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ISRAEL'S POSITION ON APARTHEID

(Excerpt from Interview given by former
Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the
monthly, Afrique à la Une,
June 1982)

QUESTION: It is difficult to explain, in Africa, that the Jewish people, which has suffered so greatly from racism, is now one of the principal allies of apartheid.

ANSWER (M. Begin): The Jewish people and the State of Israel not only are not the principal allies of apartheid; they are not allies of apartheid at all. The contrary is true: We have never missed an opportunity publicly to denounce apartheid and to associate ourselves with United Nations condemnations of apartheid. I express once again our total opposition to apartheid and to racism in any form.

We have relations with South Africa, as do so many other countries. Our commercial relations with South Africa constitute less than one percent of the foreign trade of that country. As is known, relations among countries are not based on an identity of ideologies, nor on agreement concerning all political subjects - and certainly not on questions of internal politics. It is very strange that the State of Israel, which has the specific moral obligation to maintain relations with the Jewish community of South Africa, should be singled out among the other countries which do not have the same sacred motive. Our motive is clear: to preserve our links with the Jewish community in South Africa. It is astonishing that the world also keeps ignoring the countries that trade with South Africa, with the avowed purpose of benefitting from the special conditions of production in this country: This constitutes a clear act of support for the policy of apartheid. Yet the world does not accuse them. Indeed, it is exceedingly strange that the African countries that have rejected Israel without reason, and without being in conflict with it, find it proper to resent activities being carried out by Israel which are identical with those being carried out by other States with which the African States did not sever relations.



Check Against Delivery

נשיא מדינת ישראל
PRESIDENT OF ISRAEL

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CHAIM HERZOG
IN HONOUR OF THE PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA
HIS EXCELLENCY DR. SAMUEL K. DOE, HEAD OF STATE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION COUNCIL

Jerusalem - 23.8.83

Your Excellency Mr. Head of State, Excellencies and friends,

This evening we are celebrating a renewed friendship. Your presence here goes to prove that over and beyond the day-to-day differences of approaches and opinions, which exist between countries, there are unifying elements which are stronger and more profound, which bind countries and peoples together.

We greet you as the Head of a State in Africa which has enjoyed independence before all other states in the Continent, and of a State which has been amongst the founders of the Organization of African Unity.

I mentioned in my welcoming remarks on your arrival in Israel, the historic role that Liberia played as we struggled for national independence, in one of the most difficult and, at the same time, most inspiring periods of the history of the Jewish People. Those were the days when we struggled to realize an ancient dream which was passed on from father to son over the generations and which came to expression in the prayer uttered by every Jew in the world for thousands of years: "Next year in Jerusalem".

Yes, as we fought against heavy odds in those dread and awesome days, when a nation fought for its destiny against almost impossible odds, Liberia stood by our side in an act of history which will be recalled to its eternal credit.

... in 1975 when a vile and wicked act was taking place in the

United Nations, at the instigation of our enemies, condemning our National Liberation Movement - Zionism, the hand of Liberia was proudly raised against the infamous resolution. I well recall at that time how the voice of the representative of Liberia rang out as he equated the Zionist Movement with the National Liberation Movements in Africa.

Indeed, Your Excellency, nothing unites the people of Africa and the people of Israel more than a hatred of racism. Our people have suffered more than anyone else from racism, have fought and still fight, more than anyone else against this most horrible disease that still persists among mankind.

Israel and its Government have consistently condemned publicly the policy of Apartheid, and I take this opportunity to express once more our abhorrence of Apartheid and of any form of racism wherever it may occur.

For years we enjoyed a period of fruitful association between our two people. We learned to know each other. Many Israelis visited Liberia and were involved in the development of its resources - human and material. I should mention that Liberia was the first country in which Israel undertook the first Ophthalmic program for the prevention of blindness, under the late Professor Michaelson, and also set up the agricultural training center, in which many Liberian youth received their first training.

Many were the Liberians who visited Israel and in this manner there arose a mutual understanding and a relationship which have weathered the vicissitudes of politics and time. This period of fruitful and beneficial relations was followed by a period of silence imposed by outside elements and totally unrelated to the bilateral relations of our two countries. We went our own ways, each nation encountering national situations requiring immediate solutions. During this period of silence and lack of dialogue between the greater part of the African continent and ourselves, the historic Peace Treaty between

Israel and Egypt was signed. The significance of this treaty for the future of our region could not be exaggerated, but, alas, our friends from Africa were not here to rejoice with us. We regret this deeply.

Let me state quite unequivocally, Mr. President, that the suspension of relations and absence of dialogue between us has been to the benefit of nobody. Hence, Mr. President, your decision to renew relations with Israel is so welcome and timely. Liberia has by the act of your very presence here, Mr. President, given eloquent testimony to the fact that it is an independent sovereign nation, guided by its dignity and independence, resolved to pursue its own independent route in its own interests.

In these days a heavy cloud hangs over the Continent of Africa - the cloud of fanaticism which inexorably pursues a colonial policy, as Libya endeavours to overcome its neighbours and impose on them an alien rule. Libya's invasion of Chad and its attempt to turn it into a vassal state and a springboard for further aggression into Africa, must arouse all nations in the world who value freedom and peace. We believe that the insidious aggression and subversion of Libya in Chad and in other African countries must be halted before Colonel Gaddafi's dream of an Empire drags the great African Continent into a blood-bath. Africa did not rid itself of Western colonialism in order to have Eastern colonialism imposed on it through African surrogates.

The State of Israel together, we trust, with all free and independent countries, admires the courageous independent position taken by Liberia which will, undoubtedly, be to the benefit of our two countries. I am convinced that in so doing, Mr. President, you have given an example of courage and independence of mind in the Continent of Africa, just as did His Excellency the President of Zaire Mr. Mobutu Sese Seko. I am convinced that many of your sister countries in Africa will follow your example and make decisions as to their relations with other

As in the past, so now, we will know how to fill our new relationship with fruitful content. You will find here, as have many other African countries, a readiness to contribute from our experience to others.

Your Excellency, the policy of the Governments of Israel has always been, and continues to be, that of negotiating and achieving peace with our Arab neighbours. You know, as well as I do, that peace and accommodation between nations cannot be achieved without negotiation. It has been and continues to be the policy of the Government of Israel to enter into negotiations without prior conditions with our Arab neighbours, for the purpose of achieving a peaceful solution to our mutual problems. We believe that the process of negotiations within the framework of the Agreement achieved at Camp David, must be renewed in order to reach an acceptable solution on the Palestinian Arab issue. In the history of our conflict no positive advance has been achieved without negotiations between the parties involved. At the same time no negotiations have taken place without an advance being achieved.

Permit me, Mr. President, to take advantage of your presence here to send our greetings for peace and friendship to the leaders of the African countries and their peoples. We stretch out our hand in friendship to the peoples of Africa, confident that the moment for the renewal of such friendships is approaching, for the benefit of Africa, for the benefit of the Middle East, for the benefit of our peoples.

In full appreciation of the historic significance of this act at this time, I ask you to rise and toast his Excellency, the Head of State of Liberia and the People of Liberia.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

memorandum

date 4/4/84
to Marc Tanenbaum
from Helen Ritter

subject

The attached is our
Statement/Policy on South
Africa. It is contained
in a Statement on Human
Rights which was adopted
by the NEC on October
30, 1977

We reaffirm our abhorrence of South Africa's apartheid policy. We deplore especially the repressive measures recently taken by the South African Government, including the banning of numerous independent black and other civic organizations, the closing down of liberal newspapers and the arrest of many opposition leaders. These measures are a disservice to the forces of moderation, both black and white, which are striving for a peaceful resolution to the complex racial problems of South Africa. We urge the South African Government to take concrete steps toward reducing, and ultimately eliminating, the legal and de facto discrimination against its non-white population, inherent in its apartheid policy.



AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
NATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION
STATEMENT ON ASYLUM POLICY IN THE U.S.

Asylum policy poses a new and pressing immigration challenge for the U.S. How it is handled will have a major impact on America's response to people forced by persecution to flee their homelands.

The nature of the refugee issue has changed in the past few years. Traditionally, refugees have fled oppression in their homeland, moved to places of temporary haven and gained admission to the U.S. or other re-settlement countries in an orderly process. Increasingly, however, these people come directly to the U.S. without prior authorization, and claim asylum once already here.

These asylum seekers present agonizing and complex policy challenges for the U.S. Some genuinely need a haven from persecution at home and should be treated like other refugees. Others are on the move not because political causes forced their flight but because they seek to better their economic status; they abuse asylum claims as a means to remain in the U.S. Still others may need only temporary refuge from civil wars or disturbances at the conclusion of which they can return home.

At present, the U.S. has no effective means of distinguishing those who need asylum from those who do not. As a result, people in genuine need of protection do not receive it because current mechanisms cannot differentiate them from other migrants. This problem has reached significant proportions as the number of asylum claims has risen. There are now over 100,000 applications on file; the potential for growth in this figure is enormous. This issue must be resolved if we are to maintain a humane and effective refugee policy.

The American Jewish Committee has a strong interest in the asylum issue. Jews have been among past populations of asylum seekers, and communities of Jews still live at risk in various countries and may need reception in the future. Moreover, AJC has traditionally played a national leadership role in maintaining a fair and humane U.S. refugee policy.

To deal in depth with the current asylum problem, AJC's Center on Immigration and Acculturation convened a distinguished and broad-based task force to explore the issue. Its principal recommendations include:

- 1) A revision of current modes for deciding asylum claims is necessary. At present, The Immigration and Naturalization Service determines whether an applicant receives asylum on

the basis of a recommendation from the State Department. The AJC Task Force joined many other experts in the field in concluding that neither agency is appropriate for this purpose. The primary task of INS is border enforcement, not judging the legitimacy of claims of persecution. The State Department must maintain working relations with nations from which asylum seekers flee and so cannot assess objectively claims that these people would face persecution if returned home. A new asylum review board independent of State and INS should be established to deal with these claims without being subject to undue outside pressure. A fair asylum system depends on the creation of this objective method of reviewing applications for haven in the U.S.

2. There should be greater control and efficiency in the system for judging asylum claims. At present, a decision on asylum, made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, can be appealed administratively and in the courts in a process that can take years. These long delays create great dissatisfaction with the system and result in reluctance to admit new flows of refugees and asylum seekers. The new review board should make asylum determinations, which to assure fair treatment, should be open to one administrative appeal with the opportunity of then moving directly to an appeals court. This would greatly increase the efficiency of the system while preserving principles of fairness. Counsel should be available for all appeals.
3. A more deliberative process needs to be created for dealing with mass influxes of asylum seekers into the U.S. To avoid the confusion and human suffering that previous large influxes of asylum seekers have caused, the asylum review board should assess these situations as they arise and make an objective recommendation to Congress.
4. A new status should be created for people in need of temporary refuge. In cases where people flee to the U.S. to escape temporary dangers such as civil wars and disturbances, there should be an official provisional safe haven status, subject to periodic review, established for them which would expire when they could return to their homelands safely.

Adoption of these recommendations would assure an asylum policy that protects humanitarian values and strengthens U.S. immigration law. It should also make unnecessary such previous policies as detention of asylum applicants or interdiction of their boats on the high seas, which raise serious human rights concerns. AJC will work to have these recommendations incorporated into new legislation.

AJC Task Force on Asylum Policy in the U.S.

Task Force Chair, George M. Szabad, Chair, Center on Immigration and Acculturation, American Jewish Committee

At-Large Members:

Lawrence Fuchs, Chair, American Studies Department, Brandeis University
Dennis Gallagher, Executive Director, Refugee Policy Group
Wade Henderson, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union
Alice Henkin, Justice Program, Aspen Institute
Arnold Liebowitz, Special Counsel, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy
Nina Solarz, Executive Director, Citizens Commission on Immigration Reform
Rick Swartz, President, National Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Forum
Roger Winter, Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees
Karl Zukerman, Executive Vice President, HIAS

Guest Presenters to Task Force:

Michael Teitelbaum, Senior Associate, Sloan Foundation
Michael Posner, Executive Director, International Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights
John Lawrence Hargrove, Director of Studies, American Society for International Law
David Martin, Professor, University of Virginia School of Law
Patricia Weiss Fagen, Staff Associate, Refugee Policy Group
Rev. Silvano Tomasi, Director, National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on Migration

AJC Members:

George M. Szabad
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Samuel Rabinove, Legal Director, National Affairs Department
Marilyn Braveman, Education Director, National Affairs Department
Sidney Liskofsky, Director, Division of International Organizations, International Affairs Department
Judith Banki, Associate Director, Interreligious Affairs Department

SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT

1984



Centre for Intergroup Studies

Registered as
The Abe Bailey Institute
of Inter-Racial Studies Limited
(Limited by Guarantee)

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CENTRE FOR INTERGROUP STUDIES

(Registered as
The Abe Bailey Institute of Inter-racial Studies Limited
[Limited by Guarantee])

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PREFACE

The Seventeenth Annual Report of the Centre for Intergroup Studies reflects an active and successful year in the history of the Centre. With its emphasis on conflict and peace studies and its experience in bringing together people with widely divergent views and attitudes, the Centre has developed a special potential in the promotion of dialogue and debate between groups of people with widely differing views and opinions. These special skills are already being employed in a very practical way in Southern Africa and are enhanced by the workshops and conferences organised by the Centre. The Centre seeks to promote contacts between as many political and other groupings as possible of both an intra- and extra-parliamentary nature. The extra-parliamentary groups must include groups such as the United Democratic Front, Inkatha, Azapo and the ANC, as well as leaders of the business community, academics, religious leaders and journalists.

1986 has been declared the International Year of Peace, and the Centre proposes to hold an international workshop in the field of Conflict and Peace Studies during that year.

The Director and the members of staff of the Centre are to be congratulated on the achievements which are reflected in this Annual Report.



DR S J SAUNDERS
Vice-Chancellor and Principal

THE CENTRE AND STAFF

Background

The Centre for Intergroup Studies is based at the University of Cape Town and is registered as the Abe Bailey Institute of Inter-Racial Studies Limited as a company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital. It is not part of the University and receives no government subsidy.

It is partly financed by the Abe Bailey Trust and the University of Cape Town, from which the Centre receives regular financial aid. Ad hoc grants from various organisations make up the remainder of the funds needed to run the Centre and conduct its Conflict and Peace Studies programme.

During 1984 grants were received from the Carnegie Corporation, the Chairman's Fund Educational Trust of Anglo American and De Beers and the United States government.

Major funding in recent years has come from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Joseph Rowntree and Cadbury Trusts in England, the Algemeen Diakonaal Bureau in Holland, the Chairman's Fund Educational Trust of Anglo-American and De Beers in South Africa and the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa.

The main aims of the Centre include research and education in the broad field of inter-racial studies. For the past 16 years the Centre for Intergroup Studies has been involved in research and consultation in intergroup relations, more specifically in the fields of race, ethnic and class relations.

It conducts academic and applied research motivated by the need to promote greater knowledge and better understanding among and between the various groups and communities in South Africa. In this process it brings

together individuals and organisations with different and often conflicting ideological and political perspectives.

The Abe Bailey Institute has 80 members and is controlled by a Board of Governors which includes Dr S J Saunders (Chairman), Sir Richard Luyt, Professors J V O Reid, H W van der Merwe, D van Zyl Smit, H Giliomee, R Schrire, Mr J A B Cooper and the Rev. M T L Moletsane.

Centre premises

For the past two years the Centre has been greatly inconvenienced by being housed in four small adjoining offices in the Arts Block with no facilities or meeting space for social or staff meetings.

In February 1985 we moved to a building on the main campus known as the Janitor's House located at the south end of University Avenue. This building will provide sufficient space for the administrative and research staff, and a seminar room.

We hope we will also be able to accommodate visiting fellows for periods of a few months.

Staff

The Director of the Centre is Hendrik Willem van der Merwe (PhD, California), the Administrative Assistant Mariss Stevens (BJourn, Rhodes), the part-time typist Candy Muller and the part-time Librarian Gabi Meyer (MA, HDLIS, Cape Town). The 1984 research staff included John Hund (PhD, California), Yolanda Kleynhans (MA, Stellenbosch), Odette Geldenhuys (BSocSc (Hons), Cape Town), and Wanita Kawa (BA (Hons), Transkei).

Paul Meyer was employed temporarily during July and August as organiser of the Centre's 1984 conference. Marieke van der Merwe worked at the Centre for the first half of the year as secretary and typist, and Janet Meyer helped with the typing load.

Director's visit overseas

During March and April 1984 the Director visited the United States and Britain with a partial International Visitor Grant from the United States Information Agency and with a grant from the British Council. He was Distinguished Visiting Quaker Professor at Guilford College, Visiting Nixon Scholar at Whittier College and lectured at many universities and colleges including Columbia University Business School, California Institute of Technology and Brigham Young University. He also presented papers at several sociological conferences.

Visitors

Many distinguished academics and experts in the field of conflict resolution visited the Centre during August to take part in the Centre's conference on conflict accommodation and management in South Africa.

Professor Sammy Smooha of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Haifa visited the Centre during September and gave a seminar under the joint auspices of the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and the Centre for Intergroup Studies.

During October John Graham, former United States diplomat, gave a seminar under the auspices of the Centre on 'Politics that Heal'.

CONFLICT AND PEACE STUDIES (CAPS)

The constructive and balanced manner the Centre has adopted in handling sensitive issues and its objective treatment of diverse views have established a basis for communication, consultation and mediation in a polarised society. This background provides the basis for the Centre's current programme of conflict and peace studies.

Since 1976 the major thrust of the Centre programme has been known as the Constructive Programme for Sound Intergroup Relations. The full programme relies on the well-established reputation of the Centre as a mediating body committed to fundamental change towards a more just society in South Africa.

From 1981 the Centre programme was gradually narrowed down to what has become known internationally as Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS).

This programme can best be described in the following three categories: research; facilitation of communication between conflicting groups; and education and training in negotiation skills.

RESEARCH

The Centre's current research programme was developed with due regard to the requirements for fundamental change, the facilitation of intergroup communication, the constructive management of conflict and the reduction of violence in the change process.

A major thrust of the current programme was a book written by Dr John Hund and Professor H W van der Merwe entitled Law, Ideology and Politics in South Africa. This book focuses on ideology and conflict in South Africa with special attention to legal ideology, legal development and conflict accommodation in South Africa. It will be useful for making general recommendations concerning the accommodation of conflict in South Africa.

This book and a companion volume entitled Law, Ideology and Justice in South Africa, comprising a selection of papers presented at the Centre's 1984 workshop, will be published by the Centre.

Workshops

In August 1984 the Centre held an international conference on conflict accommodation and conflict management. It consisted of three parts: three days of academic discussion in the traditional workshop format, public lectures and a seminar.

Participants in the workshop included a wide range of academics and some community leaders and businessmen who explored alternative approaches to the accommodation of conflict in South Africa. More than 30 papers were presented by academics from South Africa and abroad. Visitors from abroad included Professor Heribert Adam of Simon Fraser University in Canada, Dr John Groom and Mr Keith Webb of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict in the United Kingdom, Mrs Laura

Blackburne and Mr Bernard Charles of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution in New York, Mr Bayard Rustin, President of the A Philip Randolph Educational Fund in New York and veteran American civil rights leader.

The major topics of the various sessions were: Mediation; Responsive Law; Responsive Capitalism; Law, Ideology and Justice; and Ideology and Politics.

A selection of papers were included in a manuscript entitled Law, Ideology and Justice in South Africa, and an occasional paper, Third Party Intervention: Mediation, Facilitation and Negotiation, was produced by the Centre.

1986 International Year of Peace

The United Nations has declared 1986 the International Year of Peace. The Director has consulted with the Secretariat of the International Year of Peace to explore possibilities of organising an international conference in Cape Town in early 1986, possibly in association with the International Association of University Presidents.

Such a conference will be organised as a continuation of the regular workshops the Centre has held over the past 15 years.

COMMUNICATION

Public Lectures

In addition to these academic sessions, the Centre organised four public lectures. One was given by American civil rights leader, Mr Bayard Rustin, and the others by South African politicians who do not normally meet on the same platform in South Africa and most of whom are excluded from central decision-making processes.

Mr Wynand Malan, Nationalist MP, and Dr Alex Boraine, Progressive Federal Party MP, spoke on the first evening. On the second evening, Dr Ntatho Motlana, President of the Soweto Civic Association and a member of the Transvaal Executive Committee of the United Democratic Front addressed the meeting. Mr Hassan Howa, a patron of the United Democratic Front, agreed to speak but felt morally bound to withdraw at the last minute when a large number of UDF leaders were detained. At his request the Director of the Centre read his prepared paper.

On the third evening Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, President of Inkatha and Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, would have presented a paper followed by a panel discussion by all four speakers. The University cancelled this meeting because a crowd of singing, chanting, demonstrating students carrying offensive posters against Chief Gatsha Buthelezi occupied the lecture theatre. They indicated that they would not allow the meeting to take place.

Contacts between the establishment and
extra-parliamentary groups

As part of the Centre's programme to promote communication between conflicting groups, especially between the establishment and extra-parliamentary groups, the Director has over the years developed contacts with African National Congress leaders who are in exile. In December 1984 he arranged a meeting between Dr Piet Muller, Assistant Editor of Beeld, a pro-government Afrikaans newspaper, and senior members of the African National Congress in Lusaka. In two articles and an editorial Beeld called on the government to have talks with the African National Congress.



EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Seminar

One major requirement for successful communication between conflicting parties is the availability of professional third-party personnel who have had training in facilitating communication, and are skilled in prompting analytical dialogue. The third party should be a team of professionals who have a wide knowledge of all aspects of political and economic behaviour and who are also trained, skilled and experienced in the technique of conflict resolution.

Training in the field of communication skills in South Africa is in its infancy and the Centre arranged a seminar in August 1984 as a pilot project for the development of course content and curricula which have direct relevance for South Africa.

This two-day seminar, the first organised by the Centre, followed the conference on conflict accommodation and conflict management. It was offered by Laura Blackburne and Bernard Charles of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution in New York, and John Groom and Keith Webb of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict in the United Kingdom, assisted by Loet Douwes Dekker of the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA) and Ampie Muller of the University of the Western Cape.

The major purpose of the seminar was to establish contact and to promote communication among the wide range of individuals and organisations in South Africa who are interested in contributing to the facilitation of communication between conflicting groups. Participants were largely drawn from three fields of interest and expertise: labour and industrial relations, community issues, and national politics.

A Continuity Committee on Negotiation Skills (CCNS), consisting of a number of prominent academics and community leaders from all population groups from Natal, Soweto, Boputhatswana, Johannesburg, and Cape Town was elected.

1985 training workshops

The Continuity Committee will run a series of workshops on the practice and techniques of mediation from July to September 1985.

New post

The post of Senior Fellow/Research Officer will be advertised early in 1985. An ad hoc grant has made this appointment possible for a period of up to four years. The fellow's major responsibility will be the promotion and development of programmes and courses concerned with communication skills for mediators, facilitators and others involved in the promotion of communication between conflicting groups. It is a pioneering programme which will draw participants from a wide range of community, church, academic and business groups and will operate on community, national and international levels.

NEED FOR CONTINUITY IN WORKSHOPS AND COMMUNICATION

Problem-solving workshops

While the Centre has brought together at national and international workshops prominent national figures, including vice-chancellors of universities in South Africa and neighbouring countries, Nationalist cabinet ministers and black leaders such as Steve Biko and Desmond Tutu, no permanent system for ensuring continued contact and communication has been developed.

There is a need for assuring a continuance of communication between opposing parties. In view of the official obstacles of protocol and traditional communication barriers, such communication must often be held at an unofficial level to enable exploratory discussion in private.

The necessity for private negotiation on a national and international level is evident. This kind of contact has been pursued by the Director, but not in any systematic way or on a regular basis.

While the Centre will continue to organise academic workshops and conferences, relatively more attention will be given to more private, small meetings such as those developed by the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict in the United Kingdom and known as problem-solving workshops.

CONSULTATION

The Director has acted as a consultant to a number of organisations. These have included the Mountain Club of South Africa, the National Council of Women, the National Association of Child Care Workers, the South African Council of Churches and the Gifted Education Programme for High School Pupils.

BLACK AND WHITE PERSPECTIVES

In addition to the research programme of Centre staff, the Director has continued to promote the publication of the series Black and White Perspectives.

The first volume, African Perspectives on South Africa, which contains speeches, articles and documents by leading Africans during the decade before the mid-1970s, was published in 1978.

The second volume in this series, A Documentary History of Indian South Africans: 1860 to 1982 by Professors Surendra Bhanu and Bridglal Pachai, was published by David Philip and Hoover Institution Press in 1984 and the third volume, A Documentary History of Coloured South Africans: 1880 to 1970, edited by Dr R E van der Ross, is now with the publishers.

PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS BY CENTRE STAFF

The Centre has published more than 20 books and Centre staff have published 14 chapters in books and more than 30 articles in journals and magazines in South Africa and abroad.

The following papers and publications were written by the staff at the Centre for Intergroup Studies during 1984.

CENTRE FOR INTERGROUP STUDIES

'Directory of aid centres.'

'International Mediation and Negotiation organisations, practitioners and researchers.'
Research Draft No 1.

'Mediation and negotiation organisations, practitioners and researchers: South Africa.'
Research Draft No 2.

GELDENHUYS, Odette, and Hendrik W VAN DER MERWE

'Conflict and violence in regional perspective.'
Paper presented at the Conference of the Centre for Intergroup Studies on Conflict Accommodation and Management in South Africa, Cape Town, August 1984.

HUND, John

'A crack in the foundations of Descartes' Theory of knowledge.'
South African Journal of Philosophy 3, no 4 (1984).

^Conflict accommodation and management: a conceptual framework.
March 1984.

^Finger on the trigger in SA politics.
The Argus, 19 March 1984, p 9.

^Formal justice and township justice.
Paper presented at the Conference of the Centre for Intergroup Studies on Conflict Accommodation and Management in South Africa, Cape Town, August 1984.
Published in Acta Juridica 18 (1984).

^Law, ideology and justice in South Africa: report on a conference.
Codicillus 14 (December 1984).

^The new legal anthropology: rules and processes.
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, 17, no 3 (November 1984).

Review of Children's Rights, by C A Wringe
SA Journal of Philosophy 3, no 3, (1984).

Review of Legal and Moral Reasoning, by S Stoljar.
SA Journal of Philosophy 3, no 4 (1984).

HUND, John, and Hendrik W VAN DER MERWE

^Towards responsive law in South Africa?
Paper presented at the Conference of the Centre for Intergroup Studies on Conflict Accommodation and Management in South Africa, Cape Town, August 1984.

KAWA, Wanita

‘The politics of political opposition in South Africa.’

Paper presented at the Conference of the Centre for Intergroup Studies on Conflict Accommodation and Management in South Africa, Cape Town, August 1984.

‘A short handy guide to third-party intervention as a process to facilitate communication in conflict situations.’

KLEYNHANS, Yolanda

‘Business and the accommodation of conflict in South Africa.’

Paper presented at the Conference of the Centre for Intergroup Studies on Conflict Accommodation and Management in South Africa, Cape Town, August 1984.

MEYER, Gabi

‘Bibliography on communication skills for facilitators in conflict situations.’
Bibliography prepared for August Seminar.

Conflict and Peace Studies - An Annotated Bibliography: based on material held at the Centre for Intergroup Studies.

‘Editorial policy and citation style.’

List of Publications of the Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1983. Rev ed, 1984.

VAN DER MERWE, Hendrik W

‘Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS): towards the professionalisation of an important field of study and practice in South Africa.’

Paper presented at the Fifteenth Annual Congress of the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 3 July 1984.

‘Economic boycott: A Sure Way to Violence.’
Friends Journal, 1 February 1984.

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WASHINGTON — Before pop singer Michael Jackson completes his schedule for his tour of the United States, he should do America a favor and add one more stop — Soweto, the largest black township in South Africa.

In doing so, he would send a message to both the white and black populations of the only nation still racially segregated by law. The message to the blacks would be that the United States has not forsaken them, despite the widespread perception to that effect. The message to the whites would be that the United States rejects the highly emotional appeal by some Americans and South Africans for American disinvestment and a reduction in ties. Rather, we would be looking forward to improving relations between our two countries — as long as that included communicating with leaders of South Africa's black community.

A Jackson trip to Soweto would also signal a significant shift in how the American Government approaches South African apartheid. While their rhetoric has differed — Ronald Reagan sounds much more conciliatory — the Carter and Reagan Administrations have done little to encourage real change within South Africa.

William J. Choyke, a reporter for The Dallas Morning News, recently spent 10 days in South Africa.

American Business in South Africa Can Be a Force for Change

By William J. Choyke

Both have relied on American business to press for reform. And indeed, American companies in South Africa have been trailblazers in desegregating work facilities, providing equal pay for equal work, promoting blacks to supervisory capacities and contributing to schools and other community facilities. Many of the companies that have introduced these reforms have done so in compliance with the widely respected Sullivan code, a set of six voluntary principles for employment practices, named after its originator, the Rev. Leon Sullivan of Philadelphia.

But even the Sullivan principles have had a limited effect: Less than one half of the estimated 300 American companies in South Africa have signed the code, prompting the House of Representatives to include similar principles in the Export Administration Act, which is now in a House-Senate conference.

Yet another American business-

man's project was the establishment of the Pace Commercial College, for high-school aged students in Soweto. A sparkling three-year-old institution financed through the American Chamber of Commerce of South Africa, it probably offers the best business education that American money can buy.

But the college, too, is a limited effort. For one thing, it provides little mixing of the races. All 500 students are black. For another, it does little to raise the political consciousness of its

students and offers no courses in political science. This may not be surprising for a business college financed by foreign corporations, but it leaves a big gap in the education of many young South Africans. Asked what she thinks about the apartheid system, 18-year old Pace student Sarah Dibetso, who aspires to become a bank manager, replied: "I never thought that much about it."

The problem is that, for all their good will, American companies are hardly in a position to prod the South

African Government to repeal the laws that implement apartheid. This has prompted many liberal and labor leaders in South Africa to question whether American companies do not in fact contribute to apartheid.

Talking about the Pace Commercial College, Phiroshaw Camay, general secretary of the Council of Unions of South Africa, noted: "These projects are only ameliorating the fact of apartheid, and in a sense perpetuating apartheid by keeping things separate. If there is a black school in a black community, what does that mean? That is apartheid. If they want to do something for change, bring the managing directors' kids in contact with black school kids."

A number of black leaders would like to see American businessmen playing a more active role. Percy Qubza, one of the country's most prominent black journalists, argues that: "American companies ought to become part and parcel of the whole

movement of political, sociological reform in this country." He also disputes the view, held by many concerned Americans, that the best way for American companies to fight apartheid is to withdraw from South Africa altogether: "Now this to me is a very strange way of bringing about peaceful change." He argues that disinvestment would cause "a massive economic destabilization" and would hasten "the day when a black-white confrontation becomes a reality."

Instead of requiring American multinationals to withdraw, Washington should strengthen ties in South Africa, particularly in black areas like Soweto. It should, for example, encourage investment in labor-intensive industries — and insist that it go to businesses whose black workers enjoy the protection of the Sullivan principles. In a country where only 2,000 of the estimated 70,000 black teachers have a high school education, the United States should also assist the development of a multinational teaching corps.

In short, the United States should try a policy of enlightened engagement with South Africa. Sending Michael Jackson to Soweto would be a provocative first step — and that would only be the beginning. We to show the blacks of South Africa that we care about their plight, and to remind the whites that we are watching.

7/13/84

The U.S. should strengthen ties,
particularly with blacks,
sending a message
that we care about reform

National Executive Council Meeting

ADDENDUM TO BACKGROUNDER ON SOUTH AFRICA

THE PROS AND CONS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

PRO

1. If the U.S. imposed economic sanctions, we would signal our belief that apartheid--a uniquely repressive, racist system is morally repugnant.
2. If the U.S. considers economic sanctions against the Soviet Union for human rights violations, the U.S. cannot do less regarding South Africa.
3. Economic sanctions will encourage change in South Africa by sending the South Africa government a clear signal that the U.S. opposes apartheid, and by strengthening the resolve of the Black population to resist apartheid.
4. Economic sanctions will have a strong impact on the South African economy. Limiting U.S. bank loans will make it more difficult for South Africa to find foreign financing, and will set a moral tone that will encourage other countries to restrict loans to South Africa. Furthermore, voluntary fair employment practices, the "Sullivan Principles," have gone as far as they can; binding enforcement procedures are required.
5. By supporting sanctions against South Africa, the American Jewish community could reaffirm its historic commitment to equality for all, and also improve its relations with the American Black community, which supports these measures strongly. This could foster Black support for Jewish foreign policy concerns such as Israel's security and the rights of Soviet Jews.
6. By imposing economic sanctions on South Africa, the U.S. will improve ties with Black Africa and the Third World. This will deprive the Soviet Union of its ability to pose as the superpower with the moral position on apartheid. Furthermore, Blacks will eventually rule South Africa and U.S. support for their aspirations now will forestall future Soviet influence.

CON

1. The true test of the utility of economic sanctions is not whether they make us feel good, but whether they work. While economic restrictions against South Africa have a moral purpose, specialists have argued that sanctions will have little practical impact in changing apartheid.
2. Placing economic sanctions on South Africa without placing similar pressures on other states involved in repression of human rights, in Africa and elsewhere, is practicing selective morality.
3. Economic sanctions will deter positive change in South Africa. By restricting investment in or loans to South Africa, American companies which have instituted fair employment practices will be harmed and Black unemployment will increase. Sanctions would mean the loss of U.S. access to, and leverage with, South African leaders. In addition, past economic pressures have merely induced South Africa to gain self-sufficiency in energy, armaments, and other areas.
4. The South African economy will not be affected much by sanctions. It is self-sufficient in important strategic materials, and could obtain loans and technology from sources other than the U.S. Furthermore, provisions for enforcing "fair employment practices" are unrealistic because U.S. courts will not be able to supervise implementation.
5. There is a long history of anti-Semitism in South Africa, and American Jewish support for sanctions could encourage a backlash against South African Jews and could harm Israel-South Africa relations.
6. South Africa is the strongest military power on the African continent, and serves as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the area. By weakening South Africa, we would be whetting the Soviet appetite for expanding its power, either directly or through proxy.



Washington, D.C. 20540

Congressional Research Service
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September 5, 1984

TO : Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy
Attention: Steve Horblitt

FROM : Brenda Branaman
Analyst in African Affairs

SUBJECT: : Israeli relations with Africa

This paper is in response to Representative Fauntroy's request of May 22, 1984, for a study of Israel's relations with African countries.

Israel's relations with Africa raises two areas of interest in Congress.

In connection with Congressional concern about apartheid in South Africa some in Congress are interested in South Africa's relationship with Israel. Others in Congress are interested in Israel's role in the economic development of the Third World, including Africa. In the 98th Congress one bill has been introduced (H.R. 5424) that proposes a program of joint U.S. and Israeli development assistance to the Third World. At hearings on the bill in June 1984 it was suggested that at least one-third of the proposed assistance would go to Africa. This paper provides background information on these concerns with Israel's relationship to both South Africa and the rest of Africa.

Diplomatic relations

Israel established diplomatic relations with African countries in 1956; development assistance programs began in 1957. ^{1/} By 1966 Israel had established diplomatic relations with all but two countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These exceptions were Mauritania and Somalia. Several motivations were behind the development of this relationship. The most important motivating force was Israel's desire to prevent the political isolation which the Arab states attempted to impose. As a result Israel needed as many friends as possible in international and regional organizations. A second motivating force was the strategic value of African countries along the Red Sea. Israel wanted to prevent the closing of the Bab-el Mandeb Straits so that its freedom to navigate from the Gulf of Aqaba through the Red Sea down to the Indian Ocean would be ensured. The third motivation was economic. Israel wanted to prevent the Arab economic boycott from spreading to African countries and it needed African countries both as a source of raw materials and as markets for its manufactured goods. The fourth motivation was humanitarian. According to some analysts of Israel's foreign policy, Israel has a sense of identification with oppressed peoples because of the historical persecution of the Jewish people. Some of its leaders, therefore, have felt obligated to help African countries develop as independent countries. ^{2/}

^{1/} Levenfeld, David. Israel and black Africa. *Midstream*, v. 30, Feb. 1984: 7; Decalo, Samuel. *Israeli foreign policy and the Third World*. Orbis, Fall 1967: 735.

