




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
Box 88, Folder 8, Polls/surveys, 1981-1983.



**ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN JEWS TOWARD ISRAEL AND ISRAELIS**

**THE 1983 NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWS  
AND JEWISH COMMUNAL LEADERS**

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STEVEN M. COHEN



**INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS  
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE**

Many recent developments have fostered speculation that American Jews are becoming alienated from Israel. The hard-line posture of the Begin government, the rise to public prominence of Sephardic Israelis, recurrent Jewish and Arab violence on the West Bank, the 1982 war in Lebanon, and highly publicized disagreements between American and Israeli officials all have prompted some to suggest that the once-strong cultural, spiritual and political connections between American Jews and Israel are weakening.

If true, such a development would have far-reaching consequences, particularly in two areas. First, the commitment of American Jews to Israel has undoubtedly helped generate a strong pro-Israel American foreign policy stand, and a perceived dampening of American Jewish enthusiasm for Israel could eventually translate into reduced U.S. economic, military, and diplomatic support for the Jewish state. Second, for more than three decades, and especially since 1967, Israel has been a major element of American Jewish group identity. Support for Israel has been central to many philanthropic and other communal endeavors, and Israel has figured prominently in the spiritual life of American Jewry. Any changes in these attitudes and actions are likely to have profound consequences for contemporary Jewish identity and institutional life.

To increase understanding of how American Jews feel about Israel, and why, the Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations commissioned this nationwide study of American Jewry. The study investigated such issues as the depth of psychic attachment to Israel, the extent of involvement in pro-Israel activities, perceptions about Israelis, conflicting attitudes toward Israeli foreign policy and public figures, and anxieties about general American attitudes toward Jews and toward Israel.

This study -- the most in-depth and extensive analysis ever conducted regarding American Jewish behavior and attitudes toward Israel -- benefits from two less comprehensive studies of American Jewry commissioned by the American Jewish Committee in 1981 and 1982. By comparing the findings of all three studies we can detail the complex set of images, beliefs, and behaviors pertaining to Israel prevailing among American Jews, and, in many instances, understand how those phenomena have changed over periods before, during, and after the war in Lebanon. Moreover, this study reports on not only the responses of the general American Jewish public, but also those of a select Jewish leadership group, highlighting both where the views of the Jewish communal leadership parallel those of its putative constituency and where these two sets of views diverge.

### The Surveys

As noted, this study consists of two surveys, one of a representative nationwide sample of American Jews, the other of board members of five prominent Jewish communal organizations.

The public sample survey data collection was conducted by A.B. Data Corporation of Milwaukee, a firm that conducts direct marketing campaigns of Jewish communities. In the last year, A.B. Data compiled approximately 80,000

Distinctive Jewish Names (DJN) which it applied against lists of the country's 70 million telephone subscribers to yield well over a million households with a high probability of containing a Jewish member. Using this list, the survey was initially sent (in June, 1983) to a sample of 1600 households. About a quarter of these, in turn, were ineligible or unreachable (non-Jewish, deceased, moved with no forwarding address, etc.). Of the remaining 1200 or so, about half (N=640) eventually returned the questionnaire. Many had received as many as five mailings: an introductory letter, the first questionnaire, a postcard reminder, a second and a third questionnaire, as well as a follow up reminder phone call. The survey's last respondents replied in late July 1983.

Previous research has compared DJN and non-DJN Jews drawn from random samples secured through Random Digit Dialing and other high-cost techniques. That research found few differences, all of which were minor and in conflicting directions, between Jews with Distinctive Jewish Names and those without such names. In other words, it is safe to assume that DJNs are neither more nor no less Jewishly committed than non-DJN Jews. The selectivity in returning mail questionnaires might well pose a greater problem. Previous research on returned-mail questionnaires indicated lower response rates among the lesser educated, the geographically mobile, the elderly, and those with less interest in the subject matter. However, a comparison of this survey's respondents with those of more sophisticated (and costly) Jewish population studies revealed only small differences (see Appendix B). Slightly more of the present respondents are married; they are slightly more affluent, more Israel-oriented, and more denominationally affiliated than the others. In general, the differences between them and respondents in other studies total about 5% or less.

The leadership sample consists of board members from five national organizations: the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the International B'nai Brith, and the United Jewish Appeal. Again, about half of the eligible respondents returned the questionnaire (N=272). Results below are reported collectively for the five organizations.

### The Findings

#### Psychic Attachment to Israel

By all measures, American Jews reported a deep attachment to Israel (see Table 1). About three-quarters said that "Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew," and as many agreed that "If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life." Meanwhile, over 9 in 10 classified themselves as "pro-Israel" or "very pro-Israel" and the rest were mostly "neutral." Conversely, only about 1 in 10 reported that they were "sometimes uncomfortable about identifying myself as a supporter of Israel."

Clearly, the vast majority of American Jews not only claim to care deeply about Israel, they are not ashamed to say so in public. (This finding is all the more

impressive in light of fairly widespread images they have of American anti-Semitism and hostility to Israel reported below.)

Comparisons with earlier studies (the questions on "personal tragedy" and "pro-Israel" were asked in 1982 and 1981) demonstrate a small, but noticeable change over the three studies. The proportion who said they were "very pro-Israel" dipped slightly between December, 1981 and August, 1982 (during the war in Lebanon), but has returned to the pre-war level since then (43%, 36%, and 43%). Moreover, over the three surveys, the proportion answering affirmatively to the "personal tragedy" question has held virtually steady (83%, 83%, and 77%).

On all measures of psychic attachment to Israel the leadership sample somewhat exceeded the general Jewish public. More leaders (90% versus 78%) said caring about Israel was important to their Jewishness; more felt that Israel's destruction would be a personal tragedy; fewer felt sometimes uneasy identifying as a supporter of Israel; and more termed themselves "very pro-Israel" (63% versus 43%). That the leaders scored higher on these measures is, of course, not at all surprising in light of their involvement in Jewish communal life at the highest levels, and of their derivative experiences, socialization and peer pressures.

In brief, broad psychic attachment to Israel is still widely felt among American Jews, be they leaders or the larger public. The findings suggest little or no erosion in the most fervent and passionate support for Israel. Caring for Israel still ranks with attending a Passover Seder and lighting Hanukkah candles as among the most popular and widespread contemporary expressions of American Jewish commitment.




TABLE 1

Indicators of Psychic Attachment to Israel

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
"Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew."	78%	90%
"If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life."	77	83
"I am sometimes uncomfortable about identifying myself as a supporter of Israel."	10	4
"Feelings about Israel"		
Very Pro-Israel	43	63
Pro-Israel	43	35
Neutral	6	0
Anti-Israel	2	2
Very Anti-Israel	1	0

### **Personal Involvement with Israel**

American Jews not only feel a strong attachment to Israel, they manifest it in several ways (see Table 2). Almost all (93%) reported paying special attention to newspaper and magazine articles about Israel (in fact, the proportion actually exceeds those attending a Passover Seder, the most popular Jewish religious ritual in the United States). Moreover, three-quarters (75%) claimed they "often talk about Israel with friends and relatives," while over half (56%) considered themselves "very well-informed about Israel."

As with psychic commitment, the leaders outscored the public in terms of personal involvement, in particular in terms of often discussing Israel with friends and family (97%) and a self-image of being well-informed about Israel (93%). Again, given the nature of their communal involvement, these results are perfectly understandable.

Clearly, by every measure examined, Israel plays a prominent part in the cognitive and emotional lives of a vast majority of American Jews. Indeed, as the next table shows, a large minority of the sample also reported having direct personal contact, communication and connection with the Jewish State and society.

### **Contact and Communication with Israel and Israelis**

Several previous studies of American Jews reported that about 38% of American Jews said they had visited Israel and 15% had been there twice or more. The figures reported in Table 3 (40% and 17%) are slightly higher and may reflect an actual small growth in the proportion who had visited Israel (in fact, 4% reported having visited Israel in 1982 and 3% said they had already visited in the first half of 1983).

It should be understood that not all 40% who have visited Israel did so out of a deep sense of Jewish commitment. A national study conducted in 1981 for the Israel Government Tourist Office found that not only had 38% of American Jews visited Israel, but that -- in the same sample -- almost as many (35%) had been to Italy. For many American Jews, Israel's attraction as a tourist destination is not all that different from other historically interesting vacationlands. However, in this and other studies, those who have travelled twice or more to Israel (17%) scored substantially higher on several measures of Jewish commitment; the repeat travellers are largely visiting Israel out of a sense of commitment to their Jewishness and to the Jewish State. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that between 1-in-5 and 2-in-5 Jews share a very deep personal connection with Israeli society.

Similar conclusions may be drawn from the frequent reports of family and friendship connections between American Jews and Israelis. About a third of the public sample reported they had family in Israel and as many said they had "personal friends in Israel." Interestingly, in a parallel study of Israelis conducted simultaneously by the Institute, an even larger proportion of Israelis reported having been to the U.S., and having family and friends here. These results suggest that a very substantial minority of both Jewish communities--the one in Israel and that in the United States--has a deep personal investment in the other community.

TABLE 2

Indicators of Personal Involvement with Israel

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
Pay special attention to newspapers and magazine articles about Israel	93%	99%
"Often talk about Israel with friends and relatives."	75	97
"Consider yourself very well-informed about Israel."	56	93






TABLE 3

Indicators of Contact and Communication with Israel

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
Visited Israel		
Once or More	40%	94%
Twice or More	17	78
"Have any family in Israel."	34	35
"Have any personal friends in Israel."	35	69
"Ever seriously considered living in Israel."	17	17



The leaders in the surveys reported even more extensive contact with Israel than the Jewish public at large. Although they are no more likely than the general respondents to have family in Israel or to have considered living there, they are much more likely to have been to Israel and, as a result, many more of them have developed personal friends there. Almost all the leaders (94%) have been to Israel and over three-quarters (78%) have been there at least twice; moreover, more than two-thirds (69%) reported personal friends in Israel.

Thus, it is clear that the ties of American Jewry to Israel go well beyond ethnic or religious symbolic concerns (powerful as these may be). When many American Jews think of Israel and worry about her future they are thinking not merely of some abstract distant image, but of real places they have seen, and real people who are close and dear to them.

### Images of Israelis

Respondents were asked to comment on how accurately they thought various descriptions applied to most Israelis (see Table 4). About half or even more thought that five descriptions characterize "most Israelis...to a great extent": industrious, aggressive, heroic, peaceloving, and progressive. The sample largely rejected three characterizations: intolerant, religious, and conservative. And it was ambivalent about the remaining four modifiers: idealistic, arrogant, secular, and materialistic.

In all likelihood, informed observers of Israeli society would be considerably more prepared than were the respondents to describe Israelis as intolerant, religious, and conservative.

This discrepancy derives from a certain idealization of the Israeli in the eyes of American Jews. In particular, American Jews like to think of Israelis as akin to themselves, and to project their own self-images onto the Israelis.

This phenomenon of course only partially explains the results in Table 4. The high scores for "aggressive" and "heroic," descriptions that few American Jews would probably apply to themselves, suggest the special place Israelis hold in American Jewish imagery. With "peaceloving," these descriptions suggest the image of an embattled society heroically struggling to achieve true peace and security.

TABLE 4

To What Extent Do You Think Each Of The Following Descriptions Applies To Most Israelis?"

	<u>"To A Great Extent"</u>	
	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
Industrious	81%	69%
Aggressive	68	71
Heroic	66	66
Peaceloving	53	75
Progressive	50	44
Idealistic	30	14
Arrogant	29	29
Materialistic	21	19
Secular	20	41
Intolerant	13	14
Religious	12	4
Conservative	8	6
"Generally I feel closer kinship with Israeli Ashkenazim than Israeli Sephardim."	59	55

As noted, communal leaders travelled to Israel and had more extensive contact with Israelis than the Jewish public as a whole. As a result, although most of their images of Israelis were consonant with those of the public sample, the leaders were more likely to characterize Israelis as "peaceloving" and "secular." Their experience of meeting with them in their own land probably heightened their sense of the many hardships Israelis are enduring because of their ongoing conflict with their Arab neighbors. Those hardships, and the anxieties they produce, readily apparent to anyone who gets to know Israelis on a personal level, may well increase one's image of Israelis as "peaceloving." Similarly, direct contact with Israelis tends to dispel idealized images of a largely religious society and to make clear that many Israelis--especially the Ashkenazim--have developed a Jewish culture in a thoroughly "secular" mold.

That many American Jews see Israelis in part as extensions of themselves is evident in the majority (59% of the public; 55% of the leaders) who openly agreed with what for some must have been a very delicate statement: "Generally I feel a closer kinship with Israeli Ashkenazim than Israeli Sephardim." The sense of common (European) communal origins serves for many American Jews as a tie bridging the two communities separated both by great geographical and cultural distance. This finding suggests a potential for misunderstanding and alienation as Israeli Sephardim come into increasing prominence in Israeli public life. While some American Jews who now feel closer with Israeli Ashkenazim will in time also come to feel close to the Sephardim, as they are exposed to them, others may well feel slightly less connected with Israel because of differences they sense between themselves (largely Ashkenazim) and the emerging Israeli leadership.

### Support for Israel Activities

The widespread Jewish psychic attachment to Israel and the considerable personal contact and communication many Jews have with the country and society translates into a large minority of American Jews active in Israel's support (Table 5). Almost half the sample (46%) reported giving charity directly to Israeli educational or charitable institutions while over a third reported contributing \$100 or more to the UJA (the Israeli-oriented central communal philanthropic drive) in the past year. Almost a third reported having "contributed money to a political candidate" within a year of the survey because "he/she would support Israel." About a fifth said they had "written a newspaper or elected official in support of Israel" in the last 12 months.

Previous research has demonstrated the phenomenon of people over-reporting or exaggerating socially approved behavior. Nevertheless, on the basis of other more sophisticated surveys of American Jews, it is safe to assume that at least three-quarters who reported a UJA contribution of \$100 actually gave that much. In any event, roughly a third of American Jews view themselves --accurately or inaccurately -- as active supporters of Israel, both philanthropically and politically.

Just as the leaders reported greater attachment and involvement with Israel, so too did they report considerably more charitable and political support for Israel. As generally wealthy Jews involved in Jewish life, virtually all of them contributed

TABLE 5

Reported Acts of Support for Israel

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
"Contribute directly to Israeli educational or charitable institutions."	46%	94%
Have given the UJA/Federation \$100 or more in the last 12 months	34	97
"Contributed money to a political candidate" in the last 12 months because "he/she would support Israel"	30	76
"Written a newspaper or elected official in support of Israel in the last 12 months."	20	70

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both to the UJA and directly to Israeli institutions. For similar reasons, it is not at all surprising to learn that over three-quarters (76%) reported contributing to a pro-Israel political candidate in the last year and almost as many (70%) said they had written pro-Israel letters to a newspaper or elected official.

In short, large numbers of American Jews act out their commitment through political and philanthropic activities.

### Images of American Society and Its Orientation to Jews and Israel

As a result of deep commitments to both Israel and the United States, American Jews firmly reject the notion that a commitment to one in any way contradicts a commitment to the other. Over 9 in 10 affirmed that "U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest," while fewer than 1 in 4 agreed that "There are times when my devotion to Israel comes into conflict with my devotion to America" (Table 6).

In fact, the devotion of American Jews to the United States and to Jewish life here has been so thoroughgoing, that many observers have suggested that American Jews are pro-Israel but not Zionist -- as least in the classic way the term has been used. In this sample where almost all said they were "pro-Israel," only a substantial minority (39%) considered themselves Zionists and an even smaller number (17%) said they had ever seriously considered settling in Israel. Over 4-in-5 implicitly rejected central tenet of classical Zionist thinking -- the imperative to make aliyah (settle in Israel). Earlier studies revealed other repudiations of classic Zionism: the vast majority of American Jews believes that American Jewish life has a bright future and rejects the proposition that "Israel's future is secure." Interestingly, findings in the Institute's parallel study of Israelis, revealed that they hold converse views: consistent with Zionism's pessimistic prognosis for Jewish life in the Diaspora, most Israelis agreed that American Jewry is on the road to assimilation and that Israel is chiefly responsible for maintaining American Jewish continuity.

Although American Jews regard American and Israeli interests as ultimately consistent, they are--to put it mildly--not convinced that other Americans see things that way. Three questions designed to tap American Jewish concern about continued U.S. support for Israel demonstrate that about half of all American Jews are deeply worried about whether that support will continue. Thus, less than half (47%) agreed that "Most Americans think that U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest," and more than half expressed fears about the solidity of America's commitment to Israel's security. Most (54%) agreed that "When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive" and said (55%) they were "worried the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel." The attachment to Israel, the concern for her security, and the anxiety over American support for the embattled state lead almost three-quarters (73%, the same as in the 1981 study) to agree that "Jews should not vote for candidates....unfriendly to Israel."

To some outsiders, Jews' anxiety about U.S. support for Israel may appear misplaced, if not downright ludicrous. After all, for many years, U.S. economic and military aid has amounted to about \$2 billion a year and more. The U.S. can be

TABLE 6

Israel, American Jews, and the Larger Society

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Leaders</u>
"U.S. Support for Israel is in America's Interest."	91%	96%
"There are times when my devotion to Israel comes into conflict with my devotion to America."	24	17
Consider self a Zionist	39	50
"Most Americans think that U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest."	47	60
"When it comes to the crunch few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive."	54	41
"I am worried the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel."	55	48
"Jews should not vote for candidates unfriendly to Israel."	73	66
"Anti-Semitism in America may, in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews."	69	55
"Anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews."	37	64
"Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews."	27	44

counted on to veto U. N. Security Council resolutions voicing one-sided criticism of Israel; in fact, the voting records of Israel and the U.S. in the U.N. agree an extraordinary 85% of the time. In light of these and several other indications of a strong U.S. support for Israel, why are American Jews so anxious over that support?

Part of the reason may lie with their anxieties over the security of their own position in the American society. Despite notable advances in politics, the media, business, academe, and other prestigious or powerful spheres of American society, Jews still feel potentially threatened by American anti-semitism. Over two-thirds (69%) agreed that "Anti-Semitism in America may, in the future become a serious problem for American Jews." Only one third or so gave answers expressing lack of anxiety over the Jewish position in America. Thus, only a third (37%) agreed that "Anti-Semitism is currently not a serious problem for American Jews," and a similar number (27%) agreed with the mildly worded statement that "Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews."

In most respects, the findings reported for the leaders and the public in Table 6 are very similar. However, in one area the two views diverged notably. Leaders were much more likely to downplay the contemporary importance of American anti-semitism. Almost two-thirds (64%) agreed that it is currently not "a serious problem," compared with about one-third (37%) of the wider Jewish public. Moreover they were much more likely to agree (44% to 27%) that, "Virtually all positions of influence...are open to Jews." As successful business leaders and as leaders who are concerned with a wide variety of Jewish communal problems, these individuals are less likely than the typical American Jew to experience personal anti-semitism and more likely to be concerned with other communal issues.

In this context, it is worthwhile to examine whom American Jews see as their friends with respect to Israel, and whom they see as adversaries (see Table 7). Respondents were asked to characterize several American groups as "generally friendly, mixed or neutral, or generally unfriendly to Israel." The results are reported in the form of a "friendly index," that is, the percentage seen as "generally friendly" minus the percentage seen as "generally unfriendly." They suggest rather distinctive patterns in American Jewish perceptions. Four groups were seen as especially "friendly": Democrats, liberals, Congress, and labor unions. In contrast, President Reagan and five groups were characterized as predominantly "mixed or neutral" although slightly more friendly than unfriendly.

In the "mixed or neutral" grouping, in addition to the President, the respondents listed Republicans, the military, conservatives, "mainstream" Protestants, and Evangelical Protestants. A few groups were seen as mildly hostile to Israel: Catholics, the news media, and, in particular, the State Department and corporations. One group -- blacks -- emerge in the sample's collective mind, as the most unfriendly to Israel.

Several factors obviously help shape American Jewish perceptions of their friends and adversaries. As a liberal community and with historical memory of liberalism, American Jewry believes its friends are found in established liberal groups and institutions. Moreover, the Democratic Party, liberals, Congress and



TABLE 7

Are each of these "American Groups...generally friendly,  
mixed or neutral, or generally unfriendly to Israel?"

	Friendly Index <sup>a</sup>	
	Public	Leaders
Democrats	60	76
Liberals	46	44
Congress	38	76
Labor Unions	33	58
President Reagan	16	55
Republicans	14	42
The Military	12	24
Conservatives	10	27
"Mainstream" Protestants	8	10
Evangelical Protestants	3	63
News Media	-3	-20
Catholics	-5	9
State Department	-11	-53
Corporations	-15	-29
Blacks	-41	-58

a. Friendly Index = (the difference between the % who answered "Generally Friendly" and the % who answered "Generally Unfriendly.")

labor unions are all places where many American Jews feel truly accepted on a personal as well as a political level. As a result, they view them as more friendly to Jews and more inclined to support Israel.

To American Jews the groups listed in the middle of Table 7 constitute "America's social and political power structure." The President, Republicans, the military, conservatives and Protestants not only control America, they believe, but haven't fully accepted American Jews. Thus, one must be vigilant and ultimately skeptical of their professed friendliness toward Israel.

All the groups seen as hostile are, in one way or another, viewed as competing with American Jews for the support of the general public on a variety of issues. Jews and Catholics often conflict around Church-State and some social issues; the news media, especially after the war in Lebanon, were seen by many Jews as biased against Israel; the State Department has long been considered by American Jews as dominated by Arabists, patriotic diplomats who sincerely believe that America's long-range interests lie with the oil-rich and populous Arab world; the word "corporations" conjures up images of businesses still intolerant of Jews, which act in an amoral fashion to maximize profits, and which, as a result, have cast their lot with the economically profitable Arab world.

The extraordinary frequency with which Jews see blacks as unfriendly toward Israel bears special mention. In other surveys Jews have made clear that they share a common domestic agenda with blacks and support large-scale social spending to benefit blacks, other minorities, and all needy Americans. Nevertheless, Jews have been chastened by the apparent collapse of the once-strong Black-Jewish civil rights alliance, the urban confrontations of the last two decades, and the involvement of several prominent black community leaders with the PLO. Thus, while Jews remain sympathetic to black domestic concerns, they are very suspicious of blacks when they act in the international arena.

In most but not all ways, the perceptions of the leaders regarding various groups in U.S. society paralleled those of the public sample. Generally, the leaders had more definite or extreme views about whether groups were friendly or hostile towards Israel; thus, groups which the public rated as friendly were usually even more positively rated by the leaders, and the converse was true for groups rated hostile.

Three of the larger discrepancies between public and leaders' views include Congress, the President, and Republicans. On these and several other political groups and institutions, the leaders perceived much greater friendliness, probably because of their greater access to public officials and their greater command of specialized information.

In two other instances sophisticated knowledge undoubtedly shaped leaders' views. They saw the State Department and Evangelical Protestants as respectively much more hostile and much more friendly to Israel than did the public. The image of a pro-Arab State Department has been especially vivid among Jewish communal leaders for decades. Similarly, the pro-Israel stance of many Evangelical Protestant leaders surprises many Jews whose conventional images of

fundamentalist Christians are of religiously inspired anti-semitism. Only those Jews especially attentive to intergroup relations and to the images of Israel among the American public are likely to know much about the pro-Israel sympathies of many Evangelical Protestants.

Leaders also tended to see most American groups and institutions as more friendly toward Israel than did the general Jewish public. Since the perception of a hostile environment generally feeds reluctance to take risks and compromise, the public may be expected to have less conciliatory or "dovish" views on the Middle East conflict than the communal leaders. That this indeed is the case may be seen in comparing the two groups' views on Israeli security policies.

### Divergent Opinions About Israeli Security Policies

Although American Jews are substantially united in their concern for Israeli security, they, like Israelis, hold diverse views about how Israel should best pursue its search for peace and security (Table 8). Pragmatism and concern for security are two themes which run through American Jewish thinking about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A plurality of the public (42% to 29% with 30% undecided) preferred that Israel "maintain permanent control over the West Bank." But, for many, this view does not translate into outright annexation of the West Bank. By roughly similar margins (42% to 34% with 23% undecided) the sample endorsed Israel offering "the Arabs territorial compromise...for credible guarantees of peace," and favored (51% to 28% with 21% not sure) suspending the "expansion of settlements in...the West Bank...to encourage peace negotiations."

Previous AJC studies have shown that American Jews overwhelmingly (by about 5 to 1) support Israel's refusal to negotiate with Palestinian leaders committed to Israel's destruction. But in this most recent study, that stance is revealed as primarily a response to feelings of threat and vulnerability. Were the PLO to "recognize Israel and renounce terrorism," the vast majority of the sample (70% to 17%) agreed that Israel should talk with the PLO. By almost 2 to 1 (48% to 26% with 27% undecided) they also endorsed the right of Palestinians to a "homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel."

That threat and vulnerability are at the heart of American Jewish attitudes toward the conflict can be seen in a number of ways. First, responses to the same question -- on "territorial compromise" -- in the three AJC surveys may be compared. In December 1981, the sample was evenly split (41% to 41%) on the question; during the Lebanon war, in August 1982, when Israel was engaged in active military operations and appeared to be under attack by the American media, the sample rejected territorial compromise by a wide margin (31% for, 52% against). Now, after hostilities have diminished, a slight majority favors territorial compromise. Similarly, the minority of the Jewish public that opposed open

TABLE 8

Opinions About Israeli Security Policies

	<u>Public</u>			<u>Leaders</u>		
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
"Israel should maintain permanent control over...the West Bank."	42	29	30	21	59	20
"Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in...the West Bank and Gaza in return for credible guarantees of peace."	42	34	23	74	16	10
"Israel should suspend the expansion of settlements in...the West Bank...to encourage peace negotiations."	51	28	21	55	25	20
"Israel should talk with the PLO if the PLO recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism."	70	17	13	73	17	11
"Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel."	48	26	27	51	28	22

criticism of Israeli policies by American Jews was lowest in this last survey. Thus, the number opposing criticism started at 33% in December, 1981; it grew to 43% in August, 1982; and it has fallen to its lowest level of 31% in this study (see Table 11).

The third demonstration that Jewish attitudes are influenced by their perceptions of Israeli vulnerability lies in the findings drawn from an index of perceived hostility toward Israel. The index was created by adding "points" for seeing groups as "generally unfriendly to Israel" and subtracting points for seeing groups as "generally friendly." The third of the sample that saw more American groups as anti-Israel was some 20% less likely to endorse "dovish" points of view than was the third of the sample who considered the American public more friendly toward Israel.

