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United Jewish Appeal Meeting of the Executive Directors of
Federations and Welfare Funds. Minutes and transcripts. 17
November 1955.

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UNITED JEWISH APPEAL MEETING

of the

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF
FEDERATIONS AND WELFARE FUNDS

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

Waldorf-Astoria Hotel
New York City

November 17, 1955

ABALON STENOTYPE REPORTERS
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The United Jewish Appeal meeting of the Executive Directors convened in the Assembly Room of the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, New York, N. Y., on Thursday, November 17, 1955, at 6:30 o'clock p.m., Rabbi Herbert Friedman presiding.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: As most of you know, this is a continuation of a meeting that was started in Chicago last Thursday. This meeting at Chicago was adjourned, recessed, postponed -- call it what you will -- or expanded, to include twice as many people now as were present when the discussion was started.

At the time when we met for the first time to discuss this subject, there were eight or ten people there. It was the evening before the General Assembly opened, and we flew out to have an informal conversation with a group of the executives whom Sam Goldsmith had called together to start the exploration of this idea, which we are going to project tomorrow before this Assembly.

Before we go any further, I want to tell you something about the origin of the proposal which we are going to discuss.

The concept of a special fund is something which was born in the course of a lot of conversation and discussion. It has matured to the point where a national

meeting is being called to consider it.

All conversation prior to that is conversation which is from one man to another man, trying to find out what the implications of this are and what we mean by it and how it affects me and my city, and is it necessary, and why are you asking for it, and how can we help you do it, or why should we help you do it.

There have been a number of questions in the air which seem to indicate that one wanted it and one didn't want it, and some were for it, and some were against it altogether.

I hope that all during the day tomorrow there will be the continuation of this kind of questioning, which can only result in clarification. If the questioning results in confusion, then nobody is thinking straight about the problem. Questioning ought to result in clarification and not confusion.

Really, that is the simple and total purpose of the meeting here this evening.

When Sam asked me to come out to Chicago last week, he said, "I would like you to come so that we can give you our thoughts before you get to your meeting on the

18th, before your ideas harden and crystallize, before your plans are set."

I replied then that our ideas had not crystallized or hardened to the extent that we were closed to any thinking which anyone wanted to contribute to the stream of thought which we were engaged in.

What was true then is true now, even though the meeting will be on tomorrow, and it will be a big one and a representative one.

There is only one thing that I want to say to you now. I want to say that we have not projected this concept speciously. We haven't projected this concept childishly. We haven't come to ask for something just because we want to keep up income coming into the United Jewish Appeal this year -- or any other year.

This is no joke. This represents the best thinking we can come up with, namely, that in this situation which we have chosen to call a crisis, and call it so very seriously and solemnly, we think we have a responsibility to go to the Jews of America and ask them also to recognize that this is a crisis and to act accordingly.

If you think differently -- after all, you are a

group of people who can feel the pulse of many communities -- and if you think differently, then it is your responsibility to say so.

On the other hand, if you think similarly, then it is your responsibility to tell us how you think you can help raise this money.

If there is a crisis in terms of Israel's survival or in terms of the survival of the Jews anywhere in the world, then no honest man has any choice left to him except to put his head to work to get the money that is necessary.

If there is no crisis in your minds in this instance, or in the mind of anybody in America, then it is your bounden duty as an honest man to tell us that you think we are faking -- and there are people who have said, themselves, just that: "You are sending fake telegrams, and you are making up fake gimmicks about North Africa and Israel and security and the whole business." There are people who have said that.

Well, if anybody thinks we are faking about it, we have to get that out on the table. It is a question of measuring the degree of the crisis, and that is another

thing that we have to get out on the table and settle before we know where we are going.

By that I mean if you think it is a six million dollar crisis but not a twenty-five million dollar crisis, let's get that out on the table. If it is a question of saying, yes, we have a feeling that there is some kind of cross-roads, historic moment in front of us, that we think it is genuine, and we think that it is a question of the survival of Israel, that it is a question of the survival of Jews being at stake, then let us figure out how we can raise this money, and let us approach the problem in that way.

There are no holds barred, gentlemen. That is the only purpose of having a meeting like this. It is still nowhere near frozen or inflexible, and is still in the situation where it is not too late for an idea to emerge on the table that can help us tomorrow.

I don't think that anything of a summary of what happened at Chicago is necessary. The eight or ten men who were there presented ideas, opinions, points of view. You are all certainly welcome and invited to do the same thing tonight.

Remember this: The whole purpose of a discussion like this is to get you to speak. Bill Rosenwald is here. He has to leave by nine-thirty, because he has a date with the Prime Minister; otherwise he would stay. He isn't here to make any speeches, but I would want to hear from him before he leaves, any time that he wants to say anything to us.

There are a couple of members of our cabinet. Mr. Luckman and Mr. Berenstein are here, national officers of the United Jewish Appeal. They aren't here to make any speeches. The only speeches to be made are by people who would like to say something about our problem or ask any questions about it, and those people are some of the staff people of the United Jewish Appeal, as well as the group of Executive Directors who are gathered here tonight.

There are minutes available of the meeting at Chicago last Thursday, if anybody wants to look through them. There aren't any copies available here tonight, but we can have them for you tomorrow. There are twenty-five pages of single-spaced typing.

What it all boils down to is the fact that Zucker said this and Sobeloff said that, and Treguboff said some-

thing else and Bismo said still something else. But running through it like a thread, like a theme was the question of how to do it, whether to do it this way, or that way, and what are the objections to doing it this way or that way or some other way.

If anybody wants to ask questions, I would beg you to put the questions on the table.

Nobody in Chicago last Thursday said that this is cock-eyed; nobody said that we shouldn't ask for twenty-five million; nobody said we are dreaming or shooting for the stars; and nobody said, "You are faking." I don't know if anybody thought it, but if anybody is thinking that, for Heaven's sake, I wish he would say it, because we have to smoke out all of the authentic and genuine feeling about it.

Only if we can get all this on the table, get what people really feel about the problem, can we know where we are going.

Gentlemen, that is all there is to it. Does anybody have any questions?

MR. PEKERSKY: There is one thing I would like to bring out --

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RABBI FRIEDMAN: Before there are any questions, we know that some people don't know how to approach this problem of trying to get twenty-five million additional, and perhaps we ought to ask Bill Rosenwald to take a few minutes to say what you ought to hear about what he thinks before the official opinion of the United Jewish Appeal is expressed.

MR. ROSENWALD: I think you ought to give a short outline of what happened in Chicago last Thursday night before we go into that.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I didn't want to make a speech. If there is any basic information that I ought to transmit about the meeting, something that everybody is not in possession of --

MR. HENRY C. BERNSTEIN: May I make a suggestion, because I think we ought to settle one thing first.

I think you have laid on the table what is fundamental to any discussion, and that is the question of whether there is or there isn't a genuine crisis. If there is any question about it, that is the first thing that ought to be resolved.

I say that above all, because planning about

something which is unresolved in anybody's mind seems to me to be something which would be a waste of time.

Why don't we address ourselves first to that question, Mr. Chairman? If there is anything that relates to the question of crisis or no crisis, let us get that resolved first.

MR. ZUCKER: There is one phase of the question that has been raised with me by some of our more thoughtful people, and that is this:

We are talking about crisis. Nobody doubts that there is a crisis. But they do say this: They ask, Won't there be a crisis still another year and another year and another year, so that in projecting whatever plan we project, should be do so on the basis of a special fund for one year, or should we be thinking in terms of a permanent fund?

MR. LUCKMAN: I don't think we should be thinking at all in terms of time or considering the problem at all in terms of time. It is a special crisis for now. We don't have to think of the future.

I don't know if I will have to hock my stocks or jewelry, like some women are hocking their diamond rings,

to help out, but I think it would be a mistake to think in terms of the future on this.

MR. ZUCKER. We ought not to be talking emotionally tonight.

MR. LUCKMAN: That's right.

MR. ZUCKER: We ought to get the answers so that we can come tomorrow with a more mature understanding of what we have to think about.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Let me begin with something which I thought we would skip and save the time for, but apparently that would not be the best way to get over to the problem.

There is a conjunction of events which has occurred. Two things have crossed each other almost like two planets or two comets, to create a situation which has not occurred in the past eight years since the creation of the State of Israel.

The conjunction of events I speak of is the North African situation, together with the Russian arming of Egypt. The juxtaposition of these two things occurring at the same time has thrown Israel into the box in which she now finds herself.

The North African crisis is one which has been a growing and mounting thing, taking perhaps a year now to reach its crescendo, and it probably is at its crescendo now, although we may be too close to it to recognize it as that.

Two years ago, the Sultan was deposed. The country went into turmoil. Jews, together with other elements of the population, felt themselves increasingly insecure. In the course of a period of months, in which the insecurity builds and builds and mounts, the thought that took root in the Jewish population was exodus, flight, migration, perhaps to Israel.

During the course of the twenty or twenty-four or twenty-six months since the Sultan was deposed -- now he has returned, the same Sultan -- during the course of all of those months, as the idea of flight took shape in their minds, several episodes occurred which gave impetus to the idea of flight.

There were pogroms at Petit Jean and there were pogroms at Oudjda and other cities, and those pogroms didn't help make Jews feel secure.

On November the 20th, the Sultan is going back

to the throne. Jews will leave in larger numbers next year than they did last year. The return of the Sultan to the throne has no relationship to the mood which has now taken deep root in the Jewish psyche, and that mood is: We want out, and we want Israel.

Therefore, you have an accelerated immigration to put the lid on which will take the strongest kind of action by the Agency or the government.

This costs an amount of money in and of and by itself which the whole United Jewish Appeal did not produce last year. Just the cost of absorption of forty-five thousand people takes \$45,000,000, and we will give the Agency \$35,000,000. As if the Agency had nothing else to do at all.

This is one event. Conjoined with it is the arms delivery to Egypt, and the arms delivery to Egypt is something that you know as much about as I do or anybody else knows about it.

The arms delivery is a figure of seventy or eighty million dollars' worth of arms. That doesn't mean a thing, because the seventy or eighty million is based on the kind of valuation that is involved in the deal, and

nobody here is in a position to know anything about what is going on in that connection.

For instance, they put a price tag of \$50,000 on a MIG-15. It actually costs \$300,000 to produce. So are they giving the Egyptians \$80,000,000 worth of arms retail or wholesale? What they are giving the Egyptians is a hundred airplanes and 150 tanks, or whatever the number is, and five or seven submarines, whatever the number is, and that is the only way that it makes sense to describe the Russian arms. The only way to talk about it is in terms of quantity, not dollar worth.

I don't think anything more has to be said about this, because if you don't know what the extent of this is, then no amount of words could put it across to you.

Here is Egypt, now with the entire reservoir or arsenal of Soviet arms apparently at her disposal, whether it is through some fake business of satellite country providing them or not. It makes no difference. It is obvious that the Russian arsenal is at the disposal of Egypt.

When you get a problem of actual life or death -- and that is how it is viewed in Israel -- you can't look at

it any other way -- crossing with the necessity for keeping the doors open, then you get this feeling of crisis or desperation or urgency -- nothing comparable to it since 1948, or phrase it in any words that you feel are applicable to the situation.

Having come across the fact that these two sets of circumstances were unchanging -- and, gentlemen, that is the crux of the thing -- these two sets of circumstances are unchanging -- you are not going to stop the Jews coming out of North Africa, and you are not going to stop Russia from providing the arms, and having come to this conclusion that these two facts were unchangeable, we then come very quickly to the conclusion that the amount of money that we would produce in the normal 1956 campaign would not scratch the surface of the problem.

We come to the conclusion, further, that we could not take the arms situation, but that the least we could do would be to take the whole picture of the North African situation, which we have never done up to this point on a broad scale like this.

The arithmetic of the situation is simple. The Government of Israel puts an amount into the immigrant

absorption thing which the Government of Israel should not have to put in if it is going to have the armament problem to handle. The amount of money which the Government of Israel puts into the armament thing is the amount that it cannot put into the immigration thing -- and that is the amount of money that we have to put into the immigration thing.

The arithmetic is simple. That is the \$25,000,000 which we have to talk about.

Of course, it isn't twenty-five. It is roughly thirty-one. They are counting on five or six million from the Keren Hayesod, from other countries in the world, but they are counting on twenty-five from us, from the Jews of America.

That is how we reach the figure, and that is the basis on which we reach the amount.

It is tied with North Africa, and it is tied with security. And we haven't had a combination of circumstances like this in seven or eight years, since the birth of the State of Israel.

Now, this is the background which led us to propose that a special fund be accumulated of this amount of money.

That is the background, and there is a very simple, rough, unpolished, unchiseled plan to get this amount of money, and the basis for it is this:

We ask that a special fund of \$25,000,000 be established. We ask that each community take its share or quota of that fund. We ask that each community raise its quota for that fund any way it sees fit. We leave that up to the community.

We suggest that a man not make a contribution to the special fund until he has made at least his regular contribution to the normal campaign, because we are interested just as much as you are in trying to see that the normal campaigns are protected.

We further suggest that the 1955 PCB arrangement be maintained for 1956, so that the normal income of the United Jewish Appeal is anticipable at the same rate as 1955. We suggest simple that there is a mutual security pact involved where we want to have our 1956 income protected, and you want to have your 1956 income protected for the Welfare Fund, and if we raise the amount of money in 1956 that was raised in 1955, that will be the case, and the overage giving, which will be the plus giving on the basis

of the genuine recognition that this crisis exists, go into the special fund and that nothing be said about whether this be a one-time gift or not, because that is a dangerous slogan, and that if you can get from the man the same contribution for 1956 as for 1955, plus his extra contribution to the special fund, without saying that it is once, but saying that it is within the framework of this present context, which he understands clearly -- that there is really a chance to raise that kind of money, and that the only thing that is important here, really, is the recognition of the fact of the crisis.

The only thing I want to say in conclusion, before I haven't got a voice left, is that this thing is not a trick or a gimmick on our part to try to get another million or two million dollars. We are not going to all this trouble, and we are not asking the Jews of America to go to all this trouble just to see if we can figure out a way to get an extra million dollars, because that is just nonsense.

We are going to all this trouble, and you are going to all this trouble to put all our heads together to see if we can get as close to what that gap is as we humanly can

reach.

Now, that is the crisis which provoked this, and that is the scheme which has emerged, and I am sorry not to have said it before. I just assumed that enough preliminary information had gotten around so that you were familiar with it, but, if not, let me apologize. I just didn't know.

Now let us take any questions there, but, first, I have prevented Bill Rosenwald from taking the floor. If he wants to talk -- I just have been watching the time on this -- we will hear from him, and we will take any questions there are.

MR. STERN: Why do you talk about a special fund separated from the 1956 campaign? Isn't that kind of artificial?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: In what way?

MR. STERN: Shouldn't the special fund be part of the campaign?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Tell me what you mean, and we will try to answer your question.

MR. STERN: I don't see how you can keep separated out what a person will give in 1956. I mean, each person's

contribution is going to be taken without making him feel that this is a one-time gift, and actually, I see this is an opportunity to raise the point, that this is a sort of a shot in the arm for the campaign this year to raise the level of giving.

Not that it is for just one year, because certainly the need will be there for a longer period of time, but instead of arguing that point, perhaps it would help the boys here if I told them of the experience that we had in our community on Tuesday night.

The chairman of our campaign was in Israel on this Mission, and while in Israel he sent me a letter and asked me to set up a meeting of our principal givers for some early period upon his return.

We set up that meeting for a Tuesday night, last Tuesday night. He came back. I don't know whether any of you know him, but he is the kind of person who, when he has to get up at a meeting and say, "Thank you", needs to have his speech written for him. He is just that kind of a person.

But on Tuesday night I had never heard him speak more eloquently.

VOICE: Did you write it for him?

MR. STERN: No, I didn't.

Not only that. He didn't write it, either.

The point I am trying to make is that he was sold. He was sold a hundred per cent on the need and on the emergency.

We had forty-five people present. Among them were about twenty-five of our top givers, and I was amazed at the response. One of our contributors, one of our men, who would perhaps be familiar to you -- some of you may have seen him; our little white-haired fellow, Mr. Philip Diamond -- got up and said, "You know, in the last seven or eight years, we have been running campaigns, and every year there has been an emergency." He said, "But this year there is a real emergency."

I thought that that really expressed what was in the minds of the people that night, because they all responded in the sense of really believing -- and when I say "really believing" I want to raise the question that Rabbi Friedman seems to have raised, which I don't think is implicit in anything that we are talking about, and unanimously there was a vote taken that Paterson would go along

with our fair share of this \$25,000,000 extra fund we are talking about.

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But also implicit in the whole thing was the thought that this is not a special fund. When we go out in 1956 -- and, of course, people will ask when we are going to raise it, how we are going to raise it, and so on -- we are going to tell them that this meeting was held on the 18th, and we would rather keep an open mind, that perhaps some suggestion would come out which would give us a better idea than we have.

My own thought was that between now and January we ought to do everything in our power to get the cash in for 1955 and perhaps use the December 16 to 18th meeting of the United Jewish Appeal to bring cash in for 1955 in order to put us in a strong position to have perhaps an earlier campaign in 1956 and just add the proportion of \$25,000,000 that is our rightful share to our 1956 campaign or to the amount we raised in 1955.

I think this will produce a realistic goal for 1956.

After the meeting, of course, there were the usual wise guys who, when you talk about something like this, say,

"Well, you'll never do it." But I did have several people come up to me and say, "Well, what's our share of this thing?"

I have figured out roughly, based on our figures, it would be about one third more. There were three people there, one of whom gave eight thousand last year, and he figured it out very quickly and said, "Well, you've got it for 1956, or whenever you want it."

That has led me to believe that it isn't only the men who came back from this mission to Israel, but it is on the front pages of the newspapers. Everybody is concerned about what is going to happen to the State of Israel, and, whoever talks about it, while it is not 1948 all over again, it certainly has drawn a response from the people in terms of their realizing that there is a real emergency this year.

And I had to fight to get into this meeting.

