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Prime Minister Levi Eshkol

Answering Questions of Members of the
United Jewish Appeal "Operation Israel"

Jerusalem, Dec. 4, 1968

Mr. Eshkol:

It is very important and very good that you are with us.

The Soviets have started, in the last couple of weeks, to talk to us, directly or indirectly, more softly. Being a Jew of Russian extraction, I have tried during my service in this office to talk to them too very politely. But I am not inclined now, after five or six years of being Prime Minister, to believe seriously this softening up in their talks to us.

They want to penetrate - and they are already in this part of the world. It is an old dream from Peter the Great's time. They are succeeding, partly. They would presumably like more, but this depends very much upon the West, and this means the United States. If the United States and Nato begin to start understanding a bit more and open their eyes, they will get a better look at what is going on here.

Will they act? Nobody can tell now. The United States is still stronger at sea. We think that we are doing a job here, although nobody asked us, but we are doing it for ourselves without any help, and we are compelled to do without help. This is very important for the West and for the United States.

Of course, there are things that I cannot disclose to you. It is near the brink that I am talking to you now. They knew how to appreciate what would have happened in the Six Day War - which was a brilliant thing - and thank God, we were prepared. In Yiddish they say - "eir ot mehr mazel und siechel" - maybe we had the two things with us, siechel and mazel.

We had the tools, although not enough, because you never know how much is enough. Now we are in a situation that whereas we destroyed the Egyptian air fleet, Russia was very quick to replenish and give - some say 50% more tools.

They gave Egypt the Mig 21 and even Mig 23 instead of the Mig 17. Instead of the T 53 and T 54 tanks, they are already talking about a T 55.

We have to be prepared for the same as we were in June, 1967, although we were told that if anything was going to happen it would be only in 1970.

There is no doubt that the Egyptians are preparing, and all the other Arab States around us. Before the Six Day War, our Commanders would always be talking of Egypt or Jordan or Syria, but what would be the case if they all decided to unite and the war would start from all sides. They tried to assure me that we were prepared. We have to think that next time, which people think may be in a month, in three months or it may take a year or two, have to be prepared for a concerted effort by them all.

You asked about Russia, and I have told you what Russia's ideas are, and what their desire is. They want to take their real place here. We are in their way, although we are only two and a half million, including our own Arabs.

The Russians feel that our capabilities are much stronger than 2.4 million, and this is why we're in their way.

Let us hope that we will find a way that the United States, with their new president, will help us. And we need help. You know that whereas Nasser gets hundreds of planes and tanks and missiles gratis, or as a loan that nobody knows when it will have to be repaid, we have had to pay, until now, for everything, down to the last penny.

We still don't know the price of the Phantoms, Some say 4 million, some say 4.5 million for each. Fifty times 4.5 million is \$225 million, and with spare parts etc. it will be more.

I don't think that this is enough for us - 50 planes. We have to rely on ourselves.

As Churchill said, "Give us the tools and we will do the job."

I have said several times in the United States when they talked about the Sixth Fleet, we would not like that their wives and daughters should shed their tears for their sons, husbands or brothers who might fall here in the fight between us and the Arab countries. We will do the job ourselves, just give us the tools. This is the maximum we can hope for. We are ready to pay the full price.

We shall never give up hope or negotiations for peace with the Arabs, and trying to find a way to get peace.

Nobody can tell, you, even I, and I am an optimist, when and how. I am not sure that before we can reach such a stage, we will not have to have another war. Even this, nobody can promise you.

You will find people who know and understand the situation who say that it may happen next year.

It is the truth that if we try to do something, we should calculate whether it is worth trying to do it. In 1967 to go to Cairo, would be a crazy thing for us. What would we do with 30 million Arabs, falaheen, in Egypt. We are raised and accustomed to more egalitarian customs - I would not say socialism because we are far from it, but to have tens of millions of starving people as the Arabs are today under the Israeli regime! Worst of all, how could two and half million Jews swallow them?

If Cairo, why not Amman, and if Amman, why not Damascus? After all, according to the Bible, we were once in Amman, and we were once in Damascus, so we could build up a case, but no, it would not make sense for us.

The West Bank keeps us in a bit of a predicament. It means having 1.5 million Arabs with their natural increase way ahead of ours - and 2.4 million Jews.

We have said several times that we are ready ^{to} negotiate peace with all the Arabs together, and with each ^{one} separately. But the trouble is that they are not ready, not together and not separately. We will start with Jordan.

With Hussein, we think that he would like peace, but he is weak, and he says that he has to consult his "Big Brother" - Nasser because he is afraid, and one bullet can finish all his kingdom, especially now that the Fatah groups have developed as they have.

There are not only three states, Egypt, Jordan and Syria - there are also the Arabs living in the West Bank. There are some 800,000 Arabs. There is an idea to start negotiations with them.

I have talked to half a dozen of Arab VIP's, representatives of these Palestine Arabs. One said, peace yes, but with honour. I said yes, peace of course with honour, but not less honour than you gave us in connection with the Wailing Wall for 20 years. According to the decision of the UN, we had the right of an approach to the Wailing Wall. He said that they had made some mistakes. I am sure that if we allowed them this again, they would do the same thing.

We are still discussing it. They say that they will talk to the King. They want a peace. They want permits to go over there, so at least we should know about it. We said, by all means, go and talk to the King. They say that maybe with Nasser they will have to talk. All right, to Nasser - we have nothing to lose - talk to Nasser.

Then a month or two goes by and you hear nothing, or they come and say that they cannot do this or that - the time is not ripe.

Again, so as not to lose any hope, because without hope, we are lost. This is the greatest asset we have. Our optimism and our belief.

The last question was peace, and what about after peace. First of all, let us cross this bridge to reach peace, but the second very important thing is not just propaganda. We are now talking as friends, so that my purpose is not that if I tell you this and this, tomorrow you can help solve the problem. It is more Jews that are needed.

It is sometimes very sad to be so isolated, and always to rely on miracles. We don't believe too much in miracles. If you have time for technical education, then you can understand, but in ten or fifteen years time, then they may have more people, and be more prepared. So we need more people.

We need not only more people. The question was, what about after peace, not just a peace, but an eternal peace. What is eternal peace, between Germany and France, for instance? There is no assurance of eternal peace.

After peace, with peace, without peace, during peace, we need many more people. It so happens that Israel was established as a State after the Hitler Holocaust, because otherwise we would have millions of European Jews.

When I left Russia, we then were more than 6 million Jews in Russia in 1913. Today, there are at least three and a half million Jews, and an Iron Curtain between us and between them, as between the Western world and Russia. In Europe today we have about one and a half million, in France, England and other countries.

I have always hoped that Israel would be so attractive that people would come. As it is today, there is still some immigration, although not from the Eastern countries. The immigration after the establishment of the State was already after Hitler, so we were lucky to have more than a million Jews - remnants of the Camps, and hundreds of thousands of Jews from the Arab countries.

We have taken out nearly all the Jews from the Arab diaspora. For them it is a real redemption. It is a realization of the Zionist dream; or of the prophetic dream that one day they will come together, and Israel will in-gather all the Jews.

The Jews are now concentrated in four, instead of dozens of places. That is, Israel, Soviet Union, the United States with two or three more times than we have here in Israel, Europe with a million.

In Russia there are 3 and a half million. When some of us are asked if he believes that in another five or ten years Jews will come from Russia, they say they do. Russia today is not in the days of Stalin and Lenin - there is a big difference between Stalin and Lenin, and the Russia of Krushchev is not the Russia of Kosygin - you feel a fine difference here and there. There is the generation of Yevtoshenko and one day they may come to the helm of government so we may have Jews from there.

Once we had between one thousand and two thousand Jews from Russia, but after the war they severed all connections. But today already again we see the beginning of 80 to 100 per month. Why? We don't know. Why not? We also don't know the reasons why not.

But why they have started again to do something brings up what I said at the beginning. There is some softening up.

There are then two ways of increasing our population - immigration and increase in our natural aliya, natural birthrate. It will take time till our people especially - the Europeans - although the American Jewry has a higher birthrate than the Europeans. But the European birthrate is very small, but at least an additional child.

I am not speaking of the Oriental Jews, thank God. There the birthrate is high, and our medical help and services are very well developed. Mortality is very low - we are either the first or the second in the world, but this is the method of increasing our numbers.

This is the most important thing after we have peace. Before we have peace, we and you, we have to be on guard, and you can help us. We spend half of our annual budget, 3 billion pounds on defence - it may be 40% This is unheard of. And so is the help of world Jewry. Otherwise we simply could not do it.

We thus need more tanks and more planes and things that I don't want to talk about in public, and we have to develop our economy and absorb between 30,000 to 40,000 immigrants every year. This means housing, first of all. Take a Rumanian doctor - a wonderful person, who started with a small house of 60 sq. metres - two small rooms and a kitchen. It was alright with one child. When they had three and then four children, they needed another room. This man is already the Director of an hospital so he could afford to build himself. There are people with 8 or 10 children in two small rooms. Although you will find thousands of such families in Israel.

This means money. I came across a family in the Galilee with 17 children. The father and mother give the impression that they are ready and fit for an additional one or two. The only thing that the mother asked me was that one of her sons serves as a policeman in Tel Aviv, and I should help him to be transferred to Galilee to be near the family.

I was astonished, and was very glad and very happy. I myself belonged to a family of ten children, and in those days there were 18, 20, 22 children. We are not asking for this, but at least more than one or two children - this is a must for us. Otherwise the competition between us and the Arabs will be a very difficult one.

I have talked about this more than other things, because this is really very important.

Rabbi Herbert A. Friedman: Gentlemen, the Prime Minister was suggesting that the answer to the Jewish problem lies within the productive capacity of everyone. Implicit in that was the treating of you as friends and equals, because he was sharing his deepest thoughts with you.

After peace comes the future growth of this country, and that depends upon people.

The easy answer is that it depends upon money, but he did not say that - the more important and deeper answer is that it depends upon people. That is the loyalty, and I think that when he said that you and I are together, I think that that was also a compliment which he paid us.

FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN

Answering Questions of Members of the
United Jewish Appeal "Operation Israel"

Jerusalem, Dec. 4, 1968

The first question touches the central nerve of our policy - the question of peace. I don't know, how many of you are able to conjure up in your imagination the Israel you would have found if you could have come here in the summer of 1967, after ten years of relative stability, during which there had not been a single collision of violence between Israel and the United Arab Republic. We found ourselves at the very brink of the precipice. There we were with 200,000 Egyptian troops in Sinai, with the Egyptian airfields two minutes from our cities and centres of population; 40,000 Syrian troops in the north overlooking the villages in Upper Galilee and the Jordan plain; the whole army of the kingdom of Jordan arrayed against our narrow bottleneck in the coastal plain; and over against western Jerusalem; an illicit blockade cutting us off from two thirds of the world; 90% of our fuel supplies blocked from entering, and the object of this entire blockade of encirclement, frankly described by President Nasser. The object he said, is not the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba - the issue now is the destruction of Israel.

Thus, after 4,000 years of continuous history, and 20 years of sovereignty, the prospect of Israel's extinction was being seriously discussed in the world. In Arab capitals, with intoxicated joy, and elsewhere with profound, but impotent anguish.

Now, I bring you these memories at the beginning of my remarks, not in order to stir your emotions, or even to kindle your pride, but because these memories are essential to an understanding of our policy. Unless you understand our memory, you cannot understand our policy.

Our policy emerges from our memory, and its central principle can be simply stated: Never again can we return to the situation of vulnerability of territorial strangulation from which we have emerged. Never can we have Syrian guns brooding over us in Upper Galilee. Never can we have Arab armies crushing us up against the coast. Never again can this eternal metropolis be divided. (Applause).

Now the problem is not only to avoid a return to the June 4, 1967 map, but also a return to the June 4, 1967 political and juridical situation. Never again armistices, cease-fires, truces which fall short of peace. Never again a position in which our neighbours are able to withhold their respect of our sovereignty and our integrity.

