



THE JACOB RADER MARCUS CENTER OF THE
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Preserving American Jewish History

MS-603: Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum Collection, 1945-1992.

Series D: International Relations Activities. 1961-1992

Box 70, Folder 10, Resurgence of Islam and Jewish communities
in the Middle East and Northern Africa, 1980.

The American



Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

July 24, 1980

TO: Members of the FA Commission

FROM: Rita Hauser

Greetings:

The supposedly quiet summer time is hardly one of relaxation when it comes to Foreign Affairs concerns.

In Iran, five Jews are known to have been executed or (in one instance) to have committed suicide in jail during June and early July. Reports as to the number of those in jail vary widely. There may be as many as 60; but information is hard to come by and names are constantly being added or subtracted from the lists kept of those thought to be imprisoned. There is, alas, little leverage that can be exercised on the Khomeini regime, and always the fear that a major publicity campaign will hurt, not help, the Jews still in Iran; behind-the-scenes attempts to be of assistance, though, still go on.

Another Middle East region becoming less stable daily is Syria. Here, confidentially, some Jews have been able to make their way out of the country. Turkey is still another land where internal contention is making the situation of the Jewish community more precarious than it was before.

You will therefore be interested, I am sure, in material from a kit on "The Resurgence of Islam and Jewish Communities in the Middle East and North Africa" prepared by the Foreign Affairs Department for AJC Chapter programming. This includes major reports by Dr. George Gruen on Turkey and by Dr. Harold Rhode on "Religious, Cultural and Ethnic Trends Underlying the Iranian Revolution," as well as various background pieces on the situation of Jews still living in Moslem lands.

* * *

.../continued

MAYNARD I. WISNER, President ■
HOWARD I. FRIEDMAN, Chairman, Board of Governors ■ THEODORE ELLENOFF, Chairman, National Executive Council ■ GERARD WEINSTOCK, Chairman, Board of Trustees ■
ROBERT L. PELZ, Treasurer ■ MERVIN H. RISEMAN, Secretary ■ ELAINE PETSCHKE, Associate Treasurer ■ Honorary Presidents: MORRIS B. ABRAM, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG,
PHILIP E. HOFFMAN, RICHARD MAASS, ELMER L. WINTER ■ Honorary Vice-Presidents: NATHAN APPLEMAN, RUTH R. GODDARD, ANDREW GOODMAN, JAMES MARSHALL, WILLIAM ROSENWALD
■ MAX M. FISHER, Honorary Chairman, National Executive Council ■ MAURICE GLINERT, Honorary Treasurer ■ JOHN SLAWSON, Executive Vice-President Emeritus ■
Vice-Presidents: STANFORD M. ADELSTEIN, Rapid City, S.D.; MORTON K. BLAUSTEIN, Baltimore; ROBERT D. GRIES, Cleveland; DAVID HIRSCHHORN, Baltimore; MILES JAFFE, Detroit;
HARRIS L. KEMPNER, JR., Galveston; HAMILTON M. LOEB, JR., Chicago; JOHN H. STEINHART, San Francisco; EMILY W. SUNSTEIN, Philadelphia; GEORGE M. SZABAD, Westchester;
ELISE D. WATERMAN, New York ■

Some of you may have heard AJC Director for Mexico and Central America Sergio Nudelstejer describe the plight of Jewish communities in Central America at our May Commission meeting. The recent assassination of a Jewish businessman in Guatemala makes Sergio's May warnings all the more pertinent. Enclosed is an up-dated report by Sergio on the dangers facing Central American Jews, along with a series of articles from the New York Times dealing with this sensitive area.

* * *

United Nations forums are constant battlegrounds as the Arabs and their allies attack Israel. The Copenhagen UN Decade for Women World Conference, going on as of this writing, is one such bitter battleground. AJC's Special Projects Department and Lois Gottesman of FAD cooperated in production of material for use by women going to the Conference and the concurrent NGO Forum. The on-going UN Special Emergency Session on the Palestinian Question in New York represents still another Arab and PLO attempt to impose their kind of Middle East solution in place of the Camp David peace process. AJC has been discussing regularly with the U.S. administration, urging the firmest possible stand both as regards Copenhagen and the Special Emergency session.

The least-noticed yet perhaps most significant development, however, came in the UN debate on Jerusalem a few weeks ago. The Vatican asked for distribution of an Osservatore Romano article which, in effect, outlines a pronounced Catholic Church shift towards a more pro-Arab position on Jerusalem and seeks to stake out a Church role in decision-making on the fate of the entire city and not just the Holy Places. Enclosed is a joint memorandum by Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum and Abe Karlikow, sent to AJC people in the field, analyzing the Vatican shift.

* * *

Growing Soviet anti-Semitism hardly has received the attention it merits. Aware of this, the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights recently co-sponsored a major seminar at Columbia University on the subject, as you will see in the enclosed, pithy report featured in the Baltimore Jewish Times. AJC will help to make conference proceedings, now being edited, widely available to key audiences.

* * *

.../continued

There are other developments, too -- a renewed push for our complaint in UNESCO re Soviet obstacles to the teaching of Hebrew, in a brief by Sidney Liskofsky; good news on the exit of Falashas from Ethiopia; possible settlement of the situation of the Black Hebrews in Dimona; preparations for the Madrid follow-up conference to the Helsinki Pact...and much more as well.

We shall be discussing several of these issues at the forthcoming session of the FA Commission dinner session during the National Executive Committee meeting in Cleveland, Thursday, October 23. You will be getting further notices---but do keep this date open.

In anticipation of seeing you there.

Cordially,



Rita Hauser

RH:rf
Encs.
80-550-27



#80-300-169
cc: Abe Karlikow
Dr. George Gruen
Lois Gottesman
Gene DuBow

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date July 23, 1980
to Field Staff
from Shula Bahat *Shula*
subject Discussion Packet - "The Resurgence of Islam and Jewish Communities of the Middle East and North Africa"

I am pleased to share with you the enclosed packet which was designed to assist AJC members and others in the Jewish community to become more informed about the status of Jewish communities in the Moslem world.

Increasing understanding of the current political trends in the Moslem world and its implications for Jewish life, is timely and most significant. We recommend, therefore, that you initiate at least one chapter meeting on this issue, to assess these implications, to discuss, what can be done to help endangered Jewish communities and to absorb Jews who have emigrated from Moslem countries, as well as to explore the role of the American Jewish community in interpreting to the American public new developments and events in the Moslem world.

We urge you to make contacts with Jews from Moslem countries who have settled in your community, to bring them closer to AJC. Also, their first hand experiences can be most valuable to chapter programs.

The packet was developed by the Foreign Affairs Department, as part of its endeavor to assist chapters in the implementation of foreign affairs program priorities. The packet was prepared by Dr. George Gruen with the assistance of Lois Gottesman.

THE PACKET

To facilitate a variety of programs such as one-session discussions, discussion series and seminars, the packet includes the following sections:

Introduction and Guide to Materials by George Gruen, which can be used by discussion leaders as opening remarks and can be forwarded to participants in advance of the meeting or can be distributed to promote general interest in the issue.

Selected Questions

Which can assist discussion leaders in moderating the discussion. To provide maximum flexibility and adaptability to chapter programs, the questions are divided into the following categories:

- A. Judiasm and Islam
- B. History
- C. Present Situation
- D. Relationship with the American Jewish community

Source Material

Background material on Islam and the Jewish communities of the Middle East and North Africa should be read by discussion leaders as well as participants prior to the meeting.

Basic Bibliography

Compiled to assist members in further study of the themes of the packet.

THE DISCUSSION MEETING

Leading the Discussion

Discussion leaders should be carefully selected among your chapter leaders for their particular knowledge of the subject and their skills, in conducting a stimulating and meaningful discussion. (You may want to consider a member of the FAC.)

If you have access to local experts on the themes of the packet, you may wish to invite them to serve as resource person or discussion leader.

Speakers

None needed, but if you are considering a series of meetings or a seminar on the topic, you may want to invite Dr. George Gruen or Lois Gottesman to launch the program.

Audio Visual Material

In planning chapter program you may want to take advantage of the availability of the film, "*The Dhimmis: To Be A Jew In Arab Lands*," (21 minute version or 45 minute version, which can be rented for \$10 plus postage.) The film describes the life of Jews in Arab countries before and after the 1948 Independence War. It follows the pogroms and persecutions from which the Jews suffered as second class citizens. The film includes fascinating historic footage. For further information, please contact Lois Gottesman.

Please let me know, by way of the attached form, chapter plans to conduct session(s) on this topic and how many copies of the packet and the reading material you will need. You may wish to make the guide available as an AJC service to other organizations in the community.

We welcome your comments and suggestions.

P.S. Attached is a letter from Stephen R. Comar, member of the Chicago Chapter Executive Board to George Gruen, indicating the importance of increasing the awarness and concern to the situation of Jewish communities in Moslem countries.

RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS
UNDERLYING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

By Dr. Harold Rhode

Visiting Professor of Middle East History
University of Delaware

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES



Prepared for the

Institute of Human Relations

165 East 56 Street, New York, New York 10022

The Iranian revolution took many Westerners by surprise. A year has passed since Ayatollah Khomeini took over the reins of power in Iran but most Westerners still do not understand why the revolution took place at all. It was thought that the shah was in the midst of a gigantic effort to bring his backward country into the twentieth century, quite an admirable endeavor from our point of view. Why, then, should his countrymen detest him so violently? People in the West tried to search for answers to this perplexing question but did not usually succeed. The key to understanding why the Iranian revolution took place is to familiarize ourselves with Iran's ethnic and religious make-up.



Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Iran

Two great forces have shaped Iran during the last 1400 years -- Islamic and Persian culture. Neither force can be understood in the Western sense of territorial nationalism. Both are, in essence, ethno-cultural loyalties, and, until the twentieth century, had little connection with the territorial concept of Iran and its 2500 year old monarchy.

Since the majority of the population converted to Islam more than one thousand years ago, the prime identity of most Iranians has been Islamic. Non-Muslims have been regarded as outsiders and therefore excluded from active political and social roles in the affairs of the country.

Simultaneously, Persian culture, the culture of the settled population -- most of whom resided in the central plateau (see map) -- had a great impact on both Iranian Islam and the non-Persian ethnic groups living in the country. Most of these non-Persian ethnic groups lived in the area surrounding the central plateau. Many were nomadic and had invaded Iran from the northern steppe area.

Historically, the goal of the ruling class was to try to settle these nomadic tribes and "Persianify" them. Persian culture was regarded as superior, and attempts were made to suppress and eradicate other "inferior" cultures. Various regimes encountered great opposition to this policy, especially in areas which were almost completely non-Persian speaking -- such as Turkish Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

Ethnic Diversity

Ethnically and religiously, Iran is a mixture of many peoples who, during the course of history, migrated to the Iranian plateau. Although the deposed shah's government claimed that the majority of the people of Iran was ethnically Persian, no reliable statistics exist which prove this to be true. For example, statistically, Tehran was counted as ethnically Persian but in reality, a large part of the city's population is Azerbaijani Turkish, some of whom know little if any Persian. When asked about this situation, government officials claimed that there were no Turks in Iran -- only Turkish-speaking Persians. History shows this statement to be completely false.

A large part of the population, possibly even a majority, is ethnically Turkish. Almost the entire northwestern province of Azerbaijan is populated by Shiite Turks who speak Azeri Turkish. It is generally assumed that one-third of Iran's population lives in this area. Consequently, there are probably about 12 million Azerbaijanis. (This figure must, however, be regarded as tentative due to the lack of reliable population data.) Under the previous regime, they were not permitted to write or study their language. Very few, however, spoke Persian, the only language of instruction in the schools.

Most of the Kurds live in the southern part of Azerbaijan and further south in Kurdistan. Various sources estimate their numbers at anywhere from two to six million. Most of these are Sunni and have historically tried to revolt against outside domination whenever they perceived the central government as weak.

As in the Azeri-speaking area, Persian was the only officially recognized language for education, street signs, and media.

The Lurs, Bakhtiyaris, and Qashqais inhabited the area south of Kurdistan. These three groups, all living in and around the southern Zagros mountains, are Shiites. The Qashqais, in addition, are Turkish. The origins of the Bakhtiyaris are unclear. No exact population figures exist for these ethnic groups.

Arabs make up the overwhelming majority of the oil-rich province of Khuzistan which is situated along the northern coast of the Persian Gulf. Many of these Arabs are also Sunni Muslims. Before the Pahlavi dynasty, this area was almost 98% Arabic-speaking, but under the previous dynasty, many Persians were brought in to "Persianify" this oil-rich and strategically important area.

The Baluchis and Seistanis live in the southeastern part of the country. Both groups have ethnic connections with groups in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Baluchis are Sunni Muslims and are thought to number about one million. The Shiite Seistanis probably number less than 500,000.

The Turkomans live along the southeastern coast of the Caspian Sea. They were traditionally nomadic and are Sunni Muslims. They are thought to number between 500,000 and one million. Most Turkomans live across the Soviet border in the Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan.

In addition, there are many other smaller ethnic groups spread throughout the country. Ethnically, Iran is therefore a conglomeration of many different groups, many of which live in geographically separate areas. Historically, whenever they have perceived the central government as weak, they have tended to revolt and seek autonomy, if not outright independence. All groups have resisted government attempts to "Persianify" them. Furthermore, many of the various ethnic groups have fought each other over the control of the territory they inhabit. Most of them also suffer from internal feuds and squabbles.

The population make-up therefore provides all who wish to exploit the situation with many opportunities. The Soviet Union probably has more to fear from an Islamic Republic in Iran than other countries. Khomeini's Islamic state poses a serious problem for the Russians in Soviet Central Asian Republics east of the Caspian Sea, which have the same ethnic make-up as the areas directly across the borders of Iran and Afghanistan. With the

exception of the Slavic and Baltic elements brought in by the Soviet government, the area is almost entirely Muslim. How strongly they identify as Muslims is at present a matter of conjecture as there is no concrete way to measure this feeling. Indications are, however, that many still at least dormantly identify as Muslims.¹⁾ The Central Asian republics have the highest birthrates in the U.S.S.R. and if present population trends continue, the Muslim and Far Eastern elements of the population will outnumber the Slavic population of the Soviet Union by the end of the century. An Islamic Iranian and/or Afghan state could seriously complicate this potentially explosive problem for the Slavic leaders of the U.S.S.R. Central Asians and Azerbaijanis in the Soviet Union could possibly seek some sort of alliance or aid from their Muslim brothers to the south. At the very least, Soviet Muslims will derive some comfort from the Islamic revival in Iran and Afghanistan.

In order to prevent this situation from getting too far out of control, the Soviets purchased huge sums of Iranian currency on the Zurich International Currency Market which they undoubtedly are using to foment trouble in Iran so that no strong state could come into existence and pose a threat to the unity of the U.S.S.R. (For the same reason, they felt obliged to invade Afghanistan in order to eradicate the Islamic forces which posed a strong threat to the Soviet-backed Marxist government that was ruling the country.) Considering Iran's population make-up, however, the Soviets should have no great difficulty keeping the situation unstable.

The Role of Shiite Islam in Iran

Religiously, however, Iran is much more homogeneous in that over 90% of the population is Twelver Shiite Muslim. (The remaining 10% is almost exclusively Sunni Muslim; non-Muslims make up only a very tiny percentage of the population.) Consequently, Twelver Shiite Islam is the only identity which most of the ethnic groups have in common.

Interestingly, some Iranians try to explain this type of Islam as an Iranian religion. They attempt to prove this by citing a questionable story according to which the last Sassanian ruler of pre-Islamic Iran, Yazdegird III, married the daughter of Hussein, the second Imam, and thus their child, Zain al-Abadain, the fourth Imam, was an Iranian. (What differentiates Shiite and Sunni Islam is that the Shiites venerate the descendants of Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law [i. e. the Imams], while the Sunnis do not.) Thus, the fourth Imam is seen as fusing Shiite Islam and Iran.

1) For examples of Muslim identity in the Soviet Union, see News-week (December 24, 1979) "Russian Best Seller: The Koran," p. 19. This article shows that some Muslims will pay any price to obtain a copy of the Koran.

Any Shiite Muslim venerating the twelve Imams (hence the name Twelvers) and wishing to settle in Iran can easily acquire an Iranian identity. Within one or two generations, his descendants will be Iranian and their non-Iranian ancestry will be completely forgotten. On the other hand, however, non-Muslims who have lived in the country for many centuries are looked upon as outsiders. Jews, for example, have been living in Iran for almost twenty-seven centuries but are still not fully accepted in Iranian society as they are not Muslim.

Shiite Muslims look to their religious leadership for more than spiritual guidance. These leaders must also care for the social and legal well-being of their followers, who, in turn, contribute money, goods, and land proceeds to support their religious leaders, mosques, and religious foundations. The religious establishment must therefore be adept at handling large sums of money and at administering public foundations and trusts. Furthermore, when they have perceived the government to be in violation of any of the precepts of Islam, they have rarely hesitated to speak out. In essence, the religious leadership has a wide range of experience in dealing with all matters of life.

The highest office of Shiite Islam is the position of ayatollah. This position is self-regulating as an ayatollah must fulfill three basic criteria if he is to maintain his title. He must be known for his scholarly wisdom, have political sagacity, and be above moral reproach. As it becomes known that a certain religious figure fulfills these three criteria, people begin flocking to him and start calling him "ayatollah." If, for example, it later became known that he misappropriated funds, he would lose his title.

Some ayatollahs have attained a special status called "Ayatollah al-'Ozma" -- Grand Ayatollah. This title can only be granted to an ayatollah by an existing grand ayatollah. This title is usually granted to someone quite advanced in age and demonstrates that the ayatollah in question not only is respected by his followers but also by his senior colleagues. It is presently held by five men: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Hajj Kazem Shariat-madari, Ayatollah Mohammed Reza Golpayeghani, Ayatollah Hajj Seyyed Shehabed-din Marashi-Najafi, and Ayatollah Hajj Seyyed Abulghasem Kho'i. All of these ayatollahs are in their eighties except Khomeini, who is either 79 or 80. The Ayatollahs Shariat-madari, Golpayeghani, and Marashi-Najafi live in Qom, the center of Shiite learning in

Iran and are known as the Qom triangle. Ayatollah Abulghasem Kho'i presently lives in Najaf, a Shiite holy city in Iraq.

Prior to the Iranian revolution, few people actively supported Khomeini. Religious opposition to the shah and his policies centered around Shariat-madari, and, to a lesser extent, the other two members of the Qom triangle. Being inside the country, however, they had to somewhat mute their criticism of the government. Khomeini, living outside Iran, did not suffer this constraint and was free to say whatever he wanted. Consequently, many began to look to him as the leader of the revolution since he did not compromise in any way with the shah and his government. By the time he returned to Iran, it was obvious that he had become the most powerful figure in Iran and thereby replaced Shariat-madari as the chief grand ayatollah.

Even though Ayatollah Shariat-madari has serious reservations concerning Khomeini's concept of an Islamic republic, he is unlikely to show any strong public disagreement as Khomeini still appears to have the largest public following. History has taught the grand ayatollahs that if they publicly express their disagreements, they may lose their position of power. In the 1906-7 Constitutional Revolution, the modernizing and secular forces formed an alliance with the religious leaders in order to fight the government of the shah. Together, they succeeded in limiting the shah's power. Two decades later, however, after Reza Khan ousted the Qajar shah and assumed power, the alliance began to fragment. Some religious authorities supported the new shah's policies while others opposed them. Reza Khan took advantage of these disagreements and by playing one against the other, managed to lessen their power. With this in mind, Khomeini complained in one of his proclamations issued before this present period of turmoil, that the reason the deposed shah remained in power was that he took advantage of the disagreements among the religious establishment.²⁾ Now that the religious establishment has gained power, it is unlikely to allow its disagreements to be used as a means of again weakening its power. Nevertheless, the ayatollahs strongly disagree on their role in government. Khomeini at first claimed that he did not want to be an all powerful monarch.

2) Khomeini and the Independence Movement (Persian -- Khomeini va Jobesh-e Istighlal), p. 51.

In his writings, he states that the all powerful leader (i. e., the shahanshah, dictator, etc.) is fundamentally un-Islamic.³⁾ He claims that these rulers are non-believers⁴⁾ and that monarchical government from its inception had a history of crime and genocide.⁵⁾ Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that since Khomeini returned to Iran, he has functioned, for all intents and purposes, as a monarch in whose hands all power has been concentrated. Although he formally appointed a government in Tehran and "retired" to Qom, the government was actually powerless as all important decisions were made by Khomeini himself in Qom. Nothing of any importance was accomplished without his approval. Khomeini, in essence, became another shahanshah although, for reasons previously stated, would never take this title. Nevertheless, it would seem that by Khomeini's own definition, his rule is un-Islamic and should therefore be overthrown.

Shariat-madari, on the other hand, does not agree with Khomeini's view on the monarchical form of government. He supports the idea of a monarchy guided by the Islamic religious establishment. Historically many other Shiite leaders have taken this view, including those who supported Reza Shah, the father of the deposed shah and founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Shah wanted to establish a republican form of government in Iran but the religious authorities feared that Iran might thereby become a secular state as was neighboring Ataturk's Turkey, and therefore persuaded him to assume the title of shah.

Iran Under the Shah

The religious establishment's major complaint against both Pahlavi shahs is that they attempted to "de-Islamify" Iran. This accusation is a serious indictment of most of the previous regime's policies as Islam is best described as a way of life, not just a religion. Subjects such as public education, the judicial system, national holidays, the calendar, international politics, etc., having little to do with the religious needs of Muslims, are very much within the realm of Islam and consequently, the religious establishment claims the right to intervene in all matters of life, both spiritual and non-spiritual.

From an Islamic point of view, only Islamic history is important. Pre-Islamic history is of no importance and is usually referred to as the period of ignorance -- the Jahiliyah. The Pahlavis, in an attempt to transfer the Iranian people's basic

3) Ibid., p. 51.

4) Ibid., pp. 39-40, p. 50.

5) Ibid., p. 40.

loyalty from the peoplehood of Islam and their common Islamic past to the territorial concept of Iran, spent vast sums of money investigating pre-Islamic history and culture. They wanted Iranians to view Islamic Iranian history as just one of many important periods of Iranian history. The Pahlavis thereby hoped to create a bond between the territory of Iran and the people living there. As a result, they excavated the ancient Persian capital at Persepolis, held an ostentatious party in honor of the 2500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian monarchy by Cyrus the Great, changed the calendar dating system from the Islamic year, based on the date of Muhammad's Hegira from Mecca to Medina, to a purely Persian year, based on the establishment of the Persian monarchy by Cyrus the Great, and added many pre-Islamic Iranian holidays to the calendar. The religious establishment resisted all of those innovations, viewing them as an attempt to destroy the Islamic identity of the people.

Another aspect of the Pahlavi policy of forging a link with the Persian pre-Islamic past was the emphasis placed upon Persian culture and language at the expense of the other cultures and languages of the country. Persian was the only Middle Eastern language allowed to be used in the schools and media. The Islamic establishment strongly opposed this policy as Islam does not recognize cultures and languages as being superior or inferior. All Muslims, without regard to ethnic group, culture, language, or social status, are recognized as equal. Modern nationalist ideas are a Western superimposition on the Middle East and have no meaning whatsoever in Islam. Khomeini and most Iranians see themselves first and foremost as Muslims. Khomeini clearly indicates in his writings and proclamations that he opposes Arab nationalism, Turkish (or Pan-Turkic) nationalism and Persian nationalism, viewing them as divisive forces which the Western powers created in order to divide and conquer the Islamic world.

The religious authorities also opposed the deposed shah's much publicized 1963 Land Reform act, the stated purpose of which was to redistribute the land so that landless peasants could acquire their own acreage. In reality, however, most of the large landowners still retained the best lands while the landless peasants were very often given marginal lands. This act also contributed to the weakening of the Islamic establishment. The government expropriated the waqf (religious endowment) lands held in trust and administered by the Islamic establishment. The income from these lands supported mosques, religious foundations, etc. According to Islamic law, a religious endowment cannot be revoked and once a parcel of land or source of income has been dedicated to the upkeep of an Islamic institution, it can never be expropriated by anyone. The shah's land reform policy was

therefore perceived not only as a way to weaken the Islamic clergy but also as against Islam itself.

The Position of Minorities

The Islamic establishment also accused the shah of supporting the Bahais and allowing some of them to attain high government positions. Among others, former Prime Minister Hoveyda was accused of being a Bahai. Under no circumstances could the religious authorities tolerate the Bahais, most of whom are descended from Muslims who, in the nineteenth century, left Islam for the newly created Bahai religion. According to Islamic law, Islam, by definition, is the final revelation from God and is therefore perfect. If a Muslim wishes to leave Islam, he is in essence stating that he has found a better religion. Since, according to Islamic law, this is impossible, this individual must be put to death. Consequently, the Muslim authorities cannot tolerate Bahais living in their midst.

At the same time, the shah was accused of allowing Christians and Jews to prosper at the expense of the Muslims and also attain high positions in administration. Unlike the Bahais, the Christians and Jews are tolerated in Islamic society but must maintain a low profile and may not occupy any position where they could exercise power over Muslims.

Khomeini, while still in Paris, often stated that under his Islamic government, the Jews would continue to be allowed to live and prosper. He and his supporters went to great lengths to illustrate that Khomeini was only anti-Israel and not anti-Semitic. A close examination of his writings, however, shows this to be a distinction without difference. As the following passages indicate, he often uses the words Jew and Israeli interchangeably and at times makes violently anti-Semitic statements. Some of these quotes are taken from his book Confronting Israel, published in Arabic in 1977. Others are from a collection of his speeches and proclamations concerning the 15th of Khordad massacres in 1963. This work is in Persian and appears to have been published in the early 1970's.

"And if we don't say that the Jews and Israel are a source of danger for Iran, then why is Iran in danger? So let us ask the question, what is the connection between the Shah and Israel? The Iranian Security Organization (SAVAK) warns

us not to speak about him (i.e. the Shah) and about Israel. Is the Shah in the opinion of SAVAK an Israeli, or does it believe that the Shah is a Jew?" 6)

"And furthermore, the Jewish robbers began to spread out into every corner of Iran, placing themselves all over in positions of control and authority over the markets of our nation. And they extended their cancerous roots unto the furthest borders (i. e. into the distant parts of our country) into the economic matters of the Iranian Muslim people, influencing both political and military matters, and acquiring high administrative positions throughout our homeland. They did this with the help of their lackeys and hired helpers (that acted in Iran under the name of Bahais.) Likewise, the Israeli power began a sequence of activities harmful to the Iranians and Islam in the capital and in the most important regions of Iran..." 7)

"The exalted prophet (i.e. Muhammad) had already observed that the Jews are a race of destruction and ruin, that they lie in wait against the nearby Muslims, and that the Jews want to make the Muslims suffer great calamities. And thus the prophet commanded that the Jews be removed and thrown out of Arabia. He kept insisting upon this until the last hours of his life. Had the Muslims answered the call of their prophet, they wouldn't be afflicted with this great disaster that threatens their existence with distress and destruction." 8)

The Ayatollah's writings reflect the prevailing view held by most Iranians that there is little if any difference between the Jews and Israel. In most conversations this author has had with Iranians, both inside and outside Iran, Iranians have made almost no distinction between the two. In discussions about Israel, they easily substitute the words

6) This quote appears twice, once on pages 40-41 of Confronting Israel. It also appears in Khomeini's collections of speeches and proclamations concerning the 15th of Khordad massacres, Khomeini and the Independence Movement, pages 6-7.

7) Confronting Israel, pp. 22-23.

8) Ibid., p. 18.

"the Jews" for Israel. Furthermore, when trying to explain why they are anti-Israel, they have invariably launched into historical explanations stating that the Jews have always exploited the Muslims and continue to do so both in Israel and Iran.

Unfortunately, certain American academicians, such as Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University, have claimed that Khomeini's attitude towards the Jews was basically good but "is qualified by his (i. e., Khomeini's) hostility to Israel because of its support of the Shah and its failure to resolve the Palestinian question." ⁹⁾ An examination of Khomeini's own writings does not support such a view.

On certain occasions, ¹⁰⁾ Khomeini has stated that in an Islamic state the rulers are divinely guided and therefore cannot make mistakes. Khomeini's statements regarding the Jews cannot be labeled as irrelevant remarks made before his return to Iran as he is an ayatollah and therefore an Islamic leader whose statements reflect divine guidance.

Internationally, the shah was accused of supporting Israel against Iran's Arab Muslim brothers. Being one people, all Muslims must support their Muslim brothers throughout the world. Furthermore, Israel is considered to have usurped Islamic land. Territorially, Islam divides the world into two parts: The Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam), the area in which Muslims live and rule, and the Abode of War (Dar al-Harb), the area in which non-Muslims live and rule. As Khomeini and most Muslims understand Israel, the "Zionists" stole part of the Abode of Islam and created a non-Islamic entity in Muslim Palestine. In his speeches and writings, Khomeini constantly refers to the Muslim responsibility to liberate Muslim Palestine, ¹¹⁾ especially since the Israelis control the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, the third most holy city in Islam. Jews do have the right to live under Islamic rule but do not have the right to rule an area where Muslims live. Khomeini therefore sees the struggle against Israel not only as the responsibility of

9) New York Times, February 16, 1979; Op.Ed. Page.

10) This comment was taken from an interview given by Khomeini to Prof. Z. Khalilzad of Columbia University while Khomeini was still in Paris.

11) For example, see Khomeini's work, Confronting Israel (Arabic: Tajah Isra'il), p. 105.

the Arabs but of all Muslims equally. As he states in his book, Confronting Israel,

"Oh brothers! Let us not regard this holy and sacrificial war as a war between the Arabs and Israel. Let us regard it as a war of all Muslims together against the Jews and their leaders. It is the responsibility of all the Islamic governments with their peoples, with all their forces, and potential, to aid and support the Fedayeen on the lines of fire." 12)

As Khomeini understands the Arab-Israeli dispute in Islamic terms, it is therefore not surprising that his support for the Palestinian cause is not for the umbrella organization of the P.L.O. in general but for Yasir Arafat and his Muslim-oriented al-Fatah group in particular. (Al-Fatah, the largest Palestinian organization, is almost entirely Muslim. All of its imagery is also Islamic.) Khomeini does not support either George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine or Naif Hawatmeh's Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The above-mentioned two groups include many Christians who are, in most cases, also Marxists and oppose the Islamic theory of government.

It is therefore obvious why Khomeini's government has broken diplomatic relations with Egypt. As the Islamic government in Iran views the world, Sadat has given up the Muslim battle with the enemy and must therefore be punished. Sadat, in short, is a traitor to the Muslim cause against Israel. There can be no compromise with Israel as its very existence goes against Islam. Even if Israel had not supported the shah and had solved the Palestinian refugee problem, the Islamic nations, according to Khomeini, could not accept the existence of Israel in any shape or form.

12) Ibid., p. 100 and p. 107. Here Khomeini quotes a proclamation of some of his students in Qom.

Iranian Xenophobia

Finally, the Islamic establishment held the shah responsible for the immense social upheavals due to the large-scale infusion of capital from oil revenues. Villagers flocked to the cities with high hopes and expectations of finding employment. Most, however, could not find well-paying jobs and were forced to live in abject poverty while the wealthy lived in affluence in other parts of the cities. The religious authorities and many others felt that the shah actually encouraged urban migration in order to create a large labor pool which could produce industrial goods for the West. As people began to leave their villages, Iran ceased being agriculturally self-sufficient and had to import much of its food from the West. Additionally, people felt that the shah squandered the country's oil wealth on useless armaments also bought in the West. Since historically there has been so much deeply rooted hostility towards the Western world, it is not surprising that so many people regarded these factors as "proof" that the shah was no more than another in a long line of Iranian leaders whose sole function was to exploit Iran and her resources for the good of the West. And as the United States is presently the standard-bearer of the Western world, Iranians can most easily focus their anger and outrage against the U. S. Had the present revolution occurred thirty years ago, Great Britain, then the dominant Western power of the area, would have had to bear the brunt of their hostility.

Khomeini and his cohorts see Islam as being engaged in a life and death struggle against the West. He consequently calls upon all Muslims, whether Shiite or Sunni, to unite as brothers and put aside their past internal differences so that the Muslim world can protect itself against Western imperialism. The West, he argues, has always exploited internal Muslim discord in order to divide and conquer the Islamic world.

The origins of these feelings cannot be attributed to America's support for the shah or the Western economic exploitation of the Middle East during the last two centuries, but can best be understood in historical context. The Islamic world has both resented and feared the West since the time of the Crusaders. When the Mongols invaded the Islamic world from the east, in the thirteenth century, Muslims understood this attack as part of a two-pronged invasion of the Islamic world

by the Christians and Mongols who had formed an alliance in order to destroy Islam and divide the spoils. Since then, any Western involvement in the Muslim world has most often been understood as an additional attempt to destroy Islam.

The Russians are also resented for both historical as well as contemporary reasons. Historically, the Russians have conquered Central Asia, an area which was almost totally Muslim before the Soviets brought in non-Muslims to help control the region. Even many Iranian Marxists accuse the Soviets of imperialism. Additionally, Iranian Muslims regard the Soviets as atheists, which from an Islamic point of view is much worse than Western Christianity. At least the Christians believe in God, the basic tenet of Islam.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will obviously have some impact on Iran's relationship with the superpowers. As Iran now faces the Soviets on both her northern and eastern borders, and as the Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal has stated that he supports the Baluchi independence movement, Iran must re-evaluate its overt hostility towards the United States. Baluchi independence would mean the break-up of Iran and would give the Soviets warm water ports on the Indian Ocean which they have coveted for more than one thousand years. These ports would give them easy access to the oilfields along the Persian Gulf.

Nevertheless, the United States cannot expect the Iranians to put aside their hatred of America and ally with us against the Soviet Union. As much as we might try to convince them that we are not their real enemy and pose no threat to them, they see the situation quite differently and would suspect that any American aid would only help us re-establish our imperialist presence in their country.

Even certain Muslim countries have become the targets of Iranian xenophobia but they are hated for other reasons. Turkey, for example, is hated for maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel, the enemy of Islam and all Muslims.¹³⁾ Jordan and Saudi Arabia suffer Khomeini's wrath and are accused of cooperating with the "imperialist powers" and following policies which are inherently un-Islamic.¹⁴⁾ These attacks,

13) Khomeini and the Independence Movement, p. 21.

14) Confronting Israel, pp. 64-67.

however, appear to have strong anti-Sunni overtones. Khomeini claims these states model their behavior after the Umayyads and Abbasids, the classical Islamic Sunni empires, which, according to Khomeini, distorted Islam. 15) Sunni Muslims view the Umayyad and Abbasid periods as their golden age and could never accept Khomeini's claims that they were un-Islamic.

Prospects for Revolutionary Iran

Internally, it is difficult to forecast the long range effects of the change in regime. Until now, neither the government nor the society seem to have changed very much. Governmental bureaucracy and red tape, so time consuming under the shah's regime, continue at their same slow pace. Bureaucrats still send the public from office to office trying to avoid making any decisions for which they may later be held responsible. Bribery, a common practice under the shah, is still rampant and remains one of the few ways to hasten and influence the decision-making process. Many people, in an attempt to circumvent the bureaucratic maze, still submit minor requests to the center of power. Khomeini and his aides are now inundated with petitions as were the shah and his advisers beforehand.

