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Kaufman, Menachem and Rosalie Lurie. Transcript and notes from interview with Herbert A. Friedman. 1975-1976, 1992.

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UNITED JEWISH APPEAL

INTERVIEW WITH HERBERT FRIEDMAN

Interviewers: Rosalie Lurie and Menahem Kaufman

Dec. 7, 1975 to April 27, 1976

Reel 1 Slide #1

A.

The UJA was first organized on December 9, 1938, four weeks after Kristall-Nacht (November 9th). Within these four weeks the leaders realized that something serious was happening; that they ^{had} ~~have~~ to stop quibbling among themselves and try to unite.

Q.

The leaders?

A.

Basically three people did the whole thing, Jonah Wise, William Rosenwald, and Abba Hillel Silver. There are many other people working behind the scenes but these people were the symbols. They signed the contract, the document creating the United Jewish Appeal. It didn't stay united. One or two years later, during the war, it broke up. They had to patch it up and make a compromise. It was like chevlei leda (birth pangs). There were growing pains. Montor was the director, but he had another director working with him. Nobody remembers that man ever existed.

Q.

Who?

A.

Isador Coons. It was a question of two organizations coming together, each one afraid of the other, so each put his own man in.

They were supposed to be equal, but the personality of Montor was so strong, and the personality of Coons so weak, that the two could not work together on an equal level. You cannot have two bosses in any organization. Montor simply overwhelmed the other man. He ran the whole show.

Q.

I know an Allied Jewish Campaign was created in the 1930s. This Allied Jewish Campaign published a book, "The Pact of Glory". There was in existence a certain pre-United Jewish Appeal, called the Allied Jewish Campaign. What is it?

A.

Nothing. I haven't got the slightest recollection. It's one of several efforts which were abortions. They started and they died. Nothing was born because there was no big fusion, no sense of unity. There was no agreement on the Zionist question. It was a tactical problem. When you try to unify on a tactical basis on the battlefield, with no long-range strategy, it can't last. These were the first attempts of the American Jewish community to try to do something.

Most communities were very weak, as were most of the Federations. Most Federations were in the hands of German Jews and not the Russian and Polish Jews. Nobody was caring very much about refugees from Europe or about Palestine. There was no ideology.

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It was mostly just philanthropy. Some poor Jews needed help, and we can send some help. The Joint had a big program, a non-Zionist program. They spent millions of dollars on (Agro) Joint in Russia. I think they even believed in Birobidzhan in the early days. This was a philanthropic, not a national approach. But when Kristall-Nacht came so suddenly, it brought a new perception, a new understanding. Even that wasn't strong enough to overcome all of these old suspicions and built-in differences.

Montor was a Zionist in those days, as he defined it, and he was in his own way a genius. There's no doubt in my mind about it. Every genius has within himself the seeds of destruction. Montor destroyed himself and he almost destroyed the machine which he himself built. He is the genius who built the machine, but he tried to destroy the machine. In September of 1950, after he had been the director of the UJA for ^{about a month or ten} ~~four~~ powerful years, he made a statement at a meeting in Jerusalem in which he was trying to ^{help} ~~persuade~~ Kaplan and Ben-Gurion ~~to~~ start the Bond organization. He said that the UJA ^{would} ~~will~~ not raise twenty-five million dollars in 1951, ^{and by} ~~in~~ 1952, ~~53 and 54~~. It ^{would} ~~will~~ not raise any dollars. ^{I was present and heard him say these things} A new ^{JJA} The same Montor who built the machine was already predicting its destruction. Either this is not a balanced man or this is not a balanced picture. He was a true genius in fund raising because he had the two things which fund raising is built upon -- vision and chutzpah. He had both. I learned to appreciate him and I

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learned a great deal from him. I even liked him, although he was not a man you could like. He was cold as ice.

Q.

What did you call him?

A.

I called him Henry.

Now Montor brought two people from the D.P. camps to the UJA Conference in Atlantic City in December, 1945. This created the revolution. One was Rosensaft. The second was Zalman ^{Grynberg} Greenberg, now dead. Rosensaft was a bad man. Zalman Greenberg was a good man. ~~You're not supposed to say anything about the dead, but he was not a good man.~~ ^{They both} However, he served Montor's purpose. Montor wanted somebody to come from the Sheerit Hapleta, stand up in front of the people and say, "now look, we are here, alive, and you have to do something." It was a shock. Rosensaft came from the Eastern Zone of occupied Germany and Grynberg from the American zone.

Montor realized that he ~~cannot~~ ^{could not} make the campaign for 1946 without bringing the Jews in America into contact with the reality of 1945. You cannot make a campaign again in '46 based on slogans and not deal with realities. He told these people what he wanted them to say, "that we are alive and Hitler didn't kill us -- and we want to go to Palestine." Neither one of those two men ^{lived their lives} got to Palestine. Rosensaft went to Geneva and Zalman Greenberg ^{eventually} went to New York, ^{after a short stay in Israel,} but nobody remembers and nobody will look back.

If I had been a director at that time, I wouldn't have taken those two people, but people who were in reality going to be on a

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ship of Aliyah Bet in a week's time. I would have had people stand up in Atlantic City in December, 1945 saying "we want our country and we are going to go to our country. We don't care what the British say. We don't care what you Jews of America say. Lech le-Azazel." I think I was always a little bit stronger than Montor, although he was very strong.

Q.

Tell me who of the American Jewish leadership, were present at the Atlantic Conference? Were you at that meeting?

A.

No, I was in Germany. I think the chairman of the UJA at that time was Henry Morgenthau, so he was the leader. Among the hassidim who were working there, were Joseph ^{Holzman} ~~Felksman~~ from Detroit, ^{Sol} ~~Saul~~ Luckman from Cincinnati and Sam ^{Daroff} ~~Narrow~~ from Philadelphia, all dead now. *Others who were probably there were Sam Rottberg and Irving Norry. But you should look at the records carefully.*

Q.

What about Jacob Blaustein?

A.

Jacob Blaustein was never in his whole life at the UJA meeting; never once. Jacob Blaustein didn't go to UJA meetings. Judge Proskauer didn't go to UJA meetings. Of that whole crowd, the only one who ever went to a UJA meeting was Senator Lehman.

Q.

Was Eddie Warburg there?

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A.

Warburg was probably not there yet. He was probably still in Europe. By the next Annual Conference in December 1946, he was back.

The 1945 campaign raised thirty million dollars. By the 1946 campaign, Montor said we'd have to raise one hundred million dollars because now, at last, our brothers are out from the camps. Now we're seeing who's alive, and we can do something for those in the camps in Europe. Now, at last, we can help. You cannot give the excuse that money doesn't do any good, because now money does do good. Everyone thought he was absolutely crazy.

The Conference of 1945 was an historic meeting because it changed the quantum. There was a terrible two or three day fight, in which everyone said it's ridiculous to make a goal of one hundred million dollars -- it cannot be reached -- we will look foolish, silly -- why should we do it? Montor pushed and fought. His few hassidim fought with him. They were fighting against all of the delegations from all the communities. And the Conference passed a goal of one hundred million dollars.

Q.

That was with Rosenwald's help?

A.

Oh, sure.

Q.

..he told us he supported the hundred million dollar goal and he

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gave one million himself.

A.

I don't think he gave a million dollars.

Q.

He told us that he supported Montor for the hundred million dollar goal..

A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

He said that his family gave one million dollars.

A.

Correct. He gave 250 thousand and his sister, Mrs. Stern, also gave 250. One brother, Lessing, never gave a penny. Two other sisters each gave 250 thousand. Each of them gave 250 thousand; a million dollars from the family. We didn't have a million dollar gift in the campaign. It wasn't until the 1970 campaign, that there was a single gift of one million dollars, from one person, not even during ~~Sheshet Hayamin~~ ^{the Six-Day War}. (I have an uncertain recollection that there may have been a one-million dollar gift in 1967, from Walter Annenberg, which was obtained by Albert Parker. Check the records.)
~~You had problems during the Six-Day War?~~

A.

You have to talk to Montor about this ^{period} ~~time~~ -- August 1945, through September, '50. ^{after 1948, or 1949,} Montor was already believing in the Bond, selling the Bond organization and predicting the death of the UJA. He wasn't interested in the UJA any more. He was determined to fight it.

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Q.

Do you think that Montor was really completely convinced that the UJA was out, or did he convince himself the UJA is out because he was out?

A.

No, he wasn't out yet. I think you have to add a third alternative -- was he really convinced that the UJA was dead? No, he was too smart for that. Was he predicting the death of the UJA because he was quarreling with it? No, he wasn't quarreling yet. Was he predicting the death of the UJA in order to preside over the birth of something new? Yes, it was a tactical thing and he was telling Ben-Gurion and Kaplan -- we're going to create something new because you need a new way of getting money.

Q.

And he had Golda on his side?

A.

Yes. She wasn't terribly important at that time but he had Golda because he had Sam Rothberg. Rothberg wasn't a factor in 1945, but became a factor a few years later by 1950. Montor had Rothberg with him a hundred percent. Rothberg ^{brought} ~~brought~~ the ^{end} ~~long~~ goal -- the whole meeting in September 1950. There were thirty of us, including myself.

Q.

Where did it take place?

A.

At the King David Hotel. ^{Abc} Feinberg told Montor to be sure to bring me to that meeting.

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Q.

What was your role then?

did no much going around speaking as any key leader in the country.
A. I was a volunteer speaker for the UJA, ^{after having returned from Germany in 1947, who probably}
~~It will come to me in a minute. I'm trying to set a stage for you~~
~~to show you what you need from Montor.~~

The next director was Schwartz, a ~~total~~ failure as a ^{the executive} director of the UJA, but one of the kindest, most fullhearted, loving Jew you'll ever meet. But he was absolutely soft, not decisive. He was a good intellect, a good heart, and when he stood up you had to love him, but he couldn't lead a fight. He couldn't do anything. He couldn't win from anybody. If he had stayed as the director of the UJA for another few years, Montor's prediction would have come true, because in the years that Joe ran the UJA, one main thing happened. In this daily fight between the UJA and all of the communities -- a fight over how much money the UJA should get and how much money the local community should get -- Schwartz lost every fight. First of all, he didn't want to fight. He didn't like to fight. His attitude used to be, 'ah meleh', so Los Angeles wants to take another five percent for themselves -- we're going to make a fight? Are we going to threaten them that the UJA will make its own campaign in Los Angeles? And I used to say to him yes, by God, how can you just surrender, keep surrendering, while the UJA is getting less and less? It wasn't his fault. It was not a job for him because this was a fighting job and he was not that kind of a fighter. He didn't like it and he wanted to get out.

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Q.

How long did he stay?

A.

He stayed until I came in, in the spring of 1955. He came in, in January of '51. The Bond organization started selling in May of '51. Ben-Gurion came to America with a big tickertape parade down Broadway and down Michigan Boulevard in Chicago. Montor already had been running the Bond organization since the beginning of '51. Warburg and Rosenwald came to me ^{in 1952} to ask me to run the UJA. This was one and a half years after Schwartz was in the job and he wanted to get out. I said no.

I had my own personal reasons. Number one, I had just moved from my former congregation in Denver, to a new congregation in Milwaukee. I was only there a few months when they came to me and asked me to take this job. I said it's suicidal. It's not fair, I can't do it to these people. I came only a few months ago and I can't walk out on them.

The second reason that I gave them was that I didn't know enough to run this organization. You guys are crazy to ask me. I was the best volunteer spokesman the UJA had, I said, but you are fooling yourselves. You have an illusion. I am the best spokesman you have but what do I know about banking, advertising, labor relations and all the things that you have to know to run a big corporation? I'm not an executive of a corporation. So they said no, you are wrong. But I said look, I'm only here a few months and I can't do it. I told them to get somebody else. They didn't find anybody else and Schwartz stayed on '52, '53, '54.

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In 1954 we came into a big crisis. Montor was attacking the communities on the policy that he wanted the right to sell Bonds all year, twelve months a year. He got into a big fight with the City of Detroit. He wrote a brochure, called "The Nonsense of Timing." The essence of ^{his approach was that it was nonsense to try to} ~~the whole thing~~ was that the ^{coordinate the calendar and say arbitrarily that the UJA should} ~~UJA~~ works for six months of the year and the Bonds work for six months of the year. ~~that's nonsense~~. He said, I'm going to work twelve months of the year whether you like it or not. So they said we don't like it.

The executive director in Detroit had enough power to organize many other executive directors in many other cities and they began to make waves to the Government of Israel. The Bonds belonged to the Government of Israel. The leaders, although Montor was their man, finally had to throw him overboard. They had no choice. Eshkol was really involved in this whole thing. He was the key to the whole business. There was a burning meeting in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, in '54.

Q.

Was that near the end of the year?

A.

Yes. Finally Eshkol surrendered, after all of the community leaders were standing in front of the table and saying to Eshkol, we don't want ^{Montor} ~~him~~, get rid of him. That meant not only get rid of him, but change his policies. You must have a man who will be more cooperative with us.

Q.

They called Eshkol from Israel - he came especially for that meeting?

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A.

Yes. Sapir says he was there but I don't remember him. I just remember Eshkol sitting there. ^{Grupa} Josephthal was on the side and Nahum Goldmann was in the background. And so they gave in. The supporters of Montor said, if you get rid of Montor, we quit, so you have to decide. Eshkol said, okay, I've heard all your stories - Now I will go upstairs and decide.

He called me and he called Schwartz. He said to Schwartz, look, the communities want somebody they can work with, and that's you. I want to ask you if you'll take the Bonds? And then he turned to me and he said, we already talked to you two years ago. Now you have no choice. Now you have to ~~do it.~~ ^{take the JOA}

Q.

Eshkol?

A.

Yes. So I said, you know we were friends, Montor and I? But that didn't bother me. I had to leave the congregation of people. I had no right to say no at this time. There had to be a solution to the whole problem and all the pieces had to fit. They really didn't have anybody except me. If I had said no, then it would have been a big problem. They would have to start looking for somebody. He wouldn't know the organization or know how to speak or how to articulate; be a strong enough Zionist with enough experience and war background, Aliyah Bet and from the side of the Joint. Because I had very good relations with the Joint, from the days when I was in Berlin with them, I was the best candidate they

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had. So I told Eshkol that he'd have to send Warburg and Rosenwald again to ^{the} my board of directors ^{of my Temple} in Milwaukee to get me a release. Warburg said okay, so we made the arrangement. Montor was finished, out.

I said, you have to give me until the end of 1955, a year. Schwartz will break me in and teach me the job.

The banking business.

Q.
A.
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I built a leadership which is going to protect the UJA for the next twenty years to come. There's nothing to worry about for twenty years. Bonds didn't work that way. I could tell you who'll be the leader for the next twenty years. That's very important. Then you know you have something protecting the future.

So you have to get information from Montor. From Schwartz, you can't get anything - he's dead. I will give you one name - Melvin Goldstein. He was the closest personal ^{confidante} "~~secretary~~" to Schwartz. He was with him in Lisbon ^{as far back as} 1940.

Q.

He's in New York?

A.

He's in New York and he works for the Bond organization. Tell him you want everything he can remember about Schwartz. Schwartz took Goldstein with him. He was his personal secretary.

I came ^{to the USA} in February or March ¹⁹⁵⁵ after the big compromise meeting. Schwartz had already left. He was over in the Bond office. I

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walked into the UJA office with no training, no orientation. I didn't know how to push the button on the telephone. I didn't know anything. I carried the thing until I left in June of 1971. I started in February or March, '55. I was director the longest of them all -- longer than Montor, longer than Schwartz. There were only four directors. I was number three and Bernstein was four.

Bernstein worked for me for many years as the number two man. I don't know how deeply you interviewed him, but he has to give you four years of history. You have to interview every single chairman. Morgenthau is dead but his son is living. Maybe you could find out something from his son. He's a prime source for Morgenthau. Then Warburg was the chairman. After Warburg, Rosenwald was the chairman. After Rosenwald, came Morris Bernstein. He's dead. You must do a ^{careful interview} job on Joseph Myerhoff. He's 77 or 78 years old and in perfect health, thank goodness -- a sharp mind. ~~But don't waste time on him.~~ ^{Before} ~~After~~ Myerhoff, for a few weeks, it was Phillip Klutznik.

Q.

A few weeks?

A.

No problem -- there was nothing wrong with him. I made a deal with him. I said, I want you to be chairman. You have all the qualifications, except one. You are an outsider, not an insider. You ~~never~~ ^{did not} work inside this organization and you come up through the ranks. I'm a believer in the army system from the days of my early training. But I said, in spite of that, you have so many good qualifications -- give us the benefit. You have a wonderful strong personality, a

good strong feeling for Israel, you are a good diplomat, you can compromise fights if we have them and we always have fights.

He told me that he was about to receive an appointment from Kennedy and so he couldn't do it. I said the timing is wrong, because our conference is in December. I can't wait -- we have to announce a chairman. If Kennedy comes to you before the December Conference, sure, you want to be an Ambassador -- that's more than being chairman of UJA. Klutznik didn't deceive me. He said, if I am appointed Ambassador, that's what I want to do. First I said, maybe you can be chairman of the UJA at the same time? You know Morgenthau did, he was a Secretary in the Cabinet and he was Chairman of the UJA.

Q.

At the same time?

A.

I think so. I'm not sure either, but I was trying to use an argument. I don't remember.

Q.

Was Morgenthau finished?

A.

No. Roosevelt died in April '45, and up to the time of Roosevelt's death, Morgenthau was still the Secretary of the Treasury.

Q.

He continued with Truman.

A.

And he was the Chairman of the UJA in '45, I think. Klutznik

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wouldn't accept this. He said that there's a conflict of interests and he wouldn't accept it. He said, if you want to take me at the conference in December, you'll have to elect me. Maybe I won't be appointed to the United Nations. Maybe I'll be appointed a year later. He said, if you take me on these conditions, okay. I said yes, it's worth it for me. I have to gamble, because if you don't get appointed, we have you, and if we lose you, we lose you. You have to take risks in life. You cannot be so careful. We lost him in February. In six, seven weeks, it was finished.

Myerhoff became the chairman and to this day Myerhoff is angry at Klutznik because Klutznik put the United States Ambassadorship ahead of the UJA Chairmanship. You have to talk to Klutznik, although I don't know if he can tell you much. Then talk to Myerhoff. After Myerhoff came Fisher, then Ginsberg, ^{then} Zuckerman and now Lautenberg. Every one of them is ^{quite different, each with his own appointees.} ~~an excellent key man.~~ ^{PP} Every year there is a group in the UJA called national chairmen -- ten, twelve men. They are the top officers next to the general chairman. Every one of them puts in fifty to one hundred days a year.

Q.

They're laymen?

A.

Laymen, as volunteers, like the general chairman. You must interview every single man who ever carried the title of national chairman -- about one hundred people. These are the boys who know the work from the inside. They know the fights in all the communities, the arguments whether to have a special fund or not.

The first time I went to ^{for the UJA in 1955} Morocco, I came back and said to Warburg --

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Warburg you are Ashkenazi. We have to make a special fund for the Moroccans. If I stand up and ask for it, everybody will listen and say that we can't raise another ^{twenty} five million dollars, but if you stand up and say that you want more money for the Moroccans... Tell me you'll do it and I'll arrange the whole thing. ~~I arranged~~ ^{we convened a national} a meeting for four hundred ^{to which} and ^{Levin came, and we asked} put Senator Lehman ^{in to take} the chair. Warburg stood up and said he wanted a special fund of twenty five million dollars for the Moroccans. I said no, I think we shouldn't take the money away from Israel. ^{He said I} We were playing ^{roles we} ~~game~~ and we won. ^{had previously agreed upon and we persuaded the audience,}

Q.
When was this?

A.

This was September 1955. We ran a special fund in the calendar year 1956, twenty-five million dollars ^{extra} for the Moroccan Jews, and ^{I think we made 17 million} ~~it was making thirty or forty million~~ -- I don't remember ^{exactly}. When I took the UJA it was at its lowest point, at the beginning of '55. When I came into the office, I didn't know what I was doing because Schwartz didn't train me. Nobody taught me. I couldn't even find a secretary.

^{Almost the same week I took over the job}
~~That was~~ ^{Bingo,} the whole business in Morocco started. ~~The~~ French left. ^{The} ~~System was brought back. Moslem independence was achieved. Killed and wounded~~ ^{They} were ~~lying~~ ^{lying} in Casa Blanca.

~~So I ran away~~ I left the office. Thank God I don't like to sit in the office. I ran away to Morocco. I came back a month later and I understood the whole situation in Morocco. I said that ^{we} ~~they~~ have to move these people out -- four hundred thousand Jews sitting there waiting for Aliyah. The Joint didn't want to

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do it, but they agreed. Then everybody was for the Aliyah of these people, the CRT and the Lubawitcher Rebbe, who was ~~was~~ in Morocco working among those Jews. I started to go into every community, because to make twenty five million ^{extra} dollars you have to go out and fight on the battlefield. So you ~~have~~ ^{need} a crew of guys -- laymen, volunteers. Those boys can tell you stories about how it was - the fight in Dallas and how it was in Boston and Philadelphia and Los Angeles.

Q.

These are the ^{national} chairmen?

A.

Yes, those boys know the inside of the business. The people whose names are ^{simple} on the letterhead don't know anything. What does Abba Hillel Silver know about fighting on the battlefield? He could stand up and make a speech. You don't raise money by making a speech. You have to talk to the ^{national chairmen} ~~board~~ if you want to know how the UJA works. You have executives sitting in the office and laymen out on the battlefield. You have to talk to both.

I had an idea in December 1965 to make a conference. It was twenty years after the war and I wanted the commanding generals of Europe to come -- this was General ^{Lucius} Clay, the French General Koenig, the British Field Marshal Alexander. ^{We} invited the Russians to come. ^{Zhukov} Zukov wouldn't come. It was to remind the people that the war is over twenty years, ^{and that} ^{longing ahead building} We're now for Israel in 1966.

~~We have a great big new goal -- reelect Fisher. Who's Fisher as a name? Now you have to start going through names.~~

(NOTE: GOES THROUGH A LONG LIST OF NAMES)

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A.

I started this record. It wasn't kept before. ^{max} Topatchnik must have some records from before but I don't know. On the list are number one, the directors; number two, the chairmen; number three, the national chairmen; number four, the local chairmen.

You have to see the ^{local} guy who is on the other side of the fight. I spent many years fighting, particularly in Los Angeles, over the share of the money -- and Chicago. Those were the two worst cities that I fought with every year. You should go and speak to some key people -- the chairmen of Los Angeles and chairmen in Chicago and get the story from their side -- that's history.

Q.

The big cities.

A.

They're not the most important or the most interesting. I'll tell you just one story to illustrate my point. A few weeks ago I was in Atlanta, Georgia for the UJA and ^{the local community leaders} they wanted to take five million ^{as a goal} dollars for next year. I said seven million. We fought and we argued with the whole Hanhalah (leadership) and I talked all day long. I talked to a group of men in the morning and to a group of women at lunch. And in the evening I talked to a meeting of every single person in the community who gives more than ten thousand dollars, to the top guys in the room. At the end of the day they agreed to go for seven million instead of five. So you'll make six. They'll make more than five. So we made money.

Late at night they were all tired. It was a long day. One ^{said} guy says to me, do you remember the terrible fight you had here

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fifteen years ago? You were saying to a certain fellow, a Max Kuba, that Atlanta should be wiped off the map. Atlanta was raising less than one million dollars and it was taking sixty percent for itself, not giving the UJA a fair amount. You said that these people were stealing the money away from Israel. They are southern gentlemen and they don't like to be told that they are stealing. You were very rough on them and they threw you out and told you they never want to see you come back to this city again. They were reminding me of this fight. Milton Weinstein said to me that it was good to have me here today and they got a good shot in the arm from me. He said that fifteen years ago I was right. It's a small town. I told you the story because you should go to talk to Milton Weinstein in Atlanta, Georgia and get a very interesting look from his perspective.

Take twenty places, twenty five places, you don't have to do more. Go to Dallas, Denver, Colorado, to Atlanta, Milwaukee and San Francisco.

Q.

Phoenix, Arizona?

A.

Phoenix, Arizona today is important. Phoenix, Arizona ten years ago was nothing. Go to Nashville, Tennessee and Miami.

Q.

Mortimer May?

A.

Yes. He had as much influence on the campaign as you did. (laughter). Mortimer May used to make big speeches. He was a very rich man.

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One thing you learn if you study this whole process very carefully -- words, words, words. Mortimer May could stand up and say, I am the president of the Zionists -- I love Israel. You must all work for Israel. Then somebody says to him, fine -- but you have to face the question, how much? In his life he never gave more than five thousand dollars. In two minutes he's finished. He has no ability to lead. The whole business has to be a personal example of giving.

Q.

Bill Rosenwald -- how did he deal with this matter?

A.

Did Rosenwald tell you the story about what he once did to me? It was a beautiful story, an absolute classic and I could only love him for it -- although I hated him ^{at the moment it happened.} most. I'll tell you the story, but only to prove what a leader is. There was a guy in Tulsa, Oklahoma by the name of ^{Herman} Taubman, very rich, in the oil business a long time. Bill Rosenwald was the chairman then and I was the director. We were trying to figure out how to get Taubman to give the proper amount of money. We wanted a quarter of a million dollars from him.

and Taubman agreed to come.

Bill arranged a breakfast in his room at the hotel/The day before the December Conference Taubman called me up and he asked, what's going on here? Why do you want me for breakfast tomorrow? Because we want to ask you for a quarter of a million dollars. I said, Herman, look, you give a quarter of a million dollars, then you and I together, we'll turn on Rosenwald and you ask him for a half a million. He's much richer than you are. Taubman liked this

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kind of a game because he loved Israel very much and if he could get half a million dollars from Rosenwald, it was worthwhile for him.

We went to the meeting and had breakfast, nice. After breakfast, Taubman said "nu?" Rosenwald started to explain to him that he should give a quarter of a million, etc. We didn't have very many as big as him. At the right moment, Taubman turned to Rosenwald and he said, I'll make a deal with you. I will give a quarter if you will give half. Silence. I decided that I have to start also, so I said Bill, he's right. What's the difference? He will give two and a half -- we were always talking two and a half. Two and a half meant two hundred and fifty ^{thousand} -- five, five hundred thousand.

Suddenly Rosenwald turns on me and says, there are three of us sitting here. You're also a Jew. ^{Rosenwald} He said, ^{to me} I'll make a deal with you. I will give five if you will give five. ~~I'm a paid employee.~~ When he tells me to give five, he is talking five thousand, not five hundred thousand. I looked at him and smiled and said, you're a real bastard, but you're a wonderful fund raiser. I said, what you are saying is that his quarter of a million and your half a million are depending on my five thousand dollars -- come on. He burst out laughing and he said, if you give five, I give five then ^{Taubman} he gives two and a half. He was hugging and kissing and ^{drinking} making whiskey for breakfast in the morning.

This story is a classic, ^{an} and absolute classic. I said to him, how the hell can I pay five thousand dollars when I'm making ^{thirty} twenty five thousand dollars. You want ^{almost twenty} twenty percent of my whole income?

Never mind, I'll pay it. I'm going to get you for twenty percent of your income some day. Don't forget, Mr. Rosenwald. When everybody is making a maximum push, then you can have a success, but that takes a leader. Raising money is a science. It's not just done by accident. There are the boys ^{who} ~~de~~ did the work.

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The Zionists and non-Zionists came together under the pressure of Kristall Nacht in 1938. During the years of the war they broke apart and they came together again, always on the same argument -- they didn't trust each other. One side wanted money to go for philanthropic purposes, and the other side wanted money to go for national upbuilding of the homeland. They are two separate things and they didn't agree for many, many years. It wasn't until we came down into the fifties, maybe even the sixties, that the people on the non-Zionist side were happy that so much money came to the Zionist side. Today the fight is meaningless because all of the people who are now inside the Joint are as much Zionists as the people on the other side, but that was a fight that had an ideological basis and it continued for decades.

Q.

Even when you were really the accepted vice president of the UJA?

A.

Sure, certainly I could feel it.

Q.

But it was not so crucial as it was before '46?

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A.

Of course there was no danger of a split.

Q.

I remember in '45 there was a split. I would say the American Government really intervened in order to bring them together.

A.

No, I think what finally brought them together was when they started to make five year contracts with each other instead of one year contracts. There was still ideological tension and difference of opinion, but the danger of a split was less and less. That subject had nothing to do with the subject of national budgeting. National budgeting was an argument between the National UJA and all the communities. There was nothing ideological. This was an argument over how much is your part and how much is my part, not ideology.

Q.

You don't think that in reality Blaustein was interested in getting more power over what the Jewish Agency was doing with the money?

A.

No, he couldn't care less. He wasn't interested in the slightest. I think if I said to him, Jewish Agency, he would say, what's that?

Q.

The Jewish Agency in Palestine were quarreling about it already in 1941 and '42.

A.

Blaustein wasn't taking an anti-Zionist side or an anti-Israel side. He believed that more money should go to the local community, for the local Jewish hospital, because he believed more in America than in Israel.

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There was nothing really ideological because they were arguing over the principle of how to divide the money. Maybe there was a power argument but I don't know. I'm not sure. I never thought of it this way. There might have been a power argument about who is the boss of the National UJA or the local Jewish community -- who is the Baal Habait, who should tell them what to do.

Q.

Why did Silver fight against national budgeting and why did Blaustein always claim national budgeting. This was a fight between the Blaustein groups and the Zionist groups. He wanted national budgeting and Silver opposed national budgeting. Silver said that he was ready to give information about what is going on overseas, in Palestine, but he would never allow an American national institution to recommend how to divide the money and how to construct the budget of the Jewish Agency. Blaustein claimed that he was not only to be informed but that a certain agency in the United States called National Budgeting should not only receive information, but also recommend how to use the money collected by the UJA. It's very important to clarify the whole matter because nobody could clarify it until now. It's very mixed up in all the books. It is important for the sake of history.

A.

In the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds there is a group from the biggest cities who called themselves "Large City Budgeting Conference," LCBC. Have you ever run across this?

Q.

No.

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A.

This is the real power inside the Council of Federations. You may have two hundred Federations but Tulsa, Oklahoma is not equal to Boston, Massachusetts. There was always a small group, twelve cities, then thirteen and fourteen, ^{now sixteen} They were very jealous about who they would let into this group. The "Large City Budgeting Conference" took a position inside the Council of Federations that, since we raise most of the money and since we give most of the money to the UJA -- even if the UJA doesn't think we give a big enough percentage, we are giving ninety percent of what the UJA is receiving -- therefore we should have the right to pass judgment on the budget money which the National UJA is spending. If the National UJA is giving X dollars to JDC and Y dollars to the Jewish Agency, we should have a right to approve that. That's what we call national budgeting.

Blaustein wanted this but Silver didn't want it. Silver didn't want to give any group of cities what he thought was the right of veto, although I don't think they were asking for the right of veto. The reason that there's confusion on the meaning of the term national budgeting is because it has two meanings. To the Council of Federations it means, we would like to have something to say about how the organizations receiving our money are spending it. The UJA is only a pipeline.

Q.

In Palestine and in Poland?

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A.

Right, in Palestine and in Poland, we would like to have something to say. From the other point of view, the words national budgeting mean something else altogether. They mean that the UJA wanted to make a national budget for all the communities of the country saying, you shall all give fifty percent or sixty percent of what you raise to the UJA instead of one city giving twenty percent, one city giving thirty and one city giving eighty. Los Angeles is giving twenty percent of what they raise to the UJA and Washington is giving eighty percent of what they raise to the UJA, so there were some people who said we should have national budgeting.

Q.

What was Silver's position?

A.

No, no, here Silver is not in that. That concept is called by the initials PCB which means Pre-Campaign Budgeting. Before the campaign started for 1947 we wanted to have an agreement about how the money would be divided for the next year. There was a big fight about the idea that the UJA wanted to try to have national, uniform (national in this case means uniform) budget procedure. This means that every city in America would agree to give fifty-five percent of what it raises, that Israel and the Jews in Poland need more money than the Jews in the United States and that the biggest share or the bigger share should be for UJA. The minor

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share should be for the local community. The UJA failed -- we never got national budgeting in this sense. Neither side got what it wanted and each side had a different definition of what it meant by national budgeting.

Q.

National budgeting from the UJA ^{side} ~~type~~ means budgeting, the division of money.

A.

Right.

Q.

..really collecting from each of the communities.

A.

Right.

Q.

And UJA never received that. And Blaustein wanted national budgeting, meaning that the United States should decide how the money should be spent by Joint, the Jewish Agency and by NRS (National Refugee Service) in the United States.

A.

Correct.

Q.

And that all these three organizations should really report to the LCBC, to the large cities.

A.

Correct.

Q.

Neither the UJA or the Council of Welfare Funds ~~never~~ really got

this national budget.

A.

Correct.

Q.

And so we clarified a very, very important concept, difficult because it was a double concept. National budgeting from the side of the UJA and national budgeting from the side of the Conference of Welfare Funds. I'm interested in Silver's reasoning against Blaustein not to give these communities that kind of power in the larger sense. Is that Silver's reasoning?

Silver said, if you give the money for the Jewish people, you can't sit in Oklahoma and decide whether the money should be spent in Palestine for settlements in Dagania or for Tel Aviv. This is our business. We have the responsibility to spend the money according to the needs of the Jewish Agency and you can't sit in Oklahoma or even New York and decide how the money should be spent. A much more important point was that because Silver knew very well that a part of the money is spent for political activities of the Jewish Agency and for security in Palestine, we could never agree to any of the non-Zionists or anti-Zionists sitting down at a central conference of Federation and Welfare Funds and deciding that we only spent money for education and not for security. Am I right? These were Silver's reasons and he never agreed to Blaustein's argument. That rounds out the picture. Thank you very much for clarifying this concept. In the papers everything is mixed up. I understand that you wanted to tell us

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about the history of your own involvement in the UJA.

A.

I was born in New Haven, Connecticut. My father was born in Vilna and my mother in Kurland. Kurland was also up in the Baltic, near East Prussia. It was Lithuania. I can't find it on the map.

Q.

Kurland is really a part of Lithuania, but it was settled by Germans.

A.

She was from a pretty rich family. Her father ~~was~~ ^{my} grandfather, was in the forestry business, like everybody else. All Jews were in that business. She was one of eighteen children, from one father and one mother, in twenty-two years. They had a big Hof and they all lived together. There was a teacher and a doctor and they had a small village compound of their own family. My father came from a very poor family. ^{My parents} They met in the United States and were married there. I was born in 1918. They came after the Kishinev pogrom in 1903. When I was born they had already been speaking English for fifteen years, so they spoke English in the house, no more Yiddish, no more German, no more Russian. So I never learned Yiddish when I was a boy. I was a first generation American born, but still never learned Yiddish. It's interesting.

Q.

You don't know Yiddish?

A.

~~No, no,~~ I learned later. I went to Yale University. I have two brothers who also went to Yale. This was during the depression. I entered university in 1934 and I finished 1938. My father had

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no job. He lost his house. The bank came and closed the mortgage and took the house away, so I understand exactly what it means to live with no bread in the house. It was a very difficult time, but he said, if you boys want to go to the university, you go. Make your own way, earn your own money and go. You don't have to bring any money into the house, but I cannot give you any money for education. ~~This was my father's way, the Peshera.~~ He was very proud. My mother worked very hard. And the ~~three~~^{never} of us went through the university.

I went on to Columbia, studied Business Administration, took an M.A. and then stopped. I went to work in a factory and worked for one year, two shifts, sixteen hours, ~~eight and eight~~, to pay back all the debts. Then I decided to go to rabbinical seminary school, to Stephen Wise ^{Jewish Institute of Religion} in New York.

The motivation for ~~this~~ was Hitler and the war, because I felt very strongly about what was happening. I also felt that the Jews of America were not reacting, not doing anything, so I tried to think of what I ~~can~~^{could} do as one person. I decided that the best thing for me to do ~~is~~^{was} to try to become a civil servant of the Jewish people. The best way to be a civil servant is to be a rabbi. It has nothing to do with religion and God. I don't know any more about these subjects than you do. You don't know anything and I don't know anything, neither one of us knows.

Q.

So you agree with Kaplan? Kaplan says there's no God and I am his prophet.

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A.

Kaplan is too sure. I'm not so sure. You know I don't think there's a God, but I don't know. It is such a personal matter when somebody says, why did you become a rabbi? I became a rabbi not to try to tell somebody about God, because I don't know myself. I became a rabbi to try to do something for the Jewish people and the only way I could see, was to become a rabbi. Then I can go into the army and fight against Hitler, not just as a soldier, but from a different position. Maybe I can do something to wake up the Jews of America? I didn't think the war would be over so quickly. I saw a long, long milchama (war) and a long Festung Europe, with bad trouble for the Jews, not just in Europe, but for the rest of the world.

I went into a rabbinical school with this motivation. I stayed three more years until the middle of '43. The army had a rule that you had to have one year experience as a rabbi in some congregation before they would give you a commission. Then they would make you an officer and you could become a Chaplain. Stephen Wise sent me to Denver, Colorado and I stayed there for one year. I went as an assistant, in August 1943. I didn't know they were having a fight with their rabbi. In September, one month later, he was out. They asked me if I will be the chief rabbi and take the Yamim Noraim. ~~What the hell,~~ I had nothing to lose, so I did. It was a big congregation. We had almost a thousand families. It had an old anti-Zionist, German tradition. It had been founded ^{among them,} by the Guggenheim family. He was a United States Senator. It was a congregation two years before Colorado became a member of

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the United States, when it was still a territory.

They ^{had been} ~~were~~ trained for a hundred years in anti-Zionist German ~~classical~~ Reform tradition. I started to fight against this, to change it, to bring them toward a pro-Zionist more Jewish position. I had a very interesting year fighting, every day fighting, and changing them. It was wonderful. After exactly one year I went into the army. ^{The war in Europe was winding down and in the army but} They wanted to send me to the Pacific and I said no, I have to go to Germany. I'm not fighting against Hirohito, I have to fight against Hitler. Okay, I went ^{to Germany.} Then the war finished. I met a woman by the name of Ruth Kluger (now Eliav). She was the secretary for Mr. Ben-Gurion. She called me up. I was in Bavaria and we were collecting Jews on the roads, picking up children and people ^{who didn't even} and they ~~don't~~ remember their names or what city they come from. ^{They were in} ~~It was~~ shock, trauma. ^{we were} Running on the roads in big trucks and just getting people together, finding a place to put them. This was the beginning of (Akurim) Plitim, what we called camps for (Akurim) Plitim, displaced persons. D.P. was a terrible initial.

Now I was doing something to pay back Hitler, at least ^{for} the Sheerit Hapleta, trying to help. Ruth Kluger heard about it and she called me and asked if I ^{would} ~~will~~ come to see her in Paris. I went. I didn't know who she was but I came into the room at the Hotel Royal Monceau and she said, will you work for us? I said, who is us? She said, Haganah, Aliyah Bet. I said, okay. She went across to the door of another room. Ben-Gurion came out of it. She told him that Friedman would work for us. He said, thank you, ^{shake} ~~shake~~ hands, turned around and walked out -- not another word, finished. It was the first time I ever saw him. ^{That} ~~It~~ was at the end of 1945.