The only substitute for war is peace - peace in the fullest political and juridical sense. This is how wars have ended before in history. After the Second World War, the Allied troops withdraw from conquered territory only when peace treaties were signed, and when the aggressors of yesterday were not in a position to threaten them with a renewal of assault. In many cases in the American-Japanese peace treaty, territorial positions were maintained which would enable guarantees against renewed aggression to be effective.

In other words, a new structure, politically, juridically. In terms of security, something new must be built. We will not go back to the conditions out of which one war was created, and which, if renewed, would bring other wars to pass. This is our policy - to try and ensure that last year's war shall be the last.

In that connection, the question is very relevant. It asks us what the Arab mind is doing and thinking. It is not a unified picture. There are roughly three degrees of intensity in the Arab reaction to the events of last year.

There is the most radical reaction which comes from the revolutionary governments in Syria and Algeria. The attitude of these governments disproves the theory that men ever learnt from history or experience. My own view of history is that men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives.

The revolutionary governments still think in terms of reversing the whole course of history, and their mind is still obsessed by dark and very tangible visions of Israel's disappearance.

The second degree of intensity represents that of Cairo; it is one that finds it very hard at the moment to deny Israel's reality. I think that when you go down to the Canal area, it must be very difficult for the people on the other side of the Canal to wonder whether Israel exists or not - and certainly those who had experiences in the 1967 encounter, must regard Israel as a somewhat obtrusive fact.

But this fact they would like to confine and restrict to a situation in the first place, by restoring the 1967 situation, without peace, without recognition, leaving their options open for the ultimate assault. This is the two-faced approach; first of all to put Israel back in the straight-jacket, and then at a suitable time, to renew the final assault.

It is against this policy, chiefly, that we have to fight, because it has a diplomatically seductive air. It sounds much more moderate than it is, and most of what I and my colleagues in the Foreign Service have been doing, is to prevent the crystallization of the policy of back to June 4th, 1967. We have constructed an international coalition, headed by the United States which opposed the concept of return to the past, and which advocates the construction of a new edifice of relations in the future.

The question is whether there is a third element in the Arab mind. President Bourgiba has the advantage or disadvantage, or distance, and at any rate, is a marginal element in Arab life. Intellectually it is important. An Arab leader for the first time dismisses, with mockery, the concept of Israel's temporary character. The question is whether such realism can be found nearer to home.

We have reason to think, as a result of our explorations and contacts, that there are some people in the Arab world, principally in the Palestine Arab community and in Jordan, whose attitude may be described in the following ways. They also wish that Israel had not come into existence, but the great part of human life is composed of reconciliation to undesirable facts. They might want us not to exist, but they do not believe that we shall cease to exist. Arab nationalism has won its victories in its 15 independent states. In one place it did not get its way. There are those who would reconcile themselves to this verdict. Very few nations have secured a higher proportion of their total aspirations.

There is in fact a certain strain of realism in the Arab inquest on the war, and thinking on the present. How do we bring more realism about? First of all, by standing firm. With a weak, retreating Israel, no Arab state will make peace. But a solid, confident Israel, some Arab minds will reconcile themselves to it. There is a certain dynamism in what we are doing when we say that we will stay where we are until there is peace. This is not a static attitude. This is not because we enjoy the process of having under our domination a million and a half arabs who are not our citizens who are not able to flow into the bloodstream of our society.

It is not because the cease-fire lines are the only possible lines. It is because we want by standing firm, to generate, in the Arab mind, a desire for change.

We want to restrict the Arabs to their choice of area. We say to them, either the present position, or if you don't like it and want to change it, then it can be changed by one thing alone - by peace with Israel, under which we shall draw our boundaries together, which will even then be different from what was before, but which will reflect the new assumption of peace. That is one way of getting them to change their minds - standing firm.

Another way is to generate world opinion in favour of a new peace structure, and there is therefore great value in any statement by any governments outside of this area, and especially by the strongest amongst them, in favour of two propositions, which found their most lucid expression in a statement by the United States on the 19th June last year, and in President Johnson's statement on the 10th September of this year. The two ideas are that some thing new must be built. Above all, it must be built with Israel's agreement. Nothing can be imposed from outside, Only the countries of the area can change the present situation, but by reaching agreement.

If this is enunciated, it has, of course, a dynamic effect on the Arab mind. Instead of looking outside for salvation, instead of hoping that what would happen is what happened in 1957. Somebody else, the UN, the Security Council, the United States, the Soviet Union, somebody else will somehow get Israel by the scruff of the neck and get it out of these areas without peace.

This is an illusion that we must destroy. Therefore, when great powers say that we will not help you if you will not make peace for yourselves - it is for you to agree. This has a great psychological effect. To close off the hope of an imposed solution.

The third thing is the active pursuit of contacts, in order to engage our neighbours in a dialogue of peace. Here, of course, Ambassador Jarring, representing the unanimous world community, is the most prominent and central expression. We do not, however, confine ourselves to any single channel - I won't say any more than that. Be assured that we are actively pursuing every possible contact in order to bring a peace policy into the open arena.

We do this in rather difficult conditions. The value of our work on behalf of peace is an independent value, irrespective of whether it succeeds or not. If it succeeds, then we have achieved the greatest of all our ambitions and have an Israel at peace.

Even if it does not succeed it has intense value. It is only by a determined and constant and conspicuous and credible peace effort that we can avoid international isolation. We do not have any allies for war. We have ^{many} allies for peace. We want to maintain the friendship of other governments - including your own - to maintain Israel within the international community, not to be blockaded and boycotted, as were 10 years ago; to have a constant supply of defence equipment and trade and tourism - to live within the international organism. If we want this, then we must find a common language with friendly countries. The common language is peace.

Therefore, there is tactical gain from peace efforts, even ahead of the success of peace effort. That is why it must be done. It must be done for other reasons.

It would not be too sentimental if I call them "Jewish reasons". The State of Israel which is not actively concerned with peace is not a Jewish state, because peace is the highest value in our conception, after the existence of Israel itself, because if you don't exist, you can't cherish any values at all.

I would therefore say that after security, peace is our central interest. We will not carry the Jewish world with us unless we can convince it that we are making the maximum effort for peace.

Finally, the internal effects. I believe that the State of Israel which simply sat upon its conquests without a purposeful and constant effort for peace, would find itself corrupted within its own spirit, such an Israel whose only preoccupation was military preoccupation, whose only vocation was the domination of those who are under our control as they must be during the cease-fire, and an Israel in which the military preoccupation was not balanced by the concepts of international co-operation and peace, would be a different Israel in its spirit.

We pursue peace because by pursuing it we might get it. By not pursuing it, we shall not. We pursue peace, because by doing this we were ensuring for ourselves irrespective of the result, we ensure for ourselves solidarity with other nations. We pursue peace because it is our Jewish vocation, and we pursue peace because its pursuit has an ennobling effect on our policy, our culture and our society, and prevents us from falling victims to the effects of a military preoccupation.

The Duke of Wellington once said: "Victory is the greatest of all tragedies except defeat." There was a certain wisdom in this. There are dangers in victory which will only be mitigated by the search for peace. So I think that what Bourgiba has said is significant, but marginal. It will only be of any significance if realistic views of that kind spring up in the immediate neighbourhood, and if they find expression in the policy of the nation concerned.

Rabbi Friedman: Unbelievable. I hope we got the thing on the tape because if we did we will transcribe it and get it to you.

Q. Have you given up on the United Nations providing any viable assistance?

A. The point about the United Nations is that one should approach it neither with optimism nor with pessimism, but with realism. We should understand what it is and what it is not. It is the central forum for approach to world opinion. There is no other way in which you can seize the world's conscience with an idea or a case. It was the arena - the United Nations together with modern tele-communications system - that creates opportunities for currents and transformations of opinion within brief periods of time.

I felt this very strongly in June of last year, and on some other occasions. You suddenly get the ear of the world. For us that is very important, provided of course, that what you say impresses the ear of the world. It can have the contrary effect. It is a danger, it is a risk.

Our Rabbis spoke of a man who loses his world in one hour, or who gains his world in one hour. You can do either, but it is an opportunity.

It is, of course, the central expression of the ideas of the world community. It is the slow and halting development of an international law. It embraces the concept of a community of sovereign states. That is what it is. It is all of these things, but let us understand what it is not.

It is not an instrument of security. In the present power structure, and in the present situation of the organization, it cannot give any nation physical security, as the founders hoped that it would do. We learnt this very much in May 1957. This was the great test. In Israel's hour of agony, and of danger, the UN Security Council failed either to do anything, or to say anything, which would have any effect upon the impending doom. There were the fingers on our throats, and there the UN was unable to do anything, or even unable to express an opinion.

It did not even have the qualities of a Greek chorus of expressing a sense of disconcertedness about events which it does nothing to influence. That is what a Greek chorus is. It at least knows how eloquently to bewail something.

It was not even capable of this. That is a fact. It ran away from the scene. It ran away here, took away the fire brigade (the UNEF) when the fire broke out. It ran away there. It did not mobilize any world influences against Nasser.

Now that is our approach. We use the UN for what it is. It is the great arena of international discussion and discussion, the vestibule of world opinion. The instrument of international law. It is by membership in the United Nations that most small states are able to express and excite their sense of identity. All these things it is. We respect it for what it is. It does not have anything to do with security. Therefore we must gain our security by other means.

Firstly by being strong ourselves, because there is no great power today which has some adventurous desire to get involved in other wars. This is not the spirit of your people. You and I have very good reason from recent experience, to know. Therefore, we must be strong enough to dissuade the aggressor from his plans.

Another way is the organization of world opinion and pressures. But the United Nations is not an agent for peace or for security. That is one reason why one cannot have a total subservience to its verdicts. After all, if your government gave you no security, would you give obedience to its laws?

When does a government get obedience to its laws? When it offers security to its citizens. Not everybody has to have his own shotgun in his own house, but would ignore the government which preached but gave nothing. If the government does not give you security, it does not give you services and then it cannot get from you obedience. The United Nations does not give security, and it cannot claim obedience.

There are other defects. One the power structure. It is not a monastery full of idealistic monks. It is an arena of power politics in the most robust and virulent sense. It is a place where interests collide and branch off. In that forum we are not equitably represented.

Here are we with one vote, and the Arabs with 15 and the Communist countries around them. The starting point is one to forty. That is not much of judicial organization. What would you think of a court, for example, if you had to plead before it and your opponent in that court case had all his cousins and uncles on the bench?

Well, the Arabs have all their cousins and uncles on the bench - forty against one - who will support them in whatever they do. I once said that if the Arab League were to announce that the earth was flat, they would get forty votes for that in the United Nations and if anybody tried to veto it in the Security Council, the Soviet Union would see that it would not be vetoed.

It has a limited effect and we cannot accept, as moral judgements, the weighted verdicts of a tribunal in which we are inequitably represented and it is not worth a single shotgun as regards security. This is not the case only for ourselves.

I said in the General Assembly this year that we ought to recognize the marginal effect of the United Nations on world security. What are the great issues of today? The issues of violence. There is the Vietnam war. The United Nations does not discuss it. There is the Czechoslovak invasion. The United Nations has dropped it. There is the awful slaughter in West Africa, between Nigeria and Biafra, which is not on the agenda of the United Nations. There is the Middle East. This the United Nations discusses till the thing gets too hot and then it stops even discussing it.

Therefore we cannot be impressed by the idea that the United Nations is a substitute for our security. We will arrange our security ourselves, and we will use our membership rights in order to exploit the full resonance of the United Nations for our appeal to world opinion.

Q. What significance do you attach to the impending visit of Governor Scranton?

A. Governor Scranton's visit to the Middle East represents a determination by the President-elect that the Middle East situation has such an urgency that the discussion of it cannot await the constitutional process, and the gathering of impressions and information must go forward in advance because the American President, must, by the sheer compulsion of facts, achieve a certain sense of priorities, first amongst them, of course, as every observer understands from the American viewpoint, is the South East Asian crisis with its hundreds of thousands of young Americans involved, and obviously a crisis which can convulse the American society under the previous Presidency and brought about such disruptive effects, that if it were to continue into a new Presidency, would have an equally disruptive effect. Therefore, its priority as an American issue must be recognized objectively by anybody outside.

