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We Were as Those Who Dream:
The Image of the Product of a Successful Jewish Education

Prof. Moshe Greenberg

I was asked to suggest to educators goals toward which they might direct their efforts, and for the attainment of which they might plan strategies. When I conceived of the goals which are set forth herein, I did not tailor them according to the measure of the capabilities of the existing system, but rather by what seems to me to be the inherently desirable and necessary goals of Jewish education. The intent of this proposal, and the intent of the discussion of it, should be the elucidation of the direction in which we are headed -- are we directed towards the right destination? -- and not the elucidation of the ends it happens to be in our power to reach at the moment. He who concentrates only on adapting his goals to the powers he has to achieve them will find his powers dwindling as his fear of failure grows, whereas he who knowingly sets himself a goal which is beyond the powers he has to achieve them will discover that his power is greater than he had thought. While despair may arise out of the apparent chasm between the destination and the power required for its achievement, there is an antidote: to divide the distance to the goal into stages, each one attainable -- and each, with its conquest, serving as a launching point for the effort to reach the next. In any case, we need a distant goal so that we can orient ourselves with reference to it -- are we moving closer to it or not?

I define Jewish education as follows: education based on the content of the accepted fundamental books of Judaism: the Bible, Talmud, and Midrash, and the body of commentary which has grown up around these fundamental books in the course of the generations, be it commentary in the narrow sense of the word (e.g., Rashi), or be it systematic thought or creative literature seeking to translate the content of the fundamental texts to a contemporary vernacular -- the languages of philosophy, of morality, of mysticism. These fundamental books contain the axioms which define our relationship to the universe and to our environment -- living and inanimate, human, national, and familial; they contain prescriptions for ways of living (proverbs of wisdom, commandments, laws) and archetypes and models for behavior (tales and legends). The function of Jewish education is to transmit meaningful portions of these contents to the student, with "meaningful" having two connotations:

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a. having meaning and significance to the student, touching his heart, addressing matters which concern him;

b. of sufficient quantity to represent the entire corpus: enough of an exposure for the student so that justice is done to the original, that he may be impressed.

If the student receives "meaningful" portions of the fundamental books, in both senses of the word, he is likely to recognize the moral and intellectual power of Jewish sources and to resort to them through the years.

The ultimate goal is for the student to be engaged with fundamental existential issues and for him to discover his own Jewish identity in the process of encountering Jewish texts. Our hope is that the product of a succesful Jewish education will feel that fundamental existential values of his are derived from the basic books of Judaism.

Note 1: Jewish history and Jewish literature broadly defined are within the confines of Jewish education to the extent that they illuminate the fundamental texts, whether by illumination of the conditions under which these texts arose and became widespread, or by the exposition of their development and impact. I do not see the study of Jewish history in and of itself, and the study of Jewish literature (and art) in all its formal and historical manifestations as Jewish education, but rather as subject matter through which successful Jewish education will motivate and encourage the student. These areas certainly have in them the power to deepen national consciousness, to reinforce national identity, and to season the bond to Judaism with the spice of aesthetic pleasure. However, when it comes to giving meaning to Jewish life, when we wish to transmit eternal values which bind the soul to the continuum of the generations, the shelf containing the fundamental books, authoritative for all the generations, must be our primary educational resource.

Note 2: This paper does not deal with the extent of the background knowledge and with the conceptual language required of the teacher of Judaic studies; nor does it discuss the personal position which is desirable for teachers vis a vis the text. Some of my thoughts on these matters have been set down in the collection Al Hamikra Ve'Al Hayahadut (Tel Aviv, Am Oved, 1984), pp. 247-274, 281-290.

Jewish education is to be evaluated according to its success in fostering in its graduates four qualities:

1. Love of learning Torah (i.e., the fundamental books and all that is in them) and love of the fulfillment of the commandments between man and God:

That is, love of experience and action which have no material, utilitarian purpose, but which are good in and of themselves. All those who occupy themselves with these obtain satisfaction from the feeling of communion with their own meaning and essence. Jewish education deals with transcendant values, beyond "this world," values hinted at in the expression "eternal life," ("chayeh olam"), drawing their meaning from their being symbols of that which is beyond the personal, the societal, the human. This love of learning Torah finds expression in the phrase "(the study of) Torah for its own sake," which is learning which derives its value and satisfaction from the actual experience of contact with something of essential value -- the literary crystallization of the contact of the Jew with the realm which transcends the visible, the earthly. The fostering of the love of "Torah for its own sake" gives the student the spiritual pleasure devolving from action which is of essential value, action which involves the activation of his highest intellectual powers and the refinement of his understanding. One who studies Torah for its own sake experiences full self-actualization precisely as he explores through a spiritual world which transcends his self.

The performance of commanments between man and God, such as keeping the Sabbath and taking pleasure in it, the blessings for partaking in foods, prayer, and the dietary laws, brings the student face to face with the realm of holiness, a meeting which makes the transcendant concrete.

The purpose of Jewish education is to amplify the whisper of conscience which denies that "I am and there is nothing other then I other but me," but rather affirms that I stand commanded and accountable for my actions. This whisper takes on voice and substance in the study of Torah for its own sake and in the performance of the commandments between man and God. In these, that existence which is beyond the concrete and the visible becomes real, its gracious countenance grants meaning to life's fleeting moments. In the contact of the individual with this existence, the good and the valuable in him are affirmed, as a response to that which stands over against him. This experience is the basis for the insight that the visible world is not the be-all and end-all nor is it the measure of all things: success and failure in it, its joy and sorrow are transient relative to the "eternal life He has implanted within us."

2. Acceptance of the Torah as a guide in the area of interpersonal morality, with the recognition that the ethical decrees of the Torah are the fruit of unceasing interpretive activity:

Here I am referring to two concepts:

I) The recognition that in its moral judgements, the Torah can provide guidance in our day. This applies first of all to the "larger principles" that the Tradition identifies:

> "`love your neighbor as yourself' (Leviticus 19:18): Rabbi Akiva said: this is a great principle of the Torah. Ben Azzai said: `This is the book of the descendants of Adam [when God created man, He made him in the likeness of God] (Genesis 5:1)' this is even a greater principle."
> (Sifra, Kodashim 4:12)

And later on, in the summaries in the Prophets and the Writings of the essence of God's demands of man, as collected by Rabbi Simlai at the end of Tractate Makkot:

> "Rabbi Simlai when preaching said: Six hundred and thirteen precepts were communicated to Moses...
>
> David came and reduced them to eleven principles, as it is written (Psalm 15) `A Psalm of David. Lord, who shall sojourn in Thy tabernacle? Who shall dwell in Thy holy mountain? - [i] He that walketh uprightly, and [ii] worketh righteousness, and [iii] speaketh truth in his heart; that [iv] hath no slander in his tongue, [v] nor doeth evil to his fellow, [vi] nor taketh up a reproach against one near to him, [vii] in whose eyes a vile person is despised, but [viii] he honoureth them that fear the Lord, [ix] He sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not, [x] He putteth not out his money on interest, [xi] nor taketh a bribe against the innocent. He that doeth these things shall never be moved.'
>
> ...Isaiah came and reduced them to six [principles], as it is written, (Isaiah 33:15-16) `[i] He that walketh righteously, and [ii] speaketh uprightly, [iii] He that despiseth the gain of oppressions, [iv] that shaketh his hand from holding of bribes, [v] that stoppeth his ear from hearing of blood, [vi] and shutteth his eyes from looking upon evil.'

> ...Micah came and reduced them to three [principles], as it is written, (Micah 6:8) `It hath been told thee, O man, what is good, and what the Lord doth require of thee: [i] only to do justly, and [ii] to love mercy and [iii] to walk humbly before thy God.'
>
> ...Again came Isaiah and reduced them to two [principles], as it is said, (Isaiah 56:1) `Thus saith the Lord: [i] Keep ye justice and [ii] do righteousness.'
>
> Amos came and reduced them to one [principle], as it is said, (Amos 5:4) `For thus saith the Lord unto the house of Israel, Seek ye Me and live.'"

