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RADICALISM: SOUTHERN STYLE

A Commentary
on Regional
Extremism of
the Right

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES
By Reese Cleghorn

The Southern Regional Council
5 Forsyth Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

The American Jewish Committee
Institute of Human Relations
165 East 56th Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

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INTRODUCTION

The Southern Regional Council and the American Jewish Committee originally asked Reese Cleghorn, associate editor of the *Atlanta Journal*, to undertake this comprehensive overview of right-wing extremism in the South before the recent efforts to use this sentiment as a base for a nationwide political movement. Our purpose was to cast fresh light on the frustrations and tensions—some local and others quite unrelated to geographic area—that contribute to racism and bigotry in this country.

Although the final Wallace vote in the 1968 Presidential election was far smaller than early opinion polls had indicated, it demonstrated quite clearly that a sizable reservoir of prejudice and repression continues to exist in our land, and that it is vulnerable to manipulation by politically ambitious demagogues, not only in the South, but in the large industrial centers of the North as well.

Mr. Cleghorn's incisive examination into the roots of the "Wallace phenomenon" reveals the historical and psychological underpinnings of southern extremism and alienation and its implications for the nation as a whole. Such an understanding, in our judgment, is an essential element in any program designed to strengthen the forces of moderation and justice not only in the South, but throughout the length and breadth of our nation.

Paul Anthony
Executive Director
Southern Regional Council, Inc.

Bertram H. Gold
Executive Vice-President
The American Jewish Committee

John F. Kennedy had chosen the South as a forum for dealing with the most serious import of rightwing extremism. In the speech that was not delivered in Dallas on November 22, 1963, the President was to have said:

"Ignorance and misinformation can handicap the progress of a city or a company—but they can, if allowed to prevail in foreign policy, handicap this country's security. In a world of complex and continuing problems, in a world full of frustrations and irritations, America's leadership must be guided by the lights of learning and reason—or else those who confuse rhetoric with reality and the plausible with the possible will gain the popular ascendancy with their seemingly swift and simple solutions to every world problem.

"There will always be dissident voices heard in the land. . . . Those voices are inevitable. But today other voices are heard in the land—voices preaching doctrines wholly unrelated to reality . . . We cannot expect that everyone, to use the phrase of a decade ago, will 'talk sense to the American people.' But we can hope that fewer people will listen to nonsense. . . ."

Less than three months later, Professor Revilo P. Oliver, a member of the John Birch Society's National Council, expressed his view in the society's magazine, *American Opinion*, that "Kennedy was assassinated by the Communist Conspiracy because he was planning to turn American." Robert Welch, founder and president of the Birch Society, found Professor Oliver's analysis to be "superb commentary." Such is the degree of irrationalism which characterizes the extreme right in America and which, as President Kennedy had suggested, can endanger American security "in a world full of frustrations and irritations."

In the South today, as in turbulent and unsettled California and in the old isolationist regions of the Middle West, what we might call "white-collar" rightwing extremism has found fertile ground. To designate it "rightwing" is, however, a poor bit of shorthand, for, as President Kennedy seemed to be saying, its doctrines and underlying assumptions often are in essence neither left nor right but simply hallucinations, "wholly unrelated to reality." By some measures these "rightwing extremists" are close to the most extreme left, having strong anarchistic leanings and, contradictorily, strong inclinations toward state suppression and totalitarianism. Rightist radicalism arises generally out of the great confusion which rapid change has produced in American life. More specifically, it comes out of an inability on the part of millions of 20th Century Americans to understand an increasingly complex form of government; and an inability, for all the extreme right's ostensible devotion to tradition, to accept perhaps the most important tradition underlying two centuries of democratic continuity in

America: moderation and liberality in our political processes and a rejection of political diabolism.

The seed sown in the South by the Birch Society and lesser organizations of the extreme right fall on soil different from that of California or Michigan. It is fertile soil for rightwing doctrines; yet it could prove less receptive to hard-line rightwing organizations than the political and social climate might at first suggest.

It is well to remember that most of the nation only recently made a gross misjudgment in the case of racism, finding the South peculiarly guilty on the basis of the usual indicators. Then in the 1960s we began to see slack-jawed hoodlums harassing peacefully demonstrating Negroes in Michigan, Wisconsin and California. (Were these the fabled "crackers"?) We also heard mayors and congressmen from New Jersey and Illinois speaking all the lines long since assumed to be the peculiar litany of southern officialdom. (Were these "Dixiecrats"?) Perhaps all this has changed some of our perception of racism outside the South; surely it also must have changed some of the simplistic views about the South itself. An examination of rightwing radicalism in the South will be similarly distorted if runaway assumptions allow us to take specifics of rightwing influence in the region and loosely extend them to generalities with the reasoning that all this must be so because the South is, after all, "the most rightwing part of the country."

THE SOUTH'S PECULIAR ETHOS

The South does have its peculiar ethos, of course, that repeatedly has entangled it with whatever rightwing obsession was current. This, along with the more Gothic part of the South's history, has generated judgments that often are too pat. Consider, for example, the ways in which the region can easily be compared with the rightist totalitarian countries of our time.

This is the only part of the country with a history of strong "master race" theory. It has often been regionally paranoiac, suspicious of the rest of the nation and of the world. It is the only part of the country that has suffered stinging and humiliating defeat, and that in a war with a central moral issue. It has always been the poorest part of the nation, and often it has been the victim of discrimination; for instance, for generations, through railroad freight-rate structures fashioned through Northern political and industrial influence to help enable Northern industry to make a colony of the South. Its peculiar Church, warped by its proximity first to slavery and later to white supremacy, developed apart from mainstream Christianity and came to a theology that rationalized the status quo and sanctified the authority of the state — the state government — in basic social matters. Finally, it is the part of the country most conscious of a martial heritage. It has always responded to war. Even in the wake of the Civil War calamity

and estrangement from the nation, the South was in the forefront of American chauvinism in the Spanish-American War. Much of its private, secondary education has been in military academies. A general in uniform, Robert E. Lee, adorns the walls of its banks, law firms, and insurance offices. It has been the region lending greatest support to a "hard line" on Vietnam. Without question, the South thrills to military braid and admires military authority.

For comparison, place alongside these characteristics, now, some characteristics of places which in the 20th Century have been the most fertile ground for rightwing extremism. More often than not, they have been places with a tradition of or a susceptibility to racial doctrines something like white supremacy; have known chaos, defeat and/or some colonization (not necessarily through political structures) on the part of other countries; have had deep-running problems of poverty; have had religious influences that identified themselves with narrow power interests and with the state; and could readily accept military authority and the enthronement of military swagger and its trappings as a kind of substitute for or handmaiden of monarchy's regal trappings.

The comparisons may be imperfect, but they have general validity. If the South had attained its independence a century ago, it might have moved further into these patterns under the duress of hardship. The social, economic, political, and religious conditions that bred demagogues who could only flail against Washington might have made demagogues who could have captured the Capitol at Richmond. The modern technology without which real totalitarianism is impossible might have abetted the suppression of dissent. (The process of suppression often has been present in the South; the means usually have not been.) The hardy, indigenous strain of liberality and resistance which always has been present in the South might have been overcome, just as similar old, indigenous democratic strains were overcome in Germany Italy, Spain, Portugal and many other countries.

But because the South was not a separate nation, because it had to make its public life mesh at least somewhat with that of the nation and ultimately abide by the Constitution, the influences that might have tilted it this other way remained strong but not dominant. The region was protected and saved by its own defeat. The relatively honorable leadership of the Confederacy, which (notwithstanding its defense of slavery) still had much of the idealism and the republican, democratic devotion of the nation's Founding Fathers, was not supplanted by political jackals of the kind that often come in the second and third stages of revolution.

Liberals of the South usually have instinctively known all this, or at least have acted on these premises: They have known that the survival of liberal democracy in the South sometimes has been dependent upon

supplies, spiritual reinforcement and governmental force from outside, all these constituting a kind of reverse "underground railroad." For all their prominence, the worst influences in the region could never fully move it into anti-democratic, anti-liberal patterns. All this was with one mighty exception, of course: Negroes in much of the South lived under totalitarian control. But in a strange contradiction, even while this was taking place democracy was being extended and was becoming entrenched for others in the South.

The region's very racism enabled it to put Negroes aside as another variety of beings, so that they were not even seen as contradictions to the South's oft-expressed and oft-serious devotion to democracy. In the South's view Negroes were, after all, different. Even during the aberrations of the 1950s and early 1960s in Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama and Georgia, state-level efforts at totalitarianism were only outrageous, not finally effective. The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission said blithely that thought control was one of its chief objectives; but it never did, even so, control thoughts. Even in Mississippi's sickness of the time, this could not have been pulled off. Some sense of democracy prevailed when white people's rights began to be intruded upon.

The South in its worst moments, as during the throes of reaction following the 1954 Supreme Court desegregation decision, has been saved from its home-grown totalitarians by two forces: the centuries-old grassroots sense of democracy (which, though blinded to the lack of democracy for Negroes, was very real); and the South's very romanticism and irrationalism. Irrationalism, then, has worked both ways: to nurture doctrines of the radical right, and to thwart them in application. A police state, surely, must have efficiency and a basic ideology compatible with the aims of state control.

IRRATIONALISM: A WAY OF LIFE

Irrationalism has been a public way of life in the South since early in the 19th Century, when the region had to begin reconciling its devotion to democracy with its denial of democracy to Negroes. The South thus is vulnerable, by tradition, to nonsense. With the necessity of embracing American ideals while simultaneously defending first slavery and later rigid white supremacy, which often was absurd as well as ruthless in practice, the white South developed an irrational thought system that was both legalistic and moralistic. Its objectives, of course, were neither legal nor moral. Given this tension, the most preposterous propositions came to be accepted with tenacity. Leslie W. Dunbar has written of a great wonder: the fact that the South, which bore a burden of regional guilt that was apparent to anyone who looked and had some sensitivity to morality, has always regarded itself not just as a moral equal among regions but as morally

superior. To manage this, and to manage to defy the Constitution and make the rest of the nation ignore that for a century, it was necessary to invent legalistic and moralistic rationales that could and did stand the test of time. They were codified, becoming a catechism which ignorant white southerners could ignore (“nigger, nigger” being sufficient for them) but which intelligent and educated white southerners must know and defend lest they be seduced by troublesome alien beliefs, sponsored by “outsiders” who “hated the South.” Consequently, irrational mechanisms — “Our Negroes are happy and don’t want any of this agitation,” “The 14th Amendment is really illegal,” “The Supreme Court’s decisions are unconstitutional,” “The South is not racist; it is just for states rights and freedom of association”—became perfectly acceptable. The mind that could not understand these things, so the thinking went, just did not understand the South.

It is an easy jump from these mental processes, which were the product of guilt, obsessive defensiveness, closed-mindedness, and a bit of paranoia, to the catechisms of those who “confuse rhetoric with reality and the plausible with the possible.” These codes, too, usually are based upon obsessive defensiveness, guilt, closed-mindedness and a bit of paranoia. People who could believe that every day a snickering, South-hating, usurping, power-mad, socialistic ilk in Washington was plotting to throttle the South’s best interests and set Negroes on their best friends might just as well believe that every day Moscow was chortling as it watched its agents infiltrate and gain control of the government, press, churches and unions of America so that the country was already about three-fourths conquered by Soviet power. The two propositions were, after all, about equally true. And, of course, when the Communist scare was nicely linked with the Negro scare, as an explanation of why “our Negroes are upset,” the second proposition tended to make still more sense.

CHANGE AND PERSONAL CRISIS

Then there are the crises of change in the South which are a part of the change going on elsewhere in the country. Especially intensive are the changes from rural to urban and from agricultural to industrial. Uncertainty about one’s place and worth appears to be an increasing phenomenon in the highly organized society of modern America. It also appears to be a common factor among many people attracted to rightwing extremism. A number of analyses have suggested this. Using conclusions of a study of radical rightists, Ira S. Rohter, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, has usefully categorized many rightists as “the decliners, the new arrivals, and the value keepers” who feel status frustration. The “decliners” are people “going down on the social scale—undeservedly, as they see it,” often falling below the status levels of fathers who were self-

employed businessmen or farm owners; the "new arrivals" are "on the way up" but caught in the lag between the time the new arrival achieves success and the time he finds an established place among peers and is accepted as an equal; the "value keepers" may be rising or falling in status and feel themselves at least temporarily threatened severely by "aliens who know not the Lord," who put more stock in education, expertise and mass solutions than in the hard work, self-discipline, prudence and independence that was the bedrock of the small-town life of the past.

Study of a selected group of radical rightists indicated, Rohter concluded, a disproportionate number who were undergoing status change with feelings that they "do not have the prestige and power they should have if the world were just—and their enemies have too much." They identify themselves with "older, traditional (Protestant ethic) values of work, religion and morality" so that their fight seems not simply a struggle with other legitimate interests but, rather, on the side of truth, justice, decency, God and America. They tend to believe their troubles are caused by an evil conspiracy and see society as essentially closed to them, dominated by personalities, controlled by the wrong kind of people. They want simple explanations, and conspiracy satisfies that need. They tend to show "strident negativism and combativeness" that expresses itself in extreme self-righteousness, a strong belief in harsh punishments, a feeling of powerlessness, a view that Communism is not merely a bad and aggressive threat but an all-pervasive Satan incarnate which cannot be tolerated in any way by the righteous. (About half were members of fundamentalist religious faiths.)

It is obvious that much of the South is susceptible to such feelings, with the South's unusually rapid increase in population mobility and transitions of many kinds. Between 1950 and 1960 the nation's increase in urban population was 29.3 per cent, and in the South as defined by the Census it was 40.1 per cent. The rural farm population declined 41.7 per cent nationally and 50.2 per cent in the South. During that decade the South's urban population increased from 48.6 per cent to 58.5 per cent of the total population (compared with a national figure of 69.9 per cent). Even such a Deep South state as Georgia, which had been 90 per cent rural at the turn of the century, plunged well beyond the 50-50 mark in urbanization.

Values of the farm and the village often are in sharp conflict with the demands of the city. Further, religious fundamentalism has been so widespread in the South in the past that a confused southerner seeking explanations for the strange changes in the world around him may respond well to a simplistic religious explanation. Rightwing extremism also is more likely to be race-related in the South than elsewhere. This is true not

only because of historic racist doctrines in the region but also because a man who feels his own status threatened can see that in recent years Negroes have been rising on the ladder, Jews have occupied prominent places, and a Catholic has become President. Much of the nation may be startled at the very idea when it sees hoodlums bearing signs saying "White Power," "Keep America White," and "National Association for the Advancement of White Power," but the idea of Anglo-Saxon whites' being shoved aside and outdistanced is not strange to men and women whose own individual status seems imperiled and who are surrounded by others who see things the same way. In terms of numbers of people, there may be more of this feeling in the urban, industrial areas of the Midwest and the mobile, often impersonal and frequently rootless life of California. But in the South of today, probably a higher percentage of the population feels this powerlessness and victimization.

THE POLITICAL RADICALS

It is in the political arena, rather than in the spread of such organizations as the John Birch Society, that these frustrations are having the most dramatic impact in the South. The region obviously has much more than its proportionate share of major political figures who are close to the radical right. The list is long, but these examples are pre-eminent:

—Gov. Lester Maddox of Georgia has had an involvement with a variety of rightwing organizations over at least a decade. In the years immediately before his election as governor in 1966, he frequently was a public ally of the Birch Society, the Citizens Councils, and such rightwing gospellers as Billy James Hargis. He refused to disavow the Ku Klux Klan, obviously because to do so would have offended many of his friends. At the time he was elected, the Let Freedom Ring rightwing telephone messages for Atlanta were coming from his furniture store. After he was publicly embarrassed by a Let Freedom Ring attack on the American Legion, the telephone equipment was swiftly removed; shortly, the message service was back in action, with its equipment located in an American Opinion book store (distributor of John Birch literature). Despite an initial effort to establish a "moderate" image, Gov. Maddox did not otherwise disavow his old friends. Some members of the radical right won second-level political appointments. A few months after taking office, Maddox appeared at a national gathering of the Rev. Mr. Hargis' Christian Anti-Communism Crusade. His pronouncements on such subjects as the urban riots, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassination and international affairs have continued to reflect the rightwing extremist line. Following the assassination, for instance, he said Dr. King had "carried out the policies and programs of Communists in this country."

—George Wallace, as governor of Alabama and later as a candidate for president, was the beneficiary of nationwide help from the radical right. Its members had been prominent in local efforts outside the South for his candidacy in presidential primaries in 1964. In the 1968 presidential campaign, they held key roles in the various state organizations created to support Wallace's candidacy. Wallace supporters used the rightist third parties established in many states as an outgrowth of the Congress of Conservatives, held in 1965 under the chairmanship of Kent Courtney, a rightist pamphleteer. These truly represented the outer fringes of American politics. Principal movers in some of the activities were Courtney; "Ace" Carter, who had been in the news over the years as an Alabama Klansman and Citizens Council leader; and former Sheriff James G. Clark of Selma, who also was popular on the John Birch Society speaking circuit.

Wallace's efforts also rested heavily in some areas upon the extremist Citizens Councils, Liberty Lobby and Congress of Freedom. Liberty Lobby began pushing the Wallace candidacy in 1965. It announced it was sending everyone on its mailing list a copy of a tabloid called "Stand Up for America—The Story of George Wallace." The Citizens Councils touted Wallace in their publications. In 1965 Wallace was speaker at the annual leadership conference of the Citizens Councils of America, at which one extremist speaker lengthily spiked the proceedings with anti-Semitic remarks that could only be described as rantings. Two months later Wallace was a main speaker at the annual convention of the Congress of Freedom, one of the wildest of all organizations of the radical right.

Some of the early Wallace campaign planning was at a meeting on November 8, 1965, in Montgomery attended by Ned Touchstone, Richard Cotton and John R. Rarick. Touchstone, whose plans for a "Draft Wallace" movement must have had either Wallace's approval or acquiescence, is widely known because of the crude racism and anti-Semitism of the *Councilor*, which he edits. Cotton is a radio commentator whose views are far beyond simple arch-conservatism; he sees a "Zionist-Jewish conspiracy" as all-pervasive and works with some of the country's leading hate peddlers. Rarick, then a Louisiana judge and later a congressman, has included such nationally known extremists as Col. Curtis B. Dall and Lt. Gen. Pedro Del Valle in his congressional campaign organization.

In Ohio, the Christian Conservative Party was the first group to promote the Wallace candidacy. Its headquarters, and the offices of the early state-wide Ohio-for-Wallace group, were in a book store that distributed the most rancid propaganda of the radical right. A key figure in the effort there was a man who had advocated sending Negroes to Africa and who had suggested all Jews are Communists. In Missouri, one of the leading Wallace people was the Rev. Bill Beene, of St. Louis. He sponsored the

appearance of former Sheriff Clark when he was in Missouri as the campaign organizer. Beeney's splinter, the Counter Revolutionary Organization on Salvation and Service (CROSS), promoted the distribution of weapons to be used to combat uprisings. In some places representatives of the Patriotic Party, political arm of the Minutemen, had leading roles in the Wallace effort. Though there later was confusion about its endorsement, in 1967 the Patriotic Party chose Wallace as its presidential candidate. John Birch members had prominent roles in Wallace organizations in many states. Robert Shelton, imperial wizard of the United Klans of America, claimed more strength than his organization actually had but no doubt reflected its political allegiance when he said of Wallace: "We made him governor and we must make him president." Extremist followers of Wallace were not hanging on despite discouragement; he repeatedly refused to disavow individuals and organizations with which presidential candidates traditionally have disassociated themselves. In many ways his was the most radical major presidential campaign in the country's history.

—John Bell Williams, governor of Mississippi, had rightwing ties as open as those of Maddox and Wallace. His voting record as a congressman would have warmed the heart of any ultra-rightist. Most notably in his non-legislative activities, he was a supporter of the Citizens Councils and the Liberty Lobby. The latter organization was founded by Willis Carto, a former Birch Society worker who once proposed that American Negroes be shipped to Africa. Liberty Lobby sometimes has had anti-Semitic thrust, as well. The *Washington Observer*, which Group Research has called a thinly-disguised Liberty Lobby newsletter, once suggested that Jewish organizations were behind efforts to win U.S. approval of the U.S.-Soviet consular treaty to facilitate Jewish migration from Russia. It added that consequently "we not only got a Consular Treaty but also will now receive many more Jews as immigrants from Russia! How lucky can we be?" Among Liberty Lobby's founders was Tom Brady, later a Mississippi Supreme Court justice and a leading figure in the Citizens Councils.

—Among congressmen and senators, the South Carolina delegation often has led the South in support of the radical right. Rep. Mendel Rivers, one of Congress' most powerful men as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, defended the John Birch Society on the floor of the House in 1961. He has appeared on the rightwing Manion Forum. In July of 1967 the American Security Council, a conservative pressure group that grew out of an industry loyalty-security program, said it had been retained by Rivers' committee (apparently without payment) to study the U.S. arms race with Russia.

Rep. Albert Watson of South Carolina was a featured speaker at a Washington gathering of the Liberty Lobby in January of 1967. Reps.

W. J. Bryan Dorn and E. Y. Berry of South Carolina have been Liberty Lobby supporters. Sen. J. Strom Thurmond has always been a favorite of the radical right in general, and probably no other member of Congress has so consistently satisfied the radical right's conception of what a legislator should be.

—In Louisiana, the strong influence of Leander Perez, Sr., a nationally-known white supremacist and anti-Semite, has waned in recent years but in 1968 he showed renewed strength in manipulations within the Louisiana Democratic Party organization and through his efforts on behalf of Wallace. With a political and economic power base of his own for five decades (through his domination of minerals-rich Plaquemines Parish), Perez has had the wherewithal to voice his bigotry without compromise; it came out not only explosively anti-Negro but thoroughly and elaborately anti-Semitic. To Perez, trends toward extending civil liberties in recent years have been results of the plotting of Communist Zionists who were manipulating inherently inferior Negroes in the civil rights movement. Perez has said frankly that he does not believe in democracy and many times has advocated violence. One would think that the influence of such a man could not stand the test of time, but 50 years after his emergence as a political figure in Louisiana he still can move events. It would appear that his loss of the influence he once exercised is related less to the outrageousness of his words and actions than to the fact that in Louisiana he is now regarded as *gauche*. Perez is no longer the kind of man the most "respectable" people want to be associated with. With shiftings toward moderation in Louisiana, and with a rising Negro vote there, it is probable that no one can quite take the place of Perez. Rep. John R. Rarick, a loyal Citizens Councils supporter, and Rep. Joe Waggoner, who has supported the Liberty Lobby, are, however, two public figures of influence who are friends of the radical right.

The five states represented by these men have been, of course, the well-springs of Southern extremism in recent years. It is worthwhile to note, however, that the rightist Southern politicians seldom worked seriously to *structurally build rightwing organizations*. An exception to this observation was to be found in Mississippi in the 1950s and early 1960s, when prominent political figures such as Ross Barnett positively furthered the development of the Citizens Councils. But for the most part, the leading political rightwingers have not cared to seriously build separate, private organizations that might rival their own bases or force them at points to take steps that could be politically damaging. An example of this caution was the Talmadge organization's success in the mid-1950s in preventing the Citizens Councils from becoming a serious factor *as an organization* in Georgia. The big names of Georgia segregation — Herman Talmadge,

Marvin Griffin, Roy Harris, Lester Maddox, and others — sponsored the Georgia States Rights Council, the state's equivalent to the Citizens Councils. But apparently because of Talmadge's influence, it never was allowed to extend roots organizationally. Once a year its sponsors would gather for oratory. The council itself never became an apparatus that could be used by new Jacobins to challenge the old Jacobins politically. Politicians usually are jealous of their own control, and distrustful of power bases that might be used by someone else to outdo them at their own games.

Some politicians have learned that relying upon Birch members or encouraging their influence in political structures can be costly. One leading southern Republican, who was beneficiary of substantial Birch Society political action in the Goldwater campaign of 1964, said then they were welcome and that his only requirement was that they work for the party. They did. But in time their primary allegiance to the doctrines of the Birch Society caused difficulties. His assessment of their political participation, coming from a tough-minded political organizer, is worth noting. He said recently in private:

"Those people are no problem if you've got others who know what's going on, who'll fight them when necessary. I've never been concerned with the Birch Society as an organization. I've never seen their lines of organization and leadership galvanized behind a particular candidate or policy, with control that transcends other lines of leadership. They may get together before a meeting and talk about what to do. But I never saw evidence that a section leader ordered them to do something which they just carried out. On the other hand, the Birch Society attracts some people who are irresponsible, and the nature of the society gives them a feeling of personal power. That type, trying to satisfy his own need for power, concerns me more than the ideological commitments of Birchers in general. The Birch Society members usually are not really interested in politics on a continuing and realistic basis. The ones who helped us most in 1964 are mostly out of party work now and busy with fundamentalist-type religion of the anti-Communist, anti-National Council of Churches type."