^{2/} Sawant, Ankush Balaji. Rivalry between Egypt and Israel in Africa South of the Sahara, 1956-1970. *International Studies*, v. 17, April/June 1978: 303-305; Nadelmann, Ethan A. Israel and black Africa: A rapprochement? *Journal of Modern African Studies*, v. 19, no. 2, 1981: 187; Curtis, Michael, and Susan Aurelia Gitelson, eds. *Israel in the third world*. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction, Inc., 1976. p. 100-101; Hershlag, Z.Y., ed. *Israel-Africa cooperation: Final report*. Tel Aviv University, Israel, Research Project on Israel-Africa Cooperation, 1973. p. 12-14; Shimoni, Ambassador Yaacov. *Israel, the Arabs and Africa*.

Many African countries also desired a relationship with Israel, as well as Israeli assistance. Israel served as a model of a poor and newly independent country which had successfully overcome many difficult social and economic problems. Some African leaders believed that they could reproduce Israel's success in their own countries. Second, Israel was small in size, limited in resources, and at that time was not identified as part of the colonial legacy associated with Western countries. Consequently, Israel was not regarded as a threat to African sovereignty. Third, Israel was an example of a successful mixed economy with some state-owned businesses and some private enterprises. This combination of socialism and capitalism appealed to some Africans because neither ideology alone seemed appropriate to Third World problems. Fourth, Israel and Africa shared a desire for non-aligned status, and African countries wanted to reduce their dependence on former colonial countries. Finally, according to some analysts, Africans identified with Israel because both Jews and Africans had been victims of discrimination. ^{3/}

An African shift away from good relations with Israel began after the 1967 war, during which Israel captured a large part of Egyptian territory on the Sinai Peninsula. Some African countries sympathized with Egypt and pushed for resolutions in the OAU that demanded Israeli withdrawal from the captured territories. ^{4/} Guinea broke relations with Israel in 1967; seven other nations followed in 1972 and early 1973. The October 1973 war brought a further deterioration in African-Israeli relations. During the war Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal into previously unoccupied

^{3/} Curtis and Gitelson, p. 102-104; Sawant: 306, 311-312; Nadelmann: 188; Shimoni: 52.

^{4/} Nadelmann: 196; Shimoni: 53.

Egyptian territory on the African mainland. ^{5/} Although this action appears to be the main reason that African countries cut ties with Israel, the entire range of Arab concerns also became African concerns. The OAU resolution which was adopted ^{6/} recommended the severing of relations with Israel "until it withdraws from all the occupied Arab territories, and until the recovery by the Palestinian people of their legitimate national rights." All African countries broke relations with Israel except four: Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Mauritius. Mauritius later broke relations just before it was to host an OAU summit in 1976. Only three countries then maintained relations with Israel, at least until 1982. ^{7/}

The reasons for the African break are many. One of the strongest reasons was that Israel occupied the territory of an OAU member and African countries felt compelled to show solidarity in defense of their territorial integrity. Equally strong were Arab promises of economic assistance and resulting African expectations of compensation for high oil prices. ^{8/} The international oil crisis occurred as a direct

^{5/} Orjiako, Umunna. Black Africa and Israel: Is it time for rapprochement? Nigerian Forum, April/May 1982: 533; Aribisala, Dr. Femi. Nigerian Forum, April/May 1982: 528; Nadelmann: 205.

^{6/} The resolution was adopted at the eighth extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on Nov. 19-21, 1973. Legum, Colin, ed. Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1973-1974. London, Rex Collings Ltd., 1974. p. A7, A10.

^{7/} Gitelson, Susan Aurelia. Evolving relations between Israel and the Third World. Judaism, v. 29, Spring 1980: 204.

^{8/} Orjiako: 533-535; Shimoni: 53-54; Nadelmann: 204, 207.

result of the October 1973 war, and the enormous jump in prices made extremely difficult the struggle of already poor African countries to keep their economies afloat. 9/ After the 1967 war Israel's image among African countries changed from that of the small powerless Third World country to that of a militarily powerful aggressor. Consequently, African countries saw Arab opposition to Israel as similar to the African liberation struggles against white minority governments in southern Africa and countries with Muslim populations identified with the Arab cause. Another reason for severing relations with Israel was the frustration of some African countries with the results of some Israeli development assistance programs. 10/

Following the diplomatic break in relations, Israel withdrew most but not all of its advisers and terminated assistance programs to Africa. But unofficial relations were gradually rebuilt to the point that there are now more Israelis in Africa than before 1973, 11/ and in 1979 the Histadrut link with Zaire was officially renewed. Israel has low-profile missions or trade representatives in 12 black African countries, and diplomatic "interest sections" are maintained through other countries' embassies in Kenya, Gabon, Ghana, Togo, and Ivory Coast. 12/

9/ In October 1973 the price of Saudi Arabian oil increased by 70 percent from the August price. The price more than doubled by January 1974 and tripled again in five years time by 1979. The price of a barrel of oil in 1981 was 11 times the price of a barrel in August 1973. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and the United States: The new context in an evolving "special relationship." 97th Congress, 1st session. August 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. p. 28. (Committee Print)

10/ Orjiako: 534-535; Shimoni: 53; Nadelmann: 204.

11/ Levenfeld: 8; Israel keeps low profile, sells to 30 African states. African Business, April 1983: 16-17.

12/ Nadelmann: 214-215.

Israel began a campaign to renew diplomatic ties with African countries after Egypt and Israel had exchanged ambassadors in February 1980. In March, Israel sent a special ambassador to Kenya, Zambia, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. 13/ Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir proposed in an October 1981 speech before the U.N. General Assembly that Israeli technology be exported to Third World countries to increase their agricultural productivity and to relieve poverty. 14/ The following month Defense Minister Ariel Sharon visited Zaire, Gabon, and Central African Republic, and, according to one report, during the visit Sharon signed a secret military agreement with Zaire. 15/ A month after Israel completed a three-stage withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982 relations with Zaire were restored. In December the two countries signed economic and agricultural agreements, and in January 1983 they signed a military cooperation agreement. 16/ Liberia restored relations with Israel in August 1983 and in the same month President Samuel K. Doe visited Israel. During his visit he signed an agreement with Israel which pledged assistance to Liberia in agriculture, highway construction, health, air transport, and shipping. 17/

13/ Nadelmann: 218.

14/ Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1981: A16.

15/ Israel keeps low profile..., p. 17.

16/ Ibid., p. 17; Africa Research Bulletin, May 1982: 6472 and Dec. 1982: 6669; Africa News, July 4, 1982: 6 and Dec. 6, 1982: 12; Africa Research Bulletin, May 1983: 6720-6721.

17/ Africa Research Bulletin, Aug. 1983: 6960; Africa News, Aug. 22, 1983: 9; Washington Post, Aug. 23, 1983: A1, A14; New York Times, Aug. 23, 1983: A3; Washington Post, Aug. 26, 1983: A28; Los Angeles Times, Aug. 26, 1983: 8, part I.

There is some discussion in Africa on the merits of restoring relations with Israel. Those in favor of restoration argue that Egypt, the country to which the Sinai belonged, has restored relations with Israel, and other African countries should do the same. 18/ Zaire, in fact, renewed its link with Israel because Israel had withdrawn from the Sinai in April 1982. 19/ Another argument is that restoration of relations would enable African countries to receive more Israeli technical assistance than is possible through the current private arrangements. A Nigerian observer, however, believes African countries would be better off getting this technical assistance from sources other than Israel. 20/ There is also a widely held African perception that friendship with Israel will result in more assistance from the United States because of substantial support for Israel in Congress and because of the U.S. government's support for restoration of African-Israeli relations. 21/ A further argument favoring relations with Israel is that the promised Arab aid has not been as beneficial to African countries as they had expected in 1973. Also many African leaders believe the aid received since 1973 has not been enough to compensate for the increased oil prices. 22/ Arab aid to non-Arab African countries in 1981 was about half of the Arab aid to Arab-African countries. 23/ Nigeria as an oil-exporting country has a different

18/ Levenfeld: 8; Aribisala: 525, 528.

19/ Africa Research Bulletin, May 1982: 6472; Africa News, July 4, 1983: 6.

20/ Nadelmann: 215; Aribisala: 531.

21/ Levenfeld: 9.

22/ Israel: Coming back to Africa? Africa Confidential, Jan. 14, 1981: 8; New York Times, June 21, 1981: 9.

23/ \$213.5 million to non-Arab African countries and \$576.6 million to Arab-African countries in 1981. Nowels, Larry. OPEC aid to Third World countries. Congressional Research Service memorandum, Nov. 29, 1983. Appendix III.

perspective from other African countries. One Nigerian observer expressed frustration with Arab countries when he claimed that Saudi Arabia has periodically undercut Nigeria's oil prices. He stated that Nigeria needs neither Arab oil nor financial assistance since it has its own oil. 24/

Africans opposed to restoring Israeli relations feel strongly that as long as the OAU resolution of November 1983 stands, African countries should not renew their ties. There appears to be little support among OAU members for revoking the resolution. 25/ Several factors have been suggested as affecting African reluctance to restore Israeli relations. One is continued African support for the Palestinian right to self-determination. This issue is the major obstacle to Nigerian renewal of relations and some observers believe that whatever Nigeria decides will be followed by other African countries. 26/ A second factor is Arab power to deny both financial assistance and oil. Arab leverage was demonstrated when Zaire restored relations with Israel in 1982. Almost immediately several Arab countries broke their relations with Zaire and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) suspended its activities in that country. BADEA also warned that other African countries renewing relations with Israel could expect similar treatment. 27/ A third factor is the large Muslim population in some African countries. Those countries fear that the Islamic religion could be used to provoke dissidence and subversion if Israeli ties were restored. 28/ A fourth factor is South

24/ Aribisala: 525-526.

25/ Levenfeld: 10; Aribisala: 526, 528.

26/ Land, Thomas. Black Africa and Israel. New York Times, Feb. 11, 1980: 19; Nadelmann: 204; Shimoni: 53; Orjiako: 533; Aribisala: 526, 530.

27/ Levenfeld: 8; Nadelmann: 215, 219; Orjiako: 539; Africa Research Bulletin, May 1982: 6472; Weekly Review (Nairobi), May 28, 1982: 35; Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Financial and Technical Series), Aug. 15 - Sept. 14, 1983: 6969; Africa News, Sept. 19, 1983: 10.

28/ Levenfeld: 10; Orjiako: 539.

Africa's close relations with Israel. (See p. 3 for discussion of Israeli relations with South Africa.) Although Israel had a relationship with South Africa prior to 1973, it was a low-level one, and the much closer relations that now exist are said to have resulted from African rejection of Israel as a friend in 1973. Nevertheless, some Africans believe that their own strong opposition to South African apartheid precludes close relations with Israel so long as Israel has such strong relations with South Africa. These Africans also are concerned with South African and Israeli nuclear connections and alleged trading of intelligence information. They feel threatened by South Africa's alleged nuclear capability and argue that intelligence activities are used to suppress both South African blacks and liberation activities in the countries bordering South Africa. 29/ While this is the public viewpoint of African countries, many have trade relations with South Africa out of necessity. South Africa provides food to some African countries and to others the South African system of railroads and ports provides their only viable outlet to the sea.

Economic assistance

During the 1957-1973 period 20 African countries signed cooperation agreements with Israel, but 31 countries received economic assistance. 30/

29/ Levenfeld: 10; Arribisala: 528-529.

30/ The countries receiving assistance were Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Empire, Chad, Congo, Dahomey (now Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta (now Bourkina Fasso), Zaire, and Zambia.
Decter, Moshe. To serve, to teach, to leave: The story of Israel's development assistance program in black Africa. New York, American Jewish Congress, 1977. p. 1; Nadelmann: 189.

Four types of assistance were provided: scholarships, sending specialists and technicians, joint companies, and loans.

Between 1958 and 1971 scholarships at Israeli institutions provided training for 6,797 African students. Three major institutions supplied the training. The Afro-Asian Institute in Tel Aviv was established in 1960 by Histadrut, Israel's largest labor organization. Students there trained for leadership positions in labor movements in their countries and in development activities. The Mt. Carmel International Training Center for Community Services was established in Haifa in 1962. The center specializes in training women in nursing, nutrition, consumer education, and home economics. African students also received training at the Hebrew University's Hadassah Medical School in Jerusalem as well as other Israeli institutions. 31/

Also in the 1958-1971 period about 2,763 Israeli specialists and technicians served in Africa. Their areas of specialization were in agriculture, city planning, education, management, tourism, irrigation, water supply, police services, and military. Agricultural projects included campaigns to increase productivity; agricultural research; programs to improve farm life such as introducing the use of fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, new livestock, and guided credit; and agricultural training. 32/

Joint companies were used as a means of providing technical assistance. A joint company was initially owned by both an Israeli company and the African government or an African company. Later, the company was nationalized and the Israeli partner sold its shares to the government or national company. The two partners then signed a management contract

31/ Decter: 12-19; Sawant: 306-307; Nadelmann: 190.

32/ Sawant: 307-308; Nadelmann: 190; Decter: 21-26.

which was later changed to an advisory contract. An example of this kind of venture was Ghana's Black Star Shipping Line where originally the Ghanaian government owned 60 percent and ZIM, an Israeli shipping company, owned 40 percent. ^{33/} Other Israeli companies most involved in this method of African development have been (1) Solel Boneh, a Histadrut company involved in construction of roads, houses, and other civil engineering projects, (2) Water Resources Development (WRD) which supplied water to urban areas but was also involved in road and housing construction, and (3) TAHAL which was involved in water planning and consulting. ^{34/}

Israel granted some loans and credits, but these were small and were made to a limited number of countries. The countries receiving loans were Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, and Malagasy Republic. Loans were usually for five years and financed the cost of Israeli equipment, construction materials, and services. ^{35/}

Military relations

There were two types of military training provided by Israel to Africa-- officer training and the creation of paramilitary youth organizations. Officer training of the army, navy, and air force took several forms. Some officers were trained in Israel, others were trained in their respective countries. In the case of Sierra Leone, Israel helped establish that country's first military academy. ^{36/} Youth organizations were of two kinds. One was similar to Israeli Nahal units where personnel combine

^{33/} Sawant: 308; Nadelmann: 189, 192.

^{34/} Sankari, Farouk A. The cost and gains of Israeli pursuit of influence in Africa. Middle Eastern Studies, v. 15, May 1979: 273.

^{35/} Sawant: 308.

^{36/} Idi Amin of Uganda and Joseph Mobutu of the Congo (now Zaire) received military training in Israel. Sawant: 308-309; Jacob, Abel. Israel's military aid to Africa, 1960-66. Journal of Modern African Studies, v. 9, no. 2, 1971: 179.

military training with farming. This program was unsuccessful in Africa because the youth that were being trained were not always loyal to the government nor were they idealistic enough to make the sacrifices necessary for rural farming. The Gadna-type youth organizations were more successful. These combined physical and paramilitary training with citizenship training. Rural clubs emphasized literacy while urban clubs emphasized civic and national education. The clubs were very similar to scouting organizations. In addition to these kinds of military training Israel supplied training for police forces in some African countries. ^{37/}

Ten African countries had received direct military assistance from Israel by 1966: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Congo-Kinshasa, (now Zaire), Dahomey (now Benin), Malagasy Republic, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Upper Volta. ^{38/} (See Appendix for comparison of economic and military aid.) Of these countries, three received the bulk of military aid. Ethiopia received the largest amount. A common interest existed with Ethiopia under Selassie, which felt threatened by Islam in Eritrea and neighboring countries. Israel felt threatened by Arab influence in the Red Sea area and felt that an Israeli presence in Ethiopia would especially prevent the spread of Egyptian influence. Israeli military experts assisted all branches of the Ethiopian armed forces but Israel is best-known for its training of border patrol commandos. Ethiopian military links with Israel officially ended in February 1978 when Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan revealed the continued military relationship between the two countries. Ethiopian leader Mengistu reacted by expelling all Israelis from Ethiopia. Uganda received the next largest amount of Israeli military aid; Israel trained the air force and reportedly

^{37/} Jacob: 182-183; Curtis and Gitelson: 113-115; Sawant: 308.

^{38/} Jacob: 165.

established a counter-espionage agency. Tanzania is the third largest recipient. Israel gave parachute training to 120 military officers and police, and trained 500 Tanzanian pilots, police, and army officers in Israel. 39/

After the 1978 military break with Ethiopia there appeared to be no further Israeli military activity in Africa until the early 1980's, 40/ beginning with Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to Zaire, Gabon, and Central African Republic in 1981. Little is known about Israeli arms sales arrangements with African countries either in the past or currently. One observer says that during the earlier period Israel sold tanks to Uganda and Uzi submachine guns to Ethiopia and a number of West African countries. 41/ According to SIPRI, Israel delivered 24 Gabriel-2 ship-to-ship missiles to Kenya in 1982. 42/ The military agreement signed in January 1983 by Israel and Zaire arranged for \$8 million in arms sales. Israel also agreed to equip and run the Zairian army, to reorganize the defense capability in the Shaba Province, to train a battalion of the President's Guard, and to provide intelligence advice. 43/ It was reported in September 1983 that Liberia had agreed to buy 4 aircraft from Israel

39/ Jacob: 175-178; Nadelmann: 215; Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Recent developments in the Horn of Africa: Implications for American foreign policy. April 1978. Report No. 78-169F. p. 13. (Brenda Bransman and William Inglee); Ledeen, Michael. The Israeli connection. In Samuels, Michael A., et al., eds. The Horn of Africa. Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies. May 1978, Special Supplement. p. 48-49.

40/ Nadelmann: 215.

41/ Sankari: 274.

42/ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Yearbook 1983. London, Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1983. p. 320.

43/ Africa Research Bulletin, Jan. 1983: 6720-6721; Israel keeps low profile..., p. 17.

at a value of \$10 million. Three of the aircraft would be used by Air Liberia and one by the Liberian armed forces. 44/

Trade

Israeli trade with African countries continued despite the break in diplomatic relations, although it has always been minimal for Israel, never more than 3 percent of total Israeli exports or imports. 45/ Exports to Africa steadily increased from \$37.4 million in 1972 to \$108.8 million in 1981 but decreased to \$87.0 million in 1982. Israeli imports from Africa over the same period have fluctuated. In 1972 imports were \$20.4 million, but more than doubled by 1974 to \$42.5 million. By 1982 the value had dropped to \$24.2 million. 46/ (See Appendix.)

Israeli exports to Africa include industrial products (office supplies, electronic equipment, agricultural machinery), building materials, vehicles, spare parts, tires, furniture, textiles, fertilizers and chemicals, food products, and medicine. Major imports are diamonds from Central African Republic and Zaire for the Israeli polishing industry, hardwood from Gabon for its plywood industry, uranium from Gabon and Zaire, and beef from Ethiopia and Kenya. Other imports are coconuts and coffee beans, sesame seeds, and hides. 47/

44/ Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Financial and Technical Series), Aug. 15 - Sept. 14, 1983: 6969.

45/ Nadelmann: 191; Sawant: 310.

46/ These figures exclude South Africa. International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1979: 162-163 and International Monetary Fund...Yearbook 1983: 224; Nadelmann: 191 (table); Israel keeps low profile..., p. 16.

47/ Nadelmann: 190; Sawant: 311.

Israeli relations with South Africa 48/

Israel and South Africa have developed close relations mainly because both have been internationally isolated and because there is a substantial Jewish community in South Africa. The two countries identify with each other because they see themselves as middle-level powers, strongly anti-communist, internally stable, and loyal to the West. Both have used religious justification for settling their respective territories. In both countries the group in power feels that its survival is threatened by an overwhelming number of ethnically or racially different antagonistic groups (blacks in and around South Africa and Arabs in and around Israel.) 49/

The Israeli-South African relationship has grown since 1973 and generally appears to have been mutually beneficial, at least in the areas of economic and military relations. This section discusses relations between the two countries from the late 1970's to the present. The earlier period is covered in a 1981 CRS paper. 50/

The mutual benefit is not as clear regarding the position of the two states in the United Nations. While Israeli policy has consistently rejected racial discrimination, 51/ Israel has benefited South Africa in

48/ Information on Israel's relations with South Africa is not readily available. This paper, therefore, is based on a small number of press reports, U.N. reports, and scholarly articles. Weapons production and alleged transfers were mostly derived from SIPRI yearbooks, DMS Market Intelligence Reports, Jane's Fighting Ships, and Jane's All the World's Aircraft.

49/ Congressional Research Service. South African-Israeli Relations. July 30, 1981. Rept. No. 81-174F. p. 1. (Brenda Branaman).

50/ For earlier information on Israeli relations with South Africa see: Congressional Research Service. South African-Israeli Relations. 19 p. Information on Israel's relations with South Africa is characterized by a time lag between the date an event occurred and the date when it became publicly known. Consequently, some events, particularly relating to the military relationship, occurred before the 1981 paper but knowledge of these events was not available until published several years later.

51/ Study Commission on U.S. policy toward Southern Africa. South Africa: time running out. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. p. 307; Chazan, Naomi. The fallacies of pragmatism: Israeli foreign policy towards South Africa. African Affairs, April 1983: 169.

the United Nations in at least two ways. First, Israel never votes on the annual General Assembly resolutions condemning apartheid. 52/ Second, Israel has never signed or ratified the U.N. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. 53/ Apparently in return for these Israeli abstentions, South Africa abstained from two General Assembly resolutions in 1967 concerning the status of Jerusalem. Since 1974, however, South Africa has been excluded from participation in the General Assembly, 54/ and therefore has been unable to support Israel when resolutions are proposed condemning Israel's actions.

Economic relations

According to International Monetary Fund figures on trade, which evidently include only a portion of exports and imports between the two countries (See Appendix), Israeli exports to South Africa in 1972 were \$8.8 million and steadily increased until 1981 when they totalled \$98.4 million. Exports decreased slightly to \$78.4 million in 1982. Israeli imports from South Africa in 1972 were \$11.6 million increasing to \$153.1 million in 1979. Imports decreased slightly for the following two years but increased again in 1982 to \$166.8. 55/ These public figures show Israeli trade with South Africa to be quite small. They do not, however,

52/ Congressional Research Service. p. 14, footnote 48.

53/ Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin. Israel and South Africa 1977-1982: Business as usual--and more. New outlook, March/April 1983: 32.

54/ U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2253, July 4, 1967 and Resolution 2254, July 14, 1967. United Nations. Office of Public Information. Yearbook of the United Nations 1967. New York, United Nations, 1969. p. 221, 223; U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Credentials considerations in the United Nations General Assembly: The process and its role. 98th Congress, 1st Session. December 1983. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. p. 12. (Committee Print)

55/ International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Yearbook 1979. p. 162-163, and Direction of Trade Yearbook 1983. p. 224.

include the value of diamonds or alleged arms sales. Israeli exports to South Africa include agricultural machinery, textiles, electrical goods and equipment, and diamond cutting machinery. The major imports from South Africa are steel, rough diamonds, and coal. Other imports include timber, tobacco, hides, wool, sugar, frozen meats, canned foodstuffs (such as beer, apple juice, peanut butter), fresh citrus fruits, and prefabricated wooden houses. Many imports are semi-finished products. 56/

South African exports of rough diamonds to Israel, as to other buyers, are kept confidential, but are thought to amount to \$455 million annually. 57/ The diamond link began before World War II (and thus before Israeli independence) but declined after the war. The diamond trade resumed in the 1950's and has increased to the present. 58/ At an international diamond meeting held in South Africa in May 1980 the President of the Israel Diamond Exchange stated that the production and sale of polished diamonds was Israel's largest export trade. South African diamonds are not exported directly to Israel. Israel obtains rough diamonds for its polishing industry through the South African controlled Central Selling Organization (CSO) which conducts its diamond trading in London. In

56/ Chazan, p. 178.

57/ South African Digest, Feb. 27, 1981: 20.

58/ For a detailed history of the Israeli-South African diamond trade see Green, Timothy. The world of diamonds. New York, William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1981. p. 173-183.

February 1981 the Israeli Minister of Industry and Trade visited London to discuss questions relating to the marketing of diamonds with the CSO. 59/

Joint ventures and joint companies continued in 1979 and 1980. These cooperative efforts comprised South African investment in industrial property in Israel, manufacturing and marketing of mining tools, and production of surgical gloves, kitchenware, chemicals for plastics and paint industries, and food packaging. 60/ In 1980 two joint companies were formed relating to the steel industry. One was Iskoor, a joint company to manage the placement of South African steel with Israeli steel processing companies. The second was Zimcorn Lines, a joint shipping line to transport South African steel products to Israel. 61/

Three other events of significance to South African and Israeli economic relations occurred in 1979 and 1980. First, South Africa opened a tourist office in Tel Aviv during 1979. South African newspapers reported that Israeli tourism to South Africa had increased by 30 percent from 1978 to 1979 and by 50 percent the previous year. 62/ Second, negotiations

59/ United Nations. General Assembly/Security Council. Second special report of the special committee against apartheid. Recent developments concerning relations between Israel and South Africa. Oct. 17, 1980, (A/35/22/Add.2 and S/14156/Add.2) p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as the U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Oct. 1980.); United Nations. General Assembly/Security Council. First Special Report of the special committee against apartheid. Recent developments concerning relations between Israel and South Africa. Sept. 17, 1981. (A/36/22/Add.1 and S/14689/Add.1) p. 5. (Hereinafter referred to as the U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Sept. 1981.)

60/ U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Oct. 1980. p. 5; U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Sept. 1981. p. 5; Ainslee, Rosalynde. Israel and South Africa: An unlikely alliance? United Nations. Centre Against Apartheid. Dept. of Political and Security Council Affairs. Notes and Documents 20/81. July 1981. p. 22-23.

61/ ISCOR Survey: Supplement to Financial Mail. Nov. 7, 1980. p. 16; South African Digest, Feb. 27, 1981: 20; U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Sept. 1981, p. 3.

62/ Ainslee, p. 25; U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Oct. 1980, p. 5.

between Intergold and Israeli banks resulted in the sale of South African krugerrands in Israel beginning in 1980. 63/ Third, the South African oil-from-coal enterprise known as SASOL in 1980 interviewed 120 Israelis for engineering and other positions at its newest plant called SASOL III. 64/

Early 1981 saw the formation of a standing committee to discuss development and trade issues between South Africa and Israel. The committee was a result of a financial agreement reached during a December 1980 visit to Israel by South African Finance Minister Owen Horwood. Issues of immediate concern in 1981 related to the supply of South African coal to an Israeli power station at Hadera and consideration of an Israeli request to increase the activity of Israeli fishing vessels in South African coastal waters. 65/

Several exchanges between Israeli and South African businessmen have occurred during the last three years. In March 1980 an industrial exhibition was held in Johannesburg. South Africans participating included producers of industrial products, electronics, and electrical supplies. Among the Israeli participants were Zimcorn Lines, the Government of Israel Investment Authority, and Bank Leumi. 66/ The Israel-South Africa Chamber of Commerce (ISACC) held a June 1982 symposium in Tel Aviv to promote trade between the two countries. The South African Ambassador to Israel participated in the meeting. Also the director of the Israel Export Institute discussed Israeli goods recently introduced to South

63/ U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Oct. 1980, p. 4; U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Sept. 1981, p. 4.

64/ U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Oct. 1980, p. 5.

65/ South African Digest, Feb. 27, 1981—20 and Jan. 9, 1981: 6; U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Sept. 1981, p. 3.

66/ U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Oct. 1980, p. 4.

Africa and expressed interest in developing the South African market. 67/ A delegation of South African businessmen visited Israel in June 1983 to explore potential for business cooperation. The visit was arranged by ISACC and the Israeli Counsellor for Economic and Commercial Affairs. 68/

Other exchanges took place during 1979 through 1981: Scientific and cultural exchanges, and sports exchanges which were significant given the isolation of South Africa in recent years in international sporting events. An Israeli soccer team played in Bophuthatswana in June 1981 and in July South African teams participated in the Maccabi Games in Israel. U.S. and Australian teams also participated in the games. 69/

One of the most recent events in Israeli-South African economic relations was an agreement signed in March 1983 to strengthen trade and investment ties between the two countries. The agreement covered joint projects, provided freer flow of money, and provided for easier cooperation in the areas of agriculture, technology, and research. 70/

Other recent events involve Israeli links with the South African homelands. Although the Israeli relationship with Transkei began as far back as 1976 and continued through 1978, little seems to have occurred since then. 71/ Israel has been more active in its involvement with

67/ South African Digest, Feb. 12, 1982: 5; Legum, Colin. Africa Contemporary Record 1981-1982. New York, Africans Publishing Co., 1981. p. 8782.

68/ South African Digest, June 10, 1983: 10.

69/ U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Oct. 1980, p. 5-6; U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Sept. 1981, p. 5-6.

70/ FBIS Daily Report: Middle East and Africa, Mar. 4, 1983: U4.

71/ Ainslee, p. 23-24.

other homelands. At least since 1980, Israel has assisted Bophuthatswana in the development of its agricultural system and television service, and a number of Israeli medical personnel have worked there. Bophuthatswana's President Lucas Mangope visited Israel in 1982 and in 1981 an Israeli soccer team played in Bophuthatswana. 72/ President Patrick Mphephu of Venda visited Israel in Dec. 1980 seeking Israeli advice on exporting Venda's products, and in 1983 the 34-member Venda Chamber of Commerce visited Israel. Israelis have conducted surveys for irrigation schemes in several areas of Venda, and in 1984 a Venda government-owned agricultural company and an Israeli government-owned development company launched a joint project. 73/ A Ciskei trade mission was opened in Tel Aviv in 1982, and in 1983 Ciskeian President Lennox Sebe and 40 other Ciskeians visited Israel as part of Israel's First International Tourism Exhibition. Also in 1983 Ciskei's government reportedly negotiated with Israel for doctors, and a contract was signed with an Israeli company for the construction of a hospital. 74/ A Ciskeian bank announced in 1984 that an Israeli factory would manufacture clothing in Ciskei. It was reported in 1984 that Israel had sold to Ciskei a helicopter and personal jet for the use of President Sebe. 75/

72/ Ainslee, p. 24; Boston Sunday Globe, Nov. 20, 1983; Africa News Nov. 21, 1983: 6 and April 2, 1984: 9; South African Digest, Jan. 8, 1982: 6 and Mar. 19, 1982: 5.

73/ Ainslee, p. 24; Africa News, Nov. 21, 1983: 6 and April 2, 1984: 9.

74/ Boston Sunday Globe, Nov. 20, 1983: 43; Africa News, Nov. 21, 1983: 7.

75/ Africa News, April 2, 1984: 9 and Nov. 21, 1984: 6.

Despite the close relationship of the Israeli business sector with the South African homelands, the Israeli government appears to frown on these activities. Official policy is that Israel will not recognize any of the homelands declared independent by South Africa and homelands passports will not be accepted. The Israeli government, however, says that it cannot stop visits by citizens of the homelands if they are travelling on South African passports. At least one Israeli official believes that trade ties between Israel and the homelands are damaging to Israel's relations with African countries. 76/

Military relations

The military relationship between South Africa and Israel is difficult to determine since little information is available from unclassified, public sources. The high-level of that relationship, however, is apparent from the exchange of officials such as the December 1981 visit to South Africa by Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. Reportedly, during his trip Sharon visited South African forces in Namibia and expressed the view that South Africa needs more military support to "hold back Soviet gains in Africa." 77/ Other indications of a close military relationship are continuing reports relating to weapons transfers and production of weapons under license, military training, nuclear cooperation, and most recently the development of a military relationship with Ciskei.

Several weapons continue either to be sold by Israel to South Africa or produced in South Africa under Israeli license. Six Reshef class fast attack missile boats were ordered by South Africa in 1977. These were in addition to the three built in Israel and delivered in 1978. The group

76/ Boston Sunday Globe, Nov. 20, 1983: 13; Africa News, April 2, 1984: 9.

77/ Beit-Hallahmi, p. 33; Africa Confidential, Jan. 6, 1982: 2.

of six apparently were built under license in Durban between 1978 and 1983. 78/ At least one source reports that South Africa has ordered some Dvora class missile boats but it does not give details of when they were ordered, expected delivery date, or the number ordered. The Dvora class is smaller, carries fewer missiles, and costs less to build. 79/ Allegedly in April 1983 Argentina ordered 6 corvettes from South Africa which would be constructed under Israeli supervision and delivered in 1985. 80/

The missiles with which the fast attack craft are equipped are either Gabriel-2 missiles (Israeli made) or Scorpion missiles (South African made). 81/ In 1974 South Africa ordered 72 Gabriel-2 missiles and this amount was delivered in 1978. 82/ Another 108 missiles were ordered in 1977 but there is no available information on their delivery. 83/ At least one source says that the Gabriel missiles are still sold to South Africa by Israel. According to one report a few were sold to Argentina via South Africa during the May 1982 Falklands conflict.

78/ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1984. London, Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1984. p. 278; DMS Market Intelligence Reports. Foreign Military Markets. Middle East/Africa. Greenwich, Ct., DMS, Inc. 1983. South Africa Force Structure, p. 4; Jane's Fighting Ships, 1983-84. London, Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., 1983. p. 413; Fitzgerald, Patrick and Jonathan Bloch. Alliance among outlaws. Middle East, May 1983: 32.

79/ Military Balance 1983-1984. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983. p. 73; Fitzgerald and Bloch, p. 32; McNaughton, D. J., ed. World Fast Patrol Boats 1978. Palo Alto, Calif., Reference Research Associates, Inc., 1978. p. 254-265.

80/ Fitzgerald and Bloch, p. 32.

81/ DMS Market Intelligence Reports, South Africa Market Overview, p. 3.

82/ SIPRI 1979, p. 234-235.

83/ SIPRI 1982, p. 232.

South Africa denied that the sale was made. Another source says that they are now produced in South Africa under license. 84/

Reports of aircraft sales are not new. Allegations of South Africa acquiring Kfir fighter-bombers have circulated for a number of years. More recently, at least one source alleged that South Africa is now partly financing the development of Israel's new Lavi fighter-bomber scheduled for a first flight in 1985. 85/ Two remotely-piloted drone scouts were shot down by Mozambique in May 1983, shortly after a South African air raid on Maputo, Mozambique's capital. This was the first publicly-known evidence that the Israeli-made scout is being used by South Africa. The scouts possibly are being manufactured in South Africa under Israeli license. The number of scouts involved is unknown. 86/

Other military items said to be involved with South African-Israeli cooperation are a bomb disposal device and apparatus for sensing and locating vibrations. According to a recent report, Israeli companies

84/ DMS Market Intelligence Reports. South Africa Market Overview, p. 318, and South Africa Force Structure, p. 7; Jane's Fighting Ships 1983-84, p. 181.

85/ Fitzgerald and Bloch, p. 32; Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1982-83, London, Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., 1982. p. 121.

86/ DMS Market Intelligence Reports, South Africa Force Structure, p. 3 and South Africa Market Review, p. 9; Hanlon, Joseph. Mozambique: South Africa adopts Israeli military tactics. New African, Aug. 1983; 29; Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 1983: 6.

were granted South African patents in 1982 for the manufacture of these items. The report explains that although the granting of a South African patent does not confirm that the items will be sold in South Africa it does indicate that this was the intention of the Israeli companies. 87/

Several reports have been made involving Israeli military training. Allegedly Israelis have trained South Africans in insurgency tactics 88/ and helped South Africa train UNITA forces in Walvis Bay. 89/ According to one source, an unknown number of South African military personnel are training in Israel in connection with weapons sales, and Israeli military experts are advising Bophuthatswana on its internal security. 90/

In 1980 South Africa received 35 percent of Israeli arms exports, according to some sources. 91/ Even if this is currently true Israeli arms connections with South Africa appear to be a good deal smaller than those of France and Italy. For instance, in 1980 France delivered 360 air-to-surface missiles to South Africa 92/ and under French license South Africa has annually produced 100 Landmobile surface-to-air missiles during 1980 through 1983. Also under French license South Africa in 1980 produced 10 Mirage F-1A fighter aircraft and 100 armoured cars. 93/

87/ NARMIC (National Action/Research on the Military-Industrial Complex). American Friends Service Committee. Military exports to South Africa-- A research report on the arms embargo. Philadelphia, NARMIC, Jan. 1984. p. 8, 14-15.

