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AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
165 East 56th Street
New York City

70-900-117
September 16, 1970

To: Members of the Task Force on the Future of the Jewish Community in America

From: Morris Fine - Task Force Coordinator

Subject: Agenda and Background Papers for September 26-28 Conference

Enclosed herewith are: a) the Agenda for our conference; b) a roster of the expected attendees as of this date; c) another copy of the Statement of Purpose of our Task Force; and d) three out of the five background papers for our discussion. These three papers are:

1. "A Historical Perspective of Some Major Issues of American Judaism" by David Sidorsky
2. "Youthful Turmoil and the Jewish Community" by Mortimer Ostow — not enclosed for M. Hummel fax
3. "Zion in the Mind of American Jews" by Ben Halpern

The remaining two papers, scheduled for Sunday afternoon discussion, are already in hand but require processing. They will be mailed to you not later than Friday. These are:

4. "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile" by Sidney Goldstein
5. "Identity and Affiliation of American Jews" by Charles S. Liebman

These five papers address themselves to the three dimensions of the proposed agenda of the Task Force: the historical perspective, the projection of major current trends, and the identification of major areas of Jewish concern. Your attention is especially directed to the Monday late morning session at which no paper will be presented. The purpose of this session is to report on the present state of our planning and to decide on areas of special research for the second conference.

Reservations have been made at the Waldorf for all those who have indicated that they wished rooms. Please note that all sessions will be held at the American Jewish Committee headquarters at 165 East 56th St., corner Third Ave., beginning at 8:00 p.m. on Saturday.

Enclosures (6)
MF:df

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
165 East 56th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

September 18, 1970

To: Members of the Task Force on the Future of the Jewish Community in America

From: Morris Fine - Task Force Coordinator

Subject: Background Papers for September 26-28 Conference

Herewith are the Goldstein and Liebman papers referred to in my memorandum of September 16. The tables that are part of the Goldstein paper have been omitted because of the bulk of this mailing. Copies will be available at the conference, however. Also enclosed is a copy of the Statement of Purpose of our Task Force, which was inadvertently left out of the earlier mailing.

70/700/73

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Task Force on the Future of the Jewish Community in America

STATEMENT OF PURPOSES

The purpose of the task force is the identification and the examination of the major factors--institutions, tendencies, programs--that determine the character of Jewish culture and identity in the United States. The task force shall initiate reports and discussions of these factors with a view to the development of recommendations for action. These recommendations are not designed as directives for any particular Jewish organizations but as the agenda for the American Jewish community in the next decade. To arrive at a coherent agenda for the American Jewish community requires some sense of where, as a community, we are now, of where we are going, of what we have been doing, and of what we can or ought to be doing. Accordingly, the task force has four aims.

One aim of the task force is the formulation of a reasoned historical perspective of the state of the community. The American Jewish community has been shaped among other factors, by the characteristics of the successive waves of immigration; by the acceptance of major assumptions of the revolutions of modernity, including the value of scientific rationality and the virtues of democracy; by its

relationship to Christian institutions; and by reactions to the Holocaust and the rise of the State of Israel. The community is now in a post-immigration society in which prevailing intellectual assumptions seem to be questioned by elite groups, the major Christian institutions are experiencing great changes, and a generation has grown up since the Holocaust and the State of Israel. In the past two decades several patterns of Jewish adjustment in America seem to have emerged. This effort at historical perspective relates to an examination of the stability of these patterns and their adequacy.

A second aim of the task force is the analysis of the major social trends within the community. This involves a projection of tendencies within Jewish life which seems to crucially affect Jewish continuity and identity. This analysis would comprise demographic data like birth rate, family structure, social mobility, intermarriage, occupational and income profiles. It would also be concerned with study of institutional affiliation and more broadly with the formation of values and attitudes. The task force would direct special attention to the identification of problem areas for Jewish continuity that may emerge from this projection of social trends as, for example, evidence of disproportionate alienation among Jewish college youth.

A third aim of the task force is some examination of the present effort of the organized Jewish community to

support or to develop institutions and resources which determine Jewish continuity in America. This involves an investigation of the ways in which resources are allocated within the Jewish community. It also requires an evaluation of the effectiveness of major Jewish institutions in responding to the desires, aspirations, or needs of the community. Among the possible areas of investigation are the adequacy of the Jewish informational media or the effectiveness of Jewish education, both the formal school systems for children and the informal educational services for college youth or adults.

A fourth aim of the task force is the examdination of what can and ought to be done by Jewish institutions in shaping desirable patterns for Jewish life in America. This requires a determination of what the values of the community and its individual members are in respect to Jewish culture and continuity. Since Jewish cultural life is neither ideal nor beyond hope, the confrontation of current trends with values can suggest possibilities of programs and action. The critical analysis of those possibilities involving some determination of priorities based on comparative costs and benefits is the practical end envisioned by the task force.

May 12, 1970

TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN AMERICA
CONFERENCE AGENDA
SEPTEMBER 26 - 28, 1970

Place: The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
(Corner Third Ave.)
New York City
8th Floor Conference Rooms

Louis Stern, Chairman

SESSION I. - Saturday, September 26
8:00 - 10:30 P.M.

Opening Remarks — Louis Stern

Theme: "The Historical Appraisal of Current Issues"

"Judaism and the Revolutions of Modernity" — David Sidorsky

Discussion

(Coffee and cake at conclusion of session)

SESSION II. - Sunday, September 27
9:00 A.M. - 12:15 P.M.
(Coffee and rolls will be served at 8:45 A.M.)

Theme: "The Historical Appraisal of Current Issues" (cont'd)

"Youthful Turmoil and the Jewish Community" — Mortimer Ostow, M.D.

Discussion

"Jewish Identity and the New Left" — S.M. Lipset

Discussion

Luncheon (Kosher) 12:30 P.M.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

SESSION III. - Sunday, September 27
1:30 P.M. - 5:15 P.M.

Theme: "Sociological Projection of Critical Tendencies"

"American Jewry, A Demographic Profile" — Sidney Goldstein

"Identity and Affiliation of American Jews" — Charles Liebman
(Professor Liebman is in Israel. In his absence his paper will be introduced by a member of the Task Force)

Coffee Break

Discussion

(Cocktails will be served at conclusion of Session)

SESSION IV. - Monday, September 28
9:00 - 11:15 A.M.
(Coffee and rolls will be served at 8:45 A.M.)

Theme: "The Significance of Israel"

"Zion in the Minds of American Jews" — Ben Halpern

Discussion

SESSION V. - Monday, September 28
11:30 A.M. - 2:30 P.M.

Theme: "Constructing the Agenda"

1) a report on current plans of the Steering Committee

2) the identification of crucial areas for research and investigation

Discussion

Luncheon 1:00 P.M.
(Discussion to be continued briefly at luncheon)

Adjournment 2:30 p.m.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

70/700/73

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Task Force on the Future of the Jewish Community in America

STATEMENT OF PURPOSES

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relationship to Christian institutions; and by reactions to the Holocaust and the rise of the State of Israel. The community is now in a post-immigration society in which prevailing intellectual assumptions seem to be questioned by elite groups, the major Christian institutions are experiencing great changes, and a generation has grown up since the Holocaust and the State of Israel. In the past two decades several patterns of Jewish adjustment in America seem to have emerged. This effort at historical perspective relates to an examination of the stability of these patterns and their adequacy.

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May 12, 1970

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN AMERICA
CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER 26 - 28, 1970

EXPECTED ATTENDANCE*

Louis Stern, Chairman - Newark, New Jersey

David Sidorsky, Consultant, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia Universit

Philip Arian, Educational Director, Temple Israel - Albany, N.Y.

William Avrunin, Executive Director, Jewish Welfare Federation of Detroit

Philip Bernstein, Executive Director, Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, Inc.

Eli M. Black, New York City, President, United Brands Corp.

Lucy S. Dawidowicz, Assoc. Professor of Social History, Yeshiva Univer.

Daniel J. Elazar, Professor of Political Science, Temple University

Leonard J. Fein, Professor of Political Science, Brandeis University

Morris Fine, Program Coordinator, AJC

Miriam Freund - New York City

Bertram H. Gold, Executive Vice-President, AJC

Sidney Goldstein, Professor of Sociology, Brown University

Ben Halpern, Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Brandeis University

Selma Hirsh, Assistant Director, AJC

Alfred Jospe, Director of Program and Resources, B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations, Washington, D.C.

Samuel Katz, Director, Community Service Department, AJC

Mrs. Frank A. Kaufman - Baltimore

Morris L. Levinson - New York City

*From whom affirmative replies have been received as of 9/16/70

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

David Lieber, President, University of Judaism, Los Angeles

Seymour M. Lipset, Professor of Sociology, Harvard University

Charles S. Lipson, M.D.-Boston, Mass.

Mortimer Ostow, M.D. - New York City

Rabbi Emanuel Rackman, Fifth Ave. Synagogue, N.Y. City

Yehuda Rosenman, Director, Jewish Communal Affairs Department, AJC

Rabbi Max J. Routtenberg, Temple B'nai Sholom, Rockville Centre, L.I.

Rabbi Martin S. Rozenberg, The Community Synagogue, Sands Point, L.I.

Marshall Sklare - Professor o Sociology, Brandeis University

John Slawson, Executive Vice President Emeritus, AJC

James Sleeper - Cambridge, Mass.

Sanford Solender, Executive Vice President, Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, New York City

Harry Starr, Littauer Foundation, New York City

Sidney Z. Vincent, Executive Director, Jewish Community Federation of Cleveland

Maynard I. Wishner, Vice President, Walter Heller Corporation; Chairman Jewish Communal Affairs Committee of AJC-Chicago

Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Professor of Jewish History, Harvard

George M. Zeltzer - Detroit, Mich.

Louis I. Zorensky - St. Louis, Mo.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

OTHER TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Robert Alter, University of California at Berkeley
Max W. Bay, M.D., Los Angeles
Henry Goodman, Cleveland
William B. Goldfarb, Cleveland
Stanley C. Myers, Coral Gables, Florida
Hon. Simon H. Rifkind, New York City
Jerome J. Shestak, Philadelphia

Youthful Turmoil and the Jewish Community

prepared for the Task Force on the
Future of the Jewish Community in America
of the American Jewish Committee

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

Mortimer Ostow
5021 Iselin Avenue
Riverdale
Bronx, New York 10471

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Youthful Turmoil and the Jewish Community

I. Today's youth

Some of the behavior of today's young people challenges standards and conventions which have prevailed in Western society for generations. The challenges vary from quietly professed attitudes, such as repudiation of the scientific Weltanschauung, to serious physical attacks on property and persons. I use the term repudiation of the scientific Weltanschauung to refer to the defiant rejection of science as an arbiter of the real and the credible. What we are shown is a serious preoccupation with astrology and the occult. In the field of personal behavior there is a similar rejection of convention and tradition as guides and sources of standards, in preference to feelings and impulses. In an almost uncanny way, these challenges unsettle the adult observer for they seem to threaten the structure of society as we know it. Description seems scarcely necessary since the behavior stridently calls attention to itself and one cannot fail to see it. Yet a brief account will serve as a point of departure.

The phenomenon prevails most widely among late adolescents, but some of its features have trickled down to pubertal children. I doubt that it is visible earlier than that. The young people adopt a striking appearance. Their clothing is shabby, unattractive, often dirty, and sexually unappealing, or daring, or ambiguous. Their coiffure too is ambiguous with respect to sex, and unconventional. They appear dirty and ragged. They speak with extraordinary freedom about sexual matters and engage in exhibitionistic acts and promiscuous relations. Those who do not themselves indulge in homosexual activities defend homosexuality against conventional opposition to it. They criticise their government. They criticize organised society. They engage in political activities which vary from encouraging people to vote to acts of terrorism.

They provoke police to attack them and then appeal for sympathy and defense. They sabotage university activities and destroy university buildings. They defend minorities ardently and violently--minorities other than their own. This is not true of most Negroes who promote their own cause and disparage others. The troubled young people use drugs socially, or occasionally, or addictively. They use them in private or in public and they often use them provocatively. Some reject conventional living arrangements and retreat to communes. A number make serious suicide attempts.

How can we explain these startling events? The young people have their own explanations. Usually these are ad hoc; that is, each piece of behavior is given its own explanation. The only generalization which they offer is that adults are immoral and that no matter what the young people do, the fact that they do it publicly rather than secretly puts them on a higher moral plane than their parents. The latter are now stigmatized with the additional label of hypocrisy. These young people imply that it is better to renounce principle and ideal than to hold them and fall short. It is evident that what they call honesty and openness is actually a flaunting of misbehavior with the intent to distress and provoke the observer. They complain too that in view of what they consider to be imminent world annihilation and in view of government immorality, "life has no meaning." Any effort to restore "meaning" to life and to destroy or circumvent an "immoral" government, is justified.

They offer a variety of arguments to justify the individual pieces of misbehavior. With respect to their sexual behavior, they offer no real argument except that times have changed, that sexual morals are "irrelevant," and that contraceptives have made morality superfluous. Those who sympathize with the young accept these arguments and ignore the more subtle but essential considerations. I refer to the fact that morality is, by definition, not a standard

which can be accepted or rejected at one's convenience. It is most important and valid when it is inconvenient. Moreover the basis for sexual morality is not the problem of legitimacy of infants, but rather the rejection of sensuality as the basis for social existence.

The shabby uniform and indeterminate and messy coiffure are said to serve several purposes. Boys say that they wear their hair long because they "like it that way." Such a statement, of course, begs the question. The odd attire is similarly explained. Some say, in addition, that it avoids the pretentiousness and artificiality of more conventional attire. A few of those who are less self-conscious about logic and consistency declare that they will not be made to conform to any established pattern, ignoring their remarkable conformity to the rigid adolescent style.

Drug use is explained as a matter of personal preference. Some devotees of hallucinogenic drug experience argue that these experiences open new horizons to them, make them able to see "the truth" for the first time. I have never seen any objective traces of such revelations.

Attacks on the university are justified as efforts to rectify the inadequacies of the educational system. Political hyperactivism, however it may be defined, is said to be intended to correct injustices. The democratic process is alleged to be ineffective or too slow. These arguments are offered seriously despite the evidence of history that no other system of government has been consistently freer of injustice. In its most extreme form, this tendency becomes a revolutionary movement.

The aggrandizement of others, such as the Negroes, and the complementary derogation of one's own group, are pressed in the name of a morality "higher" than "narrow" group loyalty. Attacks on United States government policy in Southeast Asia represent, according to youthful war protesters, a dedication to

humanity, whereas our government is motivated by base considerations such as profit and the prosperity of the military-industrial complex. Consistency would require equally earnest condemnation of the Arab guerilla attacks on Israeli civilians, and Soviet suppression of its own population and of that of neighboring states. These are curiously missing. A strange logic is advanced to argue that world peace is jeopardized only by the United States, because it will not take the lead in discontinuing its military build-up and in reducing its military strength. Attacks on military research and military production are pursued in the name of loyalty to the human race. Weakening of the military position of the United States government is seen as a desideratum rather than a danger.

Not everyone of today's troubled youth holds all of these positions. In fact a number of fairly easily distinguishable groupings can be discerned, such as the political activists, the fighters for sexual freedom, the campus rebels, the anti-war protesters, the drug culture, the wanderers, and the shabby corps. Yet all these groups overlap to such an extent in membership and ideology, that one must suspect the existence of a substantial common basis through these various tendencies. Those who are least involved in any of these groups are also less diffusely involved. The leaders too, of each of the groups, tend to specialize. One is most impressed with overlap among the active followers.

While one tends to associate the problem of Negro unrest with that of white youth, I see the two problems as different. I think that the difference and the relation between the two will become clearer as we proceed with our analysis, but at this point let me suggest that Negro militancy provides a convenient focus for the accusations of white youth against its own society in the same way that the war in Southeast Asia does. One often sees white youths

eager to support Negro protesters in the name of universalism and brotherly love. Many Negroes on the other hand reject this universalist support in favor of separatism and even aloofness. This separatism is accepted and "understood" by the same Jewish youths who reject Jewish identity and Jewish nationalism as selfish and immoral. The noisy demonstrations common to the white and Negro movements should not obscure the differences between the two.

What I have to say about our young people derives from my clinical experience with them. I would estimate that I have seen perhaps fifty of them, mostly in consultation, but a few in more extensive treatment. It is legitimate to ask whether those who appear in a psychiatrist's office constitute a representative sample of young people. I believe that they do for the following reasons. The sample includes both those who are sickest among the young people and those who are least sick. It includes some who have come on their own initiative--and these are certainly not the sickest of them--and some who come only in grudging response to parental pressure. Many conversations with young people which I have enjoyed in a purely social context seem to confirm my conclusions rather than to challenge them.

The young people do not form a homogeneous group. Among them one can distinguish at least four sub-groups. First, there are those who commit themselves to the vigorous pursuit of their cause, whatever it is. Second, there are those who, while not especially active themselves, sympathize with the first group, and when the first are challenged, support them more actively. Third, there are those who do not sympathize with the dissidents. Fourth, there is a small group who actively oppose them. I know of no actual count of the relative sizes of these groups but I would estimate that the activist group constitutes about fifteen per cent, the followers about forty per cent, the indifferent about forty per cent, and the active conservatives about five per cent. I use these numbers to indicate only order of magnitude rather than true prevalence.

From the psychologic point of view, one may say that ten to fifteen per cent of the young people are so driven by their problematic needs that they cannot engage seriously in the educational, social and vocational activities that ordinarily occupy young people in Western countries. We may say that forty per cent of the young people are disturbed by similar needs but they are nevertheless able to keep them under sufficiently good control that they are able to proceed more or less satisfactorily with the adolescent business of maturation. However these needs can be intensified when the issues which involve them are raised by the activist group. When they are so intensified they may become peremptory and override the inner controls which usually guide the individual's behavior. It follows therefore that the behavior of about fifty per cent of the young people is determined much of the time by the uncontrolled needs of perhaps a third of this fifty per cent. The other two-thirds come under the influence of the activist one-third because the needs of the former are similar to the needs of the latter and can be activated and manipulated by them. Almost all of the remaining half go about their own business and so do little to cancel out the influence and the work of the activists and their supporters. Most of the active conservatives, a very small number, are no less driven than the majority of their opposite numbers, the activists.

We come now to a difficult and controversial question. If the young people with whom we are concerned contend that they are responding in appropriate manner and measure to a real threat, then the psychoanalyst who finds the motivation for their behavior in unconscious personal needs seems to be denying the validity of the social and political judgment of the young activists. While some psychoanalysts may be sufficiently <u>au courant</u> and expert in such matters to deserve the right to make overriding judgments, most, myself included, cannot presume to do so. It is true that in forming a clinical judgment about a patient's

positions, the psychoanalyst checks them out against his own view of reality. The analyst must credit his own view even though in the case of complex issues such as social or political matters, it serves as no more than a point of departure. However one cannot depend upon reality alone to make clinical judgments. At times the patient's contentions may prove completely correct, and yet they may be determined entirely by intrapsychic needs, and they may be held with little regard for reality. For example, not infrequently, a psychotic patient may entertain a delusion which corresponds accurately to reality. What makes a belief delusional is not its truth or falsity, but its origin and the intrapsychic purposes it serves. In other words, if an individual arrives at a belief because his intrapsychic needs require his holding that belief without regard for literal reality or conventionally accepted ideas, then that belief is delusional no matter whether or not it may fortuitously correspond to reality. For example, a psychotic man may believe that his wife is being unfaithful. The psychoanalyst will usually have no way of ascertaining the truth of that belief. However if he can establish that his patient must adhere to it only in order to justify his own adulterous desires, then he can deal with the problem. While it would of course be disturbing if the wife actually were being unfaithful, in the absence of any evidence that she is, holding the suspicion can only result in worsening the relation between the two, a result which the psychotic husband welcomes.

In the same way we do not have to assess the validity of the social and political positions of the young people whom we are studying. Our study of their behavior can be sufficiently well guided by investigation of their motives and the intrapsychic needs that the behavior serves. One young person who is relatively untroubled but not very perceptive, may arrive at a naive view of social problems. Another who is unable to formulate ideas which are relatively independent of his problematic needs but who is perceptive, may see events clearly, but may exploit

what he sees to justify the positions to which his intrapsychic needs have driven him.

There are revolutions which most members of our society acknowledge as moral, desirable, or even necessary. Even in such situations, one may properly ask why individuals A and B function as revolutionaries, while C, D and E stand on the sidelines. That question cannot be answered in terms of social change or social need, but only in terms of the psychology of the individuals involved.

In discussions of the psychopathology of socially deviant behavior, one is often challenged by another argument. Illness, it is said, may make some people creative, and therefore is not to be disparaged. Let me offer two replies. First, the relation of creative work to mental illness is complex. Certainly many industrious people are individuals who defend against and control distress by immersing themselves in work. Often too, the nature of the work gives expression to the specific and personal psychic needs of the individual. One thinks here of Darwin and Proust, for example. On the other hand,the contention that every schizophrenic is a potential Ezekiel, and every depressive, a potential Jeremiah, has in my experience seldom been demonstrated. My colleagues agree that their patients are most creative when they are well, and least creative when they are ill. They may use work to defend against a lapse into illness, but when they do become ill their work deteriorates.

Second, the point that is made by these critics is that mental illness may sometimes be of value and should therefore not be considered a fault. In this essay I am not concerned with celebrating or deploring mental illness. I am concerned with attempting to understand what is going on in the heads of our young people only for the purpose of making an intelligent guess about what they will be doing tomorrow.

I find in almost all the young people who are participating in the current

turmoil two principal complexes: intense ambivalence toward their parents; and inhibition in the process of transition from childhood attitudes to adult attitudes. Let us describe these complexes and their manifestations. Most of our young people will volunteer a long list of their parents' faults. They will assert their own independence and they will complain that their parents are too possessive. The hostility to their parents is overt, declaimed, and demonstrated in rebellious, provocative and offensive behavior. The affection for their parents is largely or completely unconscious. It appears in dreams, fantasies and symptomatic behavior. The adolescents run off to live in communes, but come home--protesting all the while--to get a good meal and resume the quarreling and bickering with their parents. Those who use hallucinogenic drugs find their parents frequently entering into their drug fantasies and hallucinations. True, the parents usually appear in unpleasant contexts, but if the young people were truly independent, they should appear only seldom. For example, one young man lived in a commune no more than a mile away from where his parents lived. He came home once or twice a week to get money for one project or another, none of which he ever completed. On each occasion he managed to tease and antagonize his parents. Demanding money from them was testing their love for him. Under the influence of LSD, he would see his parents being destroyed.

Usually it is the hostile side of the ambivalence which is conscious, and the affectionate which is unconscious. However in some instances, the affection for the parents is conscious and the hostility is unconscious. This situation is especially apt to obtain among young people whose principal concern is revolutionary social activity, and who are supported in their position by similarly minded parents. While they spare their parents from criticism, the hostility they exhibit to the rest of the adult community is easily seen in analysis to arise from their relations with their parents from whom the hostility is displaced onto

the others of the parents' generation. But even the adolescents who are most belligerent and contemptuous of their parents can sometimes be caught in a "weak" moment, that is, at a time when they are depressed. Then they are apt to express affection for and appreciation of their parents in earnest terms, and their sentiments may be confirmed by tears of affection.

The maturational process of adolescence involves achieving adult positions in a number of different areas. These include social relations with others, sexuality, assumption of responsibility, obligation, and restriction within the community, and vocational independence and responsibility. The process of maturation may be regarded as a kind of ordeal. While it offers gratifications, giving up old, familiar positions is frequently painful. Yet some adolescents traverse this path with enthusiasm and joy. Many find some obstacles but overcome them. A moderate number encounter serious difficulty but manage by and large to make the transition, at least partially. A small number never accomplish the passage. These show evidences of serious turmoil during adolescence and in fact seem in many ways never to outgrow the period of adolescence. When they become adults their behavior shows large gaps. These betray the faulty development which is covered over by the appearance and outer symbols of maturity.

I have the impression that in recent years in the United States, and probably in other Western countries with similar social and economic conditions, the proportion of young people who are experiencing difficulty in accomplishing the maturational task of adolescence has been increasing. Perhaps one can imagine a frequency distribution in which frequency is plotted against the degree of incompleteness of adolescent maturation. One would have to concede then that there is no reason to assume that this distribution curve remains constant over long periods of time within any given society, or from one society to another at any given time. What I am suggesting is that in our society, at this time, the turbulence that we

see in our adolescents expresses an increase in the frequency of troubled and incomplete maturation.

When the young person encounters his inability to master the challenges of maturation, whether or not he is consciously aware of this defeat, he becomes subject to a tendency to withdraw from his environment. This withdrawal may take the form of a quiet, solitary misery which we call anhedonia, or of schizophrenic retreat, or of melancholic depression, any of which may lead to suicide.

If my hypothesis is correct, then it can help us to understand the strange and distressing trials of our young people. In fact, each of the various forms of adolescent reaction can be seen as a specific pathologic method of handling the problems of ambivalence to parents and delayed maturation. In general, the common forms of adolescent behavior will show one or more of the following: anger towards the parents and towards the society whose demands cannot be met; anger towards the self which cannot meet these demands; and a search for sources of pleasant sensation to obscure unpleasant reality and inner pain. By turning the anger against the self the young person protects his parents against his conscious or unconscious murderous hostility.

Perhaps the most transparent of the adolescent devices is the commune. Young people leave their parents' home and in a group find a domicile in which they live together with a minimum of formal arrangements. They frequently call this group "the family." These youths have found that continuing to live with their parents is inconsistent with their display of independence and so they move out. Yet by entering into another "family" they betray their continuing dependent need. In these contrived families, a small number of members usually assume organizing responsibility and so function as parents, though the parental role is seldom openly acknowledged. The general lack of discipline and responsibility represents the young child's view of paradise: comfort, food, and care, with no

restriction, obligation or responsibility.

The sexual freedom of the adolescent serves at least three functions. When two or more people live together without formal arrangement, a pseudo-family of the kind we have just mentioned is created. It provides companionship with no responsibility. The sensual pleasure of the available sexual experience tends to counteract the tendency to retreat into inner misery. At the same time the demonstration of capacity for sexual performance conceals the real inability to sustain affectionate, interpersonal relations.

The universalist support for other groups, the Negroes, the poor, the North Vietnamese, the homosexuals, the Arabs, serves the needs of the troubled youth. It expresses a repudiation of their parents, of their families and their community. The formula is, "I don't love you. I love him, whom you hate and neglect." Put this way it says that the young person himself feels hated and neglected by his parents, though it is difficult to see, at first glance, what deprivation the young have experienced. The formula also seems to suggest that the young person envies these unfortunate groups and he tries to associate himself with them. He supports their cause even when his support is unwelcome. We have referred previously to the fact that militant Negroes do not , in general, welcome white support. But the white adolescent supports them in the same way that he supports Arab guerrilla activity, not because they need him but because he needs them. He makes of himself, together with his friends, an offensive minority. In essence, the young person associates himself with his parents' enemies and thereby rejects his parents. Certainly the parent feels as if that is what is happening, and it is likely that that is indeed the intent of this piece of behavior.

Protest against governmental authority and military power helps the adolescent in a number of different ways. It expresses the hatred of the young person for his parents, though once removed. When this hatred is deflected against the substitute, the full fury and venom can be voiced more freely. In the unconscious

of the adolescent, it is the parent who is being called a "pig," in retaliation for the parent's rebukes to the young child when he would not adopt habits of cleanliness and neatness, or when he used "dirty language." Since repudiation of cleanliness and neatness, and defiant regression to childhood obscenity are part of the adolescent's posture, he can figuratively--and sometimes literally--hear this epithet flung at him once more, and he defends against it by hurling it at the representatives of law and order. The campus and political protest create battle engagements which excite and arouse the young person, distracting him from concern with the areas of his defeat. Students who participated in campus occupations and militant demonstrations report experiencing an extraordinary sense of elation. The demand that the government disarm unilaterally in the presence of implacable enemies, though enunciated as a program for peace, functions actually as a program for suicide for the entire society. Indeed, it is not difficult to see that this call to suicide is one tactic in the program for destruction of the society. Another tactic is the encouragement of civil disorder and the prosecution of terrorism in the hope of alienating the people from their own government which is forced to become more repressive in order to control the terrorism.

The use of drugs which impair normal mental function is a somewhat different approach to the solution of the adolescent's problem. Here the individual aims not to attack the society which he holds responsible for his problems, but rather to make himself unaware of the problems. This is a kind of partial suicide, a numbing of one's mind. The mode of action of these various drugs and how they bring relief to the anguished adolescent is a complicated subject which cannot be handled within the confines of this paper. I can summarize by saying that the drugs obtund the individual's awareness of his disability and of his misery, and they substitute pleasant sensations which arise internally and which divert the individual from unpleasant outer reality and unpleasant inner sensation.

The drugs may also be used in ways which provide gratifications other than those afforded by their chemical effect. The use of drugs in social groups helps to weaken the barriers that many of the young people feel in their social relations with each other. The alterations in sensation which the drugs create make sexual activity more pleasurable. Supplying drugs to ~~each~~ others and profiting from drug traffic defies government authority and creates the excitement of a small scale war.

Frank mental illness, sometimes culminating in suicide, may occur in those individuals who do not undertake defensive activities such as those which we have been discussing, or in individuals who do undertake defensive activities but whose defenses fail. Sooner or later most of these disturbed young people are likely to have to face the fact of their disabilities. Projection, denial, provocation and exciting behavior can go only so far, and when the relief which they provide has been exhausted, depressive or psychotic syndromes may then become evident.

What is the cause of this epidemic? Since these problems, the behavior turmoil, and the pathologic complex behind it represent difficulties in the process of maturation, one would expect them to be perennial adolescent difficulties rather than to be peculiar to our era. I believe that they are perennial, but that recurrently, at intervals, the problems become more prominent. I imagine that a good historical study of this phenomenon may help us to understand what is happening today. Was the vagabondage of the 15th century French and German adolescents--called the Children's Crusade--a manifestation of the same kind of adolescent unrest which we see today? The myth of the Pied Piper of Hamelin may be based upon these events, and if so, it reminds us of the attraction of adolescents to alien leaders, inimical to their own parents, to bright colors which they now call "psychedelic," and to strange, primitive music. What was the nature of adolescent deviance in ancient Babylon which gave rise to the weekly Sabbath prayer for vital and faithful progeny?

One way to understand the current problem is to compare the situation in our country with the situation in other countries. We are immediately reminded of the youth of present day Israel. The majority of them display the traditional virtues of loyalty, obedience, family orientation and personal ambition. The reasons for the difference are here obvious. The Israeli youth is directly and personally responsible for the survival of the nation. His nation needs him and he is eager to respond to the call. One is tempted then to infer that the alienation of American youth from their elders relates in some way to their not being needed. If that inference is correct, and if we may generalize, then we arrive at the proposition that challenge and responsibility encourage adolescents to mature and to assume an active role within society. Conversely, an adolescence free of challenge lacks an important and powerful stimulus to maturation. Some commonplace experiences support this view. The eldest of a number of children who loses a parent while he is a young adolescent, matures rapidly as he assumes the care of his siblings. The youngest of a family is likely to mature more slowly than his sibs. The protected children of wealthy parents tend to mature late and incompletely.

It would follow from these considerations that the adolescent's ability to free himself from his dependence on his parents and to advance to the several roles of adult responsibility, can be strongly facilitated by challenge and need, and may be deterred by comfort and protection. This proposition should not be too surprising to the psychiatrist. He knows that most psychotic patients, in the face of an emergency, emerge from their illness long enough to deal appropriately with the threat, and then sink back into their illness. I have been told that during the Six Day War in Israel, ambulatory psychotics were not excused from military duty and that most performed properly. We arrive then at the paradoxical conclusion that the comfort and security which we seek for our children are likely

to discourage their psychic development. More generally we may say that comfort and security exert a noxious influence with respect to the vigor of a population.

Of course, comfort and security cannot be considered the only kinds of stress which retard and deform adolescent maturation. In the case of excessive comfort and security the adolescent attempts to grow without the normal resistance of challenge, without a "load," to borrow a metaphor from power engineering. An excessive "load" can also thwart the adolescent's maturation. That would be stress caused by excessive social pressure or social upheaval. History teaches us that at times when existing society is uprooted or violently changed, adolescents exhibit deviant and often destructive behavior. Since it is the adolescent's task to mature from family attachment to membership in society, the success of that transition requires the existence of an organized, vital society which expects and welcomes him. When the society has no need for him, or when it is itself fragmented and ineffectual, adolescent development loses motivation, goals, guidelines and discipline.

Returning to our problem of today's youth, we are led to name as the chief troublers of today's youth: the relative affluence of our society; the absence of a clear and present danger to our society; the lack of need and even opportunity to assume serious responsibility for any part of our society; and the expectation that they spend four or more years in higher education. Higher education is desired and can be pursued only by a fraction of our total youth, only those who are so well integrated that they can defer assumption of responsibility and engagement in real work. The others who comply with the expectation to study in universities, see this period of higher education as a kind of "holding pattern"--a period of enforced exclusion from adult life--and their attacks against the universities may be interpreted as an expression of anger against what they consider an incarceration.

The complaints voiced by the young people themselves must be understood as

rationalizations. They say that the potentiality for nuclear warfare makes their lives meaningless since the whole world can now be destroyed any day. The fact is that the relative immunity of the United States from military attack until the last two decades has been an exceptional situation. During most of recorded history the residents of cities and states were vulnerable to extermination by hostile forces. For the individual, extermination is extermination whether it affects, in addition to himself, his city, his country, his continent or the whole world.

That there is corruption in our society is well known. There is no reason to believe that there is less corruption in any other, or that today's generation of young people will be less susceptible to corruption than previous generations. That we have poverty, pollution, injustice? The young people are not the only ones who deplore evils, but they have yet to demonstrate realistic programs to eliminate them. That Negroes have been treated unjustly? Minorities have been treated unjustly at most times and at most places in history. Yet I doubt that one can find any minority whose status--by every conceivable measure--has improved as rapidly as that of the American Negro since World War II, and that, without the tangible assistance of most of today's white college youth.

We have noted above that espousal of the cause of an unfortunate minority in our society is a way of accusing the parent generation of abusing the youth. And now we can see what that abuse is, namely, overprotection and infantilization which makes the young person feel ineffectual and impotent, a member of an inferior minority. Many Negro leaders seem to realize that their white sympathizers are fighting a battle of their own in which the Negroes are convenient pawns, that the struggle of white youth against their overprotective parents is not the struggle of Negroes for more respect and more power.

How do these unwholesome influences affect our young people? Let us return

to our notion of a frequency distribution of delay in adolescent maturation. We assume that a small fraction of adolescents are absolutely unable to make the transition to adulthood in meaningful terms, and I would guess that most of the youthful activists are derived from this group. A large minority can make the transition, but only with difficulty and with assistance and encouragement. From this group the inactive supporters of the activists are probably derived. Another large segment can find their way into adulthood with little or no external encouragement, and these probably include most of the students who are relatively indifferent to current turmoil. To avoid misunderstanding, let me emphasize once more that not all protest, not all political action are necessarily the result of mental disturbance. As we said previously, we can imagine a ratio between vigor of response and realistic injustice. We are trying to define segments of the population in which this ratio is very high, high, and moderate. It would be just as much an evidence of an unwholesome imbalance of mental forces if an individual failed to respond to the extent that he realistically could, to blatant injustice. In fact we have already commented that sympathy by many Jewish young people for Negro rioters but not for their Jewish victims, for Arab guerrillas, but not for <u>their</u> Jewish victims, betrays an unhealthy state of affairs.

The influence of the noxious social circumstances, affluence, overprotection, security, protracted education, is to increase the difficulty of the adolescent's task. The ranks of those who fail completely are increased at the expense of those who are just able to get by with encouragement, and the ranks of this marginal group are increased at the expense of those who seemed secure in their development and not excessively responsive to social pressures. To put it another way, what we see today is an <u>increase</u> in the number of troubled adolescents and in the intensity of their turmoil, rather than a new phenomenon. What is new is that the increase in the number of activists and their sympathizers has proceeded

to the point where they can now become a serious nuisance to the rest of society; they can exert an influence upon national policy; and they are apt to leave as a residue a generation of adults who will probably show a high frequency of frank mental illness in the next few decades.

II. Today's youth and the Jews.

The section which we have just concluded is so extensive that it makes this essay top heavy. The reason is evident. These data, inferences and suppositions are based directly upon my own clinical experience. Therefore I can present them in some detail and with some confidence. What I have to say about the Jewish community is derived far less directly and completely from clinical experience. It is therefore less trustworthy and less detailed. I venture these comments below primarily to demonstrate how the data and inferences I have presented above might be linked to the problem of Jewish continuity. I cannot assure you that this is how they are linked.

From the reports that I have seen, there seems to be little doubt that Jews are highly overrepresented among both the activists of the younger generation and among their less active sympathizers. What do we see in the current situation which would account for this disproportionally high membership of Jews in the troubled segments of today's younger generation? We have observed that protracted and poorly tolerated education retards the maturational process of many adolescents. Jewish youth are subjected to greater pressure to accept higher education than others. Education has always been one of the ideals of Jews. Education of the young serves as an indication of the social status of the parents and opens the way for higher social status for the young people themselves. As an especially affluent group, the Jews can afford advanced education more widely than a cross-section of non-Jews. Therefore Jewish youths in larger proportion than others will attend colleges and universities. The vulnerable among them will succumb to

the prevalent adolescent malaise and find their way into the groups of dissidents. When higher education was more difficult to attain, only the most highly motivated went to college and beyond. Now that university attendance has become almost universal among Jews, a considerably larger proportion of the poorly motivated and the psychically vulnerable Jews will find their way into the university population. Since the proportion of Jewish youths in college still greatly exceeds that of the college age population in the nation, the proportion of disturbed Jewish young people will greatly exceed the proportion of disturbed non-Jewish young people. Let me say it another way. The greater the proportion of the young population of any social group which arrives at the campus, the greater will be the frequency of disturbed young people among those on the campus, since the disturbed adolescents are the least well motivated and are therefore the last to be recruited to the campus. Since Jews are better represented on the campus than the nation in general, it is to be expected that more of its disturbed youth will appear there than the disturbed youth of the rest of the nation.

It is interesting to note that although education has always been held as a prized goal, in practice relatively few Jews in the past achieved higher education, even in religious studies. The educated were a small elite, membership in which was confined to the most highly motivated and best students. It is only in the past few decades that education has become available to such a very large proportion of Jewish young people.

The affluence of the Jewish community in the United States today is widely recognized. Jewish young people therefore are less called upon than their non-Jewish contemporaries to provide for their parents. The relatively high position of Jewish parents in American business and American professions make their children less uncertain of their future.

Jewish families in the United States are smaller than non-Jewish families.

In families with fewer children, the ambivalent relation between parents and children tends to become more intense than in families with more children. It is as if the presence of many children dilutes out the parent-child relation. The only child finds it more difficult to emancipate himself from his parents than a member of a large sibship. And the parents usually find it more difficult to let him go. Since Jewish families are smaller, it is likely that the degree of parent-child ambivalence among them exceeds that which prevails in non-Jewish families. And since intense ambivalence is one of the chief troublers of youth, it follows that Jewish youth will, in general, be more troubled than their non-Jewish contemporaries. This theory can be checked out by comparing the family size of disturbed youth with the family size of their more stable contemporaries.

Jews probably tend to overprotect their children to a greater extent than non-Jews. This overprotection involves discouraging them from adventure which facilitates adolescent development. Adventure is challenge and it must be met by responsibility. Overprotection involves excessive indulgence of the adolescents' desires, excessive pressure for education, and a tendency for the older generation to withhold responsibility from the younger. Even after the young man completes his education and goes to work for his father, the father frequently finds it difficult to relinquish responsibility to his son. The psychiatrist commonly sees father-son conflict which centers about business relations. From my own experience I cannot say that this situation is more characteristic of Jewish families than others.

This brings us to a consideration of the Jewish family. The unusual strength of Jewish family ties is well known. To some extent this strength may be attributable to the Jews' sense of being strangers and outsiders wherever they have lived. The sense of danger from without is then met by a closing of ranks within. One is reminded too of the family orientation of the celebration of many religious occasions, the Sabbath meal, the Seder, and the Bar Mitzvah celebration.

One observation which I had occasion to make, supplemented by some theoretical considerations, relates family closeness to ritual circumcision. Briefly, a father became somewhat depressed when his first child, a son, was born. This depression was accompanied by a poorly disguised hatred, in fact, death wishes toward the infant. Such hatred is characteristic of all post-partum depression, whether of father or of mother. Immediately after the circumcision, the hostility disappeared and was replaced by a relatively unalloyed love, with a sublimated homosexual content. The father's hostility toward his son, a component of every parent's attitude toward his children, seems to have been bound by the circumcision, a ritual, symbolic of castration, and to have given way then to an intense, sublimated homosexual affection. The inference that I should like to propose is that ritual circumcision performed on the neo-natal boy, binds his father's natural hostility and paves the way for a more tender, pure, affectionate relation between father and son thereafter. This phenomenon too, may contribute to the unusual strength of Jewish family ties. I offer this as a hypothesis which must be checked for its generality both in our society and in others in which circumcision is practiced (though we must not forget to consider the age of the child at the time of the circumcision as a relevant variable).

Since all emotional relations are necessarily ambivalent, the intense ties of Jewish family life must be expected to generate great hostility. Among Jews, the latter is not permitted to find direct expression within the family or even against others within the same society. Therefore it finds indirect expressions, for example, intense vocational ambition, but also hostility masquerading as love. The parent's ambivalence toward his child may take the form of over-protection, that is, infantilizing the young child, depriving him of the adventurous exposure to danger which growing up normally entails. The chief perpetrator of this over-protection is the mother, and today's younger generation of Jews

delights in the malicious stereotype of the "Jewish mother." One hazard of the "Jewish mother" is that she really does seduce the child so that he finds it more difficult than he would otherwise to establish his independence from her. The young people complain that their parents are too possessive, and in my experience I have usually found that this complaint has been justified. The parents are too possessive and the children are too dependent. This is the trap in which the young individual finds himself and from which he struggles to escape in the ways which we have examined.

