



THE JACOB RADER MARCUS CENTER OF THE
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Preserving American Jewish History

MS-603: Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum Collection, 1945-1992.

Series D: International Relations Activities. 1961-1992

Box 68, Folder 3, Middle East, Undated.

ACTION

TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES

As Catholic bishops and as citizens of the United States, we are particularly concerned for the peoples, the nations and the Church in the Middle East. Christianity is rooted in the soil of the Holy Land, where Jesus Christ lived, taught, and, according to our faith, died and rose again. As pastors, we wish to offer a word of special solidarity and support to the Church in the Middle East at a time of trial and difficulty. We sense the fear, hope, vulnerability and suffering of the diverse peoples of the region — Jewish, Christian and Muslim. We have a deep and abiding relationship of respect for the Jewish people and support for the nation of Israel. We also feel with new urgency the pain and hopes of the Palestinian people. We have persistently tried to support the Lebanese people in their agony of war and devastation. As citizens of the United States, we also recognize the continuing engagement of our nation with the Middle East and the significant impact of U.S. policy on the region.

In 1973 and in 1978, the U.S. Catholic Conference issued policy statements on the Middle East outlining the principles we believed would contribute to a just and lasting peace. In light of a number of important subsequent developments, we seek in this statement to share our own reflections in the hope that they will contribute to a broad and sustained effort to help secure peace, justice, and security for all people in the Middle East. While our title refers to "the Middle East", this statement will focus on two major dimensions of the region: Lebanon and the relationship of Palestinians, Israel and the Arab states.

At the outset, we wish to say a word about our hopes and fears in addressing this complex set of issues fraught with such power and emotion among peoples of different faiths and convictions. We hope this expression of our concerns and reflections will contribute to a broader discussion of Middle East policy and that it will not be misunderstood or misperceived.

We have sought in these reflections to state our concerns clearly, with balance and restraint and with genuine respect and appreciation for the strong feelings and deep convictions of other communities. We believe constructive dialogue does not require silence or avoidance of differences, but an understanding that people of good will can sometimes disagree without undermining fundamental relationships of respect. Our consideration of this statement has been enriched by the perspectives of leaders of a number of Jewish, Muslim and other Christian communities and organizations.

To address the Middle East is to confront a region with a sacred character and a conflicted history. To understand "the Middle East question" it is necessary to probe political, religious, cultural and moral issues which are woven together in a complex tapestry. Reducing the reality of the Middle East to one dimension — whether it be political, military, religious,

ethnic or economic — inevitably distorts the nature of the problems people and nations face there. This quest for simplicity in turn leads to proposals which frustrate the task of shaping a just and stable peace in the Middle East.

I. The Religious and Political Significance of the Middle East

The complexity and challenge of the Middle East is related to its unique blend of religious and political history. Because it is the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the region engages the interests, the hopes and the passions of people throughout the world. The history and geography of the Middle East are permeated by events, memories, traditions and texts by which millions of believers in every part of the globe, in different ways, define their religious commitments and convictions. The religious communities living in the Middle East today hold in trust the religious legacy and heritage of much of the world's population.

The sacred character and content of Middle East history provide an abiding resource of hope: that the family of Abraham, his descendants in faith, may be able to draw from their religious values and moral principles a common framework for shaping a peaceful future. As Catholic bishops we believe this hope is well founded; religious conviction and the moral vision which flows from it can provide the motivation and direction for transforming the present conflicts of the Middle East into a stable political community of peace. However, injudicious use of religious convictions can harden political attitudes, raise contingent claims to absolute status and obscure the fact that both prudence and justice may require political compromise at times.

It is difficult to conceive of this stable and peaceful future for the Middle East apart from the contributions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, a contribution which must be shaped and guided by balanced, careful and prudent resort to each religious tradition.

The religious diversity of the Middle East is matched by its political complexity. There are very few places in the world today where the political and human stakes are as great, and where the danger of military conflict is so high. A distinguishing characteristic of the Middle East is the way in which the political life of the region has direct and often dangerous global implications. At both the regional and the global level, therefore, the Middle East poses a major political and moral challenge.

The Region: The region in fact contains several distinct political conflicts. The 1980s have vividly demonstrated the destructive capacities resident in the Middle East: the carnage of the Iran-Iraq war (including the use of children as foot soldiers and the resurgence of chemical war), as well as the devastation of Lebanon, both testify to multiple sources of conflict resident in the region.

An adequate analysis of the Middle East must be grounded in a recognition of the distinct kinds of conflict which run through the area. At the same time, it is possible to

identify a central issue which has characterized the history of the Middle East for the last forty years: the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian struggle. Both the moral intensity of the Middle East problem and its direct relationship to the larger issues of world politics are best illustrated by the continuing conflict of Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians.

While the disputes are cast in political terms, it is essential to understand that each of the major parties, particularly the Israelis and Palestinians, sees its political position as having a clear moral basis. Political objectives are supported by moral claims on both sides. The moral claims in turn are grounded in and supported by historical memories.

In the Passover Seder Jews "preserve the memory of the land of their forefathers at the heart of their hope. "(Vatican Notes, Section VI, n. 33, May 1985.) They recall centuries of discrimination in East and West. They remember the Shoah, which in the words of Pope John Paul II is a "warning, witness and silent cry to all humanity." At the time of the Holocaust they found few secure places to flee or find refuge. Israel represents for the Jewish community the hope of a place of security and safety in a world which has often not provided either for the Jewish people.

Palestinians too have ancient ties to the land. Some trace their roots to New Testament times. Their history includes centuries of living under the rule of others: Byzantium, the Caliphates, the Crusaders, the Ottoman Empire. In recent times their memories include the loss of ancestral lands and hundreds of villages; the displacement of now 2,000,000 people, most living as exiles from their native land; the indifference of the world to their plight; and the frustration of their national aspirations

The politics of the Middle East, shaped by this historical, moral and religious background are not politics as usual. The essential stakes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the central values by which nations and peoples define their existence: security, sovereignty and territory. It is difficult to conceive of a more fundamental definition of political conflict. Without trying to define and describe the essence of the conflict at this point, it is useful to illustrate its intense and unyielding character.

For Israel, one way to describe its policy problem is the relationship of territory to security and survival. How much territory is required to guarantee the security of the state and the survival of its people? The terms of the debate have changed over time, particularly after the 1967 war, but the essential argument, what constitutes "secure borders", has run through Israel's history as a modern state.

The Israelis live with a sense of political and psychological vulnerability which outside observers (especially in a country as large and physically protected as the United States) often fail to understand. Surrounded by Arab states (and formally at peace only with Egypt), Israelis see their geographical position as one of persistent vulnerability; they have an overriding sense

that there is very little room for error in judging security issues. In addition to threats from other states, Israel has been continuously faced with terrorist actions by groups aligned with the Palestinian cause.

A result of this history, and the fact of five wars in forty years, is Israel's determination to be secure by amassing military power sufficient to offset the threat of its well armed neighbors. In the minds of the Israelis, both the objectives they seek — security and territory — and these means are morally justified, because what is at stake is their survival as a people.

The reason why many in the Middle East and in the world have not been able to identify with Israel's case in all its aspects is not simply the inability to appreciate Israeli psychology. The more substantial reason is that Israel's conception of what is needed for security, particularly after 1967, has run directly counter to Palestinian claims.

The problem for the Palestinians has not been security and territory, but territory and sovereignty. Since 1948 the Palestinian case — often represented by other Arab voices in the past, but today a case made by Palestinians themselves — is that they have been deprived of territory and denied status as a sovereign state. The Palestinian case, like Israel's, is both political and psychological: political existence in a world of sovereign states requires recognition of sovereignty; both territory and sovereignty are needed if Palestinians, living inside and outside the Israeli occupied territories, are to have a psychological sense of their identity.

The Palestinian conception of how much territory is necessary for a viable sovereign state has changed over time. From an early policy laying claim to all the areas described as Palestine, the Palestinian position today is focused on the West Bank and Gaza. Even with this change, however, it is clear that Israeli and Palestinian positions collide over the same territory. The regional challenge in the Middle East involves the political and moral adjudication of conflicting claims aimed at breaking the cycle of a violent past.

Global Fears: Success or failure at the regional level has global implications. The Middle East is one of the regions of the world where local conflict has the capacity to engage the superpowers. The political-moral problem of the Middle East involves, therefore, not only regional justice, but global security. The threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the Middle East, has only intensified the danger that a regional conflict would escalate to international proportions.

A stable peace, based on the just satisfaction of the needs of states and peoples in the region is required first of all because the citizens of the Middle East have suffered enough. But peace there is also a requirement for the welfare of the citizens of the world. Regional justice and international security are joined in the Middle East.

II. The NCCB and the Middle East

The Middle East can be analyzed from many perspectives. In this statement we write as Catholic bishops, in our role as pastors and teachers. This identity shapes our approach to the issues of the Middle East.