If the American Jewish public tends to lean toward a "dovish" posture on Israeli policies, the communal leadership does more so. By about 2 to 1 (55% to 25%) the leaders endorsed suspension of West Bank settlement expansion, and the right of Palestinians to a homeland which does not threaten Israel (51% to 28%). By more than 4 to 1 (73% to 17%) they endorsed the position that Israel should talk with the PLO provided the PLO renounces terror and recognizes Israel. On these three questions the leaders were only slightly more conciliatory than the public at large. However, on the two questions in Table 8 pertaining to territories (and in two others reported in Table 10), leaders were significantly more eager for Israel to relinquish control of the territories than were respondents in the public sample. Thus they rejected by 3 to 1 (59% to 21%) the notion that "Israel should maintain permanent control over...the West Bank"; and by the much larger margin of over 4 to 1 (74% to 16%) they endorsed the proposal to offer territorial compromise for "credible guarantees of peace."

Several interrelated factors may account for the conciliatory views of most communal leaders. Previous studies of American Jewish public opinion identified several factors associated with such thinking. Those who were better educated, more politically liberal, younger, and less communally affiliated were more likely to hold dovish views (and these results hold up for this survey as well). These variables should be interpreted not in their own right, but as indicators of some underlying concept. (I have suggested that they all betoken cosmopolitanism -- being oriented and involved in thinking and groups beyond the exclusively Jewish sub-culture.)

Thus, even though the leaders share few of the distinctive socio-demographic characteristics which predispose the larger public to take a dovish stance, they have been exposed, by virtue of their leadership responsibilities, to the perspectives and values of influentials who are neither Jewish nor Israeli.

The leaders' point of view, moreover, makes for some interesting paradoxes. Generally, those in the larger Jewish population who care more deeply and are more politically and financially supportive of Israel, and have greater contact and communication with Israelis are slightly more "hawkish" than their less Israel-involved counterparts. On the other hand, the communal leaders who exhibit commitment to, and involvement with, Israel at levels far above the larger Jewish

population, are decidedly more dovish than one would anticipate on the basis of such high involvement. These contradictory tendencies could make for intra-organizational tension, with broad-based membership groups' local chapters leaning in a more hawkish direction while the top national leadership exhibits a more dovish view.

Perhaps the key aspect that predisposes the top leaders toward more conciliatory attitudes is their direct contact with a large number of Israeli influentials, many of whom strongly oppose the present government position and support other views. As Jewish communal leaders learn to appreciate distinctions between Israeli leaders and policies, they also come to recognize that expression of their more conciliatory foreign policy instincts is not necessarily heretical or disloyal.

### Ratings of Israeli Political Leaders

We asked respondents to indicate whether they had a "very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable" impression of six well known contemporary Israeli political leaders, or "no impression" at all of any of them. (Table 9)

Abba Eban -- a figure held in modest esteem by Israelis and well-known in the United States since his service as a UN Ambassador during the Six Day War (1967) -- emerged as the most popular figure among American Jews. Ariel Sharon -- now in disrepute in Israel for his bellicosity and individualism during the war in Lebanon -- was the least popular. The four other figures -- Rabin, Navon, Begin and Peres -- had fairly similar, intermediate favorability scores.

Past Israeli President Yitzchak Navon was the least well-known figure (44% had no impression). Of those who claimed to know about him, almost all gave him favorable ratings; among these, he was as popular as Eban. Labor Party leader Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Begin elicited quite different levels of feeling. About half of those with an impression of the Prime Minister thought of him as either "very favorable" or "very unfavorable"; whereas 3 out of 4 who rated Peres put him in either the "somewhat favorable" or "somewhat unfavorable" categories. Apparently, as among Israelis, Shimon Peres excites neither enthusiastic support nor diehard opposition.

The leaders' evaluations of Israeli leaders differ from those of the public in fairly predictable ways. Leaders were considerably less likely to report "no impression" of any of the six leaders. As a result, they were more likely to think favorably of Yitzchak Navon. Their views of Labor Party leaders Peres and Rabin were similar to those of the public sample; however, their views of Prime Minister Begin and former Defense Minister Sharon were decidedly less favorable than those of the public. The leaders were split down the middle on Menachem Begin and clearly unfavorably impressed with Sharon. Begin's popularity among the leaders is far behind that of the four Labor Party personalities. Their views of Israeli political leaders, then, are consistent with their views of which policies would best bring about peace and security for Israel. Just as they endorse Labor Party style policies, so too are they more comfortable with Labor Party personalities.

**TABLE 9**  
**Favorability Ratings of Six Israeli Political Leaders**

	<u>Public</u>		<u>Leaders</u>	
	<u>Favorability Rating<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>%No. Impression</u>	<u>Favorability Rating<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>%No. Impression</u>
Abba Eban	72	8	72	0
Yitzchak Rabin	41	28	45	4
Yitzchak Navon	36	45	57	14
Shimon Peres	31	23	32	6
Menachem Begin	31	3	6	0
Ariel Sharon	5	7	-39	0

a. Favorability Rating = 1 X (% "Very Favorable" - % "Very Unfavorable")  
+ 0.5 X (% "Somewhat Favorable" - % "Somewhat Unfavorable")

Clearly, American Jews distinguish among various Israeli political leaders as well as alternative foreign policies, and are also generally willing to express implicit criticism of certain Israeli policies when given the opportunity to do so.

### Criticism of Israeli Policies and Leaders

That many American Jews are uncomfortable with some aspects of current Israeli foreign policy is evident. By almost 2 to 1 (48% to 29% with 23% unsure) the respondents affirmed (Table 10) that they were "often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government." Aside from differences with Israeli leaders on how to pursue peace and security (refer back to Table 8), the sample by a 2 to 1 margin expressed concern with the way the Israeli government has been handling relations with the U.S. They agreed (50% to 24% with 26% undecided) that "Israeli leaders have sometimes been unnecessarily tactless in their dealings with American officials"; and, by a similar margin (50% to 24%; 26% not sure) they assented to the view that Israeli government policies "have hurt Israel in the U.S."

Apparently criticism of the adverse impact of Israeli policies on U.S.-Israeli relations is, in a sense, "fair game" among American Jews, as is support for more dovish policies. However, more direct attacks on current leaders and policy directions received the support of only substantial minorities. Thus, by a slim margin (38% to 35%) the sample rejected the notion that Prime Minister Begin's policies "have damaged Israel." By margins of about 2 to 1 (52% to 24%; 42% to 28%, and 50% to 22%) they also rejected three statements which directly expressed lack of faith in Israel's democracy or continuity as a viable Jewish state. Thus, they rejected the suggestion of a recent erosion in "Israel's commitment to democratic values," as well as the idea that the West Bank occupation will erode Israel's democratic, humanitarian or Jewish character.

As one would expect, the leaders were in substantial agreement with the public on these issues, but they were even more critical of the present Israeli government and its policies. Thus, many more said they were "troubled" by the government's policies (70% agreed, only 21% disagreed), and there was a near consensus that the government has hurt U.S.-Israel relations unnecessarily. By over 4 to 1 (68% to 15%) the leaders agreed that Prime Minister Begin's policies "have hurt Israel in the U.S." and even more (81% versus 10%) agreed that Israelis "have sometimes been unnecessarily tactless in their dealings" with American leaders.

Consistent with these highly critical views, a plurality (43% to 32%) agreed that the present government's policies "have damaged Israel." And while they were more hesitant than the public to declare that Israel's "commitment to democratic values has eroded in recent years," they were clearly more ready to express their fears for Israel if occupation of the territories were to continue. Pluralities (47% to 33% and 43% to 36%) agreed that continued occupation will "erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character" and her "Jewish character" as well. These views, of course, echo those expressed frequently by Israelis themselves. With their greater familiarity with the issues surrounding the occupation and with indigenous Israeli anxieties about those policies, communal leaders are more likely than the larger Jewish public to feel uneasy with those policies.



TABLE 10

Expressions of Overt Criticism of Israeli Policies and Leaders.

	<u>Public</u>			<u>Leaders</u>		
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
"I am often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government." <sup>a</sup>	48	29	23	70	21	9
"The policies of Prime Minister Begin and his government have hurt Israel in the U.S."	50	22	28	68	15	18
"Israeli leaders have sometimes been unnecessarily tactless in their dealing with American officials."	50	24	26	81	10	9
"The policies of Menachem Begin and his government have damaged Israel."	35	38	27	43	32	25
"Israel's commitment to democratic values has eroded in recent years."	24	52	24	22	64	14
"Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character."	28	42	31	47	33	20
"Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's Jewish character."	22	50	27	43	36	21

a. Answers to the first question only are "Agree," "Disagree," "Not Sure"

The respondents from both samples, then, were willing to take issue with certain aspects of Israeli political decision-making, but they were resolute in their commitment to a certain idealized vision of her society. Just as they made distinctions over the substance of permissible criticism, so too did they distinguish between those who may, and those who may not, express criticism of Israeli policies.

Thus, the sample overwhelmingly supported the right of Israelis to criticize their own government and, by inference, they suggested such criticism was a good thing. By a 4 to 1 margin (70% to 17% with 12% not sure) they rejected the proposition (see Table 11) that "Israelis who strongly criticize" some of the government's policies "are bad for Israel." They were slightly less enthusiastic about American Jewish criticism, but even here they were largely supportive. By roughly 2 to 1 margins they assented to the view that "American Jewish organizations should feel free to criticize" (60% to 27%), and they rejected the notion that "American Jews should not criticize the government of Israel's policies publicly" (57% to 31%). In contrast, the sample implicitly rejected the right of non-Jews to take Israel to task. By a 67% to 15% majority, respondents disagreed with the view that "non-Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries," even as they affirmed 52% to 37% that American Jews had the right to make such a distinction.

From these results it would seem that American Jews believe some forms of criticism of Israel, by some people, on some issues and of some personalities, is acceptable. But criticism is acceptable only if it is internal to the group, and the more internal the better. Thus, the sample saw Israelis themselves as the most accepted critics, followed by American Jewish organizations and American Jewish individuals. Criticism by non-Jews -- whose views and motives are always suspect -- of the Jewish State, her leaders, policies, and society is not acceptable. (Non-Jews can, perhaps, "get away" with regretting U.S.-Israel tensions, but not with blaming Israel for causing those tensions.)

Finally, the loyalty of potential Jewish critics to the group is seen as a *sine qua non*. By more than 3 to 1 (61% to 20%), the sample rejected the view that "Those who stop giving to UJA because they oppose Israeli government policies are right to do so." Clearly, criticism has its limits, and the decision to stop giving to the central pro-Israel communal philanthropic drive is seen by the vast majority of American Jews as transcending those limits.

In many respects, the leaders' views of who may acceptably criticize parallel those of the larger public, and perhaps they were more sharply defined. Thus, they were more resolute than the public in support of Israelis who criticize their government and they were also more definite in rejecting the right of non-Jews to hold Israel to higher standards than other countries. And their opinions about American Jews -- as individuals -- criticizing Israel virtually replicated those of the public sample.

TABLE 11

Attitude Toward Criticism of Israeli Policies

	<u>Public</u>			<u>Leaders</u>		
	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Dis- agree</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Dis- agree</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
"Israelis who strongly criticize some of the government's policies are bad for Israel."	17	70	13	7	85	7
"American Jewish organizations should feel free to publicly criticize the Israeli government and its policies."	60	27	13	42	37	21
"American Jews should not criticize the government of Israel's policy publicly."	31	57	11	31	57	12
"Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries."	52	37	11	50	39	10
"Non-Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries."	15	67	19	12	79	9
"Those who stop giving to UJA because they oppose Israeli government policies are right to do so."	20	61	19	10	78	13

The one major difference between Jewish leaders and the public in this sphere entailed attitudes toward Jewish organizations publicly criticizing the Israeli government. The public respondents were equally comfortable with organizational and individual criticism. However, among the leaders, only a slim plurality (42% to 37%) endorsed organizational criticism. As one would expect, leaders take the role of their organizations more seriously than the public. They value their pronouncements and may believe their official positions are more consequential, and potentially more damaging to Israel, than the expression of individual views. For if Jewish organizations who are committed to Israel's security criticize the government, others, whose motives are more suspect, feel greater license to take Israel to task.

In short, the reluctance of many Jewish communal leaders to issue organizational statements critical of certain Israeli policies does not derive from their concurrence with these policies, since the leaders are, in fact, more opposed to the present government and its policies than are Jews generally. Rather, the communal leaders' sense of their responsibilities as leaders inhibits them from collectively and officially expressing the views of Israeli policies they hold as individuals.

#### **A Spectrum of American Jewish Views on Israel's Policies**

From the results of these surveys it is possible to construct a composite portrait of the American Jewish opinion on Israeli security-related policies.

Utilizing the terms "doves" and "hawks" as a shorthand, American Jews may be divided into three broad groups. About 45% may be seen as doves; that is, roughly, the proportion that support territorial compromise, favor suspending settlement activity, and are willing to consider a Palestinian homeland on the West Bank and Gaza that does not threaten Israel. In fact, much more than 45% supported a formula for talking with the PLO (it must recognize Israel and renounce terrorism). In addition, over 45% affirmed the right of American Jews loyal to Israel and Israelis (especially) to criticize the government.

About 30% may be seen as "hawks." This is roughly the proportion that rejected territorial compromise; somewhat more wanted permanent Israeli control of the West Bank and somewhat fewer rejected even a non-threatening Palestinian homeland; and roughly this number also rejected the propriety of American Jewish criticism of Israeli policies. Between the doves and the hawks were the roughly 25% who were ambivalent or inconsistent about the major policy issues.

The "doves" and "hawks" in turn may be divided into roughly equal halves, that is, between strongly and weakly committed segments. Strongly committed doves (about 25% out of the 45%) consist of those who openly voice the fear, shared by Israel's Peace Now activists, that Israel's democratic, humanitarian, and Jewish character is now in jeopardy. The remaining 20% constitute weakly committed doves who prefer a Labor-oriented foreign policy, but refrain from publicly questioning Israel's major directions. As for the hawks, the 17% who would not talk with even a peace-oriented PLO suggests that the hawks too divide into a more extreme and a more moderate wing.

In sum, while commitment and attachment to Israel are matters of consensus among American Jews, the findings suggest a leaning among American Jews toward a dovish posture coupled with considerable fluidity in their thinking. They also exhibit wide diversity of views regarding Israel's current leaders and policies.

Using the same criteria, the leaders can be classified according to the same schema. Since from 51% to 74% assented to dovish positions, it is reasonable to infer that about 60% would qualify as doves; and since between 16% and 28% rejected those views, about 25% may be called "hawks." The remaining 15% may be seen as ambivalent or inconsistent. Among the doves, roughly 35% expressed views harshly critical of current policies (strongly committed) leaving 25% weakly committed; and among the hawks, 17% rejected talks with a PLO which recognized Israel and renounces terrorism (strongly committed) leaving 8% weakly committed.

Reasonable people may of course differ on how one defines such classifications "hawk" and "dove." But that the communal leaders are considerably more dovish than the larger Jewish public is indisputable.

#### Summary of Findings

1. Almost all American Jews express deep attachment and caring for Israel.
2. A substantial minority are in close touch with Israel and Israelis. About 2-in-5 have been to Israel and 1-in-6 have been there twice or more; over a third have family and friends in Israel.
3. A substantial minority of American Jews support her with political and charitable contributions.
4. Most are anxious about continued U.S. support for Israel as well as about American anti-semitism and the acceptance of Jews in the U.S.
5. Most believe the liberal-left (Democrats, liberals, Congress, labor unions) are pro-Israel; that the Establishment (President Reagan, Republicans, the military, Protestants) are mixed toward Israel; and that certain political actors (the State Department, corporations, and especially Blacks) are anti-Israel.
6. The American Jewish public tilts toward preferring a "dovish" Israeli foreign policy. Pluralities or majorities favor territorial compromise, suspension of settlements, talks with the PLO provided the PLO renounces terror and recognizes Israel, and a Palestinian homeland if it would not threaten Israel.
7. Labor Party leaders are more popular than Mr. Begin or Mr. Sharon.
8. Criticism of Israeli government policies by Israelis and American Jews is acceptable.

9. Leaders differ from the public in two significant ways:
- a. They are even more deeply involved with Israel: they travel there more often, have more Israeli friends, and are much more active in political and charitable affairs.
  - b. They are more "dovish." In particular, they are much more eager for Israel to eventually relinquish control of the territories for real peace, and are more likely to see continued occupation of the territories as jeopardizing Israel's democratic, humanitarian, and Jewish character.

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### Appendix A: Demographic and Social Characteristics

The method of data collection used in this study -- mailing questionnaires to Jews with Distinctive Jewish Names nationwide -- offers an important advantage over other methods: it is extraordinarily low-cost. Its principal disadvantage, though, is that it may produce biased, or somewhat unrepresentative results. To determine the extent to which this sample is indeed representative of American Jewry, Table 12 compares selected social and demographic characteristics of the 1983 National Survey of American Jews with the largest recent survey of American Jews, the 1981 Greater New York Jewish Population Study conducted by Paul Ritterband and myself for New York's UJA Federation. This study interviewed over 4500 Jews living in eight counties containing about a third of all American Jewry.

In many respects the two samples are, if not virtually identical, quite similar. The median age, proportion of households married, the household size and many of the ritual activities are very close. The national sample reported slightly higher income, owing in part to inflation over the last two years, and in part to the higher concentration of working-class Jews in New York, relative to the rest of the country. For similar reasons, educational attainment in the national sample was also higher.

The national sample does appear to over-represent Orthodox and Conservative Jews, and as a consequence it may under-represent the Reform or unaffiliated. In part, these differences are due to the slightly greater motivation of more Jewishly committed individuals to complete and return the study. In contrast, the friendship results point in the opposite direction: fewer of the national respondents (61% versus 70%) reported only Jewish close friends than did respondents in the New York study.

In sum, then, some characteristics of the national sample differ in small measure from the standard for representativeness derived from the more sophisticated and more costly New York study. However, none of these differences are large enough to seriously impugn the substantive inferences drawn in this study.

TABLE 12

Appendix B: Social and Demographic Characteristics

	1983 Public	1981 Greater N.Y. <sup>a</sup>	1983 Leaders
Median Age	48	49	58
% Married	70	65	90
Mean Household Size	2.6	2.5	2.6
% B.A.	62	53	90
Median Income	\$37,000	\$31,000	\$135,000 <sup>b</sup>
Denomination			
Orthodox	15	13	8
Conservative	44	36	34
Reform	29	29	50
Other	12	23	8
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100
Seder	89	90	95
Chanukah Candles	77	76	81
Yom Kippur Fast	59	68	61
Sabbath Candles	34	37	42
Separate Dishes	22	30	16
Christmas Tree	11	--	12
% 3 Closest Friends Jewish	61	70	79
% Currently intermarried (of those married)	17	11	4

a. Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen, 1981-4 Greater N.Y. Jewish Population Study, Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of N.Y.

b. Approximate calculation, 69% of the leaders reported incomes in excess of \$100,000.



# 1983 NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWS

## AMERICAN ISSUES

1. Which of these best describes your usual stand on political issues? (Circle number in this and all other questions)
- |                    |    |                   |    |                    |    |
|--------------------|----|-------------------|----|--------------------|----|
| RADICAL, SOCIALIST | 2  | LIBERAL           | 36 | MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD | 38 |
| CONSERVATIVE       | 23 | VERY CONSERVATIVE | 1  |                    |    |
2. Do you usually think of yourself as Republican, Democrat or Independent?
- |            |    |          |    |             |    |       |   |
|------------|----|----------|----|-------------|----|-------|---|
| REPUBLICAN | 11 | DEMOCRAT | 59 | INDEPENDENT | 30 | OTHER | 1 |
|------------|----|----------|----|-------------|----|-------|---|
3. Do you vote in most elections? (Circle number)
- |     |    |    |    |
|-----|----|----|----|
| YES | 90 | NO | 10 |
|-----|----|----|----|
4. Did you happen to vote in the 1982 election?
- |     |    |    |    |
|-----|----|----|----|
| YES | 90 | NO | 10 |
|-----|----|----|----|

## ISRAEL

5. Have you been to Israel?
- |           |    |           |    |                    |    |
|-----------|----|-----------|----|--------------------|----|
| NO, NEVER | 57 | YES, ONCE | 25 | YES, TWICE OR MORE | 18 |
|-----------|----|-----------|----|--------------------|----|
6. (IF YES) When was the last time you were there? (YEAR):
- |                               |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Pre 69:13, 69-71:9, 72-74:17, |  |
| 75-77:12, 78-80:24, 81-83:25  |  |
7. (IF YES) Was your impression of Israel mostly favorable?
- |     |    |    |   |       |    |
|-----|----|----|---|-------|----|
| YES | 86 | NO | 4 | MIXED | 11 |
|-----|----|----|---|-------|----|
- |                                                                                                                                                       | YES | NO |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----|
| 8. Have you ever seriously considered living in Israel? (Circle number).....                                                                          | 17  | 83 |
| 9. Do you have any family in Israel? (Circle number).....                                                                                             | 34  | 66 |
| 10. Do you have any personal friends in Israel? (Circle number).....                                                                                  | 35  | 65 |
| 11. In the last 12 months, have you contributed money to a political candidate because you believed he/she would support Israel? (Circle number)..... | 30  | 70 |
| 12. In the last 12 months, have you written to a newspaper or elected official in support of Israel? (Circle number).....                             | 20  | 80 |
| 13. Do you often talk about Israel with friends and relatives? (Circle number).....                                                                   | 75  | 25 |
| 14. Do you pay special attention to articles about Israel when you read newspapers or magazines. (Circle number).....                                 | 93  | 7  |
| 15. Do you consider yourself very well-informed about Israel?.....                                                                                    | 54  | 46 |
| 16. Do you consider yourself a Zionist? (Circle number).....                                                                                          | 39  | 61 |
17. Do you like Israel more now, less now, or the same as the last few years?
- |          |    |          |    |                                |    |
|----------|----|----------|----|--------------------------------|----|
| MORE NOW | 22 | LESS NOW | 15 | THE SAME AS THE LAST FEW YEARS | 63 |
|----------|----|----------|----|--------------------------------|----|

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

	AGREE	DIS- AGREE	NOT SURE
18. Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew. (Circle number).....	78	9	13
19. If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life.....	77	10	13
20. Generally, I feel a closer kinship with Israeli Ashkenazim (those of European lineage) than Israeli Sephardim (those of Asian or African lineage). (Circle number).....	59	22	19
21. Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries. (Circle number).....	52	37	11
22. Non-Jews should hold Israel to higher standards of conduct than other countries. (Circle number).....	15	67	19
23. I am often troubled by the policies of the current Israeli government. (Circle number).....	48	29	23
24. There are times when my devotion to Israel comes into conflict with my devotion to America. (Circle number).....	24	65	11
25. U.S. support of Israel is in America's interest. (Circle number).....	91	3	6
26. Most Americans think that U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest. (Circle number).....	47	22	31
27. I am worried the U.S. may stop being a firm ally of Israel. (Circle number).....	55	31	14
28. Jews should not vote for candidates who are unfriendly to Israel. (Circle number).....	73	15	12
29. The policies of Prime Minister Begin and his government have hurt Israel in the U.S. (Circle number).....	50	22	28
30. I am sometimes uncomfortable about identifying myself as a supporter of Israel. (Circle number).....	10	85	6
31. American Jewish organizations should feel free to publicly criticize the Israeli government and its policies. (Circle number).....	60	27	13
32. American Jews should not criticize the government of Israel's policies publicly. (Circle number).....	31	57	11
33. Generally, Jews who oppose certain Israeli government policies are made to feel unwelcome in most Jewish organizations. (Circle number).....	22	31	47
34. When it comes to the crunch, few non-Jews will come to Israel's side in its struggle to survive. (Circle number).....	54	24	22
35. Israelis who emigrate and settle in other countries are doing something wrong. (Circle number).....	16	66	18
36. Those who stop giving to UJA because they oppose Israeli government policies are right to do so. (Circle number).....	20	61	19
37. Anti-Semitism in America, may in the future, become a serious problem for American Jews. (Circle number).....	69	11	20
38. Anti-Semitism in America is currently not a serious problem for American Jews. (Circle number).....	37	43	20
39. Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews. (Circle number).....	27	55	18

Do you believe each of the several American groups and institutions below is *generally friendly, mixed or neutral, generally unfriendly* towards Israel? (Circle number)

Towards Israel, this group is:	GENERALLY FRIENDLY	MIXED OR NEUTRAL	GENERALLY UNFRIENDLY	NO IMPRESSION
40. "Mainstream" Protestants.....	20	47	12	22
41. Evangelical Protestants.....	23	28	20	29
42. Catholics.....	14	50	20	17
43. Blacks.....	7	31	48	14
44. State Department.....	22	37	33	9
45. The military.....	31	36	19	15
46. Liberals.....	53	30	7	11
47. Conservatives.....	25	49	15	11
48. Corporations.....	12	45	27	16
49. Labor unions.....	37	39	7	17
50. News media.....	21	51	24	5
51. Congress.....	44	44	5	7
52. President Reagan.....	33	44	17	6
53. Democrats.....	62	30	2	7
54. Republicans.....	26	53	12	9

What is your impression of each of the following Israeli leaders? (Circle numbers)


	VERY FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE	VERY UNFAVORABLE	NO IMPRESSION
55. Abba Eban.....	61	27	3	1	8
56. Ariel Sharon.....	22	30	20	21	7
57. Menachem Begin.....	34	34	20	10	3
58. Shimon Peres.....	19	42	13	3	23
59. Yitzchak Navon.....	22	30	2	1	45
60. Yitzchak Rabin.....	26	38	7	1	28

Below are positions often articulated by some of Israel's principal political leaders and parties. Please indicate whether you agree with those Israelis advocating each of the following positions. (Circle number)

	DO YOU AGREE WITH ISRAELIS HOLDING THIS VIEW?		
	YES	NO	NOT SURE
61. Israel should offer the Arabs territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza in return for credible guarantees of peace. (Circle number).....	42	34	23
62. Israel should maintain permanent control over Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). (Circle number).....	42	29	30
63. Israel should suspend the expansion of settlements in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) in order to encourage peace negotiations.....	51	28	21

	DO YOU AGREE WITH ISRAELIS HOLDING THIS VIEW?		
	YES	NO	NOT SURE
64. Israel's commitment to democratic values has eroded in recent years. ....	24	52	24
65. Israel should talk with the PLO if the PLO recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism. ....	70	17	13
66. Israel should grant Conservative and Reform rabbis the same status as Orthodox rabbis. ....	79	9	13
67. Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character. ....	28	42	31
68. Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank will erode Israel's Jewish character. ....	22	50	27
69. Palestinians have a right to a homeland on the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it does not threaten Israel. ....	48	26	27
70. The policies of Menachem Begin and his government have damaged Israel. ....	35	38	27
71. Israeli leaders have sometimes been unnecessarily tactless in their dealings with American officials. ....	50	24	26
72. Israelis who strongly criticize some of the government's policies are bad for Israel. ....	17	70	13

73. In general how would you characterize your feelings about Israel? Please circle one *number* on the scale below.



To what extent do you think each of the following descriptions applies to most Israelis? (Circle *numbers*)

