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30 September 1993

Morton Mandel  
4500 Euclid Avenue  
Cleveland, OH 44103

Dear Mort:

I enclose a copy of the final version of my essay. It is slightly changed statistically and conclusion-wise from the earlier draft. The more sophisticated statistical analysis did not change any of the basic findings.

I trust all goes well.

Cordially,




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Hazel Chair of Public Policy

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## The Educational Background of American Jews<sup>1</sup>

by Seymour Martin Lipset

The unique aspects of American Jewry compared to other ethno-religious groups fall into five categories: religious behavior, income, demography, politics, and education -- both religious and secular. The best effort to document their characteristics, the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) of 1990, yields information on all of these matters and much more. This paper focuses on Jewish education and is one of a series of reports analyzing the data. The sample was selected from those identified as living in a Jewish household. 125,813 randomly selected persons were asked questions about their own religious preference and that of their household. This method produced 2,441 completed interviews, giving information on 6,514 persons in those households.

The report presented here is based on interviews with 2,134 households providing information on 4,601 individuals. For the purpose of this analysis, roughly one-sixth of the respondents were not used because their responses to various questions indicated that they did not consider themselves Jewish and belonged to another current religion. The Core Jewish Population (CJP) as defined by the demographers who conducted the survey includes Born Jews whose religion is Judaism (BJR), converts who are Jews by Choice (JBC), and born Jews who do not have a religious but a secular identification (JNR). In addition, 84 percent of the CJP had at least one Jewish parent. The data were then weighted through a process

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<sup>1</sup> This report was commissioned and financed by the Mandel Institute in Jerusalem through a grant to the Willstein Institute. I am indebted to both institutes and in particular to Morton Mandel, Seymour Fox, Annette Hochberg, and David Gordis. The Hoover Institution also gave considerable support. John Torres, Jeffrey W. Hayes, and Moti Rimor contributed much to the analysis.



which involved using all of the original 125,813 screening interviews.<sup>2</sup> The analysis presented here is based on the weighted sample of the CJP.

There are a number of stereotypical observations about Jews that are confirmed by the 1990 NJPS.<sup>3</sup> These include that Jews are, by far, more well-to-do than the population as a whole, and that they are politically much more liberal. They are also the best educated of any ethno-religious group. Educational achievement has been one of the great prides of American Jewry, and the survey data indicate that it is justified. Among all-adults 18 years and over who identify themselves as Jewish in religious terms, just under a third, 30 percent, do not have any college education, while just over 50 percent are college graduates. Almost half of these, 24 percent, have gone beyond college to some form of post-graduate education. Secular Jews, those who are not religious in any way, are slightly better educated than religious Jews. Only 27 percent have not attended college. It is interesting to note that born Jews who have converted out and belong to other denominations (six percent of the enlarged sample), are less well educated. Over one-third have no college background. The picture is somewhat similar for persons who report Jewish parentage or descent, but were raised from birth in another religion.

Other trends regarding marriage and family are also clear. Jews are less likely to marry and do so later than others with similar backgrounds; they have a lower birthrate than

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<sup>2</sup> The background of the survey and a description of the sample is presented in Barry Kosmin, et al., Highlights of the CJP 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (New York: Council of Jewish Federations, 1991), pp. 1-6. See also Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," in David Singer and Ruth Seldin, eds., American Jewish Yearbook, (New York and Philadelphia: The American Jewish Committee; The Jewish Publication Society, 1992), pp. 77-173.

<sup>3</sup> For a more comprehensive description of the current state and historical background of American Jewry, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "A Unique People in an Exceptional Country," in Lipset, ed., American Pluralism in the Jewish Community (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990), pp. 3-29.



other groups in the population; and their rate of intermarriage is high and increasing steadily.<sup>4</sup> Immigration apart, these behavioral traits mean that the Jewish population in America is likely to decline. At the extreme, one demographer predicts a near extinction in the not too distant future. The hope, suggested by earlier studies on intermarriage, that such behavior might actually add to the population given conversions and Jewish identification of intermarried families, does not seem to be borne out by the 1990 survey. Fifty-nine percent of currently married households are both Jewish, six percent are conversionary households and 35 percent are mixed-marriage households. Only one-sixth, 17 percent, of intermarried Jews have a spouse who has converted. The mates of the rest have remained Gentiles. Since 1985, the majority, 57 percent, of Jews married non-Jews.<sup>5</sup> This compares with 10 percent for those who mated before 1965, and 31 percent for those who wed between 1965 and 1974. As Barry Kosmin et al. note in their preliminary report on the results of the overall study "since 1985 twice as many mixed couples (born Jew with Gentile spouse) have been created as Jewish couples (born Jew with Jewish spouse)."

In addition to the problem that is posed by low fertility for Jewish continuity, is the concern that most children with only one Jewish parent are not being raised as Jews. "Only

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<sup>4</sup> Regarding fertility rates, Goldstein points out that average completed fertility for Jewish women "was not only 20 percent below the...average for those aged 45-49 20 years earlier, but also 19 percent below the average for all white women aged 45-49 in 1988, and 10 percent below the 2.1 level needed for replacement." Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry," p. 122. See also Calvin Goldscheider and Alan S. Zuckerman, The Transformation of the Jews (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 177-78; Marshall Sklare, "Intermarriage and the Jewish Future," *Commentary*, 37 (April 1964), pp. 46-52. For a report on extensive intermarriage before the massive East European immigration, see Chaim I. Waxman, America's Jews in Transition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), pp. 25-6.

<sup>5</sup> Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry," p. 126. For similar documentation, see Sylvia Barack Fishman and Alice Goldstein, "When They Are Grown They Will Not Depart: Jewish Education and the Jewish Behavior of American Adults," *Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies Research Report 8*, March 1993.

28 percent of... children [in religiously mixed households] are reported as being raised Jewish. Some 41 percent are being raised in a non-Jewish religion." Almost a third, 31 percent, are not being given a religious identification.<sup>6</sup> If we look at the full picture, we find that not only has intermarriage doubled but that "just under half of all children in the surveyed households are currently being raised with Judaism as their religion and another 16 percent qualify as secular Jews."<sup>7</sup>

Education is obviously the principal mechanism to socialize succeeding generations into being Jewish, and to stimulate adult Jews and Gentile spouses to foster religious and cultural interests in the community. What the Jewish community of the future will look like -- occupationally, culturally, and Jewishly -- will be, to a considerable degree, a function of both non-Jewish and Jewish education.

This article attempts to understand the determinants and consequences of Jewish education through an exploration of the NJPS data. The first section of the paper examines the factors that influence the probability of a respondent securing Jewish training. These factors include gender and age, as well as denominational, generational, regional, and familial background. The second part lends support to the hypothesis that the greater the exposure to Jewish learning, the more likely the recipient is to be involved in Jewish life and the religious community, and to pass the commitment on to his or her children. The conclusions drawn from the bivariate data of these two sections are then given additional credence through multivariate regression analyses. Finally, the paper addresses the future of

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<sup>6</sup> Kosmin et al., Highlights, p. 16. See also Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry," pp. 124-28.

<sup>7</sup> Kosmin et al., Highlights, p. 15.



the Jewish community -- its youth. The determinants of Jewish education among the young are evaluated by examining the role family socio-economic status, geographic mobility, patterns of religious observance, as well as denominational, familial, and regional background. Again, multiple regression is used to support the contingency table analysis. Those Jews enrolled in college are given particular attention because of the great problems and potential solutions posed by secular education for Jewish continuity.

The concern for Jewish continuity focuses, therefore, on Jewish education as the major tool available to the community to stem the weakening which is taking place. The study permits an examination of the relationship between different types of Jewish education and subsequent participation in, and commitment to, the community. The basic picture is clear. Those who are classified as religious, whether they are as born as Jews or converted to Judaism, are likely to report some form of Jewish education. Eighty-four percent of the males and 65 percent of the females do so. The figures, however, drop for those born Jewish but classified as non-religious or ethnic-seculars. Three-fifths, 61 percent, of the men and 45 percent of the women said they have had a Jewish education. People who were born and raised Jewish but converted out were much less likely to have had Jewish education, 27 percent for the males and 24 percent for the females.

These findings present us with a classic chicken and egg problem in trying to explain the role of religious education: To what extent do family religious commitments, which themselves might be a reflection of prior education, influence the strong linkages between Jewish education, Jewish identification and community involvement. Can schooling overcome the lack of commitment of those reared in weakly identified families? No definite



conclusion is possible in absence of longitudinal data (information gathered over time from the same respondents), particularly since the decision to educate or not reflects, in most cases, the degree of religiosity in the home. Still, the evidence is congruent with the hypothesis that Jewish education makes a difference.

### Determinants of Jewish Education for Adult Respondents

Turning to the analysis, we may start with the finding that approximately 66 percent, of the core respondents reported in the 1990 NJPS had, at some point, been exposed to formal Jewish education. Participation has been measured by the type of education received and the number of years completed. For those who have received it, the type of their education can be differentiated into four groups: 1) full-time Jewish schools including day schools and *yeshivas*; 2) part-time schools that meet more than once a week; mainly afternoon schools; 3) Sunday schools and other once-a-week Jewish educational programs; 4) Private tutoring. There was no question in the survey about attendance at Jewish secular schools, such as those run by the Workmen's Circle. It is not possible to evaluate the quality of Jewish educational programs from the data. The formal Jewish education measures, e.g., types of schooling or years in different educational programs, are dependent variables when analyzing determinants, while, for the next section where the consequences of education are the focus, they serve as independent variables.

Most Jews living in America were not exposed to intensive religious education. More than half of those who ever attended, 53 percent (or 35 percent of the whole sample), went

to part-time, largely afternoon programs. The next to largest group is composed of those who had attended Sunday school (28 percent), followed by full-time day schools (11 percent) and private tutoring (8 percent). Almost all of those who have some Jewish education took part for more than a year. Only 2.5 percent did not attend for a full year. As shown in Table 1, thirty percent participated less than five years, and another 36 percent were involved for longer periods, with 15 percent having been in formal Jewish training for 11 years or more.

Table 1: Number of Years of Formal Jewish Education				
No. of Years	Born Jews - Religious Jews	Jews By Choice	Ethnic-secular Jews	Total CJP
< 5 years	31	56	20	30
6-10 years	26	4	8	21
11-14 years	8	1	1	6
15+ years	11	2	3	9
Never Attended	25	37	67	33
Types of Schooling				
Day School	13	--	3	11
Part-time/Afternoon	54	14	54	53
Sunday School	27	24	34	28
Private Tutor	5	62	9	8

Given that traditional Judaism places much greater emphasis on men than on women with respect to synagogue observance and religious study, it is not surprising that males are more likely than females to have been exposed to Jewish education (Table 2). The former are also more likely to have been involved in the more intense forms of Jewish education. Around two-thirds, 66 percent, of day schoolers and 63 percent of the part-timers are men.

The picture reverses sharply for Sunday School (the least stringent form of training), and somewhat less for private tutoring. Sixty-two percent of Sunday schoolers and 50 percent of the privately tutored are female. To sum up, women are less likely to have been enrolled at all, while those who did so are more likely to have been involved in programs that met less frequently or for less time.

<b>Table 2: Form of Jewish Education by Gender (Percent)</b>			
	Male	Female	Total
Day School	11	5	7
Part-time/Afternoon	46	25	35
Sunday School	15	22	19
Private Tutor	6	5	5
Never Attended	23	42	33

Basically, the same conclusions are reached with respect to the quantity of education received. Among those who received any, men have attended more years than women, although the gender difference diminishes for those who have studied for 10 years or more, 17 percent male and 13 percent female. Still, the most noteworthy finding is that within each age group, women are much less likely to have any Jewish education and, if ever involved, to have studied for fewer years than men (Table 3).



Table 3: Years of Attendance by Age, Controlled for Gender (Percent)									
	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80+	Row Total
Male									
< 5 years	25	29	34	36	34	38	42	32	35
6-10 years	25	25	24	29	25	26	14	17	24
> 11 years	15	11	16	18	12	17	19	27	17
Never Attended	36	35	26	17	19	20	24	24	25
Female									
< 5 years	20	25	26	26	29	28	20	21	26
6-10 years	27	22	19	20	21	16	18	8	19
> 11 years	11	10	15	13	9	12	12	27	13
Never Attended	42	43	40	41	37	44	50	44	42

The same pattern, of course, holds up for the correlates of Bar or Bat Mitzvah ceremonies. It should be noted that the proportion of the denominationally identified who have been confirmed has increased over time, particularly among the younger. The converse is true for the ethnic-secular; only one-sixth of the 18 to 29 year olds among them have been confirmed as compared to two-thirds of the religiously linked. For the core Jewish population as a whole, less than half, 46 percent, have gone through the coming of age rite. Confirmants include a majority, 56 percent, of the religiously identified birth-right Jews (85 percent men and 27 percent women), compared to 24 percent of the ethnic-seculars (35 percent men and 13.5 percent women).

The fact that younger Jews have been less exposed to Jewish education than the middle-aged is congruent with the evidence that assimilation, particularly intermarriage, has increased. However, the relationship that exists, considering all age groups, appears to be curvilinear. Older and younger people have been less exposed to Jewish learning than the

middle generation. Sixty-one percent of the 18 through 29 year olds have been involved in some form. This figure increases gradually to 72 percent for those in the 50 through 59 years old category, but then declines to 67 percent for the 60 through 69 year old group and to 64 percent for those who are 70 years or older (Table 4).

