



THE JACOB RADER MARCUS CENTER OF THE
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

MS-763: Rabbi Herbert A. Friedman Collection, 1930-2004.

Series H: United Jewish Appeal, 1945-1995.

Subseries 4: Administrative Files, 1945-1994.

Box
38

Folder
20

Executive Directors meeting. 10 November 1955.

For more information on this collection, please see the finding aid on the
American Jewish Archives website.

F. P. N. R. A. S. E. M. A. S. I.

MINUTES OF RABBI FRIEDMAN'S MEETING with Executive Directors on November 10, 1955, at the Standard Club in Chicago.

Present: Messrs. Phillip Bernstein
Bisno
Goldsmith
Herman Kaplan
Lurie
Pearlman
Pekarsky
Rosenberg
Sobeloff
Treguboff
Zibbell
Zucker

P-2/5
9

MR. GOLDSMITH presided.

MR. GOLDSMITH welcomed Rabbi Friedman and said how pleased he was that Rabbi Friedman was able to make this special trip to Chicago to meet with this group and invited Rabbi Friedman to make his presentation.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I am very happy to be here to meet with you because of the importance of this subject. The scheme is very simple because the problem is very simple. The Moroccan immigration is going on at as close to a rate of 3,500 or 4,000 a month as the Jewish Agency can manage. When I say as close to that rate, I mean it will have no relationship, on the basis of what I know, to whatever political settlement is in the process of being worked out in Morocco. It looks now as though a political settlement is coming faster than anyone thought and is adverse to the French. And the French now find themselves with ben Youssef back and with only the faintest hopes that there will be a constitutional monarchy.

The Jewish position has shifted in Morocco as the French position has changed, and we now find the Jews going over to the Arabs whom they suddenly see back in power. Whereas the Jews had the feeling that their safety and security rested with the French, they are now beginning to see that the rise of the old Sultan makes it prudent for them to mend their fences with him fast. So, already, the Chief Rabbi of Casablanca has been up to Paris to see the Sultan, and already they are receiving all assurances that everything will be all right and that this will be a constitutional monarchy.

The rate of immigration I think will continue irregardless--as they say in Milwaukee--of the political developments in Morocco. That is a fact I think we have to deal with. The figures for October were 5,000, for November just over 5,000, and in December it will probably drop a little bit to 3,500. This week--we get a cable for every six days--there were 1,300 and something, so you can see that is the monthly rate.

That poses the financial problem for us very clearly. On the basis of two solid years of experience, it works out to be about \$1,000 a head. When Josephthal first projected those figures, some people thought it was guess work, but by now experience has validated the fact that it is not guesswork. If immigration continues at this rate, and there is every intention that it shall, and if the figures are right, and there is every indication they are, you are dealing with a matter of raw immigration, initial absorption costs, including the first year, of between 40 and

Minutes--Rabbi Friedman's Meeting With Executive Directors
November 10, 1955--Chicago

and 45 million dollars, and underneath that raw statistical fact is a kind of psychological fact that is tied up with the second problem. Tied up with the security problem is the psychological fact that there is nobody in Israel today who wants to say that in the face of no matter how increasingly tense a security situation there is, we should consider reducing immigration. No responsible governmental leader will say it and no responsible person in the Agency will say it.

It is a fact that they already have an example in front of them; namely, what they did in 1948 and 1949 when they were fighting a war and when they took in 200,000 people. There is a historic precedent in front of their own eyes, and they are not willing to say that they are any the less capable now than they were then. They say that if we could fight a war at that time and take people from the camps of Germany, then we can have a tense military situation on our borders now and we can take people from Morocco, and the figures are nowhere near comparable if we take only 45,000. That is the psychological connection. Nobody makes heroic speeches about it, but that is how they feel. They say, very simply, we will not be panicked in the face of the security situation; we will not be panicked into cutting back on the Moroccan immigration.

You ask what the security situation will cost, and you get no clear cut answer. Let me share a confidence--I feel it is a confidence so I have to ask you to respect it that way. The first decision was made in terms of what they would spend two weeks ago Sunday at the Cabinet meeting at which use of the total uncommitted dollar reserve of the State of Israel--which at the moment was \$47,000,000, the total dollar reserve of the government uncommitted (there is some money committed for the requirements of bonds and some committed for other things)--and the decision was taken at the Cabinet meeting that morning to spend \$15,000,000 of it for arms. That was a unanimous decision. The only argument was over the quantity.

I cannot tell you what the armament picture will cost but only what the first step was in that direction. There is as you know the Arms Fund being collected in Israel, but that is in pounds and that does not concern us. They have taken in £10,000,000 in Israel for an arms fund on an unorganized basis, but they have now organized it and have set a goal with a committee, and they are after £25,000,000. They have now sort of formalized it with a committee. But that is an internal matter and has no relationship to us and is in local currency anyway.

Once the two financial facts became clear that there was going to continue to be the Moroccan immigration--and they are pretty unshakeable about that--and they felt that they had to embark upon a rearmament program out of their own resources, leaving to later on what may develop in the way of help from other countries, it also became very clear to us that the ordinary fund raising procedures of the UJA for 1956 were not going to begin to come anywhere near the heart of this problem; that they were going to be pathetically inadequate. I think that the final push over the brink came when Eshkol came out of that Cabinet meeting and said to Josephthal that anything which the Agency had come to depend upon from the government in the way of supplementary help on the immigration problem was now no longer available. You probably know that the UJA has never provided over the past several

Minutes--Rabbi Friedman's Meeting With Executive Directors
November 10, 1955--Chicago

years to the Jewish Agency a sum of Money adequate to handle the current immigration of that one year plus any substantial sum to cover the backlog for any previous years. We just never raised that kind of money and never provided it. The Agency has supplemented it by borrowing and by begging and by getting grants from the government.

After that Cabinet meeting, Eshkol told Josephthal that for this current year, 5717, it is through. The Agency should anticipate nothing from the government and whatever plans the Agency wanted to make, it should make on anticipating its own income from the UJA in America and the Keren Hayessod elsewhere in the world. That is all that it should count on.

