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ETNICITY AND FERTILITY: WHAT AND SO WHAT
by Bernard Berelson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ETHNICITY AND FERTILITY: WHAT AND SO WHAT*

This is a review of ethnic differentials in fertility in the modern world (what) and the policy-oriented concerns to which they give rise (so what): how common are they? how large? where? by what ethnic characteristics? how "real"? how important? what difference do they make? who cares?

The paper aspires not to technical analysis but rather to policy consideration, less to causes than to conditions and consequences. It consists of a descriptive survey, based on the available literature, of those cases of differential fertility (and associated growth) that have resulted in public concern and/or policy determinations. This review fits into a substantially broader concern with differential rates of population growth by ethnicity and their policy implications. The historical dimensions of the matter are covered in another paper in this series, and the effects of ethnic migrations in yet another. Ethnic differentials in mortality exist in today's world, though they are probably diminishing with the general decline in mortality; occasionally some attention will be given here to mortality differentials. In the main, however, the paper deals with fertility as an element of population growth. Finally, the paper is limited to ethnic differentials in fertility within countries, not among them.  

*As one librarian to another, I am glad to express both my appreciation and my gratitude for the invaluable bibliographic assistance of H. Neil Zimmerman, my colleague at the Council. Without his good help, this paper would have been even more difficult in preparation, and would be less comprehensive in outcome.

1/ For a review of the inter-country situation, see Nazli Choucri, Population Dynamics and International Violence, Lexington, 1974.
That briefly covers the fertility side of the equation, by way of introduction. What is meant here by ethnicity? For my purposes, this is the generic term designating groups characterized by distinctive origin: members are identified as such at birth, share a common tradition and social life, and usually maintain their (usually irreversible) ethnic identity in one form or another from birth to death. There are three main ethnic differentiations:

- **race:** a common biological heritage involving certain, usually permanent, physical distinctions readily visible
- **religion:** a common and different system of worship
- **nationality:** a common national or regional origin usually characterized by distinctive linguistic patterns

Often, perhaps typically, such differences are reinforced by residential segregation; that is, ethnic groups tend to live together in regions of a country or sections of a city and thus reinforce their ethnic character. In short, "the underlying idea is that of difference in some fundamental, readily visible, lasting, and socially reinforced way. Ethnic relations refer to interaction with 'unlike' people, to 'minority groups' on a 'we/they' basis."  

So much for the stage setting. Act One briefly summarizes a number of country examples of fertility differentials by ethnicity that give rise to some degree of policy concern; Act Two seeks to draw some conclusions and comments from that array.

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2/ This paragraph is adapted from Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, p. 494.
Country Cases

Most countries of the world are pluralistic in the sense that they contain within their borders groups of people recognized as ethnically different, both by themselves and by others. But ethnic homogeneity/heterogeneity is a relative matter and on that continuum countries can range from the unity of, say, Poland or Sweden or Morocco to the bifurcated societies of Belgium or Lebanon or the multi-ethnic society of the United States. Even within the homogeneous countries there are often found little enclaves of the ethnically distinctive, but such situations are so quantitatively submerged as to be less problematic on grounds of fertility differentials even when the differential itself is large (e.g., the Hutterites within Canada or the United States).

Beyond such homogeneity, what are some of the major fertility-related cases of ethnic differentiation? The following listing is presented not as a complete inventory of such cases, even less as a full examination of their demographic or social or political complexities, but rather as a representative set of cases that reveal the substance of the issues involved.

Africa

On this continent, the major cases are three-fold: the black/white differences in the South, the tribal differences throughout, and the special case of Mauritius.

South Africa: The basic ethnic distinction is between the Bantu (African) with 70% of the population and the whites with 17% (the remainder being "colored" 9% and Asians 3%). The (approximate) crude birth rates of Bantus and whites are 42 and 23 respectively, the crude death rates 15 and 9, and the natural increase about 2.7% and 1.4% (which latter comes to about 2% when immigration is added). Moreover, projections of population growth to the year 2000 envisage a Bantu population then of 28 or 35 or even 40 million, depending upon the assumed speed of mortality decline, as compared to the present 15 million, and thus a sharply greater disparity in size.
The white governors of South Africa are reported to appreciate that their small minority, destined to be smaller still, cannot win a fertility race, but it was not always thus:

"In multiracial societies politicians may find themselves in the awkward position of desiring and even advocating, the encouragement of higher fertility amongst one ethnic group only. In South Africa, government leaders have frequently encouraged higher fertility amongst the white population alone. The most famous effort in recent years was somewhat anomalously carried out by M. C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. In 1967 he urged all white couples to have one more child than they had previously intended for the good of the nation, an effort which was greeted somewhat wryly by whites who nicknamed it the 'Baby for Botha campaign' and which was hostilely received by non-white leaders who, evidently partly successfully, advocated the non-white boycotting of family planning services."3

The contention now is that neither can the Bantus win such a contest:

"This group (the dominant white population) is less concerned that it will be increasingly outnumbered by the more numerous Bantu, colored, and Asian populations than that it will not be able to provide enough jobs for the growing population and thus avoid dissatisfaction and social unrest, which could lead to political revolt. Hence, the policy is one of highly selective immigration in order to provide managerial and entrepreneurial ability."4

Yet even a marginal decline in the Bantu increase is welcomed as ameliorating their own situation as well as contributing to the overall national prospects:

"In some urban areas...many (Bantu) leaders appear to hold the view that in proliferating numbers the Bantu peoples have a potent political weapon which can be used to good effect. This is, of course, a delusion. They are already a majority group in a 7 to 3 ratio. They cannot lose their majority status. Insofar as political power is related to numbers, a rise in the ratio to 8 to 3 or 10 to 3 cannot add anything to it. Any marginal significance it may have will be wiped out by the erosion of their economic status. It will be greatly to their advantage to improve their bargaining power by way of economic progress, (partly) achieved through the reduction of the annual increments in population."5

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5/ Ibid., p. 391.
As a matter of national policy South Africa has instituted a family planning program designed for the entire population.

"It is felt that any population control program should be non-discriminatory on ethnic or any other lines. A contributing consideration here was almost certainly that any discriminatory scheme or program, in spite of any justification offered by the differential nature of demographic realities among the various ethnic groups, would leave the white propagandists open to cries of selfish discrimination and racial superiority, if not deliberate genocide. Then, too, any scheme that was not non-discriminatory would constitute a poor strategy and be doomed to failure from the start." 6/

There is no available evidence to suggest that the program is making any difference to the current ethnic differentials in demographic measures. (And much the same overall demographic situation is true of Rhodesia as well).

Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana: These countries are illustrative of tribal situations in sub-Saharan Africa, both East and West, as related to population factors -- here not necessarily for their distinctiveness but because of the relative availability of information. In Ghana, fertility differentials by tribe have been identified but within a relatively small band at the high end of the continuum (e.g., nine tribes with total fertility ranging only from 5.3 to 6.6). 7/ And even so, according to one expert:

"... (ethnic) differential fertility... may be attributed in part to education, degree of urbanisation, physical mobility, distorted sex ratios, and in part to factors like malnutrition, diseases and constitutional and aetiological sterility which tend to depress fecundity. Superstitions and differential reporting of vital events may also account for part of the differentials." 8/


In Kenya, when the family planning program was begun,

"...far more facilities were available to Kikuyu who were paramount in government;... it could be argued that these were the more urbanised and educated groups likely to employ such facilities first,"

as well as the politically dominant. In Nigeria, with both tribal differences (three tribes of roughly equivalent sizes: Hausa, Yoruba, Ibo) and religious differences (Moslem about 50%, Christians 35%), the issue of population distribution as related to political representation has caused two censuses in the past decade to be put aside as incomplete, misleading, or otherwise incorrect -- perhaps understandable in a country that at the same time fought a civil war on tribal grounds.

Mauritius: This small island country, just under a million in population, is a complex ethnic community: 67% Indian, both Moslem and Hindu; 30% African-cum-European ("general population"), most of them Catholics; plus about 3% Chinese. The groups had these gross reproduction rates in 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>2.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>1.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;General pop.&quot;</td>
<td>1.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1.184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- all down substantially in the 1960s and in substantially closer convergence now than earlier.

9/ Caldwell, op. cit., p. 25.
The population situation has been a matter of concern for at least a quarter of a century, first focusing on immigration and later, after concern about employment and welfare in the early 1960s, on fertility. Some questions were occasionally raised about the potential of Hindu domination in the government, but the major differences over public policy on family planning arose on religious grounds, in the face of strong Catholic opposition. The outcome, after some years of negotiated gestation, was government support to two family planning organizations: the Mauritian Family Planning Association, later integrated into the Ministry of Health, and the Action Familiale, a Catholic agency offering only the rhythm method.


11/ For a full review of the Mauritian situation, see Christos Xenos, Fertility Change in Mauritius and the Impact of the Family Planning Programme, No., December 1976.
Latin America

This area appears to have the fewest documented cases of ethnic differentials in fertility that are politically problematic. To a large extent, presumably, Central and South America have achieved sufficient assimilation of the various ethnic strains so that differential fertility is seen more as urban/rural or rich/poor than as ethnic in impact. The major exception may be in reverse -- that is, concern about mortality and morbidity among the Indian populations in several countries that has led to special health programs seeking a convergence on such rates rather than on fertility.

There appear to be no responsible reports on such issues in the Caribbean islands although they do contain populations in stress on other matters, both black/white and native/East Indian. The fertility matter does simmer beneath the surface, and occasionally a family planning program has apparently run into minor difficulties in this score. However, I found nothing in the literature.
Asia and Oceania

Here the picture centers on religion (and language) in the sub-continent, national origin elsewhere.

India/Bangladesh: Each of these countries has a substantial minority of the other's religion: 11% Moslem in India, 18% Hindu in Bangladesh. The issue appears to be insignificant in the latter country, since Moslem fertility is no doubt higher in that Moslem country anyway, but there has been public debate in India to the effect that the family planning program will further disadvantage Hindu fertility relative to Moslem. Actually, the current practice of fertility control is higher among Hindus than Moslems in India (13.8% current users in 1970 to 8.8%); the ideal family size is larger for Moslems than Hindus (31% three or fewer children as against 41%); and the population increase in the 1961-1971 intercensal period was 31% for Moslems as against only 24% for Hindus, and that resulted in a shift in proportionate share of total population in the amount of about 0.5 of one point, i.e., the Moslems rose in the decade from 10.7% to 11.2.

"The differential growth rate was attributed to the differential adoption of family planning by the two major religious groups, and became a controversial issue for the family planning program," with a certain amount of press comment.

Such differentials are particularly troublesome in areas of Moslem concentration, for reasons of political representation. The latter has also given rise to a kind of growth rivalry between linguistic communities identified


15/ Visaria & Jain, op. cit., p. 12.
with different states or districts: the family planning program will be used against us; or, we will take it up but they will not. This has not become a key element in the program's performance but it has not been completely absent either.

Sri Lanka: The major division here is between the Sinhalese-Buddhists (70%) and the Tamil-Hindus (20%). In the mid-1960s the government took an official position on reducing population growth and promoting family planning, but the policy was not vigorously pursued:

"...official policy on family planning, for political reasons, tended to become ambivalent and cautious. Governments in power were peculiarly vulnerable to the charge that family planning could turn out to be a device which would inevitably turn the prevailing ethnic balance of population against the Sinhalese... It was argued (that) the Sinhalese population would be reduced to a minority or 'would gradually disappear'. A sustained attack on family planning campaigns was set in motion by members of the Buddhist clergy" 16/

that had an effect in diluting the program. Subsequently, special efforts were made to extend the program to the Tamil areas. Thus,

"not unlike other multiracial societies where political power is based on contests within an organized multi-party system, attitudes to family planning in Ceylon have been determined to a considerable extent by political considerations... In such a context, it is surprising that family planning has not become a live party political issue of debate in Ceylon. Indeed, not a single parliamentary debate has been generated by the subject..."17/

The most powerful opposition came from Buddhist Monk-fraternities partly on grounds of morality but mainly political in character:

"...the present programme of birth control endangers their future existence as an ethnic group."18/

In point of fact, the record shows at least an equivalent decline for the Tamils but that did not eliminate political positions.

17/ Ibid., p. 318.
18/ Ibid., p. 321.
SOURCE: Krockland, op. cit., p. 323 (adapted)

Thailand: Although the population of this country is 98% Thai-born and 94% Buddhist, still there is considerable sensitivity about the ethnic Chinese despite their relatively small numbers: one to three million out of 40 (the uncertainty deriving from problems of definition and identification). The sensitivity is probably based on their sharp difference from the Thai community: the Chinese are highly urban (and hence disproportionately visible in Bangkok), better educated and better off, and especially prominent in the business world.

The issue arose, though subterraneously, at the outset of the national family planning program when it was argued, first, that the Chinese would not practice family planning while the Thais did; and then, after some experience, that the Chinese were not using the public clinics proportionately. Actually, as of the 1960 census, Confucianist fertility (not equivalent to Chinese) was about 12% below Buddhist, with Moslem lower still. 20/

19/ For a revealing analysis, see T. O. Ling, "Buddhist Factors in Population Growth and Control," Population Studies, vol. 23, March 1969, p. 53-60, which concludes that Buddhist response to "population control policies will depend to a large degree on the communal situation, i.e. the reaction of Buddhist to non-Buddhist groups within the population" -- for example, "the fear of Catholic power" (p. 60).

"In part, (such) research has reflected concerns expressed by policy makers in some multi-religious countries that if family planning was not uniformly adopted by members of all religious groups, the numerical balance among the various segments of the population would be upset... Despite its small proportion of non-Buddhists, the Thai government, as part of its growing concern with the overall rate of population growth, has been increasingly interested in the extent of fertility differentials among religious minority groups within Thailand and their need for and receptiveness to family planning." 21

The perception was troubling for a time; as late as 1969, 30% of a group of media professionals agreed that "with widespread family planning services, Thais will practice more birth control than minority groups," and another 197 were undecided. 22 However, it seems gradually to have declined, and now appears dormant, if not dead.

West Malaysia: This country has the same ethnic mixture as Singapore but in significantly different proportions: 50% Malays, 30% Chinese, 11% Indians. As in other fields, this balance has been involved in the development of the Malaysian population effort particularly since the Chinese are economically and educationally advantaged compared to the Malays and more urban as well.

After a perceived electoral setback for the Malays in 1969, for example,

"some Malay politicians and religious teachers raised the possible relationship between the extension of the family planning programme and the ethnic balance in the country." 23

At a subsequent national forum, the director of the National Family Planning Board, when

"asked about possible loss of political power if Malays were to adopt family planning, (replied): 'Political power does not spring from sheer numbers alone. Being in a majority is not enough if others control the economy and are better educated. Hence the necessity to adopt family planning to catch up. In any case, even with family planning, Malays would remain a majority'". 24

21/ Ibid., p. 325, 326.


24/ Ibid., p. 285.
At the same time, the national program placed its first clinics in the urban areas where the Chinese and the Indians lived and only later in the rural areas where Malays predominated -- partly a strategic move to start where the task was easier but not without an eye to the political situation as well. However, the matter is now considered as

"not really a current issue in Malaysian politics. Non-Malays have not been drawn into a debate on family planning, and, indeed, the majority of political parties have little, if anything, to say about it", 25/

largely because respected leaders of several communities have supported the movement. Moreover, fertility in the country has sharply fallen among all three ethnic groups -- but always lowest among the Chinese (probably largely reflecting other social advantages), thus exercising a soothing effect.

\[\text{SOURCE: Low et al., op. ed., p. 289} \]

Singapore: This is another multi-ethnic society: 76% Chinese, 15% Malays, 7% Indians, and 2% other. In the eight-year period before the establishment of the National Family Planning Programme (1957-1965), the total fertility rate fell by about 25%, almost all of it deriving from the Chinese community and suddenly leaving an ethnic disparity in fertility (measured in TFR) of about 50% in favor of the Moslems and the Indians. But in the following seven years (1966-1973), when a strong family planning program was in full operation, the ethnic balance was restored: the TFR fell by another 30% but by over half among the Moslems and the Indians. In 1957 there was a 15% spread in total fertility rates among the three groups; in 1973 that had fallen to 9%, but at a fertility level well below half (43% of 1957). As a high official observed:

"Family planning had penetrated all ethnic, cultural and religious groups, though with differing timing, the Malays and Hindus being the last." 26/

The acceptors in the national program were approximately proportionate in the three ethnic groups, but the Chinese were still marrying much later than the others (30% married among women 20 to 24 compared to over 50%). 27/

Fiji: This is another small island country with two major ethnic groups: Indian (50%) and Fijian (42%). About 30 years ago, the Indians passed the native population in numbers and soon thereafter differential fertility became a persistent political issue. Indeed, the development of a family planning program carried ethnic overtones from the start, in the early 1960s, including explicit calls upon the Indians to control their population growth and expectations that the program would solve "the Indian problem" and save the Fijian race.


In the early years of the program, the Indians utilized the birth control services more than the Fijians, though about half of the decline to the mid-1960s was due to a rising age in marriage. 28/ Throughout this period, a prominent part of the political debate about population and family planning was the concern about

"The idea of a population growth race between the Fijian and Indian ethnic groups. The issue of whether or not Fiji is threatened by overpopulation has elicited statements which seem fairly clearly divided along racial lines. While Indians often contended that more people were needed to develop Fiji's resources fully and that redistribution of resources rather than population control would aid development, most Fijians and Europeans expressed concern that the resources of Fiji cannot support great increases of population." 29/


Not only was there concern about the numbers themselves but also about the related land tenure system and the voting procedures (based on communal rolls giving each group equal representation). By now, after the sharp decline in the Indian birth rate, there is much less political concern expressed on the issue than a generation ago.

Other: There are a few other countries in the area where small ethnic minorities are given special treatment with regard to fertility- and mortality-related issues: China, where the government's efforts to reduce growth rates are not applied in "national minority areas (where) appropriate measures are taken to facilitate population growth...; in the national minority areas, a change has been brought about in the situation prevailing in the past, in which population grew at an extremely slow rate or even dropped sharply, owing to brutal persecution by the forces of reaction...".29a/

Taiwan, where the family planning program was not extended to the aborigine population (250,000 out of 15 million) for several years after it was provided to the general population in order to avoid any possible suggestion of impure motives; and Australia, where special consideration is required for the aborigine population: "they probably have the highest growth rate, the highest birth rate, the highest death rate, the worst health and housing, and the lowest educational, occupational, economic, social and legal status of any identifiable section of the Australian population", and what is needed is "a total programme of betterment" not limited to demographic measures. 29b/


Two of the world's major cases of concern are neighbors here: the Moslem/Christian issue in Lebanon and the Jewish/Arab issue in Israel - plus the probable case of Greek/Turkish tension in Cyprus.

Lebanon: The latest full census in this country was taken over 40 years ago (plus a war-time count for rationing purposes, a "mini-census", over 30 years ago). The reason is well known: the system of political representation is delicately balanced between the two ethnic groups that make up the country. Given the sensitivity of internal security (demonstrated again only recently), there is a tacit understanding not to undergo the recalculation that might be required by a new census, in a system in which parliamentary seats are allocated by religion: Christians 53, Moslems 46.

As was recently observed:

"Policy makers have deliberately avoided this thorny issue because of the political implications and responses that may ensue. In fact, the fear of political repercussions is one reason why Lebanon has not had a census since 1932. The fundamental balance between sects is a principle that governs Lebanese political life. Any population policy that deliberately reflects on this balance is carefully avoided". 30/

The contest is a close one: in a survey from the late 1950s Moslem fertility was higher than Christian in the cities but not in the villages (TFRs of about 7 to 4 and 7½ to 8+, respectively). 30a/ And in this more recent tabulation, older Moslems but younger Christians had slightly higher fertility than their counterparts: 31/


Average Number of Children Ever Born to Women by Age and Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Women</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Moslems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>5.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>6.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the end of World War II there were slightly more Christians than Moslems in the country but the estimates now are that there are slightly more Moslems -- but the test is still foregone by tacit agreement.

"In general, the people of Lebanon do not think of themselves as having a population problem... The primary concern is the fear on the part of the Christians that the Moslem birth rate will markedly alter the country's religious balance. There is uneasiness among the Moslems as well, over whether a Christian majority exists in the country. Religious groups watch anxiously the issuance of naturalization papers to people of various religions." 37/

It is the uncertainty about the outcome that is at the bottom of this situation.

Cyprus: Here too a census was involved: the 1970 census was postponed not out of concern over close balance -- after all the Greeks are nearly 80% the population, the Turks under 20% -- but because of tensions and lack of communication between the two communities (soon to break into open violence). As the official Demographic Report for 1972 puts it:

"Due to the political anomaly prevailing in the island the Statistics and Research Department has been unable to collect detailed and up-to-date (vital) information". 33/

The crude birth rate is reportedly in the low 20s with a growth rate of 1% or less, not because of high mortality but because of heavy emigration from the strife-torn island. Although no data are directly available, it would seem probable that the Greek birth rate is below the Turkish even though

37/ Ibid., p. 32 of Ms.
33/ Statistics and Research Department, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Cyprus, Demographic Report 1972, p. 3.
the latter are more urban: the district birth rates range between 24 and 14, far less than the range between the mother countries. In the 1950s the proportion of Greeks decreased by 1.9% whereas Turks increased by 0.2%, through migration is much involved. The two ethnic communities, particularly under the stress of events, are intensely loyal to their respective cultures, languages, and religions; and it would seem likely that their differential fertility has fueled the dispute, but I have been unable to find any documentation. 34/

Israel: This may be the most dramatic case of all: a small country in a hostile region with an internal minority of the same ethnic stock as the hostile neighbors. Population size and growth (notably including immigration) relative to the region is of paramount importance, but differential fertility within the country is also of concern as indicated by various efforts to address the problem in recent years culminating in the 1962 appointment of a national commission on the matter, called indeed the Natality Committee. In view of its special circumstances, population has always been a political issue in Israel.

At independence in 1948 Israel was about 80% Jewish and 20% Arab; now, largely in consequence of the counter-balancing effects of Jewish immigration and Arab fertility, it is nearly four times larger and 86% Jewish, 14% Arab. In the two decades from 1948 to 1968, just under 40% of the growth in the Jewish population of Israel came from natural increase (with over 60% from immigration) as against about 100% for the Arabs. But in recent years much more has come from natural increase as immigration has fallen. Throughout the country's history, Arab fertility has been much higher than Jewish; moreover, there has been a constant differential within the Jewish community itself, depending on national origin: 35/

34/ This information from Area Handbook for Cyprus, Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1971, p. 74-5.

35/ The GRR data are from Dov Friedlander, "Israel", in Berelson, ed., op. cit., table 6, p. 50; the GRR and N1 data are from Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldselder, "Peace and the Demographic Future of Israel", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol 18, September 1974, table 1, p. 488.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gross reproduction rate (1966)</th>
<th>Crude birth rate (c1970)</th>
<th>Rate of natural increase (c1970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabs of European origin</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-born of Afro/Asian origin</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Assuming the continuation of these patterns even for a limited period would imply that the less affluent, the less educated, the socially deprived section of the population would grow fast, while the affluent section would grow extremely slowly.... The Arab population in Israel...will increase rapidly and be equal in size to the Jewish population in less than three generations, assuming the continuation of current fertility and also assuming that no further substantial Jewish immigration takes place." 36/

Moreover, "family planning services are conspicuously absent from general public health services" 36a/ though induced abortion is relatively available.