88/ Economist, Sept. 19, 1981: 44; Guardian, Feb. 11, 1981: 18.

89/ U.N. report on Israel and South Africa, Sept. 1981, p. 2; Beit-Hallahmi, p. 33.

90/ Beit-Hallahmi, p. 32-33.

91/ SIPRI 1980: 86; Fitzgerald and Bloch, 32.

92/ SIPRI 1981: 239.

93/ SIPRI 1981: 257; SIPRI 1984: 278.

During 1980-1983 South Africa annually produced under Italian license 12 training attack aircraft. In South Africa the aircraft were named the Atlas Impala. 94/

Information on Israeli-South African nuclear cooperation continues to be scarce, but there is an occasional indication that it exists. For example, several visits to South Africa have been made in recent years by Major General Amos Orev, former chief scientist of the Israeli Defense Ministry. These trips are believed to be part of a continuing exchange of nuclear information between the two countries. 95/ In March 1980, Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann reportedly visited South Africa to discuss the development of nuclear submarines as well as other weaponry. 96/ Reportedly in 1981 Israeli engineers started work in South Africa on a nuclear-powered submarine at Simonstown, but both South Africa and Israel denied these reports. 97/

According to some reports Israel appears to be developing something of a military relationship with Ciskei, although Israeli officials say that Israel has never sold weapons to any homeland. 98/ A Ciskeian official announced in September 1983 that Israel was selling six American-built light aircraft to Ciskei. The planes reportedly were intended to help Ciskei build an air force. Israel was said to have agreed to help train

94/ SIPRI 1984: 278.

95/ DHS Market Intelligence Reports. South Africa Market Overview, p. 8.

96/ Beit-Hallahmi, p. 33, 34.

97/ Strategy Week, Mar. 9-15, 1981: 2; Fitzgerald and Bloch, p. 31.

98/ Africa News, April 2, 1984: 9.

pilots to fly the planes, 99/ and in November and December 1983 eighteen Ciskeians arrived in Israel for pilot training. 100/ Early in 1983 Lieutenant General Charles Sebe, the now out-of-favor brother of Ciskei's President Lennox Sebe, visited Israel and addressed a seminar of security experts. 101/

Summary

The Israeli relationship to Africa has followed an uneven course. The extremely close relations of the 1950's through the early 1970's changed completely after 1973. Diplomatic ties were cut in that year after an OAU resolution called on African countries to maintain severed relations until Israel withdraws from all occupied Arab territories and restores the national rights of the Palestinians. Despite this action trade relations continued. After 1982 when part of the goal of the OAU resolution was reached by Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai two African countries--Zaire and Liberia--restored relations with Israel. It is unclear under what conditions other African countries will follow their example. A complete restoration of relations with Israel may not happen until Israel withdraws from all the occupied territories, the question of Jerusalem is resolved, and a home for the Palestinians is established.

Israel's relationship with South Africa also could be something of a determining factor. It could be argued that as long as this strong relationship exists, Africans will not be open to reestablishing their relations with Israel. Israeli economic relations with South Africa and with the homelands continue to grow, but so does the economic relations of Western countries, including the United States. Many African countries also have trade relations with South Africa. The military relationship between Israel and South Africa cannot be fully determined. Since 1977 weapons transfers have mostly ceased but weapons are now produced in South Africa under Israeli license. Other countries, such as France and

99/ Africa News, Nov. 21, 1983: 7 and Dec. 12, 1983: 5; Boston Sun Globe, Nov. 20, 1983: 13; Fitzgerald and Bloch, p. 30.

100/ Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, Dec. 12-18, 1983: 2; Boston Sunday Globe, Nov. 20, 1983: 13.

101/ Africa News, Nov. 21, 1983: 6.



Italy, however, also have licensing agreements with South Africa. Larger numbers of weapons appear to be produced in South Africa under the French and Italian agreements than under agreements with Israel. On the other hand, Israel's transfer of Gabriel missiles to South Africa may be continuing as well as nuclear cooperation in the form of information exchange and alleged production of nuclear-powered submarines. Some would argue that if African countries reestablished their ties with Israel then Israel would be willing to reduce its ties with South Africa. This possibility is suggested by the fact that Israel's ties with South Africa did not increase until after 1973 when the African countries chose to break with Israel.

APPENDIX.

Israeli Trade with African Countries
(In millions of U.S. dollars)

Year	Other Africa		South Africa	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1972	\$ 37.4	\$ 20.4	\$ 8.8	\$ 11.6
1973	30.5	24.6	12.0	32.4
1974	41.2	42.5	28.7	43.3
1975	38.9	28.7	39.2	40.5
1976	44.5	30.3	32.5	45.2
1977	57.0	35.2	23.9	54.3
1978	72.0	28.4	37.5	80.4
1979	75.4	19.3	48.4	153.1
1980	109.1	18.7	79.2	117.1
1981	108.8	16.0	98.4	103.2
1982	87.0	24.2	78.4	166.8

Source: International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Yearbook 1979: 162-163; Direction of Trade Yearbook 1983: 224.

African Countries Receiving Israeli Economic and Military Assistance
1957-1973

<u>Country</u>	<u>Economic Assistance</u>	<u>Military Assistance</u>
1. Botswana	x	
2. Cameroon	x	
3. Central African Empire	x	
4. Chad	x	
5. Congo	x	
6. Dahomey (now Benin)	x	x
7. Ethiopia 1/	x	x
8. Gabon	x	
9. Gambia	x	
10. Ghana	x	x
11. Guinea	x	
12. Ivory Coast	x	
13. Kenya	x	x
14. Lesotho	x	
15. Liberia	x	
16. Malagasy Republic	x	x
17. Malawi	x	
18. Mali	x	
19. Mauritius	x	
20. Niger	x	
21. Nigeria	x	
22. Rwanda	x	
23. Senegal	x	
24. Siera Leone	x	x
25. Swaziland	x	
26. Tanzania	x	x
27. Togo	x	x
28. Uganda	x	x
29. Upper Volta (now Bourkina Fasso)	x	x
30. Zaire	x	x
31. Zambia	x	

1/ Military assistance did not terminate until 1978.

Sources: Decter, Moshe. To serve, to teach, to leave: The story of Israel's development assistance program in black Africa. New York, American Jewish Congress, 1977. p. 7; Jacob, Abel. Israel's military aid to Africa, 1960-66. Journal of Modern African Studies, v. 9, no. 2, 1971: 179.

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

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from David A. Harris
subject South Africa

Leo Nevas, David Geller and I met with Richard Kott, South African Country desk officer at the State Dept., and his assistant, Richard Norlund, in anticipation of the Steering Committee and NEC discussion of the South African question. Mr. Kott was appointed to the position one month ago, having dealt with African issues for a decade, though never having served in Pretoria. Norlund has been on the desk for 18 months.

Kott noted that the issue before the Administration is one of tactics, a repugnance of apartheid being assumed. The three principle questions are: 1) independence for Namibia, 2) regional stability, and 3) lifting of apartheid. The Carter approach was generally unsuccessful, involving excessive public diplomacy and rhetoric, whereas the Reagan approach of "constructive engagement," which involves more "carrot" than "stick," is beginning to have an impact. Off-the-record, the prevailing view is that progress on #3 cannot be achieved without movement on #1 and #2. The U.S. is very deeply committed to the diplomatic effort to achieve Namibian independence. Further, the accord signed by South Africa and Mozambique in March has lowered tension in the area. The key now is Angola. In sum, the U.S. is in touch with all countries in the region,

Concerning apartheid, the U.S. has raised the issue with Pretoria on numerous occasions, often based on the notion that if South Africa expects to become a full member of the Western bloc of nations, it must adhere to a set of standards radically different from its current behavior. The U.S. does, therefore, have some leverage, but this must be played very cautiously so as not to create a counter-reaction and lead to a hardening of the "fortress mentality." Kott does feel that the policy of constructive engagement has, to date, had an impact on the internal situation:

- 1) less "banning" than before;
- 2) greater ferment in the white political parties with a split in Afrikaner unity and a policy of "adapt or die" being voiced by P.W. Botha;
- 3) needed "breathing space" for South Africa created by its accord with Mozambique;

- 4) the emergence of a growing black middle class with a purchasing power;
- 5) black trade unions are beginning to show strength;
- 6) the prime minister's recent trip to Europe indicates a desire for respectability; talking quietly not publicly.

Re the Solarz Bill, the Administration is opposed to Title III of the Export Administration Act in its entirety. Specifically, it opposes attempts to render the Sullivan Principles obligatory, feeling that: 1) the standard for U.S. companies in South Africa would then be higher than for U.S. companies operating in the U.S., and 2) it would be impossible for the U.S. to monitor compliance or enforce compliance overseas. Kott did feel, however, that the Sullivan Principles work quite well, covering 70-75% of all black employees in U.S. firms (though less than 70% of the total number of U.S. firms in South Africa).

In response to a question, Kott noted that the EEC does have a voluntary code of conduct with respect to companies from the EEC doing business in South Africa, but it is less comprehensive than the Sullivan Principles. This is an area where they felt AJC might be helpful in the course of its contacts with EEC member states as well as with other Governments, namely, to encourage adherence to a set of guidelines for corporations doing business with South Africa. Rev. Sullivan has been to Western Europe several times, but Kott and Norlund were unsure of the details.

When Leo Nevas asked what policy possibilities an agency like our own should be considering, they hesitated, as if they had never before been confronted with the question, and then answered:

- 1) Pursue a program to gain more voluntary compliance with the Sullivan Principles among U.S. firms;
- 2) Look at U.S. tax dollars being spent, particularly in the area of education and labor training for South Africa's blacks. A bill to allocate \$15 million for the next fiscal year to send blacks to South African universities is in difficulty in the African Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee because some MC's say the sponsoring organization is South Africa -- the Institute of Race Relations -- has too few blacks.
- 3) Give South Africa "breathing space" to permit the emerging reformist elements to develop and avoid the temptation to seek to apply traditional "liberal" U.S. standards when measuring progress and change.

At the conclusion of the meeting, we were given a number of documents outlining the position of the U.S. Government with respect to South Africa. and Mr. Kott will be sending us a length study, to which he made reference, by Prof. Schlemmer, a sociologist at the U. of Natal, on blue-collar black attitudes to a variety of questions, including the issue of U.S. investment in the country.

dah;rpr

AJC and South Africa

In the past year, U.S. policy toward South Africa has received unprecedented public attention. The issue, which promises to remain a fixture of domestic political debate, is a vexing one for American Jews and for all Americans.

Our position on South Africa heretofore has been to express abhorrence of apartheid and to call on numerous occasions for a peaceful solution of South Africa's racial problems, including elimination of legal and de facto racial discrimination.

During the 1984 Presidential campaign many Black leaders have emphasized with increasing frequency that South Africa should become a pre-eminent foreign policy concern. For a number of years, the Congressional Black Caucus has focused attention on U.S.-South Africa relations. And, currently, there is legislation before Congress and before state and local bodies calling for economic sanctions against South Africa. Indeed, Black leaders have urged American Jewish organizations to take a more active role in this area.

Criticism has surfaced in the United States, moreover, of the allegedly close relationship that Western nations, including Israel, maintain with South Africa. International bodies have condemned Israel in particular for its alleged links with the South African regime.

For AJC, any discussion of South Africa must take into account the position of South African Jewry. What are the possible consequences of American Jewish actions on South African Jewry, a community which historically has suffered from anti-Semitism?

The difficult issue of considering other policy options toward South Africa has become an immediate and practical question for America and for American Jews. The problem is urgent, if not new; the challenge is to see whether fresh answers are needed, and if so, to determine where they may be found.

Questions for Discussion

1. Should AJC go beyond its stated commitment to social equality and abhorrence of apartheid, and assume a more activist posture against apartheid?
2. If it opts to pursue a more active role, what public positions should AJC take and what other activities should it initiate? Black, church, labor and human rights groups and government bodies have advocated a variety of measures including: issuing anti-apartheid statements in national and international fora; supporting economic sanctions such as those in the Solarz bill (see attached document); joining in anti-apartheid "disinvestment" activities; participating in efforts to provide scholarships and other assistance to Black students in South Africa; encouraging Western states to work both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis for the elimination of apartheid.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

Division of
International Organizations
Sidney Liskofsky, Director

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: PRO AND CON

By
Allan L. Kagedan, Policy Analyst

An important policy issue for AJC is whether the agency should support federal, state and local legislative proposals for economic sanctions against South Africa.

Discussion of the Solarz Bill, passed by the House in spring 1984, but blocked in a House-Senate conference in the summer, will likely resume after the Presidential election. Local AJC chapters have been approached to support this and other legislation aimed at restricting U.S. economic relations with South Africa. The proposed sanctions vary considerably; nonetheless, the principal types of sanctions may be characterized as follows (the last four being part of the proposed amendments to the Export Administration Act [H.R. 2131]:

- 1) Disinvestment -- the refusal of city agencies, for example, to do business with corporations having any investments, licenses or operations in South Africa (New York City Council);
- 2) Banning export of military and police equipment to South Africa (Berman amendment);
- 3) Prohibiting all new investments, including new bank loans, by U.S. companies in South Africa (Gray amendment);
- 4) A ban on sale of South African gold coins (Krugerrands) in the U.S., or imposition of a tax on these coins (Solarz bill);
- 5) Legal enforcement of "Sullivan Principles" requiring U.S. firms doing business in South Africa to pursue fair employment practices (Solarz bill).

What follows is a brief outline of arguments in favor and against such pressures. Once it has reached a decision on the general principle, the International Relations Commission may consider which penalties merit consideration.

1. If the U.S. imposed economic sanctions, we would signal our belief that apartheid -- a uniquely repressive, racist system -- is morally repugnant, and by strengthening the resolve of the South African black population to resist apartheid.

1. The true test of the utility of economic sanctions is not whether they make us feel good, but whether they work. While economic restrictions against South Africa have a moral purpose, specialists have argued that sanctions will have little practical impact in changing apartheid.

2. If the U.S. considers economic sanctions against the Soviet Union for human rights violations, the U.S. cannot do less regarding South Africa.

2. Placing economic sanctions on South Africa without placing similar pressures on other states involved in repression of human rights, in Africa and elsewhere, is practicing selective morality.

3. Economic sanctions will have a strong impact on the South African economy. Limiting U.S. bank loans will make it more difficult for South Africa to find foreign financing, and will set a moral tone that will encourage other countries to restrict loans to South Africa. Furthermore, voluntary fair employment practices, the "Sullivan Principles," have gone as far as they can; binding enforcement procedures are required.


3. Economic sanctions will deter positive change in South Africa. If investment in or loans to South Africa are restricted, black unemployment will increase. Sanctions would mean the loss of U.S. access to, and leverage with South African leaders. As well, economic pressures have merely induced South Africa to gain self sufficiency in energy, armaments, and other areas. And U.S. courts will not be able to enforce binding "fair employment practices."

4. By supporting sanctions against South Africa, the American Jewish community could reaffirm its historic commitment to equality for all, and also improve its relations with the American black community, which supports these measures strongly. This could foster black support for Jewish foreign policy concerns such as Israel's security and the rights of Soviet Jews.

4. There is a long history of anti-Semitism in South Africa, and American Jewish support for sanctions could encourage a backlash against South African Jews, and could harm Israel-South Africa relations.

5. By imposing economic sanctions on South Africa, the U.S. will improve ties with Black Africa and the Third World. This will deprive the Soviet Union of its ability to pose as the super-power with the moral position on apartheid. Furthermore, blacks will eventually rule South Africa and U.S. support for their aspirations now will forestall future Soviet influence.

5. South Africa is the strongest military power on the African continent, and serves as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the area. By weakening South Africa we would be whetting the Soviet appetite for expanding its power either directly or through proxy.



PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



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21st September 1984

Dr. Marc H. Tanenbaum,
Director,
International Relations Department,
The American Jewish Committee,
Institute of Human Relations,
165 East 56 Street,
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
U.S.A.

Dear Dr. Tanenbaum,

Thank you for your letter dated September 10. I look forward to being with you in Chicago from Thursday 1st November until Sunday November 4. I will then go on to Washington to have a close up viewing of the Presidential elections.

My nephew, Cedric Suzman, who is, I understand, on the A.J.C. International Relations Commission, has invited me to talk to the Southern Center for International Studies in Atlanta just before coming to Chicago, so I have asked him to liaise with Eileen Foster in order to have my air ticket from New York to Chicago routed via Atlanta and returning via Washington to New York. I have booked my own transport from South Africa and this can be fixed up when I arrive.

I have noted the areas in which your group would be interested, and will do my best to provide some information, though I must warn you that arms sales and military training are not matters on which much public information is forthcoming in South Africa. We have a Defense Act which specifically restricts such information. The press conference is fine with me and I will try to have some excerpts of my address available.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Helen Suzman".

Helen Suzman, M.P.

FOES OF APARTHEID DISPUTED IN POLL

9-23-82

Black South African Factory Workers Oppose Foreign Curbs on Investment

S. Africa

By ALAN COWELL

Special to The New York Times

JOHANNESBURG, Sept. 22 — A survey among black South African factory workers that was published today shows overwhelming resistance to the notion that United States companies should withdraw investment in this racially divided nation to force change.

Of 531 workers interviewed in the main industrial centers, 75 percent said they disagreed with campaigns in the United States and elsewhere for divestment in South Africa. Of that number, according to the survey, 54 percent said divestment would reduce the number of jobs, and 41 percent said divestment would harm blacks.

The survey, which was paid for in part by the Reagan Administration, was conducted by black interviewers working for Prof. Lawrence Schlemmer, president of the South African Institute of Race Relations. The institute opposes the policies of racial separation called apartheid. Professor Schlemmer is a prominent sociologist at the University of Natal.

"Disinvestment by U.S. companies and trade sanctions are a threat to their material and work interests, and therefore they oppose them with a firm consistency," Professor Schlemmer writes in his conclusions about worker attitudes.

"Some people may argue that it is precisely this tendency among South African blacks — to give priority to short-term survival and security — that has crippled the black liberation struggle," he says. "This is the kind of stance that can only be taken by well-educated middle-class activists, however, for whom survival and security is not an issue."

Fuel for Dispute

The survey, Professor Schlemmer concludes, shows that the divestment strategy, "whatever its validity as a means of providing opposition to vested white interests and structures, cannot claim to be a campaign for the black rank-and-file people of South Africa."

The findings seem certain to fuel the dispute over divestment since they seem to undermine those radical groups, most prominently in exile, such as the African National Congress, that argue in favor of the withdrawal of American investment. At the same time, they appear to support more moderate black movements and the "constructive engagement" policies pursued by the State Department, which advocates a persuasive rather than confrontational attitude toward the white authorities here.

The survey shows complex and apparently contradictory attitudes among black factory workers, all of whom, Professor Schlemmer says, were interviewed in their homes in the language of their choice for an average of just under two hours.

While an average of 75 percent rejected divestment, for instance, the figure was slightly lower — 71 percent — among workers employed by United States companies. When asked who benefited most from American investment, 46 percent said the South African Government was the main beneficiary, while 38 percent felt American investment helped blacks.

The survey was carried out last May in Johannesburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth and in industrial areas in the gold-mining belt around here called the Reef.

'Serious Grass-Roots Anger'

"These results," Professor Schlemmer writes, "give evidence of very serious grass-roots anger in places not usually expected to be at the forefront of black political thinking."

However, he suggests, the discontent does not crystallize into a form of political action that would jeopardize jobs.

"Most black workers," he says, "have a split consciousness at the present time, with a minority, albeit substantial, having a consistent militancy which covers both labor, community and political issues. The majority appear to value the benefits of wage employment sufficiently not to wish to see their work opportunities destabilized by political action."

Moreover, he says, the survey shows that black factory workers do not reject capitalism. "The black workers may be very angry but they have not yet become ideologically estranged from the present industrial system."

The findings, which seem to suggest a discontented but conservative factory work force, seem likely to embarrass those who portray the increasing militancy and organizational cohesion of South African labor as a precursor of revolution. Nonetheless, Professor Schlemmer says, there is great discontent and mistrust of management, imbued with a strong racial sentiment.

'Favorable Employment Image'

American companies, he says, offer a "very favorable employment image" and "for black workers the presence of U.S. capital in South Africa is highly valued."

"These production workers have very firm political views, and very substantial proportions are inclined to express support for the very agencies who are pursuing the objectives of disengagement abroad," Professor Schlemmer says.

Workers in American-owned factories, he says, "are significantly less militantly inclined than the sample in general."

Those from American-owned factories who were interviewed showed a universal belief that their employers "work with and support the Government." They were generally more satisfied with their employers' wage policies than were workers in South African concerns.

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OCT 2 1984

Anti-Defamation League
American Jewish
Committee

LYNNE IANNIELLO
Director, Communications

ADL of B'nai B'rith
American National Plaza, New York, NY 10017 212-490-2525 Telex 649278

NEWS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

New York, NY, Sept. 26....Fifteen American black community leaders from seven states returned today from a ten-day mission to Israel strengthened in their determination to improve black-Jewish relations in the United States.

According to the Rev. Charles Stith of the Union United Methodist Church in Boston, a spokesman for the group, the participants now feel "better able to play a constructive role in enhancing the relationship between blacks and Jews in America."

Rev. Stith, speaking at a news conference at the headquarters of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the mission's sponsor, said that he and his companions had met with Israeli government officials and representatives of all facets of the country's community in an effort to discuss issues of concern to both Jews and blacks in the U.S.

Declaring that the group -- state and city officials, educators, clergymen and jurists from Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York and Texas -- had arrived in Israel with "no illusions about solving the Middle East conflict," he said that their objective was to find common ground for establishing "a viable relationship, productive alliance and honest dialogue" with American Jews.

"Mostly," he said, "we went to Israel to listen and learn because we care."

Donald Mintz of New Orleans, vice chairman of ADL's National Executive Committee, who represented the League on the mission, noted that he had been on six previous missions to the Jewish State but that this one had been the "most profoundly moving and constructive."

He added that it was fitting that the mission concluded on the eve of Rosh Hashonah, the Jewish New Year, because it signals the beginning of a new chapter in black-Jewish relations and "a new dawn of understanding."

(more)

Rev. Stith said that among the concerns of the group were Israel's relationship with South Africa and the nations of Black Africa, the situation of Black Hebrews in Israel and ways to break the cycle of misunderstanding and misinformation that has divided blacks and Jews in recent years.

He added that the group was particularly impressed with its meetings with Chaim Herzog, Israel's President, and Joseph Burg, Minister of the Interior, during which they discussed the plight of the children of the Black Hebrews.

"We were concerned," Rev. Stith said, "about mistreatment and malnutrition of the children" in the Black Hebrew community.

He called the children victims of a situation in which the Black Hebrews isolate themselves in Israel. Describing what is happening as "a human tragedy," he went on to say that the mission was pleased by the interest and response of President Herzog and Mr. Burg who "had agonized over the problem for many years" and who agreed to do everything in their power to integrate the Black Hebrew children into Israeli life.

In regard to South Africa, Rev. Stith noted that every Israeli the group spoke to agreed that "apartheid is the great moral scandal of our age." He noted, however, that Israel is much maligned for trading with South Africa although Israel's trade amounts to only two-fifths of one percent of its annual international commerce while America's commercial relations with the African nation is many times that.

He praised Israel's relations with Black African nations, pointing out that the Jewish State is helping relieve Africa's central problem, "hunger." He noted Israeli educational and agricultural programs with Black African nations, including some with which it has no diplomatic relations.

Asked at the news conference where blacks could take Jews to further develop better understanding of black concerns, Rev. Stith described the trip as "the first leg" of a new intergroup program. Under consideration, he said, is dialogue between Jewish and black leaders in a city like Atlanta where there is a black mayor and black public and private institutions.

(more)

Leonard Zakim, director of ADL's New England Regional Office, who also represented ADL on the mission, said that the challenge now for both blacks and Jews is to get beyond "obstacles based on rhetoric" and extremists from both communities. The need, he said, is to build a relationship that responds to the real problems, needs and concerns of the 80's the way the broad coalition of the 60's responded to the requirements of that period.

In addition to Rev. Stith, Mr. Mintz and Mr. Zakim, participants in the mission were:

- The Rev. Howard Creecy of the St. Peter Missionary Baptist Church in Atlanta;
- Judge Joyce Alexander, a federal magistrate in Boston and former president of the Urban League there;
- Joseph Feaster, chief counsel of the Massachusetts Office of Administration and Finance in Boston;
- Ron Mclean, director of the Black Ecumenical Commission in Boston;
- Dr. Hassan Minor, director of the Corporation for Boston;
- Regis Groff, a member of the Colorado state legislature;
- The Rev. Joseph Washington of the Wesley United Methodist Church in Dorchester, MA;
- Judge Alexander Greene, a justice of the peace of Harris County, Texas;
- The Rev. Dr. Joseph Ratliff of the Brentwood Baptist Church in Houston, TX;
- The Rev. Emmanuel Cleaver of the St. James-Gregory United Methodist Church in Kansas City, MO;
- Sidney Barthelemy, a member of the New Orleans City Council;
- State Senator William Jefferson of New Orleans;
- Charles Teamer, vice president of Dillard University in New Orleans.
- Dr. Ilona Henderson, an associate professor of the Department of Special Programs of the City University in New York.

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Confidential

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: PRO AND CON

Division of
International Organizations
Sidney Liskofsky, Director
Allan L. Kagedan, Policy Analyst

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Pro

1. If the U.S. imposed economic sanctions, we would signal our belief that apartheid -- a uniquely repressive, racist system -- is morally repugnant.

2. If the U.S. considers economic sanctions against the Soviet Union for human rights violations, the U.S. cannot do less regarding South Africa.

3. Economic sanctions will encourage change in South Africa by sending the South African government a clear signal that the U.S. opposes apartheid, and by strengthening the resolve of the South African black population to resist apartheid.

Con

1. The true test of the utility of economic sanctions is not whether they make us feel good, but whether they work. While economic restrictions against South Africa have a moral purpose, specialists have argued that sanctions will have little practical impact in changing apartheid.

2. Placing economic sanctions on South Africa and without placing similar pressures on other states involved in repression of human rights; in Africa and elsewhere, is practicing selective morality.

3. Economic sanctions will deter positive change in South Africa. By restricting investment in or loans to South Africa, American companies which have instituted fair employment practices will be harmed and black unemployment will increase. Sanctions would mean the loss of U.S. access to, and leverage with South African leaders. As well, economic pressures have merely served to push South Africa to gain self sufficiency in energy, armaments, and other areas.

4. Economic sanctions will have a strong impact on the South African economy. Limiting U.S. bank loans will make it more difficult for South Africa to find foreign financing, and will set a moral tone that will encourage other countries to restrict loans to South Africa. Furthermore, voluntary fair employment practices, the "Sullivan Principles," have gone as far as they can; binding enforcement procedures are required.

5. By supporting sanctions against South Africa, the American Jewish community could reaffirm its historic commitment to equality for all, and also improve its relations with the American black community, which supports these measures strongly. This could foster black support for Jewish foreign policy concerns such as Israel's security and the rights of Soviet Jews.

6. By imposing economic sanctions on South Africa, the U.S. will improve ties with Black Africa and the Third World. This will deprive the Soviet Union of its ability to pose as the super-power with the moral position on apartheid. Furthermore, blacks will eventually rule South Africa and U.S. support for their aspirations now will forestall future Soviet influence.

4. The South African economy will not be affected much by sanctions. It is self-sufficient in important strategic materials, and could obtain loans and technology from sources other than the U.S. Furthermore, provisions for enforcing "fair employment practices" are unrealistic because U.S. courts will not be able to supervise their implementation.

5. There is a long history of anti-Semitism in South Africa, and American Jewish support for sanctions could encourage a backlash against South African Jews, and could harm Israel-South Africa relations.

6. South Africa is the strongest military power on the African continent, and serves as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the area. By weakening South Africa we would be whetting the Soviet appetite for expanding its power either directly or through proxy.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date October 2, 1984
to Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum
from Inge Lederer Gibel
subject

As we briefly discussed, I am attaching a Xerox copy of Naomi Chazan's latest paper on the relationship between Israel and South Africa.

As you read this sometimes painful document, please keep in mind that it is published by the Truman Institute of Hebrew University (with which Dr. Chazan has been associated for some time), as well as its author's background. Not only is she a solid, highly-respected academic, a serious scholar and, incidentally, one of the few Israelis in her field who is invited regularly to international conferences which include African, Moslem and Arab participants, but she is also very much of solid background and reputation as to her motivation and political outlook.

In sharing this material with you and the people receiving carbons, it is my hope that you may find it a good way to begin educating our top leadership on the problems presented by the relationship Dr. Chazan describes. You will note that she is no preacher; her arguments have to do with Israeli and Jewish self-interest - long term - and I believe that it is this approach that may be of appeal and have the greatest impact. This issue is going to come back to haunt us, it won't go away, and until now, as you know, it's been very hard to get really trustworthy information. It is unimaginable that even those who would deny or justify the Israel/S.A. relationship could

.../continued

(2)

impugn either her qualifications or loyalty to Israel.
(Dr. Chazan, incidentally, is the daughter of Ambassador Avrahm Harmon and Mrs. Zena Harmon, who represented Israel in Mexico City, as well as the wife of Barry Chazan, Director of Hebrew University's Melton Center for Jewish Education in the Diaspora.)

ILG:en
Attach.

cc: Kenneth Bandler
David Gordis
George Gruen
David Harris
Rabbi A. James Rudin






The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace

Truman Institute Reprints

Naomi Chazan

**The Fallacies of Pragmatism: Israeli
Foreign Policy towards South Africa**



Reprinted ■
from ■ **African Affairs**
Volume 82, No. 327 (April 1983)

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THE FALLACIES OF PRAGMATISM: ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

NAOMI CHAZAN

FEW OTHER TOPICS in Israeli foreign policy have been subjected to such intense scrutiny and heated debate as its burgeoning relations with the Republic of South Africa. During the past decade Israel and South Africa have developed an intricate web of interactions on a variety of levels. The evolution of this relationship has proceeded at a rapid pace and in the most demonstrative of manners. In effect, Israel has appeared to relinquish the cause of liberation in Southern Africa at precisely the same time as an international consensus has coalesced on the obsolescence of white domination in that area.

Rhetoric around this topic, not surprisingly, abounds. Israel's detractors have pointed an accusing finger at an alliance which to them furnishes ultimate proof of the illegitimacy and nefarious predilections of the Jewish state. Israel's friends are constantly embarrassed by a move that runs against their most ingrained principles. In response, Israel's defenders appeal to the logic of national interest, detail the extent of duplicity of its attackers, and decry the double standards of morality in international politics. The emotional tone and the vitriolic nature of these exchanges have tended to obscure the substance of the subject matter and to deflect attention from the main issues involved.

The paradox of Israel's South African connection

From an Israeli perspective, the South African link has engulfed policy-makers in a twofold paradox. First, an enormous gulf exists between Israel's declared position against apartheid and the continuation of ties with South Africa. Israel's consistent anti-apartheid stance is by no means mere posturing. Judaism condemns the immorality of racism. Jewish history is littered with instances of anti-Semitism and racial persecution. The state of Israel was established in the aftermath of the most horrifying genocide. As Israel's delegate to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights declared: 'Israel's opposition to the concept and practices of apartheid has been repeatedly voiced in the United Nations. I wish to reaffirm this position. Its roots are found

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in Jewish history and in the Jewish faith'.¹ It has become increasingly difficult for Israelis to reconcile their antipathy to any overt manifestation of racism with their collaboration with South Africa.

The second aspect of the Israeli dilemma centres on the contradiction between the persual of the South African connection and the damage that this has wrought. Unquestionably, the spotlight focused on this topic has harmed Israel in a multiplicity of ways. In international forums Israel has experienced condemnation and increased isolation because of its contacts with South Africa. This process commenced with the juxtaposition of Zionism and racism by the United Nations in November 1975.² Since then Israel has been berated repeatedly in UN organs for its choice of allies.³ The extent of the immobilization of Israel in international gatherings was driven home most dramatically in the General Assembly's recent decision to impose sanctions on the country. Although Israel's gradual ostracization from the world community can hardly be attributed solely to its South African ties, these have furnished an all too convenient pretext for the expression of anti-Israeli sentiment.

Israel's bilateral relations have also been adversely affected by this connection. African states have frequently utilized this link not only to excuse their reluctance to re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel, but, more pertinently, to expound publicly on the difficulties inherent in their joint efforts to attain concerted action against the South African regime.⁴ The Soviet bloc and the Arab world, predictably, have pounced on this alliance as further evidence of Israeli imperialism.⁵ Even Israel's traditional partners in Western Europe have voiced dismay and discomfort over Israel's close ties with the white regime.⁶ In the United States criticism has come both from official circles and from leaders of the American Jewish community.⁷ The South African

1. Speech by Ambassador of Israel, addressed to the Committee on Human Rights, on Israel's Position Regarding the Policy of Apartheid and Israel/South African Cooperation, Geneva, 16 February 1981. Similar statements have consistently been made by Israeli delegates in the past.

2. A good analysis of the 1975 vote may be found in Samuel Decalo, 'Africa and the UN Anti-Zionism Resolution, Roots and Causes', *Cultures et Developpement*, 8 (1976), pp. 89-117. For an African perspective on the significance of the UN for Israel, see: Peter Anyang'-Nyong'o, 'The Impact of the Middle East Conflict in African Political Orientations and Behaviour', in Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Baha Abu-Luban (eds.), *Settler Regimes in Africa and the Arab World: the illusion of endurance* (Wilmette: The Medina University Press International, 1974), p. 195.

3. United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, Supplement 22, 1976-1981. Also: 'Report on the Relations between Israel and South Africa', in Richard P. Stevens and Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri (eds.), *Israel and South Africa: the progression of a relationship*, (New Brunswick: North American, Inc. 1977, rev. ed.), pp. 202-222.

4. This became most apparent in the recent UN vote to impose sanctions on Israel. For a more general analysis see Timothy M. Shaw, 'Oil, Israel, and OAU: an introduction to the political economy of energy in southern Africa', *Africa Today*, 23 (1976), pp. 15-26.

5. For the Soviet view: S. Astrakhov, 'Alliance Between Tel-Aviv and Pretoria', *International Affairs* (Moscow), 8 (1977), pp. 62-66.

6. Reported in: Mark Segal, 'South Africa Connections', *Jerusalem Post*, 29 August 1976.

7. This despite many efforts made recently by the South African government to woo US Jews. For details see *South Africa Digest*, 10 March 1978, p. 11.

relationship has further marred the atmosphere of Black-Jewish interactions, and caused severe stress in the ties between these two communities.⁸

The ramifications of the South African enterprise have therefore exposed Israel to public wrath. This association has tarnished the Israeli image abroad, and despite attempts to minimize the backlash, it has strengthened the hands of those who have tried to establish the existence of a Tel Aviv-Pretoria-Taipei axis.⁹ Attribution of membership in an international club of pariah states is hardly comforting. Israeli policymakers are now confronting the need to balance the benefits accruing from the South African link against the palpable harm to Israel's global standing and credibility that it has unleashed.

Given the very real issues stemming from the dual currents of Israel's South African paradox, the predominant question that arises, given that this link is so problematic and even detrimental, is this: why does it continue and expand? The purpose of this article is to tackle the key components of this puzzle in an attempt to come to grips with the concrete issues surrounding the conduct of Israel's present foreign policy towards South Africa.

Specifically, this exploration will deal with three interrelated facets of the problem. First, it will briefly outline the dynamic of the Israeli political association with South Africa. Second, it will examine in depth some of the preferred reasons for this alliance, and suggest several alternative explanations. Third, it will evaluate the immediate and long-term repercussions of this association in order to assess the possibilities for change.