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She said to sit down and to take off my coat. She gave me coffee, only then. If I had said no, she would have turned around and sent me out, finished. She told me to go to Berlin and get a house and then they would send in some ^{Palestinian Brigade} boys, soldiers, ^{who were at} ~~from~~ ^{at the moment} ~~Belgium~~. ^{biruoked} ~~The Palestine Brigade was in Belgium.~~ She said ^{she would} ~~we will~~ send four boys to ^{me} you and ^{They would} you will work ~~from~~ ^{from} the route ^{from} Stettin to ~~and~~ Berlin.

Q.

You were still in the army, though?

A.

Sure, it was a good cover. Anyway to make a long, long story short -- there are so many things to tell about these years. Some day I should really write down or tell somebody all the details of everything that happened in those years. It was two and a half years and it was a fantastic story.

I went back to the United States in 1947. It was a very complicated business. General Clay sent me back personally. We became good friends and I became an adviser on his staff. I saw him almost every day and he knew everything that was going on in the Aliyah Bet (Bricha). The cooperation from the United States Army was perfect, couldn't have been better. But I did something for which he couldn't protect me, except to send me away.

You can get the whole story from Professor ^{Geusham} Sholem. Professor Sholem came over to Offenbach, a city in Germany where the Nazis, under a program of Alfred Rosenberg, had collected all the Jewish books. Rosenberg wanted to build a library for the ^{"Tausend Jahr} ~~Thousand Year~~ Reich of Jewish books to condemn the Jewish religion from ~~their~~ ^{its} own

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books. Gershom Scholem looked through all these books, ^{which were thrown around in a private warehouse} three million pieces, and ^{selected} found one thousand three hundred pieces which he wanted. ^{They included innumerable really precious irreplaceable.} He couldn't get them out of the ~~nachstan~~ {warehouse}.

He couldn't get permission because in America -- I don't know this for a fact, but somebody investigated it -- Professor Finkelstein of the Jewish Theological Seminary said that he ~~does~~ did not agree that these books should go to Palestine; that Palestine is not the only center of Jewish life. I wish I could prove this. I think it's true and Scholem thinks it's right. We have spoken about it many times but we have no proof.

The only thing we know is that the American Military Government refused to give permission for ^{Scholem} him to take these books to the National Jewish Library of ~~the~~ ^{the} Mt. Scopus Hebrew University, ^{on Mt. Scopus.} He was crying and he had only one more day left. He had ^{been given} limited permission to stay in Germany and he had to leave. I said I would steal the ^{manuscripts and he had set aside} books and so I stole them. They were in five big boxes, each one about the size of this table. It's a long story, how I stole them and how I got them out. I got them to Paris and to Antwerp and put them on a ship with the Library of Chaim Weizmann which was going from England to Palestine. The CID found out everything. They had the license number of the ambulance I was using. I stole an ambulance from the Joint, because I needed a big car and I didn't want a truck. I wanted to have something that would not cause any suspicion.

They came to me and they were going to court martial me. There was a big story in the army newspaper, ^{"Stars and Stripes"} about an unnamed chaplain who stole five million dollars worth of books. ~~There~~

a ~~rich~~ man. I went to General Clay and told him the story. He stopped the court martial. But told me that I'd have to leave. Also, I had helped to load people on the Exodus in Marseilles and they knew about that too. Sof Pasuk, go home my boy, all over.

I went back to America. The ^{USA} director, Henry Montor, heard that I was coming home to be discharged from the army and he called me to come to a ^{USA} conference in Pennsylvania. It was ~~an~~ ^{a natural} emergency conference to explain to the Jews about the condition of the people in the camps. I didn't know anything about the UJA, nothing. I didn't know anything about how the money ^{was} ~~is~~ raised in America. I hadn't been in America from the time the UJA really got started in '45. But he was a very clever man and he knew that inside of me was ^a ~~the~~ strong passion that was boiling, so he used it.

Q.

Henry met you in Europe?

A.

Yes. He met me ^{when he came through Berlin in early 1946 and again later} when I went into Poland at the time of the pogrom ^{in Kielce} in ~~Kelze~~.

Q.

When was that?

A.

The 4th of July, 194~~6~~⁶, quite a day. There was a man who came to this ^{USA} conference ^{in Pennsylvania in summer 1947} -- this is a very important story because it sets up the whole later sequence of events -- by the name of Max Firestein. Max Firestein is a good Jew from Los Angeles. He makes perfume; his business name is Max Factor. I didn't know him but

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I was sitting at this conference and listening. The chairman of the UJA, Henry Morgenthau was there too, as well as Montor. This little fellow, Max Firestein, was standing up on the floor and he was angry.

Mr. Morgenthau, he said, I am disgusted with you and this conference; why you schlepped me from California to come here for some emergency conference because we have to make more money for the Jews who are in such trouble? I'm listening to this, ^{for two days} and I ~~can't~~ ^{don't} hear anything. ~~It~~, there is nothing new that I'm learning at this conference, that I can go home and tell my people in Los Angeles. The more he ^{was} talking, ^{The more I was} ~~the~~ boiling inside.

Morgenthau and Montor were very smart. It's like you press a button at the right moment, so they pushed the button on me and said, answer him. They gave me somebody to start to hit and I took that poor little fellow and said, I don't know your name and you don't know my name, but I'm going to wipe up the floor with you. I'm going to make blotte out of you and I'm going lehashmitz otcha because you cannot stand up and say that there's nothing new. What do you want, blood like we had two years ago? What do you mean nothing new? What new things do you want? You want me to tell you what it smells like when there are thirty, forty people living in the same room? I'll tell you what it smells like. Hold your nose. I start~~to~~ make a very graphic description -- you know what it smells like when you have one letrine for five hundred people; and what it's like when you can eat once a day; and what it's like when you are going through the mud and you cannot keep

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clean and your body begins to smell; and then your mind; you are full of despair; and you came through the ovens; everybody else is dead and you are still alive but you don't know why; and you don't know what is the reason for being alive; you have no future; you want to go to Palestine and nobody lets you go to Palestine; and somebody tells you to go back to Poland where you came from; but Poland is like a graveyard full of blood; the whole ground is soaked with blood; you can't go back and you can't go forward; and you are here stuck in the mud, in the stink. It was no speech, I was just pouring out everything.

I don't know how long I talked and I don't know what I said. I never saw a transcript of that speech and I don't know if there was a recording of it. The whole attack was against him; who do you think you are; who are you; what kind of Jews do you represent; what kind of people do you have in Los Angeles; they may be like animals; are they Jews with no conscience; what kind of people are you here in America? I was attacking him and I was attacking the Jews of America. I said that the Jews of America shouldn't even have a part in this whole business, they don't deserve it; they are looking for sensations; what are you looking for; you are looking for some pitgam even for your next campaign; what do you want? You are living in the shadow of the shoa; you don't understand what happened. I was smashing.

I got all through and the room was so quiet. He stood up and he said, now I got what I came for, thank you. He came up and shook my hand. I was sweating and nervous. I didn't know who he

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was. Later on he told me who he was and I apologized to him. Never mind, he didn't care. To this day he tells the story. He says this was the beginning of his education. He went back and for twenty five years he worked in Los Angeles. He was the number one Jew, the first to give a million dollars.

Morgenthau took me up to his room and he said, now you have to come with us. And I said no, first I have to go to the army to be demobilized, released. He said no, I want you in your uniform. It makes a different impression. I want you to come with me for thirty days. We have a private airplane, and you and I will go from one city to another and we will try to create some enthusiasm. So I said, Mr. Morgenthau, thank you, I have to go and be released. He said, all right, I will arrange it.

I told him to call Fort Dix, in New Jersey, where I had to go, ^{to be demobilized} and to talk to the 1st Sargeant, the Sargeant Major. He said, I don't know anything about any Sargeant Major, I only know one person in the army, the Secretary of War. He's the only one I know and I will call him. I said no, please, you'll get me in trouble. I was only a captain. The higher up you go, the worse trouble you'll make for me. And sure enough, he called up the Secretary of War, a nice friend, I met him later. Robert Patterson was his name. They were talking and I was listening and I knew ^{I was} ~~he~~ ^{to be put} going into ~~the~~ box because they are talking. Morgenthau said, Bob, this is Henry. I want you to do me a favor. I have a captain here ~~and want him to be released, but to be~~ ^{put on duty with} ~~given to~~ me for thirty days before he's released. I was thinking -- get me something in

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writing, you know that the army needs everything on paper. Nothing doing, he didn't give my name, my number, nothing.

The Secretary of War said, Henry you want this officer, you take him. We'll straighten it out later. Straighten it out later? Thirty days later when I came back, I walked into ^{Ft. Dix} the camp to be released. I gave my papers at the gate and boom, I was arrested. I was put in jail because I was thirty days "absent without leave."

It took me four days to get out of jail - and nobody would believe the story. Finally the commanding general called up Morgenthau and he said, what is this? I have some officer here and I think I have to send him for psychiatric tests. He's telling me a story of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Treasury. I'm only a simple general. I don't know any Secretaries. Morgenthau finally got me out. I went back to Denver ^{to the congregation, but stayed} and ~~was~~ speaking for the UJA as a volunteer. ^{several days a week, for many years thereafter.} On the first day, Morgenthau and I went ^{on a 30-day tour in one private plane,} ~~an~~ to Detroit, ^{then} to Oklahoma City. We finished at midnight, got into the plane and went to the next town. On the plane, he gave me an envelope. In the envelope was a check for one hundred dollars. I asked what it was for? He said, because we have to pay you for your services. You made a wonderful speech and you got the people all excited. I took the check, tore it up and threw it in his face. I said to him, you and I are going to be on this airplane for thirty days and if you ever do this again I will throw you off the plane.

It was insult. What are you doing to me, I said. I have my army pay and that's it. I'm on duty with you for thirty days. I

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^{He said he} couldn't believe ^{such idealism.} ~~it and he couldn't understand it.~~

I worked for the next seven years as a volunteer for the UJA. I went to hundreds and hundreds of cities and made thousands of speeches. In between, I changed congregations. I went from Denver to Milwaukee for the same reason, another challenge. There was an old German reform congregation in Milwaukee and they wanted me to try to make them Zionists. I said, okay, I'll try.

From '47 to '54 were the seven years that I was working as a volunteer - I was making speeches with people from Israel and with all the political figures of the United States, Vice President Barkley, Vice President Truman and then he was President Truman. I spoke ^{on the same platform} with everybody from Israel: Golda, Sharett, ^{Talpinthal, Dov Joseph} Katznelson ~~and~~ Sprinzak, ^{and dozens of others.} In those early days everybody was coming to America. Anybody who came from Israel and who spoke ^{English} with an accent was a great attraction. We didn't use ^{army generals.} alufim. We used sergeants and corporals. ^{A captain} Segan was already something very big. Today you have to give the American audience at least a ^{brigadier general} tal aluf.

So after all those years as a volunteer -- with that belief inside me, about having to do something to make up for the guilt of what we did not do in the years of the Shoa, and confirmed and convinced in the belief that Israel ^{was} the center of the Jewish people -- I became the director ^{of the UJA}. I had the basic ideology and enough knowledge of Jewish history and tradition, learning and literature and religion from all the years as a rabbi. So I was really able to work from a long historical point of view and also

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from an immediate historical point of view. That was the success. I had, of course, a lot of willingness to try new things. That was my background and that was how I got into the job.

I got into the job not because I was a social worker or because I was a fund raiser, but through the work in Germany, the Bricha and through speech making in America. I guess I was the voice or the spokesman as an American Jew, the best there was. I stood up on a public platform at a very young age and talked to American Jews, and if we had an Israeli Jew as a partner, then it was even better.

In spite of all that, I watched the UJA going down, down, down, during the years ^{that} ~~that~~ I spoke ~~of~~ before, when Montor was already losing interest in it and Schwartz was losing the ability to fight for it. When I took it, it was really at a low point.

Q.

Tell us some stories...

A.

There were three kinds of meetings ^{to which} ~~that~~ the UJA used to send me. One - a meeting with the board of directors of the local community, to fight for ^{the} ~~the~~ share of the money. This kind of meeting with ten or twenty people is very hard fighting because it's very close. You don't make a speech for more than thirty minutes because nobody would sit still for this long.

I would come in: gentlemen, I'm here on behalf of the UJA. You know me by name and ^{you} I know I was here last year to speak at the Big Gifts Meeting, or you heard me at the conference in ^{this} ~~the~~ city.

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~~in Chicago.~~ You know who I am and you know what I believe in. You know my ideas. I'm also the rabbi of a local community so I understand all the needs of a local community. If you don't have a community center in your city, nobody will die, but if we don't have more kibbutzim in the north of the Negev, some Jews will not live, because they will not have a place to develop. So putting this on a scale, I'm not so sympathetic for your community center. I'm more sympathetic for my kibbutzim. Last year you gave ~~thirty~~^{thirty}-five percent ~~in the~~^{of your faction} campaign ~~for~~^{to} the UJA. This year I came to ask for fifty one percent. ~~Now let's agree. That's one kind of meeting.~~ ^{And we would start to argue.}

~~Then you~~^{I would} have to argue and explain. They want to know how we are spending the money in Israel and I always tell them to go back to national budgeting. It isn't a question of not wanting to give more. It's a question of who has the power of decision. I was always in favor of giving information and explanation, making them part of ~~our~~ problem. Then you can win them over. I would always bring maps, charts and books. I would walk in with a briefcase. In those days Walter Lowdermilk was a very famous man, so I used him as an authority. ~~That was one kind of meeting.~~

~~Another kind was a negotiating business meeting.~~ I would always try to have one or two of the ^{local} fellows on my side before I went into the meeting. In the afternoon, I would do some work.

Q.

Pre-soliciting?

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A.

Yes, pre-soliciting. Most of the time the meeting would end and they would say fine, we listened to you.

Q.

We'll decide later.

A.

Right. What ^{could} ~~can~~ I do? What would ^{most often} ~~always~~ happen was that if they were giving thirty five percent, and I asked for fifty one percent, we would get ^{somewhere in between.} ~~forty five and not fifty one.~~ I was defeated. ^{Theoretically,} ~~With~~ such ~~defeats~~ we gained ten percent. I ^{had a real for} ~~wanted~~ sixteen ^{percent increase}, but I didn't get it. I got ^{say, only 5 or} ~~only~~ ten. ^{Enough} ~~It was enough.~~ Such defeats ^{added} ~~make~~ up ^{to} a victory. If you can win a few more points than the year before, ^{in enough cities,} you are pushing ahead.

When I got an assignment to go to St. Louis to argue with the budget committee, I would get the whole sheet of statistics from the UJA staff, so I would know what I was talking about -- how much money do they spend on a hospital, Beit Yitomin, Beit Havraa, Beit Zekenim and Beit ha-Am.

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I would go in with this advice, all the facts that I wanted. Nobody gave me authority to ask for fifty one percent or fifty three percent or forty seven percent. I used to try to build a logical case.

I said, last year you raised one million dollars and you gave us thirty five percent. That means you gave us 350 thousand and you used 650 thousand. What are you going to need next year? What is the inflation? What is the expanded program? How many more people do you expect to have in the hospital, in the orphans' home, etc. etc? You need seven hundred thousand? Fine.

We'll make a deal that the first seven hundred thousand dollars you keep, but the next seven hundred thousand dollars you give to me. So, on one million four hundred thousand, instead of one million, we get fifty percent and you get fifty percent. Do you think you can raise one million four hundred thousand instead of one million? I will come back and help you. I will solicit people and make speeches. Negotiating, fighting, arguing and offering a premium -- that's one kind of meeting, the hardest kind of all.

Q.

What about the in-fighting in Federation?

A.

Who are those twenty people? Usually they are the biggest givers. So if I'm talking to them, saying that they have to raise one million four hundred thousand next year, what I'm saying to them is that you must give twenty five thousand next year instead of ten. I always had my figures prepared. You must do your homework. If you don't do your homework, it's no good.

Q.

They're business people.

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A.

Yes, sir. If you come as a Zionist orator, making orations and you don't come down to business, they don't listen. This is a business meeting, in which you are raising money, fighting for a bigger share of the money, stimulating them, giving them a bigger vision, telling them stories, indoctrinating them, brain-washing, because this was the leadership, these twenty people. They have the town.

Q.

Was it done the same way in the big cities and the small city?

A.

No, It was different.

Q.

In New York City?

A.

New York City was the only yotseh dofen (exception), because until two years ago it had two campaigns. It was the only city in America where there was one campaign for the UJA and one campaign for the local needs of New York City, so we never had this problem of how to divide the money.

We didn't go into every small town in America to fight over the percentage. We didn't have enough manpower, not enough people ~~like me~~ who could go, so we only went to the biggest places where there was really something to fight about. If you were going to a small place where, b'sach hakol the whole campaign ^{was} is raising two hundred thousand dollars, what ^{was} is there to fight about? If

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they need a hundred thousand dollars, they need a hundred thousand dollars.

Q.

You make a telephone call.

A.

Right, you make a telephone call -- exactly. The fighting used to be in thirty or forty cities, but that's a whole year's work. That means going every single week, once a week, to a different place, on this one subject only.

Q.

And then the money was again divided between the Joint and Israel?

A.

No, this was by contract.

Q.

So that wasn't an issue?

A.

No. The issue was between the UJA and the Federations and what their sum was going to be.

Q.

The interest of the Joint and the UJA together was to get more money out of the Federations?

A.

Oh, sure.

Q.

So you were really the representative of the National UJA, fighting for a higher percentage in each of the cities?

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A.

Correct, I was fighting for a higher percentage to go overseas. It didn't matter whether it was going to the Joint in Morocco or to the Jewish Agency in LaChish. That was the issue and I used to try to put it on the highest ideological basis -- how can you Jews in America be so selfish to put your own local needs ahead of the needs of Jews overseas? History doesn't permit that. In the 19th century, you put your own needs first, and it may be that in the 22nd century you can do the same thing, but now in the 20th century I know that the needs over there have priority.

This was the whole framework, an historical framework. When you fight something on a very high level like this, you can win because they can see that it's not petty. I was not fighting for some prestige, which is petty, or just to make a record like in a football game, to win another point. They could really see that it was an historic fight. I kept saying to them that I am trying to educate you to understand that if you guarantee the survival of the State of Israel and the Sheerit Napleta of the Jews living there, or the kibbutz Galuyyot of the Jews in Africa and in Asia, in the long run, you will be guaranteeing your own survival here in America because you will be part of something big.

If we lose over there, we will lose the Jews in Morocco and the Jews in Iraq, in Yemen, and lose Israel and you will be left here alone. You will be something small. I was trying to show

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them that in the light of their destiny and historical fate at this moment, they had to realise that overseas was a bigger priority. That's asking people to become idealistic.

Q.

Do you think that this problem exists today also?

A.

Sure it still exists. It always exists, because that's human nature. The UJA has been growing bigger and bigger and sending more and more money overseas, but ^{the federations} they are also getting more and more locally. If you are raising ~~money~~, a million dollars, in ^{a particular town} ~~San Francisco~~ and you keep fifty percent of this, you have five hundred thousand dollars, ^{for your local needs.} If you are raising three million dollars and you keep only twenty percent of it, you have six hundred thousand.

Q.

You gain?

A.

You gain. So I always tried to convince them that the percentage was not important but to raise the ^{level of the} campaign. If they raised the campaign, they can have a little bit more money and we will have a lot more money. All of their needs ^{would} ~~will~~ still be taken care of. That's what happened. When I first came, the local communities of America were getting forty, fifty million dollars, b'sach hakol. Today, I think they are spending a hundred and fifty million dollars. They have three times as much money to play with and they don't have to spend ^{much} any on health care because ^{most of} all this is taken care of now in the United States. Because the Government

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does this, their needs have gone down and they have more money. I keep trying to tell them to spend it on education.

Q.

Their needs have changed?

A.

They have changed, but they still have more money. They benefit. We finally won the battle of the percentages after many, many years -- ten, fifteen years of fighting.

Q.

That's one kind of meeting. You told us of another kind of meeting.

A.

Another kind of meeting is called a fund raising meeting. A group of people are invited to come listen to a speech and stand up publicly and make their contributions.

Q.

Before you proceed -- I never understood the motivation of these people, coming to a fund raising meeting, knowing in advance that they are obliged to give money. Why would they come?

A.

To give money.

Q.

Can't they give money without the meeting? Do they get a certain kind of prestige, coming to this meeting?

A.

No.

Q.

What is the reason for these people coming to a fund raising

meeting, listening to a long speech, sometimes a good speech, sometimes...

A.

A terrible speech.

Q.

... a terrible speech? They could have done something much more interesting and sent a check. Why do these people come to the fund raising campaign meetings?

A.

It is because of the pressure which is put upon them to come, because the people who are running the campaign know, as does the contributor, that if they come to the meeting, they will give more money. Both sides know it. If I am the chairman of the meeting and I call you up and I say, Chaim, we're having the Big Gift's meeting for ten thousand dollars and over on January 21st and the speaker is Shimon Peres. I want you to come to the meeting. And Chaim says, what do I have to come to the meeting for? How much did I give last year? Sometimes he doesn't even remember. So you say, you gave twenty five thousand. He might say, I can't do it again, I had a bad year. It was a terrible year, business was no good. Or he might say, don't waste your time and don't waste my time, I'll give you the same.

Q.

In other words, he's saying, let me off the hook?

A.

Right. Both Chaim and I know that if he comes to the meeting, he will give more. I don't know how much, ~~I don't know how much,~~

but suppose it's five thousand, or ten thousand. If I have a hundred "Chaims" in the room, that's a lot of money. It's half a million dollars and I don't want to lose it, so I'm putting the pressure on him to come. And he knows, in his heart, that if he comes, he will do better.

Do you remember the book by Rousseau, "A Social Contract?" It's a social contract between Jews. This year I am the chairman and I'm asking Chaim. In two years Chaim is going to be the chairman and he's going to be asking me.

Q.

So its a prepared game?

A.

It's a game which is played among a very small group of people at the top who are willing to take the responsibility. It's such hard work.

Q.

But it's played to prepared rules?

A.

Yes, the rules are all prepared. The State of Israel ~~will~~^{must} remain in existence -- that's rule number one. Number two, the State of Israel will always need money. There will always be the last war to pay for or the next war to pay for -- that's rule number three. There will always be the Jews of Russia or the Jews of Argentina or South Africa -- that's rule number four. Based on these rules plus the local community being in existence ad olam (rule number five), then you know you are going to have a campaign.

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Q.

But there's a larger framework, isn't there, where the people agree that they will take the responsibility?

A.

That's what I call a social contract. Within these rules, the leadership of the communities agree that it has to go on with this campaign year after year, like paying taxes. Only the chief tax collector changes. This year you are the chairman, the next year I am the chairman. Some communities like to hold a chairman for two or three years and some communities like to change the chairman every year.

This game is played for big money among a small percentage of people -- fifteen or twenty percent of the community raising eighty ^{a ninety} ~~nine~~ percent of the money. It's always this way. So when you say leadership, even in the biggest city, you're only talking about a hundred people. In a small city you may be talking about twenty people and these twenty people hold it for a generation because they are willing or because they believe in the cause. There's a very deep ideology. Sometimes I listen to ^{people} ~~these~~ guys, ~~our~~ ^{who say that the Jews} guys, in Israel, ~~They~~ make the campaign over there in America because what else would they have to do if they didn't make the campaign? ^{The wise-guy assertion is that} They do it for their own ego, egotism. That's all ~~very~~ ^{American Jews} wrong. I'll tell you something -- if ~~they~~ lost the motivation, the love of the people of Israel and the love of the land of Israel -- if they lost this and stopped the campaign, they would have plenty of ^{other} things to do. I'm not saying it would be good. They would play golf. They would spend time with their children.

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Q.

Or they ^{would} have other causes?

A.

They ^{would} go to work for something. They don't keep this campaign going with all the pressures which they put upon themselves just because they have nothing else to do with their time. These guys, dafka are the richest guys in town, the busiest guys with the least amount of private leisure time for themselves. They steal the time from the family and from the business to give it to the campaign.

There's no cynicism about this. I am still as fresh as the first day I went into this business, because this whole thing is based on idealism. What does ^{The leader} he get for ^{all his work?} it? Does he get his picture in the goyishe newspaper? No, he gets his picture in the Jewish newspaper. So what kind of Kavod (honor) is there? ~~He doesn't do it for that reason.~~

Q.

Tell us more about the second kind of meeting.

A.

At the fund raising meeting you have to try to give a good explanation of what's happening in Israel, what's happening in Poland, what's happening in Rumania. You have to give them a good inspiration in ten minutes.

^{Eddie} Warburg ^{used to} tell a funny story that every time he ^{went} ever ~~gone~~ to a meeting, the longer ^{the} distance he flew to get to the meeting, the shorter ^{the} time they would give him to speak. He ^{flies} flew from New York

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to California, ^{about} three thousand miles in each direction, ~~and he~~ gets off the plane, and ^{The chairman} ~~they~~ says, Mr. Warburg we're so happy you're here. You made this meeting a success. When everybody heard you were coming, they said they ^{would} ~~will~~ come to the meeting. We have the best attendance ever because of you. Now do us a favor and speak for ten minutes. People will be hungry and others want to dance after the meeting or they want to go home early, whatever.

So, you're a good soldier and you have to do it in ten minutes. It's unbelievable -- you have to warm them up, be friendly, give the impression that you are the ambassador coming from that big world overseas, so you are expert, you know the subject better than they do. You have to give them inspiration, and bring them to their feet cheering when you're finished.

Q.

In ten minutes?

A.

^{or twenty.}
~~In ten minutes.~~ Then the chairman stands up and says, ladies and gentlemen, you heard what Mr. Friedman said and now we are going to call the names.

Q.

Card calling?

A.

Jack, let me hear from you. Jack where are you? Jack is sitting here, or maybe there are two Jacks in the room, so two hands go up. I'm here. Okay, Jack you gave twenty five thousand last year. This year. How much? That's good card calling.

Sometimes the chairman is afraid to do it that way and he says

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Jack, how much would you like to give? He doesn't ^{state} say how much ^{Jack} he gave last year. That's soft, ^{card-calling,} not hard. ^{I would often try,} Always before the meeting, ~~to would~~ take the chairman aside and ask to see the cards. I would start to go through the cards and ~~to~~ ^{him} ask how he was going to call the cards, was he going to ^{state} give last year's amount? If he said no, that's too rough, ^{I would ask him to reconsider,} ~~I'd say let me call.~~ ^{I would try to explain} ~~to say~~ either ^{that he would get better contributions if he} you called the cards the right way, ^{and he could do it} or I will call the cards the right way, ^{without being} ~~never mind rough or not rough.~~ Sometimes I could persuade ^{him} them, sometimes not. In the south, ^{and other parts of the country,} everything ^{must be} is very, very gentlemanly, ~~in New Orleans and in Louisiana.~~

Q.

~~And Nashville?~~

A.

~~...in Tennessee and Virginia you have to be a gentleman. You cannot be rough.~~ ^{In many places,} They don't like any card calling and they don't have any cards. ^{The chairman's approach is:} ~~They say,~~ you heard the speech, you heard what Mr. Friedman said and now I think it would be very nice if some of our wonderful gentlemen would stand up and say something. Silence. Nothing. That's terrible you know.

Q.

You mean they hadn't planned anybody?

A.

No, you don't plant ^{such a community,} in ~~the south.~~ It's not gentlemanly. I used to try to teach ^{chairmen} them that this is not, ^{exactly} a gentleman-business. ^{You have to be} ~~It's~~ ^{a sort of gentleman-} ~~a business like~~ a highwayman. You have to come and point a ~~gun~~ challenge to get started.

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After ~~a while~~ ^{many years} I developed an instinct ^{as to} ~~for~~ which speakers could change the minds of people. I developed a rule that some speakers ~~are~~ ^{were} what I called five percenters, and ~~some are~~ the ~~big~~ ^{best} stars, ~~ten percenters~~. They could change the ^{pre-ordained} results of the meeting by ^{perhaps} ten percent. ~~If a guy~~ ^{A person who} gave twenty five thousand last year ~~and he comes~~ ^{would} to the meeting ~~he will~~ ^{intending} want to give the same twenty five thousand. ~~If you can~~ ^{The speaker could} change his mind by ten percent, two thousand five hundred dollars, ~~you are~~ ^{he had to be} very good. There were ~~only~~ ^{speakers} a few people who were ten percenters, ~~a few people five percenters.~~

The third kind of meeting would be a mass-meeting, not for raising money, but for Stimmung.

Q.

Creating a mood?

A.

Yes. This is where you begin to build up weeks and weeks in advance with publicity, in the newspapers, advertisements, for a mass meeting in the town hall. You are looking for a thousand or two thousand people to try to get them to know that the campaign ^{is ready} ~~has~~ to start and they have to volunteer. Maybe you put a small ^{card} ~~form~~ on every seat ~~to see who is willing~~ ^{asking people} to sign up as volunteers to work in the campaign. This ^{Kind of meeting} is to warm ~~them~~ ^{inspire, and} up, ~~and~~ ^{adulate.} For this you ^{might} have to make a ^{one-hour} speech, ~~of one and a half hours.~~

Q.

But a good speech.

A.

A good one, and it has to be really old-fashioned good ^{spell-binding} oratory.

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Q.

Like Abba Hillel Silver?

A.

^{more like} Shmaryahu Levin or Stephen Wise. We don't have many people like that.

Q.

Do we ^{have} people in the United States today who are able to give that ^{kind of} speech?

A.

No, we do not. There isn't one person in America who can speak like Abba Eban or who can speak like the old ones we mentioned. I used to be able to. I haven't done it now for many years. For example, ^{I remember a meeting in} San Francisco ^{about 1949 or 1950.} was a very assimilated town, I went there ~~came~~ with Vice President Mr. Alban Barkley.

Q.

I think he was Truman's Vice President.

A.

Right. We went to speak at a ^{public} meeting in the Opera House in San Francisco.

Q.

He was an old man, Barkley.

A.

An old man. I liked him, he was a good old man.

Q.

As a Senator, he dealt with black market business.

A.

Yes, dealt with illegal war operations. ~~He got married very late~~

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~~in life, just a few months before this particular story. We finished about ^{eleven o'clock} midnight and I said, I'm tired, that was a long meeting tonight, a hard one. The chairman ^{had come} was from Hollywood, The famous actor Eddie Cantor. Barkley had come from Washington and I came from Denver, Colorado. There had been big publicity in the newspapers. There was no television yet. Three thousand people were in the hall and Eddie Cantor started. He was the chairman. He made jokes and he was getting them warmed up. Barkley was next and he spoke about how the brave young democracy of Palestine must be supported.~~

~~When we ^{don't eleven o'clock} ~~we were all~~ finished ^{we are all} and I said, ~~I'm~~ tired, ~~and I'm going~~ ^{to no hotel and} back to the hotel. Let's go back to get a sandwich. Barkley said no, I have a plane at twelve o'clock midnight to go back to Washington. I said, you're crazy, at your age! He was maybe seventy-five, and I was about thirty years old. ^{He had just re-mained, a few movies earlier} He said: the trouble with you young men is you don't understand what it means to have breakfast with a pretty girl and I'm going back to have breakfast with my wife.~~

D spoke fast. with the Holocaust, the DP camps, the recent War of independence, a very emotional, historical speech. The meeting was very successful.

When you have characters like these, real personalities, ~~it~~ ^{they} have ^{an effect on} ~~words~~ into the crowd and they ^{in turn} ~~feel it~~ ^{more deeply the things they are saying} ~~also~~. We don't have many people today with such charisma. That was the third kind of a meeting ^{the mood-setting kind.} and those were the three ^{types of meetings or speeches} ~~things~~ I used to do.

The fourth ^{category of activity} ~~thing~~ was to fly someplace, maybe a thousand miles, to see one ^{man} ~~guy~~, to sit in ^{an} ~~the~~ office and argue with him. Maybe he ^{would} ~~only~~ give me a half-hour or maybe I ^{could} ~~can~~ hold him for three hours -- while I ^{was} ~~am~~ arguing with him face to face about his ~~one own~~ personal contribution. It had nothing to do with budgeting, just how much I needed ^{from him} ~~from you~~.

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Q.

This was before you became vice chairman?

A.

Oh, sure. These were all things that I did. I didn't know anything about the administration of a big organization. I learned that later. All of this brings me up to the point where I entered the job. Now you have the whole background.

Q.

During those seven years, ^{if volunteer work} did you find resistance in terms of the whole process of everyone agreeing to play the game, to be responsible for fellow Jews?

A.

I built the agreement. That's like Herzl saying in Basle "Today, I built the Jewish State," But it's easier for me to say because I'm looking backwards. He was looking forward. I look back now and I know without any doubt whatsoever that in all those years of fighting, what I was doing was not just ^{pursuing a particular goal} ~~the essence~~ of the moment, but I was building an ideology, so next year when I came back to the same man or to the same community, maybe I wouldn't have to fight over the same thing. I was building up an ideology based on a few simple ideas. I'm not a complicated person and I don't have complicated ideas. ^{I was trying to} ~~You can~~ ^{the} teach ^{concept} simple things ^{of} to people achdut ha'am, the unity of the Jewish people.

Q.

That's the center?

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A.

The unity of the Jewish people, ^{I said to each person -} you are responsible. Don't try to tell me you are not responsible. You have only one way that you can ~~get~~ rid yourself of your responsibility, aside from dying. You can say you are not a Jew, and the minute that you tell me you are not a Jew, you are finished, and I excuse you. You want to tell me you're not a Jew? Say it to me. I want to hear it, get the words out. ~~Then you are challenging somebody.~~ Tell me you don't give a damn about the Jewish people because you're not one of us, say it. Nobody ever said it to me, not once, never. I must have confronted about ten thousand people with this challenge. I said, you have an easy way out, tell me you are a Protestant or an Episcopalian, a Unitarian. Tell me you are a Catholic, anything.

I taught them the unity of the Jewish people, the responsibility of one Jew for every other Jew. I taught them the centrality of Israel as the salvation for the whole Jewish people.

Q.

Was it so clear to these people?

A.

No, it was not so clear to them, it was clear to me. ~~They fought me year after year.~~ Slowly but surely I won. Today if you stand up and say these things, it's like a cliché. Nobody fights you anymore on these things, but about a quarter of a century ago, it was different.

Q.

They fight the centrality, not the unity?

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A.

That's really a fight on semantics, because today they don't want to make aliyah, that's all.

Q.

It's a protection of position?

A.

This was the most interesting intellectual challenge of the whole quarter of a century of fighting, because I was fighting to get ideas across, and you get ideas across in a way that they will become operational only in a fighting situation not in a textbook situation. If you try to teach these things to people in an academic setting, it's very intellectual, but it's not a challenge. If you are fighting with a guy face to face about what kind of man he is, what kind of Jew he is, how he is acting towards his fellow Jews -- that's a challenge, full of heat, passion, argument and friction. That creates movement. The only way the car goes is when it's got friction on the road.

Q.

But tell me, please, who organized you and convinced you to do the job that whole time. You were a rabbi from Denver. Was it Montor?

A.

No.

Q.

Was it Schwartz? Or your own initiative?

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A.

It was me, myself. It was what happened to me, ^{after the Holocaust,} through the years, in the Bredicha, in Germany. It changed me and I made the right decision, thank goodness, to become a civil servant. I was in the position, the rabbi of Denver, Colorado and this was my platform. I went through a certain experience in my personal life and after this, I didn't need any more motivation. Nobody had to tell me. I didn't need any more hasbarah or inspiration.

I have it all inside. It's burning here and I have the stories to tell. I know the Hitler period, I read, I saw, I smelled, I touched. That's authentic. I came back as a volunteer. I had my job, but I didn't stay home in Denver to make a bar mitzvah, a wedding ^{and} to go visit Mrs. Cohen in the hospital. I left everything, my job, my family, my ^{synagogue} organization and I ^{went out to talk to Jews about} came to you about ^{my} your responsibility toward other Jews. ~~It~~ ^{I was} burning and it ^{was} very genuine. I was self-motivated for all these years. The office in New York used to push a button, that's all, ^{by telling me where to go.}

Q.

Who used to contact you all the time?

A.

There was a man ^{at the National USA headquarters} who was the director of the Speakers' Bureau of which I was chairman. I was ^{practically} the whole bloody Speakers' Bureau in the beginning.

Q.

This was really my question. How many people of your kind

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participated in this kind of activity? One man can do it. You can also bring somebody from Israel to do it another way. You can bring ^{Aba} ~~Abner~~ Kovner. Another question -- it could be a one-man job but couldn't you transfer this kind of activity in a pattern? When you became the vice president of the UJA couldn't you try to find another ten Friedmans?

A.

No, we didn't have another ten Friedmans, but we had an interesting situation. You talk about a pattern; there was ^{The} a director in the office, Arthur ^{FISHZORN} ~~Fishzorn~~, a nice man. He was a good clerk, like a booking agent.

Q.

He was the director of the Speaker's Bureau?

A.

Right. I was the lay leader chairman of the Speaker's Bureau. Once every year we had a meeting of the Speaker's Bureau. The Bureau had to grow and there had to be more speakers brought in. We found people. We found a ^{Woman} girl, Gerda Klein from Buffalo, New York. She was good. We found a man, Zwi Kolitz, who used to live in Israel. He lives in New York now and was a playwright or a play director. He made a movie, "Hill 24 Doesn't Answer."

We found. We began to mobilize people in America, local people. We began to bring in some people from the Israel Embassy, the Consulate. It was all very primitive in the beginning. We found people who worked in Rechesh with Teddy in Hotel 14 in

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New York. Every year we had a meeting of the Speaker's Bureau and every year I was the chairman of the Bureau. I tried to give them all of the inspiration, the technique, how I was learning to work, because I was practicing. I was learning all of these nuances as I was going along.

I tried to develop a pattern so we would have a larger number of people, a bigger force. Today the director of the Speaker's Bureau is a Mr. Sy ^{Lesser. He is very good.} Lesser. If you look at his list today, you'll find ^{many} ~~six~~ pages of available speakers, a hundred and fifty names, ^{perhaps more.} That list is the result of years and years of building.

Q.

Every one of these people went his own way?

A.

Sure.

Q.

What about the pattern?

A.

You cannot put words into somebody else's mouth.

Q.

You were not carbon copying the pattern but creating a pattern? That means that each of these men had to be original and go his own way. The pattern is the vehicle of the Speaker's Bureau and the vision?

A.

No, the vehicle is only a vehicle -- how to move people, to give them their assignments, material, the facts that they need, but

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everybody has to be free, a creative agent on his own, with his own sense of vision, speaking his own words in his own way. I used to write a model speech every year. I would give everybody the model speech and then say, tear it up, because if you try to give my speech you'll fail. But if I try to give your speech, I will fail. So they understood it.

