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HERBERT A. FRIEDMAN

EXECUTIVE VICE-CHAIRMAN, UJA

"MAIN ISSUES OF THE 1963 CAMPAIGN"

SPEAKERS' SEMINAR
OF THE
UNITED JEWISH APPEAL
ROSE ROOM, HOTEL ASTOR
JANUARY 21, 1963

I propose to give you a summary, or, still better, the ingredients of the 1963 campaign story which you will weave together into your own tapestry, according to your own skill, style, method and years of experience.

The most appropriate thing is to give a review of what happened in 1962, because a review of 1962 events shall lead you smoothly and logically, into the tasks of 1963.

Point Number 1 - Review of 1962 Experience

At the beginning of 1962, you will recall, our estimate indicated that 1962 would be one of the biggest years of migration.

Yet, our estimates were "wrong." The final data show that the actual Jewish migration in 1962 was 18% larger than predicted.

We also made a budgetary estimate of the amount of money needed for the work of our constituent agencies, -- \$95,000,000. This was the goal of last year's campaign (\$60,000,000 in Regular; plus \$35,000,000 in the Special Fund) and we were wrong here, too, because we did not raise \$95,000,000. We raised \$65,000,000.

In other words, more people came than anticipated, and less money came in than was budgeted and spent. We spent \$95,000,000 and raised \$65,000,000. Where was the \$30,000,000 difference obtained?

Additional funds came from two sources. First, they came from the Government of Israel, in the amount of \$12,000,000. That is, \$12,000,000 more than the government had committed according to their original plans, prepared at the beginning of 1962.

The \$12,000,000 the Government of Israel was able to contribute to the absorption of immigrants came in a very harsh way: from taxpayers who were already burdened with compulsory loans and new taxes, and who, directly or indirectly, are carrying a major share of the cost of housing, retraining and schooling of new arrivals. The Israelis, the old-timers, and those who came a year, two or three years ago, were asked to pick up an additional bill of \$12,000,000 for the newcomers of 1962.

I believe, it was an awful burden for us to place upon them, an immoral burden which we had no right to impose upon them. We should never forget to stress this.

The second source of funds which covered the deficit came from additional borrowing on the part of the Jewish Agency of Jerusalem. The Agency went to the banks in Europe and borrowed \$18,000,000. You may ask, why did the Agency have to go to Europe? Because it was prevented from borrowing in the United States, and you must make this point very clear. Two years ago, in 1961, the United Jewish Appeal borrowed \$65,000,000 (\$25,000,000 from the banks in New York; \$40,000,000 from banks around the country). An impressive amount of money.

This was a ten-year loan. We promised to pay back annually \$6,500,000 plus interest, and not to borrow again, barring any emergencies.

Because of continual shortage of funds during the entire year of 1962, and because the UJA could not borrow in the United States, the Jewish Agency went to various capitals in Europe and borrowed this \$18,000,000.

Now, what do we anticipate for 1963?

This brings me to the second point of the summary - Immigration Prognosis

The anticipation for 1963 -- and I will not go into details, because we have colleagues here, who are experts in various fields of welfare and reconstruction, who will answer questions -- is to repeat the migration figure projected in 1962.

Our current estimate may be wrong. As already mentioned, the actual migration in 1962 was 13% larger than originally anticipated.

In 1963, migration may equal our estimates; it may exceed them; or fall short of the projected figure. We have made a prognosis, based on the best current information available to us, and there is no authority on this green earth that can accurately predict the size of Jewish migration. Since we think the migration of 1963 will be substantially the same as the original 1962 estimate, our budget had to be substantially the same. Therefore, we have planned our current budget for \$96,000,000 which is a million more than last year. The addition of a million dollars is based primarily upon the extra need we anticipate in France. I will come to this in a moment, in the next point of my review.

Going back to 1963 migration, -- I would like to add that it is believed that the 1963 migrants will originate mainly from the same areas of Europe and North Africa as in the past years.

Let us then turn to the third point - Algerian Refugees in France.

I said a moment ago that we are adding to the 1963 UJA budget an extra million dollars to be spent in France on behalf of Algerian refugees. But it is a budgetary item, and not the whole story, by any manner of means. Therefore, I shall amplify it a bit.

There will be an internal shifting of money within the JDC budget. JDC expects a "windfall" stemming from the devaluation of the Israeli pound and from the planned reduction of the Malben program. These two factors will permit the JDC to reallocate several million dollars towards the Algerian problem in France. (Mr. Warburg and Mr. Leavitt estimate the re-allocation at about 3 million dollars). Here, again, we are dealing with an estimate, and nobody can be sure of its exactness. Much depends on how the JDC work in Israel will proceed, and still more depends upon the development in France.

As you know, the French government gives, for a period of one year, "assurance sociale" or in plain English, welfare aid and subsidies to refugees, who are French citizens. Now, the great exodus from Algeria began in February, 1962. Soon a year will have passed, and those families who came to France last February will cease receiving this governmental aid, which is certainly not very large, -- it comes to about \$150 a month, depending upon the number of children in the family, but still the state assistance brings some measure of relief. Shortly, the refugees will stop receiving aid, and we may face a crisis in May, because May of 1962 was the month when more than 10,000 refugees from Algeria came to France. Most likely in May of 1963 we are going to have thousands of people suddenly clamoring for help. True, they will be cut off from a pittance; nevertheless, this pittance made the difference between life and death.

Clearly, the exact cost of JDC help to Algerian refugees in France is unknown. However, we are sure of one thing, that this particular program will be a very serious and substantial item in JDC's budget.

We added an extra million dollars, and we will manipulate the JDC resources and see how many million dollars more can be made available for refugee aid in France.

Problem Number Four - Security of Israel

Perhaps this should have been listed in our summary as the Number One problem.

You and I know perfectly well that there is no sense whatsoever in our struggling -- with all of our great energy and warm devotion - to save our fellow Jews from hostile and oppressive surroundings and to bring them to Israel -- if Israel itself is not safe. Therefore, whenever there is danger looming on Israel's horizons, it clutches at our hearts. We become more concerned with it.

We must take into account the millions of dollars, the multimillion dollar expenditure for defense which will occur during 1963. Please note that in the coming year the increased defense needs of Israel will be met by purchases of new missiles which the United States government has agreed to sell to Israel -- and I would stress this point very strongly.

For fourteen years, the government of the United States would not sell arms to Israel. Now the fundamental policy of our government has been altered. Defensive missiles, of the ground-to-air type, called Hawks, have been offered. The change in the official attitude of the United States took place because our government came to understand there is a substantial and serious threat to Israel. Egypt is in possession of an ever-increasing arsenal: IL 28 bombers, Tupelov fighter-bombers, MIG 21 fighters, hundreds of rockets, more than one thousand tanks, almost a dozen submarines, landing craft that can put down tanks and troops on the shore, and many more weapons. The United States government decided that it must help Israel in meeting this threat by making available to it weapons in a quantity and of a quality never before contemplated. This complete about-face should be sufficient warning to us that in councils higher than our own, and in quarters not as closely identified emotionally as we are, the fact registered that Israel needs support. This is a political step of major significance.

The financial implications of the new United States attitude are obvious. These missiles will have to be paid for in cash. There are no loans; there is no certainty of long-term credits, although these are being negotiated.

If any further evidence is necessary to convince people who might still have the notion that Nasser is a mere social reformer in the Middle East and not a military schemer, I would call your attention to the two following quotations which, I believe, should be memorized and used on every proper occasion.

Nasser has threatened so persistently and so many times to destroy Israel that those of us who are familiar with his threats take them seriously. But there are many audiences that you will address who do not know this, and who might challenge you. It would, therefore, be advisable to quote Nasser directly.

"I think that the decisive year will be in 1963 or 1964.

By that time we shall ourselves have manufactured jet bombers we need and also the rockets...When I start a war, I want to take it to the only end I accept -- decisive victory."

(Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, London, May 26, 1962)

His junior partner, the new president, Abdulla Sallal, of Yemen was more explicit:

"I shall personally lead the Yemeni people in the fighting ranks in this showdown battle and my brother Gamal Abdel Nasser, will lead his people in the fighting ranks from the U.A.R. (United Arab Republic) until we crush the remaining corrupt and tyrannical regimes in Arab lands"... "Then Gamal and I will meet in Tel Aviv (Israel) to hoist Arab banners there after we liberate Palestime from intruding Zionism."

(Associated Press. January 12, 1963)

As you see, the issue of war and threats, missiles and rockets, has an unmistakable relevancy to us. If in 1962, we imposed on Israel and its people to contribute extra money for the absorption of immigrants because we ourselves failed to raise enough funds, we will have neither the moral nor any other right to repeat this demand in 1963.

If someone asks: "How will we pay for the 1963 migration, if we do not raise enough funds?" -- the answer is clear. We cannot, nor should we, expect any extra contribution from Israel.

Point Number 5 - Previous Immigrants not yet Absorbed

I should like to stress the fact that we do not begin the year 1963 with a "clean slate." Our failure in reaching fund-raising goals during the past years left many absorption problems unsolved.

There are scores of thousands of immigrants in Israel who came in previous years, who have not been absorbed, and for whose self-fulfillment we could conduct a \$96,000,000 campaign, with every moral justification. Yes, I know that there is supposed to be an "iron law" according to which there is nothing as dead as last year's immigrants. I am familiar with the fund-raisers' attitudes: "there is no strong appeal in the fact that last year's immigrants have to be paid for." Nevertheless, I consider it to be an important additional argument in the arsenal of speakers' appeals, an argument which should not be neglected but used in the presentation of the UJA story.