It is clear that the vicissitudes of intra-family aggression are not the same among Jews everywhere or at all times. The parent-child relations which I have been discussing do seem to obtain among American Jewish youth and their European born or first generation American parents. The Jewish male adolescent, therefore, in his maturation must escape from his father's affection and his mother's over-protectiveness and possessiveness. They both make his task more difficult, and when he finds it too difficult, he may be inclined to rebel in one or more of the ways which we have discussed.

Since one prominent form of adolescent protest today consists of the demand for social justice, we must consider too the historic concern of Jews for social justice. This really requires a historic and social analysis for which I have no competence. Yet what we are learning about historic and social phenomena invites some psychologic analysis. One possible explanation for the Jewish preoccupation with social justice may be constitutional. Such a statement will ring so strange on the ears of the liberal, sophisticated, Jewish intellectual that it will probably be attributed to a piece of unanalyzed idiosyncracy on my part. We, who subscribe to and are dominated by egalitarian ideals, like to believe in the equipotentiality of all humans. Given an optimal environment, we like to believe that we can all rise to limitless heights. And yet experience shows that we all have both

special gifts and special limitations, some of which are individual, some familial, some ethnic, and some racial. Yet even if we accept the idea that one group may be talented musically, and another in physical agility, still it seems difficult to accept the idea of an inherited concern with liberty and justice. However the idea may seem less improbable if we see concern with liberty and justice as derived from the tendency of a population to band together in tightly knit, hierarchical groups as opposed to the tendency to reject social organization. The former tendency would be regarded as characteristic of an authoritarian population and the latter as characteristic of a freedom loving population. The rights of the individual as opposed to the group would be better protected in the latter than in the former.

The celebrated prophetic concern with social justice implies a popular unconcern with it, and a recurrent, unpopular protest.

The Jew has been concerned with social justice on two types of occasions: when he was the victim of injustice; and when he was the perpetrator of it. In the latter case it was the prophets who prodded his conscience.

Biblical writings enjoin an ideal of human dignity, limitation of subjugation and restriction of slavery.

Three times daily the observant Jew recites, "Blow the great trumpet for our freedom." Once a year almost every Jew celebrates the festival of freedom, an emancipation which is alluded to in almost every religious service. The Hebrew language is rich in terms and nuances of freedom: chofesh, dror, cherut, shichrur, p'duth, g'ulah.

Autonomy and rejection of central authority have been characteristic of Jewish communities throughout the Diaspora. It seems to lead to military and political weakness, but it favors loyalty, historical continuity, and creativity.

Freedom for oneself and freedom for others is a perennial and consistent Jewish theme and this religious preoccupation with justice and freedom has encouraged

many rabbis to find religious merit in the political protests of student activists.

However there are some nuances that make the position questionable. Perhaps the central requirement of Judaism is that the major gratifications of life be derived from the satisfaction of accepting the discipline of religious law. What is specifically and unconditionally prohibited is the dedication of life to the cultivation of sensuality. (I believe that it is the cultivation of sensuality, that is, sexuality and violence, that is referred to in the Bible as avodah zarah). Now the cultivation of sensuality is a major component of adolescent protest, evident in sexual indulgence, drug induced sensations, and violence for its own sake.

One suspects that the complaint of social injustice is exploited as a pretext for an attack against society. Our government is attacked as if it were the chief and only perpetrator of injustice in the world. The Jews are criticized for relatively minor injustices, while their enemies are extended sympathy as though they were actually more righteous. Few critics have practical plans for alleviating injustice, and most expend the major part of their effort in protest and relatively little effort in constructive remedies.

What is especially relevant to the Jewish community is the repudiation of the Jewish community by some of today's Jewish adolescents. This repudiation takes the form of a desire to date and marry non-Jewish partners, attacks upon Israel, accusations that Jews especially are mistreating Negroes, rejection of traditional Jewish ideals and morals including sexual morality, study as a goal, restraint as opposed to indulgence, social responsibility in behavior rather than in slogan, and responsibility of Jews for each other. The promotion of universalist and supranationalist ideals is another way of repudiating the Jewish community. These ideals sound like an advance over what the young people denote as "the narrow partisan morality" of their parents. In practice the enunciation of these ideals works out to be merely a club with which to strike one's parents. Isaiah was the

prophet of universalism, but even he prefaced his prophecy with the restrictive clause, "And it shall come to pass at the end of days ..." There is no evidence that the time has come when any nation or group can abandon its defences and depend for its security on the good will of its neighbors.

I am not the first to suggest that this lack of loyalty, and in some instances disloyalty to the Jewish community is to be attributed in part to the relatively secure position of the Jewish community in the United States. Just as American students can afford to attack their government because it is in no real danger from external enemies, so Jewish-American students can attack the American Jewish community which at this time seems to enjoy relative security.

The Jewish community seems to possess the attribute of being able to organize instantly and tightly when threatened, to accept discipline and responsibility, and then to dissolve when the threat has been lifted. When Jews are threatened, every Jew responds automatically, as promptly as if he and his own immediate family were threatened. But when the threat subsides, this automatic tie to the Jewish community is resented by some, principally those who have had some difficulty in emancipating themselves from their parents.

It is the opportunity for vicarious adventure which makes Israel so enticing to many Jewish adolescents. And through Israel, many of these are attracted to full support of the Jewish community. There are those whose need to rebel against parental influence overrides even the inspiration of Israel. Because it attracts them so strongly, they resent it even more. One is reminded of the philanthropist who, upon being confronted by a particularly miserable beggar, told his secretary, "Get that man out of here! He's breaking my heart."

In the repudiation of the community, the troubled Jewish adolescent sees a symbolic emancipation from his parents. Those young people who have difficulty in achieving true instinctual independence from their parents, find all kinds of instinctual ties threatening. Those ties that represent their parents' sentiments,

that symbolize their parents' ideals are especially dangerous. The Jewish community represents the family and it represents the ideals of the parents. And therefore its repudiation symbolizes repudiation of the family. Every Jewish parent whose adolescent child turns away from the Jewish community feels as though he himself had been rejected. That feeling can be taken as an accurate indicator of the young person's intentions.

Jewish young people often attack the Jewish community, now under the banner of universalism, now Marxism, now rationalism, now progress. I see here a similarity to the current attacks of American youth against American institutions under similar banners. In each case, the young person is, I believe, attacking his own community, because it offers him insufficient challenge, adventure and responsibility. These he requires for full maturation, and if they are not offered to him he creates them by declaring war on the society which has let him down.

III. What are the consequences of these tendencies?

Let us consider first the general rather than the Jewish population, and the individuals themselves rather than the community. We do not have good follow-up studies of today's troubled students. We do not really know how their behavior changes, nor how many of them become mentally ill. We do have some rough guidelines in observations, however.

Since the frequency of attempts at suicide is high among these students, and since the frequency of accomplished suicide among those who have attempted suicide exceeds the frequency among others, it follows that this population may serve as the matrix from which later suicides are derived.

Since the more disturbed students are those who are unable to establish sound affectionate relations and sound working relations with other individuals because they have never really completed their maturation, they are likely to have difficulty with marriage and difficulty in finding a place in society. We should

keep in mind too that a significant number of troubled young people are frankly mentally ill and even those who recover are likely to carry their demonstrated vulnerability along with them.

Turning now to the question of values, I believe that there is a strong tendency for the values of the young people to swing back and become similar once more to their parents' values. It is a commonplace observation that radicalism is to a large extent a phenomenon of youth and that as the individual ages, his radicalism gives way to a more conservative attitude. Freud has described the phenomenon in psychological terms as deferred obedience. Sooner or later the adolescent need to overdo his display of independence subsides. It subsides either because he matures sufficiently so that he need no longer make an issue of maturation, or because he fails to mature and comes to terms with his continued dependence. In either case he no longer finds it necessary to reject his parents' values. In fact he frequently develops a positive need to accept them. Accepting them means identifying with the parent, and that is true maturation. It also re-establishes the affectionate link to the parent. Therefore this phenomenon of deferred obedience is especially likely to occur after the death of the parent, though it usually starts as the adolescent turmoil subsides.

We must keep in mind that the young person's attitude toward his parents is ambivalent throughout. While the hostility and rebellion are flaunted, there remains a strong affectionate bond which becomes visible only subsequently. In fact it is not difficult to find even in the form of the rebellion, an identification with some component of the parent's history, personality, or ideals. This identification may be conscious or unconscious. I have already commented on the special case in which parents support their children's rebellion. The young person in that case seems not to be rebelling against his own parent but here analysis discloses that the anti-social activities are indeed unconsciously directed against that parent.

Adolescent turmoil is one instance of a general tendency to try to solve psychic problems by action. When problem solving action is constructive and does help to resolve the difficulty, we call it "sublimation." When the action is destructive, to oneself or to others, and does not effectively dispose of the problem, we call it "acting out." Adolescent turmoil then, by and large, can usually be considered a form of "acting out." Acting out occurs at any age but it occurs especially frequently during the late adolescent and early adult period. It seems generally to be true that this form of adolescent acting out subsides between the ages of 25 and 30. We sometimes say that the mental agitation has "burned itself out." This is true, for example, for most cases of delinquency. The various forms of adolescent turmoil also seem to burn themselves out. I have been told informally that most of the student activists of five to ten years ago have settled quietly down to unexciting and inconspicuous lives, though a small number have become professional revolutionaries.

While the agitation is likely to subside for the individual young person, the country is confronted with a persistent, disturbed, restless population of adolescents and young adults who don't know the real cause of their unrest but who hold their government and the entire society which the government represents responsible. We have already noted that while the specific accusations which the young level against society are invalid or inappropriate or irrelevant, we must concede that it is the special conditions of our society which facilitate the adolescent problem. This disruptive minority may be only a nuisance now, but if they grow, they may become a substantial threat to the entire community. The threat can be accentuated if even a very small number turn to terrorism, for terrorism polarizes the population. An agitated younger generation which holds its government and society responsible, may weaken the government's defence against attack from without and against subversion from within. It does the first by interfering

with the nation's military stance and it does the latter by cooperating with and amplifying the effect of the violence of militant minorities. We must conclude that this phenomenon of youthful turmoil, if it is permitted to grow, can constitute a serious threat to our country and our society.

Before turning to the specific problem of Jewish youth, let us not overlook the fact that radical agitation among the country's youth constitutes a potential threat to America's Jews. While Jews are friends of radicals, radicals are not always friends of Jews. For example, Jews are puzzled by the anti-Semitic and anti-Israel activities of Negro militants. But few Negroes are interested in freedom and equality in the abstract; they are struggling for their own freedom. It is known by all historians of revolutions that once an oppressed group finds that its demands are taken seriously, it becomes more militant, resents the assistance of sympathizers, and literally bites the hands that feed it. Youthful radicals espouse the cause of minorities, lacking an overt and serious cause of their own, and do not hesitate to take over the anti-Semitism of struggling minorities. To the young radical, the Jewish community in the United States is no more free of blame than the Wasp majority, and to the extent that it represents the status quo, it too becomes an appropriate object to attack. The Jews of the United States will certainly not fare well if the population becomes bitterly polarized and they will not fare better than the rest of the country in the face of war or revolution which may be facilitated by the actions of a large and agitated segment of the nation's youth.

What happens to the Jewish youth who turns against the Jewish community? The phenomenon of deferred obedience gives us some cause for comfort. As they grow older we can expect the young people to regard themselves once more as members of the Jewish community. The problem of intermarriage becomes serious because it is entered into during the phase of rebellion, and by the time the

reverse pull toward Judaism makes itself felt, the marriage is no longer readily reversible. The figures are not yet in but I would guess that such intermarriages will gradually assume Jewish identification, and the children are likely to be encouraged to think of themselves as Jews. It is interesting that among intermarrying young people, there is relatively little name changing. I take this as an indication that full and enduring repudiation of Jewish identity is not intended. Of course the strength of the reflex pull back to Judaism can be no greater than the primary conscious or unconscious commitment to it, which in turn was determined by childhood experience, the attitude of the parents, and the prevailing morale of the Jewish community.

Jews self-consciously ask themselves what there is to being Jewish. Religion, it is generally agreed, holds only a small percentage of Jews. Nationalism holds perhaps a somewhat greater percentage. Jewish ideals and Jewish morality are frequently listed as reasons for remaining Jewish. I should like to suggest that Jews are loyal to the Jewish community not primarily for any of these reasons, but because the Jewish community, current and historic, is a family. It is literally a family of families. It encourages family life as a religious value. As a family it acquires the influence of the individual's literal family. By the same token it may come under attack when the individual turns against his own family.

If we were asked why we continue to be members of our own literal, nuclear families, we might point with pride to family achievements or distinctions. However we would not really be able to discount our loyalty as a primitive psychologic, even biologic mode of relating to the biosocial group into which we have been born. It makes as little sense to ask why one is attached to one's family as to ask why an infant loves its mother. It is characteristic of infants that they love their mothers; they cannot do otherwise. And it is characteristic of all humans that they cling to their families, overtly or covertly, consciously or unconsciously.

The emphasis on family relations and the family quality of the Jewish community invoke biologic forces to supplement the need to belong. Judaism has, at different times and in different places, taken various forms, meeting the specific psychic and social needs of the occasion. This need to force Judaism to assume different forms, a conservative order, an antinomian revolt, a mystical retreat, an ecstatic fraternity, a philosophic system, an intellectual elite, this need attests to the strength of the tie to the Jewish family.

It follows that the ambivalence of the troubled Jewish adolescent toward his family is likely to extend also to the Jewish community. Therefore behind the anti-Jewish declarations and behavior one will frequently find a covert and profound loyalty. Radical, drug using, hippie-mannered young people will occasionally show up in the synagogue without evident reason. I know of a number who attend fairly regularly. A Jewish young woman who was living with a non-Jewish hippie complained that her mother would not permit her to bring her boy friend home to attend Kol Nidre services. One especially shabby young hippie raged against his father when the latter refused to permit him to accompany him to synagogue on Rosh Hashanah because of his disreputable appearance. Analysis disclosed that this young man who defied, provoked and tormented his parents, was actually patterning his behavior after their experiences in fleeing the Nazis. Year after year he had heard at the Seder how the various members of the family had fled for their lives from the Nazis and he had heard of their modes of concealment and evasion. As a child he had run away from the yeshivah which he attended and as a young man he engaged in violent campus protests. But in all instances he saw himself repeating the experiences of his parents as they were escaping persecution. I don't know how this young man will settle down, but if he resists mental illness, I suspect that he will be drawn once more to the Jewish community.

Many radical, anti-religious Jewish families participate in a Seder each

year since it celebrates political emancipation. It is a religious service which permits them to assert their loyalty to the Jewish historic family and to their political and social ideals at the same time.

The ambivalence toward parents and community becomes manifest especially clearly in the recent, self-styled "chavurah" movement. Here young people who are not willing to forgo their intense commitment to Judaism, are seeking ways to assert their independence of parents and tradition nevertheless. Puzzled elders don't know whether to applaud or to deplore.

An interesting and increasingly common variant of the expression of ambivalence is the turn to religion by the adolescents who grow up in a non-religious or marginally observant family. Here the assertion of religious commitment constitutes both an act of loyalty and an act of defiance. These young people are rebuking their parents by demonstrating greater commitment to the Jewish community than to the parents themselves. An increasing number of students are coming to rabbinical seminaries out of such religiously indifferent families.

What are the consequences of the unrest of Jewish youth for the Jewish community? While the general community may be threatened when the number of agitated young people exceeds a threshold value, the Jewish community is exposed to no special danger by virtue of the disruptive activity of its youth. To be sure, if a serious polarization of the country occurs, there may be a resurgence of anti-Semitism, and the Jews may be held responsible for the activities of their young people. However the support of the Jewish community comes from people in their middle years and we have reason to expect that most of the troubled youth will have made their peace with the Jewish community by the time they arrive at middle life. As parents, they too will acquire an interest in family integrity, and in support of that, they are likely to affirm their Jewish loyalty and cultivate the family strengthening rituals of the Jewish religion. In case of danger

of physical violence, we can expect the loyalty and support of our youth. The heroism of young, non-religious Jews in Nazi Europe and in Israel is well known.

It cannot be denied however that there are Jewish communities which gradually weaken and die. I suspect that these are usually communities in which the Jews are subjected to no special challenge as such. Jews of such communities are permitted to respond as equals to the various challenges of the general community. Here the familiarity of the Jewish extended family exerts little attraction while the challenge and novelty of the alien, fascinate. My clinical experience here relates to the third or fourth generation American Jews of German ancestry. I find that whereas they frequently reject synagogue affiliation and religious observance, they maintain their Jewish identity by actively engaging in philanthropy, and especially in Jewish philanthropy. Jewish identification dies hard. One such individual recalled mysterious religious rituals performed by his grandparents, rituals which were at the time disparaged by his own parents. Aside from his philanthropic activities which were only partly Jewish, he lived the life of a non-Jew. However in response to the Nazi persecution of Jews in Europe which came at a time when he suffered a personal tragedy, he went to Europe and spent several months rescuing Jews, frequently at great expense to himself. One of his children married an Orthodox Jew and is raising an Orthodox family. Another married a non-Jew and his family is non-Jewish.

Another gentleman remained a staunch supporter of Jewish philanthropy but took pride in the fact that his children were completely assimilated. He blamed his being Jewish for his serious failures in life though to the objective observer his Jewishness was clearly irrelevant, or at least not insuperable. In analysis, it was evident that it was his parents whom he blamed unconsciously and he faulted Judaism consciously.

A third individual, like the first, recollected his grandparents' observance

despite his parents' disparagement of that observance. He had nothing to do with the Jewish community, but in later years when he became depressed, he developed a sentimental attachment to Jewish ritual and to Israel. His children are active in the Jewish community. In these three instances we may note two things: first, how slowly the drift away from the Jewish community proceeds; and how the voice of the grandparents may be heard over the resistance of the anti-religious parents.

We must keep in mind the fact that the Jewish community is not homogeneous. Even when there is least challenge to it there is a loyal and creative nucleus, and even when it is most challenged, there are defectors. I like to think of an intensely loyal nucleus which continuously produces a community of Jews. A fraction of these Jews drift away at a rate which depends upon external circumstances. When the community comes under attack, the drift is slowed. When it is permitted to prosper, and especially when the general community provides challenge to youth, the drift accelerates.

I have noticed that recent anti-Jewish sentiments of youth have been interpreted by their parents as attacks on the Jewish community, and parents who had never previously taken an interest in the Jewish community are now becoming concerned as Jews.

IV. Conclusions

A. Obviously predicting the future is beyond the capacity of most of us. A good psychoanalyst considers himself fortunate if he can "predict" the past. What we can do is to point out those interrelations and causal connections which <u>could</u> be activated by future events, and which <u>would</u> then determine the influence of these future events.

B. The turmoil of Jewish young people includes positions and activities which attack the Jewish community. I believe that this turmoil can be attributed to the affluence and relative security of our society. I believe too that the

turning away from the Jewish community by our young people is to be attributed to their difficulty in achieving full psychic emancipation from their parents in such an unchallenging environment. The Jewish community is taken to represent the parent and is attacked just as the parent is attacked.

C. There is every reason to believe that this repudiation of the Jewish community is age specific, and will subside as these individuals mature.

D. The rate of enduring attrition of more mature Jews is relatively slow, and is slowed even further whenever the Jewish community comes under attack.

E. The attitude of each individual Jew toward the Jewish community is derived from his attitude toward his family. It therefore includes both positive and negative elements. But the Jewish community is likely to find some degree of support from its members so long as men are subject to the biological need to submit to and to support family organization.

F. It follows that danger to the Jewish community resides in either physical extermination or in full and lasting acceptance by the host community.

G. Psychoanalytic data alone make it difficult to predict just which aspect of Judaism will appeal most to the current younger generation as they mature. A program to strengthen the Jewish community may address itself both to the current situation which we have considered here, and to its future form as one may project it.

Zion in the Mind of American Jews

prepared for the Task Force on
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in America of the American Jewish
Committee

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by

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Zion in the Mind of American Jews

Prefatory Note

The present discussion of the changing significance of Zion in the mind of American Jewry is offered as a contribution to the overall project of this action-oriented task force, whose aim is to delineate the probable and desirable shape of our community's future. I should like, therefore, to preface my specific analysis with some general remarks on the place of a topic like this in our total project.

This paper is one aspect of "the formulation of a reasoned historical perspective of the state of the community" defined in our statement of purposes as one of the four aims of the task force. An historical perspective provides reasoned guidance on two major facets of an action program: on the values that are established in the patterns of Jewish culture and on developing trends in the social, political and economic behavior patterns of the Jewish community whose momentum defines the problems for which we seek solutions in the immediate future.

The changing significance of Zion for various segments of the American Jewish community is primarily a cultural factor, and only indirectly involved in the social, economic, and political sectors of our analysis. It relates directly to a certain set of historically grounded values which, in different ways for various groups of Jews, prescribe the patterns of their behavior. Hence, the exposition of this topic should serve to clarify especially certain goals and norms,

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rather than the available means, which are objective conditions and variables of a program of community action.

No analytic factor in such a study as ours operates in isolation from the others. Any factor in the sphere of culture, like the changing image of Zion, has its range of freedom and autonomous laws of development, but it is also tied with all the others in reciprocal dependency. As an independent variable, changes in the image of Zion affect, in theory, the social, political, and even economic systems of our community, and the independent variation of each of these may, in theory, affect the changing image of Zion. To establish whether, in fact, there is a constant or variable relationship between changes in culture and other social spheres is a task of empirical, historical and sociological research.

On purely theoretical grounds, one could expect a closer relation between cultural and social changes than between cultural and political or economic changes. The difference between social and cultural systems is that the former do not refer to all values but only to values expressed in relations between persons, between egos and alters, but both are directly concerned with ultimate values. In culture (considered as a system of action) and in association alike the dynamic process is one of identification, not of detached problem solving, and the resultant relationship (between ego and values or ego and alter) is expressive, not instrumental. Thus, changing images of Zion are, in principle, more closely related to pertinent shifts in groupings within the community - on sectarian, ideological or even economic or political lines - than to

the immediate spheres of political and economic action. But while the relation to the instrumental sectors of action may be theoretically more remote, only specific research can show whether, in a particular set of circumstances, such a cultural theme as the idea of Zion is neutral or significantly variable in connection with primarily political or even economic changes. (And also, if variable, whether, in relation to centrally significant or peripheral aspects of political and economic action systems.)

For a systematic mapping of the situation we face it would be best, no doubt, if the material I shall present were laid out in conformity with some such analytical scheme as has been set forth above. This is not feasible, for several reasons. We have not agreed in advance of the meetings on any conceptual framework we will all adhere to. Nor does a historical topic, however analytically approached, really lend itself to such a logic-chopping scheme of exposition.

I shall therefore proceed more or less in the normal fashion for an historical discussion. Where some implications for the broader objectives of the group become apparent, I shall try to note them at least by a brief reference. This prefatory note was intended to indicate, also briefly and in broad terms, some of the general conceptions underlying such references that may occur explicitly or implicitly in the paper, and is intended to help the reader note their bearing.

The Traditional Idea

The peculiar relationship of Jews to Zion, the home of their an-

cestors, is familiar to everyone, but never loses its extraordinary fascination. No other fatherland, in spite of all the mythmaking sentimentality common to patriots everywhere, has been so intricately, profoundly, and sublimely involved in the whole cultural tradition of a people. The union in the idea of Zion of ethnic history and universal religious eschatology raises the concept to a higher power than any ordinary patriotic sentiment, however ardent.

Yet if one seeks to delineate the features of this elemental Jewish idea, it is hard to pin anything down. Zion and Diaspora, Exile and Redemption were paired concepts in Jewish tradition, joining history and eschatology in one of the world's major and most influential cultural constructions. But while there was as much history as there was religion in the notion of Exile, the idea of Zion Redeemed was a pure eschatological utopia. It had very little to do with the experience of history.

What Exile means was specified for Jews in their daily lives and in the centuries of oppression which they recorded in chronicles, litanies, and continually renewed ceremonials of commemoration. A rich imagery exhibited the meaning of Redemption too, but it was the product of imagination, not experience.

If it reflected details of reality at all, it was only as an opposed image, not as a direct imprint. Thus, in the millennium Gentiles would pray in the Temple in Jerusalem instead of destroying it; the Jews would be restored and ingathered in Zion instead of expelled and dispersed; and the lion, of course, would lie down with the lamb

and swords be beaten into plowshares. All this detail and specificity, it is clear, in no way reflected direct experience with the homeland; and Maimonides was correct- in fact, as well as in principle - when he concluded that one could not seriously discuss the course and character of the Redemption in Zion. So, too, Jews may have continued to study over the centuries the procedures of sacrifice in the Temple or the laws of agriculture in Israel, but this became increasingly an act of detached piety, and was far from being an engagement with practical projects for action.

This by and large, was the situation, but not without exception. The Messianic implications of the idea of Zion often broke the bonds of mere passive piety and emerged in active chiliastic form. The Jewish community, the Yishuv, which survived or reappeared through every vicissitude of the Holy Land's violent history, included many varieties of religious enthusiasm. Among sectarians particularly, the actual Yishuv was felt potentially to have Messianic significance, and visions of political restoration, sovereignty, and a reconstituted Jewish nation in the homeland were promoted with more or less serious and immediate intent. A kind of religious proto-Zionism can be shown to have existed sporadically from the destruction and dispersion of Judea to the rise of modern, secular, political Zionism. Only then, however, did these activist versions of the utopia of Zion become permanently imbedded in social, economic, and political institutions.

Until the creation of Israel - or, at least, until the first

achievements of Zionist resettlement - the Yishuv as it existed in actuality did not, and could not, arouse Messianic associations among Jews. It was clearly perceived as a phase of Exile, not of Redemption. It was, nevertheless, an actual community in Zion and had a necessary impact on the idea of Zion among Jews. It attached a concrete, substantial, existing Eretz Israel to the utopian image of Zion, and however remote the two perceptions were from each other in the immediate actuality, their necessary association invited cross-references from one to the other which could enrich and complicate the idea Jews had of each. And, let us note here, whatever alters the idea of Zion may also alter the idea of Exile, which is the most general idea encompassing, for Jews, their whole history in the Diaspora.

The old, pre-Zionist Yishuv - certainly in conception and very largely also in fact - functioned most significantly in the sphere of religion. Living in Eretz Israel was, of course, a religious commandment in itself; and it is also well-known in Jewish tradition that the soil of Zion sanctifies as well as makes one wise, and in Jerusalem prayers mount more directly to the Divine throne, and the gates of Heaven stand more open than in other places. Given these assumptions, it is natural that an extraordinary proportion of the Yishuv devoted itself to prayer and study; and that Diaspora Jews everywhere bound themselves to the sanctity of the Yishuv by their pious contributions

to the Halukka, the organized collection and dispensation of funds for the Yishuv's support.

The general institutional relationship of Diaspora and Yishuv, whereby the Diaspora organized to support the Yishuv and the Yishuv sanctified the Exile, assumed an even more specific form in the case of Ashkenazic sectarians. Various Hassidic sects and the Misnagdic followers of the Gaon of Vilna - not to speak of the settlers from the Hungarian and Dutch-German communities, of whom it was true in lesser degree - initially settled in the Holy Land with a vague view to strengthening their sect with the aura of Eretz Israel as an advantage in the religious struggle within Jewry. Their fellow sectarians in the Diaspora not only were especially active, out of similar motives, in supporting them but kept a close eye on the sectarian infrapolitics of the Old Yishuv, as a strategically vital part of their general intracommunal holy wars.

However specialized for religious functions, the Yishuv was nevertheless a whole society, or "subcommunity", with all the normal social, economic, cultural, and political concerns. The larger part of the Yishuv until well into the nineteenth century were Sephardi Jews, native to Palestine or other parts of the Ottoman Empire in their great majority. Pious donations supported the scholars, widows, and orphans of this community, but most Sephardim were an integral part of Palestine's economy, social and political structure, and

cultural landscape. As the Ashkenazic community grew, and more of them too were native-born, the same was increasingly true of them.

The population growth of the Ashkenazim, a community which in principle was totally supported by the Halukka donations, presented the changing Yishuv as a problem both to itself and to the Diaspora. Not only did the sheer maintenance of the Yishuv become problematic, but the character of a community universally entitled to charity was increasingly questioned. Younger members of the Yishuv began to seek methods of reforming its structure and reestablishing the community upon normal secular foundations.

Ideas and projects of this kind were strongly encouraged by a new type of Diaspora support for the Yishuv and by other changing trends of the time. The nineteenth century brought with it, among other decisive innovations in "the character of Jewish culture and identity," the growing involvement of a Western European type of emancipated Jew in the affairs of the Yishuv. Instead of traditionalists who took the Halukka as the specific piety to which they devoted themselves, men in Western countries who now adopted the Yishuv as their responsibility were "enlightened" modernists with leading positions in the whole Jewish establishment of their own emancipated communities. Even a pious type like Moses Montefiore, let alone Adolphe Crémieux or Carl Netter, was bound to analyze the Yishuv as a problem to be solved by secular methods of reeducation, relocation, vocational change - and also by political means. Their essential approach to the Yishuv was

the same as to the Jewish problem everywhere: the methods of enlightenment and emancipation which were solving the problem in Western countries should be applied to all backward areas where these principles had not yet penetrated.

The rational, secular, liberal approach of such Jews who, even if they were personally pious in the old style like Montefiore, approached the Yishuv as a problem of emancipation and reform, was spurred considerably by the growing intervention of Western Gentiles in the Bible lands, including the affairs of the Jewish community. Not only professional missionaries but consular representatives of the European powers were ready to take the Yishuv under their wing, and provide education, political protection, and economic assistance, including the offer of colonization. More than one philanthropic effort of Jews in these spheres, both in Palestine and elsewhere - including, for example, certain activities of Mordecai Manael Noah in America - was undertaken in order to forestall or counteract such missionary efforts. In other cases, Jews bestirred themselves in order to cooperate with philo-Semitic endeavors suggested or initiated by Christian proto-Zionists, like Colonel John Gawler or the fantastic Laurence Oliphant.

Christian proto-Zionism, which flourished from the 1840's in the West, particularly in England, introduced a strongly marked political element into the discussion of the Yishuv. Men like Shaftesbury may have thought in Christian eschatological terms, in many cases, but

they argued for Jewish resettlement and restoration in terms of the diplomacy of the Eastern Question. Their projects aiming at political advantages for their own country's imperial interests also contemplated the rebirth of Judea as a sovereign nation. This was a factor which complicated the situation both for Jewish proto-Zionists who shared such dreams and for Western Jewish philanthropists who were interested in the Yishuv in the spirit of enlightenment and emancipation.

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Zion for Modern Men

The emancipation of Western Jews, an unanticipated blessing in the first instance and later a cause they took up with enthusiasm, involved sharp alterations in the Jewish ideas of the Diaspora as Exile and Zion as Redemption. The most direct impact was, of course, on the notion of Exile, which comprehends all Jewish historical experiences in the dispersion.

As exiles, Jews for the most part did not consider themselves fully a part of the history or politics of the countries where they lived. Every country was a provisional domicile, until in the millennium they would return home to Zion; and the Jew's appropriate attitude in Exile was one of detachment from his country's politics, except, or course, in defense of the Jewish community. All this changed radically when Western nations not only affirmed the sovereignty of the people but gave

or seemed inclined to give, Jews equal rights among the citizenry.

The collective conversion of Western Jews to liberal principles which then followed had a critical impact on certain traditional attitudes. Jews claimed a place both in the national history and national politics of their countries, now declared to be their homes. Noone was more chauvinistic than the Briton, American, or Frenchman of Jewish faith. Considering their old religious habits, one can understand that patriotism produced Jewish proclamations that the American or French Revolution was the Redemption and Paris, London or Baltimore was Zion-on-earth.

It followed that Jews expected no restoration in the real Zion and that, so far as they retained Messianic beliefs, these were construed in a symbolic sense emphatically detached from history. Western Jews who held fast to their traditions did not, like the Reform sect, eliminate Zion from their prayers, but they were no less decided in their attachment to their countries as their home, in their patriotism and national acculturation, and in explaining away both Exile and Redemption in a strikingly nontraditional way as purely religious conceptions with no imaginable relation to historically possible, secular realities.

Notwithstanding this shift in attitude Neo-Orthodox Western Jews, and also more liberal believers who took a lead in the communal establishment, retained old sentiments toward the Holy Land and took special interest in the Yishuv there. Old, suppressed elements of Jewish myths

rose to the surface among rare Western Jews who adopted the logically available option of a nationalist, and not merely, individual emancipation of the modern Jews. Moses Hess, with the bold pathos of one of the fathers of the Communist Manifesto, proclaimed the Jews as the bearers of the final social revolution and forecast the emergence of the universal socialist utopia in a Zion restored to the sovereignty of the Jewish nation. He was, of course, exceptional and was considered eccentric. But involvement with the affairs of the Yishuv made the attachment of more representative Jewish leaders amount to something more than bare sentiment, too.

This was particularly true of the Western Neo-Orthodox, and above all of those whose acceptance of emancipation and acculturation was mixed with fears of their effect upon Jewish traditional loyalties. Such Western Jews found their own ways - for example, by separation from the more liberal, general Jewish community - to combine Western culture and national patriotism with a staunchly conservative loyalty to Jewish rituals and Hebraic learning. But they also looked to the East for their models of the authentic, untouched tradition and saw the Yishuv in Zion particularly as a bastion of Judaism unadulterated by modernity. The Dutch-German and Hungarian pilgrims who joined the Yishuv were more open to general culture than the ultratraditionalist Lithuanian Polish Jews but also, on the whole, more hostile to innovations and reforms than the younger, rebellious Eastern Europeans in the Old Yishuv.

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This conservative view expressed itself on several occasions when the need to find homes for emigrants and refugees from Russia and Poland arose in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Eastern European traditionalists and Western Neo-Orthodox Jews shared the qualms of other religious conservatives about sending their flocks to the obvious haven, America. Zion not only was the natural symbolic destination for a Jew who had to leave his country in search of a home; Jews who would go there might be expected to remain truer to tradition than those who entrusted their future to the American melting pot.

Together with this half-religious, half-secular consideration, the middle years of the nineteenth century saw the rise of a kind of religious nationalism among the Neo-Orthodox Jews who concerned themselves actively with the Yishuv and with Jewish immigration to Palestine. In conception, men like Alcalay anticipated some of the most detailed schemes of secular Zionism, while resting their primary argument on traditional religious grounds. But, until the rise of true secular Zionism, this did not prevent Jews of a different type like the Alliance Israelite Universelle, who were committed to the liberal emancipation as the solution of the Jewish problem, from cooperating in schemes to improve the condition of the Yishuv and aid the resettlement of Jews there.

The Zionist Upheaval

The rise of historic Zionism, both in the first phase in the 1880's

and in the Herzlian phase in 1897, as well as in the successive political emergencies in which Jews were involved through Zionism, had a twofold effect: it provoked a sharp ideological clash in the Jewish community, rendering more difficult the former easy, sentimental interest of liberal Jews in Zion; and it raised the question of Zion to a position of central, critical importance where it could no longer be the special interest of peripheral groups or occupy the attention of leading Jews peripherally, but necessarily concerned the whole community and demanded major efforts by Jewish leaders - whether sympathetic or opposed to Zionism.

Zionism, like other new Jewish ideologies, polarized the community initially, but in different ways in Eastern and Western Europe. Those aspects of Zionism which provoked anti-Zionist opposition in Eastern Europe made possible cooperation with non-Zionists in Western Europe; and those aspects which caused opposed ideologies to sharpen their definitions in Western Europe made possible a common Jewish consensus with Eastern European antagonists.

Zionism, and other forms of Jewish nationalism arose and took hold originally in Eastern Europe in the 1880's. The awareness that emancipation would not solve the Jewish problem there was hammered home by the equivocal or anti-Jewish position taken by Gentile revolutionaries toward the pogroms of that period. This was a perception not only basic to Zionism but widely shared by other Eastern European Jews as well, and the conclusion that a collective ethnic status was needed as

well as individual civil emancipation to solve the Jewish problem was a consensus view. What provoked opposition in Eastern Europe was the Zionist tenet that the required ethnic status must be achieved by a national restoration in Zion. Opponents who believed in colonizing some other territory decried Zionism as chimerical. Others who believed the revolution would bring Jews minority rights or cultural autonomy called Zionism defeatist, a cowardly retreat from the barricades. But whoever opposed Zionism as illiberal ethnicism remained outside the ethnically committed Eastern European Jewish consensus.

Precisely the opposite situation prevailed in Western Europe. The Zionist denial of civil emancipation as the solution of the Jewish problem - that is, their renewed awareness that Diaspora Jews remained subjugated and homeless in exile so long as their ethnic survival was not secure - repudiated a central belief upon which there was a consensus among Western European Jews. The rise of Zionism, challenging that consensus and splitting the community, caused opponents to formulate their anti-Zionism in clear and sharp outlines, focusing their hostility upon the dangerous doctrine that the Jews were an ethnic entity, and thus constituted a national problem. On the other hand, the interest of Zionists in building a modern Yishuv in Palestine brought them into an area where the Western Jewish establishment was already active. Once the political siginificance Zionists saw in this work was played down, owing to Turkish and Arab opposition that frustrated such aims, Western non-Zionists were able to cooperate with Zionist prac-

tical work in Palestine. But whenever events brought Zionist ethnic ideas and political nationalist objectives back into focus, many erstwhile non-Zionists resumed a sharply opposed anti-Zionism, Western style.

American Jews, had a communal establishment largely institutionalized and long dominated by German and other Western Jews, and their basic situation under American constitutional liberalism was of the Western type. But beginning with the immigration of the 1880's the population base of American Jewry was supplied increasingly and overwhelmingly by Eastern Europe. With the emergency of World War I, the Eastern European majority successfully challenged the German Jewish domination of the community. The sudden prominence of Zionism in the military and political plans of both sides, but particularly the Allies', was in part a result as well as a contributing cause of this development.

The American Jewish community that emerged from World War I (stabilized by the severe restrictions imposed on further Jewish immigration in 1922 and 1924) was radically reorganized from the nineteenth century pattern, and many changes, both obvious and less apparent, reflected the impact of the Zionist issue. The prewar hegemony of the American Jewish Committee, successfully challenged by the Zionist-sponsored American Jewish Congress, never regained its unrivalled dominance, even though the Congress survived only as a shadow of itself. German Jewish dominance in massive overseas relief operations conducted by American Jewry continually provoked disputes with Zion-

ists who wanted resettlement in Palestine, rather than rehabilitation in Crimea, to be the main thrust of the American Jewish effort. The German Jews may have had the power of purse and position, but Zionists had the political advantage; for events showed that the growing Yishuv, however hampered and lagging in its development, offered better prospects for solving acute world Jewish problems than did other alternatives. With the rise of Hitler, this realization became urgent and overwhelming. The rallying around the Jewish National Home of all American Jews, initiated with the non-Zionist accession to the Jewish Agency in 1929 and growing through the union of Jewish appeals for overseas aid funds, became a firm and almost universal commitment in the crises of the second World War.

These were the obvious, external developments which still form the groundwork of the coordinated establishment of major national Jewish agencies and organizations today. It was backed up by a less obvious, but pervasive merging of Western and Eastern European personnel, ideas, and attitudes in a new common-denominator American Jewry. Here, too, the ruling attitude to Zion, increasingly favorable to Zionism as Eastern European elements prevailed, was one of the landmarks, or social indicators, of a massive, gradual change.

This change can be traced most clearly in Reform Judaism, which in America developed its most distinctive and influential variant. The first stirrings of Zionism after the pogroms of the 1880's, faintly echoed by Emma Lazarus, evoked the rigorous ideological anti-Zion-

ism of the 1885 Pittsburgh platform of American Reform Judaism. To be a Zionist was declared incompatible with Judaism as understood in the Reform movement, and attempts to voice Zionist sentiments in the Hebrew Union College, the denominational rabbinical seminary, were unceremoniously put down.

But in the course of years the Reform denomination was infiltrated and then flooded by upwardly mobile Jews of Eastern European origin or descent. Zionist Reform rabbis, at first represented by a few mavericks like Gottheil, Heller, Stephen Wise and Judah Magnes, became a growing majority of the seminarians and younger rabbinate. The congregations swarmed with younger members recently risen from the immigrant ghettoes or areas of second settlement, for many of whom the ideological anti-Zionism of classical Reform was antipathetic. The ban on Zionism was lifted officially by the Central Conference of American Rabbis in 1935. In 1943 the participation of Reform Judaism in the pro-Zionist consensus of the American Jewish Conference signalized the sweeping change that had occurred. These developments, indeed, aroused sharp opposition in the group that formed the American Council for Judaism, Inc. Rather than provoke open secession the Reform Jewish bodies refrained from adopting an explicit Zionist position, but the dominant sentiment was unmistakable.

An evolution similar to that of Reform Judaism was experienced by the fraternal order Bnai Brith. Originally founded by German Jews in 1843, it remained strongly German and concentrated in the Middle West far from the mass of Eastern European immigrants through the nineteenth

century. Thereafter its ranks were greatly extended by middle class Eastern Europeans, and the groundswell of Zionist sympathies rose. In the critical years of World War II, this position was strongly developed and under Henry Monsky, Bnai Brith took the lead in uniting American Jewry around a pro-Zionist position.

The non-Reform denominations of American Jewry, Orthodox and Conservative, represented from the outset both opposition to the anti-traditional Reform attitudes, including their explicit rejection of the hope to be restored in Zion, and the social preferences of an increasingly Eastern European immigrant mass. All the attitudes toward Zionism common among pious Eastern European Jews, whether traditional or modern, sympathetic or opposed, were found among them. The Conservative movement from its inception had as one of its distinctive marks a rather partisan attachment to Zionism, in sharp contrast to its early German-Jewish philanthropic sponsors, like Louis Marshall and Jacob Schiff, not merely to its Reform contemporaries. For a time before the first World War the Federation of American Zionists was officially led by members of this emerging denomination; and men like Magnes and Friedlander were committed equally to a Conservative view and a type of cultural Zionism markedly influenced by Ahad Ha'am. In later years the leaders of Conservative Judaism were less directly identified with official Zionism, but the pro-Zionist complexion of the movement as a whole was strongly evident.