EXPORTING SOUTHERN RADICALISM

In 1968 a basic question about rightist radicalism in Southern politics arrested the attention of the nation as a whole: Could it be exported, so that a peculiarly southern politician might lead the whole country to the extreme right? George Wallace set out to make his presidential candidacy a truly national campaign, in sharp contrast with the sectional campaign conducted in 1948 by Sen. Thurmond and the States Rights Party. He won a place on the ballot in every state, an accomplishment requiring prodigious

effort and widespread support. Polls early in the campaign, and in mid-campaign, showed his popularity rising steadily across the nation.

Is Wallace a peculiarly southern politician? The argument can be made that he is simply a major political figure of the right who happens to be from the South; that other non-southern politicians, such as the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, have occupied essentially the same position in the political spectrum; and that accordingly there is nothing peculiarly southern about Wallace's politics. To a degree, this is true. It is easy to imagine that a national demagogue similar in many ways to Wallace might emerge from, for instance, the struggles over order in the schools of New York, Pennsylvania, or Ohio. But even so, such a figure would not represent the same phenomenon that Wallace represents. He embodies the essence and spirit of a century of peculiarly southern resistance to the national ideals, with all its sly subtleties alien to most of the country's people; disregard for constitutional processes in general, with an assumption (accepted in much of the South) that tradition and folk custom are more important than law; traditional southern "put-the-bottom-rung-on-top" class appeals; and regional paranoia unlike any to be found elsewhere. Even his political rhetoric, which often surprised his non-southern listeners (with such lines as "We gone put 'em *under* the jail"), reduced the sense of identity which non-southerners could have with him. Wallace was, after all, a man who had a strong political base at home partly because he had exploited many people's sense of inferiority *as southerners* and their conviction that they were being looked down upon because of what they were. ("Folks down here in Alabama are just as refined and cultured as folks anywhere!" Wallace often says, and these words invariably bring applause from people who apparently need to be told just this.) In his last speech of the campaign, on the Georgia State Capitol steps, Wallace returned repeatedly to his regional themes. He said Georgians were tired of being looked down upon, and that they were as good as any bureaucrats with briefcases. He spoke of the need to show that a southerner could be elected president. The speech again underscored that, if Wallace was not a sectional candidate, at least he was a particular kind of peculiarly southern candidate running nationally.

The election results indicated that if the nation is soon to be led to the extreme right by a demagogue, as it may be, he will have to be something more than a demagogue of provincial thought processes, rhetoric and spirit. Rightwing radicalism in the South may help him substantially; but in its provincialism, it has peculiarities that only southerners can identify with.

The early poll showings reflected a strong general discontent in the country which Wallace could marshal for the pollsters but which he could

not translate into votes for the presidency of the United States. His 13 per cent nationally can be construed as alarming or as small enough to be reassuring. What is more important than the percentage is the distribution of his vote: It almost perfectly reflected the southern nature of his candidacy and the unwillingness of those outside the South to follow him.

Wallace carried only Alabama, with 65 per cent of the votes; Mississippi, with 63 per cent; Louisiana, with 48; Georgia, with 43; and Arkansas, with 40. Twenty years earlier Thurmond had carried Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and South Carolina. There was, then, little difference between the outcome for Wallace, with respect to his area of strong appeal, and the results for Thurmond, an easily identifiable southern sectional candidate. Wallace carried most of the "inner" South and did more poorly in the "outer" South, more poorly still in border states, and more poorly still in the rest of the nation. The pattern, in terms of the "southernness" of his appeal, was clear.

In the "outer" South, which he had hoped to carry, there were these results for him: Virginia, 24 per cent; Tennessee, 34; North Carolina, 31; Florida, 29; and Texas, 19. (In South Carolina, an "inner" South state, he apparently was limited to 31 per cent largely by the influence of Thurmond and other influential Republicans who presented Richard Nixon as perhaps less desirable for the South but more likely to win.) In the border states, he won these votes: Kentucky, 18 per cent; Maryland, 15; Missouri, 11; Delaware, 13; and West Virginia, 10. Significantly, in typical conservative states distant from the South, he made some of his worst showings; for instance, in Arizona (where Barry Goldwater was regaining his seat in the Senate), Wallace had nine per cent, and in Kansas, 10. He obviously was not seen primarily as a conservative in these states, but primarily as a southern radical.

In three states where he had served as a vehicle for very strong protest votes in the Democratic primaries of 1964, he did very poorly as a genuine candidate for the White House. He won 15 per cent in Maryland, where he had polled 43 per cent in the 1964 primary; 12 per cent in Indiana, where he had 30 per cent in 1964; and eight per cent in Wisconsin, where he had polled 34 per cent in 1964. These votes indicated that although many people four years earlier had been willing to vote for him in plebiscites on their discontent, most did not see his politics as suitable for a national presidential candidate.

Surely his peculiarly southern appeal was the basic factor in his insignificant showings in such states as Maine, where he won two per cent; Vermont, three per cent; New Hampshire, four per cent; and Hawaii, one per cent. In the final analysis, too, he lost much of the blue-collar support he had seemed to have during what might be called the rhetorical protest

stage of the campaign, before the White House was at stake. His results were poor in all industrial states. In Michigan he received only 10 per cent of the votes; in Ohio, 12 per cent; in New Jersey, nine per cent; in Illinois and Pennsylvania, eight per cent; and in California, seven per cent.

The Wallace campaign, with strong financing, nationwide organization, and almost even-time treatment by the mass media in general, scored well enough to cause concern about the extent of rightwing extremist feeling in the country. But what it revealed about that was not surprising. Certainly it did not indicate that the South can mold and direct the nation's extremism according to the designs and emphases of its peculiar, provincial variety of rightwing radicalism.

RIGHTISTS IN AND OUT OF OFFICE

The kind of political extremism that has prevailed or at least has been strongly represented in much of the South for decades is not substantially the product of radical national or regional organizations. Southern political rightists frequently have aided the organized right; but they have seldom been created by it. Nor is there convincing evidence that the election of a radical governor, such as Maddox or Wallace, has greatly increased the membership and activity of such organizations as the Birch Society, again with the lone exception of Mississippi during the era of Citizens Councils strength and their alliance with Gov. Ross Barnett. No one could have been more of an "anything goes" radical rightist than Maddox. But as he approached the middle of his term in office, there seemed to be no great increase in organized radical rightist activity in Georgia attributable to his influence. The John Birch Society in the Atlanta area in mid-1968 evidently had no more than 500 active members (one former member scoffed at any suggestion that it had more than 200). That figure represented no substantial increase and possibly a decline since 1964, despite intense new organizational efforts. The Citizens Councils still had made no inroads in Georgia, which always had been barren land for them. In Atlanta, where a council existed in name, it was hardly more than a mailing address. The Klan's membership apparently had not risen appreciably. Evidence of Klan activity seemed, in fact, substantially less than in some recent years and largely amounted to an occasional peaceful demonstration in Atlanta. (The Georgia Grand Dragon of the United Klans, Calvin Craig, resigned his Klan office in early 1968, indicating he would seek public office. He was amicably sitting down with Negroes regularly as a participant in Atlanta's Model Cities program, and he sought their votes in an unsuccessful race for sheriff.) When the preacher-evangelists of the radical right, in particular Billy James Hargis and Fred Schwarz, came through Georgia in 1967, their crowds were no larger than before. A visit by Robert Welch of the

Birch Society in February of 1967 attracted about 400 people, a much smaller crowd than he had drawn in 1966.

PROPAGANDA IN PRINT

If the radical organizations have not burgeoned everywhere, nevertheless the word they bear about public issues has. The theory of the Birch Society and its allies often has served as a codification and rationalization of existing prejudices, extending and enforcing them. Much of this has been done through publications and radio.

Among the principal rightist publications widely distributed in the South is *Human Events*, started in 1944 as a four-page newsletter by some prominent people (including Gen. Robert E. Wood and Charles E. Lindbergh) who had been associated with the isolationist America First Committee. *Human Events* at one time had close ties with the Birch Society, H. L. Hunt's Life Line organization, and other radical right groups. *Human Events* and the Birch Society have jointly offered their followers bulk subscriptions to *Human Events* and the Society's *American Opinion* magazine, at reduced rates. Many of the sponsors of *Human Events* in recent years have been leading Birch members, and the tabloid-size paper continues to push a standard set of far-right views and proposals. It cannot be as clearly labeled radical right as some other publications. Much of its content may be described as very conservative but not radical rightist in the narrow sense, consisting of articles by such people as Barry Goldwater, Ralph de Toledano, and Max Rafferty and reprints from conservative newspapers such as the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Charleston News and Courier*. It offers a combination of far-rightist viewpoints along with very conservative views that are more in the mainstream of public exchange. Its national circulation has reached an estimated 180,000, and it appears to be distributed very widely in the South.

Several publications of the radical right originate in the South. They are produced primarily for Southern readers. These include the Citizens Councils' magazine, the *Citizen*, and various pamphlets and books which that organization pushes; the *Augusta Courier*, a weekly tabloid put-together of clippings and extreme personal views published by old-time segregationist politician Roy Harris, of Augusta, Georgia, president of the Citizens Councils of America; the *Independent American*, a small monthly newspaper published by Free Men Speak, Inc., of New Orleans, whose principal voices have been Kent and Phoebe Courtney; the Southern States Industrial Council *Bulletin*, published semi-monthly in Nashville by a council with some large corporate support whose stated views parallel most of the program of the radical right; the *Birmingham Independent*, whose

readership is local; and the *Councilor*, publication of the Louisiana Citizens Councils.

Other radical right publications with some influence in the South include the Birch Society's *American Opinion* magazine, a monthly, and its *Bulletin*, a monthly in which Robert Welch tells members how they may implement the society's program first by reading and then by action; *Life Lines*, a four-page commentary put out three times a week by H. L. Hunt's Life Lines Foundation; the *Dan Smoot Report*, a four-page, letter-size weekly published in Dallas by Dan Smoot, who previously was commentator for Hunt's defunct radio program "Facts Forum;" the *Christian Crusade*, a monthly magazine, and the *Weekly Crusader*, a bulletin, published at Tulsa by Billy James Hargis; *Liberty Letter*, monthly official organ of the Liberty Lobby, whose 210,000 circulation nationally makes it the biggest periodical clearly representing the radical right; and *News & Views*, a monthly published by Maj. Edgar Bundy's Church League of America.

An arresting fact about all these publications is their sameness of viewpoint. The standard line, from which there is little variation, is opposition to the United Nations, the poverty program and the Supreme Court; hysterical exaggeration of the progress of internal communism; advocacy of a return of prayer to the public schools; opposition to civil rights legislation, with assertions that civil rights organizations are Communist pawns; a belief that the schools, press, churches and other basic institutions are Communist-infiltrated or at best dominated by "liberal-socialist" theory; and proposals to basically alter the federal system. There are variations on such questions as whether to support a third party and whether to dismantle the federal government by repealing the income tax and barring it from professional and business services (as the Liberty Lobby's proposed Liberty Amendment would do) or whether to simply limit income tax rates by amendment except in time of war (as the Southern States Industrial Council proposes).

PROPAGANDA ON THE AIR

The message of the radical right is much stronger in the South than elsewhere on radio stations. In fact, radio appears to be the most formidable weapon in the radicals' arsenal. A reasonable estimate indicates that 7,000 programs of the radical right are heard weekly across the nation, and a sizable portion of these are on southern stations. One reason for their proliferation has been the sluggishness with which liberals and others have moved to challenge them. Now when licenses are up for renewal before the Federal Communications Commission, questions occasionally are being raised about whether a station heavily dispensing radical rightist views is providing the kind of balance on public issues which the FCC requires. But each challenge must be well documented. Further, a station may escape

giving equal time to those attacked or to the causes they represent if there is no well-prepared request for the time; and when a station goes unchallenged at the time of a program it can argue that it would have granted equal time if this had been requested.

The South's affinity for radical right radio programs is worth close scrutiny. The region is still less urban than most of the nation, and a large part of its population regularly listens to small, local stations. It is exactly these low-budget stations, often without network ties or other good sources of programming, which most often use the radical right's prepared propaganda. The rightist evangelists, especially, have appeal in the South. One of their byproducts appears to be in influencing local preachers (usually of the smaller, fundamentalist sects) who use the radio simultaneously for jeremiads and fund appeals to sustain the program.

The Rev. Carl McIntyre's "Twentieth Century Reformation Hour" has led the field in the South, as well as nationally. Organized in 1958, this daily program was being heard on 313 stations by 1962. Its biggest forward movement came during and immediately after the general national upsurge of the right in 1964. At one point during that year the number of stations was 448, with 201 of these (45 per cent) in the South. In 1965 the number of stations exceeded 600. The program apparently continued to be strong in 1968, with about half the stations in the southern states. Much of McIntyre's appeal is to those who dislike the National Council of Churches and the directions in which almost all the major Protestant denominations have been moving on social and theological questions. McIntyre himself was barred from continued service as a clergyman of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. (now the United Presbyterian Church) in 1936. That church's General Assembly, its highest governing body, accused him of defaming the character of fellow Christians, causing "dissension and strife" and engendering suspicion and ill will. He has been a leading figure in the American Council of Churches and the International Council of Churches, splinter groups established as rivals of, respectively, the National and World Councils of Churches. McIntyre's appeal to religious separatism and fundamentalism is enhanced in the South by his longstanding opposition to civil rights legislation and statements like the one in which he said talk about racial brotherhood is only Communist propaganda. He is stridently anti-Catholic and in the past has been allied with anti-Semites. In the spring of 1967 he held a Washington meeting of his American Council of Churches to charge suppression of his radio program by the FCC under the "fairness doctrine" on equal time; but the program appears to be still going strong.

The progress of another broadcast of the religious rightists, the "Christian Crusade Radio Ministry," a daily program by Billy James Hargis,

also is especially noteworthy. It is sponsored by Hargis' Christian Crusade, which derives funds from various sources, and by contributions it requests on the air. In 1962 it had reached a peak, with 200 radio and 12 television outlets in 46 states. The next year it was forced to retrench, keeping about 50 radio stations and a few TV outlets. In 1964, with the whole radical right feeling an upsurge in connection with the Goldwater candidacy, the Christian Crusade program was back over the 100 mark in stations and by the next year it had 237 stations in 37 states, Canada and Mexico. In 1967, it had 208 U. S. stations, 86 of which were in the southern states. Thus, southern stations accounted for more than 41 per cent of Hargis' total.

Hargis has emerged in a short time as one of the two or three leading forces of the radical right nationally. In the South, his organization may have more impact than any other national rightist propaganda force. He preaches an orthodox rightist ideology, and in 1967 he seemed to be stepping up his appeals to racism. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was "a part of the whole Communist conspiracy," he told an Atlanta audience. He went on to scoff at the idea that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People speaks for Negroes. "They have never allowed a Negro to head their organization," he declared. His line generally has been that all civil rights efforts were related to communism and effectuated by dupes and fellow-travelers. His use of the race issue was not new: As early as the 1957 school desegregation struggle at Little Rock, he was defending white supremacy. He distributed a pamphlet on the Little Rock situation written by Joseph P. Kamp, a veteran rightwing extremist. Hargis has had a background of close association with extreme anti-Semites such as the late Gerald Winrod and Allen Zoll.

Maj. Edgar Bundy's Church League of America has a 15-minute program which from its outset in 1962 had a substantial southern representation. Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia and Florida were four of the eight states reached by the program the first year. It remains a small operation by comparison with Hargis' and McIntyre's. In 1968 the South apparently had more than its share of the Bundy programs, though not as many as some Western states.

Howard Kershner's "Commentary on the News," sponsored by the Christian Freedom Foundation, Inc., also had found the South fertile ground. The number of its stations in the region is currently uncertain but, in 1962, 43 of the 148 stations carrying it, or 29.1 per cent, were in Southern states. The total number had risen by 1965 to 362 stations, including substantial increases in the South.

In addition to these rightist programs with specifically rightist appeals, others have been unusually successful. "Life Lines," the 15-minute daily

program heavily supported by Hunt's petroleum and food concerns, was organized in 1958. By 1961 it was carried by 200 stations nationally, and by the next year the figure had risen to 304. In 1963, 60 per cent of the 289 "Life Line" stations were in the South. In 1967, the figure was 236, or 47 per cent of the 500 stations. The "Manion Forum," which uses radio-solicited contributions and private industries' gifts to present Clarence Manion and his guests, has always had a disproportionate southern base. In 1959, when it had only 89 stations, 38 were in the South. In 1965, its 267 radio stations included 105, or 39 per cent, in the South. By 1967 the "Manion Forum" had been substantially reduced in scope nationally and was even more southern-oriented. Its 155 radio and TV stations included 101 in the South, 65 per cent of the total.

The Birch Society's radio program, relatively new, was making headway in the South in 1967 but how extensively was uncertain. America's Future, Inc., which might be called a fellow-traveler of the radical right, had a much less extensive but still disproportionate distribution in the South. In 1961, it had 371 stations nationally, with 121 of these, or 33 per cent, in southern states. The programs of the Citizens Councils Forum, which is supported by wealthy businessmen and which in the past had a subsidy from the State of Mississippi, were being used by more than 150 stations nationally in 1967, with a large part of this distribution in the South. The weekly "Radio Edition" of the Courtneys' *Independent American* newspaper was being broadcast in 1967 on 33 stations in about 15 states, most of these in the South.

Of the major programs only the "Dan Smoot Report" could be verifiably determined to have a less-than-proportionate distribution in the South. Analysis of the 1965 totals indicates that 20 of the 138 stations broadcasting the Smoot program were in the South, slightly less than seven per cent.

Some stations present a steady diet of the radical right's national offerings and supplement it with local rightist political programs and, frequently, religious fundamentalism. It is possible, in a few cities, to find a rightist program for almost every hour on some local station. In Birmingham in 1967, one might swing through a succession of programs, with hardly an interruption, by dialing six radio stations. On week days, starting at 7:55 a. m. and ending at 9 p.m., the right-winger's radio log included "Paul Harvey," "Christian Crusade," "Conservative Viewpoint," "Paul Harvey," "Paul Harvey," "Fulton Lewis III," and "Life Line;" and on Sundays, between 9:30 a.m. and 9:45 p.m., the "Rev. Ferrell Griswold" (a local minister and ally of the Birch Society), "The Independent Presents" (a local rightwing program), "Dan Smoot," "Christian Crusade," "John Birch Report," "Congressman John Buchanan" (a rightwing Republican), "Citizens Council Forum," "Manion Forum," and the "R. K. Scott Commem-

tary." In Birmingham the extreme rightwinger need hardly ever be without radio inspiration.

The dissemination of rightist views through broadcasting has unique significance, despite the fact that ultra-conservative opinions also are extensively distributed in the region's general-circulation newspapers. The latter will not be examined here. It might be said in passing that ultra-conservative newspaper columnists usually are sustained through normal syndication payments rather than through organizations and subsidies which exist only to promote the special causes of the radical right.

THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Among national organizations of the radical right, the John Birch Society remains the only one organized substantially across the South. (The Citizens Councils, strong in some areas, are excepted here because they are not truly national.) Some light on the degree of Birch Society penetration of the South is shed by a study done by Dr. Fred W. Grupp Jr., then of the University of Wisconsin's Department of Political Science. He surveyed members of the Birch Society in 1966 to determine, in part, how the individual attitudes of members might be correlated with the Society's official positions. He concluded there was wide disparity. Especially among the members recruited in the big expansion of 1964 and 1965, he found a very large number who did not accept the full "party line." Of principal interest here, however, is the fact that the Birch Society, though it would not reveal to him its mailing list, agreed to mail his questionnaires to a cross-section of its membership. From the replies received, Dr. Grupp calculated that 26 per cent of the Birch membership was in the 11 Southern states, which have 27 per cent of the nation's population. Since the best estimates of national Birch membership at that time were between 75,000 and 80,000, this percentage suggests a southern membership of 19,000 or slightly more. There was substantial variation state to state. From various evidences, the writer concludes that the following situation existed in early 1968. Alabama was the third state in the country in Birch members, with the highest number per capita. Texas and Florida were close to Alabama among southern states in membership. Mississippi had more than its per capita share: probably about 2,000 members. A middle rank could be assigned to Georgia, which appeared to have three per cent of the Birch membership (its total population being approximately two per cent of the nation's). Some other southern states, most notably Tennessee and North Carolina, apparently had substantially less Birch membership than their populations would indicate if membership were evenly distributed across the country. Of the remaining southern states, it appeared that Virginia and South Carolina were closer to the Texas-

Florida pattern and Arkansas and Louisiana closer to the Georgia mid-rank in Birch membership.

In some ways, the South seems to have been deliberately short-changed by the Birch Society organizationally, though it may be that only recently has the southern membership become substantial enough to justify a concentrated effort. In 1966, the Society had a chief public relations director and regional public relations directors for the East, Midwest, Southwest and Washington. No resident public relations director was in the Deep South even by early 1968. When the Society went all-out in general public appeal through newspaper advertising with a 16-page, multi-color newspaper supplement, it placed this special section in major newspapers in Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Milwaukee, Indianapolis and Dallas. (In Houston, the section was mailed directly to homes.) No major southern newspapers outside Texas had the supplement. In 1965, a national fund drive brought in \$200,000 through testimonial dinners (\$50 and \$25 per plate) in Los Angeles, Phoenix, New York, Chicago, and Dallas. Again, except for Dallas, the South had no such events. The Society has had field offices in White Plains, N. Y. (Eastern); Glenview, Ill. (Midwestern); San Marino, Calif. (Western); Washington; and Dallas (supplanting Houston in 1965, primarily for the Southwest). The Society had no such office for the South outside Texas.

Much of the Society's strength in the South is in small towns and cities of 50,000 population or less, such as Americus, Georgia, where racial difficulties apparently stimulated growth. From one smaller city to the next, there are great variations and many gaps. As for the larger urban areas, a map would call for pins to indicate relatively strong membership in all the major cities of Alabama, Georgia, Arkansas and Texas; most of those in Florida (and in particular, Jacksonville, St. Petersburg, St. Augustine, West Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale, Daytona, and Sarasota); some cities of Tennessee; several cities of Louisiana and Mississippi; some cities in North Carolina, though not as all-inclusively as among the large cities of South Carolina; and some cities of Virginia.

Growth appears to be spasmodic. Charles D. Nelson, "major coordinator" of the Society for Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, said in an interview for this report that 1966 was a slack year in his three states following big gains in 1965. He said he expected a surge in membership with the 1968 political campaign and the attendant heightening of political interest. For his area, particularly, that appeared to be a reasonable prediction, especially in view of the George Wallace candidacy. Birch membership does seem to rise and fall with the intensity of interest in politics. Although 1966 was a bad year in general for Birch membership, it was a good year in Atlanta and its suburbs; the number of chapters there increased from 17 to 33

between the spring of 1966 and the spring of 1967. During most of that time a heated state political campaign was under way, with several candidacies which were encouraging to the radical right. (The Birch Society was divided in Georgia over the candidacies of Lester Maddox, Democrat, and Howard (Bo) Callaway, Republican.)

THE "SEGREGATION ACADEMIES"

The increase in the number of private, segregated schools in the South during the past few years has raised the spectre, in the minds of some observers at least, of a substantial increase in rightwing influences in education. The "segregation academies," schools founded specifically to maintain segregation (though this frequently was denied), began to appear in a number of states in the early 1960s, when the reality of public school desegregation was at hand. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent implementation of its school desegregation provisions by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare further expanded the private-school movement. Between 1965 and 1967, the number of private, segregated schools increased to about 200, with about 40,000 students, according to the Southern Education Reporting Service. The number of schools and students remained about the same during 1967 and into 1968. Louisiana, with about 65 schools enrolling about 16,500 students, and Virginia, with about 30 schools enrolling about 12,000, were the leading states in the new private-school movement. Many of the schools were sponsored by people identified with rightwing causes. The Citizens Councils encouraged them and founded some of its own. The extent of direct rightwing influence upon the pupils was difficult to define, but clearly it was substantially present.

