready to make concessions to achieve it. On Oct. 1, however, Peres' term as prime minister will end. He will be replaced by Vice Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir—as committed to peace as Peres but far more skeptical about the "Jordan option" and Hussein's intentions. Moreover, he and Peres have very different views about the future of the West Bank. For Hussein then, this is the moment for some hard choices. He can come forward now or he can let the months go by and then try to blame Shamir's alleged "inflexibility" for stalling the peace process.

One can see the old pattern re-emerging. In 1947 the Arabs rejected the United Nations Partition Plan which would have created both a Jewish and a Palestinian Arab state. After 1947, Arab spokesmen indicated that they should have accepted that plan, as the Jews did. Today, Arab leaders think that they are making major concessions when they hint at accepting Israel in its "pre-'67" borders. Their claim is that they *only* want the "occupied territories" back. They pass over the fact that they vehemently refused to accept Israel or peace back in those pre-1967 days when they controlled the West Bank, Gaza, and east Jerusalem. For the Arabs the grass has always been greener a decade ago, or maybe two. They seem unable to recognize opportunity when it still exists in the present tense.

This, then, is a moment of opportunity and it is one that King Hussein should seize now. If he refuses to do so he will be left with nothing but nostalgia about those hopeful days of 1986 when peaceful compromise with Israel seemed a possible dream. It is his choice. Shimon Peres, joined by Yitzhak Shamir and the National Unity Government—as well as the Reagan Administration—await his response. □

VIEWING THE NEWS

Israel Refunds Aid

Israel's decision to refund $51.6 million in U.S. economic assistance to help the United States reduce its budget deficit met a strongly positive response in Washington. Under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget balancing act, Israel would have had to absorb a $51.6 million cut in economic aid (in addition to a $77 million reduction in military assistance). However, Israel had already received its economic aid for fiscal 1986 and was not required to return any of it. Nevertheless, because of the budget-cutting constraints of the legislation and the impact it would have on other foreign aid recipients, Prime Minister Shimon Peres personally offered to return the $51.6 million.

Both the Senate and House chairmen of the Appropriations Subcommittees on Foreign Operations applauded Israel's move. Sen. Bob Kasten (R-Wis.) said that Israel's action "was one of true friendship. While other nations carp about not receiving enough aid, Israel—which was under no obligation to return the money—voluntarily returned the funds. Once again, we see who our real friends are." Rep. David Obey (D-Wis.) said that Israel's decision indicates "a sensitivity to the additional squeeze mandatory budget cuts would have made on other countries if Israel did not offer to return the money."

Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said that Israel's action "only confirmed what I always knew about this uncommon ally. Israel has demonstrated once again that it takes its responsibilities as a U.S. ally seriously. At a time when so many of our other allies are distancing themselves from the United States and its policies, it is refreshing indeed to see Israel in our corner—although I'm certainly not surprised."

New Budget

Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai formally presented Israel's new $21.6 billion budget to the Knesset (*Kol Yisrael*, Jan.

(Continued)

ANALYSIS

Behind the Veil

Discussions of terrorism—like terror itself—have become commonplace. Unfortunately, according to one expert, much of the talk is still "somewhat muddled."

To help remedy that, the analyst, Ray S. Cline, and another expert, Yonah Alexander, both of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, have published a new book, *Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Warfare*.

"We are concentrating here not on random acts of violence but on the specific phenomenon of terrorism as a state-sponsored form of covert warfare," Cline explained at a press conference last week. "It's time for the United States . . . to make up its mind about the way to deal with what, in my mind, is a more urgent threat to our national security than the more celebrated and dramatic weapons like the ICBM."

Debates over nuclear arms may not add or subtract a great deal from U.S. security, Cline argued, but state-sponsored terrorism—intended to strike U.S. citizens, diminish Washington's influence abroad and destabilize America's allies—"is a matter of great strategic significance." The reason, the new book notes, is the "Andropov legacy." When Yuri Andropov took over as head of the KGB in the late 1960's the Soviets began to train, fund and arm the PLO—and through it anti-Western terrorists around the world."

The authors argue that Andropov's policy, begun with help from East Germany and North Korea, expanded to include working relationships with Syria, Libya, Iran, South Yemen, Iraq, Cuba and others. Despite ideological differences, Syria, Libya and Iran "take in each other's [terrorist] laundry," Cline noted. The U.S. and Israel top their target lists.

Transnational terrorism, Alexander said, includes elements of propaganda and psychological warfare. Displaying a PLO poster of a small boy holding a revolver and an Iranian poster of a man bleeding on an American flag drawn as a bed of spikes, Alexander warned that terrorism "will stay with us well into the 21st century."

He favored doing whatever possible to promote the Arab-Israeli peace process, but noted that relatively moderate Palestinian Arabs often have been assassinated by those more radical. A Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would not eliminate the Arab-Israeli conflict as a source of terrorism, Alexander added. Extremists would oppose such a solution and—in the Middle East and elsewhere—the Soviet Union, its allies and surrogates would continue to exploit local grievances.

Cline observed that organized terrorism "seeks to capture the attention of the [news] media." It is hard for the press to resist, "since terrorism essentially provides entertainment. . . . What I want is a greater sophistication when terrorist claims are broadcast." Cline said sympathy for terrorists as idealists driven to violence is misplaced. The media need to be more analytical about the terrorists' "inexcusable crimes" and do less justifying or repeating of their claims.

The Reagan Administration may be on the right track, Cline and Alexander believe. The recognition that counter-intelligence still needs to be improved, that legal measures are worth pursuing, and that in some cases force will be used—overtly or covertly—are among their suggestions for counter-terrorism. But the United States will have to persevere, both to bring along reluctant Western European allies and to make sure the public sees the "forest" of covert warfare, not the "trees" of solitary terrorist crimes.

□

—E.R.

HEARD ON CAPITOL HILL

Levine's Warning

Rep. MEL LEVINE (D-Calif.) has introduced a resolution which calls on the Secretary of State to issue a travel advisory warning U.S. citizens about the danger of traveling in foreign countries in which U.S. citizens are attacked by Libyan-backed terrorists. The warning would affect only those countries which choose not to close Libyan trade offices and diplomatic missions.

Explaining his resolution, Levine said: "We simply must find a way to encourage our allies to take sanctions against the Qaddafis of the world. American tourists spend millions of U.S. dollars in foreign countries. Issuance of a travel advisory results in the loss of millions of dollars in revenues to the countries for which the advisory is issued. If countries where U.S. citizens are attacked do not reduce their ties with Libya—and do not make their country safe for American citizens—then it is entirely appropriate for the U.S. government to take action to protect our people."

Middle East Trip

Reps. RON MARLENEE (R-Mont.) and HAL DAUB (R-Neb.) returned recently from a trip to Jordan and Jerusalem. The trip was sponsored by the World Affairs Council of Jordan, an organization headed by King Hussein's brother, Prince Hassan. The Washington-based National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) helped coordinate details of the trip.

Upon his return, Marlenee released a statement which called for increased U.S. support for Jordan and warned that "the U.S. Congress and the Senate had better reevaluate its position and support the King." He urged Congress not to "jerk the rug out from under the King and refuse the arms sale" and asked, "Will [the U.S.] support Jordan, its friend, or is it being blindly led by Israel?"

Student Workshops

AIPAC is holding five Regional Political Leadership Training Seminars for students during the first three months of 1986. A Midwest regional seminar on January 19 at Ohio State University was attended by more than 330 students from 18 different campuses.

Future regional seminars are as follows: *Lower New England:* February 9, Yale University.

Northern Pacific: February 23, Stanford University.

Southwest: March 9, University of Texas.

Upper New England: March 23, Brandeis University.

For more information please contact Richard Fishman at (202) 638-2256.

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PERSPECTIVE

Movement on Different Fronts

"There's something going on" is the way one Washington-based observer put it. "Hussein and Peres were both in Europe and met with some of the same people. If I wasn't such a pessimist, I'd expect a breakthrough."

An Israeli official traveling with Prime Minister Shimon Peres said that "very hard work is going on behind the scenes on how to move ahead." He said that the gaps between the Israeli and Jordanian positions on future negotiations "can be bridged."

Other officials said that the main obstacle facing the two sides remains the composition of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would meet Israel in negotiations. Jordan still wants PLO involvement while Peres rules out any dealings with those who advocate and implement a "policy of terror."

In Israel, the newspaper *Hadashot* reported on Jan. 20 that Peres was using every available means to let Hussein know that "time is running out and decisions must be made." The paper continued: "Peres is asking Hussein to make a courageous decision and include leaders who represent the inhabitants of the West Bank in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Another obstacle . . . is the composition of the international forum under whose auspices Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would conduct their negotiations. Hussein wants the auspices of the superpowers in the Security Council while Peres is prepared to accept a U.S.-Soviet international umbrella on condition that Moscow changes its attitude toward Israel."

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister and Vice Premier Yitzhak Shamir denied persistent reports that Israel and Jordan were already involved in direct negotiations. He said that there have been only "a few indirect contacts." There has also been speculation that Hussein and Peres had met in Europe. Peres himself issued a denial that any meeting with Hussein had taken place, a denial *Hadashot* labelled "diplomatically evasive." He said that "those who expect us to solve our problems over a cup of afternoon tea are wrong. I believe Hussein is serious in his attempts to bridge the gaps at the core of the conflict. We have not yet reached the right solution, but we have taken several steps in that direction."

Spanish Contacts

The Hague in The Netherlands was the setting for Spain's opening of diplomatic relations with Israel. It has been 494 years since the Spanish Inquisition and four since socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales came to power on a platform which included opening relations with the Jewish state.

Gonzales and Shimon Peres held a joint news conference at The Hague in a decidedly friendly atmosphere. Gonzales and the usually reticent Peres embraced. According to Israel radio, Gonzales told Peres that "you did not believe that I would establish diplomatic relations between our two countries after I was elected to office, and here it is happening before our very eyes." Peres spoke of the historic relationship between Spain and the Jewish people, claiming that Jews had helped Spain by discovering America. [Spaniards believe that Christopher Columbus was Spanish. Many Jewish scholars agree that he was both Spanish and a secret Jew or Marrano].

The opening of relations was big news in Israel which always welcomes relations with foreign states. Spain had been the only non-Communist European state (with the exception of the Vatican) without relations with Israel. Some observers had predicted that Gonzales would back away from his commitment to open relations in the face of renewed PLO terrorism but he was not daunted.

It is expected that the new Spanish-Israeli relationship will produce a spurt in the number of Jewish tourists visiting Spain, particularly since El Al flies there. Many Jews had avoided visiting Spain because of the memory of the Inquisition and because long-time Spanish leader Francisco Franco had been allied with the Nazis during World War II. Gonzales' action seems to have ended almost five centuries of estrangement between the Jewish and the Spanish peoples. □

—M.J.R.

VIEWING . . . *Continued*

20). "Modai said there is practically no precedent in the world for bringing down inflation as fast as in Israel over the past few months." Inflation in 1985 was down 260% from that of 1984.

The new budget anticipates almost no rise in the Gross National Product and none in the standard of living—which dropped considerably in the past two years. However, Modai said the income tax burden has been dropping significantly. Twenty-five percent of the budget is to go to defense—a much greater proportion than in most countries but representing new cuts in military budgets already reduced for several consecutive years.

Oil Plunge

"Massive output by producing countries in the face of slack demand" and a mild winter in the northern hemisphere contributed to a fall in oil prices "to levels not seen since 1979" (Associated Press, Jan. 22). The major U.S. domestic grade of crude, West Texas intermediate, sold for $20.90 a barrel, and Great Britain's Brent North Sea crude recovered 60 cents a barrel to reach $20.30 (by way of comparison, the price of oil in 1980 went as high as $34 a barrel).

The Saudis, who had kept prices up by producing at a 20-year low, "are now making up for lost time and pumping far more oil than their agreed [OPEC] rate," AP quoted Britain's *Financial Times* as saying. "As a result, the oil price is indeed falling out of bed. . . . this is partly, then, a struggle for power" among oil producers.

A White House statement pointed out that while oil exporters and debtor nations could be hurt, "the effect of a drop in oil prices on the U.S. economy and particularly on U.S. consumers is favorable."

Gemayel Resists

Syria's attempt to impose a "peace plan" upon Lebanon's warring factions is meeting strong resistance from President Amin Gemayel. Gemayel, who would be stripped of much of his power under the Syrian plan, is fighting Syrian-backed militias near Beirut. Artillery was used by both sides in battles ten miles from the capital. The Associated Press reports that Syrian army units have been deployed in mountaintop positions to back the militias against forces loyal to Gemayel.

Pro-Syrian Druze leader Walid Jumblatt blames Gemayel for the latest round of fighting. He predicted that Gemayel would attempt to consolidate an area that would extend through Druze territory down to Israel's security belt in South Lebanon. He said that Lebanon's problems would not end until Gemayel is "in his coffin." Israeli observers—noting that Israel no longer plays any role in the Lebanese struggle—say that most Israelis are not unhappy at seeing Gemayel stand up to Damascus as it attempts to consolidate its hold on Lebanon. □

BACK PAGE

Hoping Against Hope

The Reagan Administration is hoping against hope that something positive will come out of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy's latest round of shuttle diplomacy. It has been more than three years since the White House put out the word that King Hussein was ready for negotiations—but, so far, he remains on the fence. Nevertheless, the Administration keeps trying to entice him into direct talks with Israel. It deserves credit for that—although not when its enticement would come in the form of weapons Jordan could use against Israel.

It is not easy reading the conflicting signs emanating from Amman. On the one hand, Hussein tells U.S. diplomats and reporters that this year could represent the last chance for a Mideast settlement and that he is anxious for negotiations without preconditions. On the other, he is cozying up to Syria and endorsing Hafez Assad's view that no separate Jordan-Israel peace is possible.

Will the real King Hussein please stand up? Not likely. The Jordanian monarch prefers offending no one—neither Washington, nor Damascus, nor Jerusalem, nor Moscow. Jordan is a small country and it is understandable that Hussein would rather keep more powerful players guessing about which way he will go—especially if each offers inducements to join its respective side.

Still, there are pieces of evidence that Hussein is not quite ready to normalize relations with Israel. The government-controlled Jordanian press is one place to look for them. On Jan. 16, the Amman *Sawt Al Sha'b* ran an editorial on a subject fairly remote from Jordan's concerns, the Taba dispute which Israel and Egypt have just agreed to submit to arbitration. The editorial warns Egypt not to "once again . . . be a victim of the Zionist concept of peace." It refers to Israel not by name but repeatedly as "the enemy." It expresses outrage at Israel's demand for compensations by Egypt to the families of the victims of the Sinai massacre in which six Israelis were murdered by a deranged policeman. "This cannot be accepted, nor can its logic be accepted by any rational person."

It concludes that the Taba arbitration process is designed so that Yitzhak Shamir will be prime minister at the time of any change in Taba's status. It calls this "a clever ploy" because the "terrorist Shamir . . . [is] an intransigent negotiator to whose mind the map of greater Israel is still attached just as it is attached to the wall of the Zionist Knesset."

The slam at Shamir is nothing new but it is worth questioning how the Jordanians know that he is an "intransigent negotiator" inasmuch as they never agreed to negotiate with him when he was prime minister. As for the "map of greater Israel . . . on the wall of the Zionist Knesset," there is no such map. That map existed only in pre-Camp David Egyptian propaganda and now in Syrian propaganda. The Jordanians may know better but, like the Syrians, are mouthing tired lies about Israel with convincing zest.

It is easy to dismiss a single article in a single Jordanian newspaper as not representative of the prevailing Jordanian view. However, as the *Jerusalem Post* reported on Jan. 8, anti-Israel attitudes suffuse the Jordanian media. Two Amman newspapers *Ad Dustur* and *Ar Ray* report news from Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem under the headline "The Occupied Land." *Sawt al Sha'b* uses the headline "The Conquered Homeland." The image of Israelis in editorial page cartoons are right out of the Nazi newspaper *Der Sturmer*. According to the *Post*, Israelis are portrayed as having "crooked, humped noses and the image of a monster."

In short, Jordan's press is making no effort to sell the Jordanian people on the idea of peace with Israel. On the contary it continues to peddle anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic stereotypes—stereotypes which can help energize a people into going to war rather than to accept former enemies as friends. Anwar Sadat used to say that 90% of the Arab-Israeli conflict was psychological. If nations stopped viewing each other as enemies, agreements could be reached and peace attained. He was right. King Hussein may have personally accepted Israel's right to live in peace and security. But his government has made no attempt to bring the Jordanian people to that same conclusion. Until it does it will be hard to believe that Jordan-Israel peace is anything more than a wish and a prayer.—M.J.R. □

N.E.R.

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NEAR EAST REPORT

WASHINGTON WEEKLY ON AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST VOL XXIX NO. 51 DECEMBER 23, 1985

EDITORIAL

Jordan's Path

On Dec. 16 the United Nations General Assembly voted on—and passed—Agenda item 38, which consisted of four pieces of anti-Israel rhetoric. For those who may have thought that the United Nations was going soft, it may be instructive to consider some of the language overwhelmingly approved by the world body.

Item 38 declared that peace in the Middle East can only be accomplished through "the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem." It stated that any peace agreement must "enable the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to exercise its inalienable rights, including the right to return and the right of self-determination, national independence, and the establishment of its independent sovereign state in Palestine. . . ."

Item 38 condemned Israel's administration of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. It denounced its "increasing collaboration" with South Africa. It called Israel's treatment of the Palestinian Arabs a violation of international law. It urged member states to "cease forthwith, individually and collectively, *all* dealings with Israel in order to totally isolate it in all fields."

Most ominously, it declared that Israel is "not a peace-loving state." This phrase sounds fairly innocuous in view of the rhetoric that preceded it. But it is anything but innocuous. According to its charter, the United Nations is only open to "peace-loving states." By stating that Israel is not "peace-loving," the United Nations majority has taken another step toward expelling Israel altogether. It isn't likely to take that final step—if only because the Reagan Administration has promised to walk out if Israel is expelled. Still, the signs are clear. The United Nations of the "Zionism is Racism" resolution is alive and well.

Perhaps it shouldn't be a surprise—although it is—that Jordan, which supposedly is seeking peace with Israel, voted for the harshest anti-Israeli rhetoric. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria were the obvious leaders of the virulent anti-Israel onslaught. But Jordan—the Jordan which supposedly has embraced the peace process—also voted four times for a resolution which would deny Israel the right to exist in peace. It is not hard to appreciate the pressures Amman is under. After all, it can hardly afford to antagonize the militants who have about as much use for Jordan as for Israel. Nevertheless, peace does entail risks. In the Middle East, it certainly entails breaking away from the rejectionists who are set on a holy war to eliminate the "Zionist entity." Amman seems to believe that it can have it both ways. It can send sweet signals to Shimon Peres at the same time as it strives to maintain its *bonafides* with the radicals. It can't. Peace will require hard choices. It doesn't appear that Jordan is ready for them. □

VIEWING THE NEWS

Taba Progress

Kol Yisrael (Dec. 17) reports major progress toward resolution of the Taba boundary dispute. According to the report, recent Egypt-Israel talks have produced a "package deal" under which Israel will accept modified arbitration of the dispute in return for Egyptian moves toward normalization. Under the plan, Egypt's ambassador will return to Tel Aviv after the arbitration bill is signed. A Peres-Mubarak summit will then be scheduled and commercial and cultural ties will be renewed.

Labor and Likud have been sharply divided on the Taba question. Prime Minister Peres and his Labor party have been willing to accept arbitration of the dispute, as demanded by Cairo. Foreign Minister Shamir has insisted on conciliation, as provided for in the Camp David peace treaty. *Kol Yisrael* notes that, because of their differences, both Peres and Shamir will avoid placing Taba on the Cabinet's agenda. Peres has indicated that he might be ready to bring down the Labor-Likud unity government if Shamir blocks improved Egypt ties. Shamir is equally adamant. Neither, however, wants a government break-up yet.

Relations Renewed

Israel and the Ivory Coast announced after a meeting in Geneva between Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny that they will resume diplomatic relations. Peres said "that he expected ties also would be reestablished 'in the very near future' with two other African countries but declined to name them" (Associated Press, Dec. 18).

Israel now has ties with five black African nations: Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Swaziland and Zaire. Most African countries broke relations with Israel under pressure from Arab oil suppliers after the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir has made restoration of ties with black Africa a major policy objective.

Fundamentalists Foiled

In Tripoli, Lebanon's second largest city, "all funds and property of a fundamentalist Moslem movement have been confiscated" (Reuters, Dec. 16). The news service reported that the assets of the Islamic Unification Front, known as Tawheed, were confiscated by Lebanese police backed by Syrian troops.

Tawheed—which demanded an Islamic government for Lebanon—lost a five-week battle for the city with Syrian-backed leftist militias in September. An estimated 500 people died and 1,500 were wounded in the fighting, which received little press coverage in the United States. □

PERSPECTIVE

Diplomatic Options Reviewed

A senior Administration official told reporters last week that the United States would have a clearer picture of the Middle East diplomatic terrain after imminent meetings between Jordan's King Hussein and Syrian President Hafez Assad and between Hussein and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. The official, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified, offered a cautiously optimistic evaluation of the Arab-Israeli "peace process" in 1985.

He noted that a "convergence" of views had developed between Jordan and Israel in four main areas: the need for prompt and direct negotiations; agreement that the outcome of talks could not be guaranteed in advance; acceptance of an "international forum" for the direct talks; and recognition that a preliminary dialogue between the United States and a Palestinian Arab delegation should be shelved "as an unnecessary complicating factor."

The two outstanding issues between Amman and Jerusalem, according to the senior official, remain the nature of the international conference or forum which would set the stage for direct talks and the composition of Palestinian Arab representation. "Neither of these are simple issues and I don't want to minimize . . . the difficulties involved. Nor am I standing here today to guarantee early resolution of either."

The official said that Hussein believes that the PLO has not met its "historic challenge"—to give up terrorism in favor of diplomacy. He said that residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip resent the PLO for its past and present political failures but still identify with it. And while noting that "those who espouse violence don't have a claim to sitting at the negotiating table," he added that although Washington has "disagreements" with the PLO, it "is not at war" with the organization.

Amman's rapprochement with Damascus "does not mean that Jordan is "backsliding" on the peace process, according to the official: "Jordan from the beginning has said that it is not looking for a separate peace with Israel. Jordan wanted to sit with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, with an Israeli delegation but within an international framework to which Syria, Lebanon and Egypt . . . would also be involved." A recent Syrian-Jordanian communique which condemned any "separate deals" or direct negotiations with Israel left room for direct talks under some sort of international auspices, the official insisted.

However, other observers sound less hopeful than the Administration official. One, Rep. Larry Smith, (D-Fla.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, discounted what he said was the State Department's vague optimism. "The facts on the ground are insufficient to warrant any expectation of change."

An unofficial Israeli source saw a plus and a minus for the peace process in the year's developments. "I don't believe there was real progress, but perhaps some psychological progress. King Hussein is seen more clearly now as the true interlocutor—potentially—with Israel." But that change is mostly one of images, he added.

This source also believes that there was "some erosion of the U.S. position regarding the PLO." Administration representatives repeatedly stressed the firm policy of not dealing with the PLO until it accepts U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, desists from violence and recognizes Israel's right to exist. But the source recalled that the Prime Minister's office said that some U.S. officials wanted Israel to accept the PLO in the peace process without the organization's explicit recognition of the Jewish state.

An Israeli diplomat, who never subscribed to the characterization of 1985 as a "make-or-break" year for the peace process, felt "we achieved some kind of limited progress between Israel and Jordan about the need for some political process between these two countries. Everyone is more aware of the other's problems and difficulties. . . . But on the practical level, not much happened." —E.R. □

HEARD ON CAPITOL HILL

Mike Barnes' Plea

Congressman MICHAEL BARNES (D-Md.) has urged President Reagan to pardon five Washington-area rabbis who were sentenced to prison for protesting at the Soviet embassy. The rabbis are serving a 15-day jail term at the Federal Correctional Institute in Petersburg, Va.

In a telegram to Reagan, Barnes said that the sentences imposed on the rabbis were "unusually harsh." He added that their jailing is "an outrage, particularly in the middle of Chanukah and in light of the government's refusal to prosecute demonstrators in front of the South African embassy."

Barnes, who says that he has introduced a bill urging a Presidential pardon for the rabbis, noted that "it offends the moral conscience that those who protest harsh Soviet treatment of Jews would be so treated in our own system."

The rabbis were convicted of violating a Washington, D.C. ordinance prohibiting demonstrations within 500 feet of an embassy. They chose prison rather than pleading guilty.

More Arms Cosponsors

Reps. JAMES BROYHILL (R-N.C.), PAUL HENRY (R-Mich.), PARREN MITCHELL (D-Md.), WILLIAM NATCHER (D-Ky.), HENRY NOWAK (D-N.Y.), CHARLES STENHOLM (D-Tex.), PAT SWINDALL (R-Ga.) and HAROLD VOLKMER (D-Mo.) have cosponsored the resolution disapproving the arms sale to Jordan.

The resolution currently has 286 cosponsors. Supporters have vowed to bring the resolution to a vote if "direct and meaningful" negotiations between Israel and Jordan are not under way by early next year.

Markey Wins Freedom

Through the efforts of Rep. ED MARKEY (D-Mass.), 17-year-old Mikhail Stukalin will be allowed to leave the Soviet Union to join his mother and brother in the United States. Markey, a member of the Congressional Helsinki Commission, was in Moscow in September to discuss arms control and human rights issues and made a special plea on Mikhail's behalf.

Mikhail's mother had left the Soviet Union with her eldest son. His father, whose requests for an exit visa were repeatedly denied, died last June.

Markey said his intervention was "a simple humanitarian request."

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ANALYSIS

Syrian Missile Moves

In the last few weeks, Syria has moved several SAM-2, SAM-6, and SAM-8 surface-to-air missiles close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. The new anti-aircraft emplacements will make it much more difficult for Israel to continue its surveillance flights over Lebanon—flights necessary to monitor PLO and Shi'ite terrorist infiltration in that country.