The Eastern Europeans brought not only their Zionist sympathies but their distinctive type of ideological anti-Zionism to America .

The immigrants were largely employed as factory workers in the needle trades, cigarmaking and other Jewish metropolitan specialties. Radical socialist and anarchist leaders gained a powerful influence over this mass through their work as trade union organizers and through the Yiddish press. They were, of course, influenced by the anti-ethnicism of their American milieu, echoed by Abraham Cahan in his well-known pronouncement that we have no Jewish question in America, only the problem of keeping such questions from being introduced. But as secular radicals they could not be interested in maintaining Judaism as a religion; and they were subject to the influence of the Bund, which affirmed, to a degree, the validity of ethnic Jewishness while it attacked the nationalist return to Zion as chimerical and defeatist.

The conversion of Yiddishist radicals to a pro-Zionist position was gradual, responding to successive crises in Jewish history. Disillusionment with the alternative solution projected by Communist Russia played its part and a decisive factor was the repeatedly demonstrated desperate need of Jewish refugees for a national homeland when all other havens of refuge were denied them. The Hitler era made impossible any other stand than support for the Jewish national home for any American Jew who cared to remain within the consensus. And never was it more difficult morally to abandon the Jewish community than in that time of supreme trial.

While pro-Zionism became virtually a matter of consensus among American Jews, the kind of consensus which resulted nonetheless involved a good deal of ideological fudging and compromise. Such dulling

of acute ideological issues is characteristic, one might add, of Zionism itself in all Western countries, the more so the more Western Zionists adjust to local conditions. Herzl may have wanted to project the Jewish question as a national problem, to be publicly discussed and politically solved by a surgical operation, and accordingly tended to be sharp in his ideological formulations. (Kurt Blumenfeld, who was even sharper, identified strongly with Eastern Jews). Other Zionists in the German area, like Max Bodenheimer, were worried about the compatibility of Zionism with their German patriotism. Like American Zionists they found a solution in a vicarious commitment to Zionist ideology: the return to Zion solved the Jewish problem primarily by removing Eastern European Jews from countries where emancipation was hopeless. Western Zionists had a different Jewish problem, essentially a cultural one, for which the creation of the Jewish national homeland would produce a palliative, if not a solution.

The forms of Diaspora nationalism developed by American Zionists like Horace Kallen or Mordecai Kaplan also had blunted ideological edges. The notion of cultural pluralism sounded bold when first uttered but has shown itself innocuous enough to become a general American, not merely American Jewish consensus phrase. So, too, Kaplan's idea of an organic community challenged anti-Zionists in their own bailiwick, for it proposed to reconstruct the organized frameworks of American Jewish communal life. But it is far from being as politically relevant in its ethnicism as even the mildest form of Eastern European cultural autonomism. (Black nationalists, and not

Jews, have picked up this strand of the Eastern European tradition.) When American Jews favored the principle of national minorities' rights they did so on behalf of Eastern European Jews and strictly in relation to their situation, but emphatically not with reference to America. This attitude was shared by American Zionists; and if support of national minorities' rights became a consensus item for American Jewry at the Paris Peace Conference, it was in a form that represented an ideological compromise for Zionists no less than anti-Zionists. The current style of consensus Zionism is similarly innocuous, as we shall see.

There have been bitter ideological quarrels between American Zionists and non-Zionists, but with far less justification on some points than in the European parallels.

The Rise of Israel

The rise of Israel should in principle have rendered obsolete the major ideological disputes which raged around the project to create a Jewish state before it became a reality. But as few things in history really become totally or immediately obsolete, some of these issues survived in their obsolescence.

The characteristic arguments of Eastern European anti-Zionism faded from the scene not merely because it was incongruous to argue that the idea of a Jewish state was chimerical or defeatist once it was successfully achieved. An even more pertinent factor in the decline of this anti-Zionist critique was the destruction of Eastern European anti-

Zionism together with Eastern European Jewry. Among the gropings of Jewishly-involved New Left radicals one now begins to hear again reminiscences of old-line Yiddishist anti-Zionism; a kind of neo-Bundism has arisen which is balanced by the neo-Borochovist Marxist Zionism of young, aspiring Zionist-minded radicals.

Western-style anti-Zionism, denying that Jews should have a sovereign state, is no less obsolete in principle than the rejection of Zion as the base of Jewish ethnicity. But Western anti-Zionists were not exterminated by Hitler, and while the rise of Israel made some of their old formulas clearly obsolescent they sought new ways to pursue the old ideas.

The slightest adjustments were made by the most extreme opponents of Zion. The American Council for Judaism which opposed Israel before it was founded could no longer openly oppose the existence of a state recognized by the United States government. It concentrated its hostility, therefore, on the alleged political identity imposed on American Jews by Israeli law and by Zionist plotting ("duplicity" is the word often used) in derogation of their duties and rights as Americans. This theme is veiled in prolixity because underlying it is the all-too-familiar canard about Jewish disloyalty ("dual loyalties" is the recent code word) which is too blatantly anti-Semitic for a Jewish body even as far beyond the tolerance-limit of the Jewish consensus as the American Council for Judaism.

But similar preoccupations concerned a body as firmly within the

consensus as the American Jewish Committee in the period immediately after Israel's rise. They conducted negotiations with Israel to secure explicit statements that the Jewish state neither represented nor spoke for any but its own citizens, whatever its legitimate concern with the safety and welfare of the Jewish people everywhere. It was an assurance Ben-Gurion was glad to give since he was equally anxious to stress the converse principle: that only Israeli citizens, and not Jews elsewhere, whatever their natural concern with the safety, welfare, and character of the Jewish state, had a legitimate voice in determining Israel's policies, both foreign and domestic.

The fact of the matter is the main effect of Israel's rise was not to unite Jews in a common new identity, confusing their political allegiance, but to introduce a new division among Jews unsettling their old ethnoreligious identity. The idea of Zion, and of course the idea of Exile, underwent serious changes when a sovereign state arose to exemplify the restoration of Israel.

The most immediate impact, though not the most important, occurred among those most intimately involved in the creation of Israel, the Diaspora Zionists. With the doors of Israel open to all Jews who "would not or could not" live in Exile, the solution to his personal Jewish problem was open to any Jew. Every Jew had the option of going to live in his national homeland; and Zionists - at least, so felt the Israelis - were obligated by their beliefs to do so. This implied a rapid sifting of Zionists by which some, who migrated to

Israel, would realize their ideal and others, who chose to remain behind, were challenged formally to abandon it.

Diaspora Zionists, especially in America, strongly disputed this interpretation of the nature and obligations of Zionism, and developed opposed interpretations of their own. But even on their interpretation, and on some issues against their bitter opposition, the distinction between the realization of Zionism possible in Israel and the practice of Zionism in the Diaspora became a clear division. The centrifuge of migration to Israel which separated Jew from Jew operated in the fierce light of party debate within the Zionist movement.

Apart from the question of principle, how one could be a Zionist if he did not go to join the new Jewish state (to which we shall return), the centrifuge operated immediately, in the division of functions between Israel and its Diaspora supporters, to the ~~immediate~~ detriment of the Zionist movement, which lost important organizational functions. The major and first function lost was that of political activity as the acknowledged representative of the Jewish people in seeking the creation of the Jewish state. For some time even after Israel was founded, its cause continued to be defended in the United Nations by the Jewish Agency, the body recognized in the Palestine Mandate as authorized to represent and speak for Jews throughout the world in regard to the Jewish national home. While in principle constituted of non-Zionists as well, and in practice enjoying their virtually universal support, the Jewish Agency was in fact the same body of men

as the World Zionist Organization. But the long-continued Zionist responsibility for conducting the international political drive for Jewish national liberation did not survive the creation of Israel for very long. The state took over in full the conduct of its own diplomacy and conduct of international politics; and while this was natural and inevitable, the loss of a main function was nevertheless an abrupt shock to many Zionists.

It soon became clear that like every other state, especially young and small ones, Israel could not dispense with the support of friends outside; it needed reliable political friends, both official and unofficial, Gentile and Jewish, non-Zionist and Zionist. The Zionist organization was no longer in a position, as before, to act with central responsibility and freedom of decision in this sphere; but it was nevertheless the most reliable and least inhibited friend Israel had. The loss of status involved in relinquishing official, central responsibility for the destiny of the national home not only dimmed the movement's glamor and reduced its appeal to outsiders, but introduced a mood of oppression and, for a time, bitterness among the veterans. But a sense of duty, constantly revived by Israel's crises, sustained the morale of old Zionists and, in the most recent crisis, brought into play a new stream of vigorous young recruits. Their main impulse to Zionist activity arises from the critical situation now facing Israel; and this same cause has also aroused many non-Zionist organizations to the need for action in Israel's defense - especially since, as we

shall see, attacks on Israel and Zionism are a current code for the concealment of anti-Semitic activity.

In another field, the financial support of the Jewish national home, Zionist responsibilities had been fully shared since the 'thirties by American non-Zionists. This had been a foundation on which was built the structure of general American Jewish consensus support of the creation of Israel which ripened in the war-years into united backing for the political conditions essential to Israel's rise. The subsequent enormous problems of immigrant absorption, development and defense that faced the Jewish state brought about quantum-leaps in Jewish contributions, not only to this but to all associated Jewish causes. (The rate of Jewish contributions not only to Israel but to all causes financed by the community - local hospitals, welfare agencies etc. - attained a level viewed with awe and admiration by Gentile fund raisers.) In this effort, which now included a Bond-selling campaign organized by the State of Israel directly rather than by the Jewish Agency as originally projected, the distinction between Zionists and non-Zionists has all but vanished.

This distinction persisted, however, in regard to the employment in Israel's interest of funds contributed by American Jews. The Jewish Agency,which continued to control the great bulk of such funds, sought a legal restatement of its special relationship to the upbuilding of Israel as the representative of the Jewish people the world over. This was especially important in view of the interest shown by

other Jewish agencies, and encouraged by Israel, in undertaking independent projects of their own in the Jewish state. The Jewish Agency was not recognized by Israel as the authorized representative of the Jewish people, but its past achievements and present paramount role in Jewish voluntary assistance in immigrant absorption and welfare in Israel were acknowledged by statute and a formal convention, while it was enabled to coordinate, in cooperation with the government, efforts in this broad and vital field.

This continued the leading role of Zionists as the administrator of major funds raised in cooperation with the whole Diaspora Jewish community, Zionist and non-Zionist. In America especially, owing to legal considerations as well as the intimate mutual involvement of the partners, leading non-Zionist "big givers" and fundraisers were enabled to share most significantly in the budgeting and control of these expenditures. Recently this has matured into the reconstitution of the Jewish Agency on the earlier basis of full Zionist and non-Zionist partnership which was sustained during the 'thirties. In the new circumstances this will surely bring about an increasingly intimate relationship between the developing domestic concerns of Israel and a major part of the American Jewish establishment, encompassing not merely the fundraisers but the executives and lay leadership of the entire "philanthropic" community: the Council of Jewish Welfare Funds and Federations, the community councils, the professional organizations of Jewish social workers, and so on.

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Far from being asserted in opposition to Zionists (apart from minor, transient frictions such as always arise in organizational readjustments), the increased, more direct non-Zionist responsibility for Israel's welfare has been negotiated no less upon Zionist initiative than in response to non-Zionist proposals. At the same time the Zionists have been opening up and broadening, while also tightening, their own structure by creating a new American Zionist Federation as their roof-organization. While the reconstituted Jewish Agency formalizes the greater responsibilities shared by non-Zionists in projects within Israel, the new Federation opens up easier access to those responsibilities, especially in the Diaspora, which are still considered exclusively Zionist.

The general acceptability of the new relationship with Zion for all American Jews is highlighted when one considers how little opposition there is in the Jewish establishment to what is still regarded as the special province of Diaspora Zionists. Two major doctrines remained available to distinguish Zionist from non-Zionist ideologies for Diaspora Jews unable to acknowledge an obligation to live in Israel. The first, the unity of the Jewish people, rejected the implication, sometimes attached to the definition of Jews as a religion, that Jews were tied ethnically only to their fellow-citizens not to their coreligionists in other countries. The second, the centrality of Israel, opposed the idea that Jewish values were defined with equal validity by life in Diaspora countries as by the restored Jewish national culture in Israel. While both views could provoke ideological opposition

when formulated in the Diaspora, the opponents did not really question the basic mood that motivated these Zionist positions, nor the conclusions drawn from them.

What lay behind the Zionist doctrine of the unity of the Jewish people was the powerful, all-pervading sense of the interdependence of all Jews everywhere. What had happened once to Jews in one country could happen to all others elsewhere at another time. A threat to Jews anywhere evoking the memory of the Holocaust must necessarily be taken as a threat to Jews everywhere. These perceptions, articulated by Zionists in the doctrine of the unity of the Jewish people, were shared equally by anti-Zionists who considered themselves members of a religion not a people. Notwithstanding this distinction, few of those who held this view formally questioned the need for Jews to be alert, like an embattled people not a persecuted church, for ready defense, rescue, and reconstruction in united efforts across any boundaries that might separate Jews. Those few who rejected such solidarity, particularly in the case of threats to Israel, were treated like renegades by other Jews, Zionist and non-Zionist alike.

The Zionist doctrine of the centrality of Israel evoked specific challenges from ideologists who defended the autonomy or even superior qualifications of the major Diaspora Jewish communities in creating Jewish values. But this too was a fairly academic dispute. Nobody could deny that in Israel the basic resources of Jewish culture, especially the Hebrew language and literature and the age-old Jewish

tradition, were assured of survival, while this was far from true in the Diaspora. Diaspora Zionists did not usually draw the logical conclusion, from this, that the Diaspora must train itself by a maximum effort to the same mastery of these basic sources of culture as the Yishuv in Israel. Only if this were done could the Diaspora really share in Israeli culture. Anti-Zionist ideologists, asserting the autonomous cultural validity of Diaspora Judaism, did not, on the other hand, reject such borrowings from Israeli folkways as American Jewry was capable of absorbing. These, to be sure, were of the thinnest and most superficial quality, consisting for the most part of a few loan-words and dance and dress styles and other elements of décor. Most American Jews were poorly equipped to assimilate any form of Israeli culture more serious and significant than this owing to their illiteracy in the Hebrew language.

The Religious Issue

The rapidly developing institutional involvement with Israel touched a major part, but still a part, of the Jewish establishment and of individual American Jews. Other issues affected major American Jewish organizations, notably the synagogues, not directly active in Israel, or they had critical implications for the Jewish identity of every individual Jew.

The major institutional problem that the rise of Israel posed for the American synagogue stemmed from the status granted to Orthodox

Judaism by Israeli law. Under the Mandate the Jewish community, consisting of all those over eighteen years of age who voluntarily registered, was subject in matters of personal status, primarily marriage and divorce, to rabbinic law and jurisdiction. The voluntary character and other limitations of this status, in comparison with the universal jurisdiction of the Sharia courts over all Muslims in Palestine, not only seemed discriminatory but led to legal difficulties and complications. The Israeli legislator then granted Jews equality with Muslims in their own national home by making rabbinical jurisdiction universal for all Jewish Israelis, but it thereby gave Orthodox Judaism a monopolistic position which discriminated against the other Jewish denominations, Conservative and Reform.

This had manifold effects, some immediate, others more indirect and far-reaching. The monopoly of Orthodox rabbis, even in the limited area of marriage and divorce, caused multiple difficulties for those not recognized as Jews, or as validly married or divorced, or subject to other strictures as to their personal status in the eyes of the Orthodox rabbinate in Israel; and attempts to extend this monopoly into all other legislation referring to Jews, often by quite different, secular definition[5], were a fertile source of political squabbles among Israelis. These domestic issues impinged upon Reform and Conservative Jews, mainly American and partly comprising other Westerners, who became residents of Israel. Their number was

sufficient to produce a few controversial cases, but not to form a local political force ~~sufficient to~~ that could count seriously in Israeli politics.

Apart from the inconvenience and outrage caused by such particular cases, the non-recognition of the Conservative and Reform denominations raised cardinal issues concerning the validity of certain historic institutions thought to be well-established in the Jewish consensus and cast doubt on their future. Ever since Jewish communities began to bow to the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters of personal status, a process that began in the absolutist monarchies and progressed swiftly and far in the course of emancipation, the traditional control of Jewish marriage and divorce became symbolic rather than effective. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the dubiousness of personal status was increased when the uniformity of Jewish religious organization was broken by the rise of denominations, Reform and Orthodox, as well as Conservative; a process particularly characteristic of America, where it was most fully developed. These developments, however repugnant to traditionalist Jews, were not seriously opposed; or to put it differently, in the absence of a clear and firm rejection they were tacitly accepted. Now, with the legal authority granted to Orthodox rabbis in Israel, the valid existence of Jewish denominations acknowledged by Jewish history and the Jewish consensus is implicitly, and sometimes quite explicitly, denied.

If logic were carried to its ultimate conclusions, Orthodox pressure might well be applied to carry out as a matter of principle what

has so far been proposed only as threat by which further concessions to Orthodoxy have been extracted from the Israeli government: the lists of existing Jews, especially those classed as Reform or Conservative or without synagogue affiliation, might be checked in order to eliminate persons unqualified for Jewish marriage under Orthodox criteria ~~from the Jewish community~~.

While no serious attempt at such a sifting has been made in regard to American Jews (though some Indian Jews [the Bene Israel], Karaites, Falashas and others have been less fortunate), repeated Orthodox threats have raised the issue openly (and been rewarded with concessions on inner-Israeli domestic matters); and in recent legislation, arising from litigation on the question "Who Is a Jew," specific, rather involved, and probably not conclusive decisions have been reached. The Orthodox definition of Jewishness, which undermines the recognition of Jews by purely ethnic identification as well as Reform or Conservative affiliation, was extended from the rabbinic jurisdiction to matters controlled by the Ministry of the Interior; nevertheless, and notwithstanding the inconsistency, the privileges of admission and citizenship granted to Jewish immigrants are also granted to their "non-Jewish" kin and dependents - a safeguard for Polish, Russian and other Eastern European immigrants; and immigrants who become Jewish by conversion abroad (that is, by non-Orthodox as well as Orthodox rabbis) are recognized as Jews - a concession to American Reform and Conservative Jews.

These legal issues only make more salient a quandary in which the Reform and Conservative denominations of Judaism, particularly in America, are cast by the mere rise of Israel. Whether or not one accepts the Zionist views of the unity of the Jewish people and the centrality of Israel, the rise of the Jewish state creates a standard against which all values which claim to be Jewish must necessarily be tested. A religious denomination, however liberal its recognition of other denominations, is in any case an implicit claim to embody universal truths; and a version of Judaism which considered itself no more than an expression of the religious truth of American Jewry could hardly convince anyone, and especially itself, that it was religiously valid. Any version of Judaism inherently claims the belief of all who are Jews. And following the rise of Israel it is an inescapable challenge to any Jewish denomination not only to be recognized but to be represented there. If history serves as a tribunal of truth - a view which no Jew can truly deny, any more than he can fully and uncritically accept it - then anything claiming to be a valid version of Judaism faces the unavoidable test of its acceptance in Israel. Not particular grievances but fundamental historic considerations compel Conservative and Reform Jews to fight this issue; with tact and flexibility, to be sure, but to the end.

Post-religious Issues

The deepest, most widely disturbing, and least openly discussed

aspect of the rise of Israel is the fundamental challenge it poses to the whole sacred myth, shared in opposed versions by Jews and Christians alike, which defined the place of the Jews in world history. The Jews were to remain in Exile, it was universally accepted, until the Messianic era - or, in the Christian version, the Second Advent - and then alone to be restored to Zion. During the long millennia of Exile they were to live dispersed, driven from place to place, in "subjugation to the [Gentile] powers," and only when all the world was redeemed would they be restored to sovereign freedom in their own homeland. This conception, underlying the whole range of specific attitudes of Gentiles to Jews and of Jews to themselves, is sometimes reflected in special institutional positions such as those which have made the Vatican an inveterate opponent of Zionism far beyond what considerations of Realpolitik would require. The rise of Israel posed especially severe problems to the Vatican. But this is a relatively minor expression of the massive earth-tremor produced in basic attitudes toward Jews by the Zionist upheaval. The major expressions occur at deep levels of a consensus so broadly shared that no particular institution (other than certain missions to the Jews, perhaps) need be peculiarly related to it because so many are.

It is worth noting that secularism, among Jews and Christians alike, had already, at least in principle, abandoned the main institutional expressions of the idea of Jewish Exile. After emancipation the notion of Jewish "subjugation to the powers" lost its most concrete

applications and became a rhetorical phrase, even more clearly so than the more eschatological notions of Exile and Redemption. If Jews continued "subjugated" it was no longer so clear that the "powers" who had lifted their legal disabilities were doing it.

But the fact remained that Jews and Judaism continued to be "tolerated" rather than fully liberated, after their emancipation as before it. They remained a dispersed minority and their deviant beliefs, challenging the consensus of every country where they dwelt, were not the groundwork of the consensus in any country of their own. Though preachers of a new, liberal, Reform Judaism might implicitly deny the notion of Exile, preferring to call dispersion a Mission, and might look to no restoration in a Zion Redeemed, they too recognized that the Jews in their time represented a people chosen for dissent and they too awaited a millennium in which Judaism would no longer need to be tolerated because the world, converted to Jewish values, would be redeemed.

Even unbelievers who had gone beyond religion, both Christian and Jewish, acknowledged in the form of their iconoclasm, rejecting the sacred myth of their fathers, the traditional categories for describing the relation of Jews and Judaism to Judaism and Christianity. The outstanding example, of course, was the theological iconoclast and Biblical critic Bruno Bauer. Looking forward to a redeemed society happily freed from all positive religions, he nevertheless argued against the emancipation of Jews on the grounds that, in the

existing stage of the historical dialectic, Germany was and ought to be a Christian state. The argument assumed that Christianity was a higher stage in the history of human belief than Judaism. Accordingly, in order to become humanists eventually, Jews like all other men must first be converted to Christianity, and, failing conversion, should be denied equality.

Few agnostics cared to be as explicit as this but the basic assumption and conclusions are general, and generally in effect, in the whole secularized society that claims to be post-Christian as well as post-Jewish. The Jewish enlightenment and emancipation theorists not only held that a liberal, humanist Gentile society made religion irrelevant in all relations between Jews and Christians beyond the church. This was from the outset an utopian illusion, as everyone could see with ease, and in order to believe in it one required a subsidiary belief: that the growth of Reason in modern civilization was producing a common post-Christian and post-Jewish religion. But in adjusting to this futurist world faith which, a secular Messiah, would bring Redemption, it was tacitly accepted that Jews as the minority would discard outright their superstitions and outworn peculiar habits while those of the Christians would survive as symbolisms, emptied of their supernaturalist meanings, common to all in the post-Christian era.

In this spirit believing as well as unbelieving Jews accepted Christmas trees, Easter eggs, Christian given and surnames, Sunday

rest and much else. Heine accepted conversion in a spirit of cynicism not only to gain entry by whatever means necessary to Gentile society, but perhaps because he regarded this particular means as innocuous, being reduced to sheer symbolism. Other liberal and enlightened Jews would not go so far, but did something which, because it evaded consciousness, was in some ways worse. They accepted the whole anti-Jewish animus which pervades Christian culture and survives in by no means innocuous symbolisms of post-Christianity.

Our recent experiences during World War II totally undermined two premises upon which attitudes such as these rested: Jews can no longer rely in implicit confidence on Gentiles to absorb as well as tolerate them, or even in critical times to tolerate them. They now know, on the other hand, that in such times Jews and Jews alone will rally to help them as they themselves will respond with a surging impulse of Jewish solidarity.

The passive, accommodating spirit in which Jews stood open to the Gentile world, accepting it unquestioningly and relying on its reason and goodness in the hope of a secularist utopia, now seems to us not merely foolish; it seems shameful. To react with anything less than frank and bold activism to anti-Jewish threats is the great sin which our generation has learned to read in the records of the Holocaust. Even when pursuing the humanist utopia our post-Hitler generation has bitterly learned to be bold; and we demand that Christianity publicly renounce doctrines of the Jewish guilt of deicide, of ~~the~~ God's rejection of the

Jews, and radically revise its liturgy and ceremonies in order to cut out the roots of anti-Semitism. Traditional Jews, knowing that they were in Exile precisely in their inhibition against converting Gentiles (by which means their Exile could conceivably be ended) and not being able to conceive how one could remain a Christian or Muslim if Judaism were not stigmatized and decried, made no: such demands and do not fight for them today.

The outstanding example of Jewish activism for our time is Israel. Many special features of Zionism, even before Israel was created, have become common property to our generation. The old hush-hush approach to anti-Semites together with the open expressions of Jewish self-hatred, which were continually assailed by Zionists in their polemics against assimilationism, are now viewed with contempt and aversion by post-Hitler Jews generally. Israel stands for all of us as a symbol of determination not to be dishonored and not to be trapped in a posture of passivity in the face of ultimate threats inherent in the Jewish situation.

For this is another consensus item in the consciousness of present-day Jewry, whether we speak of it or not. Whatever their predecessors may have imagined, liberal, secularist, post-Jewish Jews today know that their beliefs and style of life grant them no exemption from the common fate of Jews, and they are always aware of its ultimate potentialities. To be tolerated, as we still are - all of us - , means also not to be fully trusted; and there are occasions enough in which

the general trustfulness and credibility of one part of society toward another is destroyed, exposing the Jew, the most generally available, salient scapegoat-figure of Christian and Muslim societies, to the extremes of intolerance, whose horrible possibilities we all know. In the face of these possibilities Jews today will react, normatively, not with self-denial but with self-respect; and while we American Jews all live in a wary assurance that a victorious upsurge of political anti-Semitism is not likely here, we are all aware that it is possible anywhere - and we know how we have to act in the face of it.

Whatever the confidence inspired by American conditions - and it has been shaken recently - , we also know, whether we like to face it or not, that anti-Semitism, and in particular political anti-Semitism, has never been dead. It has been discredited and rendered unrespectable, so that decent bigoted WASP's cannot avow it in its old forms; and therefore it has found disguises. The most prominent and widely used of these is to cloak anti-Semitism in the guise of anti-Zionism, and attack Israel, not the Jews. This is, of course, a tactic which Elmer Berger, more than anyone else, has sold to assorted Jew-haters, but they did not really need him to invent it.

Despite the thin avowals of a distinction, the people involved, the symbols and arguments employed, and the whole agitational, libellous, venomous operating procedure, leave noone in doubt that Arabs, Russians and all their assorted friends, from Black Panthers and New

Leftists to the Argentine Tacuara or the American Nazi Party, mean Jews when they say the Zionist-imperialist-(or Communist)-cosmopolitan world conspiracy. A cosmopolitan CIA agent drawn in the exact image of Streicher's Jew-caricatures evokes, and is intended to evoke, the same wellsprings of demonological anti-Semitism which produced autos-da-fé and massacres of the innocent through generations of Jew-haters; and Streicher, let us remember was no more a Christian than is Brezhnev or Gomulka or Gamal Abdul Nasser. Even the men employed in this vile operation in Cairo are, in many cases, the same who used to operate out of Berlin.

These facts are at the backs of all our minds, and they move us all, generation gap or no generation gap. They make Israel, the prime target of political anti-Semitism today, a cause that calls on the powerful impulse of Jewish identification shared by all.

An awareness like this is, to be sure, irksome, however powerful. We are forced to hold in constant readiness responses which, in ordinary circumstances, are palpably neurotic because our circumstances could well be such as to make them realistic. Israel today is the major example that constantly reminds us just how realistic; even more than the plight of Soviet or Communist bloc Jewry or the remaining Jews in Arab countries and other unsettled areas. It does not allow us to escape the haunting conciousness of our Jewish situation which, we like to feel, our home in America may be reducing to a minor peril far outweighed by a major opportunity; and this calculation can be made

both by those who see America as a permanent (capitalistic) revolution and those who look forward to the death and transfiguration of Amerika in a New Left revolution.

But no Jew in our time can honestly suppress the gut awareness that he remains a Jew; that Jew means to be tolerated - and to be an object of anti-Semitism; that anti-Semitism politicized and detached from tolerance can mean genocide; and that in the face of this he must be active and self-respecting as a Jew. Israel today not only reminds us of this constantly. It stands as the exemplary demonstration of how a Jew should face the world. Awareness of this is fundamental in the consciousness of American Jews in our time.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Preliminary Report
Not for Quotation

AMERICAN JEWRY, 1970: A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

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Introduction

Basic to any evaluation of the current status and future prospects of the Jewish community in the United States is an analysis of the demographic structure of the Jewish population, including its size, distribution, and composition, and factors affecting its future growth and characteristics. In stressing the importance of a demographic framework for assessing the current and future status of the American-Jewish community, it must be recognized that the demographic structure of the American-Jewish community, like that of the United States population as a whole, has been undergoing steady change under the impact of industrialization and urbanization. Any evaluation of the American-Jewish community must therefore attempt to assess those changes which are a function of the total American scene and those which may be unique to the Jewish community itself. At the same time, the changing demographic structure must also be viewed as a factor which continuously requires still further adjustment in the behavior patterns of the individual members of the Jewish community and the community as a whole. In these terms, the socio-demographic structure is both a product and a cause of change in Jewish life in the United States.

From Bibical times, Jews have been concerned to know how numerous they were: even in the wilderness of Siani, God commanded Moses, "Take ye the sum of all the congregation of the children of Israel, by their families, by their fathers' houses, according to the number of names." (Numbers 1:2.) The United States, too, has from the very beginning of its history as an independent country counted its population. At first, the U. S. census served as a basis for representation in Congress; increasingly it has become a source of information on a wide range of social and economic topics reflecting current research and policy-related

concerns. The 1970 census, for example, collected data on such widely different subjects as education, income, occupation, migration, disability, fertility, housing, and number of radio and television sets. Yet, notable because of its omission from the U. S. census is any question on religion.

In the most recent definitive work on the world's Jewish population, Professor U. O. Schmelz of the Hewbrew University points out that "the task of drawing even a rough outline of the present demographic situation of world Jewry is greatly complicated by vast lacunae in our knowledge."[1] This is especially true in the United States. Because of the high premium placed on separation of church and state in the United States, a question on religion has not appeared in any decennial U. S. census, nor, with the exception of the marriage records of two states, does it appear in any vital registration records.[2] In the general absence of official and comprehensive information on religion, social scientists concerned with research in which religious differentials are a key focus have had to rely largely on specialized sample surveys to obtain their data. But in most instances, because these surveys focus on the total population, the sample seldom includes more than several hundred Jews and often considerably less, thereby making comprehensive analyses of the Jewish subgroup difficult, if not impossible. In order to obtain needed information, Jewish groups have therefore had to collect their own data on the size, distribution, composition, and vital processes of the Jewish population.

Since 1955, more than twenty Jewish communities have undertaken such surveys. Yet, because most of the communities have been of moderate size, legitimate questions have been raised about their typicality vis-a-vis the Jewish population of the United States as a whole, and, in particular, about their representativeness of Jewish communities in such large metropolitan centers as New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Both to satisfy the need for national data and to insure

coverage of large communities, the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) is currently in the process of providing the first comprehensive picture of the Jewish demographic situation in the United States. Until the results of this study are complete, however, insights into the demography of American Jews must rely heavily on the information provided by the individual community surveys and the limited number of national surveys focussing on demographic characteristics by religion.

In order to understand the dynamics of change characterizing the Jews in the United States, a brief outline of the demographic and socio-historical setting is essential.[3] Two interrelated factors set into motion the social forces which have determined the pattern of Jewish life in the United States. First, from the end of the nineteenth century to the mid-1960's, the size of the Jewish population increased rapidly. In 1880, American Jews numbered less than a quarter of a million and represented less than one-half of one percent of the total population; in 1970, the Jewish population in the United States is estimated at about six million or three percent of the total. The American Jewish population, therefore, experienced a twenty-five-fold increase in ninety years, compared to a four-fold increase for the total United States population during the same period. Such phenomenal growth converted the Jewish population in America from an insignificant minority, too small to establish anything more complex than localized Jewish communal life, to a substantial and vibrant national American subsociety. At the beginning of the 1970's the American Jewish community constitutes the largest concentration of Jews in the world, more than two and one-half timesthe number of Jews in Israel, and accounts for nearly half of world Jewry. Yet, although Jews are considered to comprise one of the three major religious groups in the United States, they constitute only 3 percent of the total population, and, in fact, are undergoing a continuous decline in proportion as the

total population grows at a faster rate than do the Jews.

The second major factor transforming the American Jewish community lies in the source of its population growth. The tremendous increase in the number of Jews living in the United States was not the result of natural growth - the excess of births over deaths - nor was the growth evenly spread over the nine decades. Rather, the increase was primarily the consequence of the heavy immigration of Eastern European Jews between 1870 and 1924. Before the 1870's, the American Jewish community was composed largely of first and second generation German Jews who had immigrated between 1820 and 1870. Of the remaining number, some were of Sephardic origin, descendants of the original Spanish-Portuguese settlers of the colonial period; others were from Central Europe, descendants of a pre-nineteenth century migration. By the 1920's, German and Sephardic Jews no longer constituted the dominant Jewish subcommunity in America, but were submerged in the overwhelming numbers of East European immigrants, 2.5 million of whom arrived between 1870 and 1924. The immigration quota laws of the 1920's ended this mass movement of Jews from Eastern Europe to the United States; and since then the growth of the American-Jewish population has been remarkably slow. As a result, the conditions that define the character of the American Jewish community at the beginning of the 1970's evolved out of the Jewish immigration at the turn of the century. But increasingly, the character of the American Jewish community is the result of internal changes among native born American Jews. It is the growing dominance of this segment of the population which has set the stage for the significant social and cultural changes within the Jewish population which will take place in the closing decades of the twentieth century. The transition from a foreign-born, ethnic immigrant subsociety to an Americanized second and third generation community has and will increasingly have major consequences for

the structure of the Jewish community and for the lives of American Jews.

Before turning to the patterns of change themselves, a few comments are in order about the data to be used, their sources and their limitations.

As indicated, no single authoritative source of information on the demography of American Jews is available. Under the circumstances, a variety of sources must be used, each varying in the comprehensiveness, representativeness, and quality of its basic data. In terms of national coverage, probably the best single source of information is the set of data collected by the Bureau of the Census in its March, 1957 Current Population Survey.[4] Unlike the decennial census, this survey, which encompassed approximately 35,000 households, was voluntary. The purpose of including a question on religion was twofold; 1) to ascertain the public reaction to such a question, and 2) to evaluate the quality of the answers obtained to the specific wording of the question. But even before the first results of the survey were made available to the public in February, 1958, the director of the census announced that the 1960 census of population would not include any inquiry on religion.[5] The reason cited was that a considerable number of persons would be reluctant to answer such a question in the census where a reply is mandatory. This decision was reached despite the fact that the 1957 voluntary Current Population Survey indicated that only one percent of all persons fourteen years old and over had made no report on religion, thereby suggesting that the American people were quite willing to reply to such a question, at least on a voluntary basis. After giving some initial consideration to the possible inclusion of a question on religion in the 1970 census, the director on November 16, 1966 announced that a decision had been taken not to add this question on the grounds "that a substantial number of persons again expressed an extremely strong belief that asking such a question in the decennial population census, in which replies are mandatory, would infringe upon the traditional

separation of church and state."[6] In the absence of any question on religion in either the 1960 or 1970 census, the data from the 1957 Current Population Survey still provide one of the best bases for determing the religious composition of the American population and the social and economic characteristics of individuals in the various religious groups.

Until recently, the only source of statistics from the 1957 survey was the Current Population Report of February 2, 1958, "Religion reported by the civilian population of the United States: March, 1957." When the 1958 report was released, it was generally assumed that others would follow. Because of various pressures on the Bureau of the Census, however, this did not happen. As a result, a wealth of data on the social and economic characteristics of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews have not been available from this national survey. In 1967, however, the Freedom of Information Act was passed by Congress and in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the Bureau of the Census made unpublished tabulations available upon request from the 1957 survey. Thus, ten years later, a considerable amount of information from the sample survey of March, 1957 covering the demography of religious groups in the United States became available. I was one of the persons to analyze these data.[7] Although already outdated by thirteen years, they nevertheless provide important base data against which future changes in composition can be measured. As important, in the absence of other national statistics they provide one of the few comprehensive sets of information on the characteristics by religion of the American population.

Other nationwide statistics on religious composition are available from various surveys undertaken by public opinion polls and other organizations. Use of such data have been made by Donald Bogue in The Population of the United States, and by Bernard Lazerwitz.[8] From 1906 to 1936 limited data were available from

the Census of Religious Bodies, which was taken periodically by the U. S. Bureau of the Census by means of a questionnaire mailed to the pastors and clerics of the parishes or congregations. It only enumerated the membership of the various religious groups and did not provide any information on their social and economic characteristics.

Finally, insights into the characteristics of Jews and the differences between the Jewish population and those of the total population are available from a number of community population surveys, usually sponsored by the local Jewish federation group.[9] These studies differ considerably in quality, depending, in particular, on the manner in which the sample population was selected, but also on the quality of the interviewers and the analysis. Some of these surveys relied exclusively on the lists of families available to the local federation group. The representativeness of these lists vary considerably and often are strongly biased in favor of individuals and families who identify themselves as Jewish. In other communities, concerted efforts have been made to insure list coverage of both the affiliated and non-affiliated families. The success with which this can be done obviously varies both with the size of the community and with the ease with which the non-affiliated units can be identified. In those limited instances where these efforts are successful, the master lists provide a good basis for selecting a representative sample of the entire population. In those communities where serious doubts exist about the comprehensiveness of the coverage, any use of master lists for sampling purposes must be supplemented by efforts to identify those segments of the population not included in the file. Most frequently this is done through area samples in which all households in the area, both Jewish and non-Jewish, are surveyed to screen out the Jewish households for further interviewing. Such screening is essential since any conclusions

concerning the nature of Jewish identification, membership in Jewish organizations, intermarriage, etc. would be seriously biased if those individuals and families who are most assimilated and therefore least likely to be included in a master list are omitted from the survey. Yet community surveys frequently fail in this respect, and for this reason in particular their findings must be interpreted with great care; the patterns noted may apply only to the affiliated segments of the population.

An additional problem relates to the extent to which any particular community or group of communities adequately represents the Jewish population of the United States as a whole or even the population of a particular region. Most surveys to date have been conducted in moderate sized communities with Jewish populations of 25,000 or less - Boston, Los Angeles, Washington, Detroit, and San Francisco are exceptions to this. Conspicuously absent from any such list are New York City which accounts for approximately 40 percent of the American Jewish population, Philadelphia with approximately 330,000 Jews, and Chicago with an estimated 270,000 Jews. Until data become available from these large communities, the extent to which the findings of the smaller communities are typical of the total American Jewish population must remain questionable. Yet, the statistics from the individual community surveys display impressively similar patterns with respect to the characteristics of the Jewish populations they analyze.[10] While there are some variation, these can generally be accounted for by the nature of the community itself, that is, whether it is an older community or a newer suburban area, whether it is in the East or in the West. Taking these variations into account such a relatively high degree of homogeneity suggests that the demographic profile of American Jewry as a whole does not deviate significantly from that depicted by already existing sources, incomplete as they are.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

The following discussion of what is known about the socio-demographic structure of the American Jewish community and the implications of this structure for the future will rely heavily on the sources of data just reviewed. In particular, the data from one of the surveys for which I was personaly responsible - Providence, Rhode Island - will be cited frequently, because, as part of the analysis plan for this survey, special emphasis was placed on using cross-sectional data to gain insights into the nature of past and future changes in the demographic structure. No claim is made that this is a typical American Jewish community. Nonetheless, to the extent that comparisons between the patterns noted in this community and those observed elsewhere correspond closely, there is also no reason to believe that it is particularly atypical of what may be true of the American scene in general.

Population Growth

From a small community of only several thousand persons at the time of the American Revolution, the Jewish population of the United States has increased to about six million persons in 1970.[1] But this growth has been very uneven. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Jewish population still numbered only fifty thousand persons; and by 1880, the year preceding initiation of the major immigration from Eastern Europe, Jews were estimated to number only 230,000 persons. Out of a total United States population of 50,000,000 persons, Jews represented less than one-half of one percent. Within ten years, however, the Jewish population almost doubled, and by 1900 it numbered just over 1,000,000 persons. Thus, in a twenty-year period, when the total United States population increased only by 50 percent, the Jewish population increased four-fold. As a result, at the turn of the century Jews constituted 1.4 percent of the American population. Rapid growth continued through the first years of the twentieth century, interrupted

Table 1

only by World War I. By the mid-1920's, when quota laws restricted further large-scale immigration from both southern and eastern Europe, Jews in the United States numbered 4,250,000 persons and had come to constitute 3.7 percent of the total population.

Except for a slight increase in immigration after the rise of Hitler, when our immigration laws were relaxed to permit the entrance of refugees, immigration during the last forty years has not been a major factor in the growth of the American Jewish community. Rather, Jewish population increase, like that in the American population as a whole, now depends largely on an excess of births over deaths. To the extent that the Jewish birth rate is below that of the general population, the rate of increase of Jews has been below that of the total American population. For example, whereas the United States population has increased by almost two-thirds between 1930 and 1970, the Jewish population has grown by only 40 percent. According to the latest estimate prepared by the American Jewish Yearbook, the Jewish population numbered 5,869,000 in 1968, constituting 2.94 percent of the total American population.[2] If the rate of growth characterizing the 1950's and 1960's has persisted, the Jewish population will have reached 6,000,000 persons by 1970. Because of the differential rates of growth of the Jewish and the total populations, the proportion which Jews constitute of the total, after peaking at about 3.7 percent in the 1920's has declined to below 3 percent. It is likely to continue to decline as long as the birth rate of the Jewish population remains below that of the rest of the population.

This decline in relative numbers may not be particularly significant since Jews have never constituted a numerically large segment of the population. If anything, it is noteworthy that, despite their small numbers, they are generally afforded the social position of the third major religious group in the country.

