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subject    Palestine National Council: A Preliminary Assessment

The reelection of Yasser Arafat as chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization at the meeting of the Palestine National Council
in Algiers last week and the return to the fold of major radical leaders
who had vehemently opposed his policies has proved once again the folly
of attempting to predict the political demise of leaders in the Middle
East. Five years after the PLO's military base in Lebanon was smashed
by the Israelis and Arafat's defeated forces were ignominiously dispersed
throughout the Middle East, he appears once again to have emerged as the
pre-eminent Palestinian political figure.

Arafat's success in bringing his fragmented organization together
may, however, prove to be only a Pyrrhic victory for the Palestinian
people if for the sake of organizational unity Arafat now feels con-
strained to cater to the extreme elements which reject any negotiated
settlement with Israel. The growing strength of the hardliners in the
PLO was reflected in several actions:
1. The formal abrogation by the PLO, on the eve of the Palestine National Council session, of the February 1985 agreement between Arafat and King Hussein which would have provided for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating team to enter peace talks with Israel under international auspices on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and would have sought to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. (Hussein had already broken off discussions with Arafat in the spring of 1986 because of the alleged failure of the PLO to live up to the agreement, but Hussein had insisted that the terms of the accord were still valid.) Arafat went on to declare at the PNC session that the Palestinians would not lay down their guns "until the independent Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem" is established.

2. The reelection to a seat on the PLO Executive Committee of Mohammad Abbas, the mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking who is wanted for murder by the United States in the killing of Leon Klinghoffer. (Arafat had reportedly wanted him dropped because he did not fit the new peaceful image the PLO was trying to project. Abbas will hold on to his seat until a successor can be chosen by the fragmented Palestine Liberation Front.)

3. The adoption of an anti-Egyptian and anti-American line as the price for the renewed participation in the PNC and its Executive Committee of the radical pro-Soviet Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine headed by George Habash, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine headed by
Nayef Hawatmeh, and the Palestine Communist Party. Hawatmeh said that to be acceptable to the PLO, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak would have to "retreat from the Camp David agreement, stop promulgation of its policies and the Reagan peace plan -- any plan that ignores the rights of Palestinian independence and any peace conference without the full participation of the PLO."

The Egyptian delegation walked out of the conference after Habash and Hawatmeh succeeded, over Arafat's objections, to have the PNC reiterate earlier resolutions condemning the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and linking any improvement of PLO-Egyptian relations to the extent of Egypt's distancing itself from the Camp David Accords. The PLO Executive Committee was to work out the details of future PLO-Egyptians relations. This did not mollify the Egyptians. After meeting with President Mubarak, Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel-Meguid announced on April 27, the day after the end of the PNC session, that all PLO offices in Egypt "except those that deal with labor and women's affairs" would be shut down "because of the aggressive attitude of the Palestine National Council" and to "put an end to this insolence" by the PLO.

President Mubarak has now joined King Hussein, who last July closed most PLO offices in Jordan, in displaying official annoyance with the PLO. The present state of affairs appears to be a serious setback for the efforts of Osama al-Baz, Mubarak's senior adviser on foreign affairs, who had worked hard to get Arafat and Hussein together and to
come up with a formula that would bring the Palestinians into comprehensive negotiations with Israel in a way that would also serve to enhance Egypt's prestige and its acceptance within the Arab world. These efforts were also supported in principle as logical extensions of the Camp David process by some key American and Israeli officials, notably Assistant Secretary of state Richard Murphy and former Prime Minister and currently Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

King Hassan of Morocco, the moderate, pro-Western Arab leader who had officially hosted Mr. Peres last summer, also issued a critical statement following the PNC session. The Moroccan monarch was particularly incensed over Arafat’s meeting with leaders of the Algerian-backed Polisario movement, which is engaged in a conflict with Morocco.

V over the Western Sahara to address the PNC and declare that “we suffer in the Sahara what you Palestinians suffer under the Israelis.” Hassan ordered all Moroccan diplomats to boycott future meetings addressed by PLO spokesmen.

Many questions remain to be answered.

What conclusions will the Americans, Jordanians and Egyptians draw from these developments? The Israelis hope that they will conclude that the PLO is not a suitable partner for serious peace negotiations since whenever an opportunity for compromise arises it is scuttled by the more extremist elements in the organization. Will this prompt King Hussein finally to act more vigorously on his own and to intensify his efforts to recruit supporters among non-PLO Palestinians in the West Bank, or will the King be tempted to give up his efforts to seek formal peace with Israel and move once again to the sidelines to await cautiously for a more opportune time?
How significant and durable is the ostensible reconciliation achieved among the feuding Palestinian factions? Arafat declared after the close of the PNC sessions in Algiers that "this unity is a victory for our people," which would result in their united "return to Al Quds" (Jerusalem). Yet sharp personnel, tactical and ideological differences remain among the various factions. It is not clear to what extent the expansion of the Executive Committee to included Communists and other leftist elements will effectively dilute Arafat's power and further limit his freedom of action. The Executive is also to name a five member committee to run the PLO's day-to-day operations, which was regarded by some as a concession to those who have objected to Arafat's free-wheeling style.

Probably the largest question mark centers on the response of President Hafez al-Assad of Syria. Long one of Arafat's fiercest foes, Assad had backed the National Salvation Front, a coalition of Palestinians opposed to Arafat. The reconciliation between Arafat and Habash and Hawatme has seriously undercut the strength of the Syrian-backed anti-Arafat camp. According to Israeli sources, Arafat was even prepared to make up with Sabri al Banna, the head of the notorious Abu Nidal terrorist group, but that the issue of the allocation of positions rather than ideological differences prevented their reaching agreement.

Abu Nidal has in recent years been working out of Damascus. His targets have included PLO associates of Arafat's, Jordanian diplomats, Americans, Israelis and Jewish institutions in Western Europe.
It is surely not coincidental that Assad was meeting with Soviet leaders in Moscow at the time the PNC was holding its sessions in Algiers. Vasily Taratuta, the Soviet ambassador to Algeria, was actively involved during the PNC sessions to bring the rival PLO factions together. The Soviet authorities have long been embarrassed by the divisions within the PLO and by the open hostility between Assad and Arafat. At a dinner honoring Assad, on April 24, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called for unity in the Arab world and for the restoration of unity within the PLO, while emphasizing the importance he attached to Syria's role in achieving these objectives.

Gorbachev used both the carrot of additional aid and political support as well as a veiled threat in his meeting with Assad. According to Tass, Gorbachev had reaffirmed to Assad the Soviet Union's readiness to help financially hard-pressed Syria maintain its defense capability at a high level. At the same time, however, he emphasized that one could no longer suffer the waste of billions on military expenditures, which he noted pointedly hurts the economy, retards development and creates areas of tension. (Protocols for joint cooperation in commercial, industrial and technological fields were signed at the end of the visit.) Gorbachev declared his opposition to the use of military force to resolve the Arab-Israel dispute and reiterated his call for an international conference.

The common point in the Soviet, Syrian and PNC positions on the Arab-Israel conflict is opposition to the continuation of the American-
led Camp David peace process. The final statement of the Algiers PNC, as broadcast by Radio Algiers on April 26, expressed support for an international conference on the Middle East to be convened under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, China, France, the U.S. and the USSR), the parties to the dispute, "including the Palestine Liberation Organization as an equal party," and "on condition that the conference will have full authority." (This presumably means that the powers can impose a settlement on Israel.) The PNC also expressed support for a preparatory conference. It opposed Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for the solution of the Palestinian issue, and also categorically opposed "solutions and plans such as Camp David, the Reagan Plan, the autonomy plan and functional division of authority."

The Israel Defense Forces are bracing for a possible intensification of PLO attacks as the armed factions in the organization will no doubt seek to demonstrate that their militancy is not limited to rhetoric.

This is likely to be reflected in additional clashes in Southern Lebanon and along the Lebanese-Israeli border.

A crucial question is the role that will be played by the Syrians who have recently enlarged their military presence in the area.

This poses a serious dilemma for President Assad. If he tacitly cooperates with Israel in curbing the PLO, he will once again
be condemned by radicals in the Arab world. On the other hand, if he permits the PLO to operate freely against Israel, he risks the danger of provoking a massive Israeli response that may escalate into a premature war between Syria and Israel.

It is important that the United States make it clear to the Soviet Union, which continues to support both Syria and the PLO, that it expects Moscow to use its influence to impress upon Arafat and his cohorts that he can not continue to brandish the gun and wave the olive branch at the same time. If the Soviet Union is sincere in its desire for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, it must now oppose all demand a cessation of all PLO terrorist activities if it can not become a credible partner in any serious international Middle East peace effort. * * *
The Palestine National Council and the PLO
In May, 1985, during a visit to the U.S., King Hussein of Jordan announced that the PLO had privately agreed to hold peace talks with Israel on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. During his meetings with Reagan administration officials, the King stated that he and Yasir Arafat were ready to come to the peace table under the "umbrella" of an international conference.

