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Box 72, Folder 8, Soviet Jewry, 1983-1986.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date January 21, 1986
to Marc Tanenbaum
from David A. Harris
subject U.S. Policy Initiative vis a vis the Soviet Union

I received a call Friday from Mark Parris, Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs at the State Department. He indicated that he was calling to alert us, prior to the official statement in a few days' time, that the U.S. will be announcing a modification in its policy towards the sale of oil and gas equipment technology to the Soviet Union. Until now, foreign policy controls have prohibited the transfer of such technology, but the new U.S. policy will permit review on a case-by-case basis of U.S. private sector proposals to sell such technology. It is expected that many, if not most, of the anticipated proposals will be approved by the U.S. in the first few months of the new policy.

The easing of restrictions is intended as a calibrated positive response to the "timid" gestures made by the U.S.S.R. in the human rights sector in recent months, i.e. the resolution of several divided family cases, permission for Elena Bonner to travel abroad for three months to seek medical treatment, and the issuance of exit visas to long-term refuseniks Ilya Essas, etc. While the State Department recognizes the limits of these Soviet moves, it nevertheless believes that a positive U.S. response will encourage the Soviets to make additional progress in the human rights area. This is consistent with the quiet proposal made by Secretary of State Shultz to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevaradnadze in September indicating a U.S. willingness to respond in the economic sphere to Soviet human rights progress without publicly linking the two phenomena.

If the Soviets do not continue to improve the human rights picture, the State Department will end the policy of favorable review of the transfer of oil and gas equipment technology. On the other hand, the Soviets have been made aware that additional benefits would accrue if significant progress on emigration, etc. were apparent.

After thanking Mr. Parris for sharing this information, I expressed appreciation for the efforts of the State Department to break the logjam, consistent with the conclusions of our inter-agency strategy session last May that a set of calibrated responses was necessary. I then, however, voiced two major concerns:

1) Many would doubtless disagree with the State Department's assessment of even "timid" gestures in describing the events of the last two months. Emigration figures have not improved, Vladimir Lifshitz of Leningrad was just arrested, and activists report no betterment in their daily situation. Further, the travel visa issued to Elena Bonner does not fundamentally address the ongoing plight of the Sakharovs.

2) This U.S. action will probably heighten the fear of many in the American Jewish community that the momentum building in Soviet-American relations may well sweep right by Soviet Jewry. Once, for example, this new policy is in place, will it not be that much more difficult to reverse it, especially if progress on other bilateral fronts takes place during the next several months? Will American industry not become an even more formidable lobbyist for further relaxation in foreign policy controls? Will the Kremlin not believe that it can get off rather cheaply in achieving its desired economic aims in the evolving bilateral relationship? After all, to cite but one example -- the Soviets might only be encouraged to create ever new Scharanskys, Nudels, Essas's, etc. if they feel the bargaining process implicitly encourages it?

Mr. Parris expressed full understanding for both these points. He sought to assure me that the State Department would carefully monitor the process and, with the support of the White House, call a halt to further gestures if the Kremlin were perceived as seeking to take advantage of the process.

I suggested that it might well be timely and appropriate for Assistant Secretary of State Rozane Ridgway to convene a meeting of key Jewish lay and professional leaders to explain in greater detail the U.S. strategy and to permit a full and frank exchange of views. He responded favorably to the idea and indicated he would propose it to Secretary Ridgway.

DAH/tp

cc: Hyman Bookbinder
David Geller
Richard Maass
Leo Nevas

9628-IRD-5

To: FILE

From: David A. Harris

Date: 2/21/86

RE: Meeting with Dr. Sergei Rogov, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy

Participants

David Harris
Leo Nevas
Sergei Rogov
Marc Tanenbaum
William Trosten

The meeting, which began at 10:35 a.m. and continued until noon, took place in a coffee shop at the Washington Hilton Hotel. The principal points were:

1. Dr. Rogov indicated that after the first meeting with Messrs. Tanenbaum and Trosten (January 28, 1986) he had discussed the key matters raised with "the Ambassador," presumably referring to Ambassador Dobrynin, who "encouraged me" to continue the process. He later added without elaboration: "The Ambassador has some rather definite views on those questions of special interest to you."
2. Dr. Rogov speculated that Ambassador Dobrynin's days as Soviet envoy to the U.S. may be nearing an end. "When he last went to Moscow, he embraced me in such a way that I had the feeling he would not return." In response to a question about whether Ambassador Vorontsov, Soviet envoy to France, might replace Dobrynin, Rogov said "it is possible." He then offered the fact that Oleg Troyanovsky, Soviet Permanent Representative to the U.N., would become ambassador to Peking, to be replaced by Dubinin, currently Soviet envoy to Spain.
3. Regarding a possible AJC visit to Moscow:
 - a. He accepted the notion of a small "exploratory" group going to Moscow for, say, 4-5 days and suggested the end of March as a potentially good time.
 - b. He reviewed with us the various possible Soviet auspices for such a visit and concluded that it would be best if the group made normal tourist arrangements through Intourist with the understanding that a group like the Friendship Society would act as "sponsors" in Moscow and arrange appropriate meetings. "Our government cannot extend an official invitation ~~to you~~ as you are a non-governmental group."
 - c. Concerning such meetings, he suggested both "non-governmental" and governmental discussions, including meetings with the U.S./Canada Institute of the U.S.S.R., Academy of Sciences, the Soviet Peace Committee, the Ministries of Religious Affairs, Culture and Foreign Affairs, and the International Department of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., noting that the last two were doubtless the most important to us, and a visit to the synagogue.
 - d. In response to being told "in a spirit of candor" that several members of AJC, including some officers, were planning a private visit to the U.S.S.R. in April, and being asked for his reaction, he indicated that it would seem inappropriate "to the many people unable to make distinctions" that, on the one hand, a private group was in the country "probably planning to meet with refuseniks and bring books and such things" when another group from the same organization was seeking agreement to plan a visit for governmental and non-governmental meetings. Our response was that we would make a recommendation to our leadership to postpone the private trip if an exploratory group were permitted to visit Moscow at the end of March.

e. Considerable discussion focused on the topics listed in our proposed agenda (see attached). The agenda was prepared in response to his request at the first meeting with Messrs. Tanenbaum and Trosten for such a document to be shown to "his superiors" and transmitted to Moscow. He wondered aloud whether there would be sufficient time to address the five topics listed and added that a discussion in which he had participated in Moscow last year on the Middle East with a group of Soviet and American scholars had been largely unsuccessful because, though specialists in the Middle East, the scholars lacked a thorough understanding of Soviet-American relations, essential, in Dr. Rogov's view, to a fruitful exchange. (He did note that a second such colloquium will take place in the late spring in the U.S. and suggested that we may want to seek to participate. If so, the contact is Alan Kasoff's deputy at IREX in New York.)

He then asked us to go through the five points in the agenda and indicate what our positions were on each. Time only permitted discussion of the first three--arms control, bilateral relations and Jews in the Soviet Union--but he was clearly very interested in our views, especially with regard to whether AJC had taken any formal positions on such issues as S.D.I., "50% reduction," sanctions and the European pipeline controversy. He said frankly that he was looking for a "carrot" with which to "sell" the trip. He was told that AJC had held a two-year-long debate on defense issues and considered such discussion vital but had not reached a definitive position. Of course, the AJC Board could, in theory, consider those and other key issues and adopt a position. He was also told that we--and the Jewish community--had not taken a public position on the pipeline issue, and that, generally, we had been supportive of efforts to improve bilateral ties. We had certainly not opposed such issues as the long-term grain agreement, consular exchange and cultural agreement. Also, many in the Jewish community were disturbed by President Reagan's earlier harsh rhetoric vis a vis the U.S.S.R. and had made those feelings clear in private discussions with Administration officials.

He noted that there were "few in (his) country" who would understand that Norman Podhoretz and Commentary did not necessarily reflect the view of the AJC. Many would believe that Commentary's strong anti-Soviet line was doubtless the view of the sponsoring organization, AJC, though he claimed to understand the distinction. "And would Norman Podhoretz and those like him reconsider their position on the Soviet Union even if progress were made on 'your issue' (Soviet Jewry)? I doubt it very much."

He also expressed concern about ^{i.e. (?)} Morris Abram's view on linkage between Soviet Jewry and arms control "which do not, in my view, reflect the majority of American Jews," as reported in the New York Times (January 7, 1983). He wondered whether this ^{view} was "prepared by Richard Perle." Though we explained that the article skewed the true position of Morris, he noted that the perception conveyed by such an article would, nevertheless, have its impact despite efforts to clarify Morris' position as set forth in his statement to President Reagan in September. Dr. Rogov said he had not seen the statement and we agreed to provide him with a copy.

On Jackson-Vanik which he raised, we noted, as evidenced, for example, in an ad in the Washington Post signed by AJC, ADL, B'nai Brith and NCSJ (March 5, 1985) that while we supported Jackson-Vanik we also recognized the waiver provision contained therein and had sought to convey our willingness to be flexible in its interpretation in response to appropriate Soviet measures. Dr. Rogov noted that some groups, though he did not necessarily imply Jewish groups, had supported Jackson-Vanik as an "anti-Soviet" weapon rather than, he implied, a lever for emigration.

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1) repatriation and family reunification, 2) cultural questions and
3) religious matters. He accepted this with one modification: "May I suggest that you not use the word "repatriation" in your discussions. Stick to family reunification."

4. He noted that it was not at all clear whether a second summit meeting would take place and, if so, when. "Our country does not want to hold it in June, as your country proposes, because it will then be too easy for your country to say that it has not had sufficient time to consider the arms control proposals we have made." He implied that the Kremlin's position on a second summit is to link it to demonstrable progress on arms control matters.

5. He did suggest that if "in March or April" there was a positive response from Washington in the arms control area "other things would begin to happen." He did not elaborate but presumably wanted us to believe this might include emigration.

6. He proposed that as a next step we meet with Minister Counsellor Viktor Isakov at the Soviet Embassy. The tentative date is March 6 at 10:30 a.m. It is important to have such a meeting, he implied, to gain the backing of the Soviet Embassy in conveying and interpreting the importance of a possible AJC visit to officials in Moscow.

7. He offered "a personal view" that it would be desirable to de-link "this issue" (i.e. Soviet Jewry) from East-West relations. It was pointed out to him that such people as Vitaly Zhurkin, Georgi Arbatov's deputy, had himself linked the issue by suggesting that the fate of Soviet Jewish emigration was directly tied to the state of Soviet-American relations. (Note: Mr. Zhurkin, a friend of Mr. Nevas' for the last 15 years, will be in the U.S. in early March.)

Conclusions:

1. It was a meeting characterized by a pleasant and friendly series of exchanges, although there was no reason to believe that Rogov did not follow a completely prepared script.

2. There is a surprising momentum at work that might well have been absent six or twelve months ago. Rogov's proposal ~~xxxx~~ for us to meet with Isakov suggests at least some Soviet interest in the contact, not to speak of a reference to his discussion with the ambassador. Further, that he suggested March for our visit to Moscow when he could easily "have strung us along" for months or longer may be significant, though, of course, it remains to be seen whether the trip will, in fact, take place.

3. The various op eds signed ^{Soviet} by Edgar Bronfman that appeared in the New York Times calling for inclusion in an international conference on the Middle East (December 9, 1983), repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (July 1, 1983) and accusation of culpability for the downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations on both sides (January 4, 1983) were likely motivated, as we believed at the time, in part by a desire to pave the way for WJC discussions with the Soviets in Moscow.

4. Above all, the Soviets appear intent on ^{focus} following on the arms control issue and seeking movement in this area. This is confirmed by virtually every American meeting with the Soviets. S.D.I. is Moscow's principal preoccupation. As we have noted for several years, the Kremlin is anxious for the American Jewish community to assume a leading role in favor of arms control and decreased U.S. arms spending.

5. Rogov was trying to establish an imbalanced dialogue, though I believe he was not fully successful. He sought to maintain the discussion on his terms to the extent possible, ^{AND} ~~to make us come to him, to pose on the~~ ^{AND WE CANNOT} defensive, albeit in a non-aggressive and sociable way.

6. We will have to prepare ourselves well on the current bilateral issues to be able to maintain truly informed and persuasive discussions with the Soviets, beginning with the Isakov meeting.

