Series D: International Relations Activities. 1961-1992
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date 22 October 1985
to David Gordis
from George Gruen
subject Strategy on Jordan Arms Sales

This morning's Presidents' Conference meeting with Prime Minister Shimon Peres was open to the press, but questioning was limited to Conference participants. Peres noted that relations had never been closer and that there was no hint of American pressure. The only issue on which he and President Reagan disagreed was over the sale of arms to Jordan. Peres said that in presenting Israel's arguments opposing the sale he felt, "I was very convincing but I don't think I convinced him."

This corresponds to the assessment we got from Tom Dine, who told a small group of professionals who met in Jacky Levine's suite on Sunday night at the NJCRAC session in Boston, that Shultz had told Senator Lugar on Friday that President Reagan firmly felt that he had made a commitment to King Hussein to present the arms request to Congress without further delay. The only understanding reached between Peres and the Administration was that the two governments would try to avoid the acrimony of past fights and that the Reagan Administration would not allow its officials to repeat the "Begin versus Reagan" and other low tactics used in the past.

There was also a sense that neither side wishes a full-scale confrontation and would like to develop a compromise if possible. Reagan does not wish to hurt Peres domestically in Israel. Reagan was likely to effectively use the argument with Congress that he should not be weakened on the eve of the summit. Members of Congress, and especially those up for re-election next year, also do not want to be forced to choose between going against the President and antagonizing Israel and its supporters among their constituents.

Consequently, Lugar is planning to develop in place of the joint resolution of disapproval, a resolution that would approve arms sales to Jordan in principle but would include conditions
(hopefully stronger than those attached to the Saudi AWACS sale) that would restrict delivery until after those conditions -- including Jordan’s active involvement in negotiations with Israel -- had been met.

With this knowledge as background I asked Prime Minister Peres whether in view of his desire to achieve harmony between the U.S. and Israel, something along the lines of the Lugar approach, which was reported in the paper today, with conditions acceptable to Israel, might not be a way to remove this potential source of confrontation in American-Israeli relations?

The Prime Minister responded: "I prefer that the delivery of peace should precede the delivery of arms." This rather Delphic reply could be interpreted as a willingness to go along with the Lugar approach, assuming that it was phrased in a way to satisfy Israel’s concerns. Ambassador Meir Rosenne came up to me afterwards and said, "Thank you very much, George, for asking this question."

I spoke privately with my friend Professor Nimrod Novik, who is accompanying Peres and is currently his chief political adviser with regard to negotiations, to ask him what was Israel’s bottom line. He said that Israel was adamantly opposed to supplying Jordan with F-16’s and mobile I-Hawks.

If the package included F-20’s and additional stationary Hawks then Israel might go along with the Lugar type formulation, as long as no deliveries were made until there were peace talks with Jordan. I recalled the difficulties we faced in the previous arms sales fights because we could not get a clear signal from the Government. He said that we should not expect a clear signal from the Government of Israel this time either. He added that if there was a breakthrough in regard to talks with Jordan, we could expect to have the Peres Government pull the rug out from under us, since Peres sees negotiations with Jordan as a top priority. (He was then called away by Peres so I couldn’t follow up to ask him whether in case of such a positive development Israel would even remove its objection to F-16’s.)

There are tentative plans for an additional small professional strategy session with Tom Dine on Wednesday afternoon to assess where we go in light of whatever Lugar produces by then.

GG:rs

cc: Hyman Bookbinder
    Marc Tanenbaum
Memo

October 16, 1985

TO: NJCRAC and CJF Member Agencies

FROM: Charney V. Bromberg, Associate Director
Ken Bandler, Israel Task Force Consultant

RE: UPDATE ON JORDAN ARMS SALE
MORE on PLO and ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR

I. Jordanian Arms Sale

As you know, the 20-day "informal" notification period on the Jordanian arms sale is about to expire, and formal notification of Congress could occur as early as Friday, October 18, or perhaps not until Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres departs the United States on Thursday, October 25. Congress will have 30 calendar days from the date of notification in which to pass bills of disapproval, subject to Presidential veto, which can only be overridden by two-thirds majorities in both Houses.