As a first step toward such talks, Hussein proposed that the U.S. meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. According to the King, that meeting would be followed by the PLO's acceptance of Israel's right to exist and the two U.N. resolutions -- the two American conditions for recognizing the Palestinian group.

While the proposed meeting has not yet taken place, Washington has signaled that it may bypass its longstanding commitment not to negotiate with the PLO by differentiating between it and its governing body, the Palestine National Council (PNC).

Such a manufactured distinction would enable U.S. officials to meet with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian group that would include PLO members under a different label.

But, as the highest governing body of the PLO and that which is entrusted with the power to pass resolutions deciding PLO military, political and financial matters, the PNC can hardly be disassociated from the terrorist group. Indeed, it was the PNC that in 1964 adopted the PLO's National Covenant which calls for "armed struggle" against Israel and for the "liberation of Palestine." The Covenant can only be amended by a two-thirds majority vote of the PNC.

Moreover, the Council is charged with electing the PLO's Executive Committee, the organization's highest executive body. The Executive Committee is responsible for carrying out all policies, programs and plans decided by the PNC.

Despite the overwhelming evidence indicating that the PNC is at the heart of all PLO operations, there are some who suggest the existence of individuals within the PNC who have no connection to the PLO itself. Who could those individuals be? Surely not those PNC members who label themselves as belonging to one of the several PLO factions, such as Salah Khalaf and Farouk Kaddoumi of Fatah or Mohammed Abul Abbas of the Palestine Liberation Front. Perhaps they mean those in the PNC labeled as independents? But a brief look at the list of PNC "independents" shows otherwise: Shafiq al-Hout, founding PLO member and former PLO representative in Beirut and at the United Nations; Hatem I. Husseini, former director of the PLO's Information Office in Washington, D.C. and former Deputy Permanent Observer at the United Nations; and Jamal al-Surani, former PLO representative in Cairo and current member of the PLO Executive Committee, are just three examples.

Twenty-three profiles of PLO members who serve on the Palestine National Council follow. Several of those profiled have been mentioned among the prominent Palestinians who might participate in U.S. talks with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
Mohammed Abul Abbas

Mohammed Abul Abbas leads the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a small and highly fragmented faction within the PLO. The Abbas faction of the PLF is supportive of Arafat and is financed by Iraq. There is another PLF grouping in Damascus that is Syrian-controlled.

Abbas is known to be close to PLO chairman Yasir Arafat. Indeed, in gratitude for Abbas' continued loyalty and his support for Arafat when the PLO was divided into pro-Syrian and pro-Arafat segments, Arafat had him elected to the PLO's ruling Executive Committee and to the Palestine National Council in November, 1984.

Abbas' faction of the PLF is known for staging terrorist attacks that incorporate what Israeli experts call "innovative techniques." In 1981, for example, Abbas sent a group of PLF terrorists on hang gliders into northern Israel in an unsuccessful attempt to bomb an Israeli oil refinery. Later, several unsuccessful attempts were made by Abbas' men to enter Israel in hot-air balloons.

In April, 1979, Abbas took credit for ordering a raid on the Israeli town of Nahariya which resulted in the brutal slaying of four Israelis, including two children.

Abbas most recently gained world attention for his alleged role in masterminding the October 7, 1985, hijacking of the Italian cruise liner, the Achille Lauro. The ship, which was hijacked soon after its departure from port at Alexandria, Egypt, was scheduled to stop in Ashdod, Israel. In a communiqué issued after the hijacking had ended, a spokesman for Abbas' PLF stated that the real goal of the operation had not been the Achille Lauro but was a terror attack on the Israeli port of Ashdod.

Four of the Palestinian gunmen who carried out the hijacking are now in an Italian jail awaiting their trials for murder and sea piracy while Abbas is wanted by the U.S. government. In addition, Italian magistrates have issued a warrant for Abbas' arrest, charging him with complicity to commit homicide, kidnapping and hijacking, as well as belonging to a terrorist group and various weapons violations.

Abdallah Abdallah

Abdallah Abdallah has served as the PLO representative in Ottawa for over a decade. In this capacity, he was instrumental in setting up the Canadian-Arab Parliamentary Group (CAPG), an organization founded in 1983 to counterbalance the influence of the Jewish community in Canada. In 1982, Abdallah was at the center of a local controversy when he publicly charged that Canadian "Jews have a major influence in or even control of sections of the press, TV, business and government."
Ibrahim Abu-Lughod

Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, a member of the Palestine National Council, is a Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University and one of the leading pro-PLO voices in the United States.

Abu-Lughod is a former president of the pro-PLO Association of Arab-American University Graduates, an educationally oriented anti-Israel organization based in Massachusetts. He remains active in that organization and others similar to it and frequently speaks at public gatherings sponsored by pro-PLO groups.

Abu-Lughod has also written many articles for anti-Israel publications including the Arab World, published by the Arab League Information Center in New York. He was also the editor of Palestinian Rights/Affirmation and Denial, a collection of anti-Israel articles.

Father Ibrahim Ayyad

Ibrahim Ayyad, 75-years-old, is a Roman Catholic priest from Bethlehem who, since 1967 has been living in Lebanon, where he heads the Latin Church of Beirut.

Ayyad's official association with the PLO began in the late 1960's when he went on a special mission to Latin America and Europe on behalf of PLO leader Yasir Arafat.

In 1970, Ayyad led a Palestinian delegation to the U.S., Chile and Brazil. Since that time he has served as head of the PLO's Latin American section as well as Yasir Arafat's liaison to Christian organizations. Ayyad, for example, has arranged meetings in Rome between the Vatican and high-ranking PLO officials.

Over the years Ayyad has reportedly become a trusted friend to the PLO chairman. In 1977, he was appointed to the Palestine National Council.

Hani al-Hassan

Hani al-Hassan, brother of top PLO official Khaled al-Hassan, is himself a high-ranking figure in the PLO echelon. Hani al-Hassan is a political advisor to Arafat and like his brother, is a member of the Fatah Central Committee. Al-Hassan has also served as the PLO's representative in Teheran.

Shortly after the signing of the February, 1985, Jordanian-PLO agreement, al-Hassan and other key Arafat aides met with King Hussein and urged him to amend the accord. The PLO officials demanded that the agreement include an explicit commitment to an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank. Following that meeting, which took place in March, al-Hassan made a public statement attacking the core of the agreement that the PLO had reached with
Jordan. He stated that in the PLO's view, "peace means the establishment of a democratic state in all of the Palestinian territories," i.e., peace will not be achieved unless and until a PLO state is established to supplant all that is now Israel.

Khaled al-Hassan

Khaled al-Hassan is one of the founders of Fatah and a close advisor to PLO chairman Arafat. Presently chairman of the foreign relations committee of the Palestine National Council, al-Hassan is one of the most powerful leaders within the PLO. In the past, al-Hassan has served as head of the PLO's information apparatus and as a member of the Fatah Central Committee.

Over the years, Khaled al-Hassan has been described in the Western press as a moderate voice within the PLO and he is reportedly considered one of the more acceptable PLO figures to Washington.

In December, 1982, al-Hassan accompanied an Arab League delegation that came to Washington to discuss the possibility of resuming Middle East peace talks. While al-Hassan was not permitted to join the delegation in their talks with U.S. officials, his presence in Washington was heavily publicized.

Despite his "moderate" image in the West, al-Hassan's commitment to the PLO's goal of Israel's destruction remains clear. As recently as April, 1985, al-Hassan publicly declared that "there is no power in the world which can convince me that Haifa is not my homeland; that it is off-limits for me until I die... Recognizing Israel's right to exist means to recognize an unnatural entity..." Al-Hassan reiterated this position in June, 1985, during an interview with the pro-PLO East Jerusalem paper, Al-Bayder A'siyass, in which he stated that the present thrust of PLO diplomacy "is to achieve U.S. recognition of the PLO without ever altering the PLO position."

Shafiq al-Hout

Shafiq al-Hout, a founding member of the PLO and close associate of PLO chief Yasir Arafat, has served the terrorist organization in a number of high-level positions. Most recently, al-Hout served as the PLO representative in Beirut, a position he held on and off for many years, and which he maintained after the PLO's expulsion from Lebanon in 1982.

During his early years in Beirut, al-Hout was a contributing editor of Al Muhorrer, a pro-PLO daily published in Beirut. He has frequently served as a personal emissary for Arafat, carrying messages from the PLO chairman to various heads of state. In 1974, al-Hout and two other high-ranking PLO officials accompanied Arafat to New York where the chairman spoke before the United Nations. As the designated PLO spokesman during Arafat's stay, al-Hout remained in New York several weeks following the PLO chairman's address. During that time, he met with reporters and various U.N. representatives in an effort to soften American public and world opinion toward the PLO.
In addition to several more recent visits to the U.N. headquarters in New York, al-Hout has come to the U.S. to speak before several pro-PLO forums, including the second annual convention of the Palestine Congress of North America, the 1982 annual convention of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates and a one-day conference titled "The PLO 1983: Challenges Facing the Palestinian Revolution," held in 1983 in New Jersey under the auspices of several pro-Palestinian groups.