Against this background the Natality Committee advocated a pro-natalist policy of psychological, economic, and monetary incentives, with this general tone:

"If all families bore two children only, a dangerous demographic recession would follow. Families of three contribute just marginally, and only families of four or more children can make a real contribution toward the demographic revival of the nation." 37/

The opposing point of view, recognizing a rather rapid convergence of Jewish fertility toward the lower norms and considering a sharp reversal toward the large family to be most unlikely, concludes that the preferred policy would be two-fold: (1) encouragement of further Jewish immigration, and (2) spread of modern social conditions and fertility control throughout the country, and significantly to the disadvantaged groups. In this calculation, a net immigration of 15,000 per year is the rough equivalent of substantially (and unrealistically) higher Jewish fertility into the future: 38/

36/ Friedlander, op. cit., p. 52.
36a/ Ibid., p. 60.
37/ Ibid., p. 64-5.
38/ Ibid., table 8, page 85 (adapted)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish Population of Israel (in millions)</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present fertility (2.6 children)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No immigration</td>
<td>3.072</td>
<td>3.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration of 15,000</td>
<td>3.435</td>
<td>4.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility at level of large family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.5 children)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No immigration</td>
<td>3.252</td>
<td>4.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration of 15,000</td>
<td>3.633</td>
<td>5.426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, in no realistically conceivable circumstance could even a successful pro-natalist policy in Israel do much to increase its share of the region's population (from 3.4% now to 5% by the end of the century under the most favorable assumptions) or to lower the proportion of Jews in the Israeli population (from 86% to 78% by then under the least favorable assumptions) -- let alone any consideration of high fertility in the homeland as a means for demographic revival of world Jewry (of which Israeli Jews are about 18%).

39/ *Ibid*, from table 9, p. 90. For a realistic analysis of the demographic future depending upon different fertility and immigration assumptions and for alternative assumptions as to territory retained subsequent to the current international negotiations, see Friedlander and Goldscheider, *op. cit.*, which indicates by 2000 a wide potential spread in population (4.7 to 9.3 million) and in proportion Jewish (86% to 47%), on pages 486-501. In their calculations, fertility makes less difference for total population than immigration, and that in turn less than the feintorial assumptions.
Europe

A number of countries in both Western and Eastern Europe are characterized by ethnic fertility differentials sufficient for public attention -- mainly religion in the West, nationality in the East.

Ireland: Here the fertility differences are substantial, and at different levels in the Republic and in the North (or at least were over a decade ago):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Catholic</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By this measure (and the essential difference survives the usual controls), religion makes a 30-40% difference and residence about 20-30%. In the Republic, the religious difference is less important politically: not only are the non-Catholics a tiny proportion (about 5%) but they are older, with lower marriage and birth rates, and they are losing some population through inter-marriage into the Catholic majority. The prime exception is the imposition of Catholic-oriented beliefs with regard to the means of fertility control, though that too has been recently softened.

But the religious differences do press hard in the North, to the point of armed conflict. At the time of the partition, in 1926, about a third of the population was Catholic; now it is barely one to two points higher. That balance was not achieved through equivalence in fertility rates but because heavy Catholic emigration (due to low occupations) compensated over the years for higher fertility. Actually,

In the creation of Northern Ireland from only six of the original nine counties of the Province of Ulster, the link between religious composition and politics was a prime consideration: if all nine counties had been included the Protestant majority would have been only 57 percent instead of the 67 percent recorded. Since the partition, the relative size of the Catholic segment of the population, and the higher Catholic fertility, have been widely recognized by both Catholics and Protestants as having important political implications. For example, the former Northern Irish Prime Minister, Capt. Terence O'Neill, made the following comments in a radio interview following his resignation from office in 1969: 'The basic fear of the Protestants in Northern Ireland is that they will be outbred by the Roman Catholics. It is as simple as that.'

Given the strength of feelings,

"...in the last few years, the question of the religious balance of the population in both parts of Ireland has been raised in public debate. In the republic, the idea that the non-Catholic minority is being pressured out of the country is sometimes expressed, while in the north, the notion of a revanche du berceau and an eventual Roman Catholic majority is feared by some."

And the question of contraceptive availability in the republic is of course closely tied to religious position -- and indeed utilized as an argument against unification by some political positions in the North, as an indicator of what would happen under the majority's rule.

Belgium: The basic ethnic dichotomy is all the stronger for its reinforcing qualities:

Flanders in the north: Flemish-speaking, Catholic, traditionally agricultural, conservative

Wallony in the south: French-speaking, less religious, long industrialized, socialist

Flanders now contains about 56% of the population, up 5 points since 1930; Wallony 32%, down 5 points since then -- a shift attributable largely to fertility differentials. Particularly over the past two decades, the "linguistic problem" of the relations between the two communities has been at the center of political life; the new constitutional amendments of 1970-1971 recognize that officially in the formal governmental structure of the country, toward a kind of federalism.

41/ Ibid., p. 91-2.
42/ Brendan M. Walsh, "Ireland", in Berelson, op. cit., p. 37.
From the fertility standpoint the situation was eased in the 1960s by a sharper decline from the higher base in Flanders so that the differential in birth rates became only about a point in 1970 as against 3 points in 1963. About 15 years ago the matter was sufficiently alive to give rise to a special consultation for the French-speaking sector (the "Sauvy Report") that recommended various pro-natalist measures like tax relief and child assistance on the French model, but that was unacceptable as a discriminatory proposal for one sector of the society. The government countered with its own commission (the "Deltée Report") which issued a wide-ranging document of a broad social security character on, say, the Swedish model -- not "population" but "quality of life" -- but the report as a whole was never activated. The child allowances were implemented without any relationship to population policy but rather in connection with the regional origin of the minister in charge. It is dubiously coincidental that increases in allowances for higher birth ranks were settled by Flemish ministers (Flanders having higher parity children than Wallony), with an inverse action taken when Walloon ministers were in office.\footnote{43/ Louis Lohle-Tait, "Belgium", in Berelson, ed., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 214; the data are also from this source.}

**Czechoslovakia:** The basic regional differentiation, reinforced by religion, has a long demographic history as well. The Czech West (now 68\% of the population) was historically part of central Europe; not so the strongly Catholic Slovakian population of the East. Fertility differences between the two can be traced back 200 years: Czech decline not long after the French, culminating in rapid fall in the late 19th century, Slovakian starting then and proceeding to the mid-20th century. In 1960 the birth rates were 13.3 and 22.1, respectively, with rates of natural increase ranging from .4\% to 1.4\%; but fertility fell in the decade, to a low point in 1968 and then slightly up, but with a convergence between the two communities: in 1971 to CBR 15.7 and 18.2. As close observers have concluded:
"This historically constituted distinction... will require at least another ten years in order to even the fertility levels of the two Czechoslovak population". 44/

The differentials do not now appear to be of major policy concern, and certainly not of policy differentiation

Yugoslavia: This country contains a variety of nationalities differentiated regionally and theologically as well. And the differences find expression in birth rates too:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>% of population</th>
<th>Crude birth rate (1966)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia/Herzegovina</td>
<td>Moslem &amp; mixed</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"While, as regards particular demographic characteristics of the population of various nationalities (mortality, some structures, etc.) there are already tendencies toward equalization, differences with respect to fertility have remained exceptionally pronounced. We consider that it can be assumed that the different fertility rates in some nationalities are mainly caused by the factors of environment in which the population of these nationalities live or, in other words, by the impact of socio-economic factors. However, it is likely that the mentality, habit, tradition, customs and other elements, which characterize a given nationality group, constitute the cause of differentiation as regards the fertility of population." 45/

In the post-war period, birth rates have declined among all nationalities but the differentials were not particularly narrowed. Note that in this country Catholic fertility is on the low side and that the border provinces tend to reflect the fertility of their ethnic cousins across the border, notably the highest (Kosovo/Albania) and the lowest (Vojvodina/Hungary).

In general, nationality issues are at the center of Yugoslavian politics. However, such fertility differences have not surfaced as a major issue though there is the usual grumbling in the industrial sectors (Serbia and Croatia) about their burden in carrying the less developed areas

with their higher fertility and population growth.

**USSR:** Here the differentials have also centered on national minorities - geographically dispersed, different in religion and language, widely diverse in birth rates. Broadly speaking, concentric arcs centered on the Leningrad area show higher fertility the farther out toward the periphery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republiсs</th>
<th>Percent of population</th>
<th>Crude birth rate, 1973</th>
<th>CBR range by republics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltic (Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13.9 - 16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western (Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian)</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.9 - 20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian (Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaidzhan)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>18.2 - 25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (Tadzhik, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirgiz, Kazakh)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>23.2 - 35.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

46/ UN Economic and Social Council, "Post-War Demographic Trends in Europe and the Outlook until the Year 2000", prepared by the Secretariat of the Economic Council for Europe, July 1975; adapted from table V.17.
In a more detailed analysis of 36 ethnic groups, "those below the median congregate in the European portion of the USSR and consist of traditionally non-Muslim groups speaking a language of East European origin, (whereas those above the median constitute) the Asian regions of the USSR... by and large inhabited by traditionally Muslim and some Buddhist groups whose indigenous tongue is related to either the Turkic, Mongolian, or Caucasian sub-division." 47

---

**SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF 36 ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE USSR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Region</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Traditional Religion</th>
<th>Child-Woman Rate Below Median</th>
<th>Child-Woman Rate Above Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltic states</td>
<td>Latvian (L)</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estonian (E)</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuanian (L)</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western USSR</td>
<td>Karelian (K)</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainian (U)</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belorussian (B)</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moldovan (M)</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chuvash (C)</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moslem (M)</td>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East European</td>
<td>Georgian (G)</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ossetian (O)</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian (A)</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caucasian (C)</td>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus</td>
<td>Abkhaz (A)</td>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Ossetian (N)</td>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Ossetian (N)</td>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and</td>
<td>Ingush (I)</td>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Siberian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Tuvan (T)</td>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uighur (U)</td>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kazak (K)</td>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Median fertility level estimated at 1,380 children age 0-9 per 1,000 women in the 20-29 age group for roughly equivalent to the G36 of 2,720 daughters per 1,000 women. Capital letters in the parentheses refer to linguistic affiliations, such as (S) Slavic, (F) Finnic, (C) Caucasian, (M) Mongolian, (T) Turkic, (I) Irano-Turanian. (K) Caucasian, (S) Slavic, (F) Finnic, (C) Caucasian.

Source: Based on data from the 1950 USSR Census of Population and other sources.

Thus with the USSR, at least until quite recently, there was a spread in fertility rates approximating that between the developed and the developing countries, though the extremely high rates may now be in process of decline (and within such ethno-provinces are smaller ethnic groupings with even greater fertility differentials: e.g., birth rates of 60 and 66 were reported circa 1960 for the Ingush and Chechen, small Moslem groups in the Caucasian region). 48/

The large majority of the population of the USSR (about 80%) lives in republics with relatively low birth rates. Nevertheless, concern has been expressed on the nationality differentials. For example, a symposium on regional features of population growth, held in May, 1968 under the auspices of the Coordinating Council for Population Problems of the USSR Ministry of High and Specialized Secondary Education, concluded that

"demographic policy can be differentiated in accordance with the peculiarities of individual areas. Depending on concrete conditions, it encourages births in some cases and is an influence for their reduction or stabilization in others... At the symposium, measures contributing to an increase in the birth rate in certain of the country's republics and provinces were recognized as necessary." 49/

-- which is taken to mean that the birth rate of the core republic should be increased somewhat. According to a recent review,

"Although no formal government policy has emerged, the majority of demographers promote a policy of raising the national birthrate through an increase in fertility in low-fertility areas... The second major concern (of policy, after the decline in the rate of natural increase) is with the relatively high proportion of all births that occurred to the Muslim nationalities in the Soviet Union and the relatively low proportion that occurred to the Slavic groups... Although I have never found any direct statement that too high a proportion of all babies are born to Moslem nationalities, one can note the effort by Soviet demographers to publicize the large territorial and ethnic differences in fertility that do exist... The most frequently


heard policy position is that the Soviet Union should seek to raise its birthrate but do so primarily by increasing the birthrate in the low-fertility areas. "It is necessary" (says a leading Soviet demographer) "to introduce a differentiated demographic legislation so that what is appropriate, say, for the Ukraine and the Baltic region is completely inappropriate in Central Asia or Azerbaijan". 50/

To date, to my knowledge, no such policies have been taken and the differentials appear to be diminishing somewhat, from the top down.

Other: There are other concerns about differential fertility by ethnicity in Europe but on the whole less important than those cited above: The Netherlands, where the religious/regional difference -- the Protestant north, the Catholic south -- was accompanied by fertility differentials. However, the 1960s brought a much faster fertility decline in Catholic provinces so that a 16% differential in marital fertility around 1960 was more than wiped out by 1967. Although earlier it was widely believed by non-Catholics that "it is the secret purpose of Catholics to 'outbreed' the Protestants", 52/ the issue is apparently not pressing at this time; Great Britain, with regard to the fertility (as well as the immigration) of "colored" from the New Commonwealth countries, which "according to a recent estimate... may currently exceed the national average by 50 percent" 53/ and, together with other ethnic immigrants, accounts for about 10% of all births in Britain. 53a/ Even so, the projections suggest that by the end of the century the "coloured minorities" would constitute from 4-6% of the population as against 2.4% in 1968. 53b/


52. For an interesting historical analysis see F. van Heek, "Roman-Catholicism and Fertility in the Netherlands: Demographic Aspects of Minority Status", Population Studies, vol. 10, 1956-57, p. 125-38; the quotation is from p. 135.


53b. Ibid., p. 54.
Romania, where "natality is much lower in the western districts than in the eastern part of the country (also reflecting ethnic differentials). But the gap is gradually narrowing because of the recent industrialization of eastern districts which, in the past, were primarily agricultural; while in the west, industrialization began many decades ago"; 54/

Bulgaria, where the celebrated peaking of child assistance on the third child is meant mainly to stimulate an extra birth among the dominant population but also, reportedly, to discourage high-parity births for welfare payments among the gypsies; and Hungary, where there is also some muttering about the high fertility of the gypsies.

54/ Petre Muresan and Ioan M. Copil, "Romania", in Berelson, ed., op. cit., p. 361.
North America

Both countries have been marked by ethnic fertility differentials which now appear to be narrowing.

Canada: The ethnic differential from the outset has been nationality/religious/linguistic in character -- the British (now about 45%) and the French (about 30%). The other segment of the population, from other European stocks, has assimilated to the British; and the dichotomy has been reinforced by the residential concentration of the French-speaking population in Quebec. Over most of the past century the French proportion of the population has stayed at about 30%, balanced a la the Irish and Israeli cases: high British immigration against high French fertility ("cradle revenge"), the latter not so much deliberate policy as religion and traditional values. Until quite recently the differential was substantial -

"as great as fertility differences between developed and underdeveloped nations and account(ing) in large part for differences in family size between two nations." 55/

However, as in other Western countries, the birth rate declined substantially in the 1960s (about 10 points) and most sharply in Quebec, from 26.1 to 14.8, making it the lowest among the provinces:56/

"the overfertility of French Canadians has progressively been reduced and is now quite negligible." 57/

That plus a slow assimilation of French Canadians outside Quebec has meant that the proportion of French-speaking people in Canada is slowly declining, down to 27% in 1971; and that in turn intensified the separatist tendencies of that province as a "survival" measure, and led to national undertakings about language usage throughout the country.


United States: Here there are a number of ethnic communities with differential fertility patterns: blacks, Catholics (and differences by nationality within), Mormons, Chicanos and other Spanish-speaking, Indians, Hutterites on the high side, Jews and Orientals on the low side. In short, at least historically, differential fertility has characterized virtually all ethnic groups in the country and the national figures are the resulting aggregate weighted by group size. Concern appears to arise under two conditions: when the "minority" group is large enough "to matter", as nationally with blacks and Catholics or regionally with Chicanos and perhaps Mormons; or when the group itself becomes aroused to the "need" for higher fertility for political or other reasons, as occasionally with blacks, Indians, and Jews.

To my knowledge, there is no single reliable source of comparable fertility measurements across the range of ethnic groups, but the broad picture can be pieced together to show rough orders of magnitude:

Average children ever born per woman (age 35-44 years) June 1974 58/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number of Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish origin</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total fertility for 1926-1935 cohort (the "baby boom" mothers) 59/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number of Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative fertility rate, women 45 and over, 1957 60/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Crude marital fertility rates, wife under 40, 1967 - 1970 61/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese American</td>
<td>.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese American</td>
<td>.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican American</td>
<td>.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish surname</td>
<td>.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicano</td>
<td>.568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total children ever born, women aged 35-44, 1970 census 62/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese American</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese American</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish origin</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicano</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And, just to establish an upper limit, the Hutterites serve as the current standard for sustained high fertility - about 8.5 children per married women.

The broad picture emerges: the Indians and the Spanish-speaking substantially above the national average (say, 30-40%), blacks and Catholics 63/ and Mormons well above (15-20%), the Oriental-Americans somewhat below (10%), the Jews well below (25%). Indeed, in the United States, race and religion are key predictors of fertility,63a from the high of the Hutterites, Mormons, Chicanos, and Indians to the low of the Jews and the Japanese-Americans.

61/ James A. Sweet, "Differentials in the Rate of Fertility Decline: 1960-1970," Perspectives, vol. 6, Spring 1974, p. 104: from table 2: "rate based on average number of children under the age of three living in household with own mother (married, under age 40)."

62/ "Women by Number of Children Ever Born," Census Bureau Subject Reports, Series PC(2)-3A, July 1973; adapted.


63a/ UN, Determinants and Consequences, op. cit., p. 102: "...religious differences have emerged in recent years as perhaps the strongest of the socio-economic determinants of fertility"; and Vernon C. Pohlmann, "Longitudinal Study of Demographic Variables Associated with Differential Fertility of Whites and Non-Whites in the United States, 1900-1970," paper prepared for presentation at PAA, April 1973: "race per se is a key predictor of fertility."
The ethnic groups with lower than national fertility are quite small: Jews under 3%, Orientals 0.6%; two of those with higher fertility are relatively large: Catholics 20%, blacks 11%.

As of a decade ago, those counties in the United States with substantial fertility (4 or more children in the average family) were mainly characterized as rural and ethnic -- and thus somewhat outside the mainstream of American life in this as in other respects. But the situation has recently been changing, and there appears to be a convergence in progress. In the decade up to 1967-70, the urban white fertility declined 27%, as compared to 30% for the Chicano and Spanish surname group, 37% for blacks, and 45% for Indians.

"The continuous decline in fertility in the United States since 1957, while affecting all elements of the population, has been most pronounced and most rapid among those groups which previously had the highest fertility - blacks, American Indians and Mexican Americans...The decline was especially rapid for third and higher order births, suggesting a heavy concentration of completed fertility at two-child families." 64/

![Births per 1000 women, ages 15-44](chart.png)

**Sources:**


64/ *Sweet*, op. cit., table 2 and p. 107.
Similarly:

"The declines, both absolute and relative, were twice as large for blacks than for whites, and twice as large for Catholics than for non-Catholics. As a result both the race and the religious differential closed by more than half a birth. The difference between white and black fertility as of the 1966-70 period was reduced to .53 births; and for Catholics - non-Catholics to .51 births. Since fertility has continued to fall very sharply since the 1966-70 period, these differentials today may be even closer together." 65/

And the decline largely derives from decline in unwanted fertility rather than a shift in family-size norms. Says a leading expert in this field:

"The greatest declines in unwanted fertility rates were observed among blacks and among white Catholics. The race differential still existed as of 1966-70...but signs of rapid convergence were evident...The Catholic non-

65/ Westoff & Ryder, op. cit., p. 7.
Catholic difference had virtually disappeared... Nearly all of the excess of black over white fertility is due to the considerably higher unwanted fertility among blacks. Given the substantial reduction in the unwanted fertility rate among blacks across the generation, a rapidly increasing convergence of black and white marital fertility can be expected during the current decade... Such a convergence was clearly evident during the 1960s in the trend of Catholic and non-Catholic fertility because of the greater decline among Catholic women. The differential remaining in the period fertility of 1966-70 (15%) is, unlike the white/black difference, due to differences in the number of children wanted.  

Moreover, there is evidence that the improved contraceptive technology of the latter 1960s contributed to the fertility decline, and the same can be said in the case of the blacks for the publicly-financed family planning programs of the period 67/ and for the legalization of induced abortion in the early 1970s. 68/ Thus the major high-fertility ethnic groups made considerable advance in the rational control of their fertility, thus moving in this respect toward their low-fertility counterparts.

Nonetheless, or perhaps hence, the family planning programs and the general concern about population stabilization -- which requires more

66/ Charles F. Westoff, "The Yield of the Imperfect," Presidential Address, PAA, April 1975, p. 9, 11. For a similar conclusion with regard to unplanned fertility, see Westoff & Ryder, op. cit., p. 28: "The decline in unplanned fertility accounts for just about all of the decline in total marital fertility," 1961-65 to 1966-70. (Unplanned includes both timing and number failures).


"sacrifice" of fertility from some than for others -- gave rise to a certain amount of dissent within the black community and certainly by its more milit­
tant wings:

"In the black community, the deepest emotional source of this attitude is the apprehension that population policy and fertility control programs are genocidal attempts by the whites to eliminate the blacks. Such an attitude is reinforced by the appearance in ghettos of birth control clinics without pediatric or maternal health clinics or by occasional public proposals for compulsory sterilization of women on welfare having an additional child. Another related source is the concern that the dominant white community is trying to substitute population control for economic development -- an attitude not dissimilar to that voiced occasionally by representatives of some developing nations. Still another expression takes the form of connecting increased population with increasing political power -- a view strengthened by recent elections to office of black mayors and other government officials...The picture of the attitudes of black leaders is diverse, ranging from indifference to animosity. In the black population at large, however, the average person, especially the woman, is just as anxious to regulate her childbearing as is her white counterpart." 69/

Finally, in recent years, as Jewish consciousness has again been raised by the political situation of Israel, there have again been calls for higher fertility in that traditionally low-fertility community (now with a birth rate approximating or below replacement), down from its high of 3.7% of the U.S. population in the late 1930s to under 3% today and falling, while still nearly half of world Jewry. In response to this situation, for example, the newly-elected President of the New York Board of Rabbis recently called for at least three children per Jewish family, which would amount to a substantial increase. ZPG,

"should find no application in the Jewish community... Is it not obvious that in terms of Jewish survival, the European Holocaust of the war years and the Holocaust-size loss in Americans during the last three decades (by his reckoning, 6 million where there should be 12) produced the same result? (Without) an increase in population, it (the American Jewish community) will grow weaker and will face a threat to its existence... Three children should be the minimum number for Jewish families, but the larger the better." 70/

But there is another responsible view to the contrary:

"This decline in relative numbers may not be very significant, since Jews have never constituted a numerically large segment of the population. If anything, it is noteworthy that, despite their small numbers, they are generally afforded the social position of the third major religious group in the country. There seems little reason to expect that this situation will change even though their percentage in the total population declines further, particularly since Jews, both as a group and individually, will undoubtedly continue to play significant roles in specific spheres of American life, such as cultural activities, education, and urban politics. From the demographic point of view, more important factors may be influencing the position of the Jewish community within the total American community, among them changes in the geographical concentration of Jews in certain parts of the nation as well as their disproportional representation in selected socioeconomic strata of the population" 71/

- not to mention the political strength of Jewish residential concentration in New York and major cities.

70/ "Rabbi Deplores Small Families," New York Times, January 24, 1974, p. 40. Actually, the U.S. population increased in those three decades by just over 50%, not 100%.