There seems little reason to expect that this situation will change even though the percentage which Jews constitute of the total population declines further. From the demographic point of view, more important factors influencing the position of the Jewish community in the total American community may be changes in the extent of geographical concentration of Jews in certain parts of the nation as well as their disproportional representation in selected socio-economic strata of the population. But before turning to these considerations, some attention must be given to the operation of the vital processes in the growth of the Jewish population since this is a key to understanding the total pattern of Jewish growth in the future.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Mortality

As part of his classic studies of the social and religious history of the Jews, Salo Baron observed that as early as the mid-seventeenth century, it was already noticeable that the "great destructive forces, contagious diseases and wars, seem to have claimed fewer victims among the Jews than among their Gentile neighbors."[1] The explanation for such differentials favoring greater longevity among Jews has varied, including the effect of religious life on health conditions through prescriptions requiring continual washing, restricted food selection, and a weekly day of rest. Some, including Baron, have also suggested that the relatively longer experience which Jews have had living in a "civilized environment" and in an urban setting may have affected them genetically, to the extent that they are more immune to certain contagious diseases. Still others have suggested that the Jews' higher than average socio-economic status permits them to obtain more and better medical attention and to live in a better environment.

Whether the health and mortality differentials noted by Baron for the mid-seventeenth century Jewish population living in Europe also characterize the

the American Jewish community has been the subject of only limited research. Again, the limitations of available data restrict the opportunities for exploring the question. Religion is not recorded on death certificates in the United States and only by resorting to information available through funeral directors and through cemetary records has some insight into the mortality patterns of American Jews have been gained. At varying times, such studies using different approaches have been conducted for New York City, St. Louis, Providence, Detroit, and Milwaukee.[2]

Table 2

Although the specific findings differ somewhat, the data permit the general conclusion that differences exist between the age-specific death rates, life expectancy, and survival patterns of Jews and of the total white population, generally more so for males than for females. Jewish age-specific rates are below those of the white population at younger ages and are higher at older ages. The differences for males tend to be sharper than for females at all ages. The lower death rates of Jews at younger ages may result from a combination of the conditions already outlined. It has also led to some speculation that proportionately more Jews with physically impaired lives may survive until later years, when the effects of chronic disease may take higher tolls, thereby raising the Jewish age-specific death rates of older Jewish persons above those of the general population. The data for Providence, for example, by cause of death lend support to such a contention; for Jews 65 and over, the death rates from all major chronic diseases are above those of the total white population.

Comparison of life tables constructed for both Jews and total whites suggests that average life expectancy at birth favors Jewish males but shows little difference for females. The advantage of Jewish males declines, however, with advancing age and actually becomes less than that of all whites beyond age 65.

For females, the life expectancy of Jews remains below that of total whites throughout the life cycle and the differential tends to become increasingly higher from middle age onward. Because the proportion of individuals surviving to a particular age reflects the effects of mortality only up to that age, the lower Jewish mortality in childhood, as well as in the early and middle adult stages of the life cycle, accounts for higher proportions of Jews surviving into middle age and, in the case of males, even into the lower range of old age. Since the studies on which these conclusions are based cover a range of twenty-five years, it appears that identification as a Jew continues to affect the life chances of individuals. But it must be stressed that the differences are not great enough to account for the overall differences in the rate of natural increase of the Jewish population compared to the total population. To a much greater extent that differential is attributable to variations between Jews and non-Jews in levels of fertility.

Fertility

Whatever the source of information, fertility research in the United States has consistently concluded that Jews have lower fertility than members of other religious groups. As early as the late nineteenth century, a study of over 10,000 Jewish families in the United States revealed that the Jewish birth rate was lower than the non-Jewish birth rate.[1] In the Rhode Island census of 1905, the only state census that obtained information on religion and related this to family size, the average family size of native-born Jewish women was 2.3 compared to an average of 3.2 for native-born Catholics, and 2.5 for native-born Protestants.[2] Similarly, the birth rates of Jews in the 1930's were shown to be lower than those of economically comparable Protestant groups, and Jews were found to have a higher proportion using contraceptives, planning their pregnancies and

relying on more efficient methods to achieve that goal.[3] The Indianapolis fertility study conducted in 1941 included Jews only in the screening phase of the investigation which was designed to focus exclusively on Protestant couples but even here, the fertility rates, standardized for age, were about 18 percent higher for Catholics than for Protestants and about 25 percent lower for Jews than for Protestants.[4]

Beginning in the 1950's a series of important surveys were undertaken to investigate the fertility behavior of the American population. Among these were the Growth of American Families Studies (GAF), the Princeton Fertility Studies, and investigations based on the Detroit Area Studies.[5] In each of these, Jews constituted only a small proportion of the total sample, thereby precluding detailed investigation of Jewish fertility. Yet the data yielded on Jews by these studies were clear cut in pointing to lower Jewish fertility. The results of the GAF Study indicate, for example, that in 1955 the average family size of Catholic and Protestant couples was 2.1 compared to an average of only 1.7 for Jewish couples.[6] Moreover, Jews expected significantly fewer children (2.4) than either Protestants (2.9) or Catholics (3.4). Overall, the GAF Study found that Jews had the smallest families, married later, expected and desired to have the smallest families, had the most favorable attitudes toward the use of contraception, were more likely to have used contraception, were most successful in planning the number and spacing of all their children, and were most likely to use the most effective methods of birth control.[7] The 1960 GAF Study recorded similar patterns. Although differences may have narrowed since then, the results of the 1965 GAF survey, when published, will undoubtedly point to the same pattern.

Although focussing on a somewhat different population, and using a follow-up

approach to their original sample rather than an independent cross-section of the population in successive rounds of interviews, the Princeton Fertility Studies of 1960 and 1967 reached the same conclusions as those reported by GAF. Jews, when compared to Protestant and Catholics, desired fewer children and more successfully planned their pregnancies; fewer had a third child or an unplanned pregnancy. Over 90 percent of the Jewish couples used the most effective contraceptive methods compared to only 66 percent of the Protestants and 35 percent of the Catholics.[8] These patterns persisted even when metropolitan residence, social class, and other significant variables were controlled.

In its 1957 sample population survey, the United States Bureau of the Census collected information on number of children ever born. With this information it is possible to calculate fertility rates expressed as the number of children ever born per 1,000 women, within specific age groups. Here, too, the results confirmed the lower fertility of Jews. The cumulative fertility rate of Jewish women 45 years of age and over was 2.2, compared to 3.1 for Catholic women and 2.8 for Protestant women. Lower fertility also characterized Jewish women at younger ages. Moreover, controlling for area of residence, the fertility rate for Jewish women in urban areas was 14 percent below that of urban women of all religions combined. Finally, the evidence available from over a dozen Jewish community studies point to similar lower Jewish fertility. In Providence, for example, there were 450 Jewish children under five years of age for every 1,000 women aged 20 to 44. This was significantly lower than the fertility ratio of the total population in the metropolitan area (620) or the total white urban American population (635). A similar differential characterized Springfield.

Table 3

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The low Jewish fertility is significant for Jewish population growth because the average number of children born is so close to the minimum number needed for replacement. Replacement level is generally cited as 2.1, taking into account that a small proportion of adults will never marry and that a small percentage of those who do will not produce any children. The importance of fertility is accentuated as the rate of intermarriage increases, contributing to possible losses in the population both through conversion of the Jewish partner away from Judaism and through the socialization of children of mixed marriages either in non-Jewish religions or in an entirely nonreligious environment.

Within the Jewish group itself, research, particularly on the Providence community, has shown considerable variations in birth levels among groups differing in religious identifications - that is, Orthodox, Conservative, Reform - social class, and generation status. In particular, the Providence data emphasized the importance of generation changes in the relation of social class to fertility. The data clearly indicate the trend toward convergence and greater homogeneity in the fertility patterns of socio-economic groupings within the Jewish population, with distance from the first generation. This contraction of socio-economic differentials may be regarded as the result of the widespread rationality with which the majority of contemporary Jews plan their families, the absence of rapid upward mobility characteristic of earlier generations, and the greater homogeneity of contemporary Jewish social structure.

The third generation of American Jews are largely concentrated in the college-educated group and in high white-collar occupations. The lack of wide social class distinctions for this generation may account for the absence of striking fertility differences within this segment of the Jewish population.

It may thus be fortunate from the point of view of Jewish population growth that such a large proportion of the younger generation are concentrated in the higher education and higher socio-economic groups. Reflecting a reversal in the older pattern of high fertility among the lower socio-economic segments of the population, the fertility data from the Springfield survey show that it is the higher educated among the younger groups within the Jewish population who have the highest fertility levels.[9] Had the lower fertility which characterized the more educated segments of the Jewish population of earlier generations persisted and become dominant in the younger generations, the problem of demographic survival facing the Jewish community today would be accentuated. For the immediate future, all available evidence continues to point to inadequate birth levels among Jews, insuring little more than token growth. This being so, the total Jewish population is not likely to increase rapidly beyond the six million level at which it now stands.[10]

Population Distribution

In considering the future of the American Jewish population, attention must be given to its geographical distribution among the various regions of the United States as well as within the large metropolitan areas in which so many of the country's Jews live. That New York City and the Northeastern Region contain the greater part of the Jewish population of the United States is well known. Yet this concentration has not always been as great as in recent decades, nor it is likely to remain so.

The 1900 American Jewish Yearbook estimates indicate that, at that time, 57 percent of American Jewry lived in the Northeast in contrast to only 28 percent of the total American population;[1] and virtually all of these Jews were in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, with New York alone accounting

able 4

for about 40 percent of the total nation. The North Central Region accounted for the next largest number of Jews - about one-fourth - with most concentrated in Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan. In contrast, one-third of the total United States population lived in this region in 1900. Compared to the general population, Jews were also underrepresented in the South, where 14 percent were located, most in Maryland. Florida at that time had only 3,000 Jews. By contrast to the South, the proportion of Jews in the West in 1900 was identical to that of the general population, just over 5 percent.

The decades following 1900 saw a continuation of the mass immigration from Eastern Europe, resulting in a four-fold increase of the Jewish population between 1900 and 1930. Reflecting the tendency of the immigrants to concentrate in the large cities of the Northeast, and especially New York, considerable change occurred in the regional distribution of the American Jewish population. The American Jewish Yearbook estimates for 1927 place over two-thirds of the Jewish population in the Northeastern Region, with 60 percent in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania;[2] New York State alone accounted for 45 percent of the Jews in the United States. This considerable increase of Jews in the Northeast from 57 percent in 1900 to 68 percent in 1927, contrasts with the stability characterizing the American population as a whole; in both the 1900 and 1930 censuses, 28 percent of all Americans lived in the Northeast. The percentage of Jews living in each of the other regions declined. In 1927 only one in five lived in the North Central Region, only 8 percent in the South, and just under 5 percent in the West. As a result, the overall differential between the distribution patterns of the Jewish and the total population increased. The sharpest changes were in the South and West. The South's share of the total Jewish population declined from 14 to 7 percent

while it continued to account for about 30 percent of the total population. The West increased its share of the total population from 5 to 10 percent in these 30 years, but the Jewish population located there declined from 5.5 to 4.6 of the national total.

For the United States population as a whole the period between 1930 and the present has been characterized by a continuous westward shift. The proportion of Americans living in the Western Region had increased to 17 percent by 1968; and both the Northeast and the North Central Regions accounted for smaller proportions of the total American population than they did in 1930. The South's share increased a little, but this was entirely attributable to the greater concentration of persons in the South Atlantic States, particularly Florida.

With the cutoff in large scale immigration changes, in the distribution of the Jewish population of the United States in the period between 1930 and 1968 to a very great extent became a function of population movement among Jews within the country. The thirty years were marked by a considerable alteration in the distribution of the Jewish population, and, in fact, Jewish redistribution represented to a somewhat accentuated degree the general redistribution that was taking place in the population as a whole. For example, between 1930 and 1968 the proportion of all American Jews living in the Western Region increased from under 5 percent to 13 percent. Similarly, the proportion of Jews living in the South increased from under 8 percent of the total to 10 percent. By contrast, the proportion living in the North Central Region declined from one out of five in 1927 to only 12 percent in 1968. And by 1968 the Northeastern Region, including both New England and the Middle Atlantic States, although still containing two-thirds of all American Jews, had proportionately fewer Jews of the total American Jewish population than

they did in 1930.

This decline in the proportion living in the Northeast may be indicative of developments which will become more accentuated in the future 1) as Jews increasingly enter occupations whose very nature requires mobility because of the limited opportunities available in particular areas, and 2) as family ties become less important to the individual compared to what they were for the first and second generation. In short, the available data, as weak as they may be, suggest the beginning of a trend on the part of American Jewry which will result in their wider distribution throughout the United States. While not identical with that of the general population, Jewish population distribution will probably tend to approach that distribution in the coming decades.

Assuming such a pattern develops, not only will the Jewish population in the future be an increasingly smaller proportion of the total American population, but it will also be increasingly less concentrated in the Northeastern part of the United States. In an ecological sense, therefore, the population will become more truly an American population, with all that this implies with respect to opportunities for greater assimilation and lesser visibility in a numerical sense. Although this may be a trend of the future, it must be emphasized that for decades, the Northeast, and New York in particular, will remain a very large and obviously dynamic center of American Jewry. At the same time, it will probably come to contain an increasingly older segment of American Jewry because the younger persons will be those who leave this section of the United States at higher rates to become part of the mainstream of American life through the process of geographic mobility.

Urban-Rural Residence

Closely related to the concentration of Jews in the Northeast is their distribution between urban and rural places of residence. Jews in the United States are unique in their exceptionally high concentration in urban places, and particularly in very large urban places. The best source of information for this, the 1957 Bureau of the Census survey, found that 96 percent of the Jewish population 14 years old and over lived in urban places, compared to only 64 percent of the total American population. Moreover, 87 percent of all Jews in the United States 14 years old and over lived in the large urbanized areas of 250,000 population or more in contrast to only one out of every three persons in the general population. The high concentration of Jews in New York City is, of course, a major factor in this differential.

Table 5

The census data also show that under 4 percent of American Jewry live in rural places; and almost all of these are in non-farm residences. The reasons for this heavy concentration in large urban places are well known and require no discussion here. It is noteworthy, however, that although Jews constituted only three percent of the total American population, they comprised almost 8 percent of the total urban population. In all other types of residence in the United States, Jews accounted for 1 percent or less of the total population. The mid-twentieth century American Jewish community, therefore, is characterized by a population highly concentrated in major metropolitan areas. A key focus, then, must be on what is happening to the population within and between such areas. In this respect, the experience of Jews in the United States may foreshadow that of the total population, for one of the major demographic and ecological developments in the United States over the last several decades has been the increasing concentration of

the American population in metropolitan areas. As this trend continues, the proportion of Jews in the total urban population of the United States will decline as more of the rest of the American population comes to live in such areas.

Suburbanization

A considerable sociological literature exists on the Jewish ghetto in the United States;[1] yet, from a demographic point of view, there are few reliable statistics by which to document either the character of the ghettos into which the immigrant populations moved or to measure the speed with which such ghettos broke down. For few cities have there been demographic studies of the Jewish population of either adequate historical depth or with sufficient comparability over time to permit such documentation. Furthermore, in very few cities has more than one population survey of the Jewish community been undertaken, so that opportunities to measure trends with respect to changes in residential pattern are quite limited. Yet, given the very high concentration of Jews in urban areas and the fact that they tended to live in a very segregated fashion, any analysis of the distribution of the Jewish population must take note of this situation and attempt to suggest the future pattern of development.

The Jewish pattern of settlement in large cities by no means remains stable. The radical shifts in distribution are clearly evident, for example, from estimates of the Jewish population within New York City in 1930 and 1957 and a projection for 1975.[2] Although the New York data are only crude estimates, they do point to the pattern of development in the single largest American Jewish community and therefore have particular significance.

By 1930 the large area of Jewish population density on the lower East Side had already passed its peak: only 16 percent of New York City's Jews lived in all of Manhattan. By contrast, one-third were living in the Bronx and almost one-half in Brooklyn; less than 5 percent of the total Jewish population of New York City lived in Queens. Within one generation a sharp redistribution occurred. In 1957 only one in four Jewish persons in the city lived in the Bronx, whereas Queens had come to account for one in five. Manhattan continued as the residence of 16 percent of New York City's Jews, but the proportion living in Brooklyn had decreased. While the projections for 1975 must be taken as very tentative, they point to a continuation of the trends already observed for the 1930-57 period: relatively fewer Jews living in the Bronx and Brooklyn and more in Queens.

Table 6

What these data do not show is the considerable development of Jewish communities in the suburban sectors of the New York metropolitan area. Again, the data for the larger area are restricted, both in the area covered and in the method of estimates, but they do in a crude way point to the nature of developments. According to the statistics, the total Jewish population in the New York area, including both the city and adjoining Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties, numbered 2,580,000 persons in 1957, of whom 81.9 percent lived in the city itself.[3] While the population of the city is estimated to remain relatively stable between 1957 and 1975 at 2.1 million persons, the total area is expected to grow from 2.58 million to 2.72 million. As a result, the proportion of Jews living in the suburbs will increase from 18.1 percent in 1957 to 21.5 percent in 1975. It must be recognized that this does not include the New Jersey or Connecticut segments of New York's suburbs; inclusion of these would undoubtedly show much sharper changes.

Even more dramatic changes can be noted for the distribution of the Jewish population of Chicago. In 1931, 47.6 percent of the Jews in Chicago were concentrated on the West Side. According to 1958 estimates, only 5.5 percent remained in that area of the city, a decline from an estimated 131,000 persons in 1931 to only 12,000 in 1958. By contrast the North Side of Chicago had increased its Jewish population from 56,000 persons in 1931 to 127,000 in 1958, going from 20 percent to 57.7 percent of the total in the 27 years. In 1958 moreover, 62,000 of the Chicago area's 282,000 Jews were estimated to be living in the suburbs. A somewhat similar picture emerges from a comparison of the residential patterns in Detroit in 1949 and 1959. In 1949 the largest single area of residence was Dexter, accounting for almost half of the total Detroit area Jewish population; the second largest was the North West, accounting for one-fourth. In 1949 the suburban Oak Park and Huntington Woods sections contained no Jews. By 1959 the old center of Dexter was virtually abandoned as an area of Jewish settlement; only 10 percent of all of Detroit's Jews continued to live there. Replacing it as a leading center of residence was the North West, with 50 percent of the total; the suburbs by 1959 contained 18 percent of the Detroit area's total Jewish population. In fact, by 1959 the research had identified a new residential area, labeled the New Suburbs, extending beyond the older suburban areas; 3 percent of the Jewish population already lived there and future growth was expected in that direction. Overall, the Detroit area data point to a pattern revealed as quite common in many of the metropolitan areas containing Jewish communities. The geographic extent of the total area in which Jews live has become much greater. The dispersion of Jews within the larger area has increased considerably, yet distinct areas of Jewish concentration remain

identifiable; even as the older areas disappear, newer concentrations are emerging. The strain this places on Jewish institutions represents a major adjustment problem which many Jewish communities must face as they undergo significant population redistribution.

Compared to New York, Chicago, and Detroit, the Jewish community of Greater Providence is small, numbering only about 20,000 persons. Yet, because I have researched this community in depth, I should like to use it to illustrate what I believe to be a pattern common throughout the United States.

In 1970, the 19,500 Jews living in the Providence metropolitan area constituted approximately 4 percent of the area's total population. The distribution of Jews was not uniform, however, reflecting rather the historical tendency of Jews to concentrate in cities and in selected areas within the cities. Just under two-thirds of the households in 1970 were living in the central cities of the metropolitan area. Moreover, within the urban center itself, over half of the Jewish population lived in the newer settlement area, an area of comparatively high socio-economic status. By comparison, only 23 percent of Greater Providence's total population live in the same area. The heavy concentration of Jews is reflected further in the fact that in four census tracts in the heart of this area Jews constituted from one-third to one-half of the total population. Of the remaining 102 census tracts encompassed by the study, Jews accounted for as much as 10 percent of the total population in only six and were below 2 percent in 83 tracts.

Table 7

The considerable change that has taken place in the distribution of the population can be seen in the comparative statistics from a 1951 study. Although the size of the population has changed minimally during the nineteen years, very sharp alterations have occurred in its distribution within the

metropolitan area. In 1951, 88 percent of the Jewish population lived in the central cities in contrast to the 64 percent in 1970. Changes for the older urban area are even more striking; the number of Jewish families living in the old sections of the city declined by two-thirds. Within the total urban area, only the newer section experienced any growth after 1951, and even this area is beginning to experience decline as Jews increasingly move to the suburbs. The Providence data demonstrate clearly the experience of many other cities. The old ghetto disappeared almost completely except for some vestiges of various Jewish institutions; the newer urban area, containing about half of the entire Jewish population, had located within its boundaries an increasing number of Jewish religious, educational, and social institutions.

The changes in the suburbs of Greater Providence have been even more dramatic. From a total of 679 Jewish households in 1951, 11 percent of the total, the suburban population increased by 1970 to over 2,000 households, comprising over one-third of the entire metropolitan area's Jewish population. More interesting, the Jewish participation in the suburban movement took place at a much heavier pace than did that characterizing the general population. Here, again, the evidence suggests that Jews may be in the forefront of demographic and ecological developments occurring on the American scene as a whole. It is also interesting that the Jewish pattern of suburbanization resulted in quite different degrees of dispersal of the Jewish population than was true of the urban area itself. Within the central cities of the metropolitan area, 90 percent of all Jews were concentrated within one-fourth of the census tracts. The population of approximately 40 percent of the census tracts must be added together before encompassing 90 percent of

all suburban Jews, and these tracts tend to be scattered over a larger geographic area. In Providence, therefore, as in Detroit, the data point to a general dispersal of the Jewish population over the metropolitan area; but at the same time there remains a significant concentration of this population within the newer area of urban settlements. Yet, even the newer area may be entering a period of decline. The developing pattern seems to be even greater dispersion and more general residential integration of the Jewish community. As a result, institutions become located at quite widely separated points in the metropolitan area and the community finds it increasingly difficult to decide where the central location should be for those institutions serving the community as a whole. In the past, residential clustering has been an important variable in helping to perpetuate traits, values, and institutions important to Judaism. In the future, the greater residential dispersion of the Jews may become a critical factor in explaining the changing extent and character of their ties to Judaism.

In a recent investigation, Serge Carlos analyzed the influence of the urban and suburban milieu on religious practices.[4] Although his study focuses on Catholics, it may have some significance for religious behavior in general. Carlos found that the level of church attendance increases as people move from the central area of the city to the periphery. He interprets this pattern as an effect of the need for community identification and integration, both of which are largely missing in suburban communities. At the same time, he notes that the higher rates of suburban church attendance represent mainly nominal religious participation with the result that the proportion of church goers who engage in devotional religious practices is lower in the suburban areas. Reflecting the older age structure of the Jewish population living

within central cities as well as the higher proportion of Orthodox and Conservative, one would expect a higher degree of devotional religious practice in urban compared to suburban places of residence. Indeed, research on Greater Providence, where an attempt was made to measure residential differences in religious assimilation, suggests a pattern of greater assimilation for suburban residents.[5] They have higher intermarriage rates, lower scores on indices of ritual observance, higher rates of non-affiliation, and lower proportions with no Jewish education. These appear even after controlling for generation status, suggesting both that the migration to the suburbs may be selective of those not eager to maintain as strong Jewish identify as those in the cities and that the greater residential dispersion of Jews within the suburbs removes the reinforcement of traditional patterns formerly provided by the older, more densely populated urban areas. Despite this weakening, a high percent of suburban Jews do continue to identify as Jews and to follow selected religious practices. In short, residential differences exist, but they are not so sharp as to lead to the conclusion that suburbanization itself will cause high rates of assimilation. Similar changes in identification and practice are also occurring to a considerable degree in the older urban areas as the generation composition of their population changes. Research in depth like that undertaken by Carlos is needed to ascertain how the communal orientation of those Jews living in the cities and in the suburbs differs and what meaning the various activities have for the individuals, particularly as they relate to the larger question of Jewish identification and survival.

Migration

Among the demographic concerns which have received the least attention

in research on the American Jewish population is the extent and character of Jewish migration within the United States. For such an analysis, national data are essential. Yet, to my knowledge, no such data exist. Even the March, 1957 census survey did not make available any information on migration patterns. On a national level, therefore, only indirect insights into the migration of Jews can be obtained through examination of the statistics available on the changing distribution of the Jewish population among the various regions of the country. These were examined earlier. The only more direct insights on the role of migration in Jewish population redistribution come from local Jewish community surveys. Questions on date of movement into the state, city, and house of residence at the time of the survey and the place of residence before the last move permit determination of the redistribution of population both within the area under investigation and the role of in-migration in the growth of the total area's Jewish population. Losses through out-migration are more difficult to identify since most local surveys restrict themselves to persons resident in the area at the time of the survey. Some limited insights into out-migration can, however, be obtained from questions on residence of children of heads of household in the survey sample. Also, insights into possible future movement may be obtained through questions on plans to move within the next one to five years and the anticipated destination of such a move.

It is my firm belief that the importance of migration in the future development and growth of the American Jewish community has been seriously underrated. Data on both the national regional distribution of population and the increasing suburbanization of the Jewish population suggest that population mobility is a major development on the American scene and may have significant

impact of the vitality on the local Jewish community. More widespread distribution within the metropolitan area will have an impact on rates of intermarriage, on the extent of integration of Jews into the local community, on the ease with which Jewish identity can be maintained, and on the strength of Jewish institutions themselves as the population they serve becomes more dispersed. On the national scene, a higher rate of redistribution may also be occurring as Jews enter the salaried professional and executive world in increasing numbers and transfer or are transferred to branch firms located in places where large Jewish communities do not exist. Moreover, the repeated movement associated with such occupations may well be a new phenomenon on the American Jewish scene which may lead to less stable ties of the individual to his family and to the community. While local surveys can provide some insights, especially on the suburbanization phenomenon, national data are essential for a full evaluation of the extent, character, and implications of internal migration by Jews across the United States.

What does the available evidence from local Jewish community surveys indicate? The Detroit study of 1963 which ascertained the place of birth of the resident population, found that only one-third of the total Jewish population of Detroit was born in the city, another 28 percent were foreign born, but 36 percent had come to Detroit from other places in the United States, a little over half of these from other locations in Michigan and the rest from other states. A somewhat similar picture is presented by comparable statistics from Camden, New Jersey where one-third of the residents were born in the Camden area, and almost 60 percent had moved there from other places of the United States. Using the state as a unit, the Providence study found that 60 percent of all Jews living in Greater Providence were

born in Rhode Island. Of the 40 percent who were born elsewhere, 16 percent were foreign-born and the remaining 24 percent were equally divided between those born in New England and those born in other states of the Union. Virtually identical patterns emerged for Springfield, Massachusetts. Comparison of the mobility of Jews with that of the general population is best achieved through examination of the proportion of the native-born segments of the population who were born in their present state of residence. For Greater Providence, 76 percent of the general population compared to 72 percent of the American-born Jewish population were born in the state of Rhode Island. As judged by state of birth, therefore, the Jewish population closely resembles the total population in its migration level. It also resembles the general pattern in so far as most of the movement to the state by American-born Jews is from near-by areas.

Mobility can also be judged by length of residence in the area. The Milwaukee study, for example, found that 60 percent of Milwaukee Jews had been living at their current address less than 10 years, and 40 percent had been living at their address for less than 5 years. These data thereby suggest a high degree of residential mobility among Jews although they do not specify whether this took the form of intra-urban mobility or migration across larger distances. The recent Boston study also suggests a high degree of mobility. Half the population had lived at their present address for under 10 years and 31 percent for 5 years or less. These percentages vary considerably by age. Among those 21-29 years of age, 70 percent were in their present address less than 5 years; by contrast, at the other end of the age hierarchy, only 10 percent of those 60-69 were living in their present home under 5 years. Further reflecting the high mobility characterizing the Boston

Jewish population is the finding that 34 percent of the population intends to move within the next two years. Thus a high turnover is indicated both by the recency of the in-move and by the high percent intending to move in the near future. A very high proportion of the intended mobility is within the Boston metropolitan area itself; and the projected patterns indicate a heavy movement in the direction of the newer suburban areas. At the same time, the decline of the older areas in Boston is strongly emphasized by the very low percentage of persons moving into them, and the high percent of those still living there who indicate an intention to move out. For example, less than 25 percent of those living in Central Boston had moved in within the last 5 years, but 42 percent plan to move out within the next two years. In contrast, of the population living in the south suburbs, 32 percent moved in within the last 5 years and only 12 percent indicated an intention to move out within the next two.

The population survey of Greater Providence measured the level of mobility through a series of statistics showing recency of arrival in the state, in the city, and in present house of residence. Of the total population, 10 percent had moved into the state within the last 10 years, and 5 percent within three years of the survey date. But these percentages were considerably higher for those between age 30 and 39, which tend to be the peak migration periods in the life cycle. About one in five individuals in this age range had moved into the state between 1955 and 1963. The role of the suburbs in population movement is also clearly evidenced. For example, in the suburb with a high concentration of professionals and business executives, almost one out of every four Jews had moved in from outside the state during the preceeding 8 years. By contrast, the corresponding proportion for the older

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sections of Providence is under 4 percent. If the combined effect of movement from without the state and movement within the area itself is taken into account, the pattern is even more accentuated. Between 46 and 61 percent of the persons living in the suburbs had moved there during the 8 years preceding the survey. In the older urban areas of Providence, the corresponding proportion was 4 percent, and for the newer urban area 21 percent.

In Providence, 15 percent of the individuals studied were members of householdswho had definite plans to move within a five-year period. The Providence data, like those from Boston, suggest that the highest percentage intending to move occurs among those living in the older urban areas and the lowest percentage in the suburbs. In sum, evaluation of both the past and future mobility patterns in Greater Providence suggest two simultaneous developments with respect to the distribution of the population: A significant proportion of Jews will continue to be concentrated in the newer urban section of the central cities. At the same time, greater decentralization of the total Jewish population within the metropolitan area will take place through the growth of the suburban sector.

The 1968 Columbus, Ohio survey distinguishes between those Jews who are living in areas of high-Jewish density and those living in areas in which the Jewish population is more dispersed. Examination of a variety of characteristics for these two populations indicates that the Jewish population living in the more concentrated areas of settlement are older, are more likely to have been born in the community itself, have a lower education, include a higher proportion of businessmen and a lower proportion of professionals, and incline toward more traditional religious beliefs and practices. These findings suggest, as do the data for Providence, that although within the

larger community some degree of segregation is taking place among Jews, the importance of religion as a basis for selecting neighborhood of residence is diminishing in favor of other socio-demographic criteria.

The Columbus survey also examined the present religious composition of the neighborhood in which Jews lived and asked respondents the type of neighborhood composition they preferred. The results document quite clearly that only a small minority of Jews are living in neighborhoods which are at least 75 percent Jewish and that little more than one-quarter of the Jewish population is living in neighborhoods which are as much as 50 percent Jewish. In fact 30 percent lived in neighborhoods where less than one in four of the population is Jewish. Yet, respondents expressed the preference for neighborhoods with higher proportions of Jews, generally in a 50-50 balance. The overall conclusion therefore points to the desire on the part of Columbus Jews to live in an integrated neighborhood, but one which includes a substantial number of other Jewish families.

Table 8

These data refer only to a single community and quite obviously cannot be generalized to the total American Jewish population. They do suggest, however, that in the process of movement, Jews will seek out areas in which other Jews are living and most likely in which Jewish institutions are present to cater to their religious and educational needs. Problems will arise if movement occurs to areas where these opportunities do not exist. The degree to which considerations such as these influence whether or not Jews move from one section of a city to another and more particularly, from one metropolitan area to another or from one region of the United States to another will be an important factor in the extent to which increased population mobility represents a serious threat to the cohesiveness of the Jewish community.

Migration and population redistribution is important to the development of an area. It affects not only its size, but also the characteristics of the population living within it if the migration process is selective of particular age, educational, occupational, and income groups. At the same time, migration may have an important effect on the migrant himself, particularly with respect to his degree of integration into the community. In turn, a large turnover of population may also have a significant impact on community institutions. To the extent that community ties within the Jewish population are expressed through membership in temples, enrollment of children in educational programs, participation in local organizations and philanthropic activities, a high degree of population movement may either disrupt such patterns of participation or weaken the loyalties they generate. More seriously, they may result in the failure of families and individuals to identify themselves with any organized life in the local community. Sociological research has suggested, for example, that recent migrants to a community are much less active in the formal structure than are long-time residents.[1] Although their participation increases, the adjustment has been shown to take at least five years, and sometimes migrants never reach the same level of participation as persons who grew up in the community. Obviously, if a significant proportion of in-migrants know in advance that their residence in the community is not likely to be permanent, such tendencies for lower rates of participation and affiliation may be even stronger.

We have minimum historical evidence for the Jewish population of the United States to document whether the level of mobility is increasing. Impressionistically, however, from the available data both on mobility itself and on changes in educational level and the type of occupations into which Jews are going,

I believe that one of the major changes taking place in the American Jewish community is an increasing rate of population movement. For example, some recent statistics from Toledo, Ohio indicate that one-fifth of the Jews living in Toledo move each year. The study reports that national chain operations have brought to Toledo a surprising number of Jewish men in managerial positions and that the University had a substantial increase in the number of Jewish faculty. At the same time, the study reported that 45 to 60 percent of young Jews raised in Toledo seek and find permanent residence in distant cities after graduation from college. This is the kind of pattern which I believe is coming to be more typical of the general American scene and which will result not only in the increasing migration of Jews in the United States, but also in an increasingly higher rate of repeated movement by the same persons. We know from general migration studies that higher than average mobility rates have always characterized professionals and highly educated individuals because of the more limited demands for their talents in particular localities. Moreover, as Toledo shows, in recent years many national firms have adopted a company policy of repeated relocation of their executives and professionals among different branches of their firms. As the proportion of Jews holding positions as executives and professionals increases, the rate of population mobility is likely to increase.

As Glazer and Moynihan have observed, "The son wants the business to be bigger and better and perhaps he would rather be a cog in a great corporation than the manager of a small one. He may not enjoy the tight Jewish community with its limited horizons and its special satisfactions - he is not that much of a Jew any more."[2] In short, they suggest that status may be the drawing force of the third generation as financial success was the major consideration

of the second. Finally, as discriminatory practices diminish and executive positions which formerly were closed to Jews open up, this will become one more element conducive to the greater geographic dispersal of Jews willing to develop occupational careers outside the communities in which they grew up.

Some evidence of this trend is already available through limited statistics available from Providence. That study collected information on the residence of all children of family units included in the Providence survey, permitting comparison of the place of residence of children in relation to that of their parents living in the Providence area. Lenski has noted that one of the best indicators of the importance attached to family and kin groups by modern Americans is their willingness or unwillingness to leave their native community and migrate elsewhere.[3] Since most migration is for economic or vocational reasons, he suggests that migration serves as an indicator of the strength of economic motives compared to kinship ties. If this interpretation is correct, the Providence data suggests that the kinship ties of Jews have been weakening. Among all Providence families surveyed, there were 748 sons 40 years old and over. Of these, one-third were living outside of Rhode Island. Compared to this, just half of the 1,425 sons between the ages of 20-39 were living outside of the state. Moreover, the difference between these two age groups is even sharper since a higher proportion of the younger group were living outside of New England. Further accentuation of the trend is suggested by the fact that almost two-thirds of children under age 20 who were living away from their parental home were outside Rhode Island, and 42 percent of the total were outside New England.

Table 9

Although fewer daughters leave their parental community, the basic age pattern is the same as for males. Of daughters aged 40 and over,

one in every four lived outside Rhode Island, half in other states in New England and half elsewhere in United States. Of those between the ages of 20-39, half were outside the state, again equally divided between New England and elsewhere. This trend is even stronger among girls under age 20; two thirds of those living outside their parental home live outside the state.

These data lend weight to the conclusion that the American Jewish community is characterized by increased mobility and that this must be taken into account as part of any evaluation of Jewish life in the United States. From their very origins in the days of Abraham, mobility has been a tradition among Jews. But whereas at a number of points in Jewish history it may have served to strengthen the Jewish community and indeed to insure its very survival, there is serious question whether this is true of the increased internal migration in the United States. Such mobility often weakens the individual's ties to Judaism and the Jewish community, which in turn weakens the community itself by making it increasingly difficult to call upon the loyalty of the individual to local institutions. Particularly as Jews move into areas where only small Jewish communities exist, the likelihood of intermarriage will increase and the opportunities for individuals to maintain their identity through association with Jewish institutions and through providing their children with Jewish education will diminish. Moreover, if repeated mobility increases, as I speculate it will, these dangers will be accentuated. I would suggest that for all too long, the local Jewish community has rested on the assumption that most Jews remain members of the local community for a lifetime and that they are therefore willing and obligated to support the local community. This may no longer be true for many Jews. An increasing number of families may be reluctant to become affiliated with the local

community, not so much because of an initial lack of identification with Judaism, but because they fear that they will not remain in the local area long enough to justify the financial investment required. I sincerely believe that there is much more need for concern with the role of migration in the future of American Judaism than there is with intermarriage. The latter may to a great degree only be a by-product, along with other undesirable consequences, of increased mobility.

Generational Change

Of all of the demographic characteristics of the Jewish population considered in this report, perhaps the one which has the greatest relevance for the future character of the American Jewish community is the changing generation status of the Jewish population, that is, how many are foreign-born, how many are children of foreign-born, and how many are third or higher order generation Americans. A major factor in the continued vitality of the American Jewish community in the past has been the continuous "blood transfusions" which it received through the massive immigration to the United States of persons from the ghettos of Eastern Europe. Now, for the first time in the history of the American Jewish community, a third generation Jewish population faces the American scene without large scale outside reinforcement; at the very same time, it enjoys much greater freedom than Jews ever before had in America. The Jewish community in the United States is increasingly an American Jewish community in every sense of the word.

Information on the generation status of American Jews must be gleaned from local community studies. These show beyond any doubt that the vast majority of America's Jews today are native-born. Among all the community studies which present information on the nativity of the Jewish population,

Table 10

the highest percentage foreign-born noted for any location is that of Dade County, Florida reporting 33 percent in 1961, and the lowest is Camden, New Jersey reporting 9 percent in 1964. But these extremes largely reflect the differential age composition of the population living in the two areas. For most communities, the percent of foreign-born ranges between 20 and 25 percent. Yet, even this range is somewhat high because many of the communities included had their surveys taken throughout the 1950's. If the list is restricted to those communities in which surveys were taken in the 1960's, the proportion of foreign-born is generally under 20 percent. For several communities, comparable data were collected at two different points in time, indicating the pattern of change. For example, the 1953 Los Angeles Survey reported 32 percent foreign-born; but by 1959, the proportion had fallen to 25 percent. The Trenton, New Jersey Survey of 1949 reported 24 percent of the population foreign-born; by 1961 the foreign-born constituted only 15 percent. In 1937 Des Moines' foreign-born comprised 35 percent of the Jewish population; at the time of its most recent survey in 1956, only 22 percent were foreign-born. An even sharper decline characterized Pittsburgh in the twenty-fiveyear period between 1938 and 1963, where the foreign-born declined from 38 to only 12 percent.

Evidence of the increasing Americanization of the Jewish community is also provided through the comparative data on the percent of foreign-born in different age segments of the population. For this purpose, the statistics from Greater Providence provide a useful example. These data have the added advantage of not only distinguishing between the foreign-born and native-born segments of the population but sub-divide the latter into second and higher generations. Of the total Jewish population living in Greater Providence in 1963, only 17 percent were foreign born. The remaining 83 percent were almost

equally divided between those who were second generation Americans (that is, with either one or both parents foreign-born) and those who were third or fourth generation (both parents born in the United States). The statistics on generation status by age indicate that not only is the percentage of foreign-born in the population declining but so, too, is the percentage of second generation Jews; at the same time, the proportion of third and fourth generation persons is increasing. The percentage of foreign-born Jews declines from 73 percent of those aged 65 and over to less than 2 percent of those under age 15. In contrast, among those under age 15, only 13 percent are either foreign-born or even the children of foreign-born parents; a vast majority (87 percent) are American-born children of American-born parents. In the absence of any large scale immigration, the Jewish population of Greater Providence, and that of the United States as a whole, should be well over 90 percent native-born within several decades; and an increasing proportion of this number should be third or fourth generation American.

Table 11

Moreover, despite their foreign birth, the majority of the foreign-born have spent the greatest proportion of their lives in the United States. Over one-third have been in this country for over a half century and an additional third have been here for at least twenty-five years. The fact that 84 percent of all foreign-born are over forty-five years old and that most of these came to the United States as children and have lived here for three decades or more lends further weight to the evidence suggested by the overall analysis of the changing generation status of the population: the Jewish population is an increasingly American bred and raised population.

Because of the importance of generational change upon the structure of the Jewish community, Doctor Goldscheider and I approached our analysis of

Jewish Americans through comparison of the demographic, social, economic, and religious characteristics of three generations in the Jewish community.[1] In that study, we stress that the future of the American Jewish community depends to a great degree on how its members (largely third generation) react to the freedom to work toward integration into the American social structure as an acculturated sub-society or toward complete assimilation and loss of Jewish identification. Whether they reverse or accelerate certain trends toward assimilation initiated by their second generation parents or by the smaller number of older third generation Jews provides the insights by which the patterns of generation change may be detected and projected.

The physical dispersal and the deconcentration of the Jewish population were rapid and for many marked not only a physical break from the foreign-born but symbolized the more dramatic disassociation of American-born Jews from the ethnic ties and experiences that had served as unifying forces in the earlier generation. The degree of identification to Judaism of the third generation Jews who participate in this dispersal has become a key issue. At the same time, dramatic increases have taken place in secular education with distance from the immigrant generation. This provided the key to Jewish participation in the professions and, more recently, in high executive positions.