We are bound by deep ties of faith to the Holy Land, the land of the Hebrew prophets, the land of Jesus' birth, ministry, passion, death and the resurrection. These ties are the starting point of our reflection. As bishops in the universal Church, we are guided by the continuing engagement of Pope John Paul II with all the major questions of the Middle East. Building on the pastoral concern and policies of his predecessors, the Holy Father consistently seeks to lift up before the international community the human, religious and moral dimensions of the Middle East.

By this statement we hope to foster the process described by the Holy Father: "that the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, each loyally accepting the other and their legitimate aspirations, may find a solution that permits each of them to live in a homeland of their own, in freedom, dignity and security." (L'Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed., 5 December 1988). The statement also responds to Pope John Paul's determination to protect the Lebanese people and their country: "We cannot resign ourselves to seeing that country deprived of its unity, territorial integrity sovereignty and independence. It is a question here of rights which are fundamental and incontestable for every nation." (L'Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed., 13 Feb. 1989)

We are also bound by ties of episcopal solidarity with our brother bishops in the Middle East and with the communities they serve in Jerusalem, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Amman, Cairo and in other cities and villages throughout the Middle East. We are conscious of the crucial but doubly difficult vocation of the Christians in the Middle East. In almost all situations they live as a religious minority in a predominantly Islamic world, often under pressures of various kinds as they seek to live their faith. Yet they also have the possibility and the duty of living their Christianity in an interreligious context where they can witness to its value and share its resources generously.

In this statement we express our solidarity with these Christian communities of the Middle East, especially those in Lebanon, and demonstrate our concern through an effort aimed at enhancing the search for peace in their homelands.

We approach the Middle East question conscious of three different relationships, each of which we value highly, all of which are pertinent to the quest for peace in the Middle East.

At the level of interreligious dialogue we maintain relationships with both the Jewish and Islamic communities in the United States. Since the Second Vatican Council Jewish-Catholic dialogue has made major strides. Living with the largest Jewish community in the world, we have enjoyed extensive exchanges and deepening friendship leading to a fuller understanding of

Judaism and our own faith.

Our relationships with Islamic communities in the United States are more recent, but they are expanding rapidly. As in the Catholic-Jewish dialogue, Catholic-Islamic interests range from explicitly religious issues to social questions, among which peace and justice in the Middle East has a special place. Here also the process of dialogue has enhanced our understanding of Islam and deepened our own sense of faith. Islamic-Christian dialogue is facilitated by the climate of respect for religious differences in the United States.

Finally, as bishops in the United States we are citizens of and religious leaders in a nation with a critical role in the Middle East. In terms of both the regional and the global significance of the Middle East, the U.S. role is always important and sometimes decisive.

The U.S. relationship with Israel has been a defining element of Middle East politics in the last forty years. The very dominance of the fact, in the Middle East and in the United States itself, often obscures the extensive relationship of the United States with virtually all of the Arab states. This significant relationship has been crucially enhanced by the U. S. decision to open political discussions with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in December of 1988. The United States now has the opportunity to use its influence and relationships to foster a more extensive dialogue among Israel, Palestinians and the Arab states.

Public attention and discussion of the Middle East has been renewed because of the intifada, the continuing tragedy of the hostages in Lebanon and the devastation occurring within Lebanon. We addressed the question of U.S. policy in the Middle East in 1973 and in 1978. We return to the topic in this statement because we believe that a possibility to build relationships of trust and shape a secure peace exists today in the Middle East.

As often happens in political affairs, a moment of opportunity is partly the product of conflict and suffering: this is surely the case in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, in Israel as well as in the lives of the hostages. The suffering must be lamented but the moment of opportunity must be grasped. We are convinced that U.S. engagement is needed to stimulate a new initiative for peace in the region of the Middle East. Past experience illustrates that sustained U.S. efforts, pursued at the highest level of government, can catalyze a peace process. In this statement we focus on two aspects of the wider Middle East picture: the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian question and the fate of Lebanon. Our concern is to examine these issues in light of the challenge they pose for U.S. policy and for the Church in the United States.

We address these issues in light of the religious and moral dimensions at the heart of the Middle East. We offer these reflections as a contribution to the Catholic community and to the wider U.S. policy debate on the Middle East.

III. Israel, the Arab States and the Palestinians: Principles for Policy and Peace

During the last forty years, it is possible to distinguish two levels of the Israeli-Arab-

Palestinian question. One level involves Israel and the Arab states; this conflict has been at the forefront of the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. From these wars emerged the formula of "land for peace" in U.N. Resolution 242 (cf. Appendix) which remains the diplomatic guideline for a lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The goal of the formula, exemplified in the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty (1979), would return captured lands in exchange for diplomatic recognition of Israel and an end to the state of belligerency by the Arab states.

A second level of the conflict, one which has become increasingly independent since 1973, is the Israeli-Palestinian question. While this issue is embedded in the larger Arab-Israeli relationship, it has taken on its own life, particularly in the light of the "intifada" or Palestinian uprising in the Israeli occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza since December 1987.

IV. Principles for Policy

The achievement of a lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East must address both levels of the problem. There can be no secure peace that does not eventually include full diplomatic relations between the Arab states and Israel. Anything short of this leaves the "legitimacy" of Israel undefined in the policy of the Arab States, and reinforces Israel's position that the only road to survival is one requiring superior military power.

Negotiations are essential for both Israel and the Arab states. Both have needs which can only be met in the context of a negotiated agreement, supported by other members of the international community. Israel has justifiably sought a clear declaration of its acceptance by its Arab neighbors. The time is long past when this basic element of international life should be affirmed for Israel.

The Arab states need negotiations to address territorial claims resulting from the wars of the last forty years. The bitter disputes about the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza which have divided the Middle East for years must find a negotiated resolution which meets the just claims of the Arab states, the security requirements of Israel and the long-denied rights of the Palestinian people.

The Israeli-Palestinian question is theoretically distinguishable from the first set of issues, but it cannot be divorced from them. Both principles and public opinion bind the Arab states to make settlement of the Palestinian question an intrinsic part of any settlement with Israel. At the same time it is clear that the term "Arab-Israeli" conflict is insufficient for defining the specific elements of the Palestinian question.

Unlike the formula adopted in U.N. Resolution 242, which treated Palestinians as refugees, the situation today — post-Rabat (1974), in light of the intifada (1987-89) and after U.S.-PLO talks (1988-89) — requires independent recognition of the Palestinian people and a specific addressing of the issues between Israel and the Palestinians. Neither the 242 approach (Palestinians are not a party) nor even the Camp David approach (Palestinians in a secondary

role) are adequate for framing the Middle East question today.

Addressing both dimensions of the Israel-Arab-Palestinian problem, we recommend the following principles, rooted in a moral assessment of the problem and related to its political dimensions.

1. Pope John Paul II's Proposal: In a series of addresses and statements Pope John Paul II has framed a basic perspective in light of which diplomatic efforts should proceed toward a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian question. The Holy Father has expressed the perspective in diverse forms, but with a consistent meaning: the fundamental right of both Israelis and Palestinians to a homeland. On September 11, 1987, while addressing U.S. Jewish leaders in Miami, the Pope said:

Catholics recognize among the elements of the Jewish experience that Jews have a religious attachment to the Land, which finds its roots in biblical tradition.

After the tragic extermination of the Shoah, the Jewish people began a new period in their history. They have a right to a homeland, as does any civil nation, according to international law. "For the Jewish people who live in the State of Israel and who preserve in that land such precious testimonies to their history and their faith, we must ask for the desired security and the due tranquility that is the prerogative of every nation and condition of life and of progress for every society." (Redemptiois Anno, 20 April 1984)

What has been said about the right to a homeland also applies to the Palestinian people, so many of whom remain homeless and refugees. While all concerned must honestly reflect on the past, Muslims no less than Jews and Christians, it is time to forge those solutions which will lead to a just, complete and lasting peace in that area. For this peace I earnestly pray. Orgins (September 24, 1987)

On December 23, 1988, a Vatican press statement reiterated Pope John Paul II's view of the problem: "The supreme pontiff repeated that he is deeply convinced that the two peoples have an identical, fundamental right to have their own homeland in which they live in freedom, dignity and security in harmony with their neighbors." (L'Osservatore Romano, December, 1988)

The assertion that each party, Israel and the Palestinians, has equal rights establishes the framework in moral terms for political negotiations. Because each party has a right to a homeland, the goal of negotiations should be fulfillment of the two rights. Because the content of the right (territory with a legitimately recognized title to it) cannot be realized without each party accepting limits on its claim (how much territory each possesses), the classical distinction of affirming a right, then setting limits on its meaning and exercise will have to guide negotiations.