While al-Hout is generally considered a moderate within Arafat's Fatah, he is on record as calling for the continuation of the armed struggle against Israel. In December, 1984, al-Hout declared that the PLO will "always call for Arab countries surrounding our occupied territories to give us a chance to practice the armed struggle." He added that the PLO would also support a "mass struggle" in the territories by encouraging the many ways the Palestinian "people can present their resentment of occupation."

Al-Hout has publicly endorsed the infamous anti-Semitic forgery, The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, as "the pure truth." The Protocols, which is the most thoroughly discredited document in the annals of anti-Semitism, was described by al-Hout in 1978 as an accurate description of "the strategy of the Jewish movement which strives to dominate the world..."

Abdallah al-Ifranji

Abdallah al-Ifranji is currently a PLO representative in Bonn, West Germany. He is a longtime member of Arafat's PLO faction, Fatah. During the Achille Lauro affair he was quoted in Germany as a source for information about the hijacking.

Rafiq al-Natshah

Rafiq al-Natshah, a member of the Palestine National Council is the PLO representative to Saudi Arabia.

In a June 7, 1985, interview with the Saudi Arabian paper, 'Ukaz, al-Natshah denied that the PLO has any intention of accepting U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, as had been publicly suggested by Jordan's King Hussein during his visit to the U.S. in May. In an effort to portray Arafat's faction of the PLO as a willing partner to a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, King Hussein had announced that the PLO was prepared to accept the U.N. resolutions. In a clear contradiction of Hussein's assertion, al-Natshah said: "I can state that it goes without saying that the PLO leadership rejects Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Our people will never accept such resolutions... We reaffirm our rejection of these resolutions, however attractive the wrappings may be, because the content is tantamount to liquidation of the Palestinian cause."
Ahmed Abd al-Rahman

Ahmed Abd al-Rahman is chief spokesman for PLO leader Yasir Arafat and a senior member of the Palestine National Council. He is also the former spokesman for the PNC.

Al-Rahman also holds the position of editor-in-chief of the PLO's weekly publication, Filastin al-Thawra. In an April 6, 1984 Filastin al-Thawra editorial, al-Rahman wrote that "the phased policy adopted by the 1974 PNC has been misperceived (by many observers)." The PLO, he added, never renounced its goal of establishing an "independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, in Gaza and over the whole of 1948 Palestinian territory."

'Abd al-Razaq al-Yihya

'Abd al-Razaq al-Yihya, a member of the Palestine National Council, was elected to the PLO Executive Committee in 1984. Yihya is a former commander-in-chief of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), a PLO military wing originally under Arafat's command, but which has since splintered into several factions. While the PLA is largely under Syrian control, PLA units have at different times been loyal to the governments of Egypt and Jordan.

Jamal al-Surani

Jamal al-Surani, a former PLO representative in Cairo, was elected to the PLO Executive Committee in 1984. The Executive Committee is the PLO's highest executive body and is responsible for carrying out all policies, programs and plans decided by the Palestine National Council. Surani's appointment to the Executive Committee was reportedly aimed at smoothing Palestinian-Egyptian relations which had been broken when Egypt signed the 1979 Camp David peace treaty with Israel.

Salah al-Ta'amri

Salah al-Ta'amri is a Fatah military commander and a member of its supreme military council. Born in a small village on the West Bank, Ta'amri left the area after the 1967 Six Day War for Amman, Jordan, where he joined Arafat's Fatah. In 1970, he went to Beirut and assumed command of the "Young Lions" -- PLO fighting units comprised of Palestinian youths. During the 1982 war, Ta'amri served as the PLO's military commander in southern Lebanon until his capture by Israeli troops. For the remainder of the war, Ta'amri was detained at Ansar camp where he acted as the "spokesman" for his fellow Palestinian prisoners.

Khalil al-Wazir

Khalil al-Wazir, known also by his code name Abu-Jihad, is the commander-in-chief of PLO military operations under Yasir Arafat. Al-Wazir, who has
been a close aide to Arafat for more than 20 years, has maintained a reputa-
tion as an efficient organizer capable of directing both the PLO's military
actions and the organization's diplomatic overtures to the West.

In recent months, as Arafat attempted to convince Washington of the PLO's
interest in a negotiated settlement to the Middle East conflict, al-Wazir has
made several less than moderate declarations. For example, immediately
following the February 11, 1985 agreement signed by Arafat and King Hussein,
al-Wazir told the Cyprus-based Middle East Times that: "One of our [the
PLO's] main tasks in the coming phase will be continuing our struggle by any
and all means. In the occupied territories we will continue our armed
resistance against the Israeli military occupation. We will continue our
political struggle with political activity against occupation by all means...
This is the right of the people whose land has been taken - to use all means
of struggle to restore their rights and to liberate their homeland." Even
more recently, al-Wazir told a Kuwaiti paper in May that "the main option for
the revolution is armed struggle" and that "political movements were never an
alternative for armed struggle..."

Dr. Fathi Arafat

Dr. Fathi Arafat, brother of PLO chairman Yasir Arafat, is the Director
of the Palestine Red Crescent Society, the medical arm of the PLO. Dr. Arafat
is a longtime member of the Palestine National Council.

During the 1982 war in Lebanon, Arafat was at the center of a major con-
troversy concerning inflated civilian casualty figures. It was reported at
that time that Dr. Arafat had allegedly threatened the life of an official at
the American University of Beirut to force him to publish exaggerated reports
of civilian casualties which resulted from the Israeli action.

Dr. Hatem I. Hussaini

Dr. Hatem I. Hussaini has been active in the U.S. as a professional PLO
propagandist for more than a decade. From 1978 to 1982, Hussaini served as
Director of the Palestine Information Office, the PLO's registered foreign
agent in Washington, D.C. In mid-1982, Hussaini was transferred to New York
where he served until 1984 as the PLO's Deputy Permanent Observer at the
United Nations.

Hussaini's long career in the U.S. has included ten years of work at the
Washington, D.C. League of Arab States Office. In 1974-75 he served as Direc-
tor of that office.

Hussaini holds Jordanian citizenship and is a permanent resident alien in
the U.S. He is free, therefore, to travel the country and in the past years
he has traveled extensively, spreading the PLO's message in an attempt to win
support for the organization.
In addition to his activities as a speaker for the PLO, Hussaini has written extensively and his byline has appeared on the op-ed pages of the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor. He has also written articles that have appeared in smaller papers around the country, including college and university publications. Hussaini has frequently appeared on national television programs including ABC's "Nightline," and NBC's "Today Show."

In his articles, lectures and other public appearances here, Hussaini has argued that the Israelis drove the Palestinians out of their homes in 1948 and charged that the Israelis, not the Palestinians, are terrorists. In an effort to justify the PLO's continued use of the armed struggle against Israel, Hussaini declared that the Palestinians "are not terrorists, they are victims" who have "every right to pick up a gun and fight for [their] homes." Over the years, Hussaini has frequently equated the Palestinian Arab experience with the Nazi persecution of the Jews during the Holocaust.

Hussaini, moreover, has gone on record as accusing the American news media of exclusively reflecting "Zionist propaganda" and of presenting the PLO to American viewers "through Israeli eyes."

Since leaving his post as Deputy Permanent Observer of the PLO at the United Nations, Hussaini has maintained a far lower profile in this country than he had in many years.

Sabri Jiryis

Sabri Jiryis is a Palestinian Christian born in an Arab village in the Galilee. Jiryis, a leading Palestinian intellectual, was educated at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He left Israel in 1970 for Beirut where he soon became head of the Israel section of the Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, the research arm of the PLO. Later on, in 1977, Jiryis became director of the Institute of Palestine Studies, a Palestinian think-tank that has worked in close cooperation with the PLO's Research Center and the University of Kuwait.

Jiryis is considered the PLO's leading expert on Israel and Zionism and has written several books that are highly critical of the Israeli government.

In 1976, Jiryis was sent by PLO chief Arafat to the United States for the purpose of opening the Palestine Information Office in Washington, D.C. Jiryis, however, was soon ordered out of the U.S. after providing false information on his visa application.

Jiryis, who is often described in the Western press as a PLO moderate, currently heads the Palestine Research Center, now based in Cyprus.

Farouk Kaddoumi

Farouk Kaddoumi, one of the founders of Fatah, is head of the PLO political department. Kaddoumi, regarded by the PLO as its "foreign minister," is a
senior member of the Fatah Executive Committee and a member of the Palestine National Council.

Long considered one of Fatah's "hardliners," Kaddoumi has had close contacts with the Socialist and Marxist factions of the PLO and has been a frequent visitor to Moscow.

Kaddoumi, who was once among Arafat's closest advisors, has become increasingly critical of the PLO chief's leadership in recent years. In the aftermath of the Lebanon war, for example, Kaddoumi publicly criticized the conduct of the PLO leadership and hinted, without naming Arafat, that the chairman had operated beyond agreed policy parameters. More recently, Kaddoumi has voiced his opposition to the agreement signed between Jordan's King Hussein and Arafat on February 11, 1985.