Giora got very upset because he could see he was up against the ropes. The actual extent during the past year, 5716, to which the government participated in the program of the Agency directly for immigration was £64,000,000--thirty odd million dollars. The sum of money that was geared for this coming year at £66,000,000 is not available. That is a flat statement from the Treasurer of the government to the Treasurer of the Agency.

These are the essential facts in the background which lead to the conclusion that we would have to do something quite extraordinary in the way of trying to provide money for this twin program which is immigration and security, but obviously will have only to do with immigration. Equally obviously, our dealing with immigration to the full extent of the problem will release all of the government's money for rearmament.

We had talked, back in September when I first came home from Morocco, about some sort of a special fund to aid the Moroccan situation. When I say we had talked, we had had some meetings among our top lay leadership. Nothing quite jelled on that because there were doubts, hesitations how to do it, for how much it should be, and there was a budgetary discrepancy of \$11,000,000, and it was suggested in September that we conduct a special fund for \$11,000,000. That was before the whole security thing popped quite open. The Mission went to Israel and landed the day this whole thing broke. It was on the 19th of October that Sharett made a speech in the Knesset calling for voluntary contributions to an arms fund and we arrived in Israel on the morning of October 20th, and we learned that the first response to this request had come from a shoemaker who had contributed 100 pounds. So that the Mission was present in the country during the whole evolution of the next ten days' emotion of this arms picture.

It was in that framework, perhaps an emotional framework, that the Mission people began to come to the conclusion that we ought to take this special fund and put it in a framework relating to the problem, and we reached the conclusion that \$25,000,000 would be more closely related to the problem of immigration plus security than \$11,000,000 just for North African use had been weeks earlier.

At the one session we had of the Mission people that was closed--without Israelis and without newspaper men--where the people on the Mission could talk their minds out--the one closed meeting we had, we discussed the presentation of a special fund

Minutes--Rabbi Friedman's Meeting with Executive Directors
November 10, 1955--Chicago

in these dimensions, for these purposes, twin purposes, but for public consumption on the 18th of November session probably only one purpose, or maybe on the 18th we shall talk of both purposes and for real public consumption only about one. That night we got a variety of opinions. One fellow wanted to turn it into a fund raising meeting then and there and get everybody to raise his own contribution for the special fund and Dewey Stone did the arithmetic and figured out what he thought it should be. Rosenwald said he would make a contribution to the Special Fund but didn't want a resolution to the effect that we should go around the room and ask everybody to announce. Then people voiced doubts and Joe Meyerhoff said he thought the fund should be \$15,000,000. Sam Heiman then said he thought the communities should borrow, and he couldn't see how the communities could raise this additional sum now. Sobeloff said he thought it might be improper for the UJA to attempt to legislate a special fund that would amount to a freeze on the regular campaign for 1956 which would mean legislating the budgets of all the other beneficiaries of the campaign.

That meeting on Wednesday night was a meeting at which some immediately got hot, some were cooler, some more quick, some moved more slowly. It was a good discussion and almost everybody talked. Some just made speeches, but others made good contributions to the thinking.

Out of that meeting there came-- it was on the 25th or 26th of October-- a group of cablegrams that were sent to 450 leaders in the United States to attend this meeting in New York on November 18, the 18th being set because Rosenwald is arriving home on the 15th. He only takes a ship; he doesn't fly.

What we have to propose to the people on the 18th is-- and this is Eddie Warburg talking just yesterday afternoon-- is simply this: The problem exists in the following dimensions-- outlining the dimensions. The solution can only come from the communities of America indicating whether they want to tackle the problem. The only technical plan we see at the moment is that there be a special fund in addition to the regular campaign fund of 1956; that the 1956 campaign be conducted, only from the point of view of the UJA and not the communities, at the same level as 1955. We would like from the 1956 campaign the same as from the 1955 campaign. If more is raised, we are going to argue or fight on the PCB arrangements in order to get more. We would like the same out of the 1956 campaign as out of the 1955 campaign, and we would like each community to take its share of a special fund on account of \$25,000,000 all of which goes to Israel. The JDC has waived through a statement of Warburg, and will waive officially when its Administration Committee meets, their share of this Special Fund; and this is quite a thing because by our contract, they receive one third of everything UJA raises and if UJA were to raise a Special Fund of \$25,000,000, they are waiving about \$8,000,000 of it. This is really to show that in the minds of the JDC people, as well, there is an urgency in the situation.

The Special Fund is to be raised in any manner the communities see fit. We have no cut and dried, tailored scheme. The only thing to take place on the 18th is that the communities should agree in principle to the fact that the urgency exists,

Minutes--Rabbi Friedman's Meeting With Executive Directors
November 10, 1955--Chicago

that they will do their share toward it and they will accept their quotas and then they will raise their quotas in any manner they see fit. We would hope to have them do so as soon as they can. And we have wrestled out the question of timing among ourselves. Joe Holtzman thinks--and I think and a group of others think--that we ought to try to urge the communities to raise this Special Fund right away after November 18, beginning the next day. Morris Berinstein thinks that what we ought to do is to suggest to the communities that they gear themselves and begin to bring in the first contributions at the first large fund raising meeting in January. We are currently thinking in terms of a testimonial dinner to Senator Lehman on January 21. And Berinstein thinks that we shouldn't ask the communities to move in more quickly than that. I am exposing to you the internal arguments and discussions going on in our own circles to indicate there is no hard and fast procedure as yet and I don't think there can be until it is talked out good and thoroughly on the eighteenth.

AMERICAN JEWISH

The attendance for the eighteenth looks very good. There are now about 250 acceptances from out of New York and 35 or 40 from in New York, and we don't want many more than that and before we are through it will probably be 300, which is somewhat more than we wanted. But this meeting has taken hold possibly because of the mood out in the street where there is excitement because the people want to do something for Israel. And there is the right quality of people as well in that attendance. The four or five good people from every city are coming. So it looks at the moment. I think there will be a responsible group in attendance on the eighteenth and what it says ought to carry some weight. And I hope it is a responsible group in terms of doing responsible thinking. We don't have any resolutions yet on what the group ought to recommend. We were discussing yesterday how this should be handled; just when a group of five or six men should be asked to leave the meeting to concretize the meeting's thinking in a resolution. Sharett will be present at that meeting on the eighteenth, I learned this morning. He indicated in Israel he wanted to attend this meeting. Abe Harmon is coming. We invited him originally to come. We have got them both. We are not going to say to Sharett he cannot come. He made a fantastic hit in Jerusalem. He spoke for 25 minutes and nobody was more surprised than he.