Point Number 6 - JDC

We must remember that programs supported with UJA funds are not confined to Israel alone. Let us not overlook the important work carried on by the JDC. In the pamphlet, "The 1963 UJA Story," which we sent you, there is an item you should look at and study very carefully. You will find it on the page next to the last. It shows the way UJA money will be spent, and there are only ten lines under the JDC column, but each line of of a special significance.

Please examine the JDC budget, and you will see that:

Six-and-a-half million dollars are to be spent in European countries for Jews still living in these lands;

Six-and-a-quarter million dollars are to be spent in Moslem countries, for Jews who still live there, although many of them would like, but cannot emigrate;

\$7,650,000 are to be spent in Israel, for the Malben program which cares for the aged, the handicapped, the chronically ill;

Five-and-a-quarter million dollars are to be spent in another area for a great thrilling program, which could be tripled if we had the necessary means. But, this program which touches the lives and hopes, dreams and fortunes of 150,000 people, must be conducted on a modest scale because we are lacking necessary funds;

Lastly, 2 million dollars out of JDC budget will go for the support of the ORT program which is so well known to all of us.

Therefore, I am sure, you will agree that JDC story is vital and dramatic, colorful and gripping. It will appeal to many people, who might say: "Well, there is so much that we know and hear about Israel. Is there not something else?"

Please tell the JDC story as fully as it deserves to be told.

Point 7 - Resettlement, other than Israel.

This point also deals with matters we have a tendency to forget. In 1962, some 9,000 individuals were resettled in countries other than Israel, - mainly, United States, Canada, Australia and Latin America. Let us not forget about the work of two other organizations responsible for this vital social endeavor. The two agencies are beneficiaries of our fund-raising effort; I have in mind the United HIAS Service and NYANA.

Point 8 - Important Anniversaries

You all know well that 1963 is an anniversary year. The 25th Anniversary of the United Jewish Appeal is of an historic importance. But it also has a natural fund-raising appeal. Based upon my own experience, I can report to you, that during the last two weeks many additional gifts were obtained when the contributor was reminded of the life-saving work that was going on in the last twenty-four years.

The contributor is thrilled by the fact that for a quarter of a century we "were there," where our help was needed, and suddenly he begins to see clearly the historic perspective of UJA programs. It makes him feel good, because he has been a part of it. You must find a way of reminding the contributor that our work is far from being completed. It shall be his duty as well as a privilege to give more for many years to come. But in 1963 he should make an extra effort and honor the historic anniversary of UJA. Again, experience proves that oftentime the contributor is receptive and does something special.

It should also be noted that 1963 is a year of two other significant anniversaries.

On April 19, 1943, on the first night of Pesach, the last handful of Jews under Mordecai Anielewicz came out of the bunkers of the Warsaw Ghetto and started a 33-day historic fight. This year will mark the 20th Anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, in which Jewish honor and dignity were recaptured amidst the flaming ruins of the blasted ghetto.

April 29, 1963 will mark the 15th Anniversary of Israel's independence. It is not necessary for me to tell you how to draw the comparisons and conclusions of this happy event.

Depending on how much time you have for your basic presentation, it seems to me you should include these historic data in your speech. If you have the time then develop the theme more fully,

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These are the major ingredients, as I see them, which shall go into the 1963 UJA Story. Certainly there are other aspects of our work which each of you will use according to the circumstance.

But you and I know the structure within which we operate, and the limitations which are binding upon us, and very often we have no more than twenty minutes to tell our story. During this brief period of time it is usually a question of selecting the right topic, or combination of topics, on which to base our appeal. I have just picked out a few of these highlights which, I am sure, will be useful to all of us during the forthcoming campaign.

One thing is certain - the cause is just, the needs abundant, the historic goal clear. Let us use all our skill, devotion and power of persuasion to bring to the attention of our fellow Jew why he must maintain and increase his support of his people's search for freedom.

I wish us all good success in the months ahead.

Thank you very much.

(The Speakers' Seminar of the United Jewish Appeal was held in the Rose Room of the Hotel Astor on January 21, 1963, at 8:00 o'clock p.m. Rabbi Herbert A. Friedman presided.)

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RABBI FRIEDMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, let me have your attention, please. I think we have waited long enough for all those who are coming late, and they will now wait for us.

It is like in the expensive movies: the expensive seats are in the rear. That is where everybody is sitting. It is also like a schule: everybody sits in the back and leaves the front seats empty.

I would like to explain the format of tonight's meeting so that you can see how we have attempted to structure it and so that you can anticipate how each one can get the most out of it.

We have, first of all, a panel of people sitting here, and I will introduce them to you in a moment. They are here as resource personnel, who will be available to answer questions when we get to that point in the program. One of their number has volunteered, or we have drafted him to make a short statement on a subject which is of enormous importance and concern to us, namely, the matter

of the security of Israel.

We will begin the program showing you two of the films which are going to be in use in this year's campaign. This is a departure from previous practice here, but it is a departure which has been suggested to us by many of you, because, as you have traveled around from meeting to meeting, you have very often come to a meeting where one of these films is shown. You have not seen it, yourself. You are not sure of what is coming up; and then you are very often called upon to improvise your remarks with reference to what has just been shown on the film. Therefore, we would like to show them to you now, at the beginning of the year, and hopefully, by the end of the campaign season, you will be so fed up with them that during the fifteen minutes that the film goes on you can sleep and rest.

You will get to know them by heart after you have seen them enough times, but the first time we wanted you to see them here tonight in case you had any questions about any of the content in the film, and then you can ask them, and you can be as familiar with them as we are.

Each one of the films is fifteen minutes in length. We are going to show them consecutively, so

that is a half hour. When the films are done, if you have any questions on them, we will take them. If not, we will go on, and I will try to make a summary presentation of the line of the campaign this year, and the one other person here who is going to talk will talk then after I have finished for a few moments, and that should be a half hour, his speech and mine, and then we will have about an hour for questions and answers on the general material which has been presented tonight so that you can ask anything which is on your mind.

Now, let me tell you who the people are in case those of you in the back have as bad eyesight as I have and you can't see.

Sitting 'way over on the left is Henry Bernstein, whom everybody knows, I am quite sure. Both the New York and the National speakers have known Henry for 10 these many hundred years. I said that because he says that. He says he feels that way.

Sitting next to Henry is Miss Deborah Altenbacher, who is director of public relations for the Jewish Agency. Mr. Gottlieb Hammer of the Jewish Agency had intended to be here tonight but is home, ill.

Sitting next to Debbie is Jimmy Rice. I think every one of you knows Jimmy, who is the director of the

United HIAS Service.

Sitting next to Jimmy Rice is Rabbi Hugo Green of the JDC. Mr. Leavitt of the JDC had hoped to be able to get here, but I understand he came back from Europe and Israel just yesterday. Did he get in, Hugo? Did he arrive?

RABBI GREEN: Two hours late.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Two hours late isn't bad. We were four hours late coming from New Orleans. He could be six hours late coming from Geneva.

Sitting on the other side, on the far right, is Mr. Emanuel Brilotsky, who is the director of community services of the JWB. The New York City personnel know that the JWB is part of the New York City campaign. Those who speak for the UJA know that the JWB is one of the beneficiaries of the local Welfare Funds, although it is not part of the National UJA.

Sitting next to Mr. Brilotsky is Phil Soskis, who is the director of NIANA, and both the New York City people and the National people know of the work of the organization, which brings in and absorbs immigrants here into the Metropolitan New York area.

Next to Phil Soskis is Col. Gideon Elrom of the Israel defense forces, more particularly of the Air

Force, and he is the gentleman I referred to from whom we are going to hear.

Sitting next to the Colonel is Arthur Fishzohn, who prefers to remain anonymous, like many contributors at meetings who stand up and say, "I am Mr. Cohen. My store is at 1215 Main Street. We are having a sale next week. I will give another fifty dollars anonymously." (Laughter) That's a true story.

Now, these folks who are the experts are the people of whom we can ask questions when we reach that point in the program.

The two films that we are now going to show are the two campaign films, which will be bicycling all over the country. We have about fifty or sixty prints of each one and will make 160 prints of each one if there is enough call for them.

I don't know which one we are going to show first. Who can tell me?

A VOICE: "Long Hard Days".

RABBI FRIEDMAN: This is a long, hard night. The "Long Hard Days" was made by the Joint Distribution Committee, the JDC, mainly in France, just a few months ago, to try to capture in fifteen minutes the enormous impact of the Algerian Jewish flood into France. I

don't know whether in fifteen minutes one can capture both the human interest aspect of this, the sociological implications of it, the dollars-and-cents implications of it, but there was a huge flood of people, and this is a story which has excited the imagination of most Jews in the United States who were very concerned about it, so that we tried to catch it on film. How well we have succeeded you will have to be the judge. I have seen it twice and look forward to seeing it again tonight.

Now, let me ask you another question: Are you going to be able to run the second film immediately after that, or is there going to be a break while we reset the machine?

A VOICE: A break.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: How long a break?

A VOICE: A half minute.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Well, no break.

Then let me tell you about the second film right away.

The first film is "Long Hard Days" of Algerians in France. The second film is called "Foothold in the Desert" and it is a story of absorption in Israel, focused in one place. Instead of trying to tell the whole story of absorption, we decided to focus on one

town, the town of Dimona, which is a very important town down in the Negev, into which thousands of newcomers are being put, and we take the story of just three people, three heads of families, and follow them as they go down into this town and see the problems that they have of being absorbed in this town, and if you look at the problems of these three families, you will see in microcosm what is the problem of tens of thousands of people in macrocosm in the whole process, year after year, of taking hundreds of thousands of people into Israel. So you look at it in foreshortened view, and we call it "Foothold in the Desert, The Story of Dimona."

(The two films were screened.)

