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TERRORISM AS STRATEGY AND ECSTASY

by

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Through most of 1972, front-page headlines reported acts of terrorism in the Near East, Ireland, Vietnam, Cambodia, Latin America, Munich, and in commercial aircraft flying in all parts of the world. Terrorism of the variety that commanded attention in the headlines has since receded in favor of Watergate, but, for reasons that will be developed in this essay, it will likely reappear.

Terrorism is of two kinds: the regime of terror and the siege of terror. The first refers to terrorism as the instrument of an established order, the second, to revolutionary movements that are bent on overthrowing a dominant regime. Undoubtedly the former is more important. Camus once observed that most of the crimes of the twentieth century have been committed in the name of the state. But revolutionary terrorism, derivative and reflexive though it may be, exposes a level of perception into the universe of killing and being killed that may be even more revealing than state terrorism - just as the burdens of the sick man may sometimes be more acutely perceived through his symptoms than through the disease.

The Process of Terror

This essay on terrorism as strategy and ecstasy will concentrate primarily on instances of revolutionary terrorism, but first some distinctions are required that have been drawn chiefly from a study of terrorist regimes. Eugene V. Walter, in his study of terrorism in primitive African communities, argues that the process of terror includes three elements: (1) the act or acts of violence, performed by those set apart to carry out the purposes of the rulers (in one African society, those set apart were called the "king's knives"); (2) the emotional reaction of extreme fear on the part of the victims or potential victims; and (3) the intended political consequences that are to follow upon this resort to violence and the fear it stimulates. Thus the process of terror includes source, victim, and social consequence. By insisting on the term "process of terror," Walter underscores a certain global dimension to all terrorism, properly so called, within a society. He would exclude cases of restricted violence directed against a clearly defined group of present or former power holders within a society. A system of terror is not merely a society that happens to have episodes of terrorism within it. This would constitute merely a limited zone of terror. A terrorist regime, in the nature of the case, operates in such a way as to establish its hold on the whole of a society. Observes Roland Gaucher:

The goal of terrorism is not to kill or to destroy property but to break the spirit of the opposition. A minister is assassinated; his successor takes warning. A policeman is killed; ten others tremble. High tension lines are sabotaged; the news sweeps the country. Terrorism seeks above all to create a sensation - within the ranks of the enemy, in public opinion and abroad.

Walter does not examine what might be designated the fourth element in terrorist activity, insofar as it is reducible to political categories - its justifying cause. In the case of the terrorist regime, authorities usually appeal to the threat of anarchy; in the case of revolutionary terrorism, the movement justifies itself as a protest against tyranny. If, as Plotinus says, "Terror in the compound is the dread of dissolution," terrorist activity on the part of those who would besiege the compound is outrage over injustice.

Walter acknowledges that his own efforts at definition and discussion are directed to traditional societies and not to the modern totalitarian regime or revolutionary movement. But there are similarities. First, the reference to the agents of terror as the "king's knives" expresses vividly the link between terrorism and technology. Power of life and death over others depends upon instruments of violence, and those who directly wield these instruments themselves take on an instrumental character. Thus the development of modern technology makes possible the enlargement and intensification of the terrorist regime. The king's knives become the president's B-52 bombers or the armored divisions of the Nazi or Communist state. The technology of modern information systems, moreover, further increases the possibility of rule by terror. As Gerasimov observed, "For the political police a name is very important: it allows them to find their man. Everything is in a name, or nearly everything."

Technology has similarly increased the possibility of terrorist activity on the

part of the individual or the revolutionary minority. The dynamics of the situation is more subtle than the increased availability of destructive weapons - from letter bombs to heat-seeking rockets that a terrorist can carry on his back. Technology has accelerated the whole process of differentiation and specialization of function in our society which, in turn, has rendered modern society increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack from the wrecker. The airplane at the mercy of the hijacker is a dazzling symbol of an incredibly differentiated, accomplished, but nervous, high-strung, and fragile civilization.

Simone Weil did not have the particular threat of terrorism in mind when, in her essay of thirty years ago, *The Need for Roots*, she urged a more decentralized, organic, and cellular society for France in the postwar world. She felt that a France composed of local, somewhat self-contained cells would offer not only a better quality of life for the French people but a better chance of survival in any subsequent war against a totalitarian state. Whether or not the latter is true, such a society would seem better protected against revolutionary or psychotic terrorist activity than our own highly specialized culture.

Second, the victim of terror. The terrorist needs a special social environment to bring about the response of extreme fear. In the terrorist regime, fear is extreme; it spills out into religious horror because of an absolute disproportion between the power of the victimizer and that of the victim. To accomplish this discrepancy, the terrorist regime must become a closed social space in which the victim feels isolated. He must be without intermediate powers, without allies that stand between him and his potential executioners. He must feel trapped in a compound. If he is not already a prisoner, the society itself must become for him a prison.

Nineteenth-century novels achieved this sense of absolute discrepancy between the power of the victimizer and the victim in the gothic horror story by the device of isolating the victim in a castle. The contemporary equivalent of the castle is the political prison, which itself becomes the symbol of the totalitarian society at large. It conveys a sense of isolation and total discrepancy between the power of the victimizer and the final resourcelessness of the victim. Hence Koestler's choice of the prison as central image for the closed, totalitarian, and terrorist regime in *Darkness at Noon*.

The revolutionary terrorist achieves a total discrepancy between agent and victim in two ways, one of which mimics the gothic device. In the first case, he isolates his victim from the society at large, but in an enclosure ridiculously fragile rather than impenetrable - not the castle but the embassy in Khartoum or the modern airplane. He holds the upper hand, but in a poignantly transient way. The society has ample resources to storm his chosen fortress but not rapidly enough to prevent him from first killing his hostages. Thus his efficacy as a terrorist depends upon his readiness to kill and his equal readiness to die.

The physical courage (or the recklessness) of the revolutionary terrorist is in marked contrast to the notorious terrorists of the Nazi regime. Albert Speer points out that Herman Goering took great care to locate bomb shelters all along the route from his hunting lodge to his headquarters in Berlin. Apparently it was a source of personal relief to some Nazi leaders, Hitler included, to discover, after careful examination, that a shelter destroyed by an Allied bomb had roof, walls, and supports less substantial than their own retreats.

Since revolutionary capacity for violence is usually inferior to the power of the mobilized regime, a second strategy is required for getting the upper hand over chosen victims - the element of surprise. The terrorist appears out of nowhere, hits, and runs. In this respect, the terrorist is like death itself. As Edgar Herzog has pointed out in *Psyche and Death*, two primitive symbols for death were birds and horses, because they appear suddenly and are gone as rapidly - from nowhere into nowhere. Even though few in number, terrorists thus achieve the impression of ubiquity. (The two conditions for achieving this element of surprise are mobility and secrecy. Thus the Cuban guerrilla movement in the Sierra Maestra insisted on autonomy in relationship to the sedentary Communist Party based in Havana. Only in this way could they protect the movement from betrayal to the Batista regime. While terrorists and guerrilla movements are not synonymous - the Cubans, for example, repudiated terrorists who refused to be selective in their targets - they share in common the tactical need for surprise.)

The third element in the definition of terrorism raises directly the question of

political strategy. This is the question of intended consequence. What place does the terrorist act have in the whole arena of means and ends? What is its political utility? What does one hope to accomplish by a so-called propaganda of deed? Persuade the power holders? Persuade the victims to give allegiance to a new leadership? Make life intolerable for the society at large so that it will be forced to attend to a grievance that a minority finds intolerable?

The liberal has always tended to interpret terrorist regimes and movements solely as types of political strategy and found them wanting. The strategic element is present in Walter's formula: A commits certain acts of violence that terrify B for the sake of social consequence C. Nixon uses B-52s against Hanoi and Haiphong to bring the Hanoi leadership back to the conference table. The I.R.A. Provisionals engage in terrorist activity that will eventually discourage British public opinion, force the army to withdraw, and permit the Republic of Ireland to annex the North. The liberal is inclined to view such strategy, whether on the part of rulers or revolutionaries, as counter-productive and self-destructive - hence, irrational. Liberals have observed, for example, that a reign of terror depends upon a certain degree of cooperation within its society that makes the enforcement of terror possible - whether based on bonds of blood, friendship, interest, or ideology. But eventually, as in the notorious case of Nazism, the reign of terror destroys those very ties upon which it depends. Suspicion, betrayal, rumormongering, intrigue, and the disputations of ideologies, eventually threaten the system with its opposite: anarchy. In its later stage of deterioration, the pervasive fear of prison and death, which formerly galvanized the whole into a society of sorts, now becomes grounds for its abandonment.

This scenario is certainly an accurate account of what happened in the last years of the Hitler regime if Albert Speer's report can be credited, but it would be well to remember that this deterioration of Nazism from within was accompanied by a massive assault from without. It is unclear whether Hitler's regime of terror would have destroyed those social bonds upon which it depended without external intervention.

The liberal is similarly inclined to see a self-defeating element in terrorist movements from the revolutionary left. When the militant left hits the police station expecting to discredit the established regime, only too often the revolutionaries arouse the lumpen proletariat to ally itself with the police against the movement. The end result is counterproductive of original political intent. The excesses of the I.R.A. Provisionals prompt the Republic of Ireland and the Roman Catholic Church to repudiate the movement. Meanwhile, the ultras among the Protestants in their own terrorist activities nudge the pendulum in the opposite direction as the sympathies of the Church and Republic are forced to move closer to the Catholic dissidents in the North.

Arnold Toynbee makes the same argument with respect to terrorist activity on the part of the Palestinian Arab. Obviously Toynbee's general sympathies lie with the Palestinian cause, but he is vehemently critical of Arab tactics.

..... in the psychological battle for winning public sympathy, terrorism is manifestly counter-productive In murdering Israelis (and non-Israeli third parties at the Lod Airport), the Palestinian Arab guerrillas are doing their worst for the Palestinian Arab people. They are making the world forget that the non-criminal majority of the Palestinians have been grievously wronged. Yet this patent counter-productivity of terrorism does not deter terrorists from continuing on their criminal course.

Toynbee's bafflement suggests that the phenomenon at hand cannot be fully understood within the limits of political calculation and discourse alone. This is the argument of the remainder of this essay as we turn from terrorism as strategy to terrorism as ecstasy. But before exploring the meaning of the latter, we should consider a final way of interpreting the strategic element in revolutionary terrorism. Hannah Arendt remarks on this strategy in her essay *On Violence*. She quotes William O'Brien, the nineteenth-century Irish agrarian and nationalist agitator, "Sometimes violence is the only way of ensuring a hearing for moderation," and then goes on to observe herself: "To ask the impossible in order to obtain the possible is not always counter-productive." But Arendt places strict limits on the rationality of such action: "Violence, being instrumental by nature, is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it. And since when we act we never know with any certainty the eventual consequences of what we are doing, violence can remain rational only if it pursues short-term goals." But this is precisely what vanishes when, in Toynbee's despairing words, "terrorism becomes an end in itself." As Bogside Catholic M.P. John

Hume put it: "The Provos bombed themselves to the conference table, and then they bombed themselves away again."

This irrational element in terrorism obtrudes most eloquently in a recent passage in the New Yorker:

The connection between revolutionary acts and the particular revolutions they are meant to advance is often so tenuous that the act affords no clue to the identity of the revolutionary groups or the nature of its cause. For instance, a while back a bomb went off at the New School for Social Research here, yet the people at the New School were simply at a loss to know who their foe had been. Had it been anti-Castro Cubans? Or pro-Castro Cubans? Had it been Puerto Rican nationalists? Or a group opposing the war? Or a group favoring the war? In instances like this, the survivors of the attack must wait for the scrawled note in the mail letting them know who is claiming "credit" for the bloodshed. And even then they are sometimes left in the dark, for a number of groups may vie in claiming credit for crimes they did not commit.

Terrorist activity disintegrates into what Arendt calls the irrational when the connections between means and end, agent, victim, and intended social consequence have so attenuated that the terrorist action juts out as absurd. It becomes a politically impenetrable end-in-itself. After giving the strategic element its due, can we press any further into the phenomenon that allows another factor to come into view? With this question in mind, we turn from terrorism as strategy to terrorism as ecstasy.

ARCHIVES The Terrorist Regime

Studies of totalitarianism have noted that the Nazis carried out a policy of genocide against the Jews even in the later stages of the war when both materials and personnel were in desperately short supply for prosecuting the war against the Allies. The Nazi leaders, in effect, made decisions against their own best interests and against their own survival while carrying out the ghastly scenario of the final solution. Terroristic action seemed to become an end in itself - with a momentum of its own. It stood outside the ordinary arena of political means and ends. This is but an extreme instance of what we might call an ecstatic, frenzied, terroristic overkill.

One ought to give a more precise meaning to the term "ecstasy" in all that follows than the terms "frenzy," "irrationality," or "exhilaration" connote. The ecstatic may include all these elements, but it literally means "to stand outside oneself," that is, to stand outside the limits of ordinary consciousness or to stand free of the restraints and limits of everyday behavior. Terrorism - whether of the established regime or the revolutionary left - is characterized by this ecstatic element. Frenzy, outrage, exhilaration, or the sense of being "beside oneself" are but occasional, emotional coefficients of such ecstasy.

In his careful study of Northern Ireland, *Governing Without Consensus*, Richard Rose identifies a type of person who fits the ecstatic, I have in mind; in this case, the Protestant ultra, who supports the government but reacts to the Catholic so vehemently that he refuses to obey the laws of his own country.

The individual who favours the regime but refuses compliance is very formidable. This person is an Ultra, an individual who supports a particular definition of the existing regime so strongly that he is willing to break laws, or even take up arms, to recall it to its "true" way. In Southern Rhodesia, for example, the Ultras have maintained their regime since 1965 in defiance of orders from Her Majesty's Government in London, nominally sovereign there. Similarly, during the war in Algeria in the 1950's, an Ultra view led French settlers to take up arms against the Fourth Republic.

The temptation in such cases is to react to perceived threats to the society with a kind of frenzied overkill. An official inquiry into one early incident in Northern Ireland reports, "The police broke ranks and used their batons indiscriminately and with 'needless violence.'" It is almost as though one were reading an account of the Chicago police riots in 1968 or the shooting of black and white students in the course of campus protests in this country. An emotional pitch is reached at which officials or self-appointed defenders of a society spill out beyond the ordinary restraints of the society no matter what the consequences.

This tendency to overkill is religiously expressed in the Babylonian creation myth, which accounts for the origins of the world through the pitched battle between Marduk - symbol of law and order - and Tiamat - female monster figure, the symbol of chaos. It is significant that Marduk, the cosmic sheriff, has a taste for violence. He not only slays but dismembers Tiamat; he is given to fevered excess: "there lie hidden in the dark depths of his soul both violence and wildness."

This myth reflects cosmologically a political fact. In the face of crisis a society is willing to tolerate a certain element of lawlessness in its law enforcers. Its agents are permitted to exceed the bounds of the lawful in the name of the law, to proceed without limits against those who exceed the limits. We call it "taking off the gloves." When law and order are at stake, a society permits its defenders a certain frenzy and ecstasy in protecting the compound of the law. The "king's knives" stand outside the law while making a stand for the law. Their antinomianism demonstrates the fervor of their nomianism. Thus the contest between Marduk and Tiamat is not a perfectly pure conflict between opposites. Though the struggle seems at first glance to be a clear-cut contest between rival symbols - law and order vs. chaos, the Chicago police vs. the dishevelled invaders - eventually the dragon's tail shows beneath the policeman's uniform.

What I have called the ecstatic element in the terroristic regime is institutionally recognized in traditional societies. In listing the conditions that support terroristic regimes in traditional Africa, Walter cites the separation of the agents of violence and their victims from ordinary social life.

In terroristic states, the agents of violence are structurally detached, often living apart and usually organized as independent social units - armies, corps of executioners, alien mercenaries, special police, etc. In the Nazi state, the SS and the Gestapo were organized as specialists in terror, even dissociated structurally from other staffs of violence such as the army and the police.

Special uniforms, masks, sun glasses in Haiti, white robes and hoods for the Ku Klux Klan - all these devices emphasize the distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary, the profane and the sacred, the everyday world and the consecrated activities of those who, in defence of a way of life, justify and apotheosize a dreadful violence.

Revolutionary Terror

The most arresting of Malraux's novels, *Man's Fate*, opens with the isolation of a young revolutionary before death. Ch'en has been sent on a mission to get papers from a man that will permit him and his colleague to board a gunboat in the harbor and seize several hundred guns desperately needed to launch an assault on the police stations of Shanghai. But Ch'en cannot simply steal the papers. If the man subsequently discovered them missing, he would report the loss and Ch'en and his colleagues would be ambushed, the cause would founder. Thus, at the level of strategy, clearly the man has to be murdered. Ch'en enters the room of the sleeping man, transfixed for a moment before his victim.

Should he try to raise the mosquito-netting? Or should he strike through it? Ch'en was torn by anguish: he was sure of himself, yet at the moment he could feel nothing but bewilderment - his eyes riveted to the mass of white gauze that hung from the ceiling over a body less visible than a shadow, and from which emerged only that foot half-turned in sleep, yet living-human flesh.

Ch'en is about to murder the man for the sake of the party. His mission is only one incident in the succession of public events that will contribute to the success of the revolution and liberate the masses of Shanghai. Like Agamemnon, he is a soldier who can rationalize his killing as it serves the common good. His deed would take its place within the political world of means and ends.

The insurrection which would give Shanghai over to the revolutionary troops was imminent. Yet the insurrectionists did not possess two hundred guns. Their first act was to be the disarming of the police for the purpose of arming their own troops. But if they obtained the guns (almost three hundred) which this go-between, the dead man, had negotiated to sell to the government, they doubled their chances of

success. In the last ten minutes, however, Ch'en had not even given it a thought.

Ch'en is unable to keep his mind on the train of military and political events that would be set in motion by the deed because he is transfixed in silence before death itself. The very setting of the murder is like a sanctuary. The silence of the bedroom is in sharp contrast to the street noises in the profane world nearby - "there were still traffic jams out there in the world of men." The sacred precinct of the bed where the sleeping man lies is set apart from the rest of the room by a veil of mosquito netting. Ch'en feels a terrible alteration in his own being demanded by the privacy of this moment before death as compared with his alleged service to public cause. He "was becoming aware with a revulsion verging on nausea that he stood here, not as a fighter, but as a sacrificial priest. He was serving the gods of his choice; but beneath his sacrifice to the Revolution lay a world of depths beside which this night of crushing anguish was bright as day."

He lifts his arm with knife in hand and tears down through the veil "with a blow that would have split a plank" and he feels "the body rebound towards him, flung up by the springs of the bed A current of unbearable anguish passed between the corpse and himself, through the dagger, his stiffened arm, his aching shoulder, to the very depth of his chest, to his convulsive heart - the only moving thing in the room." After it is over, in the solitude and silence of the room, Ch'en sinks into the experience. "It was not fear - it was a dread at once horrible and solemn, which he had not experienced since childhood: he was alone with death, alone in a place without men, limply crushed by horror and by the taste of blood."

Ch'en's experience converts him from revolutionary to terrorist. It establishes in him a distinction between the inner and the outer, silence and speech, the order of being and the public order of doing, the sacred and the profane. He makes his way out of the room "to return among men." He shows his passport to an inspector, and with the surprise of a man who has just had sexual intercourse for the first time, he observes to himself, "What I have just done obviously doesn't show." As Ch'en reports back to a meeting of the revolutionary group, he recognizes that "he could give these men the information they wanted, but he could never convey to them what he felt . . . Words would do nothing but disturb the familiarity with death which had established itself in his being." Isolation and silence dominates Ch'en's encounter with death, an encounter later consummated in his own ecstatic-destructive-futile end. Eventually he dies by strapping a bomb to his belly and hurling himself under a truck carrying a general. The action no longer serves an end beyond itself. It is a case of "nearer my God to thee."

This transfiguring encounter with death is not just the work of the artist's imagination. It reappears in the literature about the terrorists. The Algerian F.L.N. (in its paper *El Mondjahid*, August 20, 1957) observes, "As soon as the terrorist accepts a mission, death enters his soul. Henceforth he has a rendezvous with death." In "The Catechism of the Revolutionist," variously attributed to Nechaev and Bakunin, the phrase "The revolutionist is a doomed man" is a repeated litany. "He must be ready to die at any moment."

The Malraux episode also reminds us of the customary association of the word "ecstasy" with a state of exhilaration. The encounter with violence jolts life above the routine of the everyday. The brush with death relieves men of that other death - boredom. Rubashov, in Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, reports "a slight feeling of drunkenness . . . that peculiar state of excitement familiar to him from former experiences of the nearness of death." The adrenalin flows as the man in danger summons up extraordinary levels of energy to meet the ultimate challenge. Especially among the early Russian terrorists, one finds a kind of aristocracy of courage.

Malraux emphasizes the isolation of the initiate from his friends in the revolutionary cause. But usually the extremists develop their own sense of fraternity. The Russian anarchists, argues Arendt, "had much to say about the importance of violence as a factor of unity as the binding force in a society or group." With this achievement of solidarity in mind, Fanon justifies a militant Manichaean dualism on the part of the Algerian in his struggle against the European settler. A kind of Cartesian formula takes hold: We fight, therefore we are. We make others fear us, to free ourselves from fear. If we did not inspire fear in the white man, as he has inspired fear in us, then we should not in our own right become a human presence, a human community. Sartre's preface to Fanon's work links implicitly ecstasy, manhood, and fraternity. "It is through 'mad fury' that the wretched of the earth 'can' become men." Otherwise, they

are reduced by the white man to a part of the natural landscape, alongside camels, palm trees, the desert wind, sand, and sun.

But, of course, the terrorist vanguard faces almost immediately a threat to its fraternity in the form of infiltration by the secret police. Ecstasy therefore requires and means also secrecy: double identity, a split, between one's name and function in the public realm and in the underground.

The terrorist stands outside family, profession, and class, outside the familiar universe of his relationships. He lives perpetually on the alert, hunter and hunted, haunted by the vision of death; his own and that of the enemy. Under the rigorous precautions of underground life, his only society is that of his brothers in arms. These ties are very strong, but they are limited to a handful of men who are bound together by danger and secrecy.

Indeed, "the group, for the sake of its own safety may require that each individual perform an irrevocable action in order to burn his bridges to respectable society before he is admitted into the community of violence."

This sharp contradiction between ordinary and extraordinary identity is more than a tactical response to the fear of infiltration. It is a terrifying expression of what the religious man has traditionally meant by radical conversion. The sacred cannot be viewed as a mere "additive" in relationship to one's ordinary identity and commitments. Incorporation into the sacred means detachment from all else. Thus Nechaev writes:

In the very depth of his being, not merely in word but in deed, he (the revolutionist-terrorist) has broken every connection with the social order and with the whole educated world, with all the laws, appearances and generally accepted conventions and moralities of that world which he considers his ruthless foe.

The Metaphysics of Terrorism

Here there are two possibilities: one type of terrorist makes appeal to a higher justice that governs all things; the other is nihilistic. The first, as I suggested at the outset of this essay, is convinced that there is an order, a *nomos*, a justice that overarches all other powers. This order has been offended by the ruling society. Life for the minority is intolerable, injustice must not go unavenged. This metaphysics can produce in turn two possible ethics. One is the ethics of restraint that Camus so admired in the Russian revolutionaries of 1905 - Kaliaev and his friends. In his play *Les Justes*, he called them the fastidious assassins. Kaliaev was willing to avenge injustice by assassinating a duke, but he refused to go through with the act on the day in which the duke had a child in his carriage. Thus the justice in the name of which he fights establishes restraints on his own behavior. Otherwise the moral statement he wishes to make about the killing of the innocent is obscured.

The second ethic based on justice, however, escalates violence. The perceived injustice puts one literally beside oneself with rage. In a state of outrage, one moves quickly from selective terrorism to the justification of indiscriminate and random violence so that the whole world might attend to injustice done.

There is a second, even darker, metaphysics associated with those terrorists who are nihilists. It leads directly to an ethic and practice of pan-destruction. Nechaev said that the revolutionist

knows only one science, the science of destruction. For this and only this purpose he makes a study of mechanics, physics, chemistry, and possibly medicine. For this purpose he studies day and night the living science of human beings, their characters, situations, and all the conditions of the present social system in its various strata. The object is but one - the quickest possible destruction of that ignoble system.

Such men may envisage, in the long run, the upbuilding of human life, but the world in which they live surely is one in which, metaphysically, "Strife is the father of all things."

The best literary expression of this metaphysics of conflagration and strife is offered in *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion*, a novel by Mishima, the Japanese Dostoevsky who recently committed suicide. The novel is about a young Buddhist acolyte and his obsession with the temple he serves. The building stands for the whole realm of outer forms - those made by men and the gods - seemingly obdurate, impassible, and indifferent to the pitiful impotence of the acolyte himself.

Mishima uses a beautiful image to convey the divorce between the private and the public, the inner and the outer, which the acolyte feels. He is a stutterer. Other men pass easily, effortlessly through the doorway of speech between the inner world and the outer, but every time the hero of the story attempts to pass through the door, he turns the key only to discover rust in the lock.

The boy has a love-hate relation to the beautiful temple. He resents it and yet he is drawn to its cold beauty. Eventually he sets fire to it, in an ecstasy of destruction. The novelist remarks that the young acolyte does not think of himself as starting a fire; rather, he releases those fires that are already latent in the universe. Just so the terrorist believes that he does not introduce violence into the world, he only releases the violence latent in all things. Beneath the precipitate forms of earth, water, and air, the apocalyptic fires are banked. Strife is the father of all things.

The same vision controls the remarkable detective story by Dashiell Hammett, *The Red Harvest*, which is located in a small western city. For Hammett, the town is paradigm for the capitalist system, composed as it is of bankers, newspapermen, whores, gangsters, barkeepers, corrupt police, and gamblers, for whom everything turns on the dollar. The hero of the story almost single-handedly brings the structure down, not because he himself introduces violence into the town, but because he releases the violence latent throughout the system. Thereby he achieves an apocalyptic harvest of blood.

Now strategy reintroduces itself at a deeper level. A first-level terrorist says: Go for the police station, sharpen the contradictions, because the police will club indiscriminately in retaliation and thus they will radicalize the uncommitted masses. But if the masses are likely to support the police, then go after the department store, the bar, the picnic grounds, because there you blow up the universe of ordinary men. At this point, selective terrorism goes random.

Through the good offices of the mass media, the society at large reinforces its apprehension that initiative and leverage belong to the terrorist. Even though individual episodes of terrorism seem quantitatively small as compared with the mass of prosaic events that make up the daily round, the prominence of violence and terrorism in the media does not permit one to reduce them to marginal phenomena limited to some restricted zone. They seem global and potentially pervasive.

I would disagree, however, with those critics of the media who charge their managers with a special bias on behalf of violence, as though they foist it on an unwilling public. As Joseph Reingold has argued in *The Mother, Anxiety and Death*, a preoccupation with catastrophic death is powerful in us all. In a profound sense, the media do give us what we want - the explosive headline: mercury poison here, a heart attack there, a highway accident one column up, muggings on page three, and floods in Rapid City the week before. The powers that we attend to in our papers are destructive - and disconcertingly random and indiscriminate. The terrorist is merely another ally or symptom of those forces that erupt and disrupt the precarious routines of the everyday world.

This is why terrorism tends to move from selective and discriminate action to random attack. Whatever moral disgust the latter may arouse, undoubtedly the practice of indiscriminate attack associates such a terrorist with those powers that already beset the psyche and command the headlines. The terrorist seems in alliance with the universe itself.

Does Terrorism Have a Future?

So far in this essay an attempt has been made to understand the phenomenon of terrorism in both its political and religious dimensions. The practical question still remains as to whether terrorism is a transient phenomenon or likely to persist. No attempt will be made in closing to respond to that question with predictions about the future of terrorism in specific locales - the Near East, Ireland, Indochina, Latin

America, or the inner cities of America. But two closing comments are in order - one political, the other religious - about the conditions under which terrorism flourishes and may be expected to continue to flourish.

First, the political problem. An aggrieved political minority has an acute sense of being a public nonentity. Whatever political space exists in the society does not appear to be a space into which it can enter, except perhaps through the media. It is not likely, therefore, that terrorism as a compensation for felt political deprivation will pass away. The conditions of life in the modern world are such as to shrink the public domain and grant the vast majority of people a purely private life. When life is generally privatized, the society at large is increasingly vulnerable to a politics based on resentment alone.

Technology makes a final contribution to all this. Although technology offers many positive services in meeting human needs, it also seems to have the negative coefficient of shrinking the public realm in which conflicts between competing groups might be resolved - or, if not resolved, at least honorably faced. So Hannah Arendt argues in her essay *On Violence*. Professor Arendt defines political power as the ability to act in concert with others. Such power presupposes public space, time, and institutions in the context of which people are free to exercise this power - free to debate, refute, compromise, and realign with one another in the pursuit of common goals.