MR. GOLDSMITH thanked Rabbi Friedman for his presentation and said that Mr. Sobeloff had spoken about the matter yesterday and had said just the same thing. Mr. Goldsmith said that yesterday the group had tried to set down some ideas on how the problem could be handled from a practical standpoint. He said the group was willing to assume that, of course, there was a real need.

MR. ROSENBERG asked what the role of the bonds is in the crisis situation. He pointed out that there is a mood of crisis in Miami and that mass rallies are being held. Mr. Sharett is scheduled to be in Miami on November 16 to sell bonds and the whole direction of the sale of bonds this year is Morocco and the armament situation. Mr. Rosenberg said that it is expected that Miami will purchase 100% more bonds because of this critical situation. If three days later the UJA comes to Miami and says Sharett just spoke in New York and additional money is required,

CONFIDENTIAL

Minutes--Rabbi Friedman's Meeting with Executive Directors
November 10, 1955--Chicago

the result will be confusion. Mr. Rosenberg said there should be some clarification as to what Mr. Sharett is going to say when he talks for Bonds and when he talks for UJA and Mr. Rosenberg asked what the executive directors are to tell their communities.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Sharett is not here for UJA. He is here for Bonds. The fact that he, Mr. Sharett, will be at our meeting on the eighteenth is in a way a sheer accident of time. His primary purpose is not to come for the United Nations and not to talk to Dulles. He came primarily for the Bond Drive and I want to say this simply, in our minds so far there is no relationship between the increasing push the Bond Drive will undoubtedly make capitalizing as it undoubtedly will on the current crisis, and the launching of this Special Fund which is augmented UJA. There may be a relationship in Miami in terms of three days. Miami could do nothing on November 21 on a Special Fund basis if on November 16 it had a big Bond push, and that means the timing in Miami would have to be worked out in terms of your local situation. The same thing might happen in other communities. Boston closed its campaign the other day and they might say that they cannot launch a Special Fund this month. I was at Providence the other night and \$300,000 is in toward \$500,000 of their total called for and Galkin said if you are giving us a quota share of the Special Fund, give us a month or two to breathe; so the timing of the launching of the Special Fund in communities would have to be related to what other things are going on within the same limited time. With regard to what Sharett will say when he speaks, I am sure that he will say that Bonds help Israel at least on the Moroccan thing.

In reply to a question Rabbi Friedman said: We have made a clear-cut decision. We will say as vigorously as we know how that our money is not going to buy arms.

MR. GOLDSMITH said he thought there might be a deluge of bond offerings for a special UJA fund if people are pushed hard on bonds. He said Chicago had had some of it, but it had been kept down. If the Welfare Fund opened its doors to that, Mr. Goldsmith thought, a lot of money could be obtained by it but Israel of course would get less. He asked Rabbi Friedman whether, when he speaks of \$25,000,000, he meant the dollars or would bonds be accepted by the UJA, as Dr. Josephthal encouraged the giving of bonds last year.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: They need dollars with which to purchase defensive weapons in the world market. I don't know how many dollars are required but we want dollars and not bonds. No matter where they buy arms they have to pay for them.

MR. ZUCKER said that that in the discussion of the previous day everyone felt that he wants to be as helpful as possible at this time of need but that the most effective way of being helpful is by facing the situation realistically. He said that all assumed that the need is present but that practical problems had been discussed the day before and Mr. Zucker asked whether it is anticipated that there will be a special, sub-rosa campaign to raise money direct for arms.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The night before we left Israel I asked Eshkol that question point blank. I asked, "Do you contemplate any special arms raising program, non-tax deductible?" And he said, "No." And then he made one amendment -- not at this time.

Minutes—Rabbi Friedman's Meeting With Executive Directors
November 10, 1955—Chicago

I said, "will we know?" He said, "You certainly will." I interpreted that to mean that he does not contemplate anything at this time, and if anything should happen, we will be informed, and if we know, you will know.

In reply to a question on what New York would do, Rabbi Friedman said: Henry Bernstein is still away but we cabled him and said that if this thing were to go, New York would have to take \$7,000,000 out of the 25. I got one cable back from him and he said he didn't have the figures but didn't think it sounded unreasonable and suggested before the meeting of the eighteenth we discuss the matter with the New York Executive Committee. Jack Weiler is setting up a meeting of Leidesdorf with the Executive Committee to see what can be done.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Our problem is one of ongoing institutions. We have tried to minister to the needs of local and national and other institutions, including the UJA. I think it would be the consensus of this group that we would not like to tear down that institution with the substantial support given over the years for UJA and its predecessor organization from united community funds of various kinds—with varying success. Whatever would be done by way of raising additional monies for the UJA, we are assuming the UJA would like to see done through these organized funds that have been in existence and presumably are a little hard to kill off, at least in one year. If that is true, then our problem is to fit this within the framework of what we have been doing and what we think is likely to be done this coming year by way of that organization.