Everybody thinks that his own issues are the central issues, but our Rabbis said that Jerusalem is the center of the world -- the trouble is that not all the world recognizes that Jerusalem is the center.

When I was in Cyprus yesterday, its leader said to me, "Well, what did you think of the crisis". I began an analysis of the Arab-Israeli crisis -- and they said, "No, we mean the real crisis, the Cyprus problem." That is the only thing that is of concern.

So it is determination of high priority for this question. Now, the United States plays such a high part in the scheme and system of thinking that I have mentioned, that we want to maintain our positions until we get a new and agreed map and a new and agreed peace. It is so important for us that this policy be maintained, developed. The United States is now our chief source of equipment, without which we would fall behind in the arms race and therefore revive the dangers of 1967. This matter is so important that the American-Israel dialogue must be central in our diplomacy, and I therefore welcome the opportunity of discussing our problems frankly with one who is perhaps new to the area, who I know has thought very much about it, both in the State Department with Governor Fuerter, and as Governor of Pennsylvania, and as Mr. Scranton has made very many general statements on the Middle East situation, I presume that he will be the interpreter of the ideas which the present President-elect expressed during the discussion on the Middle East in the recent American dialogue.

Those ideas were very detailed and were very consistently maintained. If they become the subjects of policy, then the continuation and the development of American policy will be assured. I tend to believe with Secretary Rusk that the change of regime will not bring about any substantial changes in American policy in the Middle East. I have some ideas as to how it could be improved, but what I mean is that I don't think that it will be changed, and as it is, now, the area of similarity and harmony, although never complete, is wide enough to enable a very close cooperation. There are no two free states in the world whose policy is identical. If you see two states whose policy is identical, then one of them is in trouble. For example, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria have identical policies. That means that one of them is not free. I will not say which.

Since the United States and Israel are free countries, they cannot have a complete identity, but the question is whether there is a broad central area of agreement. This has existed and I hope that it can be maintained and even extended.

Q. How much significance do you attach to the presence of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean?

A. The thing which preoccupies us is not the presence of the fleet as much as the policy by which the fleet is inspired. In other words, what is Soviet policy? There are other fleets in the Middle East whose presence causes us no anxiety at all.

I don't pretend to be an expert on Kremlinology--on the Soviet Union, but I tell my advisors on the Soviet Union that I don't regard them as experts on it either. About the Soviet Union there are only different degrees of ignorance.

Nevertheless, the general feeling in the Atlantic community, as I gather from the Foreign Ministers of the Atlantic states, which confirms our own impressions on the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, is that the Soviet Union is not looking for new areas of military activities, and especially if it believes that military activity by itself will create a crisis in its relations with the Atlantic states and especially with the United States, it will not seek such a confrontation.

This was one of the great issues of 1967. The Soviet Union was led to believe on the 4th of June, very directly, that American policy was: "You stay out and we stay out." In other words, the conflict must be contained within its local dimensions. If they believed that, there was only one country which could make them believe that.

The Russians are already addressing us through various channels with what I would call a sort of hostile respect, without the rhetoric and understanding that they cannot change anything without the United States, and that the United States will not be drawn to them in complete disassociation from Israel. Therefore Israel is a factor in the Middle East and in the world situation.

Israel is a factor, and I think that looking back, they would regret having broken relations with us. You don't gain anything in the Middle East by breaking relations with Israel. If you want to be a Middle Eastern power, you must be in contact with all those elements in the Middle East which have weight, and Israel, as has been proved, does have weight in the Middle East. Therefore, against their sense of hard-headed realism to be cut off from contact with one of the factors of the power balance in the Middle East. After all, Israel is reckoned to be the strongest military element in the area, at this moment, as well as having a resonance in world politics.

These are two things that the Soviets respect - military strength, and a political international resonance and ability to influence opinion.

We hope that this will take effect. We watch it very closely. We maintain our contacts with the Atlantic and especially the Mediterranean powers, whose interests have been very much awakened. There is a new sense of Mediterranean solidarity.

Q. Can Israel and the emerging African states draw strength from each other?

A. They would certainly admit that they have drawn great benefit from their contact with us. We have 29 embassies in Africa. On the diplomatic map, Israel is the third power in Africa.

We have development programmes in 26 African states. Ten thousand young men, the future leaders of Africa, have received their training in this country. Israel is to them the alma mater. Israel is the source of their contacts with technology and modern social organization.

The leaders of African countries have been here, we have returned their visits there. It is a very impressive and moving encounter, because one might have feared that African nationalism would ally itself with Arab nationalism - after all, Arab states are African states. They take part in all the family group, in all the Pan-African organizations, and yet the great mass of Africa, with the exception of certain marginal states which have strong Moslem solidarities, the majority of them have rejected the Arabs view of Israel as a kind of colonialist power. What sort of colonialist power is it that has a history, a language, a faith, that go back 3,000 years into the roots of this land, and what kind of colonialist state is it that maintains with these new countries a much more fruitful relationship than their Arab neighbors have ever maintained, so that they gain from us an accelerated entry into the new world of technology and of modern social organization.

That which is the centre of our cooperation with them is vital to their interests. The Arab states can give them resolutions in conferences. These don't really affect their destiny. The pathos of African life is that they have won political independence behind which all the squalor and hunger and starvation and disease go on unaffected. There is this great disillusion. The stamps, the flags, the institutions, the coins, the Parliament, these have not solved the great human and social problems. We address ourselves, therefore, to their human and social predicament. That is what they gain from us, and the fact that it is worthwhile is indicated in the wish to continue it, by their reluctance to join the Arab crusade against us, and by giving us this sense of international vocation.

What Israel gains from it is first of all, we gain from it the Arab policy's defeat to isolate us. The Arabs had tried to isolate us. They had rather despaired of isolating us in American and European countries. They hoped to cut us off from the new states of the old world. We have - as it were - leapfrogged over their hostility, and created a great belt of friendship, just outside the Arab area.

This has a great effect on their psychology. We gain from it also, what is an important thing for Israel, and I call it a "sense of vocation". Any state especially a small state, if it is to avoid provincialism and apathy, must have to excite its pioneering vitality.

Now the work that our people do in Africa has this effect on the Israeli people - a sense of doing something outside yourself. A citizen who does nothing, for example, but look after his own home and family and plays no part in the larger society, is not universally admired. A state which is centered completely on itself, and plays no role in the solution of universal human problems, is not a full citizen of the world.

Well, Israel cannot effect the great issues of nuclear war. strategy, but this business of development - the transformation of states into nations - the fertilization of their potential vitality - this is one of the great human and political issues of our time, and we find it moving to play a part, quite in addition to the gratitude which we get, not always.

People are not always grateful to their benefactors, but there is appreciation and gratitude in many quarters, but we also get this internal satisfaction that Israel is not closed in upon itself. It is also playing a role in the broader world community.

Q. You have discussed here the relations between Israel and Africa and Russia and the United States and the United Nations. There is one other set of relationships which Israel has, and that is with the Jews in the outside world. I would like to ask you what it is that you expect of us during this very big critical period of gestation in which the future is uncertain - its shape is yet to be born, and you must want something, you must expect something, you must have some expectations of how we should act in this situation.

A. First of all, let us understand what Israel is - Israel is the creation of the Jewish people. It is only the expression of universal Jewish solidarity, which could have brought about the strength and the political support and the economic solidation which have made it possible for us to withstand the hostile forces brought up against us.

Separate Israel from recent Jewish history, and you have nothing of any significance, nothing of any strength. The first thing, then is to understand that the need for that solidarity has not diminished in any way or in any sphere, if anything, because of the fact that our problems are greater, therefore our need for your support and solidarity is greater.

You can see how much greater our problems are. There is the security problem which increases in weight because of the sophistication of technology. In order to get the same security today as we could have got 25 years ago, you will have to increase your effort by multiples of ten or a hundred.

I remember the days when a fighter plane was bought in the United States for \$25,000. Even then, the Finance Ministers used to have heart attacks about the heavy price. Such a weapon now costs over \$3 million. To get the same security, you need a vastly intensified economic effort.

Then there is the development process. We don't want to spend all our time and energy in discussing what will happen to Nablus and Jenin. What about Jewish Israel and its development and its vitality, and its institutions and its cohesion. Apart from the new burdens which the cease-fire situation lays upon us, the new movement of men and of trade across the West Bank of the Jordan. We live, therefore in a broadened vista of economic problems and of economic opportunities.

Then there is the whole business of peace. This is not a matter for Israel alone. The question that the Arabs are asking themselves in the great debate in their minds about whether to make peace or to make war, is whether Israel is getting stronger or getting weaker.

If Israel is getting weaker then why make peace with it now, or in the near future. Why not wait?

But if Israel is getting stronger, what is to be gained by waiting?

Therefore, the spectacle of our consolidation has a direct influence on the central question of peace. Now this means that if there were to be a falling off of effort, through misunderstanding, through complacency, through the false belief that victory has lightened our burdens, through any illusions that we shall have

security until we have peace, nothing is impossible until we have peace. Anything is possible. The status quo is possible. The eruptions of violence are possible. Renewal of assaults is possible. Therefore, in this twilight zone, really what you do can be decisive.

If you can make such an effort as will give Israel a general impression of economic and social consolidation and of maintenance and security, then Arab minds, looking at this will say, what is the use, they are getting stronger, they are not collapsing under the weight of their victory, so therefore, you have a very decisive role.

I know that it is very hard to imagine that there can never be a greater need for solidarity than existed in May 1967. It is not at all fantastic if I were to say to you that we were to need more from you now than was needed in May and June of 1967, because then there was an issue for swift decision.

Now the issue will be decided in the long, slow, patient process of consolidation in which it is so much more difficult to accelerate opinion, and to generate tension. This I think is why the organizers of this venture have brought you here.

If you go away with the impression that because of our victory we need you less, then the whole thing will have failed, and we will suggest not to bring anybody else. But if your conclusion is that in spite of the pride of our victory, the burdens are very heavy and the dangers are very great, and your capacity for us to surmount the dangers is high and therefore, however strange it may sound that we need more from you than we did last year, then you will have learned that truth which is the beginning of wisdom.



REMARKS BY MR. TEDDY KOLLEK

MAYOR OF JERUSALEM

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL'S

"OPERATION ISRAEL"

KING DAVID HOTEL, JERUSALEM, DECEMBER 4, 1968

Mr. Kollek

I welcome you to this city, and I am sorry that your stay is so short. It is a very complicated city in many ways. It was a complicated city even before the unification. Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967 has absorbed more immigrants than any other city -- more immigrants absolutely and proportionately, with the exception of those which are only immigrant cities and which had no previous citizens at all.

Half of the people in Jewish Jerusalem are immigrants from Arab countries between 1948 and 1967. All their children have been born during these years here in this city. To demonstrate to you what this means, it means the same as in any other city that is an immigrant city. We have double the birthrate of Tel Aviv amongst the Jews - the Arab birthrate is even higher - and we have, moreover, other facets of this immigration which the other immigrant cities do not have. For instance, we have practically the vast, vast majority of elderly people who have come to Israel, because they have prayed for Jerusalem all their lives. To them Jerusalem meant much more than Israel because they started praying for Jerusalem before Israel existed, and for them, as for everybody over 2,000 years, the Jerusalem idea incorporated the idea of the return to the land of sovereignty, of independence: all the things that for the last twenty years since Statehood, the State of Israel means to all of us. They were never satisfied when they came to the shores of Haifa or Hadera or Tel Aviv or Rehovot or wherever it was, until they could go on to Jerusalem.

We have a greater number of academically trained because of the various institutions, from government to universities, to the museums, to teaching the institutions of Hadassah and so forth. We also had the greatest percentage of illiterates who have come from countries as widely spread as Rumania to the Atlas Mountains of Morocco, but we have overcome this.