All the latecomers who came in and who seem to be squashed in the back: There are some seats right here. There are plenty of seats right up here in the first couple of rows.

If everyone is seated, let me ask, first of all, if there are any questions about either one of these two films. I will not ask for comments. You can tell us later what you think about them, if you think they are good, bad, indifferent, adequate, inadequate, so that we won't take the time of the whole company. But if you have any questions about them, I will be glad to answer

them.

QUESTION: There is one thing that really confused me. Maybe I missed it.

In this last film, you had Arya -- I believe his name was -- brought back to seven years ago when he saw a town very similar to it, that had a thriving textile industry et cetera, that this town was named after, and then you skipped that and came back into the present, and there didn't seem to be any connection between those two thoughts.

Am I wrong?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes; you are wrong. But if you missed it, lots of other people might.

No. What we did is present his flash-back to what Dimona was seven years ago, when it started, when it was just a group of very small huts. That's all. The textile plant wasn't there at that time. The textile plant is new now.

QUESTION: But when you mentioned Arya thinking back, you showed the textile plant within seconds after that flash-back.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Well, if you look at it again, you will see probably you have missed it. But if you have, then others will, and it will be confusing to others.

So thank you for bringing it to our attention. We will watch that point and bring it up again and see if the chronology is wrong.

Are there any other questions about it?

QUESTION: Will speakers know before a given speaking engagement which film, if either, has been shown there?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I don't know the answer to that question.

MR. FISHZOHN: They can inquire of the local community through the chairman.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Now that you have seen both films and know what they are, if you come to a meeting after the pictures have been shown, and you don't know what's been shown, then simply ask which one has gone on, and you will know. That's exactly what we had in mind in showing them to you tonight, so you will know the contents of them.

QUESTION: A number of people have inquired about the film you showed at the National Conference. Will that be available?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes. The name of that is the unmelodramatic "UJA Story". There doesn't seem to be anything that could be more deadly. But, anyhow,

that's the name of it, and that's eighteen or twenty minutes.

That is available. We will not show it tonight because of the time element. Those of you who came to the December Conference saw it then, and it will be moving around, the same as these two will. So that the next time you see it, your memory will be refreshed on it if you have already seen it in December.

That's the twenty-five-year throwback. That, I think, is a very powerful and dramatic one.

Any other questions on either one of these two? All right. *PP I would like so a a*
 Let me try, then, in some sort of summary form, *of* to give you what we call the campaign story of 1963, *a skill better* or, rather, not the story, but the ingredients which you will weave together into your own tapestry, each one based *according to your* upon his own skill, style, method and years of experience.

Point No. 1. It seems to me that the first *most significant* point is to give a review of what happened in 1962, because *appropriate time to do* a review of what happened in 1962 leads into your approach *1962 events shall you smoothly and into the last of 1963* for 1963.

You will recall, at the beginning of 1962
 In 1962, we made a promise, so to speak, or we made a projection that the number of olim, the number of immigrants, the number of refugees, the number of people whose lives may be saved -- again, each one of you

will use his own vocabulary -- would be 60,000 persons, 60,000 men, women and children. That is what we announced in the budget. That is what we said were our projections that we would make, based upon our estimates ^{indicated} of the political possibilities that might occur during 1962. ^{that} It would be one of the biggest years of migration.

^{our estimate} We were wrong about the figure of 60,000. The ^{data show that the actual Jewish} final figure when the year was over, just a couple of ^{migrations in 1962 was 18% larger than} weeks ago, was 71,000. The total number of persons ^{needed} moved, resettled, transmigrated by UJA agencies was 71,000 people. Nine thousand went to other countries in the world -- Canada, Australia, South America, the United States -- and 62,000 went to Israel. Nine and sixty-two. That was 71,000 people.

We also made a prediction in the budget ^{my estimate} that ^{needed for the work of our} the amount of money that would have to be raised would ^{constituent agencies} be \$95,000,000. That was the goal of last year's campaign. ^{million in regular} Sixty plus thirty-five in the Special Fund. And we were ^{ten, two million} wrong on that one, ^{also}, because we didn't raise \$95,000,000. We raised \$65,000,000.

In other words, more people came than we had anticipated, and less money came in than was budgeted.

So you have a right to ask: If only \$65,000,000 was raised, ^{were additional sums} how was the money obtained? ^β This is a crucial

point. It's a lead into the 1963 story, and you must know this, because \$95,000,000 ^{were} was spent, and since we only raised \$65,000,000, ^{how was} where ~~did the deficit come from?~~ ^{met}

^{Additional source funds} Well, it came from two sources. First, it came from the Government of Israel, twelve million. That is twelve million dollars more than they had already committed and already contributed according to their ^{originally} own plans ^{at} the beginning of the year. ^{to the needs of the newly arrived}

The twelve million ~~that~~ the Government of Israel was able to contribute came in a very difficult way; from taxpayers who were already heavily burdened, who were ~~loaded~~ with compulsory loans and ^{new} additional taxes, and who already are carrying a massive major share of the costs of absorbing the immigrants. In addition to what ^{The Israelis} they are doing, these people, the oldtimers, the ones ^{and} those who came a year ago and two years ago and three years ago, were asked to pick up an additional twelve million ^{bill of} dollars for the newcomers of ¹⁹⁶² this year.

^{believe it} I think that was an awful burden to placed upon them. I think we should never forget to stress it.

^{came from} The second source ^{of funds covered the} ~~from~~ which this deficit was made up was borrowing on the part of the Jewish Agency of Jerusalem, ^{It} which ~~went~~ to banks in Europe and borrowed \$18,000,000 ^{because it was} more. Now, they were prevented from coming

^{You may ask why did the agency had}

to source?

ing
 to borrow here in the United States, and I think you've
 got to make this point very clear. Two years ago, in
 1961, the United Jewish Appeal borrowed \$65,000,000.
An impressive amount of money.
~~A lot of money.~~ [\$25,000,000 was borrowed from banks
 here in New York; \$40,000,000 was borrowed from banks
 around the country]

This was a ten-year loan. We ~~made a promise~~
annually
 to pay back \$6,500,000 a year plus interest, and not to
 borrow again, barring any emergency. So ~~that this year,~~
because of continued shortage in funds during the
~~as there was a short situation all year long, and the~~
because Jewish Agency couldn't come here to the United States *entire*
~~to borrow,~~ *borrow in* they went to Europe and borrowed, primarily *year*
 from London, where they took three million sterling from *of London*
 Lloyds, and they went to Geneva and borrowed \$18,000,000
 more. *from banks*

I am not sure whether it's good or bad to tell
~~what they are paying for that,~~ *Agency is the loan* but everybody knows that
in Europe interest rates are 9, 10 and 11 per cent in Europe,
with 4.5% compared to what we are paying in the United States, and
~~I am telling you about it,~~ *we must realize*
 you might just as well be told, because this is an added
~~burden of cost and should be avoided if possible.~~ *that fell upon the Israeli taxpayers.*

But we didn't raise enough; so they went ahead
Agency to ~~and did what they did,~~ *Europe a loan at high interest rate* and that's how we got through 1962.

Now, what do we anticipate for 1963? This is

bring me

the second point of the summary.

The anticipation for 1963 -- and I will not now go into details, because we've got people here, who can answer questions, such as Jimmy Rice and others, about the details of this migration -- but, in briefest essence let me say, that for 1963 we have also prepared a budgetary estimate based again upon 60,000 immigrants.

Now, we may be wrong. We were wrong in 1962. We anticipated 60,000 and got 71,000.

In 1963 we are anticipating 60,000. We may get 50,000. I don't know. I make no guaranties, and

don't you make any. No one of us can. We have a right to be wrong. On the basis of the best available

knowledge to us, we have to make a prognosis, and no one on this green earth can hold us to that prognosis.

We think that it's a good guess, and therefore we came out ahead again and planned our budget this year for

\$96,000,000, which is a million more than last year, and that million dollars more is based primarily upon

the extra need that we anticipate in France -- and I will come to that in a moment, as the next point.

Point No. 2 here was the anticipated migration for 1963, and the sources are the same, the same heavy flow from the two sources, Morocco and Roumania.

colleagues & will
certaining
the
replot the migration figure
Our estimates
As already mentioned, the actual migration in 1962 was 18% larger than anticipated
migration may equal our estimates, it may
information
made
there is no guarantee that could accurately predict the size of your migration
our's
current
we added one source
of my return
I would like to mention that
areas of origin of 1963 migration will be the same as other

We are talking privately in this room, and we use names openly. ^{I would like to emphasize} By the way, let me say that the same ^{don't apply} inhibitions apply to 1963 as did to 1962. ~~No use of the names of countries, no use of figures.~~

In the two documents we had mailed to you before you came to this meeting, ^{recently} the one prepared as the draft from New York City and the one prepared, as the draft, from the National office, ^{USA} you will notice that nowhere does it say in writing what I am saying to you orally. You don't use numbers, and you don't use names of countries. ^{reference is made} ~~of~~ ^{migration}

But our anticipation is, again Morocco and again Roumania, again in this same volume.

