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Emergency Conference of Major National Jewish Organizations.  
1959.

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YOU ARE INVITED  
TO ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE  
IN AN

*Emergency Conference*

OF

*Major*  
AMERICAN JEWISH  
ARCHIVES  
● *National Jewish Organizations*

TO BE HELD

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1959

9:30 A.M. TO 4:00 P.M.

AT THE

STATLER HILTON HOTEL

NEW YORK CITY

IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE

UNITED JEWISH APPEAL

## PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

**American Jewish Committee**

Irving M. Engel, *President*

**American Jewish Congress**

Rabbi Joachim Prinz, *President*

**American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs**

Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, *President*

**American Zionist Council**

Rabbi Irving Miller, *President*

**B'nai B'rith**

Philip M. Klutznick, *President*

**Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America**

Dr. Miriam Freund, *President*

**Jewish Agency for Israel**

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, *President*

**Jewish Labor Committee**

Adolph Held, *President*

**Jewish War Veterans of the United States**

Sam Shaikewitz, *President*

**Labor Zionist Assembly**

Meyer L. Brown • Pinchas Cruso • Chaya Surchin

**National Committee for Labor Israel**

Joseph Schlossberg • Moe Falikman

**National Council of Jewish Women**

Mrs. Moise S. Cahn, *President*

**National Council of Young Israel**

Elijah Stein, *President*

**Religious Zionist Movement Mizrahi-Hapoel Hamizrachi**

Rabbi Isaac Stollman • Mrs. Moses Dyckman • Mrs. Milton Adelman

**The United Roumanian Jews of America**

Dr. Isaac Glickman, *President*

**Union of American Hebrew Congregations**

Dr. Maurice N. Eisendrath, *President*

**Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America**

Moses I. Feuerstein, *President*

**United Synagogue of America**

Bernath L. Jacobs, *President*

**Zionist Organization of America**

Abraham Redelheim, *President*

**SUBJECT...**

the extraordinary emergency  
created by a vast emigration  
of Jews from Rumania

**SPEAKERS...**

persons of international distinction  
whose responsibilities make  
them authorities in this  
critical situation

**PURPOSE...**

to bring together the most  
active people and the best minds  
in American Jewish life to find  
ways of meeting this challenge

THE STATLER HILTON HOTEL • NEW YORK CITY

**SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1959**

SESSIONS BEGIN AT 9:30 A.M. — CONCLUDE AT 4:00 P.M.



ADDRESS MADE BY HERBERT A. FRIEDMAN

IN NEW YORK ON FEBRUARY 15th

AT UJA'S EMERGENCY CONFERENCE OF

NATIONAL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS.

This has been a century involving transplantations of Jewish population, of debt and degeneration and destruction counter-balanced by rescue and transplantation and growth in Israel. It has been that kind of century, and before it is finished, the ultimate transplantations of even larger populations loom on the horizon. Within that great impressive and millennial perspective we have got to focus our thoughts down, looking, as it were, through the other end of the telescope, to the narrow facts of this vanguard group who are on our doorstep now.

Instead of talking about the vast transplantations which will see the complete change in the demography of the Jewish world by the time another decade or two are gone, I should like, for the purpose of my talk, to confine our bright spotlight just to what is happening inside Rumania, because from that we can have a sense, perhaps, of the poignancy of what this spearhead group is going through, spearhead in the sense that they are perhaps the first and largest -- not counting the emigration from Poland which came in 1957, 1958, and still continues, because that was of a different character. In order to understand the community of Rumania today, I think we must know its background, at least of the past few years.

In old Rumania and in the provinces that surrounded it, Bessarabia, Bucovina and other places that are familiar to you, there existed before Hitler, something like 800 or 850 thousand Jews; some people



will say as many as a million. Hitler finished his work in Rumania in 1944, a year before the war was over. Because he was deprived of one year in which to do his work, he did not finish his job. Of the 850,000 Jews, there were 450,000 left alive. He got it half done.

We deal now with the other half because those who are gone are gone, and for them we can do nothing, and you are not asked to give one cent for that. Of the 450,000 who were alive in 1944 when the Germans withdrew and the Russians came in from the east, there were immediately large and small groups of them who started to organize themselves to go to Israel, so strong was their desire all the time. And when their first opportunity arrived for them to express this desire, they seized it. Thus, even while the war was still raging in other parts of the continent of Europe, Jews were leaving Rumania and slipping through and getting to Israel, and by 1945 when the war was over, tens of thousands of them went immediately westward into the camps in Germany, Austria and Italy, because they knew that there was an underground movement to Israel, and they wanted to be part of it early; and they were. By these processes, in 1944, 1946, 1947, more than 100,000 Jews left Rumania.

Then after Israel was established, in 1948 there began again a movement of Jews from Rumania. In 1949 and 1950, while it was openly possible to do so, another 100,000 went. This is an impressive accumulation which reflects the pent up desire of that population.

Then that emigration was stopped. That sudden and unexpected cessation rent many families asunder, left fathers separated from children and children separated from parents. Contemplate, for a moment, the anguish that you would feel if you had come on a boat one Monday and you expected to come behind you a week later or a month later other members



of your family, and then suddenly as the guillotine falls, a change was made and the boat stopped coming and you are separated by time and by space.

The hearts yearning for the other hearts have been beating now over this eight-year period.

So that now you have the Rumanian Jewish population reduced to the present figure of approximately 250 thousand. That is where we stand. No one should be fooled by the figures published somewhere of the official census that was taken by the Rumanian Government, when the total number of Jews registered was something like 140,000. You may see that figure published. The reason is that there were some questions on that questionnaire involving the speaking of the Yiddish language, and there were many Jews who registered as Yiddish speaking, but there were many tens of thousands who didn't and wouldn't.

Whether it is noble or ignoble, there have been cases in contemporary Jewish history where people have not written themselves down as Jews because the contemporary circumstances of their life caused them to make the unhappy choice of denial, at least on paper, although there was no denial in the heart.

Therefore, we are operating on the premise of the figure which we think is authoritative and reasonable and seems to represent the consensus of those, both Jews and non-Jews, who know the internal structure of the community and to use the figure of a quarter-of-a-million seems to be reasonably accurate.

What is the life presently of these quarter-of-a-million Jews religiously and culturally speaking? I had the occasion to meet with the Chief Rabbi, and with the President and Vice President of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Rumania, both of whom are members of the Communist Party, and both of whom I shall not characterize at this point -- but from



them I got a complete description -- in their terms -- of a full and vigorous growing dynamic Jewish life in Rumania. These two gentlemen tell you that Jewish life in Rumania flourishes. There are 100 major Jewish communities and 50 smaller Jewish communities in the country. There is one large city, Bucharest, which has a population of a million-and-a-half, which contains 50 per cent of the Jewish population -- that is, 125,000. The Jews, therefore, form almost ten per cent of the population of the city of Bucharest.

Aside from Bucharest there are no large cities. There are Cluj, Jassy, Arad, Timisoara, and in all of these places there are groups of Jews. Their statistics say 100 major and 50 minor separate Jewish communities spread around the country. They say that there are over 500 synagogues in Rumania. There are only 36 rabbis. There is one Yeshiva at Arad. Two years ago it had a population of 45 students. Today it has a population of 25 students.

When I was told that, I asked why the decline, where have these rabbinical students gone, where do you expect to get the replenishments of your Jewish professional personnel?

The reply was, "Well, you know, some Jews are beginning to leave." This is the first crack in the monolithic front which they present to you about their great flourishing community; some Jews are beginning to leave.

They say that there are three Yiddish schools in the country supported by the state. You ask for figures and they say in the Yiddish School in Bucharest there are 90 pupils. In the Yiddish School in Jassy there are 120 pupils. In the Yiddish School in Timisoara, there are 40 pupils.

So that at one and the same time you see them trying to describe



a community which is vibrant and which will live and will remain in Rumania, and at the same time by their own very figures you see the bankruptcy and the disintegration of that and the impossibility of considering that this community has any future.

There are two Yiddish state theaters, one in Bucharest and one in Jassy, and they play on alternate evenings anti-Western propaganda plays, and Yiddish classical things of Perez, and Sholom Aleichim, and Mendele. You can pay your nickel and take your choice.

This community will, in the minds of its Communist leadership, remain. They say that there will always be a Jewish community here, and don't you kid yourself about it. In their vocabulary there will be no complete liquidation of the Jewish community, but when you press them in their own vocabulary, you see that there can be only a few thousand as in Bulgaria, for example. Therefore, this gives the clue from the negative side, and I have begun with this in order that you might understand their mentality! This gives the clue from the negative side, to the way the Jews are thinking in the positive side.

The Jews of Rumania want to leave, almost down to the last man. In saying this, I take due cognizance of what they say -- the Communist Jews -- namely, there will always be a Jewish community in Rumania, if you want to consider five thousand people or ten thousand people or 25 thousand people a community. There are 25 thousand Jews living today in Germany after a whole holocaust. Do we say that there is a Jewish community in Germany?

In the same way we will say or not, there will be a Jewish community in Rumania. The fact is that you and I must conjure with this -- the Jews "want" out. This is as crystal clear as any fact could be. At the



moment there are probably 110 to 115 thousand Jews registered to leave. That is a voluntary act on their part which involves going to the police. When I say the police, I want you to understand technically how this works.

Normally, passports are given in a country by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a Department of State, or the External Ministry, or whatever it is called in any given country. In Rumania, it is not done that way. The Foreign Office has nothing to do with it, it doesn't grant these passports or these laissez-passers. It is not even sure always of what is going on. This I have from several authoritative people, Jews and non-Jews who have spoken to officials in the Foreign Ministry in Bucharest and found them not au courant. They are told to take this up with the Ministry of the Interior -- that the Ministry of the Interior is handling this.

The Russian words for Ministry of Interior have the initials M. V. D., and M. V. D. is known to us as a set of initials which is synonymous with State Secret Police.

Therefore I say that the Jews have registered with the M. V. D., with the police; a voluntary act on their part. There could be no greater individual act of desire to leave, of self-identification with the Jewish people, than that fact of registration -- with all of the penalties that it involves, which I will explain in a moment.

One hundred and fifteen thousand people have already gone to register and registration is still open and continues to be -- sometimes two days a week, sometimes one day a week, it varies. Sometimes it is open in the provinces and closed in Bucharest, and sometimes open in Bucharest and closed in the provinces. But registration is still open and new people



will continue to register. This is a dynamic process involving continuous growth. When a man takes this individual step of registration, he subjects himself to the possibility either immediately or within a few days, or at most within a few weeks, of joblessness -- or if not complete joblessness, a downgrading in his position to the point of inability to live within that income. Under these circumstances, life itself -- physical eating for his family -- becomes a matter of major concern for him while he is waiting for the rest of the documents to be processed.

The figures that we have at the moment are something like this. Up to the end of January, about 16,000 laissez-passers had been issued covering 23,000 people. For the first five days of February, and I have no figures beyond that, 1193 laissez-passers had been issued covering 2594 people.

If this is the tempo at which it is going, then it doesn't matter very much how many come in or come out in one week or one month. There may be technical interruptions due to the way those passports are given to the Jews, and there may be an interruption for a week or two weeks.. You may shift from one form of transportation to another and that may put a hitch on the works.

But you can't look at this by the week or by the month. You have to look at it in the totality of these figures.

It is not for me to go into the reasons as to why the decision was made to let them out. The fact is that the country hasn't solved its Jewish problem, does not know how to solve it, won't adopt Hitlerian or Stalinist methods of murder or deportation, and therefore reaches the conclusion to permit emigration. Consequently, this cannot be called and this is not an expulsion. It can be described as the joining together at



one moment in history of two desires -- the desire on the part of the Jews to get out, with, apparently, a top policy decision of the Rumanian Government to settle their Jewish problem by letting them out. When the two came together in time, you had the event with which we are now faced.

All the auxiliary reasons that you have heard may or may not be true -- for instance, that the Rumanians need housing. The building program for the City of Bucharest for 1959 is to build 4,000 new flats. That is all that they can manage. Four thousand flats in a city in one year is nothing. If, therefore, Jews leave and apartments are vacated, this will help in the housing situation.

Again, I doubt very much that this is the motive -- throwing Jews out to get flats. This is a by-product of letting them go.

Then there is the matter of a technical and a managerial and professional class now having been trained by the Rumanians. All responsible observers began to notice six, eight, ten months ago, that in every directorial position where a Jew was sitting, there was already sitting alongside of him a Rumanian who was being trained to take over his work.

This country, 80 per cent agricultural, is straining to turn itself into an industrial nation. That means that it has got to increase its urban population, and that means that it must push for a highly trained professional managerial class. It is trying to do both those things, and both those things have their effect on the Jewish problem. To project your own professional class into running the economy, you have to train your own boys. After you train them, you have to find jobs for them.

But the items for housing that they need to get and jobs that they want to get, are all secondary to the major consideration that they cannot swallow the Jews, the Jews who will not adjust to Communism. They will not conform to it, they will not live happily within it, and if you



cannot have them fit into the Communist system, and you don't want to kill them or deport them -- which you don't -- then you take the other way out and you say, "All right, leave."

That is the combination of historical circumstances which have brought us to this moment -- desire of the government to let them leave, full desire on the part of the Jews to go, and that is why you have them registering in large numbers.

I would like to explain the process by which this occurs, because I think that it is important for us to know the facts. Number one, the Jew makes his application to leave. This costs 75 lei per person. A lei, by the way, is eight and a half cents. It is twelve lei to a dollar. But that doesn't tell you very much.

What is its purchasing power? What is the income? There are two levels of income in Rumania. The workers -- and almost everybody is a "worker" in a state enterprise, whether it is in a cooperative making fur hats or in a cooperative making cement -- the worker earns 600 lei a month.

The professional class -- and that is the second level of salary, all professionals --, architects, doctors, lawyers, journalists, actors, and so on, earn just about double, or 1200 lei a month.

If you keep the two figures in mind, 600 lei or 1200 lei, and think of this process I am about to describe to you, you will realize what it means to the individual Jew trying to get out.

Number one, he makes his application with the M. V. D. -- 75 lei per person; three people in a family, 225 lei.

In the second step, he must go and perform a deliberate act of renouncing his Rumanian citizenship. This costs 1,000 lei per person; for a family of three, 3,000 lei.



By the way, at this point our man is completely vulnerable, because he probably has no job and now has no citizenship. Therefore, he has no basis, neither economically nor legally. He is what we used to call a D.P. or stateless person, and he has paid for this privilege.

In the third step, he must obtain what is called a laissez-passer, because he has given up his Rumanian citizenship, he has no Rumanian passport, and he has no identity papers with which he can travel. The laissez-passer, which is a one-way document, will let him out of Rumania, never to return, and will permit him to go to only one place in the world, because the laissez-passer is stamped "Destination Israel". That costs 315 lei per person; three people, 945 lei.

Number four, he must then turn over to the state his apartment in good repair, which means it must be painted, and it must be repaired if the electrical fixtures don't work, if the door handle doesn't lock -- or whatever. But before the block warden will give him a release that it is in good shape, it must be inspected by the state and certified to be livable. While there is no way in the world to put a figure on this, from everything that I could find out, it has been costing approximately 1,000 lei to put an apartment in shape, on a minimum basis.

He is allowed to take with him personal clothing. Again, in two carefully defined categories, if he is a worker he is allowed to take 70 kilos (154 lbs.) and if he is not a worker, he is allowed to take 40 kilos (88 lbs.). He must pay freight. Freight from Burharest to Naples is 6 lei per kilo. The freight for a family of three is 900 lei.