Dispersal of the Jewish population and greater exposure to public education increased the interaction between Jews and non-Jews and has given rise, as later analysis will document, to higher rates of intermarriage as distance from the immigrant generation increases. Moreover, these generational changes in residential location, social class structure, and marriage patterns have been accompanied by redirections of the religious system. Striking shifts

from Orthodox to Conservative and Reform religious identification and membership were observed between first and third generation groups as well as declines in regular synagogue attendance, observance of Kashruth, Jewish organization affiliation, and use of Yiddish as a spoken language. Yet, these trends were counteracted by a clear tendency toward increased Jewish education for the young as well as increases in selected religious observances. Overall, some aspects of religiosity appeared to be strengthened, others declined, and some remained stable over the generations. Religious change among three generations of Jews is a complex process, involving the abandonment of traditional forms and the development of new forms of identity and expression more congruent with the broader American way of life. Our generational analysis suggests that, evolving out of the process of generational adjustment, the freedom to choose the degree of assimilation was exercised in the direction of Jewish identification.

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Age Composition

Among all demographic variables, age is one of the most basic because so much of the socio-demographic structure of the population as well as the demographic processes of birth, death, and migration are affected by age composition. The significant impact of age on the generation status of the Jewish population has already been noted. At the present time, the only source of information on the national age composition of Jews is the 1957 census survey. Several changes have undoubtedly occurred since then; Jewish community studies indicate that the differences observed by the census have been accentuated.

The 1957 census data clearly indicate that the Jewish population is, on the average, older than that of the general white population of the United States. The median age of the Jewish group was 36.7 years compared to 30.6

years for the total white population. The sharpest differentials characterized the youngest age group - under 14, and the 45-64 age category. Among Jews, the youngest group contained 23 percent of the total, compared to 28 percent of the total white population. By contrast, only 21 percent of the white population of the United States was between 45 and 64 years of age in 1957, but this was true of 28 percent of the Jewish group. Both the Jewish and the white populations had quite similar proportions in the 65 and over age category, 10 and 9 percent respectively, of the total population. The significant differential in the proportion of young persons reflects the lower fertility of the Jewish group. Low birth rates lead to fewer children and in turn result in an older population. The same phenomenon helps to account for the lower proportions of Jews in each of the age groups between 14 and 34.

Table 12

In his review of "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography", Ben Seligman examined the age composition of thirteen different Jewish communities in which surveys had been undertaken between 1947 and 1950.[1] He found the median age in these communities to range between 28 and 40, compared to an estimated median age in 1950 for the general white population of the United States of 31. Comparison of more recent community surveys with earlier ones suggest an increasing proportion of individuals in the older age groups. The post World War II upsurge in the birth rate, in which Jews participated, somewhat increased the proportion of Jews in the younger age groups, but differentials clearly persisted between the Jewish population and the general population. In 1963, 10.5 percent of the total United States white population was under 5. But in the Jewish comunities of Camden, Detroit, and Providence the percentage of children under 5 varied between 6.2 and 8.5 percent, the highest

being in Camden, which in many respects is a suburban community and therefore has a disproportional number of families in the child-bearing ages. The effect of community type is also evidenced in the proportion of aged persons. In 1963, just under 10 percent of the United States white population was 65 years and over. In Providence the comparable proportion for the Jewish community was 10.1 and in Detroit it was 8.0; but in Camden, it was only 5.7.

The age structure of the American Jewish community is clear: the Jewish population is on the whole older than the total United States white population; and over time, both because of its lower fertility and because it has in most places such a large proportion of individuals in the 45-64 year age group, the Jewish population can be expected to become increasingly older. In American society the problems associated with an aged population are already multiple. During the next few decades such problems may be even more serious for the Jewish community than for the population as a whole. This can be illustrated by projections made for the age composition of the Jewish population of Greater Providence for 1978, fifteen years following the survey. These projections assumed that fertility and mortality would continue at the 1960 levels and that the total metropolitan area's population will not be affected by migration. The resulting projections point clearly to an aging of the population between 1963 and 1978. The proportion in the population 65 years of age and older will increase from 10 to 17 percent. In actual numbers, there will be a 70 percent increase in the number of aged. At the same time the percentage under age 15 will decline from 25 percent in 1963 to 19 percent in 1978, reducing the community's task in educating and providing leisure activities for youngsters. But changes will also occur in the middle segment of the age hierarchy as the reduced number of persons resulting

from the especially low Jewish birth rate during the depression move into the 45-54 age range. The percent in this group is projected to decline from 16 percent of the total in 1963 to only 10 percent in 1978. In actual numbers, there will be a decline of almost one-third. This may create some serious problems for the community as the pool of persons to whom the community can turn for leadership and financial contributions is greatly reduced.

Overall, therefore, the dynamic character of the Jewish age structure requires continuous monitoring, not only for the demographic impact it will have on births, deaths, migration, and socio-economic structure, but also because of its broader social implications.[2] While recognizing that the general trend is toward an aging population with its associated problems of housing for the aged, financial crises resulting from retirement, more illness, one must also be aware that changes are taking place at other points in the age hierarchy and that the need for schools, playgrounds, camps, and teenage programs also vary as the age profile changes. Too often the Jewish community has been guilty of planning its future without taking account of the basic considerations of the probable size, distribution, and age composition of the population.

Education

For a large majority of the Jews who migrated to America in the late 1800's and early 1900's, the major incentive was the supposed equal opportunities which would permit significant social and economic mobility. But, lacking secular education, adequate facility in English, and technical training, many found that rapid advancement proved an unrealistic goal. For others, both educational and occupational achievement were made difficult, if not impossible, by factors related to their foreign-born status or, more specifically,

to their identification as Jews. Frustrated in their own efforts to achieve significant mobility, many Jews transferred their aspirations to their children. Recognizing the special importance of education as a key to occupational mobility and higher income, the first generation Jews made considerable effort to provide their children with a good secular education. Reflecting the great value placed by Jews on education, both as a way of life and as a means of mobility, the Jews of America have compiled an extraordinary record of educational achievement.

In his article "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography", Ben Seligman notes that very few Jewish community studies covering the period before and around 1950 yielded usable information on the secular education of Jews.[1] Based on the very limited data available he concluded that for the period about 1950 the average education of Jews was higher than that of the general population, falling at about the 12 year level compared to a 9.7 average for the general white population of the United States. Moreover, he also found that the few studies which showed the data by sex reveal "nothing that might be interpreted as a notable difference as between males and females."[2] Recognizing the important part which education plays in affecting the social position of the Jew in the larger community and also in possibly influencing the degree and nature of Jewish identification, most recent surveys have collected information on education. All of them clearly document the high educational achievement of the American Jewish population.

Table 13

On the national level, the best comparisons between the educational achievement of the Jewish population and that of the general population can be made through the 1957 census survey data.[3] The results of that survey show that for the population 25 years old and over in the United States, the median

number of school years completed by Jews was 12.3 compared to 10.6 for the general population. But even this large difference does not convey fully the sharp differentials that distinguish Jewish educational patterns from those of the general population. As of 1957, 17 percent of the adult Jews were college graduates compared to only 7 percent of the general population. If those who attended college without graduating are included, 30 percent of the Jews qualify, just twice the 15 percent of the general population who had some college education. At the other extreme of the educational hierarchy, 29 percent of all adult Jews had received only an elementary school education; this was considerably below the 40 percent of the total population so classified. Since these data refer to the total population, they are considerably affected by differential age composition, which in turn is correlated with immigrant status. Later examination of community survey data will control for age. Before doing so, however, the census data will be examined further to ascertain whether the patterns differ for men and women.

Table 14

Judging by median years of school completed, Seligman's conclusion that the educational level of men and women did not differ is confirmed. The median education of Jewish men is 12.5 and that of Jewish women is 12.3; for both sexes these were above the averages of the total population. However, for Jews in particular, these medians mask some important sex differences in educational achievement. Whereas 22.5 percent of Jewish women had had some college education, this was true of 38.2 percent of all adult Jewish men. Moreover, one out of every four Jewish males had completed four or more years of college whereas only one out of every ten Jewish females had done so. Clearly, these data show that, as of 1957, more adult Jewish males had not only gone to college, but of those who did, more had completed their college

education than had Jewish women. For the total population, this sex differential was much less marked. Moreover, for both sexes approximately twice as large a proportion of Jewish adults had had college education than was true in the population as a whole.

Unfortunately, the census data on education by religion are not cross-tabulated by age and therefore do not permit determination of the extent to which the differences between Jews and the general population were narrowing among the younger age groups. Since 1957 there has been a considerable increase in education among the younger segments of the American population. For example, the March 1967 Current Population Survey shows a continuous rise in the median school years completed from 8.5 among males aged 65 and over to 12.6 among men aged 25-29; and from 8.7 to 12.5 for females. Jewish community surveys indicate similar increases in education among the younger segments of the Jewish population. Let me cite the data from Providence to illustrate.

The 1963 educational differentials between the Jewish population of Providence and the total population were even greater than those characterizing the United States as a whole in 1957. The median education of Jews was 11.8 years compared to 9.1 for the total population. But again, this large difference masks an even more striking differential in the extent of college education. By 1963, 25 percent of all adult Jews in Providence had graduated from college and an additional 16 percent had had some college education. The corresponding percentages for the total population were 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. In fact, the percentage of Jews who had continued on to graduate school, 13.4, is greater than the percentage of adults in the total population who had had any college education at all. But of particular interest

Table 15

here are the age differentials within the population, clearly documenting that a significant change has taken place in the level of education of the Jewish population. For males, the median level increases from only 7.6 years for those 70 years old and over to over 15 years for those under 40 years of age. The same general pattern characterizes the females. In each age group, the median level of education for males is higher than for females; but the differential is greatest for those in the two youngest age groups, reflecting the considerably higher proportion of men than women who take postgraduate work.

The high proportion of persons aged 25-29 who have already completed their college education and the fact that 80 percent of those in the college age group are estimated to be enrolled in college emphasize that a college education has become virtually universal for the younger segments of the Jewish population. Within the Jewish population itself, in the future the important educational differential will thus be between those who had only some college education and those who went on to postgraduate work.

As part of a larger survey of inequality in educational opportunity in the United States, the Bureau of the Census Current Population Survey of October, 1965 gathered information about school-age children.[4] To collect supplementary data, mail-in questionnaires were left with the mothers of all teenage children in the sample and others with the teenagers themselves; additional material was collected from the most recent school attended by each of the school-age children in the sample. A 1970 report, limited to white boys and girls aged 14-19 who were enrolled in elementary or secondary public or private schools, reviews the college plans of the sample respondents. Since religion was one of the three key variables in terms of which information

was collected (the other two were race and national origin), this analysis provides an opportunity to compare the college intentions of Jewish teenagers and teenagers in general.

A key variable in evaluating college intentions was the religious composition of the school attended, based on the principal's estimate of the percentage of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews in his school. Of the estimated 330,000 Jewish students enrolled in public and private elementary or secondary schools 74,000, or 22.4 percent, are enrolled in schools with half or more of their student bodies Jewish; 118,000, or 35.8 percent, were in schools with less than half the students Jewish; and an additional 41.8 percent were in schools from which no religion composition could be obtained.

This study found that 86 percent of the 330,000 Jewish youth planned to attend college, compared with only 53 percent of the general population. Interestingly, the percentages differed strikingly between those teenagers who were receiving their education in schools with heavy Jewish populations and those enrolled in schools with less than 50 percent Jewish. Among the former, 94 percent planned to attend college; among the latter only 80 percent did.

Other variables obviously intervene to affect plans for college. The study attempts to control for the effects of intelligence, mother's education, occupation of household head, and family income. Adjusting for all of these factors reduced the differences among the various religions in percent with college plans. Yet, part of the religious differences persist; and even after controlling for all of these variables, 70 percent of all the Jewish students, compared to the general average of 53 percent, had college plans. Moreover, even within the high-IQ sub-group of the population, comparisons between Jews and other segments of the population show that Jews

continue to have the highest proportion planning for college education.

The authors conclude, "The high rate of college plans (86 percent) for pupils with Jewish mothers is particularly noteworthy, especially when the effect of religious context is added to the analysis. If the majority of the student body is Jewish the college plans rate for Jewish students is fourteen percentage points higher than the rate for Jewish students in schools where Jews are in the minorty. The rate is fifteen percentage points higher even when the intelligence, mother's aspiration, occupation, and income are included in the analysis. The same results are observed for high-IQ Jews. These results suggest that it would be worthwhile to test the hypothesis that exposure of a Jewish student to the norms and values of a Jewish sub-community is important in formation of educational expectations."[5]

These data have a number of implications for the types of demographic developments considered in this paper. First they clearly confirm the projection that college education will be virtually universal among Jewish students providing they can realize their aspirations. Second, because for a number of religious groups plans for attending college are still quite low, ranging in the 40-50 percent level, it will be some time before college attendance becomes universal among the non-Jewish population. As a result a number of the differences noted with respect to education can be expected to persist for a number of decades and indirectly continue to affect occupation and income. Also important is the finding that the proportion planning to go to college differs significantly (14 percentage points) between those receiving their elementary and secondary education in a largely "Jewish environment" and those doing so in a more heterogeneous school. If the Jewish population becomes more generally dispersed and tendencies toward migration increase,

a much higher proportion of Jewish youth may be attending schools which are less densely Jewish. If the context of either residence or school environment has such an important effect in motivating individuals to higher education, increased population redistribution might lower somewhat the proportion of Jewish youth planning to go on to college. This must, however, remain speculative pending more research on the role of the Jewish sub-community in forming education expectations vis-à-vis the role of the family itself.

In the meantime, high level of educational achievement significantly affects several areas of Jewish life in the United States. To the extent that education is highly correlated with occupation, an increasing proportion of college graduates will affect the occupational composition of the Jewish population. More Jews will be engaged in intellectual pursuits and in those occupations requiring a high degree of technical skill. Concomitantly, it will probably also lead to a reduction in the number of self-employed both because small, private business will not provide an adequate intellectual challenge and because patterns of discrimination which have heretofore excluded Jews from large corporations weaken. The impact will, however, go beyond occupational careers.

In order to obtain a college education, particularly at the postgraduate level, a large proportion of Jewish youth must leave home to attend colleges in distant places. As a result, their ties to both family and community will weaken. A high proportion of these college-educated youth probably never return permanently to the communities in which their families live and in which they were raised. Thus education serves as an important catalyst for geographic mobility and evenutally leads many individuals to take up residence in communities with small Jewish populations, to live in neighborhoods which

are highly integrated, and to work and socialize in circles which are largely non-Jewish. The extent to which such a development occurs needs to be closely followed during the decade of the 1970's.

A final area in which education may have a significant effect is that of intermarriage and alienation from the Jewish community on the part of the more highly educated segments of Jewish population. This involves not only the impact which physical separation from home and the weakening of parental control may have on dating and courtship patterns, but also on the general "liberalization" which a college education may have on the religious values and Jewish identity of the individual. It may be ironic that the very strong positive value which Jews have traditionally placed on education and which now manifests itself in such a high proportion of Jewish youth attending college may eventually be an important factor in the general weakening of the individual's ties to the Jewish community.

Occupation

In his analysis of the social characteristics of American Jews undertaken for the 1954 tercentenary celebration of permanent Jewish residence in the United States, Nathan Glazer observed that outside of New York City, the homogeneous character of the occupational structure of Jewish communities is beyond dispute.[1] Basing his conclusions on a number of local Jewish community surveys conducted between 1948 and 1953, he noted that the proportion of Jews in the non-manual occupations ranged from 75 to 96 percent, compared to 38 percent for the American population as a whole. Moreover, even for New York City, where one would expect to find a substantial proportion of Jewish workers, Glazer noted that available studies suggest that as many as two-thirds of the gainfully employed Jews are engaged in non-manual work.

Table 16

Comparing his findings for the 1948-53 period with the results of ten surveys conducted during 1935-45, Glazer found that the proportion of professionals has risen on the average from about 11 percent of the Jewish gainfully employed in the earlier period to about 15 percent in the later group, and that this change was accompanied by a fall in the number of Jews engaged in the lower levels of white-collar work. Interestingly, this rise in the number of Jews engaged in the professions evidently occurred without any significant change in the proportion of Jews who were proprietors of their own business. As Glazer explains it, "The American Jew tries to avoid getting into a situation where discrimination may seriously affect him. In a great bureaucracy, he is dependent on the impression he makes on his superiors and increasingly in recent years, dependent on the degree to which he approximates a certain 'type' considered desirable in business. The Jew prefers a situation where his own merit receives objective confirmation, and he is not dependent on the goodwill or personal reaction of a person who may happen not to like Jews."[2] Whether this point of view is still justified in 1970 will be considered later.

Another of Glazer's observations is relevant. He suggests that particularly revealing of the character of Jewish experience in America is the extreme rapidity of the rise in the social and economic position of the Jews. Citing a study of American college graduates made in 1947, he notes that more Jews than non-Jews became professionals; more Jews became proprietors, managers, or officials; fewer Jews became any type of either lower white-collar or manual workers. Yet looking at their parents' occupation, this study found that fewer of their parents than of the parents of non-Jews had been professionals and proprietors, managers, and officials. In a single

generation, Jews had increased their proportion of professionals by close to 400 percent, non-Jews by only about 25 percent. Between 1910 and 1950 the proportion of the population engaged in non-manual work rose from 20 percent to 38 percent. This development offered great opportunity to the Jews, of which, given their strong motivation for social mobility, they proceeded to take full advantage. Thus, at a time when the total American population became more markedly middle class in its occupational structure, Jews became even more so.

Glazer further notes that there is a general tendency for the ethnic concentration in a single occupation to suffer dilution in time as the native-born generation becomes better educated and more familiar with the occupational opportunities available. But, he points out, for the Jews, "this dilution upward becomes a concentration, for the Jews begin to reach the upper limit of occupation mobility relatively early."[3] For Jews to reflect the general occupational structure of the United States would, in fact, require downward mobility for many. He concludes that, "This is not going to happen: so we may expect the Jewish community to become more homogeneous in the future, as the number of first generation workers and the culture they established, declines."[4] In view of the evidence available since the time of Glazer's analysis, I agree that such a conclusion is warranted, provided the reference is to broad occupational classes such as professionals and managers. At the same time, however, I would suggest that such a concentration by Jews may be followed, although not exactly to the same degree, by a similar concentration on the part of the general population. In this sense, the marked differentials which Glazer noted and which also appear in later studies can only diminish as upward mobility becomes increasingly characteristic of the

general population as well. Here, again, the experience of the Jews may be in the forefront of developments in the larger American scene.

The 1957 census sample survey provides clear-cut evidence on the national occupational composition of the Jewish population and permits us to compare this distribution with that of the general population. For the United States as a whole in 1957, 81.1 percent of all males 14 and over, and 35.1 percent of all females were in the labor force. The proportion was quite similar for Jewish males, 81.5 percent but somewhat lower for Jewish females, 30.7 percent. These overall differences mask some significant variations within specific age groups. Reflecting the higher educational achievement of Jews which results in many remaining in school for a longer time instead of entering the labor force, the levels of labor force participation by Jews age 18-24 is considerably below that of the general population, only 53.9 percent in contrast to 79 percent for the population as a whole. Between ages 25 and 44, labor force participation by Jewish males and those in the general population is virtually universal, but beyond this age the proportion of Jewish males in the labor force was higher than that of the general population, especially among Jewish men 65 years old and older, of whom 47 percent were still working, compared to only 37 percent of aged males in the total population. This differential probably reflects the higher proportion of professionals and self-employed among Jews. To the extent that retirement is more voluntary for professionals and the self-employed generally, the proportionately larger number of Jews in these categories contributes to their higher than average labor force participation rates in the older age groups.

Table 17

For females, too, the age specific labor force participation patterns of Jews differ from those of the total adult groups. In the 18-24 year age group,

Jewish women have the highest labor force participation rate, with 57 percent in the labor force compared to 45 percent of the general population. The high rates for the Jewish group may reflect their relatively high educational achievement accompanied by a somewhat later age of marriage. Greater and more successful use of family limitation may also contribute to this pattern. Since this difference persists in the urban population, it does not stem from the higher concentration of Jews in urban places. Further insights into the extent to which Jewish women differ in their labor force participation pat-

Table 18

terns from the general population can be gained from examination of participation rates of married women with varying numbers of children present in the household. The overall levels of participation vary only minimally, but significant age differentials do exist. In each age group between 25 and 65, participation rates of Jewish women were below those of the general population, especially of women between ages 25 and 45. Moreover, the presence of very young children in Jewish families significantly reduced Jewish labor force participation below that of the total population. For example, for those Jewish women with no children under 18 years of age, 30 percent worked compared to 36 percent in the general population. Among those with children under six years of age only 12 percent of the Jewish women worked, compared to 17 percent in the general population. The lower participation levels of Jewish women at all ages between 25 and 65 suggests that higher socio-economic status, augmented by the presence of small children, plays a key role in influencing participation levels.

Sharp differentials characterize the occupational composition of the Jewish group compared to the general population. Three-fourths of all Jewish employed males worked in white-collar positions, compared to only 35 percent of the total

white male population of the United States. These large differences were to a very great extent attributable to the much greater concentration of Jewish men in professional and managerial positions. Of the total Jewish male labor force, one in five were professionals compared to only one in ten in the general population; and one out of every three Jews was employed as manager or proprietor compared to only 13 percent of the total male population. The proportion in clerical work was similar for Jews and the total labor force, but almost three times as many Jews were in sales work compared to total males. Conversely, the proportion of Jews in manual work was very small, only 22 percent compared to 57 percent of the total male labor force.

Table 19

Compared with males, women in the labor force are much more concentrated in white-collar positions, but the differentials between Jewish women and all women are less marked than was true for the men. Just over 4 out of every 5 Jewish women are in white-collar jobs compared to just over half of the total female labor force. A similar pattern emerges from examination of the specific occupational categories. Among professionals, for example, the proportion of Jewish women is 15.5 percent, and 12.2 percent for the total female labor force. Like men, Jewish women are considerably under-represented in manual labor categories, only 17 percent compared to 44 percent of the total female labor force.

Special tabulations of survey data from the National Opinion Research Center show quite similar patterns of differentiation between Jews and the total population.[5] So, too, do data from the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.[6]

The different occupational composition of Jews compared to the general population has often been attributed to their higher concentration in urban places and to their higher educational achievement. The census tabulations

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enable analysis of the occupational data for the urban population, while controlling for years of school completed by religion. By restricting the data to a more homogeneous social and economic environment and by holding constant the wide differences in educational achievement it becomes possible to ascertain more clearly the extent to which occupational differences are directly related to religious affiliation and to what extent they may simply be a reflection of differential opportunities available to Jews because of the place in which they live and the level of education they have achieved.

With residence and education controlled, 70 percent of the Jewish males are white-collar workers compared to 41 percent of the general male population. Thus, the concentration of Jews in white-collar positions remains far above that of the total population, but the difference is no longer in the ratio of two-to-one as was the case with the unstandardized data. Moreover, for selected occupational categories there is also a dramatic change. For example, with residence and education controlled, only 10 percent of the Jewish males are professionals compared to 12 percent of the total male population. What was originally a two-to-one differential completely disappears and is even reversed. On the other hand, differentials in the managerial and the sales categories remain about the same. Similar conclusions hold for occupational differentials for females after the data are restricted to urban residence and standardized by education. Overall, therefore, controlling for both education and residence suggests that both these factors explain some but not all of the variation in occupational differentials between Jews and the total population.

In a further attempt to assess the relation between education and occupation, special tabulations of the occupational distribution of employed college

graduates in urban areas were examined. Such control again eliminated a con-
Table 20 siderable part of the differential in occupational distribution between Jews and the total population. For Jewish college graduates, 97 percent were in white-collar occupations. For the total population this was true of 93 percent. Similarly, 58 percent of all Jewish college graduates were professionals compared to 63 percent of those in the total population. The only important difference characterizing the college educated group is the significantly higher proportion of Jewish graduates who earn their living as managers, proprietors, and officials, 22 percent compared with 16 percent of the total population. But this differential, too, is considerably below that characterizing the population as a whole when education is not controlled.

The 1957 census data are obviously already outdated. For evidence of the occupational composition of the Jewish population in the 1960's one must turn to the various community surveys taken during that period. In 1960, 45 percent of the American white urban male population was engaged in white-collar work, but in such communities as Providence, Camden, Springfield, Rochester, and Trenton the percentage for Jews ranged from a low of 80 percent to a high of 92 percent. While the percentages in specific occupational categories varied among communities depending on the character of the community and the nature of the occupational opportunities available, the proportion of professionals among Jews was from two to three times greater than among the general population, and the differentials in the proportion of managers and proprietors were even greater.

In the absence of recent national statistics on the occupational composition of Jews which can be used to compare changes since 1957, some indication of changes that may be taking place can be gained from statistics on occupation by age which are available for Providence. These point in the direction of a

reduced percentage of Jews in the managerial and proprietor group and an increasing proportion in both the professions and sales work. For example, among males the proportion of professionals increased from 17 percent of those 65 and over to 25 percent of those 25 to 44; and conversely, the proportion employed as managers declines from over half of the oldest group to just about one-third of the 25-44 year group. At the same time, the proportion of sales personnel increases from 11 percent of the oldest to almost one-fourth of the 25-44 year group. The concentration of older males in managerial positions must be interpreted within the context of the high percentage of self-employed who tend to remain in the labor force while those in the white-collar and manual labor group must retire. Yet, as many as 17 percent of the aged segment of the employed population still held manual jobs, compared to only 13 percent of those in the 45-64 year group and 8 percent of those aged 25-44. In general, the same pattern by age characterizes the employed females, although the differentials are not always as sharp.

Table 21

Survey data on the occupation of head of Jewish families for Detroit covering 1935, 1956, and 1963 provides a unique opportunity to compare changes over twenty-eight years in the occupational composition of the Jewish population. The evidence clearly points to a pattern of occupational concentration. In 1935, 70 percent of the heads of Jewish families were employed as white-collar workers. By 1963 this had risen to 90 percent. Moreover, the most striking changes characterized the professionals who increased from 7 percent in 1935 to 23 percent in 1963, and the manager-owners who grew from 31 percent to 54 percent of the total. At the same time, the proportion of lower white-collar workers, that is, sales and clerical workers, declined from 32 percent in 1935 to only 13 percent in 1963. Using the 1940 and 1960 censuses as bases for

comparing changes in the general population, the data also show some upward concentration. In 1940, 31 percent of the population was in white-collar occupations; by 1960 this had risen to 38 percent. The proportion of professionals also grew considerably, from 5 to 12 percent, and the proportion of managers-owners increased slightly from 9 to 10 percent, compensated by a small decline in the proportion of lower white-collar workers from 17 to 16. Again, the pattern of Jews and the total population parallel each other, but the occupational movement of Jews has been much more accentuated. The conclusion seems warranted that, in time, increasing occupational concentration will also characterize the population as a whole, and differentials between Jews and the total population will decline. But in the short run, the discrepancies may be greater as Jews move up faster.

The Detroit data by age for 1963 also confirm occupational shifting within the white-collar segment of the occupational hierarchy. For example, only 19 percent of the 45-64 year age group were professionals, compared to 42 percent of those in the 20-34 year age group. As in Providence, a lower proportion of younger men were managers-owners, 40 percent compared to 56 percent. Particularly noteworthy is the decline within the managerial-proprietor group in the proportion who were owners of their own business from 42 percent among those aged 45-64 to only 30 percent of the younger group. Even if a considerable portion of those currently engaged as managers, sales, or clerical workers should become owners at a later stage of the life cycle, the total percentage is not likely to exceed the proportion in the 45-64 year group classified as owners in 1963. Again, the data analyzed here suggests that business ownership is likely to decline among the Jewish population in the years ahead.

What do these varied data suggest for future trends in Jewish occupational

composition? Although restricted because of their cross-sectional character, they suggest a continuing increase in the proportion of Jews engaged in professional work, and either stability or actual decline for the managerial and proprietor group. Possibly a number of younger persons who are currently classified as sales workers will at later stages of their life cycle move into managerial and proprietor positions, but evidence for Providence indicates that half or more of these younger individuals are working for others, outside of family businesses. With the gradual disappearance of small businesses, an increasing proportion of these Jewish men may turn to executive positions in business corporations instead of operating their own firms, as did many of their parents and grandparents.

It seems reasonable to assume that with the general rise in educational level, educational differentials among members of the various religious groups will lessen; and as discriminatory restrictions on occupational choice weaken, occupational differentials will also decline. The very high proportion of Jews in white-collar occupations leading to the "concentration" which Glazer predicted will persist; but I would suggest that within this concentration there may, in fact, be more diversity in the future than there was in the past. At the same time the total population will also concentrate more in higher occupational categories; the net result will be a decline in occupational differentials.

In commenting on educational and occupational changes within the Jewish population, Albert Mayer, the author of the 1968 Columbus, Ohio study, makes a most important observation. He stresses that the organized Jewish community must come to recognize that its constituency is now almost entirely high white-collar as well as college educated. Unless it takes full recognition of this

crucial fact in all its activities, the organized community will find it most difficult to gain the loyalty, interest, and support of its membership. The organized community may very well still be reacting to its membership in terms of earlier twentieth century sterotypes, that is, largely a foreign-born, immigrant group in need of welfare and social services. The fact of the matter is that, because of generation changes, education, and occupational mobility, this is a false image; and any approach overlooking the changes runs the risk of serious failure.

Income

Of all the standard variables in which the demographer is interested, he probably encounters greatest difficulty in collecting information on income. Not until 1940 was the first income question included in the federal census. In social surveys focussing on fertility in the United States today, there is more difficulty in obtaining accurate information on income than there is on such intimate matters as birth control practice and sexual activity. It is not surprising therefore, to find that among the large number of Jewish community surveys, very few collected information on income; and the information which was collected is often either of questionable quality or limited because no comparable data for the general population are presented. Yet, as part of this consideration of the position of Jews in American society, it is important to look at Jewish income levels, both to ascertain whether they differ from those of the general population and if so for what reason. For such purposes three sets of national data are available, all based on national surveys; those of the census survey of 1957; the Lazerwitz investigation based on survey research statistics from the University of Michigan;[1] and Bogue's analysis of National Opinion Research Survey data.[2]

The Lazerwitz material clearly documents that the income level of Jews is above that of the general population. Measured in terms of total family income in 1956, 42 percent of Jewish families had incomes of $7,500 and over compared to only 19 percent of the general population. At the other extreme of the income hierarchy, only 8 percent of the Jewish families had incomes under $3,000 compared to one-fourth of all the families in the nation. Yet, if comparison is with other specific religious groups, the high position of the Jews is surpassed by the Episcopalians, among whom 46 percent of families had incomes of $7,500 and over and only 6 percent had incomes below $3,000. The higher status of the Episcopalians who, like the Jews, are highly urbanized is also consistent with their high educational and occupational achievement.

Using National Opinion Research Survey materials compiled in 1953 and 1955, Donald Bogue also investigated the relation between religious preference and family income. His data, like those of Lazerwitz, point to higher income levels for the Jewish population. The median income for heads of Jewish households was $5,954 compared to $4,094 for the total population. Of the Jewish families, 30 percent had incomes $7,500 and over compared to only 13 percent of the families of the total population. Only 15 percent of the Jewish households had incomes under $3,000 compared to 31 percent of all families.

Bogue also found that Jewish household heads who are employed as professional, proprietory, or managerial workers tend to have higher median incomes than do the members of other religious groups belonging to those same broad occupational categories. The same was generally true for Episcopalians. He suggests that this pattern was probably due to the kind of internal variation between occupations within each of the broad occupational categories. Thus he concludes

that occupation is a much more potent factor than religious preference in determining the income level of household heads.

Similarly, his comparison of the median income of religious groups by educational attainment suggests that Jewish household heads tend to receive larger incomes than do household heads in the general population with a comparable education. He adds, however, that these differences may be due to intervening variables such as age of head, number and type of secondary earners, family structure, and occupation as well as to cultural factors associated with religious affiliation, and that education, like occupation, is a much more important factor than religious preference in determining the income level of households.

The Lazerwitz and Bogue materials are limited, however, in only presenting gross comparisons. The census data have the advantage of permitting more detailed analysis to document the influence which other factors have on differences in income between Jews and the total population. For each person in the 1957 census sample, information was solicited on the amount of money income received in 1956. This included income from such varied sources as wages and salaries, self-employment, pensions, interest, dividends, and rent. Since both high education and high white-collar employment are highly correlated with income, the fact that the $4,900 median income of Jewish males is well above

Table 22

the $3,608 median for the male population as a whole comes as no surprise. This sharp differential is also reflected in the more detailed statistics on distribution by income class. Incomes of $10,000 and over were reported by 17 percent of the Jewish males, compared to only 3.6 percent of the males in the total population. On the other hand, just over one-fourth of the Jews, but 41 percent of the total male population had incomes under $3,000. These differences extended to females as well, as evidenced by the 50 percent higher median income of Jewish women compared to that of the total population.

Controlling the census statistics for urban residence and major occupational groups eliminated the sharp differentials noted for the unstandardized data. For males, the standardized data show a median income for Jews of $4,773, just slightly above the median for the total population, $4,472. Narrowing of differentials also extends to the overall distribution by income level. For the standardized data, 18 percent of the Jewish males compared to 23 percent of the total male population had incomes under $3,000; and the proportion with incomes of $10,000 and over is 8.7 and 5.0, respectively. The same narrowing of differentials appears for women as evidenced by the reduction of the difference between the median incomes of Jewish women and all women to less than $100.

Clearly, then, the considerably higher income level characterizing Jews compared with the general population is a function of their concentration in urban areas and in high white-collar positions. This suggests that, as educational differentials between Jews and the rest of the population narrow and as increasing proportions of non-Jews enter higher white-collar positions, the existing income differentials between Jews and the general population will diminish. Such a conclusion seems justified by additional information showing

that for Jews, as for the total population, the median income level rises consistently with increasing education. For example, for Jews with less than an eighth grade education, the average median income was $2,609 but for those with a college degree, the average income was $8,041. If Jews and the total population with similar levels of education are compared, however, the differences in median income are generally less than 10 percent for all educational categories below the college level. For the college groups, and particularly for those with a college degree, the differences increase. In all likelihood, the sharp differential within the college graduate group reflects the higher proportion of Jews who have postgraduate education and who are in high income professional and executive positions. In the future, when proportionately more persons in the population will have a postgraduate education, differences in income level between the Jewish population and the total population will probably greatly diminish.

Table 23

Without further controls, the question of whether religion, occupation, or education is a more important factor in determining income level cannot be clearly determined. Control for occupation and place of residence reduces the income differentials in the three major religious groups, but it does not eliminate them completely. Similarly, comparisons of median income level among various educational categories suggests minimal differences for all but the college educated. Moreover, the range of differences by education within both the Jewish and total population is far greater than the differences in median income between the Jewish group and the total population. Whereas the difference between Jews and the total for most educational levels amounts only to several hundred dollars, the range of differences between the lowest and highest educated Jewish groups amounts to $5,400. On this basis, the conclusion suggested by Donald

Bogue, that education is a much more potent factor than religion in determining the income level of households seems justified.[3] This conclusion is further confirmed by a highly sophisticated statistical analysis of the relation between income and religious affiliation undertaken by Galen L. Gockel which controlled for occupation, education, race and region and size of place of residence using 1962 national sample survey data.[4]

In interpreting Gockel's, Bogue's, and my own conclusions that non-religious factors account for a considerable portion of religious differentials in income level, we must realize that, in actual fact, the differentials do exist; their statistical elimination merely serves to identify the causes of the differences rather than do away with them. The fact remains that, on the whole, the average income of Jews and the proportion of Jews in high income groups are both well above those of most of the population. To the extent that a considerable part of this difference is attributable to factors other than religion, the differences are likely to diminish in the future, both as the occupational composition of the Jewish population itself changes and particularly as higher proportions of non-Jews achieve higher education and move into higher paying occupations.

Intermarriage

Increasing concern with the demographic growth and survival of the Jewish population in the United States is based not only on the low fertility of the Jews; low growth rates or actual decline can also result from excessive losses to the majority group through assimilation. A consistent threat not only to the maintenance of Jewish identification but also to the demographic maintenance of the Jewish population is interfaith marriage. If marital assimilation takes place at a high rate, the Jewish group faces demographic losses both through

the assimilation of the Jewish partner to the marriage and through the loss of children born to any such marriage. In recent years, concern with the "vanishing American Jew" has reached considerable proportions as a variety of evidence has suggested an increasingly high rate of intermarriage. In the face of earlier evidence that the Jewish group had been remarkably successful, compared to other groups, in maintaining religious endogamy, the excitement caused by this new evidence is understandable.[1] It has generated considerable research in Jewish community surveys on the extent of intermarriage, both as an indication of the impact which intermarriage may have on Jewish demographic survival and as an index of the extent of group conformity, loyalty, and cohesiveness among Jews.

No definite assessment of the level and character of Jewish intermarriage and of changes over time can be made until the development of a considerably better body of data than is currently available. Although statistics on rates of intermarriage are available now from a number of community surveys, the quality of the data vary and their use must be preceded by careful attention to the type of community studied, to the comprehensiveness of the study's population coverage, and to the way intermarriage was measured. The rate of intermarriage tends to be considerably higher in those areas where Jews constitute a smaller percentage of the population. The rate of intermarriage is also higher if the data are based on the study in which both Jewish and non-Jewish households in the community are surveyed, since such surveys are most apt to find those families who are on the fringes of the Jewish community. Finally care must be given to the manner in which intermarriage itself is measured. Studies which rely exclusively on the current religious identification of marriage partners run the serious risk of under-counting intermarriages since

those partners to a mixed marriage who changed their religion in conjunction with the marriage would not be identified as having intermarried. There is general agreement that the rate of Jewish intermarriage has increased, but because of the lack of data by which to measure trends as well as serious questions about the quality of available statistics, the extent of the increase has not been clearly determined. A study of intermarriage in New Haven, Connecticut showed, for example, that Jewish intermarriages increased from zero in 1870 to 5.1 percent in 1950;[2] but New Haven is one of the very few communities in which statistics are available over such a long period of time. Most of the other statements concerning increased rates of intermarriage are based on general comparisons of the current levels of intermarriage in various communities and those in a different set of communities at an earlier time. For example, in a series of communities cited by Nathan Goldberg in which surveys were taken during the 1930's the rates of intermarriage generally ranged between 5 and 9 percent.[3] These included such communities as Stamford and New London, Connecticut; Dallas and San Francisco. But during the same period, Duluth, Minnesota showed an intermarriage rate of 17.7 percent. A number of communities which were surveyed in the late 1950's and 1960's also showed levels of intermarriage between 5 and 10 percent. These included such places as Camden, New Jersey; Rochester; Los Angeles; Jacksonville, Florida; Long Beach, California, and the city of San Francisco. Judging by the similarity between these levels and those noted for a number of communities in the 1930's, one could conclude that there has been no significant rise in the level of intermarriage. Also, in the March, 1957 nationwide sample survey, the United States Census found that of all marriages in which at least one partner was Jewish, 7.2 percent were intermarriages; but, this figure is probably somewhat low since no information was collected on the earlier religion of the marriage partners. Couples in which one spouse

had converted were therefore not ennumerated as mixed marriages. However, for the same period of the late 1950's and the 1960's, other estimates of the rate of Jewish intermarriages based on local studies range as high as 37 percent for Marin, California, 18.4 percent for New York City, and 53.6 percent for Iowa.[4] Judging by these latter studies, recent intermarriage rates are higher, but the typicality of these high rates remains questionable.

Other data used to document the rising trend in intermarriage are those comparing differentials among either the various age segments of the population in a given community or the various generation levels. An analysis of this kind by Eric Rosenthal for the Jewish population of Washington, D. C. in 1956 found that the rate of intermarriage was directly related to distance from the immigrant generation.[5] Whereas the mixed marriage rate was 11.3 percent for the total Jewish population, it increased from 1.4 percent among foreign-born husbands to 10.2 percent among native-born husbands of foreign parentage, up to 17.9 percent of native-born husbands of native parentage. Questions have been raised, however, about the typicality of the Jewish community of Washington and whether findings based on it can be generalized to more stable communities.

Rosenthal's more recent research on Indiana using marriage records and covering the years 1960-1963 cites an extraordinarily high rate of intermarriage, 48.8 percent of all marriages occurring in the four-year period.[6] The data indicate that intermarriage increases as the size of the Jewish community decreases. In Marion County, containing Indianapolis, the intermarriage rate was 34.5 percent; in counties containing very small Jewish populations, it rose to 54 percent. Rosenthal suggests that "the larger the Jewish community, the easier it is to organize communal activities, to effect the voluntary concentration of Jewish families in specific residential neighborhoods, and to maintain

an organized marriage market."[7] The key variable is the number of potential marital partners. Although the Indiana situation again cannot be considered typical of United States Jewry the high rates are in themselves alarming. They do confirm the much greater probability that intermarriage will occur in those regions of the country and in those communities where the Jewish population is of inadequate size to encourage and to permit high levels of in-marriage.

Another small Jewish community illustrating the high level of intermarriage is that of Charleston, West Virginia. In 1959 Charleston contained 1,626 Jews. By 1970, its Jewish population had declined to 1,295. In 1958-59 Charleston's birthrate was just above its death rate, to provide a small natural increase. By 1969-70 the death rate in the community was twice that of the birthrate. Of the original 1,626 persons resident in Charleston in 1959, only 939 were left in 1970. The excess of deaths over births coupled with the loss through out-migration of almost 300 Jews contributed to this reduction. But particularly noteworthy is the heavy rate of intermarriage. In 1959, 18.4 percent of all couples living in the Charleston Jewish community were intermarried. By 1970, the proportion had reached 26.8 percent. Of the twelve marriages which took place in the community during 1969, five were intermarriages. Here, on a small scale, is the decline and probable eventual disappearance of a small Jewish community, due, I would suggest, to its very small size, its high degree of isolation, and the particular economic problems of West Virginia. In this process, intermarriage has played a complementary role to net losses through out-migration and the excesses of deaths over births. I do not mean to suggest that such a development will become characteristic of Jewry in the United States as a whole. Yet, fear of this kind of development, based on the statistics for such communities as Washington and Indiana, has given rise to the very great

concern about the impact which intermarriage may have on the future survival of American Jewry. It is also this kind of relationship which I have in mind when I suggest that the greater mobility of American Jewry may bring about increased rates of intermarriage. For if such mobility takes Jews into communities where the size and density of Jewish population is small, the result may be little different from that which has been noted for Indiana or for Charleston, West Virginia.