I could go on this way to describe the problems of Jewish Jerusalem before the unification. It is also a city with less income than the other major cities. You don't make much money in having the government here -- it is a great honor of having the government and being the capital, but it is not a very lucrative business for you in the city, because the government hardly pays any taxes on its land. Neither do synagogues, yeshivas, churches, monasteries, embassies, hospitals, museums -- as much as we love them all and are proud of them.

So this is a poor city, with as many problems as Hatzor or Kiryat Shmona and the other immigrant cities that you may see on this particular trip, with the addition that we have a great deal of expenditure to keep up a city like Jerusalem without the

government being able to give us the help, let us say, that the U.S. government gives to Washington or the Canadian government gives to Ottawa or the Turkish government gives to Ankara or the Australian government to Canberra.

I must say that the government has been extremely generous in regard to helping us with the budget of East Jerusalem and in regard to several of the institutions, particularly the extension of Hebrew University. On this we have found all the understanding and a great deal of help. This is a great boon, but this does not ease the burden of the other things that I have described.

A year and a half ago, the city was united, and we have 70,000 Arabs in the city who are not happy with the situation as it is. They would like a different management than the present one.

Within all this, we have achieved within this year and a half, several things. You will hardly find any Arab who would like to see the united city divided again. They would like to see it as an international city. They would like to see it under dual sovereignty. They have all kinds of ideas, but I don't think that you would very easily find many who would like to see it divided again. If it would be divided again tomorrow by the Arab armies, they would, of course, accept this.

But in this connection, because some of you may have certain compunctions about the justification of this situation, let me say just one thing: You should know that at least for the last 120 years that there has been a census taken, there has always been a vast majority of Jews in Jerusalem. The Arabs were never half, and very often they were only a third of the population, or even a quarter, just as they are now. At the time of the division, there were 100% Arabs over there and 98% Jews here. We had about 2,000 Arabs who, during those 20 years, were not allowed to visit even their own homes which they could see across the borders.

Now, another thing is that the city, after all, was united for 3,000 years, and was divided for only 19 years. You see how quickly the world gets accustomed to this. It is now united again and we are pretty certain that this will be forever, although we know that there are still great, complicated political problems around Jerusalem -- problems created by the Arabs.

When Hussein had the chance of becoming either the King of Amman or King of Jerusalem -- quite a nice title as kingship goes -- he preferred to remain King of Amman because he did not feel at home in Jerusalem. Jerusalem did not mean anything to him. Only now the Arabs say that without Jerusalem they can't be a whole people again.

This fact alone makes it a major bone of contention in any settlement despite all we have achieved during this year and a half of fairly peaceful co-existence between Jews and Arabs.

The fact that there was a severe incident two weeks ago -- and there may be a severe incident any moment again -- is not an indicated fact that there has not been overall cooperation in many fields. On the contrary, these incidents are being perpetrated against the spirit of co-existence by those who are not interested in this co-existence. This does not make them less unpleasant or less dangerous, and in the long run, if there are many of them, it would drive the communities apart.

But there has been cooperation in the city. We are not trying to build a unified city in the sense you are trying with your cities in the United States. This is not a melting pot and if I can give you an example from North America, I would rather take Montreal where English and French live together and yet remain English and French.

Now, in this framework we try to achieve what we can, and we have pretty large responsibilities. We hope that we are on the right road, full of complications, full of problems, but we hope to bring here many, many more Jews, certain types of industries and large municipal institutions, government departments, and we hope to preserve the beauty of the city, and we hope to make it not only the capital of Israel, but the center of the Jewish world -- spiritually -- all over, and a metropolis that is worth its name. It has become this, in a way, during the last year and a half, with much more activity than we have ever had before.

(A series of questions were posed to Mayor Kollek on tax assessment, Arab participation in city government operations, the recording of deeds in the Old City, and the attitude of Jewish and Arab youths toward each other in Jerusalem.)

A. All the good taxes belong to the government and all the poor taxes belong to us. For instance, property tax belongs to the government and they give us a small share of it, not in proportion to the tax they levy, but a certain proportion of the overall income of the government from its annual revenues -- a very small percentage of that. So we have no way of assessing at all.

We do assess for rates what they call in England rates which go by the area of your living space, or your business space, and it is organized according to the area in which you live, to the quality and age of the building and a variety of other factors.

We have five categories there, of course, according to area and according to quality of the building and so forth. To give you an example, I live in an area which is fairly called A-1, in a building which was built 12 years ago, which has what not all buildings in Jerusalem have, namely, central heating. This is not really necessary, because you have about 20 days when you really need heating, and many people in the old Arab houses have old, charcoal furnaces, and in modern houses they have kerosine heaters or things of that type.

Now houses are being built with central heating, but twenty years ago this was not so. In this building, I pay roughly one and a half per cent of the re-sale value today of my apartment, which is four times as much as it cost me 12 years ago, because prices of land and property have gone up considerably.

If I would sell my apartment today, I would probably get 75 times as much as I pay annual rate for it.

Regarding Arabs in government, we have taken over 500 city officials who used to work for the Arab city government, and they all came and worked for us with similar gradings as they had before, and with similar responsibilities as they had before.

We have no elected members of the Council because the members of the Arab Council refused to join us. They were offered places on the Council but they refused to join, simply because that would have meant recognition of unification of the city.

On the other hand, we will have, next October, elections in the city, and all Arabs, whatever their nationality, as residents of the city, are entitled to vote for municipal elections. Therefore, 25,000 to 27,000 Arabs -- the voting register is put together only on the 31st December and therefore I don't know the exact figure -- will be entitled to vote. This is five times as many Arabs as were entitled to vote at the last election under Jordanian control, because in Jordan they have only property owners -- men over 21 -- who are entitled to vote. With us, men and women over 18 are entitled to vote.

There do exist deeds in the Old City. First of all though, not many, because well over three quarters of the Old City belongs to religious institutions and you can't know if they have deeds. The rest are so complicated that you can't do practically anything about it.

When we started to rebuild the old Jewish quarter, where 60 or 70 synagogues were destroyed and many houses were also destroyed, we found that although it was the Jewish quarter, a great deal of it was Moslem-owned and the Jews, for three, four or five hundred years had only been tenants, but for every house you have deeds -- here for one room, here for two rooms, and the lower floor belonged to one person and the upper floor to another. We came to the conclusion that the only way of doing it, of reconstructing the Old City as we wanted to reconstruct it, which is more or less in the character that it was, but with many improvements, was to condemn the whole of the area with the exception of actual houses of prayer, mosques or churches or whatever, and start the whole thing over and pay compensation. Otherwise there was no hope of making any improvements whatsoever, or purchasing anything.

As I said, some money comes from the government as far as developing East Jerusalem is concerned. Some money comes from indebtedness of the city and we have gone comparatively far in these last two years. We have increased our indebtedness from about one third of our annual budget to a complete year's budget, because we felt that this was not the time to hold back and wait, and we feel that up to a year, or a year and a half of the budget is still able to be carried by loans if they are long-term interest loans, and we get a little bit of money from people who feel that they should do something special for Jerusalem here and there, and there are quite a number of those.

We have found that when people do something particular for Jerusalem, such as give a playground for an area in which immigrants settled many years ago, or contribute to the restoration of the Old City walls, these gifts do not restrict what they give to the UJA, but in all cases, it increases their connection with the country, and therefore increases what they give to the UJA.

Many of our friends have started out that way, by doing something for Jerusalem, and have come around to doing something for Israel, in general through the UJA or through similar organizations in England or France, who have never done anything at all before for any purpose in Israel.

As far as young people are concerned, there is a lot of contact, but I would not over-estimate it, because you never know what they will do when they get older. But at the moment, until political influences reach them, it could not be better. To give you an example, we had last summer a youth republic. It was an afternoon camp which started at two, and ended at ten, in the Jerusalem Forest. We started a little institution there with

swimming pools and sports grounds and various activity rooms and so on, and we had about 2,000 Jewish youngsters there and about 500 Arab youngsters.

The Arabs who came were only young men, and there were no women among them, and we did not mind that too much, but we had too much to think about anyway, in terms of how to run well. We did not want any additional complications.

This worked extremely well, they elected together a Jewish Mayoress and an Arab Deputy Mayor. And mind you, I think that there is a better chance of an Arab Deputy Mayor being elected than in religious Jewish Jerusalem a Jewish Mayoress being elected. They published a daily paper in Hebrew and Arabic and they had a great deal of activities together, and it is one of dozens of examples of cooperation. But, as I said before, this may not prevent five other young Arab men planting a bomb somewhere.

Q. In Jerusalem schools, is there a dual language?

A. There is no attempt at dual language. There is Arab education in Arabic and Jewish education in Hebrew. This does not mean that both sides do not learn the other's language, but they learn it as a foreign language.

There has been fairly good Arab education in very poor buildings, which we have to bring up to our standard in order to give them the feeling that they will get the same treatment.

To give you an example of the type of investment, in Arab schools alone it would cost about \$5 million to bring them to the same standard as ours and ours are not very good.

Q. I get the feeling that in this city bombs can go off, but it is essentially quiet. How do you personally contend with this situation?

A. Let me just say this, there is no policeman outside my house. There is no official residence of the Mayor. It is just an apartment in a private house. I drive my own car, and I can walk around the city quite quietly at night. But both you and I know of some cities where you cannot do that. (Laughter and applause.)

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REMARKS OF
BRIGADIER SHAUL ROSOLIO
COMMANDER OF POLICE FOR JERUSALEM AND THE SOUTHERN COMMAND
TO
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL'S
"OPERATION ISRAEL"
JERUSALEM, DECEMBER 4, 1968

I will get straight to the point. What I want to expose you to is a certain type of problem which is less dramatic, let us say, but according to our new situation, it is one that more and more draws our attention to a certain kind of resistance that I think you should know about.

I will allow myself one preliminary remark, however, concerning my unit. Unlike Police Forces in the United States, in Israel the Police Force is National. It does not come under local authority. It is not involved in local politics, it is a national force which has responsibility for the interior security of the country.

This does include local police work, of course, but it does include, besides that, everything concerned with the well-being of the population in terms of security, with intelligence work and the co-ordination of all efforts to make life secure and peaceful whilst in the country.

This is the reason why it has been my privilege and burden to be responsible for the well-being of this city, which is in a very special situation indeed, and I don't think that there is a parallel in the entire world.

First of all, you have been told, I suppose, that in spite of the historical fact that the Six Day War terminated on the 11th June, 1967, the fact is that we live in a situation which we, in Hebrew, like to call "sub-war" (Tat-milchama). It is not a state of war; it is much less than a state of peace. Actually it is more war than peace. I take the liberty, of course, to speak freely in this room - this must be really private - because I will indicate some political connotation which this has.

The fact is that peace has not yet arrived, and I am sorry to say that the last 48 hours do not encourage any one of us to think that we are on the threshold of a settlement which could be remotely similar to anything resembling peace (a reference to stepped up Arab terrorist attacks in the Bet Shean Valley).

When the Six Day War ended, we logically thought that the defeat of the Arab countries was so large, that they would think of a way to create a situation in which a colloquy with Israel would be possible. In this we were mistaken.

The reason for our mistake is that we thought logically, while we are sorry to say that the Arabs, with the constant and unilateral backing of the Russians, are illogical. So we are living in a presence of semi-war, or a peace within a war, or a war within a peace. A war within a peace, let us say. This means

that as far as the usual functions of life are concerned, this is peace. As far as our economic and agricultural effort is concerned, this is peace. Everyone is going about his business. But, all our borders are flared.

At present, I think that there is no exception. It is only a matter of time until it starts up in the Suez again, and when it subsides here it starts in the north. But unlike the situation before June 1967, we have a different situation and from the civic point of view, a much more complicated one.

You know that we have sort of inherited, after the war, 1,200,000 Arabs, who were our avowed enemies. I say "were" I don't like to use the term "are". This is not only a matter of propaganda. You must remember that a whole generation has past since 1948, and all the Arabs between the ages of let us say, 15 and 45 have actually been brought up on the hatred of Israel: that the State of Israel personifies only the evil of the world, from the racial, religious, ethnic and political point of view. You name it.