He takes this clothing and he puts it in a box which he obtains from the customs, and he pays for the box. The box for 70 kilos costs 500 lei and the box for 40 kilos costs 300 lei. So the boxes for our family of



three, two parents and one child, is 1100 lei.

The last item to be bought is a railroad ticket, and a railroad ticket from Bucharest to Naples costs 491 lei -- make it 500. For three people it is 1500 lei.

You add this thing up and you get, for this small family of three, something like nine to ten thousand lei. A man has earned 600 a month and he has not saved on that. He hasn't lived on that. He has always had to sell things, even at the full 600 -- or, if he earned 1200, he couldn't save any money on that. Where does he get 10,000 lei?

These are practical problems of life. You can talk all you want about 5,000 Jews leaving or 10,000 Jews leaving. This is what it costs to leave. If there is anybody who wishes to shed tears of sympathy, but isn't willing to look the dollar costs in the face, then I am sorry, the tears don't mean very much. The Rumanian Jew needs help with this. He is helping himself to an extent which you and I would find almost unbelievable to comprehend.

If you had come with me through the Jewish quarters there, on the fronts of the apartment houses you would see pieces of paper with lists of furniture for sale. Lamp, table, radio -- they are selling out from underneath themselves the chair on which they sit, the bed on which they sleep. It is the only private property that they have which they can make liquid and turn into money.

Do you think there is a great market in Bucharest for buying Jewish bedroom sets? Jews are selling, gentiles are buying. The gentiles don't have any big salaries either. They are in the same position economically speaking. There are very few of them that can afford to go and pay 5,000 lei for a bedroom set, even if it cost 15,000 originally and the Jew is selling it at a loss. It is difficult to find the customer



to sell it to even at a loss.

I want to give you a conception of people walking around on the streets in large numbers. You can see them on the No. 19 tramway and on the No. 4 tramway, going out of the Jewish section into the gentile parts of town looking for people to whom they can peddle their furniture.

I think that that is a very high degree of self help, in which they are trying to do the best they can for themselves.

There is another way. There is something there called consignment shops. I understand you take your goods there, your plates, your glasses, your knives and forks, your paintings, a set of binoculars such as I saw in a window, or your camera. What you own you take down to the consignment shop, you leave it there, and if they can sell it, then they take off a percentage for selling it, and they give you the rest. If they can't sell it, it sits there.

The consignment shops are getting full of Jewish goods now, and now there is a new wisecrack that Jews are getting non-Jewish friends to take and register their merchandise, because the consignment shops already don't want to take any more Jewish merchandise.

This is nothing against the Government of Rumania. This is nothing against the people of Rumania. These are the economic facts of life. The man has got to get himself 10,000 lei. How does he do it?

I would not like to go into any details here whatsoever, but I would like to make one general statement. You have to take this completely on faith and as a fact.

As difficult as the process is by which a man tries to get himself through this tremendous financial morass, there will be many, many people -- as there have been already in these first 90 days -- many people who cannot by any means whatsoever, raise the amount of money necessary.



And yet this is the statement that I want you to take on faith without my being able to back it up to you with any details --not one single Jew who wants to leave Rumania will be left behind because of lack of ability on his part to raise money to get the necessary documents. Take that, please, as a statement of fact. It is true.

The amount of money that will be required is astronomical. The process by which the statement that I have just made will have to be implemented, is filled with great risks, and many dangers, and, therefore, it is not a light statement that I make to you. But believe me, if the campaign this year can raise enough money to do this, and everything else that must be done, then you will know that the necessary money is being applied to this -- and it will be applied successfully.

I have given you the pattern, the process, the formulation for what I call the normal case. This is the normal case of a migrant who has no complications. The complications which could be described range from the laughable to the very tragic.

Let me tell you what I am talking about as a typical complication. This laissez-passer for which you pay 1500 lei -- before you can get it, you have to clear all of the departments of the city in which you live. Bucharest happens to have eight municipal departments and one central City Hall. It doesn't matter what part of town you live in; you, the individual Jew must go to all eight municipal departments and get a little statement of clearance from each one of the eight. Then you bring all eight to the central City Hall, turn them in, and you get one which indicates that you are without any debts, you owe nothing, you are clear, you may go. In eight different departments they look up your dossier for the last eleven years of the regime, since 1947.

This is the kind of thing that comes up. I sat there with a



woman crying her eyes out, with a husband and two children. This was her second husband. Her first husband was arrested eight years ago. He was the bookkeeper in a plant. There was an embezzlement of 30,000 lei. Two people were arrested and held responsible. The plant manager -- a non-Jew -- and the bookkeeper, her first husband, a Jew. The two men were found guilty of the embezzlement. They were fined 15,000 lei each and confined to jail for ten years. Her husband after a year in jail had committed suicide. He couldn't stand it.

Over the course of the intervening years, she remarried and had two children with the second husband. Now she has registered and she wants to go to Israel. They find in the dossier that her husband "owes" the state 15,000 lei and before they will let her go, she must pay this debt. All debts are compounded at the rate of 180 per cent. This obviously would be a fortune.

So they waive the 180 per cent on the basis that she should instead also pay the 15,000 lei of her husband's partner, who is still in jail. He has not committed suicide, but has not paid his 15,000. So she has the 30,000 to pay before she can leave.

A nice story.

I will give you another case. These are all in the category of so-called abnormal cases. A man owned a tailor shop. The tailor shop was nationalized, as all other business was nationalized in the country. That is the law of the country, that is it. He had in the tailor shop at the time that it was nationalized seven fur coats belonging to seven other people. When the inspectors came in and said that they were taking over the shop, and he who was formerly the owner might now work in the shop if he wants to -- but they are taking all of the inventory --, he said, "Look, these seven coats are not mine. They were brought here for repair and for storage."



"Never mind, we will give you a receipt that we are nationalizing those seven coats also, and you can explain that to the seven owners."

"Fine," and he did that.

In all these years he has held that receipt, now a yellowed piece of paper. This Jew wants to leave. In the city department that he has to clear, the dossier shows the seven coats, and they tell him that he must reimburse these seven individual owners now before they let him leave. He shows them this piece of paper in which it is certified that the coats were taken from him, and the answer is, "That is all right, so long as you are in the country. You leave the country, what can we tell the seven owners? You must pay the seven owners of the coats."

There are so many of these cases where large sums of money are involved that it makes the ordinary process of trying to find ten or eight or nine thousand lei for the average family look easy. These are problems of great human misery.

In spite of all of this, in spite of it all, the people remain registered on the list, and more register, and they "want" out.

I went to schul on Friday evening. Here was this great temple packed. You take the ordinary service for Friday evening -- it takes 20 or 30 minutes. They stretch it to three hours so they can be together. They want to rub shoulders with each other -- the feeling of Jewish unity is to stay close, and I mean physically close. They pack into the pews so that they are in physical proximity with one other. This increases the psychological sense of unity.

And through that mass of people, hundreds and thousands in that big temple in Bucharest, when the men of the Israel Legation walked in, it was like the sea separating. These men came down and they were embarrassed -- they didn't want to be paraded like that --, but there were calls of "come



to the front, come to the front." All through the synagogue you heard this, along with leaning out to touch their coats as they went down the center of the aisle, and the whispers -- "that is our legation, ours."

These are Rumanian citizens; and yet that falls apart. These men are from "our" legation. That is our government. That identification is so thick that you can cut it with a knife.

The three hours that they sit together gives plenty of time for Jews to whisper one to the other the latest information and the latest advice and how to do this and how to do that, because only there in those circumstances can they be perfectly sure that they are talking to each other without being overheard.

Late one Shabbath afternoon I went into a little schul. They had on the table a little jar of jam which they had made from ethrog they received last fall from Israel. They said, "To a guest, an American, we want to give the biggest treasure we can -- have a spoon of this jam."

The ancient exodus from Egypt was the portion for the week, and every time I heard the word "Egypt" in that schul, I swear to you I thought that I was hearing Rumania, and that everybody in the room was hearing Rumania. The way the Jews left Egypt, the way they wanted to go out of Egypt, and the way they wanted to get to the Promised Land is in the portion of the Bible from many thousands of years ago -- but it was happening today in the minds of those people. You have to be able to translate.

Summing up, I think that we have two problems here. One is rescue -- how do you help to get them out of there; and the other is absorption -- how do you help get them into Israel. You can't get them out of there, and you can't get them into Israel, without the kind of



money that will make of this thing a running process that won't break down.

That kind of money is the kind of money that cannot be gathered without the help of every type of person and organization.

It is all on your shoulders.

The kind of campaign that we want to run this year we will run as well as the UJA knows how. It requires new kinds of things to be done. This is one such new kind of thing -- if the mass weight of the various Jewish organizations of America can be brought to bear upon the hundreds of thousands and millions of Jews -- many of whom don't give anything to the campaign, let alone enough --, then maybe we can have the kind of campaign this year that will begin to meet the needs.

These Jewish people of Rumania are wonderful. I saw them in the streets and I saw them in the theater and I saw them in the schul -- and when I saw them, I saw you. There is no difference.

When you and I talk about this Romanian migration, for God's sake let us not talk about figures, let us not talk about statistics, let us not talk about Rumania, though it is on the move -- we are talking about people, we are talking about Jews, we are talking about Jews going to Israel. That is human and it is flesh and blood, and it is the biggest ideal we have got. If we can't support that with enough money, then I don't know what we can do.

I think if we all get together behind this thing, we can have the kind of campaign this year that will make an appreciable difference in meeting our obligations (financial as well as human) -- and that is what I think our job is.



NOTES ON MEETING OF UJA ADMINISTRATION GROUP -- JANUARY 9, 1959

Present:	Morris W. Berinstein	Irving Jacobs
	Samuel H. Daroff	William Rosenwald
	Fred Forman	Dewey D. Stone
	Herbert A. Friedman	Edward M. M. Warburg
	Melvin S. Goldstein	

Mr. Berinstein opened the meeting by noting that he had called this group together to assist him as an administrative group in arriving at certain decisions regarding the campaign. He hoped it would be possible to arrange to have the members of the group, plus Mr. Joseph Meyerhoff and Mr. Albert Levin who could not attend today, meet on some regular basis throughout the campaign. He then called on Mr. Jacobs to report on the status of pre-campaign budgeting negotiations with some of the top communities.

DETROIT: Mr. Jacobs reported that on the same amount of money as was raised in 1958 the UJA will receive between \$80,000 and \$100,000 more in 1959. The important point is that there will be a sharing in the amount raised both up and down. Detroit will also give up the amount it has taken out of the special fund which amounted to 5.1 percent in 1958 and Detroit has also agreed not to deduct any amount from the UJA allocation because of fund-raising activities by the Jewish National Fund and duplicated gifts such as the Ford Motor Company gift. All of this means that the UJA should receive the entire sum allocated out of the regular fund. With regard to the regular fund, on all amounts raised over and above the sum raised last year, Detroit will keep 20 percent and the UJA will receive 80 percent.

PITTSBURGH: On the same amount raised as in 1958 the UJA will receive \$11,000 more in 1959. The overage on the regular campaign will be split two-thirds for the UJA and one-third for Pittsburgh. The Rescue Rund will give the UJA 100 percent, less some expenses that will be incurred.

NEWARK: A one card campaign is run in this community. The UJA has always used a base for Newark of \$1,735,000 and for 1959 it will receive \$828,000 out of the first \$2,000,000 raised which will provide the UJA with a higher percentage than obtained in 1958. The amount raised over \$2,000,000 is to be divided 75 percent for the UJA and 25 percent for Newark. Newark has a deficit of \$80,000 which it will try to make up by raising money over and above the amount raised last year. It is understood that of the amount raised in Newark \$1,735,000 will be considered regular campaign and everything above that will be considered special fund.

CLEVELAND: Negotiations are still under way with Cleveland. In 1958 the UJA obtained 51.5 percent of \$4,335,000. For 1959 Cleveland has offered the UJA the same percentage plus 67 percent of the overage for all overseas purposes while the UJA is insisting on 67 percent for UJA alone. At the same time, of course, it is understood that Cleveland will provide UJA with a special fund.



Notes on Meeting of UJA Administration Group -  
January 9, 1959

MIAMI: In 1958 the UJA received 43 percent of the first \$1,300,000 and the next \$100,000 was kept by Miami. An attempt is now being made to obtain 43 percent of the entire sum of \$1,400,000 and there seems some possibility that this will be worked out so that the UJA will gain \$43,000.

BALTIMORE: This city is going on an accrual basis. The UJA received in 1958 \$869,000 on the regular and the minimum on an accrual basis will be \$893,000 out of a slightly larger amount of money.

BOSTON: Mr. Stone reported that Boston will probably go along with the rest of the communities but he is waiting awhile before he attempts to work out a plan for that city.

PHILADELPHIA: Mr. Berinstein pointed out, primarily for the benefit of Mr. Daroff, that in 1957 out of the first \$3,850,000 raised the UJA was to receive \$2,100,000 and Philadelphia raised \$861,000 above that but gave the UJA only \$700,000 on the Rescue Fund. In 1958 the UJA will receive \$2,100,000 plus only \$81,000 on the Rescue Fund. This means that Philadelphia raised between \$400,000 and \$500,000 less in 1958 than in 1957 but the UJA will receive \$600,000 less. One of the reasons for this is that Philadelphia took money out of the special fund for other purposes such as, for example, rebuilding their offices. Mr. Daroff said that an effort should be made by UJA to oblige Philadelphia to return some of this money that it has taken. He said that he never knew anything about the fact that Philadelphia had taken money out of the Rescue Fund. Mr. Daroff was then asked to make his feelings known in Philadelphia so that when pre-campaign budgeting negotiations are entered into with Philadelphia the UJA can have some support.

Mr. Jacobs also reported briefly on Washington, Dallas, Richmond and Trenton. He noted that there are a large number of meetings scheduled in a number of other cities.

A statement is to be sent out by the United Jewish Appeal regarding pre-campaign budgeting pointing out that the new national policy originally adopted in Jerusalem is now beginning to see implementation in the communities.

DANGER COMMUNITIES: -

NEW HAVEN: The problem here is that this community built a new community center and last year, on a unilateral basis, took \$50,000 out of the Rescue Fund to pay off part of the mortgage and the community plans to do the same thing in 1959 and in 1960 and then on for another couple of years. The community has promised that maybe by 1960 it will have a capital fund drive for the Center mortgage but the community refuses to do anything about a capital fund drive in 1959 and feels that the money for the mortgage should



Notes on Meeting of UJA Administration Group -  
January 9, 1959

come out of the UJA campaign. Theoretically, Mr. Friedman said, the UJA has been receiving \$216,000 out of the first \$387,000 raised but in 1957 New Haven deducted \$21,000 from what should have been the Rescue Fund and then in 1958 deducted \$50,000 from what should have been the Rescue Fund which leaves the United Jewish Appeal with very little indeed -- something like \$166,000. Mr. Friedman said that the UJA ought to be able to raise this amount on its own and could depend on Mr. Gingold who gives \$7,500, Mr. Cooley who gives \$30,000 and Mr. Gratenstein who is supposed to give about \$50,000 to assist it in an independent campaign.

Mr. Berinstein, with regard to New Haven, said that he would be prepared to divide the \$50,000 for 1959 and to carry \$25,000 of it and have the community carry the other \$25,000. Mr. Stone suggested that New Haven be asked to re-negotiate the mortgage with the bank because he saw no need why it should be paid off in five years. It was the general consensus that New Haven should not be permitted to take any part of the money it needs to pay off the mortgage out of the campaign.