Kaddoumi's reputation as a "hardliner" might be owed to the fact that he has been particularly outspoken in terms of his hostility to Israel. For instance, he is on record for statements such as: "The Palestinian fighters will continue their actions in the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip... we shall never allow Israel to live in peace. We shall never allow it to enjoy total security. Every Israeli should know that behind every wall there could be a guerrilla fighter intending to shoot him."

Said Kamal

Said Kamal is a deputy to Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO's political department. Kamal is reportedly a close aide to Yasir Arafat and has been a member of the Palestine National Council for many years.

In the course of the last two decades, Kamal has served as the PLO's representative to the Islamic foreign minister's conference in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia, and as the PLO delegate in Cairo.

In a January, 1984 interview with the Egyptian weekly, Akhbar Al-Yom, Kamal stated that the PLO has set aside the military option in its struggle with Israel and is presently opting for a political solution. But, he added, this is only a "tactical, not strategic, move dictated by the circumstances imposed" on the PLO. Kamal's remark underscores the fact that the PLO has not renounced the "armed struggle" mandated in the Palestine National Covenant, but rather that the PLO will seek to achieve its goal of destroying Israel through political means.

Salah Khalaf

Salah Khalaf, member of the PLO Executive Committee, the organization's highest executive body, and a ranking member of the Fatah Central Committee, has been a close associate of Arafat's since their student days together more than 25 years ago.
Known also by his code name of Abu Iyad, Khalaf is one of the most powerful leaders in the PLO and is generally regarded as the number two official in Fatah.

While Khalaf is a close advisor to Arafat, his views do not necessarily coincide or reflect those of the PLO chairman. For example, Khalaf has repeatedly voiced his opposition to the February, 1985 framework agreement for Middle East talks that was signed by Arafat and Jordan's King Hussein.

Khalaf is perhaps best known for his leadership of Black September, the terrorist arm of Fatah which has claimed responsibility for such brutal acts of violence as the September, 1972 Munich Olympic massacre in which nine Israeli athletes were murdered. Khalaf has also served as the commander of PLO terrorist operations on the West Bank and of the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

Elia Khoury

Elia Khoury, the Episcopalian Archbishop of Jerusalem is a member of both the Palestine National Council and the PLO Executive Committee. The Executive Committee is the PLO's highest executive body and is responsible for carrying out all policies, programs and plans decided by the PNC. In May, 1985, Khoury was among the individuals chosen by PLO chairman Arafat to participate in a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that may meet with U.S. government officials.

Khoury was also one of two PLO officials who had been invited to London by Prime Minister Thatcher for talks scheduled for November, 1985, with the British Foreign Secretary. The meeting was later aborted when Khoury and the other PLO official, Mohammed Milhelm, refused to sign a previously agreed to statement recognizing Israel's right to exist.

Edward Said

Edward Said, Parr Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University is a member of the Palestine National Council. Said's renown as an academic figure within the PLO leadership has made him an attractive spokesman for the organization.

An articulate speaker, Said has frequently addressed anti-Israel forums sponsored by such pro-PLO groups as the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, and the Palestine Human Rights Campaign. In fact, he was a founding member of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates and has continued to be active in this and similar groups.

Said's preeminence as a PLO spokesman in the United States was illustrated in 1981 when the U.S. State Department recommended him as a possible American intermediary to the PLO. More recently, in the spring of 1985, Said was named as a possible participant in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that may meet with representatives of the Reagan administration.
Nabil Shaath

Nabil Shaath, born in Jaffa, joined the PLO relatively recently after a career as an Assistant Professor of Business Administration at the University of Beirut and subsequently, as a Cairo businessman. In 1982, Shaath became a foreign policy advisor to PLO chief Yasir Arafat. He has since served as head of the PLO Planning Department in Beirut and was recently elected chairman of Fatah's Department of Economics. In 1984, Shaath was appointed to his second term in the Palestine National Council.

* * *
FANNING THE FLAMES OF HATRED—THE GRENEL ON PALESTINE

UNITED NATIONS, (WNP)—In a recent press release, the UN proclaimed the convocation of a Seminar/Symposium on "the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People" in New Delhi from the 8th of June through the 12th.

This confab of hatred, sponsored by the notorious "Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People"—a cover for the dissemination of anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish propaganda—is financed from the regular contributions of Member States to the UN budget, as are all the seminars like the one in New Delhi.

A look at some of the participants, disguised as experts, at the Indian hatefest is enough to forecast its outcome. The most prominently represented nationality, believe it or not, is Ukrainians! The Ukrainian delegate to the UN has been named to chair the "authoritative" and "objective" version of "the UN and the Question of Palestine." His co-nationals, in the company of the likes of a Cuban, a Jordanian, a Syrian, and a Russian, were to speak on "The International Peace Conference on the Middle East,"

No doubt, objectivity will be ensured here, too, by the equitable geographical distribution of the panelists, an objectivity guaranteed also for the topic earmarked the "Role of the PLO" and entrusted to what is euphemistically described as "Palestinian".

All the participants, including those servicing the meeting of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) held at the same time, will be paid by the UN, which will also bear all the other costs of the Seminar:

At a time of financial crisis, one may well ask: Can a justification be found for this continued criminal squandering of UN funds? Do those responsible for this outrage believe that this is the way to get the United States Congress to approve payment of the so-called U.S. arrears? If they do, let them send the UN press release to the Members of the Appropriation Committees of the Senate and of the House. If they don't, let our readers, instead, send a copy of this column to their Representatives in Washington.

Let them also urge that our Representatives at the UN ask that this superfluous Committee be abolished, the Seminar of Hate be cancelled and let the Representatives of Jewish Non-Governmental Organizations urge their fellow representatives to boycott such despicable activities.

The American taxpayer has the right to insist that his or her money should not be used for purposes which the UN should condemn as much as they do themselves.

If not, the U.S. should withhold its contribution to the UN budget until that is done, and the saving together with those from the non-payment of Mr. Waldheim's pension are spent on worthy causes.

As a footnote to the above your correspondent is moved to cite the following brief meaningful passage from George F. Will's column appearing in the current issue of Newsweek—a column which in its logic and wisdom easily snuffs out the New Delhi pro-PLO "flames of hatred":

"It has been 20 years since those six days that shook the world. Because of what happened then, Israel never again will be 12 miles wide at the waist. Because of the war, the West Bank, which Jordan seized militarily and held for 19 years, is rightfully Israel's to dispose of as it seems prudent and, because of the echoing thunderclap from Israel 20 June 1967, the security of Israel and hence the spiritual well-being of world Jewry have been enhanced. The Holocaust ended in 1945, but the Holocaust as aspiration was not destroyed until June 1967, then Israelashed encircling armies that had the inescapably genocidal mission of obliterating the national gathering of Jews..."

As regards King Hussein's claims, author Will has this to say:

"Furthermore, if the aggressor seized the land unawfully, as Jordan had, the state acquiring it in an act of self-defense has a superior claim to the land..."

Take note, UN, and all ye who cry for the convocation of an international peace conference under the hegemony of pro-PLO Security Council Members.
SOVIETS MUST PROVE GLASNOST IN DEEDS, NOT WORDS

UNITED NATIONS, (WNP)—The Soviets "must demonstrate" their glasnost sincerely in deeds and not simply in words," President Reagan's new National Security chief Frank C. Carlucci warned in a policy address delivered at the recent 81st anniversary annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee held at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in New York.

"Their support for an International Conference, which they have kept disturbingly devoid of details," the dynamic Carlucci emphasized, "is designed to convey a commitment to peace, highlight apparent identity of views with countries like Egypt and Jordan, and appeal to Israel." But, he added, "if we were convinced the Soviets were seriously committed to peace in the region, there would be no interest in excluding them. Then they would have something useful to contribute..."

"Of the new Soviet activism in the Middle East, that does not necessarily contribute to peace" but can be "characterized by several different tracks. He enumerated the following:

"With the Arab world, the Soviets are pursuing a propaganda track which stresses peace; an overt diplomatic track which stresses better relations with moderate, Western-oriented states; and a covert diplomatic track of reinforcing, radicalizing and increasing their control over the PLO and maintaining leverage over Syria.

"With Israel, they are emphasizing the desire for peace, offering tangible prospects of greatly increased emigration—direct to Israel—and holding out the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations. This, at the same time that their efforts in Algiers produced a more rejectionist, radical PLO."

Turning to U.S. policy in the area, Carlucci stated:

"We cannot afford to be idle in the face of greater Soviet activism, particularly when that activism may narrow the choices available to Israel and to moderate regimes.

"In the Arab-Israeli context, we have adopted a two-track approach...This is all the more urgent after the Algiers meeting of the Palestine National Council, as the 20th anniversary of the occupation approaches, and we see signs of stepped-up PLO terrorism against Israel..."

The new National Security chief continued to emphasize that "peace cannot be imposed or achieved instantly, at a single meeting. It can only come gradually, through give-and-take of direct bilateral negotiations... It is not for the U.S. to decide Israel's course and Israel's future. This is for Israelis to decide. For our part, we are prepared to continue our efforts with both Prime Minister Shamir and Foreign Minister Peres."