7. We need to consider whether to discuss our meetings with a) the Israelis and b) NCSJ, and, if so, how and when.

8. We agree among ourselves that if an exploratory group is to go it will visit the synagogue, as Rogov himself proposed, and meet at least once with refuseniks. We will not, however, raise the latter issue with the Soviets in advance or force a confrontation. Assuming they do not bring up the matter beforehand, we will ~~simply~~ quietly (though not secretly) visit with refuseniks one evening and make no uncalled for reference to it.


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- a. Our approach to the subject matter seems to be a correct one, speaking as both Americans and Jews without permitting the Soviets to seek to drive a wedge between the two.
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- d. We should meet with all the groups Rogov mentioned, bearing in mind that the principal actors, in Mark's view, are the International Department of the Central Committee and the KGB and, to a lesser extent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- e. He knows Isakov very well and would be pleased to share impressions by phone prior to our March 6 meeting.
- f. There does indeed seem to be a change in the bilateral sphere as relations became "unfrosted," though its extent and possible impact on Soviet Jewry remains unclear. On the one hand, the emigration numbers remain low, but, for the first time in years, Isakov has actually come to the State Department to discuss names on the Department's representational list.

DISTRIBUTION

Theodore Eltszoff
Howard Friedman
DAVID Gordis
Richard Haass
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Marc Tenenbaum



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Ads

SECRETARY SHCHERBITSKIY AND
VISITING SOVIET PARLIAMENTARIANS:

W.P. 13
3.5.85

**Last year was bad for Soviet Jews.
Less than 900 were allowed to leave.
Teachers of Hebrew were arrested.
Nevertheless, we believe many
people in this country would be
responsive to positive changes,
especially in your emigration policy.
Why should emigration continue to
be a barrier to improved trade and
investment relations, and to
expanded cultural and scientific
exchange?**

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

National Office: 10 East 40th Street, Suite 907, New York, NY 10016
(212) 679-6122

Washington Office: 2027 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036
(202) 265-8114

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U.S. Jews' Role in a Thaw

1-4-85

By Edgar M. Bronfman

Because of the way it has treated Soviet Jews, including "refuseniks" and even Hebrew teachers, the Soviet Union has made a cold warrior of the Jewish people. Many Jews tend to regard any thaw in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States with apprehension and mistrust.

Yet over the years Jews have also learned that when things are generally bad, they tend to be worse for Jews, and only when things are gen-

Soviet Jews can't be held hostage

erally stable are Jews permitted to go about their business.

For this reason, the Jewish people should be in the forefront of efforts to improve relations between the two superpowers. Ideally, the issue of Soviet Jews should be removed from the cold war agenda and, beyond that, should be made to serve as a vehicle by which to bring about the relaxation of tensions between East and West.

Edgar M. Bronfman, chairman of the Seagram Company Ltd., is president of the World Jewish Congress.

But while a Jewish stake in a reduction of East-West tensions is clear, there is among Jews a strong resolve not to allow the question of Soviet Jews to be a hostage to the on-again, off-again cold war. While Jews should be prepared to do their part to help relax tensions between the superpowers, they must also reserve the right to reject any move toward détente that fails to take account of Jewish interests.

In the 1970's — at the height of President Richard M. Nixon's era of détente — proponents of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which denied most-favored-nation status to the Russians in order to force them to liberalize emigration, acted from the conviction that détente was being pursued without enough concern for the plight of Soviet Jews. Jackson-Vanik demonstrated the depth of the Jews' concern for their Soviet brethren. It also showed that there are in this country powerful sentiments favoring a thaw in relations between the superpowers — sentiments that can easily be mobilized if Moscow is prepared to move constructively on the Jewish question. Jews' concern for their brethren is genuine — but it is not blindly anti-Soviet.

There are those in Moscow and Washington who are cynically using the issue of Soviet Jews to sabotage the emerging thaw in Soviet-American relations. But those who seek to use this issue for their own ends have no real concern for the condition of Soviet Jews and, in any case, are doing nothing to help the Jews. A serious Soviet effort to improve the condi-

tions of Jews and liberalize emigration would therefore not only improve East-West relations but also undercut cold warriors on both sides.

The attitude of Jews will be important in the months ahead because — if Washington-watchers are correct — President Reagan, who cannot run for a third term, may choose instead to run for the history books, and try to leave behind him as his most important legacy a major relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

I urge him to do so. But it won't be easy. It will take perseverance and hard, tough negotiating to match that of the Soviet Union, and a dedication like John F. Kennedy's to space exploration and a willingness to put himself on the line, as Jimmy Carter did at Camp David.

As a businessman, I know how difficult negotiations can be, how people squabble over not only major points but also minor ones. My experience has also taught me that when the boss wants something accomplished, the atmospherics of the negotiations are quite different than when his principal aides are not convinced of his strong convictions.

There are plenty of problems with the Soviet Union and many outstanding issues, not least the whole question of human rights as defined by the Helsinki Accords. But the time seems to be right. The American people feel secure enough to want Mr. Reagan to make his run for the history books as a great peacemaker. It will take conviction, tough-mindedness, patience — a lot of patience — and an unwavering com-

mitment to succeed. But the thaw must go on, and the favorable judgment of history is its own reward.

In this endeavor, the President will find most Jews on his side. Jews are eager to act on behalf of the thaw if they can be confident that positive gestures with respect to their Soviet brethren are forthcoming. Under those circumstances, the Soviet Jewish question would serve as a stimulant rather than an obstacle to improved relations between the two countries. □

Americans witnessing the alarming escalation of hostilities in Lebanon may well feel they are looking down a tragically familiar road.

Once again, our peacekeeping motives have led us into armed confrontation and an appalling loss of American lives. It is tempting to suggest that, promptly, we ought to exercise one of two options: get out, or — the current direction of the Administration — send in whatever military forces are necessary to settle matters.

But there is a third possibility: to use the crisis as an occasion to apply diplomacy toward Syria to cool East-West tensions.

What may not be so easy, but might be more productive of Middle Eastern peace, is to examine how deeply our intransigence toward Syria is influenced by the low ebb of our relations with the Soviet Union. The Administration, with considerable justification — and a touch of cold war neurosis — considers Syria a Soviet puppet at worst, a Soviet ally at best.

At this time of severe tension and the ominous threat of military escalation, the United States might profit by directly trying to establish precisely what Syria wants. Among the possible answers are these: to establish itself as the major Arab power in the region; to expand its borders to include Lebanon; to remove the Israelis from the Golan Heights; to control or neutralize the Palestine Liberation Organization. All of these goals are understandably unsettling, if not anathema, to Israel. Yet considering that Israeli guns are closer to Damascus than Syrian guns are to Tel Aviv,

Edgar M. Bronfman is president of the World Jewish Congress.

Try ^{7.55} To Bring Syria Around

12-1-68

By Edgar M. Bronfman

security to the Syrians is not an empty issue.

It was certainly the Israelis' hope that by militarily destroying the P.L.O. in Lebanon they would cause the West Bank Palestinians to become more tractable. Washington hoped that a result would be King Hussein's arrival at the negotiating table; for his own reasons, he has steadfastly refused to come. It is Syria's hope that by crushing Yasir Arafat, it would become the dominant force with the West Bank Palestinians, but the West Bankers remain loyal to Mr. Arafat, and it is still much too early to tell whether the Syrian hope may become a reality. In any event, Syria has become a major player in Middle Eastern politics, and will play a major role in any comprehensive peace settlement.

Thus, it would be sensible for Washington to address the disease rather than the symptoms — to concentrate on a long-range program aimed at luring Damascus from the extremist orbit and into the moderate camp.

Obviously, the route to such a goal

is negotiation, not military action. Perhaps we should begin by carefully testing the waters to find a way of solving Israel's northern border issue to the satisfaction of both Israel and Syria. Then we might consider whether the Syrians, directly or indirectly, can continue to play an important role in Lebanon; having established that, we might then begin to assess how much of a Syrian role would suit the Lebanese and United States Governments.

In short, we should seek out by diplomatic means those points of confluence among the legitimate interests of all parties that do not impinge on American interests in our contest with the Soviet Union and on the security of Israel.

We have a historic precedent for such a course, reflected in the Camp David accords. Anwar el-Sadat derided and acknowledged the special relationship between the United States and Israel. In his statesmanship, he did not view that relationship as an obstacle to a significant relationship between the United States and Egypt.

In the recent Washington visit of Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, we saw an affirmation of that special United States-Israel relationship. While Israel remains our staunchest Middle Eastern ally we are committed to total and lasting support of that alliance, we must take great care that Syria does not construe this as an obstacle to the possibility of its own meaningful and positive relationship with the United States.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz has urged the Soviet Union "to look at the Lebanon problem in a sensible way." Might we not ask ourselves and our allies to do the same?

In 1974, a debate raged within the Jewish community about whether support should be given to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which drew a direct link between trade benefits granted by the United States and a country's emigration policies. The amendment was approved, but whatever might have been said about its effectiveness then, it clearly has no relevance today.

Put bluntly, Jackson-Vanik is not working. Soviet authorities have brought Jewish emigration to a virtual standstill. Accordingly, we should begin paying attention to those who suggest that the Jackson-Vanik amendment should be repealed on grounds that it disrupts Soviet-American relations without facilitating Jewish emigration.

The repeal would be a sign of goodwill that challenges the Russians to respond in kind. To that end, I would support negotiations, conducted through channels of quiet diplomacy, in which we would offer to rescind Jackson-Vanik in exchange for assurances that Moscow would enlarge the rights of Jews to leave the Soviet Union and to practice their religion within the Soviet Union.

It should be stressed that what is involved here is not a unilateral giveaway. If private assurances are not fulfilled, there is little doubt that their betrayal would be met with a public outcry. Moreover, as a practical matter, nobody, least of all the Russians, believes that in the absence of Jackson-Vanik there would simply be business-as-usual with the United States while the plight of Soviet Jews remained unchanged.

There is a natural tendency in the world toward advancing one's self-interest, and this poses the problem of how to reconcile competing interests in an effort to achieve the common

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USSR. Jews. Columns

To Help Soviet Jews

By Edgar M. Bronfman

good. I would submit there is but one answer: maximizing the benefits to all parties without betrayal of basic principles of morality or decency.

But someone has to take the first step — a step that might not only improve the lot of Soviet Jews but, more broadly, lead to a general easing of tensions and, conceivably, significant arms control.

The main principle underlying our dealings with the Soviet Union should be a desire to create a more favorable environment. And as a Jew who perforce is particularly concerned with the fate of Soviet Jews, I adhere to these same principles. We cannot resign ourselves to a second cold war. What is required is a new basis of relations from which both sides can perceive benefit.

One man who has lived long and who has achieved much wisdom on the way knows that there is one overriding agenda confronting humanity. That agenda is arms control, the lessening of tensions, peaceful co-existence, and, finally, world peace. Averell Harriman, at the age of 91, has just returned from a voyage to Moscow where he conferred with Yuri V. Andropov. He went as a private citizen. He went because he feels deeply that peace is possible and that the alternative is the apocalypse.

I am quite sure that Mr. Andropov feels that the message he delivered to

Mr. Harriman, in which he expressed his desire for peace, was itself a meaningful signal of Soviet intentions. Yet our Government must take into account Soviet conduct in Afghanistan, Poland and the Middle East, where Moscow's Syrian client red to recall its troops from Lebanon and ask whether Mr. Andropov's good intentions are sufficient in and of themselves. But the Russians do have at hand a readily available means of sending a signal — one that can be sent without great political cost. A reopening of the gates to Soviet Jews would have an enormous impact on East-West relations generally. And if positive movement on the Soviet Jewish question led to reduced global tensions, would we not all benefit?

There is certainly something of the "chicken or the egg" question here. But the point is that there isn't time to ask which comes first — our gesture or theirs. If we are not careful, there may be no one left to ask the question. Rhetoric escalates, suspicions mount, while leaders in both Moscow and Washington become increasingly inured to the hazards of the arms race and the steady growth in East-West tensions. Our first priority is to transform the conditions of our relationship. And, in the scheme of things, arms control should be our ultimate objective.

In doing so, we must set aside the demands of politics. Our system makes it all too easy for statesman to engage in political posturing when statesmanship is called for. Windows of vulnerability on one side and over-reaction on the other, saber-rattling here and harsh repression there must give way to cooperation — and soon. A gesture here, a signal there and a little more willingness to take small risks for peace and thereby transform the current somber reality — that's Governor Harriman's message. I hope those who should hear it are listening.


THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date February 26, 1986
to David Singer
from David Harris
subject Polling

I have been asked by Billy Keyserling, Director of the Washington Office of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, whether AJC is planning any national polling surveys in the near future. If so, NCSJ would like to propose the inclusion of one or two questions on attitudes to arms control, trade and human rights and the linkage therein. If a poll is planned, Billy would very much appreciate the possibility of talking with you directly to discuss the matter more fully.

✓ cc: Marc H. Tanenbaum

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date February 28, 1986
to Marc Tanenbaum
from Allan Kagedan
subject Meeting with Soviet national employed by the UN

Yesterday, George Gruen and I met with the Soviet national employed by the UN with whom we have been meeting occasionally over the past two years. During our conversation, he made the following points:

1. Regarding Soviet Jewish emigration, the official repeated the point made in an earlier meeting that nothing dramatic would happen soon. He was keenly interested in what the reaction of the Jewish community would be to the Communist Party Congress. He expressed anxiety over the potential impact of a visit to the West by Anatoly Shcharansky, fearing it would provoke heightened "anti-Soviet" feeling. The point was made to him that while it would be natural for the American media to focus on Scharansky as a dramatic symbol and heroic personality, and while it was equally natural for the Jewish community to use any visit here by him as an opportunity to express its concern for Soviet Jews, this did not presage an abrupt shift in general or Jewish on attitudes toward the Soviet Union.
2. On the Middle East, the official expressed great interest in the prospect of an international peace conference on the Middle East, which would include the Soviet Union. He said, however, that the hopes had dimmed for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union, which some consider to be a necessary precondition for the inclusion of the USSR in a peace conference. He said, furthermore, that the Soviet Union supports a united PLO, under Arafat's leadership, despite the fact that both Jordan and Syria have expressed misgivings about him. Furthermore, Soviet ~~specialists expected Syria and Jordan to draw more closely together~~; whether this would have a positive or negative affect on the prospects for peace was unclear. The official mentioned that there might soon be a ~~new European initiative on the Middle East~~, and he referred to the ~~1982 Franco-Egyptian initiative~~ as a precedent.
3. In response to a question, the official said that Mr. Isakov was the number two man in the Soviet embassy in Washington; he shared this deputy ambassadorial rank with one other official. The official said that Ambassador Dobrynin may be leaving at the end of

this year, as part of the general trend toward more frequent rotation of diplomatic assignments. As for other personnel changes, Soviet UN ambassador Troyanovskiy will be leaving and will be replaced by Dubinin, the former Soviet ambassador to Spain. Finally, Mr. Primakov, a leading Soviet Middle East specialist (who was mentioned to us as a possible contact) has been promoted to head the Institute on World Economy:

4. More generally, the official pointed out that General Secretary Gorbachev had strongly criticized the letter on arms control sent to him recently by President Reagan. He also expressed interest in and concern about the new magazine called The Catalyst, which brought together Evangelical Christians and Jews. The repeated concern expressed about the Evangelicals verifies that our contact with them can enhance our leverage.
5. In response to a question regarding the degree to which such trade restrictions as the denial of MFN to the Soviet Union was seen as a serious barrier to Soviet trade aspirations, the official responded that this indeed was taken very seriously, despite the fact that currently, most Soviet goods which the US imports are raw materials or semi-finished goods with low tariff requirements. He specifically asked whether there would be any "good news" on the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, to which it was replied that the Jewish community had indicated that it was prepared to be flexible on Jackson-Vanik in response to increased emigration levels.
6. On the issue of German relations with the Soviet Union, the official said that relations were good, that Moscow sees Germans as pragmatic, and that fewer trade barriers exist between the two countries than between the US and the USSR. He predicted increased trade in the near future.

Crisis in Soviet Jewry

DAVID A. HARRIS

Emigration from the Soviet Union has all but ceased. Harassment and imprisonment of Jewish religious and, especially, Hebrew-language activists have increased in the last year. Media attacks on Jews, Judaism, and Zionism continue. And the net effect is that we in the West are today witnesses to a deliberate Soviet policy to bring about the gradual disappearance of 15 percent of world Jewry, or some two million Jews. Yet our response has not been commensurate to the catastrophic dimension of the problem. How could this be in a post-Holocaust period in which we explore, analyze, and study the lessons of that tragedy on an almost daily basis, agonize over our own inability to influence the course of events, and pledge "never again" to let history repeat itself?

When Soviet Jewry emerged on the world scene as an issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it captured the imagination and galvanized a substantial segment of the American Jewish community. A genuine miracle had occurred and we were privileged witnesses to it. Fifty years after the establishment of Soviet power, cut off from the rest of world Jewry, deprived of the means to learn, transmit, and develop a religion and culture, subjected to inordinate pressure to deny their identity, the voices of Soviet Jews could be heard. Some whispered, others shouted, but the message was clear: "We are Jews and we want to live as Jews in our historic homeland, Israel. Help us for we cannot do it alone." And an extraordinary chapter in history unfolded. A small group of modern-day Maccabees, employing nothing more than the age-old strength of their beliefs and the knowledge that theirs is a just cause, yet adhering to the letter of Soviet law, challenged the most powerful totalitarian state on earth. And we in the West demonstrated, petitioned, fasted, adopted Soviet Jewish families, contacted our public officials, and involved academic, religious, labor, scientific, and civil rights colleagues. The results were there for all to see. Large-scale emigration began in 1971 and thousands of Soviet Jews seized the opportunity. And despite the tragedy of the prisoner and refusenik cases and unrelenting Soviet anti-Semitism, we felt we had become successful historical protagonists; to some extent at least, it was within our power to help shape Jewish destiny.

Today, however, our mood seems different. Less than 1,150 people emigrated in 1984, compared to 51,000

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just six years ago, yet where is the flood of appeals to our public officials, where are the massive public demonstrations, where are the letters and phone calls and holiday messages to an increasingly isolated and fearful Soviet Jewish community? At the time of the November summit there was a limited flurry of activity, but in many parts of our community the bad news is met with apathy and indifference. Why? What has happened over the years to explain the decline in our enthusiasm and involvement? I would suggest a number of possible explanations:

1. Soviet Jewry has been a major agenda item for 15 years and promises to continue so for years to come. Remarkably, an extraordinary group of American Jewish communal activists have persisted in the struggle, some since the founding of the American Conference on Soviet Jewry in 1964 and even before. Yet, for many, the issue is one-dimensional, requiring an almost obsessive single-mindedness of purpose. How else does one grapple with the inherent frustration of the issue? And even among the best-intentioned, "compassion fatigue" may set in.

2. The issue is regarded by some today as beyond the influence of the Jewish community. Whereas in the early 1970s the conventional wisdom was that the Soviet Union was mindful of its public image and thus sensitive to world public opinion, the prevailing view now is that the Soviet Union is more often than not indifferent to the pleas of the West on human rights questions, or at least to the public at large if not to governments. What purpose is thus served in writing to Soviet officials and demonstrating in front of Soviet embassies and consulates? Further, there are many who view the issue as inextricably linked to the ebb and flow of Soviet-American relations, a pawn in a cynical and ruthless Soviet geopolitical strategy, beyond, therefore, the reach of the individual in our community. The only alternative, in this view, is to seek to influence American foreign policy in the belief that a return to détente, or at least a movement in the direction of improved relations, is in the interests of Soviet Jewry. But to do so is to risk positioning the American Jewish community in a dangerous domestic political situation; to appear to put the interests of Soviet Jewry ahead of our country's is a potentially dangerous strategy. Thus, the irreducible conclusion for many is to leave the issue to our government in the belief that only at that level can any success be achieved.

3. Our community has become anesthetized to descriptions of the Soviet Jewry condition as "critical,"

"the worst in years," "facing impending disaster," etc. With each arrest, each decline in emigration, each appearance of an anti-Semitic book or article, the call for immediate action has gone out, to the point, perhaps, where people are no longer able to distinguish a minor from a major crisis, a drop in emigration from a precipitous decline, or the appearance of an anti-Semitic article from a new wave of anti-Semitism.

4. Whereas the issue seized the hearts and minds of national agencies, community leadership, and the rabbinic in the early days of the struggle, the response recently has been more sporadic. Of course, there are many individual exceptions, but, to some degree at least, these principal players in our community have been dealing with Soviet Jewry in fits and starts, not in a sustained manner as a high priority item, nor with appropriate programming, over the years.

5. The drop-out issue has seriously and negatively affected attitudes towards Soviet Jews among many American Jews who regard the increasing rate of non-Israel-bound emigration, reaching as high as 80 percent in recent years, as having undermined a fundamental premise of this movement, namely, repatriation to the historic Jewish homeland.

6. Many American Jews are disappointed with the Soviet Jews they have met in this country. Expecting refugees thirsty for Jewish life (even in an American Diaspora), like those who came from Russia at the turn of the century, American Jews were unprepared and surprised at the profile and behavior of arriving Soviet Jews. Many newcomers did not act like refugees fleeing a clear and present danger, did not immediately seek to establish Jewish roots here, and did not, in most cases, fit the image of the courageous and beleaguered Jewish activists who, it seems, are the only ones portrayed at our Soviet Jewry rallies. The gap created by false expectations on both sides (Soviet Jews, too, have mistaken views of the United States and the Jewish community) has had an adverse impact on attempts to motivate American Jewry in the struggle in behalf of Soviet Jewry. And the problems associated with absorption, resettlement, and integration have created further negative feeling in some circles.

7. The almost total absence of Soviet Jewish participation in the advocacy movement in the United States has also created an impression among some that "if Soviet Jews don't care about those left behind, why should we?" Of course, many Soviet Jews still fear participating in public demonstrations and worry about the possible repercussions for family in the USSR. Also, in many American communities, no active effort has been made to invite Soviet Jewish participation, either because of the divisiveness of the "drop-out" question or to avoid the appearance of creating an emigré organization that might not be as effective in the public arena (or towards the Soviet Union) as an American Jewish movement.

8. Our movement relied for too long on a number of loyal and active non-Jewish friends. The many years of this struggle have taken their toll on some of them, and their numbers have not been easily replaced, much less augmented.

I have worked over the last 10 years on virtually every phase of Soviet Jewry — in Rome, Vienna, Washington, and New York. I believe in the Soviet Jewish movement as fervently as I did when I first became involved, indeed more so, despite the difficulties we have experienced. The positive experiences have been so many and so rich that they dominate my memory, and my meetings with refuseniks in the USSR were among the most significant experiences of my life. I believe we are not just witnesses to but participants in history, in one of the most extraordinary chapters in modern times.

Emil Fackenheim, a Judaic scholar from Toronto who now lives in Jerusalem, drafted a 614th commandment: "After Auschwitz, thou shalt not give Hitler posthumous victory." It is, unquestionably, our sacred duty to remember the Holocaust and to memorialize its victims, and to transmit the painful lessons of that tragedy to our children, but our responsibilities go much further. We must respond to Jews wherever they may be threatened. And today they are threatened as never before in the Soviet Union.

Survivors of the Holocaust recall two enduring fears during the dark years: first, that the world was unaware of what was happening to them, and, second, a far greater fear — that the world *was* aware of what was happening to them but was not sufficiently moved to react. Soviet Jews know that many care, indeed that is a lifeline that sustains them, but, they ask, are we doing all we can? What will our children and children's children one day ask about our response to the current situation? Will there be any among us who even dare suggest that we did not know the extent of the problem or understand its significance in light of Jewish history?

Shcharansky, Begun, Nudel, Lerner, and countless other Jewish heroes have sought to establish new lives in Israel. These people, who have fought tenaciously in behalf of us all for their right to live as Jews, deserve our steadfast support. Are all Soviet Jews like the activists? No, of course not, but every Soviet Jew who seeks to remain a Jew in the USSR has taken a courageous step and cannot survive alone.

When I visited the homes of refuseniks in Moscow and Leningrad, I listened to the parents but looked at the children. In the eyes of Soviet Jewish children, I saw no choices — neither as free human beings nor as Jews. Even if the parents managed a good education and found work, perhaps not at the level they merit but still in a professionally challenging atmosphere, what future is there in a country where anti-Semitic taunts begin in kindergarten and continue for a lifetime; where higher

educational opportunities are increasingly limited; where professional advancement for young Jews entering the job market is ever more restricted; where opportunities to study one's culture and religion are virtually non-existent; and where Zionists are portrayed as collaborators with the Nazis?