	TO A GREAT EXTENT	TO SOME EXTENT	HARDLY AT ALL	DON'T KNOW, NOT SURE
74. Idealistic.....	30	50	7	13
75. Arrogant.....	29	48	10	14
76. Secular.....	20	51	9	20
77. Materialistic.....	21	47	18	14
78. Conservative.....	8	42	24	26
79. Peaceloving.....	53	36	4	7
80. Industrious.....	81	15	1	4
81. Aggressive.....	68	25	2	5
82. Heroic.....	66	26	1	7
83. Intolerant.....	13	56	18	14
84. Religious.....	12	55	24	9
85. Progressive.....	50	37	4	8

## JEWISH BACKGROUND

86. What was the main type of formal Jewish education you received as a child? (Circle *number*)
- NONE 14      SUNDAY SCHOOL 18      HEBREW SCHOOL OR OTHER PART-TIME 55  
DAY SCHOOL, YESHIVA, OR OTHER FULL-TIME 9      OTHER 4
87. Of your three closest friends, how many are Jewish? (Circle *number*)..... 0=8    1=11    2=21    3=61
88. Do you belong to a synagogue? (Circle *number*) ..... YES 59      NO 41
89. (IF YES) Is it:..... ORTHODOX 24    CONSERVATIVE 45    REFORM 27    OTHER 3
90. I think of myself as (Circle *number*)..... ORTHODOX 15    CONSERVATIVE 44    REFORM 29    OTHER 12
91. In what religion were you raised? ..... JEWISH 94    CHRISTIAN 3    OTHER 0    NONE 3
92. In what religion was your spouse raised? ..... JEWISH 84    CHRISTIAN 13    OTHER 0    NONE 4
93. What is your spouse's religion now?..... JEWISH 84    CHRISTIAN 8    OTHER 1    NONE 7
94. In what religion will/have/did you raise(d) your child(ren)?..... JEWISH 89    CHRISTIAN 3    OTHER 2    NONE 6
95. What did your parents consider themselves? Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, something else, or non-Jewish? (Circle *number*)
- ORTHODOX 39      CONSERVATIVE 35      REFORM 18      OTHER JEWISH 7      NON-JEWISH 2
- |                                                                                                                                   | YES | NO |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----|
| 96. Do you take part in a Passover seder at home or elsewhere?.....                                                               | 89  | 11 |
| 97. Are Chanuka candles lit in your home? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....                                                            | 77  | 23 |
| 98. Do you fast on Yom Kippur? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....                                                                       | 59  | 41 |
| 99. Are Sabbath candles lit in your home? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....                                                            | 34  | 66 |
| 100. Do you use separate dishes for meat and dairy products in your home? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....                            | 22  | 78 |
| 101. Do you belong to a Zionist organization? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....                                                        | 20  | 80 |
| 102. Do you belong to another Jewish organization aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group? (Circle <i>number</i> )..... | 44  | 56 |
| 103. Do you usually give to the UJA/Federation? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....                                                      | 64  | 36 |
| 104. Did you happen to give the UJA/Federation \$100 or more in the last 12 months? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....                  | 33  | 67 |
| 105. Do you contribute directly to Israeli educational or charitable institutions? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....                   | 45  | 55 |
| 106. At Christmastime, do you have a tree in your home? (Circle <i>number</i> ).....                                              | 11  | 89 |

## DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

107. Your sex: (Circle number)      MALE 65    FEMALE 35
108. Your age: 53 years.      Median:
110. Your zip code: \_\_\_\_\_
115. Marital status:    NEVER MARRIED 12    MARRIED 76    DIVORCED OR SEPARATED 5    WIDOWED 7
116. How many people live in your home? 1=17    2=43    3=13    4=17    5+=10
117. How many children have you had? 0=21    1=14    2=40    3=18    4=5    5+=2
118. Do you have any children living at home?    YES 39    NO 62
119. What is the highest level of education you (and your spouse) have completed?  
(If you are not currently married, disregard the column for spouse.) (Circle number)
- |                                    | YOU | YOUR SPOUSE |
|------------------------------------|-----|-------------|
| HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE OR LESS ..... | 20  | 29          |
| SOME COLLEGE .....                 | 18  | 18          |
| COLLEGE DEGREE .....               | 26  | 29          |
| POST-GRADUATE DEGREE .....         | 36  | 24          |
121. Finally, what was your approximate family income from all sources, before taxes, in 1982? (Circle number)
- |                            |                            |                            |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| LESS THAN \$10,000    5    | \$30,000 TO \$39,999    16 | \$60,000 TO \$74,999    12 |
| \$10,000 TO \$19,999    11 | \$40,000 TO \$49,999    14 | \$75,000 TO \$99,999    6  |
| \$20,000 TO \$29,999    19 | \$50,000 TO \$59,999    9  | \$100,000 AND OVER    8    |



**INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS  
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE**

165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

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# NEWS COMMITTEE

FROM THE

**THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE** Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

*MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations*

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, May 27...The latest Gallup poll on American attitudes toward Jews and the State of Israel reveals that these attitudes have not varied significantly in the past four and a half years.

This conclusion was based on a comparison of the new poll, which was conducted from last March 12 to March 22, with four similar surveys conducted by the Gallup organization at various times in the four and a half year period. All five polls were done on behalf of the American Jewish Committee.

The March 1982 poll, involving interviews with a representative sample of 1,580 adults over the age of 18, dealt with three specific subjects: the perception of Jews as wielders of influence or power in the United States; the perception of their loyalty to the United States in relation to their feelings toward Israel; and the degree of sympathy felt by the survey respondents toward Israel and toward the Arab nations in the hypothetical event that war broke out between them.

The poll revealed that Americans do not see Jews as excessively powerful in comparison to other special interest groups. Only nine percent of respondents said they believed Jews had too much influence. In contrast, 43 percent named labor unions, 42 percent business corporations, 24 percent Arab interests, and 12 percent named Blacks as having too much influence. At nine percent, Jews were tied with Born Again Christians and Evangelical Protestants. The nine percent figure is a slight decrease from the responses given in a November 1981 poll, when 11 percent of respondents felt that Jews had too much influence.

-more-

Maynard I. Wishner, President; Howard I. Friedman, Chairman, Board of Governors; Theodore Ellenoff, Chairman, National Executive Council; Robert L. Pelz, Chairman, Board of Trustees.

Bertram H. Gold, Executive Vice President

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On the matter of loyalty, a majority of Americans continue to believe Jews to be more loyal to the United States than to Israel. As past studies indicated, those who hold this view are apt to come from certain demographic categories -- college graduates, professional and business people, families with income over \$20,000 a year, young, and white.

The question about support in a hypothetical Mideast war revealed that more than five times as many Americans would support Israel in such a war than would support the Arab nations.

Founded in 1906, The American Jewish Committee is this country's pioneer human relations organization. It combats bigotry, protects the civil and religious rights of Jews at home and abroad, and seeks improved human relations for all people everywhere.

5/27/82  
#82-960-184  
EJP, REL, NC-IS, A



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Date.

9/28

To: *Marc Tannenbaum*  
From: **Harold Applebaum**

---

- For your information  
 For approval  
 Please handle  
 Please talk to me about this  
 Read and return  
 Returned as requested  
 Your comments, please  
 Per your request

REMARKS: *Please read in preparation  
for Wednesday luncheon meeting.*

*15ert Gold*

On many fundamental issues, Israelis and American Jews hold common views. But a number of questions of deep concern to both communities are perceived quite differently among Israelis than they are among their American counterparts. And in both countries, perceptions of Israel's basic political dilemmas and options play a major role in shaping attitudes towards many other issues that affect the lives of Jews.

These were the major findings in recent public opinion polls commissioned by the American Jewish Committee's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations. The two polls, conducted simultaneously in the U.S. and Israel in the summer of 1983, were the first to pose many identical questions to respondents in both countries, permitting a more direct comparison of Israeli and American Jewish attitudes and perceptions than was heretofore possible.

Perhaps the strongest agreements were evident in areas dealing with relations between Israel and the United States. Eighty-six percent of the American Jews polled and 79 percent of the Israelis agreed with the formulation that "U.S. support for Israel is in America's national interest." Despite this conviction, however, a majority of the respondents in both countries expressed concern about the depth of the U.S. commitment to Israel and a fear that America's support could not be fully counted upon.

Nearly two-thirds of both groups acknowledged the possibility that anti-Semitism could become a problem for American Jews; but they offered quite different evaluations of the current situation. Two-thirds of the Israeli respondents rejected the suggestion that anti-Semitism was a current problem in the U.S., and roughly 60 percent felt "virtually all positions of influence in America are

open to Jews." In response to a question asked only in the Israeli poll, a large majority of Israelis indicated they believed that American Jews have a strong influence on U.S. foreign policy and control important branches of the American economy.

By contrast, a plurality of the American Jews polled said anti-Semitism constituted a serious problem in the U.S. today, and only one-third said it did not. Only about one quarter of the American respondents believed that Jews had full access to all positions of power and influence in their country, and a clear majority of American Jews (but fewer Israelis) said that non-Jews could not be depended on to support Israel "in a crunch."

Regarding attitudes toward Israel, both groups tended to evaluate key American institutions in a similar light. They judged the U.S. Congress to be most friendly to Israel, perceived President Reagan and the U.S. military as neutral to somewhat friendly, and saw the State Department and the news media as leaning against Israel. Thirty-eight percent of the Israeli respondents were convinced that the U.S. media are unfriendly to Israel. More than 70 percent felt that when Israel is smeared, U.S. Jews are also hurt.

Though most Israelis would like all American Jews to emigrate to Israel, they also recognize that the overwhelming majority of American Jews consider America their home. And while many Israelis feel Americans lead a good life, nearly three quarters of those polled felt assimilation and the weakness of Jewish education were endangering the survival of Judaism in the U.S.

Other immigration issues also divided the American and Jewish respondents. Seventy percent of the Israelis, but only 15 percent

of the Americans, felt that Israelis who emigrate are doing something bad. And Israelis also felt strongly that Russian Jewish emigres are wrong to go anywhere but Israel; a view that most American respondents rejected.

Another controversial issue concerned religious pluralism. American Jews supported overwhelmingly the right of Conservative and Reform rabbis to be granted equal status with Orthodox rabbis in Israel, a view rejected by virtually all the Orthodox Israelis, though approved by a plurality of 47 to 29 percent among the respondents as a whole.

There was obviously greater confidence that the situation would improve within a generation than in the near future. A clear majority (58 percent) saw the problems solved within a generation, and this group included over 60 percent of those of Asia/Africa origin. But 26 percent of all the respondents disagreed and another 16 percent were not sure. As in the previous question, the second and third generation Israelis of European origin were most doubtful the gaps would be closed in a generation, though the majority in these groups expressed hope that they would.

On most of political questions, the sharpest divisions were evident not between Israelis and Americans, but among the Israelis themselves. Thus, while the Israeli respondents as a whole were about equally divided over whether Prime Minister Begin's policies hurt Israel in the U.S., only 19 percent of those who supported the Begin coalition agreed with that proposition, as against 74 percent of those supporting the opposition. And the same strong differences marked questions on territorial compromise for peace, suspension

of settlement expansion, permanent control of the West Bank and talks with the P.L.O., as shown by the percentages agreeing with the statements below.

<u>Question</u>	<u>Agree</u>	
	<u>Government Supporters</u>	<u>Opposition Supporters</u>
Policies of Begin government have hurt Israel.	17%	84%
Israel should suspend settlements in Judea and Samaria to encourage peace negotiations.	28%	72%
Israel should offer territorial compromise in return for credible guarantees for peace.	18%	74%
Israel should talk with the P.L.O. if the P.L.O. recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism.	34%	65%
Continued Israeli occupation of Judea and Samaria will erode Israel's democratic and humanitarian character.	16%	65%

On most of these issues, the American Jewish respondents were also divided, but less sharply; and in a number of their answers they tended to lean toward the "dovish" view. Forty-six percent said they would suspend expansion of West Bank settlements to encourage peace; only 26 percent said they would not. Forty-four percent said they would give the Palestinians the right to a homeland if it did not threaten Israel; only 24 percent said they would not. (Israelis overall rejected this proposal by 56 to 33 percent.) And 65 percent of the American respondents felt Israel should talk with the P.L.O. if it renounces terrorism and recognizes Israel. (Israelis as a whole are fairly evenly divided on this.) Further-

more, American Jews disagreed very strongly with those Israelis who supported the coalition view that public disagreement by Israelis with their government is bad for Israel. American Jews and Israelis also have different favorites among Israeli leaders. Abba Eban headed the list among the Americans polled, followed by Yitzhak Rabin, Yitzhak Navon and Shimon Perez, with Prime Minister Begin and Ariel Sharon both trailing. Navon was most favored by the Israelis, and Rabin was next; Begin won the backing of the coalition supporters while Perez garnered few supporters overall.

Just as Israelis expressed greater faith in the security of American Jews than the latter did themselves, American Jews expressed greater confidence in the strength of Israeli democracy than the Israelis themselves. But both agreed that the ties between the two Jewish communities were strong and lasting, and that despite any short-range differences between them, their future was inextricably linked.

# NEWS COMMITTEE

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MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

## FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, Feb. 1...Two hundred teenagers and young adults whose parents were the subjects of a landmark study on Jewish-Christian intermarriage are taking part in a follow-up study that is expected to break as much new ground as its predecessor did. The new research, which will be conducted before the end of the year, is examining the effects of intermarriage on children, and is the first full-scale survey to address its questions directly to the children of mixed marriages rather than to their parents.

The American Jewish Committee, sponsor of the current study, also initiated and financed the first one, which was published in 1979.

Both surveys were designed by Dr. Egon Mayer, Associate Professor of Sociology at Brooklyn College.

All of the respondents have one parent who was born Jewish and one who was born Gentile. Some of the born-Gentile parents converted to Judaism, either before or after they married, but most did not, and very few of the Jewish spouses converted to Christianity.

The goals of the present investigation, according to Dr. Mayer, are to assess the respondents' feelings of religious and ethnic identity and to examine the quality and quantity of their kinship ties and their general feelings of emotional well-being.

Among the questions being asked are:

- # If you could be born again, would you want to be Jewish?
- # Which religious group do you identify with? Which religious group does your (mother, father) identify with?

-more-



- # How much time do you spend with your (mother, father, brother, grandmother, etc.)? How much do you enjoy the time spent in (his, her) company?
- # How much has your (mother, father, etc.) influenced your ideas about religion, education, politics, anti-Semitism, careers, friends?
- # Are your friends and dating partners mostly Jewish, mostly non-Jewish, evenly mixed?
- # Do you attend synagogue services? Church services?
- # Do you find family occasions a source of warmth?
- # Do you feel well-liked by those you really care about?
- # Do you have confidence about your own future?
- # Do you have a sense of being at peace?

The first AJC intermarriage study, which focused on the intermarried spouses, was widely hailed for its insights by social scientists, family counselors, and intergroup relations specialists. Among its major findings were that:

- (1) Most of the born-Jewish spouses affirmed a Jewish identity, but did little to act on this affirmation.
- (2) Families in which the born-Christian spouse had converted to Judaism had a higher degree of Jewishness than did other intermarried families -- and seemed to be more consciously Jewish in terms of religious practices and affiliation than most families in which both spouses had been born Jewish.
- (3) Most born-Gentile spouses did not identify strongly with the religion of their birth and did not place any religious pressure on the Jewish spouse.
- (4) Differences of religious background did not seem to contribute to estrangement from parents or to conflicts in family decision-making.

Explaining AJC's reasons for conducting the new study, Yehuda Rosenman, Director of the AJC Jewish Communal Affairs Department, said:

"A very large proportion of American Jews -- approximately one third of them, according to the best available data -- are now marrying non-Jews. Consequently, the impact of intermarriage on the religious and cultural identity of the children is of the utmost importance,

since the children will determine Jewish continuity or discontinuity.

"There has been much heated debate," continued Mr. Rosenman, "on this very question: whether intermarriage will lead ultimately to the assimilation and disappearance of the Jewish people. We therefore think that studying the actual attitudes and behaviors of children of intermarriage -- which has never been done before -- is a most tangible and scientific way of trying to bring light to this debate instead of heat."

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82-960-18

1/25/82

A, EJP, REL, WO, Y-3



**THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE**

**date** November 30, 1981

**to** SAC

**from** Milton Himmelfarb

**subject** Three enclosures

1. Nathan Glazer, "Zone of Destruction," a review of Peter D. Salins, The Ecology of Housing Destruction: Economic Effects of Public Intervention in the Housing Market.

This illustrates better = worse, with special reference to housing in New York City.

2. "What Does the 1980 Census Show?", Public Opinion, August/September 1981.

Note especially the discussion of the new ethnicities, and Daniel Levine's apprehension about official rewards for ethnicity.

3. The 1981 National Survey of American Jews.

This is something that Steven Cohen of Queens College and CUNY is doing for us. The xerox gives percentages for the first group of responses received, totalling about 350. A follow-up is in the mail.

Note particularly:

- a) Question 25, which shows concern about antisemitism in America almost tied with concern about the security of Israel, and 3 out of 5 disagreeing that virtually all positions of importance in America are open to Jews.

- b) Question 66, with 29 per cent <sup>of</sup> answers reporting annual income of \$50,000 or more.

[start]

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# What Does the 1980 Census Show?

## Looking Ahead and Looking Back

with Bruce Chapman,  
Daniel Levine and Richard Easterlin

### AMERICAN JEWISH

Major changes took place in this country during the 1970s, according to new census data. Because demographics play an influential role in the formation of public opinion, the editors thought it would be useful to bring some of the new material to our readers' attention. In mid-August, they interviewed Daniel Levine, Acting Director of the Census Bureau. Bruce Chapman, Director Designate of the Census Bureau, and Richard Easterlin, economist and author of *Birth and Fortune*, a provocative work on economic and demographic cycles. The editors also asked each of the participants for their views on attitudes toward work, the theme of this issue.

**Ben Wattenberg:** Let us ask each of you what are the major demographic stories of the decade. Danny, you are the veteran at the Census Bureau, would you begin?

**Daniel Levine:** The rapid and extensive movement of the population from the Northeast and the North Central states to the South and the West is one of the biggest demographic stories of the seventies. Half or more of the population now live in the South and West. This significant shift in population has resulted in a political shift of seventeen congressional seats in the same southwesterly direction. Another major development is the change in household composition. There has been a tremendous increase in the number of single person households, households in which women are primarily present, no males

present. The changing age structure of the baby boom and the resulting shift in the age pyramid are also significant. The baby boom was followed by a period of lower fertility resulting in an echo effect as the women of the baby boom are beginning to have children.

**Wattenberg:** Does this mean the fertility rates are going up or are there more babies because there are more potential mothers?

**Levine:** The fertility rate has flattened out, and recently moved upward a little, but there hasn't been a dramatic change. With many more women in the prime child-bearing age group, even if they have fewer babies or have the same number, they will produce a big echo effect in years to come. It's going to affect our schools once again.

Another major change is that median and family income, adjusted for inflation, has been virtually flat during the decade of the seventies. In the sixties we had a tremendous increase.

**Wattenberg:** Aren't Americans living better? After all, the size of families is smaller, and the families are younger. Isn't there an increase in real income per person in a family?

**Levine:** Insofar as you have flat median income with the size of family going down, you have more income available per family member. But if you look at the distribution and the growth of groups such as the aged living alone, or female-householder families, you get a different impression. The median income of some groups in the population has improved, but others haven't been

so lucky. It's actually gotten worse for women who have divorced and live with young children. The age structure of the population also has an impact here. The situation is not as bad for older Americans, whose benefits are indexed.

**Karlyn Keene:** Bruce, do you have additions?

**Bruce Chapman:** No, but I would like to elaborate on the ones Danny mentioned. For example, flat income distribution is partly a reflection of the inflation we went through in the last decade, particularly in the later years of the decade. A recent Census Bureau study shows over a 5 percent reduction in real income for the median family over the last year.

**Levine:** The recession in 1979 and 1980 is going to be reflected in the change in median income between 1978, 1979, and 1980. The impact also shows up in terms of the poverty population. But these are shifts in the short run. I was referring to flatness over the decade.

**Chapman:** Another key demographic development we should mention is the continuing population shift from the central cities to the suburbs and beyond, despite all the public policy emphasis placed on improving city living.

**Richard Easterlin:** In the area of fertility there's been a dramatic decline which has leveled off in the last few years and maybe edged upward a little.

In the area of death rates there's been a really striking development. It's twofold. After a long period of stability from 1954 to 1968, the refined measures of mortality now show a very rapid de-

cline in death rates comparable to that which occurred before 1954. In contrast to the earlier period, when the declines at younger ages exceeded in percentage terms those of older ages, the declines at older ages now are comparable to those of very young ages. The fifteen-to-thirty-four-year-old group is a notable exception. In that group the death rates are moving upward. This is attributable to a rise in violence, the principal cause of death among young people. Accidents, homicides, and suicides are the principal sources of that.

Dan covered the principal points in terms of internal migration, the movement to the Sunbelt and to non-metropolitan areas. In external migration or immigration, the striking development is the continuation in the seventies of the dramatic shift in the composition of migration. Latin America and Asia now account for an overwhelming proportion of the immigration—undocumented as well as legal aliens. The groups coming to this country as legal immigrants are much more skilled than was historically the case. The undocumented aliens are more like the unskilled migration before World War I.

**Wattenberg:** *There was a sense in this country for a while, in the sixties and early seventies, that the age of great immigration was over. You surely do not have that sense now. Every time you pick up a paper, there are Cubans or Haitians or Vietnamese arriving.*

**Easterlin:** Relative to population, however, it's smaller than in the past. The fact that fertility is at such low levels means that this migration is a larger source of population growth. Migration accounts for about a third of current population growth.

**Chapman:** Immigration has a definite and noticeable effect on city composition. Cities are shrinking because white middle-class families are moving into the suburbs or out into the country. But there is a counter-move of Hispanics and some Blacks into the center of the city. New York, which lost 800,000 people in the decade, increased its Black and Hispanic population by 300,000 during that same period. Most of that increase is a natural increase for Blacks and it is both high fertility and immigration for Hispanics. In any event, it hasn't leveled off. That changes the center city picture.

**Wattenberg:** *We've always said that we are a unique nation because we come from everywhere. In fact, we don't come from everywhere. We come from*

*a few places, from Europe, from black Africa. But we are getting close to a point where in a few years you could say of America we've come from everywhere. There has been great third world immigration.*

**Levine:** According to the census figures we had no Vietnamese population to speak of in 1970.

**Wattenberg:** *We were a country that said we were a melting pot...*

**Levine:** I don't see us as a melting pot anymore, Ben, certainly not now. Based on our experiences in dealing with various groups during the census, what I see developing is a confederation of minorities. The immigrant streams had different problems, they had adjustment problems. But, as I remember my history, there just wasn't the vociferousness, the demand for immediate political representation there is today.

The social legislation of the sixties and seventies, though well-intended, is in part responsible. Somebody said the census now deals with two little words, "money" and "votes." Everyone wants his share.

**Chapman:** I agree with Danny. But there are some exceptions. For example, the newly arrived Vietnamese are not notably politicized yet, nor are the Haitians or the newer Cuban arrivals. Also, while there are plenty of spokespersons for the Mexican-American community very few if any, obviously, are themselves undocumented aliens although they may speak to the interests of that group.

**Wattenberg:** *One of the blessings of the American historical experience is that we're all mixed up. There are few, if any, large areas composed of all one ethnic, racial, or religious minority. We don't have much "ethnic purity" beyond the neighborhood level. There are areas of high concentration, but there still is dispersion. You can't say of the United States what you say of the Basque region of Spain, or the French in Quebec, or of the Kurds or the Armenians.*

*If one projects the Hispanic numbers in the Southwest, is there a threat we'll experience the same problems the Canadians now have in Quebec?*

**Chapman:** There is a threat if the government continues policies that prevailed in the seventies. These policies tended to discourage assimilation. But that isn't necessarily the case now in the federal government. I also see a continuing trend against separatism in public opinion.



**Daniel Levine**  
Acting Director, The Census Bureau



**Bruce Chapman**  
Director Designate,  
The Census Bureau



**Richard Easterlin**  
Economist and author  
of *Birth and Fortune*



I don't see us as a melting pot anymore. . . . What I see developing is a confederation of minorities.

LEVINE



The current Hispanic immigration wave doesn't necessarily lend itself to separatism; it's different from other big waves in that it is not ethnically homogeneous or even distinguishable. You've got a real problem, for instance, if you try to designate Cubans as white or black, because they may be either. Puerto Ricans and Mexicans all speak Spanish in the first generations, but after that, the universality of the Spanish language becomes questionable. There are large numbers of people with various amounts of Spanish—or Hispanic—blood who have absolutely no contact with their ancestors' culture after a generation or two. I expect acceptance and assimilation of the Hispanics may come a lot faster than it has, for example, for the blacks.

**Easterlin:** The last point is very important. Immigrant minorities in the past and in the present adopt the values of mainstream American culture. The second generation is increasingly assimilated into the mainstream.

**Keene:** Will that happen in the Hispanic areas in California, Texas, and Arizona?

**Easterlin:** It is happening. The political representation in these areas, if anything, has developed more rapidly than was characteristic in the historic past and it will assure assimilation. These groups are going to see that the schools in the cities are not destroyed. They are going to make sure that their children get an education so that they will gain access to the main avenues of advancement in American society.

**Wattenberg:** So, "Quebecization" is not in the cards?

**Chapman:** No.

**Levine:** I have mixed feelings, Ben.

**Wattenberg:** Earlier you referred to a confederation of minorities. What does it mean?

**Levine:** Our history shows that people can be assimilated fairly quickly. What bothers me at this point is recent legislation fostering the confederation I'm talking about. Bilingual education is an example. The very fact that we have passed legislation recognizing that these people are disenfranchised, recognizing that these people may have been discriminated against, encourages just what we don't want to happen. When you start passing legislation that says if you're Hispanic you get this type of program participation or you get this benefit, you've escalated the situation where people now are going around and saying, "make sure you save your cultural heritage and affinity because it benefits our particular group." I'm hopeful that we will arrive at Dick's and Bruce's vision of the future, but I'm concerned about it. It's not as clear as it was in the past.

**Wattenberg:** What about the movement of blacks into suburban areas in this last decade. Doesn't that work against what you are saying?

**Levine:** It works against it to some extent. The question is, when blacks move into the suburbs, are you creating new ghettos?

**Wattenberg:** Yes, but if they're only 10, 12, 15, 20 percent of the jurisdiction. . . .

**Levine:** Sure, that makes a difference. The real question is does assimilation happen as quickly as it would have without the legislative impediments, or is it slowed down by the process.

**There are cross-currents, Ben. We don't**

have Balkanization, so to speak. Take a look at some of the earlier results. It looks like Hispanics have moved all over the country as have Koreans and Vietnamese. Nonetheless, you do have huge concentrations of these populations in California, in Texas, and in New York. They are going to become increasingly important parts of the urban communities in these areas as the whites leave the city.