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It was 1955 when I began the job. I started to read my files to refresh my memory, but I didn't have a chance to read them all. Here's an acceptance speech I made at the National Conference in Washington in June 1955. That was ten years after the liberation of the war. Mr. Eisenhower was the president of the United States. We had a meeting in Washington, D.C. Eisenhower didn't come to the meeting in the hotel but we went with a delegation to the White House to see him and he accepted a plaque from the UJA

Q.

Who participated in the delegation?

A.

Oh, I don't remember. I know Rosenwald did, because he was the General Chairman.

Q.

Bill Rosenwald?

A.

Yes. Bill Rosenwald, and myself. I have a photograph in my album. If I looked at it I would see who was ^{at} in the White House ^{that day, he} I took an old oil lamp ^{from the Roman period,} ~~from the Rose period~~ and put it under a glass jar

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and gave it to Eisenhower. I made a speech and I said that this little piece of clay can be broken so easily, but it's two thousand years old. It comes from the Holy Land. He was very touched. I said it's like the Jewish people; we are so easily broken, but we're not broken, we're still here. I thanked him for what he did for the peace and the war. I said that the war has been over for ten years now - and now we are going to build up Israel.

He made a very nice speech, which we taped and played at the meeting in the hotel, in which he told people that he thought it was important to build up Israel. He remembered all the refugees in the camps in Germany and he told a story about going through a camp near Munich. He didn't remember the name, but I did, ~~Feldafang~~ ^{Bedell}. He had his Chief of Staff with him, General Walter ~~Beedle~~ ^{Bedell} Smith who later became Assistant Secretary of State. Eisenhower ^{went} ~~came~~ through the camp, ~~and~~ ^{Bedell} turned to ~~Beedle~~ ^{Bedell} Smith and said to him, "This place is terrible. How ^{can} ~~could~~ people live in a place like this? Get brooms, mops, soap and water and clean this place up."

It was a very primitive way of expressing sympathy for these people. He could only see on the surface level that he had to help them somehow to improve the way they were living. Hitler was finished, but still they had to sit in these camps for many years because nobody could see any political future. If there would be a Palestine, it wouldn't be an independent state. It was completely up in the air. Ben-Gurion had faith that there would be a state and other people had faith, but faith is just one ~~thing~~ element. General Eisenhower ordering brooms and mops,

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^{was}
~~it's~~ really funny. He remembered that ten years later.

After the visit with the president, we went back to the hotel and had a big meeting. General Clay was at the meeting, also General Bull and General White. They were all commanders in Europe ten years earlier, who were familiar with the displaced persons' problem. We made the meeting a tenth anniversary celebration of the war and it was also the occasion of my being installed in office. We also had ^{Grynberg} ~~Greenberg~~ and ^{Gringaus} ~~Greengans~~, the two D.P.'s who were the leaders of the camps ten years earlier. We had all the Jewish advisors, Rabbi Bernstein, Bill Haber, Judge Leventhal and all the ^{rest} ~~old guys~~.

I was just looking at the speech that I made on that occasion in June 1955 and it's very interesting, because my mind was already on the whole business of the Jews of Morocco and I spent a long time in the speech telling ^{The audience} ~~them~~ about that. There was a large group waiting to be resettled from the mountains of the Sahara to the Mountains of Judea. I think of them not in terms of a quarter of a million Jews of Morocco, no one can understand that. I think in terms of the people of the villages of Lachish. In 1955 we had just started Lachish, so this was on my mind. Eshkol had planned it and started it that year. Think in ~~the~~ terms of the people in the village of Lachish, eighty houses, arguments as to who should live in which house, families wanting to be placed together because they've been separated too long. The United Jewish Appeal has had a record of standing at historic moments and assuming historic tasks. It was a task that no one asked for, but a task which undeniably existed that year.

Next was the task of French North Africa. These people came from all over the vastness of the Atlas Mountains, from the Casablanca mellah. They came because there was an urge, on their part, to be resettled. We didn't want to show any lack of confidence in the French, who governed the country, but you know how quickly the French were going to be out. I think they were already out in the same year. There was no pogrom, but there was insecurity, economic fear. Soon there actually were pogroms. Then I talked about the kind of Israel that we ^{had} have to build, one ^{to which these people} ~~that they~~ could go to.

Right at the beginning I talked about how we ^{must} have a long-range plan, that Israel ^{should not have to} cannot depend upon a sporadic or erratic response from us. If the problems ^{were} are continuous, our response must be continuous. It is the height of immaturity, of irresponsibility, to make one or two gigantic spurts of response at one or two peak years and then sluff off the job undone. This kind of irresponsibility and immaturity is not worthy of us. If the UJA's record of seventeen years of service has any meaning at all, it is that there is within it the seed of seventeen more years, should they be necessary, and pray God they will not be.

I said that the problems of Israel are continuous. There is no peace, no war, that uncertain, restless, insecure, psychologically nervous condition in which a country can be worn down by attrition. And a supporting people on the side, as we profess to be, can also be worn down by attrition.

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Q.

Are you sure you are not talking about today?

A.

It was 1955. There was a beautiful custom among medieval rabbis in Provence, France, to study at long tables. When they died, these very tables were fashioned into their coffins, so that the tables at which they studied would be the coffins in which they would be buried. This was their immortality, their resistance to death. I should like to reverse the procedure. I should like us to make tables to put in the houses for our children of the future, out of the coffins of the martyred of our past; tables for eating, for children to study, for the young men as their workbenches. The preceding generation went to its coffin and the successive generation has to go to its tables to live, to work and so on. Here are speech notes made all through 1955.

Q.

Do you remember if this was the period of the Fedayin? (terrorists attacking villages in Israel)

A.

Sure, because the war ^{came soon after} was ~~1956~~ ^{in 1956}, ~~but~~ I decided to concentrate on ^{The Moroccan Jewish Question.} ~~that~~. When I say I decided, it was a personal decision, because I always believed that you cannot confuse people by telling them too many things. You have to decide what you want to concentrate on and work on ~~that~~. I decided in '55, '56 that I ^{would} have to ~~work~~ ^{explain to} ~~on~~ the Jews of America, ~~to explain to them about the Jews of~~ ^{The situation of the} Morocco.

There was a phrase once, "the forgotten millions," referring to the million Jews in North Africa who were totally forgotten

by the rest of the Jewish world. Ashkenazim in Europe didn't understand these million Sephardim in Africa and Asia and I felt that from an historic point of view, I had to concentrate on teaching the Ashkenazi Jews of America about this responsibility to the Sephardic Jews. I know that it was only starting with Morocco. It was going to go from country to country. But this didn't make any impression on the Jews in America. In 1950, we had Yemen, Operation Magic Carpet; ^{and} Operation Ali Baba in Iraq in 1950 and '51.

It didn't make any impression on them. They didn't raise more money because of it, they raised less money. The money kept going down from 1948 on. We weren't getting across with this story of the Sephardi Jews and I felt that it's got to come across to them. There was a very dramatic ^{moment} ~~thing~~ when the French went out ^{of Morocco. The Sultan returned.} ~~and~~ the Istiqlal ^{Islamic} Party came in, ^{and} pogroms ^{started.} I tried again to get across to the Jews of America that this ^{was} ~~is~~ a major historic problem.

You really had the impression that it would be more important, more successful to tell the story of what was going on with the Jews in Morocco than to tell the story of what was going on with the Jews in Israel at the same time?

A.

It wasn't a question of more successful. I never look at it from the point of view of what is more successful at the moment, because that's always like looking for a gimmick and I'm not that way. I didn't run the UJA that way. What I tried to look for

were historic trends, and to teach ^{the people} ~~them~~ what I knew they had to learn in order to give long-time support -- never just quick, immediate support. I decided that at that moment I had to devote attention to this problem.

I believe that from a long-term point of view, the most important problem that I had to bring to the awareness of the Jews of America was the security of Israel, that we are in a war which is going to be a hundred years war. I always taught them what I believe and if they didn't want to accept it, they didn't have to. But I had the responsibility to be a teacher and to try to interpret history for them -- at least that's how I ^{was defined} ~~interpreted~~ my responsibility. Nobody told me what my responsibility ^{was} ~~is~~, so I decided for myself.

Q.

This really was a fact? Nobody in the framework of the UJA decided what should be told to the Jewish community?

A.

No.

Q.

You, yourself, decided about that?

A.

Yes, that's right, sir. There were no discussions, meetings held with the cabinet or the executive committee or any official body of the UJA defining the major historic problem or what our thrust will be. There were some meetings in which, from a purely pragmatic point of view, some of the lay leaders would ask about the

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slogan for next year. They ^{were} ~~are~~ looking for slogans to put on the stationery or on some big banner in the banquet hall, such as "WE ARE ONE." If the slogan can be also coordinated with the historic thrust, "Am Echad", that's very good.

Q.

You didn't decide together ^{about} ~~with~~ a certain kind of information policy?

A.

No.

Q.

What about a policy, how to explain, how to convince people to give money?

A.

No, no.

Q.

You yourself decided about it?

A.

It was my initiative and I used to come to ^{The lay leaders} them and say, I think we should do this and this, Mr. Warburg, or I think we should do this and this, Mr. Rosenwald. As the UJA grew and we got to be more formal, then we would have an executive committee that met once in a while, a few times a year. I would go to the executive committee and say, here is what is happening. Here is the line of the speeches that I am making and that we should all make. I would suggest the line. There would be some discussion, ^{some suggestions.} ~~but never~~ ~~very serious.~~ They accepted it.

I think that it's always this way when the person sitting as a leader gives a lead, people are very happy to ^{accept} ~~have~~ the lead.

If you don't give them a lead they don't have it, so there's a lot of fumbling around. I was always a ~~very~~ strong person and always came in with my own opinion. I sometimes had arguments and ^{differences} fights with other people, but most of the time nobody challenges a leader. That's a fact of life.

Q.

You didn't discuss your policy with Israeli leaders coming to the United States? With Eshkol?

A.

No, no. I can't recall any discussions with Israeli leaders on the policies of the UJA approach.

Q.

Hasbara? In English we don't have a word for hasbara. It's not really information. And it's not propoganda. Educational information?

A.

That's why I use the word approach, policy line, mediniut. No I didn't discuss with Eshkol or with Dov Joseph or anybody whether in 1955 we should make a line of policy on Moroccan Jews.

Q.

This was your own initiative, your own idea and your own way?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You felt that this was part of an historic continuum of the whole question of Israel security, dependent on a wider vision?

A.

No, no, security and immigration are two separate things. What I

started to say before was that I believed, always have believed, that the security of Israel is the number one question. I believe that this security will take us a hundred years to achieve. I think we have ten wars to fight. It's not unknown in history that there was a hundred years war. I once remember a conversation with Ben-Gurion in which he told me that the war began in 1871 in Mikveh Israel. The first casualty was one of the agricultural students, children who came with Carl Netter. He was shot by a Bedouin. So the war began in 1871. ^{This conversation} ~~We were talking~~ with B.G. ^{took place} in 1972-~~73~~, a year or ^{so} ~~two~~ before he died, ~~so it was about one hundred years.~~ He said, we're in a hundred years war. I quite agree. I used to teach that and say that all the time.

To give you a very interesting point; the Six Day War was in June 1967. There was a meeting of the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds in Cleveland, Ohio in September 1967. I stood up and said that we will be at war again before ^{next} ~~the~~ summer. You should have heard the screaming and shouting in the room. ^{They attacked me. They said:} Friedman is a warmonger. Friedman is a sensationalist, looking for any excuse to raise another few million dollars, it's disgusting.

Q.

The war of attrition actually began half a year later.

A.

Exactly. I said that we would be at war again before the summer of '68, and we were. Then everybody began to say, my God he is not a warmonger, he is really a prophet. That was a very, very interesting reaction all through America. I insisted ~~that~~ in that speech, in September 1967, ^{That} the UJA should retain ^{the} an emergency

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(which had been held in the war year of 1967)
fund, for the campaign year 1968, because in 1968 we ^{were} ~~are~~ going to be back at war again. I wanted an emergency fund during 1968 and I didn't want to have some meeting in the middle of the year to decide about it. That would have meant losing half a year. So we got it. This again is an example of pushing the policies.

Q.

You initiated this idea?

A.

That's correct, and the executive board went along with it. For 1968 the campaign year, we had an emergency fund. Keren Hayesod in Jerusalem made an opposite decision for the rest of the world in 1968, to cancel the emergency fund of 1967. They said 1968 is a year of peace, so how can you ask the Jews to have an emergency fund for war? The Keren Hayesod lost a fortune in 1968. The UJA also made less money in '68 than '67, but still not so much less money. The question ^{was} ~~is~~ how to prevent the deterioration. I gave you that story to indicate two things. One, concentrating always on the matter of war and peace as the main theme eternal, unchanging. The second reason was to show you that I tried to make up the policies as I went along, according to the way I saw them. Nobody in Israel agreed that this should be the policy for 1968. In Israel they decided exactly the opposite.

However, having said this about war and peace always being the main theme of my teaching, I think that in between there have to be shifts and changes to other subjects of historic importance. That's why I was concentrating on the Moroccan Jews in 1955, '56.

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~~I forget which year exactly.~~ One year I decided that the theme had to be concentrated on the development towns and I commissioned the writing of a small book called "21 Towns," a beautiful little book.

Q.

Where is it?

A.

I have no idea. I suppose it's out of print or lost. I don't even have any copies of it. It shows you how important stories are and how sloppy ordinary people are. They lose everything. Harry Rosen over at the Jewish Agency might be able to dig up a copy. I tried to show the Jews of America that in Israel there was an idea about building development towns, that the idea was not going very well. Not much money had been invested in it and more money had to be invested. This was exactly the right kind of thing for UJA money to go into. We had to raise much more money and pour it into the development towns to close the social gap. We're still talking about that gap now, fifteen years later.

Q.

This was an absorption of the Moroccan Jews?

A.

Exactly. After I succeeded in getting across the idea that ^{American Jews} you have responsibility for the Jews of Morocco, a few years later I felt I ^{had} ~~have~~ to show ^{American Jews} them how these poor people ^{were} ~~are~~ living in these bloody towns, to bring up the level of consciousness to the fact that these towns ^{were} ~~are~~ without adequate financial backing. There are always two sides when you brought up such a policy question.

One is a challenge to the Jews of America to give more money for ^{The poor development towns} it, and the other is a challenge to the Jewish Agency and to the establishment ^{in Israel} here to spend more money on it, ^{these towns} instead of making ~~kibbutzim~~.

Q.

This is a very, very important question. At the time you committed yourself in the United [†] States to a certain problem, could you be sure that the Jewish Agency here would spend the money raised in the United States for the same purpose.

A.

No, of course not. You're kidding. There was always a terrible fight.

Q.

And people would later be asking, saying, you convinced me last year to spend money for a certain kind of project and what happened to the money. Was the money not spent?

A.

No, that's a different question. That's looking for corruption.

Q.

Not for corruption.

A.

For effectiveness. And the answer always was no, ^{in Israel} they didn't do ~~anything~~ ^{everything} we wanted them to do, but we pushed it a little bit further. We made some progress with them. That's the answer. The money you gave for this purpose didn't go to waste and nobody stole it. Instead of being spent so much in the development towns

the government decided it had to open up three more kibbutzim, moshavim or Nachal units, or the government decided that it would pay more money in Rumania.

This was the question at that point, because the business of Rumania was coming up in 1959. We had to pay heavy ransom and should more money be paid. ~~I forget the price now,~~ but the Rumanians raised the price from a hundred dollars a head to five hundred dollars a head. I'm not sure of the numbers, but it was a very big raise. I remember long discussions with Shragai and the ^{friend} ~~guy~~ from the underground, ~~Ben~~ ^{Ben} and Shaika about should we pay or shouldn't we pay? My ^{policy} always was, pay. I had ~~the~~ ^a big argument on the Russian question, ~~was in~~ ^{it} ~~1971 or 1970.~~ ^{in early 1971.} When the first question of the Russian aliyah came up, ^{The Russian government} they had a price for Akadamaim, so many years of study, they insisted that ^{we} you pay.

Q.

You paid?

A.

I said pay, pay gladly, pay happily and pay very quickly, and I had a terrible fight with Rivlin.

Q.

That's Moshe Rivlin?

A.

With Moshe Rivlin, and Louis Pincus. They said to me, this is a principle. We will not allow ourselves to be blackmailed. I said, I don't believe in principles. I'm pragmatic, I believe we have only one Russian Jewry, only one in the whole world. I would like

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to have them and I am willing to pay for them. I think if we pay we will overcome all the political problems of getting them out. Money speaks louder than anything. They argued with me. Then they came to me later and said, see, the Russians retreated and they took off this special tax for academics to pay back twenty thousand rubles, or whatever, for their education. Pincus and Rivlin said, we were right. I said, we'll see. Now, only a few years later, only three, four years later, we lost the Russian immigration and I believe that I was right.

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I believe that if we had paid and started a precedent to pay, very big money, ~~that number one~~^{first}, the Jews of America would give the money for this ransom and ~~number two~~^{second}, the Russian government would permit Jews to flow and flow and flow. Even if it came ^{to} a Yom Kippur War, it wouldn't make any difference. The Russian Government would continue to take the money and get rid of the problem in a fixed period of time, ten years, twenty years and everybody who ~~wanted~~^{wanted} to come out, would come out. So we spent a few million odd dollars. Who knows if they are right or if I am right? I think I am right. Maybe they still think they are right, I don't know. I give it to you as an example.

To go back to Rumania, I was pushing the Jews in America to think about the development towns and they ~~are~~^{were} asking me was the money really spent for the development towns? I said yes, most of it or some of it, but maybe some had to be diverted. Now we started to pay ransom in Rumania, also perfectly acceptable. There ~~was~~^{were} never really any complaints that some historic issue which I was pushing as a matter of policy, perhaps didn't reach

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one hundred percent effectiveness. With fifty percent effectiveness you pushed the program forward.

I think today, now that fifteen years have gone by, it gets a little bit harder to explain why the condition in the development towns is still so bad, but at that time ^{we} it didn't face that problem. If I wanted to bring the issue up again, I would face that problem, no question about it. I think the Jewish Agency would not have much of an answer, because I think by now the Jewish Agency should have put these development towns on the map economically together with the government. I think it's been largely a policy of neglect and of not paying attention, a policy of priorities. Where are the priorities? It's always very easy to say that the development towns are doing okay and will continue.

Q.

The question is not only where the money was spent in the development towns, but I also want to know how the money was spent in the development towns. You can invest it or build something or you can give it support. I want to ask you another question. There was the problem of how much American Jewry should really intermingle itself and try to determine how to spend the money. This was a question through the forties and became a difficult problem during the fifties, but did you do something in this field in America in order to get more support to press the Jewish Agency here to go along with your line?

A,

I didn't do anything to try to press the Jewish Agency to go along, because of my nature. I'm very pragmatic and when I think that

something cannot succeed I don't waste time on it. I didn't think anything would succeed in changing the Jewish Agency, to take its decision the way American Jews wanted those decisions made. I still don't think so, even with the whole big apparatus of the enlarged Jewish Agency, based ~~exactly~~ on the principle that American Jews will take part in the budget making process and will make their impact felt and give their impressions. I think it is simply symbolic, not real. I think the Jewish Agency does what it wants and I think that the Jewish Agency assembly at large is a rubber stamp. In the 1960's, you didn't have machinery like the enlarged Agency and you couldn't influence Jewish Agency decisions. In the 1970's, you do have the machinery but you still don't influence Jewish Agency decision.

Q.

Is this Jewish Agency decision^S or Israel-government decisions?

A.

I don't know how to answer that, because the truth of the matter is I don't really know. I don't know whether Sapir told Pincus what to do or Pincus told Sapir what he's going to do.

Q.

Who are the executives of the Jewish Agency here, Pincus and Moshe Rivlin?

A.

There are three people, the chairman, the treasurer and the secretary-general. They are the power nucleus.

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Q.

I'm sure they're very influenced by Eshkol and by Sapir.

A.

Of course. The only independence they have is to say no. ^{For example, they decide to} ~~We will~~ allocate one hundred and eight million dollars to the universities and ^{They} I don't care, ^{if the Ministry of Education suggests they} ~~Mr. Allon, if you want to allot 118.~~ ^{They say, we are} No, ~~I'm~~ going to give 108. This is a kind of a "dafka" position because, after all, what independence does the Jewish Agency really have? The Jewish Agency is just a tool for somebody else. It doesn't raise the money and it doesn't really spend the money. It's only a channel. I think the Jewish Agency ^{maintains} has such a rigid apparatus of its own ^{because of} with one good excuse. ^{The Israeli} ~~government~~ ^{must} stay away from this money because it's tax deductible, charitable money and if ~~you~~ ^{the government} touches it, ^{that} you will make it unclean. That's the argument that the Jewish Agency can use against the government in order to protect its so-called independence of action. I don't think it's really an important historical question, maybe an important technical question, but not a historical question.

Q.

You made a film, "Footsteps in the Desert," about the settling of Dimona in '55.

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Q.

I think it was about North African Jews coming out to Dimona and the problems they were facing in terms of jobs, etc.

A.

I made twenty films so I don't remember them all. I remember the film, but I don't remember the year. You can take a look at the

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films I have and see what you don't have. Maybe you can get them from the UJA. Those films are as valuable as speeches. I'm not talking about the technical quality of the film. Some of them are really funny to look at now. I made them in Hollywood. Imagine making a film in Hollywood about some moshav in the Negev trying to show about the Fedayin. I made a film in '55 or '56 about the problem of the Fedayin. I made it on Kibbutz Nachal Oz. I used a ^{young fellow} kid in that film by the name of Uri ^{Marinov} Malinov, today Dr. Uri Malinov, the Chief Ecologist of the government. A look at this twenty year old picture can show you the image of what the UJA was trying to put in the minds of the Jews of America. It's as good as a speech, or better. It's amateurish and you can laugh. Never mind the amateur part. Today, twenty years later, look at it, put your mind back there and look at it with eyes of twenty years ago and you hear voices coming through the night and the lights coming from the Gaza Strip. It shows a wedding at this kibbutz and it is interrupted by the Fedayin shooting, so it's super-dramatic. But it brings the message home; our borders are unsafe and our people in the kibbutzim need more protection.

Q.

How did you use it in the UJA?

A.

We showed it at meetings. We made a hundred copies and sent copies to every city in America. You have to warm ^{the people} them up and you have to explain to them. They are far away, ^{from the scene of the action.} Today it's easier because they are getting television broadcasts. If there

is some explosion in Kikar Zion, they see it on television that evening. Communication today is instant, but in those days it was not. So to try to bring far away problems to their attention I had to use films and I used maps and all kinds of audio-visual techniques.

Q.

This had never been done before? Today it's much easier with Television?

A.

During the '67 War I was looking for film material and there was a ~~guy~~^{man}, an American journalist from Denver, Colorado, who lived here, Robert Gamz~~y~~. He's dead now. He lived in Arad. I said, Gamzi,^{Gamzey,} I will pay you, go around to the Israeli newsreel and get me ten minutes of black and white footage or as much as you can get and ship it over here so I can show the people what the hell is happening. I have a few reels that he bought for me.

Then I began to use ^d video-tape, ^{which I could make} ~~because I had to make it myself~~. I would come here with a camera, make a video-tape instantly and go back with it. Every time an Israeli came to America I would sit him down in my office, and put ^{him} on the camera and the sound and ~~say, give me~~^{get} five ^{in the} minutes ^{from him}. The technology is very good. There was a laboratory in New Jersey. I could, ^{then} ^{then} ^{then} send ^{then} ^{then} ^{then} a ^{then} ^{then} ^{then} cassette of film and have a hundred copies the next morning. I used to mail out film every few days to all the communities during the 1967 War, plus a few months before the war and a few months after, to keep them up to date. I had my own information service going. So films

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are for your historical archive purpose, like speeches. They are the spoken word, oral history and you shouldn't overlook them.

I'm looking at a speech I made of a telephone hook-up to all the fieldmen. I told you that ^{when I first came into the job} I found a big staff of a hundred and fifty, and I appointed a day when they would all sit together in a fixed place and we would have a conference-call. It's called a telephone hook up. I couldn't bring them into New York; too much waste of time and too much money. And I couldn't go running to them so I really ^{developed} ~~invented~~ a new use for the telephone.

The New York Telephone Company told me I was doing things with the telephone which no commercial company was doing. They brought big, huge equipment into ^{the UJA} ~~my~~ office. They had to put on a special operator. Every man was told to be at a certain telephone number at a certain time, according to the time zones wherever he was in America. I would sit in my office and speak into a microphone and they would listen to it on a telephone, ^{wherever they were. It was a major technical effort to hook them all in.}

I said, "This is Rabbi Friedman speaking. I have been here in the UJA office just fifteen days. Part of this time was spent at the Washington Conference, for your efforts on behalf of which I want to thank you.

Part of the time has been used to meet the staff and personnel here. And now I have the opportunity to speak with you. You are the backbone of our organization out in the field." So I went on and I started to tell them first about the technicalities, where we ^{stood} ~~stand~~ in the campaign so far. We are ahead by a few percentage points, but not enough and we are behind on cash, but we made a big loan last year, in 1954, so it's not too bad, but keep going.

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Go get the cash, ~~blah-blah~~, etc. etc.

The allotment is what really counts, as I was telling you before about the percentage that we are getting from the campaign. We were still missing official notification of allocations from eighty five communities for 1954 and when too much time passes between a campaign and an allocation, we lose.

I told them, 1954 may be gone but there's a lot that can be done for 1955. Argue with the leadership in your communities for a better UJA allotment, whether we have a PCB agreement or not (~~PCB~~ Pre-Campaign Budgeting Agreement). I always like to have an agreement before a campaign starts. ~~Gentlemen, we will raise a million dollars. If we raise a million dollars, you get so much and we get so much. That's an agreement before it starts. Then you don't have any fights later. I like it better that way.~~

But whether we have such a pre-campaign agreement or not, you have to fight in your communities for a better UJA allotment, I said. Do what you can to have allocations committees appointed and send us the names so we can work with them. Set dates for allotment meetings wherever possible. Our cabinet people and our national chairmen are prepared to work on this with you. Those are the lay leaders. But you, the professionals, must tell me where their help is needed. Tell us whom we should put pressure on, where we have to go. We must know where we stand on allotment and not be surprised by developments in October, November, December, when the campaign is over and we are given our share. Then it's too late.

R. 5/2

Q.

They gave you a reply or they only listened?

A.

Both ways, it depends on what we wanted. If I wanted a two-way hook up, then I had ^{the Bell Telephone} ~~them~~ open the line two-ways. ^{Usually we asked for} ~~If you said~~ ~~only, look, otherwise they gave me~~ a one-way hook up when I wanted to talk to ^{the men} ~~them~~ for a short time ten, twelve minutes. I didn't want to go into a big conversation for two hours. ^{the men} ~~They~~ would give me ^{their replies} ~~the reply~~ by telegram or they would call me up, if they had the initiative. Always thirty, forty people call within the next three, four or five hours. We kept all the lines open. I was a man also interested in technology. It's very important, a great tool. I used everything, every technical tool I could think of. I used telephones in all imaginative ways. I used video tape.

Q.

before anybody was using it?

A.

Yes. I was the first one to use closed circuit television on a large scale going into forty or fifty communities. Do you know the technology involved in this, to bring in a big screen, six meters by six meters, find a hall to put it in, bring in a special TV cable line, have enough seats in the place for one or two thousand people? You must have one person standing in every hall with an open telephone line to a central monitor in New York. And then you put Mrs. Golda Meir in front of the ^{or someone else very important} ~~screen~~. ^{camera} We really developed it so well by 1970.

It was a very dramatic episode in September 1970. Black September, the civil war in Jordan. Golda Meir was standing in New York, in the Hilton Hotel and making a speech on closed circuit television. There was a live audience in the room of two thousand people and an audience in eighty communities all over America of thirty thousand people. She spoke for forty-five minutes.

~~I~~^{we} bought one hour of cable time. When I bought time on the cable it meant I ~~had to knock off~~ other television programs ^{had to be knocked off} from the cable. It was a very complicated thing to do, so I decided to buy one hour. I decided to gamble that she would talk thirty-five, forty, FIFTY MINUTES. I didn't want to buy thirty minutes and be cut off, so I bought one hour. ^{This represents money} ~~You're talking~~ big money.

Q.

How much did such an operation cost?

A.

Oh, I don't remember.

Q.

An approximation?

A.

It can cost a hundred thousand, two hundred thousand dollars or a quarter of a million dollars, but you only do it when you have something you know is big.

Q.

You do it with Golda Meir?

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R. 5/2

A.

And not every day even with Golda Meir. The War of Attrition had just finished, August 8, 1970. At last we could breathe. I'm always afraid when you give Jews a chance to breathe, unless you explain the next problem to them. When the War of Attrition came to an end, I decided to bring Golda here. I couldn't send her to every city so I set up the closed circuit.

I didn't care what it cost because I had to tell them in September of 1970, ^{that in spite of the cease-fire,} ~~oh, kinderlach,~~ ^{was} the fight ~~is~~ still on. Thank God nobody will be killed for a little while, but if you think this means the end of the war, you don't know what you're talking about. The war continues - and I wanted her to say it. ^{It was necessary} ~~So it's~~ ^{to maintain the historic perspective, and not let complacency take over.} ~~worth while once in several years.~~

That night was the night of the whole business in Jordan, ^{when the King} ~~and Kissinger was trying to get~~ ^{was their} ~~her~~ ^{while she was speaking,} on the telephone, Nixon was asking her if Israel ^{would} go into Jordan to protect Jordan from Syria, ^{which was} ~~who were~~ sending tanks south, ^{into Jordan, to aid the terrorists}

C.

The same day?

A.

The same hour. She came away from the microphone at about eleven o'clock at night. There was an El Al plane supposed to leave at eight o'clock, sitting out there in Kennedy airport, and two hundred people waiting hour after hour. They didn't know why they were waiting.

The point of that story is that those coincidences just happen. They make life interesting. She called Dayan :

and Dayan called her back. Then she called Kissinger and she put down certain conditions and he told Nixon. I don't want to go into that whole history. If she hadn't put it in her book I won't put it into mine.

Q.

We don't put it in a book, we only record it for you. It will not be used without your permission.

A.

Okay, if you really want me to finish that whole story -- the conditions that she put were very interesting. First of all, she said yes, of course Israel would help Jordan, especially because the United States was asking, but she had some conditions. Number one, if Israel goes in to help Jordan on the east ~~and~~ and if Egypt jumps Israel on her back in the west, America has to help Israel. Number two, America has to tell the Russians that Israel ^{was being requested by the U.S.} ~~is ready~~ to move in to stop Syria and help Jordan. Number three, America has to send a plane over from the 6th Fleet headquarters in Naples with American officers and large scale maps of Jordan in case the Israel Air Force has to go in. This plane should come from Naples headquarters via the Turkish route so the Russian radar can pick it up and can see that an American plane is actually coming to Israel, as proof to the Russians that Israel isn't doing this on her own initiative but at America's request.

She gave these conditions to Kissinger and he gave them to Nixon. She got an answer back in about half an hour - yes to everything, yes. She spoke to Dayan a couple of times and he told her that there was already an alert on the Golan for two

R. 5/2

brigades. She said she'd come home, and if he ~~needs~~^{needed} her he would find her on the plane. When she came home, he was there at the airport. He told her, no problems.

In the next two days, the Jordanians finished with the Mechablīm, the PLO. When the Syrians saw that there was an Israeli alert, their tank column, two hundred tanks, turned and went back up north. They never did come into Jordan territory. Everything was all over and everybody was very happy.

Q.

Not everybody.

A.

Everybody except...

Q.

Arafat.

A.

The main point I was making many paragraphs back was about the use of technology. I remember in 1957, thirteen years earlier, Golda was Foreign Minister and there was the whole question of the withdrawal from the Sinai. She was in the United States. I had a big, big national meeting in Miami in March 1957 and she promised to come down. This would have given the big impetus to the 1957 campaign, which was a huge campaign. ~~When we have our wars in October, it's very good for next year's campaign because the timing is perfect.~~

~~By October, November,~~ Ben-Gurion had already agreed to withdraw, four days after the war. The war was over on November 4th, ^{1956.} But ~~then it stretched out~~ ^{the withdrawal was delayed} and it didn't actually happen until March, 1957.

R. 5/2

One of our staff men, Harry ^{Biele} Beale, was a tender, soft "old" bachelor and ^{Golda} she liked him very much. He was good for her and could get her to do anything. He was in New York telling Golda; "Look, what's the difference, you are waiting for a telephone call from Ben-Gurion to tell you when to go in to the Security Council and give a date that we are withdrawing. You are sitting by your telephone in the Essex House Hotel and you won't leave the telephone. What's the difference? You get on the airplane and in two or three hours you're in Miami. If ^{B.G.} he calls you and you are in the air, he will find you in Miami two or three hours later. What's the difference? You stand in front of these people and make a speech. Fifteen minutes doesn't matter. Then you get on an airplane and come back. You are not out of contact for so many hours. I will go with you. Nothing, ^{deeny} He couldn't move her. I was sitting in the ballroom of the hotel, ^{in Miami} waiting. ^{When Harry told me she wasn't coming, I had to think of an alternative.}

I said; "Let's see if we can get a closed circuit cable from New York to Miami for tomorrow night. You see if you can get her to go from the hotel over to the CBS studio, just from 59th Street to 52nd Street. She'll only be away from a telephone for maybe seven minutes. She agreed. I had 24 hours to arrange the technology. In 24 hours the television company build a 150 foot antenna on top of the Fountainblau Hotel to receive the signal and built a screen ^{ten} ~~twenty~~ meters by ^{ten} ~~twenty~~ meters inside the ballroom of the hotel.

Q.

In '57 the technology was not as good as today?

R. 5/2

A.

No. ~~A screen that small would only show her face and nothing else.~~
Harry ^{Biele} ~~Beale~~ took her from the Essex House over to the studio. I had an open telephone line from the ballroom in Miami to the studio in New York. ~~I want to talk, I talk, and if not I don't talk and the money is going, but I have an instant connection.~~ ^{Everything worked} It was so incredible when ^{The} ~~this~~ face, ^{of} Golda, ^{highly enlarged,} came on that screen, ^{and she spoke straight} to the hearts of the people. It was like a revival meeting, fantastic. I think we got ten million dollars right there, on the spot. We ran a special fund after the war was over. The campaign took a big jump up and again the technology paid off.

I was always a believer in the use of modern technology, telephone, video-tape, closed circuit television and telex machines. I had telex machines in every executive director's office in every city in America. I put in a telex network in twenty four hours during the Six Day War, so if I couldn't get a guy on the telephone, I could talk to him on the telex.

We never had such a network before, linking together all the cities in America, all the Federations within the control of the UJA office. I talked to them on the telex and gave them information about what was happening in Israel, in the war. They answered me back, asked questions, and told what gifts they were getting in. I could put all the latest news on the telex, what's happening now in Baltimore, in San Francisco, in Hartford, Connecticut. If a newsflash came in, I'd send it out. That's technology. I kept a big book of these talk dispatches as a souvenir.

R. 5/2

Q.

Did you consider that this was a way that the UJA really became the most important leadership organization of the American Jewish community?

A.

~~Sure, I know.~~ Yes, I am sure of that.

Q.

Because of the way you gave the information you received, the leadership. Did you imagine that?

A.

Oh, come on! That's why I did it. I knew exactly what I was doing.

Q.

Are you really sure?

A.

Exactly. One theme during my whole life was the tension between the communities and the UJA. ~~Who is the leader and who is the follower. Who is trying to tell the other one what to do; always fights.~~ Fisher was always telling me not to fight with them.

Q.

What was Fisher's job at that time?

A.

I think it was in '65. In the middle sixties he was one of the national chairmen of the UJA and then he became the General Chairman in ~~1965~~¹⁹⁶⁵. Myerhoff finished in '64, I think.

Q.

Myerhoff?

R. 5/2

one of the best channels in the USA

Yes, Joseph Myerhoff from Baltimore. Fisher used to tell me when he was ~~only~~ one of the national chairmen, to stop fighting with the communities. I said, Max, look, somebody has to be the boss. If we let them be the boss, they will give us whatever share of the campaign they want and they will take whatever direction in the campaign they want. They will make their own slogans, their own policies, invite their own speakers and the whole thing will be Hefker.

I wanted ^{the USA} to be the boss. The UJA should control the direction. The UJA represents the voice of Israel in this situation and it has to fight with the communities about which speakers to take, what policies to follow and what share to give. Therefore there was this whole tension, which went on for many, many years.

Q.

Does that include the CJF^{WF}, the national office ^{of the organization?} ~~of the community?~~

Yes - we were always in contact with them - and sometimes fought with them, as well as with individual communities.
~~The CJF^{WF}, in my opinion and judgment is a totally weak and powerless organization.~~ Sometimes the communities, in their fight with the UJA, would go to the CJF and say, you should protect us against the UJA. You are our "roof" organization and the UJA is trying to push us. So the CJF officers or the executive director would come and say, you must deal with us. We are the "roof" organization of all the communities.

Q.

I remember there was one very short period in 1942 when there was a split in the UJA, and the CJF^{WF} tried to reunite the UJA. They

failed, because they were not powerful enough to do this. So it was a "roof" organization, but without any power, without the possibility to carry out a real plan or a real anything. Do you agree with me?

A.

I agree with you fully. Take a situation such as getting rid of Montor. This was a revolt that came from inside the communities. It started in one community, in Detroit. The "roof" organization didn't have anything to do with it. The "roof" organization can help call a meeting together of ten executive directors and say that in Detroit they are very upset with Montor, and how do you feel about it? But we are talking about where the power is. The power was between the local community, fighting against the National UJA, two sources of power. The Council of Federations was not a power center, it was a coordinating body.

Q.

The Council of Federations didn't have the money.

A.

You're saying money is power?

Q.

No, they didn't have money and without money and without delegation of power, you can't do anything.

A.

Correct, it was just an advisory body and a coordinating body.

It had a certain influence in 1942. I think it was the only point the in/history of the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds that

they had a certain influence. It was because there was a split in the UJA.

Q.

But in '44 they couldn't do this.

A.

I used to go through the formalities, under Fisher's pressure, of consulting with the Council of Federations. Fisher would say, don't fight with them. Go to the Council of Federations quarterly meeting. Whatever you want to propose, propose it there and give them a feeling they're your partners in the whole business. Let them think that you are coming to them for their advice and consultation. So you'll make them your friends instead of your enemy. Be smart, be a diplomat, be a good politician, Fisher was advising me.

Q.

When did Fisher act as chairman of the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds?

A.

After he left the UJA.

Q.

Who were the chairmen of the Council?

A.

I really don't remember, except for the last one or two. I didn't have too much to do with them. ~~I haven't got a clue, I can't remember.~~

Q.

It's the best proof they weren't important. Do you agree with me?

- 99 -

R. 5/2

A.

I think so. I remember one name but I don't know which year, a man from Indianapolis, Julius Freeman. There was also a man from Newark, New Jersey, by name of Abeles.

Q.

I wouldn't say that these people were the leaders of the American Jewish community.

A.

Oh, no, they were the presidents of the Council. That's all they were. In their own hometowns they were local leaders.

Q.