In assessing our current knowledge of intermarriage, it must be recognized that several important areas of research concerning marriages between Jews and non-Jews have been largely neglected. Not all cases of intermarriage necessarily lead to the loss of the Jewish partner. Conversion of the non-Jew to Judaism may actually add to the Jewish population and also increase the likelihood that the children of such a marriage will be raised as Jews.[8] In order to ascertain the extent to which this happens, surveys focussing on intermarriage must obtain information on the extent of conversion as well as on the religion in which the children of mixed marriages are raised. Both the Providence and Springfield surveys collected such information. Although these surveys are limited by their reliance on master lists, a number of steps were taken to insure maximum opportunity for inclusion of all Jewish households. While no claim is made that the resulting statistics have identified all intermarriages, I do have confidence that the findings do not depart excessively from the real level of intermarriage. This confidence, coupled with the opportunity which these data provide to examine both extent of conversion and extent to which children of mixed marriages are raised as Jews, argues in favor of their brief examination here.

The Providence survey identified 4.5 percent of all marriages as intermarriages, that is, a marriage in which one of the spouses was not born as a

Jew. In the vast majority of these cases, the husband was Jewish and the wife had been born non-Jewish. Only 0.1 percent represented the Jewish wife whose husband was born non-Jewish. Such a pattern of sex differentials, in which more Jewish men marry non-Jewish women, it is typical of almost all communities for which data were collected. Compared to the statistics cited for Washington, San Francisco, and Indiana, the level of intermarriage in Providence is quite low. Yet, it is not atypical, being comparable to levels of intermarriage noted for Rochester, Camden, Springfield, Los Angeles and New Haven. Since these communities do vary in both size and location, no obvious common denominator helps to explain their similar levels of intermarriage.

For all of the intermarried couples, 42 percent had experienced the conversion of one partner to Judaism, thereby creating religious homogeneity within the family unit. The survey could not ascertain the number of Jewish partners to a mixed marriage who converted away from Judaism cancelling out the gains made through conversion of the non-Jewish partner to Judaism. But the survey data do suggest that, for a considerable proportion of intermarriages, conversion to Judaism does occur, thereby enhancing the chances that the family unit will remain identified as Jewish and that the children will be raised as part of the Jewish community.

For Providence, as for Washington, insights into the trend in level of intermarriage can be gained only by cross-sectional comparison of the intermarriage patterns of different age and generation groups within the population. With the exception of the 30-39 year age group, the Providence data point to an increase in the rate of intermarriage among the younger segments of the population, and the highest percent intermarried (9 percent) characterizes the youngest group. On the other hand, the proportion of persons who are converted

to Judaism consistently increases with decreasing age, from none of the non-Jewish spouses in the 60 and over age group to 4 out of 10 among those aged 40-59, to 7 out of 10 among those under age 40. This clear-cut pattern is consistent with a conclusion reached by Gerhard Lenski based on a Detroit study, that the probability that mixed marriages will lead to a conversion is considerably greater among younger persons.[9]

Like the Washington studies, the Providence data indicate that generation status affects the rate of intermarriage; they also show, however, that it affects the extent of conversion. Among the foreign-born, only 1.2 percent are reported intermarried. Among the third generation, this proportion amounts to almost 6 percent. Moreover, the pattern of differentials by generation status operates within the respective age groups. At the same time, only one-fourth of the mixed marriages of the foreign-born resulted in a conversion of the non-Jewish spouse compared to over half of the intermarriages involving third generation males. This pattern of generational differences remains even when age is held constant. While confirming that the rate of intermarriage has risen among third generation compared to first generation Jews, the Providence levels are well below those observed for Washington, D. C. The Providence data also show a higher rate of conversion of the non-Jewish spouse to Judaism among the third compared to the first generation.

Comparisons of the level of intermarriage among the children of the heads of households surveyed in the Providence study support the higher rates for younger segments of the population. Whereas the intermarriage rate of Jews in the survey was 4.5 percent, that among the children of these households was 5.9 percent. Since the children enumerated here include those living outside Greater Providence, the higher rate may reflect not only their younger

age but also a tendency for persons who intermarry to move away from their family's community. Although this may partially represent an attempt at anonymity, it is more likely related to the fact that the child was already living away from home and from parental controls, thus enhancing the possibility of courting and marrying non-Jews. Most likely presenting a more correct image of the sex differential in levels of intermarriage, the data for these children in the survey units indicate that almost 8 percent of the male children intermarried compared to only 4 percent of the females.

The Providence data were also used in an attempt to assess the effect of intermarriage on fertility levels.[10] Comparison of the fertility of the intermarried with that of the non-intermarried shows that for both women 45 years old and older who have completed their fertility and those under 45 years of age who may still have additional children, intermarried couples have lower fertility than the non-intermarried; intermarried couples have a lower average number of children ever born. They have a much higher percent of childlessness; and they have a lower percentage of families with four or more children. Quite clearly, intermarriage results in lowered fertility; but the differences are not as great among the younger women in the population as among the older, suggesting that whatever factor served earlier to restrict the fertility of intermarried couples operates to a lesser degree for the younger couples.

Finally, the Providence survey ascertained the religious identification of all children in households of intermarried couples. Of the 280 children in this category, 136 were children of couples in which the non-Jewish spouse had converted to Judaism and were therefore being raised as Jews. Of the 144 children belonging to families in which the non-Jewish spouse had not converted, 84 children were being raised as Jews and 60 as non-Jews. The fact that only

22 percent of the 280 children of intermarriages were being raised as non-Jews is in strong contrast to the findings of the Washington survey where 70 percent of the children of mixed marriages were being raised as non-Jews. Too few studies have explored this relationship and more research is essential to obtain meaningful data on a national level.

The Springfield survey collected data comparable to that of Providence and its findings, including an overall intermarriage rate of 4.4, are so similar that presentation of the detailed results would be repetitious. Finally, mention must be made of the Boston survey of 1965, both because of its very comprehensive coverage of the population and because it represents a Jewish community of about 200,000 persons. This survey found that 7 percent of the marriages represented intermarriages. Although higher than the level noted for Providence and Springfield, this percentage is still markedly below the high levels noted in some other communities. The Boston data do, however, suggest a sharp rise in the level of intermarriage among the very youngest segment of the population. Intermarriage characterized only 3 percent of the couples in which the age of the husband was 51 and over, and only 7 percent of those between ages 31 and 50; but 20 percent of the couples in which the husband is 30 years or younger were intermarried. Regretfully, the Boston study did not report how many of the intermarried persons had converted or in what religion the children of such marriages were being raised.

What is the overall picture that emerges? No simple answer to this seems possible. Quite a heterogeneous pattern characterizes the United States depending on the size, location, age, and social cohesiveness of the particular community. Yet within these variations in level of intermarriage, the analysis of the data in terms of age and generation status do suggest that the intermarriage rate is increasing among the young, native-born Americans. Unless

this pattern is reversed, the overall rate of intermarriage can be expected to rise as an increasing proportion of the population becomes third generation and moves away from the areas of dense Jewish population to the newly developing suburbs and to more distant communities where the number of Jews is fewer and the organized Jewish life is weaker. At the same time our data suggest that although the rate of intermarriage may be increasing among the third generation, a higher proportion of these intermarriages results in the conversion of the non-Jewish spouse to Judaism: the rate of conversions is higher precisely among those groups where intermarriage is higher. Moreover, a significant proportion of children in such marriages are being raised as Jews. And finally, the fertility patterns of the young intermarried couples also more closely resemble those of the non-intermarried than was true of the older age groups. These changes suggest that the net effects of intermarriage on the overall size of the Jewish population may not yet be as serious demographically as suggested by several Jewish community studies. What their effect is on Jewish identification and religiosity is beyond the scope of this evaluation. There can be little doubt that the problem of intermarriage warrants considerable concern both on the policy and the research level, but from a demographic point of view there is as much need to focus on questions of Jewish fertility and Jewish population redistribution.

Overview of Future Demographic Trends

Given the available information on the demographic history of the American Jewish community and on its structure as of 1970, what future patterns of development can be anticipated?

Numbering about 6 million in 1970, after slow growth during all but the first several decades of this century, the Jewish population is likely to

continue its slow increase. Such a slow rate of growth stems particularly from the low level of Jewish fertility, which is below that of Protestants and Catholics and hovers close to the minimum needed for replacement. Limited data suggest that Jewish death rates are slightly below those of the general population, but the overall death rate is likely to rise as the average age of the Jewish population increases. This, coupled with possible larger losses from intermarriage, despite some evidence of an increasing tendency toward conversion of the non-Jewish partner, will contribute to maintenance if not accentuation of the slow growth rate. As a result, the Jewish population, even while growing slightly, will come to constitute an increasingly smaller proportion of the total American population, having already declined from the peak of 3.7 percent to less than 3 percent by 1970.

While declining as a percent of the total population, Jews will also become more dispersed throughout the United States. As a result of continuously higher education and changing occupations, lower levels of self-employment, weakening family ties, and reduced discrimination, Jews are likely to migrate in increasing numbers away from the major centers of Jewish population concentration. This will operate on several levels. Regionally, it will lead to fewer Jews in the Northeast. Jews will continue to be highly concentrated in metropolitan areas; but within the metropolitan areas, ever increasing numbers will move out of the urban center and former ghettos into the suburbs. In doing so, the Jewish population will become much more geographically dispersed, even while distinct areas of Jewish concentration remain.

At the same time that its overall numbers and distribution change, the Jewish population will also undergo significant changes in selected aspects

of its socio-economic composition. In others, it will show less change; but, because of changes in the general population, differences between Jews and non-Jews may narrow.

Because of the significant reduction in Jewish immigration to the United States since the 1920's and the subsequent aging and death of the immigrants, the most striking compositional change characterizing American Jewry is the reduction in the percent of foreign-born. Indeed, even the proportion of second generation persons will increasingly diminish as third and fourth generation Jews become an even larger proportion of the Jewish population with all this implies for questions of Jewish identification and assimilation. Reflecting their lower fertility the Jewish population, already six years older on the average than the general population, is likely to undergo further aging. This will mean a considerable increase in the proportion of older persons and also in the percentage of widowed individuals, especially women.

Already unique in their high concentration among the more educated, high white-collar, and high income groups, still further changes can be anticipated. College education will be an almost universal phenomenon among Jews and an increasing proportion will pursue graduate studies. At the same time, continuously rising education levels among non-Jews may lead to narrowing of educational differentials between Jews and non-Jews. Stemming from the high proportion of Jews who obtain specialized university training, from a tendency of Jews to move out of small family businesses and into salaried employment, and from an increasing willingness to seek and take positions away from the community of current residence, Jews are likely to move in increasing numbers into technical and executive occupations within the top professional and managerial occupational categories in which they are already heavily concentrated.

At the same time, the general upward shift in the occupational level of the general population will lead to narrowing of existing differences in the occupational structure of the Jewish and non-Jewish population. In turn, this narrowing in both educational and occupational differences will lead to reduction in the income differences currently characterizing Jews and non-Jews. Such a development is strongly suggested by the fact that with control for education and occupation, income differences between Jews and non-Jews have been shown to be greatly reduced and sometimes reversed.

These demographic changes point to a number of challenges which the American Jewish community must face. In the last three decades of the twentieth century, increasing Americanization will continue, as judged by greater geographic dispersion, higher percent of third and fourth generation individuals, and narrowing of key socio-economic differentials such as education, occupation and income. To what extent will the diminution in the distinctive population characteristics of Jews and their greater residential integration lead to behavioral convergence? The risks and the opportunities for this to happen, depending on how one views the situation, are increasingly present. Recent research suggests that, while increasing similarity on the behavioral level is likely, structural separation and the continuity of Jewish identification will persist.[1] The direction of changes appears to be the adjustment of American Jewry to the American way of life, creating a meaningful balance between Jewishness and Americanism.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

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3. For a fuller discussion of the socio-historical setting for contemporary American Jewry, see Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968). See also C. Bezalel Sherman, The Jew Within American Society (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965).

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5. Taueber, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

6. Ibid., pp. 5-8.

7. Sidney Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials among Religious Groups in the United States," American Journal of Sociology, 74 (May, 1969), pp. 612-631.

8. Donald J. Bogue, The Population of the United States (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 688-709; Bernard Lazerwitz, "A Comparison of Major United States Religious Groups," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 56 (September, 1961), pp. 568-579.

9. A selected bibliography of community surveys is included in Appendix A of this paper. The reader is referred to this list for citations of specific studies. No separate footnote citations will be given to them in the text.

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1. Ben B. Seligman, "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography," in Marshall Sklare, op. cit., p. 54.

2. See Gosta Carlsson and Katarina Carlsson, "Age Cohorts and the Generation of Generations," American Sociological Review, 35 (August, 1970), pp. 710-718.

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1. Seligman, "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography," op. cit., pp. 83-86.

2. Ibid., p. 83.

3. The following three sections of this paper - on Education, Occupation, and Income - are based largely on data from the unpublished statistics of the 1957 census survey sample and on Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials among Religious Groups in the United States," op. cit.

4. A. Lewis Rhodes and Charles B. Nam, "The Religious Context of Educational Expectations," American Sociological Review, 35 (April, 1970), pp. 253-267.

5. Ibid., pp. 263-264.

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1. Nathan Glazer, "The American Jew and the Attainment of Middle-Class Rank: Some Trends and Explanations," in Marshall Sklare, op. cit., p. 138.

2. Ibid., p. 140.

3. Ibid., p. 146.

4. Ibid.

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5. Donald J. Bogue, op. cit., pp. 702-705.

6. Bernard Lazerwitz, "A Comparison of Major United States Religious Groups," op. cit., pp. 574-575.

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1. Bernard Lazerwitz, "A Comparison of Major United States Religious Groups," loc. cit.

2. Donald J. Bogue, op. cit., pp. 705-708.

3. Bogue, Ibid., p. 708.

4. Galen L. Gockel, "Income and Religious Affiliation," American Journal of Sociology, 74 (May, 1969), pp. 632-647.

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2. Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, "What Has Social Science to Say About Intermarriage?"in Werner J. Cahnman, Ed., Intermarriage and Jewish Life (New York: Herzl Press, 1963), p. 29.

3. Nathan Goldberg, "The Jewish Population in the United States," in The Jewish People, Past and Present, p. 29.

4. New York data are taken from Jerold S. Heiss, "Premarital Characteristics of the Religiously Intermarried in an Urban Area," American Sociological Review, 25 (1960), pp. 47-55. Iowa data were analyzed by Erich Rosenthal, "Studies of Jewish Intermarriage in the United States," American Jewish Yearbook, Vol. 64 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1963), pp. 34-51.

5. Rosenthal, op. cit.

6. Erich Rosenthal, "Jewish Intermarriage in Indiana," American Jewish Yearbook, Vol. 68 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1967), pp. 263.

7. Ibid., pp. 263-264.

8. Marshall Sklare, "Intermarriage and Jewish Survival," Commentary, 49 (March, 1970), pp. 51-58.

9. Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 54-55.

10. Goldstein and Goldscheider, op. cit., pp. 166-169.

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1. Goldstein and Goldscheider, op. cit., pp. 232-243.

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AMERICAN JEWRY, 1970 - A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

by Sidney Goldstein

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TABLES

Appendix A

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Table 1

JEWISH POPULATION GROWTH,
UNITED STATES, 1790-1970

Year	Number	Percent of Total U.S. Population
1790	1,200	0.03
1818	3,000	0.03
1826	6,000	0.06
1840	15,000	0.1
1848	50,000	0.2
1880	230,000	0.5
1888	400,000	0.6
1897	938,000	1.3
1900	1,058,000	1.4
1907	1,777,000	2.0
1917	3,389,000	3.3
1927	4,228,000	3.6
1937	4,771,000	3.7
1950	5,000,000	3.5
1960	5,531,000	3.1
1968	5,869,000	2.9

Source: Estimates for 1818-1899 based on "Jewish Statistics", American Jewish Yearbook (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1900), p. 623. Estimates for 1790 and 1907-1937 are from: Nathan Goldberg, "The Jewish Population in the United States" in The Jewish People, Past and Present, Vol. 2 (New York: Jewish Encyclopedic Handbooks, 1955), p. 25. The 1950-1968 estimates are from 1969 American Jewish Yearbook, p. 260.

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Table 2

SELECTED MORTALITY MEASURES, JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATION OF GREATER PROVIDENCE*

Age	Death Rates Per 1,000 Population				Number Surviving to Specified Age Per 1,000 Born Alive**			
	Males		Females		Males		Females	
	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White
Under 1	10.9	25.7	14.3	20.0	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
1-4	..	0.8	..	0.8	989	975	986	981
5-14	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.3	989	972	986	978
15-24	..	0.8	0.8	0.4	984	968	984	975
25-34	0.6	1.1	..	0.7	984	961	976	971
35-44	2.4	2.7	0.7	1.7	978	950	976	964
45-54	4.6	9.2	3.2	4.8	955	924	969	948
55-64	17.2	23.8	13.2	11.7	912	843	938	904
65-74	55.8	52.5	43.6	31.3	768	664	822	804
75-84	124.4	108.2	91.1	85.0	433	388	528	587
85 and Over	380.9	232.8	328.1	202.9	101	182	197	237

Expectation of Remaining Years of Specified Ages**

Age	Males		Females	
	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White
Under 1	70.8	67.5	73.4	73.6
1-4	70.6	68.2	73.4	74.1
5-14	66.6	64.4	69.4	70.3
15.24	56.9	54.7	60.0	60.6
25-34	46.9	45.1	50.0	50.8
35.44	37.2	35.5	40.0	41.1
45-54	27.9	26.4	30.3	31.7
55-64	19.0	18.4	21.1	23.0
65-74	11.6	12.1	13.4	15.2
75-84	6.8	7.1	8.0	9.0
85 and Over	2.6	4.6	3.0	5.0

*Deaths to Jewish population, 1962-64; deaths to total white population of Rhode Island, 1959-61.

** Statistics refer to age at beginning of the age range indicated. E.G. of 1,000 Jewish males born, 989 were alive at age 1 and 955 were alive at age 45. The average number of years of life remaining at ages 1 and 45 were 70.6 and 27.9, respectively.

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Table 3

JEWISH FERTILITY RATIO: NUMBER OF CHILDREN
UNDER AGE 5 TO NUMBER OF WOMEN AGED 20-44, SELECTED COMMUNITIES

Community	Year	Fertility Ratio
New Orleans	1953	496
Lynn, Mass.	1955	528
Canton, Ohio	1955	469
Des Moines, Iowa	1956	596
Worcester, Mass.	1957	525
New Orleans	1958	510
Los Angeles	1959	560
South Bend, Indiana	1961	494
Rochester	1961	489
Providence	1963	450
Camden	1964	480
Springfield	1966	418
Columbus, Ohio	1969	444
U.S. White Population	1960	667
U.S. White Population	1969	523

Source: See bibliography for citation of individual community studies.

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Table 4

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL UNITED STATES AND JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGIONS, 1900, 1930, AND 1968

Region	1900 Jewish[1]	1900 United States[2]	1930[3] Jewish	1930 United States	1968[4] Jewish	1968 United States
Northeast	56.6	27.7	68.3	27.9	64.0	24.2
New England	7.4	7.5	8.4	6.6	6.8	5.7
Middle Atlantic	49.2	20.3	59.9	21.3	57.1	18.5
North Central	23.7	34.6	19.6	31.4	12.5	27.8
East North Central	18.3	21.0	15.7	20.5	10.2	19.8
West North Central	5.4	13.6	3.9	10.9	2.3	8.0
South	14.2	32.2	7.6	30.7	10.3	31.2
South Atlantic	8.0	13.7	4.3	12.8	8.1	15.0
East South Central	3.3	9.9	1.4	8.0	0.7	6.6
West South Central	2.9	8.6	1.9	9.9	1.5	9.6
West	5.5	5.4	4.6	10.0	13.2	16.8
Mountain	2.3	2.2	1.0	3.0	0.9	4.0
Pacific	3.2	3.2	3.6	7.0	12.2	12.8
Total United States						
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number (in 1,000's)	1,058	75,994	4,228	123,203	5,869	199,861

1. "Jewish Statistics," American Jewish Yearbook, Vol. 1, (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1900), Pp. 623-624.

2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census of Population, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 1961, p. 1-16.

3. "Statistics of Jews," American Jewish Yearbook, Vol. 32 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1931), p. 276.

4. "Jewish Population in the United States," American Jewish Yearbook, Vol. 70. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), p. 266.

Table 5

URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, JEWISH AND TOTAL CIVILIAN POPULATION, UNITED STATES, MARCH 1957

Residence	Total	Jewish
Total Urban	63.9	96.1
Urbanized Areas of 250,000 or more	36.6	87.4
Other Urban	27.3	8.7
Rural Non-Farm	24.4	3.6
Rural Farm	11.7	0.2
Total Percent	100.0	100.0
Total Number (in 1,000's)	119,333	3,868

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States: March 1957," Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 79 (February 2, 1958), Table 3.

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Table 6

JEWISH POPULATION OF NEW YORK AREA
1923-1975

Distribution of New York City Jews Among 5 Boroughs

Area	1923	1930	1957	1975
Manhattan	37.4	16.3	16.0	15.1
Bronx	20.3	32.1	23.3	21.1
Brooklyn	39.3	46.6	40.3	38.6
Queens	2.7	4.8	20.0	24.8
Richmond	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
Total Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total Number (in 1,000's)	1,882	1,825	2,115	2,133

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Distribution of New York Area Jews Between City and Selected Suburbs*

	1957	1975
New York City	81.9	78.5
Nassau	12.8	14.6
Suffolk	0.8	1.2
Westchester	4.5	5.7
Total Percent	100.0	100.0
Total Number (in 1,000's)	2,580	2,715

Source: C. Morris Horowitz and Lawrence J. Kaplan, The Jewish Population of the New York Area, 1900-1975 (New York: Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1959), Table 9.

* A revised estimate prepared for the American Jewish Yearbook, 1963, shows a total Jewish population of 1,836,000 for New York City in 1960 and a total of 2,688,000 for the N.Y.-Northeastern N.J. Standard Consolidated Area: 68.4% in N.Y.C., 20.2% in Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester, and 11.3% in Rockland, N.Y., County and 8 counties of New Jersey.

Table 7

DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH HOUSEHOLDS
IN GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1951, 1963, AND 1970

Residence	Percent Distribution 1951	1963	1970	Percentage Change 1951-1970*
Total Urban	88.5	72.5	64.2	-31.6
Old Urban	45.3	22.4	16.6	-66.3
New Urban	43.2	50.1	47.6	+ 5.4
Suburban	11.5	27.5	35.8	+199.3
Total Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	-

*Number of households in 1970 compared to 1951.

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Table 8

JEWISH COMPOSITION OF PRESENT NEIGHBORHOOD
AND PREFERRED COMPOSITION, COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1969

Percent Jewish	Present Composition	Preferred Composition
About 100%	1	3
At least 75%	8	8
About 50%	20	48
25% to about 50%	31	25
Under 25%	30	2
No other Jews	6	0
Don't know	4	14
Total Percent	100	100

Source: Albert J. Mayer, Columbus Jewish Population Study, 1969 (Columbus: Columbus Jewish Welfare Foundation, 1970), p. 87.

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Table 9

RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN LIVING AWAY FROM PARENTAL HOME, JEWISH HOUSEHOLDS OF GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1963, BY AGE AND SEX OF CHILDREN

Age	Residence of Children in Relation to Parental Residence						
	Same City	Different Part of Metropolitan Area	Elsewhere in State	Other State in New England	Other United States	Abroad	Total
			Sons				
Under 20	11.6	7.7	15.4	19.2	42.3	-	100.0
20-39	24.4	20.4	2.7	15.1	34.4	2.4	100.0
40 and Over	43.6	19.5	1.5	12.4	21.9	1.1	100.0
Total	30.4	19.8	2.8	14.1	30.0	2.1	100.0
			Daughters				
Under 20	18.2	12.8	3.6	25.4	36.4	3.6	100.0
20-39	27.1	20.9	2.9	23.3	24.9	0.7	100.0
40 and Over	50.0	23.1	-	14.1	12.2	0.6	100.0
Total	33.2	21.0	2.2	20.6	21.6	1.1	100.0

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Table 10

NATIVITY OF JEWISH POPULATION,
SELECTED COMMUNITIES

Community	Year of Study	Nativity		Total Percent**
		U.S. Born	Foreign-Born	
Trenton, N.J.	1949	77	24	100
New Orleans	1953	81	17	100
Los Angeles	1953	68	32	100
Canton, Ohio	1955	77	23	100
Des Moines, Iowa	1956	78	22	100
Washington, D.C.	1956	83	17	100
Memphis, Tenn.	1959	81	18	100
San Francisco	1959	72	26	100
Los Angeles	1959	75	25	100
Rochester	1961	79	21	100
South Bend, Indiana	1961	80	20	100
Trenton, N.J.	1961	85	15	100
Providence	1963	83	17	100
Detroit*	1963	62	38	100
Pittsburgh	1963	88	12	100
Camden, N.J.	1964	91	9	100
Milwaukee*	1964	65	35	100
Springfield, Mass.	1966	85	14	100
Boston	1966	83	15	100
Columbus, Ohio*	1969	74	26	100

Source: See bibliography for citation of individual community studies.

* Head of Household

**Includes small percent of unknown nativity

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Table 11

GENERATION STATUS BY AGE,
JEWISH POPULATION OF GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1963

Age	Generation Status*				Total Percent
	First	Second	Mixed	Third	
Under 15	1.7	2.4	9.3	86.6	100.0
15-24	3.1	5.3	15.2	76.4	100.0
25-44	7.6	44.8	19.9	27.7	100.0
45-64	25.9	63.9	6.5	3.7	100.0
65 and Over	72.9	24.5	1.3	1.3	100.0
Total	17.0	32.2	11.0	39.8	100.0

*"First" refers to foreign-born; "second" to U.S. born of foreign-born parentage; mixed to U.S. born of one foreign-born and one U.S. born parent; "third" to persons of third, fourth, or higher order generations.

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Table 12

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH POPULATION BY AGE,
SELECTED COMMUNITIES AND UNITED STATES

Community	Date of Study	Age Distribution					Total Percent
		Under 15	15-24	25-44	45-64	65 and over	
Washington, D.C.	1956	30	9	38	18	5	100
Worcester, Mass.	1957	27	11	26	26	10	100
Los Angeles	1959	27	12	25	28	8	100
Rochester	1961	25	12	24	26	13	100
St. Joseph, Ind.	1961	30	14	24	24	8	100
Pittsburgh	1963	27	14	25	26	8	100
Providence	1963	25	14	24	27	10	100
Detroit	1963	31	11	25	25	8	100
Milwaukee	1964	24	15	23	28	10	100
Camden, N.J.	1964	30	13	23	28	6	100
Springfield, Mass.	1966	24	16	21	27	12	100
Boston	1966	23	17	25	24	11	100
Flint, Mich.	1967	29	10	30	23	8	100
Columbus, Ohio	1969	27	13	23	28	9	100
United States Jews	1957*	23	12	28	28	10	100
United States Whites	1957*	28	14	28	21	9	100

Source: See bibliography for citation of individual community studies.

*For United States, lowest age categories are "Under 14" and "14-24."

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Table 13

EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ADULT JEWISH POPULATION, SELECTED COMMUNITIES

Community	Year	Educational Distribution: 8 Grades and Less	1-3 High School	4 High School	1-3 College	4 or More College	Total Percent
Trenton, N.J.	1949	22	7	32	9	18	100
Canton, Ohio	1955	21	10	33	18	8	100
Des Moines, Iowa	1956	18	7	32	19	19	100
Washington, D.C.	1956	10	8	27	16	36	100
New Orleans	1958	10	8	18	20	28	100
Los Angeles	1959	9	15	- 49	-	23	100
South Bend	1961	17	8	33	18	22	100
Rochester	1961	21	12	30	30	23	100
Providence	1963	15	8	34	16	25	100
Detroit	1963	9	- 37	-	- 54	-	100
Camden	1964	11	9	34	18	28	100
Milwaukee	1964	11	11	28	23	27	100
Springfield	1966	11	7	33	19	27	100

Source: See bibliography for citation of individual community studies.

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TABLE 14

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX, UNITED STATES, 1957

Years of School Completed	Total Population	Jewish	Total Population	Jewish	Total Population	Jewish
	Males		Females		Total	
Elementary: 0-7	23.2	14.7	20.3	16.6	21.7	15.6
8	18.5	13.1	17.4	13.1	17.9	13.1
High School 1-3	17.3	9.7	18.1	10.2	17.7	10.0
4	22.1	21.5	29.5	35.8	26.0	29.0
College: 1-3	7.3	12.6	7.4	12.8	7.3	12.7
4 or More	9.4	25.6	5.7	9.7	7.5	17.3
Not Reported	2.2	2.8	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.3
Total Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median School Years Completed	10.3	12.5	10.9	12.3	10.6	12.3

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March, 1957." (Unpublished)

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Table 15

EDUCATION COMPLETED BY AGE AND SEX,
JEWISH POPULATION OF GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1963.

	Age			
Education	25-44	45-64	65 and Over	Total
None	0.2	2.1	23.7	4.8
Elementary				
1-4	0.0	0.8	5.7	1.2
5-7	0.4	2.5	9.1	2.7
8	0.3	6.9	15.7	5.7
High School				
9-11	2.8	11.1	10.2	7.8
12	34.4	40.0	16.5	34.2
College				
1-3	22.9	14.8	3.7	16.2
4	18.4	9.5	3.0	11.9
5 or more	20.3	10.8	3.9	13.4
Unknown	0.4	1.7	8.5	2.2
Total Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median Years	14.5	12.6	8.2	12.8
Median Years, Males	15.9	12.7	8.3	13.0
Median Years, Females	13.6	12.5	8.1	12.7

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Table 16

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION,
MALE JEWISH POPULATION, SELECTED COMMUNITIES

Community	Year of Study	Occupational Distribution				
		Professionals	Proprietors	Clerical and Sales	Manual Workers	Total Percent
Canton, Ohio	1955	14	55	14	12	100
Des Moines, Iowa	1956	14	53	24	5	100
Washington, D C.	1956	38	24	21	10	100
San Francisco	1958	28	27	34	11	100
New Orleans	1958	25	49	18	8	100
Los Angeles	1959	25	31	24	20	100
South Bend, Ind.	1961	18	57	15	11	100
Rochester	1961	27	30	24	20	100
Trenton	1961	27	54	13	5	100
Providence	1963	21	41	25	12	100
Detroit	1963	23	54	13	10	100
Milwaukee	1964	22	35	26	15	100
Camden	1964	34	31	22	13	100
Springfield	1966	25	39	27	9	100
Boston	1966	32	27	31	10	100
Flint	1967	36	50	7	7	100
Columbus	1969	36	43	15	6	100

Source: See bibliography for citation of individual community studies.

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TABLE 17

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, BY AGE AND SEX, TOTAL AND URBAN UNITED STATES, 1957

Age and Sex	Total United States		Urban United States	
	Total Population	Jewish	Total Population	Jewish
Both Sexes	57.0	55.1	58.5	55.1
Male	81.1	81.5	81.5	81.5
14-17 Years	30.5	*	28.4	*
18-24 Years	79.1	53.9	78.1	51.7
25-34 Years	97.0	97.0	96.8	96.8
35-44 Years	97.8	99.1	98.1	99.1
45-64 Years	92.7	96.1	93.4	96.0
65 Years and Over	37.4	46.9	35.0	48.0
Female	35.1	30.7	38.3	30.8
14-17 Years	17.7	*	19.2	*
18-24 Years	45.5	57.2	50.7	57.2
25-34 Years	34.8	25.5	38.7	25.9
35-44 Years	42.6	33.5	45.7	34.2
45-64 Years	41.1	38.2	44.1	37.9
65 Years and Over	11.5	8.5	12.8	8.6

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March, 1957." (Unpublished.)

* Base is less than 150,000

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Table 18

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES FOR JEWISH AND ALL MARRIED WOMEN LIVING IN SAME HOUSEHOLD AS HUSBAND, BY AGE, AND PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, UNITED STATES, 1957

Age and Presence of Children	Total	Jewish
Total Married Women, Husband Present	29.6	27.8
Age		
Under 25 Years	29.1	*
25-34 Years	27.2	18.7
35-44 Years	35.7	24.5
45-64 Years	32.3	30.6
65 Years and Over	6.4	*
Presence of Children		
No Own Children Under 18 Years	35.6	30.0
With Children 6-17 Years, None Under 6 Years	36.7	28.6
With Children Under 6 Years	17.0	11.8

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957 sample survey unpublished data.
*Base is less than 150,000.

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TABLE 19

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS 18 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX, TOTAL AND URBAN UNITED STATES*, 1957

Major Occupation Group	Total United States				Urban United States			
	Total Population	Jewish	Total Population	Jewish	Total Population	Jewish	Total Population	Jewish
	Males		Females		Males		Females	
Professional	9.9	20.3	12.2	15.5	11.5	9.9	12.5	8.9
Farmers & Farm Managers	7.3	0.1	0.7	0.2	0.4	-	-	-
Managers & Proprietors	13.3	35.1	5.5	8.9	14.6	36.8	5.3	8.9
Clerical Workers	6.9	8.0	30.3	43.9	8.6	8.0	33.5	41.3
Sales Workers	5.4	14.1	6.9	14.4	6.3	15.0	7.1	19.0
Skilled Laborers	20.0	8.9	1.0	0.7	21.3	11.7	1.1	1.0
Semi-Skiller Laborers	20.9	10.1	17.1	11.2	21.7	14.0	17.7	15.1
Service Workers	6.1	2.3	22.7	5.1	7.7	3.4	22.1	5.9
Farm Laborers	2.5	0.1	3.0	-	0.3	0.1	0.1	-
Unskilled Laborers	7.7	0.8	0.6	-	7.7	1.1	0.5	-
Total Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total White Collar	35.5	77.5	54.9	82.7	41.0	69.7	58.4	78.1
Total Blue Collar	57.2	22.2	44.4	17.0	58.7	30.3	41.5	22.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957." (Unpublished.)

* Standardized by years of school completed.

Table 20

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED COLLEGE GRADUATES IN URBAN AREAS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, JEWISH AND TOTAL UNITED STATES POPULATION, 1957

Major Occupation Group	Total	Jewish
Professional	63.2	58.2
Managers & Proprietors	15.7	22.1
Clerical Workers	8.2	8.9
Sales Workers	5.8	7.8
Skilled Laborers	3.2	0.9
Semi-Skilled Laborers	1.5	1.3
Other Occupations	2.4	0.9
Total Percent	100.0	100.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957 sample survey unpublished data.

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Table 21

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS BY AGE AND SEX,
JEWISH POPULATION OF GREATER PROVIDENCE, 1963

Age	Occupation					
	Professionals	Managers	Clerical Workers	Sales Workers	Manual Laborers	Total Percent*
			Males			
15-24	12.3	24.6	13.9	24.6	21.5	100.0
25-44	24.6	37.9	4.8	24.3	9.2	100.0
45-64	19.0	43.6	3.5	19.5	13.4	100.0
65 and Over	17.2	50.5	4.0	11.1	17.2	100.0
Total	20.7	41.0	4.5	20.9	12.1	100.0
			Females			
15-24	22.0	4.0	64.0	2.0	6.0	100.0
25-44	32.3	10.3	34.8	16.1	5.8	100.0
45-64	8.9	15.3	42.8	22.9	7.6	100.0
65 and Over	1.3	31.6	21.5	26.1	16.4	100.0
Total	17.9	12.9	41.6	18.4	7.2	100.0

*Includes small percentage of unknown occupation

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TABLE 22

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY INCOME IN 1956, JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX, TOTAL AND URBAN, UNITED STATES*

Income	Total United States				Urban United States			
	Total Population	Jewish	Total Population	Jewish	Total Population	Jewish	Total Population	Jewish
	Males		Females		Males		Females	
Under $1,000	17.2	10.0	46.9	39.0	5.6	4.1	23.2	22.5
$1,000 to $1,999	11.7	9.0	19.3	16.6	6.1	6.4	20.6	18.8
$2,000 to $2,999	12.1	7.4	15.7	15.2	10.8	7.6	24.3	24.7
$3,000 to $3,999	14.8	11.0	11.0	15.1	17.4	13.9	19.6	19.1
$4,000 to $4,999	15.9	14.0	4.3	6.5	21.4	23.3	7.8	9.7
$5,000 to $5,999	11.9	13.4	1.5	3.6	16.0	17.0	2.7	2.8
$6,000 to $9,999	12.7	18.0	0.9	2.3	17.6	18.9	1.4	1.7
$10,000 and Over	3.6	17.2	0.2	1.5	5.0	8.7	0.3	0.7
Total Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Median Income	$3,608	$4,900	$1,146	$1,663	$4,472	$4,773	$2,255	$2,352

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957 sample survey unpublished data.

* Standardized for major occupation group.

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Table 23

MEDIAN INCOME IN 1956 OF JEWISH AND ALL UNITED STATES URBAN MEN 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED

Years of School Completed		Total	Jewish
Elementary:	0-7	$2,654	$2,609
	8	3,631	3,844
High School:	1-3	3,858	4,672
	4	4,563	4,913
College:	1-3	4,526	5,026
	4 or More	6,176	8,041

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957 sample survey unpublished data.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Identity and Affiliation of American Jews

Prepared for the
American Jewish Committee
Task Force on the Future
of the Jewish Community
in America

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

by
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IDENTITY AND AFFILIATION OF AMERICAN JEWS

So much has been written about American Jewish identity that it is difficult, in the absence of fresh data, to say anything new. The temptation, therefore, is to try and be bright. I will avoid that temptation both because of my limitations and also because the Jewish community has had no shortage of bright commentators though a dearth of wise ones. Since I have not reached the age of wisdom the best I can do is provide a dosage of common sense. Nevertheless, the paper does reflect my own values and perspectives. My only apology is that if the paper were written by someone else it would only reflect some other authors values. It may be possible to prepare a working paper on Jewish demography in which the author's own values are irrelevant to his presentation. This is impossible in the case of a paper on Jewish identity because the author's values dictate both his choice of materials and his interpretation of them.

The problem of Jewish identity has at least two dimensions. The first is the question of how strongly Jews are identified with Judaism. The second is how the Jew defines his Jewish identity. Superficially, the first dimension refers to the survival of Jewish life, and the second to its quality. However, as we shall suggest,

both the question of Jewish survival and the question of the quality of Jewish life can serve as dangerous slogans whose referrents may include any number of mutually contradictory programs. Furthermore, both the possibility of survival and the quality of Jewish life are interrelated directly and indirectly through their mutual dependance on the American environment.

The Strength of Jewish Identity

The ultimate test of Jewish commitment is behavioral rather than attitudinal. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the commitment of most Jews after seeing their response to events in the Middle East in the Spring of 1967. To a large extent, the social scientist cannot measure the depth or strength of Jewish identity much less uncover its basis. The best that can be done is to judge the behavioral responses of American Jews "other things being equal" and recognize the limitation that when other things are not equal Jewish responses are likely to be exceptional. In the past 25 years Jews perceived one extraordinary threat to Jewish survival and they responded in an extraordinary manner. Nonetheless, in full recognition of the limitations of this analysis, I do not believe that Jewish reaction in May and June of 1967 presages any permanent change in either the strength of commitment or in the nature of Jewish identity.

With these caveats let us note some general points about the strength of Jewish identity.

1. Jews feel at ease about being Jewish. A number of studies report an overwhelmingly affirmative response to the question: "If you

were to be born again would you want to be born a Jew?" Jews are not ashamed of being Jewish but they are sensitive to the fact that other Jews may be. Thus, they most frequently characterize the quality of a "good Jew" as one who "accepts his being a Jew and doesn't try to hide it." What is significant here is first that Jews acknowledge the importance of Jewish self pride but secondly, that they believe this quality is relevant. In other words, Jews conceive of a "poor Jew"; one who tries to hide his Jewishness. I think if we substituted the term American or Israeli for Jew, we would get a notion of the peculiarity of this characteristic as a desirable quality. "A good American (Israeli) is someone who accepts his being an American (Israeli) and doesn't try to hide it"(?) I am inclined to believe that among a sample of younger Jews a smaller percentage would list this characteristic as a necessary quality of a good Jew.

2. Judaism occupies a very small part of the American Jew's life space. As Simon Herman notes, "the American Jew tends to see his Jewishness as relevant only in certain settings and on certain occasions - his being Jewish is related to specific limited regions of the life space."[1]

We might better understand the significance of this fact if we juxtapose it to the theory which gained wide acceptance in the 1950's

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1. Simon Herman, American Students in Israel (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970). (quoted from page-proofs)

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that religion was the major vehicle through which the American related himself to his national society. Perhaps this was true in the 1950's though it is unlikely; it is certainly not true in the 70s. Jews continue to identify themselves as Jewish because they want to do so, or like to do so, or can't escape doing so. But they don't see that being Jewish makes them any more or better Americans. Perhaps it does, and perhaps the perceptive sociologist sees it, but American Jews don't.

3. America, though, is quite relevant to Jewish identity. The American environment is conducive to the maintenance of Jewish identity just as it is corrosive of its traditional content. It is worth while reviewing some well known facts whose enormous consequences for Jewish identity are in no way diminished by their obviousness. First of all, the American Jew is free to identify as a Jew without any legal and increasingly even social sanctions being attached to that identity. Only someone insensitive to Jewish history would argue that this condition will necessarily continue. But it remains true today and is, in fact, so taken for granted bythe overwhelming majority of American Jews that one must conclude that they are indeed insensitive to Jewish history.