Initially, Israeli reaction to the Syrian move was vehement. Army chief-of-staff Moshe Levy noted that shortly before the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon a similar Syrian missile deployment had resulted in Israeli airstrikes against the SAMs.

Speaking on television, Levy said that Israel "requires freedom of flight over Lebanon because there is no government there that is capable of ensuring what every sovereign state must assure in its territory. And if there are terrorists there, we must maintain the capacity to attack them and know where they are."

Privately, many Israelis conceded that Syria's decision to move the missile batteries to the border came after Israeli fighter pilots downed two Syrian MIGs in Syrian airspace on Nov. 19. At that time, Israeli officials stated that the Syrian planes had behaved in a threatening manner. But Member of Knesset Abba Eban, chairman of the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, now says that Israeli pilots made a mistake in shooting down the Syrian planes. According to the *New York Times* (Dec. 17), he believes that the Syrian missile deployment "apparently is a reaction to an erroneous act on our part." He says that there is little Israel can do about the missiles.

Israel could, however, attack the emplacements—a course which may become necessary if Syria shoots down an Israeli reconnaissance plane. Nevertheless, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin says that he does not expect a war. "In today's reality, given the existing lines between Israel and the confrontation states, I can see no political reason that would justify Israel's initiating a war," he said.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Shimon Peres said in Lod that he attributed Syria's military moves to Hafez Assad's "striving to attain leadership in the Arab world and to realize the age-old Syrian dream of 'Greater Syria.' " He said that Assad will seek "strategic balance" with Israel until he believes that strategic superiority is within reach. At that point, the fragile calm that exists between Israel and Syria could evaporate.

Not every Israeli shares the view that Syria's movement of the SAMs was provoked by the dogfight on Nov. 19. Military commentator Ron Ben-Ishai, writing in the Dec. 16 *Yediot Achronot*, said that "one can argue about whether the decision to shoot down the two Syrian MIG-23's . . . was correct" but it would be a "mistake to believe that this was the only reason the Syrians deployed the missiles" on the Lebanon border.

He pointed out that the anti-aircraft missiles require sites which are dug out in advance. Syrian preparation for the deployment "began far prior to the recent dogfight." He said that Syria's objective is not retaliation for a single incident but "to limit Israel's freedom to fly over most of Lebanon. The dogfight was only an excuse. . . .

"The main motive behind Syria's move is political. The Syrians consider Lebanon their exclusive zone of influence, and as long as Israeli planes fly over Lebanon without interference, their control there is not total." He noted that there is also the "military motive—preventing Israel from obtaining essential information on the movement of terrorists and the Syrian army. . . ."

Ben-Ishai added that Israel has to view the Syrian move as serious. Jerusalem cannot forgo the information it obtains from its reconnaissance flights over Lebanon. On the other hand, it understands that taking out the missile batteries would entail serious dangers for Israel—including, perhaps, Soviet military involvement or a Soviet-backed Syrian attempt to use SAM-5's to threaten Israeli planes *flying over Israel*.

That explains why Israel now seems to be downplaying the significance of the "missile crisis." Neither Israel nor Syria wants war. Rabin spoke for the Israeli leadership when he said that there "is no reason to panic." Israel will do everything it can—probably with the help of the United States—to help Syria climb down from the brink. □

—M.J.R.

HEARD IN WASHINGTON

Reflections from Breger

Marshall Breger, the Reagan Administration's liaison to the Jewish community from December 1983 to October 1985, now works as the chairman of the United States Conference on Administration. And although he makes it clear he has no intention of second-guessing his successor, Max Green, Breger still follows closely issues of community interest.

A former staff member at the Heritage Foundation, Breger said that he took over as liaison at an opportune time. "I came in after the Shamir-Reagan summit in November 1983. There was a clear change in the course of the U.S.-Israel relationship, with the President rejecting the idea of linkage between assistance for Israel—economic, moral and political—and specific Israeli policy decisions."

The liaison's job is to keep the lines of communication between the Administration and the community open for two-way traffic, Breger said. He found a desire among senior Administration figures to "understand and be knowledgeable about the views and concerns of the Jewish community"—even if they did not always accept political positions based on those views.

Breger cited three actions as peaks in his term as public liaison. They were the rescue of Ethiopian Jewry; the passage of legislation creating a Free Trade Area (FTA) between the United States and Israel; and the deepening of bilateral relations in general—including strategic cooperation.

The most disturbing moment during his tenure at the White House was the President's decision to visit the German war cemetery at Bitburg, where Nazi S.S. troops are buried. Breger, members of whose family are Holocaust survivors, felt the pressure from all sides. Acknowledging the strains the Bitburg visit created between the Administration and the Jewish community, Breger added that "the remarkable thing was that relations bounced back so quickly."

He said there was also a period of disappointment "in terms of our anti-terrorism policy, but now we are active. Some of the credit goes to Abe [Judge Abraham] Sofaer, the State Department's new legal adviser. We are moving to take strong action against terrorism," Breger asserted.

He defended the need for a public liaison. Praising the work Max Green is doing, Breger said, "It's important for the White House to know the pulse of the community. That's easy to lose in the welter of bureaucracy." □

BACK PAGE

Indicting the PLO

On Mar. 1, 1973, eight "Black September" PLO terrorists seized hostages at a reception at the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan. The terrorists immediately issued a set of demands which included the release from San Quentin prison of Sen. Robert Kennedy's killer, Sirhan Sirhan. They also demanded freedom for imprisoned members of the German Baader-Meinhof gang and for a group of *Al Fatah* terrorists being held in Jordan.

Twenty-four hours later—their demands unmet—the terrorists selected three of their Western hostages for special treatment. They were U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel, U.S. Charge d'Affaires George C. Moore and Belgian diplomat Guy Eid. The three were ordered to write farewell letters to their families, beaten beyond recognition, and then methodically murdered.

The terrorists then surrendered to Sudanese authorities who released two of them for lack of evidence. The other six were sentenced to life imprisonment but their sentences were quickly commuted. By November 1974, they were back with their PLO compatriots.

That might have been the end of the story. But it wasn't. It quickly turned out that the murders at Khartoum were not the random acts of Black September but were acts of premeditated murder which may have been ordered by none other than Yasir Arafat. Four weeks after the murders, the *Washington Post* (Apr. 5, 1973) was the first to report that Arafat was in Black September's command headquarters in Beirut when the order to kill the three diplomats was issued. The *Post*'s David Ottaway wrote that "it was not clear whether Arafat personally . . . gave the order to carry out the executions using the code word 'Cold River.' But there are reports that Arafat was present . . . when the message was sent and that he personally congratulated the guerrillas after the execution. . . ."

Today, almost 13 years later, declassified communiques released under the Freedom of Information Act point to Arafat's direct involvement in the murders. According to Neil C. Livingstone, co-author of the just-published *Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism*, a confidential State Department cable sent to Washington from the U.S. embassy in Khartoum on Mar. 7, 1973 stated that the terrorists "did not murder Ambassador Noel and Moore . . . until receiving specific code word instructions" from the PLO's Beirut headquarters. Even more damning is the alleged existence of a tape recording on which Arafat is heard issuing the order to kill the diplomats. The former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (and current United Nations ambassador) Vernon Walters said last month that it was "common knowledge at the time . . . that a tape existed."

Based on this evidence—new and old—several influential Washington organizations are seeking to indict Arafat for the murders of the two American diplomats. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, Attorney-General Edwin Meese has received the "new allegations" about Arafat's role in the killings. His indictment is, again according to a *Times* article, "under active consideration."

In practical terms, an indictment of Arafat by the United States would seriously cramp the PLO leader's style. It would make it impossible for him to visit the United Nations in New York without fear of arrest. An outstanding arrest warrant by Washington might also make it difficult for him to travel in Western Europe without risk of extradition to the United States. International airports would also be off-limits to him.

But, even more significant, would be an indictment's symbolic value. Author Livingstone writes that an Arafat indictment would be "an affirmation to the world that the United States does not take lightly the murder of its public servants and citizens" and that "terrorists do not go unpunished. . . ." He says that it would also "strip away [the PLO's] carefully cultivated face of respectability" and expose it and its terrorist allies as "the criminal gangs they really are." He points out that "an indictment of Arafat would not represent an indictment of the Palestinian people." Rather, it would remind the world, including the Arabs, "that law must prevail over violence . . . and that Palestinian interests are best served by people who understand this." □

—M.J.R.

N.E.R.

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AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS

By Howard I. Friedman, President

The American Jewish Committee welcomes the latest initiatives of Prime Minister Peres of Israel and President Mubarak of Egypt to improve relations between their two countries and to encourage efforts to broaden the Camp David peace process through direct negotiations. King Hussein of Jordan has indicated that he also favors negotiations on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and the participation of Palestinians in the framework of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

We welcome the signs of good faith manifested in Jerusalem, Cairo and Amman. We believe that the insistence by the Reagan Administration that the primary responsibility for resolving the issues in dispute rests on the parties in the Middle East has had a salutary and sobering effect within the Arab world. The repeatedly demonstrated readiness of the Government and people of Israel to make significant concessions for the sake of peace may also have finally evoked a positive response.

However, many difficulties remain. Indeed, it has become increasingly doubtful in recent days whether Yasir Arafat and the factions of the fragmented Palestine Liberation Organization that remain loyal to him are genuinely prepared to recognize the legitimacy of Israel and its right to live within secure and recognized borders, as required by Resolution 242. It thus remains to be seen whether King Hussein will be willing and able to enter negotiations with moderate Palestinian representatives, who are not officials of the PLO and who favor permanent peace with Israel in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian context.

There is thus no basis for premature jubilation. Indeed, the Hussein-Arafat joint agreement of February 11, 1985 is not only full of ambiguities but contains elements that are fundamentally inconsistent with the peace process agreed upon by the United States, Israel and Egypt. It falls far short of a serious peace proposal.

Yet one should not be overly pessimistic, for the peace process has always been fraught with difficulties. We are confident that the United States Government will continue to offer its good offices to aid all parties who genuinely seek peace through negotiations.

We trust that during President Mubarak's forthcoming visit to Washington, President Reagan will also impress upon him the importance that the United States attaches to full normalization of Egypt's relations with Israel as a necessary practical step in restoring the positive atmosphere to further the advancement of the peace process.

March 5, 1985
85-580-8

WHICH UN RESOLUTIONS?

On countless occasions in the past - and now again, in the Hussein-Arafat agreement - Arab leaders have referred to "UN resolutions" as an essential basis for any Middle East peace settlement. Actually, it is just another way of avoiding direct talks with - and recognition of - Israel.

Which United Nations resolutions do these leaders have in mind?

* On 10 November 1975, the UN (General) Assembly, taking note of the earlier Declaration of Mexico, which promulgated the principle that international cooperation and peace require, among other things, "the elimination of Zionism," referred to Zionism as "a threat to world peace and security" and determined that Zionism was "a form of racism."

* On 16 December 1982, the UN Assembly declared that Israel "is not a peace-loving member-state" and called upon all states "to suspend economic, financial and technological assistance to and cooperation with Israel, to sever diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Israel... and to cease forthwith, individually and collectively, all dealings with Israel, in order totally to isolate it in all fields."

* On 19 December 1983, the UN Assembly called upon all states "to put an end to the flow to Israel of any military, economic and financial aid, as well as of human resources" (Jewish immigration).

* On 13 February 1985, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned Israel "for its continued occupation of the Arab territories, including Palestine." ("Palestine" is a euphemism for Israel itself.)

These are just a few of a long list of UN resolutions on the Palestinian issue adopted, at the PLO's behest, by the UN's Arab-Moslem-Soviet bloc automatic majority.

In the course of the years, the UN's anti-Israel resolutions have become increasingly hostile, one-sided and inflexible. They ignore Israel's most elementary rights and interests and have now reached the point (see last item in above listing) where Israel's very right to national existence is openly challenged. Clearly, the blanket utilization of UN resolutions on the conflict - as advocated by Arafat - could easily produce a prescription for Israel's removal from the map of the Middle East. Needless to say, Israel will not acquiesce in the application of such a prescription.

The quest for peace in the Middle East will stand a chance of succeeding only if it builds on what has already been accomplished in this domain. And it must take into account two fundamental facts-of-life:

1. The only UN resolution accepted, so far, by both Israel and Arabs is Security Council Resolution 242, upon which the Camp David Agreements are based.

2. No peace settlement - in the Middle East or elsewhere - has ever been achieved without direct talks between the parties directly concerned.

Appendix

SOME RECENT UN RESOLUTIONS ON 'PALESTINE' AND ISRAEL

"The Commission on Human Rights ... Recalling World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 37.26 of 17 May 1984, which condemned Israel for its continuing occupation of the Arab territories, including Palestine....

"1. Resolutely condemns Israel....

"7. Decides to place on the provisional agenda of its forty-second session as a matter of high priority the item entitled, 'Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine.'"

(UN Doc. E/CN 4/1985/L 16, 13 February 1985)

NOTE: The words "including Palestine," in this resolution, indicate plainly that the intention of the framers of this document was to negate Israel's legitimacy in any part of Palestine!

"The General Assembly ... Calls upon all states to put an end to the flow to Israel of any military, economic and financial aid, as well as of human resources...

(102nd plenary meeting, 19 December 1983)

"The General Assembly ... Determines once more that Israel's record and actions confirm that it is not a peace-loving member-state... Calls once more upon all member-states.... To suspend economic, financial and technological assistance to and cooperation with Israel; To sever diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Israel; Reiterates its call to all member-states to cease forthwith, individually and collectively, all dealings with Israel, in order totally to isolate it in all fields;"

(108th plenary meeting, 16 December 1982)

"The General Assembly ... Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico ... 1975 ... which promulgated the principle that international cooperation and peace require ... the elimination of ... zionism....

"Taking note also of the Political Declaration ... adopted at the Conference ... held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology ... Determines that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."

(2400th plenary meeting, 10 November 1975)

Charles Krauthammer

3-8-85 WP A13

Questions for President Mubarak

In the last few weeks, Egypt has been all diplomatic motion, sending secret envoys to Israel and throwing up a variety of peace proposals. Israeli officials, starved for any hint of warmth from Egypt, are required to give any Egyptian gesture the benefit of the doubt. Americans, who are not so desperate, need not be so diplomatic. As partners to Camp David, they have a right to ask questions. The first is: Could there be a connection between this sudden peace offensive and President Mubarak's arrival tomorrow in Washington?

Mubarak comes to Washington to ask for $3.15 billion, plus forgiveness of unpaid interest on Egypt's $4.5 billion military debt. But he will have to mollify Congress, which is in no mood to grant him the money. That is because American largess was our part of the deal at Camp David. For its part, Egypt promised the United States two things: strategic cooperation with the United States and normal relations with Israel.

Congress will ask Question 2: What has happened to strategic cooperation? Its symbol was to be the Ras Banas naval base in southeastern Egypt. Sadat had promised President Carter military facilities at Ras Banas. The United States envisioned it as a staging ground for the Rapid Deployment Force. Mubarak scrapped the whole project. The reason is not sinister. Mubarak simply does not want to be closely associated with the United States, both for domestic and Third World reasons. As Prime Minister Kamal Hassan Ali once said, "We take weapons from the United States, but we are not aligned to the United States." How non-aligned? The United States asked Egypt to allow a Voice of America transmitter on its soil. Mubarak said no even to that. (It will be placed in Israel instead). Fair enough. Egypt is, as we say here, a free country. But if no quid, why our $3 billion quo?

The other half of the Camp David bargain was to be this: Israel gives up Sinai, a buffer zone three times its own size and its only source of oil; Egypt gives normal relations (the verb is strange, but so is the deal) and sends an ambassador to Tel Aviv. Question 3: How are relations and where is the ambassador?

Answer: The ambassador was recalled to Egypt over two years ago, and cultural, commercial and scientific agreements are nearly frozen. As Butros Ghali, Egypt's minister of state for foreign affairs, put it, relations are in a state of "cold peace."

Now, when the United States sponsored Camp David, it did not press Israel to give up all of Sinai for non-belligerency. Israel already had non-belligerency. That was guaranteed not only by the Sinai II disengagement accord of 1975, but by the preponderance of Israel's deterrent power. Israel gave up Sinai for normal relations. Not for the material benefits such relations would bring—they are hardly worth a tenth of the lost oil revenues alone—but because the example of open, routine commerce between Egyptian and Jew might persuade other Arabs to seek coexistence with Israel.

Egypt blames cold peace on the Lebanon war. However convenient an excuse that may once have been—in fact, the freezing of relations began long before Lebanon and accelerated with the Sadat assassination—it rings false now. Israel, under a Labor Prime Minister, is leaving Lebanon. (Likud committed Israel to withdrawing as far back as May 1983, in the treaty negotiated by Secretary of State George Shultz.) Furthermore, Shimon Peres is open to compromise on the West Bank, another "warming" condition recently created by Mubarak.

Well, says Egypt, Israel is still illegally holding Taba. Taba is a dot on the map. In fact, it is in dispute because, when the map was drawn in 1906, the lines were drawn in pencil. All of Taba lies under the width of the pencil mark! Suppose Taba did belong to Egypt. Israel gave up 61,000 square kilometers in Sinai. Taba is less than one.

For returning 99.99 percent of the land, what has Israel gotten? Israel has an embassy in Cairo with an Israeli flag flying over it. But the Israeli mission is totally ostracized by Egyptian society. The ghettoized Israeli Embassy in Cairo mirrors precisely the position of the Israeli state in the larger Arab world: an alien presence in quarantine. If that is what Israel gets for Camp David, then, in fairness, it should have given up Taba and kept the rest of Sinai.

We are now in the midst of a mini peace enthusiasm. The Mubarak peace offensive, however, is unusually empty, even by Middle East standards. Next week he will ask the United States to start a "peace process" by negotiating with a Jordanian-PLO delegation. This is a transparent attempt to get the United States to deal with the PLO, without the PLO's renouncing terror and recognizing Israel (America's longstanding condition for such talks). It is also a way to get Hussein off the hook of direct talks with Israel.

If the "process" is nothing more than maneuver, what of the "peace"? The peace everyone will be talking about next week is ultimately to be brought about, all will agree, by the "land for peace" formula. Well, land for peace is not just theory. It now has a history. That history—Camp David—suggests a final question, not only for Mubarak but for others eager to press Israel into new and riskier concessions: We can all see the land. Mubarak has Sinai. Where is the peace?

9.9

April 30, 1987

Books of The Times

By Walter Goodman

THE LOBBY. Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy. By Edward Tivnan. 304 pages. Simon & Schuster. $19.95.

AS lately demonstrated by the Iranian arms affair and the Pollard spy case, the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel can take discomfiting turns for Israel's friends in this country. So Edward Tivnan's assault on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Israel's main voice in Washington, is at least timely. Whatever reservations many American Jews may feel about Israeli actions, Mr. Tivnan argues, when it comes to addressing the White House and Congress, they tend to speak with one voice — that of this lobby.

It must be said at once that Mr. Tivnan's heavily delivered and fairly familiar charge does not include "dual loyalty." He concedes early that pro-Israel lobbyists are behaving like other lobbyists, if more effectively than most, and in accord with the expectations of the Founding Fathers, the letter of the law and the customs of American politics. What troubles him is the public-affairs group's success in influencing, for the worse, he maintains, American policy in the Middle East.

Mr. Tivnan, who has been a reporter for Time and "20/20," sympathizes with the Peace Now movement in Israel, which is more open than most Israelis to an accommodation with the Palestinians. He is exasperated that while citizens of Israel feel free to criticize their Government in public, many American Jews tend to hold back lest any show of discord hurt the Jewish state. He writes, with a typical touch of overstatement: "Total support of Israel had become a requirement of leadership in local Jewish communities throughout America. An American Jewish 'leader' could be married to a gentile, he could be a stranger to the synagogue, but if he became a public critic of Israel, he would soon become a former Jewish leader."

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The American Israel Public Affairs Committee's successes as recounted here are no secret; nonetheless, they are impressive. The lobby's main objective since its beginnings in the early 1950's has been to assure Israel of financial assistance; today, Washington gives that small country about $3 billion a year. The lobby's power rests largely on the readiness of American Jews to donate generously to politicians of both parties deemed to be friends of Israel and to withhold donations from those who are not friendly enough. In addition, Jewish citizens can be counted on to vote when and where it counts. And officeholders are aware that Israel remains popular among Americans of all faiths, at least as compared with its neighbors.

That popularity, Mr. Tivnan contends, is being jeopardized by the behavior of the Jerusalem Government, especially since the rise of the right wing, led by Menachem Begin. The gist of his chapter entitled "Jimmy Carter's 'Jewish Problem'" is that Israeli policies delayed the Camp David accords and have undermined them since they were signed. Like many of his views, this one invites rebuttal. The main point, however, is that "Jimmy Carter had more support for his policies in Israel than in the American Jewish community."

Although the book doesn't take us deeply into the private workings of the committee, it does offer a good illustration of the lobby's operations — the vote early in the Reagan Administration on the sale of five Awacs (airborne warning and command systems) planes to Saudi Arabia. The lobby narrowly lost that one, but only after strenuous senatorial arm-twisting by the White House. President Reagan, known as a friend of Israel, was driven to declare, "It is not the business of other nations to make American foreign policy." (Mr. Tivnan does not neglect the efforts of the Saudi Arabian lobby, but it isn't in the Israeli committee's league.) The defeat of Senators Charles H. Percy and Roger W. Jepsen is attributed to their votes in favor of the Awacs sale.

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"Is such an aggressive pro-Israel lobby good for the Jews, in Israel or in the United States?" Mr. Tivnan asks, and there is nothing ambiguous about his answer. He asserts, in a particularly questionable passage, that the silence of dissenting American Jews has "allowed AIPAC to sell a neoconservative version of the American Jewish community to the White House and the Congress." "Silence" is surely not the precise word for the uproar that continually enlivens Jewish public life, and no politician who reads the polls can believe that most American Jews are neoconservative.

Nor is the author's geopolitical analysis a model of subtle thinking. He calls King Hussein of Jordan "the man most actively in pursuit of peace in the Middle East," and his relentless attacks on Israeli policies are much stronger than his criticisms of such players as Yasir Arafat, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Soviet Union.

But you don't have to accept the thundering commandments to the Diaspora with which "The Lobby" concludes to grant that there is something to the book's main argument — that many American Jews do feel inhibited about speaking out on Israeli actions that are of legitimate concern to the United States. In treating that delicate subject in a not-so-delicate way, "The Lobby" is in keeping with the scrappy spirit of open controversy found in both America and Israel. It's one of the things that makes the relationship special.

Edward Tivnan

Critic's Notebook

Music That Says, 'Have a Nice Day'

By BERNARD HOLLAND

I SUPPOSE I ought to be appalled that so many new composers sound alike these days. Most of the recent pieces I've shouldn't get so upset about it.

People expect too much — sitting at every premiere, teeth clenched, hoping for a masterpiece to come out. Likely as not it won't. Nor should we curl our lip at the latest piano piece because it isn't the "Hammerkla- sure what will be going on five minutes from now. And music, of course, is a temporal business. Every listener in the midst of a piece sits on the just-happened, experiences the happening and tries to figure out the just-ahead. That's why Beethoven's

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE VIEW FROM ISRAEL

Presentations made at a conference
held under the auspices of the
Council on Foreign Relations
in cooperation with
The Dayan Center for Middle Eastern
and African Studies, Tel Aviv University
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FOREWORD

Cyrus R. Vance

Over the years, many of us have been puzzled by a relative scarcity of formal interchange between the scholarly communities of Israel and the United States, particularly in contrast to the numerous conferences and exchanges which American academic and research centers maintain with many other countries, including in Europe, Japan and even the Soviet Union. Why such a system of scholarly interchange has been so slow in developing with Israel I cannot begin to judge. But because I believe it is so important to nurture non-partisan and non-political dialogue among professional analysts of high awareness and credentials, I felt privileged to assist in the formation of the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University in December 1983 and to encourage a joint conference with the Council on Foreign Relations in New York last September.

Moshe Dayan is a man for whom I had the highest respect. The center for Middle East and African studies that commemorates his name will be the repository of all his papers. Except for some with still-active high security classifications, everything will be there for scholarly examination. This is a treasure trove, and the center has assembled a splendid faculty that is going to make a major contribution to African and Middle Eastern studies for the whole world to draw upon.

It thus seemed appropriate for the Council on Foreign Relations to invite the Dayan Center and its specialists for their first conference in the United States, to present some of their work-in-progress to a distinguished gathering of American experts concerned with the Middle East.

The Council has long been active with various research centers in the course of its Middle East studies program, through its individual members and staff. A Council Study Group was convened in New York in 1982 to examine the changes which came over Israel during the Begin era. Other groups have been engaged in similar work over the last three years on North Africa, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and the more radical forces evolving within the Arab world. In December 1983, the Council organized a small delegation of Americans and Canadians to meet with Arab thinkers and policymakers in Amman, at the invitation of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan.

The day-long meeting with the Dayan Center specialists which convened in New York fully lived up to the expectations of those of us who had helped bring it about. Initially we had no plans to publish any proceedings from what we anticipated would be a free-flowing exchange of emerging ideas among Israelis and Americans. All participants were

assured in advance that, consistent with longstanding Council practice, there would be no public attribution of views expressed, thus encouraging candor and a readiness to share emerging assessments and opinions as they develop.

But by the conclusion of the meeting, a number of us had found the presentations prepared by the visiting Israeli speakers and the American commentators to be of such high quality, with such broad interest to a community of experts far beyond the capacity of a single Council meeting, that we secured the permission of the speakers to publish a transcript of their opening remarks for distribution to an interested public. The Ford Foundation generously provided funding to the Council to underwrite the preparation and publication of this transcript. Although this record has been reviewed by each of the speakers for clarity and accuracy, it represents a report of an event that took place, not a publication of polished scholarly papers. Honoring the promise of confidentiality, no record was kept of the general discussions which followed each formal presentation.