Until 1967, we had - so to speak - those Arabs safely and securely tucked away beyond our borders. Israel and the queer borders it used to have, had the Arabs on the other side of the border. The Arab Legion, in a paradoxical way, was guarding our borders for us, because they did not like infiltration and we did not like infiltration. Anyway, the Arabs were out of the country.

What happened now is that all these Arabs are within the borders controlled by us, and the severity of this danger is so fabulous that I don't think that I have to describe it to you. Now if this is true of all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, Jerusalem is a special case.

Without so much as legally and administratively declaring so, we let the world understand that come what may, Jerusalem stays here. Now Jerusalem has a population of 70,000 Arabs, and 190,000 Jews. That is about one third Arab. These people are accorded full civil rights, freedom of movement, freedom of occupation, and so forth.

As a matter of policy, we have decided that we are going to absorb these 70,000. We have among this one-third of our population in Jerusalem, severe and fierce enemies, not only of the State, but of any and every individual Jew who walks the streets. I do not want to do injustice to those who are in favor, but they are very few, and I would rather say that they tolerate the situation.

These are people who have been brought up and educated on the hatred of us, and these are people who still stay under the influence of Arab propaganda, via the mass media, the television, the radio, the newspapers. We do not interfere with foreign broadcasts.

I don't know from which communities you come, but I would like to draw an equivalent, a parallel. Let us say that all of a sudden one city in the United States has to absorb one third of its numbers in Chinese or Cubans, who are avowed enemies - not only of the regime, but of its people, and for whom the destruction of the American people is a goal. If this is clear, this is like our situation, and this is the thing we have to cope with.

We have decided upon a policy of "life as usual - business as usual". We cannot do anything as easy as erect again the various barriers and fences and things that used to be in the city until 16 months ago. We cannot do this because this is exactly what all the Arab political organizations would like us to do, because while we want to prove that Jerusalem is one city, that the living together with Arabs is possible, all the Arab countries together want to prove that life together is impossible, that actually nothing has happened in Jerusalem and that it has remained a divided city.

It would be very easy to clamp down curfews, barriers, fences everything again, from the technical viewpoint of security, but by this we play into the hands of our enemies, so to speak.

I am giving you this background information so that you will be able to assess the actual problems of the thing. Needless to say this raises some extraordinarily difficult problems: how to maintain public safety when one third of the population of the city is the enemy, when the access to arms and explosives is easy in this part of the world - and it has been made much easier by the Six Day War.

I cannot, within the time limit, go into details of how this is done. The fact remains that until our unfortunate incident of a fortnight ago (the Arab bombing of Machane Yehuda market, which killed 12, and wounded 55), we managed to be ahead of terrorism in the city for the last 16 months, with a policy of open bridges, so to speak.

The task is a kind of underground war and underground action, which has nothing to do with real drama. It is not spectacular, it is a hard day's work, day in and day out, and the problem is: who is faster? Who is faster in information and intelligence, in action? Who heads off whom?

I think it is not necessary to explain to you that it all amounts to men, training and material. The number of security forces which are in town now, both in and out of uniform, is seven times what it used to be before 1967 - and mind you, Jerusalem was also always a city of problems because we were a divided city, like Berlin.

We have to maintain a state of outward peace, while the rumbling is going on all the time. Even in the case of colloquy with one of the Arab countries, the "groups" will continue their functions, because it is the political aim of our adversary to bring about a situation that will redivide Jerusalem, and declare our defeat, not on the field of battle, but in that problem which

we think is a major problem - to prove to the world that we can live together peacefully.

It is the aim of our enemies to destroy.

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Q. What sort of co-operation do you get from the Arab part of the police force, and how much can you rely on them?

A. I will tell you exactly. WE do not use the Arab police force to do anything political at all. We were under the British ourselves, and we know how you can use - I mean how underground movements can use - serving personnel to suit your own purposes. So what we use the Arab police for, is just to police - to work the criminal side, the traffic side, and that is that. We do not contact them as far as intelligence is concerned. We do not rely on them. We do not expose them to the problem at all. We do not want that conflict - not their internal conflict, and not ours versus them.

Q. Are you faced with the question of narcotics?

A. This is a very long story and I will make it short. This area is transitory for narcotics, which go via the Lebanon, via us, to North Africa and then to you, where it is substantially consumed. I am familiar with the set-up because I was in the United States and I asked the FBI all about it. We never were great users, but lately - after the War - since the borders have become open, the access to narcotics in the country is much easier. I am pleased to say that the Jewish population has not yet, and I hope, will not, develop dangerous or deep-rooted narcotic habits.

Q. Could you discuss for a moment political assassination by terrorists?

A. I think it is a matter of degree, in a sense. You know that political assassination amongst the Arabs in the Middle East has been a practice of very many years. Political assassination is a legitimate way to settle differences of opinion in this area. The grandfather of the present King was assassinated in front of his eyes, and we all know the series of assassinations around us.

This country has not known a political assassination for the last 36 years, and then it was an exception. Terrorism is what the name is - to terrorize a population, not to terrorize an individual. To terrorize a certain part of the population, for example the Arabs who would like to talk peace as a group.

Q. Would you say something about recruiting and training of the police officer and how people look on police work as a career.

A. We have the same problems as everywhere, in public service. As this is a developing economy, and with industry and private enterprise paying much more than we do, we have the same problems as in any democracy - in Western Europe and the United States, in recruiting police.

We take only high grade people. Our standard training is very protracted.

Q. Is there any active opposition from the Arabs to the growing terrorism?

A. There is. But because of the very special and very complicated internal struggle within the Arab camp, the opposition is still tacit. First of all, we have succeeded to divide between the population and the terrorists.

The terrorists would get a tacit agreement of the Arab population, but will not get active assistance. It is too dangerous. It has varying degrees of reluctance to come into contact with the terrorists, but it will not go outright against the terrorists. We have isolated the violence of civic participation with the terrorists. We are not at the stage yet when I can tell you that we have succeeded in activating the Arab populace against the terrorists.

Rabbi Friedman: This represents a great deal of progress.

Q. You mention walking the streets without fear. Could you give us more information?

A. We pride ourselves that our streets are safe, day or night. It is very, very rare that you have any kind of molestation or thuggery or that sort of things occurring in this country.

Q. Has the blowing up of the Arab terrorist homes been successful in curbing violence? Do you intend to continue this in spite of the disapproval of the foreign press?

A. Our policy is to discourage anyone from co-operating with the terrorists. It is dangerous. If you are a terrorist you are liable to be shot. If you are an accomplice you are liable to have your house burned, because we have not yet found the secret slogan by which we can try talking them into not doing this.

Life is much harsher than this. The population has to understand that the stakes are high, otherwise, why not? Bear in mind that they are basically our enemies, and no amount of nice talk will change this fact.

The international press protestation against this we know of, and we take this into deep consideration. We only practice these measures when we don't see that there is any other way. We have not resumed the death sentence, because we pride ourselves on being one of the first countries which abolished it.

The core of the problem is this: to create a situation by which there will be reluctance on the side of the population to

co-operate with the terrorists. We are 2 and a half million and they are 1,200,000. Can you imagine yourselves in the United States with 120 million Chinese living with you there? There is no possibility of choosing the way, it is much harsher than that.

We will continue, I think, to resort to this extreme measure if there is no other way, and if, after considerable efforts, we feel that this is the right answer. But there is one thing that must be borne in mind: it is not done just like that. Every case is assessed and the result is considered, including unfavourable foreign comments.

Q. Is there a criminal element in East Jerusalem? What are the pay rates for police?

A. The Arab population of this area has all the characteristics of an agrarian backward population. There are low incidents of crime - no "white collar" crime at all. Many disputes are settled within the families, with all the characteristics of a feudalistic, underdeveloped people.

There is not a very high rate of crime in East Jerusalem, and a very low rate in the rest of the West Bank. It is an agrarian society.

There are certain types of crimes which constitutionally are called crimes, like dope addiction. Polygamy is not considered an offence. Classical crimes and crimes of violence do not pose the problem at all. The value of a police recruit's pay is the equivalent to an intermediate grade of civil servant.

Q. Do you have a hippy problem?

A. No, we have them imported. Eilat is a favorite hippy spot from all over the world. We do not have a hippy problem.

Q. What sort of a female police force do you have?

A. Not a large one, very few.

Q. What do the families of terrorists do after their homes are blown up?

A. This is not an urban society. The Arab family is part of a clan. When a house is blown up they go and live with another part of the family which lives all around. It is not an urban society where everyone is on his own.

Q. What are you going to do five years from now for parking?

A. I can show you in the Municipal Corporation of Jerusalem beautiful maps of what there will be in five years - parking laws and overpasses and everything.

Q. What about students from other countries who are not sympathetic to our cause.

A. Being a free society, we encourage free discussion. There are some foreign students who are critical about what we do, but we not only tolerate it, we encourage it.

REMARKS BY COLONEL (RES.) MORDECHAI BAR-ON
HEAD OF THE JEWISH AGENCY'S YOUTH DEPARTMENT

TO

MEMBERS OF THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL'S

"OPERATION ISRAEL"

TEL-AVIV HILTON, DECEMBER 7, 1968

Colonel Bar-On

What I want to do very briefly, is to analyse some of the problems of immigration this year, and we hope, next year too, because we may always have difficulties with immigration, and the more problems we have the happier we are, because then we have immigration.

People speak about emergency funds and emergency campaigns, and usually the notion about the term "emergency" has to do with security-emergency situation in Israel. I want to make it clear that, of course, we are in a state of emergency, for a number of years already, and especially since the Six Day War, but I think that even without the war, we would still face an emergency if we take the problem of immigration that we now have on hand.

By the end of this budgetary year, at the end of March 1969, it is projected that we will have had 33,000 immigrants come into Israel in the past twelve months. It is projected that by next year, if we make a good job of it - and partly this good job depends on you and on our capacity to organize and absorb this year's immigration and the immigration of previous years - then it is hoped that we will have an immigration next year reaching the figure of perhaps 40,000.

Eighteen years ago, we have had much more immigration. In the early fifties we absorbed into a country which was much weaker and poorer in many aspects, as many as 150,000 or 200,000 immigrants in one year.

But one has to realise that the nature of immigration these days has changed completely for many reasons.

I want first to analyse the current total number. What is this 30,000 made of? We don't have the total number for the year because the year has not yet ended, but I will give you September as an example of a typical month this year. In this month, we received about 4,000 immigrants, Four hundred of them came from Eastern Europe. About 1,800 came from the West, including the United States. But this also includes French people. About 500 people, most of whom are North

African, emigrated to France, especially after the upheaval in Algeria, and spent a few years there before finding their way to Israel. Another 1,800 came from Islamic countries: North Africa, Turkey, Iran and so on. About 200 in this month came from Latin America.

Let us put this typical immigration into percentage form. I would say that about 10% come from Eastern Europe, about 40% from the West - it is somewhat higher than average, which I would say is 35% - about 40% from Islamic countries, and about 10% to 15% from Latin America.

Why do I give these numbers in detail? This brings about a few questions. First of all, in the year 1951 - or 1952, when even 95% of the immigration arrived from Islamic countries, Yemen, Iraq, Tripoli, Morocco, then Israel and the Jewish Agency could afford to spread the process of absorption out for a number of years.

We put people into tents at the beginning, then into tin huts and then into wooden houses, and only after ten or twelve years did immigrants, who came in 1951 and 1952 manage to reach a house, and even then not a very spacious place.

But that process of absorption we could afford at that time, because everybody was in the same state. Also the indigenous population did not have a very high income. We were living in an austerity period. No-one suffered because no-one had anything. So we could afford these hundreds of thousands of immigrants and bring them here and spread out the absorption process over a few years.

But here you have a situation in which 30 or 40% of the immigration comes from Western countries. These are people who were used to a standard of living, maybe not the highest standard according to the American standards of Jewish families.