^{Let us turn to} Now, the third point, ^{to} Algeria and France. I ^{a moment ago we added} said that we were going to put into the budget an extra ¹⁹⁶⁵

million dollars to be spent in France this year for ^{result of} Algerian refugees. ^{This is a budgetary item, and} That's the story, but it's not the

whole story, by any manner of means. There is an internal shifting of money taking place ^{within} inside the JDC budget,

^{The so-called} whereby they had a windfall because of the devaluation ^{came about}

^{Israeli} of the pound in Israel and because of the way they are ^{7DC} reducing the Malben program, so that inside the JDC budget

^{to reallocate} there will be a shift of several millions of dollars

toward the Algerian problem in France. [Mr. Warburg and

Mr. Leavitt estimate it at about three million; although,

it is an estimate, and of its accuracy much upon
 here again, nobody can be sure. It depends on how the JDC work in Israel will proceed and still next year goes, and it depends upon another factor which I think you should know. *the developments in France*

As you know
 The French Government was giving social *gives "assurance"*
a welfare aid insurance and subsidies to refugees, who were French citizens, for a period of one year, from the time they moved over from Algeria to France. Now, the big push came *great exodus from*
Algeria beginning in February of 1962. We are almost at February of 1963. *soon* A year will have passed, and those families who moved over last February will cease receiving this *came to France*
 subsidy, which is certainly not very big -- it comes to a hundred, \$150 a month, depending upon the number of children in the family -- but still, it *brings some relief*
is something. They will stop receiving that, and we are going to hit *in* the crisis of this thing in May, because May of 1962 was the month that *when* there were something over ten thousand *more than* of *Algerian* refugees from Algeria coming in, and so May of 1963 we are going to have

thousands and thousands of people clamoring suddenly, *frantically*
They will be being cut off from this *a* pittance, *the* but nevertheless *by word* the difference between life and death.

Therefore, the costs that will mount up in *exact of JDC help to*
Algerian refugees France for these people are unknown. Again, you can only make an estimate, but *and you can be sure that it will* it is a very serious and substantial *JDC* item in this budget.

And so we added the extra million, and we will ^{manipulate with resources} shift internally, inside the JDC and see how many millions ^{dollars can be made available for refugee aid} we have to put into that. That is problem No. 3.

^{in France} Problem No. 4. This is the whole question of ^{of concern: still with} security in Israel, which maybe should be No. 1, because ^{is clearly, and perhaps it}

If you and I know perfectly well that there is no sense whatsoever in our struggling, with all of the enormous ^{war} energy and devotion that we do, to save the lives of Jews ^{our fellow} from some other part of the world to bring them to Israel, if Israel itself isn't safe, and therefore, whenever there is danger looming on the horizon there, it clutches at our hearts, and we become most concerned about it.

You and I know perfectly well, as old campaigners over many years, that if we were to go out to campaign for money for bombers or for missiles -- if we could -- there would be a tremendous outpouring of reaction and response. We can't, not directly and not on the basis of our tax deductibility. We are not permitted to do that.

~~But~~ We must take into account the millions of dollars, the multi-million-dollar outpouring that is ^{expenditure} going to occur during 1963, when the increased defense ^{will} needs of Israel will be met by purchases of the new missiles which the United States Government has agreed

to sell to Israel,--and I would stress ^{that} that point very strongly. ^P For fourteen years, the Government of the United States would not sell a popgun to Israel; and there must be a basic, radical reason why the fundamental policy of this government was altered. It is because this government came to understand that there is a substantial and serious threat to Israel, ^{The U.S. Government} and decided that it would ^{must help Israel} meet ^{my own} that threat by making available ^{to it} to Israel weapons in a quantity and of a quality ~~which~~ were never contemplated before.

This complete round-aboutface should be sufficient warning to us that in councils higher than our own and in quarters not as closely identified emotionally as we are, the fact registered that Israel needed support, ^{this} and that is a political fact of major dimensions and significance.

^{the new US attitude} The financial implications of that fact are clear. These missiles will have to be paid for in cash. ^{This was seen} It's already been determined. There are no loans; there are no long-term credits, although there is work being done on that, but ~~it would be a slim chance~~ ^{me} And there is the personnel which will have to be available to train for the use of these missiles. These are the things for which we invited Col. Elrom to speak to us for

a few minutes after I am finished, and he will address himself exclusively to that point.

If any further evidence ~~is required for you to~~
dissuade people
bring to the attention of people who might still have

the thought that perhaps Mr. Nasser is not so dangerous *and*
perhaps Nasser is *perhaps a*
and really might just be a new form of social liberal in

the Middle East, I would like to *suggest* bring to your attention

these two simple quotations which I think you should *be* memorize

and use *proper* at every occasion.

Nasser has threatened so many times to destroy
Israel that those of us who know this take *this threat* it for a

certainly fact. But there are many audiences to which you will

speak who don't know this and who will challenge you. You
therefore have these words to give to them.

Nasser
He said this:

"I think that the decisive year will be in
1963 or 1964. By that time we shall ourselves have
manufactured the jet bombers we need and also the
rockets. When I start a war, I want to take it to
the only end I accept: decisive victory."

His junior partner, the new President of Yemen,
said this the other day:

"I shall personally lead the Yemeni people in
the fighting ranks in this showdown battle, and my

brother, Abdul Gamel Nasser will lead his people in the fighting ranks from the UAR until we crush the remaining corrupt and tyrannical regimes in Arab lands. Then Gamel and I will meet in Tel Aviv to raise Arab banners there after we liberate Arab Palestine from intruding Zionism."

Well, I don't know how far the desert puppet will get, but his intention is ^{clearly} stated in his own words.

And so this business of war and threats, and ^{an impossible} missiles and rockets has relevancy to us in the following term: namely, if in 1962, we imposed upon Israel and its people to contribute extra money ^{for the} to absorbing ^{in 1962} immigrants because we ^{ourselves} failed to raise enough, ^{fund} in 1963 we will have neither the moral ^{any other} nor the financial right to repeat that requisition. ^{in 1963}

And so, if someone ^{ones} says, "How will we get ¹⁹⁶³ money in 1963 to pay for the migration if we don't raise enough?" ^{fund} the answer is clear: We cannot expect any ^{extra contribution} from Israel, nor should we. It is not morally or financially in the cards this year. ~~It would be morally wrong~~

Point No. 5, ~~that~~ I think we should make in this talk somewhere along the line ^{stress} is the fact that we don't begin the year 1963 with a "clean slate." ^{" am far from} If not a single ^{in meeting fund-raising goals of the} new immigrant came in 1963, we don't have a clean slate

^{past year left many absorption}
^{problems unsolved.}

~~from 1962, 1961 or 1960.~~ There are scores of thousands
of immigrants who came in ^{in Israel} ~~in previous years, to Israel~~ —
who have not been absorbed, and for whose self-fulfilment
we could conduct this \$95,000,000 campaign, with every
moral justification.

^{Yes} Now, I know that, ^{to a campaigner} there is nothing as dead as
last year's immigrants. It's like yesterday's newspapers.
I wish there were a yesterday's newspaper. It's been
like this for forty-five days. Well, I have the
Western edition, and you have the Paris edition. The new
status symbol, of course. You know, people watch them
on the trains. They read the Paris edition of the Herald-
Tribune. They read the Western edition of the New York
Times. There are the fellows who are really 'way out,
who come in with the Jerusalem Post. They are the ones
who have gone the most distance.

I know that ^{fundamental} people say there is no strong appeal
in arguing about the fact that last year's immigrants
have to be paid for. ^{Nonetheless, I consider} but it is a strong additional but-
tressing argument in the whole arsenal and one which you
^{of speaker's appeal} should not be neglected, but used in the
^{presentation of the USA story} are entitled to use.

^{We must} Point No. 6. I think that this is an important
point, ~~to remember,~~ that we are not talking just about
Israel. We are talking about the JDC, and I think in
^{as well.}

belel ul

~~the~~ this booklet that we sent you there is an item which you should look at and ^{study} learn very carefully, just seven or eight lines on the next to the last page. It shows the way the UJA money will be spent, and there are only ~~six~~ ^{to ten} or seven lines under the JDC column, but each line is a significant one.

Six and a half million dollars to be spent in European countries, for Jews still living in these ^{lands} countries.

Six and a quarter million dollars to be spent in Moslem

countries for Jews who still live in those countries and

^{of these would like, but cannot emigrate} can't get out. Seven and three quarter million dollars

to be spent in Israel, for the Malben program, the ~~old~~ and

^{the} aged, the handicapped, ^{to chronically ill} the sick. Five million and a

^{million in another bill for} quarter to be spent behind the Iron Curtain in a great,

thrilling program, which could be tripled, if we had

that much more money, reaching in behind the curtain into

~~every country, bar none, in very small volume, in very~~

~~small quantity, to be sure, but still touching the lives~~ ^{which}

and hopes, and dreams and fortunes of 150,000 people.

~~That's not insignificant.~~

Lastly, two million dollars out of the JDC

^{budget will go} money for the support of a program of ORT, which is so

well known to all of us, but which we sometimes forget,

^{therefore} ^{will agree what JDC} so that I think you have to remember that this is a story

I will

is vital and dramatic, powerful and gripping, appealing to many people, who say, "Well, there is so much that we ~~know~~ ^{might}

~~and~~ hear about Israel, we are not so much interested in that any more. Isn't there something else, on the other side?"

Please, tell the story as fully as it deserves it.
We sometimes have a tendency to forget.

The next ^{is} ~~point~~, Point 7, ^{It deals with} is also something we

have a tendency to forget. ^{In 1962} When I said to you that ~~this~~

^{some} year there were nine thousand people who were resettled in countries other than Israel, let us not forget the two organizations — and I don't care about organizational loyalty; I care about program accomplishment. Let us

not forget about the work that goes on to save those people which is done by the two other organizations, who ^{responsible for this v. lue program} draw money from the UJA: the United HIAS and the NYANA.

Nine thousand ^{funds} people. It's an awful lot of Jews.

~~The last point, nine~~

And the last point that I think we should

^{you know all well that the current} remember in the course of the 1963 Appeal is the point

¹⁹⁶³ that this is an anniversary year. It is not just the ^{is not just the} Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the UJA, as important as that.