While the U.S. is waiting for deeds to show if there is a new spirit by the USSR in the Middle East, Israel is waiting for the outcome of the Shamir-Peres wrangle on an international conference to prepare or jeopardize her bilateral negotiations with one or the other of her Arab neighbors. The U.S., too, is awaiting the outcome.

The only power which seems to be doing anything other than wait is the USSR, who is watching what she is doing in the Middle East other than proclaiming "glasnost"?

The latest event in the Persian Gulf may be an ominous indication that the USSR is up to her old tricks.
The reelection of Yasser Arafat as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the conclusion of the Palestine National Council (PNC) session, in Algiers on April 26, and the return to the fold of major radical leaders who had vehemently opposed his policies demonstrated once again his uncanny ability to survive in the treacherous waters of Middle East intrigue. Five years after the PLO's military base in Lebanon was smashed by the Israelis and Arafat's armed forces were ignominiously dispersed throughout the Middle East, he appears once again to have emerged as the pre-eminent Palestinian political figure.

Arafat's success in bringing his fragmented organization together may, however, prove to be only a Pyrrhic victory for the Palestinian people. For the sake of organizational unity, Arafat now feels constrained to cater to the extreme elements which reject any negotiated settlement with Israel. The growing strength of the hardliners in the PLO was reflected in several actions:

1. The formal abrogation by the PLO, on the eve of the Palestine National Council session, of the February 1985 agreement between Arafat and King Hussein. This would have provided for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating team to enter peace talks with Israel under international auspices on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and would have sought to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. (Hussein had already broken off discussions with Arafat in the spring of 1986 because of the alleged failure of the PLO to live up to the agreement, but Hussein has insisted that the terms of the accord are still valid.) Arafat went on to declare at the plenary session of the PNC -- which the PLO regards as its "parliament in exile" -- that the Palestinians would not lay down their guns "until the independent Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem" is established.

2. The continued presence on the PLO Executive Committee of Mohammad Abbas, the mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking who is wanted for murder by the United States in the killing of Leon Klinghoffer, a disabled American passenger on the cruise ship. (Arafat had reportedly wanted him dropped because he did not fit the new peaceful image the PLO was trying to project. Abbas will hold on to his seat until his fragmented Palestine Liberation Front can agree on a successor.)
3. The adoption of an anti-Egyptian and anti-American line as the price for the renewed participation in the PNC and its Executive Committee of the radical pro-Soviet Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine headed by George Habash, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine headed by Nayef Hawatmeh, and the Palestine Communist Party. Hawatmeh said that to be acceptable to the PLO, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak would have to "retreat from the Camp David agreement, stop promulgation of its policies and the Reagan peace plan--any plan that ignores the rights of Palestinian independence and any peace conference without the full participation of the PLO."

The Egyptian delegation walked out of the conference after Habash and Hawatmeh succeeded, over Arafat's objections, to have the PNC reiterate support for earlier resolutions condemning the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and linking any improvement of PLO-Egyptian relations to the extent of Egypt's distancing itself from the Camp David Accords. The PLO Executive Committee is to work out the details of future PLO-Egyptian relations. This did not mollify the Egyptians. After meeting with President Mubarak, Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel-Meguid announced on April 27, the day after the end of the PNC session, that all PLO offices in Egypt "except those that deal with labor and women's affairs" would be shut down because of "the aggressive attitude of the Palestine National Council" and to "put an end to this insolence" by the PLO.

President Mubarak has now joined King Hussein, who last July closed most PLO offices in Jordan, in displaying official annoyance with the PLO. The present state of affairs appears to be a serious setback for the efforts of Osama al-Baz, Mubarak's senior adviser on foreign affairs, who had worked hard to get Arafat and Hussein together and to come up with a formula that would bring the Palestinians into comprehensive negotiations with Israel in a way that would also serve to enhance Egypt's prestige and its acceptance within the Arab world. These efforts were also supported in principle as logical extensions of the Camp David process by some key American and Israeli officials, notably Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy and former Prime Minister and currently Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

King Hassan of Morocco, the moderate, pro-Western Arab leader who had officially hosted Mr. Peres last summer, also issued a critical statement following the PNC session. The Moroccan monarch was particularly incensed because Arafat had permitted a Moroccan-born representative of the secessionist movement in the Western Sahara to address the PNC and declare that "we suffer in the Sahara what you Palestinians suffer under the Israelis." Hassan ordered all Moroccan diplomats to boycott future meetings addressed by PLO spokesmen.

Many questions remain to be answered.

What conclusions will the Americans, Jordanians and Egyptians draw from these developments? The Israelis hope that they will conclude that
the PLO is not a suitable partner for serious peace negotiations since whenever an opportunity for compromise arises it is scuttled by the more extremist elements in the organization. Will this prompt King Hussein finally to act more vigorously on his own and to intensify his efforts to recruit supporters among non-PLO Palestinians in the West Bank, or will the King be tempted to give up his efforts to seek formal peace with Israel and move once again to the sidelines to await cautiously for a more opportune time?

How significant and durable is the ostensible reconciliation achieved among the feuding Palestinian factions? Arafat declared after the close of the PNC sessions in Algiers that "this unity is a victory for our people," which would result in their united "return to Al Quds" (Jerusalem). Yet sharp personal, tactical and ideological differences remain among the various factions. It is not clear to what extent the expansion of the Executive Committee to include Communists and other leftist elements will effectively dilute Arafat's power and further limit his freedom of action. The Executive is also to name a five member committee to run the PLO's day-to-day operations, which was regarded by some as a concession to those who have objected to Arafat's free-wheeling style.

Probably the largest question mark centers on the response of President Hafez al-Assad of Syria. Long one of Arafat's fiercest foes, Assad had backed the National Salvation Front, a coalition of Palestinians opposed to Arafat. The reconciliation between Arafat and Habash and Hawatme has seriously undercut the strength of the Syrian-backed anti-Arafat camp. According to Israeli sources, Arafat was even prepared to make up with Sabri al Banna, the head of the notorious Abu Nidal terrorist group, but the issue of the allocation of positions rather than ideological differences prevented their reaching agreement. Abu Nidal has in recent years been working out of Damascus. His targets have included PLO associates of Arafat's, Jordanian diplomats, Americans, Israelis and Jewish institutions in Western Europe.

It is surely not coincidental that Assad was meeting with Soviet leaders in Moscow at the time the PNC was holding its sessions in Algeria. Vasily Taratuta, the Soviet ambassador to Algeria, was actively involved during the PNC sessions in bringing the rival PLO factions together. The Soviet authorities have long been embarrassed by the divisions within the PLO and by the open hostility between Assad and Arafat. At a dinner honoring Assad, on April 24, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called for unity in the Arab world and for the restoration of unity within the PLO, while emphasizing the importance he attached to Syria's role in achieving these objectives.

Gorbachev used both the carrot of additional military aid and political support as well as a veiled threat in his meeting with Assad. According to Tass, Gorbachev had reaffirmed to Assad the Soviet Union's readiness to help financially hard-pressed Syria maintain its defense capability at a high level. At the same time, however, Gorbachev emphasized that one could no longer suffer the waste of billions on
military expenditures, which he noted pointedly hurts the economy, retards development and creates areas of tension. (Protocols for joint cooperation in commercial, industrial and technological fields were signed at the end of the visit.) Gorbachev declared his opposition to the use of military force to resolve the Arab-Israel dispute and reiterated his call for an international conference. Assad's declared goal has been to achieve "strategic parity" with Israel to enable Syria to enter any negotiations from a position of strength.

The common point in the Soviet, Syrian and PNC positions on the Arab-Israel conflict is opposition to the continuation of the American-led Camp David peace process. The final statement of the Algiers PNC, as broadcast by Radio Algiers on April 26, expressed support for an international conference on the Middle East to be convened under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, China, France, the U.S. and the USSR), the parties to the dispute, "including the Palestine Liberation Organization as an equal party," and "on condition that the conference will have full authority." (This presumably means that the powers can impose a settlement on Israel.) The PNC also expressed support for a preparatory conference. It opposed Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for the solution of the Palestinian issue, and also categorically opposed "solutions and plans such as Camp David, the Reagan Plan, the autonomy plan and functional division of authority."

The Israel Defense Forces are bracing for a possible intensification of PLO attacks as the armed factions in the organization will no doubt seek to demonstrate that their militancy is not limited to rhetoric. This is likely to be reflected in terrorist acts within Israel and additional clashes in Southern Lebanon and along the Lebanese-Israeli border.

A crucial question is the role that will be played by the Syrians who have recently enlarged their military presence in Lebanon. This poses a dilemma for President Assad. If he tacitly cooperates with Israel in curbing the PLO, he will once again be condemned by radicals in the Arab world. On the other hand, if he permits the PLO to operate freely against Israel, he risks the danger of provoking a massive Israeli response that may escalate into a premature war between Syria and Israel.