Or, in the general principles established by the Sages, such as "Her (the Torah's) ways are pleasant ways and all her paths are peaceful." (Proverbs 3:17; cf. Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings, end of chapter 10).

Or, in the six last statements in the ten commandments - and their guidelines and their derivatives:

- Honoring of parents - out of gratitude and as an obligation for the preservation of the family, the basic cell of society;

- "You shall not murder," as an obligation derived from "in His image did God make man;"

- "You shall not commit adultery," as an obligation derived from the relationship of union [lit. "clinging"] ("and he clings to his wife so that they become as one flesh") which is to be created between man and wife;

- "You shall not steal," which affirms the concept of property and ownership of goods, the abrogation of which leads to social chaos;

- "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor," the basis of trust in law and in negotiation, without which social bonds would collapse;

- "You shall not covet," a preventive measure to protect against all of the abovementioned prohibitions.

These rules and others like them must be presented to the student, together with the prophetic vision of their fulfillment, so that he will be able to find in Judaism the answer to his aspirations for a good society and a reasonable

and just way of life, and will not turn to foreign sources to take in the principles of morality.

II) The presentation of the interpretation of the moral laws of the Torah and their specific practical application as an ongoing process is one of the principal functions of Jewish education. An eternal tension exists, throughout the generations, between the particular-national and the universal-human trends in the Torah; similarly, between the emphasis on the mysterious element of holiness, expressed in symbols used in the worship of God, and the emphasis on its moral element. This tension is already apparent in the prophets calling for the primacy of the moral element over the ritual element in the covenant between God and His people, and it continues through the generations in biblical commentary and in other Jewish sources -- the outstanding expression of the eternal confrontation of generations of Jews with the obligatory significance of their fundamental texts.

There are times when the biblical source took a broad view and the Sages narrowed it; for example, the requirement of a death-sentence for murderers, which in Genesis 9 applies to all the descendants of Noah, was limited among Jews by the Sages so as to include only the case in which the victim is also a Jew; a Jew who murders a gentile is exempt from human judgment and his fate is left to heaven (Mechilta to Exodus 21:14; cf. the reservations of Issi ben Yehuda, ibid.). The Sages were divided among themselves with respect to the scope of the term "man" in the Bible: Rabbi Meir included gentiles, basing his position on the text "....(laws) by the pursuit of which man shall live" (Leviticus 18:5), meaning that "even if a gentile occupies himself with the study of the Torah, he equals [in status] the high priest" (Baba Kama 38a). In opposition to this view, Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai decreed that "You are called `man' but the idolaters are not called `man'" (Yebamot 61a). The later scholars were divided in their interpretation of the words of R. Shimon bar Yochai: did he mean to distinguish between Jew and gentile, to say that the gentile lacks a human essence which the Jew has (as in the opinion of the mystics), or did he perhaps mean to say only that in the specific system of law in the Torah the term `man' refers to any man, and since in any legal system any man is one who is subject to the system, `man' in the Torah must refer to Israel, who alone are bound by the Torah (as in the opinion of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Chajes in his novellae to Yebamot). Proper Jewish education will turn the student's attention to the conflicts in the works of biblical commentators between the conscientious reading of the bible and the influence of the plain sense of the text. Maimonides

ruled (following the Talmud): the law against cheating does not apply to the cheating of a non-Jew, as it is written: "You shall not wrong [lit. "cheat"] one another [lit. "each one his brother"]" (Leviticus 25:14; see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Sale, 13:7). But then Kimchi, in his commentary to Psalm 15 (cited above) taught differently:

> "Nor doeth evil to his fellow(re'ehu), nor taketh up a reproach against one near to him (grovo). " His fellow" and "one near to him" mean someone with whom one has business, or a neighbor. And in saying, "nor doeth evil to his fellow", the text does not imply that he did so to others [who are not his fellows or neighbors]; but the text describes ordinary circumstances (i.e., one ordinarily is in a position to do evil - or good - to one with whom he has some business, or to a neighbour). Similarly, "Ye shall not cheat one another" (lit. "each his comrade ['amito], Lev 25:17), does not mean that one is allowed to cheat another who is a stranger and not his comrade. Similarly, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy fellow" (rea'ka, Exod 20:16), does not mean that against another who is not your fellow (=associated with you in some way) it is allowed to bear false witness. Rather [the text speaks of "fellow", "comrade" and neighbor] because the terms are not exclusive of others with whom one comes into contact]; that is the usage of the language in many cases.

One of the obstacles to our students' acceptance of the validity of the Tradition in its frozen appearance. They are ignorant of the history of biblical interpretation and of the conflicting trends within it, and therefore they are unaware of the ongoing mutual influence of the text on generations of Jews and of the commentators over the generations on the understanding of the text. Authentic Jewish culture can only arise from the dialogue between the source and the children of each generation, a dialogue in which both the loyalty of the people to the text and their participation in the culture of the present find expression.

Note 3: On matters of the morality of the Bible and of Judaism and its problems see the essay by Haim Roth, "HaTenudah HaMussarit BeEtica Yehudit," in his book Ha'Dat Ve Erkei HaChayim, (Jerusalem, Magnes, 1973) pp. 89-106; also S. H. Bergman, "Harchava Ve'Tzimtzum Be'Etica Yehudit," in his booklet Ha'Shamayim Ve'Ha'Aretz, (Shdemot, no date) pp. 29-38; and my articles "Utem Keruyim Adam..." in Al Hamikra Ve'Al Hayahadut, pp. 55-67; and "Keytzad Yesh Lidrosh et HaTorah Bazman Hazeh," in HaSegulah ve'HaCoach, (Sifriyat

Poalim/Hakibbutz Hame'uchad, 1986) pp. 49-67.

3. Living a life style which creates a community:

Many commandments in Judaism require a group:

> "These are the things, of which a man enjoys the fruits in this world, while the stock remains for him for the world to come: viz., honoring father and mother, deeds of lovingkindness, timely attendance at the house of study morning and evening, hospitality to wayfarers, visiting the sick, dowering the bride, attending the dead to the grave, devotion in prayer, and making peace between man and his fellow, but the study of Torah leadeth to them all."
>
> (Daily Prayerbook, Preliminaries to the morning service)

Almost all of these behaviors bind people to one another, and some of them require public-communal institutions; e.g., "acts of lovingkindness," which are carried out (for example) by establishing a loan fund; "rising early to attend the house of study," which assumes the existence of a house of study - synagogue; "the study of Torah," which requires the employment of teachers and the maintenance of institutions of learning for adults and children. The more we increasingly undertake such behaviors, the more we increase the relations of friendship and neighborliness, and the sharing of resources in order to establish the institutions needed to carry out these commandments. Thus is created a community of Jews, participating in each other's joys and sorrows, aiding one another in time of need, constituting an environment for the raising of children in a Jewish way of life.

4. A relationship to the Jewish people in all the lands of their dispersion:

Man is attracted to others like himself. In the past, most Jews in the Diaspora shared a consciousness of unity as members of a people covenanted to God, a commitment to a traditional way of life (to a lesser or greater degree), and a status of a foreign body in eyes of the other inhabitants of the lands in which they settled. In the eyes of the Jews, that which was shared among themselves was greater than that which was shared with the other inhabitants of the lands in which they settled. The scattered Jews were united by a "common language" of relationship to Jew and to gentile, a feeling of oppression in the present and a hope for the redemption, a calendar of holidays and a way of life, and a

consciousness of common "tribal" origin. Since the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel, the unity of the people has been based on the sharing of a common memory of national tragedy, a sense of tribal bond, and a common interest in the building and the fate of the state. These factors are not a constant element in the consciousness of the individual, nor are they sufficient to insure the continued connections among the various Jewish diasporas. Only a systematically cultivated consciousness (by means of education), including 1) a shared origin; 2) a shared existential status (members of a covenant people); and 3) a shared vision of the future redemption (the role of Israel in the "mending of the world" [`tikkun olam']) is likely to maintain the unity of the people under present conditions.

