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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION OF JEWS FROM LIBYA
NEW YORK CITY, JUNE 6-7, 1987

ארגון יהודי ליבאי לרב

Association of Jews of Libya, Italy
Cultural Center of Jews of Libya, Israel

Rome, September 1st, 1987

To: Rabbi Marc H. TANENBAUM
American Jewish Committee
NEW YORK

=====

(U.S.A.)

Dear Marc:

Although I was pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you during your visit to Rome, I am sorry that time did not permit us to have a full discussion of future cooperative venture between our Association and the AJC. We hope and fully expect to continue our cooperation in a serious manner.

Through this letter, I would now like to resume our discussion by reminding you of the pledges made by AJC, as formalized in the convention resolutions, our meeting on the day before my departure, and your press release of June '87. The AJC pledge to serve as the processing center for compiling the legal documentation on the property claims of Libyan Jews. This processing center will require full office facilities, including access to AJC's processing center, facsimile machine, print shop and mailroom etc.

Since I understand that Harry Milkman will no longer be working for the AJC, I am prepared to come to an agreement with him to be coordinator of the Association's New York office, to work exclusively on Libyan Jewish matters. Although the Association might physically be housed in the AJC building, it will be independent from any Jewish organization; AIC and ADL are our main partners in this venture based on a program to be agreed between us. We hope to develop, in the near future, a full agenda of not only legal and political activities, but also cultural and historical programs, such as the recording of Libyan Jewish in AJC's Oral History Library, and a series of conferences on Libyan Jewry utilizing our existing audio-visual materials for maximum public attention.

The association will soon be legally incorporated in both New York and Rome. I expect to be in New York at least one week before the WOJAC convention in Washington (on Oct. 20th) to be present at the incorporation of the Association, and hope to meet with you to finalize these matters. I need your response, however, as soon as possible, because I must discuss with ADL the role it is willing to assume in terms of legal work and public relations.

%...

On this matter, I propose to allocate together a budget of \$ 50.000 for the activity 87/88 to be sheared as follow:


- A) \$ 16.670 from AJC for the expenses on there offices for this activity evaluated in \$ 10.000; finance contribution for activity and events (to be agreed together) \$ 6.670 for the same period
- B) \$ 16.670 from ADL for finance contribution for activity (to be agreed together), housing the Legal Committee, activity and prints of the legal claims form etc.
- C) \$ 16.670 from Association Of Jewish of Libya for payment of Mr.Harry Milkman fee, plus expenses for activity.

In early November/December (following the WOJAC convention), we intend to convene an assembly of Libyan Jews in Rome, in which general elections will be held, to include the broadest possible base of Libyan Jews world-wide. Delegates will be elected from each country in which Libyan Jews reside (US, Italy, UJ, France, Israel, etc.). Abe Foxman has told me that ADL is happy to strongly support the future activities of the Association. We are counting on AJC support as well.

Best wishes and regards.



Raffaella Fellah
(President)



American Academic Association



For Peace In The Middle East

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Rabbi MARC TANENBAUM
FROM: MICHAEL CURTIS, Editor, Middle East Review
SUBJECT: manuscript received
DATE: 10-19-87

Enclosed is a copy of a 14-page manuscript,
„The Vatican-Israeli Relationship.”

Please let us know your opinion as to the suitability of
this article for publication in MER.

A self-addressed stamped envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

An early answer would be greatly appreciated.

PLEASE USE SPACE BELOW FOR YOUR COMMENTS.

The Vatican-Israeli Relationship

Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) wrote to the Count of Nevers:

"The Lord made Cain a wanderer and a fugitive over the earth, but set a mark upon him, making his head to shake, lest anyone find him should slay him. Thus the Jews, against whom the blood of Jesus Christ calls out, although they ought not be killed . . . yet as wanderers must they remain upon the earth, until their countenance be filled with shame and they seek the name of Jesus Christ, the Lord (Flannery, pp. 102-103)."

In 1904, Theodor Herzl, the Zionist leader, met with Pope Pius X, requesting Vatican understanding and support for the Zionist cause -- the creation of a Jewish state. The Pope responded negatively and said:

"We cannot approve of the Zionist movement . . . The Hebrews have not recognized our Lord, therefore we cannot recognize the Hebrew people . . ."

Herzl described for the Pope the terrible suffering of the Jews who lived in the anti-Semitic countries, only to hear the reply:

"If you come to Palestine and settle your people there, we shall keep churches and priests ready to baptize all of them (Rudin, p. 121)."

The primary objective of this paper is to address the question: Why does the Holy See refuse to recognize the State of Israel? The two sets of quotes above suggest that behind the Vatican's refusal is a religious, theological reason. It is the charge that is most often and most adamantly claimed by the Jewish leaders; namely, that the establishment and continued existence of a Jewish state is fundamentally antithetical to the Christian doctrinal views, and that such Christian bias is manifested in the Church's historical anti-Semitism.

The Holy See, for its part, insists that such a charge is without substance, that the Church has denounced any form of anti-Semitism, including the charge of deicide, in the Second Vatican Council in 1965, and that the present absence of a formal diplomatic relationship between the Vatican and Israel is due to a purely political and secular reason.

In the attempt to understand the true nature of the Vatican-Israeli relationship, in what follows we will pursue our search in five steps. In Part 1 of this paper, the nature and goals of Vatican diplomacy, especially with regard to the Middle East, will be briefly reviewed. In Part 2, we will look at the Vatican and the Jewish/Israeli claims concerning the lack of diplomatic relations between the two states. In the third part of our discussion, we will critique these claims in the light of history, political realities and theology, and see if they stand to reason. In Part 4, we will put the consideration so far in the context of the Vatican-Israeli relationship since the late 1960's and construct a hypothesis about the nature of Vatican diplomacy towards Israel. In Part 5, some inquiries will be made as to why and how the Vatican is to recognize the State of Israel.

Part 1. Nature and goals of Vatican diplomacy

The Vatican can be defined as "a transnational actor" whose "power and influence rest fundamentally on the moral prestige" of the Pope and the Church, not on economic and military resources (Irani, pp. 4-5). According to New Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume 4, Vatican diplomacy has four goals:

- i) promotion of peace;
- ii) enhancement of human rights;
- iii) protection of the well-being of the Church; and
- iv) "winning for God all men without distinction and leading them to Him (p. 883)."

As a rule, the Vatican believes in playing by the existing international law (Ibid., p. 882).

In the specific case of the Middle East, the Holy See officially stated on June 24, 1971:

"We repeat that only interest in peace and an intent to work for it guide our actions in this complex question (Leonard Davis Institute, p. 172)."

and went on to list three Vatican interests in that region. These were:

- i) protection of the Holy Places in the Middle East;
- ii) freedom and welfare of the Christian population there; and
- iii) international guarantee of access to Jerusalem.

Further, there are two guiding principles to the papal diplomacy (Irani, p. 6):

- i) consolidation of peace through justice; and
- ii) commitment to the right of peoples to self-determination.

Part 2. Reasons for non-recognition: exposition

In this part, we will explicate the claims made by the Vatican and then the Jews/Israelis regarding the absence of diplomatic relations between the two states.

On the Vatican side, the most formal reason for its non-recognition of Israel is that "the Holy See avoids establishing diplomatic relations with a state that lacks definitive and recognized borders (Irani, p. 23)." Thus, the Vatican has no diplomatic ties with the Kingdom of Jordan who has no such borders.

Two more reasons can be deduced from the principles and goals of Vatican foreign policy identified above, and indeed these are often propagated by the Holy See. The first reason is supposedly a consequence of the Vatican's committed principles of justice and people's right to self-determination. The argument runs as follows.

Premise 1: The Vatican has a commitment to justice and the right of peoples to self-determination in their respective homelands.

— Premise 2: The Palestinians have been unjustly deprived of their legitimate rights to their homeland and been rendered refugees.

(More than 500,000 Palestinians were displaced in 1948; and two million Palestinians were registered as refugees with the United Nations in 1985 (The Christian Science Monitor, January 16, 1987).)

Premise 3: For the Holy See to recognize Israel in the absence of a Palestinian state would be both unjust and insensitive towards the sentiments of the Palestinians.

Conclusion: The Vatican should not and does not recognize the State of Israel.

The official Vatican statement on October 2, 1979 underscores this argument. In it the Vatican declared:

— "(The) 'first stone' of a general overall peace in the area (i.e., the Middle East)" must be based on "equitable recognition of the rights of all," and hence it "cannot fail to include the consideration and just settlement of the Palestinian question (Leonard Davis Institute, p. 173)."

The other reason for non-recognition is derived from the Vatican's goal of protection of Christian welfare in the Middle East. This argument takes a valid five-point form.

— Premise 1: The Vatican wishes to protect and preserve the welfare of Christian communities in the Middle East.

— Premise 2: Most of the Christians in the area live in Arab lands as a minority among the Arabs, which makes them vulnerable to Arab violence or terrorism.

— Premise 3: Vatican recognition of Israel might trigger some Arab Moslem extremists into taking violent or terrorist actions against the Christians in their lands.

— Premise 4: Because of Premise 1 the Holy See has to avoid Premise 3.

Conclusion: The Vatican cannot and does not recognize Israel.

Although not as explicitly stated as the three reasons, or arguments, that we have seen, the Holy See, if it wanted to, could use one more argument in the defense of its diplomatic posture towards Israel. It is predicated upon "sensitivity" to the non-Zionist Jewish community. The argument takes the following form.

— Premise 1: The Vatican wishes to foster a friendly relationship with the whole Jewish populace.

— Premise 2: "Zionism is not considered as the sole expression of Jewish feelings (Irani, p. 20);" there are non-Zionist movements among the Jews.

(Some liberal Jews see Zionism antithetical to the universalistic value of Judaism, while in the view of some of the orthodox Jews Zionism represents a human, secular, political ideology which is incompatible with the traditional religious concept of "messianic days.")

Russen
Tri. Pol.
Holy War

Premise 3: For the Vatican to support Zionism and recognize Israel will be detrimental to the sentiment and cause of these non-Zionist Jews.

Conclusion: Because of Premise 1 the Holy See should not and does not recognize the State of Israel.

Reserving the critique of these arguments for now, let us turn to the Jewish/Israeli side of the dispute. On their part, the Jewish leaders' main contention is that there is something more than politics going on. A restored Jewish state, it is claimed, is theologically problematic and unacceptable to the Catholic Church -- and this is the underlying reason for the Church's historical opposition to the concept of a Jewish state as well as for its present refusal to recognize the State of Israel. Traditionally, there have been three theological arguments that rendered the return of Jewish sovereignty in the land of Israel unreconcilable to the Catholic Church. (Part of the arguments and concepts below have been appropriated from Talmage, Pawlikowski, and Rudin.)

i) Perpetual wandering theology

Premise 1: Jews killed Jesus and hang on in their refusal to accept him as the Messiah.

Premise 2: God condemned the Jews to be wanderers on this earth until Christ comes again, so that the stateless condition of the Jewish people would serve as evidence for the very truth of Christianity.

Premise 3: Creation of an independent Jewish state is a contradiction of that theological position.

Conclusion: The Church cannot approve of Zionism or recognize the State of Israel.

ii) Displacement theology

Premise 1: The old Israel (i.e., Judaism) of the old covenant has been replaced by the new Israel (i.e., Christianity) of the new covenant, for all the prophecies of the "Old Testament" were fulfilled in and by Jesus, the Messiah.

Premise 2: The Jews became a people without a *raison d'être* or purpose; any attempt by the Jews to regain independence in the land promised in the Old Testament is no longer valid; theologically, the Jewish state is to be "delegitimized."

Premise 3: The birth of the State of Israel entails the restoration of the titleship of Israel from Christianity back to Judaism -- and this is an affront to the fundamental tenet of Christianity.

Conclusion: The Church cannot approve of Zionism or recognize Israel.

Osservatore Romano (unofficial organ of the Vatican) must have assumed the displacement theology when it stated:

"Modern Zionism is not the authentic heir of biblical Israel . . . (The) Holy Land and its sacred places belong to Christianity (Pawlikowski, p. 120)."

iii) Spiritualized Kingdom theology

Premise 1: The fulfillment of the promises of the Old Testament is to be found in the universal, spiritual kingdom of God which Jesus, the Messiah, came to establish.

Premise 2: Thus, redemption is spiritualized and individualistic, and, accordingly, the "promised land" is to be found within each believer's heart.

Premise 3: Then, Zionism and the State of Israel are a repetition of the same fatal error that caused Jews' rejection of Jesus 2000 years ago.

Conclusion: The Church must not and does not recognize the restored Jewish state in the promised land.

Part 3. Reasons for non-recognition: critique

In the present part, we will evaluate and critique, first, the Vatican side of the argument and, then, the Jewish/Israeli side of the contention.

The first and most formal reason the Holy See presents for its non-recognition of Israel is that the Jewish state lacks "definitive and recognized borders." The Vatican can construct a simple valid deductive argument for this diplomatic policy.

Premise 1: The Vatican, in principle, does not recognize states without definitive and recognized borders.

Premise 2: Israel does not have such borders.

Conclusion: The Vatican does not recognize Israel.

The issue here is how justifiable Premise 1 is. Ostensibly, the Holy See adopts the principle stated in this premise so that it may avoid diplomatic complications and ambiguities with the states in the world -- this is a justification, but not the justification for the Vatican's adoption of the principle in question. For the Vatican has yet to establish that avoiding some diplomatic complications is more urgent and justified, politically and morally, than taking actions to ease the psychological and spiritual pain that the Israelis and Jews elsewhere feel in the continued non-recognition of their state by the Holy See.

Thus Premise 1 could be a supportive justification for the Vatican policy towards Israel if there is more substantial justification for the Vatican posture; otherwise it in and of itself is insufficient. Now let us examine the other claims by the Church.

The argument that the Vatican cannot recognize the State of Israel out of concern for justice and sensitivity to the Palestinian feelings does not have much force. For the core problem in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the Arab world's total unwillingness to accept a permanent, secure, independent Jewish state, and its insistence on Arab sovereignty over the entire Middle East.

Let the facts speak here: In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted for a partition plan that provided for a

Jewish state and an Arab state; the Jewish leaders accepted it; the Arabs did not, and immediately launched a concerted attack on Israel with the objective of destroying it.

Hence, the Vatican's commitment to justice and the right of peoples to self-determination will not be compromised by the decision to recognize the State of Israel; the Vatican is not morally obliged to feel sympathetic towards the "plight" of Palestinians to the extent that it cannot recognize the Jewish state out of sensitivity to the Palestinians.

The third argument that sensitivity to the non-Zionist Jewish community forbids the Holy See to recognize Israel is not persuasive either. It is true that there had been several schools of non-Zionist Jewish thought, most notably among the liberal and orthodox Jews. However, these thinkers went through a drastic turnaround in their thinking during and in the years succeeding the Second World War; the holocaust experience compelled a large number of these hitherto non-Zionist Jews to realize the devastating existential realities facing the Jews in the Diaspora and the need for a homeland that a Jew can go when all other ports of refuge and safety are closed.

To say that there is still a significant number of non-Zionist Jews in the Jewish community so that the Vatican finds it impossible to "step over" them and recognize Israel, would be both a serious anachronism and an offense to the bulk of the Jewish people, in Israel and in the Diaspora. Accordingly, the Vatican's argument based on this anachronistic conception fades in its power of persuasion.

Fourthly, the Vatican claims that its recognition of Israel might trigger Moslem extremists' terrorist actions on the Christians in Arab nations, and the Church dares not risk that. This position is the most defensible of all the arguments the Vatican puts forward. As far as its objective in the Middle East entails the protection of Christian welfare in that region, the Vatican's continued non-recognition of Israel becomes a means of avoiding the deterioration of that desired welfare.

The Vatican is then in a position to insist that its recognition of Israel be linked to a broad regional peace package: The Holy See will establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel if a peace treaty is signed by the Israeli and Arab leaders in which the Arab states come to recognize the State of Israel. As we shall see in the final part of this paper, such a peace package is going to be an important condition for the Vatican's recognition of the Jewish state.

Thus, the fourth and last claim by the Holy See stands, and, with the help of the first claim (the principle of definitive and recognized borders), the Vatican can establish the case that its continued refusal to recognize Israel is due to political-security reasons.

This much said, we should not fail to note the "dark side" of the fourth claim. The Vatican is virtually encouraging the potential Arab terrorists to build up their confidence as to the degree of power they can wield on the Church, by tacitly striking

a bargain with them: We will not recognize Israel, so in return assure us the safety of Christians in your lands.

Let us bear in mind that, had the Vatican been more willing to accept and recognize Israel from its birth 39 years ago, those potential terrorists would not, in all likelihood, have come to occupy their present position of influence over the Vatican foreign policy. The Vatican has allowed those would-be terrorists to increase their perceived and actual influence in the region over the years.

Moving on to the Jewish/Israeli side of the argument, their thesis was that Christian theological biases underlie the Vatican's persisting refusal to recognize the State of Israel. Before the Second Vatican Council in 1965, this contention by the Jewish party would have passed without much controversy even from the Catholic side. For, as the quotes of Popes Innocent III and Pius X at the beginning of this paper suggest, the Church had been an initiator, silent partner, or quiet onlooker with regard to the series of anti-Semitic policies and actions in the western states for over nineteen centuries; to wit, forced baptism, expulsion, yellow badge of shame, pogroms, deprivation of civil rights, confinement to ghettos, and denial of political independence.

The situation got more subtle since the last war. The Catholic Church, after witnessing the degree of inhumanity and cruelty inflicted upon the Jews by the Nazi Germany in the cultural background of Christian Europe, initiated a process of soul-searching in her wish to be rid of theological doctrinal anti-Semitic biases. This process resulted in the Second Vatican Council in 1965 where the Church decried "hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism" and denounced the charges of deicide and divine punishment on the Jewish people (Simon, p. 120). Thus the Church forfeited one of her traditional theological biases against a restored Jewish state: the notion that Jewish people are punished by God for their deicide to perpetually wander on this earth as evidence for the very truth of Christianity, was officially dropped.

Further, in the early 70's, the Catholic initiative bore fruit as the creation of two interfaith organizations to promote fraternal dialogue and mutual understanding between Catholicism and Judaism. The International Catholic-Jewish Liaison Committee was established in 1970; the Pontifical Commission for Religious Relations with Judaism was set up in 1974 (Irani, p. 14).

In view of these developments, we are compelled to admit that, indeed, the Holy See has been making efforts to be rid of anti-Semitism and to establish a conciliatory relationship with the Jewish community.

However, as far as the Jewish contention that there is a theological bias behind the Vatican policy of non-recognition of Israel is concerned, this claim seems to be substantially valid.

In Vatican II, the Church reaffirmed her historical claim that the Catholic Church is the only repository of all true religion. The present Pope reiterated this position when he

said:

"There is salvation in no one else (that is, in no one else but in Jesus Christ), for there is no other name under heaven given by which we must be saved (Hayes, p. 90)."

And it remains at the heart of the Catholic doctrine, first, that the Church came to fulfill the "Old Testament" Jewish faith (thus validating the fundamental premise of the displacement theology above) and, second, that the Church is concerned with a universal, spiritual salvation of all mankind (which is an affirmation of the first premise of the spiritualized kingdom theology).

Now, if the Catholic Church believes herself to be the only repository of all true religion, then it logically follows from this that any religion with conflicting views, including Judaism, is to be looked at as either incomplete or erroneous. Then it is no wonder that the Church cannot truly relate to the religious significance and yearning that the Jews attach to the restored Jewish state in the "promised land."

The Church, it has been conceded, has shown willingness to be rid of anti-Semitism and to foster a fraternal dialogue with her Jewish counterpart. However, as is often the case, intention, no matter how sincere, is not in and of itself sufficient; unless and until the Holy See conducts a "doctrinal surgery" deep into her tradition, a theological bias against a revived Jewish state remains untouched, and with it, two of the three theological arguments that render the very existence of Israel antithetical to the Catholic doctrine.

Therefore, we are in a place to conclude that the Jewish/Israeli contention that there is a theological reason behind the Vatican policy towards Israel, is substantially true even in the post-Vatican II era.

By way of summary, in this third part of the paper, we have critically evaluated both sides of the claims and come to the conclusion that there is validity in both the Vatican and the Jewish/Israeli contentions. That is, behind the Vatican non-recognition of Israel are secular (i.e., concern for the security of Christians in the Middle East, and the diplomatic principle of definitive and recognized borders) as well as theological reasons. In Part 4, we will seek to find out which of these two sets of reasons is more influential in the Vatican's policy with regard to Israel, by observing the developments in the Vatican-Israeli relations since the late 1960's.

Part 4. The Vatican-Israeli relationship since the late 1960's

The exchange of delegates, diplomats, and ministers between the Vatican and Israel became manifestly active ever since the late 1960's.

1969: Israeli Foreign Minister Aba Ebban was received in audience by Pope Paul VI.

1973: Prime Minister Golda Meir was received in Vatican.

1978: Moshe Dayan was welcomed by the Pope.

1982: Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir met with Pope John Paul II.

1985: Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited the Vatican.

(Irani, p. 23)

Further,

"The apostolic delegate has frequent contacts with the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In Rome, Israeli diplomats accredited to the Italian government are often received in Vatican City (Ibid.)."

Recently the Holy See made two statements which may be construed as the Vatican's de facto recognition of the State of Israel. In May 1983, Monsignor William Murphy, under secretary of the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace, stated:

"The Holy See recognizes the factual existence of Israel, its right to exist, its right to secure borders and to all other rights that a sovereign nation possesses (Irani, p. 22)."

Again, in April 1984, Pope John Paul II stressed in his Apostolic Letter, Redemptionis Anno:

"For the Jewish people who live in the State of Israel . . . we must ask for the desired security and due tranquility that is the prerogative of every nation and cognition of life and of progress for every society (quoted in The New Republic, February 23, 1987)."

Clearly, these developments and statements demonstrate a significant departure from the Holy See's traditional posture towards the Jewish state -- opposition before its creation and non-recognition after its birth.

Two noteworthy events took place shortly prior to the process of improvement in the Vatican-Israeli relationship above. In 1965, Vatican II took place. We have seen that the Second Vatican Council fell short of completely ridding the Church of theological bias against a restored Jewish state.

Two years later, the Holy Places including Jerusalem fell under Israeli control as the result of the Six Day War. Irani's analysis seems to stand to reason when he says that this new reality caused the Vatican to take up a pragmatic stance and opt for:

"informal talks with the Israeli government in order to work out a modus vivendi regarding the status of Catholic interests in Palestine (p. 22)."

We can interpret what has happened after 1967 as logical consequences of the Vatican's newly adopted pragmatic stance. That is, what motivated the Holy See into cultivating a friendlier diplomatic relationship with Israel by means of increased meetings with the Israeli officials and "de facto recognition" statements, was the Church's concern for preserving the well-being of Catholic interests in the land which fell under Israeli control.

This interpretation is a hypothesis: It is constructed from an empirical observation of the Vatican-Israeli relations since the late 1960's, along with consistent reasoning; it makes the generalization that, in the Vatican's decision making, political-security considerations play a more decisive role than the Church's theological, doctrinal views; and it offers the prediction that, in the future occasion when the Holy See formally recognizes the State of Israel, a combination of secular, political conditions will be crucial. In Part 5, we will try to spell out these conditions.

Part 5. The way to recognition

In this final part of the discussion, two questions are addressed: "Why should the Vatican recognize the State of Israel?" and "Under what conditions is the Vatican to do it?"

In answering the first question, we shall begin our undertaking by noting the following statement by the Vatican. In 1974, Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews published Guidelines and suggestions for implementing the conciliar declaration of Vatican II in which the Holy See stated that in order to achieve a better mutual understanding and renewed mutual esteem, Christians "must strive to learn by what essential traits the Jews define themselves in the light of their own religious experience (Leonard Davis Institute, p. 131)."