Gov. Lester Maddox said in 1967 he would like to see 100 more private schools in Georgia. He obviously was encouraging the "segregation academies" rather than the educational purpose of older private schools, which had no primarily racial motivation and some of which were integrated. Georgia had only four such academies when the governor spoke, and since then the movement has not spread in the state. Gov. Maddox himself, it is clear, identified the private-school movement with defiance of federal desegregation requirements and probably also with conservative influences in the classroom. He said he would like to find some way to make state tuition grants but acknowledged this would be difficult. It was proving, in fact, to be impossible, or nearly so. The federal courts had knocked down other states' plans for subsidizing schools obviously established with the intent of evading civil rights requirements. Gov. Maddox made no further moves on the matter, having encountered intense resistance from other high-ranking state officials in Georgia.

The progression of cases through the federal courts gave every evidence that shortly no way would be left for states to give impetus to the private-school movement. There remained the question of whether a large number of "seg academies" might yet survive because of strong private financial support. Some seemed likely to do so. They were beginning to fill a demand for quality private education which existed apart from the desire to evade desegregation requirements. As these schools (which were not in the majority) tended to follow the patterns of older private schools, they seemed to be unlikely future vessels for the perpetuation of racism and rightwing political philosophy; at least, no more likely to be than private schools in general across the country. The tuition costs of private schools genuinely striving for quality in education made it apparent that they would be limited in number.

There are, however, numerous "segregation academies" whose genesis and whose support clearly suggest that their pupils will be subject to rightwing extremist and racist influences. Dr. T. E. Wannamaker, a leading South Carolina spokesman for private schools, is a favorite of the white Citizens Councils and the John Birch Society. Wade Hampton Academy at Orangeburg, S. C., of which he is president, is one of several schools that award their graduates a lapel pin consisting of a Confederate flag and the word "Survivor" underneath. It symbolizes, Dr. Wannamaker said, "the fight to maintain great principles such as the value of truthfulness, of honor, of courage and integrity, and the great principle that governments should be governments of laws and not of men." Dr. Wannamaker discounts the role of libraries and laboratories. "Our books today tend to mis-educate as well as to educate," he said.

The inferiority of many of the segregation academies is clear, and some states have lately moved to tighten requirements for private schools. "All you have to do to open a private school in South Carolina is to have a spare stable," Cyril Busbee, the state superintendent of education, said in 1967. The state was moving toward standards for the private schools, which in some areas were undermining the local public schools by attracting their students, teachers and community support.

The spread of segregated academies, with which John Birchers and old-line segregationists frequently have been identified, appears to be encountering now the hard reality that in the long run a private school will cost parents substantial amounts of money and will be depriving the children if the main purpose is espousal of views such as Dr. Wannamaker's. Some will become more respectable. Others are likely to die. Their long-range impact thus seems much smaller than it might have seemed two years ago, when state tuition grant programs were still alive.

In the area of public education, the South has the same kind of influences

at work on its schools as do other regions, as well as its own more pronounced racist pressures. These are difficult to measure quantitatively. Some evidence exists, however, that specifically rightwing pressure on public schools is no more pervasive in the region than in many other parts of the country. The Commission on Professional Rights and Responsibilities of the National Education Association, having examined rising harassment of teachers and schools, reported in 1966 that the John Birch Society was "clearly in first place as a trouble-making agency." Among others it cited were the Dan Smoot Reports and the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade. Significantly, it said 90 per cent of the complaints of red-baiting and book censorship came from three states: California, Michigan and Ohio. Similarly, Mrs. Jennelle Moorhead, national president of the Parent-Teacher Association, blamed rightwing pressures for much of the loss of about 340,000 PTA members during the preceding three years but indicated most of the trouble had come not from the South but from other regions.

THE SOUTHERN RELIGIOUS WARP

The South, it probably can be said then, has both a vulnerability to rightwing doctrine and some resistance to formal organization of the John Birch kind. This vulnerability and this resistance are both related to the peculiar apartness of the region's culture. Although that apartness is declining under the constant impact of national norms and national outlooks, furthered through mass communications and national organizations such as religious denominational structures, it still exists.

One reason such organizations as the Birch Society have not fared especially well is that the South has a strong inclination to turn toward its traditional structures, including political forms, for expression and participation. If one lives in a state whose governor is a Lester Maddox or a George Wallace, has congressmen who vote to the satisfaction of the Americans for Constitutional Action and the Citizens Councils, is under a steady radio bombardment from rightwing propagandists and rightwing fundamentalist preachers, and lives in a city dominated by reactionary elements, who needs the John Birch Society? It becomes a foreign element in the native habitat. This kind of native habitat is not universal in the South, of course, but it exists in the areas which otherwise might be most receptive to national rightwing groups.

The South's paradoxical vulnerability to and resistance of rightwing organization also is clearly related to its religious peculiarity. The most church-oriented part of the country, the South is also the region most noted for fundamentalist, pietistic Protestantism. This has special pertinence inasmuch as even organizations of the radical right which do not have a religious orientation, such as the John Birch Society, appear to have a membership

strongly imbued with literalistic and pietistic religious views (of Catholic, as well as Protestant, varieties). "The preponderant majority of our members are deeply religious," Charles D. Nelson, the Birch coordinator for Alabama, Florida and Mississippi, has said. Ira S. Rohter, in his study of the radical right mentioned earlier, compared a sample group of radical rightists with an arbitrarily-chosen control group and found a very strong correlation between radicalism of the right and fundamentalist religious loyalties. Two students of fundamentalism and the radical right, Jack Dodson and Camille Vandervoort of the University of Houston, have suggested "the distinct possibility of the 'holinization' of the politics of the extreme right in the contemporary American society." In 1968, cars could be seen in the South bearing two bumper stickers: "God Give Us a Leader" and "Wallace '68."

The dominant churches in the South have been those which, in the broad sweep of Protestant history, would have to be called radical, part of the left wing of the Reformation. These were the churches that introduced the most radical changes in church government, including forms more democratic than previously existed and forms lending themselves to localism and extreme individualism. In theology, these were the churches that were most radical in altering views of the relationship between free will on the one hand and divine sovereignty on the other, asserting that not only was each man his own priest and not only did he fully make his own choice but that he could expect instant experience of his own salvation. This was the final triumph of religious individualism and personal pietism.

These were the churches which elsewhere were sects, characterized by their minority status, their feeling of alienation from a hostile society around them, their sense of apartness from the secular order. But in the South, what was a despised minority elsewhere (the Baptists) became the majority church. Southern Protestantism did not feel itself antagonistic toward the secular order around it; it began to be shaped by, identify with, and support that society.

The dominant Baptists, Methodists and Presbyterians became the state church of the South, defending the status quo and the entrenched, and sanctifying public policy. The most bizarre, and by most standards anti-Christian, instance of this was in church defenses of slavery. That tradition was extended through the period of segregation's decline, so that Monday newspapers depicted ushers standing with grim faces and folded arms blocking church doorways to Negroes while, inside, ministers talked of love and sin. All these evidences of the obscuring of Christian ethical demands within Christian churches have their parallels outside the region, of course, but the southern Church's history has made it especially weak in the face of today's moral confrontations and such phenomena as radicalism of the

right, with all its denials of the universality of man's humanity. A "southern theology" is central in this phenomenon. It has been in the making for a long time.

Samuel S. Hill, an authority on religion in the South, has surmised that the southern religious pattern was already set by 1800. In early colonial times, the region was not extensively religious. Anglicanism was the main force, but its reach was limited. Then, during the Great Awakening period of the 1740's, the Presbyterians spread rapidly, with an evangelical thrust which nevertheless had strong intellectual accompaniment. In the 1750's, the Baptists began a long burst of growth. From 1770, the Methodists spread rapidly, with camp meetings as a principal means. The Baptists and the Methodists, more than any others, went where the people were and offered them a faith they could quickly respond to.

The South, James McBride Dabbs has written, institutionalized revivalism in the late 19th century. Other parts of the country moved on past. But the South stayed with revivalism and its heavy emphasis on emotion, simple doctrine and quick assurance of salvation. In fact, the South distorted each of the great founders of Protestantism. Martin Luther had asserted each individual's ability to interpret the Scriptures, but the South made a preposterous anti-intellectual, individualistic fetish of that principle. John Wesley had emphasized free-will in the attainment of salvation, but he did not tear free-will loose from divine sovereignty; many of his southern Methodist followers and others did, all but making man sovereign in determining his salvation through instant self-declarations of conversion. John Calvin's strong views on social responsibility were abandoned by southern Presbyterians; Calvin had asserted that the Church must be the social conscience of the land, but for decades southern Presbyterians largely ignored that doctrine, replacing it with an extreme view on the separation of church and state which facilitated the suspension of ethical judgments on state affairs. The southern Baptists also left their ancient moorings. They have sometimes traced their origins to the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century; but their views of social responsibility became much narrower than the Anabaptist assertion that each man was responsible for the deeper morality of his day-to-day actions and for the tone of the society around him. In the great retreat from concern about the social order, Dabbs has written, the Southern Church "avoided the core problems and dabbled around the edges with a bunch of blue laws." In the early stage, said W. J. Cash, the South needed and received "a faith, not of liturgy and prayer book, but of primitive frenzy and the blood sacrifice — often of fits and jerks and barks — . . . a personal God, a God for the individualist . . ." Cash also noted a strange contrast: the South's love of pleasure alongside its Puritanism. How could hedonism be recon-

ciled to Puritanism? Cash concluded that this could be done only if religious faith and daily life were kept separate. New England Puritans had done this, too; but in the South, Puritanism lived on and became a dominant faith.

The relevance of all this to radical rightist influence in the South is clear. Rightist views in the United States are commonly grounded in narrow, anti-intellectual views of the world; in moralistic certitude; in a view that opposing ideas are satanic; in a devotion to old practices and old values with the assumption that these are under attack from evil forces; and in an assertion of individualism which, although rightists often are themselves subject to herding, becomes an official virtue. These threads of rightist radicalism are obviously also the central elements in the Southern church's peculiarity (its heresy, perhaps, from the viewpoint of mainstream Protestantism).

The revivalistic nature of the big Protestant denominations in the South has been substantially modified in recent years. These churches' clergy are better educated than in the frontier days, and increasingly influenced by mainstream religious ideas. The institutions themselves are more sophisticated. But much of the old influence remains.

Membership figures suggest just how pervasive has been the influence of the peculiar Southern church. We start with the fact that the South is far more church-oriented than any other part of the nation. The percentage of people who are *current members* of southern Protestant churches is about twice as high as in any other part of the country, and three times as high as in some. This is the only region where current members of Protestant churches *far outnumber* the members of Catholic and Jewish congregations. Only in the South do Protestant churches have an actual majority of the total population. The South had, in 1952, 4.1 churches per 2,000 people, compared with 1.4 in the Northeast, 2.4 in the North Central region, and 1.5 in the West. Beyond this, we must consider what churches southerners are in. Two examples suffice for the Deep South. In Mississippi, Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians and members of the Disciples of Christ account for 94 per cent of the population; in Georgia, for 93 per cent. Baptist and Methodist memberships comprise the great bulk of this membership.

Dr. Earl D. C. Brewer, a sociologist who directs the Religious Research Center at Emory University, has said: "The Klan is a child of the main religious forces in the South. The connection becomes closest in the case of the extreme sects. But the fundamentalist thrust is at the center of the southern brand of Protestantism."

As the major Protestant denominations that have been traditional in the South move away from the core of fundamentalism, a largely unnoticed

phenomenon is taking place which could have profound import for the future. The Pentecostal-Holiness and Church of God denominations, which reach back to the fundamentalism of old, are growing astonishingly. The best evidence is that while the region's population was increasing 37 per cent between 1926 and 1952, membership in the Pentecostal-Holiness churches in the South increased 1,000 per cent and in the Church of God congregations 659 per cent. Dr. Brewer has remarked upon the South's impact on the nation through the out-migration of its religious fundamentalists; the spread of the newer fundamentalist faiths is likely to have similar impact. They carry on with the kind of simplistic, emotional, salvationist and intellectually indifferent strains that earlier went into the mass Protestant faiths of the South, before the memberships became predominantly middle class.

In the South's political life, Lester Maddox is the peak of a largely-concealed iceberg. He combines political primitivism with religious primitivism. Far more than most political analysts seem to realize, his appeal is to the religious simplism of a sub-culture in the South which lies beneath the middle class or at its lower edges and whose extent is told in the figures on poverty in the South's poorest region. Gov. Maddox is often seen as a demagogue cut from the familiar cloth of old-style demagoguery in the South. But in many ways he is different from the cynical political charlatans. He is the South's brand of religious and political simplism run amuck. He is the logical extension, in high office, of the moods and feelings that come from those origins. It is no accident that he is both a fundamentalist Protestant and a rightwing political extremist.

THE FUTURE

It is these phenomena, essentially indigenous, which must claim first priority in any evaluation of the future of rightwing radicalism in the South. The John Birch Society is alien, with a limited middle-class appeal, though it may yet have greater impact. The Ku Klux Klan is a small fossil from the not-so-distant past. The Citizens Councils, created in the post-1954 convulsion, have been steadily dying and are of little consequence today even in Mississippi. The pure ideology of many other political extremist groups from outside the region is too complex and too pseudo-rational for all but a relatively few paranoiac southerners. But those preaching "doctrines wholly unrelated to reality," as President Kennedy described them, who can combine these nostrums with the emotional set and the religious forms indigenous to the South will be of greater significance.

A George Wallace has appeal largely based upon petulance and bitter defiance, and this is satisfying to those who feel threatened by modernism and the world at large. A Lester Maddox has this same "strike-back"

appeal, but also the moralistic appeal of a profoundly ignorant neo-Puritan who sees many devils, all of them on the left. He represents the rightwing "holinization of politics." On the South's airwaves, this tendency is fed best by the radio preachers and other rightwingers who at least superficially identify themselves with fundamentalist religious values.

The counter-weights are many, of course. Major southern religious denominations are moving rapidly away from the peculiarity of their past. Even the Pentecostal-Holiness churches tend to change somewhat as they move into the cities and the suburbs, and as many of their members continue on the "up" economic escalator taking them into the middle class. All these churches are subject, finally, to the challenge of their own religion when they begin reading it without the blinders that the South's peculiarities imposed. The region's racial and poverty crises already are beginning to receive fruitful attention from many churches whose theologies only a few years ago made them oblivious, at best. This new attention to realities will not mix well with "doctrines wholly unrelated to reality."

The South for some time probably will remain a part of the country oddly susceptible to radicalism of the right, but also resistant. It is not likely to lead the nation to the right. Its George Wallaces and Lester Maddoxes will have too limited an appeal elsewhere. Conversely, a Barry Goldwater (despite his success in five southern states) in time loses appeal among southern rightists because he is not of their ethos and style. So as has been true with so many other phenomena, southern rightist radicalism will be essentially provincial. Its future will be determined by the rapidity with which the South becomes like the nation at large.

May

1972

RABBI MEIR KAHANE

WINS COMMENTARY BY RABBI MARC H. TANENBAUM

The call of Rabbi Meir Kahane in last Friday's New York Times Op-Ed page for an immediate mass emigration of American Jews to Israel to escape an impending anti-Semitism holocaust in this country can only be seen as the latest outburst of a contemporary revolutionary protest movement whose cult of feeling leads it to disdain all restraint, to distort history, and to pervert reason itself. While the determination of Rabbi Kahane to act in behalf of Jewish security is to be respected, his resort to loose, theoretical, and despairing talk which bears practically no relationship either to historic or present reality is dangerous and irresponsible in the extreme.

Rabbi Kahane bases his argument on two convictions: first, that America is no different from Weimar Germany; second, that the embargo on anti-Semitism has been lifted in America and that the Jews are about to become the scapegoat in this troubled country. On what facts does he base his conclusions? He doesn't say. Well, there are documented facts and they provide the basis for Jewish policy and strategy far more reliable than Rabbi Kahane's conjectures. With regard to Weimar Republic, for example, the most authoritative scholars on Germany inform us that "the principal difference between the Emancipation path of German and of American Jewry is that Germany rejected the Jewish quest for Emancipation, while everything points to the fact that the integration of American Jewry will be far more complete than in Germany. Despite the legal equality granted German Jews, by 1920 there were regarded as nothing but a guest in Germany. By contrast, America has generated

a continuous and powerful pressure to Americanize all of its minorities, and to mold disparate groups into one society, while respecting ethnic differences. There is no time in American history when Jews were either the leading or only potential pariah group, while in Germany for various reasons Jews were uniquely singled out for that dubious distinction. In comparison to the Jews of Germany, the political, economic, and cultural odyssey of American Jewry reads like an unmitigated success story.

An examination of recent public opinion polls show a dramatic decrease in hostility toward Jews and an increasing willingness to accept and judge Jews by the same standards as Christians. In 1970 more Jews ran for high public office than ever before in the history of our nation.

The case for America can of course be overstated, but the measurable facts available contradict Rabbi Kahane. All rational signs point to a further flourishing of this experience. Beyond that, his scare tactics will do nothing to enhance Israel's security, for a mass aliyah would rather weaken the Jewish state by undermining the American Jewish community whose efforts have achieved so much in Israel's behalf.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date August 20, 1969
to IRSA Staff
from Seymour Samet
subject



I would appreciate your comments re the concepts described in the attached minutes of an informal meeting called to discuss the future of liberalism in America.

Your recommendations for program would also be most welcome.

SS:MRG

Attach.

- cc Harold Applebaum
- Hyman Bookbinder
- Morris Fine
- Bertram H. Gold
- Samuel Katz
- Haskell Lazere
- Samuel Rabinove
- Arnold Aronson



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date July 22, 1969
to Seymour Samet
from Harry Fleischman
subject Summary of Discussion on the New Liberal Coalition

In opening our luncheon session on July 14, Seymour Samet listed the following assumptions:

- a) The voices of moderation are being drowned by those of the new left and right. Politically this is being interpreted as a need to curb the left through repressive legislation ranging from strengthening police powers to cessation of liberal legislation. In addition, it appears that the electorate is on a rightist path and that the center is diminishing as a significant force in political life.
- b) As conservative forces increasingly are victorious, moderate leadership of minority groups will increasingly find it difficult to retain influence, as extremists demand the right to find what they consider more effective techniques for achieving power and influence. Seymour cited the frustrations being faced by NAACP leaders over the new guidelines for school desegregation.
- c) George Wallace will run for President in 1972 and will increasingly tend to receive the support both of low-income whites in the cities as well as middle-class suburbanites, anxious to stop the spread of urban blight and responding to the simplistic appeals of Wallace and the radical right.
- d) The liberal coalition of the 40's and 50's, consisting of labor, civil rights and religious groups no longer seems to have the vitality necessary to give assurance to disadvantaged and disillusioned people that it is capable of providing adequate social change within a reasonable amount of time. One result is a loss of faith in the democratic process and a willingness on the part of many people either themselves to use or to support extra-legal techniques to accelerate the process of bringing about change.

CONCLUSIONS

- A) New approaches must be considered as a means of accelerating the process of social change.
- B) This may mean a restructuring of our own priorities and a reexamination of our complete abstinence from political action.
- C) Several program possibilities are:
- 1) Support the creation of a new liberal-moderate coalition on the national scene around specific issues, e.g. social welfare reform and Freedom Budget. In this respect, it would also be important to organize similar efforts on a local and state level. It might be wise to examine the effectiveness of non-tax-exempt organizations which are free to engage in political action.
 - 2) Strengthen the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.
 - 3) Attempt to influence the Urban Coalition Action Council to respond with greater urgency to the governmental and legislative aspects of the urban crises.
 - 4) Mount a massive educational program, perhaps with the kind of national conference Harry suggested, to obtain understanding and support for the preservation and expansion of the democratic process with justice.

Haskell Lazere suggested that any coalition that must be formed has to consider not only Civil Rights, but also problems of inflation, housing and health care.

Arnold Aronson pointed out that the Urban Coalition will be unlikely to get the business community to put real pressure on Congress since there is already a considerable split between many of the business leaders and the rest of the Urban Coalition on what to do in regard to problems of surtax, tax reform and methods of combating inflation. He suggested that we need to reexamine our own priorities, and then ascertain how we can best dramatize and give visibility to our program. He pointed out that when we were dealing with specific civil rights problems such as voting and public accommodations, the events in Selma and the Freedom Rides helped to dramatize them to our benefit. Today, when the issue has become largely economic -- jobs, housing and full education -- the dramatization we have seen in riots and a variety of protest demonstrations has tended to have a negative impact.

Sam Katz felt that our coalitions had tended to attempt to deal with too many issues and that we should concentrate on one or two major items rather than attempt to cover the waterfront.

Bert Gold suggested that we need to develop new coalitions on an ad hoc basis, primarily local rather than national.

Sam Rabinove felt that it was not worthwhile to attempt to form a big new organization. He was pessimistic on the possibilities of turning the country around because "people prefer today to pay for private luxuries rather than public necessities."

Hy Bookbinder suggested the possibility of getting 500 key American leaders to sign a manifesto on the basic domestic program needs. He suggested that such a group might call itself a Council of Concerned Citizens, and wondered whether the Urban Coalition might not promote such activity.

Haskell Lazere felt that we tend to contribute to polarization by our terminology and inability to really respond to the key issues that people are worried about. He urged a study of the areas of citizen discontent. He also suggested that we utilize the bi-centennial of the Declaration of Independence in 1976 as an occasion to build educational activities around our goals.

Harold Applebaum suggested that if we get together a group such as suggested by Bookie, the group should not be an activist one.

Sam Katz suggested, that, expanding on the Declaration of Independence theme, we might organize committees of correspondence to get people working more actively on the issues.

Arnold Arnonson evinced distrust of gimmicks. What we need is to build both the Leadership Conference and particularly to expand work on the local level.

Bert Gold suggested that we need to do more thinking on why people are supporting the Nixon coalition. How do we address ourselves to people's fears? He voiced the suspicion that liberals have depended on money to accomplish results and stressed that they do not always succeed.

Sam Rabinove insisted that the use of massive sums of money has not really been tried -- that the War on Poverty, for example, has only been a skirmish.

Harold Applebaum suggested that we attempt to use our new approach in dealing with white ethnic groups to create a more effective self-interest coalition.

Harry Fleischman pointed out that one of the difficulties has been that liberals in the past, by support of such programs as FHA loans which, together with massive road programs, moved millions of white workers and middle-class whites into Jim Crow suburbs where the jobs were also going, had intensified the crises in black ghettos. We need to be concerned not only about adequate funds, but also conscious planning in the use of these funds to

avoid unanticipated boomerang effects. He also pointed out that his original memo dealt with the problem of how to counter polarization and preserve the democratic process with justice, but that we had largely neglected that matter in the discussion.

Seymour Samet summed up the discussion as a useful beginning of the process in determining where we go from here, and listed the following points as the general approach of the group:

- 1) We agreed that there is a need for a basic massive, federal approach, because private resources are not sufficient to meet our national problems.
- 2) We do not need a new coalition, but do need a more dramatic approach.
- 3) We have to consider whether securing this is worth all the efforts required to bring it about.
- 4) It is conceivable that a very large number of Americans are looking toward the Urban Coalition to give the signal for action. Can we get the Urban Coalition to move in this respect?
- 5) We agree that we should assure greater support for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.
- 6) Most of us feel that we should not at this time organize a national conference on promoting the democratic process and justice, as had been suggested by Harry.
- 7) We have to figure out ways to educate our own constituents.
- 8) We should set up our own list of priorities, so that we act rather than react.
- 9) We must study not only the semantics of approaching groups, but also study new concepts of how societies change.

It was agreed that there would be further meetings to continue discussion and action on these problems.

HF/bb

cc: Harold Applebaum
Hyman Bookbinder
Morris Fine
Bertram H. Gold
Samuel Katz
Haskell Lazere
Samuel Rabinove
Arnold Aronson - Guest

MHT

A Research Report

The American Jewish Committee
Research and Information Services

November 15, 1968

Jewish Voting in the 1968 Presidential Election:

A Preliminary Report

The Jewish liberal tradition in American politics has been traced back to the attractiveness of the candidacy of Alfred E. Smith, for whom Jews voted overwhelmingly in 1928. Forty years later dark prophecies that the erosion of this tradition was under way failed to materialize. In the presidential race of 1968 pollsters and analysts had predicted a considerable Jewish defection from the ranks of Democratic voters, but Jews remained overwhelmingly Democratic.

I. The Polls

The predicted signs of defection were not apparent in the pre-convention polls of July. Jewish preferences read like a ranking of potential candidates according to some measure of perceived liberalism (Humphrey, McCarthy, Rockefeller, Nixon, Wallace, in that order). They also were more solidly Democratic than those of any other group or category, with the exception, in the case of Humphrey,

of nonwhites, and were so in proportions that bear respectful comparison to Jewish preferences in the presidential election of 1960.