You cannot make a difference between Jews, and you have to find a way to give them, somehow, equal treatment. It will never be equal because when you take in a professor from UCLA to the University of Jerusalem, of course, you give him immediately a better income bracket, a bigger place. But the span of difference cannot be too high. That makes the whole process of absorption much more expensive.

Then there is a second point. Even from the non-Western countries, the type of immigration that is coming now, which is 20 years after we started the whole business, is already a different type of people.

I will give you a very simple story which shows one thing, and then the opposite. There was a professor of chemistry who came from Budapest - I understand that he was a very famous and well-known professor, who managed to sneak out of Hungary and ended up in Jerusalem at the Hebrew University. He received a flat in Jerusalem - what we term a three-room flat. In your terms it would be a four-room flat, including kitchen.

In Israeli terms this was a decent apartment, and he was extremely glad. He had a wife and two children, and he is now a very happy man. He has a very good position, and an apartment which he would never have dreamed of having in Budapest, in spite of the fact that he was a professor.

His neighbour was a professor of chemistry who came from America and received the same treatment, the same apartment. But he was extremely bitter about it, in spite of the fact that he had only one child, and finally gave up and went back to the States.

I tell you this story because on the one hand you have types of people who are glad to get what we give them, and on the other hand, you have others who see it as a reduction in their standard of living. Here you have the problem.

Most of those who come from Eastern Europe, in spite of the fact that they come from a poor background, are by now professionals, white-collar people, and the immigrants from Iran, from Turkey are of the same kind. But not all of them. There is still a proportion who come and who are simple workers. But more and more they are coming and requiring a higher standard of living, if we want to keep them here.

Here I come to a third point, and this is the very basic difference between the situation of immigration nowadays and of previous years.

In previous years, take for example, the Yemini immigration. When a Yemini family made the decision in 1950, or 1951 to come to Israel, this was a one way, irreversible decision, because they knew that they could never go back to Yemen. They also knew that they could only go to Israel because no country in the West would accept them.

Today in most cases, immigration is an experimental move on the part of the people who do it. It is very much so with Americans and with youngsters. I deal with youngsters a lot, and this is surely the case, because even a person who has been educated in a youth movement for ten years, with the aim of going to Israel, when he gets to the age of 18 to 20 and comes to Israel, he knows, at the back of his mind, that he can go back if he does not succeed.

This is an extreme case, but it is the case even with the North African families who can always go back to France, even if their situation in France is not that good.

This makes the whole process different, when we talk about absorption. We have to speed up, although this does not make it more expensive, because we had to reach the same level with the other people who came over 18 years ago, but the process was spread out over 15 years. Now the whole process is condensed, and we have to solve most of the problems within three years. If we fail to satisfy the immigrant within these three

years, then two main things will happen.

One, God forbid, many of them may go away and return to where they came from. Two, and this is especially the case with Eastern Europe, the rumour spreads and people write letters back home and then what happens is that those whom we expect to come in five years from now will not come. All this, if we do not do a good job in absorption here today.

I want to speak about Russia: just for a second, and I understand that you have been told already that what you are told here is not for public consumption or for quotation in the papers, because most of you know how sensitive these subjects are, especially when we deal with immigration from Eastern Europe. We already had a bad experience years ago, where word got out into the press and this stopped all the immigration from one country.

You know that after the Six Day War, relations with Russia have stopped completely, and - up to the Six Day War - June 1967 - there had been a slow, trickling pace of immigration from Russia - 60 families a month, 40 families a month. But this went along for a couple of years, and I personally was effected. My wife's aunt came from Russia and believe me, it is a fascinating phenomenon to watch these people, and how difficult it is to absorb them. But how once you do absorb them, what a redemption it is for them.

She was a woman who lost her husband in the Second World War, and she had two daughters, one was already 39 and the other was 36 - both beautiful, both talented, and they never married, not because they did not have a chance, but because they did not feel like marrying a "goy". And somehow they have been here now for three years, and they managed to get absorbed. Actually it was not very difficult in this case, because both girls are accountants and their mother did not have to work. They are both married now - the second one married about 2 months ago - and yesterday we were there and the boys were playing cards, and you should have seen this family singing and gay, and the mother, with tears in her eyes said "I thought this would never happen to me although I prayed for it every day. They managed to take me out of there."

This is, in very human terms, what it means for a Russian Jewish family to go out from there and come here.

Then it stopped completely. Not even one old man came for about a year since the June War. A few months ago, two families came all of a sudden, and we don't know why. Then four more families, then three more families - not large numbers. They were just drops, nothing more. But these drops may develop into a little stream.

I happened to be recently with Liora Eliav, the Deputy Minister of Absorption, who was once the First Secretary of the Embassy in Moscow and an expert on Russian Jewry. One family came from Tiflis which is Caucasia in Russia, and usually the immigration that came from Russia came from

Lithuania, Latvia Poland, or the Polish border - but not from Caucasia. This family came all of a sudden, and they are very traditional families and they know Hebrew. He told me a story and of all the stories that I have heard, I feel that this is quite symbolic of them all for many reasons.

This family had to go from Tiflis to Moscow to take a plane from Moscow to Vienna. From Tiflis to Moscow the train takes 48 hours, and 200 people who were friends of this family from Tiflis made the effort to go all the way to Moscow - 48 hours - and to the airport to see them off, singing and praying.

To me these stories are very symbolic from many aspects. For me it shows that there is something in Jewishness that no "goy" can really understand. Yet it is there. These families were under a Communist regime for 45 years. The Polish border and Lithuania have not been under the Communist regime alone for so long. But these people were born into the Communist regime. Yet you have this phenomenon.

You all know that the explanation of this is hard. Also it goes to show what will happen if the Russian Government does intend to open up. On the other hand, it puts an awful load of responsibility on us. This year, because of the fact that we had less immigration in the last few years, the Jewish Agency said that we would have 40,000 this year, and we make a correct prediction. But the Ministry of Housing, and all the agencies who deal with the problem of how much housing should be developed, said that this was impossible, and they planned for only 20,000. For these past few months we have had a great problem with housing.

But housing is just one aspect of the problem. In order to be able to absorb larger numbers of Russian Jews - and the same applies for every Jew - you have to prepare for all the infra-structure-schools, medical centres and housing and all that goes with it, and we have to be prepared for this.

There is another point that I want to make and this is the question of what does absorption actually mean? Is absorption just putting a man in a job and a house, and that is it? In the case of most immigration, this may be the case.

A doctor from London or a chemist from UCLA, once you give him a nice house, once you give him a job, he manages himself. He makes friends. He manages to educate his children in the proper way. This is done.

This is not the case with 50% if we take into account the North Africans who are registered under French immigration. These are people who go and join a Western civilization, which is Israel, and who have a painful struggle to uplift their own standard of orientation and skills and ability to work and live in this society. In most of these cases of Jewish immigration from Islamic countries, the generation of the elderly people who come into this country, this is usually a lost case. They cannot really push themselves up as adults and make themselves people of a Western culture or a Western civilization.

The question is, what will happen to their children? We are now struggling against many odds. First of all, the impact of the family is something that pulls them back. This is a very important impact. What the Jewish Agency has to do is not just to do the normal thing that every State and every nation can do - give a good and decent schooling, but far more. We have to struggle against the chains that lug them back to the backward tradition of one thousand years ago.

AMERICAN JEWISH

We have to put in much more effort. It is not enough to let them go to any school they want. You have to prepare more and better schools. You have to begin much earlier. You have to give them the ability to go to high school, in spite of the fact that perhaps they have not the full aptitude. You have to pump them into being able to compete with the others at high school level.

In my department, at the Jewish Agency, we have a fund to give scholarships to people who come from Islamic countries, who show a potential aptitude to study. They cannot compete with the Sabras or the children of Western families. They show that they have a potential and a possibility to compete. We take them for special courses, with additional scholarships on many levels.

We do this in preparation for high school and for university. This way, we have managed, in the last few years, to put through university hundreds of Moroccan boys, or Iraqi boys, who become the leaders of their own communities.

These are just some of the problems involved. I just want to analyze more what immigration means today, what absorption means today.

I deal with one of our Jewish Agency programs to bring professionals from the West -- including the United States, for one or two years, to work and help the development towns with immigrant populations.

Some of these professionals remain in the country as immigrants, but most of them go back. If you go to a development city like Dimona and you ask the Mayor how many professionals could you use? How many doctors, how

many teachers of English? How many social workers? How many can you utilize? How many does Dimona really need for its own social and educational point of view?

The answer would be 100. There are many people who could be helped, by teaching, by music teachers, by sports instructors. Then you ask him how many positions do you have open in your budget. Once you bring an American here he may not need to earn \$1,000 per month, but he needs an amount of money to live on.

When you ask him how many positions can they afford to have in the overhead of the Municipality, the answer would be, compared to 100, perhaps 4 or 5 or 6. The development of this city only reached a point in which the budget which the Government gives, which the Jewish Agency gives, which the Municipality has through taxes, and can only afford 4 or 5.

To add not 100, but 40 professional young Americans who come for one year to work, the Jewish Agency has to provide this Municipality with the ability to absorb. They need housing, they need tools, a club to work with the youth. If he is a sports instructor, he needs a yard, a ball, a basket, and all these things which go with the professional to enable him to work there.

This is in addition to his own small salary. This one program is extremely important - absorbing in depth, a process which goes on for many years. We can call on the Western Jews to help this because of their professional abilities. Even this is a very costly business.

We hope to have more problems, because this means that we will have more immigration. But if we are not going to solve these problems at least partially, then we will have no problems at all because immigration will dwindle down. You have heard of the importance of immigration in our general situation.

Just one more word of philosophy if I may indulge. What actually is this business, when we come to world Jewry and demand and ask and request financial help?

I think that there is a basic philosophy one should keep in mind. Take any country, for example, France, or Italy which is not as rich. They have problems of developing the land and of developing the nation. But these are normal problems of an additional nature. They have developed their countries for thousands of years. They need to reclaim another forest, or improve schools.

But what we have to do here is to gain the development which normal states, in the west especially, have done throughout a thousand years, in the span of 20 or 30 years. We have to build the whole infra-structure of the country, roads, the reclamation of lands, etc.

In any other normal nation, this has been done hundreds of years ago. Now nobody asks if this pays to be there, because it has been there for centuries, the canals, the roads.

It does not pay economically from a normal point of view. But we have to do it because we have to develop this land. From the point of view of the nation, we have to develop at least the 50% of the population who have come from underdeveloped and backward countries, and make out of them, a nation of a Western nature.

These jobs are not normal for any country in the world. This is part of the general framework of the Jewish people. I think that this is the basic philosophy, in my eyes, of what you are doing. You are helping us to prepare this additional work, that no normal state, even without the problems that we have, has to do.

If we can take into account that 60% or 70% of tax intake is being spent on security problems, you have the scope of the problem we have at hand.

Q. We met last night with American graduate students who are studying at the Tel Aviv University. These Americans expressed concern about what they considered prejudice against Yemenite Jews. Does such prejudice exist?

A. Prejudice is quite a complicated business. There are two ways to look at prejudice. One is looking down upon a group of people by those who are more lucky. There is a much fuller question. That is when there is a real gap between groups of people in a society. This makes it difficult for the lower group to reach the high positions in society, or distribute itself in a normal way, in which some are low and some are in high income brackets.

We have had throughout the years this second problem. This is one of the major problems which we call the integration of the different groups in the country. We are struggling to solve this. Much of the help that the UJA gives in the field of education is aimed at this.

This problem cannot be solved within ten years. As an educator, I believe it takes two to three generations to really solve it, if you can.

I have studied this rather thoroughly in many countries. This is not unique to Israel. You have it with the Negroes. You have it in England with the colored people. It exists in many countries. Israel is perhaps the only country that has not solved it but has a fair chance to do so. The development of the last few years showed how much progress we have made in this field.