(Laughter)

MR. GOTTLIEB: I think before the evening is over that we do have to get down to a discussion of the practical aspects of the money involved and how we are going to get it.

I have not heard any responsible person make the statement that this is a gimmick. The story of what happened in San Francisco was supposed to be an anonymous story, but I would like to --

VOICE: Tell them the anonymous story.

MR. GOTTLIEB: All right.

I mentioned responsible people. There was a Bonds meeting in Hartford on Monday, at which one of our most prominent contributors was present, and he bought a sizeable purchase of bonds. At the end of the meeting he came up to Moshe Sharett, and on top of the bonds he had bought, he presented him with a check for \$5,000 -- on top of the bonds.

Moshe Sharett said, "What am I supposed to do with this \$5,000?" The man said, "I know what the situation of the Israel Government is. I know that you have to travel around the country, and I know what this must cost. Why should the Israel Government undertake this cost? I want to contribute this \$5,000 to the expense of the tour that you are making."

That is not typical of the attitude around the communities, I am sorry to say, but it is indicative of

the attitude, I think, on the part of the responsible givers in this country.

There are many people who say that this is a gimmick, but they are the people who resist giving under any circumstances, who say that this is a gimmick.

But it is easy enough for all of us to jump on this band-wagon. I think that all of us sincerely believe that this is a crisis, that we can distinguish between the word "crisis" and the word "emergency" and know that this is a crisis.

I think we all believe this, but on the other hand, we have all lived through a lot of experiences in relation to these unusual amounts which are necessary to meet the changing situation as far as the Jews in Israel and the Jews of the world are concerned.

We know that you cannot raise substantial moneys from the Jews of America if you make a Fourth of July pinwheel out of Jewish life. This has to be done in a planned and organized way.

My impression -- and from now on I will speak more or less personally -- my impression is that we are more conscious, we are more articulate, we are perhaps more

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understanding of the necessities of this crisis than the leaders of Israel are in their approach to the United States. I know that we see propoganda to the effect that the Jewish National Fund is now going to embark on a \$35,000,000 campaign as against a million and a half or two million limit, in relation to the agreement with the United Jewish Appeal.

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That sort of note comes at the time, too, when we are considering this kind of a crisis.

I know that the Hebrew University comes to us and says that they must have X number of dollars toward their capital fund and that this is just as much a crisis as anything that is happening in Israel. The same thing is true of Technion, and the Histadruth comes to us and asks us how in the world can we give them this kind of allocation at this time of crisis in Israel?

Then there is this other factor, which I think looks very large, and that is that for many years while we were trying to raise substantial funds for Israel through the United Jewish Appeal, we were in direct conflict with the Israeli Bonds Organization. Finally, out of that situation has emerged a plan which divides the time, the calendar, so that the Israeli Bond Organization campaigns

in a community during one period of time, and the United Jewish Appeal campaigns in the community at another period of time.

That has worked out in my own community very well, and I assume it has worked out very well in most communities.

At this particular period of time is supposed to come the calendar time for the Israeli Bonds Organization to campaign. As I told you, we had this meeting in our community last Monday, at which time this emergency was very clearly outlined, and the answer to the emergency was the purchase of Israeli bonds.

I am not saying that that is not the answer to the problem, but the question in my mind is whether or not we have some moral responsibility in relation to this situation, that we have asked the Israeli Bond Organization to stay out of our communities regardless of what the propaganda is, regardless of what the emergency may be and can be at any particular time.

If we ask them to stay out of our communities during, say, what should be a spring campaign, during the time of the year when the regular spring campaign is run,

then what happens in relationship to them in the fall, if it happens to be a fall period?

These are all questions which must be answered and must be answered not to the satisfaction of the professionals, necessarily, but must be answered to the satisfaction of the lay leaders before we can sit down and establish a plan and an organization and an approach which will result in raising the \$25,000,000 that we seem to be agreed is the amount to be raised.

We can all give our affirmation to this plan. We can all say that we are in favor of it and then go back to our communities and fail miserably in raising the money in the amount that is required to meet this crisis. We may raise a million, two million, five million dollars, but if you have really got actual crisis, actual emergency, and if it is a \$25,000,000 crisis, then five million is not going to meet that crisis any more than an inadequate dose of penicillin is going to cure pneumonia.

I think that before we get down to a practical consideration of how we approach this and how we can raise this money -- which I think is something we must do here, because when you get before your group tomorrow, there

is no question about the fact that this situation has an emotional impact that that the leaders who come here will undoubtedly say, yes, we must go back and try to do everything we can. But that doesn't raise your money. That doesn't raise your \$25,000,000.

You have to have a clear-cut fund-raising approach to the problem before you can raise the money, and in order to have that clear-cut approach you have to first answer these basic questions.

MR. MINTZER: May I ask a question?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Not a question. I would like to have some answers.

MR. MINTZER: Answers without questions? What is it you want?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I think if we can get a good number of questions on the table, some of them will begin to answer themselves and I think that the duplications will shake down, and we will be left with a nut of questions which will really be the thing, the same thing that everybody has in his mind as the common denominator of the problem that we are going to discuss.

Now, Mr. Mintzer.

MR. MINTZER: Do I understand correctly that you are proposing a campaign now or in the spring? I have another question.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: What is it?

MR. MINTZER: Second, are you talking about earmarking overage by individual contributors or by communities in this situation?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Overage?

MR. MINTZER: Not overage. I mean increase.

MR. ROSENBERG: I just want to elaborate on Mr. Gottlieb's last remarks, because I also talk from experience, which unfortunately was not quite as happy in my case as it was in the Paterson experience. That is perhaps because it was not related to the forthcoming UJA drive and is related to the problem of relating our UJA drive to the bond drive.

I think we stated this before, that this is a problem of Israel and not a problem of the United Jewish Appeal, and therefore the people in our community -- and this was asked last night -- are asking questions like why, when people had come for the bond drive, there is no mention made of the UJA.

The whole direction of the approach, which is especially significant in our community, where the two campaigns follow so closely, and it is very important to note the impression created that in order to meet the crisis in Israel you must buy more bonds.

Morris Berenstein was there last night and gave a very eloquent talk for the bonds preceding that of Moshe Sharett, and yet some of our people knew that Morris Berenstein is coming to the UJA meeting this week-end, and this is said to our leadership at the time the appeal was made for the bonds: that this is a two-pronged problem, that is, that the answer is two-pronged to this problem.

I had such an experience, and it was very interesting to me.

We anticipate -- and it is a poor community that we have down south -- and when I say "poor" I mean not poor economically but poor in response to the needs. I am not bragging about our achievement, but we still anticipate that as a result of the emergency the bonds in 1955, that is, this current year, will exceed by some fifty per cent, which is the figure we have been forecasting -- that of last year.

MR. BERENSTEIN: That is in your own community, is that right?

MR. ROSENBERG: In our community, which is a poor community, but we still work in our community, for better or worse.

We had a meeting last night following the bond meeting, and there was present our campaign chairman, our president, the chairman of the bond drive, the Chairman of the Initial Gifts Committee, all of whom participated in this bond effort, and we brought up this meeting coming this week-end, and all of us experienced a let-down. In other words, the only way I can express it is that the bond drive served as a valve for letting off steam and emotions related to this crisis.

As far as Miami is concerned -- I am going to talk to Herb about it later -- we have to start from the beginning again, actually starting to create a feeling of crisis, and the UJA is the answer to it, because everyone we spoke to said, "Look, we bought bonds; Sharett spoke; he didn't say anything about the United Jewish Appeal. Morris Berenstein spoke, and he didn't say anything about it."

As a matter of fact, one of the speakers said that this is a time when we have to forget charity. This is the time when this has to be approached on the basis of investing in the future of Israel.

MR. BERENSTEIN: That is why I was there to speak at that meeting.

MR. ROSENBERG: Our very chairman, Jake Sheer, said, "I want to make it clear that this is not for charity; this is not for the United Jewish Appeal. This is for investment in bonds."

I want to show the importance from our experience of relating the two and also to ask or suggest that in other communities where this, too, will happen, that perhaps a better kind of coordination can exist on the top leadership level.

As I said before, we should approach this as a crisis of Israel and not as a crisis of the United Jewish Appeal.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Ben, I think it was well said, because Morris is going to be with Mr. Sharett for another several visits.

I didn't want to answer questions seriatim, but

they seem to be coming all together.

I just want to say that in relation to this subject, Sharett himself said that he came to America for both purposes. This was a release that was brought out of the Cabinet in Jerusalem.

The first that I knew -- and I am telling you a secret out of school -- but the first I knew that Sharett was coming to the United States was when I read it in the paper, and I read it in the Times, coming to my office. When I got to my office, I found some cables on my desk, but right out of Jerusalem they stated that he was coming here for bonds and UJA.

We had no UJA meetings scheduled at this time of the year. The big series of meetings coming up were all bond meetings. He was trying to get the idea across, and they were trying to get it across from Jerusalem, that there was a double method of solving the crisis, and in the fumbling and perhaps unsuccessful way that it was done, public-relations wise, he was trying to get the thought across that just by buying bonds you are not responding to the crisis, or just by giving to the United Jewish Appeal perhaps you are not responding to the crisis adequately,

in his mind.

His announcement was that he was coming here for both things. If in the communities the impression is being given that the crisis must be solved by buying bonds, and then, when the UJA comes, you have already solved the crisis, that will be very bad.

I quite agree with you.

MR. PEKERSKY: Sharett made the same speech Tuesday night that any UJA speaker would make soliciting UJA funds. He talked about settlement, absorption, North African immigration, and it was all tied up with bonds. There was no mention of UJA.

He sold the merchandise which you are now asking us to sell on a crisis basis. He sold it the other night, and the people responded, and they feel good. They think they did their job.

I am not criticizing Sharett for that, but we are not coming to the communities with a brand-new crisis. The crisis has been there. It has been presented by the Foreign Minister of the State of Israel. People have responded, and next week it is going to be a little bit of a warmed-over crisis, and three months from now it is going to be

much less of a crisis than it is now.

I got a letter from the Zionist Organization today, and they have to do things because they have to solve the problem of North African immigration, and they have to solve the problem of arms.

In Chicago I talked to someone, and the man said to me, "We had a meeting in our community of the Zionist Emergency Council, the Zionist Expansion Fund, to raise funds in America for American use, and again they presented the North African situation and the Egyptian arms situation as the basis for raising six or seven thousand dollars in the local community in order to have some funds for operating purposes for the Zionist Emergency Council."

That is part of the story, you see, and I don't think you can shut your eyes to it, because if we have a case where this is our merchandise, somebody else is peddling the same merchandise and peddling it before us. That is the situation.

MR. DOCKMAN: Herb, did you see the material that has already come out about national action, about something they call National Action Day for bonds, to be held in December?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes. I have seen that material already.

MR. DOCKMAN: Mr. Berenstein should be well familiar with it. It certainly is a UJA story as well as a bonds story, and we are going to have a tremendous amount of publicity in our communities, I am sure, in the month of December, based on North African immigration, on agriculture, on irrigation, as well as on security -- all those things.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Morris wants to say something. We will get to you, Henry. Morris wants to say something right now.

MR. BERENSTEIN: Maybe I should sit on the other side. I will turn my head around on the UJA side. My hat is getting old because it has been turned around many times. (Laughter)

I will start off very nicely. (Laughter) If at the end it isn't so nice, you will probably remember the beginning.

I am really a little bit surprised. In the first place, as far as Sharett is concerned, there is no UJA action yet, and there can't be, and he has no right to

talk about it, because he doesn't even know whether the UJA is going to do anything.

I don't know whether the UJA is going to do any thing. I am not even in agreement with the plan that Herb just gave. So you see, as far as so-called leadership is concerned, I am going into tomorrow's meeting wanting to know what the people who put up the money are going to say and how they feel about it and what they believe about it and what they think ought to be done.

I think that is the way the funding operation went over, and I think the gentlemen here will remember how I insisted that the same type of meeting be called.

So, as far as criticizing Sharett for not mentioning UJA is concerned, he has absolutely nothing to say about UJA until tomorrow. Mr. Sharett will be there tomorrow, and I am sure he will tell you what he thinks UJA should do and what their plan is.

Secondly, I don't believe that Bonds are stealing UJA thunder. If they are, they are not stealing it to a big enough amount to mean anything. I know what is being taken in, and, by the way, we have a new system this year: We will tell you what we take in. (Laughter)

Who the Hell is kidding whom now in this picture? If there is this crisis, and we say for the time being there is -- if you are going to bring in fifty or sixty thousand people, what are you going to do, and where do the funds come to supply them with work?

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If there is a UJA picture, and we are going to take in that many people -- I don't know -- the big shots usually ask, "Are there any reporters in the room?" I won't ask that question, because I think we are all reporters. The fact of the matter is that we are not running an arms campaign. No, of course we are not running an arms campaign. We are just putting more money into the Israeli treasury so that they can replace that money and buy arms. That is the way it shapes up.

I am sure that in this country we are going to be accused of running an arms campaign. I am sure that a certain Council will accuse us. I am sure that the Arabs will try to claim --

VOICE: They did, yesterday.

MR. BERENSTEIN: I say, I am sure, and I don't know any way of preventing it. Technically they are wrong. Spiritually -- I don't have enough spirit to answer it.

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If we are going to solve the thing in Israel, it is going to be done very simply. Somehow and in some way we have to provide many more free dollars so that the things can be accomplished that are in the mind of Sam Sussman-- and, by the way, Sam Sussman is willing to give several thousand dollars more after he makes his bond purchase. And the cream wasn't taken off of Sam Sussman. In fact, I think they could have gotten \$25,000 that night. I'm pretty sure of it.

Even though I have apologized in many towns that I have spoken in because I didn't mention UJA in the three or four minutes that I had to speak -- and I don't think I am exaggerating when I say three or four minutes. I did hear some longer ones. (Laughter)

The fact of the matter remains that the best you are going to get out of the bond drive if you stand on your heads is an extra five million for the so-called development, and I know what I am talking about. That is all you are going to get. That is the best you are going to get out of it -- plus the fact that you are living with gentlemen, if that means anything to you. But that is what the situation is.

That is the story of the bond drive. It will be synchronized. It is a synchronized story. If it isn't synchronized, then everything that we have fought for and argued against in the past few years doesn't mean anything. It will be synchronized.

It is very easy to synchronize with the people who are running the bond drive, but the fact is -- and I said that to Sharett fifty times in the last four days -- the most important meeting that you are going to address is going to be held on Friday. This is the one that counts. Because if it is possible -- and I don't know if it is; I have grave doubts -- that \$25,000,000 can go into Israel from the United Jewish Appeal and do all the things that we have talked about, this is the answer.

One more thing. I perhaps should not be the one to talk about the other things which I happen to agree with. I don't think you can run seven emergency drives at one time. I don't think the Histadruth and Hebrew University and Hadassah and everything else can go on all at the same time.

I think you can talk to Sharett about that. I think tomorrow is the ~~the~~ ~~and~~ the place to tell it to him.

I would not hide anything tomorrow, and I hope there isn't a lay person who comes tomorrow who doesn't say everything that is on his mind.

Just because you don't happen to agree with it does not mean you are against it. I go along with Herb's opening statement.

If we can come to the conclusion that this is a genuine crisis, and we just don't want to be wiped out over there, we have to take this action. Between us we have the brains. Maybe we will make some mistakes. Don't worry who gets more of the cream, and don't worry who gets more of the gravy. That isn't what we are working for. That doesn't matter.

I didn't want to become too emotional, and I don't think I ate too much, but there are certain things that you have brought up that are as valid as can be, and these things must be told to Sharett.

I would not give five cents to any other capital drive in Israel in 1956. I am supposed to be pretty friendly toward Israel. I am on record and I will go on record as saying that I won't give five cents to any other capital drive, and I think the responsibility should be placed on

the proper shoulders.

Herb, I hope I didn't infringe on any of your answers.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: No. You certainly didn't.

When you say, "Let's not pick on Sharett," you didn't have anything person in mind, did you? You were speaking about a symbol, weren't you?

MR. BERENSTEIN: That's right.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Coordination here does not mean that you can wipe the bond drive off the map. Coordination does mean that we don't go on each other's heels in such a fashion as to cause turmoil inside of a given town. If we can prevent that, and if there is a bond meeting in Hartford on November 15 or in Miami on November 16, you can't have a special UJA fund starting on November 20, but maybe you can on December 25 or January 10, and you can work out the timing of the thing.

The important think that you are talking about, Ben, is whether the Jew in America feels that he has discharged his responsibility toward Israel's crisis by buying the bond, the extra bond, the thousand-dollar extra bond or the five-hundred-dollar extra bond.

I don't see how any thinking person can feel that he has discharged his personal responsibility to a crisis by providing more money for the development of one arm of the total strength of Israel which has to be increased. I don't see that at all.

Every aspect of Israel's strength has to be increased to meet this crisis. The industrial or developmental aspect of the economy has to be increased to provide more employment for more people. That is the point that Morris is trying to make.

You buy a bond to build a factory. If the bond money is spent to build the factory, you still have to take the Jew out to get him to the factory. So do you build the factory first and then say, well, fine, I did my share? Conversely, do you say, well, I have brought the Jew out of North Africa and I have dumped him at Haifa. I am through. I have done my share. Can you say that?

Obviously, you haven't done your share in either instance if you have done one and not the other, and therefore, in my mind, coordination has to mean not just coordination of timing but coordination of concept on the part of every Jew.

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To take the last part of the argument, if somebody else is stealing the merchandise and peddling your merchandise, this still has been a thing that we have been plagued with in every single aspect of Jewish communal life. You can be raising money for a hospital, and you will talk about North African Jews. I have heard it, and I know it is something that we just have to overcome in our own minds, all of it, the sense of frustration that we have when somebody is out selling our merchandise.

I have this feeling -- and I may be wrong -- that the one who comes along and is really selling it is the one who is going to get the response. Everything else represents nibbling away, and the nibbling away is annoying and frustrating and even evil; but it is not going to prevent us really from breaking through to the minds of the people.