LYNN: In this community all of the important contributors and top workers want to have a separate campaign on behalf of the UJA. These people have made substantial pledges but refuse to pay them because they feel that the UJA is not receiving a proper share of the proceeds of the campaign. They are insisting that 45 percent of the gross go to the United Jewish Appeal. Mr. Stone said that he had told the important people in Lynn that the UJA would go along with them and that we would have a separate campaign. Mr. Stone said that in Lynn the UJA certainly has the right people on its side and it is a good testing spot.

ELIZABETH: The only real gift here is that of Col. William Schweitzer and that runs to about half the total campaign. His gift is \$105,000. If Col. Schweitzer would transfer his gift from Elizabeth to New York then the UJA would be left with very little from Elizabeth. Mr. Berinstein and Mr. Rosenwald will discuss this matter with Col. Schweitzer.

Mr. Friedman then described briefly the situation in Newport News and Long Beach (California) where very little money is raised and where the UJA should be able to raise at least that much independently. There was agreement that it might be well for the UJA to enter into independent campaigns in such places.

CAMPAIGN OFFICERS: - The following decisions were reached with regard to campaign officers:

Joseph Shulman will not be a Chairman for Regions because this post is being abolished but Mr. Shulman is to be kept on the Cabinet. Mr. Stone is to



Notes on Meeting of UJA Administration Group -  
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speak to Mr. Shulman about his giving up the Chairmanship of Regions and his remaining on the Cabinet.

Milton Kahn is not to be Chairman of the Speakers Bureau because that post has been abolished and he will certainly be a member of the Cabinet. Meanwhile, however, Mr. Stone and Mr. Berinstein are to give consideration to a possible new office for Mr. Kahn.

CABINET MEMBERS: - The following decisions were reached with regard to the names to be dropped from the Cabinet for 1959:

Lou Berry, Jacob Hiatt and Harry Levine -- Mr. Stone is to speak with these gentlemen and ask for their resignations unless he comes to the conclusion, in his conversation, that there is good reason to keep them on the Cabinet in 1959.

Joseph Markel is to be removed from the Cabinet list in accordance with his request.

David Borowitz is to be removed from the Cabinet.

A. B. Polinsky is to be removed from the Cabinet.

Harry Sytk - Mr. Daroff will speak to him and determine whether he should be removed from the Cabinet.

Norman Nobil - Fred Forman is to speak with Mr. Nobil and determine whether or not he is to be kept on the Cabinet.

Jacob Arvey is to be kept on the Cabinet.

It is understood, of course, that all people removed from the Cabinet will be placed on the National Campaign Committee.

The suggestion was made -- and it was agreed -- that additional people from the Western part of the United States should be placed on the Cabinet.

CAMPAIGN CALENDAR: - The Campaign Calendar for the next month or so was explained to the members of the Administration group, as follows:

January 11th:	Officers Meeting, New York
January 19th:	Leadership Conference with Mr. Eshkol in New York
February 1st:	Cabinet Meeting in Miami
February 7th:	Miami Conference with Ambassador Eban and Jack Benny



Notes on Meeting of  
UJA Administration Group -  
January 9, 1959

CAMPAIGN CALENDAR: (continued)

February 9th:	Country wide telephone hookup from Miami to report to communities on results obtained in Miami and the situation in Romania
February 20th, 21st and 22nd:	Arrowhead Springs Meeting
March 1st (subsequently changed to February 15th):	Meeting of national organizations in New York City

With regard to the meeting of national organizations in New York City which had originally been proposed by Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Friedman explained that what Dr. Goldmann has in mind is a meeting of 300 people to be held in either Washington or New York. These people would come from the national organizations, and the religious groups and the top officers of each of these organizations and groups would be present. The conference would be run under the auspices of the United Jewish Appeal and it would be called to endorse the crisis problem of the United Jewish Appeal in 1959.

Mr. Rosenwald noted that there was a great danger in running this conference and inviting the organizations as organizations because UJA may gain very little. He felt that these organizations would get the story and then use the information and the climate that is generated to raise additional money for themselves and not for the UJA. He felt that the thing to do is to invite as many people as possible and make it a mass affair and he also pointed to the need to minimize the danger of any resolutions that may be passed and he felt that all such resolutions should be written properly and presented correctly and, on the whole, be controlled by the UJA. The important thing, he said, is to make sure that everybody understands that the way to meet the crisis is through participation in the UJA program.

Mr. Berinstein said he would be prepared to have the UJA call the conference provided it is held in New York and provided there would be no great expense involved. He noted particularly that the UJA should not pay the expenses for any of the people who might come to the meeting.

It was agreed that no definite dates be set for future meetings of the Administration Group but that meetings be called as required.

\* \* \*

MSG:ls  
1/16/59



Joseph H. ...  
HCSG  
1/22

January 14, 1959

Mr. Herbert A. Friedman

Melvin S. Goldstein

February 15th Organization Meeting

I spoke with Dr. Clarence Berger, the Dean at Brandeis University who is in charge of the testimonial dinner being given for Dr. Sacher. The dinner is being given to Dr. Sacher at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel the evening of February 15th. It will take place in the Grand Ballroom. Ten thousand invitations have been mailed.

Dr. Berger said that he would pass to me the names of all people who indicate that they plan to attend the Sacher dinner.



MSG:mm



January 26, 1959

Sholem Sontag  
Raphael Levy

Malvin S. Goldstein

February 15th meeting

I have heard from Mr. Friedman who, en route to London, discussed the February 15th meeting with Neham Goldmann. The following are their suggestions:

1. Neham Goldmann to open the morning session and pass the chair to Irving Engel who will introduce the speakers.
2. Speakers to be the following:  
Golda Meir  
Abe Herman  
Someone from the U.S.
3. Questions, if any, before lunch, with Resolutions Committee having lunch separately.
4. Resolutions Committee chairman to be Philip Klutznick or Joachim Prinz.
5. Chairman of afternoon session to be either Klutznick or Prinz.
6. Religious organizations to be asked to nominate rabbis for invocation and benediction at lunch.
7. All presidents of organizations to serve on Resolutions Committee and sit on dais.

In addition to the above, I am sure you are proceeding along the line of having the afternoon session devoted to the presentation of the resolutions by the chairman of the Resolutions Committee and any other people who should present resolutions, and a discussion on the resolutions.

My own feeling is that before the meeting ends there should be a stimulating address and perhaps this can best be done by Herbert Friedman.

HSG/lc

cc: M.H. Bernstein  
Abe Herman  
Irving Jacobs



NOTES ON MEETING AT MORRIS BERINSTEIN'S APARTMENT -- JANUARY 16th.

Present: Morris W. Berinstein  
Herbert A. Friedman  
Melvin S. Goldstein  
Avraham Harman

1. February 15th Meeting of National Organizations:

This meeting is to be called by the organizations in cooperation with the United Jewish Appeal. Dr. Nahum Goldmann is scheduled to return to the United States for this meeting and it is understood, therefore, that Dr. Goldmann will be the Chairman. The United Jewish Appeal is to take care of the mechanics of the meeting but the attendance is to be obtained and handled by the organizations involved.

There is to be a Resolutions Committee and it was decided, tentatively, that Philip Klutznick be the Chairman of the Resolutions Committee.

The purpose of the entire conference is to establish a climate so that the communities will be able to use the man power of these national organizations in working for the 1959 campaign. The UJA can pressure the welfare funds to use the organizations and we would also have the organizations exert pressure to be used for this purpose.

The speeches to be made at the conference will deal with the following subjects:

- a. How bad the situation is in Israel as a result of the Rumanian immigration.
- b. The only way to deal with this problem is to get behind the UJA campaign.
- c. How to get behind the UJA.

2. With regard to the January 19th meeting it was agreed that it be handled as follows:

- a. Berinstein as Chairman
- b. Jordan remarks on Rumania
- c. Mr. Eshkol
- d. Questions -- to be handled by Abe Harman
- e. Campaign discussion

(R)

MSG:mm  
1/19/59

cc RL  
SS 1/21



Meeting Feb. 12  
HS/feb

January 28, 1959

Dear Nahum:

Following our meeting with Levi Eshkol and you on January 14 and subsequent meetings with the U.J.A., dealing with the problem of Jewish emigration from Rumania, I am pleased to inform you that the American Jewish Committee has joined in the call for a conference of major American Jewish organizations, to take place in New York on Sunday, February 15, 1959.

The American Jewish Committee will be represented at the meeting by members of our organization whose names are on the list which was forwarded to the U.J.A. yesterday.

You realize, of course, that this is an unusual and unprecedented action on the part of the American Jewish Committee. Our participation is based on the understanding that:

1. The American Jewish Committee, as an organization, cannot be a part of any fund-raising effort. Our organization's contribution must necessarily be confined to stressing to our members the urgency of the Rumanian situation and encouraging them, in their individual capacities, to give all possible support to the current effort to aid Rumanian Jews.

2. This official action on the part of our organization is in response to a special emergency situation, and should in no way be considered as a precedent.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

  
Irving M. Engel  
President

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Chairman  
Jewish Agency for Israel  
16 East 66th Street  
New York, N.Y.

IME/a

cc: Herbert Friedman, U.J.A.



MEMORANDUM

January 30, 1959

TO: THE LEADERSHIP OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF AMERICA

FROM: THE PRESIDENTS OF 20 MAJOR NATIONAL AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

On Sunday, February 15, 1959, at the Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York City, the major national American Jewish organizations are convening a meeting to consider an issue of the greatest urgency. We invite you, as a leader in one of these organizations, and in your community, to be with us.

In recent weeks, Jews have begun to come out of Rumania in large numbers. The numbers keep mounting by the day. Rumania has a total of 250,000 Jews. There is reason at this time to believe that about half the total number may migrate in the next twelve months.

This migration has gravely strained Israel's economic capacities. American Jews, therefore, must come to grips with the reality that what is at stake is the future of the Jewish population of Rumania. Because of the confidential nature of some aspects of the problem, we cannot go into further detail here.

The purpose of this conference is to bring together the most active people and the best minds in American Jewish communal life to find ways of meeting this challenge -- particularly to work out together the ways in which the much needed resources for this migration can be developed.

This is a call for an extraordinary conference to meet the needs of a large Jewish population on the move. We must come together to plan with one another and with the leaders of the United Jewish Appeal the best ways and means to deal with this emergency. The conference will provide an opportunity to communicate to American Jewish leaders vital information which cannot otherwise be conveyed.

You will be hearing further from your own organization about this conference. Please set aside the date:

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1959  
(The sessions will begin at 9:30 A.M.--the Conference will conclude at 4:00 P.M.)

PLEASE NOTE: All sessions will be closed and admittance will be by invitation only. You are urged to fill in the accompanying card and return it today.

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| American Jewish Committee<br><i>Immanuel</i><br>President                      | American Jewish Congress<br><i>Josephine</i><br>President  |
| American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs<br><i>M. Peretz</i><br>President | American Zionist Council<br><i>Irving Miller</i><br>President  |
| B'nai B'rith<br><i>Philip W. Klitzguck</i><br>President                        | Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America<br><i>Miriam Freund</i><br>President   |
| Jewish Agency for Israel<br><i>M. D.</i><br>President                          | Jewish Labor Committee<br><i>Adreusfeld</i><br>President   |
| Jewish War Veterans of the United States<br><i>Sam Shalkowitz</i><br>President | Labor Zionist Assembly<br><i>Myron L. Brown</i>  |
| National Committee for Labor Israel<br><i>Joseph Grossberg</i>                 | <i>Pinchas Spruss</i><br><i>Chaya Surchin</i>  |
| National Council of Young Israel<br><i>Glynn S.</i><br>President               | National Council of Jewish Women<br><i>Gladys F. Cohen</i><br>President  |
| The United Roumanian Jews of America<br><i>Dr. Isaac Gluckman</i><br>President | Religious Zionist Movement Mizrahi-Hapoel Hamizrachi<br><i>Isaac Stoleman</i><br><i>Mrs. Moses Dyckman</i><br><i>Mrs. Milton Adelman</i> |
| Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America<br><i>M. F.</i><br>President | Union of American Hebrew Congregations<br><i>Maurice R. Eisenberg</i><br>President   |
|  | United Synagogue of America<br><i>Bernath L. Jacobs</i><br>President   |
|  | Zionist Organization of America<br><i>A. A. Fedelheim</i><br>President   |



February 9, 1959

*Har*

FEBRUARY ORGANIZATIONS CONFERENCE  
Statler Hilton Hotel - New York City  
February 15, 1959

National	89
New York City	<u>154</u>
Total	243

ATTENDANCE

ALABAMA

TUSCALOOSA

Mrs. M. A. Temerson, B'nai B'rith

CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

Aaron Riche, ZOA

CONNECTICUT

BRIDGEPORT

Hon. Samuel Mellitz, Union Orthodox  
Jewish Congr. of Amer.

Isaac J. Murov, Jewish War Vets.

Bernard H. Trager, Amer. Jewish Congr.

FAIRFIELD

Irving Rubinstein, B'nai B'rith

MERIDEN

Fred Harris, Jewish War Vets.

Judge Selig Schwartz, ZOA; AZC for  
Public Affairs; United Synagogue  
of America

NEW HAVEN

Edward Lettick, Jewish War Vets.

NORWALK

Malcolm A. Tarlov, Jewish War Vets.

STANFORD

Fred Robbins, Jewish War Vets.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Miss Miriam Albert, B'nai B'rith

Joseph F. Barr, Jewish War Vets.

Maurice Bisgyer, B'nai B'rith

Mrs. Maurice Bisgyer, B'nai B'rith

Mrs. Abe Blajwas, Hadassah

Mr. & Mrs. Yale Goldberg, B'nai B'rith

Mrs. Loni Grisi, B'nai B'rith

Philip Katz, B'nai B'rith

Mrs. Lawrence Koenigsberger,

B'nai B'rith

Mrs. Raphael Tourover, Hadassah

FLORIDA

MIAMI BEACH

Dr. Morton J. Robbins, ZOA

GEORGIA

SAVANNAH

Dr. William Wexler, B'nai B'rith

ILLINOIS

CHICAGO

Morris Alexander, B'nai B'rith

Max Bressler, ZOA

Philip M. Klutznick, B'nai B'rith

Samson Krupnick, Religious Zionists  
of Amer.; Union of Orthodox  
Jewish Congr.

Milton J. Silberman, ZOA

WAUKEEGAN

Louis Pickus, B'nai B'rith



February Organizations Conference

LOUISIANA

NEW ORLEANS

Label Katz, B'nai B'rith

NEW JERSEY

ELIZABETH

Mrs. Nat Junan, B'nai B'rith

MARYLAND

BALTIMORE

Mrs. LeRoy F. Kappelman, Hadassah

HIGHTSTOWN

Phil Muskat, Jewish War Vets.

CHEVY CHASE

Joseph Andelman, ZOA

JERSEY CITY

Bernard Abrams, Jewish War Vets.

SILVER SPRING

William Levy, B'nai B'rith

NEWARK

Mrs. George J. Block, B'nai B'rith  
Bernie Gollander, Jewish War Vets.  
Harry Greenberg, Jewish War Vets.  
Yitzhak I. Rabinowitz, Amer. Jewish  
Council

MASSACHUSETTS

BOSTON

Abraham S. Karff, ZOA  
Philip W. Lown, B'nai B'rith  
Fred Monosson, B'nai B'rith  
Rabbi Joseph S. Shubca, ZOA  
Laurence S. Wolk, ZOA

Hon. Esther K. Untermann, B'nai  
B'rith

NO. HUDSON COUNTY

Kalme Aronowicz, American Zionist  
Council  
S. Greenfield, United Roumanian  
Jews of America  
Morton L. London, Jewish War Vets.  
Morris Walter, Labor Zionist Org.