What should our response be? Are the Soviets testing our staying power, hoping that if we encounter no success in our advocacy efforts that the press of other issues will draw us away from attention to Soviet Jewry? If so, we must continue to show that they have seriously misread our resolve.

Our demonstrations; letters to Soviet officials; meetings with the administration and Congress; contact with refusenik families; Bar and Bat Mitzvah twinings; travel to the USSR; letters to the editor and op-ed pieces; outreach to other groups and to the press; education of our youth; and the myriad other efforts undertaken in our community must be continued, broadened, and intensified, just as we must press the search for new strategies and tactics. We must enlist enthusiastic newcomers to interact with experienced activists in reviewing existing programming and proposing new ideas. The goals of these efforts should continue to be: 1) increased contact with individual Soviet Jews, 2) vigorous protest to Soviet officials, 3) requests for stepped-up action from our political leaders (as well as frequent acknowledgment of their effort and support), and 4) heightened public awareness in the U.S. of the condition of the Soviet Jewish community.

Does our involvement make any difference? I believe it does. It often cannot be measured in easily quantifiable ways, but the Soviet Union is not totally insensitive to world public opinion, particularly if it is thunderous and reflects the views of both Jews and non-Jews in this country and abroad. And if it strengthens the resolve of

Soviet Jews to remain Jews, keeps people like Shcharansky alive, reduces the term of a prison sentence or keeps others out of prison, or results in an exit visa, then it has had a significant impact.

As difficult as the situation is today, it could only have been more difficult in 1964 when but a few visionaries believed, against all the odds, in a possible reawakening of Soviet Jewry. The subsequent emigration of 265,000 Jews was tangible proof of the importance of the efforts of the world Jewish community. Without our voices, who in the West would have spoken for two million Soviet Jews? Who would have lobbied the administration and Congress? Who would have approached other Western governments? Who would have enlisted the interest of academic, religious, and other key communities? Who would have offered hope to otherwise isolated Soviet Jews? Indeed, without our support, one can only speculate whether there would have been *any* emigration and what further tragedies might have befallen Soviet Jews.

We must forge greater unity in the advocacy effort. We must put aside differences over such issues as the "drop-out" question, especially when virtually no one is even arriving in Vienna. If Soviet Jews are sometimes difficult to resettle, it is worth reviewing the resettlement experience of East European Jews at the turn of the century. It was not an easy process then either. And if many Soviet Jews are cut off from Judaism, let us try to understand whence they come; and let us remember that in 20 years Jews in the USSR will be still more cut off from their roots.

Ours is a race against the clock. We have no moral right to apply any kind of "Jewish standard" to other Jews as a determinant for whether or not we become advocates for them. And let us not forget that more than 160,000 Soviet Jews have resettled in Israel where they have had a beneficial impact on every aspect of Israeli life. ■

Allah Kagedan © 307

Marc Tanenbaum-

your comments would be welcome.



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
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Report on the

Conference on the Condition of Minorities in the Soviet Union
under International Law

> By ALLAN KAGAN

The Conference on the Condition of Minorities in the Soviet Union, held

March 19-21 in Bonn, and cosponsored by the American Jewish Committee's

International Relations Department and the Institute on East European Law of the University of Cologne, and

funded by grants from the *Edwards* Elson and Volkswagen Foundations, was designed

with several goals in mind. These included: to cement ties between

American Jews and the German academic and governmental community on a

subject of common interest; to foster broader public interest and

awareness in West Germany of the plight of Soviet Jews and Germans; to

conduct pioneering research in the comparison of the statuses of these

two groups in the USSR; to identify their legal status and basis for

advocacy on their behalf in bilateral and multilateral settings; to

propose remedial measures for these groups; and finally, to lay the

basis for future joint ventures between American Jews and Germans on

this and other topics.

The Conference's adoption of a final statement, as well as the praise

that the meeting received from the cosponsors, from participants, and

from the West German and American governments testify to its success in

building support for the cause of Soviet Jews and Germans. The Confer-

ence also made a significant scholarly contribution in several areas.

This brief report will touch on some of the highlights of the papers

presented in Bonn.

Socio-Cultural Condition

The Jewish and German groups, respectively the 16th and 14th largest ethnic groups in the USSR, both suffer from a lack of viable territorial unit. This deficiency helps to explain their relatively low level of ethnic language retention (Jews 14%, Germans 57%), and why they have difficulty participating in their ethnic cultures, even to the degree permitted other territorially-based nationalities.

Societal attitudes towards members of both groups are negative. Indeed, in the media and in literature, Jews and Germans are often depicted as alien, suspicious, sinister. This mistrust breeds a climate where it is easy to deny equal opportunity to Jews and Germans in employment and education.

Status under Soviet Law

Constitutionally, of the USSR's 101 groups, 58 have territorial units named for them; it is within these units that cultural rights are exercised. Jews have a nominal unit -- Birobidzhan -- Germans have none. The Soviet regime, since the 1920s, has neglected non-territorial ethnic groups.

Soviet citizens do not possess the right to learn or use their own languages; what they do possess, formally, are rights to receive the texts of laws in these languages and to use their language in the

courts. But in the key-and burgeoning-area of administrative law, citizens have no language guarantees. In fact, ethnic language use is permitted in the various nationality republics, but Jews and Germans, who are without viable units, can not benefit from this.

The right to speak Hebrew is not protected under Soviet law. Hebrew is defined as a religious language, not a native language of a group, and therefore it is as falls under the Church-state separation decree, and can not be taught in the schools. This per se should leave the door open to private Hebrew language education. But even here, Soviet authorities can suppress the teaching of a subject by declaring it to be contrary to the "interests of state and society."

Status under International Law

The principal guarantee of minority rights in international law is Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which confers on "persons belonging to [/ ethnic, religious or linguistic] minorities...the right...to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." Other instruments, including the Genocide Convention, the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, also include minority rights provisions.

Since 1978, efforts have been underway to draft a declaration on

minority rights, that would clarify and interpret Article 27's terms. Thus far, a working group of the UN Human Rights Commission has been able to agree only on a preamble for a declaration, even here with phrases not agreed on. With the scholarly community's help, a minority rights declaration can be achieved.

Soviet Jews and Germans would clearly fall under the definition of minorities prepared by Judge Jules Dechenes of Canada, currently under consideration. Furthermore, international law provides a basis for condemning Soviet policy toward the Hebrew language, inasmuch as this policy represents an effort at forcible assimilation.

Freedom of Movement

Historically, freedom of movement reached its acme by World War I; respect for this right declined precipitously thereafter. A major factor in this change is Soviet policy towards emigration, a policy replicated in Marxist-Leninist regimes on every continent. The USSR and its friends resort to sealed borders because as regimes believing in the unity of the individual and the state and pursuing collective goals, they are hostile to those who wish to opt out. This amounts to a rejection of rule by consent.

Significantly, the restriction of emigration on the purported grounds of the loss of intellectual talent or "brain drain" is made not by truly needy countries, but by those with a collectivist agenda.

There are good reasons for enlightened regimes to reverse their no-emigration policy: releasing the discontented can lead to greater social stability, promote international communication, advance a feeling of cooperation rather than coercion in a society. Indeed, blocking free movement seems to harm the interest of society as a whole -- let alone many individuals -- and this can serve only the interest of a particular ruling group.

In international law, current efforts in the UN to draft a declaration on the right to leave offers the best opportunity in decades to focus international attention on, and adopt more precise standards regarding, this right. Such a declaration should include, first, a reassertion of the primacy of the right itself, and second, make clear that, in interpreting this right, states cannot impose limitations based on activity itself protected by provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international instruments.

Specific provisions of the declaration might include: that statutes or administrative regulations governing the right be made public and available to applicants; a time limit for processing an application, normally not exceeding three months; denials of applications should be accompanied by written notification detailing the reasons for refusal; a requirement of appeal procedures publicized; refused applicants should have recourse to judicial or other independent tribunal; foreign exchange or other limits should not have the effect of prohibiting travel or emigration; emigration should not be grounds for denationaliz-

ation; applications for emigration should be renewable at reasonable intervals, without prejudice.

East-West Relations

Western efforts to aid Soviet Jews and Germans can succeed most feasibly regarding emigration. The Soviet leadership, reluctant to permit exit, would be even more recalcitrant regarding suggestions for changing the internal condition of these minority groups. In an atmosphere of general negotiation over arms and other matters, negotiation over emigration is also possible.

One means of encouraging a more liberal emigration policy on the part of Communist regimes was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, enacted by the US Congress in 1975. This measure, which has clearly beneficial effects with regard to Romania and other Soviet bloc states, has also established a link in the minds of Soviet leaders between possible trade benefits to them and freer emigration. This linkage, which survives the vicissitudes of one foreign policy development and has had a beneficial impact with respect to individual cases, may encourage broader policy changes in the future.

~~Prepared by~~ Allan Kagedan, PhD.

Relations

policy analyst in international
at the American Jewish Committee.

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The following organizations today released a statement expressing their support for continuation of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in the struggle for Soviet Jewry, and opposing proposals for change:

National Conference on Soviet Jewry
Union of Councils of Soviet Jewry
Center for Russian Jewry with
Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry

Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations
Coalition to Free Soviet Jews (NY)
World Jewish Congress
National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council

STATEMENT ON JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which is known as the Freedom of Emigration Amendment to the Trade Reform Act (1974), reflects US commitment to the fundamental principle of free emigration, a principle on which American society was built. The Amendment denies favorable trade status and commercial credit to the Soviet Union and other communist countries which restrict emigration. The Amendment provides that its restrictions may be waived, year by year, if the President and Congress find that there is a significant change in these restrictive policies. The Amendment remains the clearest and most effective expression of that commitment as it pertains to the rights of Soviet Jews and others.

The campaign for and passage of the Freedom of Emigration legislation was instrumental in the release of many tens of thousands of Soviet Jews. Frequent Soviet complaints about the Amendment demonstrate that it remains a key lever for future progress on behalf of these human rights.

Jackson-Vanik imposes no limit or ceiling on US-Soviet trade. Furthermore, any financial disadvantages the Soviets incur by reason of less favorable tariffs and lack of credits can be suspended by Presidential waiver, earned annually. The Amendment permits US trade concessions to flow, so long as the emigrants flow.

Hence, Jackson-Vanik enshrines as law the flexibility that its opponents have argued can be achieved only through modification or repeal. It ensures a continuing incentive for the granting of emigration rights.

Despite some well-publicized cases affording freedom to a small number of individuals, there has been no sign of any change in the repressive policies of the Soviet Union. In fact, emigration of Soviet Jews diminishes while persecution of Jewish cultural activists and would-be emigrants increases. We vigorously reiterate our support for the principles and the policies represented by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and affirm that we would strongly oppose any legislative effort to repeal or modify it. The Soviet Union must be shown that unless and until it has complied with the terms of the Amendment, US policy will remain as it is. There is no room for unilateral gestures until the Soviets show that they are willing to abide by the rules protecting these human rights to which they gave their pledge at Helsinki. We look for significant changes, including major steps to resolve the refusenik and Prisoner of Conscience issues, ending the present harassment of emigration applicants and study group participants and, of course, a very substantial climb in yearly levels of emigration as envisioned by Senator Jackson.



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SEP 22 1986

September 16, 1986

MEMORANDUM

To: International Relations Department

From: Nives Fox

Subj: Soviet Jewry Conference -- Paris, September 10-12, 1986

A number of old timers at the three day conference last week left saying "same people, same dissensions, same conclusions...but more white hair." The array of organization presidents certainly was impressive, causing one reporter to say "There are only presidents here!?" But to more serious matters.

Though the problem of noshira surfaced several times, it was void of the bitterness and accusations of past debates. It remained an underlying theme, however, by implication; and especially through the often made point that one speak of repatriation, return to the homeland, rather than reunification of families.

This last recurrent distinction request was introduced immediately in Arie Dulzin's opening of the conference speech: "We are not struggling for Jews to emigrate from the USSR. We are struggling for the Jews to leave for Israel, for repatriation. This is the moral and ideological base."