These three components of the consciousness of Jewish uniqueness are included in the national-historical myth whose foundation is in the bible and whose classical development is in rabbinic literature. The internalization of this myth is the crucial factor in the creation of a Jewish identity. The role of Jewish education is to foster this internalization, by means of a curriculum which emphasizes these three commonalities.

The fostering of the recognition by the Jews of Israel that they are brothers to the Jews of the Diaspora is no less important than the cultivation of the consciousness among Diaspora Jews that they are brothers to the Jews of Israel. These two camps, each mired in very different problems of existence, are in danger of increasing mutual alienation. Only the intentional cultivation of a return to sustenance from common sources of inspiration and the sharing of identical experiences of values (the study of Torah for its own sake, holiness, moral values drawn from the fundamental books in an ongoing process of interpretation) can maintain the consciousness of unity among the scattered. The attitude to the "ingathering of the exiles," and, in its religious formulation to "the commandment of settling the land of Israel," separates the inhabitants of the state of Israel from those of the Diaspora. It seems as though the nation is divided between a group which is actualizing a value sacred to the whole people in the past and a group which has abandoned that value, and has thus been torn away from the core of the people who are moving forward to "complete redemption." On the face of it, there was in the past a situation similar to ours today -- a Jewish settlement in Israel existed at the same time as large and creative Jewish communities in the Exile. It is not clear to us how the Jews in the Babylonian Exile reconciled, over a period of hundreds

of years, the contradiction between their prayers for the ingathering of the exiles and their continued residence outside of Israel. Political and economic factors probably played a role. The masses once tended to see major changes in their status as the result of divine initiative; in our day, human initiative is not only seen by the majority as justified, it is glorified. This only intensifies the confusion among us at the refraining of most of the nation from joining in the building of the state. In the foreseeable future this confusion will not be reduced, for authentic Jewish education will maintain the confusion and the tension. On the other hand, the "portable" basis of Judaism is certainly capable of supplying Jewish content and meaning to the inhabitants of the Diaspora. Those who seek to mend the rift between and their deeds and their prayers will generate, as in the past, a thin trickle of aliyah.

As we have said, Jewish education will be able to connect the Jewish inhabitants of the state of Israel with the Jews of the Diaspora only insofar as it can plant in the hearts of those who live in the land of Israel the recognition that the state is only a means to the higher end of "mending the world in the kingdom of God" (according to all interpretation which upholds the principle that the state is only a means for the actualization of universal values); and in the hearts of those who live in the Diaspora the recognition that "mending the world" must begin with the internal mending of the deeds of "the people of the covenant of God." To the extent that Jewish education succeeds in both camps, there will be a coming together of the two: Jewish society in Israel will move toward a way of life which seeks to actualize transcendant values, and Diaspora Jews will be drawn, by virtue of their identification with the principles of Judaism, to participate in the bold experiment being carried out in the state -- the actualization of those principles.

Even though it is not my role to discuss the means for the attainment of the product of the education described here, I must comment on one matter which is perhaps means, perhaps educational content: the Hebrew language. This matter is, of course, only relevant to Jewish education in the Diaspora.

The full Jewish weight of the concepts and values mentioned above cannot be transmitted in translation. For us, translations were meant to serve as an aid in understanding the original; therefore no translation could replace the original, but could only stand alongside it, as

an explication of what was read or heard. In this, custom has even overruled law: one is permitted, for example, to recite the Shema in any language he understands; in practice, throughout all the generations, the "Shema" has been recited only in Hebrew, on account of the full weight stored precisely in the syllables of the Hebrew text.

That it is possible to teach the Hebrew language in the Diaspora to a level sufficient for understanding the sources in their original language has been proven in thousands of instances - when the curriculum allocates sufficient time, resources and skilled personnel to the task. The matter depends on the willingness of the community to recognize the acquisition of the language as a goal which must necessarily be achieved in order for the learning of the Jewish heritage to take place in a manner which is meaningful. This willingness is in turn dependent on the degree to which the community perceives meaningful Jewish education to be necessary.

It follows that meaningful Jewish education will draw those who enjoy it and are built by it to deepen their knowledge of the Hebrew language. The more students feel spiritual fulfillment in their studies, the more their willingness to invest effort in them will increase, even at the expense of their full participation in non-Jewish culture. But it is doubtful that such an identification with Judaism can be born without direct nourishment from its sources. On the other hand, shallow Jewish education will not justify itself in the eyes of the students, and will surely give rise to opposition and indifference to the point where it will defeat all the teacher's attempts to pass it on. The Students will seek satisfaction from foreign spiritual and cultural sources.

It may seem as if I have made my task easy by ignoring the difficult realities of Jewish education, and that I painted a picture of an educational product which is all vision, if not fantasy. My hope is that the sounding of these thoughts of an layman-educator like me to the ears of professionals in the field may help stimulate thoughts which are more directed toward a solution for Jewish education - even if, in the end, my ideas turn out to be useful only as a foil for debate.

Menachem Brinker - What an "Educated Jew" Needs to Know: Jewish Texts of the Modern Period

1. Preface:

The answer to the question posed to me - What should an educated Jew know and with what should he/she be acquainted - would appear to be both simple and short: a great deal! Obviously, this answer will not suffice. But I want it to be clear from the outset that, in my opinion, an educated Jew must know everthing that any educated person anywhere in the world must know, plus many subjects related to his own people, its history and its culture.

I open on this note because the question was not, what does an educated Jew have to know about Judaism. It was a much broader question: what does an educated Jew need to know? Therefore, I must emphasize at the very outset, that my basic assumption is that an educated Jew must know, for example, what the renaissance was, or the French revolution, or Athens in its heyday. He should be familiar with the works of Mozart, whose bicentennial we have just celebrated, and should have read the novels of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, Balzac, Flaubert, Jane Austen and Henry James. He should be

acquainted with segments of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, as well as Kant, John Stuart Mill, aspects of modern political thought, and the development of the concepts of the "social contract" and "natural rights". He should have at least a general knowledge of the ideas of Machiavelli, and of various types of parlimentary systems. He should have some exposure to the non-democratic regimes of the 20th century: fascism and bolshevism. He must know something about the formation of Christianity and Islam. These are obviously only examples. But I am wholeheartedly convinced that today's Jew, who does not know anything about the above, is not an educated person, and therefore, in my eyes, he is not an educated Jew.

I begin thus not in order to be provocative nor in order to question the importance of Jewish education and its special role. I only seek to emphasize that in all that pertains to information, i.e. knowledge in the simple sense, and to education for values, especially in the social and political areas, a modern educated Jewish person cannot suffice with a curriculum based exclusively upon Jewish texts.

This may seem self-evident or trivial. One might think that, at best, it represents a delayed involvement in the

great discussion which has preoccupied all significant Jewish thinkers, writers, and educators for the last two centuries, known under a variety of headings such as "Torah and Derech Eretz" among German Jews, and later, as "Judaism and Humanism" in Russia, and "Hebrewism and Europeanism" in modern Hebrew literature.

Indeed, in the days when I myself was a product-in-the-making of the "Mizrachi" elementary school system, in the last years of mandatory Palestine, and of the general government secondary school of the early years of the state, these concepts were self-evident and no one thought to challenge them. But there is a certain outlook current in Israel, prevelant primarily among the policy makers of the government religious education trend, which claims that the only thing which the non-Jewish world has to offer to the Jewish student is science (i.e. nature study, cosmology) and technology. According to my view, when it comes to values, Judaism is self-sufficient.