Secrecy -- the fear of telling others anything of importance which might be misinterpreted and used against you -- which was so prevalent under the shah's regime, still permeates Iranian life today. Although the heads of the shah's secret police (SAVAK) have either been jailed or executed, people still fear being arrested by the SAVAMA, Khomeini's secret police. Iranians, both inside and outside Iran, are convinced that informers are spying on them. They still react with horror and fear when they become aware that someone they don't know might be listening to their conversation. All forms of media are censored as before. Just as criticism of the shah and his policies had been forbidden under the previous regime, so has criticism of Khomeini and his version of Islam been forbidden by the present rulers of the country.

For the foreseeable future, the country will continue to suffer from the ethnic and religious tensions which have

15) Ibid., p. 63.

resurfaced as they have in the past, after previous Iranian governments have fallen. These tensions usually cause unrest, rebellion and outright attempts to declare independence. The Sunni Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkomans will therefore most likely continue their struggle for at least some control over their own affairs, if not outright independence. Azerbaijanis, however, would probably settle for local autonomy as they are Shiites and would feel more at home in a Shiite-oriented Islamic Republic of Iran.

Unless the government can consolidate its forces and centralize power, it is unlikely that Iran can remain united. Presently, the central government has little control over Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, and few if any people know to what degree it maintains control of other provinces. In similar situations in the past, a strong military figure has eventually arisen who succeeds in once again reuniting the country. If the present government cannot consolidate its power, we should not be surprised if this happens again.

May 12, 1980
80-580-14



IRANIAN JEWRY AND THE EXECUTION OF ALBERT DANIELPOUR

A Foreign Affairs Background Memorandum

By Dr. George E. Gruen

Director, Middle East Affairs

The Danielpour Case

The sudden and arbitrary execution of Albert Danielpour, 51, by a local court in Hamadan on June 5 on trumped-up charges and in violation of established judicial procedures has aroused indignation throughout the Jewish community and fear for the fate of an estimated 70 other Iranian Jews believed to be in various prisons. Mr. Danielpour, a prominent member of the Teheran Jewish community, leaves a widow and three young children.

Mr. Danielpour, a partner in important agricultural and industrial enterprises, had originally been picked up in February 1979 and held for questioning by authorities in the Evin prison in Teheran. No formal charges were brought against him and he was released after five months. Meanwhile, his businesses had been taken over by workers' committees (*komites*). In mid-January 1980 militants from Hamadan seized Mr. Danielpour and took him to prison in Hamadan, where he and his brothers Parvis and Daniel jointly owned a textile factory that had been taken over by the local workers' *komite*. Among the wild charges against Mr. Danielpour were support "for the creation of the Israeli Zionist Government," working with Israel "to suppress the Palestinian revolution," importing honey from Israel, and spying for the CIA and Israel. On April 16 the Hamadan court convicted the Danielpour brothers and sentenced them to death. (Parvis and Daniel were tried in absentia.)

Under Iranian law no death sentence can be carried out without ratification by the Supreme Court in Teheran. Following appeals to Ayatollah Khomeini, an order was given to transfer the case to Teheran. On June 4 an international humanitarian organization was informed by Iranian authorities that the death sentence had been commuted to three years' imprisonment and that Mr. Danielpour was to be transferred to a prison in Teheran. On the same day his wife, Hilda, took the Court order and brought it to the prison authorities in Hamadan, who assured her that her husband would be transferred to Teheran within a day or so.

In reality, however, the Hamadan prison authorities called in Ayatollah Khalkhali, who carried out a summary night trial and ordered Albert Danielpour executed by firing squad at 6 A. M. According to some reports, he introduced a completely new charge -- dealing in heroin -- to justify the execution. Khalkhali, popularly known in Iran as "Judge Blood," has been travelling around the country executing "counterrevolutionaries" and was recently mandated to investigate alleged drug dealers.

Violation of Rights

Khalkhali's independence and the fact that the Hamadan authorities could so blatantly defy an order from the central authorities in Teheran add to the fears within the Jewish community that the central authorities are unwilling or unable to insure that the full rights of the Jewish minority, formally proclaimed in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, will be maintained in practice. Principle 13 defines Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians as "recognized minorities" who are "free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies" and "to act in personal matters and religious teachings in accordance with their religious regulations."

Principle 14 states:

According to the Koran, the Islamic Republican Government of Iran and the Muslims as well are bound to treat non-Muslims with good moral conduct and Islamic justice, and to observe their fundamental

rights. This principle will be applicable to those who do not get involved in anti-Islamic activities and in conspiracies against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is the potential misuse of the last sentence that has aroused great concern. More than a year ago, in May 1979, the first prominent Jew, Habib Elghanian, was executed on charges of being a "Zionist spy." Now, in addition to Albert Danielpour, it was announced on June 10 that Yousef Sobhani, the former director of the Pepsi Cola company in Iran, was executed for "aiding Zionism," among other charges. Mr. Sobhani was a Bahai, whose father had been of Jewish origin.

Two members of the Beroukhim family, owners of a chain of hotels in Iran, were arrested on April 22 and are being charged, *inter alia*, with "aiding Zionism" and allowing their hotels to be spy centers for Americans and Israelis. Among the "evidence" presented was that Israeli coins were sold in the gift shop and that regular meetings of Iranian Jewish committees and of prominent Zionists, such as Elghanian, took place at the hotels. The outcome of the Beroukhim case is not yet known, but such exaggerated accusations and the use of "Zionism" as a capital offense has provoked a public protest by a group of young Iranian Jewish intellectuals, who have in the past supported the Islamic Revolution and the Government's pro-Palestinian policies. (Excerpts from their open letter to President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, published in the Teheran weekly Tamuz, on May 29, 1980, are attached.)

General Situation

In an unusual admission, Ayatollah Khomeini publicly declared in a broadcast to provincial governors on June 10 that Iran was in "chaos" and that internal disputes among various factions supporting the revolution posed a greater threat even than U. S. or Soviet opposition. In what may have been intended as a criticism of the multiplicity of workers' *komites* and other local vigilante groups taking matters into their own hands, Khomeini declared that the Iranian revolution had progressed to the point where "the masses cannot any longer govern the nation." He said it was now up to the elected and appointed officials to govern the country and solve its problems.

In addition to disputes between President Bani-Sadr and the fundamentalist Islamic Republican Party, the government also faces opposition from Marxist and other secularist elements, and growing disaffection among regional and non-Persian ethnic groups, such as the Kurds, the Baluchis, the Azerbaijanis, and the Arabs of the oil-producing region of Khuzistan. The continually unsettled situation since the revolution has had a negative impact on the economy, compounded recently by the sanctions imposed by the United States and Western Europe.

Effect on the Jewish Community

The Iranian Jewish population in 1978 was variously estimated at between 70,000 and 80,000. It is believed that some 30,000 have since left the country. Except for a couple of thousand in Europe, the others are about evenly divided between those who have come to the United States and those who went to Israel, joining the 65,000 Iranian Jews who had immigrated since the establishment of the Jewish State in 1948. Of those remaining in Iran, the overwhelming majority (25,000 to 40,000) are in Teheran, some 7,000 to 9,000 in Shiraz, between 1,600 and 2,000 in Isfahan and about 3,500 scattered in 22 other towns.

The former upper class have generally left the country, their substantial holdings have been either officially confiscated, occupied or brought to ruin through exorbitant demands by workers' *komites*. Sharp declines in property values and the economic chaos have hurt the middle class and professionals. University professors have been dismissed and some other Jews have experienced discrimination. The majority of the Jews remaining are from the poorer groups.

Synagogues and Jewish schools still function. Parents increasingly send their children to Jewish schools, since government schools require Koran studies. The Anjoman Kalimian, the central Jewish body, still meets and there is a designated Jewish deputy in the Majlis (Parliament). Foreign travel has generally been permitted.

It is to be hoped that the latest executions do not presage a campaign to scapegoat the Jews for the country's problems and that their legal rights will be protected.

OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT BANI-SADR

The following are translated excerpts from the text of an open letter to Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, published in Tammuz, a weekly publication in Persian of the Iranian Jewish community in Teheran, dated May 29, 1980. Tammuz is affiliated with a group of young Jewish intellectuals who have up to now supported the Iranian revolution. Previous articles published in Tammuz have denounced Zionism and affirmed the Iranian Jewish community's support for the ideals of the revolution. After praising the Iranian revolution the letter continues:

"Mr. President, discrimination against minorities in Iran, especially against Jews, is being strongly felt throughout the revolutionary groups, government offices and departments....During the last year the teachers of minority groups were denied registration in the teachers' training college, merely because they were from minority groups....

"Contrary to the laws and declarations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the government agencies and departments advertise that they will only employ the Muslim applicants. Among such offices, we should mention the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has formally declared the above limitation. Presently throughout the government offices, the minority employees are being pressured that they had better find themselves jobs in the private sector; and likewise in the private sector they are told that they had better look for independent jobs....

"We shall not take up much of your time explaining the instigations of the irresponsible groups towards all minorities, especially Jews, who by publication of declarations, serious threats, belittlements and insults are causing great discomfort to your Jewish brothers, but would like to reiterate that these were not the expectations of such a revolution nor are they beneficial to its objectives....

"Because of our political activities in the past we do not wish to side with those Jews who are opposing the revolution and have been or are being tried by the revolutionary courts, but the methods of preparation of the letters of accusation in the revolutionary courts clearly indicate certain prejudices and biases which have caused grave anxiety among the Jewish population.

"...If you would read any of the prosecutor's accusations, [you would find that] apart from their basic charges, their [the accused's] membership in the Iranian Jewish community has been regarded as an act of felony....We draw your attention to the Bill of Indictment prepared against the Beroukhim family....If affiliation with the Jewish community is an act of felony then the entire Jewish community of Iran who are affiliated and are in contact with such an organization are to be considered at fault.

"With regard to having trade and commercial relations with Israel and/or frequent trips to that country,...you fully realize that the government of Israel was one of the closest allies of the deposed shah....Thousands of Iranian merchants have had trade relations with that country. Apart from that, every day hundreds of people went to Israel either for medical treatment or religious pilgrimage. We consider relations with capitalistic sources an act of felony, but importation of honey from Israel or receiving letters from relatives resident in that country surely cannot be a ground for conviction in the revolutionary courts, because such unjustified accusations will help to undermine any other factually based acts of felony.

"Exodus and migration of Jews from Iran is one of the acts supported by the past regime, and the fact is that there are very few Iranian Jewish families who do not have a certain number of relations in Israel. This is no fault of the Jews remaining in Iran."

The letter closes with the hope that the authorities will "think twice in the implementation of justice toward our Jewish brothers" and thus prevent the "adversaries of the revolution" from acting in ways detrimental to it.

REMARKS BY JEROME J. SHESTACK
AT MEMORIAL SERVICE
FOR ALBERT DANIELPOUR
June 12, 1980

We meet in this House of God to mark the death of Albert Danielpour. To mark and to mourn. To mark the death of one man. To mourn for the way he died. By a summary trial in the dark of night, deprived of due process, in defiance of a court order, in disdain of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in denigration of fundamental principles of justice and human rights.

It is fitting to mourn in a House of God because such an abuse of human rights is an anti-religious act. Religion teaches us of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. The Koran, like other holy books, teaches good moral conduct and precepts of justice. Albert Danielpour's summary trial and hasty execution is an affront to Islamic teachings.

But we mourn also the failure of the Islamic revolution that this act signifies: an act of inhumanity, fraught with implications of anti-Semitism, of persecution of minorities and pervasiveness of official lawlessness. Call it chaos or call it revolutionary excess -- human worth and dignity suffer once again.

I was one who opposed the brutality of the Shah -- his torture, his imprisonment of political opposition, his severe punishments for petty crimes, his abuse of human rights. While I was head of the International League for Human Rights, my colleagues and I strove to expose the Shah's injustices; we helped to marshal public opinion; we worked with Yazdi and Bazargan, and Ghotbzadeh to reveal to the world the abuses of the Shah. With the coming of the revolution we had high hopes for the end of tyranny in Iran.

Why did the people of Iran revolt against the Shah? Because he tortured, because he killed people summarily, because he decreed arbitrarily, because he suppressed and oppressed. But if in the end there is merely one lawlessness replacing another, militants instead of generals, bloody councils instead of Savak agents, then how have the people benefitted? A tyranny is still tyranny whether in clerical garb or imperial uniform. Tyranny is still tyranny whether called class struggle or revolutionary reform.

Santayana has spoken of the deadly significance of symbols. The execution of Danielpour and others by summary proceedings is a symbol of lawlessness. The holding of the hostages by the militants is a symbol of inhumanity. These are symbols of the failure of a revolution that so many wanted and looked to with hope.

We mourn. But we should also pray. Pray that it is not too late. Pray that the precepts for moral conduct may still prevail in Iran. Pray that the people of Iran will be served by justice and not another tyranny. Pray that the Iranian revolution will earn respect for its humanity instead of condemnation for its ruthlessness.

We meet on this dark day to mark a death. To mourn for the loss of human worth. To pray that these affronts to life and dignity shall come to an end. And that man will treat man as if he were truly created in the image of God.

* Jerome J. Shestack is currently United States representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

TURKEY IN TURMOIL:
IMPACT ON THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

By Dr. George E. Gruen

Director,
Middle East Affairs



American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations

165 East 56 Street, New York, New York 10022

Turkey in Turmoil:

Impact on the Jewish Community

By George E. Gruen

© copyright 1980

"I feel that we are sitting on a volcano," is the way a prominent leader of the Jewish community of Istanbul described the current situation in Turkey when I spoke with him toward the end of February 1980. He quickly added that he felt particularly uneasy not because he was a Jew but because he was a member of the upper middle class. He was fearful that Turkey might descend into chaos and mob violence unless the new government of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel succeeded in curbing the rising wave of political terrorism and the government's economic austerity measures brought about a rapid improvement in the country's desperate economic situation.

If Demirel's policies are to have a chance of long-term success, prompt, large-scale and sustained assistance to Turkey by the United States and its Western allies is crucial. The revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the uncertain situation in Yugoslavia after Tito's death have all served to increase awareness in the West of Turkey's strategic importance. This has been reflected in the signing on March 29, 1980 of a new five-year defense and economic cooperation agreement between Ankara and Washington, and agreement by the 16-member Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in mid-April on an aid package to Turkey of nearly \$1.2 billion, mostly in credits and long-term loans.

While this is seen as a vote of confidence in the Demirel program, it is less than half of the \$3 billion minimum needed, according to Turgut Ozal, Turkey's chief economic planner. Moreover, much of the earlier \$962 million pledged by Western countries in May of last year has been held up by donor restrictions and bureaucratic delays. As the New York Times stressed in an editorial on April 21, 1980: "This year's offerings will work only if they stimulate large sums also from the I.M.F., the World Bank, the Common Market, the OPEC countries and, one hopes, private lenders and investors."

At the start of 1980 the situation was grim. Turkey had exhausted its credit and its foreign debt exceeded \$14 billion. Because of the doubling of OPEC oil prices in the past year, Turkey's total exports failed to cover the cost of needed imports of petroleum products. As a consequence of the fuel shortage, schools had been closed for several months -- they were finally reopened in early March--and

even the lobby of the luxury Hilton Hotel was frigid. The coffee shop was reduced to serving tea, since Turkey lacked the foreign exchange to import coffee. The bitter joke circulating in Istanbul was that the country's name was about to be changed to "*Yokistan*" -- "*yok*" being the Turkish word for "there isn't any". As a result of the shortage of fuel and spare parts, industry had been operating at less than 50% of capacity and unemployment had risen above 20%.

An exceptionally cold winter aggravated the fuel shortage and cases of pneumonia and other severe illnesses increased. One American official told me he knew of persons who had gone from pharmacy to pharmacy in a desperate search for medicines their doctor had prescribed, but which had disappeared from the shelves because most foreign drug companies had given up operations in Turkey and imports had been sharply curtailed. The lucky ones had relatives abroad send them the necessary drugs or could afford to buy them at black market prices. "What about the others?" I asked. "Well, some simply died."

Increasing Emigration

The Jewish community of Turkey, which numbered nearly 80,000 in 1948, is now variously estimated at between 17,000 and a maximum of 25,000. No precise figures are available since the latest census, in 1975, no longer contained a question on religion. While Chief Rabbi David Asseo believes the total to be around 25,000, most other knowledgeable sources estimate that the total is closer to 20,000, of whom 18,000 live in Istanbul, some 1,500 in Izmir, and several hundred in Ankara, Turkey's capital. Only small remnants of once flourishing communities remain in such places as Edirne (Adrianople), Bursa, Mersin, Adana, Milas, Çorlu, Antakya, and Gaziantep.

The escalation of terrorist violence and the deterioration of the economic situation combined to engender a sense of malaise among the Turkish population in general and the Jewish community in particular. This has been reflected in increased emigration. For the first time in recent years, *aliyah* to Israel exceeded 1,000 during 1979, and more than 500 Jews are believed to have left for Western Europe and the United States.

In contrast to the first wave of large-scale *aliyah* to Israel from 1948 to 1952, which consisted primarily of the poorer and less educated elements of the population, the newest *olim* include many highly-skilled and well-educated persons who might have been expected to remain in Turkey under normal circumstances. Among last year's arrivals in Israel were 187 Jewish college students who will be attending the Hebrew University and other Israeli institutions of

higher learning. The frequent violent clashes between bands of Marxist and extreme rightist students in Turkish universities have led to the disruption of classes and have threatened the physical safety of both students and teachers. This atmosphere has prompted Moslem Turks as well as members of the non-Moslem minorities to send their children abroad for education.

Most of the Jews from outlying communities in the Anatolian provinces moved to the large cities or to Israel in the early years of the Jewish state. Recently, there has been further movement out of the smaller towns as social and ethnic unrest in the eastern provinces has sometimes taken the form of armed clashes between members of the Sunni and Alevi Moslem communities. Aside from the danger of being caught in the crossfire, Jews are naturally worried about any resurgence of religious fanaticism. There have been only rare and isolated instances of overt anti-Semitism, such as the threatening letters received by Jews in Gaziantep, an area with an Arab minority.

Turkish Jews are free to emigrate and to take their household effects with them. There are direct flights between Istanbul's Yesilkoy Airport and Israel's Ben Gurion Airport, serviced by both El'Al and Turkish Airlines. Turkish tourists are limited to one foreign trip in three years because of the severe shortage of foreign exchange. This has not seriously impeded the travel of Turkish Jews wishing to go to Israel, however, because they either qualify as businessmen or else have their tickets paid for by relatives in Israel. Virtually every Turkish Jewish family has relatives among the estimated 47,000 Jews of Turkish origin living in Israel.

Economic Difficulties

Prospective emigrants from Turkey, Jewish or non-Jewish, find it difficult to dispose of their real estate or businesses. I was told of one Armenian family planning to join relatives in the United States which had advertised without success to sell a house in a fashionable suburb of Istanbul. Since word had gotten around of their plans, prospective buyers were biding their time in hopes of getting the property at a fraction of its real value.

Businessmen in general encounter another difficulty in attempting to sell their factories. The growth of powerful labor unions and far-reaching social legislation enacted during the past decade have provided many workers with contracts that ensure them of generous pensions and severance pay often exceeding 60 days for every year of service. This has dissuaded prospective buyers even of profitable businesses because of the heavy future financial obligations they must assume. Moreover, the shortage of foreign exchange for fuel, other raw materials

and parts caused many businesses to run at less than 50 percent of capacity. Many of the older Jewish businessmen thus felt locked in and the emigrants have been primarily from among the younger members of the community and professionals. Hope was expressed by Jewish and Moslem Turkish businessmen that the strong economic measures recently introduced by the government, together with the infusion of foreign aid from the Western countries, would turn the Turkish economy around, increase productivity and stimulate export earnings. Two drastic devaluations of the Turkish *lira* within the past year to a current rate of 70 to a dollar, it was hoped, will end the rampant black market and induce Turkish workers abroad to repatriate the estimated \$3 billion they have stashed away in European banks.

If the economic measures succeed, the business climate in Turkey will improve greatly, and it will be easier for Turkish Jews to dispose of their assets. Conversely, better economic conditions are likely to lessen social tensions and therefore decrease the desire of Jews and others to leave the country. But this is a big if, for the immediate effect of the government's draconian measures to rationalize the Turkish economy and cut subsidies to unproductive state enterprises has been a three to six-fold price increase in many basic consumer goods and services. The firing of redundant workers and the rise in prices have caused social unrest, which has been exploited by Marxist labor unions.

The big question marks are: Will the Demirel government be able to remain in power long enough for the economic measures to bear fruit -- an estimated two to three years? Will the emergency aid from the United States and the other NATO countries be sufficient -- and will this arrive quickly enough to generate new jobs and to alleviate the suffering being felt by the Turkish masses? And will the armed forces be ready and able to root out the terrorist groups and prevent radical extremists from drawing mass support from the unemployed workers who crowd into the shantytowns (*Gecekondu* = houses that have sprung up overnight) on the outskirts of Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara?

Communal Institutions

The economic and social trends have also had their impact upon Jewish communal life in Turkey. As Jews have moved out of certain neighborhoods and cities, communal institutions have had to close. Under Turkish law no nationwide religious organization is permitted. This is not directed against the Jews as such but was instituted by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, primarily as a means of undercutting the power of the traditional Moslem religious leadership and promoting the concept of a secular (*laik*) republic. Consequently, it is only a local community that may own and manage

a mosque, church or synagogue. Jacques Veissid, the acting president of the Jewish community in Istanbul, mentioned to me that the community in Edirne had just donated a magnificent synagogue -- "a jewel" -- to the Ministry of Culture to preserve as a museum, and thus to prevent its being desecrated or turned into a stable. The once flourishing Edirne community no longer has a regular *minyan*.

The Jewish schools in the Istanbul communities of Balat and Ortaköy also closed after the Jews moved to other neighborhoods. Today there is only one full-time official Jewish school, whose curriculum is set by the Ministry of Education, but which is financially supported by the Jewish community. There are about 300 students in the primary school *Birinci Musevi Karma Ilkokul* and slightly more (327 last year) in the *Musevi Lisesi*, the Jewish high school. The latter has a capacity of about 380. Women affiliated with the local B'nai B'rith provide hot lunches in an effort to induce more families to send their children to the Jewish school. There is concern that if enrollment drops, the government will remove its recognition of the school. Most of the wealthier Jewish families send their children to French, English or Turkish private schools.

In addition to problems of enrollment, the Jewish school also suffers from a lack of qualified Hebrew teachers. The government does not permit the importation of teachers from Israel. This, too, is part of a larger policy undertaken during Atatürk's time to prevent the spread of Communist or other foreign influence after the bitter experience of the Ottoman Empire with the Capitulation treaties that granted special status and influence to foreigners. There are insufficient numbers of qualified Turkish Hebrew teachers. Two young *hazzanim* and *shochetim* who had been trained by the Chief Rabbi as teachers left for Israel in 1979, and a third, I was told, is planning to leave. Morale and discipline in the Jewish school have begun to be a problem since the available rabbis sometimes have to cancel classes to officiate at weddings or to serve on the *Beit Din* to deal with divorce and other communal matters. The relatively low salary the teachers receive also acts as a deterrent to more young Jews entering the profession.

The general inflation has caused Jewish communal expenses to triple in the past couple of years and it is increasingly difficult to get members to pay their pledges. It is estimated that about 60% of the needs of the community are met by some 5% of the Jewish population. The community is not permitted to have formal connections with international Jewish organizations, such as the Joint Distribution Committee or World Jewish Congress. Even the local lodge of B'nai B'rith is incorporated as a purely Turkish benevolent society with no formal ties to the international organization. The Turkish Rotary Club is the first national group to succeed in getting official permission to affiliate with an international organization.

The Jewish community also still maintains a hospital with 70 beds, although most of the patients are Moslem, and a Jewish old age home for some 80 persons.

The majority of the Jewish community is middle class and some are quite wealthy. Most of the poor left in the early years of the Jewish State -- for Zionist, religious and economic reasons. It is estimated that presently there are only some 500 poor families, consisting of a total of around 1,500 persons. Of these, 345 families receive Jewish assistance from a fund named *Mattan Beseter* (Gift in Secret, in accordance with Maimonides's principle). Most of the families in need of aid are handicapped persons and their dependents. The local B'nai B'rith organization has some 260 active members and a youth division with some 80 persons, who volunteer to aid the sick and the poor.

In addition to the rabbinical council there is a lay council of the community, but it has no formal legal existence, acting in theory as only an advisory body under the *Hahambaşı*, the Chief Rabbi. Because of legal constraints and the ingrained Turkish suspicion of foreigners, the Jewish community seeks to keep a very low profile and shuns public identification with Israel or outside international Jewish bodies.

Social Interaction and Intermarriage

The older generation of Turkish Jews tended to socialize within their own community and spoke either Ladino (Judeo-Spanish) or French at home. The younger generation, educated in the public schools and the state universities, speaks fluent Turkish. The forces of secularization and assimilation have begun to have an effect. Under the Ottoman *millet* system, marriage, divorce and other questions of personal status were left to the jurisdiction of the religious authorities of the respective communities. Under the Turkish Republic this has been supplemented by legislation providing for civil marriage.

Consequently, intermarriage between Jews and Christians and even between Jews and Moslems is no longer a rare occurrence. It is estimated that the intermarriage rate is now between 5 and 10 percent of all marriages involving Jews. The Istanbul *Beth Din* handles some two to three cases of conversion to Judaism a year. I was unable to obtain estimates of the number of conversions to Christianity or Islam. It is assumed that most partners in intermarriages formally retain the religion of their birth, although they may be agnostic if not atheist in personal belief.

Jewish men are drafted into the army but do not make military service a career. There is an unwritten gentleman's agreement that the professional officer corps does not encourage non-Moslems. There is currently no Jewish member of parliament and most Jews are reluc-

tant to get involved in politics. The late Solomon Adatto, who served in the Grand National Assembly and was active in Democratic party politics in the 1950's, was an exception.

While Turkish Jews enjoy full equal rights under the law, there are still elements of the population who tend to feel that the non-Moslem minorities -- Jews, Greeks and Armenians -- are not real Turks. The Turkish Jewish community also tends to be identified with Israel and American Jewry, despite the local community's efforts to keep a low profile. The fact that some Jewish members of Congress have supported the Greek position in the Cyprus dispute and opposed U. S. aid to Turkey has led to false allegations that there were Jewish and Greek lobbies working together against Turkey. The public support given to American aid to Turkey by Jewish members of Congress, such as Rep. Stephen Solarz, has helped somewhat to counteract this mistaken impression.

The popular identification of the minorities with foreigners and with control of the country's commercial life has its origin in the fact that in the Ottoman period, Turkish Moslems shunned commerce and industry as professions beneath their dignity. Today more than 80% of the country's economic life is in the hands of Moslem Turks. The ethnic composition of Istanbul, Turkey's largest commercial center, also reflects these changes. As late as 1945 nearly a quarter of Istanbul's population of 850,000 were non-Moslems. Today the city's total population exceeds 3 million, swollen by natural increase and the influx from the farm villages of Anatolia. Yet the total number of non-Moslems is less than 100,000. There has been a steady decline in the number of Armenians and Greeks, accelerated by the anti-Greek riots in 1955 and continuing Greco-Turkish tensions over Cyprus.

Thus, although the Jewish role in Turkey's economic life is relatively marginal today, what remains true is that most Jews belong to the business and professional classes and may be regarded as among "the haves" by those who would stir up the economically disadvantaged.

Anti-Semitic and Anti-Democratic Dangers

There is no official, government-inspired anti-Semitism. Both the currently ruling Justice Party (JP) of Süleyman Demirel and its predecessor, the Republican People's Party (RPP) of Bülent Ecevit, are formally committed to maintaining Turkey as a secular democracy in accordance with the principles established by Atatürk.

The problem is that neither of these two major centrist parties has been able to achieve a parliamentary majority in recent years, nor have they been able to cooperate with each other in a broad coalition. This is partly due to the mutual personal animosity of Ecevit and Demirel

and partly the result of ideological differences -- the RPP tending toward socialism and state management of industrial enterprises while the Justice Party has favored private enterprise and foreign investment. Consequently, both Ecevit and Demirel have in the past formed uneasy coalitions with two smaller parties, the National Salvation Party (NSP) and the National Action Party (NAP).

National Salvation Party

The National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan seeks to replace Turkey's Kemalist secularism with a return to an Islamic state. In a visit to Pakistan in December 1979, Erbakan advocated a Moslem United Nations and an Islamic Common Market, adding that Turkey could benefit greatly from the experiences of Pakistan in the field of Islamization. Denouncing Communism as "a police system of government" and capitalism as "based on usury", Erbakan went on to declare that "both these systems are two arms of Zionism which keeps the people in bondage."

Erbakan has tended to blame all of Turkey's problems, including the fuel shortage, on international Zionism. He has called for the breaking off of relations with Israel and has chided the Turkish Airlines for flying to Tel Aviv and not to Mecca. He recently circulated imitation Turkish banknotes with pictures of Demirel and Ecevit wearing Moshe Dayan-type eyepatches to dramatize his allegation that the Turkish *Lira* had declined in value because both major party leaders were Zionist agents.

Most persons in Turkey do not take Erbakan seriously and note that his party's share in the popular vote declined from 12 percent in 1973 to seven percent in 1979 and that the number of NSP seats in the Assembly is presently only 22 out of 450. Traditional religious sentiment certainly still exists among segments of the Turkish population. But Erbakan, who is an engineer by profession, has skillfully combined his Sunni Moslem religious appeal with an emphasis on economic development based on bringing industry to the smaller towns instead of concentrating it in the big cities. He has also attempted to cash in on nationalist sentiment by taking a tough stand on the Cyprus issue. Thus even Erbakan's limited electoral success is not attributable solely to pro-Islamic, anti-Zionist and implicitly anti-Semitic statements.

Both Demirel and Ecevit have had the unpleasant experience of having the NSP as a coalition partner. The longest was a two year period (1975-77) in which the Justice Party, the NSP and the National Action Party (NAP) stayed in power largely by avoiding major policy

decisions while the economic situation steadily deteriorated. As Professor Dankwart A. Rustow notes, in an article in the Fall 1979 Foreign Affairs, "it was not uncommon to hear a policy pronouncement by Premier Demirel flatly contradicted the next day by Deputy Premier Erbakan." An Ecevit-Erbakan coalition lasted for only nine months in 1974.

The present exclusively Justice Party government under Prime Minister Demirel assumed office on November 12, 1979 after Ecevit stepped down following the loss of five seats in by-elections in October. Demirel's Justice Party controls 185 seats, 41 short of a majority. It has been able to remain in power thus far with the "reluctant" support of Erbakan's NSP and NAP of Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş. Eleven of the NSP deputies, who control half of the party's seats, oppose any new coalition with the left-leaning Republican People's Party (RPP) of Ecevit.

The RPP is also divided. Ecevit reportedly believes there is a possibility of reconciling his own socialist views with the form of Islamic socialism on the Qaddafi model favored by Erbakan. The center and right wings of the RPP, however, find Erbakan's Islamic world view both unrealistic and contrary to the Western and secular tradition of Atatürk's party.

The RPP has not attempted to bring down the Demirel minority government or to press for new elections, preferring for the time being to let Demirel bear the brunt of the populace's resentment over the economic austerity measures, some of which began to be introduced by Ecevit himself last year under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and Turkey's other Western creditors.

National Action Party

The other minority party of the right is Türkeş's NAP. As a young army officer in the military junta that took over in a bloodless coup in 1960, Türkeş advocated installing an authoritarian military regime under what his critics regard as a form of fascism. The majority of the army leaders, however, favored returning power to the civilian authorities after trying the leaders of the previous regime for unlawful actions and after drafting of a constitution that explicitly spelled out basic civil and human rights and contained other safeguards against anti-democratic measures.

The NAP increased its strength from three percent of the vote in 1973 to six percent in 1977 and today controls 17 seats in the Assembly. Türkeş denies that he is a fascist and maintains that he is simply a

nationalist and anti-Communist, who believes in discipline, self-sacrifice and strong personal leadership. He has tried to reassure leaders of the Jewish community that he considers them as brothers and that they have nothing to fear from him. He also contends that he is not anti-Israel.

What has worried some Jews and other members of Turkish minorities is that Törkes began his career by advocating Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism, meaning the political unification of Turkey with the Turkic-speaking populations in Iran, the Soviet Union and China. While the basis of such a union is linguistic rather than racial, members of the non-Moslem minorities wonder how secure their position would be if an authoritarian regime on the Törkes model came into power. They also recall that when members of the National Action Party controlled the Ministry of Culture in 1977 they permitted the publication of articles blaming the "minorities" for the "deterioration of ethics in Turkish society." Törkes's NAP has the support of uniformed paramilitary cadres, who are widely believed to be responsible for the violent attacks upon leftists. Acting in the name of law and order, they have contributed by their resort to extra-legal methods to the escalation of violence.

Attempts at Rapprochement with Islamic Nations

The OPEC quadrupling of oil prices in 1974 provided an economic incentive for Turkey to improve its relations with its oil-rich Islamic neighbors. As recession cut the demand for Turkish guest workers in Western Europe and as Turkey found it difficult to compete effectively for markets in the European Economic Community, the idea began to develop in Ankara that the solution to Turkey's problems lay in creating a new tripartite partnership. This would combine Arab and Iranian petrodollars, Western technology and Turkish manpower. It was hoped that Islamic sentiment would prompt the Arabs to aid Ankara, while Turkey's longer experience with modernization would enable Turkish professional and industrial workers to bring the fruits of Western technology to the massive development programs being undertaken in the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf and Libya.

Although an Arab-Turkish Bank has been established with Libyan and Kuwaiti funds and a considerable number of bilateral Turkish-Arab construction projects have been undertaken, the results thus far have been disappointing. Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Turkey's major Middle East oil suppliers, have at times allowed Turkey to defer payment on its purchases, but while this has given the Turks a few months grace to find the money, the price of the oil has been set around OPEC levels. Although continued expansion of Turkey's economic exchanges with its Middle East neighbors is expected, Ankara now realizes that price and quality are more significant factors than Islamic solidarity in determining whether a specific Saudi contract, for

example, goes to an American, a Turkish or a Korean firm.

On the political level as well, most Turks have come to realize that neither Islam nor non-alignment offer realistic alternatives to continued close cooperation with the Western nations. There was much annoyance expressed in the Turkish press when, after Ecevit agreed last summer to the opening of a Palestine Liberation Organization office in Ankara, the PLO and most Arab states proceeded to endorse a Greek-sponsored resolution condemning Turkey at the Havana non-aligned conference. While the original decision to permit the opening of a PLO office had been taken three years earlier at an Islamic conference hosted by Turkey in Istanbul, the Turkish authorities had hesitated to permit the PLO to operate within the country in view of the clear evidence that various Turkish urban terrorist groups had received training and other support in Palestinian camps in Lebanon and Syria.

AMERICAN JEWISH

Ecevit had agreed in July to open the office as a gesture of gratitude to Yassir Arafat after a PLO mediating team had helped end the seizure of the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara by a dissident Palestinian terrorist group, the Eagles of the Revolution. The Turkish opposition expressed outrage when during the trial of the terrorists evidence was produced that one of Arafat's mediators had in fact been involved in the planning of the attack and that the "Eagles" were affiliated with *as-Saiqa*, a Syrian-backed PLO member group.

Moreover, while Turkey has since 1967 endorsed UN resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory, Ankara has refused to break its diplomatic or commercial ties with Israel. Arafat apparently realizes that Turkey will not yield on this point. At the inauguration of the PLO office in Ankara, in October, when the press inquired whether he had asked Turkey to break relations with Israel, Arafat replied that "we did not come here to dictate to Turkey or attempt to impose our policies." He also reportedly promised to refrain from interfering in Turkey's domestic affairs. Relatively normal political, economic and cultural relations are continuing with Israel and there was even a flurry of speculation in the Turkish and Arab press concerning possible strategic cooperation between Ankara and Jerusalem when Arye Levine, the head of the Israel Foreign Ministry's Middle East division, visited Turkey in February 1980.