Table 4: Number of Years of Formal Education by Year of Birth and Age (Percent)							
Years of Birth and Age							
Years Attended	1960-72 18-29	1950-59 30-39	1940-49 40-49	1930-39 50-59	1920-29 60-69	1919 and before 70+	Row Total
1-5 years	27	30	31	31	32	30	30
6-10 years	24	21	24	23	21	15	21
11-15 years	6	10	7	6	4	3	6
15+ years	5	5	9	12	10	16	9
Never Attended	39	33	29	28	33	36	33

Looking at the data in terms of decades, the largest proportion involved in Jewish education for substantial periods is found among those born in the 1930s followed by the war and post-war cohorts, those born in the 1940s. It is impossible to account for this pattern using the available data, but an interpretation may be suggested. The parents of the generations who reached confirmation age during the years that included the coming to power of the Nazis, increased anti-Semitism in the United States, the Holocaust and the creation of the state of Israel, were exposed to very strong stimuli to affirm their Judaism. These events had a positive effect on Jewish identity, activating latent religious loyalties. Logically these events should have led more parents to send their children to Jewish schools. But they were sent disproportionately to the weakest and least effective form, i.e., Sunday



school. It may be hypothesized further that as those events and experiences receded into history, the assimilatory forces regained strength.

Socio-political conditions during the school years appear to have had less effect on the type of Jewish education received than on length of time enrolled (see Table 5). Across all age or time cohorts, little more than one-third, 35 percent, of the respondents report having attended part-time schools. Sunday school attendance is, however, curiously curvilinear. It is greatest for those who were born during the 1930s and 1940s (e.g., aged 40-59 when interviewed), but less for younger cohorts and least for the oldest ones, who partook during the 1920s or earlier. Presumably such a limited form of schooling was less available for the older respondents and may have been more disapproved of by families closer to the old country experience. The proportion who went to day school has grown slightly but steadily over time, from six percent for the 1930s cohorts to seven for those who reached school age in the 1940s and 1950s, and 9 percent for the youngest cohorts. Thus there has been an increase at the two extremes, those not participating and those attending the most intensive form, day schools. The latter change has particularly involved women.

Table 5: Type of Education by Year of Birth or Age (Percent)							
Years Attended	1960-72 18-29	1950-59 30-39	1940-49 40-49	1930-39 50-59	1920-29 60-69	1919 and before 70+	Row Total
Day School	9	7	7	6	12	6	8
Part-time/Afternoon	32	36	37	36	36	37	35
Sunday school	17	17	24	23	17	14	19
Private Tutor	3	5	4	9	5	9	5
Never Attended	39	34	27	26	30	35	33
Column Total	21	25	19	10	11	13	100



How does assimilation to American society affect Jewish education? Examining the length of family residence in America provides an answer to this question. The relationship between Jewish education and national origin has been analyzed by breaking the sample into four generations. The first is composed of the foreign-born, 10 percent; the second of those born in the U.S. with two foreign-born parents, 20 percent; the third of those born here, with at least one parent born here and grandparents who are foreign-born, 27.5 percent; and the fourth of native-born, with at least one U.S. born parent and at least one grandparent born in America, 43 percent. The relationship between these "generations" and the types of Jewish education is shown in Table 7.

<b>Table 7: Types of Jewish Education by Generational Background (Percent)</b>				
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Day School	29	12	5	3
Part-Time	20	43	46	29
Sunday	7	13	22	22
Private Tutor	7	6	3	6
Never Attend	37	26	24	41

As is evident from the table, those from abroad include close to the largest proportion (37 percent) without any Jewish training and the biggest of those with the most intensive, day school (29 percent). The latter finding may reflect the greater availability of such education in the "old country." One-fifth, 20 percent, had attended part-time school. Few, 7 percent, went to Sunday School, a form of education linked largely to the Reform movement, which did not exist in Eastern Europe and had a limited membership elsewhere. Clearly, day school attendance falls off steadily with length of generational stay in America, while Sunday school attendance increases.

These findings clearly imply that assimilation pressures are operative. The interplay between generational background and type of training reinforces the assumption that Americanization works against Jewish education. As noted, the foreign-born show great propensity to have attended day school. Not only is it true that American-born Jews are seemingly more assimilated in terms of educational involvements, but logically they are also less Orthodox. These relationships are reinforced when we relate patterns of school attendance to the third generation, i.e., grandparents. As noted above, those with no grandparents born in the United States are the most likely to have attended day school. More than four-fifths, 84 percent, of all day school students do not have a single American born grandparent. The latter are also more likely to have gone to part-time afternoon than to Sunday school, and are the least likely to report a private tutor or to have no Jewish education, while those who have all four native born show the opposite pattern. Forty-four percent of the latter have not been involved in any form of Jewish education compared to 26 percent of those with four foreign-born grandparents.

The curvilinear relationship between generation and non-attendance (highest for the first and fourth generations) may reflect two diverse patterns of assimilation. Many of the foreign-born respondents and their parents were reared in cultures which contained large segments of highly religious Orthodox and extremely irreligious radicals.<sup>8</sup> As noted however, the Population Survey unfortunately did not inquire into exposure to secular Yiddish education. In America, both groups were exposed to cultural pressures to give up

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<sup>8</sup> For a fulsome account of the leftist Yiddish culture, see Irving Howe, The World of Our Fathers: The Journey of the East European Jews to America and the Life They Found and Made (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976).



the strict requirements of orthodoxy and adherence to atheistic irreligious politically radical doctrines, as they aspired to or made their way into the middle class. The more acceptable behavior was Americanized moderate Conservatism for those of Orthodox background and Reform for the scions of secularity.

Whether one is the offspring of an intermarried family or not is an even more decisive factor. The dysfunctional effects of intermarriage on Jewish continuity are clear. The likelihood of receiving a Jewish education is greatest when both parents are Jewish. This is true for roughly two-thirds of the respondents. Four-fifths of them have been to Jewish schools, compared to about 30 percent of those from intermarried families. As noted earlier, relatively few respondents attended day schools, but 93 percent of those who did were from fully Jewish families, while only 48 percent of those who are Jewishly identified but without any exposure to religious education had two Jewish parents. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents with intramarried parents continued their studies for six or more years, compared to nine percent of those with intermarried ones.

A Jewish mother appears somewhat more important for educational continuity than a Jewish father in religiously mixed families. This finding may reflect the fact that Judaism is a matrilineal religion, and that in America generally, females are more religiously committed and involved than men. Still, as indicated in Table 8, only 34 percent of the offspring of intermarried Jewish women had any religious education, a bit more than 27 percent of those whose one Jewish parent was a male.



Table 8: Intermarriage Effects on Jewish Education (Percent)				
Years Attended	Both Parents Jewish	Mother Jewish	Father Jewish	Total
< 5 years	41	24	19	37
6-10 years	27	8	5	21
11-15 years	7	2	1	6
15+ years	5	—	2	5
Never Attended	20	66	73	31

The denomination of the family of origin is obviously important in affecting the propensity for Jewish education, though by some measures less than might be anticipated. Surprisingly, an identical proportion, 20 percent, from Orthodox and Reform families never took part, while for Conservatives the ratio is a bit higher, 23 percent. Those from Orthodox homes, however, exhibited the highest commitment if type of education is considered. Forty-six percent attended day school while 28 percent went to part-time afternoon classes. Over half of them, 53 percent, spent six or more years in a Jewish curriculum. Conservative offspring were much more likely than scions of Reform to have attended day school, 12 percent, or afternoon classes, 46 percent. Curiously, the children of Conservative families spent fewer years absorbing Jewish learning than those from Reform origins. More than two-fifths of the former, 38 percent, compared with 42 percent of the latter, continued their education for six years or more. Fifty-six percent of those from an ethnic-secular background did not partake of any Jewish education.

Table 9: Denomination Raised and Years in Jewish Education (Percent)					
Years Attended	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Ethnic-secular	Total
< 5 years	29	38	38	31	34
6-10 years	30	27	29	7	23
11-15 years	9	6	9	4	6
15+ years	12	5	4	2	5
Never Attended	20	23	20	56	31

Current affiliation produces somewhat stronger correlations, presumably because level and intensity of the Jewish education experience reflect degree of religiosity of respondents. Twenty percent of today's Orthodox report having gone to a full-time day school as compared to less than seven percent of the Conservatives, and only three percent of the Reform. Conservatives lead the Reform in proportion of those who have attended part-time school, 50 percent to 34 percent. Conversely, however, those now affiliated with Reform are more likely to have been exposed to the least stringent training (Sunday school), 41 percent, compared to the Conservatives' 16 percent, and Orthodox's 9 percent. Not surprisingly, those who have remained Orthodox are much more likely to have had day school education than those who left the denomination. This may suggest that the latter's families were actually much less Orthodox than the former's. In any case, the modal relationships to religious denominations are clear: day school for the Orthodox, afternoon for the Conservatives, Sunday for the Reform. Not surprisingly, most of those who report some form of secular identification were not involved in any form of Jewish religious education.

The part of the country in which respondents were born also has a clear relationship to exposure to religious teaching. Forty-eight percent of those from the western states and

34 percent of Southerners had never partaken of any form of formal Jewish learning, compared to 30 percent of Northeasterners and 28 percent of Midwesterners. Those from the Northeast, the oldest region of American Jewish settlement, also show the highest propensity for day school, seven percent, and afternoon school, 42 percent, as compared to three percent and 25 percent for those from the South. These results again are congruent with our impressions of the correlates of assimilation: most in the West, least in the Northeast. The foreign-born, it may be noted again, were the most likely to have received a day school education, 29 percent, whereas only five percent of the American born secured such an intensive education.

Considering the different variables — gender, age, denomination, generational background, intermarriage, and region — a clear picture emerges of the factors associated with educational enrollment. The most likely candidate to have received formal Jewish education has the following profile: a male who is foreign-born or has foreign-born parents and grandparents, with practicing non-intermarried parents who raised him in the Northeast and in one of the three major denominations, preferably Orthodox. The more the indicators reflect Americanization, the less chances of having been trained for Jewish continuity. None of these are surprising, and the implications for Jewish continuity are discouraging since all the negative factors are increasing.

These factors were combined in an Americanization scale, comprised of variables such as generations in the U.S., denomination and region reared, and Jewishness of parent. Respondents scored from zero to four. As shown in Table 10, the more Americanized one's score, the less exposure to Jewish education.



Table 10: Americanization Score and Years of Jewish Education				
Years Attended	Very Jewish	Jewish	Americanized	Very Americanized
< 5 Years	35	45	36	36
6 - 18 Years	29	27.5	19	2
11 - 15 Years	8	5	7	1
15+ Years	9	4	3	-
Never Attended	18	18	35	61
Total	10	41	39	10

### The Consequences of Formal Jewish Education

The previous section related measures of Jewish education to various background variables. This section considers the educational items as independent variables to see how the degree of Jewish training, secured while young, is associated with various adult attitudes and behaviors. The following areas can be hypothesized as consequences of Jewish education: Jewish identity, denomination, synagogue attendance, philanthropy (especially Jewish), involvement in Jewish organizations, intermarriage, attachment to Israel, attitudes regarding Jewishness, adult Jewish learning, and children's Jewish education. Importantly, it should be noted that what follows are reports of correlations, not of causal processes.

Perhaps the best single indicator of commitment to continuity and the community in the survey is the question "How important is being a Jew for you?" Only 22 percent of those who had never been exposed to any form of Jewish education replied "very important." The same answer was given by 75 percent of those who had been to day school, 68 percent of the privately tutored, 47 percent of the former students at part-time/afternoon classes, and 40 percent of respondents whose training was limited to Sunday school. A strong

relationship exists between length of Jewish studies and the response "very important," from 41 percent of those who had five years or less of Jewish education to 70 percent for those who had 11 years or more. It is noteworthy that the 16 percent of the core Jewish population who were classified as ethnic-seculars -- over half of whom had no Jewish schooling -- were overwhelmingly very low on commitment.

Historically, Jewish life has centered around the synagogue. This is less true in America. As of 1990, 67 percent of Jewish households reported that they are not a member. But 73 percent of the respondents said that they attend a religious service at least once a year. Only 22 percent participate once a month or more. 52 percent attend from once to a few times a year, presumably on the High Holidays, while 27 percent never partake. Synagogue behavior, of course, correlates with religious education. The more involvement when young, the more participation as an adult.

Table 11: Years of Education and Involvement in the Synagogue (Percent)					
	Never Attended	< 6 Years	6-10 Years	11+ Years	Total
Member	18	34	44	52	33
Attended Once a Month or More	17	19	28.5	38	22

Close to half of American Jews, 48 percent, report that they observe the most serious personal obligation, fasting on Yom Kippur. Willingness to do so correlates strongly with type and duration of religious training. Most former day and afternoon schoolers, as well as the privately tutored -- 70, 59, and 70 percent respectively -- abstain from food on that day. Less than half of those who attended Sunday school, 47 percent, fast while the overwhelming

majority, 72 percent, of those who never had any Jewish education eat on this High Holiday. As expected, abstaining from food on Yom Kippur correlates strongly with amount of training: from 28 percent for those who never attended religious school to 52 percent for those who went for the five years or less, to 67 percent for those with 11 or more years education.

To further demonstrate the relationship, a scale was constructed of four so-called "identity" items used in many studies of Jewish commitment. These items are: 1) candles at Hanukkah, 2) candle ceremonies on Friday nights, 3) attendance at Passover seders, and 4) eating Kosher foods. The scale ranges from "very high" (following all four rituals most of the time) to "very low" (never observing any). As expected, the more intense the educational experience of respondents, the higher their score on ritual observance. Close to a fifth, 18 percent, of those who score in the very high category are former day school students. Conversely, only three percent in the very low group have the same background. More than three-fifths, 67 percent, of the extreme non-identifiers lack any Jewish education. Those whose Jewish training is limited to Sunday school are the least likely of the religiously educated to be in the highest identity category. Eighteen percent are, as compared to 52 percent of those who had been to day school.