WORCESTER

Hon. Joseph Goldberg, American  
Zionist Council

MICHIGAN

DETROIT

Dr. Leon Fram, Amer. Jewish Congress  
Mrs. Max Frank, Hadassah

PASSAIC

Rabbi Dr. Leon Katz, Mizrachi-  
Hapoel Hamizrachi

MINNESOTA

ST. PAUL

Samuel H. Popper, Jewish Comm.  
Relation Council

PATERSON

Leopold Frankel, ZOA

TEANECK

Stanley J. Wides, Jewish War Vets.



February Organizations Conference

NEW JERSEY (Cont'd)

TOMS RIVER

Mr. & Mrs. Sidney D. Troy, Labor  
Zionist Org.

OKLAHOMA

TULSA

Julius Livingston, B'nai B'rith

NEW YORK

DELMAR

Alexander A. Rothschild, ZOA

PENNSYLVANIA

ALLENTOWN

Bernard Frank, B'nai B'rith

MAHOPAC

Mrs. Deborah C. Cherey, ZOA

HARRISBURG

Mrs. Samuel Zack, B'nai B'rith

PEEFKILL

Samuel L. Slutzky, Jewish War Vets.

PHILADELPHIA

Dr. & Mrs. Norman H. Bram, Union of  
Amer. Hebrew Congreg.; Hadassah  
Mrs. Albert D. Bazrod, B'nai B'rith  
Milton Berger, B'nai B'rith  
Albert Cohen, B'nai B'rith  
Maximillian J. Klinger, Amer. Jewish  
Congress  
Herbert S. Levin, ZOA  
Hon. Louis E. Levinthal  
George Melnick, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Jacob P. Morrison, B'nai B'rith  
Sol Satinsky, Amer. Jewish Comm.  
William H. Sytk, ZOA

POUGHKEEPSIE

Dr. Jerome Regunberg, Amer. Zionist  
Council; ZOA

ROCHESTER

Mrs. Lester J. Berlove, Hadassah

NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE

Maurice Weinstein, B'nai B'rith

PITTSBURGH

Herman Fineberg, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Leonard Shapiro, Hadassah  
Judge Samuel A. Weiss, B'nai B'rith

OHIO

CLEVELAND

Sam H. Bonchek, Young Israel  
Irving Kane, Union of Amer. Hebrew  
Congreg.  
Mrs. Ezra Shapiro, Hadassah

RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE

Irving Jay Fain, Union American  
Hebrew Congreg.

COLUMBUS

Herbert Schiff



February Organizations Conference

NEW YORK CITY

Harry Abrams, United Roumanian  
Jews of Amer.  
Israel Baratz, Amer. Zionist Council  
Gregory J. Bardacke, Amer. Zionist  
Council  
Bernard Baum, Jewish War Vets.  
Z. Baumgold, Labor Zionist Org.  
Rabbi Karpol Bender, Religious  
Zionists of America  
Frank Bilsky, Jewish War Vets.  
Rabbi Eli M. Bleiberg, Religious  
Zionists of Amer.  
A. D. Braham, United Roumanian Jews  
of Amer.  
Hyman Bravin, Jewish War Vets.  
Israel Breslow, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Theodore Brooks, Jewish War Vets.  
Benjamin Burstein, Labor Zionist Org.  
Harold W. Carmely, ZOA  
Benjamin H. Chasin, Jewish War Vets.  
Hyman Chipkin, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Henry A. Cohen, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Fay Danzig, Amer. Jewish Congress  
J. David Delman, Young Israel  
Rabbi J. J. Deutsch, Religious  
Zionists of Amer.  
Morrey J. Deutsch, United Roumanian  
Jews of Amer.; Amer. Jewish Congress  
Benjamin J. Doft, ZOA  
Abraham M. Druckman, Amer. Jewish  
Congress  
Lester H. Duberstein, Jewish War Vets.  
E. Eberil, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Mrs. Allen I. Edles, Union Orthodox  
Jewish Congreg.  
Rabbi Dr. Israel Elfenbein, Religious  
Zionists of Amer.  
Irving M. Engel, Amer. Jewish Comm.  
Beinesh Epstein, Amer. Zionist Council  
Ben R. Epstein, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Moses P. Epstein, Hadassah  
Mrs. Ida Cook Farber, B'nai B'rith  
Morris Fox, Amer. Jewish Congress  
Dr. Miriam K. Freund, Hadassah

NEW YORK CITY (Cont'd)

Rabbi Israel E. Friedman, Religious  
Zionists of America  
Ralph Friedman, Amer. Jewish Comm.  
Benjamin A. Gebiner, Jewish Labor  
Comm.  
Israel Gitenstein, Amer. Jewish  
Congress  
Dr. Eleazar L. Globus, Mizrachi-  
Hapoel Hamizrachi  
Saul Gold, Jewish War Vets.  
Arieh Goldberg, Amer. Zionist Council  
Hannah L. Goldberg, Hadassah  
Morris Goldowsky, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Edmond Goldschmidt, United Roumanian  
Jews of America  
I. K. Goldstein, Labor Zionist Assem.  
Abraham Goodman, ZOA  
Rabbi Harold H. Gordon, Religious  
Zionists of Amer.  
Mrs. Benjamin Gottesman, Hadassah  
Mrs. Saul Granett, Hadassah  
Julius Green, Amer. Jewish Congress  
Benjamin Greenberg, B'nai B'rith  
Meyer Halperin, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Joseph Hamerman, Hadassah  
Victor Handelman, Amer. Zionist  
Council  
Bernard Harkavy, Amer. Zionist  
Council  
Sidney Hellenbrand, B'nai B'rith  
Rabbi David H. Hill, Young Israel  
Louis Hollander, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Mrs. Mortimer Jacobson, Hadassah  
Mrs. Hannah O. Jaffe, Mizrachi  
Women's Org.  
Moshe Kagan, Amer. Zionist Council  
Philip Kahn, Labor Zionist Org.  
Sam Kaplan, Labor Zionist Org.  
Joseph Kaplow, Amer. Zionist Council  
Solomon Kerstein, Religious Zionists  
of Amer.  
Walter L. Kirschenbaum, Jewish  
Labor Comm.  
Rabbi I. Usher Kirshblum, ZOA



February Organizations Conference

NEW YORK CITY (Cont'd)

Henry L. Kraushar, Mizrachi-Hapoel  
Hamizrachi  
Morris A. Lang, Amer. Zionist Council  
Miss Clara Leff, Labor Zionist Org.  
Jack Lefkowitz, ZOA  
Dr. Harris J. Levine, ZOA  
Mrs. Solomon Levinson, Hadassah  
Mr. & Mrs. Max Lewko, Mizrachi-  
Hapoel Hamizrachi  
Louis Lipsky, Amer. Zionist Comm.  
Lester Lyons, ZOA  
Mrs. Irving Mack, Hadassah  
Mrs. Mark B. Maisner, B'nai B'rith  
Harold P. Manson, ZOA  
Mrs. Rose Marder, United Roumanian  
Jews of Amer.  
Dr. Sidney Marks, Exec. Dir., ZOA  
Mrs. Clara J. Marmorek, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Meyer Mehlman, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Max M. Meth, Hadassah  
David Moskowitz, ZOA  
George Neuman, Religious Zionists  
of Amer.  
Dr. Emanuel Neumann, ZOA  
Rabbi Philip Paretzky, Religious  
Zionists of Amer.  
Jacob Pat, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Mrs. Nathan D. Perlman, Hadassah  
Miss Esther Pevsner, Labor Zionist Org.  
Harvey Platt, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Abraham Polansky, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. William Rabkin, B'nai B'rith  
Sol. Rashin, Mizrachi-Hapoel  
Hamizrachi  
Abraham A. Redelheim, ZOA  
Mrs. A. S. Richer, Hadassah  
Sam Rosen, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Harold Rosenbaum, Jewish War Vets.  
M. Morton Rubenstein, Religious  
Zionists of Amer.  
Rabbi Henry H. Rubins, Mizrachi-  
Hapoel Hamizrachi

NEW YORK CITY (Cont'd)

Mrs. Jack Ruby, Hadassah  
Paul Sampliner, B'nai B'rith  
Hon. Albert D. Schanzer, ZOA  
Joseph Schechter, Young Israel  
Dr. Joseph B. Schechtman, American  
Zionist Comm.  
Mrs. Max Schenk, Hadassah  
Avraham Schenker, Amer. Zionist Comm.  
Rabbi Lazarus Schonfeld, Mizrachi-  
Hapoel Hamizrachi  
Mrs. Albert P. Schoolman, Hadassah  
Louis Segal, Amer. Zionist Comm.  
Simon Segal, Amer. Jewish Comm.  
Henry R. Shields, Jewish War Vets.  
C. Bezalel Sherman, Labor Zionist Org.  
Mrs. Murray Shernoff, Hadassah  
Mendel Siegman, Mizrachi-Hapoel  
Hamizrachi  
Edward S. Silver, Young Israel  
Dr. S. Silverberg, Jewish Labor Comm.  
John Slawson, Amer. Jewish Comm.  
Mr. & Mrs. Joseph Sokolow, Religious  
Zionists of Amer.  
Charles Sonnenreich, Amer. Jewish  
Congress  
Leo S. Spooner, Amer. Jewish Congress  
Elijah Stein, Young Israel  
William Stern, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Israel Stolarsky, Amer. Zionist  
Council  
Isaac Stollman, Religious Zionists  
of Amer.  
Mrs. Edward S. Taub, Hadassah  
I. Teitelbaum, Amer. Jewish Congress  
Abba Tekuzener, Religious Zionists  
of Amer.  
Dr. & Mrs. Joseph Tenenbaum, ZOA  
Jacques Torczyner, ZOA  
Moses Torczyner, ZOA  
Yehuda Tyberg, Amer. Zionist Council  
Rabbi Jerome Unger, Amer. Zionist  
Council



February Organizations Conference

NEW YORK CITY (Cont'd)

Avery A. Waldman, Jewish War Vets.  
Ossip Walinsky, Amer. Zionist Council  
Milton Weill, Amer. Jewish Comm.  
Leah Weinberg, Labor Zionist Org.  
Meyer Weinstein, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Benjamin Weiss, Amer. Jewish Comm.  
Mrs. Leonard Weiss, B'nai B'rith  
Dr. Samson R. Weiss, Union Orthodox  
Jewish Congreg. Amer.  
Benjamin Winitz, Amer. Jewish Congress  
Charles Wolf, ZOA  
Leo Wolfson, United Roumanian Jews  
of Amer.  
Harry L. Woll, Labor Zionists Org.  
William Wolpert, Jewish Labor Comm.  
H. Zegas, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Richard S. Zeisler, Amer. Jewish Comm.  
Jacob T. Zukerman, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Stanley N. Zwaik, Jewish War Vets.





Meeting Feb 15  
FC/HL M/S

February 9, 1959

Mr. Herbert A. Friedman

Abraham S. Hyman

February 15, 1959

Attached is a tentative program for the meeting of February 15th, proposed by Judd Teller, Sholem and me. This program which emerged from the meeting of the three of us last Friday, had not yet cleared the Steering Committee of the organizations. The program represents a number of departures from the program which Teller had submitted. The changes are as follows:

1. He had recommended that After Naham Goldmann and you spoke, there be a question period presided over by Engel and that after lunch, Golda Meir would speak, following which there would be further discussion as to what to do about the emergency. Sholem and I both felt that this would be a deadly arrangement.

First, after you and Goldmann had made your presentations, there would really be very few questions that could be asked. We are sure that you will both cover the subject adequately and if a few questions emerged from your discussion, which we thought would probably happen, the morning session would end somewhere around 11:30 -- a risk which we could not afford to take.

Secondly, if there are going to be any questions, they should be questions addressed to the entire problem and the entire problem would not have been presented until Golda Meir had spoken and given the Israel aspect of the situation.

Finally, we could not see how you could discipline people to a point where they will ask questions in one period and make statements in another period. A man who will stand up to ask a question will be tempted to make a statement as to what he thinks should be done. In any event, we did not think that the splitting up of the discussion periods was practical.


The only risk involved in the arrangement we recommend is that, in view of the fact that Golda Meir will have spoken in the morning, the people will leave and not stay on for lunch and the afternoon session. Although there is some risk involved we ruled it out on a number of grounds: The caliber of the people who are attending the conference -- all by special invitation -- should warrant the confidence that they will stay on for the afternoon session.



February 9, 1959

2. The other change is that we suggested that Lehman be included on the program as the one person who can speak for the entire American Jewry. Moreover, his presence would add dignity to the entire conference. Teller called Mrs. Halprin for her clearance on Lehman and she indicated she had to think it over and we could know what the answer would be only this morning.

This morning, Teller called me to say that he had received a call to the effect that Abba Eban wondered why he was not on the program. This matter is now under discussion at the Jewish Agency.



ASH:GB  
CC: MSG, SS, LJ



RECOMMENDED TENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR MEETING OF FEBRUARY 15th

- I. Opening of meeting and announcement of the composition of the Resolutions Committee Adolph Held
- II. Presentation of Problem
- (a) Introduction of first two speakers Irving Engel
1. Address Dr. Nahum Goldmann  
2. Address Herbert A. Friedman
- (b) Introduction of Golda Meier Philip Klutznick
1. Address Golda Meier
- III. Lunch
- Invocation by President of N.Y. Board of Rabbis
- IV. Questions regarding and discussion of the emergency
- (a) Opening statement Morris W. Berinstein
- Chairman of balance of session - Rabbi Irving Miller
- V. Discussion of what organizations must do to bring emergency to note of American Jewry and to enlist voluntary workers in the cause of the emergency.
- VI. Action on Resolution
- (a) Report of resolution Dr. Joachim Prinz
- (b) Statement in support of resolution Herbert H. Lehman
- (c) Signing of resolution by all the presidents of the organizations who issued the call for the conference
- VII. Closing address Abe Harman



~~1777~~  
4560

February 4, 1959

FEBRUARY ORGANIZATIONS CONFERENCE  
Statler Hilton Hotel - New York City  
February 15, 1959

National 31  
New York City 77  
Total 108

ATTENDANCE

CONNECTICUT

BRIDGEPORT

Bernard H. Trager, N. C. R. A. C.

MERIDEN

Judge Selig Schwartz, ZOA, etc.

NORWALK

Malcolm A. Tarlov, Jewish War Veterans

STAMFORD

Fred Robbins, Jewish War Veterans

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Miss Miriam Albert, B'nai B'rith  
Joseph F. Barr, Jewish War Veterans  
Maurice Bisgyer, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Maurice Bisgyer, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Raphael Tourover, Hadassah

ILLINOIS

CHICAGO

Morris Alexander, B'nai B'rith  
Philip M. Klutznick, B'nai B'rith

NEW JERSEY

ELIZABETH

Mrs. Nat Junan, B'nai B'rith

HIGHTSTOWN

Phil Muskat, Jewish War Veterans

NEW JERSEY (Cont'd)

JERSEY CITY

Bernard Abrams, Jewish War Veterans

NEWARK

Mrs. George J. Block, B'nai B'rith  
Hon. Esther K. Untermann, B'nai B'rith

NO. HUDSON COUNTY

Morris Walter, Farband Labor Zionist

PASSAIC

Rabbi Dr. Leon Katz, Mizrachi-  
Hapoel Hamizrachi

PATERSON

Leopold Frankel, ZOA

NORTH CAROLINA


CHARLOTTE

Maurice Weinstein, B'nai B'rith

OKLAHOMA

TULSA

Julius Livingston, B'nai B'rith





February Organizations Conference

PENNSYLVANIA

PHILADELPHIA

Mrs. Albert D. Bazrod, B'nai B'rith  
Milton Berger, B'nai B'rith  
Albert Cohen, B'nai B'rith  
Herbert S. Levin, Phila. Zionist Org.  
George Melnick, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Jacob P. Morrison, B'nai B'rith  
Sol Satinsky, Amer. Jewish Comm.