It seems to me that there should be one question put to you definitely, and the answer might be only your own thinking and not official at all because you might say officially the meeting on the eighteenth and the subsequent resolution by the UJA Cabinet would give us the official answer—but is it proposed that each community raise a Special Fund having in mind what your proposition to us is, that we should in effect freeze the regular UJA contributions from the communities at the 1955 level and add a special fund appropriation to that. We may be loath to freeze anything, whether local or UJA, but that is the effect of the proposal we establish in the minds of our givers and certainly of our policy-making group, to freeze UJA at the 1955 level and add to that this special need which presumably is for this year only and presumably for one time. It may not prove to be that, but presumably at the moment it is that, an emergency need to the extent of \$25,000,000 as you can best calculate it. If it were to be done by way of separate campaigning as you suggest, some people think that we should start at once or on a certain date—that is one matter. If it were to be done by way of budgeting out of a percentage or on a dollar basis on the funds we are likely to raise and then budget for the UJA to the 1955 appropriation plus the allotted sum, whatever that would be in each community, and have one campaign for the whole business with various understandings as to how existing funds would be used, whether all to UJA or what not. A third way would be to have your regular campaign and then have designations to a separate fund. That has great dangers as far as the structures of the central fund are concerned. We agree that the earmarking is a trap because most people especially the larger people do not earmark.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: First of all let me agree at the outset with the basic premise you establish, and it is clear in our minds. This has to be done through, with, and by

Minutes--Rabbi Friedman's Meeting With Executive Directors
November 10, 1955--Chicago

the apparatus established in every local community. The concept of the UJA operating outside the framework of the local communities' structures to raise this money is, I think, foolish talk. The organized fund raising patterns of America represent the organized will of the Jews of America. We have bent over backwards to try to figure out what the position of a local welfare fund is in this matter, and that is why in thinking of the several alternative schemes, we have been thinking all the time of what effect this would have on the local welfare fund.

For example, a city might take a quota of \$500,000 for the Special Fund and raise it, either before its regular campaign or during its regular campaign, or even after, and yet have its regular campaign suffer by 2 or 3 or \$400,000. What is gained? What is gained is that that city has made \$500,000 available in a Special Fund and dropped \$400,000 in a regular fund. Who loses? And we have dickered with all kinds of suggestions, even suggestions of reinsurance schemes for the communities. The UJA raises nationally \$25,000,000 in a Special Fund but has to pay back \$7,000,000 which they fell down in total--is it right, is it wrong, is it moral? Do we run into the position of having a guy who made a special gift to a Special Fund and says, "You are using my money to pay back for somebody else's cut." I cite this as an indication that we have really tried to wrestle with how it hits the local communities.

My personal feeling is that I would prefer that a community freeze us at the 1955 level and I know all the dangers implicit in that. It means that we are setting the maximum income we may expect from the communities. We are depressing the level and not giving it a stimulus to boost upward. Why do I say that I would be willing to take this? Because I would then know that there is a fixed pace of income, and I can tell Josephthal he can anticipate that; I can tell the JDC that they may anticipate that, because we are asking the JDC to take on lots of extra burdens with Malben, and they have to have an assurance of an income for themselves from the regular campaign. I would therefore say that the UJA should agree to a floor in the 1956 campaign which might at the same time also be a ceiling; namely, the 1955 level, and our beneficiaries would then know and be geared to spend at that level. I am talking about a dollar amount.

MR. SOBLOFF asked what would happen if a community raised \$500,000 for the Special Fund and then fell \$300,000 on the regular fund.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Under what I am proposing, what would happen would be that our normal income would drop by our proportionate share.

MR. SOBLOFF said that in that case the UJA would come out with \$200,000 more when it is all over and all other agencies would come out with \$200,000 less. After some discussion it was noted that in the aggregate the UJA would come out with \$300,000 more and the other agencies with \$150,000 less.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Eddie Warburg's thinking is you should not take a gift to the Special Fund without at the same time having the man's gift to the regular campaign

Minutes--Rabbi Friedman's Meeting With Executive Directors
November 10, 1955--Chicago

which in his judgement would run simultaneously; that is, the two campaigns would run simultaneously. Timing does not matter, and you could have Big Gifts in January or the end of December. A man gave \$50,000 in 1955, and you say to him that your contribution was \$50,000 in 1955 and we want the same in 1956. Or you might say to the man that he would have to give \$55,000 in 1956 because there must be a certain increase to protect the normal fall-off in the campaign. For the Special Fund that man's share will be 25% or \$12,500 additional. So you solicit him either twice, with two cards, or once for two purposes. The language is flexible. You solicit in order to protect your 1956 campaign income, protected for everybody concerned, for the UJA and for the other beneficiaries. You solicit him at the same time for his main gift and for his extra gift and you indicate that his extra gift is really extra. It makes no sense if people give a minus gift to the normal campaign. You have to do both together, Eddie says. ✓

MR. ZUCKER said that Cleveland's campaign in 1955 raised about the same in 1954. For every individual card that was a decrease in 1955, there were nine cards out of ten which were either increased or renewed and there was still the same number of dollars available. But in the 1954 and 1955 campaigns, Cleveland lost \$150,000 in deaths and removals which had to be made up which was just about accomplished with new givers and modest increases. He felt that if Cleveland would adopt Rabbi Friedman's proposal, he could guarantee that there would be less in the regular fund. He felt that from the point of view of campaign technique, it wouldn't be good to run the Special Fund in this way and, furthermore, Zucker didn't think a Special Fund was salable to the other partners in the Welfare Fund, particularly when they are faced with the certainty that they cannot get any more money and might even lose. The only way a successful campaign can be run, Mr. Zucker said, is when at least 90% of the contributors want to go ahead with the plan. He ended by saying he thought the best way of getting more money for the UJA is by raising more money for all causes.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: We have struggled with the problem of how to build into this thing some way of building security for the Welfare Fund. How do you think it can be done? I am again speaking for myself, and I am opposed to the reinsurance proposition. I don't like it. I reject it, at least in my mind, on the morality of the thing.

MR. ZUCKER said that it wouldn't be possible for Cleveland to run any kind of a special fund campaign between now and the end of the year on a community basis although if there are cities that can do so, then perhaps they should. He thought it would be best to put the UJA in for its fair share in the 1956 campaign and he said that in Cleveland that would be the same percentage of the total as in 1955. He said that beyond that the UJA should be included for 100% of the additional. He recognized that other cities might be able to do things differently but pointed out that in Cleveland this would mean that the UJA would get the same as last year plus as much money as was raised over and above last year's total.

In reply to a question Rabbi Friedman said that the cash figure for 1955 will be about \$56,000,000.

MR. LURIE asked whether any people had been sounded out on their willingness to give more money this year, and Rabbi Friedman said that there has been no sounding out.

Minutes—Rabbi Friedman's Meeting with Executive Directors
November 10, 1955—Chicago

MR. BISNO asked whether the present situation has had any impact on the campaigns going on right now.