Moreover, this is not just a theoretical matter. There are many educational institutions which exempt their students from all knowlege of western culture, be it history, philosophy, literature or political science. I consider this new approach a great danger to both the future of the Jewish

people and the cultural and political future of the State of Israel. It is not only the general level of knowledge of the students which will be hurt by this approach. Almost every important "Jewish" value, as well as "Jewish" sensitivity which I can think of, are jeopardized by this introverted, narrow-minded and snobbish approach.

The grand issue of Jewish and particularly Hebrew culture of the last two hundred years, in all its aspects (abstract thought, historiography, publicistics and belles lettres), has been the way in which the Jewish people has been integrated into the family of nations and Jewish culture into western civilization. This has entailed a close examination in our literature of the unique nature of the people of Israel, the future of this uniqueness and its limitations. The most productive and lively aspect of this discussion is based upon a consciousness of the new conditions created by the integration of the Jew in general history and in general culture.

The last thing which Jewish educators should do is to conceal from their students the extremely problematic nature of this great issue. I would not be disappointed by a curriculum and an educational system whose graduates discover within the culture of the Jewish people unique elements which

appear to them superior to anything in non-Jewish culture, and remain faithful to them throughout their lives. However, I am not only disappointed, but astonished every time anew, by the casual references to the decline of western culture, and to the possibility of overcoming all crises through "teshuvah", stated by people who haven't the slightest understanding of what they are suggesting.

The transition from these introductory remarks to the contents of the curriculum (the suggested "texts") appears to me to be a natural one. The specific task assigned to me, in contrast to my colleagues, involves Jewish texts of the modern period. It is clear that in my opinion this very subject - the meeting between Jewish culture and western culture, and the entry of the Jew into the modern world, with all its possibilities and its dangers - must be reflected, in all its aspects, by the modern texts themselves with which an educated Jew ought to be familiar.

Let me add an additional note of explanation. I too believe that the primary goal of the Jewish curriculum must be the creation of a "good Jew". But in contrast to my colleagues, I do not envision a single portrait of the "good Jew." The short experience of the state of Israel can teach us at least this: the same education, the same body of

knowledge and even the same normative inspiration can produce either Jews or Israelis who differ from each other in the extreme. It is indeed easier to define a "good diaspora Jew": a Jew who is involved of his own free will in the life of the [Jewish] community, and in a more general way, feels some emotional connection with his brethren throughout the world, taking an interest in their fate and expressing that interest in concrete terms. If he has free time or economic means, he devotes them to activities of a Jewish nature. If he is part of a religiously observant community, he expresses this connection in his daily life, devoting to it thought, free time and means.

It is much harder to define a "good Jew" in the State of Israel, where involvement in the life of the community and in its fate is not a matter of choice but is imposed from the outside, like it or not. Serving in the IDF is not to be compared to volunteering for a year of service in Israel nor to holding community office; paying Israeli income tax is not to be compared to contributing to immigrant absorption or to Jewish institutions for mutual aid. Therefore, it seems to me that in contrast to the situation in the diaspora, a constant danger exists that, in the State of Israel, concepts such as "love of Israel", "Jewish loyalty" or "Jewish rootedness" become empty rhetoric, or what is worse, an ideological cover for political manipulation and brainwashing. In this

respect, zionism appears to me to be completely successful. When one thinks about behavioural, rather than educational, excellence in Israel, it is hard to pinpoint criteria for Jewish excellence, i.e. being a good Jew, which are not identical with those by which we define an Israeli citizen as a "good citizen" or even simply as a "good person".

Therefore, I shall prefer an operative definition of a "good Jew" as the ideal product of an educational system. For our purposes, a "good Jew" is one who is intellectually and emotionally involved in the "here and now" of the Jewish people, aware of the problems, dangers and opportunities of Jewish life and willing to take an active part in it. It is precisely from the creation of such involvement in the present which means arousing the desire within the student to understand the present in all its aspects, that the educational system derives the ability to teach the history of the Jewish people in the past. It is the interest in the present which creates understanding of the values of tradition, the values of the social revolution which the Jewish people experienced in the 20th century, the fundamentals of Jewish thought from its very inception in the biblical wisdom literature to our days, and the exemplary works of Hebrew literature from its biblical beginnings to its present Israeli station.

It is not the task of the Jewish Studies Curriculum to summarize for the student the "principles" of Jewish culture. In my opinion, it is also not its task to bring the student to summarize such principles for himself. The emphasis must be placed precisely upon the tremendous pluralism of Jewish culture and Jewish experience in general, and that of the last 100 years in particular. Students must know that among the ancient Israelites, there were those who worshipped Adonai and those who worshipped the Baal; there were kings and prophets, pharisees and saduccees, rationalists and mystics; those who limited the Halacha and those who sought to broaden it, those who sought general knowledge and those who withdrew into the world of halacha. In the modern period, there are orthodox and reform, neo-orthodox and assimilated Jews, "maskilim", "hasidim" and "mitnagdim", rationalists and cosmopolitans, zionists and those who oppose zionism, Jewish socialists and those who oppose them, universalists and particularists, conservatives and fundamentalists, as well as rebels/revolutionaries who want to turn everything upside down.

All these elements within the Jewish people, the tensions created by them, and the struggles between them must be presented openly to the student. The greatest achievement

of a Jewish curriculum may well be in enabling the student to personally sense "the Jewish drama" - unparalleled in world history - in all its convolusions, both historic and conceptual. The educator must develop within his student an empathy for different, even polaric, positions both in ancient Jewish history and within the modern Jewish experience. It is incumbent upon the educator to help his student to identify with the zealots and with Josephus, with Spinoza and with those who excommunicated him, with both the orthodox and the "reformers", with the zionists as well as with the doubters who observe from the sidelines, and the opponents of zionism on both the right and the left.

This ability to understand is the only explanation I can give for the well-known slogan "love of Israel". This breadth of knowledge - not to be confused with objectivity - is not a matter of luxury. On the contrary, it is the very basis of our existence. Without it, "love of Israel" must become either partisan love or self-love. The well-springs of real Jewish solidarity - i.e. unconditional solidarity - are being destroyed. And tolerance, always a scarce but desireable item in Jewish life, is being lost and its place usurped by nationalist or religious or zionist fanaticism, all of which entail a blocking of curiosity and of respect for authentic

Jewish life in its various expressions in thought, literature and history.

The student who finds himself emotionally involved in Jewish arguments, ancient or modern, even if there is no role model for him to emulate, is not inferior to, and may even be preferrable in my eyes to the student who puts together a list of those "principles" from which he is determined not to deviate either right or left out of all of this rich and variegated material.

I find absolutely nothing wrong in teaching the history, the culture and the literature of this nation as an uninterrupted series of polemics and conflicts which do not lend themselves to a single harmonious resolutioN binding upon all Jews. The one and only condition which appears to me to be important is that this education provide the student with the feeling that there is still a future for the Jewish people and for Jewish culture, together with the arguments and differences of opinion in respect to basic issues. The modest task of education must be to prepare the student to take part in these same arguments and disagreements, and to take an active part in the life of his people, through a deep sense of belonging as well as a high level of self-awareness.

The curriculum suggestion which follows is divided into three areas: history, thought and belles lettres. Should this suggested Jewish curriculum succeed not only in reflecting that which is unique to each of these areas, viewed in terms of their own disciplinary logic, but also in instilling within the student a sense of the underlying connection among these disciplines - that together they form the Jewish experience, it will be an accomplishment not to be taken lightly.

It is impossible to understand modern Jewish thought without an understanding of the "external" history of the Jews in this period. The historic dimension is also essential in order to comprehend the central elements of both prose and poetry. But by its very nature, the suggested curriculum cannot itself develop this sense of mutuality among the subject areas taught by different teachers at different hours. The assumption is that if the material is taught properly, by good or even reasonably good teachers, then students with any ability for self-education will use their own imagination and understanding to fill in that which is missing.