**Chapman:** We have had concentrations throughout our history. Today you can go to communities that are predominantly Danish, or in my home state, Swiss or Dutch. You will always have a certain affinity among like peoples which is fine. Throughout our history, first-generation immigrants have collected in central cities. One thing is different today though. George Gilder talks about it in *Wealth and Poverty*. Today the government has a whole system set up to organize people, to provide community action for people—supposedly to help them assimilate. In fact, these efforts create barriers to assimilation. Gilder says, somewhat ironically, that an immigrant is lucky if he doesn't speak English because then the welfare advocates have trouble recruiting him, getting him into a welfare system from which he can't escape. If he is lucky, he doesn't speak English, he goes to work and in a few years, he is able to climb the ladder and become self-sufficient.

**Wattenberg:** Then he appears on one of those IBM commercials and his son says, "See, my father just bought a computer and . . ."

**Chapman:** Yes, and then the grandchildren appear in Pan Am commercials

There is a threat [that we will experience the same problems the Canadians have in Quebec] if government continues policies that . . . discourage assimilation. But that isn't necessarily the case now.

CHAPMAN



Government policies are not a very substantial factor pro or con, in assimilation of these minority groups. . . . The overriding forces have always been there, namely the economic changes in the U.S. which shape people's aspirations. Assimilation is happening more rapidly than in the past because of the media.

EASTERLIN

as they are flying back to visit the old country.

But when there's intense political organization of an ethnic group, an otherwise valuable heritage can tend and sometimes will tend to become alienating. Individuals left to their own devices can still have that sense of ethnic identity and wind up becoming very staunch advocates of traditional values. Easterlin: Traditional American values. Chapman: . . . Traditional American values or traditional values that happen to coincide with traditional American values. Look at the Mexican Americans and their love of family. That certainly runs against some of the liberationist 1970s values that have been fashionable in this country. Look at the strong family identification of the Southeast Asians. Look how they have pulled together after coming here. The assumption that immigrants are going to become a radical force or even a liberal force in this country is an overstatement.

Wattenberg: I'm confused. Bruce was saying that the policies of this new administration are reversing this trend toward ghettoization or a confederation of minorities. You are saying that governmental policies are fostering it. Is there an inconsistency here?

Levine: There is no inconsistency. We're talking about time. The real question is how much of the well-intended, but potentially destructive efforts to retain these group identities has been institutionalized. Will there be a residual effect and will it take much longer to have assimilation.

Easterlin: In my view government policies are not a very substantial factor,

pro or con, in assimilation of these minority groups. The overriding forces are those that have always been there: namely, the tremendous economic changes in the United States, the improvements in the standard of living which shape people's aspirations. It's happening more rapidly than in the past because of the media.

Chapman: There is also a sense of being a real American. Teddy Roosevelt called it an "unhyphenated American." That's what most people want to be. They may want to retain some cultural identification with the old country, but they also want to be unhyphenated Americans. When I was secretary of state in Washington state, federal law required us to print election ballots in Spanish because we have a certain number of Hispanics. But in some areas, when we asked voters if they would like a Spanish ballot, many were insulted. "What do you mean? Are you trying to make a second-class citizen out of me by making me vote on a Spanish ballot? Why are you calling attention to the fact that I have a Spanish surname?" Of course, there are others for whom the Spanish ballot is necessary, but that's a short-term phenomenon among immigrants.

Levine: Let me be a devil's advocate for a minute. When we finished the 1970 census, there seemed to be a general consensus that the time was right to do away with race as an identifier in federal records and other classification systems. Blacks were supporting "getting rid of race." They felt like hyphenated Americans. As we got closer to the 1980 census, with more and more attention focused on programs such as revenue

sharing, block grants—on which rest billions of dollars of federal money—the pressure built tremendously, not only to retain race but to expand that list of races infinitely. I am concerned about that.

Wattenberg: You ain't seen nothing until you go to a meeting of the Democratic National Committee. [Laughter.]

Levine: I'm a little less sanguine. It may be a short-run phenomenon. I hope so. But it's going to take more time than it has in the past.

Wattenberg: On my list of changes is the shift in population to areas outside the metropolitan areas, away from cities, and suburbs. For the first time, the greatest growth has occurred outside these urban areas.

Chapman: That's a very important story. The move from the rural areas to cities to the suburbs, as Ed Banfield described it in *The Unheavenly City* has been an unvarying trend in this country for many years. But the depopulation of the rural areas stopped between 1970 and 1980. Now there is a danger that people will start to see the depopulation of the cities as another inevitable trend.

Keene: Why are people leaving the SMSAs?

Levine: It's too early to say. Part of it is statistical. Obviously a number of the counties that are adjacent to, but not considered metropolitan counties today, will become part of metropolitan areas. Television and better roads are in part responsible. You can get all the amenities in these areas now. Cable television has been a real boon. Others have decided that the urban rat race is



# BIG STORIES

★ Due largely to migration from the Northern regions, the proportion of national population in the South and West increased from 48 percent to 52 percent.

	Percent increase, 1970-1980	Percent of total population	
		1970	1980
Total	11.4	100.0	100.0
Northeast	0.2	24.1	21.7
North Central	4.0	27.8	26.0
South	20.0	30.9	33.3
West	23.9	17.1	19.1

★ In a reversal of an historical trend, the population of nonmetropolitan areas (as defined in 1981) grew more rapidly than the population of metropolitan areas; however, the metropolitan proportion of total population dropped by less than 1 percentage point.

	Percent increase, 1970-1980	Percent of total population	
		1970	1980
Total	11.4	100.0	100.0
Metropolitan	10.2	75.6	74.8
Nonmetropolitan	15.1	24.4	25.2

★ Due largely to past fluctuations in fertility, the rate of population change in certain key age groups differed greatly from the national rate.

	Percent change, 1970-1980
Total, all ages	+11
Elementary school ages (5-13)	-15
Prime college ages (18-24)	+25
Prime household-forming ages (25-34)	+49
Elderly (65 and over)	+27

★ Mortality rates, after leveling off or increasing in most adult age groups in the 1960s, resumed their long-term decline.

	Death rate per 1,000 population		
	1960	1970	1979
Total, all ages	9.5	9.5	8.7
15 to 24	1.1	1.3	1.2
25 to 34	1.5	1.6	1.4
35 to 44	3.0	3.1	2.3
45 to 54	7.6	7.3	5.9
55 to 64	17.4	16.6	13.7
65 to 74	38.2	35.8	29.2

too much for them.

**Wattenberg:** *Speaking of the rat race, past, present and future, Dick, you recently wrote a book which may help to explain some of these things. Could you describe the thesis of Birth and Fortune?*

**Easterlin:** The basic thesis is that the welfare of individuals in the period since World War II is importantly affected by the size of their generation. By that I mean how large the birth rate was in the year they were born. Those generations that are small have been relatively prosperous over the long run and have tended to have large families. They have been characterized by less economic and psychological stress. Generations that come from periods when the birth rate is high tend to have the opposite characteristics. They are under greater economic stress. They have more unemployment, and relatively lower earnings. They tend to have smaller families. Their psychological stress and family disruption are greater.

**Keene:** *Is it self-perpetuating? Can you get out of this cycle?*

**Easterlin:** I'm not claiming that generation size explains all of an individual's personal experience. What I am talking about is one of various forces that shape people's welfare. Over the past forty years the effect of generation size has not been generally recognized.

**Wattenberg:** *Does this mean that the babies born in the depression era do*

*well compared to the rest of the population, and that those born in the baby boom years have a much tougher go of it?*

**Easterlin:** Yes. To revert to the statistic Dan quoted earlier, the stability in median family income over the past decade illustrates the process I'm talking about. If you look at the trend by age, persons forty-five to fifty-four years old would show improvement in real income over this decade. Among those in their early twenties, there would be a decline. The disparity between younger and older households has widened against the background of a generally level average.

**Wattenberg:** *Does this account for another of the big stories we haven't discussed yet—the substantial increase in two-earner families? Is that why women are going back into the labor force?*

**Easterlin:** In my view, yes. One of the big sources of the striking rise in the labor force participation of younger women is the fact that these younger adult cohorts are under greater financial pressure than their parents were.

**Keene:** *So you see the trend toward increased participation of women in the work force as an economic one, and not a concern by some women for more fulfilling lives?*

**Easterlin:** It's hard to find evidence in the opinion polls that the search for a more meaningful life is the principal reason that most young women are en-

tering the labor force. Most young women are telling the pollsters they want two children. Most of them would prefer not to be in the labor force when they have children of preschool age. Most aspire to the same types of occupations that have been typically female occupations in the past. This combination of attitudinal data suggests that women don't have a different image of themselves, but rather are flooding the labor force as a response to the pressures they feel by virtue of the general deterioration in the earning abilities of younger households.

\* \* \*

**Wattenberg:** *We have heard a great deal about the decline of the work ethic. Yet we have never had a greater percentage of the people in the labor force. Is the diminishment of the work ethic a real story? Or is it media hype?*

**Chapman:** It is a changing situation to some degree. In the sixties and well into the seventies, people expected the economy to get better and better indefinitely. That assumption evaporated in recent years, and we are beginning to see evidence that people realize they have to work hard to make a living. There is less sentimentality about work satisfaction, for example. It just isn't talked about as much. Attitudes change with the economic picture.

**Easterlin:** I have serious doubts whether the work ethic has diminished at all.

# OF THE DECADE

★ Minority group populations had growth rates exceeding the national average and thus increased as a percentage of total population, although it should be noted that in some cases, the increases are due partly to changes in how people reported race or origin.

	Percent of total population	
	1970	1980
Total	100.0	100.0
Black	11.1	11.7
Spanish origin	4.5	6.4
Asian and Pacific Islander	0.8	1.5
American Indian (including Eskimo and Aleut)	0.4	0.6

★ There was a small net in-migration of blacks to metropolitan areas which was comprised of a net out-migration from central cities and a net in-migration to the balance of metropolitan areas.

	Net internal migration, 1970-1979	
	1970-1979	1980
Total	—	—
Metropolitan areas	+142,000	—
Central cities	-714,000	—
Outside central cities (suburban)	+856,000	—
Nonmetropolitan areas	-142,000	—

★ The proportion of households headed by married couples dropped as most of the growth in households was accounted for by persons living alone.

	Percent distribution	
	1970	1980
Total	100.0	100.0
Married couple households	70.5	60.9
One person households	17.1	22.5
Other households	12.4	16.6

★ Median family income (adjusted for inflation) rose only 5 percent, due partly to the decreased proportion of married couple households; however, due to the decline in average household size, average income per family member increased by 18 percent.

	1969		1979		Percent Increase 1969-1979
	(constant 1979 dollars)				
Median family income:					
total	\$18,700	\$19,700			5
Married couple families	\$19,800	\$21,500			9
Female householder	\$ 9,500	\$ 9,900			4
Average income per family member	\$ 5,800	\$ 6,800			18

Moreover, the work views of many of the new immigrants make the American work ethic look like small potatoes.

**Levine:** You have to define what you mean when you say work ethic. Are you talking about job satisfaction or work ethic? The work ethic hasn't changed. You have to work to make a living and people's aspirations have changed, so more of them work to achieve those aspirations. Maybe that's one of the causes for two-worker families.

Television and the media have raised expectations for all people. They want a better style of living. That goes along with some of the things that Dick just said. There is a difference, though, between work ethic and work satisfaction. According to the studies I've seen many people today just aren't satisfied having a job and putting in eight hours a day. They want to derive something beyond that from the job. Satisfaction may be a problem, but the work ethic hasn't changed at all.

There are a couple of points I want to make, getting back to some of the things Dick said earlier. The number of women going to college is much higher today than it ever was before. Women don't go to college solely to sit at home and have children. But many do feel that when they have young children they want to stay home with those children. They don't plan to stay home forever. Young women today are better

trained than their predecessors. They have opportunities and they take advantage of them. You are going to see some shift in the occupational distribution of women. It might not be as dramatic as you expect. Women will move into managerial jobs.

I think Dick would agree that some of the data we have which suggest women are postponing having children suggest that there is a conflict. Dick would say that it is strictly economic in origin. I'm not so certain. Obviously, the big growth during the 1970s decade was the number of women with school-age children in the work force. In addition, during the last couple of years we have seen a substantial movement upward in the number of women with very young children entering the labor market. That may be a function of economics. I'm not sure. That's one of the things the crystal ball won't tell us until a number of years go by and we can see how the cycle changes.

**Easterlin:** The cohorts now reaching young adulthood are indeed the ones most seriously disadvantaged. Economic pressures are the most severe on young adults in the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s. I would like to come back to the question of the relation between the education of women and their occupations and make a couple of observations. The first is that in terms of women going to college there was a

much greater increase in the two decades before 1960 than in the two decades from 1960 to 1980. Yet, younger women in that earlier period did not opt to go into the labor force at the rates they are now. It's not necessarily the case that more college-educated women and greater occupational aspirations go together. One could argue that the nature of education has changed. I'm not inclined to argue pro or con. But it's important to recognize that the period before 1960 was one of dramatic educational improvement, more than the period since 1960.

**Levine:** Would you agree that there has been a change in the distribution of the types of degrees women are taking and the opportunities available to them?

**Easterlin:** To some extent, yes.

That's the other point I want to make. You see fewer women going into teaching today. The opportunities have deteriorated. It's not clear that a lot of them are going into alternative occupations one would think of as men's occupations. The improvement in the proportion of women in managerial jobs as you know, has been quite small.

**Levine:** There's a time lag there. I won't disagree.

**Easterlin:** Nevertheless, the number going into these occupations remains small. There's virtually no change in the proportion of women in some male occupations, or there is an actual de-

cline. In some occupations, such as bank tellers, there's been a big improvement. But that occupation—because it is largely computerized—has become an unskilled occupation. Many educated women are still taking jobs that make it possible for them to leave the labor force and then reenter. Computer programming is that kind of job. I agree with Dan that they tend to reenter and will tend to reenter after their children get in school. But, they are interested chiefly in jobs that can be combined with the raising of children. The fact that fewer women are going into traditional teaching jobs doesn't mean they are opting for the traditional male types of jobs. They are seeking substitute jobs where they can come in and out the way they did in the past.

\* \* \*

**Wattenberg:** *Dick, much of your work, much of the work the Census Bureau tries to do is to project and predict—to look into the future through the use of this demographic material. Putting ourselves at this table in the year 2000, let me ask each of you first, are you optimistic or pessimistic? And, second, if you were looking back from the year 2000 to today or to the decade of the seventies what would you say has changed in the nature of our national being?*

**Chapman:** I am an optimist. If I were looking back from 2000 I would say that in the sixties and in the early seventies, we had a loosening up of a number of different standards followed by a tightening up. The pendulum swung.

In education you are going to see a reevaluation. The 1980s approach of educational institutions will be more sophisticated because it is going to be harder to get students. There are going to be fewer children, particularly teenagers, and a shrinkage in the number of students available to colleges. They are going to have to be competitive. There are going to be more and more of us who stretch the idea of education past childhood and young adulthood.

In terms of migration, you will see more rural growth which necessarily means a reevaluation of what cities do and how they operate, and what makes people want to live in them.

The issue of crime is going to continue to be very important. People are less tolerant about crime than they were a decade ago.

In terms of the economy, as the baby boom generation matures and gains ex-

perience, it will help fuel economic prosperity and a number of other breakthroughs in the eighties. I was born in 1940 and I've been surfing at the head of the crest of the baby boom all my life. We were constantly being told, this is the first generation to do this and the first generation to do that, the first McLuhan generation, the first generation to see technology as a means of development. That sense of expecting change and creating change will have a tremendous economic effect. You are going to see more thirty-or-forty-year-old people starting novel technological companies.

**Easterlin:** To take your second question first, it seems to me that looking back from the year 2000 to the present, one would tend to emphasize the continuity of traditional American values, and see that the notion of ever-rising economic aspirations and improving standards of living continued to be a governing factor in people's behavior. This is contrary to the anticipations that arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when there was much talk about communal living and similar radical lifestyles. Family values, the nuclear family as the ideal, will continue. There are going to be some modifications. There has been a relaxation of sexual standards. Unmarried couples living together as a premarital arrangement will probably continue to grow. Some of the barriers to women in the marketplace will break down, and therefore, there will be a modest improvement in the kinds of jobs they do.

My views about the importance of generation size in shaping individual welfare, would imply an optimistic outlook for the coming two decades because the baby bust generations of the last twenty years will be reaching adulthood. The scarcity of young adults will be increasingly pronounced. For this reason, I am inclined to feel that the economic circumstances of young adults in terms of employment and income, relative to their parents' situation will show by 2000 a marked improvement compared with the present situation. Because of this, there will be some movement toward early marriage again, though this will be tempered by the trend toward growing college education. This may mean larger families among young households by the year 2000. The general rise in divorce rates will be considerably moderated over the next twenty years. The psychological stress young adults have been evidenc-

ing—the figures I mentioned on mortality among young adults due to violence are good indicators—is likely to take turn for the better. Crime rates among the young are not likely to continue to rise as they have. Reports of alienation among the young are likely to decline so that the general improvement in the circumstances of the young will contribute to a happier economic and social environment over the next twenty years, just as in the last twenty years it has contributed to a deterioration and the feeling of social malaise—that things are going to hell.

**Levine:** I am an optimist, which is unusual for me because on most things, I'm not. But as far as the country is concerned, I am a *real* optimist. I differ a little with Dick. Looking back from the year 2000, you are going to see significant changes in the position of women; it is going to be dramatic, much more dramatic than Dick predicts. The birth rates are going to stay down. Women are still going to have difficulties adjusting to the dual role of wanting to participate in the labor market and also wanting children and families. That is going to be a problem in the year 2000. But women are going to make significant inroads into male-dominated occupation groups. I am still concerned about what I called the growing confederation of minorities. That's the one big problem from my view. Will they assimilate fast enough; will the economic situation allow them to assimilate?

I agree with the others' assessment of traditional factors. We are not going to become a hedonistic society completely, with wild sexual mores, or anything else. We are going to have significant changes in our industrial base and the way our economic base is organized. A lot of this is going to be outside our control. It's going to be affected by what happens in the rest of the world. We won't be able to compete in the manufacturing sector to the same extent we once did. We are going to see significant changes in economic organizations which will bring about, through technology, tremendous changes in occupations and industries, and in the way we service the rest of the world. We are going to be more externally oriented in the year 2000.

Looking back, those will be the major changes. Overall, I am an optimist. I expect good things for the country, both economically and socially. □

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# THE 1981 NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWS

## AMERICAN ISSUES AND POLITICS

1. Whom did you vote for or favor in the last presidential election? (Circle number) 1/1

21 1 ANDERSON  
42 2 CARTER  
34 3 REAGAN  
3 4 ANOTHER CANDIDATE

1 123  
2/  
8/

2. Which of these best describes your usual stand on political issues? (Circle number) 9/

2 1 RADICAL 16 4 CONSERVATIVE  
35 2 LIBERAL 1 5 VERY CONSERVATIVE  
47 3 MODERATE

Below are several policy choices facing the American people.

What is your stand on each question? (Circle number)

YES NO NOT SURE

3. Should the U.S. substantially increase defense spending? 1 37 2 46 3 17 10/

4. Should the government pay for abortions? 1 54 2 39 3 7 11/

5. Should school children be bused when other means of integrating schools have failed? 1 22 2 65 3 14 12/

6. Should the government give aid to non-public schools? 1 18 2 76 3 7 13/

7. Should the death penalty be abolished? 1 22 2 69 3 9 14/

8. Should affirmative action be used to help disadvantaged groups? 1 54 2 27 3 20 15/

9. Should quotas be used to help disadvantaged groups? 1 19 2 67 3 14 16/

10. Should the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) be passed? 1 73 2 17 3 10 17/

11. Should declared homosexuals be allowed to teach in the public schools? 1 69 2 23 3 8 18/

12. Should the government use stronger measures against illegal immigration? 1 73 2 16 3 12 19/

13. Should the U.S. substantially cut spending on social welfare? 1 36 2 57 3 7 20/

14. What is your political party preference? (Circle number) 21/

66 1 DEMOCRATIC  
11 2 REPUBLICAN  
1 3 OTHER PARTY  
23 4 INDEPENDENT OR NO PARTY PREFERENCE

15. Are you a registered voter? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 22/

16. Did you vote in the 1980 election? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 23/

91 9

17. In the last 12 months, have you or other members of your household belonged to or been active in any of the types of organizations below? Check all that apply:

- |                             |                                     |                             |                                                          |     |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 15 <input type="checkbox"/> | Labor union                         | 49 <input type="checkbox"/> | A synagogue                                              | 24/ |
| 38 <input type="checkbox"/> | Professional association            | 27 <input type="checkbox"/> | A synagogue-related group (e.g., men's club, sisterhood) | 26/ |
| 8 <input type="checkbox"/>  | Business ass'n, Chamber of Commerce | 6 <input type="checkbox"/>  | NAACP, Urban League, other civil-rights groups           | 28/ |
| 14 <input type="checkbox"/> | PTA                                 | 11 <input type="checkbox"/> | NOW or other feminist groups                             | 30/ |
| 19 <input type="checkbox"/> | Block, tenants, neighborhood groups | 9 <input type="checkbox"/>  | Sierra Club or other environmental groups                | 32/ |
| 14 <input type="checkbox"/> | YMHA, Jewish community center       | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> | A campaign for public office                             | 34/ |
| 6 <input type="checkbox"/>  | Country club                        | 37 <input type="checkbox"/> | Cultural group (e.g., museum, ballet, public TV, opera)  | 36/ |

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES  
THE MIDDLE EAST

18. In general, do you think Israel's policies in its dispute with the Arabs have been: (Circle number)

- |    |   |                                                |     |
|----|---|------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 25 | 1 | TOO "HAWKISH"                                  | 39/ |
| 73 | 2 | ABOUT RIGHT: NOT TOO "HAWKISH" OR TOO "DOVISH" |     |
| 2  | 3 | TOO "DOVISH"                                   |     |

Below are different statements about the dispute between Israel and her Arab neighbors. For each statement please indicate whether you agree or disagree. (Circle number)

- |                                                                                                                                                                          | AGREE | DIS-<br>AGREE | NOT<br>SURE |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|---------------|-------------|-----|
| 19. Israel is right not to agree to sit down with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), because the PLO is a terrorist organization that wants to destroy Israel. | 1 73  | 2 18          | 3 9         | 41/ |
| 20. If the alternatives are permanent Israeli annexation of the West Bank or an independent Palestinian state, then an independent Palestinian state is preferable.      | 1 33  | 2 41          | 3 27        | 42/ |
| 21. If the West Bank became an independent Palestinian state, it would probably be used as a launching pad to endanger Israel.                                           | 1 62  | 2 11          | 3 27        | 43/ |
| 22. If Israel could be assured of peace and secure borders, she should be willing to return to Arab control most of the territories she has occupied since 1967.         | 1 95  | 2 38          | 3 17        | 44/ |
| 23. In general, how would you characterize your feelings about Israel? Please circle one number on the scale below ranging from "Very anti-Israel" to "Very pro-Israel." |       |               |             |     |

Very anti- Israel	Anti- Israel	Neutral	Pro- Israel	Very pro- Israel					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
-	-	-	-	7	27	22	20	24	45/

JEWISH CONCERNS AND ACTIVITIES

25. How important is each of the following issues or problems confronting American Jews? Please answer the question on a scale from one (1) to five (5) by circling the number of your answer.