This statement shows the Vatican's growing willingness to foster a more conciliatory relationship with the Jewish community and is adequately explicable in terms of the Church's pragmatic policy since the late 60's. Now, assuming that the Vatican intends to put into action what it officially declares, we can construct the following normative argument for the Vatican's recognition of the State of Israel. (The concepts and reasoning have been partially appropriated from Flannery, Tanenbaum, and The World Jewish Congress.)

Premise 1: The Vatican ought to take actions consistent with its statements.

Premise 2: In Vatican II, it denounced anti-Semitism.

Premise 3: In Guidelines and suggestions, it declared the Church's commitment to "strive to learn by what essential traits the Jews define themselves in the light of their own religious experience."

Premise 4: From Premises 1 and 2, it follows that the Vatican ought to dissociate itself from anti-Semitic policies.

Premise 5: A statement or act is anti-Semitic if it denies the Jews of their right to self-identity.

Premise 6: Jews, especially in the post-holocaust era, find a major source of their identity and self-pride in the State of Israel.

Premise 7: Opposition to the existence of a Jewish state in the land of Israel, then, is an act of anti-Semitism.

• Premise 8: The Vatican ought to drop its traditional refusal to recognize Israel and establish formal ties with the Jewish state.

Premise 9: From Premises 1 and 3, it follows that the Holy See ought to make efforts to learn and respect the way Jews define themselves in their religious experience.

Premise 10: The land of Israel and hope for return to that land, again especially after what happened during World War II, are essential in the Jewish faith.

Premise 11: Refusal to recognize the State of Israel, then, is tantamount to denying Judaism its core and self-expression.

• Premise 12: The Vatican ought to recognize Israel.

We have noted the unthorough nature of Vatican II in ridding the Church of theological bias against a restored Jewish state. Nonetheless, as we have just done, it is quite possible to construct a normative argument for the Vatican's formal recognition of Israel, predicated upon its (the Vatican's) own statements in 1965 and in 1974. However, the major determining factor in the Holy See's diplomacy, we have hypothesized, is a political-security consideration. Hence, we must look at the secular, political conditions that would finally convince the Vatican that recognizing the State of Israel is not only normatively required but also politically feasible.

Here we turn to the second question: Under what conditions is the Vatican to form an official diplomatic relationship with Israel? The conditions fall into two major categories. The first category concerns the Christian interests in the Middle East. Specifically, as we have reviewed in Part I, the Holy See is concerned about the status of Jerusalem, preservation of the Holy Places, and the welfare of the Christian communities in this region. Then, international guarantee of access to Jerusalem and assurance by both Arabs and Israelis that the Holy Places and the Christian welfare will be protected, will become the first condition for the Vatican's recognition of Israel.

The second category of conditions concerns Arabs/Palestinians. The Holy See has repeatedly expressed its desire for "a just and lasting peace that will guarantee the legitimate rights of all involved (Israeli, p. 12)." Although we have noted the unpersuasiveness of the Vatican's non-recognition of Israel out of sensitivity to the Palestinians, the Papacy, for its part, seems to be committed to the creation of an independent Palestinian state before committing itself to a formal diplomatic tie with the Jewish state. Indeed, Pope Paul VI declared in 1975 that both peoples, Palestinians and Israelis, had to recognize

each other's right to self-determination and nationhood (Ibid., p. 28). Another issue is the Israeli occupation of and subsequent settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 1967 onward. The Holy See has stated that this has become one of the hindrances for Vatican recognition of Israel (Ibid., p. 22).

Then the easiest solution to these two sets of Arab/Palestinian issues would be Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, followed by the establishment of a Palestinian state. This shall be the second condition for the Holy See's recognition of Israel.

It seems increasingly likely that the Vatican is wishing for a broad peace package which combines the first and second conditions -- that is, a peace plan in which Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories is followed by:

- i) creation of a Palestinian state;
- ii) mutual recognition by Arabs and Israelis; and
- iii) assurance by all parties involved of the protection of Christian interests in the region -- free access to Jerusalem, welfare of Christians, and preservation of the Holy Places.

Of course, this is seen primarily from the Vatican's vantage point. The Israelis might contend that their occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is a security imperative, so that they cannot sign a peace treaty which demands their foregoing of these territories. The Palestinians might insist that the whole Middle East belongs to the Arabs, that the Jews are invaders who resort to ancient religious texts to legitimize their rights to the land, and hence mutual recognition and coexistence with Israel is unacceptable. And there are the superpowers and other states with conceivably differing interests in that part of the world.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the feasibility of the aforementioned peace plan in the light of these, and possibly additional, realities and constraints, although that would be a worthy enterprise. What we can conclude is the rather tautological proposition that as far as the Vatican demands that the two conditions be met before its formal recognition of Israel, the Vatican will not officially recognize Israel until these conditions are met, ceteris paribus. The Holy See might change its demands and conditions for establishing formal relations with Israel due to some external pressures (e.g., a new round of Arab-Israeli war); then the prospects for formal diplomatic ties between the Vatican and the State of Israel are to be recalculated accordingly.

By way of summary, in this paper we began our discussion by determining the nature and goals of Vatican diplomacy, especially with regard to the Middle East; we then reviewed and critiqued the Vatican and the Israeli claims as to the lack of formal diplomatic relations between the two states, coming to the conclusion that both sides have validity to their respective claims; in Part 4, we constructed a hypothesis about the Vatican's diplomacy and inferred that political-security considerations exert

Premise 5: A statement or act is anti-Semitic if it denies the Jews of their right to self-identity.

Premise 6: Jews, especially in the post-holocaust era, find a major source of their identity and self-pride in the State of Israel.

Premise 7: Opposition to the existence of a Jewish state in the land of Israel, then, is an act of anti-Semitism.

•• Premise 8: The Vatican ought to drop its traditional refusal to recognize Israel and establish formal ties with the Jewish state.

Premise 9: From Premises 1 and 3, it follows that the Holy See ought to make efforts to learn and respect the way Jews define themselves in their religious experience.

Premise 10: The land of Israel and hope for return to that land, again especially after what happened during World War II, are essential in the Jewish faith.

Premise 11: Refusal to recognize the State of Israel, then, is tantamount to denying Judaism its core and self-expression.

•• Premise 12: The Vatican ought to recognize Israel.

We have noted the unthorough nature of Vatican II in ridding the Church of theological bias against a restored Jewish state. Nonetheless, as we have just done, it is quite possible to construct a normative argument for the Vatican's formal recognition of Israel, predicated upon its (the Vatican's) own statements in 1965 and in 1974. However, the major determining factor in the Holy See's diplomacy, we have hypothesized, is a political-security consideration. Hence, we must look at the secular, political conditions that would finally convince the Vatican that recognizing the State of Israel is not only normatively required but also politically feasible.

Here we turn to the second question: Under what conditions is the Vatican to form an official diplomatic relationship with Israel? The conditions fall into two major categories. The first category concerns the Christian interests in the Middle East. Specifically, as we have reviewed in Part I, the Holy See is concerned about the status of Jerusalem, preservation of the Holy Places, and the welfare of the Christian communities in this region. Then, international guarantee of access to Jerusalem and assurance by both Arabs and Israelis that the Holy Places and the Christian welfare will be protected, will become the first condition for the Vatican's recognition of Israel.

The second category of conditions concerns Arabs/Palestinians. The Holy See has repeatedly expressed its desire for "a just and lasting peace that will guarantee the legitimate rights of all involved (Israeli, p. 12)." Although we have noted the unpersuasiveness of the Vatican's non-recognition of Israel out of sensitivity to the Palestinians, the Papacy, for its part, seems to be committed to the creation of an independent Palestinian state before committing itself to a formal diplomatic tie with the Jewish state. Indeed, Pope Paul VI declared in 1975 that both peoples, Palestinians and Israelis, had to recognize

each other's right to self-determination and nationhood (Ibid., p. 28). Another issue is the Israeli occupation of and subsequent settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 1967 onward. The Holy See has stated that this has become one of the hindrances for Vatican recognition of Israel (Ibid., p. 22).

Then the easiest solution to these two sets of Arab/Palestinian issues would be Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, followed by the establishment of a Palestinian state. This shall be the second condition for the Holy See's recognition of Israel.

It seems increasingly likely that the Vatican is wishing for a broad peace package which combines the first and second conditions -- that is, a peace plan in which Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories is followed by:

- i) creation of a Palestinian state;
- ii) mutual recognition by Arabs and Israelis; and
- iii) assurance by all parties involved of the protection of Christian interests in the region -- free access to Jerusalem, welfare of Christians, and preservation of the Holy Places.

Of course, this is seen primarily from the Vatican's vantage point. The Israelis might contend that their occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is a security imperative, so that they cannot sign a peace treaty which demands their foregoing of these territories. The Palestinians might insist that the whole Middle East belongs to the Arabs, that the Jews are invaders who resort to ancient religious texts to legitimize their rights to the land, and hence mutual recognition and coexistence with Israel is unacceptable. And there are the superpowers and other states with conceivably differing interests in that part of the world.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the feasibility of the aforementioned peace plan in the light of these, and possibly additional, realities and constraints, although that would be a worthy enterprise. What we can conclude is the rather tautological proposition that as far as the Vatican demands that the two conditions be met before its formal recognition of Israel, the Vatican will not officially recognize Israel until these conditions are met, ceteris paribus. The Holy See might change its demands and conditions for establishing formal relations with Israel due to some external pressures (e.g., a new round of Arab-Israeli war); then the prospects for formal diplomatic ties between the Vatican and the State of Israel are to be recalculated accordingly.

By way of summary, in this paper we began our discussion by determining the nature and goals of Vatican diplomacy, especially with regard to the Middle East; we then reviewed and critiqued the Vatican and the Israeli claims as to the lack of formal diplomatic relations between the two states, coming to the conclusion that both sides have validity to their respective claims; in Part 4, we constructed a hypothesis about the Vatican's diplomacy and inferred that political-security considerations exert

more influence on the Vatican's decision-making regarding Israel than the other, theological considerations; finally, we set up a normative argument for the Holy See's formal recognition of Israel, and spelled out the conditions under which the Vatican will opt for that decision, assuming that our hypothesis is correct. Final verification or refutation of the hypothesis will have to wait until the predicted event takes place or fails to take place in the manner specified.



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WOJAC

Arrival

הארגון העולמי של יהודים וצאנא ארצות ערב
المنظمة العالمية لليهود النازحين من البلدان العربية
WORLD ORGANIZATION OF JEWS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DES JUIFS. ORIGINAIRES DES PAYS ARABES

A G E N D A *

THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF WOJAC
Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C.
26-28 October 1987

Day 1: Monday, October 26

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1100-1800 Registration.

1400 Press conference

1530-1730 Preparatory Session :

Chairman and Co-Chairman: (see note 1)

The Objectives of the Conference.

- Leon Tamman, Chairman of the Presidium of WOJAC;
- Mordechai Ben-Porat, Chairman of the World Executive.

Exchange of views by delegates of WOJAC Chapters worldwide.

1800-1930 Festive Dinner.

2000-2130 Opening Meeting:

Chairman: Kenneth J. Bialkin.

- Greetings:
- Leon Tamman, Chairman of the Presidium, WOJAC;
 - Morris Abram, Chairman, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations;
 - Edgar Bronfman, President, World Jewish Congress (not confirmed);
 - Moshe Arad, Ambassador of Israel to the United States.

Keynote Speakers:

- Prominent Member of the United States Administration;
- Israel Cabinet Minister Prof. Moshe Arens.

2130-2230 Reception.

Ad journment.

* The final Agenda will be distributed to the participants on arrival.

Day 2: Tuesday, October 27
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0900-1100 First Session (Working Groups 1 & 2)

- (1) Legitimate rights and claims of Jews from Arab countries.
- (2) - Jews under Arab-Moslem Rule - past and present.
- Rescue of endangered Jewish communities in Arab countries.

Chairman: Seymour Reich, President, B'nai B'rith International.

Co-Chairmen: - Menachem Yedid, Chairman, Israel Council for the Rescue of Jews from Arab Countries;
- Roger Pinto, President du Comite International pour la Liberte des Juifs de Syrie.

1100-1245 Second Session (Working Group 3)

- a. Exchanges of Population in the 20th Century - Historical Perspective.
- b. Program for dealing with the humanitarian aspects of the Middle East Refugee problem to promote a lasting Arab-Israeli peace.

Chairman: Ambassador Seymour M. Finger, Executive Director, National Committee on American Foreign Policy.

Co-Chairman: Prof. Menahem Milson, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

1245-1415 Lunch.

Chairman: Michael Pelavin, Chairman of NJCRAC.

Keynote Speaker: Prominent U.S. Political Personality.

Israel Minister of Energy and Infrastructure Moshe Shahal and distinguished members of Legislatures will participate.

Day 2: Oct. 27 - Cont./..

1430-1700 Hearings

Chairman: Justice Arthur Goldberg;
Co-Chairman: Prof. Shimon Sheetrit, Professor of Law,
Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
Advocates: - Mr. Morris Abram, Chairman, Conference of
Presidents;
- Mr. Shlomo Toussia-Cohen, President, Israel
Council for the Rescue of Jews in Arab
Countries.

Judicial Hearing of witnesses on abuses of human and civil
rights of Jews in Arab countries, elicited by courtroom
style questioning by advocates; these will sum up the
evidence and present a brief showing the witnesses'
experiences to be representative of their respective
communities as a whole.

1730-1900 Coordinating Committee Meeting of Working Groups Chairmen.

2100-2300 Entertainment.

Day 3: Wednesday, October 28
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0900-1230 Resolutions.

Co-Chairmen: - Leon Tamman, Chairman Presidium of WOJAC;
- Mordechai Ben-Porat, Chairman World
Executive of WOJAC.

1230-1400 Concluding Lunch:

Guest of Honour: Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations
Benyamin Netanyahu.

Chairman: Theodore Ellenoff, President, American
Jewish Committee.

Co-Chairmen: - Mordechai Ben-Porat, Chairman World
Executive of WOJAC.
- Leon Tamman, Chairman, Presidium of WOJAC.

1430- Leave Hotel for Capitol Hill to meet with Members of
the Human Rights Caucus of the United States Congress.

1500-1700 Hearings of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus.

Co-Chairmen: - Congressman Tom Lantos
- Congressman John Porter.

Tel-Aviv, August 1987

Ambassador (ret) Shaul Ramati
Conference Director

Among the Research Papers to be distributed at the Conference:
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1. The Proportion between the Arab States' contribution to the solution of the Arab Refugee Problem and their national revenue and expenditure.
- Dr. George Gruen.
2. The Claims of the Jews from Arab Countries: "Justice Delayed is Justice Denied".
- Dr. Yaakov Meron
3. Aliya and Absorption in Israel of Jews from Arab Countries.
- Yehuda Dominitz.
4. Contemporary Arab Media on Jews, Zionism and Israel.
- Prof. Raphael Israeli, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
5. The Concepts "Jihad" (Holy War) and "Dhimmi" (Protected People) in Islamic Thought
- Bat-Ye'or.
6. Human Rights of Jews in Arab Countries.
- Dr. George Gruen.
7. Lectures given at WOJAC -American Jewish Committee Seminar on: "The Attitude of Sectors of the Israeli Population towards the Peace Process."
- Prof. Ephraim Ya'ar, Tel-Aviv University.
- Prof. Sami Smooha, Haifa University.
8. Proposed Initiatives to ameliorate the condition of the Arab Refugees under Israel Administration.
- Prof. Menahem Milson, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
9. Will There Always Be Refugees? - A Survey and Proposals for a solution of the Middle East Problem, prepared by the Ministerial Committee on Refugees chaired by then-Cabinet Minister Mordechai Ben-Porat.
10. Motion on the Claims of Jews from Arab Countries, tabled in the Knesset, July 29, 1987.
- A Summary by Ambassador Shaul Ramati.

NOTES:

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- (1) Members of the World Executive and representatives of Chapters of WOJAC will be appointed to the Directorate of the Conference and its committees upon confirming their participation.
- (2) Exhibition "THE FORGOTTEN MILLION - Arab Jewry, Heritage and ***** Aspiration" - will be on display for the duration of the Conference.
- (3) In the course of the Conference certain Foreign Embassies will be visited to express appreciation, where appropriate, of help extended to Jews from Arab countries in the past and to solicit their support for WOJAC's aims.

Draft 3

JEWS, CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS: The Way of Dialogue

1 Whilst dialogue with all faiths is highly desirable we recognize a special relationship between Christianity, Judaism and Islam. All three of these religions see themselves in a special relationship to Abraham, the father of the faithful, the friend of God. Moreover these faiths, which at times have been antagonistic to one another, have a special responsibility for bringing about a fresh, constructive relationship which can contribute to the well-being of the human family, and the peace of the world, particularly in the Middle East. Dialogue is the work of patient love and an expression of the ministry of reconciliation. It involves understanding, affirmation and sharing.

The Way of Understanding

2 The essential condition of any true dialogue is a willingness to listen to the partner; to try to see with their eyes and feel with their heart. For understanding is more than intellectual apprehension. It involves the imagination and results in a sensitivity to the fears and hopes of the other. Understanding another means allowing them to define themselves in their terms rather than ours, and certainly not in terms of our inherited stereotypes. This means that in dialogue we may have to face some strange and even alien understandings of religion, as well as attractive ones.

3 In relation to Judaism this means, first of all recognizing that Judaism is still a living religion, to be respected in its own right. The Judaism of today is not that of any one of the sects of first century Palestine, and certainly not that of the plain text of the Hebrew scriptures. Its definitive works, such as the Mishnah and the Talmud, as well as its current liturgy, were produced by the post-Pharisee rabbis in the same period, the first to fifth centuries, within which the Fathers of the Church were defining the meaning of Christianity. Great care should be taken not to misrepresent Judaism by imputing to it, e.g. the literal implementation of "an eye for an eye," which was repudiated by the rabbis, or the denial of life after death. Judaism is a living and still developing religion, which has shown considerable spiritual and intellectual vitality throughout the medieval and modern periods despite its history of being maligned and persecuted. The Middle Ages saw great Jewish philosophers such as Maimonides, Bible commentators such as Rashi, and the ibn Ezras, poets and mystics, as well as scientists and lawgivers. Our modern world is inconceivable without the contribution of Jewish thinkers from Spinoza to Buber, scientists such as Freud and Einstein, as well as musicians, artists and others who have helped shape our cultural life; we are, to our loss, less knowledgeable of the creative vitality of such Jewish spiritual movements of recent times as Hassidism and Musar.

4 Secondly, Judaism is not only a religion, as many Christians understand the word but a people and a civilization. Jews know and define themselves as Jews even when they do not fully share the religious beliefs of Judaism. It is against this background that the religious importance of the land of Israel to the majority of Jews throughout the world needs to be understood.

5 Thirdly, it is necessary for Christians, as well as Jews, to understand the profound changes and potential for good in modern scholarly understanding of the Bible. Modern biblical scholarship is increasingly becoming a joint enterprise between Jews and Christians. Recent Jewish research has shed much light on the complex and varied religious and social situation in Palestine during the first century of the Common Era (i.e. the era common to Jews and Christians). Some Jews have become very aware of Jesus as part of their own history, and their writings have brought home to Christians his Jewishness. Renewed study of Jewish sources by Christian scholars has led them to see first-century Judaism in a new and more positive light, and to recognize that some negative assessments of Judaism in the early Church are far from being the whole story. There were many different groups within Judaism at the time of Jesus and 'the scribes and Pharisees' reported in the New Testament should be seen as part of a wider discussion within Judaism. The New Testament picture of Judaism, written in specific historical conditions, needs to be supplemented by expressions of faith by Jews of the time if first-century Judaism is to be properly understood.

6 We now have a far better appreciation than ever before of first century Judaism, and not least of political factors which led events to take the course they did. The trial and execution of Jesus are now generally recognized to have been brought about to serve the interests of the Roman occupation forces and those Jews who collaborated with them. It was Rome, too, by its destruction of Jerusalem at the end of the Jewish War in 70 CE which forced a reconstruction of Judaism along much narrower and more rigorous lines than had prevailed earlier. And because with the fall of Jerusalem Jewish Christianity was greatly weakened, opposition between Jews and Christians became much more intense.

7 This new understanding of events is leading both Jews and Christians also to look at the way in which Judaism and Christianity came to part company and go their separate ways. Since many of the factors in this split were contingent on specific historical developments, and events need not necessarily have turned out the way they did, there would seem to be no reason why a new understanding should not develop, based on a reconsideration of what originally drove Christianity and Judaism apart.

8 Islam, like Christianity, is a living, world religion. Dialogue with Muslims needs to take into account the fact

that it has taken root in and shaped a wide range of countries and cultures. Contrary to popular opinion, for example, the largest Muslim country in the world is not in the Middle East. It is Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Over the last 14 centuries, Muslims have developed a rich and varied mosaic of cultural patterns, theological schools, mystics and philosophers. Its impact on the development of both Jewish and Christian thought and civilization has been profound. Medieval Jewish thinkers like Maimonides and Ibn Ezra wrote many of their most influential works in Arabic. The philosophy of Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists came to western Europe largely in translations from Arabic, the translators being in many cases Christians living in the Muslim World. If geometry is a Greek word algebra, alchemy and chemistry are Arabic. We call our number system Arabic because the Arabs brought it to us from India. The astrolabe and the architectural arch both came from Muslim scientists. We are sadly unaware of much of Islamic history and thought. So rich and varied is it, that many Muslims are not familiar themselves with some of the thinkers and movements which are historically, geographically or theologically remote from their own experience: just as many Western Christians are unaware of Byzantine Orthodox thought or of the life of the Oriental Churches and vice versa. One of the values of an informed dialogue is that it can help both partners become more aware of some of the riches of their own respective traditions.

9 In understanding Islam it is necessary for Christians to grasp the central place of Islamic law in Muslim life. Islamic Law, shari'ah, is based on the belief that God has, as a gracious act of mercy, revealed to humanity basic guidelines to live both individually and in society. Whereas Christians today tend to think of Christian faith as a personal commitment which can be expressed quite happily in a secular society, many Muslims believe that God has revealed his will on how the whole of society is to be ordered, from details of banking to matters of public health. Although based on the Qur'ân, the sources of Islamic law are much wider. The picture becomes even more complex if one attempts to include the Shi'ites who are the majority in Iran. A long development independent from the majority Muslim community (Sunni) has resulted in a very different ethos and theology, making blanket statements about Islam almost impossible when Iranian and other Shi'ite thinkers are taken into account.

10 Islam, no less than Judaism, has suffered from Christian stereotyping. This is especially true of the notion that Islam is a religion committed to spreading its faith by the sword. History belies such a conception. It is true that the communities of the Middle East, North Africa and the northern half of the Indian subcontinent were originally brought under Islamic rule by military expansion. In many cases, however, they were aided by indigenous Jewish and Christian communities suffering under the yoke of the Byzantine Christian Empire. It was the grandfather of John

of Damascus who as mayor, opened the gates of Damascus to the Muslim armies without a fight and Muslims were the first to invite Jews to live again in the holy city of Jerusalem after Christians had forbidden it for centuries. Much of the part of the world which is now predominantly Muslim did not receive its Islam through military conquest. In fact, the majority of the territory won by Islam in its early advance was taken from it by the Mongols, who already numbered Christians among them, including the wife of Genghis Khan. Yet Islam converted its Mongol conquerors and central Asia remains Islamic to this day.