The result of recognizing the same right in both parties, then limiting its extent to allow for fulfillment of both rights should produce a settlement which achieves two objectives. First, it should formalize Israel's existence as a sovereign state in the eyes of the Arab states and the Palestinians; and second, it should establish a Palestinian homeland with its sovereign status recognized by Israel. The achievement of this outcome will require a series of other steps, which we have advocated in 1973 and 1978 and now reaffirm.

2. Recognition of Israel's Right to Existence Within Secure Borders: Both the U.N. Resolution 242 and the papal statements require this recognition as a means of resolving the "security-territory" problem for Israel. In our view, it is a foundation stone for a just and stable peace. This issue is so central, as a matter of survival, in Israel's conception of its situation in the Middle East, that it is in everyone's interest for security to be guaranteed politically, strategically and psychologically for the Israelis. Secure borders are the means by which a nation's existence can be defended. To affirm Israel's right to exist and not resolve the secure borders question is to fail to resolve the issue which has led to four wars. Resolving the issue, however, will require a disciplined definition of what constitutes adequate security. The resolution of the security-territory issue cannot be based on such an expansive definition of security for Israel that the fundamental rights of other parties (especially Palestinians and the neighboring states) are preempted.

It is said that one state's absolute security means everyone else's insecurity. No lasting settlement can be based on the logic of absolute security, because even the right to security must be related to other just claims in a political context. Recognition of this point opens the way for the "land for peace" formula to be used effectively.

3. Recognition of Palestinian Rights: At the heart of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians is the right to a homeland, another foundation stone of a just peace. The right to a homeland for the Palestinians is tied to recognition of other rights: (1) their right to participate as equals, through representatives selected by Palestinians, in all negotiations affecting their destiny; (2) the right to a clear, legitimated title to their territory, not dependent on the authority of others.

This cluster of rights seeks to address the "territory- sovereignty" needs of the Palestinians. The conclusion which follows from these assertions is as clear as it has been controversial: Palestinian representation in Middle East negotiations leading to Palestinian territorial and political sovereignty.

To draw this conclusion requires recognizing limits on Palestinian rights: sovereign title to a territory of their own means disavowing larger claims to other territory in Israel. Sovereign coexistence with Israel requires an understanding that security is a mutual term - Palestinians will ensure secure possession of their homeland by being clear in word and deed

several occasions: (1) the sacred character of Jerusalem as a heritage for the Abrahamic faiths should be guaranteed; 2) religious freedom should be safeguarded; (3) the rights acquired by the various communities regarding shrines, holy places, educational and social institutions must be ensured; and (4) the Holy City's special religious status should be protected by "an appropriate juridical safeguard" which is internationally respected and guaranteed.

It is useful to recognize that these elements are not fulfilled by simply discussing who has sovereignty in Jerusalem, nor do these elements require any one particular form of jurisdiction or sovereignty. They neither demand nor exclude one civil power exercising sovereignty in the city of Jerusalem.

B. The Intifada

The principles just outlined find a specific reference in the Israeli-Palestinian question. It is this aspect of the Middle East that the intifada has pushed to the center of the policy agenda. For much of the last decade the Palestinian question has been overshadowed by the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, the Persian Gulf conflict and the Lebanese war.

It was precisely when others seemed to ignore them that the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza took matters into their own hands. Since December 1987 Palestinians have forced Israel, the United States, the Arab states and the international community to pay attention to them again. The intifada has recast the policy agenda in the Middle East.

There are several possible ways to interpret the significance of this event of the intifada. Here, its political, psychological and human rights significance strike us as important to highlight. Politically, the intifada is a statement that after more than twenty years of military occupation the Palestinians refuse to be reconciled to this status. The essence of the Palestinian claim is that the present political situation in the Israeli occupied territories rests upon an injustice, a denial of fundamental human rights.

Psychologically, the pressing of their political position through the intifada has provided a new sense of political self-determination and solidarity for a whole generation of Palestinians. The central theme which needs to be lifted up and repeated is that the intifada is a cry for justice; it is a cry for personal and political identity; it is an expression of the personal and political rights which Palestinians have as human beings worthy of being respected as individuals and as a people.

The scope and duration of the intifada have created the strongest challenge yet mounted against Israel's rule in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967. The Government of Israel has recognized the fundamental political challenge posed by the intifada and it has responded. The U.S. Government's human rights report concisely captures the response. The Israeli Government

sees the intifada not simply as a civil disturbance, but, "as a new phase of the 40 year war against Israel and as a threat to the security of the state." (Country Reports, p. 1377)

The measures taken in this "war" have produced the strongest human rights criticism — inside and outside of Israel — in the twenty-two years of occupation.

The U.S. Government's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988 documents several principal categories of human rights violations including: (1) excessive use of force resulting in many Palestinian deaths; (2) physical abuse and beatings of prisoners and of others not directly involved in demonstrations; (3) demolition and sealing of homes; and (4) closing of educational institutions; and (5) arrest and detention without trial.

Moreover, the Heads of Christian communities in Jerusalem in a public statement in April 1989 described their peoples' experience of constant deprivation of their fundamental rights, and tragic and unnecessary loss of Palestinian lives, especially among minors.

The precise adjudication of distinct human rights claims is open to continuous review, but the deeper political question — the justice and legitimacy of Palestinian demands for territory and sovereignty — is the fundamental issue posed by the intifada. It is precisely the political foundation of the intifada, a reality acknowledged both by the Palestinians and the Israelis, which gives it special significance. It for this reason that it is chosen here for attention among the many human rights issues in the Middle East.

V. Lebanon: The Tragedy and the Crime

In a region which has long known war, death and suffering, the case of Lebanon in the last fifteen years still stands out as particularly horrifying. Since 1975 over 100,000 Lebanese have been killed in a nation of four million; in recent months thousands were killed or wounded in the constant shelling which left Beirut devastated and depopulated.

The statistics convey some of the horror of the war in Lebanon. The tragedy lies first of all in the loss of human life, but also the contrast between what Lebanon has been and could be in the Middle East and what it now is. Because the Middle East requires that political and religious convictions be continuously balanced, Lebanon has stood for over forty years as a daring experiment. From the time of the National Pact in 1943, the effort to weave various religious traditions into a form of democratic governance has been pursued with determination in Lebanon. The process had major flaws and the description of the system was always better than its performance, but the Lebanese experiment in interreligious comity and democratic governance held a unique place in the Middle East. The present disintegration of both the religious and political dimensions of Lebanese society is an incalculable loss for the Middle East. As Pope John Paul II said in his appeal to the followers of Islam: "The eyes of the whole world behold a ravaged land where human life no longer seems to count. The victims are the Lebanese themselves — Moslems and Christians — and day after day the ruins on Lebanese soil

become ever more numerous. As children of the God of mercy, who is our creator and guide but also our judge, how can we believers allow ourselves to remain indifferent to a whole people which is dying before our very eyes?" (NC News, September 27, 1989)

There are several causes which contributed to the terror and tragedy of Lebanon in the 1980s. It is possible to distinguish internal and external reasons for the dissolution of the Lebanese state and society. Typically, Lebanese stress the external elements, and outside observers assign major responsibility to the Lebanese themselves. However the balance is struck, both dimensions are necessary for an understanding of Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s.

Internally, the description often given of Lebanon is that it has been the scene of what many people perceive to be a "religious war" since 1975. The reality is more complex. It is not possible to understand Lebanon apart from its religious rivalries, but it is not accurate to analyze the Lebanese conflict exclusively through a religious prism. In addition, unfortunately, many groups responsible for violence are identified, or choose to be identified, by a religious label.

The National Compact of 1943, an unwritten agreement formulated by Lebanese Christians and Muslim leaders at the time of independence, sought to achieve a balance of religious freedom and religious participation in Lebanese society for 17 different religious groups in the country. Part of the agreement was the assignment of constitutional offices to different religious constituencies; the President was to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, the Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite. There was also system of proportional representation in Parliament. The system survived and succeeded to a degree not often acknowledged from the perspective of the 1980s. Its success should not be forgotten amidst the destruction of these past years in Lebanon.

But the system did fail to adapt and to accommodate both demographic changes (a part of the original formula was based on the Christian-Muslim statistics of the 1930s) and political changes within key groups in Lebanon. By the 1970s both political and economic reforms were urgently needed, but not undertaken. The failure to address internal reform in the 1970s, and the inability of the political leadership (Christian and Muslim) to shape a viable constitutional consensus in the 1980s opened the way for the Lebanese political, economic and religious controversy to get caught up in open military conflict, beginning in 1975 and continuing in much intensified form in 1989.

Internal factors alone cannot account for the history of Lebanon since 1975. The external causes of Lebanese conflict are essentially the projection of the major rivalries of the Middle East into Lebanon. The country has become the battleground of the region. The fact that there were Lebanese parties willing to strike deals with the outsiders must be

acknowledged, but it does not diminish the point. Lebanon has been devastated from within and without.