Extreme Leftist Groups

The basically pro-Western, democratic orientation of Turkish policy is threatened on the far left by the Turkish Labor Party, a Marxist-Leninist group that is pro-Soviet, other communist factions leaning toward Peking and a variety of clandestine terrorist groups, some of

which have been linked to the Palestine Liberation Organization. None of these groups has been strong enough to win seats in the Turkish Assembly and most are dedicated to overthrowing the present parliamentary system. These groups are also violently anti-Israel, regarding the Jewish state as an ally of Western imperialism.

The first upsurge of leftist terrorism occurred a decade ago when the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA) assassinated Israeli Consul General Ephraim Elrom in Istanbul in 1971, as well as British and Canadian radar technicians. Under the martial law imposed briefly at that time, the Turkish military captured the leaders of the TPLA. At their trial evidence was produced that the group's members had received training in Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Three TPLA leaders were convicted and hanged in 1972.

Groups such as the TPLA have again become active in the past two years. Violence by them as well as ethnic and religious strife in the eastern provinces prompted the government of Premier Ecevit to impose martial law in 19 of Turkey's 67 provinces over a year ago. Ecevit's efforts at curbing the terrorism were not very effective and some of his critics charge that leftist supporters of Ecevit in the police and the judiciary had dealt too leniently with suspected Marxist terrorists, tipped them off about impending police raids and even aided their escape after they were convicted and imprisoned.

The Demirel government has acted more vigorously against leftist activities, prompting opposition leader Ecevit to charge that the government was resorting to "Nazi-like" tactics and that Demirel's measures might lead the country into a "South American type of dictatorship."

Other Turks and Western diplomats with whom I spoke considered Ecevit's remarks irresponsible and inflammatory. Çetin Gökçeataam, the American-educated manufacturer of agricultural equipment and President of the Turkish affiliate of Rotary International, compared Turkey to a sick patient who needs a serious operation. Demirel, he said, is a good surgeon and he has prescribed bitter but effective medicine. However, as he is about to operate, Ecevit and other Turkish politicians stand around and offer contradictory advice. Gökçeataam believes that Demirel's tough economic and anti-terrorist stand has widespread approval and that he would increase his strength if new elections were held.

Anti-Terrorist Measures

The Government's tough stand is beginning to show results. On February 12 a coordinated anti-terrorist operation by martial law authorities led to the arrest of 56 members of the illegal "Marxist-

Leninist Armed Propaganda Union." Among those captured were the accused killers of four American servicemen, Turkish provincial officials and Avraham Elazar, the Istanbul branch manager of El Al airlines, who was shot on his way from the airport on January 2. The pro-Government newspaper Tercuman reported that during the raid documents proving the group's connections with the PLO had been found, as well as PLO literature, and that several Arab citizens had been taken into custody. A martial law communiqué said that a total of 70 militants belonging to various branches of the Turkish People's Liberation Party Front had been arrested since last May.

The struggle against leftist extremists is by no means over. Communist revolutionary groups took over a state-owned factory in Izmir and held it and nearby slum neighborhoods for eleven days in February until armored units from the security forces helped the police regain control of the area. During the strike, banners calling for Kurdish independence were unfurled, reflecting cooperation between radical leftist and secessionist elements among Turkey's estimated 7 million Kurds. The Turkish authorities are also concerned with the effect on Turkey's eastern region of ethnic separatism and religious clashes between Sunni and Shi'i Moslems in neighboring Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Three days before my arrival in Istanbul leftist teenagers managed to intimidate most shopkeepers to close their stores for a day as part of a workers' protest against the new economic austerity measures. Although commercial life was again relatively normal the following week, the event brought home to many Istanbulis a greater sense of impending danger and helplessness than did the political terrorism, which previously had been directed by leftist and rightist extremists against one another. The ordinary citizen was not affected directly unless he was unlucky enough to be caught in a crossfire.

The government has now extended martial law to Izmir and to the eastern province of Hatay on the Syrian border, and Turkey's National Security Council has broadened the powers of the martial law authorities.

Turkish Jews, like other members of the Turkish public, are anxiously waiting to see whether the Demirel government will succeed in crushing the terrorists and in reviving the Turkish economy. They also hope that the United States and Turkey's other NATO allies will act swiftly to carry out their pledges to strengthen Turkey in view of its crucial importance to the Western democracies in this strategic area.

May 13, 1980
80-580-15

THE JEWS OF MOROCCO

by Abraham S. Karlikow

The Moroccan Jewish community, numbering about 18,000, is the largest stable Jewish community in the Moslem world today. Most Moroccan Jews live in Casablanca, which has well over half the population, with a couple of thousand each in Rabat and in Marrakech, and the rest being spread through other cities throughout the country. Once, Moroccan Jews were a much larger community indeed, totalling over a quarter of a million in 1948. Even though their situation was a relatively peaceful one in comparison with that of Jewish communities in other Arab lands, such as Iraq and Syria, yet Moroccan Jews departed in their overwhelming majority, going to Israel for the most part.

Moroccan Jewish history goes back nearly two thousand years. There were the Jews who came in Biblical times after the fall of the Temple when Jews made their way across Africa. There were others who were Berber Jews. Still others came at the time of the Inquisition. The result was a Jewish community that was, in many ways, well-integrated into the country in which it lived for centuries, even though in other ways it was quite separate. It was integrated in that it took up many of the fashions, many of the habits, many of the ways of life of the Arab world around it. It was separate because to a considerable extent, the Jews of Morocco had to live under a code elaborated in the 7th century by a Moslem *caliph*, a code that called for special quarters for Jews, even special clothing; that made it impossible, for example, for a Jew to ride a horse, only a donkey, lest he be higher than his Arab neighbor; that declared, similarly, there could be no synagogue or any other building of prominence by Jews higher than a mosque or important Moslem building. So there was a dichotomy, a dichotomy that was to last up to the rule of the French, who made Morocco a Protectorate in 1914.

The coming of the French opened up a new situation for Moroccan Jewry, creating a gateway to the Western world as it were, even though -- unlike the situation in Tunisia, for example, or Algeria -- Moroccan Jews were not permitted to take up French or other citizenship but were considered as "protected" persons of the Sultan. There was even a term for this status, *dhimmi*. French influence made itself felt particularly in education, thanks, in large measure, to the work of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, which established a network of Jewish schools across Morocco. One result was that there were substantial numbers of Jewish children who received a basic education at a time when, in the surrounding environment, Arab children had little or no education for the most part. For those more advanced in their schooling or whose parents might be better off, there was the possibility of attending French schools and universities. French influence made itself felt in other ways, too.

A Jewish middle class arose that did its business primarily with France. The Jewish Community Council, which had been largely theocratic in cast before the coming of the French, took on more secular aspects and tasks as well, and looked to the French for inspiration for all that it was under the sway of the Moroccan authorities and responsible to them.

Nonetheless, for the great majority of Moroccan Jews in 1948, their life-style was still in many ways an Arab life-style. Jews lived in *mellahs*, the Jewish quarters of towns and villages, for the most part. These were horribly overcrowded, and living conditions were primitive. Often as many as ten or twelve people dwelt in a single room with hardly any facilities to speak of, even in the way of water, except for the town pump. Local Jewish *heders* were hardly worthy of the name where so-called teachers knew very little about Jewish learning and law but, really, acted more as guardians of the children, using a strap or a stick to enforce discipline. Several diseases, such as tuberculosis, tinea and eye disorders were prevalent. With the coming of the Joint Distribution Committee toward 1950, the work of the OSE (a worldwide Jewish health organization) and of other local Jewish institutions as well, considerable headway was made against such diseases and there was general improvement in health and other welfare standards.

The creation of Israel in 1948 marked a critical turning point for Moroccan Jewry. Moroccan Jews were, in great part, deeply traditionalist, almost in a Biblical sense. And so there began the first major wave of Jewish emigration from Morocco to Israel by those inspired by the Messianic predictions of return to Jerusalem. Perhaps 30 to 40 thousand of Morocco's quarter of a million Jews left in this first wave. After that there was something of a hiatus, but then, in 1953 and 1954 came another development -- the fomentation in Morocco for independence from the French. The prospect of such independence greatly worried many Jews concerned as to what life might be like for Jews under an independent Moslem state without the possibility of French protection in the event of difficulties. Hence, another move from Morocco of Jews began, again largely to Israel, and, in much smaller measure, also to Canada and other places where French is spoken.

Independence brought new status to the Jews of Morocco. Before, as noted above, they had been "protected ones". Now, they were given full citizenship and equal rights with their Moslem neighbors. There was even a Jewish minister, Leon Benzaquen, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. Sultan Mohammed V reassured Jews of his solicitude for them, a solicitude he had shown during the days when France's Vichy government had tried to apply discriminatory measures against them. Nonetheless, some Jewish exodus still continued.

This created difficulties with various government ministries, and emigration was forbidden for a while. The forbidding of emigration set up an even greater desire among Jews to go, leading to unauthorized

movement out of the country, resulting in a tragedy when one ship making its way with migrants across the Mediterranean to France was caught in a storm and sank, and 18 Jews perished. The gates soon were to open again, however. Ever since, Jews have been able to depart from Morocco freely when they so desire. At the same time, for those who remain, there is equality before the law.

As a result of all this movement, however, the Jewish population of Morocco dropped from a quarter of a million to what it is today, in the 18,000 range. There has been little movement in the last few years, Jews feeling relatively secure despite the fact that Morocco has played its role as an Arab state in the conflicts between Israel and the Arab world, including the sending of contingents to fight on the Golan Heights in the last war. Both the late Sultan Mohammed V and his son, King Hassan II, however, have always insisted and publicly stated to the Moroccan people that a distinction had to be made between the Arab stance against Israel and the situation of Jews in Morocco itself. In times of difficulty, when popular opinion was stirred up by various Arab-Israel conflicts, the monarchy took positive action to protect the Jews.

For all that Moroccan Judaism is today a stable Judaism yet the stability still is relative. Moroccan Jews believe their fate is closely tied up with the fate of Hassan II. They are well aware that there already have been several attempts to take the King's life in the past few years. At present, the King seems firmly in control. Morocco is currently having serious difficulties arising out of a war being waged in territory in the south taken over from Spanish control just a few years ago. This area is rich in phosphates that make up a large part of Morocco's exports. It is also an area where Moroccan sway is challenged by *Polisario* tribes seeking independence. The *Polisario* is supported in its fight by Morocco's neighbor, Algeria, Libya and other countries, and has gained a fair amount of international support from other Arab and African states, much to Morocco's chagrin.

The United States is involved here, too, for Morocco has asked the U. S. to furnish it with certain kinds of military material in order that it may carry on its fight against *Polisario* forces. The struggle puts a heavy drain on the Moroccan economy, leading to some discontent. For all that, almost to a man, the entire Moroccan population is behind the King in his fight against the *Polisario*. Jewish leaders in Morocco have on occasion come to the U. S. to help explain the Moroccan policy, both to Jewish leadership in America, to legislators and to the United States public at large. This occurred both with regard to the "Green March" of some years ago, when Morocco took over the former Spanish-controlled territory (with Spanish consent, be it said), and again more recently, when it was moot whether the U. S. would give arms

to Morocco.

The Moroccan Jewish community today is quite different from what it was in 1948. There are still a couple of thousand who need welfare assistance. For the most part, however, the Jews of Morocco now are middle-class, in businesses of their own or in professions. They are virtually all educated. All have relatives in Israel, or in France, or in Montreal, and find no difficulty in keeping in contact with them. There is no bar to the full exercise of Jewish religious activities or Jewish education, such as that given by the ORT or by the *Ittihad*, the successor organization to the Alliance, the Lubavitcher or the *Ozar Hatorah*. Jews have their own religious courts for matters of personal status, such as marriage and divorce. There is not much emigration today; rather, something of a slow seepage out as Jewish youngsters go to France to study and do not return but set themselves up in that country or in Canada.

While Morocco, as a member of the Arab League, officially broke off relations with Israel and while it subscribes to the Rabat decisions with regard to the Palestine Liberation Organization, yet, in certain ways, Morocco's attitude vis-a-vis Israel has not been as harsh as that of other Arab states. Several years ago, for instance, King Hassan II pointed to the benefits that might accrue from Arab-Jewish cooperation. This was a prelude, indeed, to a secret meeting on Moroccan territory of then Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and a representative of the Egyptian government which was to lead, some months later, to the dramatic coming of President Sadat to Jerusalem. Recently, King Hassan has made a statement urging the Palestinians to negotiate with the Israelis, a stand which is at variance with the attitude of the PLO. It may be that the monarch is sorely disappointed in the PLO, to which he has given some support, yet which has taken political positions against Morocco at various international conferences.

King Hassan II also feels that he has a claim upon Western powers and the United States, for helping keep all of Africa more stable. This occurred on two occasions, when Morocco sent troops to fight on behalf of the Zaire government which readily could have fallen to anti-Western forces without such assistance.

The Moroccan Jewish community of 18,000 is, thus, today a stable and relatively prosperous community. But it knows that this stability and even this prosperity is closely allied to the fate of the Alawite monarchy and King Hassan II.

June 24, 1980
80-580-22

Legal coalition for syrian jewry

THE CUPRENT PLIGHT OF SYRIAN JEWRY

By Dr. George E. Gruen
Director, Middle East Division
American Jewish Committee, 165 E. 56 St., NY, NY 10022

Growing Sense of Desperation

In the past several months developments within Syria have resulted in a growing sense of fear and even of hopelessness among the 5,000 Jews in Syria. This feeling that there is no future for them in the land their families have lived in for millennia has led to desperate attempts to flee by entire families, including some prominent and economically well-established members of the Jewish communities in Damascus (c. 3,500) and Aleppo (c. 1,300), and the isolated and impoverished community of Qamishly (c. 200).

Since the Syrian government still imposes a ban on Jewish emigration, "illegal" attempts to escape the country have led to arrests, harsh interrogation and imprisonment of those caught by the authorities or suspected of aiding others to leave. Nine Jewish men were released at the end of October after nearly two months of detention. Two others, David Boucai and David Kabariti, were finally released in January 1980.

Women and children have usually been detained only several days. Yet the risk to life as well as liberty remains great. This was tragically illustrated by the case of a young mother with six small children who was gravely wounded when she was shot by border guards in August. Although released from prison, she is still bedridden and may be permanently paralyzed.

Deterioration in General Climate

In addition to the various restrictions described below, which are imposed specifically on the Jews, the Jewish community is affected by general trends within the country. The economic liberalization introduced by President Hafez Assad in the early 1970's and the rapid growth rate of that period have been replaced by increasing inflation and other difficulties, largely the result of the heavy drain on the Syrian economy since 1976 of the continuing Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, where more than 30,000 Syrian troops dominate the "Arab Deterrent Force." Syrian budgetary expenditures have risen sharply this year, with the entire 45 percent increase officially "allocated to defence as Syria has become the main confrontation state after (the) Camp David agreement." (Syrian Arab Republic statement published in the New York Times, November 16, 1979.) The vehement hostility of Syria to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty has also dashed the hopes briefly raised in the Jewish community that President Assad might follow Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's lead in seeking a negotiated settlement with Israel and that in the process of normalization the Syrian Jewish community might also finally achieve its freedom.

The Assad regime has become increasingly embattled both domestically and within the Arab world. The intervention in Lebanon is unpopular and there are reports of widespread corruption involving the President's brother Rifaat. Most serious are the physical threats to the regime, including the assassination of key officials and the massacre of over 50 military cadets in Aleppo in June. The victims have nearly always been members of the minority Alawite community to which President Assad belongs and from which his military and political élite are primarily recruited. The Alawites, an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam, are estimated at between seven and thirteen percent of the country's population, the

overwhelming majority of whom are Sunni Muslims.

While earlier assassinations were attributed to Iraqi agents, the recent waves, including the Aleppo massacre, are believed to be the work of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fanatical group of fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, which originated in Egypt and has spread throughout the Arab world. Although the Syrian Government executed fifteen alleged Muslim Brotherhood members on June 28, the wave of assassinations has continued. The Jewish community is particularly fearful that should President Assad be overthrown and replaced by a Muslim Brotherhood dominated regime, a new wave of active anti-Jewish persecution would begin. Christians and other minorities in Syria are also fearful of the effect upon them of a fanatically religious Muslim regime, but they are able to leave the country, while Jews are barred from doing so.

Restrictions on the Jewish Community

At a meeting with Syrian Jewish community leaders in Damascus at the end of 1976, President Assad promised to remove the special restrictions upon the Jewish community and to treat Jews equally with other citizens. Some degree of liberalization did occur in subsequent months. Jews no longer required advance written permission from the Muhabarat (intelligence or secret police) to travel from one city to another within Syria, and the special marking of Jewish identity papers with the word "Musawi" (Jewish) prominently in red was replaced by a smaller notation in blue. However, in the case of Muslims and Christians the entry for religion was usually left blank, in keeping with Assad's policy of attempting to minimize ethnic and religious divisions in the country.

Despite the promises to remove other restrictions, Jews continue to face difficulties with regard to inheritance and in disposing of property, requiring special permission to sell a car or a house. If they wish to engage in foreign trade they are advised to use a Muslim partner to head the firm. Muslim directors also are appointed by the Government to supervise the Jewish schools. Government employment is not open to Jews, and while they can attend the universities, their numbers and fields of study are restricted.

Foreign Travel and Emigration

Some Syrian Jews have been permitted to travel abroad on brief visits for business, health or family reasons, but they are still required to leave a large security deposit and members of their immediate family must stay behind as assurance for their return.

In response to numerous interventions including a personal appeal by President Jimmy Carter, President Assad agreed in July 1977 to allow twelve unmarried Jewish women to come to the United States to find husbands here. Despite Assad's promise to allow additional persons to leave for humanitarian reasons "on a case by case basis", the Syrian Government has turned a deaf ear to repeated requests conveyed by the United States Government on behalf of other Syrian Jews, including a list of an additional 51 young women, and requests for family reunions submitted by members of the 25,000 Jews of Syrian origin living in the United States. It is the dashing of all hopes for legal emigration combined with the deteriorating situation within Syria that has prompted Syrian Jews to turn in desperation to "illegal" avenues of escape.

Amnesty International describes in its Briefing Paper No. 16 on Syria, issued in October 1979, the violations of fundamental rights engaged in by the organs of Syrian state security, whose pervasive influence has been intensified as a result of the internal unrest in the country. The Jewish community suffers from this general climate as well as the specifically anti-Jewish restrictions.

It is therefore all the more urgent to maintain international legal and humanitarian efforts to induce the Syrian authorities to live up to their obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Revised February 22, 1980

Legal Coalition for Syrian Jewry, Suite 2600, 111 W. 40 St., NY, NY 10018 212-221-1537
& Suite 802, 6505 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif. 90048 213-852-1234 ext. 276

THE THREAT TO JEWS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

A Foreign Affairs Background Memorandum

By Sergio Nudelstejer, AJC Director
For Mexico and Central America

The pattern of revolution and counter-revolution, Marxist guerilla kidnappings and social unrest in Central America poses serious threats to the continued existence of the small Jewish communities in several of these countries.

Altogether, approximately 10,000 Jews live in the six Central American states of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama, with another 15,000 in the northernmost South American country, Colombia---lands where political crises in varying degrees reflect the need for deep structural and economic changes.

Jewish communities in all these countries not only are caught up in the present-day social and political strife but now are also being increasingly affected, as they were not before, by the play of Arab propaganda, growing PLO presence and resultant anti-Jewish pressures.

These last are felt, not only in Central America proper but in two key neighboring Latin American lands, Mexico (with a Jewish population of 40,000) and Venezuela (19,000 Jews). These, as oil powers, play a key role in Latin America, now one of the fastest growing areas, demographically in the world, and beginning to demonstrate new found economic might.

Since Jews in Central America generally belong to the business and merchant community they often are considered as class enemies by Marxist and leftist forces. One example of this was the assassination in Guatemala late May of Alberto Mishan Habie, a prominent figure in the Jewish community and owner of the greatest textile factory in all Latin America. As president of Guatemala's Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations Habie was considered the leading figure of Guatemala's private business sector. Guatemala's clandestine Communist Party (P.G.T.) is reported to have claimed the assassination

#

Going from one Central American land to another, one finds the following picture.

During the conflict that brought down the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, virtually the entire Jewish community of some 75 families moved out of the country. The Sandinist government, it should be pointed out, has not demonstrated any anti-Semitism or anti-Jewish stance: simply, the community had almost vanished by the time it came to power. Some Jews had suffered from the earthquake that devastated the capital city of Managua some years ago, others fled during the revolutionary fighting. A few have returned, but seemingly just to liquidate their holdings.

The Jewish community in El Salvador, where terrorism and violence are current, apparently is well on the way to the same fate. Most of the members of the 80 Jewish families who lived there have left the country. Only some two-score Jews, practically all males, remain, in the attempt to manage and salvage their assets. One factor in the exodus of this community was the kidnapping and murder in March, 1979 of Jewish businessman and Honorary Consul of Israel Ernesto Liebes, by a group of leftist guerillas.

Here, too, one finds no evidence of overt anti-Semitism on the part of either government or revolutionary forces. No Jewish institution, such as the Jewish center, synagogue or cemetery has been touched. Liebes' murder was viewed primarily as part of the general social conflict. Simply, El Salvador's Jews no longer see any future for themselves in the country.

In Guatemala, the Jewish community already had diminished by well over a fourth, down to 1,500, even before the shock of the Habie murder. Practically the entire Jewish population lives in the capital, Guatemala City. A number of Jews have been kidnapped and held for ransom as bourgeois targets and, sometimes, were charged with being supporters of American imperialism in this land where clashes between the army and the guerilla forces are rife. Generally, a worsening of the situation is expected in Guatemala and this doubtless will have its effects on those who still remain.

In Honduras, the poorest of the Central American states, one finds about 250 Jews. Here the government is seeking to stave off guerilla activity and revolution through democratization of institutions, but pressure from left and right wing extremists is powerful. The major challenge to the Jewish position arises from the presence of several thousand Palestinians in the country who seek to make their influence felt.

Only in Costa Rica, which traditionally has been democratic and stable, and in Panama where the military government is in fairly complete control, do the Jewish communities -- 2,500 in Costa Rica, 5,000 in Panama -- feel relatively secure. A development causing concern in Costa Rica is the announcement that an Arab delegation invited to visit that country will include PLO representatives, who thus will be coming under official auspices for the first time.

Colombia, too, is a nation that traditionally has been democratic and stable, and its Jewish community of 15,000 is a flourishing one. Here, too, serious warning notes have been sounded, both for the nation as a whole and for its Jews. Leftist forces have been growing in size, and both urban and countryside guerilla groups growing in number and boldness. This was evidenced by the seizure, some months ago, of the Dominican Republic embassy in Bogota, Colombia's capital, with ambassadors of several lands held hostage there for several weeks.

And here, too, there have been several cases of kidnappings of Jews by rebel elements. So that, Colombia's democratic principles notwithstanding, the Jewish community is uncomfortably aware of rougher times portended by growing social disruption.


Giving a new dimension to all of this for Jewish communities in these lands and in Mexico as well is the heightened activity of the PLO and the spread of Arab influence.

The PLO is known not only to have contacts in Colombia, Nicaragua and Venezuela but also to have been sponsoring revolutionary movements along with anti-Israel political positions and anti-Jewish propaganda in these and other countries.

One clear drive of Arabs living in these lands, and the PLO of course, is to try and persuade the oil nations, Venezuela and Mexico, that they should change their policies and make sure that none of their oil goes to Israel. Mexico presently is a major supplier of oil to Israel. Arab loans to countries such as Panama, Nicaragua and Venezuela carry with them their own tacit, and sometimes not so tacit, anti-Israel pressures. The number of Palestinians living in Latin American lands also has been increasing, so that there is further resonance for anti-Israel themes, and concomitant local Jewish discomfort.

The last five decades have seen Jewish life in Eastern Europe reduced to a pittance of its former strength, the Jewish communities in Moslem lands virtually emptied. Now the presence of Jews is still another quarter of the world increasingly is threatened, not so much by specifically anti-Jewish forces but by the interplay of large-scale social and economic changes that put Jewish communities in jeopardy.

July 10, 1980
FAD/sh
80-550-25



A Year After Somoza's Fall, Violence Convulses Region

7-7-80

By ALAN RIDING

Special to The New York Times

MEXICO CITY, July 6 — A year after the Somoza regime was overthrown by Sandinist guerrillas, the shock waves from the Nicaraguan revolution are still reverberating through Central America, bringing new violence and instability to the region.

In El Salvador and Guatemala the Sandinist victory has inspired the armed left

Nicaragua's new Government has apparently avoided involvement in political crises elsewhere in the region. Yet Central America's five tiny republics — 20 million people in an area equivalent in size to California — are so tightly knit that some domino effect from the revolution was inevitable.

"It was the first revolution in Latin America in 20 years," a Honduran leftist said, "and it took place in an area ripe for revolution. After all the leftist disasters in South America, it showed that armed struggle was still possible."

The ouster of Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle on July 19, 1979, was seen as a victory for all the region's leftists and democrats and a defeat for all its armies and conservatives. And just as neighboring countries played a key role in the Nicaraguan conflict they now cannot escape involvement in the strife in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Leftists Appeal for Help

On the right, Guatemalan paramilitary gunmen are operating in El Salvador; Salvadoran conservatives are financing recruitment of members of Nicaragua's defeated National Guard to fight in Guatemala, and the Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala have accused the Sandinists of helping their opponents.

Leftists, on the other hand, appeal for support throughout the region, saying the popular struggles in El Salvador and Guatemala must advance hand in hand to forestall outside intervention. "If the right wins in El Salvador and Guatemala,

Central America: A Region in Turmoil

First of three articles.

to launch an open bid for power and has frightened conservatives into stepping up repression against even moderate opposition groups.

In Honduras, the army has accepted a return to civilian rule in the hope of forestalling popular unrest. Even Costa Rica, long a democracy, is worried about the political effects of a deep economic crisis.

Struggling to rebuild its economy after a civil war in which 30,000 people died,

Continued on Page A10, Column 4

OVER

MONDAY, JULY 7, 1980



United Press International

Salvadorans examining one of the mutilated bodies of seven youths found in a slum in San Salvador

Turmoil Spreading in Central America

Continued From Page A1

it will threaten the Nicaraguan revolution as well as Honduras, Costa Rica and even Panama," a Guatemalan leftist said.

Despite their internal differences, the countries of Central America function as a geographical and political unit with much in common: They were ruled jointly until 1838, their populations are of mixed Indian and European ancestry, they are strongly Roman Catholic, their economies are dependent on agricultural exports, their rulers have traditionally been authoritarian and they have long been dominated by the United States.

Geographically, at least, Panama and Belize are also part of Central America, but in every other way they are not. Panama broke away from Colombia in 1903 and its economic and political development has been dominated by the canal built and controlled by the United States. The British colony of Belize, though claimed by Guatemala, belongs more properly to the Caribbean, with its population black, its language English and its religious affiliation Protestant.

In the rest of the region, there is a strong, although informal, political integration through the close ties between armies, politicians, priests, intellectuals and guerrillas. National boundaries seem less important than class and ideological lines. A crisis in one country is felt in all the others.

The impact of the Sandinist victory on the region reflects the vacuum of power left by the Somoza regime.

Somozas Ran Region

"The Somozas ran the region for 40 years," said a 64-year-old Nicaraguan leftist who spent most of his life in exile in Costa Rica. "There are few of us alive who remember a time when they weren't in charge."

Following in the footsteps of his father and older brother, President Somoza behaved for 15 years as if he owned Central America, investing in most countries and interfering openly in the affairs of his neighbors.

"He used to complain loudly that my land reform program would open the way to Communism, that I'd be overthrown and he'd then have to give me a job in his dairy," recalled Gen. Oswaldo López Arellano, who as Honduran head of state between 1972 and 1975 helped defuse social tensions by handing out plots to poor peasants.

The struggle to oust, or sustain, the Somoza regime absorbed the entire region. Costa Rica, long a haven for exiles from nearby military regimes, became the informal capital of the Sandinist National Liberation Front, allowing its territory to be used for guerrilla training and as a conduit for arms. Salvadoran guerrillas gave money to the Sandinists and young Guatemalans volunteered to fight alongside them. The ruling generals of El Salvador and Guatemala, on the other hand, sent arms to bolster President Somoza, while Honduras tried to prevent weapons and guerrillas from crossing its border into Nicaragua.

Torrent of Political Forces

The collapse of the Somozas released a torrent of political forces throughout Central America, not only the Marxism of the guerrillas and the corresponding anti-Communism of conservatives, but also populism, nationalism, militant Catholicism, traditionalism and even anarchy.

No dominating personality emerged on left or right to give focus to the political confusion. Nicaragua is governed by a five-member junta and a nine-member Sandinist directorate. El Salvador has a weak five-member junta. Gen. Policarpo Paz García presides over a three-member junta in Honduras, and President Romeo Lucas García of Guatemala seems dominated by his own army high command. Nor do the guerrillas in El Salvador or Guatemala have a charismatic leader.

The size of the countries also became an important political factor. The rest of the world generally ignored them, letting revolutionary movements grow in a near vacuum. The result was the creation of tiny laboratories in which political forces could be mixed in small but undiluted quantities, with explosive reactions.

Every political incident was felt nationwide, every dead guerrilla or kidnapped businessman was someone's cousin or neighbor, every strike or demonstration became a direct challenge to the government.

In El Salvador and Guatemala hope for peaceful change was dashed in the mid-1970's, when electoral fraud blocked the victories of moderate opposition parties. But the Nicaraguan revolution brought a sudden polarization of public opinion and accelerated the final collapse of the non-violent political center.

Guatemalan Politicians Slain

In Guatemala the country's two most popular opposition leaders, Alberto Fuentes Mohr and Manuel Colom Argüeta, were murdered by right-wing gunmen just weeks before the Sandinists' final of-

CONTINUED

fensive last summer. Since then dozens of other non-Marxist politicians have been killed or forced to flee, while the Christian Democratic Party recently closed its offices after several legislators received death threats.

In El Salvador fears of a Nicaraguan-style popular insurrection prompted a military coup in October. Despite a program of reform and Christian Democratic Party involvement in the Government, the new junta has been unable to stop extremist violence or rebuild the political center. Instead, it has gradually allied itself with the right.

"We've been driven into the arms of the left by the stubbornness of the right," said an exiled Social Democratic politician from El Salvador.

In both Guatemala and El Salvador militant peasants, workers, students and leftist intellectuals are lining up against the middle classes, wealthy elites and armed forces in preparation for a violent confrontation. In El Salvador, where more than 3,000 people have died in political violence so far this year, an insurrection seems close. In Guatemala it is several months farther away.

Nicaragua Seen as Special Case

In either case a leftist victory over powerful armies and right-wing paramilitary forces will be more difficult than in Nicaragua, where an entire nation was united against General Somoza and his poorly trained National Guard.

"Looking back, the Nicaraguan revolution was pretty easy," a Costa Rican leftist said. "The Sandinists had everything going for them — an open border with Costa Rica, arms pouring in from friendly governments, a good image abroad. And of course they had Somoza. They were fighting one man instead of an entire system."

Although the middle class turned against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the middle class is aligned, if only by fear, with the armed forces in El Salvador and Guatemala. Although the Sandinists received large amounts of money and arms from abroad, the opposition forces in El Salvador and Guatemala are still isolated internationally. Also, the guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala have no "open border" with a sympathetic neighbor.

But El Salvador's armed left is backed

by huge peasant-worker-student coalitions, while Guatemala's guerrilla are beginning to stir the country's long-passive Indians, who make up half the population. In contrast, the Sandinists were never able to mobilize the peasants. Instead, they won the support of urban slum-dwellers for their final insurrection after 17 years of activity.

Sandinist Regime Embarrassed

Nicaragua's new Government is clearly embarrassed at not being able to help foreign guerrilla movements that sent weapons, money and volunteers to fight against the Somoza regime. But the region's leftists have not insisted. "The most important thing is that Nicaragua consolidates its revolution," a Salvadoran guerrilla leader said. "The Sandinists should not take the risk of helping us directly."

The Sandinist regime is a target of hostility from the Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. In addition, the Nicaraguan authorities said they believe conservatives in the Honduran Army are tolerating "counterrevolutionary" activities, mainly isolated assassinations by former National Guardsmen living in refugee camps just beyond Nicaragua's northern border.

The absence of a serious challenge or threat to the year-old revolution has played an important role in maintaining the political moderation of the new Government. "You must remember that Cuba only became truly radical after the Bay of Pigs invasion," a Nicaraguan analyst said.

Although the Sandinists' outright victory gave them full control over the country, they maintained political pluralism, some independent news outlets and private industry.

But businessmen are reluctant to invest in rebuilding the economy while the Government remains dependent on traditional agricultural exports and the vagaries of world prices for foreign exchange. As evidence of its commitment to transform Nicaraguan society, the Government has started a nationwide literacy program. But it has already discovered that successful political revolutions bring no easy answer to chronic social ills.

TOMORROW: The price of revolution.

For the Rich Who Stay, Life in Central America Is Ruled by Fear

Special to The New York Times

MEXICO CITY, July 6 — In the quiet tree-lined neighborhood of San Benito overlooking San Salvador, dozens of large modern homes are available at giveaway rents. Their owners have been driven from the country by political violence and are sitting out the conflict in Miami or Guatemala City.

"The real estate market has collapsed, so I can't sell," said a self-exiled businessman whose six-bedroom house with swimming pool is now occupied by four maids, one armed guard and three dogs. "Anyway, who knows, perhaps one day we can return."

For those who have not left, life is dominated by security precautions. Their palatial homes and offices are fortified, they travel in bulletproof cars and they are surrounded by bodyguards.

El Salvador's wealthy elite, "the 14 families," has been caught off guard by the surge of popular unrest and terrorism. The elite long took its political and economic control of the country for granted and failed to recognize mounting social tensions. Now it has only one explanation for the convulsion: Communism.

'Out to Destroy Us'

"There is clearly a plot to bring Communism to all of Central America," a wealthy coffee grower said. "First it was Nicaragua, then El Salvador and finally Guatemala. Just look what's happening. The Communists are out to destroy us."

The physical fear of the elite is not unfounded. In recent years, numerous businessmen and landowners, including several foreign executives, have been kidnapped or assassinated. Leftist propaganda against the "oligarchy" also seems designed to generate class hatred. "My nightmare is that one day the hordes will come up from the city center and rampage through our neighborhood," an elderly woman said.

Awareness of the impending crisis nevertheless spread slowly. First there was a flight of capital, about \$1 billion in 18 months. Then children were sent away to school. Finally entire families decided to move abroad. Many wealthy Salvadorans speak English and feel at home in the United States, having attended college or spent vacations there. Most chose to go to Miami.

Some Go to Guatemala

Some powerful businessmen still involved in El Salvador's political struggle moved instead to neighboring Guatemala. From there, United States officials say, they have been financing paramilitary "hit squads" and paying right-wing army officers to keep up the fight against leftist militants.

But panic is now spreading among the rich families of Guatemala. As in El Salvador, most of their fortunes come from the land. But few belong to the old rural aristocracy that lived on haciendas and presided over "their" peasants with paternalistic concern. Rather, most are hard-driving businessmen whose cotton and coffee plantations are run by administrators and whose interests frequently include hotels, banks and light industry. As guerrilla activity and unrest have increased in Guatemala, they have closed ranks with the army-backed

Government and extreme rightist political parties.