Bill Rosenwald wants to speak now. He has to get away, so I think we ought to hear from him before he leaves, and then maybe he can take over to Mr. Sharett now some of the sense even of what we are talking about and what we have been talking about right here.

Bill, would you take the floor, please. I know

you have been waiting patiently.

MR. ROSENWALD: Herb said a good deal of what I was going to say. It reminds me a little bit of a JDC meeting around 1947, I think it was, when Dr. Louis Dublin got up, and he is one of our most eminent minds devoted to this work.

He made an impassioned plea that the JDC should give paramount attention and importance and funds to helping the children, because, after all, the children are the Jews of the future; and when he was through, everybody was convinced that they should get all the money, even if it meant taking it away from the other programs.

Moe Leavitt got up and said, "I completely agree with Dr. Dublin. The only problem I am up against is that he makes this plea for the children, and somebody comes along and says that we must give all of this money for vocational training, because if the Jews can all get jobs, then they will be self-supporting, and all your problems are solved. So that is the key to it.

"Another person comes along and says that the health program is the important thing, because, after all, if the Jews are not healthy, how can they work? And another

one comes along and says that the religious work needs it.

"I agree with all of them," he says. "The only problem is, how do I divide the JDC dollar?"

We are a little bit in that situation here, at the other end of it. Here each organization comes along and says that they are the organization that is going to solve the problem, and, as Herb just pointed out, in different ways, each one is. It is particularly true of bonds and UJA. I don't know that some of the building funds are necessarily in that category, and, as a matter of fact, we have word, as you will hear tomorrow, that there is going to be an effort made to put a damper, a very definite damper on postponing all postponable things of that sort in Israel.

I really only had three things I wanted to tell you. For some mysterious reason, we have all been talking about 1948, and we forget the other things. 1948 was a big year, of course. It was a dramatic year. The headlines were full of Israel, and, at least in the New York papers, pretty much nothing but Israel was in the headlines for the whole period of the campaign.

It was tragic, but from a fund-raising viewpoint,

it was a "natural". We forget that in 1944 the UJA raised somewhere in the neighborhood of \$20,000,000, and that in 1945 there was no UJA during most of the campaign season. It was a split campaign year, you know, like the customer who went into a restaurant and the waiter recommended the ox-tail soup, and the customer asked if that wasn't going pretty far back. (Laughter)

Going back to 1944 and 1945 is going back pretty far, I must say.

In 1945, by some miracle we raised \$35,000,000, despite the split campaign, and it was the most that had ever been raised, and people thought it was a miracle. Then we projected the \$100,000,000 campaign, and that was crazy. My God -- you just raised \$35,000,000. That was a miracle, and now you are talking about \$100,000,000? You're out of your mind.

And it happens that, together with a few other distinguished gentlemen, I was Chairman, National Chairman of the 1946 campaign. And it was crazy. \$100,000,000 wasn't hay.

1948 was better, sure. In 1946 we told them it was one time. We were mistaken. I was hooked, too, and

we said, all right, no more than one time. I couldn't promise anybody else, not even myself, because it didn't work with myself, and you couldn't do it again.

But in 1947 you raised more, and it couldn't be done again. In 1948, it was still more.

If there is a real crisis, the money will be there. This we have learned. You have to get it across — that it is a real crisis.

Going back to those years again, or even a little further, what was the crisis? The crisis was to a large extent in the 30's. We forget that six million Jews died because we weren't raising \$20,000,000. We thought if we got eight million we were doing well. If we got ten million it was a miracle. And millions of Jews died because we didn't have the imagination, the foresight.

We learned too late that you have to face the problem before it gets in the headlines.

It took a war in 1948 to really show us what we could do, the War of Independence of Israel, and it took the aftermath of the Second World War in 1946 to show us that we could raise as much as a hundred million.

Gentlemen, in the situation we have now, we have a

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combination of those two factors. We have, first of all, the situation of the 30's. We said, let's get the people out before they are trapped, as trapped they are in Lybia today, where we have all sorts of international assurances and guaranties that they will be allowed to go out.

So you go to the Police Chief in a little town in Lybia, and you are a Jew, and you say, "Here are my international guaranties. I want my permit to emigrate." He hasn't heard of those things. He doesn't know of those treaties. And it is up to him whether you get out or not, and you don't get out nine times out of ten. That is the way it works.

Let's learn from what we have gone through.

I was there. I was in Israel when Egypt marched a massive force of its army on to Israeli territory, and the United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission -- if that is the name of it -- immediately said, "Please get out." And what did they do? They sent in more troops and tanks, and they dug deeper trenches, and they sent in reinforcements and material.

After a few days of saying, "Please get out", there was a very quiet mobilization. It wasn't mentioned

in the press. All I knew is, one day I got service in the hotel, and the next day I didn't, and I asked what was the matter, and they say very calmly that they are very sorry but half of our staff is mobilized.

I learned more about it than I did in the papers. But before I left, the Egyptian troops were off of Israeli soil.

So we had a little war. It was just localized, but it was a little war.

And we have these two appeals today, and I have no doubt that with these two appeals we have a situation that we can justify by special effort, the special appeal, the kind of thing we did in 1946 or 1947, whatever we did in those years. I don't have to call it by name. The substance is there.

When we were in Israel, Sharett was there at the time and there were three top ambassadors talking to the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, talking to Secretary of State Dulles and his counterpart, McMillen, and to Eden, and other people of the four or five big nations of the world. And Golda Myerson said to us, "Gentlemen, I don't know what Sharett is going to come back with. I wish him success."

Of course, I wish him success. It is very important that he have success. But even if the foreign ministers promise him attention and help and guaranties, and we haven't got the Jews of the United States for partners, we are lost."

She said, "I don't care if they tell him they are not going to do anything for him, as long as we have the Jews of the United States for partners, we have a partnership that can work, that can last, that can make a go of it, that has been making a go of it."

That was the essence of that part of her very eloquent talk.

I would like to have carried that one step further. I have been in this work long enough to know a little bit about the partnership between us schnooks and you fellows. The next guy is an ordinary guy away from home, and I am at home, so you are the experts. But you are the experts in much more of a sense than that.

I know that without a group like the group here tonight, a group of the group that is here tonight -- because I think essentially that practically every person that is properly by his position, by his training, by his experience, the thinking person, the planning person, the

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executive person of the community -- every person, pretty much who is represented tonight will be with us tomorrow -- and I feel that the responsibility of meeting this crisis is with you.

I don't know the answer to many of the details you have raised. I really would rather have stayed here and listened to that answer. It concerns me very much, Herb, and I and Henry and a few others of us battled it out yesterday.

Louis was there; Mel Goldstein, Eddie Warburg. We battled it out for three years -- it felt like years, but it was three hours. Joe Schwartz took time to come into the battle. He has been very helpful. Even when it hurts Bonds, he is very helpful.

He said, "You have to have a November 18 meeting even if it hurts Bonds."

That is the kind of spirit we had. We finally came to -- I won't say a meeting of the minds where everybody was happy with it. No matter what you do, it's going to have something a little wrong with it. I don't think that what we have is necessarily the answer.

You people, knowing what can be done in the

communities, knowing how it can be approached, will find the answer, will give us the answer here tonight in preparation for tomorrow's meeting.

At tomorrow's meeting, you and the lay people, as a partnership, will give us the answer.

The last thing I wanted to tell you is that I am satisfied in my own mind and have been, even before we had this security situation in Israel, when Herb came back and reported on North Africa -- I am satisfied in my own mind that the answer cannot be anything which is merely reflected in the thought, "Let's go after bigger goals," and the rest of the campaign goes on as usual.

This is not something that will have any meaning to the contributors, it will have no relation to raising more money to meet the crisis, it will have no relation to setting aside an extra contribution, so that the contributor knows it is something over and above his regular gift that was given in this crisis to meet this crisis, and not something expected to be repeated and increased year after year.

I can't spell out to you exactly how that is going to be worked out. I can't explain the mechanics and

the details of it. I don't think Herb can. I don't think Lou can. I don't think Joe Schwartz or Eddie Warburg can.

I think you are the people who have to tell us how to do that. I think that is the main purpose of the meeting here tonight.

I want to thank you all for coming. I want to apologize for running off, as I have to do, and especially apologize for speaking so long.

Thank you. (Applause)

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I have been making notes of the questions that you fellows have asked. Henry now wants the floor.

MR. ZUCKER: I want to ask three questions, the first of which isn't important to me, but it has been asked of me, so I am going to ask it. The other two are very important, I think.

The first question is: Will there be any contributions, important contributions, extraordinary contributions from North African Jewry on behalf of the emigration of Jews from North Africa.

Is the question clear?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Right.

MR. ZUCKER: As I say, that to me is not very important personally, but it is a question that has been asked of me.

The other two questions I think are important. The first one is with relation to New York City -- and these two are connected. Has New York City had any chance yet to think out this problem in terms of, first, what its share of the \$25,000,000 is, and, secondly, what it is likely to be able to accomplish in this drive.

I think that will probably be asked tomorrow, and maybe there is no answer to it, but if there is I think it would be interesting to all of us.

The third question is really part of the second one, too, that is: Has any quota system been devised, and, if so, on what is it based, because one of the problems we face at home, where we have talked about this, is this problem, and I think there are some other cities to which this applies more or less, namely, that if we are thinking in terms of an extraordinary effort in '56 and '57, some psychology that will lift us out of the normal campaign and project us not a minute ahead of last year but a long distance ahead of last year is necessary.

If we have that, then we have to think in terms of what is fair among the communities in order to know the potential among the communities.

Our men have done some calculation which shows that in 1946 we contributed two per cent of the national goal, which everybody assumed was a fair allocation. Now we are contributing four per cent. That means that some cities that gave one per cent may be down to six tenths of a per cent now, or some that gave five per cent may be down to three per cent.

The question is, on what basis will the goals be projected? Will it be on the basis of last year's experience, or will it be based on a new basis?

What are we going to get the people to think about this, on the basis of recharging their campaign? That is a question of technique, but I think several cities will be asking that question.

MR. KOUSIN: I want to agree with something that has been said here before, and I also want to raise a question that has not been touched upon except in a very cursory way by yourself.

This relates to the experience we had when

Elizabeth revised the formula we had, and the net result was that after what I consider to be an unsuccessful campaign, the non-UJA succeeded pretty well. They got more money than we gave them last year; and naturally the UJA got less. But we also raised less money. Still, the UJA got less.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: It sounds sickeningly familiar.

MR. KOUSIN: I was one of the people who argued for a more liberal grant for UJA.

Of course, we didn't have the crisis. If there is a crisis, we will perhaps need a little extra courage in the face of this new situation, and that is why I am a little surprised, Rabbi, when you introduced your statement, and you said something to the effect that you will be satisfied if we hold the line in terms of pre-campaign commitments to UJA.

If we are convinced that this is something special, don't we have to re-examine this basis? It is going to be pretty unpopular among the people, and it is unpopular with me.

It is hard to say it, but if we are convinced that we have to look for a new source of money, then we have

to re-examine the basis for the distribution of the money that is taken in during the campaign.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: It is an honest question, and it is one that comes out of soul-searching, and I can believe that.

Are there any other questions?

MR. SPIVAK: It seems to me we have been asking a lot of "iffy" questions. If there is a crisis, what the response will be, and if there will be a response. I think we have to get more specific.

Having returned from the Study Mission, about which a number of us like myself have spoken at various community gatherings -- and I don't think it is a surprise to any of us that after we spoke at any of these meetings, the people there responded with some desire to be of help, and a number of them asked very pointedly and said, "We would like to contribute toward the purchase of arms."

We explained that as far as the UJA is concerned, the important thing is the charitable nature of the gift, and so on and so forth. The point is this: Whatever explanation we gave to them, there still was a very decided and very strong feeling that they want to do something,

and they wanted to do something now.

It is good to be objective about this, and I think we have to plan this very carefully. But it seems to me we are dealing with a situation as if it were a chronic illness, whereas we really have an acute illness before us. It is something that may require action a lot faster than we think.

I don't doubt that among us we realize that this is a threat which requires immediate action. Perhaps our postponing and planning for a future campaign in April or May and then getting a goal and then going beyond the goal and then getting funds later and maybe months too late isn't the answer.

I honestly feel that the situation is so acute, it is so critical now that we ought to do something, something perhaps that is not in keeping with our own previous experience.

I raise this as a question not because I am certain that we can do it, but I raise it so that we should consider the possibilities of veering away from our past practice of having a date in March for a given period for a campaign goal, and we will try to reach the goal or reach

five per cent more or one per cent more, or whatever it may be, and our job is done.

Perhaps we ought to get to realize that the people will respond, they are responding, they want to do something now, so the campaign climate is good. The news that appears in the papers, the reactions of people you talk to -- it all adds up to a good campaign climate.

I think Max pointed it out, and others will bear it out, too, that the climate is such that we ought to try something now from a campaign technique point of view. The need is great now.

If we conclude as a result of this meeting that we ought to take action at this time and try to raise \$25,000,000 without regard to campaign goals in a given community, without regard to spring campaigning as such, I would like to propose a specific plan of action.

I realize that you cannot go into this immediately without exploring the implications, but merely from the point of view of a person who has always given a lot of thought and been troubled by it, I have wondered whether it would not be wise or possible for us to take the period of Chanuka, for example, and, again, with the inspiration of

our own experience, try to get those eight days as eight days for the raising of funds.

We won't say it is for arms. We will know it is for arms. The people we go to will know it will be for arms. But it will be to raise funds to help the State of Israel maintain itself.

MR. STERN: Three million dollars a day, and we've got it.

MR. SPIVAK: From what you say, Max, it should not be difficult for Elizabeth or Paterson.

MR. STERN: Maybe for Elizabeth it won't be difficult. (Laughter)

MR. SPIVAK: I propose this as something for our consideration as one possibility, or, if not that, something in between that and our regular order of doing business.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Everybody keeps saying we go into this meeting with an open mind and we will probably come out with something different from what we went in with. If we came out with something like this, it certainly would be different from what we had in mind when we went in.

An eight-day campaign for \$25,000,000 is something that the Jews of America could do with a snap of the fingers,

if we were able to reach them, and I really believe that it could be done.

The organizational machinery and apparatus by which we have to get at them is what stands in between the desire to get the money on the part of somebody like yourself and the willingness on the part of the contributor to give it. You want to get it and they want to give it, and that is true on both sides.

If only there were a way of reaching the people, I think three million a day for eight days would go like a snap of the fingers across the country, if there were some kind of machinery by which one group of solicitors could get to a group of contributors. It should only happen.

MR. COHEN: I just want to give you one experience we had in Boston. We raised at a special dinner about \$200,000 of new money on a North African appeal. We raised another hundred thousand at fund raising meetings. That was before the crisis in Israel.

After the crisis in Israel, we got our same cuts from the people that aren't the good people in the community. The good people had given already.

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I think the best idea thrown out here tonight is if we could dedicate ourselves to collecting the money that is outstanding, on an emergency basis, we would have a terrific campaign next year. We know that we didn't get money, we didn't get hundreds of thousands of dollars, because they were accumulating a backlog of money, of owing us money, and some of our best people are not afraid to cut, and they are not afraid to give less, and they won't give you ten thousand, and they will turn around and pay a debt to the hospital.

We all know that. If we can get our house in order financially, if you could dedicate your December meeting to that, I would say that I think we will be in much better shape.

I also think that we have to build up a real psychology in the minds of the people. After all, we had the problems in the 30's and early 40's, and nobody got together to give a million dollars. You had to build up a machine, and I think it takes time to do it. It just doesn't happen overnight.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Are there any other questions that anybody has to ask?

MR. BERNSTEIN: How about the answers?

MR. LUCKMAN: I was in Louisville about ten days or two weeks ago to speak for Bonds, and Clarence Douder, whom you all know, pulled me on the side and told me a most unusual story.

There is a man in Louisville by the name of Levy, who has nothing to do with the Jewish community at all. He doesn't contribute to the Welfare Fund campaign. He doesn't even want anybody to know he is a Jew-- but he has the name, Levy.

VOICE: Maybe it's his middle name. (Laughter).

MR. LUCKMAN: Levy approached Clarence Douder and asked him whether or not he could conduct a campaign for arms for Israel. He said, "I am proud of those guys over there, and I want to be the chairman of a campaign to raise funds for arms for Israel."

Of course, it's a very complicated thing, and I don't think that Mr. Levy, with his record of giving in the Jewish community, can really get people to back him up in a thing of this kind.

However, I think there is an awful lot in what you say. I was interested in the raising of funds for

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Haganah before there was a State of Israel, and, strangely enough, there was one year when Rudy Sonnenborn called us together, a group of us, only about sixty or seventy of us, and after we left the meeting in New York we went home and around the country we did raise three million dollars, and we did it very quickly, too.

The money was put right on the table. There were no pledges. We got the checks.

Even in our small community -- there are only twenty thousand Jews -- we got them \$100,000, which was a hell of a lot of money for a one-meeting effort to raise money.

I don't know whether we can do things that way. I don't know whether it is wise to do it that way at this time. Then you could do anything, because there was no State of Israel. Today there is a State of Israel, and there is a State Department; there is a Treasury Department. There are certain things that you have to do for public relations.

I don't know whether it is wise doing what you suggested, although to me it is a wonderful idea. I love it. I know that I could raise a lot of money in that way and

quickly. But whether or not we can do it that way is something else again. I think that we have to ask the Israeli Government. I think that there must be legal advise sought out, and various other things.

While I am on my feet I want to say a few things about these campaigns that we are all faced with. In Cincinnati, when the JNF wants to raise money they come' to me. When the Histadruth wants to raise money, they come to me. When the Hebrew University wants to raise money for capital funds they come to me, and in the last few days I had all of them in my office.

To the Hebrew University, I said to the fellow who was there, and I hated to take it out on the poor guy -- he is being paid to do a certain job -- I told him to go back to New York and tell the people there that we are not going to have a capital fund campaign in Cincinnati this year for the Hebrew University. I told him, "If the emergency is as great as it is -- and I believe it is -- then we have to use our efforts to raise money for the most needed purpose."