Table 12: Type of Schooling and Ritual Observance (Scale) (Percent)							
		Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High	Row Total
Day School	Row	5	6	20	17	52	8
	Column	3	3	6	5	18	
Part-time	Row	6	14	27	28	26	35
	Column	16	31	38	39	40	
Sunday School	Row	8	14	25	36	18	19
	Column	12	17	19	27	15	
Private tutor	Row	4	14	28	26	29	5
	Column	2	4	6	6	7	
Never Attended	Row	25	22	23	18	13	33
	Column	67	45	30	22	20	
Column Total		12	16	25	25	22	100

The same relationship holds true for the number of years of Jewish education. Close to half, 44 percent, of those with more than 15 years of study are in households which observe all four rituals, while, as noted earlier, two-thirds, 67 percent, of the interviewees without any religious training are not involved in any. The propensity to be totally non-observant correlates in linear fashion with the amount of education: 25 percent for none, 19 for one to five years, seven for six to ten, four for 11 to 15 years, and three for those with 15 years or more. The ritual observance scale has been disaggregated in Table 13 below to demonstrate that the longer one attends Jewish schooling, the more likely one is to follow each observance.

Table 13: Years of Jewish Education and Ritual Observance (Percent) (Rows)								
Years Attended	Hanukkah Candles		Attend Seders		Friday Candles		Kosher Meat	
	Never	All of the time	Never	All of the time	Never	All of the time	Never	All of the time
1-5 years	21	51	18	47	65	8	59	13
6-10 years	13	61	8	65	54	15	56	13
11-15 years	12	73	11	77	44	25	60	23
15+ years	22	65	12	65	46	30	42	33
Never	48	33	40	31	75	7	65	9

The decline of involvement in the Jewish religious community is paralleled by a fall-off in intra-communal social relationships if the popular impression of close ties in the old country or areas of first generation immigrant settlement is accurate. Close to two-fifths of the respondents, 37 percent, reported most or all of their closest friends are Jewish. About a fifth, 23 percent, said none or few are, while 41 percent responded "some." As with earlier indicators, the more education, the more Jewish friends (Table 14). The data showing most or all are Jewish has, however, fallen steadily over time, from close to three-fifths for those over 65 years old to below a third for those between 18 and 29 years of age. And as with other indicators of Jewish commitment, informal ties are linked to religious training. Over half, 53 percent, of those with more than 15 years of Jewish education reported most or all of their closest friends are Jewish, compared to over a quarter, 27 percent, for those who never partook in any formal Jewish learning.

Table 14: Jewish Friendship and Years of Education (Percent)						
Jewish Friends	< 5 Years	6-10 Years	11-15 Years	15+ Years	None	Row Total
Few/None	20	20	18	16	29	23
Some Jewish	41	39	33	30	44	40
Most/All	39	41	49	53	27	37
Column Total	33	23	6	5	33	100

Much more important than friendships, of course, is marriage. The most publicized result of the Population Study is that the rate of intermarriage has steadily increased to 57 percent for those wed in the last five years. This is a new development in the history of the American Jewish family. As Egon Mayer points out, the Jewish family has been a remarkably stable institution through much of the twentieth century during which time "Jews continued to marry other Jews, and through the forces of intergenerational continuity, continued to raise children stamped with some inchoate sense of Jewish identity...."<sup>9</sup> Signs of change were revealed in the 1970 NJPS: "What shocked the community was the reported rise in the level of intermarriage from less than 2 percent of those individuals who had married before 1925, to about 6 percent of those marrying between 1940 and 1960, to 12 percent of the 1960-64 marriage cohort, to a high of 29 percent of all Jews marrying in the five years preceding the survey."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Egon Mayer, "American-Jewish Intermarriage in the 1990s and Beyond: The Coming Revolution in Jewish Demography and Communal Policy," in Mayer, ed., The Imperatives of Jewish Outreach (The Jewish Outreach Institute and The Center for Jewish Studies, City University of New York, 1991), p. 39.

<sup>10</sup> Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry," p. 125.



The 1990 NJPS indicates the pace of change has not decreased. If we consider the entire core Jewish population in the sample, not just the recently married, 61 percent of the respondents report that their first and usually only spouse was born Jewish. Another five percent are married to converts. Of the remaining, 10 percent have Catholic spouses, 13 percent Protestants, six percent "others," and four and a half percent wedded people with no religion. The latter two categories are probably predominantly of Jewish origin.

Once again, the extent and nature of Jewish education correlate strongly with the probability of mating with another Jew. The more Jewish education one has, the less likely one is to marry a non-Jew. Over three-quarters, 78 percent, of those who attended a day school married birth-right Jews, a figure which falls off to two-thirds for both private tutorees (65 percent) and persons educated in part-time school (67 percent), and to 57 percent for Sunday schoolers. Half, 50 percent, of interviewees who had no Jewish training wed non-Jewish partners. The full picture is presented in Table 15 below:

Table 15: Type of Schooling and Inter-marriage (Percent)					
Religion of Spouse (First Marriage if More Than One)	School Type				
	Day School	Part-time	Sunday School	Private Tutor	Never Attended
Born Jewish	78	65	57	67	50
Converted	1	8	5	3	4
Catholic	6	9	11	5	14
Protestant	3	11	18	19	14
Other	4	3	6	6	9
No Religion	9	4	3	—	7

The growth in the intermarriage rate reflects current attitudes dominant among adult Jews. The Population Survey inquired: "Hypothetically, if your child were considering marrying a non-Jewish person, would you: strongly support, support, accept, or be neutral, oppose, or strongly oppose the marriage?" Only 16 percent would oppose or strongly oppose (six percent strongly). One-third would support a child doing so, 47 percent would accept it or be neutral. More religious education only marginally reduces the willingness to accept or support intermarriage, except for those with more than 15 years of schooling, presumably largely dedicated Orthodox. Still, only minorities in each category are antagonistic: 34 percent in the 15+ years group, 23 percent among the six through ten years one, 15 percent for the five years or less, and only eight percent among those without any formal Jewish education.

The decline in concern for intermarriage is reflected in Jews' preferences with regard to the ethno-religious character of the neighborhoods in which they live. The proximity to Jewish or Gentile neighbors presumably affects the probabilities for marrying in or out of the community. The majority of those interviewed report living in areas which are not Jewish,

35 percent, or little Jewish, 28 percent. Only nine percent reside in very Jewish districts. The proportion living in the latter falls off in linear fashion by age from those over 60, 15 percent, to the 18 through 29 year old group, 8 percent. Many, of course, do not have much choice when their communities lack distinctively Jewish districts as more and more cities do.

The NJPS inquired as to how important the Jewish character of the neighborhood is to the respondent. A majority, 62 percent, replied that it is either not important or not very important, while 32 percent answered somewhat important. Only 14 percent said it is very important to reside in a predominantly Jewish district. Not surprisingly, such feelings strongly relate to the extent and type of education received, much like the behavioral and attitudinal items presented earlier. As reported in Tables 16 and 17, the longer and more intense the Jewish educational experience, the more people are interested in living among their co-religionists, presumably, at least in part, to facilitate the upbringing and marriage of their children with other Jews. But as we have seen this is not a major concern of most American Jews. Only 27 percent of those with 15 or more years of religious education said it is very important to live in a Jewish neighborhood, while fully 44 percent did not consider it important. The indicators of sentiments toward the religious background of their children's spouses and neighbors suggest that the walls have been permanently breached, that education alone will not maintain the community.



Table 16: Importance of Neighborhood Jewishness by Years of Jewish Education (Percent)							
		1-5	6-10	11-14	15+	none	Row Total
Not important and not very important	Row	32	22	4.5	4	8	54
	Column	52	51	39	44	62	--
Somewhat important	Row	36	26	6.5	5	26	32
	Column	35	36	33	29	26	--
Very important	Row	30	21	12	10	28	14
	Column	13	13	27.5	26.5	12	--
Column Total		33	23	6	5	33	100

Table 17: Importance of Neighborhood Jewishness and Type of Jewish Education (Percent)							
		Day school	Part Time	Sunday	Private Tutor	none	Row Total
Not important and not very important	Row	5	32	21	5	38	54
	Column	34	48	60	47	62	--
Somewhat important	Row	8	40	19.5	6	26.5	32
	Column	34	36	33	36	26	--
Very important	Row	17	40	10	6	27	14
	Column	32	16	7	17	12	--
Column Total		7	35.6	19	5	33	100

Nathan Glazer once noted that Israel had become the religion of the Jews. That is to say, it is the major source of Jewish identity or commitment. The findings of the Population

study, however, challenge the assumption that Jews, regardless of their background, are deeply committed to the Jewish state. The responses to four questions provide evidence: "How emotionally attached are you to Israel?"; "How many times have you been to Israel?"; "Do you often talk about Israel to friends and relatives?"; and "Do you contribute to the United Jewish Appeal?" Most of the funds for the latter are collected in the name of Israel's needs.

The responses to the first question clearly suggest that most American Jews are not strongly dedicated to the Jewish state. Only 10 percent said they are "extremely attached to Israel," while another 20 percent answered "very attached." The most common response given by over two-fifths, 45 percent, was "somewhat," while 25 percent replied they were "not attached." At first glance, the picture looks more positive with respect to the second query, conversations about Israel with friends and relatives. Over two-thirds, 68 percent, said they talked about Israel. When the interviewers inquired further, "How often would that be?" giving them the choices of often, sometimes, rarely, or not at all, the interest seems less than implied by the affirmative answers. Only 18 percent of the total sample replied "often." Two-fifths, 40 percent, answered "sometimes." A tenth said "rarely," which, when added to the 32 percent in the never category, comes to nearly half, or 42 percent, for both.

Similar distributions of reactions to Israel are reflected with respect to visits to Israel. Only 26 percent of adult Jewish Americans report ever having travelled to the Jewish state. The proportion of those who have done so three or more times is six percent, the same as for those who have visited two times, while 14 percent went once.

These four measures of commitment to or interest in Israel clearly correlate with various indicators of Jewishness, such as type of religious involvement and adherence to Jewish ritual. Secular and intermarried Jews are less close to Israel. And as might be expected, attitudes and behavior correlate with educational background. A good majority, 63 percent, of those who attended day school report themselves extremely, 34 percent, or very, 29 percent, attached to Israel. The small group who had private tutoring are a far second in indicating that they are very or extremely attached to Israel, while the part-timers are third and the Sunday schoolers fourth. Almost half of those without any Jewish education, 47 percent, said they feel no attachment; only five percent of them indicate extreme attachment.

<b>Table 18: Type of Schooling by Attachment to Israel (Row Percent)</b>					
	Extremely Attached	Very Attached	Somewhat Attached	Not Attached	Row Total
Day School	34	29	23	14	8
Part-time/Afternoon	11	22	51	16	36
Sunday School	5	24	53	18	21
Private Tutor	13	30	46	11	4
Never Attended	5	10	39	47	30
Column Total	25	45	20	10	100

The same pattern turns up in the analysis of the other three items -- how often Jews visit Israel, talk about the Jewish state, and contribute to the United Jewish Appeal. As can be seen in Table 19 below, the more years of education, the more likely a Jew will visit Israel.



<b>Table 19: Years of Jewish Education and Visits to Israel (Percent)</b>					
	Never	< 5 Years	6-10 Years	11-15 Years	15+ Years
Never Visited	87	75	67	47	49
Visited Once	7	17	18	22	17
Visited Twice	3	4	6	14	17
Visited Three or More Times	3	4	9	17	17

And once again, type of Jewish school attended and number of years involved are associated with propensity to engage in discussions about the Jewish state. Three-fifths of those without any formal training rarely or never discuss Israel, while the parallel figures for day schoolers is 23 percent. The proportion who talk "often" is much more, 55 percent, for day schoolers.

<b>Table 20: Type of Schooling and Propensity to Talk About Israel (Percent)</b>		
	Rarely or Never	Often
Day School	22	45
Part-time/Afternoon	41	18
Sunday School	29	20
Private Tutor	29	28
Never Attended	61	7
Total	42	18

Looking at sources of Jewish communal financial support and activity, Jewish education is clearly relevant. Over four-fifths, 83 percent of the respondents in households

that contribute to Jewish charities, have received formal Jewish schooling. Furthermore, it appears that close to 60 percent of former Jewish school pupils are in households that donate.

The recurrent pattern reported here is reiterated with respect to the background of contributors to the UJA/Federation, as well as to other Jewish charities. More Jews, however, give to the latter, which are not necessarily related to the state of Israel. The more education Jews were exposed to as young people, the greater their propensity to contribute to both types of philanthropy.

<b>Table 21: Household Contribution to Jewish Charities and UJA Federation (Percent)</b>		
<b>Years Attended</b>	<b>Jewish Charities</b>	<b>UJA</b>
< 5 years	57	38
6-10 years	61	45
11-15 years	65	38
15+ years	65	53
Never	33	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>35</b>

And in a similar vein, willingness to belong to and volunteer services to Jewish organizations correlates strongly with educational history. The range of those who report volunteer activities descends from 29 percent for those with more than 15 years of study to 16 percent for those with less than five years of study, and ultimately to 10 percent for those unschooled in Jewish learning. Similarly, the more intensely educated, the more likely people are to subscribe to Jewish periodicals: 37 percent for individuals with 15 years or

more of Jewish education, 21 percent for those with five years or less schooling, and 12 percent for the Jewishly uneducated.