Many wealthy Salvadorans as well as exiled supporters of the ousted Somoza regime in Nicaragua are now eager to help Guatemala's rightists combat the new leftist challenge. "They see Guatemala as the last stronghold," a Guatemalan businessman said.

In revolutionary Nicaragua, businessmen never felt threatened by the Sandinist guerrillas, and the two sectors eventually formed an alliance

against the dictatorship of Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

Even now, although the Sandinist Government has proved more radical than they had hoped, many Nicaraguan businessmen remain in the country and are trying to adjust to the new rules. The Government has also tried, usually unsuccessfully, to persuade others who have settled in Miami to return home.

But perhaps more than any sector, it is Central America's middle classes that have been hurt by the political and economic ferment. Caught in the cen-

ter, dedicated neither to preserving the status quo nor to installing a socialist regime, they have found themselves politically voiceless and powerless to prevent their living standards from falling.

"I'd like to leave, but our only savings are in our house," a young Salvadoran lawyer said. "I'd have to find a job somewhere first, but that's not easy. We feel trapped here. We just live from day to day. You know, about the only time we go out now is to attend funerals."



Ferment in Central America Adds To the Woes of the Region's Poor

7-8-80

By ALAN RIDING

Special to The New York Times

MEXICO CITY, July 6 — Rising political violence in Central America since the revolution in Nicaragua last year has provoked economic crises that are aggravating tensions and hardship among the poor peasants and workers of the region.

Many of the problems have been caused by leftist militants trying to weaken the power of the private sector. In Guatemala, they have burned crops, kidnapped industrialists and assassinated farm administrators. In El Salvador, they have bombed stores, occupied factories and seized their managers as hostages.

The insecurity has prompted an exodus of businessmen and a flight of capital, forcing the Governments of both countries to impose exchange controls. And with many companies reluctant even to invest in raw materials, production has

slumped in the economy, while businessmen in Honduras and Costa Rica are holding back new investment for fear that the revolutionary fever could spread.

The political radicalization of the past year has thus been paralleled in economic polarization; just as the left and right have increasingly taken up extreme positions, so the gap between rich and poor has widened.

"It's a classic vicious circle," a Guatemalan economist said. "Social unrest creates political problems that under-

Continued on Page A8, Column 1

Central America: A Region in Turmoil

Second of three articles.

slumped while prices and unemployment have rocketed. Thousands of jobless Salvadorans are trekking across Mexico in the hope of finding work in the United States.

Oligarchy Is the Target

"We have to destroy the oligarchy in order to have a revolution," a Salvadoran guerrilla leader said, "and its power is economic. We know this brings suffering, but it is a price people are willing to pay. We're fighting for people who have nothing to lose."

Along with Nicaragua, which is still struggling to rebuild its war-damaged economy, El Salvador is feeling the crisis most acutely. Frequent strikes there have led many factories to close. Political unrest is also affecting the Guatema-

OVER

Ferment Wrecks Economies And Adds to Woes of Poor

Continued From Page A1

mine economic confidence and further escalate the political crisis."

Through its impact on the region's economies, the Sandinist victory over the Somoza regime has therefore worsened the living conditions of many poor and increased political discontent. Militant labor and peasant leaders say they are convinced that economic and social conditions can improve only after an outright revolution.

But a Salvadoran business leader said: "The extreme left is not fighting for reforms. It simply wants power. What can they do for the people if the economy is destroyed?"

Rural Disruption the Key Factor

The intense pressure for change has its roots neither in the Nicaraguan revolution nor even in the region's chronic poverty. It stems from the disruption of backward rural societies by sudden economic growth.

Having barely changed in decades, the five Central American republics have been transformed since 1960 by urbanization, new industries, nontraditional export crops, a lucrative tourist sector and an annual economic growth averaging 5.5 percent.

Yet, while per capita income appeared to grow, the newly generated wealth was so concentrated in the hands of a military, business and landowning elite that most urban poor and peasants were worse off. The poorest 20 percent of El Salvador received 5.5 percent of national income in 1961, but this share had dropped to 3.7 percent by 1969.

Combined with a population explosion, the economic boom began to undermine the near-feudal social structures of several countries. Heightened competition for scarce farmland stimulated migration by poor peasants to overcrowded city slums. There they were exposed to new consumer patterns and political currents that raised expectations that could not be fulfilled.

A minority, in contrast, was buying farms, founding banks and manufacturing companies, building huge walled homes, acquiring private aircraft and helicopters and living as the very rich do anywhere in the world. Top generals, who were the guarantors of this growth, were invited to share in the boom.

Political Structure Said to Lag

"The problem was that the economy was being modernized and the political structure was not," the Guatemalan economist said. "Social tensions had nowhere to go, so they built up and an explosion became inevitable."

Almost as critical, the sudden increase in world oil prices in 1973 brought inflation and balance-of-payments difficulties to the region for the first time. Its oil import bill increased from \$60 million in 1970 to \$600 million in 1979, while average prices, which rose only 13 percent between 1950 and 1970, doubled over the next eight years.

By 1975, convinced that the army would never surrender power in elections, grassroots organizations in El Salvador turned their back on party politics and took up issues of immediate concern to their members, such as wage increases, credit for poor farmers, water for slums and cheap transportation. "Our success was that we didn't talk to the poor about Marx, but about their specific problems," said a leader of the Popular Revolutionary Bloc. Soon they were targets of repression, but they continued to grow rapidly. During the past year, they have abandoned the campaign for reform and have begun fighting for revolution.

Social Tensions in Countryside

In El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, social tensions arose first in the countryside, where 82 percent of farms cover only 17 percent of cultivable land and many peasants own no land at all.

Guatemala has traditionally depended

on coffee and sugar exports, but in the early 1960's its fertile southern lowlands were taken over by cotton plantations and cattle ranches also dedicated to exports. With good world prices, these products brought fortunes to a new rural elite, which diversified into trading companies and banks.

In contrast, in the mountains, where corn and beans are grown on rocky patches, Indian farmers found their small holdings endlessly subdivided with each generation of large families. Frequently, the gunmen of big landowners would even drive them off communal properties. When the north of the country was recently opened up for colonization, only enough Indians were given land to insure that labor was available for larger estates.

Conditions in Mountains Are Worse

Conditions in the crowded mountains have steadily deteriorated, forcing as many as 500,000 men, women and children to migrate to the south coast each winter at harvest time. Some have also moved to the cities, but the pressure for land remains intense because most Indians feel strong ties to their traditional communities. Evidence that these Indians, who make up half the country's population, are being mobilized by the left is the most dramatic political development in Guatemala in decades.

In El Salvador, where almost five million people live in a territory the size of New Jersey, overcrowding has been a chronic problem, but this was aggravated when 300,000 Salvadorans were forced to return home from Honduras in 1969 after a brief border war.

The conflict, which brought a suspension in trade between El Salvador and Honduras, also damaged the Central American Common Market, formed in 1960 to stimulate the growth of light industry.

The resulting slowdown in new job opportunities in El Salvador's cities increased the demand for land and work in the countryside. And it was among the peasantry that the first militant farm worker unions were formed in the early 1970's. Only later did they join worker and student coalitions to form such powerful groups as the Popular Revolutionary Bloc.

Guerrilla Groups Are Resilient

The emergence of these grassroots organizations explains why the guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala have proved so much more resilient to repression than the leftists who took up arms in many Latin American countries after the 1959 Cuban revolution.

Fidel Castro's strategy of "exporting revolution" involved sending radical middle-class students to the hills where, theoretically, they would form a peasant army that would gradually encircle the cities until they, too, fell. But, as illustrated by the ill-fated expedition of Che Guevara to Bolivia in 1967, these groups were never able to establish an alliance with the peasants.

In contrast, the new guerrillas in Guatemala have spent years quietly working among the Indians, winning their trust, learning their languages and sharing their lives and problems. As in El Salvador, the Guatemalan guerrillas, although frequently led by leftist intellectuals, have incorporated many workers and peasants in their ranks through their close ties with the popular organizations.

Honduras has largely avoided the fate of its neighbors because, in the words of a frustrated leftist in Tegucigalpa, "we're even too underdeveloped to have a revolution."

When a strong peasant movement emerged early in the 1970's, the Honduran Government responded with a partial land redistribution program. Labor unrest has been channeled through trade unions rather than smothered by repression.

Because the country's main export, bananas, is in the hands of United States companies, no local oligarchy comparable to the coffee barons of El Salvador, the cotton planters of Guatemala or the Somoza family in Nicaragua has emerged.

In Honduras, 'Even Rich Are Poor'

"You don't have the same extremes of wealth and poverty here," a United States diplomat said. "Here, even the rich are poor."

Central America's perennial difficulty in achieving economic viability is perhaps best illustrated by Costa Rica. It has enjoyed full democracy and social progress for more than 30 years, yet its agricultural economy has no control over the price of the oil and manufactured goods that it must import and the coffee, bananas and meat that it sells. The largely middle-class population has expensive consumption patterns and expects public services that the country cannot afford. And, with a population of only 2.2 million and the Central American Common Market in disarray, it has no market to offer medium-sized industries.

Nicaragua's experience suggests that weak economies would force new revolutionary regimes into sufficient political moderation to obtain aid and perhaps investment from abroad. But there are also grounds to believe that the unfulfilled social and economic expectations of sudden revolutions may trap the area in continuing political instability.

TOMORROW: The United States tries to get back into the game.



Sygm / Alain Keiser

Revolutionary posters at the University of San Salvador. Since the revolution in Nicaragua last year, rising political violence has provoked economic crisis in several countries in Central America.

U.S. Loses Ground in Central America And Backs Changes in a Bid to Recoup

By ALAN RIDING

Special to The New York Times

MEXICO CITY, July 6 — Caught off-guard by the revolution last year in Nicaragua, the United States has begun promoting radical change in Central America in the hope of averting new leftist takeovers in the region.

But years of neglect have eroded the traditional influence of the United States in countries whose stability and friendship Washington had long taken for granted. Now the United States is finding it is deeply distrusted by both conservatives and leftists while besieged moderate groups see liberal Governments of Western Europe and Latin America as their natural allies.

As with Nicaragua, the Carter Administration's new campaign for change in El Salvador and Guatemala may again have come too late to forestall violent confrontations between political extremes.

Conflict Continues to Grow

Recent events in El Salvador have underlined Washington's feeling of impotence. In March, the United States sponsored the most radical program of land redistribution Latin America has known outside Cuba and pressed the military regime to nationalize private banks. But the conflict between the army and leftist guerrillas has continued.

In Guatemala, the Carter Administration's recent call for reform has been dismissed by ruling generals and conservative businessmen who are gambling that a victory by Ronald Reagan in the Presidential election in November will lead to a reversal of United States policy.

As recognition of Central America's strategic importance has spread through Washington, pressure has mounted in Congress, the National Security Council and the Pentagon for a hard-line response to the leftist challenge.

'Alarm Bells Go Off'

"No one is interested in Central America as such," a State Department official said, "but they look at a map and see Mexican oil to the north, the Panama Canal to the south and of course Cuba to the east. Then the alarm bells go off."

The specter of Cuban control over the region has proved the strongest obsession. "Cuba is clearly not the cause of Central America's problems," William G. Bowdler, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, told a House subcommittee in May, "but Cuba could just as clearly become a major beneficiary of turmoil."

The State Department has argued that since change is inevitable United States interests are best served by "stealing" Cuba's cause and promoting change. Significantly, Congress backed a \$33.7 million economic aid package for Nicaragua last month only after it was presented as vital to neutralize Cuban influence.

Left Is Called Main Danger

But conservatives in the United States insist that Washington's first priority should be to help crush leftist guerrillas, even if this means providing political support and military assistance to unpopular and repressive regimes.

The new policy has worked well in Nicaragua. Despite resentment because of Washington's long support of the Somoza dynasty, the Administration has gradually established a good working relationship with the revolutionary Government. The United States Ambassador, Lawrence A. Pezzullo, is liked and trusted by the former guerrillas. In a much-appreciated gesture, he moved out of the palatial hillside residence that had long symbolized United States domination of Nicaragua.

Washington can also claim some success in Honduras, where it has persuaded the army to leave power after presidential elections next spring.

But the most critical test of the United States commitment to human rights and social reform is coming in El Salvador and Guatemala. Since a leftist takeover in either country would be a major embarrassment to President Carter during his re-election campaign, the temptation to support repression may grow.

No Blank Check for Extremists

"We don't want wild bloody revolutions, but we can't give a blank check to wild bloody fascists," a State Department official said. "We want fundamental reforms that lead to democracy. We don't want to choose between revolutions and fascists."

But this may be the stark choice the Administration faces.

Washington historically has never

given much attention to the region. Even now, with a total population of only 20 million, it offers a tiny market for United States goods. And as a source of strategic raw materials, it is equally unimportant: The area's main exports are bananas, coffee and cotton.

Washington's interest has only been stirred when the region's stability has seemed threatened. The Marines intervened in Nicaragua in 1911 and left 22 years later after the Somoza family had been installed in power. The Central Intelligence Agency helped oust a leftist Government in Guatemala in 1954, and the United States Army trained Central American soldiers in counterinsurgency after the 1959 Cuban revolution. But in times of apparent tranquility, such as the 1970's, the region was ignored.

In contrast, the United States has always dominated the lives of the five tiny nations, which regarded themselves as virtual colonies. The United States ambassador in each country was seen as a proconsul with the right to interfere in local politics. The ambassador in turn looked after the interests of major United States investors and picked friends from among the wealthy businessmen and landowners. Few ambassadors spoke fluent Spanish or sought out opposition leaders.

The power of the United States banana companies in Honduras surpassed that of any ambassador. During elections, candidates would compete for their contribu-

Central America: A Region in Turmoil

Last of three articles.

tions and support, while on occasion the companies financed coups against unfriendly regimes. In 1975, United Brands paid \$1.25 million to officials to lower an export tax.

Wealthy Central Americans spoke English, sent their children to college in the United States and frequently vacationed there. They would read Time magazine before their own newspapers, listen to the Beach Boys rather than folk music and prefer barbecues to native food.

Leftist intellectuals deeply resented the political, economic and cultural presence of the United States. Once asked to identify Central America's main problem, a Nicaraguan guerrilla replied without hesitation, "North American imperialism." They dismissed the United States as a monolithic imperialistic power that would tolerate no change in Central America.

Both the ruling elites and their main opponents were surprised and confused by President Carter's human rights campaign. At first neither rightists nor leftists believed it would go beyond verbal admonishments. "It's all cosmetics," a Salvadoran Social Democrat said late in 1977. But conservative governments gradually became more irritated with Washington, while leftist, democratic and church groups found their own human rights campaigns creating interest in the United States.

In Nicaragua, Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle complained that Washington was forcing him to fight leftist subversion "with one hand tied behind my back." Conservatives in El Salvador charged that the human rights policy was destabilizing the Government and encouraging the extreme left. Both El Salvador and Guatemala renounced United States military aid to protest human rights reports critical of them.

United States businessmen also began protesting the policy and in several cases the United States Chamber of Commerce took the lead in denouncing the Carter Administration.

OVER

No New Friends to Replace the Old

"There was a basic flaw in the American human rights policy," a Salvadoran Social Democrat said. "They seemed to think you could have Somoza regimes that didn't torture. They didn't see that human rights violations were essential for the survival of these regimes."

The Carter Administration was losing its traditional friends without winning new friends among the opposition groups that were benefiting most from the human rights campaign.

Poorly staffed embassies failed to alert Washington to the growth of popular unrest. "Even when we saw the way things were going," said a former State Department official, "it was impossible to get the Administration's attention. I remem-

ber being asked, 'How can you prove it?'"

In Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala the strength of the opposition was underestimated, and when the United States finally intervened diplomatically it found its options virtually limited to supporting the dictatorship, intervening militarily or accepting revolution.

In Nicaragua, unable to persuade General Somoza to hand over power to moderates, Washington called for dispatch of an inter-American peace force. When the Organization of American States rejected the idea, an outright Sandinist victory became inevitable.

In El Salvador, United States officials, increasingly despairing of the junta's ability to restore order, are now said to favor direct negotiations between the Government and the main opposition coalition, the Democratic Revolutionary Front, to take place during a cease-fire supervised by an inter-American peace force. The front, however, has already rejected outside intervention.

But the strongest resistance to Washington's new reform-minded policy has come from conservatives who, in the words of a United States diplomat, "prefer to give nothing and risk losing everything." Washington's success in pushing change through El Salvador's junta, for example, so infuriated local rightists that they laid siege to the residence of the United States Ambassador, Robert E. White, forcing Marine guards to fire tear gas so he could escape.

Complicating Washington's diplomatic efforts is the fact that it is now competing for influence not only with Cuba but also with Social and Christian Democrats of Latin America and Western Europe and with such interested countries as Mexico and Panama.

Foreign support for the Sandinists — mainly money and arms from Venezuela, Panama and Costa Rica — was crucial in bringing them to power. The opposition groups in El Salvador and Guatemala also seem aware that the outcome of their struggles may be decided outside their borders.

Even Mexico, which has traditionally ignored its own backyard, is becoming more active in Central America, strongly backing the Sandinist Government, opposing United States policy and encouraging unity among opposition factions in El Salvador and consciously cooling relations with Guatemala.

The United States is also trying to fit its Central American policy into the broader context of the Caribbean basin, which includes Cuba, the unstable socialist regimes of Jamaica, Grenada and Guyana and several island nations that are overwhelmed by economic and social problems.

"Were we dealing with a series of unrelated crises, we could assume the relaxed attitude of monitoring painful but necessary birth pangs of a new and possibly more just order," Luigi Einaudi, a State Department policy planner, said recently. "But taken together these developments increase uncertainty about what the future will bring."

The American



Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

July 8, 1980

TO: Area Directors, CRCs and Federation Directors
FROM: Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum and Abraham Karlikow
RE: The Vatican Declaration on Jerusalem

The Vatican has just made a major statement of its position regarding Jerusalem which it submitted to the UN Security Council for circulation as the Council was closing its recent debate on the Status of Jerusalem. That statement, published simultaneously in the June 30th issue of L'Osservatore Romano and issued to the press in New York, was clearly intended as a political document intended to stake out a primary role for the Vatican in the unfolding negotiations over Jerusalem.

There are a number of issues in this document that give reason for concern. We wish to alert you to these since they may arise in inter-religious or other discussions in which you participate with Catholic representatives. We do not recommend that you become involved, at this stage, in any action or programs involving this Vatican statement; and should any such action be proposed by others please check with us first. We do recommend that you report immediately to us any indications that Catholic or pro-Arab personalities or groups may be seeking to advance or promote those points in the Vatican statement that trouble us, described below.

That is not to preclude any broader discussions designed to increase Christian understanding of the deep historic and religious ties that bind the Jewish people and Judaism to a unified Jerusalem. In fact, where appropriate, we would encourage that such dialogues on Jerusalem be planned, and that evangelical and moderate Protestant leadership who are sympathetic to Israel's position be included.

The Vatican document recognizes that Jerusalem is "deeply united by nature." At the same time, however, it goes on to insist on Jerusalem's "religious plurality" as a basis for arguing that "all three religions"

(over)

MAYNARD I. WISHNER, President ■ BERTRAM H. GOLD, Executive Vice-President
HOWARD I. FRIEDMAN, Chairman, Board of Governors ■ THEODORE ELLENOFF, Chairman, National Executive Council ■ GERARD WEINSTOCK, Chairman, Board of Trustees ■
ROBERT L. PELZ, Treasurer ■ MERVIN H. RISEMAN, Secretary ■ ELAINE PETSCHKE, Associate Treasurer ■ Honorary Presidents: MORRIS B. ABRAM, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG,
PHILIP E. HOFFMAN, RICHARD MAASS, ELMER L. WINTER ■ Honorary Vice-Presidents: NATHAN APPELMAN, RUTH R. GODDARD, ANDREW GOODMAN, JAMES MARSHALL, WILLIAM ROSENWALD
■ MAX M. FISHER, Honorary Chairman, National Executive Council ■ MAURICE GLINERT, Honorary Treasurer ■ JOHN SLAWSON, Executive Vice-President Emeritus ■
Vice-Presidents: STANFORD M. ADELSTEIN, Rapid City, S.D.; MORTON K. BLAUSTEIN, Baltimore; ROBERT D. GRIES, Cleveland; DAVID HIRSCHHORN, Baltimore; MILES JAFFE, Detroit;
HARRIS L. KEMPNER, JR., Galveston; HAMILTON M. LOEB, JR., Chicago; JOHN H. STEINHART, San Francisco; EMILY W. SUNSTEIN, Philadelphia; GEORGE M. SZABAD, Westchester;
ELISE D. WATERMAN, New York ■

must be ensured "a level of parity" concretely, publicly and juridically.

In line with this, the Vatican calls for an appropriate juridical system to protect "the city" (our emphasis). This approach patently ignores the character of the modern urban municipality of Jerusalem. It represents a major shift in emphasis: for since the late 1950s the Vatican has given the impression--and in 1957, explicitly informed the AJC and others--that its concern was with the "Holy Places" and the parts of the city in which they are located, not the "city" as a whole. The Vatican further calls for a "special statute" to protect the city and connected rights that would be "guaranteed by a higher international body."

The Vatican resurrects the scheme of "internationalization." It does so in a historical vein in order to bolster its arguments for an internationally guaranteed juridical system. But it makes a point of stating that the UN position of 1948-50 dealing with "territorial internationalization" of Jerusalem and a corpus separatum ("separate body," such as a Vatican City) "does not appear at least as yet to have been formally revoked." While the Vatican does not explicitly advocate a return to the "corpus separatum" proposal in this document, it does suggest that it remains as a latent UN option, while favoring some form of "international statute" for the entire city. The Vatican appears to be directing its message "to require any power that comes to exercise sovereignty over the Holy Land to assume the obligation...to protect not only the special character of the City, but also the rights connected, on the basis of an appropriate juridical system guaranteed by a higher international body."

The document, while couched in terms of the "deep religious significance and spiritual values" of Jerusalem for Christians, Jews and Moslems, in fact clearly makes or implies several political statements in conjunction with the thrusts outlined above.

It argues that the situation of the different religious communities--that is, of the Christians and Moslems, since the situation of Jews differs substantially in today's context--"cannot fail to be a matter of concern for all." The three communities, then, "should be partners in deciding their own future," and, as pointed out previously, "on a basis of parity." One has here, then, a stand taken on behalf of the Moslems and, implicitly, of the Arabs of East Jerusalem as well as on behalf of Christians. It remains unclear as to what such partnership signifies--equal governance of Jerusalem, a Jewish-majority city in which Arabs are a minority? Or Arab governance of East Jerusalem alone?

It argues that Israel alone (Israel per se is not mentioned but clearly is meant) cannot provide the necessary guarantees re Jerusalem. For the appropriate "juridical safeguard," it says, cannot "derive from the will of only one of those parties interested." The responsibility for Jerusalem, it continues, "goes well beyond the states of the regions...surpass(es) the interests of any single state or bilateral agreements between one state and others." Thus, for the Vatican, even an agreement reached under the Camp David accords would not be enough.

It, in effect, challenges Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem more sharply than before. The "positions of the two sides on the question of sovereignty over Jerusalem are known to be very apart," the Vatican paper declares, thus, in effect, equalizing Israeli and Arab claims. It goes on to warn that "any unilateral act tending to modify the status of the Holy City would be very serious."

This paper, therefore, represents a Vatican move away from Camp David, a more pro-Arab position than indicated hitherto and a challenge and warning to Israel regarding exercise of sovereignty.

A last point. The Vatican on this occasion, as often before, purports to speak on Jerusalem, at least implicitly, for all Christians; and makes mention in this document of the presence in Jerusalem not only of Catholics but of the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian and the other eastern communities, as well as of Anglican groups and others springing from the Reformation. In fact--one should be very much aware--it is the other non-Catholic groups that hold or are responsible for well over 70% of the properties and areas held by Christian elements on which the holy places are located; and that other Christian groups have in the past, and may perhaps again on this occasion, resent the Vatican unilaterally presuming to represent their interests.

But the major thrust of the entire document is that it is not just these areas that are in question: that, according to the Vatican, "the Jerusalem question cannot be reduced to mere 'free access for all to the holy places'." The sense of this Vatican paper, of the Vatican's intervention at the UN with this document, is that it shall have its say on the disposition of Jerusalem as a whole.

MHT/AK:bf

80-700-44

IS THERE ANY HOPE FOR SOVIET JEWS?

A all-day conference in New York held out little room for optimism.

BY DAVID M. SZONYI
Contributing Editor

B leak.

In one word, that was the prognosis on Soviet Jewish life suggested by a number of scholars during a May 27 all-day, inter-disciplinary conference on "The Status of Jews in the USSR and the Impact of Anti-Semitism" held at Columbia University.

The conference was co-sponsored by the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry (GNYCSJ), the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee, the Columbia University Program on General Education, and the Columbia University Program on Soviet Nationality Problems.

Demographic "Crunch"

In the first place, Soviet Jews face a severe demographic "crunch." According to figures from the recently released 1979 Soviet census, cited by Theodore Shabad, an instructor in the Columbia Geography Department, there are only approximately 1,811,000 Soviet citizens who identify themselves as Jews. This represents a decline of 15.8% from the 2,159,000 of the 1970 census, which in turn was a 5.2% decline from the 2,268,000 of the 1959 census. Of course, these figures may not reflect the number of Jews who actually live in the USSR, estimates of which run as high as 2,660,000 (1979 *American Jewish Yearbook*). But at the least, they do reflect the significant impact of emigration and assimilation on Jewish visibility.

According to Shabad, a little more than half of this decline (8.1%) is due to emigration; over 240,000 Jews left the USSR during the 1970s. Largely because of emigration, Shabad notes, many small Jewish communities in Soviet Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia and other areas have been decimated. And because those who leave tend to be young, Jewish emigration has also adversely affected the rate of "natural increase" (birth rate minus death rate), Shabad adds.

Identity Decline

A second threat to Jewish life in the USSR has been the decline of Jewish national and cultural identity. Maurice Friedberg, a professor of Russian literature at the University of Illinois, reported that the number of Jews claiming knowledge of a Jewish language (Yiddish or Hebrew), has declined steadily — from 21.3% in the 1959 census to 17.7% and 14.2% in the censuses of 1970 and 1979, respectively.

The predominant Jewish language of the USSR has traditionally been Yiddish. Yet while almost all other ethnic groups in the USSR are permitted to publish in their own languages, such rights have been denied Jews for decades. Thus, no Yiddish books were published between 1946-1959, while from 1959-1978, only 60 such books appeared — an average of three a year. At present, there exist only one Yiddish newspaper (*Briobid-Juner Stern*) and one periodical (*Sovietische Heimland*) in the USSR.

As for Hebrew, no publications of any kind appear in that language, the study of which is permitted only to a few advanced linguistic students in Soviet universities. Writing in a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Soviet Jewish affairs expert William Korey contended that this may soon change as Soviet authorities come to view Hebrew as necessary training for emigration. Friedberg contested this assessment, noting that precisely because education in Hebrew is viewed as an instrument of "Zionist propaganda" by Soviet leaders, they will remain adamant opponents of any Hebrew teaching or publications.

What of Russian, the *lingua franca* of over four-fifths of Soviet Jews? Unfortunately, notes Friedberg, Jewish authors writing in Russian rarely produce books with Jewish themes, for they face very strong pressures against ethnic assertiveness. Indeed, given the Leninist doctrine of "nationalist in form, socialist in content," even when authors of

other ethnic groups write in their native languages, their works usually reflect "universalist" (read Soviet) as opposed to particular ethnic concerns. According to Friedberg, there are no Russian-language Jewish writers who have assumed the mantle of Isaac Babel. (Writing in Russian in the two decades following the 1917 Revolution, Babel recorded its impact on Jewish life in a number of poignant novellas and short stories.)

Anti-Semitism

The third and perhaps greatest threat to Jewish life in the USSR is the persistence, and recent intensification, of both official and popular anti-Semitism. A number of speakers at the conference noted the multi-faceted nature of Soviet anti-Semitism, which involves:

- a continuation of a centuries-old tradition which saw the Jews guilty of deicide, or of being non-Russian "Westernizers," "subversives and radicals," and "rootless cosmopolitans";
- a utilization of the "Jewish issue" to deflect attention from the ongoing tensions between Russians (who will constitute less than 50% of the Soviet population within thirty years) and other ethnic groups, as well as from the activities of Soviet dissidents;
- a means of "re-ideologizing" Soviet life by depicting Jews as the demonic and dominant force behind "imperialism" and "racism";
- a function of the USSR's support of those Arab and other "Third World" countries which are unequivocally anti-Israel.

Whatever its causes, Soviet anti-Semitism assumed a particularly virulent form during the late 1960s and 1970s, according to Jonathan Frankel, a senior lecturer at the Hebrew University's Center and East European Research Center. Usually, such anti-Semitism appears in the guise of blistering attacks on "Zionism." As one example, Frankel pointed to a 1976 Soviet conference on Zionism, one of whose resolutions proclaimed the Jewish nationalist movement to be "the main enemy of the USSR and of all progressive mankind." The conference packet included a pamphlet on "The Soviet Protocols of Hate," Co-published by the New York Zionist Federation and the GNYCSJ, this pamphlet consists of excerpts from anti-Semitic/Zionist articles in the Soviet press, some of which are as crude and venomous as the infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

Boris Shragen, a former fellow at the Moscow University Institute of Fine Arts, told the gathering that Soviet anti-Semitism is so ingrained that it even pervades the *samizdat* (underground dissident writings).

Unfortunately, anti-Semitic ideology is also carried over into "praxis" — systematic discrimination against Jews in Soviet universities and in the professions. Marshall Goldman, Associate Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, charges that "The prospects of Jews being admitted to Russian universities is rapidly approaching zero."

Goldman also echoes the assertion of Soviet Jewish mathematician Grigori Freiman ("A Soviet Teacher's 'J' Accuse," *New York Times Magazine*, November 25, 1979) that Jews are being systematically discriminated against in mathematics entrance exams and dissertation approvals in Moscow, Leningrad and Novosibirsk.

Paradoxically, Jewish emigration only exacerbates anti-Semitism directed at those Jews left behind. Maurice Friedberg noted that Soviet Jews are a "very easily distinguishable" ethnic group, for they alone are outspoken in their desire to emigrate and, already, one-eighth of the community lives abroad. In the highly chauvinist USSR, "both Soviet authorities and ordinary citizens view the Jews as suspect," Friedberg observed.

So rabid has been the nature of Soviet anti-Semitism that a number of speakers, including Shragen, even suggested the possibility of future "pogroms" if internal tensions in the USSR increase substantially. Emigration may offer some hope for Soviet Jews, but in 1980, exit visas are being issued at only one-half the rate of a year ago. Given the present chill in Soviet-American relations, the number of Jews let out is expected to decline further.

Is there then any hope for Soviet Jews? As a "bottom line," it should be noted that the leaders of the Brezhnev era and beyond almost certainly will not repeat the horrors of the Holocaust and the "black years" (1948-1953) of Soviet Jewry. And of course, there are impressive — perhaps miraculous — enclaves of a Soviet Jewish "renaissance," one largely characterized by the teaching of Hebrew and other courses in Jewish studies.

Yet it is assured of some degree of survival in the USSR the Jewish community is nevertheless characterized by "insecurity and isolation, discrimination and fear" — but not, for the most part, "a Jewish life in any positive sense." ♦

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Suite 1004 • 1411 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19102 • 564-2460

Marc Tanenbaum

8/5



Martin J. Raffel
Assistant Area Director

[start]

Original documents
faded and/or illegible



editorial

Our Real Enemies Are the 'Gentlemanly Anti-Semites' Decent People' With Spiritual Blindness, Callousness

A sorry witticism of the genre called *Galgenuor* has a Berlin resident remarking in 1935 to a friend that he "misses the good old-fashioned anti-Semitism." One can understand how, as the Nazi scum was coming to the top in violence and murder, the "gentlemanly anti-Semitism" of the former ruling classes seemed easier to bear.

YET THE TRUST IS that it was precisely the cultural and religious anti-Semitism of the "decent" people that prepared the way for the viciousness of the vulgarians. Until they should come to power it is not the black-booted bullies of the NSDAP or American Nazi Party that threaten the Jewish people: it is the muddle-headedness of the "liberals" of the American Civil Liberties Union who can't distinguish between a treasonous conspiracy and the eccentricity of an offbeat but legitimate splinter party; it is the "even-handedness" of the American Friends Service Committee, which bleeds all over its published pages for Arab refugees and never remembers that there are an equal number of Jewish refugees from Arab lands.

The problem of endemic anti-Semitism, unless the thugs acquire political power (as police commissioners or judges or members of local or national governments), is the insidious and often skillfully disguised anti-Semitism of "decent" people. Some of the Jewish "defense" agencies are as blind to this fundamental truth as offices of the Christian denominations.

ITEM: IN THE LONG HAUL, the current "Middle East Panel" of the National Council of Churches is as threatening to the Jewish people and its survival as the Russian-equipped Syrian forces now stationed near Israel's northeast border.

Item: as viciously anti-Semitic as *The Thunderbolt*, and far more effective, is a recent book published by the press of the British Student Christian Movement. The book by Lucas Grollenberg has been published in translation. The translator, John Bowden, recently was appointed to a high managerial post in the SCM Press, once one of the more reputable publishing houses in London. The new title is *Palestine Comes First*. The book, somewhat changed from the original, is being enthusiastically promoted by the "Christian" publisher because the author "has dared to say publicly what many people, including many churchmen, feel privately."

LEST WE FORGET

by Dr. Franklin H. Littell

National Institute on the Holocaust

WHAT "MANY PEOPLE, including many churchmen, feel privately" is that the Jews should — by one means or another — be made to disappear. They also teach it. In fact, they have taught it for centuries: the survival of the Jewish people does not fit Christian ideology; the Jews have brought their woes upon themselves; slander, calumny and contempt may be expressed toward the Jews, though "decent" people would be ashamed to utter the same level of opinions toward any other known group.

Among the 150 nations represented in the United Nations, Israel alone is repeatedly singled out for verbal lynching parties by mobs of Communist and Muslim diplomats, while representatives of the so-called Christian nations make no effort to rebuke the obscenities. When children are killed in a school or kibbutz inside Israel, by terrorists who have made their way through UN lines without being stopped, the UN contingents' governments do not even apologize. But let two UN soldiers be killed in an altercation with Muslim inhabitants of south Lebanon, and the same governments will gather their representatives like vultures to attack Israel for supplying arms to the Christian villagers still holding out against the Syrian invader of their country.

CHURCH BUREAUCRATS, bemused by "even-

handedness" and intoxicated by "Third World" vapors, will publicly criticize Israel's Military Government for blowing up buildings that house terrorists — and never say a word when the "moderate" Arafat, his terrorists armed and trained (in a camp on the outskirts of Moscow) by Russia, claims credit for ambushing and murdering Sabbath worshippers in Hebron and threatens to blow up the oil supply of Western Europe if the U.S. doesn't submit to Arab League blackmail and PLO terrorism. Verily, the death wish of "Christians" for the Jews has now infected their own will to live.

And, of course, that is where the malaise of Christendom, anti-Semitism, ends: for Christendom died at Auschwitz — and not "only Jews."