2. The History of the Jewish People in the Modern Age:

There is no shortage of books on this subject. However, some of them suffer from tendentiousness, especially with respect to zionism. In this area, the educational system must aim, in my opinion, to provide the student with a general viewpoint encompassing, in reasonable proportion, many contradictory themes. An elaboration of such themes includes: (1) the message of the emancipation, with all its lures and dangers versus the call for auto-emancipation; (2) the flow of Jewish migration from the east to the west, versus the various "aliyot" to Eretz Yisrael; (3) persecution and discrimination (the Jew as passive object of the actions of elements within the environment) versus the cultural creativity and Jewish communal organization within the religious community, within its institutions of mutual aid, and other expressions of national solidarity (the Jew as an active factor in the spiritual, economic, social and political realm); (4) national awakening versus assimilation; (5) the spiritual and social trends within Judaism: hasidism and "mitnagdim", haskalah and nationalism, zionism and anti-zionist socialism (the Bund and its spinoffs); (6) anti-semitism, its sources and expressions, vis a vis the various Jewish responses to anti-semitism; (7) the "yishuv" in Eretz

Yisrael prior to and following the establishment of the State vis a vis the fate of other diasporas, especially that of the United States and the Soviet Union; (8) the holocaust and the Israeli war of independence; (9) the major dilemmas of the state of Israel today and those of the Jewish People in the various diasporas and that which binds them together.

Among the texts with which I am familiar, that of Prof. Shmuel Ettinger, Jewish History in the Modern Period, appears to me to be the most meticulous in maintaining the desirable balance among the various subjects. I assume that, at the secondary school level, students do not have much of an opportunity for specialization. The entire student body will be exposed to modern Jewish history through a single text (in the best of cases). Therefore, that text must be chosen with great care. Nonetheless, the better and more alert students may want to delve more deeply into one or another aspect of this subject. Let me add that the emancipation of Western Jewry is well-illuminated in Prof. Jacob Katz's Out of the Ghetto, while the social movements among Eastern European Jewry, as well as their offshoots and later development among the Jews of the United States and in Israel, are well-described in the book by Prof. Yonatan Frankel, Prophecy and

Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and Russian Jewry 1862-1917. The most significant essay on the Holocaust is that of Raoul Hilberg, which will hopefully soon be translated into Hebrew. Good summaries of the struggle involved in establishing the State of Israel can be found in the writings of Prof. Yehudah Bauer, while the most complete description of the war of independence is found in the book of Dr. Meir Pa'il. As regards the immigration of the Jews to the United States, especially noteworthy are Irving Howe's The World of our Fathers, and Arthur Hertzberg's new book. Let us hope that both of them will be published in Hebrew.

3. Jewish Thought in the Modern Age:

Jewish thought has taken a total about-face in modern times. In the post-18th century world, it can no longer maintain its pretension to be an all-encompassing world-view, nor a picture of reality encompassing all that is, based upon the fundamentals of existence and leading to the obligation of man towards the creator and His creatures. Human thought has been divided into autonomous domains: science, philosophy (including ethics), and religion and faith.

One still finds Jewish Thought which at least appears to have the old scope, encompassing God as creator, the work of creation, God's revelation and the chosenness of Israel, the mission of Israel and the redemption. It is very important that the Jewish student, even the most secular, be made aware of messianic thinking in its new form, such as is found in the writings of Rabbi Kook, and in other forms, in the later work of Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig. We must recognize the fact that most modern Jewish thought has devoted its main interest to the Jewish people and has become, both practically and in some respects even philosophically, a reflection of what Jews think about their own experience and that of their people.

Jewish thought in this new broader sense is by no means limited to philosophical or theological writing. It encompasses the works of authors from four separate disciplines which are often in conflict with each other:

a) Philosophical and theological writing (e.g. Moses Mendelssohn and Samson Raphael Hirsch; R. Nahman Krochmal and Moses Hess; Hermann Cohen and Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig and Rabbi A.I. Kook; Rabbi M.D. Soloveichik and A.J. Heschel;

S. H. Bergman, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Natan Rotenstreich and Eliezer Schweid.)

b) Historical and meta-historical writing (e.g. the essays of Zvi Graetz, the articles of Simon Dubnow and Yizhak Baer, Gershom Scholem and BenZion Dinur.)

c) The works of writers, literary intellectuals and publicists (e.g. Perez Smolenskin, Moshe Leib Lilienblum, David Frischmann and Ahad HaAm, M.Y. Berdyczewski and Hayyim Nahman Bialik, Joseph Hayyim Brenner and A.D. Gordon, Dov Sadan and Avraham Kariv, Aharon Appelfeld, Amos Oz and A.B. Yehoshua.)

d) The writings of social reformers and the ideologists (spokesmen) of social movements (e.g. Y.L. Pinsker, Theodore Herzl and Max Nordau, Vladamir Madam and Nahman Sirkin, Ber Borochov and Zeev Jabotinsky, Rabbi I.J. Reines and Mordechai M. Kaplan.)

Clearly, some of those listed in the last section are appropriate to an earlier category. But there are those who belong solely to this category. They are neither philosophers nor historians nor literary critic. Rather they are purely social reformers or people who stimulate others to such reform. The addition of these people may arouse disagreement. It seems to me, however, that the overall picture of Jewish thought will be incomplete if their writings are not included. Their inclusion will assist students to identify "thought" and "thinkers" in every context and not only in texts labelled as such. Obviously, it is desireable to ensure that only representatives of movements of a high conceptual level be included in this category. The works of people like David Ben Gurion, or the spokesmen for the Jewish religious movements in the United States, belong in this history category and not in the Jewish thought category.

It is possible to provide a more detailed bibliography. It would also be appropriate to think in terms of a 2-3 volume comprehensive anthology which would include excerpts from the writings of suggested writers. In the context of this general presentation, the essential educational consideration in the teaching of this material must be to present to the student the entire spectrum of positions and approaches relating to the Jewish experience.

My own experience as a counsellor in a youth movement, as a teacher in secondary school, teacher's seminary and university, and in particular as a lecturer in the army on the subject of Judaism and zionism, has demonstrated that questions of Jewish identity and the essence of Judaism are of the deepest concern to Israeli youth. In this respect, zionism has not led to "normalization" and it may well be good that it has not silenced these questions. This implies, however, that education carries a heavy burden of responsibility in presenting to the student the full range of modern Jewish thought. The students must be acquainted with those who view Judaism as a contract between God and His chosen; with those who view Judaism as a unified spiritual system and with those who view the Jews as an ethnic-historic clan with a common memory and mutual responsibility. The student must know those who think that Judaism has a role to play in the world and those who believe that its only involvement should be with itself; those who view Judaism as a destiny and those who view it simply as a fate.

The students must recognize differing analyses of the distress of the Jews in the world - both as individuals and as a culture - and must come to suggest solutions to relieve that distress. Students will argue with each other - as they

have always, but now their arguments will be based upon a higher level of information and awareness. The will argue about the distinctive nature of the Jewish people: absolute or relative, a blessing or a curse; whether this distinctive nature should it be preserved - partially or totally; and what bearing does all this have upon the future of the Jewish people, in Israel and in the diaspora.

Let us aspire to the students' creating in their own minds some connection between their people's ancient beliefs and culture, and modern life and society. I am not concerned with the nature of this connection, as long as it springs from knowledge and thought. I feel certain that the vast majority of those students capable of thinking this through will not choose either of the extremes, and to my mind undesirable, options. They will not opt for either cosmopolitanism (not even the Israeli or "Canaanite" version) or withdrawal into the world of Halacha, in response to a sense of alienation from, and total enmity towards the curse of modern life. However, the educator who thinks that he can predict the results ahead of time is suffering from delusions of grandeur.