Recommendations

1. Accordingly, in keeping with positions already established, NJCRAC member agencies should begin an intensive campaign with members of both Houses, seeking their co-sponsorship of the bills that will be formally introduced immediately upon the Administration's formal notification. Enclosed is the text of the identical House and Senate bills which have been circulated with the accompanying "Dear Colleague" letters by the principal sponsors in the House and Senate.

2. In addition to a full-scale letter campaign directed to members of both Houses (but with special emphasis on the Senate), we recommend that you ask your local Anglo-Jewish paper(s) -- Federation-sponsored and independent -- to do immediate interviews with House and Senate members to get them "on the record."


3. As you may know, the NJCRAC Commission on Israel and the Executive Committee will be addressing this issue on Sunday, October 20 and Monday, October 21, respectively. We will update these recommendations according to the judgment of these bodies.

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II. Campaign Against the PLO

We are pleased to send additional material which we think should be useful in carrying out the Israel Task Force Strategy Committee's recommendation that an intensive campaign be undertaken to secure public awareness that Arafat's PLO is directly linked to the Achille Lauro affair, as well as other recent acts of Palestinian violence against Israelis and others, and, hence, must be understood as unsuitable to participate in the U. S.-sponsored peace process.

Enclosed is an American Jewish Committee backgrounder by George Gruen and Harry Milkman on the recent Larnaca and Tunis actions which contains very useful information on Arafat's "Force 17" and appendices on recent PLO actions and statements.

Also included is New York Times' reporter Tom Friedman's most recent analysis of the impact of Arafat's involvement in the Achille Lauro on King Hussein. Highlighted are the details of Great Britain's refusal to meet with two PLO leaders because the PLO figures refused to make a statement recognizing Israel by name and declaring non-belligerency on behalf of the PLO. Great Britain's praiseworthy rejection of the PLO emissaries and its reasons for doing so should be shared with the media as yet another demonstration of the intentionally misleading rhetoric of Arafat's PLO in pursuit of its dual—and obviously cynical—policy of terrorism and diplomacy.

Recommendations

1. As recommended in our October 11 mailing, all NJCRAC member agencies are asked to share the names of authoritative specialists on the PLO, international terrorism, and the peace process with us so that we can, in turn, share them with other communities and the media to maximize their exposure. Additionally, we are seeking the names of nationally prominent figures who would author op-ed articles.

2. As you know, Arafat will not address the U. N.'s October 14 - 24 celebration of its 40th Anniversary because the President of the General Assembly ruled that only heads of state would be invited. However, Arafat still has a "standing" invitation to address the General Assembly during the Palestinian debate scheduled to commence November 3.

THEREFORE, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, ALL CRCs and NATIONAL AGENCIES WITH CONSTITUENCIES IN THE BOSTON - WASHINGTON CORRIDOR ARE ADVISED TO DO ALL NECESSARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING—ALERTS TO RABBIS, JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTERS, CONSTITUENT AGENCIES, REGIONAL OFFICES AND CHAPTERS, ETC., AND LOGISTICS OF BUS RESERVATIONS, ETC., AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THE PROBABILITY OF AN ARAFAT VISIT ANYTIME BETWEEN NOVEMBER 3 and NOVEMBER 29 REMAINS HIGH. MOREOVER, A DEFINITIVE ALERT MAY BE—indeed, IS LIKELY TO BE—GIVEN WITH LESS THAN ONE WEEK'S NOTICE.

Additional programmatic ideas are being developed by the NJCRAC Israel Task Force Strategy Committee, and this issue will be a major agenda item at the meeting of the Israel Commission. Once again, your immediate feedback of ideas, contacts and materials is earnestly solicited.

/epl
Enclosures

0, EX, CHAIR, CJF-EX, ITF-NJ
Dear Colleague:

We are writing to ask your support for a Resolution of Disapproval of the Administration's upcoming request for the sale of advanced weapons to Jordan.