11 In fact, jihād, usually mistranslated "holy war," is a complex notion that needs to be seriously explored by Christians in dialogue with Muslims. The problem for many Christians is with jihād not in the sense of spiritual struggle (the greater jihād) but in the sense of armed struggle (the lesser jihād). Muslim views on the lesser jihād range from those who say it is a constant duty against all non-Muslims to those who argue that it is permissible only in self-defense, with myriad shades of grey in between. Even apart from the legal complexities, however, it is difficult for Christians to understand its place in Islamic thought. The Qur'ān speaks often about zulm (oppression or tyranny) and about fasād fi l'ard (corruption or evil doing in the earth). It speaks of the need for God's people to oppose these things, by armed struggle if necessary. Classical, and especially contemporary, Muslim views about jihād cannot be divorced from an understanding of this aspect of Islamic ethics.

The Way of Affirmation

12 If Christians wish their own faith to be affirmed by others they themselves must be open to the full force of the attraction of the partner in the dialogue and be willing to affirm all they can affirm, not least when it resonates to the Gospel.

13 For Christians, Judaism can never be one religion among others. It has a special bond and affinity with Christianity. Jesus, our Lord and the Christ, was a Jew and the scriptures which informed and guided his life were the books of the Hebrew Bible. These still form part of the Christian scriptures. The God in whom Jesus believed, to whom he totally gave himself, and in whom we believe is "The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob". A right understanding of the relationship with Judaism is, therefore, fundamental to Christianity's own self-understanding.

14 Christians and Jews share one hope, which is for the realisation of God's Kingdom on earth. Together they wait for it, pray for it and prepare for it. This Kingdom is nothing less than human life and society transformed, transfigured and transparent to the glory of God. Christians believe that this glory has already shone in the face of Jesus Christ. In His life, death and resurrection

the Kingdom of God, God's just rule, has already broken into the affairs of this world. Jews are not able to accept this. However, both Jews and Christians share a common frame of reference, in which Christian belief in Jesus Christ is set. For it is as a result of incorporation into Jesus Christ that Christians share the Jewish hope for the coming of God's Kingdom.

15 Christian faith focuses quite naturally on Jesus the Christ and his Church. However, both these realities can and should be seen within the hope for, and the horizon of, the Kingdom of God. The presence and the hope for the Kingdom of God were central to the preaching and mission of Jesus. Moreover, Christians continue to pray daily "thy Kingdom come". Christian faith in Jesus the Christ and his Church have not superceded hope for God's Kingdom. On the contrary, it is through incorporation into Christ through membership of the Christian Church that Christians come to share in the hope for the Kingdom. We believe that if this hope for God's Kingdom was given its central place by both Jews and Christians this would transform their relationship with one another.

16 Christians and Jews share a passionate belief in a God of loving kindness who has called us into relationship with himself. God is faithful and he does not abandon those he calls. We firmly reject any view of Judaism which sees it as a living fossil, superceded by Christianity. As Paul, who believed Jesus to be the Messiah, put it:

God has not rejected the people which he acknowledged of old as his own. (Romans 11:2)

Again, he wrote:

God's choice stands and they are his friends for the sake of the patriarchs. For the gracious gifts of God and his calling are irrevocable. (Romans 11:28-29)

17 However, with some honourable exceptions, as when Jews and Christians lived at peace with one another in the Middle East for many centuries, their relationship has two often been marked by antagonism. Anti-Jewish prejudice promulgated by leaders of the state, and even of the Church, has led to persecution, pogrom and finally, provided the soil in which the evil weed of Nazism was able to take root and spread its poison. The Nazis were driven by a pagan philosophy, which had as its ultimate aim the destruction of Christianity itself. But how did it take hold? Further, although there are, thank God, many examples of Christians who tried to save Jews, the Churches as a whole were characterized by a deafening silence. The systematic extermination of six million Jews and the wiping out of a whole culture must bring about in Christianity a profound and painful re-examination of its relationship with Judaism.

18 Discrimination and persecution of the Jews led to the "teaching of contempt"; the systematic dissemination of anti-Jewish propaganda by Church leaders, teachers and preachers. Through catechism, teaching of school children,

and Christian preaching, the Jewish people have been misrepresented and caricatured. Even the Gospels have been used to malign and denigrate the Jewish people. The biblical call for love toward one's neighbour impels us as Christians to self-examination and repentance for our prejudice and persecution of God's covenant people. In order to combat centuries of anti-Jewish teaching and practice, Christians must develop programmes of teaching, preaching, and common social action which eradicate prejudice and promote dialogue and sharing among the biblical peoples. The Christian response to persecution and holocaust must be that of our Jewish neighbours: Never again!

19 The Second Vatican Council affirmed Islamic monotheism and spoke approvingly of Islamic devotion to Jesus and to Mary, his virgin mother. Islam stands in a particular relationship to Christianity because of its acceptance of Jesus as the promised Messiah of Hebrew scripture. At the same time, however, we note that Muslims do not understand this affirmation to imply a doctrine of the person and work of Christ which would be acceptable to most Christians. Nonetheless this affirmation of Jesus as the fulfillment of the Messianic promise is unique to Christians and Muslims. The same is true of the Islamic affirmation of Jesus as the Word of God, although Islamic Christology does not accept this as implying the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. At the same time, Islam affirms the Hebrew Scriptures and of the special relationship which God had established with the Jewish people "to whom he had show his special favour."

20 On the other hand, it has been the almost unanimous Islamic tradition to reject the crucifixion of Jesus as either historical fact or as theologically significant. The Qur'anic material relating to the crucifixion is highly ambiguous and there is the possibility of theological dialogue with Muslims on the interpretation and significance of the Qur'anic material on Jesus. We need not, however, totally reject the Islamic affirmation of Jesus, even as we challenge it in its rejection of his atoning work upon the cross. It is important to note that the Islamic rejection of the crucifixion is not ultimately based on a rejection of the concept of the suffering of God's righteous prophets. God's power is not perveived in Islam as a magical talisman against unjust suffering and persecution. The Qur'an often refers, as does the NT, to prophets of God which have been killed at various times in Jewish history. It accepts not only the possibility but the fact of prophets' death at the hands of the wicked. Nor can we say that Islam automatically rejects the positive value of suffering for others or in the cause of God. This it affirms strongly and in the Shi'ite tradition the concept of vicarious suffering is of fundamental importance.

21 The Second Vatican Council spoke also of the Islamic struggle to be faithful to the example of Abraham. The Bible, no less than Islamic tradition, traces the descent of

the Arabs, and so of Muhammad, to Abraham through Ishmael. This is important for Muslims in their understanding of the prophetic mission of Muhammad and of their relationship with Judaism and Christianity as religions which also have a special connection with the faith of Abraham. Even though most Muslims today are not Arabs, they feel, like Christians, that they are Children of Abraham by faith because of the message of Muhammad, descendent of Ishmael, son of Abraham.

22 Although Luther had already spoken positively about the faith of Ishmael, few Christians have given much thought to this child of Abraham, about whom the Bible says "God was with the lad and he grew up" (Gen 21:20). Although rejected from the line of the covenant, there is no Biblical evidence that this child, miraculously saved by God in the wilderness, ever abandoned his faith in the God of his father Abraham. The figure of Ishmael is theologically challenging for, although rejected from the covenant, he and his mother were the object of particular and miraculous attention on the part of God. Perhaps we need to challenge the negative assumptions that surround our reaction to this biblical character.

23 Christians also often feel challenged to affirm the devotion which Muslims display towards God in their prayers. This is clear not only in their ritual prayers but in their own personal prayers such as have been gathered together with Christian prayers by Kenneth Cragg, former Anglican Bishop in Cairo in his book Alive to God.

24 Christians may also affirm the sense of fellowship which Muslims often show to each other, regardless of language, race or national origin. They can also affirm early Islamic ideals of religious tolerance. At the same time they would want to challenge Muslims to develop those aspects of their tradition which imply a broader understanding of the unity of all people.

25 Christians would also want to affirm the deep Islamic reliance on the grace and mercy of God. Although often misunderstood and misrepresented by Christian theologians as teaching salvation by works, all schools of Islamic thought are marked by a deep sense of the gratuitous Mercy of God. This mercy cannot be earned by anyone because, in Islamic thought, no one can have any claims against God. All that God gives, he gives not because we deserve it but gratuitously. And yet, Islamic thought does not reject the importance of human cooperation with God in working his revealed will here on earth. In this respect the Qur'an speaks of humanity as God's viceregent (khalifah) on earth, and this line of thought is developed by many Islamic thinkers. Although some forms of popular Islam may seem to have degenerated into legalism and fatalism, the normative Islamic emphasis on grace and human co-operation should always be born in mind.

The Way of Sharing

26 Dialogue does not require people to relinquish or alter their beliefs before entering into it; on the contrary, genuine dialogue demands that each partner brings to it the fullness of themselves and the tradition in which they stand. As they grow in mutual understanding they will be able to share more and more of what they bring with the other. Inevitably, both partners to the dialogue will be affected and changed by this process, for it is a mutual sharing.

27 Within this sharing there are two main attitudes towards Judaism within Christianity today. There are those Christians whose prayer is that Jews, without giving up their Jewishness, will find their fulfilment in Jesus the Messiah. Indeed some regard it as their particular responsibility to share their faith with Jews. Other Christians, however, are unable to make this prayer. Sometimes the reason is theological. Whilst Jesus called his people to the heart of their religion, he opened the way to God for gentiles; a way which was already open for Jews. For others, the main reason is the holocaust. This lays upon them a divine obligation to help affirm Judaism. Their prayer is that Jews may be faithful to God within their own tradition.

28 Both these approaches, however, share a common concern to be sensitive to Judaism, to reject all proselytising, that is, aggressive and manipulative attempts to convert, and of course, any hint of anti-semitism. Further Jews, Muslims and Christians have a common mission. They share a mission to the world that God's name may be honoured: "Hallowed by your name." They share a common obligation to love God with their whole being and their neighbours as themselves. "Your Kingdom come on earth as it is in heaven." And in the dialogue there will be mutual witness. Through learning from one another each will enter more deeply into their own inheritance. Each will recall the other to God, to trust him more fully and obey him more profoundly. This will be a mutual witness between equal partners.

29 Genuine sharing requires of Christians that they correct all distorted forms of Judaism and Islam as it requires of Jews and Muslims that they correct distorted forms of Christian faith. For Christians this will include careful selection and explanation of Biblical passages, particularly during Holy Week.

30 In this process it is important to remember also the damage that has been done to Christian-Muslim relations by a distorted view of Islam and by outright animosity. Both Jews and Muslims often shared a common fate at the hands of Christians in the Middle Ages and the centuries of warfare known collectively as the Crusades was directed primarily against the Muslims, although both Jews and Eastern Christians shared in the suffering inflicted by the Western

Christian armies as they advanced to and through the Middle East. Christians have upon occasion seen Islam as a Christian heresy and at other times as the mere product of human imagination. Scholars have always stressed the influence of Jewish-Christian monotheism on Islam, for it was born in an area where both Judaism and Christianity were practiced: We should always be careful about how we characterize another person's faith and try to avoid hurtful language. This is especially the case when, as with both Judaism and Islam, the unquestioningly negative characterizations of the past have resulted in much pain and suffering inflicted by Christians in the name of religion or where it has left a legacy of bitterness and division.

31 There is also much in the way of common action that Jews, Christians and Muslims can join in; for example:
the struggle against racism, apartheid and anti-Semitism
the work for human rights, particularly the right of people to practice and teach their religion.
There is a common witness to God and the dignity of human beings in a world always in danger of becoming godless and dehumanized.

32 Understanding and affirming are already ways of sharing. However, if we are truly to share our faith we must not only affirm what we can but share our own deep convictions, even when these appear irreconcilably opposed to our partner's faith and practice. In the case of Islam particularly, Christians must first understand Islam if this witness is to be effective. Islam is a missionary religion, in some ways and in some areas more active and effective in spreading the faith than Christianity. This missionary zeal is not confined to the Middle East but is fervent in Africa, Southeast Asia and is apparent in the intellectual centers of the West. Muslims are often confidently superior to Christians in much the same way that Christians have often been towards Jews. Many Muslims would simply dismiss views which diverge from Islamic faith and practice with the conviction that if their partner only understood Islam they would be a Muslim. Christianity will only get a hearing by informed Muslims when it is clear that the Christian who is speaking understands Islam and yet remains a Christian by choice, not, as it were by default.

33 Many Muslims feel that Islam has superceded Christianity the way many Christians have traditionally felt that Christianity superceded Judaism (a view which the same Muslims would share). Just as Christian polemicists have often seized upon the writings of Jewish scholars to try to undermine the faith of the Jewish community, some Muslim intellectuals and propogandists rejoice when they feel able to use some pronouncement of a Western theologian to undermine Christianity and underscore the truth of Islam. Such pronouncements, tossed off easily in liberal societies, are pounced upon and used to damage small Christian churches in Islamic societies.

34 One pressing concern that Christians will want to share with Muslims is the need for clear, strong safeguards for adherents of minority religions in Muslim societies. Any interpretation of Islamic law that seems to deny basic human rights, including the right of people to practice and teach their own faith, must be challenged. We recognize that here there is positive ground for dialogue because Muslim thinkers of the Middle Ages were among the first to actually incorporate ideas of tolerance and safeguards for minorities within their legal systems; centuries before such ideas were advocated by the European Enlightenment. However, Muslim thinkers of today must be challenged to develop even more positive understandings of the role of minorities in society. In particular, the law of apostasy is undergoing considerable discussion today by Muslim thinkers and jurists and is an area where Christians versed in Islamic law must enter into dialogue with Muslims. In matters such as this the sometimes tiny, struggling churches set in Islamic societies need the support of the wider church.

35 It is quite clear that there can be no genuine understanding, affirmation or sharing with Islam without quite detailed study by at least some experts. In this respect Jewish-Christian dialogue is better served. Most of the important works of traditional and contemporary Jewish thought are available in English, French, Spanish or German translations (if indeed these are not the language of the original). Most of the basic works of traditional Islamic thought have not been translated into these languages and are accessible only to those with a knowledge of Arabic. Even today, although more Muslims are writing in these languages, most of the contemporary intellectual activity within the world of Islam is being conducted in Arabic, Urdu, Persian and Bahasa Malaysia/Indonesia. Valuable work is being done by Christian institutions, in which Anglicans play a part, such as the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at the Selly Oak Colleges (Birmingham, U.K.), the Henry Martin Institute (Hyderabad, India), the Duncan Black MacDonald Center (Hartford, U.S.A.) and the Christian-Muslim Study Centre (Rawalpindi, Pakistan). There is also the new study center recently established in the Gulf by the Bishop of Cyprus. Such work needs to be extended and supported by the Churches of the Anglican Communion.

Resolution that the Anglican Communion:

Endorses the principles of this paper, Jews, Christians and Muslims: the Way of Dialogue, and encourages the churches of the Anglican Communion to engage in dialogue along these lines:

Sets up an Inter-Faith committee and that this committee, amongst its other work, establishes a common approach to people of other faiths on a Communion wide basis and appoints working parties to draw up more detailed guidelines, on a communion-wide basis, for relationships with Judaism and Islam; *and with other faiths*

an appropriate

Initiates talks, wherever possible, on a tripartite basis, involving both Jews and Muslims;

Supports those institutions which are helping Christians towards a more informed understanding of Judaism and Islam.





**The American Jewish
Committee**

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July 22, 1988

Dear AJC officers and staff,

On June 7-8, 1988, the International Relations Department held its Middle East Academic Consultation here at AJC headquarters. Attached is a summary of the event, prepared by Gary Wolf, Eve Jacobson, and Daniel Kamin.

The Consultation brought together scholars, AJC staff and lay leadership, government officials, and other experts for an intensive two-day examination of current issues in Israel and the Middle East.

Those of you who attended the Consultation would surely agree that the diverse points of view presented by the speakers helped to stimulate a lively, in-depth discussion of the critical problems facing the region. Issues such as the Arab uprising in the territories, Soviet Middle East policy, and trends in U.S.-Israel relations were brought into perspective and analyzed with great insight.

If you have any comments or ideas concerning the Consultation, please let us know.

Sincerely,

Marc H. Tanenbaum
Director
International Relations

George E. Gruen
Director
Israel & Middle East Affairs

GEG/ss
88-580

RESOLUTION NO:

LC88/24

TITLE/SUBJECT: Palestine/Israel

SUBMITTED FROM: Christianity and the Social Order

TEXT OF PROPOSED RESOLUTION:

This Conference, saddened by the present suffering in the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

- 1 affirms the importance of the Church in the exercise of its prophetic role by standing on the side of the oppressed in their struggle for justice, and by promoting justice, peace and reconciliation for all peoples in the region;
- 2 affirms the existence of the State of Israel and its right to recognised and secure borders, as well as the civic and human rights of all those who live within its borders;
- 3 affirms the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, including choice of their own representatives and the establishment of their own state;
- 4 supports the convening of an international conference over Palestine/Israel under the auspices of the UN and based on all the UN resolutions in relation to this conflict, to which all parties of the conflict be invited;
- 5 commits itself to continued prayer for Israelis and Palestinians, for Muslim, Jew and Christian, for the achievement of justice, peace and reconciliation for all.

PROPOSED BY:

Passed unanimously without amendment.

SECONDED BY:

(Any amendments to the above Resolution must be submitted to the Chairman of the Resolutions Committee not later than 1.00 pm, Tuesday, 2 August 1988.)

*Best wishes,
Norman*

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Middle East Academic Consultation

Sponsored by the AJC International Relations Department

June 7-8, 1988

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The American Jewish Committee held its annual "Middle East Academic Consultation" on June 7-8, 1988, at AJC headquarters in New York. The purpose of the consultation is to bring together scholars, AJC staff and leadership, government officials, and other experts in the field for an intensive examination of current issues in the Middle East with a view to developing policy options for the United States and Israel.

Following is a synopsis of the remarks of the main speakers at the consultation:

Ian Lustick (Professor of Government, Dartmouth College): The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza see their "Intifada" as a revolution. They seek to end the occupation; the Intifada is a way to force Israel to negotiate, eventually driving the Israelis out. As far as Israel itself is concerned, the Intifada has caused a severe polarization within Israeli society.

Sammy Smooha (Professor of Sociology, Haifa University): The uprising is a new stage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinians have received international sympathy; the Israelis, international criticism. Other effects of the uprising include an unbearable cost of occupation to Israel, and an acceleration of a previous trend among the Palestinians to move away from rejectionism.

Mordechai Abir (Professor of Middle Eastern and African Studies, Hebrew University): We are not dealing here just with the Palestinians, but rather with the entire Arab world. Arab rejection of Israel continues, as does the ongoing effort to destroy Israel. Instead of empathizing so much with the Arab side, let us also consider the Israeli interest.

Barry Rubin (Fellow, John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies): U.S.-Israeli relations continue to be good, but the future is uncertain. Right now, the Mideast is not the highest priority for the Administration; the same goes for the presidential election campaign. (Rubin outlined seven possible courses of action for the U.S. and/or the AJC vis-a-vis the Arab-Israel conflict.)

Arthur Klinghoffer (Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University): Relations between Israel and the USSR have been steadily improving, as evidenced by the recent Shamir/Shevardnadze meeting in New York, the start of a direct flights and the impending resumption

*** This consultation was made possible by a generous grant from the Ruth E. Samuel Fund for International Relations of the American Jewish Committee.



of consular ties. The USSR is taking a less pro-Arab stance in recent pronouncements concerning the Arab-Israel conflict. The Soviets seek a greater role in the peace process.

Adam Garfinkle (Analyst, Foreign Policy Research Institute): The Jordanian option, although encountering difficulties, is still the most realistic path to peace in the region. Hussein basically seeks peace with Israel, but has many constraints that limit his freedom of action. In order to "unlock" the Jordanian option, four "keys" are needed: the Palestinian, the Syrian, the American, and the Israeli. Thus far the four keys have never been available at the same time.

Joseph Kostiner (Visiting Professor of Middle East Studies, George Mason University): Peace in the Middle East is a secondary concern of the Fahd peace plan of 1982. Its main purpose was to provide a vehicle for Arab consensus. The plan does not represent a significant departure from previous Arab positions. (The plan was reaffirmed as policy by the Arab League at the Algiers Summit in June, 1988).

Asher Arian (Professor of Political Science, Tel Aviv University): The territories are not considered by Israelis to be the most burning issue in the upcoming election campaign. The majority of the voters tend toward the center, and can be potentially swayed by either the Likud or Labor. There is no large-scale polarization occurring within Israeli society.

REVIEW OF THE CONSULTATION

June 7, 1988

George E. Gruen, Director of Israel and Middle East Affairs at AJC, opened the consultation. He welcomed everyone and outlined the agenda for the consultation, noting that our objectives are to assess the current situation, examine the likely impact on the American and Israeli elections, and identify options for the United States, Israel and the American Jewish community. In order to provide for free and full discussion, Dr. Gruen said, only the opening presenters would be cited by name in the summary to be distributed.

Ian Lustick, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, began with an overview of the "Intifada", the Palestinian Arab uprising in the West Bank and Gaza. He had just returned from a tour of Israel and the territories. According to Lustick, the protesters view recent events in mythic terms. They see their Intifada as revolutionary; a tidal wave. The most common slogan Lustick heard when he visited West Bank refugee camps last month was "Death to Collaborators." Lustick was told that hundreds of informers had left the occupied territories as a result of the uprising, thus depriving Israel of vital information. Mass arrests--Professor Lustick gave the figure of over 10,000 Palestinians--failed to stem the tide of revolt. There is the sense of a hydra-headed monster operating on two basic principles: support for the external PLO leadership and its diplomatic decisions on the one hand, and an affirmation of local control of the Intifada on the other. Overall, however, the Intifada has been exhilarating for the Palestinians and demoralizing for Israeli Jews.

Lustick asserted that the Intifada has caused an erosion of the center in Israeli politics, with both left and right-wingers saying things they would not have said before the Intifada. There has been more talk from Gush Emunim and the Herut Party about the degeneracy of Peace Now leaders. Thus, Lustick averred, not only has the expanding support for the right wing led to increased public advocacy of transfer/expulsion of Palestinian Arabs, but there is

wing led to increased public advocacy of transfer/expulsion of Palestinian Arabs, but there is also greater willingness to speak of civil war--of a need to "purify" Israel. Such quarters are pleased at reports of renewed anti-Semitism in the U.S., anticipating an upsurge in Zionism and aliyah as a result. Left-wingers are talking more openly about negotiating with the PLO. Lustick estimated that at least one-third of the Labor Party favors talking with the PLO, with another third unsure and only one-third against such negotiations.

Lustick detailed two consequences of the polarization between hawks and doves. The first consequence is that the army has been drawn into the center of Israeli political life. While the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) has traditionally never had a problem carrying out government policy, it has been unable to stem the tide of the uprising. While the political right wants the army to define a solution to the Intifada--being quite willing to authorize any draconian measures the army may require to put down the uprising--the predominantly left-wing oriented IDF command has been unwilling to define the problem as a military one. The IDF command has labeled the Intifada a political problem which the army may contain but not solve. This political stand directly contravenes Likud ideology, and makes the IDF a potential political resource for the Israeli left.

The second consequence is that Israeli Arabs have also become a central political question in Israel. There is now great concern over the formation of an Israeli Arab political party, as block voting by Israeli Arabs will enhance their political power. [MK Abdel Wahab Daroushe recently quit the Labor Party and announced his intention of forming an Arab Democratic Party, claiming that he will get 8-10 seats in the next election.] While Israeli Arabs have not yet decided exactly how to support the Intifada, any political grouping would have to join in coalitions with Labor in order to have saliency. Left-oriented parties in Israel will be expending considerable effort to get the Israeli Arab vote in Israel's November elections.