Further, the propensity to continue with Jewish education into adulthood is closely linked to previous attendance and type of former schooling. Even though only 14 percent of the respondents reported attending adult programs during the year before they were interviewed, 78 percent who did so had formal Jewish education. Of the small group who had spent 15 or more years in some form of religious study, 22 percent have continued their education as adults, as have 24 percent for those who were exposed to Jewish education for 11-15 years, and 12 percent for those who had five years or less. Type of education differentiates in the same way. If respondents had attended day school in their youth, they were more likely to be involved in adult Jewish educational programs than were those who had been involved in other forms of schooling. Close to 28 percent of former day schoolers, as compared to 14 and 12 percent of former part-timers and Sunday schoolers respectively, took part in adult Jewish educational programs.

The results of the 1990 NJPS clearly point up the weakening of American Jewishness. As indicated at the beginning of this paper, the combination of assimilation processes (especially growing rates of intermarriage) and a low birthrate have significantly reduced the proportion of Jews in the national population as well as decreased the stringency of the commitment to Jewishness of those who remain identified. Almost one-fifth of the survey respondents report that the denomination in which they were raised was Orthodox, but only five percent identify their current affiliation as such. Conservatives have remained constant at 31.5 percent, while Reform grew from 25 to 35 percent. The proportion who report their



family origin or themselves as non-religious or "just Jewish," increased from nine to 14 percent.

The data reported in Table 22 emphasize anew the weakening of traditional Judaism and the power of assimilation. Thus, as noted, less than a quarter, 23 percent, of the offspring of Orthodox parents, have remained in the same denomination. Conservatives have retained 58 percent, while the most Americanized group, the Reform, have held on to 79 percent. Goodly majorities of the children of the secularized or non-denominational parents fall into similar categories. It is noteworthy that both the Reform and the Conservatives have recruited about one-seventh of their supporters from persons of non-Jewish origins, i.e., converts.



Table 22: Denomination Raised and Current Denominational Affiliation (Percent)										
Raised	Current	OR	CO	RE	CB	JJ	MX	NR	NJ	Total
Orthodox (OR)	Row	23	46	19	4	7	--	1	1	19
	Col	84	28	10	27	14	--	4	2	--
Conservative (CO)	Row	1	58	26	4	5	--	3	4	32
	Col	4	57	23	38	16	38	23	11	--
Reform (RE)	Row	--	5	79	1	5	--	3	7	25
	Col	--	4	55	11	13	37	15	15	--
Combina-tions (CB)	Row	1	39	30	17	56	--	2	6	3
	Col	1	4	3	16	2	--	1	2	--
Just Jewish (JJ)	Row	4	6	14	1	63	--	5	6	7
	Col	5	1	3	3	47	--	9	4	--
Mixed J & NJ (MX)	Row	--	--	11	11	--	--	16	63	1
	Col	--	--	--	3	--	--	3	4	--
Non-religious (NR)	Row	--	12	5	--	3	--	80	--	2
	Col	--	1	--	--	1	--	36	--	--
Not Jewish (NJ)	Row	3	14	16	1	6	1	3	57	12
	Col	6	5	5	3	7	25	9	63	--
Column Total		5	32	35	3	10	--	4	11	100

To sum up, the iron law of the "more the more" prevails. The longer Jews have been exposed to Jewish education, the greater their commitment to the community, to some form

of the religion, and to Israel. The relationships among type of school attended, attitudes, and behavior reiterate this conclusion again and again. For all items presented above, those who went to day school were much more likely to give the most intensely Jewish responses than respondents who attended part-time/afternoon school. The latter in turn exhibited a higher degree of Jewish commitment than interviewees whose education was limited to Sunday school. It is impossible, however, to conclude from the separate bivariate analyses presented so far that a Jewish learning experience is the most important causal factor in the processes. Obviously, the religious education a young person receives reflects his or her family values and the character of the community within which he or she lives. Such background factors undoubtedly influence him or her as much or more than what goes on in the classroom. But these variables are interactive, mutually supportive or negating. Clearly, the better (whatever that means) and more intense their training, the more likely Jews are to continue in the faith and community. The next section utilizes multivariate regression to clarify and support the contingency table analysis in the preceding parts of the paper. Using statistical controls, this approach allows us, on the one hand, to evaluate and compare the different determinants of Jewish education for adult respondents and, on the other, to consider Jewish training as a single independent variable within a larger model of the causes of adult behaviors and attitudes. Basically, it involves holding all variables constant, so that the factors which might have an impact, other than those being tested, are eliminated.



### Multivariate Analysis of the Adult Respondents

This section seeks to confirm and further specify the analysis of the determinants and consequences of formal Jewish education. The first part deals with the factors that determine the type and duration of Jewish schooling a respondent receives. Since the purpose is to derive the determinants of enrolling in Jewish educational programs, the factors or covariates logically must be causally prior to the outcome. The second half studies the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of receiving a religious education as measured by a composite Jewish Identity Index.

### Data and Variables

The first series of regressions utilizes five different measures of Jewish education as dependent variables: 1) years of formal Jewish training not controlling for the type of education, 2) years of day school, 3) of part-time school, 4) of Sunday school, and 5) of private tutoring. The independent variables for each of these models include denomination (if any) in which the respondent was raised (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or Secular), generational background (a four point scale described above), gender (male=1, female=0), age, intermarriage of respondent's parents (both parents Jewish=1, mother Jewish=2, father Jewish=3, both non-Jewish=4)<sup>11</sup>, and region born (Northeast=1, Midwest=2, West=3, South=4). A variable for respondents who converted to Judaism is added to the final model for private tutoring since adult converts secure this type of education.

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<sup>11</sup> The last category (no parents Jewish) is very small, containing only respondents who have converted into the faith.

The second series of multiple regressions uses as a dependent variable a scale of Jewish identity composed of 18 factors: adult Jewish education, synagogue membership, subscription to a Jewish newspaper, giving to Jewish causes, volunteering to Jewish causes, membership in Jewish organizations, lighting Shabbat candles, Seder, keeping Kosher, having separate dishes, observing Hanukah, Purim, and Yom Kippur, handling money, Jewish friends, celebrating Israel's Independence Day, giving Jewish education to children, and intermarriage. All factors were transformed into dummy variables and the scale was computed ranging from 1-18. Like the first section, the independent variables include denominational and generational background as well as gender and age. Other variables are: level of secular education achievement (number of years completed), synagogue attendance (scaled 1-9 with 1 representing "a few times a week"), number of trips to Israel (1-3), region born, and income. Five models are generated to observe the different effects of day, part-time, and Sunday school training as well as private tutoring on Jewish Identity.

### Hypotheses

The contingency table analysis in the preceding sections has laid out in detail the expectations for the multiple regressions. For the determinants of Jewish education, denominational background should demonstrate a strong relationship with propensity to seek a Jewish education. More specifically, being Orthodox is expected to be an important factor in increasing the number of years of Jewish training, particularly day school. Conservative and Reform should demonstrate similar but weaker patterns, while being raised in a Secular family should show a negative relationship. All measures of assimilation -- intermarriage of

a respondent's parents, generational distance from the old country, and age (i.e., younger Jews) -- should relate negatively to education. In addition, generational background and age should demonstrate curvilinear trends, as suggested in the above bivariate analysis. Gender (being male) is expected to show a positive relationship. Finally, a conversion background should significantly increase the likelihood of having private tutoring.

For the consequences of Jewish education on Jewish identity, we are primarily interested in the hypothesis that training has a positive relationship to identity and that the type of schooling matters (day school having the greatest impact on identity, followed by part-time, and then Sunday school and tutoring). Denomination is again expected to be an important variable in determining Jewish identity. Generation, gender (being male), secular education, and income are expected to produce negative correlations with Jewish identity. With the exception of gender, all of these are indicators of assimilation. This expectation with regard to gender is informed by the larger American pattern of females demonstrating higher levels of religious commitment than males. Age, synagogue attendance, and trips to Israel should show a positive relationship, while region born is expected to be negatively related.

### Methods

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with dummy variables was used to analyze the data. Forced entry multiple regressions were run with independent variables entered according to their order of relationships expressed in the zero-order correlations with the dependent variable.



The following equation was used to estimate all the models:

$$(1) \quad Y_i = \beta_0 + \gamma_1 D_1 + \beta_1 X_{1i} \dots + \gamma_k D_{ki} + \beta_k X_{ki} + e_i$$

where  $Y_i$  is a numerical dependent variable observation,  $X_{1i}$  and  $X_{ki}$  are fixed independent variable scores and the  $D_{ki}$  are dummy variable regressors. I will comment on the nonlinear forms of the age and generation variables below. Both tables report beta-weights or standardized partial regression coefficients for:

$$(2) \quad \beta_k^* = \beta_k (\delta_x / \delta_y)$$

where  $\beta_k^*$  is interpreted as the expected change in  $Y$ , in standard deviation units, for a one-standard deviation in increment  $X_k$ , holding constant the other independent variables.

Lastly, the  $e_i$  is an error random variable with the same properties as the error in a simple bivariate regression. Errors are assumed to be normally and independently distributed with zero expectations and common variance,  $\delta^2$ .

### Results: Determinants

Confirming the earlier contingency tables, denomination raised played a significant role in explaining both duration and type of formal Jewish education received. Gender also had a consistent impact on the dependent variable. Most important, however, was the extent to which respondents came from fully Jewish families, i.e., whether they were raised in intermarried households. The results from Models [1] through [5] are presented in Table 23.

In Model [1], where type of schooling has not been controlled for, being Orthodox explains greater variation in the dependent variable, with a standardized coefficient of .18, than being Conservative or Reform (.07 and .03). Controlling for the type of education, different denominations predictably impact the propensity to obtain different forms of education. For Model [2], being Orthodox has a strong positive relationship with years of day school, while being Conservative or Reform shows the reverse relationship. With a beta weight of .18, being Conservative is a strong predictor of part-time school attendance, relative to the other denomination variables. In Model [4], Reform demonstrates a large positive relationship with years of Sunday school. Finally, a secular orientation is negatively related to all types of Jewish education. These results are not surprising -- Orthodox secure the most intensive form of training while Conservative, Reform, and Secular Jews tend to enroll in progressively less rigorous types of education.

The most powerful factor affecting the dependent variable in virtually every model is intermarriage. In Models [1] through [4], the intermarriage variable has betas of -.49, -.48, -.58, and -.41 respectively. Clearly, a cohesive Jewish family unit is vital in increasing the probability that a respondent secures some form of religious training.

Gender also demonstrates a clear and consistent relationship with religious education generally. Positive and substantively large betas in each model support the earlier bivariate analysis which indicated that men are more likely than women to secure training. However, this pattern holds mainly for the more intensive forms of education (day school and part-time), while the gender gap is less apparent in the case of Sunday school enrollment.

Bivariate analyses of the age and generation variables indicated possible curvilinear relationships. This hypothesis was born out for age, but not generation. Consequently, the regression results reflect age transformed by the general parabolic curve --

$$3) \quad \beta_{age} X_{age}^{1/b}$$

Contrary to expectations, age negatively impacted the likelihood of receiving Jewish education in Models [1], [2], and [3], while this variable had a substantively insignificant beta of .00 in the Sunday school model. Interpretation of these results is difficult. For our purposes, we leave the effect of age on education an open question, only noting that all of the beta weights are small-medium in magnitude and that none achieve statistical significance at  $p < .05$ .

The original hypothesis regarding generation was neither clearly confirmed or disconfirmed by the results. Generation demonstrated the expected negative relationship in Models [1] and [2], with standardized coefficients of -.01 and -.23 respectively. However, the direction of the relationship changes when predicting years of part-time education and Sunday school. This is understandable since increasing generational distance from the old world would tend to decrease the propensity of Jews to seek the most intensive form of religious training (day school) while increasing, in a relative sense, the likelihood of obtaining less rigorous forms (part-time and Sunday school).

The region variable also had an ambiguous effect on the duration of different forms of Jewish training. The hypothesis regarding the importance of being born in regions of more heavily concentrated Jewish populations and institutions was not supported by the regression



results. Region demonstrated a substantial beta weight of .22 in the Sunday school model, yet it had a negligible effect on the number of years of day school and part-time training, indicating the region is a fairly unimportant variable in determining duration of the more intensive types of education. The large and statistically significant coefficient for Model [4] may reflect the propensity of Jews living outside of traditionally Jewish regions to obtain the least rigorous of the forms of Jewish education. Part of the problem would seem to lie in the variable itself. The NJPS asked respondents in what region they were born, but, taking into account patterns of mobility, respondents' answers might not have been reflective of the region in which they spent their school years. The region variable is also difficult to interpret because its status as an ordinal variable is uncertain. That is, it is not clear what it means to "increase" from Northeast (=1) to Midwest (=2) in terms of rank order.

The final model in Table 23 produces clear and predictable conclusions. Having converted to Judaism best explains how much time was spent with a private tutor. Being raised in any denomination has a consistent and strong negative effect on the likelihood of receiving this type of education.

Finally, it should be noted that once the type of education had been controlled for, the fit of the models improved. Model [1] had a total variance explained of .29. The  $R^2$  jumped to .55 once Model [2] controlled for day school graduates and dropped to .40 and .34 for part-time and Sunday school graduates respectively.

### Consequences and Jewish Identity

Table 24 presents the five models used to analyze the consequences of formal Jewish education. Model [1] confirms that duration is one of the better predictors of Jewish identity. However, though the effect of Jewish education is strong and significant when controlling for other covariates, synagogue attendance and visits to the Jewish homeland are stronger correlates of Jewish identity.<sup>12</sup> The more frequently the respondent attends the synagogue and visits the Jewish state, the higher the Jewish Identity score.