The topics of interest were both general and specific. First, coming under intense scrutiny was the uneasy state of relations between Israel and Egypt, with speakers on both sides concerned about whether the present "cold peace" could survive, or would inevitably deteriorate unless positive steps are pursued to restore some of the promise we envisaged at Camp David and in the long negotiations for the 1979 peace treaty. Many of us view the present stalemate in this incipient relationship as most distressing, for the establishment of peaceful relations between Egypt and Israel surely represents the most constructive development the Middle East has known for many years.

The general understanding of Egyptians and Israelis for the concerns of each other has failed to evolve as we hoped it would, including relations on the economic, social and inter-personal levels. Israelis express frustration at how slowly contacts are developing between the two countries' academic communities. An American participant at our conference responded by describing the pressures and inhibitions on Egyptian scholars. Though long a cultural center of the Arab world, enjoying a tradition of relative intellectual freedom, Egypt now finds its scholarly community reliant upon other wealthier Arab states for research and publication resources -- and these include states which have not yet been able to come to terms with Israel as the late President Sadat did. Any public association of Egyptians with Israeli institutions, it was said, tend to dry up these resources.

Many of us believe that United States attitudes toward the two countries over the years to come will be colored to some extent by their measure of peaceful interaction, since the United States played such a catalytic role in bringing this constructive relationship about. It must be a central concern of American Middle East policy that nothing be allowed to reverse the progress that has been made.

The conference considered the complex triangular relationship among Lebanon, Syria and Israel. Many experts have argued that the United States has often failed to comprehend and accurately assess Syria's

interests in the Arab-Israeli conflict, yet even they seem to differ among themselves about what those fundamental interests are and, more significantly, what a fruitful American strategy should be in dealing with Syria. The Syrian regime of President Hafez el-Assad has held power for an unprecedented 14 years; even when the leadership eventually changes, however, analysts find little reason to believe that fundamental changes in policy would ensue. Some confidence was expressed that once Israel has managed to withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon, tacit separation-of-forces understandings could be established between Israel and Syria as they did in the 1970s, and the way for creative diplomatic activity would then be open. Considerable skepticism was expressed about what the parameters of such arrangements could be, and the question remained of how stable uncodified standoff understandings could be over the long term.

The rise of Shi'ite militancy in southern Lebanon was cited by Israelis and Americans alike as one of the most disruptive consequences of the Israeli invasion and prolonged occupation. With this as a current flashpoint, the wider phenomenon of Muslim fundamentalism obviously demands continued observation and discussion, for it presents challenges to American policy well beyond the more familiar political attitudes that have dominated policy considerations up to now.

American and Israeli experts compared assessments of the relationship emerging between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization, or at least that part of the PLO still loyal to Yasir Arafat. Several speakers remarked that it is more realistic to speak of "making progress" on the Palestinian issue than of "solving" it. Discussants from both countries noted that the future of the Palestinian Arabs is as much a problem for Israel as for the Arabs and the Palestinians themselves. The question was raised of whether the PLO can still claim to speak with authority for the million Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, as well as the millions more dispersed around the Arab world and elsewhere. This situation is in a state of flux, and seems bound to dominate the diplomatic scene for the months to come.

We noted signs that what was once considered Arab nationalism, or Pan-Arabism, appears to have fragmented into layers of competing nationalisms, defined more by frontiers and regimes than by any remnant of Arab unity. From Israel's point of view, as the conference amply demonstrated, the potential for instability across the Arab world makes Israelis even more hesitant about steps of accommodation with Arab governments. These are among the questions which American and Israeli specialists will be exploring in more depth with their counterparts from Arab academic institutions in future encounters which we hope will come about.

Finally, our conference considered the nature of the peacemaking process and the various obstacles that have to be overcome before serious negotiations and agreements can be realistically envisaged. There seemed a general sense that the United States must remain intimately engaged with as many of the leading parties to the dispute as possible, but that the time is probably not ripe for an outside power to seize the initiative

which properly belongs to the parties themselves. A new broad Israeli coalition is attempting to define its own priorities and assess its room for maneuver. Pending the definition of a clear Israeli strategy toward the diplomatic process, the United States role is to be supportive of moderating trends on all sides, and forthcoming with economic aid within the limits of the demands on our own economy, as the Israelis struggle to rationalize their inflated economy.

This transcript of opening remarks conveys the essence and flavor of a remarkable discussion at the Council on Foreign Relations. It will come as no surprise that the participants found as many areas of disagreement as of convergence in analysis. What is more notable, however, is that the opinions and assessments did not divide along national lines; Israelis and Americans alike found themselves in agreement and disagreement with their colleagues from both countries. This is just as it should be among scholars of high professional standing. This kind of probing intellectual exchange is what both the Council and the Dayan Center hope will grow among the many respected research institutions in the Middle East and the United States.

EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND THE ARABS

Speaker: Shimon Shamir

Seven years after Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, and more than five years after the conclusion of the peace treaty, the Israelis are still debating the original purpose of the Egyptian peace process. There is a very strong school of thought, possibly a majority, that maintains that the whole exercise was a tactical ploy on the part of Sadat: that the main purpose was simply to regain Sinai, that Egypt never intended to enter into a long and enduring normal relationship with Israel, that they obstructed the normalization process from the very beginning, seizing every opportunity to diminish it further, and to produce what the Israelis have termed "The Cold Peace," which stands today. Egypt's relations with the Arab world and peace with Israel are mutually exclusive -- sooner or later Egypt will have to return into the Arab world and sacrifice its commitment to the peace process.

There is another school of thought which maintains exactly the opposite, that Sadat's trip to Jerusalem did signify a major historical turning point. These people believe that Sadat had in mind an entirely new type of relationship when he spoke about comprehensive peace, that he didn't mean just two or three agreements signed with other Arab countries, but rather a restructuring of relations in the Middle East, the creation of a structure that will include Israel. There were hints in the direction that this would possibly mean a changed Israel, a different Israel -- but nevertheless, with Israel as a part of the system. Having reasserted Egyptian identity, Sadat could have regarded that as not being incongruent with national values and national interests.

There is, of course, a third version, and I suspect that historians would instinctively favor this version, which argues that there was no tactical plan and strategic grand design, that in fact there was no plan at all. Sadat simply, after having tried all other ways to achieve the restoration of Sinai, found himself in a situation where he had to negotiate a full peace. The agreements that he had in mind were a far cry from what eventually emerged, but once he started the process he found himself committed to it, personally and politically. He probably underestimated the reaction of the Arab world, but he had to stick to his guns. His successors simply inherited the situation, and now they have to live with it; they will make decisions in the future not according to any grand design, but on the basis of the changing circumstances.

Concerning the present state of Egyptian-Israeli relations, one increasingly encounters in the Middle East the notion that in spite of all the frustrations and the controversies of the "cold peace" situation, both

sides find it quite comfortable to live with. Political analysts and political personalities would tell you that while both parties complain loudly and bitterly about the violations of the agreement by the other party, in fact they are content to live with the realities of the "cold peace" situation. The Israelis, it is argued, having removed the threat of war from their southern borders, now enjoy a level of freedom of action which is unprecedented. If the price for exercising this freedom is a low level of normal relations with Egypt, this is not too high a price to pay. Certainly, the supporters of the settlement policy welcome the freezing of the autonomy policies which they rightly regard as restrictive and unpredictable. Similarly, the Egyptians, having regained Sinai, and benefitting today from the advantages of a peacetime situation on the economic and domestic fronts, now find it convenient to use every pretext to diminish the commitments to normalization and set the ground for a rapprochement with the Arab world.

The notion of the desirability of a "cold peace" is based on the wrong premises. It is shortsighted, and, in the long run, may be dangerous. Cold peace may sound better than cold war, but in fact it does not necessarily guarantee greater stability. One may also argue that cold peace is not even warmer than cold war. For example, it is not very difficult today for an American President to arrange a meeting with a Soviet Foreign Minister. There have been exchanges of students between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is not too difficult for an American businessman to do business in Moscow, at least in certain areas, but these things do not exist today between Egypt and Israel. The crucial difference in these situations is that the cold war is between two principal powers who have demonstrated that they can contain the dangers fairly well, while cold peace takes place in an extremely dangerous environment -- the unstable Middle East -- where a large number of forces are at play over which the two sides have very little control.

Above all, cold peace is not a static situation. It is a process of erosion. You can observe it in many ways. In Cairo, you can see that cold war means that the critics of peace get louder and louder, while the voice of the government is muted, to the point at which the very legitimacy of peace in the eyes of the Egyptian public is gradually being diminished. Simultaneously, the ability of this system to withstand the pressures of future crises gradually decreases. In order for the peace treaty to establish a reasonable level of security in the region, a much higher level of security is needed, as well as a much higher level of political and strategic coordination between the two parties. There needs to be a development of a whole network of relationships between the two societies -- cultural, commercial, social -- which would create a local interest that would want to pursue a peace policy, as well as give it backing and stabilize its value.

The cold peace situation cannot help the Egyptians to repair their relations with Arab countries. While those relations do not depend on the level of normalization with the Israelis, they are certainly affected by the existence or non-existence of a common interest. In analyzing what happened in recent years between Egypt and Iraq, Egypt and

Jordan, Egypt and some of the Gulf States, or between Egypt and Oman, the Sudan and Somalia in the very beginning of the process, this situation can be seen very clearly. Those countries which are interested in having relations with Egypt do not need much more than some form of legitimization for Egypt's involvement in the peace process. This can be achieved only by some progress on the Palestinian issue. Mubarak often indicated in his interviews to Arab newspapers that Egypt is the only country in the Arab world which managed to extract an Israeli commitment on the Palestinian issue. This is the way the Egyptians try to legitimize the process, and the key to this is dialogue with Israel.

The Egyptians must be realizing at this point that legitimization cannot be achieved, and there is no way of making progress on the Palestinian problem -- if there is any way at all -- but through dialogue with Israel: with its political leaders, with the Israeli public, and with those who sincerely want to find a solution to the problems of the Middle East. At present, neither of the two parties is doing any of these things. Israel has not undergone the conceptual transformation for which engagement in the peace process calls. There is little understanding in Israel of the fact that an Israel which is committed to a peace treaty with a major Arab country cannot enjoy the same freedom of action it had enjoyed before 1977 or 1979, and that every action or inaction will also have an impact on its partner in the peace process.

Israel must consider that self-imposed restrictions on the use of power will sometimes be necessary because of this partner. Israel, regrettably, has effectively shattered the Egyptian ability to rationalize peace with Israel in Arab terms. That rationalization is dependent mostly on two arguments: first, that peace with Israel does not expose other nations to Israeli power, and secondly, that peace with Israel does not mean the abandonment of the Palestinians, but on the contrary means finding a more effective way to serve their cause. In 1984, these arguments can no longer be used by the Egyptians for domestic or all-Arab purposes.

Egypt also has not undergone the kind of conceptual transformation that its peace with Israel requires. The conceptual framework and the vocabulary used by the Egyptians today when they discuss Israel has not changed, or has hardly changed, since the days of the most bitter years of the conflict with Israel. There is no understanding in Egypt of the difference between criticism of Israel's policies and categorical denunciation of the Jewish state and the Jewish people. One can witness this phenomenon. Anti-Semitic literature has increased since the beginning of the peace process, not diminished. The Egyptians have effectively shattered the faith of the average Israeli in the sincerity of Egyptian intentions. Many of the Israelis seriously doubt the sincerity of Egypt's acceptance of Israel according to the terms and spirit of the peace treaty.

To say, however, that the Egyptian-Israeli peace has not been developing in the right direction does not mean that it has ceased to exist, or that it has lost its importance. Peace in Egyptian-Israeli

relations is a reality. Tens of thousands of Israeli tourists cross the border every year. El Al flies, Egged runs its bus service, the Suez canal is now regularly being used by the Israelis. Oil flows to Israel, and Israel is perhaps the most important customer of Egyptian oil. The embassies are there, even if the Egyptian ambassador is absent from Tel Aviv. The Israeli cultural center operates in Cairo. There are still a number of joint projects, which operate in Cairo and in Jerusalem in spite of all of the present difficulties. These facts mark what may be considered the most important historical development in Arab-Israeli relations since 1948 -- probably the greatest single accomplishment of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, and the outcome of the most impressive manifestation of courage and leadership on the part of Middle Eastern statesmen. Nevertheless, precisely because the importance and the potentialities of the peace process are so great, it should have received a higher priority in the policies of the countries involved than it has received in recent years.

Commentator: Alfred L. Atherton

One of the great tragedies, perhaps, is that after these many years of peace, these many years of interactions between Egyptians and Israelis, going back to the first tentative encounters right after the 1973 war -- more than a decade of Egyptians and Israelis interacting with each other -- there is still so little understanding by each of the imperatives and motivations of the other.

Sadat did have a strategy behind the peace process, and it wasn't just a gimmick to get back the Sinai, it wasn't merely improvisation. Certainly he improvised tactically as he went along, but it was within a broader strategic concept of what he wanted to do -- not only in terms of Egypt, but in terms of the Israeli-Arab relationship, of the Palestinian problem, and of the structure of relationships in the region.

The question of Egypt's relationship to Israel on the one hand, and to the Arabs on the other, is not a zero-sum game. In other words, they are not mutually exclusive. The manner in which Eygpt deals with the Arabs and the Arabs with Egypt is largely in terms of their determination of what their interests require. The attitudes of Egypt toward its relationship with Israel is not solely a function of the attitudes of Egypt toward its relationship with the Arabs. I won't say that there aren't some in Egypt who do factor that in, and I won't say that that isn't at least a part of the larger equation, but it certainly would be an oversimplification to say simply that it was a zero-sum game. The Egyptian attitudes are much more complex than that.

There were those -- and still are in Egypt -- who really did cross the psychological watershed in their minds, and felt that the time had come to put wars behind them and to try to follow the vision that

Sadat had, to work for for some kind of a new structure and to try to make the normalization process work. But there were from the beginning, and there are today, others who had mental reservations -- and sometimes not just mental reservations -- outspoken reservations about the relationship.

A distinction should be made that not many people in Egypt have reservations about the decision to make peace, in other words to put an end to the wars with Israel. But many had, and many still have today, reservations about the nature of the peace. There are some who feel that it's much more comfortable simply to have an absence of war, to abide by the letter of the peace treaty, and despite accusations of violations on both sides, the main lines of the peace treaty have been observed by both Egypt and Israel. Those who feel this way believe one should be careful not to put very much flesh on the bones of that treaty, that there is comfort in the cold peace. There may be people on both sides who advocate that, although this could be a dangerous thesis -- for while the state of peace may be stable in the short run, there is likely to be a process of erosion over the long run. Even though the fundamentals of the peace treaty are still very, very strong in the commitments of both Egypt and Israel to that peace, there must be some movement in building this network of relationships over time -- and that's going to require some changes in mind-sets on both sides. This is also going to require some changes in policies.

Therefore, over time, the peace treaty will be subjected to growing stresses and strains. There is not a great likelihood of the treaty suddenly being abrogated, unless the worst occurs -- a fundamentalist Islamic revolution in Egypt, for example -- which is not foreseeable. So, again, I don't see a sudden dramatic falling apart of the peace treaty which would totally change the kind of Egypt we have today, only perhaps a slow erosion whereby the commitment to it would become less strong. The understanding of what went before fades into the recesses of history and memory in the minds of the new generation of Egyptians, and also a new generation of Israelis. So it can't stand still; we have to find ways to build on what exists, before the process of erosion that could someday become dangerous has begun.

If in fact the Egyptian position on its relations with Israel is not solely or even primarily a function of its concerns about its relations with the Arabs, then what inhibits President Mubarak and the present Egyptian leadership from taking some step towards improving relations, such as sending their ambassador back to Tel Aviv or getting out of the corner on the question of a visit to Israel by the Chief of State of Egypt? This latter isn't obviously a live issue today, but hopefully it will become one in the future, and President Mubarak is on record as saying he will not go to Jerusalem. This means there won't be any visitation at all, because no Israeli government is going to accept a visit of a head of state who won't even spend a few hours in what Israel considers its capital city.

What inhibits the Egyptian government from moving further in this direction? I think it is largely due to domestic considerations. There is not a lot of enthusiasm in Egypt for improving relations. There is

also certainly no apparent desire in Egypt to see the peace treaty break down, opening the possibility of another war. There are many people in Egypt, although not the President and the political leadership, who do not see what they have to gain in improving relations with Israel. There is a sort of sourness in much of Egyptian public opinion that has developed over the years since the peace treaty was signed as a result of disappointment over the failure of the autonomy talks; the failure of any progress of a meaningful sort to be made toward the resolution of the Palestinian issue; the episode of Lebanon climaxing with the Sabra and Shatila incidents, which led to the withdrawal of their ambassador; the settlements policy of the Likud government being pursued -- all things which tend to make Egyptians a little bit embarassed in terms of their own sense of national identity, their own sense of Arabism. Egyptians do not feel very comfortable about getting too close to an Israel that pursues these kinds of policies. Therefore, it's politically popular for Mubarak to keep the relationship a little bit in the freezer.

There's another consideration that should be kept in mind, however. Mubarak can't ignore the issue too much, because he is well aware, as are all thinking Egyptians, that the state of their relations with the United States and the very large amount of military and economic assistance that Egypt gets from the United States could not have come about if it hadn't been for the peace treaty, and that the continuation of the special relationship with the United States, which the Egyptians still like to talk about, depends upon the continuation of the peace treaty. This, therefore, is one inhibiting factor, as far as most Egyptians are concerned. Even though Egyptians like to pull out the stops a little from time to time, in terms of making political hay domestically by some of the things they say and do toward Israel, they have to keep an eye on their American constituency, as well as their domestic constituency.

I think, all things considered, that President Mubarak has walked the fine line reasonably well, given the various cross currents that he is subjected to. There are many who say that if Sadat were in power, he would not have gotten into the position that Mubarak has, withdrawing his Ambassador, then finding no way to send him back, or refusing to go to Jerusalem. On the other hand, part of Sadat's problem was that he came to be perceived as going too far towards trying to satisfy Israel's requirements -- even to the point where there were those who questioned the extent to which Sadat was really putting Egyptian interests first. In fact, part of the erosion of Sadat's image toward the end of his regime was precisely the impression that he was more an instrument of American policy than of Egyptian policy in the eyes of particularly nationalistic Egyptians.

I would close by saying the challenge is to find some way to help each side understand the mind-sets, the imperatives, the perceptions of the other. This has been true of the Arab-Israeli conflict for a long time; it is particularly discouraging that after this many years there is still such a gap, such a void of ability to understand each other. There are some individuals who try to keep those lines of communications open, and it seems the best policy then to try to maintain and exploit what

small opportunities there are to keep these channels open until circumstances evolve to the point where perhaps there can be some movement.

The fact that Shimon Peres is going to be the Prime Minister of Israel may help, as there is a possibility that the Egyptians will see some Labor leaders in power in the coalition government in Israel as something they can try to build on. The Egyptians have always done a lot to try to cultivate the Labor Party in Israel, and they have found it very difficult to keep any kind of a dialogue going with the Likud leadership, particularly since Begin left the scene. Therefore, it seems to me there is a chance that there would be at least some tentative probings and responses from the Egyptian side to any signal that might come out of Israel these days. It could be argued that Egypt ought to make the signal, but I think it very unlikely that Mubarak will be the one to send the signals. But if there is any kind of signal out of the government of Israel, which includes the people that the Egyptians feel more comfortable with, I think we would find at least some tentative responses to it.

The Israeli temptation, sensing that something to this effect is a possibility, is to repeat 1967. In the face of arms buildup, growing Soviet presence, provocations perhaps, an incident of serious magnitude could become the pretext for a pre-emptive war.

The logic of either of those moves doesn't sound so compelling in 1984 -- the Syrians are not ready, Israel certainly isn't in the mood, as I would read it from the outside -- but it's conceivable to imagine a relatively stable period over the next several years while both sides prepare for a war that neither one feel they can fight today. This is what I think one has to worry about. The early warning signs will not necessarily grow out of trouble in Lebanon. I don't think there's a direct relationship between the two -- there might be a very quiet situation in Lebanon as regards Syria and Israel. Therefore, this should not be a clue as to whether or not the larger war is a possibility. It does seem to me that there is a kind of logic on both Israel's side and Syria's side later in the decade to really try to break the stalemate with a major strategic move: in the Israeli case, as in 1967, with the hope for a massive destruction of Syrian military equipment, discrediting the most hostile leader on the Arab side, and on the Syrian side, there is the temptation to recreate something analagous to 1973.

THE ISRAELI/ SYRIAN/ LEBANESE TRIANGLE

Speaker: Itamar Rabinovich

I'd like to begin with a brief episode. British Foreign Officers in the Middle East used to write quarterly reports with a paragraph at the end of the report which predicted the trends expected in the quarter to come. In January 1954 the British Ambassador in Damascus was surveying the regime of Adib Shishakli, who was the Syrian dictator at that time. The Ambassador took a very sanguine view of Shishakli and his regime, so much so that the last sentence of the report read as follows: unless he commits suicide, Shishakli is here to stay. That was in January 1954. In February 1954 Shishakli was deposed by a military coup and everybody in London held their breaths, waiting for the first account of the coup to come in from their Ambassador. When it arrived, it soon became a classic in the annals of the Foreign Office because it opened with the following sentence: "Close scrutiny of the events that have unfolded in Damascus in the past forty-eight hours inevitably lead one to the conclusion that Shishakli committed political suicide...."

Looking at the present Syrian-Lebanese-Israeli triangle in the context of settlement or peace arrangements in the Middle East, three major questions or issues arise: first, the settlement in Lebanon, including the Syrian-Israeli component of the settlement of the current Lebanese crisis, second, the question of a settlement in the larger Syrian-Israeli relationship; third, Syria's position toward, and role in, a prospective settlement of other components of the Arab-Israeli conflict, primarily that of a prospective Jordanian-Israeli settlement. In more complete terms: should a Reagan initiative or another initiative be revived concerning a Jordanian-Israeli settlement, what would the Syrian position be and/or what would the Syrian impact on that process be?

There are two assumptions that have to be disposed of before we deal with these three issues. One is that the domestic situation will not change and that the regime will remain in place in the foreseeable future, at least in the next year or so. That is a complex assumption, almost as complex as the position in January 1954. Last November, an era ended in Syrian politics. It began in November 1970, when Assad seized power in Syria, and for the first time in modern Syrian history provided Syria with an effective and endurable regime. The last fourteen years represent the first period in which Syria has had an effective, stable government that has functioned over a long period of time. If one compares that to the previous thirty-five years of Syrian politics, this is a very impressive,

unprecedented record. As a result, Syria, for the first time, could carry out a sustained and continuous foreign policy. At times, both the United States and Israel have had reason to regret the effectiveness of that Syrian foreign policy. But the policy was there.

At the root of that stability and effectiveness was obviously the personality of Hafiz Assad, but also the fact that for the first time, power was taken or seized in Syria in November 1970 by a leader who had unquestioned authority, and who led a group of which he was the unquestioned leader. It was a group remarkably free of internal friction, and this helped to provide the regime with that stable nucleus which has accounted for this effectiveness. Apparently, this is disappearing. When Assad became seriously ill in November 1983 and a struggle for succession ensued, this erosion in Assad's authority became more apparent until it assumed, in some cases, violent manifestations.

Even if Assad has been able to stabilize this situation, even if his health is at least for the present under control, it is possible that in the not too distant future, trouble may resume. I would not suggest that we take Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlas -- and some of the most ferocious statements to have come out of Syria -- literally. He is not the most authoritative spokesman for the regime. On the other hand, this is a regime in which the Minister of Defense does not make statements of this nature in a vacuum. It is an indication that the problem is serious and that at any given moment, whether because of Assad's health or because that firm nucleus in the center has come to pieces, there would be a change in the stability to which we have become accustomed in the past 14 years. Syria has been a key actor in the Middle East for the past few years, particularly so in the last two years, and particularly a key actor in the triangle which we are discussing. Obviously a change of regime is going to have a very profound impact on that.

The second assumption concerns the potential resumption of hostilities. As we are dealing with prospects for peace in the Middle East, we should never forget that there are dangers and risks of violent outbursts in the region. There does not seem to be any reason for either party to launch hostilities in the foreseeable future. But the potential is there in Lebanon and in the prospective Syrian reaction to a resumption of Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. Again, while not suggesting that this is a likely eventuality in 1985, we should remember that certainly for the longer range, this is a potential problem.

Let me now turn to the three issues that I mentioned at the outset, starting with the question of settlement in Lebanon. What do we mean by "a settlement in Lebanon"? There is a larger Lebanese crisis, a crisis that can be defined as generated first by the inability of the Lebanese themselves to agree on the nature of the Lebanese state, on the distribution of power within that state, and on the interaction between the domestic conflict and the actions of external powers since 1982 -- less so the PLO and several other actors, more so Syria, Israel and the United States. The interaction between the domestic actors and the external participants has been the most important component of the Lebanese conflict. I do not think that this problem can be resolved.

The Lebanese political system is doomed by the rising power of the Shi'ites and by the change in the external circumstances in which it operates. It is unfortunately the beginning of a process of transformation, and there will be responses and provocations from the outside. Within that general context, we are presently enjoying a relatively calm stage, and the Gemayel administration has done relatively well in consolidating its hold. We should remember, however, that when one refers to "the Lebanese army" one does not speak of a normal army. Rather, one speaks of an army in which the brigades are built on a congregational basis. There is a Christian brigade, a Druse brigade, a Shi'ite brigade and so forth. We are using doublespeech when we discuss normalization in Lebanon. But in relative terms, the past few months saw a success of the consolidation efforts of the administration, and of Syrian efforts to support the administration.

Syria's success has largely been the result of the lowering of Israeli sights, indicated by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Beirut to the outlying rivers a year ago. The decision of the Israeli Shamir-Arens government not to continue the ambitious policies launched in 1982 by the Begin-Sharon government could only represent partial transformation, because it was in part a government of continuation, not representing a total break with its immediate predecessor. It was a Likud government with different personalities, and therefore the Israeli disengagement from the center of Lebanese politics was only partial. Even that degree of disengagement, however, obviously increased the Syrians' ability to maneuver and operate in Lebanon and then re-establish themselves as the single most influential actor on the Lebanese scene.