71/ Goldstein, op. cit., p. 12.
Summary

That is a highly compressed overview of ethnic differentials in fertility that have become politically problematic within countries — surely not an exhaustive exploration in any one case, probably not a complete set of such cases. Nevertheless, this overview is illustrative, perhaps representative, of the situation in this regard. Once more the reminder that this account has been limited to fertility differentials, without full regard to the differentials in migration, mortality, nuptiality, and age structure that would refine issues of population growth; yet omitting migration, either way, the fertility differentials usually denote growth differentials of a similar order of magnitude.

I now attempt to summarize for condition, cause and consequence.

The condition is present in many pluralistic societies around the world, maybe in most of them. The condition is independent of type of country: as even this listing shows, it appears in large and small, in developed and developing, in capitalist and socialist, in religious and secular, in East and West and in between. It involves all the major ethnic distinctions — race, religion, nationality, language. It is present, that is, but seldom manifest: a subterranean issue, but real. There is

"the existence of different demographic communities within the same society, with the consequent exacerbation of related social and political problems... although nowhere is it an explicitly pursued goal of national policy to equalize the vital rates of such internal divisions..." [72]

[72] Berelson, ed., op. cit., p. 787
Still, in the very nature of the case, there may be more concern than
gets expressed in formal doctrine, or for that matter in writing.

Indeed, an intensive study of European fertility has concluded that
fertility norms and behavior were themselves diffused precisely through
such "natural" communities. 73/ In another long view,

"these examples point to a shift from concern with differential
fertility rates among socioeconomic classes (an issue in much
of western Europe in the 19th century when conflicts were mainly
along class lines) to a concern with differential fertility
rates among populations having different cultural values.. .
of the changing proportions of racial, religious, or tribal
groups (when) the difference is seen as having a significant
political effect." 74/

Nor is there anything surprising here: perceived group differences have
always presented difficulties of accommodation to human beings and par-
ticularly those of real or perceived permanence, fundamental and inera-
dicable.

At the same time, with only a few possible exceptions, the condition
has not presented an issue of overriding importance to the body politic;
it is mainly a limited affair.

73/ A.J. Coale, "The Demographic Transition", IUSSP International Pop-

74/ Myron Wiener, "Political Demography: An Inquiry into the Political
Consequences of Population Change," in Rapid Population Growth,
op. cit., p. 597-8.
The differences, though present, are typically small, not very visible to the naked eye of social observance: a one-child differential is substantial. When the ethnic group is a quite small minority and not politically or economically powerful, even a large differential is primarily of academic interest, as with the Hutterites in the United States and Canada. Moreover, in a number of countries—both developing: Mauritius, Singapore, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Fiji; and developed: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Netherlands, Canada, U.S.—the differentials are narrowing:

"The trend towards a diminution of the differential in a number of countries has been attributed to several factors: (a) a modification of traditional attitudes on the part of certain religious bodies towards ideals and practices which affect family size; (b) a weakening of the influence of religious doctrine and tradition; (c) a lessening in the non-religious differences which appear in part to have contributed to the religious differential in fertility."/76/

Finally, within the demographic sphere, migration differentials by ethnicity are probably more visible, perhaps more telling; and in the political sphere generally, there are many issues of much greater concern./77/

Nonetheless, concern continues to be expressed, both nationally as we have seen and beyond. For example, a recent writer goes so far as to


/77/ For example, two recent reviews of population policy in Western and Eastern Europe say nothing about the matter: Massimo Livi-Bacchi, Population Studies, 28, July 1974, p. 191-204; and Milos Macura, op. cit., November 1974, p. 369-79.
refer to the

"critical problem of competitive breeding (as) in my judgement one of the world's central problems... This topic, even more delicate than that of population control, rarely receives mention but it is a nettle which must sooner or later be firmly grasped. How can man ever control his overall population size within the carrying capacity of the environment whilst individual groups are remorselessly competing for numerical superiority, regardless of the consequences?" 78/

- though he was probably thinking mainly of inter-country competitions.

The causes of such ethnic differentials are a matter of dispute within the scientific community: are they genuine (i.e., deriving somehow from the ethnic characteristics themselves) or are they spurious (i.e., reflecting merely some simultaneous other differences, in urban residence or education or income or occupation or socio-economic status or some similar characteristic)? On any such complicated question, the answer is seldom definitive but the current judgment would appear to be that in most ethnic situations in most countries the difference is real.

Take the central case of religion. Across the world, three religious communities do have distinctive and consistent fertility patterns: Moslems very high, Catholics higher than their national counterparts, Jews low. And such differences have some historical validity.

Over a long period of time Jews have had smaller families and have planned them more rationally -- not just in the United States, not just recently, not just social position. 79/ Similarly, "the cross-national pattern for Catholics is equally clear, and higher Catholic fertility has been observed in almost every 'developed' country where data are available." 80/

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80/ Calvin Goldscheider, Population, Modernization, and Social Structure, Little, Brown, 1971, p. 277
In such countries "Catholic fertility exceeds that of non-Catholic in almost every country and socio-economic group" 81/ -- and especially where they are a distinguishable and self-defined minority. As for Moslems,

"within the important limitations of the data it may be said that Moslem natality (1) is almost universally high, (2) shows no evidence of important trends over time, and (3) is generally higher than that of neighboring peoples of other major religions." 82/

In its review, the U.N. concludes:

"...in any study of fertility differentials based on religion, it is important to consider to what extent the observed fertility differences between religious groups may be due to differences in income, occupation, education, urban-rural residence or some other non-religious factors. These studies have found, generally, that while socio-economic and residential factors often account for a substantial part of the religious fertility differential, they do not account for all of it." 83/

In sharp compression, whatever the full explanation, some of the reasons appear to be distinctive to each: cultural practices in family life and particularly the subordination of women among Moslems, doctrinal beliefs with reference to fertility norms and means of fertility control among Catholics (now weakening in the West), high social mobility combined with


83/ U.N., op. cit., p. 102
the historical "insecurities and marginality" of small-minority status among Jews.

In the past five years or so have appeared a spate of papers seeking to explore the underlying causes of differential ethnic fertility through two competing hypotheses: (1) the "assimilationist" or "characteristics" hypothesis that as ethnic groups become similar in social, economic, and demographic characteristics and thus assimilated into the mainstream, their fertility will also converge; and (2) the "minority group status" hypothesis that (a) fertility will remain low if the (small) minority group is after social mobility, has no pro-natalist ideology ("particularized theology"), and suffers "insecurities and marginality" in its status (Jews in America); if not, it can be quite high as a matter of group preservation (Hutterites, Hasidim, and Black Muslims); (b) fertility will remain high if the group is large enough to challenge for political power (Catholics in Holland), if its chances for social mobility are not good (Catholics in Northern Ireland), or if its position in a heterogeneous society intensifies its religious feeling and the fertility norms that go with it (higher Catholic fertility in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States et al., than in their majorities in Argentina, France, Italy, Hungary, et al.)

The outcome to date is inconclusive, as indicated by this conclusion from

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the latest article:

"The findings of this study... strongly suggest a minority group status effect. But they also suggest... that with the assimilation of minority groups, the fertility of majority and minority groups converge." 85/

Thus any narrowing of differences in sub-groups is taken to support one hypothesis, and any remaining difference to support the other.

So on the whole ethnic differentials in fertility appear to be real, not explainable away by reference to other social characteristics of the groups involved. But even if they were "spurious", i.e., attributable thereto, that is somewhat beside the point of policy-oriented concern, since (a) the perception is also real in the sense that it leads to consequences and (b) whatever the "true cause", the fact remains that a clearly identifiable ethnic group has different fertility.

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- Goldscheider and Uhlenberg, op. cit.
- Kennedy, op. cit.

and there are at least two earlier titles of relevance:

- Van Heek, op. cit.
"and that's what matters." In fact, the overlapping characteristics have been given a reverse twist, so to speak:

"It would appear that rich/poor differences in fertility are mainly perceived as publicly troublesome only if simultaneously ethnic in character, as they typically are in non-homogenous societies." 86/

Finally, the consequences of such differentials are considered to be mainly political - the power reflected in numbers:

"In a democracy where one man has one vote it would seem obvious that groups with large populations would have more power than groups with a small number. Certainly many minority racial, religious, and ethnic groups have often assumed that they could relieve themselves of persecution if only they could increase their number sufficiently to gain greater voting power. In the United States it has been suggested that elements within the Roman Catholic Church may have encouraged large families among Catholic parishioners in order to gain the Church greater political strength... In many cases a large population has provided a minority group with an increase in political power. In the early days of the United States, Roman Catholics suffered a great deal of political persecution at the hands of the overwhelming majority of Protestants. Eventually, however, as their numbers increased (through immigration as well as through fertility), the Catholics found themselves in an ever more favorable political position..." 87

and particularly when regional or local concentrations are considered:

Catholics in Massachusetts, Jews in New York.

In any case, the road to political power through differential population growth is a long one. Consider these examples (based on simplistic assumptions of no migration or other demographic differentials, but suggesting orders of magnitude): 88/

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86/ Derelson, ed., op. cit., p. 772


88/ I am indebted to my colleague Dorothy Nortman for these calculations as well as other assistance.
With another child per family, when would U.S. Jews become 6% of the U.S. population?  
111 years

...When would they total 12 million?  
45 years

With a half-child differential in family size, when would U.S. blacks become 25% of the U.S. population?  
94 years

With the continuance of present birth rates in Northern Ireland, when would the Catholics become 51% of the population?  
82 years

With the continuance of present birth rates in Belgium, when would the Wallonians become 51% of the population?  
200 years

With the continuance of present birth rates in Cyprus, when would the Turks become 51% of the population?  
143 years

With the continuance of present differentials in population growth, when would the Moslems in India become 25% of the population?  
123 years

Policy does not usually get made, let alone applied, for such long-term prospects, and certainly not on such changeable matters as fertility rates. Moreover, as noted above,

"an increase in population is not the only road to greater power for a minority group... In all probability, Jews have increased potency in the United States not through an increase in number... but because so many individual Jews have gained influential positions in the society," 89/

as similarly demonstrated by the small Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia.

Finally, in an economic consequence of differential ethnic fertility, felt on the individual level, the high fertility cohort is penalized by its own size in achieving educational and occupational mobility, for succeeding generations.

89/ Heer, op. cit., p. 99
"The effect is to exacerbate a demand for government interventions if the economic characteristics and political opportunities of the groups are unequal. Among underprivileged groups, RPC (rapid population change) tends to increase differentiation and discrimination because their numbers increase faster than their opportunities. Demands for new opportunities could affect governmental services if politicians decide to respect rising group expectations, to capitalize on the awareness of group differences, or to respond to potentially effective organizational activity on the part of emergent groups."


The analysis proceeds:

"In the abstract formulation of the four extreme demand situations, (1) would describe a case of equal growth rate among the different ethnic groups where opportunities are restricted to a preferred elite community; (J), where growth rates are uneven and the opportunities are differentiated; (K), with even growth rates and undifferentiated opportunity, and (L), unequal population growth in communal situations of undifferentiated opportunity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group Functions</th>
<th>Restricted Opportunities</th>
<th>Undifferentiated Opportunities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of RPC Rates Among Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Even</td>
<td>J</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uneven</td>
<td>I</td>
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Situation I. The ethnic groups that are restricted to low productivity or marginal economic functions will be disadvantaged by RPC and will agitate for education, employment preferences, and unemployment and other social benefits. (Examples: Canada, Rhodesia.)

Situation J. If the increase occurs in economically marginal ethnic groups, a highly volatile situation arises (if rural, the group will demand urban access; if urban, they will demand increased welfare services or equivalent amenities); in more favorably situated ethnic groups, the possibility of volatile responses would still remain if they lose their preferred status because of excessive growth rates. This situation is common (continued)
by the substance of the matter, as suggested above, but also by two other considerations: acceptable policy interventions are not available anyway, and the "remedies" are of such a long-run character as not to warrant much policy attention.

The issues, in short, lie deeper than fertility. If ethnic relations are poor, fertility gets caught up as an element in the conflict but cannot readily be addressed outside the arena; if they are good, the issue falls away. Like other problems, this one may be better solved indirectly: "as with so many other problems", Ryder says, "the solutions that seem plausible and effective and acceptable are non-demographic in character." 93/ Or to put the matter more positively, large ethnic groups are not likely to achieve much more "power" in a matter of decades by differential fertility, and small minorities might best fulfill their perceived missions through the hold of internal doctrine or cultural identity rather than through an increase in numbers that in any case could only be marginal.

At the same time, around the world, fertility appears to be decreasing. If that continues, as would seem likely, then given time there will be a much narrower band of fertility rates within which differentials can operate. Among other benefits of lowering fertility -- and this is not the largest -- should come a lowering of ethnic differentials, as the top falls toward the bottom. Although the data are by no means definitive, it begins to appear that policy can do more to decrease than to increase fertility. Thus over time there will be more of a convergence on the down side -- not uniformity

93/ Ryder, ibid.
As for the effect of population growth in general upon ethnic tensions, there are as usual two sides to the question:

"In countries which do not have a homogeneous population, rapid population growth creates or aggravates political and economic conflicts between racial, cultural, religious, and linguistic groups."

"There is less likelihood of ethnic conflict when all groups are growing than when some are growing and some declining... Growth simplifies problems of accommodation and change."

In any case, what is to be done if ethnic fertility differentials are "unacceptable"? What have these countries tried to do? The list is short: try to manipulate child assistance stipends (Belgium), try to manipulate family planning assistance (United States, Malaysia, Thailand), depend on migration in or out (Israel, Ireland, South Africa), exhort (Israel, USSR, South Africa: strange bedfellows!), look away (Lebanon, Nigeria, Cyprus). Given the conflict situation in which the ethnic groups are rooted to begin with, discriminatory policy of any strength is counter-indicated at the outset, short of repressive measures; and it may be that most governments are not particularly concerned not only

\[90/\] (cont) because restricted opportunities tend to relegate certain groups to below-average socioeconomic levels, which in turn leads to above-average birthrates. For the same reason, Situation I is rare. (Examples of Situation J: Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, S. Africa, Congo(Brazz.), Bolivia, U.S., USSR, Yugoslavia, Malaysia.) Situation K. RPC does not magnify ethnic conflict as a source of demand for government services. (Example: Tanzania.) Situation L. Foreshadows possible future ethnic specialization leading to Situation I or J because fastest growing groups may gain control of certain occupations. Differential cultural compatibility with requirements and opportunities of modernization in either Situation K or L could also lead to Situation I or J. (Examples: China; Zaire; the southern Nigerian states.)"


\[92/\] Norman Ryder, "Two Cheers for ZPG", Daedalus, Fall 1973, p. 61.
of course but less differential -- and that may be the likeliest prospect both for the present transition and for ethnic differentials.

Hence in this as in other ways, it may turn out in the eye of history that the Jews got there early if not first. This time, the wave of the future may be theirs.
Demographic and Political Implications of Immigration Policy

by Charles B. Keely
Demographic and Political Implications of Immigration Policy

Charles B. Keely
Department of Sociology
Fordham University

Appendix A

This appendix contains summary data on the proportions and sex ratios of immigrants from various regions and countries. The goal is to provide a general overview of some effects of the 1965 Immigration Act which amended the basic immigration code contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the McCarran-Walter Act). The data are presented for three periods: 1961-1965, the last five years under the McCarran-Walter provisions; 1966-1968, the transition period during which the quota system was phased out; 1969-1973, the first five years under the new provisions. (See Keely, 1971 for the details on the process of phasing out the quota system. For more detailed data on other characteristics, see Keely, 1971; 1974a; 1975a.)

These data are from a file in which published and unpublished aggregate data from INS for 1961 through 1973 were compiled for all countries from which 2500 or more immigrants were admitted in any one year between 1961-1972. Support for the project in which these data were collected came from the Ford-Rockefeller Foundations Program in Support of Social Science and Legal Research on Population Policy (1973-74). The contents of the file are described in Tomasi and Keely (1975).
I. Introduction

(1) The purpose of this paper is to review the historical and current controversies regarding United States immigration policies and their effects. This review is made in the context of trying to clarify the relationship between immigration policy and the demographic characteristics of the immigrant streams and the American population. This background will hopefully provide insights and raise pertinent questions about political and social implications of immigration for intergroup relations along a path to a stationary population in the United States.*

(2) The topic of population stabilization and intergroup relations is difficult to handle for at least two reasons. (A) It is a broad and extremely complex issue which affects the life of the nation from the bedroom to the boardroom. Examples can be multiplied endlessly illustrating the impact of slowing population growth and ethnicity (in the sense of racial, religious and national origin background) on the economic, social and political behavior of Americans. (B) It is a new topic of thought in this country. Serious consideration has not really been given to this subject whose importance is clear. It is true that visions of being overrun by various groups of foreigners have been raised in the past and have affected policy. These nightmares are unfortunately also part of the American dream. The most recent example is the fear of a Latin American inundation which resulted in the legislative jumble of current restrictions on Western Hemisphere immigration.

*In this paper, I will interpret the "population stabilization" of the Conference title in the more narrow sense of "movement to a stationary population." The implications for immigration policy of stationary, stable or quasi-stable populations would appear to be different, especially if different ethnic groups are not all in the same demographic situation. I think introducing such a variable at this stage of discussion of the conference subject would be somewhat premature and perhaps too speculative.
(3) The complexity and newness of this particular topic apply also to the more narrow subject of immigration policy in a stationary population. To gain even a modicum of closure at this point is difficult indeed and even premature. The goal of this paper is more modest. It is to review the genesis and development of immigration policy, to trace its demographic effects and to present the major policy questions currently raised about immigration. Given this background, I will conclude with some particular problem areas raised by immigration for intergroup relations.

II. Immigration and Population Growth: The Demographic Issue

(4) It is good to remind ourselves about the history of a social issue. Quite frankly, in the recent past, immigration was a fairly dead social, political, and academic issue until the interim report of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (1971). Perhaps it is too much to say that without the Commission people would not have become aware of the impacts of immigration at its current volume and with its changing characteristics. It may not, however, have become such a live issue. Perhaps immigration would not have been the topic of a separate background paper at this conference but rather have been relegated to a subsection of the paper on differential growth rates. However, the Commission did raise the question and raised it forcefully.

(5) The interim report of the Population Commission (1971, 8-9) pointed out that about 20 percent of current population growth is due to net immigration.* The Commission also estimated that net immigration of 400,000 per

*Net (civilian) immigration as estimated by the Census Bureau includes alien immigration, net migration from Puerto Rico, net arrivals of civilian citizens, conditional entrants (e.g., refugees) and emigration (Keely, 1972b, 2-3). It
should also be noted that there are indications that estimated emigration at a rate of about 10 percent of alien immigration seems to be low for the decade of 1960-1970 (Warren and Peck, 1975). Warren and Peck estimate emigration of the foreign born at about 1.06 million for the decade, or 100,000 per annum, which equals a bit more than 25% of net civilian immigration and about 32% of alien immigration. It should be noted that this is an estimate of foreign-born emigration only and so does attempt to account for native-born emigration. Since about 25 percent of Warren and Peck's estimated emigration were females between 25-44, there is a possibility that substantial numbers of children who are native-born emigrated. As Warren and Peck note (p. 13), the possible sources of errors should lead one to regard their estimates, especially by age, as approximations. It is clear, however, that there was a large return migration of foreign-born in the 1960's.
year would yield an additional 16 million persons in the population of the year 2000 and over the next 100 years immigration at that volume would account for nearly half of the population growth from 204 to 340 million.

(6) This unforeseen situation aroused concern. News media gave coverage to the findings, members of Congress reacted in oversight hearings about the administration of immigration law (Keely, 1972b, 2), and concerned citizen groups, like Zero Population Growth (ZPG), turned their attention to the impact of immigration.

(7) The major issue that has been raised is the contribution of immigration (immigrants and their offspring) to population growth. There are some basic and serious methodological problems (which have policy implications) about the use of net civilian immigration rather than net alien immigration (Keely, 1972a) about estimates of the components of net civilian immigration (Warren and Peck, 1975), and about the use made of the balancing equation to arrive at the estimates of the relative contribution of the components of population growth (Keely, 1974b). However, the basic issue remains: What is a tolerable level of immigration? Is it the current level, zero net immigration, some number which takes into account the fertility and age structure of immigrants? Or is it some other option?

(8) A look at past and current data may illuminate this issue, although not provide a definitive answer since the issue is a question of values. At its root, the issue of immigration and population growth requires balancing the costs and benefits of receiving immigrants. It seems obvious that people in the United States do not assign the same values to these costs and benefits nor even consistently categorize an effect as a cost or benefit (e.g., having a certain proportion of the population foreign born or of

(9) Census data on the foreign born and foreign stock (which includes foreign born plus native born persons, one or both of whose parents are foreign born) are available beginning with the Census of 1870 and data on country of birth are available from 1850. Niles Carpenter's study *Immigrants and Their Children* (1927) examined the data on the foreign born and the foreign stock available in the two series. He drew four conclusions from his examination of the size of the foreign stock.

(10) "First, the mere bulk of the foreign white stock has increased tremendously." (p. 7). The foreign born increased from about 2.3 million in 1850 to 13.7 million in 1920. In the 50 years from 1870 to 1920, the native born whites of foreign or mixed parentage increased from 5.3 to about 22.7 million.

(11) "Second, the proportion of the foreign white stock, both in the total population and the total white population, has not varied significantly during the period under consideration." Tables 1 and 2 present the data Carpenter was summarizing.

(Table 1 about here)

(12) "Third, in some respects, the proportionate size in the immigrant stock seems to be falling off slightly." Carpenter was referring to the decline between 1910 and 1920 in the percentage of foreign born (from 14.5 to 13.0 percent) and of foreign stock (from 35.0 to 34.4 percent). Carpenter saw this as the beginning of a declining trend (p. 10) due to restricted immigration, accelerated emigration accompanying the First World War and the effects of other factors such as the exhaustion of free land (p. 9).

(13) "Fourth, the foreign-born element in the population of this country while much larger, relative to the total population, than that in European
countries, is, nevertheless, not such a large faction of the whole as in certain other American nations (particularly Canada and Argentina)." Carpenter's conclusion was intended to underline the fact that the demographic impact of immigration in the United States was less than elsewhere and that the catastrophic results predicted for the United States by opponents of immigration were not a necessary result. Other countries with a larger relative impact showed social and cultural continuity. It should be parenthetically remarked that although Carpenter made this passing reference to the comparative perspective, his work shares the characteristic of a parochial outlook of much immigration literature. The reader is often left with the impression that United States policy and the size and composition of immigrant streams were only tangentially affected by what happened elsewhere and that United States immigration was not part of world wide population redistribution. Further, comparative studies of immigration policies and comparative studies of the effects of immigration are sparse. The approach parallels--perhaps affects or is affected by--the traditional Congressional assumption that immigration is a purely internal matter and foreign policy or the wishes of other governments should not play a role in policy development in this area.

(14) E. P. Hutchinson followed up the work of Carpenter in his 1956 study, Immigrants and Their Children, 1850-1950. Hutchinson noted the rising trend in the number of foreign born until 1930 (14.2 million) and the beginning of the declining trend in 1940 and 1950, which continued through two subsequent censal periods. The proportion of foreign born has decreased since 1910. Table 2 presents data on the foreign born since 1850.

(Table 2 about here)
(15) Hutchinson (p. 2) explained the declining trends as due to immigration restriction, the depression, World War II and the aging of the foreign born population. It should be noted that despite the increased alien immigration of the latter part of the 1960's, both the number and percentage of foreign born decreased between 1960 and 1970.

(Table 3 about here)

(16) Patterns similar to the foreign born are apparent for the total foreign stock and native born of foreign or mixed parentage. The data in Table 3* show that the number of foreign stock peaked to nearly 40 million in 1930 and has been generally declining since that time to a level of 32 million in 1970. The proportion of foreign stock began to decline in 1910 and was at 17.9 percent in 1970, the lowest level in the century for which data are available.