Controlling for type of schooling, Model [2] shows that respondents' time spent in day school has the most significant effect on Jewish identity of all the model's variables. This is confirmed by the magnitude of the standardized score at .52. As reported in Models [3] and [4], duration of part-time and Sunday school education have a smaller effect on Jewish identity with betas of .13 and .09. In short, Jewish education programs that require a greater time commitment have greater impact on Jewish identity after controlling for other important covariates. The difference between attending day school and enrolling in any other type of training is considerable.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> The findings regarding synagogue attendance and visits to Israel are unsurprising, but one should be wary of their role in this analysis. In modelling the determinants of Jewish identity, there are numerous variables which can be used as either independent variables or components of the dependent variable. That is, one could plausibly reason that attendance and visits to the homeland are indicators of the construct Jewish identity. This, in part, explains the magnitude and statistical significance of these two factors when they are defined as independent variables.

<sup>13</sup> A statistical note is needed here. This paper examines the determinants of Jewish education and then utilizes education as an independent variable in a model of Jewish identity. A complication arises because a number of the same independent variables (such as denomination, gender, generation, age, and region) are included in both regressions. Since the first regression shows correlations between these variables and religious training, when using training as a variable in the second regression, it contains the explanatory power not only of itself but also of those variables (denomination, gender, etc.). In a sense, then, those variables are given additional weight in the second regression in the guise of the Jewish education variable. This is a problem, but it is one inherent in the slippery nature of the subject matter, i.e., ethnic or religious identity.



Interpretation of the other independent variables is fairly straightforward, although a few interesting results appeared. Denominational differences, not unexpectedly, reveal themselves in different levels of Jewish identity. In all of the models (with the exception of Model [2]), being Orthodox has a greater positive effect on identity than being Conservative or Reform. It is notable that a Secular background does not significantly impact a respondent's identity in a negative fashion; this variable demonstrates a similar relationship with the dependent variable as did being Conservative or Reform. Thus, denominational differences, though manifest, are not as important determinants of Jewishness as one might expect.

The factors and mechanisms that form women's Jewish identity vary considerably from those for Jewish men. Despite women's lower Jewish educational attainment, they are more likely to have higher Jewish identity scores than men. Models [1] through [4] show statistically significant positive relationships between being female and Jewish identity.<sup>14</sup> As hypothesized, the mechanisms by which Jewish women consolidate their ethnic and religious identities are clearly different from those for men. The results correspond to what we know about religion in America, that generally, women participate more than men.

Expectations regarding generational background, age, and region are generally born out by the models -- assimilation and living outside of the "Jewish regions" of America contribute to lessened religious identity. On the other hand, indicators of economic and educational success demonstrate interesting and unexpected patterns. When controlling for other factors, increasing secular education levels have a negligible effect on identity. This is

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<sup>14</sup> The coefficients are negative of course because male is numerically defined as 1, female as 0.



a consistent result common to every model, indicating that the universalizing environment of academia neither positively nor negatively impacts the Jewishness of respondents. The income variable, on the other hand, was positively related to identity, contrary to the initial hypothesis. According to these results, measures of socioeconomic success and assimilation - such as greater wealth and higher educational attainment -- do not correlate with a weakening of individual identity. This indicates that assimilation is an important but complex process with multi-faceted (i.e., not wholly negative) ramifications for the community.

### Conclusion

The determinants and consequences of Jewish education for adults are extremely consistent and logical. The duration of enrollment in Jewish educational programs and the type of education experienced is largely a function of intermarriage, denomination raised, including ethnic-secular, as well as gender. In the analysis of Jewish identity, religious training plays a significant role in determining levels of Jewishness, while behavior such as synagogue attendance and trips to the Jewish state are also positive correlates. Gender is also an important variable. With a few exceptions, the multivariate regressions support and clarify the basic conclusions of the contingency table analysis.

**Table 23: Regression Analysis of Formal Jewish Education Determinants**  
**Dependent Variable: No. of Years of Formal Jewish Education**

Variables	<u>Model 1</u> Years of Formal Jewish Education Not Controlling for Type of Education	<u>Model 2</u> No. of Years of Day School as Formal Jewish Education	<u>Model 3</u> No. of Years of Part-Time Formal Education	<u>Model 4</u> No. of Years of Sunday School	<u>Model 5</u> No. of Years of Private Tutoring
Orthodox	.18*	.35**	.05	.04	-.18
Conservative	.07	-.19	.18	.14	-.25
Reform	.03	-.25	-.05	.41*	-.29
Secular	-.12	-.11	-.18	-.09	-.28
Gender	.08	.21**	.18**	.03	.05
Generation	-.01	-.23*	.14*	.06	.11
Age	-.06	-.11	-.03	.00	.07
Intermarriage of Parents	-.49***	-.48***	-.58***	-.41***	.04
Region Born	.15**	.00	.02	.22**	.19*
Converted	-	-	-	-	.24*
Constant	4.11***	5.1***	2.4*	.5	-.15
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.29	.55	.40	.34	.04

Reported results are standardized coefficients.  $P < .0001$  \*\*\*,  $P < .005$  \*\*,  $P < .05$  \*.

Table 24: Regression Analysis of Formal Jewish Education Consequences.  
Dependent Variables: Jewish Identity Index

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Orthodox	.08*	.00	.09*	.09*	.12*
Conservative	.06	.20**	.04	.05	.11
Reform	.02	.13*	.03	.00	.08
Secular	.04	.15*	.05	.03	.03
Gender	-.07***	-.17***	-.09***	-.06*	-.07
Generation	-.05*	.03	-.07*	-.06	-.07
Age	.02	.05	.02	.02	.01
Jewish Education Of Any Type	.10***	-	-	-	-
Day School	-	.52***	-	-	-
Part-Time	-	-	.13***	-	-
Sunday School	-	-	-	.09*	-
Private Tutor	-	-	-	-	.17***
Secular Education	.00	.05	-.01	.00	.00
Synagogue Attendance	.64***	.49***	.63***	.65***	.63***
Trips to Israel	.16***	-.05	.15***	.17***	.17***
Income	.10***	.11***	.10***	.10**	.08*
Region Born	-.03	.03	-.01	-.04	-.06
Constant	-.80	-2.6*	-.05	-.10	.17
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.63	.67	.63	.62	.64

The dependent variable remains the same for all four models: the Jewish identity index. Reported results are standardized coefficients.  $P < .0001$ \*\*\*,  $P < .005$ \*\*,  $P < .05$ \*,

### The Education of the Young

The 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, like the U.S. Census, inquired about children, thus permitting an analysis of the next generation's actual and planned exposure to Jewish learning. The survey included 1241 children in 801 households. This sample comprises both school-age (ages 6 through 17) and younger offspring (ages 0 through 5). The question dealing with Jewish education for the under 18 population differs from those for adults reported in the previous sections in that the former inquired whether the children had



received formal Jewish education in the past year, while adult respondents were asked whether they had ever received formal Jewish education. Similar categories were used for the type of education, i.e., day schools, Sunday schools, etc. Parents who did not report offspring enrollment were then queried as to whether they expected to register their children in the future. As Table 25 indicates, one-fifth of the children were enrolled in school, while almost another quarter, 23 percent, largely those under six, were expected to go sometime in the future. Over two-fifths, 44 percent, of all youth in Jewish households were not attending Jewish classes and were not expected to do so in the future. The future status of the remaining 12 percent is unclear. The proportion of parents who anticipate enrolling their children (identified as less than six years-old) is less than half, 40 percent, a troubling statistic for the community. Thirty-five percent said they would not send the children to Jewish schools, while the rest, 24 percent, were uncertain (Table 27).

Table 25: Children's Enrollment Status in Formal Jewish Education in the Past Year (Percent)	
Enrolled in past year	21
Not enrolled in past year, yet expect to enroll in future	23
Not enrolled in past year, and will not enroll in future	44
Do not know	12

The children participating in Jewish training (one-fifth of the total) were fairly evenly divided as to the type of education they were receiving. Of those enrolled, 29 percent were in day school while 35 and 28 percent attended part-time and Sunday school respectively. 8 percent had a private tutor.

Table 26: Children 6-18 Enrollment Status in the Past Year by Type of Education (Percent)	
Day School	29
Part-Time	35
Sunday School	28
Private Tutoring	8

The age of the older children did not markedly differentiate attendance in the past year. Given the emphasis on being confirmed at age 13, the natural expectation is that enrollment peaks at ages 12-13. It does in fact do so, but not to the degree expected.

Almost half, 47 percent, of the former are receiving some sort of Jewish education. This is five percent more than among both the 11 year old group and the 13 year old cohort.

Overall, the variations among those between six and 13 years of age are not striking. They do not increase steadily among older cohorts. As expected, however, they do go down sharply for those 14 and older.

Table 27: Children's Ages by Formal Jewish Education Enrollment in the Past Year for Those 6 through 17 Years Old (Row Percent)					
	Attended In Past Year	Expect to Enroll, Yet Did Not Attend	Did Not and Will Not Attend	Do Not Know	Row Total
6 years	35	26	32	7	10
7 years	38	21	35	6	11
8 years	45	10	37	7	10
9 years	39	13	38	9	10
10 years	37	14	48	2	9
11 years	38	4	55	4	9
12 years	47	9	39	5	7
13 years	38	5	55	2	8
14 years	25	6	68	1	7
15 years	23	9	67	1	6
16 years	15	4	81	--	7
17 years	20	4	76	--	7
Column Total	34	11	50	4	100

What is perhaps most striking is that at every age a majority of young people are not obtaining any form of Jewish training (Table 27). Two-thirds of all those school age, 66 percent, were not enrolled in 1990. And among those past the Bar/Bat Mitzvah age, around three-quarters are outside the educational system. These totals represent a decline, since "approximately 40 percent...were enrolled...in 1978/79."<sup>15</sup>

Parents' expectation to register children who are under 6 years of age in Jewish education declines with increasing age of the children. Anticipation is highest for infants and lowest for those 5 through 6 years of age. This pattern is understandable since parents' plans for their children's education are relatively unrealistic when offspring are younger. The

<sup>15</sup> Waxman, *America's Jews in Transition*, p. 187.



prospects for securing a Jewish education either solidify or weaken as children get closer to being enrolled in a particular type of education.

<b>Table 28: Parents' Intentions for Formal Jewish Education Enrollment Intentions for Children under 6 Years of Age (Percent)</b>				
<b>Children's Ages</b>	<b>Expect to Enroll</b>	<b>Will Not Enroll</b>	<b>Do Not Know</b>	<b>Row Total</b>
Under 1 year	50	30	20	17
1 year	45	37	18	18
2 years	46	40	14	17
3 years	41	31	27	15
4 years	35	32	32	17
5 years	23	41	36	16
<b>Column Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>100</b>

The major factors associated with children's actual or planned attendance are, as expected, the same as the correlates of parental education. Family educational background, denomination, Jewish identity, and intermarriage, are strongly associated with whether children secure or will be receiving Jewish religious training.

Thus, when both parents have had some formal Jewish education, 58 percent have enrolled or expect to enroll at least one child. The percentage of actual or planned attendance for children from families in which only one parent is Jewishly educated drops off to 32 percent. The proportions for the two groups who actually were attending when the interview occurred were 23 and 9 percent. And only four percent of the households in which neither parent has a Jewish education reported enrolling at least one child, while another 14 percent said they expect their children to attend. The differences are similar among single-

parent households. Two-fifths, 42 percent, of the households in which the parent is Jewishly trained, had at least one child enrolled or expected to do so. This is in contrast to the 11 percent of households in which the single parent had not received a Jewish education.

Table 29: Parents Jewish Education Background by Their Intention to Enroll their Children in, and Actual Attendance by their Children in Formal Jewish Education (Percent)						
Parents' Educational Status		Attended in Past Year	Expect to Enroll, Yet Did Not Attend	Did Not and Will Not Attend	Do Not Know	Row Subtotal
Households with both parents						
Yes-Yes	Row	23	35	23	19	29
	Column	57	41	14	33	
Yes-No	Row	9	23	50	17	46
	Column	33	42	46	46	
No-No	Row	4	14	70	12	27
	Column	10	15	40	21	
Column Subtotal		12	24	48	16	100
Single Parent Household						
Yes	Row	18	24	50	10	40
	Column	60	83	30	30	
No	Row	8	3	73	15	60
	Column	40	17	70	70	
Column Subtotal		12	12	63	13	100

As hypothesized, the depth of parental Jewish education has a strong effect on the probabilities that children will receive Jewish training also. The more years a respondent has spent in Jewish institutions, the more likely it is that s/he will enroll his/her children in school. A less powerful relationship exists between type of education a parent had and that which his/her children are securing. Thus, as noted in Table 30, of those children in day



school at the time of the NJPS, 43 percent had parents with a similar background. And of children enrolled in part-time/afternoon classes, 49 percent had a parent with a comparable experience. Thirty percent of the Sunday schoolers had a parent who went there as well. But of the children with a private tutor (an idiosyncratic form), eight percent had a parent with the same background.

Table 30: Respondent's Type of Formal Jewish Education by Children's Type of Formal Jewish Education in the Past Year (For Children 6 through 17)				
Respondent's Type of Formal Jewish Education	Children's Type of Jewish Education in Past Year (percent)			
	Day School	Part-time	Sunday School	Private Tutor
Day School	43	11	4	50.5
Part-time	23	49	26	21
Sunday School	13.5	14	30	2
Private	21	10	8	8
None	--	15.5	32	18
Total	7	24	26	12

The denominational background of the children's household is obviously a major determinant. As noted in Table 31, a large majority of the scions of the Orthodox, 61 percent, had their children attend school during the past year while another fifth, 20 percent, expected to enroll their children. The proportions of young people among those of Conservative and Reform backgrounds who attended school were nearly identical, 31 to 32 percent. Reform supporters, however, were insignificantly less likely than Conservatives to say that their youth will not attend in the future. Around two-thirds of ethnic-secular Jewish



families said that their children do not receive any Jewish education and are not foreseen to secure any in the future.