It has been estimated that in 1960 Kennedy received 75 per cent of the Jewish vote. The Gallup Poll, on July 11, 1968, reported that in a contest between Humphrey, Nixon and Wallace, 79 per cent of Jews preferred Humphrey. When the contest was between Humphrey and Rockefeller, a liberal Republican, the percentage of Jews preferring Humphrey declined to 62 per cent. The support Humphrey garnered from Jews, however, was greater than that from any other group or category, with the exception of nonwhites.

Similarly, Jews preferred Senator Eugene McCarthy to either Nixon or Rockefeller: McCarthy -- 71 per cent, Nixon -- 14 per cent; McCarthy -- 51 per cent, Rockefeller -- 36 per cent. Although he received a smaller proportion of Jewish votes than did Humphrey, McCarthy's support from the Jews, according to the Gallup Poll, was greater than that from any other group. Data from the Harris Poll, while not strictly comparable, indicated a contrary Jewish reaction to McCarthy's candidacy. According to Harris (New York Post, July 8, 1968), in a contest between Humphrey and McCarthy only those Democrats with income under \$5,000 and Negroes were more pro-McCarthy than Jews

(68 per cent of Jews preferred Humphrey, 23 per cent McCarthy). The lack of consistency in the direction of the available data can perhaps be accounted for by the different elements in the respective Jewish samples of Harris and Gallup. The Harris sample, it has been reported, gives greater weight to lower-income Jews. Though solid data are lacking, it may be suggested that most Jews remain within the liberal voting tradition, but Jews of varying socioeconomic status and perhaps also of different ages differ as to which wing of the Democratic party is the most relevantly liberal.

Just one post-convention poll (Gallup Poll, October 2, 1968) reported on Jewish presidential preferences: only 51 per cent of the Jews said they supported Humphrey, 31 per cent were for Nixon, four per cent for Wallace, 14 per cent were undecided.* These figures indicated a substantial fall-off from the summer polls and from the estimated Jewish support for Johnson in 1964 and John Kennedy in 1960. The Jewish preference for Humphrey, however, remained larger than that of any other group in the Gallup Poll, again with the exception of nonwhites.

* The Gallup Poll's normal sample is 1,200-1500; Jews are three per cent, that is, about 50 Jews. When Gallup reports that four per cent of Jews are for Wallace, that means actually only two respondents.

The data on this phenomenon of Jewish defection from the Democratic party are too scanty to satisfy and resolve the speculation they arouse. The first problem we are confronted with is to determine the accuracy of the analyses and projections of the pollsters and writers. Did the signs of Jewish desertion from the Democratic party, not en masse but in numbers that would amount to more than a trickle and possibly to a trend, reflect a real situation or were they merely errors of the measuring instrument? The pollster's margin of error increases as the absolute number in each of his categories decreases, and, it should be borne in mind, the absolute number of Jews in most samples is rather small. There were, however, nonquantifiable indicators which tended to confirm the pollsters, who were uncannily precise in their national predictions; perhaps they were indeed reflecting the true mood among the Jewish electorate. Suggestive among those are the strategy considerations of the respective presidential campaigns. Nixon exerted energies to gain a Jewish vote apparently thought to be within his grasp, while Humphrey was forced into a me-too position on issues directly relevant to Jews. Nixon, for example, first advocated the sale of jets to Israel; Humphrey was forced to speak to Jews about law and order and about how he was "deeply troubled over antisemitic remarks" coming from extremist

quarters. The Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle (October 31, 1968) reported that a confidential candidate's poll showed that Jews were disturbed by the problems exploited by Nixon -- violence, extremism, etc., and that impartial polling indicated a shift to the Republican party.

Indications of the reality of the phenomenon do exist, but the problem of accounting for it still remains and will remain at least until solid data are made available that could establish which elements of the Jewish population were responsible for the defections. Newspaper analysts, however, have proffered explanations of three basic types, each with its own inadequacies. First is the explanation that emphasizes the Jewish consciousness of the Jewish electorate. The claim is made that Jews were reacting to black militancy, to the rise of black antisemitism, and to the clash of Negro and Jewish interests now coming to the fore, as in the New York school crisis. This explanation assumes that the specifically Jewish reaction to black militancy is sufficiently intense to create a Jewish "backlash," whipping votes into the camp of the candidate perceived as being most willing and able to check black demands. The simplicity of this explanation, however, obscures the complexity of the situation. We do not have data to determine with any certainty the extent to which Jewish defection originated within the ranks of

those who vote as Jews, or from among those Jews whose vote is in accordance with other elements of their status. The constant movement of Jews into those positions normally associated with Republican voting has been continuing since the presidential election of 1960.

Secondly, the "backlash" account fails to consider other factors that would counteract or mitigate such backlash. Studies of Jewish voting patterns have suggested that Jews identify the political right with antisemitism, and thus the selfishly interested backlash vote may be rejected by Jews as in fact contrary to self-interest. It has also been noted that ideological or principled voting, often incongruent with apparent self-interest, is an important element in Jewish voting patterns. Considering the strength of voting traditions and the safe opportunity voting affords to acknowledge values and principles that may not be honored in the gut, it is too facile to explain the phenomenon of Jewish defection by simple reference to Jewish reaction to black militancy.

A second type of explanation shifts emphasis from Jewish consciousness to Jewish demography. Jews live primarily in urban areas, often those most afflicted with violence and fear. There the call for "law and order" originated and there the response to its exponents has been most receptive. The Republican candidate was perceived as most capable of damning the violence and easing the fear.

The force of this explanation, which would absorb Jewish backlash into white backlash, Jewish fears into white fears, is seriously weakened by its failure to consider that Jews have established unique voting patterns that cannot be accounted for by reference to geographic distribution or other factors that overlook distinctly Jewish experiences. In other words, the reply to those who would argue that Jews vote simply as Americans is that indeed they vote as Jews.

A third explanation relates to the failure of the McCarthy candidacy. Many McCarthy supporters, Jews included, were withholding support from Humphrey; this could account in part for Jewish defection from the ranks of the party. Without additional data, however, we cannot estimate the strength of this factor. It may, however, be presumed to be of small statistical significance.

II. The Results

First readings of the election returns suggest that Jews remained loyal to the Democratic party, more loyal than the last poll would have suggested, and in proportions comparing favorable to the 1960 election. Thus, for example, Brooklyn's 44 A.D., reported to be four-fifths Jewish, gave about 73 per cent of its vote to Humphrey, 25 per cent to Nixon and two per cent to Wallace. According to Gallup (New York Times, November 7, 1968), Jewish

precincts in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and New Jersey gave 87 per cent of their vote to Humphrey.*

Unofficial returns from predominantly Jewish suburbs in Long Island showed that Jews continued to differ from non-Jews in their voting patterns, even though they resembled them in socio-economic patterns. In the Great Neck area, about 65 per cent Jewish, Humphrey received 70 per cent of the vote, Nixon 29 per cent, Wallace one per cent. The Republican vote was five per cent larger than it had been in 1964. Woodmere, L.I., another densely Jewish community, gave Humphrey 76 per cent of its vote, Nixon 23, and Wallace one per cent. Garden City, in contrast, whose population is perhaps 20-25 per cent Jewish, gave Nixon 76 per cent of its vote, Humphrey 22 per cent, and Wallace two per cent. Predominantly Jewish towns showed a rather modest rise in the Republican percentage over 1964, from five to ten per cent; towns with fewer Jews increased their Republican vote by ten to fifteen per cent.

*According to an NBC computer analysis of the vote based on sample precincts, Jews gave Humphrey 83.4 per cent of their votes, Nixon four per cent, and Wallace 12.6 per cent. These figures are beyond credibility, belying all known data about Jewish voting behavior. We are trying to check the sources for these figures; an error was most likely made in designating certain precincts as Jewish which were not Jewish or which had also a substantial non-Jewish population. In sharply mixed neighborhoods, the phenomenon of group polarization in voting is common. When Jews are known to favor one candidate, the Irish, for example, in the same district will deviate from that pattern and support the opposing candidate.

When it came to Jews, the actual vote, it seemed, belied the polls. A portion of the returned voters may have been from the McCarthy camp, most of whom it seems did return, when the time came for the actual vote, to the Democratic camp. Others may have been victims of polling-booth trauma, unable to pull down the lever of the party one simply does not vote for, a phenomenon once described as "terminal horror." Others may have been those who continue to vote according to principle.

Traditional Jewish voting patterns then have persisted, but, it would seem, almost begrudgingly. The sentiment expressed in the polls but suppressed at the polling booths may be indicative of a new Jewish ambivalence with regard to liberalism in American politics.

AS

"THE JEWISH RESPONSE TO THE REVOLUTIONS OF OUR TIMES"

Delivered before the
JEWISH WELFARE FEDERATION OF DALLAS, TEXAS
May 14, 1969

By Rabbi Balfour Brickner

"The streets of our country are in turmoil. The universities are filled with students rebelling and rioting. Communists are seeking to destroy our country. Russia is threatening us with her might. The Republic is in danger. Yes, danger from within and without. We need law and order! Yes, without law and order our nation cannot survive... We shall restore law and order."

This quotation well describes much of America's current mood. I hear this sentiment wherever I go. I see it's effects in terms of the retrogressive legislation currently being enacted or contemplated for our cities, our states, and even by our federal government where the erosion of social welfare is not just serious, but, I am afraid, liable to become disastrous.

Who do you think made this statement? Some contemporary political campaigner? Some fundamentalist Southern preacher? There are even some to whom I read this statement who believed that it was made by the current President of the United States. Wrong! The statement was made, in the city of Hamburg in 1932, by Adolf Hitler in a campaign speech. Frightening, isn't it? Frightening that we could even imagine that such a sentiment could be uttered here in the United States of America in 1969.

What has brought us to this state of affairs? What has made us so concerned? What has brought us to such a state of affairs that we could believe such a sentiment could be uttered in and about contemporary America? The answer, it seems to me, is frustration: The frustration of blacks trying to punch themselves out of the bag of white American prejudice, the frustration of youth, fed up with the chasm between the pronouncements of their parents' generation, and that generation's practice, the frustration of an adult world which does not know how to cope with the newly discovered reality that indeed its national

leaders do not tell them the truth, either about the war in Vietnam or the cost of the anti-ballistic missile system or the conduct of international relations -- or, for that matter, about anything else.

And, being the qualitatively adolescent nation we are, our frustrations lead us to aggressions which produce counter-aggressions which we call "the need for law and order," in reality a euphemism for "beat the hell out of them"-- whoever the "them" may be: blacks or Vietcong or the kids. We in America are just not used to this kind of revolutionary situation. Europe is; we are not.

How then shall we cope with the social problem confronting us? Recently, I read an article in "Commentary" magazine by Mr. Earl Raab, the executive director of the Jewish Community Relations Council in San Francisco, entitled "The Black Revolution and the Jewish Question." There, he made the following observation:

"The bulk of data indicates that massive numbers of Americans, who presumably have a ritual attachment to the concept of free speech, and would reject any gross attempts to destroy it, do not care much about the fine points of that concept when the crunch comes--when hard-core dissenters intrude upon their sensibilities.

The American people would reject any gross attempt to suppress religious freedom, yet almost half of them say that if a man doesn't believe in God, he should not be allowed to run for public office... and the majority of them, while jealous of due process, would rather throw away the book and resort to the whip when dealing with sex criminals. In short, American democratic institutions have flourished because some people have understood them, and the rest of the people were loyal to them. This loyalty is based on an inertia of investment in the country, the system and the traditional political structure. At times, mass dislocation of such loyalty has occurred, usually spinning off new and "extremist" political movements. (italics mine)

If Mr. Raab is right; if the majority of our society is still so adolescent as to render the democratic coalition this fragile, then I suggest that some courageous force has to begin to play the role of stiffening and toughening the fabric. That, I suggest, can and should be the forces of the Jewish community of this country. I do not make this suggestion pietistically. Neither is it based on an appeal to the Jews' spiritual quotient. I find that,

while Jews like to hear these kinds of exhortations, they are not very effective as stimulators to action. I have tried this approach. I know how fruitless this approach really is, and so, these days I talk to my fellow Jews on a basis I know they can understand and to which they always do respond: self-interest, and self-interest alone.

Quite simply, and perhaps all too painfully, we Jews know well enough that when a society is sick we are the first to run the fever. When knives and guns appear, we are among the first to bleed. And, conversely, when society is healthy we are the beneficiaries of that health. If Mr. Raab is right, then it is in our self-interest to become involved, or the forces of radical, political and social reaction will take over: the Birchers; the Minutemen; the American Crusade; the forces of the "Reverend" Billy Hargis. Here, in Texas, I suspect you know about these forces better than I do.

There is no doubt that we are in a social revolution of major proportions. I should neither frighten nor deter us. Unfortunately, it is doing both. We Jews in America are both frightened by the revolution and deterred from engaging in it. As it is separating the Christian from his Church and the Jew from the Synagogue, so is it driving divisive wedges into our community -- between those who say we have a responsibility to do something to alleviate the problems that make for the social revolution of our time, and those who say "to hell with 'them'" we have a responsibility only to ourselves, to insure our own endurance.

This social revolution is the oldest of all of the revolutions of our contemporary age. It is the one we know best, and, paradoxically, the one which at the beginning of this century we most welcomed. As "have nots" in America, as "greenies" to these shores, we encouraged, and participated in this social revolution we called "the state of welfare." The totalitarian systems from which our fathers and grandfathers fled, our legacy of a "prophetic imperative," our own personal poverty, combined to propel us into participation. The slogans we used then were simple and well known: "Black and White together."

"Equality for All." They were great slogans, and we meant them. But now that we have "made it"; now that we are part of the affluent society, where, from the pinnacle of our small empires: be they business, suburban, and/or organizational, we see others trying to claw up the path we so recently trod, we are not so sure that we want to help. Especially when "they" call us names and act as ingrates. The best we can now blurt out is: "We pulled ourselves up by our bootstraps; why can't they?" Many of us are confused, hurt and bewildered; angered by the seemingly endless insensitivity and brutality that surrounds us. And so we have a tendency to turn our backs on the scene. Thus, the social revolution which we thought and hoped would weld us all together has done just the opposite. It has polarized us. The truth is that, despite the few sporadic attempts by a few communities to become involved, we Jews have not picked up the challenge of poverty or the demands of our nation's inner cities, rotting from the inside out.

I do not expect any massive physical presence of Jews from suburbia into our urban ghettos. That is a preposterous notion. The Black community would not let us in even if we wanted to come. Today's mood of separation prohibits that. But, we can move beyond pious resolution. The times call for Jewish Urban Action Forces in every major city in America -- financed in part by Federations, in part by private foundations, in part from yields from our organizational pension funds, our organization's stock portfolios and real estate holdings --(all of which are soon to be taxed anyway) and in part by voluntary self-imposed taxation from every synagogue in our country in an amount comparable to that from which these institutions are now tax-exempt because of their status as religious institutions. After all, these institutions take freely from the community in terms of police and fire protection. They must begin now freely to return to the community; money, services; tech-

nical skills and the business and professional expertise for which we Jews are justifiably renowned. The ghetto desperately needs these skills and resources, and would accept them from us, as its residents would work with us, in putting these funds and skills to maximum use.

I call for the creation of both local and national organizations by which to make available to the ghetto large amounts of capital with which their own residents could initiate their own action programs; their own leadership training programs, and thus rehabilitate their world and ours. We are among the last to see the necessity for such an approach. Protestants and Catholics -- and now, even business and insurance groups -- are committed and involved. This past year, the Protestant Episcopal Church committed nine million to the urban crisis, and now the Methodists and the Presbyterians are matching funds and energy. Urban America has become American Christianity's Israel. What we do for the state of Israel, they are beginning to do for the urban cores of America's cities. If we can raise \$200-million in six weeks for the state of Israel, as we did at the end of June in 1967, certainly we can raise one-twentieth of that amount for those in our society who are enslaved, entrapped and impoverished. The distribution, the allocation, and the use of these funds would be made through interreligious and other organizations like IFCO, Urban Coalitions and Interreligious Committees against Poverty. We would find ourselves working in communities with other urban action forces; some created by others in the community; some of our own creation.

Direct-action programs are also needed-sponsored by local Jewish groups, both synagogue and lay. Organizations like the Upper Park Avenue Community Association, a joint housing board, in which my own Union of American Hebrew Congregations is intimately involved and in which it plays a leading role. UPACA is rehabilitating six square city blocks in East Harlem, New York, financed under FHA 221D - programming. If our Jewish communities can build homes

for the aged, hospitals, YMHAs, Jewish community centers in the suburbs, then certainly we can build decent housing, child care centers, day care centers in the ghetto for those who still remain in areas from which we are only too recently fled. The number of our people who could become involved is limited but they would represent a physical and spiritual presence of the Jewish community in the urban slum. Moreover, such presence and the programs that could be generated would provide an outlet for those who are willing to leave their sunny suburban climes, at least on a part-time basis, to lend themselves to the ghetto and to the crisis that confronts America today.

We need a cadre of young men to match the Catholic and Protestant urban ministries. During the past summers, we at the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, through our national Commission on Interfaith Activities, have piloted a project which we call The Rabbinic Internship in Urban Affairs, whereby we place young rabbinic students in urban cores for a ten-week learning session during the summer months. But we realize that this is only a stop-gap measure, and that it is inadequate to meet the real needs.

Finally, we need to turn our downtown institutions into service centers. By this I do not mean worship service. I mean centers of social service. With more money, all of these things could be multiplied, expanded, until they became massively meaningful. In response to the question, "should we become involved?", the answer is, "you're damned right, we should!" for the sake of Jewish survival, which is first and foremost the survival of the larger society. And so today I find myself begging Jews not to be driven off; not to withdraw from the present urban crisis.

Involvement, is the first step toward coping with the social revolution of our times. It is also the first step toward our own Jewish survival. Contrary to the advice of some of my colleagues who have been deeply affected by the anti-Jewish diatribes of some militant blacks who are not even leaders

in their own communities, I do not believe that this is the time to "sit and do nothing"; to retreat into the self-ghettoization of Jewish study, or even the activity of exclusive work for Israel -- beleaguered, threatened, endangered as that State may be, necessary as she may be for our own survival. We are a diaspora, not in an exile, and we have responsibilities here as well. We must help create conditions where real pluralism becomes a live option for the American people. Otherwise we, as another plurality, are endangered. What American Jewry has yet to realize, and as yet has not realized, is that our withdrawal, or the withdrawal of any segment of America that can help allows black and poor people to be radicalized, and thus to be badly deceived. The implications of a meritocracy can not be ignored. We are quickly becoming a society where only skill and training are the modes of ascent. We all face the problem of what to do with 25,000,000 blacks (and whites) in this country who are untrained, unskilled, semi-literate frustrated people. Five years from now, the present confrontation between blacks and Jews will be over and gone, because nothing that blacks want Jews out of are positions or occupations that Jews want to stay involved with. Jews have no new economic stakes in the Harlems of America. If the public schools were the only way Jews had of making it into power in the 1930s, that is now no longer true. Five years from now we will all be faced with the sweepings of those who are left behind by the avalanche of technocracy. Many of those left behind will be black, unless we do something about training them now for the near future. I can't ignore or abandon that fact of life, and neither can you. Moreover, in a pluralistic world, a society that makes room for Black culture and Black growth is, in the final analysis, a society that will be good for Jews -- because it will make room also for Jewish culture and for Jewish growth. Not too long ago, Dr. Leonard Fein of Harvard University described the situation where a significant

number of Jewish young people at a large eastern University petitioned the administration at that University for a Department of Jewish Studies. As Jewish young people listen to black young people, they become proud of their own Jewishness. This is a lesson that they couldn't learn from their fathers, who spent so much time making Jewish life easy that they made it trivial as well. There is no better way to cope with the insults of others than to be secure in one's own self. To be fixated therefore by the present trivia of so called "Black anti-semitism" is as suicidal for the Jewish future as it is myopic.

In the State of Israel, they read with incredulity of the present American black-Jewish confrontation and their response is a simple and naive one: "So nu? When are you coming to Israel? Why are you waiting? The second Holocaust is upon you!" You and I know that it is not like that here. And you and I know that it won't be like that here. We know that we must live with that belief as a faith and that unless we hold that as a faith we are all lost. Yet, we do not act by our faiths. And that is the problem. The strange paradox of all this is that while we are the beneficiaries of pluralism, a pluralism which encourages us to remain identifiable as the unique group, we capitulate to the subtle pressures of the larger social mass of which we are a part, and thus yield up that which gives any distinction to our uniqueness. I fear that we are all too quickly becoming the common, "common man," letting the priceless dynamic of our Judaic idealism slip through our well manicured fingers.

For whatever it is worth to you, I will tell you that the Christian world looks at this with wonder and with amazement. They expect more and better of us. As at no prior time in history, Christianity is going through a process of "re-Judaizing" itself. Prof. James Browne, an Episcopalian teacher at an Episcopalian Seminary, wrote not too long ago: "It was only a stubborn insistence on the Hebraic elements in the Gospel that prevented our (Christian) faith from disintegrating into yet another form of religiosity...One develop-

ment that is bound to have a powerful effect upon the attitude of Christianity to Jews and Judaism is the reawakened preoccupation with the Jewish heritage of Christianity on the part of Biblical scholars, and the fact that theology once again means Biblical theology, and not Greek or Hellenic thought." To match that, we find the writings of Father Paul Deman, the well known French Catholic, who in his small volume, "Judaism," writes: "Is not the work of the Church not more precisely seen less as a mission to Israel than as a call to it to be faithful to its own divinely given vocation?"

Christians are not only reinvesting Judaism into their own theology; they are indeed rediscovering the Jewish notion of the prophetic witness. They call it "the social gospel." They look to us -- the Jewish community -- for cooperation and for joint stewardship. Ecumenical action groups are springing up in every town in America. Here, the small, struggling Dallas Cooperative Ministry, exemplifies my point. With support it could grow into a meaningful action force in the community. Throughout the country the minority of like-minded; the few; the committed, mostly professionals. Organizational men from the various denominational groupings are gathering together. In many instances they are "bootlegged" from denominationals and from the mainstream religious bodies. Together with some few laymen, they are beginning to make a difference in the shape of our urban societies. They cluster around points of pain and possibility, be they drugs or sex or housing or urban justice. Sometimes they are motivated out of a religious conviction, but together they devise new ways of acting that are still unheard of. The Jewish community can no longer afford to stay out, contenting itself by hiding behind the resolutions of national bodies.

If a re-thinking and a re-structuring of our response to the urban crisis is long overdue, so too must we re-think our approach to ourselves.

Whatever contributions will be made to the total American society, will, it seems to me, be made only from an internally strong Jewish community.

There are many who are now singing woeful dirges over American Jewry and who with copious tears are uttering pessimistic Jeremiads. I am not one of these. While our situation here in the United States is not altogether healthy, it does not warrant the utter lament that some are singing over it. Jewishly, that is, ethnically speaking, we are very much alive. We are in remarkable quantitative shape. The owners, the proprietors of swimming cabanas in the Bronx, delicatessens and resorts here and in Florida are taking care of that. They, combined with the producers of such "Jewish" theater as "Fiddler on the Roof," "The Tenth Man," "The Fixer," "The Investigation," and writers of books like "Herzog," "Call it Sleep," "The Fixer," "Goodbye Columbus," "The Chosen," and now of course, the notorious "Portnoy's Complaint," together with travel agents who send us to Israel regularly, are all doing very well to help us perpetuate our Jewishness, and they do it "without benefit of clergy." These types have become the new priests of American Jewry, and participating in one or all such activities is the newest form of Jewish ritual. And why not? If I go to two or three plays a year dealing with a Jewish theme, if I read the latest Jewish bestseller while munching a hot pastrami at the cabana of a Jewish resort hotel and take my children and my grandchildren to Israel for two weeks during either the Christmas or the summer holiday, isn't that enough? How much more Jewish than that can one be? I agree! That's plenty Jewish! And such an involvement gives sufficient evidence of quantitative Jewish vitality in America. But, it isn't sufficient for our qualitative future. Nor do I mean to sound altogether cynical. The books and the plays are of special value. "The Source" is the best Jewish History text written in years. Too bad that it was written by a non-Jew. And it is no small matter that the real sermons and the important

messages are being given not from American synagogue pulpits but from the stages of American theaters. The spiritual impact and the moral message of plays like "A Man For All Seasons," "The Royal Hunt of the Son," "Gideon," "Marat/Sade," "The Deputy," "The Homecoming" are not to be denied. Let us learn from this. What we really need for an American Judaic life is a National Fund for the Jewish Arts. Such a fund would underwrite artists, writers, dramatists and musicians, who could and would produce for a Judaic community. Why should an Isaac Bashevis Singer or a Maurice Samueal or an Agnon or a Nelly Saks struggle all of their lives until they are discovered by the non-Jewish world.