THAT THE MALICE of "Christians" continues unrepentant is amply documented by the scandal of the Grollenberg publication. The SCM Press translation judiciously omits the Dutch original's appeal for sympathy for the "Palestinian" terrorists who murdered unarmed Israeli athletes in Munich: that might be too much for an English audience to swallow. And the English translation adds an "even-handed" bibliography — with books not, however, used in the original text. The text has its internal dishonesties, too. For example, Einstein is quoted in "opposition to Zionism and the State of Israel" from a secondary source (a 1953 book by Alfred M. Lilenthal) — without noting that the original Einstein statement, without the selective deletion, said exactly the opposite.

The malaise of the "Christian" peoples, anti-Semitism, is only partially demonstrated by the spirit of moral cowardice and political appeasement which is openly displayed in political choices. It runs deeper, and the pervading stain is much more resistant to purging — as the recent contemptible actions of the "Middle East Panel" of the National Council of Churches and the British SCM Press make clear.

The Holocaust was made possible not just by the murderous political ideology and actions of Nazi perpetrators: the complicity of "Christian" collaborators and spectators played its necessary role, too.

THE "MIDDLE EAST PANEL" of the National Council of Churches made its report to the governing board of the NCCC. The structure of the panel's "hearings" and trip to the Middle East has already been discussed in this column. As originally planned by the Middle East staff of the NCCC, a longtime pro-PLO and anti-Israel nest, the "hearings" and the trip were designed to produce an unqualifiedly hostile set of pronouncements. That this did not happen is due to intense political activity by Christians friendly to Israel and opposed to the politics of terrorism.

Since most press services are markedly anti-Israel, and even the better journals (e.g., *The New York Times*) make maximum use of every opportunity to criticize, one should not trust too much what is contained in these publications. But one concluding statement is worth noting: "The panel's hearings were boycotted at one point by Jewish organizations, but it later met with them . . ." This is a flat lie. It reached me in Jerusalem in the same mail as an Anti-Defamation League analysis which confirmed what I already knew: the fact that the panel "hearings" were *unanimously boycotted* by every responsible Jewish organization.

WHY WAS THERE SUCH A BOYCOTT? (I will not try to discuss why a press service such as Associated Press should print a bare-faced lie. Ben Johnson said once that a society has less to fear from streets filled with soldiers accustomed to steal than from garrets filled with scribblers accustomed to lie.) There was a boycott, and it was *not* reversed, because the nature of the panel and its plans made perfectly clear from the start that its intention was intensely partisan and hostile.

Israel was not on trial, as the panel intended. It was the panel itself that was on trial — and the office that set it up in response to a motion put forward by a delegate whose membership in the general board of the NCCC is as obscure as the membership of his illustrious ideological predecessor on the general board, Bishop Trypha.

WHY DO DECENT PEOPLE suffer the presence of the Marias and Tryphas in their midst? The truth is that the Streichers and Eichmanns and Hitlers, overt anti-Semites, are only dangerous if they come to power. But they come to power through the weakness of the "gentlemanly anti-Semites" — the "decent" people who do not recognize and strike the enemy *vigorously and in time*.

The problem before the overt anti-Semites come to power is the spiritual blindness and callousness of decent people, people who may despise the political anti-Semites but are themselves (often unknowing) theological and cultural anti-Semites.

THE LEADERS of the National Council of Churches who court favor with the PLO, and call it "the only organized voice for the Palestinian people," have the same malaise as the leaders of the German churches who failed to see the mounting peril of Nazism in time. And thus the day came when the Nazi Party was in fact "the only organized voice of the German people."

Such church leaders fail to see the mounting peril because they are themselves contemptuous of the Jews and essentially indifferent to threats and violence which (at first) seem to threaten only Jewish suffering and life. Today those who have studied the Holocaust and the Church Struggle, and mastered some of the lessons, know that the Nazis came to power because of the appeasement politics ("even-handedness") of otherwise decent people. The trouble with the American church agencies, vis-a-vis Israel and the rest of the Jewish people, is simply this: they have not taken to heart the lessons of the Holocaust and the Church Struggle.

OUR CHURCH PUBLISHING HOUSES, sermon materials, and Sunday School units have yet to publish the most elementary information on Bonhoeffer, Lichtenberg, Jochen Klepper, Father Delp, Pastor Paul Schneider, Franz Jaegerstatter — or any of the other Christians who suffered and died as opponents of Nazism. And nothing has been done on the Holocaust. We do not have in America a single denomination that has come any where near the position paper of the Protestant Church of the Rhineland (January synodical meeting, 1980).

Our "Mail Line" Protestant churches in America are the last intact bloc of 19th century *Kulturprotestantismus* left in the world, and they talk and act just like German liberal Protestantism before Hitler. They have not drawn the knife on anti-Semitism, and they do not take covert anti-Semitism seriously. They are making the same mistakes in allowing violent anti-Semites, like the PLO and other terrorist bands, a status in public life to which they are neither morally nor politically entitled.

THE NCCC PANEL publicly called for an "open dialogue" between the U.S. and PLO. Sitting safely in their bureaus in America they have forgotten the situation in which real people live (or die): when someone comes at you with a machine gun, having announced his intention to kill you, the dialogue is adjourned.

Seamus L. Jones
July 31, 1980

[end]

Original documents
faded and/or illegible





Middle East Panel Report:
A STUDY DOCUMENT

**NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES
OF CHRIST IN THE USA**



AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

This document is issued by the Governing Board of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, USA. It is a Study Document; it is not a Policy Statement. It is not to be construed as an official statement of attitudes or policies of the Council.

Copyright © June 1980 by
The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

Cover: "The Peaceable Kingdom" from Yours in Peace
by Fritz Eichenberg
Published by the Fellowship of Reconciliation
Nyack, New York 10960

\$2.00 each / \$1.75 each for quantities of five or more

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	ii
Members of the Middle East Panel	iv
Middle East Panel Report: A Study Document	1
Statement to the NCCCUSA Governing Board: Rabbi James Rudin, American Jewish Committee	16
Statement to the NCCCUSA Governing Board: Mr. Richard Seikaly, a Palestinian-American	17
Maps	19
Study Questions	21
Reading List and Other Resources	22
Response Sheet	23

APPENDICES

I. "Report on the Fact-Finding Trip of the Middle East Panel"	1
II. UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)	25
III. UN Security Council Resolution 338 (1973)	26
IV. "Camp David Framework for Peace in the Middle East"	27
V. U.S. Department of State: "Middle East Peace Process: A Status Report" (March 20, 1980)	32

INTRODUCTION

On May 8, 1980 the Governing Board of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, USA received the Report of the Middle East Panel and requested that it be sent to member churches and ecumenical agencies for study. This Study Document, which includes the Panel Report and background materials, is therefore issued by the Governing Board as a contribution to the discussion of Middle East issues, in the hope that it will help individual Christians and NCCCUSA member communions formulate their own opinions and judgments.

The Report faithfully reflects the consensus of the Panel on the five issues chosen for study and consideration. These issues were:

1. Security in the region. In an area as geographically compact as the eastern Mediterranean, and given the nature of modern arms technology, what concepts of security are relevant to the Middle East today? What will be required to ensure safe and secure borders for the state of Israel, and a Palestinian entity, if established, in this small region? What has been the effect of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty on the security of the region? What are the effects on the states in the area of the great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union? What are the great powers' perceptions of their security needs with relation to the Middle East? What are the non-military factors which contribute to meeting these needs?
2. The right of Palestinian Arabs to national self-determination. If it is agreed that Palestinian Arabs have the right of national self-determination, where is it to be exercised and in what form(s) might national self-determination be expressed? What progress has been made toward Palestinian autonomy within the Camp David Framework and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty? What role should the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the state of Israel, play in self-determination for the Palestinian Arabs? What role should the United States government play in assisting the Palestinian Arabs to achieve self-determination?
3. Human rights issues. How can the NCCCUSA best use available documentation on alleged human rights violations in the Middle East? This includes alleged violations of human rights in the Israeli-occupied territories, and of Jews living in Arab countries. Attention should be given to allegations of human rights violations in all the countries of the area, including those violations occurring in pre-1967 Israel. Should our definition of human rights include the issue of self-determination?
4. Settlements on the West Bank. What limitations on settlements on the West Bank, if any, should be imposed? Israel has claimed that settlements in the occupied territories are necessary for security reasons. Others have described the Israeli settlements on the West Bank as violations of international law or obstacles to peace. How should the NCCCUSA Panel view

these settlements, and according to what standards?

5. Religious issues. These issues include: free exercise and expression of religion by all peoples in all countries of the region; emigration from the region for religious reasons; the various perceptions regarding Jerusalem and access by all inhabitants of the region to the Holy Places; conflict among faith groups. Which of these issues should be included in the NCCCUSA Panel's consideration as contributing toward fulfilling its responsibilities and its mandate?

The findings on these issues are offered as a contribution to the discussion needed in the United States as policy is formulated and reshaped.

The Panel has understood and articulated its understanding that the issues with which it has dealt may be a matter of life and death to the people of the Middle East. Panel members are not those people, but they are citizens of a nation and members of churches that have connections and responsibilities bearing on the lives of those in the Middle East. For the Panel members, this has been a sobering matter giving a depth of seriousness and care to the task assigned them by the NCCCUSA.

In addition to providing a more effective way in which the NCCCUSA can perform its role of reconciliation, the preparation of the Panel Report has served to inform a process of policy formulation on the Middle East for the National Council of the Churches of Christ, USA. Since 1978 an interunit task force has been drafting a comprehensive policy statement on Middle East issues, including relations among the churches, relations with persons of other faiths, and the witness of the church in society. In May 1980 this proposed policy statement was presented to the Governing Board of the NCCCUSA for comment and suggestions. In November 1980 the Governing Board will act upon the revised statement, at which time it will be adopted as policy.

In distributing this Study Document to the churches, the Panel hopes its Report will be studied and discussed with seriousness. Church members are encouraged to reach out and use the Report as a means of engaging both American Jewish and American Palestinian and Arab neighbors in a search for understanding, peace and justice for our brothers and sisters in the Middle East.

The selection of the Fritz Eichenberg illustration of The Peaceable Kingdom, based on a passage from Isaiah 11:6-9, represents the Panel's prayer and vision for the future for all peoples of the Middle East. It is in this spirit that this Report is shared with the NCCCUSA member churches and ecumenical agencies.

We note with appreciation that the Panel's work has been partially supported by the George Gund Foundation of Cleveland, Ohio.

June 5, 1980

MEMBERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PANEL

Bishop Maximos Aghiorgoussis, NCCC Third Vice-President; Bishop of Pittsburgh, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America

The Reverend James Andrews, Stated Clerk, Presbyterian Church in the United States

Ms. Sonia J. Francis, NCCC Vice-President for Communication; Radio-Television Officer, Office of Communication, the Episcopal Church

The Reverend M. William Howard, Jr., President, NCCC; Executive Director, Black Council, Reformed Church in America

The Reverend William R. Johnson, Head of the Delegation to the Governing Board, NCCCUSA of the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church

The Reverend Tracey K. Jones, Jr., NCCC First Vice-President; General Secretary, Board of Global Ministries, United Methodist Church

Bishop Chester A. Kirkendoll, Recording Secretary, NCCC; Bishop of the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church

Dr. Dorothy J. Marple, NCCC Second Vice-President; Assistant to the President, Lutheran Church in America

The Most Reverend Archbishop Torkom Manoogian, Primate of the Eastern Diocese of the Armenian Church of North America

The Reverend Robert W. Neff, General Secretary of the Church of the Brethren

The Reverend Avery D. Post, President of the United Church of Christ

The Reverend Jeanne Audrey Powers, NCCC Vice-President for Faith and Order; Assistant General Secretary, Division of Ecumenical and Interreligious Concerns, United Methodist Church

The Reverend George B. Telford, Jr., NCCC Vice-President for Church and Society; Director, Division of Corporate and Social Mission, Presbyterian Church in the United States

Dr. William P. Thompson, Immediate Past President, NCCC; Stated Clerk, United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

STAFF

Dr. Claire Randall, General Secretary, National Council of the Churches of Christ

Mr. Kenyon Burke, Associate General Secretary, Division of Church and Society, National Council of the Churches of Christ

STAFF (cont'd)

Mr. J Richard Butler, Director, Middle East Office, Division of Overseas Ministries, National Council of the Churches of Christ

The Reverend Joan B. Campbell, Assistant General Secretary, Commission on Regional and Local Ecumenism, National Council of the Churches of Christ

Ms. Alice Wimer, Staff Associate for International Affairs, Division of Church and Society, National Council of the Churches of Christ



MIDDLE EAST PANEL REPORT:

A STUDY DOCUMENT

In September, 1979 the Executive Committee of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. called for the creation of a special Panel on the Middle East. Its purpose was to review the situation in the Middle East in a holistic rather than a piecemeal fashion, to contribute to a new Middle East policy statement from a larger perspective than that of special interest or advocacy groups, and to consider whether there was a "new moment" in the Middle East that demanded new responses from the United States Christian community. Composed of officers of the Council and heads of some member communions, the Panel, confirmed by action of the Governing Board of the NCCCUSA in November, 1979, began a process of study, open hearings for all parties, a two-week visit to five countries of the Middle East, and further conversations with Middle East interest groups in the United States.

The action of the Council sprang from a sense that a new opportunity may exist to resolve the conflict of over thirty years in the Middle East. Motivated by a belief that opportunities for peace may have been lost in the past, the Panel members have approached the last six months with a seriousness of purpose and a belief that, as a religious organization, the NCCCUSA has a role of reconciliation to play, a role different from that of political organizations and governments. At the same time, as an organization of United States churches, the NCCCUSA also has a responsibility to address its own people and government about the appropriate role for the United States of America in helping resolve the conflicts in the Middle East.

At the outset of this process of consultation and firsthand observation, the Panel identified five issues* considered most crucial within the mandate given it by the NCCCUSA Executive Committee and Governing Board. These issues were:

Security in the region

The right of Palestinian Arabs to self-determination

Human rights issues

Settlements on the West Bank

Religious issues

*(The full formulation of these five issues is included in the Introduction. --ed. note.)

As the Panel delved into the five issues, it became convinced of the inter-relatedness of each issue with all others, as part of a comprehensive peace settlement.

This report provides the findings and convictions of the Middle East Panel of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, U.S.A. to the NCCCUSA Governing Board. In making this report, the Panel wishes to emphasize an overall theme heard from the groups and persons with whom it has met. There is a deep longing and desire for peace in the Middle East. The "new moment" about which the Panel has spoken appears to be born out of hope and despair. On the one hand there is hope prompted by the signing of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty and the belief that negotiation is possible. On the other hand there is despair marked by a fear of the future, a weariness and near desperation brought on by five wars within thirty years. The Panel recognizes that there is an urgent need to ensure that opportunities for peace not be lost. It is with this sense of urgency and of the hope we know in Jesus Christ, which continues even when optimism fails, that we address this report to our brothers and sisters of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES
SECURITY IN THE REGION

The Middle East Panel affirms that security is a legitimate concern of individuals, of peoples, and of states. Yet this very need for a nation's security is often used to justify escalating and excessive expenditures in order to develop a superior military position. The possession of military might by some then breeds fear and suspicion among others, who in turn seek to build comparable or greater military might. More fear and suspicion result, leading to an escalation of violence rather than the establishment of full security.

The peoples and nations of the Middle East are caught in this spiral of violence. In the long run, seeking security through arms alone is in fact a false and idolatrous hope. True security can ultimately be found only in relationships of trust. The late Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion recognized this fact when he stated: "As for security, militarily defensible borders, while desirable, cannot by themselves guarantee [Israel's] future. *Real* peace with our neighbors--mutual trust and friendship--that is the only true security."¹

The Panel recognizes that for a region that has known only a state of war for thirty years, trust is not easily gained. Further, the Panel acknowledges the special and realistic concern of Israel with matters of security. This concern is tied to the experience of genocide and holocaust in our generation and persecution over many generations. It is also a result of a precarious geographical situation marked by unbending hostility from almost all of Israel's neighboring states and political entities. The commitment of the Jewish people to reestablish a state in the land of their origins has in part been motivated by

¹David Ben-Gurion, The Saturday Review (interview), April 3, 1971. (Emphasis is in the original.)

this history of hostility and by their longing for a place where "we can be ourselves".¹ The commitment to a national identity and to self-reliance that manifests itself in the urgent Israeli concern for security is understandable, and this Panel expresses its absolute support of the right of the state of Israel to exist as a Jewish state in peace with its neighbors, within secure and recognized borders. The Panel therefore concurs with the Israeli perspective that a major obstacle to peace in the Middle East has been the unwillingness of Arab states and the Palestinian Arabs to recognize Israel's right to self-determination as a Jewish state which deserves the respect of the entire family of nations as a member of the world community and whose secure and defined borders must be recognized. UN Security Council Resolution 242 "Affirms . . . respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force".² This document, accepted by Egypt, Jordan and Syria, the major Arab states in a state of belligerency with Israel, became an important first step toward peace, as it implicitly acknowledged the presence and recognition of Israel's place among the Middle East nations.

Every act that builds trust builds security. The Panel is very conscious of the measure of trust that has developed between Israel and Egypt as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March, 1979. While that trust is now being severely tested, it is clear that the Camp David Frameworks for Peace of September, 1978 provided the impetus for this important step of building trust and therefore security between two adversaries in the Middle East conflict. The fact that Egypt, the largest of the Arab nations and the one that threatened the western flank of Israel, is now no longer at war is a significant development both for Israel and Egypt. The Panel underscores this achievement by stating again the words of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, USA Governing Board which

Recognizes that an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement substantially removes the option of war in the Middle East in that the two strongest military powers in the area resolve to settle differences through peaceful means, enhancing the sense of security of both parties but especially that of Israel in not having to face the threat of a two-front war;

Celebrates the role of Egypt, and especially the initiatives of its president in the creative search for peace in the area;

Rejoices with Israel in feeling that its dream of peace and deliverance might be realized and the threat of annihilation diminished;

Concurs with Presidents Carter and Sadat and Prime Minister Begin that peace is not simply the absence of war, but that

¹This phrase was heard repeatedly during the Panel's Middle East trip.

²United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967).

peace and justice must be held in positions of equal importance;¹

While the Camp David Accords have provided a new climate of trust between Egypt and Israel, this has not been the case throughout the entire Middle East. This agreement has isolated Egypt from other Arab states, weakening to a degree the security obtained through peace with Israel. Regretably, the Accords (and the lack of sufficient progress toward their full implementation) have not brought Israel closer to peace agreements with other Arab states, nor with the Palestinian people. Thus the Panel, while deeply appreciative of the Camp David initiatives, believes the Accords to be fundamentally flawed. They fail both to acknowledge the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to provide in a sufficient way for the participation of those recognized representatives of the Palestinian people in the negotiations to define these rights. The Panel believes the Camp David Agreements should therefore be seen as part of the *process* of peace-making in the Middle East. The diplomatic initiatives taken there need to be amended and broadened if security for all, including Israel, is to be achieved (see further comments on self-determination in the next section).

Israel is not the only country of the area for which security is a legitimate concern. The Panel can only be deeply grieved at the continued military action in Lebanon, where neither sovereignty nor territorial integrity are fully respected. Lebanon, which has had a tradition of opening its doors to those in need from surrounding countries, now finds its soil the battleground of others. The Lebanese people themselves are drawn into a situation of growing self-destruction and national disintegration. It is clear to the Panel that there will be no ultimate peace for Lebanon until the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is resolved by a settlement that grants both the recognition of Israel's existence and the right of the Palestinian people to their own self-determination. Meanwhile, the Panel urges the fullest international support and assistance to the Lebanese government in its efforts to maintain its national identity and security in this tragic situation. Specifically, the Panel believes the United States government should undertake urgent initiatives with Israel, while at the same time seeking urgent initiatives by Arab states with Palestinian leaders. Such initiatives should seek a negotiated end to the escalating, open and covert warfare on and from Lebanese soil, particularly those forms of battle that deliberately inflict massive wounds on innocent civilians under the guise of necessity, and in which UN peace-keeping personnel are attacked and, indeed, killed.

Finally, security is also a legitimate concern of people within other states in the Middle East. In this region, where the concept of "peoplehood" is particularly meaningful, the security needs of various ethnic and religious groups require continued attention. A few such cases include the Armenians in Turkey, the Assyrians in Iraq, the Copts in Egypt, the Jews in Syria, the Kurds

¹National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., "Resolution on the Middle East Peace Effort", adopted by the Governing Board on November 3, 1978.

in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, and the Palestinians in Israel, on the West Bank and Gaza, and in other Middle Eastern countries as well.

The history of the Middle East is replete with instances of its peoples and states becoming surrogates or pawns of nations outside the area. Located as a bridge between three continents--Europe, Asia and Africa--the Middle East has long had strategic value to major world powers seeking to protect their national interests. The fact that nearly 60 percent of the world's oil reserves are located in the Middle East has once again given a strategic importance to some countries of the area, including the Gulf States, Iraq, Iran and Libya. Being contiguous to these states gives a significance to other countries of the region, and therefore makes the conflicts of the region command world-wide significance.

These factors help contribute to the great powers' interest in the region and their attempts to maintain a balance of power favorable to their interests there. This vying for support by the great powers makes the region more vulnerable to arms and weapons escalations. The Panel believes that a United States policy that seeks to build just relationships with peoples and governments of the region will, in the long run, be the major contribution toward securing the mutual interests of the U.S. and the peoples of the region. Creating militarily strong governments as surrogate powers, while ignoring other aspects of just relationships, can only end in escalating hostility toward the U.S. Similarly, the Panel urges the U.S. government to refuse to allow Soviet-U.S. tensions to undermine any efforts of Middle East nations and peoples to negotiate regarding their differences.

Finally, the Panel stresses again the urgency of the present moment in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This opportunity for the development of trust, peace, and thus security must not be missed. The agreement reached at Camp David and the subsequent withdrawal by Israel from the Sinai have demonstrated that differences can be resolved by negotiation rather than by war. Further, the Camp David process, as an important first step, indicates the role that a third party such as the United States must play in bringing the principal parties to negotiation.

THE RIGHT OF PALESTINIAN ARABS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The Panel affirms that the right of self-determination is a basic human right recognized in international law. This right of all peoples to self-determination assures that "they freely determine their political . . . and cultural development."¹ Although the international community recognizes this principle, the existing body of international law does not provide adequate criteria to define it in every instance. Neither has international law established procedures

¹United Nations, "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", Part I, Article 1, number 1. Also in United Nations, "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", Part I, Article 1, number 1.

for its peaceful and just implementation. Therefore, in claims to self-determination involving conflicting claims to territory, the right of each party to self-determination must be seen in the context of the other's equally valid right.

During the course of its work, the Panel became convinced that a crucial element in the resolution of the Middle East conflict was the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. A variety of historical events and circumstances have forged a Palestinian identity over the last century--and particularly during the last fifty years--that is separate and distinct from, even if related to, other Arab national groups. In numbers, the Palestinians approximately equal the citizens of Israel proper. They are at a remarkable stage of development culturally and educationally, hardly surpassed by any country in the Middle East. Together with political, military, educational and social organization, a process of self-identification has clearly occurred. Today there is no doubt that a Palestinian people, calling for the exercise of their right to self-determination, does exist.

Mutuality and reciprocity should characterize the exercise of this right of self-determination by neighboring peoples. The Panel is convinced that, just as the Jewish people have claimed and exercised their right of self-determination in creating within a part of historic Palestine west of the Jordan River the state of Israel, so the Palestinian people should be able to exercise their right of self-determination. Until the precise boundaries of a Palestinian entity have been defined by mutual negotiation, it should be understood to involve lands referred to by Palestinians as the "occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" and by the Israelis as the "administered territories of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District".

The Panel believes that a necessary next step in the peace process, and an essential one if the Camp David Accords are to continue to have relevance, is a U.S. declaration of support for the principle of Palestinian self-determination. The United States has indicated support of this concept to some degree by employing terminology such as "homeland",¹ the right "to participate in the determination of their own future",² and "insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people".³ The Panel believes that the United Nations Security Council would be an appropriate forum in which a more forthright declaration could be made by the U.S. The Panel encourages the U.S. to support a Security Council resolution on behalf of self-determination for the Palestinian people. Such a resolution, along with steps to clarify that the principles enunciated in Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) are also applicable to the Palestinians, would be strong motivation to encourage Palestinian representatives to participate in the peace process and to subscribe to the entire Security Council Resolution 242.

The question of representation of the Palestinians is a crucial issue in

¹President Carter, Statement at Clinton, Mass., March 16, 1977.

²President Carter, Statement at Aswan, Egypt, January 4, 1978.

³U.S.--USSR Joint Communique, October 1, 1977.

any discussion of the future of this people. From its experience with Palestinians all over the Middle East, including the West Bank, the Panel came to believe that the Palestine Liberation Organization represents the aspirations of the Palestinian people for self-determination. The PLO functions as the only organized voice for the Palestinian people and appears to the Panel to be the only Palestinian body likely to negotiate a settlement on their behalf. We believe it is futile to claim that there are other Palestinian representatives as long as the Palestinian people, by the imperfect legislative and political means at their disposal, do not indicate themselves that they wish other representatives. At the appropriate time, of course, a plebiscite will need to be undertaken among the Palestinian people to afford them the opportunity in a free and open election to affirm the results of negotiation between their representatives and Israel and other concerned governments, as well as to create appropriate instruments for their political and economic rights.

In making this statement, the Panel is aware of the negative image of the PLO, caused in part by its being an umbrella organization that includes diverse groups with widely varying programs and policies. The Panel believes that the Palestine Liberation Organization is more than an organization of military groups that command attention from the media. The Panel has noted the representative nature of the Palestine National Council, the legislative organ of the PLO, and the educational and social welfare programs operated by the PLO. The need for "consensus politics" within the Palestinian community and the PLO does not always enable more moderate voices to be heard, but gives undue hearing to more extreme positions. This is true not only of the PLO, but also of governments that operate in a democratic forum and whose policies are open to public debate.

The Panel, in expressing these views, is not unaware of or unconcerned about the violent activities of the organization and its member military groups. While violence (including violence against innocent persons) is not confined to one side in the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, as governments utilize a particular kind of systemic violence along with more overt forms, and while acts of "terrorism" are often the only form of armed resistance available to peoples without a standing army who are under the political and military authority of others, yet the violence of the Palestine Liberation Organization has a particular character. Rather than simply being the expected violence often associated with any national liberation movement to secure national self-determination, the violence of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its allies has been directed toward the very destruction of the state of Israel--and in some formulations against the Jewish people as well as the state. Articulation of this violence is contained in the Palestine National Covenant of 1968, to which many Israelis refer when expressing pessimism about the possibility of a peaceful co-existence of the two peoples.

Palestinian leaders indicated to the Panel that some of the extreme positions contained in this document have been modified by subsequent actions of the Palestine National Council.¹ The Panel was told privately by Palestinians

¹For example: Article 21 of the Palestine National Covenant states that the "Palestinian Arab people . . . rejects every solution that is a substitute

in positions of high leadership, including Yasir Arafat himself, that the PLO acknowledges the socio-political fact of the state of Israel and is prepared to recognize it and live peacefully with it in exchange for recognition of Palestinian rights to self-determination. However, the public statements of Yasir Arafat and other Palestinian leaders continue to reflect the disparity and contradictory nature of positions held by different factions of the PLO. The position of the PLO on this crucial issue is ambiguous to the Panel because of the conflicting statements attributed to Palestinian leaders.¹

For these reasons, the Panel is convinced that either the Palestine National Covenant itself must be amended, or some clear, unambiguous declaration must be adopted by the PLO specifically denying the continued relevance of those sections of the Palestine National Covenant that commit the Palestinian national struggle to the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state, either in the immediate future or ultimately. Such amendment or declaration must remove any doubt about the acceptance by the Palestinians of the continued presence in the Middle East of the state of Israel, and of the right of Jews to the same self-determination sought by the Palestinians.

The Panel is convinced that such amendment of the Covenant by the Palestinians would strengthen those elements in Israel and in the world Jewish community who respond favorably to the concept of Palestinian self-determination but are reluctant to press for its implementation until the basic intentions of the Palestinians are clear.

By the same token, it is essential that Israel be prepared to recognize the right of Palestinians to self-determination and refrain from those statements and actions that ultimately deny this right. Therefore, the present impasse as perceived by the Panel is one in which Israel refuses to admit to Palestinian national rights so long as the Palestinians continue to express their claims in terms that, to Israelis and many others, jeopardize the existence of Israel.

At the same time, the Palestinians will not make public assertions of their

for a complete liberation of Palestine" It was pointed out that in the Six Point Program adopted by the Palestine National Council on December 14, 1977 this maximum demand was altered to allow for ". . . the realization of the Palestinian people's rights to return and self-determination within the context of an independent Palestinian national state on any part of Palestinian land" The Panel was told that this action permits the PLO to negotiate a settlement creating a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state.

¹For example, in an interview in the French newspaper *Le Figaro* (March 13, 1980), when asked about Israel's right to exist, Yasir Arafat responded: "Before asking me this question, it is perhaps necessary to ask this: what is the future of the victim?" and in this way avoided answering the question asked. In addition, the *New York Times* (April 21, 1980) states: "Arab diplomats say the thaw in Libyan-Palestinian relations was possible because Arafat endorsed the hard-line policy approved at last week's meeting," held on April 14 in Tripoli, Libya with leaders from Libya, Syria, Algeria and South Yemen.

professed willingness to recognize Israel and agree to peaceful coexistence until Israel's intentions toward Palestinian national rights are clarified.

The process of breaking this impasse--and creating a climate in which the Israeli and Palestinian communities might begin to build trust--is a delicate one. At present it appears that neither party is willing or able to take the first step toward a resolution of the impasse between them, or even to give a clear signal of intent to do so. Here, third parties such as the United States and the United Nations can play a crucial role. The Panel was grateful to learn of the deep reservoir of good will toward the U.S. among the people in the Middle East. This factor should encourage the U.S. government to come forward with creative, new options for peace. In the effort to bring about a mutual recognition by the Palestinians and the Israelis of the right of the other to what each claims for itself, these third parties must play a catalytic role. It is in this respect that the Panel would hope that the U.S. would encourage a UN Security Council resolution supporting Palestinian self-determination. Similarly, the U.S. should be engaged in open dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization to help clarify its position with regard to Israel and to help bring these two contending parties into negotiation for mutual recognition. Through such initiatives the U.S. can contribute to the long term security of Israel and to the stability of the Middle East.

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

The human rights issue is inextricably interwoven into the fabric of the entire Middle East. The Panel was confronted in each of the countries which it visited with allegations, if not evidence, that some of the rights of persons with whom we met had been violated. It is with this in mind that the Panel concludes that any assessment of human rights issues in the area must be seen in the broadest context.

The international community has developed a consensus recognizing certain basic human rights and obligations that all governments owe to their citizens. This body of international law is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and other international and regional human rights agreements.

These rights fall into three broad categories. First are those concerning the inviolability and integrity of the person, including such matters as torture or cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, denial of fair public trial and invasion of the home. Second are the rights to fulfillment of basic human needs such as food, shelter, health care and education. Third are civil and political rights including free speech, press, assembly and religion, the right of travel to and from one's own country, and the right of freedom from discrimination based upon race or sex.

While virtually all governments acknowledge the validity of these rights, there is no doubt that some rights are violated regularly in the Middle East, as elsewhere, including the United States of America.

During its two-week visit to the Middle East, the Panel did not undertake the investigation, observation or verification of specific human rights violations that would enable it to make a definitive pronouncement on these matters. However, in each country visited the Panel had sufficient reports on these matters to put it on alert that there are problems requiring attention.

It might be said that human rights violations are always predicated upon the particular political situation in which the action occurs. Where a state of war exists, such as the Panel experienced in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel, human rights will undoubtedly suffer in the interest of security and military needs. In a situation of "occupation", as on the West Bank, other forms of human rights denials (such as preventive detention, exile, or collective punishment) will be expressed. In a situation where war is absent, as in the United States, rights to the necessities of life such as food, housing and health care can be claimed. Thus, human rights can never be understood in a vacuum.

The reported or alleged violations we encountered fell into various categories and in some cases are unique to special circumstances in the Middle East. In several countries the Panel heard that Christians are subject to harassment bordering on persecution. In several cities in Egypt, Christians have been attacked by religious extremists, and tension is growing in universities because of harassment of Christian students. Since these actions do not appear to be inspired by nor sanctioned by the Egyptian government, the Panel is encouraged by recent efforts by the churches of Egypt and the government to resolve or lessen the tensions which have developed.

Groups in these and similar circumstances claim that they are entitled to equal status and opportunity regardless of their religious affiliation or background--whether, for example, they be Christians in Egypt, Jews in Syria or Arab Christians or Muslims in Israel. This claim becomes increasingly problematic as a growing number of states in the region define themselves from a religious perspective. While the Panel does not deny the right of a majority to define itself as it wishes, the burden is on the majority group to provide equal rights for citizens who may therefore be placed in a minority status.

In Syria, the Panel raised with Syrian and U.S. government officials the status of the Jewish minority. Restrictions on travel had been in effect, the Panel was told, because of both the state of war that exists with Israel and Israel's claim to represent all Jews everywhere. U.S. authorities in Syria indicated that the only restriction placed on Jews at present that were not similarly placed on other groups had to do with the right to emigrate. Although this was the only legal restriction mentioned, the Panel noted a distinct tension when the subject of the Jewish minority was discussed. The Jewish community is small and appears to be isolated from the larger community, although it is active and appears successful in the commercial life of Damascus. This situation was simply the first of those encountered in the region where the present state of war and considerations of national security are given as reasons for abridgment of rights.

The present situation of military government on the West Bank and in Gaza complicates the consideration of human rights violations there. Not only is there conflicting evidence put forth concerning the treatment of the inhabitants

of the West Bank and Gaza, there is a disagreement over the standards by which this military administration is to be judged. While most governments, including that of the U.S., insist that the Fourth Geneva Convention (concerning the protection of civilian persons in time of war) is applicable in these situations, the Israeli authorities declare that they voluntarily observe most of the stipulations of this Convention.

Indeed, the Panel was impressed by the extent to which Israel has sought to provide as many rights as possible to a people under military occupation. Freedom of the press, with only rare exceptions, is evidenced in sharp criticisms of many Begin government policies, criticisms that add to dissenting opinion and provide support for Palestinian causes. Freedom of speech results in fiery political rhetoric among Palestinian people in East Jerusalem and elsewhere, even though it occurs in occupied territory. Acts of defiance are tolerated by the Israeli government, until understandable nervousness results in various forms of collective and official harassment of enemies of the state of Israel. Nevertheless, criticism of Israel is always more intense with regard to the denial of human and civil rights in Israel than in other countries of the Middle East, precisely because of Israel's claim to be a democratic state. Such a claim properly requires such honest criticism and judgment from others.

Israeli authorities with whom the Panel raised questions of human rights violations on the West Bank and in Gaza were quick to deny that there was any official policy allowing the use of torture or cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment of prisoners. They added, with illustrations of specifics, that when incidents have occurred, those responsible have been punished. The Panel heard sincere expressions of concern from some Israelis that the continued military administration was having a damaging effect on Israel and its moral sense.

At the same time, the Panel heard from persons on the West Bank of repeated allegations of abuse and mistreatment, both by military occupation authorities and most recently by groups of armed Israeli civilian vigilante-type groups. Without in any way denying the reality of these allegations to the persons afflicted, the Panel realized that the situation of military occupation, by its very nature, brings violations of rights. And, from a larger perspective, the denial to Palestinians of the right of self-determination and the humiliating refugee status of many Palestinians are also gross violations of human rights. The Palestinian issue once again leads the Panel to a sense of urgency that new initiatives be found to resolve this issue.