The Histadruth guy came around, and he had a plan to show me for a hospital in Beer Sheba. I don't know

if you fellows knew about this. He had a plan for three thousand dollars for an oxygen tent, and a thousand for this and two thousand for that. There was a list of about fifteen different things for the hospital. And he should ask me to call up a half dozen of my friends and get that money, and they would have those things that he included in the plan.

I said, "Look, forget about it. If there is an emergency -- and I know a little about what is going on -- I am not calling anybody up for any of this money at all. Get your hundred-dollar bills for this from the same guys that give you the hundred-dollar bills, and don't bother me with this special emergency campaign."

The JNF had their dinner last Sunday night, and it was the same thing, the same ten, five and twenty-five-dollar bills, with a few hundreds from a few of the people. That's all. They don't have a terrific impact on the community. There are no thousand-dollar gifts for JNF, and there are no thousand-dollar contributions to Histadruth. I think a hundred dollars is the limit for contributions to them.

They get a fair amount of money for their needs

from the community, but nothing to interfere with our regular UJA campaign.

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But I believe that tomorrow -- and I think that some of you fellows should consider this very seriously -- you should say what you said, try to get Sharett to understand and in turn send this information or give this information to the Israeli Government, that if we have to raise \$25,000,000, then they have to stop all these splinter campaigns and just suspend them for a year or two or forthwith let them go for the duration of the emergency.

I believe that the money can be raised, but, as you fellows all way, what is the method of raising it? That is something that I would like to find out from a lot of the other people.

MR. GOTTLIEB: I agree with Sol that there are a lot of people who would give money for arms for Israel. There are a lot of Jews who would give money anonymously, a lot of money anonymously, if we could go out and ask for arms for Israel. They would like to give money anonymously, because one thing that Jews don't like to admit is how much money they have, and this is a way of hiding it, if they could give it without being known to the community. I

think that is one way.

But I have hesitated to present any more questions, because it takes a lot of nerve to raise so-called picayune questions in this kind of a meeting. I think that if you have enough picayune obstacles, they soon build themselves up into an amazingly large mountain in a very short time, which is pretty difficult to climb over, and I think we ought to avoid that.

What we are concerned with is not how much money they raise for these other causes. We all know that the money is not substantial enough to materially affect our central campaign. What we are concerned with is the attitude of the Israeli leaders toward these campaigns. How do they allow these statements to be made in this country, the statements which confuse our leaders? How, too, do they allow an attitude to grow up over the years? We thought it would be different now, but, for instance, in relation to the bonds, they give the attitude that the Israeli Government officials are much more interested in the bond campaign than they are in the UJA campaign.

Moshe Sharett may be here by accident as far as that is concerned at this particular time for bonds, but in

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the past Moshe Sharett and Golda Myerson and a lot of other dignitaries have come here for the bond campaigns, and, as far as the UJA is concerned, we have been lucky to get the water boy from the Israeli Consulate to come out and lend the kind of dignity that is needed as far as the communities in the hinterlands are concerned.

If the boys here disagree with me, they can say so.

I also happen to think that it is terribly important for us to give very serious consideration to the impact of what we are talking about on the 1956 and on the 1957 and on the 1958 campaigns, not only because we as professionals are concerned with the campaigns in our communities.

Let us forget about the Federation campaigns and the Welfare Fund campaigns. Let us talk about the UJA campaign, and let us press the UJA campaign.

I think there are some serious matters to be discussed in relation to those campaigns tied in with this special effort. I for one have very serious doubts as to whether or not it can be done without being done at the expense of the 1956 and 1957 campaigns.

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I don't think that the experience around the country is going to be uniform. I think that there may be some communities where substantial sums can be raised on an emergency basis, on a Chanuka appeal, if you wish. I don't think that is practical, but it may be in some communities around the country.

I think we have to have a variety of approaches to communities. For instance, you take the refunding loans which are made. In some communities those loans are substantially paid, at least one third paid. I think, for instance, in my own community -- and I am not offering this as a suggestion, because I think that we will get a better public opinion from the leaders tomorrow than we can get from the professionals here -- but I think that in our own community, for instance, we could very well go out and borrow back the 33-1/3 per cent or so that we have already paid and advance it in cash to the United Jewish Appeal and use that as a basis for interpreting the crisis in 1956 to raise more money so that we could have the money to pay back the loans without affecting the 1956 and 1957 level of allocations in relation to 1955 and 1954.

I submit that I don't think that any uniform

approach to the communities is going to result in maximum results throughout the country.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Fellows, let me try to answer a couple of these questions -- not answer them in the sense of any rebuttal, but I have made notes on what everybody has said.

Here are some of the things I would like to say in answer.

A couple of fellows talked about bonds. I think that as much as has to be said has been said on that subject. At least, that is my opinion. I think we can get rid of that now.

One question was asked about whether to do it now or in the spring. One question asked was about getting it done at Chanuka. One question was asked, Why wait? Why confine ourselves to our previous experience? Our normal campaign is April, so we would have to wait until April.

In other words, there is a serious amount of doubt, a number of questions asked having to do with the timing of this thing.

We have no hard and fixed notion in our minds. All I say about the timing of the thing is that whatever is

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to do in your communities you do. As far as the special fund of the UJA is concerned, if the Assembly tomorrow votes it into being -- and again, let us not get involved in legal technicalities. The Assembly tomorrow does not come empowered by anybody except itself. It does not consist of anybody except -- we hope -- the best people in most of the communities, and I say that is a quality list that we have there tomorrow.

You will see that this Assembly tomorrow is a group of people who can say, "Yes, we recommend that the UJA should create a special fund and now come to each of our communities and ask us, and there in our communities we will vote formally on taking our share of it, and that will create this."

So whether it is created tomorrow or whether it is created in the period of the next thirty days, when we hope to visit thirty or forty cities, theoretically, when the special fund comes into being, it is empowered to receive contributions immediately, and any individual who wants to make a contribution to it can do so, whether his city has made an arrangement or not.

If an individual were to ask me my opinion, I

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would say, "Don't make a contribution to the special fund until we have met with your board in your town and worked it out with your board." As much as I want contributions to that special fund, beginning the day after tomorrow, I would have to tell them to wait until we have made our deal with their board -- our deal -- namely, as Henry Zucker brought up, "What is the quota of your city? If you are anxious to make a contribution to the special fund, what is your contribution going to be to the regular fund first?" That is because no one of you has come to the question which I think is the question that you should be asking: How do we get protected with our local share?

VOICE: That is coming next.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: It has been on the table for two weeks. How do we get protected? We have our payrolls to meet, and we can't cut down any more.

MR. BERENSTEIN: We will give it to you, Herb. You can do it.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: By now I can do it just as well. I understand it.

So I would say to my anxious contributor, "Yes, the fund is open for business tomorrow, and we will take a

contribution for it. But I would suggest that you wait until we have met with your board in your city."

Therefore, in my own mind, what is the timing of the thing? I will give it to you, and you tell me whether I am wrong.

In my judgment, the timing on this thing is, as soon as we can get to your communities, which we can do with your cooperation in the rest of the year, in the months of November and December, and have had formal meetings with as many of the local boards in the cities as possible, that we then begin to solicit contributions for the special fund, and if that means soliciting the contributions for the regular first, that is, solicit the regular contributions before you solicit the contributions for the special fund, or at the same time, to get that base nailed down, then start the big gift soliciting in every city, as they do in most of the bigger cities, namely, at the end of December or even in January, because in Detroit and Cleveland and Baltimore and several of the big cities they start the big give solicitation -- Miami certainly, with its jump-off in early January, starts a big solicitation already at the end of December or the beginning of January.

I would say, start then. If this means that in New York you cannot, because in New York you have an agreement with the local Federation until January 30, then in New York you don't start until January 30.

But there is a variation in every city. All I would say as far as the questions on timing are concerned is, get started as fast as you can. It is better for the regular campaign, and it is better for the special fund to do it that way.

MR. GOTTLIEB: How is it better for the regular campaign?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The earlier the big gifts are in, the better it is for the campaign.

MR. GOTTLIEB: I don't know.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: That is what everybody tells me, and this is what from my personal experience has turned out to be true.

The man in the big gifts category, who is going to make his big-figure gift to you for the Miami meeting in February, can make it just as well in February. He isn't waiting to see what his accountant tells him in November. He is already that far away from the end of the year.

I think that that is a sensible way to approach that question.

That is the only answer that I have as far as timing is concerned.

MR. GOTTLIEB: Are they going to have a January meeting in New York?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes. We have a January meeting scheduled, and we have a meeting scheduled January 21, to be exact.

MR. GOTTLIEB: A big gifts meeting?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes.

MR. ZUCKER: On a national level?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: That's right. The last big gifts meeting was held in honor of Eddie Warburg. Ten million dollars was announced at that meeting. It was a card-calling meeting, and everybody got up and said, "I give so much and so much, and in honor of Eddie I give this much more."

Eddie was sitting there, and this all took place in front of him, and he was embarrassed as Hell, and he did it because it was good for the campaign. It was just one of those things.

MR. STERN: Herb, could I interrupt you?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Sure.

MR. STERN: Could you tell us what percentage of the amount pledged to UJA for 1955 has been realized in actual cash?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry, but I haven't any idea. Irving, do you know?

MR. JACOBS: About sixty per cent.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: About sixty per cent of the 1955 campaign?

MR. JACOBS: Yes.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: In cash?

MR. JACOBS: Yes.

MR. PEKERSKY: How will it be protected?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: What do you mean?

MR. PEKERSKY: As I said to you in Jerusalem, merely for a city to take on an additional quota of a couple of hundred thousand dollars doesn't either assure the success of a campaign or assure the safeguarding of the funds.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes.

MR. PEKERSKY: My thought would be if something

could be worked out along these lines, briefly, that the city could be asked or the country could be asked to give a special fund of \$25,000,000 for North African immigration into Israel, and that each community would take a share of it and an allocation would be made by that community to that fund.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Just as it would to any other organization?

MR. PEKERSKY: Just as it would to any other organization. That's right.

For instance, in Washington, as I have it projected in my own mind, it would work as follows: We will take one per cent of \$250,000 and earmark it for North African immigration or colonization into Israel, and that will be safeguarded as would any other allocation to any other organization. That would be above and beyond what the United Jewish Appeal would get from Washington in 1956.

MR. ZUCKER: Where would you get the one per cent?

MR. PEKERSKY: Raise it. We will allocate \$250,000 in Washington over and above what we normally give them for the campaign.

MR. LUCKMAN: I understand what he has in mind.

If you work this in the regular procedure, and you raise \$250,000 more, how much is the United Jewish Appeal going to get if you don't make a special arrangement whereby they get it all.

MR. SEGALMAN: Everybody is going to get at it, wherever it is.

MR. LUCKMAN: In some communities they will get fifty per cent. That is what he means.

MR. VERET: How different is that from pre-campaign budgeting?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Let him phrase the question.

MR. VERET: How different is that from pre-campaign budgeting that will assure you one hundred per cent of the amount that you guaranteed last year?

MR. LUCKMAN: How are you going to get the extra money?

MR. STERN: Who won't give it to you?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: It is no different at all if you mean that Washington raised X amount of dollars last year, which it allocated in a series of subdivisions. Now he says that Washington will raise \$250,000 more, and that \$250,000, assuming that that is their quota, will be allocated

to the special fund, which means that nobody else can bite into it.

The assumption that they can raise the \$250,000 more is the premise on which he begins. He begins from the premise that they are going to raise more money.

MR. PEKERSKY: And also give it a priority. That is very important, too.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: And he is going to protect that much more money by regarding it as an allocation, which makes it inviolate. Nobody can say, "You raised \$250,000 more. Give us a bite of it."

MR. COHEN: Would you be satisfied with that arrangement?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: No.

MR. COHEN: Why?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The reason I wouldn't be satisfied with it is that all that it means is that the City of Washington, with the best will in the world, hopefully, wishfully -- yes, we are going to take your extra quota of \$250,000, and we are going to pile it on top of what we raised last year, and that makes up our new goal for 1956, and we will raise it, and that extra cream, the frosting,

that extra \$250,000 will go to you. You will get it, they say. Don't worry about it, they tell us, because we are going to allocate it to you.

I believe that you will allocate it to us. The question is of raising it.

Let me get down to cases. Somebody made a remark at the last meeting which I think is an important remark, because it goes to the very center of the thing. He said, "Do you have a real crisis here? If so, why aren't you willing to let every community raise that extra frosting, because it will roll in if the people really believe you have a crisis. Why must you have a special method of raising this money? If it is the method that you are talking about, then all that you are looking for is a trick. If the appeal itself isn't enough to produce the money, why do you think that a different methodology will product the money?" That is exactly what he said.

Now, look: Max Stern started asking the question at the very beginning. He asked, why have a special fund? Why not make this part of the regular fund?

I simply have the feeling -- and I would like to be persuaded otherwise -- I really want to be convinced

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otherwise -- that if a community takes on the extra quota, adds it to its regular amount, raises some part of it by a very vigorous campaign, we will get some part of it or we will get all of it, and all of it will represent some part of \$25,000. That is not what we are after. What we are after is something else.

What are we talking about, now? We are talking about a method which is as important as the concept, because if you accept the concept, then you have got to assent to the method and you have to accept the method by which the concept can be realized.

The method of a special fund means that after the man makes his contribution to the regular fund, he makes his contribution to the special fund, and in his mind he is doing something extra. He is not just giving a larger gift to the regular campaign. He is not just responding to your appeal to increase his giving. He is giving the gift which has become his normal tax, and he is responding now to the 1955 situation which he reads about in his newspaper.

I say 1955. In January it will be 1956; but it won't be much different.

The method is special, because something special has occurred, and you have come to him for his gift every year, and every year you have asked him to increase, and some years he has and some years he hasn't.

This year you are coming to him, and you are asking him for his gift, and you are putting a second card under his nose for a second gift. You want to put the two cards under his nose at the time time, or you want to give him the special card first, or you want to give him the special card second. Which way do you want to handle the card situation?

Nobody, certainly no one person in the National Office knows the answer to that. You know your own people better. You know your own cities better.

Let me try to finish the answer to Henry's last questions, which are the last ones I have, and then we can get down to the real discussion on this.

Henry asked three questions: Are there any extra contributions coming in from North African Jews themselves for this fund?

I would say in answer to that question, pretty flatly, without wanting to be checked on the figures, that

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the answer to that one is no. The North African Jews have a campaign which they do conduct amongst themselves, and there are some few wealthy ones. Their contributions to their own campaign are practically minimal; they practically don't exist, aren't worth talking about.

The main problem of North African Jews who have any money at the moment is how to get it out. They sure can't take it with them.

VOICE: So they might as well give it to this special fund.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I agree with you. They might as well give it. But they are lucky if they can liquidate their assets for any percentage of their worth.

Then there is the question that he asked about New York City. Henry Bernstein is here, and he may want to answer that question, about New York City's share and its accomplishments toward reaching that share.

The last question that Henry asked was about the quota system, whether it would be based on 1945 or 1955 or whatever year, or based on some sliding ratio on how badly a community has fallen off, what extra spurt will bring them back.

Irving, maybe you ought to be thinking about that while Henry is answering the questions that have been asked about New York City.

MR. BERNSTEIN: I want to apologize for just getting back from Europe. I haven't had a chance to find out what quota we are going to take or how we are going to take it.

Seriously, I think there are two answers to this. In the first place, personally I am convinced that the way in which the most money can be raised -- and I am talking purely about New York; this may not apply in your other cities -- for this special fund is by having the two-card system, because all of the people that we are going to have to go to, that are going to give substantial sums of money have in the back of their minds this one problem: "This rates me for next year, and I don't want to be rated for next year."

While we cannot say to them that this is a one-time gift, implicit in the fact that you say it is a general gift plus a special gift is the understanding that you can't come back next year and say, "Last year you gave us X dollars."

So far as my own thinking is concerned and the thinking of my associates who are concerned with how this might be run, we think that is the way to do it, the way to raise this money.

One thing among many things that Bill Rosenwald left to do today is to try to work out a date for our board on the 28th of this month so that we can come to some conclusion officially as to what New York should do. I don't think the question about what New York will accept as its goal is important, because New York will have to take on its fair share of this \$25,000,000, no matter what the rest of the country does.

What is much more important is how this money is going to be raised, and I would like at this point to comment on some of the things that have been stated because I think they are general problems.

I don't think that the question of competition with other campaigns is important in terms of the amount of money they raise. I think if we present it on that basis we are minimizing the effect of these other competing campaigns.

Its real importance is on the amount of damage

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it does to the overall picture, and what we have to get across is not that it takes away a few dollars that they raise that we otherwise could have, but that it kills important gifts that could be gotten, because people find this a very convenient excuse for getting away with a five-dollar bill when it should be a five-hundred-dollar bill making up their contribution.

I am not concerned about the desire of people to give money for arms and about not being able to satisfy them. Of course, I don't say that it does not have its own problems, but it is interesting to find that many of the people who are ready to give you money for arms become reluctant if they don't get a tax exemption, and they are not going to get a tax exemption if they give it for arms, and I don't think that the people who really count in this picture are so naive that they don't understand that giving money toward a special fund of this kind has a direct bearing on Israel's ability to purchase arms.

If these people don't know what is going on, they can read it in the papers and hear it from all sides. The papers are full of it, and if they don't read the papers they can hear it from the Arabs, because the Arabs

are doing something about it, too, and the papers have already got the request once again that the United Jewish Appeal's tax exemption be taken away.

I don't think we need worry about it. I don't think that is a problem to us. I do think that the big problem that we have -- and I am assuming now that this is so, since nobody has questioned it -- is that there is a crisis, that everybody agrees with it, and the immediate thing we have to worry about, to the exclusion of everything else is how we can implement the special fund. That is, after all, what we are here to talk about.

In my judgment, if we don't treat this as a special fund, if we don't get across the fact that one hundred per cent of this money is to go for this North African crisis, and, by implication, therefore, that the money becomes available to Israel and that money becomes available to Israel for the purchase of arms, then I think that we are going to fail.