^{It's significant but it also was a natural fund.} is -- and I can tell you from my own personal experience

^{during only} in the last two weeks that many additional gifts can be

^{contributor} obtained when we remind the person to whom we are speaking

^{is understood} that for twenty-five years this life-saving work has

been going on, and he thrills to the recognition of it,

and suddenly he begins to get a sense of the historic perspective of it, and ^{it makes him} ~~when he does that he feels~~ good ^{because} that he has been a part of it, and then you have a way of reminding him that this has got to go on for many years to come, and for this year, to mark the anniversary, perhaps he should do something special, and he smiles and he relaxes and he does something special.

I was in Cleveland on Thursday, soliciting gifts all day long, and I will give you one typical case in point. The man had given \$20,000 in 1961, and last year, in 1962, when we came to him for his special fund contribution, the big extra gifts or what in New York is called the Opportunity Fund, he gave \$15,000 more, so that was \$35,000; and when we came to him now for his 1963 contribution he started by backing off to his twenty, and he said, "Well, yes, I did give \$15,000 extra last year, but that was because there was an extra problem."

Well, explaining it to him, we said the problem is still the same; we haven't solved it. We helped with his money last year. We did raise five or six million dollars extra the way he gave some extra money, and that was true, but we still anticipate a big flow of immigrants.

We told him everything that I have told you, and he sort of shook his head and said, "Well, I don't know

if I can do that \$15,000 again. I thought I would only have to do it once."

And then I decided in this solicitation to go on the offensive and said, "Look, not only should you give the \$15,000 again, which means \$35,000 again, but you should give another \$2,500 to mark the twenty-five years of the anniversary of the UJA."

So this gave me an angle by which I went on the offensive with him, and he shook his head rather groggily, and he said, "What?" And I started to tell him about the other sort of stuff which we don't always get into for illustration, because we can't always deal with it, the history and the ideology, but once you do this, you force him to listen, because you are asking him for more money, and he is prepared to give you less; he has prepared his defenses to give you less, and so when you move on him that way, he is sort of taken aback.

I thought myself, in my own mind, that I could apply this to the extent at least that he would stop arguing and repeat the \$35,000, but instead of that, he went ahead and gave the \$37,500.

Now, I give you this as one little clinical example here. This has been repeated a dozen times in very substantial gifts, so that it is something meritorious,

which we can use, and not just the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the UJA, as I said, because there are two other anniversaries. This year marks the fifteenth anniversary of the State of Israel, and this year marks the twentieth anniversary of the right of resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto.

In April 1943, April the 19th, on the first night of Pesach, the last handful of Jews under Mordecai Analevich came up out of the bunkers and started that thirty-three-day historic fight. When we talk about anniversaries, we don't talk about celebrating. We talk about remembering history.

Fifteen years of the life of Israel. Twenty years from the time that that handful decided to shed indignity and degradation, and instead go nobly to the fight. Twenty-five years from the time that the Jews of America organized themselves with solidarity to attempt to meet these global problems.

And so, because of the coincidence of this, and because of the rounding out of the historic concept of this, I would include this. Depending on how much time you have in your basic presentation, I would include this for a passing mention or more, if you have the time to develop the theme.

for
it seems to me
use historic data in your speech
you

And you have
more time

These are the major ingredients, as I see them,
 which go into the telling of ^{1963 UTA} the story. There are
~~many others~~ ^{aspects of our work will use according} which each of you can improvise from these,
~~and I am sure there are others which you have thought of~~
^{to the interview.}
 that I haven't, ~~but~~ you and I know the structures within
 which we operate, and the limitations that are binding upon
 us, and ~~we~~ ^{we} very often have no more than twenty minutes
 to tell our story, ^{during this brief period} and so there is a lot to be gotten in,
~~and it is usually a question of editing and selection,~~
^{since} and it is usually a question of editing and selection, ^{selectivity of topics}
^{in of extreme importance} so that I have just picked out a few of these highlights
 of things of which I would remind you. ^{maybe could be useful to}

^{all of us} I would like to suggest the following procedure,
 if you will: Let me stop now, and let me ask Colonel
 Elrom to speak to you for a few minutes, and when he is
 done, then I think we can go profitably into the question
 and answer period.

Thank you very much.

COL. ELROM: I think that we ought to remember
 that in 1963-'64, the Jordan River project ought to come
 into fruition, and there is an additional reason not only
 in Nasser's words to be heeded, and I think they should
 be heeded, because he means every one of them, but also
 the objective circumstances in 1963 and 1964 will be such
 that it certainly obviates making 1963 the year to let

our guard down in terms of the potential threat that is posed by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and our Arab neighbors.

Now, every one of us knows about the Hawk missile. As Herb said, we are not getting the Hawk as a gift. We will have to purchase it. And although I think that much of the information is necessarily classified, confidential, much of it is not, and I think that those aspects that are not classified are sufficient to leave quite an impact with the listener. It certainly left an impact with me.

The one fact that can be mentioned is that the basic unit within which the Hawk is organized is a battalion. It is not very much. The United States Army has scores of such battalions. I don't know how much we shall buy, but I doubt very much whether it could be less than one battalion.

Now, one battalion of Hawk missiles, according to the United States Army's reckoning, is a matter of \$28,000,000. That is one battalion. This is only the beginning of it, because buying a new weapon, and joyfully as we received the news, we still cannot ignore the burden that it would involve, because buying a new weapon means not only paying for the weapon as such, but for a tremendous logistic supporting service, services that have

to go with it, and hopefully within the next few months, we shall be sending to this country scores and scores of Air Force people.

I said scores and scores. I can't quote the exact numbers. I don't think it is terribly important. I think it is important to emphasize that although these defense forces have required the sending of people in bulk for training abroad, never before have we had to send so many people for such lengthy and expensive courses as we will in relation to the Hawk missile.

I think that it may be very illuminating to trace some of these so-called dry facts and figures over the past fourteen years, and being an Air Force officer, I will refer to Air Force figures, but I want to emphasize that this is only one part of the picture, not necessarily the most expensive part. I think it might be illuminating to say that fourteen years ago, in 1948, the front-line fighter of the Israel Air Force was the P-52 Mustang, the American aircraft. The Mustang then cost about ten thousand dollars. In 1952 or thereabouts, we graduated to our first jets, each of which came to roughly a hundred thousand dollars or \$120,000.

Later still, about four years later, in 1956, we got our first Mystaires, the French fighters. The

Mystaires were \$350,000 each. In 1957 and 1958 we absorbed the Vultur, which is another of the French fighter-bombers. The Vultur was \$600,000.

A few months ago, we were very fortunate in receiving our first Mirage fighters, French Mirage fighters. It is a small aircraft, very small, but each Mirage comes to about a million to a million and a quarter dollars.

So you can see that the progression has been very steep, far steeper than the addition to our national income.

I want to emphasize again that the Hawk is only part of the picture. In fact, it is an answer, a part answer to the Iliushin 28s and the Tuplev 16s that Nasser has been getting in considerable quantities from Soviet Russia. But I think that you should -- at least, I have found from my experience that today, mentioning the Iliushin 28 makes much more of an impression after the Cuban episode than it did three or four years ago. People know about the Iliushin 28s. They didn't know that the Tuplev 16 is about twice as big, twice as fast and in fact twice as dangerous, and if people here were very concerned -- and they were very concerned with the thirty or forty Iliushin 28s ninety miles from Miami

Beach, I think it might be worth while to remind them that we have been living with about seventy Iliushin 28s for the past eight years and with about thirty Tuplev 16s for the last two or three years.

One other fact that I wanted to mention was that the Hawk is by no means -- by no means -- an answer to Nasser's IRBMs, the intermediate range missiles, two prototypes of which he fired some five or six months ago. The Hawk is an antiaircraft missile. It is not an antimissile missile.

I don't know what our answer to these intermediate missiles will be, and if I did know, I don't suppose I could mention it to you here. The fact is, I don't know, but what I do know, one thing I am very sure of, and that is that whatever the answer will be, it will surely be twice as expensive. I hope it will only be twice as expensive as the Hawk is.

If there are any questions which I can give answers to, I shall be glad to do so. (Applause.)

RABBI FRIEDMAN: In a very calm, quiet and understanding way, as is usually the way with the Israeli defense personnel, Colonel Elrom put the thing on the table for us.

Ladies and gentlemen, the floor is now open for

questions, and I hope that we will have a profitable and penetrating question and answer period.

Now, the people who are here: you know the type of work they represent, and therefore you know the type of questions you can present to them. The floor is open. Who would like to have the first question?

Now, not everybody knows everything. I am sure of that. There is no need for a group as sophisticated as this to be at all self-conscious.

I see several hands now.

QUESTION: What is the relationship between the Jews in France and their impending, intending or otherwise, alyah to Israel?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes. I am glad you asked that. Someone else asked me that before, and I said that I would answer it.

Here are the figures:

There were 130,000 Jews living in Algeria. 120,000 of them left. There are about ten thousand still remaining in Algeria. Of the 120,000 who left, ten thousand went to Israel, 110,000 went to France. Will the 110,000 remain in France? Our hope is that they will not.

The specific answer to your question is that we

have no indication of what numbers will transmigrate once again from France to Israel. Everyone in positions of authority and responsibility is attempting to encourage the move of as large a number as possible. It is better for them if they get out of those slum sections where the key money for a room is so awful, and they can't pay it. It is better for them if they move over to Israel. It is better for the Jews of France if they move over to Israel.

The Jews in France find themselves in a very awkward position now. There were about 150,000 Jews in France. After World War II, more refugees poured in on them, Polish, Hungarian, Roumanian, Russian, German, and the population shot up from 150,000 to 350,000 fifteen years ago. Now the population has shot up from 350,000 to 500,000, because besides the Algerians, there are some Tunisians, and there are some Moroccans.