In the 1970s, Palestinians were granted refuge and support by the Lebanese. They then tried to construct an autonomous base of operations from Lebanese soil, thereby threatening Lebanon's external relations, and shredding its internal cohesion. In the early conflict of Lebanese and Palestinians, the Syrians entered Lebanon; they came at the invitation of other Arab states, but they have long ago outlived their welcome.

Syria has become an occupying power in Lebanon. The limited legitimacy of its initial intervention is exhausted; yet it still has the capacity to play a positive role in relation to Lebanon. There is no long-term answer to Lebanon's predicament that does not include Syrian military withdrawal.

The other major intervention in Lebanon is that of Israel. The Israeli invasion in 1982, undertaken for Israel's purposes with the invitation of the Lebanese, did not end Israel's involvement in Lebanon. Israeli forces, with the cooperation of some Lebanese, continue to control southern Lebanon.

Pope John Paul II powerfully described what is at stake in Lebanon in his Angelus Message of August 15, 1989:

"What is happening before everyone's eyes is the responsibility of the whole world. It is a process which is bringing on the destruction of Lebanon. Truly, we are confronted with a menace to the whole of international life. It is a moral menace, all the more painful because it is a weaker State which endures the violence or the indifference of stronger ones. In fact, the principle according to which it is not lawful to harm the weak, to kill the weak, is valid also in international life. Who so behaves is guilty not only before God, the supreme Judge, but also before the justice of human history.

Moral guilt weighs also on all those who, in such situations, have not defended the weak when they could and should have done so."(L'Osservatore Romano Eng. ed., 21 August 1989)

What can be done? To ask that question in 1989, after months of slaughter in Beirut, is to be faced with very narrow choices. What is at stake in the first instance is Lebanese life: the lives of women and children who have lived in bunkers and bomb shelters; the lives of ordinary Lebanese who are not terrorists or militias but citizens who have lived and worked in a free-fire zone. At a different level the stakes are political and cultural; the Lebanese experiment — an multi-religious, multi-ethnic democracy — must be preserved. It is important for the Lebanese and it was a crucial ingredient in the Middle East; it is now mortally threatened. What is at stake today is whether this valuable attempt of bridging both East and

West and Christianity and Islam will ever be tried again.

The significance of what is at stake in Lebanon has been continually stressed by Pope John Paul II. In his letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations of May 15, 1989 he said:

At this point the very existence of Lebanon is threatened; for many years this country has been an example of the peaceful coexistence of its citizens, both Christian and Muslim, based on the foundation of the equality of rights, and respect for the principles of a democratic society.

(L'Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed., 24 May 1989)

Finally, what is at stake in Lebanon is a special and specific form of Christian presence in the Middle East. One need not endorse, support or agree with some things done under the title Christian during the last fifteen years, to be able to say that Christian presence in Lebanon is an anchor for Christian life in the Middle East. What is at stake in Lebanon is the way the Christian presence there has sustained Christian hope and life in other countries of the Middle East.

What can be done? If the tragedy of Lebanon involves in part what some outside forces have done in the country, the crime against Lebanon is the way other outside forces have failed to provide constructive diplomatic and political support in Lebanon's hour of need. The parties who did intervene in Lebanon had interests there, but little concern for the Lebanese. What is needed are outside parties who have a concern for Lebanon, but are not self-interested parties in the usual sense of the term.

In his message to episcopal conferences throughout the world of September 26, 1989, Pope John Paul II forcefully emphasized the moral imperative which today confronts the international community in its duty to Lebanon: "To be sure, it is not for the Pope to put forward technical solutions; yet, out of concern for the spiritual and material well-being of every person without distinction, I feel that is my grave duty to insist on certain obligations which are incumbent upon the leaders of nations. Disregard for these obligations could lead quite simply to a breakdown of orderly international relations and, once again, to the handing over of mankind to brute force alone. If rights, duties and those procedures which international leaders have worked out and subscribed to are scorned with impunity, then relations between peoples will suffer, peace will be threatened and mankind will end up a hostage to the ambitions and interests of those who hold the most power. For this reason, I have wished to state again and again — and I repeat it once more today on behalf of the whole Church — that international law and those institutions which guarantee it remain indispensable points of reference for defending the equal dignity of peoples and of individuals." (NC News, September 27, 1989)

Intervention has hurt the Lebanese, but it is seriously questionable in 1989 whether the Lebanese are capable of moving beyond war and destruction without help. It will take a mix of internal and external forces to reconstruct Lebanon. The reforms which are required — constitutionally, politically, economically and legally — must be Lebanese products. They must be shaped by a generation of Lebanese political leaders who recognize that the designs of the 1940s will not fit the Middle East of the 1990s.

But internal reform in 1989 can only occur after space is created within which Lebanese can discuss, decide and make choices. Here, disinterested outside parties are needed. Without Syrian withdrawal from Beirut immediately, and a promise of full Syrian military withdrawal, the Lebanese can neither decide freely nor choose effectively. At present the Syrians have little incentive to withdraw; a larger international framework must be created which will create the conditions for Syrian withdrawal and will promise that legitimate Syrian foreign policy concerns will be met.

The same logic applies to Israel; it has legitimate security concerns which must be met, but not at the expense of Lebanon.

Creating this larger international context is a task in which the United States is an indispensable force, together with France and the Arab League. There is also the widespread conviction that Soviet influence in Syria could be considerable. The goal of creating political space is to free Lebanon of all foreign forces. The first steps toward peace are embodied in the initiative of the Arab League which we urge all parties to support.

If political space can be created, the immediate need is to reconstitute the institutions of the Lebanese state: the offices of President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament need to be filled with individuals who can command loyalty across religious lines. Following initial steps in this regard a government of national unity could be envisioned.

Finally, if political reconstruction begins, economic assistance, both humanitarian aid and longer term development assistance, will be essential for Lebanon.

V. United States Policy: Recommendations

We have had U.S. policy in mind throughout this statement since we write as bishops of the United States. The purpose of this section, however, is to draw out more specifically a set of recommendations for U.S. policy in light of the assessment we have made of the Middle East. Our concern here is to relate the moral principles found within this statement to specific choices in the U.S. policy discussion. By definition these specific judgments are open to debate and to amendment in light of changes in the Middle East.

What is not open to debate is the need to move forward in the Middle East peace process. The method of progress must be dialogue — it is the tested alternative to violence. Pope John Paul II has described the dynamic of dialogue which can lead to peace: "I exhort

that consideration with sincere good will be given to every positive and constructive gesture that may come from either party. The road of dialogue in the search for peace is certainly arduous and tiring, but each obstacle that is removed can be considered true progress, certainly worthy of inspiring other corresponding gestures and the needed confidence to proceed." (L'Osservatore Romano, Eng. ed., December 1988)

The specific policy recommendations we make in this section are all designed to enhance a movement toward dialogue, promoting confidence among the parties and removing obstacles in the search for a just peace. The recommendations highlight the role of the United States, but the appeal to a broader dialogue involves in the first instance the parties to the conflict in the Middle East. The key to successful political dialogue will be Palestinians willing to discuss secure boundaries and stable political relations with Israel, and Israelis willing to discuss territory and sovereignty with Palestinians; successful political dialogue will require Arab states to assure Israeli legitimacy and security, and it will require Israeli commitment to land for peace. The Israel-Egypt negotiations of the 1970's provide a model for successful dialogue. They also highlight the essential role of the United States in fostering such negotiations.

Presently there are several proposals to begin negotiations advocated by different parties. The Israeli government advanced a proposal on May 14, 1989. President Mubarak of Egypt has offered recommendations which build upon the Israeli plans. The Mubarak plan is a creative initiative designed to expand upon other initiatives and to transcend both procedural and substantive obstacles. Palestinian representatives and other states have called for an international conference as the forum for Middle East negotiations.

Without entering a discussion of these proposals, our purpose is to urge consideration of them and to reiterate our conviction that dialogue and negotiation are the road to peace in the Middle East.

Dialogue — practical, realistic negotiations — based on a firm commitment to secure a just peace is also a key to the survival of Lebanon. The dialogue required is between Lebanese and Lebanese about the internal structure and polity of their country. But a diplomatic dialogue of Syrians and Israelis with the Lebanese is needed as well.

The United States is positioned to assist the political dialogue required in the Middle East. It cannot substitute for others, but it can assist them. Our recommendations are offered to urge the further engagement of the United States in the process of seeking and making peace in the Middle East.

A. The U.S.- Soviet Relationship in the Middle East

One of the elements which leads us to believe there is a new moment — indeed an open moment — in the Middle East is the possibility for constructive change in the U.S.-Soviet

relationship.

For many years the Soviet Union has been at the margin of Middle East developments. Recent Soviet statements seem to suggest that the Soviet "new thinking" on foreign policy is not satisfied to stay at the margin. At the same time the tenor and themes of Soviet statements indicate a willingness to play a more constructive role in the region.