We all welcome King Hussein's statements last week at the United Nations and during his visit to Washington that Jordan is now prepared to negotiate with the Government of Israel, promptly and directly, under the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We applaud King Hussein's efforts to advance the peace process, and we hope that his efforts can bring a lasting peace to the Middle East. Our approval last June of $250 million in new economic aid to Jordan should be viewed as our strong encouragement for King Hussein's efforts.

However, we are deeply concerned about the King's continued insistence for an international conference under auspices which would include the Soviets, Syrians and the PLO, a proposal that the U.S. and Israel have repeatedly rejected.

In addition, we cannot accept the King's public statements of intent, as welcome as they are, as being sufficient concrete progress towards peace with Israel to warrant a transfer of advanced weapons to Jordan. For that reason, we think the timing of the Administration's request for such an arms sale is unfortunate. By introducing the controversial issue of weapons sales to Jordan at this time, when concrete progress in the peace process may finally be possible, the Administration is raising unnecessary and potentially insurmountable obstacles to continued progress towards negotiations between Jordan and Israel.

We appreciate King Hussein's concern about Jordan's ability to defend itself from radical Arab forces bent on destroying the peace process. We also understand Israel's concern that her security should not be put in jeopardy as a result of the transfer of highly sophisticated weaponry to a neighbor that has not yet in concrete and irreversible ways committed itself to the peace process.

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We join President Reagan in his hope that negotiations can begin before the end of the year. When negotiations between Israel and Jordan actually go forward, that would be the time to consider Jordan's request for sophisticated weapons.

But until such time as Jordan actually sits down in direct peace negotiations with Israel, we believe that a sale of advanced weaponry to Jordan would be a mistake.

We urge you to join us as co-sponsors. If you have any questions, or if you wish to co-sponsor this legislation, please call Nancy Soderberg at 4-2635 or Jeff DeLaurentis at 4-6324.

Sincerely,

Edward M. Kennedy
John Heinz
Robert W. Kasten
Alan Cranston
Ruby Boschwitz
Dear Colleague:

On September 27th, the President sent to Congress pre-notification of his intention to sell some of our most advanced aircraft and air defense systems to Jordan. The President is expected to send the formal notification to Congress within 20 days.

Arms sales have never advanced the peace process. The Camp David Accords were achieved without a major arms sale to Egypt. For 35 years, the selling of sophisticated weapons has failed to bring peace to the Middle East. After the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Egypt received the most advanced American arms and became a large recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. If we were to sell Jordan our most advanced weapons now, what incentive would Jordan have to further the peace process?

We would like to see Jordan take a more active role in the peace process. We are also deeply concerned by King Hussein's continued call for an international conference, which would include the Soviets, Syrians, and the PLO—a proposal that the U.S. and Israel have rejected repeatedly. Our support for Jordan is indicated by the recent approval of $250 million in supplemental economic assistance.

Direct bilateral negotiations are the best method to reach a peace settlement. When direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel actually go forward, then Congress should consider Jordan's request for sophisticated weapons.

In the next few days, we will introduce a joint resolution to express our disapproval of this arms sale to Jordan. A similar resolution will be introduced in the Senate by Senators Kennedy, Heinz, Kasten, and Inouye. A draft of this resolution is on the reverse side of this letter. If you would like to join us as a co-sponsor, please call Jonathan Slade in Rep. Larry Smith's office at X 57931 or Amy Wolak in Congressman Vin Weber's office at X52331.

Sincerely,

Chairman, Foreign Affairs

Rep. Mark Siljander
Rep. Larry Smith
Rep. Norman Lent
Rep. Bob Torricelli
Rep. Bill Gray
Rep. John Mica
Rep. John McLean
Rep. Mel Levine
Rep. Jim Florio
Rep. Chris Smith

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JOINT RESOLUTION

To prohibit the sale of certain advanced weapons to Jordan,

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DISAPPROVAL OF PROPOSED SALES.