The second important if obvious fact about the American environment is that Judaism shares enough characteristics in common with other legitimate sub-groups in the environment that there is nothing

peculiar attached to one's self identification as a Jew. All societies tolerate sub-groups and depend upon them to perform a variety of social functions. All societies must, therefore, accord these sub-groups some degree of freedom and autonomy. But it does not follow that the particular sub-groups which society recognizes as legitimate and whose autonomy and freedom it fosters need be ethnic or religious groups. Indeed, there were signs in the last decade that ethnic and religious differences were being replaced by occupational and age groups differences as a legitimate basis for social divisions. A youth culture, a golden-age culture, a college culture, or a professional culture tend to cut across ethnic and religious differences. The cry of Black Power and demand for racial recognition may retard the expansion of these new sub-cultures. There is evidence that it has impeded the development of a universalist student culture on college campuses and this has invigorated the self-identity of many Jewish students. But Black self consciousness may be moderated to the point where it no longer provides an obstacle to the development of age and profession sub-groups. These in turn, will increasingly preempt the role and function of religious and ethnic groups. In that case, Jewish self-identity will become even less relevant to other aspects of the individuals life space and more idiosyncratic in the American environment.

4. The present condition of American Jews, far from thrusting an identity crisis upon them, is ideally suited to their identity needs and values. These are the same values which have characterized modern European as well as American Jewry.[2]

2. The following section reprints in part material from my essay, "Toward A Theory of Jewish Liberalism," Donald Cutler (ed.), The Religious Situation, 1969 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 1050-1051 and 1053-1054.

If one looks at the behavior of Jews since their political emancipation one is struck by two apparently contradictory phenomena. On the one hand, there appears to be a constant drive for the Jew to free himself from the condition which Judaism apparently thrusts upon him. For lack of a better term we will call this the condition of estrangement. The impetus for intellectual and religious reform among Jews, the adoption of new ideologies and life styles, but above all else the changing self perception by the Jew of himself and his condition was not simply a desire to find amelioration from the physical oppression of the ghetto. It was rather a desire for emancipation from the very essence of the Jewish condition in which a Jew found himself as a minority different in quality and kind from even other minorities and hence ineligible to participate, even as other minorities did, as an equal member of society. This denial of equality was not simply a matter of rights. Even where the Jew was granted full political equality he still sensed his estrangement, indeed often sensed it more acutely. The Jew's problem was his alienation from the roots and the traditions of the society. Although the sense of estrangement is a constant throughout Jewish history, it is felt most sharply in the post-emancipation period where on the one hand the gentile society and culture are no longer formally Christian, and where on the other hand secularization sweeps the Jewish people, destroying traditional values which provided religious legitimation to the estrangement and obviating the expectation of its removal in the messianic period.

But most Jews, were not looking to escape from Judaism. Even where options were open, the Jew sought to retain his Jewish affiliation. When nothing else remained to give him a separate identity, when it appeared as though the Enlightenment millennium of a universal society was indeed open to the Jew, he still sought a distinct identity, if in no other way than through association with other Jews. Most Jewish Marxists in

Poland were not Communists, they were Bundists. And, at least in the early 1920's, all that separated the Jewish Workers' Bund of Poland from the Communists was the former's insistence on retaining their organizational identity. The Jew sought the options of the Enlightenment, but rejected its consequences.

Jews were enthusiastic supporters of universal humanism and cosmopolitanism. They embraced democratic nationalism, liberalism, and moderate socialism. There were variations from one region to another and one period to another. Nor did all Jews respond in quite the same way. What is striking, however, is the constant search for a universalistic ethic which would cut through the differences that an older tradition had imposed but which would permit the Jew to retain at least nominal identification as a Jew.

The Jew desperately sought to participate in society and rejected sectarianism as a survival strategy. He wishes to be accepted as an equal in society not because he was a Jew, but because his Jewishness was irrelevant. Yet at the same time the Jew refused to make his own Jewishness irrelevant. For that matter, Judaism with its religious particularism and cultural and ethnic overtones is indeed not irrelevant to the extent that the new nation state aspired to a uniform culture and civilization. The Jew wanted the non-Jew to ignore his Jewishness but, paradox of paradoxes, the Jew himself was unwilling to do so. The most he was willing to do was make the effort to redefine the nature of his commitment to Judaism and his perception of the content of Judaism.

5. The foregoing discussion takes no account of differences among American Jews. While it is true that the majority of Jews confront the same stimuli and tend to respond uniformly, not all begin from the same starting point. Secondly, what is true of the majority of Jews is not true of all of them. A good case can be made for an increasing polarization of the Jewish community as a result of the intensified

identity and commitment on the part of a minority. One consequence of defining Judaism as a religion has been that some of the more committed necessarily locate themselves in the more religious, i.e. Orthodox camp and others of this highly identified minority take their cues from developments and trends within American Orthodoxy. Orthodoxy, in turn, has also been effected by Americanization, so that these tendencies are not without their subtleties. But the trend toward polarization has some very clear expressions. The increasing tolerance toward intermarriage rather than the rates themselves suggests a diminution of Jewish identity on the part of most Jews. On the other hand, the growth of Jewish day schools, increased aliya or recent outbursts among impatient Jewish youth to be discussed below, indicate that one small segment of the community is moving in the direction of heightened identity.

The Nature of Jewish Identity

The way in which the individual Jew relates himself to Judaism can be examined in many ways. We will explore two of them. First, we will discuss the American Jew's perception of the values or meaning of Judaism and his relationship to those values. Secondly, we will explore the American Jew's relationship to other Jews and the organized Jewish community. The two measures of Jewish identity are related but by no means identical. They are related in two ways. First, Jewish values both traditionally and in their American transformation place a high premium on communal affiliation. It is, pardoxically, only the most religious and knowledgeable Jew who "can make Shabbos for himself" and he is the least likely to do so. Secondly, most behavior which weakens the individuals link to the community (intermarriage is probably the best example) tends to weaken his links to Judaism as well. However, the Jewish community and Jewish values are not identical. Activity in a Jewish organization, rather

than serving Jewish purposes may simply be an instrument for the activist to broaden his contacts with non-Jewish society by virtue of his status as a Jewish leader. Secondly, institutions which are structually Jewish may serve the latent function of assimilating the Jew to aspects of American cilture. Many commentators have noted that this is precisely the role which the Yiddish press, particularly the leading Yiddish newspaper, The Forwards, fulfilled for the immigrant Jews at the turn of the century. It was through the medium of the Yiddish press that the immigrants learned middle class mores and etiquette, American values of child rearing, connubial relations, romantic love, women's new emancipated role, and political participation. Jewish fraternal organizations provide an opportunity for Jews to meet socially and through their adult education programs they reinforce values of group survival. By the same token such social activities as a weekend in Las Vegas, a fishing trip or a synagogue dinner dance or cocktail party legitimizes aspects of non-Jewish leisure activity which may in turn suggest a whole new set of values, attitudes and life style. On the other hand, left-wing intellectuals and radicals of the 1930s who denied their Jewish heritage and went so far as to affirm the insignificance of Hitler's anti-semitism were led back to a sense of Jewishness as they were led back to an affirmation of the positive aspects of American life.[3] One writer has noted that the more Americanized the Jewish workers became "the more enthusiastically they support the fund for Palestine and the Jewish State."[4] Thus, the impact of organizational affiliation on the one hand, or of Americanization and acculturation on the other, is complex. Jewish affiliation can and has served not only as a vehicle

3. Norman Podhoretz, Making It (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 109-136.

4. From the Foreward by Joseph Schlossberg to Samuel Kurland, Cooperative Palestine cited in Mordecai M. Kaplan, A New Zioniam (New York: The Herzl Press, 1959), p. 89.

for Americanization but even for the internalizing of anti-Jewish values.

With this introduction we now turn to separate discussions of Jewish values, and then of Jewish affiliation.

Jewish Values

American Jews share a set of characteristic values which relate to their American environment as well as to Judaism. We will confine ourselves to those values which bear more directly on the question of Jewish identity.

1. In one sense we have already defined the dominant American Jewish value -- integration in the American community on the one hand and Jewish survival as a distinct community on the other. Values of integration and survival are not unique to Jews but the intensity with which these values are held is probably more pronounced among Jews than any other group in American society. The Italian immigrants, for example, resisted acculturation more strenously than did the Jews. But their second and third generations are barely distinguishable as a separate group. Even the Irish, despite their celebration as a proud, defiant, separate sub-group in American society are not only disappearing rapidly but seem to take pride in their loss of identity. Amish, on the other hand, are far more resistant to acculturation than are the Jews, but the Amish do not insist, concurrently with their separatism, that American society close its eyes to their distinctiveness in economic, political or social considerations. Not so for the Jews. They desire more than simply to be treated as equals. They demand that their Jewishness cease to be a factor in any judgments which society exercises over them. Jews, for example, do not argue that since they comprise X percentage of New York City's population they are entitled to X percentage of the political offices. On the contrary they argue that their Jewishness should simply be irrelevant to such

considerations. But Jews are quite conscious of their proportion of office holders, or college presidents, or large corporation directors. Where the number of Jews is less than might be anticipated they suspect that this is a result of discrimination. Jews do not argue that equality means that public support for education should include public support for Jewish schools. On the contrary, they (at least many of them) argue that public support for education should not be extended to any non-public-schools, and they are embarrassed by the very existence of Jewish day schools. The incessant demand of Jews is that they be treated as though Jewishness does not exist. Nothing pleases most Jews more than to be told that they don't look Jewish or behave Jewishly -- that they cannot be distinguished in appearance, dress, speech, attitudes, or behavior from the non-Jew. All this is true on the one hand. But on the other hand, Jews still want to be Jews. They don't flock to Christian ministers for conversion. They don't even flock to the Universalist-Unitarian church or to Ethical Culture. Classical Reform Judaism and synagogues such as New York City's Temple Emanu-El is a more characteristic institution of assimilated Jews. The synagogues of classical Reform Judaism, particularly at the turn of the century were barely distinguishable from liberal Christian churches. One Protestant is reported to have wandered into New York's Temple Emanuel and only discovered by chance that he was in a Jewish synagogue. But, of course, there is a difference -- the name, And that is how the Jews seem to want it.

Jews want full acceptance as Americans, not as Jews. But most of them are still scandalized by intermarriage and insist that a non-Jewish partner to a marriage convert to Judaism even when, as is usually the case, that partner no longer considers himself (herself) Christian. They support the State of Israel financially, politically and emotionally when such support must surely raise the spectre of dual national loyalty if not disloyalty to America, and are outraged by the idea that the State Department discriminates against Jews in its personnel policies.

The Jew is pulled in two directions--integration and survival. The tension between the two values divides to some extent one Jew from another, but the tension is really present in almost every American Jew. The typical Jew, regardless of where he stands on a survival-integration continuum is himself pulled in both directions.

2. One can identity more specific values of American Judaism. The forthcoming American Jewish Year Book suggests six such values[5] and a survey of 1,200 synagogue and local chapter presidents of a national Jewish organization confirmed their widespread acceptance. Five of these values are of direct relevance to our discussion.

a. There is nothing incomparable between being a good Jew and a good American or between Jewish standards of behavior and American standards of behavior. If, however, one must choose between the two, one's first loyalty is to American standards of behavior and American rather than Jewish culture.

b. Separation of church and state is an absolute essential. It protects America from being taken over by religious groups, it protects Judaism from having alien standards forced upon it, and most importantly, it protects the Jew from being continually reminded of his minority and Jewish status. Only the separation of church and state assures the existence of religiously neutral areas of life where the Jew can function with his Jewish status a matter of irrelevance.

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5. Charles S. Liebman, "Reconstructionism in American Jewish Life," American Jewish Year Book 1970 (forthcoming)

c. The Jews constitute one indivisible people. It is their common history and experiences which define them as a people, not any common religious beliefs. What makes one a Jew is identification with the Jewish people and this is not quite the same thing as an indentification with the Jewish religion. Religious differences within Judaism should not be tolerated and must be compromised where they threaten the basic unity of the people.

d. Jewish rituals are nice, up to a point. Going to synagogue a few times a year, or lighting candles Friday evening, having the family together for a Seder or celebrating a son's bar mitzvah are proper ways of expressing one's Jewishness and keeping the family integrated. But Jews cannot be expected to observe all the rituals and practices of traditional Judaism. These were suitable, perhaps, to different countries or cultures but not to the American Jew of the twentieth century. Many rituals ought to be changed and it is up to each person to decide for himself what he should or should not observe.

e. Among the major tasks that face Judaism is insuring the survival of the State of Israel. This is an obligation for every Jew. But, support for Israel doesn't mean that one has to move there or that living outside Israel is wrong, or that one who lives in Israel is a better Jew than one who does not.

3. The Jews' definition or classification of Judaism (is it a religion or ethnic group, or culture, or nationality, or people etc.) is not easily resolved. In a nominal sense the American Jew no doubt thinks of Judaism as a religion. This is a largely unconscious accomodation by the East European immigrant or his descendants to the

American environment which proved unreceptive to ethnic or cultural or national separatism but quite congenial to religious independance. America tolerated ethnic groups as long as they didn't use their "ethnicity" to justify separatism. Jewish or Catholic structures against intermarriage or programs of supplementary education were tolerated. But picture the reaction of a typical American to an Irish parent who objected to intermarriage of his children with non-Irish, or to an Italian group which sought to establish afternoon schools to teach the Italian language, literature, and history and limited enrollment to children of Italian descent.

It took the first generation of East European immigrants some time to learn this. Further, having learned what America anticipated of them it is doubtful if all the Jews really internalized the message. Even when the first generation of immigrants defined Judaism as a religion it is not always clear that they meant it. The religious facade of Jewish life prior to World War II might have been intended to fool the non-Jews at least as much as it was intended to fool the Jews themselves. In addition, institutions and organizations of a non-religious nature (economic, cultural, ethnic, and national), continued to exist as alternatives rather than supplements to the synagogue.

World War II marks a new period in Jewish self identification. It inaugurates a period of heightened self interest and awareness on the part of many Jews and increased status of "Jewishness". On the other hand it is also a period of tremendous Jewish mobility, geographic and social and the coming of age of the second generation which meant increased pressure for Americanization.

This second generation American Jew had lived vicariously through the holocaust and the creation of Israel. Judaism carried a great emotional charge for him and it seemed a betrayal of self to deny one's Jewishness, particularly since American values supported Jewish self-identification and economic prosperity released monies and energies for Jewish activity. But this was also a generation of incredible ignorance. Twice removed from the East European Jewish heartland it had no memory of traditional Jewish life to compensate for its Jewish illiteracy. This Americanized and acculturated generation simply overwhelmed the existing Jewish community and completed the process of "religionizing" or more correctly "Protestantizing" American Judaism. Judaism took the indelible stamp of an American religious denomination whose patterns of religious change showed increasing "secular content and similarity to Protestant-liberal norma".[6]

4. A religious definition of Judaism has a number of consequences. Two of the most important relate to Jewish ideology and intermarriage. While American Judaism has produced no Jewish philosopher or ideology of stature, the creativity it has shown has been in the religious realm. This is true in both behavior and thought. The intellectual "action" has been in the religious theological sphere in contrast say to modern East European Jewry which produced a Jewish historiography, a Jewish literature, and a Jewish national, social, and cultural ideology. But, since modern Jewish intellectuals have felt least

6 Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, Jewish Americans (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p.240.

comfortable with religious and theological categories of thought, the consequences of the religious definition of Judaism has been to increase their disaffection.

Secondly, if Judaism is a religion, then it follows that someone who is not religious is not Jewish. A religious as distinct from ethnic definition of Judaism makes it open ended. It is easier to enter and easier to leave. It is significant that precisely among suburban residents who have "the greatest assimilation in almost every aspect of religiosity", the greatest intermarriage rate, and "the weakest affiliation with Jewishness"[7] that conversions to Judaism are highest. On the other hand, a religious definition reduces the formal pressures on the religiously indifferent Jew to retain a familistic or symbolic tie to the community when he does not recognize his own ties to that community's sense of purpose.

5. American Jewry has linked itself to Israel through tourism, financial contributions, investments, political support, and even aliya. Indeed, it seems as though interest in Israel, particularly in the last few years has preempted other Jewish concerns. The dimensions and intensity of Jewish support for Israel raises questions about the religious definition of American Judaism. If Judaism is a religion, why then should concern for Israel be such an important component of American Jewish identity? One possibility is that American Jews see Israel as the religious and spiritual center of Judaism. But this is not the case. Indeed, in a survey of Jewish synagogue and organizational leaders, a majority, except for the Orthodox, expressed agreement with the following statement: "While there must be a warm

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7 Ibid., p.241.

fraternal relation between Jews of the United States and Israel, the center of American Jewish life must be American Judaism rather than a Jewish culture which has developed or will develop in Israel.[8] Thus, the intensity of American Jewish support for Israel remains paradoxical given the religious definition of Judaism. Jewish demonstrations against French President Pompideu on the occasion of his visit to the United States in early 1970 raised fears even among Israeli officials that Jewish enthusiasm for Israel would jeopardize the position of American Jewry. Furthermore, support for Israel reaches heretofore inaccessible segments of the Jewish community. As we shall see in the next section, non-religious organizations do not derive their support from the "unsynagogued". Support for Israel is probably the only major Jewish activity today which involves the "non-religious" Jew.

Perhaps, therefore, American Jews are shifting to a new stage of Jewish identity in which Israel is replacing religion. Such a change would be totally out of harmony with prevailing American notions of legitimacy. One is inclined, therefore, to explore the possibility that support for Israel is really only an extension or evolution of American Jewish identity since World War II rather than a radical shift.

The first point to note is that the Jewish religion itself emphasizes the importance of Israel. This is not only true in the sense that Israel-Zion occupies such an important place in Jewish liturgy and ritual. Nor is it true only because the religious

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8 This and other responses of Jewish synagogue and organizational leaders to Israel is reported in Charles S. Liebman, "The Role of Israel in the Ideology of American Jewry," Dispersion and Unity 10 (Winter, 1970), pp. 19-26.

establishment, especially the various rabbinical and synagogue organizations have been unanimous in their pronouncements and declarations in support of Israel. It is especially true, because at the local congregational level, Israel has turned into a focal point of Jewish identity. There are the rabbis' sermons which stress Israel, the gift objects from Israel, the trips to Israel under synagogue auspices, the prominent place of Israel in men's club and sisterhood programming, and the increasing number of Israelis who staff the synagogue's school programs. Nothing illustrates Israel's role in the religious life of American Jewry better than the sale of Israel Bonds on Yom Kippur (which is not to say that such significance is absent even on that day). This holiest day of the Jewish calendar stresses the personal relationship of man to God and the idea of repentance. The prayers, devoted to spiritual self assessment and pleas for forgiveness are interrupted in hundreds of synagogues in the United States by an appeal to the congregants to buy Israel Bonds. The point here is not to judge whether such conduct is right or wrong, just or unjust, necessary or unnecessary. Let ur grant that it may be the most effective way to raise money. It is nevertheless vulgar and ludicrous. But American Jews apparantly don't consider it either vulgar or ludicrous and this says a great deal about their concept of "religious" behavior and the place of Israel in their "religious" outlook.

The foregoing suggests that American Jews continue to define Judaism as a religion but that Israel increasingly defines the content of that religion. Concomitantly, support for Israel becomes not only support for a State thousands of miles away or for its inhabitants- rather, support for Israel is the symbol of one's Jewish identity like staying home from work on Yom Kippur. It has nothing to do with zionism, with a national Jewish self definition, or even with knowing very much

about Israel itself or modern Jewish-Israeli culture. It is perfectly compatable with being a good American.[9] Of course, there are other reasons as well for the important place of Israel in American Jewish life.

The stakes involved in Israel's success are obvious. The lives of two million Jews are involved. Furthermore, unlike Soviet Jewry, where many Jewish lives are also involved, far more American Jews have relatives in Israel with whom they met, continue to hear from, and with whom they may even correspond regularly.

Support for Israel, politically and financially represents an outlet and expression of Jewish activity which is religiously legitimate but which is entirely secular in content. In a sense it gives one something Jewish and something important to do which, unlike pure religious behavior demands no knowledge and no strange ritualized behavior.

Finally, the mass media bring Israel to the constant attention of the American Jew. The agenda of American Jewish life is by and large dictated by the concerns of the non-Jewish media. Religion is no longer the topic of as many articles, news stories, books, etc., or religious personalities the subject of as many T.V. interviews as they were in the last two decades. But Israel has achieved much greater prominance

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9 Nathan Rotenstreich makes a similar point in his comments found in Changing Relationships Between Israel and the Diaspora (Jerusalem: The Institute for Contemporary Jewry, Publications of the Study Circle on Diaspora Jewry, Hebrew, 1969), pp. 60-61.

thereby reinforcing the efforts of Jewish leaders to bring its problems to the attention of the American Jew.

It remains to be seen whether Israel will continue to occupy its present role in Jewish life in the event that the American public becomes less tolerant of Jewish commitment to Israel, or in the happy event that threats to Israel's physical survival diminish. Will American Jews resist pressures to deemphasize Israel's importance, and will some other symbol replace Israel as a focus of (religious) identity? For the present, even pessimists must confess to the capacity of at least one Jewish symbol to evoke an emotional response among elements of the community such as some college youth and some intellectuals for whom eulogies had already been pronounced.

6. As in the previous discussion on the strength of Jewish identity so here in this section on the nature of Jewish identity, one must not lump all Jews together. Not all of them identify or define Judaism in the same way. First of all, the vast majority of Jews may define Judaism as a religion while disagreeing among themselves about the content of the religion. Studies of Jewish teenagers in the 1950's [10] indicated surprising agreement on the ritual requirements of Judaism. The teenagers accepted traditional or Orthodox norms even while they deviated from them. One suspects that this is no longer the case. In the portrait which Sklare and Greenblum paint of Lakeville,[11] the Dorian

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10 Bernard Rosen, Adolscence and Religion (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1965)

11 Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier (New York: Basic Books, 1967)

Grey of American Judaism, only 12 per cent of the respondents thought it essential or desirable to observe the dietary laws in order for a Jew to be considered a good Jew. There is probably a new level of agreement emerging among Conservative and Reform Jews about the desirable level of traditional observance but this leaves the Orthodox segment of the community in substantial disagreement.

Furthermore, there are still some Jews who retain a purely cultural, linguistic or national self definition. While they represent a small minority and really fall outside the consensus of American Judaism they may play a prominent public role because of the intensity of their commitment. They are to be found in disproportionate numbers among Jewish professionals in fields such as education, camping, zionism, and social and communal work.

Finally there is that assimilationist element which, unwilling to die a quiet Jewish death, is not satisfied unless it can drag the rest of American Jewry along with it to the grave. This element once thrived within Reform Judaism. Since the 1930's and especially since World War II the assimilationists have been on the defensive there. They are more likely now to be totally outside the religious camp and define themselves as Jewish secularists. Their views which find expression in such best sellers as James Yaffe, The American Jews[12] define Judaism in purely universalist terms. The ideals of Judaism, in their view, requires the abandonment of all Jewish particularism and advocates intermarriage.

We turn now to the second aspect in the nature of Jewish identity, the American Jew's relationship to other Jews and to the organized

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12 New York: Random House, 1968

Jewish community.

Jewish Affiliation

1. In a study which has assumed great importance in the literature on American minority groups, Milton Gordon characterized various stages of assimilation.[13] The two stages most relevant to our discussion are: 1) cultural or behavioral assimilation in which the minority group changes its cultural patterns to those of the dominant society and 2) structural assimilation in which there is large scale entrance of minority group members into the cliques, clubs and institutions of the host society on the primary group level. In his discussion of American Jews, Gordon suggests that cultural assimilation has taken place, whereas structural assimilation has not. One author, who relies on Gordon for his theoretical framework makes the following observation:

> ...The Jews of America associate among themselves...they are culturally American, but socially in the ghetto. But, mind you, the ghetto is an American ghetto, not a Jewish ghetto. American Jews in B'nai B'rith...do precisely what other Americans do in the Knights of Columbus, the Rotarians...and other fraternal organizations. They do not differ in behavior patterns, in ritual, in professed ideals, in activitivities of all sorts, except for this one very significant thing, that they prefer to associate among themselves.[14]

While there is undoubtedly some truth in this observation it is exaggerated and misleading. Gordon may be right in a very general way but his categories of cultural and structural assimilation are too gross.

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[13] Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) See also the attack on Gordon from a Jewish perspective by Marshall Sklare, "Assimilation and the Sociologists", Commentary, 44 (May, 1965), pp. 63-67.

[14] Werner I. Cahnman, "Comments on the American Jewish Scene," Herbert Strauss (ed.), Conference on Acculturation (New York: American Federation of Jews From Central Europe, 1965), pp. 20-21.

The essence of American Jewish identity, the core meaning which Judaism has for many American Jews may very well be their social ties to one another. We shall call this, associationalism. The distinguishing mark of American Jews is increasingly the fact that they associate primarily with other Jews rather than what they believe or even how they believe (though as we shall see, associationalism is related to behavior). As Gherhard Lenski found in his Detroit area study, ties binding Jews to their religion are weaker than those of Protestants or Catholics; ties binding them to one another are much stronger. More than other religious groups, "the great majority of Detroit Jews find most of their primary relationships within the Jewish subcommunity." [15] Even among the third generation, wealthy, acculturated suburban Jews of Lakeville, Jews make their friends almost exclusively among other Jews. By and large this is not a result of anti-Semitism or deliberate exclusion on the part of the non-Jews. Rather, many respondents emphasized:

> ...that Jews are predisposed to social contact and intimate association with other Jews because of a common religio-ethnic heritage and a pervasive group identity. "It's because Jews go with Jews and Gentiles go with Gentiles. My background is so Jewish and my life is so Jewish that I'm happier surrounded by Jews", explains a young salesman's wife who is now active in Lilienthal Temple, although as an adolescent she had some close friends who were Gentile. "It's the identity, the background, the religion. It would be hard for a Gentile to be comfortable without those common bonds," elaborates an affluent lawyer and business executive who came to the United States from Russia when he was a youngster...A young businessman who observed almost none of the traditional religious practices to which he was exposed in childhood mentions similar reasons to account for the fact that he lost contact with the non-Jewish friends he had before marriage. "They went different paths because of differences in economics, education, and a different mode of living." [16]

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15 Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (New York: Anchor Books, rev. ed., 1963), p.37.

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16 Sklare and Greenblum, op. cit., pp.280-281.

The first point to be noted is that Jewish associationalism has a behavioral foundation. In other words, Jews who seek out other Jews, do so because they apparently find something different or special which distinguishes Jews from non-Jews. Sociologists may not know what this special quality is. One is reminded of the question-who can tell the difference between a male turtle and a female turtle? The answer is, of course, that turtles can tell.

The second point is that Jewish associationalism exists independently of other attributes of Jewish identity. It is a pattern which exists among all types of Jews and in all types of Jewish communities, urban and suburban, wealthy and poor, first generation American and third generation American. Sklare and Greenblum found that those "uninvolved in religion and synagogue life have almost as Jewish a friendship circle as those who possess religious commitments".[17] In his sample of Chicago area Jews, Lazerwitz constructed nine measures of Jewish identity one of which was ethnicity. This was defined by the number of close Jewish friends one had or the frequency of visiting Jews compared to non-Jews.[18] There were no pronounced differences in ethnicity between Jews who scored high and those who scored low on other measures of Jewish identification. These included, for example, religious behavior, Jewish education, zionism, pietism, traditional beliefs, and Jewish organizational affiliation.

Jewish associationalism, at least among adults, appears to be ubiquitous. This does not mean that it is a permanent phenomenon. Indeed, there is every reason to be pessimistic concerning long run

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[17] Ibid., p.284.

18 Bernard Lazerwitz, A First Report on the General Components and Consequences of Jewish Identification (National Jewish Welfare Board Research Program at Brandeis University, mimeo, 1968)

trends since many Jewish youth today not only form ties with non-Jews (this was apparantly always the case) but explicitely reject the values implicit in Jewish associationalism. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that educational, life style, child rearing patterns that were once characteristically Jewish, are now shared by many non-Jews. Consequently the basis of Jewish associationalism among the assimilated, that is those who associate with Jews rather than non-Jews only because of common life styles, will disappear. But let us continue for the time being with an analysis of present Jewish behavior rather than predictions for the future.

2. While there is no relationship between friendship patterns and other measures of Jewish identity, there is a relationship between organizational affiliation and other identity measures. Those affiliated with Jewish organizations are most likely to identify themselves with the religious community. Lazerwitz found that "the two dominating factors of Jewish identification, which are also strongly associated with one another are the religio-pietistic and Jewish organizational factors.[19]

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[19] Lazerwitz, op. cit., p. 19. Similar conclusions are to be found in: Stanley K. Bigman, The Jewish Population of Greater Washington in 1956 (Washington, D.C., The Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, 1957), p. 68; and Morris Axelrod, et. al, A Community Survey for Long Range Planning: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston (Boston: The Combined Jewish Philanthropies, 1967), p. 165.

Sklare and Greenblum, on the other hand, found that among men (though not women) the degree of religious commitment meant little if any distinction in the level of organizational affiliation or even in the degree of involvement. However, the religiously uncommitted had "an affinity for social and recreational organizations which avoid any instrumental or Jewish purpose."[20] Thus, their conclusion that Jewish organizational involvement provides a secular alternative for the non-religious Jews seems unwarranted because Jewish organizations are not of a single mold.

It appears far more useful to distinguish among types of Jewish organizations. Those which are purely recreational or social bring Jews together at the associational level, the lowest level of Jewish identity. They do evidence the pattern of cultural assimilation and structural segregation. But the Jewish organizations which we more commonly identify as communal organizations; B'nai B'rith, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Hadassah, Jewish War Veterans, Zionist Organization of America, or ORT, are not a secular alternative to the synagogue; they are a supplement to religious identification. Whatever social, recreational, or purely expressive satisfactions the Jew may derive from such organizations he also relates to them because they fulfill instrumental Jewish purposes. Contrary, therefore, to what Gordon suggests, there are types of Jewish structures which still remain culturally independent and

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[20]Sklare and Greenblum, op. cit., p. 263.

they are precisely those structures which play a crucial role in the network of Jewish communal relationships. This is not to suggest that such organizations have not been Americanized or, as we indicated above, may not even socialize their members to anti-Jewish values. But surely we must view an organization as culturally Jewish if its goals are uniquely Jewish. On the other hand, Gordon's description of the Jewish community as structurally segregated but culturally assimilated fits, at least temporarily, Jewish social and recreational organizations. Less clear is the place of Jewish Community Centers. Do they fulfill purely associational needs or are they cultural supplements to other forms of Jewish activity? Some Centers are probably of one type, and other Centers of another type, depending on the community in which it is located, the Board, and the Executive Director.[21]

Tapping such a measure is fraught with difficulty. We would obviously have to measure relative contributions but relative to what? individual income, family income, present income, past income, anticipated income, etc. Would we distinguish types of Jewish philanthropies, rather than lump say hospitals and Jewish schools together? How would we hold constant for community and economic pressures to contribute? What would we do about family or corporate contributions? What about contributions to such organizations as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee which is not philantrhopic? Finally, how

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[21] We have been using type of organization as a measure of identity. A far more revealing measure might be contributions to Jewish philanthropy.

reliable would self reporting of such information be? But, if these technical hurdles could be overcome we might have a measure of activity which cuts across the entire gamut of Jewish identification and is the best single measure of Jewish commitment.

3. The synagogue is the institution with which Jews are most widely affiliated. Approximately 60 per cent of American Jews are afiiliated with synagogues.[22] Estimates of the number of Jews affiliated with communal organizations are subj ect to greater error. In the absence of organizational figureswe must rely on self-supporting by respondents in various community surveys. Unfortunately, such data is not always collected or reported uniformly. Based on studies of Washington, D.C., Camden, New Jersey, Providence, Rhode Island, and Boston, Massachusetts,[23] I would estimate that about 35 per cent of the adult Jewish population belongs to at least one Jewish communal organization, this excludes membership in synagogue mens' clubs and sisterhoods (the most pervasive type of organizational affiliation and in Jewish Community Centers.

There seems to be a tendency for women to affiliate more than

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[22]The figure can be misleading since it includes family members whose affiliation might take place through one parent. On the other hand it excludes many elderly who may disaffiliate in a formal sense while retaining informal ties to the synagogue. Over 90 per cent of American Jews express some denominationl preference when asked if they identify themselves as Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or secular Jews.

[23]Studies include surrounding suburbs as well as the city itself. On Washington see Stanley K. Bigman, op. cit.; for Camden see Charles Westoff, Population and Social Characteristics of the Jewish Community of the Camden Area 1964 (Camden: Jewish Federation of Camden County, n.d.); for Providence see Sidney Goldstein, The Greater Providence Jewish Community (Providence: The General Jewish Committee of Providence, 1964); for Boston see Morris Axelrod, op. cit.

men (in two areas more women are affiliated and in one area the same proportion of women are affiliated but they are members of more organizations), though in one area the tendency is reversed. There are only two Jewish organizations to which at least ten per cent of the Jewish population who are eligible to join are affiliated. The largest Jewish organization is Hadassah followed by B'nai B'rith. However, in individual communities, a particular local organization may be much larger. In Providence, for example, 22 per cent of the women were affiliated with Zionist orgqnizations (we may assume the overwhelming majority were members of Hadassah), but 26 per cent of the women were affiliated with the local Jewish Home for the Aged. Parenthetically, 21 per cent were affiliated with the Jewish Community Center and 36 per cent with synagogue sisterhoods.

As we indicated, Jewish communal organizations do not represent alternatives in terms of memberships to the synagogue. We simply don't know whether they represent alternatives for active participation and leadership, though this seems likely.

4. From the preceeding discussion, a picture emerges of three types of Jews. The affiliated Jews, the associated Jew, and the non-associated Jew (the non-Jewish Jew). The affiliated Jew represents the largest category and includes an estimated 70 per cent or more of American Jews. He is likely to belong to a synagogue and he or his wife probably belong to some other Jewish organization. His closest friends are Jews. While the quality of his Jewish life and the level of his Jewish knowledge leaves much to be desired while he may be

gradually assimilating more and more values and life-style patterns of the non-Jewish community, he is Jewishly self-conscious and wants Judaism to survive.

The associated Jew is unaffiliated with a Jewish synagogue or Jewish communal organization and may even identify himself as a secular Jew though his closest friends are Jewish. He may be affiliated with a social or recreational group which is nominally Jewish or whose predominant membership is Jewish. While associated Jews comprise only a minority of American Jews they are a significant group because they are disproportionately third of fourth generation American Jews and are disproportionately under 40.

Finally we have the non-associated Jew about whom we know the least statistically but with respect to some individuals the most anecdotally. He is the Jew who is least likely to be captured by community studies, is most likely to be intermarried, and is completely marginal to the Jewish community. He is, I would guess likely to be of two types. As a member of the working class and a high school dropout he may slither out of the Jewish community without anyone caring to claim him. Alternately he may be engaged in a ghighly professionalized or specialized occupation--university professor, psychoanalyst, artist. His major associates and friends may be Jewish because such occupations are highly attractive to Jews. But from his point of view, however erroneous his conclusion may be, the fact that most of his friends are Jewish is a matter of accident. In fact, most of them may not be Jewish.

Among the many independent and dependent variables associated with these types of Jews, two deserve special mention. Jewish education may be the critical independent variable. That is, Jewish education may be the single best causative explanation for differences amobg types of Jews and even for differences between the more and less committed of the affiliated Jews. My own guess, however, is that even if Jewish education is the single best explanatory factor, it hardly suffices to explain everything.

The second factor we have ignored is contributions to Jewish philanthropy which, if we had some accurate way of measuring it, might prove to be the most reliable dependent variable. I suspect that this is the case.

5. We have proposed a model of three types of Jews. Affiliated, associated, and non-associated. Even if this model adequately describes the behavior of most American Jews it misses a qualitatively significant segment. Since June of 1967 about 8,000 Americans have emigrated to Israel each year and the estimates for 1970-1971 are 10,000. About half of these olim are Orthodox Jews. My own guess is that among the Orthodox, at least 50 per cent were not affiliated with any Jewish organization in the United States and a few like myself,(though they may have been active in the day school which their children attended), were not even affiliated with a synagogue. Yet these olim were prompted to come to Israel from a strong sense of Jewish identity and despair over the possibility of providing a satisfactory Jewish environment for their children in the U.S. In other

words many of these strongly identified, strongly committed olim do not readily fall into the category of affiliated or associated Jew. Among the non-Orthodox olim, the proportion of deviates is certainly higher. I would guess that a far smaller percentage of them were affiliated with a Jewish organization or with a synagogue. The pre-1967 olim came out of a much stronger Zionist organizational orientation than the post-1967 olim. However, in his study of Americans and Canadians still in Israel who came prior to 1966, Antanovsky found that 58 per cent of those who came in the previous decade and did not settle on Kibbutzim did not even belong to a Zionist organization.[24]

In addition to the oleh who does not fit into our classification there is the radical Jewish youth phenomenon. There are all sorts of radical Jewish youth and it would be a mistake to lump them all together. There are the radical Jewish youth who are identified with Black nationalist and/or anti-semitic and/or pro-Arab groups. There are the Jewish youth who participate in a Ramparts seder to mock and pervert the Jewish tradition and the Jewish community. While the destructive capacity of such youth must not be underestimated, and the existence of their fellow travellers within the affiliated Jewish community must be appreciated, they do not really constitute an exception to our typology of American Jews. At most, one might be forced to construct a fourth category of Jews from them. If we heretofore suggested that non-associated Jews (non-Jewish Jews) constitute the

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[24]Aaron Antanovsky, Americans and Canadians in Israel, Report No. 1 (Jerusalem: Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, mimeo, 1968.) The figures are derived from those presented on p.24.

lowest rung on the ladder of Jewish identity, these youth might in fact constitute a fourth level, anti-Jewish Jews. But our concern is with another type of radical youth who is also disaffected from the synagogue and Jewish communal organizations but for very different reasons. He is the young man who "sat in" in 1968 at a meeting of the American conference on Soviet Jewry and charged that organization with being little more than an alibi for inaction on Soviet Jewry. He is the radical youth who "occupied" the offices of the New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, or who demonstrated at the 1969 meetings of the CJFWF. Here is part of what a spokesman for those who demonstrated at the CJFWF meetings had to say. It is quoted at some length to demonstrate that antagonism to the organized Jewish community is quite compatible with a high commitment to Judaism:

> I am not a part of this convention; neither was I nor any young person asked to speak at this time...I stand here because of pressure that we exerted upon the planners of this conference to permit us to address you directly. Knowing that we were given this opportunity only through threats of a disruption, you might dismiss us as children of our times, bored with the battle of the campus and looking for a new stage upon which to play our childish pranks of doubtful morality...
>
> We were born during and shortly after the war. The Holocaust made a deep impression on our young minds, as did the new-felt pride in the state of Israel. We had the bewt set of blocks, the shiniest bicycle, and piano lessons. We did well in school. We went to Hebrew school and occasionally synagogue, but found them dull. There were few exciting models for us in the Jewish community, little opportunity to give expression to our youthful ideals. In contrast the larger world was exciting, a labyrinth of mystery and challenge...The Jewish publicists spilled seas of ink bemoaning our alienation. Perhaps it was a sign of our health that we were not attracted to a Jewish life devoid of intellectual and spiritual energy.
>
> It took us several years to realize our confusion of form and essence and to recognize that there was more to Judaism than its poor expression in the American Jewish community. For some it was a trip to Israel, for others it was the reading of Buber's I and Thou for others an encounter with Hassidim, for others it was a traditional

Jewish education redirected to confront existential problems, for others the exploration of self could not overlook the Jewish component. The Six-Day War forced us to reassess our attachment in deciding to risk our lives if necessary on Israel's behalf. The black awakening reminded us that the melting pot dream was a fool's fantasy and that differences were legitimate. We woke up from the American dream and tried to discover who we really were. For many of us this now means turning our concerns inward into the Jewish community because we are disenchanted with the crass materialism of the larger society. Yet where can we find inspiration in the multi-million dollar Jewish presences of suburbia?

...As the Jew rose into a secure middle class niche, he became more of a social and political being. Organizations multiplied which reflected the needs of adjustment and defense...

...Settlement houses had suburban off-shoots of Jewish community centers closely modelled aftered the YMCA's. These Jewish swimming pools and game rooms were to be instrumental in maintaining Jewish loyalties.

... Jewish education was a step-son of organized Jewish philanthropies...Ironically, constitutent organizations have declared a holy war against government support of Jewish education while simultaneously refusing to give any aid themselves.

...It is inconceivable for a Jewish community to be guided by Jewish principles and values if its leaders are ignorant of them. Surely some knowledge of Hebrew, of Jewish history and traditions should be a pre-requisite. Leaders of Jewish philanthropies should not only solicit funds but educate benefactors to the needs of the community. This requies Jewish knowledge.

Your response to us could be: you pampered kids, if you want things done differently, why don't you do it yourselves and leave us alone? This is the way we want the Jewish community, If that would be your response, then with much pain and disappointment we would indeed be forced to do it ourselves...And then perhaps it will only be the coming of the Messiah that will turn our hearts to yours.[25]

By chance, the statement by Hillel Levine came to my attention within a day or two of the statement that follows. While addressed to a different topic I thought it instructive to contrast the style and content of the two. The author of the following statement, Morris Laub, is Director of the Joint Commission on Social Action of all the

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[25]Hillel Levine, "To Share a Vision," Speech before the CJFWF meetings held in Boston, Nov., 1969 andprinted in Response, 6 (Winter 1969-1970), pp. 3-10. The journal in which the speech was printed is itself an interesting example of thephenomenon to which we refer.

Rabbinical and lay groups of the Conservative movement. Laub, as embedded in the Jewish establishment as one can be, was writing this year about the activities of the Jewish Defense League and made the following observation.