It is important that the United States make it clear to the Soviet Union, which continues to support both Syria and the PLO, that it expects Moscow to use its influence to impress upon Arafat and his cohorts that they cannot continue to brandish the gun and wave the olive branch at the same time. Until the Soviet Union acts firmly to oppose all PLO terrorist activities it cannot become a credible partner in any serious international Middle East peace effort.
STATEMENT
BY
AMBASSADOR JOEL BARROMI, ISRAEL
IN THE
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE
ITEM 75
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES
29 OCTOBER 1984

Check Against Delivery
My delegation has studied with all due attention the Report of the High Commissioner of UNRWA (document A/39/13). We wish to express our sincere appreciation for the good work done.

We would be less than candid, however, if we would refrain from pointing out that the efforts made by the High Commissioner and his office to give an objective assessment of events and activities have not been fully successful.

Sometimes this may have been caused by faulty communication. For instance, in the statement made in this committee in October 23rd, the efforts of Israel to relocate refugees at Beit Lahiya to new lodgings and to demolish the shaky and unsanitary shelters left by them, were described as "coercive efforts."

The real situation is of course absolutely different. The actual facts are that the refugees are not put under any pressure whatsoever to move into the Rehabilitation Project. On the contrary, the number of housing solutions the administration can offer is several times surpassed by the number of applicants. It is therefore clear that no "coercive efforts" are needed.

The Beit-Lahiya housing project is a prestige enterprise. A refugee who opts for, and is admitted into this project is given a plot with complete infrastructure, (such as roads, electricity,
sewage and water supply). He is also given grants and cheap loans. Each shelter vacated in the refugees' camps is fully compensated for; additionally, the carpentry, the bricks, and the other materials can be used for the erection of the new house, which is also helpful in meeting the expenses.

No shelter had been demolished in order to make a refugee move to a project which is, as stated previously, overbooked. In the Jabaliya Refugees' Camp, the authorities had to take action to clear the streets from rubble and to ensure that the newly vacated space would remain clear, increasing the amount of sorely lacking public area.

More serious is the fact that whenever loss of life, limb, or property is attributed to the Israel authorities, numbers of victims and costs of damages are spelled out in great detail. Thus, paragraph 8 which refers to an Israeli air-raid on Baalbek specifies as follows: "On 4 January an Israeli air-raid on a building near Wavell camp in Baalbek killed 15 refugees and wounded 125, destroyed the accommodation of seven refugee families in the barracks kitchen area and 52 individual shelters, and damaged 66 refugee shelters. Agency installations in the camp, including two schools were damaged."
When however death and ruin on a large scale were brought about by other parties and in other areas of Lebanon, the report resorts to an uncommitted, ambiguous language. It will be recalled that from November 3 to November 26 Tripoli in the north was the battlefield for rival Fatah factions, some of them sponsored by Syria. The casualties were estimated by Mr. Reto Meister, head of the local branch of the International Committee of the Red Cross, at 438 dead and 2100 injured. Yet in paragraph 6 of the report, these developments are summarized only in the following terms: "On 4 November, intense fighting broke out in and around Nahr el-Bared and Beddawi camps and Tripoli town. The Agency
mounted an emergency operation to assure essential services and alleviate suffering as soon as it had access to the refugees, in some cases while fighting continued. The conflict in the north died down in December.

Likewise paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 referring to the fighting that took place in and around Beirut in September '83, February '84 and June '84 respectively, refrain from stating actual facts and figures. For example paragraph 9 reads as follows: "In February, heavy fighting broke out once again in the Beirut area and again the Lebanon Field Office premises had to be closed, with operations controlled from the Agency's Central Warehouse. During this fighting, non-essential international staff in the Lebanon Field Office were evacuated for a brief period. All have since returned, and the international staffing in Lebanon has actually been strengthened". Casualty figures are again omitted; though there were no less than 189 dead and 45 injured. Much would have been gained, moreover, if the description of the main developments had included a mention of the chain of causes and effects. We believe that it is important for this committee to learn that the Baalbek air-raid was a military action aimed at hostile, fanatic forces responsible for some of the most heinous terrorist acts, car bombings and the shellings of residential areas.

We feel likewise that the SPC should have been told that the havoc in Beirut did not happen by itself. It was the consequence of the collapse of the authority of the Lebanese government, deliberately brought about by Syria.

Indeed one of the striking features of this year's report is the absence of any substantial reference to Syria. Still Syria was in 1983-1984, as often in the past, the main actor in the Lebanese scene.
Not only has Syria grossly intervened in Lebanon's political affairs, but Syrian troops took direct part in the fighting in the Beq'a Valley during the summer of 1983 and in and around Beirut in the autumn of the year under review. In full justice, the present plight of the Lebanese people has to be laid at Syria's door.

The High Commissioner's office could have better approached Lebanon's real problems, had it consulted the statement made by the representative of Lebanon, Mr. Abouassi, last year in this committee in its 34th meeting, on November 18, 1983. According to the summary record the representative of Lebanon said that "for the last 15 years, the camps had been transformed into closed and fortified barracks". This goes a long way to explain the danger posed to Israel from these military bases and the need for counterattack. In the same statement the representative of Lebanon complained that "In north Lebanon and in the Beq'a non-Lebanese forces were still illegally present and exercising effective control". He stressed his country's "determination to liberate its national soil from all unauthorized non-Lebanese forces and to extend the unifying authority of the state to every inch of its territory". In other passages he said that "the Lebanese people had been facing tragedy, suffering and destruction" and that the security of the Lebanese civilians had been impaired. The Lebanese representative spoke, for obvious reasons, in cautious terms. Yet, what could be the unauthorized forces occupying Northern Lebanon and the Beq'a Valley if not the Syrian army, its allies and its vassals? Is it really possible to ignore the responsibility of Syria for the agony and despair of the Lebanese people of those regions?

Admittedly all United Nation organs work under severe pressures and more often than not feel bound to heed them. This is the sad reality of today's United Nations. A typical example is the statement included...
in the foreword of the report, according to which, UNRWA has become an "important political factor" in the Middle East. The foreword affirms that: "Because of the refugees' perception of UNRWA as a token of international commitment to their cause .... the Agency has become an important factor in the overall Middle East political context."

UNRWA was established in 1949 as a Relief and Working Agency. It still bears that name. The states which took the initiative of setting up the organization and which generously contributed to its upkeep during 35 years wanted to alleviate the hardships faced by the refugees and ensure their swift absorption into productive and gainful work. In 1952 the then Director General of UNRWA, John B. Blandford, presented his 3-year plan for reintegration, with the aim of promoting the integration of the refugees into "the economics of the countries in which they were now sheltered", thus contributing to welfare of the concerned countries as well. A draft resolution endorsing the plan, was introduced by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/AC-53/L.36, 21 Jan. 1952).

It is of interest to note that the proposal drew the vehement protest of Mustafa Bey of Egypt, Mr. Al-Jamali of Iraq and Mr. Choukayri (who later became the first chairman of the PLO), representing Syria. Their contention was that "the joint draft resolution, instead of dealing exclusively with assistance to refugees, referred to plans for the development of the countries of the Near East, and thus encroached upon the sovereignty of those states. The item before the Committee concerned the plight of refugees pending the solution of outstanding problems in accordance with General Assembly resolutions". I have quoted the summary record of the statement of the Egyptian representative in the Ad-Hoc
Political Committee of the 6th session of the General Assembly, on January 10th, 1952.

Equally noteworthy was that in the same session the Soviet representative Mr. Tsarapkin, invited the US and other countries to cease to interfere in the affairs of Palestine and other Middle Eastern countries, "leaving the population of these countries to settle their differences among themselves".

Eventually the draft resolution was adopted. The belief of the General Assembly was that the 3 years reintegration plan would provide for the successful settlement of the refugee problem. There was no doubt that international assistance to the refugees would be only of a temporary nature.

Nobody envisaged then that UNRWA would carve for itself a permanent role in the political mosaic of the Middle East. UNRWA was meant to be a temporary humanitarian agency and not a political barony, with its evergrowing network of offices, facilities, with a retinue of over 17,000 officials, claiming increased benefits and even a slot of their own in the permanent United Nations budget.

This is certainly an unhealthy process which should not be allowed to continue unchecked. In previous years my delegation has pointed out the lack of logic of this inordinate expenditure. Last year in the 33rd meeting the Israel representative in this committee showed that UNRWA spends ten times more for each refugee than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. There is certainly reason to wonder why the standards thought fit for refugees of other areas, be it Africa, Asia, or Europe, should be considered insufficient or inadequate by UNRWA.
The answer given by Arab delegations in this Committee is that the case of the Palestinian refugees is unique and deserves a privileged treatment.

The uniqueness of the Palestinian problem is a pivotal element in the presentation of their case. To sustain it they display a massive array of historical arguments. At the end of 1984 the technique of misrepresentation of facts and of rewriting history, prophesized by George Orwell, has become very advanced indeed.