If we don't look at it in that light, all we will be doing is tacking on to whatever sum is raised this year, say sixty million, the sum of twenty-five, so that instead of going out as we did in 1955 for some \$99,000,000, we will

be going out for \$85,000,000.

I can't look at that as making any success, and I don't think anybody else can, sincerely, either. I think we would be kidding ourselves.

Therefore, it seems to me that whatever approach is taken in any community, it ought to be related to this special fund, and I think that is the way, too, in which we protect ourselves.

All of us know that, no matter how good the first gifts are going to be, we are going to get to the point that Sidney mentioned, where the fellows who want to cut, will cut, and it is interesting to find, Sidney, that some of the people who have not given yet, the tough people, so to speak, are no less tough at this point, in spite of the crisis, than they were last year or they have been every year.

But the one advantage that we have -- and it is an advantage that we have been using successfully, because we are obliged to work all year round, even though it isn't an organized campaign -- is that this crisis has made it possible to say, "You can't cut under these circumstances, because we are going to have to come out and get a special

fund for this dual reason."

That usually works, and it seems to me that that is the kind of insurance that is important, and that is why I do feel that you ought to give serious consideration to that type of campaign in your own communities, a campaign addressed to the individual on the basis that more money is needed than we have raised in the past to do the things that we were supposed to do.

In addition to that, we have to get plus money. I think that the most tragic thing that could happen in this whole picture is for us to go through the motions of having a special fund and getting allocations to the special fund which would sound very nice in the right-hand pocket and then find that the general campaign for UJA takes that money away.

A thing like that would make us all look very ridiculous and I think will accomplish nothing, either for the present or for the future.

Somebody said, "What is going to happen in 1957, and perhaps we can take a leaf from what has happened in the past. There have been campaigns, building fund campaigns, and here I am talking about New York. I don't know your

experience.

Federation in New York ran a campaign in 1945 for its general campaign maintenance and building fund. It ran a similar campaign in 1949. In each instance, it is interesting to find that the year following the campaign in which they had the building fund appeal, the maintenance fund went up, even though in their campaign it was a three-year deal.

In the 1949 campaign they talked about special contributions. Nobody could give a special contribution unless the gift to the maintenance fund was at least as much as they had given in the past. The special building fund contribution could be paid over a period of three years, which was an additional feature.

What happened is that some of the fellows who said they would pay it up in three years paid it up, and when they were approached the next year, in their minds they had spent that much money, and you got more money from them.

I don't think we need worry about 1957 at this point.

There is another reason why I don't think we ought

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to worry about 1957. Let me tell you that if this thing isn't met in 1956, you won't have anything to worry about in 1957, because that is the kind of crisis that I think this is, not only in terms of North Africa, but in terms of Israel.

MR. GOTTLIEB: I would like to say something on the subject of this discussion.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Before you do, Mr. Gottlieb, I don't want to monopolize the floor on this end, but are there any people who haven't said anything, who want to talk now?

MR. BISMO: I think we ought to come to grips with what Herb really wants and see whether or not the communities are able to give it to us.

Herb just told us -- and I think I understood him correctly -- what he wants out of this, and that is that he wants UJA's share of what it got in the 1955 campaign. He said that when we approach them in 1956, that is the normal tax. What the individual gave in 1955 we want him to repeat in 1956, and out of that amount you want the same proportion that you got in 1955.

So far, is that correct?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: That's right.

MR. BISMO: Then you want another pledge card or another emergency contribution, and as I understand it, you want all of that because that will be for the Israel emergency, is that correct?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: That's right.

MR. BISMO: Well, Herb, aren't we right back to where we were when we thought about this a few days ago? We said that if the communities did that, there was one unanswerable box in which we would find ourselves, namely, that if all of the increases went to UJA in the form of the additional emergency gift, that campaigns like our own in Los Angeles -- as much as we love the United Jewish Appeal, and it has the highest priority that we can give it, because it is the largest gift that we give, and we love most the thing we give to most -- but if we did that, Herb, how would our campaign end up?

I have to tell you, Herb, that if we did that, our campaign would end up \$750,000 below what we raised in 1955, remember?

Now, how are we going to answer that? How are we going to solve that problem? How can we get the

normal contribution, the same amount as the individual gave last year, and give all of the overage, the surplus, the plus money to the United Jewish Appeal?

In addition to that, there seems to be devised no formula whereby we have a way of making up the normal increases that come to the campaign every year, making up for the guy who moves, making up for the guy who cuts, making up for the guy who dies, making up for the guy who goes out of business, and making up for the guy who, somehow or other, finds himself in a situation where he is sick or he had a bad year, and he has had to cut his gift in half.

That is the thing we have to answer here, and I don't think it is answered by just the thing that you want, as much as we would like to give it to you. It just isn't answered.

MR. TREGUBOFF: We are on a West Coast Jag right now, you might call it.

MR. BISMO: Incidentally, I wanted to report, Mr. Treguboff, you had a bond campaign the other day, and you weren't there, so it was a success. (Laughter)

MR. TREGUBOFF: How could it be?

MR. BISMO: It was the most successful campaign you ever had, and for the first time San Francisco, by some fluke, raised more money than Los Angeles. It was the best you ever had.

MR. TREGUBOFF: Incidentally, my friend's plan will not go over in San Francisco. They don't even know what the word Chanuka is. They celebrate Christmas, and it is only one day, and they couldn't raise that amount of money in one day.

There is another basic thing. What Herb in effect described, of course, is a certain additional gift in the form of earmarked contributions. While there is one advantage to New York that I never realized in this situation, it is not a Welfare Fund involvement.

I think there is one basic similarity. At least it is the only central fund raising effort, something that some people throughout the country were and are trying to preserve.

People felt there was some merit in not allowing the person to earmark the contribution. Taking my community, if earmarking of contributions were allowed, in the last five years the United Jewish Appeal probably would not

have received half of the money it received during that period.

So we are faced with another situation. We received upwards of a quarter of a million dollars from members, and some of them are members of a very strong section of the Council for American Judaism. There is one gift of \$28,000 from a vice president of the local Section of the Council, the same man who, two years ago, because he was interested in a particular medical institution, organized a group of about two hundred people and proposed a special pledge card campaign to raise some money, and guaranteed that upwards of \$200,000 would be raised for that particular hospital.

We told him in not so polite terms to go and fly a kite.

That gentleman will not forget. Neither will his group of people. They will not forget that, two years later, while earmarking in the name of that sacred Welfare Fund was not allowed, it is now not only allowed and permitted, but encouraged.

You see, that particular person would not understand or comprehend the crisis, because if he did comprehend

it, he probably would not constitute the nucleus of that famous organization.

To him what we are discussing now, however real it is, is very foreign, and I know that Morris Berenstein, who has visited our community on a number of occasions, knows what I am talking about.

That is another basic handicap, and is one of several that we have.

Now, there is a way out. There is a way out, even in an unfortunate community -- unfortunate from this standpoint -- like San Francisco. I think that, the leadership willing, something unkosher but not entirely unkosher can be undertaken.

Even in our community there are situations where something like this can be done. There is a group of people, not very many, maybe thirty-five and maybe as high as fifty, who will understand this thing, and I am talking about top gifts; I am not talking about anything below a hundred dollars or even a thousand dollars. I am taking contributions in the range of, let us say, \$2,500 or \$5,000 and up.

These people would really, understanding and

comprehending this thing, be willing to make a special contribution.

You might question the wisdom of violating it with a few and not violating it with many. However, those are the people that some of us believe are already at a high level of giving.

Normally, if most of those thirty-five or fifty repeated their 1955 gift in 1956, we would consider it a good job done in those particular cases. If they understand this emergency, and if over and above that good gift those thirty-five or those fifty want to make an additional contribution to the United Jewish Appeal for this emergency, because we are thoroughly convinced that no extra dollar from them would accrue to anybody in 1956 but this particular item, I think we would be justified in accepting it and remitting the total in toto to the United Jewish Appeal for this special purpose.

That is the only exception, really, as I see it. That is the only exception that you can really make, because, if you go 'way down the line on this thing in most communities, first, for our community, I don't think it will produce real dollars. It may be a good idea somewhere, but

it won't work out everywhere.

Secondly, it may lose real dollars, because that gentleman I described who gives \$26,000, or \$28,000, fourteen of his twenty-eight is remitted to the United Jewish Appeal. Now, I don't want to put his \$14,000 in jeopardy as far as anything that UJA is doing this year is concerned.

MR. FITTERMAN: I would like to speak on what to me is the most important thing, and the thing on which you said you didn't want to start discussion and which you took for granted.

I, too, am convinced at this point that the more important thing is the point of not the methodology which we have been kicking around, but I am personally convinced that the most important thing, however little or long time it takes to arrive at it, is the determination and voluntary recognition and conviction of how real the crisis is.

I personally believe that the degree to which people are convinced of the reality of the crisis will determine how much money is going to be raised for this special fund.

Even if you have a separate campaign, if you talk

about \$25,000,000, the people believe it is only worth one million or two or five or ten. That is all the separate cards will bring in.

At the same time, it could also bring in only one, five or ten, even in a merged campaign, if that, too, is all that the people feel and believe the crisis represents as far as giving is concerned.

I know that you commented a little earlier in terms of previous campaigns, but I do recall this, and I recall it very well:

When people believed that a hundred-million-dollar campaign meant just that much money, one hundred million, and that is the value and the importance and the emotional depth it had for them, they went out and got it and gave accordingly.

Even beyond that campaign, they they truly believed what the crisis was in terms of what it was translated to them in dollars to represent, they also got that, and they went out and raised money accordingly.

It seems to me that right now the main thing is not so much that methodology, because I personally feel that even if you had this separation you could end up not with the thing you wanted; but how we can comprehend,

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ourselves and be able to translate to American Jewry what this crisis is and why it is that it is \$25,000,000 and not five and not fifty, in terms of the immigration, because within even a merged campaign of the kind that we have handled in the Welfare Funds up to now, the important thing there would really be a matter of insuring for the United Jewish Appeal how it could get all that extra money instead of having to worry about how we are going to raise it.

Another thing I am sure of is that the conviction about how to sell that will raise it, and nothing else will do it.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Are you asking why the figure has been set at \$25,000,000?

MR. FITTERMAN: I am saying that the methodology is not the focus at the moment.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: All I can say is that if you can take Dayton or any other city and create the climate of 1948 all over again and get money in in such quantity as will reflect that mood of the people, then there will be no problem of methodology.

Are you following me carefully?

MR. FITTERMAN: I understand what you are saying. I understand it very well.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: If you have enough money flowing in, there will be no problem of methodology. We would not have to argue with you about pre-campaign budgeting, for example, to protect ourselves with one or two percentage points, as we do now. On this PCB --

VOICE: What is that?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: PCB is pre-campaign budgeting, where we go to the city and fight with you for an extra point.

MR. KOUSIN: Pre-campaign bargaining.

MR. BERNSTEIN: Communities invite you. You don't go. (Laughter)

RABBI FRIEDMAN: If the money were flowing in in quantities which reflected the attitude of the people, we would not have to argue about these pre-campaign arrangements that provide any kind of a floor under the amount of money we are going to take.

In a situation like that, we wouldn't have to worry about keeping the money in one fund or in a special fund.

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If you say to us that you can create the climate or you can exploit the climate already created, if you say to us that there is no war but that we are as close to a war as we can get without having war, there is no pogrom in North Africa, but we are as close to it as we can get without having a pogrom, and on the basis of an almost-war and almost-pogrom that you think the Jews will put up money, or we will set the size of our campaign, and we will get money, or we will cut something locally because we think that the situation of the crisis is more important, or anything that you would say which would indicate that money would be coming in in a flow, then you wouldn't have to talk about methodology at all.

You can see, it all depends on getting the money to come in.

I believe there is money to be raised, because I believe the Jews of America want to give it. I believe we have to ask for it.

The whole talk of methodology is simply to make sure that there is no argument later about what to do with this money that will come in.

If you want to eliminate talk of methodology, I

would be delighted, because then the premise would exist that the money would come in in quantity.

I think that the method will help it come in in the quantity that we need, the quantity that will enable us to stop worrying about the method, but, I repeat, if I am wrong, tell me that you think I am wrong, and if the method is cockeyed and that the quantity will come in anyhow, because the appeal is enough to produce it, and you are the guys who raise it, I want you to tell me about that, if that is the way you feel.

MR. STERN: I so move, Mr. Chairman. (Laughter)

MR. LUCKMAN: They are not the guys who raise it, though.

Just a minute. Let us get this straight. I want to tell you what happened in Cincinnati this year. Talk about raising money. There is nobody who can convince me that there isn't a damned sight more money in the Jewish community today than there was in 1948. No man living could convince me.

You own some stocks, and I own some stocks, too. I know what the score is. You get rich overnight, without lifting a finger up.

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In my town, my temple this year raised \$225,000 to build ten Sunday School classrooms. We needed it. Of course we needed it. But there were men in the temple who wanted to build a \$550,000 job, and I stopped them from going ahead with it. I couldn't prevent the \$225,000 job.

We raised \$136,000 for the Hebrew Union College for a new school they are going to build in Jerusalem, and we raised it one Sunday morning at lunch, just like that. There was nothing to it.

The Hebrew University came in for their building fund campaign, and we gave them \$50,000. Fifty guys each gave them a thousand dollars, or a thousand-dollar Israeli bone.

Three little jobs, \$385,000.

Do you mean to tell me we aren't raising as much money now as we used to raise years ago? Certainly we are, because there is more money around.

The problem is to convince them that there is an emergency. They all know there is an emergency, but the trouble is that it is costing us too much money to operate our local institutions, whether we like it or not. It is

taking too much of the money.

When I told the biggest contributor in our town that we are setting aside a reserve of \$235,000 for costs and reserve for uncollected pledges -- almost \$250,000 on a one-million-one campaign, he was shocked. In other words, a guy who gives ten thousand has to realize that two thousand of it is set up for costs and reserves, and he is paying the bill.

Do you think they like that? They don't like it any more than I like it, and I want to tell you that I don't like it.

MR. SPIEGLER: Is that against costs of collecting the money?

MR. LUCKMAN: Costs of operating the Welfare Fund and the reserves.

How much do we set up for service charges, or, rather for reserves for uncollected pledges? Six per cent. How can the whole thing be six per cent? It was \$235,000, a lot more than six per cent.

MR. STERN: You must have something more in there other than costs.

MR. KOUSIN: You have something for the local

services, don't you?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I am sorry to interrupt this part of the discussion, but there are a lot of people who want the floor who haven't had it yet, and I would like to begin to focus the conversation.

MR. ROSENBERG: I do want to say that if the tone of tomorrow's discussion goes along those lines, we are wasting our time tonight, because I think we should be rational throughout.

MR. LUCKMAN: I think I have been wasting my time for a long time.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I think that we are making slow, tortuous progress, but progress.

MR. KOUSIN: With deliberate speed.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes, in a direction. This is apparently the best we can do.

Look, fellows: For the sake of any argument, you keep on pressing for a point, and you keep waiting for and getting the rebuttals against that point. That is what has been happening here.

I have been pressing for a point, and everybody has been making comments and chipping away and working

around at the thing. Now let us keep on in that vein, and we will get somewhere.

MR. SOLLID: I still haven't heard the answer to Mr. Bismo's question. It is a very pointed thing, and I think it should be answered.

In other words, if we talk about Baltimore, if we had two contributors who died in 1954, resulting in losses of \$60,000, the United Jewish Appeal this year will, in all likelihood, receive the same amount of money that it received in 1954, a million and a quarter.

Local institutions did not get one dime more than they did in 1952, 1953, 1954 and 1955. In order to make up the \$60,000 in two losses plus a number of unwarranted cuts, Sol, because we agree with you that people have money that they haven't even begun to count, we had to pick up out of the community \$25,000 to \$130,000 to match last year's figure.

The United Jewish Appeal, by the way, got the \$125,000, although it was not an increase over 1954 -- or \$135,000, and you will get the \$135,000 by not having to take any losses.

But in what way are we going to reconcile a

guaranty which you say is involved in this pre-campaign budgeting of \$250,000 for 1956, with somebody not absorbing the losses that may amount to \$200,000 if we suffer -- God forbid -- a few other deaths?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The answer to the question is this:

When I say we want a guaranty for 1956 and 1955, I mean the percentage, not the dollars. If you take a \$200,000 loss in Baltimore, and our share of the campaign is \$500,000, we take a proportionate share of the loss. If our share in the campaign, according to the pre-campaign budgeting is fifty per cent, then of course we take fifty per cent of the loss. We split the loss. We take our percentage of it.

The real point of your question -- and tell me if I am wrong in my understanding of your question -- is this: Supposing we helped raise, in our special fund, for you, in answer to this question, the quota for the year or almost the quota of what you want in the special fund, which in Baltimore would be five or six hundred thousand, and our regular fund falls off, and you say, yes, you will take half and we take half, because, as you say, it is a fifty-fifty

split.

Then we are \$100,000 out. What do we do? You could make the question even more pointed. You could say, in order to take care of wash-outs, which is a couple of hundred thousand dollars, or \$135,000 worth in your town, or \$750,000 worth in somebody else's town, in order to take care of wash-outs, you have to get lots of increases to your normal funds, let alone talking about increases to the special fund.

How do you get increases to your normal fund to balance out deaths, removals and washouts for one reason or another? How do you do that when you are asking for all of the increases to go into the special fund? What is the answer?

Bill Rosenwald said we sat yesterday for three hours. What were we talking about? We sat for three hours yesterday to figure out a method of how or whether or when or to what extent can we be concerned about this amount of fall-off in every community.

The word that we kicked around among ourselves was the word "re-insurance." Shall we offer the communities the proposition that out of the amount that will be raised

in the special fund we will re-insure you for your share of the fall-off in the regular fund?

You might say that would be easy business. If you can really raise \$25,000,000 for the special fund in all the communities of America, and I go off a hundred, he goes off fifty and I go off thirty. You might even have to pay back something to the communities in certain situations. I don't know.