	VERY IMPORTANT	SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	NOT IMPORTANT	
Assimilation	43 1 172	21 3 84	115	47/
Antisemitism in America	63 1 202	14 3 34	25	49/
Security of Israel	68 1 202	9 3 24	15	51/
Quality of Jewish education	38 1 232	26 3 84	45	53/
Soviet Jewry	32 1 292	25 3 114	35	55/

26. Do you belong to a synagogue? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 56/ 57/

(IF YES) Is it:

8/16 1 ORTHODOX 15/323 REFORM

24/51 2 CONSERVATIVE 1/24 OTHER TYPE

No SYN.: 52/-

27. What was the main type of formal Jewish education you received as a child. (Circle number) 58/

1 1 NONE

2 2 SUNDAY SCHOOL OR OTHER ONCE A WEEK

3 3 HEBREW SCHOOL, FOLKSHULE, HEDER, OR OTHER PART-TIME

4 4 YESHIVAH, DAY SCHOOL OR OTHER FULL-TIME

5 5 PRIVATE TUTOR

28. Have you been to Israel? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 59/

38 62

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (Circle number)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DIS- AGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	NOT SURE	STR. DISAGREE	
29. There is a bright future for Jewish life in America.	1 16	2 56	3 15	4 12	5 2		60/
30. American Jews should not criticize Israel's policies publicly.	1 11	2 26	3 5	4 42	5 15		61/
31. Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews.	1 6	2 28	3 7	4 49	5 12		62/
32. Israel's future is secure.	1 2	2 9	3 18	4 47	5 25		63/
33. Each American Jew should give serious thought to settling in Israel.	1 3	2 8	3 6	4 54	5 30		64/
34. I often talk about Israel with friends and relatives.	1 16	2 52	3 3	4 23	5 6		65/
35. There are times when my devotion to Israel comes into conflict with my devotion to America.	1 7	2 19	3 4	4 44	5 27		66/
36. U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest.	1 57	2 38	3 6	4 1	5 1		67/

	SA	A	MS	O	SD	NS	
37. Most Americans think that U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest.	1 9	2 35	3 16	4 35	5 5		68/
38. Jews should not vote for candidates who are unfriendly to Israel.	1 36	2 41	3 5	4 15	5 3		69/
39. If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life.	1 52	2 30	3 6	4 10	5 2		70/
40. I think of myself as a/an: (Circle number)							71/

5 1 ORTHODOX JEW      29 { 4 SECULAR JEW  
 35 2 CONSERVATIVE JEW      5 ANOTHER TYPE OF JEW  
 31 3 REFORM JEW

41. How many of your closest friends are Jewish? (Circle number)							72/
12 1 ALL	23 4 ABOUT HALF						
29 2 ALMOST ALL	7 5 FEWER THAN HALF						
19 3 MOST	10 6 FEW OR NONE						

42. Below are things that some Jews do. Please indicate which you do now, which you did ten years ago, and which were done in your home when you were a child. (Check your answers  in the appropriate columns)

	I DO THIS NOW	I DID THIS TEN YEARS AGO	MY PARENTS DID THIS	
Attend a Passover Seder	79 <input type="checkbox"/>	66 <input type="checkbox"/>	71 <input type="checkbox"/>	73/
Light Hanukkah candles	67 <input type="checkbox"/>	59 <input type="checkbox"/>	68 <input type="checkbox"/>	76/
Regularly light Sabbath candles	22 <input type="checkbox"/>	24 <input type="checkbox"/>	54 <input type="checkbox"/>	8/
Fast on Yom Kippur	53 <input type="checkbox"/>	45 <input type="checkbox"/>	62 <input type="checkbox"/>	11/
Attend services on Yom Kippur	60 <input type="checkbox"/>	55 <input type="checkbox"/>	62 <input type="checkbox"/>	14/
Attend services on Rosh Hashana	55 <input type="checkbox"/>	52 <input type="checkbox"/>	62 <input type="checkbox"/>	17/
Attend Sabbath services once a month or more	16 <input type="checkbox"/>	23 <input type="checkbox"/>	37 <input type="checkbox"/>	20/
Attend Sabbath services weekly	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	12 <input type="checkbox"/>	29 <input type="checkbox"/>	23/
Belong to a Jewish organization other than a synagogue	38 <input type="checkbox"/>	30 <input type="checkbox"/>	42 <input type="checkbox"/>	26/
Give to the UJA Federation every year	49 <input type="checkbox"/>	32 <input type="checkbox"/>	39 <input type="checkbox"/>	29/
Have different dishes for meat and dairy products	13 <input type="checkbox"/>	12 <input type="checkbox"/>	41 <input type="checkbox"/>	32/
Subscribe to a Jewish periodical	37 <input type="checkbox"/>	20 <input type="checkbox"/>	34 <input type="checkbox"/>	35/
Fast at least part of the day on Tish'ah be-Av	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	18 <input type="checkbox"/>	38/
Refrain from shopping or working on the Sabbath	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	25 <input type="checkbox"/>	41/



BACKGROUND

44. Your sex: (Circle number) 46 1 MALE 572 FEMALE 42/
45. Your present marital status: (Circle number) 43/
- 2 1 NEVER MARRIED 1 4 SEPARATED  
6 2 MARRIED 9 5 WIDOWED  
9 3 DIVORCED
46. Were you ever widowed? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 44/
- 16 87
47. Were you ever divorced? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 45/
- 9 91
48. How old were you when you first married? (If never married, skip)  
I MARRIED FIRST AT AGE \_\_\_\_\_ MEAN = 24.5 46/
49. How many children do you have in each age group?  
(If none, write "0" in each appropriate space) 48/
- |                      |        |             |          |     |
|----------------------|--------|-------------|----------|-----|
| UNDER 6 YEARS OF AGE | 0 1 2+ | 19 TO 24    | 0 1 2+   | 48/ |
| 6 TO 12              | 92 7 1 | 25 AND OVER | 80 12 8  | 50/ |
| 13 TO 18             | 90 7 3 |             | 63 11 26 | 52/ |
|                      | 87 8 5 |             |          |     |
50. Your present age: \_\_\_\_\_ YEARS MEAN = 48 53/
51. Including yourself, how many adults (age 18 and over) live in your household?  
\_\_\_\_\_ 1 2 3+ 55/
- 26 58 16
52. How many children (age 17 and under) live in your household? \_\_\_\_\_ MEAN = 0.49 56/
53. Your ZIP code: \_\_\_\_\_ 57/
54. How long have you been living at your current address? \_\_\_\_\_ YEARS MEAN = 9.6 62/
55. How long have you lived in the community or neighborhood in which you are living now? \_\_\_\_\_ YEARS MEAN = 16.0 64/
56. Do you own your own home or apartment? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 66/
- 39 61
57. Were you born in the United States? (Circle number) 67/
- 1 YES 90  
2 NO (SPECIFY COUNTRY OF BIRTH: \_\_\_\_\_) 10
58. Were both your parents born in the United States? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 69/
- 45 55
59. How many of your grandparents were born in the U.S.? (Circle number) 70/
- 0 1 2 3 4  
77 7 9 4 3

If you are not currently married, in the questions that follow, disregard the column for spouse.

60. Highest level of education you (and your spouse) have completed. (Circle number) 71/
- |                             | YOU  | YOUR SPOUSE |     |
|-----------------------------|------|-------------|-----|
| SOME HIGH SCHOOL OR LESS    | 6 1  | 1 11        | 72/ |
| HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE        | 13 2 | 2 16        |     |
| SOME COLLEGE                | 22 3 | 3 23        |     |
| COMPLETED COLLEGE           | 28 4 | 4 20        |     |
| MA, MBA, MSW, OR EQUIVALENT | 20 5 | 5 18        |     |
| LAW DEGREE                  | 5 6  | 6 6         |     |
| PH.D., ED.D., OR EQUIVALENT | 4 7  | 7 5         |     |
| M.D., -- D.D.S.             | 3    | 3           |     |

61. Current religion: (Circle number)	<u>You</u>	<u>Your Spouse</u>	
JEWISH	94 1	1 83	73/ 74/
PROTESTANT	1 2	2 4	
CATHOLIC	0 3	3 4	
OTHER	0 4	4 1	
NONE	5 5	5 7	

62. Religion in which you were raised: (Circle number)	<u>You</u>	<u>Your Spouse</u>	
JEWISH	96 1	1 83	75/ 76/
PROTESTANT	1 2	2 10	
CATHOLIC	1 3	3 6	
OTHER	0 4	4 1	
NONE	2 5	5 1	

63. Employment: (Circle number)	<u>You</u>	<u>Your Spouse</u>	
EMPLOYED FULL-TIME	56 1	61 1	77/ 78/
EMPLOYED PART-TIME	11 2	10 2	
FULL-TIME HOMEMAKER	10 3	14 3	
FULL-TIME STUDENT	3 4	2 4	
UNEMPLOYED, LOOKING FOR WORK	3 5	1 5	
RETIRED	17 6	13 6	

64. Type of main occupation: Below are several descriptive characteristics of jobs and occupations. With respect to the main job or occupation(s), please check all the descriptions below which apply:

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>YOUR MAIN JOB OR OCCUPATION</u>	<u>YOUR SPOUSE'S MAIN JOB OR OCCUPATION</u>	
Self-employed	16 <input type="checkbox"/>	19 <input type="checkbox"/>	1/3 8/
Salaried	38 <input type="checkbox"/>	33 <input type="checkbox"/>	10/
Professional	30 <input type="checkbox"/>	30 <input type="checkbox"/>	12/
Businessman/woman	17 <input type="checkbox"/>	21 <input type="checkbox"/>	14/

65. Which of the following types of Jewish education are you giving (did you give/will you give) your child(ren)? (Circle the number of the main form of Jewish schooling)

- 12 1 I EXPECT NO CHILDREN 17/
- 2 2 I DO NOT EXPECT TO RAISE MY CHILDREN AS JEWS
- 10 3 NO FORMAL JEWISH EDUCATION
- 9 4 BAR/BAT MITZVAH LESSONS
- 21 5 SUNDAY SCHOOL OR OTHER ONCE A WEEK
- 37 6 HEBREW SCHOOL OR OTHER AFTERNOON
- 8 7 YESHIVAH, DAY SCHOOL, OTHER FULL-TIME

66. Finally, what was your approximate family income from all sources, before taxes, in 18/1980? (Circle number)

- 5 1 LESS THAN \$10,000
- 10 2 \$10,000 TO \$14,999
- 9 3 \$15,000 TO \$19,999
- 11 4 \$20,000 TO \$24,999
- 8 5 \$25,000 TO \$29,999
- 11 6 \$30,000 TO \$39,999
- 18 7 \$40,999 TO \$49,999
- 13 8 \$50,000 TO \$74,999
- 13 9 \$75,000 TO \$99,999
- 3 10 OVER \$100,000

THANK YOU

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

**date** December 14, 1981  
**to** Bertram H. Gold  
**from** Geraldine Rosenfield *GR*  
**subject** Gallup poll, November 1981

From November 20 to 24, 1981 the Gallup organization, on behalf of the American Jewish Committee, asked six questions on attitudes toward Jews and Israel. These particular questions were selected as a means of assessing the public mood following the weeks of discussion and the vote on the sale of AWACs to Saudi Arabia. The discussion sometimes appeared to have an antisemitic component.

Preliminary results of the poll are attached. A final report and more detailed analysis will be forthcoming.

A quick reading

Americans recognize Israel is of vital interest to the United States. Many more are sympathetic to Israel than to Arab countries, but over a third are uncommitted in their feelings.

Attitudes about the loyalty of Jews to the United States have not changed visibly since the Gallup poll in August 1979. About half the population feel Jews are more loyal to the U.S. American Jews are not considered to have "too much" influence compared to other groups. A slight downward trend in the number seeing Jews as "too" influential can be seen from polls in 1976 and 1979.

Question I

Many people believe that the United States has a vital interest in certain areas of the world and not in other areas. That is, certain countries of the world are important to the U.S. for political, economic, or security reasons. I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me whether you feel the U.S. does or does not have a vital interest in that country?

	<u>Does</u>	<u>Does not</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Canada	77.5	14.1	8.4
Egypt	78.1	11.4	10.5
Israel	80.6	10.3	9.1
Saudi Arabia	84.4	6.8	8.9

Question II

Here are some countries and groups that the United States frequently deals with. Do you think [ ] has too much influence in United States policy?

	<u>Does</u>	<u>Does not</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>		
Japan	46.7	41.3	12.0
Israel	53.0	35.7	11.2
South Africa	16.8	63.8	19.3
OPEC--The Organization of Oil Producing Countries	82.3	9.5	8.7
Canada	19.5	70.0	10.5
Saudi Arabia	64.4	23.0	12.6

Question III--Half sample (A)

Which, if any, of the groups listed below do you feel has too much political influence in the U.S.?

	<u>Per cent</u>
Oil companies	70.2
Labor unions	46.2
Blacks	14.4
The Catholic Church	9.3
Born Again/Evangelical Protestants	9.8
Jews	10.5
Arab interests	29.9
Zionists	4.1
None of these	4.4
Don't know	8.9

Question IV--Half sample (A)

If war broke out between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with whom would your sympathies lie?

	<u>Sympathy with</u> <u>Per cent</u>
Israel	50.8
Saudi Arabia	14.0
Don't know	35.1

Question V--Half sample (B)

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States.

	<u>Per cent</u>
Agree	33.7
Disagree	49.5
Don't know	16.8

Question VI--Half sample (B)

If war broke out between Israel and the Arab nations, with whom would your sympathies lie?

	<u>Sympathy with</u>
	<u>Per cent</u>
Israel	49.2
Arab nations	12.4
Don't know	38.4

Geraldine Rosenfield  
12/81  
81/180/14

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

STAFF ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
Meeting of November 30, 1981

Summary

Present

Bertram Gold, Chairman  
Harold Applebaum  
Evan Bayer  
Eugene DuBow  
Milton Himmelfarb  
Selma Hirsh  
Sonya Kaufer  
Haskell Lazere  
Seymour Samet  
Philip Shamis  
Phyllis Sherman  
Adam Simms  
William Trosten  
Morton Yarmon

Absent

Abe Karlikow  
Irving Levine  
Marilyn Rothman  
Yehuda Rosenman  
Marc Tanenbaum

I. TASK FORCE ON URBAN/SUBURBAN PROBLEMS

Seymour Samet said that the Task Force paper gave the following as the rationale for Jewish concern about the problem: (1) 58% of Jews live in the Northeast, mostly in urban areas; (2) the most vulnerable Jews are the poor and aged who live in the central cities, as well as the Orthodox; (3) Jews have major investment in urban areas; (4) the break-up of older neighborhoods means the breakdown of centers of Jewish life; and (5) despite a move to the right, Jews are still predominantly Democratic and liberal and committed to social justice.

The problems of the urban crisis include: (1) the shift of population with a decline of the Northern cities and the growth of the South and West which also has tended to disperse the Jewish population in America, (2) the diminishing fiscal resources of most urban areas (in this regard the reduced size of Northern cities may not necessarily be bad), (3) fewer jobs for unskilled workers (often blacks), (4) growing demand for government services to replace those previously provided by family, e.g., child care for working or single parents, care for the elderly and sick.

The writer of the Task Force report, Bernard J. Frieden, recommended focus on the issues of: (1) poverty and racial inequality, (2) changing neighborhoods and population mobility, including help to maintain viable neighborhoods through, among other measures, support of neighborhood re-investment efforts, (3) mediating institutions to help provide necessary services at a time when the government is pulling dollars out of social programs. The Task Force felt that these issues were bigger than ethnic

interests and that the Jewish community should not go into them purely for Jewish needs. Social stability is threatened by inadequate attention to the poor and disadvantaged. The Task Force also recommended that block grants be monitored and guidelines provided for them.

The paper provides for two different kinds of scenarios for the end of the 1980s. If there is a good economy, the central cities will have fewer people but more in the middle class and there will be a lower concentration of Blacks and Hispanics. There will be more housing accommodations, safer streets as a result of the decline in teenage population. The suburbs will be more self-supporting. This will result in lesser commuting to the cities and less congestion in urban areas. Jews will be more dispersed but most will still live in Jewish neighborhoods and there will be greater demands on Jewish service organizations.

If there is a bad economy and if the government turns its back on the disadvantaged then we will see: intergroup confrontation, flight of the middle class, growing class separation, heightened political conflicts and overconcentration of poor and pensioners in urban areas. AJC's work, it was felt, should focus on the economic agenda and social policy, the use of resources at the state government level, and the development of contacts with Hispanics and other potential coalitional partners.

DAD will focus on helping to preserve the democratic process and social justice in a pluralist society, as well as attempting to help secure economic stability for women, labor and the disadvantaged. Education and crime are urgent areas for DAD.

In the discussion that followed Mr. Samet's presentation, it was pointed out that the packaging of the urban-suburban program does not do justice to its content, nor does it give a symbolic message about AJC's universal concerns. It was felt that the program should be recast to emphasize the social justice agenda and our work to preserve the democratic process and social stability.

In addition to our long-term work, it was also recognized that we need to deal with what is happening in the meantime, namely, the debates in Congress on budget cuts, the future of social welfare programs and how they can be replaced where possible by programs in the private sector.

There was agreement that our leadership must be reminded about the dangers of real economic disparity and why we are in the social justice agenda. We need to raise and uplift the issues in terms of Jewish interest. In this connection, it was recommended that discussion guides for our chapters should be provided.

## II. GOOD AND WELFARE

### Agency Publications

Sonya Kaufer is to consult with each of the department to ascertain their schedule for publications for the coming year. Concern was expressed



by Mr. Gold about the diminishing number of publications coming out of the departments during the past year.

Anti-Semitism

There was a brief discussion about the interpretation of the Yankelovich study on anti-Semitism and the proposed conference on anti-Semitism to be held by AJC in conjunction with Columbia University

Cults

James Rudin and Sam Rabinove are preparing a backgrounder on cults to be used by a newly formed interdepartmental committee on cults which will be chaired by Miles Jaffe.

Hispanic-Jewish National Task Force


An interdepartmental task force is also being formed to review AJC's program in this area.

Immigration

Gary Rubin is preparing a pro-con statement for consideration by the Board of Governors on the issues of employer sanctions and permanent identification.

PHS:mb

81-900-130



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

STAFF ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
Meeting of December 21, 1981


Summary

Present

Bert Gold, Chairman  
Harold Applebaum  
Lee Billig  
Eugene DuBow  
Inge Gibel  
George Gruen  
Abe Karlikow  
Sonya Kaufer  
Haskell Lazere  
Irving Levine  
Marilyn Rothman  
Seymour Samet  
Philip Shamis  
Phyllis Sherman  
Marc Tanenbaum  
William Trosten  
Morton Yarmon

Absent

Selma Hirsh  
Milton Himmelfarb  
Yehuda Rosenman



I. MIDEAST DEVELOPMENTS

SAC spent considerable time discussing what AJC's response should be to recent Mideast headline news events: the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel; the suspension by the U.S. of the strategic agreement between Israel and the United States; and the subsequent statement by Prime Minister Begin, accusing the Reagan administration of treating Israel like a "vassal state" and stating that the American Jewish community has "a right and a duty" to support Israel. SAC considered the public relations implications of the exchange between the two governments as well as the substantive issues raised by it.

On the issue of whether or not to issue a public statement in response to Begin's statement of December 20, SAC, after considerable discussion, felt that a statement was necessary. Several different kinds of formulations were proposed and it was finally decided that the Foreign Affairs Department in consultation with others would prepare an AJC statement along the following lines: (1) a call for both the U.S. and Israel to "cool" the rhetoric and de-escalate the dispute, welcoming the Haig statement to this effect and (2) an expression of understanding -- without condoning -- U.S. and Israeli action. [On December 18, AJC issued a statement which declared that whatever one's views on Israel's action in annexing the Golan Heights, the U.S. should not have reacted by suspending the U.S. Memorandum of Understanding, since this undercut U.S. efforts to deter threats from the Soviet Union to the area.]

In addition, it was decided that FAD would prepare a backgrounder on the Golan Heights issue. Both the statement and the backgrounder are to be ready within 24 hours for distribution to the field staff along with "talking points" on other aspects of the exchange deliberately left out of the statement, namely

Begin's reference to the "duty" of the American Jewish community to support Israel. SAC felt that there would be a very different perception with respect to Begin's December 20 statement among Jews and non-Jews and that this will have to be dealt with by the Interreligious Department and IPGI, in particular, as well as by the field.

## II. POLISH CRISIS

Irving Levine felt that while AJC's statement on the Polish crisis was quite adequate, it was not enough. He reported that a successful multi-ethnic response to the Polish crisis was orchestrated in Chicago with the help of AJC. This is an issue he thought held much promise for multiethnic coalition building.

SAC was agreed that AJC should issue a statement on the use of anti-Semitism by the Polish military government. But it thought that it would be a mistake to focus Jewish involvement in the cause of the Polish people on this aspect of the problem, particularly in building multiethnic coalitions.

It was also decided that IPGI would pull together a meeting of AJC's Polish-Jewish dialogue leadership to discuss what more AJC can do in this area. In addition to the internal meeting, an AJC meeting with Polish American leadership, including leadership in the Catholic Church, was recommended.

## III. PROGRAM PRIORITIES

In a review of agency priorities, no new priorities were added by SAC and none of the existing priorities were deleted. In a number of cases, however, they are to be recast with somewhat different emphases.

There was some discussion as to the format of the "Priorities Document." CSD was of the view that the priority programs should be subsumed under five major categories: Mideast, defending Jewish communities overseas, promoting American Jewish security, promoting social justice and pluralism, and enhancing Jewish identity. Some others in the group felt that this might tend to diminish the importance of individual priorities. There was no definite decision made as to whether or not there should be a new format, pending the preparation of a trial draft. Harold Applebaum, Phyllis Sherman, Sonya Kaufer and Lee Billig are to meet to set the process in motion.

It was decided that each of the department heads would submit by the end of next week a statement covering the priorities within their purview, indicating new emphases as needed. In addition, they were asked to prepare an outline of how their priority programs would fit under the five suggested rubrics mentioned earlier in these minutes. The Executive Committee, at its meeting on January 13, will be asked to review the priorities and may be consulted as to the format for the document.

#### IV. HILDA BLAUSTEIN STAFF INSTITUTE

There were very brief and "impressionistic" reports on the Staff Institute. It was felt that on the whole it had gone quite well, although there were some problems with aspects of the sessions and the overall concept of the meeting. The new field staff seemed to desire more "skills training" than was provided for and this may have resulted from a confusion on their part as to the purpose of the Institute.

PS:mb

81-900-126



M. Tanenbaum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY

STAFF ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
Meeting of November 23, 1981

Summary

Present

Bertram H. Gold, Chairman  
Harold Applebaum  
Inge Gibel  
Milton Himmelfarb  
Selma Hirsh  
Abe Karlikow  
Sonya Kaufer  
Haskell Lazere  
Yehuda Rosenman  
Seymour Samet  
Philip Shamis  
Phyllis Sherman  
William Trosten  
Morton Yarmon

Absent

Eugene DuBow  
Marilyn Rothman  
Marc Tanenbaum

Guest

Francis Rosensteil



I. COUNCIL OF EUROPE -- PRESENTATION BY MR. ROSENSTEIL

Francis Rosensteil, a delegate to the Council of Europe spoke about the deterioration of attitudes and policy toward Israel within the Council. He said that there were significant problems in all of the zones of Jewish interest: Soviet Jewry, representation of Arab states in the Council, linkage of racism and anti-Semitism, terrorism, human rights, and Middle East policy. With respect to representation by Arab states, he urged AJC to help explain to our government that it would not be in American interest to allow representation by non-democratic governments in a parliamentary assembly specifically designed to include only Western democratic countries. He then went on to list some issues on which pressures might be mounting, including human rights in the occupied lands, Jerusalem, and settlement of the Lebanon situation. He urged the Jewish NGOs to become more deeply involved in the affairs of the Council of Europe and recommended that AJC cooperate with the World Jewish Congress in systematically informing Jewish communities around the world of the trends in European parliamentary councils, and particularly to see to it that the Jewish communities keep their own governments au courant with these developments.

## II. MEETING WITH THE ADMINISTRATION: REPORT BY BERT GOLD

Mr. Gold reported that approximately 30 Jewish leaders met at the White House with the President and members of his staff on Thursday afternoon November 19, 1981. The meeting was called by the White House and followed a meeting held earlier that day with approximately 30 Jewish Republicans. Nate Perlmutter, Rabbi Joseph Sternstein, Ivan Novick and Mr. Gold met a week earlier with Jack Stein and Elizabeth Dole in Washington. Mrs. Dole informed them that the meeting was being planned and asked for their advice about agenda.

The meeting with the President lasted from 3:30 P.M. until 5:00 P.M. The group met with Elizabeth Dole, Ed Meese, and Richard Allen until about 4:10 P.M., at which time they were joined by Vice President Bush. The President arrived at 4:20 P.M. and stayed for the remainder of the session. The group was welcomed by Jack Stein and then Mrs. Dole said that the meeting was to be one of many she hoped would be held in the future so as to avoid the misunderstandings that had occurred during the AWACS controversy. She invited those present to get in touch with her any time they felt the need to do so.

Mr. Allen was introduced and he stated that he was aware that the AWACS sale had been of major concern to the Jewish community. Although he didn't want to go into the details again, he stressed that the sale was conditional and that AWACS would not be delivered for four years. The residue of ill feeling about the AWACS vote occurred in four areas which he outlined: (1) Manifestations of anti-Semitism. He said the Administration will take whatever steps are necessary to counteract it. If there were any statements made by the Administration that were unseemly, the Administration would do everything it could to make amends. (2) Concern about the depth of commitment of the Administration to the Camp David peace process. Mr. Allen said that Camp David is the only peace track and the Administration will vigorously pursue it. (3) The PLO and terrorism. The United States insists upon the PLO's recognition of UN Resolution 242, that it acknowledge Israel's existence and that it give up its terrorist activity, or the PLO cannot be a participant in Mideast peace discussions. (4) The Administration's relationship to Israel. Mr. Allen said he believed that Israel is of key importance to the U.S. as the only democracy in the Mideast and America's lasting friend. He looked forward to a continuation of the strategic partnership discussions being held with the Israelis.

Mr. Meese reiterated that the President's commitments to Israel had not changed. Reports that the Administration will retaliate against those who had voted against the AWACS were untrue, and the Camp David peace process will continue to be one of the major components of American foreign policy.

Howard Squadron then made a statement in which he described the reaction of the Jewish community to what it perceived to be the Administration's encouragement of anti-Semitic feelings and expressions of dual loyalty. There were questions from the floor during which it was recommended that the President make a strong statement denouncing such behavior, preferably to a non-Jewish group, to which there seemed to be agreement. The President's staff once again stressed the great concern of the Administration about anti-Semitism and Allen added that the Administration was trying to be responsive to such issues as Soviet Jewry.

Concern was expressed by the Jewish leaders about the military buildup given by the Department of Defense to Saudi Arabia. Meese said that the President makes foreign policy not the Defense Department, and he stressed that the Saudis had been helpful in the peace making in Lebanon. In response to a question, Meese said that the Saudi price rise after the AWACS sale was actually an important step for the West made in order to decrease prices by other OPEC countries. Moreover, he said the Administration has not embraced the Fahd plan. However, he said it does represent some progress.

Vice President Bush then was given the floor and he made an eloquent statement on the dual loyalty and anti-Semitism issue. He said if the Administration had made tactical mistakes in the AWACS process they would try to rectify them. He cited Hy Bookbinder's letter as one illustration of the expressions of anguish received from many in the Jewish community. He pleaded for the Jewish community to be prepared to change their perceptions of the Saudis, reminding us that no one would have imagined that there could be peace between Egypt and Israel. Our perceptions of Sadat were that he was an implacable enemy of Israel. After further exchange and comments by Meese and Allen, the President arrived. He spoke without notes for some 10 to 15 minutes. The following is a general outline of his remarks.

He said he knew how the group felt with regard to the AWACS situation. He reported that he told Mr. Begin when he was in Washington that it was terribly important for there to be peace in the Middle East and that in order to achieve this we had to involve the moderate Arab states. The President reassured him about U.S. control over the AWACS and Mr. Begin said that he would continue to express opposition to the sale. The President said, however, he didn't believe that Begin was overly alarmed. The President told Begin that the U.S. has an abiding commitment to Israel and that it is a two-way street in that Israel is a block to Soviet encroachment in the Middle East. The President said he used the term alliance with the Prime Minister for the first time that that phrase had been used in this context.

President Reagan said that he had told the Senators that the Administration would never allow Israel's military edge to be eroded but that Israel's security really depended upon peace in the Middle East and moderate Arab


countries were important to that peace. He then told the story about the assistance of the young Saudi prince in helping to achieve peace in Lebanon. After some further references to the multinational force in the Sinai, he said that Reagan vs. Begin was a misinterpretation and that he was simply telling the press that they were overemphasizing this element of the debate. He said he was going to do everything he could to stamp out bigotry and anti-Semitism and that his position on this was well known.

Mr. Squadron then made a very thoughtful and cogent speech on behalf of the group, citing their concerns directly and simply and then he asked the President whether the things that the President had stood for in the past, such as a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control, his position on the PLO and terrorism, etc., could not be given greater emphasis. The President seemed to agree to this. He said in response to a question that Soviet Jewry would be made a part of any summit talks he might have with Brezhnev.

### III. GOOD AND WELFARE

It was reported that AJC will conduct a study on teenage culture and violence.

81-900-122





# THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

memorandum

**date** December 22, 1981  
**to** Bertram H. Gold  
**from** Geraldine Rosenfield *GR*  
**subject** Gallup poll

Attached are highlights of the findings and analysis by Gallup of the questions asked from November 20-30, 1981.



GR:rg  
81/180/16

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE  
Information and Research Services



ATTITUDES CONCERNING THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY:  
THE GALLUP POLL, NOVEMBER 1981

12/81  
81/180/15

## INTRODUCTION

This is the fourth in a series of studies conducted by The Gallup Organization, Inc. on behalf of The American Jewish Committee designed to measure attitudes of the general public toward Israel and toward Jews. More specifically, in the period just prior to interviewing, there was some concern that recent political events might have had an impact on public attitudes toward Israel and Jews. These political events included the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the decision to sell AWACs planes to Saudi Arabia, and the statement made by President Reagan in reference to Begin's position on the AWACs sale that no foreign government would set U.S. policy.