MR. ZUCKER noted that Sid Cohen had said that the situation had arisen at the tail end of the Boston campaign but that the excitement was not reflected in larger gifts.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The only campaign going on now is Providence and, as I said, they are 3/5 of the way through. Their top money was in two months ago. Rochester is going on now and they have some very good increases in the upper levels.

MR. ZUCKER asked whether those two cities could not return to their best contributors and see whether they would respond to this new, critical situation which might give us some indication of what we might look for.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: We don't know yet what we want to ask them for.

MR. SOEHLÖFF noted his proposal as one that would protect the welfare fund's structure and of course give the UJA more money if more money were raised. He continued as follows: "The simplest thing for us to do is to note that last year the UJA was in for \$2,100,000 out of \$4,000,000 raised in pledges. Getting over the hurdle of the freezing idea and assuming there could be some accommodation between the 25 and \$50,000 that would be needed to take care of one fringe problem or another—if we figured that our share in this total fund would be \$750,000, if we included the UJA in our campaign for the same as last year and under item B noted a Special Emergency Fund required in the sum of \$750,000, thus bringing the total amount required to \$4,800,000. If we raise \$4,100,000 you would wind up with the same. If we raise \$4,750,000, the UJA would get that extra money; that would mean we would be running a campaign this year structurally like every year except the talking point would be to sell the special problem, and the only way to meet it is to appeal for extra money and we appeal to our contributors to give more money. This creates no new complications.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: What that presents for us is the very wonderful hope and fine wish and earnest determination that the regular campaign of 1956 shall raise lots more money and a lot more shall go to the UJA. That's no different from what we have been saying for years. We keep coming back in all our discussion to the feeling that this would be the easiest thing for the cities of America but we simply are afraid that unless this thing is brought home to people with some special sense of urgency, the impetus behind it will evaporate as time goes on. What would happen if we don't raise a nickel of this \$25,000,000? The money for arms will long since have been committed, certainly by next March or April. When next year's balance sheet is all done and they see what they have available in Bond dollars and UJA dollars, what will have happened will be one or two things. The immigration program will long since have been cut to ribbons and I think that is a terribly dangerous thing to contemplate because we would be leaving people not only hostage in an Arab country but one in which the Communists have also begun again to fish. This intrusion into Egypt was no slight thing. All of North Africa is wide open today. The cutting to ribbons of an immigration program because of arms money spent means a lot of people left behind because they shouldn't have been. The second thing is that they will have gone very considerably into dollar debt and the good effort of the consolidation loan will be to a large extent wiped out. Maybe, we shouldn't talk about a special fund at all. Maybe we would go out and refloat the consolidation loan. There is \$30,000,000

Minutes--Rabbi Friedman's Meeting With Executive Directors
November 10, 1955--Chicago

worth of credit available to be tapped; that's what has been repaid. On the basis of running a campaign without a special fund aspect to it it will be the most well-meaning campaign in the world that will not produce. The immigration program will be gone and the good economic value of the consolidation loan will be jeopardized.

MR. SOBLOFF said that it was therefore not the nature of the emergency that would sell the people but that the Special Fund was really a device. He understood Rabbi Friedman to mean that except for an occasional person, the same person who will give \$50,000 for the regular campaign will give an extra \$10,000 for the special fund if asked separately, but will not give \$60,000 to the regular campaign which covers the special need. He felt that UJA was falling back on a gimmick as the thing that would get the money and not the nature and content of the appeal.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Eddie says that a man has taken five years to cut down almost to the level he wants to cut down to. He has reached his level of, say, \$50,000 and now you come along and want \$62,500 and Warburg says

MR. SOBLOFF said that the appeal would still be made on the basis of \$50,000 for the man's regular contribution plus \$12,500 as his share of the additional sum that must be raised. Mr. Sobloff said that if a man does not give the money at that point, it is simply because he doesn't want to contribute.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: You are simply raising the level of your ordinary campaign as against what we have come to see as being an important, dramatic.....

MR. SOBLOFF said Detroit raised \$4,100,000 last year and would be prepared to go for \$4,850,000 in 1956 and that total could be asked for from regular gifts plus extra amounts. He felt that could be part of a national plan and every person could be asked to participate.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I am resisting the inclusion of a life-and-death amount of money into the workaday campaign. I have a feeling that with the mood in the country being what it is, people will put up money for this. How do you conceive of this taking place from the point of view of time? I am thinking in terms of capitalizing on the sentiments of the people. The facts in this rearmament matter are going to be as coldly similar six months from now as today but the emotional climate may be different. The United States will sell arms to Israel and Egypt will quiet down and border incidents might cease and in March or April, when you hit most of the contributors, there won't be headlines any more but 30 or 20 or 60 million dollars worth of arms will have been bought and committed for. Therefore, my concern is not from the point of view of a gimmick, but to try to channelize the emotional will of the people, to take advantage of the mood as quickly as possible. The effort for a Special Fund is an effort to channelize the mood. You wouldn't have to do that if these events transpired in the middle of next January.

MR. LURIE asked whether it was thought that there might be a quiescent period and the impact would be lost while the Government would still have bills to pay.

MR. SOBLOFF said he thought the UJA was headed for a hit and run idea by getting to the first money which includes the increases and putting that aside.

Minutes--

RABBI FRIEDMAN'S MEETING WITH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
November 10, 1955--Chicago

RABBI FRIEDMAN: If we can have that first money show that the level of giving for the normal campaign will be the same or better and there is a willingness for that first money to pay an extra 25%, we have a feeling that it will percolate down the line. I don't want to hit and run.

MR. SOBLOFF said that the regular campaigns begin with Big Gifts meeting in December and January, to be tied to the Warburg and Miami meetings. Under his suggestion Mr. Sobeloff said the welfare fund would go after the increases at the beginning and continue right down the line until the end of the campaign. He pointed out it might be found that the increases at the beginning average out to only 14% rather than 25% but that would not necessarily be the fault of the method employed and that it doesn't necessarily follow that if these people were called together separately for special giving, the whole campaign would raise more. It is a question of whether the whole idea of Israel's needing more in this emergency clicks. He didn't think that it was the emergency fund method that has prevented the UJA or the Federation from raising more money but rather that people have become more blasé. He noted if 25% more is to be raised, then it might be necessary to get increases at the beginning to run to 40 or 50%.