The main contention of this article is that Israel has become embroiled in an unequal relationship with ambiguous returns. The scope of exchange, though diverse, is meagre. The benefit Israel derives from these interchanges is unclear; in any event it is in no way commensurate to that reaped by the other partner in the equation. Thus, this analysis will attempt to demonstrate—popular myths notwithstanding—that this policy from Israeli viewpoint makes very little sense indeed.¹⁰

If, as this article posits, Israel's South African connection has been maintained by a bewildering admixture of emotion, lack of knowledge, external machination, narrow interests, and inertia, then it might be possible to illuminate the ambivalence that surrounds its underpinnings and consequences. On this basis, it would not be too farfetched to suggest that the time might be ripe for a thorough revision of Israel's policies in Southern Africa.

8. Bayard Rustin to Arthur Hertzberg, letter dated 27 August 1976 (circulated copy of correspondence).

9. This terminology is rampant. For an extreme example of the admixture of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism see: Lindsay Barrett, 'Israel (sic) and Africa: Jewish economic interests', *Afriscopes*, 8, No 7 (1978), pp. 14-16.

10. Israelis tend to assume that there must be a good reason for the government's stance viv-à-vis South Africa. This sentiment exists elsewhere as well, although few efforts have been made to substantiate it.

The political backdrop

The evolution of Israel's relations with South Africa may be divided into four distinct phases.¹¹ The first stage commenced with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and extended until 1961. During this period, which coincided with the consolidation of Afrikaner power in South Africa, Israel supported correct, albeit not overly cordial, contacts with South Africa. An Israeli legation was set up in Pretoria, and, though South Africa was content to allow Britain to represent its interests in Israel, the foundations for diplomatic communication were laid down. Some exchanges of visitors did take place: Moshe Sharett, then Foreign Minister,¹² went to South Africa in 1951 at the behest of the Jewish community. South African Premier D. F. Malan came to Israel in 1953, the first head of government to make an official visit to the country. But beyond these formalities and the cementing of Israeli contacts with the South African Jewish community, these years were uneventful.

The second stage in Israeli-South African contacts covered the years between 1961 and 1967. In 1961 Israel joined an anti-apartheid censure initiative in the United Nations. In 1962, this vote was repeated, and by 1963 Israel had withdrawn its diplomatic delegate to South Africa, unilaterally reducing its representation to a consular level. In keeping with its efforts to woo the new states of Black Africa, Israeli officials avoided any unnecessary association with the South African regime. These moves suggested that, when Israel had a choice between Black Africa and South Africa, it opted unequivocally for the former.¹³ The new direction in Israel's policy culminated in 1966, when Israel voted with the UN majority to relieve South Africa of its mandate over Namibia. During this phase Israel's ties with South Africa cooled perceptibly. By 1967 real contacts had dwindled to a mere trickle.

Following the Six Day War, a certain thawing was evident, at least from the South African side. South Africans praised Israel's military victory, and the South African government began to make overtures towards Israel. Between 1967 and 1973, a period of transition, efforts were made to reestablish trade and commercial contacts, and the South Africans set up a consulate in Tel-Aviv. Israel, for its part, responded only partially to these gestures. While the vigour with which it had pursued anti-apartheid measures waned, Israel continued to back efforts to effect a change in southern Africa. In 1971 the government offered a financial contribution to the Organization of African Unity's African Liberation Committee. Although this donation was rejected by the OAU, it led to an almost total break in Israel-South African relations.¹⁴

11. Pre-state contacts, so belaboured by Richard P. Stevens, 'Smuts and Weizmann: a study in South African Zionist cooperation', in Stevens and Elmessiri, *Israel and South Africa* (also appeared in Abu-Lughod and Abu Lahan, *Settler Regimes*, pp. 173-186), did exist. Those that are pertinent to understanding the present situation will be elaborated upon in other parts of the paper.

12. And not Prime Minister, as many sources (apparently quoting each other) insist.

13. Highlighted by Yosef Goell, 'Israel/South Africa: a view from Jerusalem', *Africa Report* (November-December 1980), pp. 18-22.

14. South Africa cut off the flow of Jewish funds to Israel at the time.

Israel also resisted requests to upgrade its representation in South Africa. Gradually during these years, however, Israel's links with South Africa improved. And, as ties with Black African states became more precarious, this connection assumed a new prominence.

The events of 1973 constituted a turning point in Israeli-South African interactions. Three interrelated occurrences lead to a drastic reversal of previous trends. First, the Yom Kippur War (which South Africa followed with more than casual interest¹⁵) severely shattered the equanimity that had characterized Israeli policies after 1967. Secondly, the Arab oil embargo altered the relations between Israel and the West, creating a breach in what had heretofore been the backbone of Israel's international support system. And third, by the end of 1973 all but four African states had severed diplomatic relations with Israel.¹⁶ This confluence of upheavals, by rendering Israel exposed in the international arena, laid the groundwork for the launching of the fourth, and current phase in Israeli-South African relations.

In early 1974 the Israeli government decided to reinstate its diplomatic representation in South Africa. Mr Yitzhak Unna, then Consul General, was appointed Israel's ambassador to Pretoria. In that year senior Israeli officials (including Moshe Dayan and Haim Herzog) visited South Africa and held talks with South African leaders. The then Minister of Information, Dr Connie Mulder, came to Israel. Trade relations between the two countries took on a new impetus. By 1975 the Israeli-South African link had begun to strengthen. Following the UN anti-Zionist resolution in November, South Africa appointed its first ambassador to Israel, Dr Charles Fincham. In April 1976, Prime Minister Rabin treated Prime Minister B. J. Vorster to an official state visit, indicating that Israel was now willing to reciprocate the South African initiatives of previous years.¹⁷ At the end of this demonstrative tour Israel and South Africa concluded a comprehensive pact that covered a range of commercial, trade, cooperative, fiscal, and, in all probability, military spheres. A joint ministerial committee, to meet at least once a year, was created to oversee the implementation of the pact.¹⁸ The Vorster visit in effect drew Israel and South Africa into a complex network of mutual collaboration.

In 1976 Israel absented itself from anti-apartheid votes at the UN.¹⁹ Yet, although cooperative ventures developed apace, Israel still attempted to downplay the South African connection and forbade ministerial visits to South Africa. Thus, when the Likud coalition under the leadership of Menahem Begin came

15. Reports of South African involvement in the 1973 war, despite a keen interest in events, were vigorously denied: *South Africa Digest*, 9 November 1973, p. 9.

16. Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mauritius (which cut diplomatic links in 1976).

17. This willingness to respond to South African overtures was expressed in an editorial in *The Jerusalem Post*, 11 April 1976 and echoed with few exceptions in the Israeli press.

18. One of the most thoughtful reviews of the visit was published by Benjamin Pogrund, 'Israel's South Africa Ties,' *Swasa*, 3, No 18 (May 1976). For further details see Azim Husain, 'The West, South Africa, and Israel: a strategic triangle', *Third World Quarterly*, 4, (1982), pp. 70-71.

19. *Maariv*, 16 September 1976.

to power, South African government circles expressed satisfaction with the selection of the new Premier (who had visited South Africa and was the chairman of the Israel-South Africa Friendship Society).²⁰

The Likud government has not exhibited the same unease with the South African association that characterized the position of key figures in the Labour Party leadership.²¹ The South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, R. F. (Pik) Botha, visited Israel shortly after the political changeover and reaffirmed South Africa's support for Israel. The flow of official and unofficial exchanges since then has grown, and by early 1982 overt interactions appeared to have reached an all-time high.²²

The pattern of the progression of South African political relations with Israel over the past thirty-four years has vacillated significantly. Since 1967, however, with minor gyrations, what had been a casual encounter blossomed into a full-grown relationship. The intensity and rapidity with which this connection has been nourished requires more systematic explanation.

The balance sheet of Israeli interests in South Africa

The reasons forwarded for the proliferation of Israel's South African connections in recent years rest on considerations of pragmatic self-interest. Although no public acknowledgement has been forthcoming, the underlying assumption of participants and observers alike has been that compromises on moral issues have been made in the name of more tangible concerns. It is therefore necessary to examine with some care precisely what interests are actually being furthered by this alliance, at what price, and to what end.

The first Israeli national interest ostensibly served by the South African connection relates to the well-being of South Africa's Jewish population. Since the inception of the state a major leitmotif of Israeli foreign policy has been its concern for world Jewry. Israeli leaders have viewed the South African Jewish community as a unique instance of the application of this guide-rule.

The South African Jewish community, which numbered 117,990 in the 1970 census (3 per cent of the white population) is extremely homogeneous and highly structured. The bulk of Jews are of Lithuanian extraction. Since the main influx in the late nineteenth century, South African Jews have been constantly caught between their Jewishness and their whiteness. They are a minority within what is itself a rigidly structured ruling white minority. The economically secure Jewish community's response to their dilemma has been

20. *Maariv*, 19 May 1977; *Al Hamishmar*, 22 May 1977; *South Africa Digest*, 27 May 1977.

21. Many Labour Party members expressed private dissatisfaction with the link. Of special note is Professor Shlomo Avineri's refusal to assume his post as Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until the Vorster visit ended and his reluctance to permit a strengthening of links during his tenure.

22. Unna was replaced by Joseph Harmelin, formerly head of Israel's security services. In the summer of 1981 Eliahu Lankin, a Jerusalem attorney, assumed the post of Israeli Ambassador to South Africa. The present South African Ambassador is Derek S. Franklin, formerly under-secretary in the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

to organise around two guiding institutions: the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and the South African Zionist Federation.

Although this is hardly the place to detail the history of South Africa's Jews, three themes of this experience are pertinent.²³ The first strain in Jewish life in South Africa has been anti-Semitism. Even before the establishment of the Republic in 1910, Jews were systematically excluded from the mainstream of white society in the country. In the 1930s and 1940s the Ossewabrandwag and the Greyshirts used scare tactics against Jews. Segments of the Afrikaner leadership, avowedly racist and anti-Semitic, supported the limitation of Jewish immigration to South Africa in 1937, and spent the better part of the war in internment camps because of their Nazi sympathies. The National Party lifted its anti-Jewish ban only in 1954. The recurrence of anti-Semitic outbreaks persist to this day.²⁴ A second, and interrelated, current in the South African Jewish experience concerns its position vis-à-vis the dominant philosophy of apartheid. Until recently, South Africa's Jewish leadership has systematically abstained from provoking the ruling oligarchy. Individual Jews, however, have not only served at the forefront of the anti-apartheid struggle, but have been vocal in their attacks on the quiescence and acquiescence of their fellow Jews.²⁵ If it is thus correct to say that many white liberals and radicals were Jews, it is equally correct that not many Jews were liberals and radicals.²⁶ In this context, Zionism, the third component of the South African Jewish triangle, has served as both a prop and an escape from the realities of Jewish existence in the country. Contacts with the Zionist movement and Israel have constituted a prominent dimension of Jewish life. The Zionist movement in South Africa replicated party divisions within Israel, and links (on a personal, communal, normative and financial basis) have been consistently close throughout the years. This association has exposed South African Jews to charges of dual loyalty at the same time as it furnished an important outlet from the dilemma of being a Jew in contemporary South Africa.

The direct links between Israel and the Jews of South Africa have followed several concurrent paths. First, and perhaps foremost, South African Jews have contributed to Israel more per capita than any other Jewish community in the world. This transfer of funds has been facilitated by the government's agreement to permit the transit of Jewish donations to Israel despite strict restrictions on the exportation of capital. While individual contributions from

23. By far the most superior work on this topic is Gideon Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: the South African experience, 1910-1967*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1980).

24. For another view see: 'Afrikaner and Jew Show Route to Reconciliation', *To the Point International*, 12 December 1980. One of the most bizarre aspects of the Israeli connection to South Africa was the Vorster visit to the Holocaust Memorial at Yad Vashem.

25. Neville Rubin, 'The Impact of Zionism and Israel on the Political Orientation and Behaviour of South African Jews', in Abu-Lughod and Abu-Lahan, *Settler Regimes*, pp. 165-172; Leslie Rubin, 'South African Jewry and Apartheid', *Africa Report* (February 1970), pp. 22-24 (and response by Henry Katzew, 'South African Jews and Politics, Another View', pp. 22, 23).

26. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, p. 304.

South Africa are high, the absolute quantity of monies received from South Africa falls far below that of the much larger Jewish communities of the United States, Britain, France, and Canada, and its impact on Israel should not be exaggerated.²⁷ Nevertheless, the fund-raising activities of the Israel United Appeal are an integral element of the annual calendar of South African Jewry. These have provided for a steady flow of Israeli dignitaries to South Africa, and of South African missions to Israel.²⁸

South African Jews also maintain contact with Israel through ties with immigrants from South Africa. Such prominent politicians and diplomats as Abba Eban, Michael Comay, Shmuel Katz, and the late Louis Pincus are of South African extraction. South African students in Israel have frequently settled in the country, and the Zionist federation continues to encourage Aliyah (immigration) to Israel. Once again, however, the magnitude of this personal link need not be overdrawn. Since the establishment of Israel, 12,000 South African Jews have settled in the state, far less than the South African Jewish diaspora in London or Toronto. Moreover, the number of Israelis currently residing in South Africa, estimated at 20,000, outnumbers the total number of South African Jews who have migrated to Israel.²⁹

Alongside these ties, religious interchanges have flourished. Especially in the 1970s the Jewish community in South Africa has looked towards Israel's religious establishment for spiritual sustenance and practical support. Israel supplies many Jewish educators and Rabbis, and Israel's religious leaders have made frequent trips to the country. More recently, the political dimension of these links has expanded, since the Likud government in Israel developed particularly close relations with the revisionist Herut faction that has dominated the South African Zionist Federation since the early 1970s.³⁰ Approval of these multi-faceted links was granted by Prime Minister Botha, who stated that the special relationship with the Jewish state '... has no bearing on the loyalty which I know our Jewish citizens hold for South Africa'.³¹

That the links between South Africa's Jews and Israel are exceedingly close cannot be denied; what can be questioned is the degree to which Israel's affinity with and concern for South African Jews is assisted by its growing relationship with the Republic of South Africa. The answer is far from clear cut. In the first instance, Israel's collaboration with South Africa has hardly ameliorated some of the internal dilemmas of South African Jewry. Examples of continuing anti-Semitism have not abated.³² The highest officials of the South

27. For a comparison with other contributions: between 1948-1966 receipts from South Africa totalled \$38,757,000 versus \$764,572,000 from US Jewry. *Ibid*, p. 239.

28. Most recently Abba Eban, *South Africa Jewish Times*, 25 February 1981.

29. My thanks to Gideon Shimoni for his clarification of these numbers.

30. The leader of South African Revisionists, Harry Hurwitz, was appointed personal advisor to Begin on external information, and later became Minister to Washington, *To the Point International*, 6 March 1978.

31. Quoted in *South Africa Jewish Times*, 3 September 1980.

32. Anti-Semitic pamphlets are distributed regularly. A report on these incidents was published in *Maariv*, 20 July 1978.

African government continue to berate Jews for their dual identities.³³ And internal squabbles on the nature of the Jewish role in South Africa have not been resolved in the wake of this tie. Second, and more puzzling, has been the tangible reduction in Zionist fervour in South Africa since the mid-1970s. The number of immigrants has dwindled, interest in Israel has lessened, and Zionist activities attract fewer supporters.³⁴ Third, and most problematically, Israel's links with South Africa have gained momentum at exactly the same time as South Africa's Jewish community, via the pronouncements of the Jewish Board of Deputies, has announced its commitment to the abolition of apartheid.³⁵ This renewal of the social justice role of South Africa's organized Jewry stands in blatant dissonance with Israel's collaboration with South Africa.

Even if, as some observers maintain, the South African-Israeli link nevertheless provides Jews in that country with a short-term security blanket,³⁶ the long-term effects on the well-being of South African Jews are debatable. Were Israeli policymakers as truly interested in the future of South African Jews as they maintain, they would display a much greater sensitivity to the tides of change in South Africa and to the need to define better the Jewish place within this transformation. No such forward looking awareness is presently apparent. In this context, the claim that Israel's concern for South Africa's Jews justifies the improvement of relations with South Africa can hardly be supported either empirically or logically.

The feebleness of the Jewish argument is further corroborated by the fact that Israeli foreign policy has not been subservient to the sensitivities of the Jewish diaspora when other considerations have intruded.³⁷ Israel has not supported the Soviet Union because of its large and subjugated Jewish community. Recent relations with the United States have surely given little succour to American Jews. More to the point, Israel in the past took strongly anti-apartheid positions in the name not only of morality and Israeli interests, but also of oppressed Jewish communities elsewhere.³⁸

The suggestion that Israel's present policy in southern Africa is an outgrowth of its Jewish concerns is not borne out under close investigation. Further-

33. Statement by former South African Minister of Justice and Police, Jimmy Kruger, *Jerusalem Post*, 23 November 1977.

34. Peter Medding's comments in Gideon Shimoni, 'Jewish National Identification in the Diaspora: the South African community,' Background Paper no. 2, prepared for the President's of Israel's Sixth International Seminar on World Jewry and the State of Israel, 1981, p. 17. Also: *Maariv*, 28 May 1975.

35. *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 July 1980. Contrast with: 'South Africa's Jews: widely misunderstood community', *To the Point International*, 20 September 1980.

36. Gideon Shimoni, 'Jewish National Identification', maintains that the position of Jews in South Africa is partly a function of relations with Israel.

37. Hirsh Goodman 'Parallel Illusions', *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, 11 September 1981 argues nevertheless that the Jewish interest is paramount.

38. D. Ben-Gurion's defence of Israel's anti-apartheid vote in the Knesset in 1961 is instructive. Details in Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, p. 321.

more, this proposition has little explanatory value in understanding the reasons for Israel's recent rapprochement with South Africa.

The second set of arguments for Israel's present South African policy highlights economic matters. The implicit assumption behind this category of reasons is that official contact can be shown to promote the Israeli economy. Verification of this justification rests on an assessment of the profitability of Israel's material exchanges with South Africa.

Israeli-South African economic links have mushroomed during the past decade. The substance of cooperation in trade and investment has been ironed out in a series of agreements reached between the two countries since the 1976 Rabin-Vorster pact. The nature and direction of economic contacts is supervised by the minister and senior officials of the economic and finance ministries of the respective countries, who have exchanged visits frequently since 1975.³⁹ Two organizations, the Tel-Aviv based Israel-South Africa Chamber of Commerce and the Johannesburg based South Africa-Israel Chamber of Economic Relations have also played their parts in these growing economic exchanges.

Trade is the first component of the new Israel-South African economic alliance. South African exports to Israel include a variety of raw materials and semi-finished products, ranging from steel, timber, tobacco, hides, wool and sugar, to frozen meat, canned food stuffs (such as beer, apple juice, peanut butter), and even, ironically, fresh citrus fruit and prefabricated wooden houses.⁴⁰ Three items account for the bulk of the trade. Steel alone comprises 40 per cent of South Africa's exports to Israel.⁴¹ Raw diamonds, crucial to Israel's cutting industry, while purchased through the Central Selling Organization in London, originate mostly from South Africa.⁴² Lately, coal has assumed a most significant place in South Africa's exports to Israel. The coal deal, negotiated in 1979, provides for the supply of \$23 million of coal per annum for Israel's Hadera plant, thus making South Africa Israel's main source of coal.⁴³

Israel, in turn, exports mostly finished products to South Africa. These include agricultural machinery, textiles, and electrical goods. Of special note

39. In 1975 the deputy Minister of Economic Affairs visited Israel (*Maariv*, 20 August 1975). In August 1976, the South African Minister of Labour and Mining came to Israel (*Jerusalem Post*, 3 August 1976). A high level trade mission came in September 1976 (*Jerusalem Post*, 2 September 1976). In 1978 Owen Horwood came, and then met Israeli Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich in Belgrade (*Haaretz*, 25 September 1978). Israel's Finance Ministers Y. Rabinowitz and S. Ehrlich were in South Africa in 1976 and 1978 respectively.

40. These details culled from the Israeli press, 1976-1981. It is sufficient to enter an Israeli supermarket to see the extent of the influx of South African goods.

41. *South Africa Digest*, 30 July 1976.

42. Peter Hellyer, 'Israel and South Africa: the racists allied', in A. W. Kayyali (ed), *Zionism, Imperialism and Racism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 288-289; Husain, 'The West, South Africa, and Israel', p. 71.

43. *The Economist*, 5 November 1977, p. 91. Kunirum Osia, *Israel, South Africa and Black Africa: a study of the primacy of the politics of expediency* (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 25-26. Other suppliers include the United States and Australia.

are South African purchases of sophisticated Israeli electronic equipment and diamond cutting machinery.⁴⁴ In effect, then, trade between Israel and South Africa conforms to the well-known pattern of an exchange of raw material for manpower and technology.⁴⁵

The volume of trade between Israel and South Africa has expanded tenfold in the past decade. From a level of \$20.9 million in 1970, the figure jumped to \$199.3 million in 1979.⁴⁶ South African exports to Israel grew from \$10.2 million in 1970 to \$151.1 million in 1979 (i.e. by a factor of 15), whereas Israeli exports to South Africa expanded only fivefold, from \$10.7 million to \$48.2 million in 1979. Thus, the rapid yet unbalanced pace of growth is perhaps the key characteristic of Israel's commercial contact with South Africa.

The second, and lesser known, facet of Israeli-South African economic exchange consists of mutual investments and joint ventures. South African financing has been instrumental in establishing joint companies in Israel, the most prominent of which is Iskoor, a joint venture between the South-African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) and Koor Industries for the distribution of steel in Israel.⁴⁷ South African investors have poured money into a variety of Israeli schemes, ranging from a new hydro-electric system that will divert water from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea, regional development projects in the Negev, a plan for linking Eilat and Tel-Aviv by rail, and the construction of the coal loading quay in Hadera, to investments in the Tel-Aviv marineland and dolphinarium and a brush factory on a kibbutz.⁴⁸ Subsidiaries of South African companies have sprung up in Israel, most notably Tagun Rubber, a Calan subsidiary, Transvaal Mattress, and Hendler and Hendler.⁴⁹ Other opportunities are being investigated systematically by South African business interests.⁵⁰

In contrast, Israeli investment in South Africa is miniscule (indeed, it accounts for barely .01 per cent of total Israeli investment per annum).⁵¹ Tadiran, Israel's large electronics firm, has established several plants in South Africa in cooperation with the local Calan conglomerate. Other Israeli companies, mostly in construction and agricultural technology, have established

44. *Maariv*, 1 June 1978. Full details have appeared in the *Jerusalem Post*, 1976-1981.

45. Rosalynde Ainslee, 'Israel and South Africa: an unlikely alliance?', U.N. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Centre Against Apartheid, Document 20/1981 (July 1981), presents very full details.

46. Computed from table in Ethan Nadelman, 'Israel and Black Africa: a rapprochement?' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 19, (1981), p. 191.

47. *South Africa Digest*, 26 October 1973.

48. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, 'South Africa and Israel's Strategy of Survival', *New Outlook*, 20 (1977), p. 56, provides information on the hydro-electric project. The railroad deal is detailed in 'Israel and South Africa: new cooperation', *Africa Confidential*, (December 1977), p. 5.

49. *South Africa Jewish Times*, 24 October 1979; *Maariv*, 13 June 1978.

50. *Jerusalem Post*, 4 August 1976. In November 1981 a delegation of forty industrialists visited Israel.

51. Victor Low, 'Israel and South Africa', (Unpublished paper, Jerusalem 1982). Dr Low kindly allowed the author to peruse a draft of his paper prior to publication.

South African subsidiaries.⁵² But these efforts have been negligible, as witnessed by the real effort made very recently to encourage greater Israeli investment in South Africa.⁵³

The economic cooperation between Israel and South Africa on this level has been facilitated by the extension of a substantial credit line to Israel for imports from South Africa and by the special permission granted to augment the total of South African investments in the country.⁵⁴ The intense interest exhibited by South Africa in Israeli ventures derives in no small measure from the desire to utilize Israel as a stepping stone for reaching European markets. Local processing of semi-finished goods enables South African businessmen to relabel their products and by-pass the severe controls on imports from South Africa imposed by the European Economic Community. Israel has thus come to provide, whether consciously or not, a vital bridgehead for South African exports to Europe and the United States.⁵⁴

The diversification of economic contacts and collaboration has been the hallmark of the Israel-South African economic exchanges of recent years. But whether this feverish activity is also economically worthwhile to Israel merits further examination. In fact, in purely economic terms this alliance is problematic from an Israeli standpoint on a number of counts. In the first instance, the scope of contacts with South Africa is really quite restricted. The South African market contributes only one per cent of the export trade, and imports from South Africa account for barely two per cent of totals. For South Africa the figures are even more infinitesimal, with the trade volume with Israel reaching not even one per cent of annual commerce.⁵⁶ For Israel, according to official statistics, relations with Black Africa still accounted in 1982 for a more significant proportion of trade than did contacts with South Africa.⁵⁷ In comparison, the South African exchange with African states, with the Arab world, and with the West renders Israel's relative role close to meaningless.⁵⁸ It is exceedingly doubtful that the scope of Israel's ties with South Africa in the economic sphere justifies the undue attention that these links have drawn.

52. *Jerusalem Post*, 30 December 1976.

53. A trade survey showed that Israelis could invest in 46 products in South Africa. *Zionist Record*, 8 August 1980. Ads appear frequently in the Israeli press. A symposium was held in Tel-Aviv in early 1982 to attract Israeli investment to South Africa, *South Africa Digest*, 12 February 1982.

54. 'South Africa: the Israeli connection', *Africa Confidential* (August 1978), pp. 5-6. An accord to avoid double taxation was signed in the same year, *Haaretz*, 13 February 1978.

55. This fronting process is well known. References to it may be found in the Israeli press: *Haaretz*, 3 February 1978; *Maariv*, 13 February, 1978; *Jerusalem Post*, 23 March 1978. For another view see: 'New Israel-South Africa Ties', *Arab Palestinian Resistance*, (1976), pp. 82-87.

56. Kenneth Adelman, 'Israel-South Africa: the club of pariahs', *Africa Report* (November-December 1980), pp. 8-11.

57. Figures supplied by Israel Ministry of Commerce and Industry. These figures do not include diamonds and military transfers. Nigeria remains Israel's largest trading partner in Black Africa.

58. For the West, Husain, 'The West, South Africa, and Israel', p. 47. For Africa, the detailed accounts in 'Africa's Trade with South Africa', *Afriscope*, (July 1978), pp. 22-26; and Moshe Dechter, *South Africa and Black Africa: a report on growing trade relations*, (New York, American Jewish congress, 1976).

A second objection to this economic collaboration stems from the unequal benefits that Israel derives from this relationship. Israel has a growing negative trade balance with South Africa. Israeli goods are subjected to stiff South African import levies.⁵⁹ Many South African imports compete with locally produced goods. The returns that Israel receives economically are hence highly equivocal. It might not be too rash to posit that during the past decade the Israeli economic position vis-à-vis South Africa has lapsed into one of rank inequality and incipient dependency.

However much the statistics are manipulated and arguments in terms of short term gains are employed, it is impossible to demonstrate a strong economic argument in favour of the current economic links. At a specific level, for instance, Israel's readiness to form economic links with the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei, and the Bantu Investment Corporation possesses next to no economic virtue.⁶⁰ More generally, the constant reminder and commentary on economic interactions cannot show that any major economic purpose is being served.

In short, then, Israel's economic returns from the South African connection are much more problem-ridden than they appear on the surface. When coupled with the possible economic harm brought about through the circumscription of contacts with potential partners, it becomes difficult to understand the rationale behind Israel's purported economic interest in South Africa.

This conclusion holds even more firmly for the third set of interests supposedly upholding Israel's South African connection: those related to cultural, academic, and sports links. The presumption in this connection is that close formal ties are necessary to support ongoing links in an array of mutual endeavours. Once again, in order to evaluate the merits of this claim it is necessary to take a closer look at the exchanges involved.

The first is that of tourism. In the past decade tourism between Israel and South Africa has grown moderately. In 1979 approximately 10,000 Israelis visited South Africa (from a total outward Israeli movement of some 500,000).⁶¹ The rise in visits from Israel prompted the South African Tourist Corporation to open a branch in Tel-Aviv. This office is actively engaged in promoting tourism to South Africa.⁶² And the South African travel agents association has held a conference in Israel. South African tourism to Israel has also been on the increase, with approximately 25,000 tourists, many of them black, visiting Israel in 1980.⁶³ Despite the steady stream of visitors in both directions, their movement accounts for only small percentages of the tourist trade of the two countries. Moreover, the rise in tourism triggered a conflict

59. Raised recently to 10 per cent, *Haaretz*, 18 February 1982.

60. 'Israel to Invest in Homelands', *New African* (April 1977).

61. *Maariv*, 27 July 1979; *Haaretz*, 15 May 1979.

62. One example is a pamphlet entitled: 'The Jewish Heritage is South Africa', published by the South African Tourist Corporation.

63. *South Africa Digest*, 24 October 1980.

between South African Airways and El Al about the frequency of travel and landing rights on the Tel-Aviv-Johannesburg route. Israel has had to make concessions to the South African carrier which have reduced profits on this line.⁶⁴

There have also been sporadic cultural exchanges between Israel and South Africa. In 1973 and 1974 fashion models toured South Africa, as did the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra. Some Israeli singers have performed in South Africa, including the Jerusalem Song and Dance Ensemble, and the prestigious Bat Dor and Batsheva dance troupes, who visited South Africa in 1976 and 1981 respectively. A few Israeli artists have exhibited in South Africa. In the opposite direction some South African productions have stopped in Israel, among them the Johannesburg Youth Ballet and several plays.⁶⁵ These exchanges, however, have been mostly symbolic and may hardly be deemed of quantitative import. In fact, many Israelis have protested in favour of limiting cultural contacts with South Africa, and a diplomatic incident ensued after Israel's ambassador refused to attend the opening of a white-only production of the musical 'Golda'.⁶⁷ In the same vein, the striking of twin city agreements between Haifa and Cape Town and Simonstown and Akko has not gone uncriticized.⁶⁸

Sports links have also often been more problematic than worthwhile. Some South African rugby teams (a non-sport in Israel) have played in the country. And South African and Israeli gymnasts have exchanged visits. Similarly, two Israeli swimmers have competed in South Africa, as has Israel's foremost tennis pro, Shlomo Glickstein.⁶⁹ But by and large Israeli sports associations have shunned contact with South Africa, and rescinded a 1979 directive prohibiting all sports contact with South Africa only under extreme political pressure.⁷⁰

Some cooperation does exist between Israel and South Africa on the academic level. In 1976 Israel's National Council for Research and Development signed an agreement with South Africa's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Other contracts have been completed in the medical and agricultural fields. Since then South African scientific and medical personnel have participated in conferences and colloquia in Israel, most recently a cardiology conference attended by Dr Christian Barnard.⁷¹ Israeli academic visits to

64. *Yediot Aharonot*, 20 March 1978.

65. These visits were arranged by the South Africa Zionist Federation, *Jerusalem Post*, 6 August 1974.

66. *Haaretz*, 16 June 1977, gives a run down of these exchanges.

67. Details in *South Africa Digest*, 7 July 1978. An Israeli, Avi Ostrovsky, conducts the only multi-racial orchestra in South Africa.

68. Extremely harsh denunciations in Omar Ibrahim, 'Israel-South Africa Entente', *Mainstream*, (23 October 1976).

69. These athletes recently appeared on the international lists of sports people banned from international competition.

70. *Maariv*, 24 January 1979.

71. Again, based on various press items, 1976-1981.

South Africa have been of several sorts. Some Israeli scholars have toured South Africa on a private basis at the invitation of the South African government.⁷² Others have come as guests of the South African Jewish community.⁷³ And still others have carried on fund-raising missions for Israeli universities.⁷⁴ The delicacy of these academic contacts has prompted Israeli academic circles to understate them as much as possible. The Hebrew University has even forbidden members of its teaching staff to visit South Africa in other than a private capacity unless on missions of purely Jewish concern.

The extent of Israeli-South African links in cultural and educational fields is simply very insignificant. Interest in these exchanges in Israel is minimal, and they elicit no clear benefit; these contacts are, if anything, a byproduct of, rather than a reason for, Israel's South African alliance. To suggest that these links lie at the root of this association is to confuse cause with effect.

The political interest

The Jewish economic and cultural interests supposedly underlying Israel's continuing cooperation with South Africa have been shown to be of little explanatory consequence. A fourth set of interests of a more purely political bent appears on the surface to be more compelling.

The contention that the Israeli-South African link is a manifestation of vital Israeli political interests rests on two, rather contradictory, arguments. The first school of thought claims that the Israeli involvement with South Africa flows from Israel's reliance on the West in general, and the United States in particular. To buttress their analysis, proponents of this view point to two key pieces of evidence. First, a fair amount of speculation has developed around the suggestion that Henry Kissinger encouraged an increased Israeli connection with South Africa as a way of bypassing the congressional decision to avoid an involvement in the Angolan war.⁷⁵ Second, Kissinger, Prime Minister Vorster, and the late Labour Foreign Minister of Israel, Yigal Allon, were reported to have met in Bavaria in June 1976, in order to clarify modes of US-Israeli-South African cooperation.⁷⁶ The motive behind the purported US inducements to Israel on the South African question may be found in the American desire '... to use Israel as a clandestine conduit to South Africa'.⁷⁷

72. The South African government arranges lectures and tours for invitees in conjunction with South African universities, covers all expenses, and often offers a free trip for wives.

73. The list of politicians, journalists, and scholars who have gone under these auspices is extensive, and includes: Yitzhak Rabin, Mordechai Gur, and Ezer Weizman, Ephraim Katzir and Hirsh Goodman.

74. Details of these visits appear in the *South Africa Jewish Times*.

75. Peter Hellyer, 'Israel and South Africa: a strengthening alliance', *Arab Dawn*, (March 1980), pp. 11-12. Also: *Maariv*, 6 November 1977.

76. Bernard Magubane, 'Israel and South Africa: the nature of the unholy alliance', (Paper presented at the United Nations Seminar on the Palestinian Question, Arusha, July 1980, pp. 17-18).

77. *The Economist*, 10 November 1977. Echoed by Ainslee, 'Israel and South Africa', esp. p. 16.

Some observers have interpreted this evidence as an indication of a US effort to form a US centred strategic triangle to counteract the African-Arab-European triangle that was emerging at this time.⁷⁸

The theories that have evolved around this proposition and the meagre data mustered to support it have been more concerned with proving American complicity with South Africa than in comprehending the reasons underlying Israeli actions. Some hesitations as to the veracity of this explanation from an Israeli angle do come to mind. In the first place, while it is probably correct that Israel has in the past been overly associated with American and Western interests in the Third World and Africa,⁷⁹ it is equally true that Israel's position as the weak link in this Western chain has been politically costly. The backlash that Israel experienced in Africa on this count in the early part of the 1970s has served as a warning signal for the resumption of a similar third party role.⁸⁰ Second, the United States has repeatedly expressed its concern over the Israeli-South African venture. In the summer of 1976 the United States requested a clarification from Israel on reports that Israel was transferring American know-how to South Africa.⁸¹ If the United States had conspired with Israel, it would not need to demand such an elucidation. In the same vein, in early 1977, the US requested that Israel cease its arms deals with South Africa.⁸² And during the Carter presidency the administration repeatedly berated Israeli-South African ties. These expressions of unease from Washington raise some grave doubts and are a reminder that the priorities and perceptions of successive administrations may differ widely. Israel is unquestionably greatly dependent on the United States, and perhaps signs of this link have also spilled over to the South African arena. But Israeli politicians and pundits have never brought in the US connection as an explanation for Israel's South African policy; and if they should do so in the future they would be hard put to present a convincing case for such a justification.