A second repeated theme of dissent was that of uniting the Jewish with other causes. This not because anyone seriously raised the issue. Rather, as a result of either strange misunderstandings or purposeful distortions of what one speaker said, leading to aggressive responses and time consuming debate to demolish an argument that was never given in the first place. For example: the most reasonable suggestion made by Kenneth Bialkin that Jewish bodies augment forces by including friendly non-Jewish bodies, particularly for the envisaged mass demonstration in Washington at summit time, possibly on other occasions as well, was taken by several to mean inclusion of other causes. Another example of this type of distortion and argumentation ensued when Shcharansky mentioned the thanks due to Sakharov -- in the context of thanks to President Reagan and President Mitterrand -- for the several courageous interventions he had made over years on behalf of Soviet Jews, as meaning that the liberation of Sakharov should become part of the battle for Soviet Jewry.

Also causing much ado was the suggestion that one way to fight the Soviet Union might be its "South Africanization" and this in the sense of making it unacceptable to democratic nations. This aroused contradictory stances, leading to plain foolishness, and then was just dropped.

Much time was spent on the proposition for a huge mass demonstration ^{at summit time} in Washington of at least 400,000 persons (never discovered the whys of this arbitrary figure, unless it was meant to match the number of Jews who wish to leave). Whatever, there were those who insisted that this was impossible and those who said it could be done; and those who suggested that perhaps there will be no summit (with Daniloff in mind), or not in Washington (perhaps in Camp David); or that it might be planned for a day with an unexpected snow storm, with housing and food for such a number and at such a time of the year giving more than serious problems. At any rate, the project is on, with a call to Europeans to participate and thus strengthen President Reagan's position vis-a-vis the Russians and for whatever maximum number of participants can be gathered, Jews and non-Jews.

Perhaps the moment of total madness was reached when a suggestion, directly following yet another go at the noshira question, was made that the US be persuaded to close its doors to Soviet Jewish emigration. You can well imagine the reaction of the Americans -- almost each making a point forcefully rejecting the very thought, and getting on the record as it were on this even after the matter seemed dropped and forgotten.

It was the presence of Eliyahu Eassas and Anatoli Shcharansky that created greatest expectations and interest. Two very different personalities indeed, be it in looks -- Essas tall, quite youthful, with a long beard and wearing a yarmulka, slow, soft spoken, never losing sight of the target he has set for himself; Shcharansky short, stocky, bold and bareheaded, quite aware that what he had to say may not please everyone yet saying it clearly and directly. Both symbols of Soviet Jewry and the struggle on its behalf, recent arrivals bringing information, with views that converged and diverged, but always cogent and sharp. Essas the mathematician who became the religious and spiritual leader among activists in the USSR, a contrast to Shcharanski's cybernetic expertise and human rights activism to the point of martyrdom.

Speaking first, Essas described efforts among Jews in the Soviet Union toward Jewish education and identity as they wait and fight for emigration. For him there is a potential of half a million Jewish emigrants, most passively waiting, in Moscow and Leningrad but also in small towns all over the USSR. Of these, some do not apply because they are afraid, some may or may not be ready to leave immediately; but all are potential emigrants, who follow international affairs via radio and press, but also via letters from abroad, and reach opinions. It is therefore important, he says, that good absorption and settlement conditions be found in Israel; and noshrim have a devastating influence, their letters do not inspire departure for Israel.

There are also several thousand refusniks. They too are waiting, especially in small towns, and little is known about their efforts. But particularly in the small towns, KGB pressure is high. Finally, there are the activists, whom we know and are in touch with. He defines them as "too impatient to

wait, and therefore active." The problem among this group is that during the past 15 years of Jewish emigration possibilities visas for activists have been refused year after year. They are worn out. He remembered discussing this weariness ten years ago with Slepak, when Slepak was in his fifth year of being a refusnik and Essas only in his second. Now, after 10, 15 and more years of waiting, lassitude and hopelessness are taking over. It is this phenomenon and this group that must be thought of first in present approaches, for with emigration virtually nil the tiredness effect is multiplied.

Another point Essas stressed was the acquisition of good Jewish education by more recent activists in the large cities. This is new, and if it continues, he says, the new leaders will be religious, most speaking fluent Hebrew and playing a decisive role in this direction, with possible snowballing results attracting others. For the sake of greater understanding of them and by them, he urged that visitors contacting them also be at least as knowledgeable because the religiously ignorant are bound to shock this group.

Among refusniks, says Essas, there is a silent majority which wants to go to the West and not to Israel. They distort the situation, are less Jewish and a possible danger to the movement because they may become activists and leaders without a Jewish identity, more difficult to deal with and help.

Essas believes it is important to follow changes in the activist situation, to know who are the tired ones and what they are thinking. For Soviet Jews no longer are what they were 15 years ago, he cautioned, and one is faced with a third generation deprived of a Jewish environment and understanding of the Jewish world outside, though more imbued with Judaism. He felt that long time refusniks should be brought out first, though this may make growth of activism harder to predict; but he seemed confident that the development of Jewish religiosity and tradition would bring about new leaders.

As for the small group of prisoners of Zion, the problem is even greater: there is no way to get them free, and at the present rate of one every blue moon it could take 45 years for the 15 prisoners and former prisoners to get out.

Anatoli Shcharansky, who spoke much later at the meeting, was, as said above, a contrast, both in looks and ideas. But he too, using his case as an example of not giving up and believing in miracles, agreed that time for getting Soviet Jews out of the USSR was growing very short: assimilation, long waits and harsh punishment threats each took a heavy toll. In ten years, he said, the problem of Soviet Jewry will be gone, "so we must work fast."

He viewed present action on their behalf as responding to events, but lacking a real strategy. Because of his notoriety, he said, he had just had a lot of interviews with the press. In France no journalist asked him about Soviet Jews: "What do you think about terrorism?" was the main question (not unnatural presently, in France). But he had no problem in focusing his answers to the plight of Jews in the USSR, explaining that hostages were used as leverage for blackmail and terror exactly in the same way as the KGB uses refusniks and activists. In other words, don't let up, every occasion can and should be aimed toward keeping the problems of Soviet Jews alive.

Strongly opposed to the case by case approach -- "this is the way for one side to give in on major items for a handful of hostages" -- he fears the US leaders are ready to accept it, and urged that Jews continue fighting for their over 2 million brethren, of which 400,000 wish to leave and a few thousand are refusniks. But it was not enough to just speak: conditions must be set out, linkages made. For the KGB and Soviet authorities are very patient and ready to wait us out. Therefore linkage, all across the board; and therefore though they know what we do, our weaknesses, our disagreements, the question for us is to know their interests. (This truly is Shcharansky's constant reminder, he used it by organizing a demonstration over the possible Soviet consular delegation visit to Israel insisting that nothing be given without reciprocity.)

Picking up the "South Africanization" expression used in the debate before, he charged the Soviets as being worse than South Africa. Yet, if congressmen and leaders of important organizations in the US are happy to be arrested in demonstrations against South Africa, they are less happy and willing to go to the Soviet Embassy. And if many are in favor of disinvestment, none invokes economic measures against the USSR. Why are there no hearings held showing up Soviet society? All this proves that the masses are not behind the Jewish movement in the USSR, and that linkage with the Helsinki meetings is not being used. As a result, the case by case situation makes ever greater inroads, helping to make more impossible for the Soviets even to envisage the principle of an open door policy.

At the risk of being again told he is not a Zionist ("I knew I was in Israel when I heard this from people and read it in the press") Shcharansky declared that he wanted all the Jews to go to Israel, that he agreed neshira was a danger, but not because the USSR says that it is this that prevents departures. "I am happy to be in Israel, but not among people who say they were forced to come."

Concerning the forthcoming summit and planned demonstration in the US and its possible effects, Shcharansky pointed out that Gorbachev understands the weakness of his system. Much as one should distrust him, he does understand more than his predecessors, knows that he must stop star wars, find a way to limit arms and work on economic development. This is why President Reagan must be able to say to him that public opinion (namely a very large demonstration) in the US will not permit negotiations with the Russians until the human rights situation there improves.

Shcharansky said he was still idealistic enough to believe new ways can and will be found to get a large number to a demonstration in Washington. It was important to make Jews aware of the basic bond between them all over the world and to show this by joining in the manifestation. "I am ready to leave my pregnant Avital after 12 years of separation for this purpose. Surely those on the spot can do as much. The summit offers an occasion that may not present itself again for many years."

Leverage used must not be anti-Soviet, he warned; but the cause of Jewry is unique, should not be mixed with other causes, valid as they may be, he concluded.

David Bartov kept a low profile throughout the meeting (with such as Essas and Shcharansky there was not much he could add) with a brief initial summary of the present situation, which he succinctly described as "we are back to square one." He asked that official visits from various countries might be coordinated; that contact with refusniks also be coordinated, so it could be spread out and not concentrated on the few known names; that every event should be used -- cultural exchanges, trade, etc. -- to forward the cause of Soviet Jews. He believed Soviet denial of a Jewish problem in the USSR (stated by Gorbachev and echoed by all other Soviet officials) to be a bad sign, leaving room for action only on behalf of few, individual cases. Obviously one must fight for all those who wished to leave and not for individuals whose departure could give the Soviets a good conscience with a premium of good public relations added. He called upon all the representatives at the conference to find a formula for cooperation, for divisions are not only harmful but also a waste of resources. (Bartov's appeal for cooperation and coordination partly responded to complaints among the Europeans at the meeting that Israel did not cooperate and, to some extent stifled action in Bern. The Europeans feel they have much to contribute but are not kept informed and not taken into account; they understood Israel's stance in Bern as being predicated by hope of advancing in the matter of renewed diplomatic relations with the USSR, and support this; but also feel that it need not interfere with their actions and projects.)

Finally, Bartov said there were 3,236 families presently refused permission to leave, a total of 11,376 persons; and 15 prisoners of Zion. He pressed that until the summit is over everyone speak of 390,000 wishing to leave and having asked for invitations from Israel. Of course, he also asked that emphasis be given to repatriation and not reunion of families.

Morris Abram's intervention was very well received. In his view there were dire enough Soviet problems -- of social and economic nature -- to offer leverage through the Stevenson and Jackson Vanick amendments. A formula was needed to maintain US interest on the Jewish emigration problem. At the Geneva summit the linkage was made for credibility on the Helsinki accords. For the second summit, he said, "we must fit like hand in glove with President Reagan's position." He pointed out that a linkage with arms control could boomerang: "if a superb arms agreement was offered President Reagan could not reject it." Therefore negotiations must stay multipronged, as they were on the Geneva agenda -- arms, human rights, regional problems -- even though the Soviets are interested only in the arms issue. To keep to this goal he believed cultural exchanges must be used (though opposition to them must not take any violent form -- tear gas, stink bombs, etc.). The Soviets also must be told that stunts like the Intourist advert are hazardous for them. Abrams favored a mass demonstration just before the summit, and he too called upon Europeans for strong support, with a show of their banners along the American ones, coming of European parliamentarians, and demands for Helsinki compliance by all.

He informed the conference that he had a 30 minute appointment set with Secretary Shultz for this September 17, with Michael Pelavin, Edgar Bronfman and Kenneth Bialkin also participating, and during which a request to include Soviet Jewry in the summit agenda would be made. Pressed by Essas on what could be expected for 1987? for 1988? what could the US give up since star

wars were not for bargaining, Abrams thought one possibility was to wave the Stevenson and Jackson Vanick amendments in return for clearly enforceable Jewish emigration agreements, set up on an institutionalized basis for a decade or so, making sure that a one time 2-3000 departure followed by nothing could not occur.

Of course, everyone at the meeting had a chance to have their say, and much of what each had to say was repetitive -- both of past meetings and at the meeting itself. Note: Israel Singer did respond after one of the appeals for repatriation to homeland and not reunification. He called a differentiation between the two a sham, but in any case felt that one was not exclusive of the other. The choice of Israel was an ideological one, and ideally all Jews should go there; but reality was different and that was that.

Shcharnasky too responded to some criticism over his intervention. He repeated that a moral debt was owed to Sakharov, and for him a personal one as well. (And for sure one does not intimidate a Shcharansky, for he later acted on this conviction and spoke of Sakharov at the public meeting in the Cirque d'Hiver.) He also reiterated that while he did not favor neshira he preferred it to enforced choice. Having listened for hours to organizational squabbles and differences, he also declared that this type of competitiveness harmed the cause rather than helped it; and again pledged to continue fighting the KGB, much as he had been counselled to stay away from conferences and live a peaceful and quiet life.