Secondly, such a Fund could commission specific works, just as the Met commissioned Samuel Barber, Chagall and Dufy to do the murals for the new Metropolitan Opera House. Clearly, such a Fund would finance a new Jewish theater in four or five communities throughout the country; not vulgar Yiddish, not trash theater, but a serious theater, where the significant and the spiritual could be experimentally entered into. For example, how many know of the existence of the Jewish Children's Theater in New York City? It is a fine professional company. Each year it struggles to survive. It cries for recognition, expansion, support, and a broadened base of operation. All of this goes begging for the lack of funds and for lack of awareness. Is there some reason why Federation dollars could not go for the support of such creative endeavors as that support now goes for the still prevalent Jewish mania for fighting an anti-Semitism which has the virility of a tired old man? Is it not time to re-orient our philanthropic thinking away from sole support for Jewish hospitals that aren't Jewish, Jewish social service agencies that aren't Jewish, Jewish centers which are little more than sauna baths for affluent, middle-income usually overweight, Jews? Is it not time to re-orient our philanthropic thinking away from Jewish lay organizations, whose reason for being is not really Jewish survival, and towards those programs, institutions and agencies that at least

make for the possibility of the survival of Judaism's qualitative stimuli; if any of these things are to happen, our "machers" -- our big givers -- those who control our community's purse-strings, are going to have to go through a metamorphosis in their thinking, and that will not happen until and unless you the people goad them into change.

This is only the beginning. The times call for radical surgery. In the field of Jewish education, we need Jewish Preparatory Schools. Notice the term. Not just Day Schools, though these are good too. What we really need is a Jewish "Andovers," Jewish "Kents," "Grotons," "Choates" and "Hotchkiss" throughout the country. Quality schools for the bright; for the children of the Jewishly committed, who long ago stopped fighting the battle of assimilation and who seek now Jewish survival for themselves and their progeny. It is indeed ludicrous that we should bend heaven and earth to have our youngsters enrolled in schools that are denominationally sponsored and call that private education, while coloring proposals for similar institutions under Jewish auspices with the pejorative brush of "Parochialism."

The program cannot stop here. Our young people are too bright and too sophisticated to be fooled by the juvenile Judaism which characterizes so much of our education. They want, and are entitled to, more meaningful fare. It is time we stopped deceiving ourselves about what we presently offer on our college campuses. Extra-curricular Judaism on the campuses is ineffective. Young people are like their parents. They want to and they do things for credit. Therefore, I suggest that we need a "Judaism for credit" program on our university and college campuses, where the Jewish community underwrites Jewishly committed, Jewishly knowledgeable, professors and teachers to fill now vacant chairs in departments of religion and philosophy existing on university campuses all over our country. Instead of the fifty or sixty men who are now so engaged in this program throughout the country, there could be 200 to 300. It is one way mean-

ingly to engage and challenge our alienated young Jewish intellectuals.

Here, then, are some responses to the question of our responsibility and role in the total community:


A recognition of our own established Jewish identity;

Acceptance of our own prophetic challenges;

Turning to those in need in new, creative and costly ways;

The building of a strong Jewish community on radically new lines.

Will any of this "save" us? I don't know! Surely no single approach will, but if undertaken, these proposals and programs will carry us fruitfully, at least, till the year 2,000. Beyond that, one can only dream -- and hope!



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Rev. Snoek

CABLES: "OIKOUMENE" GENEVA - TEL. 33 34 00 TELEX 23 423 OIK CH - 150 ROUTE DE FERNEY, 1211 GENEVA 20 SWITZERLAND

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AMERICAN JEWISH

An Open Letter on Human Rights

Many of the member churches of the World Council of Churches, and some who are not, are very concerned about the denial of human rights throughout the world. Last year the General Synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands sent a letter to Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, the general secretary of the WCC, asking his advice on how they could give expression to their concern for human rights in the Sudan and in Eastern Europe. In the attached letter Dr. Blake gives his reply.

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Geneva, April 1972

General Synod of the Reformed
Churches in the Netherlands
Utrecht
Netherlands

Dear Friends,

Some time ago I received your letter which expressed concern about the neglect of human rights in Eastern Europe and the Sudan. I have already expressed my gratefulness for your letter but asked for some patience because one of the countries you were concerned about was in the midst of negotiations to end its internal strife.

Now that a very positive settlement has been reached in the Sudan, your question about that country can be answered easily. Our Commission on Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and World Service has a programme for the rehabilitation of the Southern Sudan in which we can all help to strengthen the peace which we were allowed to help build. I apologise that the involvement of the World Council of Churches in the Sudan negotiations had to be kept absolutely confidential for a long time, but the outcome will make you appreciate that an organisation like ours often contributes best in cases of human rights by playing its quiet role behind the scenes.

Your other question pertains to Eastern Europe, and you ask what your Church can do. My answer is the one the World Council has always given:

- (a) the churches are an important channel for reliable information;
- (b) the ecumenical movement offers us a great opportunity for visitation and exchange, and
- (c) each church must protest as effectively as it can and at the proper address where it feels conscience-bound so to do.

Allow me to work this out in some detail. Reliable information about church life, its strengths and hardships, in Eastern Europe, is rare. Most people in the West and in the two-thirds world have only a partial image of the life of God's people in socialist countries. They are often victims of cold war propaganda, repeating stories from the worst period of Stalinist oppression, or they are confused by enthusiastic reports about the strength of faith in
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a particular church and so believe that all is well. Others are so ideologically biased that they can see no wrong in certain countries. I am often astounded at how many people can ignore the amazing differences between the religious situation in the nine socialist countries of Europe: a sign of the disastrous effects of the formation of isolated political blocks.

I am afraid that an effective contribution by our churches to the amelioration of human rights in Eastern Europe will only be possible if we build it on the solid base of a much more reliable and differentiated strategy of information. Churches who believe that there is persecution of Christians in some Eastern European countries should be willing to pay the price of such an information service. There are enough reliable centres specialising in Eastern European studies to make it possible for congregations to know more than just the appalling incidents of religious persecution. The many restrictions on churches in Eastern Europe make it difficult to ask these churches to publish more about their life themselves, but studies made and reported in the West can help to lay a solid base for real knowledge, understanding and effective help. However, information is only the first step.

It seems to me that the most important help we can give our member churches in Eastern Europe, as well as to other groups in these countries, like the Jews, is to take more seriously our ecumenical opportunities. If we do not really get to know the churches in socialist countries our expressions of critical concern become cheap and can only be understood in the countries concerned as anti-communist, i.e. political/ideological, declarations.

The great gift of the ecumenical movement is that, for the first time after a long history of alienation and isolation, we can now get to know each other. A number of churches have understood this and have built up a relationship with a fellow-church in the other part of Europe. Common planning in national councils of churches makes it possible to relate to different traditions in different countries. In Eastern Europe such relationships are deeply appreciated, and Western churches have learned more than they expected from their Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant brethren in the East.

I express the hope that in the Dutch Council of Churches such a programme of regular communication, visitation and exchange can be established.

This leads me to a second point. Relations with the churches in Eastern Europe - and hopefully with Christians in the People's Republic of China -

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have become even more necessary because Marxist thinking is becoming so important in the Western churches. Sometimes it seems that of all secular philosophies Marxism is becoming the most popular and persuasive among our people, especially among our young intellectuals. This development, however critically or positively we evaluate its existence, deserves much more serious attention in our churches than it usually receives. The theological reflection on Marxism is now a common necessity for all churches, under whatever form of government they live and witness. If such study were not to involve churches which live in socialist lands, we would deprive ourselves of the experience and witness of churches who live and work in countries where secularisation is not only a cultural process but a governmental programme. We would do well to listen much more carefully to whatever contribution such churches can make to us.

I therefore hope that your church, and other Dutch churches within the framework of the Dutch Council of Churches, will reflect on this and take action. The World Council's programme of Dialogue with people of other living Faiths and Ideologies would also greatly benefit from such an initiative and provide a framework in which it can be shared and deepened.

We can base our statements and actions on human rights on such an effective and broad contact with the churches in Eastern Europe, and within the framework of a new concern for Christian reflection on Marxism. I do not have to go into detail about human rights in each country of Eastern Europe. The situation in Poland is totally different from that in the DDR, and Jugoslavia shows a very different picture from that of the Soviet Union. Presently, they all have one thing in common, however: the Christian faith is deemed irreconcilable with Marxist doctrine and therefore church and state cannot but live in constant tension, in spite of the official separation of church and state and in spite of a proclaimed policy of non-interference. In each country, the Christian churches live under severe restrictions, at least from a Western point of view, even if these churches are made up of loyal citizens of their country.

Religious freedom is guaranteed in all Eastern constitutions, but the interpretation of such freedom differs greatly. What is regarded as basic for freedom in the West is often forbidden in the East. Free publications, youth work, social work, open evangelism, freedom to establish organisations, to build meeting facilities, schools, monasteries or seminaries; freedom to
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criticise the government publicly, to travel abroad or be host to international conferences, are often severely curtailed. In some countries more is allowed than in others, but everywhere restrictions exist and are often crippling to the full life and witness of the churches.

And although a hostile Western press may often exaggerate the number of really persecuted Christians and the fate befalling them, there are too many open letters sent by Protestant and Orthodox Christians alike, too many people who are sent to labour-camps or kept in psychiatric institutions, too many churches and monasteries closed to believe that there are not regular actions carried out against minorities which live from sources other than the prevailing ideology. In this connection one has to mention the Jewish community. Their situation is in many ways comparable to that of the Christians but made even more difficult because of the desire to maintain their ethnic identity.

The World Council of Churches is not unaware of this situation and knows that many of its general pronouncements on human rights are as much applicable in Eastern Europe as in South-East Asia, North America, Southern Africa and Latin America.

Some of our member churches, especially concerned about such situations, have, after carefully establishing the facts through study and direct contacts, taken contact directly with the embassies of specific countries in their own land. Such direct contacts with representatives of governments concerned or contact through one's own government in the country concerned are certainly more effective than requests or complaints to our member churches in Eastern European countries.

We must ask in each case: Do we really help by public protest, or should we make a non-public approach? Several of our leaders and staff members have made private démarches to government officials in socialist countries in order to advocate greater freedom for the churches. It must be remembered that we have often found that such approaches are more successful than public declarations.

The World Council of Churches will continue to enlarge our common concepts of human rights, to press governments for the acceptance and application of these principles. It will do all it can to bring and to keep as many churches as possible in a fellowship which facilitates common enrichment and correction; act as a centre where the member churches can inform each other, and speak
(more)

when the occasion requires. Member churches can base their own speaking and action on such statements and may well be more specific than the World Council can be.

There are two more points I would like to make.

There are many people in our constituency who plead for equal treatment in all cases of discrimination. They would like to protest in exactly the same terms to a country where public opinion is a mighty force as to others where public opinion has little influence. They would like to use the same language in countries where churches are regarded as an important part of the electorate and a strong moral force as in countries where churches are hardly tolerated. Even if churches get into major trouble when the World Council criticises their government, they feel that the World Council should speak there exactly in the same way as in countries where churches are allowed or even encouraged to make their constructive and critical contribution.

I know that a policy in which the difference of situations is disregarded may help the public image of the World Council of Churches, but I am not willing to pay such a price for our image. More important than the image of the World Council is the quality of our fellowship, and a genuine fellowship expresses itself through differentiated approaches according to the real needs of those suffering discrimination. In the ecumenical movement respectful attention for different cases - and consequently for different means of improvement - is essential.

All this should not lead us to silence in cases in which we must speak, but it may well lead us to a different way of speaking. We may criticise the one, where we plead with the other, or protest publicly in one case while we try to persuade behind the scenes in another.

Last but not least: We must be very careful not to create the impression that we regard the situation in Eastern Europe in isolation or even that we give it automatic priority. Your letter asks specifically what your Church can do for people who claim a violation of their human rights in Eastern Europe. I am sure that in the Netherlands you will have received criticism on that choice. Why not choose torture in Brazil, arbitrary justice with regard to black Americans, political prisoners in Indonesia, Iran or North Vietnam? Why not choose the situation of Indians in East Africa, of the Aborigines in Australia or of the Eskimos in Canada? Or why not communists in Greece or liberals in Paraguay?

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I do not doubt for one moment that your genuine interest goes out to all people who ask for support against discrimination, but we must say this clearly time and time again.

I have tried personally always to put the general problem first. In my public letter to U Thant, dated April 16, 1970, I asked, in the name of the World Council of Churches, that the United Nations do everything it can to provide the Human Rights Commission with the power to investigate complaints about human rights and to apply them. In that letter I cited eleven countries in all continents and the different political blocs from which we have received complaints and requests for help. Again, in my address to the American Ecumenical Witness Conference on Vietnam on January 15, 1972, I mentioned a large number of countries by name, so making clear that we are not singling out one political system or any one particular country as the most guilty one.

There are others in our constituency who apparently feel that churches should protest more strongly against non-Christian governments than against fellow Christians in positions of defence of a Christian civilisation. With them I disagree. We shall continue to speak up for better justice everywhere but we cannot lose sight of our primary responsibility over against those who deny men their rights and do it in the name of our faith.

That is why I hold the ecumenical Programme to Combat Racism to be so important. Through the evil of white racism millions of people are denied their dignity and justice. I know that your Synod is still discussing the extent of your participation in this programme. Already a good number of the members of your Church have participated in it personally and financially. They have contributed to a new credibility of the churches in Africa. The positive involvement of the churches in the Sudan negotiations would have been impossible without the Programme to Combat Racism. They have also contributed to a new credibility with many outside the Church. I would not be amazed if our attitude - and consequently our action - against white racism which is perpetrated by misled Christians in political power, proves to be an important factor in favour of our being heard and heeded by atheist governments when we plead for full human rights of Christians and non-Christians alike in their countries.

Respectfully yours,

Eugene C. Blake
General Secretary

The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022
PLaza 1-4000

Date June 13, 1972

TO: Marc Tanenbaum

FROM: Milton Himmelfarb

- AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES
- For approval
- For your information
- Please handle
- Please talk to me about this
- Read and file
- Returned as requested
- Your comments please
- 

Remarks:

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date June 6, 1972
to Area Offices (one to each; please share)
from Milton Himmelfarb
subject Genetics, intelligence, and all that

Isaiah Terman has suggested this memo. The issue is hot, and likely to get hotter.

I wish we were in a position to give you a good presentation and analysis of the substantive and political matters at stake, but we are not. In the interim, you may find useful the attached xeroxes of articles and editorial statements in the Humanist (a journal published by the American Humanist Association and American Ethical Union) for January-February and March-April 1972:

- I. January-February
 1. David C. McLelland, "I.Q. Tests and Assessing Competence"
 2. Arthur R. Jensen, "Reply to McLelland"

- II. March-April
 1. Paul Kurtz, "The Principle of Equality and Some Dogmas of Environmentalism"
 2. Sidney Hook, "Democracy and Genetic Variation"

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I.Q. Tests and Assessing Competence

by David C. McClelland

Debunking I.Q. Tests

There has always been a tendency on the part of certain people who are good at manipulating symbols to use this capacity to exclude other people from positions of power in society. For example, to insure their dominant position, the Chinese intelligentsia invented a language, Mandarin Chinese, that could be learned by only a very small part of the population. Our society has a comparable system for defending power, and it is supported oddly enough by the standard antidemocratic argument for "pure" knowledge and "pure" understanding. (In contrast, the people who usually threaten the intelligentsia are practical people.) We call our system intelligence testing. I have been very much concerned about it for a long time, because it has become like a game of Chinese checkers or chess. The landed gentry have plenty of time to learn to play chess and other fun and games that poor people don't have time to master. Then they turn around and say that if you can't play chess, you can't belong to the élitist system. Unfortunately, the game in this country is becoming almost as effective as it was with the Chinese.

At one time, in order to get into the Chinese civil service, a person had to pass some extremely rigorous and extensive examina-

These remarks were taped at an informal seminar sponsored by the Union Graduate School. They were intended to be provocative and to stimulate discussion. The audience were students who needed to have some of their assumptions questioned. The remarks accordingly are not documented; nor are they offered as a complete scholarly presentation of Dr. McClelland's point of view—The Editors

"The I.Q. test . . . becomes part of an élitist mechanism to discriminate against the disadvantaged."

tions. Of course, only certain people in certain families had the leisure time necessary to learn the rules of the games being tested and to develop their playing skills. In our own society, the so-called intelligence movement has been extended to an extraordinary number of things. We demand good performance on similar tests as an important qualification for all sorts of jobs and positions. Consequently we also discriminate against people who haven't had the chance to learn the games that have been selected. We can look at this practically, moreover, and ask the businessman's utilitarian question: "So what, so if you play chess and these other wonderful games so beautifully—what does that mean? What else can you do?" As far as I can determine, the justification for the use of the tests is almost completely circular. There is no evidence that they predict anything more useful than one's ability to take other intelligence tests. Yes, they may also predict grades, but grades, of course, involve the same kinds of tests. I'd like to give a simple example of how the system works.

I have been serving as a member of a governor's commission appointed to deal with the problem of discrimination in the civil service of Massachusetts. To determine a person's qualifications for a job in the civil service, Massachusetts uses an intelligence-scholastic-aptitude type of test for all positions except maybe that of janitor. We have been especially concerned with the one that must be passed to become a policeman. An applicant has to play the analogies game; a typical item is the following: "Lexicon is to dictionary as policeman is to (check one of the four alternatives)." Now in order to qualify to be a cop, you have to score 70 on this test. (Where they get the number 70, I don't know, and they don't know. It's just one of those games that they play.) But if you're a black resident of Roxbury, chances are you haven't been exposed to words like "pyromaniac," "lexicon," and so on. There are several consequences of this simple fact.

First, by definition, a person is less intelligent if he can't play the game these people have made up. He doesn't know the words or the rules. Second, as a result, the person naturally doesn't qualify to be a cop or anything else in Massachusetts, and there is therefore a high and significant correlation between intelligence and occupational level. We've all seen tables

showing that people in lower occupations have lower I.Q. scores, while those in higher occupations have higher scores. This guy who can't be a policeman because he can't play the I.Q.-test game is contributing to those tables. He can't do the intelligence test, so all he can be is a janitor, whereas people who play the games well can become policemen and enter higher-level jobs. The test itself thus becomes part of an élitist mechanism to discriminate against the disadvantaged. What we have is a very vicious circle that insures poor people don't get better jobs. Still a third thing that happens is that the test-taker gets mad, angry, upset. This establishes a nice correlation between intelligence and human adjustment. If you have low intelligence-test scores, you are more apt to be neurotic. Of course, you may be neurotic because you can't get a job, and you can't go to school, and so on. But the correlation is there—by dint of what we may call "incestuous validity," that is, you correlate the thing with itself.

I have been very much concerned about these methods and have been trying to figure out how they could be attacked in some way that would offer a reasonable chance of success. The traditional attack against an élitist's discriminatory devices is utilitarian: "Look, there is no evidence that the test has anything to do with being a better cop or a worse cop. No one has shown that those who score higher on the so-called intelligence test make better cops." In Massachusetts, this argument forms the basis of a lawsuit that will probably prevent the test from being used. Furthermore, there's very little evidence that high intelligence-test scores predict success in any other occupation. Even really creative research scientists do not score higher. This has been shown in the United States and, independently, in England; it's been shown repeatedly.

All the evidence, however, does not prevent educational institutions from saying, "Doing well on these kinds of tests means that you will do well in our school." A fundamental problem, then, is whether we can allow educational institutions to ruin society by insisting that only the people who go to their schools should have access to higher positions in the society. Surely the schools become an oppressive mechanism when they select and distribute only people with certain types of talent into various types of jobs and the talents, like chess playing, are not really related to perform-

ing well in the jobs. In some cases, there may even be an inverse relationship between the two abilities.

What is really odd is that the tests have often been justified on the grounds that they are more democratic than other means of selection. There's an especially nice historical irony here. Testing got its start because it was supposed to prevent nepotism, such as getting sons of alumni into Yale. It was supposed to be a democratic mechanism. Instead, it has become much more oppressive than the method it was designed to replace. Under the old method, even if you did happen to get sons of alumni who were not very good at taking this type of test, they would still be able to get into college. For the new type of aristocracy, however, testing selects more rigorously than genes.

During my years of searching for ways to measure different types of human competence, I have argued for things like tests with answers that are known to the people who are trying to do well on them. (Another trick of the oppressing classes is to keep the answers a secret: You don't learn the mistakes you've made; you guess at how to improve your performance.) Teachers are in a somewhat peculiar position because the psychologists do not allow them to understand very much about what's going on. They know that some of the kids have high S.A.T. scores, but they don't really know how to teach a person to get a high score. I think it was Tim Leary who suggested to me the idea of teaching people to cheat on intelligence tests; that is, you give out the answers. The argument is that if you really know how to do the problems, you are more intelligent by definition; so we ought to teach the definitions and produce as many intelligent people as possible. I've been very much interested in developing measures that teachers could use to achieve this goal. Unfortunately, I haven't been able to get the kind of support I need to develop them into practical form.

Question: Meaning financial support?

McClelland: Yes.

Question: You have a design that might work?

McClelland: We have all kinds of designs, measures, and things we think are important. We need support to put them into a practical format. Then people could write in and say, "Hey, send me a copy." I now get many requests of this sort, but I can't fill them.

Question: Given that block, how do we attack the system? How do we stop people from using the tests?

McClelland: One way is by lawsuit, like the one I mentioned previously. If I could think of a good one, I'd go ahead with it. The problem is that in most cases, which

are concerned with education, you can't win a lawsuit, because the schools have a good defense; namely, that the tests discriminate validly insofar as grades are concerned. The testing service says only that it has tests to predict how well people will do in the schools—and that is perfectly true. Since that's all they claim, the schools rather than the tests are the major problem. And because of that, the lawsuit is a method that won't work.

Question: What about the Massachusetts case that you mentioned?

McClelland: That's a different problem. We can probably win that one, because we can show that the tests do not predict police performance. We cannot show that they don't predict school performance, however, because the schools use the same type of tests. They could stop using them, but that might threaten their methods, their traditions, their status quo, and so on. On the other hand, Bowdoin College has

San Francisco, Nov. 27 (AP)—A suit has been filed in Federal Court seeking to stop the use of elementary school intelligence tests on the ground that they force a high proportion of black children into classes for pupils considered mentally retarded.

The class-action suit, brought by the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and other groups last Wednesday, charged that the tests were based on the cultural norms of white children and thus violated the civil rights of black youngsters by failing to "properly account for their cultural background and experience."

—The New York Times, November 28, 1971

stopped using the S.A.T., although it did it for the wrong reason. The decision shows how strange things can happen. They had the teachers pick out those whom they regarded as the ideal Bowdoin students, then discovered that there was no relationship between the test scores and the people whom the teachers had selected. So they dropped the tests. Although that's probably not a reason I would like to use for dropping them, it might be better than I think.

Comment: The school with which I'm associated, and which used the S.A.T. initially, has found it to be totally invalid because the structure and the ends of the school are not academic, but educational in a broader and more varied sense. They don't want S.A.T. scores anymore; they have other criteria for selection. Whether what you're saying will help generally,

however, I don't know. I can see traditional educational institutions saying that they're not interested in looking for creepy, weird people.

Also, for reasons somewhat different from those already mentioned, Mexican-American parents in California have brought an injunction against the State Board of Education to prohibit administering these kinds of standardized tests to their children. Their reasons are linguistic. **McClelland:** I think they can probably make that case stick. The problem is gaining recognition of ghetto dialect as a separate language, and that's not going to be hard to prove in court. It can be demonstrated by taking a white, middle-class person and putting him in the ghetto to try to figure out what's going on. As a matter of fact, some black students are now inventing tests in ghetto dialect, and even high scorers on the S.A.T. couldn't pass them. But what do you prove by all that? It's a kind of gamesmanship that really isn't getting at the issue.

An Alternative: The Lottery Plus Intensive Training

Question: Could the tests be proved unconstitutional? Wouldn't a state university or other state organizations using them be particularly susceptible to a charge of discrimination? And what about an alternative?