Lustick concluded his comments with the assessment that Secretary of State George Shultz has "botched" the peace process by allowing his initiative to peter out without resting any blame at Shamir's feet. This mistake on Shultz' part has enabled Shamir to assert that he may be flexible in negotiations and that his posturing of recent months reveals only that he is a hard bargainer (rather than a rejectionist), thus facilitating a Likud victory in the next election.

Question: What do the Palestinians really want?

Answer: They want to end the occupation. As to their ultimate aims, Lustick affirmed that it was not what they wanted that was so important (presumably, the eradication of Israel) but what the Palestinians will be willing to settle for. He offered the metaphor of the bazaar, where the initial offer made by the merchant or buyer is only a bargaining point. The idea of the uprising is basically to convince Israel that the potential problems imposed by negotiating with the Palestinians are preferable to the cost of not negotiating.

An Israeli scholar noted that 50% of Israelis wait to the last minute before deciding how to vote; while they are presently leaning towards the Likud, the election is still up for grabs. Someone then asked about the Islamic element that was at the forefront of the initial disturbances in Gaza: How strong is the Islamic element in the Intifada, and are Islamic fundamentalists so intransigent as to make negotiations impossible? Lustick responded that there is no unity among the Palestinians, implying that the presence of Islamic fundamentalists in the Palestinian camp should not deter negotiations with the Palestinian national movement as a whole.

A senior Israeli political analyst opined that there was no united, accountable leadership

of the PLO in the international arena and no strong body coordinating the uprising in the territories. Israel, then, still has the problem of finding an interlocutor with whom to negotiate. Moreover, he continued, the PLO has failed to sustain the Intifada, proving unable to channel money to the people who are striking. The "general strike is no longer in existence . . . [and] incidents are sporadic." The accomplishment of the Intifada, on the other hand, has been that the Palestinian issue will be important in both the U.S. and Israeli elections in November. The next stage in the peace process will have to wait until after the elections.

An Israeli active in the peace movement noted that Israelis of all stripes are now realizing that the status quo is untenable. They are therefore more open about advocating extreme solutions. When Yuval Ne'eman of the Tehiya Party talks freely of transferring 600,000 Palestinians before the onset of negotiations, one can see how mainstream his attitudes have become. The speaker believes that Hebrew University Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi is right in saying that we must distinguish between the grand designs of the Palestinians and their actual policies. When she was in Gaza in January, she found a distinct pragmatism among the Palestinians she interviewed, who told her that they wanted a West Bank/Gaza state rather than a fight to the death for all of Palestine.

Lustick, for his part, claimed that he was more optimistic than others about the loyalty of Israeli Arabs to the state. He highlighted the increase in Israeli Arab support for Labor--from 3% in 1977 to 17% in 1984. In his view, the Israeli Arab electorate is becoming increasingly sophisticated.

Haifa University sociologist Sammy Smootha supported this point, asserting that Israeli Arabs identify themselves as Israeli and are not part of the Intifada, or more generally, of the Palestinian resistance movement. They have used, and will continue to use, the democratic procedures of the Israeli system to express their sympathies for their Palestinian brethren. As for the Intifada, Smootha continued, it should be judged in terms of two historic processes: the increasing cost of the occupation for Israeli Jews and the "visible" nature of these costs which has strengthened the arguments in favor of disengagement; and the shift in the Palestinian national movement away from rejectionism. According to Smootha, cracks in Palestinian rejectionism have appeared since 1978. After the 1982 war in Lebanon, the Palestinians felt deserted by the Arab states and the Soviets and thus became even more pragmatic. Smootha asserted that the seeming failure of the uprising to scare the Israelis out of the territories will lead the Palestinians even further away from rejectionism. They will see that they have to provide Israel with viable options in order to get the Israelis to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Intifada, then, started a new stage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The polarization of the Israeli electorate as a result of the Intifada has only occurred at the fringes. The Labor Party is not yet reassessing in a fundamental way its position on the territories. While the Intifada does provide an opportunity to adopt a dovish program, for the time being Labor is banking on ambiguity to win over stray Likud voters in the next election. In the end, Smootha concluded, the solution to the Palestinian problem must include the PLO. This is the real lesson of the Intifada.

An American participant followed up on Smootha's point, asking whether the PLO might make Israel an offer that is difficult to refuse. An Israeli political analyst answered that other actors were also involved. Surprises, he said, may come from the USSR which will create motion in the Syrian and PLO positions. Still, he reiterated, we will have to wait until after the next elections for real movement in the peace process.

Question (to Smootha): Is the new Palestinian discipline in using relatively non-lethal

methods a positive development? Answer: The "semi-violent" tactics employed by the uprising are second best for the Palestinians; non-violence would be the best approach from the Palestinian point of view. Therefore, Israel has put obstacles in the way of Palestinians who wish to mobilize politically. Meanwhile, the Palestinians have gained international consideration and sympathy while Israel's legitimacy in the international arena has deteriorated as a result of the Intifada.

A member of the AJC's International Relations Commission posited that the real issue brought forward by the uprising was acceptance of change. New realities demonstrate that the PLO is not the only force to represent the Palestinians while the Likud is not the only group representing Israel. Wondering aloud whether the consultation was an endeavor to find a new formula, he argued that in the face of decreasing support for Israel in the U.S. Congress and among sectors of the American populace, conference participants should be talking about new methods to approach the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A participant from Washington disagreed with Lustick's judgment of Secretary Shultz's efforts. The Reagan Administration, he said, has been trying to find a way to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

An Israeli scholar specializing in the region contended that we are not just talking about the Palestinians but about 180 million Arabs and 21 Arab states [who continue to maintain a state of war with Israel]. PLO rejectionists have kept the PLO from establishing a government-in-exile. In his mind, there are no solutions which protect Israel's security against Arab extremism, which goes back to the 1920's. There are no Peace Now demonstrations in the Arab community. The Intifada has caused people to forget about the Arabs' "strategy of stages", whereby Jews would be deluded about a peaceful settlement in order to get them to make territorial concessions, which the Palestinians then exploit to facilitate the reclamation of all of Palestine. What kind of non-repressive measures can Israel adopt in the face of such Palestinian attitudes? Moreover, he continued, the Palestinian problem involves millions of refugees. How are 2 million Palestinian refugees to be resettled in the 2,000 square miles of the West Bank? An independent Palestinian state is not economically viable and it is for these reasons that Israel emphasizes a Jordanian-Palestinian option, which is still being rejected by the Palestinians.

An Israeli participant noted that revolutions are always unclear while they are occurring, citing the 1789 French and 1979 Iranian revolutions. The Intifada has influenced three processes. There has been a change in Palestinian leadership, although it will still be called PLO. Within the Palestinian camp, Islamic trends are challenging more Western orientations. The resolution of this tension is dependent on Syria and Iran as well the Palestinians themselves. Finally, there is a new Palestinian understanding of Israel as more vulnerable.

Another Israeli political scientist maintained that the Arab-Israeli conflict has now once again been transformed into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, moving us closer to a solution which centers on the issue of partition. He highlighted the limits of empathy toward the Arabs, citing the Talmudic story of two men in the desert: one owns a canteen with enough water for only one person to reach an oasis. If he shared with his companion both would die. The ruling is that one is not allowed to kill oneself in order to save the life of another. There has been no constructive effort by the Palestinians to engage the Israelis in peaceful negotiations. The Jordanian option should be revived, if possible, and a Zionist agenda should prioritize more desirable solutions--those which come closest to guaranteeing Israel's security. An AJC participant noted another Talmudic dictum on splitting a disputed garment, suggesting that this might be a more appropriate metaphor for the Israeli-Palestinian dispute than the canteen of water.

A member of the AJC's International Relations Commission joined in criticizing Lustick's presentation and expressed his feeling that there was empathy only for the Arabs and not for Israel. He asserted that no Arab speaker of prominence has come out with conciliatory statements. An Israeli peace activist, however, took issue with both the tone and the substance of his criticism, declaring that "all of us" are primarily concerned with Israel's peace and security and that the salient differences concern the best way to attain this objective. An American scholar endeavored to bring the discussion "back above the surface," noting that what could be said now was that the Palestinian question was back on camera. There has been no historic breakthrough; the current disturbances were a throwback to the 1936 riots. Yet, he felt that it was apparent that the Israeli electorate was being pushed to the right.

Barry Rubin, a Fellow at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, was the other keynote speaker at the first session of the consultation. He began on an optimistic note, affirming that the strength of U.S.-Israeli relations are visible in the strategic realm and in the commonalities shared by the two democracies. Continuity in these areas is strong, according to Rubin. Still, he warned, there may be a dysfunction in relations after the next elections. If the Middle East is a high priority for the next Administration, concessions will have to be made to the Arabs and pressure will be exerted on Israel. Thus, it would be better if the Middle East peace process were only a moderately high priority for the next U.S. government. Disagreeing with Lustick, Rubin said that the U.S. was not at fault for the failure of the peace process but that the Arabs and some factors in Israel were responsible. A PLO state would not be in the U.S. interest as it would threaten pro-U.S. governments in the Middle East, notably Israel and Jordan. A PLO state's relations with the Soviets would also be a threat to U.S. interests as would such a state's instability and possible militarist posture.

The Middle East will not be the number one foreign policy issue in the next U.S. elections, Rubin posited, as the region will take a back seat to U.S.-Soviet relations and, for the Democrats at least, South Africa. Economics are as big an election issue as ever. Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans will stick their necks out for a Mideast peace. The Dukakis camp estimates that he will receive 80% of the Jewish vote. The Massachusetts Governor, however, may be seen as too soft on Middle East issues and he will likely be on the receiving end of pressure from his own party to be "liberal" with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. George Bush, for his part, said in a televised 1984 debate with Geraldine Ferraro that the Palestinian question is central, but he neglected to mention recognition of Israel as a corollary Palestinian imperative. Generally, Bush would demonstrate continuity with the Reagan Administration on the Middle East. The conservative oil interests which back him may pose a problem for the Vice-President in vigorously continuing Reagan's decidedly pro-Israel policies, however, as they are known to be sensitive to Arab concerns.

Rubin outlined a range of seven possibilities for both AJC and U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Starting with the most radical departure from current policies, they are:

- (i) An independent Palestinian state run by the PLO without significant PLO concessions.
- (ii) Recognizing the PLO and negotiating with it to get the PLO to modify its position vis-a-vis Israel.
- (iii) An international conference with ground rules established clearly and some form of Palestinian participation (leaving open the question of PLO participation).
- (iv) Unilateral autonomy and/or unilateral withdrawal. (Rubin denigrated this idea since the Arabs would not have to commit to anything nor make any concessions.)
- (v) Waiting for the Palestinians to digest the lessons of their uprising in order to see if they are truly more radical or perhaps more moderate as a result of their Intifada.
- (vi) Appealing to the Israeli Government to strive for peace in every way which is consis-

tent with Israel's security needs. Such an appeal would emphasize that peace is more important than land. Thus, while the need for a secure peace is stressed, Americans could advocate the "land for peace" principle.

- (vii) Using U.S. leverage and power to press for American interests, for example, that any future Arab rule in the occupied territories would have to be within the framework of a confederation with Jordan.

Rubin highlighted the last two options as the best. Americans should encourage a flexible Israeli posture while making it clear that the stalemate is not just Israel's fault. An international conference is possible if it really leads to direct negotiations and the Soviet Union can neither veto nor impose a solution. Rubin affirmed that the next U.S. Administration will have the Middle East peace process as a medium high priority. It will be put on the front burner if there is a direct threat to U.S. interests or a clear opportunity to achieve progress.

One participant asked how these last two options differed from the Carter and Reagan policies. Rubin responded that the last option (vii) does not, but that (vi) was more flexible than either the Carter or Reagan approaches. He added that we should always say that the primary fault for the stalemate is not with Israel but we should not clap for Shamir . . . it is bad for peace and bad for American Jewish influence in the U.S.

A participant asked whether the United States wanted Israel to hold on to the occupied territories for the sake of U.S. interests. An American political scientist commented that the U.S. was to blame for highlighting the international conference in the face of the Intifada, while noting that American-Israeli relations have always had their ups and downs. Rubin responded by agreeing that the U.S. did have some responsibility. He felt that the erosion of U.S. support for Israel is a slow and long-term process. It remains unclear whether the current strain will bring qualitative changes in the U.S.-Israeli alliance. In response to the question, Rubin asserted that the Reagan Administration had never adopted a position preferring the status quo to movement in the peace process.

An American scholar wondered whether Black anti-Semitism was pertinent to the discussion; whether a Black voter impact on Middle East affairs would be deleterious for Israel, because of a third world orientation and opposition to foreign aid (due to an emphasis on domestic programs). Rubin countered that the Middle East was not a top priority for American Blacks and he did not envision the problematic scenario outlined by the questioner.

An Israel official opined that the lack of American Jewish support for Shamir's position has influenced King Hussein's attitude, leading him to hold back in the hope of more U.S. pressure on Israel. Rubin retorted that the American Jewish community should say what it thinks. The U.S., Rubin continued, will not exert maximal pressure on Israel as analysts such as Hebrew University's Harkabi have suggested.

Ian Lustick broke in before the session concluded to modify his comments on the Shultz "botch-up." The Secretary of State's mistakes were only in the past month or so and not with the initiative per se. Shultz misread Shamir, thinking that the Israeli Prime Minister would move toward an international conference given certain conditions. Overall, Lustick clarified, the Reagan Administration has acted properly in not pushing harder for peace than had leaders in the Middle East themselves.

June 8, 1988

Arthur Klinghoffer, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, delivered a lecture on Soviet Middle East policy in which he argued that the Soviet line toward an Arab-

Israel peace settlement is now more moderate (i.e., favorable to Israel) than it has been in the past twenty years, since the USSR broke diplomatic relations with Israel during the Six Day War. Klinghoffer said that the ascension to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 was largely responsible for the warming trend in Soviet-Israeli relations. Gorbachev is interested in managing or resolving regional conflicts, he said, in order to turn his full attention toward solving the Soviet Union's numerous domestic problems. Toward this end, he has tried to improve his country's relations with Israel while also improving its standing with conservative Arab regimes such as Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Better relations with Israel have been manifested in talks between high officials, (such as the forthcoming meeting between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Prime Minister Shamir), consular agreements between Israel and certain Eastern bloc states, the Soviet consular delegation which is still in Tel Aviv, increased Soviet Jewish emigration, and increasing cultural exchanges. All these moves should be seen as part of a Soviet strategy to promote a role for itself as co-sponsor of a Middle East peace conference and co-guarantor of any subsequent settlement. They are obviously meant as a slow buildup to the resumption of Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations, a question that has been linked to progress on a regional peace initiative. The Soviet Union has been anxious to reinsert itself into Middle East diplomacy since Henry Kissinger froze them out of the Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreements that followed the Yom Kippur war in 1973.

According to Klinghoffer, the Soviet line toward the constitutive elements of a Middle East peace settlement has undergone a revision in Israel's favor recently, as was revealed after the talks that Foreign Minister Shimon Peres held in Washington in May with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Yuri Dubinin. The Soviet scenario for Middle East peace includes a Palestinian state alongside Israel (the USSR has always rejected the PLO call for a democratic, secular state to replace Israel), but the USSR has retreated from its earlier position that Israel must return all territory occupied in the June, 1967 war. Gorbachev told PLO chairman Yasir Arafat at their last meeting that he must "take into account the security of Israel," which Klinghoffer maintained was a clear reference to the idea of territorial revisions, in Israel's favor, from the 1949 armistice lines. The USSR also said recently that it accepts the English language version of U.N. Security Council resolution 242, which talks of withdrawal from "territories," rather than the Russian language version which it claims says "the territories," meaning all the territories.

Jerusalem has also been dropped from the Soviet list of "occupied territories," signaling, Klinghoffer said, "a soft line, almost no line, on the Jerusalem question." The Soviets had taken a very hard line on Jerusalem, preferring its repartition or internationalization, particularly after the USSR's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, which created a need to mollify Muslim feelings. The USSR has also hinted that it is willing to entertain territorial adjustments in Israel's favor on the Golan Heights.

The Soviet Union has taken the position that the Palestinians must be represented at any international peace conference, but it no longer insists that it name the exact form of that representation. This question "the Palestinians must work out by themselves," a retreat from the former strong Soviet wording on a PLO delegation that would participate on an "equal footing" with the participating states. Klinghoffer suggested that the Soviets envisioned a conference having two stages: a first stage involving a plenary at which there would be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and a second stage in which the plenary would break up into bi-lateral working groups, where Israel would negotiate directly with Palestinians who might not necessarily be members of the PLO. The Soviet stand on resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel has also become softer, Klinghoffer said. In the past the Soviets insisted on Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 before it would reestablish relations, while now they place the resumption at the beginning of such a process, "within the

framework of a peace conference."

Klinghoffer characterized the Israeli prime minister and foreign minister as having different motivations in wanting to resume diplomatic relations with the USSR. Peres is more interested in promoting an international peace conference, in pursuance of his secret 1986 agreement with Jordan's King Hussein, while Shamir sees relations not as a road to a peace conference but as a way to increase Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel.

Question: Does the Soviet desire for participation in the peace process extend as far as putting pressure on the Syrians? And if so, how much leverage do the Soviets have?

Answer: Yes. Gorbachev has said publicly to Assad that he needs to pursue diplomatic solutions, not military ones. This is not just public relations. Soviet leverage is limited, however, as Syria is rather independent. The USSR and Syria have outstanding differences on Syrian policy in Lebanon, towards the Iran-Iraq war, and vis-a-vis Yasir Arafat, above and beyond their close military relations.

Question: How much good does it do to involve the Soviet Union in the peace process? They talk reasonably to be let in, but are they really interested in promoting a settlement or in getting permanently involved in a continued conflict?

Answer: The Soviet strategic perception is that the U.S., through its diplomacy, has enhanced its strategic position. They look at U.S. moves such as the (now abrogated) Israel-Lebanon agreement of 1983, which included the peacekeeping role of the Marines, and the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force, as U.S. logistical gains that repeated the arms and aid packages that stemmed from the Camp David Accords. They see that the U.S. has increased arms sales and scored logistical gains as a result of its effective diplomacy. They would like to obtain similar results.

Question: Are the Soviets afraid that the PLO might in the future orient itself towards the U.S.? Would a PLO state function as a Soviet base?

Answer: The USSR is not afraid of a PLO reorientation because it assumes close U.S.-Israel relations will continue. Whether a PLO state would be a Soviet base depends on the terms of the settlement itself. If such a state is demilitarized, it won't need Russian arms. Even if it wasn't, the Soviets wouldn't have a real interest in arming a "Palestine" too much, as any Israel-Palestine hostilities would mean a chance of war with the United States, which it doesn't want.

Question: It's well known that the USSR supplied SAM missiles to Syria but less well known that it has also provided certain types of missiles to Jordan. What is the significance of this?

Answer: They sold Jordan surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, but it seems the Jordanians are unhappy with the performance of the missiles and feel shortchanged. The Syrians have similar complaints, and also resent the lack of Soviet support for their policies in Lebanon.

Question: Could you elaborate on the differences between the U.S. and Soviet conceptions of a peace conference that emerged at the Moscow summit on the role of the plenary? Also, does Moscow feel it needs ties to the Likud? Would renewed Soviet-Israeli diplomatic ties be more substantive or symbolic?

Answer: There are outstanding U.S.-Soviet differences on the conference. One might ask whether the U.S. needs or wants a comprehensive settlement. In 1986, when Peres was prime minister, the United States was against the idea of a conference and in favor of the idea of

step-by-step negotiations. Peres wants a more comprehensive settlement than Reagan.

Both Israel and the USSR want the Shamir-Shavardnadze meeting; the USSR because it thinks that Shamir may win in November's election and it will need ties with his party, Shamir because he wants to promote immigration. Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations would be mostly symbolic at this point because they have rather good relations without them. But it would lead to the end of Israel's diplomatic isolation because many Asian and African nations that broke ties with Israel would take the cue and restore them.

Question: Will the superpowers collaborate to impose a settlement?

Answer: Maybe. But Israel would be the main obstacle to that because it wouldn't want to rely on international guarantees.

Adam Garfinkle, research analyst at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, began his talk by answering the proposition "is the Jordanian option really dead?" with an equivocal, "yes and no." The Jordanian option has, he said, a certain inexorable logic based on history, demography, and the "cold embrace" of Hussein and certain elements of the West Bank population. This logic explains why the option, despite Hussein's seeming weakness, won't go away.

Garfinkle likened the factors necessary to the successful implementation of the Jordanian option to "four keys," all of which are necessary to unlock a treasure box. There is a Palestinian key, a Syrian key, an American key, and an Israeli key, all four of which never seem to be present at any one time.

The Palestinian key is some kind of Palestinian cover or acquiescence to Hussein negotiating on their behalf. The Syrian key is an entente with Damascus that would neutralize Assad's veto power over any such arrangement. The Israeli key is a government in Jerusalem willing to cede territories to Hussein, i.e., a Peres government. The American key consists of a United States that exercises skill, finesse, and secrecy in its diplomacy. After the Iran-Contra affair, the Jordanian monarch feels that the United States doesn't inspire much confidence in this regard: it was shown as naive, duplicitous, and unable to keep a secret.

Hussein, who would be taking many personal risks in such a plan, would need to know the end result of negotiations in advance, "in order to stick his neck out that much." As against the popular wisdom which thinks that Hussein would need to get back "everything" in order to negotiate, Garfinkle said that Hussein once met with Moshe Dayan and told him he could accept something less than total withdrawal. But he would need to proceed with extreme caution, as even within the confines of his East Bank kingdom he has "a permanent problem with Palestinian nationalism."

Joseph Kostiner, visiting professor of Middle East studies at George Mason University, discussed the relevance of the Fahd peace plan developed by Saudi Arabia between 1981 and 1982, and adopted by the Arab League summit in Fez in 1982. Kostiner said that the plan was developed in the main because the Saudis wanted to forge a pro-Iraqi Arab consensus at the time on the issue of the Iran-Iraq war and to consolidate their standing as inter-Arab mediators. Peace is only a secondary concern of the document. But he said the plan has relevance as a formula for inter-Arab cooperation on a peace process, as it is unlikely that any one Arab actor will attempt unilateral maverick activity in the manner of Sadat. It delineates a set of principles on which there is broad Arab consensus and pushes individual Arab states to work together as a system.

Most of the Fahd plan does not represent a significant departure from previous Arab

positions. The language that calls for the insuring of "security for all states in the region" places the onus of this security on United Nations guarantees and does not mention Israel by name. The Saudis claimed that this clause implies recognition of Israel, but the language is vague enough to encompass all possibilities. The language of the first draft of the Fahd plan had been more specific in calling for the security of all states in the region, but it was diluted in order to secure Syria's signature on the document. Kostiner answered the question, "should Israel be interested in the Fahd plan?" in the affirmative. It is in Israel's interest to use the Arab state system to moderate Arab behavior, he maintained, as any settlement will have to be backed by more than one Arab state.

Asher Arian, Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University and currently at the Graduate Center, CUNY, described his reading of the probable outcome of Israel's November elections by citing statistics provided by recent polling. Arian said that, contrary to the popular wisdom, the next election in Israel will not be a referendum on the occupied territories, for in his estimation the Israeli public does not perceive the territories to be a burning political issue. Israelis see the Palestinian uprising as a military and public relations problem, and also see an absence of concrete proposals to end the occupation. He did, however, see interesting shifts in the structure of attitudes on the question. One-third of Israelis are ready to negotiate with the PLO without any preconditions, he said, while a full 50% would be willing to do so if the PLO renounced terror and recognized Israel's right to exist. Half of the Israeli public agreed that the continuation of the status quo in the territories is not good, and of those, 57% (as against an earlier total of 54%) advised that annexation was the best course of action. But he did not see the across-the-board polarization in Israeli society that some commentators were forecasting.