That's right it's the president, not the chairman.

A.

You asked me the question whether I realized what I was doing when I put in a network of telex machines. I certainly did. It's consistent with my whole life's policy in which I tried to have the UJA lead, direct and dominate. I knew that the flow of information is a key factor in determining who is taking the lead, or who is in fact the leader.

Q.

You mean information makes formation?

A.

It does. It creates and forms social structures. It forms power relationships.

Q.

I'm not talking only about leadership in fund raising.

R. 5/2

A.

No, I'm talking generally, bichlal.

Q.

As you told us during the last meeting, the American Jewish community, since the beginning of the sixties, didn't have big leaders, charismatic personalities. So your organization, the United Jewish Appeal, became the leading organization instead of these charismatic personalities. Is that right?

A.

I think, in fact that's right. From a political point of view I think that maybe Nahum Goldmann and the Presidents' Conference, which he organized, would not agree, because these men think they are the politicians in Jewish life. The president of the Conference of Presidents thinks that he is the leader of American Jewish organized life.

Q,

The American Jewish Committee doesn't participate in this?

A.

No, it's an observer, a close friend. It follows the line most of the way, but it will not be a member.

Q.

Why not?

A.

I don't know. For historic reasons. I say that the UJA, its leaders and its power was the leading Jewish influence in the

✓

R. 5/2

organized Jewish community; more than the synagogues and more than the political organizations of the Presidents' Conference. They might disagree, but I can only give you my opinion. I think in terms of results.

Q.

And in setting up the telex machines, you were recognizing the need for a mass education of the American Jewish community.

A.

It was an instrument, a tool that had an educational value to spread out wider to reach a larger number of people. I finally, against a lot of opposition, got the UJA computerized. The greatest technology of all was the computerization. I failed, but what I had in mind to do, was to create a computer bank with the names, addresses, number of children and other information about every single Jewish family in the United States of America. Nobody has it. It doesn't exist, ^{I wanted} everything on tape. Then we would know what we have, once and for all, a total census of the Jewish community, like in the Bible. As I said, I failed, but at least I got started. National UJA did it. They must have something like two hundred thousand names of contributors on their computer.

Then every big community in the country began to computerize. Many of the small ones became computerized by tying in with the computer of a bigger town somewhere. Akron, Ohio is tied in to Cleveland's computer. I think America is three-quarters computerized by now. I failed to do it as a NATIONAL UJA. It's my fault.

R. 5/2

Q.

It has all the names of the Jews in their community?

A.

Not all, most contributing Jews.

Q.

You're not talking about the whole population?

A.

No, I wanted the whole population and this is what I failed to do. What I did start was computerizing the contributors every place. I got most of that although maybe not all of it. I went one step further and persuaded every local community to computerize. If I were there, I would finish the job. I would get a tape from every city in America which made its own system and I would put them on one master drum and I would finish the job. A certain amount of money, time, energy, imagination and you can finish it.

Q.

Many people say that computerizing is one of the faults of the UJA today, that the population involved could be bigger. You always involve the same population.

A.

Not the same, but you involve a small percentage. That's criticizing the campaign methodology. There are good reasons why it's very difficult to do. The problem is only in four places, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and Los Angeles. Those are four unique problems by themselves. They're not reaching so many hundreds of thousands of Jews. Los Angeles has about six hundred thousand Jews and they have fifty five thousand families in the

computer. Fifty five thousand families is two hundred thousand, two hundred and twenty thousand people.

Q.

One-third.

A.

The problem is not much better or worse in Los Angeles than in New York, It depends on how you want to say it. The computer was, to me, a final technological tool.

Q.

When did you begin the computer program?

A.

Ask Tabatchnik. He ^oknows exactly, because he was the first man to study a computer program for the UJA for me. I'll guess at 1965. If I had stayed longer, I would have carried the computer forward to its ultimate and tried to make one complete master list of every Jew in America and then try to figure out how much each one is contributing, so if I want^o to push a button and get all the zeroes, I ^{would} ~~will~~ get all the zeroes.

R. 3/3 (only)

A.

I was always interested in technology as a tool which could increase the efficiency of the campaign and improve its ability to work. Sometimes when you talk about efficiency and tools, you get a feeling of some very cold machine. I didn't want to turn the UJA into a cold operation but I just don't think that you have to use a pen and a pencil in an age when you have a computer.

I believe that there are many future technologies which the UJA should use and I hope they will use them. I used airplanes and helicopters. I had a project called "Operation Jet" to get into small communities, where there are only one or two Jews, with a private chartered jet plane. I would have them meet ~~us~~ at the airport and sit inside the plane, ^{in a room at the airport} ~~with me~~ and talk for an hour, ~~have drinks in a small private plane~~. Then you keep going. You can make five or six towns in one day by this method and we did it. I once made an inventory of all the leaders of the UJA who had their own airplanes, who would give us the airplanes for nothing.

R.3/1

I used to have ideas which nobody would agree with, but some day maybe the UJA will carry them out. One suggestion I made was to take a mission and fly to Moscow, stay there a few hours, turn around and fly back. You don't need a hotel. I came to this because I was having such trouble with Intourist.

R. 3/1

They didn't want Jews. They said they don't have hotels and they don't want to be embarrassed by bringing visitors. That was the early approach in Russian tourism. So I said, we don't need hotels. I only want to stay there for three or four hours, that's enough. It would make the impression I was looking for. We turn around and go back on the same plane and we will take pledges on the plane going back. It was called "a meeting in the air." In eighteen or twenty-four hours we would finish the whole thing from front to back.

I once had another idea. People were telling me it was too much to go to Israel all the time seeing the same thing on every study mission. I suggested that we take a plane and fly to Auschwitz. We will have a meeting in the town of Cracow with every Israel Ambassador on the Continent of Europe, so we have the feeling of Israel, what the French call "presence".

If we can't have it there, we'll have a meeting in Vienna and listen to every ambassador give a ~~half-hour~~ resume about the problems of Israel vis-a-vis his country. Then we get on the plane and go back. We see Auschwitz, make ^{Ulijah ba -} ~~eloh~~ regel to the Beit Kvarot, talk to the Shagririm of Israel, and go back to New York. You don't need anything. We would put on two extra meals, ten more bottles of whiskey, some pillows and blankets and finished. That's a study mission, too, a one day study mission.

You can do it if you have the airplane, if you have the telex equipment on both sides and if you have a standby personnel. Everytime I would make an ^{operatives} ~~mission~~ like this, I would be the director,

R. 3/1

because I never trust anybody with ^{all the} details. ^{The details determine success or failure} Maybe that's a failing on my part, but when you are using high technology, you cannot just tell somebody else to do it, not the first time at least. The second time you also have to do it yourself. Then you have a few guys trained and they know what you want. Then it's okay.

The technology of the future? My God! Many times I wanted to make closed circuit live broadcasts from Israel, but we never had what's called an Earth Station here in Israel.

Q.

Now we have?

A.

When I wanted to do it in 1970-71, we didn't have an Earth Station yet. Here's what I wanted to do. We did it anyway on film. It was almost as good but not quite. My idea was this: Dayan standing at the Suez Canal, Golda standing ^{in the} at Bet Shaan Valley ~~outside the town of Bet Shaan~~, Abba Eban standing at the (Western) Wailing Wall, and I had a helicopter and I was going to go from one ^{person} ~~way~~ to the next, see each one in his own setting. Dayan is standing with a flak jacket, a helmet, sandbags and the guns. Golda is standing on a small bridge in a field with some trees behind her. You can see the Golan in back of her, and part of the town of Bet Shaan on this side. She's talking about mechablīm and Bet Shaan. Eban is standing, dressed in a suit and a tie, the Wall in the background, we could have made a continuous broadcast for about thirty minutes. I would be at one place, ^{as the anchor man,} and we'd pick somebody else to be ^{at} ~~with~~ the second, ^{place,} and somebody to be

R. 3/1

^{at}
~~with~~ the third. The camera would come back to me at the end and I would be ~~the anchor man~~ and close it for the last one or two minutes.

I worked with the ^{director-general} ~~manager~~ in the ^{Ministry of Communications} ~~Misrad Hatikshoret~~ for a long time and he couldn't work out the technology. He said we'll have an Earth Station but we don't have it ^{yet} ~~now~~. Instead we did it on film. I went to the Suez Canal and stood with Moshe Dayan for fifteen minutes on film. I took the helicopter to Golda and to Abba Eban. We put the film together, put it on a TWA plane and sent it to New York. We showed it the following night on closed circuit in about a hundred cities.

Q.

It's not the same.

A.

It's twenty-four hours later. It's a can of film and they are looking at something that happened twenty-four hours earlier. It was not only good, it was almost great, but it would have been fantastic.

Now it is already four, five years later and we have an Earth Station here, but nobody is using it for the UJA. I'm afraid the use of technology has not continued the way I would have continued with it. It is crucial for communication. If we want imaginative, instantaneous communication daily, why can't you have a telex in Jerusalem going to every city in America? Nobody's doing it.

I would use the Concorde airplane. The Concorde will not come into New York because of pollution, but the Concorde can

R.3/1

come to Ben-Gurion once. So the people in Holon will be upset once. Rent the Concorde. I can just see a beautiful meeting up in the air or on the ground.

I will finish by saying that if an organization in today's world doesn't use technology, then it's very routine and it will lose something of its spirit, aside from losing the results. The last thing I would like to say is a philosophical comment. Money is not always the result simply of the ~~the~~ intellectual argument you use, or even the emotional argument you use. Sometimes money is the result of the spirit, the ambiance, the ^{atmosphere} ~~avirah~~ which you create. Given the same intellectual content, the same emotional content, if you can find some way to put electricity into the meeting, you will make more money. Golda understood this. I would say, Golda, let ~~us~~ ^{us} have a meeting in the garden of your house on Ben Maimon, ^{street in Jerusalem} or Dayan let us have a meeting in the garden of your house in Zahala. It's better than in a hotel. It's that extra little neshamah veterah that you put into it that creates a little excitement. Here the technology is only a bus, but the ~~principle~~ ^{principle} is the same. Technology can assist you, if you use it properly. I think it's indispensable. I tried all my life to have technology work for me and to use new technology. ~~Okay, sof easuk. We'll continue in 1955 and we'll see how to go next time.~~

R. 4/1

Q.

I would like to hear your impression of the personalities in the UJA, of Bill Rosenwald. He told us about working with you, about the trouble with the problems of the UJA and the Bonds. If I remember correctly you told some people, or you made a speech in which you said that giving ~~us~~ to the UJA and giving to Bonds is all the same and that created a problem.

A.

That's what he said?

Q.

And that created a problem for him between Bonds and UJA. He said most people liked giving and you said that you were interested in cash, and Israel was interested in cash and you didn't pay attention to the difference between the UJA and Bonds. So we want your reaction to some things; first to your relationship with Bill Rosenwald and the others; second, your reaction, what you remember from the Emergency of '67?

A.

I want to start to read my material about '67. I think there's no sense in trying to give you ^{only} what I remember, because that was a very hectic period. I remember some big things.

There were fantastic stories that I have to tell you about Max Fisher, Eshkol, Henry Ford and Yitzhak Rabin and such. I came to Israel on the 21st of May, I think, '67 and stayed here until the 30th of May. In those ten days so much happened with

R. 1/1

me, the government, the people and the army; with Fisher, who was in Athens; with the leaders, who were in America; all the telephone calls/^{when} I tried to convince them that we were going to have a war here. They didn't want to believe that there would be a war.

What we went through in those ten days are a story to turn your hair gray, but it was a turning point in the whole history of the American Jewish community. The ^{essence} ~~idea~~ of the matter was that they didn't want to accept anything where there would be trouble and that therefore they would have to react in a certain way. I had such an argument with Fisher in Athens that I said I was going to resign and call a press conference to tell the whole world that I believe Israel is going to be in a war, that I believe that the Jews of America must act a certain way and start the big campaign immediately. ^{I said to Max that so long as I remained} ~~While I stay~~ in office I ^{could not} cannot argue with ^{him} you, because ^{he was} you ~~are~~ the chairman and I ^{was} am the vice chairman, but if I resigned I ^{could} can say what I want^{ed} as a free man and that's what I ^{was} am going to do. It was a very serious moment and he understood it.

I was traveling, running back and forth from Tel Aviv to ^{Auja (Nitzana)} El ~~Uja~~ and down into the desert. For three days I was in Sinai and then ~~back~~ to Athens ^{where Fisher was,} and from Athens back to here. I was on the telephone to Cleveland, where Ginsberg was, the deputy of Fisher, trying to convince Ginsberg. ~~But I want to read all the papers first.~~

R. 1/1

Now, to go back to the first question, my reaction to the different chairmen. It's a question of not speaking in generalities, but in specifics. In general terms, I tried to have a good relation with every chairman, to give him the respect which was due to him because he was the lay leader. I was the professional. You always have to work together on a very delicate balance. You must never bring it to a confrontation over who is the boss. That's the whole secret, never cause a confrontation.

On the other hand I always had the feeling that I was the permanent officer, there all the time. The chairman is always changing. It's like the British government. They have His Majesty's Permanent Undersecretary, and then you have a ~~Secretary~~^{Minister} who's changing all the time. ~~His~~^{Her} Majesty's Permanent Under-Secretary must really keep the line of policy of the government going, never mind who's the Minister. I always had that same feeling, that I wanted to try to give a policy direction to what we ~~are~~^{were} doing. I wanted to try to create the policies. I had to convince my chairman, whoever he was, without fighting with him. And yet I didn't want him, if I thought he was wrong, to try to use his authority to say to me, well, I am deciding we will not do this or that. I always tried to keep the balance, so that the two of us should be on the same line. Maybe I might have to convince him or he had to convince me, but when we ~~came~~^{came} face to face with the public or ~~to face~~ the executive committee or any official in Israel, we would always be on the same line.

R. 1/1

Q.

I understand there was a difference even between chairmen?

A.

Always.

Q.

Because Rosenwald was convinced that he is a specialist in fund-raising and he knew better than anybody else in the United States how to run the business?

A.

Right.

Q.

I understand that the other ^{vice} chairmen he had were not convinced of that.

A.

Right.

Q.

He ^{led} had the NRS and he was involved deeply in Joint business for a long time. So he was completely convinced that he knew better than anybody else in the establishment of the UJA how to do the business. I'm really asking you to give us a description not only of Rosenwald, but of the difference between working with such chairman and working with a chairman who's a very good business man, but his experience in fund-raising is more intimate. Is my question clear?

A.

The question is very clear, but it's based upon a misconception,

a judgment that what Rosenwald said is correct.

Q.

I said that Rosenwald was convinced of what he was saying.

A.

Rosenwald thought that he was a great expert on fund-raising, more so than anybody else, and your question was how was it for me to work with other chairmen. They all thought they were experts on fund-raising. Rosenwald has a very strong personality, so he came across to you in this way, but if you would interview anyone else who was chairman, Warburg, for example, he would say, oh, I don't really know anything about fund-raising, but of course I was the president of the Joint for twenty-five years. His personality is such.

Warburg is a fellow who laughs at himself all the time. Rosenwald is a fellow who takes himself very seriously. Warburg knows as much about fund-raising as Rosenwald, but in his own way he would say, I don't know anything about fund-raising, I never asked a man for one dollar in my whole life. I would only tell a man what our problems are and then I'd leave it to him to decide. Is this a good fund-raiser or a bad fund-raiser?

There are no rules in this game. I think, for example, that it's better if you ask a man, please give me ten thousand dollars instead of saying I leave it to your conscience. That's my opinion. Warburg would leave it to the man's conscience. Rosenwald would say, give me ten thousand dollars. Sapir, who ^{was} ~~is~~ supposed to be a very good fund-raiser, never once asked a man for a specific

R. 1/1

sum of money. I used to have terrible fights with him. I told him to ask the man for a specific sum. Sapir never did it once. Is he a good fund-raiser or a bad fund-raiser?

Q.

I think it depends on the attitude of the man.

A.

Now you are talking about the psychology of the contributor. Then you are in the field of art, not science. Some people say that the whole approach to fund-raising must be very scientific, according to the rules. I say there are no rules. It's not a science.

Q.

It's not?

A.

It's much more than a science. Of course, there are general rules, and one is to ask a man for a specific sum. But if you have some feeling that the psychology is different, then don't, because he will react badly. He will think it's pressure. If you have some feeling he will be more generous if you leave it to his conscience, do it. It's a feeling, what the Germans call Fingerspitzengefühl.

You could never get Warburg to ask for a specific amount, but does that mean he was not as good a fund-raiser as Rosenwald? I don't know. Rosenwald had a very strong sense of self-confidence and ^{Warburg} had a very dry sense of humor about himself. He wasn't very serious about himself. Maybe he didn't have as much self-confidence as Rosenwald, but he had more charm, more humor, an easier relationship with the contributor. Rosenwald was stiff. The contributor

R. 1/1

respected Rosenwald, but was charmed by Warburg.
~~I liked him and Warburg could charm him!~~ Who's a better fund-raiser?
I don't know. There's no way to say. Each of them was excellent according to his own style.

The professional would decide ^{to} whom to send Warburg ~~to~~ and ^{to} whom to send Rosenwald ~~to~~, but you still cannot predict. There is a critical amount of decision on how to handle the contributor, like the critical moment of a battle. At that moment, something can stretch or change. You cannot decide everything in advance. You plan as well as you know how to plan down to the last detail.

Q.

You try?

A.

And something can go wrong.

Q.

You think about the alternatives?

A.

Always, and you tell everything to your man. You give him a good briefing and tell him how to retreat if he must, how to attack if necessary.

I like Rosenwald because, as a chairman, he was a very, very hard worker. This is the most important thing in a chairman, that he give to you all the time you need, that he do his homework and study everything you give him to study. He knew the material, what he was selling. He studied everything. If you told him to talk about the development towns, about immigration, security, whatever, he said, give me the material. He read everything. He was the best

chairman I ever had, from the point of view of doing his homework, reading up, doing his briefing on each person.

We gave him a long profile, the psychology of each man, his background, his interests, his hobby, his clubs, his relatives, everything we could find. When Rosenwald went to see a man, he knew as much about that man as we could tell him. I think I ~~had~~ worked with eight chairmen and I never had one who did his homework like Rosenwald. ^{Yet} I never had one who was less flexible. He followed the instructions if you gave him "A" or "B" or "C". After a while he lost his flexibility and then he would come back.

Q.

You mean he made up his mind?

A.

Yes, he was very much a Yeke and this was what was excellent about him, but this was also his limitation. He would often have to come back for new instructions. He might be working with somebody and he would not be getting what he wanted and he would say, stop, we will meet next week. The man would say, what do you mean? Rosenwald said, I have to think about this some more and then he would come back to me and say, now what do I do?

Q.

He would stop the battle?

A.

He would stop. If he was not satisfied and saw it was not going well, he wanted more instructions. He had so much authority..

R. 1/1

Q.

That they listened.

A.

The contributor would take it from him because Rosenwald had such tremendous personal power. That came from two things. After all the years he put into his public service, everybody knew him and they respected him. Secondly, it came from the respect they had for him as a successful business man. With Warburg they used to say, he ^{inherited} got so much money from his father and ~~lost it all~~. ^{never made any himself.} Rosenwald ^{They would say,} got so much money from his father, ^{but + went out and} ~~and he~~ made five times more. Everybody knows that Sears & Roebuck is his old company. American Security Corporation was always in the stock market, ~~and~~ always making deals, buying ships, buying and selling companies. He had so much personal authority from his business success that anybody would listen to him. I told you the story of what he did with me and Mr. ^{Taubman} ~~Kauffman~~, when he solicited five thousand dollars from me and five hundred thousand dollars from himself, to get two hundred and fifty thousand from ^{Taubman} ~~this other man~~. He is like a tiger and he doesn't let go.

Another thing about him; this whole business was to a certain extent a game to him. He had to succeed, like he had to succeed in everything he did. In the ^{non-Jewish} ~~other~~ part of his life he gave to many, many institutions. I wasn't working with him in ~~these~~ areas. He gave money to ~~the~~ universities. His father gave money to the black universities in America, one hundred million dollars. Howard University and Tuskegee University and all the big ones were all paid for by his father. ^{And Bill learned from his father.} He did work for general humanitarian causes.

R. 1/1

I didn't work with him in ~~this~~^{other} fields, but in the Jewish field, his approach was philanthropic and humanitarian, to help poor Jews. As far as Israel ~~is~~^{was} concerned, if Israel ~~is the way~~^{was}, the tool to help poor Jews, ~~it's~~^{that's} fine with him. If the way to help the Jews of Morocco ~~is~~^{was} to bring them to Israel, ~~he's not against it~~^{he was all for it, even though}, but he ~~was~~ not a burning Jewish nationalist. I used to say that the main thing was to strengthen Israel, ahead of the individual person. If we can create a strong state we can save many Jews now and prevent another holocaust in the future.

I was more interested in upbuilding the country and using the people to build up the country. The people are also being helped, but it's a question of which comes first. I used to say to him, if you ^{personally} don't want to buy Bonds, don't buy them. You don't think we should get the UJA mixed up with the Bond organization, that ~~they~~^{we} are two separate organizations and must remain separate because ~~we~~^{the} ~~UJA~~^{UJA is} ~~are~~^{are} tax exempt and ~~they~~^{Bonds} are not. However, down in the local community, ~~we have to sell them~~^{the USA leadership must give policy direction, and say that} either we ~~can~~^{can} fight against the Bonds or we ~~can~~^{can} cooperate with the Bonds, one or the other. He preferred ~~to work together~~^{cooperation} because Israel ~~will~~^{would} get more money, ^{totally} All the money that ~~she~~^{Israel} gets from ~~us~~^{The UJA} is better, because that money is free. She doesn't have to pay it back, But there are plenty of Jews and non-Jews, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, labor unions, who can buy these Israel Bonds and loan Israel money. It's extra money for Israel.

I think Israel is wrong to continue to sell the Bonds. I told Eshkol ^{and Sapir} that when the fifteen years were finished in 1966, you should stop selling bonds. The first ones are coming due. Pay

them off a little bit every year, but don't sell more because you're only going deeper and deeper in the box. He didn't agree. He wanted to keep going.

I explained to all the chairmen and all the leaders of the UJA, that even if we do not think it good economic and financial policy to continue to sell Bonds, Israel decided to do it. We have only to decide to help or not to help. It's stupid for us to be working so hard for Israel, trying to get free money, and not also to help her sell some Bonds if there's any way we can help. It's not our responsibility, but if we can help in any way, we should do so.

What does that mean in the local community? You can help them to get a chairman for the Bonds, or you can prevent it. I once got a telephone call ^{in Jerusalem} from the Bond organization, ^{in New York} They wanted a ^{certain} man ⁱⁿ from Boston ^{to be the Israel} chairman, Mr. George Shapiro. He was the chairman of the Federation-UJA campaign for many years and he is very strong and aggressive. He said no, he'd had enough. They called me from New York and I said I'd try to help.

I called him in Boston. He asked if I was calling from Jerusalem. I said sure and I want you to be the Bond chairman, because that's the way you can help Israel. You already did your job as UJA chairman, now be the Bond chairman for a few years. He agreed and was the Bond chairman for about three years. He did a fantastic job for them.

I myself could not see that there was a contradiction. Rosenwald thought if I ^{was} ~~am~~ the director of the UJA I must be loyal only to the UJA. I said no, I am loyal to Israel. He said, what! Not

just the UJA? Rosenwald said look, you must be like a horse closing your eyes except ^{to what extent} what is right in front of you. I said no. This was a typical disagreement. It was never any policy issue inside the UJA. ~~They tried to tell me to stop trying to help the Bond organization, but they knew not to make of it a confrontation and I didn't make a confrontation with them.~~

An example of how chairmen are different; Mr. Myerhoff, who was the chairman of the UJA for four years, was exactly the opposite of Rosenwald. He was the first chairman of the Bonds in Baltimore. The same year he was the chairman of the ^{local} UJA. He did it dafka in order to prove that a man can do both jobs with no contradiction and do them well. He wanted to offer personal proof. ^{He is a wonderful man.} ~~It was my attitude and I said fine.~~

It's a question of time. The calendar is divided; the Bonds have one ^{season} ~~time~~ of the year and the UJA has a different ^{season} ~~time~~. That's the way it used to be. Today, the tempo has increased, and the campaign has gotten so big for both of them, ^{that they both work all 12 months,} But there's always the question of trying to coordinate and this always creates little arguments all the time. You argue with your wife every day. Every day I had four or five cases coming up, local arguments which had to be settled. I used to call Schwartz and say, Joe, what the hell is happening in Hartford, Connecticut? He would say, I don't know what's happening. I said, call your man and find out. ~~He was always slow and I was always fast.~~ He ^{would} ~~called~~ me back and ^{said} ~~said~~ there's some argument about the Bonds having a meeting on February 2nd and the UJA wants to have a meeting on February 1st. I said, Joe, if they cannot settle it on the local level, you and I will ^{try to} settle it.

R. 1/1

You tell your man and I'll tell my man. We had five, six cases like this every ~~day~~ ^{year}. We'd settle in one city, ^{then} it would come up in another city. Those are just tactical problems of every day. The overall strategic problems were to try to create cooperation between the two organizations in the field so they both could function. Rosenwald finally came to accept this. Fisher became the chairman and we never argued about this. He had a broadminded view of that.

The normal attitude of most of the chairmen I knew, most of the sub-chairmen and the national chairmen, was that the State of Israel is a tool with which to serve the nation. The Jewish people is a nation and the State would serve the nation. This was the main motivation. This is how I tried to train them and this is the kind of men I tried to find.

Bill Rosenwald would say, yes, the State is necessary; the State is the most important thing, but my main motivation is to help the people and also I like to be a success in everything I do. It wasn't how you put his motivations one, two, three, four. Maybe number one was humanitarian, to help the Jewish people in trouble. Number two was his personal success as the greatest fund-raiser. Number three was to help the State of Israel. Rosenwald was ~~as cold~~ ^{very firm.} ~~as ice and~~ when he decided to cut down on ^{his own} a gift, nobody could move him. His giving always fluctuated. He used money as a tool. He tried to get money out of people, by using his own gift as a lever.

R. 4/2

A.

I'll give you an example of how Rosenwald used to manage his own giving. After the '67 war, the campaign of '68 went down, during the campaign of '69 we began to pull up again and the campaign of 1970 I wanted to pull up even further. The campaign of '71, I thought, must come back to the level of '67.

Why?

Q. AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES
A.

I think we spoke about this, about the rhythm inside campaigns, of the cycles of many years. If a campaign begins to go down every year for too many years, pretty soon you will never recover. It's like an airplane that's going down and the pilot can never pull it up. You reach a point where it smashes into the ground. After the campaign began to go down one year, '68, two years '69, '70, '71, it would keep going down. In four or five years we would lose it. Nobody knew there would be a war in '73 to bring it back up again. So I tried without a war.

To try to make people aware of danger, to pull the campaign up, I tried to think of ways to do it. In 1970 I decided that we must begin to have a ~~large~~ number of million dollar gifts. We didn't have them in '67 and certainly not in '68 or '69. ^{I thought that} If I ~~can~~ ^{could} introduce this ^{element} into the campaign, maybe it ~~will~~ ^{would} be a way of giving some extra speed to the engine to turn the airplane the other way. That's when I spoke to Golda and asked her if she would be willing to come to a private house and have dinner with a few private people, not official and no publicity. I had to have the power

of her name. I wanted to try this in three cities, New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. (I'm using this story to explain Rosenwald.)

Golda agreed. ~~And then I said fine, now~~ I had to get three houses on three evenings. We had to get permission for an El Al plane to land in Los Angeles and Chicago, which was never done before. I wanted to have the ^{commitments} ~~money~~ in advance, so the only ones who ^{would} ~~will~~ come ^{would} ~~will~~ be those who have already agreed to give a million dollars. At the dinner we ^{wouldn't} ~~don't~~ have to talk money, just a very lovely evening, a social party. ^{I explained the idea to her and said:} You are going to the house of Mr. Meshulam Riklis for dinner and you are going to meet some friends. It's not a speech and not a meeting. It's a dinner party. There'll be five, ten people. She said okay, a brilliant idea.

Here is where I went to Rosenwald and I said, Bill, I'm trying something brand new. It's pioneering and I need to make a breakthrough. I need you to give ~~me~~ a million dollars. If you say you'll do it, then I can build on that. I can say, ^{Rosenwald} ~~he~~ is going to give a million, so you ^{Mr. X, Y, Z,} must give a million, ~~Mr. X, Mr. Y, Mr. Z.~~ ^{Bill} He said okay, because he understood the mechanics, the game. He understood that he had to do it, noblesse oblige.

Q.

And he had the means?

A.

Of course, he always has the means, he's a very rich man. That's the point of my story. Now I will jump ahead to the following year and finish the whole million dollar story later. What happened

is not important, because it's only about Rosenwald.

The next year when I went to see him for his gift, he said, two hundred thousand dollars. I said Bill, how can you do this, to drop from one million to two hundred thousand? You'll kill the campaign. He said oh, no, when you needed me for a pioneer, I gave a million dollars and you made a breakthrough. You have seven people now who gave you a million dollars. You don't need me any more. I'm going back to something more normal. I said: Come on! Two hundred thousand dollars is not normal for you. He said, that's it. That's all I'm going to give this year. Finished. I could never move him, not one millimeter, once he made up his mind.

Q.

Did that break the campaign?

A.

No, he was right and he knew it. I was angry for a different reason. I couldn't really use ^{the same} that argument with him ^{again} because I also knew it ^{was} not true. ^{A new level of giving had been accepted as normal. We didn't have to do that job twice.} ~~I brought it to a new level. I said~~ ^{But I tried to persuade him very simply that} ~~to him, Bill, come on,~~ ^{him} Israel needed more money from ~~you~~ and this argument didn't succeed with him.

If he had to put in one million dollars ^{in a given year} in order to make ^{a certain plan} the game ^{work}, ^{he was willing} yes. But to ask him to put a million dollars in again because Israel needed the money, no. Now does this give you some clue to the psychology of the man? Many times after we would agree on what he was to give, ^{and} every year ^{the amount} was different, he used to make me sign a letter that I ^{would} will not bother him for more money, ^{had to} that I ^{in writing that} promise ^{would} until such and such a date I will never bring up

R. 1.2

the question of more money. I ^{could} ~~will~~ never resolicit him and I ~~will~~ never ask him for some extra, one-time gift to use it to convince somebody else. He called it the "aid-memoir" and he'd put it in his safe in the office. It's such a joke. He's a multi-millionaire, but he wants an aid-memoir from me. He had a little book with his most important papers and he said, in case I die, I want this to be in here, so you will never go to my estate. They will already have here a letter saying you are not entitled, that you agree not to ask for more money until such and such a date. A stiff and stubborn, but a wonderful man because I could always count on him. He would always take cards. He didn't care if you sent him to solicit somebody for five ~~hundred~~ thousand dollars. It was okay by him. He said, I can only do so much. If you want me to see this man for five thousand, okay, but don't come to me and give me another one for five hundred thousand, because today I can only do one.

Q.

A very clever businessman.

A.

A good soldier. He used to have a secretary in his office to do the UJA work. We'd pay for the secretary. He had a telephone in his office to make calls for the UJA and we paid the telephone bill. He insisted on things like that. He said, I have no right to charge such an expense to the American Securities Corporation. It's your expense. So I said Bill, what the hell, pay it out of your own pocket. He said no. I give you a million dollars and you have to carry the expenses.

R. 1/2

Q.

I see why he was a rich man.

A.

Strict. If you sent him for a visit to some town to make a speech, we paid the airplane ticket. I used to give him a ticket, one hundred dollars, to go from New York to Boston every time. That was his idea.

Q.

I'm not surprised. This is the way people make money.

A.

Exactly, this is a perfect separation between giving money and spending money on some public cause. Then you want your money back. He said, I didn't agree to give you one million plus five thousand expenses. I agreed to give you one million.

Q.

But he gave you his time?

A.

As much as we needed.

~~Look, everybody has to be put on the balance and on the balance~~ he was wonderful. I don't know how he would be today. He's now about seventy, but if his health is good, if his mind is good, if he has physical energy, I would take him as the chairman today.

The UJA had an ^{unexpected} problem in '74, ~~a big crisis~~, ^{due to financial crisis involving} a ~~scandal with~~ Ginsberg and Adelman. Adelman was supposed to become the chairman at the conference in December 1974, but he couldn't because he was involved with Ginsberg in ~~Texas~~. ^{Financial} Three weeks before the conference, ^{this financial matter which became public knowledge, involved bankruptcy, and possible additional implications.} the UJA had to go find a new chairman. They found Mr. Lautenberg,

who was the chairman in '75 and again in '76. I don't know him very well but everybody tells me he's a very good chairman. I would say if they had not found him and if they were looking for somebody in November 1974, if anybody ^{would} ask me if the UJA should invite back Mr. Myerhoff to be chairman, I would say ~~no~~. ^{yes, but I would be} ~~He~~ wouldn't do it. Mr. Fisher as chairman? I would say no, because he wouldn't ^{be} ~~work~~ ^{work} hard enough as the chairman ^{must} ~~any more~~. He is past that. Mr. Rosenwald as the chairman? I would say yes, if his health is okay. With all of the things that were ^{difficult about} ~~wrong~~ with him, he was really a very, very good chairman.

I don't know how he remembers me, but I remember him with a great deal of respect and I think even with some affection. So that's the Rosenwald story, although there are many more parts of the story. That's enough on Mr. Rosenwald.

Do you want to know the end of the million dollar ^{Golda} story? I got Mr. Max Firestein in Los Angeles, his company is Max Factor cosmetics, to agree to give a million dollars and to have the dinner in his home. I got about three other people in Los Angeles to agree, ^{Larry} Mr. Weinberg was one. I forget who else. We had a lovely dinner. Golda enjoyed it very much and they enjoyed her. It was a real breakthrough. We had four gifts in Los Angeles of a million dollars and this put the campaign on a new plateau, because when you throw a stone in the water you get ripples.

If four people are giving this much money as a routine gift, ~~so what the hell~~, then a quarter of a million dollars is not so much. Then you can go through the community and say to everybody

R. 1/2

who is giving a hundred thousand, you ^{should} have to give 250, and ^{there} you ^{is} have a chance to get it. You can bring up the whole level.

New York was the same thing. We had a very lovely dinner at the home of Mr. Riklis, and we had four or five people. In Chicago I failed completely. I had one man who agreed to be the host, Henry Crown. He is a very rich man and a very successful businessman, the largest stockholder, I think, in ^{the} company called General Dynamics. They make airplanes, the F-16 which we are going to buy next. It's a fantastically good company, ~~is~~ ~~General Dynamics~~. He's a good Jew and he said okay to the dinner at his home and he would give a million dollars, but of course, he didn't want to be alone. I said no, certainly not, I ^{simply} need somebody to say they will start, and then I will get other people. I told him what was happening in Los Angeles and in New York.

I worked in Chicago many days myself, not my staff. Not the Chicago staff, not the national staff in New York. I saw twenty-two people and I couldn't get a single one to agree, ^{to give me million dollars.} I went back to Mr. Crown ^{and explained that, in spite of his willingness + lead,} ~~and told him I had failed.~~ ^{I explained to him that I was} ~~Number one, I'm~~ going to cancel Golda out of Chicago; ^{transfer the} ~~Number two, the dinner is~~ ^{at} ~~his house was off; and if he didn't want to, he didn't~~ ~~off at your house.~~ ~~Number three, you don't~~ have to give a million dollars.

Q.

Did he give?

A.

No, he gave half a million, because that's what he wanted to give, in the first place.

R. 1/2

He had been willing to
~~I was trying to get him to~~ double from half a million to a million. *of which*
had been willing to follow suit.

I said, I think it's terrible, Chicago has more money than Los Angeles, the Jews are living in Chicago for over a hundred years. German Jews. I really am ashamed about Chicago. He said no, I am more ashamed, because I live here. But, I said, you are released, you were willing, thank you. I have no right to hold you. So we had dinners in two cities but not Chicago. He gave the half million for 1971, but by 1973 he gave a million in the Emergency Campaign.

So that was the million dollar story. We started with seven gifts of a million dollars for the campaign for 1971. This was done in September 1970, an operation to get gifts in advance for the 1971 campaign. By ~~this~~ ^{The} time ~~we~~ ^{The VJA} came to the 1973 campaign, the Yom Kippur War, ~~we had~~ ^{it was able to mobilize} forty-five gifts of ~~over~~ a million dollars *and over.*

Q.

Also in Chicago?

A.

Even some in Chicago. You must prepare the ground. It was a very brilliant concept at that point in time. During the 1967 campaign there were no million dollar gifts, except one. We got one gift, an accident.

Q.

Who gave it?

A.

Walter Annenberg from Philadelphia, the man who later was the American Ambassador to London. He never gave much money before that and never gave much money after that, but as I say, it was an accident.

R. 1/2

Q.

How could it happen? He is a Jew, but not a Zionist. He is a very devoted American citizen, devoted to American policy and one day he decides to give a huge sum of money. I even know about people that gave large sums of money and they didn't want it known.

A.

People who want to give money anonymously, this is psychological.

Q.

But you had such cases?

A.

Sure we had such cases.

Q.

What sums?

A.

Well, huge sums.

Q.

Half a million dollars?

A.

No, no, always a hundred thousand or two hundred thousand. That's not so huge. The anonymous part didn't bother Annenberg. Your real question should be, why does a man give this much?

Q.

He didn't give earlier and he didn't give later, just once he gave a million dollars.

R. 1/2

A.

Yes. Something touched him or worried him, maybe the War of '67. I don't know. During the '67 war I lived in America, but during the '73 war I already lived here so I don't know how the American Jews were thinking and feeling.

Q.

When in '67 did he give the money?

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A.

He gave the money ~~around June. We got it on the first~~^{2nd second} day of the war, 5th or 6th^{June}. I don't remember. ~~Somebody called him up to ask for the money, a lawyer from New York, a friend of his, Albert Parker, who was one of the officers of the New York City UJA, called Annenberg and asked for the contribution.~~

In America May 31st is a holiday called Decoration Day.

Banks are closed, schools are closed, offices, everything. Nobody goes to work. I was alone in my office. That was the day I came back from Israel. ^{had for at least three weeks that} I felt war was coming any day and I was trying to organize a mass meeting of the leadership of the Jews of America, which was finally held on Sunday, June the 4th, one day before the war broke out. ^{up to that point the American Jewish leadership} ~~The Council of Federations~~ didn't want to believe

anything, ^{as} and they were slow like molasses. ^{I had had a terrible time, convincing them. I was in Israel from May 20 onward had gone to Athens to see Mr. Fisher had called me. Ginsberg in Cleveland was getting nowhere. Mr. Fisher came back to Tel Aviv with me. Think was probably correct.} ~~The chairman of the UJA and I had terrible fights with Mr. Fisher.~~ ^{I returned to U.S. and} I left him on a boat going through the Aegean, making a cruise through the Greek Islands with Mr. Henry Ford, ~~and another businessman~~

I was making telephone calls all over America trying to get people to come to this "emergency meeting" for which we needed two or three top leaders from every community in America. Four hundred people finally came. There was only one man sitting with me in my

That was coming and I guess would have to

R. 1/2

office that day, ^{Memorial Day} Albert Parker.