One thing is certain: the intentional concealing of Jewish pluralism, both past and present, which involves keeping the student ignorant of his people's thought, history, culture and literature, is likely to backfire when the student is exposed indeed to information which has been withheld from him. Over the years, zionist education in Israel - particularly that of the kibbutz and the youth movement - attempted to conceal the full historic depth of Jewish cultural and religious identity. It often seemed that this education aimed to create within the student the impression that Jewish thought originated with Pinsker's "Auto-emancipation" and Jewish history with the concept of "holocaust and heroism", when the emphasis was on heroism, of course. The tone of that educational approach is best expressed in the unfortunate statement attributed to David Ben Gurion, according to which the history of Israel contains nothing of significance between the failure of the Bar Kochba rebellion and the founding of the Mikve Israel agricultural school. I am not at all surprised that many of the best of those students, when they discovered what had been concealed from them, set out to "search for their roots", "to return to the sources" and on occasion, even chose the path of the "newly religious".

Analogous to this educational blackout, the national religious educational system to this day places an opaque screen between its students and most of the social trends in Jewish history, the heights of Hebrew literary creativity and definitive chapters of national thought. The Jewish experience of the last 200 years, its richness, its tensions and its contradictions, is completely unknown to the students of this educational trend, lest it confuse them. They have created an artificial hothouse, and I do not hesitate to say that, alongside the ignoramuses created by the zionist/nationalist education in its heyday, the national religious education system (to say nothing of the Independent Education system) has produced myriads of Israeli youngsters whom I would call "religiously observant Levantines".

In both cases, the result for most of the students has been superficial Jewish consciousness: knowledge (limited) at the best, and at worst, total illiteracy. Among the secularists, there is ignorance of the sources, the originality and the historic depth of Judaism. Among the religiously observant, there is ignorance of the modern Jewish experience. Superficiality of Jewish consciousness is not to be differentiated between the two groups. I would even compare one to the other, based on the clearly controversial

assumption that a chapter of Bialik, Berdyczewski or Dubnow, for example, is no less "Judaism" or "Jewish education" than a chapter of the Kuzari or the tales of R. Nahman of Breslav.

I will not conceal from the reader the fact that my fears concerning the product of this education stem not only from a concern for appropriate Jewish education for the students. My fear stems from a genuine awareness that the incomplete education which, in my opinion, characterizes both the religious and the secular school, not only creates ignorant Jews but Jews who are fanatic, aggressive. narrowminded and lacking in even a minimal amount of tolerance. I trust that in this respect at least, my suggested curriculum represents some improvement.

4. Modern Jewish Literature:

Over the years, beginning with the schools of Eretz Yisrael and later, with the Israeli secular schools, literature was studied as an illustration of the history of the Jewish People, and especially of the growth, development, and justification of zionism. In the religious elementary school, modern Hebrew literature was barely

studied at all. Where it was studied, it was again treated as an illustration of "weightier" Jewish subjects: the halacha and its development, theoretical thought and history.

This was the situation in most Israeli elementary schools. Only in a few, both in the general and the religious sectors, was the situation different, and that due to the presence of a few exceptional enlightened teachers with good taste and a love of literature. But these were definitely the exception. For the most part, writers, poets and critics who appeared on the Israeli literary scene in the so-called Palmach generation, or the generation of "the state in the making" had to discover literature, both Hebrew and general, outside school hours, for themselves and by themselves.

Only in after-school hours did the graduates of secular schools discover aggadah and midrash, religious poetry (piyyut) and the "musar" literature, along with the true sources of the Hebrew language. (Sad proof of the lack of any significant meeting with the above is the impoverished Hebrew of many of Israel's native-born leaders.) On the other hand, the graduates of the religious schools discovered only later the existence of Chekhov and Sophocles, Shakespeare and Dostoyevsky, Faulkner and Camus. Indeed, this delayed discovery in many instances destroyed their literary ability,

which is one important reason that there are so few Israeli writers products of the national religious education trend.

In the sixties and seventies, with the penetration of the new trends of literary criticism and literary analysis ("new criticism", formalism, phenomenology, etc.), the philosophical and historic burden which had determined the teaching of literature weakened. Teachers had to change their approach to teaching literary works in themselves and not as illustrative auxilliaries of other subjects. In the wake of student pressure, they were also forced to teach indigenous Israeli literarure which, while still lacking the status of classics, were much more closely related to their own intellectual and emotional milieu.

As the curriculum became more varied, the teaching of literature improved. Today's aspiring authors are better prepared forthe goal which they have set for themselves. Literature has also penetrated the national religious education, whose students now read the works of Yehudah HaLevi, Agnon and Bialik. In the best of these schools, they also study one Greek drama and one Shakespeare drama, as well as one or two nineteenth century novels.

In my opinion, literature should be taught differently than Jewish history and Jewish thought. The difference should be expressed in three ways.

First, the main criterion for choosing the material should be its literary value and not its representative value for Jewish culture or Jewish history. The contradiction between these two criteria is only theoretical. To our good fortune, there are many exemplary works in Hebrew which deserve to be included in any reader according to both criteria, and it is these which should be selected. From "The Crown of Kingship" and "Domains" of Shlomo Ibn Gabirol and from the "Ode to Zion" and "Loves" of Yehudah HaLevi, to the poems of Bialik, the idylls of Tchernichovsky, the stories of Mendele, Berdyczewski, Brenner and Agnon, it is possible to find a large number of excellent works which reflect specifically Jewish experience, thought, ambience, problematic and sensitivity.

It would certainly be desirable to include Hebrew poetry and short stories which do not stand at the crossroads of the nationalist experience, from the drinking songs of Moses Ibn Ezra, the aphorisms of Shmuel HaNagid and the maqama of Yehudah Alharizi, to the "Winter Poems" of Bialik and the

sonnets and love poems of Tchernichovsky. But the limited number of curricular hours makes this difficult. Therefore, it is preferable as far as compulsory subjects are concerned (for electives, see below) to select works which, in addition to their high literary quality, are specifically Jewish in experience, thought and expression.

Second, in teaching literature to adolescents, it is important to include contemporary writing which describe the external as well as spiritual landscapes which are part of the student's own reality. Israeli literature includes a sufficient number of good works to provide the student with a rich experience and also meet the two criteria set out above. The stories of Yizhar and Oz, Amalia Kahane-Carmon and A.B. Yehoshua articulate Israeli landscapes, situations, conflicts, and attitudes with great intensity. Israel's wars are reflected in a stronger light in the "Friendship Poems" of Hayyim Guri, the love poems of Yehudah Amichai, the poetry of Natan Zach and Dalia Rabikovitch than in any history book. The echoes of the Holocaust in the stories of Aharon Appelfeld and in the poetry of Dan Pagis will not be forgotten by students whose souls are open to literature. It is essential that the curriculum in this area include a certain number of Israeli works.

Third, I am aware that the goal which I have set for the teaching of literature is not a simple one. It seems to me, however, that, along with literature as a compulsory subject, it is essential to provide an elective literature course where student can study additional classical and contemporary material. In such a course, it should be possible to learn literary theory beyond the bare minimum possible in the compulsory classes. Creative writing, whereby students share their own writing with their classmates and receive comments and reactions, could also be included.

Here too I have not provided a full bibliography. The suggested items are intended to be food for thought and not a detailed practical course. Should it be deemed necessary, I can provide a model bibliography.

5. Summary:

I assume that these ideas, as well as their liberal/ nationalist underpinnings, will disappoint my orthodox educator colleagues. They may think that my expectations of Jewish education are too modest for at least two reasons. The first is my assumption that it is neither necessary (nor possible) to place upon Jewish education the full responsibility for value-oriented, ethical and socio-

political education. I have elaborated my position and while I do not consider my remarks to be the final word, I assume that they form a basis for thought and discussion.

The second reason is my scepticism towards education, or more accurately, the educational system. True, as teachers and educators we must be guided by the premise that the educational system can make a great difference. But can it really compete with the home, friends, the street, and the newspaper. There are undoubtedly many upon whom a good teacher, a good book, and even a single good lesson have made an indelible impression. I have had the privilege of knowing such people.