MR. GOLDSMITH: You can have a special appeal only once. You may try it again but it will result in lower results. This problem of the preservation of the State of Israel is one we would all agree will be with us a long time. Secondly, the zealous people on behalf of Israel are very important in our campaigns but we carry along in this campaign a good many people who are not zealous with regard to Israel. They aren't likely to join a separatist appeal. Thirdly, where do you want to put the level of giving for the future? If you want to put the level where it can be helpful in the future without trying to devise a situation, here is one that's a natural one. Fourth, if tomorrow's papers carry agreement by Dulles or the President that arms will be provided for Israel, the Jews in America will consider the problem solved. You will have to then say that Israel has committed \$100,000,000 or whatever and they have to pay it and they haven't got the money. I think what Soby has been driving at is about what we thought would be best as we discussed it yesterday. Budget the UJA for this extra amount of money, do our best to get people to subscribe it and preserve our machinery and structure.

MR. ZUCKER said that if the UJA is successful in arriving at good PCB commitments from the communities and it is assumed that there has been established a priority for the UJA, that is greater than anything established in the last few years. A stop could be put to the erosion of the UJA's share of the general funds and thereby in effect make more secure the underpinning of the UJA's annual effort. In that way, the UJA would stand a good chance of getting additional funds. That would leave open the question of whether some communities should solicit in December. Mr. Zucker said that he could state pretty early the best contributors are prepared to do and that if they feel that will not give anything special, there is nothing that we can do.


MR. BISNO said that from the standpoint of campaigning, if a man can be persuaded to give his normal gift plus a special gift for the emergency campaign, he thought the campaign could be dramatized and additional money brought in. A fallacy, however, is, said Mr. Bisno, that if the campaign is at the 1955 level and the increases above 1955 are given to the UJA, Los Angeles, he said, would drop \$750,000 behind. In Los Angeles, he said, the campaign has normal decreases from 4,000 people, exceeding \$300,000. Debts and removals cost the campaign about \$400,000. That \$700,000 has to be protected and comes from 6,000 people who increase and from new contributors. Mr. Bisno said that the UJA might work out some adjustment in its formula to protect the loss the community might suffer.

Deaths

Minutes—Rabbi Friedman's Meeting With Executive Directors
November 10, 1955

MR. ZUCKER AND MR. SOBLOFF noted that this would result in greater losses to the UJA the following year.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: You have a five million dollar campaign within which contributors vary. You raise about \$5,000,000 year after year and you give us \$1,900,000 or two million or whatever. We say, all things being equal, you will again have a natural fluctuation of your clientele and you will raise about the same amount of money. We want the same in 1956 as in 1955. You will have to struggle to raise five million and ~~will~~ will struggle for the two million. What we want is \$1,250,000 of special fund extra plus giving for Israel in an emergency in which the other partner, JDC, will waive its share. So you, in the community, you waive your share and if you can reach a plus amount of giving up to your quota, that goes to solve the emergency problem, whereas your normal two million out of your normal five million pays for the on going program of the Agency and the JDC which we have to support.



Minutes - Rabbi Friedman's Meeting with Executive Directors
November 10, 1955 - Chicago

MR. SOBELOFF called attention to a man who may have contributed \$250 last year and who this year will give \$500 and asked whether the extra \$250 would go into the Special Fund. Mr. Sobeloff said that if the reply is in the negative he would like to know which increases go into the Special Fund and which do not. He asked whether the individual increases go into the Special Fund.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The theoretical answer is, you gave \$250 last year; we need an increase from you because we always suffer losses; we want \$500 from you for 1956. Having said that, and having got your \$500, you say, "Now you also know"

MR. SOBELOFF and others said that would not be realistic solicitation.

MR. BERNSTEIN pointed out that although Rabbi Friedman said the UJA approach would not be in terms of armaments, he had discussed armaments and he wanted to know whether the campaign would be on the basis of armaments or on the basis of North African immigration.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: We are not buying arms, we are buying arms. We will say it in public ten thousand times that we are not raising money for arms. This should be clear, that this money represents tremendous releases of other monies.

MR. PEKARSKY asked whether Rabbi Friedman was in accord with a proposal he understood Mr. Leavitt to have made made in Jerusalem to ensure the regular campaigns out of the UJA's regular share in the campaign.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: No. I made no proposal. Moe Leavitt at the beginning was against the Special Fund because he thought it would hurt the regular campaign. He talked himself around in favor of the Special Fund to such an extent that he is ready to reinsure Sobeloff. I was describing Moe's reinsurance scheme to which I was objecting.

There followed some discussion of the necessity for proceeding with a Special Fund campaign immediately. It was felt by many that this same situation would exist several months hence.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I may have been misunderstood when I talked about immediate exploitation. I think the situation as far as terroristic attacks in Morocco are concerned will quiet down when the Sultan returns to the throne. The number of Jews who want to leave will remain the same. The headlines will quiet down but the same number of Jews will press to get out. I think the headlines will quiet down as far as border attacks in Gaza are concerned but the same accelerated pace of rearmament will go on in Israel. Apparently the Jews of the country are sensitive to the flash headlines and the sustaining power to comprehend this in terms of giving money diminishes.

(Mr. Goldsmith left at this point and Mr. Sobeloff assumed the Chair.)

MR. ZUCKER said that in December and/or in January every community might single out those people who give \$10,000 or more or who may have dropped below \$10,000 in the recent past, who would be particularly interested in the situation in Israel. He thought that through a local or national effort or a combination of the two, this particular group of people

Minutes - Rabbi Friedman's Meeting with Executive Directors
November 10, 1955 - Chicago

might be exposed to the whole story and they might be permitted to make contributions equal to their last year's gift plus an earmarked contribution for this special fund. Mr. Zucker added that in the regular campaign the UJA would get its regular share as heretofore. He felt that it would then be possible to go to the public and advertise these greatly increased gifts and that would help the regular campaign as well. Mr. Zucker said that the local community could make up lists of the names of people to be approached on this special basis. He said that people who are up above \$10,000 are not going to give any increases under any normal circumstances in the campaign. "You don't get increases from the top people, by and large," Mr. Zucker said. "So, in fact you are giving up relatively little. You would be getting plus money and example gifts for your campaign. As far as the rest of the money is concerned, the UJA would have the same consideration as every other group. Then, roughly, it would be about the same as the current year."