You have to make every community feel secure that it has its irreducible nut, its base. Then they will go along with you on the special fund.

We have several people in our inner councils who play the role of Devil's Advocate very gracefully, very fluently, and they persuaded us for three hours, and they tried their best to do it.

After being very, very desirous of trying to put ourselves in the position of the community, we have come to the conclusion that this is simply no scheme at all, that, to begin to talk about a special fund and then immediately offer the proviso that out of the special fund you will re-insure back the regular fund is an immoral proposition to make in terms of the contributor, and it is

an immoral proposition to make as far as the morale of the whole community of Baltimore or any other community is concerned.

That brings us back to the problem of what you do if you wind up with a hundred thousand less. It means that you have raised two hundred thousand less in your community.

I have to ask you: Does it stand to reason that in a community where you raise amounts like a million dollars, and you will raise a quarter of a million in the special fund, that your regular fund will drop off by a hundred, by 150, by two hundred or by the 250 that you have raised in the special fund?

If a million-dollar community on the 1955 basis, with 1955 slogans, with 1955 push, with 1955 energy -- whatever you put into the campaign -- if a million-dollar community of 1955 is asked to take a quarter of a million dollar quota for the special fund and raise this sum or almost all of it, and if that million dollar community will fall down a quarter of a million or any part of it in its regular fund, you are the guys who have to answer it, and if you all unanimously say yes, then you are telling me in

essence that you can't raise the money.

MR. SPIEGLER: We started off by talking about something else.

When Herman made his earlier remarks, he mentioned something about a mutual security pact, or something like that, among the Welfare Funds and the United Jewish Appeal, and I assumed that in there he was referring to the thing that we have been discussing now.

Herb has answered that in the sense of saying that it has been knocked around and that the UJA has concluded, or at least, the people who discussed it have concluded that it is not workable, and then you raised the question, Herb, that if you can raise a quarter of a million dollars for the special fund, do you mean to say that you are not going to be able to raise the same million dollars that you raised last year in order to insure the same amount of money for all the other agencies?

All you have to do is look at figures, whether it is in Los Angeles or Detroit or Cleveland or New York. You say Newark is a bad community. The fact is that you are bound to get decreases in some cases, and you know you are bound to get losses. You are bound to lose money,

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because people have gone out of business or moved out of town, or something like that, and every community can name right now some of the losses that they are going to take, because businesses have been liquidated and because people have moved away, because some people have died.

If you can't use a penny of your increases to offset those losses, you are bound to end up with less money for your campaign.

You are giving us a plan which is a built-in guaranty that a local community is going to end up with less money than it had last year.

I don't think we can operate on the theory and keep on making the speech that all the local agencies are living on the fat of the land, and the money they are getting is being taken out of the money that should rightfully go to the United Jewish Appeal.

Last year we took \$125,000 out of the local agencies. We closed some up completely. We cannot continue doing that year after year. You cannot say, take it out of the local agencies, they've got it and they have the reserves. I am telling you that you are going to have a hell of a time selling our community -- I can't talk for

anybody else -- that they should guarantee that the local agencies are going to have less this year than they had the year before, after a \$125,000 cut.

It doesn't make sense. I have discussed it with some of the best UJA people in the community, people whom you know, and they said they cannot see it. They are ready to talk in terms of saying that no local agency should get more, but it is obvious that at least we have been told that we have to hold them, and they are not ready to guarantee to each local agency, before the campaign, that they are going to get less.

There is one more thing I want to say, Mr. Sobeloff, and I pointed it out to Moe Leavitt in Jerusalem. There are people who are not ready to give to overseas agencies but are ready to give more to local agencies. Don't argue with me, because it's not my fault, but that is the way they believe.

We can't say to them that they have to stand still and we will guarantee them in the process that the agencies they are interested in are going to get less than they did last year.

Herb, it is not a realistic plan, and no matter

what resolutions are adopted by acclamation tomorrow, you are going to have trouble in the communities selling it to them.

There is no use kidding ourselves and saying that we are nice guys and we are going to go along with it. It just won't work out.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: What are you going to do about it?

MR. SPIEGLER: We are going to raise the money. That's what we are going to do.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: You are begging me to give you a plan, right?

MR. SPIEGLER: I guess so.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: All right.

Now, when I say -- not impertinently or impudently -- "How much more can you raise? We will go out and raise all the extra money we can." Do you think that is the way to get \$25,000,000?

I think this can be worked out. The best plan in the world can come out of this room, with the brains that we have here.

MR. SOBLOFF: It is a tough situation, and for

the moment in this discussion I don't see it quite resolved yet.

Herb, I hesitate to take issue with you on the subject of morality, with your background and mine (laughter)

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I know mine. I don't know your background.

MR. KOUSIN: That's what he means when he says that.

MR. SOBELOFF: Give me the benefit of yours.

Let us take a look at the morality angle of it. Is it moral for the United Jewish Appeal, as a device, to pretend that it is running two campaigns and then to make a proposal which guarantees that the \$56,000,000 part of an \$80,000,000 campaign will end downward and drag along with it everything else that went along with the \$56,000,000 campaign last year, because, for the reasons explained by the last two speakers, that is bound to happen on the \$56,000,000 part, plus the second part of last year's campaign.

In order to work out a device which would insure greater success for a new and separate campaign -- and I would emphasize that, that it is a separate campaign and a

new campaign -- is that good morality?

Doesn't the United Jewish Appeal have as much responsibility for the \$56,000,000 part of the \$80,000,000 campaign?

Forget the other part of the campaign. Morally, has the United Jewish Appeal a right to sacrifice a particular \$56,000,000 part of an \$80,000,000 campaign in order to do better on another part of it, and say that we will tie it up in such a way that, what the hell to we care if we raise more money in 1956 or not?

We have a new deal here, and if we tie you up on the other part of the deal, we will come out all right. It's all right to say that.

For the moment, let me say that I said my piece in Jerusalem, and I said my piece in Chicago. I don't have any fun repeating the points. They have been pretty well made.

I want to address you and the United Jewish Appeal this time on the subject of morality. Since the United Jewish Appeal was established, it has been campaigning through Welfare Funds. What does the United Jewish Appeal owe to the continuation of its partnership, and what does it

owe to the greater part of its own fund?

There have been many deals made as far as Israel is concerned. Whether it is because of bonds, whether it is because of the refinancing and anything else you want to bring up, the deals were made because of desperation, because there was always a desperate situation.

You always had to find some new way, and you are now frankly coming out with this proposition. That is why I say it is unresolved, and I am not going to challenge your point, either.

There is desperation. You aren't sure -- I don't mean you personally, but in this connection I am talking about the aggregate thinking -- you are not sure that the Jews of America are ready to give really big money, because when you say that they will give it in a separate campaign, and they won't give it in the regular campaign, once you get out into a community, you are going to have trouble collecting your money.

I think I said this before. A man gave ten thousand last year. If he is not ready to give ten thousand this year, handing him an extra card isn't what is going to swing it, because, with all respect to Henry Bernstein,

this ability to give more money on a one-time basis is not a new idea. We have done that again and again.

If this fellow doesn't want to give you more money, that isn't the way to get it.

As a matter of fact, we have taken gifts like that already. A fellow says, "I will give you a thousand dollars, but don't put it down as a regular gift."

It is not a brand-new idea. We have done that in lots of ways.

If you want to do that in a more dramatically set-up form, if you want to do it more dramatically, all right. As I recall, at the last meeting, Mr. Zucker flirted with the idea of just a little bit of pregnancy, and I think that is what Mr. Treguboff was flirting with, too. Maybe we can figure out something.

Frankly, I am ready to consider the possibility -- and I think I said this last week -- of letting Joe Holtzman come down from Detroit. He is a very good giver. Everybody in the community knows it. He is a member of the Cabinet, and he is very deeply involved.

The likelihood of his giving more money without some special excitement and special need is not great. If

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he wants to give and if he is ready to give, whether it is five thousand or ten thousand or whatever else more, I would be inclined to respect that, that he has a right to earmark it, and I would be ready to say, if you put two limits on it, that you can tie us up two ways, that everybody who wants to give more to UJA can give it -- that part is all right.

Another thing: With respect to all the people who will give less, that is our hard luck, and we will take the licking on that.

Something else: The point that Herman made, that you do have, whether you represent five per cent of a given community or more than five per cent, you have a situation like we have. In our community it isn't a big percentage, but it might represent \$50,000 worth, or even \$100,000 worth, where some fellow would give you an increase because he is interested in something other than the United Jewish Appeal.

I am not overstating it. In fairness to the United Jewish Appeal, I think the overwhelming amount of increases would come from UJA, but that difference -- and it may be \$25,000 or \$50,000 -- maybe in this situation

it would be the difference between the other agencies -- there are even a few Israeli agencies among them -- other agencies doing at least as well as the year before.

I think you have to try here, whether tonight or tomorrow, to figure out from the standpoint of morality, from the standpoint of some principle, and from the standpoint of practicality, a little bit more flexibility.

The easiest thing in the world -- and Herman also said this -- is to get resolutions passed tomorrow. What resolutions you get passed depends often on who is running the meeting, under whose auspices the meeting is being conducted.

You can get by acclamation tomorrow a resolution passed that anybody who doesn't go for the special campaign is a bum. You can get it passed, because it is pretty hard, in the climate of a particular meeting, to stand away from the majority, even if you really think you are right in what you feel.

If you could maintain that climate all the way, you could raise your \$25,000,000 and then some; but once you get away, the climate changes.

What we ought to try here is to figure out the

spirit of this meeting, to have enough flexibility to meet the situations as they arise.

There are places where flexibility would be important. One of them wasn't mentioned, and what I want to point out on the other side, which is from the other side of what I have been saying is that in every year, in the same way that we lose money, get certain losses, still in the same way we get certain new money.

The UJA has to make that part of the figure. That entirely new money can be figured in the regular campaign. That is a piece of money that can help out toward balancing out.

The United Jewish Appeal should not be thinking of that as money taken away from it, because it is about to ask for and get very special consideration, with all due respect to the special need, which ought not to result in making people in every community, again, whether it is five per cent or ten per cent or more feeling that this is a bad deal and demoralizing the Welfare Fund to the point where even if you don't worry too much about 1957, it will come back to plague us, because surely enough in 1957 the UJA will continue to have some kind of emergency, and if you tie

up the other causes on the same level, by the following year they will want a special card, and there will be wrangling with them.

They will say that they gave you special considerations, and the United Jewish Appeal will have to explain that the emergency is endless and they can't ever have that special consideration.

It might end up in a mess. I am very much afraid of that.

So what I would appeal for is thinking on what are the points of flexibility, so that the plan that is offered shows some respect to the total situation that we are talking about here.

I said that every time I spoke before on this. Nothing I am saying should mean to you that everything else must be treated as well as the United Jewish Appeal, but there is the problem of the floor and all the wrangling tomorrow, and all the big givers all over the country, and all the communities are lush and fat -- it is not going to convince the Agency, a hospital or a Talmud Torah that somehow they ought to get along on less money. I don't think you can count on that.

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Part of the planning has to be how in one way or another we can at least be saying to the communities, "In this emergency, stay put. Don't expect increases." But you can't tell them that they are going to end up with a plan that gives them a licking, because they are going to make a lot of people unhappy, and the net result will be harmful both to the United Jewish Appeal and to the other agencies and to the whole efforts.

MR. ZUCKER: I want to follow up the last two parts in this manner: I have done a little thinking here, and I am ready to talk about getting a little more than a little pregnant.

What I was talking about in Chicago did involve part of the approach to this problem. I have become convinced of this: I think some things are crystallizing in the group here.

First, everybody assumes that there is an extraordinary condition prevailing at this present time, and that we have got to do everything we can to treat this next campaign on a basis that maybe we haven't been thinking psychologically about for a number of years. I think we have to consider that right now.

So I think that is a beginning point, and I think we can all assume that.

The second point is, recognizing this emergency, still nobody here representing a Welfare Fund feels that it is feasible -- I will leave out words like "Moral" or anything like that; I am talking strictly on a practical basis -- to let down the other beneficiaries in a Welfare Fund, including your own beneficiary agencies.

So that we must assume that what is done for the United Jewish Appeal is not done at the expense of the other partners in the Welfare Funds.

I think that probably in this group all the Welfare Fund executives will agree with that, so that from a practical point of view, no matter what the technique for raising this \$25,000,000 comes out to be, I think we must assume that in all probability the United Jewish Appeal cannot have any more money in 1956, unless more money is raised.

I think that that assumption should be made.

This business about two separate funds or one fund -- I think that is a matter of technique, which probably should be allowed to be chosen by the individual city as

it determines best.

In other words, the communities themselves can do better if they are allowed to judge whether the best results will come from two separate campaigns or from a joint campaign, so to speak, from one appeal or from two separate all-inclusive appeals.

I can see the reasons for this. I can understand it, and I think all of us should say that New York is the best one to judge that. In San Francisco, if Treguboff says it is going to work against the best interests of all the partners in the Welfare Fund, to single out this thing and point it up and make a special fund out of it, I think San Francisco should be able to work out the techniques that will raise the most amount of money for the special fund or any other fund.

For Cleveland, I think that we could probably enter into an agreement with the United Jewish Appeal which provided this: If we raise four million one, in the campaign, using round figures now, which is the same as we raised in 1955, the United Jewish Appeal will get the same number of dollars as it got in 1955.

In other words, if you raise four million one,

that is the situation that could be worked out.

If Cleveland aims to raise five million and raises five million, whether in one fund or two funds, it would be possible in my judgment for the nine hundred thousand overage, less allowance for shrinkage, to go to the United Jewish Appeal -- just that part of it, that nine hundred thousand.

I am not committing Cleveland. I am not saying it can be sold in Cleveland, but I am saying that it may be feasible.

I don't know if it is feasible to raise five million dollars, but that remains to be seen. At least, that type of distribution, based on the supposition of whether we can raise it in one fund or two funds, is something that may be able to be done in Cleveland.

I think we should see whether some general acceptance of that approach in terms of budgeting is feasible.

I am not saying whether the town can do it, but whether in a general way, without too much deviation from that kind of formulation, something like that is feasible in 1956. I think a question like that could be discussed to some advantage now.

MR. KOUSIN: You want to use the term "freezing"?
Is that it?

MR. ZUCKER: I don't know about that. In most cities, within the amount reserved for the UJA and within the amount of other agencies than UJA, whether there is the ability to make such a reserve.

This situation doesn't have anything to do with how you raise the money.

Let me suggest one more possible technique for some cities. I am thinking that maybe this would be a good technique for Cleveland -- I don't know -- namely, that, recognizing an all-important emergency and assuming that the community is sold that there is an extraordinary situation here and we have to raise not five per cent more next year but a lot more money than this year, the suggestion is made that then we deviate from our policy of not earmarking funds at all, which we have never done in Cleveland, and deviate to this extent, that we will present the opportunity, try to sell it, of course, to contributors, to earmark anything above their 1955 contribution.

Let us say a man gave \$10,000 in 1955. If he will give two thousand as a special gift in 1956, he can

say, "I want that all to go to the United Jewish Appeal or to local agencies," or he can say that he thinks the budget committee knows best what to do with it.

In our situation, assuming that we have a good campaign, it would go almost all to the United Jewish Appeal.

I think that offers another possibility, because you are assuming now that the distribution would be roughly the same for 1956, and it gives you a chance to let people put it where they want it to go or, as I hope they do, leave it to the budgeting committee or the board of the organization to decide whether to give it to the United Jewish Appeal or to some other agency.

I am not suggesting that we adopt anything like that but rather that we think whether that applies to any of the individual cities represented here

RABBI FRIEDMAN: How about having reactions from some of the other people?

MR. BERENSTEIN: I think the first time I spoke was only in answer to my name being mentioned.

I don't think professionals raise the money, but I am sure they feel they do. I think some of them are

commencing to realize that once in a while they do need help.

I preface my remarks this way, by saying that, thank Goodness there was that other organization mentioned tonight, because if I say something tonight that loses my job in this one, I have someplace to run to.

All I can say, to begin with, is that there is no \$25,000,000 in this discussion. It is a lot of schmoos. You could use a different word to describe it.

It hurts me, not that I thought we were going to come out with too much more than this, because, frankly, I don't like our plan, and I mean it sincerely.

I think that the position is untenable. I think it is unfair to the Welfare Funds, and I also believe that the plan of saying that we freeze 1955 is untenable to the United Jewish Appeal.

I think that it is unfair, also, to talk on the one side of your mouth about our understanding that it is a genuine emergency, and maybe a country is going to be wiped out, and Morris, don't get emotional, because, after all, that is what we are talking about, and then say, but everything must stay as it is, regardless.

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That to me does not make much sense, either. It seems to me that there must be a common meeting ground some place. I am sure there isn't a dire plot that has been hatched by the Israeli Cabinet in order to wipe out the Welfare Funds. The reason we are having such a problem is that there is such a thing as Welfare Funds, and we want them to keep operating for the good of the American Jewish community, not the Israeli Jewish community.

Unless we are all going to bend our heads to the thought of what is this between and not argue pro and con against one another, we aren't all trying to figure out an answer for the same thing, and we are really on both sides of a table.

For instance, I don't like reserves. I don't like the six per cent. I am not a professional, but am I wrong in saying that our collections are a lot better and losses are less?

Campaigns are smaller. People are giving less money, but the money is coming in faster, and perhaps the reserve of six per cent is an impractical reserve at this time.

If we scan the thing, we can find places where

we can cut, especially if we are talking about saving a country.

There are communities that have capital funds included in there. Would it be immoral not to deduct one year's proceeds for capital funds? What is immoral about that? Every community is different. I realize that. You can't take the community of Newark, for example, because what they did last year they did because they were not raising enough money, and you cannot ask them to take another \$165,000 off.

But what community did take the \$165,000 off? So, herman, why are you using this as a pattern for the country at large?