Q.

He volunteered?

A.

He volunteered. He's a rich lawyer from New York, a very interesting man. I said Albert, is there anybody you can call to get some money? I'm trying to get the Jews of America to start an emergency fund again? I have to tell you I started the business of emergency campaigns in 1955. Every time something happens, I try to get another emergency campaign, always with the same idea that the communities should not take any share out of it. We needed to have a declaration that there should be an emergency campaign, but the ^{important} ~~best~~ thing is not just to pass a resolution that we shall have an emergency campaign. The best thing is to have some ^{men ready to} guys give some good money to it, because that's better than just a resolution. He said, I'll call Annenberg. ~~I said, you know him? He said, sure I knew him.~~ To make a long story short, he's the one that got the million dollars from Annenberg and we announced it the following Sunday, June 4th, as I recall.

Q.

So he got it before the war started. That's very interesting. The emergency fund of the '73 war was after the beginning of the war. I was in Israel for both wars and I was in the army in '67. The danger, the emergency, our worry was before the war, when we said we don't attack and they get stronger and stronger and stronger every day.

R. 1/2

A.

This is why I was going crazy because I could not persuade Mr. Fisher or the Council of Federations or my own national chairmen, twelve men. I couldn't persuade them.

Q.

But how could you persuade Mr. Annenberg?

A.

Because Parker believed.

Q.

Parker could persuade Mr. Annenberg?

A.

Maybe Mr. Annenberg as a newspaper publisher was more sensitive, reading things coming over the wire; or maybe something touched him in his Jewish heart; or maybe he simply was a smarter man; or maybe he made a lot of money that year and he had some money to give away for taxes. I don't know what moved him. All I know was that he gave the only million dollar gift we had in the 1967 Emergency Fund Campaign from June until December.

Because of that fact, that in 1967 we didn't have any million dollar gifts ~~or by 1970 and 1971~~, my intuition told me we must begin to raise the level. And, thank God, because of what I started in '70 and '71, by the time we came to '73, ^{the concept of} a million dollar gift was already routine.

Q.

Does the UJA have million dollar gifts regularly?

R. 1/2

A.

Sure. I don't know how many they have now. ^{I'm not in touch with the details any longer.} Maybe they have six or eight. I don't know, ten?

Everything I did in the UJA, I did, as I told you, for the long range. I tried to create norms and standards and I tried to do it at a time when my instinct told me it was the right time to make a move. If I ^{had} ~~have~~ tried to make this move in 1968, I would have failed. But for 1968 I succeeded in keeping the emergency fund going. The Keren Hayesod, in Jerusalem, refused to vote on an emergency fund for 1968. The war was over and we won. Everybody was in euphoria.

I went to the Council of Federations' meeting in Cleveland, Ohio in September 1967 and made a speech in which I said we are going to be at war again before the summer. They thought that I was crazy and they were ready to tear me to pieces. I was mocked, scorned, attacked for being a sensationalist, trying to make a few extra dollars for the UJA. They said I was cheap, vulgar.

~~11/13/67~~

They asked me why I thought this and I based everything on Khartoum, because the declaration out of Khartoum on September 1st was no peace, no recognition, no negotiations. This was the declaration of the Arabs. I felt the situation was going to lead us to war again, without question. So I insisted that we keep an American emergency fund for 1968. The Jews won't give the same as they gave in 1967, ^{but} they still ^{would} give something if it ^{was} going into

R. 4/3 only

an emergency fund and Israel ^{was to} get it all. It ^{was} not divided in the community. I insisted that we must maintain it.

I was ridiculed at the public meetings in Cleveland. We came back to New York and the executive of the UJA had its meeting. I think it was in October. I absolutely insisted, demanded that we must have an emergency fund. This is what I call making a major policy decision and providing leadership in the organization. This is what I always tried to do. Many of the people said the UJA will look foolish and that in Jerusalem the Keren Hayesod was not going to do it. Why should we be holier than the Pope? In Jerusalem they're not calling for an emergency fund, but in New York we are.

~~R. 2/1~~

I said, I don't care what the Keren Hayesod does. ~~I didn't think much of their initiative or their leadership.~~ I felt we had a responsibility, that's all, so we did it. We made half of what was made the year before, but as I recall it, it was something ^{like an extra} ~~around~~ eighty or ninety million dollars.

Q.

Did anyone give you any kind of political guidance?

A.

None at all. I had my own intuition.

Q.

Do you think that the UJA should have political guidance?

A.

I do think so because some day the director or the chairman might not have such good intuition.

R. 2/1

Q.

You had contact with Harman, the Ambassador?

A.

All the time, the closest contact. I could always see him at five minutes notice. He would give me all the time I wanted. But when you talk about guidance I am always talking about vozmah, who takes the ^{ti} initiative to do something. There was never a situation where they took the initiative in Israel. I don't know why. Maybe because they felt they shouldn't try to tell the Americans what to do. I don't know what the reasons are. All I know, was when I wanted to consult with the Israelis they were always open to me, in Washington or Jerusalem. I never had the slightest trouble. I could always go immediately to the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister didn't come to me. When I say the Prime Minister, that's a symbol.

I remember a time when Eshkol ^{took the initiative.} ~~did it.~~ Before the Six Day War Eshkol sent me a telegram. I'll never forget it, I think it was the 20th of May. I was again sitting alone in my office on a Saturday night. The Consul-General in New York was Michael Arnon. He is now the director of ~~the~~ Bonds. He called me at home and said Eshkol sent you a coded telegram. He couldn't find you by telephone. You weren't home. He wanted to bring over the telegram. Eshkol said in code, we are having some problems and I think we will need some cash very quickly. Do you think you can get twenty of twenty-five million dollars together in one or two days? That

was the time he took the initiative. I said to Arnon I won't give him any answer. We'll go to Kennedy airport and I'll find a plane and go to Israel. I already had a feeling that this was war. I'm always sensitive about war. Warburg used to call me General Haganah. I said I feel something and I don't like it. It doesn't smell good. I'll tell you the whole story some other time, but what he wanted the money for was to buy some F-86 airplanes from Canada. The American Government would not ^{directly} sell any airplanes in 1967. ^{Israel's supplier} ~~It~~ All came from France. ^{But F-86's were being assembled in Canada under license. And America did agree that Israel could buy twenty four of these aircraft from the Canadian manufacturer.} You went to Israel then?

A.

That night. I'll tell you the whole story of what happened in those ten days and how I really failed, or thought I failed. Ultimately, I guess, I succeeded, but the first ten days it was like breaking teeth to convince the Jews of America that we were moving into a war. They didn't want to accept it. The first time the ^{Israeli} Cabinet had a meeting ^{around May 27} and they voted nine to nine not to go to war. All the people in America were saying to me, see, you are a warmonger, a sensationalist. There will be no war.

The ^{following} ~~next~~ week the vote in the Cabinet was sixteen to two. That was on a Sunday and the war started on Monday morning. The Government of Israel never published the names of the two men who voted against. I know who they are and so do you. Think back. Anyway Mr. Eshkol took some initiative ^{on May 20.} ~~that~~ night. But your

R. 2/1

question was did the UJA get political advice or guidance?

A.

The answer is no. I think the Government of Israel would give you an explanation that the reason they didn't do it was not to mix into the affairs of an American tax deductible organization.

Q.

And they still follow that course?

A.

I don't really know any more. I'm not there, but my guess is that it is the same thing

R. 6

A.

The crisis of 1961 was not an Israeli crisis, but an internal political crisis inside the UJA. For the first and only time in my whole experience with the UJA where there was an internal political power play. I suppose it's typical in big organizations. It was very interesting from a historical point of view because it was not simply a few men in the organization trying to take the authority away from others. That's normal. This began to develop into large ideological overtones and that was not normal. That's why I think it's worthwhile to include this as part of the whole history of the UJA.

Here's what happened. There were two men who were working in the organization, Melvin Goldstein and Irving Jacobs. These two were very close. Melvin Goldstein had been the advisor and

^{to Joseph Schwartz.}
secretary. He was expert in taking shorthand, so he was the ^{private} secretary to Joseph Schwartz from the time they were together in Lisbon in 1941, and he was his "amenuensis". Schwartz was never without him, twelve, sixteen hours a day. Goldstein was his shadow. Jacobs was an accountant working in the accounting department and he was the shadow of Goldstein. These two men felt psychologically that they were the UJA. When Schwartz left, they stayed with the feeling that they were protecting his inheritance. I came in, a new man and immediately there was a tug of war over who is going to be the boss. But I was the boss. They were very nice, but they made it clear to me that they knew much more about the organization and more about it's history than I did and without them I could not run the organization. The man who was the accountant knew everything of the figures inside, the ^{personnel} ~~personal~~ practices, who was hired, who was fired, salaries and all this. Without him he thought I could not function. Goldstein knew all the files of the organization because he was essentially a very, very highgrade clerk. He knew what was on every piece of paper. Such a man also thinks that without him, a new boss like me ^{could not} ~~can't~~ run the organization.

I liked them both and I appreciated them both and when I came in I saw that what they wanted was promotion. I gave them promotions and titles. I gave them promotions in money, partly because I thought they deserved it and partly to appease them and keep them quiet. You have to do that in a big organization.

Things were quiet for about five years. But all during this time these two men were attempting to find the opportunity to assert their authority over me and they found it. It was through an accident and they found the right moment.

There was a friend of mine whom I knew from Germany. He ^{had} was working with me in Rabbi Phillip Bernstein's office, ^{his name was} Major Abraham Hyman, ~~I think he was working for the Jewish Restitution Organization in New York.~~ I decided that I wanted to bring him over to the UJA because he was a very capable man. I knew his abilities. I had worked with him. I decided I was going to bring him in as an assistant for myself.

I ^{had} brought Hyman into the whole ^{Jewish} business in Germany. At the time of the Landsberg Trial in 1946, I found Hyman in the Adjutant General's Office. I was under instructions from General Clay to bring the best American Army lawyer to defend the Jewish D.P.'s in the trial in Landsberg. I went to the Adjutant General and I said, who is the best Jewish lawyer you have here. He said, I have a man by the name of Captain Hyman and he is in charge of reviewing from a legal point of view all court ^{material} materials where the soldier has been given a death sentence. Before we execute a soldier, we have the best lawyer in the army review the whole case. That's Hyman.

I said I want him. I have to take him down to Landsberg in Bavaria to defend these Jewish D.P.'s, by order of General Clay. The Adjutant General said okay, I accept General Clay's orders, but you have to convince Hyman, not me. I went to Hyman and I said I have to take you. He said oh, no, because I am ready to finish

R. 2/1

with the United States Army and go home. If you are going to drag me into this business, to start with these refugees, I won't get out of here for five years.

I will jump to the end of the story. Hyman finally left Germany in 1951. He had stayed there for five more years; he was right. He became the last one of the Advisors on Jewish affairs, after Bernstein and Judge Leventhal, after all of them. He finally closed up the office in 1951. Then when he came back to America he went to work for the Jewish Restitution Organization and I wanted to take him into the UJA. I got him in 1960-61. These two gentlemen, Goldstein and Jacobs, came in and said no, you may not take Hyman as your assistant. I said I don't believe what you are telling me. I cannot take whom I want for my assistant? I said I appreciated their advice, but I make the decisions, not ^{you.} them.

They then started a big political campaign, first with the chairman of the UJA, Morris ^{Bernstein} Bernstein. They won him over to their side. Number two was Mr. Warburg, the chairman of the JDC and they won him over to their side. The argument they used with him was that I was an irregular administrator. I didn't go according to the line. If I wanted to make ^{someone my} ~~an~~ assistant, I had to take one of them, not somebody from the outside. Or I ^{had} have to take a candidate whom they approved of, not somebody who ^{was} is unknown to them. Another thing they said to ^{Warburg} him was that I ^{was} am too much of a Zionist and I ^{was} am taking the UJA too much in the direction of Israel and the ^{JDC} Joint wouldn't like that. They brought up all the echoes of the old arguments between the Joint, humanitarian, non-Zionists, ^{and me} UJA, pro-Zionists.

Warburg accepted the argument. He came to me in all friendliness and said, listen my boy, you cannot run this thing without Goldstein and Jacobs and they don't approve of what you're doing. I said Eddie, you have to give me one simple answer, that's all, and then I will decide what to do. Do you think that this organization can be run by a troika, three people? He said that's the way it has to be. I said, fine, then you and I are on different sides, because it has nothing to do with me. It has to do with the general principle. An organization like this cannot be run by a committee of three people, ^{im} possible.

If I am too much of a Zionist for you, ~~too bad~~, get yourself another fellow. But whoever runs this ^{then} has to be one boss not three, otherwise you'll have anarchy. He said no, I don't agree, you have to have checks and balances on you. In the American system, we have three parts of the American government, the Executive, the Legislative and the Courts. Here we have three men, checks and balances on each other. I said no.

For almost one whole year the organization of the UJA began to split down the middle with some lay leaders taking the side of the JDC, and other lay leaders, without realizing it, began to take the side, not of Friedman, but the side of Israel. It's very interesting psychologically, how a small, internal administrative problem, which was nothing, expanded into a huge ideological problem and having to take sides.

I said this is terrible because I didn't want what happened in '41, to happen in '61. We were past those times. I explained

very carefully to all of the lay leaders that ^{I was} I'm not trying to hold onto this job, I couldn't care less. You people came and said you wanted me. Now I'm not going to threaten anything.

Goldstein and Jacobs had a threat. They were going to resign if they did not win this fight. I said I'm not going to resign if I don't win this fight, and I'm not going to threaten you. I will walk in and resign if I decide I want to resign. I'm going to fight to the end, but not to split the organization. I do not want my vote on the board of directors and I do not want my vote on the executive committee.

By this time the Israelis were in on the fight. They were nervous. They didn't want to have this Joint-Israeli split take place because the Malben was in ^{Israel heavily} here ~~heavy~~ and the Joint was spending eight or ten million dollars a year of ^{JIA} their money inside Israel. The Joint was spending a few million dollars for Shaul Avigur in ^{The} Russian business and the Rumanian business. Almost three quarters of the money of the Joint was coming into Israel or Israel-connected enterprises. That's why it was already a false argument by 1961.

Finally it came to a head. Josephthal was still alive and I think Dov Joseph was the treasurer of the Jewish Agency. The chairman of the Agency in '61 was Sharett. Nahum Goldmann was the president of the Zionist Organization. This argument went on all year. Finally, Dewey Stone, who was the chairman of the UJA or UPA, ^{number} whatever it was called in those days, the opposite ^{number} of the Joint, was a wonderful man. He's still alive but I think he is very sick, almost nearing the end. He didn't want to have a fight

closed

with Warburg, but he obviously knew that he had to support me. When it came down to the end -- I think it was in December 1961 at the time of the National Conference in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel -- there was a climatic meeting and Stone said to Warburg, listen Eddie, we're not going to split the UJA over this thing and that's all. Now Goldstein and Jacobs have to leave and we're backing Friedman. Goldstein and Jacobs have put in their letters of resignation, and I'm telling you that I accept them. We have the majority of the votes and that's all there is to it. In this partnership, the UJA is two thirds and the JDC is one third. I'm sorry, Eddie. I hope you won't walk away angry and I hope you won't split the UJA. I cannot let this thing continue, this arguing and fighting. We've decided to stop it, to finish it. Your friend, Mr. Rosenwald, who is also with the JDC, agrees with me that this is bad.

Q.

Rosenwald agreed with you?

A.

Yes, sir. He was a JDC man. That was his natural background, but he understood the principles of organization, that you cannot have three bosses. He understood that you either have to have confidence in your director or you fire him. He didn't want to break up the UJA and he simply said, as a businessman, my number one executive is more important to me than the number two or three or four executive. We cannot get another one to replace Friedman so easily, but we can get another bookkeeper. That's all, simple. I understand all the nuances, but the health of the organization is more important than

the personal ambitions of any two men.

Mr. Dewey Stone arranged a very, very lavish separation agreement for the two gentlemen and they walked away, I think, with so much money, hundreds of thousands. It was finished. Mr. Golstein went back to his friend, ^{Joe} Schwartz in the Bond organization and Mr. Jacobs went to work for the Yeshiva University as an accountant.

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~~R. 2/1~~
A.

Now we're talking about the crisis of 1967 which was before the Six Day War. In the middle of May, I began to worry about a feeling that I had. It was my own intuition which I always seem to have in regard to war in Israel. I felt that we were coming into the danger of war. I really felt it very keenly. I couldn't get anybody to agree with me, but I decided that I had to make my own preparations, to look through all of the books of the UJA to see where I could get money quickly in case something should happen quickly.

What I was looking for were those communities which owed a large amount of money to the UJA from previous pledges. We always had accounts receivable. ~~It was not a crisis, nothing unusual, but in the event of trouble, if I had to mobilize quickly, I wanted to know where to turn.~~ I did not want to entrust this job to anyone else, so I used to come to the office late at night, alone, go through all of the accounts receivable. I made up my own ~~private~~ little list of which communities owed us large amounts

R. 4/1

of money, which I thought we could get in a hurry. There were many communities that owed us a lot of money, but couldn't realize cash quickly. I don't care if the whole world falls in. It was a feeling of knowing where the money was and where we could get it, those two things.

On May 20th, a Saturday night, I was sitting in the office, all alone. You have to know what it is like in New York on a Saturday night in an office building on the 29th floor. The whole building is dark. Nobody's working on Saturday night, and you are in the middle of all these dark office buildings. I was in a terrible mood because I was getting more and more worried. I had to make up a list by now. I had in front of me about twenty-five million dollars. That was all I saw that I could put my hands on quickly and get within a matter of one or two days. I said, my God, that's not enough if we really have trouble.

Suddenly, into my dark office on a Saturday night, walked Michael Arnon, Consul-General of Israel in the State of New York. Later on he was the Secretary to the Cabinet, and now he's back as the Director of the Bond organization in New York. He walked in with a coded cable from Eshkol. He had already gone to my house to give it to me. My wife was very angry and said he's not home, he's in the office. So he came to the office.

The cable from Eshkol said very simply that he was worried about events in Israel and he was afraid of an outbreak of war. It was May the 20th. He wanted to know if I could mobilize twenty or twenty-five million dollars very quickly if necessary. It was like mental telepathy. Here I was working on this exact

R. 4/1

problem and he was over there worrying about the same thing. He even used the exact same amount of money that I had come up with.

I told Mike to give a coded answer that I'm coming over tomorrow. There was no sense trying to talk about this. An open telephone line was obviously no good, and coded cables back and forth take too long. I had a date with Sapir on the 22nd of May anyway to talk about the Keren Hachinuch, the Education Fund, which we had started a couple of years earlier in 1964. I was always calling Sapir about it and we had a tentative date which I was not going to keep because on May 22nd I was thinking about war, not about Keren Hachinuch. But now that Eshkol sent this cable I decided I would jump over tomorrow and derech agav, ^{would} ~~will~~ keep the date with Sapir.

I left the next day, the 21st, and I arrived on the 22nd. I walked into Eshkol's office which at that time was in Room 503 in the Dan Hotel. All the General Staff was in the Dan Hotel and all of his closest advisors were there. They were living in a few rooms. He wanted to get away from the Kiryah and the whole routine business of the government. That same day was the day Nasser announced the closing of the Straits of Tiran.

When I walked into Eshkol's office I asked him why did you send the cable? What gave you the feeling that you are having to go to war? In America nobody accepts it when I say so and here in Israel nobody accepts it when you say so, because nobody accepted it when Eshkol began to warn about it. He said, I'll tell you one story that convinced me. ^{Army Chief Chaplain} Goren came to me with a

R. 4/1

request for dedicating a piece of land in Ramat Gan for a cemetery. According to the estimate of the army, they wanted to have a piece of land for a cemetery, big enough for forty thousand graves. Forty thousand, because the army was thinking that, if there ^{were} ~~will~~ be a war, there ^{would} ~~will~~ be mass bombing of the big cities. When Goren came in, two days ago, ^{Eshkol said that} is when I sent you the cable. He shocked me because he put into words what I was thinking myself. That's how my mind was working. Now, today, Nasser closed Tiran, so we know this and we are going to make a full mobilization.

Rabin was in Room 504, and just put his head in the door all the time, saying what do you want, what shall I do and taking orders from Eshkol. I said I agree ^{with him} ~~with you~~, but now I ^{would} ~~have~~ to convince my people in America. The campaign for 1967 is finished. It's almost June. We have to organize an Emergency War Fund Campaign and I know that I'm not going to be able to convince them easily. I want to go down to the Sinai border for two, three days, myself. He called in Rabin and the latter wrote some notes. But I said, when I have finished making my own investigation, and I am no big military expert, then I must go back to America and say I was at the borders of the Sinai. I saw the preparations of the Egyptians.

To cut a long story short, I went down there and spent ~~two~~ ^{two} three days. I went to Nitzana and across ^{the line} from that point. I was with ^{a colonel} ~~some~~ ~~guy~~ who was the commander of the artillery and I saw across the line, over the green line into the Sinai. With binoculars I saw long lines of Egyptian tanks standing there.

R. 4/1

I saw the mobilization, the boys sitting by the tanks in full preparedness (~~Konfront~~). I traveled hundreds of kilometers, as far as we could go, up, ^{and down the line,} vis-a-vis, the Egyptians.

I came back to Tel Aviv and said to Eshkol, I now have enough knowledge to talk with authority. Give me a telephone line. Jacob Herzog, I think, arranged it very quickly. I got a good connection right in Eshkol's room. He was sitting on the couch eating ^{Yangerines} a ~~mandarine~~ and sometimes sleeping. In the next room were the army boys and also some of the advisors. Everybody was nervous and tired. I started to call the national chairman of the UJA to get support for the idea that we must call a national emergency meeting in New York city, call all the communities together and declare a national war fund, an emergency fund. By this time Eshkol was not talking twenty-five million dollars. He and I were trying to make an accounting. It was so silly, now that I look back at it, almost a joke. Jacob Arnon, the Director of the Treasury, was there and we were trying to talk about figures. How much is this war going to cost, depending on how many days it'll go on? It was something really bizarre. We came up with another figure, sixty-five million dollars. So I said we have to have a fund for one hundred million dollars.

How little we knew about what war really costs. We didn't know. I got no response from the leaders of the UJA in America. They said I was crazy, hysterical, making propaganda. They said there will not be a war. All the facts I gave them didn't convince them.

R. 4/1

Q.


All of them?

A.

Almost all of them, everyone I spoke to. The chairman of the UJA was Max Fisher. He was not in the United States but in Athens. After I finished all these telephone calls, I got on a plane and went to Athens that after noon. Fisher was in the Hilton Hotel with a friend by the name of Nate Cummings, a fantastically wealthy man, hundreds of millions of dollars. He was the chairman of the corporation called Consolidated Foods which owns all different kinds of food industries.

Nate Cummings had not given any money to Israel for fifteen years because of some argument. He got angry once in the past and nobody knew why. I was nervous and tense. I came into Fisher's room and said, look, Max, Israel is going into a war and we, the UJA, have to galvanize and mobilize the American Jews. If we don't do it, we miss our historic duty. He said, you are ^{exasperating and overwrought.} ~~crazy~~. I said, no, I'm not. You're the chairman. I am the executive vice chairman. You and I have to make this decision. I've made it. I'm begging you to come back to Tel Aviv with me this afternoon and see Eshkol. You must become convinced as I am convinced.

He said no, it's impossible, I'm here with my friend Cummings and I'm waiting until tomorrow for my friend, Henry Ford. He is coming from Rome and we are going on a cruise of the Islands in the Aegean. It's a vacation. My wife is in Rome with Mr. Ford and his wife and the three of them are coming tomorrow, so I'm not going to



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Tel Aviv. I had a terrible argument with him. I said Max, you have a duty, a responsibility, and I pleaded and begged. I told him how it ^{would} ~~will~~ look if Israel ^{got} gets into a war and the Jews of America ^{were} ~~are~~ not warned or prepared by us, and we failed. ^{I urged him to remember the time} ~~You are a~~ public man with a public responsibility, ~~you can't do it.~~

This other fellow, Mr. Cummings, was walking around in a bathrobe during this whole discussion and he wanted to know what ^{it was} ~~this is~~ all about. I said listen, I don't know who you are, but do me a favor and stay out of this argument. Probably nobody had ever talked to him like this in his life. I said if you want to know what this is all about, this is about a war, Jewish fate, the State of Israel, possibly getting hurt or defeated, the Jews of America trying to help. We're talking about the most serious things in the world, war and peace, life and death. If you want to get into it, get into it, but then you have to be constructive and tell your friend Fisher that I need a few hours from him. I'll take him over to Tel Aviv, let him talk to Eshkol for an hour and we'll bring him back. By this time it was late at night.

Q.

Did Cummings reply?

A.

No, nothing. He said I just don't know anything about this so I will keep listening, but I will not get into the argument. You are right. I will stay on the side.

That day, I think it was either 24th or 25th of May, there was a revolution in Greece and the colonels took over the government.

I was in the Hilton Hotel and I wanted to make a long telephone call to the vice chairman of the UJA, Mr. Edward Ginsberg, to report to him that I was not succeeding with Mr. Fisher and that we are going to come into a crisis.

My plan was, that if I could not persuade Fisher, then I was going to resign, call a press conference and announce why I resigned - because there is a default of leadership in the UJA. As long as I stay on the job, I cannot overrule the chairman, but when I am out of the job I can do what I want. I am a free man and I will call a press conference in New York and will accuse the leadership of the UJA of defaulting on their duty. I will call on the Jews of America myself to come to a national conference and they will come.

That same day was the 50th birthday of Edward Ginsberg and he was having a birthday party in the Jewish country club in Cleveland, and I was in Athens, and the Colonels took over the country. They closed down the post office and the telephone lines. There were five national chairmen present at Ginsberg's birthday party so I can get the vote of six people.

Q.

How many national chairmen were there?

A.

Twelve, which means if I have fifty percent, I have them all, because the other fifty percent are not going to argue. I spent all night trying to make contact.

Q.

Could they overrule Fisher?

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A.

Sure, the UJA doesn't have a strict parliamentary organization which goes by vote. It never happened in my whole experience. Never was a decision taken by a vote of eight to four or seven to three, it's a consensus

Q.

A typical American organization? Many of the leading American organizations have a consensus. The consensus even became more important than the subject discussed.

A.

No, that's not true. The UJA was not consensus.

Q.

But the UJA, but other organizations.

A.

Not consensus per se, but consensus in order to try to keep a good working team together.

Q.

The Jewish Labor Committee, the American Jewish Committee, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, many times preferred a consensus and really stopped discussing a new policy.

A.

No, not with us.

Q.

You agree?

A.

I think I agree with you. I'm not too familiar with their

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~~internal workings, but I think generally you probably are right, because they were fighting about policy questions.~~

We never had policy questions to argue. Our arguments always were on technical questions. Shall we call a special conference on ~~June 2nd?~~ ^{at certain date - June 2, 3, or 4?} No, not June 2nd. If two or three of the fellows said, we don't believe there's going to be a war and we ~~didn't want~~ want to call a national conference. We will look stupid and we cannot make a second campaign in the middle of the year.

I spent all night trying to get that telephone call through and I finally got it. The Greek censor didn't understand and he didn't want to listen. He had troops shooting and tanks taking over the radio station. It was crazy. Finally, they gave permission for the call and I spoke for over an hour on the phone to Ginsberg and to all the national chairmen at this birthday party. I told them I was going to try once more in the morning with Fisher to get him over to Tel Aviv. If I could succeed, I was coming back to America in a few days and they would have to start now, to help organize a big national meeting. If I didn't succeed with Fisher, I would be back with them on the phone tomorrow from Tel Aviv and I was coming home to make this resignation and public statement.

We slept for three or three hours, not much more and then we were up again. Fisher and I started to argue again about this. Finally he said okay, I will go to Tel Aviv with you. And I told him that I thought that was really what a leader should do and that I would try to explain to his wife and to Henry Ford,

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whom I knew. We are friends by accident because we went to Yale college together and our names, Ford and Friedman, were together, we sat together in class, just b'mikreh. So I knew him pretty well. To this day we are friends.

I said I would go to the ^{Athens} airport with Fisher and we would wait for them to come from Rome and I would explain to his wife and to Henry that I had to take ^{him} you away and they should go to a hotel and wait. When we are finished in Tel Aviv, we will come back. He agreed. By this time, Cummings said to him Max, you should go. We will take care of everything. We will hire the cook and the band and the other things for the yacht. We have work to do for a day and we will wait for you.

I spoke to Margorie Fisher. Henry ^{frid} asked what's the matter? I said there's going to be a war. He said, you know, you're probably right. I can feel something, and I don't know whether we should be going on such a cruise now, at this time, but we are here and he continued with it. They were very nice. Max was very relieved when he saw it was no problem with his friends and with his wife. We went to Tel Aviv, to room 503 and we stayed there all afternoon and all through the night. By this time, Fisher was already beginning to be in it.

Q.

They convinced him?

A.

Yes, he could sense the atmosphere and feel what was going on in the room. He never left that room. I told him again, long stories

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about what I saw in the Sinai. I forgot to tell you one whole part of the business with Sapir and Abba Eban. Eban and I were friends. That week he went to France, England and America. He got nothing.

He saw de Gaulle first and de Gaulle told him, if you fight you lose France. He told that to Sapir and Sapir told it to me. Eban went to England for a few hours and Wilson told him, what can I do? England has no power. So he left and went to America. He got a very interesting reaction from Johnson, which was that the American government really wanted to help, and the way to help was to try to get some other maritime powers to agree to make a convoy and break up the Tiran blockade.

Eban ^{replied} ~~was telling us this on the telephone.~~ He said that Johnson ^{had} asked him for three weeks to make a survey of all the ~~great~~ ^{naval} navy powers of the world, ^{to see who would} ~~those that don't agree with the~~ ^{to join in breaking the} blockade of ^{Tiran} ~~any~~ straits, or gulf because if this can be done against Israel it can be done against anybody. Eban said to ^{Johnson that he couldn't} ~~this, I don't~~ ^{give him} ~~think we have three days and~~ ^{let alone three weeks,} came back to Israel. I told all this to Fisher and Fisher caught the atmosphere.

We agreed on a plan. Fisher would go back to Athens the next morning and go on his cruise. I would go back to the States and with his approval we would phone everybody and call the nation to a special meeting for a special emergency war campaign. We didn't sleep the whole night. He was very tired and he fell asleep and Eshkol fell asleep.

By this time one vote had already passed in the government

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not to go to war, nine to nine. Of course, it was the first vote. That was the day we left. I think it was Sunday, which had to be the 28th. We left Israel on the same plane. He dropped off in Athens and I went on to New York. Those were the days from May 20th, when Mike Arnon first walked into my office until May 28th when I came back to my office. That was a holiday week-end in America, Memorial Day in memory of all soldiers killed in all the wars. ~~Nobody's working.~~

I got Joe Schwartz from the Bonds, Phil Bernstein from the Council of Federations and Eddie Ginsberg who ^{was at that moment} ~~became~~ the Acting Chairman of the UJA, ~~not the Deputy Chairman~~ because Fisher was on a boat in the Aegean. We made the decision and we pushed all of the buttons. We lit up every community in the country and there was a great national conference on Sunday, June 4th.

By that time there was a vote in the government, sixteen to two, to go to war. Everybody was saying, after Eshkol made that radio speech, ^{when} how he was stuttering and stammering, ^{that} and he was no good, that he was too weak. Eshkol was a very strong man, from my point of view, because he understood before anybody that ^{Israel} ~~we~~ ^{was} are going to war.

Q.

We were told in the army on a Friday, I think May 26th.

A.

The government vote on Sunday, May 28th, was nine to nine, full mobilization. Sunday, June 4th there was a great meeting in New York, the best top leadership, no arguments. Everybody simply

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said, what's the assignment, how much, what do we have to do? We will help. At that time we ^{were told that} had a delegation of Pincus and Sapir and Laskov appointed by the army, the Jewish Agency and the government, ^{was} coming to help. This was the delegation of three people that was going to make a blitz through the United States, as many cities as possible, every day. Nobody knew the war would come the next day, Monday June 5th.

Sunday, the 4th, we know that the army had been mobilized for two weeks already, all civilian industries were at a standstill. The American effort had produced only one country, Holland, which agreed to join a naval convoy. There was no way out. Egypt was fully mobilized. We met before the cabinet. There was seven hours time difference. By early afternoon, the vote in New York was okay. We had a national campaign beginning immediately, tomorrow. Six, seven hours later, the word came about the cabinet vote. And still, to tell you the truth, even I was surprised. When the cabinet was finished, it was midnight, Sunday in New York. I didn't hear about the attack, only about the vote.

Q.

You did hear about the vote?

A.

I heard about the vote. Why are you surprised at that, was it a secret?

Q.

A top secret. You were all surprised. It could kill the whole operation?

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A.

After the cabinet vote, I still did not think ~~it~~^{war} would come the next morning. I was as surprised as everybody else, because I thought we still had a few days to work.

I got a telephone call in the middle of the night from Pincus. He was sleeping in the Essex House Hotel, fifty yards from where I lived. He called and said, I just got word that war started. Where is Sapir? I said Sapir is in the air on the way down to Buenos Aires. He said, where is Laskov? I said he is in the air between Chicago and Miami. He said, you have to get word to them both. I said I will, but let's get together. In fifteen minutes I was up and dressed and we were talking at ~~one~~^{three} o'clock in the morning, drinking coffee, trying to figure out how to make the plan work for the following few days. I certainly didn't expect war immediately.

A few hours later we reached Sapir. He was already in Buenos Aires and said he was going to continue with his mission because there ~~is~~^{was} nothing he ~~can~~^{could} do if he ~~goes~~^{went} back to Israel and the most important thing for him ~~is~~^{was} to try to get some money. Laskov said the reverse, that he ~~feels~~^{felt} he had to go back, as a General. It ~~is~~^{was} not so important for him to ~~get~~^{concentrate on} money. He ~~has~~ to help in the fighting. That afternoon we got him a plane from Miami to London and Tel Aviv.

Pincus decided to stay and so he and Sapir continued to go from city to city. I was with them. Never mind that whole story, we can tell it some other time, but the important thing was the

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beginning. Fisher stayed on the boat, I think for the whole five days, six days of the war. He telephoned. He got a phone call through from the boat that he hoped we ^{new} are doing well and he encouraged us and ^{would} will be coming home as soon as he can. He hoped Ginsberg ^{was} is doing a good job. Nate Cummings ^{wanted} wants to give a hundred thousand dollars and Henry Ford ^{also} wants to give a hundred thousand dollars. They were listening on the boat radio to what was happening every day of the war.

The UJA headquarters was turned into a war room. It was a fantastic thing. I'm sorry we don't have a photograph to describe the teletype machines and the telegraph machines and the open telephone line, a big fantastic switchboard built into the room of the board of directors. I was sitting at my desk wearing the canvas Australian hat, with the big 'ZAHAL' on the top. I brought it home with me.

Men were flying in from all over the country asking for assignments -- what do we do, where do we go, who do we see? The telephone company brought in fifty telephones to the big room of the board of directors in a matter of two, three hours. We had twenty-five lines on the switchboard, but we brought in fifty extra trunk lines. Every man could have a straight line out, without having to go through the switchboard.

One of the men on my staff was sitting next to each ^{lay leader,} ~~my,~~ giving him names of people to call. They said, I'm calling from the UJA headquarters in New York. The following is the latest report we got today from Tel Aviv. Now I want from you a hundred

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thousand dollars, yes or no, fast, I have a lot of people to call. It went like this, like a machine.

Q.

Did you receive negative answers?

A.

Sure, when you are dealing in such a volume, thousands and thousands of people, you got some people who ^{said} say I'm not going to give you any money. I'm not in agreement with this. Israel is the aggressor. Israel could have started World War III. I don't agree with it, forget it and he hangs up. You ^{had} have such cases. You ^{had} have other cases of people who ^{said} say we just finished the 1967 campaign. I gave fifty thousand dollars and I haven't got ~~it~~ ^{any more} to give anymore. So the fellow on the phone ^{argued} is arguing with them, but if he really ^{saw} sees there ^{was} is nothing doing, he ^{had} has to stop because he must go on to the next man.

The more common thing was the number of stories of people who went ^{completely} overboard; ^{at} a meeting held in a synagogue or in a community center the Jews ^{were} are gathered together and the black man who ^{was} is the janitor of the building ^{said} says I want to give my ten dollars, and the man who ^{was} is outside cutting the lawn ^{was} wanted to give his ten dollars. There were non-Jews, Jews, poor Jews for whom the regular campaign was never organized. The UJA was never a mass campaign reaching down to the last Jew, but in the war this Jew who was never asked by the UJA or the Federation, came forward and brought his ten dollars, twenty dollars and his hundred dollars. Bar mitzvah boys bringing in all of their money or going out to try to sell the presents to ~~get~~ money; the book, the fountain pen, the

~~R-471~~

violin and the shirts.

~~R-572~~

A.

No book has been written with all of these human interest stories, but I have a journal in my archives of as many as we could remember of this time. Everyone knows, in general, how the Jews responded, but these little episodes in particular -- the woman who brings in her ring -- literally happened. In every city the Federation had a big table in the lobby of its office building, community center or synagogue. This was no regular event. This was everything happening, people volunteering. The UJA and the Federations did not conduct a campaign in the war of 1967 in the normal sense of the word. The Jews gave money, the Federations and the UJA took the money and gave some little help. We kept them up-to-date with what was happening in Israel. We sent speakers to them very quickly. Lots of people came running over from Israel. Even when the war was finished, the campaign for the money wasn't over in six days. It went on all the month of June right up to the beginning of July. I would say the campaign took four, five weeks to finish. During that time, we provided them with speakers, generals who came from Israel. I made audio-visual tapes. So it's not fair to say we didn't do anything, but basically, the Jews did it themselves by their own initiative and by their own feeling of excitement.

I think that the human interest stories are a very good footnote to the whole thing; people who brought personal possessions

to cash in; people who went to the bank to take a mortgage on the house to get money. All this is true, it all happened. People who just bought a new automobile took it back to the dealer and said, give me some money back for the car, I don't want the car. He said, but it's a used car. Fine, I will lose something on it but give me back the most you can give me. I want to give the money to Israel. Hundreds and hundreds of stories like this, which showed the high degree of commitment and identification of the Jews, and the non-Jews in America.

That's the story of how we got into the '67 ~~xxxx~~ war. I think it is a whole chapter by itself. ~~It begins with Monday, June 5th, and again, b'mikrah, by accident the New York City campaign is~~ ^{whose campaign calendar is always later than other cities,} ~~always later.~~ New York City had a meeting scheduled many months before ^{the} Monday, June 5th, one of a normal series of meetings in their calendar held in the Waldorf Astoria, a luncheon meeting. Businessmen coming in very quickly. The whole meeting ^{was} is supposed to last one, ^{or} one and a half hours so they can ^{go} back to work. The meeting was scheduled and people had been invited weeks and weeks earlier. We had the room reserved. It was one of those incredible things. The war started that day and that meeting turned into the first war campaign meeting and I think we did something like fifteen million dollars of new money in a matter of an hour.