For this study, personal interviews were conducted with a nationally representative sample of 1,508 adults. The survey used a replicated sample design; selected questions were asked of all respondents while other questions were asked of only half of the respondents. All interviews were conducted between November 20 and November 30, 1981.

## SUMMARY

The survey results indicate that recent political events have not had a dramatic impact on public attitudes toward Israel or toward Jews. In October 1980, 10% felt Jews or Zionists exerted too much influence on the U.S.; in the current survey this figure was 15% (this increase is not statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence). Similarly, the relative number who feel the U.S. has a vital interest in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt has remained unchanged since 1978. Although there has been an increase between October 1980 and 1981 in the proportion who agree with the statement that most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States, this increase was only five percentage points, and the 1981 figure is equal to the April 1980 figure.

When we analyze the 1981 survey results without regard to the trend, several conclusions can be drawn. Most Americans do not feel that American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the U.S., and most do not feel that Jews or Zionists have too much political influence in this country. In fact, more Americans feel Arabs exert too much influence than feel this way of Jews or Zionists. On the other hand, majorities feel that both Saudi Arabia (64%) and Israel (53%) have too much influence in U.S. policy. Most Americans feel that the U.S. has a vital interest in Israel, and as many feel we have a vital interest in Israel as feel we have a vital interest in the Arab countries. However, if war broke out in the Middle East, half of the American public would support Israel, one-third are undecided, and the remainder would support the Arab countries.

## Perceived Political Influence of Various Groups

The Question: (HAND CARD) Which, if any, of the groups listed on this card do you feel has too much political influence in the U.S.? Just read off the number in front of the groups which you feel have too much influence.

Relatively few Americans feel that Jews (11%) or Zionists (4%) exert undue political influence in the U.S. Given a list of eight groups along with the category "none of these," only 13% of those surveyed selected either Jews or Zionists as a group wielding too much political influence. A significantly larger number feel too much influence is exerted by Arab interests (30%), which ranked third of the eight groups.

Oil companies (70%) and labor unions (46%) were the pressure groups that the largest numbers feel exert too much political influence. The other two religious groups included on the list (Born Again/Evangelical Protestants and the Catholic Church) were each selected by about one in ten respondents. Blacks were chosen by a slightly greater proportion (14%) than these individual religious groups.

<u>Groups</u>	<u>Percent Who Feel Each Group has Too Much Influence</u>
	<u>%</u>
Oil Companies	70
Labor Unions	46
Arab Interests	30
Blacks	14
Jews/Zionists (Net)	13
Jews	11
Zionists	4
Born Again/Evangelical Protestants	10
The Catholic Church	9
None of These	4
Don't Know	9
Total	191*
Number of Interviews	(746)

\*Total exceeds 100% because of multiple responses.

Perception of Various Countries as Vital Interests to the United States

The Question: *Many people believe that the United States has a vital interest in certain areas of the world and not in other areas. That is, certain countries of the world are important to the U.S. for political, economic, or security reasons. I am going to read a list of countries. (Included in list: Canada, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia.)\* For each, tell me whether you feel the U.S. does or does not have a vital interest in the country.*

Roughly equal numbers of Americans believe the U.S. has a vital interest in Canada, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Looking at the three Middle Eastern countries, the highest proportion believes the U.S. has a vital interest in Saudi Arabia (84%), followed closely by Israel (81%) and Egypt (78%). Although the number feeling each country is vital to U.S. interests has increased slightly since the January 1979 Gallup survey, their relative position remains unchanged. The increasing tendency of Americans to characterize a country as vital to our interests is borne out by their attitudes toward Canada--78% now believe Canada is a vital interest to the U.S., compared to 69% who held that view in January 1979.

Represents a Vital Interest to the U.S.	Saudi Arabia		Israel		Egypt		Canada	
	1978	1981	1978	1981	1978	1981	1978	1981
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Does	80	84	78	81	75	78	69	78
Does Not	8	7	8	10	10	11	19	14
Don't Know	12	9	14	9	15	11	12	8
Number of Interviews	(775)	(1508)	(775)	(1508)	(775)	(1508)	(1546)	(1508)

\* The question used for comparison in the text and tabular presentation that follows was included in the January 1979 Gallup survey conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Although the question wording was identical, the list of countries on the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey was longer, and a different list was provided for each of the two subsamples. Canada appeared on both lists; along with Israel, Egypt, and 10 other countries on the first and along with Saudi Arabia and 12 other countries on the second.

Opinion Whether Various Countries or Groups Have Too Much Influence in United States Policy

The Question: *Here are some countries and groups that the United States frequently deals with. Do you think (name of country) has too much influence in United States policy.*

Although slightly more than half (53%) of the American public feels that Israel has too much influence over U.S. policy, an even greater number (64%) feel this way about Saudi Arabia, and a substantial majority (82%) feel OPEC exerts too much influence. Almost half (47%) believe Japan exerts too much influence, and substantially fewer feel Canada (19%) and South Africa (17%) have too much influence.

	<u>Has Too Much Influence in United States Policy</u>			<u>Total</u> %	<u>Number of Interviews</u>
	<u>Yes</u> %	<u>No</u> %	<u>Don't Know</u> %		
OPEC - The Organization of Oil Producing Coun- tries	82	10	8	100	(1508)
Saudi Arabia	64	23	13	100	(1508)
Israel	53	36	11	100	(1508)
Japan	47	41	12	100	(1508)
Canada	19	70	11	100	(1508)
South Africa	17	64	19	100	(1508)

Where Sympathies Would Lie if War Broke Out Between Israel and Saudi Arabia or Israel and the Arab Nations

The Questions: *If war broke out between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with whom would your sympathies lie? (ASKED OF SUB-SAMPLE A)*

*If war broke out between Israel and the Arab nations, with whom would your sympathies lie? (ASKED OF SUB-SAMPLE B)*

Given the hypothetical situation of war breaking out between Israel and Saudi Arabia, about half (51%) of the American public would side with Israel; if Israel's opponent is generalized as "the Arab nations," virtually the same percentage (49%) would support Israel. Regardless of the way the question is asked, only about one in eight of those surveyed would sympathize with Israel's opponent. A significant number of Americans, more than one in three, cannot or will not choose either side. If responses to this question are re-percentage based on all with an opinion, roughly eight in ten would support Israel.

If War Broke Out in Middle East, Sympathies Would Lie With:	War Between Israel and Saudi Arabia (Sample A)	War Between Israel and Arab Nations (Sample B)
	%	%
Israel	51	49
Other Side	14	12
Don't Know	35	39
Total	100	100
Number of Interviews	(746)	(762)

Based on Total Making a Choice:

If War Broke Out in Middle East, Sympathies Would Lie With:	War Between Israel and Saudi Arabia (Sample A)	War Between Israel and Arab Nations (Sample B)
	%	%
Israel	78	80
Other Side	22	20
Number of Interviews	(493)	(481)



Agree/Disagree: Most American Jews are More Loyal to Israel

The Question: *Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States. (ASKED OF SUB-SAMPLE B ONLY)*

As in August 1979, most Americans do not feel that American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States. One in three (34%) agree with the statement that most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States, 49% disagree with the statement, and 17% have no opinion. Responses to this question have not varied a great deal since the question was first asked in 1979.

Most American Jews More Loyal to Israel	August	April	October	November	Change in Percentage Points Oct.'80-Nov.'81
	1979	1980	1980	1981	
	%	%	%	%	
Agree	29	34	29	34	+5
Disagree	50	47	46	49	+3
Don't Know	21	19	25	17	-8
Total	100	100	100	100	
Number of Interviews	(799)	(1571)	(1593)	(746)	

Two groups in particular show a high percentage of agreement with the statement: those who feel Israel has too much influence in United States policy and those who would sympathize with the Arab nations rather than with Israel in a Middle East war.

<u>Most American Jews More Loyal to Israel</u>	<u>Total Sample</u>	<u>All Who Feel:</u>	
		<u>Israel has Too Much Influence</u>	<u>Sympathies More with Arab Nations</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Agree	34	42	46
Disagree	49	45	44
Don't Know	17	13	10
Total	100	100	100
Number of Interviews	(762)	(399)	(98)

In general, the percentage who do not feel American Jews have greater loyalty to Israel than to the United States is greater among upper than lower socioeconomic groups. This latest survey confirms the differences found across demographic categories in previous soundings of public opinion.

- 71% disagree among college graduates vs. 32% disagree among people without a high school degree.
- 56% disagree among people with a family income of \$20,000 or more vs. 45% disagree among low income families.
- 61% disagree among professional and business households vs. 40% disagree among manual laborers.
- 52% disagree among whites vs. 31% disagree among nonwhites.




December 22, 1981

Bertram H. Gold

Hilton Himmelfarb

Articles on the media, elites and  
political elites in Public Opinion,  
October/November 1981



These articles, based on survey  
data, are informative and useful.

MH:rg

cc: Hy Bookbinder  
Selma Mirsh  
Abe Karlikow  
Seysour Sanet  
✓ Marc Tanenbaum  
Mort Yaron

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
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by S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman

# MEDIA AND BUSINESS ELITES

## AMERICAN JEWISH

Yesteryear's ragtag muckrakers, who tirelessly championed the little guy against powerful insiders, have become insiders themselves. Newsmen have long cherished the vantage point of the outsiders who keep the insiders straight. But now, leading journalists are courted by politicians, studied by scholars and known to millions through their bylines and televised images. In short, the needs of a society increasingly hungry for information have contributed to the rise of a national news network—the new media elite. Leading figures within this network are anything but the low-lives and ambulance chasers mythologized in *The Front Page*. Instead they constitute a new leadership group that competes for influence alongside more traditional elites representing business, labor, government, and other sectors of society.

As columnist Joseph Kraft writes, "in the past two decades, those of us in the press have undergone a startling transformation. We are among the principal beneficiaries of American life. We have enjoyed a huge rise in income, in status, and in power. . . . We have moved from the sidelines to the center of the action."<sup>1</sup>

Eric Sevareid, in his final CBS commentary, put it even more succinctly: "We are no longer starvelings and we sit above the salt. We have affected our times."<sup>2</sup>

The influence of the press is based not on money or political power but on the information and ideas they transmit to other social leaders, as well as to the general public. Even those who question the media's power to persuade grant their ability to help set the agenda for discussions about social policy. Bernard Cohen notes, "the mass media may not be successful in telling us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about."<sup>3</sup>

As part of a larger study on elites, we surveyed members of the national media elite during 1979 and

1980.\* We wanted to discover their backgrounds, attitudes, and outlooks toward American society and their own profession. We conducted hour-long interviews with 240 journalists and broadcasters at the most influential media outlets, including the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *Time* magazine, *Newsweek*, *U.S. News and World Report*, and the news departments at CBS, NBC, ABC and PBS, along with major public broadcasting stations.<sup>4</sup>

Within each organization, we selected individuals randomly from among those responsible for news content. In the print medium we interviewed reporters, columnists, department heads, bureau chiefs, editors and executives responsible for news content. In the broadcast medium we selected correspondents, anchormen, producers, film editors, and news executives. A very high proportion of those contacted, 76 percent, completed the interview. The response rate was high enough to insure that our findings provide insight into the composition and perspective of this new elite.

To provide comparisons with a more traditional leadership group, we also surveyed executives at several major corporations. We interviewed at seven *Fortune* 500 companies, ranging from a multinational oil company and a major bank to a public utility and a nationwide retail chain. We chose randomly from upper and middle management at each company and completed 216 interviews, or 96 percent of those contacted. The focus of this article is, of course, the media elite. At appropriate points, however, we will compare their attitudes to those of the successful and influential leaders in the business world.

\* This study is directed by Rothman and Lichter, under the auspices of the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University. The surveys of media and business leaders were supervised by Response Analysis, a survey research organization.

## Who Are the Media Elite?

The social and personal backgrounds of the media elite are summarized in table 1. In some respects, the journalists we interviewed appear typical of leadership groups throughout society. The media elite is composed mainly of white males in their thirties and forties. Only one in twenty is nonwhite; one in five is female. They are highly educated, well-paid professionals. Ninety-three percent have college degrees, and a majority (55 percent) attended graduate school as well. These figures reveal them as one of the best educated groups in America. They are also one of the better paid groups, despite journalism's reputation as a low paying profession. In 1978, 78 percent earned at least \$30,000, and one in three had salaries that exceeded \$50,000. Moreover, nearly half (46 percent) reported family incomes above \$50,000.

**Table 1**  
Backgrounds of the Media Elite

White	95%
Male	79
From northeast or north central states	68
From metropolitan area	42
Father graduated college	40
Father occupation "professional"	40
College graduate	93
Postgraduate study	55
Income \$30,000+	78
Family income \$50,000+	46
Political liberal	54
Religion "none"	50

Geographically, they are drawn primarily from northern industrial states, especially from the northeast corridor. Two-fifths come from three states: New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Another 10 percent hail from New England, and almost one in five was raised in the big industrial states just to the west—Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio. Thus, over two-thirds of the media elite come from these three clusters of states. By contrast, only 3 percent are drawn from the entire Pacific coast, including California, the nation's most populous state.

Journalism is a profession associated with rapid upward mobility, yet we found few Horatio Alger stories in the newsroom. On the contrary, many among the media elite enjoyed socially privileged upbringings. Most were raised in upper-middle-class homes. Almost half their fathers were college graduates, and one in four held a graduate degree. Two in five are the children of professionals—doctors, lawyers, teachers, and so on. In fact, one in twelve is following in his father's footsteps as a second generation journalist. Another 40 percent describe their fathers as businessmen. That leaves only one in five whose father was employed in a low status blue or white collar job. Given these upper status positions, it is not surprising that their families were relatively well off. Forty-five percent rate their family's income while they were growing up as above

average, compared to 26 percent who view their early economic status as below average.

In sum, substantial numbers of the media elite grew up at some distance from the social and cultural traditions of small town "middle America." Instead, they were drawn from big cities in the northeast and north central states. Their parents tended to be well off, highly educated members of the upper middle class, especially the educated professions.

## Social and Political Attitudes

All these characteristics might be expected to predispose people toward the social liberalism of the cosmopolitan outsider. And indeed, much of the media elite upholds the cosmopolitan or anti-bourgeois social perspective that Everett Ladd has termed the "new liberalism."<sup>5</sup>

A predominant characteristic of the media elite is its secular outlook. Exactly 50 percent eschew any religious affiliation. Another 14 percent are Jewish, and almost one in four (23 percent) was raised in a Jewish household.<sup>6</sup> Only one in five identifies himself as Protestant, and one in eight as Catholic. Very few are regular churchgoers. Only 8 percent go to church or synagogue weekly, and 86 percent seldom or never attend religious services.

Ideologically, a majority of leading journalists describe themselves as liberals. Fifty-four percent place themselves to the left of center, compared to only 19 percent who choose the right side of the spectrum. When they rate their fellow workers, even greater differences emerge. Fifty-six percent say the people they work with are mostly on the left, and only 8 percent on the right—a margin of seven-to-one.

**Table 2**  
Presidential Voting Record of Media Elite  
1964-1976\*

	Percent	Percent Voting
<b>1964</b>		
Goldwater	6	(62)
Johnson	94	
<b>1968</b>		
Nixon	13	(67)
Humphrey	87	
<b>1972</b>		
Nixon	19	(74)
McGovern	81	
<b>1976</b>		
Ford	19	(82)
Carter	81	

\*Percentages based on those who voted for major party candidates. Third party vote never exceeded 2 percent.

These subjective ratings are borne out by their voting records in presidential elections since 1964, summarized in table 2. (The interviews were conducted before the 1980 elections, so our most recent data are for 1976.) Of those who say they voted, the proportion

**Table 3**  
Media Elite Attitudes on Social Issues

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
<i>Economics</i>				
Big corporations should be publicly owned	4%	9%	23%	65%
People with more ability should earn more	48	38	10	4
Private enterprise is fair to workers	17	53	20	10
Less regulation of business is good for USA	16	47	24	13
Government should reduce income gap	23	45	20	13
Government should guarantee jobs	13	35	33	19
<i>Political Alienation</i>				
Structure of society causes alienation	12	37	32	20
Institutions need overhaul	10	18	31	42
All political systems are repressive	4	24	26	46
<i>Social-Cultural</i>				
Environmental problems are not serious	1	18	27	54
Strong affirmative action for blacks	33	47	16	4
Government should not regulate sex	84	13	3	1
Woman has right to decide on abortion	79	11	5	5
Homosexuality is wrong	9	16	31	45
Homosexuals shouldn't teach in public schools	3	12	31	54
Adultery is wrong	15	32	34	20
<i>Foreign Policy</i>				
U.S. exploits Third World, causes poverty	16	40	25	20
U.S. use of resources immoral	19	38	27	16
West has helped Third World	6	19	50	25
Goal of foreign policy is to protect U.S. businesses	12	39	28	22
CIA should sometimes undermine hostile governments	26	19	36	19
	None	Democracies	Friends	Anyone
To what countries should we sell arms?	19	29	48	4

of leading journalists who supported the Democratic presidential candidate never dropped below 80 percent. In 1972, when 62 percent of the electorate chose Nixon, 81 percent of the media elite voted for McGovern. This does not appear to reflect any particular personal aversion to Nixon, despite the well-publicized tensions between the press and his administration. Four years later, leading journalists preferred Carter over Ford by exactly the same margin. In fact, in the Democratic landslide of 1964, media leaders picked Johnson over Goldwater by the staggering margin of sixteen-to-one, or 94 to 6 percent.

Most significant, though, is the long-term trend. Over the entire sixteen-year period, less than one-fifth of the media elite supported any Republican presidential candidate. In an era when presidential elections are often settled by a swing vote of 5 to 10 percent, the Democratic margin among elite journalists has been 30 to 50 percent greater than among the entire electorate.

These presidential choices are consistent with the media elite's liberal views on a wide range of social and political issues, as table 3 reveals. They show a strong preference for welfare capitalism, pressing for assistance to the poor in the form of income redistribution and guaranteed employment. Few are outright socialists. For example, they overwhelmingly reject the proposition that major corporations should be publicly owned. Only one in eight would agree to public owner-

ship of corporations, and two-thirds declare themselves strongly opposed. Moreover, very few sympathize with Marx's doctrine, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." Instead, they overwhelmingly support the idea that people with greater ability should earn higher wages than those with less ability. Eighty-six percent agree with this fundamental tenet of capitalism. Most also believe that free enterprise gives workers a fair shake, and that deregulation of business would be good for the country. Seventy percent agree that private enterprise is fair to working people, and almost as many, 63 percent, say that less regulation of business would serve the national interest.

Despite this basic support for private enterprise, we should not expect the media elite to lead the cheering section for Reagan's economic policies. Leading journalists may subscribe to a capitalist economic framework, but they are equally committed to the welfare state. Sixty-eight percent, about the same proportion that praise the fairness of private enterprise, also agree that the government should substantially reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor. They are almost evenly divided over the issue of guaranteed employment. Forty-eight percent believe the government should guarantee a job to anyone who wants one, while a slight majority of 52 percent oppose this principle of entitlement.

Of course, there is no necessary contradiction be-



tween praise for private enterprise and calls for government action to aid the poor and jobless. These attitudes mirror the traditional perspective of American liberals who—unlike many European social democrats—accept an essentially capitalistic economic framework, even as they press for expansion of the welfare state.

Despite their acceptance of the economic order, many leading journalists voice a general discontent with the social system. Virtually half, 49 percent, agree with the statement, "the very structure of our society causes people to feel alienated." A substantial minority would like to overhaul the entire system. Twenty-eight percent agree that America needs a "complete restructuring of its basic institutions." The same proportion generalize their criticism to include all modern states. They hold that *all* political systems are repressive, because they concentrate power and authority in a few hands.

It seems that a substantial portion of the media elite accept the current economic order, yet remain dissatisfied with the social system. Indeed, it is today's divisive "social issues" that bring their liberalism to the fore. Leading journalists emerge from our survey as strong supporters of environmental protection, affirmative action, women's rights, homosexual rights, and sexual freedom in general.

Fewer than one in five assents to the statement, "our environmental problems are not as serious as people have been led to believe." Only one percent strongly agree that environmental problems are overrated, while a majority of 54 percent strongly disagree. They are nearly as vehement in their support for affirmative action, an issue that has split the traditional liberal constituency which favored civil rights measures. Despite both the heated controversy over this issue and their own predominantly white racial composition, four out of five media leaders endorse the use of strong affirmative action measures to ensure black representation in the workplace.

In their attitudes toward sex and sex roles, members of the media elite are virtually unanimous in opposing the constraints of both government and tradition. Large majorities oppose government regulation of

sexual activities, uphold a pro-choice position on abortion, and reject the notion that homosexuality is wrong. In fact, a majority would not characterize even adultery as wrong.


When asked whether the government should regulate sexual practices, only 4 percent agree, and 84 percent strongly oppose state control over sexual activities. Ninety percent agree that a woman has the right to decide for herself whether to have an abortion; 79 percent agree strongly with this pro-choice position. Three-quarters disagree that homosexuality is wrong, and an even larger proportion, 85 percent, uphold the right of homosexuals to teach in public schools. (A mere 9 percent feel strongly that homosexuality is wrong.) Finally, 54 percent do not regard adultery as wrong, and only 15 percent strongly agree that extramarital affairs are immoral. Thus, members of the media elite emerge as strong supporters of sexual freedom or permissiveness, and as natural opponents of groups like the Moral Majority, who seek to enlist the state in restricting sexual freedom.

In addition to these social and cultural issues, we inquired about international affairs, focusing on America's relations with Third World countries. Third World representatives to UNESCO have argued that the American press serves the interests of capitalism by "presenting developing countries in a bad light and suppressing their authentic voices,"<sup>7</sup> as a recent *New York Times* article put it. Such charges are supported by media critics like Herbert Gans, who claims that "conservative dictators . . . are apt to be treated more kindly (by the press) than socialist ones."<sup>8</sup> We cannot address these questions of media coverage. But we can assess the sympathies of the elite press on several of the controversial issues raised by these critics. Among these are U.S. arms sales, C.I.A. activity, and alleged American exploitation of developing countries.

In most instances, majorities of the media elite voice the same criticisms that are raised in the Third World. Fifty-six percent agree that American economic exploitation has contributed to Third World poverty. About the same proportion, 57 percent, also find

## DOONESBURY

by Garry Trudeau



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America's heavy use of natural resources to be "immoral." By a three-to-one margin, leading journalists soundly reject the counterargument that Third World nations would be even worse off without the assistance they've received from Western nations. Indeed, precisely half agree with the claim that the main goal of our foreign policy has been to protect American business interests.

Two issues dealing more directly with American foreign policy elicit a similar division of opinions. A majority of 55 percent would prohibit the C.I.A. from ever undermining hostile governments to protect U.S. interests. The question of arms shipments produces an even split of opinion. Forty-eight percent would ban foreign arms sales altogether or restrict them to democratic countries. Forty-seven percent would supply arms to any "friendly" country, regardless of the regime. Only 4 percent would be willing to sell arms to all comers.

Thus, in several controversial areas of U.S.-Third World relations, the media elite is deeply divided, with slight majorities endorsing some key Third World criticisms of America.<sup>9</sup> We noted earlier that many leading journalists criticize the American system from within, as "alienating" and in need of an overhaul. It appears that even larger numbers extend their criticisms to the international arena. About half charge America with economic exploitation and seek to limit C.I.A. activity and arms sales as instruments of our foreign policy.

#### Toward the Good Society

Thus far we have examined elite journalists' opinions on the great and small issues of the day. By charting their responses to numerous social issues, we try to gain an intuitive feel for their general perspectives on society and politics. The results can be deceptive. They create the impression of a broad ideological portrait of the media elite without ever asking journalists to deal with the "big picture." Their attitudes toward issues like abortion, affirmative action and arms sales provide us with benchmarks for understanding their outlook, since most of us have opinions on such pressing and hotly debated questions. But they do not address some of the most basic underlying issues of political life: What direction should American society take? What groups exert the most influence over social goals and political processes? How much influence *should* be wielded by such forces as business, labor, minorities, and the media?

These issues are as old as political philosophy. But it is not only philosophers who grapple with questions like "who should rule?" and "what is the good society?" Most people have answers to these questions, even if they haven't consciously arrived at them. Their answers express basic attitudes that underlie their transient opinions on current social issues.

In the interviews, we tried to tap these fundamental predispositions of political thought. First, we

asked journalists about the goals America should pursue during the next decade. From a list of eight choices, we asked them to select the most important, second most important, and least important goal. The list, created by political scientist Ronald Inglehart, includes:

- Maintaining a high rate of economic growth
- Making sure that this country has strong defense forces
- Seeing that the people have more say in how things get decided at work and in their communities
- Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful
- Maintaining a stable economy
- Progressing toward a less impersonal, more humane society
- The fight against crime
- Progressing toward a society where ideas are more important than money

He classifies these choices as either "instrumental" and "acquisitive" values, on one hand, or "expressive" and "post-bourgeois" values, on the other.<sup>10</sup> In this list, the "post-bourgeois" choices are those dealing with participation, a humane society, beautiful cities, and placing ideas above money. On the basis of their other opinions, we would expect the media elite to be relatively supportive of these types of social goals. But relative to whom? Unlike standard polling items, these choices are not presented periodically to cross-sections of the American public. This is where our sample of business leaders comes in. As archetypal representatives of a bourgeois society, they should be oriented toward more conservative "acquisitive" values like a strong economy and national defense. Thus, they provide an appropriate comparison group for the media elite.

We found that substantial segments of the media elite endorse the "post-bourgeois" value orientation that Inglehart calls a "silent revolution" transforming the political culture of advanced industrial society. The results are shown in table 4. Only one in eight business leaders picks any of the "expressive" values as America's most pressing concern. By contrast, one in three journalists deems citizen participation, a humane society, or a society less oriented toward money as our most important goal—more important than either economic well-being or national defense.

Even among the journalists, a slight majority favor economic stability as the most important value. However, almost half of the media elite (49 percent) pick post-bourgeois values as their second choice, compared to 30 percent of the business elite. Forty percent of these leading journalists select a humane society as either their first or second priority, more than double the proportion among business leaders. Conversely, the businessmen list national defense more than twice as often as do the newsmen. Finally, the journalists are almost twice as likely as the executives to choose acquisitive values as the *least* important for America to pursue.

(Continued on page 59)

(Continued from page 46)

Overall, the media elite shows a clear preference for post-bourgeois goals, relative to the business elite. For many leading journalists, liberal views on contemporary political issues apparently reflect a commitment to substantial social change in pursuit of the good society, as they visualize it. Such a commitment would align them with emerging forces of social liberalism which are pitted against more established leadership groups. Therefore, as the final focus of our inquiry, we shall examine the media elite's evaluation of its competitors for social influence.