The questions now arise -- can Syria and Israel come to a renewed understanding in Lebanon? What about the Israeli presence in South Lebanon? Syria and Israel had, between 1976 and 1982, a very curious and controlled relationship in Lebanon in which they acted sometimes on the same side of Lebanese politics, sometimes on conflicting sides of Lebanese politics, knowing each other's actions and limitations, and working through the red lines established by American diplomacy. On the whole, given the adversary relationship between Syria and Israel, the ability to do all that for six years was remarkable. This collapsed in 1981, and then further in 1982.

It can be argued, however, that the potential is there for reviving the Syrian-Israeli tacit and indirect dialogue in Lebanon. The Syrians were out to destroy the May 17, 1983 Israeli-Lebanese agreement, but in the process they realized that Israel has legitimate security concerns in South Lebanon. As long as these are not formalized in a treaty that resembles Camp David, the Syrians might be willing to tolerate such concerns. This would be more difficult to establish in the eastern part of Lebanon. There the motivation is stronger, but there are other considerations involved that weigh heavily with the Syrians. A separation of forces would be appreciated by both sides.

The question is how to formalize something that the Syrians do not want to formalize. This is not beyond the limits of creative diplomacy. What has already been accomplished in Egyptian-Israeli

relations was more difficult to achieve than a Syrian-Israeli separation of forces in southeastern Lebanon would be. There is a general Israeli desire to disengage in southern Lebanon. This is agreed upon by both the Likud and the Labor partners to the coalition. Once there is a government that does not represent an obvious continuity to the Begin-Sharon government, it will be easier for Israel to deal with the question. There are still going to be serious problems, though. What to do with a city like Sidon when the Israeli army pulls out? Can General Lahad and the South Lebanon Army really be trusted with controlling such a large area populated mostly with Shi'ites? Is Yasir Arafat not going to go back to Sidon? Are there not going to be massacres in Sidon between Sunnis, Shi'ites and Christians that would be far more sinister than the massacres that have already taken place in Lebanon in 1982 and in 1983? These are questions that one would have to contend with.

There is also the question of whether Israel is essentially going back -- only on a larger scale -- to the model of pre-1982 with an Israeli presence on the Israeli side of the Lebanese-Israeli border, and local militia providing a cordon sanitaire on the Lebanese side of the border. A larger scale means an essentially Shi'ite population in the South but with General Lahad -- a Maronite general of an army with many Shi'ite volunteers. Will that army be effective? For now, these will have to remain open-ended questions, but they do represent serious problems for every Israeli government wishing to disengage from South Lebanon and hoping to replace the current situation with something more desirable for all parties.

The second issue relates to the question of a larger Syrian-Israeli settlement. Three components make up the Syrian-Israeli conflict, or relationship: the question of the Golan Heights, the Syrian-Israeli conflict in Lebanon, and the larger role that Syria wants to play in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Syrians, for instance, have indicated (this was very clear in 1977) that they would not settle merely for an Israeli withdrawal in the Golan Heights. Rather, they would insist on a Palestinian component, their interpretation of that component meaning that the Palestinians must be a part of any settlement. What about the three components of the relationship? The Syrians are doing quite well in Lebanon now. They are not likely to make concessions on another front in order to get Israeli concessions in Lebanon. That may have been true in 1979-80, but it is not true in 1984-85. There is not much that the Syrians and Israelis can agree upon in the Golan Heights at present. In theory, a Syrian-Israeli settlement concerning the Golan Heights can be discussed. Assad is not Sadat — Assad will not give what Sadat has given and cannot expect to get what Sadat received. This suggests, in theory, possibilities for a creative diplomatic mind. This is not the time, however. It would be futile to try to have the Syrians and the Israelis talk at present about a settlement in the Golan Heights.

We come then to the third and final component: the anticipated Syrian reaction to potential Jordanian-Israeli negotiations, which is likely to be negative. We are likely to see a repeat of what we saw in November 1980. At that time, it was said that when Hussein considered the

possibility of coming aboard the Camp David process, the Syrians concentrated troops on the Syrian-Jordanian border and threatened to take action. This possibility has to be contemplated seriously in case of a resumption of the Reagan initiative in 1985. The Syrians will take strong exception to such a procedure. It would be regarded as being in the Camp David spirit, leaving them not just on the sidelines, but also as the only ones not to have regained the territory lost in 1967. It should be borne in mind that Hafiz Assad was the Minister of Defense, bearing formal responsibility for the loss of the Golan Heights in 1967, under very controversial and dubious circumstances. This means that he has a problem in that he would not want his to be the one Arab state to remain without redressment while Egypt and Jordan have been provided for.

Furthermore, this situation ties into a larger consideration of Syrian foreign policy. The Syrians have been sending messages to the United States, quite effectively in the past two years, to the effect that no settlement in that part of the Middle East will be attained without talking to Syria, and that a trip to Cairo to arrange matters in the region will not be successful unless it also goes to Damascus. If the United States goes to Beirut and to Tel Aviv and does not go to Damascus, it is going to less than the complete list of addresses that have to be visited in the region.

In other words, Damascus need not be just a capital to be visited, but the capital to be visited if the affairs of that part of the Middle East are to be sorted out. As long as this is not the case, the idea would be to try to obstruct a settlement, not just because the Syrians are left out, but because the proper importance is not assigned to Damascus. This should not be a consideration for not proceeding with a settlement idea. To go to Damascus and try to resolve the Palestinian issue in Damascus is very interesting theoretically, but it is not going to work. So the only avenue open, I would argue, is to try Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. Politically, the Syrians would have to be dealt with more wisely perhaps than in the past to prevent them from disrupting the process, keeping enough hope for them so that they are not relegated into a corner from which they could only play a negative role. With that in mind, with patience and creative diplomacy, this can yet be achieved.

Commentator: William B. Quandt

Looking back over the last couple of years at the developments in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, it is very striking to see how deep the misreading of Syrian foreign policy was in Washington, in Israel, and among most of the Lebanese factions. I think if there is a single thing that Amin Gemayel, the Israeli government and the Reagan Administration had in common during this period, it was that they misread the intensity of Syrian opposition and, perhaps more importantly, the capability of the Syrians to disrupt the moves that were being orchestrated among the Israeli, the American and the Lebanese governments.

We should be grateful to Itamar Rabinovich for having tried over the years to shed light on the mysteries of Syrian political developments. Syria is probably one of the most difficult countries in the region to understand. It is a very closed society and we do not have a great deal to go on in trying to interpret the internal developments within the regime, but we do have a pattern of external behavior which can be analyzed and has proven to be remarkably consistent during Assad's tenure as President. I think that there should not have been such surprise at the intensity of Syria's opposition to the agreement between Lebanon and Israel and to the Reagan initiative -- not only should it have been anticipated, it should have been taken into account in the formulation of the strategies.

It has been suggested that changes in Syrian foreign policy might be surprising if there were a change of regime. This is always a reasonable point to raise, yet I think the change would probably not be as fundamental as occurred in Egypt from Nasser to Sadat, for example. It seems to me that the Assad regime has been playing out a Syrian policy that is not just an Assad policy. Any successor to Assad is likely to regard Syria's interests as necessarily deeply involved in Lebanon. Syria needs to have a predominant voice in developments in Lebanon because Lebanon is important to Syria's concept of its role in the Arab world and, very importantly, to its concept of its own internal security. The Lebanese virus, if it spreads to Syria, will cause a great deal of havoc. No Syrian regime wants that to happen. The Syrian regime does not want an uncontrolled situation in Lebanon either.

What may change with the regime is the skill with which Syrians play their hand. Although Assad has proven to be a remarkably skillful and sometimes ruthless player, he is not unique in the vision he has of Syria's place in the Middle East network. His successor is very likely to share the same concept, and I would be absolutely astonished if there were a Sadat waiting in the wings in Damascus, ready to engineer the kinds of reversals that were seen in Egypt between 1970 and 1977. I think it is much more likely that there will be basic continuity, with perhaps some variations in the skill with which the game is played.

Let me make another point about why the Syrians have been relatively successful in this recent period. The success, in part, has been the result of the mistakes made by others: Americans, Israelis and Lebanese. The Syrians have profited from the bungling of their competitors. While not going into excessive detail on this, it is fair to say that the Syrians had a clearer concept of what they were up to and were more determined in pursuing it. In the end they have prevailed more than anyone else in Lebanon -- although they are far from having complete sway.

There is another perhaps more basic reason why the Syrians have considerable room to maneuver in the Middle East, even though I think this is a more transient condition. The Syrians have rarely played such a big role in the Middle East as in the last few years. They have rarely been in this central position of being able to block major moves by others.

They could not, after all, block Camp David; they could not block Sadat's going to Jerusalem. The Syrians by and large had to sit on the sidelines and watch these developments. But, after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, several very important things happened that made Syria more important than it would have been otherwise in the regional scheme of things. The first was Egypt's comparative isolation from the game of inter-Arab politics. This has given more weight to Syria's voice in the inter-Arab political game. Even though Egypt is far from being out of the picture, and has made something of a comeback recently, for a period of time Egypt's comparative isolation and absence from the limelight worked to the advantage of the Syrians. If and when the Egyptians rebuild their network of relations with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the North African states, I think we can expect Egypt to be something of a counterweight to Syria in some of the inter-Arab political games. That is a traditional role Egypt has played.

Of course the other natural counterweight to Syria in the Arab world has been Iraq, and since September 1980 Iraq has been almost totally preoccupied with the conflict with Iran, leaving minimal capacity to play the kind of game that it previously played, providing some kind of counterweight to Syria. If and when the Iraq-Iran conflict subsides (unfortunately I do not see that happening any time soon), I think it could be expected that Iraq would again play a part in inter-Arab politics, balancing off Syria's power.

I would like to turn now to another point having to do with Lebanon. I think it is correct to say that there is an internal dimension to the Lebanese crisis that is not anywhere close to being resolved, and that a process of transformation is beginning in which power is going to shift gradually from the hands of those who have had it for the entire period of independence -- the Maronites -- over to those who are numerically, and in many ways politically, ready to play a larger role -- the Shi'ites.

I spoke to an American journalist who returned recently from a long stay in Lebanon; he was terribly pessimistic about developments in Lebanon, more so than he had ever been. So I said, "Well, how do you see the future? Things cannot just go on in this sort of chaos forever -- you must have some sort of image in your mind of where this is headed." He said, "Yes, I think we have to start thinking of Lebanon as a Shi'ite state." It is not quite there yet, but I think the kind of transformation that Itamar Rabinovich is talking about is this shifting of power toward the largest community -- a community that is increasingly well organized and militant, that reaches into the South, to Beirut, and to the Beqaa. It has a national constituency. No Shiite leader can write off the South. It is not impossible for the Maronites to think of themselves as concentrated in East Beirut and in the nearby mountains, but it is impossible for a Shi'ite leader now in West Beirut who aspires to lead the Shi'ite community to ignore Beqaa and the South.

It is also very important to note the role of the external powers in hastening the transition. This transition was probably unavoidable, but whether it would have taken another generation or two, and whether it would have been accompanied by so much violence, is an important question. I think that the role that Israel has played in the politicization of the Shi'ite community and in its demographic thrust toward Beirut, the displacement of Shi'ites from Southern Lebanon as Israel and the PLO fought out their battles in southern Lebanon, created the setting in which the Shi'ites could make their successful bid for power in West Beirut last February. With a very large Shi'ite community in the suburbs, the slums of West Beirut, they were ready to go into the streets and seize power.

This did not just happen by the normal process of the people drifting off to the cities in order to find work: it came about in large measure because of the PLO-Israeli confrontation in Southern Lebanon, which drove hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites out of the south and into the slums and suburbs, making them available for politicization and recruitment, and turning what had been a very traditional, conservative community into a highly militant, well-organized and effective militia. There were internal causes, but the end result had a lot to do with the fact that Israel and the PLO were engaged in their struggle in basically a Shi'ite populated area.

The third point that I would like to dwell on for a moment has to do with the possibility of restoring an Israeli-Syrian tacit understanding. It is true of course that from 1975-76 until about 1981-82 there was a kind of understanding that suited the interests of both Israel and Syria about their respective involvement in Lebanon. What I question is whether one can restore this kind of understanding and expect it to be stable for very long. It seems to me that these are rather fleeting kinds of understandings resulting from circumstances at the moment -- perhaps a moment of internal weakness in Syria, perhaps a period of internal weakness in Israel -- when for various reasons a test of strength with one another is not in either side's interests and therefore, as hard-headed, balance-of-power, realistic kinds of actors in the Middle East political game, they can reach tacit understandings. I do not think, however, that Syria recognizes the legitimacy of Israel's security interests in Lebanon. They recognize that Israel is there, they recognize that they cannot challenge Israel without a major clash, but I do not think they really accept that there is something right about Israel being there and that they will not challenge it.

The Syrians recognize that they cannot do much about the fact that Israel will have a dominant sphere of influence in Southern Lebanon. However, should the opportunity arise to challenge that, to make it costly for the Israelis, to encourage terrorist attacks upon Israel in southern Lebanon, the Syrians would certainly continue that process. Deep down they would like to do to the Israeli presence in Lebanon what they did to the American presence in Lebanon: essentially to drive the Israelis out and to have everyone know that it was Syria and Syrian surrogates who were

behind the move. So I am a little less optimistic about how neatly one can design these tacit understandings and how long they are likely to last.

The final point is the notion that there might be some way in which one could move forward on the peace process without dealing in Damascus. Bringing Damascus into the process complicates an already extraordinarily complex process of negotiation between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians. If Damascus is added into this list, an impossibly complicated picture emerges. And yet, to leave them out, as I think was more or less envisioned in September 1982, would also mean a formula for causing a lot of problems, because the Syrians almost certainly will use their influence with Jordan and with the Palestinians to sabotage any such process.

All we were left with in the initial presentation was the hope that creative diplomacy could find some way to leave the Syrians out, while giving them enough of a belief that there might be some future role for them, so that they would not feel painted into a corner and destroy the process. I find that a very optimistic expression, perhaps the triumph of hope over experience, for I do not think it is easy to find that delicately balanced point where the Syrians are left on the sidelines with the hope that they will be next.

To accomplish this, I think, would involve much more than subtle diplomacy. It would involve some kind of orchestration or pressures on the Syrians so that they cannot disrupt the process if it really gets going, while convincing the Syrians that there are other arenas in which a serious diplomatic dialogue can be sustained -- if not on the West Bank, at least in Lebanon, and perhaps there might be other topics as well. But I do not think you can count on simply sending the right signals. The Syrians will also have to feel some major disincentive from trying to obstruct any future Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli negotiation. We are not now ready to test this proposition since a Jordanian-Israeli dialogue is not about to be resumed. Were we to get as close as we were in the fall of 1982 to thinking seriously about ways to initiate a Jordanian-Israeli negotiation, however, we would then have to consider seriously ways to give the Syrians an incentive not to be disruptive. I think the Syrians will tend to be disruptive, especially in view of the remarkable success they had in 1983 when they relied on such tactics. Their normal impulse will be to throw their weight around, to be very brutal in trying to disrupt any move toward negotiations in which they are not included.

THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND THE JORDANIAN OPTION

Speaker: Asher Susser

Addressing the Palestinian question and the Jordanian option, the question immediately arises, and has been posed many times in Israel and elsewhere: is there a Jordanian option at all? Jordan has proved to be most reluctant to join the peace process. Jordan faces particular difficulty in making a decision of such magnitude. What has happened to the Israeli-Egyptian peace process and the fate of the May 17, 1983 Israeli-Lebanese accord are not particularly encouraging to the Jordanians to follow as a model. Jordan is particularly susceptible to outside Arab pressure -- whether it be political, economic, or even military. Jordan has always sought to obtain a guarantee in advance of the negotiating process that the outcome will be to its liking. This has proved impossible. As an alternative, the Jordanians have sought maximum Arab support, and particularly Palestinian support, in order to join the peace process. This has not come about either. But to conclude that there is no Jordanian option, or that the Jordanians have lost interest in the issue, would be incorrect.

Jordan's most valid political long-term interests are interwoven with the Palestinian issue in an inseparable manner. There are very strong historical ties between the populations on both banks of the river: the Jordanians ruled the West Bank for nearly twenty years; today somewhere around 50 percent of the East Bank population is of Palestinian extraction. It was King Hussein, not Ariel Sharon, who first used the slogan "Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan." King Hussein used the slogan in the early 1960s to confront the notion of establishing the PLO as an independent political organization to determine the fate of the Palestinians. The slogan was not used to justify arguments or to transform Jordan into a Palestinian state, but rather to make the point that Jordan sought a predominant role in the determination of the political future of the Palestinians as a major national interest. As is well known, the PLO seeks to do precisely the same and its raison d'etre is to determine the political fate of the Palestinians. Unfortunately from the Jordanian aspect, it is the PLO who have been recognized by the Arab world as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

Both sides realize that the issue between them -- which of these two is to play the predominant role in determining the political fate of the Palestinians -- does not relate to the West Bank alone. The Jordanian-PLO competition has never been, is not, and will probably never be, restricted to who is to control the West Bank. The question is: who among these two is to control the political fate of the Palestinians, most

of whom are on both sides of the Jordan River. It is this Jordanian--Palestinian complex on both sides of the river that needs to be decided when one refers to the Palestinian question. The ultimate competition between these two is over their very political existence. Is there to be a Jordanization of the Palestinians -- or rather a Palestinization of the Jordanians? There is little room for compromise between these two.

In this competition between the two parties, Jordan has very important assets: territory; the Palestinian population on the East Bank; access to the West Bank; and a large military force in Middle Eastern terms. The PLO's major asset is a thing the Jordanians do not have -- legitimacy, the right in the eyes of the Arab world and in the eyes of many Palestinians to determine the political fate of the Palestinians. The PLO has severe weaknesses in this competition as well. First and foremost, it does not control the Palestinian population. The vast majority of the Palestinian population are either under Jordanian control or Israeli control. This, obviously, is not a very good situation from the PLO's point of view. Secondly, and definitely connected with the first factor, the PLO have been very dependent on either the good or ill will of a variety of Arab regimes. It is very difficult for the PLO, in this kind of atmosphere and political reality, to retain what they call their independent power of decision. In order to establish room for maneuver in the Arab world, it was crucially important for the PLO to establish a manner of political independence, to create a territorial stronghold.

The ideal territorial stronghold was, and still is, Jordan on both sides of the river. Jordan is the area of decision of the Palestinian question. The Palestinian question will no doubt be decided there, regardless of the views one holds -- from the Israeli extreme right to the most radical Palestinian. Any Palestinian solution of the question will relate very profoundly to the population and to the regime on both sides of the Jordan River. It was, therefore, in Jordan that the PLO initially sought to establish its base of operations -- not a base of operations in the purely military sense, but rather the political room for maneuver that would be afforded by an independent existence.

Lebanon was the second-best alternative, but it was the only one available after the "Black September" events of 1970 in Jordan. As far as the PLO is concerned, that is an extremely important point to make in reference to the results of the 1982 war in Lebanon. The war had a disastrous effect on the PLO, not because of the loss of men and materials -- which is relatively easy to redress -- but rather because of the loss of the Lebanese territorial base, for which there is no alternative. The loss of the Lebanese territorial base has severely reduced the PLO's room for maneuver, so that now the PLO is far more dependent on the good or ill will of Syria in particular. Most of the PLO forces were pushed into Syrian controlled territory in Lebanon or into Syria itself. Thus the dependence on Syria has grown considerably. Syria's capacity to interfere in PLO affairs has also increased considerably, a factor that Yasir Arafat did not pay enough attention to initially.

Secondly, Jordan's room for maneuver has increased at the expense of that of the PLO. And thirdly, the West Bankers, who -- since 1967 -- were pretty much on the sidelines, now loom larger in the Jordanian-Palestinian equation than prior to the war in Lebanon. After the war it was therefore crucially important for the PLO to preserve both its role as a party of regional consequence and its major and last political asset: that of being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Certainly prior to the war in Lebanon, but particularly afterwards, the PLO could not allow Jordan to take any kind of political initiative that would sidestep the organization, that would make any real advance in settling the Palestinian issue while leaving the PLO on the sidelines of the political process.

It is against this background that the PLO's behavior relative to the Reagan initiative can best be understood. It was important for Arafat to negotiate with Hussein to make sure first of all that Jordan would not assume any significant role in the Reagan initiative without the PLO also gaining access to the political process, or, conversely, to prevent Jordan from going along at all. The PLO-Jordanian dialogue, therefore, did not include the possibility of the PLO authorizing Jordan to speak on its behalf. This was the last asset that the PLO had, and the Hashemites were the last people the PLO would possibly allow to speak on their behalf. They did come to an agreement -- the agreement on confederation -- but from very different perspectives. As far as the PLO was concerned, the arrangement was a means to allow the PLO access into the political process without having to be faced directly with concessions of historical consequence to Israel. As far as the Jordanians were concerned, the purpose of this partnership with the PLO was to legitimize the Jordanian role in the process. The talks, however, failed.

Granted, there were serious outside pressures that brought about this failure -- Syrian and Soviet ones in particular. There are also other important reasons, intrinsic to the Jordanian-PLO relationship and independent of the outside factors, that played a major role in the failure of these negotiations. King Hussein and the PLO do not share the same long-term objectives, or the same perception of Palestinian self-determination. As far as the Jordanians are concerned, Palestinian self-determination means an autonomous province in the West Bank, linked to Jordan but, for all practical purposes, under Jordanian control. The PLO sees self-determination in an independent Palestinian state, certainly not anything less. In <u>any</u> reference to confederation the PLO systematically refers to the relationship between two totally independent states.

Secondly, the PLO and Jordan do not agree on the basis for the political process. Jordan has always accepted UN General Assembly Resolution 242; the PLO never has. And thirdly, a particularly important factor is their differing perceptions of the time element. The Jordanians are very concerned with the immediate, short-term future of the West Bank; they are afraid of Israeli annexation; and of a military confrontation with Israel. The Jordanians are therefore genuinely keen on some kind of settlement that would prevent Israel from taking over the West Bank. The

Jordanians have fears of the Israeli expulsion of Arabs, no matter how unrealistic these may be. On the other hand, the PLO -- Yasir Arafat and the people around him in particular -- still continue, despite the war in Lebanon and their ensuing difficulties, to see the time factor in the historical dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the negotiations, the Jordanians pressed the PLO to come to a decision, while the PLO maintained that there was no point in rushing, that in the long term, time was on the Arab side, and that in years to come the Arabs would eventually achieve supremacy. Consequently, concessions of historical consequence could not be afforded in this interim phase of the conflict. This view of the time factor is obviously not conducive to major concessions by the PLO to Jordan, to the United States, and certainly not to Israel.

Has the rebellion within the PLO changed much? In terms of the relationship with Jordan, the rebellion has shown that the Syrians have considerable disruptive capacity; but just as they have less constructive capacity in Lebanon, the same is true with regard to the PLO. They have not been able, despite all the difficulties they have caused Yasir Arafat, to produce a legitimate alternative leadership to Arafat. Not one leader of consequence in al-Fatah withdrew from the organization and from support for Arafat to join the rebels. Those who joined the rebels were easily portrayed by Arafat to the West Bank as Syrian stooges, and this was widely accepted in the West Bank. There has been no legitimate substitute for Arafat's leadership in the eyes of the Palestinian community, and the representative status of the organization has not been seriously undermined, at least not in the short term.

Arafat's priorities after the rebellion are, above all, the unity of the organization. Splitting the organization formally, establishing one or two or three PLO organizations with each of them claiming to be the sole legitimate representative of the organization, would deprive the organization of that very status and pave the way for Hussein and perhaps some combination with the West Bankers. Arafat's priority is indeed the unity of the organization, i.e., the unity of al-Fatah (including many people who hold fairly radical views -- certainly toward Jordan -- who did not join the rebels and who are on Arafat's side) as well as other organizations, particularly those of George Habash and Hawatmeh, who are on Arafat's side in the rebellion in the relationship with Syria. They have taken a neutral position, which vis-a-vis Syria would mean a position supporting Arafat. The Jordanians are still waiting on the sidelines for the means to avert the problems of negotiating with Israel. They either have to have Israel coerced and delivered as agreeing to the Jordanian conception of the future of the West Bank and Jerusalem, or alternatively, to have the PLO join them in the negotiation process. Neither of these seem to be realistic possibilities.

There is one ingredient of potential change in the situation, and this again is linked to the war in Lebanon. As long as the PLO does not succeed in reestablishing that mini-state within a state that it had in Lebanon, as long as the PLO is forced to live in the political reality of extreme dependence on Arab regimes -- there is a chance that the

organization will decline in regional importance. Consequently, it may either become more receptive to ideas of compromise, or alternatively, become weak enough to allow the Jordanians and significant figures in the West Bank to come forth with some alternative Jordanian-Palestinian solution. It is doubtful whether such a settlement would satisfy all. Perhaps a settlement that could satisfy all is not at all possible, but maybe there is hope for one that would be bearable to most.

Commentator: Harold H. Saunders

One of the peculiarities of the Israeli-U.S. relationship is that, although it is a deep friendship and unofficial alliance, we still don't know quite how to disagree with each other openly and publicly. As Abba Eban said to Henry Kissinger one time: "If you're not 110% for us you're against us." Whereas we can disagree with our NATO allies and the capacity to manage disagreement is built into the nature of the alliance relationship, somehow it's not there in the U.S-Israeli relationship.

I say this because it seems to me that the problem before those who will continue the peace process in the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian complex is not a diplomatic problem. Rather, it is a political problem of the profoundest character in each camp. To move the peace process forward we do not need diplomatic formulations. We need an understanding of what will enable political leaders in all three or more camps to make the decisions and to provide the leadership in pursuing those decisions that will be necessary for us to move forward. We need above all to be able to talk with each other.