I spoke for ten minutes, Pincus spoke five minutes, the chairman of the New York City campaign, Jack Weiler, spoke five minutes and the people started standing up all over the room jumping, waving their arms and yelling. You couldn't hear. The hardest thing was

to keep only one voice talking, so you could mark everything down, because some guy's yelling twenty thousand and another guy's yelling fifty thousand and he doesn't give his name. The secretaries ~~are~~^{were} going crazy, because they want to know the name. Three and four people were yelling at one time. It was pandemonium, but I don't think we missed anything. We had a lot of secretaries working so I think we caught everything.

We went on airplanes and had meetings with Jews at five o'clock in the morning at some airport. We always tried to have meetings at the airport, to bring the Jews who should come to the airport. Then we could stay an hour and go to the next city. We ran those whole six days. We didn't sleep.

That's the end of the '67 story.

April 27, 1976

A.

As to your question about the big givers and who has influence on them, the local Federation or the National UJA, it is always a combination of both things. I think from an historical point of view you have to say that at the beginning, when the number of big givers was very small, the relationship was all between the UJA and the big givers. The UJA developed the big givers, cultivated them, kept in touch with them, influenced them, inspired them and solicited their gifts.

Q.

Directly?

A.

Directly. When I first came into the UJA, we had 400 big givers, each giving ~~about~~ ^{and more,} \$10,000 [^] in the whole United States of America, including New York. I knew each one of those 400 people personally, and all the lay leaders of the National UJA also knew them. They were all connected with the national organization and influenced by the national organization. Very few people in the local communities could get a gift of \$10,000 or above.

As the thing grew, developed and expanded, and the local Federation became stronger and the professional executive directors learned their business better, pretty soon the local influence on the big givers began to be at least equal to the National UJA influence. Today, I think the formula is reversed. Now you have maybe 10 or 15,000 people ^{not 400} who are giving ^{above} ~~about~~ \$10,000, ~~not 400,~~

Here, the influence is always from the local side, because the National leadership can't reach 10,000 or 15,000 people. They can reach one or two or three thousand, so I think that the situation is reversed. I think the major influence on most of the big givers is probably from the local Federation.

I'll make only one reservation. The influence of the UJA is still the more important of the two at the very top. When you talk about gifts of \$100,000 and up, then I would have to say that the influence of the national UJA today is probably still the strongest. The higher up you go in the amount, the more you need the national organization to work on the man. He must relate to some National or even International program, like a mission to Israel and this has the major influence on him.

Q.

How is the money divided? Let's say a man gives \$100,000 to the UJA.

A.

Nobody ever gives a dime to the UJA.

Q.

To the Federation?

A.

Always. New York City is the only place where the money is given directly to the New York UJA and two years ago the New York UJA made a merger with the local Federation. No money comes directly to the UJA.

You have asked me about ^{who} influences the big giver. As far as the question about relationships between New York and National, this is

always a question of great tension, always was and I suppose it still is. The national UJA creates programs and tries to get local communities to take them. New York is another local community. New York says to the National okay, we think we can take this program. It may be a film, a speaker, an idea for a cash conference or whatever the National is suggesting.

But sometimes New York says, look we are an exception, not like Dallas or Atlanta and what you are suggesting won't work. Then big tension develops, because New York says no and National says, if you won't do this in New York how can we persuade them to do it in Philadelphia? You must help us to serve as a model for other places. There is always tension back and forth.

Secondly, there is a question of the independence of New Yorkers. New Yorkers have a very big ego. That is a very important psychological fact. New York is the center of the nation, ~~not~~ ~~Washington~~ and New Yorkers think that they know everything better than anybody else. Even though the National office is located in New York City, it doesn't consist of New Yorkers. On the Board of the National UJA are people from all over the country. To New Yorkers they are provincials and who are these provincial people to tell us what to do. It was always a serious problem.

Q.

From the beginning it was a problem in spite of the merger between the Federation and the UJA?

A.

That doesn't make any difference. It probably even makes it worse, makes the tensions even more difficult. The New York UJA has a split

personality. It wants to help the National UJA because New York UJA is all for Israel. On the other hand, it doesn't want to be pushed around by the National UJA, because it knows better. I would say that on the whole, the relations are basically very good, but not easy.

Whenever some big thing comes along, like making the first loan from the insurance companies or from the banks, National UJA has to get the New York UJA to help, because the provincial people on the National UJA have connections with their banks in their own cities, but the banks of America are all concentrated in New York. You need New Yorkers to go to the New York banks to begin the whole operation. Then the bank in New York tells the bank in Cleveland to do something or tells the bank in Los Angeles to do something. You always have to start with the New York banks. The New York UJA always cooperates with the National UJA.

I am giving you one example where there is no tension, when the New York UJA realizes that out of "Noblesse Oblige," it must do something because it can do it better than anybody else. I gave you another example where the New York UJA said, leave us alone. We know better than you do about what to do. So in answer to your question about the relations between New York and National, they are normal relations of love and hate, sometimes good and sometimes bad.

Q.

They were not the same relations you had with Cleveland, Detroit or the other Federations? Was there a difference because of the

bigness of New York and the special influence of New York?

A.

I would say that the one basic difference was that the National UJA always said to the New York UJA, you should understand better than anybody, because you are here in New York, because you are not a Federation, because you don't have to worry about local problems and you don't have to appease anybody who is anti-Zionist. You have no anti-Zionists, ~~in the New York UJA~~. National used to say to New York, please take the lead, take the biggest quota, say you will send the most people on a mission. But they never sent anybody on a mission. Sometimes they would take the biggest quota but they wouldn't put anybody on the mission, because they wanted to make their own mission. Sometimes you have cooperation, sometimes you don't. The National UJA could never believe that it had the New York UJA in its pocket. It was a separate, independent organization which would very often refuse to take any suggestions from the National.

Q.

Most of the general chairmen were not New Yorkers?

A.

No, because the UJA tried very hard to give a national look to the UJA.

Q.

You did it intentionally?

A.

Sure.

Q.

Not a single New York general chairman of the UJA?

A.
Yes - Morgan from Warburg, Rosenwald - but we tried
~~You~~ try to avoid a New Yorker as a general chairman if ^{we could} you can find
somebody else outside. The only people picked from New York were
~~Warburg and Rosenwald~~, because they were from the aristocracy. But
when you got down to the ordinary "Rabinovich" and if you have a
Rabinovich from New York or a Rabinovich from Cleveland, you take
somebody from Cleveland rather than New York, because the rest of
the country has an antagonism against New York.

I don't have to tell you, you can see it now, in the bankruptcy
of New York. The whole nation couldn't care less if New York goes
bankrupt. The whole nation hates New York. It was always this way.
In order to have good relations with the rest of the nation it is
better for the UJA if a chairman is from Baltimore, Cleveland or
Detroit. We talked about having chairmen from Los Angeles, even
though it was so hard because of the distance. The principle was:
have somebody from outside.

You asked some questions about relationships between the UJA
and Federation directors. Those relations were always very, very
difficult. It was a question of persuasion. The UJA couldn't
give any orders to the Federation directors, but could only persuade
them. A huge amount of the time of the National staff of the UJA
and lay leaders of the UJA was spent trying to convince local
Federation directors to go along with a certain program or a certain
policy.

We used to call meetings of the executive directors, ~~at our~~ expense. We sometimes tried to bring them all together from the whole country or sometimes we would make four regional meetings. We would go to them and explain that we wanted to do some program -- ^{for example,} we are bringing over Mr. Levi Eshkol and we want him to have four big meetings around the country and we want you men to cooperate. We tried to bring them in as partners. They were not employees. We couldn't order them. We tried to make them equal partners in the planning and this was a psychological process of trying to keep good relations with them.

Sometimes they would refuse. ^{for example} when I was going to start the Young Leadership movement, ^(in 1962) I wrote a letter to all the executive directors, explaining what I wanted to do. I asked them if they had any names of candidates to suggest. I checked in ^{my} the files the other day. Almost every executive director in the country wrote me a letter, told me it was a terrible idea and they refused to ^{do it} ~~do it~~. ^{to do it} So I did it without them and now every executive director in the country will tell you how wonderful the Young Leadership program is, because it ^{gives} ~~gave~~ him all this ^{man} power to work with.

Q.

Henry Montor told me that in his time he tried to organize ⁱⁿ the big cities UJA committees outside the Federation. Did you do it?

A.

No.

Q.

It was not done later?

A.

No. I never tried it either. He talked about it and thought about it, and he really wanted to do it. He wanted to break the UJA away from the Federation, because he did not like the Federation as his partner. He didn't want to share money with them and he didn't believe that they were Zionist enough. He used to make a bluff all the time, that he was going to form a committee and run a separate UJA campaign, apart from the Federation. That means a fight, ~~because of the same Askanim.~~ If you go to ^{by leader} Mr. X and he's working for the Federation, and you tell him you want him to work only for the UJA campaign committee, he says no, I'm not going to work twice. I don't agree we should have two campaigns ^{in our city.} This was a dream of Montor, but he never really did it.

Q.

How did you deal with the problem? You always had a fight with the directors?

A.

As I told you, the relations were very, very difficult. There was fighting all the time. We tried to persuade them and sometimes we couldn't. Then we would get into a fight.

Then your next question was what's the relationship between the UJA lay leaders and the Federation lay leaders. You can't generalize. It is a very big subject and we don't have time, so I am making generalizations for you now, but I don't like to. Every generalization has to be broken down.

On the matter of the UJA leaders and Federation leaders I would say probably there was also arguing. The National UJA staff ^{would be} ~~is~~ trying to persuade the local Federation director to do something. They have trouble. What does a UJA staff man do -- a regional director, an area director, city director, what does he do? He calls his UJA lay leader. He might say I'm having trouble with this executive director. I have orders to try to get a big cash conference going in June and I am supposed to try to persuade Chicago to send 50 people to this cash conference. Chicago has 5 million dollars outstanding. They must get to work on their cash collections, so we want their people to come to this conference to get all the inspiration, the instructions to go back and collect the cash. The director in Chicago doesn't want to do it. He said to leave him alone. He didn't finish his campaign yet and he cannot bother about sending some people to a National conference in Atlantic City. What shall I do?

The UJA staff man calls a UJA lay leader and says, do me a favor. I'm not getting anywhere with the executive director. You call up the President of the Federation, lay leader to lay leader, and explain to him what we are trying to do. Put the pressure on. Tell him that his executive director is not cooperating. Tell him to interfere, to do the best he can.

Yes, you went behind his back. You ^{tried} ~~try~~ to get one lay leader to ^{work on} ~~fight with~~ another lay leader. You fought with a professional as a professional and you didn't get anywhere. ^{Next} ~~Now~~ you send ¹ one lay leader of yours, against one lay leader of his. So the relations

also were not always the best, although lay leaders didn't get into such bitter fights as the professionals did, because it is not ~~his~~^{their} bread and butter. ~~He doesn't take it with the same kind if Hitlahavuth, and he is not so committed.~~

National UJA lay leaders fought and argued and intervened with Federation lay leaders and the relationship between them was better than professionals when they would get into a fight, but the relationship was still one of pressure. That is the best word to describe the relationship. UJA lay leaders were always pressuring Federation lay leaders.

You asked about the relationship between the UJA and the Council of Federations. The Council of Federations, in my judgment, always was a weak organization. It could not control its own members and didn't try to. From the philosophical point of view, it didn't need to or believe it should control or direct or give instructions. The Council of Federations only thought of itself as a clearing house, as a service and fact finding agency. The Council of Federations would say to the local executive director: we don't know. If you're fighting with the UJA about how to divide the campaign, what percentage and you are asking ~~me~~^{us} for advice, we will tell you what the figures are, how the money is divided in Cleveland, Boston or Denver, but you decide yourself what you want to do. The UJA used to try to get the Council on its side but never could succeed 100%.

Q.

You sometimes succeeded in emergencies?

A.

Very rarely. I would call up ^{the Council of Federations director} and say, I am having ^a terrible trouble

with the director in Los Angeles on whatever the issue is. Can you help me? He would ask, what do you want me to do? I said I want you to call him up and give him hell, or I want you to call him up and tell him ~~to~~ please ^{to} cooperate with me. I want you to call him and explain to him why it is so important because he is not listening to me anymore. Maybe he will listen to you. ^{The Council man} ~~he~~ would say: I can't tell him what to do. I'll call him and try to find out what is bothering him. I said I know what is bothering him. I'm pressing him, that's what's bothering him. Don't act like a social worker. He would say, well, I don't know.

I am answering your question; would he ever intervene? Very rarely. And therefore the relationship between the UJA and the Council was always full of struggle. I fought with the Council for a long time in the early years over the question of dividing the money and I also fought with them on the question of what the priorities are, in the local communities.

I said, you are taking away too much money for local needs in the local community. You don't need these large community centers and you certainly don't need these Jewish hospitals. They are not Jewish anymore and the government pays for hospitals anyway so you don't need to take so much money. I fought with them for a long time, maybe five, six, seven years. Fisher tried to get me to reduce my fighting with them and to be more diplomatic, so for a few years I was more diplomatic.

Q.

Toward the Council or the Federation?

A.

To the Council of Federations. I tried to develop joint projects with them. Before the National UJA would make a decision about a quota for next year, ^{for example, I would suggest we} ~~lets~~ have a joint meeting with the Council of Federations and discuss with them what the quota should be next year. In order to do that, sometimes I would be a good politician and I would say to the Council, why don't you invite Dr. Dov Joseph to come to the Council meeting, not to UJA meeting, or invite the treasurer of the Jewish Agency to come to a council meeting to explain why Israel needs, or why the UJA needs so much money.

What I tried to get from the Council ^{was} ~~is~~ one of two things: one was a haskama (approval). ~~If~~ the UJA next year ~~you want~~ to raise the quota ~~to \$50 million~~, so in every community there ~~will~~ ^{would} be pressure to raise more money, more pressure to take something away from the local, ^{we would ask the Council to agree} ~~We~~ agree. Very seldom would they do that, so the ^{second} ~~best~~ thing I ^{would try to} ~~could~~ get from them was that ^{they} ~~we~~ don't disagree, i.e. ^{that Dov} ~~we~~ won't fight ^{against us.} ~~with you.~~

Q.

But then you had to have a fight between the UJA and the ^{local} Federation? It would depend on the federation director or the Federation Lay Leader or the president to get them to change the quota.

A.

That's the picture more or less. Either ^{we would} ~~to~~ try to get approval (haskama chiyuvit) from ^{the Council} ~~them~~, or if you couldn't get that, to get ^{at least} what I call a hunting license, so that ^{we} ~~I~~ could go to the local community and hunt for ^{my} ~~my~~ money without their fighting.

Q.

They wouldn't take them in their fight?

A.

No. They believed that the Council of Federations would retreat to a position of neutrality.

Q.

But today they are members of the large Jewish Agency.

A.

All this is after I left the UJA, so I am really not able to comment on that. I think that their membership in the large Jewish Agency is very sincere on their part, but I also think very meaningless as far as action is concerned. The UJA still has terrible problems with the Council of Federations or so I hear from second hand reports.

Q.

That's really a means to convince them - to be more into the business?

A.

Yes, to drive them, to pull them in.

Q.

In order to get them to be responsible, sitting in the Council of the Sochnut?

A.

So what?

Q.

You don't think it made any difference?

A.

Not much. Again we're talking generalities. With some men it makes a difference and they then influence their cities, but with other men, it doesn't make any difference. They are very cold. There's the whole question of the relationship between the UJA and the synagogues.

Q.

The relations of the three synagogue organizations and their roof organizations?

A.

The UJA had no relationship with any of those. ~~With the national UJA~~ I created something ^{in the UJA} called the ^{national} rabbinical advisory council and put ^a rabbis on the staff to work with ^{this} a national council of 25 or 30 rabbis, each time changing the chairman from reformed ^{to conservative to} and orthodox ^{in rotation} and so on. All this to do what? To influence the local rabbi in the local congregation that he should work for the local Federation/UJA campaign. That was the purpose of it. I was not interested in getting resolutions from the roof organizations, because what are the roof organizations? I told you before I was a practical man and if something had no meaning I wasn't going to bother with it.

Q.

I was told by local Federation people that they had their own fight with the rabbis. The rabbis didn't want to support, not only the UJA, but even the federation campaign, ^{since} so they were making their own campaigns for ^{their own} the synagogues, ~~and they didn't allow anybody in.~~

A.

That's not really true any more. That is an exaggeration that may describe some local situation which is very bad, ~~but~~ where there is a fight. I would put it to you historically this way; right after World War II, there was an expansion in the local community of all local services. Hospitals were being built, community centers, Jewish Family Agencies to take care of refugees coming to America. There was a big expansion of local services which took a lot of money.

At the same time, After World War II there was an expansion of religious buildings in America and great numbers, hundreds and hundreds of synagogues were built, some of them costing as much as \$7 and \$8 million. It's hard to believe but it's true.

Q.

After ten years they were moved out by the blacks.

A.

Right, and after ten years the community centers also had to move out because of the blacks. Inside of a community we had the religious establishment working against the Federation establishment. Why were they working against each other? Because they were not working together. They were not working together on anything, not on community education, not on fighting against anti-Semitism. There was no area in which they were working together and there were many areas in which they were working separately.

Over the period of 25 years a deep antagonism developed and the director of the Federation complained against the rabbi; he is no good, he doesn't care, he makes a sermon that he loves Israel, but he won't help the campaign and then the local rabbi preaches a sermon he would love to help the campaign if all the money went to Israel, but he is not going to help the campaign if so much money stays locally. Then the Federation director would attack him again and say, what is the rabbi talking about? He is keeping money here locally. Many millions of dollars he kept here locally, building his local synagogue.

So you see there are fights going on between them for many years. Now for the first time, in the last two or three years, there is a committee trying to bring understanding between the synagogue

and the Federation. The Council of the Jewish Federations is always talking with National religious organizations. Phil Bernstein is going to speak in June in San Francisco at the National Conference of Reform~~ed~~ Rabbis, to try to make shalom b'beit.

Q.

You don't believe it?

A.

No, I don't. Because you have built-in tensions and because the rabbis are wrong and the Federations are wrong. Both of them are wrong. But the antagonisms are so deep now that I don't know how you can overcome them without some really revolutionary leaders coming into the picture and saying that everybody must forget their old antagonisms.

In Montor's days he thought it was a real question, but it's not a real question today. That's why I say that the Federations are wrong to be suspicious of the rabbis and the rabbis are wrong to be suspicious of the Federation. I always believe in trying to be a bridge between them and to try to bring the local rabbis into the work of the local Federation. I always try to say to the local Federation people to use the rabbis, not just to give a "bracha" at some dinner and ~~you~~ waste his whole evening. He sits there and ~~m~~akes one "bracha" and he wastes four hours, so then he is angry. Use the rabbi for something much more serious than that. Use him to start a study group inside the Federation or to solicit members of his congregation, to make a speech on behalf of the Federation in the pulpit. Use him as the chairman of the campaign. We had many rabbis who became successful chairmen of the ^{local Federation} campaign.

Q.

The Federation campaign?

A.

Federation, UJA. The Federation campaign is the UJA campaign. It is synonymous. It is the same thing. I have been preaching for a long time about rabbis becoming executive directors of the Federation. It should be a man with a Jewish background, not just a social worker. I managed to get two men into position after I left. I still had some influence. I helped to get two rabbis into positions as executive directors in the community, one in Houston and one in San Francisco. I think they are succeeding.

I keep telling the rabbinical organizations that they should infiltrate into the field, because there is a terrible lack of manpower and the jobs are good jobs, important jobs. It is the central job in the community (Kehilla) and the man who is trained as a rabbi with a good Jewish background could help a great deal to develop the local community. If we had 30 or 40 rabbis in those jobs as executive directors, I think a better job would be done. I give this as an example of what I think should be the best relationship.

Q.

What did you really create in the National UJA? The special departments dealing with the synagogues and the rabbis, what are they doing?

A.

I created something called the 100% plan. Every rabbi was supposed to take his membership list and check with the contributor list of the Federation to make sure that every one of his members ^{was} ~~is~~ a contributor to the Federation/UJA campaign. 100%. I based it on the theory that if a man is a member of a synagogue, voluntarily,

nobody ^{forcing} forced him, and he pays \$200, \$300, \$400 dues every year, how is it possible that such a man should not give any money to the Federation campaign? How can a man be a member of a synagogue and not give Israel any money? The answer is that nobody asked him.

He is a Jew, a good Jew. He joins the synagogue and he volunteers. I am sure if somebody asked him he would give his money to the campaign. I supposed that the individual Jew is okay. He is not the problem. The problem is the organization which doesn't go to him. If the rabbi would go down ~~to~~ his membership list and see ~~this guy is giving \$100-\$1000-\$100-\$200, \$500, \$1,000, \$20,000, zero.~~ how many of his members were complete non-givers he would be shocked.

Suddenly you find a Jew who is not giving. The rabbi should go to ^{such a Jew} him or appoint a committee of the board of directors to go to him and say, my good friend Mr. Goldstein, you are a member of ~~my~~ ^{our} congregation. We have a plan. We want 100% of our members to be contributors to Israel and you are not. I am sure somebody overlooked you. So we are here on behalf of the synagogue. We want you to contribute to the campaign. I think you should contribute \$1,000.

The first synagogue in America that ever achieved success with 100% of its members, was a synagogue in Los Angeles. The rabbi was an Orthodox fellow, Simon Bolgin, who now lives in Ramat Eshkol. Bolgin was very proud and I was very proud. We became good friends even though he was orthodox and I was reform. The point is that you had 3,000 synagogues in America and I gave instructions to my National ^{Rabbinical Advisory} Committee; you have to work in all of your circles to try

to make sure that every member of every synagogue is giving something -- 100%. First we did research which showed that about 60% of the members of congregations were not giving any money.

Q.

When did you begin it? '63, '64?

A.

Somewhere in
~~Yes,~~ the middle ^{or late} sixties. In '64 ^{we} started the Keren Hachinuch (Education Fund). I never started two things in one year. In '63 I started the Young Leadership cabinet. ~~If you have a synagogue where 60% of the people do not contribute, you want to bring it to 100%. Even if you only bring it to 80%, you still doubled.~~

Q.

You had rabbis, reform rabbis, orthodox rabbis and conservative rabbis, dealing with their own congregations?

A.

we had well-known men as chairmen - all men who were nationally prominent & respected
~~Yes. One year the man who would be the chairman was a rabbi by the name of Bachman, a well-known orthodox rabbi.~~

To finish this, I don't know how to judge the success of this rabbinical operation. All I know is that it increases the number of contributors all the time and it is another channel by which to get at people in a community. I don't know how effectively it is working today, but I know in theory the idea is correct and it has produced lots and lots of new money and new contributors. Its potential is really unlimited. The by-product of what you gain from this ^{project} is unlimited, because if you work at it very hard, sooner or later you will wipe out the fighting between the rabbis and Federations. If you can get the rabbis involved in helping with

the campaign, then you reduce their antagonism.

The Federation, if ~~its~~^{it's} smart, will involve the rabbi. How many ~~have you got left?~~^{are there?} You ~~talk~~^{and} about three, four, five men, in ~~the~~^{any one} town. You can't fight them doing something that will get them involved. You have to be pretty stupid not to figure out how to involve four or five people, ten in a large city.

New York City had a different relationship with the synagogues. New York City had a specific synagogue division as a fund-raising tool, like a trade and industry division. You raise money from doctors' meetings and from dentists at dentists' meetings and you raise money from synagogue members at synagogue meetings.

Q.

There was no duplication?

A.

Sometimes there ~~is~~^{was} duplication as when you have a meeting on Wall Street where the man works and one out in Long Island where the man lives. You have to ~~live with that,~~^{accept such duplication -} that's all. The computer doesn't record a man's gift twice. He can announce it in two separate places, but ~~then~~ he is only asked to pay it once and he knows it, you know and the computer knows it.

Q.

Sometimes he gets his honor twice?

A.

Of course. The synagogue division of the New York City campaign is a big division and an important one. They work very hard to keep good relationships with all local synagogues and all local

rabbis. They work through one roof organization, called the New York Board of Rabbis.

Q.

That includes the rabbis from all three ^{denominations?} ~~congregations~~?

A.

Yes. In this whole religious fight where the orthodox organizations say that their people should not be together with reform and conservative, there is one exception. You can work together, reformed and orthodox people, on anything which has to do with Israel. That's okay. You may cooperate with them, even though you think they are "goyim" because if it is for Israel, what's "Kadosh-Kadosh."

Q.

You didn't have any relationship with the National organizations? You told us nothing.

A.

Which one?

Q.

The American Jewish Committee?

A.

No. ^{how} The American Jewish Congress. These are political organizations and the UJA has always stayed away from the political side of Jewish life.

Q.

Even the Zionist organizations didn't support and work for the UJA?

A.

That's a different question. First you asked if we worked with the organizations. The answer is no. The second question is, didn't

the Zionists work for the campaign? Not the Zionists, the Zionist organizations. Montor said nothing. They really didn't do anything during all the time they were in charge of the UJA, the ZOA and the Poalei Zion, Hadassah. They didn't do anything. We had no relations with them. They weren't capable of doing anything. This was the way I explained it. What do I want to say, that they are nasty people? All I want to say is that they are weak people. They mean well, but they have no power and they couldn't influence anything. They had so much trouble keeping their own organizations going. They ^{worked very hard to} ~~could hardly~~ raise any money for themselves. They were small-minded, closed minded, ^{self-centered} ~~tiny~~ organizations. The ^{main} ~~only~~ thing Hadassah women can think about is the Hadassah Hospital. Every time I would say that a hospital is only part of a nation. If you don't have a hospital, ^{but} you still have a nation, you are okay. If you have a hospital and you don't have a country, what the hell good is it. Never mind, I could talk and talk until I ~~am~~ ^{was} blind.

Q.

On this problem you agree 100% with Montor?

A.

Oh, yes. I agree more, but I don't want to make an attack on them now, because they are almost ~~dead~~. ^{without influence in the communities.} The Zionist organizations don't mean anything anymore, ^{outside of their own internal programs} ~~so what the hell.~~ ^{so what is the sense of fighting with them.}

Q.

The ZOA?

A.

None of them. Until only a few months ago Hadassah wouldn't even agree to use the word "aliyah!" Aliyah was a dirty word. You could never get the American Zionist organizations, men or women, to get

behind a program for aliyah. They refused. They said, it's not our business. ^{The various other things said.} Our business is to build a hospital. Or our business is to help General Zionists in Israel, or we have a project where we are going to build one room in the Hebrew University.

There's nothing to talk to them about, no strings, no vision, no leadership. They are small people with no lay leadership, no professional leadership. Hadassah ladies were like Amazons. They would kill you if you didn't believe what they believed in. They're hard, like rock, to this day. They make big speeches about how they are the biggest Zionist organization in the world, or in America, because they have 300,000 members. My answer to that is, so what? I am not interested in your membership. I am interested in what you do. And what you do is some little bit of a program of education, what they call American education and a little bit of Israel education, and a hospital and that's all. They have a vocational school, Seligsburg. It is all a "Kleinigkeit."

To come to them and talk about helping in the campaign to make 200 million, 300 million or 400 million, no. It is really a dreadful thing. They really are ~~representative~~, a complete failure, I think, from an historic point of view, because they lost any relationship to fund-raising, to aliyah.

The UJA had no relations with the National organizations or with the Zionist organizations of any effective nature in regard to the running of the campaign. Every year we would have a mass meeting of all the organizations and we would plead with them for their support. Every year they would promise it and every year we would

get a letter from each one saying that they had passed the following resolutions. I don't know who passed those resolutions. Somebody in the back room writes a resolution, signs it and sends it to us. So it is a resolution, so what? It didn't mean a thing.

Q.

Did you recruit any people from these organizations?

A.

No.

Q.

To the lay leadership?

A.

Almost never.

Q.

After Silver, nobody came in?

A.

If you could come up with somebody who was an important lay leader, either locally or nationally, and ~~he~~^{who} happened to be important in ^{any} the Zionist organization, then it was b'mikreh. There was a ~~guy~~^{man} in Philadelphia, Samuel Daroff, who was an important lay leader, a good ~~guy~~ ^{fellow}. He is dead now. In the years when he was giving \$50,000

to the campaign, a man by the name of Frederick Mann was giving zero dollars to the campaign. He also lived in Philadelphia. He gave a few bucks to the Hechal Hatarbut in Tel Aviv and he got his name put on.

This made Sam Daroff crazy. For his \$3,000 he gets the Mann Auditorium and for my \$50,000 I get zero. I don't want my name on anything, but he shouldn't have his name on anything. Daroff believed

that Golda Meir made that deal with Frederick Mann and he was sore as hell for the rest of his life at Golda Meir because of that. Daroff was a good worker, locally and nationally, an important lay leader of the UJA. He was one of the first men who came on the first mission with Montor to Germany in 1946 when the war was over. I met him then and I knew him for all those 25 years. He happened to be a Zionist leader in Philadelphia, but this was sort of an accident. He worked hard for them, but he didn't become a leader in the UJA, because he was a Zionist. I could go through the years in my mind, in different cities and I could give you maybe ten names like his, ^{Makes all} ~~finished~~.

Your next question regarding the relationship of the UJA to the Keren Hayesod. There was none, none at all. An American, Israel Goldstein, was chairman of the Keren Hayesod, living in Israel, but that didn't mean anything. Keren Hayesod had nothing to do with America. At a certain point I began to feel that I could increase the sights of the American leadership if I could show them that there were other Jews around the world who were also working on this campaign, that they ^{are} ~~are~~ not the only ones doing it. You know Americans; as far as they are concerned, they are the leaders of the world. I wanted to show them that there were other Jews who gave money and also worked, so I started something.

In our annual December conference I began to bring in Jews, 3 or 4 of them from different parts of the world, to invite them as our guests. We paid the airplane fare. We had them ~~stand and make a speech~~ ^{Speak} about what they were doing in their country. I did it, very frankly, in order to give something "piquant" to my people.

I showed them a Jew from Mexico, a Jew from Iran, and a Jew from Switzerland. I put them all in the same program and said look, this is the Jewish people of the whole world. It made my people feel excited, and it was very good. So for several years in a row, we had a session called "The International Session of the American UJA Conference" and I invited three or four ^{different} people, ^{each year}. They gave speeches and we had a party for them. They gave interviews to the local press and television. If they had time, they went out of New York and made a circuit to other offices.

Every year, when I would try to decide whom to invite to this conference, I would talk to Israel Goldstein in Jerusalem and say, who is the leading Jew in South Africa? ^{or Germany, or England} I don't know. So he would ^{give me suggestions} say, ~~Judge Monzell, or Yigael Horovitz.~~ I would call him up and invite him to come to the UJA conference next December. What's the UJA, I said, it is the Keren Hayesod in America. That was the whole relationship. ~~There was no other relationship.~~

Gradually, the Keren Hayesod in Jerusalem began to be aware of the fact that I was trying to create a broader outlook and Israel Goldstein said, why don't I come over. Then I began to be friendly with a Mr. Michael Barzelai. He later went to England as the director of the campaign. He is now finishing there. He was the co-director of the Keren Hayesod in Jerusalem until he went to England. ~~Then Kreitner pushed him out and Kreitner became the sole director here.~~

Gradually, the relations between the UJA and the Keren Hayesod began to be better and better and closer and closer. They began to use the films that we made and we began to ask them to send their

films. They began to be aware of our Young Leadership Division and they opened one up and put a staff man on it, Raviv, a big tall guy. So Keren Hayesod has a young Leadership staff.

I began the idea of having a meeting of UJA givers in the home of Rothschild in Paris, just for Americans, to give them something piquant. Then the Keren Hayesod said, why don't we make it an international meeting of big givers, not just Americans. You are bringing over 50 people to the Rothschild house, so we will put in a few people from Belgium, Germany and Switzerland. Slowly the relationship developed and got closer. I would say that, today there is a good working relationship, no enmity, no hatred, ~~no~~ ^{good cooperation} enmity. They still have far to go to bring the campaigns of the Keren Hayesod up to the level of the campaign in America, from a technical point of view.

On that point, I will give you just one footnote to history. When I moved ^{to Israel} ~~here~~ I said to Sapir and Pincus (~~both of them now dead~~) that I was going to move ^{here} ~~to Israel~~, that Israel Goldstein was going to retire and that ^{chairing the Keren Hayesod} ~~this~~ would be a job that I could do in this country very well. I said, I would promise them that I would introduce all of the American methodology into the other campaigns around the world and in three years I would raise the income three times. These two gentlemen came back to me and said, sorry, I don't come from the right political party and that's that. ^{most top jobs in Israel are decided on the basis of party politics} They ^{professional analysts} said it was too bad, but they already had a candidate for the job, who came from the right political party, Mr. Ezra Shapiro from Cleveland. They asked me what ~~did~~ ^{thought} I think about him and I told them

My opinion of him as a person was quite high. But my opinion of his professional experience was low. That didn't change the situation, not what I thought about him as a human being or as a person. He is a nice fellow, but that's not what I think about him as the chairman of the Keren Hayesod worldwide. I tried to change the whole picture. I said I thought he was without ability, that's all. He was a good lawyer. He was a nice Zionist and he was from the right party, etc. So what? He was a party candidate for a professional job.

Q. These things don't happen in America?

A. No, are you kidding? In America, if you are talking about political parties, each political party has its candidates for different jobs, but every candidate has to be able. Anyway I hope that the relationships between the UJA and the Keren Hayesod will get deeper and better because they can learn from each other.

Q. Do you think that the UJA can learn from the Keren Hayesod?

A. Oh sure, no question about it. There were some years when ~~we~~^{we} didn't make a film, because the film that the Keren Hayesod made was as good, or better than anything ~~we~~^{we} could make. So why should I make one? We had good publicity people but they had a man by the name of Rogow. I don't know where he is now. He ~~is~~^{was} a good publicity man, and we used a lot of his pieces. So there are things that the American campaign can learn from the Keren Hayesod.

Q. How was the board of the UJA elected?

A.

I want to know what you mean by the Board. The UJA is a corporation. The UJA corporation has a meeting of its Board of Directors once a year, for one hour. The UJA has two members on the Board, A and B. Member A is the Joint Distribution Committee. Member B is the United Israel Appeal. Each member has a right to put 12 persons on the Board. These 24 people come to a meeting of the Board of Directors. They vote in a block. There are only two votes, an A vote and a B vote. That's all. They vote on such things as the signature on bank accounts.

The secretary prepares resolutions to which the Board has to agree, so the secretary reads the resolution: it is hereby resolved that the bank account in the Chase Bank shall have the power of these names for signing checks, Jack, John, Bill, 3 ^{names} ~~days~~. The secretary says, Mr. Chairman, do I hear a motion? So somebody from the side of A says, I move to accept the list. Somebody from the B side says, I second the motion. Finished. The secretary has a whole ^{Series} ~~list~~ of questions like that all prepared for the A and the B side. One makes the motion and the other seconds it. That's it. That's the corporation. These people are not elected.

Q.

But you did have a certain body of people, not a Board?

A.

Once you say not a Board, then you are talking about campaign structure.

Q.

Not only campaign structures.

A.

That's all they are. They change all the time. Seontimes we used to have a campaign cabinet, what we call campaign officers, the campaign executive committee. These are all different kinds of structures.

Q.

Were they elected?

A.

No, they were not elected.

Q.

They were volunteers, more or less?

A.

They were appointed.

Q.

Appointed by whom?

A.

They were appointed by a concensus of two or three people. For instance, in the structure today there is something called a cabinet with probably 250 or 300 names in it. Maybe it has a meeting once a year. It is a structure which has outlived it's use. There is also a structure called national chairmen, 12 national chairmen.

Q.

Before you came to the United Jewish Appeal, what structure was there then? You took over from Schwartz? What structure was there?

A.

We had no national chairmen. We had no executive committee, no administration committee. I think we had a cabinet of 30 to 40 people from all over the country. There were a few people from New York also. This was a so-called ruling body of the UJA.

Gradually that cabinet got bigger and bigger and as it ~~gets~~^{got} bigger, it got to be less executive. So I said, we have to have a few guys who can get together, four or five fellows, to make a decision. Let's form an inner committee, an actions committee. I forget what ~~it~~^{we} called it. Out of the hundred people in the cabinet, take 5 or 6 of the closest, the hardest workers, the ones with the most influence. These were the ones we used to call together more frequently. There are no by-laws, no articles of association that say the cabinet shall meet on the first Monday of every month, ~~for instance.~~

Q.

It is no United ~~Nazim~~ Jewish Appeal Parliament?

A.

It is like a semi-dictatorship. Two, three or four people always had to make the inside decisions, the executive director, whoever was his chairman of that year, whoever we were thinking might be the next chairman and maybe one or two more people and that's it.

Q.

They made the decisions?

A.

Yes. You once asked me how was a chairman elected.

Q.

Who had the right to elect the chairman?

A.

There was no question of right. It is not written down anywhere. In practice it was myself with the present chairman. I would say to him, you know who would be a good fellow for the next chairman when you are finished. We might consult with somebody just to get

a feeling, maybe with Warburg, the chairman of the JDC. I would say Eddie, we are thinking of a young guy from Cleveland, Ginsberg, to be the chairman. He'd say, who is he? Tell me about him. I told him something. He said, is he a good guy? If he's a good guy, okay. Then I called up the executive director in Cleveland, Zucker, and said we are thinking of Ginsburg for chairman.

Q.

We interviewed Zucker

A.

Zucker thinks of himself as the number one professional of America, and many others think he is, also. I liked him, but I don't understand the mystique about him. I never did. Sometimes we would also consult ^{the} a man who was the president of the UJA corporation. The last ^{selection process} thing I was involved in was when Ginsburg was the chairman. Fisher was the president of the corporation and I was the director, so it was the three of us, democratic enough, deciding who is going to be the next chairman.

closed

A fellow by the name of ^{Paul} Zuckerman was pushing to get the job. He was telling everybody in America, I am going to be the next chairman. When ^{the three of us} we came down to talk about it, I said; I think not. I think he doesn't have the quality. Ginsburg said I am not sure either. I am not sure that I like him ^{for the job}, but I promised him that I would see to it that he gets the job. Fisher said he is my next door neighbor. I don't like him. We fight all the time, but I think we have to give it to him. I said no, he doesn't have the capabilities, and I lost. The two of them said yes and I said no.

They invited him to be the chairman and many years later both of them said that they had made a mistake. That's how it works, no elections. ~~It was a dictatorship~~ Then we worked out a system that the outgoing chairman should become the president of the corporation, so he ~~can~~^{could} still be an insider for another year or two.

Q.

Who is the president of the corporation today?

A.

The president of the corporation today is Paul Zuckerman, the ex-chairman. When Lautenberg will become the ex-chairman, he will become the president and Zuckerman will go out. I hear that the new general chairman will be Leonard Strelitz from Norfolk, Virginia. He is one I put on the list for you to interview, because I was hearing the rumors.