> ...study after study has shown that the black is among the least anti-semitic of Americans...The problem of anti-Semitism cuts across all of America, all religious groups, and all economic classes. The Jewish establishment hasnot rid American of anti-Semitism-nor could it-but it has done a remarkably protective job. It is rank distortion of the problem to offer black scape=goats as a solution.
>
> The urban crisis does affect Jews - but not Jews alone. It poses a serious problem for all Americans. Well before the Jewish Defense League came into being, the Kerner Report on Civil Disorders was embraced by all Jewish organizations, and with it the need to do something about Jews in the core city. Even a cursory reading of statements, convention proceedings and resolutions points to the heightened consciousness on the part of national and local Jewish organizations <u>of the need to devote more thought, energy and money to the problems of the core city. The problem of the Jew in the inner city is a function of the urban crisis and of American society, and not of black racism or anti-Semitism. The solution lies, therefore, in directing attention to the causes of the illness, not merely to the symptoms.</u>[26]
> (Underlining <u>not</u> in the original)

What Laub is saying is that Jews are an epi-phenomena of a core city problem. Shades of Karl Marx. One need hold no brief for the Jewish Defense League, and one doubts many raidcal youth do, but they would surely see Laub's solution as a typical "cop-out" of the Jewish establishment.

Like <u>olim</u>, Jewish radicals t4nd to be unafilliated and even antagonistic to the organized Jewish community, but hardly indifferent.

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[26]Morris Laub, "Vigilantism: Is it Needed?," <u>Conservative Judaism</u> 24 (Spring, 1970, pp. 52-53

We leave open the question of whether the affiliational problem relates more to the program of Jewish organizations, or to their style, to their decision making procedures, to some other factor or to all or some of these.

6. The importance of communal organizations, both in terms of their instrumental goals (we haven't really touched upon them at all), and as a foci of Jewish identity means that not only the qulity of their programs, but their very survival must concern all Jews. It is my impression that though there is a crisis in the synagogue, while the synagogue fails to attract many Jewish youth and intellecturals, and while rabbis are becoming less and less secure about that they are doing and ought to be doing, Jewish communal organizations are experiencing more serious difficulty. The immediate problem is not membership, though age composition is a cause for concern. The best expression of the problem is to be found in comparing the presidents of Jewish organizations today with presidents twenty or even ten years ago. Is it only coincidence that there is hardly a president of a national Jewish organization who is a personality of national stature? Apparently, Jewish organizations are having difficulty recruiting top lay people for leadership positions. Shortage of professional staff is a second problem. All organizations, public andprivate, rely increasingly on their professional staffs for program planningand initiation as well as their administration and execution. There has always been a shortage of Jewishly knowledgeable professionals but in the past they were at least committed to their own organization and

its program. Jewish organizations are experiencing increasing difficulty in attracting skilled staff, much less a professional staff loyal to the organization. Finally, the growth and increased role and status of roof organization - the President's Conference, the Conference on Soviet Jewry, the NCRAC, the CJFWF, the Synagogue Council of America, introduce a desirable measure of unity but raise enormous dangers to the quality of Jewish Communal life. This subject deserves extended treatment. It is surprising and disheartening that no one has addressed himself to this question. In the absence of any study the following remarks must be accepted even more tentatively than the previous ones. The characteristic of roof organizations is that they have organizations as constituents; although some of them go outside their organizational constituencies for funds. But their decisions which often represent the lowest common denominator of agreement among constituent organizations are also once removed from accountability to a mass membership. Thus, they are not only impotent except on those rare occasions where true unanimity exists on the communal scene, but they handicap the constituent organizations from exercising boldness and initiative since the latter must often clear their programs with the roof organizations. It is no wonder, therefore, that some talented laymen find the national organizations less and less attractive as an arena of activity and power. One national organization complains that it has trained laymen at the local level who then leave it for the greener pastures and "instant prominence" of activity in a roof organization.

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7. The earlier discussion of points 4 and 5 suggest that the organized Jewish community, to the extent that it can transcend environmental pressures and truly arrive at independent decisions, must choose between alternative strategies that will inevitably alienate one segment or another of American Jews. Catch phrases such as "relevance" are of little help since that which is relevant to the concerns of one group of American Jews is quite irrelevant to another.

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The Future of American Judaism

Marshall Sklare wrote recently that "it is a hallmark of the contemporary Jewish community that assimilationists insist upon designating themselves as survivalists."[27] While it would be unfortunate to let the assimilationsts preempt the survivalist vocabulary, their argument is not without its own logic in the reality of contemporary Jewish life. When we talk about Jewish survival it is not always clear if the referrent is to the survival of a group of people who identify themselves as Jewish or to the survival of Judaism. Of course, there is no Judaism without Jews. So if our referrent of surviva. is Judaism, then what we also mean is the survival of Jews, but in this case, not only nominally identified Jews but those who adhere to some definable essence called Judaism.

Whatever definition of Judaism is adopted, one is sure to despair over the possibility for the continued adherence of large numbers of American Jews to Judaism. Indeed, the more maximalist a definition one adopts (and highly committed Jews tend also to be maximalists), the more pessimistic one is likely to be over the prospects for the survival of Judaism in the United States. The assimilationists may argue, therefore, with justice, that Jewish maximalists are reading Jews out of Judaism. It makes more sense, they may argue, to define Jews rather than Judaism. Jews would be people who call themselves

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[27] In his response to letters from readers, Commentary, 49 (June, 1970), p. 14. By an assimilationist Sklare apparently means someone who persists in calling himself Jewish although he denies the tenets, beliefs, practices and traditions associated with Judaism.

Jews and Judaism would be what they say it is. If the Jewish "establishment" is going to push these people too far, abjure their nominal identification, reject their definitions, they will simply opt out of Judaism. Therefore, Jewish survival, as assimilationists understand the term, requires catering to thelowest level of Jewish identification. A responsible rabbi, according to this argument, will agree to officiate at a wedding between a Jew and a non-Jew, even performing the ceremony jointly with a Christian clergyman, especially if he is convinced that would he refuse, the wedding will take place anyway.

Not all assimilationists adopt such a broad definition. There are those who choose a narrow path rather than a boulevard. However, as we shall see, that may be becuase they confuse the path with the boulevard. America, as we have said, legitimized Jewish affiliation and frowned on the absence of any group identity. In the 1960's, radicalized Jews were indiffernet to what American society did or did not legitimize. But Black radicals became a new referrent group. Either way, as a good American conformist or a militant radical, the assimilationist was stuck with his Jewish identity. What he often did therefore was to redefine Judaism, to suit his own proclivities. So the Jewish tradition became liberalism, or socialism, or radicalism, or activism, or vegetarianism, or any ism with which the assimilationist was iden tified.

Maximalists might be much more comfortable if assimilationists really assimilated and left them with exclusive control over definitions of Jewish identity; even if it meant the loss of many nominal

Jews. But maximalists must first confront two qeustions before they have a moral or intellectual right to persist in their position.

First of all, the problem of Jewish numbers is not easily dismissed. There may be a cost of commitment which is too great even for many highly identified Jews. Jews at present represent about 2.6 per cent of the American population and thepercentage is declining. At this level, the lower the proportion of Jews the greater the increase in commitment costs. It is reasonable to believe that the Jewish identity of even many highly committed Jews is related to their status in the larger society. Jewish status today is high. Political leaders take account of Jews who constitute a respectable proportion of urban voters. Cultural institutions must take account of Jews who constitute an important segment of their producers and consumers. Academic and intellectual groups are continually conscious of and sensitive toward Jews who comprise such a large share of their community. Economic institutions must consider the Jews who play a crucial role by virtue of their overrepresentation in professional and technical positions. Finally, as has been so often said, at the level of popular culture, the Jews constitute one third, not 2.6 per cent of America. Jews, after all, hold a one-third share in the Protestant-Catholic-Jewish definition of the religious composition of America.

But at what point does American society, and its political, cultural, and economic institutions awaken to the fact that Jewish status is disproportionate to their number in the society or its special institutions? Should the percentage of Jews in the total

population continue to decline someone is going to wonder why Jews, the Jewish vote, Jewish sensitivity, etc., has to be taken so seriously. At that point, the cost of Jewish commitment rises. Now one may well argue - so be it. In every era only a small remnant of Jews has survived. Better to retain only a million, or a half a million, or even less as long as they are truly committed. I am myself attracted to this position. But it should be clear that it means losing far greater numbers of Jews than wasoriginally envisioned when we spoke in terms of a dichotomy between the vast majority of the Jewish community who were affiliated to the community and the minority who were only associational Jews or less. Secondly, I believe it does mean basing one's hope for Jewish survival in America on faith rather than sociology, on the continued capacity of the Jewish people to defy the normal laws of survival, rather than upon the normal processaes of history. Furthermore, if Judaism is to survive in America with its ranks so depleted, it will probably do so in a far more sectarian context than is presently the case.

This last point is reinforced by the response of the maximalist to the second question he must face. The question of how he defines Judaism.

I would like to offer such a definition, not to press my own position as much as to indicate the kind of problem which I think virtually any meaningful definition of Judaism faces--the problem of its being out of step with American, indeed with Western currents of thought and behavior. Not with the worst of such currents, not

with rootlessness, drugs, broken homes, violence, self-centeredness, idolatry and license, but with the best of the western tradition.

There are, I believe, three indispensible aspects to a definition of Judaism. One is a sense of peoplehood. A community is not Jewish if its members do not sense a special feeling of unity with and responsibility for the physical and spiritual welfare of all other Jews, wherever they are, or whatever else they may be. Judaism transcends national, regional, racial, and cultural boundaries and a Jew hasspecial loyalties to other Jews wherever they are. A second aspect in the definition of Judaism is Torah. I understand Torah, at its least, to mean that a Jew must submit himself to a set of laws and practices which exist objectively or in a reality which is not of his construction. Torah is outside of us and calls upon us to behave in a certain way. Those who fail to respond to Torah's call are bad Jews, but those who deny that Torah exists, deny an essential aspect of Judaism. The third aspect of Judaism is Jewish education--the study of Torah as sacred text. This implies the belief that some texts are sacred and as a Jew one has special obligations to study them andtransmit them to others.

It seems to me that all three aspects in my definition of Judaism are threatened in the United States. Jewish peoplehood is threatened by cosmopolitanism and universalism, by the vision of an undifferentiated and diffuse love and the desire to destroy all that separates man. It is hard to argue against unity and love, hard to maintain the belief that more lasting unity and love may come through each community ful-

filling the best in its own tradition. Torah and the study of scared text is absurd in a society which stresses the primacy of conscience and individual freedom against even society's own law. The very notion of sacred text is antiquarian and there is no room for a tradition of study in a culture which affirms the value of sensation and activity and experience and the individual as the final arbiter of right and wrong.[28]

At least until we enter a post modern world, the Jew who wishes to remain in the United States but is also committed to the survival of Judaism, has no alternative but to retreat into a far more sectarian posture than has heretofore characterized American Jewish life.

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[28]Since writing these lines I have heard Cynthia Ozick's paper, "America: Toward Yavneh" at the 1970 American Jewish Congress Dialogue in Israel. The paper, which may already be published by the time these lines are read documents another radical and very crucial difference between Jewish and Western values; the realm of aesthetics.

A Historical Perspective of Some Major Issues of American Judaism

Prepared for the
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Task Force on the Future
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in America

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

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A Historical Perspective of Some Major Issues of American Judaism

Jewish beliefs and attitudes in the United States today reflect the continuing confrontation between an historic religious tradition and the revolutions of modernity. Among the major revolutionary movements of modern culture which have brought about a transformation of the tradition, four seem to be of pervasive influence and of continuing significance. The first is the scientific revolution which has drastically shifted the locus of intellectual authority and psychological energy from exploration of the revealed historical tradition by exegesis and dialectic to investigation of natural phenomena by rational and empirical techniques. The second is the democratic revolution with an accompanying belief in human progress through the exercise of individual freedom of choice. The third is Marxism which has proven to be secular faith that serves as a magnet for the expression of moral idealism and provides a basis for an aggressive criticism of religious or national traditions. The fourth revolution is in the interpretation of the concept of human nature. During the past century the emphasis in Darwin and Freud on the biological base of human values has led to a reappraisal of traditional structures of values.

Obviously these four movements are multi-faceted and

have impinged on Jewish self-consciousness in many ways, some of which challenge Jewish continuity, some of which have transformed Jewish tradition and some of which can possibly enhance Jewish life. An historical review can locate some of the current points of confrontation. It can also hint at ways in which the Jewish response can be directed to reconciliation of continuity with change.

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I. The Culture of Science

The confrontation of the historic Western religions with a self conscious and universally applicable scientific methodology is now three centuries old. Yet as the recent vicissitudes of Catholicism and even some of the current frustrations in Islam suggest, the fruits of that confrontation have not yet been harvested. Judaism has coexisted with a variety of cultural institutions in its rich history, and three centuries would appear to be long enough for the development of an adaptive pattern. So it does not surprise us that a religion which began with a revolt against moon-worship in Ur is able to celebrate man's landing on the moon.

On the other hand, Professor Brzezinski has argued in a just published work that the implications of the application of science are only now being felt in the United States and that the future impact remains to be worked out. The general view of those who stress the novelty of our technological, electronic, post-industrial society is that it will introduce enormous discontinuities in all current institutions including those of Judaism.

Whatever be the continuity or discontinuity of the near future, however, the significance of scientific culture for Judaism in historical perspective can probably best be grasped through an insight of the noted Jewish historian, Y. Kaufman. Kaufman

showed that throughout two milennia of the Diaspora, Jews were always adept and eager at cultural assimilation linguistic, social aesthetic particularly when the majority culture had areas for emulation. Thus Alexandrian Jews knew Greek, Moroccan Jews wrote Arabic and Spanish Jews designed contemporaneous synagogues, etc. The brake, however, was the consistent Jewish rejection of religious conversion and their refusal to assimilate into the dominant religious culture. It is therefore not novel that Jews in striking degree have transferred their intellectual and spiritual capital into the enterprise of science. The new crux is that the entry into a scientific culture, or into a religiously indifferent secular culture which does not require conversion, can involve the dissolution or abandonment of traditional religious culture.

The recognition of the unique challenge of scientific culture for the long term survival of Judaism was dramatically and prototypically realized at the very outset of the rise of science in the thought and life of Baruch Spinoza. Four aspects were involved in Spinoza's relationship with Judaism which exhibit perennial relevance as paradigm case. First, there was the magnetism of the new scientific activity in Amsterdam as generating a transfer of loyalties and interests from the parochial culture of the Yeshiva. Secondly, there was the self-imposed consequence for Spinoza that any affirmation of religion must be reinterpreted radically in the light of scientific truth.

Concomitantly, Spinoza became involved and was in fact a major pioneer in the critical and scientific study of Jewish religion, history, politics and language. Fourthly, Spinoza's abandonment of Judaism did not lead to his entry into another religious faith but did make him the first secular Jew in history.

These four characteristics of Spinoza's career are indices of the continued tensions of Judaism within scientific culture. On the assumption that scientific methods remain the dominant feature of Western cognitive culture, despite drugs, beat, hippie, Zen or even Hasidism, an assessment of the present status and significance of the confrontation is in order.

(1) The Distribution of Talent and Energy

The clash between science and religion on issues of doctrine or world view is a familiar theme although its significance for contemporary Judaism is a matter of debate. Less familiar but probably more significant is the redirection of talent and intellectual energy from religious studies to scientific pursuits. The most gifted Jewish persons who were involved in intellectual affairs were traditionally participants in Jewish learning. There is obviously an enormous cultural impact on the Jewish education enterprise if it is almost universally conceded that the most desirable expenditure of intellectual energy is in secular culture. And it is remarkable in what short time, and on what a scale this

effective change of values took place.

(a) The acceptance of science as the seat of intellectual authority on most concerns has been conceded by the contemporary religious leadership in many ways. It has obviously led to a displacement of religious authority as dominant within Jewish culture. Thus the role of the rabbi has been restructured even among the Orthodox. In recent years, however, a crisis of confidence in scientific culture has emerged. It is unlikely that the more extreme attacks on objectivity will continue for too long or that the more irrational and cultic aspects of that attack will be influential. At the same time a reordering of intellectual concerns is taking place. Paul Goodman, Norman Mailer, Allen Ginzberg are symptomatic of the displacement of rational intellectual authority and the search for irrational alternatives. The question is whether the Jewish religious leadership can develop a focus of intellectual energy on the moral and spiritual problems of the culture which would merit intellectual respect and serve as a rallying point for involvement of young Jews. Ironically, the rationalist aspects of Judaism suggest a vested interest by the religious community in the rejection of these irrational options which reflect alienation from Judaism as well as from Western scientific accomplishment.

(b) The high percentage of Jews in educational and scientific

establishment is a recent phenomenon. Businessmen, lawyers, and doctors have long supplied active lay leadership of Jewish community life. It is only recently that practicing scientists in significant numbers are found in some Jewish congregations. The growth of these vocations could mean greater withdrawal of Jewish professionals from the Jewish community. It could also bring about a neutralization of all doctrinal issues of science and religion within the synagogue. Hence it suggests the development of the Jewish religious pattern as a stress upon historical and connotative symbols and practices. This process cumulatively has been influencing and can reshape the character of Jewish religion.

(2) The Doctrinal Issues

With the efflorescence of existential theologies in the 1960's, the long term pressure upon structures of religious belief by secular culture seemed to abate. The value or significance of the theological revival, particularly for American Judaism is a subject of controversy. Historically, the general strategic response by any religious tradition to intellectual challenges is to reinterpret the tradition to absorb the challenge.

Again it is interesting to note how extreme such reinterpretations can be. For Spinoza, for example, God is the new scientific order of nature, ethics is self-fulfillment through knowledge of the laws of nature, and freedom is acceptance of the structure of nature. This interpretation may seem too

radical for Jewish continuity yet it is difficult to state antecedently what are the limits of interpretive processes within a tradition.

Only one group, the Reconstructionists, have proposed an explicit and sweeping reinterpretatation of the tradition. Their fundamental claim which is relevant to the context of Jewish continuity is that a Jewish religious establishment which is in conflict with the basic intellectual beliefs of the culture cannot survive or attract the next generation. In this view,every Jewish survivalist group, with the exception of those who are willing to pay a price of segregation from modern culture, will in greater or less degree commit themselves to Reconstructionism.

Directly related to the strategies of Jewish continuity are two claims which argue against radical reinterpretation. First, persons involved in Jewish tradition and practices on a social, psychological level are willing to tolerate the disparate intellectual assumptions of their religious practices. The set of expectations with which one approaches a religious cluster is not that of theological consistency.

Second, those who would abandon Jewish practices because of a failure to interpret or reconstruct its theory would abandon it in any event since the psychological motivation involved is less rationalistic.

Thus, while not excluding any kind of reinterpretation or reconstruction of tradition, a less explicit rationalistic effort may be possible and fruitful.

It is worth noting that one of the striking facets of American Judaism is the neglect of the richness of interpretive and preservational devices available in the tradition simply through failure of imagination and scholarship. If we reject the stereotype of "authoritarian, narrow" Orthodox-dominant tradition, then Orthodox, Reform, Conservative, Reconstructionist, or secular Jews can find support in the multiplicity of the viable traditions within "normative" Judaism. The range of the tradition is far richer than is usually presented to the consciousness of American Jews. The single effort at broadening this tradition has been the romanticization of Hasidism. It would be interesting to follow up an appeal at a much more "catholic," i.e. non-parochial, presentation of Jewish traditional materials for all Jewish denominations.

To cite a concrete illustration: The Task Force can clearly not evaluate the significance for Jewish continuity of Orthodox/Reconstructionist/Reform or Conservative prayerbooks and their doctrinal import. It is, however, legitimate to inquire whether the aesthetic, attitudinal, philosophical, and bibliographical resources of prayerbook traditions have been presented adequately to the community. This is an "inter-

denominational" resource activity consonant not with a lowest-common-denominator approach, but with a stress on shared values in interpreting, reinterpreting or reconstructing tradition.

(3) Critical Study of Judaism

A third consequence of the meeting of Jewish culture with Western science was the rational, even scientific, study of religion. Historically, it is probable that Spinoza's development of historical and contextual study of prophecy is more a "subversive" than philosophical interpretation of concepts of God or Nature. One of our contemporary rabinical seminaries which is liberal in the range of theology taught or believed does not allow Higher Criticism of the Pentatevch to be taught. On the other hand, it is remarkable that the transposition of "internal" study of "external" Jewish tradition to scholarly analysis of that tradition maintains a degree of commitment to that tradition.

Three attitudes toward critical study of Judaism can be distinguished. The first views the critical analysis of Sinai, Exodus, etc., as basically subversive. Even where tolerated, or where welcomed when confirming historicity of Biblical episode, it is an alien endeavor which upsets the normative chain of tradition which binds the generations.

The second attitude which characterized the founding fathers of "Science of Judaism" in Germany was that the scientific study of Judaism would document the triumph of Jewish national or religious spirit against the vicissitudes of paganism, preju-

dice, persecution, etc. It involved scholarly objectivity, rational apologetics, and a desire to erect an epitaph for an heroic culture whose destiny has probably been completed.

A third attitude would lay much greater stress on objective and comparative analysis of Jewish historical materials. Its tendency is to study Jewish texts or history within the framework of comparative anthropology or within the context of general history.

There is, however, a striking fact which should be noted. While partisanship and scholarship are sharply separate, the study of culture generates a degree of interest and commitment. Thus the hostile or negative attitude toward critical analysis of the tradition fails to recognize the significantly positive implications for Judaism of a large number of scholars and critics. The universities in this country are prepared to assist the development of such a community of Jewish scholars. The development of Jewish studies in this country is not the theme of the present paper. The relevant point is the continued focus of energy on Jewish studies which is expressive of the best standards of scientific and humanistic enquiry.

(4) Secularism

The development of secular Jewish agencies and movements is a dramatic manifestation in contemporary Jewish history. The development of secular Jewish movement is concomitant with

the general secularization of culture and with separation of Church and State in political society. For both Jews and Christians, a wide range of communal activities now carried out by secular agencies were historically part of religious structure.

In the past few decades the range of service of the major Jewish agencies has increased significantly. Simultaneously, the ideologies of secular Judaism--Hebraism, Zionism, Yiddishism--have all waned significantly at the same time. For example, in the past few years the central teacher training institution of both secular Yiddish and secular Hebrew movements has merged, primarily because of decline of student interest.

The decline of the major secular movements has long been predicted since these movements were presumably a response to conditions of the Jewish masses in East Europe. Their continuity in this country reflects some of the intensity of commitment these movements generated. If the intensity was itself a transference from the religious tradition, the issue of the retransfer or restoration of that commitment in the next decade is raised. Some of the ingredients that led to secular Judaisms remain--that is, rejection of established religion and loyalty to Jewish continuity. It would appear that this potential can find Jewish expression only in Israel-centered movements.

The demise of secular movements with the simultaneous redefinition of secular Jewish agencies is obviously of major

potential for future of Judaism. One speculative suggestion is the possibility of a different kind of private Jewish school not connected to either the old secular movements or to the denomination religious schools. Another more likely possibility is the continued reshaping of denominational religious schools because of the involvement of Jews whose commitments relate to the "secular" Jewish areas. A third possibility is, of course, that this kind of Jewish involvement will simply be eliminated from Jewish life.

It seems clear that even if the prophets of technotronic society and future shock are mistaken, the cumulative significance of scientific revolution calls for significant adaptation of Jewish institutions in the next decade.

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II. Emancipation and Enlightenment

The most appropriate general characterization of American Judaism within the historical framework of modern Jewish history is that it is a post-"Emancipation" and post-"Enlightenment" community. This is so even though the Jewish community in the United States did not undergo either the emancipation process common to European countries or the self-conscious enlightenment movement of Western or Eastern Europe. Its historical processes are the fusing of successive "waves" of immigrant tradition. Yet the contemporary community on the whole shares the ideology of the primacy of civil rights first generated in Jewish life by the struggle for emancipation and is deeply committed to faith in liberal progress which was the residue of the enlightenment. These values and attitudes are primarily of political significance but also affect Jewish culture and continuity in the United States in several ways.

(1) Universalism and Jewish Interests

Since Emancipation there has been a widespread tendency to assume that Jewish self-interest is identical with the furtherance of values of universal civic rights, religious toleration, and separation of Church and State. Jacob Katz of the Hebrew University has documented what a significant transformation in traditional Jewish religious attitudes the adoption of the doctrines

of toleration, universalism, and separation has been. With the possible exceptions of doctrinal status of "chosenness" within American Jewish religious thought and the function of women within the institutional religious life, the compatibility of Judaism with "democratic liberalsim" has been demonstrated. Yet the success of the transformation of what was a partially theocratic, patriarchal, partially authoritarian religious value framework with that of liberal ethos, raises issues of cultural continuity.

Thus, the standard post-emancipation criticism is that the fruit of freedom for the individual Jew is the deterioration of status of Jewish community. (It is noteworthy, for purposes of contrast, that in the Eastern tradition, religious freedom means freedom for the community to maintain its institutional life without State interference, but not individualist freedom to abandon his religious community.) We have long grown accustomed, however, to the risks and benefits of individualism for the traditional religious and ethnic communities of this country. What is emerging, perhaps, is the striving for an older type of communal expression as significant manifestation of ideal of freedom. One controversial example is the view that a separatist school group with community control is a more significant expression of freedom than individual right of free choice.

An interesting and significant area of application of

reinterpretation of the ethos of liberalism is in the Jewish school system. The familiar interpretation of American democracy required separation of Church and State with the public school as the institutional embodiment of religious tolerance and shared commitment to equality and fraternity. In the past five or six years, there has been a revival of a view that favors multiple private, parochial school systems geared to differing needs of communal constituencies. (John Stuart Mill believed that such a diversity of private school systems was a more liberal system since it generated broader range of opinion.) This poses again a traditional dilemma with American Judaism whose resolution was decided by suburban patterns in the fifties and will now be restructured. While it cannot and ought not to lead to a totally separatist Jewish school system, it can result in significant experimentation if the Jewish community wants it. A complex weighing of costs, risks, benefits--both in psychological, political and cultural consequences--is required. If the development of Jewish private school system were viewed as compatible with democratic ideology and as appropriate for Jewish continuity, then the number of non-Orthodox Jewish schools of experimental or traditional curriculum could multiply. This would seem to make the Jewish community pattern more like the traditional Roman Catholic parochial system at the very time when abandonment of that system may be taking place. In fact, however, what is

developing is more like the traditional English pattern with significant segments of educational process in private schools of variety of nominally or significantly religious aspects. One obvious possibility is the Jewish-sponsored analogue to St. Paul's or Groton prep schools of superior academic standards, not necessarily restricted to Jews but involving Jewish education. Without abandoning integration, there are innovative possibilities in Jewish educational systems.

The school system situation is only one illustration among many. We have not been sufficiently attuned to the ways the regnant ideology has affected patterns of Jewish life. In part, the identification of Judaism with vague liberal ideology is both supportive of conformist aspects of suburban synegogue structure while it has given to the Jewish "establishment" a reputation of moral redundancy on major political and social affairs. Significant revision of this approach is unlikely and perhaps undesirable but openness to experimentation with value systems of Judaism in American life might be significant. This is especially so, apart from the Left, for segments of Judaism that believe that the Holocaust has undermined the optimism of liberal ideology. It might wish to explore the tradition in new ways with possible implications for institutional changes in American Jewish life.

The general point here is the recognition of the ways Conservative or Reform Judaism has reflected general acceptance

of American liberalism and the options open to a Judaism which would critically reexamine that acceptance.

(2) The Denominational Adaptations

The inevitable process of Jewish confrontation and adjustment with the majority culture took on special form in Jewish communities as a result of the Emancipation and the Enlightenment. The result has been the development of patterns of Jewish religious adjustment which significantly broke from self-segregation tradition. The career and the thought of Moses Mendelssohn which included translating the Bible into German, the development of a rational defense of Jewish belief and morals, and the demonstration of fruitful participation in the cultural life of the West, is pardigmatic for later Jewish culture. Mendelssohn's thought formulated in many ways what many Jewish generations have wanted to believe in its process of adjustment with Christian culture. That doctrine is that the inner kernel of theism is morally and metaphysically valid, shared by Judeo-Christian culture, while its various external wrappings are open to changes of taste, preference, tradition or custom. Here is the formula for a partial revision and partial conservation of selected features of the tradition while maintaining loyalty to the "core" doctrine which can be the religion of all Enlightened men. In some measure, even German Neo-Orthodoxy but certainly Conservative

and Reform embraced the doctrine. Not only historical influences but similarity of environmental challenge this accounts for the for the fact that the three German Jewish denominations--Neo-Orthodox, Conservative and Reform--have become part of the institutional fabric of American Jewish society.

It is a commonplace, rather than a scandalous revelation, that long before 1970 the doctrinal distinctiveness of either Conservatism and Reform had eroded. Differences of generational piety, nostalgia for tradition among congregants or rabbis, or degrees of social status within local Jewish communities seemed to determine patterns of Reform or Conservative Judaism. The theological basis which had motivated Reform the historicist rationale that had characterized Conservatism were no longer central. Both Reform and Conservative intellectual leadership probed Hasidism, existentialism and naturalism without finding unifying convergence. Both stressed the connection with Israel as a new motivating force for Jewish life. As is well known, Reform, which had pioneered a school system which was modeled on Protestantism Sunday School education, was deeply dissatisfied with results just as Conservative pattern of three day Congregational schools was also cause of dissatisfaction. Both Conservative and Reform movements sought to overcome these deficiencies through development of camp programs, youth movements and informal educational structure. The relevant point here is not the validity of respective educational systems which will be studied

more competently elsewhere; it is the view that a pattern of institutionalized Jewish-American adjustment was felt to be in need of significant reformulation. It was also clear by 1970 that Reconstructionism would not supply for Conservative or Reform Jews an optimal way of living in two civilizations, though it might provide yet another variant of Jewish synagogue ritual, and educational practice. Perhaps this experimental perspective permits a different interpretation of the data of denominational insufficiency. The denominations each provided experimental patterns for Jewish-American religious life. The new HaVurot may attract a slightly different clientele to such an experimental pattern.

The rapid rise of congregations in the past two decades has been conditioned by a Jewish community predisposed in favor of a religious movement that embodied a liberal Judaism with a pattern of practices compatible with American consensus and middle class family ties. This raises sharply the problem of the stance and self-conscious values of the religious movements vis á vis the next generation.

The most forceful analogy against post-emancipation Judaism, one which is both favored by partisans of Orthodoxy and which is elaborated in Professor Isaiah Berlin's essay on Emancipation, likens Judaism to an iceberg congealed in harsh environment. The warm rays of freedom will melt the more accessible

portions of the hard mountain which then join the universal ocean while the remnant remains. On this view patterns of flexible adjustment to democratic culture are inevitable way stations of Jewish assimilation. The Mendelssohn family itself is here taught as proof. It takes four generations from a family of Jewish cantors to a Christian composer. Those Zionists and those Orthodox Jews who have held this view differ on the degree of sincerity or of "false consciousness" they ascribe to Reform or Conservative Jews but they insist on their historic assimilationist direction. Ironically, some Conservative Jews partly accept the indictment by considering conservative synagogue practice as a sort of regrettable but not quite excusable lapse from orthodoxy. And the historic hard grain of truth in the argument is that the bulk of leadership of Conservative, Reform and secular Jewish community life usually are born and bred in traditionalist milieux. The challenge of self renewal or replication is to be faced on large scale only in the next decade in American Judaism.

There has been little self-conscious study of replication. Contemporary Jewish practices, whether in weddings, Bar Mitzvahs, dinners, rituals often represent a necessary and probably valuable generational compromise. Seldom do they embody a reasoned commitment of what the present generation of Jewish leadership who promote them would themselves like to see emerge as the pattern for a coming Jewish generation.

Perhaps this is not a task for a superimposed blueprint, for drift, compromise and adjustment may be an inevitable characteristic of the process of making a viable American Judaism. Yet the degree to which intelligent Jewish persons accept patterns of behavior whose aesthetic or intellectual traits are inferior to those of their non-Jewish commitments suggest that this laissez-faire attitude toward Jewish culture is tied up with a double standard in American Jewish life. The reexamination of what our ideal aspirations as a community are in many areas of Jewish endeavor and how our institutions function in those areas thus might redirect energy to the projection of patterns which merit emulation and replication.

There is, however, no rational social engineering formulae available. Both unanalyzable depth factors and chance factors seem significant in determining generational continuity or discontinuity with Judaism.

Further, the hypothesis that the synagogue establishment of the past thirty years is simply a religious shelter for a vague ethnic-national-social conformation of a generation in transition has some strong evidence. In charting patterns for Jewish life for the coming generation, then, we do not have, except for the Orthodox, clear guidelines to replace the type of limited compromises out of which current practices have grown.

III. Marxism

The acceptance of the premises and promise of the "Emancipation-Enlightenment" was the shared starting point of the major movements that today characterize American Judaism as well as the matrix of much of contemporary assimilation. The rejection of Emancipation-Enlightenment has also brought about significant consequences for Judaism. Three kinds of rejection can be readily distinguished.

The first is the self-segregationist segment of Jewish orthodoxy. This group, popularly known as "Hasidim," seeks minimal contact with major social or cultural phenomena of Western society. (It is instructive that those aspects of current youth culture which reject American democracy have sought to set up some rapport with the superficial qualities of that culture.) The major significance of this extreme Orthodox phenomenon for other Jewish groups is that it tests certain assumptions about the melting-pot, or integrative aspects of American society. It also provides a laboratory for development of a parochial school system or other traditional fairly self-contained Jewish communal endeavors.

Zionism provides a second pattern of ideological rejection of Emancipation-Enlightenment assumptions. There is a series of Zionist classics starting with Leon Pinsker's Auto-Emancipation which argued for a Jewish state as the sole condition to Jewish

emancipation. Ahed Ha'am argued that emancipation in Western Europe is purchased only by denial of authenticity. Herzl contended in The Jewish State that Western Europe would itself default on promise of Emancipation and betray its ideals in wreaking catastrophe upon European Jewry. The destruction of European Jewry and the existence of the State of Israel have both confirmed and revised the ideology of Zionism. The extent to which the future of Israel is tied up with the continuity of democratic institutions in the United States and the extent to which American Jewish and Israeli institutions can intersect are fairly recent developments.

The third and most provocative rejection of Emancipation has been provided by the Marxists. Karl Marx himself wrote that the true emancipation of the Jews was to be their emancipation from Judaism, presumably to citizenship in a truly free, secular, socialist, universalist society. This doctrine stressed a rejection of the promise of Enlightenment as façade-masking bourgeois exploitation, regardless of any apparent improvement in Jewish civic status, or in the expression of cultural and religious freedom. Yet the subsequent attack upon civil rights and religious freedoms shows a deep alienation from Jewish interests in Jewish Marxists. Especially so since for five decades the closest expression to the ideal society of socialism was a society in which Jewish religious or cultural expression

was either rigidly proscribed or systematically persecuted. Throughout this period, however, Marxism became the major secular religion of a significant portion of the intelligentsia and its practitioners, in Europe, Russia, and America, include a significant minority of creative Jewish talent.

During the late 1950's and the early 1960's, it seemed that the above episode was of historic interest only. The development of the New Left, its concomitant reawakening of embers of Old Left sentiment among Jewish Liberals, even after the explicit anti-Semitic experience of Stalinism and anti-Israel character of Soviet policy, revealed how deep may be the psychological connection between Jewish alienation and radical universalist Utopianism. Most of the relevant concerns raised by this issue relate to issues of group relations and foreign policy. Yet the magnetism of the New Left for a creative or neurotic minority of Jewish elite groups poses a challenge for Jewish cultural leadership.

Two directions of response can be identified. On the one hand, the Jewish community can programmatically ignore the existence of the Jewish Left (except, of course, in the obvious defensive measures on political and social questions). The only appropriate Jewish response may be to accentuate its own efforts at Jewish continuity which would take place whether Jewish involvement in the Left is or is not a lasting phenomenon.

On the other hand, it is a matter of concern that an ideology which holds as an article of faith (in its pure form only) that Judaism is a reactionary, immoral and to-be-replaced phenomenon should have such perennial appeal to Jews. It demands response because it is so destructive of Jewish morale even if the numbers involved are small. On this view, Jews should actively demonstrate the universality of Jewish tradition, its humanistic liberal or radical impulses, its support of liberal initiatives by programs of social action in all Jewish institutions. Of particular interest here is the role of the concededly authentic Israeli Left in Kibbutzim as an exemplification of the viability of Jewish tradition for social experimentation and social idealism.

There is no effort in this paper to adjudicate these alternative approaches. The Jewish Left will inevitably find the Jewish institutional framework as "conservative" since its reason for being is the celebration and perpetuation of a tradition or the assertion of continuity rather than social innovation. The degree, however, to which the Jewish community should seek to encompass Jewish alienation is a matter of some concern. And the possible benefits of experimental efforts to embrace radical Jewish youth groups should be explored.

IV. Identity and Continuity

In his lecture to B'nai B'rith in Vienna in 1926, which Erik Erikson tells us is "the only occasion on which Freud used the term identity in more than a casual way," Freud said

> What bound me to Jewry was (I am ashamed to admit) neither faith not national pride, for I have always been an unbeliever and was brought up without any religion though not without a respect for what are called the "ethical" standards of human civilization. Whenever I felt an inclination to national enthusiasm I strove to suppress it as being harmful and wrong, alarmed by the warning examples of the peoples among whom we Jews live. But plenty of other things remained over to make the attraction of Jewry and Jews irresistible--many obscure emotional forces, which were the more powerful the less they could be expressed in words, as well as a clear consciousness of inner identity, the safe privacy of a common mental construction. And beyond this there was a perception that it was to my Jewish nature alone that I owed two characteristics that had become indispensable to me in the course of my difficult life. Because I was a Jew I found myself free from many prejudices which restricted others in the use of their intellect; and as a Jew, I was prepared to join the Opposition, and to do without agreement with the "compact majority."

Several themes emerge from Freud's statement which are typical of patterns of Jewish identity in the absence of independent religious or nationalist ideology, and whose examination is significant for the American Jewish future.

(1) Jewish Family Structure

Without pretending to any detailed understanding of how such "common mental construction" is formed, it seems evident that early experience in the family must be extremely significant. Freud's own autobiographical writings and his

biographers trace his own upbringing against background of Viennese Jewish "Hôskalah" parents, one generation away from its roots in rural Hasidic orthodoxy. In this light, change in the Jewish family structure is crucial to the ways in which sense of Jewish identity is shaped. Secondly, independent of considerations of impact of early family experience on child's construction of this self, the pattern of family life is crucial for any institutionalized Judaism, concerned as it is with rites of passage. The stability or the change in patterns of family life in this country then are going to dramatically influence Jewish continuity. Here we must turn to empirical materials. What is happening to patterns of Jewish family? To take one extreme example: it is doubtful if the Jewish community would grow if Jewish family life were replaced by commune patterns. And this replacement is far fetched. Yet in the lengthened adolescence of technological and affluent society, the possibility that marriage decisions take place when inherited identity role is being restructured does have significance for Jewish continuity. Especially is this so in a culture which values hedonistic or individual expressiveness above loyalty to collective or historic ideals.

(2) The Dynamics of Jewish Religious Continuity

A familiar feature of Jewish life has been the residual emotional strength of certain religious, cultural, or ethnic

patterns even among those who have broken with Jewish way of life and the apparently irrational discrepancy in support of certain aspects of Jewish life with neglect of others. Justice Frankfurter does not live as a Jew but requests Kaddish to be said at his grave while explicitly refraining from using the word "Kaddish;" Jews who don't observe Yom Kippur sometimes don't eat pork; secular Jews insist on orthodox circumcision, etc.

We know little of the dynamics of this behavior and are hard put to use what knowledge we may have in planning institutional responses for the needs of members of community. Perhaps greater self understanding would lead to more consistent Jewish commitment. Perhaps the moment of fear in 1967 revealed Jewish guilt for the Holocaust which could not emotionally abide the thought of passivity in the face of another disaster. This ordinarily repressed emotion has probably had an enormous effect on continued Jewish loyalty to Israel.

There are many examples of psychic costs exacted by Jewish self-hatred or Jewish alienation. These data are relevant to an approach which would consider how the psychic roots of being Jewish later affect assimilation or commitment. Jean Paul Sartre argued that every assimilated Jew became an "inauthentic" person from the point of view of his inability to assert his commitment. On the other hand, the ability to find one's self only through commitment <u>against</u> an established tradition,

the multiplicity of roles available as vehicles for authentic self-expression in rapidly changing society, suggest the difficulties of any conclusion that patterns of Jewish continuity uniquely satisfy psychological needs for authenticity.

In this context, an interesting area is Freud's own view that psychological needs for religious belief had long been prevalent in human history. These needs were the need to find some acceptance of one's place in Nature, the need to come to terms with death, and the need to reconcile oneself to human hostility. These needs accounted for various aspects of religious functioning including, for example, atonement processes which do allow one to accept one's own or fellow men's cruelty, or burial rites as a means of coming to terms with death. The existence of these needs as part of human condition or the inadequacy of alternative ways of satisfying them might then account for some of the well known discrepencies of Jewish behaviour and argue for the guaranteed continuity of Jewish religion. Yet if these needs are in fact omnipresent the remarkable phenomenon of the recent Jewish past has been the effort to find secular faith like Marxism or humanism which would meet those needs while allowing for an escape from Judaism. These issues are complex, and I am happy that Dr. Ostow is going to tackle some of them. One relevant question seems to be how sensitivity to the psychological processes involved in the

assertion of personal identity ought to affect the development of those Jewish institutions that are concerned with the shaping of Jewish identity.

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Conclusion

Historical prophecy has fared poorly in the twentieth century. Jewish historians projecting the Jewish future in 1930 did not anticipate the two major phenomena which shaped ensuing decades: the Holocaust and the State of Israel. They did not predict such striking events as the influx of Oriental Jews to Israel; the destruction and continuity of much of Soviet Jewry; the affluence and organizational pattern of American Judaism. Similarly, there can be no doubt that we cannot foresee some of the major factors that will affect Jewish continuity in this country. The preceding, then, has not sought to project the Jewish future.

Yet unless violent perturbations distort all historic continuity, the cumulative effects of the four revolutions of modernity will significantly affect Jewish life. The response of the Jewish institutional framework to these pervasive factors of Western intellectual and social heritage can shape the continuity and inevitable redirection of Jewish life.

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