**Who Should Rule?**

Beyond inquiring about the direction our society should take, we asked a more pointed question: Who should direct it? Specifically, we asked the journalists to rate seven leadership groups in terms of the influence each wields over American life. Then we asked them to rate the same groups according to the amount of influence they *should* have. Each group was assigned a rating from "1," meaning very little influence, to "7," representing a great deal of influence.

The seven groups rated represent a cross-section of the major competitors for social power in contemporary America. They include black leaders, feminists, consumer groups, labor unions, business leaders, and the news media. The journalists' perceptions of these groups' influences are pictured in figure 1. They see four of the groups as relatively disadvantaged in the competition for social power. Feminists are least powerful, followed closely by black leaders, intellectuals and consumer groups. All four are clustered tightly together, however, well below the big three of labor, business, and the media. The unions rank third, leaving the media close on the heels of business leaders, who are perceived as the most powerful social group in America.

Thus, the media elite recognizes its own position of


**Figure 1**  
Media Elite's Perceptions of Influence among Leadership Groups



power, viewing itself as more influential than any other leadership group except the business community. It places itself between business and labor, traditionally the leading contenders for influence, and pictures the emergent forces of consumers, intellectuals, blacks, and feminists as playing a decidedly subordinate role.

When members of this elite are asked their preferences, this picture changes drastically, as figure 2 illustrates. They would strip both business and labor of their current perceived power, while raising the status of all the other groups. In the media elite's preferred social hierarchy, business leaders fall from first to fifth

**Figure 2**  
Media Elite's Preferences for Influence among Leadership Groups



**Table 4**  
Media and Business Elites' Choices of Most Important Goal for America in the Next Decade

	Acquisitive				Post-Bourgeois				Totals	
	Economic Growth	Stable Economy	National Defense	Fight Crime	Humane Society	Ideas, not Money	Community Participation	Beautiful Cities	Acquisitive	Post-Bourgeois
<b>Most Important</b>										
Media	10%	52%	6%	0%	17%	5%	11%	0%	67%	33%
Business	14	60	13	1	6	3	3	0	88	12
<b>Second Most Important</b>										
Media	9	18	14	8	23	15	8	3	51	49
Business	18	15	30	8	13	11	3	3	70	30
<b>Least Important</b>										
Media	15	2	12	10	10	9	22	17	39	61
Business	8	1	7	5	12	13	32	23	21	79

position, and unions drop to the very bottom of the ladder. Feminists move up only slightly, but blacks, intellectuals and consumer groups would all have more influence than either business or labor. Emerging at the top of the heap, as the group most favored to direct American society, are the media.


There is a certain irony in the media elite's choice of itself as preeminent in the race for influence. The press is traditionally ambivalent about its power, and journalists often either deny or decry the growing reality of a powerful media elite. In a 1976 study of elites conducted by the *Washington Post* and Harvard University, the media leaders were the only group to claim they want less influence than they already have.<sup>11</sup> In fact, one could say the same of our subjects, but it would be a deceptive interpretation of our findings. In absolute terms, these journalists would assign themselves a lower influence rating than they now have. On the other hand, they would assign even lower ratings to all the other groups, thereby leapfrogging themselves from the second position, as they perceive it, to the top spot they would prefer.

The business leaders, by the way, return the compliment. They perceive the media as far and away the most powerful influence on American society, with labor a distant second and business only third, followed by the four emergent groups. Not surprisingly, they, too, would prefer to sit atop the influence hierarchy, while burying the media well back in the pack in fifth position, precisely where the media elite would place them. Indeed, the hostility these two elites seem to feel toward each other is rather striking. Business leaders regard the media as the most powerful group of those listed and would reduce the power of journalists more than any other group. Media leaders perceive business leaders as the most powerful group and would likewise strip away most of their influence. One might speculate that these elites view each other with such mistrust precisely because each attributes great power to the other. In the ongoing struggle over the direction of our society, each appears wary of the other as its strongest competitor.

\* \* \*

The pointed views of the national media elite are not mere wishes and opinions of those aspiring to power, but the voice of a new leadership group that has arrived as a major force in American society. Cosmopolitan in their origins, liberal in their outlooks, they are aware and protective of their collective influence. The rise of this elite has hardly gone unnoticed. Some hail them as the public's tribunes against the powerful—indispensable champions of the underdog and the oppressed. Others decry them for allegiance to an adversary culture that is chiseling away at traditional values.

While we advocate exploring the attitudes of the national media elite, we side with neither their extollers



"Don't let it bug you, clown. These are tough times for authority figures."

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nor critics in declaring what kind of role the media do or should play. The crucial task that remains is to discover what relationship, if any, exists between how these individuals view the world and how they present that world to the public. This is the next key step to understanding how the evolution of the media elite has transformed American society. □

- 1 Joseph Kraft, "The Imperial Media," *Commentary*, May 1981, p. 36.
- 2 Quoted in Gary Paul Gates, *Air Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 424.
- 3 Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).
- 4 Several studies have shown these media outlets to be the most influential in influencing other social leadership groups. See, for example, William Rivers, *The Opinion Makers* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965); Carol Weiss, "What America's Leaders Read," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring 1974, pp. 1-22; J. W. Johnstone, Edward Slawski, and William Bowman, *The News People* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1976). For an extensive discussion of the news media elite, see Stanley Rothman, "The Mass Media in Post-Industrial America," in S. M. Lipset, ed., *The Third Century* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 346-388.
- 5 Everett Ladd, "The New Lines are Drawn," *Public Opinion*, July/August 1978, pp. 48-53.
- 6 For a discussion of the effect of Jewish ethnicity on elite journalists' attitudes toward Israel, see S. R. Lichter, "Media Support for Israel: A Survey of Leading Journalists," in William C. Adams, ed., *Television Coverage of the Middle East* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1981), pp. 40-53.
- 7 Paul Lewis, "Gloves Come Off in Struggle with UNESCO," *The New York Times*, May 24, 1981.
- 8 Herbert Gans, *Deciding What's News* (New York: Pantheon, 1979), p. 37.
- 9 For a more extensive discussion, see S. R. Lichter, "America and the Third World: A Survey of Media and Business Leaders," in William C. Adams, ed., *Television Coverage of International Affairs* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1982).
- 10 Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).
- 11 Barry Sussman, "Media Leaders Want Less Influence," *Washington Post*, September 29, 1976.

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
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# POLITICAL ELITES

**F**ew power centers in American politics have been so little studied as the national Committees of the two major parties. For much of their history, this neglect has been deserved. Until recently, little power has been centered in either.

In the past twenty years, however, and especially in the last ten, the Republican and Democratic National Committees have grown considerably in their ability to influence events. The Democratic party's increasingly complex rules for nominating its presidential candidates have given its national Committee significant leverage over state and local parties. The power to seat or not to seat convention delegates has become the power to influence how and when primaries and caucuses are held. The leverage of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) extends even to how and when local party officeholders are picked.

At the Republican National Committee (RNC), the checkbook, not the rule book, has paved the road to power. Adroit financial strategies have created a national headquarters and staff with a forty-million-dollar-a-year cash flow. Cash, expert consultants, and high technology flow daily from the national headquarters to state and local candidates and party organizations. Candidates at all levels look to the Committee for training programs and help in raising money. Pollsters, media consultants, and other campaign specialists look to the Committee for steady work, retainers, and referrals.

Three years ago, in an early effort to formulate policy at the Committee level, Republican National Chairman Bill Brock successfully advanced the Kemp-Roth tax cut as the party's major issue in the 1978 campaign. It is now law, only slightly altered, and the RNC can claim a major role in moving it forward.

For years, political scientists and others have studied the operations of the party system in Congress and the White House. Since the 1950s, there has been a steady stream of studies of the political elites found at

national nominating conventions. In an effort to bring the same kind of attention to the increasingly activist national Committees, CBS News surveyed about 90 percent of the members of both Committees by telephone this spring. We interviewed 324 of the 369 DNC members and 159 of the 168 officers and members of the RNC. To obtain some measure of the degree to which these party leaders reflect the thinking of ordinary party members, we asked them a number of questions on public issues and general philosophy—the same questions asked in the most recent CBS News/*New York Times* poll of the general public.

## The Democrats

On the Democratic National Committee, conservatives are genuine oddities. Among ordinary Democrats, they are almost a third. The largest share in both groups chose to be called moderates, but professed liberals are much more common among Committee members. Both groups, however, are less liberal than the delegates to the 1980 Democratic National Convention. Though that convention rejected the more liberal candidate, Edward Kennedy, the largest bloc of delegates called themselves liberal.

The disparities between rank-and-file Democrats and Committee members are especially striking when such issues as food stamps and increased military spend-

Table 1

	Rank-and-file Democrats	Democratic National Committee members	1980 Democratic National Convention delegates
Liberal	24%	36%	46%
Moderate	42	51	42
Conservative	29	4	6

ing are discussed with them. (See table 3.) The differences are even more pronounced on the overall Reagan tax and budget cuts. No issue provided so striking a contrast between rank-and-file Democrats and the national Committee members as did the question about a constitutional amendment to permit prayer in schools.

On a few issues, Committee members were closer to rank-and-file Democrats. These were all issues on which ordinary Democrats take what is generally considered the liberal position. The proportions favoring the liberal position were, however, considerably higher among Committee members. Both groups, for example, support the Equal Rights Amendment, but Committee members do so by a far wider margin.

### The Republicans

On balance, Democratic National Committee members are more liberal than rank-and-file party members, but more conservative than recent convention delegates. In the Republican party, Committee members are more conservative than both the convention delegates and the rank-and-file Republicans.

Table 2

	Rank-and-file Republicans	Republican National Committee members	1980 Republican National Convention delegates
Liberal	11%	1%	2%
Moderate	33	31	36
Conservative	51	63	58

As might be expected, Republican National Committee members from the South are even more likely than the rest of the Committee to identify themselves as conservative: 79 percent of the southern members think of themselves that way.

On specific issues, Republican National Committee members generally take the same conservative position as rank-and-file Republicans, but to a greater degree. (See table 3.)

National Committee members—whether Democrats or Republicans—are not known for their defiance of incumbent presidents of their own party. The current Republican National Committee is no exception. Ninety-nine percent approved of Reagan's budget cuts; 97 percent approved of his tax cuts. The latter figure contrasts strikingly with the CBS/*New York Times* pre-convention poll of the party's national convention delegates, in which only 59 percent supported essentially the same tax proposal.

The all but unanimous Committee backing of Reagan's budget and tax plans was shared by the ordinary Republicans who had opinions about the measure when polled this spring. Nearly half of them, however, had not made up their minds at that time.

Deviations in the conservative consistency of both Committee and everyday Republican thinking appeared on the so-called "women's issues." A majority of both groups believe that if a woman wants to have an abortion and her doctor agrees to it, she should be allowed to have it. In this instance, they seem to be of similar mind with the delegates to last year's Republican convention. A majority of delegates polled by CBS and the *New York Times* opposed a constitutional amendment to prohibit abortion even though the convention, voting under a closed rule on a Reagan-backed platform, endorsed a plank supporting such an amendment.

Committee members, like last year's convention delegates, opposed the Equal Rights Amendment by about two-to-one. Rank-and-file Republicans, however, when polled by CBS News and the *New York Times*, were as likely to support the amendment as not.

Prayer in public schools evoked a sharp disparity between average Democrats and National Committee members. The same was true for the Republicans. In both parties, there was overwhelming rank-and-file support for a constitutional amendment permitting prayer in schools. Unlike their Democratic counterparts, Republican Committee members do not oppose the amendment outright. They do, however, support it by only a very narrow margin—compared to a huge margin (five-to-one) among Republicans in general.

### The Committees and the Future of the Parties

The CBS News surveys were conducted at a time of particularly good feelings at the RNC, not quite the case at the DNC. Not only were the Democrats still getting adjusted to a Republican White House and Senate, but the Republican administration had just won the first of a series of coalition victories on its budget in the nominally Democratic House. Worst of all, perhaps, public opinion polls were showing something that had not accompanied previous periods of Democratic distress: the public's long-standing Democratic margin in partisan leanings had slipped seriously. CBS News asked members of both Committees for their explanation of this development. Republicans were twice as likely as Democrats to attribute the shift in party loyalties to a conservative trend in the country. Democrats were twice as likely as Republicans to attribute it to the popularity of Ronald Reagan.

Asked what could help the Democrats recover their lost support, Democratic organization leaders, not surprisingly, called for their own specialty: organization. Unlike Capitol Hill, where Democrats talk a good deal about new ideas and new directions, only one in ten of the Committee members thought recovery might depend on a change in the party's way of looking at things. As many called for greater stress on traditional Democratic issues. After organization, the most often-cited basis of hope for the party was—fingers crossed—Republican mistakes.

Republican Committee members were asked what

Republicans could do to promote further growth in popular support. The members were clearly in no mood to experiment. The most common answer was to stress the party's traditional positions. Communicating these positions more effectively came next. What was it most

important *not* to do? The leading answer was not to change what Republicans were doing. Only a handful wanted to look for new issues. They like the ones they have.

Looking toward 1982, CBS News asked Committee

Table 3  
Issue Profile

	REPUBLICANS		DEMOCRATS	
	RNC	RANK-AND-FILE	DNC	RANK-AND-FILE
GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON...				
MILITARY/DEFENSE				
INCREASE	89%	60%	22%	48%
DECREASE	1	5	18	13
KEEP SAME	7	31	51	36
FOOD STAMPS				
INCREASE	2	9	16	16
DECREASE	71	63	14	40
KEEP SAME	19	24	64	37
AID TO THE ARTS				
INCREASE	3	6	17	7
DECREASE	65	41	17	33
KEEP SAME	26	47	58	52
JOB PROGRAMS/CETA				
INCREASE	3	19	39	46
DECREASE	66	39	13	17
KEEP SAME	22	39	44	31
REAGAN'S TAX CUT				
APPROVE	97	44	17	26
DISAPPROVE	—	5	73	14
NOT SURE	3	51	10	60
REAGAN'S BUDGET				
APPROVE	99	48	10	23
DISAPPROVE	—	3	80	22
NOT SURE	1	49	10	55
PRAYER AMENDMENT				
FAVOR	46	81	19	79
OPPOSE	41	15	65	16
E.R.A.				
FAVOR	29	46	92	62
OPPOSE	58	44	4	29
TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS				
AGREE	98	72	35	59
DISAGREE	1	22	49	30
ALLOW ABORTIONS WITH DOCTOR'S CONSENT				
SHOULD	52	55	80	64
SHOULD NOT	13	30	8	26
DEPENDS	23	11	8	7



members of both parties about a number of potential influences upon next year's congressional elections. Once again, the responses from the two Committees were quite different. Ninety-two percent of the Republicans expected Ronald Reagan's record to help Republicans running in their states. Only a third of the Democrats were concerned about Reagan hurting Democrats. They were much more worried about conservative political action committees (PACs) and the Moral Majority—three or four times as many as were concerned about Reagan's popularity.

Democrats lose sleep over right-wing PACs and preachers; Republicans are much more divided over whether these forces actually help them. Though three out of four of the Democrats worry about the PACs, only about half the Republicans think they help. And, while a majority of the Democrats worry about the Moral Majority hurting Democrats, only a fifth of the Republicans think this group helps *them*.

#### Party Favorites for 1982 and 1984

One asset which party officials normally value is the relative handful of leaders who enjoy national fame—whose appearance on behalf of local candidates can generate large turnouts of supporters and contributors, and attention from the local media. On the Democratic Committee, only two Democrats were named, unprompted, by more than a few members when they were asked who they would like to see campaigning in their state next year. They were Walter Mondale (29 percent) and Edward Kennedy (13 percent). Of the 324 Committee members interviewed, only one chose former President Carter. The member who did so represents the territory of Guam.

Republican Committee members were asked who, other than President Reagan, they would most like to have campaign in their states next year. Sixty percent chose Vice President Bush. Far behind, ranging from 9 to 4 percent, were Jack Kemp, Howard Baker, David Stockman, and Paul Laxalt.

Most Republican Committee members want and expect President Reagan to run for reelection. If he doesn't, by far the largest bloc on the Committee favors Bush (41 percent). Far behind (both under 10 percent) were Kemp and Laxalt.

On the Democratic side, Mondale with 20 percent, and Kennedy at 10 percent are again the first and second choices of those members of the Committee who had an opinion. Sixty percent did not. This group's preference for Mondale should be viewed in light of its members' 1980 allegiances. By a three-to-one margin, they supported Carter over Kennedy. The margin among delegates to last year's convention was three-to-two.

#### What the Parties Stand For

If the national Committee members, especially the Democrats, often seem at odds with the view of ordi-

nary partisans, their responses were very similar (and greatly different from the other party's) when asked about the principal difference between the two parties. Nearly half of the Democratic Committee members said that the chief difference was that Democrats are concerned about the poor and the Republicans about the rich. The next largest response from Democratic Committee members was that their party, as opposed to the Republican, was for "the people."

Not surprisingly, Republican Committee members had an entirely different set of answers. Over half cited contrary attitudes toward the size and cost of government; the next largest bloc cited ideological differences (e.g. conservative versus liberal). In both cases, the responses of rank-and-file party members were remarkably close to those of the Committee professionals.

#### Speculations

Findings from this single survey are inconclusive on many points, but the CBS News study does invite the following speculations:

1. The processes, local and national, by which the DNC membership is chosen appear to filter out most of the many Democrats in the general population who regard themselves as conservatives.

2. A similar process appears to weed out the much smaller number of liberals in the Republican party. While the Democratic National Committee is consistently to the left of rank-and-file Democrats on the issues explored by CBS News, and the Republican National Committee, generally to the right of rank-and-file Republicans, the differences on the Democratic side are much more pronounced.

3. Whether they are national Committee members or just ordinary partisans, Democrats and Republicans seem to have reached a consensus among themselves about what distinguishes the parties. Democrats see the parties primarily in terms of the class interests they serve. Republicans see themselves as representing different views of the role of government.

4. Neither Committee is aflame with bold new ideas or, for that matter, even a sense of needing them. The Republican Committee members were understandably content with their current leader and his programs, then at a very high level of personal popularity and legislative success. They attribute their 1980 victories largely to a conservative drift in the country, and are not inclined to alter their own course.

5. Democratic Committee members are less sure that any great upheaval has taken place in the minds of the people. They are inclined to blame Jimmy Carter for Democratic losses—and to credit Ronald Reagan for Republican gains rather than to recognize a victory of one set of principles over another. Many continue to think the traditional goals and values of the party are valid. "Better" for them means better leaders, better organization, and, best of all perhaps, Republican mistakes. □

COMPARISONS OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS SAMPLE SURVEYS

Note survey  
10 min  
per year

	1975-BOS	1981-NY	1981/2 NJAJ
AGE (AOLTS)	42	49	49
B.A. +		51	59
SYN. MEM.	48	41	51
USA GIVEN	44	52	49
ISRAEL TRAVEL	20	37	37
<u>QEN:</u>			
OATH	5	13	6
CONS	35	36	36
REF	34	29	27
OSMBA	26	23	31
SEDER	85	87	78
CHANUKAH		74	66
YK FAST	55	64	54
SAB CANDLES	43	40	22
2 SETS DISHES	17	26	15

4,200 cities

1700 fresh meat

89% non-vegans

1/2 returned q. west

N.Y. use from

# THE 1981 NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWS

FOR MORE INFORMATION:  
 PROF. STEVEN M. COHEN  
 CENTER FOR JEWISH STUDIES, CUNY  
 33 W 42 ST.  
 N.Y., N.Y. 10036

## AMERICAN ISSUES AND POLITICS

1. Whom did you vote for or favor in the last presidential election? (Circle number) 1/1  
2/  
8/
- |    |                   |
|----|-------------------|
| 19 | ANDERSON          |
| 39 | CARTER            |
| 37 | REAGAN            |
| 3  | ANOTHER CANDIDATE |

2. Which of these best describes your usual stand on political issues? (Circle number) 9/
- |    |          |    |                   |
|----|----------|----|-------------------|
| 2  | RADICAL  | 17 | CONSERVATIVE      |
| 32 | LIBERAL  |    | VERY CONSERVATIVE |
| 48 | MODERATE |    |                   |

Below are several policy choices facing the American people.  
 What is your stand on each question? (Circle number)

	YES	NO	NOT SURE	
3. Should the U.S. substantially increase defense spending?	35	47	17	10/
4. Should the government pay for abortions?	51	39	10	11/
5. Should school children be bused when other means of integrating schools have failed?	22	67	12	12/
6. Should the government give aid to non-public schools?	18	75	7	13/
7. Should the death penalty be abolished? / <i>gun control?</i>	19	72	9	14/
8. Should affirmative action be used to help disadvantaged groups?	55	27	18	15/
9. Should quotas be used to help disadvantaged groups?	20	65	15	16/
10. Should the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) be passed?	72	17	11	17/
11. Should declared homosexuals be allowed to teach in the public schools?	67	23	10	18/
12. Should the government use stronger measures against illegal immigration?	74	13	13	19/
13. Should the U.S. substantially cut spending on social welfare?	35	57	8	20/

14. What is your political party preference? (Circle number) 21/
- |    |                                    |
|----|------------------------------------|
| 65 | DEMOCRATIC                         |
| 11 | REPUBLICAN                         |
| 1  | OTHER PARTY                        |
| 23 | INDEPENDENT OR NO PARTY PREFERENCE |

15. Are you a registered voter? (Circle number) 22/
- |    |       |   |      |
|----|-------|---|------|
| 94 | 1 YES | 6 | 2 NO |
|----|-------|---|------|

16. Did you vote in the 1980 election? (Circle number) 23/
- |    |       |   |      |
|----|-------|---|------|
| 92 | 1 YES | 8 | 2 NO |
|----|-------|---|------|

17. In the last 12 months, have you or other members of your household belonged to or been active in any of the types of organizations below? Check all that apply:

- |                                                                         |                                                                                              |     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Labor union                         | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A synagogue                                              | 24/ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Professional association            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A synagogue-related group (e.g., men's club, sisterhood) | 26/ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Business ass'n, Chamber of Commerce | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NAACP, Urban League, other civil-rights groups           | 28/ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PTA                                 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOW or other feminist groups                             | 30/ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Block, tenants, neighborhood groups | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sierra Club or other environmental groups                | 32/ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YMHA, Jewish community center       | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A campaign for public office                             | 34/ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Country club                        | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cultural group (e.g., museum, ballet, public TV, opera)  | 36/ |




18. In general, do you think Israel's policies in its dispute with the Arabs have been: (Circle number)

- 1/5 U.S. Jews left = 20% in Israel*
- |    |   |                                                |     |
|----|---|------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 23 | 1 | TOO "HAWKISH"                                  | 39/ |
| 74 | 2 | ABOUT RIGHT: NOT TOO "HAWKISH" OR TOO "DOVISH" |     |
| 3  | 3 | TOO "DOVISH"                                   |     |

Below are different statements about the dispute between Israel and her Arab neighbors. For each statement please indicate whether you agree or disagree. (Circle number)

- |                                                                                                                                                                          | <u>AGREE</u> | <u>DIS-<br/>AGREE</u> | <u>NOT<br/>SURE</u> |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----|
| 19. Israel is right not to agree to sit down with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), because the PLO is a terrorist organization that wants to destroy Israel. | 74           | 17                    | 9                   | 41/ |
| 20. If the alternatives are permanent Israeli annexation of the West Bank or an independent Palestinian state, then an independent Palestinian state is preferable.      | 28           | 42                    | 30                  | 42/ |
| 21. If the West Bank became an independent Palestinian state, it would probably be used as a launching pad to endanger Israel.                                           | 64           | 11                    | 26                  | 43/ |
| 22. If Israel could be assured of peace and secure borders, she should be willing to return to Arab control most of the territories she has occupied since 1967.         | 41           | 40                    | 18                  | 44/ |
| 23. In general, how would you characterize your feelings about Israel? Please circle one number on the scale below ranging from "Very anti-Israel" to "Very pro-Israel." |              |                       |                     |     |



JEWISH CONCERNS AND ACTIVITIES

5. How important is each of the following issues or problems confronting American Jews? Please answer the question on a scale from one (1) to five (5) by circling the number of your answer.