Technology and its accompanying social form, the bureaucracy, have been oriented to the service of private needs, precisely that sphere where people do not act together with others. As life for most people is increasingly privatized, what is left of politics only too often transmutes into entertainment for private consumption over TV. An aggrieved minority feels that it has no real access to the public domain for redress of a perceived injustice.

Under these circumstances, political disputation, debate, deliberation, and decision within the context of constitutional processes or international agencies are replaced by an atmosphere of pressures, forces, and resentments that weigh heavily on everyone, leaders included. An emotional threshold is crossed. Violence does not seem to be a remote possibility, unthinkable before other strategies have been exhausted, but the only way in which one can burst into the public domain. As A. W. Lintott observes in his study of violence in republican Rome, violence emerges as a strategic act because people have, or feel they have, no other recourse.

A religious comment. When the liberal argues that terrorist activity is counter-productive, self-destructive, and irrational, he is really arguing that it has become an end in itself. It stands outside the ordinary utilitarian world of means and ends.

Formally considered, the concept of an action which is an end in itself puts us rather close to the religious meaning of celebration. As Josef Pieper has pointed out, "To celebrate a festival means to do something which is in no way tied up to other goals; (it) has been removed from all 'so that' and 'in order to.' True festivity cannot be imagined as residing anywhere but in the realm of activity that is meaningful in itself. One does not have to look beyond it for its justification.

In the case of terrorism, of course, we are talking about a festival of death, a celebration that has its own priest and victims and that carries with it the likely risk that the priest himself will become a victim. The rest of us become concelebrants in this liturgical action through the medium of the media. Thus the media respond to the human thirst for celebration, the need for ecstasy, the desire to be lifted out of the daily round. Through violent death, their horror before it and their need to draw near it, men are momentarily relieved of that other death which is boredom.

But the media are not able wholly to quench the human thirst for festival. They must serve up endlessly a supply of violent happenings - whether fictional or real - because, in fact, such liturgical action fails to offer a truly terminal satisfaction. It pre-occupies without satisfying. It fails to meet the deeper human need for celebration - a thirst for festival that is truly nourishing, recreational, and productive of community. Indeed, as the Malraux story tells us and Heidegger reminds us, the encounter with death, a horror before death, a rapture with death, is inherently isolating. There is something symbolic about concelebrants who are served up their daily dose of death and violence at a distance from one another through the medium of TV.

The phenomenon of terrorism, then, blurts out the fact that both our political

and ritual lives have become cramped, isolating, and impoverished. Perhaps terrorism also indicates at a deeper level that there is a connection between the two - a defective ritual life and defective political institutions.

What is it that brings men together into human community? The social contract theorists argued, in effect, fear - the need to secure life and property. But does the need to protect private good from external threat and terror suffice to create public space and to fund a commonwealth? Does it, moreover, adequately provide for restraints on the exercise of state power? There is another, more ancient theory of the state, which argues that the commonwealth, with all the painful imperfection of its distribution of goods, must have as its nourishing center not merely the negative experience of threat but the positive experience of a communal good which is not diminished for being shared. The vulgar reflection of this experience of shared good was the festival at which there was food in abundance for everybody: crooks, cripples, tarts, gamblers, bankers, and the rest. This celebrative experience of a superabundance by which community is enlivened seemed required to provide a public order that is not cramped and crooked and private quarters that are not simply dark corners where resentment is bred.

Communities so founded in the past produced their own share of injustice, deprivation, and terror. It would be unwarranted to close this essay with an expression of nostalgia for any society in the human past. But at least two conclusions seem justified with respect to the modern state and the threat of terrorism. First, violence and terrorism may not be quite so counterproductive as they appear. They may succeed in bringing down the modern state insofar as it is built on the fear of death. The terrorist has special leverage against a state founded on a negativity alone. Second, terrorism, with its inherently isolating experience of ecstasy, will not be able to found and fund those spacious, humane, and habitable institutions which civilized life requires. Terroristic action, in and of itself, will not be able to make terrorism disappear. The deeds of the terrorist may inspire awe but they fail to establish that sociality on which institutional life depends. We may need a different kind of experience of ecstasy for that.



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
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THE MEANING OF TERRORISM FOR WORLD ORDER



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This paper's purpose is to examine the implications of recent terrorism against the state for theories of international relations. The history of insurgent terrorism of the past fifteen years is familiar. It is distinguished by the seizure of hostages in order to bargain with governments, attacks on diplomats, and violence against civilians having no responsibility for the conditions terrorists oppose, combined with familiar methods of assassination and bombing directed against symbolic and prominent targets. While the violence of terrorism has grown more atrocious and shocking, it has become commonplace on a global scale. The United States, although not affected by significant domestic terrorism, is the most frequent target of terrorism occurring against its citizens outside of its borders, another strong trend in recent terrorism. Transnational terrorism has increased in a cyclical pattern from 123 incidents in 1968 to 480 in 1972, with 340 in 1977. The number of deaths resulting from incidents increased from 34 in 1968 to 409 in 1976, with 277 in 1977. A total of 177 nations were affected in the 1968-1977 period (Mickolus, 1980: xiii-xxx).

Terrorism has attracted the attention of scholars, policy-makers, journalists, and the general public, leading to inquiries into numerous of its aspects, beginning with the problem of constructing suitable definitions and proceeding to analysis of appropriate countermeasures. However, the meaning of terrorism for current interpretations of international politics is a neglected subject.

The argument of this paper is based on an irony of politics. The origins of the problem of terrorism can be traced in large part to the changes in world politics that inspired new theories built on the concepts of interdependence, transnationalism, and international regime. However, these theories neither predict nor explain why violence should result from and sometimes even subvert international processes expected to lead instead to peaceful cooperation and the end of reliance on military force. Understanding the issue of terrorism, especially how states respond to it, requires returning to traditional theories of international relations, based on the assumptions of an anarchical world, the sovereignty of the nation-state, and the primacy of force.

Terrorism presents a paradox that the interdependence model cannot solve, but at the same time it demonstrates that the older realist theories must be tempered with awareness of modern forces in world politics. Transnational actors and relations are important; state behavior is often cooperative and governed by common values; international and domestic politics are linked; and states are interdependent and vulnerable to each other in complex and subtle ways.

Thus terrorist organizations are often transnational actors; they thrive on the modernization of communication, transportation, and society that has led to economic integration; and they are encouraged and supported by a set of international norms legitimizing the pursuit of national self-determination. However, in a world where anarchy persists despite the existence of multiple sets of partial governing arrangements, the state response to terrorism is unilateral, self-interested, and at its extreme, based on the use of military force. Although terrorism does not pose a

serious threat to material interests, it undermines national prestige. Since prestige is intimately connected to power, however ambiguous it has become, government leaders are sensitive to symbolic challenges. They refuse to abandon the rights of sovereignty for the sake of a common response to terrorism. Furthermore, conflicts over values are also a struggle for power, as the supporters of national liberation also oppose the international order created and upheld by the opponents of terrorism.

It is not sufficient for theories of interdependence to claim that they are appropriate only to the issues they choose to explain, leaving the residue for traditional theories. Issues of political violence are not simply security issues, any more than economic issues have merely economic implications. Seen as a case study of international politics, the issue of terrorism cuts across the areas of international behavior to which each theory is most applicable. What is needed is a synthesis that can integrate theoretical propositions from each model in order to explain the causes and effects of international violence.

THE INTERDEPENDENCE MODEL

The undercutting of the nation-state by subnational and supranational actors and transactions, the declining effectiveness of military force, the superseding of security by economic and social issues, and an increased role for international institutions were thought to result from systemic change, especially in the areas of economics and technology (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Yet the attributes of world politics emphasized by theories of interdependence sometimes promote disorder and fragmentation as well as cooperation and integration. The paradoxes evident in the case of terrorism cast doubt on the merit of the theory.

Theorists of interdependence perceived alterations in world politics in the post World War II era that made a new conception of international reality imperative. In particular, although they criticize the naivete of the "modernist" school (Keohane and Nye, 1977:4), they were impressed by "the reinforcing effects of modern transportation and telecommunications technology [which] accelerated the transnational movement of money, goods, people, and ideas, thus creating circumstances in which states were interpenetrated and interconnected" (Oliver, 1982: 376). Yet these features of modernity have also created a novel sort of vulnerability. Looking at the issue of terrorism, we see that modernization in commerce, transportation, communications, and technology generates liabilities for all states within the system, especially the most developed. Terrorist organizations have become imaginative exploiters of complexity and sophistication.

Advances in civil aviation make hijacking possible and provide the international mobility essential to terrorists. The growth of the multinational corporation scatters foreign, especially American, business personnel over the world, presenting visible and convenient targets that make kidnapping executives for high ransoms easy and lucrative. Many analysts now fear that the diffusion of nuclear power may comport even greater risks (Horton and Greenberg, eds., 1979). The recent bombing by the African National Congress of a South African nuclear power station under construction (New York Times, December 20, 1982: 1 and 14) did not result in injuries or radioactive risk but may be a harbinger of the future.

In addition to accessible and powerfully symbolic targets, nuclear energy may provide weapons for terrorists, should explosive materials be seized or stolen. However, the proliferation of advanced conventional

weapons is currently more critical to arming terrorists. Guns featuring not only the availability, simplicity, and efficiency that are essential to terrorists but other useful qualities such as high firepower, automaticity, moderate rate of fire, stopping power, and miniaturization significantly facilitate terrorism (Dobson and Payne, 1982: 104). The post-World War II development of submachine guns, automatic rifles, machine pistols, grenades, surface-to-air missiles, and portable rocket launchers benefits terrorists as well as conventional armies. In the field of explosives, the recent invention of plastic rivals, the discovery of dynamite in the nineteenth century. Radio fuses, pressure contact mines, barometric bombs, and letter bombs are similar technological innovations in the means of destruction. Furthermore, a transnational arms market, supplied, sometimes inadvertently, by states as diverse as the United States and Czechoslovakia, exists independently of government control.

Communication among nations and people was commonly thought to be a critical factor in the process of global integration. Yet the development of a world communications network, based on satellite transmission of television programming and the growth of the mass media, is considered by most specialists on the subject to have a direct bearing on the expansion of terrorism.

Two schools of thought dominate the debate over the relationship between the media and terrorism. The first school holds that publicity is a strong cause of terrorism (National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1977; Alexander, 1979; Laqueur, 1980). The common aim of terrorists, according to this view, is to acquire recognition and attention. Terrorists therefore consciously and deliberately manipulate the media, choosing locales and targets for maximum publicity. The media, by

their sympathetic portrayal of terrorists, establish a propitious climate for further violence. Terrorism is seen as a direct result of advances in communications as well as of standards of reporting in liberal democracies. Television, with its instantaneous and compelling presentation of violent events, is particularly criticized for submitting to terrorist exploitation for the sake of news.

The second point of view also blames the media but for different reasons. According to this argument, lack of access to communications channels rather than excessive publicity causes terrorism (Schmidt and de Graaf, 1982). Both because bureaucracies and parliaments are ineffective channels for minority demands, and because the Western and capitalist-dominated communications industry fails to provide a voice for the powerless, the discontented turn to novel and dramatic disruptiveness to appeal to the public's sensibilities. More rather than less attention to the grievances terrorists express would prevent violence. Some proponents of this view admit that terrorists do attempt to manipulate the media (Schmidt and de Graaf, 1982), but others argue that governments, not terrorists, actually control the media, even if unofficially and informally, and distort media presentations of terrorism in the interests of the state (Schlesinger, 1981).

However, a case study of news coverage of the seizure of the Dominican Embassy in Columbia in 1978 indicates that if terrorists hope to communicate their grievances and aims to a wide popular audience, then their efforts are unsuccessful (Delli Carpini and Williams, 1982). Substantial differences were found between television and newspaper coverage. In contrast to the New York Times, television did little to develop public understanding of the issue. None of the networks explained the context of terrorism, the demands

and motivations of the terrorist organization, the details of negotiations, or the resolution of the crisis. Instead they focused on the American Ambassador. Television reporting tended to be ethnocentric, based on official sources, and biased toward presenting terrorists as irrational fanatics.

If the message that terrorists seek to transmit is distorted by the television medium, then publicity may not be a powerful causal factor. Whether or not the effective communication of their message via the New York Times to a foreign policy elite is satisfactory to terrorists is unknown. Some observers assume that terrorist violence is purely expressive, that any attention, however biased, is preferable to none. If, in contrast, terrorist organizations are rational actors, then the distortion of their message would diminish the value of communications as a stimulus to terrorism.

The interdependence model places great emphasis on the role of transnational as opposed to state actors in world politics. Modern terrorist organizations are often distinguished as transnational actors, acting independently of states and aggressively threatening their control of the international environment. Revolutionary organizations have been considered important examples of transnationalism since the beginning of interest in the trend (Bell, 1971). Terrorism becomes a transnational activity when terrorists operate outside their national contexts, choose foreign victims, or are externally directed. Autonomous terrorist groups are also intimately linked in a transnational network of cooperation and assistance.

Although some authors claim that this network constitutes a "terrorist international," a conspiracy directed by the Soviet Union against Western

civilization (Sterling, 1980), a more realistic assessment is of a loose, informal, and shifting coalition of eclectic groups based on opportunity and circumstance as much as ideology and external assistance and largely escaping state control. A process of "transnational coalition-building" (Amos, 1980: 238) has created a spiderweb with the Palestinian Resistance, especially the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Democratic front, and Black September at its center. "Summit meetings" of the leaders of terrorist organizations and the training of West European, Latin American, and Asian terrorists in Palestinian camps create and maintain linkages. Interorganizational personnel exchanges as well as pooling of resources and information are common. Underground connections among twenty-five organizations with roots in nineteen different countries were centered in the Middle East before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Amos, 1980: 238-44). Furthermore, Latin American terrorist groups have frequently collaborated.

In addition to physical connections, which contribute significantly to the forms terrorism takes (several spectacular attacks such as those on Lod Airport in 1972 and on the OPEC meeting in 1975 were collaborative ventures), a transnational contagion process, which Keohane and Nye cite as a form of "sensitivity interdependence" (1977:12), operates (Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida, 1980). After an initial period of random diffusion of terrorist acts, a definite pattern of contagion seems to have taken hold, with distinctive prototypes serving as models for imitation. Learning of a terrorist action inspires other groups, furnishes practical advice and provides an innovative example. Terrorist tactics are almost ideally imitable: low-cost, visible, easy to emulate, and with rapid pay-off. The existence of a pattern of contagion may partially explain the occurrence of

terrorism in Western democracies. West European, American, and Canadian organizations modeled their actions on third world revolutionary groups who could claim greater credibility and moral authority, often sanctioned by the international anti-imperialist regime and/or resistance to genuinely repressive governments. The Tupamaros provided a particularly influential example, especially for West German organizations.

Theories of interdependence further propose that the foreign policies of states are often determined by interdependence, seen as the costliness of transactions or vulnerability to the actions of others, especially in the economic realm, rather than by traditional considerations of state power and interest. In confirmation of this proposition, we can note that many West European states, heavily dependent on oil imported from the Middle East, have been accused of being "soft" on international terrorism. The French, sometimes felt to permit excessive terrorist traffic within their borders, are dependent on the importation of Middle Eastern oil and on the export of conventional weapons to the Middle East, both ventures critical to economic well-being. Israel has claimed that the French "pro-Arab" or "pro-Palestinian" attitude is responsible for anti-Semitic terrorism in Paris (New York Times, August 12 and 13, 1982: A8 and A7). It has also been suggested that French leaders were reluctant to extradite Abu Daoud, accused of responsibility for the Munich Olympics attack, because they feared reprisals from Arab states (Hannay, 1980: 407). America's Western allies were reluctant to follow Carter's admonitions to apply sanctions to Iran because of their vulnerability. Carter, in responding to the Iran crisis, considered it crucial to cut off Iranian oil imports so as to remove any appearance of reacting to the pressures of the relationship (Jordan, 1982: 54-55).

The American reaction to the Iran crisis can in other ways be considered as a confirmation of theories of interdependence that accord priority (or at least equality) to economic issues. The freezing of Iranian assets in the United States, rather than military intervention, permitted the eventual resolution of the crisis. Lengthy and complex financial negotiations, requiring multilateral cooperation among political adversaries, preceded a final compromise. It could be argued that the American ability to manipulate Iran's financial dependence, a legacy of the Shah's reign, and to withstand a cut-off of Iranian oil rather than superior military force, furnished the basis for dominance in this issue-area. The possession of the means of force was, from this point of view, at best counterproductive, and at worst, a disastrous temptation.

Another element of the interdependence model, which is a current source of theoretical controversy, is the concept of international regime, defined as the "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area" (Krasner, 1982: 185). Views range from the position that regimes are integral to the functioning of states in a world system (Puchala and Hopkins, 1982) to the argument that the assumptions underlying the conceptualization of regimes are faddish, imprecise, value-biased, static, and state-centered (Strange, 1982). My purpose is not to engage in the debate over what regimes are and what causes them. For the present, let us accept the premise that regime is shorthand for a complex of values, norms, and beliefs held in common by a group of states and which lead them to cooperate in the issue-area so governed. We conceive of international regimes as reasonably permanent, based on internalized norms more than self-interest, and functioning to coordinate state behavior to achieve desired outcomes. If the concept of

international regime is valid, what are its implications for the analysis of terrorism and for the assessment of the appropriateness of the interdependence model? That is, if we accept this theoretical construct on its own terms, does it explain its own implications?

The emphasis of scholarly analysis to date has been on the development of international regimes, viewed almost exclusively in terms of how collaboration has taken place and how conflict has been managed. The consequences of regimes are rarely mentioned, not even when Ernst Haas answers the question of "Why study regimes?" (1982: 212-13). The issue of terrorism reveals that regimes are costly as well as beneficial to their members, their impact on international politics may be destructive as well as constructive, and they generate problems they cannot resolve.

One of the sources (although not the sole source by any means) of the contemporary wave of political terrorism is what interdependence theorists would consider an anti-imperialist regime that replaced the colonial regime that was in existence until roughly 1960. It is not our concern to explain why this regime shift has occurred (see Puchala and Hopkins, 1982: 257-59), but to note the ingredients of the present regime and analyze its effects. Three principles are dominant. First national self-determination has become a primary legitimating factor in international relations. Second, the use of force in its service is justified, just as the use of force to maintain colonial states was justified under the colonial regime. Third, the United States has replaced the former European colonial powers as the enemy of the forces of national liberation. Furthermore, the anti-imperialist regime emphasizes non-governmental organizations, as well as states, as central actors in the international arena. The United Nations and its specialized

agencies and committees have become the major institutional forum for the expression and codification of these principles (Dugard, 1974; Murphy, 1982).

This change influenced the development of terrorism in the late 1960s and 1970s. First, it provided motives, rationales, and models for the formation of national liberation movements challenging the authority of a growing number of states no longer restricted to colonial powers and their territories. Not all such challenges, of course, can be classified as "movements;" many, especially in Western Europe, cling to the rhetoric of mass appeal but are small organizations without politically meaningful constituencies. The anti-imperialist regime, translated into the behavior of non-states, is thus a factor in the rise of nationalism as a disintegrative force, because it not only encourages states to pursue nationalistic foreign policies, rejecting economic interdependence, but it also supports secessionist movements in well-established states thought to be long past the traumas of national consolidation. As K.J. Holsti argues, secessionist movements can be partially explained by the hypothesis that "the doctrine of self-determination, a genuine transnational ideology or value, has become one of the most important sources of political legitimacy, the most potent propaganda symbol used to raise the consciousness (and conscience) of both national and foreign audiences. A national liberation movement, no matter how authoritarian its leadership and bloody its tactics, can obtain significant international attention, sympathy, and occasionally material support by portraying itself as fighting a colonial regime or seeking to obtain independence for a distinct ethnic, language, or religious group" (1980: 44).

It would be misleading to imply that all national liberation organizations are terrorist, since terrorism is a specialized form of political violence used by organizations of diverse ideologies. However, many contemporary nationalist and revolutionary groups use terrorism, especially when rural guerrilla warfare is denied them by circumstances. Historically, terrorism developed out of this denial. The euphemism of "urban guerrilla warfare" grows from the transition from guerrilla warfare to terrorism. In the late 1960s, successful revolution based on mass mobilization and guerrilla warfare in the countryside, as exemplified by the successful Chinese, Algerian and Cuban revolutions, was the model for challengers to governments. However, urban terrorism -- assassinations and bombings directed against European civilians in Algeria's cities -- was significant to the FLN campaign and constituted an element of the successful model of third world revolution against the West. (It was popularized and widely disseminated in the film "The Battle of Algiers," starring the head of the FLN organization in Algiers.)

In the Middle East the Palestinian Resistance was unable for reasons such as inappropriate terrain, absence of secure sanctuaries, internal divisions, and superior Israel capabilities to mount traditional guerrilla attacks against Israeli territory. Similarly, in Bolivia, Che Guevara was unable to replicate the success of Castro in Cuba. In both regions, perhaps because of the effects of the Vietnam war, 1968 seems to have marked a watershed, although limited terrorism has occurred in both areas for many years. Nationalist and revolutionary movements adopted innovations in terrorist activity that were spectacularly attention-getting precisely because they violated existing norms of international behavior. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an El Al airliner in July

1958.1/ The first assassination of an American Ambassador occurred in Guatemala in August, 1968. In September, 1969, the American Ambassador to Brazil was kidnapped by a revolutionary group.

Hijacking, assassinations, and kidnappings were subsequently imitated by Western European extremist groups; some, such as the Basque ETA, with nationalist credentials, but some, such as the West German Red Army Faction, lacking such justification. The rationale of the use of violence against the colonial military and civilian administration was stretched to include terrorism against the United States and its allies in the industrialized as well as the developing world and against liberal democracies as well as authoritarian governments. It is consistent with the tenets of anti-imperialism that 38% of terrorist incidents that are directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments involve Americans (National Foreign Assessment Center, 1981). American capitalism, especially its extension in the multinational corporation, was perceived by revolutionary forces as the oppressor of the Western proletariat and the developing world in general.

One of the components of the theory of regimes is that they determine state behavior. If so, the anti-imperialist regime has led to diplomatic support for national liberation movements from the third world, particularly in the United Nations, and in some cases to more tangible forms of aid, such as providing asylum, sanctuary, weapons, and funds. Iraq, Libya, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Cuba, China, North Korea, and Vietnam have all been known or suspected to aid insurgent terrorist organizations on occasion (Amos, 1980: 244-45). The most revealing demonstration of the impact of anti-imperialist precepts on state behavior in the United Nations occurred during 1972 and 1973. In the

aftermath of the Munich Olympics attack, the United States introduced a draft convention to combat terrorism. Although the United States attempted to convince its audience that the convention was not directed against national liberation movements, the move was greeted with suspicion by third world and Eastern European states. This coalition, led by the Arab states, "expressed more concern for the underlying causes of terrorism and refused to support any measures which might interfere with the activities of liberation movements or which failed to condemn organised state terror on the part of 'colonial, racist and alien regimes'" (Dugard, 1974: 74). Consequently the General Assembly instead adopted a resolution calling for a study of the causes leading to violence, although the ad hoc committee it appointed was unable to agree on recommendations.

Such debates within the United Nations General Assembly and committees such as the Sixth or Legal Committee and the International Law Committee illustrate other features of international regimes, which the originators of the theory have not taken into account. Although anti-imperialism has replaced colonialism, the international regime founded upon it is neither universally shared nor followed with equal enthusiasm. Puchala and Hopkins distinguish between specific, single-issue regimes and those that are diffuse and multi-issue; anti-imperialism must fall in the latter category (1982: 248-49). The regime legitimizing national self-determination may be a general principle of world politics but allegiances to it vary in intensity as do interpretations of how to act on its principles. Regimes in the same issue-area or of equivalent generality may compete for state allegiance, especially during transition periods when one regime is replacing another; regimes pertaining to different issue-areas may conflict with each other; and universal regimes may clash with particular regimes.

Thus it is very difficult to determine what regimes govern what issues and when; furthermore, the clash of regions is a source of political and sometimes military conflict.

In the case of terrorism, the patterns of violence of the modern period -- attacks on civil aviation, diplomacy, and international commerce -- came into conflict with older regimes or sets of rules guaranteeing the safety of diplomatic personnel, foreign nationals, and civil air transportation. Since before the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, governments have viewed piracy as a crime against the common interest and agreed on a common and equal right to punish offenders (Joyner, 1974: 230-66). Whereas to nationalist or revolutionary movements, representatives of the United States, whether diplomats or business executives, are symbolically identical to the colonial administrators who were the legitimate targets of violence in Algeria and other nationalist revolutions, to the Western powers diplomats and civilians were due protection by norms of interstate behavior and international law.

Under international law, responsibility for the safety of diplomatic personnel and of foreign nationals generally lies with the host government. In the 1970s, terrorism led governments reluctantly to expect non-governments to disobey these norms, but many states continued to act on the expectation that other states would observe the rules and procedures of the traditional regime. Faith in the strength of the norm of diplomatic inviolability influenced President Carter's decision to admit the Shah of Iran to the United States for medical treatment in 1979. Upon hearing from Zbigniew Brzezinski that the American Embassy in Teheran had been overrun and its staff captured, Carter noted in his diary: "We [Carter and Vance] were deeply disturbed, but reasonably confident that the Iranians would soon

remove the attackers from the embassy compound and release our people. We and other nations had faced this kind of attack many times in the past, but never, so far as we knew, had a host government failed to attempt to protect threatened diplomats" (Carter, 1982: 457). Iran's challenge to the international regime protecting diplomats is perceived as more serious than the inroads made upon it by non-state terrorist organizations (Krasner, 1982: 189). The importance of upholding this regime was also a reason for Panama's decision to accept the Shah when asked by the United States. Torrijos reportedly replied that "the crisis is first and foremost the problem of the United States, . . . But it is also the problem and the responsibility of the world community. As long as diplomats can be held like those in Teheran, no diplomat is safe anywhere" (Jordan, 1982: 83-84).

Independent regimes can reinforce as well as compete with each other, also with violent consequences. For example, it could be argued that the regime guaranteeing the immunity of civilians from warfare has steadily eroded since the adoption of the policy of strategic bombing by the Allies during World War II. The nuclear "balance of terror," based on the principle of civilian hostages, as well as the events of the Vietnam War, also contributed to its breakdown. The defenders of national liberation forces may contend that insurgents are only imitating techniques states have employed on a massive scale for the past forty years. They could further argue that the anti-imperialist regime represents a coalition of weaker states opposed to American hegemony, whereas the classic regime protecting diplomats and foreigners is one which the United States sponsors and maintains because it suits national convenience (Haas, 1982: 213).

Finally the link between international terrorism and the anti-imperialist regime produces a paradox that regime theorists, with their emphasis on processes of cooperation, neither foresee nor explain. Terrorism in the service of national liberation has weakened the regime that initially motivated and sustained it. States initially supportive of organizations professing to seek national self-determination found themselves threatened by terrorism from groups who were not only nationalistic but revolutionary. Thus the conservative Arab states, although they supported the Palestine Liberation Organization, became the targets of its more radical factions. The most spectacular instance was the December 1975 attack on the ministerial meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Vienna. Such terrorism produced divisions within the third world, as more radical states such as Algeria, Iraq, and Libya continued to provide asylum, and, in the cases of Iraq and Libya, active support. There is no doubt, however, that terrorism became an embarrassment to many countries. States distanced themselves from it rhetorically and became much less willing to provide asylum for hijackers. The Soviet Union, for example, while sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and finding it advantageous to support it, was embarrassed by the terrorism of its ideological affiliate, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Soviet Union repeatedly but vainly advised the PLO to desist. A 1975 Moscow radio broadcast in Arabic optimistically asserted that "the PLO proceeds, in its just struggle, from a position of maturity and reality. It is well-known that terrorist actions in no way belong to the means of revolutionary struggle; rather they greatly harm such a struggle." Terrorist operations were attributed to "irresponsible elements" who failed to realize that Zionist and imperialist propaganda used

them "to degrade the PLO's growing reputation on the international scene" (Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna, 1981: 92, 85-92).

The argument that terrorist violence has discredited the anti-imperialist regime and strengthened the classic international regime governing the conduct of diplomacy and commerce is supported by the evidence that in 1979 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a convention on hostage-taking. However, this development, the 1974 convention on crimes against internationally-protected persons, and the relative successes of the International Civil Aviation Organization in adopting anti-hijacking conventions (Hague, Tokyo and Montreal), may be attributable to strong reactions from threatened states who have imposed greater order on world politics, not to a weakening of loyalty to the anti-imperialist regime. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that threatened states have exhibited great sensitivity to anti-imperialist values; attempts to combat terrorism usually revolve around depoliticizing the issue, divorcing actions from motivations, and treating terrorist offenses in terms of their component crimes.