Prior to the commencement of direct bilateral negotiations between Jordan and Israel, the President may not issue a letter of offer with respect to any of the proposed sales to Jordan of advanced weapons systems, including advanced aircraft and advanced air defense systems, that are described in the advance notifications of possible certifications pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act submitted to the Congress on September 27, 1985 (Transmittal Nos. 85-CP1, 85-CP2, and 85-CQ).

SECTION 2. PROHIBITION ON DELIVERIES

If a letter of offer has been issued for any sale described in Section 1 of this Act before the enactment of this Act and that letter of offer is accepted, the President shall make no deliveries to Jordan pursuant to that sale without specific authorization by the Congress.
THE PLO TERRORIST ATTACK IN CYPRUS AND ISRAEL’S RESPONSE

An International Relations Department Background Analysis

By George E. Gruen and Harry Milkman

Evidence of Yasir Arafat’s Involvement

On September 25, 1985, three Israeli tourists were brutally murdered aboard their yacht in the port of Larnaca, Cyprus by three PLO terrorists. Although Palestine Liberation Organization officials in Cyprus disclaimed any connection with this terrorist attack, there is incontrovertible evidence that the three were acting on behalf of PLO leader Yasir Arafat. Two of the gunmen, Elias Yehia Nasif and Mahmoud Khaled Abdullah, are Palestinians who have been positively identified as members of Force 17, the elite security unit of al-Fatah, Mr. Arafat’s own guerrilla organization. In addition to providing bodyguards for Arafat, Force 17 has recently been given the additional assignment of executing special terrorist missions against Israelis.

The third member of the terrorist squad that committed the triple murder in Cyprus has been identified by Cypriot officials as Ian Michael Davison, a British carpenter from South Shields in northern England, who joined Arafat’s men as a mercenary in Lebanon. Although he initially tried to pass himself off as a Palestinian named George Hannah, his poor Arabic gave him away. According to a dispatch from Nicosia by John Kifner in The New York Times (Sept. 29, 1985), “Western journalists interviewed Mr. Davison in December 1983, when he was among a shipload of supporters of Mr. Arafat being evacuated from Tripoli after the area was besieged by rival Palestinian groups backed by Syria.” In one of those interviews, with the New York Post on December 20, 1983, Davison said that the PLO paid him a salary in U.S. dollars and Lebanese pounds. He added that Arafat had sought him out several weeks earlier and gave him “a big welcome” for joining the PLO. Davison reportedly impressed Arafat, who subsequently recruited him into his elite Force 17.

The terrorists’ victims were three Israeli civilians: Esther Paltzur, her husband Reuven, and Avraham Avneri, a family friend. Professor Emmanuel Sivan of the Hebrew University, who knew the Paltzurs well, has provided us with the following details. Mr. Paltzur, 53, had been a merchant seaman for some 25 years. At age 45 he decided to enter the Hebrew University to obtain a degree

Dr. George E. Gruen is the Director of the Division of Israel and Middle East Affairs. Mr. Harry Milkman is a Research Analyst in the Division of Israel and Middle East Affairs.
in Social Work. Professor Sivan, who was at the time designated by the President of the University as advisor to special students who lacked the usual academic preparatory credentials, helped Mr. Paltzur meet the requirements. After he obtained his social work degree, Mr. Paltzur obtained a position as chief social worker for the Seamen's Union, and more recently switched to a position as chief social worker for Etz Lavud, a kibbutz-operated plywood factory. He was also active in the Haifa Sea Scouts, teaching youngsters to sail. He and his wife leave four children. Their friend, Avraham Avneri, 56, was a founding member of Arad. He worked as a guide and site inspector for the National Parks Authority. He leaves a wife, three daughters and a granddaughter.

Because of their love of the sea, the Paltzurs for 15 years were members of the Carmel Yacht Club and spent their vacations on a boat he purchased with his savings. That is how they happened to be in nearby Larnaca, Cyprus, when they fell victim to the terrorist attack. The terrorists knew the three Israelis were unarmed at the time, because the Cypriot authorities require that vessels entering their ports turn over all weapons to the port authorities, who ostensibly provide police protection for visiting tourists.