McClelland: I think that question has to be examined in light of an interesting problem concerning American values. In talking with the civil-service people in Massachusetts, we had to confront the following question: "All right, suppose we don't use this test. We still have 4,000 applicants for 50 jobs in the Boston police department. How do we choose 50 people?" A judge will also want an answer to that question. He'll want to know what other workable method is free of discrimination. We don't want to open jobs to patronage. After all, that's why the civil-service system was started: We wanted to make certain that whoever got elected didn't appoint all his relatives and friends to public jobs. Moreover, we want to fill the jobs with the best persons possible.

I've recommended an alternative to the present system, but it goes so much against American values, even against most liberals' values, that it would be difficult to implement. My solution is a lottery. Let's do it by chance. That avoids patronage, gives minority groups a break, and saves money. But how does it get the best people for the jobs? I think the answer is to pick a few more people than needed and then put everyone through very intensive

training. Lots of evidence suggests that people may start out without the characteristics necessary for a job, but that they can and do learn.

Let's look more closely at the problem. A lottery would likely produce, for example, a certain number of candidates for the police force who were very prejudiced against blacks. Since we don't want those people on the force, we ought somehow to screen them out. But we do not have to use preliminary tests. What we can do is to intensively train those selected by lot and at the end of two weeks throw out the ones who still show prejudice against blacks. We do not accept the idea that bigotry is something in the genes; that we can screen 4,000 people for it. We believe we can get rid of it. We also know, however, that we will not succeed with everyone; that there are some people from whom we can't eradicate prejudice. They will be dropped out at the end of the training and told, "Sorry, this was one of our objectives and you didn't make it." What is important here is that no one has been prejudged on the basis of a test that may bear no relationship whatsoever to the demands of the job and that, beyond this, allows no opportunity for learning. In effect, we use training itself as a screening device.

It's like the process a person must go through to get a license to drive a car. We don't predetermine that only people whose fathers have owned cars will be licensed. No, we try to train everyone of normal physical capacity to drive, but at the end we may screen out some uncoordinated idiots we don't ever want on the road. We just wouldn't give them a license at the end of their training.

Americans nonetheless would feel very uncomfortable about using a lottery to pick people for important positions. If they're picking a social worker, they want to insure that they're getting a person who is sympathetic. My point is that we can probably train most people to be sympathetic, and train for various other functions and characteristics that we're now trying to select by test. The few who can't be trained may be eliminated at the end of the training period. Using intelligence tests to pick social workers is also a way of picking by lot; it's just less obvious and less equitable. As I've mentioned, however, these arguments notwithstanding, there are few people who would opt for a lottery system.

Question: Don't we do it when lives are at stake; that is, when we pick juries?

McClelland: That system begins by trying to eliminate people who are prejudiced.

Question: No, people are picked out of the phone book; names are put into a pot and drawn by lot. I think there's an analogy

"My solution is a lottery. Let's do it by chance. That avoids patronage, gives minority groups a break, and saves money."

between that and your suggestions. But there is and probably will continue to be resistance against selecting people for jobs by lottery. Do you have any notion why—particularly when it is perhaps the most politically democratic idea ever invented, one the Greeks used when they conceived the system we call democracy?

McClelland: Well, as I've already said, I think the idea of meritocracy, which is the basis of our present system, was conceived as an antiaristocratic point of view. The idea was that people would be selected on the basis of qualification and merit, not on the basis of pedigree or connections. So how do you defend yourself against somebody who asks, "Don't you believe in getting the best qualified person to do the job?" You have to say, "Yes." At least I do.

Comment: But there is a vein of American thought and practice—it's usually identified with the Jeffersonian tradition—that you can train anybody.

McClelland: That's interesting. You give me a little hope. But I'd like to see somebody try to win that case somewhere. I know there are lots of opportunities for all of us to try it. Are you picked by lot in this program [Union Graduate School for the Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities]?

Answer: No.

McClelland: Then start here. You're all saying let somebody else pick by lot. You could abolish the admissions office. It's much cheaper not to have one. You wouldn't need so much staff and paperwork!

Measuring Competence

Question: You said something about alternative measures of competence. Could you lay out a few of them?


McClelland: I have a general list of things that I think are more important than some of what we now measure. I think, for example, more of our tests should involve measuring a person's ability to communicate, since that's often part of our criteria for successful behavior in a position. I remember an application from a black student who was editor of his col-

lege newspaper. He enclosed articles he had written, but his Miller Analogies score was unbelievably low. The Miller Analogies test, as you may know, is supposed to predict a person's ability to reason and think straight. We had evidence he could do this, since he had written the articles. But I couldn't get that guy into Harvard because they said it would be unfair to him: He wouldn't do what he had demonstrated he could do well, because the test predicted that he couldn't do it. By the way, I've known people who scored high on the Miller tests, but were terrible at writing a reasoned piece of discourse.

I can draw a similar illustration from an experience in Ethiopia. We were there to evaluate the effect of Peace Corps teachers on Ethiopian high-school students. One of the big arguments going on was whether the students were being taught English well enough to enable them to pass the Cambridge examination. This fill-in-the-blanks test for proficiency in English is based, believe it or not, on *The Vicar of Wakefield*. I don't know if you've read the book recently, but it contains the weirdest vocabulary in terms of usable English. The American Peace Corps teachers rebelled. "First," they said, "this is the wrong vocabulary; second, we want to know whether the kids can use the language, not whether they can fill in the blanks to show they know English grammar."

The problem became political; accusations were made that students taught by the Peace Corps were flunking the exam. So we invented a different one. We had students write little themes or stories, and we also probed for motivational changes. The design was not so much to check correctness of spelling and grammar, but to look for what we called fluency, that is, the ability to communicate reasonably well. We coded for, among other things, the complexity of the sentences. And we found that the students taught by the Peace Corps were really much better at writing complex sentences than were other students—primarily, I think, because their teachers spoke English as a native language. In other words, the Ethiopians were learning from the American teachers how to think and communicate in a language rather than how to memorize the rules of its grammar. I think that we need more teaching and tests of this sort.

Psychology Today published a test that fascinates me because it illustrates a communication skill in which I have long been interested. It's a card game that requires you to communicate emotions. The card tells you which part of the body you have to use in order to do this. I'm sure some people are good at it and some people are



bad at it. It's an important human skill. Why isn't it just as important as the Miller Analogies? I don't know if the game works. I've never played it. But I'm sure it's fun.

Question: All right, you've named one type of competence. Do you have other suggestions?

McClelland: Yes. Much competence depends upon what are known as personality variables. One of the important ones in kids is the ability to delay; it's sometimes called reflective ability, as opposed to impulsiveness. This is a quality that I would want in cops, for instance, to lessen the chance of their literally jumping the gun. Waiting long enough to size up the situation is a very valuable human trait. It can be taught to young kids or to adults training to be policemen.

Another important competence is learning to set a moderate goal. We stress this in our achievement-motivation training. Unfortunately, kids are often taught in school to choose goals that are either too easy (so that they'll get A's) or too difficult (so that they'll be rewarded for shooting high). We try to correct problems that arise from this kind of teaching.

We must also work with ego development. The concept bothers me, as it does most American psychologists, because I'm not sure there are genuine stages to it. American educators, however, have always wanted to develop people to higher levels so that they can adapt better. Paul Costa and I have been working on a measure of ego development with four stages, corresponding more or less to those described by Erik Erikson. The first is that of compliance or waiting; Erikson sometimes calls it hope-trust—the oral stage, if you want to think of it in traditional psychoanalytic terms. Within each stage there are four levels. For instance, level two of stage one is essentially compliance with whatever the teacher wants after a kind of minimal objection has been made. Stage two is rebellion, that is, assertion of individual will. This represents an improvement in ego development, although, since it makes trouble for them, most teachers see it as a nuisance. The third, or phallic, stage is one of curiosity: A person begins to reflect on what is going on.

The fourth involves generativity or committed action. Costa has developed a rough measure of these stages. He has found, using the measure, that a more democratic, participatory type of school program tends to raise people on the scale of ego development. Most of the kids in a program of this type reflect later stages of ego development, whereas kids from the traditional schools are still primarily at stage one, passive and compliant.

Comment: But surely these stages are not hierarchical!

McClelland: I agree. The problem, however, is that if you have stages of one, two, three, and four, everybody, teachers included, begins thinking automatically that stage four is better than stage one. We might all deny it, but how do you stop thinking that way if you talk about development? I don't know. That's why I'm a little worried about using the concept when discussing the types of competence about which we should be concerned. Nevertheless, I think it's a welcome alternative to academic I.Q. games.

How Do Motivators Motivate?

In the last 10 years, most of my time has been spent trying to teach achievement motivation to businessmen and students. Those of us engaged in this effort have now concluded that we probably haven't been teaching motivation after all. We've been effective in making kids better students and making businessmen better businessmen, but we're not sure that we've been changing motivation so much as teaching people how to better manage their lives. Through a program emphasizing self-study, we teach participants about the achievement syndrome, about how to analyze their problems, to find out their wishes, their wants, and their goals; we also teach them to plan for the future. Mastering this is comparable to developing what we call a cognitive skill.

There is a bank in Atlanta that requires this training as part of a system by which they're trying to develop black men who want to get into business and own property—just the way whites do. Recently I asked some people who had participated in the program a year ago what they thought the motivation course had done for them. None spoke of increased motivation, which was the purpose of the course. Rather, they said it taught them to look at themselves more carefully, to see that certain of their problems were in themselves rather than in the world, and, based upon their evaluation, to set goals that they had a reasonable chance of achieving. That's an excellent measure of competence. ■

The Case for I.Q. Tests

Reply to McClelland

by Arthur R. Jensen

Readers of *The Humanist* ought to realize that many arguments against I.Q. tests ignore a large number of scientifically established facts. Below I have listed some of those that seem most germane; except the first, all items are amply substantiated by research published in scientific journals. *Note:* Unless explicitly specified, the following points pertain only to standard intelligence tests. Although such tests take a number of different forms (for example, verbal and nonverbal, group and individual, and so on), not *all* tests are intelligence tests.

1. The level of technology needed to maintain the standard of living enjoyed in North America and Europe, given their present populations, demands that a substantial proportion (say, 15 per cent) of the population possess a high level of the kind of mental ability measured by intelligence tests. We could get along without this kind and amount of intelligence in the population only if we drastically reduced population size and returned to a simple agrarian way of life or became hunters and gatherers of food, as in primitive societies. The present population could not be sustained without the technology (food production, transportation, health services, sanitation, and so on) and the kinds of brains needed to maintain it. Thus, to denigrate intelligence is to abandon civilization as we know it.

2. Intelligence tests do, in fact, predict socially and occupationally significant criteria. I.Q. is in a sense a measure of a person's ability to compete successfully in the world of work in all known civilized societies. When the "man in the street" is asked to rank various occupations in order of their "prestige," "desirability," and so on, it turns out that the rank order of the average I.Q. of persons in those occupations closely corresponds to the rank order of their desirability. For example, most of the practical business executives to whom McClelland refers have an average I.Q. that places them above approximately 96 per cent of the rest of the population.

3. Persons would still differ in intelligence even if there were no intelligence tests. Any merit system based on performance reveals these differences. I.Q. tests reveal the same differences to the extent that the performance involves mental capabilities. They are not intended to predict performance based on physical capacities or on special talents such as artistic and musical ability. Bright persons and dull persons were recognized long before intelligence tests came into existence, and there has always been a marked relationship between mental characteristics and occupational attainments. Throwing out intelligence tests will not improve a person's intelligence or reduce differences between persons, just as throwing away the thermometer will not cure a patient's fever.

4. The use of intelligence tests in the armed forces shows that they are highly correlated with the kinds and levels of skills for which men can be trained and the time they need to achieve certain levels of skill. Reversing the assignments of recruits in mental Categories I and IV would guarantee the greatest snafu in military history.

5. Intelligence tests do not reflect only the accidents of cultural and social privilege; they get at some quite basic biological capacity underlying the ability to reason, to organize and utilize one's knowledge, and so on. Hereditary or genetic factors account for more of the I.Q. differences among persons than do cultural and environmental factors. In the white European and North American populations, where this has been studied most extensively, it has been found that genetic factors are about twice as important as environment as a cause of individual differences in I.Q.

6. Intelligence is positively related to other nonintellectual traits of personality and character that are also involved in competing successfully for what most persons in our society—rich or poor, black or white—regard as the "good things in life."

7. Various intelligence tests differ in

their degree of "culture loading." Contrary to popular belief, blacks perform *better* on the *more* culture-loaded than on the *more* culture-free tests. (The opposite is true for other minorities.) Blacks also do better on verbal than on nonverbal tests. Thus, on some nonverbal I.Q. tests, about 85 per cent of American blacks score below the average for whites, while the culturally very different Arctic Eskimos score on a par with white norms. This shows that higher scores on these tests do not depend upon having experienced a white, middle-class American background.

8. Just as no one has been able to make up a test of mental ability that favors younger children (say, 10-year-olds) over older children (say, 12-year-olds), so no one has been able to make up a test that favors persons of low socioeconomic status over persons of middle- and upper-class status. If the reasons for social-class intelligence differences were due to status-biased content, it should be possible to make tests that reverse the differences. Yet, despite many attempts, no one has succeeded in devising such tests.

9. Language and dialect do not have the importance in intelligence tests attributed to them by popular belief, especially where nonverbal I.Q. tests are used. Urban black children tested on the Stanford-Binet I.Q. Test by a black tester using ghetto dialect do not score appreciably higher than when the test is administered in standard English. Children who are born deaf, though scoring poorly on verbal tests because of their severe language deprivation, score no differently from children with normal hearing on the nonverbal tests.

10. College aptitude tests, such as the S.A.T., predict college grades for blacks as well as for whites, for rich as well as for poor. The tests are color-blind. Black individuals and white individuals, rich or poor, with the same I.Q. can be expected to perform equally well in school or on the job—insofar as the job depends upon intellectual ability. In predicting a person's scholastic performance, knowledge of his race or social class adds little or nothing to what is predicted by his I.Q. ■

Editorials

The January/February issue of *The Humanist* devoted a special Ethical Forum to "I.Q. and Race." All the contributors except one were psychologists. As a follow-up, we present reflections by three philosophers and a clinical psychologist on some of the moral and social implications of the controversy—Editor.

The Principle of Equality and Some Dogmas of Environmentalism

by Paul Kurtz

We have been living through a time of great ferment, a time in which the principle of equality and the doctrine of equal rights have been widely proclaimed. All who believe in democracy must surely applaud efforts in behalf of equality. The principle is not new. It has been appealed to before and it will be appealed to again—for equal rights are in constant need of nourishment and protection. What is new today is the recognition that equality is a basic premise of a democratic society and can no longer be compromised. Equal rights, like virtue and morality, should not be mouthed only at Sunday sermons, or during Presidential election campaigns, and forgotten at other times. The extension of equality to blacks, Indians, Chicanos, and other disadvantaged groups of society and the liberation of women thus is long overdue. No individual should be denied access to society because of race, sex, origin, or background.

Unfortunately, there is often great confusion among those who passionately espouse equality about what it means and how it should be applied. This is particularly the case when it is tied to an oversimplified environmentalism. Indeed, some idealists, in an effort to defend an environmental-equalitarian doctrine, have apparently overlooked or undermined other important principles that are equally essential to a democratic polity.

Free thought

Democracy, for example, entails commitment to the principles of free inquiry. Recently, Harvard professor Richard Herrnstein, author of an article on race and I.Q. in *The Atlantic Monthly* (September, 1971), has come under heavy attack by over-zealous environmentalists. They have also attacked *The Atlantic Monthly*, Arthur Jensen, *The New York Times*, the *Harvard Educational Review*, and *The Humanist* (see January/February, 1972, issue) for publishing articles that ask whether intelligence is basically genetic or environmental in origin, and whether there are racial differences. Environmentalists at meetings of the American Anthropological

Association and the American Philosophical Association have recently pushed through resolutions "condemning" such inquiries as "racist."

It is one thing to criticize the heritability thesis of Jensen and Herrnstein; it is another to condemn publication of their views. One who believes in the free mind should not condemn out of hand those who engage in such scientific inquiry.

Merit

Another principle that one would think esteemed by society is the appreciation of merit. We approve of and seek to encourage in our children any signs of creativity, precocious intelligence, musical ability, good muscular coordination, or keen moral sensitivity. Yet some environmentalists apparently condemn certain words as "undemocratic": "talent," "ability," "excellence," "competence," "merit"—all are said to smack of "elitism." From the standpoint of individual justice and the social good, should we not identify and reward demonstrated ability and talent? Yet there are those who seem to think that making such distinctions is wicked! Surely democracy does not entail an end to merit; if it did, it might mean the end of a viable social system.

Descriptive claim versus normative policy

A confusion that some environmental equalitarians make is to fail to distinguish a descriptive claim about what men are from a normative recommendation about how they ought to be treated. One who believes in equality need not insist that all individuals, races, or ethnic groups are exactly alike in every way; nor that all discernible differences have an environmental explanation. Human beings *may* be dissimilar in some of their biological characteristics and cultural proclivities without undermining our commitment to equality as a moral ideal.

The principle of equality is not a description that "all men are born equal"; rather it is a moral principle that holds that all men *ought* to be so considered.

Nor does the principle of equality mean that everyone ought to be treated exactly alike (egalitarianism); for individuals are unique in their needs and dispositions, which may have to be satisfied in diverse ways.

What equality means is (a) that all human beings should be

We wish to thank the many readers who contributed to our fund drive. We are grateful to those who have responded and to those who will respond.

—The Editors

regarded as having equal dignity and value as humans, (b) that they should be afforded equal protection of the laws, (c) that they should be given equal opportunity to fulfill their unique potentialities, (d) that they are entitled to equal consideration and fair treatment, and (e) that the satisfaction of their basic needs ought to be guaranteed by society.

Environmentalism

There are many environmentalists who seem dogmatically to advocate easy social solutions for every human ill. They are steadfastly committed to a wholly environmental explanation of human differences and to a compensatory solution to rectify them: they insist that all inequities and differences in performance and achievement must have an environmental explanation and a social cure.

We must grant the profound influence of the social environment in determining who and what we are. But are there not also genetic and biological causes that explain some of the differences between individuals and groups? There is a growing scientific literature that points to the importance of genetic determinants of behavior. For example, some genetic stocks tend to have certain diseases—such as Tay Sachs disease, diabetes, and sickle-cell anemia—more than others. Do genetic factors also apply to intelligence, creativity, physical dexterity? Genetic differences surely apply to individuals; whether they also apply to in-breeding groups is at least an open question; and to suggest the possibility that they might (as Jensen, Eysenck, and Shockley do) does not mean that one is a "racist." Similarly, can one not ask whether there are important biological differences between the sexes without being called a "sexist"? A "racist" or "sexist" would be one who would deny the normative policy of equality to blacks or women because they are blacks or women, and who would direct hostility, bigotry, or a condescending attitude toward them because of their origins. "Racist" and "sexist" should not be used to label those scientists who find racial or sexual differences. To so argue might, for example, condemn doctors as "racists" for discovering that blacks have a higher proportion of the genetically based sickle-cell anemia disease than whites, or biologists as "sexists" for suggesting that female hormones influence psychological reactions.

In one sense, whether there are racial or sexual differences between people possibly is a more important question today than in previous decades precisely because environmentalists have forced the issue. And they have forced the issue by defending the doctrine of compensation.

Compensation

This doctrine holds that if a group in a society has a disproportionate share of power, position, or status, then—since all individuals and groups *a priori* are equal in talent and ability—the explanation *must* be due to social discrimination. Therefore, they argue, democratic policy and moral concern must redress the imbalance and offer reparations or preferential treatment.

This argument on the surface seems reasonable, humanistic, altruistic. If one is to ensure that women, blacks, and other minority groups continue to make progress against discrimination, one can make a case for a selective policy of compensation — provided, however, that it is used only as a *temporary* measure to stimulate the social redress of past wrongs and to unlock hidden and suppressed reservoirs of talent.

The mindless application of the compensatory doctrine insists, however, that since women make up 53 per cent of the population, they should occupy 53 per cent of the positions in the society; and since blacks make up 11 per cent, they should hold 11 per cent of the important jobs. Some officials in HEW seem to have been convinced of this argument, for they are now insisting, for example, that colleges and universities engage in affirmative actions to approach these figures or suffer loss of federal funds. It is even being suggested that compensatory religious quotas be established.

Those who defend the compensatory policy most vehemently are perhaps unaware of two possible dangers in its indiscriminate application. That the compensatory policy should *not* be employed as a permanent political or social policy should become apparent by reference to the following considerations.

First, what the environmental-compensatory doctrine overlooks is the fact that the maldistribution in some positions might not be due solely or largely to environmental prejudice—racism or sexism—but to the unavailability of competent minority members or women to fill the positions. Granted that we need to identify and train those discriminated against; that this may be a long social process. But this assumes that the reason why there is underperformance is solely environmental or due to discrimination, when there may also be biological and genetic causes at work. If there are genetic causes responsible for some inequalities among individuals, then our policies of social amelioration must perhaps also pursue other directions. In regard to racial differences, perhaps we should seek to find a cure for forms of retardation, if this is a significant occurrence among blacks. (Jensen claims that the rate is six to eight times that of the white population.) Similarly, some differences in male-female roles may not be due solely to social causes or male oppression, but may have bisexual origins as well. This is true of other primates, and it may also be true of humans, as Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox argue in their book *The Imperial Animal*, and Shulamith Firestone in *The Dialectic of Sex*. All of these matters are at least open to further research. Environmentalists tend to foreclose such possibilities.

Second, many devotees of environmentalism and compensation are perhaps unaware of the possible disastrous negative and antidemocratic aspects implicit in the indiscriminate use of quotas. For if one minority claims to be underrepresented, others may ask the same questions: How many Poles, Portuguese, or Italian Americans are there in various fields? How many Catholics, Jews, Baptists, or free thinkers? Why do certain groups tend to attain a proportionately higher rate of achievement in some fields rather than others? There are no doubt important social or cultural factors that help to explain differential performance. The point is, there are dangers in imposing reverse quotas: If we are to make sure that 53 per cent of the top positions are held by women, 11 per cent by blacks, proportionate shares by Poles, Portuguese, Italians, Chinese, and so on, does this mean that in some areas we will have to limit over-achievers, such as Jews and WASPs? How else make room for those disproportionately underrepresented unless those who are overrepresented are restricted? And would we not in the process be abrogating the rights of qualified individuals who are denied positions because of the need to fulfill minority quotas?

Environmental-equalitarians rightly criticize racists for singling out minority groups and discriminating against them. They

demand compensatory social policies to rectify some of the injustice. But if it is wrong for a Southern racist to identify and discriminate against blacks as blacks, is it not wrong for environmentalists to identify blacks as blacks, or women as women, or any group as a group, and demand compensatory representation?

Conclusion

The conclusion to be drawn is that we should treat human beings as *individuals*, not simply as members of groups. Equality of opportunity, equal consideration, fair treatment, as basic democratic principles should apply primarily to individuals: All individuals should have full access to social opportunity to the maximum of their potential. It is one thing to defend equal rights; it is *another* to abandon reason and empirical inquiry, to suppress truth, condemn merit, impose quotas, without recognizing the possible negative consequences of misplaced and dogmatic idealism. I am not saying that we should in any way let up in our efforts for social equality—only that our efforts be wise and intelligent.

One point to the Jensen controversy that needs to be made loud and clear is that even if Jensen is correct—that is still a debatable question—this in no way should invalidate our commitment to a free, open, and democratic society or to the application of the principle of equality to all individuals in society.

RELIGIOUS QUOTAS AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance is taking action against religious discrimination in employment. OFCC has drawn up guidelines requiring all federal contractors, sub-contractors, and federally assisted firms to institute and maintain an affirmative action program to eliminate religious discrimination, especially in executive and middle-management positions. The proposed guidelines would require all federal contractors to: "(1) be cognizant of the religious minorities in their work force; (2) identify employment problems based on religion; and (3) institute appropriate affirmative actions to obtain solutions." Companies doing business with the federal government *will be required to keep records of the religious affiliations of their employees* and determine the number of Jews and Catholics occupying executive and middle-management positions, where it is thought that discrimination against those two groups exists.

The Joint Washington Office (of the American Ethical Union, American Humanist Association, and Unitarian Universalist Association) has lodged a complaint. The new order does not respect freedom of conscience. There are individuals who might not wish to reveal their affiliation or tradition, Catholic, Protestant, or Jew. Is an ethical culturist, humanist, Unitarian, or atheist going to benefit by having his unorthodox religious affiliation, or lack of it, known to his employer? Robert Jones, Director of the Joint Washington Office, has protested that the order conflicts with the right of privacy.