PITTSBURGH

Herman Fineberg, B'nai B'rith  
Judge Samuel A. Weiss, B'nai B'rith

RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE

Irving Jay Fain, U. A. H. C.

NEW YORK CITY

Gregory J. Bardacke, National Comm.  
for Labor Israel  
Z. Baumgold, Labor Zionist Org.  
Hyman Bravin, Jewish War Veterans  
Theodore Brooks, Jewish War Veterans  
Benjamin Burstein, Labor Zionist Org.  
Harold W. Carmely, ZOA  
Benjamin H. Chasin, Jewish War Vets.  
Hyman Chipkin, B'nai B'rith  
J. David Delman, Young Israel  
Morrey J. Deutsch, American Jewish  
Congress  
Abraham M. Druckman, American Jewish  
Congress  
Lester N. Duberstein, Jewish War Vets.  
E. Eberil, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Mrs. Allen I. Edles, Union Orthodox  
Jewish Congr. of America  
Rabbi Dr. Israel Elfenbein, Religious  
Zionists of America  
Beinesh Epstein, Zionist Revisionists  
Ben R. Epstein, B'nai B'rith

NEW YORK CITY (Cont'd)

Mrs. Ida Cook Farber, B'nai B'rith  
Israel Gitenstein, Amer. Jewish Congr.  
Dr. Eleazar L. Globus, Mizrachi-  
Hapoel Hamizrachi  
Saul Gold, Jewish War Veterans  
Morris Goldowsky, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Edmond Goldschmidt, The United  
Roumanian Jews of America  
I. K. Goldstein, Labor Zionist Assem.  
Rabbi Harold H. Gordon, N. Y. Board  
of Rabbis  
Julius Green, American Jewish Congr.  
Benjamin Greenberg, B'nai B'rith  
Meyer Halperin, B'nai B'rith  
Sidney Hellenbrand, B'nai B'rith  
Louis Hollander, N.Y. Joint Board,  
A. C. W. A.  
Mrs. Mortimer Jacobson, Hadassah  
Morris A. Lang, National Comm. for  
Labor Israel  
Mr. & Mrs. Max Lewko, Hapoel  
Hamizrachi  
Louis Lipsky, Amer. Jewish League  
for Israel  
Mrs. Mark B. Maisner, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Rose Marder, The United  
Roumanian Jews of America  
Mrs. Clara Marmorek, B'nai B'rith  
Siegman Mendel, Mizrachi-Hapoel  
Hamizrachi  
Mrs. Max M. Meth, Hadassah  
George Neuman, Religious Zionists  
of America  
Jacob Pat, Jewish Labor Committee  
Esther Pevsner, Pioneer Women  
Harvey Platt, B'nai B'rith  
Mrs. Abraham Polansky, B'nai B'rith  
Sol. Rashin, Mizrachi-Hapoel  
Hamizrachi  
Abraham A. Redelheim, ZOA  
Sam Rosen, Jewish Labor Committee  
Harold Rosenbaum, Jewish War Vets.  
M. Morton Rubenstein, Religious  
Zionists of America



February Organizations Conference

NEW YORK CITY (Cont'd)

Rabbi Henry H. Rubins, Mizrachi-  
Hapoel Hamizrachi  
Irving Rubinstein, B'nai B'rith  
Paul Sampliner, B'nai B'rith  
Rabbi Lazarus Schonfeld, Mizrachi-  
Hapoel Hamizrachi  
Mrs. Albert P. Schoolman, Hadassah  
Henry R. Shields, Jewish War Vets.  
Dr. S. Silverberg, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Mr. & Mrs. Joseph Sokolou, Religious  
Zionists of America  
William Stern, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Israel Stolarsky, National Comm. for  
Labor Israel  
I. Teitelbaum, American Jewish  
Congress  
Dr. & Mrs. Joseph Tenenbaum, ZOA  
Jacques Torczyner, ZOA  
Rabbi Jerome Unger, American Zionist  
Council  
Avery A. Waldman, Jewish War Vets.  
Ossip Walinsky, American Zionist  
Council  
Mrs. Leonard Weiss, B'nai B'rith  
Dr. Samson R. Weiss, Union of  
Orthodox Jewish Congr. of America  
Ben Winitz, American Jewish Congress  
Charles Wolf, ZOA  
Leo Wolfson, Zionist-Revisionists  
United Roumanian Jews  
Harry L. Woll, Labor Zionist Org.  
William Wolpert, Jewish Labor Comm.  
Richard S. Zeisler, American Jewish  
Committee  
Jacob T. Zukerman, Jewish Labor Comm.



NOTE FOR MSG FILES:

RE: NATIONAL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

With regard to the follow-up on the February 15th Conference of National Jewish Organizations on behalf of the United Jewish Appeal, on February 11th responsibility for the follow-up was passed to Mr. Abraham Hyman.

Mr. Hyman is to see to it that the National Jewish Organizations do whatever they can to implement the ten-point program during the UJA campaign this spring.

Mr. Friedman is to call in every President of the National Jewish Organizations, on an individual basis, and urge them to prod their organization constantly particularly while traveling to visit chapters in various parts of the country, to become more involved in the campaigns on behalf of the United Jewish Appeal.

Mr. Hyman is then to follow up on a staff basis and maintain contact with the Executive Directors of the National Jewish Organizations and also the Executive Directors of the communities.

See HAF files.

Campaign 1959 - National  
Jewish Organizations  
Implementation 10-Point  
Program - see Run

MSG:mm

4/13/59



**AN  
URGENT CALL  
TO  
AMERICAN JEWRY  
AMERICAN JEWISH  
ARCHIVES**



**ISSUED BY PARTICIPANTS IN AN  
EMERGENCY CONFERENCE  
OF MAJOR  
NATIONAL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS**

...

**HELD SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1959**

**NEW YORK CITY**



# Declaration

*Herewith is the text of a declaration adopted at an Emergency Conference of Major National Jewish Organizations, Sunday, February 15, 1959, in New York.*

THE MOVEMENT OF JEWS FROM RUMANIA TO ISRAEL is an event of deepest concern to Jews the world over and represents a special challenge to the people of Israel and to the Jews of America. The representatives of 19 major American Jewish organizations are met here today in response to this challenge.

THE COMING OF THESE NEW IMMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL means a reuniting of families, and the re-entry of multitudes of Jews into the stream of Jewish life. They include young and skilled artisans, workers and professionals, constituting a great new infusion of strength into the life of Israel. The pressure of this sudden immigration—which has been estimated at 100,000 in 1959—taxes the resources of Israel. Nevertheless, the people of Israel give every indication of being prepared to continue at great sacrifice to welcome and absorb the newcomers.

THIS UNPRECEDENTED ASSEMBLAGE of 19 Jewish organizations, diversified in functions and views, gives expression to its determination to act in this emergency.

WE CALL UPON OUR RESPECTIVE CONSTITUENCIES and members throughout the country to:

***Give*** every possible assistance to meet this imperative need, including maximum support to the 1959 campaign of the United Jewish Appeal.

***Give*** encouragement and help to every local community in order to raise the vast funds called for in this emergency.

This movement presents an historic challenge to the Jews of America and to the world.

## PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

American Jewish Committee	Labor Zionist Assembly
American Jewish Congress	National Committee for Labor Israel
American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs	National Council of Jewish Women
American Zionist Council	National Council of Young Israel
B'nai B'rith	United Roumanian Jews of America
Hadassah	Union of American Hebrew Congregations
Jewish Agency for Israel	Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
Jewish Labor Committee	United Synagogue of America
Jewish War Veterans of the United States	Zionist Organization of America

Religious Zionist Movement Mizrachi-Hapoel Hamizrachi



EMERGENCY CONFERENCE OF MAJOR NATIONAL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

IN CONJUNCTION WITH

UNITED JEWISH APPEAL

\* \* \*

STATLER HILTON HOTEL, NEW YORK - FEBRUARY 15, 1959

P R O G R A M

MORNING SESSION - 9:30 A.M. TERRACE ROOM

Presiding: Adolph Held

Address Dr. Nahum Goldmann

Address Herbert A. Friedman

DELEGATES LUNCH - 12:15 P.M. GRAND BALLROOM

MEETING OF PRESIDENTS - 12:15 P.M. EMPIRE SUITE

AFTERNOON SESSION - 1:30 P.M. GRAND BALLROOM

Introduction Philip M. Klutznick

Address Her Excellency Golda Meir,  
Foreign Minister, State  
of Israel

Presiding: Rabbi Irving Miller

Report of Credentials Committee Samuel Rothstein

Report on Conference Statement Dr. Joachim Prinz

Remarks Edward M. M. Warburg

Remarks Morris W. Berinstein

Discussion

Introduction Mrs. Rose L. Halprin

Address His Excellency Abba Eban,  
Ambassador of Israel to  
the United States

\* \* \* \* \*



HAF

SUGGESTED TEN POINT PROGRAM OF ACTION  
TO BE ADOPTED AT THE FEBRUARY 15th EMERGENCY MEETING

1. Each organization will advise each of its districts, branches, chapters, lodges and other constituent bodies that it has joined with the other major Jewish organizations in a nation-wide effort in support of the 1959 UJA campaign.
2. Each organization will advise the presidents of its districts, branches, chapters, lodges and other constituent bodies, and its individual members who have a role in forming public opinion, what must be done on a working level within their respective areas of competence to highlight the emergency created by the mass migration of Rumanian Jewry in 1959.
3. Each organization will issue a call to its members to volunteer their services to the local Federations and Welfare Funds in the interest of the 1959 UJA campaign.
4. Each organization will instruct its local constituents to help the local Federations and Welfare Funds in the solicitation of their respective membership to the end that their members may make the maximum contribution to the 1959 UJA campaign.
5. Each organization will undertake to disseminate through its national and local organs of information the nature of the emergency created by the mass migration of Rumania and the importance of giving full support to the 1959 UJA campaign.
6. Each organization will at frequent intervals mail its own material and UJA material related to the 1959 UJA campaign.
7. Each organization will undertake to bring the emergency to the attention of such other organizations as may be helpful in coping with the problem.

8. The organizations agree that wherever feasible their respective local leaders will meet jointly to consult on how best to cooperate with the local Federations and Welfare Funds in achieving the maximum results in the 1959 UJA campaign. The organizations agree to give community-wide publicity to such deliberations.

9. The organizations agree that wherever feasible they will during 1959 join in promoting city-wide meetings in support of, and in conjunction with, the local Federations and Welfare Funds for the purpose of educating public opinion on the emergency created by the mass migration of Rumanian Jewry.

10. The organizations agree that they will form a temporary ad hoc committee, consisting of their respective presidents, which will serve in an advisory capacity to the UJA in connection with the 1959 UJA campaign. This committee will meet from time to time with representatives of the UJA to make suggestions and recommendations as to what might be done to bring the emergency to the attention of American Jewry and, in turn, will disseminate through their own respective organizations suggestions from the UJA as to how they may be helpful in the 1959 UJA campaign. Each organization will, in addition, designate a person on a professional level as a member of a sub-committee to implement the program of the Advisory Committee.

2/12/59



FACT SHEET ON MOVEMENT OF JEWS FROM RUMANIA

Prepared for  
EMERGENCY CONFERENCE OF MAJOR NATIONAL JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

Statler Hilton Hotel - February 15, 1959

\* \* \* \* \*

Before Hitler was expelled from Rumania in 1944, he succeeded in taking toll of about 400,000 of the 850,000 Jews in Rumania. The post-war population was further reduced by the migration of about 100,000 to Palestine in the years immediately following the end of the war and by another 100,000 who left for Israel during 1949 and 1950, when Rumania permitted migration to Israel. Suddenly, in 1951, when the Jewish population of Rumania stood at about one quarter of a million, Rumania put a halt to further Jewish emigration. For all practical purposes, the doors of Rumania remained closed from 1951 until August of last year.

Then, suddenly, Rumania started to issue exit visas to Jews and during the months of September, October and November, Jews left Rumania for Israel at the rate of 1500 a month. In view of this development, estimates were made that about 20,000 Jews would leave Rumania for Israel during 1959. It was believed that during the same period, about 20,000 Jews would come out of other countries. To handle this new mass migration and to reduce the backlog of unmet needs -- particularly the need for permanent housing for the 100,000 who were still living in hovels (maabarot) -- American Jewry undertook to raise \$100,000,000 in a Special UJA Fund, over and above the sum of \$102,000,000 in the Regular Campaign.

No sooner were these estimates made and they had to undergo radical revisions. For in the very month the original calculations were made -- the month of December -- a total of 5,000 Jews from Rumania entered Israel. Moreover, by then 100,000 of the quarter of a million Rumanian Jews had registered for emigration. It then became obvious that what was involved was not a mere trickle of Jews who would enter the immigration "pipe-line" but that a very substantial movement of Jews was in progress.



There is much speculation on why Rumania has suddenly opened its gates to its Jews. The official reason given is that it is based on compassion -- to permit the reunion of families. Whatever the reason or reasons may be, it is apparent that Rumania has reached a top-level policy decision to permit the Jews to leave. The people of Israel welcomed this decision because many of them saw in it the hope of reunion with loved ones. Israel welcomed it on two grounds: one, because it meant that another Jewish community had been given the freedom of movement and two, because, if properly integrated into the bloodstream of the nation, the Jews of Rumania would add strength to the country.

No one can say with absolute certainty that what is, apparently, high policy of the Rumanian government today may not be reversed tomorrow. On the other hand, it is equally probable that the movement out of Rumania may be accelerated. Consequently, estimates on the rate and total immigration from Rumania are subject to revision from month to month.

However, if there is uncertainty about the duration of movement of Jews out of Rumania and on the number of Jews who will be permitted to leave, there is certainty with respect to all other aspects of this movement of Jews. In the main, these facts and considerations are:

1. There is, obviously, a strong desire on the part of the Jews of Rumania to leave, as attested by the fact that knowing all the economic, social and political consequences of registering for migration to Israel, 110,000 have put themselves on record with the Rumanian authorities as wishing to leave for Israel.

2. Under Rumanian law, a person who emigrates from Rumania is permitted to take with him only 88 pounds of baggage if he is a non-worker and 154 pounds if he is a worker. In either case, his baggage is limited to personal clothing. This means that the Rumanian Jews coming to Israel are, upon arrival, in need of every type of economic and social assistance and will remain in such need until they become self-sufficient.



3. The Jews coming from Rumania represent a high level of culture. While most of them come from Bucharest, where one-half of the Jewish population is concentrated, many come from smaller communities in which they acquired some familiarity with agriculture. There is reason to believe that many of these newcomers will be settled on the land.

4. On other hand, the immigration is non-selective: the aged, the sick and the handicapped are admitted on the par with the young and the able-bodied. Israel will not, under any circumstances, depart from this immigration policy and it is believed that despite the budgetary implications of this policy, the Jews of the world would not want Israel to pursue a less humane policy.

5. The average cost of providing for a single immigrant from the point where he is picked up in Vienna to the point where he applies for work in Israel is \$1,600. This includes his transportation from Vienna to Israel, his maintenance while he is getting settled, minimum housing (420 square feet for a family of 4), etc. For an immigration of the expected 100,000 Jews in 1959, the minimum cost is \$160,000,000.

6. The people of Israel are making every sacrifice to admit the newcomers into Israel. Aside from the fact that they pay a rate of taxes incomparably higher than Jews do in the United States -- due, in a large measure, to the burden they bear in the absorption of the newcomers -- they have recently undertaken to raise IL 20 million through a voluntary loan. More such loans and even higher taxes are in the offing to meet the immigration emergency.