(17) The native born of foreign or mixed parentage peaked in 1930 at about 26 million. The number declined during the 1930's only to rise again steadily until the 1970 Census when it returned to the 1940 level. It would seem obvious that the depression with its effects on fertility and the net loss in international migration to the United States affected these

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*These data are for the white population only due to accessibility of data over time. In 1970, there were 801,765 persons of foreign or mixed parentage who were classified as Negro or other races. This was 3.2 percent of the total in that category. About 240 thousand Negroes were included in that 801,765 and the rest were primarily Asian. This number of native Negroes of foreign or mixed parentage represented 1.1 percent of the 22.1 million Negro population. However, those classified as a race other than White or Negro totaled 2,552,575 persons, of whom 632 thousand were foreign born and 561 thousand are native of foreign or mixed parentage. This amounts to over 46 percent of the (primarily) Asian population being of foreign stock. Thus, the Asian population, as part of the new ethnics (groups whose members increased rapidly due to the 1965 Immigration Act), is in sharp contrast to the current situation of the White and Negro population.
trends. Also it is to be expected that declining trends in the children of the foreign born would lag behind declines in the foreign born population. The proportion of white persons of foreign or mixed parentage relative to the total white population has steadily declined since 1920 to the 1970 level of 13 percent, also the lowest level in the century during which data have been collected. The earlier decline in the proportion (as opposed to the number of natives of foreign or mixed parentage) should alert us to the question of the fertility of the alien population relative to the native population.

(Table 4 about here)

In short, the white foreign stock of the United States and its component parts have been decreasing numerically and, for a longer time, proportionately. Data on total (all races) foreign stock are available for 1960 and 1970 and presented in Table 4. It, too, shows the absolute and proportional declines between 1960 and 1970 in total foreign stock and its components, foreign born and native born of foreign or mixed parentage.

From these data, we can conclude that the country is not being overrun by immigrants and their children. The foreign stock is declining and is at its lowest level as a percentage of the United States population in a century and the same is true of both its component parts. Although the United States continues to accept immigrants in generous numbers, we seem numerically to be in no danger of being overrun. Local and regional impacts of the foreign stock must also be evaluated, but on a national level, American society and culture seems not to be in danger from being "overrun by the foreign element."

The demographic significance of immigration takes on added impor-
tance with the cumulation of the streams. Information on the process of cumulation during intercensal periods is afforded by year-of-immigration questions. Such information was included in the censuses for 1890 through 1930 and inserted again in 1970. In their study of The Changing Population of the United States, Conrad and Irene Taeuber (1958) discussed the cumulative effects of migration between 1900 and 1930. Published data from the 1970 Census are not directly comparable with the Taeubers' presentation (periods of arrival differ) but there are some comparisons that can be made between the 1890-1930 data and the 1970 data in the two panels in Table 5.

(Table 5 about here)

(21) First, the number and percent who arrived in the decade immediately preceding the census year declined during the 1900-1930. However, in 1970, 29.4 percent of the foreign born arrived between 1960-1970. Second, in 1970, 31 percent of the foreign born population arrived before 1925 and was, therefore, 45 years or older. In 1930, 32.5 percent was 30 years or older. Thus, as Hutchinson pointed out, the age structure and mortality play a significant role in the trends in the number and proportion of the population who are foreign born. In fact, in 1970, 32 percent of the foreign born were 65 years of age or older and 59 percent were 45 or older. This compares with 9.9 percent and 30.5 percent of the total United States population for the two respective age groupings. (Characteristics of the Population, Vol. 1, Part 1, Table 49, p. 1-263).

(22) A longer-range view of the effects of cumulative immigration and immigrant fertility is offered by Gibson (1975) in his study of the contribution of immigration to United States population from 1790 to 1970. The 35.5 million net immigrants in that period contributed an estimated 98
million or 48 percent of the 1970 population. Although an increased proportion of annual population growth was due to immigration in the last decade, this has been due to the decline in the amount and rate of natural increase in the United States. As Gibson (1975, 176) quotes from the Report of the Population Commission: "the increasing relative significance of immigration can be misleading for, if native births and deaths were balanced, (net) immigration would account for 100 percent of population growth," no matter how small net immigration was.

(23) Gibson notes further (1975, 176-177) that the number and percent of contribution of immigration from 1790 has no obvious social, economic or political implications due to the indeterminancy and variability of demographic and other variables. However, the cumulative effects of immigration from a more current date could indeed have policy implications. Such estimations, as well as projections of future cumulative impact, are possible using Gibson's methodology and Coale's (1972) methodology contained in his paper on "Alternative Paths to a Stationary Population" prepared for the Population Commission. In each case, actual experience or different assumptions about various future characteristics of the immigrant stream can be substituted.

(24) In this context, I feel more attention should be paid to the variables of the size of net immigration and immigrant fertility. Two points ought to be borne in mind regarding net immigration. First, net civilian immigration, as estimated by the Census Bureau, includes more than net alien immigration, i.e., more than net total of foreign born intending settlement and possessing valid immigrant visas. In discussing policy on immigration and population growth, it is clear that legal alien immigration, the other components of net civilian and illegal alien immigration, all affect future population size. It is
not equally clear, however, whether or to what extent the impact of illegal immigration or the citizen components of net civilian immigration ought to affect policy to increase or decrease legal alien immigration. Second, as mentioned previously, the work of Warren and Peck (1975) calls into doubt recent assumptions about the amount of emigration. Their estimates of foreign born emigration are well above the assumed level of total emigration (equal to 10 percent of alien immigration). The amount of native born emigration, independent of and related to this flow (e.g., native children of foreign born parents), could also be more substantial than previously suspected.

In short, how one defines "immigration" and the serious questions about size of the emigration component lead me to the conclusion that the frequently used assumption of annual net immigration of 400,000 ought to be examined and conclusions based on analyses of estimates and projections using that figure ought to be carefully stated, especially when policy on alien immigration is involved.

(25) The fertility experience of immigrant groups is becoming the topic for an increasing amount of research. This development has been spurred on by the competing hypotheses used to explain differential fertility among subgroups in a population: the particularized theology hypothesis, social characteristics hypothesis, and minority group status hypothesis. Frequently, analyses of subgroup fertility have dealt with broad comparisons, for example, among native White, Negro and Spanish. More recently, detailed comparisons among a larger variety of ethnic groups have been undertaken. Kritz and Gurak (1975), for example, have examined fertility differentials among 18 ethnic groups in the United States to determine the contribution of ethnicity in explaining United States fertility patterns, to determine
whether ethnic effects are additive or interactive, and to specify groups which have significantly different fertility processes from native whites. They conclude that, although the absence of ethnicity would not produce highly biased results in a study of general fertility processes, there are significant differences in fertility patterns across groups, with some foreign born groups significantly lower than native white. Such differences take on added significance on the local or regional level if a group is highly concentrated geographically.

(26) Further, I have found after some preliminary analysis of completed fertility of older (45 and over) foreign born women that their fertility is surprisingly low. I have not yet controlled for factors such as age at marriage, origin, year of immigration and so do not draw any conclusions.

(27) I raise these two examples to point out the need for more detailed analysis of ethnic fertility. Such analyses are especially needed in the context of ethnic relations in a population characterized as stable or stationary, especially given the findings of Kritz and Gurak on different patterns across groups. Such detailed analyses should also take into account ethnic concentration in order to evaluate localized effects on social and political relations.

(28) One final word is necessary about future immigration. Clearly not only size but also characteristics of immigrants are important when considering their effects on society. Current proposals to alter immigration law, to say nothing about possible future action to reduce volume, could radically alter the composition of immigration. Such policy issues will be discussed below. It is sufficient at this point to note that there seems to be no way to reliably estimate future composition given the wide
variety of proposals being discussed and contained in bills before Congress and the data available on immigrants, visa applications and aliens resident in the United States (Tomasi and Keely, 1975).

(29) In this section, I have reviewed a wide variety of topics in which immigration intersects with the issue of population growth. Immigration as a demographic issue is developing as a major policy concern. Most probably, the demographic impact of immigrants will become an increasingly important policy consideration, which has not been the case in the past. I would sum up the major points of this section as follows:

(1) the number and proportion of foreign born and foreign stock in the United States has been declining;

(2) the increasing role of immigration in population growth can be misleading since it is a function of fertility decline;

(3) data on cumulative effects of past immigration reconfirm the "nation of immigrant" image but provides little insight for future policy;

(4) there is serious question about the assumed level of emigration;

(5) ethnic fertility patterns need further study, especially when groups are highly concentrated in localized areas;

(6) future characteristics of immigrant streams cannot be reliably estimated.

(30) I am led to the same conclusion stated previously: on the national level, the basic demographic issue is a basic question of values. How many people do we want in the society? Coale (1972, 599, 603) concluded that current levels of immigration are tolerable and that "it is not necessary to abandon the American tradition of welcoming immigrants." (Italics in original) The president of ZPG, John Tanton (1975), comes to the opposite
conclusion on the basis of Coale's work. But neither of these conclusions
deals with composition, rather, they focus on volume. As we will see below,
what kinds of immigrants we welcome continues to be the major focus of
controversy.

III. Immigration Policy: The Break With the Past and Its Effects

(31) The most important political factor in immigration policy has not
been population size but ethnicity. For example, among the first federal
laws on immigration were the Chinese Exclusion Acts of the 1880's. The de-
velopment of Congressional jealousy regarding its perogatives in this area
(now deeply institutionalized and supported by re-election concerns) has
important roots in Executive action relating to the Gentlemen's Agreement.
In fact, up to and including the Immigration Act of 1965, ethnic consider-
atations have been the chief ingredients in the formulation of law. The out-
lines of this history are fairly well known. I need only mention opposition
to the "new immigrants," literacy tests, the 42 volume report of the Dilling-
ham Commission, national origin quotas, oriental exclusion, the Asia-Pacific
triangle. These and other mechanisms were supported and justified by
ideologies of racial superiority and hypotheses about assimilability.

(32) After the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act in 1952 over President
Truman's veto, those who rejected any scheme using national origin or ances-
try as an immigrant selection mechanism (and the intellectual baggage support-
ing such schemes), regrouped for yet another assault against what some believed
to be the cornerstone of United States immigration policy, the national origins
quota system. As events developed, the opponents of the quota system were
successful.

(33) Until the 1965 Act, the basic structure of immigrant selection was
the quota system which reserved a proportion of annual immigrant visas for
countries based on the proportion of the ethnic stock of that country in
the United States population as of 1920. Within each country's quota,
immigrants were given preference on the basis of skills and family rela-
tionships. (See Chart 1) Certain immediate relatives of United States
citizens were exempt from quotas. All countries had a minimum of 100.
For natives of the Western Hemisphere (except those of oriental ancestry),
there were no quotas or ceilings. All immigrants had to meet certain health,
moral character, criminal record and past political affiliation tests. A
special provision, the Asia-Pacific Triangle, applied to all persons with at
least one-half ancestry traceable to an area defined by longitude and lati-
tude in an area covering Asia and the Pacific. Such persons were counted
not against the quota of their country of birth but of their country of
ancestry. For those of mixed Asian background not predominantly from one
country, a special quota of 100 was established against which they would be
counted. Although this provision was a break with complete oriental ex-
clusion, it was still clearly racial discrimination against persons of Asian
ancestry.

(Chart 1 about here)

(34) The 1965 amendments to the immigration and nationality code made
major revisions in United States policy (Keely, 1971, 1974a). The law elimi-
nated the national origins quota system and Asian restrictions, introduced
a new preference system (Chart 1), added labor certification procedures
for certain classes of immigrants, and put a ceiling on Western Hemisphere
immigration for the first time. These changes resulted in increased volume
and alteration of the origin and the demographic and labor characteristics
of immigrants from various countries. These changes in the immigrant streams.
and the relationship of the structure and operation of the law and demographic changes have been discussed elsewhere (Boyd, 1974; Keely, 1971, 1974a, 1975a; Irwin, 1972). In Appendix A, I have included tables with some summary data on these changes for the reader's information and convenience.

(35) There are two types of changes, however, which require discussion given the conference topic, namely, geographic origin and labor force characteristics. The data are summarized in Table 6.

(Table 6 about here)

(36) First, there have been major shifts in origin (Table 6, Col. 1). European immigrants have proportionately declined. There has also been a decided shift to Southern European countries within Europe, with a resultant absolute decline for some Northern European countries, the previous recipients of high visa quotas (Keely, 1974a, 590). North and South America also declined, especially after the imposition of the 120,000 ceiling in 1968. The other continents, and most notably Asia, have increased their proportionate share of the larger volume following the 1965 Act.

(37) The proportions of persons intending to enter the labor force also changed. Europe and the Americas declined and Asia and the other continents increased (Table 6, Col. 2). The proportion of professionals among those in the labor force by country (Table 6, Col. 3) and the geographic origin of the immigrant professionals (Table 6, Col. 4) altered radically. Asian changes in both cases are very notable. The experience of the Western Hemisphere in these areas is also worth noting. As will be discussed below, the effect of immigration law on the brain drain is a mixed picture.

(38) I do not think it fruitful to go into further detailed analysis of the changes but will leave it to the reader to inspect the data in
Appendix A or consult the analyses in the references cited. What are more important in terms of our focus are the controversies that have developed because of the changes noted and the issues raised regarding immigration policy.

IV. Current Issues in Immigration Policy: Selection Mechanisms

(39) In this section, I will summarize the major issues before Congress related to immigration. It should be noted that, at present, these issues revolve around immigrant selection and not volume. In short, the demographic concern is not yet mirrored to any large extent in Congressional deliberations.

Four areas of policy will be considered: (1) change to a world-wide selection system; (2) illegal immigration; (3) the brain drain; and (4) legislative adjustments of a technical nature.

World-Wide Selection System

(40) Experience under the 1965 amendments has led to a number of criticisms of the current law. The major criticism of the law's operation centers on the different sets of requirements for applicants from the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world (Eastern Hemisphere). These hemispheric differences (e.g., in ceilings, applicability of the preference system, scope of labor certification and adjustment of status) have resulted in a two-and-a-half year wait for a visa for Western Hemisphere natives while, for most countries in the Eastern Hemisphere, all preferences are current or close to it. This situation is viewed as inequitable and has reinforced the dissatisfaction which existed with the involved legislative history which led to the separate hemispheric provisions in the first place.
That legislative history has been discussed elsewhere (Keely, 1972a). Our purpose here is not to analyze the policy development process but to indicate that dissatisfaction with the longer waits for visas in the Western Hemisphere confirms a widely shared opinion about inequity in the hemispheric provisions.

(41) The perceived inequity in treatment of natives of the two hemispheres has led to a number of omnibus-type bills to again restructure immigration law. Their purpose is not so much to change policy goals but to devise a system whereby area of birth would not penalize a visa applicant. The desire is to ensure that, within the framework of family reunification and protection of the United States labor (the preference system), discrimination on the basis of country of birth be eliminated from United States policy.

(42) Three major bills were introduced into the 93rd Congress to develop a unified world-wide immigrant selection system: H.R. 9409, an administration bill; S. 2643, introduced by Sen. Edward Kennedy; and H.R. 981, introduced by Rep. Peter Rodino, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary. These bills are representative of the general thrusts of changes suggested in this area. All three bills attempt to achieve uniformity in the application of immigration laws by having a world-wide ceiling of approximately 300,000 visas. All bills retain provisions for admitting immediate family members (generally parents, spouses, and children) of United States citizens outside the 300,000 limit. Each bill would have the preference system apply universally (and not just to the Eastern Hemisphere as at present). There are different proposed alterations within the preference system such as eliminating married brothers and sisters of
United States citizens from fifth preference, changing the proportion of visas reserved for each preference and permitting the dropdown of unused visas in any category to meet excessive demands in the categories that follow (Tomasi and Keely, 1975).

(43) A major point of contention in the different bills is the status accorded Canada and Mexico. Current law for the Eastern Hemisphere mandates that no single country receive more than 20,000 visas per annum in order to avoid domination of annual immigration by one country. No such limit currently exists for the Western Hemisphere. The House seems to favor treating contiguous countries as all other countries would be treated, i.e., 20,000 visas. The Senate bill, however, would make an exception for Canada and Mexico and allocate 35,000 visas for these two countries on the basis of cultural, geographical and political factors. The main argument on the House side was summed up by Congressman Eilberg, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and International Law, during debate on H.R. 981: "we should treat all individuals regardless of place of birth on an equal basis."

(44) Supporters of special treatment point to the sharing of borders as a basis of the two exceptions. Perhaps more to the point is the realization that the particularly difficult problem with Mexico over international migration could be exacerbated by reducing legal immigration to 20,000 per year. This whole problem of Mexican immigration, including illegal migration and temporary worker programs, is seen in the context of United States relations in the hemisphere. Mexican immigration and control of the Panama Canal are two potentially very explosive questions for the United States. The United States, unlike Russia and China, as James Reston (1975) recently
pointed out in his syndicated column, has not been paying attention to countries in its geographic area. The Western Hemisphere has not been a strong suite in United States diplomacy. Perhaps, the Kennedy proposal reflects such concerns and uses the contiguous border concept to justify the effort to placate Mexico.

(45) In sum, there is strong feeling, especially in Congress and the administration, that the dual-hemisphere approach to immigration is inconsistent and inequitable. There is general agreement on developing a unified world-wide system which maintains the goals of current policy but which better achieves the principle of equity (first-come, first-served regardless of birth) within the context of the family reunification and labor protection embodied in the preference system and labor certification procedures uniformly applied. The question of Mexican immigration remains unresolved. Changes to a unified system could result in major compositional changes of the immigrant streams.

Illegals Aliens*

(46) It seemed that, given the general consensus for a world-wide system, some version of unified immigration procedures would pass the 93rd Congress. Two factors led to such expectations not being met. First, the Watergate affair and resultant change of administrations intervened. The Judiciary Committees of both houses of Congress had major jurisdiction over

*There is opposition to use of the term "illegal aliens" because of the connotations which the concept carries. It is an example of "blaming the victim," in the sense that the concept ignores all the structural factors (including United States tolerance and even encouragement of illegal migration through enforcement procedures) involved in such international population distribution and focuses on the individual actor who may be reacting to factors beyond his or her control in a most rational way.
impeachment hearings and these are the same committees with jurisdiction
over immigration legislation. Although the House did pass H.R. 981, the
Senate did not act. After the change of administrations, the crush of
activity on the economy, energy policy and Southeast Asia resulted in the
93rd Congress ending with no bill passed.

(47) During 1974 and into 1975, the second factor, concern with illegal
aliens, has overshadowed immigration policy. Interest has focused on H.R.
982, first introduced in the 93rd Congress and reintroduced in the House
in the current (94th) Congress under the same number. H.R. 982 is a bill
to penalize employers of illegal aliens as a means to cut down on the volume
of illegal immigration. It also contains an amnesty provision for aliens
in the United States who entered unlawfully before 1968. The bill was
recently (July 30, 1975) favorably reported out of the House Judiciary
Committee under the number H.R. 8713. It does not appear that the Senate
will accept the bill in its current form.

(48) Illegal immigration into the United States is one of those social
issues where concern outruns knowledge. The President has appointed a
Domestic Council Committee to study the problem, headed by the Attorney
General in whose department the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
is located. Commissioner Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. of the INS has spoken
on numerous occasions recently about the size and economic impact of the
situation. The Commissioner variously estimates the problem to include
between 4 to 12 million persons and has indicated that with the proper
resources he could open up 1 million jobs for citizens and legal residents.
The INS is feeling heavy pressure to "do something" about the flow of
illegal aliens. The public statements of the Commissioner and re-organization
of assignments within INS toward more patrol and investigation (Chapman, 1974) reflect that pressure. The INS has also recently contracted for a major study of the size and flows of illegal aliens. Public concern is also mirrored in continuing Congressional oversight hearings on illegal aliens beginning back in 1971 and the employer sanctions bill (H.R. 8713). The news media have also evidenced interest, as exemplified by the ABC network's hour-long special report in January, 1975 and major articles and editorials in the Christian Monitor, the Washington Post, San Francisco Examiner, New York Times, and U. S. News and World Report. The magazines of such organizations as the American Legion and the AFL-CIO have also run cover stories on illegal aliens.

(49) The general label "illegal alien" applies to a number of subcategories. Information and problems of control are different for subcategories. For example, seamen who "jump ship" and visitors who overstay their visas can be enumerated and often detected more easily than those who successfully enter clandestinely or violate the terms of their visas, e.g., by working with a visitor's visa. Indirect information is available from trend data on apprehensions and deportations. These data indicate an increase in illegal entry and overstay. However, it is difficult to partial out the effects on the data of increased illegal entry and changes in law enforcement activity. Clearly, apprehension data undercount the number of illegal aliens by any unknown amount but this is at least partially offset by the large number of repeater apprehensions.

(50) Characteristics of illegal aliens and their economic and social effects are obviously also difficult to determine. Although the major concentration seems to be Mexican nationals in the Southwest of the country,
other regions of the United States and nationals of other countries are also involved. New York City, for example, apparently has large numbers of illegal entrants among its various Hispanic ethnic groups.

(51) In short, current information on illegal aliens is scattered and of variable quality. Nevertheless, concern and anxiety is high. Policy discussions at this point are in four directions: employer sanctions, increased law enforcement, control of social security cards, and national identity documents.

(52) Hearings on an employer sanctions bill have taken place in the last and the current sessions of Congress. The arguments in favor of such a bill are that it would reduce the incentive to hire illegal aliens and thus reduce economic opportunities which are assumed to be the major drawing factor. Arguments against such a bill revolve around enforcement procedures and unintended discrimination against "foreign-looking" or non-English speaking citizens and legal resident aliens. Although there is widespread support for the intent of the bill, there is still argument over the procedures for enforcement and legislative language to prevent unwarranted discrimination.

(53) The second policy thrust is toward increased law enforcement by the INS. A set of revised priorities emphasizing patrol and investigation and reassignment of personnel was promulgated by the INS Commissioner in September, 1974 (Chapman, 1974). There is also pressure for increased INS budget for law enforcement manpower needs. Part of the re-deployment of INS personnel included reducing inspectors for overseas airline flights so that public inconvenience might be translated into increased funding for INS.
(54) Increased enforcement does not involve a change of law but it does intersect with an area of increasing policy discussion, temporary workers. There are numerous classes of temporary visas which are intended to permit the performance of work or which allow work to be performed as part of a "training experience" (Keely, 1975b). Such work encompasses not only lower-skilled and stoop labor but includes the labor of skilled craftsmen in construction and highly trained professionals in medicine, academia, and business. The areas of temporary work and enforcement get intertwined when conditions of temporary visas are violated. Since many temporary visa holders are permitted to "adjust status" to permanent immigrant, there is also the problem of fraud involved in adjustment of status cases. Temporary visas and adjustment of status also involve the policy problems of the brain drain and international education, which will be discussed below. In short, increased enforcement is not confined to just border patrol and inspection of entrants. It involves the complex interaction of the whole range of policy areas which affect immigration.

(55) The third policy thrust in controlling illegal aliens relates to control in the issuance of Social Security cards. Amendments in 1972 to the Social Security Act mandated passing of certain information by the Social Security Administration to INS regarding aliens applying for social security numbers. There has been much opposition to these procedures due to the clear legislative history surrounding the social security system. Social security cards were not intended to be identity cards and social security data were meant to be used only for social security administration and not in record matching for law enforcement. The expanded use of the social security number for a whole variety of purposes by all sorts of
organizations (e.g., bank accounts, military ID numbers, personnel numbers in business and industry) has led to concern about record matching and unintended use of the social security number. The 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act went a step further in mandating passing of information gathered from applications for a social security number to a law enforcement agency. (Manpower shortages have led to recent cut-backs in the program for passing information from Social Security to INS.) Thus concern over the use of the social security number and information has led to opposition to the 1972 law and the issue may eventually be adjudicated.