The Panel firmly believes that the best way to improve the lot of the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza is to exercise all efforts at helping the Palestinians achieve the goal of self-determination and to end as quickly as possible the military occupation by Israel of the West Bank and Gaza. Generalized condemnations or specific illustrations that can be volleyed back and forth do not appear to have been effective in this respect.

Further, the Panel strongly underscores the need to apply the same standards of judgment to all countries of the Middle East in questions of human rights and to resist singling out any one country for particular focus.

SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK

Consideration of the establishment by the Israeli government of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip cannot be viewed in a vacuum. These settlements have definite implications for Israeli security concerns, both immediate and long term. Similarly, these settlements may well have an impact on the eventual exercise of the right of self-determination by the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of these areas.

In the short run, those settlements that were established for obvious military purposes, in some cases as companions to military installations, provide either real security or a sense of security. Meeting such security needs is understandable from an Israeli perspective, given the experience of Israel since its birth. Because the long term security of Israel and other nations of the area depends in large part on relations of justice between peoples, the settlements take on a more questionable character.

The settlements are clearly seen by the Palestinian Arabs and many others as a strategic initiative of Israel to populate and colonize, to control water and other resources, and to destabilize the predominantly Palestinian population during a critical period of transition. Specific proposals and plans put forward by some leading Israelis, along with government actions that appear to follow step-by-step the most developed of these "plans" and statements by Israeli political leaders, are troubling. Palestinians and many others are convinced that Israel has no intention ever to return the captured territories to Arab sovereignty. They expect Israel to expel a significant number of the remaining Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza and to establish the state of Israel over all of what Israelis term *Eretz Israel*. In light of these convictions, the settlements serve to exacerbate intensely the already hostile relations between the Palestinian Arabs and the Israelis. Therefore, the Panel believes that further expansion of settlements, even for the sake of security, threatens the long term security of the state of Israel.

While the policy of the Israeli government in the period following the 1967 War up to 1977 was largely aimed at settlements in which security was a consideration, since 1977 the policy has been more ideologically oriented. In the decade after the 1967 War, some 36 settlements were established on the West Bank alone. In the three years since 1977, including the period of the Camp David Accords, the number of settlements has risen to over seventy. The settlements established by the present government policy in this latter period appear to be vulnerable to the charge leveled by opponents, both Israeli and Palestinian, that they are acts of colonization for obvious political purposes.

The Panel sees the continued development of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza as an obstacle to peace. This current policy heightens tension and is leading toward further serious deterioration in relationships between Palestinians and Israelis. Any successful peace process will require Israel to end its current policy of establishing new settlements and to desist from expropriating or confiscating private or "state-owned" land in these areas. Further, Israel should declare its intention to negotiate with the recognized representatives of the Palestinians about which settlements should remain--and under what conditions--within the framework of a comprehensive peace agreement. Obviously during peace negotiations no new settlements should be established.

At the same time, the Panel recognized that such declarations of intent by Israel must elicit an action from the Palestinians. Such Israeli declarations, along with the international recognition by the UN Security Council of the right of Palestinians to self-determination (see section on self-determination), will require the representatives of the Palestinian people to respond immediately with declarations of intent to cease acts of violence within Israel and the occupied territories and to recognize UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) as primary bases for a resolution of the conflicts. They will also require the Palestinians to make clear that Jews are not, in principle, to be excluded from settlements anywhere within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel will not accept a peace settlement, nor should it, which makes any area, especially in historic Palestine, *Judenrein*.¹ Jews should be free to live within a Palestinian entity with the same liberties, privileges and rights granted to Palestinian Arabs within the state of Israel.

While Israeli military installations in the occupied territories may be seen to constitute an infringement on the ultimate sovereignty over these territories, it is reasonable that they might remain with clearly defined powers and functions for a period of time after formal conclusion of the military occupation. Ultimately, however, in the final phases of the peace process, such military installations should also be withdrawn. When that happens the military security of Israel and its neighbors must be guaranteed. The entire area of presently occupied territories should be demilitarized for a fixed period of time under international auspices.

Concern related to the current settlement policy of Israel has led the United States government and the Security Council of the United Nations to call for the cessation of the establishment of settlements. The Panel supports the policy of the U.S. government in relation to the settlements issue as most recently expressed by the Department of State.² The continued tension between the U.S. and Israeli governments over this issue, and the disagreement between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin over the content of their agreement at Camp David concerning cessation of creating new settlements, further erodes the credibility of the United States as a broker in the peace process. The positive accomplishments of the Camp David Agreements and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty are jeopardized by the present settlement policy of Israel.

The importance of a change in Israeli policy regarding the building of new settlements cannot be stated too strongly. Continuation of the present policy would warrant a thorough review by the U.S. government of its policies towards Israel. Certainly continued support of those programs in Israel that have a direct or indirect relation to the building of new settlements is untenable. In order that the relationship between the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program and the construction of new settlements be better understood, the Panel believes that the appropriate Congressional committees should hold further public hearings on this subject. The continued intransigence of other states in the region on

¹The German term conveys a prohibition against a Jewish person living in any given area or place.

²Statement by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., March 20, 1980.

other issues also warrants a similar review of U.S. assistance policy toward those states.

RELIGIOUS ISSUES

The Panel saw the many religious issues encountered in the Middle East as coming together in Jerusalem, which continues as a focus of the deepest religious inspiration and attachment of three faiths: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. A key issue in this regard is the future of the Holy Places.¹ The Panel believes that the Status Quo of the Holy Places² and the age-old topography of the Old City of Jerusalem should continue to be respected. The rights of the worshipping communities in Jerusalem and its environs should be safeguarded, so that their existence around the Holy Places may be maintained and guaranteed.

International treaties (Paris, 1856 and Berlin, 1878) and the League of Nations have guaranteed the rights of the three monotheistic religions' claims to these Holy Places. These treaties have established the so-called Status Quo for these places, which, by way of compromise, has sought once and for all to keep the existing peace among these communities and in order to avoid any possible conflicts in the future, this Status Quo has to remain unalterable.

The Panel rejoices in the fact that the above Status Quo is presently respected by the Israeli government, and that it has given guarantees that it will continue to do so in the future. At the same time, the Panel expresses the hope that the rights of the worshipping communities around the Holy Places will remain inviolable, in an environment in which worshipping communities have free access to the Holy Places and feel welcome and at home in the area.

In order to keep the peace among the three religious communities--Jewish, Christian and Muslim--the Panel feels that major alterations should not be made in the topography of Jerusalem, especially when these alterations may affect the Holy Places or other places sacred to one of these three religions. Any such major change will result in bitterness for the community that feels its rights are violated, thus endangering peace in the Holy City.

Since June, 1967, Israel has taken administrative and legislative actions to unify the city under its control. In doing so, it has maintained careful re-

¹The principal Holy Places to which the Status Quo (cf. footnote 2 below) applies include: Basilica of the Holy Sepulchre, Beir al Sultan, Tomb of the Virgin, Sanctuary of the Ascension, Western (Wailing) Wall. Source: UN map 229, November, 1949 as reprinted in H. Eugene Bovis, *The Jerusalem Question: 1917-1968*, Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971.

²"The special legislation regulating the relationship of the Christian communities and the authorities, guaranteed by international treaties (Paris, 1856 and Berlin, 1878) and the League of Nations . . . [is] known as the Status Quo of the Holy Places" World Council of Churches, "Jerusalem", Plenary Document No. PD 52, Fifth Assembly, Nairobi, Kenya: 23 November - 10 December, 1975, paragraph 2. (Hereafter referred to as "Status Quo".)

spect for the historic religious sites of the city. Access to the city's places of pilgrimage is guaranteed for all people, and the government has engaged in major archeological and reconstruction projects so as to preserve an ancient history which belongs to humankind itself. However, the United Nations, with the United States concurring, has criticized Israel's intention to maintain control over Jerusalem. While the Panel believes that Jerusalem should be physically unified, this does not mean that it supports unilateral actions of the occupying power. The Palestinians have not so far played a significant role in the planning and decision-making concerning the future of the city. Unless they actively and freely participate in all necessary decisions and actions, mutually acceptable agreements cannot be found that respond to the needs and rights of all the people in the city, and antagonisms will be perpetuated that threaten the peace of the city, and possibly of the region.

The Panel sees that the relationships between persons of different religious communities are significant religious issues in themselves and expresses concern over ways in which religious issues appear to be used for political purposes. While the experience of the members of the Panel in the United States gives us a preference for a separation of the power of organized religion from the power of the state, the Panel recognizes that others have had different experiences and understandings. The Panel believes that the right of self-determination does include the ability to determine whether a state will be a so-called "religious state" so long as those of minority religions in the state are guaranteed the full rights and privileges of citizenship.

Within this context, the Panel expresses deep concern for the diminution of the Christian community of the Middle East. Vital, living churches, which trace their beginnings to the earliest Christian era, are finding their people emigrating elsewhere because of political turmoil in the region. This weakening of the Christian community, described by a Christian leader as "a slow draining away of its lifeblood", depletes a strong Christian life in the region, particularly when churches in the western world encourage their immigration.

In the contacts the Panel had with some Middle East Christians, it was reminded of the theological differences that still exist within the Christian community over the meaning of the Abrahamic covenant and the continuing role of the Jewish people. Most Panel members saw that some theological positions, when combined with the political dynamics of the area, could be understood as what the West would call anti-semitism. Thus, the seeds of religious alienation can be carried through the churches themselves. The Panel feels that it is of crucial importance that there be further discussion and study of this theological issue with religious scholars and theologians from the Middle East.

In many ways, the Holy City of Jerusalem is a microcosm of the hopes and aspirations of all the peoples of the Middle East. In the midst of political uncertainty and conflict, there is still a search for the peace envisaged in the name of the Holy City--Jerusalem, *Yerushalim*, *al-Quds*. The Panel concludes with a prayer and determination that all effort be made to find peace for the Holy City of peace, as a sign that this peace may reign in the entire region and world, among all peoples and all religions.

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
IN REACTION TO THE REPORT OF
THE MIDDLE EAST PANEL OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

presented to the Governing Board of the NCCCUSA in Indianapolis, Indiana on May 8, 1980 by Rabbi A. James Rudin, Assistant National Interreligious Director of the American Jewish Committee. Rabbi Rudin is an official observer at NCCCUSA Governing Board meetings.

While positive in a number of respects, the Report of the Middle East Panel of the NCC is of deep concern to the American Jewish Committee in its call for U.S. government "open dialogue with the PLO" and because some of its recommendations would, in effect, undermine the Camp David peace process.

The American Jewish Committee welcomes the Panel's "absolute support" of the right of the State of Israel to exist as a Jewish state in peace within secure and recognized borders. We are gratified at the Panel's recognition that "a major obstacle to peace in the Middle East has been the unwillingness of Arab states and the Palestinian Arabs to recognize Israel's right to self-determination as a Jewish state which deserves the respect of the entire family of nations."

On the other hand, it is regrettable that the NCC Panel should recommend that our government engage in dialogue with the PLO and press for Palestinian self determination without any pre-conditions and without their first renouncing terrorism. This can only strengthen the PLO's belief that its aims can be achieved without any change in its policies but rather through U.S. pressure on Israel.

Inasmuch as the Camp David agreements have broken the tragic and senseless cycle of war and terrorism the NCC and all the world abhors, the AJC deeply regrets that the Panel should see fit to describe these agreements as "fundamentally flawed." We profoundly believe that Christian leaders must support and encourage this first realistic peace plan to emerge in thirty years of Middle East conflict, and urge our government--and the American people--to stand firmly behind them.

A number of recommendations of the Panel's report are to be commended. We would certainly hope that its call for "a public commitment by the PLO to cease all acts of violence and renounce its rejection of the existence of Israel" will find a resonance throughout the Arab world. Gratifying, too, is the Panel's declaration that the same standards must be applied to all Middle East countries in judging questions of human rights.

There is a serious imbalance in certain other elements of the report as, for example, where the Panel demands that Israel change its West Bank settlement policy or suffer U.S. Government re-evaluation of its policies toward Israel. Such a demand constitutes a form of intimidation that would vitiate the U.S. role and jeopardize the peace process.

The American Jewish Committee wishes to acknowledge the integrity of the effort by the NCC Panel to acquaint itself firsthand with the complex realities of the Middle East situation. We recognize that the report represents a serious attempt on the part of the NCC to contribute to the cause of peace and reconciliation in the Middle East.

*

STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD SEIKALY, A PALESTINIAN AMERICAN

IN REACTION TO THE REPORT OF
THE MIDDLE EAST PANEL OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

based on a presentation to the Governing Board of the NCCCUSA in Indianapolis, Indiana on May 8, 1980. Mr. Seikaly served as a member of the Antiochian Orthodox Archdiocese delegation to the Governing Board.

I would personally like to commend the Middle East Panel for its involvement in the arduous process leading to the presentation on May 7, 1980 of its Report to the Governing Board of the NCC. This effort clearly reflects the commitment of the Panel to thoroughly examine policy issues in relationship to the Middle East. After analyzing the Panel Report, several negative as well as positive elements emerge.

For example, the Report elicits a perceptible concern for Israeli security while excluding any consideration of the reciprocal need for Palestinian security. In this way, a bias emerges which is inherent in much of the document.

Similarly, while the Report asserts that the Palestine Liberation Organization represents "the aspirations of the Palestinian people", it fails to correctly identify the Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people: a recognition which has been confirmed by a consensus of the international community. Thus, the report appears to minimize the significant political reality of the PLO as well as the positive role it maintains in the Palestinian national movement.


The Panel Report harshly criticizes the "violent" nature of the PLO, yet while admitting that violence is a two-sided issue, it refuses to explicitly condemn Israel for its massive aggression against Palestinian civilians. Moreover, the Report makes no attempt to differentiate between the reactive violence of an oppressed people and the systematic violence of a repressive occupation force.


The document asserts that Israel has respected Palestinian human rights in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, it fails to mention that, by its very definition, any military occupation not only brings about violations of rights, but is itself a violation of international human rights. Additionally, the Report does not acknowledge the findings of international investigatory commissions which confirm the Israeli policies of systematic torture, collective detention, deportation and land expropriation, while denying due process of law to the Palestinians.


In examining the positive aspects of the Report, the Panel enunciates a firm support for the inalienable right of Palestinian national self-determination. Moreover, the Panel correctly urges the United States government to officially endorse this concept.

Further, the Report identifies affirmatively the continuing development of Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory as an obstacle to peace. In this respect, the Panel's position is a correct response to policies that so contemptuously defy international law and suppress the Palestinian people.

As a member of the Antiochian Orthodox delegation to the recent NCC Governing Board meeting in Indianapolis, and as a Palestinian, it is my conviction that a just, viable and lasting peace in the Middle East must be based on the international recognition that the Palestinian people constitute an indivisible national unit with inalienable rights, including the right of return and the right of national self-determination. The Panel Report reflects progress in this direction.







STUDY QUESTIONS

It is hoped that this Study Document will be read and discussed by church members in local churches, their ecumenical agencies and in denominations. It is the feeling of the Middle East Panel that the dialogue would be enriched if it could be shared with American Palestinians and with persons from the American Jewish community. The following questions are suggestions for focusing your dialogue.

1. Why should U.S. Christians be concerned about the crisis in the Middle East?
2. From your reading of the Report, what would you identify as the major obstacles to peace? What would it take to remove these obstacles?
3. How would you evaluate the role of the U.S. in the peace process in the past . . . presently? What should our role be in the future?
4. How can one evaluate competing claims to the land as in the case of the Israelis and the Palestinians? What should determine U.S. policy?
5. In a situation where open conflict exists between nations, how does one deal with the violation of human rights? What role can the international community play if violations are discovered?
6. Read carefully the comments of the American Jewish Committee and the Palestinian American on pages 16 through 18 and discuss the implications of these comments.
7. What has been your experience in your own community with issues related to the Middle East, especially as it affects relations with the Jewish community . . . the Palestinian or Arab communities?
8. What do you think are the appropriate roles in this conflict for the U.S. Christian community at the local church level, through denominations, in local ecumenical councils, by the National Council of Churches?
9. What is the position of your Congressperson (House of Representatives and Senate) on the Middle East issues, particularly in relation to foreign assistance to Israel and the Arab states?

READING LIST

Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in the Arab-Israel Conflict: A Christian Perspective. Cranford Pratt, et al. New York: Friendship Press, 1979. (475 Riverside Drive; New York, N.Y. 10115)

The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs. Mark A. Bruzonsky, ed. (3rd edition) Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1979. (1414 22nd Avenue, N.W.; Washington, D.C. 20037)

Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israel Conflict, 1967-1977. William Quandt. Berkley: University of California Press, 1978. (470 Stephens Hall; University of California; Berkley, Calif. 94720)

Israel: The Embattled Ally. Nadav Safran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. (79 Garden Street; Cambridge, Mass. 02138)

The Question of Palestine. Edward Said. New York: New York Times Book Division, 1979. (3 Park Avenue; New York, N.Y. 10016)

Christians in the Arab East. Robert Betts. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1978. (341 Ponce De Leon Avenue, N.E.; Atlanta, Georgia 30308)

OTHER RESOURCES

In order to gain a human perspective on the issues with which the Middle East Panel has dealt, and for further resources, readers are encouraged to contact Middle East-related organizations or churches, synagogues and mosques in their own communities. In addition, an Israeli consulate, an Arab Information Office or a consulate of an Arab country might also be of assistance. Through these sources a local church, ecumenical agency or interfaith agency might be able to obtain speakers or dialogue partners for programs on the Middle East.

RESPONSE SHEET

The Middle East Office and the Commission on Regional and Local Ecumenism of the NCCUSA are interested in knowing how these documents were utilized and what suggestions you might wish to make to the National Council of Churches in relation to Middle East involvement. Thank you for your concern.

1. This Study Document was utilized by: _____
church/denomination/ecum. agency/other

2. Give a brief description of your study process: _____

3. List any actions or suggestions made by your group: _____

4. What information/insights/suggestions would you like to make to the NCCC: _____

Please address any questions you might have regarding these documents to:

Mr. Richard Butler, Director (212) 870-2811
Middle East Office
Division of Overseas Ministries

or

The Rev. Joan B. Campbell, Director (212) 870-2157
Commission on Regional and Local Ecumenism

National Council of the Churches of Christ, USA
475 Riverside Drive
New York, New York 10115

Please use extra sheets if necessary, and mail completed Response Sheet to Room 612 at the above address. Thank you.

REPORT ON THE FACT FINDING TRIP
OF THE MIDDLE EAST PANEL

The Middle East Panel, a specially appointed group of NCCCUSA officers and leaders of thirty-two member communions of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, USA, took a two-week fact-finding trip to the Middle East. They departed on February 25 and returned on March 11, 1980.

The Panel, chaired by First Vice-President Tracey K. Jones, Jr., was constituted by the Executive Committee in September 1979 and affirmed by the Governing Board during its November 1979 meeting. The Middle East Panel came into being because of a commonly shared perspective that there may be a New Moment in the long, painful history of the Middle East, and that this New Moment may be a fragile carrier of fresh possibilities for peace. The Panel's task, as defined by the Executive Committee, was "to study in depth the issues related to the Middle East/Israel--Palestinian conflicts in order to explore and recommend means to make our churches more effective instruments for peace, justice and reconciliation."

The National Council of Churches has had a policy toward the Middle East since May 1969. Since then, the NCCCUSA has adopted resolutions in 1974, 1978 and twice in 1979 that are based on that policy. The Policy Statement is inclusive of the myriad issues and problems that comprise the Middle East situation. For two years, a group of persons have been drafting a new and comprehensive policy statement. These persons represent the Council's Middle East Committee, Division of Overseas Ministries; Committee on Christian-Jewish Relations; Task Force on Christian-Muslim Relations; Interunit Committee on International Concerns; Commission on Education for Mission, Division of Education for Ministry; Commission on Faith and Order; Commission on Regional and Local Ecumenism; and Commission on Justice, Liberation and Human Fulfillment. This proposed policy statement will go before the Governing Board for a first reading in May 1980; a vote for final passage will be taken in November 1980. It is expected that the Middle East Panel will contribute to the final formulation of this policy statement. Thus, the insights of the Panel, based on an extensive listening and learning process, will help shape the NCCCUSA's future response to issues related to the Middle East. It should be noted that the proposed policy statement will deal with the totality of NCCCUSA concerns in the Middle East, while the Panel will focus on the Israel-Palestinian situation.

The Panel has therefore focused its efforts on the following five issues: 1. Security in the region, 2. the right of Palestinian Arabs to national self-determination, 3. human rights issues, 4. settlements on the West Bank, and 5. religious issues.* The Panel fully recognizes that these issues are inter-

* (The full formulation of these five issues is included in the Introduction to the Study Document. --ed. note.)

related and must be seen as only a part of the Middle East mosaic. The Panel's vision was extended by those in the Middle East with whom they spoke.

Although the trip to the Middle East was the most visible and the most intensive part of the Panel's learning process, it should be seen as just that: part of a process. The Panel held two full days of hearings on February 6 and 13, 1980 in New York and Washington, D.C. respectively, where presentations by over twenty groups were given. The hearings were open to all national organizations and groups that concern themselves with matters related to the Middle East. The fact-finding mission to the Middle East included visits to Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and the West Bank. The Panel met with political, religious, academic and cultural leaders in these places. The Panel's meetings were set up primarily by the Middle East Council of Churches, whose staff traveled with Panel members in most of the countries visited. In addition, the American Jewish Committee gave special assistance to the Panel in Israel.

The intensity of the feelings expressed, the complexity of the problems encountered, the centrality of the United States' role and the importance of the religious communities have humbled the Panel, yet made clear the urgency for reconciliation in this part of the world. What follows is a factual report detailing where the Panel went, with whom they talked and the major insights they gained from those persons. It should be noted that no attempt has been made to evaluate any person's comments, but rather to report faithfully what was heard as excerpted from Panel members' notes.¹ This factual report was prepared by Avery Post, Robert Neff, William Thompson, Jeanne Audrey Powers, Kenyon Burke, J Richard Butler, Joan Campbell, and edited by Joan Campbell. The report was shared in two dialogues with leaders of the American Jewish community and the American Palestinian community.

Following those dialogues, the Panel will meet for an additional two days to prepare a Report and recommendations to the Governing Board and to any other appropriate bodies. The recommendations will be based on the data derived from the hearings, the fact-finding trip and the dialogues. The recommendations will deal mainly, but not necessarily exclusively, with the five areas of concentration. The Panel will share their Report and recommendations with a small group of American Jewish leaders and American Palestinian leaders so that the persons most affected will be informed of its action.

The Panel has approached its task with seriousness of purpose, an effort to be open to all points of view and a recognition of both their human limitations and the potential influence on church and United States policy as they relate to the special pain and promise of the Middle East.

We note with appreciation that the Panel's work has been partially supported by the George Gund Foundation of Cleveland, Ohio.

¹The Panel and staff of the NCCCUSA accept responsibility for the factual report. It should be noted that the content of the report has not been approved by any of the persons mentioned in the report.

Lebanon

Approaching Beirut, Lebanon on a flight from New York, members and staff of the special Middle East Panel of the National Council of Churches were prepared from the previous day's edition of the *New York Times* to visit one of the most volatile capitals in the world. First impressions, however, were of a city with vitality, energy, colorful street commerce, and many signs of the durability of people under stress. During the two days that followed the focus sharpened and deepened as we became acquainted with the beautiful coastal city partly destroyed by a long war echoing with the sounds of current conflict, heavily policed at scores of checkpoints by regular troops of the Syrian army, broken between a Christian east Beirut and predominantly Muslim west Beirut, distressed by mass displacements of people, and clearly devoid of tourists and of the economic activity that once gave Beirut a reputation as financial capital of the Middle East.

In this setting for two days, including one working day that lasted eighteen and one half hours, members of the Panel met and listened carefully to the following persons:

Gabriel Habib, General Secretary, Middle East Council of Churches and his associates, including Kamel Costandi, Rafiq Habib and Riyad Jarjour; Shafiq Wazzan, President of the Islamic Supreme Council; His Holiness Khoren, Catholicos Coadjutor, Armenian Orthodox Church of Antelias; representatives of churches in Beirut and Lebanon, including the Greek Orthodox Church, Greek Catholic Church, Syrian Orthodox Church, Assyrian Catholic Church, Maronite Church, Armenian Evangelical Church, National Evangelical Church of Beirut, and National Evangelical Synod of Syria and Lebanon; Dr. Charles Malik, former Foreign Minister of Lebanon and former President of the General Assembly of the United Nations; former President Camile Chamoun; Mr. Fuad Butros, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon; Inan Ra'ad, Lebanese National Movement; Mohammad Labadi, Information Officer of the PLO; Yasir Arafat, Chairman, Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

These wide ranging contacts provided us with the broad spectrum of political thought in Lebanon. The Panel heard sharply contrasting, and at times conflicting, viewpoints from the persons with whom we talked. In spite of these differences, however, there were certain common themes which we heard in Lebanon. These included:

1. The future of Lebanon is at stake in the present conflict, and the Palestinian problem must not be solved at the expense of Lebanon. There was widespread agreement that Palestinians should not be resettled in large numbers in Lebanon; this view was shared across the total perspective of contacts, both Lebanese and Palestinian. The solution of the Palestine problem would enable the Lebanese to begin dealing with the purely Lebanese issues at stake in the present conflict. There was also the feeling that the United States, and perhaps much of the rest of the world, has not done as much as it could to help solve the present conflict in Lebanon.

2. At this point there is a willingness on the part of the various Lebanese political parties for compromise in order to safeguard the continued life of Lebanon. The coalition of leftist parties agrees that the secular state which remains their long-range goal must be held in abeyance, and that the political arrangement whereby power has been shared on a confessional basis must be the continued basis for organizing the state of Lebanon.

3. Lebanon has an important role to play in the Middle East as a state where coexistence can continue between different religious groups and different political groups. In addition, the Christian community continues to look to Lebanon as a place where Christians will have the kind of religious freedom and freedom of cultural expression that has been peculiar to Lebanon.

4. With few exceptions, the consensus of opinion supported the settlement of the Palestine issue along lines suggested by the Palestine Liberation Organization. These would include the exercise of the right of self-determination by Palestinians and, at a minimum, the creation of a West Bank/Gaza state alongside the state of Israel within its pre-1967 boundaries.

5. Most of the issues of the Middle East are interconnected; the Palestine issue remains the key for resolving many other issues or developing broad support of Middle East countries. There is widespread concern about Soviet influence in the Middle East, and the inability of the United States to have a just policy toward the Palestinians is seen as a factor in pushing Arab states into the Soviet camp.

6. There is widespread concern about the emigration of Christians from the countries of the Middle East, including Lebanon. Some reported a feeling that the West, due to national interests and factors of security, are no longer interested in the Christians of the Middle East.

Egypt

Eight members of the Middle East Panel arrived in Cairo at 2:00pm on February 28 where each passenger received an intensive security check. The opening of the Israeli Embassy and rising tension in the Middle East make these searches necessary. With the help of our travel agent we eased our way through passport control and customs. Archbishop Manoogian was met by a delegation of Armenian Christians who welcomed the Archbishop and whisked him off to his hotel. We were greeted there by Bishop Samuel of the Coptic Orthodox Church who briefed us on the program for the next few days.

At seven o'clock we arrived at St. Mark's Cathedral, where we were the

guests of the Ecumenical Committee, an ecumenical dream world in which members of the Coptic, Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic Churches participate on an equal basis. In a large hall we sat around tables in groups of fives and sixes chatting together about matters of mutual concern and serving ourselves several kinds of Middle Eastern sweets, most of which we had never before tasted.

After the exchange of greetings by Bishop Samuel and the Reverend Tracey Jones, representatives of all the Egyptian churches began sharing their faith and belief in peace. It was a marvelous litany of peace which dramatized the deep commitment of the Egyptian Christians to the Camp David Framework, and President Sadat's search for peace. When either the names of Sadat or Carter were mentioned there was a spontaneous applause. The Egyptians left no doubt that they had paid dearly in the conflict between the Arab states and Israel. They cited an Egyptian proverb: "The Arabs will fight the state of Israel right down to the last drop of Egyptian blood." There was concern that Israel had not kept its part of the bargain with reference to the settlements on the West Bank and there was fear that nothing would happen by the May 26 deadline. Nonetheless, all hoped for peace and spoke about what Christian love might mean in terms of Israeli/Egyptian relationships. The whole evening was an exhilarating event because of the fundamental belief in peace which was shared by all the participants.

In a tour arranged for us the next morning, we became aware of the long history of Christianity in Egypt. The Coptic Church dates to the visit of St. Mark in 61 A.D. We as a Panel witnessed a litany in church which goes back to the 4th century and commemorates the hideout of the Holy Family when they were in Egypt. Just a few yards distance from the church is a synagogue which some date to the time of Jeremiah and it also commemorates an early event, namely the discovery of Moses by Pharaoh's daughter. Antiquity and continuity, these were the code words for our experience in Egypt. Those of us who are Protestants were awakening to the tradition and the contribution of Christianity in the Middle East and were beginning to think of the close relationships with these churches.

Our visit had been arranged to meet with church leaders in each area. In the afternoon we met for a luncheon discussion with leaders of the Coptic Evangelical Church, Synod of the Nile. These leaders stated that self-determination for the Palestinians must come even though this should occur gradually and deliberately. The Arab states recognize the reality of Israel but the U.S. must put pressure on Israel to stop the settlements on the West Bank. This is the time, they argued, for Carter to move aggressively. There was deep division in the group over the recognition of the PLO, the next steps towards peace and the role of the super-powers in the area. They agreed that Egypt had taken great risk in the peace process and all feared that the move on the part of Egypt might mean greater isolation and the possibility of fragmentation in Egyptian society.

There was some sentiment that Egypt might be moving too quickly to establish an Israeli Embassy in Egypt. All agreed that the sentiment in the Arab world had led to the recognition of the right of Israel to exist. They were the

fruits--they, the Egyptians--of that movement. There will be a long psychological struggle since hatred seemed the appropriate attitude for people in this area for such a long period of time. Peace is possible and attitudes to change, but we must all be aware of the long struggle it will take to bring these changes about.

In the evening we attended a Bible study with His Holiness Pope Shenouda III. We were guided to the front row seats by Bishop Samuel through a throng of 6,000 people who had come to hear His Holiness respond to questions about loneliness, acceptance, issues of marriage and direct biblical quotations. The Pope answered these questions with humor and skill. We felt the vitality of this Coptic Church and sensed its willingness to deal directly with life where people act and work. We concluded our day with a late meal at 10:00pm and further discussion with Bishop Samuel.

By invitation of His Holiness Pope Shenouda III, we gathered in an audience room at St. Mark's Cathedral on the morning of our departure. His Holiness greeted us and welcomed us to Cairo, since he had not seen us individually until this time. He began a thoughtful discourse around the theme of the role and the presence of Christians in the Middle East. He spoke of the importance of a pluralism in which the several faiths can live in mutual respect and harmony. The group noted the diversity in the understanding of pluralism in the region. Pope Shenouda underscored this fact by referring to the difference between an Egypt under President Sadat and an Iran under the influence of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Pope concluded by speaking of our visit, the purpose of which he knew, and urged that we not be concerned with politics alone, but also with the Christians in the area. He sent us on our way with a blessing, a Coptic cross and a fond farewell. We could not again easily dismiss the problem and questions of Christians who trace their heritage back to 61 A.D. It would be difficult to think of the Middle East simply as a problem of Arabs and the state of Israel. Our Christian brothers and sisters in Egypt had reminded us of our common Lord and our partnership.

This interlude had passed all too quickly and we were on our way to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where we met another Christian in a totally different setting. The Foreign Ministry building is a converted palace that dates back to the royal family. We were again asking the hard political questions and Butros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was quite willing to take all the time we needed.

The Minister maintained that Egypt would have to remain flexible. The pledge of Egypt is not to have a bilateral peace but a global one, he asserted. He was quite clear that Egypt could not speak for the Palestinians and that the military occupation brings the violation of human rights in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel must give the signal that she is serious about stopping the settlements on the West Bank. This single fact of contiguous settlements has made life difficult for Egypt. In fact the Minister said that much of his time was taken in explaining the position of Egypt not only to the Arab states, but to the Third World who felt betrayed by Egypt.

The Minister suggested that the rejections of Israel and the rejections of the Arab states had much in common. In fact, they were two sides of the same coin. Israel does need to give a signal to the Arab world and that will come by stopping settlements.

Syria

On Thursday, February 28, the group assigned to Damascus arrived late in the afternoon by automobile. After freshening themselves from the travel they joined the Reverend Riyad Jarjour, a native of Syria who is an evangelical pastor on the staff of the Middle East Council of Churches, and Mrs. Mahat Khouri, an Orthodox laywoman who works with the Council. Mrs. Khouri is a writer and a poet, well known in the intellectual circles of Damascus. She was invaluable in arranging contacts for the group.

The group proceeded at 6:00pm to its scheduled meeting with His Holiness Ignatius Jacoub III, Syrian Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch. Making their way to the Patriarchate in the old city, the group was shown to a formal reception room. Upon entering this room one immediately noticed a large tiger skin on the floor and the throne-like chair for the Patriarch. His Holiness soon entered. A short man reported to be in his eighties, he seated himself in the chair reserved for his use. He appeared alert and vigorous. When informed of the purpose of the trip, he described the situation of the Church he leads. He spoke of his concern for the emigration of Christians from the Middle East, creating an even smaller minority; the central role of King Hussein in the future of the area; the right of Palestinians to self-determination and the centrality of that issue for the Middle East. He concluded by speaking of the need for unity among Christian churches, now a tiny minority in a sea of Muslims.

The group went directly from the Patriarchate to the residence of the United States Ambassador at the invitation of Ambassador and Mrs. Talcott Seelye. The Ambassador is very familiar with the area, having been reared in Beirut where his father was a professor at the American University. He spoke very clearly of the problems in the area and described in detail present U.S. policy. He went on to speak of misperceptions of Americans about Syria based in part on the minimal number of American visitors to Syria. Syrians, he pointed out, are not pro-Soviet as perceived in the U.S., but are forced into that orbit because of intense U.S. involvement with Israel. He pointed out that the Middle East has two ways of dealing with the world, rhetoric and reality, and that Westerners must learn to discern the difference. Mr. Seelye told us that there are 4,000 Jews in Syria and that all restrictions have been lifted except the right of free emigration--their movement out of the country is in fact limited. He went on to say that the small Christian community is well integrated into the society but few Christians hold positions of power. Mr. Seelye said that he could understand why the Israelis might not agree to a Palestinian state outright but must have experience to prove that an autonomous West Bank state is not a threat. For example, Israel could declare her intent to work towards a Palestinian state, but an interim solution is needed. Security will come not

from arms but from trust and understanding.

On the following morning, February 29, the group drove along the street in the old city which is still as in New Testament days called Straight. It is a roofed shopping street but on this day the merchants' stalls were all tightly shuttered because it was Friday, the Muslim holy day.

At 11:00am the group went by appointment to meet with His Beatitude Ignatius IV, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch. Once again, the group was directed to a reception room not essentially different from the other, but somehow less formal. Here the Patriarch's chair was distinguished from the other chairs only by slightly different carving. The Patriarch, a man in his middle years who is quite informal, seated himself with the group. Many of the Panel remembered him as Bishop Hazim prior to his elevation. He is a member of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches and informed the group that he intends to remain as active as his duties permit. He discussed with the group the issues of the region and urged that they study the relevant resolutions of the World Council of Churches which he considers to be excellent. He spoke of the Palestinian problem as the major problem of the Middle East, especially in Lebanon. He commented that it is unrealistic to think that other Arab nations will absorb the Palestinians. He emphasized that they are not just a number, but a people with an identity that must have a home--a place to establish their identity. The Patriarch added that Palestinians are not just a band of homeless refugees but they have their rights, both spiritual as well as political. The Patriarch concluded with a word of hope that partial or marginal solutions are not the answer and that not everything that can be done has been done. In speaking of the holy places, he stressed that these must not become purely symbolic for pilgrims to visit. They must have a living, vital, worshipping congregation that keeps the faith alive. In this context, he expressed concern about whether Israeli actions in Jerusalem might make this impossible.