If the purpose of the conference was to set up a detailed plan of action and new ideas on ways to increase emigration from the Soviet Union, this was not achieved. But there was some re-fanning of enthusiasm to continue the struggle and do a maximum. One may well believe in miracles, as Shcharansky says, but they are not easy to create or find, as Shcharansky well knows.

As for the November 4 meeting of the CSCE in Vienna: the committee reviewed the situation and agreed to further efforts for involving smaller communities like Spain, Portugal, Austria, Italy, Sweden (yes, this too was a complaint); to set up a regular ~~xxx~~ system of exchange of information among all. An office will be available in Vienna (agreed to with the Austrian delegate at the meeting) with a permanent secretary. The usual rotating system of experts will be applied, beginning two weeks before the Conference starts, and with Steve Roth taking the first "watch" in mid-October. Alan Rose, David Harris and others are being counted upon for relays during the first two months. Ideally there should be one person throughout the Conference that would make for sustained work and continuity, but apart from the need for funding, it would be difficult to find a qualified person able to stay for the duration. Steve Roth announced that the "Blue Book" is just about ready for distribution; and also told the meeting that Senator d'Amato will be the US delegate in Vienna.

Though future action, other than the demonstration in Washington, was not quite spelled out, it is being planned: the Europeans, who had several separate sessions, distributed a fairly impressive list of projects they are confident will be carried out; and of course the National Conference for Soviet Jewry and other US bodies working on this question will hardly be inert.

The Conference resolution was voted (along with a message to Soviet Jews) and the first was criticized somewhat for not being specific enough. Its drafters argued that a resolution could not spell out everything and there was enough implied for those who read carefully to understand quite well.


Coverage of the Conference by the press (a press conference was called to take place immediately after adjournment) was not too good, and understandably so, with headlines and pages taken over by the frequent terrorist attacks in Paris just then.

As after every one of these meeting, there was a measure of dissatisfaction, disappointment and disillusion; equally, organizations, committees and commissions everywhere will continue to do what they can and help to reinvigorate a cause that, to some extent, alas, suffers from the same lassitude and fatigue that affects the many waiting Jews in the USSR.

#####

cc: Marc Tanenbaum
David Harris
Sergio Nudelstejer

Enclosures: David Harris



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date October 1, 1986
to Marc H. Tanenbaum
from David Geller *DG*
subject Emergency Meeting re Soviet Jewry - October 1st

The meeting was chaired by Morris Abram. Aryeh Dulzin was also present, having attended the dinner on the previous evening.

The meeting was called to discuss two groups of suggestions... one group developed at a meeting between Jerry Goodman and Jewish organization representatives in Washington, and a second by Al Chernin and the NJCRAC staff. The "Washington" suggestions consisted of the following:

- * Continue our planned activities for Summit II.
- * Organize petition in Congress addressed to President Reagan
- * Organize delegation of Congressional leaders to meet with the President
- * Organize "send-off" to the President
- * Organize delegation to Iceland of European Jewish leaders
- * Organize delegation to Iceland of American Jewish leaders
- * Ads in Washington Post and Icelandic newspapers; (Mort Yarmon's cousin is married to an editor of one of them)
- * Convene emergency public meeting in Washington on Thursday with press conference prior to meeting
- * Solicit appearance of Jewish and Christian clergy in Washington plus statements

The NJCRAC recommendations are attached.

During the discussions that followed both groups of suggestions were accepted with the following additions:

1. The emergency assembly in Washington will be conducted on Wednesday rather than Thursday because the President may be leaving on Thursday.
2. Attempts will be made to get prominent speakers with important credentials, such as Sen. Lugar, Dante Fascell and/or other Congressional members of committees dealing in foreign relations, and there would also be an attempt to invite a former Secretary of State.
3. It has been estimated that \$40,000 is needed to fund the various activities and constituent agencies of the NCSJ and the Presidents' Conference will be asked for emergency contributions.
4. Because preliminary reports indicate that there is little hotel space in Iceland and that bookings on the regular commercial airlines are probably no longer available, an appeal was made to Max Fisher who said that he would be able to get five private planes to be put at our disposal.
5. Israel Singer cautioned the group about planned demonstrations in Iceland. He said that the government has strict regulations regarding such demonstrations and we would have to be careful that we are not planning some activity that the Icelandic Government will not allow us to implement. Accordingly, it was suggested that someone be delegated to travel to Iceland on Thursday or Friday and report on the actual situation.
6. A special effort will be made to have a group of rabbis conduct a special prayer service in Washington. In addition there would be an attempt at an interfaith activity of some kind.

On another but related issue, the attached statement by Morris Abram regarding the release of Yuri Orlov was distributed. It was unfortunate that the first sentence in the release was not included in the quote cited by The New York Times which made it seem as if the NCSJ was ignoring or not overly concerned about Orlov because he was not a Jewish dissident.

DG/es

Enclosures

cc: David A. Harris

October 1, 1986

TO: Washington Mobilization Committee

FROM: Al Chernin

RE: NJCRAC Recommendations for Programming Prior to Iceland Summit

Operating on the premise that the Iceland Summit is indeed preparatory to a Summit in the United States as well as what realistically can be achieved in the next 10 days, NJCRAC has come up with programmatic suggestions that seek to seize the moment. The underlying theme of this one-week campaign is to convey to the President our deep conviction that he shares our commitment about the plight of Soviet Jewry, and that our concern is that it be treated seriously as a major item on the agenda in Iceland and the Summit in the United States. Therefore, we propose the following (presented out in chronological order of implementation):

1. During Rosh Ha'Shana services, rabbis should make impassioned appeals to members of their congregation to send to the President telegrams which set forth our concerns. Our goal should be to send to the White House no less than 50,000 telegrams in a concentrated period between October 6-8. Such a voluminous number received in those two to three days cannot but have an effect on the White House. This is where we could demonstrate national grass roots concern, even in the absence of a massive demonstration in Washington.
2. A subcommittee of agency professionals should draft a letter to the President from Morris Abram on behalf of the organized Jewish community of the United States in which we set forth in definitive terms of ideally what we would want to be achieved in a Summit Conference between the President and Gorbachev on the subject of Soviet Jewry. We have in mind the type of demands that were being shaped in 1979 in consultation with the White House when we were looking for a key to permit the President to invade the waiver in Jackson-Vanik. We were seeking not only large numbers permitted to immigrate from the Soviet Union (as in 1979), but fair, equitable, published standards for determining who may emigrate. The charge on the subcommittee would be to draft such a letter that would go beyond the demand of "let my people go."
3. On Wednesday, October 8th, a national leadership assembly should be held in Washington, DC which would comprise the presidents of every national Jewish organization that is a member of either the National Conference or the Presidents Conference, presidents and chairmen of every federation, CRC and mobilization task force as well as their staff, and rabbis. The program should be geared to bringing out the points that will have been developed in the letter to the President. Thus the ideal would be to have personalities that might include one or two former secretaries of state; key members of Congress; prominent members of the "cloth" who are particularly identified with human rights, and, possibly, spokesmen for the Administration. The theme of such a day would not be simply to call

attention to the issue. The issue itself is widely recognized; we have achieved public consciousness of the issue. Now we have to go beyond it by pressing for the hard negotiations of the principle that are required to fulfill the demands of "the refuseniks."

4. On that day, October 8, an ad should be published in the Washington Post signed by the type of individuals who again would underscore the definitive demands set forth in the letter. Thus we would propose that the letter be signed by overseers of American foreign policy, such as, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Committee.

5. On Thursday morning, October 9, we should launch daily shuttles to Iceland, going and coming the same day. Because hotel rooms and space on regular airlines are already fully booked, we propose to try to enlist the assistance of those Jewish leaders who have private jets which have the capability of flying to Iceland. We know of at least four planes, each of which can hold about 10 people. What we would seek is a group of 10 people going each day on Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday to carry the message to the media and to the extent possible, key officials comprising the American delegation. Each group would have a different character. For example, on Thursday we might send over mothers and children or refuseniks who may be in the United States (we know of some who are already in the United States.) On Friday, perhaps, we could prevail on a small group of members of Congress to fly in and out. On the weekend we should utilize Christian clergy who would emphasize their presence is out of concern for Soviet Jewry and also their sense of obligation to Jews who are at home for Shabbat Shuva and Yom Kippur. Another plane might also include a group of prominent Soviet experts. By these different casts we would seek to provide the media with a different story each day. While we are not calling for Jewish leaders to fly to Iceland, we believe it would be desirable for a few prominent Jewish leaders to be present at some time during those four days, such as, for example, Morris Abram. Also, each planeload should include at least two professionals, one who would have expertise on Soviet Jewry and the other, public relations.

* * *

What we are proposing is a formidable program, admittedly hard to implement, but we also believe it can be effective because it is a program responsive to an exceptional situation. Thus we should bend our efforts to achieve it. We have to make decisions on these and other programmatic decisions today and to assign the responsibilities among the various agencies. As a first step, a very small steering committee should be established to oversee the total program.

**National
Conference
on
Soviet
Jewry**

NEWS RELEASE

CONTACT: Deborah/Jerry Strober
(212) 679-6122

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT BY MORRIS B. ABRAM, CHAIRMAN
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

NEW YORK, September 30. . .We welcome the news that Yuri Orlov will be released. A longtime advocate of human rights, and founder of the Moscow Helsinki Group, he has suffered greatly in prisons, labor camps and Siberian exile.

We are deeply disappointed, however, that the Soviet Union has refused to make any significant gestures to ease the plight of Soviet Jews. Hundreds of refuseniks continue to live in limbo. Others suffer unjustifiably in labor camps.

We hope therefore that progress toward a summit will be made during the pre-summit meeting in Iceland, and that all the underbrush will be cleared away. We have confidence that the Administration is proceeding on its promise to press the issue of Jewish rights and emigration at the summit and to help secure the immediate transit of those hundreds of thousands of Jews who wish to be repatriated to Israel, and to join their families.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY
10 East 40th Street, Suite 907
New York, New York 10016

SOVIET JEWS: THE CASE FOR EMIGRATION

Soviet Jews, numbering officially 1.8 million and more likely 2.5 million, have a distinct human rights claim because they have no homeland in the USSR, and are systematically denied the combined rights of their ancient language, culture, and religion, granted to other minorities. The purpose of these Soviet policies is to extinguish Jewish identity and permanently sever the Soviet Jewish population from history. The effect is to stimulate the desire to emigrate.

Millions of Americans are determined that the Jewish people, 1/3 of whom were annihilated in the Hitler Holocaust, will not stand alone in their determination that 1/5 of world Jewry today (who live in the USSR), will not be lost in the memory hole of history.

The claim of Jews to emigrate, and be reunited with their kin, is grounded in international agreements to which the USSR has agreed, namely Article 13 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Principle 7 of Basket I and Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act.

From 1968 to June 1986, 648,824 Soviet Jews were sent the necessary personal affidavits of invitation, submitted by Israeli citizens and registered in the Israeli Foreign Office. (This is the first step for Jews in the emigration process.) During the same period, 266,059 Jews left the Soviet Union with Israeli visas.

Therefore, there remain well over 330,000 who, at grave risk to their personal status, have taken the initial step to leave. In this group we can identify 3,200 families comprising over 11,000 "refuseniks," who have repeatedly been refused an exit visa, many for 10 years or longer. Among the "refuseniks" are those Jews who, because of their struggle for human rights, are now in labor camps or internal exile, nearly half of whom were sentenced since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power.

The claims of Soviet Jewry to emigrate is gradually becoming an outstanding moral issue in America's political dialogue comparable in scope, albeit not yet in intensity, to opposition to the South African policy of apartheid. The only debate arises over how America should respond -- and the differences are narrowing.

Soviet practices in this field, because they are inconsistent with the Helsinki Accords, give currency to those who argue that the USSR cannot be trusted to comply with any agreement -- especially one affecting its vital interest such as armaments. Therefore, the President is not only morally right to insist on change in Soviet policy in these areas; he is stating the political reality that new agreements are implicitly linked by trust as tested by experience with existing agreements.

The claims on humanity by Soviet Jews have galvanized an overwhelming majority of the US Congress and millions of ordinary citizens. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, linking trade concessions to emigration, is but one expression of their concern. More are expected to follow if conditions for Soviet Jews do not improve, especially the figures of those permitted to leave.