My first proposition is this: Within a theoretical framework which might describe the four or five parts of the peace process, we could say that the late 1970s was a time of driving in fourth or fifth gear. Pictures of Israeli and Egyptian lawyers, soldiers, diplomats, and heads of government meeting to exchange texts, draw maps, and develop timetables for moving military forces around became commonplace. We also got used to the pictures in the East Room of the White House and on the White House lawn of heads of government signing agreements. These were the later stages of the peace process, when people were in around-the-table negotiations and were implementing agreements. These are stages four and five of the peace process as I define it. Now we're on a steep uphill slope after five years of inertia, and we can't start the process in fifth gear. It is necessary now to go back to the beginning of the process. (Notice I say five years, and not four. I'm not making a partisan political comment in the U.S. context. I think we faded out somewhere within the last eighteen months of the Carter administration for American domestic political reasons, not for lack of will.)

In my view, the beginning three stages of the peace process are: first, the parties define the problem (that sounds like a sophomoric statement, but there are profoundly different definitions of the problem

in each camp); second, the leaders make that deep political gut commitment to a negotiated settlement; third, the parties have to arrange for a negotiation -- not simply deciding whether to meet in Geneva or whether the PLO will sit at the table, but agreeing on the approach and arranging the terms of reference for negotiation, which we all know is a very difficult process and can take a long time.

Let me go back for a moment to that very first stage, the definition of the problem. What is the problem? How do Jordanians, Israelis and Palestinians see it? Is Arafat's definition of the problem to gain an opportunity for the Palestinians to exercise the right of self-determination, or is it to keep the PLO alive as a party to the process? What is the Jordanian view of the problem? Is it to solve the Palestine problem or to keep the Jordanians alive in the process? There is also a definitional problem in Israel. What is the nature of the problem for the Israelis? Is it to make peace with the Palestinians or is it to establish Eretz Israel? Israel has to sort itself out somewhere in that spectrum of issues.

All of us, be we Americans, Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, must concentrate on the politics of defining the problem before we can get started again. One way, out of many, of formulating the question would be: "Do we see the problem now as working out some kind of solution between the people of Israel and the people who call themselves Palestinians within the context of a state-to-state peace -- which would involve Israel and Jordan as well as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and others?"

Back in the forties, there was a problem of how two peoples with claims in the same land could share that land. The equation devised at that time -- for which the United States voted and in which Zionist leaders at the time acquiesced -- was that there would be an Israeli state and a Palestinian state in that land. It's not that simple anymore -- we're well down the road -- but the question is: "Are we talking about a problem where there must be an Israeli-Palestinian settlement (they're the two parts of the equation) within the larger state-to-state settlement? Or are we talking about a problem where there should only be a state-to-state settlement with the Palestinians living as an ethnic minority in whatever solution is worked out?"

This must be talked through in terms of two questions. The first question is: "What would provoke the political debate in Israel, among the Palestinians, and in Jordan, to come to a national understanding of some kind, or at least an operational consensus on that issue?" This question is imperative because until there is some kind of agreement in Israel, among the Palestinians, and in Jordan on this question, there will not be a negotiating position. We must ask ourselves, "What will precipitate that position, or what will help move that discussion forward so that there will be an operational base to work from on this point?"

In the second stage of the peace process, leaders need to make a commitment to a negotiated settlement. They do this by addressing three interlocking questions: 1) Is it any longer in our interest to see the

present situation drift along, or are there such inherent dangers in the present situation that we prefer to negotiate than to drift; 2) Is there an available, conceivable settlement with which we could live? Intellectually could we visualize the shape of a settlement with which we could live? 3) Is there a balance of forces that would permit the negotiation of such a settlement? Each of these questions is a political question, rather than a question about the shape of the settlement per se -- this is not an intellectual exercise.

In determining the answer to the question of what would cause Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians to see the prospects for this future in such a dark and dangerous light that they would decide it's better to negotiate now than to face that future, it is necessary to answer such specific questions as these: What would persuade the Israelis to see that future as so dangerous as to suggest that movement in the Palestinian-Jordanian process might be a less dangerous way of moving forward than waiting for the war which might come on the Syrian front? What would persuade the Palestinians looking at the situation on the West Bank to decide that they should negotiate now rather than wait for the process which goes on in the West Bank to continue to reach its inevitable conclusion? Or what would cause the Jordanians to reach conclusions on whether the future of the Hashemite dynasty lies in allowing Jordan to become Palestine one way or another or in trying to resolve the Palestinian issue on the Palestinian side of the Jordan river?

Political leaders need to address these questions: Shall we drift or shall we negotiate? How does an outsider like the United States and how do leaders on the ground bring these decisions to a head? What does it take to precipitate gut decisions on those issues? What about the shape of the settlement? Surely, in addition to seeing the dangers one must see the opportunities. How can we contribute to establishing a picture of the shape of the settlement which might meet the security and aspirational interests of each party?

Third, in talking about the balance of forces on the Palestinian-Jordanian side, clearly the view is that the cards are so heavily stacked against them with the U.S and Israel on the other side of the table that they have no prayer whatsoever of going into the negotiation room and getting a fair deal. In my view, an important reason why King Hussein rejected participation in Camp David was not so much because he thought the ideas were bad, but because he thought the United States couldn't deliver a fair negotiation within that context. Admittedly, there were Arab pressures and other factors at work, but I think that it was this feeling which Hussein articulated more recently and very forcefully that neither the United States nor Israel would deliver. With Israeli military preponderance, there was no way to have a fair negotiation. Palestinians must feel that way doubly. Not only do they have the Israeli adversary and power with the U.S. behind it to cope with, but they also confront a tremendous Jordanian advantage as Jordanians control a substantial portion of the Palestinian population. So the Palestinians, or the PLO anyway, feel twice disadvantaged in entering the negotiation room. How does one change that sense of the imbalance of forces, which works against negotiation?

All of these are questions on which we should focus. Some of these questions are best left to the experts. That's the job of government -- governments move other governments -- but it's so difficult to do that it seems to me that all of us could well focus on these questions. What would precipitate decisions on these issues in the camps involved? How do you take advantage of or overcome the balance and imbalance of power in these relationships, and then move them to an operational base? Of course, then you need to do that on the Israeli side, and for the American purpose it's necessary to understand how to fit itself into these decision making processes. How should the U.S. help Israeli leaders who want to come to conclusions on these issues make those decisions?

We have not had a serious U.S. President-Israeli Prime Minister discussion about these issues in five years. It may be that at some point with the next administration in the United States and the next government in Israel, a President-Prime Minister discussion of where we are going together as allies in this process of reaching for peace in the Middle East will occur. If this happens, the appropriate level of dialogue should not be on how much aid, or a focus on this detail and that detail, but instead attention should be given to the very large questions: "What is to be the U.S.-Israeli relationship ? How much support can the United States provide to an Israel with this answer to these questions or an Israel with that answer to these questions? How does the U.S. factor fit into the internal Israeli debate?" The same would be true, of course, in a Jordanian-U.S. dialogue as well as whatever Palestinian-U.S. dialogue might also emerge.

THE IMPACT OF RESURGENT ISLAM ON THE REGION

Speaker: Martin Kramer

Perhaps it is in the nature of resurgent Islam that just when people think they have reached some kind of an understanding, something comes up or erupts on the scene which lays waste to some of the best laid plans of statesmen, diplomats and strategists. In the five years after the Iranian revolution, we have seen the seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca and the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in Syria, and the Shi'ite self-detonations in Lebanon. These are all the punctuation marks of violence and a statement on profound social change which has been made by resurgent Islam. We are dealing here with subterranean currents and with a specific form of expression which is characteristic of this form of resurgence. Resurgent Islam has not spent itself; more of its effects will be seen. We may even be surprised again -- probably not in quite as big a way as in 1979 -- but the potential is still there. Whatever happens -- whether or not we are surprised, whether or not there are some unforseen developments which cloud the political and diplomatic scene -- the options for peace have already been narrowed, perhaps even considerably, by a fear of resurgent Islam, both in the Arab world and in Israel.

There is an apprehension, born of a realistic sense throughout the region, that Islam has not yet spent itself; that it may yet claim another regime in the region; that it may yet claim the life of another head of state; or that it may yet terrorize a great power into retreat. In short, resurgent Islam is already accepted as a given. It is something that figures now in calculations, especially in the calculations of domestic repercussions of diplomatic and political developments. The reason that it is taken into consideration is that it has become the foremost form of ideological resentment against domestic oppression and foreign domination in the region. To a large extent it has replaced the Arab nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s. This is not a phenomenon which is easily assessed. Many of the developments have occurred just beyond the horizon, just beyond our view, in the popular quarters, in the minds of the masses. Journalists and diplomats write backgrounders on this kind of subject. It figures very little in the cable traffic, even less in some of the day-to-day reporting coming out of the Middle East -- except, of course, when it bursts onto the foreground. The obvious problems of analysis are those of interpretation. Underestimation and overestimation are the two principal problems and both of them feed on the same major problem -- the dearth of reliable information. We do know something about the way it works, on what it feeds, and the way it expresses itself, and

there's already a vast Western literature of explication, but it still is difficult to fathom fully Muslim activism or to empathize with Muslim expressions of commitment.

Some of the items appearing in the Iranian press on a regular basis are the last testaments of various Iranian soldiers and soldier Mullahs who've been killed in the war. They are very moving, but in some ways profoundly perplexing. The following is a citation from one which is representative: "My dear wife, I asked you to be honored if I achieve my wish, which is martyrdom so the enemy would know that the Muslim nation of Iran devotes their dearest ones in order to obtain their sublime goal. My dear wife, I request you to tell our son that if his father did not smile upon him, and if he was deprived of fatherly compassion and love, the leader of the revolution of the Islamic republic will do so and will fill your heart with fatherly feelings and sentiments." Two elements here defy understanding -- the professed desire for martyrdom and the absolute faith in the powers of consolation of Khomeini. Even if this total commitment is beyond our empathy, it is still possible to identify its recurrent themes and to map its impact.

What is the impact? First, in many countries the tide of resurgent Islam has been stemmed. One must remember the atmosphere in late 1979 and early 1980 when it was widely believed that through imitation there might be further revolutions in the Muslim world. There have been no revolutions by emulation. If Iran believed at the time that simply by pure example it could inspire a vicarious movement of sympathy sweeping throught the Muslim world, it was wrong. On the other hand, and differently from those first two years after the revolution, Iran is now actively exporting its revolution through agencies that are only now coming to light. This is a major development, involving the Iranian foreign office, government ministries, leading clerics, various emigres who are now based in Iran, and numerous volunteers. Iran is asking itself the question that perhaps every revolution that has a universal message must ask itself: Is Islam possible in one country? Can the Islamic revolution survive isolated and alone?

Khomeini's answer to this question has been an emphatic "no." In Iran they openly speak of exporting the revolution, and they covertly work to do so. Not since Abdel Nasser's day has there been any Middle Eastern state which has believed itself to have so broad a license to interfere in the affairs of others. The impact of this attempt to export the revolution has been very uneven, and it has had repercussions that even the Iranians themselves did not expect. Even when one takes into account the unevenness of the impact, there is no doubt that the greatest impression has been made upon Shi'ites, particularly those who live in Lebanon and in the Arab Gulf States. Iran does not necessarily regard them from a sectarian point of view, but rather from a strategic point of view, as the vanguard of the revolution.

Iran of course makes no differentiation between Sunnis and Shi'ites in its formal ideological profession of the faith. What it does say, however, is that the Shi'ites may be, because of the nature of their

belief, at a higher level of consciousness and awareness. They will stand at the vanguard. The others -- that is, the wider Sunni world -- will eventually reach that comparable stage only after a more prolonged process. Most of the activities which I have followed and which have come to the attention of the wider world -- be they the attempted coup in Bahrain in 1981 or the activities of the Shi'ites in the Baalbek, or the bombings in Kuwait late last year -- all these are examples of Iranian activities, or reflections of Iranian activities among various Shi'ite communities.

I would say that the overall prospects for this kind of intervention depend to a great extent on the deadlocked Iran-Iraq war. Since no one is in a position today to say how that war will resolve itself, it is difficult to make any final judgement as to the prospects of resurgent Islam in the Gulf, in Lebanon and in other Shi'ite areas. If a succession struggle develops soon, Iran's star will find itself in rapid descent. On the other hand, if there is some unexpected change in Iran's favor in the Iran-Iraq war we may see many Muslims -- in the Gulf especially, but also elsewhere -- come down off their fences. If this is the case, we would see more than the isolated terrorism that we have seen so far -- possibly even a concerted bid for power. A Persian Gulf crisis -- and it takes no imagination at this point to imagine one -- could send Islam stock soaring once again and Islamic resurgence could then receive that second wind about which there has been such a question mark since 1979.

How has all this affected the prospects for peace in the Middle East? First of all, it is important to note that Israel's present and potential partners for peace have almost all faced some form of Muslim opposition, including terrorism, insurrection, rebellion and assassination. It is difficult to get a reading on the general mood in the wake of these events, but a brief survey is in place, beginning with Egypt. The rise of religious movements in the 1970s, especially the extremist movements which were responsible for Sadat's assassination, are well known. Mubarak, while repressing the more extreme groups, has undoubtedly gone out of his way to conciliate the mainstream fundamentalists. Of course, they are not interested in peace on the terms which were negotiated at Camp David. Indeed, they are not interested in peace on any terms short of Israel's utter emasculation or destruction.

As for Syria, in the early 1980s the Muslim Brotherhood launched a concerted effort to bring the regime to its knees -- a campaign which reached its apex in the Hamah uprising of early 1982. This was the most serious domestic challenge posed to the rule of Hafiz Assad. It was suppressed quite ruthlessly and has since been forgotten. Since then, however, while standing firm on his secular principles, Assad has moved to bolster his Muslim credentials -- particularly his Shi'ite credentials -- at least in part by becoming the closest Middle Eastern ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This results in a curious paradox: a secular Arab nationalist state closely allied with the foremost exponent of Islamic clericalism and fundamentalism in the Middle East! There are, of course, other reasons for his actions -- the Iran-Iraq war is but one --

but the regime in Syria has used this affiliation with Iran to bolster its credentials, and there is a relationship between that and the posture which Syria has taken in the conflict.

With the rise of the Lebanese Shi'ites to demographic preeminence and their political awakening, Lebanon today is the most fertile ground in the Middle East for the transportation of Khomeini's neo-Shi'ism and Irani-style fundamentalism. What has transpired on Israel's northern border is really quite remarkable. It has been a complete surprise. It was not anticipated that the Shi'ites of Lebanon may as a consequence of both American actions and of the various social and migratory trends, come to hold the veto power over Lebanon's policy towards Israel. This is a veto power which, it can be argued, they have already exercised once.

Only Jordan has remained unshaken, but at a price. The Muslim Brotherhood is allowed to operate freely in Jordan, but Hussein shows a caution towards them bordering on deference. The Saudis, needless to say, are wary; they too have covered their bases. At the time they were promoting the Fahd peace plan, they were also making noises in the direction of jihad, about which a formal resolution emanated from a summit conference held in Saudi Arabia in 1981. These are both sides of a wavering policy which the Saudis have been pursuing vis-a-vis Islam and their standing in the Muslim world. Recent signs indicate that Saudi Arabia is interested in once again coming into the fold -- certainly to be in Iran's good graces. This came to the fore in the most recent pilgrimage season just concluded.

Needless to say, those in Israel who are open to persuasion are still profoundly apprehensive about the events that they see around them. They believe that resurgent Islam affects the Arab willingness to talk and the long-term viability of peace. It is one thing to be surrounded by a Muslim sea -- but when the sea is turbulent, that apprehension grows still greater and there is an inclination to drop even more anchors. There is no sense in Israel that Israel or the Arab-Israeli conflict is in any way responsible for this phenomenon, and it is argued there that one cannot attribute the events in Iran to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Certainly the events in Iran were paramount in bringing Muslim fundamentalism to the fore in the Middle East. In conclusion, the resurgence of Islam has had the effect of reducing the political courage -- both Arab and Israeli -- without which peace is an impossibility in the Middle East. As a consequence, the eye of the needle through which any peace initiative must pass has grown considerably smaller.

Commentator: Bernard Lewis

Thank you. I find myself at something of a disadvantage in that my predecessor said nothing with which I disagree and indeed has said much that I had intended to say. Let me reassure you, however; this will not prevent me from saying it again. I would like to take up some of the points that he made and perhaps discuss them in greater detail or in a slightly different way.

Resurgent Islam is not spent. I find the occasional reassurances that the worst is over completely unconvincing. Why did it happen? How did it come about? These are very large and complex questions for which I would like to offer just a few very brief and necessarily schematic suggestions. It seems to me that this eruption in Iran, which had a considerable impact on ther Islamic lands, rises from a special combination of circumstances, such as also produced revolutions in other times and other places. One such circumstance is the disillusionment that had spread over much of the Islamic world with the outside institutions, aspirations and ideologies which had been imposed on them by a world regarded as alien and for the most part hostile. These foreign laws, educational systems, customs -- European, for the most part -- had reached a point where they had manifestly failed, and were unable to satisfy either the needs or aspirations of these societies. In such a situation there was a very natural tendency to look towards more indigenous, and in their sense therefore more authentic, sources of guidance. For Muslims very obviously that means Islam.

The second group of circumstances conducive to the expansion of the movement is what one might call the economic and social strains which have reached breaking point in many of these countries. Linked with this is the discrediting of the western world from which these borrowed ideas and institutions had come -- a discrediting due largely to its own activities and publicized by its own media with devastating effects.

The final ingredient necessary to a revolutionary mix was the sense of power, the sense of having the world by the throat, which came as a result of the oil crisis, and the feeling that this terrifying western world which had dominated them for a century or more was not so terrifying after all and could easily itself be terrified.

The combination of these proved highly explosive. The explosion occurred in Iran where circumstances were especially favorable. Let us make no mistake about it; what we have witnessed in Iran is a revolution in the fullest sense of that word -- revolution in the same terms as which we may speak of the Russian revolution or the French revolution. I am not expressing approval here; I am saying that it is a revolution in the sense that it is a major change, not consisting merely of a transfer of power from one group to another group, but a long process of change beginning under the old regime, continuing under the new regime. This is a process change which at a certain moment requires a transfer of political power and therefore accomplishes it.

It resembles the French and the Russian revolutions in some other respects too. An example of this is in the tremendous impact which it had, not only in the country in which it occurred, but in the whole civilization with which it shares a common universe of discourse. One sees the same sense of excitement, the same sense of messianic exaltation, the same enormous expectations of a new world to come, a new sense of power, a new sense of achievement. There is also the same willingness to excuse, to overlook. Muslims who know perfectly well of the mass executions in the name of Islamic justice in Iran have found the same kind of excuses as western liberals successively found for the French terror and the Stalinist repressions. The extent of this impact is enormous and

not just limited to the Middle East. Last year in Sarajevo, in Yugoslavia, in a country under a communist dictatorship for the last forty years, a whole group of young Muslims in that Muslim city were brought to trial and accused of having plotted to bring about an Islamic revolution in order to create an Islamic republic of Bosnia of a Khomeinist complexion. If that amount of impact is felt in Sarajevo, imagine the effect in some areas less remote from Islamic traditions and central Islamic themes! It appears in Senegal and Indonesia and, I have no doubt at all, also in Central Asia. It therefore obviously has a very considerable effect on the regions with which we are immediately concerned, which are much nearer to the revolutionary source. The second point is that the revolution narrows the options for peace, and will almost certainly continue to do so. By endangering rulers and regimes, its impact will make them more circumspect than they might otherwise have been.

I would like to differentiate between the short-range effects and the long-range effects -- not in terms of options for peace so much as attitudes towards Israel. Islam has been cited as having furnished the foremost ideological expression of protest both against foreign domination and domestic oppression. I would certainly agree with that. In order to have not just a limited movement of westernized, western-educated intellectuals but the type of mass movement that happened in Iran which can really mobilize millions, the appeal has to be stated in Islamic terms. Islam has the evocative power to raise the masses in this way. Its two targets are indeed foreign domination and domestic oppression.

This leads to an interesting difference among the various fundamentalist groups in the priorities which they accord to the two. For some, the primary enemy is foreign domination -- not necessarily meaning direct rule, but rather what is seen as excessive influence. In Egypt and elsewhere, however, there is written evidence manifesting that to significant groups domestic oppression is more of a foe than foreign domination. One of the ideologists of the Egyptian fundamentalists in discussing this specific question argued something like this: to those who claimed that the prime objective of jihad in our day is the liberation of Jerusalem as a holy place, he agreed that the liberation of holy places is a duty imposed by God on all Muslims. But he reminded them that the fulfillment of the duty of jihad is subject to three considerations. First, that fighting the near enemy takes precedence over fighting the distant enemy; second, that since Muslims who begin a jihad must fight on until a final victory, they must ask themselves before beginning whom that victory would benefit -- would it serve Islam, or would it merely strengthen the existing regimes, which make a show of Islam and exploit nationalism, but are in fact apostates and infidels. This leads to a third point, that these rulers are themselves the cause of imperialist domination in the lands of Islam: "To begin with the struggle against imperialism is a task which is neither glorious nor useful, and is only a waste of time. It is our duty to concentrate on our Islamic cause, and that is the establishment first of all of God's law in our own country and causing the word of God to prevail. There is no doubt that the first battlefield of the jihad is the extirpation of these infidel leaders and their replacement by a perfect Islamic order, and from this will come release."

In other words, the jihad should not be fought against foreign imperialists and colonialists until there is first accomplished the primary task of overthrowing the secularist and neo-pagan rulers who govern and establishing a true Islamic society. This is obviously a very different point of view from the more familiar one. This does not mean that these gentlemen are motivated by any feeling of goodwill towards Israel or by any desire to enter into a peace with Israel. Quite the contrary. What they are saying is that the whole problem of imperialism, Zionism, colonialism and the rest is, so to speak, an epiphenomenon -- it is a consequence of the weakness and degradation to which their present rulers, they say, have brought them. Once these leaders have been eliminated and a true Islamic society is established , the rest will be easy. If indeed they ever succeed in creating a united Islamic world, driven by the same force and enthusiasm that inspired the revolution in Iran, the situation might indeed be ripe. It doesn't, however, seem very probable.

This is not the first such Islamic movement. There have been a number of others in the past. Although prophecy is associated with the Middle East, standards are too high for me to attempt to compete. Indeed. dearth of reliable information about these movements has been a major problem. The difference between the Islamic opposition in Islamic countries and other oppositions — especially the leftist and nationalist oppositions -- is that the Islamic opposition sees no reason to address itself to the West. It is not concerned with winning Western support, approval or goodwill. It addresses itself to its own people. The leftists and the nationalists have at least one eye, and usually both, on the western public and the western audience, addressing them in the vocabulary which many of them learned in Western universities. With few exceptions, the Islamic opposition, the fundamentalist opposition, doesn't care what the Western world thinks of them. They do not seek approval. Therefore, for the most part, Westerners are remarkably ill-informed about what is going on in those movements. It isn't easy to follow them.

I think in talking about Islamic fundamentalist movements and the like, that it is useful to distinguish certain categories. On the one hand, there are the governments. Here again, a sub-classification: there are those in government who adopt a kind of Islamic fundamentalism which might be called pre-emptive. They are frightened by the fundamentalists. They try to head them off by doing things to please them. The most obvious case of that is the government of the Sudan. There are also those in government who think that they can use fundamentalism. The most obvious example of this is Iran, which is not really using it as much as actually representing it in a much profounder sense. There are those who both fear and try to use it simultaneously: the Saudis, with their usual careful ambiguity in such matters. Perhaps more interesting than the governments are the oppositions. Here again, there are a number of different types, with the main division being between those for whom the struggle against the outsider is the first priority and those for whom domestic struggle is the first priority.

ISRAELI POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Speaker: Haim Shaked

The brand new national unity government of Israel is most unusual. A number of pundits within and without Israel have already expressed a learned view that this kind of system cannot possibly work. One Israeli politician, whose party is in opposition to the new government, was quoted recently in an American newspaper as having said that this new government resembles a body with a monstrous head and two right hands. Indeed, this kind of government is a new experience for the Israeli polity, for it is very different in nature from the national unity government which Israel had from 1967 to 1970. Furthermore, it contains a brand new element -- perhaps an innovation even for long-time political scientists: the idea of rotation at the very top of the government. Many mutual suspicions were involved in the tedious process which led to formation of the government. All of this might lead to the logical conclusion that the new Israeli government will not be able to function. However, we are dealing with the Middle East -- a region of miracles. Specifically, this new hybrid government was created in a country which was once described by Barbara Tuchman in the title of an article as "Israel -- the Land of Unlimited Impossibilities." In such an unusual country a situation may arise which will surprise the analysts by a functioning government. This, in turn, may create new dynamics in Israeli politics, with important consequences.

Another assumption concerns the real nature of the present constellation of political forces within Israel. In the past few years Israel has experienced the gradual creation of a rather new political bloc. It is centrist, and its outlook is nationalistic. From 1948 through 1974, eight elections in Israel saw the predominance of parties that shared a social-democratic, activist outlook. Since then, and more pronouncedly after the 1977 victory of the Likud party, another part of the Israeli polity has asserted itself. The new powers that be were also activist, but represented a liberal, capitalist, conservative orientation.

Quite a few commentators and pollsters expected the results of the 1984 election to be very different from what actually occurred. These people wrongly predicted that a Labor alignment would take over from the incumbent Likud and thereby introduce a completely new Israeli foreign and defense policy. In my opinion, even if the new government would have been dominated by a Labor alignment -- its foreign policy, at least initially would not have been sufficiently different from that of its predecessor, the Shamir-Arens-led Likud government. It <u>is</u> quite possible that the present Israeli government does represent more of the mainstream of the Israeli body politic than what might be inferred by a superficial glance.