The interdependence model does not claim equal applicability to all foreign policy issues; certainly it leaves important questions about the issue of terrorism unanswered. International institutional arrangements and multilateral negotiating policies are a logical response to the issue of terrorism, but international cooperation has proved difficult to achieve. The interdependence model would include conflict among the multiple international regimes governing the issue and relationships based on unequal vulnerabilities as reasons for dissensus. Another reason, however, is the persistence of sovereignty, of the central role of the state, of its explicitly political interests, and of the perception by government

decision-makers that military force remains a useful instrument of foreign policy.

ANARCHY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND MILITARY FORCE

Although the forces of world politics that are at the center of interdependence -- modernization, transnationalism, common values and experiences that to a certain extent govern state behavior -- also contribute to the growth of terrorism, we cannot blame them exclusively. Terrorism is also a product of explicitly political disputes, whether domestic political grievances, independent of the international system but frequently expressed outside of national boundaries, or conflicts of interest among states. It is frequently a reflection of old-fashioned power politics. The Middle East, a region where states encourage terrorism against their enemies by supporting terrorist organizations or use terrorism directly against foreign as well as domestic opponents, is a case in point. Conflict between Libya and Egypt, Iraq and Syria, Iran and its enemies, as well as between the Rejection Front states and Israel leads to terrorism as much as does Palestinian nationalism. The Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union is also seen by some observers as a source of terrorism. A desire to destabilize the West is considered the motive for Soviet sponsorship if not direction of international terrorism. The opposite extreme would hold the United States responsible for much terrorism in Latin America because of American support for repressive regimes in states such as Guatemala and El Salvador, and in the Middle East, because of support for Israel (e.g., "Sandinists Accuse U.S. of Terrorism, New York Times, January 13, 1983: A4). The fact that interstate conflicts of interest are sources of terrorism is fully consonant with the realist or

traditional interpretation of world politics, but we have also noted that the interdependence model explains (without intending to) some of the ambiguities associated with its origins.

The realist conceptualization of international politics is most relevant to the issue of government response to terrorism. The dominant factors in policies toward terrorism are unilateralism, insistence on sovereignty, and a reliance on military force when other attempts to deter and prevent terrorism fail.

The failure of the international community or society of states to develop more than embryonic joint policies against terrorism is often due to the unwillingness of any state, whatever behavior the international regime suggests, to relinquish the privileges of sovereignty. The right to grant asylum to individuals who have committed political offenses is valued by all states and until recently was incorporated in almost all bilateral extradition treaties. Anti-terrorism conventions frequently foundered on the rock of the "political exception" rule. For this reason, no agreement with sufficient scope to make guaranteed sanctions effective has been possible even when restricted to narrow categories of terrorist "crimes," such as hostage-taking, attacks on diplomatic personnel, or hijackings (Harnay, 1980: 381-83; Evans, 1978). Even within Western Europe, a homogeneous region firmly linked by unifying treaties and institutions, the issue of "extradite or try" made acceptance of an effective agreement problematic (Lodge, 1981).

International cooperation against terrorism is limited because each state reacts not in terms of community interest but according to the degree to which it is individually threatened (Hutchinson, 1978). States whose national interests are most affected by terrorism are those most likely to

appeal to the general interest of all states, presenting the struggle against terrorism as not only a national goal but an environmental or "milieu" goal. Such claims are undoubtedly less a matter of heightened sensitivity to the higher good than of identification with the prevailing international order. Policy changes come when threats to national reputation or to the position of domestic incumbent elites increase, as they did in Western Germany in 1975, when a policy of compromise was replaced by a no-concessions posture when the German Embassy in Stockholm was seized. Similarly, when Arab states were threatened by Palestinian terrorism, their eagerness to furnish asylum faded.

The failure of international cooperation is a partial explanation for unilateralism in foreign policy behavior. Another reason is that terrorism creates crisis situations to which governments are tempted to respond with force, rather than negotiation. Decision-makers perceive that military force is a useful instrument of policy when or even before negotiations fail. States primarily respond to acute terrorist crisis as units rather than as disaggregated bureaucracies (although in non-crisis periods the interdependence theory's prediction of fractionalized policy-making holds true; see Farrell, 1982). National leaders are firmly committed to upholding national honor and reputation, even though national security is not usually directly endangered.

Terrorism is a threat to the prestige of states, not to their actual military and economic capabilities. Prestige, as Robert Gilpin defines it, is critical to the ordering and functioning of the international system (1981: 30-34). Prestige is essentially the reputation for power and the equivalent to authority in domestic politics. It depends on other actors' perceptions of a state's willingness and ability to use power. States

rarely have to use force or the threat of force because prestige determines bargaining and the outcomes of negotiations, functioning as the currency of international relations. A decline in prestige is thus a grave matter because its diminution in one situation weakens the state's position in the next bargaining situation: "In a diplomatic conflict the country which yields is likely to suffer in prestige because the fact of yielding is taken by the rest of the world to be evidence of conscious weakness" (Gilpin, 1981: 32; quoting Hawtrey, 1952: 64-65). Terrorism poses a challenge to the existing international hierarchy of prestige. Similarly, in domestic politics, terrorism is a threat to the government's authority, not in most cases to the stability of the state. It is natural, given the significance of prestige to power, that states should oppose the terrorist challenge. Since the successful use of military force is the best method of shoring up slipping prestige, decision-makers in such circumstances prefer military intervention to negotiating on an equal basis with partners seen not only as unequal but unworthy.

The use of limited military force, pinpointed against a terrorist adversary with minimal interference in the affairs of the states willingly or unwillingly harboring the organization, became an appealing model after the successful Israeli raid at Entebbe. A comparison of Israeli decision-making during the Entebbe crisis, West German decision-making during the Mogadishu crisis, and American decision-making during the Iran crisis reveals the dominance of traditional state interests as determinants of foreign policy as well as the importance of the links between foreign and domestic policy that the interdependence model predicts. However, public opinion, instead of being a brake on adventurism, accelerated a forceful reaction. In each case government leaders felt that conciliatory responses

entailed unacceptable domestic political costs because international prestige and domestic authority are bound together. In each case, as well, intangible values rather than material values were threatened; the issue was one of prestige and the image of power rather than immediate concerns of national security. Saving the lives of hostages, while important, came second to preserving national honor.

In the Entebbe crisis in 1976, the Israeli government concentrated on the threat posed by the Palestinian hijacking of an Air France flight from Israel to Uganda to four basic state values: the loss of Israeli lives, the challenge to Israel's anti-terrorism policy, the blow to Israel's diplomatic prestige, and the domestic threat to the government's stability (Maoz, 1981: 690). Israel had a long-established policy of responding to hostage situations in hostile foreign countries with military intervention if feasible. Although Israel anticipated that the hijackers would release the hostages unharmed if their demands were met, the adverse consequences of acceding to terrorist demands -- the damage to Israel's reputation and credibility and the likely fall of the Rabin government -- excluded negotiations. The government's concern with gaining the support of the opposition before proceeding to the rescue operation further demonstrates the salience of domestic politics.

The West German government under Helmut Schmidt at the time of the Mogadishu crisis in 1978 was confronted with a technically less difficult situation: hijackers holding hostages in a friendly country. Similar considerations nevertheless influenced decision-making (Pridham, 1981: 34-36). The pressure of domestic politics was heavy, since the opposition Christian Democrats had seized on the government's "softness" toward internal terrorism as a campaign issue. Schmidt therefore created a special

bipartisan coordinating committee to handle the crisis. The West German government also had a unique policy history in its dealings with terrorist organizations. Whereas the Israeli government had consistently determined not to make concessions except under the most extraordinary circumstances, the West German government, beginning with acquiescence to Palestinian demands for the liberty of the Black September terrorists responsible for the Munich Olympics attack, had been willing to compromise for humanitarian reasons. Decision-makers and the public were aware, however, that the prisoners whose freedom was obtained through the 1975 kidnapping of Peter Lorenz, Christian Democratic mayoral candidate for Berlin, had proceeded to commit further acts of terrorism. Schmidt anticipated that the behavior of the individuals whose release was demanded with the kidnapping of Hans Martin Schleyer and the subsequent hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner would be comparably embarrassing. Moreover, a second policy shift on terrorism would have been costly for the government. As in the Entebbe crisis, a military rescue operation was perceived as the only means of reconciling two opposing values: saving the lives of the hostages and preserving prestige and authority by resisting terrorist intimidation. Again, as at Entebbe, the government's gamble paid off, bringing international approval and domestic support.

Whether these successes improved Israeli or West German security from terrorism is problematic. We do not know if terrorists are deterred by failure or indeed how they perceive failure. A study of hostage-taking in Western Europe in the 1970-1980 period could discover no correlation between granting or resisting terrorist demands and the continuation of terrorism (Aston, 1982: 10). Military intervention may not have any deterrent value. This pair of successes did, however, have the effect of creating a

misleading image of effective military force, overlooking the inherent riskiness of the endeavor (Gazit, 1981). Other states were led to establish specialized elite military intervention units, not an uncommon reaction to crisis in the pattern of military politics since World War II (Cohen, 1978). Although there is no evidence that the precedent set by Israel and West Germany influenced American decision-making in creating "Delta Force" in 1977, it is logical to suppose that it did. It must also have influenced the thinking of the French in November 1977 when they alerted paratrooper regiments in response to a Polisario kidnapping of French nationals. Similarly Egypt launched an unsuccessful commando assault against Palestinians holding a hijacked airliner in Cyprus in February 1978 (Cohen, 1978: 78 and 83).

Although the United States had resolutely opposed concessions to terrorists abroad, and despite the existence of Delta Force, the United States intervened in force in Iran only after negotiations to end the crisis had stalled for months and domestic political pressure on President Carter, now campaigning for reelection in 1980, reached intolerable heights. Frustration with the constant impasses reached in secret negotiations with the Iranians, conviction that he was dealing with an irrational adversary, inability to reveal negotiations to the public to offset impressions of passivity, public restlessness and impatience coupled with the anticipation that the crisis might last well into or past the election campaign, concern for preserving national honor while saving the lives of the hostages, and assurances by the military that a rescue mission stood a good chance of success led Carter to opt for intervention, although the use of force was antithetical to the administration's foreign policy principles (Carter, 1982 Jordan, 1982). Only Secretary of State Cyrus Vance seemed cognizant of the

risks involved; he opposed the decision and signaled his resolve by announcing his intention to resign.

Like the consequences of success, the consequences of failure stood out most sharply in terms of public opinion. Whereas Entebbe and Mogadishu resulted in popular euphoria, the aborted Iran rescue mission undermined Carter's position at home and abroad. Iran dispersed the hostages so that another rescue attempt was impossible; Khomeini was handed a propaganda victory; a negotiated solution was delayed; the United States and Carter suffered a loss of prestige; and eight American servicemen died. This outcome badly damaged President Carter's standing in American public opinion; his ultimate failure to bring an end to the crisis, culminating what the American public perceived as a history of incompetence, created an image of impotence that in his opinion cost him the 1980 presidential election (Carter, 1982: 567-70, 594).^{2/}

The series of military interventions, a mixture of success and failure, and the threat of force they collectively implied may, however, have weakened third world support for the anti-imperialist regime. It has been argued that after years of disagreement the United Nations was able to act on the issue of hostage-taking (beginning with the adoption of a convention in 1979) both because the Iran case highlighted the need for international consensus and because of the prospect of military rescue attempts. "Not least of the factors serving to induce third world states to join in the consensus was a perception that most of these states were exceedingly vulnerable to self-help measures by militarily advanced countries along the lines of the Israeli raid at Entebbe" (Murphy, 1982: 194; citing Boyle, 1980: 828). The 1979 convention is interpreted as rejecting the thesis "that the pursuit of equal rights and self-determination by liberation

groups can justify acts of terrorism such as hostage taking" (Murphy, 1982: 195).

The three cases of intervention we have analyzed did not lead to full-scale military conflict. In other cases terrorism or the military reaction to terrorism has provoked war. World War I was precipitated by the assassination of the Archduke of Austria by a Serbian nationalist, which, coming on top of underlying causes, set in motion a chain of reactions that led to conflagration. Terrorism has frequently been the spark that has set off Israeli attacks on surrounding states, particularly Lebanon. (Terrorism from the Gaza strip was also a factor in Israel's decision to cooperate with France and Britain during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis.) The 1982 invasion of Lebanon and attack on Palestinian and Syrian forces, following the June 1982 assassination attempt against the Israeli Ambassador to London, is the most serious reaction to terrorism in modern warfare. According to Amos Perlmutter, the invasion of Lebanon had long been in the planning stage because it fulfilled many of Begin's fundamental aspirations. Once Ariel Sharon became Defense Minister, it was inevitable. Sharon is said to have had two prerequisites for the implementation of the invasion plan: American approval, which was thought to have been purchased by agreeing to the principle of a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and the excuse that the assassination furnished (1982: 73-75).

It follows from the examples we have discussed that terrorist crises can cause grave political consequences. In conjunction with other crises and instabilities, terrorism can act as a precipitant of international conflict. Failure to resolve terrorist crises with adequate authority and prestige can also imperil the position of domestic elites.

In conclusion, the issue of terrorism demonstrates that the qualitative aspects of international relations have not changed substantially despite developments in technology and economics that have fostered interdependence among states, enhanced the power of non-state actors, compelled international cooperation, and increased the cost of war. Examination of the causes and especially of the consequences of terrorism as a form of limited war on the international level leads us to agree with Robert Gilpin that "World politics is still characterized by the struggle of political entities for power, prestige, and wealth in a condition of global anarchy. Nuclear weapons have not made the resort to force irrelevant; economic interdependence does not guarantee that cooperation will triumph over conflict; a global community of common values and outlook has yet to displace international anarchy" (1981: 230, and 211-30). Analysis of the theoretical implications of terrorism also suggests, as James K. Oliver argues, that there may and perhaps should be a conceptual convergence between theories of interdependence with their emphasis on the concepts of transnationalism, international regimes, multiple channels of influence, and equality of issues under normal circumstances, and traditional perspectives stressing state power, military force, and anarchical environments. The changes heralded as the beginning of a new international order have not fundamentally altered the dynamics of state interaction because they affect state behavior only under specified conditions and because they have introduced new occasions for conflict as well as cooperation. The same factors that seem to make models of interdependence relevant to world politics also create problems that the interdependence framework cannot explain.

The crisis posed by modern terrorism arises in part from the existence of an international anti-imperialist "regime" or set of norms that legitimizes violence for the purpose of national self-determination. Whether or not one agrees that "regime" is a viable concept, the value accorded anti-colonialism motivates transnational organizations with nationalist, separatist, and revolutionary ideologies and reinforces a norm of state obligation, either to aid forces of national liberation or, at a minimum, to decline to punish their transgressions. The third world proponents of anti-imperialist principles proclaim ambitions that are not only ideological but involve a fundamental redistribution of power in the international system. Anti-imperialist values challenge the dominance of the United States and the Western industrialized world and the legitimacy of the system the greater powers uphold. Terrorism thus affects international struggles for power on regional and systemic levels.

Economic interdependence, technological innovation in transportation, communications, and the means of warfare, and the rise of the multinational corporation provide novel opportunities for terrorism. While terrorism is a force directed toward transforming the existing order, the form it has taken is unorthodox but still well within the bounds of realist conceptions of politico-military conflict. Modernization has led to a smaller, more interpenetrated world, but it has made that world fragile, vulnerable to disruption from minorities willing to flout the rules of the system. At the same time, the effects of terrorism have weakened interdependence by increasing national isolation. Communications are impeded, offending states are ostracized, and national borders are sealed to hamper terrorist mobility.

Most threatened states, with the exception of Israel, treat terrorism as a problem of modest proportions over the long run. In the short run, however, terrorism can aggravate existing problems on both domestic and foreign levels. Government decision-makers are sensitive to threats to prestige because of the ramifications of appearing weak for the future exercise of power. Nothing appears weaker, especially to one's constituents, than publicly conceding to the demands of a non-state. Terrorism is an assault on the authority and legitimacy rather than the security of the powerful. Because terrorists are weak, they concentrate their resources on affecting intangible values of honor, credibility, and image, rather than military or economic strength.

State responses to terrorism are further determined by the anarchical character of the international system. Theories with interdependence as the central organizing concept would prescribe a multilateral approach, which is also in accord with the nature of the problem. Yet unilateralism has prevailed. Despite the efforts of the most powerful states in the system to promote the rule of law and to formalize universal norms preserving diplomatic inviolability and the safety of international commerce and communication, international cooperation is limited by incompatible values, struggles for power, and by state reluctance to surrender any of the prerogatives of sovereignty by accepting treaties with effective sanctions for terrorist offenses.

Furthermore, states generally react to terrorism in terms of a narrowly conceived national interest, depending on the degree to which terrorism is a threat, especially to domestic stability, and the issue's relationship to other individual foreign policy objectives. For example, states dependent upon oil imports from the Middle East do not often find it in their interest

to enact sanctions against states aiding terrorists or to pursue vigorously terrorist conspiracies within their borders. Only those states whose self-interest coincides with the general interest and who identify strongly with the existing order are likely to appeal to the common good. The issue of the response to terrorism is even politically divisive among allies.

In a context of anarchy, where unilateralism is the only effective policy option, military force is seen as useful in dealing with political conflict despite the inhibiting effects of the nuclear revolution, the risk of provoking wider conflict, the domestic consequences of failure, the usefulness of economic coercion, and the dubiousness of the proposition that force deters terrorists. Military responses to terrorism are part of a trend toward greater politicization of the use of force. The search for negotiated solutions to terrorist crises has not been abandoned, but states are compelled to be prepared to use force when compromise cannot uphold national prestige. Concession to terrorist demands guarantees hostage safety better than military intervention; concessions do not demonstrably increase the likelihood of future terrorism; and terrorism is not a significant threat to objective or material interests. Yet force remains, as in the past, the method of last resort, even against weak adversaries, and conciliation is rejected as appeasement.

The issue of terrorism also demonstrates that the undermining or dissolution of the traditional nation-state would not necessarily make military-political force less central to the resolution of disputes. Transnational terrorist organizations, while not as powerful as nation-states, can be equally or more violent within the limits of their capabilities, which may in the future assume monstrous proportions should nuclear power become accessible to them. Moreover, the difficulties

experienced by states in responding to terrorism against their citizens has generated a new genre of private actors, security firms that not only perform intelligence functions and advise corporations on protection techniques, but also take on more active roles as mercenaries or paramilitaries. To some critics, this development presages a new international "feudalism" (Nathan, 1981: 156-66). Doing away with the nation-state might not lead, as integrationists hope, to larger configurations competent to preserve order, but to a fragmented system of smaller, less viable entities, less central Jewish control, and greater violence. This analysis casts doubt on the assumption that doing away with the nation-state is the answer to the violence of separatist minorities (Birch, 1978).

While underscoring the continued importance of traditional concepts of power, the issue of terrorism also bears out one of the tenets of interdependence: the elusiveness of power in the modern world. The great -- individuals as well as states -- are exposed to violence by the wealth and status that make them powerful. Although terrorism has not changed the international distribution of power or weakened the nation-state (paradoxically, it may have strengthened it), it has decreased the control of the powerful and fostered the impression of disorder. That the actions of small extremist organizations, rarely numbering over a hundred members, could attract the rapt attention of policy-makers, the press and the public, generate lengthy debates in international organizations, produce volumes of treaties and draft conventions, extort significant national concessions in the payment of monetary ransom and release of prisoners, and increase economic coercion, political tensions, military interventions, and open

warfare reflects the significance of violence, even when largely symbolic, to present world politics. Far from being a minor anachronism, violence endures as a critical and unresolved political problem.



NOTES

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Hijackings occurred frequently in the United States and Latin America in the early 1960s. Most American cases involved mentally disturbed individuals acting alone, usually hijacking planes to Cuba. In Latin America, hijackings were explicitly political and directed by revolutionary organizations but usually involved simple demands for asylum for the hijackers. The pattern was thus similar to hijackings from Communist bloc countries to the West, a third type of pre-1968 hijacking. Palestinian hijackings received extensive publicity and became models for imitation because of the escalating nature of the demands made on governments (release of large numbers of prisoners, policy changes, monetary ransom, in addition to safe passage) and because of the new dangers posed for airline passengers. Threats to destroy planes and harm their passengers, soon made credible by Palestinian actions, were novel and attention-getting.

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Carter's misfortunes were compounded by the unhappy coincidence that election day fell on the anniversary of the seizure of the hostages.

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NEWS

MEDIA ACCUSED OF "GRISLY FASCINATION" WITH TERRORISM

WASHINGTON, April 18 -- "Terrorism is the original cheap shot and is not really cost-effective unless given publicity," stated Diego Ascencio, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, U.S. State Department, at a conference on terrorism in Washington last week.

Journalists and terrorism experts debated domestic and foreign news coverage of terrorist events at the session, sponsored by The Media Institute's Transnational Communications Center and the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, the State University of New York. Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-AL), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, criticized the press for its "grisly fascination" with terrorism and said that while terrorist events may not be media-created, they are media-promoted.

The symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorists was an underlying theme of the conference. The session was opened by Leonard J. Theberge, President of The Media Institute, who noted that terrorist acts have become media events. Acknowledging the unprecedented amount of publicity given to this "new breed of violence," Yonah Alexander, Director of SUNY's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, stressed the need for devising acceptable standards for reporting terrorist acts.

He pointed out that "after the loss of Beirut as the major headquarters for terror international, the significance of other terrorist bases will grow in coming months." Among these other bases he named Damascus, Teheran, Nicosia, Tripoli, Athens, Rome, Paris, and Stockholm.

Ambassador Marks, citing a recently issued report, pointed out that a total of 117 groups representing 71 different nationalities claimed credit for international terrorist incidents and threats of violence in 1982.

"This is the second largest total since 1968," he said. "The only year that produced a larger number was 1980, when 128 groups claimed credit for violent events."

"As in past years," he added, "Palestinians, Armenians, West Germans, and Central Americans were responsible for the majority of the incidents in 1982."

Turning his attention to those terrorist incidents that were directed against American citizens or property, Mr. Marks reported that the total in 1982 was "more than in any other year since 1968 except 1978, when hundreds of attacks occurred in Iran." He added that "bombings of American property increased from 91 in 1981 to 160 in 1982, and threats against Americans rose from 29 to 75."

Discussing the various categories of incidents, he said that bombings were by far the preferred type of operation, with assassinations, hijackings, and kidnappings following in that order.

Within the territorial borders of the United States, Ambassador Marks continued, there were 51 terrorist acts in 1982, compared with 42 in 1981 and 29 in 1980. Because of this increase, he said, the FBI is devoting more resources to deal with terrorism, including the development of a "hostage rescue team comprised of carefully selected special agents who are now receiving training at the FBI's Quantico facility."

Mr. Lisker, whose Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism has held 27 hearings since it was established two years ago, said that these hearings had revealed that "certain groups that have been accorded recognition in the United States, and are believed by many to be legitimate national liberation organizations, are in fact pawns of the Soviet Union." He named specifically the African National Congress and the South-West Africa People's Organization, and claimed that the latter, SWAPO, which has observer status in the United Nations, had used that position from which to plan murders that have taken place in Namibia.

Mr. Lisker also stated that the hearings held by his subcommittee had proved that the African National Congress was controlled by the South African Communist party, and he accused the ANC of murdering the man who had testified against it. He said:

"After our report was published, our star witness, Bartholomew Hlapane, and his wife were murdered at their Soweto home, and the ANC appears to have taken credit for their murder. According to a telephone tape recording of Habari News Service, which

is part of the African Bibliographic Center, they linked the murder to the publication of a document that reported his testimony. Hlapane's daughter Brenda, age 15, was also shot and is paralyzed."

Mr. Lisker said also that his subcommittee was responsible for an expected change in FBI guidelines that had hampered investigation of domestic organizations. He explained:

"As a reaction to Watergate and to the counterintelligence program of the FBI, a set of guidelines had been devised to limit the FBI's intrusion into areas deemed to be protected by the First Amendment. The net effect was that the FBI was effectively precluded from monitoring domestic organizations of a political nature that were engaging in plans for terroristic activities. The guidelines have been changed, and are in the White House now. We expect the Attorney General will announce acceptance of the changes around February 18. We believe the changes will eliminate the criminal standard."

Dr. Cline, who spent four years as Deputy Director of the CIA, called for "greater awareness of the ramifying dangers of international support for the use of violence as an indirect form of warfare against open societies."

He cited specifically Soviet support of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and declared that "what began as a support system for individual cases of terrorism against Israel became a low-intensity warfare machine terrorizing a whole nation, actually Lebanon more than Israel."

Asserting that "the genie of violence let out of the bottle by Soviet support for terrorists has caused disorder and anguish in many quarters," Dr. Cline went on to cite Moscow's involvement in "extensive quasi-criminal terrorist activity in Turkey, the Bulgarian-supported plot to assassinate the Pope, and recent circumstantial evidence implicating Yuri Andropov himself with the Bulgarian secret intelligence service operation in the Vatican assassination attempt."

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TERRORISM

2/15/83

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The Institute for Studies
in International Terrorism
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FOR RELEASE AFTER 10 A.M.
TUESDAY, FEB. 15, 1983

NEW YORK, Feb. 15... Experts in international terrorism warned today that the world terrorist movement, supported if not actually controlled by the Soviet Union, was engaged in a campaign to undermine the stability of Western society. They asserted further that democracies could fight back only if they understood "the infrastructure of terror that has been created to harass and eventually destroy them."

The panel of experts made their comments at a news conference sponsored by the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism of the State University of New York, in cooperation with the Institute of Human Relations of the American Jewish Committee, and held at AJC headquarters here.

The speakers included Ambassador Edward Marks, Coordinator for Anti-Terrorism Programs, U.S. Department of State; Joel S. Lisker, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, U.S. Senate; Dr. Ray Cline, former Deputy Director of the CIA, currently Director of the World Power Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; and Dr. Yonah Alexander, Professor of International Studies and Director, the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, SUNY.

Major points made by the participants were that terrorism on a global scale had been increasing in recent years, that it was likely to grow even more in 1983, that it was zeroing in on democratic societies in a war of attrition, and that evidence pointed to the Soviet Union as a prime supporter and abettor of this process.

Setting the scene for discussion, Dr. Alexander presented statistics to illustrate his conclusion that "the cost of ideological and political violence is staggering." He said:

"Between 1970 and 1982, a total of 15,868 significant domestic and international terrorist incidents have been recorded. In 1982 alone, 1,331 attacks were recorded against civilian and military targets, killing 5,671 and wounding 2,539. Total reported dollar losses in 1982 reached \$92,762,706. This year will probably be more active, simply because some of the terrorist movements that suffered major setbacks in 1982 are expected to regroup in order to show their adversaries that they are alive and kicking."

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NEWS

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The conference panelists, however, were far from unanimous in supporting regulations on media coverage. "Terrorism is at least as much of a political problem as a security problem and therefore any attempt to curb media coverage is a form of censorship," said Nicholas Ashford of The Times (London). Because the media are news-oriented rather than issue-oriented, analysis of terrorists' aims and causes is often lacking, said Ford Rowan, host of the public television series, "International Edition." "The media are a selective magnifying glass," he said, adding that most coverage of terrorist incidents is live and--with no time for editing or reflection--is prone to mistakes. FBI representative Wayne Gilbert noted that some terrorist events have been covered so well (e.g., the takeovers of the Washington Monument and the U.S. Embassy in Tehran) that "journalists ran out of things to say."

Other panelists included: Charles Fenyesi (The Washington Post); Eugene Methvin (The Reader's Digest); Frank H. Perez, (Deputy Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism, U.S. Department of State); George Watson, Vice President of News, ABC); Ali Birand (Milliyet, Turkey); Shalom Kital (Israeli Broadcasting Authority, Jerusalem); Dieter Kronzucker (ZDF German Television, Channel 2); and Scott Thompson (Associate Director for Programs, U.S. Information Agency).

The first panel on "Domestic Experience" was chaired by Morris I. Leibman, (Sidley and Austin, Chicago,) Former Chairman, American Bar Association Standing

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Committee on National Security and Intelligence, Recipient of President's Medal of Freedom, and the second panel on "Overseas Experience" was chaired by John McLaughlin (Executive Editor, Washington, The National Review and Moderator, "The McLaughlin Group", NBC). William Claire (Director, Washington Office State University of New York) presented concluding remarks. Conference video and proceedings will become available.

The purpose of SUNY's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism is to provide the opportunity for intensive study and research in understanding international education. For further information call (607) 431-3709, (202) 659-2330, (212) 687-6681.

STATEMENT BY PAUL JOHNSON
AT THE OPENING SESSION
OF THE JONATHAN INSTITUTE'S
SECOND CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
SUNDAY, JUNE 24, 1984
THE FOUR SEASONS HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE CANCER OF TERRORISM

זכר אלה יעקב וישראל

The Cancer of Terrorism

Terrorism is the cancer of the modern world. No state is immune to it. It is a dynamic organism which attacks the healthy flesh of the surrounding society. It has the essential hallmark of malignant cancer: unless treated, and treated drastically, its growth is inexorable, until it poisons and engulfs the society on which it feeds and drags it down to destruction.