The last question you asked was whether it is worthwhile to go to the smaller givers. I don't have the time to go into all the arguments. My own personal belief in the matter is that the UJA should go after the small givers to broaden the base of the number of people who are making contributions. As a general rule, the smaller the city, the more you cover everybody and almost everybody is making some contribution.

In a community where there are already 5,000 families, I am sure that you do not have 100% participation. Even in a community that small there are still many people not contributing, because neither the National UJA, or the local Federation goes down deep enough to reach everybody. We know all the reasons why not. It costs too much money, there isn't enough manpower and nobody has a way to do it.

closed

The Bond organization doesn't think it is worth while. The smallest bond they now sell is \$250. They are not interested in the small ~~guy~~^{man} who wants to buy \$50 or \$100. They used to sell a \$50 bond and \$100 bonds, but no more. They say it is not kedai, but I am not convinced of that.

I believe that a campaign has to go two ways, ^{most important is up, but} ~~up~~ and it must also go sideways to cover everybody. I suggested this many times but I never succeeded. Last year, 1975, for the first time, the New York City UJA started something which they called a mass action in the city, a telethon. ^{They} ~~We~~ ran a telethon for 24 hours. They took in \$7 million and they got something like 30,000 new contributors. I am not sure of that number. I am all in favor of that because if you put 30,000 new names into the computer you have 30,000 new customers to go to during the next campaign.

Q.

I heard that it had the worst coverage.

A.

As I told you before, the higher up you go on the scale of population, the smaller the percentage of coverage becomes. The next worst coverage after New York therefore is what city?

Q.

Los Angeles, then Chicago and Philadelphia.

A.

It goes like a scientific law. It is a universal problem and in the whole strategic approach of the commander of the campaign, ~~he~~ must always leave the question of how to get the smaller

contributions alone, because nobody ^{has} found an answer for him. I had an answer. I proposed it, but it was never really tried, so I don't know if it would be successful or not.

I wanted to use the students and kill two birds with one stone. First of all, ^{one would have} ~~I had~~ to indoctrinate the students and teach them to go out to work on the campaign. Secondly, ^{one} ~~I~~ could get their ^{own} contributions. I don't care if it ^{is} \$1, \$5 or \$10, but they ^{would} become contributors. I would give each one his identity card and he would go out as an official of the campaign. You give him a big building and you give him a shetach. You have to work it like an army, in plugot and gedudim. You have to have commanders and maps. Everybody comes in ^{to headquarters} and makes a report. It all has to be done in a very systematic way. I believe that if we could mobilize the student power of America, ^{approximately} 400,000 Jewish students, ~~maybe more now~~, each of the students might give \$ten himself, and bring in a thousand. Do you ^{see} ~~know~~ what we are talking about? And this is really only the beginning.

My answer is yes, it is worthwhile to go after ^{smaller contributors} ~~them~~. ~~I had~~ ~~a plan of how to go after them and I would have to have that plan~~ ^{proposed would have to be} in operation five years, ^{before anyone would possibly} ~~I would be able to tell you~~ whether it works or not. But nobody has done it. I have ^{discussed} ~~given~~ the plan with ~~both~~ ^{Ernest Mitchell} to Irving Bernstein in National and ~~to Michelle~~ in New York. I don't know why they don't want to do it, but they don't.

Q.


Today we are talking about two sections: first of all Young Leadership and then the Women's Division.

A.

I think it is commonly agreed and understood by now that the Young Leadership is one of the most important things which the UJA developed, learned how to do, is now profiting from and will continue for many years into the future. Since that is so, I think it is important to understand how it began. It could possibly be a lesson for another big project which, I think, should be conducted among the student generation, ages 20 to 25. I think that some of the lessons that we learned from the Young Leadership, aged 30 to 35, ^{could} ~~can~~ be applied ^{to persons} ten years ^{of age} earlier and the same success achieved with the student generation.

That's really the only reason that I am interested in making sure that the details of how the Young Leadership was organized, should be in the record. Maybe somebody will look at the record and think of how to apply it to the student generation. I had intended to start with the student generation when I left the UJA, actually in the summer of 1970, to develop the first student committee of the UJA. Then I left the UJA in 1971 to come here, so nothing really ever happened. It is too bad.

I was convinced that we had to find a new generation of leaders, that we had to train them and motivate them. For a year I went around the country to every meeting of the UJA ^{in the local communities} looking for young men who were obviously more than average, who stood out above the crowd, either in the way they spoke, the way they gave money, the way other people followed them. You can tell who is an exception. I was marking down names in my book for a year but didn't tell anybody what I was doing.



Q.

Which year?

A.

That had to be ~~in 1959~~ ^{from} the fall of '59 until the spring of 1960, one whole campaign season. I had something like 300 to 400 names in my book by the time I was finishing ~~the~~ this research and nobody knew what I was doing. Every time I would go to a meeting I would look and see who was there and watch who was speaking and look for the young ones. I would find out the names.

Then I decided it was time to call a ^{national} conference, ^{of these people} which I ^{introduced} called for ^{November} September 1960. I wrote to the executive directors of the Federations in the communities, telling them that I was going to try to form a group of young men whom we would teach and train and move into leadership positions. I asked what they thought of the idea and did they have any candidates ^{who should be invited to the first conference.} ~~to suggest to me?~~ I have the file of letters which I received. I kept every one. It was absolutely remarkable how they all said, no, don't do it. It is not your job and you shouldn't do it. It is the Council of Federations' job and you are going to conflict with them.

To cut a long story short, I called a meeting and 250 people came, all at their own expense. It was a fantastic success. Nobody believed there would be such number, such quality and such enthusiasm. I could see immediately that this was something so exciting that these ^{men and women should} ~~kids could~~ not be treated ^{to} ~~like~~ a routine conference where they come and listen to somebody giving ^{routine} ~~a~~ speeches ~~about the Joint. I did all this too. I invited Mr. Leavitt of the Joint and I invited all the people from the UJA, and the UJA.~~

But they needed something special and I decided that I would try to give them an educational lecture which you do not ordinarily get at the usual weekend conference. I didn't know whether it would succeed. This was a big gamble for me because if this succeeded, then I knew that I had found the secret of how to deal with these people -- ^{namely first} the intellectual level and then to proceed to the emotional level. Their fathers of the previous generation ^{had been} were all emotion and ^{much less} no intellect. If you ^{talk} ~~talk~~ to their fathers, who were born in Minsk, Pinsk, or ^{Dvinsk} ~~Prinsk~~, ~~then all you had to do was something like the Pavlov conditioned reflex. You had to say,~~ ^{evoked memories} "All Jews are getting killed in the pogrom," and the father would start to cry and yell. He would say, I must do something and he would give \$20. ^{These signs produced a Pavlovian} It is a conditioned reflex. It is automatic, ~~but~~ not very big. It was an emotional gut reaction, the Jewish shtetl reaction.

I knew that this was not correct for their sons who were university graduates. I would try an intellectual approach, but I knew that ^{would} ~~s~~ not ^{be} enough either. I ^{would} ~~will~~ begin with this and ^{from} ~~from~~ this I will go ^{on} to the emotion. ^{If} The intellectual ^{approach would} ~~will~~ not touch them, ~~and~~ then I would have no way to reach them. I decided to give a lecture that would be the highlight of this conference, but it might have to take four or six hours, which was also unprecedented. I decided to deal with the subject of 100 years of Jewish history, 1880 to 1980. I gave the lecture in 1960, so there had to be 20 years of projection into the future. I picked 1880 because that was the watershed, the dividing point. That was the ^{Pobledones'tov} "Potatoes" era in Russia, the beginning of the big migration to America and

the beginning of the "BILU" into Palestine. First, I took them back 100 years and told them what life was like in the shtetl. That was the background. Then I told them what happened when the Jews started to come ^{in huge numbers} to America and ~~that a few Jews started to go~~ ^{in tiny numbers} to Palestine; ~~and~~ the build-up of the American community in 1890, 1900, 1910 and World War I; the first aliyah ^{to} in Israel; the ^{first} second aliyah ^{to} in Israel; I took them through the years of 1920's. That ^{brought} took us into the build-up of the Hitler period and then into the Holocaust; the establishment of the State of Israel; building up the state; all of the waves of immigration; and meanwhile the building of a strong community in America.

^{I described the change of values}
~~The values are changing~~ in America, from the "what will the goyim say" attitude and fearfulness, to more of a Jewish sense of independence; and more independence in Israel, war after war; the two communities growing up parallel with each other, each developing more self-confidence. Then, of course, I tried to make a projection of what would happen from 1960 to 1980.

The speech is on record, so I don't have to go into the speech now, but the point of the matter was that when it was all over, there was this fantastic, incredible reaction. First of all, I gave them a history lesson. They never knew such things happened and this opened up an appetite to learn this history. Number two, it showed this feeling of pride. It was long before the Six Day War and the State of Israel was still something fairly new.

What I tried to do was to make them proud of being Jews and of being connected to Israel. At the end I left them, of course, with a feeling that they had a big responsibility. I am very hard

I told Ben
on that. If you want to take part in this thing, you have to
enlist as a soldier for the rest of your life. If you don't want
to take part, good-bye. That's all, ^{to join} ~~show~~ him the Protestant church.
Shalom. So we lost a few more Jews. It doesn't make any difference.
We lost six million, so we will lose you and another few thousand.
It doesn't matter. We will fight the fight with whoever wants to be
a good soldier. Those who don't want to be good soldiers, go home.
I don't want to see you anymore. But if you stay, you have to stay
for your whole lifetime. I told them of the Bible, ^{story in the Bible where Gideon separated} the whole story,
^{those} who wanted to fight ^{from those} and who ^{didn't} want to fight and who ^{went home} drinks the
water. ~~That is our tradition.~~

Begin here

Q.

These stories were new to them? To these ^{young people?} kids?

A.

Sure. This is what is called the lost generation in America. They
^{had} ~~have~~ no Jewish education because their parents ^{didn't particularly care,} ~~didn't want them to~~
~~have any.~~ The parents didn't care. They were busy becoming
Americans. Now the children's generation, the second or the third,
want to come back. They are hungry to come back, but you have to
know what to feed them.

Q.

Is it really just the intellectual involvement that is important?
Don't you have to create a certain emotional involvement? In-
tellectual involvement is nothing. You can get involved with the
Chinese people.

A.

I said that. Intellectual involvement is ^{not enough,} ~~nothing.~~ You have to get
on to the next step of emotional involvement. The question is, how

to get them interested at all. If you begin with an emotional thing, you lose them because they don't have any background to understand the emotion you are talking about. The father understood. If the father was born in Minsk all you had to say to the father ^{was} ~~is~~ Cossack.

The first story Golda Meir tells in her book was that when she was six years old, she remembered ~~that~~ the Cossacks ^{who} came riding down the street on their big horses and she was a frightened little girl. Then she tells the story about when she was in Milwaukee, the first time she saw an American policeman on a big horse, she was afraid of him, ~~that~~ ^{thinking} ~~he~~ ^{was} ~~is~~ like the Cossack. Somebody told her that in America the policemen are not there to hurt people, but to help them. So she learned a lesson about the difference between the Cossack and the American policeman, on the same horse.

That is pure emotion, which the fathers respond to but the generation of the sons cannot yet respond to this. First you have to teach them, what is a Cossack. You have to teach them what is a shetl. This is pure intellect, academic material out of a book, out of the mouth of the speaker, out of a film or picture. This is something that you have to create for them, a whole academic or intellectual environment. Then you have to draw out of this the emotional implication of why they should be involved in this business.

Nobody could ever prove that this was right. I took a big gamble, because if I was wrong and this conference would have been a big failure, that's it, finished. The thing would never get off the ground. But it turned out I was right. The approach was correct

and the reaction was incredible. They wanted to learn more, so we started the idea at the conference of sending a book a month. After a while, most of them developed a library of 50, 75, 100 volumes, all on Jewish history, philosophy, half of the books connected only with Israel. Each of them now has a little library which we gave them. It was money well spent.

Q.

How did you develop their involvement?

A. AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

We planned that they ^{would} come on a mission to Israel in the summer of 1961. It was the first Young Leadership mission. When I asked how many people ^{would} ~~will~~ come next June, all the hands went up. We didn't have all of them, but we had 100 ~~and~~ half of them came. We developed their involvement by making them read the book every month, come to a retreat once a year, come to a regional conference once a year, come on a mission overseas once a year and then begin to take part in the work of the local Federation Campaign for the UJA.

After you train somebody, motivate him, involve him intellectually and emotionally, teach him how to do the work of soliciting money, get him on three trips to Israel, so he knows what he is talking about, then what do you do with him? It is as if you ^{had} ~~made~~ ^{created} a beautiful ^{tool} ~~saw~~, but how to put that ^{tool} ~~saw~~ to use? That was the organizational side, to convince the local communities to begin to take these fine trained, good, fresh new ^{men and women,} ~~boys~~ and put them to work with responsibility. We had to work with the executive directors, to convince them to accept this new manpower.

In some cities we failed and in some cities we succeeded. At the end of a process of 10 or 15 years I will just give you one statistic. There are 68 cities in America that raise more than \$1 million. In 57 of these the chairman of the campaign is someone who came out of the Young Leadership campaign. It is like a revolution, where you train a cadre and move them into position. They rise to the top and they take over the leadership. In some cities where the executive directors couldn't see the wisdom of this, they said, we don't want these young fellows. They rejected them, used all kinds of excuses. The executive directors would say, my old leadership is not yet ready to retire.

Chicago is the most outstanding example of a city that absolutely refused. The Young Leadership Cabinet ^{was headed by a general} ~~had one national~~ chairman, like the general chairman of the UJA. ~~We had one~~ fellow from Chicago ^{named} called Robert Schroyer, ^{because the Young Leadership} ~~the~~ chairman for the whole country. In his own city of Chicago he had a hell of a fight to get himself onto the board of his own local Federation, because the executive director was stupid and because the lay leadership was blind and couldn't see the value of these young ^{men} ~~guys~~ coming in, making a revolution and taking over.

Last year, the chairman of Chicago finally was a man, Leonard Sherman, who ^{was} ~~is~~ a friend of these Young Leadership boys, although he is about ten years older. He never passed through the Young Leadership training in an official way but in a non-official way, he did. Now in Chicago we have one of our Young Leadership graduates. ~~Back in the early days there were more cities that were rejecting them but thank God, most cities did not.~~

Cleveland is another city which rejected them more or less, ~~the whole young leadership concept~~ and it didn't put into ^{top} position in the local leadership any of the men who came up through the Young Leadership ranks. In most of the country it worked, and most of the cities had enough intelligence to realize that these boys ~~have~~ ^{had} to be put into positions of responsibility.

Q.

Is there continuation? That was in 1960. Has Young Leadership developed new people?

A.

There was a constant process of recruitment, in and out, because when a ~~boy~~ ^{man} reached the age of 40 he had to ~~leave~~ ^{graduate from the cabinet}. He wasn't young leadership any more.

Q.

In Israel the Young Leadership is 70 years old. Mrs. Meir is 78.

A.

You have to keep recruiting people all the time. We recruited more people in '61 and had another mission in '62. By the time we got to '63, I ^{felt it was time to} ~~formalized~~ ^{the movement} ~~it~~ and made a cabinet out of it, ~~dropped off~~ ~~some people who were no good and picked up some new people~~. In 1963 we had a meeting. I asked Governor Herbert Lehman to come to this meeting and give his blessing, so in the records of the history of the UJA, we say that the Young Leadership Cabinet was formed by Governor Lehman. It was like the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Everybody in the first Cabinet got a picture taken with Governor Lehman. Every one of the first Cabinet members was a founder of the Young Leadership movement. One hundred years from

now it will be history, like the first Zionist Congress.

The organization was established, formed and then began to make chapters in each city. Then there was the organizational work of convincing the executive directors to accept these people and then widening the circle, beginning to look for new names.

I was involved very closely in that for ten years, from 1960 to 1970. I picked the chairmen. Some were good, some not so good, some excellent. I had two executive directors. I picked them out of my staff and assigned them to this project. I paid a tremendous amount of personal attention to this program. I took these men on trips to Dachau, to Mathausen, to Auschwitz, so they should really understand the Holocaust. I took them many times to Israel. I went to every regional conference myself and I fought with executive directors to accept them in every city. It was a personal structure, but it is fantastic in its power, because today it carries the whole weight of the UJA, with the exception of maybe a dozen older men. The work in the communities is done by these men. There are two or three thousand who went through this training process.

A second development occurred. In the communities, the Council of Federations quickly saw that this was a very useful thing, so the communities began to develop ^{local} leadership training courses. They would recruit ^{50 or} 100 ^{men} boys. Maybe only two or three of these fellows were good enough to ^{rise} ~~bring~~ to the National Cabinet, ^{level} but in the local community the standards ^{were} are different. They would have a Young Leadership training course and we would send people down to lecture them. I went myself many scores of times to talk to the Young Leadership ^{groups} of ^{local Federations.} ~~Boston, of Memphis.~~

Q.

Who organized the local Young Leadership, the ^{national} Young Leadership people or the Federation director?

A.

It began with the initiative of the National Young Leadership people and if the local Federation director was smart, he accepted it. Sometimes he fought against it, but after two or three years of fighting, suddenly he would see the wisdom of it and he would start it himself. He would say, I don't want you fellows from the UJA to tell me what to do. I will do it myself, because my young leadership must be oriented to the local needs as well as those of Israel. I didn't care. He was accepting the principle.

Q.

Could you give me some examples of executive directors who took the initiative in this field? Who was very active?

A.

My memory is not so good and I can't pinpoint it for you. I can tell you that in 1960, '61, '62, '63 and the very beginning years, the director in Los Angeles, Julius Ratner was very enthusiastic about a Young Leadership Division. He got Chester Firestein, the son of Max Firestein, Max Factor Perfumes, to be the first chairman of the Young Leadership in Los Angeles. He was exactly right, perfect, because if you get such a ^{man} boy, 30 years old or maybe less, to be the chairman of the Young Leadership, he is like 24 carat gold, the elite. They will come around him and they will sit and listen.

Los Angeles developed an excellent young leadership, because

the local executive director agreed with the concept, took the inspiration from us and took all of our material. I used to go out there ^{Three or} four times a year to talk to the young leadership and it developed into something ^{very} good.

Philadelphia also got a good program going. A young boy, Saul Friedman, was the Vice Chairman of the National Young Leadership and sold his local director, Mr. ^{Don Hurwitz} ~~Horowitz~~, the idea that they should have one in Philadelphia.

Q. Did the National Young Leadership involve itself in real fund raising or only in organizational work?

A.

Organization leads to fund raising. They entered into the fund raising machine of the local community. When they were lucky and we pushed them properly and the executive director had enough sense and all of the factors were right, they got to the top. Last year, the chairman of the Campaign in Los Angeles was Irwin Field. He is 40 years old and when we started with him, 15 years ago, in the Young Leadership he was 25. He rose up through the ranks in the National Young Leadership. He took assignments all over America. He gets invited to make a speech in Boston, or in Dallas, to sit down and solicit money from their young leadership group. He comes in as the expert from outside and he starts to raise the money among them. That's what he does, outside of his own community, as a national leader.

Inside of his own community, first he began as the chairman of the industrial division, then the chairman of the local committee

out in the valley where he lives and ^{so he climbed} up the ranks. Finally he is ~~the~~ general ^{chairman} of the whole city of Los Angeles in the Campaign of 1974 and again in '75. He now gives \$60,000 and runs a campaign of \$45 million. He is a perfect example of a leader who rose to the top at a young age, with a willing executive director and local establishment behind him, with a national framework, within which he has developed his own reputation. In his own community he reached the top. He did a fantastically good job. He was vice chairman of the national Young Leadership. This year he was elected as one of the 12 national chairmen of the whole UJA. He is the youngest one. Will he ever get to be the General Chairman of the UJA? I hope so.

I have conducted a ^{struggle} fight now since 1973 with the UJA, with Mr. Irving Bernstein, with Mr. Max Fisher, with Mr. Paul Zuckerman. Why? They do not take one ^{man} boy from this Young Leadership group as the next General Chairman, even in the next one, two or four years from now, to look to the future. The Cabinet was formed in 1963 and in 1973 there was a 10th anniversary conference in Washington, D.C. They invited me to speak. I said, kol hakavod, congratulations. You guys have really done a beautiful job. You fulfilled all expectations. Now I would like to ask you to do one more thing, and here, of course, I was not very popular. I said, by now one of you should have been the General Chairman of the National UJA. You are not being invited and you know why. Just as in the beginning, we had to make a revolution in the local communities to get you boys into positions, I am now urging you to make a revolution in the National UJA, because if they won't put you into position, you have to put yourselves into position and force your way in.

Of course, this was not very popular with the ~~public~~^{newspaper} ~~and~~^{establishment} and nobody liked that speech very much, but I liked it. I think we are coming to the time where, not the next chairman, but the one after him, will be Gordon Zacks from Columbus. He was ~~one of the~~ chairmen of the Young Leadership Cabinet when he was 35 years old. He is ~~very~~ rich, industrious, from the Midwest, a perfect type for you to study as a sociologist, keen intellect, total emotional commitment. He will be, I think, the first ex-Young Leadership chairman to be the General Chairman of the whole UJA. I think maybe two or three years from now, they will be ready for him. I hope so.

Q.

What about the Women's Division?

A.

The Women's Division is a much shorter story. I didn't start it so I don't know what the founding philosophy was. I think the philosophy was that a gift from a woman is an extra gift to the ~~campaign~~. I think it is no more than that. The belief was that, in America, women have their own money or they get an allowance from the husband and if they are very careful, they can save \$10 or \$100. Why shouldn't we try to get extra gifts from the women? The first Women's Division chairman was selected with an eye toward social prominence, social importance. It was the sister of William Rosenwald, ~~of~~ Mrs. Adele Levy.

Q.

She was a contributor on her own. She gave a quarter of a million dollars to the UJA.

A.

^{Yes -}
^ In '48, but the Women's Division was started before that. I don't know exactly what year, but it was already in existence in '48. She proved her point that a woman's gift is an extra individual gift. It means plus money and this was the first slogan of the Women's Division, "Your dollars are plus dollars." That was the first idea behind it and this idea succeeded. Again, the whole question was that the National UJA had a plan and ~~now you~~ ^{then} ~~had~~ to sell it to the local community Federation, the same business. In some Federations they accepted the idea of Women's Divisions and in some Federations they said no, if the woman gives \$100 the man will take it away and give \$900 instead of \$1,000.

Q.

In many families women really have their own money.

A.

You always have a liberal, a visionary attitude and you have a reactionary attitude. If an Executive Director wants to find a reason to say no, ~~so~~ this is his reason. If there is a rich widow who has a lot of money of her own, then let her be approached by the Men's Division. Let them go to her and make believe she is a man. The argument went back and forth, but year after year the Women's Division grew stronger and stronger.

Q.

I understand that the Women's Division was started by Montor.

A.

Yes, he started it in '47, or '46. I really don't know which year.

Q.

Did he also start a local Women's Division?

A.

He couldn't start anything local. You must understand the dynamics. The National Director of the UJA could never start anything locally. His relationship with the local people wouldn't make any difference. Schwartz' relationship with the local people was perfect because he never fought with them. They thought he was a god because he never got into an argument with them. He always gave them what they wanted. The only thing ^{the UJA Director} he could do if the local people wouldn't agree, was to say, I will split ^{from} with you. I don't want to work through you. I don't want you to be my agent. I don't want to have any connections with you. I will make an independent UJA committee. Montor used to threaten this all the time, but never did it. Schwartz never ^{even} threatened it. Schwartz didn't fight with the community at all.

I lived with the community. At the beginning there was a ^{serious} ~~terrible~~ state of tension and fighting with them. Then I grew more mellow. It was always a struggle to convince them of something, but I never made any foolish threats. I wanted to have separate campaigns in two places, Chicago and Los Angeles, but I never threatened them, because I never had the backing from my own people, my own General Chairman and ~~little~~ executive committee or my cabinet. If you don't have their backing, how can you threaten to do something.

The Women's Division grew stronger and stronger by having good chairmen and by having a strong sense of commitment. You know women when they take something on. Why is Hadassah the strongest Zionist organization in America? Women are much more

devoted to a project than men are. Here it was a big money project.

Q.

Was there any kind of coordination between the Women's Division of the UJA and the Hadassah, Council of Jewish Women?

A.

There was no coordination. There was fight. ~~There was nothing,~~
It was like living on two separate planets. A woman in Boston, Dorothy Spector, was very active in the Hadassah. ^{I don't think she even} ~~She never~~ got to be the National President. She was also very active in the UJA Women's Division. I was thinking about her as the National Chairman. She is the ^{most obvious} ~~quickest~~ example I can ^{name} think of, a woman who was active in Hadassah and also rose to the top in UJA Women's ^{Division}. Most of the women who were at the top of the UJA, nationally or locally, were good members of the Hadassah chapter, or good members of the Council of Jewish Women. But it's different being a member and being a leader and I'm talking about leaders. The leadership of the National UJA and the local UJA committees grew up separately and independently and there were no conflicts with the other women's organizations. If a woman ^{was} ~~is~~ active in Hadassah, she loves Israel, so she ~~cannot~~ ^{could not} say no to Hadassah. But ^{that is different from being} ~~if she is~~ the chairman of the \$365 luncheon for the Federation Campaign, ^{where} she is working like hell month after month to get people to give \$365, \$1 a day.

In Hadassah there is a \$25 donor luncheon, ^{possibly} a \$100 donor luncheon. ^{A strong active leader realized that she could} ~~I can~~ make more money, ^{for Israel though} in the UJA than through Hadassah. So she's a good member of Hadassah, a good member of the synagogue, ~~the ladies' guild~~ or the sisterhood, a good member of the Council of Jewish Women. She's a good member of everything. But where is

she a leader? She is a leader in the UJA Campaign. I would say that the Women's Division grew and developed because of the quality of their leadership. It was superb. From Mrs. Levy to Matilda Brailove. In her day she was superb and Paulette^{Fink} was an excellent chairman, and Elaine Cyrus Winik was fantastic. The present chairman is Mrs. Hasenfeld from Providence, Rhode Island. She has such quality and elegance. There was Fanny Shenan and Mrs. Karp. This is superb human material.

Q.

I see that most of these Women's Division leaders are not New Yorkers.

A.

That's right. There was only one. The second reason for the success was that the women were always willing to take a risk and try something new. That's what I liked about them. They would sit and study and think and they would make some psychological survey. They would have a big meeting. Boston is very conservative, so we'll only make the jump up to \$500. Los Angeles and Hollywood are more flamboyant, so we'll make the next jump \$1,000. New York would always follow the lead. New York never gave the lead. When there was a \$1,000 luncheon in Los Angeles, New York would have a \$1,000 luncheon. In Chicago when they agreed they would try a \$2,000 women's luncheon, New York tried a \$2,000 women's luncheon. It's reached the point where there are now \$10,000 minimum Women's Division luncheons.

Q.

You're going to tell me that this is not their husband's money?

A.

I think not, because any woman can give \$10,000 if her husband is giving \$50,000. He ~~wouldn't~~ ^{might not} give \$60,000, but he would ^{give 50 and} let her give \$10,000. Now it's a question of her prestige in the local community. The Women's Liberation groups are much stronger. She tells him I want to be in the lead. I want to give my own money. I want to give \$10,000. He says to her, what do you mean your money, it's my money. She says no, it's not, because I worked for it too. Did you ever hear women's liberation people? I work too. I brought up the children. I ran this household. I did as much work as you did in your office. Don't tell me it's your money. I want to give \$10,000. Maybe he cuts down to \$40,000, but I don't think so. We have almost no cases like this. I think it's the same principle, extra money. That's the human psychology. She comes on her separate women's missions. She has a separate cash collection committee and she has her separate program at the National Conference in December every year. It has reached the point now where women are producing more than ^{100%} ~~100%~~ of the gross Campaign. That's fantastic, \$50 million through their own initiative.

Q.

Have you ever considered young women's leadership?

A.

Sure, I did, but they're not doing it. You have to have one person around who will do it, around whom to build and who will put the time and attention into it. They really do it, but they don't create a separate organization. What they do is look for young girls, 25, 30 year old young married women with one child and

they bring her right into the women's committee. They don't make a separate committee out of it. Maybe for them it's right.

Q.

Could you have created a girls' division?

A.

I don't know. Young girls, 20 year olds, are students at universities and I think it's better to have a students' division with boys and girls together. Between the ages of 25 and 35 there is a huge difference. At 25 you have a young married woman with no children, at 35 a married woman with two or three children. She is already a different type of person. They are in two separate worlds. A 25 year old man who is starting out as a young lawyer and a 35 year old man who is an established lawyer, they are both lawyers. They both go to their offices. Or they are both architects, storekeepers, whatever. They can be 25 or 35 years old and they'll still have something in common. A 25 year old married woman and a 35 year old married woman don't have anything in common anymore. The older one is already over the line.

Q.

Where's the line?

A.

Maybe 30. 35 to 45 are the same. There's no difference. The children are a little older, that's all, but they are in the same psychological, mental and social framework. This one has problems with her children who are eight years old. The other one has problems with her children who are eighteen years old, the same problems..

The third reason for the success of the Women's Division is this women's liberation movement and a motivation to want to do something on their own, as women, not just as Jews. They are proving themselves as people, equal to their husbands. As that developed I think that strengthened the Women's Division. Women's liberation is a separate movement, not a Jewish movement, but as a general movement in society, it helped the Women's Division.

Number four, the last point I would mention, is the degree of ideology and commitment. When you get a woman committed, her commitment, I think, is deeper than her husband's and she helps to convince him. Thus the value of the Women's Division is not just that she will give her \$1,000 plus, but that she keeps convincing him that he should raise his \$10⁰⁰ to \$12⁰⁰ to \$15⁰⁰. She helps work on his gift. Most people don't think of this. If she becomes so deeply committed, she keeps pushing him. She is the best solicitor of him.

Q.

Fanny Shanen told me that she became the chair-lady of the general Campaign in Dallas. Did that happen many times?

A.

Unfortunately, it didn't happen too many times. It happened from time to time, but still it's not common that a woman is chairman of the whole campaign, ^{in her community.} Some women have also become president of the Federation, not just chairman of the Campaign.

Q.

Faulette could have done that?


A.

Sure, but Paulette was never in her hometown very much. She was travelling all the time. In all the active years of her life, she was almost never in her own community, so she could never be president of the Federation. She was never there.

The Women's Division is worth a whole study by itself, believe me. I would criticize myself and the men's administration of the UJA because we never really gave the women as much time, attention and support as they wanted, as they needed and as they had a right to. They deserved it and we never gave them enough. They always complained about it and then they always said, we'll go and do our own business.

M. Kaufman

May 31 1977.



Not everything worked


Where is it possible to get this in?

Small gifts 197-99

Computerization 101-103

3-hour mission to Moscow
day mission to Australia

paying ransom in Russia 79 1971



Kaufman notes

UJA working (types of meetings)

~~50-66~~ ~~84-89~~ ~~101-108~~ 165-163 192-197
197-199

✓ Development forms

77-8; 81-83

Chairmen

WR; emmw; JM and Bonds

111-121; 124-126

✓ Million-dollar Dinner 127-138

Political crisis - coup

138-145

Six-Day War 145-164

Xerox these pages -
then put them up against
what I have already written
ch. 8 sec. 4.

UJA + local feds

168-177

UJA + Synag., national orgs., K.H.

178-85; 185-192

Women's Div.

213-221

GOOD MATERIAL for Chapter on W.D.,
together with seminar material from 1991 (?)

Make an outline

①

How the UJA works

1. Various types of meetings

B. Allocations, with local Fed. (42 ff - 50)

a. Why do people come to meetings? (50 bottom - 54)
Social contract + belief in cause

c. card calling meetings (54 - 57)

d. Stimulating meeting, mess (57 - 59)

1955 10th anniversary of war's end - Eisenhower - my installation speech on Morocco.

e. individual solicitation meetings (59 - 63)

(67 - 73)

f. speaker's bureau (64 - 66)

g. role of leader is to lead (73 - 74)

2. Making of Policy - duty of the leader

a. Emergency Fund / 1968 (75 - 76)

b. Development funds - booklet 21 Towns (77 - 78)

c. paying ransom to Russia (I lost) (79)

3. Use of technology (83 - bottom - 89)

a. documentary films (~~83~~ bottom -

Nahal OZ - Fedayeen '56

Dimona - Moroccans '60

video-tapes '67

(BOR canopy)

b. telephone hook-up - to 50 field-men - 1955

c. Golda - Miami - March 57 - re withdrawal (p. 92)
receiver on roof of Fountainbleau. from Sinai

d. telex network to all Feds in 67

e. I wanted national computer bank - failed. (p. 101). Individual communities did the job for themselves
1965 - Takatnik.

Notes

Good sentence

I wasn't born in 1776 but 1948 was
the closest thing - and I wanted to be in on the
ground floor.

look in Martin Berman section for pages
of notes - including Six-Day War schedule.

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES
MENACHEM KAUFMAN

- ✓ 1-9 - MONITOR & 45 Dec. Conf.
- ✓ 10 - IAF^{was} asked to be USA head 1952
- ✓ 11-12 "Nonsense of Timing" - really a declaration of war,
after a few years of skirmishing.
- ✓ 13 - IAF came to USA office - early 1955
- 14-16 - Klutznick's chairmanship
- ✓ 17 - Warburg - Special Fund for Morocco
- 18-21 - importance of lay leaders
- 21 - 22 Rosenwald soliciting Friedman in order to get Taubman
- 23 - 29 National Budgeting - power fight? Silver vs. Blaustein
- ✓ 30 ff IAF^{was} Personal History
- ✓ (34 ff) - Gershon Shalom "boots" story
- ✓ 36 ff - USA Conference 47 - Max Firestein
- ✓ 39 ff - Morgenthau and Demob story
- ✓ 41-42 - IAF^{was} qualities which were good for the job
- ✓ 42 ff - Description of allocations meeting - PCB
- ✓ 48-49 - Sense of destiny - 20th cent. was overseas needs first.

Menachem Kaufman (cont.)

- ✓ 50-51 - why people come to meetings
- ✓ 52 ff - social contract between Jews - rules of the game - played among handful of top givers.
- ✓ 55 ff - cord calling meetings
- ✓ 57 ff - stimulating meetings
- ✓ 59 - individual solicitation meetings
- ✓ 60-62 - building an ideology: unity of the people; responsibility; centrality of Israel
- ✓ 63 - my personal motivation came from Holocaust and Bricha
- ✓ 64-66 - Speakers' Bureau and teaching others how to do it. Each person was creative
- ✓ 67 - Eisenhower
- ✓ 68 - 1955^{ms} installation, meeting in Washington, 10th ann. of V.E.
- ✓ 69 - installation speech
- * ✓ 70 - study tables + coffins
- ✓ 71 - emphasis in 55, 56 on rescuing Moroccan Jewry
- ✓ 72-3 - ^{I tried to teach} historic trends, requiring long-range support; I made policy as to thrust + emphasis
- ✓ 74 - role of leader is to lead.
- * 75 - security of Israel is #1 question - we are in a hundred year's war - ^{Moh. Kveln Journal - B.G.}
- 75-76 Emergency fund for 1968
- 77 - booklet - "21 Towns"
- 78 - raising money for a particular reason, ^(ie. - development towns) and not being sure the Agency would spend it ^{on that need,}
- 79 - paying ransom for immigration - I said pay. for Rumanian Jews + Russian.
- 81 - situation in development towns still not good - J.A. guilty of neglect
- 82-3 - I don't think J.A. is responsive to what American Jews want - ^{Recons. funded J.A. is million stamp}
- 84-5 - films + videotapes 1967
- 86-78-9 telephone hook-up; closed circuit TV - big screen - Golda in Sept. 70
- * 90-92 - story of Israeli interdiction of Syria
- 92-94 - Golda on Miami TV
- 94 - technology again
- 95 - Fisher and not fighting with communities
- 96 - Meyerhoff
- 97 - communities, CIF USA and center of power. USA was the power.

Menachem Kaplan (cont.)

- ✓ 101⁻³ - Computerization, national and local
- ✓ 104 - use of planes, private, quick visits to small towns and big (Moscow)
- ✓ 105 - 3-hour mission to Moscow; 1 day mission to Auschwitz
- ✓ 106 - closed-circuit live TV broadcasts from Israel - someday will be possible when Israel has an Earth Station. Now you can do it by film and get your film to N.Y. and shown on closed circuit to your audiences within 24 hours. In future - real time
- ✓ 108 - Psychology of using new technology, to put electricity + excitement into an event.
- 109-110 Six-Day war
- 111-112 - Relationship to chairman, in general
- 113-118 - Rosenwald + Warburg, two different types
- * 118-119 - Rosenwald + Israel Bonds: USA + Bonds. USA should help. I was loyal to Israel more than to the USA.
- 120 - Mayachoff exactly opposite: took chairmanships of both USA + Bonds
- 120-121 - Cooperation between 2 organizations on national level.
- 121 - Relationship between State + nation. More about Rosenwald.
- * 122-123 - In order to keep campaign on upward trend, I tried for million \$ gifts.
- 124-126 - More on Rosenwald's psychology of giving + method of working
- 126-127 - Problem of chairman in '74 - Adelman couldn't take it; Lautenberg did.
- 127-129 - Back to the million \$ gifts story.
- 131-133 - Annenberg's gift of 1 mill. in '67 - reference to Fisher's role (more later - page 150 ff)
- * 134 - I predicted in Sept. '67 that war would resume in '68, thus we would need another Emergency Fund. I based this on Kheifetz's declaration - three w's.
- * 136 - I always had to take the initiative on policy matters - except once, in '67. Eshkol called, on eve of '67 war.
- * ✓ 138-145 Political crisis in '61 inside USA - attempted coup against me. Issue arose over Abe Hyman, whom I wanted to bring in as my assistant.
- * * * * 145-164 Return to the May '67 moment. Story is now told in sequence. This is the most detailed recital of ^{SFA} ~~my~~ ^{my} ~~war~~ ^{war}
- 165-167 Big Gifts - who influences them - USA or local federation?
- 168-170 ~~168-170~~ Relations between New York + National, including chairman
- 170-171 Relations between USA + Fed. Directors - Difficult
- 172-174 Relations between USA lay leaders + Fed. lay leaders - pressure
- 174-177 Relations between USA + CEF - not very helpful. CEF would not assist USA to pressure local. I always argued with CEF - really had little use for them. They are local-oriented. direct a layman

Menachem Kaufman (cont)

- 178-185 - Relationship between VSA and synagogues - what VSA did: national rabbinic cabinet, plus 100% plan
- 185-189 - Relations with national organizations - none, including Zionist organizations.
- 189-192 Relations with Keren Hayesod - gradually became closer, full cooperation
- 192-197 How was Board of VSA elected?
- 197-199 - worthwhileness of soliciting small gifts - I thought it worth a try and had a plan, using students, but it was never really tried, by either Bernstein or Michel
- # 200-213 - Young leadership - story of its founding
- 213-221 Women's Division

האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים

THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM

INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY JEWRY

המכון ליהדות זמננו
המדור לתיעוד בע"פ



ירושלים, כ"א באלול תשל"ה
28.8.1975

לכבוד

הרב הרב פרידמן,
היברו יוניון קולג',
רח' דוד המלך 13,
ירושלים.