The alternative political interest theory proffered for the Israel-South African alliance stems from an opposite set of propositions. It suggests that because Israel and South Africa are both beleaguered states with few international options it is only natural that they should form a combined political axis.⁸³ Expounders of this thesis underline the fact that South Africa in the past made repeated gestures to Israel to join an alternative South Atlantic

78. Husain, 'The West, South Africa, and Israel'.

79. A particularly antagonistic portrayal may be found in Africa Research Group, 'David and Goliath Collaborate in Africa', *Leviathan* (September 1969), pp. 22-26.

80. Recent events may indicate the fading of such a reservation in the past several months. Defence Minister Ariel Sharon's quest for U.S.-Israel cooperation in Africa was exhibited in the signing of the (since deferred) Memorandum of understanding in late 1981, and in the expressed willingness of Israel to act as a conduit of support to Zaire, following the resumption of diplomatic relations in May, 1982.

81. *Maariv*, 25 August 1978.

82. *Haaretz*, 3 February 1977.

83. Ainslee, 'Israel and South Africa', highlights this contention.

Treaty Organization under its aegis.⁸⁴ In 1975, the argument runs, Israel, besieged on all fronts, finally capitulated to these entreaties. The Ford administration in 1975 announced a re-evaluation of its Middle East policy and cut off aid to Israel for a period of seven months. During this hiatus Israel cemented its South African alliance as a way of breaking out of its total dependency on the United States.⁸⁵ Since then, it is advanced, Soviet intrusions in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean have perpetuated this collaboration.⁸⁶

There is some evidence to suggest that in Israel's increasingly isolated circumstances, the need for and possibility of broadening political alliances furnishes a weighty *realpolitik* argument for increased ties with South Africa. The logic of this political explanation, however, is almost as faulty as its opposite. Again, from an Israeli viewpoint, even if there is a similarity between Israel's precarious political position and that of South Africa—and Israel and South African leaders alike have hastened to emphasize this convergence—it is not at all clear how Israel's international future depends on closer ties with South Africa. No details have been furnished to explain what Israel hopes to gain from such a political connection, and it may be unlikely that any such data exists. Even if such thoughts did play a role in the mid-1970s turn-about, Israel's recent concerted effort to renew links with Black African states indicates that other *realpolitik* considerations are pulling in quite different directions. Moreover, the international political opprobrium experienced by Israel on this count defies the political returns to be gleaned from the continuation of such an association. It appears, therefore, that the similarity of global circumstance provides a very weak long-term political motive for Israel's South Africa policy.

The confusion adhering to the opposing political arguments raised to explain the Israel-South African alliance highlights their fragility. The contradictions inherent in the two main approaches to this topic tend to cancel each other out. Those in search of reasons for this connection must turn elsewhere.

The military—strategic interest

The final and in view of the indeterminacy of the foregoing interests perhaps the most interesting group of concerns behind Israel's South African ties lie in the military-strategic category. Israeli policymakers are understandably reluctant to discourse on military motives, or to expound possible Israeli strategic interests underlying their South African connection. A very strong impression, however, has been transmitted by both foreign observers and Israelis to the effect that the South African link is, however distasteful, a necessity

84. 'Newly Emerging World: putting it together', *To the Point International*, 19 May 1978.

85. Highlighted in *The Economist*, 5 November 1977. For an American view-point: Rita Hauser, 'Israel, South Africa, and the West', *The Washington Quarterly*, 2, No 3 (1979), pp. 75-82.

86. For more information on Israel's position in the Horn of Africa, see: Shlomo Slonim, 'New Scramble for Africa', *Midsream*, 23, No. 9 (1977) pp. 30-35; and Peter Schwab, 'Israel's Weakened Position on the Horn of Africa', *New Outlook*, 21, No. 2 (1978), pp. 21-25.

vital to Israeli security. Israeli-South African military cooperation, it is posited, is an outgrowth of geo-political concerns, of strategic interests, and of a joint aversion to Soviet expansion in the Middle East and Africa.⁸⁷ Its history goes back to 1967, when South Africa reportedly supplied Israel with crucial spare parts for French-made arms after France imposed an embargo on Israel prior to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. Since then the two so-called garrison states have developed a small, though heterogeneous, set of military interchanges. The following analysis seeks to summarize the evidence, speculative though it often is, on cooperation in these areas in an attempt to uncover the degree to which they might justify Israel's ongoing connection with South Africa.

The first documented area of Israeli-South African military exchange has been in the sphere of arms transfers. The list of Israeli sales of military hardware to South Africa concentrates on a limited number of items. Israel has supplied South Africa with six Reshef-class warships equipped with Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles. Two of the gunboats were supplied in early 1976 and the remainder of the shipment went through after Vorster's visit to Israel that year.⁸⁸ Israel has trained South African naval personnel in the use of this equipment.⁸⁹ South Africa has also purchased an unspecified number of Ramata patrol boats. Further transfers have taken place in military electronics, with Israelis providing assistance to the South African Air Force in aircraft computers, and in the production of electronic military fences.⁹⁰ In 1977 Israel undertook to modernize 150 Centurion tanks in return for rare steel needed to construct Israel's homemade Chariot tanks.⁹¹ Contrary to popular presumptions, Israel has not been an important small arms supplier to South Africa, although Uzi submachine guns are being manufactured in South Africa under Belgian licence.⁹² Moreover, Israel has not responded to South African requests for the sale of Israeli made Kfir fighter bombers.⁹³

This is the known extent of Israeli arms transfers to South Africa. The scope of these exchanges in no way parallels that of South Africa's major arms suppliers from the West.⁹⁴ It is not clear that the sum total of these deals even rivals some Eastern European and Arab sales to South Africa.⁹⁵

87. Robert S. Jaster, 'South Africa's Narrowing Security Options', *Adelphi Papers*, No. 159 (Spring 1980). Also see *Foreign Report*, No. 1510 (2 November 1977), pp. 1-2.

88. *Haaretz*, 5 September 1977.

89. *Maariv*, 6 August 1976.

90. *Maariv*, 28 August 1978, quoting from foreign sources.

91. *The Economist*, 5 November 1977, repeated in many sources.

92. Osia, *Israel, South Africa and Black Africa*, p. 3; Stevens and Elmessiri, *Israel and South Africa*, p. 67.

93. This at the insistence of the United States, since the Kfir fighters are made with American engines, and require US government approval for their re-exportation. *Haaretz*, 13 August 1975 and 20 June 1978 (quoting *Aviation Week*): Also: *To the Point International*, 2 March 1979.

94. Moshe Dechter, 'The Arms Traffic with South Africa', *Midstream*, 23, No. 2 (1977), pp. 14-25.

95. Osia, *Israel, South Africa and Black Africa*, pp. 64-69. Dechter, 'Arms Traffic with South Africa' claims that Jordan sold South Africa 17.9 million dollars of short Tiger surface to air systems and centurion tanks, pp. 22-23.

To some observers even these small exchanges are damning. The more relevant question in the present context is whether this connection justifies the continuation of Israel's links with South Africa. In the first instance, the extent of these deals is simply not that great. Second, it is not at all clear that arms transfers have continued after the Security Council decision of November 1977 to impose an arms embargo on South Africa. While Israel at first baulked at this dictate to the glee of the South African press, the late Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan soon announced Israel's compliance with this order. Israeli representatives have repeated this decision to abide by Security Council Resolution 498 (1977) and have stated unequivocally that Israel 'will not provide South Africa with arms or related materials of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles or equipment'.⁹⁶ Although some rumours have circulated that Israel continues to defy this embargo, it is not yet possible to offer concrete evidence to back these speculations.⁹⁷ A final caveat on the significance of this facet of Israeli-South African ties is provided by the South African arms industry itself. South Africa is today a net arms exporter, whose own burgeoning arms production has made it virtually self-sufficient in small arms and hardware needed for counter-insurgency operations.⁹⁸ It appears, therefore, that Israel-South African arms transfers, however regrettable, do not help to explain the continuation of Israeli ties with that country.

A second aspect of military links with South Africa is in the area of counter-insurgency techniques and joint training ventures. Several reports have been published to the effect that senior Israeli military personnel frequent South Africa to lecture on military procedures.⁹⁹ Other sources have insisted that Israel has trained South African teams in counter-insurgency warfare and quick strike tactics.¹⁰⁰ And SWAPO spokesmen have claimed that Israeli advisers have been seen providing support to South African army raids against Namibian freedom fighters in Angola.¹⁰¹ These reports have neither been verified nor falsified. If they are correct, Israel's motives for such an involvement are puzzling. At least overtly, there seems to be no good reason why Israel should give these services to South Africa, especially since there is no visible return

96. Letter dated 14 September 1979 by Permanent Representative of Israel to United Nations Committee established under Security Council 421.

97. Ainslee, 'Israel and South Africa', pp. 13-14; J. G. Calloway, 'Israel and South Africa: unity in isolation', *Middle East International*, 79 (January 1978), pp. 19-20. Ariel Sharon has not helped to alleviate these rumours by his recent statements that South Africa needs more modern weapons, *New York Times*, 14 December 1981; *Haaretz*, 15 December 1981. In its latest Yearbook, SIPRI lists South Africa as Israel's main arms purchaser in the 1970s, accounting for 35 per cent of Israeli arms exports. Stockholm International Peace Research, *World Armaments and Disarmaments, SIPRI Yearbook 1981* (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1981), p. 188, and elsewhere.

98. Robert Jaster clarified this point in a recent communication.

99. *Maariv*, 8 July 1975, quoting *The Guardian* Correspondent in South Africa.

100. Israeli denial in *International Herald Tribune*, 3 June 1976.

101. *Maariv*, 23 August 1976, quoting *Guardian* correspondent in Lusaka. Also see E. C. Chibwe, *Afro-Arab Relations in the New World Order* (London: Julian Friedman, 1976), p. 23.

for such an involvement. The claim that this is a repayment for South African moral support or for the fact that 1,500 Jews of South African descent participated in the Yom Kippur war is patently absurd.¹⁰² On that basis Israel should be training the armies of Iraq or Syria, since Jewish soldiers from those countries comprise a much higher proportion of the Israeli defence forces than Jews of South African origin. The reasons for these alleged actions remain a mystery. In any event, they must be seen more as a confirmation of Israeli-South African collaboration as opposed to constituting a reason for this interaction.

The third, and unquestionably the most delicate and problematic field of Israeli-South African military cooperation, is the nuclear one. The conventional wisdom among strategic analysts is that Israel and South Africa are collaborating in the nuclear sphere. This collusion is perceived as one facet of South Africa's stepped-up nuclear development programme that has gained momentum through German, French, British, Belgian, US and Italian assistance during the past decade. The main known components in the South African atomic programme revolve around the Valindaba uranium enrichment plant sited near the Palindaba atomic research facility. In the mid-1970s South Africa gained access to the German nozzle process technique for the enrichment of natural uranium.¹⁰³ The uranium used to feed this programme is supplied by South Africa's substantial uranium reserves (second only to those of the United States). The world's largest uranium mine at Rossing in Namibia produces 5,000 tons of uranium oxide per annum.¹⁰⁴ More recently, the first two French built light waterpower reactors have reportedly become operational at Koeberg.¹⁰⁵

Talk of some Israeli involvement in the extensive South African nuclear programme began immediately after the signing of the 1976 scientific cooperation agreement. It has been claimed that South Africa receives help in its nuclear research from Israeli scientists and that Israeli personnel have been seen at the Valindaba plant.¹⁰⁶ Lately, reports have been published to the effect that South Africa hired Israeli consultants to advise on safety aspects of the com-

102. A. Elmessiri, 'Israel and South Africa: a link matures', in Stevens and Elmessiri, *Israel and South Africa*, p. 76; Y. Kachine, 'L'Alliance des Sionistes et des Racistes', *Remarques Africaines*, 15, No. 421 (1973), pp. 8-9.

103. The best source continues to be: Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers, *The Nuclear Axis: secret collaboration between West Germany and South Africa* (New York: New York Times Books, 1978).

104. Tami Hultman and Reed Kramer, 'Pretoria's Nuclear Trump Card', *Afriscopes* (September 1977), pp. 41-48. For an analysis of British assistance see: Dan Smith, 'South Africa's Nuclear Capability', (World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, London, February 1981).

105. J. E. Spence, 'South Africa: the nuclear option', *African Affairs*, 80, (1981), pp. 442-444. On the other hand, there is contrary evidence to suggest that South Africa has experienced difficulties in obtaining fuel for these plants: *New York Times*, 14 November 1981.

106. Robert Manning and Stephen Talbot, 'American Cover-up on Israeli Bomb', *Middle East*, 68 (June 1980), pp. 8-12; and Smith 'South Africa's Nuclear Capability', p. 19.

mercial reactors.¹⁰⁷ When a Soviet satellite spotted a nuclear test site in the Kalahari desert, it was widely presumed that this was the location for a possible South African-Israeli test.¹⁰⁸ Recent evidence from a book banned in Israel on the country's nuclear technology refutes this charge, claiming that Israel refused a Kalahari test site for Israeli experiments.¹⁰⁹

The most widespread discussion of Israeli-South African atomic cooperation has centred on reports of joint testing of nuclear weapons. Although some mention has been made of a test in September of 1978,¹¹⁰ most speculation focuses on a possible explosion on 22 September 1979. The probability of a low-yield nuclear blast on that date comes from a variety of sources, including the Los Alamos observatory, the US observatory at Areabo in Puerto Rico, and the US navy research laboratory.¹¹¹ The US position on this matter is that: 'We do not have corroborating evidence that a nuclear blast took place; but neither do we have evidence corroborating any other explanation'.¹¹² Talk of Israeli collusion in this test commenced in the Spring of 1980, following a report by CBS correspondent Dan Raviv, broadcast from Athens to bypass the Israeli military censor.¹¹³ Circumstantial evidence to support the Israeli connection—including a visit to South Africa by Israeli Defence Minister Ezer Weizmann and nuclear scientist Amos Horev—has been published in several reports.¹¹⁴ If these publications of a South African explosion in 1979 are correct, the purported Israeli connection to this explosion does not rest on a solid empirical foundation.¹¹⁵ Thus, it would seem that, despite widespread rumours, no hard facts have been (or are likely to be) produced to verify either the existence of Israeli involvement in South Africa's nuclear surge or the extent of such collusion. Circumstantial evidence, including the fact that both countries are non-signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and share some common strategic concerns, does not suffice. It is just very hard to know exactly what links exist in this sphere.

Should information establishing a definite link between the two countries become available at some future date, it is still unclear what benefit Israel hopes to derive from such a nuclear connection. It is widely known that Israel has

107. David K. Willis, 'On the Trail of the A-Bomb makers: how South Africa and Israel are maneuvering for the Bomb', *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 December 1981.

108. Cited in Smith, 'South Africa's Nuclear Capability', p. 16, but appears throughout the literature.

109. Manning and Talbot, 'American Cover-Up', p. 12.

110. *Maariv*, 28 October 1978.

111. The most detailed evidence in Manning and Talbot, 'American Cover-up'. Also see Hellyer, 'Israel and South Africa', p. 1; and Husain, 'South Africa, Israel and the West', pp. 58-60.

112. Some have claimed that validation was problematic because the explosion came from a neutron bomb. Manning and Talbot, 'The American Cover-Up', p. 8.

113. *Jerusalem Post*, 20 March 1980. Raviv's credentials were withdrawn.

114. Hellyer, 'Israel and South Africa', p. 11.

115. Many other rumours exist. A most recent report states that Israel, South Africa and Taiwan are developing nuclear warheads with U.S. assistance. Barbara Rogers, 'The Nuclear threat from South Africa', *Africa*, no. 113, (January 1981), pp. 45-47.

been independently developing its own atomic energy programme for some years, and that Israel possesses the scientific know-how and in all probability the facilities to manufacture nuclear weapons.¹¹⁶ Under the circumstances, what Israel has to gain from nuclear collaboration with South Africa is not self-evident. Two sets of hypotheses have been offered, the first of which centres on the possibility that South Africa is supplying Israel with enriched uranium.¹¹⁷ But Israel, in all probability, has its own enriched uranium stock-piles and the scientific capacity of separating U-235 from natural uranium through the gas centrifuge and/or Laser Isotope Separation (LIS) methods.¹¹⁸ Moreover, Israel can extract uranium from its ample phosphate reserves.¹¹⁹ So the need to find an additional source of uranium is far from obvious. A second suggested reason for the South African nuclear connection relies on the possible Israeli need for testing space. But it is documented that Israel did not accept South African offers of testing sites in the past, and if some tests have occurred, one cannot be sure how long this reason is still operative.

The entire topic of nuclear research is covered with a cloak of secrecy in Israel. But the questions raised above do cast a pall on the eagerness of Israeli defenders and detractors alike to find a convincing argument in this sphere for Israel's ongoing contacts with South Africa. Moreover, whatever the merit of opposing arguments in this regard, it is worthwhile repeating that even if some kernel of truth exists in this domain it is not self-evident that the minor gains that Israeli nuclear policymakers might possibly reap from this collaboration outweigh the damage that intimation of an Israeli-South African nuclear conspiracy has wrought.¹²⁰

Thus, although Israel and South Africa have engaged in joint activities in the military and strategic spheres, the preceding analysis has attempted to show that from an Israeli perspective there are severe reservations on what indeed Israel receives in return for these contacts. Israel in all probability has little long-term interest in serving South African military ambitions.

The interests weighed

The argument for the continuation of the Israeli association with South Africa, despite the serious complications that this has entailed, is predicated on the supposedly compelling nature of the interests involved. The foregoing

116. For a good summary see Robert E. Harkavy, 'Spectre of a Middle East Holocaust: the strategic and diplomatic implications of the Israelis nuclear weapons program', University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, (n.d.).

117. Alan Dowty, 'Nuclear Proliferation: the Israeli case', *International Studies Quarterly*, 22 (March 1978), fn. 5, p. 82. P. R. Chari, 'The Israeli Nuclear Option: living dangerously'. *International Studies*, 16, (1977), p. 346.

118. Harkavy, 'Spectre of a Middle East Holocaust', pp. 26-27.

119. Rogers and Cervenka, *The Nuclear Axis*, pp. 311-324.

120. Especially in view of the growing concern in Africa about the possibility of an alteration of the continent's nuclear-free status. B. Akporade Clark, 'Preface' in Smith, 'South Africa's nuclear Capability'.

exploration has sought to highlight the weaknesses inherent in such an approach.

The diversification of Israeli ties with South Africa has been subjected to exhaustive scrutiny in the academic and popular media.¹²¹ The attention that this connection has drawn is out of all proportion to the magnitude of the contacts in question. On a comparative basis, the scale of Israeli involvement pales in comparison with those of other states. As Andrew Young so aptly stated: 'It is unfair to link Israel to South Africa. If there is a link you must compare Britain, Germany, Japan and the United States. Israel becomes too easy a scapegoat for other problems we have'.¹²² Pointing to the hypocrisy of the holier than thou attitude adopted by Israel's critics (while it does go a long way towards putting this link in its proper perspective) in no way absolves Israel from responsibility for this connection. Even taking into account the recent ramification of Israeli-South African ties, the insubstantial scope of these links hardly justifies Israel's insistence on their significance. These simply do not occupy a quantitatively or qualitatively meaningful segment of Israeli trade, political or military activities.¹²³

Arguments about the extent of Israeli-South African collusion aside, this investigation has gone to great pains to show that collaboration is not coterminous with benefit. In the separate spheres of Jewish, economic, cultural, political and military interchanges Israel's gains from its South African alliance are ambiguous at best. Even on a cumulative basis the results of all these contacts do not bear out the *realpolitik* considerations that one is lead to believe guide the policy. What these multi-faceted ties have produced are specific constituencies within Israel (the defence industry, businessmen, financial planners, nuclear strategists, commercial concerns) who have strong interests in maintaining links with South Africa. As their particularistic concerns have been advanced Israel has become entangled in an unequal partnership of a highly inconclusive nature.

Whatever the very short-term arguments that may be garnered to uphold this policy, these exhibit a long-term policy weakness of the highest order. By linking Israel (if only by association) to South Africa, policy makers have not even taken the trouble to hedge Israel's longer range political bets in the region. This smacks of a short-sightedness and lack of concern for Israel's future interests that raises serious questions regarding the political maturity of policy-making procedures.¹²⁴ Moreover, even the most persuasive arguments cannot

121. Virtually every intricate detail of links has been documented with care. Underlying these efforts is often the questionable assumption that conclusions may be drawn merely from demonstrating interaction.

122. Statement by Andrew Young during a visit to Tanzania, quoted in Low, 'Israel and South Africa', p. 17.

123. Adelman, 'The Club of Pariahs', p. 4.

124. Michael Wade, 'Bypassing Africa—and history', *New Outlook*, 19, No. 7, (1976), pp. 23-27. Naomi Chazan, 'Israel's Short-Sighted Policy in South Africa', *Jerusalem Post*, 12 April 1976.

justify the apparent intensity with which Israel has followed its South Africa course. The demonstrative nature of these links possesses no redeeming value in Israeli national terms.¹²⁵

Therefore, the contention that Israeli (and not just specific) interests are promoted by its present policy in South Africa just does not stand up to close analysis. This argument can hence serve neither as a justification nor as a cause of ongoing contacts. It surely cannot act as a convincing counterweight to the moral queries evoked by this policy. In short, from a rational viewpoint, this attachment simply does not make very much sense.

AMERICAN JEWISH

Toward an explanation for Israel's South Africa policy

The absence of necessary or sufficient reasons for Israel's link with South Africa does not, however, explain how this policy evolved or why it continues. This analysis would not be even partly complete without an examination of some of the more salient factors that may account for its formulation and perpetuation. Three interlocking hypotheses come to mind.

The first rests on the deep sense of hurt and betrayal that Israelis have expressed in the wake of Israel's systematic abandonment by many of its former allies. The tightening of Israel's ties with South Africa scarcely a decade ago came in the aftermath of Africa's massive rupture of diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel had expended a great deal of energy, time, and devotion to the nurturing of common ties with African states during the period of decolonization and early independence. Not only had Israel designed a substantial and highly regarded programme of technical cooperation in Africa,¹²⁶ it also had made efforts to adjust political stances to suit the sensitivities of African leaders.¹²⁷ The rise of anti-Israeli sentiment in Africa during 1971, 1972 and early 1973 was perceived as a deep breach of confidence. Israelis were particularly unnerved by the constant references in African gatherings to Zionism as an unmodified form of colonialism.¹²⁸ Feelings were further stirred when President Mobutu of Zaire, in his declaration on the severance of ties

125. Osia, *Israel, South Africa, and Black Africa*, p. 100, reiterates this conclusion forcefully.

126. For details see: Leopold Laufer, *Israel and the Developing Countries: new approaches to co-operation* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1967); Z. Y. Hershlag (ed.) *Israel-Africa Cooperation Research Project, Progress Report* (Tel-Aviv: Department of Developing Countries, Tel-Aviv University, 1970); Shimon Amir, *Israel's Development Cooperation with Africa, Asia and Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1974).

127. The best overall compilation of studies on this period may be found in: Michael Curtis and Susan Aurelia Gitelson (eds.), *Israel and the Third World* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1976). Elliot P. Skinner, 'African States and Israel: uneasy relations in a world of crisis', *Journal of African Studies*, 12 (1975), p. 7, highlights the need to study the Jewish contribution to African liberation movements.

128. Boumedienne's statement, as quoted in Ali Mazrui, 'Black Africa and the Arab Israel Conflict', *Middle East International*, 87 (September 1978), p. 14, is instructive.

with Israel, compared Israel to a friend who could not replace a brother (the Arab states).¹²⁹ Emotions finally peaked during the October and November 1973 breaks.

The reasons for the actions of African states in 1973 are extremely complex, and in all probability these moves were taken despite a strong sense of affinity with Israel and appreciation for Israeli endeavours in the continent.¹³⁰ The periodic mention of Israel's ties with South Africa in some of the official proclamations on the cutting of ties were incidental to other, more weighty, concerns.¹³¹ In any event, the Israeli press and the Israeli public reacted strongly and emotionally to what was treated as a sign of total perfidy. With few exceptions, the Israeli journalists inveighed against the infidelity of African states.¹³² In a public survey, a cross-section of citizens expressed dismay at the African political manoeuvre and many decried the lack of reciprocity displayed by this action.¹³³

In this charged atmosphere, it is hardly surprising that few voices of dissent were raised to protest the upgrading of diplomatic relations with South Africa in early 1974. The move was seen not only by the public but also by Israeli officials as a fitting *quid pro quo* to the African initiative.¹³⁴ Murmurs to the effect that only tragedies reveal who one's true friends are were rampant.¹³⁵ The 1973 African boycott and the nature of the Israeli response effectively neutralised Israel as an anti-apartheid force.¹³⁶

In the same vein, some of the subsequent improvements in Israeli ties with South Africa since 1973 can be linked to an Israeli diplomatic setback involving Third World countries. Thus, the 1976 Vorster visit may be interpreted as part and parcel of the fallout of the 1975 correlation of Zionism and Racism which evoked widespread reactions within Israel. The step-up in relations

129. Nehemia Levtzion, 'The Friend and the Sister: Africa between Israel and the Arabs', (Jerusalem: Institute of Asian and African Studies, 1973). Also Skinner, 'African States and Israel', p. 2. Zaire was the first African state to renew ties. The symbolic significance of its move in the aftermath of the 1973 statement was highlighted in the press. *Haaretz*, 17 May 1982.

130. Varying explanations have been forwarded. The best known is Susan Aurelia Gitelson, 'Israel's African Setback in Perspective', in Curtis and Gitelson, *Israel and the Third World*, pp. 182-199. Probably the most subtle analyses maybe found in Aryeh Oded, 'Africa between the Arabs and Israel', *Hamizrah Hahadash*, 25 (1975), pp. 184-209; and Robert Vineberg, 'The Rupture of Diplomatic Relations between Africa and Israel', (M. A. thesis, Department of Political Science, McGill University, 1977).

131. World Jewish Congress, African and Asian Media Survey, *African and Asian Attitudes on the Middle East Conflict* (New York: Department of African and Asian Studies, 1974).

132. Yoel Marcus, 'The Ugly African', *Haaretz*, 9 January 1973, is one example. At the same time some very sensitive pieces appeared, the most prominent being, Yehoshua Rash, 'Africa: won't you remember?' *Al-Hamishmar*, 1 November 1974.

133. Israel Institute for Applied Social Research and the Institute of Communication of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 'Foreign Relations of Israel with African States in the Eyes of the Public', (January, 1974).

134. An exception is Yuval Elitzur, *Maariv*, 21 March 1974.

135. One of the worst examples of this train of thought may be found in Yosef Lapid, 'For South Africa I Won't Equivocate', *Maariv*, 14 March 1979.

136. Gideon Shimoni stated this most forcefully in a recent conversation.

with South Africa in 1977 and 1978 coincided with the Afro-Arab summit convened in Cairo in the summer of 1977.¹³⁷ The African reluctance to renew diplomatic relations after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, despite an upsurge in non-formal contacts, has been seen as bearing out Israeli reactions.¹³⁸ By 1982, however, Israel's South African connection was as much a deterrent to the resumption of diplomatic relations as it might previously have been an excuse for the rupture of these links.¹³⁹

The emotional vagaries evinced by Israel's relations with Africa, and by extension with South Africa, are bewildering. Reactions have ranged from self-righteousness to hysteria, from raw emotionalism to paranoia.¹⁴⁰ These changing feelings reflect, for better or for worse, some of the important undercurrents that fuelled the reinstatement of close links with South Africa during the past decade. In the context of the events of 1973, these forces, which have their own irrational rationality, do furnish an understandable explanation for the initial change of heart. What they do not explain is why, after emotions subsided, the South African connection has grown.

A second hypothesis, which harps on the similarity, empathy, and even conspiracy between Israel and South Africa, has been introduced to fill this explanatory gap. The gist of this argument is that Israel and South Africa share many common features (both countries are on the fringes of the world community, both feel beleaguered, both may be portrayed as minorities struggling for survival, both view themselves as the chosen people, both have to confront terrorism, both fear communism, both have deep religious roots), and that therefore their alliance is an overt manifestation of ongoing empathy.¹⁴¹

Proponents of this form of explanation came from two widely divergent camps. On the one hand, the South Africans themselves highlight this interpretation. South African officials have gone out of their way in recent years to drive home the similarities between Israel's situation and their own.¹⁴² The convergence between the Jewish experience and the Afrikaner one (however bizarre the comparison) is constantly underlined.¹⁴³ White leaders in South

137. Susan Gitelson, 'First Afro-Arab Summit in Cairo, March 1977', (mimeo). For details on Afro-Arab cooperation see: Victor J. Le Vine and Timothy W. Luke, *The Arab-African Connection: political and economic realities* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979); Hartmut Neitzel and Renate Notzel, *Africa and the Arab States: documentation on the development of political and economic relations since 1973* (Hamburg: Institute of African Studies, African Documentation Center, 1979); Aryeh Oded, 'Slaves and Oil: the Arab image in Black Africa', *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, 27, No. 32 (1974), pp. 34-47.

138. On the improvement of nonformal relations see Naomi Chazan, 'Israel in Africa', *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 18 (Winter 1981), pp. 29-44; and Avi Gil, 'Israel's quiet relations with Black Africa', *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, 21, No. 2 (1977), pp. 3-4.

139. Vincent B. K. Khapoya, 'Africa and Israel in the Period of the Severance of Diplomatic Relations', Paper presented at the African Studies Association Meetings, Philadelphia, October 1980, recently reiterated by Nigerian sources, *Maariv*, 19 February 1982.

140. An excellent analysis of this may be found in: E. Lotem, 'Israel-Africa Relations in the Eyes of the Press', *Internasional Problems*, 14, (Fall 1975), pp. 33-54.

141. Osia, *Israel, South Africa and Black Africa*, pp. 14-21.

142. *Die Burger*, 29 May 1968.

143. 'Afrikaner and Jew have much in common', *South Africa Jewish Times*, 22 April 1981.

Africa see Israel as a model for emulation, as the following statement by General H. Van de Berghe, the ex-head of the South African Bureau of State Security, exemplifies: 'I went to Israel recently, and enjoyed every moment there. I told the Prime Minister when I got back that as long as Israel exists we have a hope'.¹⁴⁴ This sentiment was echoed in 1981 by the State President, Marais Viljoen, who cited Israel as an example which 'inspires us to stand firm and to work for peace, prosperity and safety for all South Africans'.¹⁴⁵ In a recent public opinion poll, Israel even emerged as South Africa's favourite country.¹⁴⁶ From the expression of empathy it was only a short hop to the presumption of collaboration. South Africans have not only defended this cooperation on the grounds of a common battle against the Palestine Liberation Organization and the African National Congress, but have gone so far as to exalt the virtues of a parish state status.¹⁴⁷

The South African government has not, however, relegated its quest for the establishment of cooperation through an insistence on commonality merely to the academic plane. The South African Embassy in Tel-Aviv has spent a small fortune on glossy publications detailing the virtues of South Africa and its propinquity to Israel. Articles originating from the South African Embassy have appeared in the local press. The South African legation has subsidized a veritable stream of visits by Israeli journalists to South Africa.¹⁴⁸ And no opportunity is missed to hammer home the common destiny of South Africa and world Jewry. Some of the single-mindedness with which this policy has been implemented came to light during the Muldergate scandal which rocked the Afrikaner hierarchy. Eschel Rhoodie, the former South African Information Department secretary and the supervisor of the (dis) information slush money publicly acknowledged that some of the funds he managed were used to buy influence in 'Jewish circles' in the United States, South Africa and Israel.¹⁴⁹

The South African campaign to establish a congruence between Israel and the white oligarchy has been rivalled only by the most strident anti-Israeli elements. In the minds of Israel's critics on the left and in the Arab world, the only viable explanation, since no other reasons hold, for Israeli-South African cooperation lies in the alliance of two racist states.¹⁵⁰ To this allegedly shared racism has been added the notion of conquest and exploitative settler

144. Yediöt Aharonot, 16 August 1973, quoted in Cervenka and Rogers, *The Nuclear Axis*, p. 311.

145. *The Citizen*, 27 July 1981.

146. *South Africa Digest*, 20 November 1981, p. 6. One assumes that the survey polled only White South Africans.

147. 'Newly Emerging World', *To The Point International*, 19 May 1978.

148. It is possible to compile a long list of Israeli journalists who have visited South Africa in this way. Certain press people, who might write critical articles, have not been given visas.

149. *South Africa Jewish Times*, 15 August 1979.

150. Hellyer, 'Israel and South Africa'.

societies,¹⁵¹ and, of course, the 'unholy alliance of imperialism'.¹⁵² 'Israel-South Africa ties are becoming organic. . . This relationship has a special quality unlike any other relationship South Africa has because of the worldwide awesome power and influence of Zionism especially in the United States'.¹⁵³

The government of South Africa and the radical detractors of Israel make strange bedfellows. Although the operative conclusions they draw from these comparisons are radically different, they both rest their case on the intimation of an Israel-South African conspiracy based on an acknowledged mutuality of interests. The problem with this hypothesis is that it has fallen mostly on deaf ears in Israel. Conspiracies need collaborators. Most Israelis reject out of hand (any validity of these comparisons aside) the suggestion that democratic Israel's struggle for security against external threats is in any way akin to a racist minority's quest for self-perpetuation.¹⁵⁴

Vorster's visit gave rise to a public outcry against comparing Israel's internal situation with that of South Africa. Public pleas were made to shun an alliance with what was euphemistically dubbed a second Massada state. 'With our hands we pour oil on the anti-Israel fire. He who open his arms [to South Africa] becomes a partner to crime; a collaborator with a hated and cruel regime'.¹⁵⁵ And in the same disassociating tone: 'The white regime has no future; for us it is possible that things will turn out otherwise. It may come to pass that there might be agreement and understanding here; for these we must toil. And this difference must be stressed in every possible way'.¹⁵⁶ Examples of such periodic public soul-searching are a regular feature of Israeli political discourse. With next to no exceptions, even those who support cooperation with South Africa as a means of breaking out of Israel's international isolation deny the similarity between the two countries and decry racism in South Africa. The uniformity of this attitude is perhaps best exemplified by the first Israeli ambassador to South Africa who categorically stated that 'the contention that Israel and South Africa are in the same boat is simply not true'.¹⁵⁷

A few, albeit hardly a significant number of Israelis, have translated these thoughts into action. Anti-South African planks are an integral part of the platforms of several Israeli parties.¹⁵⁸ The Israel Labour Union, the

151. Magubane, 'Israel and South Africa'; Richard Stevens, 'Israel and South Africa: a comparative study in racism and settler colonialism', in Kayyali, pp. 265-287; A. Kalman, 'Israel and South Africa Unite Against Black Liberation', *African Communist*, 68 (1977), pp. 60-68.

152. The title of Kayyali, *Zionism, Imperialism and Racism*, is indicative.

153. Alfred T. Moleah, 'Israel-South Africa: the special relationship', *Africa Report* (November-December 1980), p. 12.

154. Nehemia Levtzion, 'The Comparison Between Israel and South Africa', *Miguan* (1976), summarises this position well.

155. Dov Barnir, *Al-Hamishmar*, 3 September 1976.

156. Aryeh Palgi, 'No Cooperation with the Second Massada', *Al Hamishmar*, 7 September 1977.

157. *Maariv*, 3 November 1977.

158. Sheli, The Israel Civil Rights Movement, and Shinui. The Labour Party has been silent on this matter formally.

Histadrut, has systematically shunned ties with the all-white South African Confederation of Labour. For a few years Israel had a small anti-apartheid movement headed by Arthur Goldreich, one of the Rivonia defendants who managed to escape from South Africa and now makes his home in Israel. A Jerusalem printing house regularly translates volumes of oppressed literature from South Africa. Although the scope of these activities is narrow, no real debate has arisen around the principles that guide them. Explicit Israeli sentiments thus belie the proposition that links with South Africa are maintained because of empathy for the South African cause or because of a conscious plot to link the fate of these two states.¹⁵⁹ Under these circumstances, the verification of the conspiracy hypothesis demands further corroboration.