7. The absorption of the newcomers in Israel is no less the responsibility of the Jews of America than it is the responsibility of the Jews of Israel.

8. Irrespective of what the Jews outside of Israel do by way of raising the funds to finance the migration from Rumania, Israel, faithful to its unbroken

ten year old pledge, will admit these people. It is unthinkable that Israel would do otherwise.

9. Israel, faced with a continuing security problem, being unable to do more than it has already done to absorb the new immigrants, and the Jewish Agency, already operating under crushing debts contracted in connection with absorption of previous waves of migration, only two ways exist of financing the new migration from Rumania:

ONE:

For the Jews of America -- the Jews in the best position to do so -- to make an all-out effort to raise the funds required to meet this emergency.

TWO:

For the Jews of Rumania entering Israel to pay for this migration by suffering from the lack of housing, lack of food, lack of medical supplies and services, lack of schools -- in short, by accepting a cruel fate for themselves and their children.

10. It is for the Jews of America to make the choice between these two alternatives.

\* \* \* \* \*



FROM: Raphael Levy  
Director of Publicity  
UNITED JEWISH APPEAL  
165 West 46th Street  
New York 36, N. Y.

Copy Feb 15  
UJA

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NATIONWIDE LABOR ZIONIST MOVEMENT MOBILIZES FOR 1959 UNITED  
JEWISH APPEAL DRIVE AND SPECIAL FUND DRIVE FOR IMMIGRATION

-----

National Labor Zionist Leaders Call For A Minimum Gifts  
Of Week's Salary From Members to Special Fund, Over and  
Above Regular Campaign Contributions

NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 15 --- National leaders of the three major Labor Zionist organizations today called upon their 80,000 members throughout the country to give extraordinary support to the 1959 United Jewish Appeal campaign and to the UJA Special Fund for immigration aid.

Leaders of the LZOA, Farband, Pioneer Women and the youth group HABONIM called upon every member to make an additional contribution of at least one week's income to the UJA Special Fund, over and above regular contributions for 1959 to their regular community campaigns.

The decision to make this call was reached after a number of meetings held by national Labor Zionist leaders with Avraham Harman, of the Jewish Agency Executive, in which Mr. Harman detailed the enormous difficulties which Israel's people are encountering in dealing with the huge and sudden influx of Jews from Eastern Europe.

In a joint call the presidents of the LZOA, Farband and the Pioneer Women stated: "It is the moral obligation of every member of the Labor Zionist movement to make an over-and-above contribution to the UJA Special Fund this year. Labor Zionists must be in the vanguard in devoting all their energies and in making sacrifices to help Israel's people cope with the gigantic task of absorbing 100,000 new immigrants this year.



"Labor Zionists must take the lead in support of the UJA in order to inspire and influence other sections of the American Jewish community to follow their example."

The Labor Zionist Movement was the first to proclaim the principle of a one-week's income contribution to the UJA Emergency Rescue Fund of 1956, during the Sinai crisis. That year tens of thousands of Labor Zionists made additional contributions of from one to four weeks' income. Women who were not gainfully employed contributed the equivalent of a week's household expense and youngsters a week's allowance for from three to four weeks.

To help mobilize the Labor Zionist effort for 1959 a number of regional and community conferences of the Labor Zionist movement will be held throughout the country. These campaign efforts on behalf of UJA are being conducted under the auspices of the National Labor Council of the UJA.

Joining in the call for UJA Special Fund support were the presidents and officers of the three major organizations: Pinchas Cruso, President, Rabbi Samuel Wohl, Vice-president and Jacob Katzman, Executive Secretary of the Labor Zionist Organization of America; Meyer L. Brown, President, S. Bonchek, Vice-president and L. Segal, General Secretary, of the Farband Labor Zionist Order; and Chaya Surchin, President, Clara Leff, Vice-president and Sara Bershad, UJA Chairman of the Pioneer Women's Organization.

Zev Baumgold is Secretary Director of the National Labor Council of the United Jewish Appeal.

Funds raised by the United Jewish Appeal finance the life-saving programs of three agencies. They are the United Israel Appeal, which supports the work of the Jewish Agency in transporting immigrants to Israel and absorbing them into that nation's economy; the Joint Distribution Committee, which serves aged, ill and handicapped newcomers in Israel, and also aids Jews in need in 24 other countries, and the New York Association for New Americans, which provides settlement-and-adjustment aid to new arrivals reaching the New York metropolitan area. The United Hias Service, which is concerned with immigrants to countries other than Israel, will also share in the proceeds of the Special Fund.





February 20, 1959

Dear Friend:


I am sure you have heard of the unprecedented conference of 19 major national Jewish organizations held in New York on February 15th. The representative character of this meeting and the enthusiastic response which it provoked are, in our judgment, ample proof of the great impact the Rumanian migration has had upon the American Jewish leadership and that this leadership has recognized that this migration represents a challenge which must be met and an opportunity which must be seized.

To supplement the information you already received from the CJFWE on this conference, I shall in a few days, send you the highlights of the major addresses made at the conference, as well as the statements made by the presidents of the organizations, committing their organizations to support the 1959 UJA campaign. We know that these commitments will be a source of great encouragement to you. In the meantime, I am enclosing a copy of the declaration unanimously adopted at this conference. Copies of this declaration were sent by the heads of the organizations to their local leaders, including the leaders in your city.

We regard as the most important outgrowth of the conference the formation of the ad hoc committee, consisting of the presidents of nearly all the organizations which participated in the conference. The member organizations of the ad hoc committee, which embrace a substantial part of American Jewry, seem determined to involve their local leadership and members in the current campaign. In line with this determination they are advising their respective leaders to confer with one another and to make plans on how they can best assist in the 1959 campaign. It goes without saying that we expect the local leaders of the organizations in your city to tender this assistance to you and to cooperate with you in every way possible.

We trust that the initiative shown by the organizations will result in increased giving on the part of the greatest number of people and in providing a large corps of workers, to the end that the greatest coverage can be secured in your city.

Sincerely,



Abraham S. Hyman  
Assistant Executive Vice-Chairman



MEMORANDUM

February 24, 1959

*msa*  
*Felph*

TO: National Field Representatives  
FROM: Sholem Sontup  
SUBJECT: Emergency Conference of Major National Jewish Organizations ,  
February 15, 1959

The attached letter from Abraham S. Hyman, with accompanying Declaration adopted at the conference, has been sent to executive directors of welfare funds and is being sent to you for your information.

SS:JB  
Encs.



3/9/59 *scf/eb*

SUBJECT: Report on the Emergency Conference of the Major National Jewish Organizations in conjunction with the UJA held in New York on February 15th, and on the implementation of the resolutions adopted at this Conference.

The Conference was held in New York City, on February 15th. The following organizations participated:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| American Jewish Committee                            | Labor Zionist Assembly                            |
| American Jewish Congress                             | National Committee for Labor Israel               |
| American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs        | National Council of Jewish Women                  |
| American Zionist Council                             | National Council of Young Israel                  |
| B'nai B'rith   | United Roumanian Jews of America                  |
| Hadassah   | Union of American Hebrew Congregations            |
| Jewish Agency for Israel                             | Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America |
| Jewish Labor Committee                               | United Synagogue of America                       |
| Jewish War Veterans of the United States             | Zionist Organization of America                   |
| Religious Zionist Movement Mizrahi-Hapoel Hamizrachi |   |

The nucleus of the Conference were the organizations comprising the Presidents Committee, which has been in existence for several years. In addition, other organizations with a specific interest in the Rumanian migration, and the American Jewish Committee which is not a member of the Presidents Committee, were invited. All the invited organizations participated.

The Conference was organized at a relatively short notice -- in less than three weeks. Yet, because of the unprecedented nature of the Conference and because of intensive promotion on the part of the organizations/and the UJA, approximately 450 delegates of the 19 organizations came from 45 cities in 25 states.

Dr. Goldmann spoke on the significance of the Rumanian migration. I addressed the Conference on the situation as I found it in Rumania, Golda Meir spoke of the problems with the new migration created in Israel and the need for the American Jewish community to equal the effort of 1948, and Ambassador Eban concluded the Conference with general observations.

Following Mrs. Meir's address a resolution on which the Presidents of the constituent organizations had previously agreed was presented to the Conference



calling upon the constituent organizations to give maximum assistance to the 1959 UJA. Ed Warburg briefly discussed the significance of the collective effort of the organizations and in response to his request the delegates unanimously adopted the statement as "Call" to American Jewry. At this point Morris Bernstein got up and it very clear that what was needed most to make the Campaign a successful one was the complete coverage of the Jews in every community in the country, which coverage could be achieved only with the help and cooperation of the participating organizations. In this connection he said: "This Campaign must become the Campaign of all American Jewry, and not that of the leading American Jews - 100, or 200 or 300 richest families." He then stated that it had been suggested that the solidarity reflected at the Conference be continued beyond the Conference and that he welcomed the idea proposed by some of the representatives of the organizations Ad Hoc Committee consisting of the representatives of the organizations be formed to be in consultation with the UJA on how the organizations can best be of help in the 1959 Campaign.

Morris' remarks were followed by brief statements on the part of every president or representatives of every organization who, with the exception of the president of the American Jewish Committee, stated they would participate in the suggested Ad Hoc Committee.

Following the Conference, which adjourned late in the afternoon, the Ad Hoc Committee convened and made plans for the concrete program of action in the communities.

A Technical Committee on which the UJA was represented was appointed by Phil Klutznick, who was elected temporary chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, to work up a program of implementation which would in turn be recommended to constituent organizations. The Technical Committee recommended to the member organizations that the initial effort made to get community-wide leadership meetings organized in the 25 top communities. To that end the organizations were requested to designate their respective representatives in each of the 25 top communities, which they did, who would be held responsible for joining in a



collective effort in support of the UJA campaign in those communities.

The Ad Hoc Committee met on February 25 with Golda Meir participating, approved of the program of action proposed by the Technical Committee and converted itself into the Conference of Presidents for the 1959 UJA. Phil Klutznick was elected Chairman of this Conference.

From all the discussions of the Technical Staff as well as the Ad Hoc Committee it developed that the constituent members of the Conference would exert pressure upon their local representatives to offer assistance to the local Federations and that the UJA would call upon the Executive Directors to convene the organization representatives with the view of securing collective effort in support of local campaigns.

As a result of the efforts of the Conference of Presidents of the UJA, community-wide meetings of the representatives of the member organizations were scheduled in the following communities:

Pittsburgh	March 8
Boston	" 9
Milwaukee	" 16
St. Louis	" 18
Chicago	" 22
Atlanta	" 26

Two communities, Miami and Houston, were dropped from the 25 communities because their campaigns are practically over. The UJA office spoke to the Executive Directors in the remaining 25 top communities and received assurances from most of them that they would take the initiative in organizing the local leadership meetings.

It is important to <sup>note</sup> know that although the Executive Director may take the initiative in organizing the local conferences, these conferences will take the form of organizational conferences in which organizations have their spokesman and undertake to mobilize support for the 1959 UJA campaign in the communities.

*fr 1959*

*Pittsburgh*



This is what happened in Pittsburgh where the conference of representatives of the organizations took place yesterday.

Bob Hiller, the Executive Director reports that 65 people representing all the member organizations participated in this meeting and that as a result the organizational representatives agreed to bring the story of the Rumanian migration back to their respective organizations and to provide the local campaign with manpower to do a complete coverage of the Jewish community of Pittsburgh. To see that this program is implemented the local representatives of the local organizations constituted themselves as an Ad Hoc Committee to follow up on the decisions reached at the leadership conference. Bob Hiller further reported that he considers the instrument created at the Pittsburgh Conference as one which has great promise for his community. ✓

At a meeting of the Executive Directors of the member organizations of the Presidents Conference ~~just completed~~ held today it was agreed to concentrate on the remaining top 23 communities to see that meetings are organized in them and to do as much as possible to get similar meetings stimulated in the lesser 170 organized communities in the country.

The whole effort is directed to reach the middle bracket and small groups.



Fellible  
AST

July 28, 1959

Mr. Herbert A. Friedman

Abraham S. Hyman

Report on program of Conference of Presidents for the 1959 UJA

This report will include the following items:

- I. Activities of the UJA in connection with the Conference program
- II. Activities of the member organizations of the Conference in support of the Conference program
- III. Cost of the program to UJA
- IV. Evaluation of the Conference program
- V. Recommendations

I. Activities of the UJA in connection with the Conference program

The program was launched with the convening of an all-day Emergency Conference in New York City on February 15, 1959. The UJA secured from the participating organizations the names of their community representatives and extended invitations to these people. It followed up on these invitations with another mailing and made all the arrangements for the Conference, except for the Conference program itself, which was arranged in consultation with Dr. Judd Teller, representing the Conference.

The organizations, on their part, made independent efforts to secure attendance of their representatives.

The Conference was attended by 361 representatives of the 19 organizations. Approximately 130 people who indicated that they would attend did not show up. As indicated in the attached chart (Exhibit A), these representatives came from 17 states and Washington, D. C. Altogether 72 cities were represented, 46 of which were represented by one person. Of the 361 representatives, a total of 225 or 62% came from New York City. In the order of greatest number of representatives, the organizations represented by at least 10 representatives rank as follows:



Jewish War Veterans	59
B'nai B'rith	47
American Zionist Council	35
Labor Zionists	32
Zionist Organization of America	29
Hadassah	26
Religious Zionists	25
American Jewish Congress	21
Jewish Labor Committee	20
American Jewish Committee	12
Union of American Hebrew Congregations	11

The Conference served a two-fold purpose: one, it provided a platform to get the Rumanian story told to the people who attended, and two, from the Conference there emerged the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference of Presidents for the 1959 UJA. On February 25th, this Ad Hoc Committee was replaced by a committee known as the Conference of Presidents for the 1959 UJA. With the exception of the American Jewish Committee, all the organizations represented at the emergency meeting joined this Conference.

In planning the follow up on the Emergency Conference, the UJA and the Conference representatives agreed, at the outset, that the main effort would be exerted in the 23 top communities in the country. It was decided that an effort would be made to organize city-wide meetings in these communities along the pattern of the National Emergency Conference in New York with the double objective of mobilizing workers for soliciting middle and lower bracket givers and of employing the local organizations to stimulate better giving on the part of the members.

In the implementation of this general plan, it was agreed that the UJA would urge the Welfare Fund Executive Directors in the top 23 communities to convene the meetings and that the member organizations of the Presidents' Conference would urge their respective representatives in the communities to approach the local Executive Directors with the view of getting them to convene the meetings in question.

Pursuant to the foregoing plan, the UJA took the following steps:

1. On February 20th, advised the Executive Directors in the 23 top communities of the action taken by the Emergency Conference, namely, the adoption of the resolution and the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee, (Exhibit B).
2. On March 3rd, mailed these Executive Directors a resume of the proceedings of the Emergency Conference, called their attention to the statements made by the national presidents committing their organizations to support the UJA during the 1959 campaign, forwarded to them a list of the communal representatives of the organizations, and urged them to convene this group of local leaders and to involve them in the campaign (Exhibit C). In each case, the list of the local representatives was provided by the national organizations at the request of Dr. Judd Teller, representing the Conference.



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3. On March 13th, advised these Executive Directors what, in detail, had to be done at the local meetings which would be convened, based on the experience in Boston, in which the UJA helped organize a city-wide meeting on March 9th, which was intended as a pilot project (Exhibit D).

4. On March 16th, notified the members of the Campaign Cabinet of the meetings scheduled to be held in the key communities and urged them to accept invitations to attend these meetings and to help implement the Conference program in their respective communities (Exhibit E).