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I think that is about as close to what I am thinking and Eddie is thinking, as possible.

MR. SOBLOFF asked whether anybody present felt that the way to raise extra money in his community would be to organize a thoroughly separate campaign. There was no reply. Mr. Sobeloff then asked whether it might not be possible in November, December and January, in soliciting bigger gifts, to tie them to one of the special national meetings in New York or Miami or some other special meeting, to get an individual to announce for those meetings his gift for last year plus a special sum in view of the emergency, and Mr. Sobeloff asked whether this might be done in some of the communities.

MR. TREGUBOFF replied that was more desirable; that those people who will go to a meeting and give an additional amount of money are the people who can be talked to confidentially about their extra gifts. Mr. Treguboff said that a special list could be made up for San Francisco.

MR. BERNSTEIN asked how this would relate to the previous discussion regarding earmarking.

MR. SOBLOFF said that what Mr. Zucker is saying is that perhaps on gifts of a certain amount and over, particularly those related to a UJA meeting, earmarking can be accepted.

MR. ZUCKER said that on a \$10,000 normal gift, the \$10,000 would go to the regular campaign and the overage would be earmarked.

MR. TREGUBOFF said that he agreed with Mr. Zucker.

MR. SOBLOFF called attention to obtaining \$250,000 on that basis and later finding that the regular campaign is \$100,000 behind. Of course, half of that shortage is the UJA's but he wondered what would happen.

MR. ZUCKER said that the best givers in Cleveland will remain at about the same level and that nothing could be lost to the campaign if those people decided to give 15 or 25% more for a special fund.

MR. TREGUBOFF agreed with Mr. Zucker.

MR. SOBLOFF asked whether Mr. Zucker thought of a cut off date.

MR. ZUCKER Replied that he would relate the whole thing to a specific meeting.

Minutes -- Rabbi Friedman's Meeting with Executive Directors
November 10, 1955 -- Chicago

MR. ZUCKER said that he might have 50 or 60 people, perhaps 100 people, in Cleveland who contribute \$10,000 and over, who could be approached. Mr. Zucker said that a man who increases from \$100,000 to \$125,000 because of the emergency appeal, would have his gift publicized but that when it came to budgeting, the extra \$25,000 would be put aside for the UJA.

MR. SOBLOFF said he understood Mr. Zucker as wishing to allow earmarking down to a certain level in some special way that will make it possible, in connection with UJA meetings, to contribute to a special fund.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Why not do it all the way down the line?

MR. SOBLOFF replied it would then be opened up to all kinds of demands by organizations for earmarking and would become a terribly difficult thing.

In reply to a question regarding the person who does not want to make a contribution to the special fund but wishes to increase his contribution to the regular campaign, Rabbi Friedman said that, of course, the campaign would take the increase.

MR. ZUCKER said that in general he was not in favor of earmarking but in recognition of the special situation it had to be noted that in Cleveland there was a group of the best givers who could conceivably be brought together with the explanation that this is a bona fide emergency, that in the light of this the UJA was setting up a special fund and the community wanted these people to know that Cleveland wanted their gifts renewed from last year so that the regular fund would not suffer, and it could be explained to these people that they should make special increases available for the special fund. Mr. Zucker added that he did not see how it is possible to induce a much higher level of giving from these people on a regular basis.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Because I agree with that, because of that simple statement, we do not feel that simply throwing \$750,000 on top of \$4,100,000 will do the trick. The top givers are giving what they feel is their level. If you increase the goal that will not get the extra money.

MR. BISNO spoke of the possibility of asking for bonus gifts for 1956 -- a regular gift plus a bonus gift because of the special need -- all to go into the regular campaign. In this way the contributor does not feel that he has been placed at a new level of giving.

MR. TREGUBOFF said that he supported Mr. Zucker's suggestion because in San Francisco he thought there was a group of about 25 people, who give above \$10,000, who by all standards will probably maintain the same level next year, and if a regular campaign is held they will give the same amount. Mr. Treguboff said that these people would probably be very impressed by this new emergency. Mr. Treguboff also said that in his opinion these people would not give extra money for the regular general campaign or even for specific earmarking in the city of San Francisco. Those people, said Mr. Treguboff, can be approached on a very selective basis for extra dollars to a special fund in connection with a national or special meeting.

MR. SOBLOFF said that he thought there would be a quarter of a million dollars of that kind of money in Detroit.

Minutes -- Rabbi Friedman's Meeting with Executive Directors
November 10, 1955 -- Chicago

RABBI FRIEDMAN: If the UJA National, through its national leaders on the 18th and the decision of its Cabinet, etc., announces the establishment of a Special Fund to meet Israel's special emergencies and enjoys the affirmative word of the communities that they will do their share or as much of their share as they can towards this Special Fund and that the Special Fund is authorized to accept gifts, I wonder why if, after you have made your test sounding of your top group whose extra giving would only be for this and who are not going to indulge in minus giving -- why, after you have done that test sounding, you cannot continue through the rest of the campaign on the same basis, saying the special fund is a fact and we continue on every echelon of our campaign to accept no gifts to the special fund until a person has given to the regular fund, and why you cannot do at the \$2,000 level the same as you do at the \$10,000 level.

MR. ZUCKER said that the suggestion he made is only for the very best givers; he was thinking in terms of people who understand the problem and are the type of people who know what is involved and who could be told the whole story at all times.

MR. PEKARSKY said that if the principle of the special fund is extended then the campaign might be faced with the problem of less money raised and the programs would suffer.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: How far down the line can you go to protect the regular fund and give the guy down the line an opportunity to participate in the special fund?

MR. ZUCKER said he would be against permitting anybody but the small group he referred to as being part of the special fund.