(56) To carry out the 1972 Amendments, there are plans (not yet instituted due to manpower shortages in the Social Security Administration) to issue Social Security cards to all children in first grade and to all permanent immigrants as part of their initial documentation. Such procedures would reduce walk-in applications for a social security number since citizens and eligible immigrants would normally receive a number. Thus, it would be administratively easier to check the eligibility of walk-in applicants.

(57) There are currently a spate of bills introduced which make various proposals to expand the use of the social security number or card as the basis of a system to check the legality of residence and the right to work.

(58) This use of the Social Security card ties into the fourth policy under discussion as a means to control of illegal immigration. During the 1975 hearings by the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Immigration and International Law on H.R. 982, there was close questioning by subcommittee members regarding the idea of a national identity card indicating a person's legal status (citizen, permanent resident alien, etc.) and right to take employment. The issue of an identity card is an emotional one in
the United States due to a long tradition and deep feelings against such a document. The opposition involves Constitutional questions about equal treatment, due process, and free movement among the states. There is also deep suspicion about government misuse, aggravated perhaps by the questionable and illegal activities by members of the Executive branch.

(59) Given the long tradition opposing identity cards, that it is even brought up by this time indicates the perception of the seriousness of the illegal alien problem. The members of the subcommittee and the Executive and most persons testifying did not support such an "extreme measure" as an identity card. However, the problems of detection and enforcement of the law regarding illegal aliens are so difficult and the anxiety so high that even so controversial a measure is at least discussed.

(60) In sum, the concern over illegal immigration has resulted in changes in social security practices. There is pressure for increased funding for INS enforcement activities and wide support for the employer sanctions bill (H.R. 8713). The use of national identity cards, although a possible help in enforcement, receives little meaningful support currently due to the traditional opposition to the idea in the United States.

(61) Illegal immigration clearly raises questions about ethnic relations. The political implications of methods proposed to control illegal immigration raise major questions about the type of society in which this and the following generations will live. The question of national identity cards or numbers and their use illustrate the broad range of implications of immigration policy.

Brain Drain

(62) One of the most notable effects of the 1965 amendments to United
States immigration law was the increase in the number and proportion of professionals and the changed areas of origin of such highly skilled people.

(63) The changes illustrated in Table 6 (especially Columns 3 and 4) have led to concern about whether United States immigration law encourages a brain drain. It should be noted that the 1965 preference system lessened emphasis on skills as a basis of entrance. Under the McCarran-Walter (1952) Act, persons who were highly skilled had first preference and fifty percent of all visas were reserved for them. (See Chart 1) Secondly, the different effects of the 1965 law on the Eastern and Western Hemisphere are also frequently overlooked in discussions of the brain drain. The provisions for Western Hemisphere immigrants (no preference system, the 120,000 ceiling, broad application of labor certification, no adjustment of status) and two-and-a-half year wait for a visa have resulted in a decline in the proportions of Western Hemisphere immigrants with a stated occupation (Col. 2), who are professionals (Col. 3), as a source of professionals (Col. 4), and as a source of immigrants generally (Col. 1). In short, a good case can be made that the most important change in the 1965 Act which led to the increase in the proportion of professionals and in the change in the areas of origin of professionals was not the new preference system but rather the abolition of the quota system. If the 1965 Act contained all the changes it did except abolition of the national origins quota system, the number and proportions of professionals might well have remained steady or declined. If this is the case, the policy choice in retrospect would have been between retention of a discriminatory selection system based on national origin (and the attendant racial, religious, and nationality discrimination of the quota system) versus the increase in professionals among immigrants.
especially from the Third World countries of Asia.

(64) Of course, the policy decisions were not based on those considerations. The overriding concern in the Congressional deliberations was elimination of the quota system. There was express consideration of the brain drain problem. What was not expected was the large demand for visas by professionals in some countries which removal of the quota system would generate, even with the downplaying of professional skills in the new preference system (third preference in the 1965 Act versus first preference under the McCarran-Walter Act).

(65) More focused concern has developed over the ability of Eastern Hemisphere applicants to apply for adjustment of status from a temporary to an immigrant visa. Adjustment of status was prohibited for exchange visitors but a 1970 amendment limited that prohibition only to exchange visitors supported by their own or the United States government. The same 1970 law also instituted a temporary visa (L visa) for intracorporation transferees and restricted adjustment of status for them. The issue here is that some exchange visitors (H & J visas) and students (F visas), as well as other classes of temporary visa holders, can adjust status. Such procedures call into question the whole purpose of exchange programs and international education policy. It was feared that temporary visas would be used primarily as a means of early entrance, giving the recipient advantages for gaining United States work experience and finding employment. Thus, the temporary visa would not in fact be used to get training or experience for use in the home country, but would increasingly become a mechanism to insure permanent immigration.

(66) Data do not lend support to the hypotheses of increased use of adjustment by students and exchange visitors (Keely, 1975b). The proportions
of adjustees who were exchange visitors or students have remained steady.

(67) However, there is the basic question about whether exchange visitors or students should be allowed to adjust status at all. To answer such a question involves complex problems about absorption capacity of developing countries, international education and exchange, the respective role of the sending and receiving countries in controlling and limiting manpower movement (skilled and unskilled), educational policies of sending countries and opportunities for ethnic minorities and women in the United States.

(68) At present, discussion in the United States over immigration and the brain drain is not focused on specific policy changes. There is still disagreement over such issues as the amount of drain versus overflow; the role of the United States in controlling immigration, especially if this requires singling out natives of only certain countries; the wisdom of curtailing international flow of highly trained manpower; and the amount of federal government control of international education programs at state and private colleges and universities.

(69) Obviously, the brain drain issue intersects with many complex policy issues. Indeed, some are convinced that the generic term "brain drain" tends to oversimplify a complex phenomenon. At this point, discussion continues (some would say endlessly) with no resolution in the form of consensus over whether changing immigration policy would, on balance, be more beneficial to sending countries, the United States and the cause of Third World development and, if so, what changes should be instituted.

Other Policy Considerations

(70) In this section, I will review other immigration policy areas
which would have an impact on the characteristics of streams and, therefore, affect intergroup relations. Many are of a technical nature. Because they are technical, however, does not necessarily mean they will be unimportant in their ramifications.

(71) The following revisions of current law have been advocated by voluntary agencies, business groups and other private-sector associations. Some are even in the form of proposed legislation. All have been objects of discussion by those professionally involved with United States immigration policy and its administration. (The following discussion in this section relies heavily on and, in places, quotes from Tomasi and Keely; 1975, especially Chapters 3 and 4.)

1. Temporary Workers

(72) One suggested tactic to control illegal aliens, especially in the Southwest, is expansion of non-immigrant temporary laborer programs. An attempt to return to the "bracero program" and large-scale temporary worker migration was made in early 1973. Rep. Omar Burleson (D - Texas) introduced H.R. 3355 to amend the Agricultural Act of 1949 to provide for workers in certain temporary or seasonal occupations. The bill outlines the structure of a program for systematic importation of temporary workers from Mexico. However, Sen. Joseph Montoya (D - New Mexico) introduced S. 3412 to establish a temporary National Commission on Alien Labor to investigate the use of alien agricultural labor in the United States before any commitment is made to expanding temporary worker programs. (For a review of the volume and characteristics of temporary, non-immigrant workers in the United States, see Keely, 1975b.) Neither bill was passed.

(73) One justification of policy proposals to return to the Bracero
agreement with Mexico is as a measure to reduce and inhibit illegal immigration. Given current concern about illegal immigration, it is not inconceivable that efforts may be made to extend the practice of temporary worker status to non-agricultural jobs on even a larger scale. This is a clear case where the separate but related policy issues of legal and illegal immigration can become conceptually and programmatically confused. Congress can face contradictory and confusing policy and program choices: deport illegals and punish employers of illegals to reduce the flow; regularize illegals present in the country for a certain number of years; recognize the strong pull factors affecting the flow of laborers but try to control the situation by admitting them as temporary non-immigrant laborers and, therefore, define away the illegal problem to some extent; reduce immigration by further extending temporary worker programs systematically across all skill levels; and, finally, conclude bi-lateral agreements with countries that are sources of illegal aliens for economic development to reduce push factors. The ultimate outcome of these various proposals on the volume, the sources and the mix of immigration and temporary labor migration remains to be seen. There are numerous problems in law, international relations, program administration and the ethical questions of exploitation which go into such decisions. Movement to greater use of temporary workers would also involve departing from the traditional United States approach to immigration as settlement migration as opposed to the view of migrants as basically workers which is more characteristic of European guest-worker programs and South Africa migration programs for mine workers.

2. Exemption from labor certification for parents of minor United States citizen children.
(74) In equalizing the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, the exemption from labor certification for parents of minor United States citizen children, and their entitlement to automatic registration as intending immigrants to the United States, would be terminated for natives of the Western Hemisphere, by both the House and Senate proposals. At present, natives of the Eastern Hemisphere receive no such benefit. It is generally believed by members of Congress that a benefit to the parents of minor United States citizen children is undesirable. Since any child born in the United States is, by virtue of its birth, a United States citizen, by conferring a benefit upon his parents there are certain undesirable consequences such as aliens attempting to give birth to children in the United States and attempting to enter the United States solely for this purpose. The opposing point of view is that by not conferring any benefit upon such parents and forcing them to leave the United States, the United States citizen child is likewise forced to leave the country which demonstrates an ambiguous attitude towards United States citizenship. It is thought that this is a roundabout way of getting at what Congress views as the real problem, which is that a person born in the United States should not automatically, by virtue of his birth, be a citizen if both his parents are aliens and, particularly, if his parents are aliens not in lawful immigration status. Therefore, it has been proposed by various groups that the exemption from labor certification for parents of minor United States citizen children not be eliminated, but rather this privilege be extended to natives of the Eastern Hemisphere as it presently exists for natives of the Western Hemisphere, and such aliens be allowed to come in the non-preference category, or be granted a higher preference.
3. **Labor Certification.**

(75) The labor certification provision under the various bills would be maintained in its present form. However, there are many proponents of a change in the labor certification provision so that labor certification is either eliminated as a requirement for permanent residence or certification is granted more easily. Proponents of this point of view appear not to be in harmony with the current economic situation and discount too greatly organized labor's support of the labor certification program.

4. **Cuban Refugees.**

(76) Cuban refugees adjusting status in the United States would be exempt from numerical limitations. This provision seemed in the past to be essentially non-controversial since Cuban refugees utilize a disproportionate share of the total Western Hemisphere visa numbers available. However, population growth considerations lead some to wish to slow this process of regularizing de facto presence by keeping Cuban adjustment of status within the present structure and thereby lowering the number of new entrants.

5. **Adjustment of Status.**

(77) Permission to adjust status has been proposed for all aliens who enter the United States lawfully expect (a) crewmen or aliens in transit without visas, (b) aliens who continue in or have accepted unauthorized employment other than immediate relatives, (c) student and exchange visitors, or (d) combinations of these exceptions. It should be pointed out that under the present law, all natives of the Western Hemisphere are prohibited from adjusting status, whereas natives of the Eastern Hemisphere can adjust
status, except crewmen and aliens in transit without visas. The denial of adjustment of status to any alien who has accepted or continues in unauthorized employment would greatly reduce the number of aliens eligible for adjustment of status and, presumably, greatly increase the amount of fraud confronting the Immigration Service. It should also be noted that this type of penalty would probably fail to deter unauthorized employment since it would merely force the applicant to obtain his immigrant visa. The question of adjustment of status has wide ramifications for the process of gaining entrance as an immigrant and is a very touchy policy issue.

Summary

(78) In this section on current immigration policy issues, I have summarized the major topics which currently are the objects of discussion. Each of them has potential implications for intergroup relations or political implications for society at large. All of these controversies center on selection mechanisms or control of illegal flows. The ethnic composition and other characteristics of those we welcome and those who enter illegally obviously will make an impact on the size, concentration and effects of the foreign-born population and their offspring. At this point, I feel the resolution of these controversies is so unclear that making any predictions or to draw any conclusions is presumptuous. But we must be aware that such policy questions are very live ones indeed and could have important implications.

(79) Further, we should realize that important actors in these controversies include a wide variety of religious and nationality groups, as well as organized labor, and federations of such groups. Immigration is a major object of national level, and in some areas local level, politics.
Part of ethnic group relations now and in the foreseeable future is the cooperation and conflict over immigration policy. To date, there is no careful study of the role of such groups in policy formation and, equally important, policy administration. Such groups not only try to influence law, they are the major watchdogs of congressional and executive action on immigration. Further, many such non-government groups are called upon to cooperate and aid government agencies in administration of the law through emergency resettlement (e.g., most recently in the Vietnamese situation). Finally, such private sector groups do much of the work of helping immigrant adjustment by means of social services in the absence of government schemes to help in adjustment such as those which the Swedish government conducts.

Therefore, any proposal to alter immigration may affect not only future ethnic relations but would involve current relations in the political sphere. It is not easy to summarize how those relations would be affected in the absence of a specific issue. Most of the information on the stances, alliances and the presumed influence of such groups would be of the "inside-dopester" variety at any rate. To my knowledge, no one has tried to document who these actors are, their structural relationships or their influence on actual decisions. The Population Commission, for example, soon became very aware of their presence and the Commission report, I think, clearly reflects the strength of organizations with a vested interest in immigration (Keely, 1972a).

The issues summarized here and the current and future ramifications for ethnic relations could change substantially. If, when and how the demographic issue enters into immigration policy consideration is one
example of how a significant new policy factor could change the current structure of ethnic relations. In a stabilized or stationary population, immigration policy will probably continue to be a stage of ethnic group interaction in a bid to achieve symbolic and substantive goals of various groups.

V. Immigration and a Stabilized Population

(82) In this section, I will briefly discuss five topics which I see emerging as important issues in intergroup relations. Each of them would be further complicated by movement to a stable and stationary population and each bears directly on immigration policy and its role in the future of ethnic relations in the United States.

The Hispanic Population

(83) The rapid growth of persons of Spanish-speaking background has begun to raise doubts about the future of the United States culture and the political system. At their worst, these fears center on an Anglo-Hispanic version in the United States of the Anglo-French split in Canada or even a secessionist movement in the Southwest in territories which formerly were part of Mexico. The questioning, however, runs a whole gamut of cultural, political, social and economic concerns which are less extreme.

(84) There is, first of all, question as to the commitment and possibility of keeping English as the only official language. The use of Spanish in official documents, public notices, civil service tests and business notices (some utility companies' bills are in Spanish and English) are examples of language usage which goes beyond the use of a foreign language
for personal communication by ethnics in their own community. This latter use is expected and has been part of the adjustment and assimilation of early generations in United States history. The wider use of Spanish goes beyond this traditional aspect of ethnic adjustment processes.

(85) In addition, government programs like bi-lingual education and ethnic heritage studies may have a latent function beyond the pedagogical purpose of aiding learning of basic skills and building healthy self-images. Such programs may not only slow adoption of English as the mother-tongue but also legitimize the official or quasi-official acceptance of bi-lingualism. Current practices are in that direction, although they fall short of Canadian policy. Further, Spanish was the mother-tongue of the "indigenous" (having established social institutions) Spanish population in the Southwest long before Anglo conquest. As Lieberson et al. (1975) suggest mother-tongue diversity seems to be largely derived from subordinate indigenous groups in long-standing, established enclaves (Lieberson et al. 1975, 54). Thus, the "natural" process of linguistic and cultural diversity in the region may be enhanced by national policy on education and new migration. Further, development of a national Hispanic federation may lead to demands for more widespread and legitimated use of a second language.

(86) The situation is further complicated by the participation of persons of Mexican origin in the new ethnic consciousness. The Chicano and la raza movements add further to demands for cultural maintenance and abandonment of assimilationist policies and programs.

(87) However, the Mexican-American group does not present a united front. There are serious splits within the group which affect these processes. One such split is over illegal immigration. Chavez, for example,
presents almost a classic case of the American labor leader torn between the needs of his followers in this country and the plight of their ethnic brothers seeking entrance. He has opted for United States citizens and residents and supports measures to curb illegal movement on the grounds of unfair labor competition. Other Mexican-Americans take opposing views all the way up to a demand for virtually free movement over the border on the basis that the Southwest region is basically Mexican since it was taken by the United States. Mexicans, they argue, should have a right to enter the land that makes up part of their ancestral patrimony.

(88) Obviously, the questions of the cultural, political and economic effects of Hispanic (and especially Mexican) migration are of national and regional importance. Information on developments may well be forthcoming from persons engaged in Borderlands Studies, a recently developed, interdisciplinary specialty. However, other regions bear close scrutiny. The long-range effects of Cuban movement in Miami and the Hispanicization of New York City by a whole variety of Latin ethnics are two examples of localized impact of great importance, which even have national implications.

(89) I think the questions concerning the Hispanic population need further attention to sharpen our focus on developing issues and to gather needed information. We should be fully cognizant that such data collection can not only lead to informed decisions (even though they are ultimately choices of values) but can also function to define the "issues." We may, in fact, be in the initial stages of such a process which will, one way or another, have great national and regional import.

New Ethnics

(90) Not only has the United States experienced a new ethnic con-
sciousness but we have also been receiving New Ethnics. As Table A-1, in Appendix A, shows, there has been substantial movement in the past ten years of previously slightly represented groups (due often to low quotas). Many of these groups pose new questions about ethnic relations. I will mention a few and point out issues for which we need further information.

(91) There has been a movement of Black West Indians as a result of the 1965 Immigration Act. This group, along with Black Spanish-speakers, can raise problems for the Black population, particularly in light of the split in the Black group between West Indian and "American" (descendants of the United States slave population) Blacks. A particularly interesting group are the Haitians whose culture and French language set them even further apart.

(92) Asian people have benefited greatly from the changed immigration selection system. The effects on traditional Asia ethnic groups (especially Chinese) and newly important groups (e.g., Filipino and Korean) need study. The special case of the large, one-time infusion of Vietnamese is also important not so much for long-term impact as for knowledge of the process and result of large scale resettlement undertaken by the United States from time to time (e.g., Hungarian, Cuban). As is so often the case with ethnic groups, the Asian impact probably has greater regional impact (Hawaii and the West Coast especially) due to concentration.

(93) I have previously discussed the Hispanic cases. Here, the question of federation or maintenance of sharp national difference is important. Other groups have transcended national identities for certain purposes, for example, using religion as the binding force. Catholics are a case in point, although nationality differences still have extreme importance
within that group. There is also the case of the Jewish population transcending nationality for certain purposes. In short, there are examples in which nationality, while remaining a vital force especially in internal group dynamics, has been suppressed for certain broader group action and goals.

(94) Whether Hispanic culture and identity can function in the way religion and peoplehood have in the two cases cited remains to be seen. If it does, ethnic relation dynamics will be obviously quite different for the United States in general and for internal dynamics of an Hispanic confederation.

(95) Finally, there is the religious issue involved in immigration and group relations. The immigrants in 1974 from predominantly Catholic cultures equalled about 206 thousand or 52 percent of gross alien immigration.* Clearly, not all these immigrants are Catholic themselves and their Catholicism is not necessarily the same. Also, Catholics from other countries entered. My point here is that the number and proportion of Catholics (culturally and in practice) is high. Further, this movement has generated a feeling of obligation and responsibility among the Catholic Church, particularly the official organization. Thus, moves to reduce immigration or other policy initiatives seen as anti-immigrant can raise the question of anti-Catholicism. The point is not so much whether anti-Catholicism is intended. It is the perception and reaction to the coincidence of the religious background of immigrants and any anti-immigrant movement which

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*The countries of birth of the immigrants included are: Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Philippines, Mexico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and South American countries.
may take place. Given United States history, it is not difficult to con-
struct numerous scenarios of possible conflict, depending on immigration
developments, especially as the population moves to a stable and stationary
state.

(96) In short, the composition of recent immigration raise important
questions for and about the Black, Hispanic, Asian and Catholic groups.
These questions not only focus on the results on current immigration law
and policy but also center on changes in that policy and body of law. Once
again we see that ethnic relations in the United States have been, are and
probably will be played out in political arenas and immigration law is the
game.

(96a) One should add, however, that for each of the cases cited there is a
basic need for demographic analysis of the potential impacts of these groups.
For example, even if Black West Indians are coming to the U.S. in larger numbers,
will their relative size and impact in the Black community remain more or less
constant? What may seem to be striking changes in immigrant composition will
not automatically result in major changes in intra- or intergroup relations.
Obviously, other variables will be involved. Thus, I have discussed these groups
to illustrate the need for research and discussion about effects of immigrant
composition on group relations.

Population Policy and Immigration Policy

(97) Many people feel that the United States needs population and
immigration policies in the sense of explicit goal or targets with rationally
based and clearly articulated programs to achieve those goals. Some even
see immigration policy as a wedge to force the broader question of population
policy. The current national debate in Canada on immigration is pointed
to as a model of the process of using immigration to open up the population
issue and put pressure on for the development of an integrated and explicit
policy.
I think Berry's (1973) discussion of the problems of national urban planning is quite apposite. In analyzing the probability of the development of a national urban strategy in democratic nations, he states that the applied rationality of goal oriented activity seems to be a threat to the traditional process of incremental adjustment characteristic of change in democratic societies. Manipulation of interest group politics, bargaining, coalition-building and log-rolling do not seem compatible with goal-oriented national planning. In fact, "the very utility of future-oriented planning is to provide a basis for decision-making more rational than that of interest-group politics" (Berry, 1973, 72).

In short, I do not expect the United States to develop an explicit population or immigration policy in the foreseeable future. Given the style of United States politics, the strong ethnic group interest in immigration and the interest in group survival, population policy may become, in fact already is to some extent, another forum for ethnic relations. I think the application of policy development studies to population is a potentially important source of information and can provide important insights into the course of ethnic relations.

Pluralism

Finally, I think the United States is in for another round of discussion on pluralism. It is perhaps part of the "genius" of American society (although intellectually untidy) that it absorbs new ideas and practices, even radical changes, and yet maintains the same labels. Tiryakian's (1975) recent discussion of United States society approvingly presents the work of such recent analysts of America as Renel and Servan-Schreiber. Both of the latter emphasize the American social system's flexibility and its ability to absorb profound change rooted in the personal and collective crises of the diverse and often contradictory "moral systems" (Tiryakian, 1975, 2-5).

One need not be sanguine about the United States ability to absorb change or even be in the state of constant revolution within the institutional structure of society. However, I think it is clear that
in the area of ethnic relations, ideology has and is shifting and there is continuing effort at redefining the ideology of ethnic relations. Even though pluralism is riding the waves of public acceptance, there are both profound opponents of the idea and a great deal of disagreement about what it means. I see this as a continuing process with no ultimate resolution. Many who defend pluralism would oppose official bi-lingualism. There is a clear clash between pluralism and the values of individualism and universalistic criteria. The debate on pluralism represents another level of the contest of ethnic group interests and relations.

(102) However, I do not think the debate can be dismissed as just another ideological squabble having no impact on events. Whether we are a pluralistic society and what that means is part of the lives of many Americans from birth to death. Ethnic institutional structures, political socialization of school children, career patterns and demographic rates are but a few examples of areas where pluralism (what we mean by it and do about it) affects us.

(103) Immigration policy obviously is directly tied into the image of the United States as a pluralistic society. Do we want a continual infusion of persons of foreign culture? Is the declining proportion of foreign born and foreign stock a portent for the future? Does the citizenry still hold to a fear of non-Western cultures which may be exacerbated by the current national origin composition? How does one react to the generally agreed upon need for opportunity for United States minorities and women and the high proportion of professionals among immigrants? The questions and the conflicts go on. They influence and in turn are influenced by our understanding of pluralism.