On the other hand, responsible Americans would welcome -- and be electrified -- by a real change in Soviet emigration policies -- a change which would find a reciprocally favorable response, especially within the Congress.

We recognize that priorities may be established within a responsible emigration policy. At the beginning exit visas should be granted to those waiting over ten years, followed by visas to those refused for five to ten years. In addition, exit visas should be given within two years to those who have received a refusal; Jewish Prisoners of Conscience should be released (according to an agreed timetable), and visas given to former prisoners who have applied to go to Israel, but are still waiting. Those refused on security grounds should be granted visas within 5 years after the end of the security job, in compliance with Mikhail Gorbachev's promises in Paris, last year, that "this is not a problem." Finally, exit for all applicants should be seen as part of an institutionalized process which allowed more than 50,000 Jews to exit in 1979.

October 8, 1986





National Conference on Soviet Jewry

STATEMENT BY MORRIS B. ABRAM
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

REYKJAVIK, ICELAND
Friday, October 10, 1986

We, representing the organized American Jewish Community, have come to Reykjavik, Iceland in support of President Reagan's determination to press at this pre-summit for the internationally recognized rights of Soviet Jews to live as Jews within the USSR, to be repatriated to their homeland in Israel, and to be reunited with their families.

We regard this as a critical moment in the history of our people and the fight for human rights within the Soviet Union.

For the next two days the spotlight of the world will be focused expectantly on this island. We have flown here overnight to return today. And we are prepared to go anywhere at any time, and for as long as necessary, until the Soviet Union lives up to its human rights obligations under (at least three) specific international agreements, guaranteeing the right to emigrate.

We also wish to express our appreciation to the people and government of Iceland for the reception of our delegation.

This may be an appropriate time to recall that in 1947, Thor Thors, the Icelandic Ambassador to the United States and Canada played a key role in the birth of Israel. Ambassador Thors was the Rapporteur of the U.N. Political Committee seized with the then Palestine question. It was Thors, over Arab opposition in November 1947, who reported that "All possibility for agreement has been exhausted," sending the issue of the founding of Israel to the UN General Assembly, which voted for the birth of the Jewish State.

We come here to stand behind our President who said to some of us at the White House, earlier this week, that he would "make it amply clear to Mr. Gorbachev that unless there is real movement on human rights we will not have the kind of political atmosphere to make lasting progress on other issues."

The President also stated: "There has been much speculation that our up coming meeting in Reykjavik will focus on arms control. But true peace requires respect for human rights and freedom as well as arms control. Our agenda at Reykjavik will deal not only with arms control but Soviet human rights violations, military intervention by the Soviets and their proxies in regional conflicts and broadening contacts between our two peoples."

These views were confirmed in a meeting we had with Admiral Poindexter, the President's National Security Advisor, on that same day.

The following day Secretary of State George P. Shultz, speaking to 400 Jewish leaders in the Department of State elaborated on the Administration's position:

". . .our message to the Soviets is simple. Token gestures or short term lowering of barriers will not suffice. What the American people want to see is a genuine and lasting improvement in the



situation of Soviet Jews as part of a broader commitment on the part of Soviet authorities to allow their citizens to exercise basic human rights, including freedom of movement. This goal cannot be detached from any of the others on the agenda, including bilateral issues and arms control. . .we need to let them (the USSR) see that the continuation of this behavior means that they pay a price. They pay a heavy price. . .we will always keep after this issue and will have it right up as a top priority in our discussions."

This then is the Administrations position.

This President, and his delegation at this meeting, is the best prepared and most motivated group who have ever met with the top Soviet representatives on this issue:

1. The Secretary of State has received from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry a comprehensive up to date set of papers covering the plight of Soviet Jewry which he has described as "well organized with references to (its) documentations."
2. We have furnished the Secretary substantiation of the fact that over 300,000 Soviet Jews who have completed the first step in the emigration procedure have not had their applications processed.
3. We have handed the Secretary the names of the Jewish Prisoners of Conscience, nearly one half of whom have been jailed or sent to internal exile since Gorbachev came to power.
4. We have provided Adm. Poindexter, at his request, the names of 11,000 refuseniks, many of whose applications to emigrate (filed at great personal risk) have been turned down several times over many years.

Some of us met with the President on September 9, 1985 before the first Geneva Summit and stated a proposition which has been accepted as a truism by the Administration and all levels of American opinion, including the Congress.

"At the outset of the talks (in Geneva) the Soviet Union should be informed that it is very unlikely that the American people will trust the Soviets or new agreements on arms affecting the vital security interests of both countries while they persist in violating the merely humane provisions of the Helsinki Accords."

Secretary Shultz referred this week to the Helsinki Accords, quoting a section reaffirming Articles 13, paragraph 3, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own and to return to his country." Then the Secretary, dramatically pointing to a copy of the Accords, said:

"I turn to the back of this document and I see here the signature of Mr. Brezhnev. And I believe that we have a right and a duty to monitor adherence to these provisions and insist that they be complied with."

We have provided our negotiators the priorities that may reasonably be established within a responsible Soviet Jewry emigration policy:

"At the beginning exit visas should be granted to those waiting over ten years, followed by visas to those refused five to ten years. In addition, exit visas should be given within two years to those who have received a refusal, Jewish Prisoners of Conscience should

be released (according to an agreed timetable), and visas given to former prisoners who have applied to go to Israel but are still waiting. Those refused on security grounds should be granted visas within five years after the end of the security job, in compliance with Mikhail Gorbachev's promises in Paris, last year, that "this is not a problem." Finally, exit for all applicants should be seen as part of an institutionalized process which allowed more than 50,000 Jews to exit in 1979."

We say to the Soviet authorities that we and all American would welcome -- indeed we would be electrified -- by a real change in Soviet emigration and human rights policies -- changes which would find a reciprocally favorable response, especially within the Congress.

We come to Iceland in support of our President and with expressions of genuine good will to the Soviet people. We seek peace and friendship which, together with respect for human dignity, are the goals of the struggle for human rights.

These are the motivations of millions of American who are determined that the Jewish people, one-third of whom were annihilated in the Hitler Holocaust, will not stand alone in their determination that one-fifth of world Jewry (who live in the USSR) will not now be lost in the memory hole of history.

May G-d at this season, so sacred to the Jewish people, grant wisdom to the leaders who convene here. May these days between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, known as the Days of Awe, yield a blessing to all mankind.

* * * *

National Conference on Soviet Jewry Leadership Delegation to Reykjavik, Iceland, Friday, October 10, 1986: Morris B. Abram, Chairman, National Conference on Soviet Jewry and Chairman, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations; Jerry Goodman, Executive Director, National Conference on Soviet Jewry; Theodore R. Mann, President, American Jewish Congress and Immediate Past Chairman, National Conference on Soviet Jewry; Seymour D. Reich, President, B'nai B'rith International; Michael Pelavin, Chairman, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council; Albert D. Chernin, Executive Vice Chairman, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council; Alan Pesky, Chairman, Coalition to Free Soviet Jews and Ruth Popkin, President, Hadassah.

JG/D5/009



National Conference on Soviet Jewry

DATE: October 15, 1986

TO: Member Agencies & Board of Governors
CRC & Federation Executives
Interested Parties

FROM: Morris B. Abram, Chairman
Jerry Goodman, Executive Director

The Meeting in Reykjavik

As the developments in Reykjavik continue to be analyzed, some have already suggested that the cause of Soviet Jewish emigration received a setback because of the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach an arms control agreement. While we share the President's disappointment that no final accord on arms was reached that would have also permitted the issuance of a statement on human rights and Jewish emigration, one thing is clear: There can never be another summit at which human rights issues, including Jewish emigration, are not central.

In his briefing to the White House press on Sunday, October 12, Secretary of State George P. Shultz was asked if the issue of human rights got lost in the discussion on SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) at Reykjavik. He answered:

"The issue of human rights was brought up on a number of occasions and some very significant material was passed to the Soviet Union, which they accepted, that stated not only our views but in detail things about Jewish immigration, the numbers of people who have signified their desire to leave, lists of people and things of that kind. So all of that was covered. And in what might have been a statement coming out of the meeting dealing with this issue, the subject is explicitly referred to, and perhaps at some point there is a prospect of setting up some kind of systematic basis for discussing it. But of course that remains to be seen."

We are encouraged that, as a result of the Reagan Administration's determination to raise the issue in Iceland, some progress in the area of human rights and Jewish emigration appears to have been made. When a delegation from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry flew to Reykjavik (see attached details), we understood that the meeting between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was expected to be a "pre-summit" encounter, with little likelihood of any formal agreements.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did accept the Administration's proposal to discuss the easing of certain emigration restrictions. A basic hurdle was overcome when it was agreed to create a working group at Reykjavik to deal with humanitarian issues, including emigration and the reunion of families. Thus, Moscow has acknowledged that the issues are discussable, representing a shift away from prior policy which had insisted that they were not a matter for bilateral discourse. The Soviet Union has now recognized that there is proper jurisdiction at summit meetings, as well as in other bilateral encounters, to deal with human rights -- a position long held by the Administration.

- over -



For this achievement, we should express our gratitude to President Reagan and Secretary Shultz. Never have American leaders gone to a summit meeting so thoroughly briefed on the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union, especially emigration, and so determined to raise it. The President and the Secretary pledged publicly that human rights would be one of four major agenda items to be dealt with in Reykjavik, in addition to disarmament, regional issues, and bilateral questions. They fulfilled that pledge and apparently were on their way toward reaching an understanding with the Soviets.

That measure of success heartens us in the belief that, with the continued commitment of this administration, the continued support of the American people and the Congress, and the continued and unremitting effort by the American Jewish community, we shall overcome the violation of human rights on the part of the Soviet Union, and what the President called their "refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted."

A Mobilized Jewish Community

When a NCSJ delegation (Morris B. Abram, Jerry Goodman, Seymour D. Reich, Kenneth Bialkin, Michael Pelavin, and Malcolm Hoenlein) met with Secretary of State George P. Shultz on September 17, in preparation for a series of meetings with Foreign Minister Eduard Sheverdnadze, we intensified our effort to position the issue of Soviet Jewry for consideration at a summit, which we assumed would take place in the winter. The commitment of the administration to press the issue of human rights, specifically matters related to the Jewish minority -- notably emigration -- was vigorously reinforced by the Secretary. As part of the process we presented him with well prepared briefing materials and a basic position paper (copies of which have already been circulated).

As soon as the Iceland meeting was announced, we convened a special consultation for the next day. The reaction was marvelous. Among those who participated were our membership groups, especially the major coordinating agencies: the Conference of Presidents, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, the Council of Jewish Federations, the Synagogue Council of America, and the American Zionist Foundation; as well as the various specialized agencies, notably the United Jewish Appeal, the Coalition to Free Soviet Jews, the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, the Student Struggle for Soviet Jews (with the Center for East European and Russian Jewry), and the Wiesenthal Center. Other agencies indicated their commitment, after the meeting, in a series of telephone conversations and agreed to lend immediate support.

At that initial meeting, and the next day, we approved various proposals, and responsibilities were parcelled for immediate implementation.

1. We sent Gerry Strober to Iceland to check on logistics and media arrangements, and to remain throughout the meeting. He was then joined by Deborah Hart and NCSJ Associate Director, Myrna Shinbaum, who went on to facilitate the presence in Iceland of many relatives of refuseniks.

A press conference, convened by the NCSJ and the Conference of Presidents, with the Coalition to Free Soviet Jews and NJCRAC, was held on Friday morning, October 3. You may have seen some of the press reports, which announced our expectations and efforts for the Iceland meeting and beyond. Our plans for a projected major summit were also clarified, knowing that the President had reaffirmed support for such an encounter, and that Moscow had done the same.

2. Plans were set in motion to transport people to Iceland, with the realization that there is a limited regular flight schedule, and that most private planes were barred. The NCSJ, however, did charter a plane and was represented in Reykjavik (see attached

statement with list), with the cooperation of the government, which gave us special permission and helped us arrange our press conference. Joining us were several relatives of refuseniks, including Alex Goldfarb, Alexander Slepak, Elana Fridman (Ida Nudel's sister), Vladimir Magarik, Zeva Shtemler, and representatives from the Israeli "Mothers for Freedom" (Vanda Osnis and Faina Lemberg).