Against the backdrop of these observations, it should be noted that within the kaleidoscopic changes which have characterized the Middle East in general and Israel in particular, a number of basic factors have been shaping Israel's Middle East policy by way of continuity rather than change. The first of these is that there is no lucid, well-defined, formal Israeli policy with regard to the Middle East. There are attitudes, actions, reactions, and expediency moves, but not a comprehensive, articulate policy -- as far as the strategic level is concerned -- with regard to Israel's Middle East role. This may be so because Israel itself is still in a formative stage as to what it means and represents.

In Israeli parlance, this problem is usually referred to as: "What kind of Israel would we like to see evolve?" Thirty-six years after the establishment of the state of Israel, this is still a subject of a very serious and profound debate in Israel which may not be resolved in the near future. As a result, various camps and circles, with divergent objectives in mind, create or adhere to diverse policies in order to attain their objectives. For quite a while, and irrespective of who is the Prime Minister and which party forms the majority of the government, this soul-searching process will continue.

The second basic factor is that the set of considerations for any Israeli attitude or policy with regard to Middle Eastern issue is a derivative of Israel's security concept. This security doctrine, in turn, is the outcome of what might be briefly and superficially termed the collective, cumulative and, very importantly, subjective Israeli experience. Israeli strategists have refused to mold the Israeli security doctrine by the assessments of other nations or by diplomatic considerations. In adhering to the idea that they have to go by their own experience and evaluation, they are also saddled with the burden of ancient and recent history as living memory.

Naturally, there is great dissent in Israel with regard to the tactics that have to be employed in order to achieve what has to be accomplished. Side by side with this dissent, however, there exists a very remarkable degree of national consensus over a number of issues which are germane to the general Israeli interpretation of what Israel is all about and what kind of dangers it faces. It is only by looking at both the dissent and the national consensus that we may develop a proper clue to the understanding of Israel's actions in, and policy toward the Middle East.

Israel's security doctrine is based on the self-image of great vulnerability rather than great strength. The point of departure of Israel's experience -- that of its Jewish majority -- is Jewish history, which has been characterized by great persecution. Israel was subject to a series of wars even before it came into formal existence. The conflict with the Arab and Islamic world in which Israel has been involved for so long is still anomalous in that it does not rage over clearly defined, tangible issues, such as territory, size, demarcation lines, etc., but rather over the very legitimacy of the existence of Israel in the eyes of its immediate neighbors.

This vulnerability is further aggravated by a chronic economic crisis, which everyone in Israel recognizes to be the most urgent and pressing item on the new government's agenda. Both Labor and Likud feel that Israel's financial dependence on the United States imposes potential limitations on Israel's strategic maneuverability. Many Israelis from all camps share the notion that what may be defined as a tactical error on the part of an American assessment could mean a strategic disaster as far as Israel is concerned. For many years, this has had a major impact on the point of view of Israeli decision-makers, contributing greatly to Israel's self-image of vulnerability.

In this context, with Israel still extremely concerned about its very existence, there emerges another painful situation which Israeli society has not been able to resolve satisfactorily. Two discrepancies in Israeli existence go beyond the question of which party or bloc controls the government, and are inherent to the understanding of Israeli actions and reactions. One is the growing incongruity between the muscle of a Goliath and the self-image or the mentality of a David. The other is the growing disparity between the traditional fabric of Israeli society and its body politic, and what Israel now sees when it looks at the mirror -- given all kinds of profound social, demographic and economic changes which have taken place within the country.

Finally, another more immediate issue must be considered while the new government's attitudes and policies toward the Middle East are examined. At present, and for some time to come, the predominant factor which will mold governmental decisions and activities in Israel under the umbrella of a national unity government will be the nagging suspicion that elections may take place before the prescribed period of four years is out. Questions arise therefore, not only as to how to run the country properly and efficiently, but also how to prepare for such an eventuality. Once elections are called, all bets are off, and each party goes back to its corner.

In light of these complexities and considerations, I think it is reasonable to assume, first of all, that the immediate priority of the Israeli government (as far as it is free to set up its own priorities) will not be Middle Eastern issues, but rather the economy. As far as the economy is concerned, all ideas and solutions which have been proposed reflect the urgent need for a very tough policy.

It is quite possible that the tough measures which are required in the economic sphere will have a direct bearing on the political one, including a possible spillover into Israel's Middle Eastern policies. In this context, the peace with Egypt assumes a paradoxical meaning. Many Israelis would still agree that the peace with Egypt is one of the most important -- if not the most important -- breakthroughs in Israel's history. The peace with Egypt, however, has also accentuated the animosity of the other countries in the region. In a sense, peace has provided an absolution to those who say that no other immediate action by Israel is needed, the logic of their argument being that once Egypt was forthcoming and wanted to make peace, Israel was willing to engage right

away and to go all the way. As long as there are no others who are willing to do the same, Israel should concentrate on other aspects of policy rather than the solidification of this process.

The composition of the new Israeli government, particularly its inner core of decision-makers, will be characterized by a pragmatic, rather than doctrinal, attitude -- an approach which will be a combination of activism and engagement in any conceivable opportunity or possibility to make things move. As far as the Middle Eastern agenda of this government is concerned, there are three immediate issues: Lebanon; the West Bank and Gaza or the Palestinian question; and Egypt. It is my guess that this government may try to concentrate primarily on Lebanon and Egypt, hopefully creating momentum along these two tracks in order to fend off any need to make immediate, major decisions on the West Bank.

Regarding the West Bank, we ought to remind ourselves that the debate which preceded the agreement for the setting up of the government was not whether the West Bank should be returned to Jordan or annexed to Israel, but whether so many settlements or fewer settlements should be set up in the immediate future. Unlike the Rabin-Peres or Begin-Sharon government, this is a Peres-Rabin-Navon-Shamir-Arens-Levy composition which has many shared views -- not with regard to the end result of Israel's policy towards the West Bank, but rather on the practicality of expecting King Hussein to come forth soon and engage in negotiations.

It has been my impression that when the Middle East is discussed in knowledgeable circles in the United States, there is often an assumption that the Middle East consists of a number of states, with each of them considered a given. Hussein has his problems, therefore he acts accordingly. Assad has his problems, therefore he follows a certain line, etc. Israel, however, is regarded as a variable. It is commonly thought that if Israel were to do "the right thing," the Middle Eastern situation would be changed. It is my opinion that in order to better understand both the Middle East and Israel, it would be best to assume that Israel is also a given, not a variable, in the Middle Eastern puzzle.

Commentator: Max Frankel

I would say that in the recent Israeli election the Likud came in second and Labor came in next to last. They have formed a merger of weaknesses out of which they somehow hope to achieve the world's first two-party "dictatorship." I think there is a consensus in Israel and I think it is, weakly, represented in this new government.

Israel's foreign policy, first, last and always, is security and survival -- whether that is rationally, subjectively, experientially, or neurotically defined. There is one overarching policy: whether in strength or in weakness, whether militarily or diplomatically, the

government must divide the hostile environment in which Israel finds itself in order to survive; to carve up the Arab adversaries into separable parts and to deal with them, whether on the battlefield or at the bargaining table, on a one-to-one basis. Israel has found this to be a highly successful or at least functioning way of defining its policy.

There is another large component of that policy which is sometimes, if not forgotten, at least de-emphasized in Israel. This second consideration is that truly the first line of defense runs through Washington, DC, through the United States and through the political power that Israel's friends can muster in the U.S. It seems to me that those two doctrines, whether fully acknowledged or not, run through all recent Israeli policy.

The economic crisis of the moment will preoccupy and consume Israeli society, precluding an adventuresome or well-defined foreign policy coming from this uneasy coalition. I would submit, however, that in the background and moving through Israeli consciousness there must be two large elements which bear on the definition of the next foreign policy, whenever it emerges.

First, there is the so-called discretionary war. The notion that the peace with Egypt can be exploited and cashed in for an effective combination of military and diplomatic action in order to change Israel's environment has been powerfully discredited. Whether that yet registers in Israeli votes is obviously not clear, but I think that in Israeli consciousness anything resembling the Sharon approach to rattling the table and shaking up the pieces and forcibly taking matters into our own hands, is not going to be a lively option for a long time to come. I think the wounds and the psychic scars of this war will affect the definition of policy.

Second, even more controversial, in my judgement, is that Israeli society is only very dimly beginning to realize that the view one has toward Palestinians -- as that finally devolves into an attitude about the West Bank -- very powerfully affects the nature of Israeli society, and goes right back, in the end, to the question of survival.

The slogan has been heard from a few in Israel that "We can either be Jewish or democratic, but we're not going to be both if we swallow this huge Arab population." This may be simplistic, but Israelis will discover that they're going to have to decide whether they want to engage in apartheid and the brutalities that would be required to hold down this population, or whether they want to give the Arabs even a modicum of civil rights and stature inside Israel. Even if only 10% of the Arab population were to become voters in Israel, judging by the results of the last election, they would acquire the balance of power to decide Israeli politics on many occasions. This goes to the heart of what Israel will become, and I think it has been little understood or debated in Israel so far. Those two trends -- the Lebanon experience and the West Bank reality -- will dawn on Israel only slowly, and on this government only if and when it gets past the economic crisis.

Every discussion that is well intentioned towards Israel has to begin and end with security doctrine. I think the United States can, at given moments, decide that Israel is too strong or too weak for its own good. At any moment, the United States can choose to resupply Israel with military weaponry or instead to rescue the Egyptian Third Army, playing a narrow power balance game so as to soften up each of them. But if the United States hopes to influence Israel and bring its policies into accord with American objectives in the Middle East, the United States must always look to this psychic sense of security that the Israeli population needs. And if U.S. actions, whatever they may be, and however finely calibrated, ignore that need, then the United States inherits nothing but trouble.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR., Ambassador to Egypt from 1979-83, received his M.A. from Harvard University in 1947, the same year in which he joined the Foreign Service. In 1953-56 he was Second Secretary in Damascus, Syria, and in 1957-58, Consul in Aleppo. Mr. Atherton has served as Consul in Calcutta, India from 1962-65; Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department from 1966-65; and as Country Director for Arab States North from 1966-67 and for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs from 1967-69. From 1970-74 he was Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, served from 1974-78 as Assistant Secretary, and was Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel from 1983-85. He is currently Director of the Harkness Fellowships Programs of the Commomwealth Fund.

MAX FRANKEL, educated in New York City, received his M.A. in American Government in 1953 from Columbia University, and is Phi Beta Kappa. In 1952 he joined the staff of The New York Times as a full-time reporter. Mr. Frankel has worked in various capacities at The New York Times, among them foreign, diplomatic and White House correspondent, and Sunday Editor. From 1968-72 he was chief Washington correspondent and head of the Washington Bureau. Mr. Frankel was named to his current post of Editor of the Editorial page of The New York Times in 1977.

MARTIN KRAMER received his M.A from Columbia University and his Ph.D from Princeton University. He joined Tel Aviv University in 1980 and is currently a Visiting Professor at Cornell University. He is the author of Islam Assembled and Political Islam, and is a research fellow at the Dayan Center, specializing in the history and politics of modern Islamic movements. Dr. Kramer is currently editing a book on the Shi'a in the contemporary Middle East and organizing an International Conference on the subject. He is also preparing a political biography of Charles Crane, an early American activist in the Middle East.

BERNARD LEWIS received his Ph.D from the University of London in 1939. At the University of London he was Professor of History of the Near and Middle East from 1949-74. He has been a Visiting Professor at the University of California (1955-56), Columbia University (1960), Indiana University (1963), Princeton University (1964), Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton (1969), College de France, Paris (1980) and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1983. Since 1974 he has been

the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, as well as a lifetime member of the Insitute for Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT was educated at Stanford University, receiving his Ph.D in International Relations in 1963. From 1972-74 and from 1977-79 Dr. Quandt was a staff member of the National Security Council, specializing in the Middle East. He served as Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania from 1974-76. Since 1979 he has been a Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, serving as Program Director in Energy and National Security Studies.

ITAMAR RABINOVICH received his Ph.D in Middle Eastern History from U.C.L.A. in 1971. Since then he has held the position of lecturer, Senior Lecturer and Associate Professor of Middle Eastern History, as well as Chairman of the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University. Dr. Rabinovich has held visiting professorships at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, the University of Pennsylvania, and Cornell University, and currently serves as the Director of the Dayan Center and the Shiloah Institute at Tel Aviv University.

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS received his Ph.D from Yale University in 1956 in American Studies. From 1961-74 he was at the National Security Council in the White House and from 1974-75 he was Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for the Near East and North Africa. Mr. Saunders was an important part of the negotiating team which helped produce five Arab-Israeli agreements from 1974-79, including the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. He has been a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute since 1981 and is the author of The Middle East Problem in the 1980s, published by the Institute.

HAIM SHAKED was educated at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and received his Ph.D in 1969 from the School of Oriental and African Studies, the University of London. In 1969 he joined Tel Aviv University and to date has held many academic positions there, including Senior Research Fellow at the Shiloah Institute, as well as Head of the Center (1973-80). In 1975 he was elected Dean of the Faculty of Humanities/Arts. Dr. Shaked is currently Visiting Professor and Director of Middle East Studies at the University of Miami's Graduate School of International Studies.

SHIMON SHAMIR received his Ph.D at Princeton University. He taught for several years at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and then at Tel Aviv University. Dr. Shamir has held visiting appointments at Harvard University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Cornell University. He is the author of The Modern History of the Middle East and Egypt Under Sadat. Dr. Shamir currently serves as the Director of the Israeli Academic Center in Cairo.

ASHER SUSSER was born in South Africa and emigrated to Israel in 1963. He received his M.A. in Modern History of the Middle East from Tel Aviv University in 1980 and is currently working on his doctoral dissertation, Western Power Rivalry in the Levant and Its Inter-Relationship with Local Politics, 1941-46, under Dr. Itamar Rabinovich. He has been a Junior Research Associate at the Shiloah Institute and a teaching assistant and Instructor in the Department of Middle East and African History at Tel Aviv University.

CYRUS R. VANCE, Secretary of State from 1977-80, was graduated from Yale University Law School in 1942 and admitted to the New York Bar in 1947. Mr. Vance has held many government positions, among them Special Counsel, Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee (1957-60); General Counsel, Department of Defense (1961-62); and Secretary to the Army (1962-67). Mr. Vance has also served as Special Representative of the President in the Cyprus Crisis (November, December 1967), and the Special Representative of the President in Korea in February, 1968. He is Chairman of the International Advisory Board of The Dayan Center.

Appil 8, 1987

David Gordis

Mort Yarmon

Bookie just sent on this article from The Economist, with this note:

"The Economist article is first-rate ... a bit harsh but accurate. It's based very largely on the discussion I had with its Washington correspondant. (It might be added to items going out to chapter for their chapter discissions... At least it might go out in regular field office mailings.)"

cc: Shula Bahat
Gary Rubin
Marc Tanenbaum
Gene DuBow

not in entering male-dominated fields but in making some headway there.

In almost every field, women have now proved that they can get in and progress to the middle. They seldom get higher. Among white-collar workers, only 10% of women are managers. In colleges and universities, women hold only 25% of the full-time faculty positions but about 44% of the low-paid, non-tenured jobs. Although they account for half of all law students, few women become partners in law firms. In the foreign service, the Court of Appeals has found the State Department deliberately keeping women out of the programme-direction section and assigning them to the consular corps, which carries less prestige.

Certain fields, such as corporate finance, are virtually impenetrable to women, largely because they are still not trusted to keep secrets. For reasons of comfort and camaraderie, as much as outright prejudice, many higher echelons are, in effect, male clubs. Accepting women in some token role is not difficult; allowing them power, inside knowledge or a place on the letterhead, the concomitants to promotion, are altogether different.

Prejudice is not the only obstacle faced by women. Another is education. Women may crowd the campuses (at the University of North Carolina, in Chapel Hill, as at the University of Indiana and the University of New York at Plattsburg, women now make up a majority at a "male" college, and some trustees fear for their future donations). But they still tend to study soft subjects, the humanities and the life sciences, which do not lead to the best paid jobs. There has been a notable shift away from teaching and towards business studies; but in the physical sciences and engineering, where only 18% of graduates are women, several programmes started in the enthusiastic 1960s specially to attract women have been dropped for lack of interest.

Another obstacle is pure biology: the fact that women, as the bearers and rearers of children, are more likely to take leave from their jobs for periods of years. This dissuades their bosses from promoting them, and in many cases dissuades the women from trying to get any higher. Exhaustion takes its toll, and stamina is needed to overcome the largest obstacle of all, the self-protective instincts of men.

The Santa Clara decision, which implicitly upholds any number of voluntary plans that were in doubt before, may encourage companies to make more effort to promote women. Yet there is also a need for some example in high places. Efforts to promote women in state and federal offices seem to embolden private employers. Under President Reagan, recruitment of women to government has recently returned to its level of 1980 after a sharp dive; about 15% of presidential appointments are now women, and about the same proportion hold elected posts in the cities and cabinet appointments in the states.

The administration, however, refuses to countenance preferential treatment for anyone. It fought on Mr Johnson's side in the Santa Clara case as long as it could and, having lost that one, is now trying to insist on the enforcement of a Court of Appeals ruling blocking racial quotas in the hiring of firemen in Washington, DC. If all else fails, says one officer of the Justice Department, a new appointment or two to the Supreme Court may be the only way to turn the tide.

Jews

Diaspora divided

WASHINGTON, DC

"America, it now appears, may not be your promised land." In a letter to the *Jerusalem Post*, Professor Shlomo Avineri, a respected Israeli political scientist, contends that the dismay of American Jews at Israel's bad behaviour reflects their insecurity: their exile may be velvet-lined but they still feel "as vulnerable as Soviet or Iranian Jews", running for cover to avoid, not in their case the police, but the suspicion of divided loyalties. American Jews, suggests Mr Avineri, live with the fear of being shut out, once again, from the high-powered, sensitive jobs they now command. Stuff and nonsense, respond American Jewish leaders. Mr Avineri, they say, is indulging in "an intellectual temper tantrum". American Jews are outraged at the prospect of defending an indefensible Israel, not fearful of reawakened discrimination against themselves.

The intense preoccupation of America's 6m Jews with Israel makes rubbish of the proposition, advanced by Mr Avineri and by Mr Charles Krauthammer in the *Washington Post*, that Israeli villainy should be no skin off the community's nose. American Jews are Israel's bounteous bankers, ardent ambassadors: identifying Israel's interests with America's own, they have converted administrations, Congresses and would-be elected officials to the thesis. The charge of "dual loyalty" breaks surface from time to time and is stamped underfoot as anti-semitic, notably in a vituperative exchange last year between Mr Gore Vidal, who had written a mischievous article in the *Nation*, and Mr Norman Podhoretz, the neo-conservative editor of *Commentary*, who responded with ponderous fury.

The current agonising among American Jews is less introspective. Freshened with anger, it could in the end lead to a less one-sided relationship between Israel and its American Jewish supporters. The Israelis, not the most modest of people, take their benefactors' uncritical support disdainfully for granted. And the Americans, in the greater interest of saving Israel from its Arab enemies—and in gratitude for themselves living in the United States and not in Israel—have swallowed all lesser reservations. If Israel

has been criticised, for its policies in Lebanon or in the West Bank, it has generally been in a whisper, out of the side of the mouth. "However much we were disconcerted by [Israeli] policies," writes one Jewish leader in response to Mr Avineri, "we neither shrank from our Jewishness nor did we waver in our support for Israel." Criticism from non-Jews is disallowed, equated with a willingness to let Israel go down the drain.

To a limited extent, this attitude may be changing. Last month a group of 65 American Jewish leaders spent a week in Israel, speaking their minds to their hosts in a manner that was unusually blunt. And they found, in the words of one of them, Mr Hyman Bookbinder, that they could say frankly what they thought of Israel's misbehaviour and the world did not collapse about them. Their boldness, they believe, could mark a significant change in American-Israeli relations. Constructive criticism, after nearly 40 years of backing Israel right or wrong, may tentatively be on the cards.

Thank Mr Jonathan Pollard for that. American Jews are upset with the Israelis on several counts, but the Pollard case takes precedence. Americans are outraged that an American Jew should have been engaged by Israel to steal vast quantities of ultra-sensitive American military information, and insulted by the Israeli government's equivocal reaction to American indignation. The affair is slowly unravelling in Israel. The resignation of Colonel Aviem Sella, Mr Pollard's principal handler, from the senior command post to which he had been promoted, is, Americans hope, only a beginning.

A curious American addendum to the affair is hanging in the air. Senator David Durenberger, a former Republican chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, is up for re-election next year. Apparently seeking to please some Jewish activists in Florida, the senator let fall that the Americans broke the rules of the American-Israeli game first by getting a disaffected Israeli officer to spy out secrets in the early 1980s. Confusion ensued, including denials from both sides and an investigation by the Senate ethics committee of Mr Durenberger's apparent breach of confidence.

South Africa, and immigration, too

If it had not been for the Pollard affair, other American-Israeli disputes might have been more readily covered up. As it is, there is an accumulation of differences, and Israel's friendly relations with the South African government tops the heap. On April 1st, the State Department issued the report that Congress had asked for when it passed the anti-apartheid sanctions law last year. This partly classified document lists the countries that are still selling arms to South Africa in defiance of the 1977 embargo "with a view to terminating military assistance to those countries".

The sky has not yet fallen

Arms dealers in several NATO countries, including Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, plus Switzerland, are believed to be still selling weapons to South Africa. Since none of these countries receives American military aid, they can be embarrassed by the report but not punished. Israel is in a separate category: it is by far the largest single recipient of American military help—now running at $1.8 billion a year—and it is said, unofficially, to make up to $800m a year from its secret government-to-government sales of weapons and, in particular, military technology to South Africa.

Nobody expects Israel's military aid to be cut off: an escape clause will, never fear, be found. But to make the escape smoother, and to ease the awkwardness, the Israeli government announced on March 19th that it would not enter into any new military contracts with South Africa. It would, however, honour all existing contracts. There were two curious aspects to this announcement. It was the first time that the government had acknowledged that any such contracts existed. And it was still kept secret how long the present contracts had yet to run before they expired. As an act of self-denial, it was less than convincing.

A growling dispute over Soviet Jewry, which encapsulates the underlying resentments that Israelis and American Jews feel towards one another, may have been resolved by reports that the growing number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union will, in future, fly direct to Israel by way of Romania (see page 28). In the past, their first stop has been a we European country, Austria or Ital where they have been able, by claimir refugee status, to choose the Unite States as their final destination in prefe ence to Israel.

Most Soviet Jews do choose Americ and American Jewry supports their fre dom of choice; Israel, which wants mo Jewish immigration, claims that no Je who is free to come to Israel is entitled t call himself homeless or a refugee. Onc Soviet Jews reach Israel, they acquir Israeli citizenship and lose the short-cu route: if they still want to come to Amer ca, and have no family there, they ar obliged to join a long queue of Israelis.

The scares, turmoil and agonising c the past few months have not reduced th Israeli lobby's authority. It is probably a fanciful as ever to see Congress cuttin the huge share of foreign aid that goes t Israel, with Egypt attached by tow-line Yet things are, perhaps, changing. Amer ican Jewry has shown that it can say bo to Israel and survive the day without th sky falling in.

Soviet spies

Lonely Lonetree

The elite Marine Corps is going through a bad patch. Entangled in the Iran-contra affair are several of its members and former members, including Lieut-Colonel Oliver North; the former national security adviser, Mr Robert McFarlane; and Mr Donald Regan, who until recently ran the White House for President Reagan. Now the Marine Corps itself, which since 1948 has provided guards for American embassies around the world, is in

ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

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NATIONAL UNITY PRIORITIES
(Press Summary-September 16, 1984)

Three days before the expiration of the extended mandate given Shimon Peres to form a government, he succeeded in presenting to the Knesset his national unity cabinet of 25 ministers, supported by a record number of Knesset members (97 versus 23), including Labor-Yahad (40 Knesset members), Likud (41), National Religious Party (4), Shas (4), Shinui (3), Agudat Yisrael (2), Morasha (2), and Ometz (1). Accordingly, Labor and the Likud have 10 ministers each in the new government.

Left in the opposition corner are Mapam (6), which broke away from its partnership with Labor in the Alignment; Hatihiya (5), Hadash (4), Ratz (4), the Progressive List Party (2), Tami (1), and Rabbi Meir Kahane.

In interviews last week with Israel's major newspapers, Prime Minister Shimon Peres acknowledged that the newly formed national unity government's priorities would be to deal with the country's economic situation, especially to bring under control the 400 percent inflation per annum, and to bring about an early withdrawal of Israel's army from Lebanon.

Both Israel's economy and the unresolved situation in Lebanon were the major issues in the recent national election campaign. In the new government the Likud's Yitzhak Moda'i, 57, is finance minister and Labor's Yitzhak Rabin, 62, is defense minister. Moda'i is the leader of the Liberal party faction of the Likud, whereas Rabin is a former Israeli army chief of staff, ambassador to Washington and prime minister. These two ministers are the ones directly responsible for carrying out the policies that Mr. Peres has made his government's priorities.

1. **The Economy.**

Shlomo Ma'oz, writing in Ha'aretz (September 14), describes Mr. Moda'i as "close" to both Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir. "Yitzhak Moda'i's economic theory objects to a large devaluation (of the shekel) that leads only to further inflation.... In his opinion, every subsidy or support of basic commodities, fuel, electricity, education and health must cease," Ma'oz notes. Such subsidies are currently between 40 to more than 100 percent of those basic and other commodities. But Moda'i "supports the linkage of wages to the index, while objecting to the sophisticated system of linkages that otherwise neutralize the government's ability to conduct effective (economic) policies."

Ma'oz predicts that Mr. Moda'i will choose to implement a "total economic program" rather than step-by-step measures, thereby serving "to neutralize the public's expectations that (contribute to the) rates of inflation." This program, Ma'oz adds, would include selective investment in economic growth through increased, but not subsidized, exports.

Finance Minister Moda'i is described by associates as a "scintillating person" whose greatest enemy is himself, writes Ma'oz, adding that Mr. Moda'i's "impulsive temperament" would "be best restrained by a staff of advisors."