You have the basic foundation of a Jewish population of 150,000 who have taken in 350,000 refugees. It's a very unhealthy pattern, almost an impossible one. The present French Jewish population with its resources can't absorb this amount. Think of what would happen if you had a couple of million Jewish refugees coming into New York City.

And so it would be better for the Jews of France if this refugee group filtered over to Israel. It would be better for themselves. It would be better for us, who are trying to help them, because we can help them more effectively in Israel than we can in France. It is cheaper to get them started. For not much more than the key money to get them one room, we can build them a two- or three-room little house.

And so it is to everyone's advantage if there will be a big shift in that group. Whether there will be or not remains to be seen.

I think the date by which we will know whether anything of that sort is beginning to happen will be, in my judgment, after May, when the little social insurance begins to dwindle, and then more and more people in France may begin to realize that it will be better for them if they go to Israel.

QUESTION: What is the date of President Nasser's statement?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: What is the date of it? I think it was in May or June of this year -- or last year -- 1962. It was reported verbatim in the London Jewish Observer. Henry Bernstein, I see, has a photostatic copy of it.

MR. BERNSTEIN: The Jewish Observer of May 25.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The Jewish Observer of London of May 25, 1962.

COMMENT: And the Near East Report had it, as well.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Then there are two sources from which you can get it verbatim.

QUESTION: I should like a piece of information based on the previous question about the French Jews.

How much of what you said, that absorption in Israel would be better for them in terms of our dealing, was your point of view, UJA's point of view? How about the Jews themselves? Have they come into France because this was their direction? Do they want to go to Israel? Do they want to go to Israel if the situation in France becomes complicated enough?

I think this is a factor in terms of the way the absorption takes place in the Jewish State.

This would be a piece of information I would like to have. I am talking about the psychology of the refugees coming into France.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Apparently -- and I can only put it that way -- apparently their psychology was that they preferred to go to France rather than Israel, because

that is the way they made their move.

The reasons for which they preferred that choice were two: First, citizenship. They were French citizens living in Algeria, which was considered to be the same as living in Metropolitan France, and so they had the advantage of no change of passport, no change of citizenship. The second reason was language. The French language was their mother tongue, and there is nothing more difficult for a person to do when he roots himself from one country to another than to attempt to learn a different language, and so they felt it would be easier for them to make the adjustment in Metropolitan France.

That was the psychology that motivated them to move as they did, almost monolithically. Whether that monolithic opinion will now break in the face of the difficulties they will have in the months ahead, as I say, I don't know.

QUESTION: Is this your personal opinion, the desirability of the Algerians going to Israel, or have you authority for it?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I didn't say that.

QUESTION: You are advocating that the Algerian Jews --

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Could you please stand so I

can hear you more easily?

QUESTION: I say, it appears that you are advocating that the Algerian Jews would be better off -- the Jews in France would be better off if they were to go to Israel rather than remain in Paris, in France. Is that your personal opinion, or have you authority for that opinion?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I see what you mean. No. the UJA officially has taken no stand on the matter.

QUESTION: Then how did you come to be so certain that it is desirable to advocate publicly and for the reasons that you state that the Algerian Jews, the Jews in Paris would be better off if they were to emigrate to Israel? I ask that because some of us might be able to use it.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Well, I thought I made it clear. Let me try again.

QUESTION: I have your reasons. All I am asking is whether you have authority for what you are saying, outside of your own opinion.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Well, again I thought I stated that the UJA officially has no position in this matter.

QUESTION: I see.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: No position. The action, the

functioning of the UJA agencies is based upon a principle of non-coercion. We never attempt to coerce anybody to do anything, so that we don't apply our funds in a discriminatory way or in a pressure way to attempt to get a person to do one thing or another. He does what he wants. Our responsibility is to help him in whatever he decides to do.

If they are all decided to go over to France, we are struggling valiently to help them in France, and we will continue to do so, as long as we can.

So that I was giving you my personal opinion, but I thought it would be better in the long run, and we could do more for them in the long run.

However, if they don't move to Israel, no one will force them to, and we will continue to do our very best to satisfy their needs in France as long as we can.

QUESTION: I would like to direct my question to Jim Rice.

Jim, will you tell us a little bit of the United HIAS accomplishments in Cuba, Jamaica and Miami?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: All right. We are back in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba, Jamaica and Miami. And the question was, will Mr. Rice tell us something about the

work of the United HIAS in those places. Jimmy, the floor is yours.

MR. RICE: Thank you, Herb.

Somebody might think that that was a very spontaneous question. I guess it was, although I should point out to you that the gentleman who asked the question is a member of the Board of Directors of United HIAS Service, as well as one of the top leaders of the United Jewish Appeal, and I think all of us who know him are proud of both those affiliations.

The Cuban Jewish population at the time Castro came to power was about ten thousand, in 1959. At the present time it is about three thousand. Almost all with the exception of about four or five hundred who went to Israel and about seventy-five or a hundred who went to Latin America have come to the United States, most of them with the help of United HIAS Service, and many of them resettled here in New York City, of course, with the help of NYANA.

Among the ten thousand we gave a priority, at the very urgent request of the Cuban Jewish community early in the game, to bringing over unaccompanied Jewish children. This was the first time since the Hitler period, I think, that we had been engaged in this kind of operation.

The reason for it was simple: Many of the parents saw that they could not leave in the near future, and they were particularly concerned about the very aggressive and rapid Communization of the public schools and the full effort on the part of the Castro regime, which all of you are well acquainted with, to indoctrinate the youth.

So we brought over these four hundred children, and I am going to tell you that about half of them have already been reunited with their parents, whom we have been able to help come to this country subsequently. A substantial part of them have also been under the care of the New York Association for new Americans in this city, and many others have been sent to other Jewish communities where you will be speaking.

You will find that this has excited, as you can well understand, a good deal of interest on the part of these communities who have taken care of them through their Jewish child care agencies or with relatives in those communities.

Now, let me first refer to the Jamaica operation. I won't say this was an unprecedented procedure, because it is the kind of thing that Jewish organizations have had to do from time to time ever since Hitler came to power,

but it was somewhat new for us in that we had to engage in a special charter flight rescue program.

When we found in the summer of 1961 that a substantial number of our Cuban Jews were unable to get out of the country because there wasn't enough transport -- the waiting lists were running from three to six months -- we got a hint from the little Jamaican Jewish community of a hundred families, mostly in Kingston, that there might be a way to charter BOAC planes to bring them out of Havana to Kingston, and then we could process them for the United States.

That plan worked. We brought to Jamaica, mostly in these charter flights as well as some of the other scheduled flights that went from Cuba to Jamaica, over twelve hundred Cuban Jews, and I am glad to tell you that we have only three hundred still there. All of them have come to the United States, even though part of them were the hard core, complicated cases.

That was a very expensive operation, because, at least by our standards, some of these figures are a little high for a modest agency like our own, but also expensive in the sense that it cost only twenty-five dollars to pay for the ticket for a Cuban Jew to go from Havana to Miami, a short distance, but if you brought him

from Havana to Kingston, that cost thirty-five dollars; and then you had to have him wait a few weeks until his American processing was completed, and you had to pay for him to stay in Kingston, even in the modest institution that the Jamaican community turned over to us; and then you had to fly him to Miami. That came to two hundred dollars a person.

Multiply two hundred by twelve hundred, and that comes to almost a quarter of a million dollars for that operation, for which we had to get extra funds from the UJA as well as from the Jewish communities around the country.

Just to bring it up to date, there have been no substantial movements of Cuban Jews since October 22, the time of the crisis, because the PanAmerican flights have been canceled, nor have we considered it advisable, although now we think it is possible to institute charter flights to bring out the remaining fifteen hundred to two thousand of the three thousand Jews we are pretty sure want to leave. A thousand we have already documented with U. S. admission permission.

However, we think those flights will start again, now that the ransom affair is finishing, and the return of the Cuban Americans, these people with dual citizenship

you have been reading about -- or hearing about, I should say, is coming to an end, and when that is over, the flights will begin again, and our program will also begin.

One final note: When the Bay of Pigs prisoners were returned to Miami, there was a Jewish boy who arrived with them. We have a picture of him reuniting with his family, and there was another Jewish volunteer he told us about who died on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: That is a very full exposé on that subject.

Is there another question?

QUESTION: Yes. I think that the point that Col. Elrom made regarding the comparison with Cuba can be very significant in giving our argument, and I wonder if we could get some more concrete figures and if some of the missiles that have been sent from Russia to Egypt are similar to the ones that were withdrawn by Khrushchev from Cuba, and if so, to what extent they are similar, and how many miles they are from Israel in comparison with the ninety miles, the figure that is used regularly in comparing Cuba and Miami with Egypt and Israel.

Could we get some kind of further explanation of that, Colonel?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I know what you are driving at.

QUESTION: Insofar as you are able to tell us.

COL. ELROM: Unfortunately very little, because the Russians haven't sent any missiles to Egypt. They have sent some ground-to-air rockets, as far as we know, but no missiles similar to the missiles that were based in Cuba.

The two missiles that I spoke of, the two prototypes that Nasser built and fired -- he has probably built some more since of his own manufacture, and the help given him -- of course, he couldn't do it on his own -- the help was not given to him by the Russians. So -- Well, not by the Russians.

I don't think that in this sense you can draw any meaningful pattern between Cuba and Egypt, but in terms of the planes, certainly, and so far as the distance is concerned, well, we will say a MIG 21 from a base in El Arish in the Sinai Peninsula would reach Tel Aviv in something like four and a half minutes.

QUESTION: I think that is very significant. That is what I wanted to know.