It soon became apparent to the UJA that nothing would happen in the communities if the matter would be left at the UJA writing the Executive Directors and the organizations writing their local representatives. Had the local representatives of the organizations volunteered their help, the Executive Directors would, in the main, have welcomed it. But, inasmuch as such offer of help did not materialize, they concluded that this was another instance where the adoption of a resolution and the transmission of directives are the end result of a conference.

Having concluded that the initiative for pressure upon the Executive Directors would not come from the designated representatives, the UJA called the Executive Directors in each of the 23 top communities and secured commitments from the Executive Directors in the following communities that they would hold meetings:

Boston  
Washington  
St. Louis  
Cleveland  
Minneapolis  
Detroit  
Chicago  
Hartford  
Milwaukee  
Atlanta  
Buffalo  
Columbus  
Baltimore  
Denver

The UJA had engaged a man to work especially on this program in the communities and offered to make this man available to the communities to help in the requisite planning for the meetings. Only Boston, Chicago and Atlanta eventually took advantage of this offer. Chicago was assisted, in addition, by a man from B'nai B'rith who spent a week there in advance of the community-wide meeting, and Atlanta also had the services of a full time man made available by B'nai B'rith.

Primarily as a result of the effort of the UJA city-wide meetings were held in Boston (March 9th), Chicago (March 22nd), and Atlanta (June 5th), and smaller special meetings were held in Detroit and Baltimore. For various reasons meetings failed to materialize in the other communities which had promised to hold such meetings.



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Having exhausted the possibilities of what by common consent it was agreed, could be done in the 23 top communities, it was subsequently agreed between the UJA and the Conference representatives that an attempt should be made to reach the representatives in the remainder of the organized Jewish communities in the country which have spring campaigns. It was agreed that the method of reaching these people would be through the device of a telephone hookup on April 9th. As in the case of the previous effort, it was agreed that the UJA would try to "sell" the hookup to the Welfare Fund Executive Directors and that the national organizations would urge their local representatives to approach the Executive Directors and urge them to arrange for meetings of the local representatives which would be reached by the hookup.

Pursuant to the foregoing plan, the UJA sent wires (over the signature of the Conference Chairman and Herbert A. Friedman) to the Executive Directors in all the organized Jewish communities conducting a spring campaign (Exhibit F) and followed this up by a letter (Exhibit G) which emphasized the significance of this unprecedented hookup. When the deadline for participation in the hookup approached, and only 25 communities had responded in the affirmative, it was realized that, in the absence of a concerted effort on the part of the UJA and the Conference, the number of communities which would volunteer to come in on the hookup would be so small as to call into question the usefulness of the entire project. The UJA, therefore, called all the Executive Directors who had not responded to the invitation and succeeded in persuading 26 additional communities to participate. The Conference was given the responsibility of urging their local representatives to get in touch with the Executive Directors in those communities which had indicated that they did not wish to participate in the hookup.

In the course of this effort, the UJA ascertained that in virtually no instance in the case of the 26 communities which the UJA had persuaded to participate in the hookup were the Executive Directors approached by any of the local representatives of the national organizations (despite specific requests from the National Organizations to do so). Moreover, in no instance where a community had initially indicated its unwillingness to participate in the hookup was the decision reversed. There is reason to believe that the reason for this is that the local representatives failed to register with the Executive Directors their interest in having the hookup meetings convened.

A total of 51 cities participated in the hookup (Exhibit H). Reports on this hookup ranged from one extreme to the other. All in all, one cannot say that this hookup achieved its objectives.

After the hookup, the UJA offered the taped recording of the hookup to the Executive Directors of the communities which did not participate in the hookup (Exhibit I). A total of about 25 communities asked for the tape.



## II. Activities of the member organizations of the Conference in support of the Conference program

The member organizations of the Conference took the following steps in the implementation of the plans agreed upon by the UJA and the Conference:

- a. Cooperated in securing the best representation at the Emergency Conference of February 13h;
- b. Supplied the UJA with the names of their respective leaders in the organized Jewish communities;
- c. Circularized their local leaders in all the organized communities in the country as often as it was mutually agreed upon between the UJA and the Executive Directors of the National Organizations, urging them to convene city-wide meetings in cooperation with the local representatives of the other organizations, to participate in steering committee meetings, to utilize meetings of their own chapters, lodges, etc. to impress upon the membership the importance of full participation in the local UJA campaign, and to provide manpower for solicitation in the local campaign;
- d. Publicized the 1959 UJA in their national and local organs and the urgency of giving full support to this campaign;
22. e. Gave solid support to the UJA in its negotiations with New Haven over the allocation of the proceeds of the 1959 campaign;
- f. Conferred with the UJA on steps to be taken to further the program, as often as the UJA requested meetings with the national Executive Directors of the member organizations.

## III. Cost of the program to the UJA

The total cost of the Conference program to the UJA is approximately \$24,000, consisting of the following items:

Emergency Conference	\$5,365.15
Payroll (Yehuda Hellman and secretary)	6,787.50
Printing	2,580.27
Mail service and postage	844.82
Meeting expenses (Atlanta, Washington)	1,077.00
Travel (Yehuda Hellman, George Wolk, Arnold Ellison)	3,204.86
Telephone hookup	1,372.46
Miscellaneous	485.15
Telephone bills (estimated)	2,282.79
	<u>\$24,000.00</u>

The above figure is exclusive of the pro-rata share of the salaries of Mr. Hyman and his secretary, Miss Bialer who from about the 1st of February to the middle of April devoted most of their time to the Conference program.



#### IV. Evaluation of Conference program

##### A. Evaluation by selected Executive Directors and campaign leaders.

Before presenting my own evaluation of the program, I want to submit the reactions of a number of Executive Directors and other campaign leaders whose opinions I canvassed.

##### Al Hutler, Campaign Director, Chicago

Chicago had one of the best organized and most representative city-wide meetings along the pattern of the February 15th Emergency Conference. It was planned to have an Organization day during June of this year, during which the men recruited from the organizations would saturate the city in a one-day solicitation drive. According to Mr. Hutler, the organizations offered their cooperation in this project (Note: The UJA offered to send in Hellman to work on this project as long as his services were required) but the Combined Jewish Appeal concluded that there was not enough time to do the mechanical and administrative work required to launch the project properly. Consequently, the project was dropped for this year but a firm decision has been reached to have an Organization Day in June, 1960.

Mr. Hutler reports that so far as he could ascertain, the efforts of the Conference of Presidents has not resulted in an increase in the number of gifts. He feels, however, that if the Organization Day could have been held this year it would have shown positive results. Furthermore, in appraising the Conference program, Mr. Hutler says that the CJA enjoyed this year better relationship with the organizational leadership than it has anytime during the past ten years, an improvement which he ascribes to the Conference program. He also claims that the publicity which the Conference program stimulated among the membership was very valuable and was beyond the means of the CJA to purchase. Mr. Hutler obviously has a great deal of faith in the potential of the Conference program.

##### Harry Greenstein, Baltimore

Mr. Greenstein was persuaded to have a meeting of the presidents and Boards of Directors of all the local branches of the national organizations participating in the Conference. The meeting itself was a successful one, due principally to the perseverance of Mr. Greenstein in getting maximum attendance. In Mr. Greenstein's opinion the Conference program was "of no help whatsoever" in the Baltimore campaign. Mr. Greenstein assigns two reasons for this failure. First, the Conference effort, such as it was, came much too late to be of help. Second, the local representatives of the national organizations showed no interest whatsoever in following up on the decisions reached at the meeting which Mr. Greenstein convened. Mr. Greenstein is convinced that this breakdown was due principally to the fact that the national leaders of the organizations did not make it sufficiently clear to the local representatives that the support of the UJA was considered crucial in the program of the national organizations.



Mr. Greenstein feels that the adoption of resolutions by the national organizations and the mailing of letters by the presidents of the national organizations to the heads of the local organizations are of little or no value. In his judgment, unless the national presidents personally follow up on these resolutions and letters with personal calls in which the national presidents would tell the local leaders in no unmistakable terms that they regard the support of the UJA important and that they expect the local leaders to communicate this decision to the local membership, and to take positive steps to involve the membership in the campaign, the whole effort will be of little value. On the other hand, Mr. Greenstein believes that if the Conference program got under way at the beginning instead of in the middle of the campaign, and if there were personal follow ups on the part of the national leaders with the local leaders, the Conference program might be of help in the campaign.

Sidney Cohen, Boston

Boston was the first community which held a city-wide conference along the pattern of the National Emergency Conference of February 15th. This was followed up by a mailing among 26,000 members of the local organizations which participated in the local conference, asking them to volunteer for solicitation work in the campaign. Of the 26,000 a total of 50 persons responded in the affirmative and of these people all but about 10 had already been recruited for work in the campaign. Mr. Cohen says that, in the main, the local organizations are undisciplined and directives from the national organizations have no impact upon them. But, despite the disappointing experience, Mr. Cohen feels that the idea behind the Conference program has merit. He feels that if the effort of the Conference started during the time when the campaign calendar was being fixed, it would stand a better chance of success.

Mike Brisman, Washington, D. C.

Principally due to the initiative and drive of Mr. Maurice Bisgyer of the B'nai B'rith, a large city-wide conference was held in Washington along the line of the Emergency Conference in New York. About 400 people attended this Conference, representing every organization represented in the Conference. The UJA provided the services of a field representative for about 3 weeks to help organize the Conference and a member of the publicity staff for about a week to handle the public relations aspect of the Conference.

Mr. Brisman has mixed feelings about the value of the Conference program, as seen from the vantage point of Washington, D. C. In the first place, even before the Conference came upon the scene, Washington had used the local organizations in the field of general solicitation and had succeeded in recruiting a total of about 400 to 500 workers from the organizations. In the second place, despite the intensive effort made in connection with the city-wide meeting, it yielded only about 50 new workers to the roster of solicitors and Mr. Brisman could not tell whether these workers had, in fact, succeeded in tapping resources that had not previously been reached. In the third place, it took a great deal of time and effort to organize the city-wide meeting and Mr. Brisman himself feels that this time could have been spent more profitably in other channels so far as concrete results are concerned.



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Mr. Brissman, at the same time, makes the point that the fact that the meeting was planned and that all the local organizations were involved meant that for about 1½ months during which the meeting was in the planning stage the story of the UJA was being told at local meetings of the organizations in a degree unequalled before and that this, in turn, was felt in the general community, with the result that in the lower echelons some people gave who never gave before. Mr. Brissman ascribes this gain to the intensification of interest in the campaign, inspired by the tumult in connection with the city-wide meeting. At the same time, Brissman feels that the benefits accruing from the city-wide meeting would only come as a result of a Conference in which a great amount of time has to be spent and that if, in the light of hindsight, he would have to make the decision now whether to invest the time required to organize the meeting, he would answer the question in the negative -- on the ground that this time could have been spent more profitably in other directions.

Leo Bernstein, Assistant Director, UJA of Greater New York

The objective of the UJA of Greater New York was to induce the local organizations to help secure a turnout for the affair at Madison Square Garden in honor of Abba Eban on May 14th, and in providing workers for the person-to-person telephone campaign that was to follow the Garden event. The UJA provided the UJA of Greater New York with the full time of services of a field representative for one month to help in this effort. Mr. Bernstein reports that the organizations did a first-rate job in getting a turnout for the Garden affair but produced virtually nothing in the way of mobilizing workers for the campaign.

Ed Kahn, Atlanta

A great deal of pressure was exerted upon Mr. Kahn to hold a city-wide conference of representatives of local organizations in Atlanta and to invite representatives from other communities in Georgia. Mr. Kahn claims that the Conference was a fiasco, that the people who attended the conference -- only 75 in all -- did not attend it because of any loyalty to any organization, but because of an interest in the 1959 campaign. He maintains that what the Conference of Presidents is trying to do -- to bring all the organizations together to work in the interest of the UJA -- is unrealistic for several reasons. In the first place, it is "naive" to believe that directives from national presidents mean anything to the leaders of the local organization. What is important is the relationship between the local leaders of the respective organizations and in many instances this relationship is very poor. Moreover, the national organizations are themselves interested in the "philanthropic dollar" and impose quotas upon their local organizations to meet, and that, therefore, the local organizations will not put out any real effort in behalf of a competing cause.

All in all, in Mr. Kahn's opinion, the Conference program in 1959 had no impact whatsoever on the campaign in Atlanta. He thinks that the UJA is making a serious mistake in turning over the conduct of part of its affairs to a combination of organizations which have their own "axes to grind" and their own interests to pursue, part of which -- fund-raising -- is, in fact, competitive with the UJA. He feels that the UJA should return to the device of the regional meetings they once sponsored, over which they would exercise control and whose objective would be clear.



Ralph Segalman, Waterbury, Conn.

I canvassed the opinion of Mr. Segalman because of a report we received following the telephone hookup that inspired by the messages the local B'nai B'rith leadership heard on this hookup, they undertook to handle the general solicitation in the city. Inasmuch as this was an unprecedented offer of help, Mr. Segalman welcomed it and offered every possible encouragement to the B'nai B'rith leadership to go through with their plans. Mr. Segalman reports that his experience with this effort was very disappointing. Because of inertia on the part of the B'nai B'rith local leaders, the meeting of the workers was postponed from one date to another and was finally held on May 27th representing a delay of one month for that effort, as called for by Mr. Segalman's campaign schedule. To make this a completely B'nai B'rith affair, Mr. Segalman requested a B'nai B'rith leader as the speaker for the breakfast meeting which the UJA helped secure.

Mr. Segalman insisted that at the meeting cards be called on the unassailable premise that workers are effective only after they, themselves, have made a decent gift. This recommendation was rejected by the B'nai B'rith leaders, and the meeting was convened upon the promise that no cards would be called. Of the 40 B'nai B'rith leaders who were invited 20 attended. About a dozen non-B'nai B'rith members also were present. The cards were distributed among these workers. As of July 15th, only 50% of the cards have been turned in with pledges. Generally, this solicitation, which yields about \$8,000, is completed by July 1st. Mr. Segalman realizes that he has to play along with this effort until September 1st. Whatever cards are not in by then will have to be recalled and handled as before. Mr. Segalman claims that the only result of the effort thus far is that several of the B'nai B'rith officers, well able to give, who had previously given a pittance to the campaign came forth with "magnanimous" gifts of several hundred dollars each. All in all, Mr. Segalman is not complimentary to this effort.

Oscar Littlefield, Sioux City, Iowa

I called Mr. Littlefield because of the report we received that the local JWV chapter had been induced by the JWV leaders in the course of an address, to take over the general solicitation in the community. Mr. Littlefield reports that while dollar-wise the effort lead to only a "trivial" increase, it did bring about the greatest house-to-house coverage in the history of the community. Moreover, the spectacle of the JWV undertaking gave a real impetus to the rank and file solicitation. Mr. Littlefield estimates that about 50 new items were added to the list of contributors as a result of this effort. While praising this effort, Mr. Littlefield claims that it was due not so much to the work of the JWV as to the drive of Mr. David Alpert, Campaign Chairman, who injected himself into every phase of the campaign and made sure that each undertaking produced results.

Nel Zaret, Milwaukee, Wisc.

Mr. Zaret had promised to convene a meeting along the lines of the Emergency Conference in New York, but finally decided against it on the ground that he had concluded that a man's usefulness in a campaign had nothing to do with his affiliation or non-affiliation with any specific organization, but is determined by his interest in the problem, his willingness to become involved, his standing in the community and his general effectiveness.



Julius Bisno, Los Angeles, Calif.