It is not a question of only Yemeni Jews. It includes Moroccan Jews, Iraqi Jews and other Jews who came from Islamic countries.

This is one of the major struggles of Israel to uplift these people. What is the actual ability of these people to go higher. What do they feel about themselves? The Six Day War was a very instrumental development in the positive sense. All over, the Eastern Jews after the Six Day War gained a lot of confidence. They lost much of the bitterness that many felt before because of their handicaps.

Many of them took part in the War as officers and corporals and just privates who gave their share of sacrifice and hardships in the War, with all the rest. It made them feel that they are full partners in this country.

This is very important. Once they are confident of what they are, it is much easier to deal with them and uplift them.

As for prejudice in the narrow sense, we have it, but not among young people. You will find prejudice mainly among elderly people who were educated in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe.

I was born here. Among my friends, especially in the Army there is little prejudice. You have so much experience in living with Yemenis and Iraqis in one tent for two and a half years in the Army, fighting alongside him. You can see that he performs in the battlefield like you do, and sometimes better, and the prejudice cannot stand up against this.

The answer is that you may find, here and there, prejudice. Once the people are fully absorbed here, both Eastern and Western prejudices disappear quickly. This gives me hope that in the future, we will have less and less of it.

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REMARKS BY MR. HAROLD TROBE

DIRECTOR GENERAL MAIBEN--JDC

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE

UNITED JEWISH APPEAL "OPERATION ISRAEL"

TEL AVIV HILTON HOTEL, DECEMBER 7, 1968

Mr. Trobe: I see from the schedule, from the work you have been doing this week, that what you have been essentially looking into, and getting an understanding of, is the enormous security problem that we face here. Of course, I am sure you have become convinced, as we all are, that Israel is ready, and that one of our hopes is that the Arabs will be deterred by an awareness of this readiness. But sometimes I think it is a little bit like the story of the man who went to his Rabbi and said: "I have a terrible problem. My son can't play cards." And the Rabbi said: "That you call a problem? I have many people coming to me saying that their sons are playing cards and losing enormous amounts of money." And the man said: "I didn't say my son is not playing cards, I just said he can't play cards -- and that's terrible." This is like the Arabs. They may not be able to win the war, but they may continue to try.

Now it is fitting and proper, and it is correct in relation to the enormity of the problems faced here, that if you only spend only one week looking at the problems of Israel, you have to concentrate on the security problem. But that should not blind you to the fact that there are enormous social and medical problems in the country, and my task this morning is to give you something of a picture of the enormity of these problems.

Our assignment here has been to take care of the handicapped among the immigrants. When Israel was created, there were 600,000 Jews here. Then Jews who had to be rescued from all over the world began pouring in, and something had to be done about taking care of the enormous number of handicapped persons among those immigrants. Among them were many, many aged, many T.B. cases, and so on, and JDC's job was to establish homes for the aged, to establish hospitals, to establish programs to care for these aged, infirm and handicapped.

Now you haven't had a chance to visit one of our eleven institutions, but as of this moment we have 3,000 aged persons in our homes. Half of them are sick, requiring nursing care, or infirm, requiring some major degree of medical service during the day. The other half are ambulant, but 80 years of age and over.

If you come to one of our homes--and when you come back again we hope you will have the time to do it--you will find not a depressing sight, but you will find a group of people who are not only well-cared for in the physical sense, but for whom every effort is made to add life to those years. And what's

more you will find a group of people who are very very conscious of the fact that they owe to you the fact that they are living decently. There are people who came out of Eastern Europe, out of North Africa, with no awareness of what to expect. Very many of them lost their families in the Nazi holocaust, and who, when they came here, were delighted to find that you had had the wisdom to provide the funds for a program which took them from the ships and from the airports -- those who needed it -- immediately into institutions, and also provided other services for the aged and the sick, among those who could still be kept in the community.

And that's one of the things we have tried to do. We don't believe in institutions, except for those who are absolutely in need of them. We can't afford to put everybody into institutions, even those whom we recognize need it. We must first take those who simply cannot be cared for at home. And this is a tremendously important aspect of the problem, because the failure to take care of an aged person within a family group, when the aged person requires medical services, and full-time care, destroys the productive capacity of the workers in that family. And that is something which Israel, at this stage of its development, and with its problems, simply cannot afford.

We built two hospitals to treat T.B. during the early days. There was an enormous number of T.B. cases among the refugees who came from Eastern Europe and from North Africa. And, we are happy to say, that with good care, with the new drugs that have been developed, that problem has been licked, and those two hospitals were turned over to the Government for service to the general population, and now are serving the chronic sick and various other kinds of problems.

Among the major problems that we face, especially from the groups that were brought in from the Yemen, from North Africa, were the enormous number of blind among them, and for this we have established special workshops and various kinds of programs to deal with that problem. We had a very large program providing loans and help to those handicapped persons who, with some kind of help, can be made productive. For example, you have a bookkeeper who is, let us say, a double amputee, and if you can make a double amputee into a bookkeeper, you have got a man who can function normally in society. He may need some training; he may come here already trained. And then what you need is some means by which he can get to his place of employment and back. Thus, we provide specially equipped cars, through various kinds of programs we were able to help literally thousands of people who otherwise would not have been able to function, to live anything resembling a normal life.

Now, all of this has added up to a very, very impressive program. Out of the 1,200,000 immigrants who have come to Israel since the creation of the State, one out of five, or 250,000, have received some kind of help from this, your program in Israel.

Now, this all would be a very pleasant report if I could say that we are at the end, or were beginning to see the end, but I am afraid that is not the case.

We know in advance the areas of the world from which our future clients are going to come. Every time a Jewish community

is liquidated, you find some of the worst kinds of cases, those requiring very special services. Immediately after the Six Day War, the remains of the Jewish Community of Libya fled to Israel. The largest number of Libyan Jews had come here in 1949 and 1950. Those who came here last were some fairly well to do people, some very poor people, and some very, very severely sick people. Families in which there was only one person -- this was a fairly typical pattern -- who could be cared for in the setting which they knew about. They could hire fairly inexpensive maid service to look after an old and sick or paralyzed member of the family. After the Six Day War, the Arabs in Libya went hunting for Jewish throats, and Jews had to leave immediately. The Libyan Government helped Jews to get out by arranging for plane transportation. They came to Rome where JDC had to care for them. Most of those people, especially the most difficult cases came here. Here is where the doors were open for them.

Just a few months ago you may have noticed an article in the New York Times which said that the Egyptians were going to permit about 100 Jews to leave. It didn't say where they were going, and it didn't say anything about the condition of those Jews. Well, I want to tell you that forty aged and sick persons have come out of Egypt. We can't write about it because we are afraid that if we do -- and if we talk about from where most of them have come -- the Egyptians in keeping their hostages in their desire to have some kind of substitute victory over the Jews will not permit them to leave. I am sure that you are aware of the fact that there are only about 1,000 Jews left in Egypt. About 250 were arrested at the time of the Six Day War and have not been released. They are kept under terrible conditions. The Egyptians permitted only 23 Jews -- all aged and sick to come out of the one aged home left in Cairo -- a home which it's difficult to know how it continues to operate, since there are no responsible members of the community able to do anything about it. There are a handful of people who are looking after it. We are not legally allowed to send any money in to help them, and it's a terrible situation. Well, 23 of those people of the 40 who came out have come here, and I just want to read to you three cases to indicate who we get when a community is being liquidated.

Case No. 1 -- A stroke victim -- he's chairfast -- requires help in washing, dressing and in toilet.

Case No. 2 -- had been in a mental hospital and then sent to the Heliopolis aged home for the most difficult confused mental cases. He was placed in a Malben nursing home.

The 3rd case -- an aged couple, aged 74 and 72, until 1956 he was a successful businessman but lost everything after the Sinai Campaign. Both have a long list of chronic diseases and were placed in a nursing unit. The wife has since died.

It's interesting that at the Rome airport, when these cases came in with the help of the International Red Cross in Egypt, they were known as the Joint Cases, the Malben cases. People around the airport said, "Where did all the healthy ones go? Is this the kind of immigration we are receiving?" You can understand it from the Israeli point of view. This is the critical point that must be understood, that in order to understand Israel's medical and social problem, why are they different from others.

There are a number of reasons, but this is the basic one. There were 650,000 Jews in Israel when the State was created. Since then 1,400,000 Jews have come in. Now if those 1,400,000 Jews were carefully selected, it would have been difficult enough in this kind of setting, for one Jew to take care of two newcomers and to help them come in.

Let me give you some examples to enable you to compare what this means.

Australia has a population of over 10,000,000; a continent which has a marvelous set up, climate, natural resources, a long period of development, lots of capital investment -- everything you can imagine -- no major security problems. Australia is very eager to get white population, but they restrict the number of people that they will take into the country to a maximum of 100,000 persons a year, because they say they simply cannot absorb any more than that.

If you have high blood pressure you won't get a visa to Australia. I know a case of a man who was 4'11" tall, one of our refugees, who was rejected for that reason alone. That's how carefully the people are selected.

When the Jews had to flee from various countries, we found ourselves with 100,000 Jews in refugee (DP) camps immediately after the Second World War. Then came the program in Poland, and we had the mass outflow of that pitiful remnant of Polish Jews. 300,000 came out in 1946. In 1947 came the Rumanian Jews. In 1949 came the Hungarian Jews. The Yemenite Jewish population of 40,000 came out in 1949-50. 140,000 Iraqi Jews had to be brought in here within a matter of four months in 1951. Then 1956, with the Egyptians and the Hungarians coming here.

This has been the pattern. The door has been open. No selectivity. No question whether an immigrant could support himself. There wasn't any selectivity possible, or desirable. When the Jews of Morocco had to leave Morocco, those who had a certain level of education, who spoke French, could go to France. Or they could go to Canada. They could go to the United States. They could meet the rigid requirements of those countries. Those who had less education, those who were sick, those who had a member of the family who was blind, feebleminded, or had mental illness -- these could only go to Israel.

When the Jews of other countries had to flee for their lives, we in the United States took 60,000 carefully selected, healthy young able-bodied. Our six million American Jews with our communities in good shape, were able to integrate them with industry and with jobs everywhere. We were able to take 60,000 able-bodied people. That is what six million did for 60,000. That is one per hundred able-bodied, carefully selected.

The Israelis had to absorb every one, unselected. Now, are we beginning to see the light at the end of the tunnel?

We know where our next ones are coming from. There are in Morocco some 60,000 Jews left. They will come the next time Arab mobs go for Jewish throats.

Those with some degree of education may succeed in getting to France. The aged and sick will come to Israel. The less educated are not a problem because they can be educated. The big problem is the aged and the sick.

The Israelis don't worry about the illiterates, and they certainly don't worry about the young people, no matter what condition they are in. They take care of them and make useful citizens out of them. But this is an enormous problem, and we are going to have it.

What about the Jewish community of Rumania? The doors to exit have virtually been closed since the Six Day War. They are going to open those doors. There are 100,000 Jews in Rumania, 55% of them over the age of 50.

The JDC is today helping in this one country in Eastern Europe in which we are able to work legally. We are providing aid to 5,000 of the neediest aged and sick persons in Rumania. When the door opens, they will come here in large numbers and we are going to have to deal with that problem.

There was a UJA mission that went to Rumania in October. They insisted that the JDC had to spend at least one million dollars more to deal with the needs of Rumanian Jews.

We still have a residual community of about 18,000 Jews in Tunisia. The next time there is another mass attack against the Jews, the Jews will finally leave. When the Jews do flee, ten thousand of them or 12,000 of them will go to France, maybe 6,000 will come here, and of those 6,000 a large number are today receiving assistance in Tunisia because they are unemployable. This is the kind of problem that we face.

There is an aspect of the problem in Israel which we have not been able to touch. Malben can only take people who have lived in the country for five years or less. Let older, aged residents apply and we can do nothing for them.