Table 31: Denomination of Children's Households by Children's Enrollment in Formal Jewish Education in the Past Year (Percent)					
	Attended in Past Year	Expect to Enroll, Yet Did Not Attend	Did Not and Will Not Attend	Do Not Know	Row Total
Orthodox	61	20	4	15	6
Conservative	31	31	29	9	20
Reform	32	34	27	11	27
Mixed Jewish	37	19	41	7	3
Ethnic-Secular Jew	11	20	62	6	12
Jewish & Other (mostly ethnic-secular)	3	13	68	16	31
Column Total	22	23	43	12	100

The effects of intermarriage and conversions out of Judaism may be seen in Table 32. Only four percent of the mixed households enrolled at least one child in Jewish schools in which the only Jewish parent is also identified denominationally. When the parent is ethnic-secular, only two percent did so. In fully Jewish households in which both parents are ethnic-seculars, no children were enrolled. Conversely, for those who did not and will not register their children, the figures are 24 percent for households with two religious Jews, 53 percent for the intermarried households with one religiously identified member, 66 percent for the Jewishly "mixed," religious and ethnic-secular households, 78 percent for households where the Jew in a mixed marriage is ethnic-secular, and 78 percent for households where both are ethnic-seculars.

Table 32: Religious Background of Parents for Children under Age 18 by Children's Attendance in Formal Jewish Education in the Past Year (Percent)						
		Attended in Past Year	Expect to Enroll, yet Did Not Attend	Did Not and Will Not Attend	Do Not Know	Row Subtotal
Households with Both Parents						
Both Denominationally Jewish	Row	26	35	24	16	39
	Column	86	57	19	38	
Denominationally and Ethnic-secularly Jewish	Row	--	18	66	16	5
	Column	--	4	6	4	
Denominationally Jewish and Non-Jewish	Row	4	22	53	21	33
	Column	11	30	37	43	
Both Ethnic-secularly Jewish	Row	--	14	78	8	4
	Column	--	3	7	2	
Ethnic-secularly Jewish and Non-Jewish	Row	2	9	78	11	18
	Column	3	7	30	12	
Column Subtotal		12	24	48	16	100
Single Parent Households						
Denominationally Jewish	Row	22	15	50	14	65
	Column	100	91	50	80	
Ethnic-secularly Jewish	Row	--	3	91	6	35
	Column	--	9	50	20	
Column Subtotal		14	11	64	11	100

Table 33: Religious Composition of Parents for Children between Age 6 through 13 Years by Children's Attendance in Formal Jewish Education in the Past Year (Percent)						
		Attended in Past Year	Expect to Enroll, Yet Did Not Attend	Did Not and Will Not Attend	Do Not Know	Row Subtotal
<b>Household with both Parents</b>						
Both Denominationally Jewish	Row	37	25	22	16	44
	Column	86	53	20	65	
Denominationally and Ethnic-secularly Jewish	Row	--	16	81	4	6
	Column	--	4	10	2	
Denominationally Jewish and Non-Jewish	Row	7	24	60	9	28
	Column	10	32	34	24	
Both are Ethnic-secularly Jewish	Row	--	5	85	11	4
	Column	--	1	7	4	
Ethnic-secularly Jewish and Non-Jewish	Row	4	11	82	2	17
	Column	3	9	29	4	
Column Subtotal		19	21	49	11	100
<b>Single Parent Households</b>						
Denominationally Jewish	Row	37	7	45	11	71
	Column	100	100	55	74	
Ethnic-secularly Jewish	Row	--	--	91	9	29
	Column	--	--	45	26	
Column Subtotal		26	5	59	10	100

Similar results were obtained in a smaller, earlier study among American Jews conducted in 1989 by the Israel Gallup poll for the Mandel Commission. Since the questions and sampling procedures for the Gallup poll vary from the NJPS, the findings are not directly comparable. Still, it may be noted that this study reported that 80 percent of the children with two Jewish parents had, at some point, attended day or supplementary schools (the only two choices offered), as compared to 22 percent of offspring of religiously mixed marriages.



The NJPS findings are particularly striking. Attendance is, by far, the greatest when both parents are denominationally identified. Among children aged 6 through 13, the proportion who attend or are expected to do so rises to 62 percent as reported in Table 33. They are also relatively high, 44 percent, for single parent households which are so identified. For intermarried families in which the Jewish parent is religiously linked, the proportion falls to seven percent enrolled, and to 24 percent who expect to do so. The estimates decline much further for mixed marriages involving an ethnic-secular Jew. Four percent of those parents have their children enrolled and 11 percent expect to do so. The situation is not better when one parent's identity is religious and the other is ethnic-secular. None of them had their children enrolled and only 16 percent planned to do so. Having two ethnic-secular Jewish parents produces a worse outcome in terms of enrollments than does intermarriage between a denominational Jew and a non-Jew. None of the children of the former are enrolled in Jewish education. Single parent religiously identified households are more likely to educate their offspring in the Jewish tradition than all other combinations of family backgrounds except when both parents are denominationally-linked.

Table 34: Religious Composition of Parents for Children between Age 14 through 17 Years by Children's Attendance in Formal Jewish Education in the Past Year (Percent)						
		Attended in Past Year	Expect to Enroll, Yet Did Not Attend	Did Not and Will Not Attend	Do Not Know	Row Subtotal
Households with Both Parents						
Both Religious Jews	Row	40	9	48	2	54
	Column	94	75	38	74	
Jew and Ethnic-secular Jew	Row	--	4	89	7	7
	Column	--	4	9	26	
Jew and Non-Jew	Row	5	2	94	--	24
	Column	6	--	33	--	
Both Ethnic-secular Jews	Row	--	--	100	--	4
	Column	--	--	6	--	
Ethnic-secular Jew and Non-Jew	Row	--	12	87	--	11
	Column	--	21	15	--	
Column Subtotal		23	7	69	2	100
Single Parent Households						
Religious Jew	Row	18	5	66	12	56
	Column	100	65	49	82	
Ethnic-secular Jew	Row	--	4	93	3	42
	Column	--	35	51	18	
Column Subtotal		10	4	77	8	100

Other indicators of Jewish commitment produce the same results. The more the parents feel the importance of being a Jew, the more likely the children are to be counted in the ranks of those studying Judaism at present, or are expected to be when they reach school age. Of those who enroll their children, 78 percent think it is "very important," 20 percent "somewhat important", and three percent "not very important." None of those who feel it is not important have registered a child. Conversely, as indicated in Table 35, 87 percent of

those parents who do not and will not enroll a child feel that being Jewish is "not important," compared to less than a quarter, 24 percent, of those who think it "very important."

<b>Table 35: The Importance of Being a Jew by Enrollment of Child in Jewish Education (Percent)</b>				
	Attended in Past Year	Expect to Enroll, Yet Did Not Attend	Did Not and Will Not Attend	Do Not Know
Not Important	-	-	87	13
Not Very Important	2	6	82	10
Somewhat Important	6	29	48	17
Very Important	23	43	24	11
Column Total	11	28	48	13

The relationship between synagogue attendance by adults of a household and a child's enrollment in Jewish education is strong. Only 13 percent of parents who never attend services have children enrolled or expect to send them later (Table 36). For those who participate from one to three times a year, the proportion rises to 31 percent (three percent enrolled and 28 expected to be), while among families who partake more than three times a year, the actual and expected enrollment jumps to 54 percent (23 percent enrolled).

<b>Table 36: Parents Frequencies of Synagogue Attendance by Enrollment of Child in Jewish Education (Percent)</b>				
	Not at All	Less Than Three Times	More Than Three Times	Row Total
Attended in Past Year	2	3	23	13
Expect to Enroll, Yet Did Not Attend	11	28	31	26
Did Not and Will Not Attend	73	50	30	45
Do Not Know	13	20	16	16
Column Total	29	15	56	100



The survey inquired of those parents whose children under 18 are not currently enrolled or are not expected to be enrolled in the future: "What is the major reason you do not expect to enroll [name of child] in a program of formal Jewish education?" Responses were grouped into 11 categories (Table 37). One-tenth, 11 percent, reported a child now in non-Jewish religious education, while slightly fewer, eight, said they are planning to enroll their offspring in the future in non-Jewish schools. Another nine percent did not qualify as candidates because they were too young, too old, or had sufficient education. Over a fifth, 22 percent, of the respondent parents said they were not interested, while another 12 percent thought their child was not interested. Only four percent reported that Jewish education was too expensive for them.

<b>Table 37: Reasons Given for Children Not Being Currently Enrolled (Percent)</b>	
<b>Reason Category</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Too young	4
Too old	1
Has sufficient Jewish education	4
Parents uninterested	22
Child uninterested	12
Schools are too expensive	4
Schools are too far away	4
Schools are poor quality	1
Now in non-Jewish religious education	11
Will enroll in future in non-Jewish schools	8
Other	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Relating the reasons given to indicators of family Jewish identity produces a clearer picture, although the amorphous category of "other," which includes over one-quarter of the responses, confuses the issue. However, the pattern is still fairly consistent with expectation (see Table 38). A tenth, 11 percent, of parents reporting that their child(ren) has sufficient education or is too old to continue are religiously identified Jews married to religiously identified Jews (J-J). The proportion approaches zero for the various categories of ethnic-secular or intermarried families. Why do some children of school age of the religiously identified not attend? The most common response is, by far, lack of interest, either by the parent (26 percent) or by the child (26 percent). Relatively few complain that Jewish schools are too expensive (four percent), too far away (four percent), or of poor quality (one percent). It is interesting to note that ethnic-secular Jews are more likely than the religiously identified to account for non-enrollment by citing cost or distance. The negative import of intermarriage seems again obvious. Close to 30 percent of parents with non-enrolled children explained the failure to give their children a Jewish education by the fact that their offspring were receiving a non-Jewish education, or that they expected to place them in a non-Jewish religious school. This group of parents were also the most disposed to give responses which have been coded as "other" under current religion.

Table 38: Reasons for Non-Involvement in Jewish Education for Children Under 18 Years of Age (Percent)

Parents	Too Young	Too Old to Continue	Have had Sufficient Jewish Education	Parents Not Interested	Child Not Interested	School Too Expensive	School Too Far	Poor Quality School	Now in Non-Jewish Education	Future Non-Jewish Education	Other	Row Total
Households with both parents												
J-J	3	5	6	26	26	4	3	1	0	0	27	21
J-ESJ	--	--	14	18	7	16	13	--	11	0	21	6
ESJ-ESJ	--	--	--	16	8	7	--	--	19	13	36	35
J-NJ	1	--	--	42	20	--	8	--	0	0	29	7
ESJ-NJ	7	--	--	24	3	--	6	3	14	13	30	30
Column Total	4	3	2	22	9	4	4	3	12	9	28	100
Single Parent Household												
J	--	--	--	2	35	19	2	9	0	--	31	44
ESJ	--	--	--	--	71	--	--	--	6	--	22	55
Column Total	--	--	--	40	17	9	1	--	6	--	26	100

## Key:

J = Religiously Identified Jew

ESJ = Ethnic-secular Jew

NJ = Non-Jew



A consistent pattern emerges when parents are differentiated by whether they have had formal Jewish education or not. The main reasons given for the failure to enroll their children by parents who were themselves educated are lack of interest by the child (20 percent) and by the parents (33 percent). Over 90 percent of the non-attendees have one or both parents who did not receive a religious education. Those parents most commonly say that their child is not Jewish or that they (the parents) are not interested in giving their child(ren) a Jewish education.

<b>Table 39: Relationship of Parental Jewish Education by Reason Given for Children Not Being Currently Enrolled (Percent)</b>				
Reason Category	Parent Education			Row Total
	Yes-Yes	Yes-No	No-No	
Too Young	4	1	7	4
Too Old	4	1	0	1
Have Had Sufficient Jewish Education	13	2	4	4
Parents Not Interested	33	16	24	22
Child Not Interested	20	9	12	11
School Too Expensive	0	3	5	4
Schools Too Far	4	5	6	5
Poor Quality Schools	0	3	0	1
Now in Non-Jewish Education	0	18	7	11
Future Non-Jewish Education	2	8	7	7
Other	19	33	26	28
<b>Column Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>100</b>

Asking respondents why they do or do not act in a certain way does not necessarily reveal the "true" reasons for their actions.<sup>16</sup> It is more fruitful to compare indicators of behavior or position which logically may affect the propensity for Jewish education. The survey permits the examination of some possible sources such as the region of the country people are living in, geographic mobility, and family income. Recent relocations have negative effects on enrollment in Jewish educational institutions. The children of the respondents who have moved to another community since 1984 are less likely to attend Jewish schools than those in non-mobile families. Similar to the findings for the parental generation, children living in the West and South are less prone to be enrolled in Jewish education, or, if under six, less likely to be intended for enrollment than those in the Northeast and Midwest. There appears to be a very positive relationship between the Jewishness of the district a family lives in and the enrollment of children in Jewish schools. As indicated in Table 40, 52 percent of the children living in what the respondent described as a very Jewish neighborhood are enrolled or are expected to be; conversely 58, a slightly larger percentage, of those residing in an entirely non-Jewish area are not so registered or are not expected to be in the future. The figure for a "somewhat Jewish" neighborhood is 41 percent and for a "little Jewish" neighborhood 39 percent. This relationship, however, may be an artifact of self-selection. The more Jewish Jews are, the more likely they are to seek to dwell among their fellows, while those with little or no commitments may prefer to reside among Gentiles or are indifferent as to the ethno-religious character of the neighborhood.