Modern terrorism dates from 1968, when the PLO formerly adopted terror and mass murder as its primary policy. Terrorism was thus able to draw on the immense financial resources of the Arab oil states, and on the military training programmes of the Soviet Union and of its satellites, Cuba, South Yemen, Vietnam and North Korea. Over 1,000 PLO killers have been trained in the Soviet Union alone. Moreover, from 1970-1982, the PLO operated a quasi-occupation of Lebanon, and was thus able to enjoy, in practice, all the advantages of its own sovereign territory. It acquired the weaponry of a sizable modern army, and set up terrorist training camps of its own, used as facilities by the Red Brigades, the IRA and a score of other killer gangs throughout the world.

This physical growth of the terrorist cancer was accompanied by a progressive elevation in its moral status. Yasser Arafat ceased to be a mere gangster leader and became, in effect, a

terrorist statesman. He moved around the world with increasing diplomatic pomp, and was greeted, on a level of moral equality, by more and more world leaders. He and his organisation finally achieved, at the United Nations, a position of privilege granted to no other body not a sovereign state. But perhaps his greatest moral triumph was to be received, and photographed, being greeted by the Pope, His Holiness and His Depravity together.

Inevitably, with the physical and moral growth of the terrorist international, came a growth in its military capacity. From the ability to kill individuals grew the ability to kill scores, then hundreds, now thousands. Not merely the PLO but its junior allies began to handle munitions on a prodigious scale. It is now common for the IRA, for instance, to stage killings involving two or three tons of high explosives. International terrorists operating in a score of countries now have the power to shoot down aircraft, destroy armoured vehicles and destroy heavily-protected security posts. There is the danger, frighteningly obvious to all of us, that terrorists will eventually possess nuclear weapons, but a more immediate risk is that they will secure -- perhaps already have secured -- devastating modern equipment now moving into the inventories of official armies: high-speed machine pistols firing 1200 rounds a minute and almost soundless; lightweight grenade-launchers and mortars, squirtless flame-throwers, short-range portable anti-tank weapons, shoulder fired

multi-rocked launchers and, most alarming of all, the new generation of guided missile-throwers which have long-ranges, are highly accurate, and can be carried and fired by one man or woman.

At whom will these devastating new weapons be aimed? The question is pointless. They are aimed at the world, at civilized society everywhere. They will be used not merely to destroy security forces, but ordinary civilians, men, women, children. For, just as there seems to be no upper limit to the terrorist's arsenal, so there is no lowest depth beyond which the terrorist cannot sink in his moral declension. So -- ask not for whom the terrorist bell tolls: it tolls for thee, and thee, and thee -- for all the nations represented in this room, and for decent, innocent people everywhere.

But in the growth of the terrorist cancer, a still more sinister aspect even than the expansion of its arsenals, is the arrival of the first terrorist states. If Soviet Russia and four of its satellites actively train and arm terrorist movements, we now have the phenomenon of two regimes -- Iran and Libya -- which constitute terrorist states in themselves. These states do not merely finance, arm and train foreign terrorists, providing them with bases and havens; they operate their own official machinery of international terrorism.

Both Iran and Libya now deploy, as part of their official armed forces and government machinery, assisted and provisioned by their embassies and diplomats, heavily armed, highly-trained and totally ruthless gangs of killers, who roam the world seeking out and destroying political or religious opponents -- or mere critics -- and in the process killing and maiming bystanders and destroying property throughout the civilized West. These states conduct such policies of government terrorism while still enjoying all the privileges of sovereign status and all the protection of international law -- membership of the UN and its agencies, access to the IMF and World Bank, to the International Court and the Vienna and Hague Conventions.

Iran and Libya illustrate the extent to which the terrorist cancer has established its trip on the world's health, and our paralytic failure to treat the disease. Let me remind you that four years ago Iran committed a gigantic crime of state terrorism: it seized all the occupants of the embassy of the United States -- the greatest power on earth -- and held them hostage. That crime goes unrepented and unpunished. Yet Iran still operates privileged embassies throughout the world, to service its killers. It is still a member of the UN, where it can defend its policies of mass murder. It is now destroying the world's shipping in the Gulf -- maritime terrorism on a gigantic scale -- or to give it the old name, piracy. Will that go unpunished too?

Or again, two months ago, one or more professional state terrorists, living in and working from the Libyan Embassy in London, murdered a young British policewoman, in broad daylight and in front of hundreds of people. Under the protection of the Vienna Convention, on whose provision Colonel Qaddafi insisted down to the last comma, the killer or killers were allowed to leave the country without search or investigation. Here was a murderous dictator who has sponsored terrorism all over the world, who operates his own terror-squads, organizes and finances others, who has caused, extended or prolonged no less than ten civil and interstate wars in Africa, who is responsible for the deaths of at least a million people, and who openly proclaims his contempt for international order, here he is able to take the maximum possible advantage of the conventions which govern behavior between law-abiding states.

Thus, with the emergence of the Terrorist State, the cancer has spread to the point where it is multiplying its cells from within the framework of world order. The inmates are taking over the asylum; the doctors are helping to spread the bacillus. There is, then, no alternative to drastic treatment.

I have three propositions to put to you tonight -- the first on the moral level, the second on the legal level, the third on the military level. On the moral level, let us clear our minds of cant. By this I mean let us reject the ambivalence with which civilized people often approach the problem of terrorism. They condemn terrorism in general and on principle, but there is often one particular group of terrorists which arouses their sympathy, for historical, racial, ethnic or ideological reasons, and whom they are not prepared to describe as terrorists, but rather as freedom-fighters and guerrillas. One case is a small section of the Irish community in the United States and its sympathy for the IRA. The IRA is beyond question one of the most evil and destructive terrorist movements on earth. But it could not exist without the regular financial support it receives from otherwise law-abiding and peaceful American-Irish.

So I would counter this ambivalence in the civilized world by a simple proposition there is no such person as a 'good' terrorist, anywhere, at any time, in any circumstances. In fighting terrorism, there cannot be qualifications. Terrorism must be fought with the same absolutist rigour with which the civilized powers once fought piracy and the international slave-trade. There were no 'good' pirates. There were no 'good' slavers. There can be no 'good' gunmen.

And let us note, at the same time, that the gunmen, the terrorists, do not, and by their nature, cannot, achieve legitimate political aims. Under no circumstances can democratic societies be the beneficiaries of terrorism. The only gainers are anarchy on the one hand, and totalitarianism on the other, the twin Frankensteins which threaten to overwhelm the democratic West.

Let me give you two examples of what I mean. The modern age of terrorism began in 1968 with the PLO. Today, sixteen years later, the PLO and the other terrorist movements it has succoured, have racked up an appalling total of lives extinguished and property destroyed. But how far has the PLO progressed towards achieving its political ends? It has made no progress at all -- it had, in fact, regressed. The Palestinian state is further away than ever. The Israeli state is stronger and more firmly established than in 1968. The victims have been the Arab states which harboured the gunmen. Jordan saved itself in 1970 because it threw them out. Lebanon perished because it lacked the courage to do the same. That is always the pattern: if the only ultimate beneficiaries of terrorism are totalitarian regimes, the chief victims are weak-minded democracies which lack the perception and courage to treat terrorism as a mortal enemy.

Again, take the IRA. They have killed over a thousand people,

most of them their own countrymen, since 1968. But the unitary Irish state is as far away as before, and they themselves constitute the chief obstacle to its realization. Meanwhile, what has happened to the Irish Republic, which has throughout observed that fatal ambivalence towards terrorism which I have described? Its economy is in ruins, the very fabric of its state is under threat, and -- since the IRA finances itself through the drug-trade -- Ireland now has the biggest drug problem in Western Europe. No harm of any consequence has been inflicted on Britain -- it is Ireland and her people who are the victims of the men with guns.

Now let us look briefly at the legal level. If there are no 'good' terrorists, it follows that civilized states must act collectively against all of them. Of course, the UN is useless -- terrorist states are among its honored members. NATO is inappropriate. I put no faith in the European Anti-Terrorist Convention, even if everyone could be persuaded to sign it. Indeed, I put no faith in any formal treaty arrangement -- you end up with a Vienna Convention. But I have a lot of faith in practical, informal and flexible arrangements between the major civilized powers.

We have to grasp the fact that to hurt one terrorist movement is to hurt them all. So I would like to see a coordinated,

well-financed, informal and secret effort by the major civilized powers to discover and exchange information about movements, routes, identities, weapons stocks, methods, plans, codes, safe houses and bases of all terrorists everywhere. And it follows we must be prepared to devise and carry through concerted operations. The hydra is less likely to survive if struck simultaneously in several places. All the legitimate powers must have their trained anti-terrorist units, and they must be accustomed to acting in concert.

For the terrorist, there can be no hiding places. The terrorist must never be allowed to feel safe anywhere in the world. He must be made to fear he is being followed not just by agents of the government against which he is conspiring, but the agents of many governments, coordinated by a common system. A terrorist kept constantly on the defensive is an ineffective terrorist.

No hiding places -- and that means, sooner or later, that the civilized powers must be prepared to act directly against the terrorist states. Looking back over the last two decades, we can claim some notable successes against individual terrorist movements. But these have been essentially defensive successes. Only on one occasion has a major offensive blow been dealt against the system of international terrorism itself. That was in 1982, when Israel crossed into Lebanon and expelled the PLO by

force. The truth is, by having the moral and physical courage to violate a so-called sovereign frontier, and by placing the moral law above the formalities of state rights, Israel was able for the first time to strike at the heart of the cancer, to arrest its growth, and to send it into headlong retreat. That is the kind of thing I mean by drastic treatment.

I believe this conference should study the example set by the Israelis in 1982, and debate in what circumstances, and by what means, the civilized West as a whole will be prepared to act physically against the terrorist states in the future. I think it must be made clear to the master-killers of Teheran and Tripoli, that there can be no ultimate hiding place for them either, that the arm of civilization is long, and sinewy, and may be stretched out to take them by the throat. Let us in the West consider these possibilities. Let us have no formal treaties or arrangements. But let us debate privately among ourselves when, and if so how, we will be prepared to discard the obstacle of sovereignty and national frontiers, behind which the state killers shelter. Let us calmly and discreetly amass and train the forces which will be necessary for such police-action, and discuss how we will deal with the political and international consequences. Let us decide in good time the limits beyond which terrorist states will not be allowed to pass, and let us perfect a military instrument of fearful retribution when and if those limits ever are crossed.

I believe the knowledge that the civilized world has the courage and means to act in this manner will itself serve as a deterrent to state terrorism. I stress the word courage, and the physical preparedness without which courage is useless. For the cancer of terrorism feeds on weakness in all its forms -- on all the hesitations and divisions and ambiguities inseparable from free, liberal societies. We must put these weaknesses behind us, and act, in Lincoln's words, with malice towards none -- except the killers; with charity to all -- especially their innocent victims; above all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right. We must, as the Book of Joshua puts it, 'Be strong and of good courage', for it is the combination of strength and courage which alone can arrest and destroy the terrorist cancer.



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date November 30, 1984

to Marc Tanenbaum

from Marty Plax *Marty*

subject Expert on "Terrorism" Addresses Chapter

"Terrorism" isn't the same as warfare. It is randomly directed against innocents who are not party to any conflict. Suicide bombings of military installations are not acts of terrorism. With this distinction in mind, Professor Abraham Miller addressed a large group of listeners at the Temple Branch, November 28. Dr. Miller, a political scientist at the University of Cincinnati, and a previous participant in AJC's Israel Academic Seminar, spoke about the role of the media in promoting the goals of terrorists and indicated why it is not likely to become a major problem in American political life.

Dr. Miller observed that terrorists' success depends on their ability to undermine the faith of citizens in their governments' ability to protect them. That's why acts of terror depend so much on the exposure given by the media. Aside from the tragic killing of innocent individuals, the goal of terror is to be "good theater". It is a dilemma for the media. They depend on "news" and acts of violence to attract viewers and listeners. "But in granting interviews to terrorists, the media inadvertently legitimate terrorists' claims that their actions are justifiable," he noted.

"Once people begin to take their claims seriously, they forget the murder of innocents and begin to question their own moral judgments about killing being evil no matter what the reason. It's not just the killing, but the effect on citizens' own moral standards that is so insidious about terrorism." Taking note of this issue, Dr. Miller expressed concern that the media may be undermining the morality of the sanctity of life by its particular form of coverage of terrorists' acts. "Worse is the fact that sometimes reporters lie in order to get a scoop, not realizing how their 'freedom' is doing damage to the principle of freedom of the press."

As for the question about terrorism in America, he observed that it is not likely to be successful here because of the size of the country. Terrorists need places to hide and to escape which they have in Eastern Europe. At the same time, American policy towards terrorism needs to be firmed up, he observed. The Israelis have only negotiated once, at Maalot, where children were involved. American policy is not that firm, but it ought to be. Then attacks against Americans, no matter where in the world, will likely be more limited.

"Perhaps the most serious danger in the future," he concluded, "is the threat from chemical and biological weapons, not nuclear ones." "But whatever will be their actions, we must make certain that we don't over-react, because in doing so, we give aid and comfort to their cause."

cc: Adam Simms

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Torture used in one-third of the world, study says

By Jeff Nesmith
Cox Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Although a United Nations declaration promises that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment," more than one-third of the world's governments have used or allowed torture since 1980, Amnesty International declared Tuesday.

The human rights organization, in a report titled "Torture in the Eighties," called for an international campaign for the abolition of cruel treatment of prisoners.

"Revulsion at the exterminating camps of the Second World War led to a convention outlawing genocide for all time as a crime against humanity," the report says. "Today's torture chambers demand a similar international response — a convention to enforce the prohibition of torture and of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment."

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the United Nations in 1948, promises that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."

"The international legal framework for its abolition exists, as do the investigative methods to verify and expose it," the report states. "What is lacking is the political will of governments to stop torturing people."

"Torture does not occur simply because the individual torturers are sadistic, even if testimonies verify that they often are. Torture is usually part of the state-controlled machinery to suppress dissent."

The report lists 66 countries, ranging from the Soviet Union to Guatemala, where Amnesty International claims to have evidence that prisoners have been tortured.

Among those not on the list were the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most countries of Western Europe, Japan and the Caribbean.

The report charges that in Ethiopia prisoners have been tortured at police stations, military barracks, and at the headquarters of the Central Revolutionary Investigation Department.

Methods have included beating on the soles of the feet, with the victim tied to an inverted chair or hanging upside down by the knees and wrists from a horizontal pole, electric shocks, sexual abuse and burning parts of the body with hot water or oil.

A spokesman for the Ethiopian Embassy here said almost no torture has been used in Ethiopia since 1980. He said the report was "a monstrous lie" and "an absurdity that cannot be sustained."

He said that one of the groups the report said was subjected to torture has actually been given full rights of citizenship

for the first time under the current Ethiopian government.

Beatings, electrical shocks, rape and other sexual abuse, along with denial of air, water and food, are common techniques of torture, the report said. Suspending a victim by bound knees and wrists from a horizontal pole has been known by various names in different countries — "the parrot's perch" in Latin America and "roast chicken" in Asia.

The report charges that in Chile suspected dissidents have been subjected to all these tortures and others.

"In previous (Amnesty International) reports, I have noted that there have been denunciations and allegations, but no attempt to determine whether they are true," said a spokesman for the Chilean Embassy.

"We have courts in Chile, and it is very easy to pursue these matters in court. If Amnesty International is truly interested in trying to be effective, why do they not send someone to Chile and pursue these allegations through the courts? Or are they merely interested in trying to be some sort of propaganda agency?"

The report states that "the Chilean courts have not taken effective action to prevent detainees from being tortured."

When detainees have filed complaints before the courts, and military personnel were suspected of being involved, they were normally dealt with by military tribunals which have consistently failed to charge or convict any member of the security forces.

In the Soviet Union, the report says, allegations of bad treatment have been made by prisoners in petitions at their trials, by prisoners and relatives in complaints to Soviet officials and international bodies, and by Soviet citizens unofficially engaged in monitoring violations of human rights.

"Many prisoners of conscience indefinitely confined to psychiatric hospitals are reported to have been given forcible treatment with disorienting and pain-causing drugs by doctors — in particular haloperidol, chlorpromazine and trifluoperazine. In some cases these drugs have been given in excessive quantities without necessary correctives and in disregard of contraindications," the Amnesty report says.

"Other forms of punishment have included insulin-shock therapy and various forms of fixation and immobilization."

"I have no intention to listen to the allegations," said an official at the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

The report charges that in Israel, the Shin Beth — members of intelligence services — have subjected Palestinians from occupied territories to a variety of mistreatments, forcing some to stand without moving for many hours at a time while hooded and handcuffed.

HARPER'S

FOUNDED IN 1850 / VOL. 268, NO. 1606
MARCH 1984

[Speech]

NURTURING TERRORISM

From a keynote address by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, senator from New York, at a conference on terrorism held in New York City on December 13. The conference was sponsored by the State University of New York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, in cooperation with the American Jewish Congress.

I offer as my thesis today the threefold proposition that much of the current disorientation in American foreign policy derives from our having abandoned, for all practical purposes, the concept that international relations can and should be governed by a regime of public international law. Further, that this ideal has not yet been succeeded by any other reasonably comprehensive and coherent notion as to the kind of world we do seek. And finally, that among the consequences of the disappearance of law as a guiding principle in American foreign policy has been the steady elevation of the role of terrorism, to the point where it is now a common instrument of the foreign policies of a number of nondemocratic governments.

At a recent gathering at the Center for National Policy in Washington, one speaker cited international law as a standard by which to judge the desirability of a policy. Zbigniew Brzezinski replied that among the shortcomings of international law as a useful framework for thinking about foreign policy is the fact that it does not provide us with an answer to international lawlessness, such as terrorism. What Dr. Brzezinski seemed to be saying was that, in a world where terrorism is a growing problem, international law is increasingly irrelevant.

What I would ask you to consider is whether the reverse might, in fact, be true: whether, in a world where international law is increasingly thought to be irrelevant—or at least is so treated

by those who conduct U.S. foreign policy—terrorism will flourish.

Could it be that the inattentiveness of the West, and of the United States in particular, to considerations of law has contributed to an international political climate that allows other states to believe that we will not hold them accountable to standards of civilized and peaceable behavior, such as might be embodied in a tradition of international law? Consider the consequences of this for the United States.

The idea that a world ruled by law would be an ideal one—certainly a peaceful one—is almost as old as the idea of law itself. But it was only in the last part of the nineteenth century that it came to be seen as a practical vision and a reasonable choice that governments might make in determining their behavior. It was part of the prevailing optimism of the time.

There was terrorism then, to be sure. In many ways the series of assassinations of public figures and bombings of citizens in cafes that spread through Europe and North America in the years before World War I—the first modern wave of terrorism—was more alarming than anything we face today. But governments of that time had no reason to consider the problem to be anything other than a matter of law enforcement: find the murderers and prosecute them. (I promptly grant that the question is much complicated by state-sponsored terrorism. The government of North Korea recently undertook to blow up the government of South Korea. The international community has developed almost no effective means of coping with such acts. Yet this does not mean we cannot; still less that we should not.)

The optimism that prevailed early in this century was part of that era's broad confidence in the continuing expansion of freedom through democracy and law, a confidence epitomized by Woodrow Wilson. No man, before or since, so engaged the passions and the hopes of all mankind as Wilson did in the months after the end of World War I. Wilson's ideals of normative world order were embodied in the League of Na-

tions. And though the United States did not join it, we did not abandon the proposition that law ought to be central to the conduct of states.

It fell to Franklin D. Roosevelt to achieve Wilson's objective, by establishing the United Nations. The U.N. represented a more experienced and perhaps more practical Wilsonianism, its ideals somehow vindicated by the devastation of World War II, which was seen as the consequence of the unwillingness of the democracies to insist upon and defend those ideals.

How very long ago that all seems. We no longer believe that democracy is the way of the future; nor do we believe that international law provides a guide to policy making.

Yet though we no longer believe in what we once did, we have not replaced it with anything. It is the resulting aimlessness and normlessness in U.S. foreign policy that seems to me to be a source of so many of our immediate problems.

For example, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter spoke of his personal disillusionment with Leonid Brezhnev. In fairness, Mr. Carter did try to do something; he proposed a grain embargo. But his reaction was based on his shock at having been lied to by a man he had embraced when last they had met. That the Soviets had violated international law was not the ground on which we acted. Our response was, at an important level, a normless one.

President Reagan seems to have followed a similar pattern last September when the Soviets shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007. Ronald Reagan said this was "a terrorist act" about which the Soviet government had "flagrantly" lied. His language grew harsher still—yet the President *did* nothing. William Safire noted at the time that Reagan had "sounded off more fiercely than Theodore Roosevelt and has acted more pusillanimously than Jimmy Carter." Why? Because the President did not know how to respond. Indeed, on September 9 the President replied to critics such as Safire by asking plaintively, "Short of going to war, what would they have us do?"

Reagan's question points to the disappearance of the idea of law as an alternative; that in between doing nothing and going to war there are no intermediate sanctions. So, we did nothing.

Not long afterward, as if to confirm that considerations of *realpolitik* are as paramount in Washington as in Moscow, the President turned his attention to Central America. Commenting on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency there, he said: "I do believe in the right of a country, when it believes that its interests are best served, to practice covert activity . . ."

Now this is a wholly normless statement. It could as easily be said that the Soviet Union has

a right to shoot down civilian airliners if "it believes that its interests are best served." The President said precisely what the Soviets believe.

I don't think the President recognizes the trap we have fallen into. A country has the right to do what it has the right to do—not what it thinks serves its interests. That is the difference between the Hobbesian state of the war of all against all and a state of law.

In February 1982, less than six weeks after a Baghdad-based terrorist group set off a bomb in a West Berlin restaurant, the Administration announced that it was removing Iraq from the official list of nations that support international terrorism. (The Export Administration Act imposes export controls on countries that support or participate in acts of terrorism.)

Not only does Iraq provide sanctuary to numerous terrorist bands, but its *diplomats*, on more than one occasion, have been killed or injured while making or delivering explosives abroad. Yet, rapprochement with Iraq having been determined to be necessary for reasons of Persian Gulf *realpolitik*, legal sanctions against terrorism were abandoned. The United States thus demonstrated that—even in an era in which terror has emerged as a routine tool of antidemocratic forces and governments—our opposition to terrorism is not based on principle or rooted in law. We can overlook it.

We are committing ourselves to the world described in those wonderful lines from Wordsworth, in "Rob Roy's Grave":

The good old rule
The Simple plan
That they should take who have the power
And they should keep who can.

Having no sense of norms, or of law, we do not object to lawlessness as such. So we find ourselves disoriented, apparently unable or unwilling to confront the lawlessness of terrorism as *lawlessness*. If we permit ourselves to view terrorism simply as being politically undesirable in certain contexts, and overlook it in certain other contexts, then we have told the world that we do not find it fundamentally unacceptable.

The costs to Americans shall in the end be measured not in the size of explosions, such as that detonated in the Capitol building on November 7. Had the timing been different, two dozen senators could have been killed; but senators can be replaced. No, the costs are to be measured in the concrete barricades that have been constructed around government buildings throughout Washington, and in the diminished access Americans will thereafter have to their own government. A government, I suggest, that has not paid adequate attention to the role of law in world affairs.

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN
NEW YORK

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 16, 1984

Dear Friend:

Knowing of your interest in world affairs, I enclose a recent contribution to the discussion of the growing challenge of terrorism.

As always, I would welcome your comments.

Sincerely,


Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Enclosure

REPRESENTATIVE JACK KEMP
REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY AT THE
JONATHAN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
24 JUNE 1984

Ladies and Gentlemen:

One of the most profound scholars of our time, Leo Strauss, once wrote of behavioral scientists that 'Rome burns while they fiddle, but they have two excuses: they don't know Rome is burning, and they don't know they are fiddling.'

Dr. Strauss could have been describing the way Western elites look at terrorism today. In fact, in his studies of politics there is almost nothing Dr. Strauss emphasized as much as the moral character of political acts. He taught that just as there is an objective distinction between healthy and sick bodies, there is a deep objective distinction between moral and political health and moral and political illness.

This is precisely what Paul Johnson meant yesterday by describing terrorism as a "cancer". It is also what President Reagan pointed to in one of the most moving speeches of our time, on Normandy Beach June 6th, when he said, "there is a profound moral difference between the use of force for liberation and the use of force for conquest."

We do not understand international terrorism as a political act unless we see it for what it really is -- a profound evil against which the liberal democracies must fight if they wish to gain moral clarity, self-confidence, and political victory.

I have warm memories of being in Jerusalem some five years ago, where I was privileged to participate, along with many of you, in the first Conference on Terrorism. Our founding Chairman Professor Benzion Netanyahu explained that 1979 Conference "was called to serve as the beginning of a new process -- the process of rallying the democracies of the world to a struggle against terrorism and the dangers it represents." I was honored and proud to be a part of that beginning, to celebrate the victory over terrorism at Entebbe, and to pay tribute to the courage and devotion of Yonaton Netanyahu. He was a true hero, who represents the most noble and best within freedom's sons.

Israel, perhaps more than any other country in the world, has known the dear price of freedom's struggle against terrorism. Operation Galilee, for all of its costs in terms of lives and treasure, was the single greatest blow to international terrorism.

I want to recall the words of another hero of our times, to whom President Reagan will award the Medal of Freedom tomorrow night, posthumously.

Senator Henry Scoop Jackson was a statesman of the highest order, a tireless leader in the cause of freedom, strength, and human dignity. In 1979, before this Conference, he said,

I believe that international terrorism is a modern form of warfare against liberal democracies. I believe that the ultimate but seldom stated goal of these terrorists is to destroy the very fabric of democracy. I believe that it is both wrong and foolhardy for any democratic state to consider international terrorism to be "someone else's problem."

Clearly, international terrorism is not "someone else's problem." Our tragic experiences in Lebanon, alone, should suffice to tell us that. I do not believe that there is a single person in this room whose countrymen haven't suffered at the hands of terrorists. But speaking as an American, let me say to those who were responsible for the deaths of our Marines in Beirut: Never again will we permit such an attack to go unanswered.

Last night, my wife Joanne and I had the pleasure of sitting alongside Ambassador Max Kampelman, a great champion of the cause of human rights. Listening to Paul Johnson's eloquent presentation, he leaned over and said, "You know, Democracy's greatest weapon is the truth." I couldn't agree more -- the whole structure of democracy rests on the foundation of truth.

And so I want to salute the founders of the Jonathan Institute. They should take pride in the fact that the 1979 conference was an historic step in articulating the truth about international terrorism, and thus in defending liberal democracies.

It is to their credit that the 1979 conference first set aside the polite niceties of the detente era and identified the Soviet Union's sponsorship of terrorism. In the words of Scoop Jackson's sharp rebuke, "One of the great coverups of this century is the effort by Western governments, who know better, to muffle the facts about Soviet bloc support for international terrorism."

I am proud to say that there has been no coverup of Soviet complicity under President Reagan. As our able Secretary of State George Shultz said last night, "The Soviets use terrorist groups for their own purposes, and their goal is always the same: to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability."

Today, the situation is both better and worse than it was in 1979. It is better because people recognize the role of the Soviets; what in 1979 I called the "unseen hand" of the Soviet Union has been made visible. It is worse because that exposure does not appear to matter very much. It is too often denied, or dismissed, or ignored; or the implications are lost in a fog of moral confusion.

It never ceases to amaze me how in the face of mountains of evidence of Soviet misdeeds, some in the West can continue to deny its reality. For example, a review of Claire Sterling's seminal study on terrorism, written by a prominent liberal human rights activist, dismissed Ms. Sterling's work with the assertion that her sources -- including many distinguished participants at this Conference -- were nothing but "apostles of the new cold war".

Well, if this isn't a type of war against democracy, then how does one account for the fact that terrorist violence is targeted almost exclusively against liberal democracies of the West? That over half of the victims of terrorism last year were Americans? That the classic objective of terrorism is to eliminate "the capacity of man to act", to paralyze the human will so that free men and women can no longer be said to be free?

There are some who routinely engage in what Ambassador Owen Harries has called "Best Case thinking". That is the insistence to see the world through rose-colored glasses; to look at events or patterns of behavior by enemies of free societies in a way that explains away any real threat. Such thinking can disarm and blind us when it comes to dealing with enemies of freedom such as Kaddafi or Khomeini or the latest ruler in the Kremlin.

And it seems that when even the "best case" explanation is appalling, some people make the most extraordinary efforts simply to ignore the evidence.

For example, two weeks ago Claire Sterling again made a contribution to truth when the New York Times Magazine carried excerpts from her report concerning the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II. She made public the evidentiary basis of the Italian investigator's conclusion that the Soviet Union was behind the attempt to assassinate the Pope.