A day does not go by that I am not approached by somebody, although we take cases only through the local welfare offices or the Jewish Agency. Let me give you an example that was pressed on me just yesterday. A Rumanian family came here 12 years ago. The man is a worker. He earns about IL 700 a month. His wife takes care of the house. They have a young son who is a science student at the University. They have an old mother. The mother is 82 and is confused and requires daily help. She is not a mental case. With the shortage of mental hospitals in Israel she is not eligible for that. She is not eligible for a Malben institution. But she is destroying the life in that family. The student can't work at home. He has to do all of his work outside the house. The family's income is so limited that they can't care for the old lady. They can't buy these services because the few private facilities that are available would cost much more than his total monthly earnings, and this is destroying the life of the family.

A more graphic example is one that I had just a few weeks ago of a mother and a daughter who had lived together. They had come here in 1935, and the daughter is a school teacher. The mother was keeping house. Everything was reasonably

normal and satisfactory. Then the mother had a stroke. She is now totally bedridden and requires somebody to take care of her. Where? The daughter's earnings are about IL 600 per month. There is no place to put the mother. There are very few beds available. There are only about 300 beds in the country except for Malben. We have 1,200 beds for that type of case. But there are only 300 other beds in the whole country for such cases. Many nursing homes cost much more than her total earnings.

So she had to quit her job as a school teacher to take care of her mother. We need in the country at least 5,000 new beds for the aged. Our most ambitious plan is to construct an additional 1,000 beds in the course of the next five years. We will still be short 4,000 beds

There will come a time, and I think everybody is convinced of this, when the Russians will open the doors. The Jews all around the world are putting a great deal of pressure on the Russians, demanding, correctly and justifiably that they should "let our people go" -- those who want to do so.

We are pressing the Russians to let the Jews out, but I want to tell you that if we don't do a lot more about the social services in the country, the Russian Jews, when they are given the chance, will be forced -- because conditions will not be good enough -- not to take the opportunity, and we will have failed.

I just want to give you some indication of some of the social problems here in a brief figure. The average wage in Israel is 587 pounds a month. That's \$175. I don't know whether your schedule has permitted you to get around enough to see what the price structure is here, but you can't live and have anything left over on 587 pounds a month, if you have to support the average family of four. One out of every four units in Israel has an income of IL 300 or less. These are mostly families in which there is no employable member. If there is an employable member, he will get into the group of the IL 587 per month. That is one out of four, and that is an astounding figure.

What can this country afford if you need assistance? Thirty-five pounds per capita per month. That is \$10 per month. That means that a family of four has to live on \$40 per month, and if you are getting to the ripe old age of 65 for a pension, and you qualify for a pension in the country, you get, if you are a single person, 68 pounds per month. That is a little less than \$20.

If you have a very special problem, a very special need, and you have absolutely no income from other sources, you get a little more. You get \$30 if you are a single person and \$43 for a couple. \$43 per month! And it is not because the Israelis are not conscious of the problems, or unwilling to do something about the problems. It is because there is no alternative to doing something about it.

Let me read a report of a neighborhood. This was done by three very competent sociologists and social workers. Fifty per cent of the population of this neighborhood are on

assistance or work relief. Many families of 8 and 10 persons are living in 2 rooms. There is a serious truancy rate among children, noticeable at first at the third grade, and by the sixth grade, many or even most of the children are hopelessly behind in their studies. Of 49 children who finished the 8th grade in 1964, only 17 went on. And only four finished secondary school out of 49. Nineteen per cent of the youth between 14 and 18 had some kind of a police record. A very low percentage of the youth in this area managed to acquire a skill.

This is not Watts in Los Angeles. It is not Hough in Cleveland. It is not the Hill district of Pittsburgh, which I know so well. It is not Harlem. It is Musrara in Jerusalem and it is a direct result of the fact that Israel has had to absorb this enormous number of people.

Now all of these problems have to be dealt with. You can ignore social problems to a certain extent. If the Jews of Russia and other oppressed Jews are to be saved, and if the two and a half million Jews here are to be given the chance to survive, the American Jewish community is going to have to carry much of the burden of Israel's social needs.

Q. What steps are being taken to induce immigrants to come to Israel rather than going to other countries?

A. Let me describe the procedure that happens in Vienna where Jews who are coming out of Poland and Czechoslovakia come.

We don't publicize this. A Jewish Agency representative sits in the JDC and the HIAS office. HIAS actually handles immigrations to all countries other than Israel. A Jewish Agency representative meets them on first arrival, and he presents the picture of Israel and what possibilities are available to them. That is a much more effective way than the way JDC could do it. JDC has to protect its position in order to enable it to work in Arab countries. We are still working directly in Morocco and Tunis. We are working in Iran which is a Moslem country, though not an Arab country. We have to work in Rumania still. These are all areas where it is of tremendous importance that the JDC's position as a pure Jewish assistance agency with no kind of propagandistic aspect.

Q. How well is the Malben program doing in Israel?

A. We take care of aged cases at an astoundingly low cost. It only costs us an average of about \$150 for our sick and well aged, per month. That is a low cost of care and includes the most severe nursing cases. That is \$1,800 per year. The average stay in our Malben institutions is 10 years.

Each person admitted means that you are committed to an \$18,000 expense. That is why we need a lot of money, as you know from your own communities.

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ZELIG CHINITZ, RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE IN ISRAEL

FOR THE UNITED ISRAEL APPEAL

ADDRESSING MEMBERS OF THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL'S

"OPERATION ISRAEL"

TEL AVIV, DECEMBER 7, 1968

Frankly speaking, we are confronted with a paradox. The Israeli economy is improving, is rising. Our people read the Press. I am sure you have been reading the Jerusalem Post all week. And so the question is often asked: Why emergency in the face of a relatively prospering Israeli economy?

You know the answer. You were at the Canal. You were at the Eneq Beit Shean, and at the Golan Heights. We can't count on the El Fatah to maintain the campaign at very high tempo all year. We hope that the Israeli economy will continue to thrive. That question will have to be confronted head on, the need for the gift dollar in the face of a prospering Israeli economy. I want to confront it head on and try to answer it in a thumbnail sketch of the situation without becoming an amateur economist.

To put it very bluntly, business here in Israel is good. But the Government is broke. That is the truth. On Wednesday I had a meeting with the Deputy Director of the Budget; I asked him frankly: What does Israel expect through the Jewish Agency, the recipient of world Jewish philanthropic giving? What does Israel expect in 1969 in order to make ends meet? I can give it to you line by line: for health 17 million dollars; for secondary education, 17 million dollars; for high education, 69 million dollars; for housing 117 million dollars; for agricultural settlements, 49 million dollars; for welfare, 32 million dollars; for a total of 301 million dollars. This is what Israel needs from the Jewish Agency based on the gift dollar from the United States, and the other 54 countries of the Keren Hayesod throughout the world.

To this figure must be added 30 million dollars for immigration, anticipated between 30 and 40 thousand. Also added about 4 million for Youth Aliyah. This makes a grand total of 335 million dollars.

This is what Israel needs to maintain its infrastructure of social services in the realm of health, education, welfare, housing, immigration, initial absorption and Youth Aliyah.

Now you may read that the situation continues to improve on the home front, thus netting increased tax income to the national Government. That's true. You have also heard about the herculean tasks facing the Defence Ministry. I was with you when the Prime Minister stated that 40% or more of the total budget goes for defence. You can look at it another way -- 20% of the gross national product goes to defence. In

the U.S. with 500,000 soldiers in Viet Nam, defence takes between 9.2 and 10% of gross national product. In Israel it's at least 20% of the gross national product for defence. If there is an increase of tax revenue for the Government, and 75% or so goes for defence, the remainder goes for health service, education and social service that we cannot cover for legal and technical reasons.

And so I maintain that world Jewry has to get back to June, 1967 level where we did a fantastic job, where in June, July and August, 1967 in three months, world Jewry poured into the Jewish Agency 37% of what we did in the previous eighteen and one-half years. This reflects a capacity on the part of world Jewry. The challenge is to demonstrate that 1969 means not emergency level of 1968, but back to the level of June, 1967, because there is no alternative.

You may say that if the economy is rising in Israel, why don't you increase income taxes. It's a logical question. Obviously, you can't raise any revenue from the low paid family heads earning 500 or 600 pounds a month who just manage for the basic necessities. A civil servant earning a very good salary of IL 1,220 a month, \$350 a month -- has a take-home pay of \$227. This is after you deduct income tax, property tax, social tax, defence loans, health payments, and national insurance. His boss who is in the top 10% or 5% earns IL 1,500 a month, \$430. His take home pay is \$258 a month.

It is unconscionable to talk about increasing income taxes on the so-called upper level of Israel's economy. We should know that everyone in that bracket has to spend approximately \$300 a year or IL 1,050 a year, for the high school education of his son or daughter. So you can't increase taxes.

You might say let the Israeli Government borrow more money. The debt of the Israel Government is over a billion dollars. The debt of the Jewish Agency is 300 million dollars. So there are limits to the borrowing capacity of the Israeli Government. To ask David Horowitz, Governor of the Bank of Israel, to print more money is to set in motion an inflationary cycle. That would nullify all the economic achievements of the past twelve months. So, you can't increase taxes. You can't print more money. You can't borrow any more hard currency. You can't ask Israel to decrease the Defence Budget.

Normal life continues in this country only because there are men with the proper tools along the borders, and in and around the cities, as Commander Rosolio explained to us, who maintain security along the lines, and keep a top level security inside the cities, with occasional mishaps.

No American, certainly no Jew outside Israel, will suggest to the Israelis that they decrease the Defence Budget which is eating up between 70 and 80% of the taxes.

The only other alternative is to decrease the social services. That would be too precarious for two reasons. First, it affects the security of Israel. When you decrease educational services in Israel, it is a question of physical survival.

One of the basic differences between the average Israeli soldier and the average Arab soldier was that the Israeli soldier could handle and manipulate sophisticated equipment on the battlefield. The Arab soldier by and large hasn't learned how to manoeuver with equipment, how to do three or four or five operations simultaneously. To give a command and take a command, and coordinate and aim and direct, it's a little bit beyond him.

That doesn't start when you are in the army. That starts when you are in kindergarten, and grade school, and vocational school and high school. So when we talk about the possibility of decreasing the level of educational services, we are asking Israel to imperil its very survival capacity.

There are over 300,000 people who are under-housed. With all the money, if we raise the 300,000,000 dollars, they need 300 additional beds to keep up with the population increase -- and only some 200 are going to be built. Three municipal hospitals and two mental hospitals are approved and plans exist. But they have to be cancelled for 1969. You heard of the level of social welfare payments, IL 35 per month, \$10. Can you decrease that any more? If you take all the categories of welfare, you come to a total that 10.5% of the population is living on poverty levels. They need thirty million dollars to overhaul the welfare program.

This is the dimension of the emergency that many Jews all over the world have to grasp 18 months after the end of the Six Day War. World Jewry has to shoulder the burden of the social service needs of Israel, and help education, welfare and housing. We have got to get back to the levels of June, 1967 in giving.

It is my duty as resident representative of the United Israel appeal, which receives 2/3 of the funds of the regular UJA campaign of the United States, with 1/3 going to the JDC, and a slightly small proportion to HIAS, but we get 100% of the Emergency Fund.

Though we handle immigration costs, we do not spend one cent of UJA money on the immigration of Jews from English speaking countries who happen to be, relatively speaking, affluent countries.

No contribution to a local federation which sees its way to UJA, to the United Israel Appeal (and we decide where the money goes, and the Jewish Agency is our agent) is used for transmigration of American or English Jews, because that is sort of an ideological situation - not a hardship or a needy, or fleeing from oppression. I am here to protect the tax deductability status of the UJA gift, or of the local Federation gift. We cannot spend any of the money on elementary education in Israel because it is a statute.

We can't take the place of a government. It is non-government administered. It is administered by the Jewish Agency, the money that UJA goes for. It is inside the green line - the June 5th, 1967 boundaries. The United States won't permit its tax deductible dollars to become involved in what is to this day, in the eyes of America, a political problem.

The Jewish Agency has other sources of income that it uses for transmigration of English speaking Jews coming here.

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