

C-7411 to C-7412 Transcriptions

Friedman, Herbert A. "A Half Century of Fire and Glory, Part 3:

All the Wars Are One War." 5 July 1989.

Herbert A. Friedman:

...and, that's a kind of a, uh, a, of a snappy way of trying to explain the whole military problem of Israel. Don't forget...close it please.

Male audience member:

Sorry about that.

Herbert A. Friedman:

Thank you. Um...there are two couches you can choose from [indistinct voices from audience]. Okay...Um, the subject of the whole week's work is, the overarching subject is, "A Half a Century of Fire and Glory." Half a century of fire and glory. Half a century begins when? When am I beginning this in my head, when I'm trying to plan five lectures for the week?

Male audience member:

1948?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

'33. Hitler came to power in '33. [1:00] So, a half a century takes you to about '83, or '89, it's the same thing. Um...and I tried to see, in that period of time, that span of time, what were these most crucial events. I would like to give you, first of all, an opinion of mine, it's, and therefore that's all it's worth: that these fifty years...which contained the three years that are more important than any other [writing with marker]...'45 what happened?

**Male audience member:**

The war ended.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

The war ended. '48 what happened? [Indistinct voices in audience] War began. I mean Israel, Israel war. These three years are from the death to the birth, or rebirth of the Jewish people. These are the core; this is the guts, of this whole half century. [2:00] These three years are the three most important years in three and a half thousand years. Never in the three and

a half thousand years of our existence...you wanna close the door please?

**Male audience member:**

So sorry I'm late.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

It's okay. There's a couch here. [door closes] There's some room on the couch over there, and there's a chair way back at the end, whichever's more comfortable...Okay...Oh, sure, that's alright.

Um...think very hard about 3750 years. [writing with marker] That's the, [3:00] that's the lifespan of the Hebrew people. Abraham was [writing with marker] seventeen-hundred and fifty BCE, so you come down to zero, and then you came up to 2000, so your total time is 3750 year. We say 5000 years, that's a gross exaggeration. We say 4000, it's closer to reality, and it could be 4000 years, 3750's close enough. We can't be exact about the datings back there. When did the human being begin to write, to write, either in Cuneiform or Bab- or uh Hieroglyphics, little pictures, letters came even later. When

did the human being begin to write, in any form whatsoever, scratchings, when?

**Male audience member:**

Probably 3000.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

5000 years ago. So, if the Jewish people is [4:00], Hebrew people, is 4000 years old, we go back almost to the very beginning of human civilization. Until you have the ability to write down, and then therefore it gets transmitted to the s- to the next generation, there's no civilization. There are storytellings around the fire. It's all oral, and when you're doing things oral it gets changed, and one guy around the fire telling stories around the fire, you know, he's a great dramatic actor and so he's gonna change that story a little bit, and that's the way the next generation is gonna tell it with some little variations, and the next generation. And by God, you get down two, three hundred years, and you don't recognize the same story. All the Bible stories were oral before they were written. God knows what they were in the original form. He's the only one who knows! Nobody else does, certainly. I'm stressing this:

human civilization begins with writing! The Hebrew people were [5:00] almost at the very beginning of the writing of all of mankind. Okay.

Now, I'm making what you might think is a wild statement, That in all these almost 4000 years of history, these three years were the most important. How 'bout that? And the reason for it is very simple. Never, never, in all the 4000 years, did we come any closer to being wiped out! I mean, my God, we fought it out with the Romans and the Babylonians, and the Sumerians, and the Akkadians, and the [babbles] all the way down, to the Nazis! And nobody came as close to getting us as the Nazis did, just a few, handful of years ago. I mean, boy, if you could come back 500 years from now and tell people that you were around on the Earth when this happened, they would look at you [whispers] like you were some kind of magic. [6:00] That's how it's gonna look like, down the road from now when the kid, when the, when the Heb- Jewish people in the future uh, read about this...This is when we came to the closest to the death, and this when like a snake, you know, that got its head cut off with the tail still wiggling, and we were still wiggling a little bit. So we took a jump and threw the dice and created a state. I mean, you know, you pray for the resurrection of Zi- of Jerusalem and the

rebuilding of Zion, and the, then you pray three, pray three times a day for 2000 years, and when does it happen? It happens when you were at your absolute weakness. I mean, if you were to pick a time in 2000 years when you were gonna roll those dice to create that state, you wouldn't pick 1948, would you for God's sake! One-third of your people are killed! And the other two-thirds of your people are paralyzed! [7:00] American Jews were paralyzed, what the hell were they doing then? Russian Jews were in prison, what were they doing then? Whole Jewish people is just at the lowest ebb of its strength! And that's the minute you pick to create your state? It's an insanity! But it was a necessity. If we hadn't 'a done it then, if hadn't 'a done it then, with the head of the snake cut off the tail would have stopped wiggling pretty soon. Metaphor. Two generations after 1948, sixty, seventy years later, what reason are you gonna give your kid not to intermarry? What reason are you gonna give your kid to keep Judaism going? What reason are you gonna give your kid to be proud of being a Jew? I mean, what are we talking about?! If the Jewish people hadn't rolled those dice, the Jewish people would have rolled over and died completely. [8:00] The will to live, the survival instinct, all would have faded out...

Whoever made the coffee better tend the coffee...

**Female audience member:**

Me.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

[laughs]. Good-bye!

**Female audience member:**

It's not finished!

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Well, the perking is very disturbing.

**Female audience member:**

Is it really disturbing you?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yes.

**Female audience member:**

I'll go and get it. [indistinct].

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Um, so...in this series, set that I made, of the fifty years, and I tried to figure out what to cover for you, with you, from fire to glory, so I broke it up, uh, into five lect-set- uh, lectures. The first one was on the Holocaust, that was the fire. We did that Monday. The second one was the three years [writing with marker], this period, we did that yesterday. The third one, today, is [9:00] the wars are one war. The fourth one, Thursday, is gonna be uh, the growth of Israel, Israel growth. That's already coming into the glory. And the fifth one is going to be American growth, and that's the last chapter of the glory. That's today. So that's how I broke up the five lectures. So today we're right smack in the middle here. Israel is born in war. There's no other way to get born. There's no other way to get born, except by the shedding of blood. Does anybody know how you could have birth without blood? Even the men in the room know that, let alone the women who go through it. Birth is blood! Okay, [10:00] now we're still there, the blood still flows. All the wars are one war. Now, let me give you a couple more dates and then I'll get back, we'll get back down to the text.



When did the war begin, which I call "the one war"? Give me a beginning day. Who, those of you who were here yesterday, keep quiet.

**Female audience member:**

You mean the war of independence?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

When did the war of the Jews for the rebuilding of their state in modern times being?

**Male audience member:**

1920?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

No. [indistinct response]. No.

**Male audience member:**

'45?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

No.

**Male audience member:**

1880, 18- [indistinct]

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

You're not even warm. 1880s, no. What?

**Male audience member:**

1871?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Were you here yesterday? [laughs] You devil!

**Male audience member:**

...the first Jewish settlement, in uh...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

What was the name of it? [11:00]

**Male audience member:**

I can't think of the name of the settlement...It was  
sometime in the 1870s

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

18- 1871, there was a farm settlement set up by a French Zionist named Charles Netter, N-E-T-T-E-R, and he brought twelve young boys from France to learn agricultural farming, and they lived on this farm outside of what we called today, what's Jaffa...and a Bedouin on a camel, coming out of Jaffa, there was no Tel Aviv then...saw these kids, got nervous, got excited, or had some great historic understanding that, "Oh boy, here are the Jews, we better stop 'em and nip it right in the bud." So he either was an ignorant, illiterate camel driver, or he was a wise, prophetic Arab, one or the other... [12:00] But he shot the first kid. That was the first casualty. The first casualty in the effort of modern Jews to recapture the land took place, uh, um, in 1871. Okay.

Now where are we now? We're 1989...so what do we got? We got 118 years. That war's been going on for 118 years. Now, did you ever hear before in modern history of a hundred years war? Yeah, there was a hundred years war between the French and the English in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Okay? So a hundred years is not unusual...How 'bout a two hundred years war? Was there ever a two hundred years war in, uh, in human history? Where?

**Female audience member**

Well, there always were conflicts in the, in the Nile delta between the Egyptians and their neighbors. [13:00]

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Those are steady border, territorial conquests. They can go on forever. But I'm talking about a continuous, consecutive war, with the same objective over a long period of time. The Hundred Years War was England and France attempting to determine domination between them over territory, who was gonna own the British Isles, who was gonna own the landmass of France, and they fought for a hundred years over that one same issue. So that's what I mean about a continuous war on the same problem. I don't think you've ever had a two hundred years war in human history.

**Male audience member:**

What about the Crusades?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Och! So you now you put your finger on it, exactly! In the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries, you had an effort by, on the part of the Christian forces of Europe to take over the Holy Land. Okay. How'd that war come out? [14:00]

**Male audience member:**

The Christians lost.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

They lost. Who won that war? Who was the final, culminating, great Arab general who won that war?

**Male audience member**

Saladin.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Saladin! You know the name of the street in Jerusalem, Salah ad-Din, in east Jerusalem, where you're going past the Damascus Gate and you turn left, and you're on Salah ad-Din Street, and those shops are all open on Shabbat, and everything else in west Jerusalem is closed? Salah ad-Din is Arabic for Saladin. Who was the final, culminating Christian king whom

Saladin fought? Great, famous, English, Richard the Lionhearted. He kicked him in the behind and sent him back to England with his tail between his legs! Seven popes, all the gold of Europe, all the kings, all the big horses, all the armor, my God it went on and on! All the big forts they built in in in, in Palestine, the remnants of which you can see [15:00] today...Nothing doin'! They lost. These scruffy little desert nomads beat 'em. Alright? So now what's the application of that to today? What do you think the Arabs think?