The raiding party stormed the boat at dawn, immediately shot the woman to death on the deck when she tried to cry out, and held the two men hostage. According to an eyewitness, Davison was the one who shot Mrs. Paltzur. Charles Lachman of the New York Post (Sept. 30, 1985) quotes the witness as saying, "She was standing on the deck of the yacht and one of the terrorists shouted at her in a British accent: 'Shut your mouth or I'll shoot your head off.'" He then heard shots and saw her fall on the rail.

The terrorists demanded the release of 20 PLO prisoners being held in Israeli jails, including Faisal Mahmud Abu-Sharah, the Deputy Commander of Force 17 who was captured a few weeks ago by the Israeli navy off the Lebanese coast. (See Appendix II for details of recent PLO attempts to infiltrate Israel from the sea.)

After a nine-hour siege, the terrorists surrendered to Cypriot police, who found the two Israeli men in one of the yacht's cabins, bound hand and foot, and shot to death. The Cypriot government has so far refused the Israeli government's request that the three terrorists be extradited to Israel for trial.

When Force 17 prisoners in Israel were shown photos of the men captured in Larnaca, without being told the context in which the photos were taken, they immediately identified the men by name and provided other details establishing that they were well-known colleagues of theirs in the unit.

**Israeli Response**

On October 1, 1985, the Israeli Air Force attacked the headquarters of the PLO and facilities belonging to Force 17 at Hamam ash-Shaat, 21 miles southeast of Tunis, the capital of Tunisia. The air strike was carried out in response to a number of terrorist actions perpetrated recently against Israel and Israelis by PLO units under Arafat's control. Israel Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin asserted on October 6 that the only Tunisians killed or injured were those working for the PLO.

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PLO Headquarters was transferred to Tunisia following the PLO's evacuation from Lebanon in September 1982. The number of PLO guerrillas in Tunisia was reinforced after the withdrawal of the pro-Arafat PLO forces from Tripoli in December 1983, in the face of attacks by Syrian-backed PLO rebels. Although Arafat's PLO headquarters was established under the auspices of the Tunisian authorities, Israelis point out that the area is now, in effect, an extraterritorial enclave under the total control of the PLO.

Secretary of State George Shultz told an interviewer from The New York Times (Oct. 4, 1985) that the United States had helped persuade President Habbib Bourguiba of Tunisia to offer a place of refuge for some of the PLO personnel being evacuated from Beirut in 1982. However, he stressed, "we were looking for a place where people could go and where the armaments would not go with them." The United States had not anticipated that a PLO "headquarters would be established out of which terrorist operations would be conducted."

A substantial number of recent terrorist incidents committed or planned against Israelis and Israeli population centers were perpetrated by elements of the PLO under Arafat's direction or with his full encouragement. (See Appendix I for a list of PLO terror attacks over the last year, which have killed 18 Israelis.)

Within the PLO, Force 17 is responsible for the armed activities of the organization including acts of terrorism against Israelis both abroad and in Israel. The murder of the three Israelis in Larnaca, Cyprus was but the latest in a series of terrorist acts perpetrated by Force 17. Its facilities in Tunisia were therefore also targeted by the Israeli Air Force. An Israeli Defense Forces spokesman indicated that Israel will strike at PLO terrorists "wherever and whenever appropriate," and that even the most distant terrorist facilities would not be immune to Israeli counter-attack.

Israel's Action and International Law

Israel's attack on PLO headquarters in Tunisia -- 1250 miles from Israel -- has reportedly been denounced by Tunisia and other states at the United Nations as a violation of international law and an infringement on Tunisian sovereignty. In response, Israel argues that the UN has done nothing while Tunisia has been flagrantly violating international law by harboring PLO terrorists on its soil and allowing them to perpetrate terrorist acts against Israel. Indeed, there are specific principles of international law, codified by the UN, that are being violated by Tunisia and other states that harbor PLO terrorists.