(104) As I stated, I do not think the question of pluralism will get resolved in a final and fixed way. I do think, however, that the debate
on the issue is ignored at one's peril. Whatever the social sources of group positions on the subject and the dominant definition at any given moment, the debate both affects and reflects ethnic relations.

(105) This discussion of the Hispanic population, the new ethnics, population policy and pluralism obvious does not exhaust the field of topics in which immigration intersects with intergroup relations and I have only briefly outlined each topic as a starting point of discussion. It seems to me that these topics, along with immigrant selection mechanisms and the effects will be among the major, if not the major, issues concerning immigration and intergroup relations.
Chart 1

Preference Systems

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(McCarran-Walter Act)

1. First preference: Highly skilled immigrants whose services are urgently needed in the United States and the spouse and children of such immigrants. 50 percent plus any not required for second and third preferences.

2. Second preference: Parents of United States citizens over the age of 21 and unmarried sons and daughters of United States citizens. 30 percent plus any not required for first and third preferences.

3. Third preference: Spouse and unmarried sons and daughters of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 20 percent plus any not required for first or second preference.

4. Fourth preference: Brothers, sisters, married sons and daughters of United States citizens and an accompanying spouse and children. 50 percent of numbers not required for first and three preferences.

5. Nonpreference: Applicants not entitled to one of the above preferences. 50 percent of numbers not required for first three preferences, plus any not required for fourth preference.

Immigration Act of 1965

1. First preference: Unmarried sons and daughters of United States citizens. Not more than 20 percent.

2. Second preference: Spouse and unmarried sons and daughters of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 20 percent plus any not required for first preference.

3. Third preference: Members of the professions and scientists and artists of exceptional ability. Not more than 10 percent.

4. Fourth preference: Married sons and daughters of United States citizens. 10 percent plus any not required for first three preferences.

5. Fifth preference: Brothers and sisters of United States citizens. 24 percent plus any not required for first four preferences.

6. Sixth preference: Skilled and unskilled workers in occupations for which labor is in short supply in the United States. Not more than 10 percent.

7. Seventh preference: Refugees to whom conditional entry or adjustment of status may be granted. Not more than 6 percent.

8. Nonpreference: Any applicant not entitled to one of the above preferences. Any numbers not required for preference applicants.
Table 1

Percent Distribution of U.S. Population by Nativity and Parentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Population</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1850</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native white, total</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native parentage</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign parentage</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed parentage</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign born white</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other*</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes Negroes, Indians, Chinese, Japanese, and all other non-white.

Source: Carpenter, 1927, p.5.
Table 2

Foreign Born in the U.S. Population: 1850-1970a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
<th>Percent Foreign Born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>203,210,158</td>
<td>9,619,302</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>179,325,671</td>
<td>9,738,143</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>150,697,361</td>
<td>10,347,395</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>131,669,275</td>
<td>11,594,896</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>122,775,046</td>
<td>14,204,149</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>105,710,620</td>
<td>13,920,692</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>91,972,266</td>
<td>13,515,886</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>75,994,575</td>
<td>10,341,276</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>62,947,714</td>
<td>9,249,560</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>50,155,783</td>
<td>6,679,943</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870b</td>
<td>39,818,449</td>
<td>5,567,229</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>31,443,321</td>
<td>4,138,697</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>23,191,876</td>
<td>2,244,602</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

bAdjusted for underenumeration.

Sources: Hutchinson, 1956, p.2; Census of Population: 1970a, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Final Report PC (1)-C1 United States Summary, Table 68.
Table 3
Nativity and Parentage of the White Population of the United States: 1870 to 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total white population</th>
<th>Total foreign white stock</th>
<th>Foreign-born white</th>
<th>Foreign white foreign or mixed parentage</th>
<th>Percent of white Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>178,119,221</td>
<td>31,887,935</td>
<td>8,733,770</td>
<td>23,154,165</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>158,837,671</td>
<td>33,978,380</td>
<td>9,294,033</td>
<td>23,784,347</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>134,942,028</td>
<td>33,750,653</td>
<td>10,161,168</td>
<td>23,589,485</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>118,701,558</td>
<td>34,576,718</td>
<td>11,419,138</td>
<td>23,157,580</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>110,286,740</td>
<td>39,885,788</td>
<td>13,983,405</td>
<td>25,902,383</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>94,820,915</td>
<td>36,398,958</td>
<td>13,712,754</td>
<td>22,686,204</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>81,731,957</td>
<td>32,243,382</td>
<td>13,345,545</td>
<td>18,897,837</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>66,809,196</td>
<td>25,859,834</td>
<td>10,213,817</td>
<td>15,646,017</td>
<td>38.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>55,101,258</td>
<td>20,625,542</td>
<td>9,121,867</td>
<td>11,503,675</td>
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<tr>
<td>1880b</td>
<td>43,402,970</td>
<td>14,834,546</td>
<td>6,559,679</td>
<td>8,274,867</td>
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<tr>
<td>1870b</td>
<td>33,589,377</td>
<td>10,817,980</td>
<td>5,493,712</td>
<td>5,324,268</td>
<td>32.2</td>
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</table>

**a** 1870-1950 Continental United States.

**b** Parentage data partly estimated.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population (1)</th>
<th>Native born of native parents (2)</th>
<th>Foreign born (3)</th>
<th>Native born of foreign or mixed parents (4)</th>
<th>Percent of total population</th>
<th>Native born of native parents (5)</th>
<th>Foreign born (6)</th>
<th>Native born of foreign or mixed parents (7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>203,210,158</td>
<td>169,634,926</td>
<td>9,619,302</td>
<td>23,955,930</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>179,325,671</td>
<td>145,275,265</td>
<td>9,738,143</td>
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<td>81.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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Table 5

Year of Immigration of the Foreign Born Population: 1970
(000's)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
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<td>1,721</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>586</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>10,341</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>13,516</td>
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<td>1920</td>
<td>13,921</td>
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<td>1930</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Region</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>1961-65</th>
<th>1966-68</th>
<th>1969-73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Total Immigration from Geographic Region</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persons with Stated Occupation</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
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<td>Professionals as Proportion of Col.  (2)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>28.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of all Professionals from Geographic Region</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>45.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966-68</td>
<td>35.3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1969-73</td>
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<td>36.0</td>
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<td>1969-73</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>36.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966-68</td>
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<td>1969-73</td>
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<td>44.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1969-73</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>1961-65</td>
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<td>25.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966-68</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1969-73</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
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*N for 1961-65 = 1,450,314; 1966-68 = 1,139,460; 1969-73 = 1,887,131.
Annual averages volume for the three periods respectively are: 290,063; 379,820; 377,426.
Table A-1

Percent Immigrants Admitted by Country and Continent of Origin:

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<th>1961-65</th>
<th>1966-68</th>
<th>1969-73</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
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<td>35.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<td>.4</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
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<td>27.4</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>.6</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>.4</td>
<td>.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
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<td>.1</td>
<td>.8</td>
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<td>.1</td>
<td>.7</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asia</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td>UAR</td>
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<td>.4</td>
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<td>Oceania</td>
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<td>.8</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>.4</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>.9</td>
<td>.7</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>.6</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*N for 1961-65 = 1450314; N for 1966-68 = 1,139,460; N for 1969-73 = 1,887,131
Table A-2

Sex Ratio of Immigrants by Continent:
1961-65; 1966-68; 1969-73

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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Europe</td>
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<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
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<td>106</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88</td>
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REFERENCES


The View from the Past: Population Change and Group Survival

by Etienne van de Walle
In assessing the causes of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon assigned part of the blame to the morality of the triumphant Christians.

"It was their favorite opinion that, if Adam had preserved his obedience to the creator, he would have lived for ever in a state of virgin purity, and that some harmless mode of vegetation might have peopled paradise with a race of innocent and immortal beings. The use of marriage was permitted only to his fallen posterity as a necessary expedient to continue the human species, and as a restraint, however imperfect, on the natural licentiousness of desire."(1)

Indeed, St. Augustine toyed with the idea that human kind was striving toward moral perfection, and that reaching it would mean the extinction of the species through the abolition of carnal desires. The admonition to "replenish the earth," however valid in the Old Testament while the genealogy of Christ was building up, was superseded by the cardinal concern to fill the City of God. It is no surprise then that the Christian ideal of chastity was seen by opponents throughout history, as a factor of depopulation. The argument was invoked for instance by the French Revolutionaries when they voted the suppression of convents and religious orders, these "graves of population."
Modern scholarship had debated about the demographic causes of the fall of Rome, and before that, of the decline of classical Greece. Many contemporaries were certainly concerned about low fertility, assumed or real, generalized or restricted to a small upper crust of society. The historian Polybius, writing in the 2nd Century B.C., claimed that "Greece suffers from such an interruption of procreation and such a shortage of men that cities are depopulated. The reason is that people today love opulence, money and laziness above all and don't want to marry; or married, to raise a family. At the most they accept one or two children, so that they can leave them rich and raise them in luxury."2) Similar indictments were formulated by Roman writers, and the opinion that "Malthusian" attitudes and practices have contributed to the collapse of the Empire are widely held today. In the 1930's, anti-malthusian writers were using the Roman example to argue that family limitation would lead to the decline of Western civilisation. Today, the best specialists of the demography of the Ancient world incline to a more agnostic view. Infanticide, and abortion were practiced widely in Greece. The surviving medical literature from the Greek and Roman writers contains many contraceptive and abortive recipes although there is little there that would allow efficient control of fertility. Coitus interruptus, the main birth control technique of the European demographic transition in the 19th Century is not mentioned in the medical literature of Rome. Because of a total absence of statistical sources, it will be impossible to assess whether small families were widespread or restricted to a thin part of high society - precisely the
one that produces literature and moralistic treatises. It is likely that marital customs—late marriage of the men and a large age difference between the spouses—were not particularly favorable to high fertility. But no one can say whether the birth rate was particularly low. Fluctuations of mortality, specially because of epidemics, may have been more determinant in shaking the administrative and political order. But here too, not enough evidence has survived to allow the barest quantitative assessment.

The view from the past on the subject of demographic factors in group survival then, must begin in times and social groups where statistics are available. The earliest reliable evidence comes from elite groups. Shifting from the Roman Empire to the European aristocracies of the Modern period represents a serious change of focus, and we must provide some kind of framework for this survey before we can go any further.

The survival of groups

There are many kinds of groups that are threatened by extinction and loss of influence or, conversely, that can expand and flourish. For the purpose of this paper, we shall distinguish between three types of groups: those that have in common a territory (a nation, province, village etc), those defined by a more or less indelible characteristics (race, language, religion...) and finally those that share a common status or vocation (aristocracy, clergy...). Groups can gain or lose numerical importance and/or power and influence through natural increase, transfer from group to group, or qualitative improvement or decay. The accompanying diagram illustrates, in an exemplative rather than an exhaustive way, the types of gains and losses more frequently sustained by various groups.
Groups defined by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial criterion</th>
<th>Physical or cultural trait</th>
<th>Social function or vocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country Province</td>
<td>Race Language Religion</td>
<td>Aristocracy Bourgeoisie Clergy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GAINS**

**Quantitative:**
- Births: x x
- Immigration: x x
- Recruitment: x x
- Annexation: x x
- Qualitative: x x

**LOSSSES**

**Quantitative:**
- Deaths: x x
- Emigration: x x
- Defection: x x
- Loss of territory: x x
- Qualitative: x x
Most groups gain by birth (but not a clergy) and lose by death; and they are usually subject to changes due to migration, annexation, conversion or defection. Some groups are not affected by border changes. A group identifiable by physical traits – such as color of the skin – can only grow numerically by the balance of births and deaths, although its influence may fluctuate independently of numbers. Qualitative gains by groups – that may well be more important in the long run for the continued viability of groups – range from the gain of resources and technical progress, to their acceptability by the rest of society or even fashionability; similarly, a group may perish because it could not adapt to changed circumstances or lost its raison d'être.

We assume that survival is a goal shared by all groups, although to a different degree, and not necessarily with a high priority when in competition with other goals. Since our task here is not to speculate on the dynamics of groups, but to present some of the relevant historical experience, the above scheme is sufficient for our purpose.

The survival of aristocracies

Elites that are perpetuated by birthright, obey very different principles of renewal than empires and nations, even though birth, death and migration are factors in both instances. The survival of an aristocracy is predicated on the individual survival of families, and there is no compensation when one family disappears and another has an overflow of sons,
It is of no benefit to the last male La Rochefoucauld to know that the Montmorency have three sons. If one son is necessary to inherit the title and the manor, other sons will be no more than a hedge against high mortality risks. Cadets are an embarrassment as long as the eldest son is alive, and usually they will be accommodated in the army of the clergy as single men. Because they are not expected to marry, they do not offer a very effective defense against extinction of the name when an older son dies without offspring.

It seems a constant empirical fact that aristocracies have not been able to reproduce themselves, despite the vested interest in doing so, which was stronger than in most other social groups. To survive in the long run, an elite group must allow the accession of selected individuals from the outside. In England, for example:

Of the 63 noble families of December 1559, 21 had failed in the male line by December 1611, and 26 by December 1659. There is nothing unusual in an extinction rate of 40 percent per century, indeed it is probably rather low in comparison with other periods. This inexorable attrition destroyed any prospect of maintaining the peerage as a self-perpetuating closed caste. If the Crown did not bestir itself to plug the gaps, in 250 years or so there would be no one left to sport a title. The extinction of family lines is an unavoidable result of the distribution of infecundity among couples, chance variation in the sex ratio at birth, and high mortality before the age of reproduction. To show the interplay of these factors, we selected a population practicing little if any contraception: women, married at 20 to 21 years before 1889 and still married to the same men, reporting the number of their live born children in the Norwegian census of 1920. The figures are as follows:
Large families are the rule in this population; the average number of children is 7.7, of whom about half are boys. If 70 percent of them survive to the mean age of childbearing, there should be on the average almost 3 boys per family. But the point of view of individual families is different. One observes that 2.6 percent of these women have born no child at all; another 2.6 percent had only one child, and in about half of the cases it should be a girl. The probability of having all girl offspring decreases with the number of children. Assuming for simplicity's sake, that births are evenly distributed among the sexes, six percent of the Norwegian women would have had no son. And with 30 percent of the sons dying before the average age of paternity (a moderate mortality level corresponding to an expectation of life at birth of 50 years), about 10 percent of the families would die out per generation. It would take seven generations to reduce the number of families by half, even under such favorable conditions of fertility and mortality, if only one son per family was entrusted with the function of perpetuating the family name and heritage.

In European aristocracies of the preindustrial era, the attrition seems to have been considerably faster, both because fertility was lower than in Norway and because mortality was higher. For example, of 177
families of the patriciate of Milan existing in 1650, 26 only were surviving in 1950. In Florentine patrician families of the 16th or 17th century

... the marriage of only one son was such a common occurrence as to have been almost a general rule, and since 16 percent of the sons who did marry had no children, the chances were that family lines would be abruptly truncated within three or four generations, for lack of heirs.

Apparently, when confronted with a choice between the risks of extinction and those of loss of prestige and social standing, the Florentine patricians were deciding for the former:

Given an unwillingness to divide estates permanently, and limited opportunities for making independent fortunes sufficient to provide patrimonies for second or third families, younger sons apparently resigned themselves to bachelorhood.

In Florence at least, the erosion of the upper class was compensated by the continuous rise of bourgeois into the aristocracy. In Venice, the patriciate was closed. A law passed in 1297 restricted membership to the Great Council, and therefore access to important offices and committees, to an exclusive group of families. There were 30 ennoblements in 1381, and only minor exceptions thereafter. "For 265 years it was virtually impossible for even the wealthiest and most able nonnoble Venetian citizen to enter the ruling class." When the economic fortunes of the city compelled the elite to change from commercial to landed sources of revenue, the preservation of family patrimonies became imperative. This gave rise to the general practice of restricted marriage. There was no custom of primogeniture as in Florence:

In most wills, possessions were left to all sons equally ... But since they usually remained under the same roof, and since the fideicommissum prevented them from alienating
any of the "immovable possessions," and since unmarried brothers usually left their possessions to the children of the brother who had married, estates usually remained intact.9

The patrician family of Venice functioned as an association of specialized brothers: one would participate in the government of the Republic, one would administer the family's business, a third one would insure the survival of the name by marrying. James Davis in his book from which our information is extracted, presents an illustration which admirably symbolizes the system. It is a family portrait. The mother is sitting in the foreground, holding four children; at the back, four elderly gentlemen stand, looking equally proud, with nothing to distinguish the genitor from his brothers.

In Davis' words, "the Venetian experience becomes a fairly clear demonstration of the infeasibility in the long run of an "aristocratic" or closed ruling class."10 The nobility diminished by fifty-five percent between the middle of the 16th century and the Napoleonic conquest. The wealth of died-out families was redistributed among surviving related nobles, or went to churches and monasteries. This demographic decline of the ruling class was translated into a shortage of manpower in the government, which greatly reduced its effectiveness.

The practice of restricted marriages was not the only way by which aristocracies were limiting their numbers and apparently hastening their own extinction. The French Dukes and Peers started using contraception by 1700 (or perhaps even earlier). For the second half of the 18th century, among women married before they were twenty years old, 35 percent had no child; and another 46 percent had only one or two children.11 In a social group where reproduction and survival must have been an important consideration, these figures cry for an explanation.
These facts have some relevance to one of the arguments in the theory of the demographic transition. In trying to explain why natural increase remains high in developing countries, despite the obvious problems caused by population pressure, some writers have argued that many cultures impose family sizes beyond what is necessary to reproduce the aggregate population, because of the desire to have a son around during old age and the need to perpetuate the name. Heer and Smith for example constructed a model showing the rates of population growth and fertility implied under a series of mortality levels, if it was assumed that parents desire 95 percent of certainty that at least one son would survive to the father's old age. Their computation suggested that a very substantial proportion of wives (up to 40 percent in some instances) would never bear the needed number of sons under conditions of high fertility and mortality. The authors concluded:

If ... the degree of certainty for filial survival stipulated by Model 1 is congruent with present day realities in the less developed nations, we can expect little reduction in the rate of population increase until we reduce mortality still further.¹²

The paradox is that Western elite groups were putting a high premium on filial survival, but they nevertheless reduced their fertility and population increase either by restricting marriages or by using contraception, before mortality had been reduced to levels reached by most areas of the world today.

To resolve the paradox, we must perhaps recognize that the imperative to reproduce has been ineffective at the very level where it counted most, the microcosmic level of individuals and families. The numerous wars of succession in history bear witness that even royal families
could not count on male heirs, despite their advantages of wealth and
the ability (demonstrated by Henry VII of England) to influence law and
religion for their purpose. The intrinsic weakness of the survival
mechanism in individual families explains perhaps in part why alterna­
tive systems of renewal have been devised, and why reproduction has not
been more important an imperative for larger social groups.

The survival of linguistic, racial and religious groups

Heer and Smith argue that the interest of individuals--namely their
preoccupation to have a son around when they are old--leads them to
overlook the collective interest in a lower growth rate. We are here
turning the argument around and applying it to instances where the per­
ceived interest of the group is a high growth rate, and where that
concern conflicts with individual benefit. Where groups are in competi­
tion, it has often appeared, rightly or wrongly, that a high rate of re­
production would further their collective aims. With the general decline
of mortality, mortality differentials between social classes have tended
to play a lesser role in the numerical importance of various segments of
the population. Increasingly therefore, high fertility has been identi­
fied as a sign of vital strength that would eventually insure the triumph
of minority groups. The term "revanche des berceaux" (revenge of the
cradles) has been used to characterize the higher fertility of the politi­
cally and economically disfranchised Francophone Canadians. Today's world
is still full of such examples, and some of my co-panelists have dealt
with them. It will be sufficient here to evoke the topic briefly, to the
extent that cultural differences have played a role in the history of the
demographic transition.
My co-panelists have found pervasive contemporary concern about
differential growth by ethnic or linguistic groups. It is worthy of note
that this concern appears quite late, either in public consciousness or
in the literature. The idea appears to characterize the 20th Century.
There are several reasons for this, the most important being that large
differences in fertility are a recent phenomenon. And then, until recently,
there were no statistics to measure vital rates by subgroup of the population
— both a consequence and a cause of the lack of interest in the subject.

In the 19th Century, the modern State in Western Europe was concerned
with nation building, unification and, wherever possible, eradication of
regional particularism. On the whole, the effort was highly successful.
The Breton-speaking in France were estimated at 1,350,000 in 1880; by 1930,
their number had dropped to roughly one million, despite the large population
increase in the Breton départements.¹³ The Basque-speaking population went
minority languages
from 150,000 to 100,000 during the same period. Other were not faring
any better in Western Europe, in most instances, their very survival was
threatened, not by a failure of reproduction but because of the overwhelming
strength of the languages of government, of the towns, the schools and the
press. At the same time that powerful, unilingual states were forming, the
main European languages were spreading out of national borders: French was
the most important cultural language of Europe, English spread widely over-
seas, whereas German minorities were expanding in Eastern Europe.

The early 20th Century, however, represented a radical change of trend:

"The First World War resulted in the raising of most of the local
languages of Eastern Europe to nationhood... With the sanction of
political authority and its institution as the language of instruction
and higher culture all of the new national languages of Eastern Europe
made gains as over against linguistic minorities within their national boundaries. Before they had the strength that comes from having roots in the soil, and, as predominantly rural and peasant peoples, higher birth rates than alien and more urban elements. Now these tendencies were reinforced by all the prestige and official sanction and use. In the face of this circumstance linguistic group representing the old ruling elements retreated, in many cases the minorities being further weakened by emigration of some of their numbers to countries where their languages remained dominant.14

In Western Europe too, there were clear cultural revivals—illustrated by the conscious resuscitation of the Irish language, the new militancy of Flemish in bilingual Belgium, and the separatist agitation in the old Basque and Celtic marches. Thus, by the 20th Century, there were new cultures acquiring nationalistic pretensions, at the very time when fertility differentials were becoming large.

Linguistic statistics from censuses are notoriously unreliable. The central State has a stake in minimizing the extent of cultural dissimilarities. For example, the censuses of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were classifying Yiddish as German, and the French linguistic censuses of Alsace-Lorraine were listing as "patois" what German censuses of the area had tabulated as High German. With the rise to nationhood of the Versailles nations, the apparent linguistic make-up of Eastern Europe reported in censuses changed dramatically over what it had been, - the result of a different phrasing of the question and of a different viewpoint on the part of census takers.15 The absence, or tendentiousness of the statistics on differentials growth, long contributed to a general ignorance of the problem that we are discussing here, and its recent accession to the forefront of public discussion coincided with a heightened sense of cultural identity.
In Europe during the last hundred years the regional differences in fertility often tended to follow cultural lines. Ansley Coale tells the story of one of his students who showed a map of fertility by province in Spain to a Professor of Romance Languages, and drew the comment that this was a linguistic map of Spain. Regional differentials have usually reflected the time at which marital fertility started its steep modern decline—and therefore the onset of widespread contraception. While fertility was in its process of long term decline, a lag in starting time would for long mean higher levels. In Belgium, the factor that accounts the best for the earliness of the fertility decline, is on what side of the French-Flemish linguistic border a village lies. During the last century, the Flemish have had a higher rate of natural increase as a result. In France too, there is a relationship between the prevalence of minority languages and dialects, and the 19th century levels and trends of fertility. High birth rates continued to prevail in regions of Breton, German and Flemish speech, and to some extent in the langue d'oc regions, after they had come down elsewhere.