Avi Temkin, writing a "news analysis" on the front page of the weekend Jerusalem Post (September 14), entitled, "Nation's economy will be in volatile hands," notes that Israel's "next finance minister, Yitzhak Moda'i, has a reputation for being unpredictable. Those who have tried to forecast his next steps have found it a risky matter."

Temkin reviews Mr. Moda'i's ideas on Israel's economy during the past year, beginning with an interview in the Jerusalem Post in September, 1983. At that time, Mr. Moda'i "said that he had some ideas about ways to rescue the economy, adding that they would involve the use of some administrative measures to diminish the budget deficit." A few days ago, Temkin adds, Mr. Moda'i "again hinted at administrative measures when he said that, temporarily, some anti-Liberal moves would be needed."

Temkin speculates what those moves may be and suggests that they include "a wage and price freeze, a proposal common to almost every economist in the country. Although Moda'i has gone on record.... in favor of a large budget cut, a freeze in social services and a slash in public spending, he seems to have reservations about the benefits of trimming the budget."

Citing Mr. Moda'i's temperamental nature, Temkin recalls the period when the new finance minister was energy minister in the Likud government. During a strike by workers of the Electric Corporation in August 1979, Mr. Moda'i warned "we will sit in the dark, refrigerators will not work and there will be no water, but we shall not give in to every pressure group that lays its hands on the economy's throat." Two weeks later, Temkin adds, Moda'i granted almost all of the workers' demands and the strike ended.

According to Zvi Zerachya, writing in Davar (September 14), published by the Labor party, "the most wanted commodities in the finance ministry are two articles, published some seven months ago in the press ("Yediot Acharonot" and "Ma'ariv"), and written by the new finance minister, Yitzhak Moda'i...." Thus, Zerachya notes that Mr. Moda'i's economic programs are not new since he had personally made them public in the past. They consist of price and wage freezes, a monthly devaluation of the shekel at the rate of the monthly cost-of-living index, with wages linked to the monthly index.

The same publicized programs, Zerachya indicates, should also put to rest the fears shared by labor union leaders regarding unemployment that could result from recession-like measures that many expect. Apparently, Mr. Moda'i opposes unemployment. "In his opinion, unemployment causes great losses to the economy and, in addition, leads to large payments of compensation for dismissal that interfere with the control of inflation," Zerachya writes. Nevertheless, Mr. Moda'i is known to favor a reduction in the civil service staff, he adds.

Zerachya predicts that very soon "it will be possible to begin to measure the intensity of the tremor that will accompany the entrance of Moda'i to the post he spent years preparing for."

2. The War in Lebanon.

"The promissory note that the the Alignment signed when it alloted six months for the exit of the IDF (Israel Defense Force) from Lebanon has now been presented to Yitzhak Rabin for payment," writes Michael Garti of Ha'aretz (September 14), in an article entitled "The first note."

Garti writes "that the Israeli public -- constituents of the Alignment, the Likud and all the others, wants an end to the wretched chapter in the military history of the IDF.... (when Israel's) soldiers became the contents of a training bag, which boxers of all Lebanese communities and political streams have been punching."

In one sentence, Garti sums up the tragedy of the Lebanese war: "Twenty-seven months, 595 killed and 3,500 wounded, following (Ariel) Sharon's declaration of a 48-hour war; two governments after (Menachem) Begin's claim, following consultation with his government's ministers, that if 50 soldiers will fall in the operation this will be a disaster -- it appears that also those who supported the war with all their hearts, want to see in Rabin that defense minister who will pull the IDF out of the Lebanese mire."

But Garti fears that "the public's yearning to get out of the Lebanese mire, and the trust that the public places in Rabin, the chief-of-staff of the (1967) Six Day War, have the makings of bitter disappointment." This assessment is based on the assumption that the IDF cannot unilaterally withdraw entirely to the international boundary without first guaranteeing the safety of Israel's northern border.

"The meaning of such a withdrawal is to depend upon the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA), and such dependence is strictly very limited. If IDF forces leave all of Lebanon, the SLA will be unable to accept full responsibility for the peace of the Galilee -- and at the most could only prevent the massive deployment of (Palestinian) terrorists," Garti writes. Consequently, Garti argues that the IDF can only make a partial withdrawal to a new line of defense that would take into account the 22 kilometer range of Katusha missiles and their threat to Israel's northern population. Missiles with a longer range, Garti adds, are not very mobile and cannot be easily introduced surreptitiously to an area that is subject to investigation and controls.

In Garti's view, withdrawal of the IDF to new lines in Lebanon, especially on the western front, will not lead to a reduction in Israeli casualties since experience has proved that "the grenade throwers and those who plant explosive charges" have been following Israeli soldiers south after each transfer of responsibility to the SLA by the IDF.

Garti recommends that Mr. Rabin, "whose analysis regarding the situation in Lebanon is the best that has been made, must understand that he cannot allow the public to see him as an all effective magician... this obligates him to tell the truth to the public, and it is best that these things be said before the expectations develop to the extent that the fall from them will hurt..."

The Jerusalem Post's defense correspondent, Hirsh Goodman, in an article entitled "A difficult legacy," also notes that "Rabin's optimistic words this week that he could get the IDF out (of Lebanon) in six months will undoubtedly come back to haunt him."

The situation continues to get worse, Hirsh writes. "There are an average of 10 attacks against IDF personnel in Lebanon each week.... There is increased fundamentalism and anti-Israeli sentiment is building up among the Shi'ites. There is also a gradual but persistent PLO build-up in the Bekaa and along the Awali, where the Druse have been lax, a bolstering of Syrian positions in the Bekaa and growing political pandemonium in the north."

Others, however, believe that the continuing war in Lebanon has a solution, but not one that the new national unity government of Israel is likely to undertake. This view appears in an article by Alex Fishman, entitled "A doctor without access to the medicine cabinet," in the weekend Al Hamishmar (September 14), published by the Socialist Mapam party.

The doctor is, of course, Yitzhak Rabin, and the "medicine cabinet" is the Palestinian problem that must be solved, according to Fishman, if Israel is to live in peace with its neighbors. But "the conditions that led to the establishment of the national unity government, the composition of that government and its policy guidelines, create a very clearly defined area in whose framework the tenth defense minister of Israel can operate... The question, therefore, will not be what does Yitzhak Rabin want to do, but what can he do," writes Fishman.

Fishman claims that Mr. Rabin has "prescriptions for the illness. A territorial compromise and talks with (Jordan's King) Hussein according to a very strict timetable are at the top of (Rabin's) priorities. More than once he told limited forums on the eve of the elections, that if he does not succeed in bringing Hussein to the negotiating table in the course of 1985, he will see this as the failure of his policies in the defense system, as well as the failure of the entire government, requiring new elections."

Fishman writes that under the circumstances of the national unity government, in which the Likud has parity with Labor, "Rabin is as limited as his predecessors, and will only be able to deal with the symptoms of the illness." But Fishman does not agree with those who are convinced that Mr. Rabin cannot rapidly achieve Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. He cites Mr. Rabin's repeated determination to bring about such withdrawal within four to nine months and predicts that this will happen accordingly. Among the reasons Fishman offers is the Labor party's "need for a quick political achievement, while showing off its abilities in terms of action before another round (of elections)" that Fishman foresees. In the words of Yitzhak Rabin, "the Lebanese problem is the least important of all the problems that are presented in the confrontation regions of the State of Israel where quiet has been maintained for ten years. We have to remove the Lebanese problem from our national agenda."

Fishman sincerely hopes, as do many others, that the new defense minister "will enter history as the resurrector of the defense theory of the State of Israel -- (that) the solution of political problems cannot nor should not be solved through wars. War is the last alternative and the worst for solving political problems."

* * * * * *

(Edited by Kenneth Bandler)
P063-Highlights (9-16-84)/smm

memorandum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date March 17, 1986

to Area Directors and Executive Assistants

from George E. Gruen, Director, Israel & Middle East Affairs

subject Proposed U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia

The basic points in this background memorandum were approved by the Steering Committee of the International Relations Commission this morning and by the Board of Governors at its meeting this afternoon. It was decided not to issue a formal public statement at this time, but to authorize the officers to issue a statement expressing our disapproval of the proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia at their discretion, dependent upon the outcome of present efforts to reach a compromise between the Administration and Congressional opponents of the arms package.

The following points may be helpful to you in case you receive inquiries as to the issues we believe need to be considered in regard to the current proposal:

The American Jewish Committee shares the concern of the United Government to maintain the free flow of oil from the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf, to support the security and stability of the pro-Western Gulf states, to oppose radical forces in the area and the expansion of Soviet influence into the region. We have serious questions, however, about the wisdom and efficacy of certain planned Administration actions intended to achieve these strategic goals.

The Reagan Administration notified Congress on March 11 that it proposes to sell Saudi Arabia $354 million worth of additional sophisticated air-to-air, air-to-sea, and ground-to-air missiles in the belief that such action would advance these interests and that the sale was made urgent by the recent successes of the Iranian forces against Iraq and the potential threat this poses to neighboring Kuwait and eventually to Saudi Arabia. The Administration contends that failure to meet the Saudi requests at this time would harm bilateral Saudi-American relations and hurt the credibility of the United States with the rest of the Gulf Arabs.

The Administration further contends that these arms are needed for Saudi defense, can be absorbed within the Saudi military, and "do not represent a threat to Israel," since "this sale will not threaten Israel's qualitative military edge nor change the balance of power in the Middle East." The number of missiles being offered for sale, the Administration argues, are only one-third of the number originally requested by the Saudis.

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The American Jewish Committee believes that this sale should not be seen in isolation, but within the context of Saudi Arabia's overall program of acquisition of large quantities of the most advanced aircraft and missiles. We believe that before deciding whether or not to approve the present Saudi arms request, the Congress should carefully examine whether these additional missiles are in fact needed in view of the large stockpile already present in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the current Saudi ratio of missiles per plane greatly exceeds that of the U.S. and Israeli air forces. In any case, their delivery should be made contingent on the depletion of existing supplies as they are expended in training and through attrition.

Moreover, in view of the limited number of serviceable planes available to the Iranian air force, there is considerable doubt as to how much of a realistic challenge they pose to Saudi Arabia, which already has numerous planes and missiles, as well as the effective advance warning and electronic support provided by the four U.S. Air Force AWACS currently stationed in the country. The recent Iranian successes against Iraq have been achieved through massive infantry attacks and not through airpower. The missiles are also no barrier to the propaganda and subversion campaigns being mounted by Iran against its conservative neighbors.

Finally, Congress should weigh the Administration's request in the context of the Congressionally mandated requirement that the Saudis must provide "substantial assistance" to the United States in promoting peace in the region. We note with deep concern that Saudi Arabia continues to furnish financial assistance to Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization to enable them to carry on what it calls the "armed struggle" against "the Zionist enemy." Moreover, the Saudis have in recent months proclaimed their "categorical solidarity" with Libya -- including a pledge to replace losses resulting from American economic sanctions. At the United Nations last December and at the Islamic Conference Organization meeting this past January the Saudis sponsored resolutions calling on all states to sever their ties with Israel and laying the groundwork for expelling the Jewish state from the United Nations.

Congress should also keep in mind the potential danger that until Saudi Arabia stops supporting the enemies of Israel, any weapons -- and particulary such ideal terrorist weapons as the Stinger handheld anti-aircraft missiles -- may at some point be diverted to use against Israeli or American aircraft by radical forces such as the PLO, the Syrians or the Libyans.

cc: Board of Governors
Steering Committee
International Relations Commission

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The Administration further contends that these arms are needed for Saudi defense, can be absorbed within the Saudi military, and "do not represent a threat to Israel," since "this sale will not threaten Israel's qualitative military edge nor change the balance of power in the Middle East." The number of missiles being offered for sale, the Administration argues, are only one-third of the number originally requested by the Saudis.

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In view of this record, it is crucial that the United States insist on verifiable safeguards to insure that any arms it furnishes -- and particularly such ideal terrorist weapons as the Stinger handheld anti-aircraft missiles -- be available exclusively for defense of Saudi territory. They must not be allowed to be diverted to use against Israeli or American aircraft by radical forces such as the PLO, the Syrians or the Libyans.

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THE POSITION OF THE "BLACK HEBREWS" IN ISRAEL

An Examination of the Complex Issues Involved

By George E. Gruen

As elections approach in Israel, the future of the "Black Hebrew" community has once again become a headline issue in the Israeli press. Who are these people, why has their presence in Israel aroused so much controversy and what are some of the issues that need to be addressed?

1. Who are the Black Hebrews?

While popularly known in Israel as the Black Hebrews, this messianic sect officially calls itself the "Original African Hebrew Israelite Nation of Jerusalem." According to a basic study by Dr. Morris Lounds, Jr., a Black sociologist, the group appears to have arisen in the Black ghettos of Chicago in the early 1960's, at a time when "there were a number of Black Jewish cult groups in Chicago advocating a form of Judaism blended with Black nationalism." (Lounds, Israel's Black Hebrews: Black Americans in Search of Identity Washington, D.C., University Press of America, Inc. 1981.) Most of these groups soon disintegrated and the remainder did not seriously consider emigration from the United States. The Black Hebrews, however, did. In the summer of 1967 a group of some 170, mostly from Chicago, left -- not for Jerusalem, but for Monrovia, the capital of Liberia.

2. How were the Black Hebrews Received in Liberia?

Initially they were welcomed by the Liberian Government, in accordance with its policy of encouraging immigration, especially of American Blacks. They were given rent-free housing for three months and a monthly allotment of $60 per person. They were also offered a 300-acre site to develop into farmland, as they had requested. Relations soon soured. The Black Hebrews contend that the land was not suitable and that they were being discriminated against because they would not work on the Sabbath. The Liberian authorities denied the charges, noting that they were also given housing in Monrovia and that the Constitution specifically exempted Sabbath-observers from working on Saturday. Some of the disillusioned members of the group returned to the United States.

After two years, in November 1969, Liberian Attorney General James A. A. Pierre instituted deportation proceedings against some 75 remaining members of the Black Hebrews on the ground that they were "undesirable aliens" and "without any apparent intention of working or becoming useful to the country." (Liberian Star, Nov. 4, 1969.) Moreover, Mr. Pierre pointed out that the Government had repeatedly offered them citizenship but had asked them to spread out and be assimilated into the general population of the country, which had been founded by freed American slaves in 1847. The Black Hebrews had refused to apply for citizenship and had rejected the Government's request.

Mr. Milt Greaves of the Liberian Department of Information made a scathing comment: "When they arrived in Liberia, they stated that there were others in Chicago also interested in coming to settle in Liberia. The basis of identitication then was that we were all 'Black soul brothers' who had to stand to-

gether.... When They discovered that Liberia, a developing country, could ill afford parasites merely because they were 'soul brothers,' they decided to seek greener pastures. The logical place was Israel. Where they will go next is a little harder to determine . . . Their dissatisfaction with Liberia stems not from discrimination but from the false picture they had of the country as a country flowing with 'free' milk and honey!" ("America's Black Jews in Israel," Israel, March 1970, p. 36.)

3. When did the Black Hebrews first arrive in Israel?

A few weeks later, on December 21, 1969, a group of 39 Black Hebrews landed at Lydda International Airport, and asked to be granted immediate immigrant status under Israel's Law of Return and be given land to establish a kibbutz, or communal farm, near Tel Aviv. The Israeli immigration authorities said that the question of whether they were in fact Jewish was to be determined by the government in consultation with the rabbinical courts. The authorities granted them tourist status for three months, as is offered to any American visitor entering on a valid U.S. passport. In addition, the group was settled in the Negev development town of Dimona and given assistance in obtaining housing, employment, Hebrew language instruction, and other support usually provided to new immigrants.

Shortly thereafter, the rest of the Hebrew Israelites from Liberia arrived in two groups and joined their brethren in Dimona. At first relations with the general community, mostly composed of recent Jewish immigrants, were fairly amicable. Dimona's dynamic young mayor, Israel Navon, was quoted as saying that

"we've got jobs for 600 more, if we had housing for them." The Black Hebrews' colorful, individual clothing, their eagerness to learn Hebrew, their sense of community, all were at first seen as positive factors.

While their beliefs aroused curiosity, they did not encounter discrimination on the basis of their race. Indeed, many of their Jewish immigrant neighbors had come from India, or North Africa, and their skin color was in some cases just as dark as that of the Hebrew Israelites.



Did race have anything to do with the treatment of the Black Hebrews? Israeli officials point out that the exceptional measures to aid the group were undertaken largely because of Israel's special sensitivity toward persons who had suffered discrimination and also ~~toward special sensitivity towards its concern~~ its concern to avoid any possible suspicion of racism. They emphasize that had a similarly bizarre sect of white persons come with the claim that they were the original and only true Israelites they would have been barred entry and summarily deported.

The question of the human rights of the Black Hebrews in Israel ws investigated in January 1981 by a delegation of prominent American Black civil rights leaders, including Bayard Rustin of the A. Philip Randolph Education Fund; Alexander J. Allen, Vice President of the National Urban League; Lewis J. Carter III, National Labor Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; and Mrs. Arthur C. Logan, National Council of Negro Women. The delegation intensely investigated the question of whether official racism was involved in the Black Hebrew problem, raised the question with each person the delegation met and "spent considerable time with non-white groups which we felt would be most sensitive to any such problems." The

delegation stated that "Ben Ami Carter, leader of the Black Hebrews, told us that he does not consider that his community's problems spring from official racism."

In its report, the delegation stated:

From all the evidence we have heard, including that from the Black Hebrew Community, we conclude that official racism plays no part in this sensitive problem. The initial welcome given to the Black Hebrews and the offer of conversion clearly support that conclusion. The general agreement is that the official difficulties stem from deep-seated religious, philosophical and political differences.

5. Are the Black Hebrews Jewish?

Black Hebrew leaders have taken conflicting positions about whether they claim to be Jewish. Hiskiyahu Blackwell, who led the first group of arrivals, told reporters at Lydda airport: "All we ask is to be allowed to live here in Israel and work and study. We are Jewish. We have always been Jewish, and we have come to Israel for the same reason any Jew comes here." (New York Times, Dec. 23, 1969.)

Rabbi Dar'i of Jaffa, a native of Morocco, who had discovered "lost Jewish souls" in Arab families and helped them return to Judaism, became interested in the Black Hebrews and sought to help them with the authorities. Upon investigation he found that they readily admitted that before coming to Israel there had been considerable intermarriage with non-Jewish Blacks, some had been

married in church; some had been baptized. Dr. Lounds found that many of their rituals also departed radically from Jewish tradition, for example their absolute fasting every Sabbath, their strict vegetarianism, and their assertion that the holy days "are memorials, of less importance for devotional acts for Hebrew Israelites than for Jews." (Lounds, Israel's Black Hebrews, p. 61.)

While the Biblical exodus from Egyptian slavery has always been a unifying theme among all Jews, the Black Hebrews have chosen to disassociate themselves from Israel's Jewish community in the observance of Passover. Whereas Israeli Jews, both Ashkenazim and Sephardim, observed the holiday in Nissan (corresponding to mid-April this year), the Black Hebrews are observing their "New World Passover," a month later on May 17-18.

Rabbi Dar'i recommended that they undergo formal Orthodox conversion to Judaism and accept the normative Jewish practices. They would also have to stop the practice of polygamy. (Israel has outlawed polygamy except for those who had lawfully contracted multiple marriages before the coming of the law into effect.) Several Black Hebrews were considering the route of formal conversion to Judaism when Ben-Ami Carter, "The Righteous Teacher," came from Liberia with 47 additional followers from Chicago and strenuously rejected formal conversion to Judaism. (Israel, March 1970, pp.38-43.)

Carter now began to expound a view of history and theology that was bound to antagonize the Israeli authorities. Typical was the statement that the Israeli Jews "are mostly European converts who adopted the ways of the ancient Israelites. There is no link between these people and the Biblical Israelites who were Black." (Jerusalem Post, Jan. 9, 1973) Carter and other Hebrew

Israelite leaders predicted that a war of Armageddon wold occur shortly in which their antagonists would be destroyed and the Hebrew Israelites would assume power, to usher in the millenium. (Lounds, op. cit., p.3.) In a 1975 interview, Asiel (Warren Brown) the "International Ambassador" of the Hebrew Israelites, told Black World:

> By 1977, the lands and the institutions now being controlled by the illegal government occupying that land [Israel] will be in the hands of Black people from America, with the authority of the Original Hebrew Israelite Nation from Jerusalem. (Quoted in "The Black Hebrews," by Roberta Elliott, Newsview, Feb. 14, 1984.)

After the rabbinical authorities had decided that the Black Hebrews were not Jewish and the Minister of Interior began expulsion proceedings against Black Hebrews who had either entered the country illegally or whose residence permits had expired, the Black Hebrews went to court. During the trial, they did not claim to be "Jews," but argued that the law should apply to anyone who regarded himself as a Hebrew by nationality or birthright. The Court ruled that since the Hebrew Israelites were not Jewish they could not benefit from the Law of Return. The Ministry of the Interior therefore was acting within its rights to expel Black Hebrews who were living in the country illegally. Significantly, the Court recommended that all those Hebrew Israelites already residing in the country -- then estimated at a few hundred souls -- be allowed to remain in Israel. (Lounds, op. cit., pp. 49-50 and 161-62. For description and analysis of the court case, see the Jerusalem Post, Jan. 9, 1973.)

6. What factors have exacerbated the problem?

REPORT
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GEORGE GRUEN / MARCTANENSIUM

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THE BRAIN-WASHING OF THE ANTI-ZIONISTS

by S. Zalman Abramov

(this article has been translated from *Ha'aretz*, January 1, 1986, by The American Jewish Committee as a public service.)

MISSIONARY ACTIVITY IN ISRAEL IS NOT AN OFFENSE UNDER THE LAW EVEN THOUGH THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX TRY TO PRESENT IT IN SUCH A LIGHT.

There is no need to mince words over the scandal caused by the anti-Zionists with respect to the Jerusalem branch of an American university founded by the Mormon sect. For some years now, this branch has been operating here as an academic institution in all respects and no complaint has been heard against it. Following the dying down of the scandal of the assaults on the work of the archaeologists, and revocation of the rabbinical ban, with respect to ancient graves in Tiberias, Agudat Israel activists have now picked on an American university to agitate the public. Their claim is for a halt to the construction of this university since, in their view, it is designed to convert Jews - in other words: to engage in missionary work.

The leaders of Aguda are not unaware of the fact that there is no legal possibility for complying with their demand. Nevertheless, they have set this campaign in motion and, surprisingly enough, even some non-orthodox have joined the fray. The leaders of the nation, however, have remained silent and have not had the civic courage to tell the people the truth of the matter. The result of their failures: distortion and confusion.

While expressing no confidence in the Government, in the Knesset on December 24, 1985, M.K. Avraham Shapira, speaking on behalf of Agudat Israel, claimed that since this university is a mere camouflage for missionary activity, its construction should be halted and its functioning prohibited. He was followed by M.K. Rabbi Drukman, who called for "a fight to prevent missionary activity with the aim of converting us".

Appearing for the Government, Minister Moshe Shachal pointed out that this university had obtained all the authorizations as required by law, including that of the Ministry of Education, then headed by Zevulun Hammer, by the Ministry of the Interior, then headed by Minister Yosef Burg, and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by Minister Yitzchak Shamir, as well as by the Town Building Committee and by the organs of the local Government in which representatives of the ultra-orthodox and the religious faction participated, and did not protest at the

granting of the authorizations. Since this university has complied with the requirements of the law, the construction cannot be halted. The Minister said further: "There is an international aspect to this issue, since the Mormons have influential supporters, among them senators and administration representatives, whose support is important (for us). It was not for nothing that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Shamir at its head, attributed importance to strengthening the connection with the Mormons, and it should also be mentioned, by way of intimation, that world public opinion will not be happy with an arbitrary action on this subject nor will world Jewry derive pleasure from it".

It would have been fitting had Mr. Shachal made do with the following weighty arguments: the obligation to uphold the law on the one hand, and general Jewish and national interest on the other. Any Zionist would have found these satisfactory. But the Minister, for some reason, also wished to satisfy the non-Zionists, and so, raised another point. He said: "There is a written undertaking by the Mormons not to engage in missionary work in Israel. The students, faculty and staff associated with the institution will not be permitted to engage in activities of religious conversion in Israel."

LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE

This statement is most surprising as it implies that missionary activity in Israel is prohibited and that, therefore, all those associated with this institution have been required to make a commitment not to breach this prohibition. It must be made absolutely clear that the law in Israel does not prohibit missionary activity. For 150 years now many Christian institutions have been engaging in this activity and, despite the meager results, they continue to seek converts for their religion. A number of years ago, members of Agudat Israel launched an anti-mission campaign and under their pressure, the Knesset enacted a law entitled "Penal Code Amendment (enticement to change religion) Law", 1977, which provided that "whosoever gives to a person or promises to a person money or money's-worth or other material benefit in order to induce him to change his religion, or in order that he may induce another person to change his religion, is liable to imprisonment for five years". So far no person has been prosecuted under this law.

There was no justification for Minister Shachal to refer to undertakings from the students, teachers and employees of the Mormons' university to desist from missionary activity. Such an undertaking has not been asked from other Christian institutions active in Israel. It is illegal for Government to request that a person desist from a legal act. It is easy to imagine the intensity of the reaction of the Christian world to a prohibition against religious propaganda and the effect of this reaction on the standing of Jews in the Diaspora. It is also easy to imagine the reaction of the Mormons if they realize that the prohibition applies only to them and not to other Christian sects.

The freedom to persuade - persuasion, not enticement - is one of the principles of a democracy, and just as it is legal to persuade people to change their philosophical, social and political outlook, so is it legal to persuade them to change their religion.

The attempt to interfere with legal missionary activity will hurt not only Israel's image abroad, but will encourage those who seek to undermine our sovereignty over the city that is holy to three religions, each of which has rights and interests of long standing. If we fail to respect these rights and fail to refrain from harming Christian institutions, we shall be accessories to those who demand the suspension of our sovereignty over Jerusalem.