I hope, however, that I will not be considered an incurable pessimist if I state that, in my opinion, there are many more who will receive their "real" education from the other sources enumerated above. For these individuals, the impression made by the educational system - as excellent as it may be - will be swept away by other influences. It may well be that the educational system has to take this possibility into account. Thus, instead of aiming high, and dreaming of "molding" the soul of the student, it should think of itself as creating obstacles and antibodies to the negative influences upon the student.

I posit that the most important antibodies for Jewish youth today are not only antidotes to crass materialism, to contempt for education and all spiritual values, to superficiality and to blind ignorant admiration for everything non-Jewish and out-of-bounds. They are also antidotes to unfounded fanaticism, to self-enclosure based upon a sense of chauvanistic superiority and to self-imposed ignorance. It seems to me that concern for the above creates a situation in which communication between teachers and educators of the liberal/nationalist sector and the traditional/orthodox sector in both Israel and the Diaspora is not only desirable but essential.

What Must a Jew Study—and Why?

(Maimonidean aspects of the phenomenology and teleology of learning)

I. Twersky

Note: The views that I am presenting here are closely linked to particular sources and to their precise interpretation. It will be necessary to consider separately, in depth and with sensitivity, their theoretical and practical educational implications. I am not proposing a specific curriculum here, but it should be abundantly clear that Maimonides' ideas provide the basic ideas and guiding principles for a curriculum and for the understanding of its aims at various stages. Content and purpose are inseparable.

A key passage, shedding valuable light on Maimonides' understanding of and approach to the vast and complex issue of what a Jew must study, is found in the *Laws of the Study of Torah*, Chapter 1:11-12:

> The time allotted to study should be divided into three parts. A third should be devoted to the Written Law; a third to the Oral Law; and the last third should be spent in reflection, deducing conclusions from premises, developing implications of statements, comparing dicta, studying the hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is interpreted, till one knows the essence of these principles, and how to deduce what is permitted and what is forbidden from what one has learned traditionally. This is termed Talmud.
>
> For example, if one is an artisan who works at his trade three hours daily and devotes nine hours to the study of the Torah, he should spend three of these nine hours in the study of the Written Law, three in the study of the Oral Law, and the remaining three in reflecting on how to deduce one rule from another. The words of the Prophets are comprised in the Written Law, while their exposition falls within the category of the Oral Law. The subjects styled Pardes (Esoteric Studies) are included in Talmud. This plan applies to the period when one begins learning. But after one has become proficient and no longer needs to learn the Written Law or continually be occupied with the Oral Law, he should, at fixed times, read the Written Law and the traditional dicta, so as not to forget any of the rules of the Torah, and should devote all his days exclusively to the study of Talmud according to his breadth of mind and maturity of intellect.

Several important aspects of this passage should be noted; at the same time, however, it should be stressed that it contains a number of formulations requiring explication and clarification. It is as complex and original as it is important.

The passage stands out, uncharacteristically for Maimonides, for its lack of brevity. It is based on the concise but rich talmudic dictum: "One should always divide his years into three: a third

for Bible, a third for Mishnah, and a third for Talmud" (Kiddushin 30a). The reversal of Maimonides' usual approach, which is to summarize lengthy talmudic passages in a few words, cannot help but draw our attention. He proceeds to present in great detail the three units of study mentioned in the Talmud. The following two points require consideration: a) Maimonides' apparent assumption that a specific case (the Mishnah) is interchangeable with a general category that includes it (the Oral Law); and b) his mention of Gemarah or Talmud as an independent unit of study, separate from what he refers to as the Oral Law, and including the natural sciences and metaphysics. A precise definition of the terms Mishnah and Talmud in Maimonides' writings, together with the delineation of their limits and of the relationships between them, will help us to understand these points. If Oral Law is used as a synonym for Mishnah, where does the Talmud fit in, and what is the place of philosophy in it?

Perhaps it is best to present our conclusions first, and to set out the supporting arguments afterwards.

First of all, the Mishnah and the Gemarah coincide completely in scope; both represent the complete codification of the Oral Law.

Secondly, they are distinguished from each other in method and form: the Mishnah is apodictic and unequivocal, while the Gemarah is complex and analytical. However, in purpose and function they are identical. The Gemarah is to the Mishnah as supporting evidence (Moffet) is to established tradition (Kabbalah). The essential nature of the Gemarah is self-analysis, conceptualization, interpretive expansion; it seeks understanding, both broad and deep.

Finally, philosophy (Pardes) is an inseparable and even central component of the Oral Law, and like the halachah, it can be formulated either in language that is absolute and apodictic or in the format of analytical discussion. Let us look at these matters more closely.

Actually, the fact that Maimonides, in the passage cited above, identifies the Mishnah with the Oral Law, using the term to refer to the entire authoritative corpus of the halachah, should not surprise us. The Mishnah of R. Judah Hanasi is in fact the basic text of the Oral Law. All halachic works, whether by Tannaim or by Amoraim, either explain or interpret the contents of the Mishnah; they never attempt to add to it. Maimonides reviews this distinction carefully and consistently in his introductions to his Commentary on the Mishnah and to the Mishneh Torah. The purpose of the *halachic midrashim*, the *Sifra* and the *Sifre*, is "to explain and to make known the main points of the Mishnah." Likewise, the Toseftah comes "to explain the Mishnah." The same is true for the *baraitot*, which are also intended to explain "the words of the Mishnah." This interpretive relationship to the Mishnah characterizes as well the two Talmudim, which continue the "interpretation of the matters in the Mishnah and the explanation of its deeper meanings." One of Rav Ashi's four purposes in editing the Babylonian

Talmud was to reveal the innovations that the scholars of each generation had built upon the Mishnah, and to explain the rules and the proofs that they learned from these innovations.[1] The primary interest of all of these works is "explanation." Perhaps this can help us to understand why Maimonides often refers to the Talmud when he is actually citing the Toseftah[2] – for in his view, the two are one and the same. Thus, the Mishnah does indeed represent all of the Oral Law.

The Mishnah is different from the Gemarah only in that its contents are presented in the form of a legal code – and this is the second aspect of the definition of the term. The Mishnah presents the normative conclusion, the obligatory mitzvah, without extensive explanations and without detailed examination of the process of interpretation and analysis. Therefore, it is possible in various contexts to use the terms "Mishnah," "mitzvah," "halachah" (or "*hilchatah*") as synonyms, freely and without distinction.[3] It is significant for this discussion that the introduction to the Mishneh Torah opens with these words:

> All the precepts which Moses received on Sinai were given together with their interpretation, as it is said, 'And I will give to you the tables of stone, and the law, and the commandment' (Exodus 24:12). 'The law' refers to the Written Law; 'the commandment,' to its interpretation. God bade us fulfill the Law in accordance with 'the commandment.' This commandment refers to that which is called the Oral Law.

The equation Mishnah = *mitzvah* = Oral Law is formulated here in sharp relief. The fact that Maimonides stated this equation intentionally, with full awareness of its implications, and that he consistently identified with it, is clearly confirmed by another passage in the Mishneh Torah, which refers to the above citation in these words:[4] . . ."Moses was commanded concerning all these matters orally, as in the case of the rest of the Oral Law, which is referred to as

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1 Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, pp. 34 ff.; Introduction to the Mishneh Torah, 73-74. Also, in Maimonides' famous letter to R. Pinhas Dayana (Vol. 1, 25:4), he mentions that "the Talmud is commentary on the Mishnah."

2 See, for example: S. Lieberman, *Tosefta Kifshutah*, Tractate Zera'im, p. 637, n. 1; p. 642, n. 25; p. 645, n. 38, and so on.

3 Kiddushin 49b; Mishneh Torah, Laws Relating to Marital Relations 8:4 (There Maimonides translated the Aramaic term "hilchatah" as "mishnah"). See R. Hai Gaon (or R. Sherira Gaon [See T. Groner, *Teshuvot Rav Hai Gaon*, p. 65, #881]), in Harkavy, *Teshuvot Hagaonim*, #262, p. 135 (and *Otzar Hagaonim* on Megillah 28b, p. 53): "but hilchata is our Mishnah." And see Asaf, *Teshuvot Hagaonim*, 1927, #58, p. 74: "And you must know that the core of all of our Sages' wisdom and of all of their teachings in the Baraita and the Gemarah is the Mishnah." (And see the beginning of the introduction to the Talmud attributed to R. Shmuel Hanagid: "The Mishnah is what is called the Oral Law.")