The first explanation that springs to mind is that language is the vehicle for the diffusion of cultural traits, including the norm of the small family and the knowledge of birth control techniques; information is held up at linguistic boundaries. But a more insidious mechanism may be at work too. There is often a relationship between language and the extent to which a region has been drawn into the mainstream of economic and political life. Flanders, no doubt, had suffered heavily from the process of industrialization, and was economically depressed compared to Wallonia; French was the language of the elite. In France, the regions where a language other than French was still spoken, were areas that had long been isolated from the center because of a combination of
ecological and political factors. The survival of dialects is an indirect measure of the failure of the educational and administrative systems in their efforts to integrate particular regions. There is a price to pay for being different, including higher mortality rates and unusually high migration. And if high fertility was the premium for relative backwardness, it also brought further problems and impediments in its wake. When that is said, it must be pointed out that differential fertility does not prevail forever. The large differences in population growth that occurred as a result of the lags in the onset of the demographic transition in various groups, were transitional phenomena. Today the fertility of the Bretoons, the Flemings or the French Canadians is not standing out any more; in the two latter cases at least, it has decreased below national averages.

Religious differences operate sometimes much like linguistic ones. In the ongoing secularization process, the regions that preserved their traditional faith were often those sheltered from the inroads of administrative centralization. Bretoons, Flemings and French Canadians were all distinguished by their militant catholicism. The maps showing religious practice in France during the interwar period, look strikingly like maps of marital fertility for the mid-19th century. That all religious doctrines do not accept contraception to the same extent may to some degree be relevant to explain fertility differentials. But religion has acted as another barrier to the diffusion of information as much as it acted to indoctrinate its flocks; and the other barriers to cultural diffusion, distance, language, illiteracy, were protecting traditional belief at the very time they were impeding the transmission
of new fertility norms. A student of religious sociology in France, Le Bras, pictured the 19th century parish as "a defense post of Christian civilisation" and associated the decline of fertility with the spread of worldly influences:

Many novelties are contributing to loosen the hold of the Church on rural masses: the multiplication of contacts, social transformations, the persistent action of the lay State. There will soon be no village which will not be linked to the city by bus, no peasant who won't have his bicycle or his truck; Parisian fashions are implanted even in thatched cottages; newspapers, lecturers penetrate in the smallest hamlets... The school and the army barrack transform spirits, the administration substitutes itself to the former leaders ...¹⁸

Early explanations of the fertility decline were often cast in terms of the superior "civilization" and the greater spirit of restraint and foresight of the peoples who were able to improve their economic lot by curbing their impulses. It is not surprising, therefore, that the higher fertility of ethnic minorities was not usually seen as a strength, but rather as a weakness: something that went together with poverty, high mortality, low nuptiality, certainly with backwardness and perhaps with intemperance. To French authors of the 19th Century, the high fertility of the minority areas was another of the quaint customs, to be classified with regional costumes, barbaric languages, and lack of hygiene. They were often opposing the Bretons and the Normans. About the latter, Pellegrino Rossi in his 1836 lectures at the College de France, was referring to "the welfare enjoyed by the laborious and prudent populations of the départements which have placed themselves in the lead of French civilisation."¹⁹ In opposition, an English observer noted:

"... the Bretons seem by their very ignorance and the high mortality which it allow of, to be at once rendered insensible to consequences and freed from the necessity of placing any great restraint upon their inclinations."²⁰
The irresponsible poliferation of the Irish was eliciting the same kind of scorn in England.

It is only more recently that high fertility became a public virtue, under two sets of influences. First, the concern of States for the implications of vital trends reached crisis stage in the 1930's. Second, there was a resurgence of nationalistic movements in Europe with the First World War. In the rhetoric of the interwar years, large families were equated with vigor and youth, and the constant progress of contraception was blamed on selfishness and "overcivilisation" in the "senile" countries of Western Europe. The pockets of high fertility that had been left behind by the unequal diffusion of the demographic transition were seen as fountains of youth springing from the ancestral soil of the ethnic groups. And religion, with its opposition to contraception, was seen as a defender of the traditional virtues. Conversely, the reproductive potential of the minorities was seen as a weapon in the fight for political dominance.

The long term prospects implicit in the faster growth of ethnic or religious groups were noted in many contexts; numbers were often used to buttress particularistic viewpoints. But it would be wrong to picture these arguments either as very concerning or as shared by a large proportion of the very groups that were pictured as engaged in a struggle for dominance. Indeed, they were part of pronatalist propaganda that was notoriously unsuccessful. In Belgium for example, the higher birth rate of the Flemings was already obvious to observers at the beginning of the century. Jacquart, the head of the Belgian
Statistical Institute, was noting that:

"The extraordinary development of the Flemish race which fills the voids in the Walloon country prevents us from noticing the consequences of the decline in the Walloon birth rate. The colonies of Flemish workers who slowly invade Wallonia usually abandon the use of their mother tongue, so that the language census shows no observable change in the location of our linguistic border." 21

Jacquart went on to note that the Flemish bourgeoisie was contaminated by "the devastating germs carried by the French influence." Flemish writers meanwhile, were congratulating themselves on the relative "health" of their people, and discussing ways of protecting it against the French influence.

"Our people has long remained wholesome and healthy of heart and spirit, because it was deeply anchored in the fertile soil of ancestral tradition... Many (migrants) have been attracted by and within the sphere of the superficial, frivolous French mentality, and have abandoned the fundamental health of their own simplicity for a French coating..." 22

During the German occupation a Dr. J. De Roeck contrasted the biological strength of the "Vlaamsche Volk" with Latin degeneracy, and produced population projections based on the continuation of pre-war trends, that led to the quasi-disappearance of the Walloons.

"The frightening fertility decline of the Walloons and the growth of the Flemish people's part, raises in the mind the ghost of an almost complete netherlandization of Belgium within foreseeable time." 23

These predictions not only failed to recognize the parallel (although lagged) decline of Flemish fertility, but also underestimated the cultural attraction of French.

Despite the higher reproduction rate in Flemish speaking areas, the proportion of the population reporting that it spoke Flemish was 56 percent at
both the 1866 and the 1947 censuses. The latter was the last census to include a question on language as the linguistic border was fixed once and for all to prevent further encroachments of French on Flemish land.

Elsewhere too, projections have been based on rather naive extrapolation, and have failed to understand the transitional character of fertility differentials. In Switzerland, where it had been predicted that the higher fertility of Catholic cantons would necessarily lead to the spread of Catholicism, the proportion of Catholics evolved from 41 percent in 1860 to 42 percent in 1950 and 46 percent in 1960 (the latter rise being mainly due to migration). There was also very little change in the linguistic make-up of Switzerland overtime. In the Netherlands, some Catholics were seeing an opportunity "to outbreed the Protestants." The high natural increase of the "healthy," non-contracepting faithful, was seen implicitly as a "striking revenge of Divine Providence." Actually, the percentage of Catholics went from 38 in 1849 (and 35 in 1909) to 40 in 1960. Although the Dutch Reformed Church was steadily losing ground (in part to other Protestant denominations), the most remarkable increase was in the category "no religion" that increased from 0.3 percent in 1879 to 18 percent in 1960. Although the Roman Catholics had become the largest church by 1930, the trend was not leading to outbreeding. Finally in Canada, where the high fertility of the French Canadians was long proverbial, the percentage of the population with French mother tongue has steadily gone down in recent years: 29 percent in 1941, 27 percent in 1971. Immigration of English speakers, or of other groups that were assimilated into the English Community, has on the whole prevented the progress of the minority language.
Conversely, those who were belonging to the less prolific segments of the population, were resenting the threat of the fertile invaders. Thus, the Socialist S. Webb in England:

"Twenty-five percent of our parents... is producing 50 percent of the next generation. This can hardly result in anything but national deterioration; or, as an alternative, in this country gradually falling to the Irish and the Jews."^{26}

Indeed, according to the 1916 Report of the National Birth Rate Commission, the fertility of the Jews was above average in England. Such differentials are subject to periodic changes. Moreover, the numerical advantages expected from differential growth are vulnerable to defections. It can be concluded, perhaps, that the social, economic, political and cultural forces that lead to the survival or dominance of language or religion are worthy of more attention than the slow and unpredictable trend in the birth rate. This is indeed the position that professional demographers have assumed on the whole, and the opposite argument, with its racial and nationalistic overtones, has been restricted to partisan politics.
Villages and nations

One of the questions raised by the organizers of this meeting was: "Has any group ever bred itself out of existence?" If the question refers to the single effect of low fertility, no well documented example comes to mind among racial, religious or linguistic groups. These groups, rather, are threatened by loss of identity through intermarriage and assimilation. The types of groups that have historically dwindled in size or influence because of their low fertility belong to our third category: those that are territorial in nature. There are many abandoned villages and dead towns, and low fertility usually accompanied their decline, either because the young people left early with their potential for childbearing, or because the population stopped reproducing itself, even without migration.

Preindustrial village populations in Western Europe have often been remarkably stable over time. Dupaquier, who gives examples of this constancy over large numbers of years for the Basin of Paris, suggests that it is due to an autoregulating mechanism having its origin in the social rather than in the physical world. There exists a limited number of slots in the village society--houses, farms, trades, jobs--and openings get filled as they occur, by the single waiting in the wings for this opportunity to start an independent household. The *numerus clausus* of careers and opportunities determines the size of the system, and regulates fertility through marriage as a consequence of the mortality level that created openings among the previous generation.

During the 18th century, in country after country there appears to be a clear tendency toward exceptionally large population increases. Although the controversy over the sources of the increase has not abated, it seems
today that it can hardly be denied that mortality declined during the century—be it the exceptional toll of epidemics and subsistence crises, or the "normal" deaths that yielded to improvements in economic welfare, hygiene or public health. The trend accelerated in the 19th century, and gave rise to increased densities on the land. Toward the end of the 19th century, an increasing proportion of the European population started to limit their marital fertility. (France had been engaged in this process much earlier.) The change in vital rates has received the name of demographic transition. It was accompanied—and to a large extent caused—by economic and social transformations, including a redistribution of the population over space. Economic competition and a growing reliance on the market, favored certain regions endowed with resources and good communications. Remote areas that had been self-sufficient previously, were emptied by migration. Over much of history, urban mortalities were probably high, and large cities were replenished by steady streams from the countryside. But with modernization and industrialization, the countryside started eventually to lose population absolutely. Thus, the processes of differential growth of geographical areas by migration is commonplace enough to be excluded from the present discussion. More to the point is the regional role of fertility.

It is difficult to perceive the logic that determined the waning or the persistence of high levels of fertility in various regions of Europe. We are arguing that the numerical survival of established groups does not feature very highly among the priorities that regulate fertility; and this is more true for village communities than for any other type of group, perhaps because the identity of such a group is not very well differentiated and perceived by the component individuals. The map of rural Europe is
full of examples of extreme family limitation that reduced numbers drastically over time. The "one-child system" adopted in Ormansag, a region of Calvinist villages in Hungary, by the mid-19th century, had led by 1970 to take over of the area by migrant families. Philippe Ariès has coined the term "human evaporation" to characterize the steady decline in the Aquitaine region of France during the 19th and early 20th centuries: a decline that was caused by low fertility without much migration. The following table presents population totals (females only) for two départements in Aquitaine—Lot-et-Garonne and Tarn-et-Garonne—two départements in Normandy—Calvados and Eure—and as a contrast, the Finistère département in Brittany, at three different dates. The four first départements are among those that adopted the practice of birth control on a wide scale at the time of, or before, the French Revolution; their birth rate had been under 30 female births per 1000 women from the beginning of official vital statistics in France in 1801. In contrast, the decline of marital fertility does not seem to begin in Finistère before 1870. In all instances, there is little net migration, and the growth or decline is mostly the result of the balance of births and deaths. Finistère is the only département among the five that undergoes significant, although moderate out-migration.

The decrease of population must have appeared advantageous to individuals. It facilitated the access to land and the raising of the few children that were born. In 1911, Dr. Jaques Bertillon published the
results of a survey of doctors' opinions in 4 départements of Aquitaine and Normandy. He noted the association of low fertility with rural well-being ("the wealthiest cantons are those which are most sterile in men") and with the desire for land.

In Lot-et-Garonne '... a second pregnancy is considered as a shame' according to one of our respondents; 'a man who has children is despised even by the women' according to another. Another writes that when a couple has a second child, he is presented not with congratulations, but with sympathies... Several of our respondents insist on the known fact that it is most of all out of fear to divide one's wealth that the peasant wants only one child. 'He loves his land more than his family.' 'An only heir married to an only heiress, that is his dream.' 'He accepts very well that his name disappears, and is easily resigned not to have another heir, even if his child is a girl'.

It is difficult perhaps to draw up a balance sheet of societal gains and losses resulting from this pursuit of individual reproductive goals. It may have depopulated the countryside—but the same result could have come about from migration to urban jobs and areas. It has been argued "that in the last century Aquitaine, declining in population, saw its agriculture stagnate, while Brittany, under constant demographic pressure, cleared the land, modernized its techniques, and branched out into entirely new products." What if population pressure resulted in misery in the process? Is modern day agriculture compatible with high rural densities? Thousands of non-competitive Breton farmers are now compelled to leave the land and seek a living in the cities. On the other hand, the Breton have preserved their cultural identity to an extent impossible in the Garonne region, where a steady flow of foreign farmers was taking over the ownership of abandoned land.

The issue of competition between nations received a dramatic illustration while France was undergoing her fertility decline well in advance of other European countries. The wars of the Napoleonic period show
that France could withstand the coalition of the other European nations by drawing upon her large population. "With a population exceeded in 1800 only by that of Russia, France saw her population outstripped in the nineteenth century by the population of Germany (1850), Austria-Hungary (1880), the United Kingdom (1900) and Italy (after 1930)." The European equilibrium was displaced, and the colonial expansion of the English could not be matched. While large overseas nations were built on the emigration of prolific Europeans, France herself was becoming dependent on immigration to insure the continued growth of her labor force; in 1927, 54 percent of the population were of foreign origin dating from the third generation or less.

The 19th century, and the first half of the 20th, represented a peak period of nationalism in Europe, and of intense competition between nations. The size of the military forces was a powerful argument in the resolution of conflicts. That the French resorted widely to contraception almost one century before their neighbors, undoubtedly influenced the relative strength of nations. When this fact was realized, it became an important factor in national and international French policies.

The defeat of France by Prussia in 1870-71 greatly intensified the alarm of French social scientists and publicists at the low level of natality and population growth in France, in contrast to the levels prevailing in other large European countries. For this defeat not only diminished the military prestige of France and cost the country several millions of population; it altered significantly the distribution of demographic forces on the continent; it led foreign observers to conclude that the French race was decadent and that France had lost permanently her former position as the dominant continental power.

Joseph Spengler who wrote the classical *France Faces Depopulation* (published in 1938, on the eve of the Second World War), showed how the
perception of a demographic weakness helped shape France's social and economic policies, diplomacy, colonial theory and practice, and migration legislation. In turn, a resolute attempt was made to influence natural increase. This effort illustrates the pitfalls in trying to impose collective goals to individuals by compulsion and repressive measures—although monetary incentives were present too. Alva Myrdal's indictment stands: "Population interest in France ... never became sufficiently social-minded to care rationally for the economic fate of the large families it encouraged." The law prohibited the sale of contraceptives and doctors were prosecuted for giving advice on contraception. The effect was probably to entrust the poorest and least educated with the function of ensuring the reproduction of the country.

Meanwhile, the international situation that gave rise to great concern in the early part of this century, has disappeared before the measures taken to correct national trends of population could have much effect. Today, the rate of natural increase of most European nations is rather precariously balanced close to zero—Germany has a negative rate and France a positive one—the old military balances have lost their meaning, and developed nations import large labor forces from less developed ones. The conflicts between nations have changed in nature, and the argument of numbers is used today with a different twist: nations with an excessive rate of growth, it is argued, jeopardize their opportunities for economic and social development. Military might depends more on the quality of the hardware and the training of those who man it, than upon the size of the battalions. The particular set of historical forces that resulted from time lags in the population transition, and pitted nations with changing demographic potential against one another, may never exist again in quite the same way.
Conclusions

This review has been limited by the scarcity of the evidence in the historical record. We have looked at the demographic factors determining the survival or dominance of three types of groups. The dynamics of the first type based on the geographical criterion appears to be largely conditioned by physical mobility—although lags in the inception of a long-term decline of fertility has affected the size of national populations. This is a once-and-for-all effect. In 19th century Europe, the international differences in population growth were moderate, and those countries that continued to increase their population at rates usually under one percent per year were able to absorb the additional numbers, or let them emigrate, without visible deleterious effects on their economic development. The matter may well be different under the rates of growth and the degree of unemployment prevailing today in many developing countries. There may be a dilemma between larger populations or a faster rate of socio-economic progress.

Our second type of group included elites that cannot survive without absorbing "new blood" from outside because they are almost equally threatened by extinction and by excessive numbers of heirs. Finally, our third group was made up of persons who have common racial or cultural characteristics. Such groups are more threatened by assimilation than by physical extinction. Assimilation and the preservation of one's cultural identity are both desirable in some ways, and the latter of these aims cannot be achieved without resorting to the double-edged weapons of isolation and particularism. The advantages gained by maintaining a higher fertility have often proved to be elusive historically, as defections and mixed marriages are nibbling away the temporary advantages of
faster growth. Furthermore, because of the high cost of excessive fertility, quantitative and qualitative advantages must be weighted carefully.

Here too, historical experience gives few well documented examples of competition between ethnic or religious groups that are resisting assimilation and are bent on a collision course where numbers might become the deciding factor. Such examples unfortunately appear to exist in today's world: there are conflicting groups where one has a large technological advantage and the resulting degree of contraceptive knowledge and practice, whereas the less developed other will steadily accumulate overwhelming numerical advantages because of its uncontrolled fertility. History suggests that such differences are reduced in the long run, but that vastly different accumulations can result before the process runs its course.


10. Idem., p. 129.


12. David M. Heer and Dean O. Smith, "Mortality level, desired family size, and population increase," *Demography*, 1968, p. 120.

13. The estimates are drawn from E. Levasseur, *La population française*, vol. 1, Paris 1889, p. 392, and from Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years*, League of Nations, 1946, p. 231. These figures do not take into account the intensity of knowledge or use of Breton (e.g. as a second language only) in either period and may well underestimate the attrition.
15. See Kirk, op. cit., p. 224 ff, for the pitfalls in linguistic statistics.
24. W. Bickel, Bevölkerungsgeschichte und Bevölkerungspolitik der Schweiz, Zurich, 1947, p. 139-140.


36. *Idem.*


Alarums, Excursions and Delusions of Grandeur:
Implicit Assumptions of Group Efforts to Alter
Differential Fertility Trends

by Frederick S. Jaffe
ALARUMS, EXCURSIONS AND DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR:
IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS OF GROUP EFFORTS TO ALTER DIFFERENTIAL FERTILITY TRENDS

by Frederick S. Jaffe*

Questions of population go to men's heads, and the prospect of emptying cradles in particular is one at which they look through reddening spectacles.

---C. E. M. Joad, 1947**

Differential rates of change have not only occupied a major place in the scientific study of population; they have also been a central, if not dominant, theme in the political consideration of population phenomena. Even a cursory reading of history shows that differential rates of population growth or decline often have been viewed with concern, and sometimes paranoia, by group leaders. Indeed, the implications of such differentials between nations, and among ethnic, religious and racial subgroups within nations, have probably constituted the principal focus of political discussion of population matters in societies at differing stages of economic development and with very diverse social, religious and cultural settings. The population question which seems to have gone most readily to men's heads has been the prospect that the cradles of one's own group are emptying more rapidly than those of one's neighbors -- or conversely, that they are not being filled fast enough.

*President, The Alan Guttmacher Institute, and Vice President, Planned Parenthood Federation of America


In a world in which the survival of nations and subgroups has never been certain and strategies to advance survival are more a matter of faith and ideology than of knowledge, this particular view of population change is hardly surprising. What is interesting is its persistence over time, regardless of historical experience, and its espousal by leaders who in most other respects represent very different, even opposing, philosophies and political forces:

- In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt decried the declining birth rate in the United States as "race suicide" and condemned American women who limited their family size as "criminal(s) against the race".*

- In 1917, when Margaret Sanger was prosecuted for opening a birth control clinic in the Brownsville ghetto of Brooklyn, the District Attorney told the jury "the clinic was intended to do away with the Jews".**

- In 1919, the U.S. Catholic Bishops attacked birth control as "the selfishness which leads to race suicide",*** an accusation which became a standard element of the Catholic literature on birth control in the 1920s and 1930s and was abandoned as "obsolete" only in 1963.****

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In the face of projections in the 1930s which suggested rapid decline if not actual depopulation, European leaders responded with actions characterized by one observer as "a panic that corresponded in the democratic countries to the blustering and population-boosting of the fascist states".*

In the mid-1960s, family planning programs in the U.S. were attacked as "genocidal" by some black males who advocated higher fertility as a means of increasing black voting strength, power and/or fighting capacity.**

In 1975, the newly-elected president of the New York Board of Rabbis warned that the American Jewish community faces "a threat to its existence" if it does not increase its population and urged Jewish couples to have a minimum of three children.***

These illustrations could be extended almost indefinitely to include, not merely the developed nations of Europe and North America, but the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the socialist nations as well. Neither geography nor ideology seems to influence the exploitation of concerns over differential fertility for political purposes. Elites who lead nations and majority groups have typically expressed fear of loss of power or dominance as a result of the higher fertility of neighboring countries (some of which were historic adversaries), or of class, racial or religious minorities within their borders; not infrequently, these expressions have reflected explicit or thinly disguised racist, nativist, eugenic or social Darwinist doctrines, as well as nationalist and imperialist ideologies. Leaders of minority groups often have accepted the assumptions underlying these claims, and in mirror-image terms, advocated increased fertility to enhance their group's power or improve its chances of survival in hostile settings.

*Flugel, op. cit., p. 19.
It seems useful to recall this background as the U.S. moves toward population stabilization and as population changes on a world scale command greater international attention. None of the jeremiads has come to pass, but the historical record is no guarantee against recurrence of the arguments. Not only does the persistence of the theme over time and in different settings imply that the issues are far from settled, but in the past few years when U.S. period fertility rates have dipped below replacement levels, we have begun to hear talk of a "birth dearth" and of the "dire" consequences associated with population decline. That there will continue to be national concerns over fertility decline and intergroup concerns and tensions over differential fertility seems highly probable. Whether or not these forthcoming debates are simply re-runs of the earlier arguments remains to be seen.

These issues persist partly because the political consequences of population changes -- of which the relationship between fertility and group survival is one -- have been subject to "so many myths and so little research", as Myron Weiner has observed.* In the absence of systematic research, it is difficult to assess the validity of the claims and counter-claims. But the global assertions can be broken down into their component assumptions which may be more amenable to examination in the light of available evidence, and the weight and direction of the evidence can be summed as a guide to policy-making.

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This essay attempts such an examination — an exercise which is inherently selective and to some degree judgmental. My principal purpose is to illuminate the relationship between fertility and the survival of minority groups in the U.S. The available research pertains more to nations than to subgroups, however, and it will be necessary to draw on this literature. In my view, this is an appropriate procedure because the issues involved in the debate on the relationship between fertility and survival are essentially the same for nations or subgroups.