Yet in the face of this damning report, there has been remarkably little public or media attention.

Where is the outrage, the marches, the boycotts such a revelation should provoke? Why hasn't the press followed up every lead with their accustomed exhaustive attention to detail?

When the Soviet Union shot down KAL 007, some said that their action could be understood as misguided self-defense; that it was but an air defense action, admittedly taken without regard to the identity of the intruder aircraft, but with proper regard for Soviet defense.

Leave aside, if you wish, the nature of a regime that would institute an automatic "shoot-all-intruders" order, whether military or civilian, armed or defenseless; or the morality of a regime that would not so much as apologize for needlessly taking the lives of innocent civilians; and let us suppose there is a plausible explanation for their act.

The Italian investigators' indictment of Soviet behavior is of an entirely different nature. For there is absolutely no way that the decision to kill the Holy Father, made "in some secret place, where every secret is wrapped in another secret", can be rationalized as anything other than the barbaric act it was.

And yet, for the most part, the Western democracies have taken a "business as usual" approach to the sources of terrorism.

In much the same way the Soviet Union's military power benefits from Western technology, acquired through both legal and illegal means, so too is international terrorism sustained to a degree largely unappreciated through Western capital and business enterprises. We are not only supplying the rope with which to hang us, in Lenin's memorable phrase; we're supplying the fragmentation bombs, the plastic explosives, the sniper's bullets. And by refusing to unite on a common and resolute stance, the democracies are also supplying the long-sought "legitimacy" that terrorists so eagerly covet, which allows their spokesmen and front men to walk unhindered through the capitals of the West, to exploit the opportunities that only our free societies can provide, and to champion through word and slogan and disinformation the very objectives terrorism's masters seek to attain.

Those who refuse to recognize the Soviet Union's role in international terrorism, despite the far reaching and ever growing evidence of it, remind me of those who refused to

acknowledge the reality of what Nazi Germany was doing to the Jews of Europe. Walter Laqueur speaks of this phenomenon as "the denial of reality, the psychological rejection of information which for one reason or another is not acceptable." The reasons for this self-deception are all the more mysterious, he says, "if the issues at stake are not events of marginal importance... but very real dangers to the survival of one's group or oneself."

Jean Francois Revel, in a chapter from his profound new book How Democracies Perish, published in Commentary -- one of the most valuable journals of our time -- has pointed out that democracy's greatest weakness derives from its greatest virtue: "Democracy," he warns,

tends to ignore, even deny, threats to its existence because it loathes doing what is needed to counter them. It awakens only when the danger becomes deadly, imminent, evident. By then, either there is too little time left for it to save itself, or the price of survival has become crushingly high.

I do not believe that the hour for action is too late, nor that the price we must pay is too high. But from my seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, I must say that I have become alarmed by the emergence of a political divide in the U.S. and in other countries of the Free World that may stifle our will to respond.

The disturbing undercurrent that emerges during debates on the House Floor and elsewhere is not exactly that an important part of the Western political spectrum has become "soft on communism", but rather that they have become soft on democracy.

I have heard some say that America's liberation of Grenada was no different than the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan. Where were they when American students came home, kissing the ground with joy to be safe again? Have they met the mujahadeen, fighting against tremendous odds to reclaim their homeland?

I have heard some say that the United States' support for those seeking freedom in Nicaragua is no different than Soviet efforts to overthrow the legitimate, democratically elected governments of Central America, in order to impose totalitarian rule. Do they know of the political prisoners, the religious persecution, the censored press in Nicaragua? Have they seen the people of El Salvador standing hours in the hot sun to proudly exercise their cherished right to vote?

I have heard some say that NATO's decision to strengthen its defenses is no different than the Soviets' massive offensive buildup. Have they never understood the reality of the Berlin Wall, dividing the oppressed from the Free?

In testimony before the Senate subcommittee on Terrorism, Robert Moss pointed out that those who refuse to acknowledge the Soviet Union's role in international terrorism do so partly out of a belief that there is no moral difference between Soviet and American leaders. We must dispel this illusion if we are to have a chance of defeating international terrorism, and the objectives of the kind of system that would employ terrorist means to secure its ends.

The mujahadeen, the misnamed "contras", the boat people of Cambodia and Vietnam, the members of Solidarity -- these people have no lack of moral clarity. They know the difference between freedom and tyranny. The struggle for freedom is a daily part of their life, not a topic for the cocktail party circuit.

The democracies need to end the moral and intellectual confusion that has hobbled us. Evil acts can be identified, and we who are in government owe it to those who look to us for leadership to base our policy on that distinction. For without it we simply contribute to the demoralization of the democracies that are faced with an enemy that relies, precisely, on the tendency of the Free World to lose its self-confidence, to engage in moral relativism, to blame itself for everything, and to seek eagerly for justification of Soviet behavior.

The murder of innocents by terrorists is an obvious evil, grasped by a Western public more readily it seems than by some of its business and government leaders. It is here that we should begin; we should draw the line and make clear that what was tolerated in the past is no longer to be tolerated.

There are a number of practical things we can do, many of which are detailed in President Reagan's legislative proposals submitted this year to Congress. For instance, we can enact laws against providing funds to terrorist groups or states. We can tighten federal penalties on perpetrators of terrorist acts, and improve our own abilities to detect and combat terrorism by training contingents of state police in anti-terrorist techniques.

We need to ensure that we have the best information and early warning of terrorist activities. To do this, we must restore the ability of the intelligence community to protect us. After four years of serious deterioration, the United States is slowly recovering our vital intelligence capabilities, under President Reagan's direction. But far more needs to be done.

The threat of international terrorism cannot be surmounted if we in the West are disunited in our response. Indeed, I believe that the way in which we work together to combat international terrorism may mean the difference between the success or failure


of our great experiment in democracy. I particularly want to commend and endorse Yitzak Rabin's proposal last night to establish an international organization to counter terrorism. And Congress should immediately enact the International Convention Against Taking of Hostages, and the Montreal Convention to protect against sabotage of civilian aircraft. Together, we must coordinate and intensify our antiterrorist intelligence efforts, and -- most importantly -- find the moral courage to act when action is necessary.

I admire Revel's analysis, I do not share his pessimism because I believe democracy is most in accord with human nature. Democracy is not, I believe, a brief parenthesis in human history. It is really the only system that works. The war against international terrorism, essential in itself, can help us to regain our moral clarity and our self-confidence. To fight against international terrorism, at bottom, means to fight for the fulfillment of our nature as free men and women.

The Old Testament Book of Proverbs says, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." But to be wise means to know the moral nature of our acts: Wisdom is the basis of hope.

Let us hope that the West's political, religious, and business leaders learn to treat international terrorists, and the regimes that sustain them, in the light of that sacred wisdom.

Thank you.



AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

MAIN POINTS OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN
AT THE JONATHAN INSTITUTES'S SECOND CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
SUNDAY, JUNE 24, 1984
WASHINGTON, D.C.

-- Eight years have passed since Operation Jonathan was successfully and brilliantly carried out. It served as a landmark in the struggle against international terrorism. Israel was confronted by an act of international terrorism. The terrorists who hijacked Air France flight 139 from Tel Aviv to Paris comprised PLO terrorists of the Wadia Hadad faction and German terrorists of the Baader Meinhof group. They were provided with passports by an Arab country. They brought the plane and the hostages to Entebbe. The government of Uganda and its armed forces helped and protected them..

The Government and people of Israel were determined to do their utmost not to give in to the terrorists' blackmail.

The rescue operation -- Operation Jonathan -- was assisted by information supplied by France and other countries and carried out on the assumption that the government of Kenya would allow the use of its facilities, including the Nairobi airport as a refueling station on the way back, without which the operation could not be carried out. It was an example of how vital international cooperation is vital in such a mission.

Israel paid heavily for its decision. Jonathan Netanyahu, the commander of the elite unit of the IDF was wounded and later died. With him, 4 Israeli hostages lost their lives.

The Jonathan Institute was established as a tribute to a unique man and a leader of men in battle. Yoni, as he was called by his friends, was an example of all the best that we can expect and hope in our young generation. A man of the book that did not hesitate to use the sword for the defense of his country and the values in which he believed.

-- The free world faces today 3 types of threats of war:

Nuclear war that carries the horrible threat of world destruction. Therefore, there is a hope that it can be prevented.

Conventional war, the only type of all-out war between nations since the end of the Second World War, which breaks out from time to time in our world. It is costly and therefore nations try to refrain from it. In the case of Israel we have had in the last 36 years one war every 6 - 8 years.

* Terrorism, that has become in many countries the kind of warfare that inflicts fear and interrupts the daily normal way of life of society, and has become a daily scourge that many of the governments of the world have to cope with.

* Modern terrorism has been internationalized in two ways. First full cooperation exists between most of the terror organizations. For example, today 11 terror organizations outside the Middle East cooperate with the PLO terror groups.

And second, sovereign states initiate and support terrorism and terror organizations. It is done by allowing them to use their territory for training and refuge. They supply them with diplomatic assistance and arms. For example, over 95% of the arms of the PLO were produced in the Soviet Union. Till the beginning of the war in Lebanon the arms were supplied to the PLO directly by Bulgaria."

The only way the free world can cope effectively with international terror is by cooperating internationally against it. International terror must be thwarted by an internationally organized effort.

* Today there is no international organization of any kind that acts against terror. There are effective bilateral arrangements between various states, but there is nowhere headquarters that direct the fight against international terrorism.

The United Nations cannot present the framework within which such an organization can be created, because of the membership of the Communist bloc and other countries that encourage and support terrorism.

PROPOSAL

Therefore I believe that there is an urgent need for the creation of a voluntary international organization of sovereign states that choose to work together against international terror and against states that promote and assist it. This will be in addition to the existing bilateral arrangements.

Only the United States, the leader of the most powerful country in the free world, can take the lead in initiating the establishment of such an organization and in guiding the organization's operation, and the cooperation and coordination of the activities of the state members.

The functions of this organization will be:

- Intelligence and counter-intelligence
- The creation of effective defenses and preventive measures against terrorism.
- Operational assistance against acts of terror.
- Coordinated political activity against countries that initiate or assist terror.

The structure of the organization will include governments which accept the principle of fighting terrorism and that choose to become members of the organization.

The center of the organization will be located in Washington, D.C. and be headed by a senior representative of the United States.

There will be no military or security forces under the command of this organization.


Every member state will operate and cope with acts of terrorism by its own force. It does not exclude the possibility of a combined operation by the member states involved.

A limited permanent machinery will be created to deal with the subjects defined.

Each member state will have permanent representation in the Organization.

Financing of the Organization will be shared by the member states.





AMERICAN JEWISH
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STATEMENT OF

PROFESSOR BENZION NETANYAHU

TO THE JONATHAN INSTITUTE:

SECOND CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

SUNDAY, JUNE 24, 1984

THE FOUR SEASONS HOTEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

זכר אלה יעקב וישו אה

Mr. Secretary, Lord Chalfont, Mr. Rabin, Mr. Johnson, honored guests:

This is the second time that I have been asked by the Jonathan Institute to represent it in a conference devoted to the issue of international terrorism. I have accepted this assignment as a matter of duty, with due humility, and with the full awareness of the responsibility that must rest on anyone who takes any part, however small, however marginal, in this hard and crucial struggle. I have called this struggle crucial not only because it touches such vital issues as our current security, but also because its outcome, we believe, will determine the basic conditions of our future life. Indeed, as we see it, what is involved is nothing less than the survival of free society itself.

Five years ago, when our first conference on terrorism was held, there were only few in the West who fully realized all the implications of this phenomenon. Today there are many in the free societies who recognize its essence and what it entails. Today we see leaders of the free world -- primarily the leading statesmen of this country -- approaching the front lines of this battle, and seeking, with great courage and determination, means and devices to put a halt to the blight. This is certainly a heartening development, whose importance cannot be overassessed. Yet, on the other hand, we see leaders in the West, and many in the press and

the public at large, who are still perturbed by doubts and hesitations as to the stand they should take toward terrorism. Others believe that the proper course to follow is the one that might lead to accommodation with the terrorists, even though they are not at all sure that such an accommodation is really feasible. We consider both these attitudes harmful, since both prevent the West from closing its ranks and forming a common and united front, which alone, as so many of us believe, can cope with the terrorist menace. We certainly would like the doubters to stop doubting and join those who believe in the policy of resistance. And we naturally would like those who preach accommodation to reverse their tendency and adopt the same policy. But before we try to attain these ends, we must comprehend the reasons of those who refuse to take a clear stand against terrorism, let alone to meet it head-on.

As we all know, there are some who maintain that these reasons are rooted in the immediate advantages, political or economic, which the statesmen concerned hope to reap for their countries from a compromise with the terrorists. That such considerations play a part in this matter is indeed difficult to deny; yet it is also difficult to conceive that they alone determine such attitudes. It is hard to believe that Western statesmen, whose patriotism must be held above question, would agree to ignore long-term dangers in exchange for short-term gains. We believe therefore that the indecision of some statesmen, and the preparedness of

others to bend toward the terrorists, stem in part from lack of conviction concerning the true nature of terrorism, and in part from a belief that the terrorists have a case, perhaps a just case, that they can be reasoned with, and finally won over by a number of adequate concessions. The Real Politik is, of course, there; but behind it there is a moral consideration which is based on a misconception of terrorism and what the terrorists are after.

We must clear up this misconception if we wish to make real headway in our effort; and in doing so we must bear in mind that we deal here with a crafty, most potent enemy who operates not only with physical, but also with psychological weapons, with persuasive arguments and captivating slogans. Thus, to delude the peoples of the free world, the terrorist appears as the bearer of their ideals, as the champion of the oppressed, as the critic of social ills, and, more specifically, as a fighter for freedom. The last claim especially is the sure catch which closes the trap laid for the credulous. Since freedom fighters have also used violence in their struggles, and since freedom is so dear to free men, many in the democracies are almost automatically filled with sympathy for the terrorists and their causes, and some of our youth -- our idealistic youth -- are even moved to join their ranks. Others, more observant, more critical, but unconvinced, ask with bewilderment: Who are these men? Are they really

freedom fighters as they claim to be, or are they merely using a pretence, a ruse, a guise, under which they hide their real face -- the face of quite another kind of fighter and another type of man?

Our first conference sought to answer this question by offering a summary definition of the terrorist, a definition based not on his claims, but on his deeds, on his actual conduct. Terrorism, it said, is "the deliberate, systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear in order to gain political ends." This, we maintain, is a perfect definition. But what definition, however perfect, cannot be submerged, evaded or distorted by a campaign of shrewd demagogues proclaiming gross untruths from all the major forums of the world? The distinction we have made seems to have been drowned in the noise of their tumultuous agitation. In any case, it had not gone far enough. We must, therefore, launch it here again.

But now we should sharpen our definition. We should put more stress on the word "innocent" which, when fully understood, cannot fail to expose the sham of the terrorist claims. For in contrast to the terrorist, no freedom fighter has ever deliberately attacked the innocents. He has never deliberately killed small children, or passers-by in the street, or foreign visitors, or other civilians who happen to reside in the area of the conflict. This was not just a matter of tactics, but one that related to his basic aim. His aim was to secure all our freedoms, and therefore

he could not trample under foot the rights of men, which constitute these freedoms. The terrorist, on the other hand, treats these rights as dust, which means that to him our freedoms are worthless. By no stretch of logic, therefore, can he be regarded as a fighter for freedom. But, then, what is he? What is he fighting for?

It may be argued that he fights for the liberation of his own people, without caring about the rest of the world at all. The idea may be proven absurd from many standpoints, but we shall not go into this here. We shall just take a look at the promise of free life that the terrorist carries for his own people. There are countries where this promise was already materialized, and thus we can judge it by their examples. Look at Angola, at Ethiopia, at Nicaragua! Look at Vietnam, look at Cambodia! Do you have freedom there or a despotic rule, which employs all forms of oppression? The subjugated populations of these countries are so terrified that they do not even utter a whisper of protest against any of the abuses of their rights. Yet some advocates of the terrorists still argue that it is better for a group to be subjugated by its own members than by members of a foreign people. But when was this proven to be the rule? Oppression is oppression from whichever side it comes, and intolerable oppression remains intolerable even when practiced by your own kind. In fact, it is often far worse. When Mazzini, after Italy's liberation, was asked for his view about the establishment of a

Marxist regime in Italy, he answered: "I would rather see the Austrians return to Italy than see the Italians slaves to themselves."

But we must also consider a third factor which shows clearly what the terrorist is. I refer to his patrons, promoters and overlords, all of which are states with repressive regimes in which freedom as we know it has no place. Known are his connections with countries of the Middle East such as Syria, Libya, Iraq and Iran, which earned the title of terrorist states because they habitually use terror to further their aims. But not so well-known, and often obscure, are the ties of the terrorists with the Soviet Union; and these are by far more important, more decisive, and more crucial for the future of the free world. The Soviets, as we know, have repeatedly disclaimed their responsibility for the rise of terrorism in the world, but their deeds indisputably refute their denials. It is sufficient to note their treatment of the PLO, which was rightly labeled as the "core of world terror." They support them politically on an unprecedented scale, as the whole world has repeatedly seen; they support them militarily as was revealed in our first conference by offering them training in numerous bases within and outside the Soviet Union; and they support them legally by preventing the attainment of an international convention that will provide for the terrorists' extradition. And, just as there can be no question about these facts, there can be no doubt about their

motives. Terrorism is the first general attack upon a free society which the enemies of freedom plan to take over. When they take it over, and the country falls prey to the terrorist assailants, it becomes a satellite of Soviet Russia and another jumping ground for its political expansion.

The conclusion we must draw from all this is quite evident. Far from being a bearer of freedom, the terrorist is the carrier of oppression and enslavement to any society in which he has his way. The three distinctive signs we have just mentioned -- his method of warfare which includes murder of children, his oppressive rule over his own people, and his alliances with tyrannical regimes -- indicate this unmistakably. If we point out these signs repeatedly, we should be able to destroy, as we must, the myth of the terrorist as a freedom fighter. But this is not enough. We should not only indicate what the terrorist is not, we must also show clearly what he is -- and this brings me to my final remarks.

The terrorist represents a new breed of men which takes man back to prehistoric times, to the times when morality was not yet born. Divested of any moral principle, he has no moral sense, no moral controls, and therefore is capable of committing any crime, like a

killing machine, without shame or remorse. But he is also a cunning, consummate liar, and therefore, much more dangerous than the Nazis, who used to proclaim their aims openly. In fact, he is the perfect Nihilist.

I must add that the harbingers of this type of man have appeared already a century ago, and then too they portrayed themselves as champions of "progress" and "true liberty", as the new wave of the approaching future. Then, of course, it was difficult to see where all this would lead. But a few great men did. One of these was Dostoyevsky, another was Max Nordau. Alarmed by the sight of these terrible humans, and seeking to unmask them, Nordau issued his famous warnings. "They are not the future," he shouted with indignation, "but an immeasurably remote past. They are not progress, but the most appalling reaction. They are not liberty, but the most disgraceful slavery." Were their influence not destroyed, he added, the future would not bring the hoped-for brightness of day, but "the dusk of the nations, in which all suns and all stars gradually wane, and mankind with all its institutions and creations perishes in the midst of a dying world."

Ladies and gentlemen, this is no longer an apocalyptic vision, but a forecast of a stark reality. Nordau did not speak of the death of mankind by nuclear destruction. The atomic bomb was then not yet envisioned; but civilizations may be subject to moral diseases which may kill them as surely as any bomb can. Our attitude

toward terrorism and the way we treat it, the way we are getting conditioned to its horrors, and above all our reactions to the dangers of enslavement represented by the terrorists and their masters, indicate that we are struck with a serious moral sickness that debilitates our capacities to act as free men. And yet we feel within ourselves the power of recovery and the ability to emerge triumphant. May God grant us the wisdom to cure ourselves before the dusk of the nations is upon us.



STATEMENT BY LORD CHALFONT
AT THE OPENING SESSION
OF THE JONATHAN INSTITUTE'S
SECOND CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
SUNDAY, JUNE 24, 1984
THE FOUR SEASONS HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



May I begin by saying what a special privilege it is to preside over this Second Conference of the Jonathan Institute on International Terrorism. It is five years since the first meeting in Jerusalem, and since we met there we have been saddened and diminished by the death of two distinguished international figures, both closely involved in our aims and aspirations -- Sir Hugh Fraser and Senator Henry Jackson. It is strange to think that, on an occasion like this, they will not be here to enliven us with their humour and to enlighten us with their wisdom. I shall not ask you to observe any formal act of remembrance this evening -- somehow suspect that they are not too far away at this moment, and neither of them would have patience with too much solemnity or formality. But I know that many of you will, like me, think often of Hugh Fraser and Scoop Jackson as we go about our business over the next two days.

This occasion has one special element of appeal to those of us who were at the Jerusalem Conference -- and to many others as well. It is, almost to the day, the 8th anniversary of Operation Jonathan -- the dramatic rescue at Entebbe which set new standards for those concerned with counter-terrorist operation. The only fatal casualty among the Israeli forces on that incredible occasion was Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu, the commander of the operation. It was after him that the Jonathan Institute, which has sponsored and organized this

Conference was named; and it is a matter of special pleasure that his father, Professor Benzion Netanyahu and his brother Benjamin are here tonight. Both will be speaking to us later -- Prof. Netanyahu this evening and Benjamin on Tuesday. We ought to give a special welcome.

Just over a month ago an unarmed London policewoman was murdered by a gunman firing from the window of the Libyan Embassy in the centre of the city. For many people in my country already scarred by years of assault by the gunmen and bombing of the IRA this was the first realization that state-sponsored international terrorists now strike anywhere in the free world; it was also a chilling reminder that they can often do so with complete impunity. The man who fired indiscriminately into St. James's Square with an automatic weapon had brought that weapon into England in a diplomatic pouch. He took it out the same way; and he went back to Libya to be embraced in front of the television cameras by the leader of his country. It is not my concern this evening to comment on the handling of this affair by the British Government. The problem was an agonizing one, and when thousands of British citizens were living as potential hostages in a country ruled by unpredictable fanatics, there were no easy solutions.

I mention the London incident simply to comment that it illustrated, in an especially vivid way for British people, the problem which we have gathered here in Washington to discuss.

By the standards of the international terrorist it was not an especially apocalyptic event -- not to be compared with Lod Airport or the Munich Olympics -- and to anyone who has followed closely the development of international terrorism it came as no great surprise. Indeed, those of us who met in Jerusalem for the first Jonathan Institute Conference five years ago gave a clear warning that terrorism was being developed by certain states as a weapon for the systematic disruption of the political institutions of the free world. Since the Jerusalem conference the pattern has become clearer and the intensity of the threat has increased. We are now in a phase of low-intensity warfare in which state-sponsored terrorism is being systematically employed as a paramilitary alternative to overt attacks upon Western democracies.

In the last 10 years, sixty embassies and consulates have been attacked or occupied; hundreds of government officials, business executives and diplomats have been murdered, tortured and kidnapped; the President of Egypt, a former Chief of the British Defence Staff and a former Prime Minister of Italy have been assassinated; attempts have been made to kill the Pope, and the commander of the U.S. Army in Europe; embassies, government buildings, hotels and airport lobbies have been destroyed by terrorist bombs; and hostages have been taken all over the world. Since 1968, when official statistics were first compiled, there have been 8,000 major terrorist incidents;

over 8,000 people have been wounded and nearly 4,000 killed; and, even more significantly the graph of terrorism has risen and is still rising. According to U.S. government figures the numbers of attacks rose from under 200 in 1968 to 800 in 1983; the number of attacks which caused death or injury rose from about 25 in 1968 to over 200 in 1980, and it is still rising.

Faced with this sombre picture, it seems to me that there are some hard questions to be answered; and in this conference we intend to ask, and possibly even to answer, some of them. What is the link between terrorism and totalitarianism? How has the growth of religious fundamentalism affected the "non-suicidal" nature of terrorism? How do terrorist groups organize and co-ordinate their operations? What is the role and responsibility of the media? And finally, what can we do to ensure that the free world prevails in this special form of warfare? In this last context, I hope we shall have some discussion about the four major pieces of legislation now before the United States Congress.


Each of these subjects will be addressed over the next two days by some of the world's leading experts and authorities of international terrorism. It is not, therefore, my intention to elaborate upon them any further at this stage.

It is my pleasant duty now to introduce the opening speakers of this important conference.

As Prepared for Delivery

TERRORISM:

THE CHALLENGE TO THE DEMOCRACIES



EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY, SCHEDULED FOR APPROXIMATELY 9:30 P.M. EDT., SUNDAY, JUNE 24, 1984. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY CITED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

Five years have passed since the Jonathan Institute held its first conference on terrorism, and in that time the world has seen two major developments: one a cause for great distress; the other a reason for hope.

The distressing fact is that over these past five years terrorism has increased. More people were killed or injured by international terrorists last year than in any year since governments began keeping records. In 1983 there were more than 500 such attacks, of which more than 200 were against the United States. For Americans the worst tragedies were the destruction of our Embassy and then the Marine barracks in Beirut. But around the world, many of our close friends and allies were also victims. The bombing of Harrods in London, the bombing at Orly Airport in Paris, the destruction of a Gulf Air flight in the UAE, and the Rangoon bombing of South Korean officials are just a few examples -- not to mention the brutal attack on a West Jerusalem shopping mall this past April.

Even more alarming has been the rise of state-sponsored terrorism. In the past five years more states have joined the ranks of what we might call the "League of Terror," as full-fledged sponsors and supporters of indiscriminate -- and not so indiscriminate -- murder.

Terrorist attacks supported by what Qaddafi calls the "holy alliance" of Libya, Syria, and Iran, and attacks sponsored by North Korea, and others, have taken a heavy toll of innocent lives. Seventy or more such attacks in 1983 probably involved significant state support or participation.

As a result, more of the world's people must today live in fear of sudden and unprovoked violence at the hands of terrorists. After five years, the epidemic is spreading and the civilized world is still groping for remedies.

Nevertheless, these past five years have also given us cause for hope. Thanks in large measure to the efforts of concerned governments, citizens, and groups like the Jonathan Institute, the peoples of the free world have finally begun to grapple with the problem of terrorism, in intellectual and in practical terms. I say intellectual because the first step toward a solution to any problem is to understand that there is a problem, and then to understand its nature. In recent years we have learned a great deal about terrorism, though our education has been painful and costly. We know what kind of threat international terrorism poses to our free society. We have learned much about the terrorists themselves, their supporters, their targets, their diverse methods, their underlying motives, and their eventual goals.

Armed with this knowledge we can focus our energies on the practical means for reducing and eventually eliminating the threat. We can all share the hope that, when the next conference of this Institute is convened, we will look back and say that 1984 was the turning point in our struggle against terrorism, that having come to grips with the problem we were able to deal with it effectively and responsibly.

The Anatomy of Terrorism

What we have learned about terrorism, first of all, is that it is not random, undirected, purposeless violence. It is not, like an earthquake or a hurricane, an act of nature before which we are helpless. Terrorists and those who support them have definite goals; terrorist violence is the means of attaining those goals. Our response must be twofold: We must deny them the means, but above all we must deny them their goals.

But what are the goals of terrorism? We know that the phenomenon of terrorism is actually a matrix that covers a diverse array of methods, resources, instruments, and immediate aims.

It appears in many shapes and sizes -- from the lone individual who plants a homemade explosive in a shopping center, to the small clandestine group that plans kidnappings and assassinations of public figures, to the well-equipped and well-financed organization that uses force to terrorize an entire population. Its stated objectives may range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution. International drug smugglers use terrorism to blackmail and intimidate government officials. It is clear that our responses will have to fit the precise character and circumstances of the specific threats.

But we must understand that the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: With rare exceptions, they are attempting to impose their will by force -- a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear. And their efforts are directed at destroying what all of us here are seeking to build.

The Threat to the Democracies

The United States and its democratic allies are morally committed to certain ideals and to a humane vision of the future. In our foreign policies, we try to foster the kind of world that promotes peaceful settlement of disputes, one that welcomes change without violent conflict.

We seek a world in which human rights are respected by all governments, a world based on the rule of law. We know that in a world community where all nations share these blessings, our own democracy will flourish, our own nation will prosper, and our own people will continue to enjoy freedom.

Nor has ours been a fruitless search. In our lifetime, we have seen the world progress, though perhaps too slowly, toward this goal. Civilized norms of conduct have evolved, even governing relations between adversaries. Conflict persists, but with some notorious exceptions, even wars have been conducted within certain restraints: Indiscriminate slaughter of innocents is widely condemned; the use of certain kinds of weapons has been proscribed, and most nations have heeded those proscriptions.

We all know that the world as it exists is still far from our ideal vision. But today, even the progress that mankind has already made is endangered by those who do not share that vision -- who, indeed, violently oppose it.

For we must understand, above all, that terrorism is a form of political violence. Wherever it takes place, it is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies -- against our most basic values and often our fundamental strategic interests.