In Israel, 20 percent of the population could be described as "mature hawks," that is, hawks who were unlikely by virtue of their age to change their opinions, while another 10 percent of Israelis could be described as "mature doves." Polarization is taking place in these two categories, where people are saying, "I told you so" -- seeing in the uprising a set of events that validates their existing beliefs. What is more interesting, claims Arian, is the behavior of the other 70 percent of Israelis, "who seem to be huddling to the center." It is no accident, and probably a world record, that for seven of the last 21 years Israel has had a national unity government, Arian said.

Within the national unity coalition, which appears to be frozen on the surface, changes were taking place underneath that will affect the future dispositions of both Labor and Likud. Arian maintained that such coalition politics favoured the long term positions and interests of the Likud. After serving in a unity government with a more hawkish party, Labor will have a difficult time switching itself and the voters back to dovish positions. The Peres-Shamir entente, therefore, serves Labor only in the short term.

The coming election would represent a historic turning point, according to Arian, in that it will be the first election in which a majority of the voters will be Israeli born. "Israel may still be a country of immigration," he said, "but it is no longer a country of immigrants." The new Israeli voter is young, professional, and generally with some Sephardi background. He advised Israeli politicians that these voters represent what he called "an extreme center," and if they want to attract them they should tailor their policies accordingly.

Trends in the next election should reveal this "extreme center" trying to consolidate itself. Arian predicted that the mainstream Zionist parties, through the Israeli Electoral Commission, would try to limit the periphery of the electoral spectrum by challenging the right of extreme parties to field lists. A number to watch in this centrist trend is the percentage of the vote that the two biggest parties comprise together.

Question: Since the electorate does not see a solution to the uprising, won't this radicalize them even more?

Answer: I just don't see the territories as being the primary issue in this election. Like the Yom Kippur war, which produced an electoral shift not in 1973, but in 1977, the uprising will effect electoral politics not now but in 1992. Arian commented that it was more salient to the coming election that the Labor party was still being led by the same leadership that was responsible for the Yom Kippur war problems and the loss of the 1977 elections to Begin. This fact did not bode well for Labor's continued vitality, he stressed, and Labor had in fact become Israel's one true ethnic party, representing in effect the interests of a group of aging Ashkenazim.

An American scholar proposed that the AJC should lend its prestige to the sponsoring of dialogues between American Jews and Arab-Americans to promote understanding and explore creative avenues for bringing disputants closer together. One of the scholars present responded that while he was not against such dialogues per se, they actually accomplished very little toward conflict resolution because what was hindering a settlement was not lack of creativity but the intransigence of certain Arab actors. There were, he said, three Arab positions: rejectionism, indifference to a settlement, and desire for peace. The movement in Arab ranks had not been from rejectionism to peace, but from rejectionism to indifference. Barring concrete action toward accepting Israel on the part of Arab actors and states, there would be no resolution of the conflict and dialogues with individual Arabs were mere palliatives.

At the informal luncheon meeting, two members of the AJC proposed that the AJC take steps to provide housing for Palestinian refugees currently residing in camps in the occupied territories, so that Jews could participate in an international humanitarian effort on their behalf. This suggestion was rejected by the scholars assembled for a variety of reasons. The consensus was that such efforts would be rejected by both Palestinians and the world community as bribes which sought to reduce the Palestinian national problem to a humanitarian one, and anyway had no chance of success in the absence of a political settlement. There was agreement, however, that the AJC should promote the dissemination of information on what Israel has done to absorb Jewish refugees from Arab countries, as well as Israeli actions and proposals to resettle and the rehabilitate the Arab refugees.

It was suggested that relatively inexpensive, creative, and helpful project that the AJC might undertake to improve Israel's image would be to create a fund which would pay for the translation of four or five works of outstanding Israeli scholarship or literature from Hebrew each year, so that Israeli arts and letters would be discussed in the American intellectual mainstream. Such an endeavor would generate good publicity for Israel and sympathy for its people and demonstrate that Israel is a country that makes a positive contribution to civilization.

This report was prepared by Eve Jacobson, Daniel Kamin, and Gary Wolf.

Papers on current issues relating to Israel and the Middle East available from the American Jewish Committee's International Relations Department:

- * **The Arab States and the Palestinian Uprising: Behind Facade of Unity, Divisions Remain**
- * **Lebanon's Jewish Hostages: What Next?**
- * **The Mubarak Awad Case**
- * **International Conference Focuses on Plight of Syrian Jews**
- * **Religious Conflict Among Jews in Israel: Prospects for Reconciliation**
- * **Update on Plight of Syrian Jewry**
- * **Continuing Turmoil in the West Bank and Gaza: Responses to the Current Crisis, Underlying Issues and Potential Solutions**
- * **The PLO and the Palestinian Uprising: Their Tactics and Declared Objectives**
- * **Israel, A Democratic, Pluralistic Society: The Status of Israel's non-Jewish Minorities**
- * **The Arab Summit in Amman: A Qualified Success for King Hussein, Egypt and Pragmatism**
- * **Arab Aid to the Palestinians**
- * **The Other Refugees: Impact of Nationalism, Anti-Zionism and the Arab-Israel Conflict on the Jews of the Arab World**
- * **The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987: An Update on the Controversy Surrounding Efforts to Close Down PLO Offices in the U.S.**
- * **PLO Hardliners versus Arab Moderates: Implications for U.S. Policy and Mideast Peace**
- * **Back to Basic Principles: The Relationship Between the State of Israel and Jewish Communities of Other Countries**
- * **The USSR and Israel: A New Chapter?**
- * **Shi'ite Terrorists Target Lebanese Jews**
- * **Israel and Asia: A Survey of Bilateral Relations**
- * **Combating Terrorism: Lessons from the Istanbul Massacre**
- * **Israel and Black Africa: A Step Closer**



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
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AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
MIDDLE EAST ACADEMIC CONSULTATION

(June 7-8, 1988)

List of Participants:

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- Mimi ALPERIN Chairperson, Executive Committee, American Jewish Committee.
- Asher ARIAN Professor of Political Science, Tel Aviv University; currently at C.U.N.Y. Graduate Center.
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- Baruch BINAH Press Consul, Israeli Consulate in New York.
- Hyman BOOKBINDER Special Washington Representative, American Jewish Committee.
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- Michael CURTIS Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University.
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-- Ian LUSTICK Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College.

-- Harriet MANDEL Assistant Director, N.Y.J.C.R.C.

-- Alfred MOSES Vice-President, American Jewish Committee.

-- Evelyn MUSER Director, Speakers' Bureau, Israeli Consulate in New York.

-- Laurie MYLROIE Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University.

-- David NAVEH Senior Analyst, Political Research Center, Israel Foreign Ministry.

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-- Sammy SMOCHA Professor of Sociology, Haifa University; currently at Brown University.

-- Marc TANENBAUM Director of International Relations, American Jewish Committee.

-- Gary WOLF Research Analyst in Middle East Affairs, American Jewish Committee.


FO/SFB

DATE: August 3, 1988
MEMO TO: Marc Tanenbaum
FROM: Helene Zinn Losk - instructed by Ernie Weiner
RE: San Francisco Chronicle
Special Report/Gaza and the West Bank

Relative to Ernie's discussions with you yesterday on Mubarak Awad's San Francisco tour, the enclosed exclusive interview sets the theme & tone for his "Mission" under the banner of the American Friends Service Committee and the Jewish Left.

Trying for balance, the newspaper presents the article by Louis Rapoport. Jan Sluizer's article is pure propanganda, since she is essentially a journalist with a hard left orientation.

cc: George Gruen
James Rudin
Eugene Dubow
Geri Rozanski





9/15/88

Memo August 23, 1988

TO: Members of the NJCRAC Israel Task Force

FROM: Arden Shenker and Maynard Wishner, Co-Chairs

RE: Task Force Meeting in Washington, D.C.,
September 15, 1988, 8:00 - 10:00 P.M.;
September 16, 1988, 9:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.,
B'nai B'rith, 1640 Rhode Island Avenue, Room 816

The next meeting of the Israel Task Force will take place in Washington, D.C., on Thursday, September 15, 1988, from 8:00-10:00 p.m., and Friday, September 16, 1988, from 9:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.. The meeting will be held at the offices of B'nai B'rith, 1640 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., (between Connecticut and Massachusetts Avenue), in Room 816.

As always, you are invited to participate in the meeting of the Domestic Task Force (agenda enclosed), which will be held at the same location on Thursday, September 15th, 11:00 am - 5:00 pm.

The following items will be on our agenda:

I. U.S Policy in Response to Recent Developments in the Middle East

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Richard Murphy, will review recent developments in the Middle East from the perspective of the Administration, particularly with reference to his recent visit in the region. Mr. Murphy will be speaking with the Task Force, Thursday evening, September 15th, at 8:00 pm.

II. Status of the Peace Process and Impact on Israel of Recent Developments in the Middle East

Moshe Arad, Israel's Ambassador to the U.S., will join the Task Force for an exchange of views on the status of the peace process and the ramifications for Israel of King Hussein's disengagement from the West Bank, as well as Israel's efforts to put an end to the continuing violence in the territories. Other developments in the Arab world, particularly the expected upcoming session of the Palestinian National Council, also will be discussed.

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III. Examination of the Views toward Israel and the Peace Process of the two Presidential Candidates

The Task Force will meet with the senior foreign policy advisors of the Presidential candidates -- Dr. Madeleine Albright (Governor Mike Dukakis) and Dr. Dennis Ross (Vice President George Bush). We intend to discuss with the two advisors their own views, and those of the candidates they serve, regarding the present situation in the territories, King Hussein's recent actions, the PLO, the peace process, American foreign aid, arms sales to Arab nations and other subjects of concern to members of the Task Force.

IV. Priorities for 1988/89 Program Year

Both the Task Force and the Israel Commission have held discussions on the new Hasbara challenges at the local and state levels presented by the more aggressive and sophisticated activity of Arab-American groups and their supporters. The Task Force will examine this problem with a view to developing specific recommendations for interpretative efforts tailored to the evolving situation in the Middle East as well as organizational techniques that will enable NJCRAC member agencies to more effectively reach local and state leadership.

V. Campaign on Behalf of the Pollards

People associated with a grass roots campaign on behalf of Anne and Jonathan Pollard have sought the active involvement and support of the organized Jewish community. The Israel Strategy Committee, which is in the process of reviewing the issues surrounding this case, will bring its report and recommendation to the Task Force.

We look forward to seeing you in Washington on September 15-16.

MR:mh

Return to: NJCRAC
443 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10016

Attention: Martin Raffel

FROM: _____

AGENCY _____

I will will not be attending the NJCRAC Israel Task
Force meeting in Washington, D.C. on:

Thursday, September 15 - 8:00 - 10:00 pm, and
Friday, September 16 - 9:00 am - 1:00 pm

Please make the necessary hotel reservations for me.

Arrival Date: _____ Departure date: _____

My credit card is _____ # _____

Expiration date: _____

Room type: Single Double

9/8

memorandum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Israel Office

date September 4, 1988

to George Gruen

from Ron Kronish

subject Article by Mordechai Gazit on History of Peace Negotiations

I am pleased to send you the attached article by Mordechai Gazit regarding the Israel-Jordan Peace Negotiations. It gives the reader the kind of historical background that one rarely gets in today's contemporary discussions.

Please give copies of this article to Ira Silverman, Marc Tanenbaum, Gary Rubin, David Singer and Murray Polner on my behalf.

Ra

cc: Mordechai Gazit
M. Bernard Resnikoff



Mordechai Gazit

The Israel-Jordan Peace Negotiations (1949-51): King Abdallah's Lonely Effort

The story of the negotiations between King Abdallah of Jordan and the new State of Israel has not yet been told in full, although the previously classified diplomatic documents, Israeli, British and American, have been available to the public for several years now. Even those well-versed in the history of the region will find much that is new to them. It emerges clearly that King Abdallah conducted the talks throughout with complete sincerity but with a singular lack of sober appraisal as to the possible outcome of all the changes that took place in Jordan as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Abdallah's prolonged exertions in pursuit of peace with Israel make an intricate story that deserves a full-blown monograph, in which the interactions between the participants — the Jordanians, Palestinians, Israelis, British and Americans — would be treated *in extenso*, supported by a full armoury of documentary references. This brief account will focus only on the salient points of the story.

Abdallah was assassinated on 20 July 1951; on 27 June, just three weeks earlier, he had shown how very far he was from any accurate evaluation of the prospects for a settlement with Israel, when he unburdened himself to a US member of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission then visiting Amman, who recorded the talk in vivid detail. 'I am an old man', said Abdallah. [He was sixty-nine years old.] 'I know that my power is limited. I know that I am hated by my own son [Tallal]. I also know that my own people distrust me because of my peace efforts. I know I could get a peace settlement if only I had some encouragement.' A year earlier, the Arab League had passed two Resolutions (on 1 and 13 April 1950) to expel any member that made a separate peace with Israel. Abdallah was quite ready to defy this decision of the Arab League but not his own people, who, he was sure, would support him if only Israel were to offer Jordan what he termed 'reasonable concessions'. He concluded the conversation with

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the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission representative by appealing in what the diplomat described as 'an almost imploring tone' — 'Please help me. I can do it if I get some help and encouragement. But I am an old man', he said for the second time. 'I have not much time left and I do not want to die of a broken heart.' The King's interlocutor, who had not seen him for some time, was struck by the fact that he had aged greatly.

On 28 June 1951, just one day after this conversation in Amman, Sir Alec Kirkbride, the British Minister in Jordan, who was then in London, met the founder and director of the Dead Sea Potash Company, Moshe Novomeyski. Kirkbride's thirty years in Jordan had given him an unsurpassed knowledge of the country and familiarity with Abdallah himself. He said to Novomeyski that people outside Jordan altogether failed to grasp that the country had undergone a peaceful revolution in the previous six months, caused by the arrival in Amman of the Palestinian refugees, and that Palestinian Arabs were now in control there. The country was still called 'Jordan' but in reality it had become Palestine, and the King had lost most of his authority. Kirkbride did not add, as he might have done, that the King himself was either insufficiently aware of what had happened or else refused to admit even to himself how far-reaching the change in his position was.

It has generally been assumed that the decline of the King's authority in this period was the direct, inevitable result of the Palestinians' increased representation in the parliamentary elections and of the proclamation on 24 April 1950 of the Union between the two banks of the Jordan and their amalgamation in one single state. This assumption is correct, but the process of erosion of the King's authority was revealed earlier than that. The King had already suffered a severe setback in March of that year, a full month before the elections, when he failed to find a Prime Minister prepared to co-operate with him in seeking a settlement with Israel. Prime Minister Tewfik Abu el-Huda (a Palestinian, born in Acre) had resigned at the beginning of March 1950 because he did not care to be identified with the King's policy of negotiation. Abdallah had then asked one of his closest associates, Samir el-Rifai (also a Palestinian, born in Safed, father of Zaid Rifai, Prime Minister of Jordan in 1988); to form a new Council of Ministers. It took only two days for Samir to have to confess to failure, leaving Abdallah no choice but to reinstate el-Huda. The King had to pay a price for Huda's agreeing to serve — he was forced to suspend the negotiations with Israel until after the

elections on 17 April 1950.² This suspension spelt the end of all serious negotiations.

The meetings with Israel that took place intermittently in the following year were marked by the dichotomy of the regime in Amman, with the King and his Council of Ministers moving further and further away from each other. The bitter cup that Abdallah was forced to take from the hands of Abu el-Huda would not be his last. The King was extremely disappointed by both of Huda's successors, Said el-Mufti (Prime Minister from 14 April to 3 December 1950) and Samir el Rifai (from 4 December 1950 to 25 July 1951).

The diplomatic documents show clearly that Said el-Mufti and his Ministers were not prepared to undertake direct negotiations with Israel, although Abdallah doggedly went on trying to get them to change their attitude. This evidence is of the highest importance, because it completely clears Abdallah of the charge of duplicity, of having pretended still to be seeking a settlement when he was in fact coming round to his government's line. The documents show that the King put pressure on el-Mufti to negotiate a settlement, but that el-Mufti resisted the pressure and was ready to offer his resignation rather than enter into negotiations for a separate agreement with Israel. He threatened to resign whenever he felt he was being asked to change course.³ In this he was sure of overwhelming support from both Houses of Parliament.

Kirkbride tried in vain to use his influence as British Minister in Jordan to further agreement between Jordan and Israel. At the end of September 1950 he informed London that the struggle between Abdallah and his Ministers had come to a head. Abdallah had asked them to agree to direct contacts with Israel; they had refused and Prime Minister el-Mufti had tendered his resignation. The ensuing government crisis with el-Mufti in October 1950 resembled that with Abu el-Huda the previous March in every detail. Again the question was whether the King would be able to find a government ready to enter into any kind of agreement with Israel, even if only a working arrangement. After ten days of efforts to find a new Prime Minister, King Abdallah had to admit defeat and ask Said el-Mufti again to form a new Council of Ministers.⁴ The new Council held office less than two months, giving the King little satisfaction. He was obliged to inform Israel that he could not find a Cabinet ready to negotiate peace. In December he dismissed the Cabinet and called again on his old associate Samir el-Rifai to form another. This time, Samir was successful. A week after the formation of the new government,

Abdallah showed optimism at a meeting with Reuven Shiloah, the Israeli representative — an optimism caused by the new Prime Minister's appointment. He explained to Shiloah that in the past Samir had been a mere bystander without executive authority, but this was no longer the case. The King's optimism was, however, misplaced. By now a separate settlement between Jordan and Israel was becoming more and more remote, certainly as far as Samir was concerned. He regarded the stalemate with equanimity, while Abdallah refused to accept it. When, shortly after his appointment, Samir was attacked in the Jordan parliament on the issue of negotiations with Israel, he made it plain that he would only make peace with Israel if this step were accepted by all the Arab countries. Told by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) Chief of Staff that the Israelis were delighted with his appointment, he reaffirmed that he had no intention of making a separate peace. He told Reuven Shiloah so too, and made it clear to him that he could do only one thing, namely, discuss problems connected with the smooth working of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement. Shiloah soon discovered that Samir meant very little by this.⁵

Abdallah also realized eventually that he could not count on Samir any more than on his two predecessors. Sufficient evidence of this can be found in the Israeli diplomatic documents, and in at least one US document, which reports that the King was much upset by a stiff reply that Samir sent to Israel.⁶ The Israeli documents provide fuller insight into the relations between the King and his Ministers. Abdul Ghanem Karmi — the ever-ready faithful go-between between Abdallah and Israel — related how Abdallah convoked his Ministers in mid-February 1951, telling them that if they were still not ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel, they ought at least to enter into a non-aggression agreement such as he had proposed in February 1950. He reminded them that they had been appointed specifically in order to promote relations with Israel, adding that Ministers who disagreed with this policy were free to go their own way. Moshe Sasson of the Middle East Department in the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs wrote at the time: 'The attitude of the present Prime Minister has come as a severe blow to Abdallah. For some time now, the King has had his doubts of Samir's courage and readiness to do as he [the King] wishes. . . . [Samir] had formed a moderate enough Council of Ministers that would allow him broad and flexible political manoeuvring, and this gave rise to new hopes [on the part of the

King]. . . The King did not stop pressing him to reach an agreement with Israel, but Samir cherished his political and personal record as a veteran leader too highly to endanger it through any arrangement that could make him look a traitor in the eyes of the Arab world.⁷

Abdallah's determination to achieve peace with Israel is borne out by documents numerous enough to convince the most confirmed sceptic. A striking illustration is provided by a step he took very soon after the parliamentary elections on 17 April 1950. The day after the Jordanian parliament proclaimed the Union between the two banks, Abdallah met Reuven Shiloah, keeping it secret from his new Prime Minister, Said el-Mufti. A few days later, he finally divulged the fact of the meeting to the British Minister, asking him to inform el-Mufti about it and plead with him to renew contacts with Israel. Kirkbride put it to the King that it was preferable for el-Mufti to hear the news from him directly. Abdallah took his point and told his Prime Minister of the meeting. It was now el-Mufti's turn to ask Kirkbride to talk to the King and get him to restrain his excessive enthusiasm for talks with Israel. Kirkbride decided to ignore the request. In his report to London, he stated his reasons: if he acceded to el-Mufti's request and advised Abdallah not to press his government on contacts with Israel, the King was likely to tell the Israelis that the British were holding him back in his peace efforts; but if he, Kirkbride, were to do as the King wished and encourage the Prime Minister to negotiate, it could result in the latter's resignation. He preferred to escape from the dilemma by not doing anything at all. One of the Foreign Office officials who read this report approved of Kirkbride's masterly inaction, but nevertheless commented: 'Whatever happens, Abdallah [may] tell the Israelis that it is the British who are holding him back.' This comment proved prophetic. A few days later, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, indeed informed Sir Knox Helm, the British Minister in Israel, that Abdallah had told the Israeli envoy, 'Kirkbride was advising him to go slow, but he [Abdallah] was determined to go ahead.'⁸

The general picture delineated here is confirmed in a report to Washington from the US Minister in Jordan, Gerald A. Drew, dated 3 May 1950. Drew had learned from Kirkbride that Prime Minister el-Mufti had told him that no more than five or six of the fifty members of the Jordan parliament would be prepared to support negotiations with Israel, and that all the members of the Cabinet were against. Referring to Abdallah's meeting with Shiloah, Drew added that this was the first time that the King had concealed a meeting with

the Israelis from him and from Kirkbride. Drew thought he had done so not only because he wanted to keep his Council of Ministers in the dark, but also because he knew in his heart that he had been acting hastily.

An incident that sharply illuminated the difficult relations prevailing at the top occurred in July 1950. Abdallah was again persistently pressing his government to negotiate with Israel, now using the argument that whenever he spoke to Palestinians living on the West Bank, he got the impression from them that they were seemingly in favour of a peace settlement with Israel. His government, however, contended that he was mistaken and that its impression was exactly the opposite. To clear the matter up, the Council of Ministers sent a 'fact-finding' Ministerial Commission to the West Bank (22-26 July 1950). By pure coincidence, Kirkbride was in the West Bank at the time, having assigned himself the thankless task of explaining to the Palestinians there that they would do well to agree to a settlement with Israel. Little did he realize that his chances of success were negligible; the Palestinian nationalists saw him as a British agent with unlimited influence over Abdallah. The unexpected arrival of the Commission, though something of an embarrassment to Kirkbride, enabled him to observe its *modus operandi*: in effect it set out to prove that its reading of West Bank sentiment was the correct one. The persons interviewed were carefully coached beforehand to say what the Commission wanted to hear — opposition to a separate peace with Israel and only grudging consent to contacts between the Jordanian government and the Palestine Conciliation Commission of the UN. The Palestinians presented the Ministerial Commission with petitions, among whose signatories were many people who had taken a completely different line in talking to the King. Abdallah soon got to know of this 'put-up job' from his own sources and was infuriated beyond measure. He would have proceeded to dismiss his Council of Ministers forthwith had it not been for the realization that he could not find anyone to replace them.⁹

The Israeli leaders and Israeli representatives at the negotiations are seen in the documents as being on the whole realistic about the prospects of a settlement with Abdallah. They were fully appreciative of Abdallah's traditional friendship and his desire to live peacefully side by side with the Jewish community in the early days, and thereafter with the State of Israel. Abdallah's attitude had made it

possible to reach military agreements between Israel and Jordan many months before the first Armistice Agreement was signed between Israel and Egypt in February 1949. The Mount Scopus Agreement with Jordan was signed as early as July 1948, followed in November by the 'Sincere Cease-Fire Agreement' in Jerusalem. Meetings with the King himself were again possible from January 1949. The Israelis remained sceptical all the same, being well aware of the constraints that were likely to prevent the King from making peace as he wished to do. The fact that Abdallah had surrendered to the Arab 'front' and joined the general military offensive of the Arab States against Israel on 15 May 1948 was sufficient warning not to be carried away, even when agreement with Jordan seemed within easy reach.