The alternative to this explanation is a third thesis, one that stresses a combination of ignorance, insensitivity and indifference as the key to comprehending the perpetuation of this problematic alliance. 'Israel's policies today are characterized not only by an insensitivity to moral and human issues, but also by a complete ignorance of what is happening in the real world'.¹⁶⁰ Many Israelis simply do not possess the most rudimentary knowledge on the state of their country's ties with South Africa. Even fewer have more than a hazy notion of South African policies and dispositions. And most Israelis, much like citizens elsewhere, are ignorant of the prospects for and directions of change in southern Africa. Confronted with a morass of difficulties closer to home, they are ill-equipped, this hypothesis contends, to query government policies.

Ignorance has, it is suggested, been compounded by a growing de-sensitisation to the issues and ramifications of Israel's South African involvement. Under the Labour government, Israeli-South African relations started to undergo periodic review. These regular reassessments were a reflection of the perceived need to weigh 'a national abhorrence of the racist philosophy and practice of apartheid' against pragmatic advantages accruing to Israel from relations between the two countries.¹⁶¹ In November 1976, barely six months after the Vorster visit, Israel announced its intention to review its links with South Africa. This reassessment was supposed to occur in two stages: first, policy was evaluated within the Foreign Ministry, and then a full-scale discussion with the Prime Minister was scheduled to take place. After the rise of the Likud coalition, it is not clear that the South Africa question has been raised in cabinet meetings, although the Foreign Ministry continues to conduct reconsiderations at regular intervals. What has changed in the past few years is the significance attached to the South African question, and, concomitantly, the stress placed on coming to terms with the dilemmas entailed by this association. 'The most disturbing part of the new Israeli consciousness on South

159. Beit-Hallahmi, 'South Africa and Israel's Strategy of Survival', p. 57, already sees signs of some Israelis beginning to believe these claims.

160. Beit-Hallahmi, 'South Africa and Israel's Strategy of Survival', p. 56; echoed by Wade, 'Bypassing Africa—And History'.

161. Goell, 'A view from Jerusalem', p. 18.

Africa, for those who are concerned not only about Israel's image, but about Israeli realities and Israel's future, is the lack of sensitivity to the issues involved and the seriousness of the situation among so many Israelis.¹⁶²

The indifference exhibited to the South African question, coupled with the salience of other subjects, it may be suggested, has allowed this topic to fade from the public eye. In these circumstances, no public pressure has been exerted to coordinate the activities of the various bodies involved in South African affairs. The individual entities engaged in activities in South Africa have simply continued to pursue their own activities without any guidance or constraints. Often, some policymakers are unaware of the actions of other policymakers in different government ministries or of specific interests (commercial and military) involved in South Africa. In effect, this hypothesis posits that the continuation of Israel's South African connection is more a product of neglect than of duplicity. With no strong pressures exerted to diverge from the present path, existing narrow groups continue to prevail in an overall state of policy inertia. The South African relationship may have developed a momentum which, without concerted efforts to define its purposes and scope, continues to advance on a trajectory of its own.¹⁶³

None of these three hypotheses: the hurt-betrayal hypothesis, the similarity-emphathy-conspiracy hypothesis, or the ignorance-indifference-inertia hypothesis can be conclusively confirmed at this juncture. Common to all three is the heavy emphasis placed on subjective factors. When instrumental reasons cannot be sustained, emotions appear to have replaced rationality as explanations for political behaviour. This conclusion may not console Israel's friends nor reinforce Israel's critics, but it does point towards an explanation for a connection whose concrete reasons remain elusive.

Israel and South Africa: the paradox renewed

The ambiguity characterizing the reasons and explanations for Israel's ongoing association with South Africa does not alleviate the dilemma that Israeli policymakers must face when dealing with this topic. To the contrary, this analysis confirms and even magnifies some of the problematics attendant upon the continuation of present trends. The implications for Israel are not particularly reassuring.

In the first place, the international isolation experienced by Israel is not necessarily attenuated by any overt gains derived from the South African connection. If anything, this tie might now have become a barrier to Israel's efforts to regain its standing in the international community. This obstacle is especially pronounced in the case of Black Africa. The Egyptian peace treaty

162. Beit-Hallahmi, 'South Africa and Israel's Strategy of Survival', p. 57.

163. This view has been propounded by some observers. Recent conversations with Israelis involved in the South African venture tend to bear out the proposition that frequently the right hand is unaware of what the left hand is doing.

and the final withdrawal of Israel from Egyptian territories captured in the Six-Day war could have provided an opportunity for the resumption of full diplomatic relations with other African states besides Zaire. But many African leaders feel that 'the question of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Israel cannot be disposed of without taking into consideration Israel's strategic collaboration with apartheid South Africa'.¹⁶⁴ The practical costs of maintaining ties with South Africa require further consideration.

Second, Israelis have yet to resolve the gap between their aversion to apartheid and their connection with South Africa. 'How does one walk the narrow line between national need and national prostitution?... How does one reconcile the anti-Semitism of some members of the South African government and Israel's relations with that government?... Can this ambivalence be allowed to continue, and what will be the long-term cost for Israel?... What about morality and can morality withstand the logic of an expediency born out of Israel's need to survive?'.¹⁶⁵ By furnishing undeserved sustenance of the South African regime Israeli policy undermines the substance of that moral rectitude it seeks to instill in its citizenry.

Third, and from the Israeli viewpoint most perplexing, are the reverberations of Israeli policy towards South Africa on the nature and development of an Israeli ethos. This subject mirrors in a nutshell the contradictions between Israeli society's egalitarianism and its discrimination, its tolerance and its exclusivity, its universalism and its parochialism, its democracy and its authoritarianism, its militarism and its deep-seated commitment to peace, its ideals and its realities. At this historical confluence, the South African link unnecessarily complicates the choices facing Israel in the years to come, and delays the weighty task of the formulation of a new synthesis.

Israelis are currently engaged in a reassessment of the nature of their path. If there are very few ethical or pragmatic reasons for prolonging Israel's association with South Africa, it might be possible to place this question at the forefront of the agenda of topics for reconsideration. Israel has very little to lose by reversing its South Africa policy. Such a shift might go a long way towards helping Israel redefine its self-image internally and internationally.

Israel's South African connection is morally, Jewishly and instrumentally indefensible. But those truly concerned with the liberation of South Africa would do well to remember that, even if the Israeli government can be dissuaded from pursuing its present policies, the impact of such a move on change in southern Africa would be drastically less than if other, more powerful states, could be convinced to alter their course.

164. Imobigbe, 'Israeli-Egyptian Treaty', p. 12. Also Nadelmann, 'Israel and Black Africa', p. 214. Sadat was reported to have asked Begin to sever diplomatic relations with South Africa in order to facilitate the resumption of relations with Africa, *Al-Hamishmar*, 1 January 1978. Sharon's visit to South Africa a journey to several African states in November 1981 was understandably not well received in Africa.

165. Goodman, 'Parallel illusions', p. 6.

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President Bok's Statement on Investment Policy

On May 9, 1984, the Advisory Committee on Shareholder Responsibility (ACSR) submitted a report on the subject of Harvard's investments in American corporations doing business in South Africa. The Harvard Corporation's Committee on Shareholder Responsibility has today issued a detailed reply to the ACSR report, agreeing with some of its proposals and disagreeing with others. I will not repeat all that is said in that reply. But I will express some thoughts of my own on the subject of divestment, since it represents the point of greatest disagreement in this community concerning the response of the University to the injustices of apartheid.

Let me begin by making clear that this is not a dispute about apartheid or the record of the South African government. All of us on every side of the divestment issue agree that apartheid is a cruel and shameful form of racial exploitation that has no conceivable justification. Nor does this debate simply reflect a difference of opinion over tactics or money—though I do believe that the tactics of divestment will not succeed and that they would cost the university money. At bottom, this is also a dispute about the nature of the university itself and the ways in which it should and should not respond to evil in the outside world.

Harvard has taken a number of steps in response to apartheid: We have cast our ballot with care on shareholder resolutions concerning South Africa, often voting to urge corporations to subscribe to the Sullivan Principles, sometimes voting to have a company withdraw entirely from South Africa. We have engaged in intensive dialogue with corporations to persuade them to improve wage and employment practices for black South African employees and to improve the quality of life outside the workplace for these employees, their families, and nonwhites in general. A number of companies have taken such steps. We have also initiated a program to bring nonwhite students from South Africa to study each year at Harvard. Finally, I have helped to organize a nationwide effort of universities, corporations, and foundations which has brought over 300 black South African students to study in colleges and professional schools across the country.

Many members of this community would like Harvard to take a different course and divest all of its stock in American companies doing business in South Africa. I have disagreed with this view, and I continue to do so. Much as I oppose apartheid, I strongly believe that universities should not attempt to use their power to press their political and economic views on other organizations and individuals beyond the campus. This is essentially what Harvard would be doing by divesting—boycotting the stock of American companies to bring the pressure of this institution to bear against them to have them cease doing business in South Africa.

My views on this matter are not casual; they involve the essential purposes of the university and the terms on which it exists and does its work in our society. Universities have the distinctive mission of promoting discovery, new ideas, understanding, and education. These activities depend on experimentation, self-expression, and the widest opportunity for debate and dissent. They require insulation from outside pressures that would impose an orthodoxy of "safe" ideas or use the university for ends other than learning and the pursuit of truth. In this respect, the university is quite unlike other institutions, such as governmental bodies, which are designed to exert power over others and to be subject in

turn to outside pressures from groups seeking to influence the uses of power in a democracy.

In order to protect the process of learning and discovery, universities must maintain a reasonable autonomy in the conduct of their internal affairs. They must persuade the outside world to refrain from exerting pressure that would limit the freedom of their members to speak and publish as they choose. They must also preserve the freedom to select the best teachers and scholars for the faculty regardless of their opinions or political activities and to set their own policies without external control save by the government in behalf of established public ends.

Today, these freedoms are generally respected in the society. But this was not always the case. The autonomy of academic institutions was resisted for many decades by those who thought it too

dangerous to allow universities to exist without some control over what was written or taught within their walls. Even now, our freedom exists within limits. Like all freedoms it has reciprocal obligations. We cannot expect individuals and organizations to respect our right to speak and write and choose our members as we think best if we insist on using institutional sanctions to try to impose on *them* those policies and opinions that *we* consider important.

The obligation I perceive in no way inhibits individual members of this community from expressing themselves on issues such as apartheid or from engaging in political efforts to promote their views. Indeed, the right to act in this way is an essential part of academic freedom. There is likewise no reason why the university should not perform the function entrusted to it as a shareholder under our laws by voting on issues of social responsibility. The university may even communicate its views through discussions with the officials of companies whose stock it holds. But the line is crossed when a university goes beyond expressing opinions and tries to exert economic pressure by divesting stock or engaging in a boycott in order to press its views on outside organizations.⁶

The more the university acts in this way the more it risks disturbing the implicit arrangements under which institutions of learning can continue to function with the freedom they need to carry out their essential mission. If Harvard insists on exerting leverage on issues we care deeply about, individuals, corporations, and other organizations are likely to exert economic pressure against us on matters *they* feel strongly about, such as the radical opinions of particular professors, or Harvard's position toward ROTC, or the University's policies concerning involvement in covert CIA activities.

⁶ The University may occasionally sell the stock of a corporation because of a disagreement with its policies. Such action, however, is not taken to pressure the company into conforming with Harvard's views but occurs because the University does not wish to continue an association with a firm that fails to live up to minimum ethical standards and offers no reasonable prospect of doing so in the future.

Every year, shareholder resolutions are introduced to bar corporate support to universities on grounds such as those just mentioned. These resolutions are regularly defeated because most shareholders are persuaded that corporations should not use economic leverage to influence the internal policies of universities. It would be unreasonable to expect such attitudes to continue if we begin boycotting products or selling shares to press particular policies on corporations and other organizations.

Some of the strongest proponents of divestment are not deterred by this prospect. Indeed, they have organized a fund to be given to Harvard only if it agrees to sell its stock in companies doing business in South Africa. I could not disagree more with this approach. Once we enter a world in which those with money and power feel free to exert leverage to

influence university policies, we should not be surprised to find that universities have lost much of their valuable independence. Nor should we complain when we discover that those who wield the most power are not necessarily those whose policies are congenial to our own.

Critics may reply that I am putting the private interests of the University ahead of the plight of the black majority that suffers under the heel of apartheid. In response, I would begin by resisting the charge that the interests just described are merely self-serving. In carrying out its tasks of education and research, a university is performing public functions of great importance to society. The freedoms universities seek, like their buildings and endowments, are not private assets but resources essential to the accomplishment of a vital public mission.

In addition, I reject the suggestion that a policy against divestment will perpetuate injustice, since I see no realistic possibility that having universities sell their stock in American companies will make a noticeable contribution to ending apartheid or improving the lot of black South Africans. Divestment can make a significant contribution to overcoming apartheid only if *all* of the following questions can be answered affirmatively.

1. *Will selling stock offer a significant chance of persuading American firms to leave South Africa?*

There is no indication that sales of stock will put sufficient economic pressure on the management of American companies to induce them to withdraw, since such stock will be purchased

by others with no permanent economic consequence to the firm. Nor is there any evidence that the publicity engendered by sales of stock will lead companies to incur the losses entailed by abandoning their South African operations. In fact, no American company has left the country because of the divestment actions taken by various states and municipalities over the past few years.

2. *Is divestment a more effective way of inducing companies to withdraw than voting in favor of corporate resolutions to withdraw?*

There is no evidence to indicate that this is so. Neither divestment nor shareholder resolutions have caused any American company to withdraw, and neither tactic holds much promise of doing so in the future. Shareholder resolutions and dialogue with company executives have at least led to some tangible corporate actions to improve the lives of black South Africans. Divestment has not had even this effect.

3. *Even if divestment could somehow help persuade American companies to leave South Africa, would their withdrawal materially help in overcoming apartheid?*

In fact, if American companies left South Africa, it is virtually certain that their operations would be taken over either by local interests or by foreign concerns. Since the business would continue operating, it is not clear just how withdrawal would pressure the government into reforming the apartheid system.

4. *Would corporate withdrawal, assuming it somehow occurred, contribute more to the defeat of apartheid than efforts by American companies to improve wages, employment opportunities, and social conditions of nonwhite workers?*

At bottom, this question raises the difficult issue of how major social change can come about in a country like South Africa. Those who support corporate activity in South Africa argue that economic development will eventually undermine apartheid as the needs of the economy force the Nationalist regime to give more education, economic opportunity, and ultimately power to nonwhites. Proponents of divestiture believe that real change will never occur by evolutionary means, whereas the withdrawal of American companies could produce widespread unemployment and economic distress that would either force the government to institute reforms or lead to a successful revolution.

Both these theories leave many questions unanswered, and it would be difficult to choose between them or to assert that either will prove to be correct. In response to proponents of divestment, it seems most unlikely that corporate withdrawal would cause an economic collapse, since other companies would presumably take over the operations abandoned by American firms. Even assuming that withdrawal did hurt the economy substantially, the question still remains whether this result would bring about the end of apartheid or simply cause more suffering, black unemployment, and repression. This question seems all but impossible to answer. Proponents of divestment argue that blacks and their leaders favor withdrawal of American companies. In fact, some do, but others don't. In the words of the American columnist William Raspberry, writing from Capetown, "If the Harvard students find the question easy, black South Africans are by no means unanimously agreed."

In summary, divestment can have a constructive effect on South Africa only if we can answer all four of the preceding questions affirmatively. In reality, it is far from clear that one can give a positive answer to *any* of these questions. The likelihood that *all four* can be answered affirmatively is vanishingly small. Hence, I find no basis for concluding that universities will help defeat apartheid in South Africa by agreeing to divest. As a matter of principle, therefore, I see no reason for departing from the basic norms that define the role of the university in society. Even apart from the special constraints on universities, I do not believe that we can know enough about the future of a distant country to insist to the point of a public boycott that American companies will do more for black South Africans by leaving the country than by remaining and instituting better employment and social conditions. And I find it difficult to support in good conscience a decision that would jeopardize resources given to us for educational purposes to pursue a strategy that neither furthers the academic ends of the institution nor offers a realistic chance of achieving its objectives.

Despite these conclusions, some critics contend that Harvard should divest rather than continue its practice of voting on shareholder resolutions and communicating with corporate managements because the present practice has failed to overcome apartheid or to close the gap in wages and working conditions between black and white

workers. This argument misconceives the current policy. The University did not adopt this policy because it felt that its actions—or any action that universities could take—would have a substantial effect on apartheid. Harvard decided on

this course of action in the conviction that it should vote shares as conscientiously as possible, even if the effects are only limited, and because of a strong belief in the principle that voting and communicating views are appropriate forms of behavior for a university while efforts to exert pressure through boycotts and divestment are not.

Others who advocate divestment have suggested that the University's normal policies as a shareholder need not apply because South Africa is such a special case—the only nation that institutionalizes racial discrimination and practices it on a massive scale. Recognizing the enormities of apartheid, Harvard has gone beyond its normal practices by communicating directly with corporate officials to persuade them to alter their employment practices and by creating special scholarship programs for black South Africans. But it is one thing to make efforts of this kind and quite another to disregard one of the University's basic principles, especially when such action is urged in pursuit of a strategy that has no significant chance of affecting the course of events in South Africa.

Those who seek a more effective way of putting pressure on the Afrikaner government need not look far. Last year, for example, bills were introduced in Congress, and passed the House of Representatives, to mandate fair labor practices, limit bank loans, impose export controls, and forbid all new American investment in South Africa. Whatever one may think of these bills, those who favor divestment must concede that such legislation would be a vastly more effective means of achieving their objective. Nevertheless, I have not observed substantial numbers of persons on this campus working actively for the passage of these measures.

Other critics take a very different tack and argue that we should divest, whether or not it will have any practical effect, because it is simply immoral to hold stock in any firm that does business in South Africa. This argument would have more force if Harvard owned stock in companies doing all or most of their business in South Africa. But that is not the case. The companies from which we are asked to divest typically do less than one percent of their business in South Africa. We do not invest in these concerns

because of their South African operations; it would be more nearly correct to say that we invest *despite* those operations.

The point, therefore, must be that Harvard should sell stock on principle if it is tainted, however slightly, by the stain of doing business in South Africa. This is a troublesome argument. It suggests that morality lies in trying to avoid all contact with the wrongs of the world and that it is better to sell one's stock and simply turn away from the injustices of South Africa than continue working as a shareholder to persuade companies to improve the wages and conditions of their black employees.

We should also recognize that far more than divestment would be needed to sever all our links to South Africa. If it is wrong to hold stock in an American company doing a tiny share of its business in South Africa, one would suppose that it is also immoral to hold shares in the many companies that buy goods from South Africa or sell goods to it, since they too benefit from the South African economy and presumably help to sustain it. One would also suppose that Harvard should not accept gifts of money derived in some demonstrable part from South African operations, since they would also be tainted. Accepting tuitions from South African students would likewise seem suspect; even tui-

tions from American students paid for in part by dividends from companies doing business in South Africa could be questioned. In short, the ramifications of such a rigorous policy are far-reaching indeed.

Before we insist on such a drastic moral standard, we should ask ourselves not only whether it is practical but whether we are willing to apply it to our own lives. How many of us have examined the purchases we make to see whether they come from companies that do business in or with South Africa? How many students have inquired whether their tuitions are paid in part from the dividends of companies with a South African subsidiary? For that matter, how many of us have stopped buying goods or using funds that can be traced to Guatemala, Salvador, Iran, Uganda, or other countries where thousands of innocent people have been killed with no justification? The truth is that virtually no one follows such a policy or regards it as a feasible standard to follow.

Finally, some have argued that Harvard should divest because divestment is a particularly dramatic, affirmative way of expressing the University's opposition to apartheid as a system at war with our ideals of freedom and justice. Such people often stress the pervasive influence of Harvard on the society and argue that the effects of our divestment on world

opinion could be substantial. My experience leads me to doubt this view. Harvard may command great respect for what it has accomplished in pursuit of its central mission of research and education; it does not have much influence, even with its own alumni, when it makes institutional statements on political questions such as corporate involvement in South Africa. Like it or not, the public knows that the University cannot claim any special wisdom in expressing itself collectively on issues of this kind.

It is also important to note that Harvard has already stated its clear and complete opposition to apartheid on various occasions. In what respect, then, is divestment a more effective, more forceful expression of disapproval? Because it will contribute in some significant way to ending apartheid? We have seen that this is most unlikely. Because the stock of American companies in South Africa is peculiarly tainted? That rationale is also unrealistic. The argument that divestment will be a peculiarly effective gesture must presumably rest on the belief that divestment will cost Harvard money and thus represent a sacrifice which will reveal the depth of our convictions.

This too is a highly questionable argument. Presumably, Harvard could also demonstrate its convictions by giving funds to the African National Congress or some other opposition group. Such a grant would certainly be a dra-

matic gesture and might well do more than divestment to further the struggle against the Nationalist regime. And yet, despite our revulsion toward apartheid, the fact remains that Harvard's resources were entrusted to us for academic purposes and not as a means of demonstrating our opposition to apartheid or to other manifest injustices and evils around the world. This is one reason why we have supported the expenditure of University funds to educate nonwhites from South Africa at Harvard but have opposed a policy of divestment.

In making these arguments, I am acutely aware of the contrary views expressed by those who strongly favor divestment. I respect their convictions. I hope that they will respect mine. It is never a pleasant task to disagree with others who care deeply about injustice. In the case of South Africa, the injustice is so monstrous that the heart aches for some opportunity to resist effectively. Nevertheless, such feelings cannot bring me to support a course of action that would force this University to deviate from its proper role, jeopardize its independence, and risk its resources in behalf of a dubious strategy that has no realistic prospect of success. As a result, having thought about the issues as carefully as I could, I continue to believe, as I did in 1978, that the arguments for divestment are not convincing and that Harvard should not adopt such a policy.


THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Date 10/10

To: Marc Tanenbaum
From: Harold Applebaum

- For your information
- For approval
- Please handle
- Please talk to me about this
- Read and return
- Returned as requested
- Your comments, please
- Per your request

REMARKS:





October 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: Leo Nevas, Chairman, International Relations Commission, A.J.C.

FROM: Bruce Fetter, Member, International Relations Commission and N.E.C.

B.F.

As the only member of the commission currently teaching a course on Southern Africa--regretably obliging me to be absent from the N.E.C. debate--I believe that we should advocate selective sanctions, which are in fact in the interest of the American and world Jewish communities. Certain considerations limit the extent of those sanctions: Israel's relations with South Africa, including a heavy migration of Israelis in search of high wages and quick profits; and the constraints of practicality on what we advocate as American policy. Nonetheless, if we expect to re-establish links with the U.S. black community, we must show our good faith to them regarding South Africa.

Of the options presented in the backgrounder, only disinvestment seems to me impractical--moral posturing, rather than effective action. Selective bans on imports from and exports to South Africa, however, show greater promise. There is no reason why American currency speculators should buy krugerrands rather than Canadian maple leaves; the U.N. ban on the sale of military equipment should be implemented and brought back to where it was before the current administration lifted the restrictions on computer sales. As far as the export of American capital is concerned, numerous measures can be taken short of an outright prohibition of new investments: U.S. guarantees of bank loans and capital investment should be denied all agencies, including the South African state, which do not abide by the Sullivan principles.



THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN—MILWAUKEE/P. O. Box 413, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

COLLEGE OF LETTERS AND SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
HOLTON HALL

(414) 963-4361

October 15, 1984

Mr. Leo Nevas
Nevas, Nevas and Rubin
P.O. Box 791
Westport, Conn. 06881.

Dear Mr. Nevas:

Many thanks for your letter of October 10th indicating interest in the views outlined in my memorandum to you on South Africa. I expressed myself telegraphically in order to determine whether there was any reason to write at greater length.

Enclosed is a memorandum for the Steering Committee's November 2nd meeting, which I hope you will have distributed. It is a great pleasure to know that I am not simply throwing out a message in a bottle.

I look forward to meeting you on November 1st.

Sincerely yours,

Bruce Fette





October 15, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Steering Committee, International Relations
Commission, A.J.C.

FROM: Bruce Fetter, Member, International Relations Commission and N.E.C.

RE: ^{B.F.} A.J.C. Policy Regarding South Africa

Before assessing the suggestions included in the N.E.C. background, we must first consider the question of whether our organization ought to advocate any sanctions at all against South Africa. To do this we must assess the interests of two Jewish groups: Israel and the American community.

Israel undoubtedly has closer ties with South Africa than we do. In order to maintain the loyalty of South African Jews, the Republic's government has allowed the transfer of significant charitable donations to the Jewish state. In addition, the two nations have developed extensive trade involving diamonds, which Israelis cut and polish for re-export, and armaments, which South Africans can not always buy through ordinary channels because of U.N. sanctions. In addition, tens of thousands of Israelis have migrated at least temporarily to South Africa in search of high wages and quick profits not to be found at home.

Since ties between the two countries are so firmly rooted in mutual interest, I doubt that anything that our organization advocates will adversely affect that relationship. On the other hand, American Jews have a great deal to lose from remaining silent on South Africa.

Many American Blacks feel as strongly about Africa as we feel about Israel. They have been appalled by the Reagan administration's policy of "Constructive Engagement", which seems to mask covert sympathy for the apartheid regime. At the very least one can argue that the South Africans were on the point of granting independence to Namibia when a move to the right in Washington stiffened their resolve to take a hard line.

Our own relations with the Black community are as bad as they have been at any time since the race riots of the late sixties. As far as foreign affairs are concerned, Afro-Americans might well resent the imbalance between four billion dollars spent on Israel and the failure to provide adequate relief to African nations suffering from the current (and recurrent) drought. I therefore believe

(2.)

that the advocacy of measures against the South African regime will be an important step in the re-establishment of links between America's Jews and Blacks.

Of the options presented in the backgrounder, only disinvestment seems to me impractical--moral posturing, rather than effective action. Disinvestment amounts to a secondary boycott of all American firms with South African subsidiaries. Rather than blocking all trade and investment between the U.S. and South Africa, I would advocate measures that restrict financial transactions which bolster the racial status quo. The Sullivan principles, which call for equal pay for blacks and whites doing the same job and for the rights of Africans to collective bargaining, should be used as a litmus test for judging financial transactions. Why not deny guarantees of bank loans and capital investment to all agencies, including the South African state, which do not abide by the Sullivan principles?

Two other measures seem promising. The United States has participated in the U.N. boycott of arms for South Africa, but the definition of arms should be tightened. We should, for example, advocate the reimposition of the ban on the export of computers and software. Since the Reagan administration eased that restriction, an American firm has sold computers to the South African police.

Finally, we should consider a ban on the sale of new krueger rands on the American gold market. Many Americans like to invest in gold coins, but given the availability of such non-South African coins as the Canadian maple leaf, such a ban would be relatively easy to impose.

A firmer policy against the South African status quo is not simply a sop to the U.S. Black community. It is a moral act consonant with our Jewish traditions of justice and fair play.

CONFIDENTIAL

Meeting with South African Consul General October 15, 1984

Recently, AJC lay leadership and staff met on an off-the-record basis with the South African Consul General in New York, Abe Hoppenstein. At the meeting, Mr. Hoppenstein made the following points:

* The key to South Africa's future lies in an improvement of the condition of South African Blacks. Now numbering 22 million, by the year 2,000 South African Blacks will number 40 million as against 8 million whites. In addition, the black population counts for 65% of all consumer spending, and the number of black high school matriculants, outnumbers the number of white matriculants. In short, change is inevitable, and the question is whether it will be accomplished peacefully or violently.

* Public opinion sampling shows that the Black community has a low regard for the Jewish community. Why this is so is difficult to determine; it may be that Blacks see hypocrisy in the position of many Jews, who say that apartheid is wrong but who themselves are prepared to leave the country rather than work for internal reform.

* From the perspective of global strategy, peaceful change in South Africa is important. Between them, the Soviet Union and South Africa control many of the world strategic metals. For this reason, the Soviets would dearly love to gain control of southern Africa, and revolution could enable them to achieve this.

* The model for the future that South African government projects is that of a political system of local government for white townships and black townships. The general model might resemble that of the Swiss cantons, governed by an overall parliament.

In response to questions, Mr. Hoppenstein said the following:

* On the question of relations between Israel and South Africa, there is need for an updated version of Moshe Decter's study on trade between Black Africa and South Africa. Forty-nine of the fifty-two black African states trade with South Africa, and the volume of their trade exceeds Israel and South Africa trade elevenfold.

* The idea of having AJC sponsor a scholarship program for South African Blacks is worthwhile. First, American Black leaders, such as Rev. Leon Sullivan, should be consulted. One might also talk with leaders of American corporations involved in such programs such as Mobil. The South African government does nothing to obstruct such programs, and these projects would be recognized as a positive contribution by South African Blacks.

* It would be useful for AJC leaders to send a commission of inquiry to South Africa to enhance the organization's credibility on this issue. AJC leaders would have full, free access to any region in any city of the country and to any leaders whom they wish to visit.

Prepared by Allan Kagedan.

N077-Hoppenstein

10/16/84-gn/el

STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA

As an agency devoted to the advancement of human rights, we remain deeply troubled by apartheid. ^{This}~~Our~~ concern stems from ^{our}~~2~~ dual American and Jewish heritage. Americans, a people dedicated to liberty and justice, find the South African system of racial discrimination morally repugnant. And Jews, whose traditional commitment to justice has been reinforced by their own historical experience of legally-entrenched discrimination, understand the evil of apartheid.

The American Jewish Committee has expressed consistently its abhorrence of apartheid, and has called for the ultimate elimination of the legal and de-facto discrimination inherent in that institution. We applaud the decision to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, one of the brave South Africans of many races and religions who have struggled against apartheid. This award will increase international attention on South Africa, and there can never be too much attention paid to the violation of basic human rights.

In South Africa harsh treatment of opponents of racial segregation has not abated. The recent large-scale army raids on black townships seem calculated to intimidate the black population to drop its demands for equality. Thus far in 1984, 80 blacks have died in clashes with police. Tragically, reports of torture and lapses in due process also emerge from South Africa.

The South African constitutional reforms, which belatedly offer partial representation to Indians and "coloreds," fail to enfranchise the country's overwhelming black majority. Indeed, the system of racial segregation remains firmly in place. The policy of "removing" black

South Africans from their homes for "resettlement" in resource-poor "homelands" has disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands--if not millions--of persons. The influx control laws, the Group Areas Act, and the Mixed Marriage and Immorality Acts entrench racial discrimination.

It would be presumptuous to suggest that we can offer a solution for the complex problem of apartheid. Indeed, the role that those outside South Africa may play in this issue is necessarily circumscribed. But we believe that positive measures can be adopted that reduce the likelihood of violent upheaval, and enhance the prospects for peaceful change. Non-violent change would benefit South Africans of all race and religions, including 119,000 of our fellow Jews resident in that country.

Restructuring economic arrangements can transform South African society. Thus we urge American corporations operating in South Africa to engage in fair employment practices toward blacks. Specifically, companies should desegregate work facilities, respect the right of workers to belong to trade unions, provide equal pay for comparable work, initiate job training programs, create opportunities for career advancement, and improve health, housing, and school facilities. We also call upon European firms doing business in South Africa to adhere to the 1977 EEC Code of Conduct which outlines similar fair employment principles.

The American Jewish Committee, furthermore, endorses programs by private groups and government agencies, in the United States and abroad, to educate black South Africans to assume leadership roles in the economic and public life of their country.

In the diplomatic arena, we urge the United States Government-- indeed all democratic governments--to work vigorously through appropriate channels, bilateral and multilateral, for the democratization of South African society.

The American Jewish Committee reaffirms its unequivocal condemnation of apartheid. We recognize that racial segregation breeds instability, hatred, and bloodshed. By improving the position of South African blacks, Americans and others, in a limited but positive fashion, can help South Africans chart a moral course for their future.



Remarks of Helen Susman at National Executive Council,
American Jewish Committee, Chicago, November 1984

I am, of course, deeply honored at having been chosen as the recipient of the 1984 American Jewish Committee's American Liberties Medallion. When Leo Nevas called me earlier this year in Cape Town to give me the good news, I told him I really was not in the same league as the illustrious recipients of former years. I was not, however, quite as surprised as I was in December 1978 when I was among the four individuals and the representatives of four organizations who received an award from the United Nations on the occasions of the 30th anniversary of the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I was struck by the fact that apart from being white and Jewish, there was I, a South African woman, being honored in respect of a Declaration which my country, along with the Soviet block and Saudi Arabia, did not in fact sign, even though the framer of part of the preamble to the United Nations Charter in 1948 was none other than General Smuts, then Prime Minister of South Africa. But it also occurred to me that many of the countries that had signed the Declaration and whose representatives were present at the ceremony in December '78 were perhaps as guilty as South Africa of not observing the letter and the spirit of of the Declaration. Few countries have, in fact, proved equal to the task of living up to the high expectations and exalted ideals propounded by the statesmen who came together at the end of World War II to lay down standards for a brave new world. Mankind has made no quantum leap into a better future for human rights such as it has made in the opening up of such fields as space travel, genetics and computer technology. If anything, the succession of dazzling scientific

achievements of the second half of the 20th century serves by way of contrast to highlight the stumbling efforts there have been in such vital spheres of interest as man's societal structures, governing procedures and the advancement of basic human rights. And perhaps most noticeable of all, the increasing indifference to violence, institutionalized and other. South Africa is by no means the only country capable of violating human rights - her special and unequaled prominence is of course due to the fact that, firstly, she claims to be among the Western nations and it is as such that she is judged and found wanting and secondly, because racial discrimination is entrenched in law in South Africa.

When I entered Parliament in 1953 it was a strong desire to do something about this issue that motivated me, although at that time the worst laws entrenching apartheid and eroding human rights were not yet of the Statute Book. I have been privileged to have had the opportunity to record my opposition to all those laws in the 32 years I have spent in Parliament. I have had a ringside seat watching the incredible jigsaw puzzle of apartheid being assembled piece by piece, legally entrenching racial separation in every facet of life - political, social, educational and economic - separate but not equal. And pari passu, as was to be expected, laws eroding the rule of law and habeas corpus were passed. I say as was to be expected, because if laws are passed which are not acceptable to the majority of people to whom they apply, the normal process of the law will not suffice to maintain law and order.

Thus in South Africa today the Minister of Law and Order has powers that are more appropriate to a country behind the Iron Curtain than to one that claims to belong to the Western community of nations. He can ban people, detain them indefinitely without trial, list them so they may not be quoted, restrict

them to certain magisterial districts. Right now in South Africa about 10 people are banned and restricted, 22 are held in preventive detention and 69 are held under the indefinite detention law.

I don't want to give you the impression that South Africa is a fully-fledged police state. It is not.

The press in South Africa is certainly more free than the press in any Black State on the Continent of Africa. Editorials criticising the Government are published daily in the newspapers. South Africa is not a one-party state and the Official Opposition to which I belong is able to voice its objections inside and outside Parliament and to put its alternative policy to the electorate at free and fair elections.

But the Catch 22 of this is, of course, the exclusion of Blacks (i.e. 70% of the population) from the franchise - they have a vote only in the so-called homelands (areas set aside for occupation and ownership by Blacks) even though they may never have set foot in those remote rural areas. This year a new Constitution for South Africa was introduced. It included the two minority groups, Coloured and Asian, in a tricameral Parliament, but not Blacks.

The new Constitution was hailed by two-thirds of White voters who participated in a referendum last year as a step in the right direction.

But the new Parliament opened in September in a South Africa rent by unrest and riots in the Black urban areas. Those of us who voted "No" at the referendum predicted increasing polarisation between Black and white. Alas, those predictions appear to have been correct.

The rather dismal picture I have painted does have a few bright spots - there have been some indications of re-thinking from Government sources. The defection some 2 years ago of a group of far-right M.P.s from the ruling Party

has allowed for some flexibility in what was a truly rigid, fundamentalist approach. The Government is even considering repelling the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and the law prohibiting sexual relations across the colour line. Although training facilities for white and black sportsmen are grossly unequal, sports is fully intergrated as a result of international pressure though this did not readmit South Africa to the Games in Los Angeles. (Only poor Zola Budd with her brand new British passport got there and alas, ended in a triangle with Mary Decker.)