The Patriarch entertained the group at luncheon, which was bountiful, although our host apologized that it was a vegetarian meal because of Lent. The group met three or four bishops recently ordained. One of them, Bishop Saliba, is a cousin of Metropolitan Philip and formerly served a parish in Rhode Island where he was active in ecumenical circles. He will be responsible for administration.

The group stopped at the Church of Ananias, a Roman Catholic Church, believed to be on the site where Paul was received after being blinded enroute to the city. Although the church was originally above the surface of the earth, it is now completely underground as a result of the surface rising through the accumulation of soil. The next stop was the place in the wall where it was believed that Paul was lowered in a basket. Here a Greek Orthodox Church and orphanage are maintained. The group then visited the great Omayyad Mosque. This great structure was once a Christian church and the relics of St. John the Baptist were interred in the church. This reliquary remains in the mosque and is revered also by Muslims.

Mrs. Khouri had arranged a stimulating evening for the group. It began

with a visit to the studio of Elias Zayyat, a professor at the University of Damascus and an artist, known for restoring and painting icons but also a painter in contemporary style in both water colors and oils. The group viewed with appreciation his works which were shortly to be exhibited in Sofia, Bulgaria. The group then proceeded to Mrs. Khouri's home for tea. The hostess had invited a group of intellectuals, including a professor at the University of Damascus, Antoine Makdisi, who is a secular humanist interested in the renewal of the church; George Jabara, a lawyer who was formerly a judge of the Court of Cassation; Dr. and Mrs. Rustum, a professor of pediatric surgery and his American wife; Mr. Shabat, a civil engineer; Fr. Zahlouwi, a Roman Catholic priest; and Bishop Elias Audeh, the newly appointed Metropolitan of Beirut. The conversation was frank and pointed. It acquainted the group with the reservoir of good will which the U.S. enjoys in Syria but the harsh criticism of present Middle East policy. Discussion centered on the urgently felt need to resolve the Palestinian question. All expressed anger at the U.S. government for strengthening Israel and urged us to pressure our government to influence Israel to withdraw from West Bank/Gaza to allow for a Palestinian state. There was strong feeling about the interjection of an Israeli state based on Jewish identity; a fear many expressed that the existence of religious states--Israel/Iran--will work against the movement toward a secularized Arab Nation where there would be free movement of people and a common language.

On Saturday, March 1, the group visited in quick succession for approximately one hour each: Adib Ghannam, Vice-Minister of Information; Zouheir Jana, the Director of Public Relations; Dr. Assad Lutfi, Vice-President of the University of Damascus and Dr. Ibrahim Salkini, Acting Dean, Faculty of Islamic Law, University of Damascus; Nasir Kaddour, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. In each interview the group gained further insight into the present situation in Syria. Particularly in the final meeting the official policy of the government was most clearly stated. The Deputy Minister made clear that President Sadat was perceived to be a traitor to the Arab cause for making a separate peace with Israel.

After a very fruitful visit to Damascus, the group left for Amman in a rainstorm which changed to snow and rendered driving in the mountains between the two cities very hazardous.

Jordan

The best laid plans go oft astray and the travel of the Middle East Panel was no exception. Portents of the worst snowstorm in 30 years were suggested when the two cars going from Damascus were delayed in their arrival over a mountain road, having passed five autos and trucks which had slipped off the road edge and whose taxi drivers very nearly refused to continue the journey because of the heightening snowstorm. The next morning, Panel members awoke to a raging blizzard. All plans for an ecumenical dinner with Muslim and Christian intellectuals and Jordanian ministers were cancelled. In addition, our participation in Sunday services at both the Anglican and Orthodox Churches to be fol-

lowed by meetings with Christian lay leaders and the Minister of Religious Affairs and other Muslim leadership was impossible.

A service of worship in our hotel was immediately prepared by Avery Post and Archbishop Manoogian and our Panel heard the sermon which Bishop Maximos had intended to give at the Greek Orthodox Church in Amman on that Sunday.

Led by the Chair, a satisfying and yet exhausting day of intense discussion included a conscious decision to avoid all efforts at drawing any sort of premature conclusions with regard to the issues (because the time in Jordan and Israel and the West Bank had not yet been part of the journey). At the same time, the group engaged in a probing discussion of matters which needed clarification for context and perceptions. The Panel sought diligently to make the most use of this day and the next without venturing into any premature conclusions until the itinerary had been completed.

As the city began to emerge from its immobilization, a phone call summoned us with the words, "His Majesty will see you at 2:30." With a small passenger van supplied by King Hussein, Panel members were transported, through sun and slush, to the Royal Palace to await an audience with His Majesty. He appeared in civilian clothes, graciously welcomed us in a way which indicated our arrival had been anticipated and our sensitivities to the Palestinian and Jordanian people expected. As our Chair introduced the purpose of our trip, the King was one of the few persons with whom we met who took careful note of the five issues we had come to explore. Speaking articulately from these notes, Panel members noted the repeated use of words such as tragedy, sadness, anguish, pain, deep concern, worry, suffering. Indeed, to many, he seemed like a 'pastor' bearing deeply the hurts of his people. At times because of his manner of speaking, softly and in personal terms, one felt that he--or we--might at any moment burst into tears.

As so many other times throughout the trip, when Arab Christian and Muslim leaders expressed bewilderment that the U.S. would seek to mobilize the Arab world over USSR occupation of Afghanistan but remain oblivious to what they consider to be a similar occupation of Palestine by Israel, the King emphasized that security cannot be guaranteed on the ground, even for Jordan. A graphic personal illustration was given in the King's comment that when he is in the cockpit over Beirut, he can see Damascus, Jerusalem, Haifa, Amman. He asked what kind of security is possible when F-15 jets, which go 3,000 miles, are only 30 miles away. Real security is only when both sides feel they have a mutual solution. The King stated his conviction that both a moral and a political commitment to Egypt required their involvement in the 1967 War and that the Camp David accords did not evidence Egypt's similar moral commitment to Jordan. He emphasized that self-determination for the Palestinian people is the *sine qua non*, but whether that is a separate state, whether it be under the PLO leadership, whether it be linked to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, would be for them to determine. He also said that he is not willing to bargain over one inch of Palestinian territory taken since 1967: the solution is total Israeli withdrawal. In spite of his regal bearing and the way in which his attendants served him, he was the only person with whom we spoke who issued us the invitation that

if we had any suggestions as to how 'this monumental headache' might be solved, that we would share these with him. Sometimes, friends from the outside see things from a different perspective.

Following the second round of personal handshakes and posing for pictures (which were later repeatedly broadcast on Jordanian television), the Panel returned to the hotel for a two-hour informal conversation with the American Ambassador to Jordan, Nicholas Veliotis. Having previously been Charge d'Affaires in Israel, the Ambassador's candid and perceptive remarks provided a comprehensive overview of the Middle East situation, and its possible solutions. He stressed the essential need to guarantee Israel's existence and security, but time and again he came back to the issue of Israeli settlements as not being essential to security and the failure of American policy to recognize that its judgment on the settlements combined with its inability to do anything about their expansion (especially since Camp David) was diminishing whatever American credibility remains.

With bags ready early the next morning, Panel members soon learned that icy roads made bus travel precarious, and after several hours of thaw and flooding, especially of the Allenby Bridge area, made travel into Israel impossible. While staff sought to negotiate alternate travel into Israel (30 miles away) by air via Cyprus or Athens, assignments were immediately made for the writing of this report. Unlike our U.S. experience, in which gatherings of important church and civil dignitaries take weeks of advance planning, appointments with special visitors began to develop on the spot.

Thanks in part to the hospitality of our Jordanian hosts, it was possible for us to meet with a variety of persons in the time remaining to us. These included: His Excellency Mr. Kamel al Sharif, Minister of Religious Affairs; Mr. Peter Salah, Deputy Minister of Information; Dr. Ahmad Hilayel, Director of Preaching and Guidance, Ministry of Religious Affairs; Dr. Izzat Jardat, Director of Studies, Ministry of Education; Dr. Abdulaziz Khayat, Dean of Islamic Studies, Jordan University; Bishop Diodorus, Greek Orthodox Bishop of Amman; Bishop Sima'an, Roman Catholic Bishop of Amman; Mr. Zaki Noursi, layman of the Orthodox community in Amman; Mr. Fouad Yaghnani, layman of the Orthodox community in Amman; Mrs. Aql Aql, widow of the late Bishop Aql, Episcopal Church; Dr. Hanna Nasir, President, Birzeit University.

Much of the discussion with these persons focused on Jerusalem's holy places, with an emphasis on their importance as part of a living church rather than as museums for tourists. Many persons expressed their conviction that Arab Christians and Muslims were best capable of maintaining the holy places in Jerusalem, and for providing an atmosphere of tolerance, mutual respect, understanding and dialogue which is required in a city where the three great religions focus on the importance of "place".

Over and over again, we heard bewilderment and dismay that the United States Christian community has ignored the Palestinian community by supporting the state of Israel. The Panel members also heard statements made which, to them, smacked of Christian anti-semitism and expressed their dismay at these.

Nonetheless, the Panel also heard the hope expressed that, just as the Common Market could include Germany after decades following World War II, so too, a Middle East confederation might include Israel after two or three decades.

West Bank

The frustrations caused by the snowstorm in Amman and the loss of two days of appointments quickly disappeared as the NCCC Middle East Panel traveled from Ben-Gurion airport to Jerusalem. The fact that the group had to travel some 2,400 kilometers (1,500 miles) to reach a destination only 90 kilometers (60 miles) distant was no longer important as the group viewed the landscape carpeted with wild flowers and greenery. As the bus climbed the last of the long hills and Jerusalem came into sight, a sense of excitement and expectation was all-pervading.

After a brief time for registration at the newly refurbished Hotel de Notre Dame the group set out for the Old City of Jerusalem, entering New Gate directly across from the hotel. Under the leadership of Archbishop Manoogian, who has lived for two periods of his life in Jerusalem, the group walked to the Holy Sepulchre or Church of the Resurrection. Just outside, the group met Bishop Guregh Kapikian, representative of the Armenian Patriarchate to the Holy Places. This coincidental encounter made possible a tour of the Holy Sepulchre under the guidance of one knowledgeable and devoted to these most holy of places for Christians. The progress evident in the renovation and restoration of the churches and chapels encompassed in the Holy Sepulchre was a vivid witness of the potential good that can come from Christian cooperation if not Christian unity.

The first evening marked the beginning of a series of social occasions to which the Panel was to be treated by the East Jerusalem community. Due to the delayed arrival of the group, the proposed program had been rearranged. The Panel members were briefed by the planning committee which the Jerusalem representatives and staff of the Middle East Council of Churches had brought together for this visit. This planning committee included: Archbishop Constantine Michaelides, Vicar of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate; Archdeacon Samir Kafity, Episcopal Church of Jerusalem and the Middle East; Mr. Yousef Khoury, Engineer; Mr. Kameel Nasir, General Secretary, East Jerusalem YMCA; Miss Doris Salah, General Secretary, YWCA; Mr. James Fine, American Friends Service Committee; Mr. Jean-Marie Lambert, MECC Service Department for Palestine Refugees; Mr. Elias Khoury, MECC Service Department for Palestine Refugees.

Following a briefing concerning the two days' program in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the Panel members and planning committee dined and engaged in intense conversation. These one on one or small group discussions over excellent meals were the pattern of the next two days.

The first day of visits on the West Bank began with a brief stop at French Hill in northeast Jerusalem along the road to Ramallah. There the group was briefed on the impact of reported land expropriations and development of Israeli

housing settlements. They met a Palestinian Arab who, they were told, had lost through expropriation land that had been owned by his family for some ninety years. His wife was introduced as a courageous woman who had attempted to stop the leveling of her husband's land by barring the way to bulldozers with her body.

The next stop was a visit to the UNRWA Refugee Camp at Kalandia. There the group was provided with factual information on the UNRWA operation and status of Palestine Arab refugees by the Area Officer, Mr. Tony Bakerjian. Mr. Bakerjian told of the accomplishments of Palestinian refugees in spite of education throughout the refugee community and the impact this had on the entire Middle East. After a brief walk through Kalandia Camp the group moved on to travel east to the Jordan River Valley to see settlements built there by the Israeli government.

The so-called "Allon Road" was pointed out as part of the Israeli security system in the Jordan Valley and was further interpreted as part of a plan to divide the West Bank into different control areas. The group proceeded through Jericho to the village of el Aujha where, it was reported, water resources had dried up after a deep well had been drilled for a new Israeli settlement. Stumps of withered banana trees and orange trees were seen in the parched soil. The group then drove into the Israeli settlement of Yitav and was shown the swimming pool where last summer settlement residents relaxed and swam while Palestinian farmers saw their crops die from lack of water.

The YMCA and YWCA centers in Jericho were the next stops on the group's visit. After touring the YMCA vocational training center and the YWCA kindergarten the group was joined for lunch by several members of the Supreme Council of the YMCA of East Jerusalem and Jordan. Again the meal was accompanied by spirited discussion.

That evening the group attended a dinner at the YWCA in Jerusalem where that organization's Palestinian Folklore Club presented a program of music and dance. In addition to the spirited dancing of the young people, Mrs. Rima Tarazi accompanied a group in singing three songs which she had composed. The dinner was attended by persons from the Christian community of East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

On Saturday, March 8, the group divided into three sections in order to visit major municipalities of the West Bank. One group traveled to Nablus where they visited the Deputy Mayor, Mr. Zafer Musri. In addition, they met the President of Najjah University, Dr. Abdul Haq and the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, Mr. Hikmat al Masri.

The second group visited Bir Zeit University where it met Dr. Gabi Baramki, its Vice-President, and several faculty members. In addition, the group briefly toured the new campus of the University. This group also visited Ramallah, and met with its Mayor, Mr. Karim Khalaf, its vice-Mayor, the Reverend Audeh Rantisi and several leading citizens. Finally, it called on the Mayor of al-Bireh, Mr. Suleiman Tawil.

The third group traveled to Hebron where it met Mayor Fahed Kawasmeh and to Bethlehem and its Mayor Elias Freij.

All of these visits provided insights into the circumstances in which local government is conducted on the West Bank as well as an encounter with those who represent the political and intellectual leadership of the Palestinian community there.

The return to Jerusalem in the early afternoon provided an occasion for the Panel members to meet representatives of some of the churches of Jerusalem: Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Latin Catholic, Episcopal, and Quaker.

That evening a social setting at the Hotel de Notre Dame brought the Panel together with a broader spectrum of Jerusalem society. A sumptuous meal served in an elaborate decor with candelabra and beautifully arranged flowers reflected the presence of the elite of the Palestinian community. The group was also treated to an address by Mr. Anwar Nusseibeh, former Governor of Jerusalem and former Jordanian Ambassador to Great Britain. Again this social setting provided an opportunity for exploring and pressing issues which had emerged during the visit.

The major themes of the presentations and discussions during the two days in East Jerusalem and the West Bank included:

1. Many expressed weariness at times bordering on despair as a result of twelve years of living under occupation. The Christian community particularly cried out for help, speaking as they said to Christians from the West.
2. There was a universal expression of a hope for peace and most persons expressed a willingness to accept as a fact an Israel within the 1967 borders. This latter in return for an Israeli recognition of Palestinian national rights. At the same time there were often extreme statements of blame for all problems, for all change, on the Jews and/or the Zionists. These statements took varying forms from Christian clergy and from Christian and Muslim laity.
3. The Palestine Liberation Organization received support from all as representing the Palestinian people. Some explained that while every action of the PLO is not approved nor every leader acclaimed, the organization has provided a sense of identity and recognition for Palestinians.
4. There was a near universal sense of distrust of Israel and its intentions in regard to any eventual withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, particularly given the present leadership of Israel. The settlement policy of the Israeli government is seen as a subtle way of transforming the demography of the West Bank and making any future exercise of self-determination by Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank meaningless.

Israel

On Friday, March 7, five members of the Middle East Panel met with Bernard Resnikov and Jacov Pinini of the American Jewish Committee. They outlined a full two days of in-depth dialogue and discovery for the Panel in Israel. We discussed the climate for our visit, including an unfortunate article in the *Jerusalem Post* written by Franklin Littell, that questioned the Panel's objectivity and integrity. Panel members responded with sadness to this criticism as they had to the boycott of the earlier hearings in the U.S. All recognize that the slate of the Christian Church throughout history is not a proud one as it relates to the Jewish people, but the prejudging of the Panel's motives and eventual recommendations was deeply disturbing.

Our hosts informed us that we were most welcome and would be able to meet with religious, political, and cultural leaders of the Israeli community. Tracey Jones reiterated the Panel's determination to have as full an exposure to Israel as possible. As the Panel was snowbound in Amman, Jordan and had traveled 3,500 miles from Amman to Athens to Jerusalem, it now added an extra day to the trip so that we might listen and learn from the Israelis. The total Panel (having been sensitized to the intensity of feeling of our American Jewish friends by both the criticism of the Panel's process prior to our leaving and the helpful dialogue that took place on the day before our departure) was determined to draw no conclusions about the Middle East until there had been full opportunity to listen carefully to the Israelis.

It was in this spirit of openness and concern that the Panel began two full days of listening and learning, searching and probing for a deeper understanding of the Middle East conflict as seen through Israeli eyes. The Panel requested exposure to the widest range of views and were well pleased by work done by the AJC in setting up the agenda.

Late afternoon on Friday, seven of the group, with Jacov Pinini as their guide, walked through the New Gate into the Old City and on into the Jewish Quarter. It was near sundown and Shabat was about to begin. A sense of expectancy pervaded as young and old walked purposefully down the narrow cobblestone street toward the Western Wall. This holiest of Jewish places is a gathering place of the devout, the lonely, the concerned and the joyful. The Panel members joined the throng at the Western Wall and observed the timeless celebration of the beginning of Shabat. The experience connected us with the Jewish people of times past and we sensed the importance of this place--this piece of land, this history--to all who gathered at the Wall. We were reminded that the Jews had been denied access to this holy place when the City of Jerusalem was divided.

On Saturday as we had planned, the Panel moved from the Notre Dame Hotel, a center for Christian pilgrims on the border of West Jerusalem, to the Bat Sheva Hotel on busy, highly commercial King George Street. Here we found ourselves in the midst of a vital, fully alive business district with all the signs of a thriving metropolis. The only reminder that this was a nation beset by security concerns was the constant presence of soldiers casually dressed but ever watchful and always armed.

On Saturday evening some Panel members visited briefly with the U.S. Consul General in his home. He was helpful in stating the U.S. position on Jerusalem and other matters.

Very early Sunday morning, March 9, the entire Panel departed by bus for the Upper Galilee and the Golan Heights through the Jordan Valley. Our companions for the trip were Jacov Pinini, staff member of the American Jewish Committee and Nahum Astar, a former Ambassador. The trip through the Jordan Valley past the Dead Sea and the Jordan River up into the Galilee was rich with meaning. We experienced firsthand those places where prophets of old walked and worked and ministered. The life and work of Jesus was given depth and perspective as we made our way to Nazareth.

The Panel drove to the Golan Heights and there stood on the border between Syria and Israel and saw quite clearly why the Israelis have a concern for safe and secure borders. We listened to our guides explain the strategic importance of the Golan and the deep fear the Israeli people have of the Syrians. They pointed out the ease with which the valley could be shelled if vigilance was not maintained on that particular border. The evidence of past battles was powerfully apparent. Here the security issue took on a visual dimension.

We hurried from the Golan to Kibbutz Gonen where we had a simple self-serve lunch among members of the Kibbutz. A young woman from New York City who had lived in the Kibbutz for twelve years gave us a brief tour and overview of life and work in the Kibbutz, including their philosophy of communal life. The stresses of life on the border were apparent. Bomb shelters are an important part of the landscape and everyone is taught to use a weapon. But despite these necessary precautions, life seemed peaceful with evidence of farming and children playing and learning in a stimulating atmosphere.

After leaving Kibbutz Gonen we stopped briefly in Kiryat Shomona on the Lebanese border. This is a village where many oriental Jews, refugees from Yemen, Morocco, etc., have been settled. Our guides pointed out the tension between the oriental Jews and those from the Western world. The orientals have more children, less financial security, are less literate and culturally distinct. This is one of the more serious internal problems for the state of Israel.

Kiryat Shomona has been the scene of several terrorist attacks by the PLO. The homes are a witness to this painful history: a close look reveals a secure shelter which has been attached to each row of apartments. The terrorist attacks which put the residents under physical and psychological stress plus the already difficult living conditions speak of classic human tragedy.

We went on to Nazareth where we met with Mr. Ibrahim Shbat, author, journalist, and politician, and Judge Khalil Abboud, of the Regional Labor Court of Nazareth, both of whom are Christian Israeli Arabs. Mr. Shbat extended the hospitality of his home for our visit and graciously served us with welcome coffee and sweets.

Early in the conversation Mr. Shbat informed us that he would do most of

talking since many of our concerns were political in nature and judges in Israel were not to be involved in politics. The Panel was most impressed with Mr. Shbat's openness and apparent freedom to express his views which were quite divergent from those of the Begin government. He made it clear that his views are in the minority but that this minority is vocal and increasing in strength. Basically he told us that:

1. The tensions that presently exist between the Jews and the Arabs are tragic for they are both Semitic people--brothers and sisters.
2. What we have is a confrontation between two just causes. Since 1948 the Jews have ignored the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and the Arabs have denied the right of Israel to exist and have ignored their real need for security. These two extremist views still exist but must be ignored for the way to peace is compromise and negotiation. Mr. Sadat recognized this fact when he bridged the gap and came to Israel. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is a first step to peace--an example of compromise.
3. Central to the solution of the Middle East conflict is the resolution of the Palestinian situation. The Israeli government holds the key to lasting peace. It must recognize the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. This public recognition will strengthen the hand of the moderates among the Palestinians and will encourage them to recognize publicly Israel's right to exist. Following this recognition (maybe as much as two years later) the Palestinians will then be able to negotiate for leadership and the type of political entity they will be. The role of Jordan in peace negotiations is crucial.
4. The confiscation of the Arab lands by the Israelis is a thorn in the side and must be stopped if we are to proceed with the peace process. Mr. Shbat said clearly that he does not believe in occupation by anyone; neither does he believe that the Palestinians are suffering more under the Israelis than they did under the Jordanians.
5. There is no need to partition Jerusalem as there are many ways to create an open city. For example, one model could be the establishment of a Palestinian Council and an Israeli Council with one umbrella-type body presiding over both.
6. Finally, he said there is in Israel the potential for a real paradise and our help is needed to press for peace. Mr. Shbat said they do not need those who blindly support either Israel or the Palestinians. There must be a homeland for both Jews and Palestinians.

Judge Abboud, having been silent all this time, added a few comments of his own:

1. Security is the main concern of all parties and this creates injustices in the name of national security. The best security, he

noted, is not illegal settlements but a just and lasting peace. He pointed out that both Arabs and Jews have confiscated one another's lands and that this must end.

2. What is needed most is an organized force on both sides to speak aloud for peace.

We left Mr. Shbat's home feeling encouraged by the words of these two men and by their clear commitment to peace through compromise and negotiation.

We were very late for our next appointment so we drove quickly to the large Arab village of Kfar Kera where we met and had dinner with representatives of the Interns for Peace organization. This is an organization funded mainly by the American Jewish community and, to a lesser degree, by ecumenical groups including Church Women United. This funding base and their lack of dependence on either the government or any political party enables them to have freedom of thought and movement.

We met with Rabbi Bruce Cohen and young people who are interns from the U.S. and Israel. The lateness of the hour and the fact that we had to be back in Jerusalem for the midnight service at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre where Bishop Maximos was to be the liturgist forced us to cut short our visit with these hard-working young people. The focus of Interns for Peace is more on doing than on discussing. Here we witnessed a community development project designed to identify programs based on mutual participation and benefit. The young community organizers emphasized how much the village people want peace; their willingness to compromise and their weariness with war.

Bruce Cohen pointed out the isolation of Jews and Arabs from one another, and his feeling that this is more psychological than geographical. He noted that in his experience the oriental Jews are the more open-minded regarding cooperation with the Arabs. He stressed, as had Mr. Shbat, that the Palestinian question must be resolved for, in his words, both Arabs and Israelis are going to continue to live together. He, like so many others, asked for our help and reiterated the centrality of the U.S. role in the prospect for peace. He urged us to tell the story of Interns for Peace in the United States and to assist wherever possible in encouraging support for their work.

A tired but strangely hopeful Panel boarded the bus for the two-hour ride to Jerusalem where our 17 hour Sabbath day was to end at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre worshipping in the Greek Orthodox Cathedral just as Christians before us had done in unbroken succession every midnight for over one thousand years.

Monday, March 10 came too early but the concern and commitment that had characterized the Panel's work continued and all were in attendance when we began our first meeting with Dr. Amnon Selah, Professor of Russian studies at Hebrew University. These leaders of the Peace Now movement (an organization that is two years old and began with the Egyptian/Israeli peace process) shared their goals with us:

1. The key to peace is the recognition and security of Israel and

the recognition of Palestinian self-determination. Professor Selah pointed out that what we have are two sets of rights to the same piece of land. There are two possibilities: one is that both sides continue to claim their full rights and refuse to compromise, which will lead to yet another war; the other is that both sides will give up some rights and will recognize the existence of each other and thereby gain some measure of security and increase the potential for peace. The latter is the Peace Now movement position. They believe that there must be a new partition between Israel and a Palestinian entity and that both Israelis and Palestinians must have a homeland. They said that the Peace Now people are ready for partition.

2. Peace Now is willing to talk with any Palestinian willing to recognize that negotiation, not terrorism, is the key to peace. The Palestinians must denounce the terrorism of the PLO and demand peaceful solutions. Both speakers recognized the danger of speaking out in this way and pointed out the fact that some moderates within the PLO had been shot for talking with the Zionists.

3. Peace Now, like others, stressed the importance of groups like the NCCC Panel who could listen to both sides and carry the message of peace from one to the other. They urged us to encourage the Palestinians to speak out publicly for peace. Specifically they asked that we urge Palestinians to speak not to the Israeli government but to the Peace Now people. They felt that this would increase the possibility for peace and strengthen the hand of the peace movement in Israel. The Peace Now people feel they have taken risks, have spoken loudly against government policy and they want to see an olive branch from the other side.

The Panel moved on to City Hall, a building that shows the strain of many bullets and too much war. Here we met with Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem. He had invited religious leaders to be present, including: Archbishop Constantine (Greek Orthodox); Reverend Gardiner Scott, Minister Emeritus, St. Andrews; Reverend Coos Schoneveld, Executive Secretary, Ecumenical Theological Research Fraternity; Canon Roger Adeney, Christ Church; Father Bruno Hussar, (Dominican) Superior, Isaiah House; Colonel Ord Dobbit, Warden of the Garden Tomb. The Mayor was quite relaxed and prepared to give us a considerable amount of time. His main points were:

1. Christian Community

He noted that the Christian community had dwindled from 25,000 in 1948 to approximately 10,000 to date. He expressed the opinion that much of this was due to a lack of economic activity under the Jordanians. He analyzed the Christian community as three types--

- a) The Armenians and the Greeks who are concerned about neither the Arabs nor the Jews but primarily about the continuation of tradition;
- b) The Christian Arabs for whom nationality is stronger than

religion--these churches, he pointed out, are now "decolonized" with Arab bishops and include Palestinian clergy and laity;

c) The Christians who are here because this is where it all began--these persons are concerned with the history of their faith and are for the most part apolitical.

He stressed the government's desire to help the Christians retain their communities and thus his hope that their numbers will increase. To that end he enumerated government actions that have been taken, specifically:

- a) helped with removing obstacles to obtaining building licenses;
- b) gave a grant to the Maronite Church to complete building of church and hostel;
- c) facilitated the repurchase of Notre Dame Hotel from Hebrew University;
- d) strengthened the Christian community by providing housing loan assistance, along with help in land acquisition.

The Mayor noted with a sense of satisfaction that Jerusalem is becoming a more religious city where more people attend churches, synagogues and mosques than before. He noted that there is more tolerance and religious freedom than ever before.

2. Future of Jerusalem

The Mayor spoke forcefully to this issue stating that Jerusalem should be one city without divided sovereignty. For all the compromises Israel is willing to make, none is willing to see the city divided. He recommended a borough system with each borough having a degree of independence but he noted that the only way this would work would be for the Arabs to want one city. Fear of recrimination from the more militant forces keeps them from speaking up.

He noted that there are tensions in the city and that here integration is not possible. The Arabs consider themselves to be an occupied people and the Jews, 60% of whom are refugees from Yemen, Morocco, etc., where they were treated as third class citizens by the Arabs, are not inclined to integrate. He did however, point out that despite this tension there have been no physical clashes between Arab and Jewish inhabitants of the city. There have been acts of terrorism but these have been perpetrated by people from the outside who know that terrorist attacks in Jerusalem will get the world's attention.

3. Expropriation of Land

The Mayor made it clear that he was against further expropria-

tion of land except for such things as schools. He pointed out the difficulty in purchasing land from the Arabs because of their fear of reprisal. The results of this is that they will sometimes ask the City to expropriate and then to compensate for the land. Regarding the City expropriation of land to date:

- a) No land (with one exception) was expropriated on which housing stood--this included vineyards and olive trees;
- b) All land formerly held in institutions was returned, with one exception--29 acres of Jewish Quarter was expropriated, 70% owned by Jews and 30% by Arabs when the City compensated and assisted in relocation.

The Mayor noted that there is more building going on in the City than in Jordanian times and expressed his belief that this points to a belief in peace rather than a will to war.

Following the meeting with the Mayor of Jerusalem the Panel enjoyed lunch in the Old City on a terrace with a beautiful view of the Mount of Olives and the distant hills.

We then moved to the office of Mr. Shmuel Tamir, the Minister of Justice, where we had a stimulating visit. Mr. Tamir pointed out that:

1. The Middle East is the cradle of civilization--the most fascinating, challenging, dangerous area on earth where conflicting rights have brought about five wars in 30 years. He spoke passionately of the need to make peace between these clashing rights.
2. He reminded us of the painful history of the Jewish people and their long and unsuccessful struggle to get the world to deal with the Jewish problem which culminated in the Holocaust. The event of the Holocaust made it clear that the only answer for the Jewish people is to have a roof over their heads. The state of Israel's existence depends not only on the Jews of the world but on Christians and Muslims as well. The PLO must remove from their covenant their intent to drive Israel into the sea if peace is to be possible. He noted that Israel had been willing to give up the Sinai for peace, and that this must be seen as willingness to negotiate.
3. Mr. Tamir noted that Jordan is already a Palestinian state and that another Palestine in addition to Jordan is artificial. He, like others we heard, pointed to the essential role that Jordan must play in the peace process.
4. He defended the state of Israel as a state where human and civil rights are taken seriously. He stated that Israel is more humane than any other country in the Middle East and is the only country in 2,000 years that has had such a humane occupying force. Torture is not allowed and if discovered is punished for it tears at the fabric

of society.

The Panel moved quickly from the Ministry of Justice to the Knesset Building where we met with Shulamit Aloni of the Human Rights Movement and with David Glass of the National Religious Party and a Likud Member of Knesset. The views of these two spanned the political spectrum present in Israel.

The Panel noted that Shulamit Aloni was not only the most influential woman we had met with on the trip but one of the very few women with whom we spoke. She was delightfully clear and open in her comments. She noted that her views were strong enough for her to say that the biggest favor the Begin government could do the country would be to resign. She was very critical of the autonomy policy of the Begin government. In general she said their policies toward the West Bank are suicidal. Despite her criticism of the Begin government she was a strong, able defender of the state of Israel. She pointed to the strength of their democracy noting that 102 countries are represented in Israel, and that most of the people are from Muslim countries. She pointed out that she criticized the government not because it is the worst in the world, but because she wants it to be the best.

She pointed out that:

1. The question of security is foremost in mind and feeling--this must be remembered.
2. The majority of Israelis believe that Arab land should be given back to insure peace. She suggested a phased peace process that should include representatives from
 - a) Palestinians in occupied territory;
 - b) PLO representing Palestinians outside;
 - c) Jordanians (all Palestinians on the West Bank are Jordanian);
 - d) Israelis.

David Glass reflected that:

1. The Palestinian problem must be addressed, for its resolution is crucial to the peace process. We believe, he said, that self-determination is essential and that the Palestinians must be recognized as a political entity in their own right. He noted that this was not said at Camp David so no sign of hope was given to the Palestinians, but neither have the Palestinians given any signal to Israel that negotiation is possible. He stated strongly that most Israelis are against a Palestinian state governed by the PLO and see that as a daily danger to Israeli existence.
2. He indicated his view that the settlements on the West Bank are a nuisance, an expense, and do not help security. He further indicated the Israeli government had made a big mistake in their decision to place settlements in Hebron.

The peace process, he noted, would be aided by the withdrawal of the military force from the occupied zones. This would reduce interference in the daily lives of the Arab population, would increase good will and enable the people to govern their own municipalities.

3. Mr. Glass was critical of the heavy-handedness of the U.S. government. He felt that our criticism of the settlements was suspect because of our need for oil from the Arab countries. He felt that we are more critical of Israel particularly in the area of civil and human rights than we are of other Arab states where rights are much more limited.

We left the Knesset Building and hurried on to our next encounter at Yad Vashem. Our guide pointed out to us that every official guest of the Israeli government must make this pilgrimage to Yad Vashem before talking with any government official. Those in the group who had been to Israel before affirmed the importance of this memorial. It is essential to understanding the meaning of the state of Israel to the Jewish people.

"Forgetfulness leads to exile, while remembrance is the secret of redemption" (Baal Shem Tov). These words, carved in stone at the Yad Vashem exit, best describe the meaning and purpose of this Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Memorial. Yad Vashem is a poignant photographic reminder of the fact of the Holocaust. It was a sobering and painful encounter with evil and this recognition of human sinfulness put in perspective the Jewish peoples' fear for survival and their passion for a homeland. Immediately after leaving the museum we went to hear a lecture by Zeev Mankewitz, Director for the Institute for Diaspora Youth Leaders and lecturer at Hebrew University. He provided greater insight into the meaning of the Holocaust and its psychological impact. Briefly he noted:

1. In the struggle of the Jewish people for survival one cannot underestimate the importance of Israel. Of the 13 million Jews in the world, 3 million live in Israel.
2. Every institution in the world, be it a national government, or an individual, has its own priority. In World War II no one had the Jewish people as a priority. Today, Israel is the only place with a Jewish priority. Still, Israel more than other countries must justify its right to exist; it is not a self-evident right. The question is whether Israel can do more than survive. Can a people who suffered so, fight for human decency? Can a people who have emerged from death affirm life?
3. Anti-semitism is a virulent form of racism that attacks the fact of Jewishness, not just that person's negative traits.
4. The present political impasse in the Middle East would change if:
 - a) the PLO would stop terrorism;
 - b) the PLO would end rhetoric about driving Israel into the sea;
 - c) King Hussein would agree to begin negotiations;

- d) Israel would stop all expropriations;
- e) Israel would dismantle all settlements except where absolutely necessary;
- f) Israel would then agree to meet with King Hussein and begin dialogue on suggestions for compromise.