QUESTION: The question of figures and numbers has been asked repeatedly, and I am not sure which figures and statements may be quoted. When we went from 62,000

individuals can we mention that there is activity in the Moslem countries? Can we mention that immigration comes from North Africa, without specifying the countries? Can we mention that refugees are coming out from behind the Iron Curtain, and how much may we talk about the Hawk missile and the fact that Israel needs money for that, and is it possible to get a copy of Nasser's statements, either this evening or sent to us?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I would appreciate it if you would give me those back one at a time, and I will answer them one at a time.

As far as the possibility of getting a copy of the statement made by Nasser, we can sent it, and I wish Mrs. Warner and Mr. Fishzohn would make a note of it -- and by the way, I would like to present them.

I would like them to make a note to send to every one of the speakers on both lists a photostatic copy of that Nasser statement.

QUESTION: Rabbi Friedman, that statement is listed on page nine of the release sent to us, isn't it?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: All right. In the release that was sent to the New York City speakers -- I am not sure if it was sent to the National Speakers -- then we will send it out.

Now, would you go back seriatim and give those points to me one at a time?

QUESTION: 62,000 immigrants in the last year.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: No. Please don't use the figure 62,000 or nine thousand to other countries for a total -- Excuse me. We are getting another piece of advice.

MR. BERNSTEIN: I think you should differentiate between where you can say it and where you may not say it.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: In answer to all of your question let me say that the general rule is that we feel that we may speak freely in those meetings in which we are sure that there are no representatives of the press present. What we are afraid of is newspaper publicity. What we are afraid of is articles written.

We aren't afraid of telling this information to Jewish audiences in closed rooms. If, therefore, you are speaking to an audience somewhere, and you are certain that it is a closed session, then the answer is, yes, you may use the figure of the 62,000 or 71,000. If there is a reporter in the room, you should attempt to suggest that he should be excused, and if you can't do that, then you have to be circumspect.

Now, your next question.

QUESTION: That there are activities in Moslem countries.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: That there are activities, yes, certainly, perfectly freely, even with reporters present. The JDC has an open program in Moslem countries.

QUESTION: The fact that some of the refugees come from North African countries, without specifying the actual countries.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Again, if there is no reporter present, you could go ahead and specify the actual country.

QUESTION: But can we mention generally North Africa with the reporter present?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes. North Africa, without defining the countries.

QUESTION: That they come from Iron Curtain countries.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: No.

QUESTION: How much can we mention that we have heard about the Hawk, the cost of the battalions?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The last question is, how much can we mention about what we have heard of the Hawk. The sale of these things to Israel has been announced. The fact that they have to be paid for has been

announced.

COL. ELROM: The price has been specified by the Army. The price is \$28,000,000 per battalion.

QUESTION: What is a battalion?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: We are getting a crossfire of questions. Let me attempt to be the moderator.

Apparently the Hawks are sold and operated in units of a battalion. A battalion is an indivisible unit. You can't have a half a battalion or a quarter of a battalion. The cost of a battalion is \$28,000,000. The number of Hawks in a battalion has not been given. I would assume that is a classified figure.

COL. ELROM: No.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: No? Then --

COL. ELROM: Do you want me to give that?

I personally did not go into all these details. I didn't think they were significant. However, it is divisible because the organizational framework, the basic organizational framework is the battalion, and it is as convenient a starting point as we have.

A battalion in the U. S. Army consists of five batteries. Each battery has three launchers, and each launcher normally has three missiles. But I don't think that you should overburden your audiences with all these

details.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I think that was a gentle hint, and a word to the wise is sufficient.

Does that exhaust your list, sir?

QUESTION: Would you comment a little on the point of origin of the 71,000 people who have moved, and, secondly, clarify whether we can use this statement about a vast immigration from Algeria of approximately 100,000 plus a large number which I thought came out in 1963 -- in 1962, I should say. Such a vast immigration came out of Algeria during 1962 that it would mean that hardly anybody would come out of Roumania and Morocco.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: No.

QUESTION: If you gave a sum total of 71,000 --

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The 71,000 did not include Algerians to France, no. No, the 71,000 included 72,000 into Israel, nine thousand into other countries of permanent resettlement, like the United States, Canada, Australia and South America. That did not include the transfer -- We don't call it a migration. We call it a transfer from Algeria to France.

QUESTION: Then even though they may in fact remain --

RABBI FRIEDMAN: If they remain there, they may

become a part of the permanent population of France.
Just a second, now.

Now, you say, where did the 62,000 who entered Israel come from? Forty thousand of the sixty-two came from Roumania and Morocco, the two major sources. 22,000 came from all other parts of the world: Iran, Turkey, Yemen, the remnants from Poland, Tunisia, those from Algeria who did go to Israel. 22,000. Forty thousand from the two main sources of Morocco and Roumania.

Now, Rabbi Green of the JDC wanted to add something to this.

RABBI GREEN: I think it is fair to state that there were approximately 200,000 Jews on the move in some part of the world or another during 1962.

Incidentally, an interesting little footnote: The Jewish community of Cochin in 1962 was completely liquidated, all of them. The last one of them reached Israel.

MR. BERNSTEIN: You mean, uprooted.

RABBI GREEN: In the sense of Cochin, yes. There was a hard core of people left behind who were quite sick, and I don't think the word "liquidated" is a good word. I think the word for it was that they themselves thought of it that the Messianic hope was fulfilled.

COL. ELROM: The current situation and the prospects in Argentina.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: The question is being asked about the current situation and the prospects in Argentina.

We are pretty clear on a number of things down there. We are not clear about a number of other things. We are clear about the following:

No. 1. There are two very strong, powerful anti-Semitic groups organized. Of the two, one is important. It is called the Taka Ara. This one has in it all of the social elite and prominent nobility families of Argentina, mostly kids, eighteen, nineteen, up to twenty-five, twenty-six. They have the complete support of the police. There have been no arrests there, despite all the protests that have been made.

They apparently have the support of a large portion of the clergy, which condones this groups actions. They are a Nazi-style group, in the sense that they believe in two things. First, physical violence, which they have demonstrated against Jews, and, No. 2, the liquidation of the Jews from Argentina, only they say, not by killing them; simply by throwing them all out; and since there is Israel, they have a place to which they can be thrown, and so they are not inhumane, and they are not

suggesting that they should be all killed. They just want to get rid of them.

The government there is in a very shakey condition. It is a very unstable coalition of a few generals and a few admirals, and no one gives much hope for a stable government in the near future.

None of the generals and admirals who are in the Junta want to offend this group, so no one does anything to them: not the government, not the police, not the clergy, not their own families; and they come from the intelligentsia and the elite and the nobility of the country. Therefore, they are potentially very, very dangerous.

It is a small group. In numbers, as far as we can tell, it runs somewhere between 2,500 and four thousand, so you can say this is not large. On the other hand, it is the nucleus for what could be a very large-scale movement.

They wear Nazi-type uniforms. They have maneuvers out in the forest and in bivouacs and camps of theirs, and they have stated their intentions. Whether they will be able to carry out these intentions will depend upon the economic and political future of Argentina.

I would say that if chaos of any sort appears,

if governmental instability of any sort became serious there, this group would not hesitate to move against the Jews.

QUESTION: How many Jews are involved?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: In Argentina, there are almost half a million Jews. There are more readers of the Yiddish newspapers in Buenos Aires than there are in New York City.

Let me go on and try to finish as much more as I know about this.

Second, all sorts of protests have been made to the Argentinian Government by responsible Jewish authorities all over the world. The major organizations here in the United States, the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress and private individuals of the Jewish communities who are important have made protests to the State Department of the United States Government and to the Argentinian Ambassador in Washington. Protests have been made by all the responsible Jewish organizations in England to the Argentinian Ambassador in London. The Board of Deputies has entered an official demarche. In Israel, protests have been made to the Argentinian Ambassador.

The most vigorous and heroic and courageous

stand of all has been taken by the Daya, which is the official group of Argentinian Jews themselves down in Buenos Aires. They have not hesitated at all to go straight to the government. They have had many face-to-face confrontations with a police chief, who is a certain Horatio Green, a Navy Captain. They told him to his face that what he was doing was anti-Semitic and asked him to change it.

They spoke to the Minister of the Interior. They are very courageous down there. I am not sure if American Jews would have spoken to the government officials that way in America. That is my private opinion. You can scratch that off the record.

All this got them nowhere. Therefore, down there they are very nervous, and they don't know what the future will bring.

Now, then, the immediate question arises: What are they doing, if anything, about leaving? There has been a very small movement up to now, some twelve hundred Argentinian Jews having left to go to Israel. They have been told also, in very clear terms, by all of the important Israeli officials that they would be welcome in Israel and more than welcome, and in Israel both the Government and the Jewish Agency have constant consultations

to see what they can do to help absorb these middle-class immigrants, who are not poor refugees at this moment; they are not penniless; -- to see what inducements can be made, what schemes can be made for helping to absorb these middle-class people.

There is a great deal of agitation going on as between Argentina and Israel, the Jewish authorities, but right now we don't see more than what I have indicated, although there are those who feel that if things get very much worse than they are now -- and right now, by the way, they are quiet; there hasn't been any violence in the last month or two. Violence means murders, bombings, burnings of synagogues, carving of swastikas into breasts of girls, burning of swastikas with cigaret butts into bodies. All this is not made up. This is the kind of thing that has been happening down there.

Now, for the past month or two it has been quiet, and Jews are funny people: when it is quiet, they relax, although they are living on a powder keg.

So I don't know. Perhaps further deterioration of the situation will occur. If that occurs, perhaps further exodus will occur. But right now that is as much as has occurred right up to this point.

There were some hands in the back.