All of you here tonight are I am sure anxious to know what you, as Americans, can do to hasten real change in South Africa - to set it on the path towards a true democratic society.

I wish I had the answer - but there is no simple answer to this complicated question - for there are several aspects to be considered - moral, economic, primitive, reform - all interwoven. The moral aspect is the simplest - it is a value judgment you have to make for yourselves, if, that is, the decision to disengage or divert is envisaged as a method of distancing oneself from any association with the abhorrent system of apartheid institutionalized race discrimination - to put it simply - to keep one's hands clean.

Such a course of action has a simple appeal. And so too does disengagement with a view to its primitive effect. But it also does other things - it removes you from a position of exercising any influence over the course of future events. The vacuum created by U.S. disengagement would be filled by others less concerned with reform and the pace of change - slow enough in all conscience - would be even slower.

There are those who believe that total economic collapse would facilitate a black revolution and black minority rule. Such a course could only be advocated by people sitting safely thousands of miles away, for a black revolution would have no chance of success, as anyone who knows anything about the strength, ferocity and competence of the South African police and many will agree. The key to peaceful change in South Africa lies I believe in the opposite direction - in the expansion of the economy, in the increasing acquisition of skills among Blacks, in increasing consumer power among Blacks, in developing economic muscle among Blacks which can be used to demand social and political change. And Western nations that urge reform should stay in South Africa and use their influence to this end. Moreover despite the gulf that exists between rhetoric and prevailing practice in the realm of human rights there are international codes of conduct with regard to such rights that have been widely established and accepted, albeit reluctantly by some, as just and proper aims of humanity. Not even a super power like the Soviet or a defiant small country like South Africa is comfortable when charged with infringement of those codes. The U.S. must protest loudly against apartheid's outrageous violation of human rights.

I did not intend to delve into politics this even - we had an indepth seminar yesterday where a number of issues were probed, including U.S./S.A. relations and Israeli/South African relations. I really wanted to talk about more personal matters and especially to say few words about South African Jewry - so very akin to U.S. Jewry - and no wonder since the two communities stem largely from the same roots - Eastern Europe and Germany. Irving Howe's wonderful book "World of our Fathers" was not, but easily could have been, the world of my father. He belonged to that generation of Jews born in a little shtetl in Eastern Europe - in Lithuania - in the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century.

Like all Jews in Russia in those days he was confronted with enormous obstacles to advancement - lack of mobility, lack of opportunity, lack of human rights, not to mention the possibility of having to serve in the Czar's army for 25 years should he not escape the draft. Like hundreds of thousands, indeed millions, of other Jews, he set out to seek a new life in another country. But unlike hundreds of thousand of other emigrants, he did not choose America - he chose South Africa, largely I think, because an older brother had already emigrated there. (Why he made that choice, I never learned.) My father arrived in South Africa just after the end of the Anglo-Boer War in 1903; I wonder as I stand here tonight if I would be receiving this honour from the American Jewish Committee if my dad had in fact landed at Ellis Island instead of at Cape Town in 1903? I very much doubt it - it is so much easier to be a big duck in a small pond. I would probably have been a teacher on the lower East Side or a Civil Rights Lower - or maybe a mini-Bella Abzug. My father, I know, would have done well where-ever he'd gone - he was a man of remarkable energy and considerable intelligence. He had only the formal education of a shtetl boy and certainly no knowledge of either English or Dutch when he arrived in South Africa. Yet he prospered. Well, the over-riding characteristic about all those remarkable immigrants of y father's generation (all have departed this earth, alas) is that they were obsessed with ensuring that their children received the best possible education. And my generation in South Africa has carried on that tradition with our offspring. But unfortunately South Africa has not gained greatly from this because so many second generation - young South African born Jews have left the country. There is a whole new Diaspora of South African Jews spread across the Western world. Everywhere I go, I find them - in New York, Boston, Atlanta, Houston and Los Angeles; I find them in Toronto, London, in

Sydney and Melbourne. And in Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. They are all doing very well. They leave either because of better career prospects or, more usually, because they see little hope of a better system replacing the existing political structure in South Africa. And some do not want their sons to serve two years in the army fighting for something they don't believe in. We, the first generation south African born mostly stay put - deprived grandparents but with this difference - my father never saw his parents again after he left Russia - we manage to visit our offspring once a year: as I shall do, thanks to you, next week!

I thank you once again for the great honour you have bestowed on me this evening and I am especially grateful for the timing, for it has enabled me to observe at the closest possible quarters the exciting event that will take place next week in the U.S. I had to watch the Olympic Games on T.V. from 12,000 miles away. I will be in Washington - again - thanks to you - on Tuesday.

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ADDRESS BY MRS. HELEN SUZMAN M.P. TO THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, CHICAGO, NOVEMBER 2nd 1984

Although the title of my talk is 'Southern Africa - the new Political Landscape', that will have to serve as framework only, for Dr. Tanenbaum wrote to me at the beginning of September suggesting a number of topics in which you would be especially interested. They are:

- (1) The present situation in South Africa with particular reference to the unrest that accompanied the recent Indian and Coloured elections;
- (2) The situation and mood of the Jewish community in South Africa;
- (3) The relationship between South Africa and Israel, South Africa and the Western powers, and South Africa and Black African countries;
- (4) Prospects for the future and for the Jewish community in South Africa;

Each of these subjects could in fact take up my entire allotted time of 30-45 minutes, but I will do my best to cover some aspects of each of the suggested topics, though not seriatim.

I want to begin by giving you a few relevant statistics about the South African society.

South Africa has a total population of approximately 25 million people, of whom 4 1/2 million are white, 17 million are Black, 2 1/2 million are Coloured and 800,000 are Asian.

The white population is by no means homogeneous in language or in culture. Afrikaners (of Dutch stock, way back in the mid-17th Century) are the dominant group, numbering about 2.8 million. English-speaking people represent some 40%. There are today about 500,000 people of Portuguese origin in South Africa, having come from Angola and Mozambique when those countries became independent and were taken over by Black governments in the mid-70s. The Jewish community consists of about 120,000 people - you could lose them in a corner of Brooklyn.

Jews went to South Africa in two major waves of immigration - the first from Eastern Europe at the turn of the century to escape pogroms, being drafted into the Czar's army and to seek a better life; the second in the thirties from Germany to escape the Nazi terror. Immigration was restricted by two laws - the Quota Act of 1913 and the Aliens Act of 1932.

South African Jews are a tightly-knit community, held together by cultural and religious ties. About 50% of Jewish children attend Jewish day schools. There is a strong Zionist movement in South Africa and South African Jews are reputed to be the highest per capita donors to Israel after the Jews of the U.S. (There are no tax deductions for these contributions) Their political affiliations in South Africa span all parties except the far-right Conservative and Herstigte Nasional Parties - the latter indeed prohibits Jews from becoming

members, and while the former does not prohibit membership, it has stated that adherence to Christian principles is required of its members.

Until the early fifties the ruling National Party did not admit Jews in the Transvaal. Today it not only admits Jews but has nominated a Jew as an M.P. (now retired) and recently nominated a Jew to the President's Council in the new constitutional structure. A number of Jews support the National Party today, though it is fair to say that the majority support the Opposition. They not only remember the National Party's support of Nazi Germany during World War II but have an understandable dislike of the manifold injustices inherent in the apartheid system. In my own constituency (a "silk stocking" constituency in Johannesburg), there is a large number of Jewish voters who have faithfully returned me to Parliament over eight general elections. I do not claim they all agree or perhaps even know every detail of the policy I and my party (the official opposition Progressive Federal Party) propound. Maybe they have just become thoroughly conditioned to vote for me over all those years! However, though not all Jews are liberals in South Africa, a disproportionate number of liberals are Jews.

A great number of young and middle-aged Jews have emigrated from South Africa over the past 25 years. Many have left for career reasons, but a good many more have left for political reasons. They dislike present policies and they fear what the future may bring.

The Jewish population in South Africa is an aging population. It would be a shrinking population were it not for the \pm 18,000 Israelis who are living there. A few thousand more are there temporarily.

Which brings me to the South African/Israeli connection.

One of the main reasons why some Jews support the National Party government is because of the Government's sympathetic attitude towards Israel, which, inter alia, relaxed exchange control to enable South African Jews to send money and goods to Israel. There is a bond between South Africa and Israel as a result of the isolation felt by both - targets of the East and the West. The two countries trade extensively, exchange information and expertise and refuse to participate in boycotts against each other. Both feel beleaguered and the military connection is rumoured to be substantial. (I cannot give you details - there is an embargo on such information and a Defence Act that prohibits its dissemination). But it is known that there is a formal treaty between Israel and South Africa agreeing to a regular exchange of technical and scientific information which may well include advice regarding defence and counter-insurgency matters from Israel.

In return, Israel gets vital minerals such as coal, iron and vanadium, as well as other raw materials it cannot obtain elsewhere. I am well aware that the South African/Israeli connection has made the task of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. that much more difficult. I can only assume that Israel has weighed up the pros and cons and considers, rightly or wrongly, that she would have more to lose if she severed the connection with South Africa.

There have been repercussions in South Africa as well, as a result of the South Africa/Israeli connection. Over recent years there has been a noticeable rise of anti-Jewish sentiments among Black South Africans, many of whom - especially young radicalised Blacks - identify with the P.L.O. Last year there were ugly scenes on the campus at the University of the Witwatersrand where Black students (mostly Asian), supporters of P.L.O., and Jewish students clashed violently. I have had leaders of the Black community in Soweto ask me how it is possible that Jews in Israel can have friendly relations with a country like South Africa whose policy is based on race discrimination.

I have been at pains to tell them that the Israeli/South African connection is based on survival - each has something the other needs and cannot obtain elsewhere; and that it is unrealistic to expect Jews in Israel who have lost so much to endanger their survival out of sympathy for Blacks in South Africa, but that this does not mean that they identify with the policies of the South African Government. I also point out that Black states in Africa have rejected Israeli offers of technical assistance, have expelled Israeli diplomats and have made clear their sympathy for the P.L.O. Two leaders, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Machel of Mozambique, have recently received Arafat and repeated the silly statement that Zionism and apartheid are synonymous.

Needless to say, this is having its backlash among Jews in South Africa, but I am firmly convinced that Jewish voters (in my constituency anyway) are so imbued with a feeling for simple justice that they will not be influenced into changing their political affiliations.

It is also important to note that South Africa maintains ties with most Western nations, engaging in extensive trade with, among others, Great Britain, U.S. and West Germany. Its trade with the U.S. includes exports of gold, diamonds and other minerals in exchange for chemicals and technology. There are approximately 350 U.S. companies currently operating in South Africa, of which 200 have endorsed the Sullivan Principles.

I turn now to Dr. Tanenbaum's proposal that I discuss the present situation in South Africa with particular reference to the unrest that accompanied the recent Coloured and Indian elections. Let me briefly sketch the events leading up to those elections.

During the 1983 Parliamentary session a new Constitution for South Africa was adopted by the all-white Parliament with my party opposing and the far-right Conservative Party also opposing - for totally different reasons. We opposed because the new constitution omitted to make political accommodation for 70% of the population - the Blacks. And the C.P. opposing because the all-white Parliament would henceforth include, in a tricameral structure, the Coloured and Asian people. Having passed the Constitution Act, the Government held a referendum of white voters, asking whether the new Constitution should be implemented "Yes" or "No."

My Party advocated a "No" vote, anticipating further polarization between Black and white due to the exclusion of Blacks.

We had uneasy bedfellows in the far-right C.P. which also advocated a "No" vote because of the inclusion of Coloureds and Asians. In the event, the Government won the referendum hands down. 66% of the white electorate voted "Yes", including a considerable number of opposition supporters who felt that the new Constitution was "a step in the right direction" and that the Government must have a hidden agenda that would eventually bring Blacks into the new dispensation.

In August this year elections were held to choose the Coloured and Asian M.P.s for their respective Houses (Representatives for Coloureds; Delegates for Asians). But meanwhile a rising tide of opposition to any participation in the new structure was very evident - the United Democratic Front - consisting of a conglomerate of some 400 organizations - of all races - plus political organizations like the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congress - campaigned vigorously against participation. Low polls were the result - 30% in the case of the Coloureds (less if one bases the percentage on the total number that could have but did not register for the vote) and 20% for the Asians. The Government charged intimidation as the reason and said it considered the elections to be valid. It had in the meantime locked up - under the preventive detention law - a number of leading lights of U.D.F. and of other Black organizations. There was a great deal of violence at the polling booths with the police out in full force using sjamboks and tear gas.

Hardly an auspicious way in which to usher in the so-called new era of reform.

Also erupting at this time were black townships close to the Witwatersrand: ostensibly due to an increase in rents but no doubt also due to the ongoing smouldering resentment engendered by all the apartheid measures and non-inclusion in the new political set-up. At least 100 people were killed and a great deal of damage done to property. The Government's reaction was predictable. Approximately 20 people have been held under the security laws and six have sought refuge in the British Consulate. More arrests and a ban on all indoor meetings until the end of September. (outdoor meetings have been banned since the 1976 unrest - that this has not restored law and order appears to have escaped the Government). Something like 160,000 Black school kids were boycotting school when I left South Africa and there was trouble at every Black university in the country. The tricameral Parliament opened on 18th September with a pious "applepie and motherhood" speech from the new Executive State President, elected not by popular vote as yours will be on 6th November but by 50 members of Parliament of his own Party: for the Coloured and Indian M.P.s in the electoral college are outnumbered 50-38. How's that for democracy?

The old Westminster system which South Africa had before was by no means perfect, but what the Government has done is to retain the worst features of that system - winner take all elections and highly centralized form of government - and it has failed to introduce the best features - namely, universal franchise under the rule of law. Moreover, the foundation stones of apartheid remain untouched - the new Constitution is based on race classification. All the ugliest aspects of apartheid - residential and school apartheid, the pass laws, forced removals, remain. (True, repeal of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Act is being considered.) All the violations to the rule of law will also remain.

So when you ask me what the prospects are for the future, and for the Jewish community - they are bound up together.

Presently, unlike the U.S., South Africa is in the throes of a recession caused by the drop in the price of gold, the decline in the value of the Rand, and a devastating two-year drought. I believe we will recover for the country has resources, expertise and resilience. It also has a remarkable history of windfalls. But Government spending has to be curbed and there are two areas in particular where this should be done - expenditure in connection with apartheid and the vast bureaucracy it spawns, and defence expenditure in the on-going seemingly bogged-down war in Namibia/Angola. The M.P.A.A. can't combat Unita without the Cubans. South Africa won't withdraw until the Cubans leave, and is extremely reluctant to quit Namibia and leave it to a SWAPO Government. Thus there is an impasse and a very expensive one - it costs S.A.R 2,000 million p.a.

Perhaps at this juncture I should comply with Dr. Tanenbaum's suggestion that I say something about South Africa and its relationship to the Black nations in Southern Africa.

You will have read probably about the Nkomati Accord which, was in effect, a non-aggression treaty signed by Botha and Machel on behalf of South Africa and Mozambique. Mozambique undertook to refuse the use of its territory as a launch pad for A.N.C. guerillas to attack South Africa. South Africa undertook to restore economic ties with Mozambique and to help stabilize that sorely-tryed area. I visited Mozambique in August. It is in a dismal state, drought ravaged as is most of Southern Africa, pestered by the M.N.R. which continues to operate despite South Africa's promise to help immobilize it. The M.N.R. has disrupted railway traffic throughout the area and to Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. It constantly cuts the powerline from Cabora Bassa. Food is rationed - there's nothing to buy in the markets or shops. There are queues everywhere. The railways and harbour at Maputo are not yet functioning properly - South Africa's use of labour from Mozambique is down to just over one third of what it used to be. Tourism, another major earner of foreign exchange, is nil.

The only cheering feature was that Mozambique is a truly non-racial society.

It has a long way to go before it becomes economically viable. Zimbabwe has so far proved a disappointment. Mugabe is about to turn the country into a one-party state; the vicious action against Nkomo in Matabeleland has brought much international disapproval. The economy is much better than that of Mozambique and has been helped this year by bumper crops of tobacco and rice.

Zambia, which I also visited recently, has an economy dependant on a single export product - copper - and the price of copper is down and the rail link to Lobito in Angola out of action because of Unita. Copper goes out via the long railway to Dar. Kaunda, with whom a colleague and I had a 2 1/2 hour session, is very much in command.

All three BSL countries are closely bound to South Africa - they are part of a Customs Union and Rand monetary system.

They depend on South Africa for markets and the sale of labour. They are being pressured to sign Nkomati type treaties of non-aggression.

All the Black States in Africa cordially dislike South Africa. All would like to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa. All, however, (+ 50 of them anyway) trade with South Africa.

And all are well-aware of South Africa's military might which is more than capable of dealing with any aggression from all of them combined. At most they can provide bases for training and places of refuge for the A.N.C., while the neighbouring territories (other than the "independent" homelands) are possible launch pads for guerrilla raids. South Africa, however, has already demonstrated (in Lesotho and Maputo) that she will not hesitate to cross the borders in hot pursuit, and to destabilise countries that assist the A.N.C.

The future of Jews in South Africa is, of course, no different from the future of everybody else in South Africa. There is no black revolution around the corner. There is certainly going to be an escalation of urban violence unless really fundamental changes are introduced.

I have to say that I do not foresee such fundamental changes as imminent. It is going to take years to get back to square one, i.e. a South Africa minus laws that infringe human rights. And even then it will take many more years to implement real equality of opportunity for all races. Pressures for change will roll on - international pressures - some effective, some counter productive.

The sports boycott has been effective, but has brought no regards -- the ante has been upped. Sport is integrated today though training facilities are grossly unequal. Where integrated sport was originally the demand, now the cry is "There can be no normal sport in an abnormal society."

The U.N. mandatory arms embargo and the oil embargo have not been effective. South Africa today has a very efficient arms industry and obtains her oil from three oil-from-coal industries and from those who are prepared to sell at a price.


I am well aware of the vigorous campaign being waged in city governments, State Houses, on campuses and in Congress. I know that several cities, including New York City, have withdrawn their pension funds from companies doing business in South Africa. I know that the Solarz, Berman and Gray bills will resurface. I understand the motivation but I do not believe that divestment will affect reform though it may very well make the divesters feel they have won a moral victory: or inflicted punishment (on both those who deserve it and those who do not.) I know that the term "constructive engagement" has acquired an unpopular political flavor. As for disinvestment, I am of the opinion that it is better for the U.S. to stay in South Africa and to try to exert influence than to leave and have no further influence. I certainly believe that the U.S. as the most powerful country in the Western world with a declared policy on human rights has a decided responsibility to speak up on all the thoroughly offensive goings-on in South Africa. And if some of the rhetoric is somewhat shrill in this pre-election time in the U.S., no matter: there are occasions in politics when expediency coincides with a just cause.

In the long run, it will be the Blacks themselves inside South Africa who will be the instrument for change. Power takes many forms, and in South Africa today Blacks are slowly but surely accumulating economic power as they urbanise, despite the pass laws, and as they are drawn into the national economy not only in every-increasing numbers but at rising levels of skills. Economic muscle can be used as shown in all industrialized countries to redress imbalances in wealth, privilege and power. I don't think the West can or should prescribe final solutions for South Africa - they should rather as a British Ambassador to the United Nations once said "apply such leverage as they have in trying to attain specific and achievable ends." To put it in Talmudic language "It is not incumbent upon thee to complete the task - but neither art thou free to desist from it altogether."

Instead of drawing up 'hit-lists' of possible reprisals against South Africa, concerned foreigners could be more usefully engaged in helping to make positive and constructive proposals to solve a problem of great complexity. How, in fact, does one bring about 'full political participation for all' in a country with South Africa's racial composition without all political power passing to the overwhelming black majority? How can the rights of minorities be best protected? And more particularly in a society of widely disparate ethnic and cultural backgrounds and with no long-established consensus as to how the society should be run? These are not simple questions to be solved by even simpler solutions encompassed in slogans. They are desperately difficult questions with which all the main political parties in South Africa are wrestling at this very moment. No one is trying to shirk them. We all know they must be faced and answered, and answered in accordance with the conscience of mankind.

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA

The American Jewish Committee, this country's pioneer human relations organization, has been devoted since its founding to combatting violations of human rights wherever they occur. In this tradition, we reaffirm our abhorrence of apartheid, South Africa's system of legally entrenched racial discrimination, and we call for its speedy elimination.

We applaud the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Desmond Tutu, a courageous and eloquent leader of the anti-apartheid struggle. The award symbolizes universal recognition of the justice of this cause.

Unhappily, in South Africa, voices of protest against apartheid are often silenced harshly. Lack of due process and detention without trial are prominent features of life, with attendant abuse of political power.

Recently enacted constitutional reforms, belatedly offering partial representation to Indians and "coloreds," have left the system of racial segregation intact; unfortunately, they fail to enfranchise South Africa's overwhelming black majority. The policy of "resettling" blacks in poverty-stricken "homelands" has disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands -- perhaps millions. The influx control laws and the Group Areas Act aggravate the suffering of the black population.

The role that those outside the country can play in combatting apartheid is limited. But they can help to enhance the prospects for peaceful change, which would benefit South Africans of all races and religions.

Thus, we endorse programs by private groups and government agencies, in the United States and abroad, for educating black and other non-white South Africans to assume a prominent role in the economic and public life of their country. Education can be a powerful force for social change, a key element in dismantling apartheid.

Furthermore, all American companies operating in South Africa should be urged to apply fair employment practices toward blacks. These include desegregating the workplace, permitting workers to join trade unions providing equal pay for comparable work, initiating job training programs, creating opportunities for career advancement, and improving health, housing, and school facilities. Additionally, all European firms doing business in South Africa should be urged to adhere to the fair employment principles enunciated in the 1977 EEC Code of Conduct. Such practices by Western firms can contribute significantly to the long-term goal of building a society based on equality and justice.

Finally, we urge the United States Government, and all other Western governments, to work vigorously through appropriate bilateral and multilateral channels, for the democratization of South African society.

Adopted by the National Executive Council
Chicago, Illinois, November 2, 1984

rpr


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ADDRESS BY MRS. HELEN SUZMAN M.P. TO THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, CHICAGO, NOVEMBER 2nd 1984

Although the title of my talk is Southern Africa - the new Political Landscape^o, that will have to serve as a framework only, for Dr. Tannenbaum wrote to me at the beginning of September suggesting a number of topics in which you would be especially interested - they are:-

- (1) The present situation in South Africa with particular reference to the unrest that accompanied the recent Indian and Coloured elections.
- (2) The situation and mood of the Jewish community in South Africa.
- (3) The relationship between South Africa and Israel, South Africa and the Western powers, and South Africa and Black African countries.
- (4) Prospects for the future and for the Jewish community in South Africa.

Each of these subjects could in fact take up my entire allotted time of
30-45 minutes....



30 - 45 minutes, but I will do my best to cover some aspects of each of the suggested topics, though not seriatim.

I want to begin by giving you a few relevant statistics about the South African society.

South Africa has a total population of 25 million people, of whom 4 million are white, 17 million are Black, 2 million are Coloured and 800 000 are Asian.

The white population is by no means homogeneous in language or in culture. Afrikaners (of Dutch stock, way back in the mid-17th Century) are the dominant group, numbering about 2.8 million. English speaking people represent some 40%. There are today about 500 000 people of Portuguese origin in South Africa, having come from Angola, and Mozambique when those countries became independent and were taken over by Black governments in

the mid-70's...



the mid-70's. The Jewish community consists of about 12000 people - you could lose them in a corner of Brooklyn.

Jews went to South Africa in two major waves of immigration - the first from Eastern Europe at the turn of the century to escape pogroms, the Czar's army and to seek a better life; the second in the early thirties from Germany to escape the Nazi terror. Immigration was restricted by two laws - the Quota Act of 1913 and the Aliens Act of 1932.

South African Jews are a tightly knit community, held together by cultural and religious ties. About 50% of Jewish children attend Jewish day schools. There is a strong Zionist movement in South Africa and South African Jews are reputed to be the highest pro capita donors to Israel after the Jews of the U.S. Their political affiliations span all parties except the

far right




far-right Conservative and Herstigte National Parties - the latter indeed prohibits Jews from becoming members, and while the former does not prohibit membership it has stated that adherence to Christian principles is required of its members.

Until the early fifties the ruling National Party did not admit Jews in the Transvaal. Today it not only admits Jews but has nominated a Jew as an M.P. (now retired) and recently nominated a Jew to the President's Council

in the new constitutional structure. A number of Jews support the National Party today, though it is fair to say that the majority support the Opposition.


They not only remember the National Party's support of Nazi Germany during World War II but have an understandable dislike of the manifold injustices inherent in the apartheid...



inherent in the apartheid system. In my own constituency (a silk stocking constituency) there is a large number of Jewish voters who have faithfully returned me over eight general elections. I do not claim they all agree or perhaps even know every detail of the policy I and my party (the Progressive Federal Party) propound. Maybe they have just become thoroughly conditioned to vote for me over all these years! However, though not all Jews are liberals in South Africa, a disproportionate number of liberals are Jews.

A great number of young and middle-aged Jews have emigrated from South Africa over the past 25 years. Many have left for career reasons, but a good many more have left for political reasons. They dislike present policies and they fear what the future may bring.

The Jewish population..



The Jewish population in South Africa is an aging population. It would be a shrinking population were it not for the 18 000 Israelis who are living there.

Which brings me to the South Africa/Israeli connection.

One of the main reasons why some Jews support the National Party government is because of the Government's unsympathetic attitude towards Israel, which inter alia relaxed exchange control to enable South African Jews to send money and goods to Israel. There is a bond between South Africa and Israel as a result of the isolation felt by both - targets

of the East and the West. The two countries trade extensively, exchange information and expertise and refuse to participate in boycotts against each other. Both feel beleaguered and the military connection is rumoured

to be substantial...




to be substantial. (I cannot give you details - there is an embargo on such information and a Defence Act that prohibits its dissemination).

But it is a fairly open secret that Israeli defence experts have advised South Africa, ~~on its military and air force capabilities, that Israeli arms are needed greatly.~~


In return Israel gets vital minerals needed for its armament manufacture as well as other raw materials it cannot obtain elsewhere. I am well aware that the South African/Israeli connection has made the task of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. that much more difficult. I can only assume that Israel has weighed up the pros and cons and considers, rightly or wrongly that she would have more to lose if she severed the connection with South Africa.

There have been




There have been repercussions in South Africa as well as a result of the South African/Israeli connection. Over recent years there has been a noticeable rise of anti-Jewish sentiments among Black South Africans, many of whom - especially young radicalised Blacks - identify with the P.I.O. Last year there were ugly scenes on the campus at the University of the Witwatersrand where Black students (mostly Asian), supporters of P.I.O., and Jewish students clashed violently. I have had leaders of the Black community in Soweto ask me how it is possible that Jews in Israel can have friendly relations with a country like South Africa whose policy is based on race discrimination.

I have been at pains to tell them that the Israeli/South African connection is based....



connection is based on survival - each has something the other needs and cannot obtain elsewhere; and that it is unrealistic to expect Jews in Israel who have lost so much to endanger their survival out of sympathy for Blacks in South Africa, but that this does not mean that they identify with the policies of the South African Government. I also point out that Black states in Africa have rejected Israeli offers of technical assistance, have expelled Israeli diplomats and have made clear their sympathy for the P.L.O. Two leaders, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Machel of Mozambique have recently received Arafat and repeated the silly statement that Zionism and apartheid are synonymous.


Needless to say, this is having its backlash among Jews in South Africa, but I am firmly convinced that Jewish voters (in my constituency anyway) are so imbued with a feeling for simple justice that they will not be influenced...



not be influenced into changing their political affiliations.

I turn now to Dr. Tanenbaum's proposal that I discuss the present situation in South Africa with particular reference to the unrest that accompanied the recent Coloured and Indian elections. Let me briefly sketch the events leading up to these elections.

During the 1983 Parliamentary session a new Constitution for South Africa was adopted by the all-white Parliament with my Party opposing and the far-right Conservative Party also opposing - for totally different reasons. We opposed because the new constitution omitted to make political accommodation for 70% of the population - the Blacks. And the C.P. opposing because the all-white Parliament would henceforth include, in a tricameral structure, the Coloured and Asian people. Having passed the Constitution Act,....




Constitution Act, the Government held a referendum of white voters, asking whether the new Constitution should be implemented "Yes" or "No".

My Party advocated a "No" vote, anticipating further polarisation between Black and white due to the exclusion of Blacks.


We had uneasy bedfellows in the far-right G.P. which also advocated a "No" vote because of the inclusion of Coloureds and Asians. In the event, the Government won the referendum hands down. 66% of the white electorate voted "Yes", including a considerable number of opposition supporters who felt that the new Constitution was "a step in the right direction" and that the Government must have a hidden agenda that would eventually bring Blacks into the new dispensation.

In August this year elections were held to choose the Coloured and

Asian M.P.s for....



Asian M.P.s for their respective Houses (Representatives for Caloureds; Delegates for Asians). But meanwhile a rising tide of opposition to any participation in the new structure was very evident - the United Democratic Front - consisting of a conglomerate of some 400 organisations - of all races - plus political organisations like the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congress - campaigned vigorously against participation. Low polls were the result - 30% in the case of the Caloureds (less if one bases the percentage on the total number that could have but did not register for the vote) and 20% for the Asians. The Government charged intimidation as the reason and said it considered the elections to be valid. It had in the meantime locked up - under the preventive detention law - a number of leading lights of U.D.F. and of other Black organisations. There was a great deal of violence at the polling booths with the police out in full force using



force using sjambeks and teargas.

Hardly an auspicious way in which to usher in the so-called new era of reform.

Also erupting at this time were black townships close to the Witwatersrand; ostensibly due to an increase in rents but no doubt also due to the ongoing smouldering resentment engendered by all the apartheid measures and non-inclusion in the New political set-up. At least 50 people ^{have been} killed and a great deal of damage done to property. The Government's reaction was predictable. More arrests and a ban on all indoor meetings until the end of September. (outdoor meetings have been banned since the 1976 unrest - that this has not restored law and order appears to have escaped the Government). Something like 160 000 Black school kids were boycotting school when I left South Africa and there was trouble at every...



was trouble at every Black university in the country. The tricameral Parliament opened on 18th September with a pious "apple pie and motherhood" speech from the new Executive State President, elected not by popular vote as yours will be on 6th November but by 30 members of Parliament of his own Party: for the Coloured and Indian M.P.s in the electoral college are outnumbered 50 - 38. How's that for democracy?

The old Westminster system which South Africa had before was by no means perfect, but what the Government has done is to retain the worst features of that system - winner take all elections and highly centralised form of government - and it has failed to introduce the best features - namely, universal franchise under the rule of law. Moreover, the foundation stones of apartheid remain untouched - the new Constitution is based on race classification. All the ugliest aspects of apartheid - residential & school



residential and school apartheid, the pass laws, forced removals, remain.

(True, repeal of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Act is being considered).

All the violations to the rule of law will also remain.

So when you ask me what the prospects are for the future, and for the Jewish community - they are bound up together.

Presently, unlike the U.S., South Africa is in the throes of a recession caused by the drop in the price of gold, the decline in the value of the Rand, and a devastating ³ two-year drought. I believe we will recover for the country has resources, expertise and resilience. It also has a remarkable history of windfalls. But Government spending has got to be curbed and there are two areas in particular where this should be done - expenditure in connection with apartheid and the vast bureaucracy it spawns, and defence expenditure in the on-going seemingly bogged-down war in Namibia/Angola. The M.P.A. can't combat Unita without the Cubans. South Africa won't withdraw until the Cubans leave, and is extremely reluctant to quit Namibia and leave it to a SWAPO military Government. Thus there is an impasse & a very expensive one - it costs S.A. R2 000 million p.a. to administer Namibia & to prosecute the war.

Perhaps at this juncture I should comply with Dr. Tanenbaum's suggestion that I say something about South Africa and its relationship to the Black nations in Southern Africa.

You will have read probably about the Ekamati Accord which was in effect a non-aggression treaty signed by Botha and Machel ^{in April this year} on behalf of South Africa and Mozambique. Mozambique undertook to refuse the use of its territory as a launch pad for A.N.C. guerillas to attack South Africa. South Africa undertook to restore economic ties with Mozambique and to help stabilize that sorely-ried area. I visited Mozambique in August. It is in a dismal state, drought-ravaged as is most of southern Africa, pestered by the M.N.R. ^(Renamo) which continues to operate despite South Africa's promise to help immobilise it. The M.N.R. has disrupted railway traffic throughout the area and to Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. It constantly

cuts the powerline...




cuts the powerline from Cahora Bassa. Food is rationed - there's nothing to buy in the markets or shops. There are queues everywhere. The railways and harbour at Maputo are not yet functioning properly - South Africa's use of labour from Mozambique is down to just over one third of what it used to be. Tourism - another major earner of foreign exchange is nil.

The only cheering feature was that Mozambique is a truly non-racial society.

It has a long way to go before it becomes economically viable. Zimbabwe has so far proved a disappointment. Mugabe is about to turn the country into a one-party state; the vicious action against ~~Mromo~~ ^{supporters} is

Matabeleland has brought much international disapproval. The economy is much better than that...



much better than that of Mozambique and has been helped this year by bumper crops of tobacco and rice.

Zambia which I also visited recently, has an economy dependant on a single export product - copper - and the price of copper is down and the rail link to Lobite in Angola out of action because of Unita. Copper goes out via the long railway to Dar. Kwanda, with whom a colleague and I had a 2 1/2 hour session, is very much in command.


All three BSL countries are closely bound to South Africa - they are part of a Customs Union and Rand monetary system.

They depend on South Africa for markets and the sale of labour. They are being pressured to sign Nkomati-type treaties of non-aggression.

All the Black States in.....



All the Black States in Africa cordially dislike South Africa.
 All would like to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa.
 All however (50 of them anyway) trade with South Africa.
 And all are well-aware of South Africa's military might which is more than capable of dealing with any aggression from all of them combined.
 At most they can provide bases for training and places of refuge for the A.N.C., while the neighbouring territories (other than the "independent" homelands) are possible launch pads for guerilla raids. South Africa, however, has already demonstrated (in Lesotho) and Maputo) that she will not hesitate to cross the borders in hot pursuit, and to destabilise areas providing assistance to the A.N.C.



The future of Jews in South Africa is, of course, no different from the future of everybody else in South Africa. There is no black revolution around the corner, ^{though} there is certainly going to be an escalation of urban violence unless really fundamental changes are introduced.

I have to say that I do not foresee such fundamental changes as imminent. It is going to take years to get back to square one - i.e. a South Africa minus laws that infringe human rights. And even then it will take many more years to implement real equality of opportunity for all races. Pressures for change will roll on - international pressures - some effective, some counter productive. The sports boycott has been effective, but has brought no rewards - the ante has been upped.


The arms embargo and the oil embargo have not been effective. I do not believe....



do not believe that divestment will affect reform though it may very well make the divesters feel they have won a moral victory or inflicted punishment (on both those who deserve it and those who do not.).

I am of the opinion that it is better to stay in South Africa and exert influence than to leave and have no further influence: call it constructive engagement, if you like. I certainly believe that the U.S. as the most powerful country in the Western world with a declared policy on human rights has a decided responsibility to speak up on all the thoroughly offensive goings-on in South Africa. And if some of the rhetoric is somewhat shrill in this pre-election time in the U.S. - no matter: there are occasions in politics when expediency coincides with a just cause.

In the long run...



In the long run, it will be the Blacks themselves inside South Africa who will be the instrument for change. Power takes many forms, and in South Africa today Blacks are already but surely accumulating economic power as they urbanize despite the pass laws, and as they are drawn into the national economy not only in ever-increasing numbers but at rising levels of skills. Economic muscle can be used as shown in all industrialised countries to redress imbalances in wealth, privilege and power. I don't think the West can or should prescribe final solutions for South Africa - they should rather as a British Ambassador to the United Nations once said "apply such leverage as they have in trying to attain specific and achievable ends".


Instead of drawing up ...