It is evident that superpower rivalry in the past forty years has intensified the danger of the Middle East and has made resolution of key issues very difficult. If a shift of orientation allows a more coordinated superpower approach to the region, the change should be welcomed and pursued.

The perspective which should guide the superpowers is one which gives priority to the welfare of the local states and people. It should not be an imposition of superpower views on weaker states.

B. The U.S., the Palestinians and the Intifada

The fact of the intifada demands, on both moral and political grounds, a response by the United States government.

Human rights violations should be addressed in light of U.S. policy and legislation on human rights. The assessment of the situation found in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988 is a solid beginning and should be taken into account in the implementation of U.S. policy.

As noted above, the intifada points beyond human rights questions to the deeper political issue of Palestinian rights to a homeland. In our discussion of principles for policy we have set forth what we believe is needed to address the security, sovereignty and territory issue between the Israelis and Palestinians. The United States should continue in political discussions with the Palestinians, should continue its support for a Palestinian homeland and should address more clearly the relationship of homeland and sovereignty. At the same time the U. S. role should be to obtain Palestinian clarification of its December declaration accepting Israel's existence and the terms of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. This can also lead to more specific discussion of how the Palestinians and Israelis would see the measures needed to build trust and guarantee peaceful and secure borders for both parties.

The United States should continue to press with the Palestinians the principles affirmed by John Paul II: that dialogue is the road to peace in the Middle East, "while excluding any form of recourse to weapons and violence and above all, terrorism and reprisals."

(L'Osservatore Romano, December, 1988)

C. The United States and Israel

U.S. support for Israel is basically a sound, justified policy, in the interests of both nations and can contribute to the progress needed in the Middle East to produce peace for

Israel, its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians. U.S. support for Israel, politically, strategically and morally should be continued. This proposition does not conflict with the need for the United States to maintain its own position on a range of issues, at times in opposition to Israel, nor does it conflict with concern for human rights. For example, the United States regards the Israeli settlements in the West Bank as legally problematic and politically provocative.

D. The United States and Lebanon

The horror and tragedy of Lebanon demand more systematic attention from the United States than they have received in several years. The U.S. cannot "solve" the Lebanese problem. But the dissolution of Lebanon as a nation is moving relentlessly forward; without the diplomatic and humanitarian (not military) intervention of major outside powers, Lebanon as a sovereign state could pass into history. Many Lebanese believe the United States is sacrificing Lebanon to larger Middle East policy goals.

Whatever the reason for believing this to be the case, the United States must take steps immediately to demonstrate that it is not. The primary need is a clear, consistent policy pressing Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This should be complemented by a U.S. policy supporting the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Other possible U.S. diplomatic engagement could involve a joint U. S.-French effort, support for Arab League initiatives and an appropriate role for the United Nations.

If the fighting can be stopped and the withdrawal of foreign forces begun, then U.S. assistance would be needed to support efforts to reconstitute state authority in Lebanon and to rebuild Lebanese society.

E. The United States and the Arab States

The political settlement of the Middle East requires, as we have said, stable, just relations between Israel and the Arab states, as well as settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian question.

While U.S. relations with the Arab states vary across a spectrum, there is substantial influence with many of the key states. The United States should continue to encourage, persuade and press Israel's neighbors to follow the Egyptian path of normalizing relations with Israel.

The history of four major wars, the needs of the Arab states themselves and the fact that Israeli willingness to address Palestinian concerns is contingent upon the attitude of Arab states toward Israel, all point to the need "to normalize" the political map of the Middle East.

The history of the Middle East in the past forty years has been marked by failure of the Arab states as well to respond adequately to Palestinian needs and aspirations. Today there is clearly a consensus of moderate Arab states which is seeking a settlement of the Palestinian

question based on land for peace. The United States should encourage this consensus and help Israel to see and grasp this moment of opportunity.

VI. Conclusion

It is our conviction that a truly open moment for peace exists in the Middle East, and that the United States has an indispensable role to play in the peace process which has moved us to write this statement.

To grasp the open moment, to transform the potential for peace into a real process for peace will require the best efforts of many institutions, communities and individuals. In this statement, we have found it necessary to probe some of the complexity of the Middle East in order to highlight the moral principles and problems which lie at the heart of the Middle East question.

We believe, however, that even beyond the political and moral intricacy of the Middle East there is a deeper reality which must be recognized and relied upon in the pursuit of a just peace. The deeper reality is the pervasive religious nature of the Middle East: its territory, history and its peoples have been visited by God in a unique way. The religious foundations of the Middle East have political and moral relevance. The search for peace in the region requires the best resources of reason, but it also should rely upon the faith, prayer and convictions of the religious traditions which call the Middle East their home.

Above all else, the achievement of a just and lasting peace is a grace and gift of God. Although human peacemakers have their essential roles — and are blessed by Muslims, Christians, and Jews — ultimately peace comes as a work of God in history.

We request the prayers of all believers for peace in the Middle East. In The Challenge of Peace (1989) we called on our people for prayer, fasting and Friday abstinence for the sake of peace. Here we renew that call with special reference to the Middle East.

We also pledge continuing dialogue with our Jewish and Muslim partners and friends. In our three religious traditions, we share two central themes: the capacity for hope in the face of difficulty and danger and the pursuit of peace in the face of conflict and violence. Let us together seek to turn our hopes into true progress toward genuine and lasting peace.

The Jerusalem Quarterly

The Jerusalem Quarterly was founded in 1976 at the initiative of Shlomo Argov, then Assistant Director-General of the Foreign Ministry. The idea was to establish an independent Israeli intellectual quarterly and to that end Argov mobilized the help of Emmanuel Sivan, chairman of the Department of History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who in turn recruited the editorial team. The Jerusalem Quarterly began publication in Fall 1976 and since then has appeared uninterruptedly. Twenty-eight issues have been published until now. The journal has a format somewhat resembling Foreign Policy magazine, 144 pages, on an average eleven to thirteen articles per issue.

The major aims the journal set for itself were:

- 1) to create an "Israeli presence" in the field of foreign policy publications; that is, a journal that would be read by the type of reader, particularly in the United States, who reads Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Orbis, etc.
- 2) to create an "Israeli presence" in the field of periodicals on Middle Eastern Affairs, almost all of which are blatantly anti-Israeli. We refer here to journals like Middle East International, Merip Reports, International Journal of Middle East Studies, etc.
- 3) to help promote dialogue with Jewish intellectuals in North America bringing them a spectrum of Israeli voices on both current and fundamental problems facing the Jewish people and Israel.
- 4) to promote the same type of dialogue with American intellectuals (of the type who read Commentary, the New Republic, Dissent etc.), with special emphasis on "entering the classroom"; that is, creating such material which may be used by university teachers in graduate and undergraduate courses on foreign policy, Middle East and Jewish affairs.

This combination of aims explains the mixture of topics in the issues enclosed. It also explains the mixture of literary styles: essays, research reports, review articles, memoirs, fiction and poetry.

The Jerusalem Quarterly has by now ca. 7,000 subscribers, an overwhelming majority of which reside in the United States. It is estimated that at least one half of the readers are Jewish, mostly in universities, liberal professions, foreign policy and intelligence bureaucracies. Whereas most readers give their home address, making it difficult to come up with exact figures on professional affiliations, there is some solid data on institutional subscribers. Individual subscribers pay \$18.00 per year (\$10.00 for the first trial period), while institutions pay \$24.00. All subscriptions and promotions are handled by Harry Hochman Associates of New York City, who also handle the Jerusalem Post and Present Tense.

The journal's budget amounts to roughly \$195,000 per year, of which about \$145,000 goes for production costs in Israel (including editorial costs, honoraria, paper and actual printing) and air delivery by El Al. At least one half of the "American part" of the budget goes for promotion campaigns to recruit new readers. The Israel Foreign Ministry which in the beginning bankrolled the whole operation has now seen its share reduced to \$120,000, the rest coming from subscribers. It should be noted that magazines of roughly the same type, such as Foreign Policy have an analogous share of their costs covered by the parent organization (in the case of Foreign Policy, the Carnegie Endowment for Peace).

It is difficult to estimate exactly the success of the Jerusalem Quarterly, but one should note:

- A) no Israeli periodical has ever achieved this kind of paid circulation.
- B) all major university and public libraries in North America and Europe subscribe to it and the same holds true for major foreign policy and intelligence agencies of the United States and other governments (including the Soviet Union and Arab states); the same goes for major think tanks (Rand, Brookings, American Enterprise, etc.).
- C) the journal has a growing number of unsolicited manuscripts coming from major scholars and thinkers coming from outside Israel.
- D) It is abstracted today in the following: International Political Science Abstracts, The Middle East: Abstracts and Index, Historical Abstracts, America; History and Life, and Index to Jewish Periodicals.
- E) Dozens of requests arrive every year for permission to use articles in university seminars, educational activities (synagogues) and courses in major U.S. army military academies.
- F) Articles from the journal are widely quoted, not only in scholarly and Jewish publications, but also in many publications which are by no means pro-Israeli, such as the Middle East Journal (published by ARAMCO, financed by the Middle East Institute of Washington D.C.) as well as by major Arab publications (such as al-Ahram in Cairo).