If the argument is focused on the ability of a group to survive or enhance its power in the face of real or imagined adversaries, the pronatalist position taken by leaders of many groups rests on three principal assumptions:

1. That a group's power to insure its survival is dependent, to a significant degree, on its size.

2. That increased fertility constitutes an effective way to alter the group's size vis-a-vis its neighbors.

3. That such increased fertility entails benefits to the group but few or no countervailing costs.

These premises appear to be accepted as self-evident by group leaders who advocate higher fertility as a key to group survival. The available evidence, however, suggests that not only are they not self-evident as generalizations, but may in fact be exactly wrong in concrete cases.
Studies on the relationship between population size and power deal primarily with nations, not subgroups. Among nations, size is obviously one determinant of power. But there are others which may be equally important — economic and technological development, human and natural resources, political structure and governmental efficiency, national morale and so forth.* That the interrelations between these variables are complex is illustrated by David Heer in a simple table ranking the 12 nations with the largest populations, highest per-capita incomes, and greatest production of steel;** only two of the nations with the largest populations are among those with the highest per-capita incomes and only six are included among the leading steel producers. Others point to the 1967 Israeli victory over Arab nations with vastly larger populations to make the same point.

Given the multiple determinants of national power, the policy issue for national leaders concerned with survival is to determine which of the malleable factors will most effectively yield the desired result of enhanced power. This would require a complex analysis of each nation's concrete situation. More than likely, neither the theoretical framework nor the empirical data exist for a definitive analysis, so the answers will be uncertain. What is certain, however, is that a simplistic effort to increase group size is not necessarily the policy option of choice, particularly when the effects of more rapid growth on such key variables as economic development and the quality of human resources are examined.


**Heer, op. cit., p. 123.
Among subgroups within a nation, there are analogues to most of the multiple variables affecting the power of nations. Size is of course one factor but Weiner suggests others -- the group's cohesiveness and organizability, its skills (i.e., human resource development), its financial resources, its ability to deny goods and services to others.* Even within a representative political system based on one person-one vote, these other variables appear to be at least as -- and in some cases, more -- important than size in determining a group's overall power. It would be difficult to sustain an argument that the 24 million U.S. blacks are more "powerful" than the six million U.S. Jews. Before minority group leaders advocate higher fertility as a -- or the -- solution to their group's fears, a closer examination of the interrelations of these multiple factors would seem advisable.

The second underlying assumption -- that increased fertility increases a group's size -- also seems obvious, until it is set in a time-frame appropriate to consideration of a group's ability to survive. Most political issues, including the international and intergroup conflicts which jeopardize survival, are relatively short-term in perspective; in governmental circles, a time-span of five years usually represents "long-term" planning. Presumably a group or nation feels threatened by what its enemies may do today, or in, say, the next 10 to 20 years at most. In this context, how useful is fertility change in altering the balance between the group and its adversaries?

*Weiner, op. cit., p. 595.
The answer will vary from case to case but two recent analyses suggest its general direction. Dov Friedlander has examined the effects of a "return to the large family" represented by an average of 4.5 children per woman among Israeli Jews, which some Israeli leaders have advocated in response to high Arab fertility. Friedlander regards such a development as highly unrealistic. Even if it were achievable, however, it would make a difference of only two to four percentage points, depending on the immigration policy pursued, in the proportion of Israel's population which is Jewish in the year 2000. From a current 86 percent, the proportion would decline to 78 percent if no further immigrants are admitted and the average number of children in each family remains at 2.6; under the same immigration policy, it would decline to 82 percent even if Israeli Jewish women have an average of 4.5 children. Since Israel's internal problems of survival would hardly be much different if Jews comprise 82 rather than 78 percent of the population, he concludes that higher Jewish fertility would have a negligible effect.*

Using a different methodology, Ernest Attah has projected the size and rate of growth of the white and nonwhite populations of the U.S., employing alternative assumptions about the future course of fertility in each group. His assumptions include one set in which white fertility drops to replacement level immediately in 1965, while the nonwhite fertility reaches replacement level only after 75 years. Even under these most extreme assumptions, it would take until 2005-10 before nonwhites, who now comprise

13 percent of total U.S. population, reached 20 percent.*

Clearly then, increased fertility is of little use either to Israeli Jews or U.S. blacks who have reason to be concerned over their ability to survive in the next few years or decades. The slowness of demographic processes makes them notoriously inefficient for policies intended to affect short-term political problems.

It could be argued, however, that in the case of fertility policies as distinguished from other political issues, national and group leaders look to the long-run; in a word, they act like statesmen when it comes to fertility. Of course, leaders believe they act like statesmen in protecting the long-run interests of their constituents on all policy matters, but there is no necessity for others to accept their beliefs uncritically. In light of the demagogic uses which leaders have made of differential fertility historically, such a claim is at least questionable. Nonetheless, it is possible that political leaders may now understand that demographic processes take a long time; consequently they may be seeking solutions not for today's problems but for tomorrow's.

In this context, examination of the third underlying assumption -- that increased fertility entails benefits but few or no costs to the group -- provides an opportunity to assess the statesmanship of those leaders who advocate higher fertility.

As with other questions of social policy, balancing the benefits against the costs of higher fertility is not a simple procedure, especially if an effort is made to bring all costs and benefits, not only the economic ones, into the calculus. Assessment of cost/benefit ratios at the subgroup level is particularly difficult because most of the pertinent studies focus either on the "macro" level of nations or the "micro" level of individuals. A subgroup would subsume the micro effects on individuals but not necessarily the macro effects on nations. In the absence of systematic studies at the subgroup level, however, we can only try to infer from these macro and micro studies conclusions which appear to be relevant to subgroups.

Perhaps the most general conclusion which emerges from these studies is that there is no universal answer to the question; the concrete situation of each nation, subgroup and individual needs to be analyzed before a reliable cost/benefit assessment can be made. While population growth was traditionally thought to be necessary for national economic growth, many if not most Western scholars now believe that even from a macroeconomic perspective alone, the costs of greater size in many cases exceed the benefits. The excess becomes even greater when micro-level considerations are added to the calculation. Nor is the micro-macro distinction in the current state of the art entirely satisfactory. In essence, under the current highly selective conceptualization of costs and benefits and their interrelations, it is possible to reach the conclusion that the group receives a preponderance of benefits from a
situation in which the individuals making up the group experience a preponderance of costs. Such a conclusion is peculiar enough to warrant the suspicion that the conceptual framework which permits it may be metaphysical.

At the macro level, high rates of population growth, by increasing the ratio of dependents to earners, are considered to have adverse effects on the rate of capital formation and growth of per-capita output in developing countries.* In developed countries with more advanced economies, the relationships between population and economic growth are thought to be more complex.** After reviewing the evidence for the U.S., the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future concluded in 1972 that "a reduction in the rate of population growth would bring important [economic] benefits" to the nation and to individuals.***

Subgroups are of course not nations; they do not encompass entire economies in the sense comprehended by macroeconomic analysis. It is nonetheless difficult to believe that U.S. minority groups would experience costs from a reduction of population growth if the nation as a whole receives benefits. It does not follow, however, that minority groups, particularly disadvantaged groups, would necessarily share equally in the benefits; whether they do, however, depends not on population factors but on other policies. Slower population growth would make possible significant benefits but, as the Commission noted, "the fruits...will be denied to those most in need of them unless


deliberate changes are made in distribution of income to those who lack it by reason of discrimination, incapacity, or age.*

The case is clearer at the micro level: in the U.S., the costs of high fertility to individuals generally outweigh the benefits. Systematic studies, for example, have shown that family size is negatively related to educational attainment and current occupational level -- both significant measures of socio-economic status in the U.S.** -- and that higher fertility among blacks in low status occupations has a non-trivial adverse effect on future occupational achievement and upward mobility.***

In addition to economic costs, high fertility has other consequences for individuals. Bearing children at too young or too old ages, or too close together, or having too many children are major factors associated with higher rates of maternal and infant mortality and morbidity, prematurity, genetic defects, congenital malformations and other handicapping conditions and adverse outcomes of pregnancy.**** The social consequences have not been documented as well as the health or economic effects, but lack of documentation does not mean that they don't exist. In particular, high fertility is associated in the U.S. with early childbearing which often results in precipitous marriage or out-of-wedlock birth, school dropout and

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*Ibid., p. 41.


low educational attainment, and higher probabilities of divorce. The impacts of these varied processes on the status of women has been studied very little, but their direction is reasonably clear: Almost all tend to reinforce the traditional maternal role and to diminish a woman's options to choose other roles or combine motherhood with a career outside the home.

This brief summary of some of the interrelationships is, of course, oversimplified. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to raise serious questions about the assumption that higher fertility confers only benefits on a nation or subgroup and exacts few or no costs. The costs are there — economic, health and social and yet others which are invisible only because they have not been documented and monitored (in part because they have not been deemed important enough by policy-makers and researchers). Friedlander states the tradeoff exactly when he notes, in reference to Israel's low income Asian-African Jews, that reduced fertility would contribute to improvements in their social and economic levels, even if it would reduce the overall growth of the Jewish population.* In the U.S., the evidence suggests strongly that these varied costs aggregate to an inverse relationship between high fertility and a group's ability to invest in its future generations -- the development of its human capital -- which may be the decisive factor in insuring its survival.

The American Jewish community offers a classic example of these processes. The impoverished immigrant Jews, whom the District Attorney ostensibly

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*Friedlander, op. cit., p. 51.
sought to protect from genocide in 1917, crowded Margaret Sanger's clinics as soon as the authorities permitted them to function. In the next generation, they went on to become the "most careful family planners"* of all U.S. religious groups. In 1957 -- the last year in which Current Population Survey data are available by religious identification -- U.S. Jews had higher income and socioeconomic status than did either Protestants or Catholics, largely as a result of differential educational and occupational achievement.** The causal nexus are not unambiguous but it seems clear that effective family limitation was associated with greater investment in human resources which in turn was associated with higher status (and by inference, greater power).

When we turn to examination of the measures employed by group leaders to implement higher fertility objectives, the balance of costs over benefits becomes even clearer. Historically three kinds of policies have been adopted by national and group leaders in an effort to elicit more babies from their followers: exhortation, positive inducements, and/or restrictions on the availability of the means of fertility control. The first two have proven largely ineffectual, while the third adds serious costs to the equation.

Pro-natalist propaganda, comprising what David Glass has aptly described as "homilies on virtue, sacrifice, patriotism, social duty and all those sublime abstractions",*** has been employed by a variety of group leaders --

Theodore Roosevelt, Charles de Gaulle, Benito Mussolini, Dick Gregory and Rabbi Sol Roth (the president of the New York Board of Rabbis), to name only a few. Unlike the Pied Piper, however, leaders appear to have few followers when they summon their constituents to reproduce for the sake of the group. Clearly there seems to be a difference of perception: It is part of the ethos of leaders that they always act on behalf of their group's best interests and particularly when they solicit higher rates of reproduction. But their constituents evidently believe otherwise. To my knowledge, no one has studied the costs of this disjunction to the morale of the group and its confidence in the judgment of its leaders.

There is an extensive literature describing the various programs of positive inducements implemented in Europe and other countries in the 1930s and 1940s which were justified, at least in part, on the grounds that they would lead to higher fertility,* and a number of studies attempt to evaluate their effectiveness in achieving these stated objectives.** The results are inconclusive; fertility levels have changed but it is far from clear that family allowances, maternity benefits and other similar measures have significantly influenced these changes. Perhaps this is because of the limited scope of most of these programs; as Glass observed 35 years ago, "however urgently governments may have declared their desire to increase the supply of births, they have nevertheless persistently tried to buy babies at

*Cf., e.g., Glass, op. cit., and Berelson, op. cit.
bargain prices".* No nation seems to have been willing to carry out the fundamental redistributive policies implied in the restructuring of the conditions of reproduction advocated by Gunnar Myrdal in 1938.**

In contrast to the ineffectuality of exhortation and inducements, restrictions on the availability of the means of fertility control may have been somewhat more effective in some nations in increasing fertility. These efforts include various acts of commission and omission. Some nations enact laws to prohibit or restrict the dissemination of contraceptive information and services and make abortion illegal. Some subgroup leaders stigmatize fertility control measures and support restrictive legislation and policies. Even in nations which follow welfare-state principles, fertility control measures often are inexplicably omitted from socially-provided national health services, or provided only under conditions and restrictions which are not applied to other kinds of health care. (Is there a better explanation than a pervasive pronatalist bias for the fact that family planning was finally "integrated" into the National Health Service in the United Kingdom only last year, nearly three decades after the NHS was established, and the extent of its "integration" remains very uncertain?)

In these cases, national and group leaders demand more babies whether their constituents want them or not. Sometimes they are successful but not always, because illegality or stigmatization do not deter all of their women constituents from finding ways to avoid compulsory mother-

*Glass, op. cit., p. 371.

**G. Myrdal, Population - A Problem for Democracy, Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1940 (reprinted by Peter Smith, Gloucester, 1962). Nor have the less developed countries been willing to carry out the opposite kinds of redistributive policies in order to induce fertility decline, perhaps because such policies usually penalize children already born.
hood. In almost all counties, one of the principal consequences of restrictive laws and policies is to reinforce differential fertility trends based on socio-economic status; the poorest have the greatest difficulty in obtaining access to the services. Some of the costs of these processes are almost invisible — there are, for example, only two limited studies in the entire world of the effects on children of being unwanted by their parents — and no one seems to have tried to measure the alienating effects of such policies on women. But others are plainly visible for those who want to look: The French leaders who opposed the legalization of abortion last year could have done so only by shutting their eyes to the vast incidence of illegal abortion among French women, just as a U.S. black leader could oppose legal abortion only by ignoring the evidence of massive illegal and self-induced abortions among blacks which was to be seen daily before 1970 at Harlem Hospital in New York.

Romania offers the best example of a nation which, by the abolition of legal abortion, succeeded — at least temporarily — in reversing what was regarded as a disastrous fertility decline. The law was changed in 1966. In 1967, all fertility indicators nearly doubled, with the greatest relative increases occurring among women older than 30 who already had two or three children. By 1972, however, the birth rate had again declined (though not to 1966 levels), but the rate of abortion-related maternal deaths had

increased three-and-a-half times.* Since Romania also imposed restrictions in 1966 on oral contraceptives and intrauterine devices, investigators have concluded that the sharp fertility decline following the 1967 spurt and the rise in maternal mortality both imply that it took several years for illegal abortion facilities to become reestablished. Surely reestablishment of the illegal abortion industry was not the intent of the Romanian leaders, but it is nonetheless a cost which has to be weighed against what appears to have been only a short-term increase in births.

In this analysis I have tried to set forth some of the elements of a more comprehensive calculus for assessing the costs and benefits of higher fertility for subgroups in the U.S. Perhaps the attempt has only succeeded in demonstrating the very narrow calculus within which such questions are conventionally weighed, in part because of deep-seated biases of both policymakers and social scientists. The economic bias has been noted by many observers, but less attention seems to have been paid to possible sexist biases. When the subject is fertility, it seems clear that group leaders are demanding that their women constituents make greater sacrifices on behalf of the group against their own judgments of what is best for themselves and their families. It is questionable if the leaders would treat such matters as prohibitions on fertility control quite so cavalierly if men bore the babies.

Hopefully, the effort will also have suggested, as Bernard Berelson concluded in reviewing population policies of 24 developed countries, that "it is easier to lower birth rates by policy measures than to raise them".* If this is so, it is because the fertility levels even of developed nations -- and of subgroups within them -- include significant numbers of births which the parents would avoid if they could, and it is easier through public policy to affect the supply of fertility control services than to modify the number of children which parents believe is best for them and their families.

In the current state of knowledge, it seems evident that we have no proven understanding of the relationship between population change and the survival of subgroups in the U.S. or in the world as a whole. Since the available evidence is not conclusive, each observer can add it up in his own way. In my view, the weight of the evidence suggests that in terms of the ability of U.S. subgroups to survive, higher fertility is the wrong issue at the wrong time in the wrong place. Other factors than size are more determinant of a group's status and power, particularly its capacity to invest more of its current resources in the development of its human resources. And higher fertility, for most subgroups, is counterproductive to this objective, particularly if it is to be purchased only by forcing the birth of more unwanted children.** The survival of U.S. minority

*Berelson, op. cit., p. 788.

**This conclusion is shared by many U.S. black leaders who have supported programs to make fertility control more widely available. See, e.g., Shirley Chisholm, Unbought and Unbossed, New York: Avon, 1970, pp. 124-36.
groups would seem to be served better by the continuation and acceleration
of the recent trend toward diminished fertility differentials and con-
vergence among all sectors of the U.S. population in fertility values and
behavior; this rapid convergence has been associated in the last decade
with greater access by all groups to modern means of fertility control.

Others may come to different conclusions but the evidence seems to me
sufficiently consistent to sustain one basic conclusion: If group
leaders are interested in seriously advancing their group's capacity to
survive, they will not automatically pull out the higher fertility demand
from their desk drawers. If the basic relationship between population
change and group survival is at best uncertain, the weight which leaders
attach to fertility in formulating survival policies is at least reduced.
It goes without saying that they should also encourage and support
systematic research which might reduce the level of uncertainty.

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At bottom, the case of minority groups is part of a larger question of the
relationship between the individual and society which is a central issue of
population and social policy generally. At one level of analysis, there is
little but confusion: Myrdal and other European observers, contemplating
fertility decline in Western democracies in the 1930s, found an inherent
conflict between the individual's interest in maximizing his own welfare
by limiting family size and society's long-term interest in reproducing
itself.* Three decades later, Garrett Hardin (apparently proposing a

universal truth), Kingsley Davis (in reference to less developed nations) and Judith Blake (in reference to the U.S.) also found a basic conflict between the individual and society, only the terms are reversed: The individual is still determined to maximize his own well-being but now he does this by having too many children for society's good.* The substantive differences reflect real differences in today's world compared to the 1930s.

But the common features of both viewpoints are striking: Both pertain less to demographic matters than to human nature. The philosophic (and untestable) view they proclaim conceives of human nature as selfish and unadapting. They share a common elitist conviction that individuals cannot be trusted to perceive correctly the relationship between their own interests and those of the (presumably valued) groups to which they belong. Both positions espouse intervention and manipulation in the very personal area of family size decisions, a remarkable viewpoint to emerge in societies which still worship Adam Smith in the impersonal market place sufficiently to require that advocates of intervention bear a very heavy burden of proof.**

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**Reports from the People's Republic of China imply that political pressures and exhortations, coupled with massive distribution of the means of fertility control, are responsible for China's presumed success in reducing fertility. In the absence of systematic data, it is difficult to determine how much success there has been and how much of it is attributable to the pressures and exhortations as compared to the distribution of the means. Nevertheless, it seems at least possible to me that in the context of a society in which all important aspects of social and personal life are subject to explicit planning processes, individuals would accept social decision-making on reproduction. What seems impossible is that they would do so in the context of quite different societies, such as the U.S., where there is little explicit social decision-making even in impersonal areas.
In terms of group survival and the ostensible conflict between the interests of the individual and the group, the basic resolution of the dilemma is given in this paraphrase of observations by Richard Easterlin (substituting in parentheses survival and other terms pertinent to this discussion for the economic objectives to which he referred):

There is the question of what one conceives as the basic objective of social policy. Is the goal merely to maximize (survival) or to maximize individual welfare, broadly and democratically conceived? If it is the latter, then it is necessary to consider fully the ingredients of individual well-being...If nothing is done to (increase group fertility), won't (the group) just go on (declining) until intolerable conditions result? The implication of this view is that human reproductive behavior does not voluntarily respond to environmental conditions...Nowhere, I think, is this view called more into doubt than by American historical experience...*

Easterlin's essentially optimistic view includes advocacy of greater access to fertility control knowledge and services and public programs to assist U.S. men and women to avoid unwanted pregnancies. Such policies and programs are justified for welfare reasons alone and as means of insuring that human reproductive behavior can voluntarily respond to environmental conditions. Presumably these same considerations of maximizing human welfare underlie the admonition, in the World Population Plan of Action, that nations, "respect and insure, regardless of their overall demographic goals, the right of persons to determine, in a free, informed and responsible manner, the number and spacing of their children." (emphasis added)** Based on similar considerations of enhancing the well-being of their constituents (and thereby, the group's strength), leaders of U.S. minority groups should advocate full access for their constituents to the knowledge and means of insuring reproductive freedom. For if survival does not encompass freedom in as fundamentally personal an area as reproduction, what does it mean?


**United Nations Center for Economic and Social Information, Action Taken at Bucharest, United Nations, New York, 1974, p. 16, Section 29(a).
Response to the Newspaper Story in Philadelphia on Your Recent Remarks on Abortion

I am enclosing a Xerox copy of a letter received from a Philadelphia leader of the American Jewish Congress critical of your newspaper remarks on abortion. I thought it important that you respond directly to her and I have told her you would, in view of the negotiations with Congress presently underway. You have a copy of the newspaper story so you know the garbled way in which they reported your remarks.

MF:r
Enclosure
cc: Will Katz
Dear Sir:

As a Vice-President of Philadelphia Women's Division of American Jewish Congress, and Chairman of the Commission on Law and Social Action, I have just been shocked, grieved and outraged by a report in the Evening Bulletin of a speech before a Catholic audience by Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum in Atlantic City.

Recently, amidst talk of why American Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress should merge, it has been convincingly pointed out that the two organizations frequently take similar positions. It would make economic and ideological sense to combine. Rabbi Tanenbaum's views are not consistent with Congress position, which object to Catholic insistence on aid to parochial schools as well as to the Catholic stand on abortion. The letters expressed by Rabbi Tanenbaum are reactionary, anti-humanist and anti-feminist, and strangely, anti-Irish American (this I find an incomprehensible aberration in one who finds as much to admire in Catholics). I can hardly believe that AT Committee really can support the views he expressed.

The "gift" of the Church? Unwanted, unwanted children who become burdens on society; how sanctified is an unwanted, neglected, impoverished life after it has been ushered into an inhospitable world? What about women,
ill equipped to bear a child for whatever reason, financial, emotional, health, deformity, incest, rape; how sanctified is that life which is forced into being? Anti-abortion laws force poor women to resort to back-alley butchery while women with money, regardless of the law, obtain safe abortions. A "gift" of the Catholic Church which gives precedence to a potential life, from the moment of conception when it is an undifferentiated mass of cells or even a fetus which cannot exist independently of the mother, over the life of a woman who has a place in the world, with skills, achievements, obligations, loved ones and dependents; is grossly unfair. No man is ever faced with such a choice where his life is judged to be dispensable in deference to a "potential" for life. It is an insult to call it selfishness and materialism for women to lead a decent life of their own choosing.

Rabbi Tanenbaum has an interesting interpretation of reverence for life. Feeding starving millions means at best, allowing them to exist at the verge of starvation. What sounds like humanitarian largesse is cruel and shortsighted without plans for population control. As complex problems do not speak well for such a prestigious organization as AJC Committee.

Furthermore why single out the Irish as callous? What about German, Russian, Arabo, Portugese, French? When in the long history of the world has there not been killing and brutality? Has not
our government contributed countenantly to more killing in Southeast Asia? For more than a
decade Americans watched on the evening news
the bombing, burning, shooting and defilement
in Vietnam and Cambodia. Were Americans not
pawless to allow this to continue so long? Rabbi
Tannenbaum does not mention our present
in peace making in Southeast Asia.

Perhaps the Rabbi did mention some of the
aspects of killing and brutality that disturb me. The
newspaper report can hardly be complete. But I
find his sentiments confused, contradictory, appalling,
frightening. I wonder at his rationality. Any Jew
who could be puzzled by the lack of enthusiasm of
Jews to join with Catholics when the Church is controlled
by such a conservative Pope makes me doubt his
competence.

I could only expect a speech like this from the
most orthodoxy fringe of Jewry. What is a man like
this doing representing AJ Committee before the
public?

I really would like an answer. —

Sincerely,

Lenore Sheldon