I say that we are coming back to something which I despise, because it is tortuous, and that is pre-campaign budgeting based on a community's desire, and where the United Jewish Appeal, if it is resolved tomorrow -- and I agree with Mr. Sobeloff, that that is a very emotional question, and it would be very simple to get an acclaim from the best people, and if you look at the audience tomorrow, they are the best people, and those people will give more money, too, that is, the ones who are at the meeting

tomorrow -- I don't know about the ones who are not coming to the meeting.

But that isn't what we want, otherwise we would not have held this meeting.

Isn't there somewhere a legitimate and reasonable and sentimental if not emotional point where we can get together on the thing? Let us translate the facts.

We will take Baltimore, for instance. There is \$200,000 less on this particular thing, because of the special situation. Baltimore's share is a hundred. Maybe they can find fifty, if it is this so-called word that we keep using, and somewhere along the line we can be honest with ourselves and the people who put up the money, that you, the professional leadership and we, the designated people appointed by Israel, all work together on this basis, not that local agencies are frozen.

I will tell you why I am afraid. I would be the first one tomorrow, if it is done on a local freeze basis, to say that it cannot be done. I think I am a good enough campaigner to know that we are talking about two million, three million or four million dollars. Actually there are small bullets being fired here.

What happens in sixty days or ninety days, when the big bullets are fired? What do we do then.

We are going to find that we have sold our rights and sold our souls for a mere pittance, and we have left ourselves with nowhere to go except to say that we are sorry, let's run another campaign.

I say to you gentlemen that unless out of this is coming a soul-searding fifteen or twenty or twenty-five million dollars, let us not have it. That is my opinion, and it is given to you on that basis. It will be the worst thing to happen to American Jewry.

Take Morris Berenstein again. Take me. Suppose I give Five thousand dollars more to the Syracuse campaign, and Syracuse allocates the same kind of money. Somebody gives less, and the Hebrew Education gets more. Well, it just does not make sense. You are going to kill me as a potential big giver. You aren't going to keep me giving that kind of money.

There are lots of Morris Berensteins. There are lots of people in that position.

I am just trying to point out the insecurities and the unfairness of the things said here tonight. It is not

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deliberately being unfair, because, believe it or not, I do believe that every man in Israel would like to walk out of this room with a proper plan, and every man would like to walk out knowing that he has contributed to the safety of Israel without hurting anything here.

I don't know long you fellows wish to stay. I have been at many places this week. Maybe it will have to come out tomorrow.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Do you have a suggestion to make on this?

MR. BERENSTEIN: I think the thing can be argued back and forth with the understanding, for instance, that different communities would have to be different. If you take a community like Newark, I think it takes a close examination to see that there are three or four spots where you know you can save some money.

MR. KOUSIN: You yourself indicated that there is no money in it.

MR. BERENSTEIN: Then I say that you should go out for an all-out separate card drive in the communities, but based on some sort of a plan independent of what is already going on, some sort of a plan of an amount, not the

full amount but, after examining it carefully, some sort of an amount so that the community knows it does not have to close up a worthwhile institution. Not a hundred per cent, maybe not seventy-five per cent, not fifty per cent.

In other words, what I am trying to get at is, suppose we did pre-campaign budgeting in every community, all over, in 1955, based on the emergency that exists. Would we have done it differently? If we could not, then there is no sense of meeting here.

That is what I am saying. There is no sense of meeting here, because you are saying only then that -- I am sorry. Go ahead and ask questions.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I would like to jump back to Henry's suggestion. Henry was trying to get reactions to a specific suggestion. Morris was saying that we ought to be able to find a common meeting ground out of this impasse that we are in.

Maybe he was saying to me implicitly that I ought to budge a little bit.

I was listening to his figures there. He had Baltimore down to where they took a couple of hundred thousand dollars loss, which we think involved a hundred

for them and a hundred for us.

Maybe they could find ways. They have a reserve. Dig in. And so it winds up that they need thirty thousand from somewhere. So let us worry about that last thirty thousand later in the year, next June or July.

I think that is what Morris was telling me. I am not sure.

MR. SOLLID: If we raise the amount of money, the same this year, probably the United Jewish Appeal will get the same, and if we raise more, probably the United Jewish Appeal can get almost all or all of the overage.

Second, there is the specific suggestion of earmarking for those persons who have made their basic gift and giving them permission to earmark the overage.

So that Morris Bernstein in Syracuse could earmark his five thousand for the UJA.

Let us say that in Cleveland last year they had an overage from a special campaign. Aren't you saying the same thing? If a community raised a few hundred thousand less, the UJA and the other beneficiaries would share and share alike in that loss. But I am putting together two figures, one, the figure that was raised basically, and,

the other, what was raised in the special campaign.

MR. GOTTLIEB: I want to comment on the remarks made by the last few speakers. This is not rebuttal, but it is in a more positive tone than we have had up to this point.

My first statement will be more or less negative, but I think what we are doing now is talking, going back to the point where we are talking about increasing quotas, and in that way we are going to raise the money, which to me is ridiculous.

I can guarantee that our community will take a much larger quota for 1956 than it did in 1955, and I can guarantee that everything we raise above it will be for the emergency fund. But that does not say that we are going to raise the money. That is just paper work.

I think when we start talking about what we can save we are talking about picayune things and not anything that relates to \$25,000,000 at all. What we are talking about here, stated baldly, is raising more money, so that this \$25,000,000 emergency fund can be raised.

I am not particularly optimistic when it comes to thinking in terms of raising more money in these times,

after having dealt with certain leaders under certain conditions. They were not optimistic at the time that the first hundred million campaign was projected. It was not projected on the enthusiasm of the professionals.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: On whose enthusiasm? I would like to know.

MR. GOTTLIEB: I am coming to that.

I happen to think that this \$25,000,000 can be raised, if it is to be raised, by the United Jewish Appeal. The United Jewish Appeal has to learn to help itself. You can't expect that the communities are going to tell you that they are going out to raise this \$25,000,000 and then admit that the way the crisis or the emergency, whatever you want to call it, received acceptance throughout the country was due to what the United Jewish Appeal did in relation to that crisis or in relation to that emergency.

In your communities, if your leaders say that there is a crisis, there is a crisis. If the United Jewish Appeal leaders say there is a crisis and they are willing to give X number of dollars on top of what they gave last year, then there is a crisis, and there is the beginning of an understanding of that crisis all throughout the

country.

You have a situation here in New York City. You have a meeting which I attended last year in January here in New York. I tell you that for all practical purposes we can't get down to any fund-raising before January. All of us would love to do fund-raising early. All of us would love to start fund-raising on January 1. But there are good reasons why we can't start campaigning until March or April, which I can't go into. We would love to have our campaign over by Passover, so we could go to Grossinger's for the holidays, but we can't do it.

This January there is the National Big Gifts Meeting. The only people who can deliver the top people to that meeting are the UJA people, with our help. But the UJA has to work on it.

The United Jewish Appeal in New York was for the most part a big gifts meeting in the City of New York. There were scattered leaders from around the country who came and made contributions, but for the most part it was a big gifts meeting for New York.

I would like somebody to dispute the fact that it was an inspirational big gifts start for the City of New

York. That was the impression that I got.

MR. BERNSTEIN: The impression is wrong.

MR. GOTTLIEB: Then the impression is wrong. In any event, it didn't represent the leadership of the United States. It didn't represent the top givers of the top communities in the United States. There were only a handful of those people there.

I am talking about the attendance at the meeting now.

MR. BERNSTEIN: We are talking about money, not attendance.

MR. GOTTLIEB: Hartford happens to be a good community. Hartford had only one leader at the meeting.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Suppose you got ten.

MR. GOTTLIEB: Suppose we had seventy or eighty per cent of the money there. You can organize those people and plan to the point where at that meeting those people will get up and say, "I will give the same as I did in 1955, and in addition to that I will give twenty-five per cent more", whatever it is, "to meet the emergency."

Until you do that, you have a situation where the crisis is not recognized by the Jews of America. Until you

do you haven't got a crisis.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The Warburg meeting last year was a National UJA Big Gifts meeting, at which announcements were made of gifts to local community Welfare Funds, more than New York. It was more than just that. The proportion was the reverse.

Those contributions were made all with increases for Mr. Warburg to the Welfare Funds of those cities, and when the cards are all shifted down at the end of the year, the ten and the fifteen and the twenty per cent increases that were announced under the impetus of the UJA, called by a National UJA meeting, in honor of the National UJA President, ten and fifteen per cent increases made in his honor, in his name, in his presence -- when the whole thing is all boiled down at the end of the year, the United Jewish Appeal doesn't get it.

MR. GOTTLIEB: No. That is not what I said.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Let us take it your way, but go one step further.

Look, fellows: This is very important, because you may be suggesting something here which you don't realize, but let us talk it through.

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If the United Jewish Appeals to start to become a national machinery for the purpose of the raising of gifts, namely, get into the business of making more direct solicitation than it does -- and weigh this carefully -- and the UJA becomes a fund-raising apparatus in a national sense similar to what you are in a local sense, and we start picking up the big gifts around the country through the medium of our own people --

MR. GOTTLIEB: No. I suggested that you do it at one meeting.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: At what point do you want to stop, then?

MR. GOTTLIEB: At that point. We will take it up from there.

MR. SOLLOD: Mr. Chairman, the gifts that are made at the UJA Big Gifts meeting, whether they are made in New York or Washington or at Miami Beach, are arranged at home, arranged for by the people in the city in which the gifts are made.

Detroit had about \$700,000, and every penny was delivered so that a good start would be made for the campaign.

It is those first big gifts and a sprinkling of them and more than just a sprinkling of them from each city with a big increase that permits us to believe that we will raise twenty-five per cent more this year, and that will be the closest guaranty of success to this effort.

MR. BERNSTEIN: You have missed Herb's point. Herb is saying that he agrees that the way in which the 1946 campaign was put over, the way in which the subsequent campaigns that raised more money went over was based on the fact that the top leadership gave the kind of leadership that spelled, "This is important to do."

What Herb is saying is this: How do you relate that to what finally comes out of the Welfare Funds when you are talking in terms now --

MR. KOUSIN: It is unimportant.

MR. BERNSTEIN: It is not unimportant. When you are talking in terms of a special \$25,000,000, which you have to get over and above what you raised last year, how is it going to come out of your Welfare Fund?

MR. SOLLOD: It is not going to come out of the United Jewish Appeal unless it is plus dollars, no matter how many special dollars are raised. In New York or another

large city you might pick up \$25,000. We are talking about big money, if we can raise big money over and above what we raised in 1955.

That is the only answer to this problem. I say that if we agree to that and if we agree in our pre-campaign arrangement that this overage belongs to the United Jewish Appeal or substantially all of it belongs to the United Jewish Appeal, then I think that the only thing that stands between the UJA and this extra \$25,000,000 is a successful campaign for the money.

That is the reason I coupled the two suggestions together.

MR. ROSENBERG: I want to endorse what Henry suggested. I think that in order to raise what you raised in 1955 you have to pull out all the stops. We have to put in the UJA and we have to put in all the emotional impact of the United Jewish Appeal, plus the local agencies, plus the JDC, plus whatever agencies are included.

We seem to have taken for granted here that without too much effort we can raise what we raised in 1955, that we can simply go to people and say, "Give what you gave in 1955," and then put on the UJA story.

In order to raise what we raised before, we have to put on the UJA story as part of the total picture. How can we separate the two parts of the UJA story in making the appeal to our givers?

Therefore, it seems to me that it has to be a one-package deal.

Secondly, as we think more about this dual card approach, it seems to me that the very approach of the two cards is an admission of weakness. You are in effect saying to the people in the community, "We know that no matter how often we appeal to you, we will not raise enough money, so we are coming to you with two cards."

The answer seems to me to be that if we can make an effective enough approach on the part of the UJA and try to put across some of the spirit of the year 1948, we will be able to raise enough money, not necessarily to raise the additional \$25,000,000, but to approach it.

MR. BERENSTEIN: Let me ask you a question. I think I can get a hundred thousand from Sam Friedland as a special thing, but I don't think Sam Friedland will announce a gift of \$200,000 as a basis for years to come. I am sure he will not.

It is the same thing with me. You can't get me to give it as a basis for years to come.

Suppose next year there is no great emergency. Suppose next year peace comes, and everything is fine. We are talking about big money. We are not talking about big money from the non-givers. We are talking about big money on top of the big money from the big givers.

Those fellows are entitled to protection. That is moral, also. They cannot shrink in the corner next year because they cut a big gift a little bit.

MR. ROSENBERG: That would be covered on a community basis. This would imply a pre-campaign budgeting process. In every community you can pick up the Sam Friedlands or the Holtzmans or whatever, on a special one-time grant. But I do feel that very few communities -- and I am talking about the larger communities, those big enough to have professional direction -- not because of professional direction -- but very few of those communities will accept as realistic the two-card approach or the freezing approach.

The only approach these people will accept is the ability of the United Jewish Appeal, together with the

Welfare Funds, to create, as Bob Fitterman said before, an acceptance of the crisis which can be translated into a 1948 type of a campaign.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: In pulling out all those stops, Ben, using your words, pulling out all the stops means talking North Africa and talking war, and you are going to get the same as you did in 1955.

MR. ROSENBERG: I didn't say that, no.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: If that is the fact of the matter, Ben, then I think the people in Israel ought to know it.

MR. ROSENBERG: No. There are other aspects of the UJA on which to appeal in order to raise what we raised in 1955.

Added to that, in the same package, we pull out all stops such as the emergency and the Moroccan situation, and we will be able to raise more money.

MR. BISMO: Herb, I think we are running around. I am at the end back here, and I am almost back in California.

I think we are going in circles, and we ought to return to what some of us feel is the only way that this

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money can be raised, and I think Henry said it, and I think my friend from Miami said it: The only way that it can be done is to run a better campaign in 1956 and for the United Jewish Appeal to get all of the extra money that we raise.

Now, when we started out, you asked a question. You said, "Can we raise more money in 1956?" We can raise more money in 1956 if there is a crisis on which we can peg raising that.

The question comes back not to us, but now it is a question of whether you have confidence that we can raise more money in 1956, and you only have confidence if you believe there is a crisis. If there is a crisis, we are going to raise more money, and every community here is going to raise more money, and you are going to get all of it.

Now, what is going to happen if we don't have a crisis? Look at what has happened in the past couple of years. Without a crisis in 1956, the communities, by and large, are going to raise what they raised in 1955. I think it has been demonstrated during the past couple of years that we have more or less shaken down to a figure. Our campaigns haven't greatly differed from one year to the

other, with the exception of one or two per cent.

So, without an emergency and without a crisis, in 1956 we will about raise what we raised in 1955. The only thing that the United Jewish Appeal is entitled to -- and a hundred per cent -- is the plus that is going to come about as a result of a crisis in 1956.

Now, if you have confidence in the communities, that, by and large, they will raise what they did in 1955 next year, and there is a crisis, and we can go out and raise more money, then have confidence in the apparatus that has been raising the money for the United Jewish Appeal all of these years. If you have confidence in it, then we are going to run that kind of campaign.

You say, "But if we do it, it is just what we have been doing every year." If we say to Los Angeles, "You raised four million seven this year," then we say that Los Angeles' additional quota for next year is a million, so that Los Angeles is going to have a quota to raise of five million seven.

There is a difference this year. If the crisis isn't there, you don't deserve it, because there isn't a crisis; but ideally, if the crisis is there, and the plus

on last year's quota is real -- and I submit that every time there has been a crisis, the communities have responded and money has come through.

In 1946, when we had sacrificial giving, we raised more money. In 1947 we raised more money. Why? Because the American Jewish community believed that there was a crisis.

In 1948, didn't we come back and raise more money than 1947? Yes, because the Jews in America believed that there was a crisis, and they did it.

And when did it begin to cool off, and when did we begin to shake down? When the crisis began to be removed, when the crisis began to abate.

You say that the only way we can raise more is when people who are especially interested in Israel and people who are especially interested in the United Jewish Appeal are willing to give more, and you want all of the excess to go to the United Jewish Appeal campaign.

Let me tell you something. Some of our most ardent supporters of the United Jewish Appeal have been cutting their contribution, as you well know, just as everyone else did. This year, when Los Angeles raised more,

the only substantial cuts that we got were from some of the people most devoted to the UJA cause.

Now they have to take their chances when we raise less money, just as when we raise more money.

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If you have confidence that there is an emergency, that the American Jews believe that there is an emergency, and I believe it, and I think that they believe it, then I think they will respond, and if you place your lot with the communities, as you have done every year, and add the kind of goal that you want to add this year, \$25,000,000 -- it is not a new goal, and it is not something topping what we raised last year, but it is something that comes about as a result of an emergency -- and if the Jews of America believe it, they are going to give the money, and increases will be shown in the communities, and we can promise you a hundred per cent more. I don't know how we can promise more than that.

MR. BERENSTEIN: I may be able to mention the names of the men you had in mind. Do you in your own mind feel that the present basis of allocations should be the same, crisis or no crisis? I am asking this because I think it should be asked.

MR. BISMO: I say that you can't go all over America and renegotiate.

MR. BERENSTEIN: This is a thing that ought to come down on the table. Should that be the same? I am talking about two or three million dollars, so I am a pessimist. I don't think we could raise fifteen or eighteen, and more than that, plus the two, which would be twenty million.

Do you honestly believe that it should be the same, regardless of what it is?

MR. BISMO: No. I think we should have the same basis as last year, the same as 1955, and then, on the basis of the crisis, to which the American Jewish community will respond, every red cent of the additional money ought to go to the United Jewish Appeal.

MR. BERENSTEIN: You are saying that the allocation, regardless of what it is, crisis or no crisis, should remain the same as 1955, and you would make no change even though there is a terrific crisis?

MR. BISMO: Because without the crisis we will raise the same as we raised last year.

MR. BERENSTEIN: Is that the general opinion of

everyone here?

MR. STERN: What is the question?

RABBI BERNSTEIN: Just hold it, everybody. Hold it for a minute.

MR. STERN: What is the question?

MR. COHEN: Part of the difficulty is that we are talking about budgeting when part of the \$25,000,000 is basically a fund-raising question, and unless we are addressing ourselves to raising \$25,000,000, then a good deal of this doesn't have merit.