The anti-Zionist has indeed managed to brain-wash many members of the public into thinking that missionary activity is prohibited by law and that there is a real danger of apostasy because of the work of the mission. These two claims are groundless and are no more than a demogogic exercise that, because of the failure of the leaders of the State, has achieved its objective; it has sown confusion and increased xenophobia. Even if this campaign dies not achieve its objective, as may be assumed, it could nevertheless undermine the friendship of many of our well-wishers among non-Jews, and arouse deep concern among our brethren in the Diaspora as regards the image of our state and the quality of its leadership.

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PRELIMINARY DRAFT---NOT FOR PUBLICATION

The Saudi Armed Forces: a source of stability or instability?

by Mordechai Abir *)

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia has an area of over 860,000 square miles. Its coastal line is over 2,000 miles long and its population is generally estimated to be between 7 to 9 million people. Yet, the Saudi government censuses, conducted in 1963 and 1974, indicate that the country had less then 4 million citizens. Most scholars believe, however, that the present population of Saudi Arabia is about 8 million. Of these, 4.5 million are Saudis and 3.5 million are foreign residents (the Saudi workforce is made up of over 2.5 million foreigners and only 1.1 million Saudis).

Destabilizing asymmetries

It is somewhat ironic that about two thirds of the western world's proven oil reserves are located in the Gulf area, historically one of the poorest, most backward and least populated in the Middle East. More than 25 percent of the Western world's proven reserves, moreover, are to be found in Saudi Arabia's eastern province alone. But the latter, the Wahhabi kingdom's nearly sole source of wealth, has a Shi'i population, estimated at over 300,000 out of a total indigenous population of 700,000.

Al-Hasa (the eastern province) is typical of the many asymmetries which prevail in the region. Indeed, all the oil rich city-states of the Gulf with their tiny population have substantial Shi'i minorities or Shi'i majorities of their population. The gravity of this situation has surfaced following the rise of the Shi'i

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fundamentalist revolutionary regime in Teheran. Iran, moreover, has 40 million citizens, about ten times the indigenous population of Saudi Arabia and nearly twice that of all the Arab Gulf countries, including Iraq, put together.

The oil wealth of Saudi Arabia and its neighbors is immense. Yet, all lack most of the components necessary for the development of diversified economies. Their population is so small that to modernize, or industrialize, they are forced to import a vast foreign workforce, which in many cases outnumbers the indigenous one.

Naturally the regional anomalies and the weakness of its anachronistic regimes is conducive to internal instability and regional conflict. But even though the Soviet Union may have sufficient energy resources for the coming decades, the very fact that the western industrialized countries are so dependent on the Gulf oil makes the area a target for Soviet strategy.

Security of the whole of eastern Arabia, notwithstanding the US-western naval presence in the north-western part of the Indian Ocean, revolves around Saudi Arabia. Yet, it is doubtful (to say the least) whether Riyadh is capable of handling the complex challenges generated by the asymmetries mentioned above, not to mention its structural weakness and the social change generated by wealth and the rapid modernization which the Wahhabi kingdom is undergoing.

The house of Saud was relatively successful in the past in walking the tightrope between the kingdom's Wahhabi puritan principles and its evolutionary modernization, and between the nationalist, sometimes leftist, aspirations of its new elites and the conservatism of the traditional elites and the Ulama. Riyadh succeeded as well in walking the tightrope between the different camps in the Arab world by strictly adhering at least verbally, to the Arab consensus.

Yet, the "affair of Mecca" in October 1979 was an indication that neo-Ikhwan tendencies were spreading and that the fundamentalist wave in the Muslim world, sparked by Shi'i Iran, is having an impact on Saudi Arabia. There are indications, moreover, that Ba'athist and other socialist ideologies are making increasing inroads into the ranks of the Saudi workers in the oil fields and the young university graduates returning from studies in Europe and the United States.

In the weak disunited Arab camp of the early 1980's, Saudi Arabia remained secure in the leadership, as long as it did not deviate too far from the Arab consensus.
Events in Lebanon and the growth of Iranian power and influence in the Gulf region may, however, undermine the relative stability which Riyadh has been enjoying. The struggle for power within the ruling class could accelerate the process, yet the house of Saud in the past tended to close its ranks whenever its monopoly of power in Saudi Arabia was at stake. The future stability of the kingdom, if not its security from external threats, will depend , largely on the loyalty and strength of the Saudi armed forces.

Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's the Saudi army and National Guard, both volunteer forces, remained small and approximately of equal strength (15,000-18,000). In reality the National Guard, independent of the ministry of defense, was more respected and enjoyed superior manpower and the trust of the royal family. Regular Guard units were stationed in all the main towns and the oil fields and were responsible for the security of the royal family. Volunteers to the Guard units came mainly from Najdi settled and noble Bedouin elements. The armed forces (officially established in 1960), however, recruited their volunteers from among secondary tribes, the urban unemployed, the offsprings of slaves and even foreigners. They were commanded by members of the Najdi aristocracy and important families from other provinces. Occasional abortive coups in the 1950's and 1960's and the desertion of airforce pilots to Egypt and Yemen in the early 1960's, reinforced the distrust in which the armed forces were held by the Saudi ruling class. Thus, army units were normally stationed on the kingdom's border and the airforce was kept short of fuel.

The rise of Arab nationalism and Nasser's massive involvement in the Yemeni civil war in the 1960's convinced King Faysal (1964-1975) of the need to expand and upgrade his armed forces. By the mid-1960's, therefore, the US was requested to help modernize and nearly double the size of the armed forces (to 30,000).

In December 1967 PDRY's Marxist regime was established. A Soviet flotilla appeared in the Arabian Sea shortly after the British decision to evacuate the Gulf by 1971. In 1967, moreover, Israel defeated the Arab armies and captured East Jerusalem and other territories. Riyadh realized by then that its new role in the Arab and Muslim leadership would necessitate a more active involvement

in the struggle against Israel. As Riyadh gradually assumed a key role in the Arab camp facing Israel and its contribution to Arab political and military efforts against the Jewish state after 1973 increased dramatically, its apprehension about Israeli retaliation began to grow.

The decline of US credibility, following the fall of the Shah, and the impact of Iran's fundamentalism and its victories over Iraq (end of 1981) caused panic in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh increased its military purchases. At the same time, to coerce Washington to support its "pax Arabica" and to demonstrate its independence, Riyadh diversified the sources of Saudi military purchases and assistance. But the Fahd government also came to believe that the crisis in the Gulf completely overshadowed the Arab-Israeli conflict. The war in Lebanon further convinced the Saudis of the need to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict but Syria's resistance to a peaceful settlement and the further decline of American credibility in this relation, caused the timid Saudis to move further into the arms of the Arab consensus and to again examine the strength of their armed forces.

2. The development of the Saudi armed forces

The traumatic developments in the Arabian Peninsula in 1967, followed by three successful military coups in Libya, Sudan and Somalia and two abortive coups instigated by officers of the Saudi Hijazis and airforce in 1969 shook the Saudi royal family. But King Faysal became more determined to proceed with the modernization and expansion of his armed forces. Thus, by 1976 the Saudi army numbered 35,000 men, organized in four brigades with artillery, SAM and tank units and a small airforce composed mainly of British planes. Notwithstanding the tension in Saudi-US relations following the Yom Kippur War and the oil embargo, Riyadh accepted Washington's "Peace Hawk Program" for the reorganization of its ministry of defense, the upgrading of its airforce and navy, and the creation of a five-to-ten year master-plan for the development of the Saudi armed forces. Riyadh's willingness and ability to invest heavily in ambitious defense plans were taken for granted. Indeed, defense received the highest budget compared to any other single item in the Saudi second

development plan (1975-1980).

The kingdom's immense territory, long coastlines, sparse and traditional population, and its oil wealth were key factors in Saudi defense planning. American military experts assumed that, while it will remain chronically short of manpower, Riyadh will not lack funds. They persuaded the Saudis, therefore, to focus on the development of a powerful airforce and air defense system, rather than waste their meager human resources on a large army and navy. The Saudi airforce is both capital and technology intensive and is most suitable to defend the country's oil fields and vast territories and, therefore, Riyadh's (US) choice was logical from a policy standpoint.

By 1976 the Saudi airforce, with 10,000 men (15,000 by 1983) and 95 British fighter planes, was receiving delivery of an additional 100 F-5 US made fighers and an improved Hawk SAM system. In addition, the US corps of engineers was engaged in modernizing and expanding air-bases all over Saudi Arabia. Indeed, in this year alone, Saudi military purchases from the US (including construction and training) amounted to $7 billion, (compared to a total of about $600 million between 1950 and 1973). Impatient with the slow growth and modernization of their armed forces Saudi leaders and planners substantially increased the allocation for defense in their second five-year development plan (1975-1980). It was shortly afterwards, when still struggling to absorb previous weapon systems, that the Saudis, induced by leading American officials, opted for the purchase of F-15 (A/B) Eagle, among the most advanced planes then in American avionics. In addition,

Riyadh agreed to purchase a large number of Sidewinder and Maverick air-to-air missiles. For Riyadh the F-15s and (later on) the AWACs became a test case both of America's friendship and of its own ability to influence Washington.

As the Saudi defense budget began its upward spiral in the 1970's it was followed by the rise of Saudi defense purchases in the United States. In the twenty months following October 1973 Riyadh purchased America weaponry and services worth $14.6 billion and between 1979 and 1982 about $25 billions worth (including services and construction).

As was the case with oil, Riyadh awarded generous military contracts to different Western suppliers in order to prove its independence from Washington and to coerce Western nations to adopt what it considered a balanced stance regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Subsequently, in 1977/8, abandoning the American master-plan, the Saudis decided to accelerate the modernization of their land forces and navy with the help of the eager West Europeans. Following the purchase of 500 AMX-30 tanks from France in 1978, French advisors were given control over half of the Saudi armored corps (the other half was left to Americans). But to further demonstrate their independence and disapproval of Washington's Mideast policy (Camp David) Riyadh awarded France a $3.5 billion contract for the construction of a fast missile carrying navy and, to all effect, phased out the US naval program signed in 1972/3. The British, who won in 1977 a five year extension of their contract for training the Saudi airforce (now largely made of American planes), won in 1978/9 a billion dollar contract for a separate communications network for the National Guard. An attempt to purchase several hundred Leopard tanks from the West Germans was aborted in 1980-1981 because of the

pressure of public opinion. Dutch, German, Swedish, Japanese, South Korean and Pakistani firms also won substantial slices of the vast Saudi defense budget (see appendix). The diversity of suppliers created confusion which was further exacerbated by Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi and Pakistani military missions. Indeed, it was to be expected that such a variety of experts, military philosophies and weapon-systems would reduce significantly the effectiveness of the Saudi armed forces and contribute to its increasingly hybrid character.

Some experts and Arab leftist writers, each for their own reasons, have been strongly critical of the American-planned expansion of the Saudi armed forces. They pointed out that the cost/benefit of the vast Saudi military expenditures, as far as Riyadh's military capability was concerned, was only marginal. As much as 60 percent of the military budgets was allocated to construction (including military cities, hospitals, schools, naval and air bases)--whereas training facilities accounted for an additional 20 percent. Only the remaining 20 percent went directly to expanding the military striking force.

Arab analysts accused Washington of misleading the Saudis and intentionally, or unintentionally, decelerating the growth of their military power. Progressive Arab writers claim, moreover, that Riyadh never wanted to have a strong and efficient army, which could endanger the regime. All it wished was to please its officers, technocrats and Arab public opinion.

Be that as it may, one cannot ignore the impact of power politics within the Saudi ruling class and the need of the rulers to please their respective "constituencies". That would account for much of the military construction and its cost in the last decade.

Patronage, moreover, is a key word in Saudi internal politics and budgets are the fuel for patronage.

Chronically short of all kinds of manpower Saudi efforts to create a "capital-intensive" military force and to diversify their suppliers of weapon-systems, has only exacerbated their need for skilled manpower. With no compulsory military service, the Saudi military unevenly competed with the private sector and government. Thus, the number of expatriates in the ranks of the Saudi military, on contract, secondment, or representing western suppliers increasingly grew.

American planners should have been more keenly aware of the Saudi manpower problem. The polyglot advisors' contingent (see below) and the hybrid character of the Saudi military are partly the outcome of "planned" over-expansion.

3. Manpower problem.

By 1982 the Saudi armed forces managed to grow to about 58,000. But the army was reduced to recruiting volunteers among the most peripheral and traditional tribes and villagers and among elements of questionable Saudi nationality. Thousands of expatriate Arabs and Muslim officers, NCOs and technicians now serve in the Saudi armed forces on direct contract.

To attract lower middle class candidates to military schools, a wide range of military and technical high schools and colleges was established, by the ministry of defense, where students are granted handsome benefits and are awarded academic degrees. Such schools and technical institutions, however, appeal only to the fringes of Saudi society and thus supply only a fraction of the technicians, NCO's and officers needed. University graduates, moreover, shun the services and prefer to become respected administrators or "lumpen capitalists".

The upgrading and expansion of the Saudi armed forces caused the military to turn increasingly to the better educated and sophisticated Hijazis and Al-Hasa Sunnis. Both elements were previously ignored, as much as possible, because of their questionable loyalty to Al-Saud. In the service, however, they became frustrated by the preference shown to the Najdis and the fact that the offspring of the Saudi oligarchy monopolize all key positions. Moreover, until recently, corruption and the practice of kickbacks among high-ranking officers were taken for granted and tolerated.

The Hijazi officers' frustration about real, or imagined, discrimination, is well known. It is associated with a widespread feeling among Hijazis that once again (since Faysal's death in 1975) Najdis are given preferential treatment by the authorities. Hijazis were, moreover, involved in the abortive 1977 air force coup and in the alleged January 1983 abortive fundamentalist, "middle class" coup. Nevertheless, it should be noted that recent reforms in the armed forces and improvements of service conditions have had a positive impact. The efficiency of the American-tutored secret services, moreover, is a factor that one cannot overlook.

Compulsory military service has been widely debated in Riyadh in recent years. Saudi nationalists consider it essential for the achievement of social integration and democracy. Prince Sultan, the minister of defense, indeed wishes to have a 100,000-strong Saudi army. Though the government agreed in December 1982 on "national service regulations", it is unlikely that such a law will be implemented in the near future because the ruling class is said to be apprehensive about its far-reaching social and political ramifications.

4. Expatriates and the Saudi armed forces: The "polyglot region"

The correlation between vast military expenditures and the dramatic growth of expatriate manpower in the kingdom has already been discussed. Even more striking is the impact of the upgrading of the armed forces on the growth of the Saudi "polyglot region" of advisers, military personnel and experts made up of Americans (30,000), Europeans (10-15,000), Pakistanis (10,000) and several thousand other Arab and Muslims /non-national/ officers, NCO's and technicians. The Saudi army also has Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, Iraqi and other military delegations attached to it for unspecified duties.

It would be futile to follow the activities of the many other aliens involved in the expansion, upgrading or reorganization of the Saudi armed forces, National Guard, security services and military industry. Suffice it to say that the more foreigners the Saudis employ, irrespective of, or in connection with, the purchase of military equipment, the less return they get for their immense investment. Moreover, considering that the targets of American planners were excessive in view of the kingdom's limited manpower resources, Riyadh's decision in 1977 to abandon these targets and diversify its sources of supply created chaos. The result is increased dependence on the host of foreign advisers and mercenaries of different kinds.

The number of foreigners, especially Westerners, attached to the Saudi armed forces undoubtedly exacerbates the socio-political problems faced by the military, producing tension if not xenophobia. The presence and impact of so many Westerners in their country's armed forces is a source of increased agitation among the puritans and nationalists, who also suspect Westerners' intentions concerning Saudi Arabia's oil wealth.

One wonders what would happen to the complex Saudi war machine if all the foreign experts were to leave? Seriously, it should be of great concern to the Saudi government whether the foreign experts would continue to serve in the Saudi armed forces if Riyadh became involved in a revolution or in a war with one of its neighbors. Would Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen and Pakistanis fight the rebels or the kingdom's foreign enemies?

5. Manpower problems: The changing face of the National Guard?

While the Saudi armed forces tripled in size over the last 25 years, the National Guard, it is claimed, remained stable at 15,000-20,000 regulars and an unknown number of reserves (A highly credible source claims that the active power of the regular Guard is 5,000-8,000, possibly with a similar number spread over the countryside in small units performing a "gendarmerie" role). Theoretically, the Guard is organized in 20-21 battalions (LIWA), whose size varies according to their tribal affiliation and the rate of AWOL (always high) in each unit. As for the Guard reserves, these units are purely tribal in their composition, organized in 24 "battalions" (FIRQAH) (~~liwae~~) whose capability and size are a mystery. Membership in the Guard's reserves, requiring minimal duties, is always padded up by every tribe to obtain additional payment from the authorities.

A decision to modernize the Guard, at the cost of $330 million, was taken in 1972 after Prince Abdallah, its commander, exerted considerable pressure on the regime. The decision was part of the effort to placate the conservatives, led by Abdallah, in the face of the rapid decline of the Guard's power compared to that of the armed services.

Vinnell Corporation of California (related to a US federal agency) was chosen for the job, but was not very successful. Abdallah,

known for his anti-American stance, was suspicious of the Sudeiris' intentions and did not cooperate fully with the American company. Vinnell's objective was to transform the Guard into a mobile para-military security force to complement, rather than compete with, the armed forces. To this end Vinnell proposed to modernize four regular Guard battalions. The Guard's beduin commanders and officers did not like their American instructors (75 officers and 308 contract personnel in 1978) and were apprehensive about the reorganization, the new duties and the discipline which Vinnell wished to institute. Abdallah, moreover, did not agree with Vinnell's objectives. Thus discipline remained lax, absenteeism very high, and maintenance of new armoured cars and modern weapons very poor.

By the mid-1970's, Vinnell and Prince Abdallah agreed on a modus vivendi. Abdallah wished his tribal army to continue as a military power, competing with the armed forces. Vinnell, because of problems in the US and given the huge sums budgeted for the National Guard ($3 billion in 1975), wanted "a piece of the cake". It is unclear what was done with the National Guard between 1975 and 1978. The fact remains that in the one instance when it was needed (mounting tension with Yemen in 1979) the Guard's 400 armored cars were found to be non-operational.

The facts that an ex-Guardsman led the "Mecca incident", and that weapons used by the rebels came from National Guard depots, greatly disturbed Al-Saud. Guard units brought to the Grand Mosque, moreover, seemed bewildered and did not perform very well. However, by the time the rebels were brought to trial, it became clear that the incident was created by a small fundamentalist movement with no roots in beduin society or in the National Guard.

The development of the National Guard is, to a large extent,

dictated by the rivalry within the royal house. Aware of the continuing decline of power of "his" army, Prince Abdallah obtained in 1978 $1-2 billion for the reorganization of the Guard and tried in 1980/81 to purchase several hundred Leopard tanks from West Germany. It is to be expected that Fahd's government was delighted with Israel's objections to this deal.

Unable to spend its budget rationally on weapons and training, the Guard, like the armed forces, spends a large part of it on construction of camps, officers' quarters, training facilities, and a communication system separate from that of the armed forces. The Guard has just opened a 500-bed hospital in Riyadh ("the most modern in the world") and is completing a network of hospitals, clinics, infirmaries and schools for Guardsmen and their families in the rural areas.

While the modernization and training of the first four battalions by Vinnell are still not complete, and their manpower is beneath standard, Vinnell is now beginning the modernization of an additional four regular battalions. Armored cars, scout cars, helicoptors, sand-buggies, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and other sophisticated but simple-to-operate weapons were acquired in the United States. Yet even the die-hard supporters of Abdallah, who refuses to relinquish the command of the Guard, must have become aware of the fact that this force can no longer compete with the armed services. The Sudeiris are attempting to incorporate it in the armed forces, and its pool of volunteers is rapidly decreasing. Recently a special force was established by the ministry of interior to protect important economic installations, previously a Guard duty.

The strength of the National Guard lies in its deployment in the kingdom's most sensitive nerve centers. As was the case in 1962 and 1964, the Guard may assume an important role in the struggle over the succession to the throne. The Guard's conservative character, its presence in the towns and countryside, and its mobility also make it the best security force to deal with dissatisfied expatriate and Shi'i workers or with the new elites and groups of ~~antcil~~ military who do not have the support of the army. Thus, even if somewhat archaic and declining in power, the National Guard will remain an important asset for the Saudi regime.

Conclusions

The sheer size of Saudi Arabia, its long shores and limited manpower, make the kingdom's security policy exceedingly difficult. Saudi Arabia's defense is further complicated by the strategic and economic importance of its oil and the fact that, aside from external threats, Riyadh is obliged to take into account factors affecting its stability. Defense considerations (such as the expansion of the military), moreover, are not always compatible with internal security ones and vice versa.

The complex problems affecting Saudi defense are reflected somewhat in excessive diversity of the kingdom's armed and security forces (armed forces, National Guard, special forces, border and coast guard, police, Hajj police, moral and religious police, etc.). But in the final analysis, only the armed forces are meaningful to the country's defense posture, while all the other forces, the Guard included, relate to internal security. The structure of the defense and security forces could be rationalized and made more efficient if not for the struggle for power in the ruling class. That, although the Guard is no longer a match for the expanded and modernized armed forces.

The shortage of manpower and the quality of available human resources were key issues for the Saudi government. American planners in the early 1970's, therefore, opted for the best cost/effective solution--strong airforce and air defenses. Their plans proved to be widely off the mark, however, because of unrealistic manpower projections made by the Saudis. Moreover, Riyadh's decision to diversify its supplyers, and inter-Arab motivations affecting the development of the Saudi forces in the 1970's, changed the military priorities. All that led to the emergence of a vast "polyglot legion"

of foreign experts rather than a more powerful and efficient Saudi Armed forces.

The presence in Saudi Arabia of a horde of foreigners in the military could prove socially explosive and politically dangerous to the regime. Yet, Riyadh has resigned itself to such an anomaly. Is it conceivable that this is a safety measure against nationalist elements in the armed forces, as some progressive Arab writers claim? Could this be also part of the effort to establish a regional defense pact (anti-Iranian? anti-Soviet? or anti-Israeli?) for which Egypt is gradually being brought back into the Arab fold? Is it also a safety measure against the new power of Syria and the radical camp?

Be that as it may, the six Saudi armored, mechanized and infantry brigades (all substantially under strength), even when supported by a super-modern air defense and (small) air-force, operated largely by foreigners, are no match for a Soviet threat or an Iranian aggression. Since the Arab camp is unlikely, for the time being, to serve as Riyadh's protector (incapable of doing so anyway) it will be the west (US) which, in the final analysis, will have to protect the Saudi regime. The question is, of course, whether the west, relying so heavily on naval power and on long range transportation for its RDF, will be capable and willing to challenge the Iranians or, if the case arises, the Soviet Union.

In the meantime the vast quantities of sophisticated armament which the Saudis are acquiring are causing apprehension in Israel. It is clear that their contribution to Saudi power is limited. Yet, in case of an Arab-Israeli war, the Saudi armed forces will add to Israel's problems and would probably transfer some, or most, of its advanced weaponry to the larger and more militant Arab countries.

Economically, moreover, Israel cannot afford the arms-race with Riyadh.

Finally, the question of the Saudi regime's stability must be addressed. The spread of neo-Ikhwan ideologies in the kingdom is a source of apprehension but its impact will remain limited as long as Al-Saud continues to retain the loyalty of the bedouins and the urbanized masses through the extensive benefits, subsidies and social services which they enjoy. The power of the new elites and of the nationalists is indeed growing by the annual influx of thousands of graduates of institutes of higher education. The ruling classes, rightly from their point of view, continue to refuse to share their authority and policy-making power with them. But, given the appetite of the majority among the new elites for wealth, rapid advancement and executive power, the Al-Saud government was able to satisfy most of them. Recently, nevertheless, due to the decline in Saudi oil revenues and the more vociferous criticism of the regime's policy, it looked as if the honeymoon between the two may end. King Fahd, however, wisely chose to continue with "business as usual" and the deficits caused by declining oil revenues were made up by drawing upon the substantial petrodollar reserves of the kingdom.

The wide power-base of the Al-Saud regime is still the strongest guarantee for its stability in the near future. Yet, it would be wrong not to observe that events in the kingdom, in the Arab camp and in OPEC are likely to erode this power-base. The struggle for power within the royal family could have accelerated the process if not for the common fear from the Iranian threat and for the future of the house of Saud. The stability of Saudi Arabia will depend, therefore, on developments concerning the factors already discussed. But, above all on whether or not the Saudi armed forces will produce "Young Turks" who will lead the opposition to Al Saud

APPENDIX A

SAUDI ARABIAN BUDGET EXPENDITURES/DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (in $ millions)

YEAR:	TOTAL ANNUAL BUDGET:		DEFENSE BUDGET:	
1958-59	300.5 a.		70.81 a.	
1960-61	382.2 d.		78 c.	(54 d.)
1962-63	525.56 d.		111 b.	(71.56 d.)
1964-65	691.56 d.		104 b.	(130.4 d.)
1966-67	----		335 b.	(286 e.)
1968-69	7,710 c.		375 b.	(343 f.)
1970-71	12,946 c.		2,311 c.	(383 f.)
1972-73	21,385 c.		3,734 c.	(1,478 h.)
1974-75	36,995 c.	(19,940 g.)	7,911 c.	(6,800 g.)
1976-77	31,274 c.	(33,670 g.)	8,952 c.	(7,500 g.)
1978-79	45,940 g.		14,200 g.	(9,630 i.)
1980-81	72,680 g.		24,417 l.	
1981-82	76,430 g.		27,700 k.	
1982-83	91,400 m.		24,400 l.	
1983-84	84,000 (estimates)		21,952	

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Table prepared by: D.T. Fuhrmann

APPENDIX B

Evolution of oil revenues 1965-1983

Year	Amount (in $ millions)
1965	655
1970	1,214
1973	4,340
1974	22,574
1975	25,676
1976	37,809
1977	30,900
1979	65,400
1980	95,000
1981	108,000
1982	75,000
1983	45,000 (est.)