Mr. Bisno refused to convene a special meeting of the representatives of the local organizations, giving as his reason the fact that in Los Angeles the organizations were integrated in the campaign without any prompting on the part of the Conference of Presidents. Mr. Bisno claims that the Conference program had no impact on the local campaign. He thought that with all of the publicity put out by the national organizations there would be an increase in the number of contributors. This did not materialize. Those who were indifferent to the appeal in the past were not converted into contributors in 1959. The increase in this year's campaign over last year is due not to the addition of new givers but to increased giving on the part of those who had given in previous years.

Milton Feinberg, Trenton, N.J.

I called Mr. Feinberg because Trenton is an organized community in which the UJA made no particular effort other than to persuade Mr. Feinberg to participate in the telephone hookup. Mr. Feinberg succeeded in getting the presidents of 12 of the local organizations of the national organizations represented in the Conference of Presidents to attend the hookup and to plan for the organizational participation in the campaign. Mr. Feinberg reports that this effort had no impact on the campaign whatsoever. According to him, the difficulties are several: (1) the leadership of some of the local organizations is very weak, (2) the leaders refuse to make any substantial contributions and therefore can have no influence with their membership so far as the UJA is concerned, and (3) in a community of the size of Trenton the problem is not so much the matter of coverage but good giving which is not achieved by working through organizations headed up by people who are ineffective as leaders and do not give pace-setting gifts themselves. Nevertheless, Mr. Feinberg feels that the effort of the Conference is worthwhile because whenever a group of people assemble in the interest of the UJA, it is bound to have some beneficial effect.

Oscar Mintzer, Indianapolis, Ind.

I called Mr. Mintzer for his evaluation because he represents a community in which coverage is a problem and one in which he took the initiative immediately following the Emergency Conference of February 15th, to convene a meeting of the representatives of the organizations with the view of getting more workers and raising the level of giving. Mr. Mintzer claims that the program produced nothing tangible either in terms of workers or increased giving. According to him, there are enough workers in the general solicitations division (under \$100). The difficulty in Indianapolis lies in the categories of (a) the \$100 to \$300 givers and (b) in the \$300 and over contributors. Workers in the latter categories are not secured through mass organizational effort.

While having many reservations about the tangible results that the effort of the Conference can produce, Mr. Mintzer feels that the effort is worthwhile in that it cannot help but improve the campaign climate in the community.



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Mrs. Joseph Nelson, Englewood, N.J.

Englewood is not an organized community. The UJA persuaded Mrs. Nelson, a very active leader (along with her husband) in the campaign, to participate in the hookup and to make her home available for this purpose. I called Mrs. Nelson for her evaluation because this evaluation would, I thought, indicate what impact the Conference program had on a community where the sole medium and influence of the Conference program was the literature the local organizational leaders and members received from the national organizations. Mrs. Nelson states that from the standpoint of giving and of active participation in the campaign, the Conference program had no impact whatsoever. However, she cites two positive things that happened in the community, both of which she ascribes to the support given to the UJA by the national organizations: one, the local Hadassah, which had an important meeting scheduled the day of the telephone hookup, yielded the date to the UJA group so that the local leaders could participate in the hookup and two, at a meeting of the Council of Jewish Women, the local president took the floor to convey to the members the importance that the national organizations attaches to the UJA. This was the first time that this group had ever identified itself with the UJA.

Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds

On June 7, 1959 at a joint meeting of the Council's Advisory Committee on Campaign and Publicity Services (in which the Executive Directors of the Federations and Welfare Funds of the leading communities participated) the effect of the Conference program was discussed. The following is an extract from the minutes of this meeting: "...the consensus was that it (the Conference effort) had not achieved sufficient impact, in terms of additional money and workers. One probable reason for this was the fact that the effort had started too late to be truly effective; it was agreed that a much earlier start should be made next year. It was agreed that specific information should be sought from communities on their experience this year, and suggestions to strengthen the operation should be developed."

Pursuant to the decision taken at this meeting, the Council canvassed the opinion of all the Executive Directors for their views on the Conference program. I was advised by Mr. Lou Stein, in charge of this project, that the results of this survey would be available the latter part of August or the first part of September.

B. Personal evaluation

To be fruitful, the evaluation of the Conference program must be made in the light of the objectives of the program. These objectives were two-fold: one, to induce better giving on the part of the middle and lower bracket contributors and two, to mobilize additional manpower in support of the campaign, with the view of achieving better coverage among the potential middle bracket and lower givers.

There is not the slightest doubt that the program failed in achieving these two ultimate objectives. With the single exception of Mr. Littlefield in Sioux City, who reports greater coverage (while at the same time making the point that the monetary value of this greater coverage was "trivial"), not one of the Executive Directors canvassed by me stated that the Conference program achieved either of its objectives. Even in the one city -- Boston -- where the maximum effort was



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made to involve the organizations in the campaign (by a well-planned and well-organized city-wide Conference, by mail follow-up among the total membership of the organizations, by a special effort for the recruitment of workers from the organizations), the Conference program had no perceptible impact upon the campaign.

There are a number of explanations for the non-realization of the goals set by the Conference.

Perhaps the best single explanation is the one pointed out by Ed Kahn of Atlanta; the fact that local leaders do not, as a general rule, leap to their feet to carry out directives from their national organizations.

This was apparent in every phase of the Conference program. The national organizations certainly made an effort to get good representation at the Emergency Conference. Yet, the Conference was anything but representative. No less than 62% of the people who attended the Conference came from New York and the overwhelming percentage of the balance came from cities on or near the Atlantic seaboard. In other words, all but a handful of people ignored the request of the national organizations that they attend this Conference. Again, in the New Haven crisis, local organizations presented a solid balanz in ignoring the directives of their national organizations to support the position of the UJA. Moreover, neither in the effort to organize local meetings nor in the telephone hookup did the local leaders show any disposition to follow the directives of the national organizations by manifesting to the local Executive Directors their interest in doing something.

Virtually everything done in the communities related to the Conference program was done at the initiative of the Executive Directors in response to promptings from the UJA. After the Executive Directors showed the initial interest in involving the local organizational leadership in the campaign, they left the initiative for the follow up with these leaders. The Executive Directors advised me, to do so would have required a campaign in itself and the Executive Directors felt that they had better use for their time than to try to get people involved who apparently did not want to get involved.

In brief, they took the position that what was novel in the Conference program was that, as they had expected, for the first time the initiative in coming forth with help in the campaign would be taken by the local organizations. Since that did not materialize, the situation, so far as the Executive Directors was concerned, was no different than it had always been -- namely, that it was a matter for the Executive Directors to determine whether the effort spent in involving the organizations was worthwhile. The Executive Directors have different views on this matter and, in line with these views, did or did not pursue a policy of involving the organizations in the campaign.

So much for the main reason that the program failed in achieving its objectives.

Another reason for the failure is that in many communities the heads of the local organizations are mere figureheads and not men of strength or influence. Within their own orbit they do what is expected of them but they can be of little help in a general communal effort either in terms of motivating the members of their own organizations or in terms of adding any strength to a team consisting of the leaders of the local organizations.



Also, any number of Executive Directors stated that the leadership of the local organizations took the "business as usual" attitude and gave only lip service to the support of the UJA, while concentrating all of their energies on the normal program of the organizations they represent.

Finally, the program had no impact because the leadership of the organizations did not in their own giving show that they took the whole thing very seriously. Any number of Executive Directors told me that many of the local leaders of the organizations were, everything considered, among the poorer givers in the community and that the participation of their respective organizations in the Conference program did not change the pattern of their giving. In these circumstances the membership of the organizations could hardly be expected to improve their giving or take a more active role in the campaign.

You will, of course, recall your own suggestion, which was turned down by the Conference, that governing Board of the national organizations canvass themselves to make sure that every member of the Board has contributed to the UJA and that the national organizations request the governing Boards of their respective local organizations to do likewise.

If the Conference program did not achieve its primary objective what, if anything, did it accomplish? Based on all reports which reached our office, I think it can be said that as a result of the combination of the activities of the Conference, the members of the organizations received additional stimulation to contribute to and to participate in the local campaigns. To some extent, the leadership in the local organizations paid attention to the new role taken by their organizations in formally supporting the UJA effort in 1959. This was reflected in the reports which reached us that the relationship between the organizational leadership and the local Welfare Funds improved, presumably as a result of the Conference program. However, in no community did this improved relationship result in either of the two objectives of the Conference program.

In view of the foregoing, if one were to ask whether the immediate results achieved warranted the effort and the money expended to achieve them, the answer from the standpoint of the UJA would unequivocally have to be in the negative. The only reason for the existence of the UJA is to raise money and even the greatest enthusiasts for the program have admitted that the program did not have the slightest impact on the campaign.

#### V. Recommendations

The crucial question is whether the program should be continued assuming, of course, that the organizations would be amenable to the suggestion that they take on the program for the coming year.

There is opinion from respectable quarters that if the Conference program were launched at the planning stage of the campaign instead of in the middle of the campaign, the work of the Conference would have been more effective. I personally doubt that the time element alone was the determining factor in the lack of success of the 1959 effort. The Emergency Conference was held on February 15th and



immediately thereafter the UJA tried to have similar meetings set up in the major communities in the country. So far as the middle and lower bracket givers are concerned, the campaign had not advanced to a point where the organizations could not have done some good if (a) it was in the cards for them to do some good and (b) if they had taken the initiative to become involved in the campaign. If it is true that the program was launched too late it was true only because the initiative and the follow up had to be taken by the Executive Directors who by the middle of February had enough on their hands without trying to involve the organizations more than their previously fixed campaign schedules called for.

However, inasmuch as it seems now very clear that under the most favorable circumstances, with all the willingness on the part of the national and local organizations do help in the campaign, the initiative will have to be taken by the Executive Directors, some attention must be given to the argument that the Conference program was launched after the spring campaigns had gotten under way. It strikes me that on this ground alone the organizations should be encouraged to continue the program for 1960 in the hopes that a timely launching of the program might produce better results.

But, there are more compelling reasons why, despite the fact that this Year's efforts failed in their objectives, the effort should be continued, provided that the organizations can be induced to continue the effort.

I attach great importance to the principle that whenever a group of people assemble for the purpose of promoting the UJA, only good can come out of it. The least that can be said that it is better than if the group had not met. I believe that the same can be said of material that reaches the potential contributor -- particularly if the additional material stems from a source other than the UJA, to which source he has some loyalty.

I am not sanguine that a Conference program will result in any revolutionary change in the pattern of giving. Quite the contrary, I believe that even if the program is launched in due time, it will more than likely take the form of a lot of "simues." However, even if the "simues" does not immediately pay off, it may, if continued, result in positive good to the UJA.

In taking this position, I have in mind particularly those organizations which have hitherto not been particularly identified with things related to Israel: the Council of Jewish Women, the Jewish Labor Committee, the Jewish War Veterans, and the three synagogue movements. These organizations embrace a substantial part of American Jewry. I think it is important from the standpoint of the UJA that these members be reminded that their organizations consider the support of the UJA important. Unless we take the cynical view that words are not important and cannot motivate behavior -- a view hardly consistent with the amount we invest in publicity -- we must welcome every offer of help to publicize the UJA and the importance of supporting the UJA.

Moreover, I think that it is preeminently important that American Jews -- even those who are already involved in the cause of the UJA both as contributors and as workers -- get the clear picture that the whole or organized Jewry is solidly behind the UJA -- tenuous as that support may, in fact actually be. Such picture



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cannot help but sustain the morale and interest of those already involved in the campaign and may even win over converts from the ranks of those who are not committed.

I do, however, have some observations to make on the type of program which should be recommended to the organizations if they are prepared to continue any kind of program.

Except in the event of a real emergency, I believe that no special conference of the organizations along the line of the February 15th conference should be called in 1960. The 1959 Conference was not representative and if no emergency exists in 1960 a Conference of the organizations convened in 1960 would be even less representative.

In my judgment, a resolution of the Conference of Presidents itself, placing each organization on record as supporting the UJA, could do as much good as the resolution which was adopted by the Emergency Conference on February 15th. I believe that the resolution of the Conference of Presidents should be to the effect that work of the UJA must not be viewed in terms of a year to year affair but is the responsibility of a generation: to help complete the full integration of the immigrants in Israel, to take care of those who will come in the year ahead, and to prepare for those who will be coming within the next decade. The organizations must say that they regard the work of the UJA as important as any facet of Jewish life and that for that reason they consider the support of the UJA an integral part of their own programs.

Moreover, I feel that in the absence of a situation which American Jewry would inescapably regard as presenting a real emergency, devices such as the telephone hookup should not be employed in 1960. The over-all reaction to the hookup in April of this year was negative -- due largely to the fact that when the hookup was held the mass migration from Rumania which had called the Conference into being -- had ceased. In any event, the hookup was recommended as an omnibus device for reaching the communities other than the top 23, with the view of trying to get the organizations' leaders in these communities to convene meetings and to mobilize manpower for the campaigns.

I am now of the opinion that with respect to the overwhelming number of the Jewish communities in the country, this special effort is not needed. In the medium and the smaller communities all the pressures which serve to induce good giving and fair participation in the campaigns exist without the help of the organizations, and the organizations, as such, can in my judgment, add little to the campaign. For these communities, it is sufficient that the local organizations are through the normal publicity channels of the respective national organizations made aware of the commitment to support the UJA and are urged to take steps within their own branches to stress the importance of the UJA in local meetings.

Nor do I think that it is necessary for the UJA to employ a person to help implement the Conference program in the communities. I believe that those Executive Directors who will want to make use of the local organizations have the ingenuity to mobilize these organizations without the assistance of a staff member.



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Affirmatively speaking, I believe that the program of the Conference of Presidents for 1960 should be along the following lines:

- (1) The issuance of a comprehensive statement by the Conference of Presidents supporting the UJA.
- (2) So far as the country as a whole is concerned, each organizations should by mail to their local leaders, by the use of the house organs, and through the medium of major conferences of national and regional scope, encourage their leaders and their members to give to the UJA and to participate actively in the campaign.
- (3) In the larger communities, with respect to which there is agreement between the UJA and the local campaign leadership that the proper involvement of the local organizations could have an impact on the campaign, the national organizations should be asked to make a concentrated and concerted effort to mobilize the support of the local organizations behind the campaign. This effort should be as intensive as possible and should include:
  - (a) City-wide conferences of the organizations;
  - (b) Commitments from the local leaders to involve their organizations in the campaign and to mobilize a given number of new workers in the campaign;
  - (c) Visits by the national leaders to the communities to make sure that whatever course of action is agreed upon is implemented by the local organizations.

As I envision is, in a program of this nature, the role of the UJA would be minimal and would involve the UJA in virtually no cost, and in no substantial effort on the part of its staff. The UJA would be merely called upon to confer with the Conference of Presidents on the (a) policy statement they should issue, (b) on the line the individual organizations should follow in publicizing the 1960 UJA campaign, and (c) on the program which should be pursued by the organizations in the communities selected for special effort, and, in addition, would be called upon to confer with the campaign leadership in the communities selected for special effort to pave the way for the effort of the Conference of Presidents in those communities.

I should make it perfectly clear that the foregoing recommendations are not based upon an a priori conclusion that the UJA involvement in the program should be minimal both in terms of outlays of money and the assignment of staff to the project. Rather, the recommendations are based on the conviction that they call for a program that is both realistic and not wasteful. The minimal involvement of the UJA in that type of program merely flows from the nature of the program. Any substantial change in the general plan of the program and, particularly, any change which would shift the responsibility for the implementation of the program to the shoulders of the UJA would involve costs on the part of the UJA, the outlay of which could not be justified. This is especially so since it is subject to a serious doubt that even a maximum program, engrafted upon, or integrated into, the present campaign machinery in the communities, could produce substantial increases in the UJA.