MR. BERENSTEIN: Suppose this gentleman here were to give \$25,000 additional without the card? What can we say? I think it amounts to more money.

I am trying to figure out a way of getting the maximum amount of money, without hurting the communities. I think that these big gifts amount to more money than you gentlemen think.

MR. FITTERMAN: In certain dties that thing has been going on for the last three or four or five years that I know of.

MR. SOLLLOD: Mr. Chairman, we are talking about a campaign technique, and if there is anybody in Cleveland

who is going to give you substantially more money over and above his normal gift in 1956, we will arrange some way to make sure that the United Jewish Appeal can have it.

MR. BERENSTEIN: Cleveland isn't Los Angeles.

Let me ask a question. Do you want to go in with that, to hold everything to the same? Are all communities in the same position? Do you want to make such a flat statement?

MR. STERN: All we want is a concerted opinion, a consensus.

MR. SOBLOFF: Are we talking about pre-campaign budgeting? What are you wasting our time for?

MR. BERENSTEIN: I am not after anything except a professional opinion. I have never wasted your time. I stay up until three o'clock in the morning just to watch you eat, and I don't feel that you are wasting my time.
(Laughter)

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Gentlemen, somebody tried to reduce it into too neat words. One asked if it wasn't true that one aspect of what we are talking about is budgeting, how do you protect what is being raised, and the other aspect fund-raising -- how do you raise more?

Jules says, if you have confidence in us that we will raise more, and we give you our word that we will give you everything additional that we raise, that is as much as we can do.

It isn't a question of not having confidence. With very, very few exceptions, we have never been chiseled after an arrangement has been made. We have been chiseled before they have been made, but when they have been made, we haven't been chiseled. Nobody breaks his word.

It isn't a question of not wanting to use that apparatus that has been raising the money all these years, because, let me tell you, everybody, that part of the very serious wrestling of this whole program was whether we ought to do this through the Welfare Funds or go outside of the Welfare Funds.

Let us not kid ourselves about it. That has been implicit in everything we have said. We have decided that we will do this through the Welfare Funds. It is the only way to do it.

The fact that we analyzed the other proposal and discarded it is the greatest measure of friendship, confidence, partnership, call it what you want, that we

feel exists with you.

Either we raise this money nationally in your communities, or you raise the money in your communities -- and you raise the money, not us. You raise the money.

It is obvious that there is no other way to do it. We just are not going to take and split this whole thing, as much as we know how badly this money is needed, and as much as we use the word within our own precincts, survival of a country -- maybe going around like this makes us dopey with these words because we live too close to it.

But that is what we are faced with, and, having faced it and having looked at it most earnestly, and having come to the conclusion that we don't want to go outside of the framework of the Welfare Funds, we have this feeling of confidence and mutuality and partnership, and we believe that you will give us everything that you raise above 1955 if you say that that is what you are going to do.

So it isn't a question of no trust, and it isn't a question of arguing about budgeting. I happen to think that the procedures have been shabby by which the United Jewish Appeal has been cut down year after year in city after city by arrangements which were made by officials of

the United Jewish Appeal, who should not have given in, but who did, and arrangements which were made by communities who had no right to make them.

However, that is all water over the dam. That is done. Let us not talk about that.

There is an established pattern of doing things. That is your Welfare Funds, of which you gentlemen are the best professionals, and we want to work with you and only with you and through you and only through you.

Now you are telling us that you believe there is a crisis and you believe more money can be raised if the crisis is presented properly, and what you are suggesting is that you think that everything that is raised in 1956 over 1955 ought to be applied to the solution of this crisis and that you think that there are ways inside of different communities by which various levels of contributors can be approached for extra giving, which could be earmarked for this special fund.

So far, that is the total of the practical suggestions outside of one or two others with which I am not in complete disagreement, although I have been accused of having a hit-and-run mentality, but I think the notion of a

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\$25,000,000 campaign in one week is something which is startling to the imagination, and if there were technical facilities for mounting it, I would say that that is the way to raise money.

Aside from that, a couple of other suggestions, the practical suggestions that have been made boil down to the summary I have just given, which is essentially Henry's summary, in which Mr. Treguboff has agreed and Mr. Bismo has agreed, and various others have made amendments on it. I don't know whether it would be wise to be afraid or not of that, and it isn't a question of being afraid of an enemy or an opponent. It is a question of trying to wrestle with friends as to whether or not there is any substance in this.

I haven't heard anybody here say that they think they can get out on the street and create or find a 1948 climate.

MR. GOTTLIEB: I said before and I say again that I disagree with that, Herb. I think I said it already.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: You think it is there?

MR. GOTTLIEB: I think I said it. To state what I tried to say before, with just one example, if a

Barney Rappaport, who is a member of the United Jewish Appeal Cabinet, who gave \$60,000, will stand up in the Big Gifts Meeting here in New York in January and say, "I gave \$60,000 and \$25,000 out of capital," or whatever way he wants to give it, and if that \$25,000 is earmarked for Israel in this crisis, he sets the pattern, and we can go back to the communities and do the same thing there.

I say that part of the responsibility is yours to organize that, and it must be done with your help.

MR. MINTZER: Part of that is right. I don't believe that the American Jews at the present time accept the fact of a crisis. I think the need is there. I think we are closer to it than anyone else, generally speaking, but if our community is typical -- and Eddie would say it isn't, and maybe that is the hope of the community -- but if our community is typical, then in the face of the action that the community has taken within the last two weeks, I tell you that there is no sense of crisis, certainly not around North Africa, and only a little more so around the whole question of the military situation in Israel.

Now, there are different needs. If we are going to just make speeches about the thing, we will not persuade

anybody. We have to get out and do a job, and what Bernie suggests, if I understand it, is the only way that I know of to do a job, to get givers to demonstrate by their own giving that they are prepared to do a job.

The business of the budgeting is meaningless, because we are at a point where we are wrangling over only a few percentages.

I think that this point was made here, and the only solution is to raise more money by trying to get across to the people the need for more money, and if we succeed, I think the money will be there.

I don't think that our community today would vote to earmark an additional dime for any agency, United Jewish Appeal or anything. It will be only at the point that they are prepared to give more that they will accept the need and sense the need for the United Jewish Appeal to get more.

That is the only way, and all the rest of the speeches don't mean anything.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The contradiction of what you said is in the fact that they would not be prepared to go as far as other people are willing to go tonight. Then by what right do I have to go build steam in a city like

Indianapolis, with no notion at all that it is any good?

If there are no results for the Welfare Fund of Indianapolis, you and I are in the same boat.

MR. LUCKMAN: Lazur Goodman will be there tomorrow, won't he? If he is convinced tomorrow that there is a real emergency, a real crisis, Lazur Goodman will go back to Indianapolis, like I will go back, with three or four other fellows who will be here from Cincinnati, and the whole climate will change.

I agree with Bernie. This thing must be sold tomorrow, and I would not talk another word about budgeting tonight.

MR. MINTZER: Let me tell you what the Lazur Goodmans did a week ago. They voted a percentage of the campaign for a mortgage, a local mortgage.

All I am trying to say is that we can make all the speeches, but we are going to have to reach these people.

There is no sense of crisis, so far as I can see, in their awareness.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I have one or two questions to ask, and then Mr. Fitterman wanted the floor, and I think

we can draw this to a close.

MR. FITTERMAN: I just wanted to ask Mr. Gottlieb a question.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Don't anybody go. Something is going to happen.

MR. FITTERMAN: I wanted to ask if we can figure out a more practical relationship both from the local and the national level to work on our few key people, to get the proper pace. I am pretty sure we will get it.

When every member of our own cabinet was at a meeting, and we came out with a certain figure at that meeting, and those boys called the others on the phone and got them committed, we knew that we were going to have a much better campaign than we had the year before.

The same thing will hold true this year in relation to this emergency and crisis. We know who our key people are in terms of setting the pace and in terms of enthusiasm and selling and everything else. If we can sell them on both the way and the method and the speed of organization and the kind of giving that they will command, and give themselves, we can translate that crisis into a \$25,000,000 campaign.

MR. LUCKMAN: Who is coming tomorrow? If those guys are sold tomorrow, which is what I said before, you will raise a hell of a lot more.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: And they will raise it through you.

MR. FITTERMAN: It's up to you now. (Laughter)

RABBI FRIEDMAN: What I want to do is to take the elements of the plans which you have been sort of suggesting and try to congeal them, jell them.

Somebody asked me a question. Under this scheme, what happens if you raise less money? I want to hear Bernie on that. Somebody has asked that question.

MR. GOTTLIEB: What happens if we raise less money? The baby dies. I don't think you can approach this any more than you approached the hundred million dollar question with the thought that you are going to raise less money.

Tomorrow there is going to be what we used to call an educational meeting. After you get through with that then you have to start raising the money. I don't care when you do it. Just give me a setting in which the top ten contributors in my community understand the thing and

accept it, and the whole community will accept it after them.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: We are trying to line up a series of visits, and we have to get down to business. If you get your top ten people together in Hartford, or the fifteen or twenty, we will try to send somebody to you who will get these top ten or twenty people sewed up.

We are trying to arrange a series of visits with boards, with executive committess, at the same time that we come to the town to talk to the boards about the matter of the basic proposition here.

MR. STERN: Of Pre-campaign Budgeting?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Whatever you want to call it. We will talk to your ten or twenty people. If it is ten or fifteen or five or twenty-six. We will talk to them.

There once was a time when the UJA, through its trade and industry set-up, was tied up intimately and cross-tied in every town through a bunch of cross influences. That is over, theorteically. That was a time when a notion existed that one layman in one city could influence another laymay in another city.

If it was ever valid -- and if you say it wasn't --

all right. It wasn't. Then let's try to make it.

We will try to do the best we can in the way of giving you all the help we can, to try to get your top few people.

Knowing this, I would like to get down to the formalizing of our thinking here. If it boils down to a variety of Henry's plan, or what has now become the sort of common plan -- I don't know whose it is any more -- Do I understand it this way? Did you say that everything that you raise above the 1955 level you give to the United Jewish Appeal for this special fund?

MR. MINTZER: No. We cannot say that.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Then what do you say?

MR. GOTTLIEB: For all practical purposes we can say it.

MR. STERN: Why not? What have we been talking about?

MR. MINTZER: I think it is dishonest in terms of my community.

MR. SPIVAK: You are trying to reach an agreement over the fund-raising. Bernie made an important point. It is one thing to talk about a crisis and another thing to

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give like a crisis.

The thing that happened in 1946 that electrified the country was not a crisis. It was a million-dollar gift by the Rosenwald family and the half million gift by the Masur family and the other gifts that were announced at the meeting.

MR. LUCKMAN: Masur didn't give five hundred thousand.

MR. SPIVAK: Whatever the amount was. There were gifts like that announced on the dais, and before the leaders went to the communities to line up these ten gifts, they had committed themselves, and they had set the climate for the entire country, and they had sent the communities off on the pattern that had been set.

What was missing, I think, at every one of the subsequent meetings, what was missing was that the dais did not come through with the gifts after the talk, and they knew it, and everybody else knew that the talk wouldn't do it.

I think what Bernie said is true, and I think that if we pass over this, we are passing over the basic point of this: What will have more effect than anything else

in generally and sincerely convincing the country that the UJA leaders themselves take the \$25,000,000 seriously is the immediate commitment of the UJA leaders themselves to their personal gifts and the immediate announcement of that.

Unless that is done, you will again have \$99,000,-000 goals and \$25,000,000 goals, and a lot of other things, and it won't mean a thing if the conviction isn't there.

I am not saying that it isn't there, but certainly the discussion this evening does not give any sense of any great confidence that it is there, because if it were there, I think a great deal of this discussion would not be necessary.

I think Bernie put his finger on it. It is the same thing that happens in every community every year.

MR. BERENSTEIN: What is the UJA leadership?

MR. SPIVAK: The officers and the Cabinet. The people who hold official positions in the United Jewish Appeal.

MR. SPIEGLER: Why is it that the lay leaders in America recognize the crisis and the professionals don't? What demonstration is necessary to convince a man that

it is the survival of the people in Israel that is at stake and that the first priority at the present time should go to them?

MR. CHEN: Take them over on a mission.

MR. SPIEGLER: You don't have to see a woman have the child to know that she is going through labor pains. That's ridiculous.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I don't want to interrupt your analysis. The only flaw in it is that everyone of you has conducted a campaign in your own city, where you have gotten the big givers to increase \$20,000, because that is going to set the example of everybody behind him, and everybody falls flat on his face.

MR. SPIEGLER: No. That is not so.

MR. SPIVAK: No. It is just the reverse of that.

Again, what I have said nationally applies in every community. If the campaign leadership, the chairman and the officers of the campaign, set the real pace by announcing their gifts, in terms of the campaign goal at the beginning -- that you have a campaign, and if you have local officers but they don't commit themselves, you haven't got a campaign.

The same thing is true nationally. If the UJA is going to give the country the conviction that they mean \$25,000,000 and not just two million or three or five million, then what I said follows, and if they don't do it, we are in real trouble.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: And if they do do it?

MR. SPIEGLER: Then you have the greatest asset you could possibly have in getting the money.

MR. BERENSTEIN: Let us say \$25,000,000 is approximately thirty-three per cent more. Not, let us be facetious enough to say that these top officers are doing a pretty good job now, and if they increase thirty-three per cent, does that illustrate an emergency or do they have to triple while somebody else gives ten more?

MR. SOBELOFF: Now you're talking just like a contributor.

MR. BERENSTEIN: You said you want a demonstration of this.

MR. SOBELOFF: Are the bad givers going to triple their gifts?

MR. BERENSTEIN: Let us take the good givers. Are they supposed to double or triple? Now we are supposed to

get some intelligence out of this meeting. I think I am asking an intelligent question. Let us have an answer to it.

MR. SOBELOFF: You take a group of the top givers nationally or locally in Detroit. If you have a meeting in Detroit, and out of our twenty best people we begin getting speeches, what do you expect from us? After all, we are giving as well.

MR. BERNSTEIN: That is not the question.

MR. SOBELOFF: If the leaders gave a third more, I agree that it doesn't mean that every last individual is going to do the same thing. But unless you averaged now a third more, \$25,000,000 over 1956, I don't know what it comes to exactly, but it is forty per cent at least, and if you can't average for the whole campaign twenty per cent more in the Welfare Funds, roughly, and unless the leadership averages out thirty-three per cent, it isn't going to work.

MR. SPIVAK: Every local leader to whom you are going figures he has given just as well as the National UJA leaders, and it may be true that some National UJA leaders just can't for whatever reasons they have give twenty-five more, but others can triple or quadruple, and you have to

expect of the national leaders just what you expect of the good givers locally, and the average must be something at least that adds up to a national total of \$25,000,000 for this campaign.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I think we have to close this meeting, because we are starting another meeting early tomorrow morning.

I have been trying to gather together a sense of the meeting, but there is no sense of the meeting as far as I see it. There really isn't.

I think what has happened here is that we have tried to present a problem. I think that a group of people have tried to wrestle with the problem, and I think there is no sense of the meeting in the technical meaning of a majority feeling of how the problem ought to be handled throughout the country.

MR. STERN: I think you are wrong.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: All right. I wish you would try to phrase it.

MR. STERN: I think we are pretty much agreed that there is a crisis. I think by this time if we were not convinced when we walked in here, the meeting did con-

vince us.

I was convinced a long time ago, and I think that if this thing is properly presented, if we get all the advantages of good demonstration from the national leaders, and so on, the community as a whole will give money.

Of course, whether they will give thirty-three per cent or twenty-five per cent I don't know, but I think they will give substantially more than last year.

MR. SOLLOD: I am speaking of Morris Berenstein, still a citizen of Syracuse, making the kind of sacrificial giving that we are talking about here as pace-setting not only for the country but for his own community.

They are not going to let the man in the town who can afford to give get away with the thing.

I know that would prevail in our own community, and this thing all sifts down to a local situation. If we can convince the top leadership of the United Jewish Appeal who are members of our local communities, they will give sacrificially.

MR. STERN: The second point that I think we are all agreed on is, whatever funds are raised generally above what was raised in 1955 will go to the United Jewish Appeal.

Naturally, we don't do the budgeting ourselves, so that we cannot commit our community, but as individuals, I think we can say that we believe that generally the moneys raised over 1955 will go to the United Jewish Appeal.

Third, I think we are pretty well agreed, with exceptions, that the two-card system should not be used.

Let me put that positively: that every community should be permitted -- it is going to do it anyhow, so you may as well permit it -- to run their campaign in the best way they know how.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: No question about it. You run it the way you want.

MR. STERN: Will you ask the question now of the group whether there is that much agreement?

MR. SOBLOFF: Let us get a show of hands.

MR. LUCKMAN: I don't think there should be any vote.

MR. BERENSTEIN: I would say it would be nice if there were a tightening of belts also.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: It isn't a question of a show of hands of this meeting or a vote. It is a question of whether that summary represents the finest expression of

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the nicest Jewish conscience that exists. That is what it represents to me, and that is not disparaging it. That is the finest expression of the most wonderful Jewish conscience that wants to respond within the framework of all of the other pressures operating on it. It is an effort to try to say, "I will do the best I can." But there are an awful lot of pressures on this conscience that we know exist in the back of our minds, and it is not going to be able to break through them to do what we are asking.

That is what I am reading into it.

MR. STERN: Why? You have a rich imagination if you put that in.

MR. BERENSTEIN: Why don't we go into the meeting tomorrow and see what the boys who have to put up the money will do? I can assure you of one thing.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Wait a minute. Let us adjourn the meeting right. I don't want anybody to think that I don't appreciate what Max said. I am not sure that I am being understood in what I am saying. I am saying that I think it is wonderful, and I am saying that I think you do appreciate that a crisis exists, and I am saying that I think you do want to do something about it, and I am saying

that I hope that what you are saying you want to do about it
will do the trick.

Thank you all for coming.

(The meeting adjourned at 12:15 a.m.)



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