Instead of drawing up 'hit-lists' of possible reprisals against South Africa, concerned foreigners could be more usefully engaged in helping to make positive and constructive proposals to solve a problem of great complexity

How, in fact, does one bring about 'full political participation for all' in a country with South Africa's racial composition without all political power passing to the overwhelming black majority? How can the rights of minorities be best protected? And more particularly in a society of widely disparate ethnic and cultural backgrounds and with no long-established consensus as to how the society should be run? These are not simple questions to be solved by even simpler solutions encompassed in slogans. They are desperately difficult questions with which all the main political parties in South Africa are wrestling at this very moment. No-one is trying to shirk them. We all know they must be faced and answered, and answered in accordance with the conscience of mankind.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~...



MRS HELEN SUZMAN, M.P. : CURRICULUM VITAE

Born 1917, Germiston, South Africa

Educated - Parktown Convent, Johannesburg

B.Com., University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

Married Dr. M.M. Suzman, 1937. Two daughters

Statistician, War Supplies Board, 1941-44

Lecturer in Economic History, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg, 1944-52

Elected Member of Parliament for Houghton - Opposition Party -
1953 to present.

Honorary Doctorate in Civil Law, Oxford University, 1973

Honorary Fellowship, St. Hugh's College, Oxford, 1973

Honorary Fellowship, London School of Economics, 1974

Honorary Doctorate of Laws, Harvard University, 1976

Honorary Doctorate of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, 1976

Honorary Doctorate of Law, Columbia University, New York, 1977

Honorary Doctorate of Law, Smith College, Northampton, USA, 1977

United Nations Award for Human Rights, 1978

University of the Witwatersrand Alumni Award, 1979

Honorary Doctorate of Law, Brandeis University, 1981

Honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters, Denison University, 1982

Honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters, New School of Social
Research, 1984

Honoring
Helen Suzman


For the thirteen years from 1961 to 1974, Helen Suzman was the sole Parliamentary voice in opposition to South Africa's policy of apartheid and the array of racial and security laws that policy engendered. Today, 31 years into a political career devoted to the championship of rights against repression, Mrs. Suzman has company on the benches of the anti-apartheid Progressive Federal Party. Nevertheless, the passion and the quality of her arguments for the principled positions she values, are undiminished.

She has said that, in the days when she was a minority of one, she had to be ready to speak on all issues. Now, she speaks mainly on black-majority affairs, urban affairs, civil rights and prisoners. Throughout her years as a Member of Parliament, Mrs. Suzman has tried to make sure that the interests of South Africa's non-white majority have at least one voice. Time and again she has taken up such questions as the pass law system which controls the movements of South Africa's blacks, malnutrition in tribal reserves, blacks' access to and living conditions in urban areas, the poverty wages and working conditions of blackes em-

ployed by white farmers, detention without trial, treatment of prisoners, denial of passports.

She has said that she is motivated by "a feeling for justice" and that "there are so many obvious instances of injustice in South Africa that this motivation always remains alive."

In presenting the American Liberties Medallion to Helen Suzman, The American Jewish Committee pays tribute to this spirit of justice and to the "courageous defense of human rights" that resulted from it.



FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

AJC NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING

Chicago, Illinois November 2, 1984

DRAFT

STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA

1. As an agency devoted to the advancement of human rights, we reiterate
2. our abhorrence of apartheid, and our call for elimination of South Africa's
3. system of legally-entrenched racial discrimination.

5. We applaud the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Archbishop Desmond
6. Tutu, courageous and eloquent leader of the anti-apartheid struggle. The
7. award symbolizes universal affirmation of the justice of his cause.

8. Unhappily, in South Africa, voices of protest against apartheid are
9. silenced harshly. Recent large-scale army raids on black townships evidence
10. the government's intention to suppress those who speak out for equality and
11. to intimidate the black population. Thus far in 1984, 80 blacks have died
12. in clashes with police. Torture and abuses of due process are also reported.

13. Recently enacted constitutional reforms, belatedly offering partial
14. representation to Indians and "coloreds," have left the system of racial
15. segregation intact; unfortunately, they fail to enfranchise South Africa's
16. overwhelming black majority. The policy of "resettling" blacks in resource-
17. poor "homelands" has disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands -- perhaps
18. millions. The influx control laws, the Group Areas Act, and the Mixed Mar-
19. riage and Immorality Acts aggravate the suffering of the black population.

20. The role that those outside the country can play in combatting apart-
21. heid is limited. But they can help, in a modest way, to enhance the pros-
22. pects for peaceful change, which would benefit South Africans of all races
23. and religions, including South Africa's 119,000 Jews.

1. Thus, we endorse programs by private groups and government agencies,
2. in the United States and abroad, for educating black South Africans to assume
3. a prominent role in the economic and public life of their country. Education
4. can be a powerful motor for social change, a key element in dismantling apart-
5. heid.

6. Furthermore, American companies operating in South Africa should be
7. urged to apply fair employment practices toward blacks. These include deseg-
8. regating the workplace, permitting workers to join trade unions, providing
9. equal pay for comparable work, initiating job training programs, creating
10. opportunities for career advancement, and improving health, housing and school
11. facilities. Additionally, European firms doing business in South Africa
12. should be urged to adhere to the fair employment principles enunciated in the
13. 1977 EEC Code of Conduct.

14. We urge the United States Government -- and all democratic governments
15. -- to work vigorously through appropriate channels, bilateral and multilateral,
16. for the democratization of South African society.

17. The American Jewish Committee reaffirms its unequivocal abhorrence of
18. apartheid, a system that breeds instability, hatred, and violence. By improv-
19. ing the position of South African blacks, Americans and others can help South
20. Africans chart a new course for their future.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, NOVEMBER 2, 1984

1 The American Jewish Committee, this country's pioneer human
2 relations organization, has been devoted since its founding to
3 combatting violations of human rights wherever they occur. In
4 this tradition, we reaffirm our abhorrence of apartheid, South
5 Africa's system of legally entrenched racial discrimination, and
6 we call for its speedy elimination.

7 We applaud the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Desmond
8 Tutu, a courageous and eloquent leader of the anti-apartheid struggle.
9 The award symbolizes universal recognition of the justice of ^{the}his
10 cause.

11 Unhappily, in South Africa, voices of protest against apartheid
12 are often silenced harshly. Lack of due process and detention without
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15 Recently enacted constitutional reforms, belatedly offering
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21 control laws and the Group Areas Act aggravate the suffering of the
22 black population.

23 The role that those outside the country can play in combatting
24 apartheid is limited. But they can help to enhance the prospects

25 for peaceful change, which would benefit South Africans of all
26 races and religions.

27 Thus, we endorse programs by private groups and government
28 agencies, in the United States and abroad, for educating black
29 and other non-white South Africans to assume a prominent role
30 in the economic and public life of their country. Education can
31 be a powerful force for social change, a key element in dismantling
32 apartheid.

33 Furthermore, all American companies operating in South Africa
34 should be urged to apply fair employment practices toward blacks.
35 These include desegregating the workplace, permitting workers to
36 join trade unions, providing equal pay for comparable work, initiat-
37 ing job training programs, creating opportunities for career
38 advancement, and improving health, housing, and school facilities.
39 Additionally, all European firms doing business in South Africa
40 should be urged to adhere to the fair employment principles enun-
41 ciated in the 1977 EEC Code of Conduct. Such practices by Western
42 firms can contribute significantly to the long-term goal of building
43 a society based on equality and justice.

44 Finally, we urge the United States Government, and all other
45 Western governments, to work vigorously through appropriate channel
46 bilateral and multi-lateral, for the democratization of South African
47 society, *[and to that end we welcome legislative initiatives
that serve that purpose.]*

National Executive Council Meeting

BACKGROUND

AJC AND SOUTH AFRICA

Background Memorandum for
International Relations Commission, Friday, November 2, 9:30 AM

In the past year, U.S. policy toward South Africa has received unprecedented public attention. The issue, which promises to remain a fixture of domestic political debate, is a vexing one for American Jews and for all Americans. AJC policy on South Africa is in the context of the Statement on Human Rights adopted at the Atlanta NEC Meeting in 1977. The pertinent paragraph states:

We reaffirm our abhorrence of South Africa's apartheid policy. We deplore especially the repressive measures recently taken by the South African Government, including the banning of numerous independent black and other civic organizations, the closing down of liberal newspapers and the arrest of many opposition leaders. These measures are a disservice to the forces of moderation, both black and white, which are striving for a peaceful resolution to the complex racial problems of South Africa. We urge the South African Government to take concrete steps toward reducing, and ultimately eliminating, the legal and de facto discrimination against its non-white population, inherent in its apartheid policy.

During the 1984 Presidential campaign many Black leaders urged that South Africa become a pre-eminent foreign policy concern. For a number of years, the Congressional Black Caucus has focused attention on U.S.-South Africa relations. Currently, pending legislation calls for economic sanctions against South Africa. Black leaders have also urged American Jewish organizations to take a more active role in this area.

Discussion of the Solarz Bill, passed by the House in spring 1984, but blocked in a House-Senate conference in the summer, will likely resume after the Presidential election. Local AJC chapters have been approached to support this and other legislation aimed at restricting U.S. economic relations with South Africa. The proposed sanctions vary considerably; nonetheless, the principal types of sanctions may be characterized as follows (the last four being part of the proposed amendments to the Export Administration Act (H.R. 2131)):

1. Disinvestment -- the refusal of city agencies, for example, to do business with corporations having any investments, licenses or operations in South Africa (New York City Council);
2. Banning export of military and police equipment to South Africa (Berman amendment);

3. Prohibiting all new investments, including new bank loans, by U.S. companies in South Africa (Gray amendment);
4. A ban on the sale of South African gold coins (Krugerrands) in the U.S., or imposition of a tax on these coins (Solarz bill);
5. Legal enforcement of the "Sullivan Principles," requiring U.S. firms doing business in South Africa to pursue fair employment practices (Solarz bill).

For AJC, as for other Jewish organizations, any discussion of South Africa must take into account the position of South Africa's 119,000 Jews and the possible effect on Israel. The South African Jewish community fears a resurgence of anti-Semitism, and there is the possibility that American Jewish support for sanctions against South Africa could encourage a backlash against South African Jews.

The situation in regard to Israel is even more complicated. There has been criticism of Israel's allegedly close relationship with South Africa in the United States and in international bodies. It has been argued that Israel-South Africa relations harm Israel's ties with Black Africa. This latter criticism is made despite the fact that many Black African states trade with South Africa, (out of necessity not choice, their defenders say) and that Israel did not upgrade diplomatic ties with South Africa to the ambassadorial level until 1976, three years after Black African states broke relations with Israel.

The difficult issue of considering other policy options toward South Africa has become an immediate and practical question for America and for American Jews. The problem is urgent, if not new; the challenge is to see whether fresh answers are needed and, if so, to determine where they may be found.

Questions For Discussion

1. Should AJC go beyond its stated commitment to social equality and abhorrence of apartheid, and assume a more activist posture against apartheid?
2. If it opts to pursue a more active role, what public positions should AJC take and what other activities should it initiate? Black, church and human rights groups have advocated a variety of measures including: issuing anti-apartheid statements in national and international forums; supporting economic sanctions such as those in the Solarz bill; joining in anti-apartheid "disinvestment" activities; participating in vocational training programs for Black South African workers, and in scholarship programs for Black students either in South Africa or abroad.

National Executive Council Meeting

ADDENDUM TO BACKGROUNDER ON SOUTH AFRICA

PRO

1. If the U.S. imposed economic sanctions, we would signal our belief that apartheid--a uniquely repressive, racist system is morally repugnant.
2. If the U.S. considers economic sanctions against the Soviet Union for human rights violations, the U.S. cannot do less regarding South Africa.
3. Economic sanctions will encourage change in South Africa by sending the South Africa government a clear signal that the U.S. opposes apartheid, and by strengthening the resolve of the Black population to resist apartheid.
4. Economic sanctions will have a strong impact on the South African economy. Limiting U.S. bank loans will make it more difficult for South Africa to find foreign financing, and will set a moral tone that will encourage other countries to restrict loans to South Africa. Furthermore, voluntary fair employment practices, the "Sullivan Principles," have gone as far as they can; binding enforcement procedures are required.
5. By supporting sanctions against South Africa, the American Jewish community could reaffirm its historic commitment to equality for all, and also improve its relations with the American Black community, which supports these measures strongly. This could foster Black support for Jewish foreign policy concerns such as Israel's security and the rights of Soviet Jews.
6. By imposing economic sanctions on South Africa, the U.S. will improve ties with Black Africa and the Third World. This will deprive the Soviet Union of its ability to pose as the superpower with the moral position on apartheid. Furthermore, Blacks will eventually rule South Africa and U.S. support for their aspirations now will forestall future Soviet influence.

CON

1. The true test of the utility of economic sanctions is not whether they make us feel good, but whether they work. While economic restrictions against South Africa have a moral purpose, specialists have argued that sanctions will have little practical impact in changing apartheid.
2. Placing economic sanctions on South Africa without placing similar pressures on other states involved in repression of human rights, in Africa and elsewhere, is practicing selective morality.
3. Economic sanctions will deter positive change in South Africa. By restricting investment in or loans to South Africa, American companies which have instituted fair employment practices will be harmed and Black unemployment will increase. Sanctions would mean the loss of U.S. access to, and leverage with, South African leaders. In addition, past economic pressures have merely induced South Africa to gain self-sufficiency in energy, armaments, and other areas.
4. The South African economy will not be affected much by sanctions. It is self-sufficient in important strategic materials, and could obtain loans and technology from sources other than the U.S. Furthermore, provisions for enforcing "fair employment practices" are unrealistic because U.S. courts will not be able to supervise implementation.
5. There is a long history of anti-Semitism in South Africa, and American Jewish support for sanctions could encourage a backlash against South African Jews and could harm Israel-South Africa relations.
6. South Africa is the strongest military power on the African continent, and serves as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the area. By weakening South Africa, we would be whetting the Soviet appetite for expanding its power, either directly or through proxy.

Turning to her personal experiences, Mrs. Suzman stated: "When I entered Parliament in 1953, it was a strong desire to do something about this issue that motivated me, although at that time the worst laws entrenching apartheid and eroding human rights were not yet in the Statute Book. I have been privileged to have had the opportunity to record my opposition to all those laws in the 32 years I have spent in Parliament." She added:

"I have had a ringside seat watching the incredible jigsaw puzzle of apartheid being assembled piece by piece, legally entrenching racial separation in every facet of life -- political, social, educational and economic -- separate but not equal. And, as was to be expected, laws eroding the rule of law and habeas corpus were passed."

Mrs. Suzman pointed out that "if laws are passed which are not acceptable to the majority of people to whom they apply, the normal process of the law will not suffice to maintain law and order."

In presenting the American Liberties Medallion to Mrs. Suzman, Philip E. Hoffman, Honorary President of the American Jewish Committee, hailed her "as the sole voice for more than a decade in South Africa's Parliament to oppose that country's apartheid policy." She staked her life, he said, "on the Biblical and humanistic conviction that every life is sacred, and on the deeply Jewish teaching that 'he who saves one life is regarded as if he (or she) saved an entire world.'"

Mrs. Suzman has also lived the basic philosophy of the American Jewish Committee, Mr. Hoffman added, "namely, that the security and welfare of Jews is inextricably linked with the strength of democracy and the defense of human rights of all people."

"I profoundly believe," Mr. Hoffman said, "that one day the name of Helen Suzman will be established in history among a handful of great women -- that extraordinary company of righteous women who helped changed the course of history -- Mother Theresa, Helen Keller, Madame Curie, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Golda Meir."

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A, EJP, NEG-A, Z, REL

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10/30/84-gn

NEWS

FROM THE

COMMITTEE



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

**ANNUAL MEETING
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
NOVEMBER 1-4, 1984
HYATT REGENCY HOTEL
151 EAST WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILL. 60601
(312) 565-1000**

**CONTACT: Press - Joyce Kaplan
Leonard Fink
Ralph Bass**

**TV-Radio - Randall Czarlinsky
Haina Just
Laurie Chock**

**PRESS ROOMS: PICASSO & HAYMARKET ROOMS
(CONCOURSE LEVEL)**

**FOR RELEASE AFTER 8 P.M.
SATURDAY, NOV. 3, 1984**

CHICAGO, Nov. 3...Helen Suzman, a member of South Africa's Parliament and a long-time opponent of apartheid in that country, today stated that the key to peaceful change there rested in the expansion of its economy for the benefit of 22 million blacks.

Accepting the American Jewish Committee's American Liberties Medallion at the annual dinner of AJC's National Executive Council, which continues through Sunday at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, Mrs. Suzman argued against "those who believe that total economic collapse would facilitate a black revolution and black minority rule."

Such a course, she said, could only be advocated by people sitting safely thousands of miles away, for "a black revolution would have no chance of success, as anyone who knows anything about the strength, ferocity and competence of the South African police will agree."

Stating that the solution must be found in the opposite direction -- in the expansion of the economy, in the increasing acquisition of skills among blacks, in increasing consumer power among blacks, in developing economic muscle among blacks -- Mrs. Suzman urged Western nations that press for reform to stay in South Africa and use their influence to bring about social and political change by such means.

South Africa is by no means the only country capable of violating human rights, Mrs. Suzman said, "but her special and unenviable pre-eminence is of course due to the fact that she claims to be among the Western nations, and it is as such that she is judged and found wanting, and also because racial discrimination is entrenched in law in South Africa."

-more-

Howard I. Friedman, President; Theodore Ellenoff, Chair, Board of Governors; Alfred H. Moses, Chair, National Executive Council; Robert S. Jacobs, Chair, Board of Trustees; David M. Gordis, Executive Vice-President

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CSAE 1707

NEWS

FROM THE

COMMITTEE

aje

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MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, Nov. 14...Branding apartheid in South Africa an "abhorrence," the American Jewish Committee's National Executive Council called this week for "speedy elimination" of that country's "legally entrenched racial discrimination" as it awarded Helen Suzman, leader of the nation's anti-apartheid opposition party, its highest human rights award, the American Liberties Medallion.

The National Executive Council is the largest policy-making body of the American Jewish Committee, comprised by its Board of Governors, chapter presidents and members-at-large. Under the chairmanship of Alfred Moses of Washington, D.C., the NEC unanimously passed seven resolutions during its four-day meeting last week in Chicago, attended by some 500 persons.

The anti-apartheid resolution noted that whereas "the American Jewish Committee has been devoted since its founding to combatting violations of human rights wherever they occur," it "reaffirms our abhorrence of apartheid, and we call for its speedy elimination." The resolution was prepared by the AJC International Relations Commission chaired by Leo Nevas of Westport, Conn., and directed by Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum.

The text also applauded the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Desmond Tutu, calling him "a courageous and eloquent leader, and the prize a "universal recognition of the justice of this cause."

It continued: "Unhappily, in South Africa, voices of protest are often silenced harshly. Lack of due process and detention without trial are prominent features of life, with attendant abuse of political power.

"Recently enacted constitutional reforms have left the system of racial segregation intact, have failed to enfranchise South Africa's overwhelming black

more....

Howard I. Friedman, President; Theodore Ellenoff, Chair, Board of Governors; Alfred H. Moses, Chair, National Executive Council; Robert S. Jacobs, Chair, Board of Trustees.

David M. Gordis, Executive Vice-President

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CSAE 1707

majority. The policy of resettling blacks in poverty-stricken 'homelands' has disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands — perhaps millions. The influx of control laws and the Group Areas Act aggravate the suffering of the black population."

The resolution further called upon American companies operating in South Africa to apply fair employment practices toward blacks and to work to improve health, housing and school facilities.

"These include desegregating the workplace, permitting workers to join trade unions, providing equal pay for comparable work, initiating job training programs, creating opportunities for career advancement, and improving health, housing, and school facilities. Additionally, all European firms doing business in South Africa should be urged to adhere to the fair employment principles enunciated in the 1977 EEC Code of Conduct. Such practices by Western firms can contribute significantly to the long-term goal of building a society based on equality and justice," the text read.

"Finally, we urge the United States Government, and all other Western governments, to work vigorously through appropriate channels, bilateral and multi-lateral, for the democratization of South African society," the statement concluded.

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#84-960-448

A, EJP, BL, FP, FD

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NEWS

FROM THE

COMMITTEE



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MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, Dec. 10....The American Jewish Committee today called upon the South African Government "to take the necessary steps, starting with the immediate release of trade union leaders, to end finally the gross violation of human rights inherent in apartheid."

AJC President Howard I. Friedman said it was "heartening" to note "the major escalation of public calls for such elimination of apartheid" and to find "bi-partisan support and participation" in recent declarations.

"There are understandable differences over some proposals that have been made to encourage changes in South African policies," Mr. Friedman continued. "But there can be no differences among advocates of basic human rights on the need for all people of conscience to speak out on the moral issue involved."

Mr. Friedman recalled that the AJC's top policy-making National Executive Council last month had called for the "speedy elimination" of apartheid, which it defined as "South Africa's system of legally entrenched racial discrimination."

Mr. Friedman's full statement follows:

"Last month, the National Executive Council of the American Jewish Committee reaffirmed 'our abhorrence of apartheid, South Africa's system of legally entrenched racial discrimination' and called for its speedy elimination.

"It is heartening to us that in recent weeks there has been a major escalation of public calls for such elimination of apartheid -- including the use of dramatic non-violent civil disobedience, a time-honored social tool which can contribute to peaceful change. It is especially heartening to find bipartisan support and participation in these recent declarations.

"There are understandable differences over some proposals that have been made to encourage changes in South African policies. But there can be no differences among advocates of basic human rights on the need for all people of conscience to speak out on the central moral issue involved. And so, once again, on behalf of the American Jewish Committee, I call upon the South African government to take the necessary steps, starting with the immediate release of trade union leaders, to end finally the gross violation of human rights inherent in apartheid."

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BASS, BNES

Howard I. Friedman, President; Theodore Ellenoff, Chair, Board of Governors; Alfred H. Moses, Chair, National Executive Council; Robert S. Jacobs, Chair, Board of Trustees;

David M. Gordis, Executive Vice-President

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CSAE 1787



Memo

December 14, 1984

TO: NJCRAC Member Agencies

FROM: Michael Pelavin, Chair, NJCRAC Task Force on Domestic Concerns
and Michael Newmark, Vice-Chair

RE: Recommendations on responding to current protests of apartheid in
South Africa

At its December 6 meeting, the NJCRAC Task Force on Domestic Concerns discussed the recent heightened protests against apartheid in South Africa and how the Jewish community relations field should respond. This memorandum is intended to provide you with background on the Task Force discussions and recommendations.

As you are probably aware, during the past several weeks protests, sparked by the recent increased harassment under apartheid and the arrests of trade unionists, have occurred in Washington, D.C., New York, Boston, Chicago and other cities. The protests, which were initiated by Transafrica, a Washington-based foreign policy lobbying organization, have engendered support by numerous groups, including organized labor, the Congressional Black Caucus, civil rights groups, clergy and some NJCRAC member agencies. Some of the numerous protesters have been arrested for sitting in or crossing police lines.

Organizers of the protests have announced their intention to continue the demonstrations, as well as to initiate them in other cities with South African consulates. Plans for demonstrations in additional cities, including Mobile, Cleveland and Salt Lake City, have also been announced. The protests will also extend to companies doing business in South Africa.

After extensive discussion, the Task Force agreed the NJCRAC should urge communities, based on our longstanding position in opposition to apartheid (see enclosed excerpt from 1979-80 Joint Program Plan), to express support for the protests in whatever way they deem appropriate. The Task Force noted that not only is the protest against apartheid gaining momentum, but also that it is of paramount importance to the black community and the civil rights community overall.

The Task Force recommended that if the question of participating in civil disobedience arises in your community, that you consult with the NJCRAC.

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It was further agreed by the Task Force that NJCRAC should initiate a process for examining the issues of the current administration policy of constructive engagement, as well as divestiture of investments in South Africa. It was noted that some state legislatures have already passed divestiture legislation, and that others will be considering it in the coming year.

The wide protests appear to be reaping some positive results. In recent days more than 20 black political detainees have been released. President Reagan made a strong anti-apartheid statement on International Human Rights Day, and 35 Conservative House Republicans sent a letter to the South African Ambassador warning of U.S. economic sanctions unless the South African government demonstrates a commitment to changing its racial policies.

In order to facilitate discussion of these issues, NJCRAC will send out a proposition for consideration by the Plenum, and will provide a session for discussion of the issue at the Plenum.

If your agency has prepared any statements on South Africa or becomes involved in supporting the protests, please be in touch with us. If you have any questions, please contact Marlene Provi-zer.

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Republic of South Africa: Apartheid

As we asserted in the 1965-66 Joint Program Plan: "The oppression of 14 million non-whites in the Republic of South Africa by a totalitarian government has evoked worldwide denunciation... Jewish community relations agencies... cannot regard the struggles of oppressed people for liberation from the chains of racism anywhere as remote and foreign struggles separable from our struggles against racism in our own national life; nor, as Jewish organizations, impelled into the forefront of every struggle for equality by the traditions and historic experience of the Jewish people and by our sense of the indivisibility of freedom, can we be indifferent to the plight of any group anywhere in the world that is denied its basic human rights."

Since then, many nations in Africa have consolidated their independence and, however tardy, some movement toward majority rule has occurred in other parts of southern Africa on the borders of the Republic of South Africa. While there are reports from time to time of possible relaxation of the highly resented "pass laws," at this writing there have been no fundamental steps taken by the government of South Africa to dismantle the complex legislative underpinning of apartheid, or even to moderate the most painful aspects of apartheid, including the brutal and unjust "security" legislation maintaining racial purity laws as reprehensible as the Nuremberg laws.

Accordingly, the constituent agencies of the NJCRAC reiterate and reaffirm their unanimous and total denunciation of apartheid as repugnant to Jewish tradition and incompatible with the commitment of the Jewish community relations field to equality and equal justice without regard to race, religion, nationality or sex.

NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE



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MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

WASHINGTON, D.C. Dec. 25... Demonstrators from the American Jewish Committee protesting apartheid manned the picket lines here today in front of the South African Embassy, relieving those who have been participating in the vigil so that they could spend Christmas Day with their families.

The AJC vigil drew participants from various Jewish groups in the Washington area, with some 250 marchers taking part in the event.

Hyman Bookbinder, Washington representative for the AJC, speaking outside the Embassy, told the demonstrators that their presence was intended to carry a message, "a condemnation of apartheid that Jews have sent before and which we repeat," not only to the South African Government, but also to "our Christian and black brothers and sisters."

Mr. Bookbinder declared, "With the last night of Chanukah and Christmas coming together, we once again express our love and respect for our Christian brothers and sisters, letting them know that we do indeed know how precious Christmas is to them; and, as on previous occasions, we are happy to be able to relieve some of them from other responsibilities so that they can spend this holy day with family and loved ones."

He added: "There is also a message for our black brothers and sisters, a reminder that despite some differences over one policy or another, we are indeed close allies in the struggle for human freedom and social justice everywhere."

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L012-PEI
December 1984/tp

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date December 26, 1984
to Howard Friedman, Edward Elson, David Gordis, William Trosten, Leo Nevas
from Marc H. Tanenbaum
subject Highlights of Meetings in Strasbourg and Bonn/Cologne.

This memo summarizes the highlights of several meetings dealing with international relations and human rights issues held in Strasbourg and Bonn/Cologne.

On Wednesday, Dec. 12, Ed Elson and I came to Strasbourg, the "Capital" of the European Community, for a series of meetings that produced quite important programmatic results for AJC.

At 9:30 a.m., we met with Prof. Alexander Kiss, Secretary General of the International Institute on Human Rights (the Rene Cassin Institute) which had had a long and productive relationship through Sidney Liskofsky with the Jacob Blaustein Institute. Present was also Mrs. Sforza, assistant director.

Following cordial introductory remarks during which Prof. Kiss acknowledged warmly the constructive ties between his Institute and the AJC, he said, "There is no need for developing new rights. Our task now is to implement the existing covenants, particularly the 'right to leave.'"

After detailed conversation, Prof. Kiss agreed to co-sponsor with the AJC and the Jacob Blaustein Institute the following conferences or programs in 1985:

- 1) A conference on "Upsala Updated." (Ed and I reported on the proposed West German conference on "The Right to Leave," and Prof. Kiss, while welcoming that, saw the need for a broader consultation in Strasbourg that could involve representatives from the pan-European community.)
- 2) A conference on "Religious Intolerance" that would be tied in the UN study on this subject. We informed him about the Blaustein study on this theme, and Prof. Kiss felt strongly this might be the basis of a useful conference in Strasbourg. He also said this consultation could give impetus to the preparation of a curriculum on "Religious Freedom" as well as on minority groups.
- 3) Kenya - Prof. Kiss proposed that we consider co-sponsoring a conference in Kenya in 1985-86 on "Religious Freedom and Human Rights." As an expert on international law and environment, he has many contacts in Nairobi and is planning to visit there shortly. We encouraged him to explore the possibility of sponsoring such a seminar with AJC next year, or soon thereafter.

Strasbourg-Bonn/Cologne-2

4) A conference on Human Rights Education in Secondary Schools will be held in Strasbourg in July '85. He invited our possible co-sponsorship and possible participation. We indicated our interest and said we would discuss it with Sidney Liskofsky, Richard Maass, and the Blaustein Institute.

In Fall 1985, his Institute is holding its annual meeting in Strasbourg and he invited our participation.

We concluded this excellent meeting with agreement that we will be in touch with each other shortly for appropriate follow-up.

At 11:00 a.m., Ed Elson and I met with the Hon. Pierre Pflimlin, President of the European Parliament. It was a warm, friendly meeting during which he expressed concern over the fate of Soviet Jews and the determination of the EP to be helpful. He also expressed interest in promoting moderation and negotiations in the Middle East between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

We reported our concerns over "religious intolerance" and the Nairobi conference on women's issues in July '85, and he asked that we send him our background materials. We promised to do so.

At 12 noon, we met with Mr. P. Hauprecht, chairman of the Directorate on Human Rights of the Council of Europe. He also spoke warmly of his ties with Sidney Liskofsky and the Blaustein Institute. He expressed an interest in strengthening cooperation between AJC and his group in areas of common concern -- Soviet Jewry, the right to leave, the UN covenants on religious intolerance. He reported that from Nov. 13-16, 1985, there will be a conference on "Freedom of Information" in Spain, and he hoped that we would be involved with that activity. We did not propose any specific conferences at this time, pending clarification of our other commitments and priorities established with Prof. Kiss's Institute and what we develop in Cologne.

Footnote: The presence of so many governmental and non-governmental representatives in Strasbourg raises the important question of our considering establishing some AJC presence here. It is a major center for information-gathering and human rights activities that impinge on so many of our interests. Also, Strasbourg is a good place for us to consider holding an AJC European consultation in the near future.

Before leaving Strasbourg, we held a quick meeting with Dr. Henri Hochner (2 rue de l'île Jars, Strasbourg, 67000; 88.366196), vice-president of the Jewish community. (Jean Kahn, president, was out of town). Hochner, a Polish Jew and a dentist, was extremely cordial. He expressed a strong hope that we could cooperate with his community on some future project. We assured him we were eager to do so, and would be in touch with him before our next visit to his city.

That evening of Dec. 12, Ed Elson and I arrived late in Bonn. We missed the meetings that Howard Friedman, David Gordis, and Bill Trosten held there with Dr. Alois Mertes, West German Staatsminister, and with the Ebert Foundation

Strasbourg-Bonn/Cologne-3

(although we joined them for a meeting with the latter on Thursday.) A report on the Mertes meeting will have to come from those who met with him.

COLOGNE, THURSDAY, DEC. 13

Our full delegation met at 10 a.m. in the offices of the Bundesinstitut in Cologne. Present from the West German group were Dr. Heinrich Vogel, Bundesinstitut director; Prof. Brunner, director of the Institute of East-West Studies, University of Cologne; Dr. Buchholz; Dr. Studemyer, and Dr. Luchterhanz.

Messrs. Friedman and Trosten reported that during their last visit to Germany Chancellor Helmut Kohl had indicated his interest in taking part in a high-level conference to be held in 1985 on the theme of "the Right to Leave" with special reference to the situation of Volga Germans and Soviet Jews.

After extensive discussion of the international legal, sociological, and East-West political issues, there was general agreement that a conference be held preferably between Sept. 18 and 20 (between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur) or later in Nov. or Dec. 1985.

The theme as presently formulated would be:

"International Law and the Status of Minorities -- the Cases of Ethnic and Soviet Jews."

The conference would be co-sponsored by the Institute of East-West Studies of the University of Cologne and the International Relations Department of the American Jewish Committee. About 30-40 people, "serious academic types" would be invited, and public sessions would be held to assure a public impact, including a possible press conference at the close for issuing a joint declaration.

Papers would be presented on the following themes:

I - International Law and Ethnic Minorities

The Legal Status of Germans and Jews in the USSR

II - The Conditions of Life of Germans and Jews in the USSR

The political, social, economic situation of Germans and Jews; issues of assimilation, acculturation, and emigration.

III - The Implications of Minority Problems for East-West Relations

- a) The legal consequences
- b) Strategies and Options involving International Instruments:
 - 1) The role of Governments
 - 2) The role of non-Governmental agencies

IV - A Joint Declaration of Principles

It was agreed that there would be an opening public ceremony on the first day which would feature a statement by Chancellor Kohl, Edward Elson, and a subsequent statement by Howard Friedman.

Finances for the conference were estimated at about \$30,000-\$40,000 (100,000 DM), plus 7,000 DM for translators. It was felt that a German foundation might be interested in covering all or part of the expenses.

The Wissenschaft Centrum or Beethoven Hall were suggested as possible sites.

Dr. Mertes was to be invited as a keynote speaker. Discussants from both communities were to be invited to comment reciprocally on papers. Among invitees suggested: Leo Nevas, Walter Laqueur, Gregary Grossman of UCLA; Prof. Thomashad of Bonn. (Participants should also be looked for at the "Olympics" on USSR research to be held in Washington, about 2,000 scholars, next October.) Sidney Liskofsky would be asked to comment on the draft proposal.

Tanenbaum agreed to send a draft proposal to Prof. Brunner by Jan. 30, 1985. Prof. Buchholz asked that the Munich empirical research based on interviews with German refugees and the Illinois interviews with Soviet Jews be included in the section dealing with "quality of life" and discrimination in the USSR.

MARTIN BUBER INSTITUTE - We visited the Buber Institute in Cologne that afternoon, and discussed the possibility with Dr. Johann Maier of some joint project. The archival project of identifying all Jewish communities in Germany elicited particular interest.

EBERT FOUNDATION - A friendly dinner was held with the Ebert Foundation headed by Peter Schneider.

FRIDAY, DEC. 14

WEST GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY - A frank and useful discussion was held with Dr. Fiedler, director of the Middle East desk of the Foreign Ministry. He said that West Germany and the EEC generally were trying to encourage moderate Arab states to enter into negotiations with Israel. He gave us a copy of the last EEC declaration on the Middle East which is generally more balanced than the earlier Venice Declaration (copy available from IRD.) He expressed concern about Israel's economic situation and said that Germany tries to be as helpful as possible, provided that Israel takes the necessary austerity measures.

MINISTER OF CULTURE: WOMEN'S RIGHTS: A helpful conversation was held with Dr. Witte of the Culture Ministry, a Dr. Thieme, president of the German Women's Rights group, and two aides. Dr. Witte agreed to host a conference in preparation for the Nairobi Women's Rights meeting of Women leaders from West Germany, France, Israel, and AJC women's leadership in the U.S. (He agreed to pay the fare for Israeli delegates). The consultation was proposed for March-April 1985 to prepare strategy for countering anti-Israel and anti-Jewish propaganda in Nairobi.

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We also discussed UNESCO, with Dr. Witte indicating that while he supported the U.S.'s critique of UNESCO, they would prefer to stay in for at least another year and try to bring about internal reforms, as Britain seems to be doing. We agreed to be in touch with each other.

ADENAUER FOUNDATION - The day concluded with a visit to the Adenauer Foundation with Bill Trosten reviewing the status of their relations with AJC.

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