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<sup>16</sup> Paul Lazarsfeld, "The Art of Asking Why," *National Marketing Review*, 1 (1935), pp. 32-43, reprinted in Lazarsfeld, *Qualitative Analysis: Historical and Political Essays* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).

Table 40: The Jewish Character of the Neighborhood and Child Enrollment in Jewish Education (Percent)					
Neighborhood	Attended in Past Year	Expect to Enroll, Yet Did Not Attend	Did Not and Will Not Attend	Do Not Know	Row Total
Very Jewish	21	31	24	23	7
Somewhat Jewish	17	24	41	18	22
Little Jewish	13	26	46	14	30
Not Jewish	7	21	58	14	41
Column Total	12	24	48	16	100

Finally, the evidence indicates that, in spite of what the respondents say, economic factors appear to play a role in determining parental behavior with respect to their children's attendance at religious schools. The cost of such an education is rarely given as a reason for not sending children to a Jewish school, but of those who attend, more children come from the higher income levels. Although Jewish identity, conformity to rituals, is stronger among the less affluent than the well-to-do, the latter are more disposed to have their children receive some Jewish education. As indicated in Table 41, more than half, 58 percent, of those with a family income of under \$40,000 a year neither send or expect to send their offspring for Jewish education. Conversely, less than half, 45 percent of those with annual incomes of \$80,000 or more do. There is a linear relationship between income and propensity to send children for religious education.



Table 41: Relationship between Family Income and Attendance at Jewish Schools (Percent)				
Family Income	Are Attending	Expect to Attend	Neither Attend or Expect To	Do Not Know
Under \$40,000	7	21	58	14
\$40 - \$50,000	15	13	52	21
\$50 - \$60,000	12	24	48	16
\$60 - \$80,000	15	27	43	14
\$80,000 +	14	26	45	15

The findings reported point out both the weakness and power of Jewish education. The power is reflected in the finding that those who have received Jewish training are disposed to transmit their heritage through formally educating their children. The weakness refers to the fact that most children in the sample between six and 13 years of age were not exposed to Jewish education during the past year (Table 33). These figures decline sharply for parents with children between 14 and 18 years of age, and, as noted earlier, only 40 percent of parents with children under six state that they have definite expectations to enroll them (Tables 32 and 34). Given the growing rates of intermarriage among young people and the extremely low proportion of the children of mixed marriages who are sent to Jewish schools, the proportions of children of some Jewish parentage who are exposed to such education should be much lower a decade from now.

#### Multivariate Analysis of Youth Respondents

Like the earlier multivariate analyses, this section seeks to confirm and further specify the determinants of formal Jewish education, although, in this case, for youth respondents

only. The methodology for these regression models is identical to that used in examining the data for adult respondents.<sup>17</sup>

### Data and Variables

The regressions utilize five different measures of Jewish education as dependent variables: 1) years of formal Jewish training not controlling for the type of education, 2) years of day school, 3) of part-time school, 4) of Sunday school, and 5) of private tutoring. The independent variables for each of these models include denomination (if any) of the respondent's household (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or Secular), gender (male=1, female=0), synagogue attendance (never=1 to weekly=4), Jewish education of parents (yes=1, no=0), income of household, intermarriage of respondent's parents (both parents Jewish=1, intermarried=2), current region (Northeast=1, Midwest=2, West=3, South=4), Jewishness of respondent's neighborhood (very Jewish=1 to not Jewish=4), and length of residence (always lived at current residence=1 to lived at residence 5 years or less=5).

### Hypotheses

In general, it is expected that the pattern of relationships will be similar to that found for adult respondents, with some exceptions. Denominational background should again demonstrate a strong relationship with propensity to seek religious training, with Orthodox being the most predisposed, Secular the least. Intermarriage, an indicator of assimilation, should be negatively related. The fact of youths' parents having secured a Jewish education

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<sup>17</sup> See pp. 00 for a detailed description.

and greater income of parents are expected to be associated with a longer duration of training. Both of these variables were unavailable in the case of adult respondents and are of particular interest because they provide evidence regarding the generational continuity of religious training and the importance of economic resources in securing training. Specifically, greater resources should be related to greater duration of religious education and having parents who themselves have underwent some training should increase the likelihood of their children being so trained. Living outside of the traditional concentrations of Jewish communities (i.e., the Northeast and, to an extent, the Midwest) should show a negative effect on the duration and type of education. Two new demographic variables have been included in this analysis of the children's data. As suggested in the bivariate tables, increasing geographic mobility (i.e., shorter length of residence) is anticipated to be negatively related to education. This is because frequent moving tends to disrupt educational patterns. Also, respondents who live in neighborhoods which they categorize as very Jewish are likely to secure more religious training than those who live in neighborhoods that are not very Jewish. Finally, gender is expected to show a different relationship from the one exhibited in the adult models. In recent years, the gender gap in Jewish education has been narrowing, with girls increasingly participating in contrast to past patterns.

### Results: Determinants

As with the adult respondents, denomination raised plays a significant role in explaining both duration and type of formal Jewish education received. Most important, however, is the educational history of the parents of the youth respondents. Children of Jews



with formal religious training are much more likely to be enrolled in some type of training themselves. Surprisingly, intermarriage does not reveal a strong negative association with education, as it did in the case of the adults. The complete results from Models [1] through [5] are presented in Table 42.

In Model [1], where type of schooling has not been controlled for, being Orthodox explains considerable variation in the dependent variable, with a standardized coefficient of .16. Contrary to the adult respondents, being Conservative or Reform has virtually no effect on the likelihood of receiving training. Living in a Secular household has an expected negative impact. Controlling for the type of education, different denominations again relate differently to the various types, although the relationships are not as clear and predictable as in the models for the adults. For Model [2], being Conservative or Reform shows a negative relationship (both have betas of  $-.36$ ) with years of day school, as is the case for adults. However, the effect of being raised in an Orthodox household for this most recent generation of Jewish youth is meager. The beta weight of  $.00$  reveals that the strength of this denomination in shaping educational patterns is waning. With a beta weight of  $.06$ , being Conservative is a minor predictor of part-time school attendance, although, relative to the other denomination variables, it is the only one to at least have a positive relationship. In Model [4], years of Sunday school is most strongly influenced by being raised in a Reform household ( $.36$ ), but interestingly, the difference between Conservative and Secular households is minor by this measure. Both have small but positive betas --  $.05$  for Conservative and  $.02$  for Secular. Orthodox, who remain disproportionately enrolled in day school, are negatively disposed to this type of education.

The most powerful factor affecting the dependent variable in virtually every model is the fact of the parents of respondents having undergone some form of religious training in their youth. In Models [1] through [4], the variable for the Jewish education of parents has betas of .56, .68, .66, and .79 respectively. Clearly, a history of formal training is important in increasing the probability that Jewish youth secure their own Jewish education.

As predicted by the bivariate tables, household income is shown to be an important determinant of duration of training, once the type of training has been controlled for. Economic resources are relatively more important in the propensity to secure day school education (.23), the most expensive form of religious training, than in the likelihood of attending part-time school (.11) and, in turn, Sunday school (.02). Also as expected, synagogue attendance reveals a small but consistently positive impact on the duration of education.

One of the most interesting results of this multivariate analysis is the relative insignificance of the intermarriage variable, a factor which played an important role in explaining variance in the education models for adult respondents. In the day school model, intermarriage reveals the expected, substantively large negative relationship with the dependent variable. However, in Models [1], [3], and [4], being raised by religiously mixed parents has either a small negative effect on years of education or no effect at all. This is in contrast to the strong and statistically significant negative relationship borne out in virtually every model for the adult respondents. Relative to older Jews in the NJPS sample, this measure of assimilation appears to be of less significance in negatively affecting the educational enrollment of this recent generation of Jewish youth. One explanation for this



finding concerns the stigma attached to marrying outside of the religion. For older generations, choosing to marry a non-Jew often meant a clear break with the faith and sometimes family as well. Intermarriage for more recent generations has become more accepted, more tolerated. Thus, intermarried couples are still less Jewish in terms of religious identity, but it is now easier for them to remain a part of the community, which includes enrolling their children in less rigorous forms of religious training. A non-Jewish intermarried parent is under less pressure to raise his/her children as Christian than in the past.

The role of gender also illuminates the changing relationship between Jews and education. Whereas in the adult regressions being male increased the likelihood of receiving more years of training, data for the youth respondents show the opposite gender effect. Being a Jewish girl lengthened the duration of training in the day school (-.05) and part time school (-.02) models, while only the Sunday school model demonstrated a minor advantage for boys (.02).

The nature of the NJPS questions for the child respondents allows a detailed examination into the effect of certain geographic and demographic factors, including region, geographic mobility, and the Jewishness of a respondent's neighborhood. Of these three variables, only geographic mobility performed as hypothesized, but the role of all three in determining years of formal education is minor compared to other covariates. As in the adult analysis, the region variable has an ambiguous effect on the duration of different forms of Jewish training. The hypothesis regarding the importance of being born in regions of traditional concentrations of Jewish communities and institutions is not supported by the



regression results, with the notable exception of the day school model. Positive betas in the models for part-time (.00) and Sunday school (.23) models closely resemble the unexpected pattern of the region variable in the adult analysis. As noted, region has the hypothesized negative effect only in the case of determining years of day school attendance, a result which makes logical sense since these institutions require the greater resources, a larger immediate Jewish community to support them than the less intensive forms of education, and are more likely to be Orthodox. And Orthodox Jews are obligated to live within walking distance of a synagogue since they may not ride on Saturday.

The region variable for the multivariate analysis of the youth respondents possesses the same flaws noted above in the multivariate section on the adults. A more precise indicator of the concentration of Jews and Jewish institutions in an area is a respondent's perception of the Jewishness of their particular neighborhood. However, the association revealed by the regression results again disagrees with the initial hypothesis. After controlling for the type of training, living in a less Jewish neighborhood reveals a small but positive association with more years of religious education. From the results of both the youth and adult multivariate analyses, it is clear that living in a particular region represents neither an encouragement or discouragement to secure education. Finally, bivariate analysis indicated the importance of putting down roots in a neighborhood for an extended period of time. And indeed increasing geographic mobility is negatively related to the different types of religious training (with the exception of part-time school), but the relative significance of this variable is marginal.

The final model in Table 23 examines the determinants of the duration of private tutoring for youth respondents. Being raised in any denomination has a consistent and strong negative effect on the likelihood of receiving this type of education. Although, a Secular orientation has a small positive relationship. The strongest relationship is revealed to be the positive impact of the parents of the children having secured some Jewish education, with a large beta of .89. Interestingly, intermarriage is a positive covariate, and indeed Model [5] is the only model in which being raised in a mixed household increases the propensity for formal religious education. Not surprisingly, greater income is associated with more tutoring. The three demographic variables demonstrate interesting relationships with the dependent variable. The less Jewish the neighborhood, the fewer years of private tutoring. This result might be explained by the relative scarcity of such tutors in non-Jewish areas. Living outside of the traditionally Jewish regions in America is strongly and positively related to more years of tutoring. Again, this could be because of the lack of institutions (i.e, synagogues and Jewish schools) in such areas relative to the Northeast, for instance.

Finally, it should be noted that, as in the adults' regressions, once the type of education had been controlled for, the fit of the models for youth respondents improved. Model [1] had a total variance explained of .56. The  $R^2$  rose to .86 once Model [2] controlled for day school graduates and was .70 and .86 for the part-time and Sunday school models respectively.



Table 42: Regression Analysis of Formal Jewish Education Determinants for Youth Respondents Dependent Variable: No. of Years of Formal Jewish Education					
Variables	Model 1 Years of Formal Jewish Education Not Controlling for Type of Education	Model 2 No. of Years of Day School as Formal Jewish Education	Model 3 No. of Years of Part-Time Formal Education	Model 4 No. of Years of Sunday School	Model 5 No. of Years of Private Tutoring
Orthodox	.16***	.00	-.11*	-.09*	-.32***
Conservative	-.02	-.36***	.06	.05	-.32***
Reform	.00	-.36***	-.10	.36***	-.40***
Secular	-.08	-.18***	-.18**	.02	.05
Gender	-.02	-.05*	-.02	.02	.08*
Synagogue Attendance	.16***	.09***	.16***	.05*	-.06*
Jewish Education of Parents	.56***	.68***	.65***	.79***	.89***
Income of Parents	.00	.23***	.11***	.02	.21***
Intermarriage of Parents	-.04	-.37***	.00	-.04	.18***
Jewishness of Neighborhood	-.09*	.06*	.03	.02	-.19***
Current Region	.09**	-.18***	.00	.23***	.33***
Geographic Mobility	-.04	-.06*	.07*	-.06**	.01
Constant	11.55***	26.74***	8.7***	13.14**	9.5***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.56	.86	.70	.86	.80

Reported results are standardized coefficients.  $P < .0001$  \*\*\*,  $P < .005$  \*\*,  $P < .05$  \*.

### The Future: College Students and The Campus

A discussion of educational trends among the Jewish community and particularly its youth would be incomplete without mention of the importance of higher education. Secular education has complex consequences for Jewish identity and continuity. On the one hand, higher levels of education correlate positively with Jewish training. Yet, as I will argue, the



two types of learning environments have opposite effects on one's Jewishness. However, even though higher education should logically weaken commitment to the community through its emphasis on universalistic values, the geographic concentration of young Jews in higher learning institutions presents an opportunity for young Jews to meet and for organizations such as Hillel to reach students at the same time as the university environment weakens their particularistic religious norms.