**Audience:**

Holy war

Just wait 'em out.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

[laughs] "It only took us two hundred years to know those Christians out of the box! What the hell's the hurry to make peace with the Jews? Come on! We got time, we'll get 'em. We'll get 'em." You have to know how your enemy thinks. I had a conversation once with a man in Jerusalem of the tribe, of the family Nashashibi. Nashashibi is one of the great Arab families, and rich, gold watch chain, Harvard, Oxford, three piece suit,

[16:00] half a dozen languages, cultivated, international, uh, uh broad-minded person. You know, you love to meet people like that. Just a pleasure. No silly dope talking about yesterday's television show. And you talk to this guy and you get from him, you get the mentality..."It's really too bad," he says, in his Oxford accent, "that you people don't understand, that you are aliens here. You don't seem to understand it. You don't belong here! You are Europeans. White, middle class, Europeans, with a slight professional overlay. But underneath it all you are pants sellers and herring sellers, and that's what you've been for hundreds of years in your European ghettos. That's what you are! And I'm sorry, I don't hold anything against you, but that's what you are. And [17:00] you're trying to come into a place that doesn't belong to you. And it really doesn't matter that you think it belonged to you. I'm sure Abraham was a Hebrew. I, I agree. But, one of Abraham's two sons was Ishmael, and the other one was Isaac. Okay? And Isaac was the light man and, and the Jew, and he went off to Europe, and Ishmael was the brown fellow, and he was the Arab, and he stayed here. So, forget about all that Bible stuff and...we have just as much of a claim from it as you do. That's not our claim, it shouldn't be your claim. We're talking about today, and you don't belong, and

good-bye, and you should go without bloodshed, but if you won't, then we will send you back."

**Male audience member:**

How are you convinced that the viewpoint you just expressed dominant or majority...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

It's the intellectual Arab point of view! When you say dominant or majority, I mean I dunno [18:00] what most Arabs never heard of it, don't think that way. But, the layer of, of, the diplomatic layer, the governmental layer, the academic and intellectual layer in the Arab world, every Arab university graduate, and don't forget in the, only the last twenty-one years, in the West Bank we, we have built four universities for them. Before that we used to let them come to the Hebrew University, Haifa University. Um...so, we're bringing them, uh, through education, into the modern world...There are tens of thousands of them now who are beginning to think that way!



**Male audience member**

Was this an actual conversation that took place between you and this fellow?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

In the Jerusalem Museum, in a lovely dining room on the second floor, with twenty people there, David Rockefeller was the guest of honor, Teddy Kollek gave the lunch, and we were sitting there talking, drinking uh, cognac after lunch in a very civilized way, and this is what Mr. Nashashibi said. [19:00]

**Male audience member:**

What was your response? What...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

I said...Yes, Peter?

**Peter:**

Let me predict your response.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

[laughs] Oh ho, that's a good game! Okay.

**Peter:**

Uh, your response to him was, um, "Mr. Nashashibi, those ghettos in Europe that you'd have us return to have all been burned to the ground by the Nazis. We have no home in Europe anymore either. Where would you put us? Where would you have us live?"

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Oh, listen, we tried that one. He said, "New Mexico's a nice place. It's empty." It's a, it's a blip in history! He doesn't care about the ghetto being destroyed, or you don't wanna go back to Poland. Fine, you don't wanna go back to Poland, it's okay by him, he's not trying to shove you back to Poland.

**Peter:**

Where would he have us?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

He's trying to shove you OUT of where you don't belong. Go wherever you want!

**Peter:**

That's the point, there's nowhere else!

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Come on, there's nowhere else! The world's empty! The whole Antarctic is empty.

**Peter:**

...the Holocaust, there wasn't a square foot of earth for Jews on this planet.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Who said so?!

**Peter:**

I said so, I'm [indistinct]...History says so!

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Oooh, well that's between mister...that's between mister...No, we said so! Peter! We said so. In nineteen hundred and forty-five, we said, [20:00] "We wanna go home!" And where

is home, and the British said, "Well, look, hey, fifty years ago we offered you Uganda. And you didn't want it!" Hey, not bad if we had taken it. Uranium, gold, oil, water, all the coffee up there in the highlands of Kenya. Come on! Let, we must be honest with ourselves. There's a place we wanted! We rejected every other place. We got our roots!

So my conversation with Mr. Nashashibi is, "Listen," and he's how I answered him, "uh, you, you think we don't belong here, you think this is not ours, you think we are alien, Europeans...Yes, of course there are plenty of other places. Listen, we are a creative people, we are quite a genius people, we are very vigorous when we want to get our act together. Uh, yes there are three states out in the western part of America, uh, we would only need the amount of land [21:00] that the Navajos are using, [laughs] in the northwest corner of New Mexico, but that's about the size of Israel. They got 8000 square miles on that reservation, that's what Israel consists of, is 8000 square miles. Um, and we sure could have made deals in, in South America, and we could have taken the deals from the Eng- the deal from the English then, and we could make a deal with a lot of countries today. Would have been some struggle, would have been some blood, would have been some waiting in

camps in Europe. I spent three years in, in DP camps in Europe. I told that whole story yesterday, of how we brought in a quarter of a million people in order to bring them out and get 'em into Palestine with some manpower and some guns. Was a three year piece of work out of the life of the Haganah, and that's the same '45 to '48, and I worked there, in Germany, and lived through it. Brought plenty of people and plenty of guns. So it was fine. So I said, "But what, the mistake you make is that [22:00] you don't understand the, the the strength of will of the Jewish people, and the dream of the Jewish people, and why this uh rotten, rocky, empty land is so cru- important to us, and we shall not give it up. So, you think you can get rid of us and that time is on your side and you will continue trying, as long and as hard as you can. And we will continue trying as long and as hard as we can to get a foothold here." He said, "You haven't got it yet," and I said, "We sure haven't. But your two hundred years aren't over yet." Okay! [Hebrew word] as you say in Hebrew in the Talmud, stalemate, check! Playing chess, and the conversation is check. Not check mate!

**Male audience member:**

What's a direct response to the brown one, Ishmael?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

What do you mean what's the direct response? He's the father of the Arab people. [23:00] He's the half-brother of the Jewish people. What d'you call him, the Arabs call him, when they wanna, when there is real, authentic friendship between and Arab and a Jew they call each other cousin. When the Arab wants to mock and sneer the Jew as his enemy, he also calls him cousin but he calls him cousin with a sneer. It's interesting...when you listen to the conversation in Hebrew and Arabic...on, on the street, which, you can't if, as a tourist. You gotta get hold of that language, and I plead with you, all the time, you've got to learn at least the Hebrew! You got to! And every one of you in this room is smart enough to do it. This is a question of willpower and arranging your lives, that's all, for God's sake. Every one of you has got within the reach of your hand an Israeli student in some university near you who's twenty years old and would love to have the few bucks that you would pay him for the tutoring, or her, and you will learn the language in a year. Do it, for Christ sake! [24:00]

Okay, close the parenthesis, pardon me. Um, then, when, when your ear is attune to it and you hear it, you will hear the

word cousin said in one way, and you'll feel a good feeling, or you'll hear the word cousin said in a different way and you'll say, "Oy vey, there he goes, the bastard, he's gonna shoot me or I'm gonna have to shoot him!" That's the answer to it, there's no evading it! Mr. Nashashibi has to know that we are intending to stay, and we have to know that he intends to get rid of us. And the trick in the game is to see if we can find a middle ground, and there is only one middle ground, only one. And several of our great leaders have enunciated it in words, beginning way back with uh, with uh president, the first president, a man who was first Professor Chaim Weizmann, [25:00] who got Professor Albert Einstein, Weizmann from England and Einstein from Germany, came to American in 1921, they came together on the same boat to begin the preaching of the Zionist movement to the Jews in the United States, and in 1921 Mr. Weizmann said, "This is a struggle of two rights." No one right and one wrong. It's a struggle of two rights. We are both right, and we have to learn how to share that original homeland. And down through the years since 1921, Mr. Ben-Gurion said the same thing, every meeting of the uh, commission that he came, the Peel Commission, and the Morris and Grady Commission and the [unsure] Commission...They [indistinct] every few years,

everybody gets in heat and sends, this is during the '20s and '30s, [26:00] sends a commission over to see what should be done. And every time any Jewish uh, official testified in front of that commission, whether it was Ben-Gurion or whether it was Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver from Cleveland, or whoever it was, they all came down the decades with the same line: partition, partition, partition, partition. Which means, two groups of people set up two forms of autonomous government, live side by side, no borders, no customs declarations, maybe even a common currency, or maybe not, doesn't matter...I mean, Canada, America. You've got a thirty-two hundred mile border with not a, not a, um, one machine gun on it! 3200 miles! Can drive your car in and out, you know, in the old days you used to smuggle some whiskey in the trunk of your car, when there was prohibition in America. [27:00]

Uh, alright, so we gotta get back on the track. Uh, by the way, the second strain of Zionist thought, from Jabotinsky on down, was no two peoples in one- sharing one land. No, no, no, no, no. They had a slogan like this, well I don't have, here, okay. Um, their slogan is a fist holding a rifle, and one end of the rifle touches the Mediterranean, and one end of the rifle touches Amman in Jordan, and the Hebrew says "Rak kakh!" which



means "only thus," "only this way," "we want the whole bloody thing," from the Mediterranean out to the desert, the Jordanian desert.

Okay, so you have two, two trends in Zionist thinking, and uh, they have fought each other, I mean even with weapons, all the way down through the years. And uh, Shamir today comes from that line, Ben-Gurion from yesterday came from the other line, [28:00] the Jewish people is split in Israel today. Uh, the Jewish people in the diaspora is split...I mean, how many American Jews uh, uh take one side or take the other? And it's a lot...half the Israeli Jews take one side or the other, the Boychiks can't make their mind up. That's our weakness. And by the way, Nashashibi knows that. 'Cause one of the little tiny pieces in the conversation was, he said, "Well, you know, you fellows think you have all the time in the world to get your act together. You don't." [laughs] I mean, he's right!

Alright. None, none of this is a digression, by the way. It's not a digression. That's why I gave the title to this thing, "the wars" beginning 118 years ago, "are one war!" And where it's gonna end, in time, in the future, I haven't got a clue. So let me just bring [29:00] you up to date as to where everything is. Now, let me first show you the map.

This is a military map, and you won't see it in a book or in a magazine or anything, and uh it's in Hebrew 'cause it doesn't exist in English. Uh, *hayam a tikhon*, this is the Mediterranean, right here, so that over here, this is [Hebrew] which is part of uh, Tripoli, which is today called Libya. This is Libya. Here is the Egyptian port of Alexandria. Here is approximately El Alamein, Rommel got as far as here...You, those words, Rommel, El Alamein...

**Male audience member:**

World War II.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Okay, World War II.

**Male audience member:**

What's the date of this map?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

The date of this map? Oh, geez, it's gotta be down there somewhere...[indistinct voice from audience]

**Male audience member:**

December, 1962.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Okay. [30:00]

**Male audience member:**

December what?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

'62. Nothing has changed on this map since '62. It's not a political map. Um, this is a map showing terrain; this is a map showing how, where you fly airplanes and things. Uh, uh, here's Baghdad, in the middle of Iraq, okay, Baghdad. Uh, here is an airfield in Israel. Okay? That's a pretty long flight, um, on the 4<sup>th</sup> of July...

**Male audience member:**

Seven minutes?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Oh ho ho noooo! Hours, hours, hours. You have to overfly Jordan, and you have to overfly, uh, uh Saudi Arabia, and you

have to overfly Syria, and you have overfly Iraq, until you can get to that reactor. We flew to that reactor, bombed it, and came back. Never landed, refueled in the air all the way.

[31:00] You know what that means? Fourteen aircraft...all grouped together in the air, so that on the radar on the ground, when they were looking at it, it looked like one big 747, commercial airplane, and they thought some big commercial airplane was off course, and they were trying to help the poor pilot, and they were talking to him in Arabic, and he was talking back, in very good Saudi Arabic...And he finally convinced them, he was off course, but he'll be okay, don't worry, don't worry. Fourteen airplanes! Grouped so close together, wing to wing! I mean, my God, what the opportunities were for accidents and crashes. The whole thing would have gone up in smoke. Do you remember the American helicopters trying to get to Iran to...well all right. So uh...That was a real dumb thing, for God's sake. That was an idiot operation. They came up off an aircraft carrier out here [taps on map]. This is the Gulf of Oman. Here's the Horn of Africa. This is the way you get inside the Persian Gulf, [32:00] it's a real tricky entrance here. There's one island that can block the throat. There, seven

miles wide here, and you can stop it, if you want. And, well, anyway, I don't want to get into too many details on this thing.

Here is Israel, here is the Sinai Peninsula, here is the Straits of Tiran, which were closed; here is Eilat, right up here at the head of the Gulf, and the Brit- and the Jordanian port of Aqaba is right next to it. If you really wanna lock off Israel, you don't bother to close Tiran. The next time they wanna do it, they'll close down here at Mandeb, and the very body of the Red Sea. Here's, this is all the Red Sea. You close off Bab-el-Mandeb and you got it, you lock, you lock Israel off from access...Most of the fuel that's used to power the [33:00] electric plants in Israel, to produce electricity, is in the form of coal. It comes into Israel from South Africa. You wanna know why these two countries are up tight, that's one of the reason. Israel lives on South African coal, coal, 'cause she can't live on Arab oil! The coal's gotta come up from Africa, down here. It's gotta come up through Mandeb, it's gotta come up the, the Red Sea, it's gotta go in through Tiran, and it gets offloaded up here. Okay? And it gets put on trains, and it gets carried up to near the golf course at Caesarea, where those great big towers were that you saw last, well you were there last...How many of you were there...? Okay.

Think in terms of the whole area. What's this big landmass in the middle? What is this? That's Saudi Arabia. Did you ever realize how big it is? It's huge! [34:00] It's unbelievable. You know where Ethiopia is, where we're trying to get the Jews out of? It's right here [taps on map]. It's on this same map. It's right there. There's been work going on, uh, all the time, with uh Mengistu, uh the dictator of Ethiopia, to try to uh, uh he wants help from Israel in beating the Eritrean guerillas, who are next door to him, and uh efforts have been made to make a trade with him. You want help with uh, squashing the Eritrean guerillas? We'd like to fly some aircraft in, uh, just enough to take about 10,000 people out, and we'll fly in at night and we'll fly out at night, and you'll never know we're there, and pretty soon you'll be uh, rid of the problem, and we'll be rid of the problem, and then we can leave a few planes behind with some arms in 'em, and you do what you want with 'em. Still can't persuade him to make the deal. I think he's on his way out, thank God. But then we'll have to begin all over again with the next guy. [35:00] Uh, we gotta get those last 10,000.

Okay. I told you about Iraq, Baghdad, that's, that thing was blown up, it's still not rebuilt. The French have offered to, and they're sending parts, and uh, they will, they'll

rebuild it. But there's one that's coming on stream, a very, very, uh, now within a year, less maybe. Uh, you know where it is? Karachi. You know where Karachi is on this map? Karachi's right here. That's Pakistan. We're all the way over. This is Baluchistan, here's Afghanistan, and here is Pakistan. Uh, there it is right there, where that 25 is, if in Hebrew you can read the letters, "Karachi." Well, that's a long flight! But, uh, we'll have to do it...Uh, it'll, or, put it the other way, it will have to be done. We might not be able to do it alone. But you have to think about it...That map is on the, uh, the, is in the office [36:00] of the General Staff; that map is in the office of the prime minister, and that covers everything from Libya to Pakistan, all the way down to the south of Sudan, and Ethiopia, and the way to the bottom of Saudi Arabia; this is Yemen, down here; this is Oman; and America has a base off the coast of Oman, on an island right here. Okay?

Uh, this is Russia [taps on map]. These are the southern provinces of Russia, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and this is where all the stuff is going on today, of the nationalities of Russia, which are trying to express their independence, and along their southern border, this way, Russia has about, plus minus, fifty million Muslims! Citizens of

Russia. [37:00] Russia's making a deal now with Iran, after Khomeini's dead. Here's Tehran, here. Tehran is right here. Russia's gonna open a railroad, right down straight to Tehran, because Russia needs an outlet for her Muslims. So Russia's got a natural link up with Tehran, and the efforts are being made to persuade Russia that, at the same time, it's okay...that at the same time that she wants...uh, there's a chair here, Michael...oooooh, okay [speaking Hebrew], you're rescuing your jacket [laughs]...Um, at the same time that Russia links with uh with Tehran, the effort is being made to persuade her to link with Israel, do it simultaneously if you want. What the hell's the difference, if you want a PR advantage out of it. Um...and Russia's close, to considering uh, to to, reopening diplomatic links [38:00] with Israel. But, she's also gonna, uh uh, diplomatic link with Iran. Never forget it.

We're living in the middle of this vast territory, and we are this big, yea, and we could so easily fit...this is the Sea of Galilee, see this little point of blue? That's the Sea of Galilee. You see this little uh, blue thing? That's the Dead Sea. There we are. That could fit on the Navajo reservation in New Mexico. Um...we're living in the middle of that volcano, and we will continue to stay there. But if you folks don't



understand that this war's going on for a long time, then you're gonna be caught all the time by surprise and frustration, and you'll say, "Ooooooh!" You must have patience, you must keep on being willing to fight it. Fighting it takes money. There is no alternative. [39:00] You cannot buy airplanes with baseball cards. Eh, you gotta put cash on the table. McDonnell Douglas sells for money! If you get that money from the uh, Congress, that's fine; if you get that money from the Jews, that's fine. Doesn't matter where you get it from, you have to keep getting it! Everybody's gotta chip in to it.

Let me do a quick run through, now that you got the map, now that you have the dating, and now that we have no time left, uh...[laughs] I don't know where the hell the time goes, but uh...you wouldn't believe it that we've been at this for three quarters of an hour, would ya? Uh, lets do a very quick run through of these various chapters. This was a book that was written, by uh, Chaim Herzog. Now Chaim Herzog is thought of, variously, as a lawyer...or as a television commentator, or as an army general, uh, [40:00] or as the president of Israel. Of all those roles, he was very good as an army general, chief of military intelligence, he was a successor to General Yariv, who's here now, whom all of you have met and heard from.

Um...and he wrote a good book of military history, and the book is called *The Wars*...it's called *The Arab Israeli Wars*, and I really, I gave you several chapters out of it, but I would recommend that you get the book and have it in your library.

The War of Independence, '48, '49...uh...is simply a short, you know, couple page thing, um, if you look over on the second page of that, there are no numbers unfortunately, uh, on the left hand side...left hand column, [41:00] where I've underlined...I, uh, "War of Independence." No, it's the first one, it's the very first one...

**Male audience member:**

In our book it was the last one. They may have been...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Oh, you're kidding! Blech!

**Male audience member:**

All out of order

No big deal, we found it.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

"You're fired!"...is what I will say to whomever I can put my hands on, who did it for you. "War of Independence." Second page of that chapter...left hand column, first paragraph, six, seven lines down, I underlined, "6000 dead in the war of independence, of whom over 4000 were soldiers and 2000 civilians." And he compares that to other populations. Um...if you compared it to the American population it would be two- two and a half million, dead; or it, to the British population it would be a half million dead. [42:00] Um, America hasn't suffered two and a half million dead in all the wars it has fought in three hundred years. And in that one war, 6000 dead was 10%, was um...1% of the population of the entire country. The entire country, in '48, had six hundred thousand men, women, children, old guys, babies, six hundred thousand. And six thousand were killed. So that means out of every hundred people, one person was killed. That's such an unbelievable rate...In World War II, Russia lost twenty million, twenty million. That's the highest rate of loss of any country, in any war, in the entire s- uh, history of civilization. Twenty million, out of a population of two hundred million, was 10%. Uh, Israel's 1% [43:00] was tougher on her, and I'm not minimizing how tough a 10% loss is...Um, then he goes on about Ben-Gurion being in the

class of Churchill, Roosevelt, and de Gaulle, and then come down to the bottom of the page, 'cause this is important, "the main brunt of the fighting in the War of Independence was borne at the battalion and company level," and I don't know how much military experience you guys have had, but you know that company level uh, is, uh very small, a company can be anywhere from a hundred to a hundred and fifty men...a battalion is never more than uh, eight hundred, nine hundred, maybe a thousand men...a battalion is usually made up of anywhere from six to eight companies. A commander of a company is usually a lieutenant; commander of a battalion might be a captain. It's a, these ranks are important [44:00] because in terms of the Israeli military procedures, they made a decision in the very first war of independence that officers would go first. Those who go first get killed first. So when you make that decision, you are deciding in advance that after any given war or battle, you are going to be short a certain number of lieutenants and captains, company and battalion commanders. When you are short at that level, then there's nobody to promote up to be the majors and the colonels, to run the regiments and the divisions, which are larger units of men. But that's a deliberate, sacrificial act, because without it you're not gonna win. You use your best men

to win, and they are killed, and they are off the board...and then you have to find underneath them [45:00] sergeants to promote up...At the regimental and the and divisional level, when your majors and colonels lead, they are killed, you have no manpower for your generals. In the war of 19- in the October War of '73, we lost ninety-one colonels... and Israel, fifteen years later, is so short of generals, it, it, it, we're throttled. It'll take another five years, another ten years, if there is no war, and we'll get 'em replaced, because from '73 to now it's already sixteen years, and that's why we're beginning to feel a little less strangled. Give us another five years without a war, and we'll begin to be able to replenish the ranks of the generals. Lose ninety-one colonels! And down at the lower level, we lost five hundred sergeants. [46:00] So, no lieutenants and no captains coming out of the ranks of the sergeants, the dead...The casualties, the penalties of war, are always in terms of the next war. I mean, the widows and the children, they cry, and they lost Papa, and they lost an uncle...um, so that's a family tragedy, personal tragedy. But the national tragedy is that your, your strength is in jeopardy until you can replace it. Don't think the Arabs don't understand that! So this understanding of the way the army works is important, and that's

why I underlined it. "The main brunt of the fighting in the War of Independence was borne..." [end Side A; gap in recording]

...was a dozen men. Okay... [47:00]

**Male audience member:**

Is there significance between a corporal and a general more than the experience of age?

**Male audience member:**

Colonel.

**Male audience member:**

Ah, col- excuse me, colonel and general?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yeah! The experience is not just age, the experience is in leading how to handle a mass of men and armor, er equipment. How many people do you feel you could command and give orders to and watch out that those orders are being obeyed, and at the same time watch that there's enough, that the hot food is coming, and there's toilet paper in everybody's knapsack, and that if the sack of mail comes in, put the mail someplace where it's gonna

be safe until the fighting's over then you can give the guys all their letters...

**Male audience member:**

...learn it like this, or do you have to learn it out in the field?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

No, you have to learn it in training. You learn it in training. So some people have the capacity to manipulate...look, I am maneuvering here, three hundred people. Okay? So sometimes I'm sitting down here at the smallest unit of a platoon, of fifteen people, [48:00] and we're working, and sometimes I'm out there trying to, to uh, speak to three hundred people, and a staff out there of five people working, and they have staffs under them, the food man, and the the the, et cetera. So, it's being able to handle authority, distribute it, keep an eye on it, don't let anything get out of control, there isn't a thing that gets out of control here, that I don't know about. And yet I can't go around, you know, looking nervous and looking worried, and with antennae coming out of my ears, and walkie-talkie...I don't use any of that garbage.

**Male audience member:**

That's why you have a professional staff...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Well, but how do I keep in touch with them?

**Male audience member:**

They'll get you...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Okay, good point, intelligence has got to filter up, as well as be requested from the top down. So you, every- all, so these are all the linkages you have to set up. You set up [49:00] an information flow for you to get everything, et cetera, et cetera. So some people have the capacity to handle units up to a certain size. Listen, uh um, I was a chaplain in a division, 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. A division is 15,000 men. 15,000 men strung along a front in battle can spread as far as ten to twenty miles. Okay. There's no walkie-talkie in the world that goes ten miles, twenty miles. It doesn't exist. So you could have telephone, but you gotta string the wire. You give a guy a



spool of wire and you tell him to start stringing it, and he gets killed and shot and he falls down, and he's on top of the wire. You don't know what's happening. You send two more guys out, they get killed, you still don't know what's happening. Meanwhile, you're out of touch. Meanwhile, a company over here, four miles on your right flank is getting decimated and you don't know it. [50:00] And you sent them out 'cause they had to blow a bridge, but they didn't blow that bridge, so the Germans are coming across the bridge, and suddenly you're sitting here at c- at, at uh uh division headquarters, and pow! pow! pow! The shells start coming, and where the hell they coming from?! All of sudden here you got yourself a whole gang of Nazis, and they're within half a mile of you...Oh, what happened to that bridge? What happened to that bridge?! Well, three poor dead guys are what happened to that bridge.

So there are some people who cannot handle large numbers of men over long expanse of territory. Some people have got the capacity to sit way back from the battle. And the American style is, not, not that the commander goes first. The American style of battle is that the commander has to be in charge of, of information, to make decisions as to how to dispose of groups of men, and tanks, [51:00] and big artillery, and how to, how to

deploy them, and how to give the order for this one to do this, and that guy to start shooting when, and so on. You, you, you don't want to kill your men! The Israeli army principle infatuates the American army. They teach it at all American army command and staff colleges, out at Fort Leavenworth, uh, all over America. And uh, they can't figure out how the Israelis do it, and they finally have come to the conclusion that it's only because of two things. A) the willingness to sacrifice the personnel and B) the small distances involved, in Israel. And so the American army decided that since most of its fighting is done with much larger groups of people and over much longer distances, they cannot utilize the Israeli tactic. And so the commander is in the rear and the flow of information comes [52:00] to him and his maps around the wall, and a bunch of runners, whom he sends out with info- with messages and commands. Today you don't have to do it so much with runners. You can send out- send ah, light aircraft, um, give your instructions by wireless to a pilot in a light aircraft who then gets to the um, point, lands on the grass and gives the message. Or even, now, it's getting very much more sophisticated. Messages are going via satellite, so you kick your message 22,000 miles up - 22,000 miles - some satellites in

geosynchronous orbit over you, and it comes down that way to a point that may only be three miles away. So you've got a message going 44,000 miles, in order to get three miles, but that's instantaneous, by the second. [indistinct comment from audience] [53:00] Sure it is! Sure it is, and you haven't got time to fuss around with codes. Well, alright, we don't have to get into the technicalities of battle. But the important point is, for Israel, that, uh, a small group of people have grown up through the years, who have survived all the wars, and in the middle of that page is that last thing I want you to know: speed, commando type operations, the use of outflanking maneuvers, and above it, a couple of sentences above it, is a line "fighting by night." Okay. If you wanted to know the doctrine of the Israel army, you have it in this half page. Beginning with the main brunt of the fighting at battalion and company level, and all the way over here to these four characteristics of how the Israeli army fights.

Now all this is a description of the war of independence, [54:00] forty years ago. And you wanna know something? Today the equipment is so much more sophisticated, we have missiles that'll fly a thousand miles, the Jericho II, Russia's scared of it... A Jericho II can fly from Israel onto Russian territory.

How 'bout that? And the Russians know it. They don't want any Israeli missiles coming into Tbilisi, and Sevastopol, and any of the oil fields at Baku and Batum, it's all within range. All within range. This crazy... if the next war escalates into some crazy missile exchange... escalates, 'cause it won't start between Israel and Russia but it could escalate... Then, Russia's got to calculate now, uh, Israeli missile capability. [55:00] So, I'm trying to say, in the forty years since this chapter, which this chapter describes, forty years later the equipment is better, the manpower is better, the whole mechanism is strong, it has survived all these wars...Um, and yet, and yet, the basic tactical principles are the same! Yes Alan?

**Alan:**

The Arab armies do not use the same tactics, that is officers don't go first?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

No way. Nor are they flexible. They go by the book. See they, the Russian...The Arab armies learned their tactics from the Russians. Don't forget, Egypt invited the Russians in then threw 'em out. Down to this day, the Syrians are a Russian

client, in a military sense. They use Russian aircraft, Russian uh, uh, air to ground missiles, ground to air missiles, the reverse, Russian tanks...and Russian doctrine! And Syrian officers go like Russian officers, [56:00] with the book. Russian officers are as rigid and as stolid as their boots and their uniforms and their personalities. No flexibility. Russia depends on massivity. Take 3000 big artillery pieces and line 'em up, hub to hub, axle to axle, no room in between. Keep the people behind, putting the shells in, fire the shells steadily, non-stop; million shells a day. That's how they bombarded Berlin into pieces. When I came into Berlin to look for a house to leave in and the Haganah guy said to me, "Go get yourself a house with four walls and a roof," [laughs] I laughed like mad, 'cause four walls and a roof, in a city of twen- ten million people...there wasn't one! The Russians just laid it out. Yeah?

**Male audience member:**

What strikes you as different today than forty years ago? Is it technology, [57:00] and type of weapons that they use, especially the aircraft, um...when everything is really within seconds, uh...capability of destruction...[unclear] being destroyed...What's the Israeli military strategy...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

What's the difference?

**Male audience member**

What's the difference?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

You're only talking a...Well, time, so you have to...

**Male audience member:**

...ten minutes versus one minute...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

So you have to, you, so you have to take uh, um, uh, measures, to adjust to that uh, shortage of time. What are the measures that you take?

**Male audience member:**

Where do they expect the battles to be fought, in the air?  
...it certainly can't be over Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Where? Why can't they be over Tel Aviv and Jerusalem?

**Male audience member:**

...the population...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Well, isn't that too bad? Yeah, and a lot of people would get killed if there were air battles over Tel Aviv, that's the reality.

**Male audience member:**

And that's the strategy?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

There's no strategy! You try to stop them. If you don't stop them, [58:00] they'll come through! One good way to stop them is...

**Male audience member:**

Stop 'em wherever you can...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Well, and the best way to stop them wherever you can is while they're still on the ground. Isn't that the best place? Yeah. So Israel's basic strategic consideration, since you used the word strategy, is pre-emptive strikes. You all play bridge, you know what a pre-emptive bid is. So the whole trick is, um A) do you get information long enough in advance to know that you're sure that they are about, that they are about to strike, so you'll try to hit 'em first? Do you get information? B) Have you done your training, so that you can get your forces up in the air, and sufficiently widely deployed...Let me give you a real case. I can see the way we're going, we'll never get to cover this textual material, [taps book] but if you got into the chapter on the '70, um, on the, on the '67 war [59:00] ...I'll, let me, let me tell it to you, and then I beg you to read it.

The '67 war...was a war in which Israel and the Arabs had mobilized their ground forces two and a half weeks in advance. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of May, 1967, the Straits of Tiran, right here, were closed by the president of Egypt, whose name was Nasser. Remember that name? He ordered the UN troops out of the area which, and they were here, in the Sinai Peninsula, and the Director General, Secretary General was named U Thant, he was uh



Burmese, and he uh, accepted the order from Egypt and by twenty-four hours later, the UN forces were out. [1:00:00] The Straits of Tiran were closed. Israel was breathing on only one lung, the Mediterranean and the port of Haifa, of, of Haifa, which is here, right here. So you, first you got two lungs, the port of Eilat and the...now you only got one lung, eh heh heh [nervous sound], you're beginning to get worried, and then the UN is out, and oh ho ho, so it means, uh, so you begin to mobilize... Mobilization is a very complex thing, because after you are mobilized, whether it takes you 48 hours or 72 hours, you have pulled approximately 400,000 people out of the economy of the country, so everything stops. Your factories aren't working, your production is piling up or stopping, the orders that you got from Bloomingdales for those shirts are not gonna be fulfilled and Bloomingdales' computer is going to cancel the order [1:01:00] 'cause it isn't gonna arrive by due date. I'm not kidding! That's how the, what are you smiling at, that's how it happens.

**Male audience member:**

I'm know, I'm in retail, I know how it...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Well are you? Okay, good. So you know that I'm not making these up, I mean this is reality. The whole economy of the country grinds to a halt. You've pulled out 400,000 men, out of a total population of two million.

**Male audience member:**

They weren't in barracks, they were in their homes?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

No, once they're mobilized they're not in, at home!

**Male audience member:**

I'm saying, in the beginning, they were in their homes...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Home! Job! That's right. They're working, they're civilians, they're you! You belong to a unit. The unit that I belonged to, the codename was *sadin adom*, which means "red sheet," that is a hell of an image, thinking of me, laying there wounded, bleeding, and covered up with a red sheet! But they thought of these kooky names for code names, so when the radio

starts, and there's a code signal interrupts uh, the news broadcast and everything, and then you just glue your ear til you hear the num- the codename [1:02:00] for your unit, and then you say to your wife, "Ta ta!" okay, "Goodbye, boys." The kids are in school! And uh, you go to your closet, and you have your knapsack and you have your whatever it is, your A1, your M16, and you go to a collecting point. You have a predestined corner at which you're supposed to wait, 'til the truck comes along that's got, uh, your thing on it, you jump on your truck, and your truck takes you to a larger installation, a military base, which has a warehouse on it. Doors of the warehouse are pulled open, all the crap is pulled out, and you start to get your belt and a da da da da. All you can keep at home is your knapsack and your gun, but now you gotta get 48 rounds of ammunition and you gotta get your six grenades, and you gotta get your belt-your strapping, and you put it all on, and you get your boots, and you get your tin hat, and ta ta ta, and you go back, and it's all pant and push and rush and rush, and then the next rule in the army is, hurry up! [1:03:00] And wait. [laughs]

And..plotz, now you're all hot in the sun, and you're all carrying sixty pounds, and okay...

So, what's happening at the law office? What's happening in the factory? What's happening in the store? It's like that's all on the moon! Within twelve minutes your whole mental psyche's changed. So your economy is going to hell, nervous tension mounting. Mama and the kids running to the grocery store to get, uh, you know, what, whatever's most important to them; cornflakes, or cooking oil, or popcorn. You know, eeh, people are people. Granola bars! And then there's a lot of hustling around and uh, some old man who's left behind in the apartment house goes down into the, into the shelter, and my, my God the cobwebs have got it, and the rats have got it, and uh the canisters of water are all scummy, and so, you know, 'cause they've been sitting there for a long time and nobody paying attention to 'em. [1:04:00] Now suddenly you gotta get it all going and, 'cause who knows when uh the bombs might start falling! Well, they start on two o'clock in the afternoon of Yom Kippur day in 1973.

But let's go back to '67. The country gets mobilized. The country remained under mobilization for two and a half weeks. That is seventeen days, seventeen days. The guys are out there, and the women are manning the radios, and the, and the uh, headquarters shacks, the trailers, in every place. They're

scattered around, nobody knows what side you're gonna get hit from, and uh, every tank, uh, crew is five people, and they are all fully uh, dressed and don't get out of those clothes for seventeen days, and they, they, sitting on the ground, leaning up against the treads, trying to stay in the shade. And they turn the tank around [1:05:00] uh, in the morning, against the sun one way, and then they turn it the other way in the afternoon against the sun the other way, and they're sitting on the ground, because when the order comes to jump, all they gotta do is get up, climb up, get in, and go. They are not five millimeters away from the foot step to get up and climb in. You're right there, on your piece of equipment. You are sitting in your command car. You are in your [unclear], or in your APC, armored personnel carrier, or wherever the hell you're assigned to. Okay.

Who decides if you're going to war or not? Either the enemy decides, or your own government decides, one or the other. If the enemy decides, and bombs you, [indistinct], uh you don't wait for anybody [laughs], uh you get your immediate order from your next highest commanding officer and you go, you do whatever he tells you to do. [1:06:00] But if it, but it didn't happen that way. The government of Israel meets on a Sunday. The first

Sunday of this waiting period, the vote whether Israel should go to war...Now here I'm on your point about preemption. So, now, let me, let me bring it to the focus. The government of Israel votes on that first Sunday, nine to nine. Do you go to war with a vote of nine to nine? No, you do not! It continues.

Abba Eban was sent off on a mission to three countries: fly to France, talk to de Gaulle; jump the Channel and talk to, uh, Harold Wilson, prime minister of England; and get over to Washington and talk to, uh, president of the United States, Johnson. Eban was uh, after that vote Eban was in Eng- was in France by the following morning, and de Gaulle gave him the famous message, [1:07:00] "You lift a finger and you will never see one bullet more from France." And that's when he called the Jews a haughty and an arrogant people. Remember that famous thing? Okay. He, Eban says, "Ain't gonna get any help here! Not gonna waste any more time here." Bingo, he got over to, to Wilson a few hours later, and uh, you know, uh, he said, the essence of that conversation was, "Listen, what d'you want from us? We're a mini-power. We invented the mini-skirt. I mean everything's mini. Ah, we can't help you? What're we gonna do? You guys gotta do what you can do, uh, we wish you good luck."

And that, you know, and in a way I suppose you can't blame the British. I don't.

**Male audience member:**

[indistinct]

**Male audience member:**

Well he's on his way up

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

He's on his way up, things are getting better. He got over to Johnson, uh the next afternoon, and um...he got a, he got a, a very strong affirmative feeling of political support, and PR support, [1:08:00] and that America would back Israel all the way, whatever she had to do. But as far as military support is concerned, what Johnson proposed was a military, a, a, a sea blockade, a sea blockade. Blockade Egypt so she can't do anything except walk across the desert, and then if you keep forcing the Egyptian troops into the desert, you got them at the mercy of your aircraft. And if you blockaded them by sea, they can't resupply, they can't get any more supplies in from anybody. So, set up a sea blockade top and bottom, and that he,

Johnson would commit the American navy and that he would try like hell to get other maritime powers to join in so it would look like there were many other nations in the world that were willing to protect Israel. And uh, Eban said, "Hey look, thanks, goodbye, I gotta go home. Um, if you can get the blockade, fine." [1:09:00] Johnson tried for three solid weeks, the war was long over by the time he finished, and he got one other maritime power in the world to agree to join in with the United States to defend Israel, and that was Holland. Bingo! So, Israel's gonna get protected by the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet and a few Dutch boats. Uh, so she knew she was on her own.

When he came back from that trip, reported, the cabinet, at its next meeting the following Sunday, voted sixteen to two. Then you go to war. And what did it consist of? When the cabinet voted on the Sunday, sixteen to two, the word goes from the minister of defense, who was a civilian in the cabinet, civilian...and in this case, it was the prime minister, Mr. Eshkol, [1:10:00] who took the military, the minister of defense portfolio to himself, so he's got the political power and the military power in one person. And it goes to the chief of staff of the army, who was General Dayan, and then it goes from there to whoever are the command, uh, uh generals, northern command,



central command, southern command. And it goes to the commander of the air force. There's nothing that the, that the area commanders can do, the troops are already mobilized. I mean, they're sitting there two and half weeks in the sun. So the whole thing hinged on what the air force would do. And that vote of sixteen to two gave the commander of the air force the ability to preempt. And Monday morning, by very carefully calculated contingency plan. Parenthesis: which is what [1:11:00] I've been trying to teach you for the past two days, that you get a crisis and you gotta figure out a contingency plan, how to handle that crisis, put the plan in the drawer, and when the crisis occurs, or it if occurs, you pull the drawer open and you got the damn thing, you don't have to sit around and start fumbling. The whole purpose of this crisis planning, or crisis scenario management is, try to think in advance of what you would do if, if, it's all if! But for God's sake, don't try to figure [distortion] when the bomb falls, well what do I do now?

So General, the commander of the air force was Ezer Weizman, the one that I brought you to hear at uh, at uh, who, from being Israel's predominant hawk, number one, for what he did in 1967, has come to a political realization that he, so

he's now called dove number one, [1:12:00] because he takes that line that I told you about before, there are two peoples that have to share one land. And that's the...what he did to them in 1967, is so paradoxical that he should be the most trusted Israeli in Egypt. Uh, his plan was very simple. Uh, his plan was that once the government gave him permission, uh, he would put the Israel air force up in the air, uh... at 7:45 in the morning, Israel time, which would be... uh at, at 8:45 in the morning, Israel time, which would be 7:45 in the morning Cairo time, when in those incredibly massive traffic jams, all the uh, Egyptian pilots are on their way to work at the airfield, but they're sitting in traffic. And uh, until that thing gets worked out, there's another hour, hour and a half, so he's got a time jump. [1:13:00] Um...every tiny detail was thought out. Twenty five Arab airfields were targeted, in all the surrounding countries. The maps of every airfield were in a loose-leaf book in the pocket, in the pilots', uh, you know that, this kind of briefcase they carry? Um... every single pilot in the Israel air force had been trained in what we call skip bombing, which is... you know, remember when you were a kid and you took a flat stone and she skipped, jumped, okay. Israel developed, I mean nobody in the world did this, Israel developed a bomb which, when you

come in, and you are over the enemy's runway, and you drop one of those, it keeps skipping and skipping, and digging hole after hole after hole, so the damn runway is totally useless, and even if you can't hit the airplanes that are lined up on the side of the runway, [1:14:00] you have made the runway useless. So it's gonna take 'em one hell of a long time to bring out the, the trucks, and the tar, and the pitch, and, and patch up all the holes and get those...So you get another few hour gain on the thing. I mean, you cannot believe the incredible detail of careful thought, month after month...If I were to put you in a room and say, "Okay, do you think we oughta go skip bombing? Not that that, equivalent of...we got a problem in the federation, we oughta do, and I want you to start to think of how to handle crises, and put the plan in the drawer."

Okay, within uh, uh, about three and half hours, by about 11:30, 12 noon, over four hundred Arab aircraft had been destroyed, on the ground, on twenty-five Arab airfields. Were no dogfights in the air, very few... Egyptian planes did manage to get up, [1:15:00] couple of Israeli planes got caught and shot, eh lost in the dogfights, but it was, it was a clean sweep. A preemptive, we hit them before they lifted a finger. And the Six Day War, which did indeed last six days and didn't

finish till the next Saturday, was all through on Monday morning, the first morning of the war. The Arabs had no air forces. The rest of it was all mop up.

Switch scenario, we got a couple of minutes. Come to the '73 war.

**Male audience member:**

You know you have 'til 12:30...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

I thought we were supposed to quit 12 o'clock.

**Audience members:**

12:30

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Ooooooh! Get me a glass of water. [laughs]. You're not talking. I, this is no good, I'm doing all the talking. This is not good. Let me stop. Uh, pause. Time. Uh, anybody got any questions? Yes, Alan?

**Alan:**

[1:16:00] ...tell me about the Liberty incident.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

The Liberty. Yeah, well, okay, that's '73. I will. Any other questions? So this is just storytelling time, right? Okay. Is this interesting to you? Maybe it's too technical?

**Audience members:**

No.

It's very interesting.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yes, Peter?

**Peter:**

Uh, you alluded to the Altalena incident yesterday. Could you elaborate on that today some?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yeah, I better put this down, I'll forget. You said, uh, Liberty [writing with marker]...and you said Altalena. Okay. Anything else? That should be an N, -lena, Altalena. Yes?

**Male audience member:**

In '73, I think the Israelis decided it was better to take a hit than to go for another preemptive strike. Do you think that, in another confrontation, [1:17:00] they will assume that same posture or say chuck public opinion?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Okay. Pre-empt. Okay, I know what that refers to, I'll get to that one. Sir?

**Male audience member:**

...the War of Independence...concerns that the basic strategy the Israelis used, um being so significantly outnumbered, um...insufficiently equipped...Arabs... [unclear] in numbers to the Arabs. Was it more a [unclear] situation, the Israelis just moxie, or Arabs [unclear] technical skills, or the ability not to overrun the Israelis in the War of Independence just by sheer numbers. If you could...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Um, may I ask you if the following is the question you are asking, namely: [1:18:00] are you asking, how did Israel win that war? How did she manage to win that war? That's the question? Okay. [writing] 'War of Independence, basic strategy.' Okay. Did you, did I see your hand go up? No? I thought I saw your hand go up.

**Male audience member:**

Are you going to talk at all about today's situation? What's going now?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

[grumbles] Alright, if we get to it. [writing] 'Today'. Yeah. Alright, then let's quit. Then let's...[indistinct comment from audience] What? I got enough on the plate, yeah, right. Um, okay.... Let me take Ray's question about preemptive, about '73. Let me begin with that one.

Um, in the '73 war... Israel's army [1:19:00] was not mobilized two and a half weeks in advance. Nobody knew, uh, what was gonna happen. It was a total surprise attack. Everybody was in schul, or at the beach. Population of Israel on Yom Kippur day is in one of two places, 60 to 70% of the people are at the

beach, 30 to 40 % of the people are in schul, uh...and there isn't the radio uh, either place. Oh, yeah, they take a radio to the beach, but it you're not listening to it to hear your code uh...Um... In April, April, of that year, I gotta take you back. Yom Kippur was in October. In April of that year there was an episode over the Lake of Galilee, in which uh, some Syrian airplanes uh, started to uh machine gun Israeli fishing boats on the lake, and uh, the Israeli, [1:20:00] the Israeli army was annoyed by that, and the air force was authorized to uh, engage Syrian aircraft in dogfights. It's a question of tempting them..."Come on, hey...come on, come on, let's go!" And you gotta get 'em up in the air by, you do all kinds of tricks to get 'em up in the air. It's like kids in schoolyard! How do you tempt a kid to come, come one you wanna fight?!

**Male audience member:**

You egg 'em on.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

You egg 'em on! So, we shot down uh, ninety-one Syrian airplanes [laughs] in April, and nobody paid any attention to it except the Syrians. They were pissed. [audience laughter]. And,



uh, um, then what happened was, they mobilized for a, what we thought looked like a ground attack across the Golan. And Moshe Dayan, in April of 1973, [1:21:00] ordered mobilization, and we spent about 75 million bucks and called everybody out, and about three or four days later, uh, it all cooled off, and everybody got demobilized and sent back home. But we blew a packet of money and wasted a week's uh, time of the economy, and everybody said, "Oh, God!" and yet everybody said, "Hey, what choice have we got? I mean, we had to do it."

Okay. That's, that prelude is important because in October, when rumors began about the Arabs...because intelligence is a funny thing. Everybody wants hard intelligence. You want a report from your spy on the ground, who saw the papers in Egyptian army headquarters. Or you want satellite photographs taken by the American satellite the Department of Defense gives Israel, [1:22:00] and the American satellite passes over the area twice each day, taking pictures. So, let's see the pictures. Your, every, every military commander wants hard data. Well there was no hard data, but there were rumors in the air, and there were incomplete reports, and uh, the atmosphere was heating up as early as the Monday before the Saturday of Yom Kippur, six days earlier. And the conversation started between

David Elazar, who was the uh, chief of staff of the army, lieutenant general, and uh Dayan, and Golda who was the prime minister, uh [whispering] "Something's happening, something's happening..." And nobody could quite put their finger on what was happening. And then, every time the conversation would surface around the table, [unclear] [1:23:00] I mean, mobilization? Your eyebrows go up and you say, "Oh, Jesus Christ, remember that thing back in April? Oh no, what should we do? Don't know, don't know, Not sure. Can't blow another 75 million bucks."

The discussion got interrupted; Golda went to Vienna, on the Tuesday, the next day. What happened in Vienna? A train with Israel- with immigrants, Jewish immigrants from Moscow, coming to Vienna, got blown up about 20 km before reaching the south station in Vienna. It was a diversionary attack by the PLO, and somehow or other it got her so furious, the prime minister, the chancellor of Austria was this uh Jew, Kreisky, and Kreisky uh, made a statement saying that if the terrorists attacking Jews were gonna invade [1:24:00] Austrian soil and create danger for Austrian citizens, then he was going to stop those trains coming from Moscow and he wasn't gonna, his duty was to protect his Austrian people. Stop the trains coming from Moscow?! Geez! And

Golda was a very peculiar person. She was the, she was, she undoubtedly was, had, had all the characteristics of a leader. She was not a manager. But she had one flaw, and the one flaw was that sometimes something would get in her craw and she felt, she and *only* she can handle that particular situation. And that's the thing that she dug her heels in on that Vienna thing, on the Tuesday, and she decided she's gonna jump over to Vienna and try to talk Kreisky uh, out of doing anything drastic to interrupt the flow, and uh, only she could do it. [1:25:00]

Well, geez, you gotta weigh, on the scale, I mean, there's rumor of war on the air, something is happening! You're sitting talking to Elazar and Dayan about whether to mobilize the country, and all of a sudden you've got another problem, a big problem, important problem. But come on, put 'em on the scale! You really think you're gonna get anywhere with Kreisky? He was such...socialist, left wing, tough guy to handle, no Jewish sentiment in him. You wanna, you wanna make a demarche, you wanna try to make sure he doesn't do anything that you- you got a lot people you can send. Send somebody! Nope, gotta go!

So on the Wednesday, she's still in Vienna. And on the Wednesday we begin to get hard information, hard information begins to filter in. So, they got her and they said, [1:26:00]

"Hey, come on, come on, come on. Get back here. You're the prime minister. Nothing can happen with you. Now get back here!" So she got back on the Thursday. By the Thursday, the information is quite clear. The information is, that they're gonna hit us at six o'clock in the afternoon, on Yom Kippur day, Saturday, and they picked that time, when the sun would be setting in the west, and it's gonna be in our eyes. And with the sun in our eyes...it's like when you're playing tennis, come one, same problem! So, get the sun in our eyes and we move into a disadvantageous position. And that we're gonna get hit from the Egyptian side and that the Syrians are gonna come... 'Cause they're gonna come from the west, and we're gonna be trying to fly at them into the west, [1:27:00] and the sun's in our eyes; the Syrians are coming in, the Jordanians are coming in, the Saudis are gonna put in some troops, the Iraqis are gonna put in troops, and then the Libyans are gonna hit us, also from the west. And the data begins to accumulate and, uh uh, she comes back on the Thursday and uh, she starts to waffle and she can't figure out what to do. Calls a meeting of the cabinet, cabinet meets all day Thursday, no dice, no answer. I was listening to one group session here, uh, yesterday, that I was leading, and uh, I'm looking at fifteen bright people in front of me, and for

a half hour nobody gives, comes up with one idea. It was like my, the battery in the car was flat, dead. I was plotzing! [audience laughter] Uh, but okay, the cabinet of Israel was plotzing all day that Thursday and didn't come up with a damn thing.

**Female audience member:**

And they knew that they had hard data... [1:28:00]

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

By Thursday, the data was hard. Yeah? Gail?

**Gail:**

Um, quick question. The Israeli people hold Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir responsible for this war...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

They threw 'em out of office a couple months later.

**Gail:**

Um, was there anybody that took an alternate opinion and said, and warned them that they better move, they better take action?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yeah, the chief of staff, David Elazar, Lieutenant General David Elazar, who died a year later with a, of a heart attack in his swimming pool. Thank goodness he went that way, 51 years old. He tried. I'll come to the end of the story of what happened on Friday and Friday night.

**Gail:**

What...I just don't understand the indecision, with the hard data. That's what I'm trying to...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

[laughs] Come on, kiddo, neither can anybody understand. I mean, they wrestled. I, we, I could take you through all the arguments, pro and con. Everybody can think up arguments why he's against this, why he's against that, why you, these photographs [1:29:00] aren't being interpreted properly. Don't get hysterical; remember April; Yom Kippur's coming tomorrow,

day after tomorrow; don't throw the whole population of Israel into a tizzy. I mean, you know, come on! Think of all the things that could be said. The job of a leader is to listen to all that and decide what is baloney, and what is crap, and what simply has to be taken, and take a risk on it. Okay, that's what leadership's all about. You cannot postpone decisions indefinitely, you gotta make 'em. Maybe you're wrong, and you hope you're right...Uh, meeting was adjourned, and uh, reconvened for the following morning, and the following morning is Friday, and there are several religious ministers in the cabinet, and they say, "Hey, this has gotta be finished by twelve, one o'clock, we gotta get home for Shabbas, and especially for Yom Kippur tomorrow. So, okay we'll meet again tomorrow morning, but twelve o'clock, bingo, I'm going home."

[1:30:00]

And, um...all Friday morning they wrangled and wrangled and wrangled, and could come to no decision, and by that time, uh, when they wanted to adjourn at noon, uh, General Elazar said to them very openly, "Gentlemen, you know our country. The radio shuts down, and the television shuts down, and the staffs go home, and I can no longer mobilize the country. I'm telling you now. And on Saturday of Yom Kippur, everything is shut down,

including the whole power plant, and there's no way in the world that I can get the codes out, and there's no way in the world that the men and women of this country can be mobilized. You have gone past the time limit." Uh? Lovely, great. So those guys, "Oh, Jesus, really, how'd that happen [grumbles]."

[1:31:00] Watch the clock! That's another lesson of leadership: not only watch the calendar days go by, watch the clock, hours, go by!

So they adjourned, and the only thing that Golda did was to say to everybody that she absolutely refuses to allow them to go their homes, scattered around the country where all the ministers live, um, and uh, everybody has to stay right in Tel Aviv, within walking distance of the headquarters, uh military headquarters. And that means you guys who are *shomre Shabbat*, 'cause if I need you on Saturday, I'm gonna call you and you're gonna walk! So don't go home to your kibbutz and to your nothing. Here! You stay. And she ordered them! The cabinet of Israel slept in Tel Aviv that Friday night.

She went home and she took, with her to the *kitzur* kitchen Dayan and Elazar. [1:32:00] And they're literally sitting in the kitchen, and they're arguing and discussing, and now they know, these three people know at least, that the data is absolutely



accurate, that the data is, is, can only be interpreted in one way, and tomorrow afternoon, Saturday afternoon at six o'clock, we're gonna get hit, and no chance to mobilize anymore. I'm not making this up, this is reality. You never heard this story, this has never been written anywhere, and yet this is absolutely the fact.

**Male audience member:**

What time is [unclear] they know it's Friday night?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yeah! They were sitting, they had supper at her house, it was nine, ten o'clock Friday...

**Audience members:**

[indistinct]

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Knew they were what?

**Female audience member:**

[Indistinct]

**Male audience member:**

She was having a cigar.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yeah!

**Male audience member:**

They knew they were going to get attacked the next day...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

The next day, Saturday, at six PM! It's incredible, sure it's incredible.

**Female audience member:**

In this, in um Herzog's book, [1:33:00] it indicates that Egypt was able in the middle of the night to erect ten bridges...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

That's correct, across Sinai, across the canal, right across the canal.

**Female audience member:**

[indistinct]

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

What security? You have no troops out there, you have not mobilized! The Egyptians threw ten bailey bridges across the canal, Friday night. You got nobody out there. Nobody! Nobody. It's Friday night erev Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur! I mean, they're not so dumb, that they picked that night. They didn't think that they would be... [recording skips]

...We're not gonna get to those other things. Well, let's...I can quit, or do these other things.

**Audience:**

[Several voices together, indistinct]

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Oh, forget that.

**Male audience member:**

We have 'til 12:30?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yeah, well, it's almost 12:15, yeah.

**Audience:**

[Several voices together, indistinct]

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yeah, we come the, this is the crux, is right. Keating brings in the message from Kissinger that... [1:34:00] Israel is not to preempt. That's what you were referring to. American army knows perfectly damn well that what's in the minds of the Israel army, and the only option open left to them of the night was to put the air force up in the air, because what Elazar was saying was..."I cannot mobilize the nation, but I, the air force you don't have to mobilize." The Israel air force, the entire air force, all its personnel, ground personnel, flying personnel, uh care and maintenance, bombing section, pilots, is always on the alert, permanently, the whole apparatus. The pilots live on the base with their families. The ground crew lives on the base, with the families. It's all there. The planes are all armed with the little red flags out in from that their totally armed, all

the weapons are in. You can get those planes up in the air in seconds. [1:35:00] So that's what they were talking about when Keating came in with the lovely message that the United States president says to Israel, "Listen, kids, you cannot preempt. If you do, I will not be able to help you. The public opinion of the world will be against you. You have hard data, knowing that they're gonna attack you. We have the same hard data, we gave you part of our data, so we don't dispute the fact that you're gonna get hit tomorrow, but you're gonna take the first blow. And that is the only way that American public opinion can be swung around so that I can resupply you!"

**Male audience member:**

It might be too late, though.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

No! Forget public opinion. Resupply is the, is the key word here. Oh, boy! So, then, they got three people [1:36:00] around the table, now they got four, and they've, Keating is a friend, and he's not an enemy, and he's crying in his cup of tea also with them, and he says, "Jesus, this is really tough," and uh, you know, "I don't know have bad that first blow is gonna be,

but you cannot preempt. You just cannot preempt. You cannot strike first. You have to allow yourselves to be struck." Okay. And then he goes home. I mean, they'd excused him and then he left, 'cause they had to decide between the three of them. And they decided. And this is what I meant before. Elazar said, it's about ten o'clock at night now, eleven o'clock at night, "At first light, I can get the whole air force up in the air. We'll smash as hard from six o'clock in the morning until six o'clock at night when, in the afternoon, when they were gonna jump over. I got twelve hours to work." And it worked. "Give me permission [1:37:00] to go up at first light. I got plenty of time to get it all organized."

And uh, Golda looks at Dayan, Dayan looks at Golda, and they both of them shake their head no. And he just said, I mean he was holding his temper, because what could he do, but at that point he just snapped a salute and he said, "Okay, I'm out!" Walked out of the room. 'Cause the two civilian, I mean the two politicians, [mumbles] they said no! She, she then called Keating back in, and she said, "I want you to do at least one thing. You go back to Kissinger and let Kissinger go back to Nixon, and I would appreciate it if you would indica- have them call," um, uh what's his name, "Sadat, and Assad, in Egypt and

in Syria, tell them, tell them, hey, we know the plan, that  
[1:38:00] we're gonna get hit at six o'clock. We are not going  
to take any preemptive action. Just lay it on the table  
straight, tell them up front. You muscled us and you told us not  
to, and we've agreed and we're not gonna. So let them think  
twice about whether they should hit us. Whatever problem they  
got, they don't have to go to war with us, they're not gonna be  
able to defeat us. They'll hurt us, they'll wound us, they can't  
defeat us. So, why bother? We know about it. We've accepted the  
American request to demur. Don't do it!"

And indeed, Kissinger did, he did make those two phone  
calls, in the name of Nixon, Nixon agreed. He made the two phone  
calls, and, and the end of the story is, that when he got off  
the phone, Sadat and Assad spoke between the two of them  
[1:39:00] and decided that they would give up the advantage of  
hitting us at six in the evening, when the sun would be in our  
eyes, they would hit us instead two o'clock in the afternoon  
when were all still in schul. And so we got hit at two o'clock,  
not six o'clock, and that was the whole difference. And the  
United States government said no preempt, because they knew damn  
well, and this is a very long story I told you about an answer  
to your question about what can you do about it. Okay? You can

always preempt. We always have the capacity to do that. When you say, "Will we do it next time?" Well, it all depends what the circumstances of the next time are, that's all. The game differs. If Russia backs off from the, from backing Syria, if Syria becomes less of a threat maybe the next time, which we assume will be an attack from Syria, [1:40:00] won't happen...So I can't tell you the next time. I know this is, this is an option in our back of tricks that's always with us, and the bag of tricks keeps getting bigger and bigger and better, let me assure you.

**Male audience member:**

Two questions. If Keating had not brought the message from Nixon about the preempt, would they have preempted?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yeah, I think so.

**Male audience member:**

Second question: if you were Golda, you were the prime minister of Israel, would you have ignored Nixon's request and continued, and preempted?



**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Yes. That's, but that's just, you're asking me what I would do, that's me...

**Male audience member:**

But I wanted to know...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Somebody else is somebody else. I gotta tell you the sequel. On the ninth, by the ninth day of the war, we were all out of heavy ammunition. You guys gotta be in the boat when?

**Male audience member:**

Leave 12:30! Keep going.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

The, um, uh we were out of heavy ammunition. We had no more 175 mm shells, [1:41:00] no more 155s, no more 105s. All the big stuff was all shot out. We had lost a hundred, hundred and fifty aircraft by then, we had lost a thousand tanks by then. I mean we're not, Israel isn't accustomed to long fighting. Three day

war, six day war, melee. We're now in the ninth day, ultimately that war took eighteen days. That's a long war by Israeli standards.

So, she got on the phone, Golda, and uh, she called Dinitz, who was the ambassador in the United States. She says, "You tell President Nixon I'm gonna be there tomorrow morning. You tell him, we haven't gotten any goddamn resupply. You remind him that he told us don't preempt, so that he would have public opinion behind him to be able to resupply us. [1:42:00] Well he hasn't done it! Now I'm coming in there tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock! And if I don't get any satisfaction from him, I'm going out on the television cameras, and I'm gonna tell all Americans what he did to me, and I'm gonna make it personal. [laughs]. You know, Jesus! Dinitz is plotzing, and he doesn't know what the hell to do, and uh, he tells Kissinger, and Kissinger says "Wait a minute, tell her to hold her horses! Tell her no, don't come don't come! Tell her she's gotta stay there and run a war." Uhh, and uh, Kissinger goes into Nixon...and that's when Nixon made his famous uh, crack. Nixon called a meeting of himself and Kissinger and Schlesinger, the minister of defense, and in the presence of these two guys, [1:43:00] he says to them, "Israel is not resupplied. Israel is against the ropes. Prime minister

wants to come over tomorrow morning and give me hell and go out in public and give me hell and rip America, and the public sympathy of America is behind Israel because she took the blow and she took the hit, and that's the way we planned it, and she did her part, and we didn't do our part. Which one of you two Jews is holding up this resupply!" [laughter from audience]

Kissinger, Schlesinger, "Which one of you two Jews is holding up the resupply!" It's the, whooooo, did he put his finger right on it, because between the two of 'em, you know, Schlesinger's says to Kissinger [indistinct]. Who talks first, you know what I'm saying? He says, "Well you told me stall!" Schlesinger says to Kissinger, "You told me to stall!" Which is absolutely part of Kissinger's nature. Kissinger in his book says, [1:44:00]

Schlesinger, who isn't a very good Jew...he was waiting to see, maybe Israel would uh, would not need the stuff, or maybe she'd get defeated. Nixon says, get those goddamn C-5A Galaxies at Langley Field in Virginia loaded and off the ground, and get 'em going! Schlesinger says, "Well I, I have not made re- refuel arrangements." What the hell does that mean? It means, nobody would allow these American great, big, huge transport planes that have tanks inside and pallets of ammunition... England said, "No, we will not let them land here." You can't get from

Langley Field, Virginia, to Pal- to Israel without stopping  
somewhere for gas. You cannot refuel that number of planes in  
the air by uh KC-135 tankers. Can't do it. Too many aircraft,  
too dangerous. You gotta stop somewhere. So England said no;  
[1:45:00] France said no; Spain has got four American bases,  
said no; Germany's got six American bases, said no. Do you know  
where the Israel resupply line, of a constant flow of hundreds  
of flights, hundreds! Do you know which great, powerful  
democracy gave the support to...

**Male audience member**

Portugal.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

Portugal. And said you can land in the Azores. And every  
plane flew across the ocean, landed at the Azores, got gassed  
up, and got to Ben-Gurion airport. And that's the end of the  
story.

**Male audience member:**

The two o'clock instead of the six o'clock. Are you suggesting if they did, if the Arabs came in at six o'clock with the sun in our eyes, it would have made a world of difference?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

No.

**Male audience member:**

Oh, okay.

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

No, no.

**Male audience member:**

Was there some [indistinct] story on the Liberty [indistinct]...that was a terrible public relations...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

The only story on the Liberty was very simple. [1:46:00]  
The Israel air force sees a spy ship off the coast of Egypt. The Liberty was...

**Male audience member:**

[indistinct] accident...

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

No, it was, like hell. The Liberty was right here. With all of its, with all of its, uh um... capability of interfering and recording airplane, uh uh, telephone conversations, radio conversations. Who said before, when you give a message to the satellite, you can in- you can uh, intercept it. So here was the most sophisticated uh, interception ship ever seen in the area, hanging off the coast, it is established as an American ship. The Arabs have nothing like it; it wasn't Russian! And the decision was, even though it's an American ship, what the hell is it doing there? It's listening to the Egyptians, it's listening to us. Well that's not a friendly act! So they made an effort, [1:47:00] and they communicated with the ship and told the ship get the hell away, go, beat it, get a hundred miles away! Ship refused. Israel, the air force commander gave orders to sink it. Well they didn't sink it. They attacked it, and they wounded it, and they killed a lot of sailors on it, um, and then it limped away.

**Male audience member:**

What was the date of that?

**Herbert A. Friedman:**

The date? I don't know, it was one of the days of the war.  
I forget which day...

END OF AUDIO FILE [1:47:31]