The note of scepticism is omnipresent in the Israeli documents. Sharett, then still Shertok, gave a very reserved welcome to the renewed contacts with Abdallah and the good news they seemed to herald. 'We tend to regard these contacts as nothing more than public relations,' he wrote. '[Abdallah] is not master of the situation either in relation to the British or his own government.'¹⁰ This comment of Sharett's was made many months before the intensive negotiations for a settlement actually started. When these negotiations began seriously, they lasted for three months, from the end of November 1949 to the end of February 1950, by which time it had become clear that the two sides could not bridge the gap between them.

The negotiations went through three stages. The first, which lasted for two months (from 27 November 1949 to 23 January 1950) focused on attaining a comprehensive peace settlement. This proved to be out of reach, because Jordan demanded territorial concessions from Israel. One demand was probably made for bargaining purposes only — that Israel surrender part of the Negev — but the other was meant perfectly seriously. Jordan insisted that Israel give Jordan an outlet to the Mediterranean in the form of a coastal belt linked by a corridor to the Jordan-held part of the West Bank. The coastal belt would have to run from the border of the Gaza Strip to Ashkelon (Majdal), and the corridor cutting across Israel should be at least two kilometres wide, under Jordan sovereignty.¹¹ These demands Israel rejected. It recognized Jordan's need for a coastal outlet and was prepared to grant special transit rights along an access route, two to three hundred metres wide, connecting the outlet with Jordan territory; but a corridor under Jordan sovereignty was out of the question. Jordan turned this proposal down. In vain the Israelis tried

to make their offer more attractive by expressing readiness to grant Jordan transit and special port rights in Haifa as well.

To save the talks from deadlock, Israel proposed tackling the problem of Jerusalem. The Jerusalem issue was indeed urgent. It was still on the agenda of the UN Trusteeship Council, and the danger of internationalization was still a real one. The Israeli and Jordanian delegations at the UN had in fact co-operated in foiling UN plans for internationalizing the city. The Israelis explained to the Jordanians that they saw negotiations about Jerusalem as part of the talks on a general settlement, a hint that Israel had not given up hope of a comprehensive settlement. Under pressure from his confidant, Samir, the King agreed to ask his Council of Ministers to take part in negotiations over Jerusalem. This marked the second stage of the negotiations, which lasted less than a month. The Jordanians demanded the return of the Arab quarters of Jerusalem occupied by Israel (Talbieh, Katamon, the Greek Colony, Baka'a, etc.) and Israel demanded the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and Mount Scopus with the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Hospital. On 13 February, the Jordan Council of Ministers rejected the Israeli demands. A further meeting between the Israelis and the Jordanians on 12 February was about to end in failure, when King Abdallah joined the delegates to declare that he would not accept defeat. He said he was certain that one day the two peoples would live in peace and friendship; it was therefore vital to move towards this goal through temporary arrangements, if full formal peace was still unattainable. The Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement (signed in April 1949) would not do. Special arrangements would be bound to bring the parties closer together and create a more propitious atmosphere. Concretely, he proposed a Non-Aggression Pact for five years. He asked Samir el-Rifai to draft the terms, and when the latter jibbed at the task, the King himself dictated the text then and there in Arabic to the Israeli representative, Reuven Shiloah. The main points were that the agreement would remain in force for five years and would cover the territories of the two States without any changes in the then-existing armistice demarcation lines. The two parties would give the UN firm pledges on the safety of the Holy Places. There would be discussions on special compensation to residents of Jerusalem for their abandoned property. Property-owners would be granted permits to cross the lines or to empower legal representatives to settle their claims. Negotiations would take place to renew trade relations and provide a free zone for Jordan in Haifa. Joint

committees would be set up to prepare solutions to the problems that would still have to be solved, solutions that would eventually be embodied in the final peace treaty.

No representative of the Jordan Council of Ministers was present at the meeting in which Abdallah made this proposal; this explains why he said he would submit the matter to his government for discussion only when the Israeli government informed him of its favourable reaction to his plan.¹² This was the start of the third and last stage of these contacts. Within a matter of days, Israel conveyed a message to Samir expressing readiness to negotiate on the basis of the King's proposal. Samir's reply was puzzling: if Israel was not prepared to make new concessions, there was no need for any further meetings. The Israelis suspected that this message had not been authorized by the King, and so they addressed themselves to him directly, informing him of their consent. The result was an invitation to a meeting which took place the next day, this time with a representative of the Jordanian government present in the person of the Defence Minister, Fawzi Mulki. The King again dictated his proposed agreement in detail. The new text was somewhat longer than the first one but remained substantially unchanged.¹³ When the King had completed the drafting, he asked those present to initial the agreement. Samir and Mulki did so with patent reluctance. (Shiloah and Dayan initialled for Israel.) It was then decided that each of the parties should prepare a formal draft of its own to serve as a basis for the final text. At the next meeting, which took place on 18 February, both parties, however, met with bitter disappointment. Jordan presented a diluted text that had only the vaguest resemblance to the initialled document: it was not called a non-aggression pact but described as a modification of and annex to the Armistice Agreement. It did not limit the agreement to five years, and the provision on trade between the two countries had disappeared. The Israeli draft was marked by excessive legalism. Entitled 'A Pact of Non-Aggression and Amity', it was decked out in all the nice distinctions of international law, including a provision on conciliation and arbitration in case of disagreement. All the same, the Israeli draft did refer to all the provisions that had been agreed on in the first draft, with the exception of the outlet to the sea under Jordan sovereignty, reference to which was omitted. The earlier draft had stated that this issue would be discussed in a joint committee, as one of the provisions to be included in the eventual comprehensive peace treaty.¹⁴ Abdallah had not been shown his own government's draft and flew into a rage when

he saw it, criticizing it openly. According to the American report on the incident, he said that he could influence the Israelis but he could not control his own government.¹⁵ The Israelis noted in their report that they actually felt embarrassed by the King's criticism of his Ministers. Abdallah went to the length of saying that, if necessary, he would get himself a new Council of Ministers.¹⁶ Kirkbride nonetheless remained optimistic. In reporting to London, he said that he was hopeful that the efforts would continue despite all the difficulties. He considered that the fact that the Council of Ministers had decided in principle in favour of a non-aggression agreement was 'the most important step taken so far' by Jordan towards a settlement. He pointed out that this decision gave the lie to all the previous declarations of the Prime Minister and his Council to the effect that they would 'never negotiate with Israel'. For all that, Kirkbride was mistaken. Prime Minister Tewfik Abu el-Huda reacted furiously to the Israeli draft. He found it completely unacceptable, declaring he saw no point in attempting to reach agreement with the Jews, who were 'tricksters'. The British Minister tried unsuccessfully to calm him down by saying that it would hardly be expected that agreement would be reached at the first meeting, when matters of such import were at issue.¹⁷ Abu el-Huda resigned, retracting only when the King promised to halt the meetings with Israel until after the elections.

The King, in his embarrassment, conveyed a proud message to Israel: 'Abdallah son of Hussein does not break his word.' At a further meeting, the Jordanian representatives had a *Note Verbale* read out: 'The Jordanian government accepts the King's plan as a basis for settlement. Owing to rumours and lies circulating in Jordan, it is decided not to press negotiations but to ask for an adjournment.' Hope was expressed that negotiations would be resumed at the earliest possible moment, 'animated by the same spirit and objectives as in the conferences to date'. The King explained that he would have preferred to go ahead, but since his government had accepted his plan — implying that it had bowed to his wishes — he had agreed to the delay.¹⁸

The idea of a non-aggression pact was certainly the most realistic proposal put forward. Abdallah's agreeing to hold up the negotiations indicated a serious weakening of his authority. This immediately raised the question in Israel of how to proceed. Moshe Sharett did not doubt the King's sincerity. When urged by his advisers to mobilize US and British diplomacy to persuade the King to continue negotiating, Sharett asked rhetorically, 'Mobilize against whom?' 'The King needs

no persuasion,' he affirmed, 'but [rather] Ministers ready to sign and damn the consequences. US [is] unable to supply them [i.e. Ministers] . . . On the contrary [US] intervention at this stage interpretable as Jewish pressure, hence inimical.'¹⁹ Sharett may not have realized that his view was very similar to those held in London and Washington. There were, however, nuances: London was rather more inclined than Washington to consider whether the time had not come to help the negotiations along, but doubted whether anything could in fact be accomplished by increased diplomatic urging.²⁰ While London and Washington were still weighing their tactics, the problem partly resolved itself, since Kirkbride continued to play a constructive role in Amman in line with his general instructions. London soon realized, however, that the King might end up alone without a Council of Ministers, if he persisted on his course. It became apprehensive of making things still worse between the King and his Ministers by giving unwanted advice to the Ministers and unneeded encouragement to the King. Washington, for its part, feared that to prod Jordan in the pre-election weeks would be seen as interference in the country's domestic affairs. According to the US Minister in Jordan, the real argument against diplomatic *démarches* was, however, their complete futility. The opponents to an agreement — the Arab League, the Palestinians and the Jordan parliament — had become so much stronger that the diplomat felt bound to advise his superiors not to be affected by Abdallah's enthusiasm.

Notwithstanding this setback in March 1950, the King went on believing that an agreement with Israel was possible, even if it turned out rather less than a fully-fledged peace treaty. At the very least, such an agreement could be something in the nature of an extension of the Armistice Agreement.²¹

As months went by without the contacts' producing any results, Israel was inclined at times to blame the deadlock on the western powers and on Britain in particular. In May 1950, there was an awkward contretemps between Israel and Britain.²² Sir Knox Helm responded to the repeated requests of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and asked London to urge Abdallah to continue negotiating. The Foreign Office, however, preferred to heed Kirkbride's counsel not to do anything that might complicate the King's relations with his Council of Ministers. One matter of much concern to the British, as they wondered whether or not to use their influence in Amman, was the economic problem. The Arab League was threatening to impose sanctions on Jordan in the event of a Jordanian agreement with

Israel. The Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, Geoffrey Furlonge, pointed to the problems that would be liable to arise for Britain. Having repeatedly declared in favour of a settlement between the Arab States and Israel, Britain could hardly refrain from helping Jordan, if that country were to sign an agreement with Israel and become the object of an economic blockade. Furlonge noted, 'In [Jordan's] already weakened economic position, which a settlement with Israel will apparently not much improve, this [economic blockade] will make it difficult for her to survive without direct help from ourselves. On the other hand, we can hardly discourage King Abdallah from settling with Israel if he can.'²³

How Britain should act was becoming a matter of controversy inside the Foreign Office itself. Sir Thomas Rapp, Head of the then still influential British Middle East Office (BMEO) in Cairo, visited Israel and Jordan towards the end of 1950. He was very favourably impressed by Israel and worried by what he saw in Jordan. He concluded that time was not working on the side of an agreement and strongly suggested that the Foreign Office adopt a firmer stand in favour of reaching an agreement — the King was old and weak, and this was one more reason to act quickly while he was still there.²⁴ It appears that Rapp went so far as to suggest the use of bribes to promote agreement. The Head of the Eastern Department, embarrassed by Rapp's exhortations, was forced to defend himself again and explain that during the spring and summer of that year (1950), he and his superiors had regularly gone into the question of using British influence in Jordan (and perhaps in Israel too) in favour of an agreement, only to conclude time and again, on the basis of both Kirkbride's reports and their own knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs, that such pressure would be of no avail. The Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir William Strang, also felt impelled to send Rapp explanations on similar lines. He pointed out that the Jordanian Prime Minister, Samir el-Rifai, had said shortly before that he could not make peace with Israel because of the Arab League. 'After all,' as Strang noted, 'Samir's statement cannot be ignored — he is one of the King's most trusted aides.'²⁵

The basic British attitude towards a settlement between Jordan and Israel can be put quite briefly. The British documents will surprise anyone expecting to find an exclusively pro-Arab or pro-Arab League line. As early as September 1948, the Head of the Eastern

Department of the Foreign Office, Bernard A. Burrows, wrote that if the price for settling the Palestine question was to disrupt the Arab League, 'I'm not sure we should be so very distressed.' A year later, a Foreign Office memorandum prepared for the Cabinet stated 'It is not up to HMG to take any steps to bring it [the Arab League] to an end but we shall not regret its demise.'²⁶

The British favoured a settlement for two main reasons. They were apprehensive of being subjected to Jordanian pressures to come to that country's assistance in case of a serious border incident with Israel. The Anglo-Jordan Treaty gave Jordan cause to ask for help in such circumstances. As hopes rose in February 1950 that King Abdallah would make headway with his Non-Aggression Pact proposal, Kirkbride wrote approvingly: 'My own reaction is that the present move seems to offer better hopes of an early settlement, which will remove the danger of hostilities between the two countries and consequent embarrassing appeals by Jordan under the Treaty.'²⁷ The second reason was that Britain had reached the conclusion that in order to play a strategic role in the Middle East, she would need Israel in time of war. It would obviously be far easier to include Israel in Middle East defence plans after a peace settlement between Israel and Jordan.

In the last few months before Abdallah's assassination, Israel no longer had any real hope that the contacts with Jordan would bear fruit. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was of the opinion that King Abdallah meant well but was in the hands of the Palestinian Arabs and powerless. Reuven Shiloah held similar views but also believed that the King had become 'a wishful thinker'.²⁸ It was Eliahu (Elias) Sasson, a man particularly esteemed by Abdallah, the veteran expert on Arab affairs of the Jewish Agency's Political Department and later Director of the Middle East Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, who was the first to draw attention to several matters that escaped other observers, misled by their zeal for an agreement. In 1951, when Sasson was already serving as Israeli Minister in Ankara, he wrote home that Jordan was indeed the Arab country most inclined to make peace with Israel, but it was also the country that had the biggest claims on Israel — claims that Israel could not admit. Secondly, Jordan depended on one old man, 'old and strange . . . courageous and well-meaning but not independent and not free to direct and control affairs'.²⁹ Sasson was also the first to warn that

negotiations would take a turn for the worse when Samir el-Rifai was made Prime Minister.

One question remains — what made Abdallah persist in his efforts against tremendous odds? It was Kirkbride who tried to give an answer. In a letter to the Foreign Office that made something of a stir and that was still being quoted months later by his colleagues, Kirkbride wrote that Abdallah's desire for a settlement with Israel was not in fact due to far-sighted statesmanship. Abdallah was obsessed with the idea of recovering the land of his fathers, the Hejaz, whence his father, the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, was expelled by Ibn Saud in 1924. Abdallah saw a settlement with Israel as the first step towards his objective. The second step was to be the creation of 'Greater Syria' and only then the final confrontation with the Saudis. Kirkbride noted that there was no chance whatsoever of the dream's being realized but, he added, this did not affect Abdallah's determination or his actions. According to Kirkbride, it was because of the dream of reconquering the Hejaz that Abdallah was indifferent to the precise terms of a settlement with Israel and was ready to be accommodating.³⁰ Abdallah's Ministers were aware of the King's motives and maintained their reserve. There is certainly a great deal of truth in this analysis by the veteran British envoy in Amman, yet Abdallah was also beyond question impelled by a sincere desire to settle the problems between Jordan and Israel peacefully.

Shortly after Abdallah was assassinated, the Jordan Prime Minister — it was Tewfik Abu el-Huda again — told the US Chargé d'Affaires that his government would not continue with Abdallah's policy on 'Greater Syria'. Moreover, Jordan would abandon Abdallah's policy of a separate peace with Israel and would from then on follow the lead of Egypt and the Arab League in this matter.³¹ Thus hope of an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement disappeared for many long years to come.

Notes

1. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereinafter FRUS) 1951, vol. 5, 735.
2. FRUS, 1950, vol. 5, 804.
3. British diplomatic documents, Public Record Office, Foreign Office (hereinafter FO) 371/EE82179/100, 1 October 1950.
4. FO 371/82179/103, 13 October 1950.

5. FO 371/91364/371, 12 January 1951.
6. FRUS, 1951, vol. 5, 660.
7. Israeli documents (hereinafter Isdoc) 2408/13, 19 February 1951. See, too, summary of M. Sasson's impressions in memorandum entitled, 'The policy lines of Mir Pasha Rifai regarding Israel'.
8. FO 371/82178/EE1015/55, 4 May 1950 and FO 371/82178/EE1015/56, 10 May 1950.
9. FRUS, 1950, vol. 5, 978 ff; FO 371/92179/EE1015/82, 19 July 1950.
10. Isdoc 2451/3, telegram from Sharett to Eban, 2 February 1949.
11. Isdoc 2408/13, 17 February 1950, report on meeting of 9 February.
12. Isdoc 2408/13, 17 February 1950.
13. In Abdallah's first draft there was no mention of an outlet to the sea for Jordan with full Jordanian sovereignty, but it was referred to in the second draft, although as a subject for discussion at the final peace settlement and not in connection with the non-aggression pact.
14. As against this, the possibility was mentioned of a Free Port in Haifa as mandated in the previous draft.
15. FRUS, 1950, vol. 5, 774.
16. *Ibid.*, 775.
17. FO 371/82178/EE1015/36, 2 March 1950.
18. FRUS, 1950, vol. 5, 797.
19. Isdoc 2453/3, telegram from Sharett to Geneva, 5 March 1950; 2453/3, meeting Sharett and newspaper editors, 9 March 1950, 12.
20. FO 371/82177/EE1015/2, 371/82177/EE1015/19, 31 December 1949, 6 and 12 February 1950.
21. FRUS, 1950, vol. 5, 836.
22. Isdoc 2412/6, 3 May and 2412/6, 16 May 1950.
23. FO 371/82178/EE1015/62, 31 May 1950.
24. FO 371/82178/EE1015/119, 15 December 1950.
25. FO 371/82178/EE1023/156, 15 January 1951.
26. FO 371/68587/EE12196, September 1948; CAB 129(36), 25 August 1949; CAB 129(37), 19 October 1949. These last two Cabinet Papers are memoranda by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin.
27. FO 371/82177/EE1015/28, 20 February 1950.
28. FRUS, 1951, vol. 5, 711, 657.
29. Isdoc 2408/13, letter from Eliahu Sasson to Reuven Shiloah and his son Moshe Sasson, 12 January 1951.
30. FO 371/82179/EE1015/77, 14 July 1951.
31. FRUS, 1951, vol. 5, 990.

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ACTION

AD HOC COMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST

The proposed statement, "Toward Peace in the Middle East: Problems and Principles," is submitted to you in this draft form for your study and comments between now and the General Meeting beginning November 6 in Baltimore.

The Committee, made up of Archbishop Roger Mahony, Cardinal John O'Connor and Archbishop William Keeler, has developed the proposed statement after:

- Consultations with the Holy See and the leaders of Christian communities in the Middle East;
- A series of consultations with major Jewish, Arab and Christian organizations;
- Consultations in Lebanon by Cardinal O'Connor in May;
- Consultations in Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt as well as the West Bank and Gaza by Archbishop Mahony and Archbishop Keeler;
- Dialogue with past U.S. policymakers and academic experts on the Middle East.

Following usual Conference policy, the Committee would welcome your recommendations both prior to the General Meeting as well as during the first two days of the meeting on improving the statement. Since the events of the Middle East continue to change rapidly, the Committee will continue its work throughout October. We will bring any additional Committee recommendations to you at the General Meeting.

Most Reverend Roger Mahony
Chairman
October, 1989

TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLEEAST: PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES

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5 As Catholic bishops and as citizens of the United
6 States, we are particularly concerned for the peoples, the
7 nations and the Church in the Middle East. Christianity is
8 rooted in the soil of the Holy Land, where Jesus Christ
9 lived, taught, and, according to our faith, died and rose
10 again. As pastors, we wish to offer a word of special
11 solidarity and support to the Church in the Middle East at a
12 time of trial and difficulty. We sense the fear, hope,
13 vulnerability and suffering of the diverse peoples of the
14 region -- Jewish, Christian and Muslim. We have a deep and
15 abiding relationship of respect for the Jewish people and
16 support for the nation of Israel. We also feel with new
17 urgency the pain and hopes of the Palestinian people. We
18 have persistently tried to support the Lebanese people in
19 their agony of war and devastation. As citizens of the
20 United States, we also recognize the continuing engagement
21 of our nation with the Middle East and the significant
22 impact of U.S. policy on the region.

23 In 1973 and in 1978, the U.S. Catholic Conference
24 issued policy statements on the Middle East outlining the
25 principles we believed would contribute to a just and
26 lasting peace. In light of a number of important subsequent
27 developments, we seek in this statement to share our own

1 reflections in the hope that they will contribute to a broad
2 and sustained effort to help secure peace, justice, and
3 security for all people in the Middle East. While our title
4 refers to "the Middle East", this statement will focus on
5 two major dimensions of the region: Lebanon and the
6 relationship of Palestinians, Israel and the Arab states.

7 At the outset, we wish to say a word about our hopes
8 and fears in addressing this complex set of issues fraught
9 with such power and emotion among peoples of different
10 faiths and convictions. We hope this expression of our
11 concerns and reflections will contribute to a broader
12 discussion of Middle East policy and that it will not be
13 misunderstood or misperceived.

14 We have sought in these reflections to state our
15 concerns clearly, with balance and restraint and with
16 genuine respect and appreciation for the strong feelings and
17 deep convictions of other communities. We believe
18 constructive dialogue does not require silence or avoidance
19 of differences, but an understanding that people of good
20 will can sometimes disagree without undermining fundamental
21 relationships of respect. Our consideration of this
22 statement has been enriched by the perspectives of leaders
23 of a number of Jewish, Muslim and other Christian
24 communities and organizations.

25 To address the Middle East is to confront a region with
26 a sacred character and a conflicted history. To understand
27 "the Middle East question" it is necessary to probe

1 political, religious, cultural and moral issues which are
2 woven together in a complex tapestry. Reducing the reality
3 of the Middle East to one dimension -- whether it be
4 political, military, religious, ethnic or economic --
5 inevitably distorts the nature of the problems people and
6 nations face there. This quest for simplicity in turn leads
7 to proposals which frustrate the task of shaping a just and
8 stable peace in the Middle East.

9 I. The Religious and Political Significance of the Middle
10 East

11 The complexity and challenge of the Middle East is
12 related to its unique blend of religious and political
13 history. Because it is the birthplace of Judaism,
14 Christianity and Islam, the region engages the interests,
15 the hopes and the passions of people throughout the world.
16 The history and geography of the Middle East are permeated
17 by events, memories, traditions and texts by which millions
18 of believers in every part of the globe, in different ways,
19 define their religious commitments and convictions. The
20 religious communities living in the Middle East today hold
21 in trust the religious legacy and heritage of much of the
22 world's population.

23 The sacred character and content of Middle East history
24 provide an abiding resource of hope: that the family of
25 Abraham, his descendants in faith, may be able to draw from
26 their religious values and moral principles a common
27 framework for shaping a peaceful future. As Catholic

1 bishops we believe this hope is well founded; religious
2 conviction and the moral vision which flows from it can
3 provide the motivation and direction for transforming the
4 present conflicts of the Middle East into a stable political
5 community of peace. However, injudicious use of religious
6 convictions can harden political attitudes, ~~raise contingent~~
7 ~~claims to absolute status~~ and obscure the fact that both
8 prudence and justice may require political compromise at
9 times.

10 It is difficult to conceive of this stable and peaceful
11 future for the Middle East apart from the contributions of
12 Judaism, Christianity and Islam, a contribution which must
13 be shaped and guided by balanced, careful and prudent resort
14 to each religious tradition.