According to the "UN Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation of States," (Resolution 1625, XXVth Session) "Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force." (Our emphasis.)

Furthermore, according to the leading authorities in international law, "states are under a duty to prevent and suppress such subversive activity against foreign governments as assumes the form of armed hostile expeditions or attempts to commit common crimes against life or property. Moreover, while
subversive activities against foreign states on the part of private persons do not in principle engage the international responsibility of a state, such activities when emanating directly from the government itself or indirectly from organizations receiving from it financial or other assistance or closely associated with it by virtue of the constitution of the state concerned, amount to a breach of international law." (Treatise on International Law, Oppenheim, edited by Lauterpacht, vol. I, pp. 292-93.)

Bowett, in his classic study of Self-Defense in International Law, p. 45, cites the following as the kind of illegal action which would justify the injured state to resort to "self-defense" as a permissible means of protection against further harm: "It is clear that the state must not organize hostile expeditions within its territory and directed against another state, nor must it encourage the formation of such expeditions by non-state agencies or private persons."

Reaction of the U.S. Government

On October 1, President Reagan acknowledged that the Israeli air strike is "understandable as an expression of self-defense" and a "legitimate response to terrorist attacks." The following day, in the face of mounting Arab criticism of the seemingly unqualified U.S. endorsement of the Israeli action, the Administration modified its position somewhat: while continuing to characterize the raid as "understandable as an expression of self-defense," a White House statement said that the bombing "cannot be condoned." Although, regretting the accidental loss of Tunisian civilians during the Israeli air strike, the United States refused to condemn Israel's act, nor has it accused Israel of misusing American equipment in an offensive act. According to White House spokesman Larry Speakes, "While the resort to violence is deplorable, it is useful to recall the antecedents to this attack, which included repeated attempts to infiltrate terrorists into Israel and the outrageous murder of three Israeli civilians in Larnaca [Cyprus]."

Sensitive to the possible repercussions for the pro-American government of Tunisian President Bourguiba, the United States did not veto a resolution in the UN Security Council on October 4 to condemn the Israeli action. However, in acknowledgement of the provocation which led to Israel's response, the United States refused to vote in favor of the resolution. Instead, it abstained, allowing the resolution to pass. Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, in explaining the abstention, cited the one-sided nature of the resolution: "My Government cannot support this resolution disproportionately placing all the blame for this latest round of the rising spiral of violence in the Middle East onto only one set of shoulders, while not also holding at fault those responsible for the terrorist acts which provoked it. We must be absolutely explicit in identifying the real threat all civilized peoples are facing. That threat is terrorism, and the failure adequately to address the subject prevents my Government from supporting this resolution."

Arafat's Duplicity Regarding Responsibility for Terrorism

Yasir Arafat has a long record of publicly denying terrorist actions for which his own al-Fatah group was responsible. After the PLO was expelled from Jordan in September 1970, an ostensibly new Palestinian terrorist group called "Black September" emerged, and between 1971 and 1973 it took credit for more

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than 60 international terrorist operations. Although the PLO denied any connection to Black September, the group was in fact set up by Arafat. Indeed, one of Arafat's closest advisers, Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu 'Iyad, subsequently published a book in which he explicitly said that he was put in charge of Black September.

The atrocities carried out by Black September included the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tal, the hijacking of Jordanian commercial airliners, the murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972, and the takeover of the Saudi embassy in Khartoum in March 1973 and the subsequent murder of U.S. Ambassador C.A. Noel Jr., U.S. chargé d'affaires G.C. Moore and Belgian chargé G. Eid, who were attending a reception at the embassy. Following the seizure of incriminating documents in the office of al-Fatah in Khartoum, Sudanese President Numeiry declared that his government had "clear-cut" evidence of the direct collaboration of the Fatah officials with the six Black September terrorists who had come via Libya. Other sources have disclosed that the actual order to execute the American and Belgian diplomats had been communicated to the terrorists in Khartoum by telephone from Arafat's headquarters in Beirut.
APPENDIX

I. RECENT EXAMPLES OF PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAELIS

Since August 1984 18 Israelis were killed in thirteen separate terror attacks:

12 August 1984 - Body of Israeli soldier found near Mevo Dotan in Samaria. He had been kidnapped, then murdered.

22 October 1984 - Two Israeli students murdered near Cremisan Monastery in Bethlehem area. (Killer apprehended, tried and sentenced to life imprisonment.)