The values upon which democracy is based -- individual rights, equality under the law, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of religion -- all stand in the way of those who seek to impose their ideologies or their religious beliefs by force. A terrorist has no patience and no respect for the orderly processes of democratic society and, therefore, he considers himself its enemy.

And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists also make them so vulnerable. Precisely because we maintain the most open societies, terrorists have unparalleled opportunity to strike against us.

Terrorists and Freedom Fighters

The antagonism between democracy and terrorism seems so basic that it is hard to understand why so much intellectual confusion still exists on the subject. We have all heard the insidious claim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Let me read to you the powerful rebuttal that was stated before your 1979 conference by a great American, Senator Henry Jackson:

"The idea that one person's 'terrorist' is another's 'freedom fighter' cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'freedom' to be associated with acts of terrorists."

Where democracy is struggling to take root, the terrorist is, again, its enemy. He seeks to spread chaos and disorder, to paralyze a society. In doing so he wins no converts to his cause; his deeds inspire hatred and fear, not allegiance. The terrorist seeks to undermine institutions, to destroy popular faith in moderate government, and to shake the people's belief in the very idea of democracy. In Lebanon, for example, state-sponsored terrorism has exploited existing tensions and attempted to prevent that nation from rebuilding its democratic institutions.

Where the terrorist cannot bring about anarchy, he may try to force the government to overreact, or impose tyrannical measures of control, and hence lose the allegiance of the people.

Turkey faced such a challenge, but succeeded in overcoming it. Martial law was imposed; the terrorist threat was drastically reduced, and today we see democracy returning to that country. In Argentina, the widely and properly deplored "disappearances" of the 1970s were in fact part of a response -- a deliberately provoked response -- to a massive campaign of terrorism. We are pleased that Argentina, too, has returned to the path of democracy. Other countries around the world face similar challenges, and they too must steer their course carefully between anarchy and tyranny. The lesson for civilized nations is that we must respond to the terrorist threat within the rule of law, lest we become unwitting accomplices in the terrorist's scheme to undermine civilized society.

Once we understand terrorism's goals and methods, it is not hard to tell, as we look around the world, who are the terrorists and who are the freedom fighters. The resistance fighters in Afghanistan do not destroy villages or kill the helpless. The Contras in Nicaragua do not blow up school buses or hold mass executions of civilians.

How tragic it would be if democratic societies so lost confidence in their own moral legitimacy that they lost sight of the obvious: that violence directed against democracy or the hopes for democracy lacks fundamental justification. Democracy offers mechanisms for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievances.

But resort to arms in behalf of democracy against repressive regimes or movements may indeed be a fight for freedom, since there may be no other way that freedom can be achieved.

The free nations cannot afford to let the Orwellian corruption of language hamper our efforts to defend ourselves, our interests, or our friends. We know the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters and our policies reflect that distinction. Those who strive for freedom and democracy will always have the sympathy, and when possible, the support of the American people. We will oppose guerrilla wars where they threaten to spread totalitarian rule or deny the rights of national independence and self-determination. But we will oppose terrorists no matter what banner they may fly. For terrorism in any cause is the enemy of freedom.

The Supporters of Terrorism

If freedom and democracy are the targets of terrorism, it is clear that totalitarianism is its ally. The number of terrorist incidents in or against totalitarian states is negligible. States that support and sponsor terrorist actions have managed in recent years to co-opt and manipulate the phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals.

It is not a coincidence that most acts of terrorism occur in areas of importance to the West. More than 80 percent of the world's terrorist attacks in 1983 occurred in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. The recent Posture Statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it this way:

"Terrorists may or may not be centrally controlled by their patrons. Regardless, the instability they create in the industrialized West and Third World nations undermines the security interests of the United States and its allies."

States that sponsor terrorism are using it as another weapon of warfare, to gain strategic advantage where they cannot use conventional means. When Iran and its allies sent terrorists to bomb Western personnel in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the West's commitment to defending its interests in the Middle East. When North Korea sponsored the murder of South Korean government officials, it hoped to weaken the non-Communist stronghold on the mainland of East Asia. The terrorists who assault Israel are also enemies of the United States. When Libya and the PLO provide arms and training to the Communists in Central America, they are aiding Soviet efforts to undermine our security in that vital region. When the Soviet Union and its clients provide financial, logistic, and training support for terrorists worldwide -- when the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in Germany assault free countries in the name of Communist ideology -- they hope to shake the West's self-confidence and sap its will to resist aggression and intimidation.

And we are now watching the Italian authorities unravel the answer to one of the great questions of our time: was there Soviet-bloc involvement in the attempt to assassinate the Pope?

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion: The Soviet Union officially denounces the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Yet there is a wide gap between Soviet words and Soviet actions. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups are indigenous to every society. But in many countries, terrorism would long since have passed away had it not been for significant support from outside. The international links among terrorist groups are now clearly understood, and the Soviet link, direct or indirect, is also clearly understood. The Soviets use terrorist groups for their own purposes, and their goal is always the same: to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability.

A Counterstrategy Against Terrorism

Having identified the challenge, we must now consider the best strategy to counter it.

We must keep in mind, as we devise our strategy, that our ultimate aim is to preserve what the terrorists seek to destroy: democracy, freedom, and the hope for a world at peace.

The battle against terrorism must begin at home. Terrorism has no place in our society, and we have taken vigorous steps to see that it is not imported from abroad. We are now working with the Congress on law-enforcement legislation that would help us obtain more information about terrorists through the payment of rewards to informants, and would permit prosecution of those who support states that use or sponsor terrorism. Our F.B.I. is improving our ability to detect and prevent terrorist acts within our own borders.

We must also ensure that our people and facilities in other countries are better protected against terrorist attacks. So we are strengthening security at our embassies around the world to prevent a recurrence of the Beirut and Kuwait Embassy bombings.

While we take these measures to protect our own citizens, we know that terrorism is an international problem that requires the concerted efforts of all free nations. Just as there is collaboration among those who engage in terrorism, so there must be cooperation among those who are its actual and potential targets.

An essential component of our strategy, therefore, has been greater cooperation among the democratic nations and all others who share our hopes for the future. The world community has achieved some successes. But too often, countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities or fear of provoking the bully. The time has come for the nations that truly seek an end to terrorism to join together, in whatever forums, to take the necessary steps. The declaration on terrorism that was agreed upon at the London Economic Summit two weeks ago was a welcome sign that the industrial democracies share a common view of the terrorist threat. We must build on that foundation.

Greater international cooperation offers many advantages. If we can collectively improve our gathering and sharing of intelligence, we can better detect the movements of terrorists, anticipate their actions, and bring them to justice. We can also help provide training and share knowledge of terrorist tactics. To that end, the Reagan Administration has acted promptly on the program that Congress approved last year to train foreign law enforcement officers in anti-terrorist techniques. And the President has sent Congress two bills to implement two international conventions to which the United States is a signatory: the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, and the Montreal Convention to protect against sabotage of civilian aircraft.

We must also make a collective effort to address the special problem of state-sponsored terrorism. States that support terror offer safe havens, funds, training, and logistical support. We must do some hard thinking about how to pressure members of the League of Terror to cease their support. Such pressure will have to be international, for no one country can exert sufficient influence alone. Economic sanctions and other forms of pressure impose costs on the nation that applies them, but some sacrifices will be necessary if we are to solve the problem. In the long run, I believe, it will have been a small price to pay.

We must also discourage nations from paying blackmail to terrorist organizations. Although we recognize that some nations are particularly vulnerable to the terrorist threat, we must convince them that paying blackmail is counterproductive and inimical to the interests of all.

Finally, the nations of the free world must stand together against terrorism to demonstrate our enduring commitment to our shared vision. The terrorists may be looking for signs of weakness, for evidence of disunity. We must show them that we are unbending. Let the terrorists despair of ever achieving their goals.

Active Defense

All the measures I have described so far, domestic and international, are important elements in a comprehensive strategy. But are they enough? Is the purely passive defense that these measures entail sufficient to cope with the problem? Can we as a country -- can the community of free nations -- stand in a solely defensive posture and absorb the blows dealt by terrorists?

I think not. From a practical standpoint, a purely passive defense does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it. It is time to think long, hard, and seriously about more active means of defense -- about defense through appropriate preventive or pre-emptive actions against terrorist groups before they strike.

We will need to strengthen our capabilities in the area of intelligence and quick reaction. Human intelligence will be particularly important, since our societies demand that we know with reasonable clarity just what we are doing. Experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. As President Reagan has stated:

"We must make it clear to any country that is tempted to use violence to undermine democratic governments, destabilize our friends, thwart efforts to promote democratic governments, or disrupt our lives, that it has nothing to gain, and much to lose."

Clearly there are complicated moral issues here. But there should be no doubt of the democracies' moral right, indeed duty, to defend themselves.

And there should be no doubt of the profound issue at stake. The democracies seek a world order that is based on justice. When innocents are victimized and the guilty go unpunished, the terrorists have succeeded in undermining the very foundation of civilized society, for they have created a world where there is no justice. This is a blow to our most fundamental moral values and a dark cloud over the future of humanity. We can do better than this.

No matter what strategy we pursue, the terrorist threat will not disappear overnight. This is not the last conference that will be held on this subject. We must understand this and be prepared to live with the fact that despite all our best efforts the world is still a dangerous place. Further sacrifices, as in the past, may be the price for preserving our freedom.

It is essential, therefore, that we not allow the actions of terrorists to affect our policies or deflect us from our goals. When terrorism succeeds in intimidating governments into altering their foreign policies, it only opens the door to more terrorism. It shows that terrorism works; it emboldens those who resort to it and it encourages others to join their ranks.

The Future

If we remain firm, we can look ahead to a time when terrorism will cease to be a major factor in world affairs. But we must face the challenge with realism, determination, and strength of will. Not so long ago we faced a rash of political kidnappings and embassy takeovers. These problems seemed insurmountable. Yet, through increased security, the willingness of governments to resist terrorist demands and to use force when appropriate, such incidents have become rare. In recent years, we have also seen a decline in the number of airline hijackings -- once a problem that seemed to fill our newspapers daily. Tougher security measures and closer international cooperation have clearly had their effect.

I have great faith that we do have the will, and the capability, to act decisively against this threat. It is really up to us, the nations of the free world. We must apply ourselves to the task of ensuring our future, and consigning terrorism to its own dismal past.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release: June 25, 1984

Address by: Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
Second Conference on International Terrorism

Ambassador Kirkpatrick on Terrorism and Totalitarianism

Their Method, Violence and Lies

Their Goal, Total, Exclusive Power

"Terrorism is a part of total war. It chooses violence as its method, and unarmed, undefended, unwary civilians as its victims. Terrorism is a form of political warfare, and "terrorists are the shock troops in a war to the death against the values and institutions of Western society."

So declared Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, in an address to the Second Conference on International Terrorism, sponsored by the Jerusalem-based Jonathan Institute.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, emphasizing the importance of observation and description of palpable evidence, devoted the major portion of her speech to an analysis of the distinctions between terrorism and simple crime, and between terrorism and

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conventional war.

Like terrorism, crime is unauthorized violence against persons who are not at war. The difference lies not in the nature of the act, but in the perpetrator's understanding of what he is doing. "Terrorism," she noted, "is political in a way that crime is not."

While a political purpose related to a public goal makes an act political, she pointed out, it does not make it moral. "And a public purpose does not make a terrorist who has been arrested a political prisoner."

As for the distinction between terrorism and conventional war, Dr. Kirkpatrick emphasized that soldiers use violence where a state of belligerence is recognized to exist, and in accordance with the legal authorities of his society. But "a terrorist engages in violence in violation of law against persons who are not at war with him."

Ambassador Kirkpatrick also emphasized the crucial affinities between terrorism and totalitarianism.

"Both politicize the whole of society....Both conceive violence as appropriate means for their political ends, and use violence as an instrument of first resort....Both reject basic moral principles associated with Judeo-Christian civilization.... Both reject prohibitions against the use of offensive force in social or international affairs....Both act, and see themselves

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as acting, in the name of a new morality...a higher morality whose transcendent collective ends justify and demand violation of conventional morality and the sacrifice of people whose membership in the old society makes them expendable. Both permit and even encourage expression of aggressive murderous instincts...."

But, as Kirkpatrick sees it, the most important relation between the two is a pragmatic, not a theoretical one: The most powerful contemporary totalitarian state, the USSR, is also "the principal supporter and sponsor of international terrorism as a form of political action".

Among the regimes in which she sees terrorism and totalitarianism linked today are Nicaragua, Grenada prior to its liberation, Vietnam.

Another significant new doctrine, according to Ambassador Kirkpatrick, is the notion that "the intended victims have no right to self-defense" against terrorism perpetrated by national liberation movements. The innocent civilian victims of such illegitimate violence are not seen as victims but as "objects of a national liberation movement". And only governments that seek to repress the violence of national liberation movements are cited, at United Nations ~~forums~~ and other such forums, for human rights violations.

According to this dispensation, Kirkpatrick pointed out, West Germany has no right to defend itself against the Baader-

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Meinhof gang; the Italian government has no right to defend itself against the Red Brigades; the Spanish government no right of self-defense against the Basque terrorists, and so forth.

The level of intellectual, political and moral confusion, Dr. Kirkpatrick asserts, "has grown very deep and very serious". And this is largely because of a final affinity she notes between terrorism and totalitarianism: "Both attempt to confuse as well as to terrorize."

She cites Aleksander Solzhenitsyn and George Orwell in pointing out that "violence is used to maintain a system of lies, and lies are used to justify relations based on violence. Violence can be used to close a society. Lies can be used to veil the violence."

The most important step toward defeating those who would destroy our freedom, Dr. Kirkpatrick concludes, is to "find the courage to face the truth and speak about it openly."



Julian Amery (United Kingdom) is a Conservative Member of Parliament. He has served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Financial Secretary of the War Office, Minister of Aviation, Minister of Public Works, and Minister of Housing. His books include several volumes on the life and policies of Joseph Chamberlain.

Moshe Arens (Israel) is Israel's Minister of Defense. He served as his country's Ambassador to the United States from 1982 to 1983. A member of the Knesset since 1974, he was Chairman of its Defense and Foreign Relations Committee from 1977 to 1982. Prior to his election to the Knesset, he was Professor of Aeronautical Engineering at the Technion and Vice President of Israel Aircraft Industry.

Jillian Becker (United Kingdom) has been writing about terrorism since 1975. Her most recent book, "The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Liberation Organization," was published in Britain in April 1984, and this month in the United States. She has also edited "The Soviet Union and Terrorism," scheduled for publication next fall.

Walter Berns (USA) has taught Constitutional law at Yale, Cornell, the University of Toronto and the University of Chicago. His books include "The First Amendment," "The Future of American Democracy," and "For Capital Punishment." He is John M. Olin Distinguished Scholar in Constitutional and Legal Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and Professorial Lecturer and Georgetown University.

Alain Besancon (France) is Professor of the History of Russian Culture at the Ecole de Hautes Etudes in Paris and columnist for L'Express. Last year he was Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford. Two of his 12 books were translated into English: "The Intellectual Origins of Lenin" and "The Soviet Syndrome."

David Brinkley (USA) is the host of "This Week with David Brinkley" on ABC-TV, and has anchored "World News Tonight." Prior to joining ABC News in 1981 he was with NBC for 37 years. As anchorman, reporter and political analyst he has covered every presidential campaign since 1952 and, with Peter Jennings, is ABC's political analyst for the current campaign.

Vladimir Bukovsky (USSR, USA) is a Russian dissident and author. Prior to his expulsion from Russia in 1976, he campaigned for human rights in the USSR and exposed the Soviet use of psychiatry against political dissenters. He was arrested several times, placed in a "psychiatric ward," and in 1972 was sentenced to a term of 12 years on a charge of anti-Soviet activities. He is the author of "To build a Castle," an autobiography, and "The Piercing Pain of Freedom."

Lord Chalfont (United Kingdom) is a writer and journalist and former Cabinet Minister in the British government. He is the author of several works, including a biography of Field Marshall Montgomery and an analysis of American military power "The Sword and the Spirit." He is a frequent contributor of articles and reviews to The Times and professional journals.

Alan Cranston (USA) is the Senior Senator from California, and Democratic Whip. He is a member of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee and of the Foreign Relations Committee. He is the ranking Democrat on the Arms Control Subcommittee, and is a member of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee and the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee.

Alfonse D'Amato (USA) is the Junior Senator from New York. He is a member of the Committees on Appropriations and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, and sits on the Defense and Transportation Subcommittees.

Arnaud de Borchgrave (USA) is an author, journalist and lecturer. He was Newsweek's chief foreign correspondent from 1964 to 1980 and in the past 33 years has covered most of the world's major news events from some 90 countries. A recipient of many journalistic awards, he has co-authored "The Spike" and the recently published "Monimbo."

Midge Decter (USA) is an editor, writer and Executive Director of the Committee for the Free World. Her works include "The Liberated Woman and Other Americans," "The New Chastity," and "Liberal Parents, Radical Children," and numerous articles on political and social issues.

Carlo Ripa di Meana (Italy) is a member of the Socialist Party and representative to the European Parliament, where he has been a leading proponent of international action against terror. He has visited Afghanistan three times since 1980, touring battle zones and rebel outposts, and has lectured extensively on developments there.

Wolfgang Fikentscher (West Germany) has been professor of Law at the University of Munich Faculty Law since 1971, and has held positions on the faculties of several European and American universities including Munster, Tubingen, Ann Arbor (Mich.) and Berkeley (Cal.). He has published books and articles on legal theory, anarchy and the New Left, and international economic relations. In his book "Blocke und Monopole in der Weltpolitik" (1979), he proposed the establishment of a Free Nations Organization and an instrument of cooperation in matters of common concern, among them terrorism.

Louis Giuffrida (USA) is Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. He reports directly to the President of the U.S. and establishes federal policies for the organization and functioning of the Federal Government under emergency conditions. Among papers published by Mr. Giuffrida are "The Language of Terrorism," "Kidnappings and Hostages," and "Morality of Terrorism."

Arthur Goldberg (USA) is the former Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, former U.S. permanent Representative to the U.N. and former Secretary of Labor. He currently practices international law.

Shintaro Ishihara (Japan) has been a member of the Japanese Diet from the second district of Tokyo since 1972, and chairman of the Ishihara faction of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. He has authored several prize-winning books in Japan, including "Season of Violence." He is a leader of the young generation in Japan's political life.

Paul Johnson (United Kingdom) is a writer and historian. He was editor of "The New Statesman", one of England's leading weeklies. He is the author of "Elizabeth I," "Pope John XXIII," "A History of Christianity," and "Enemies of Society," as well as numerous articles on literary and political subjects. His most recent book, "Modern Times," was published in the United States in 1983.

Eli Kedourie (United Kingdom) is Professor of Politics at the University of London and has been teaching at the London School of Economics for over 30 years. He has also served as visiting professor at Princeton and Harvard. He has been the editor of the quarterly "Middle Eastern Studies" since its inception in 1964. His books include "Nationalism in Asia and Africa," "Islam in the Modern World and Other Studies," and "The Chatham House Version and Other Studies," soon to be published in a new edition.

J.B. Kelly (New Zealand) is a diplomatic historian of the Middle East. He has taught at the universities of Oxford, Michigan, and Wisconsin. His books include "Eastern Arabian Frontiers," "Britain and the Persian Gulf," and most recently "Arabia, the Gulf and the West." He is currently writing a history of British and American relations with Saudi Arabia.

Jack Kemp (USA) is serving his seventh term in the US Congress. He is Chairman of the House Republican Committee and is a member of the House Budget Committee. He is also the ranking Republican on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. Recently named to the UN Special Session on Disarmament, he has also served as Congressional delegate to the SALT talks and the US Commission on Refugees.

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick (USA) is the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. She also serves as a member of President Reagan's Cabinet. Prior to joining government she was professor of government at Georgetown University. Her books include "The Reagan Phenomenon--and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy, "Dictatorship and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics" and "The New Presidential Elite."

Leszek Kolakowski (Poland, USA) was for many years Professor of the History of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw. Since his expulsion from the university in 1968 he has taught mostly in England and the United States; he now divides his time between All Souls College, Oxford, and the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago. Mr. Kolakowski's books include the three-volume "Main Currents of Marxism," "Religion," and an essay "Totalitarianism and the Lie" in "1984 Revisited."

Ted Koppel (USA) is anchorman for ABC News "Nightline" and "Viewpoint." From 1971 to 1980 he was ABC's Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, and from 1975 to 1977 the anchorman for the "ABC Saturday Night News." After joining ABC News in 1963, he served in posts around the world, including Japan and Hong Kong, where he served as Bureau Chief. He has received many awards for outstanding journalism and won national and international recognition for his nightly coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis.

Charles Krauthammer (USA) is senior editor at the New Republic magazine. A contributing essayist to Time since 1983, he recently won the National Magazine Award for essays and criticism. He was Commonwealth Scholar in politics at Oxford and a speechwriter for Vice President Mondale.

Paul Laxalt (USA) is the Senior Senator from Nevada. He also served as Nevada's Lieutenant Governor and Governor. He is a member of the Appropriations and Judiciary committees and is Chairman of the Judiciary Criminal Law Subcommittee and of the Appropriations' State, Justice, Commerce Subcommittee. In January he became General Chairman of the Republican Party.

Michael Ledeen (USA) is a senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and the former executive editor of "The Washington Quarterly." A former professor at Washington University in St. Louis and at the University of Rome, he is the author of books on Italian fascism, West European communism and, with William Lewis, of "Debacle: The American Failure in Iran." In 1981-82 he served as special adviser to Secretary of State Alexander Haig. He is now completing a book on the superpowers.

Burton Leiser (USA) is Edward J. Mortola Professor of Philosophy in the Dyson College of Arts and Sciences of Pace University, and Adjunct Professor of Law at the College of Law of Pace University. He has also taught at the State University of New York College at Buffalo, Sir George Williams University in Montreal, and Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa. His books include "Custom, Law and Morality," "Liberty, Justice and Morals: Contemporary Value Conflicts," and "Values in Conflict: Life, Liberty, and the Rules of Law."

Bernard Lewis (USA) is Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern studies, Princeton University, and Long Term Member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. His numerous books include "The Origins of Ismailism," "The Arabs in History," "The Middle East and the West," "The Assassins," and "The Muslim Discovery of Europe." He is co-editor of "The Cambridge History of Islam" and "The Encyclopaedia of Islam" (in progress). His books and articles have been translated into 18 languages.

Christian Lochte (West Germany) is a Director of the Hamburg Senate and the Chief of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, West Germany's agency responsible for combatting terrorism.

Edwin Meese III (USA) is Counsellor to the President. As the President's chief policy advisor, he is a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council. From 1977 to 1981, he was Professor of Law at the University of San Diego, where he was also Director of the Center for Criminal Justice Policy and Management. Before joining Governor Reagan's staff as Legal Affairs Secretary and Executive Assistant, he served as Deputy District Attorney of Alameda County.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan (USA) is the senior Senator from New York. He is Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and is a member of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee. He was the US Ambassador to India and US Ambassador to the United Nations. He served as a member of the Cabinet and sub-Cabinet to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford. From 1972 to 1976 he was Professor of Government at Harvard University. His most recent book is "Loyalties".

Takeshi Muramatsu (Japan) is the dean of the College of Comparative Culture at Tsukuba University. A writer, columnist, literary critic and French scholar, he has written on a great variety of subjects. His books include "Charles de Gaulle," "International Terrorism," and "Blood, Sand and Prayer--History of the Contemporary Middle East."

Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel) is Deputy Chief of the Israeli Mission in Washington. From 1967-1972 he served as a soldier and officer in a special paratroop unit of the Israeli Army. He is the editor of "International Terrorism: Challenge and Response," co-editor of "The Letters of Jonathan Netanyahu," and author of articles on the Middle East in leading American newspapers.

Benzion Netanyahu (Israel) is Professor Emeritus of Judaic Studies at Cornell University and author of numerous books and studies on Medieval and Modern Jewish History. Architect and first General Editor of the "World History of the Jewish People", he was also for many years Editor-in-Chief of the "Encyclopedia Hebraica". His works include "The Maranos of Spain" and "The Origins of the Inquisition", to be published next year in the US. He was chairman of the Founding Executive Committee of the Jonatnan Institute.

John O'Sullivan (United Kingdom) is a journalist who was formerly editor of "Policy Review" and a fellow of the Institute of Politics at Harvard. He has recently joined the editorial staff of the London "Daily Telegraph."

Norman Podhoretz (USA) is the Editor-in-Chief of Commentary magazine, a position he has held since 1960. His books include "Why We Were in Vietnam", "The Present Danger" and "Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir". He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the Boards of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, the Committee on the Present Danger and the Committee for the Free World. He is Chairman of the New Directions Advisory Committee of the USIA.

Yitzhak Rabin (Israel) was Prime Minister of Israel from 1974 to 1977. He served as Israel's Ambassador to the United States from 1968 to 1973. His military career began in Israel's War of Independence in 1948 and culminated in his role as Chief of Staff during the Six-Day War. During his period as Premier, his Cabinet authorized the rescue mission to Entebbe.

Jean-Francois Revel (France) is an author, editor and journalist. His most recent book, "How Democracies Perish" will be published in the U.S. in November, 1984. His writings include seventeen books, among them "The Totalitarian Temptation," "Without Marx or Jesus," two volumes of selected articles, and a "History of Western Philosophy." Professor Revel taught at the French Institute in Mexico City, Florence, Lille, and Paris. From 1978 to 1981 he was editor of L'Express.

Eugene Rostow (USA) is Stirling Professor of Law, Yale University, and former Dean of the Yale Law School. He held several senior posts in the U.S. government, including Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Reagan Administration and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under President Johnson. He was also the president of the Atlantic Treaty Organization and has been the chairman of the Executive Committee on the Present Danger since 1976. He has written numerous works on international law and political affairs.

Daniel Schorr (USA) is senior foreign correspondent of CNN. He was CBS correspondent in the United States and abroad for many years prior to his present assignment and headed the CBS bureau in Moscow at its opening in 1955. He is author of "Clearing the Air," which includes a chapter on TV and terrorism, and of "Don't Get Sick in America." He has received many journalistic awards here and abroad and is known for his activist involvement in the defense of the First Amendment.

George P. Shultz (USA) is the 60th U.S. Secretary of State. He served in President Nixon's Administration as Secretary of Labor, Director of Office of Management and Budget, Secretary of the Treasury, and Chairman of the Council on Economic Policy. He taught at MIT and the University of Chicago, where he was Professor of Industrial Relations and Dean of the Graduate School of Business. He has published numerous works on Economics, Business and Labor-Management issues.

Claire Sterling (USA) is an American foreign correspondent based in Italy for over 30 years. She was foreign correspondent for The Reporter throughout its existence and has reported on European, African, Middle Eastern and South-East Asian for The Atlantic, The New York Times Magazine, the Reader's Digest, Harper's and the New Republic. Since 1970 she has been writing columns of political analysis for the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and the International Herald Tribune. She has written three books: "The Masaryk Case," "The Terror Network," and the recently published "The Time of the Assassins."

P.J. Vatikiotis (United Kingdom) is Professor of Politics with Reference to the Near and Middle East at the University of London. His most recent books are "Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Sadat," "Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East," and "Nasser and His Generation."

William H. Webster (USA) has been the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations since 1978. He has served as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri, a member of the Missouri Board of Law Examiners, Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

George Will (USA) is a Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist whose articles appear in Newsweek, The Washington Post and more than 300 other newspapers in the United States. His books include "The Pursuit of Happiness and Other Sobering Thoughts" and the recently published "Statecraft as Soulcraft."

Bob Woodward (USA) is Assistant Managing Editor at the Washington Post. He is co-author of "All the President's Men," "The Final Days," "The Brethren" and author of the recently published "Wired." His six part series, "The Terror Factor" was published in the Washington Post last February.

DANIEL SCHORR

Terrorism and the Media

Synopsis

Second International Conference

on

International Terrorism,

June 26, 1984

There exists an unfortunate symbiotic relationship between terrorism and television. It was displayed in satiric form in the film, Network, in which a gang of terrorists in effect engaged in paid programming for television, and in the NBC docudrama, Special Bulletin, in which Charleston, S.C., was (fortunately fictitiously) lost in the interplay between a television station and terrorists.

In real life, as we call it, television responds to violence, and that tends to encourage violence.

Anthony Quinton, former head of the State Department's Office for Combating Terrorism, has associated the increase in casualties during hijackings and hostage-takings with the desire of terrorists to insure news media attention.

Deliberate acts of horror--like the tossing out of slain victims--are planned as media events.

Sometimes the aim of terrorists is to hijack television itself. When the radical Baader-Meinhof gang in West Germany kidnapped a politician in 1975 as hostage for the release of five imprisoned comrades, it forced German television to show each prisoner boarding a plane and to broadcast dictated propaganda statements. "For 72 hours we lost control of our medium," said a German television executive.