15 The religious diversity of the Middle East is matched
16 by its political complexity. There are very few places in
17 the world today where the political and human stakes are as
18 great, and where the danger of military conflict is so
19 high. A distinguishing characteristic of the Middle East is
20 the way in which the political life of the region has direct
21 and often dangerous global implications. At both the
22 regional and the global level, therefore, the Middle East
23 poses a major political and moral challenge.

24 The Region: The region in fact contains several
25 distinct political conflicts. The 1980s have vividly
26 demonstrated the destructive capacities resident in the
27 Middle East: the carnage of the Iran-Iraq war (including

1 the use of children as foot soldiers and the resurgence of
2 chemical war), as well as the devastation of Lebanon, both
3 testify to multiple sources of conflict resident in the
4 region.

5 An adequate analysis of the Middle East must be
6 grounded in a recognition of the distinct kinds of conflict
7 which run through the area. At the same time, it is
8 possible to identify a central issue which has characterized
9 the history of the Middle East for the last forty years:
10 the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian struggle. Both the moral
11 intensity of the Middle East problem and its direct
12 relationship to the larger issues of world politics are best
13 illustrated by the continuing conflict of Israel, the Arab
14 states and the Palestinians.

15 While the disputes are cast in political terms, it is
16 essential to understand that each of the major parties,
17 particularly the Israelis and Palestinians, sees its
18 political position as having a clear moral basis. Political
19 objectives are supported by moral claims on both sides. The
20 moral claims in turn are grounded in and supported by
21 historical memories.

22 In the Passover Seder Jews "preserve the memory of the
23 land of their forefathers at the heart of their hope.
24  Vatican 'Notes, Section VI, n. 33, May 1985.) They recall
25 centuries of discrimination in East and West. They remember
26 the Shoah, which in the words of Pope John Paul II is a
27 "warning, witness and silent cry to all humanity." At the

1 time of the Holocaust they found few secure places to flee
2 or find refuge. Israel represents for the Jewish community
3 the hope of a place of security and safety in a world which
4 has often not provided either for the Jewish people.

5 Palestinians too have ancient ties to the land. Some
6 trace their roots to New Testament times. Their history
7 includes centuries of living under the rule of others:
8 Byzantium, the Caliphates, the Crusaders, the Ottoman
9 Empire. In recent times their memories include the loss of
10 ancestral lands and hundreds of villages; the displacement
11 of now 2,000,000 people, most living as exiles from their
12 native land; the indifference of the world to their plight;
13 and the frustration of their national aspirations.

14 The politics of the Middle East, shaped by this
15 historical, moral and religious background are not politics
16 as usual. The essential stakes in the Israeli-Palestinian
17 conflict are the central values by which nations and peoples
18 define their existence: security, sovereignty and
19 territory. It is difficult to conceive of a more
20 fundamental definition of political conflict. Without
21 trying to define and describe the essence of the conflict at
22 this point, it is useful to illustrate its intense and
23 unyielding character.

24 For Israel, one way to describe its policy problem is
25 the relationship of territory to security and survival. How
26 much territory is required to guarantee the security of the
27 state and the survival of its people? The terms of the

1 debate have changed over time, particularly after the 1967
2 war, but the essential argument, what constitutes "secure
3 borders", has run through Israel's history as a modern
4 state.

5 The Israelis live with a sense of political and
6 psychological vulnerability which outside observers
7 (especially in a country as large and physically protected
8 as the United States) often fail to understand. Surrounded
9 by Arab states (and formally at peace only with Egypt),
10 Israelis see their geographical position as one of
11 persistent vulnerability; they have an overriding sense that
12 there is very little room for error in judging security
13 issues. In addition to threats from other states, Israel
14 has been continuously faced with terrorist actions by groups
15 aligned with the Palestinian cause.

16 A result of this history, and the fact of five wars in
17 forty years, is Israel's determination to be secure by
18 amassing military power sufficient to offset the threat of
19 its well armed neighbors. In the minds of the Israelis,
20 both the objectives they seek -- security and territory --
21 and these means are morally justified, because what is at
22 stake is their survival as a people.

23 The reason why many in the Middle East and in the world
24 have not been able to identify with Israel's case in all its
25 aspects is not simply the inability to appreciate Israeli
26 psychology. The more substantial reason is that Israel's
27 conception of what is needed for security, particularly.

1 after 1967, has run directly counter to Palestinian claims.

2 The problem for the Palestinians has not been security
3 and territory, but territory and sovereignty. Since 1948
4 the Palestinian case -- often represented by other Arab
5 voices in the past, but today a case made by Palestinians
6 themselves -- is that they have been deprived of territory
7 and denied status as as a sovereign state. The Palestinian
8 case, like Israel's, is both political and psychological:
9 political existence in a world of sovereign states requires
10 recognition of sovereignty; both territory and sovereignty
11 are needed if Palestinians, living inside and outside the
12 Israeli occupied territories, are to have a psychological
13 sense of their identity.

14 The Palestinian conception of how much territory is
15 necessary for a viable sovereign state has changed over
16 time. From an early policy laying claim to all the areas
17 described as Palestine, the Palestinian position today is
18 focused on the West Bank and Gaza. Even with this change,
19 however, it is clear that Israeli and Palestinian positions
20 collide over the same territory. The regional challenge in
21 the Middle East involves the political and moral
22 adjudication of conflicting claims aimed at breaking the
23 cycle of a violent past.

24 Global Fears: Success or failure at the regional level
25 has global implications. The Middle East is one of the
26 regions of the world where local conflict has the capacity
27 to engage the superpowers. The political-moral problem of

1 the Middle East involves, therefore, not only regional
2 justice, but global security. The threat of proliferation
3 of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and chemical weapons
4 in the Middle East, has only intensified the danger that a
5 regional conflict would escalate to international
6 proportions.

7 A stable peace, based on the just satisfaction of the
8 needs of states and peoples in the region is required first
9 of all because the citizens of the Middle East have suffered
10 enough. But peace there is also a requirement for the
11 welfare of the citizens of the world. Regional justice and
12 international security are joined in the Middle East.

13 II. The NCCB and the Middle East

14 The Middle East can be analyzed from many
15 perspectives. In this statement we write as Catholic
16 bishops, in our role as pastors and teachers. This identity
17 shapes our approach to the issues of the Middle East.

18 We are bound by deep ties of faith to the Holy Land,
19 the land of the Hebrew prophets, the land of Jesus' birth,
20 ministry, passion, death and ~~the~~ resurrection. These ties
21 are the starting point of our reflection. As bishops in the
22 universal Church, we are guided by the continuing engagement
23 of Pope John Paul II with all the major questions of the
24 Middle East. Building on the pastoral concern and policies
25 of his predecessors, the Holy Father consistently seeks to
26 lift up before the international community the human,
27 religious and moral dimensions of the Middle East.

1 By this statement we hope to foster the process
2 described by the Holy Father: "that the Israeli and
3 Palestinian peoples, each loyally accepting the other and
4 their legitimate aspirations, may find a solution that
5 permits each of them to live in a homeland of their own, in
6 freedom, dignity and security." (L'Osservatore Romano, Eng.
7 ed., 5 December 1988). The statement also responds to Pope
8 John Paul's determination to protect the Lebanese people and
9 their country: "We cannot resign ourselves to seeing that
10 country deprived of its unity, territorial integrity
11 sovereignty and independence. It is a question here of
12 rights which are fundamental and incontestable for every
13 nation." (L'Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed., 13 Feb. 1989)

14 We are also bound by ties of episcopal solidarity with
15 our brother bishops in the Middle East and with the
16 communities they serve in Jerusalem, Beirut, Baghdad,
17 Damascus, Amman, Cairo and in other cities and villages
18 throughout the Middle East. We are conscious of the crucial
19 but doubly difficult vocation of the Christians in the
20 Middle East. In almost all situations they live as a
21 religious minority in a predominantly Islamic world, often
22 under pressures of various kinds as they seek to live their
23 faith. Yet they also have the possibility and the duty of
24 living their Christianity in an interreligious context where
25 they can witness to its value and share its resources
26 generously.

27 In this statement we express our solidarity with these

1 Christian communities of the Middle East, especially those
2 in Lebanon, and demonstrate our concern through an effort
3 aimed at enhancing the search for peace in their homelands.

4 We approach the Middle East question conscious of three
5 different relationships, each of which we value highly, all
6 of which are pertinent to the quest for peace in the Middle
7 East.

8 At the level of interreligious dialogue we maintain
9 relationships with both the Jewish and Islamic communities
10 in the United States. Since the Second Vatican Council
11 Jewish-Catholic dialogue has made major strides. Living
12 with the largest Jewish community in the world, we have
13 enjoyed extensive exchanges and deepening friendship leading
14 to a fuller understanding of Judaism and our own faith.

15 Our relationships with Islamic communities in the
16 United States are more recent, but they are expanding
17 rapidly. As in the Catholic-Jewish dialogue, Catholic-
18 Islamic interests range from explicitly religious issues to
19 social questions, among which peace and justice in the
20 Middle East has a special place. Here also the process of
21 dialogue has enhanced our understanding of Islam and
22 deepened our own sense of faith. Islamic-Christian dialogue
23 is facilitated by the climate of respect for religious
24 differences in the United States.

25 Finally, as bishops in the United States we are
26 citizens of and religious leaders in a nation with a
27 critical role in the Middle East. In terms of both the

1 regional and the global significance of the Middle East, the
2 U.S. role is always important and sometimes decisive.

3 The U.S. relationship with Israel has been a defining
4 element of Middle East politics in the last forty years.
5 The very dominance of the fact, in the Middle East and in
6 the United States itself, often obscures the extensive
7 relationship of the United States with virtually all of the
8 Arab states. This significant relationship has been
9 crucially enhanced by the U.S. decision to open political
10 discussions with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
11 in December of 1988. The United States now has the
12 opportunity to use its influence and relationships to
13 foster a more extensive dialogue among Israel, Palestinians
14 and the Arab states.

15 Public attention and discussion of the Middle East has
16 been renewed because of the intifada, the continuing tragedy
17 of the hostages in Lebanon and the devastation occurring
18 within Lebanon. We addressed the question of U.S. policy in
19 the Middle East in 1973 and in 1978. We return to the topic
20 in this statement because we believe that a possibility to
21 build relationships of trust and shape a secure peace exists
22 today in the Middle East.

23 As often happens in political affairs, a moment of
24 opportunity is partly the product of conflict and
25 suffering: this is surely the case in Lebanon, the West
26 Bank and Gaza, in Israel as well as in the lives of the
27 hostages. The suffering must be lamented but the moment of

1 opportunity must be grasped. We are convinced that U.S.
2 engagement is needed to stimulate a new initiative for peace
3 in the region of the Middle East. Past experience
4 illustrates that sustained U.S. efforts, pursued at the
5 highest level of government, can catalyze a peace
6 process. In this statement we focus on two aspects of the
7 wider Middle East picture: the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian
8 question and the fate of Lebanon. Our concern is to examine
9 these issues in light of the challenge they pose for U.S.
10 policy and for the Church in the United States.

11 We address these issues in light of the religious and
12 moral dimensions at the heart of the Middle East. We offer
13 these reflections as a contribution to the Catholic
14 community and to the wider U.S. policy debate on the Middle
15 East.

16 III. Israel, the Arab States and the Palestinians:

17 Principles for Policy and Peace

18 During the last forty years, it is possible to
19 distinguish two levels of the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian
20 question. One level involves Israel and the Arab states;
21 this conflict has been at the forefront of the wars of 1948,
22 1956, 1967, and 1973. From these wars emerged the formula
23 of "land for peace" in U.N. Resolution 242 (cf. Appendix)
24 which remains the diplomatic guideline for a lasting
25 resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The goal of the
26 formula, exemplified in the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty
27 (1979), would return captured lands in exchange for

1 diplomatic recognition of Israel and an end to the state of
2 belligerency by the Arab states.

3 A second level of the conflict, one which has become
4 increasingly independent since 1973, is the Israeli-
5 Palestinian question. While this issue is embedded in the
6 larger Arab-Israeli relationship, it has taken on its own
7 life, particularly in the light of the "intifada" or
8 Palestinian uprising in the Israeli occupied territories of
9 the West Bank and Gaza since December 1987.

10 IV. Principles for Policy

11 The achievement of a lasting and comprehensive peace
12 in the Middle East must address both levels of the
13 problem. There can be no secure peace that does not
14 eventually include full diplomatic relations between the
15 Arab states and Israel. Anything short of this leaves the
16 "legitimacy" of Israel undefined in the policy of the Arab
17 States, and reinforces Israel's position that the only road
18 to survival is one requiring superior military power.

19 Negotiations are essential for both Israel and the Arab
20 states. Both have needs which can only be met in the
21 context of a negotiated agreement, supported by other
22 members of the international community. Israel has
23 justifiably sought a clear declaration of its acceptance by
24 its Arab neighbors. The time is long past when this basic
25 element of international life should be affirmed for Israel.

26 The Arab states need negotiations to address
27 territorial claims resulting from the wars of the last forty

1 years. The bitter disputes about the Golan Heights, the
2 West Bank and Gaza which have divided the Middle East for
3 years must find a negotiated resolution which meets the just
4 claims of the Arab states, the security requirements of
5 Israel and the long-denied rights of the Palestinian people.

6 The Israeli-Palestinian question is theoretically
7 distinguishable from the first set of issues, but it cannot
8 be divorced from them. Both principles and public opinion
9 bind the Arab states to make settlement of the Palestinian
10 question an intrinsic part of any settlement with Israel.
11 At the same time it is clear that the term "Arab-Israeli"
12 conflict is insufficient for defining the specific elements
13 of the Palestinian question.

14 Unlike the formula adopted in U.N. Resolution 242,
15 which treated Palestinians as refugees, the situation today
16 -- post-Rabat (1974), in light of the intifada (1987-89) and
17 after U.S.-PLO talks (1988-89) -- requires independent
18 recognition of the Palestinian people and a specific
19 addressing of the issues between Israel and the
20 Palestinians. Neither the 242 approach (Palestinians are
21 not a party) nor even the Camp David approach (Palestinians
22 in a secondary role) are adequate for framing the Middle
23 East question today.

24 Addressing both dimensions of the Israel-Arab-
25 Palestinian problem, we recommend the following principles,
26 rooted in a moral assessment of the problem and related to
27 its political dimensions.

1 1. Pope John Paul II's Proposal: In a series of
2 addresses and statements Pope John Paul II has framed a
3 basic perspective in light of which diplomatic efforts
4 should proceed toward a settlement of the Israeli-
5 Palestinian question. The Holy Father has expressed the
6 perspective in diverse forms, but with a consistent
7 meaning: the fundamental right of both Israelis and
8 Palestinians to a homeland. On September 11, 1987, while
9 addressing U.S. Jewish leaders in Miami, the Pope said:

10 Catholics recognize among these elements of the Jewish
11 experience that Jews have a religious attachment to
12 the Land, which finds its roots in biblical tradition.
13 After the tragic extermination of the Shoah, the
14 Jewish people began a new period in their history.
15 They have a right to a homeland, as does any civil
16 nation, according to international law. "For the
17 Jewish people who live in the State of Israel and who
18 preserve in that land such precious testimonies to
19 their history and their faith, we must ask for the
20 desired security and the due tranquility that is the
21 prerogative of every nation and condition of life and
22 of progress for every society." (Redemptionis Anno,
23 20 April 1984)

24 What has been said about the right to a homeland also
25 applies to the Palestinian people, so many of whom
26 remain homeless and refugees. While all concerned
27 must honestly reflect on the past, Muslims no less

1 than Jews and Christians, it is time to forge those
2 solutions which will lead to a just, complete and
3 lasting peace in that area. For this peace I
4 earnestly pray. Orgins (September 24, 1987)

5 On December 23, 1988, a Vatican press statement
6 reiterated Pope John Paul II's view of the problem: "The
7 supreme pontiff repeated that he is deeply convinced that
8 the two peoples have an identical, fundamental right to have
9 their own homeland in which they live in freedom, dignity
10 and security in harmony with their neighbors."
11 (L'Osservatore Romano, December, 1988)

12 The assertion that each party, Israel and the
13 Palestinians, has equal rights establishes the framework in
14 moral terms for political negotiations. Because each party
15 has a right to a homeland, the goal of negotiations should
16 be fulfillment of the two rights. Because the content of
17 the right (territory with a legitimately recognized title to
18 it) cannot be realized without each party accepting limits
19 on its claim (how much territory each possesses), the
20 classical distinction of affirming a right, then setting
21 limits on its meaning and exercise will have to guide
22 negotiations.

23 The result of recognizing the same right in both
24 parties, then limiting its extent to allow for fulfillment
25 of both rights should produce a settlement which achieves
26 two objectives. First, it should formalize Israel's
27 existence as a sovereign state in the eyes of the Arab

1 states and the Palestinians; and second, it should
2 establish a Palestinian homeland with its sovereign status
3 recognized by Israel. The achievement of this outcome will
4 require a series of other steps, which we have advocated in
5 1973 and 1978 and now reaffirm.

6 2. Recognition of Israel's Right to Existence Within
7 Secure Borders: Both the U.N. Resolution 242 and the papal
8 statements require this recognition as a means of resolving
9 the "security-territory" problem for Israel. In our view,
10 it is a foundation stone for a just and stable peace. This
11 issue is so central, as a matter of survival, in Israel's
12 conception of its situation in the Middle East, that it is
13 in everyone's interest for security to be guaranteed
14 politically, strategically and psychologically for the
15 Israelis. Secure borders are the means by which a nation's
16 existence can be defended. To affirm Israel's right to
17 exist and not resolve the secure borders question is to fail
18 to resolve the issue which has led to four wars. Resolving
19 the issue, however, will require a disciplined definition of
20 what constitutes adequate security. The resolution of the
21 security-territory issue cannot be based on such an
22 expansive definition of security for Israel that the
23 fundamental rights of other parties (especially Palestinians
24 and the neighboring states) are preempted.

25 It is said that one state's absolute security means
26 everyone else's insecurity. No lasting settlement can be
27 based on the logic of absolute security, because even the

1 right to security must be related to other just claims in a
2 political context. Recognition of this point opens the way for
3 the "land for peace" formula to be used effectively.

4 3. Recognition of Palestinian Rights: At the heart of the
5 legitimate rights of the Palestinians is the right to a homeland,
6 another foundation stone of a just peace. The right to a
7 homeland for the Palestinians is tied to recognition of other
8 rights: (1) their right to participate as equals, through
9 representatives selected by Palestinians, in all negotiations
10 affecting their destiny; (2) the right to a clear, legitimated
11 title to their territory, not dependent on the authority of
12 others.

13 This cluster of rights seeks to address the "territory-
14 sovereignty" needs of the Palestinians. The conclusion which
15 follows from these assertions is as clear as it has been
16 controversial: Palestinian representation in Middle East
17 negotiations leading to Palestinian territorial and political
18 sovereignty.

19 To draw this conclusion requires recognizing limits on
20 Palestinian rights: sovereign title to a territory of their own
21 means disavowing larger claims to other territory in Israel.
22 Sovereign coexistence with Israel requires an understanding that
23 security is a mutual term. Palestinians will ensure secure
24 possession of their homeland by being clear in word and deed
25 about Israel's security and territory. Respect for each other's
26 basic right to a homeland requires scrupulous observance by both
27 parties of the principle of nonintervention. There must be

1 limits to the exercise of Palestinian sovereignty, so it is clear
2 that Israel's security is protected.

3 ~~the solution of the~~ the solution of the
4 Palestinian problem cannot rest simply on Israel. All the states
5 in the region, as well as others in the international community,
6 have a responsibility to help address the legitimate aspirations
7 of the Palestinian people, and to seek all effective response to
8 their need for territory and sovereignty.

9 4. Fulfillment of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338: These two
10 resolutions still embody central principles for any lasting
11 settlement in the Middle East. Other texts help to fill out the
12 picture in light of changed and changing circumstances in the
13 region, e.g., Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (1979); Fez Summit
14 (1982); the Arafat Statements (Dec. 1988), but they do not
15 dispense with U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.

16 The essence of 242 and 338 is to affirm the formula of land
17 for peace and to secure acceptance of Israel by the other Middle
18 East states.

19 5. Human Rights and Religious Freedom: This principle is
20 crucial throughout the Middle East. Respect for human rights is
21 a precondition for stable peace; this is a conviction which our
22 episcopal conference has consistently affirmed. (cf. A Word of
23 Solidarity, A Call for Justice: A Statement in Religious Freedom
24 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 1988) The very diversity
25 of the religious communities in the region and the differences
26 among political regimes means that constant vigilance about
27 religious liberty is required. Moreover, it is critical to

1 emphasize that religious freedom means not only respect for the
2 personal conscience of believers, but also recognition of the
3 rights of religious communities to worship, to establish and
4 maintain educational institutions and to sponsor social
5 institutions. The Palestinians (Christian, Muslim, and Druze)
6 and the Israelis (Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and Druze) can be an
7 example of religious toleration and pluralism to all the world.
8 In contrast to this hope we are deeply concerned by the threat
9 posed to Christian and other communities in the Middle East by
10 militant movements.

11 6. Compensation for Past Losses: The long and destructive
12 history of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle has left many with
13 just claims for compensation. Both the Palestinians and the
14 Israelis can document these claims, and in our judgment the
15 claims should be carefully reviewed and met. We are convinced
16 that the achievement of a just political settlement would move
17 many states and other institutions to assist this process legally
18 and financially.

19 7. The Status of Jerusalem: The city of Jerusalem has been
20 a contested value in the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian question since
21 1948. Clearly the ultimate status of the city cannot be settled
22 by unilateral measures.

23 Here we simply reaffirm and support the basic principle set
24 forth by the Holy See on several occasions: (1) the sacred
25 character of Jerusalem as a heritage for the Abrahamic faiths
26 should be guaranteed; 2) religious freedom should be
27 safeguarded; (3) the rights acquired by the various communities

1 regarding shrines, holy places, educational and social
2 institutions must be ensured; and (4) the Holy City's special
3 religious status should be protected by "an appropriate juridical
4 safeguard" which is internationally respected and guaranteed.

5 It is useful to recognize that these elements are not
6 fulfilled by simply discussing who has sovereignty in Jerusalem,
7 nor do these elements require any one particular form of
8 jurisdiction or sovereignty. They neither demand nor exclude one
9 civil power exercising sovereignty in the city of Jerusalem.

10 B. The Intifada

11 The principles just outlined find a specific reference in
12 the Israeli-Palestinian question. It is this aspect of the
13 Middle East that the intifada has pushed to the center of the
14 policy agenda. For much of the last decade the Palestinian
15 question has been overshadowed by the Egyptian-Israeli
16 negotiations, the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, the Persian
17 Gulf conflict and the Lebanese war.

18 It was precisely when others seemed to ignore them that the
19 Palestinians in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and
20 Gaza took matters into their own hands. Since December 1987
21 Palestinians have forced Israel, the United States, the Arab
22 states and the international community to pay attention to them
23 again. The intifada has recast the policy agenda in the Middle
24 East.

25 There are several possible ways to interpret the
26 significance of this event of the intifada. Here, its
27 political, psychological and human rights significance

1 strike us as important to highlight. Politically, the
2 intifada is a statement that after more than twenty years of
3 military occupation the Palestinians refuse to be reconciled
4 to this status. The essence of the Palestinian claim is
5 that the present political situation in the Israeli occupied
6 territories rests upon an injustice, a denial of fundamental
7 human rights.

8 Psychologically, the pressing of their political
9 position through the intifada has provided a new sense of
10 political self-determination and solidarity for a whole
11 generation of Palestinians. The central theme which needs
12 to be lifted up and repeated is that the intifada is a cry
13 for justice; it is a cry for personal and political
14 identity; it is an expression of the personal and political
15 rights which Palestinians have as human beings worthy of
16 being respected as individuals and as a people.