	VERY IMPORTANT		SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT	
Assimilation	40	19	22	9	10	47/
Antisemitism in America	65	18	13	3	1	49/
Security of Israel	68	20	9	2	1	51/
Quality of Jewish education	39	23	26	8	5	53/
Soviet Jewry	33	27	26	11	4	55/

6. Do you belong to a synagogue? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 56/  
 (IF YES) Is it: 51 49 57/  
 16 ORTHODOX 29 REFORM  
 54 CONSERVATIVE 1 OTHER TYPE

7. What was the main type of formal Jewish education you received as a child. (Circle number) 58/  
 16 NONE  
 20 SUNDAY SCHOOL OR OTHER ONCE A WEEK  
 52 HEBREW SCHOOL, FOLKSHULE, HEDER, OR OTHER PART-TIME  
 4 YESHIVAH, DAY SCHOOL OR OTHER FULL-TIME  
 8 PRIVATE TUTOR

8. Have you been to Israel? (Circle number) 1 YES 2 NO 59/  
 37 63

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (Circle number)

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	DIS- AGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	NOT SURE	
9. There is a bright future for Jewish life in America.	17	59	12	8	17	60/
10. American Jews should not criticize Israel's policies publicly.	13	25	42	15	5	61/
11. Virtually all positions of influence in America are open to Jews.	6	29	47	14	5	62/
12. Israel's future is secure.	2	10	44	26	18	63/
13. Each American Jew should give serious thought to settling in Israel.	3	9	50	31	7	64/
14. I often talk about Israel with friends and relatives.	16	52	23	7	2	65/
15. There are times when my devotion to Israel comes into conflict with my devotion to America.	6	20	42	29	3	66/
16. U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest.	57	36	2	0	5	67/

	<u>SA</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>NS</u>	
37. Most Americans think that U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest.	9	36	33	6	16	68/
38. Jews should not vote for candidates who are unfriendly to Israel.	35	42	16	3	4	69/
39. If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life.	52	31	11	2	5	70/
40. I think of myself as a/an: (Circle <u>number</u> )						71/

6 ORTHODOX JEW                      SECULAR JEW } 31  
 36 CONSERVATIVE JEW              ANOTHER TYPE OF JEW }  
 27 REFORM JEW

41. How many of your closest friends are Jewish? (Circle <u>number</u> )						72/
" ALL	24	ABOUT HALF				
28 ALMOST ALL	8	FEWER THAN HALF				
22 MOST	7	FEW OR NONE				

42. Below are things that some Jews do. Please indicate which you do now, which you did ten years ago, and which were done in your home when you were a child. (Check your answers [ ] in the appropriate columns)

	<u>I DO THIS NOW</u>	<u>I DID THIS TEN YEARS AGO</u>	<u>MY PARENTS DID THIS</u>	
Attend a Passover Seder	[78]	[64]	[68]	73/
Light Hanukkah candles	[66]	[57]	[65]	76/
Regularly light Sabbath candles	[22]	[22]	[52]	8/
Fast on Yom Kippur	[54]	[43]	[60]	11/
Attend services on Yom Kippur	[60]	[55]	[62]	14/
Attend services on Rosh Hashana	[55]	[53]	[61]	17/
Attend Sabbath services once a month or more	[17]	[23]	[38]	20/
Attend Sabbath services weekly	[7]	[12]	[29]	23/
Belong to a Jewish organization other than a synagogue	[38]	[30]	[40]	26/
Give to the UJA Federation every year	[49]	[34]	[37]	29/
Have different dishes for meat and dairy products	[15]	[13]	[40]	32/
Subscribe to a Jewish periodical	[36]	[19]	[34]	35/
Fast at least part of the day on Tish'ah be-Av	[5]	[5]	[18]	38/
Refrain from shopping or working on the Sabbath	[5]	[5]	[23]	41/



61. Current religion: (Circle <u>number</u> )	<u>You</u>	<u>Your Spouse</u>	73/ 74/
JEWISH	95	85	
PROTESTANT	1	5	
CATHOLIC	1	4	
OTHER	0	1	
NONE	3	5	

62. Religion in which you were raised: (Circle <u>number</u> )			75/ 76/
JEWISH	96	83	
PROTESTANT	1	9	
CATHOLIC	1	6	
OTHER	0	1	
NONE	2	2	

63. Employment: (Circle <u>number</u> )	<u>You</u>	<u>Your Spouse</u>	77/ 78/
EMPLOYED FULL-TIME	58	53	
EMPLOYED PART-TIME	10	12	
FULL-TIME HOMEMAKER	8	17	
FULL-TIME STUDENT	4	1	
UNEMPLOYED, LOOKING FOR WORK	2	1	
RETIRED	18	16	

64. Type of main occupation: Below are several descriptive characteristics of jobs and occupations. With respect to the main job or occupation(s), please check all the descriptions below which apply:

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>YOUR MAIN JOB OR OCCUPATION</u>	<u>YOUR SPOUSE'S MAIN JOB OR OCCUPATION</u>	
Self-employed	[11]	[8]	8/
Salaried	[28]	[15]	10/
Professional	[25]	[12]	12/
Businessman/woman	[12]	[9]	14/

65. Which of the following types of Jewish education are you giving (did you give/will you give) your child(ren)? (Circle the number of the main form of Jewish schooling)

- 11 I EXPECT NO CHILDREN 17/
- 2 I DO NOT EXPECT TO RAISE MY CHILDREN AS JEWS
- 12 NO FORMAL JEWISH EDUCATION
- 9 BAR/BAT MITZVAH LESSONS
- 18 SUNDAY SCHOOL OR OTHER ONCE A WEEK
- 39 HEBREW SCHOOL OR OTHER AFTERNOON
- 8 YESHIVAH, DAY SCHOOL, OTHER FULL-TIME

66. Finally, what was your approximate family income from all sources, before taxes, in 18/1980? (Circle number)

- |                         |                         |                         |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 9 LESS THAN \$10,000    | 10 \$25,000 TO \$29,999 | 12 \$50,000 TO \$74,999 |
| 8 \$10,000 TO \$14,999  | 15 \$30,000 TO \$39,999 | 5 \$75,000 TO \$99,999  |
| 13 \$15,000 TO \$19,999 | 13 \$40,999 TO \$49,999 | 5 OVER \$100,000        |
| 11 \$20,000 TO \$24,999 |                         |                         |

THANK YOU



TABLE 7 - 1

DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSES TO SELECTED PUBLIC OPINION QUESTIONS:  
 COMPARISONS OF THE 1981 NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN JEWS WITH DATA  
 FROM COMPARABLE QUESTIONS ON RECENT NATIONAL SURVEYS OF AMERICAN ADULTS

	1981 NSAJ <sup>1</sup>	Other Surveys <sup>2</sup>
<u>Presidential Preference (1980 Election)</u>		
Anderson	19	7
Carter	38	43
Reagan	39	49
Other	4	1 <sup>a</sup>
	100	100
<u>Political Orientation (self-described)</u>		
Liberal (and Radical)	33	21
Moderate	48	36
Conservative (and Very Conservative)	19	43 <sup>b</sup>
<u>Liberal Opinions</u>		
Defense spending - against increasing	45	(43) <sup>c</sup>
Social spending - against decreasing	56	(28) <sup>d</sup>
Affirmative action - favor	55	66 <sup>e</sup>
Quotas; special treatment - favor -	(19)	10 <sup>f</sup>
ERA - favor	72	45 <sup>g</sup> ; 52 <sup>h</sup>
Abolish death penalty	(18)	20 <sup>i</sup>
Homosexual school teachers - okay	(67)	45 <sup>j</sup>
Busing for integration - okay	22	12 <sup>k</sup>
Government pay for abortions - okay	50	40 <sup>l</sup> ; 40 <sup>m</sup>
Toughen action against immigration - oppose	13	-
<u>Party Preference</u>		
Democratic	65	47
Republican	12	27
Independent; other	25	26 <sup>n</sup>
	100	100

*I selectively more liberal than Most of Country*

AMERICAN JEWISH  
ARCHIVES




TABLE 7 - 2

## SELECTED MEASURES OF JEWISH IDENTIFICATION BY RITUAL OBSERVANCE SCALE

RITUAL OBSERVANCE:	<u>SECULAR</u>	<u>MINIMAL</u> <u>INACTIVE</u>	<u>MODERATE</u> <u>ACTIVE</u>	<u>OBSERVANT</u>	<u>ALL</u>
<u>Items Used to Construct Scale</u>					
Passover Seder	0	79	99	98	78
Hannukah candles	0	58	85	100	66
Fast Yom Kippur	0	39	72	98	54
Rosh Hashanah services	0	32	86	99	55
Sabbath candles	0	6	16	83	23
Meat/dairy dishes	0	4	5	65	16
Belong to a synagogue	10	15	100	100	52
<u>Other Items</u>					
Yom Kippur services	1	40	92	100	60
Sabbath services-monthly	0	1	28	48	17
Sabbath services-weekly	0	1	8	22	7
Jewish organization member	7	26	56	67	39
UJA donor	21	35	66	75	49
No Sabbath shopping	0	3	1	22	6
Jewish periodical	13	22	49	71	37
Tish'ah Be-Av	1	1	2	21	5
Most friends Jewish	26	63	71	77	64
<u>Self-description</u>					
Orthodox	1	2	4	18	6
Conservative	2	27	51	60	37
Reform	21	32	33	14	27
Other	<u>76</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>30</u>
	100	100	100	100	100

TABLE 7 - 3

## PUBLIC OPINION QUESTIONS BY RITUAL OBSERVANCE SCALE

RITUAL OBSERVANCE:	<u>SECULAR</u>	<u>INACTIVE</u>	<u>ACTIVE</u>	<u>OBSERVANT</u>
<u>Presidential Preference (1980 Election)</u>				
Anderson	9	18	23	23
Carter	43	47	33	24
Reagan	44	30	42	50
Other	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
	100	100	100	100
<u>Political Orientation (self-described)</u>				
Liberal (and Radical)	36	40	26	25
Moderate	39	48	54	48
Conservative (and Very Conservative)	<u>24</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>27</u>
	100	100	100	100
<u>Liberal Opinions<sup>a</sup></u>				
Defense spending	42	49	40	44
Social spending	54	58	56	51
Affirmative action	45	59	59	49
Quotas	17	23	13	21
ERA	68	80	69	62
Death penalty	19	23	12	16
Homosexual teachers	57	74	70	57
Busing	26	26	14	22
Abortions	42	60	49	41
Immigration	12	16	12	8
<u>Party</u>				
Democratic	45	70	67	69
Republican	24	7	12	12
Independent; other	<u>31</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>19</u>
	100	100	100	100

<sup>a</sup>See Table 7-1 and text for description of liberal opinion items.

TABLE 7 - 4

LIBERALISM<sup>a</sup> AND SUPPORT FOR REAGAN<sup>b</sup> BY GENERATION, AGE, EDUCATION,  
INCOME, AND RITUAL OBSERVANCE (MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS)

	LIBERALISM		SUPPORT FOR REAGAN		N
	UNADJUSTED	ADJUSTED	UNADJUSTED	ADJUSTED	
<b>GENERATION</b>					
First	30	42	33	31	30
Second	38	41	38	35	234
Third	51	45	39	42	230
Young foreign born	-	-	-	-	20
<b>AGE</b>					
Under 35	58	48	37	43	138
35-44	47	44	36	35	61
45-54	41	44	45	40	88
55-64	38	42	41	38	110
65 and over	33	36	37	36	113
N.A.	-	-	-	-	4
<b>EDUCATION</b>					
High School or less	31	31	44	54	101
Some College	31	30	47	48	110
B.A.	45	44	40	36	123
M.A. or more	58	59	30	25	170
N.A.	-	-	-	-	10
<b>INCOME</b>					
Under \$15,000	45	52	22	18	76
\$15,000-\$24,999	44	46	30	27	101
\$25,000- 39,999	36	34	46	48	113
\$40,000- 74,999	36	35	46	50	116
\$75,000 or more	50	48	34	37	44
N.A.	50	58	51	50	64
<b>RITUAL OBSERVANCE</b>					
Secular	38	38	43	45	78
Inactive	51	49	30	30	205
Active	39	40	42	43	134
Observant	36	39	50	47	97

<sup>a</sup> Liberalism = 1 if 5 or more "Liberal" responses to political orientation and 9 of 10 public opinion items (all except "Quotas" as listed in Table 7-1); 0 otherwise.

<sup>b</sup> Support for Reagan = 1 if favored Ronald Reagan in 1980 presidential election; 0, if favored other candidate; includes voters and non-voters.

TABLE 7 - 5

SELECTED MEASURES OF JEWISH IDENTIFICATION, LIBERALISM, AND SUPPORT FOR  
REAGAN BY RITUAL OBSERVANCE AND PROPORTION OF CLOSEST FRIENDS WHO ARE JEWISH

RITUAL OBSERVANCE	SECULAR		MINIMAL			MODERATE		OBSERVANT
	Less Than $\frac{1}{2}$	Half	Less Than $\frac{1}{2}$	Half	Most	Half	Most	Most
<u>JEWISH FRIENDS:</u>								
Belong to a synagogue	0	11	7	24	13	100	100	100
Jewish organization member	3	10	3	12	36	52	58	75
UJA donor	13	25	10	34	40	62	68	84
Jewish periodical reader	0	10	20	18	24	38	51	75
<u>SELF-DESCRIBED DENOMINATION</u>								
Orthodox	0	5	0	2	2	4	5	22
Conservative	4	0	30	20	30	50	52	57
Reform	14	30	23	39	32	39	31	13
Other	82	65	47	39	36	7	12	8
Liberalism	41	45	66	63	42	38	39	38
Support for Reagan	55	40	27	24	32	38	46	52
(Approx.) N =	29	20	30	49	125	29	94	73

TABLE 7 - 6

## SUPPORT FOR REAGAN BY LIBERALISM AND RITUAL OBSERVANCE

<u>RITUAL OBSERVANCE</u>	<u>CONSERVATIVES</u>	<u>MODERATES</u>	<u>LIBERALS</u>
Secular	68 (38)	30 (23)	- (17)
Minimal	49 (71)	32 (72)	5 (62)
Moderates	64 (61)	35 (52)	0 (21)
Observant	76 (51)	29 (34)	- (12)
All	63 (221)	32 (181)	4 (112)



Table 8-1

Distribution of Responses to Pro-Israel Questions and Related  
Items, 1981 National Survey of American Jews

	<u>Percent Agreeing</u> <sup>a</sup>
<u>Classical Zionism</u>	
Each American Jew should give serious thoughts to settling in Israel.	12%
There is a bright future for Jewish life in America (Disagree)	13%
-----	
<u>Concern or Caring for Israel</u>	
If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life.	83%
Jews should not vote for candidates who are un-friendly to Israel.	78%
I often talk about Israel with friends and relatives.	67%
How important is each of the following issues or problems confronting American Jews? ("Very Important")	
Security of Israel	69%
Antisemitism in America	66%
Assimilation	41%
In general, how would you characterize your feelings about Israel?	
Very pro-Israel	43%
Pro-Israel	50%
Neutral or Anti-Israel	7%
-----	
<u>Support for Israel's Policies</u>	
Israel is right not to agree to sit down with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), because the PLO is a terrorist organization that wants to destroy Israel.	74%
If the West Bank became an independent Palestinian state, it would probably be used as a launching pad to endanger Israel.	64%
If the alternatives are permanent Israeli annexation of the West Bank or an independent Palestinian state, then an independent Palestinian state is preferable. (Disagree)	41%
If Israel could be assured of peace and secure borders, she should be willing to return to Arab control most of the territories she has occupied since 1967. (Disagree)	40%

Table 8-1 (continued)

	<u>Percent Agreeing<sup>a</sup></u>
In general Israel's policies in its disputes with the Arabs have been:	
Too "Hawkish"	24%
About right	73%
Too "Dovish"	3%
-----	
<u>Israel and America</u>	
U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest.	93%
There are times when my devotion to Israel comes in conflict with my devotion to America. (Disagree).	71%
Most American think U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest.	45%
American Jews should not criticize Israel's policies publicly.	39%

<sup>a</sup> Most figures refer to "agree" responses; other responses are indirected for particular questions.





Table 8-2

Concern for Israel and Support for Israeli Policies  
by Age, Education, Income, Ritual Observance and  
Liberalism (1981 National Survey of American Jews)<sup>a</sup>

	<u>Concern for Israel</u>		<u>Support for Policies</u>		<u>N</u>
	<u>Unadj<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>Adj</u>	<u>Unadj</u>	<u>Adj</u>	
<u>Age</u>					
18-39	32	37	52	57	214
40-59	46	45	66	63	185
60+	53	47	73	70	184
<u>Education</u>					
H.S. or less	59	55	74	70	103
Some col.	49	47	71	68	124
B.A.	37	38	65	68	149
M.A. or more	34	37	49	51	137
N.A.	-	-	-	-	10
<u>Income</u>					
Under \$15,000	46	42	64	61	80
\$15,000-24,999	40	40	57	56	119
\$25,000-39,999	41	44	65	68	129
\$40,000-74,999	38	39	61	63	129
\$75,000+	35	39	66	70	52
N.A.	62	57	69	64	74
<u>Ritual Observance</u>					
Assimilated	16	17	46	46	78
Inactive	40	41	61	64	244
Active	50	51	67	65	209
Observant	58	56	75	71	133
<u>Liberalism</u>					
Cons-Mod	46	44	70	68	241
Lib	43	41	66	65	209
Left-Lib	38	45	45	50	133

<sup>a</sup> See Chapter 7 for descriptions of ritual observance and liberalism indices. The concern for Israel index consists of five items relating to (a) reactions to the hypothesized destruction of Israel; (b) not voting for anti-Israel candidates; (c) talking about Israel with friends. The support for policies index is also built with five items: (a) policies are too hawkish, (b) no talks with the PLO (c) Palestinian state would be a danger (d) annexation is preferable to a Palestinian state (e) and lands should not be touched for assurance of peace. See text (this chapter and table 8-1) for more precise details.

<sup>b</sup> Unadjusted figures refer to simple bivariate relationships between either pro-Israel index and each of the five independent variables. Adjusted column control figures adjusted by Multiple Classification Analysis where the effects of each variable is reported controlling (adjusting) for the other four.

Table 8-3

Travel to Israel by Age, Education, Income, Ritual Observance,  
and Liberalism (1981-2 National Survey of American Jews)

	<u>Unadjusted</u>	<u>Adjusted</u>
<u>Age</u>		
18-39	33	31
40-59	38	33
60+	47	54
<u>Education</u>		
H.S. or less	27	21
Some college	38	33
B.A.	42	45
M.A. or more	45	47
N.A.	-	-
<u>Income</u>		
Under \$15,000	24	31
\$15,000-24,999	36	38
\$25,000-39,999	40	40
\$40,000-74,999	42	38
\$75,000+	50	50
N.A.	75	42
<u>Ritual Observance</u>		
Assimilated	21	19
Inactive	32	32
Active	46	46
Observant	58	59
<u>Liberalism</u>		
Cons-Mod	37	38
Lib	40	38
Left-Lib	40	43

CONCERNS ABOUT ISRAEL, ANTI-SEMITISM, POSITIONS OPEN TO JEWS; ISRAEL SECURE BY AGE, EDUCATION, INCOME, RITUAL OBSEVANCE, SEX

Age	CONCERNS				POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE			ISRAEL'S FUTURE IS			N
	NTHR	A-S	ISR	BOTH	OPEN TO JEWS?	<del>ISRAEL</del>	<del>ISRAEL</del>	SECURE	<del>ISRAEL</del>	<del>ISRAEL</del>	
AGE:											
18-39	29	16	14	41	38	4	53	14	17	69	217
40-59	20	11	17	51	36	3	60	19	18	73	189
60+	16	9	15	59	29	7	65	13	18	69	186
ED:											
H.S. Grad	15	6	13	66	34	9	57	14	23	63	118
Some Col	20	14	12	54	35	4	60	9	20	71	131
B.A.	20	13	13	48	37	2	60	7	15	79	153
M.A.+	28	16	18	39	32	4	64	16	16	69	202
INC:											
< 15000	19	10	14	58	29	9	61	11	18	71	92
15-25	25	16	12	47	34	6	60	18	18	64	126
25-40	22	17	13	49	32	4	64	9	19	73	133
40-75	23	14	20	43	37	4	60	10	21	70	133
75+	21	8	23	48	41	0	59	6	10	84	52
RITUAL:											
SECULAR	42	14	17	26	46	5	49	11	22	67	99
MINIMAL	19	16	14	51	34	4	62	12	16	73	250
MODERATE	16	9	16	59	33	4	63	11	19	70	159
OBSERVANT	18	7	16	59	28	5	67	15	17	68	111
SEX:											
M	25	13	18	44	39	4	56	13	18	68	324
F	19	12	12	57	29	5	66	10	18	73	286
TOTAL:	22	13	15	50	35	5	61	12	18	70	616*

**THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE**

**date** October 6, 1981  
**to** Staff Advisory Committee  
**from** Geraldine Rosenfield

**subject** Reactions of the Jewish press to the Yankelovich study:  
"If it's good news, you must be lying"

The Yankelovich study on antisemitism, which was the subject of the American Jewish Committee's press conference on July 28, 1981, was reported as a straight news story in the general press, with some editorial comment. Typical of general reaction to the Yankelovich study is the statement appearing in the New York Daily News (8/2/81): "The finding gives us hope that, with the passing of time, the curse of bigotry will be lifted from the nation--not only the prejudice against Jews, but all the ignorant hostilities based on race, creed or color." The Jewish press, on the other hand, saw no cause for optimism,\* despite the fact that the principal finding of the study was that antisemitic opinion has declined significantly since 1964.

The Yankelovich staff conducted over 1,200 in-depth interviews in February and March 1981, and then compared its findings with those of a similar project conducted by social scientists at the University of California in 1964. The Yankelovich people found attitudes that seem consistent with what we know from experience, observation, and repeated statistical studies: American Jews can

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\*A notable exception was the Baltimore Jewish Times, which handled the Yankelovich report as a straight news story.

and do enter neighborhoods, schools, professions, politics, etc., with little fear of discrimination. The report also tells us bad news, that about one-third of the population is prejudiced and harbors anti-Jewish and, most likely, other xenophobic feelings.

The Jewish press indignantly repudiates reports of improved attitudes toward American Jews as individuals and as a community. Normally it is the bearer of bad tidings who must fear for his life. With the Jewish press, it is the bearer of good tidings who must be afraid.

Take, for example, the Seven Arts subsidiary of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. In a commentary widely used by papers serving Jewish communities around the country, the writer claims that the Yankelovich study "presents illusions by suggesting a decrease in antisemitism." He warns American Jewry that "numbers are deceptive and in this time of social disarray and economic instability the fuel is there for those who seek scapegoats." The writer adds that "the analysis and conclusions of surveys and reports may be interpreted in any fashion. This one should be read with outrage. The next report should explain why the number of overt acts have increased and what can be done to get to the root causes to stop this creeping gangrene."

JTA's columnist David Friedman pronounces that Yankelovich's finding of decreased antisemitism and ordinary people's perception of rising antisemitism are both correct, and he implies that evidence for the one is no more solid than evidence for the other.

"People are more willing to make anti-Jewish remarks," he says. This is especially true in the black community...."

Several papers carried an interview with Shifra Hoffman of the Jewish Identity Center, who countered Yankelovich by citing vandalism and thefts in Long Island synagogues and local activities of Nazi-like groups. The Jewish Identity Center is connected with the Israel Aliyah Center.

The publisher of the New York Jewish Week mistrusts the Yankelovich findings because, he says, "It is an unwarranted assumption that people who answer questions designed to elicit the innermost thoughts of people...tell the truth about their feelings."

Finally, there is almost comical misunderstanding. The Jewish Floridian asks: "What does the publication of this compulsive, doubtfully accurate testing accomplish?" The editorialist suspects that publication of "announcements that antisemitism has increased [sic!] in themselves encourage it to increase." And about attitudes toward Israel he asks, "What group gives such a commodious theatre as do American Jews to discovering through a public opinion poll whether or not a particular country should continue to exist?"

The average educational level of American Jewry has risen dramatically in the past generation. The level of our press does not seem to have risen correspondingly.

The Institute is an American-centered enterprise that seeks to respond constructively to the complex and changing

increase opportunities for consultation and collaboration between these two largest and most important Jewish communities in the world.

The Institute was founded on these premises:

1. The American Jewish community is a healthy, creative and viable community with a positive future in the United States.
2. American Jewry's commitment to Israel's security and survival is strong and irrevocable; for many, Israel is a major ingredient of their Jewish identity.
3. Israelis have come to recognize the importance of the American Jewish community's economic, political and moral support as well as the potential for joint action between Israelis and American Jews on issues of common concern.
4. Events that affect one community are likely to affect the other as well, and to impact on the status and future of Jewish communities the world over.

## What is the Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations?

relationships between American Jewry and the people of Israel. It undertakes programs and activities in America and Israel designed to enhance the quality of the interaction and

# THE INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Bertram H. Gold, *Director*

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# THE INSTITUTE ON AMERICAN JEWISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS

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Since the State of Israel was founded, there has developed an extensive network of American Jewish organizations and diverse patterns of institutionalized activities to further relationships between the American Jewish community and Israel. Most of these efforts, however, focus on

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## The Challenge

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building support for the young State, and on helping American Jews to understand Israel's needs, problems, hopes and aspirations.

There are, on the other hand, few systematic efforts to provide Israelis with a realistic conception of Jewish life in America — though such insights are essential to understanding the true nature of the partnership between Israel and American Jewry. Too often, distorted perspectives born of different historic and contemporary experiences have impeded communication and limited the possibilities for constructive cooperation.

The virtual isolation of Israel in the international community and its almost total dependence on the United States for its security and economic viability, place a heavy responsibility on American Jewry. At the same time, recurrent strains between the American government and Israel often cause tensions and conflicts within the American Jewish community, and between American Jews and other Americans.

There is therefore a great need to develop new perspectives on issues of mutual concern, to examine all available options and to propose new and independent initiatives to help the American Jewish community achieve effective interaction with Israel not only in times of crisis but day by day, well into the future.

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The Institute plans a many-pronged program including research as a basis for action, policy studies, publications, dialogues and colloquia in Israel and America, and visits to America for young potential Israeli leaders to learn about America and American Jews.

The following are merely illustrative of programs under way or planned for the near future:

► Studies of American Jewish attitudes toward Israel and Israelis, and parallel studies of

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## The Program of the Institute

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Israeli attitudes toward America and American Jewry, to probe and correct mutual misconceptions.

► Analyses of major themes and recommendations growing out of the many dialogues and colloquia that have been conducted between Israelis and American Jews in recent years, to help chart educational programs in Israel and in America.

► Policy studies on current issues relating to Israel that impact directly on American Jewry — on American-Israeli economic relations, religious pluralism in Israel, the nature of

Jewish identity and Jewish education in Israel, the issue of dissent among American Jews, and so on.

► Occasional newsletters from and about American Jews addressed to Israeli public officials, educators, opinion moulders, journalists and others in various walks of life.

► An ongoing program of visits to America to give potential leaders of Israel intensive exposure to the American Jewish community. Following such visits the Israel office will maintain continuing contact and carry on a sustained program of education with these future leaders.

► An ongoing program developed for Israelis on sabbaticals or other short-term assignments in America, to acquaint them with American Jews and help them to understand the American Jewish community and American society.

► Occasional publications, such as a newly prepared annotated bibliography on Israel-Diaspora relations for use by American and Israeli scholars; and a "reader," in preparation, on the integration of Oriental and Sephardi Jews into Israeli society, for distribution in the U.S.

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The Institute is an arm of the American Jewish Committee, located in its headquarters at 165 East 56th Street, New York City. As such it has ready access to the Committee's resources and facilities both nationally and in

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## How the Institute Functions

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the communities. It is professionally directed by Bertram H. Gold, Executive Vice-President Emeritus of the American Jewish Committee assisted by Selma Hirsh, formerly Associate Director of the Committee. Morris Fine, former Director of AJC's Foreign Affairs Department serves as a special consultant, and David Sidorsky, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, chairs an academic resource panel.

Mordechai Gazit serves as a special consultant to the Institute, working out of the Committee's office in Jerusalem. Mr. Gazit is a former Director of Israel's Foreign Affairs Office, and formerly served as secretary to the Israel Cabinet and as Israel's Ambassador to France.

Stuart Eizenstat chairs the Institute's American Advisory Board, which includes 50 distinguished American Jews representing diverse interests and points of view. The officers and many current leaders of the

American Jewish Committee serve on the Advisory Board which meets several times a year to review and approve the Institute's program and oversee its operations. Small *ad hoc* committees of Board members are convened as necessary to advise on specific programs.

The Institute also has an Israeli Advisory Board, chaired by S. Zalman Abramov, former Deputy Speaker of the Knesset, and made up of approximately two dozen prominent Israelis who share the Institute's interests and concerns and who are able to bring the Israeli perspective to its program. Joint meetings and periodic exchanges of views on specific issues are conducted between the two Boards as the need arises.

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The initial phase of the Institute was made possible by grants from interested individuals and

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## The Need

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foundations. To ensure continuity for the vital programs getting under way, and to sustain and develop the significant work of the Institute, substantial new resources, in both annual gifts and endowments are required. Contributors may choose to become Fellows of the Institute or to support a specific program with the designation of the benefactor.

Such tax-exempt gifts may be made to the American Jewish Committee and earmarked for the Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations.