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17 January 1969

There are many matters on my mind and heart, which I want to share with you - some fears, some hopes, all springing from the deep emotions which fill us now as we go through the tumultuous days of Arab guerrilla action; French embargo; Russian "peace" offensive, recognized by many Western diplomats as representing no change from Russia's completely pro-Arab stance; and American government transition. Through all of this there is the steady pulse beat of strong determination in Israel and united support by American Jewry.

All the events of the past two weeks underscore the depth of the critical pressures in Israel. These pressures are so tremendous that we simply must make a success of this Emergency Fund. Some communities have gotten off to an excellent start - with a spirit of excitement, dedication, wide-spread awareness of need, and very good pace-setting gifts. They are matching or even surpassing 1967 and are far ahead of 1968. If all communities would equal the pace and achievement of the best, we would do the job we must. I am pleading for speed, energy, dynamism - in every case and in every city. We should be soliciting most earnestly and sincerely with 1967 standards in mind.

There are some people who have accepted the necessity of conducting a Third Emergency Fund for 1969, because the Jewish leadership of the country approved it - but in their actual daily performance they are working without the complete depth of commitment which the current situation absolutely requires. In those communities the campaign is starting without the luster or promise it must have. More than anything else the results are attributable to the mood and conviction of those leading the campaign. Beyond the indispensable skills and techniques that the Executive brings to the entire effort, his own manifest understanding and commitment is of critical importance to inspire the layman. The issues at stake are so grave, and this moment in history demands so much of us, that each man must give the utmost devotion possible, leave no stone unturned, strive sincerely to reach and surpass the heights of 1967.

#### CONFUSION RESULTING FROM NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF ISRAEL'S 1969 BUDGET

Last week there were various stories in the press concerning the figures of the Israel government budget for fiscal 1969, which the Minister of Finance, Mr. Zev Sharef, presented to the Knesset. A budget is a very complicated matter, and the newspaper accounts can only cover bits and pieces of the whole story. I received several letters

asking for clarification of the relationship of these figures to those which we had stated earlier. This clarification was offered in the TWX transmission of 7 January, and I want to add the following information.

There is a remarkable closeness between the estimated figures projected by the Minister when he met with the CJFWF in mid-September 1968, and the actual figures submitted in January, 1969.

At that time, he estimated the defense budget would be over IL 3 billion. In last week's actual presentation he listed IL 2.5 billion for the Ministry of Defense, and stated clearly that this does not include all defense spending, some of which is contained within other ministries. He did not spell out the hidden details, nor would you expect him to. It should be clear that the total figure is exactly as he estimated it would be.

He also made an estimate in September that income from Israeli tax-payers would be around IL 3.6 billion - so that defense spending would absorb 90% or so of anticipated revenue. And this startling fact led us to the conclusion that we would have to mount a huge Emergency Fund to increase the campaign revenue so that we could take care of all or almost all of the humanitarian costs because the Israelis could contribute nothing to these costs.

Now, he has a slightly more optimistic figure for income, namely, IL 3.76 billion, which is almost 20% higher than last year. Many feel this is too optimistic - and even if the economy expands, or if more people join the labor force, so that more tax money comes in, it won't be 20% more, which would be a huge jump. At any rate, if he is correct, and we hope he is, and even if IL 3.76 billion does come in, defense spending will still take more than 75% of that. So the only discrepancy between September and January figures is between estimates of IL 3.6 and IL 3.76 in tax income. The basic problem still remains - for the defense burden is still crushing.

The other possible confusion resulted from the statement that the defense budget represented 37% of the total national budget of IL 7.8 billion. This figure is true and Mr. Sharef made reference to the latter figure when he met with us in September. This underscores the urgency because the rest of the national budget above the income is met by borrowing. One good friend wrote me: "Since it is unlikely that a country would run a federal deficit of about half of its budget, it would appear that the information I have been disseminating for campaigning is incorrect." Well, my friend simply cannot understand that there is a "deficit" of more than half, but it is so. The approximately IL 4 billion beyond the tax revenue is obtained through borrowing from U.S. government (through P.L. 480 for surplus grain); from Export-Import Bank; from World Bank; from sale of Bonds; and from internal loans and issues in Israel, including reducing the reserves to a dangerous level.

The figures I have given you come from the official printed budget and information supplied by the Bank of Israel. The basic point for our consideration is that approximately 75% (and it might still be up to 90%, if optimistic hopes do not materialize) of the tax revenue is earmarked for defense - which leaves us to handle alone the philanthropic items of immigration, absorption, housing, health, education, welfare.

WEEKLY UJA FLIGHTS

I cannot begin to tell you how valuable these have been for the hundreds of men who have so far undergone this experience. The five and one-half days are so crowded with one emotional impact after another that it is hard to define any one particular crescendo point. The total effect brings home the nature of the present difficult situation with utmost clarity. I could offer pages and pages of testimonial sentences, but they are really not necessary. The best testimonial lies in the figures, showing pledges made by the members of the group. Everyone is solicited and before the return flight everyone has committed. The following are the exact results of the first three flights:

<u>Flight</u>	<u>No. of Gifts</u>		<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
Dec. 1	59	Reg.	\$ 72,267	\$ 88,382	\$ 99,415
		E.F.	57,525	66,615	153,730
<hr/>					
Dec. 15	60	Reg.	292,915	329,575	355,395
		E.F.	445,800	411,519	470,850
<hr/>					
Jan. 5	94 (broken down)	Reg.	179,575	213,115	262,410
		E.F.	234,975	207,805	342,815
	30 (combined, in process of being broken down)		459,300	311,759	465,200

The fourth group is in Israel now and I am waiting for the final figures and the breakdown. The first 137 gifts show the following:

<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
\$712,853	\$826,579	\$1,216,900

It is clear that a powerful new device has been developed. Short trips, action-packed, conducted in December and January, with all participants solicited, thus providing maximum campaign value, can be, for the medium-level contributor and ardent worker, what the big October National Mission is for the largest contributors. It is crucial now that we follow up to make the most of these new assets by using the members of the flight groups to the full when they get back to their communities - in meetings, in speaking, in soliciting.

I am sure we will continue with the program of weekly flights for next year's campaign.

#### SIX-COLUMN BREAKDOWN

I think it is crucial that we solicit pledges on a two-gift basis. I am absolutely convinced that larger gifts are obtained, and better increases, both for the regular and emergency funds, when a double, differentiated approach is used. Lumping gifts, or combining them, tends to obscure what is happening. The case is strong enough. We have every moral right to ask for an increase over 1968 to the regular fund and can document the need for it, and should do so. And we certainly can ask for an increase in the emergency fund over 1967 or 1968, whichever was higher, since the need for this is made clear on the front page of the newspaper every day.

Even though it is sometimes cumbersome, I make all my individual solicitations on the basis of what I call a six-column breakdown, and where necessary I write the figures down for my prospect to look at and ponder. The tabulation is most graphically clear, as follows:

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
Regular	X	X + a	X + a + b
Emergency	Y	too often, Y - something	Y + something

When I explain to my prospect the reasons why the needs of 1969 are greater even than 1967, and we are really trying to raise more than 1967 - then I find it mandatory to remind him what he gave in 1967, in order to ask him to surpass it. Simply relating "this year" to "last year," as we usually do in campaigning, is not adequate to achieve the results required during this period.

I admit this is a very hard-sell method, but I don't think there is anything wrong with that approach under these tense and difficult conditions. As a matter of fact, any less hard-driving approach today would be selling the people of Israel short.

The staff of the National UJA is under instructions to implement this concept with every means possible. We suggest: to an individual solicitor, to work as I have described above; to a card-caller, to refer to the 1967 as well as the 1968 gift when calling for the 1969 pledge; to a chairman, to guide his lay leaders into this system.

And in the statistical reporting of a meeting, our men are under explicit instructions to seek six-column data, for only this way can we really see where the campaign is going, and whether we are in trouble with the emergency fund (because the regular will surely register another good gain in 1969). I know you and your staff are under pressure, and accounting procedures sometimes seem unimportant to you - but I am not talking accounting when I most strongly urge this - I am really talking campaigning. If you insist upon relating always to 1967 and requiring two gifts, you will raise more money.

### CASH

It may seem unusual for me to bring up this subject so early in the year. But everything is unusual now, and we must increase substantially the flow of cash during 1969. It can be done. There are large amounts outstanding. Our records show the following as being due the UJA (rounded-off figures):

#### Regular

1. From 1967 and prior years	\$10,000,000
2. From 1968	23,500,000

#### Emergency

1. From 1967	5,500,000
2. From 1968	<u>39,000,000</u>
	\$78,000,000

If most of this \$78,000,000 could be brought in during 1969, as well as the payments which will be made on the on-going campaign, we might be able to reach a cash flow figure which could keep pace with the tremendous expenditures. We should try for something between \$175-200 million.

I would like to suggest a special cash approach that will reinforce everything we are trying to do in the solicitation and which will help bring much greater desperately needed income:

- (1) Send bills now for 1968 and all prior pledges still outstanding.
- (2) Send bills for the 1969 pledges immediately after each pledge is made.

This is reminiscent of the 1967 mood, when people understood instinctively that cash was required, not promises, and contributors borrowed large amounts, as we all recall, so they could pay quickly. The same concept must be placed before contributors today - the reality of the emergency is underscored by the demand for cash. I believe people will respond.

## RABBINICAL EFFORT

I know we would agree that when the rabbinical forces in a community lend their efforts to the Federation it is certainly helpful, in terms of establishing climate generally, and even in terms of relations with specific individuals who might be beyond the Federation's normal reach, but susceptible to a particular rabbi. In other words, the rabbi may be the best solicitor for that prospect.

In order to obtain greater rabbinical participation in this campaign, I am having a series of meetings. Monday, the national leaders are coming to my office - representing the three national rabbinical organizations plus the Synagogue Council, plus executive directors of Boards of Rabbis. We will discuss a specific agenda - to see if agreement can be reached on the specific ways in which rabbis can help in their own communities. I will let you know what program is developed.

Beginning next week I am going to meet with the Boards of Rabbis in those communities large enough to have an organized board with an Executive Director. So far I have, or am in the process of making, appointments in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, Boston and New York.

I want to speak specifically about rabbis working in conjunction with the Federation; helping with selected prospects; helping with general solicitation of their entire congregational membership; helping to create a climate of urgency through rallies, sermons, special events.

Just as we felt that the professional community of executive directors and campaign directors should be personally exposed to the problems of Israel today, so we feel that the rabbis should be also. It would not be possible, nor is it necessary, to invite every rabbi to make this one-week trip, but it is possible for selected individuals to do so. The idea which will be proposed to the national leaders Monday is that in selected communities, having a Jewish population of more than 10,000, a decision should be reached, with the participation of the Federation executive, regarding the invitees, seeking to achieve a tri-dimensional cross-section. These three rabbis, conservative, orthodox and reform, would then constitute a community delegation, whose departure for and return from Israel, would be properly publicized as part of the Federation campaign effort. The financial arrangements for the trip would be half paid by the UJA and half paid by the rabbi himself or his congregation.

Obviously, when we get into the discussion of details, there will be many refinements - but basically the idea is sound if the right men go (and you play a crucial part in determining that); if they inspire their colleagues and congregants when they return; and if they add their concrete effort to speaking and soliciting. The "rabbinical special" would have to be middle or end February, at the latest, in order to be useful for the campaign.

Friends, fellow professionals, this letter expresses my sense of deepest concern about the kind of campaign we must conduct this year. Some cities have truly caught the blaze and the fervor; others not yet. We simply cannot afford a mundane and pedestrian effort in a single city. In every city, we need a passion and burning drive beyond anything we have ever had - beyond what some cities have even now in January.

With what plea can I end? Israel is ringed with fire. Do all of our communities feel it? There is much agony among the people of Israel. Do all of our communities understand it - share it? We are only at the beginning. We can make this campaign what we will. Please - a big fire.

Sincerely,





# Personal Letter

From

**RABBI HERBERT A. FRIEDMAN**

Executive Chairman, United Jewish Appeal

1290 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N. Y. 10019

22 August, 1969

NOT FOR PUBLICATION. This letter is written in Jerusalem and mailed from New York.

Dear Friend:

We are having a strange Summer in Israel. The Maccabiah games drew 1600 visiting athletes from all over the world and a crowd of 35000 to the opening ceremony in Ramat Gan stadium; the movie houses are full; throngs crowd the Jaffa art fair every evening until midnight; the red tourist busses speed up and down the roads constantly, with July surpassing all records in the history of tourism; and the Roman amphitheater at Caesarea is already sold out for the Casals concert to be held at the end of August. If anything could be said to look normal, Israel in the Summer of 1969 would qualify.

During this self-same Summer - about 25 Arab warplanes have been shot out of the skies in deadly combat over the Gulf of Suez, the Sinai Desert, the Golan Heights and Sharm-el-Sheikh. The MIG-21 and Sukhoi-7 have illuminated every border with the flames of their fiery crashes.

A. H. Raskin, assistant editor of the New York Times editorial page, described this paradox rather neatly in an article written after his trip here in early July. He wrote: "For a visitor freshly arrived from New York the startling thing about Israel is how muted the tension is. The external impression is one of normalcy in homes, shops, hotels, factories and farms. Rome is a thousand times more taxing on nerves and blood pressure than Tel Aviv or Haifa. People walk the streets of Jerusalem - the Old City as well as the new - without anxiety at any hour of day or night. Even in the kibbutzim of the Beth Shean Valley, where the children sleep in underground shelters every night because Arab shelling is so frequent, the workers give every outward appearance of cheerfulness and the youngsters beam proudly as they demonstrate how they climb into their subterranean bunks.....The resoluteness of Israel's determination to see it through, even if it means standing against the whole world, cannot be doubted."

There is a war going on here, swirling around and over the heads of a civilian population trying to go about its daily affairs as calmly as possible, trying to conduct the business of a nation, while its citizens and soldiers are daily being killed. It is difficult to find the term to describe this situation. Is it to be called a guerrilla war? A small war? A static war? A non-war? What should people think? Both Mrs. Meir and Mr. Dayan have recently seen fit to make simple declaratory statements in order to give guidance to the population. Mr. Dayan said on 24 July that war has already begun, from the Arab point of view, with Nasser's abrogation of the cease-fire. Dayan did not think a full-scale war was imminent this Summer. On the other hand, since Nasser has said that Egypt had the military strength to fight Israel "for liberation now", Israel should be prepared for anything Egypt might do, including bombing Tel Aviv.

Mrs. Meir said, on 3 August, "Peace is far off. We are in the very midst of a war. Some call it a little war. Well, it's big enough for so small a people as ours." She declared that the nation must carry on its normal life, and at the same time consolidate its security position.

It seems to me this is the essence of life in Israel today, reflecting itself in the phrase continuous emergency. Some people say this phrase is impossible, because the two words contradict each other. An emergency, they say, is an event of limited duration - a fire, an earthquake, a flood - which may take great toll, but which does end, and things return to normal. An emergency, they say, by very definition, cannot be continuous, for this implies an event of unlimited duration with no end in sight, and that is no longer an emergency, but a permanent state of affairs. Well - it's just as accurate to describe that permanent condition as a continuous emergency.

What we have here is a nation trying to live normally, expand its economy, take in its annual flow of new immigrants, increase its health and education facilities, while the daily newspaper headlines report planes being shot down, bombs planted, raids across borders, and on the front page every day are the small pictures of the dead - the 20-year olds whose blood soaks into this soil. Understand it, please, so that you will not be confused, at this moment in history. Israel will be in this condition, required to make enormous sacrifices of manpower and money, for a long time to come. This war will go on, and no one dare falter.

I. MILITARY EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS

1. Suez Canal

Daily artillery duels; many raids by commandos; Egyptians coming across, and Israelis going across; much destruction of Egyptian towns; many dead and wounded, including UN personnel. On 20 July the Israel Air Force entered the Canal Zone fighting. The sheer number of guns on the Egyptian side, supplied with unlimited ammunition, are hard to silence by the sparser number of Israeli guns. But they are more vulnerable to air attack, and, therefore, the Air Force began to go in, to blast the gun positions, as well as missile launching sites further inland. This means that the Air Force is now operative daily on all fronts, for it has already been policy to use planes against Fatah bases in Jordan, and Syrian guerrilla bases on Mt. Hermon or east of Golan, or even in Southern Lebanon. From now on, one may expect planes over the Canal every time there is a serious artillery barrage.

2. Jordan River Valley

Daily acts of firing and infiltration from the Fatah bases in the Gilead mountains; mortars, rockets, artillery fired at random against the kibbutzim and moshavim; children in these villages sleep in shelters every night.

3. Golan Heights

Occasional acts of sabotage gangs from Syria; laying mines; attempting to destroy facilities of Nahal units; firing mortars; blowing up busses.

4. Gaza Strip

Frequent acts of terrorism, throwing hand grenades into crowds standing at a bus-stop; rolling hand grenades under slowly-moving vehicles or busses; firing with automatic weapons.

5. Acts of Arab Terrorism in Cities and Towns

- a) 1 July - Willys station wagon filled with dynamite blown up on Keren Kayemet Boulevard in heart of Tel Aviv.
- b) 12 July - bazookas fired into group of picknickers at Banyas Springs.
- c) 12 July - explosive charge placed on beach at Tantura

- d) 12 July - rockets fired into Kibbutz Yotvata, near Eilat
- e) 22 July - hand grenade thrown into truck full of kibbutzniks visiting Hebron
- f) 23 July - explosion at kiosk at bus-stop near Kirya, Government Headquarters, in Tel Aviv
- g) 24 July - explosives planted in water melon stand in Haifa, at entrance to Tokyo Circus.
- h) 24 July - explosive planted in Synagogue on outskirts of Kfar Saba
- i) 2 August - rockets fired into town of Kiryat Shmoneh

#### 6. Air Battles

- a) 26 June - 2 Egyptian MIG-21 shot down over Gulf of Suez
- b) 2 July - 4 Egyptian MIG-21 shot down over Gulf of Suez
- c) 7 July - 2 Egyptian MIG-21 shot down over Gulf of Suez Red Sea, near Sharm-el-Sheikh
- d) 8 July - 7 Syrian MIG-21 shot down over Golan Heights
- e) 24 July - 7 Egyptian planes (MIG-21 and Sukhoi-7) definite, and 2 more probable, shot down over Sinai Desert.

In the course of these events of the past few weeks, Israel lost 2 aircraft and many dead and wounded, both soldiers and civilians.

Since the Six-Day War Egypt has lost 40 aircraft, Syria 15, while Israel has lost 5, one of which was a Piper Cub.

Since the Six-Day War, Israel has had more than 2100 casualties, including more than 400 killed.

## II ARAB DECLARATIONS OF RECENT WEEKS

1. Mohammed el-Zayyat, chief spokesman of the Egyptian Government, on 9 July confirmed by implication the reports of a recent partial call-up of reservists and commandeering of civilian trucks for military purposes. Asked at his weekly news conference about such reports, he did not deny them, but replied emphatically, "We consider ourselves at war. We try to exert the maximum

effort to get the occupation troops out of our territory. This will end the war." On the same day the Egyptian newspaper "Al-Akbar" declared that "the Egyptian regular forces are ready for the day of the great crossing of the Canal."

2. The UPI reported from Rome on 10 July that Arab diplomatic sources admitted that Syria has massed very large numbers of troops (most of its nine brigades) along its line with Israel and has given permission to all Arab guerrilla groups to infiltrate Israel from its territory. It is believed that all terrorist activity out of Syria is now fully coordinated with the Syrian regular army.
3. Nasser made a long speech on 23 July to the national Congress of the Arab Socialist Union in which he said that Egypt had the military strength to fight Israel for "liberation now" and would set free "not only Sinai but all occupied Arab lands and above all Jerusalem." He cautioned that the road would be long and difficult. "What is the meaning of a cease-fire?... We have to fight." He bitterly attacked the United States and Britain for their support of Israel; praised France; and expressed deep gratitude to Russia for its aid. "Today we can be proud of our armed forces. We are ready to fight. The Six-Day War has not ended. It will be the two-year war, the three-year war, the four-year war. The Israelis were dancing in the streets in June 1967. In 1969 they are weeping. Thanks be to God the picture has changed." Three days later, at the end of the Congress, Nasser spoke again, warning against over-confidence, saying the fight against Israel was only at the beginning and would be a long, hard one. The Congress passed a resolution saying "what has been taken by force will be retaken by force," and flatly rejected any idea of negotiations with Israel, noting that "we will not relinquish an inch of our land."

### III. WORLD REACTIONS TO ARAB THREATS

#### 1. International Herald Tribune, dateline Cairo, 26 July

"The mood in the capital today is certainly buoyant and hawkish, marked by frequent threats against Israel by senior military officers. The military, it is said, is getting tired of all the training and is anxious to come to grips with Israel. Mr. Nasser in public exudes confidence, looking relaxed and healthy. He contends that the morale of the armed forces is very very high. Is President Nasser deluding himself? Most impartial western observers here believe that the Egyptian

military is still years away from developing the ability to defeat Israel in a full-scale war."

2. Sunday Telegraph, London, 27 July

Last week's fierce fighting in the Suez Canal area marked "a significant Egyptian breakthrough." The paper said that Egypt's new-found aggressive spirit stemmed from the return from training in Russia of several hundred pilots who had been there for over a year. "With planes dispersed as far away as Algeria, Egypt has lost the fear of having its air force destroyed on the ground once more."

3. Daily Telegraph, London, 28 July

"It is highly improbable that any marginal improvement in military effectiveness on the part of the Arabs would save them from yet another drubbing."

4. Associated Press, Washington, 30 July - Fred S. Hoffman, military writer

"The rebuilt Egyptian Air Force's first attempt to challenge Israeli air superiority since the Six-Day War has failed. United States analysts believe Egypt lacks the air power necessary to support a major ground attack across the Suez Canal into Sinai.

The U.S. experts feel the Russians have succeeded in re-equipping the Egyptian air force and training substantial numbers of new pilots who, however, still fall far short of matching the Israeli air force in combat. One U.S. general said, "The Egyptians obviously don't think they are strong enough to launch any major ground assault. I can't conceive that they would dare cross the Canal in force unless they had at least an even break in the air, which they don't have."

Israelis are concerned about additional arms. They say the Russians have agreed to send more to Egypt as a result of Nasser's visit to Moscow last fall. The Israelis speak about possibly 100 to 200 more planes, 500 more artillery pieces and 600 more tanks."

5. New York Times, Washington 30 July - William Beecher

"American analysts believe that if the simmering Middle East crisis should boil over into war, Israel would win again, though after a longer, bloodier struggle than the last one. The Israelis are still considered 'more than a match for all the Arab forces combined', in the words of an American general.

Some intelligence analysts believe that should war erupt - and much would depend on how it started and whether surprise was achieved - the Israelis would prevail in about three weeks of bitter fighting. But this time they would not be able to prevent some bombing of their principal cities and their losses would be substantially higher than in the 1967 war.

The Egyptians are said to be very inefficient in coordinating and employing their Russian-supplied sophisticated air-defense network of radar, missiles, etc. For example, several weeks ago Israeli jets were reported to have flown over Cairo unopposed (this, in fact, did occur on 17 June) and specialists here say they fly almost daily reconnaissance missions all over Egypt. One military man here said, "There's just no comparison on pilots. The Israelis are worlds better."

#### IV. ISRAELI REACTIONS

I have spoken to many of Israel's very top leaders in recent days - both civilian and military. It would be imprudent to attribute specific words to specific individuals - nor is it really necessary. From the following statements you can sense the general tone and thinking of the leadership of Israel today:

- Mr. A. - Nasser's speech of 23 July that the cease-fire no longer exists must be taken at face value. Egypt has chosen the path of war.
- Mr. B. - Nasser's speech meant that the Egyptian army has been given a free hand to attack Israel. We must reject suggestions that Nasser's statement was designed solely for internal propaganda purposes.
- Mr. C. - The Arabs think it will be difficult for us to hold out for a long time under this pressure. They think our only style is to mobilize fast, fight fast, demobilize fast and go home. They will go on for a long time, in stages, gradually escalating their pressure, but not seeking a quick show-down. We must organize ourselves, from an economic and psychological point of view, to adjust ourselves to this long pressure.
- Mr. D. - The Arabs made a decision at Khartoum not to negotiate for peace - but to try to get us to withdraw by political means - i.e. UN, Big Powers, world pressure. This has failed. Now they are reverting to military means through pressure on our borders, terrorism and preparation for full

war. We are actually at war with only a portion of our force. We do not mobilize our reserves because we want the country to live normally, take in the immigrants, etc. This will continue for a long time. We won the war in six days. It may take six years to get peace - and maybe more. The Arabs are not ready for peace - they still want war. We must hold out.

V. IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC ARENA

Here the situation remains substantially as it has been for months:

1. The UN provides no leadership, and while U Thant makes clear in his periodic reports that Egypt initiates most of the firing, nevertheless, he warns both sides with equal impartiality to end offensive operations immediately. This remarkable inability to locate and identify the major culprit seems to some observers very strange.
2. The United States continues its dialogue with the Soviet Union to find as much common ground as possible, but its chief negotiator, the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Joseph Sisco, said on 8 July that the major powers could only work out a framework for peace - a final solution could be reached only by the parties themselves. This has been the Israeli position all along - and the United States really does understand it.
3. As for France, the new president maintains the posture of the old. Pompidou said at his recent press conference that France would maintain its total embargo on arms supplies to Israel. Mrs. Golda Meir, in an interview published in "Figaro" 17 July criticized France and spoke of the fundamental injustice of the embargo. "These aircraft are essential for the needs of our security, at a time when the waves of arms deliveries do not cease to roll on the Arab world .... The fact that our reactions are measured does not mean we do not feel this injustice with deep sadness."
4. The Soviet Union continues in its inscrutable way to be one of the chief villains, simply by virtue of being the multi-billion-dollar arms provider. Everyone agrees that Russia probably does not want to see Israel destroyed; probably does not want Egypt to start another war; does not want a confrontation with the United States; is only interested in her newly acquired Mediterranean bases, her African foothold, her thrust toward the Persian Gulf - and yet, in spite of all such protestations, Russia is really responsible for the tension in the Middle East.



Had she not re-supplied Egypt and Syria with more and better equipment after the 1967 war, there is little doubt that the region would today be much closer to peace than to renewed war. Russia continues to play her mischievous game in support of Arab clients.

#### VI. HUMAN NEEDS CONFERENCE

A most remarkable meeting was conducted in Jerusalem for four days in June, under the above title. About 250 leaders of the international Jewish community came together from all over the world, without fuss or publicity, to examine such "unexciting" subjects as health, housing, immigration, education - all things pertaining to the needs and wants of human beings in search of a better life. Many of these men are at the very apex of fame and public responsibility in their countries. Many are less well-known but all are legitimately entitled to be called leaders. They are conscientious, devoted, serious and thoughtful. What they tried to do was summarize exactly what would be required in the field of social services to satisfy the needs of new immigrants and others in the years immediately ahead, when the energies and resources of the State would be so massively preoccupied with security and defense. The Conference was a beautiful demonstration of Jewish concern for a better future, while struggling through a difficult present.

Obviously, in four days the participants could not master the complexities of the subjects studied, but their task was made easier by the existence of some extraordinarily clear documents which had been in preparation for almost a year, and which presented all basic data in a most efficient manner, plus suggested solutions for some of the main problems. This set of documents, brief and easy to read, should be digested by every person seriously concerned with Israel's future. They may be obtained from the UJA or the CJFWF.

Through discussions in the workshops, from reports by various Israeli experts, through exchange of ideas, the conference participants did come to a basic understanding of what the next five years might look like. Assuming an immigration during that period of 175 - 200,000 persons (average annual 35 - 40,000), and assuming that the entire philanthropic responsibility stemming from this immigration must be undertaken by the Jewish communities outside Israel, for the community inside is completely concerned with defense and cannot contribute to the humanitarian costs as it had done in years prior to the Six-Day War, the average annual cost for maintaining the minimum priority programs to absorb these immigrants will be somewhere between \$350 and \$400 million per year. This is one million dollars per day, expected to

be contributed by the approximately  $8\frac{1}{2}$  million Jews of the free world as a voluntary offering. If anyone thinks this sounds like a high figure, contrast it with the cost of maintaining the present war at the rate of three million dollars per day, provided by the approximately  $2\frac{1}{2}$  million Jews of Israel, as both a voluntary and involuntary (i.e. tax) offering.

The attitude of the conference delegates was excellent. They digested these figures very soberly, and in the end accepted the responsibility. What did this acceptance really mean? Basically, it was a moral matter, as these great issues always are. The fund-raising leaders were saying that they understood the reasons why this large annual sum was required, and would interpret this to their constituencies at home, endeavoring with all might and main to educate, inspire and lead their communities to this standard of achievement.

#### VII. NEW STANDARDS

It should be clear by now that the new standards in fund-raising must become permanent. We were all surprised by the incredible outpouring of June-July 1967 - and thrilled that our Jewish emotion was so deep as to evoke that response. But then we lowered the level of our response in 1968 because we really did not understand that the war was continuing, defense expenditures were rising, and the citizens of Israel could not assist in the humanitarian tasks. During this year of 1969 we have once again increased our response, as comprehension re-asserted itself, and the newspaper headlines kept telling us that peace was far off.

And so, now, at this mid-point in 1969, the immediate future of the next few years unfolds with relative clarity. The Arab pressure will grow stronger; Israeli defense will require more; the citizens of Israel will be asked to provide more and ever more, in the form of taxes and loans. In addition to all taxes, by the way, Defense Bond sales to the Israeli public this year have surpassed IL 200 million already, and the target of sales is now being increased to IL 300 million. This is an absolutely incredible display of public will and determination and support of the policy of holding out as long as will be necessary.

Therefore, the entire burden of philanthropic costs must be assumed by the Jewries of the free world - and if this requires repeating our performance of 1967, so be it - this must become our conscious target - the new standard for the years ahead.

It is clear that American Jewry understands this in 1969, for present estimates indicate that \$20 - 25 million more will be pledged in 1969 than in 1968. As we approach 1970, we must strive again for another increase, both in the regular campaign and in the Emergency Fund. I think it is entirely possible - and this new breakthrough will itself, like an ever-spiralling circle, provide even more courage and resolve.

Here is a short table of cold figures which really reflects hot emotion:

(Approximate) Pledges to UJA in \$ Million

	<u>Regular Campaign</u>		<u>Emergency Fund</u>
1966	66		
1967	68	+	175
1968	71	+	85
1969	73	+	102

How should we add 1970 to this table? As follows?

1970	75	+	125
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Is that enough? Is this our American share of a global \$350 - 400 million, or should our fair share be even higher? Let each man decide for himself.

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During the Six-Day War the Ben Horin family, living in Kibbutz Kfar Menachem, had two sons at the front; Amram, married with a little boy, and Yochanan, single. The mother tells the story: "I was working at the telephone in the kibbutz and received a call to come to the Ashkelon town offices. I knew that something had happened. All I asked was - which one, I have two. And they said - both."

That was two years and two months ago. Just a few weeks ago, Moshe Dayan stood at the grave of Sergeant Ehud Ram, aged 24, in his kibbutz of Hanita, speaking the following words of eulogy: "At dawn yesterday we stood on the shores of the Gulf of Suez to await the return of the raiders from Green Island. The young soldiers returned after they had achieved their objectives and won the battle, carrying the price of victory, six dead and nine wounded, on their shoulders.

Sons such as these, who can live, fight and die like this are the most wonderful treasure we have as parents, comrades, and as a nation.

There are events which in time become legends, and Ehud and his comrades were a legend which became reality. The dream of an exiled, humiliated and aching nation has come true. The reality of independence, of a homeland, of Jerusalem, of the settlement of mountains and deserts, of flowering trees. But a reality also of blood, of funerals, of casualties, and of bodies carried home at dawn. We can do nothing but to strengthen our hearts in love."

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Stirring words, roaring eloquence, fiery slogans are not needed to arouse a slumbering people. Our people are awake, alert, aware. We shall do what is required. May the Holy Days ahead strengthen our will.

Sincerely yours,

*Herbert A. Friedman*