Democracy and Genetic Variation

by Sidney Hook

It cannot be repeated too often that democracy as a way of life does not depend upon the belief in the *physical* or *intellectual* equality of persons and races, but upon their *moral* equality. Parents of children whose I.Q.'s vary from 85 to 140 would be morally indignant at the notion that this variation therefore justified absence of equal concern on their part for *all* their children to develop themselves to the full measure of their potential growth. They would be utter fools, however, if they denied their children's varying capacities to learn and expressed their equality of concern through a mechanical equality of treatment. The very effectiveness of the teaching process depends upon sympathetic identification of, and with, the individual differences and needs of a child.

Even if it were the case that the I.Q. was largely a measure of native intelligence and that the mean difference of I.Q. among racial groups, however defined, was 15 points, this would have no bearing whatsoever upon our democratic commitment to provide equal opportunity for *all* persons in the community to develop themselves to their fullest. The key to moral equality is the recognition and appreciation of the importance of individual differences, and the organization of community resources to further the growth of each individual. Statistical generalizations, even when valid, cannot fairly be applied to particular cases. Suppose it were true that men are naturally physically stronger or (according to A. A. Goldenweiser, the famous anthropologist) more creative than women, or that whites are more logical than blacks, or blacks more musical than whites. Nonetheless, any particular woman might be more creative or physically stronger than any particular man, any particular black might be more logical and less musical than any particular white. It is the uniqueness and distinctiveness of individual achievement that is educationally and morally important, not general superiority or inferiority with respect to others. Every individual can achieve his own *specific* superiorities and to some extent mitigate his *specific* inferiorities by individualized curricular studies.

Whatever the uses of I.Q. tests, with respect to individuals they should be diagnostic, employed to determine strengths and weaknesses in the same way that actuarial data and vital statistics are used in the quest for "individualized remedial measures." This was John Dewey's view. He welcomed the scientific study of innate qualities. But he pointed out that although innate qualities may set limits, they are not active forces "dooming individuals to a predetermined social or vocational status in our industrial society." "Barring complete imbecility," he wrote, "it is safe to say that the most limited member of the populace has potentialities which do not now reveal themselves and which will not reveal themselves until we convert education by and for mediocrity into an education by and for individuality."

So long as statistical distributions are not applied to individuals, and so long as it is recognized that there are various modes of intelligence—so that individuals are not judged ex-

clusively on the basis of one score without the right to personal interview and appeal—there can be no reasonable objection to the use of certain intelligence tests to help determine eligibility when the number of applicants exceeds the number of available posts.

I have found shocking the recommendation made in the January/February issue of *The Humanist* by those opposed to intelligence tests that we abandon them and use lotteries to choose policemen (or, for that matter, physicians, plumbers, and teachers). The reasons are unclear why we should train a random selection of applicants for police jobs rather than a group initially selected for their native intelligence (inferred from their differential performance on intelligence tests). It is true that native intelligence may not be a sufficient condition for effective police performance on the job, but a certain degree of it seems necessary, assuming that police performance requires intelligent detection of crime and not merely collecting tolls or directing traffic. Other things being roughly equal—say courage, honesty, absence of bigotry, and other traits that can be manifested if not altogether revealed by certain practical tests *before* selection is made—the more intelligent the police officer, the more likely he is to be a good police officer.

Whatever the outcome of further inquiry into the genetic components of intelligence, the intellectual intolerance of those who would taboo such inquiries should be exposed and the disruptions of the lectures, classrooms, and laboratories of scientists engaged in the study of these problems should be firmly repudiated and punished. There are more racists among the intolerant dogmatists who would ban attempts to discover the facts about race than among those they currently accuse of racism. ■

memorandum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date October 1, 1969
to Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum
from Rabbi A. James Rudin
subject

This brief explanation of Zionism by Martin Buber was given in 1946 before the Anglo American Commission in Jerusalem.

Although we may not agree with his conclusion, I feel Buber's thoughts are still timely.

AJR:FM
Encl.



means to us and why we so ardently believe in the return to Zion. I shall then try to bring out some of the points of our written statement. Mr. Smilansky will in the course of the discussion want to emphasize two points, first, that Jewish-Arab cooperation is possible, and second, that there is sufficient land in the country for the absorption of a large Jewish immigration. Mr. Smilansky has lived and worked in Palestine for more than 55 years, and I venture the statement that there is no one who has so intimate a knowledge of these subjects. Professor Buber, who is now to speak, is not only an internationally known writer and scholar, but he was also one of the pioneers of the Zionist movement since the days of Theodor Herzl.

Professor Buber and I wish to make it clear that we are not speaking in the name of the Hebrew University. There are various opinions there as elsewhere. We are speaking as residents of the country and as Jews who feel it to be their duty to give voice to a view which, though differing from the official Zionist program, is nevertheless shared, as we know, by large numbers of the population.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Professor Buber.

PROFESSOR BUBER: Mr. Chairman, it is impossible to survey the problem you are trying to meet without an understanding of the very roots of Zionism. For only through this understanding will the observer realize that he faces something quite different from the well-known national antagonisms, and therefore that methods other than those of political routine are called for.

Modern political Zionism, in the form it has taken during my nearly fifty years of membership in this movement, was only developed and intensified, but not caused by modern anti-Semitism. Indeed, Zionism is a late form assumed by a primal fact in the history of mankind, a fact of reasonable interest at least for Christian civilization. This fact is the unique connection of a people and a country. This people, the people Israel, was once created by the power of a tradition that was common to some semi-nomadic tribes. Together these tribes migrated, under very difficult conditions, from Egypt to Canaan because they felt united by the promise to them of Canaan as their "heritage" since the days of the "Fathers." This tradition was spectacular and decisive for the history of mankind in that it

confronted the new people with a task they could carry out only as a people, namely to establish in Canaan a model and "just" community. Later on, the "prophets"—a calling without any historical precedent—interpreted this task as obliging the community to send streams of social and political justice throughout the world. Thereby the most productive and most paradoxical of all human ideas, Messianism, was offered to humanity. It placed the people of Israel in the center of an activity leading towards the advent of the Kingdom of God on earth, an activity in which all the peoples were to cooperate. It ordered every generation to contribute to the upbuilding of the sacred future with the forces and resources at their command. Had it not been for this idea, neither Cromwell nor Lincoln could have conceived their mission. This idea is the origin of the great impulse that, in periods of disappointment and weariness, ever and ever again encouraged the Christian peoples to dare to embark upon a new shaping of their public life, the origin of the hope of a genuine and just cooperation among individuals as well as nations, on a voluntary basis. But within the people that had created it, this idea grew to a force of quite peculiar vitality. Driven out of their promised land, this people survived nearly two millennia by their trust in their return, in the fulfillment of the promise, in the realization of the idea. The inner connection with this land and the belief in the promised reunion with it were a permanent force of rejuvenation for this people, living in conditions which probably would have caused the complete disintegration of any other group.

This serves as an explanation of the fact that, in the age of national movements, Judaism did not simply create another national movement of the European type, but a unique one, a "Zionism," the modern expression of the tendency towards "Zion." In this age the hostile forces which consciously or not, see in Judaism the Messianic monitor, quite logically attacked it more and more violently. Yet simultaneously, in Judaism itself, a great regeneration had started. Out of an inner necessity this movement of regeneration chose for its aim the reunion with the soil and, again out of an inner necessity, there was no choice other than the soil of Palestine and its cultivation. And with an inner necessity the new Jewish settlement on this soil centers in the village communities which, in spite of their differing forms of organization, all aim at the creation of a

genuine and just community on a voluntary basis. The importance of these attempts surpasses the frontiers of Palestine as well as of Judaism. Given the chance of unhampered development, these vital social attempts will show the world the possibility of basing social justice upon voluntary action. Sir Arthur Wauchope who, as High Commissioner in the years 1931-1938 had the opportunity of acquainting himself with this country and this work, was right in pointing out that these "astonishingly successful" communal settlements are an example of cooperation for the whole world and can be of great importance for the foundation of a new social order.

At one time the productive strength of the people Israel in this country was a collective strength in the most sublime sense. Today the same might be said of the productive strength which the returning Jews have started to display in this country. It is the productive strength of a community directed towards the realization of real Community, and as such, it is important for the future of mankind. Mankind is fundamentally interested in the preservation of a vital and productive Jewish people, such as can grow if fostered by the unique connection of this people and this country.

From this the principle of Zionism results. It is concentration in Palestine of the national forces fit for renewing their productive strength. This principle again results in the three irreducible demands of Zionism. They are:

First: Freedom to acquire soil in sufficient measure to bring about a renewed connection with the primal form of production, from which the Jewish people had been separated for many centuries and without which no original spiritual and social productivity can arise.

Second: A permanent powerful influx of settlers, especially of youth desiring to settle here, in order incessantly to strengthen, to amplify and to revive the work of reconstruction and to protect it from the dangers of stagnancy, isolation and the forms of social degeneration particularly threatening colonization in the Levant.

Third: Self-determination of the Jewish community about their way of life and the form of their institutions, as well as an assurance for their unimpeded development as a community.

These demands, formulated simply in the concept of a "National Home," have been recognized, but not yet adequately understood, by large parts of the world. The tradition of justice, which I have mentioned and which must be realized within every community and between the communities, makes it clear that these demands must of necessity be carried out without encroaching upon the vital rights of any other community. Independence of one's own must not be gained at the expense of another's independence. Jewish settlement must oust no Arab peasant, Jewish immigration must not cause the political status of the present inhabitants to deteriorate, and must continue to ameliorate their economic condition. The tradition of justice is directed towards the future of this country as a whole, as well as towards the future of the Jewish people. From it and from the historical circumstance that there are Arabs in Palestine, springs a great, difficult and imperative task, the new form of the age-old task. A regenerated Jewish people in Palestine has not only to aim at living peacefully together with the Arab people, but also at a comprehensive cooperation with it in opening and developing the country. Such cooperation is an indispensable condition for the lasting success of the great work, of the redemption of this land.

The basis of such cooperation offers ample space for including the fundamental rights of the Jewish people to acquire soil and to immigrate without any violation of the fundamental rights of the Arab people. As to the demand for autonomy, it does not, as the greater part of the Jewish people thinks today, necessarily lead to the demand for a "Jewish State" or for a "Jewish majority." We need for this land as many Jews as it is possible economically to absorb, but not in order to establish a majority against a minority. We need them because great, very great forces are required to do the unprecedented work. We need for this land a solid, vigorous, autonomous community, but not in order that it should give its name to a state; we need it because we want to raise Israel and Erez Israel to the highest level of productivity they can be raised to. The new situation and the problem involved ask for new solutions that are beyond the capacity of the familiar political categories. An internationally guaranteed agreement between the two communities is asked for, which defines the spheres of interest and activity common to the partners and those not common to them, and

guarantees mutual noninterference for these specific spheres.

The responsibility of those working on the preparation of a solution of the Palestine problem goes beyond the frontiers of the Near East, as well as the boundaries of Judaism. If a successful solution is found, a first step, perhaps a pioneer's step, will have been taken towards a juster form of life between people and people.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Thank you, sir.

I understand, Dr. Magnes, the most convenient course is for you to address us now, is it?

DR. MAGNES: Yes, sir.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Thank you.

DR. MAGNES: Our view is based on two assumptions, first, that Jewish-Arab cooperation is essential for a satisfactory solution of the difficult problem, and second, that Jewish-Arab cooperation is not only essential, it is also possible. The alternative is war, but the plain Jew and the plain Arab do not want war. There are many thousands here, Jews and Arabs, who stand aghast at the revelation, that Jewish and Arab militarists seem to be eager to fight it out on the field of battle. We do not know who would win this war. We only know that thousands of innocents would be the victims.

The militarist mentality throughout history is not able to believe, that complicated situations can be resolved other than by force of arms. I would like to assure you, gentlemen, that the vast majority of plain, inarticulate Jews and Arabs are not anxious for war. They want understanding and cooperation, and to achieve this they would make many concessions and sacrifices. It is necessary to give them the chance for this. But hope must not be too long deferred. All the world today is pressed for time; time presses also in this ancient land.

At the beginning of the war there was a real opportunity for bringing Jews and Arabs together in the face of the common danger. A proposal was therefore made to Government for the appointment of what was called a Consultative Body, consisting of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs, for the purpose of bringing Government and the population closer to one another in the war effort. This proposal was rejected, the more's the pity. A

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM

**TO: DEPARTMENT AND
DIVISION HEADS, AREA DIRECTORS**

DATE: Dec. 3, 1968

FROM: MORRIS FINE

About two months ago Prof. Daniel Bell of Columbia University delivered a first-rate, thought-provoking address at the NCRAC Executive Committee meeting. A transcript of it has just been made and I have received a limited number of copies.

I commend it to your attention. Because the supply is so limited, I can only distribute from 1 to 3 copies to each department, therefore I would appreciate your circulating it.

MF:ms
att.

NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL
55 West 42nd Street New York, N. Y. 10036

* * * * *
* SOME BASIC TRENDS IN THE STRUCTURE AND *
* * * * *
* FUNCTIONS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY: *
* * * * *
* THEIR RELEVANCE TO JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS PLANNING *
* * * * *

Transcript of a Talk by

DR. DANIEL BELL
Sociologist, Columbia University

to the
AMERICAN JEWISH
Executive Committee
of the
NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL
September 29, 1968

Together with a summary of ensuing discussion

Most of you are better informed than I am about the immediate circumstances of the immediate scene. So I will not talk about that, but rather try to identify some of the deeper structural changes that have been and are taking place in American society -- changes that will outlast the Viet Nam war, obviously the key precipitating element in the anxieties and disturbances that have racked the society in the last several years.

I shall draw largely on two sources -- the work of the Commission on the Year 2000 of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, which I have been chairing for the last two years; and a government panel that is trying now to write the prototype of a social report to the president. As you know, there is an annual economic report which gives a sense of economic conditions and trends in terms of unemployment figures, growth rates, imbalances in the economy, and other indicators. There has been no parallel social report, attempting a social assessment in terms of health, environment, standard of living, social mobility, etc. For the past two years about sixty people in different work groups have been trying to pull together from the best sources available some of the assessments we can make about the social performance of the society. There is a certain set of basic assumptions about the structural changes, meaning fundamental changes in the patterns or the matrix of social relationships, that are occurring in the society; and these are the things that I want to put forward this afternoon.

Demographic Changes

The most obvious source of problems is the enormous magnitude of the recent demographic changes in this country. Between 1946 and 1948, the birth rate

jumped about 30 per cent. The bulge based upon that enormous increase is now coming to the fore. In 1950, there were 150,000,000 persons in this country; by 1970, there will be 210,000,000. That means 60,000,000 people added in 20 years. The problem of dealing with 60,000,000 more people, in terms of providing schools, housing, the extra demands upon water, air, etc. transcends differences of political and social ideology -- capitalism, socialism, creeping federalism, creeping socialism, what have you. It has to do with the problems any large mass society has to deal with.

Paralleling the population explosion, is what may be termed a population implosion, an increasing urbanization of the society. Today about 70 per cent of the society is in metropolitan areas, as against 40 to 50 per cent 25 years ago. More importantly, the accompanying physical movement of the population has been to the rims, geographically. The whole center is being denuded, relatively speaking. In large part because of the increase in agricultural productivity which took place during World War II and after -- about 7 to 8 per cent a year for about 15 years -- people were forced off the farms, and most of them moved to the rims of the society -- the Atlantic Coast and the California coast. The most important element of this was the Negro population, which is the most highly urbanized of all the social groups in the country, with a majority in the North, though there are still of course large concentrations of Negroes in the South.

A third demographic feature is the variegated nature of the population. About 30 per cent of the American population still consists of immigrants and their first generation progeny. Add the huge impact of the Negro population in the metropolitan centers, most of them in the old central city districts, and you have an enormous change which few societies have had to handle in these magnitudes.

Sociological Dimensions of Change

Now, let us look at some sociological dimensions. Three kinds of social revolutions are taking place in this society.

A National Society

First, within the past thirty years, cresting in the present period, this has become a national society.

This has always been a nation; it has never been a national society, in which something taking place in one part of the society has immediate repercussive impact on every other part of the society. It is a national society in terms of national economy, transportation, media of communication; the whole society gets pulled together.

(Few nations are national societies. England to some extent became a national society before ours, given the fact that they have had national newspapers and a high degree of homogeneity. France even today is not a national society; large parts of France are outside the scope of the national society. Most other countries in the world are not national societies because large parts of the world still are agrarian, with 60 to 70 per cent of the labor force in villages or engaged primarily in agricultural or extractive work, and they are largely outside the political structure of the society.)

As late as 1920, if I am not mistaken, there were still no telephones in the White House. Think of the enormous number of messages which come across the President's desk, the extraordinary number of situations he has to address himself to in terms of the domestic scene, the number of foreign problems which come across his desk, and you get a sense of the vast experiential change brought about by modern communications alone. This is immediately apparent in the work of the NCRAC. National television shows police dogs in Selma, Alabama, the whole mood of the country is aroused and, within a week or so, ten thousand people are flying down there to take part in a parade.

New Role for Mass Pressure

Now, the political consequence is that to a considerable extent this is becoming (I apologize for the heavy-handed term) a plebiscitarian society, in which everything is subject to mass pressure, mass mobilization, mass plebiscites, and moving away from purely representational government.

In the past, this country has been spared national turmoil by what might be called the insulation of space. We have a huge history of violence; but this is a huge country, and much of the violence took place at the perimeters of the society, not at the center. For example, there was probably more labor violence in this country from about 1870 -- the big railroad strikes -- to the end of the 1940's than in any country in Europe. Yet it never had the kind of political impact that violence had in the European societies. In 1893, 10,000 persons set out in a huge unemployment demonstration from a city in Ohio to march on Washington. It took them about three weeks to get there, and by that time they were so bedraggled and decimated that "Coxey's army" became a term of derision. In 1962, Martin Luther King and A. Philip Randolph called for a march on Washington, and in forty-eight hours a quarter of a million people poured into Washington -- by bus, plane, and auto.

The forces that have made us a national society have created a national cockpit for all kinds of problems that before had been dispersed and insulated. This is a very radical change. More problems get pushed to a federal level, this is very obvious. You have a managed economy, very sensitive to fiscal policies, you have a mobilized polity in the sense of having a permanent military establishment, you have a national popular culture, and you have a welfare state, all coordinated in and through the Federal Government.

A Communal Society

Second, besides having become a national society, we have become in a curious way a communal society.

There are two dimensions to this change. First, it involves the rise of non-market public decision-making; that is, basic decisions about the lives of people are no longer made in the market, but are made largely through overt political mechanisms. Simply by way of analysis, by no means by way of advocacy of laissez faire, let me point out that a market society has a number of political advantages:

It disperses responsibility. Consider, as a perhaps rather outlandish illustration, the decline of the textile industry in the 1950's, which was a consequence of the decline in the marriage age from about 24 to 19 for girls and from about 26 to 22 for boys. What has this to do with the textile industry?

Very obvious, at least to a sociologist. Among married people there's less dressing up, less going out, there is a shift in purchasing from clothing to cars and houses. The textile industry suffered. So whom is the textile industry to blame? Against whom do they protest? The point is that here is a profound economic change resulting wholly from market trends for which nobody in particular is responsible.

On the other hand, take some of the major social problems of our day, which are not subject to market influences. Nobody can buy his share of clean air, of clean water, of education (except at a cost that becomes increasingly unbearable). In these areas, there is public decision making, or political decision making. Everybody knows where decisions are made, it is clear whose ox is being gored, and demand and protest alike focus on city hall.

The kinds of public decisions that must be made through political mechanisms will multiply in our society, and the potential for community conflict will increase correspondingly. We shall have to learn to live with such conflict, simply because more and more decisions are made in visible, open places, in city hall, in Washington, rather than through the market. If a road is to be built, will it go through the ghetto, or through a rich section of town? All sides know where the decision is going to be made, and the entire conflict converges there. One of our major problems is to devise mechanisms to mediate this kind of conflicts.

Participation vs. Power

People talk about feeling more powerless in contemporary society. To me, this represents an interesting personal reaction to what is actually the obverse of a fundamental sociological fact. There probably is more participation in American society today than ever before. But this participation cancels itself out. Look at New York City. Fifty years ago, Tammany Hall was the center of power; it made deals and got things done. Today, a directory of organizations in New York City occupies 700 pages, and all of them, of course, are pressuring City Hall. With the multiplication of organizations, necessarily they cancel each other out; nobody can have it all his way immediately; and there are fewer mechanisms for bargaining or trade-offs. Thus, people feel more powerless and helpless; and frustration invariably nurtures rage.

We have more participation in American life, more organizations, more public decision making, more political decision making, and more and more community conflict. In dozens and dozens of areas, the rise of public non-market decision making is increasing the potential for community conflict, because decision points become visible rather than dispersed through the market.

Group Rights vs Individual Rights

A second dimension of the communal society is that rights come to inhere increasingly in groups rather than in individuals.

Individual rights still exist, but by and large, the major factor in the black revolution has been the claim to rights inherent in status as a black, not inherent in each person's status as an individual. This, in itself, is not novel. Farmers long have claimed certain rights as farmers, labor unions have claimed rights as labor. But now there is a shift from such functional economic groups to an ethnic pattern, in which group rights are claimed.

To some extent, this reflects an ideological or philosophical switch for the black community. Twenty or thirty years ago, the complaint against society was that Negroes were treated as a category, the black man was not seen as an individual human being, with the right to be judged on his own merits. Now, this position is completely reversed. Rhody McCoy has been quoted as saying that the New York City merit system for accrediting public school personnel is inequitable because, on merit, Jews will get the top positions, and any system that doesn't assure black supervisors is wrong. Increasing clashes between the older principle of merit, of individual distinction, and the newer claim for group rights, for certain group advantages, are certainly in prospect.

A Service Economy

And third, a revolutionary aspect of the communalization of our society, has begun to reveal itself in the last ten years and will work itself out in the next thirty years; namely, the transition to a post-industrial society. Let me take three dimensions of this.

First and most obvious: this is no longer an industrial society in the sense that the majority of the working classes engage in manufacturing or the production of goods. This is primarily a service economy, the first such in world history. Almost 60 per cent of the labor force today is engaged in services -- trade, finance, real estate, education, government, health, etc. The units of a service economy are not the giant corporations, but essentially smaller units. And this has meant an enormous change in the industrial structure.

Technology and the Rise of a Professional Class

A second major change is in the rise of the professional and technical class. Projecting observed trends, it is estimated that by 1975 something like 15 million persons in the labor force in this country will be classified as professional and technical (which means, roughly, having the equivalent of a college education) and this will be the second single and the fastest growing occupational group in the country. (The first is still the semiskilled workers, but they are declining relatively, although in absolute numbers they will still be first.) If the labor force as a whole grows 30 per cent from 1960 to 1975, the professional and technical growth rate will be about 66 per cent, and the scientific and engineering component of that is about 99 per cent. This is a group which is largely still inarticulate in terms of its own needs, though a large measure of this has been taken care of in and through the universities where a high proportion of these persons are located.

So, the third and most important dimension of a post-industrial society is that basically, innovation in the future depends upon the codification of theoretical knowledge. Every society has always existed on the basis of knowledge, but for the first time, advances in the society -- particularly economic advances, technological advances -- come from the codification of theoretical knowledge.

Let me give you a quick example of what I mean. Every major industry we have today -- steel, auto, aviation, electricity -- is a 19th century industry in the pattern of its origin and growth. Almost all were created by individual inventors, tinkering around with no knowledge of the fundamental laws of science -- Darby in steel, Edison and Siemens in electricity, the Wright brothers in

aviation, Alexander Bell in telephones. The first 20th century industry -- or, if you will, 21st century industry -- is chemistry, because in chemistry a theoretical knowledge of the properties of the molecules is indispensable. An illustration will indicate how radical this consequence is.

Almost every major general staff in its calculation of World War I said it could not be a protracted war. They anticipated a German advance in a smash, and that the center would either collapse or hold. The calculations involved one fundamental assumption -- that the British navy would blockade Germany and cut her off from Chilean nitrates, making it impossible for Germany to produce explosives for a protracted war. But Fritz Haber invented the nitrogen-fixing process, which led to ammonia and synthetic nitrates and a synthetic chemical industry and synthetic explosives. Thus a technical advance forced a recasting of all calculations about the war. A similar role was played in World War II by the atomic bomb.