When Arab terrorists seized the Vienna headquarters of OPEC in 1975, killing three persons and taking oil ministers hostage, the terrorists' plan called for them to occupy the building until TV cameras arrived.

A central feature of the plan of the San Francisco Symbionese Liberation Army, which kidnapped Patricia Hearst, was the exploitation of the media--forcing radio and television to play its tapes and carry its messages.

The Hanafi Muslims' hostage-taking occupation of three locations in Washington in 1976 was a classic case of media-age terrorism. The leader, Hamaas Abdul Khalis, spent much of his time giving interviews by telephone while his wife checked what was being broadcast.

"These crimes are highly contagious," said Dr. Harold Visotsky, head of the department of psychiatry at Northwestern University. "Deranged persons have a passion for keeping up with the news and imitating it."

Television rewards violence with notoriety, conferring a sense of identity on those seeking to validate their existence.

In 1977, in Indianapolis, Anthony George Kiritsis wired a sawed-off shotgun to the neck of a mortgage company officer, led him out in front of the police and TV cameras, and yelled, "Get those goddamn cameras on! I'm a goddamn national hero!"

John Hinckley Jr., who shot President Reagan, told examining psychiatrists that he had deliberately planned an assassination before news cameras to win maximum media attention.

"No crime carries as much publicity as the assassination of the President of the United States," he said. Hinckley's first question to the Secret Service officer who interrogated him was, "Is it on TV?"

As television, again and again, remorselessly, hypnotically, played the video tape of the shooting, the Secret Service recorded an astonishing number of further threats against the President. Hinckley told psychiatrists he knew he would spend the rest of his life in the spotlight. He had gone, he said, from "obscurity to notoriety."

The speech he wrote for his sentencing, which he never got to make because of the finding of innocence by reason of insanity, said, "The entire civilized world knows who I am."

Television offers a perverse incentive to the unstable and the fanatical. Because television goes to town on a hostage crisis, some are encouraged to plot hostage crises.

For example, the Washington Monument siege in December, 1982, was apparently planned as a media event in protest against nuclear arms. Norman Mayer made clear he wanted to negotiate not with the police, but with the media for air time. He apparently spent part of his last day on earth watching, on a TV set in his van, the live coverage of his siege that represented his great triumph. It may have been only a coincidence that it was 7:30 PM, as the network news ended, that his van started towards the White House to stage the next episode--to be met with a hail of police fire. One can only speculate whether he would be alive had there been less live coverage.

Television is reluctant to confront the unintended consequences of the temptations it offers. Television will have to face the question of whether covering the news requires exploitation of the news--whether a terrorist or hostage incident must be turned into a circus of round-the-clock live coverage, complete with ego-satisfying telephone interviews.

Television has come, in some respects, to replace government as a authority figure. It confers prestige and identity. It must learn the responsibility that goes with its influence. That means not encouraging terrorists by giving them the rewards of massive notoriety.

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June 25, 1984

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Washington, D.C., June 25--Senator Alan Cranston (D., Calif.) said today that Iraq and Iran are "back in business" in the race to develop nuclear weapons.

Cranston, who is Senate Democratic Whip and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, told a Conference on International Terrorism (Four Seasons hotel, 2800 Pennsylvania ave., N.W., 2:15 p.m.) that:

* Iraq is seeking a replacement for the nuclear reactor which Israel bombed out in 1981 and is fortifying the plant site at Osirak.

* Iran is shopping around for equipment and is recruiting scientists and technicians to revive a nuclear program the Ayatollah Khomeini abandoned after the overthrow of the Shah.

Cranston described the two warring nations as "countries which routinely use terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Neither would hesitate to use a nuclear bomb against the other or against Israel."

"It would take only three nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist or a terrorist state to destroy Israel," he warned.

Cranston, who last week revealed that Pakistan, with the help of China, has achieved the capability of producing nuclear weapons, urged that the U.S. halt aid to governments "bent on developing nuclear weapons".

"And we should set our own house in order," Cranston said. "The U.S. should live up to ^{our} obligations under the non-proliferation treaty to negotiate a halt to the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race."

Cranston told the conference, which is sponsored by the Jonathan Institute, a private research organization, that Iraq tried to buy a replacement reactor from the French, on credit, until negotiations broke down with the escalation of the Iraq-Iran war.

He said some sensitive "hot cells" or laboratories for reprocessing plutonium survived the Israeli bombing, as did a core load of about 14 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.

(more)

Cranston--add one

Cranston said the Iraqis have surrounded the shell of the destroyed reactor with "an ominous array of anti-aircraft systems, balloons to frustrate low flying aircraft and 60-foot high earth berms that look rather like a Great Wall of Baghdad. Clearly they hope to reinvigorate a sophisticated nuclear development effort".

Cranston said Iraq "came close to a nuclear weapons capability" in 1981 with a plutonium producing reactor and weapons-grade enriched uranium purchased from the French, hot cells obtained from France and Belgium, and the help of "the best Italian technicians".

Cranston also reported on "persistent indications" that key ingredients of Iraq's stockpile of chemical weapons came from I. G. Farben of West Germany and that Iraq has a "latent production capability" to manufacture its own chemical weapons.

Cranston said Iran's nuclear program--"which the Shah once hoped would bring more than two dozen enormous power reactors on line in his lifetime"--is "undergoing a revival".

He said Khomeini, who abandoned the program in 1979 because it was "too reliant on the technology of the 'Satanic' West, is pressing exiled nuclear scientists and engineers to return".

"Lucrative offers and personal threats reportedly have been made to reassemble a cadre of nuclear specialists to work on a new, unmistakably Islamic nuclear development," Cranston said.

He said the Iranian Atomic Energy Commission has reopened its once boarded-up offices and "is back in business".

"Thirty-five West German technicians are back in Iran studying the feasibility of completing two 1350-megawatt reactors at Bushehr" which are three-quarters finished, Cranston said.

He said Khomeini's agents reportedly discussed purchasing plutonium reprocessing technology with "two of the most sophisticated firms in Switzerland and Belgium".

"This technology could not be used by Iran for anything other than nuclear weapons inasmuch as they have no peaceful nuclear energy generating program whatsoever," Cranston said.

He estimated, however, that Iran is five years away from being able to generate its own plutonium and/seven years away from being able to produce nuclear weapons.

Attached is the text of Cranston's remarks.

ADDRESS OF SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON

TO THE

JONATHAN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JUNE 25, 1984

The magnitude of the threat terrorism poses to the people and nations of the free world is immeasurable.

I want to speak with you about the responsibilities of the democratic nations to check terrorism and to prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.

Nowhere in the world is war raging with fewer restraints and more frequent resort to terrorist tactics than in the Middle East and South Asia.

We are witnessing a continuing death struggle in the Persian Gulf between Iran and Iraq. Without regard to traditional rules of war, they are using every possible weapon against each other in what began as a minor territorial dispute.

We are seeing an interminable conflict in Lebanon, where the forces of terrorists and extremist factions have yet to be vanquished.

And we are witnessing vicious civil strife across religious divides in India, and elsewhere in the region.

In conflicts in this region, international treaties have been no bar to the use of chemical weapons, to the seizure of diplomatic personnel, to attacks on nuclear installations, to assaults on religious sites, to deployment of brigades of children as human "mine sweepers", and to repeated attacks on commercial shipping.

It takes little imagination to comprehend the dangers posed to U.S. national security interests -- and to the interests of our friends and allies in the region -- if nuclear weapons were to play a role in these unrestrained wars.

Does anyone doubt that if the Shah of Iran had succeeded in developing a sophisticated nuclear program in Iran that the Ayatollah Khomeini would have used a nuclear weapon against Iraq?

By the same token, does anyone now doubt that if Iraq had been permitted to make swift progress towards a nuclear weapons capability that Saddam Hussein would have used a nuclear bomb against Iran?

Or that either of them might have subsequently resorted to a nuclear strike in a "jihad" -- a "holy war" -- against Israel?

Those most concerned about the spread of terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist states should be deadly serious about the need for a sound and successful nuclear non-proliferation policy.

But the fact is that western democracies and industrialized nations have done grave injury to our security interests by spreading weapons-usable nuclear technology about the world. Like Lenin's capitalists -- who would sell the rope for their own lynching -- we have permitted the export of nuclear material, plants and technology that may someday be used in a lethal assault against us.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the Middle East and South Asia, where several fundamentalist Islamic states have made great efforts to get "the bomb".

Last week I revealed substantial new information demonstrating that Pakistan has acquired all the capability necessary to produce their own nuclear weapons.

I based this conclusion on four new facts:

(1) Pakistan has operated and expanded its clandestine uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta;

(2) Pakistan has operated its clandestine plutonium reprocessing facility at PINSTECH;

(3) Pakistan has expanded its nuclear weapons design team at Wah and has stepped up imports of nuclear warhead components;

(4) Pakistan's KANUPP reactor has been subject to continuing chronic failures in its safeguard system, making plutonium diversion highly feasible.

Pakistan also has the ability, should it so choose, to export the nuclear-trained technicians, the highly advanced nuclear technology and designs -- and perhaps even nuclear weapons -- to fundamentalist colleagues in other Islamic nations. This export capability and the extent of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability have far more profound implications than were presented by the Iraqi nuclear program before the Osirak reactor was bombed in 1981.

Pakistan is a nation ruled by a fundamentalist Islamic dictator, General Zia. Under Zia's leadership, the Islamic Conference in 1981 -- and again since then -- has renewed its call for "holy war" against America's only stable, democratic ally in the Middle East, Israel.

This is obviously of grave concern to Israelis, to Americans and to all those who seek to prevent nuclear conflict.

But there is another story here, and there are more details I would like to discuss today.

This is the story of the continuing reckless transfer of nuclear know-how from western nations to countries which may not share our reservations about using weapons of mass destruction.

How did Pakistan get nuclear weapons capability?

They picked up key components in the offices of Saint Gobain Technique Nouvelles in Paris, at VAT and CORA in Switzerland, at the firm of Keybold Heraeus in West Germany, of Emerson Electric in the U.K., and in the offices of hundreds of firms in the west who were so eager to consummate a sale that they were indifferent to Pakistan's clear

intentions.

In fact, the west has repeatedly sold sensitive nuclear technology to countries which routinely employ terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

Let's look at Iraq. How did they come so close to their own nuclear weapons capability in 1981? They bought plutonium producing reactors in Paris; they bought hot cells from Paris and Brussels; they brought in the best Italian technicians; and they bought weapons-grade enriched uranium from the French.

And how did Iraq put together the chemical weapons used with devastating effectiveness against the Ayatollah's young volunteers? My information is that Iraq bought several of the components from unwitting U.S. firms. And there are persistent reports that the key ingredients for manufacturing this gas came from a firm that should have -- and did -- know better, I.G. Farben of West Germany. To this day, Iraq has a chemical weapons stockpile and latent production capability. They also still have sensitive hot cells for reprocessing plutonium and a core load of some 14 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. They have a large stockpile of some 200 tons of raw uranium. They are still trying to get the cash to replace the Osirak reactor. The shell of the destroyed reactor is today surrounded by an ominous array of anti-aircraft systems, balloons to frustrate low flying aircraft, and sixty foot high earth berms that look rather like a Great Wall of Baghdad. Clearly they hope to reinvigorate a sophisticated nuclear development effort.

And what about the nuclear program in Iran, which the Shah once hoped would bring more than two dozen enormous power reactors on line in his lifetime? Abandoned in 1979 by the Ayatollah as too reliant on the technology of the "Satanic" west, this program is now undergoing

a revival. The Iranian Atomic Energy Commission is back in business and senior Iranian officials have reportedly pursued nuclear cooperation possibilities both in Europe and Pakistan. Recent press reports about the Ayatollah attaining nuclear weapons capability within the next two years, ^{are} in my judgment, irresponsibly exaggerated. It is true that 35 West German technicians are back in Iran studying the feasibility of completing two 1350 megawatt reactors at Bushehr. But it would take nearly five years to finish these reactors and generate some plutonium through their operation.

There are two ominous developments in the Ayatollah's nuclear program, however:

First, Tehran has sent agents throughout Europe to press exiled nuclear scientists and engineers to return to Iran. Lucrative offers and personal threats have reportedly been made in an effort to reassemble a cadre of nuclear specialists to work on a new, unmistakably Islamic, nuclear development effort.

Second, representatives of the Ayatollah's government have reportedly approached firms in Switzerland and Belgium to express an interest in plutonium reprocessing technology. This technology could not be used by Iran for anything other than nuclear weapons inasmuch as they have no "peaceful" nuclear energy generating program whatsoever. It takes some fifty operating reactors before such reprocessing becomes even arguably cost-effective.

And then there is Colonel Quadaffi of Libya, who continues his ham-handed efforts to beg, borrow or steal a nuclear weapons capability. He has pressed the Soviets for an optimum plutonium producing reactor. He has offered Pakistan cash and uranium in the hope of benefitting from Islamabad's weapons efforts. He has tried to buy nuclear weapons from China. And he is building at least the intellectual resources in

Libya to help make one of his own. Libya's Tajura Nuclear Research Center offers use of highly advanced fusion technology. Libya has an experimental research reactor which runs on highly enriched (weapons-grade) uranium. They have several extra core loads in-country, though not enough HEU sufficient for fabricating a nuclear warhead.

Much has been made of the extent to which the Pakistani nuclear program has been supported and advanced as promising an "Islamic bomb." It is fair to ask: Is it in the Pakistans' eye -- or in the eyes of nervous Americans or Israelis or Hindus -- that this nuclear program is so viewed?

We should be reluctant to brand forces poorly understood in the west. But concerns about the use of a Pakistani nuclear bomb in a "holy war" seem justified by the words of the program's architects. At some point, one has to take seriously the statements of Pakistan's leaders.

Let me quote from General Zia: "China, India, the USSR and Israel possess the atomic arms. No Muslim country has any. If Pakistan had such a weapon, it would reinforce the power of the Muslim world."

Or as Prime Minister Bhutto wrote in his memoirs: "We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilization have this capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change" (with the advent of Bhutto's nuclear program).

Most to the point are recent statements by Dr. A.Q. Khan, the "father" of the Pakistani bomb who recently declared:

All the Western countries including Israel are not only Pakistan's enemies but also enemies of Islam. If some other Muslim country had accomplished the same thing (as Pakistan's breakthrough on uranium enrichment), the same venomous and false propaganda would have been conducted against it as well. The examples of Iraq and Libya are before you. Even though these countries are not capable of manufacturing an atomic bomb for a long time yet,

western media sources are conducting a violent propaganda campaign against them. All this is part of the crusades which the Christians and Jews initiated against the Muslims 1000 years ago. They are afraid that if Pakistan makes obvious progress in this field that the whole Islamic world will stand to benefit.

Khan went on to charge: "the 'Islamic bomb' is a figment of the Zionist mind and this has been used full force by the anti-Islamic Western countries." He insisted that the only reason he was convicted by a Dutch court of stealing sensitive nuclear design information for Pakistan's nuclear effort was that "all these charges and court cases were imposed at the insistence of Zionists and Western anti-Islam elements."

General Zia could use this program as a magnet for training scientists from the several nations to whom he is in debt including Saudi Arabia and Libya, or with whom he needs to curry favor, like Iran. Despite Zia's radical program of Islamization in Pakistan -- which includes judicial sentences of public flogging, stoning and amputation -- General Zia has reason to fear the Ayatollah Khomeini's forces, as well as those forces in Pakistan who believe Zia has not gone far enough to advance fundamentalist causes.

Will men like Khan help other fundamentalist scientists in Iran, Libya or the P.L.O.?

Will they export plans, designs, hardware, technology, or weapons-usable materials with or without General Zia's approval?

Will they train scientists who will help still more extremist nations or terrorist groups?

Will they make nuclear threats in subsequent regional wars?

And how responsible will General Zia's successor be with nuclear weapons -- a successor who is likely to come from among the more extreme fundamentalists?

The answers to these questions could have grave ramifications for American interests. They could effect the very survival of Israel.

It would only take three nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists or a terrorist state to decimate Israel.

The United States has a compelling interest in combatting nuclear proliferation and preventing nuclear terrorism. A nuclear war launched regionally could swiftly engulf the super-powers and destroy us all in the ultimate holocaust.

There is much the democratic nations of the world should be doing.

We should be clamping down once and for all on the sale of sensitive technology and dual use hardware to unstable nations.

We should be halting aid to countries like Pakistan who are bent on developing nuclear weapons. American taxpayer dollars should not be subsidizing Pakistani nuclear weapons. And we should not be selling them F-16's -- the world's most capable penetrating fighter-bomber.

We should be checking the growth of arsenals of radical states so eager to acquire the most sophisticated military technology.

And we should set our own houses in order. Here, in the U.S., this means we should live up to our obligations under the Non-proliferation Treaty to negotiate a halt to the superpower nuclear arms race.

For years, nuclear proliferation has been a life-or-death threat that many of us have talked about and warned about but none of us are doing enough to stop.

Now its happened again. Now still another nation, Pakistan, has joined the nuclear club.

This is an issue which warrants the highest attention of the leaders of the industrialized democracies.

It should have been on the agenda at the recent summit of NATO leaders.

To deal with this ultimate terrorist threat, I believe nuclear proliferation warrants a summit of its own.

Thus I call upon my government and those of our allies to join together on this issue and to think anew -- and act -- on the means to avert this most serious threat to our survival.



FROM THE OFFICE OF

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

New York

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1984

Contact: Lance Morgan
202/224-4451


SPEECH BY SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (D.-N.Y.)

Delivered at
THE SECOND CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Sponsored by
THE JONATHAN INSTITUTE

Four Seasons Hotel

June 25, 1984



FIVE YEARS AFTER THE JONATHAN INSTITUTE CONVENED THE FIRST CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN JERUSALEM, THE EVENT SEEMS MORE PRESCIENT THAN EVER.

HENRY M. JACKSON DEFINED THE ISSUE IN THE FINAL SESSION OF THAT CONFERENCE. TERRORISM, HE SAID, IS "THE DELIBERATE AND SYSTEMATIC MURDER, MAIMING AND MENACING OF THE INNOCENT TO INSPIRE FEAR IN ORDER TO GAIN POLITICAL ENDS."

THE FURTHER OBSERVATION THAT THE SOVIET EMPIRE DOES NOT MERELY PROFIT STRATEGICALLY FROM TERRORISM, BUT ACTIVELY INVESTIGATES IT, HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIATED SINCE -- MOST RECENTLY IN THE COURSE OF THE ITALIAN INVESTIGATION INTO THE 1981 ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF POPE JOHN PAUL II.

THE FORECAST AT THE FIRST JONATHAN CONFERENCE, THAT TERRORIST INCIDENTS WOULD MULTIPLY, HAS BEEN FULFILLED. ON JUNE 13, SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ SAID, IN TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE:

IN 1983 THERE WERE MORE THAN 500
 ATTACKS BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS,
 OF WHICH MORE THAN 200 WERE AGAINST
 THE UNITED STATES. . . . IN 1983
 MORE AMERICANS WERE KILLED AND INJURED
 BY ACTS OF TERRORISM THAN IN THE
 FIFTEEN PRECEEDING YEARS FOR WHICH
 WE HAVE RECORDS.

WE HAVE ENTERED AN ERA OF PROLIFERATION. A BASIC
 TERRORIST MODEL HAS ENTERED THE INVENTORY OF WORLD POLITICAL
 INSTITUTIONS. THIS CENTURY HAS SEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
 WORLD POLITICAL CULTURE. INSTITUTIONS THAT WERE ONCE CON-
 FINED TO A PARTICULAR STATE OR REGION -- THE CONSTITUTIONAL
 MONARCH, THE POLITBURO, THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY -- ARE NOW
 AVAILABLE, AS YOU MIGHT SAY, ON THE WORLD MARKET. A WORLD
 PARTY SYSTEM CAN BE SEEN EMERGING, AS THE NATIONS OF THE
 SOVIET BLOC, THE NON-ALIGNED, AND THE "WEST" COALESCE
 AROUND PARTICULAR ISSUES AND CREDOS, AND VOTE ACCORDINGLY

IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS. SIMILARLY, MORE AND MORE NATIONS FIND THEMSELVES DEALING WITH TERRORIST MOVEMENTS WHOSE ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS ARE HARDLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE 19TH CENTURY EUROPEAN ORIGINALS. I SUPPOSE IN SOME LARGE VIEW OF EVENTS THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM IS SIMPLY ONE ASPECT OF THE GENERAL DIFFUSION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS TO THE WORLD AT LARGE.

IT IS USEFUL FOR AMERICANS TO REMIND THEMSELVES THAT THE NEWEST ADDITION TO THIS EUROPEAN, OR WESTERN, POLITICAL TRADITION IS THE TOTALITARIAN STATE. THAT HAS BEEN OUR GREAT GIFT TO MANKIND IN THIS CENTURY. (LITERALLY, THE WORD FIRST APPEARS IN ENGLISH IN 1928 IN A REFERENCE TO FASCISM. IN 1929 THE TIMES DEFINED IT AS "A REACTION AGAINST PARLIAMENTARIANISM . . . IN FAVOR OF A 'TOTALITARIAN' OR UNITARY STATE, WHETHER FASCIST OR COMMUNIST.") TERRORISM IS A RELATED DEVELOPMENT. ONE WISHES FOR HANNAH ARENDT TO EXPLAIN THE RELATION MORE FULLY, BUT ANY OF US CAN SEE

IT, MORE OR LESS UNIFORMLY, TERRORISM WHEN SUCCESSFUL ENDS IN TOTALITARIANISM. THE TOTALITARIAN STATE IS TERRORISM COME TO POWER.

TWO FEATURES ARE INVARIABLY ENCOUNTERED.

FIRST IS THE PRINCIPLE OF A SELF-APPOINTED ELITE -- LENIN'S "VANGUARD FIGHTERS" -- WHO DECIDE THE COURSE OF EVENTS -- WHO SHALL LIVE, WHO SHALL DIE.

THE SECOND FEATURE -- AND VASTLY THE MORE DANGEROUS -- IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO ONE IS INNOCENT OF POLITICS. TERRORISM IN PRINCIPLE DENIES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE . . . GOVERNMENT AND INDIVIDUAL, WHICH IS THE DISTINCTION THAT LIES AT THE HEART OF LIBERAL BELIEF. FOR THE TERRORIST, AS FOR THE TOTALITARIAN STATE, THERE ARE NO INNOCENT BYSTANDERS, NO PRIVATE CITIZENS. TERRORISM DENIES THAT THERE IS ANY PRIVATE SPHERE, THAT INDIVIDUALS HAVE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY AUTONOMY SEPARATE FROM OR BEYOND POLITICS.

THERE ARE THUS NO STANDARDS ACCORDING TO WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN, OR THE THREATENED SOCIETY, CAN ATTEMPT TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE TOTALITARIAN TERRORIST. THERE IS NO WAY TO SATISFY HIS DEMANDS CONTINUALLY OVER TIME BECAUSE WHAT HE WANTS TO DO IS TAKE AWAY THE CAPACITY OF OTHERS EVEN TO DECIDE TO SUBMIT. THE ONLY STANDARD IS WHETHER ONE IS A MEMBER OF THE TERRORIST GROUP OR NOT. IF YOU ARE NOT, THEN THERE ARE NO RULES TO SUGGEST HOW YOU MAY BE TREATED BY THIS PERVERSE ELITE.

THE ABSENCE OF STANDARDS MAY BE PUT ANOTHER WAY: THERE IS NO LAW. LAW IS THE ANTITHESIS OF BOTH THE TERRORIST AND THE TOTALITARIAN STATE. LAW IS THE HIGHEST EXPRESSION OF LIBERALISM; ESTABLISHING AS IT DOES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY; PRESERVING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL VIS-A-VIS THE STATE. A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IS RULED BY LAW.

TERRORISM SEEKS TO DESTROY THE LAW. IT IS UNLAWFULNESS, ENSHRINED AS PRINCIPLE. THIS IS MANIFESTLY TRUE IN A PURELY

DOMESTIC CONTEXT, AS IN ITALY OR IRELAND OR ISRAEL WHERE TERRORIST INCIDENTS MUST BE ADDRESSED THROUGH LAWFUL PROCEDURES AND DUE PROCESS LEST THE TERRORISTS WIN BY INDUCING A KIND OF COUNTER-TERRORISM.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT, AMONG OTHERS, THAT I HAVE FOUND MYSELF ASKING WHETHER THE UNITED STATES AND GENERALLY SPEAKING THE WEST IS SUFFICIENTLY ALIVE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSERTING OUR ADHERENCE TO THE RULE OF LAW IN THE CONDUCT OF NATIONS. INEVITABLY THIS ISSUE AROSE THIS SPRING WHEN NICARAGUA BROUGHT CHARGES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT WE SHOULD HAVE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET THE SANDINISTAS IN COURT. INSTEAD WE PLEADED THAT THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION. THIS WAS BOUND TO FAIL, AND IN THE END THE UNITED STATES SUFFERED WHAT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS THE WORST DEFEAT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IN ITS HISTORY.

THIS WOULD SEEM TO HAVE BEEN AN UNNECESSARY LOSS, AND YET

I DETECT A CURIOUS INDIFFERENCE TO IT, ACCOMPANIED BY A MEASURE OF INDIGNATION THAT IT SHOULD BE THOUGHT TO MATTER. WHEN I SAID SO RECENTLY, MY FRIEND WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., WAS GENUINELY UPSET. MY REMARKS REMINDED HIM OF:

THE KIND OF SQUISHY-SOFT ERISTIC
CUCKOO TALK THAT USED TO CAUSE
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN TO WEEP
IN DESPAIR, BACK WHEN HE WAS IN
THE U.N., BACK WHEN HE WAS FIGHTING
THE GOOD FIGHT.

I CONFESS I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS. WHY CAN'T YOU FIGHT A GOOD FIGHT IN A COURT OF LAW?

I SUPPOSE WHAT MOSTLY WORRIES ME IS THAT WE SEEM TO BE FORGETTING THAT THE LAW IS ON OUR SIDE. SHORTLY AFTER LEAVING THE UNITED NATIONS I WROTE THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF U.N. AFFAIRS FOR THE HARVARD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. IT WAS ENTITLED "ABIOTROPHY IN TURTLE BAY: THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1976."

(ABIOTROPHY IS A MEDICAL TERM REFERRING TO THE CEASING TO FUNCTION OF AN ORGAN OR ORGANISM WITHOUT APPARENT REASON.) THE ESSENCE OF MY ARGUMENT WAS THAT IF THE DEMOCRACIES WOULD ONLY INSIST ON THE VALIDITY OF THE CHARTER, THE U.N. WAS POTENTIALLY A CONSIDERABLE ASSET.

THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE CHARTER IS A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENT UTTERLY OPPOSED IN SPIRIT AND HOSTILE IN ITS PROVISIONS TO TOTALITARIANISM. THE ORWELLIAN INVERSION OF LANGUAGE HAS PROGRESSED SO FAR IN OUR TIME THAT IT IS EASY TO ASSUME THAT NO ENDURING MEANING IS TO BE ATTACHED TO WORDS OF ANY SORT, BUT THIS IS A MISTAKE. THE MEANING OF THE CHARTER IS CLEAR. IT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENT DRAFTED IN THE TRADITION OF WESTERN LIBERAL SOCIETIES.

THE SIMILARITIES WITH THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION ARE OBVIOUS ENOUGH:

WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES . . .

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS . . .

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN STRESS ON 'FUNDAMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHTS,' ON 'THE DIGNITY AND WORTH
OF THE HUMAN PERSON,' AND ON 'THE EQUAL
RIGHTS OF MEN AND WOMEN' IS ENCOUNTERED
AT THE OUTSET OF THE DOCUMENT AND RECUR-
RENTLY THEREAFTER. THE CHARTER TAKES AS
A GIVEN THOSE PROPOSITIONS ABOUT 'HUMAN
RIGHTS AND . . . FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS FOR
ALL,' WHICH ARE THE COMMON PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS ON WHICH THE DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETIES OF THE WEST HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED.
IF THE SOVIETS SIGNED, SO MUCH THE WORSE

FOR THEM. IN DOING SO THEY UNDERTOOK
AS DID ALL OTHERS, TO PROMOTE, THROUGH
THE UNITED NATIONS,

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND

FOR FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS FOR

ALL WITHOUT DISTINCTIONS AS

TO RACE, SEX, LANGUAGE, OR


RELIGION . . .

JUST FRIDAY THE PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA, MR. J.R.
JAYEWARDENE, SUGGESTED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CONSIDER
FORMING A SPECIAL AGENCY DEVOTED TO STOPPING THE SPREAD
OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

HIS COUNTRY, OF COURSE, IS JUST THE MOST RECENT EXAMPLE
OF A DEMOCRATIC REGIME OF A SUDDEN ASSAULTED BY A STANDARD
MODEL LEFTIST TERRORIST GROUP, COMPLETE WITH THE NEWEST
FEATURE, SUPPORT FROM DISTANT STATES. (BY NEW, I MEAN
POST-WORLD WAR II.)