The Jerusalem Quarterly has been appearing regularly since the fall of 1976. 27 issues have been published so far. In that time it has undergone no stylistic changes in format or design, and no major changes in content or direction, insofar as can be judged from fleeting acquaintance with the content of the articles that have appeared to date.

The quarterly is published by the Middle East Institute, the address of which is given as The Van Leer Institute. Its publication, in other words, is not associated with any one of Israel's universities, nor with any of the well-known institutes of Middle East studies and research. This suggests that the real publishers are hiding behind a "P.O.Box," which could lead to suspicions about the journal's sponsors, purpose, objectivity, etc., or confirm suspicions about its bias and academic credentials. This is not the case, however, with JQ, whoever its sponsor, whatever its purpose, its academic quality and integrity are beyond reproach.

The JQ is clearly intended as a forum for Israeli academics. The majority of contributors are indeed from the faculties of Israel's universities and research institutes. Yet, the format of the JQ is not that of a standard academic journal. It is not divided and subdivided into the usual and recurring compartments found in such journals, including major and minor research papers, book reviews, correspondence, debates and rejoinders, source materials, etc. The 27 editions that have appeared so far contain some 300 entries, but, as far as I can see, no cumulative index has been provided to date. Another difference from the standard academic journal is the minimal disturbance of the text by footnotes and references.

The absence of compartmentalization by content, the minimal use of indexing and footnotes is not, it seems, accidental. The editors seem to be pursuing an

intellectual image in the broadest sense of the word, rather than a narrowly academic one. In other words, the JQ is intended to be on a higher level and to seek wider appeal than the run-of-the-mill academic journal. It does not seek to prove obscure points by means of even more obscure references, but to address major issues in a more general way. This explains not only the absence of academic trappings, but also the considerable number of ranking personalities and public figures from all walks of life who have contributed articles to this journal. These have included: Yigal Allon, Abba Eban, Yitzhak Ben Aharon, Aharon Yariv, Nathanel Lorch, David Hacohen, Mordechai Gazit, Israel Tal, Natan Rotenstreich, Shlomo Avineri, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Yoram Dinstein, Ehud Aviad and many others.

On the pages of the JQ, statesmen, scholars, soldiers, journalists and writers contribute to a broader understanding of the issues facing Israel and the Jewish people from within and from without. The intellectual level sought by the JQ means that many articles are philosophical, reflective and general in nature, as their titles would suggest, e.g.:

- Reflections on a Solution of the Palestinian Problem
- Reflections on Palestinian History
- Reflections on Modern Jewish National Thought
- Israel in Asia
- Israel in Africa
- Israel in Europe
- Latin America and Israel
- Reflections on the Future of American-Israeli Relations
- Reflections on Israeli Deterrence
- Israel and the Palestinians

Apart from general, philosophizing statements such as these, many other articles are nonetheless concerned with current events. For example, a number of issues carried articles which reflected the peace process that gained momentum following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Another example would be the articles relating to

Israel's general elections, and especially the change in government from Labour Alignment to Likud.

The combination of articles of a reflective nature and those dealing with current events (there is little history for its own sake in JQ) has resulted in the journal's projecting something akin to an Israeli "Zeitgeist." Selections from contemporary literature tend to reinforce this impression.

Included in the JQ are some 50 articles dealing with the Arab world and Arab and Islamic culture, of which approximately 20 are by Arab writers. These articles cover the whole gamut of Arab concerns from "Egypt's Population Explosion" to "Saudi Arabia in the Red," from a political profile of Assad to a political profile of Saddam Hussein, from the "Marriage Crisis in Syria" to the "Crisis of the Lebanese Family." The result is a portrait of the wide-ranging problems facing the Arab world today, both politically - internally and externally - and socially. The impression created by the inclusion of these articles is that the Arab world is beset by numerous problems of its own, both as a whole and each country individually, and these specific problems either are unrelated to the Arab-Israel conflict or demonstrate how the conflict affects society, religion, culture and other values in the Arab world no less than it does in Israel.

The overall impact of several hundred articles dealing with every possible aspect of Israel and the Middle East is to leave the reader with the feeling of a "world and the fullness thereof." By comparison, the relatively small number of articles addressing the subjects of the Palestinians/PLO/Judea, Samaria and Gaza (approx. 15) specifically and not merely in passing or in relation to other topics of more immediate interest, fade into a marginality that is no doubt intended by the editors. The problem of the Palestinians and the administered territories is one among a plethora of others facing both Israel and the Arabs.

The intellectual level and the strong literary tendencies of the JQ have remained

consistent from first to last. There has been no falling-off in quality. In summing up, it can be said that the present collection of volumes of JQ would grace any library or private bookshelf. Its readership cannot but emerge as well-informed about the complex issues of the Middle East. The impact of the journal is subtle, not laboured. The opinions expressed in the journal are Israeli opinions, and there is little reliance on outside opinion, supporters, well-wishers, etc.; however academic or intellectual the arguments, the starting point is almost always an Israeli one. Even its name and the place of publication - Jerusalem - make it central to the subjects it discusses and convey an authority, without it seeming to be government-sponsored. As stated, the journal's impact is subtle, intellectual, authoritative, but in a cumulative, long-term manner.

Despite the fact that the majority of the articles treat political or social themes, there is no immediate political message. Paradoxically, the honesty and precision in the treatment of the material and the absence of anything that would serve short-term propaganda purposes, make of the JQ a perfect example of "the other Israel" - Israel of technological advances and social progress - while at the same time it addresses the major issues of the region at this time.

Number of Articles by Subject Matter

Israeli Politics - 21	Israeli Culture - 19
Soviet Union in the Middle East - 6	Arab and Islamic Culture - 19
Palestine (Mandate) - 10	Zionism - 21
Holocaust/Antisemitism - 13	Jews in Arab Countries - 4
PL0 - Palestinians - 9	Judea, Samaria and Gaza - 6
Israeli Economy - 7	Arab-Israel Conflict - 36
Arab Politics - 26	United States in Middle East - 3
United Nations - 2	Israel Among the Nations - 10
Israeli Society - 33	Diaspora - 6
Nuclearization of Middle East - 1	Jerusalem - 3
	Other - 8

The list does not include literary works.

The breakdown and allocation is of course somewhat arbitrary and approximate.

Contributions from non-Israeli academics - 17

Contributions from journalists - 2

Contributions from politicians, public figures, government officials - 26

Contributions by Arab writers - 23





Dear Rabbi Teunenbaum,
Pursuant to our
conversation,



Sincerely
Morde Gegas

with
the Compliments of
The Information Department

הקונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בניו-יורק

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

OXFORD 7-5500

No to Jordan Arms Sale

The United States is inevitably a significant player in the effort to bring an Arab-Israeli peace. To begin with, none of the Arab states would ever consider peacemaking with Israel if they thought they could defeat Israel militarily. Therefore, U.S. military aid to Israel is the most immediate ingredient necessary to create an environment for peacemaking.

Once Israel is perceived as strong enough to avert defeat, then a key part of moving peace forward is the way the United States deals with would-be Arab peacemakers. The critical element in this process is to make clear that U.S. assistance will be an integral part of the American response to a serious move toward peace.

This is a delicate business. Timing is everything. The more the United States acts on military assistance prior to an Arab commitment to peacemaking the less the chances that peacemaking will be pursued. Saudi Arabia may have been hinting to the United States in 1981 that it would make certain positive moves if only the U.S. agrees to sell it AWACS, but once the U.S. did so the Saudis lost any incentive to consider making a decision it would prefer not to make in any case. As long as arms are sold to Arab states prior to their moving to peace then the U.S. is providing a disincentive to them to make the big move.

That is exactly what is taking place today with regard to prospective arms sales to King Hussein. The Administration maintains that the arms sale is necessary to embolden the King to move forward. But the King knows full well from the experience of Anwar Sadat that making peace with Israel does lead to large-scale military and economic assistance to his nation. Sadat understood that the road to Washington lay through Jerusalem. After, but only after, Sadat went to Jerusalem and Camp David, successive Administrations and

Congresses opened their arms to him. Hussein knows this and if it were American largesse in exchange for peace he was truly after, the Sadat precedent of peace and then aid would be the way.

Clearly, then, the King has not yet opted for Sadat peacemaking. Focusing on the need for American arms now he is in reality indicating that he still hopes to achieve some degree of increased American assistance without doing what Sadat did. If, indeed, the United States does supply a squadron of F-20s, sophisticated Hawk missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles at this time, then Hussein will inevitably fall back to the hope that he need not take the risks for peace in order to achieve American protection.