3. We were represented at a small meeting with the President, when he welcomed Yuri Orlov to the White House on October 7. This was an opportunity to raise the question of the inclusion of human rights issues in the talks at Reykjavik. While the President and his key advisors did not need any convincing, we thought it was important to keep reminding those who would be meeting the Soviet delegation.

4. An emergency leadership assembly was called for Wednesday, October 8, at the State Department. Nearly five hundred national and community leaders were briefed by Secretary of State George P. Shultz (see enclosed speech) who pledged to carry forth the Administration's commitments. He also referred, generously, to the NCSJ briefing materials given to him earlier, on September 17.

Others who joined with us later for a special session on Capitol Hill, chaired by Robert Loup, NCSJ Vice Chairman and Treasurer of the United Jewish Appeal were AFL/CIO President, Lane Kirkland, Rabbi Haskel Lookstein, the author of "Were We Our Brother's Keeper?", Ruth Daniloff, Rabbi Gilbert Klaperman, Vice President of the Synagogue Council of America, Leonid Slepak, and Rabbi Mark Staitman, who recently returned from the Soviet Union. NJCRAC Chairman, Michael Pelavin, and Jacqueline Levine, Chairperson for the projected Washington Mobilization, handled the session on community organization for the summit with great skill.

In a tremendous out-pouring of solidarity nearly 50 members of Congress joined with us. The speakers were Senators Bill Bradley (D-NJ), John C. Danforth (R-MO), Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ), and Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD), as well as Representatives William H. Gray (D-PA), Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Jack F. Kemp (R-NY), and Lynn Martin (R-IL).

5. With NJCRAC and the Coalition to Free Soviet Jews, an effort was launched to secure thousands of messages of support to the President, in the expectation that the Administration's commitment to human rights and the rescue of Soviet Jews would be pressed vigorously in all forthcoming meetings with Soviet officials. These were sent to the White House and the American Embassy in Finland. The messages were not meant to preclude the completion of the national petition campaign, whose target is "1,000,000 plus" by November 10th. That campaign must go forward, for the petition addresses itself to any future meetings between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev, as well as to fundamental issues affecting Soviet Jews.

In the days following the announcement of the Reykjavik meeting, the phones kept ringing in our New York and Washington offices. Our staff was under constant pressure to keep the larger process in motion, while answering individual calls from the press, our member agencies, local CRC's and Federations, members of Congress, and hopeful relatives of Jews still in the Soviet Union. Professional and lay leaders from our member agencies, as well as unaffiliated individuals, called and offered time, resources and money.

While it was an exhilarating and fatiguing week, we proved that we can cooperate, coordinate, and act for the common good. This lesson should be kept in mind as we move beyond the Iceland meeting for the continuing campaign for Soviet Jews.

We take this opportunity to wish you, your colleagues, and your families the best for the coming year.

12/1/86



The American Jewish Committee

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Bertram H. Gold

November 14, 1986

To: Marc Tanenbaum

From: Sidney Liskofsky

→ IN ROOM 300 B

I am pleased to invite you to a luncheon on Monday, December 1, 12:45 PM, with Dr. Angelo Ribeiro of Portugal, recently appointed UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance.

This position, conceived by Ambassador Richard Schifter, U.S. Representative to the UN Commission on Human Rights, was created last March by resolution of that body. It empowered the Commission's Chairman to appoint "an individual of recognized international standing," initially for one year, as Special Rapporteur with a mandate "to examine incidents and governmental actions in all parts of the world which are inconsistent with" the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, and "to recommend remedial measures including, as appropriate, the promotion of dialogue between religious communities and their governments." The Chairman's choice, made in consultation with the Commission's bureau (steering committee), was Dr. Ribeiro, the Portuguese government's ombudsman.

The texts of the Commission resolution, the 1981 Declaration and Dr. Ribeiro's bio are attached.

AJC joined recently in establishing a Committee on Religious Liberty for the specific purpose of bringing Dr. Ribeiro to the U.S. to meet with religious and other interested non-governmental organizations, to obtain their suggestions on issues to address, sources to consult and methods to apply in carrying out his assignment. He will be in this country December 1-12 for meetings in New York, Chicago and Washington, D.C. Our meeting on December 1 will be his second, following one with Freedom House.

Obviously, in the short time available at the luncheon, we can only touch on highlights of our concerns and activities in matters of religious intolerance. A main purpose of the luncheon should be to register AJC's identity in Dr. Ribeiro's awareness so as to facilitate subsequent contacts and input of our concerns and data, which are both particularist and universal.

Kindly let me know (extension 316) if you plan to attend the luncheon on December 1. I hope you can.

SL:tm



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

**Resolution on Religious Intolerance Adopted at the 42nd Session
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Geneva, 1986)**

The Commission on Human Rights,

Recalling the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, which was proclaimed without a vote by the General Assembly in its Resolution 36/35 of 25 November 1981,

Bearing in mind that the General Assembly has, most recently in Resolution 40/109 of 13 December 1985, repeatedly requested the Commission on Human Rights to continue its consideration of measures to implement the Declaration,

Seriously concerned by frequent, reliable reports from all parts of the world which reveal that, because of governmental actions, universal implementation of the Declaration has not yet been achieved,

Determined to promote full implementation of the existing guarantees under the relevant international instruments of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom of everyone to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice without fear of intolerance or discrimination,

Recognizing the value of constructive dialogue on the complex and serious questions of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, and that the problem of such intolerance and discrimination requires sensitivity in its resolution,

Recognizing the valuable nature of the study undertaken by Mrs. Odio Benito, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, on the root causes and current dimensions of the general problems of intolerance and of discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, including recommended educational and other specific measures to combat these problems,

Convinced also of the need to deal urgently with questions of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief by promoting implementation of the declaration.

1. Expresses its deep concern about reports of incidents and governmental actions in all parts of the world which are inconsistent with the provisions of the declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief,

2. Decides therefore to appoint for one year a Special Rapporteur to examine such incidents and actions and to recommend remedial measures including, as appropriate, the promotion of dialogue between religious communities and their governments,

3. Requests the Chairman of the Commission, after consultations within the bureau, to appoint an individual of recognized international standing as Special Rapporteur,

4. Decides further that the Special Rapporteur in carrying out his mandate shall seek credible and reliable information from governments, as well as specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and non-government organizations, including religious communities and groups of believers,

5. Requests the Secretary-General to appeal to all governments to cooperate with and assist the Special Rapporteur in the performance of his duties and to furnish all information requested,

6. Further requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Special Rapporteur,

7. Invites the Special Rapporteur, in carrying out his mandate, to bear in mind the need to be able to respond effectively to credible and reliable information that comes before him and to carry out his work with discretion and independence,
8. Requests the Special Rapporteur to submit a report to the Commission at its forty-third session on his activities regarding questions involving implementation of the declaration, including the occurrence and extent of incidents and actions inconsistent with the provisions of the declaration, together with his conclusions and recommendations,
9. Decides to consider this question again at its forty-third session under the agenda item "Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief."



**DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF INTOLERANCE AND
OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
RELIGION OR BELIEF**

(Excerpt from compilation of
documents published by the
United Nations).

**17. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief**

Proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on 25 November 1981 (resolution 36/55)

The General Assembly,

Considering that one of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations is that of the dignity and equality inherent in all human beings, and that all Member States have pledged themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization to promote and encourage universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights proclaim the principles of non-discrimination and equality before the law and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief,

Considering that the disregard and infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or whatever belief, have brought, directly or indirectly, wars and great suffering to mankind, especially where they serve as a means of foreign interference in the internal affairs of other States and amount to kindling hatred between peoples and nations,

Considering that religion or belief, for anyone who professes either, is one of the fundamental elements in his conception of life and that freedom of religion or belief should be fully respected and guaranteed,

Considering that it is essential to promote understanding, tolerance and respect in matters relating to freedom of religion and belief and to ensure that the use of religion or belief for ends inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, other relevant instruments of the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the present Declaration is inadmissible,

Convinced that freedom of religion and belief should also contribute to the attainment of the goals of world peace, social justice and friendship among peoples and to the elimination of ideologies or practices of colonialism and racial discrimination,

Noting with satisfaction the adoption of several, and the coming into force of some, conventions, under the aegis of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, for the elimination of various forms of discrimination,

Concerned by manifestations of intolerance and by the existence of discrimination in matters of religion or belief still in evidence in some areas of the world,

Resolved to adopt all necessary measures for the speedy elimination of such intolerance in all its forms and manifestations and to prevent and combat discrimination on the ground of religion or belief,

Proclaims this Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief:

Article 1

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to

have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.

2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

Article 2

1. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs.

2. For the purposes of the present Declaration, the expression "intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief" means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.

Article 3

Discrimination between human being on grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and shall be condemned as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and enunciated in detail in the International Covenants on Human Rights, and as an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations between nations.

Article 4

1. All States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life.

2. All States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination, and to take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in this matter.

Article 5

1. The parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the child have the right to organize the life within the family in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up.

2. Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in accordance with the wishes of his parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle.

3. The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief. He shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace and universal brotherhood, respect for freedom of religion or belief of others, and in full consciousness that his energy and talents should be devoted to the service of his fellow men.

4. In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal guardians, due account shall be taken of their expressed wishes or of any other proof of their wishes in the matter of religion or belief, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle.

5. Practices of a religion or beliefs in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or to his full development, taking into account article 1, paragraph 3, of the present Declaration.

Article 6

In accordance with article 1 of the present Declaration, and subject to the provisions of article 1, paragraph 3, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall include, *inter alia*, the following freedoms:

(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;

(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;

(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;

(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;

(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;

(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;

(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;

(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief;

(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.

Article 7

The rights and freedoms set forth in the present Declaration shall be accorded in national legislation in such a manner that everyone shall be able to avail himself of such rights and freedoms in practice.

Article 8

Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as restricting or derogating from any right defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights.

Angelo Vidal d'Almeida RIBEIRO

DATE OF BIRTH : 1921

PROFESSION : Member of Lisbon Bar since 1943

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES: Held many positions in Portuguese Law Association of which he was Chairman for three years (1972-1974);

In 1974, member of Commission which drew up electoral law for Portugal's initial elections after return to democracy;

Now holds the position of Ombudsman for Portugal, to which he was elected by the Portuguese Parliament; assisting citizens in redressing violations of bureaucratic regulations, laws and human rights;

HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITIES: President of Portuguese Chapter of International Commission of Jurists;

Chairman of Portuguese delegation to United Nations Human Rights Commission, 1978-1981;

Chairman of Portuguese League of Human Rights, 1976-1977;

Representative of Portuguese Ministry of Justice at International Congress on the Teaching of Human Rights, in Vienna, 1978.

Conference Possibilities
for discussion with
the Institut Fuer Ostrecht

I. Religion in Eastern Europe

A conference on the foundations of, and recent developments in, Soviet bloc policy toward religion. Analysis and comparison of condition of major religious groups, in light projected Papal visits to Poland, and possibly the U.S.S.R., in 1988. Focus could be on countries with significant Jewish populations -- USSR, Hungary, Romania, and also Poland.

II. Religion in the USSR

Against the backdrop of the 1000th anniversary of the arrival of Christianity in Russia (1988) and possible Papal visit to the USSR, the conference would focus on Soviet policy toward religious groups, the responses of these groups (official religion and unofficial), and assess the significance of legal and doctrinal shifts in the Gorbachev era.

III. Religion and East-West Relations

Little attention has been paid to the official and unofficial contacts between religious groups in East and West. This conference

would outline these and study how they might be used to enhance the situation of religious believers in the USSR. Among the relationships that could be surveyed: international ties of the Russian Orthodox Church; World Council of Churches; Baptist Church ties; Jewish Rabbinic ties; non-official Christian and Jewish relations, Western religious broadcasts, Vatican-Kremlin ties.

IV. Western Broadcasting to the USSR

A number of Western countries, including the US, FRG, Britain, Canada, France, Sweden, Israel broadcast regularly to the USSR. American broadcasts have attracted public and congressional attention over the past two decades in light of alleged anti-Semitic and anti-democratic broadcasts by the Munich-based Radio Liberty. A conference could analyze the extent and nature of the broadcasts; what messages they are conveying to the Soviet population; and what their cultural, religious, human rights content is.

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