17 The scope and duration of the intifada have created the
18 strongest challenge yet mounted against Israel's rule in the
19 West Bank and Gaza since 1967. The Government of Israel has
20 recognized the fundamental political challenge posed by the
21 intifada and it has responded. The U.S. Government's human
22 rights report concisely captures the response. The Israeli
23 Government sees the intifada not simply as a civil
24 disturbance, but, "as a new phase of the 40 year war against
25 Israel and as a threat to the security of the state."

26 (Country Reports, p. 1377)

27 The measures taken in this "war" have produced the

1 strongest human rights criticism -- inside and outside of
2 Israel -- in the twenty-two years of occupation.

3 The U.S. Government's Country Reports on Human Rights
4 Practices for 1988 documents several principal categories of
5 human rights violations including: (1) excessive use of
6 force resulting in many Palestinian deaths; (2) physical
7 abuse and beatings of prisoners and of others not directly
8 involved in demonstrations; (3) demolition and sealing of
9 homes; and (4) closing of educational institutions; and (5)
10 arrest and detention without trial.

11 Moreover, the Heads of Christian communities in
12 Jerusalem in a public statement in April 1989 described
13 their peoples' experience of constant deprivation of their
14 fundamental rights, and tragic and unnecessary loss of
15 Palestinian lives, especially among minors.

16 The precise adjudication of distinct human rights
17 claims is open to continuous review, but the deeper
18 political question -- the justice and legitimacy of
19 Palestinian demands for territory and sovereignty -- is the
20 fundamental issue posed by the intifada. It is precisely
21 the political foundation of the intifada, a reality
22 acknowledged both by the Palestinians and the Israelis,
23 which gives it special significance. It for this reason
24 that it is chosen here for attention among the many human
25 rights issues in the Middle East.

26 V. Lebanon: The Tragedy and the Crime

27 In a region which has long known war, death and

1 suffering, the case of Lebanon in the last fifteen years
2 still stands out as particularly horrifying. Since 1975
3 over 100,000 Lebanese have been killed in a nation of four
4 million; in recent months thousands were killed or wounded
5 in the constant shelling which left Beirut devastated and
6 depopulated.

7 The statistics convey some of the horror of the war in
8 Lebanon. The tragedy lies first of all in the loss of human
9 life, but also the contrast between what Lebanon has been
10 and could be in the Middle East and what it now is. Because
11 the Middle East requires that political and religious
12 convictions be continuously balanced, Lebanon has stood for
13 over forty years as a daring experiment. From the time of
14 the National Pact in 1943, the effort to weave various
15 religious traditions into a form of democratic governance
16 has been pursued with determination in Lebanon. The process
17 had major flaws and the description of the system was always
18 better than its performance, but the Lebanese experiment in
19 interreligious comity and democratic governance held a
20 unique place in the Middle East. The present disintegration
21 of both the religious and political dimensions of Lebanese
22 society is an incalculable loss for the Middle East. As
23 Pope John Paul II said in his appeal to the followers of
24 Islam: "The eyes of the whole world behold a ravaged land
25 where human life no longer seems to count. The victims are
26 the Lebanese themselves -- Moslems and Christians -- and day
27 after day the ruins on Lebanese soil become ever more

1 numerous. As children of the God of mercy, who is our
2 creator and guide but als our judge, how can we believers
3 allow ourselves to remain indifferent to a whole people
4 which is dying before our very eyes?" (NC News, September
5 27, 1989)

6 There are several causes which contributed to the
7 terror and tragedy of Lebanon in the 1980s. It is possible
8 to distinguish internal and external reasons for the
9 dissolution of the Lebanese state and society. Typically,
10 Lebanese stress the external elements, and outside observers
11 assign major responsibility to the Lebanese themselves.
12 However the balance is struck, both dimensions are necessary
13 for an understanding of Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s.

14 Internally, the description often given of Lebanon is
15 that it has been the scene of what many people perceive to
16 be a "religious war" since 1975. The reality is more
17 complex. It is not possible to understand Lebanon apart
18 from its religious rivalries, but it is not accurate to
19 analyze the Lebanese conflict exclusively through a
20 religious prism. In addition, unfortunately, many groups
21 responsible for violence are identified, or choose to be
22 identified, by a religious label.

23 The National Compact of 1943, an unwritten agreement
24 formulated by Lebanese Christians and Muslim leaders at the
25 time of independence, sought to achieve a balance of
26 religious freedom and religious participation in Lebanese
27 society for 17 different religious groups in the country.

1 Part of the agreement was the assignment of constitutional
2 offices to different religious constituencies; the President
3 was to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, the
4 Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite. There was ~~also system~~
5 ~~of proportional representation in Parliament.~~ The system
6 survived and succeeded to a degree not often acknowledged
7 from the perspective of the 1980s. Its success should not
8 be forgotten amidst the destruction of these past years in
9 Lebanon.

10 But the system did fail to adapt and to accommodate
11 both demographic changes (a part of the original formula was
12 based on the Christian-Muslim statistics of the 1930s) and
13 political changes within key groups in Lebanon. By the
14 1970s both political and economic reforms were urgently
15 needed, but not undertaken. The failure to address internal
16 reform in the 1970s, and the inability of the political
17 leadership (Christian and Muslim) to shape a viable
18 constitutional consensus in the 1980s opened the way for the
19 Lebanese political, economic and religious controversy to
20 get caught up in open military conflict, beginning in 1975
21 and continuing in much intensified form in 1989.

22 Internal factors alone cannot account for the history
23 of Lebanon since 1975. The external causes of Lebanese
24 conflict are essentially the projection of the major
25 rivalries of the Middle East into Lebanon. The country has
26 become ~~the~~ battleground of the region. The fact that there
27 were Lebanese parties willing to strike deals with the

1 outsiders must be acknowledged, but it does not diminish the
2 point. Lebanon has been devastated from within and without.

3 In the 1970s, Palestinians were granted refuge and
4 support by the Lebanese. They then tried to construct an
5 autonomous base of operations from Lebanese soil, thereby
6 threatening Lebanon's external relations, and shredding its
7 internal cohesion. In the early conflict of Lebanese and
8 Palestinians, the Syrians entered Lebanon; they came at the
9 invitation of other Arab states, but they have long ago
10 outlived their welcome.

11 Syria has become an occupying power in Lebanon. The
12 limited legitimacy of its initial intervention is exhausted;
13 yet it still has the capacity to play a positive role in
14 relation to Lebanon. There is no long-term answer to
15 Lebanon's predicament that does not include Syrian military
16 withdrawal.

17 The other major intervention in Lebanon is that of
18 Israel. The Israeli invasion in 1982, undertaken for
19 Israel's purposes with the invitation of the Lebanese, did
20 not end Israel's involvement in Lebanon. Israeli forces,
21 with the cooperation of some Lebanese, continue to control
22 southern Lebanon.

23 Pope John Paul II powerfully described what is at stake
24 in Lebanon in his Angelus Message of August 15, 1989:

25 "What is happening before everyone's eyes is the
26 responsibility of the whole world. It is a process
27 which is bringing on the destruction of Lebanon.

1 Truly, we are confronted with a menace to the whole
2 of international life. It is a moral menace, all
3 the more painful because it is a weaker State which
4 endures the violence or the indifference of
5 stronger ones. In fact, the principle according to
6 which it is not lawful to harm the weak, to kill
7 the weak, is valid also in international life. Who
8 so behaves is guilty not only before God, the
9 supreme Judge, but also before the justice of human
10 history.

11 Moral guilt weighs also on all those who, in such
12 situations, have not defended the weak when they
13 could and should have done so." (L'O'sservatore
14 Romano Eng. ed., 21 August 1989)

15 What can be done? To ask that question in 1989, after
16 months of slaughter in Beirut, is to be faced with very
17 narrow choices. What is at stake in the first instance is
18 Lebanese life: the lives of women and children who have
19 lived in bunkers and bomb shelters; the lives of ordinary
20 Lebanese who are not terrorists or militias but citizens who
21 have lived and worked in a free-fire zone. At a different
22 level the stakes are political and cultural; the Lebanese
23 experiment -- an multi-religious, multi-ethnic democracy --
24 must be preserved. It is important for the Lebanese and it
25 was a crucial ingredient in the Middle East; it is now
26 mortally threatened. What is at stake today is whether this
27 valuable attempt of bridging both East and West and

1 Christianity and Islam will ever be tried again.

2 The significance of what is at stake in Lebanon has
3 been continually stressed by Pope John Paul II. In his
4 letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations of May
5 15, 1989 he said:

6 At this point the very existence of Lebanon is
7 threatened; for many years this country has been an
8 example of the peaceful coexistence of its
9 citizens, both Christian and Muslim, based on the
10 foundation of the equality of rights, and respect
11 for the principles of a democratic society.

12 (L'Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed., 24 May 1989)

13 Finally, what is at stake in Lebanon is a special and
14 specific form of Christian presence in the Middle East. One
15 need not endorse, support or agree with some things done
16 under the title Christian during the last fifteen years, to
17 be able to say that Christian presence in Lebanon is an
18 anchor for Christian life in the Middle East. What is at
19 stake in Lebanon is the way the Christian presence there has
20 sustained Christian hope and life in other countries of the
21 Middle East.

22 What can be done? If the tragedy of Lebanon involves
23 in part what some outside forces have done in the country,
24 the crime against Lebanon is the way other outside forces
25 have failed to provide constructive diplomatic and political
26 support in Lebanon's hour of need. The parties who did
27 intervene in Lebanon had interests there, but little concern

1 for the Lebanese. What is needed are outside parties who
2 have a concern for Lebanon, but are not self-interested
3 parties in the usual sense of the term.

4 In his message to episcopal conferences throughout the
5 world of September 26, 1989, Pope John Paul II forcefully
6 emphasized the moral imperative which today confronts the
7 international community in its duty to Lebanon: "To be
8 sure, it is not for the Pope to put forward technical
9 solutions; yet, out of concern for the spiritual and
10 material well-being of every person without distinction, I
11 feel that is my grave duty to insist on certain obligations
12 which are incumbent upon the leaders of nations. Disregard
13 for these obligations could lead quite simply to a breakdown
14 of orderly international relations and, once again, to the
15 handing over of mankind to brute force alone. If rights,
16 duties and those procedures which international leaders have
17 worked out and subscribed to are scorned with impunity, then
18 relations between peoples will suffer, peace will be
19 threatened and mankind will end up a hostage to the
20 ambitions and interests of those who hold the most power.
21 For this reason, I have wished to state again and again --
22 and I repeat it once more today on behalf of the whole
23 Church -- that international law and those institutions
24 which guarantee it remain indispensable points of reference
25 for defending the equal dignity of peoples and of
26 individuals." (NC News, September 27, 1989)

27 Intervention has hurt the Lebanese, but it is seriously

1 questionable in 1989 whether the Lebanese are capable of
2 moving beyond war and destruction without help. It will
3 take a mix of internal and external forces to reconstruct
4 Lebanon. The reforms which are required --
5 constitutionally, politically, economically and legally --
6 must be Lebanese products. They must be shaped by a
7 generation of Lebanese political leaders who recognize that
8 the designs of the 1940s will not fit the Middle East of the
9 1990s.

10 But internal reform in 1989 can only occur after space
11 is created within which Lebanese can discuss, decide and
12 make choices. Here, disinterested outside parties are
13 needed. ~~Without Syrian withdrawal from Beirut immediately~~
14 and a promise of full Syrian military withdrawal, the
15 Lebanese can neither decide freely nor choose effectively.
16 At present the Syrians have little incentive to withdraw; a
17 larger international framework must be created which will
18 create the conditions for Syrian withdrawal and will promise
19 that legitimate Syrian foreign policy concerns will be met.

20 The same logic applies to Israel; it has legitimate
21 security concerns which must be met, but not at the expense
22 of Lebanon.

23 Creating this larger international context is a task in
24 which the United States is an indispensable force, together
25 with France and the Arab League. ~~There is also the~~

26 ~~widespread conviction that Soviet influence in Syria could~~
27 ~~be considerable~~ The goal of creating political space is to

1 free Lebanon of all foreign forces. The first steps toward
2 peace are embodied in the initiative of the Arab League
3 which we urge all parties to support.

4 If political space can be created, the immediate need
5 is to reconstitute the institutions of the Lebanese state:
6 the offices of President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the
7 Parliament need to be filled with individuals who can
8 command loyalty across religious lines. Following initial
9 steps in this regard a government of national unity could be
10 envisioned.

11 Finally, if political reconstruction begins, economic
12 assistance, both humanitarian aid and longer term
13 development assistance, will be essential for Lebanon.

14 V. United States Policy: Recommendations

15 We have had U.S. policy in mind throughout this
16 statement since we write as bishops of the United States.
17 The purpose of this section, however, is to draw out more
18 specifically a set of recommendations for U.S. policy in
19 light of the assessment we have made of the Middle East.
20 Our concern here is to relate the moral principles found
21 within this statement to specific choices in the U.S. policy
22 discussion. By definition these specific judgments are open
23 to debate and to amendment in light of changes in the Middle
24 East.

25 What is not open to debate is the need to move forward
26 in the Middle East peace process. The method of progress
27 must be dialogue -- it is the tested alternative to

1 violence. Pope John Paul II has described the dynamic of
2 dialogue which can lead to peace: "I exhort that
3 consideration with sincere good will be given to every
4 positive and constructive gesture that may come from either
5 party. The road of dialogue in the search for peace is
6 certainly arduous and tiring, but each obstacle that is
7 removed can be considered true progress, certainly worthy of
8 inspiring other corresponding gestures and the needed
9 confidence to proceed." (L'Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed., 5
10 December 1988)

11 The specific policy recommendations we make in this
12 section are all designed to enhance a movement toward
13 dialogue, promoting confidence among the parties and
14 removing obstacles in the search for a just peace. The
15 recommendations highlight the role of the United States, but
16 the appeal to a broader dialogue involves in the first
17 instance the parties to the conflict in the Middle East.
18 The key to successful political dialogue will be
19 Palestinians willing to discuss secure boundaries and stable
20 political relations with Israel, and Israelis willing to
21 discuss territory and sovereignty with Palestinians;
22 successful political dialogue will require Arab states to
23 assure Israeli legitimacy and security, and it will require
24 Israeli commitment to land for peace. The Israel-Egypt
25 negotiations of the 1970's provide a model for successful
26 dialogue. They also highlight the essential role of the
27 United States in fostering such negotiations.

1 Presently there are several proposals to begin
2 negotiations advocated by different parties. The Israeli
3 government advanced a proposal on May 14, 1989. President
4 Mubarak of Egypt has offered recommendations which build
5 upon the Israeli plans. The Mubarak plan is a creative
6 initiative designed to expand upon other initiatives and to
7 transcend both procedural and substantive obstacles.
8 Palestinian representatives and other states have called for
9 an international conference as the forum for Middle East
10 negotiations.

11 Without entering a discussion of these proposals, our
12 purpose is to urge consideration of them and to reiterate
13 our conviction that dialogue and negotiation are the road to
14 peace in the Middle East.

15 Dialogue -- practical, realistic negotiations -- based
16 on a firm commitment to secure a just peace is also a key to
17 the survival of Lebanon. The dialogue required is between
18 Lebanese and Lebanese about the internal structure and
19 polity of their country. But a diplomatic dialogue of
20 Syrians and Israelis with the Lebanese is needed as well.

21 The United States is positioned to assist the political
22 dialogue required in the Middle East. It cannot substitute
23 for others, but it can assist them. Our recommendations are
24 offered to urge the further engagement of the United States
25 in the process of seeking and making peace in the Middle
26 East.
27

1 **A. The U.S.- Soviet Relationship in the Middle East**

2 One of the elements which leads us to believe there is
3 a new moment -- indeed an open moment -- in the Middle East
4 is the possibility for constructive change in the U.S.-
5 Soviet relationship.

6 For many years the Soviet Union has been at the margin
7 of Middle East developments. Recent Soviet statements seem
8 to suggest that the Soviet "new thinking" on foreign policy
9 is not satisfied to stay at the margin. At the same time
10 the tenor and themes of Soviet statements indicate a
11 willingness to play a more constructive role in the region.

12 It is evident that superpower rivalry in the past forty
13 years has intensified the danger of the Middle East and has
14 made resolution of key issues very difficult. If a shift of
15 orientation allows a more coordinated superpower approach to
16 the region, the change should be welcomed and pursued.

17 The perspective which should guide the superpowers is
18 one which gives priority to the welfare of the local states
19 and people. It should not be an imposition of superpower
20 views on weaker states.

21 **B. The U.S., the Palestinians and the Intifada**

22 The fact of the intifada demands, on both moral and
23 political grounds, a response by the United States
24 government.

25 Human rights violations should be addressed in light of
26 U.S. policy and legislation on human rights. The assessment
27 of the situation found in the Country Reports on Human

1 Rights Practices for 1988 is a solid beginning and should be
2 taken into account in the implementation of U.S. policy.

3 As noted above, the intifada points beyond human rights
4 questions to the deeper political issue of Palestinian
5 rights to a homeland. In our discussion of principles for
6 policy we have set forth what we believe is needed to
7 address the security, sovereignty and territory issue
8 between the Israelis and Palestinians. The United States
9 should continue in political discussions with the
10 Palestinians, should continue its support for a Palestinian
11 homeland and should address more clearly the relationship of
12 homeland and sovereignty. At the same time the U.S. role
13 should be to obtain Palestinian clarification of its
14 December declaration accepting Israel's existence and the
15 terms of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. This can also lead
16 to more specific discussion of how the Palestinians and
17 Israelis would see the measures needed to build trust and
18 guarantee peaceful and secure borders for both parties.

19 The United States should continue to press with the
20 Palestinians the principles affirmed by John Paul II: that
21 dialogue is the road to peace in the Middle East, "while
22 excluding any form of recourse to weapons and violence and
23 above all, terrorism and reprisals." (L'Osservatore Romano,
24 December, 1988)

25 C. The United States and Israel

26 U.S. support for Israel is basically a sound, justified
27 policy, in the interests of both nations and can contribute to

1 the progress needed in the Middle East to produce peace for
2 Israel, its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians. U.S. support
3 for Israel, politically, strategically and morally should be
4 continued. This proposition does not conflict with the need for
5 the United States to maintain its own position on a range of
6 issues, at times in opposition to Israel, nor does it conflict
7 with concern for human rights. For example, the United States
8 regards the Israeli settlements in the West Bank as legally
9 problematic and politically provocative.

10 D. The United States and Lebanon

11 The horror and tragedy of Lebanon demand more systematic
12 attention from the United States than they have received in
13 several years. The U.S. cannot "solve" the Lebanese problem.
14 But the dissolution of Lebanon as a nation is moving
15 relentlessly forward; without the diplomatic and
16 humanitarian (not military) intervention of major outside
17 powers, Lebanon as a sovereign state could pass into
18 history. Many Lebanese believe the United States is
19 sacrificing Lebanon to larger Middle East policy goals.

20 Whatever the reason for believing this to be the case,
21 the United States must take steps immediately to demonstrate
22 that it is not. The primary need is a clear, consistent
23 policy pressing Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.

24 This should be complemented by a U.S. policy supporting the
25 withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

26 Other possible U.S. diplomatic engagement could involve
27 a joint U.S.-French effort, support for Arab League

1 initiatives and ~~an~~ appropriate role for the United Nations.

2 If the fighting can be stopped and the withdrawal of
3 foreign forces begun, then U.S. assistance would be needed
4 to support efforts to reconstitute state authority in
5 Lebanon and to rebuild Lebanese society.

6 E. The United States and the Arab States

7 The political settlement of the Middle East requires,
8 as we have said, stable, just relations between Israel and
9 the Arab states, as well as settlement of the Israeli-
10 Palestinian question.

11 While U.S. relations with the Arab states vary across a
12 spectrum, there is substantial influence with many of the
13 key states. The United States should continue to encourage,
14 persuade and press Israel's neighbors to follow the Egyptian
15 path of normalizing relations with Israel.

16 The history of four major wars, the needs of the Arab
17 states themselves and the fact that Israeli willingness to
18 address Palestinian concerns is contingent upon the attitude
19 of Arab states toward Israel, all point to the need "to
20 normalize" the political map of the Middle East.

21 The history of the Middle East in the past forty years
22 has been marked by failure of the Arab states as well to
23 respond adequately to Palestinian needs and aspirations.
24 Today there is clearly a consensus of moderate Arab states
25 which is seeking a settlement of the Palestinian question
26 based on land for peace. The United States should encourage
27 this consensus and help Israel to see and grasp this moment

1 of opportunity.

2 VI. Conclusion

3 It is our conviction that a truly open moment for peace
4 exists in the Middle East, and that the United States has an
5 indispensable role to play in the peace process which has
6 moved us to write this statement.

7 To grasp the open moment, to transform the potential
8 for peace into a real process for peace will require the
9 best efforts of many institutions, communities and
10 individuals. In this statement, we have found it necessary
11 to probe some of the complexity of the Middle East in order
12 to highlight the moral principles and problems which lie at
13 the heart of the Middle East question.

14 We believe, however, that even beyond the political and
15 moral intricacy of the Middle East there is a deeper reality
16 which must be recognized and relied upon in the pursuit of a
17 just peace. The deeper reality is the pervasive religious
18 nature of the Middle East: its territory, history and its
19 peoples have been visited by God in a unique way. The
20 religious foundations of the Middle East have political and
21 moral relevance. The search for peace in the region
22 requires the best resources of reason, but it also should
23 rely upon the faith, prayer and convictions of the religious
24 traditions which call the Middle East their home.

25 Above all else, the achievement of a just and lasting
26 peace is a grace and gift of God. Although human
27 peacemakers have their essential roles -- and are blessed by

1 Muslims, Christians, and Jews -- ultimately peace comes as a
2 work of God in history.

3 We request the prayers of all believers for peace in
4 the Middle East. In The Challenge of Peace (1989) we called
5 on our people for prayer, fasting and Friday abstinence for
6 the sake of peace. Here we renew that call with special
7 reference to the Middle East.

8 We also pledge continuing dialogue with our Jewish and
9 Muslim partners and friends. In our three religious
10 traditions, we share two central themes: the capacity for
11 hope in the face of difficulty and danger and the pursuit of
12 peace in the face of conflict and violence. Let us together
13 seek to turn our hopes into true progress toward genuine and
14 lasting peace.

15
16
17 ACTION: Does the body of bishops approve the statement
18 "Toward Peace in the Middle East: Problems
19 and Principles?"

20
21 Most Reverend Roger Mahony, Chairman
22 October, 1989
23
24
25
26
27

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United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338

APPENDIX

U.N. RESOLUTION 242, NOVEMBER 22, 1967

The Security Council.

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or stages of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity:

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement

and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

U.N. RESOLUTION 338, OCTOBER 22, 1973

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

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Memo

13 October 1989

TO: CRC Executives

FROM: Jerome A. Chanes, Co-Director for Domestic Concerns
 Martin Raffel, Director, Israel Task Force

RE: National Conference of Catholic Bishops Statement on
 the Middle East: Draft Text

As a follow-up to the NJCRAC consultation held on October 11 on the forthcoming National Conference of Catholic Bishops statement on the Middle East, "Toward Peace in the Middle East: Problems and Principles," we enclose a text of the draft statement. As you know, the full NCCB will consider the statement at their General Meeting beginning on November 6 in Baltimore.

Under separate cover we will be sending you the recommendations that flowed out of the NJCRAC consultation. Our sending the draft statement to you at this time reflects the recommendation that this issue be given the highest priority between now and November 6.

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