It is no accident that seventy senators across the political spectrum called on the Administration to desist from submitting this arms proposal. The lessons of Middle East peacemaking have become clear in spite of the persistence of old State Department views that Arab leaders must be pacified in order to get them to do what we wish. In fact, the vast majority of the Senate seems to understand the dynamics involved, the process of earning American assistance that led Sadat to move, the process of arms in advance of peace that led the Saudis to continued rejectionism.

There may or may not be real movement in the peace process. Hussein's comments about negotiations with Israel based on 242 and 338 can lead one to hope; on the other hand, his insistence on a PLO role or veto and on international peace conferences can lead one to despair. One thing is clear: he has not yet committed himself to direct negotiations without preconditions with Israel that constitute true peacemaking.

What would bring him to make that qualitative leap forward? No one knows for sure. He always is concerned with the risks of peacemaking whether they

come as threats from the Syrians or Palestinian radicals. On the other hand, increasing Israeli settlements on the West Bank give him the sense that the longer he refuses to negotiate peace with Israel the less there may be to negotiate about.

The United States can and should play a role. It should indicate, as it has, that Hussein must negotiate directly with Israel. It should indicate that the U.S. will play a role as facilitator to the negotiations, as it did in the Egyptian-Israeli process. And it should indicate that peace with Israel can transform American attitudes and American levels of assistance to Jordan as it did to Sadat's Egypt. This kind of a role can serve as a catalyst to peacemaking.

Other kinds of American signals can only retard the process. Talk of an international conference hurts. Talk of the U.S. negotiating with the Arabs rather than Israel hurts. And talk of a premature American arms sale to Jordan — before the King makes the move to peace — hurts most of all.

KJ/kp

Kenneth Jacobson
Director
Middle Eastern Affairs
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear President Reagan,

I am a third generation American Jew, a veteran of World War II, and my father was a veteran before me. I have always considered my first loyalty to my country, the U.S.A., and have never felt any conflict between my country and my religion.

I recently returned from a fact-finding mission to Israel, and I feel compelled to write to you about my feelings. I hope that this letter will get to your personal attention, because I feel that you have not been given the correct information.

My project was to see the "West Bank" (Judea and Samaria), and interview as many people as I could. The individuals with whom I conversed ranged all the way from the far left (i.e., Yossie Sarid, member of the Knesset) to the far right (i.e., Elyakim HaEzri, an attorney in Kiryat Arba, a settlement just outside of Hebron in Judea).

I went to Israel with an open mind and I left with the conclusion that Israel should not relinquish sovereignty over any land to the Arabs for a promise of peace. My conclusion is based on the following facts:

1) From Nablus, the largest Palestinian city in Samaria, one can see the city of Tel-Aviv and the Mediterranean coast from Ashdod to Caesarea. This is a distance of 12 to 20 miles, representing over 50 percent of the entire population of Israel, within artillery range.

2) From Hebron, the largest Palestinian city in Judea, one can see Jerusalem a mere 8 to 10 miles away.

3) King Hussein, and the P.L.O., have shown no desire or initiative whatsoever to recognize the state of Israel and guarantee its security. Furthermore, history proves that their promises are worthless.

4) Privately, King Hussein might express the desire to make peace with Israel, but he remembers only too well that his grandfather, King Abdullah, of Trans Jordan, was assassinated for talking to the Israelis, and Hussein does not want to follow in his grandfather's steps.

5) After Camp David, Israel made peace with Sadat and gave the Sinai back to Egypt. After Sadat was assassinated, the P.L.O. danced in the streets and they immediately reopened their office in Cairo. On the second day of the Lebanese incursion for peace in the Galilee, Egypt withdrew its ambassador to Israel- and the Israelis have already captured P.L.O. terrorists infiltrating from the Egyptian border.

So after giving up all that buffer zone, including oil fields and strategic air bases, the peace with Egypt is very tenuous. Anwar Sadat had the courage to seek peace, but can you blame the Israelis for not wanting to give up land to the P.L.O. and/or Hussein?

6) Several of the settlers on the West Bank told me that they purchased their land from the Arabs and that the land was not confiscated after the six day war of 1967. They had titles and receipts to prove this. The land had not been used by the Arabs as it was rocky and barren.

7) Kibbutz Kefar Etzion was a well-established community prior to 1948. During the War of Independence, the Arabs overtook it and massacred all of the defenders. They subsequently destroyed all of the buildings and left it to rot between 1948 and 1967. This was one of the first settlements to be rebuilt after the 1967 war.

A report on Israel cannot be complete without speaking about the tragic massacres at Sabra and Shatila camps. I had to answer for myself the question that many well-meaning Americans have been asking: "Are the Israelis becoming killers like their Arab neighbors?" I am convinced that the answer to this question is a resounding "no!"

Israel is a strong and moral democracy. When Menachem Begin tried to deny any Israeli complicity, because the Christian Phalangists were the murderers, 400,000 Israelis, over 10 percent of the total population, rallied and demanded an inquiry and an explanation. Where else in the world could this have occurred? Certainly not in Russia or in any of the Arab countries where massacres are a way of life.

I spoke with a young Israeli soldier who had recently returned from Lebanon. He told me of entering a P.L.O. controlled town in Lebanon, seeing some teenaged children, and not taking them prisoner, only to see his life-long buddy and fellow soldier shot from behind by one of the children. Despite this, he does not hate the Arabs, as Israeli children are taught not to hate.

I spoke with Beverly Unger, a registered nurse, mother, and wife of a professor at Bar Elan University. She is the nurse for the school in Tqor, a new settlement in Judea. She told us of David, a 27-year-old Israeli archaeologist, who was murdered by the Arabs. The entire community of Tqor held a meeting and decided that instead of responding by starting a blood feud, they would open a new settlement on the other side of the adjacent Arab town and name it after David. Her sincerity and dedication to her land were eloquent.


These are only a few of the many incidents that confirmed my conviction that Israel is still a very special, humane country, worthy of all the financial and moral support we can give her. I do not have to remind you of the efficiency of the Israeli Defense Force, but it is primarily a civilian reserve army, which takes time to assemble - and time requires space. They will never trade their national security for a worthless promise.

If I have added one bit of knowledge to your understanding of this complex problem, then my mission and this letter have not been in vain.

Sincerely yours,

Hubert J. Rubenstein, M.D.

HJR/ls



MR. ARTHUR GREENBERG

INTRODUCTION OF MR. ROBERT BASIL

THE CRISIS IN LEBANON HAS DOMINATED THE EVENTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE PAST SEVEEAL MONTHS. FEW EVENTS HAVE STIRRED THE EMOTIONS OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE IN ISRAEL , IN THE UNISED STATES AND ELSEWHERE AS ~~MAXXXXX~~ HAVE ISRAEL'S ENTRY INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON TO ~~WROXX~~ UPROOT PLO TERRORISM, THE CONFLICT IN BEIRUT, AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE PALESTINIAN MASSACRE BY FALANGIST MILITIA.

THOSE TUMULTUOUS EVENTS, ~~HAVE~~ AMPLIFIED AND FREQUENTLY DISTORTED BY SELECTIVE MEDIA ATTENTION, HAVE CREATED A HOST OF PROBLEMS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. THEY HAVE ALSO LEFT A RESIDUE OF STRESS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THIS COUNTRY AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.

TO HELP US UNDERSTAND THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE STATUS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COESISTENCE BETWEEN THE TWO DEMOCRACIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE ARE FORTUNATE TO HAVE ONE OF THE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE AUTHBBITIES ON THIS AREA. OUR GUEST SPEAKER IS MR ROBERT BASIL, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN LEBANESE LEAGUE AND PRESENTLY CHAIRMAN OF ITS BOARD. MR. BASIL IS PRESIDENT OF ROBERT BASIL INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES.

HE IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THEM MAJOR CHRISTIAN MARONITE LEADERS IN LEBANON AND HIS ADVICE IS REGUARLY SOUGHT BY LEADERS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

BEFORE INTRODUCING HIM TO YOU, I SHOULD ADD THAT THERE

ROBERT BASIL

- 2 -

HAS BEEN A LONG HISTORY OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AMERICAN LEBANESE LEAGUE AND THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE. FOUR YEARS AGO, AT OUR NEC MEETING IN BOSTON, WE INVITED DR. CHARLES ~~XXX~~ MALIK, FORMER DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF LEBANON, AND FATHER EL HAYEK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE LEBANESE LEAGUE TO SPEAK TO US.

~~XXX~~ ALSO, SINCE JUNE OF THIS YEAR , THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE HAS BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF ORGANIZE EMERGENCY RELIEF EFFORTS WITH THE AMERICAN JOINT DISCRIBUTION COMMITTEE FOR THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS. AS OF THIS MONTH, AMERICAN JEWRY HAS CONTRIBUTED MORE THAN ONE MILLION DOLLARS IN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION AID TO LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS.