QUESTION: I have two questions. First of all, if immigration, the immigration situation is going to be the same, is the sixty thousand going to be mostly from Morocco and Roumania this year?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes. They are the major sources of immigration.

QUESTION: On the next one, I am probably in error, but it seems that 1963 is less of a crisis year than 1962, and let me show you why in my own way of thinking this is so.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Suppose you stand up so people can hear you.

QUESTION. In '62 you had something like 72,000 Jews in migration. In '63 it appears that there are going to be 60,000. Now, in '62 we had the tremendous Algerian problem. We had the tremendous Algerian movement in '62.

Now, from this -- and again, I say I am sure I am wrong -- it seems to me that 1963 is less of a crisis year in a sense than 1962.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Well, when you say "in a sense", perhaps that is the clue to the situation, that in a psychological sense in your mind or in anybody else's mind it might appear to be less of a crisis year, but not

in an actual sense at all.

First of all, your first point, that last year there were 71,000 persons who were transmigrated. This year I said to you we are projecting 62,000. Please remember, we only project 62,000, or we only projected 62,000 last year also. No one on God's green earth on January 21 can tell you what is going to be by next December 31.

I said that it might be 70,000. It might be 80,000. It might be 50,000. It might be 40,000. We don't know. What we do know is there still continues to be a big push, and we gauge it to be in somewhat the same proportions as last year. So there is nothing less on that score.

Now, secondly, you say that the big Algerian thing was in 1962, and this is where I think you have made a psychological error. In 1962 people moved, but it didn't cost us any money yet. The expenditures are going to be incurred now in 1963 to start supporting them, you see.

As a matter of fact, 1963 is more of an expensive year in potential than 1962 was, and it is a question of your transmitting your psychological sense into a reality as you draw the picture for your listeners. If you feel

it is less of a crisis, that is the feeling you are going to transmit. If you feel in your own mind that it is just as important and maybe more so, then that is the feeling you will transmit. Each one of us is in a very, very crucial position. Hundreds and maybe thousands of people listen to each one of us, and you have to know -- you have a serious responsibility on your head when you talk, because thousands of people who know less than you do are going to catch a mood from you.

So if you have a feeling that it is less, less of a crisis, that is what your audiences will understand. Then maybe we better have some more talk, or maybe I better go all over it again tonight.

QUESTION: I said I had the feeling it is incorrect. I just wanted --

MR. BERNSTEIN: Just add security to that.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: I am sorry. Henry reminded me. The security situation in Israel was nothing in 1962 compared to what we are facing now in 1963. It is an added ingredient to the argument.

QUESTION: I would like to ask a question.

May we refer in our speaking to the situation in Argentina?

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Yes; by all means. That is

completely open.

QUESTION: And may I offer a comment on this gentleman's last question?

I think you made it very clear in the way you captioned the two last numbers by saying "migration" and "transfer", and I think if we would keep that in mind, migration and transfer in relation to the Algerian population, we will then be able to elucidate on each in the proper manner.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Thank you.

Mr. Brickland.

MR. BRICKLAND: I would like to add something to that.

I happened to be in Argentina. I had nothing to do with it. I think that we are forgetting another thing in connection with South America, and that is that what is happening in Argentina has a very disturbing influence on what is happening in the neighboring countries, and the bestiality of certain incidents in Uruguay was much stronger than what happened in Argentina itself, and things that happened while I was there in Chile and Colombia indicate that this anti-Semitic sentiment in South America is spreading, and it may not assume the character of a mass anti-Semitic organized movement -- if

I refer to mass, it is because they are seen en masse -- as it is in Argentina. But we should be aware of the fact that something is simmering in South America.

Now, another thing that I would like to add, although what I say is based more on assumptions than on facts. There is a very strong conviction, and there is some evidence that behind many of the so-called anti-Semitic groups stands not an anti-Semitic movement directed from Sweden, where the so-called anti-Semitic Internationale has its offices, but the local Arabic representations are financing, are moving, organizing and influencing certain movements and certain anti-Semitic outbursts.

As I say, there is no direct evidence, but there is a very strong conviction in South American circles that this is the case. I personally am convinced that the Argentinians, Chileans, Colombians and even the Uruguayans -- the Jews in these countries -- are thinking more about emigrating to Israel than is apparent at the moment. There is very serious investment movement. There are very serious economic negotiations with the Government. There is no panic movement. But there is a very serious preparation for movement to Israel. If the need comes, people want to come to something ready. They don't want to be homeless refugees. So they are

preparing. Should the situation change, they will be no the move.

My second remark is that in search of another anniversary this year, I think we should not forget that in another week thirty years will have passed since Hitler came to power, and with the thirty years many things happened to which the twenty relate, the fifteen relate and the twenty-five certainly relate.

So somewhere on our calendar we may put that in.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: A good point. The date was January 30, 1933.

As far as the Arabic influence in South America is concerned, I think you should know that there are half a million Arabs, some Syrians and Iranians there.

Jim Rice wants to comment on that.

MR. RICE: The subject of Argentina I feel is an extremely important and at the same time a difficult and delicate one, but I would be remiss if I didn't tell you what is the view of our agency, the United HIAS Service at this particular time.

I am encouraged to say something which is perhaps partially at least in disagreement with what Herb has said and with what other speakers have said, by the

fact that, for one reason, my colleague, the charming lady on the left, who represents the Jewish Agency, just said to me she thinks it is a matter that we should stress at this point: the Argentine situation. I agree, and I would like to say why.

First of all, let me dispel any feeling on your part that it is we as an agency who helped people go to South America who have a vested interest in this. I have just consulted my own figures to be accurate, and in 1962 out of nine thousand people we sent exactly sixty-five to Argentina, and those were people joining their very close relatives, especially from Iron Curtain countries, who asked us to undertake this family reunion. It is not by any means an important or even a slightly significant part of the United HIAS job at this time. However, we have watched it closely. Our director from Latin America was there in August and made reports to us at our office a few weeks ago and is there tonight, as a matter of fact. He is spending another few days there to see what the situation is. He reported that there is no feeling of panic among the Argentine Jews. That is not to say that he could not be wrong. Perhaps he is. But there is no feeling of panic. This is the reason, of course, why you have not seen a large emigration from

that country.

I think it is worth mentioning also that the political situation, while extremely serious, is not quite as black as it might seem from what has been said. For example, as Hugo reminded me, his namesake, this Argentinian official Green has been fired since this incident took place. Mr. Aaron Baru, who is a retired general, formerly president of Argentina after Perone left, and who has the status, I would say, something like Eisenhower in this country, has headed up a committee to combat anti-Semitism, and this probably accounts at least to some extent for the lessening of the events whose seriousness I would be the last to underestimate.

But at least there has been a change for the better. The Argentine leaders themselves -- and I think this is the last point I want to stress -- have asked particularly that there be no effort on the part of other Jewish leaders in other parts of the country to describe their situation as precarious, because they believe that might contribute to making it more precarious than it is.

Now, that is a difficult concept for us to understand, especially if you feel you can say certain things in closed meetings that you may not say in open meetings; but this is, I think, a little food for thought

on this subject.

I for one could not in all sincerity, in my own speeches on behalf of UJA, feel that it would be right to stress that this is imminent danger in the sense of something happening in 1963 in Argentina. I don't say it is impossible. I think anybody would be a fool to go out on a limb and predict a mass movement or say that it is impossible. But I think these facts ought to be taken into consideration also.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Jimmy.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is getting late, and I am going to call this to a halt by asking you one last question.

We have heard from members of the JDC and the United HIAS Service. You have addressed some questions to them. Are there any questions you wish to address to the representative of the Jewish Agency or the representative of NYANA or the representative of the Jewish Welfare Board? I would like to recognize only a question which is directed to any one of those three persons.

All right, you have the last question.

COMMENT: I am sorry. It is not a question. It is a statement that I wanted to make, but I didn't realize it was so late. It has reference to something that

I saw and observed during a three and a half month trip through the Arab countries before I went to Israel the second time, a trip made a year ago, and conditions may have changed a little bit, but I don't think very much.

The remark will be very brief.

The first thing is about the Arab refugees whom we hear so much about from Arab protagonists in the United States, particularly in the college communities. I must confess that after a trip through the Gaza Strip, where I saw the refugee conditions there, and then the Jericho refugees, I felt that some of my labor friends were right when they said that somehow or other we didn't think of the Arab refugees; we tended not to think of the Arab refugees as a human problem as well.

I was very much concerned about them. And then, in Egypt, in Lebanon and in Jordan I talked to top leaders, government, labor and cooperative and so-called Socialist leaders, and what turned my mind about again was the difference in attitude in their official attitude towards their own Arab refugees, and the attitude of the Jews in Israel and Jews all over the world about their Jewish refugees, who came in numbers from the Arab countries equal to those who came from Palestine into Israel. The difference is so stark, is so revealing that almost all

of my sympathy for the Arab refugees in the Gaza Strip and Jericho faded away, because there is no attempt at all on the part of Arab officials, government, labor, cooperative and so-called socialist, to do anything with the Arab refugees in those camps except to use them as a weapon with which to flay Israel in the United Nations.

The second point, very fast -- one sentence for each -- in all my trips, in all my conversations with these leaders in the three Arab countries, I never met a single Arab, even in the most cultured circles -- and they treated me very well, very cordially, -- who didn't look forward to the coming war with Israel. I didn't meet a single Jew in Israel who didn't say that the thing that will save us, and the thing we want most, is peace.

I think there is a very important point to make.

RABBI FRIEDMAN: Thank you very much. On that note, we would like to close the meeting. We hope it has been worth while. We hope you have found it profitable, and we would like to invite you for refreshments, which are served in the next room.

Thank you.

(The meeting adjourned at 10:30 o'clock p.m.)