הרב פרידמן הנכבד,

המכון ליהדות זמננו של האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים בשיתוף עם
הנהלת המגבית היהודית המאוחדת החלו בפרויקט תיעודי על תולדות המגבית
היהודית המאוחדת. גביית התיעוד תעשה באמצעות מדורנו.

אנו מעונינים מאוד לקיים עמך ראיון מוקלט בנושא זה. המראיין
יהיה מר מנחם קאופמן מן המכון ליהדות זמננו.

נודה לך מאוד אם תואיל לתת את הסכמתך העקרונית לקיום הראיון,
מיד עם קבלת הסכמתך, נחקר עמך כדי לחאם את המקום והמועד הנוחים לך
לקיום הפגישה.

רצ"ב חמצא גליון המסביר את דרכי עבודתו של המדור ומטרותיו.

בתודה מראש
ובכבוד רב,

אשר קייג

אהרן קירר
מנהל מדעי

לוטה.

Spoke to Dagan? 10.9.75
He thanked me for initiative
and said Kaufman would be in touch.

המדור לתיעוד בע"פ הינו חלק מן המכון ליהדות זמננו של האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים. המכון עוסק בחקר ובהוראת תולדות עם ישראל בזמננו. המדור לתיעוד בע"פ יוצר ומשלים תיעוד (דוקומנטציה) בשטחים, שלמרות חשיבותם להסטוריה היהודית החדשה, לא נמצא לגביהם חומר אחר במידה מספקת. זכרונותיהם של עדי התקופה יכולים להאיר נושאים אלה לחוקר של היום ולהסטוריון של מחר. תדפיסי הראיונות נשמרים בארכיון המדור לתיעוד בע"פ, המכיל כבר קרוב לסלושת אלפיט עדויות.

נוהל גביית העדות

עם מתן ההסכמה העקרונית להיות מרואיין, אנו מתאימים את הזמן והמקום הרצויים למרואיין לטעם ביצוע הראיון. אנו נוהגים להקליט את הראיון על גבי סרט של רטם-קול (טייפ-רקורדר) ואח"כ להדפיסו. שני עותקים (מקור והעתק) של התדפיס נשלחים אל המרואיין לטעם תיקון והשלמה. את המקור, כשהוא מאוטר בחתימת ידו, מבקש המרואיין להשיב בדואר למדור; ההעתק נשאר בידינו.

אנו מסאירים למרואיין את האפשרות להחליט באיזו מידה תהיה עדותו פתוחה או שמורה.

עדות פתוחה: בעדות פתוחה כוונתנו לעדות שיוכלו לעיין בה לצרכי מחקר וציטוט אנטי מחקר מוכרים שיאוטרו על-ידי האוניברסיטה.

עדות שמורה: הגישה לעדות שמורה חוגבל כאמרו לעיל לגבי עדות פתוחה; נוסף על כך יהיה צורך לקבל היתר בכתב מן המרואיין לכל פרסום ועיון בחומר. למראיין ולראשי המדור לתיעוד בע"פ שמורה הזכות לעיין בחומר זה.

אנו מוכנים לסווג עדות כשמורה וסודית לחלוטין לפרק זמן עליו יוסכם עם המרואיין. עדות מסוג זה זוכה לטיפול הולם. היא מודפסת על-ידי כתבנית מיוחדת; האמונה על סודיות, ונשמרת במקום בטוח המיועד למטרה זו.

הסייגים שהובאו לעיל אינם חלים על המראיין והמדריך, אשר יוכלו להשתמש בעדות למחקרם ללא צורך באיטור נוסף, אלא אם כן מבקש זאת העד במיוחד.

ישראל והמגבית היהודית המאוחדת: מהפך מלחמת ששת הימים

מאת מנחם קאופמן

דולר אלא 65 מליון דולר יידרשו והוצע שהקהילות יכריזו על מגבית חרום של 100 מליון דולר. מקס פישר נמצא באותו זמן בחברת המיליונר קמינגס באתונה. הם ציפו להנרי פורד כדי לצאת להפלגת נופש אל איי הים האגיאני. בלי אישור פישר אי אפשר להיה להתחיל במגבית חרום. רק אחרי יום ולילה של דיון טס פישר לתל אביב ולמד ממנהיגי ישראל על רצינות המצב והצורך בסיוע מיידי. נמסר לו מידע על ההכנות הצבאיות של האויב ועל התוצאות המאכזבות של המאמצים המדיניים. ב-28 במאי הוא נתן את אישורו למגבית חירום, חזר לאתונה ויצא להפלגה. עמיוניו בארה"ב, שבחלקם שהו בחגיגת יום הולדתו ה-50 של אדורד גינסבורג בקליבלנד, נתנו את הסכמתם הטלפונית. הקשר הושג בקושי כי ביוון פרצה מהפכת הקולונלים. גינסברג שנטל על עצמו את הנהגת המגבית בפועל מסר עדות זהה לזו של פרידמן על האירועים במגבית בסוף מאי. אחד ממנהיגי המגבית התעשין ג'ק פלדמן מדאלס, נתן ב-2 ביוני ביטוי למהפך העמדות. הוא התחייב לתרום מיד 250,000 דולר. גינסברג מצטט את דבריו:

"אם זה לא מספיק, בחורים, אמרו לי מה עלי לעשות, כי אתם יכולים לקבל כל מה שיש לי. אם משהו יקרה לישראל כל מה שיהיה לי יהפוך לחסר-משמעות".

הוא תרם לבסוף חצי מליון דולר. ב-1976 הסביר פלדמן, שחשש משואה חדשה, כי חש באשמה שלא עשה די בשעת הצורך במלחמת העולם השנייה.

ב-30 במאי יצא פרידמן עם גינסברג לשדה התעופה כדי לקבל את פני השגריר אברהם הרמן ולפי הבעת פניו הבינו שהמלחמה היא בלתי נמנעת. באותו יום הגיע פנחס ספיר לאמריקה ואריה פינקוס הצטרף לצוות. ב-31 במאי (The Decoration Day בארה"ב) היו המשרדים סגורים, ולא ניתן היה להפעיל את מנגנון המגבית כדי לארגן כנס חרום. ביצוע המגבית היה מוטל על הפדרציות. הכנס התקיים רק ב-4 ביוני בהשתתפות 400 נציגי קהילות. שם הוכרז על מגבית חרום למען ישראל. במועד זה היה חשוב לקבל תרומה חריגה מתורם חריג שתשכנע את הספקנים בצורך למאמץ חריג. ולטר אננברג שלפני מאי 1967 ובימים רגילים לא היה בין התורמים הגדולים שוכנע ב-31 במאי, לתת מיד מליון דולר. אננברג, מאוחר יותר שגריר ארה"ב בלונדון, היה מעורב בתקשורת ולכן מעודכן יותר מאחרים ביחס להכנות הערבים להשמיד את המדינה היהודית. מנהל ה-Bonds, ג'ו שווארץ, ומנהל מועצת הפדרציות, פיליפ ברנשטיין,

רביית יהודי אמריקה וביניהם ראשי המגבית היהודית המאוחדת (ה-UJA) הופתעו מפרוץ מלחמת ששת הימים. גוטפריד המר, אחד מראשי המגבית במשך דור, נתן לכך ביטוי: "מלחמת ששת הימים הכתה בנו כרעם ביום בהיר". כאשר נתבהרה חומרת הסכנה, גברה ביהדות אמריקה החרדה משואה חדשה. הוגה הדעות היהודי אברהם יהושע השל שאל: "האם יהיו עוד אושוויץ? עוד דכאו? עוד טרבלינקה? זהו הרקע להתפתחויות UJA שהפך אולי למוקד החשוב ביותר של תגובות יהודי ארה"ב לאירועים.

הרברט פרידמן כיהן ב-1967 כסגן נשיא בפועל של המגבית. הוא לחם מ-1955 כדי לחזק את ישראל. ב-1967 הוא חש בסכנה המרחפת עליה מוקדם יותר מראשי המגבית אנשי ציבור. כזכור הכריז עבדול נאצר שעצם קיומה של ישראל היא בבחינת תוקפנות. ב-16 במאי הודיעה קהיר שמגיע הקרב בו ישראל תושמד. ב-19 במאי גירש נאצר את כוחות האו"ם מחצי האי סיני. ודיוויזיה אחרי דיוויזיה חצתה את התעלה. פרידמן חש שעל המגבית להתארגן לשעת חירום. הוא לא יכול היה לשכנע את מקס פישר, יושב הראש הכללי של המגבית, את שנים עשר יושי-הראש הארציים ואת ראשי ה-CJFWF. אדוארד גינסברג, אחרי ה-5 ביוני ראש המגבית בפועל, מזכיר שב-25 במאי הגיב לאזהרתו של פרידמן ממלחמה: "יצאת מדעתך". פרידמן החל לבדוק את ספרי המגבית כדי לסכם את חובות הקהילות ולפנות אליהן בשעת מצוקה. ההתחייבויות היו 25 מליון דולר. ב-20 במאי הגיע למשרד הראשי של המגבית הקונסול הכללי של ישראל, מיכאל ארנון, ובידו מברק מוצפן מאת ראש הממשלה לוי אשכול שישראל זקוקה באופן מיידי ל-25 מליון דולר במזומן. סכום זה נועד למלא "חור" בקופת מטבע החוץ של המדינה שביקשה לרכוש מיד מקנדה מטוסי F-86. למחרת טס פרידמן לישראל. ב-22 במאי נפגש עם אשכול. באותו יום הודיע נאצר על סגירת המיצרים. כאשר נודע לאשכול שמנהיגי יהודי אמריקה אינם מאמינים שתפרוץ מלחמה, העיר שהרב הצבאי הראשי שלמה גורן ביקש להקצות שטח קרקע ל-40,000 קורבנות. לפרידמן אורגן סיור לאורך קווי שביתת הנשק עם מצרים. שם צפה בשדרות הטנקים המצריים ופגש את חיילי צה"ל המתחפרים.

מתל אביב התקשר אל יושבי הראש הארציים בארה"ב, אך אלה השיבו שהוא משוגע והיסטרי. חישובו במקום שלא 25 מליון

עודכנו. מנהיגים יהודים הקשיבו לפרשנים מקהיר מיריחו ומדמשק. אלה מסרו, כל אחד בשפתו, שהערבים גייסו מאות אלפי חיילים וישראל תובס בוודאות, השאלה היא רק כמה זמן תמשך המלחמה. ב-4 ביוני פסקו בניו יורק הויכוחים. בלילה שבין ה-4 ל-5 ביוני טלפן פינקוס לבנין המגבית והודיע שהמלחמה התחילה. בשעות הראשונות שררה פניקה בקהילות רבות. תחנות שידור ערביות הודיעו שתל אביב בוערת, בתי הזיקוק בחיפה נהרסו וכל ארצות ערב הכריזו מלחמה על ישראל. ישראל עדיין שתקה. פישר התקשר למטה המגבית מספינתו בים האגיא. חבריו, קנינגס והנרי פורד, תרמו כל אחד 100,000 דולר. המשרד הראשי של המגבית הפך למוקד חשוב של התגייסות יהדות ארה"ב למען ישראל הלוחמת.

מלחמת ששת הימים שינתה את מעמד המגבית ביהדות אמריקה. על כך מעיד אברהם הרמן, אשר כיהן בעבר כקונסול כללי בניו יורק ומ-1959 כשגריר ישראל בוואשינגטון. הוא מסר ב-1980: "תמיד חשבתי שאנו בקונסוליה ובשגרירות חייבים לראות במגבית את המכשיר הפופולארי והמקיף ביותר להזדהות יהודית עם ישראל". על המגבית לפני 1967 אמר: "בתקופה זו לא נוכל לדבר על התקדמות מתמדת בהישגי המגבית. כאשר המצב בארץ היה שקט היתה ירידה. כאשר היו אירועים חריגים היו עליות". ב-1957/1956, בזמן מבצע "קדש", היתה עליה לא גדולה בהכנסות המגבית. זה היה עניין חד-פעמי. נראה שבזמן מבצע סיני לא חשו יהודי אמריקה שסכנה ממשית מאיימת על קיום ישראל ותושביה. הרמן ממשיך לדווח: "מ-1959 ועד 1967 היתה תקופה קשה ביותר למגבית. זו היתה תקופה שקטה. אני זוכר את הסכומים. כל שנה היה מאבק, עליך היה להשקיע מאמץ עצום כדי להגיע לאותה תוצאה." הרמן מוטר לנו שבראשית מאי 1967 עדיין תוכננה ועידה כלכלית בבית הקונסול בניו יורק כדי לסייע למיבית ולבונדס, "שאיסוף התרומות שלהם פיגר, כי היתה תחושה שהכל בסדר ושחלף עשור בלי שמשוה יקרה".

את משמעות המהפך ביהדות אמריקה ב-1967 יש להעריך על רקע פעילות המגבית בשנות החמישים והשישים. בתקופת מלחמת השחרור עמד הנרי מורגנטאו הבן בראש המגבית אך הנר מונטור הטביע עליה את חותמו. הוא העלה את המגבית מארגון פילנטרופי אל מעמד של גורם המסייע למדינה היהודית בשלבי הקמתה. לאחר שהתחייבויות למגבית הגיעו ב-1947 ל-125 מיליון דולר וב-1948 ל-150 מיליון חלה ירידה ב-49 לרמה של כ-103 מיליון. ב-1953 היו ההתחייבויות למגבית 65 מיליון וב-1955 ירדו לשפל של 60 מיליון. אחרי האופוריה של מלחמת העצמאות חזרה יהדות ארה"ב לשגרת יום יום והקהילות נתנו יותר ויותר עדיפות לצרכים המקומיים. אולי היה גם נסיון להדחיק את אשר התרחש בתקופת השואה, שעה בה יהדות אמריקה לא עמדה במבחן. בראש המגבית התייצבו, בין היתר, אדוארד וורבורג וויליאם רוזנוולד מראשי הגיונט. רוזנוולד היה מתרים מעולה, אך העובדה שמדינת ישראל זקוקה בדחיפות לכסף לא תמיד הרשימה אותו. לפרנסי הקהילות היה נראה שהמטרות שהציבו לעצמם בסוף מלחמת העולם השנייה הושגו.

בראשית שנות החמישים נואש מונטור מעתיד המגבית ובעידוד בן גוריון הקים את ה-Bonds. כמנהל המגבית מונה ג'ו שווארץ, המנהל הדגול של הגיונט באירופה במלחמת העולם השנייה. הוא היה בלתי מנוסה בתחום גיוס הכספים. לא היה

הסכם על השיעורים שיוקצבו לצרכים מעבר לים ולצרכי הקהילות. ברוב המקרים היתה יד הקהילות על העליונה. שווארץ וויתר ולא איים על הקהילות בעריכת מגבית מחוץ למסגרת הפדרציה שכפי שעשה מונטור. היתה זאת תקופת העימות למרות צרכיה העצומים של ישראל. בשעת עליית שארית הפליטה מאירופה ועליית קהילות ארצות המזרח לא התגייסה יהדות אמריקה. קליטת העליה לא נתפסה על ידה כמצב חירום.

פרידמן הכניס רוח חדשה למגבית, נאבק עם ראשי הפדרציות על חלקה של המגבית בהכנסות המגביות המקומיות. כציוני העמיד את מדינת ישראל במוקד. הוא נקט ביוזמות שסייעו למגבית ב-1967. מאמץ גדול הושקע בארגון משלחות (missions) למחנות המוות בפולין ולהבדיל, לישראל, כדי שיבינו את משמעות השואה ואת צרכי ישראל. הוא התמקד במנהיגים צעירים. הופעלה קרן מיוחדת לחינוך אליה הורשו לתרום רק אלה שמלאו את חובתם למגבית הסדירה. הוקמו "המחלקה לנשים" ו-"מועצת היעוץ הרבנית". אל הקהילות באו מנהיגי ישראל ובכיריה. נוצרו הכלים ששרתו את המגבית במשברים של 1967 ו-1973. אך ההכנסות לא עלו בצורה משמעותית. ב-1956 נעה הן היו 75 מיליון; ב-1957 85 מיליון; בין 1958-1966 נעה ההכנסה בין 60-64 מיליון דולר לשנה.

נראה שב-1967 ובעשור אחרי מלחמת ששת הימים הפכה המגבית לארגון נג בעל עוצמה של יהדות ארה"ב, כלי חשוב לחיזוק זהותה, אולי, ארגון המנהיגות החשוב ביותר. מועצת הפדרציות (CJF), עדיין חלשה, עסקה בעיקר בתאום עמדות הפדרציות הבודדות. לא היה בכוחה להטיל עליהן מרות ולארגן אותן למבצע משותף. לא בלטו מנהיגים כריזמטיים שיהיה בכוחם להפעיל את הציבור היהודי באמריקה בשעת איום על קיומה של ישראל. בתחום המדיני הטהור פעלו כבר ב-1967 שני גופים: וועידת הנשיאים (Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations) שהחלה להתארגן עוד ב-1953, אך הפכה לגוף קבוע רק ב-1966; וה-AIPAC. שגרשם באופן רשמי ל"lobbying organization" למען ישראל וזו היתה עיקר פעילותו. שני ארגונים אלה לא נועדו להתארגנות המוני היהודים בשעת חירום. במישור המקומי פעלו הפדרציות אשר קבלו את ההנחיות בתחום המגביות בעיקר מהמגבית. אברהם הרמן הגדיר את מהות המגבית אז בזו הלשון:

"אף פעם לא התייחסתי אל המגבית היהודית המאוחדת כאל עניין כלכלי טהור, אם-כי ההשלכות הכלכליות של הארגון חשובות. היא מהווה תחליף לארגון ציוני ציבורי, משום שהיא מייצגת את השאלה הפשוטה: האם יש ליהודים זכות למדינה משלהם או לא".

בכל חידושי הטכניקה והתקשורת של אמצע שנות השישים כדי לשדר לכל הארץ מידע, הנחיות ונאומים לאספות במשך 24 שעות. חומר מצולם מהחזיתות ששוכפל בלידה בניו-יורק נשלח בבוקר בדואר אוויר לכל הקהילות, לפי פרדימן, "כדי להראות לקהילות מה לעזאזל קורה שם". ה-CNN טרם נולד. בעלי מטוסים פרטיים העמידו אותם לרשות המגבית. כל זה על פי העקרון Information makes formation. אמצעים אלה סייעו למגבית להשאר במוקד החיים היהודיים.

פרידמן הפך את משרדי המגבית למטה של מבצע שהוכיח את עצמו. לא פחות חשובה בשלב זה היתה רוח ההתנדבות. הן פרידמן והן ברנשטיין שאפו להפוך את האירגון לתנועה, ל-movement לפי תפיסת הציונות האמריקנית, ועשו זאת בהצלחה ניכרת. החל מ-67 הפעילו היטב את הכלים שהקנו למגבית סממנים של תנועה.

המשתתפים במשלחות חשו בשליחות, מושג לא זר ליהדות אמריקה. ה"קבינט של המנהיגות הצעירה" השתלב בפעולה השוטפת. חבריו עזבו את עסקיהם והתנדבו במשך חודשים. לאונרד בל, אחד מראשי הקבינט מדוח: "ההתייצבות בניו יורק ב-30 במאי, לא חזרתי הביתה עד סוף אוגוסט. נסעתי עם פנחס

מטרה זו הושגה למעשה רק כעבור 19 שנה. ארוינג ברנשטיין ביקש לראות במגבית ב-1967 ובעשור אחרי מלחמת ששת הימים את "ארגון הציונות החדשה".

לא בכל מקום הופתעו מפרוץ המלחמה. מקולומבוס/ אוהיו שיגרו ראשי הפדרציה ארבעה ימים אחרי סגירת המיצרים, ב-26 במאי, 262 מברקים לקבוצת יהודים נבחרת והזמינו אותם לכנס בו הוכרזה מגבית חירום. תוך חודש נאספו שם 611,000 דולר במזומן. ברוב המקומות ציפו ליוזמת הנהגת המגבית. בניו יורק גוייסו ב-5 ביוני, בטרם נודעו פרטים על מצב המלחמה 15 מליון תוך שעה אחת. מערכת החשמל התקלקלה, אך האספה נמשכה. למזכירות היה קשה לארגן את רישום זרם התרומות. רוב התרומים הבינו שאין זה הזמן ל"התחייבויות", לכן נתנו כסף מזומן, גם כאשר נאלצו לגייס את הכסף. הויכוח בין ראשי המגבית והפדרציות על חלוקת ההכנסות הפך לעניין אנטאכרוניסטי. המוסדות הישראליים הפסיקו את מגביותיהם הנפרדות. במצב זה היתה חשיבות עליונה לכושר הארגון והאלתור של ראשי המגבית. כדי ליצור אווירה מתאימה ותחושה של מחויבות אצל היהודים היה צורך להעמיד לרשותם מידע עדכני ומהימן. מטרה זו הושגה על ידי שימוש

קורס ללימודי "אמריקה וארץ הקודש 1620-1948"

מאת משה אברנך

הרבה הישגים מקוריים יש לזקוף לזכותו של פרופ' משה דייוויס, כגון ייסוד המכון ליהדות זמננו באוניברסיטה העברית והמרכז הבין-ארצי להוראת תרבות ישראל באוניברסיטאות. ברם, יתכן שגולת הכותרת של פעולותיו המחקריות של פרופ' דייוויס היא יצירת דיסציפלינה חדשה במדעי היהדות: "לימודי אמריקה וארץ הקודש" – נושא שכמעט ולא עסקו בו עד שבה פרופ' דייוויס וטיפל בו במסירות עצומה משך עשרות בשנים והפכו לדיסציפלינה מכובדת. חלק הגון של הספרות

בתחום זה נכתב או נערך על ידי פרופ' דייוויס, והוא גם הכין ביבליוגרפיות של הספרות והמקורות. כיום יש מספר ניכר של סטודנטים באוניברסיטאות שלומדים נושא חדש זה ואף מתמחים בו.

הדיסציפלינה החדשה נועדה לחקור את מכלול היחסים בין אמריקה וארץ ישראל מאז המאה ה-17 ועד ייסודה של מדינת ישראל ב-1948. חשיבותו של מפעל זה הוא מעל ומעבר לתחום האינטלקטואלי. יש בו גם מימד אקטואלי, שכן עשוי הוא לתרום להידוק היחסים בין ארה"ב ומדינת ישראל. נושא מרתק זה שופך אור על הקשרים ההדוקים בין אמריקה וארץ הקודש משך מאות בשנים. התעניינותה של אמריקה בכל מה שמתרחש בארץ ישראל אינה עניין של צורכי בחירות ולחץ הקול היהודי כפי שטוענים אויבינו. האינטרס האמריקני כגורם חיובי ואוהד ליהודים בא"י קדם לציונות המודרנית במאתיים וחמישים שנה.

מחקריו של פרופ' דייוויס בתחום זה כבר הספיקו לגלות עד כמה היתה ארץ הקודש גורם חיוני בחיים הרוחניים של אלפי

אמריקנים – בחינת גשר בין תולדות אמריקה וארץ ישראל והנצרות האמריקנית שהתנ"ך וארץ הקודש היו מרכיבים מרכזיים בהשקפת עולמה.

בקץ זה נערך קורס עיון, מחקר ולימודי שדה מטעם המכון ליהדות זמננו, בשיתוף עם בית ספר רוטברג לתלמידי חו"ל, על "אמריקה וארץ הקודש". תשעה סטודנטים, מהם שבעה נוצרים, השתתפו בקורס, ומשך חודש ימים שמעו מדי יום הרצאות על מגוון רב של נושאים, וביקרו במספר מקומות הקשורים בצורה זו או אחרת לפעילות אמריקנית בא"י.

במסיבת קבלת פנים לקראת סיום הקורס שנערכה בדירתו של פרופ' דייוויס, שוחח פרופ' דייוויס – בין השאר – על הנשיא טרומן וידידו היהודי, אדי גייקובסון, וכן על ביקורו של הרב הראשי יצחק הרצוג ז"ל אצל הנשיא זמן קצר לפני הכרזת מדינת ישראל. בהזדמנות זו כינה הרב הרצוג את טרומן "כורש של ימינו". הדברים נכנסו לליבו של הנשיא – עד כדי כך שאח"כ כינה את עצמו בתואר זה! בשיחה מרתקת גילה פרופ' דייוויס שקיבל אישור מהנשיא טרומן

אך גם ב-1967 לא נענו כל היהודים לפנייתו. היו שהשיבו: לא אתמוך בישראל התוקפנית. אנטיציוניס חששו שישמשו בכספים למטרות "לא לגיטימיות" כגון מימון העליה אולי אפילו של יהודי אמריקה. נתקבלו תשובות כגון "כבר נתתי ואין לי יותר תקציב". היו מיליונרים שתרמו סכומים קטנים מאוד. כאשר חשו שאין סיכוי לשכנע עברו לאיש הבא ברשימה. לפעמים היה הכרח להרגיע יהודים מודאגים, שתרומה גדולה אינה התחייבות קבועה לעתיד. לא היה קשה להסביר גם אחרי הניצחון הצבאי שדרוש כסף רב כדי להבטיח את ההישג. בדרך כלל היתה הענות מעבר לכל המצופה. ספיר המשושף במגביות היה נרגש מהפגישה עם שלושה דורות של תורמים, אבות בנים ובני בנים, אשר הביאו את חסכוניהם.

אחד היהודים שבעבר חזר והשיב לספיר תמיד: "אין לי כסף בשבילך" הביא לו מעטפה שהכילה 100,000 דולר. מאוחר יותר תרם מליון. אנשי "ארגון הקולונוענים" תרמו בערב אחד 2 מליון. מתבוללים שהסתייגו בעבר מכל קשר לעניין יהודי ואפילו מתנצרים שינו את עמדות ונתנו לכך ביטוי על ידי תרומה גבוהה. כאשר הסביר גינסברג בטלפון לאחד התורמים בכוח את המצב ב-5 ביוני בבוקר קבל את התשובה הבאה: אתה צודק,

ספיר בחוף המערבי מאספה אחת לשניה. בתיק שלי הצטברו מאות המחאות על סך מיליונים. מנהיגים צעירים אחרים פעלו באופן דומה. התקשרתי עם כל חברי ה-Cabinet. לא מצאתי איש מהם בביתו או במשרדו. כולם היו מגויסים. אחדים מחברי הקבינט תרמו בעצמם סכומים גדולים מאוד... הייתי במשלחת עם אדי גינסברג וארוינג ברנשטיין ביום החמישי של המלחמה, כמעט הרסתי את העסק שלי אך זה לא העסיק אותי אז". חברי "מועצת היעוץ הרבנית" וחברות "מחלקת הנשים" פעלו בדרך דומה. רבנים הפכו למתרימים. המאמצים שהושקעו בעשור שקדם ל-1967 נשאו פרי. אדי גינסברג, ראש המגבית בפועל אז נעדר מביתו במשך ששה שבועות.

לאור הנסיבות הללו הלכו ופחתו המתחים בין מנהל המגבית ובין מנהלי הפדרציות. מנהל מועצת הפדרציות פיליפ ברנשטיין פעל ממשרדי המגבית למען מגבית החרום. אך כל הפעילים הקפידו להדגיש שהכספים הנתרמים אינם מיועדים למימון ישיר של המלחמה אלא לקיום שירותים אזרחיים. היה תמיד חשש שאוהבי ישראל באר"י ינסו לנצל מגבית בזמן המלחמה כדי לפגוע בסטטוס של "התרומה המשוחררת ממס" של המגבית. חקירות ועדת הסנטור פולברייט ב-1963 טרם נשכחו.

כי אין ספק שהמסורת הנוצרית באר"י מעודדת לימודים אלה. לקראת השנה הבאה, נוסף למחקרים השוטפים, מתכנן המפעל לערוך קורס עבור מורים ישראלים, תוך מטרה להכניס במשך הזמן את תחום ההוראה הזה למוסדות החינוכיים של מדינת ישראל. לשם כך, דרוש עיבוד המקורות, שרובם ככולם באנגלית, ללשון העברית.

ויפתחו את המפעל שפרופ' דייוויס התחיל בו. פרופ' דייוויס מדגיש שוב ושוב שיש חומר עצום בספריות ובארכיונים המכחה לחוקרים מיומנים שיעסקו בו ויפרסמו את ממצאיהם. הרבה מהעוסקים במחקר זה אינם מבני ברית אלא סטודנטים נוצרים צעירים שבהשראתו של פרופ' דייוויס התלהבו מהנושא הזה, ולאודווקא מטעמים דתיים, אם

שאכן היה זה הרב הרצוג שהמציא את הכינוי "כורש של ימינו" ביחס לטרומן. בקשר לזה, הודיעה אחת התלמידות שתפקידו של אדי גייקובסון והשפעתו על הנשיא טרומן יהיו פרויקט מחקר מטעם המכון ליהדות זמננו.

שוחחתי עם כמה מהמשתתפים, וכולם היו מלאי התפעלות על החוויה של לימודים אינטנסיביים ברמה אקדמית גבוהה באוניברסיטה העברית. כמה מהם מתכווננים להמשיך במידה זו או אחרת את המחקרים שהחלו בהם.

מנהל הקורס היה החוקר ד"ר מנחם קאופמן. מר יוסף גלאס ריכז את פעולות הקורס וגם שימש מדריך בכמה מלימודי השדה שנערכו בשביל המשתתפים. בין שאר המרצים היו: ד"ר יעקב אריאל, מחבר הספר On Behalf of Israel; פרופ' יהושע בן-אריה, מראשי החוקרים של תולדות א"י בתקופה המודרנית; פרופ' גרשון גרינברג מ-American University; בווינגטון; והרב דוד קלצקר שתחום מחקריו הוא "עולי רגל לא"י".

המשימה העומדת כעת לפני המכון ליהדות זמננו היא לעודד מלומדים צעירים שימשיכו

משתתפי
הסדנא,
בקיץ 1992



יהודים מוכרים במשק האמריקני, כגון מקס פיישר בדטרויט ופיליפ קלוצניק בשיקגו נתנו גיבוי לפניית הקהילות. ההלוואות אושרו ללא תקלות. יהדות אמריקה נרתמה אז לעזרת ישראל בכל המסלולים הפיננסיים האפשריים.

אך היו גם תקלות. כאשר הרברט פרידמן טען בספטמבר 1967 שהמלחמה עשויה להתחדש בקרוב, הוא נתקבל בקריאות כגון: אתה מחרחרר מלחמה המחפש סנסציות ותרוצים כדי להשיג כמה מיליונים נוספים. המבקרים גם הסתמכו על כך שקרן היסוד שפעלה מירושלים לא המשיכה במגבית החרום. כעבור חצי שנה החלה מלחמת ההתשה. ירידת הכנסות קרן החרום ב-1968 ועליית ההכנסות בשנים הבאות מעידים על כך שלבסוף השתכנעו יהודי אמריקה שהנצחון ב-1967 לא פתר את בעיית בטחונה של ישראל, גינסברג, ראש המגבית ב-1968 אמר: "החלטות חרטום הוכיחו לנו שכדי להשרד חייבת ישראל להשאר בכוננות צבאית גבוהה המחייבת הקצאת שיעור גדול של ההכנסה הלאומית לבטחון. המשכנו במשימה לסייע לה. מלחמת יוני זעזעה את יהודי אמריקה שהבינו שקיימת אפשרות שישראל תושמד. הם חשו עד כמה היא חשובה להם. הם דאגו לא רק לשלום היהודים הישראלים אלא לדימוי העצמי שלהם עצמם אשר הפך לגורם חשוב למניעת הפיכת התרומות לקרן החרום הישראלית לעניין חד-פעמי. היתה תחושה שהאיום על היהודים שם בישראל הוא איום על העם היהודי, גם בארה"ב".

כדי לשמור על רמת הזדהות גבוהה המשיכו ראשי המגבית להזרים מידע מעודכן. צוותים בהשתתפות אנשי צבא ישראלים ביקרו בקביעות בקהילות בחודשים ובשנים אחרי תום קרבות 1967. המשלחות לישראל היו בתקופה זו בבחינת סימניריונים חינוכיים. אחרי 1967 המגבית הפכה לעניין מרכזי. מפעם לפעם הועלו סיסמאות שריתקו את תשומת הלב, כגון: We Are One. למרות שהתרומות הגיעו באמצעות הפדרציות, התחזקו הקשרים האישיים בין צוות הנהגת המגבית והתורמים הגדולים בכל רחבי אמריקה. יהודים רבים המשיכו לתרום סכומים גדולים כדי להיות "in". זרם זה של הזדהות היה תוצאה של הסכנות והסיכונים של מלחמת ששת הימים והשנים שאחריה. אף בניו יורק, בה הסתייגה הפדרציה במשך שנים רבות מכל פעולה משותפת עם המגבית, חל מהפך שהביא מאוחר יותר לביצוע המגבית במשותף באמצעות הפדרציה. חידוש הסוכנות היהודית המורחבת ב-1971 היה המשך תהליך המעורבות הישירה של הפדרציות בבעיותיה של ישראל, זאת גם על פי העקרונות המקובל מאוד באמריקה: אין מיסוי בלי ייצוג. עוד בספטמבר 1967 ביקרה משלחת של מועצת הקהילות בישראל. בשוים לארה"ב דיווחו: "קבלת הפנים החמה לה זכינו היתה מבוססת על כך שבישראל מכירים בעבודה היוצאת מן הכלל שעשו הפדרציות שלנו תוך שיתוף עם המגבית, אולי חשוב עוד יותר, נוצרה הבנה של המשכיות תפקידו המרכזי של הארגון הקהילתי שלנו בחיי יהדות אמריקה ויהדות העולם". בהמשך הזמן התחזק מעמד ה-CJFWF (מועצת הפדרציות) גם על חשבון המגבית כגוף מרכזי בחיי יהודי אמריקה.

ארתור הרצברג סיכם ב-1968: "יהודי אמריקה מאמינים בעומק נפשם שהתשובה הנכונה לסכנה היא לתרום כסף. זו ודאי היתה התגובה המיידית במשבר האחרון במזרח התיכון. היה הבדל אחד: מספר יותר גדול של אנשים נתן יותר כסף מאי פעם בהסטוריה".

המכון ליהדות זמננו, האוניברסיטה העברית

חייבים לעזור, אך תדע, אינני יהודי. הוא שלח המחאה על סך 25 דולר. באותו יום צלצל ליהודי באטלנטה שהיה חייב 100,000 מהעבר. הוא לווה את הכסף מהבנק וכעבור כמה שעות שלח 200,000 דולר. יהודי שפשט את הרגל לווה מידידים 10,000 דולר. נתקבלו תרומות אנונימיות רבות, בתו של לסינג רוזוולד מראשי ה-ACJ. שכל ימי חייו לחם בציונות, תרמה בעצמה והתרימה את בני משפחתה. חלק מפעילי ה-Council העשירים כגון הנרי לב מסן פרנסיסקו, ג'ון לב מניו יורק ומשפחת רייס מקליבלנד פרשו מהארגון ותרמו למען ישראל. אספות של המגבית התקיימו בבתי כנסת בבקרים, בשדות התעופה היו מאות מעשים יוצאי דופן של יחידים וקבוצות. היו תורמים שהמשיכו להצהיר שהם אנטי-ציונים. הסברם היה "אמריקני". ישראל היא הדמוקרטיה היחידה במזרח התיכון ונכס אסטרטגי לארה"ב. בתקופה אחרי יוני 1967 איבד ה-ACJ את שארית השפעתו. אחד מאנשי הארגון מתח בקורת על אלמר ברגר, הדובר הראשי של ה-ACJ בזו הלשון: "אם אינו יכול לאמר דבר טוב על ישראל, למה אינו סותם את פיו?" (ברגר עזר לשגריר סוריה להכין את נאומו למועצת הבטחון אז). יהודי אמריקה לא רק תרמו כסף למגבית הם תרמו דם, ציוד רפואי ואף מזון. בחודשי הקיץ הגיעו לארץ כ-7,500 מתנדבים שהיו מוכנים להחליף את הישראלים המגויסים. בין המתנדבים היו רופאים, מורים ורבים מבני פעילי המגבית.

הממשל האמריקני לא היה בתקופה הנדונה גורם בעל משקל בתקציב מטבע החוץ של ישראל. מהקמתה ועד 1966 קיבלה ישראל מהממשל בסך הכל 1,105 מיליון דולר. בעיקר בצורת עזרה טכנית, עודפי מזון והלוואות, מהן 273 מיליון ישראל כבר הספיקה להחזיר. הצלחתה של מגבית נמדדת בסופו של דבר בתוצאות הכספיות. כפי שאמרנו, השיגה המגבית בשנים לפני 1967 בין 60 ל-64 מיליון דולר בשנה. רוב ההתחייבויות משולמות בדרך כלל שנה אחר כך. ב-1967 הצליחו לגבות את רוב ההתחייבויות בחודשים יוני-אוגוסט ובדרך זו להגדיל את ההכנסות במזומן. ספיר טוען שחשב בתחילה שניתן אולי לגייס 30 מיליון בקרן החרום מעבר למגבית הרגילה של 1967. (קרן החרום הראשונה שיוזם פרדימן ב-1955 כדי לממן את קליטת יהודי מרוקו הכניסה 25 מיליון דולר). בשנת 1967 קבלה המגבית 241 מיליון דולר, מזה היו 173 מיליון הכנסות קרן החרום; ב-1968 היו הכנסות המגבית 146 מיליון. מזה 80 מיליון מקרן החרום שהמשיכה לפעול. ב-1969 חזרו ועלו הכנסות ה-UJA ל-167 מיליון דולר בעיקר היות וקרן החרום הכניסה בשנה זו 99 מיליון. ההכנסות מקרן החרום המשיכו לעלות והגיעו ב-1970 ל-124 מיליון דולר. קרן זו הפכה בשנים אלה לחלק מקובל של המגבית הרגילה. על ידי הסדר זה זכתה מדינת ישראל לקבל שיעור גבוה יותר מההכנסות של המגביות.

במלחמת ששת הימים יצרה המגבית סטנדרטים חדשים של מעורבות יהודית שבאו לביטוי ברמת התרומות גם בשנים הבאות. הכנסות המגביות בתקופת מלחמת יום כיפור שהתבטאו בעיקר ב-1974 עלו מדרגה נוספות. ההזדהות עם ישראל התבטאה גם במכירת הבונדס. בשנים 1967-1969 עלה בידי מפעל הבונדס למכור איגרות בסך 428,687,000 דולר. סכום שעלה בשליש על כל המכירות במשך 19 שנה שקדמו למלחמת ששת הימים. כל הסכומים האלה לא הספיקו כדי לממן את הוצאותיה של ישראל. המגבית נאלצה ללוות 65 מיליון דולר מהבנקים באמצעות הפדרציות סכום שהוחזר תוך 5 שנים.