I have already mentioned in my previous interventions who is responsible for the main exodus of the Palestinian refugees. If I refrain from elaborating on this subject now it is because we feel that protracted polemics on past events may divert the attention of this committee from the real problems of our time.
We believe that the SPC should concentrate on the essentials. The first point is a thorough understanding of the economic, social and demographic changes in the populations of the Middle East. Migrations from one Middle Eastern country to another are phenomena of major significance, whose origins are traced back to the beginning of the last century. The Arab population of Palestine, for instance, during the episode of the British Mandate, that is up to 1948, was to a large extent the product of migratory currents. Members of the SPC would be well advised to consult the recently published book on this subject, by Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict Over Palestine.

This work describes in detail how waves of Arab immigrants poured into the country during and prior to the British Mandate, attracted by the opportunities offered by the emerging and vibrant economy of the Jewish areas. Sir Winston Churchill noted in the debate in Parliament on the White Paper on the 22nd May, 1939, that "Arabs have crowded into the country" in greater numbers than Jews. Indeed the British census for 1931 shows that among the Moslems of Palestine there were natives of Syria, Egypt, the Hijaz and Nejd (in today's Saudi Arabia) Iraq, and even of remote countries such as Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia. Non-Arab Moslems immigrated from Persia, Turkey, Georgia and Albania. The Christian population was just as mixed. Likewise, according to the same census, the Moslems spoke no less than 23 languages, including Afghan, Bosnian, Circassian, Kurdish, and Turkish.
In recent times Arab migration has been mainly directed at the oil rich Arab countries of the Gulf area. According to the Arab Press Service of June 1984, Palestinian population in that region is estimated approximately at 500,000 people. For example, they constitute some 20% of the population in Kuwait and 14% of the population in Qatar. They mingle with other Arab migrants, attracted by high salaries. Asian workers too move to the Gulf area often under conditions of duress and exploitation.

The refugees of the Arab Israeli wars became part and parcel of this large population movement. Their overall number was one and a half million, half of them Arabs and half of them Jewish. Arab and Jewish refugees fled the zones of military operations in 1948; Jewish refugees abandoned their homes in the Arab countries in the fifties, Arab refugees left in 1967. More recently Lebanese of different ethnic and religious affiliations lost their homes in the fighting which has been ravaging their country since 1975, caused by internecine conflicts and foreign intervention.

At the price of much anguish and suffering a new reality emerged. The influx of outside workers invigorated the economy of scarcely populated countries. In the Gulf the newly arrived attained high standards of living, thanks to the commercial, banking and industrial development that followed the Middle East oil boom. In Israel the Jewish refugees were accepted as brothers;
and were absorbed, let us not forget, at the price of no little deprivation, sacrifice and social tension. Arab refugees in Judea, Samaria and Gaza benefitted from the dramatic rise in income and living conditions that took place in the Israeli administered areas. It should be added that in these districts the refugee problem is of a comparatively limited scale. As indicated on page 49 of the Report, the population figures included there exceed reality. Actually the number of refugees living in camps in Judea, Samaria and Gaza is 240,000. Moreover, as explained in paragraph 135 of the Report, these camps have lost their initial connotation and have become low income quarters at the edge of the cities and towns inhabited by refugees and non-refugees alike. On the other hand, many refugees have become affluent and live in high income areas. It should be remembered that refugees living in camps constitute only 35.23 percent of the UNRWA-registered refugee population, according to UNRWA figures (paragraph 134).

The displacement and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of human beings was certainly a distressing experience. By now however the process of social restructuring through economic progress is well advanced, in Judea, Samaria and Gaza and in the Middle East in general. Certainly it could be completed within a reasonable time were it not for the interference of external factors.
The Middle East is a realm of lost opportunities and this is my second point. In 1949, the neighboring Arab states - with the exception of Iraq - signed armistice agreements with Israel. The first article of those agreements stated that they constituted a step towards the restoration of peace. It could be assumed that the Arab states would make a sincere effort to absorb the Palestinian refugees into their societies and economies, out of purely humanitarian reasons and in order to improve the overall political climate, without prejudice to political stances; international aid was available. The Arab governments however willfully prevented the integration of the refugees, spurned the Blanford Plan and all other plans of cooperation with the United Nations and went so far as to deny the refugees the rights of citizenship. They rejected all proposals of regional development and of joint water management, such as the Johnston Plan of 1955. When in 1963 a number of African and Latin-American countries tabled in this Committee a proposal calling for negotiations between the parties on all outstanding issues, the Arab states rose in fury. The Jordanian delegate, Mr. Rifa'i said ... "The term refugee should not be taken to mean a poor, helpless group of refugees whose problem was how to feed themselves and where to settle. The Palestinian Arab refugee, in the real sense of the term, was every Palestinian Arab who laid a national claim on every part of Palestine under Israel occupation."
I am quoting his statement in the 398th meeting of the SPC on November 4th, 1963. Note should be taken that this reference to "Israeli Occupation of Palestine" was made three and a half years before 1967 and therefore refers to the 1949 armistice lines. Two weeks later, Mr. Rifa'i voiced his rejection of any accord in an unequivocal way, stating (in the 414th meeting of the SPC on November 20th, 1963) that "As to the substance of the draft, his delegation was astonished to see that the text, which deliberately ignored the most salient facts that had emerged during the debate, requested the Governments concerned to undertake direct negotiations with a view to finding an agreed solution for the question. That was both strange and regrettable, and could not fail to detract from the seriousness of the Committee's work".

Clearly the Arab states did not take to heart the conditions of the refugees or even the welfare of their own peoples. They wanted first and foremost to blot Israel out of the map of the Middle East. They worked at this by different means: diplomatic pressure, economic boycott and sheer violence. In the fifties they recruited among the refugees gangs of marauders, the so-called Fedayeen, who infiltrated into Israel to kill and loot. In 1964 the Arab states' summit set up the PLO. They gave logistic and financial support to the PLO murderous raids and outrages, causing an escalation which led to the 1967 war. In the seventies,
the PLO grew into a major center of international terrorism and the Arab states became shareholders of this sinister enterprise. They supplied the PLO with bases, weapons, money, false diplomatic identities; they transmitted PLO messages through diplomatic pouch. They offered haven to airplane hijackers. With their blessings, the blessing of states members of the United Nations, the refugee camps became again recruiting grounds. Young people were led into joining the ranks of terrorist's organizations and to commit horrible crimes at the risk of their own lives.

In the business of terrorism, certain Arab states were only dormant partners. Others such as Libya, Syria and Iraq actively directed and participated in the terrorist operations. Much can be written on the threat that the Mukhabarat, that is, the secret services of these states, pose to life and security around the globe.

True, the Arab states were not the only ones who engaged in this senseless adventure. The Soviet Union and other communist countries supplied the PLO with sophisticated weaponry, training, expertise and information. They too share the responsibility for the turmoil and violence still prevailing in our area.

The victims of this continuous belligerence are the civilian population, particularly the dispossessed, many of them refugees. Violence hampers economic activities, disrupts community ties,
sets different peoples and ethnic groups one against the other. It is difficult to foresee today what set of forces will carry the day. On one hand, there are the needs of the peoples, the demands of economic development, the urge for technological progress and social integration. On the other hand stands a policy of hostility and hatred. It has been made ever more dangerous by the appearance of a twin headed alliance of aberrant religious fundamentalism and ruthless left-wing radicalism.

It is against this shifting and uncertain background that UNRWA is carrying out its mandate. Considering these obstacles the job done by the Agency has been a remarkable one. We were especially impressed by the chapters on medical assistance, education and vocational training.

Israel too will continue its efforts to improve the lot of the refugees, notwithstanding the difficulties caused by the present economic retrenchment. The settlement project in the Gaza District mentioned in paragraph 141 of the Report is a case in point.

At the same time Israel has not relinquished its hopes for peace and cooperation with its neighbors. Prime Minister Peres has already publicly invited the King of Jordan to take part in negotiations. It would be easy for the two countries to embark on a joint development plan that could eliminate the pockets of poverty among the refugees and raise the general standard of the entire population of the area.

This may seem today improbable, but in the Middle East the unseen often happens and sometimes dreams come true.
Selma G Hirsh

Dec 26 1985

Marc Jamieson -

Note the attachment to the description of this publication as a "periodic publication" -

It's the first I've seen.

Had you seen it?

S.
date: December 27, 1985

to: Marc Tanenbaum

from: David Geller


Last night on a FOCUS segment of MacNeil-Lehrer, there was an interview with Arafat conducted by Charlene Hunter-Gault. During the interview there were movie clips from the BBC-Panorama program. The clips were full of biased and distorted scenes, viz. pictures of the small, older section of the refugee camp with no shot of the new homes constructed by the Israelis, which are almost immediately adjacent. In addition, there were shots of Arab workers going by bus to their places of employment with the narrator gratuitously comparing it to workers of Soweto(!) going to work. In another section, referring to the murder of the three Israeli tourists on their yacht in Cyprus, the narrator repeats the PLO charge that they were Israeli agents, with no attempt to remind the audience that the perpetrators themselves had admitted that they were innocent civilians.
The entire segment was broadcast in the context of Arafat, with his back to the wall, and the question - Will he be able to make another comeback? -.
VENEZUELA GRABS PLO TERRORIST, HANDS HIM OVER TO FBI

By MURRAY WEISS

A SELF-described PLO terrorist has been captured and charged here in connection with an attack on an Israeli bus that killed one person and injured three others.