I CANNOT SUPPOSE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WILL ESTABLISH SUCH AN INSTITUTION. BUT THERE IS NO REASON WHY MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD NOT DO SO ON THEIR OWN, AS IS THEIR RIGHT UNDER THE CHARTER, AND IN THE NAME OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER COMMENCE TO HELP DEFEND ONE ANOTHER.

I WOULD HOPE THE UNITED STATES MIGHT RESPOND TO THE SUGGESTION. CAN WE NOT GET SRI LANKA TO CALL A MEETING AND SEE WHO COMES? BUT IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY SUCCESS, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MUST BE SEEN TO BE ACTING IN SUPPORT OF LAW. THAT IS A STANDARD TO WHICH NEUTRAL NATIONS CAN REPAIR. WE HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR FROM IT: OR SO I BELIEVE.



AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

STATEMENT OF DR. CRISTIAN LOCHTE

TO THE JONATHAN INSTITUTE

SECOND CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

THE FOUR SEASONS HOTEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1984

FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

THE PRESENT TERRORISM, WHICH BEGAN IN THE LATE SIXTIES, APPEARED IN MANY COUNTRIES AND IN VARIOUS DIFFERENT TYPES. EACH OF THESE TYPES ASSUMED DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS ~~IN THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN WHICH THEY APPEARED~~. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO SINGULAR COMPREHENSIVE FORMULA TO FIGHTING DIFFERENT TERRORIST GROUPS.

IN WEST GERMANY THERE ARE ACTUALLY THREE TYPES OF TERRORISM: THE LEFT-EXTREMISTIC GROUPS "RED ARMY FRAKTION" (RAF) AND THE "REVOLUTIONARY CELLS" (RZ) AND NEO-NAZI GROUPS, LIKE THE GROUP.

THE RAF OPERATES UNDERGROUND AS AN URBAN-GUERILLA GROUP, LIKE THE SOUTH AMERICAN TERRORISTS. SINCE ITS INCEPTION, THE RAF DEFINES ITSELF AS A MARXIST-LENINIST GROUP OF A WORLD-WIDE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

TILL 1977 THE RAF SAW ITS STRUGGLE EXCLUSIVELY IN CONNECTION WITH THE STRUGGLES OF THE SO-CALLED LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD.

AFTER 1977 THE RAF CHANGES ITS POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS AND NOW PROCEEDS ON THE ASSUMPTION OF A EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM AND CONFINES ITS ACTIVITIES TO WEST GERMANY.

ITS ANTI-IMPERIALISTIC STRUGGLE IS DIRECTED AGAINST WHAT IT CONSIDERS THE TWO MAIN IMPERIALISTIC POWERS: THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY. THE TARGETS OF THEIR ATTEMPTS ARE ESPECIALLY THE STAFF AND THE FACILITIES OF THE U.S. ARMY, NATO AND THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC FIGURES OF WEST GERMANY.

THE RAF IS CAPABLE AND WILLING TO CARRY OUT MURDERS, KIDNAPPINGS AND BOMBINGS. BUT ITS PROFESSED POLICY IS NOT TO THREATEN THE LIFE OF INNOCENT CITIZENS.

THE RAF IS AN INDEPENDENT GROUP, NEITHER INSTRUCTED NOR FINANCED BY FOREIGN TERROR GROUPS OR STATES. HOWEVER THE RAF DOES HAVE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE, ESPECIALLY FROM PALESTINIAN GROUPS. FOR INSTANCE, RAF MEMBERS WERE TRAINED IN USING WEAPONS IN PLO CAMPS.

EXACT KNOWLEDGE OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THE MOTIVATION AND THE WRITINGS OF THE RAF CAN AFFORD US INSIGHT INTO ITS WORKINGS. FOR EXAMPLE:

IN 1973 OUR AGENCY RECEIVED AN INDICATION THAT THE TROTSKYITE "GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL MARXISTS" WAS DEBATING ITS ATTITUDE TO THE RAF. A MINORITY DEMANDED A SOLIDARITY WITH THE RAF BY

ACTIONS. TWO MEMBERS OF THIS MINORITY LEFT THE GROUP BECAUSE THEY DID NOT PREVAIL. OUR AGENCY KEPT BOTH PERSONS UNDER SURVEILLANCE BECAUSE THEY WERE CONSIDERED POTENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE RAF. THEY SOON DISAPPEARED. WHEN SHORTLY AFTER THE FORMATION OF A NEW TERROR GROUP IN HAMBURG BECAME KNOWN -- THOSE TWO PERSONS WERE IDENTIFIED AS MEMBERS OF THE RAF-SUCCESSOR-GROUP. ON FEBRUARY 4TH 1974 NINE MEMBERS WERE ARRESTED AFTER OBSERVATION BY THE OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

SINCE 1973 THE RAF HAS BEEN OPERATING A LEGAL WING WHICH PURSUES ITS POLITICAL GOALS OPENLY, ON A LEGAL LEVEL.

OBSERVING AND TRACKING PERSONS INVOLVED ON THIS LEVEL ENABLED US TO CRACK THE RAF UNDERGROUND. SINCE 1975 ALMOST ALL PERSONS BELONGING TO THE LEGAL SUPPORT SYSTEM WHO SWITCHED TO THE UNDERGROUND COULD BE TRACED BY OUR AGENCY BEFORE THEY TOOK PART IN COMMANDO-ACTIONS. FOR A WHILE THE LEGAL WING CALLED ITSELF "THE ANTIFASCISTIC GROUP". ITS POLITICAL CREDO PROFESSING OPPOSITION BOTH TO THE OLD AND NEW TYPE OF FASCISM. THEY INCLUDED IN THIS AMERICAN AND GERMAN POLICY.

THROUGH THESE ANTI-FASCIST GROUPS WE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH THE UNDERGROUND. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT I CANNOT GO INTO MORE DETAILS. LET ME MERELY SAY THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE OF THE POLITICAL FRONT OF TERRORISM SHOULD NOT BE

UNDERESTIMATED.

DESPITE SETBACKS, THE RAF IS STILL ACTIVE. ATTEMPTS AGAINST AMERICANS AND AMERICAN FACILITIES MAINLY IN THE MILITARY AREA MUST STILL BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.

BUT ITS RELATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS HAS DECREASED, BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE ON THE PLO. THE RAF, CONSIDERING ITSELF NEW LEFTIST, REJECTS POLITICAL ALLIANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

THE SECOND TYPE OF THE LEFT-EXTREMIST TERRORISTS IN WEST GERMANY ARE THE "REVOLUTIONARY CELLS" (RZ). IT DIFFERS FROM THE RAF IN ITS ORGANIZATION AND POLITICAL AND TACTICAL CONCEPTIONS. THE RZ CONSISTS OF SOME MINI-GROUPS WITH THREE TO FIVE MEMBERS. THESE GROUPS ACT INDEPENDENTLY FROM EACH OTHER, AND CARRY OUT ACTIONS ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. THE MEMBERS DO NOT LIVE IN THE UNDERGROUND. THEY LEAD A NORMAL LIFE. ACCORDING TO THEIR COMPREHENSION FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE A DAILY REFERENCE TO ACTUAL POLICY AND DAILY EVENTS TAKING PART IN THE POLITICAL BASE OF THE NON-DOGMATIC NEW LEFTISTS.

THE RZ SEES ITSELF AS A SOCIAL-REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. ITS POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS CONTAIN SOCIO-POLITICAL ANTI-IMPERIALISTIC AND ANTI-ZIONIST COMPONENTS. THE LATTER TAKES THE FORM OF ATTEMPTS ON PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL FACILITIES OF THE USA AND ISRAEL.

THE RZ ALSO HAS AN "INTERNATIONAL SECTION". THIS GROUPING, WHICH EXISTS SINCE THE EARLY SEVENTIES, HAS EXTENSIVE LINKS NOT ONLY TO THE PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS BUT ALSO TO THE IRA. ITS MEMBERS PARTICIPATED IN SENSATIONAL INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS, INCLUDING THE RAID AT THE OPEC CONFERENCE IN VIENNA IN 1975 AND THE HIJACKING OF AN EL AL PLANE TO ENTEBBE ON JUNE 27, 1976 WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF WILFRIED BOSE AND BRIGITTE KUHLMANN.

ACCORDING TO NEW INFORMATION, MEMBERS OF THESE INTERNATIONAL SECTIONS OF THE RZ COLLABORATE WITH THE TERROR GROUP OF 'CARLOS' WHICH CALLS ITSELF "ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED ARAB STRUGGLE/'ARM OF THE ARAB REVOLUTION.

ITS LEGAL COVER MAKES THE RZ LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO OBSERVATION THAN THE RAF. UNTIL NOW THERE IS NO PAT SOLUTION TO RECOGNIZING RZ ACTIVITIES AT AN EARLY STAGE. BUT THE FACT THAT RZ MEMBERS ARE OFTEN ACTIVE IN BASIC ORGANIZATIONS OF THE NON-DOGMATIC NEW LEFT SHOWS SOME PROMISE OF SUCCESSFUL DEFECTION.

SO DOES A CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THEIR WRITINGS, WHICH MAY INDICATE THE VIOLENCE QUOTIENT OF ANY GIVEN CELL.

THE THIRD TYPE OF TERRORISM IN WEST GERMANY IS THAT OF NEO-NAZI GROUPS LIKE THE 'HEPP/KEXEL' GROUP. ITR IS THE FIRST NEO-NAZI TERROR GROUP WHICH PROCLAIMS AN ANTI-IMPERIALIST LIBERATION STRUGGLE. THE GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED IN MARCH 1982 BY THE NEO-NAZIS WALTER KEXEL AND ODFRIED HEPP AND CONSISTS OF SIX CORE MEMBERS.

IN THEIR PAMPHLET "FAREWELL TO HITLERISM" -- PUBLISHED JUNE 20TH 1982 -- HEPP AND KEXELL TRIED TO GIVE AN IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR AN ANTI-IMPERIALISTIC LIBERATION STRUGGLE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AS THE MAIN ENEMY. THEY MAKE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN IMPERIALISM, REACHING THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION VARIETY IS POSITIVE, WHICH REDUCES THE TARGET TO AMERICAN IMPERIALISM.

THE USA IS VIEWED AS AN OCCUPATION-POWER IN WEST GERMANY. IT IMPOSES A STRANGE DEMOCRACY ON GERMANS WHICH MUST BE ATTACKED. TO ACHIEVE CHANGE IN WEST GERMANY A STRUGGLE AGAINST AMERICAN FACILITIES MUST BE SUSTAINED.

THE "HEPP/KEXEL" GROUP WENT UNDERGROUND AND FINANCED ITSELF BY BANK ROBBERIES. ON DECEMBER 14TH AND 15TH, 1982, THE GROUP CARRIED OUT THREE BOMBINGS OF CARS OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN HESSE. TWO US SOLDIERS WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED. THE PURPOSE WAS TO FORCE AMERICAN TROOPS OUT OF GERMANY.

SOLVING THESE BOMBINGS PROVED VERY DIFFICULT.

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

IT WAS KNOWN THAT TERRORIST NEO-NAZIS WERE ACTING IN A BLIND RAGE. THEY ACT WITH THE MOTTO "THE MORE UNPLEASANT THE BETTER." THEY WANT TO SET UP AN EXAMPLE OF HORROR, LIKE THE BLASTING AT THE MUNICH OCTOBERFEST ON SEPTEMBER 1980 IN WHICH 13 PERSONS WERE KILLED AND 215 PERSONS WERE INJURED. THERE WERE A LOT OF INDICATIONS FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY OF NEO-NAZIS. THEREFORE A LOT OF NEO-NAZI PAMPHLETS WERE INVESTIGATED IN ORDER TO FIND REASONS FOR THE ARMED ANTI-AMERICAN STRUGGLE. SUCH A REASON WAS FOUND IN THE PAMPHLETS "FAREWELL TO HITLERISM". BY MEANS OF THIS CAREFUL ANALYSIS THE CRIME COULD BE TRACED TO THEM.

THE "HEPP/KEXEL" GROUP PROBABLY IS RESPONSIBLE ALSO FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAELI FACILITIES AND THE ATTEMPT AGAINST THE COUNTER HALL IN THE MUNICH AIRPORT.

IT IS CHARACTERISTIC THAT THE GROUP IS A CONGLOMERATION OF PERSONS WHO WERE TRAINED BY AL FATAH IN LEBANON AND OF PERSONS WITH A NATIONAL BOLSHEVISTIC IDEOLOGY.

TO SUM UP: IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE AN EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF EXTREMISM IN GENERAL IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. TERRORISM CANNOT BE VIEWED AS DETACHED FROM OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF EXTREMISM. ALSO, IT IS NECESSARY TO ANALYSE CAREFULLY THE WRITINGS AND PAMPHLETS OF TERROR-GROUPS. BY MEANS OF THIS ANALYSIS IT IS POSSIBLE FIND OUT THE IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS OF EACH PARTICULAR GROUP AS THEY ARE REFLECTED IN ITS IDEOLOGY, ITS POLITICAL ARGUMENTS, ITS LOGISTICS, ITS TARGETS AND ITS WAYS OF ACTING. THESE ASSESSMENTS HAVE TO BE MADE STRICTLY. IT HAS TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THAT ALL ACTIONS ARE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. ANALYSIS OF TERRORISTIC WRITINGS OR CRIMES MUST NOT INCLUDE SPECULATION. IN MOST CASES A CAREFUL ANALYSIS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO FIND OUT WHICH GROUP IS INVOLVED IN ANY PARTICULAR ACTION.

A SOPHISTICATED, SPECIAL OFFICE TO INVESTIGATE, PURSUE AND COMBAT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IS ESSENTIAL, IF THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM IS TO SUCCEED. THAT THERE IS AN INTER-STATE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, OF WHICH I AM A MEMBER, TO MONITOR AND EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT TERRORISM IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE. FROM A PURELY TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FREE WORLD SHOULD BE OBVIOUS.



"TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA"

STATEMENT OF JOHN O'SULLIVAN

TO THE JONATHAN INSTITUTE

AMERICAN JEWISH
SECOND CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

ARCHIVES

TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1984

FOUR SEASONS HOTEL

WASHINGTON, DC

We already have too many definitions of terrorism and terrorists, but a definition worth considering is that a terrorist is a criminal who seeks publicity. This sets him far apart from what British officials in Northern Ireland have taken to calling the ODC, or ordinary decent criminal who understandably shuns the limelight. Indeed, it is an understatement to say that terrorists seek publicity. They require publicity. It is their lifeblood. If the media were not there to report terrorist acts and to explain their political and social significance (the motives inspiring them and so forth), then terrorism as such would cease to exist. Each terrorist act would then be seen merely as an isolated criminal event. It would not be interpreted as an integral part of a pattern of political violence, the likely prelude to other bombings and shootings, something to be seriously discussed by politicians, bureaucrats and television sociologists. As Walter Lacquer put it: "The media are the terrorist's best friend. The terrorist's act by itself is nothing; publicity is all." One might say that terrorists are simply another type of media parasite, but famous for being infamous.

There is, of course, an element of parasitism on the other side. The media find terrorism a sensational news story and are therefore inclined at first to over-report it, to write admiringly of the terrorists' "daring" even while morally condemning them, and to exaggerate their significance. But the media exploit terrorism as a good story rather than depending upon it. If it were not there, other equally newsworthy topics would be to hand -- wars, demonstrations, elections, congressional battles, the marriages of pop stars and, of course, decent ordinary crime.

What benefits does the terrorist seek from media publicity? In what ways does he hope to make the media his accomplices? There are, I think, three types of unwitting media assistance. They help the terrorist to spread an atmosphere of fear and anxiety in society; they provide him with an opportunity to argue his case to the wider public; and they bestow an underserved legitimacy on him.

Let us take the first: the spreading of fear and anxiety through society. This seems to be achieved principally through the media simply reporting the terrorist's act -- bombings, shootings, and so on. Such reports naturally arouse public concern; it would be alarming if they did not. In a free society, however, nothing is to be done about this. A regime like that in the Soviet Union can suppress all news of its occasional hi-jackings, as it does news of airline crashes and major industrial disasters. And if events do not become known, plainly they cannot influence public opinion. (Even this argument cannot be pushed too far, however. If terrorist acts were sufficiently frequent, they would become known through gossip and hearsay in the most effectively censored society.) Is panic contrived by terrorists then, simply an unavoidable price of living in a society with a free press? I don't think so.

For it is not the simple succession of terrorist acts which, when reported, arouse profound public anxiety. Statistically, these are usually a very trivial threat to the lives and limbs of anyone in particular. No, the media heighten tension much more dramatically by reporting not just terrorist acts, but their threats of future acts, by describing in often lurid colours the campaign

of terror that will ensue if the Government does not yield to their demands and in general by giving the impression that a prospect of endless violence and upheaval lies ahead.

This spreads panic and anxiety in two ways. First, directly, it increases the ordinary citizen's fear that he may fall victim to a bomb in a restaurant or a supermarket. But also, more subtly, it conveys the message that society is a moral chaos, that the laws, rules, standards and securities we have taken for granted no longer provide any protection against random violence and that, in the words of the Rumanian refugee in Casablanca, "the Devil has the people by the throat". There is an instructive comparison from the world of crime. People are murdered all the time without arousing any public feeling more profound than a prurient curiosity. But when a killer like the Yorkshire Ripper not merely kills people, but also mutilates them and then jeers at society for its inability to stop him, mocking the police for their incompetence, then a genuine fear based on moral uncertainty does grip the public. In short, the media magnify terrorist violence so that its impact on public opinion is disproportionate to the actual physical harm it does.

In these circumstances pressures grow for the Government to take action to restore public order. Awkwardly from the terrorist's point of view, this is more likely to be pressure for repressive measures than for government concessions. To take account of this, philosophers of terrorism produced a theory whereby terror would produce a repressive government which in turn would alienate the people by its repression, which would at last usher in a revolutionary government to the terrorists' taste. This has turned to be wishful

thinking. Democratic governments in Britain, Italy and West Germany have been able to reduce or eliminate terrorism without abandoning democratic institutions. And even in countries like Argentina, where a military government did take over and institute counter-terror, it has been replaced by a conventional democratic government not very different from that originally attacked by the Montoneros. Meanwhile the country has endured all the trauma of civil war.

I turn now to the second point: that the media provide the terrorist with an opportunity to broadcast his views to the wider public. This is an opportunity which he would not generally enjoy if he were to use the conventional channels of democratic politics because his support would not warrant that kind of media attention. But the use of terror gives him a platform. The reason is, once again, straightforward journalistic curiosity. Who are these people blowing up restaurants and shooting policemen? Why are they doing it? What are their aims, intentions, philosophies? And what are their demands? We assume that the public is clamouring to know the answers to such questions and seek to provide them. The terrorists themselves so arrange their affairs as to make life relatively easy for the media. They arrange press conferences, publish communiques and statements of ultimate aims, and give exclusive interviews. In Northern Ireland, indeed, the so-called Republican Movement is divided into a terrorist wing which murders people, the IRA, and a political wing, Sinn Fein, which is available to the media to explain why these murders were regrettable necessities.

We can judge the importance placed on this media platform by terrorists from the fact that, when such attention is lacking, they force the media to present their case by threatening to kill hostages, etc. In his classic essay on this topic, Professor Yonah Alexander cites a number of cases in which terrorists have secured statements of their views in the press through such tactics. In 1975, for instance, the Montoneros terrorists in Buenos Aires released a Mercedes Benz director after his company had published advertisements in Western newspapers denouncing the "economic imperialism" of multi-national corporations in the Third World.

This presents a problem for both press and politicians in a democratic society. It is our natural instinct to publish some incomprehensible verbiage which few will read and by which no-one will be influenced, in return for saving identifiable lives. We can assure ourselves what is perfectly true in another context -- that the terrorists on such occasions are falling victim to their own delusions about the power of advertising to condition people's social and political attitudes. That being so, the only effect of such advertisements will be to swell the revenues of newspapers and the salaries of journalists. But such bien-pensant reasoning ignores the long-term effects of the terrorist being seen to bargain with governments and to dictate to the media. Not only does he thereby raise his political status dramatically, but he also obtains the "Robin Hood" glamour of having triumphed, however trivially, from a position of relative weakness. Governments and media, on the other hand, by cooperating in their own denunciation, come off as somehow corrupt, certainly impotent. One answer is for

governments to announce in advance, as Edward Heath's government did in 1973, that they will not bargain if one of their number is abducted. Such a declaration strengthens their moral authority when they urge private bodies to resist a similar blackmail.

More generally, however, concentration by the media on the terrorists' "case" gives rise to the third problem: the unwitting bestowal of respectability upon terrorist groups. Talking about the aims and philosophies of terrorists inevitably conveys the impression that they are a species of politician rather than a species of criminal. We begin to think of the terrorist in relation to economic or foreign policy rather in relation to knee-capping and amputations. Yet it is what the terrorist does rather than what he thinks (or says he thinks) that makes him a legitimate object of media attention. After all, some people like killing, hurting and frightening others. That insight might be a far more reliable guide to the terrorist's "motivation" than some parroted guff about social justice and institutionalized violence. It might therefore also be a better guide to his future actions.

Television presents this problem of legitimacy in a particularly acute form. For it conveys a sort of respectability upon the terrorist simply by interviewing him. Television is a levelling and homogenizing medium by its very nature, and the process of critically interviewing someone, whether he is a terrorist or a foreign diplomat or an administration nominee in trouble before the Senate, is essentially the same process. Of course, the producer and interviewer will go to considerable lengths to show the terrorist in a

bad light. No matter how aggressive the questioner is, however, he could hardly be more aggressive than, say, Sir Robin Day interrogating Mrs. Thatcher or Mr. Dan Rather grilling Mr. Nixon. Even if the terrorist comes off badly, therefore, he will have his aim by being treated as someone whose contribution to public debate is worthy of attention. He becomes by degrees a politician.

Is there some compensating advantage that justifies such interviews? I don't believe that there is. The blunt truth is that a terrorist is an advocate of murder and that the advocacy of murder is, or should be, beyond the acceptable boundaries of public discussion. The justification commonly advanced is that "we need to know what these people think". But that is poppycock. To begin with, we invariably know what they think long before they appear on television to tell us. Is anyone here unaware of the aims and beliefs of the PLO, or of the IRA, or of the Red Brigade? Secondly, what they say on television is not necessarily what they think (which, as I have argued above, is much more accurately conveyed by what they do). It is sugared propaganda. Finally, even if we needed to know what the terrorist thought and could rely on his honesty, a straightforward journalistic report and analysis by the journalist himself would be a more efficient and reliable method of conveying such information without the side effect of conferring legitimate respectability upon murderers.

Thus far we have considered rather general examples of the media's influence in relation to terrorism. But there have also been a number of occasions on which newspaper and television reporting of specific terrorist incidents has actually hampered the

authorities. Professor Alexander gives what is unfortunately quite a long list in his essay. For instance, in the 1977 hijacking of the Lufthansa jet, the terrorist heard over public radio that the German captain was passing information to the ground authorities over his normal radio transmissions. They subsequently killed him. A similar incident which, fortunately did not have so tragic a result, occurred during the London siege of the Iranian embassy. BBC television viewers suddenly found an old movie interrupted -- appropriately enough, it was a John Wayne movie -- by live coverage of the start of the SAS operation to lift the siege. Fortunately, it seems that the terrorists were not John Wayne fans and did not therefore receive this inadvertent tip-off. If they had, some of the hostages might have perished.

Are there any attitudes in the media which contribute to both the general and specific problems I have outlined? It seems to me that there are, or at least until recently have been, three such attitudes. The first is an exaggeration of the reasonable view that press and government are necessarily antagonistic, the press bent upon exposure, defending the public's right to know, the government insisting upon its executive privacy. Whatever virtue this may have in the ordinary political rough-and-tumble, it is not an appropriate attitude when the authorities are coping with a campaign of murder. "Leaks" of government plans and ignoring official requests for a news blackout when lives are at stake represent a professional distortion of proper human priorities. Fortunately, this is changing. In the Manns-Martin Schleyer kidnapping, the media generally observed an official request for strict silence on official actions.

The second attitude is what Conor Cruise O'Brien calls "unilateral liberalism" which is quite common in the media as it is in the new professional classes in general. This is the "kind of liberalism which is sensitive exclusively to threats to liberty seen as emanating from the democratic state itself, and is curiously phlegmatic about threats to liberty from the enemies of that state." It is this attitude, surely, that is the basis of the belief that, in some sense, the terrorists have a right to have their case presented as if murder were a sort of opinion which the state should respect.

The third is the dynamic of commercial and professional competition which allows no self-restraint in pursuing a dramatic story.

Quite clearly, the most important contribution that the media could make to defeating terrorism would be changing such attitudes. All sorts of other aspects of media coverage would then change automatically. In the absence of that, however, I offer a few arbitrary and random suggestions:

1. Editors should consider very carefully the extent to which their treatment either exaggerates or minimizes the dangers of terrorism. It is my impression -- and no more than that -- that at present Western media coverage exaggerates the domestic dangers and minimizes the threat of international terrorist cooperation except when, fortuitously, the two are linked as in the London siege of the Libyan embassy. This probably reflects nothing more sinister than the usual priority for home over foreign news. But one effect is that public support has not been built up in the

Western democracies for joint action against the terrorist states and the international terror network. Once this goes beyond platitudes, there is an outcry.

2. The media should not allow itself to be used by terrorist groups. It should not seek interviews, or publish communiques, or employ terrorist vocabulary like 'execute' for murder, or the ludicrous titles that terrorists give themselves like "Chief of Staff" of the IRA. Such matters may appear trivial, but they are an important part of establishing the moral climate in which terrorism operates. Geoffrey Jackson, the British Ambassador to Uruguay, told me once that he believed he had significantly unsettled his captors by refusing to accept that he was in a "Peoples' Prison" and insisting that his presence made it the British Embassy. This challenged their version of reality.

3. In an ideal world, journalists would cooperate fully with the law enforcement authorities. They would not protect terrorist sources and they would inform the police of the time and place of any terrorist press conference. But this would mean a joint agreement among different newspapers and television stations to prevent one newspaper or television station gaining an unfair competitive advantage. I do not see the dynamic of competition allowing this at present. But there should be discussion between major news organizations and journalists' trade unions to establish guidelines for self-restraint in dealing with terrorist organizations. To object to such guidelines on the grounds that they might subsequently be used as the basis of a more general censorship is frivolous.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release: June 25, 1984

Speech by Professor Burton M. Leiser

(Professor of Philosophy and Law,
Pace University, New York)

Second Conference on International Terrorism

Law Professor Declares:

"Hot Pursuit" of Terrorists,
Sanctions Against States that Abet Them,
Are Legitimate Principles of International Law

The principle of "hot pursuit" of terrorists should be internationally recognized, according to Burton M. Leiser, professor of philosophy and law at Pace University.

In an address today in Washington at the Second Conference on International Terrorism, sponsored by the Jerusalem-based Jonathan Institute, Reiser asserted that any nation attacked in any way by terrorists "ought lawfully to be able to pursue these predators wherever they might flee".

Moreover, he declared that "any nation that provides aid and comfort to these international outlaws should be subject to appropriate sanctions," ranging from economic and diplomatic

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actions, to total severance of communications, to "blockade, invasion and open warfare".

Reiser emphasized the distinction between terrorism, on the one hand, and the objectives of a revolutionary or even a subversive organization, however much one might disapprove of the latter.

The law professor offered three ways of analyzing terrorism:

"1. It is any organized set of acts of violence designed to create an atmosphere of despair or fear, to shake the faith of ordinary citizens in their government...to destroy the structure of authority which normally stands for security, or to reinforce and perpetuate a governmental regime whose popular support is shaky.

"2. The practitioners of terrorism engage in seemingly senseless, irrational ...forms of violence, all committed with dedicated indifference to existing legal and moral codes or with claims to special exemption from conventional moral norms.

"3. Their policies are pursued with the conviction that the death and suffering of innocent persons...are fully justified by whatever success they may enjoy in achieving their political ends."

Reiser declared that terrorists -- like the PLO -- should be clearly labeled as "a menace to world peace and order, and a threat to civilization. He pointed out that under international law, belligerents do not have an unlimited right to use any means they wish to injure the enemy. But terrorists "demonstrate their

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contempt for law, morality and the principles of civilization itself by engaging in precisely those acts that have been forbidden by the nations of the world even during active hostilities".

Terrorists must thus be recognized as "enemies of mankind" and treated accordingly, the professor stated. This requires two courses by the free nations: risk-taking joint action "to extirpate" terrorism, and a determination "to inform the public of the danger and to arouse our peoples to resistance".