The University as Status-Maker

The science-based industries, which are the advancing industries, give this country a strong lead over Europe in technology -- particularly in electronics, computers, fluorides, lasers, and various others of this sort. This lead is essentially linked to theoretical knowledge, and this is one of the elements which make the university such a central feature of this society, because the codification of theoretical knowledge is fundamentally a feature of university life rather than of industrial life.

I have written, perhaps a little fancifully, that in the next fifty years the university will replace the business firm as the primary institution of the society. Not that the business firm will disappear, but, just as the business firm is a large new social invention for organizing production and harnessing men, materials, and markets for the creation of a large industrial society, so the university, as the mechanism for codification of theoretical knowledge, becomes the primary institution of the post-industrial society. There are in the developing post-industrial society the ingredients of a monopoly for the university system in this country and in every country. The university used to reflect the stratification of the society: children of middle-class parents and upper-middle class parents went to college. Today, it becomes a determinant of the stratification system. How you make out in the university becomes a determinant of where you go. In a curious sense, money loses importance -- not entirely, of course, but to a degree. And even the acquisition of money depends more and more on having technical knowledge. Family corporations, family businesses, family occupations, family firms have been in decline for years; and even the inheritor of a business has to have the technical knowledge to run it.

Now, when status in society becomes dependent on achievement within the university, the university becomes the gatekeeper for the society. And many kids understand this and resent it. What is behind much of the argument against grades is some such feeling as this: "Who are you (meaning a young instructor with a Ph.D. who has written one article) to control my life, to tell me whether I'm going to go ahead or not, on the basis of a grade?" The rebellion is against something that really exists, because the university has become a determinant of the stratification system of the society, as other modes of access -- starting a business, inheriting a family firm -- are largely diminishing. So here is a set of structural changes in the society that shape a series of anxieties, resentments, which in turn create more and more tumult in the society.

Crisis of Liberalism

Now, let me draw one political consequence from all of this. For the last twenty or twenty-five years, the dominant political philosophy of this society has been liberalism. Today, we confront a fundamental crisis in the nature of political liberalism and philosophical liberalism. Among young people on campus, there is an overt rejection of liberalism on all levels, some of it unthinking, some with an element of thought behind it. It seems to me to stem basically from a rejection of liberalism's implicit claim that "we know how to solve problems." One of my difficulties is that, given the new complexities of our situation, increasingly I know less and less how to solve social problems.

We thought that government enterprise, government initiative, government spending, government organization of services would solve problems; but it turns out we don't know how to do these things very well. Ideas come easy. What is hard is translating ideas into programs -- making them work. We even lack the resources. We talk about city planning; but there are only about enough city planners in this country to average out to two per city, to deal with the whole vast problem of urban affairs.

The political structure of this country is completely out of whack. If we are a national society, what is the sense of a structure of fifty states? As social entities, they make no sense. They lack the resources to carry on services, particularly in education and welfare, which is what they are still charged with in the Constitution. There are something like 212 standard metropolitan statistical areas in this country, and (except for Dade County, Florida, which is part of the joke) there is not a single metropolitan government to deal with the whole organization of the problems that are metropolitan in scope.

Now, I say part of this is the problem of liberalism because liberalism had a very easy conception of how things would work in this respect. Let me take some of the findings of what probably is the largest social science inquiry in this country in twenty-five years, done by James Coleman at Johns Hopkins for the U.S. Office of Education, an inquiry ordered by Congress as part of the civil rights law. Its aim was to assess the impact of education on differences between Negro and white children. The easy assumption, of course, particularly in the liberal philosophy, is that education will reduce the differences between groups. Well, what the Coleman report concludes is that at the end of four years of schooling -- even the best of schools, given the best student-teacher ratios, etc. -- there is no appreciable difference, in fact a slight increase, in the differential between Negro and white kids.

So, we retreat to the next line: the more important variable is the family structure. Now, family structure, which is not a very popular term in the Negro community today, is not an easy variable to deal with, to try to control in order to bring people into a society.

Complex Problems vs Simplistic Solutions

Every society, but especially a national society, has to ask: What are the priorities, where should we spend our money, what's the better payoff, where do we put our resources? We just don't know. We are just beginning to do the kinds of studies that may give us some guidelines to social management -- the economists have been far ahead in that respect in terms of managing an economy --

but people want instant answers: "Let's do it now," is the demand on all sides. The best answer to this was Nathan Glazer's piece on the New Left, two or three months ago in Commentary, in which he said, in effect: "The problem is not simply housing or schools, or more housing or more schools, but better schools and better housing, and we don't know what the word 'better' means, we don't have the indicators on which to base evaluations. There have been no studies, no experiments, there's no real knowledge in the social science community, to give that kind of answers."

But as soon as one suggests that a problem is too complex for ready solution, he is accused of either copping out, selling out, or refusing to deal with the situation. And this is a fundamental problem for many who, like myself, have been committed to liberalist philosophy, and who still are basically liberals. The most difficult thing to make young people accept is that the answers to social problems are highly complex, shouting is not going to hasten their solution, nor necessarily is the spending of more money; the answers simply are not known. It is hard to convince them that this doesn't mean we're not going to do anything, but that we're less sure than they are of where we can cut into these problems and how to go about it. There is a credibility gap here, based on a misinterpretation of honest ignorance as self-interested obstructionism.

Hence the attack by the young people of the Left on liberalism as the enemy. The phrase, "corporate liberalism," which has now become rather fashionable among the New Left, has some menacing overtones. Those of us who come out of the liberal and socialist movement remember the use in the thirties of the term, "social fascism," whereby the Communists designated as the worst enemy not the right-wing but the socialists. In Germany, pursuing this piece of double-think, the Communists, instead of uniting with the socialists against the threat of the right-wing, had this line: The socialists are the main enemy. First, destroy the socialists; "nach Hitler kommt uns."

There is a parallel situation here now in the election campaign. "Dump the Hump." Destroy the Democratic party; then we'll pick up the pieces. This is by now a rather coordinated overt strategy, and, it seems to me, one of the most dangerous aspects of the radical youth movement.

In the long run, there are hopes. The projected social report to the President is one enterprise that sustains such hopes. It will for the first time provide a coordinated balance sheet of where we stand in areas of health, environment, standard of living, social mobility, and will provide perhaps a little more thoughtful notion of where to commit resources in those areas. But this is a long and painful process; it doesn't satisfy people who may be up against the wall, so to speak, and begin shouting as a way of getting what they want.

Bargaining as a Social Mechanism

More and more, what is lacking in the society is fundamental bargaining mechanisms. You can't do everything at once. A few years ago, the National Planning Association published a small book called "Goals, Priorities, and Dollars," which took the goals of the 1960 Eisenhower Commission and asked: "What would it cost to realize all these goals -- better environment, schools, roads, housing, etc. -- projected to 1975? It turned out, even assuming a 4% growth rate in the society, low unemployment, etc., that for 1975" one still

would be 150 billion dollars a year short of realizing all these goals. In effect, the study showed, this society is rich enough to give better schools, better cities, better housing, better water, better air; but not all at once. There has to be some set of priorities. The difficulty is that we lack mechanisms for the bargaining which would have to go on to determine the priorities. Just possibly, if the needs and the resources are laid out, a rational basis for bargaining can be developed. This is a very rational conception in a society which is increasingly irrational. If you ask me for programmatic consequences, I must confess I don't have the answers. If I did, I might be more cheerful.

Question and Answers

Q. Does the Jewish community have a special interest in this whole transition from the rights of individuals to group rights? In other words, are we necessarily threatened, as we sometimes think we are, by this new emphasis in the Negro community?

A. Of course, one of the consequences is that it makes everyone more conscious of group differences and thus tends to polarize them. In the next ten years the black community itself will achieve some degree of self-organization. One of the problems in dealing with the black community has been the absence of widely recognized representative spokesmen, due to the fragmentation of the group. For the proximate future, therefore, I say the chief consequence of the shift of emphasis to group rights will be a certain degree of polarization.

Q. Wouldn't one at least partial approach to the students in the colleges and young intellectuals who are not of the New Left, but for whose allegiance they are competing, be the kind of analysis and exposition that you have given us here?

A. Yes, since I still believe in rationality in education; but it's a feeble approach as the Viet Nam war goes on. Once we're out of the Viet Nam war, it might be possible to have more specific bargaining mechanisms, to lay out alternatives, to get debate on what you want, show difficulties. As long as the Viet Nam war goes on, this is almost impossible.

"Community Control"

Q. My question is about one aspect of the New Left theory these days, which is related in part to the black revolution, but goes beyond that, at least in Washington, D. C. -- this whole theory of what one of our Washington people called "the Balkanization of the community," local control. In New York City, it has revolved principally, if not exclusively, around the local control of schools. In places like Washington and other places, it has been proposed as a broader philosophical and social approach to the problems that afflict the urban society. "Let's get away from these large structures and let's have local control by the local people of all the social services, etc., etc." How does this look to you from the perspective of your researches today?

A. One of the psychological strengths of the New Left, and a factor that makes it so difficult to reach, is that they come out of themselves. There's no older generation adjacent to them from whom they learn or come from -- which is part of the consequence of the collapse of the Old Left in the fifties.

And because they come out of themselves, they brashly think they know all the answers. It gives them a certain kind of psychological elan to feel that they've discovered things for themselves for the first time. So, it is very difficult to reach them and talk to them in the terms of our discussion here. I think, let me add, that, in time, their own experiences will show them how much more difficult these things are than they now imagine.

Now, as to community control: one of the problems we have been trying to grapple with in the Commission on the Year 2000 is the fundamental one of the appropriate size and scope of the necessary social unit to do what job. Centralization and decentralization are not answers in and of themselves; they become shibboleths. It is very nice to say that people ought to control the institutions which control their lives. But what is the unit of decision? What are you part of? Has everybody got the right to say, "I don't want it?" Does a Southern community have the right to say, "Since the end of segregation will change our lives, we don't want the end of segregation?" Does anyone have the right to say, "The road can't go through my house because it's going to affect my life?" It's such an elementary problem in political philosophy, but it is brushed aside by the emotional slogan: "No one's going to control me; I don't want anybody to control my life."

It is true that we have an antiquated administrative structure in this country, and a lack of adequate definitions of what jobs are to be done, and the appropriate social unit of what scope and size to do them. Certain things, it seems to me, have to be done on a decentralized basis. The very cost of doing so many of these things involves a certain degree of federal power, particularly in terms of funding. A rough measure would be to say that, by and large, given the nature of the government, given the nature of the society, and given our general social philosophy, we don't want the government doing any operative work; the functions of a central government are essentially those of funding, policy, guidelines, standards, while the operative units are local, sometimes private enterprise, sometimes municipalities, sometimes non-profit corporations, sometimes state pacts, etc. A variety of new social forms are possible.

But, militating against pure decentralization is the dynamic of the post-industrial society, which is changing so rapidly that it must create future-looking mechanisms, forward mechanisms, lookout mechanisms, anticipations. Just as the CIA makes what it calls a national estimate of the opponent's capability and strength in order to be able to see where we deploy our resources, we must have a national estimate of the next ten years, the next twenty years, a projection of all of the fundamental social trends on the basis of: What are the problems? Where do we commit our resources? And this is fundamentally a centrally-organized problem. It is a shibboleth to talk of decentralization or centralization in abstract terms. The fundamental problem is what particular issue you're talking about and what is the appropriate unit to handle that sort of thing.

Population Dispersion

Q. We have 70% of our people on 2% of the land. Sound planning would be to move people out to Montana, Wyoming, and other sparsely settled areas. Are you hinting at a population policy control approach?

A. There is a very self-conscious effort on the part of the administration to direct population policy. This is embodied in the "new towns" concept. If you take a look at industrial growth in the country in the last ten years, the two largest growth industries in the country have been education and health. About nine out of ten net new jobs are coming from that sector. Now these fields are those in which public decision-making plays a large role. For example, location of new universities has very important economic effects. Look at the New York system. There are now 60 to 70 colleges being dispersed through the whole New York State system. Old Westbury -- a new area out on Long Island where Post College now is in being -- gets a new state college and a hospital; this transforms the entire area and pulls population into it. It grows increasingly possible, given the fact that so many new facilities are in health and education sectors, to use public policy to redistribute population to a degree.

Q. As far as I grasp what Dr. Bell has said, solutions for some of the problems of our society lie ten or twenty years in the future. I agree. But, what does that imply for the great mass of the poverty groups, the disadvantaged groups, who are unwilling to wait ten or twenty years for the solution of these problems for their children or grandchildren?

A. I didn't mean to say that people have to wait ten years. People won't wait -- clearly. What I am saying is that effective programs can only be organized if you have a clear sense of what's going to be ahead ten years. A large part of the impetus of the Commission on the Year 2000 arose from the fact that a number of us had been involved in the early years of the Kennedy administration when people from the Kennedy administration came around to the university and said: "Give us a poverty program. Give us a Negro program." All I'm saying is that you'd have a more effective program if, ten years before, there had been lookout institutions to assemble data, identify trends, and formulate alternative plans. In the same way, it's much more difficult to deal with contemporary problems when they're part of a mess, when you have no design for them. In order to be more effective ten years from now, you have to start working right now, which doesn't mean you don't work now on current problems. Of course, you deal with them as well as you can, right now.

Dynamics of Change in the Negro Community

Q. What about the great group of disaffected people, restless, turbulent, in violent opposition? How will we be able to carry on the important forward changes you outline in the face of this rebellion, which is mounting, and I think justifiably, from day to day?

A. One should not confuse rhetoric and anger with what is going on. Really rather enormous changes are taking place in the whole structure of the Negro community. A Negro middle class is growing rapidly, large numbers of Negroes are entering into the political structure of the country, and so on. We are observing a typical phenomenon in such circumstances: those who want to get in move more left and begin shouting more loudly to become claimants for admittance into the process, especially those who have fewer of the necessary talents. Those with political skills, economic skills, are placed more readily. Those with fewer of these find that word-mongering agitation also provides leverage into the system. In some respects, historically speaking, the rate of absorption has been fairly remarkable, in terms of the decline of the poverty group, the absorption rate of the Negro middle class, etc. We simply have to live with some of the turbulence for a long period of time, doing the best we can in terms of programs designed to meet some of the particular issues.

Q. Has any study been made or is one in process taking the very issues you discussed in terms of the American Jewish community? In closing your talk, you spoke of bargaining and the establishment of a trade-off -- if you want this, you have to give up that -- and you referred to goals and priorities as a basis for allocating dollars. We have the same problems in our Jewish community. Is any work being done in that field, and if it isn't, when should it begin?

A. Well, it's being done on the economic level, almost purely on the economic level. On the sociological level, no. There is a very immediate case study right now in the fight between Ocean Hill and the teachers' union. This is a real trade-off fight, between the union, which is predominantly Jewish -- because of the historical accident that Jews, being shut out of other places, went into teaching in New York City -- and Negroes, who are now trying to cut into the system, bypassing processes set up by the system. This struggle is not going to be settled by studies; it is going to be settled in part by power, in part by accommodation. The only thing one can do, it seems to me, is try to convince the Negro community that they are setting a very dangerous precedent, in the sense that they are demanding a form of segregation which the Birchites will not fail to exploit; and to try to convince them that some of the notions of equity, job security, rights to a job, which are inherent in unionism, are important to them, too.

What is critical are the fundamental dynamics of the black community. Processes that have been taking place during the last thirty or forty years now have been vastly speeded up. The concentration of the Negroes in a large number of urban centers, as they moved out of the South, has occurred wholly within ten or fifteen years. In these circumstances, a speeding up of demands is not avoidable. The answer to that problem is logically rather plain, though in practice very difficult: the necessary diversion of a large amount of resources of the society into the satisfaction of legitimate Negro demands; which means something that goes against the grain of other groups in the society, which is public spending. One basic problem of this society derives from the fact that most people regard taxes as something being taken from "us" by "them." Few people regard taxes as the necessary purchase of public services which people can't perform themselves. Increasingly, in the next ten years, there will have to be more and more public spending, more and more diversion of resources. And this, as I say, goes against the grain of some of the affluent middle-class groups in the society who resent this kind of deduction from their income, which is how they regard it.

Poverty, Politics and Fiscal Policy

Q. The presentation we heard is basically pessimistic, and I think most of us share that pessimism. The large restructuring of the society which appears to be necessary is not being accepted by the American people, who have to be consulted in these things, and who are still thinking of solutions in terms of the 19th and early 20th centuries. And, not only that, but I think that, in the years immediately ahead, instead of fighting for all these reforms that we think are desirable, we are going to be fighting off a counter-reaction, a movement for repression generally and away from our basic democratic system. A very small part of the rest of the world has anything like what we call democracy here; and I think that it is palpably impossible for areas like Africa and South America and the new countries in Asia to bring themselves into the 20th century under a democratic system. And, what I'm concerned about is that I'm

beginning to have the feeling that maybe the same thing is true here, that the kinds of things we regard as necessary simply will not get done under a democratic system. Are we just beating our heads against a stone wall in the next few years if we try to maintain our democratic processes? Or should we just forget about that and work for the reforms that are needed?

A. Well, I don't know. One of the things that I regard with fear is a Republican victory in the upcoming elections. Historically, the Republicans always have followed the economic policy of choosing price stability against growth. During the eight years of Eisenhower, there was an extraordinary degree of price stability in this country -- there was very little inflation -- at the cost of economic growth. This is a fairly deliberate policy of favoring one section of the society -- middle-class groups, rentier groups, banking groups -- as against, in a sense, those who benefit from growth. By 1960, therefore, there was a 6 or 7 per cent unemployment rate -- which was compounded by the fact that the growth rate of the country had been an average of about 2 per cent a year, plus the beginning bulge from the demographic picture, which doubled the number of young people coming into the labor force.

Now, the economists say there's a very technical thing called a Phillips Curve, which says in effect what it costs to get one million more jobs. It turns out, given the structure of this society, which is not going to change overnight, that unemployment cannot drop below 3 per cent without inflation. Oddly enough, more jobs in this society are paid for with inflation, and it can be controlled to some extent with a flexible economic policy. A Republican administration will not buy inflation, which means in effect it will opt for price stability in its economic policy as against growth, with consequent rising unemployment, with more tensions in the society. Nixon is not necessarily committed to such a course; in the last year of his administration, Eisenhower ran a \$12 billion budget deficit, the largest peacetime budget deficit until the Viet Nam war. So it may be that Nixon, if elected, will not pursue the traditional Republican policy.

Q. Dr. Bell, establishing priorities, you said, is inhibited by the fact that basically so many irrational factors enter in. Is it possible to classify these and understand them, so that the irrational can in effect be rationalized? What would you give as examples of the irrational?

A. If we leave out the Viet Nam war, clearly there are three groups which are subject to these irrational impulses: one is the traditional radical right, which has been augmented in recent years by the "law and order" issue; the second is the blacks; and the third is the New Left. And they're irrational in the sense that none will accept some kind of orderly process in getting what they want. The blacks may be more justified in terms of the fact that they've been waiting so long. The group that seems to me easiest to deal with, even though it's presently the most militant, are the blacks, because they've got more justice on their side. You can bargain with them more directly. The issues are fairly clear. And the question is whether the rest of the society is prepared to pay the costs in terms of diversion of resources to deal with them.

The New Left I would regard as more subject to the resolution of the Viet Nam war and the elimination or modification of the draft, which is breathing down their necks. Changes are taking place in the universities to lessen some

of the immediate pressures -- structural changes, in terms of second chances, pass-fail options -- the sort of small devices that are useful to loosen up some of the pressures which have been paramount in the university system.

With the radical right, of course, you have a series of apprehensions and fears, which are more difficult to deal with, because they're more intangible; and they are likely to grow as the blacks make gains in the next ten years. That's where a future source of larger tension resides.

Q. Among these irrational impulses, the one that frightens me the most is the protest vote that's exemplified by the error of omission -- that is, by opting out of participation in the election. Many young people proclaim that there's nothing to vote for; and when we try to explain the complexities of the situation, we are derided. Do you want to comment on that?

A. I suspect that problem will begin to recede. People start out saying: I'm confused; I'm not going to vote. By election day, they begin to move toward the polls. I think there will still be a large proportion who will not vote. But one can't take the present moment -- let's say the beginning of October -- as a percentage that will stay that way. I think that increasingly, you will find, local issues will pull them in.

Postures for Jewish Community Relations Agencies

Chairman Band: From the analysis we've been hearing thus far we should attempt to project implications for Jewish community relations objectives. We've talked about the movement toward social and economic changes essential to the resolution of the problems of poverty and race and urban deterioration; we've talked about civil liberties; we've talked about the absence and the need to restore national confidence and unity; and other such implications that affect our concept of equality and pluralism and freedom. So now, if we may, let us hear some comments on roles for Jewish community relations agencies -- for which I turn to Isaiah Minkoff.

Isaiah Minkoff: Our NCRAC Commissions and other bodies will be deliberating on these matters in the months ahead. I will venture only a few comments on two implications of Dr. Bell's talk. For the Jewish community of America, the stability of democracy is the sine qua non. We have played a very important part in the development of American society; and in this respect we must regard ourselves as part of the establishment. We want to maintain the democracy we have helped to build and I believe that democracy will survive if we can achieve a certain type of stability.

To some of us, it was clear seven or eight years ago that a switch was taking place among Negroes from the demand for individual rights to that of group rights. Until then Negroes disavowed any interest in group rights. We in the Jewish community always make a distinction between individual liberties and group rights. Negroes were talking only in terms of individual rights, of the acceptance of each person as an individual. Let us not forget: when the Negro, as an individual, is accepted as a full equal member of the American society, he will again speak in terms of individual rights. There is a race between the emancipation of the Negro and the acceptance by the American society of the Negro as an individual. He is losing faith in the prospect of getting his full equality as an individual, and therefore he has embraced the idea of group rights. In some respects, the doctrine of group rights is incompatible with the merit system.

As Jewish community relations agencies, we are in a perplexing dilemma. For many Jews see the demand for group rights, irrespective of individual merit, as directly threatening. At the same time, there is less than justice -- and far less than realism -- in insisting on the merit system against group rights in every situation. Therefore, continued and growing conflict appears to me unavoidable, creating large opportunities for demagogic Jewish alarms about anti-Semitism in the Negro community, and accusations that we are not protecting the Jewish community from that kind of assault. We must expect such accusations. But demogogy cures nothing. We must accommodate to the demands for group rights, while we try to accelerate the race for acceptance of the Negro as an individual. Then it will be possible to restore the merit system.

Now, as to the vogue for "confrontation" -- I see in it signs of the erosion of the stability of American society. I see the two-party system in the United States as a consensus of twenty parties. And this helps toward the stability of American society, for in each of the two parties there are pressures from various groups and various interests, until, so to speak, twenty various political parties have come to a consensus. When it is achieved, that works toward the stability of American society, because it works against polarization. But when this process is by-passed, not only the two-party system, as such, but the whole thrust toward consensus that the two-party system fosters, is eroded. That's why I consider third-party movements so dangerous. Years ago, we thought that the masses were always liberal. We didn't realize that it could go in either direction, that a third party is not necessarily a liberal party. Polarization may bring a third party and fourth party and polarize our society just the other way around. As a Jewish community, without regard to partisan politics, we have a stake in avoiding confrontations that erode the system, in strengthening the process that inheres in the two-party system.

Chairman Band: Dr. Bell spoke about compromises; Mr. Minkoff spoke about polarization. We're concerned in our society, in these groups, about the stresses and pressures on society and the polarization that's taking place. We seek a restoration of national confidence and unity, and yet we march on, as I think we must, in search of justice, knowing that the prevailing attitude in America -- indeed in the Jewish community, at the moment -- may be repressive and knowing that we ourselves may thereby be adding to the stresses. Is it a step in the direction of anti-polarization and restoration of national confidence and unity, when we continue to emphasize the injustices in the society and continue to demand a correction of the defects of society at a time when -- I hope I'm wrong, but it looks like -- a majority of the American people are pointed in the other direction?

Dr. Bell: The trouble is that we have all of these confrontations of a very great magnitude at the same time against the background of prosperity which the majority of the population enjoys. So you don't have a situation comparable to the thirties, where the majority of the population had become pauperized as a result of the crisis that existed at that time. So that makes it tougher. But if we are not going to participate in this process of amelioration, we ourselves are going to be guilty of pushing more and more toward this confrontation. And that in itself will be even worse. So here's your choice. And I don't think we can help ourselves; it's unavoidable for us to be in the liberal camp, in my opinion, no matter how you slice it.