Following Professor Mankewitz's presentation, the Panel returned to the hotel for a dinner meeting with Gabriel Bach, State Attorney for the Government of Israel; General Dov Shefi, Military Advocate General; and David Krivens, investigative reporter for the *Jerusalem Post*. Gabriel Bach, an impressive man who was the prosecutor in the Adolph Eichman trial, defended the position of the Begin government, noting that the Israelis will never recognize the PLO because of its Covenant that calls for the destruction of Israel.

He outlined the Israeli position on the status of the West Bank and Gaza in international law, as this has relevance to issues of human rights and the settlements. Mr. Bach pointed out that the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank was recognized only by Great Britain and Pakistan and that therefore the question of sovereignty of this area and the Gaza Strip, which was administered by Egypt from 1948 to 1967, is still undecided. Israel therefore considers itself as the present power administering these territories until their status is resolved in negotiation, as provided in the Camp David agreements. Since Israel has the role of administrator rather than occupier of the Territories, the various Geneva Conventions governing occupation of enemy territory do not apply to the West Bank and Gaza. However, Israel has indicated its willingness to apply the substance of these conventions in the administered territories.

He reiterated the government's position that Jerusalem must remain undivided. He indicated that this is a point on which all Israelis agree.

He further reminded us that there was a partition of Palestine in 1922 resulting in part of the creation of what is now called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. That state now has a 60% Palestinian population and there is not room for another Palestinian state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.

A weary but enlightened Panel thus ended their time in the Middle East and began to make preparations for their return to the United States. We left at 5:00am on March 11 for our return via Athens (the third Athens stop in 14 days) to New York. The airplane ride provided opportunity for sleep, work and dialogue about the continuing work of the Panel. All agreed that we were not yet ready to come to a consensus nor to issue a recommendation, but rather to gather and set down what we had seen and heard and to continue listening and learning from the Jewish community and the Palestinian community in the United States. A final report and any recommendations deemed necessary will be made in May to the Governing Board.

The entire group landed at J.F. Kennedy airport safe and secure, and all were grateful for the experience of the trip and enriched by our friends in the Middle East.

TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
OF NOVEMBER 22, 1967

Resolution 242

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East;

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security;

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter;

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
 - (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
 - (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
 - (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
 - (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
 - (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
OF OCTOBER, 1973

Resolution 338

The Security Council:

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than twelve hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its points;
3. Decides that, immediately, and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.



A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

--The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts. [The texts of Resolutions 242 and 338 are annexes to the document.]

--After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

--The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

--The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

--To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

--Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace

within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

--Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

AMERICAN JEWISH Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. *West Bank and Gaza*

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza

or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

- 1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
- 2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
- 3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
- 4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on inter-

nal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. *Egypt-Israel*

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. *Associated Principles*

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors-- Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

- (a) full recognition;
- (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
- (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.


5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government
of the Arab
Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat

Witnessed by:



For the Government
of Israel:

M. Begin

Jimmy Carter

Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

(Signed September 17, 1978)

Middle East Peace Process: A Status Report

March 20, 1980



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

AMERICAN JEWISH

Following is a statement by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., March 20, 1980.

There has been a great deal of discussion about the subject of today's hearings: the events surrounding the U.S. vote in the U.N. Security Council on March 1. I know that all of us here are aware of the importance of approaching our discussions today with a view to their possible impact on our efforts for a comprehensive peace. In this regard, Ambassador Linowitz [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiation] is leaving tomorrow for a round of particularly sensitive negotiations with the Egyptians and Israelis.

Over the years the United States has been forthright in stating its position on these issues. We have made clear:

- Our unwavering support for Israel's security and well-being;
- Our longstanding commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the Middle East, including Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
- Our support for Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts as the foundation of a comprehensive peace settlement;
- Our belief confirmed by Egypt and Israel at Camp David that negotiations are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338;

- Our conviction shared by Egypt and Israel, that a comprehensive peace must include a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects;

- Our firm position that we will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

- Our unswerving commitment to the negotiating process laid out at Camp David; and

- Our strong view that in the interim the parties should conduct themselves in accordance with international law and common-sense restraint so as to build trust that a sequence of successful negotiations can bring about a just, honorable, and lasting peace for all.

After nearly 30 years of stalemate and strife, we finally have seen concrete progress toward peace through negotiations. President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter embarked on a process that has led to the Camp David frameworks, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, and the present negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. At the request of the parties, the United States is a full partner in these negotiations.

It is important to stress that the objective of all three partners is a peaceful settlement compatible with the Camp David accords and achieved through negotiation. The approach which has begun to bear fruit in the last 2 years is to reach accommodation on those issues that can

be tackled now and then to use the progress made in the present stage to facilitate resolution of the tougher issues in later phases of negotiations. It is critical to this process that each side gain trust that a negotiated settlement on fair terms is possible.

Let me turn now to several specific issues.

The Present Negotiations

The current negotiations provide the context for concrete discussion of individual issues. It is important to define what the current negotiations are and what they are not.

They are not, for example, designed to define the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. All issues relating to permanent institutions in these areas are to be resolved in a later negotiation where the Palestinians can participate in the determination of their own future through the process set forth in the Camp David accords. Our concern is that unilateral acts tend to prejudice the outcome of those negotiations and, therefore, to undercut the avenue to a peaceful and honorable resolution of these complex issues.

The current negotiations are an effort to establish a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period while fully protecting Israel's security. In order for that effort to succeed, some important issues will have to be resolved.

The current negotiations must also define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. These arrangements should assure full autonomy for the inhabitants of these territories while providing for the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

There is, also, the question of how the elections will be conducted which will produce the freely elected body called for by the Camp David frameworks. Those elections should assure that that body has the popular support necessary to carry out during the transitional period its responsibilities as agreed among the parties.

On the question of security, let me reaffirm the statement in the Camp David accords that: "All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond." That commitment is an integral part of the Camp David frameworks, and this Administration intends to see that it is honored in full.

The U.N. Resolution

In February, we were faced with a draft resolution on the question of Israeli settlements which was circulated in the Security Council.

We disagreed with a reference in the resolution to dismantling existing settlements and sought unsuccessfully to have it removed. As often happens in the U.N. Security Council, therefore, we stated our reservations without opposing the resolution as a whole. President Carter has stated clearly our view that this call for dismantling was neither proper nor practical.

As you know, we did succeed in removing paragraph seven of the draft, which called on Israel to assure the exercise of religious freedom in Jerusalem, thereby wrongly implying that it is not already doing so.

There was a misunderstanding, however, with regard to our position on other references to Jerusalem in the resolution. The President understood that all references to Jerusalem would be removed before we would vote for the resolutions, believing that in the present phase of the autonomy negotiations it would not be helpful to raise the issue of Jerusalem in a U.N. resolution concerning settlements. I believed that what the President wished to have removed was the reference to Jerusalem and related material contained in paragraph seven. I was mistaken and have accepted full responsibility for this misunderstanding.

As Ambassador McHenry [Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations] stated in the Security Council immediately following the vote, the United States considers Resolution 465 as recommendatory rather than binding. With regard to the references in the resolution to "Palestinian and other Arab lands," it is our position that this phrase should not be construed as in any way prejudicing the outcome of the autonomy negotiations or negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

As the President unequivocally stated on March 3, our policies with respect to settlements in occupied territory, and with respect to Jerusalem, have not changed. I think it is important that I take a moment to reiterate briefly our policies on these two issues.

Settlements in Occupied Territory. U.S. policy toward the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is unequivocal and has long been a matter of public record. We consider it to be contrary to international law and an

impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process. We have consistently urged Israel to halt actions to create new settlements or to seize land to expand existing ones. We regard such restraint as particularly important while the autonomy negotiations are underway.

The Camp David frameworks do not refer specifically to Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, certain questions concerning the status of the settlements during the transitional period will obviously have to be resolved in the course of the autonomy negotiations.

The permanent resolution of the settlements issue must then be decided in the subsequent negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories.

Jerusalem. Our policy on Jerusalem has remained consistent under the past four Presidents. As President Carter stated on March 3, our position on the status of Jerusalem has not changed. That position remains as indicated by the President in his letter to President Sadat signed at the time of the Camp David accords.

With respect to the future of Jerusalem, it has been our consistent position that the final status of the city must be settled in the context of negotiations for a final peace. We believe that whatever solution is eventually agreed upon should preserve Jerusalem as an undivided city. It should provide for free access to the Jewish, Muslim, and Christian holy sites without distinction or discrimination for the free exercise of worship. The solution should assure the basic rights of all the city's residents. We have taken no position on exactly how the final status of Jerusalem might be defined.

The Peace Process

In sum, there has been no change in U.S. policy as we continue our dedicated efforts toward a comprehensive settlement. Before turning to your questions, I would like to say a few final words about the Middle East peace process as a whole. Over the past 3 years, there is no foreign policy goal on which the President and I have worked harder than a genuine peace in the Middle East. The achievement at Camp David, the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, the launching of negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza are historic accomplishments, particularly when viewed against the past history of this tragic conflict.

It is critically important that we concentrate our full and undivided attention

on the autonomy negotiations and do all we can to give these talks the best possible prospect for success. The autonomy negotiations offer the first real opportunity for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza to achieve full autonomy within the context of assured Israeli security, as the next step toward achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement.

As reflected in the agreement

reached at Camp David, such a peace is deeply in the interests of the United States, of Israel, of Israel's neighbors, and of the world. Every decision we have made—and will make—is designed to move us toward that goal.

With this in mind, the President has invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin each to come to Washington in early April to discuss with him how best

we can accelerate the movement toward our mutual objective. □

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs • Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • March 1980 • Editor: Harriet P. Culley

This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced; citation of this source would be appreciated.



**AMERICANS SOUGHT TO BRIDGE GAP
BETWEEN ISRAELI ARABS AND JEWS**

By Tammy Tanaka
Religious News Service Staff Writer (8-1-80)

NEW YORK (RNS) -- Americans are being recruited for a pioneering program designed to stimulate cooperation between Israeli Jews and Arabs.

Called Interns for Peace, the volunteers live and work for two years in neighboring Arab and Jewish villages in northern Israel.

Farhat Agbaria, an Israeli Arab who directs the field program, said it was crucial to mend the deteriorating relationship between Israeli Jews and Arabs. He said "extremism within both the Jewish and Arab communities" is largely responsible for the widening gap. Arabs make up about 15 percent of Israel's population of 3.7 million.

Interns for Peace has had a modest beginning. The first eleven interns have been working for the last year in three Arab villages. Having inspired some trust, they are now reaching out to foster cooperative projects with neighboring Jewish settlements. Eight of the interns are North Americans, two Israeli Jews and one an Israeli Arab.

Twenty more volunteers are being sought this summer. Ten of them are expected to be North Americans, selected through the New York office of Interns for Peace (150 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10011). Program officials aim to have 100 interns in the field in five years.

The program was founded in 1978 by Rabbi Bruce Cohen, a community relations expert who has worked in East Harlem here and Newark, N.J.

It is independently financed and developed in consultation with the Israeli Prime Minister's Office on Arab Affairs. Policy is set by a steering committee of six Jews and six Arabs. Local advisory committees coordinate the programs in the villages. There is also a 150-member North American advisory committee.

The Ford Foundation has provided a two-year \$25,000 research grant to evaluate the program. Research will aim to determine changes in attitude among members of the Jewish and Arab communities in Israel as a result of the work done by the interns.

(more)

PAGE -11-

Preliminary observations by the interns and program leaders show positive signs. They say initial suspicion and skepticism on the part of both Jewish and Arab Israeli villagers has been largely replaced by trust as the interns became integrated in the life of the communities.

Program field director Agbaria recalled that when the interns first began living in the three Israeli Arab communities in 1979, some of the local population suspected they were "agents of Israel's secret service, or even the CIA."

Israeli Jews, for their part, suspected the motives of the interns and wanted to know, "were we really on their side?" said Dina Lipsky, one of five interns living in the Arab Israeli village of Tamra. She was in the U.S. in July for a speaking tour.

One long-term aim of the program is to develop a corps of specialists in Arab-Jewish relations. Interns are trained in the dynamics of conflict resolution, cross-cultural understanding, basic principles of community work and the sociology of Arab and Jewish communities.

The first 11 interns served in the Arab-Israeli villages of Tamra, population 18,000, in western Galilee and Kfar Kara, pop. 8,000, and Ar'ara, population 6,000, both near Hadera.

Joint Israeli Arab-Jewish community projects planned by Interns for Peace include pre-natal educational training programs for Arab and Jewish women; summer camps; scouting and physical education programs for Arab and Jewish youth; a farming cooperative for Jewish and Arab farmers; and a traveling bi-cultural folk dance theater group.

Academic counseling and evaluation for the interns is based at the Arab-Jewish Center of the University of Haifa.

-0-

CORRECTIONS

In RNS of Thurs., July 31, page 7, Church and State Notes, headlined EVANGELICALS TESTIFY IN CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF SCHOOL PRAYER BILL, 5th paragraph, 1st line please delete "Robinson" and substitute "Robison" for it. Name of Texas Baptist television evangelist is James Robison.

Also, in same story 7th paragraph, please change first sentence of paragraph to read: The proposed bill passed the Senate in April 1979 under sponsorship of Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) as an amendment to S. 450, which dealt with Supreme Court jurisdictional questions.

-0-

PAGE -12-

20-8-4-80

ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS REACH BOILING POINT OVER JERUSALEM (610 -- An NC News backgrounder)

By Jeff Endrst

UNITED NATIONS (NC) -- The Jerusalem issue is keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict at a boiling point and is developing into a major roadblock in Egyptian-Israeli efforts to negotiate a form of Palestinian autonomy in the occupied Arab territories.

The vote by the Israeli Knesset (parliament) July 30 to proclaim an undivided Jerusalem as the "eternal capital" of Israel is in direct conflict with a recent resolution adopted by an emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly.

The General Assembly resolution, passed July 29, said the eastern part of Jerusalem, which was under Jordanian rule until the Six-Day War in 1967, is part of the occupied Arab territories which must be returned by Israel. Israel rejected the assembly's resolution.

Even before the formality of the Knesset vote, the Israeli government had repeatedly stated that Jerusalem "will never be divided again."

While many Western countries, including the United States, agree that the division of the city is undesirable, they consider Jerusalem's future status as something still to be determined. They also support the majority United Nations view that all Israeli changes in the occupied part of the city -- administrative, legal and geographic -- will be considered null and void.

Egypt is fully behind the Arab demand that Eastern Jerusalem must be returned to "Arab ownership."

After the Knesset vote, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat decided to suspend talks with Israel on the Palestinian autonomy issue. Sadat's decision is viewed as a major victory for the Arab states which have never accepted the Camp David framework for Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Arab diplomats at the United Nations say the Conference of Islamic Nations may call a summit meeting to discuss the emotional Jerusalem issue in the name of 800 million Moslems.

Jerusalem is considered a holy city by Jews, Moslems and Christians. After Mecca and Medina, Moslems consider Jerusalem their most holy place.

The United States abstained on June 30 when the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution warning Israel against formalizing its claim to all of Jerusalem, saying such a claim is illegal. The 14 other council members supported the resolution. The United States said that the Israeli position would not be helpful to the peace-making process in the Middle East.

The United States has since formally criticized Israel for its decision to go ahead with the Jerusalem annexation law in defiance of standing U.N. resolutions.

The Islamic conference represents 40 countries, many of them important oil-producers, and has threatened that its members will break diplomatic and trade relations with any country recognizing Israel's claim to all of Jerusalem.

A potential test of such a threat could come if Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin decides to carry out his stated plan and move government offices to Eastern Jerusalem from their current locations in Western Jerusalem, which was Israeli-controlled territory prior to 1967.

Governments doing diplomatic business with Israel then would be faced with the options of risking a rift with Israel or facing a diplomatic and trade boycott from Moslem countries.

The General Assembly resolution of July 29 gives Israel until Nov. 15 to begin its evacuation of the occupied

(MORE)

Arab territories, including Eastern Jerusalem. It was passed by a vote of 112 to 7 with 24 absentions. The United States and Israel were among the countries voting against the resolution.

The United States and several other nations which opposed the resolution or abstained said they did not base their decisions on the resolution's language about Jerusalem, but on its one-sided approach to a call for an independent Palestinian state with no guarantees for Israel's continued existence within secure and recognized borders.

END

21-8-4-80

MIAMI SCHOOLS PREPARE FOR REFUGEE STUDENTS (310)

MIAMI (NC) -- Cuban refugee children in the Miami area will probably attend classes in three elementary schools closed more than a year ago because of small enrollments as well as in other schools.

Between 12,000 and 18,000 children are expected to enroll in Dade County public schools this fall.

In the Archdiocese of Miami, which this year is opening a new elementary school in the southwest section of Dade County, Catholic schools will accept refugee students whenever space permits, according to Father Vincent Kelly, archdiocesan superintendent of education.

According to Paul Bell, Dade County associate superintendent of schools, the three reopened public schools could hold 1,000 or more youths with each operating on double-session schedules. All of the pupils would be bused from areas where county schools are already too crowded to take them.

Vacant classrooms at 30 other schools will also be used for the newly arrived refugee students. In 20 additional schools refugee students are expected to be absorbed into the schools in the areas where they live.

Plans call for new refugee students to be in separate classrooms with intensive instruction in English and in American culture. Bell emphasized that the young refugees will not be mixed with other students for their first year of studies.

Maria Belen Diaz, education specialist with the Dade Board of Public Instruction, said they anticipate \$250 for each child from the federal government. The money will pay for salaries for one teacher and two aides for each 80 refugee children.

Meanwhile, School Superintendent Leonard Britton estimated that the schools need \$1,000 per child to provide all the programs required by the federal government for children who do not speak or understand English. However, he explained, until such funds are forthcoming only basic English programs will be provided.

More than 117,000 Cuban refugees have arrived by boat at Key West from the port of Mariel, Cuba, since the recent exodus began in April.

END

22-8-4-80

JERUSALEM VOTE STIRRED MUCH DEBATE IN ISRAEL (460 -- With 20-8-4-80, UNITED NATIONS -- Arab-Israeli tensions...)

By Ulrich Sahn

JERUSALEM (NC) -- The Israeli Knesset (parliament) bill to proclaim an undivided Jerusalem as the "eternal capital" of Israel stirred much debate and underwent several modifications before becoming law.

One of the approved modifications provides free access to holy sites by believers.

The bill, passed July 30 by a 69-15 vote, establishes Jerusalem as the seat of government and the site of the presidential offices and the Knesset.

The wording which declares Jerusalem "complete and united" has been criticized by Arab countries and by Israel's allies, including the United States. It is in direct conflict with United Nations' resolutions saying that Israeli-occupied territories, such as Eastern Jerusalem, should be returned to Arab control.

(MORE)

The intention of Geulah Cohen, Knesset member of the rightist Tehiya (Resurrection) Party, in initiating the bill was to insure that the Arab areas occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War in 1967 should remain under Israeli sovereignty.

However, a passage saying the "integrity and unity of Greater Jerusalem in its boundaries after the Six-Day War shall not be infringed upon" was deleted. If maintained, this passage would have meant Israeli sovereignty over a large portion of the West Bank.

Efforts by Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kolleck were successful in getting an amendment guaranteeing free access to holy places and their protection. Jerusalem is considered a holy city by Moslems, Jews and Christians.

"The holy places will be protected against desecration and any other offence, and against anything liable to infringe on the free access of adherents of religions to their holy places," says the law.

Several Knesset members wanted guarantees of religious freedom to be added, but these failed. Opponents said this might bring unwanted sects to Jerusalem and interfere with the delicate balance of relations between existing communities in the city.

According to Moshe Shahal, Knesset member of the Alignment Party, the real reason was efforts by Orthodox Jews to keep Reformed and Conservative Jews out of a Jerusalem considered the "fortress of Orthodoxy."

A proposal to substitute "worship of God" for "cult" was turned down because most of the lawmakers did not want the word "God" mentioned in Israel's secular lawbooks.

Uri Avneri of the small leftist Sheli Party unsuccessfully urged the Knesset to add a paragraph guaranteeing Christians that their educational and cultural institutions will not suffer state interference.

"Exercise of religious life in freedom, not free access to holy places, is the real problem," he said.

A similar request had been made by Catholic leaders in Jerusalem.

Avneri severely criticized the overall purpose of the bill, saying it was a "declaration of war by Israel against 800 million Moslems in the whole world."

Most Knesset members opposed the timing of the law but approved of the content which reflects a wide consensus of the Israeli population.

END

23-8-4-80

NEW DEAN-RECTOR FOR ST. JOHN'S U. THEOLOGY SCHOOL (230 -- With NC

Photo to come)

COLLEGEVILLE, Minn. (NC) -- Benedictine Father William Skudlarek began a three-year term as dean-rector of the School of Theology at St. John's University in Collegeville on Aug. 1.

His nomination was a joint decision by Bishop George Speltz of St. Cloud and Abbot Jerome Theisen of St. John's Abbey. The executive governing board of the university made the appointment.

During the 16 years since his ordination, the 41-year-old Father Skudlarek, a monk of St. John's Abbey, has taught, pursued advanced studies in theology and preaching and held administrative posts in the university's theology department.

As dean, Father Skudlarek has responsibility for the entire academic program of St. John's School of Theology. As rector, he is charged with supervising the preparation of monks and diocesan seminarians for the priesthood.

Father Skudlarek pointed out that, as a seminary, St. John's differs from other seminaries, most of which serve one diocese. "St. John's draws students from about 30 dioceses for our priesthood program," he said.

A second distinction between St. John's and other seminaries, he said, is that most seminaries are exclusively devoted to preparing men for the priesthood, while St. John's also prepares men and women for other forms of ministry in the church.

(MORE)

The school's enrollment for 1980-81 will be between 125 and 130.

A native of the St. Cloud Diocese, Father Skudlarek was born in rural Avon and grew up in Holdingford. He received a bachelor's degree from St. John's University, a licentiate in theology from the Gregorian University in Rome and a doctorate from Princeton Theological Seminary.

END

1-8-5-80

SISTER GETS HIGH DIOCESAN LEADERSHIP POST (130)

GREEN BAY, Wis. (NC) -- Sister Marie Paral, a Sister of St. Francis of the Holy Cross, has been named by Bishop Aloysius J. Wycislo of Green Bay as executive secretary of the diocesan pastoral council. The post is one of the highest leadership positions in the diocese.

Bishop Wycislo said the new job "furthers the position of women in the Diocese of Green Bay."

Sister Paral succeeds Father David Kiefer, on a leave of absence to work with the Center for Human Development, Washington, D.C. She is principal of and a teacher at Holy Trinity School, Casco, Wis., a member of her order's council, and a former vice president of the National Sisters Vocation Conference-Wisconsin. Sister Paral also has served as the diocesan pastoral council's secretary and vice chairwoman.

END

2-8-5-80

THE NEWS IN BRIEF (300)

NATION

NEW YORK (NC) -- Five Catholic bishops and several other Catholic officials were among 36 religious leaders who signed "A Religious Call to Conscience" warning that draft registration would be the first step toward war. The bishops are Bishop Carroll Dozier of Memphis, Tenn., Auxiliary Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit, Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle, Auxiliary Bishop Peter Rosazza of Hartford, Conn., and Bishop Walter Sullivan of Richmond.

KEENE, Calif. (NC) -- The United Farm Workers of America union is demanding a hearing on an Internal Revenue Service ruling that refuses to accept the volunteer status of UFWA's president Cesar Chavez, and many of his top aides.

WASHINGTON (NC) -- In a change of heart from an earlier stand Congress gave quick approval to a \$21 million "heat crisis" program to help the poor and elderly pay the added costs of running fans and air conditioners.

WORLD

(UNDATED) (NC) -- Papal intercession for nine Italian Salesian priests in Iran accused of spying received a cold reception from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of Iran's Islamic revolution. Khomeini said Pope John Paul II should be sending messages to President Carter condemning treatment of arrested Iranians in the United States.

CASTELGANDOLFO, Italy (NC) -- Pope John Paul II deplored postwar Italy's deadliest terrorist bombing and prayed for the dead, the wounded and their families on Aug. 3. The pope said he was "saddened and disturbed by such an unexpected tragedy" that took place Aug. 2 in Bologna, Italy.

(MORE)

Speech Delivered Tuesday, July 1, 1980,
by Representative Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) in
the U.S. House of Representatives.

PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD HAVE VETOED THE UNITED NATIONS'
RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL

Mr. Speaker,

I rise to protest the failure of the Administration to veto the resolution on Jerusalem adopted yesterday by the UN Security Council. This is but the latest instance in which the Administration has failed to stand by Israel, failed to confront the drive to isolate Israel and failed to defend our own national interests and principles.

Abstention indicates a neutral stance on an issue, but there is no way the United States could be neutral about the resolution on Jerusalem. That pernicious document asserts that actions taken by Israel to alter the status of Jerusalem are "null and void," and that Israel must end its "occupation" of Arab territories "including Jerusalem." Does the Administration's decision to abstain mean that it has no opinion on the demand for the redivision of Jerusalem? Is the Administration uncommitted on the idea, expressed specifically by certain Mid-East leaders, that Jews not be allowed in East Jerusalem? Is President Carter ambivalent about whether Israel's stewardship of Jerusalem -- an era in which the religious rights of all have been respected -- is no better than the previous 19 years of rule? From 1948 until 1967, officials controlling Jerusalem ordered the demolition of 34 of 35 synagogues, and the opening of open sewers on the site of the Western Wall, and the quarrying of Jewish gravestones.

Those nations which voted for yesterday's resolution said by their votes that a return to such a situation would not disturb them. Behind the talk of international law was a chilling indifference

towards the years of desecration, and an awesome contempt for the importance a unified Jerusalem has for Israel and the Jewish people. And on this, the Administration chose to be neutral.

What we see is an emerging pattern of appeasement, in which an Administration intimidated by the specter of the oil weapon chooses acquiescence over the forceful defense of principle. Let no one be deluded: this pattern elicits escalating demands, not moderation. Ambiguity invites exploitation, not reasoning compromise.

I am concerned that during this year, we will see more of this behavior. Already, we have witnessed the Administration's decision to reward a recalcitrant and uncooperative nation with 100 advanced M-60A3 main battle tanks. Similarly, the Administration has moved towards selling offensive sub-systems to another nation for use on its F-15s, sub-systems which only two years ago the Administration promised the Congress it would not sell. Neither country heeded our call to join negotiations with Israel. Both condemned the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and broke relations with Egypt, and joined a campaign to boycott Egypt economically and politically. Both talk of tests of America's relationship with them, yet both have failed tests which the American people would have expected any supportive friend to meet easily. Why can't we demand reciprocity?

Mr. Speaker, the Administration should be aware that it cannot stabilize an unstable Middle East, or blunt Soviet adventurism, or compensate for a weakened American naval presence, or secure steady oil supplies by pressuring Israel or by currying favor with rejectionist states. In today's situation, we must identify our interests and our friends, and defend them. Our support for Israel is seen throughout the world as the litmus test of America's commitments abroad.

We can abuse Israel only at severe risk to the peace process and to our own reputation. We must hold out the hand of friendship to all, but not out of fear and intimidation.

America's own national interests, and the interests and principles of the West, require more than studied ambiguity, and more than abstention.





Congressional Record

United States
of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 96th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 126

WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 1980

No. 91

House of Representatives

KEMP SUPPORTS AID TO ISRAEL

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise not to offer an amendment but to initiate a dialog which may or may not result in an amendment being offered.

I have placed in the Record, and I believe the committee is well aware of them, three possible amendments to the aid bill relating to Israel. One would cut off \$150 million in aid assistance to Israel if Israel continues to expand its West Bank settlements. The second would require a certificate by the President of the United States that this aid money, over \$800 million, is not being used for settlement purposes in the same way that on page 20 of the bill we require as a condition of our aid to Syria, an adjoining country, that the President certify to the Congress that Syria is acting in good faith to achieve further progress toward a comprehensive peace settlement.

The third amendment confirms that it is the sense of Congress that none of the funds appropriated under this bill be used for the construction of new settlements or the construction of additional facilities on the West Bank. The problem with an amendment of this kind, as has been pointed out, is that if the amendment carries, it may stiffen the determination of the Israel government to resist outside pressures and cause them to push through a policy of increasing settlements, which apparently no one in the United States supports and only a minority of the Israeli people support. On the other hand, if the amendment loses, it is a signal that the Congress does not care whether or not the settlement policy goes forward.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that there comes a time when the United States must draw the line even with its closest friends and allies, when one of those friends or allies proceeds with a policy which is clearly inimical to the attaining of peace. We did this with France and England when they invaded the Suez in October 1956. They were our NATO allies. We did so with Turkey when U.S. weapons were used for the invasion of Cyprus in July of 1974. Turkey was a NATO ally. Despite our very real needs for security bases in the Azores, we drew the line with Portugal and its brutal repression in its African colonies in 1961. Despite our security needs for the Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base, we are deeply troubled by the deterioration of constitutional government and the rights of human beings in the Philippines.

Before deciding which of the three amendments, if any, should be offered, I would like to ask the chairman of the committee whether any of these three amendments, in the chairman's judgment, would be helpful to peace in the Mideast at the present time.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman from Indiana for this purpose.

Mr. HAMILTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Although he mentioned the chairman of the committee, I will respond on behalf of the committee.

First of all, let me say that I appreciate the purpose of the gentleman's several proposals, and I agree with those purposes. I think it is not in the interest of the United States that funds be used for the construction of new settlements on the West Bank. I want to point out to the gentleman and to the committee, however, that the United States today has an agreement with Israel which provides that any assistance by the United States to Israel be used in the geographical areas which were subject to the Government of Israel's administration prior to June 5, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(At the request of Mr. Kemp, and by unanimous consent, Mr. McCLOSKEY was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I will be glad to yield to any of my colleagues on this subject, because what I want to establish in this dialog is that it is, indeed, the sense of Congress that U.S. aid funds not be used for settlements purposes. If anyone wants to speak to the contrary, I will recognize him, too.

I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KEMP. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding. I agree with the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. HAMILTON) that the amendments would be injurious to the process toward peace started at Camp David. It seems to me that these amendments would be trespassing on the Camp David accords and for the Congress to interject itself unilaterally at this point in the peace process by putting limitations on the disposition of economic support funds, so I oppose the amendments and urge the gentleman not to offer them. Such an encumbrance would imply a determination that all of the West Bank settlements are illegal. No such determination has been made, and it would be prejudicial to the negotiations for the Congress to imply that this was the case.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. If the gentleman will allow me to reclaim my time, I want to respond to the point the gentleman just made. Camp David was a great experiment by President Carter that had initial success and is now teetering on the brink. Whether that success will continue in the West Bank autonomy negotiations, which were to be concluded on May 26, the administration's policy on the West Bank settlements is quite clear. President Carter has stated on a number of occasions that the West Bank settlements policy of the Israelis is illegal.

Mr. KEMP. If the gentleman will yield further, that was my next question. Is that the gentleman's premise? Is that the predicate on which his amendment is based, that all of the West Bank settlements are somehow illegal? There is a great deal of dispute on the issue.

In testimony before the Subcommittees on the Middle East and International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on September 21 of last year, Rita E. Hauser presented a tightly reasoned study of the legal aspects of the West Bank settlements. Rita Hauser was formerly a U.S. Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and is a distinguished lawyer and legal scholar. Her testimony carefully reviewed the character of Israel's settlements on the West Bank. Her testimony stated, "I would therefore conclude that, to date, the three types of settlements in the occupied territories on the whole do not violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention." Thus, the legal case against the West Bank settlements is questionable at best. The Congress should not go on record taking a position on the settlements question with so doubtful a legal foundation.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. No; I quote the President only. I have looked at the legal arguments on both sides. Frankly, I am not persuaded that the settlements are legal or illegal. Others may differ; the World Court may differ on that question. My argument against the settlements is not based on the claim that they are illegal.

Mr. KEMP. If the gentleman will yield, I think the gentleman should have time, because this is an extremely important subject. It seems to me that the gentleman is suggesting somehow that it is illegal for the settlements to exist on the West Bank. There are a minority of Arabs living in Haifa and other parts of Israel. Is it the gentleman's contention that somehow Jews are not Palestinians, and they should not be living on the West Bank of Jordan?

In an article published in the May 14 issue of the Wall Street Journal, Theodore R. Mann, "Israeli Settlements Aren't Obstacle to Mideast Peace," pointed to the fundamental problem in the search for peace. He said:

It is Arab refusal to accept Israel as a permanent part of the Middle East—not the settlements—that is and always has been the only obstacle to peace.

This is the real issue and the settlements controversy should not obscure it. The Camp David accords have provided the basis for a settlement of the settlements controversy through negotiated autonomy for the West Bank. The Congress should not further complicate these most difficult negotiations by intervention on the content of the settlements question that is best left to be resolved by the parties involved.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. The contention I make is this, that at a time when we have so much at stake in the continuation of Camp David, at a time when the rest of the Arab world has bitterly condemned Sadat and is threatening, literally, to assassinate Sadat because he is perceived in the Arab world as having sold out the Palestinian cause in the Camp David agreements, we have a tremendous stake in the continuation and the ultimate success of both the West Bank autonomy negotiations and the process that Camp David only commenced.

June 5, 1980

(At the request of Mr. KEMP, and by unanimous consent, Mr. McCLOSKEY was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. McCLOSKEY. It is not my position, and I do not want to argue and get lost in the maze of whether it is legal or illegal. Clearly these settlements are detrimental to reaching peace in the Middle East, and they are detrimental to reaching accords on autonomy, because they inflame, and understandably inflame, the Palestinians who live there.

Mr. KEMP. If the gentleman will yield, Israeli settlements are not blocking the peace process, they were not a detriment to solving the problems of the Sinai. When President Sadat came to Jerusalem, was it the settlements in the Sinai that were the detriment to peace, or was it the willingness of Sadat finally to get together with Israel and work out an agreement over the Sinai? Who has really stood in the way of peace? Is it Israel and the settlements, or is it, indeed, the intransigence of some of the immoderate, rejectionist Arab States?

Mr. McCLOSKEY. I think the difference between the West Bank today, Samaria and Judea and the Sinai is paramount.

There is no similarity between placing Israeli settlements in the wastes of the Sinai and placing settlements on the West Bank in Judea and Samaria where they must inevitably compete for land and water with Arabs already living there.

The settlements on the West Bank clearly are a deterrent to peace.



WRFM

AYATOLLAHS, SHAITES, ISLAMIC THEOCRACY IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE

by Marc H. Tanenbaum

Reports of mounting efforts in recent weeks by the forces of Ayatollah Khomeini to establish in Iran an Islamic republic based on strict Orthodox Islamic law has led to growing anxiety among many Jews, Christians, and others who are committed to democratic principles.

(by ^{the} Ayatollah's militia)

Within recent days, people have been executed without due process of law, women's rights have been abrogated, media have been censored and "theocratized," and two million Kurds in Iran have been denied autonomy.

The ~~reasons for the~~ anxiety over the meaning of these developments for non-Muslim minorities in Iran as well as for the ~~future~~ prospects for eventual peace in the Middle East becomes all the more profound if you look into the history and religious beliefs of the Shiite Muslim sect and the pivotal role of the Ayatollah in Islamic traditions.

According to the religious historian, Dr. Trevor Ling, there are essentially two opposite tendencies within the Islamic world: one emphasizes the charismatic community of believers or umma, the other emphasizes the charismatic leader.