WITH THAT BACKGROUND IN MIND, IT IS NOW MY PRIVILEGE AND PLEASURE TO INTRODUCE TO YOU OUR DISTINGUISHED SPEAKER, MR. ROBERT BASIL.

AGENDA

1. BLESSING OVER CHALAH AND WINE ...Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum
2. LUNCHEON
3. INTRODUCTION OF MR. ROBERT BASIL (SEE INTO)
4. RESPONSE BY RABBI TANENBAUM
5. DISCUSSION FROM FLOOR

CLOSE BY 2:30 p.m.



Text of a Telegram To be sent to the Apostolic Delegate
as stated below (to be signed by Roman Catholics among the group)

"As Roman Catholics, we are deeply disturbed at the
prospect of Our Holy Father, himself the victim of violence,
Yasser Arafat, a person
granting an audience to ~~an individual~~ whose reputation
has been built on terrorism and the murder of
innocents. It would seriously impede the Vatican
from playing any constructive role in future Middle
East negotiations. We urge the Secretariat of State
to oppose such a meeting."

Signed:

Anne Mary Dooley, S.S.J.

Sister Ann Gilken, S.H.C.

Thomas E. Bird

J. A. Paulinski, O.S.M. Paulkowski

Mrs. Anthony J. Giannone

Sr. Dorothy Wilson S.H.C.

Regina Dierschke

John A. Roberts

Sr. Anna Marie East S.H.C.

[start]

Original documents
faded and/or illegible



POPE JOHN PAUL II, PLO's YASIR ARAFAT, AND ISRAEL

- Some Background Reflections

by Marc H. Tanenbaum

(Rabbi Tanenbaum is national interreligious affairs director of the American Jewish Committee and a pioneering leader in Jewish-Christian relations. He has just returned from participating in a joint Vatican-International Jewish consultation in Milan, held from Sept. 6-9.)

On the face of it, Pope John Paul II's agreeing to receive the architect of international terrorism, PLO's chief, Yasir Arafat, was a moral and propaganda disaster - as much to many Christians as to Jews. When the dust settles on this surrealistic happening, it may prove to yield some positive features for Israel and eventual peace in the Middle East. In the present emotional and angry atmosphere, few may want to allow for that possibility, but reason and the pragmatic interests of Israel require that consideration be given to certain hard realities beneath the provocative headlines and ~~photographs~~ photographs.

To understand those "hard realities," it is necessary to recall an earlier meeting between Vatican officials and the PLO. In February (March) 1981, Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, Vatican Secretary of State, granted ~~to~~ an audience to the PLO's so-called Foreign Minister, Farouk Kaddoumi. On the day following that audience, Kaddoumi called a press conference on the premises of the Vatican and issued a press statement declaring that the Vatican, in effect, supported the political positions of the PLO and that the Pope himself supported the PLO's stand on Jerusalem.

The Jewish community - and many Christians - were outraged by that event. The anger was intensified by the fact that a photograph

was taken at that press conference showing Kaddoumi being embraced by Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, the former Melkite bishop of Jerusalem who was arrested by Israel for gun-running for the PLO.

In October 1981, the International Jewish Committee for Inter-religious Consultations (IJCIC) which maintains ongoing and mutually helpful relationships with the Vatican Secretariat on Catholic-Jewish Relations, asked for an urgent meeting with the Vatican Secretariat of State. I attended that meeting with other Jewish leaders from Israel, Europe and ~~ix~~ the United States.

This was our first "official" meeting with the "State Department of the Holy See and we met with the high officials of three Vatican secretariats. At the intense meeting, we protested in vigorous terms the fact that the Vatican had agreed to meet with the foremost terrorist body in the world, a group that had in fact trained the Turkish terrorist who had almost murdered Pope John Paul II. We then asked for an explanation of whether Kaddoumi's version of his meeting with Casaroli was in fact what transpired.

The Vatican authorities, clearly embarrassed and defensive, said that exactly the contrary had taken place at that meeting. Cardinal Casaroli, they told us, had in fact read the riot act to the PLO official. The Vatican spokesman had condemned the PLO's resort to murder, violence, and terrorism; ~~they~~ he called on the PLO to give up its campaign of terrorism and turn to political methods of ~~pe~~ peaceful negotiations; he asked the PLO to accept and abide by UN resolution 242 which acknowledged Israel's right to existence; and, most strongly, ~~they~~ ^{he} called on the PLO to stop its massacred and persecution of Christians and Muslims both Lebanese and Palestinian in South Lebanon. (At that ~~x~~ it was not

yet public knowledge that the PLO and their leftist Muslim allies had in fact since 1975 massacred about 100,000 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians.

With incredible arrogance and clear contempt for the Pope and the Vatican, the PLO's Kaddoumi exploited his meeting with Cardinal Casaroli and hijacked the Holy See's foreign policy and the ~~in~~ international press by constructing a scenario of that meeting was little less than a cluster of lies, distortions, and misrepresentations. Subsequently, the Vatican issued its own statement, but it was so vague and abstract that it was virtually ignored by the press. The PLO's scenario became the world's understanding of what was supposed to have taken place.

When the announcement of the proposed audience between Pope John Paul II and Arafat became public, I telephoned Archbishop Pio Laghi, the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, who resides in Washington. Archbishop Laghi, who had formerly served as nuncio in Jerusalem for many years and then in Argentina - and who has a record of genuine friendship for Israel and Jews - understood at once our distress. He told me that he had just been on the telephone with the Vatican and urged them not to allow Arafat to repeat the exploitation of the Vatican that Kaddoumi had pulled off with Casaroli last February. The Vatican issued a communique on Sept. 12th saying the following:

"~~Mr. Arafat~~; invited to Rome to participate in a world interparliamentary meeting, has requested to be received by the holy father.

"His Holiness has agreed to receive him after the general audience on Wednesday, Sept. 15.

"Such a meeting is to be interpreted as a sign of good will and concern of the supreme pontiff for the Palestinian people without any political significance particularly as regards the character of representation for those people as claimed by the PLO."

This communique was sent by the Vatican Secretariat of State to Vatican diplomatic posts on Sept. 12th and was released to the press.

by the Holy See's mission to the United Nations. Vatican authorities said the wording of the communique was designed to repudiate any interpretation of the meeting as an endorsement by the Pope or the Holy See of the PLO's claim to be "the sole and legitimate representative" of the Palestinian ~~masses~~ people. The communique significantly refers to the meeting with "Mr. Arafat" without designating him as leader of the PLO. The Vatican source said the communique expresses the continued Vatican neutrality on the question of the PLO's status regarding its representation of the Palestinian people.

In contrast to the Casaroli-Madamei meetings, the Vatican issued its own statement on the Pope John Paul-Arafat meeting in order to provide the official interpretation of that audience, and to preclude the PLO's grabbing the international headlines with its propagandistic version of what actually took place. In a three-paragraph communique, the Vatican said that the Pope told Arafat that "terrorism was unacceptable as a ~~mix~~ method for solving conflicts between people;" he called for "a recognition of the rights of all peoples and in particular those of Palestinian people for their own homeland and of Israel for security;" and while "expressing good will for the Palestinians" the Pope again "strongly deplored terrorism" and expressed his hopes that that current efforts to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "is not interrupted and that it can become a precious element of stability and peace in the Middle East."

After the audience, the Pope went to nearby St. Peter's Square to begin his general audience. During his address, the Pope stressed the "importance of respecting the rights of all people in the area and the need for reconciliation and tolerance." He then reiterated the Vatican's longstanding demand for the internationalization of the holy places in Jerusalem - not the internationalization of the city of Jerusalem. That, too, constituted a repudiation of the PLO and Arab-Muslim demand that the Vatican identify itself with their position which calls for the return of East Jerusalem to Arab-Muslim-PLO sovereignty.

In sum, in terms of the substance of the positions taken by the Pope, they were far closer to the views of Israel and the Jewish people than to those of the PLO and the Arab-Muslim extremists. In that sense, it could be seen as a political victory for Israel's cause.

But since international politics is so much affected by the

images of reality conveyed by the mass media, the single photograph of the Pope - the Vicar of Christ on earth - clasping the hands of Arafat - the chief architect of international terrorism and the murderer of tens of thousands of Lebanese Christians and thousands of Israeli Jews - inevitably will overwhelm whatever constructive messages the Pope delivered to Arafat.

It is that image - and that the PLO and its allies will make of that image in the third world and Communist media - that has led Israelis to term that audience as "revolting" and world Jewry to feel betrayed and outraged.

It is not naive optimism to hope that once the 24-hour sensation of the audience and the photographs are over that the substance of that audience will have more lasting effects and ultimately might constitute a contribution to peace and reconciliation in the Middle East.



[end]

Original documents
faded and/or illegible