MR. SOBLOFF said that the trouble with going all the way down the line is that a new machine is set up behind the regular machine in order to get earmarked gifts and people became active in trying to instruct solicitors to go after earmarked funds rather than regular funds.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: As far as I am concerned we can continue this on November 17th with some preliminary briefing for the people who were not here today. It is up to you. I am not sure that there is not more to be gained by continuing this discussion. I think there is. As many of you are coming in for the 18th, we will keep this meeting set up for the 17th.

MR. SOBLOFF said that no matter what the UJA may decide, he understood that the individual community would have the right to say whether it wants to carry through one way or another.

MR. BERNSTEIN said that if everybody has agreed that earmarking is bad basically, that he thought it would be best to have the special fund part of the campaign with every dollar over a certain amount raised going for a special fund. As regards certain special officers or cabinet members of the UJA, they might be permitted, said Mr. Bernstein, to have their own personal special gifts earmarked in some way.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I would not permit it. I don't think it's good and I think it would tend to tear their loyalties.

Minutes — Rabbi Friedman's Meeting with Executive Directors
November 10, 1955 — Chicago

MR. ZUCKER said he agreed earmarking is not a good thing but we ought not to throw the whole idea out just because we are against earmarking in principle.

MR. LURIE asked whether anything was going to be done by the Friends of Israel group.

RABBI FRIEDMAN said he did not know.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I got the sense out of this not only that the communities ought to have the right to do it the way they want, but once we made the initial decision on our part to do it through the communities, then the next step falls quite logically. Each community has tailormade decisions to make quite independently. I have gotten another sense out of this meeting by which I am very encouraged; that you are for doing something. I think before we get through there may be a couple of other variations on what might be done. My only desire is that there be transmitted to the Jewish people of America the fact that this is probably the most authentic crossroads situation we have had in eight years. This is a combination of things that have been considered here. Morocco and the war have created a sense of turmoil and authenticity of the crisis. The UJA has a very quiet but firm responsibility to say to the Jews of America, "this money is needed and this is what it is needed for". If you cannot put it up then you cannot, but somebody has to ask for it. The way in which to meet it is quite clearly the responsibility of the cities and I am really glad we came out.



UNCLASSIFIED

Handwritten text at the top of the page, possibly a header or introductory notes.

- ① ...
- ② ...
- ③ ...
- ④ ...
- ⑤ ...
- ⑥ ...
- ⑦ ...
- ⑧ ...
- ⑨ ...
- ⑩ ...
- ⑪ ...
- ⑫ ...
- ⑬ ...
- ⑭ ...
- ⑮ ...
- ⑯ ...
- ⑰ ...
- ⑱ ...
- ⑲ ...
- ⑳ ...
- ㉑ ...
- ㉒ ...
- ㉓ ...
- ㉔ ...
- ㉕ ...
- ㉖ ...
- ㉗ ...
- ㉘ ...
- ㉙ ...
- ㉚ ...
- ㉛ ...
- ㉜ ...
- ㉝ ...
- ㉞ ...
- ㉟ ...
- ㊱ ...
- ㊲ ...
- ㊳ ...
- ㊴ ...
- ㊵ ...
- ㊶ ...
- ㊷ ...
- ㊸ ...
- ㊹ ...
- ㊺ ...
- ㊻ ...
- ㊼ ...
- ㊽ ...
- ㊾ ...
- ㊿ ...

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including dates and names. A large watermark reading "AMERICAN UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES" is visible in the background.

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including dates and names.

Handwritten initials or a small mark on the left margin.

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including dates and names.

Handwritten initials or a small mark on the left margin.

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including dates and names.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the words "ארכיון" (archive) and "אמריקני" (American). The text is written on lined paper and includes a large, faint watermark in the center that reads "AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES".

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, continuing the text from the top section. The notes are written on lined paper and include various phrases and words.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the word "ארכיון" (archive) and "אמריקני" (American).

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the word "ארכיון" (archive) and "אמריקני" (American).

Handwritten text in Hebrew script, possibly a list or account, with some numbers and dates.

אנזכרה / אנזכרה / אנזכרה

Handwritten text in Hebrew script, including a large watermark that reads "AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES".

Handwritten text in Hebrew script, continuing the list or account, with various entries and numbers.

Handwritten notes in Urdu script, top section.

Handwritten notes in Urdu script, middle section.

Handwritten notes in Urdu script, lower middle section.

Handwritten notes in Urdu script, bottom section.

Handwritten text in Hebrew script, appearing to be a list or notes. The text is written in a cursive style on lined paper. Some legible words include "היום", "למחר", and "ביום".

Handwritten text in Hebrew script, continuing the list or notes. The text is written in a cursive style on lined paper. Some legible words include "ביום", "למחר", and "היום".

Handwritten text in Hebrew script, continuing the list or notes. The text is written in a cursive style on lined paper. Some legible words include "ביום", "למחר", and "היום".

Handwritten text in Hebrew script, continuing the list or notes. The text is written in a cursive style on lined paper. Some legible words include "ביום", "למחר", and "היום".

Handwritten text in Hebrew script, appearing to be a signature or a final note. The text is written in a cursive style on lined paper. Some legible words include "היום", "למחר", and "ביום".

~~Handwritten scribble~~

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the number 41 and a date 1977.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the number 12 and a date 1977.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the number 12 and a date 1977.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the number 12 and a date 1977.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the number 12 and a date 1977.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the number 12 and a date 1977.

Handwritten text

Handwritten notes, possibly including a date like 1/24/1941.

Handwritten notes, possibly including a date like 1/24/1941.

Handwritten notes, possibly including a date like 1/24/1941.

Handwritten notes, possibly including a date like 1/24/1941.

Handwritten notes, possibly including a date like 1/24/1941.

Handwritten notes, possibly including a date like 1/24/1941.

Handwritten notes, possibly including a date like 1/24/1941.

Handwritten notes, possibly including a date like 1/24/1941.

Handwritten notes, possibly including a date like 1/24/1941.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew script, including a large circular stamp that reads "AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES". The text is written on lined paper and appears to be a list or series of entries, possibly related to archival records or historical documents. The entries are written in a cursive style and include various names and dates.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew script, continuing the list or series of entries from the previous section. The text is written on lined paper and includes various names and dates, similar to the first section.