The linkage of Jewish to secular education is linear. That is, the more Jewish learning a person has received, the more likely s/he is to have an extended higher education. The lowest level of Jewish attendance is among those who have not completed high school. Only 51 percent of them have had any Jewish education. Conversely, 74 percent of all college graduates without post-graduate work, and 80 percent of those who have some, or have completed, graduate education, have had some Jewish training. The relationship is more consistent for women than for men.

<b>Table 43: Secular Education and Attendance at Jewish Education by Gender (Percent)</b>			
	Men	Women	Total
Some High School - High School Graduate	61	41	51
Some College	81	56	68
College Graduate	84	65	74
Graduate School	87	73	80

Not surprisingly, the relationship between Jewish and secular education is similar when attained degrees are considered. Four-fifths of those with graduate degrees have had some Jewish training as compared to 51 percent for those whose only diploma is from high

school. Those with the least secular attainments (less than grade 12) report the highest population of day school attenders, 11 percent, probably reflecting the behavior of some Orthodox. But there is no relationship between the two forms of education for the rest of the respondents, differentiated by extent of secular education from high school onward. The proportions going to day school are roughly the same for all groups from those with a high school diploma to persons with post-graduate training. Attendance at afternoon classes, however, increases steadily with secular education, moving up from 21 percent among those with high school diplomas to 39 percent among those with a bachelor's degree, and 47 percent for persons who went on to post-graduate work. Sunday school peaks among college graduates at 24 percent, but drops off to 21 percent among those who attended graduate school.

Ironically, Jewish education achievements may be a major source of the long-term trends that are undermining Jewish continuity. As noted, attendance at higher educational institutions is commonplace among young people. According to the Population Survey, more than five-sixths, 87 percent, of religiously identified Jews who are 18 to 24 years of age have been to college. College attendance rates for Jews have remained constant since the 1970 NJPS.<sup>18</sup> For all Jews, religious or secular, it is the same. But as is well known, higher education, particularly in the leading liberal arts colleges and research universities where Jews tend to be disproportionately represented, is the most universalistic institution in the country with respect to attitudes toward ethnic particularism and religious identification and practice. A basic belief in this environment is that students should not "discriminate"

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<sup>18</sup> Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry," p. 111.



according to religious and/or ethnic criteria with respect to dating and mating. This norm is strongest among the more politically liberal segment of the population, one which disproportionately includes Jews. It may be hypothesized, and perhaps even assumed, therefore, that a major source of the extremely high rate of intermarriage is the pattern of attendance by Jews at colleges and universities. Education makes for higher income and status, more culture, and greater influence, but it is also associated ultimately with lesser involvement in the Jewish community, although low income may be an even greater barrier to participation.

The college students exhibit a low resistance to intermarriage. Less than a quarter, 22 percent indicate that they would oppose or strongly oppose a child of theirs marrying a non-Jew (7 percent strongly), while 62 percent would support or strongly support such an action (17 percent strongly). The remaining 15 percent say that they would "accept" intermarriage. Not surprisingly, the proportions accepting or supporting intermarriage increase when the question is posed in terms of a spouse who converts to Judaism. Although these figures are discouraging, they are similar to the response patterns of all Jewish adults with regard to opposition to intermarriage, 16 percent. The whole sample, however, exhibits much less support, 33 percent, than the students' 62 percent.

<b>Table 44: Attitudes of College Students to Intermarriage (Percent)</b>		
	<b>If a Child Considers Marrying a Non-Jew</b>	<b>If the Potential Spouse Will Convert</b>
<b>Strongly Support</b>	17	39
<b>Support</b>	45	12
<b>Accept</b>	15	38



Oppose	15	10
Strongly Oppose	7	--
Do Not Know	--	--

Yet, as indicated in the multivariate analysis, "increasing secular education levels have a negligible effect on identity," (p. 44). These findings conflict with the frequently voiced impression and logical deduction that secularly educated Jewish youth are less attached to Jewishness or to Israel than their elders. The evidence and logic are clearly contradictory. Since the Population Survey only included 88 students in its sample, 73 undergraduates and 15 graduates, it is impossible to seek to resolve the contradictions through further analysis. Hopefully these questions will be dealt with by future researchers.

On the positive side, three-quarters of students interviewed in the Population Survey reported a denominational affiliation: 31 percent Conservative, 36 percent Reform, and eight percent Orthodox. The proportion identified, however, is 13 percent lower than that of their parental families, from 88 percent to 75. Or conversely, one-fourth of the students are secular compared to 11 percent of their parents. Slightly over half, 53 percent, had no Jewish education, compared to 64 percent among those over 25 who had been to college. In terms of gender, this breaks down to 73 percent for males and 59 for females for all Jews who have been to college. Men were less likely to have had a confirmation ceremony, 42 percent, than women, 58 percent. The best indication of continued Jewish religiosity is that close to half of the students, 42 percent, said they fast on Yom Kippur. Thirty-six percent said that they have personally belonged to a synagogue. None believe that the "Bible is the actual word of God," while four percent refrain from handling money on the Sabbath.

Table 45: Denomination of Students and Parents		
	Students	Parents
Orthodox	8	10
Conservative	31	41
Reform	36	37
Secular	25	11

The campus is particularly important for the Jewish community. It is easier to reach Jews in the university environment to make them aware of the Jewish message, existence, and activities, than to find the unaffiliated anywhere else. Campus organizations can do this more easily than other organizations dealing with the general population. Students can be written to, personally contacted, leafletted, and the like. Hence, even the completely secular who have never partaken of any formal activity -- educational or other -- will hear about Hillel or other Jewish groups. For the great majority, to take part in them or to attend services is physically easier than it has ever been before they came to college or ever will be after they leave.

Therefore, Hillel and other Jewish campus organizations are potentially one of the most important forces for Jewish continuity. Yet the findings of this study indicate that they have only been effective for a small minority, that most students are not deeply involved in Jewish activities, and that on average, they are less committed than their parents. Only 21 percent of the 88 students in the Population Survey reported that they had taken part in any Jewish educational program during the past year. A more limited survey conducted by Israel Gallup in 1989 sampled identified American Jews and found that 21 percent of college aged



children took part in Hillel programs, while an overlapping 15 percent belonged to other Jewish student groups. Twenty-two percent of those interviewed reported belonging to at least one Jewish organization. Less than one in ten, eight percent, volunteered during the past 12 months for a Jewish organization.

### Conclusion

Concern over the state of religious education and its relationship to the continuity of the community is not a new phenomenon. Jewish immigrants of the nineteenth century were unable to replicate the extensive system of religious schools that existed in Europe. Referring to the Northeast in particular, Glazer writes: "The established American Jewish community offered no model for Jewish education. Following the collapse of the synagogue schools of the 1850s under competition from the public schools, the established synagogues of New York had limited themselves to Sunday or Sabbath schools...."<sup>19</sup> The weakness of Jewish education was a persistent worry for later generations of German Jews. And as Irving Howe points out, "The Yiddish press during the early years of the [twentieth] century constantly laments the condition of Jewish education."<sup>20</sup> Headlines such as "Jews Neglect Jewish Education and Blame America" were not uncommon in publications such as *Tageblatt*. Following up on similar findings by Mordecai Kaplan eight years earlier, a 1919 survey by Alexander Dushkin found that "only 65,000 out of an estimated 275,000 Jewish

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<sup>19</sup> Nathan Glazer, American Judaism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 71.

<sup>20</sup> Howe, World of Our Fathers, p. 202. See also, Waxman, America's Jews in Transition, pp. 52-3 and Charles E. Silberman, A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today (New York: Summit Books, 1985). pp. 173-174.



children of school age were receiving Jewish instruction at any given time...."<sup>21</sup> In the early 1900s, much as today, the focus of criticism was on the quality of the Jewish training that the young were receiving, as well as the limited numbers receiving it. With many living in poverty and possessing limited community resources, Jews in America were still struggling to break through the barriers of anti-Semitism to enter the ranks of the middle class and beyond. In 1993, their affluent descendants are concerned about the numbers who are not involved in any form of Jewish education and are defecting from the community -- particularly through intermarriage.

Ironically, contemporary Jews have to worry whether their community will survive, not because of its enemies, but because the larger environment is too friendly, not sufficiently hostile. The walls of anti-Semitism, which once held Jews within the fold, have largely crumbled.<sup>22</sup> There is nothing to stop them from walking out. The status barriers which identify marriage with a Jew as a step down for a non-Jew no longer exist. Many non-Jews, particularly the well-educated among them, often view Jews as part of a superior culture, defined in educational and intellectual terms. In Europe, when Jews married non-Jews, the Jew almost invariably converted to Christianity, or at any rate, dropped all his or her affiliations to Judaism. Here, the opposite is true. Intermarried Jews on the whole remain identified as Jews, although with less commitment to the religion and the community,

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<sup>21</sup> Howe, World of Our Fathers, p. 202. For New York City, there was a modest rise in participation between the mid-1930s when 25 percent of Jewish children of elementary school age attended Jewish schools and 1955 when the figure had increased to 31 percent. According to Glazer, the increase was attributable to the increased activity of the Orthodox. Glazer, American Judaism, p. 111.

<sup>22</sup> See Gregory Martire and Ruth Clark, Anti-Semitism in the United States (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 113-19 and Lipset, "A Unique People in an Exceptional Country," pp. 16-18.

while, as noted, a minority of non-Jews convert and another considerable portion of them identify their family as Jewish. These developments have led the so called "optimists" within the Jewish community to argue that intermarriage results in an increase of the number of self-identified Jews in the country. There is some evidence that this may be true in the short-run, but in the long run, it is not. The children of the intermarried are very loosely affiliated, if at all, uneducated Jewishly and even more likely to marry non-Jews than birth-right Jews so their children, while perhaps aware of their background, will have no communal commitment. As Sidney Goldstein notes, of the children of intermarried couples, only 25 percent were being raised as Jews, while the remaining cohort was either being raised in another faith or without any religion at all.<sup>23</sup> The membership and financial problems faced by the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, B'nai Brith and ADL attest to the effects of these developments.

Beyond the impact of anti-Semitism, the changing relationship of American Jewry to Israel is important. Clearly, hundreds of thousands, if not more, have become deeply involved in communal activities because of their interest and commitment to the Jewish state. Much of the activity of the community has been related to Israel. This has been true for the so called "defense organizations," the American Jewish Committee, the ADL, and the American Jewish Congress, as well as the local Jewish communal federations. Hillel, the main organization on campus, devotes a great deal of its activity to Israel. Synagogue and temple affiliated groups are Israel oriented. The link to Israel, however, has been declining, especially among younger Jews. As with anti-Semitism, what has kept many Jews involved

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<sup>23</sup> Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry," p. 127.



in Israel oriented activities is concern about security, about the fact that the state has remained for so long a pariah nation, facing a military threat. But as of now, there is some reason to believe that this situation will end. Israel's Arab neighbors and the Palestinians are revealing a willingness to accept the Jewish state, to end the conflict by trading land for peace. Clearly this chapter of history is not written yet, but possible reactions of the American Jewry to something resembling a real peace might entail lessened interest in the Jewish state, reduced financial contributions, lesser participation in communal activities designed to help Israel in welfare, economic and political terms, and as a consequence less identification with Judaism. The discussion about a possible merger of the U.J.A. and the C.J.F. reflect a concern on the part of their leadership about decline.

The problems of Jewry in the former Soviet Union still offer a cause to rally around. A great deal of activity and money has been dedicated, collected to help Soviet Jews resettle in Israel or elsewhere. There is foreboding about the future of the Jews left in the former Soviet areas. But still, their prospects there are reasonably good. In any case, the evidence suggests that this cause is not at all comparable to those of anti-Semitism or Israeli security as motives to take part in Jewish activities.

Beyond the conditions which affect the commitment of Jews to their community, it is necessary to emphasize the consequences of demographic factors. Jews have a very low birth rate, even less than most other extremely educated and well-to-do urban groups. Jews simply are not reproducing themselves. The one major exception, which also does not adhere to the generalization about high intermarriage rates is, of course, the Orthodox. But they constitute somewhere around seven percent of the total American Jewish population, that



is about 300,000 people. They have very large families, but those who rely on them to reproduce or expand Jewry forget that in America, as in days gone by in eastern Europe, a significant minority of Orthodox young people do not stay Orthodox. The estimates for drop-outs by youth from Orthodoxy, though not from Judaism, run as high as one-third. All the indicators suggest the economic and social integration of Jews will continue.

In the future, as in the past, the great majority of Jews will be born into the faith. The basic problem for the community is and will be to hold them, to keep them Jewish. The most important means to do this is education. The findings reported here indicate that the longer and more intensive the Jewish training, the more likely people are to be committed to and practice Judaism.<sup>24</sup> But many drop out. In any case, as documented here, the main factors which determine school exposure are linked to family background. We obviously should try to develop better educational techniques, recruit more sophisticated educators and provide a more meaningful social and physical environment for Jewish youth. We should also recognize that such improvements will not stop the decline. For all except the Orthodox, improving the content of Jewish education, what is taught, is more important than the technical factors which can be improved with more money. And here most of the Jewish community is at a loss. They, themselves, are not religiously observant, much less so than most Christians. They do not believe in the Torah. Yet, the schools are expected to teach the children what their parents basically reject by their actions. Beyond religion, America's universalistic openness undermines the message of ethnic particularism. The intermarriage

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<sup>24</sup> For earlier results, see Harold S. Himmelfarb, The Impact of Religious Schooling: The Effects of Jewish Education upon Adult Religious Involvement (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1975).

rate will grow. Hence, while we must do what we can to reach out to those weakly committed, we must concentrate on the dedicated "remnant." There is, of course, the alternative of formulating a new secularized curriculum which corresponds to the way of life of most Jewish parents. But that is another topic, a different agenda.