4 February 1985 - Reserve soldier murdered in Ramallah marketplace. (Suspected killers apprehended and charged.)


8 April 1985 - Body of Israeli soldier found near Beit Aryeh. He had been kidnapped, then murdered.

19 April 1985 - Taxi driver murdered in Jerusalem. (Suspected killers apprehended and charged.)

7 June 1985 - Reserve soldier kidnapped and shot to death.

30 June 1985 - Israeli couple murdered near Beit Shemesh. (Suspected killers apprehended and charged.)

21 July 1985 - Two Israeli teachers murdered near Afula. (Suspected killers apprehended and charged.)

30 July 1985 - Israeli man murdered in Nablus (Shechem) marketplace.


3 September 1985 - Israeli soldier murdered in Hebron Casbah.

25 September 1985 - Three Israeli tourists murdered in Larnaca, Cyprus.

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II. ATTEMPTED TERRORIST INFILTRATION BY SEA

Since April 1985, the Israeli navy intercepted three attempts to bring terrorists into the area by sea. In each case, the link between the planned operation and its initiator, the PLO, was clearly established.

20/21 April 1985 - The Israeli navy intercepted a vessel carrying a terrorist squad, which was, according to PLO leader Abu Jihad, to have carried out a "military operation" in the center of Tel Aviv. The planned operation, he told the French News Agency, Agence France-Presse, on April 22 in Amman, was part of "the policy of armed struggle in occupied Palestine, a policy that would continue to be followed by the Fatah revolutionaries."

24/25 August 1985 - An Israeli naval patrol intercepted the yacht Casserredit carrying eight Fatah terrorists trained in Algeria for a civilian massacre in Israel's Galilee region. The operatives were to have been landed in Sidon, in southern Lebanon, outfitted there by the Fatah, and to have continued by land across the Israeli border to Galilee.

31 August 1985 - The yacht Ganda was intercepted off the Lebanese coast, carrying a terrorist squad belonging to Arafat's "Force 17" secret service unit, which had been instructed to infiltrate into Israel for a maximum-casualty terror operation.

III. RECENT STATEMENTS BY ARAFAT AND OTHER PLO LEADERS ADVOCATING "ARMED STRUGGLE" AGAINST ISRAEL

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat:

 Asked whether the stepped up attacks against Israelis in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza constituted a new PLO approach, Arafat replied:

"Our people... have the right to use all means in their fight against oppression.

(Reuter, Tunis, 3 September 1985)

Abu Jihad, Commander of Fatah armed forces:

"It is our right to continue our struggle with all the means at our disposal..."

(Quoted by The Observer, London, 18 August 1985)
"Every step of the way, the Palestinian revolution has moved along two parallel tracks. We fly with two wings: the military struggle and the political struggle. These two wings are attached to one another, and they cannot be separated."

(In an interview for Al-Majallah, Saudi Arabia, 17 August 1985)

Nabil Shaath, member of Fatah Central Committee (one of the candidates for the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that is to meet with the Americans):

"There is no point in seeking political solutions only, without continuing the armed struggle."

(In an interview for Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, Saudi daily published in London, 18 August 1985)

Fatah Revolutionary Council:

From communiqué at conclusion of the Council's August conference in Tunis:

"Further armed escalation, a firm stand, more sacrifice and further national and revolutionary dedication to the struggle -- these constitute the golden path to the approaching victory. The revolution will continue until victory is achieved."

(Voice of Palestine, San'a, North Yemen, 28 August 1985)