The terrorist, Mahmoud El Abed Ahmad, 33, was grabbed several days ago by immigration officials in Caracas, Venezuela, as he tried to enter the country, officials said yesterday.

Ahmad, a naturalized American citizen, was captured and charged here in connection with an attack on an Israeli bus that killed one person and injured three others.

The terrorist, Mahmoud El Abed Ahmad, 33, was grabbed several days ago by immigration officials in Caracas, Venezuela, as he tried to enter the country, officials said yesterday.

Ahmad, a naturalized American citizen, was turned over to the FBI yesterday and flown to New York because Venezuela does not have an extradition agreement with Israel.

FBI spokesman Joseph Valiquette said Ahmad was charged with murder and attempted murder as soon as his Pan American flight touched down on U.S. soil at JFK Airport at about 3 p.m.

Ahmad had been the subject of a global manhunt since he shot up an Israeli bus with an accomplice in April last year.

The accomplice was captured at the scene by Israeli soldiers.

Later convicted, he was sentenced to life after implicating Ahmad in the attack.

Authorities could not say how Ahmad eluded capture during the past year, or how Venezuelan authorities knew who he was.

Valiquette said Ahmad was born on the West Bank and later emigrated to Puerto Rico where he became a U.S. citizen in 1982.

Amid heavy security yesterday, Ahmad was wisked from the airport to the FBI's headquarters in lower Manhattan.

He was later transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center where he was held pending arraignment today in Brooklyn Federal Court.

Authorities said they expect Israeli officials will soon make a formal request for his extradition.

Ahmad's bus attack was staged on the second anniversary of another bus hijacking in the Gaza Strip that ended when Israeli soldiers stormed the bus, killing two terrorists and then executing two others who surrendered.

The first incident began when five terrorists took 35 passengers hostage.

The executions caused a public outcry in Israel as well as an internal inquiry that determined that guards bludgeoned the two gunmen to death after they surrendered.
MIDDLE EAST ISSUES OF AJC CONCERN

U.S.-Israeli Relations and the Peace Process

Recent months have witnessed increasingly close cooperation between the two countries in strategic planning, intelligence, and other defense related areas, the beginnings of unprecedented economic ties through the new Free Trade Area Agreement, and supportive measures by the U.S. to help Israel revitalize its economy, including the provision of all new aid in the form of grants rather than loans. Moreover, both the Reagan Administration and the Government of Prime Minister Shimon Peres are actively seeking ways to encourage King Hussein of Jordan to enter into direct negotiations with Israel.

Nevertheless, serious differences have developed between Washington and Jerusalem -- as well as within the respective governments -- as to the appropriate tactics to achieve this result. Among these issues are:

1. Supply of advanced aircraft and other arms to Jordan. The Reagan Administration contends that Hussein needs these weapons to demonstrate that he has credible U.S. backing to defend himself against Syria, which opposes the peace process. Israel, the majority of Congress and groups such as AJC contend that the U.S. has other ways to demonstrate its commitment to Hussein and that arms shipment should be deferred until after Hussein has ended the state of belligerency with Israel and actually begins direct negotiations.

2. The steps leading to negotiation and the role of the PLO. While Hussein says that he hopes for the start of negotiations "before the end of the year," he insists that he needs the backing of Palestinians -- specifically Arafat's wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization -- before he can proceed, as well as the "cover" of an international conference with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the PLO to neutralize Syrian and Soviet opposition. Hussein contends that his February 11 agreement with Arafat already represents PLO acceptance of the principle of negotiations with Israel and linkage of any Palestinian entity to Jordan, which would be in accordance with the Reagan Initiative of September 1982. Israeli and American critics point out that the PLO has failed to say so explicitly and has not renounced its goal of an independent Palestinian state. Moreover, the increasing incidence and escalation of Palestinian terrorist attacks, including some sponsored by Arafat's own al-Fatah, raise serious doubts as to Arafat's readiness for peace.
Both the United States and Israel oppose a broad international conference that would bring in the Soviet Union -- which still has not restored the diplomatic relations with Israel which it broke off in 1967 -- and other potentially disruptive forces. However, there is disagreement between them over other preliminary steps proposed by Hussein. The King's scenario is as follows: (1) preliminary discussions between the United States and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; (2) PLO acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which outline the basis for Arab-Israel peace; (3) American recognition of the PLO; (4) an international peace conference involving the five permanent Security Council members (U.S., USSR, China, France, Great Britain), the Arab states, the PLO and Israel.

King Hussein's path toward direct negotiations with Israel is a long and convoluted one that contains many junctures at which the entire process is subject to failure. Indeed, the Israeli Government opposes the entire concept of preliminary U.S.-Palestinian discussions from which Israel is excluded. It also opposes participation of identifiable members of the PLO, although Peres and Foreign Minister Shamir disagree on what other Palestinians might be acceptable. Some State Department officials would be even more flexible in their interpretation, accepting individual Palestine National Council members, who while nominally connected to the PLO are not involved in terrorist acts and profess a desire for peace with Israel.

3. The U.S. and Israel also disagree over the wisdom of supplying additional arms to Saudi Arabia. The United States contends that the Saudis need the weapons for their own defense and to help counter potential threats to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, Washington regards the Saudis as an element for peace and stability. Israel and its supporters in Congress point out, however, that far from being a force for peace, the Saudis have been paying for the Soviet weapons purchased by Syria and the PLO. Moreover, they note that Saudi Arabia denied defense facilities to the U.S. and has tried to discourage other Arab states from entering into close cooperation with the U.S. in the defense of the Gulf. In the absence of peace, provision of additional arms to nearby Arab states such as Saudi Arabia will require Israel to expend additional scarce resources to maintain the military balance. The recent $4 billion British arms sale to Saudi Arabia compounds the problem, since the British and French place less constraints on their sales than does the U.S.

4. Response to terrorism. While both the U.S. and Israel are committed to fighting international terrorism, the Administration, responding to State Department fears of an anti-American backlash in the Arab world, refused to veto a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Israeli air strike on PLO headquarters in Tunisia, even though President Reagan had earlier termed the Israeli action an understandable "expression of self defense" and a "legitimate response to terrorist attacks." Israel had hoped that the U.S. would veto the UN
condemnation, especially since Secretary of State Shultz in a major address last year called for a more active policy to counteract terrorism, including pre-emptive and retaliatory action even if civilians might be killed in the process. Moreover, Israel Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin insists that the only Tunisians killed in the raid were persons working for the PLO. The U.S. use of military aircraft to capture the pirates who had killed an American on the Achille Lauro may hopefully signal a greater convergence of U.S. and Israeli views on combating terrorism.

**Israeli Domestic Issues**

Although the Israeli economy is showing signs of improvement -- including a decline in its rate of inflation and in the trade deficit -- these have come at the expense of a drastic austerity program which has resulted in increased unemployment, which has exacerbated existing social tensions, especially between Israel's Ashkenazim and the Oriental communities. Most of these Middle Eastern Jews are on the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder and are concentrated in the development towns, which have been especially hard hit by dismissal of employees and closing down of factories.

We are also concerned over recent manifestations of intolerance and anti-democratic tendencies. The polarization of Israelis into militant Orthodox versus secularists has been aggravated in recent months by such issues as the efforts to incorporate Orthodox demands into the Law of Return, the controversy over the Jewish identity of recent Ethiopian immigrants, and the opposition to construction of a Mormon educational center in Jerusalem. In addition, the recent escalation of Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israelis within Israel's pre-1967 borders, as well as in the territories under Israeli military administration, has added to Israelis' mistrust of the Arabs in their midst, and has added fuel to the growing strength of Meir Kahane's racist and anti-democratic campaign against the Arabs.

**The Position of Jews in Arab and Islamic Countries**

AJC has been engaged in intensive efforts to safeguard the rights of Jews in Arab and Islamic countries who continue to face hardships ranging from restrictions on their freedom to emigrate (in Iran, Syria, and Yemen) to threats to their physical safety, such as recent kidnappings in Lebanon and a recent violent attack in Tunisia.

**Questions for Discussion**

1. Under what circumstances should the American Jewish Committee modify its current position of opposing arms sales to Jordan?
2. What can the AJC do to help the U.S. Government increase public understanding of the need to counteract terrorism?

3. What additional programmatic steps should be taken to combat the growth of Kahaneism and other anti-democratic tendencies in Israel? On the positive side, what should the AJC do to promote democratic and pluralistic values which will foster a climate of tolerance and respect for diversity in Israel?

4. What can AJC membership do to strengthen the efforts to publicize the plight of Jews under Arab and Islamic rule and in appealing to Arab and Islamic governments to ease the conditions of its Jews and permit them to emigrate?

George E. Gruen & Harry Milkman,
Israel & Middle East Affairs Division,
International Relations Department

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