4 Mishneh Torah, Laws Relating to Slaughter 1:4; beginning of introduction to the Mishneh Torah.

'commandment,' as we have explained in the introduction to this work." The Talmudic source of this statement, Berachot 5a, was first pointed out by the Gaon of Vilna.[5] Fortunately, we now have explicit testimony from R. Abraham, Maimonides' son, confirming that this "interpretation of the translators" is indeed the source of the opening words of Maimonides' magnum opus. Thus, our general assumption of the identity in the eyes of Maimonides of the Mishnah and the Oral Law (or of the Mishnah and mitzvah) is substantiated by his son, who emphasizes forcefully—even dramatically—that the term "Mishnah" does not refer to a particular text, but rather to the general foundations of the Tradition: "The Sages statement, 'and the commandment—this is the Mishnah' refers to the Fathers (=Foundations) of the Tradition, not to our text of the Mishnah."[6] The term "Mishnah" thus relates to the entire traditional corpus of the Oral Law. "Talmud" refers to the constantly expanding interpretation of this corpus.

As a final example, we mention Maimonides' well-known letter to R. Pinchas Dayana of Alexandria (vol. 1, p. 25b):

> Know that I have already stated at the beginning of my work that what I have tried to do is to adopt the way of the Mishnah and the language of the Mishnah. But you did not pay attention to my words, and didn't understand the difference between the way of the Mishnah and the way of the Talmud. And because of your failure to understand this you wrote to me the following: 'And when I study our master's work, I find many times matters that are beyond me, for they are presented without proof and I am incapable of understanding them.' Such were your words; I shall now explain.
>
> Know, friend and colleague, that whoever has written a book, be it in matters of Torah or in other disciplines, be it by the non-Jewish authors of antiquity, masters of the sciences, or be it by physicians, must choose one of two approaches: that of codification or that of interpretation. The codificatory approach includes only correct views, without challenges and analysis, without any proof whatsoever, as did R. Judah Hanasi in composing the Mishnah. The interpretive approach includes both correct views and contrary ones, challenges on every matter, and analysis and proof regarding what is true and what is false, what is worthy and what is not. This is the approach of the Talmud, for the Talmud is the interpretation of the Mishnah. Now I have not written an interpretation, but a code, like the Mishnah. And if one who didn't understand were to claim that the Mishnah's giving the names of the Sages may be seen as a form of supporting proof—So-and-so says thus, and So-and-so says thus—this is not substantiation. Substantiation means exposing the reasons So-and-so is saying what he says; it means stating the "why" behind a Sage's ruling.

In the process of defending the purpose and nature of the *Mishneh Torah*, Maimonides clarifies

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5 R. Menachem Krakovsky commented on this in *Avodat Hamelech*, "Al Atar"; abd see B.Z. Bacher, *Ha'Agadah Beyetzirat Chazal*, p. 136, n. 1 (Moshe ben Maimon, p. 145, n. 1).

6 R. Abraham ben Moshe, Commentary on Exodus 24:12, pp. 382-384 (and note the editor's comment on p. 383, n. 105). Volume 1, 25b.

in this letter the differences in structure and style between the two genres, "interpretation" and "codification." He defines the *Mishneh Torah* as codification.

What stands out here more prominently than in the sources cited above is the fact that Maimonides explicitly identifies the "way of Mishnah" with the "way of codification" and the "way of Talmud" with the "way of interpretation." In other words, we find here two different approaches to the same content, two different methods of presentation. Maimonides identifies his own work not only with the Mishnah, but also with the "way of the Mishnah," as though to say: the *Mishnah Torah*, an all-inclusive summary of the Oral Law, is equal to the Mishnah in its comprehensiveness and in its authoritative approach. This is how Maimonides refers to his magnum opus in all of his writings.[7] Taking together his various statements on this matter, we can arrive at the following definition of the *Mishneh Torah*: The book is a summary of and an authoritative guide to the entire Oral Law, including both the currently practical portions and those sections not applicable in our day. It is formulated, in genre and style, according to the Mishnah, and avoids talmudic detailed analysis and argumentation. Its purpose is to give the reader access to the entire contents of the Oral Law in highly concentrated form. Maimonides' willingness to dispense with talmudic deliberation is of particular significance.

From the above discussion, we can learn the following:

1.

At first glance the substitution of the term "Written Law" for "Bible" ("Mikra") seemed simple and unproblematic, and therefore we did not find it necessary to comment on it previously. However, it is difficult to understand the relegation of the Bible (Written Law) to the elementary level of study ("the period when one begins learning"), that which is needed in order to create a reservoir of basic knowledge but which apparently does not involve interpretive effort or deep study. The implication that all that is required of a student in this area is a certain level of textual expertise requires further explanation. After all, we can easily show that Maimonides made extensive use of the Bible in many different contexts (philosophical, halachic, ethical, historical, linguistic); likewise, mention can be made of his productive achievements in the area of biblical interpretation: original exegesis and innovative application. Maimonides assigned great importance to the precise and detailed knowledge of the Bible, and opposed the kind of preoccupation with Talmud study which left no place for the

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7 Regarding the expression "Mishneh Torah" meaning "repeated study of the Torah" see R. Shlomo ben Shimon Duran, *Milchamah Mitzuvah*, 39a. He finds support for his view in the expression "Mishneh Tefilah" in the Laws Relating to Prayer 1:1. (Cf. *Kesef Mishnah*, Laws Relating to Divorce 2:6: "That is why the master called his book Mishneh Torah, as he writes in shortened form all that is written in the Gemarah".)

study of the Bible, "a book that is the guide of the first and the last men" (*Guide of the Perplexed*, part 1, chap. 2), "the book that has illumined the darknesses of the world" (ibid., part 3, chap. 10). He criticized those who claim to understand the Bible on the basis of "glancing through it during leisure hours . . . as one would glance through a historical work or a piece of poetry" (ibid., part 1, chap. 2). He advised his beloved disciple R. Yosef ben Yehudah, whom he knew to be deeply involved in study: "Nevertheless, expound the Torah of Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, and do not depart from it . . . [for] in it you will see divine visions" (*Maimonides' Letters*, p. 16). In the third chapter of the "*Eight Chapters*," the Torah is referred to as the "book of truth." Philosophical views and matters of belief are regularly associated by Maimonides with the Bible, either by close interpretation or by asmachtah. R. Abraham, Maimonides' son, cites several interpretive traditions which he received from his father orally, and often dwells on biblical interpretations found in the *Mishneh Torah* or implied by halachic statements therein. In the light of these facts, which point to Maimonides' constant and intense occupation with the Bible, we must return to his words, quoted above from the *Laws of the Study of Torah* 1:12, in which he seems to present the study of Bible as an incomplete and elementary discipline, providing neither challenge nor insight. In fact, the study of the Bible has two aspects [in his thinking]: the aspect of simple reading, which results in basic cognitive knowledge, and the aspect of in-depth study, which leads to philosophical enlightenment and correct opinions.

2.

Mishnah is an independent subject for study, comprehensive in its scope and not dependent on the Gemarah (the same holds for Maimonides' *Mishneh Torah*); this can be inferred from the author's definition of his *Commentary on the Mishnah*:

> It seems to me that if this work covers the entire Mishnah, as I will explain, it will have four great uses. First, that we will make known the correct interpretation of the Mishnah and explicate its terms; for if you were to ask the greatest of the scholars to explain a particular halachah from the Mishnah, he would not be able to answer unless he had memorized the Talmud on that halachah; or he would reach the point at which the Talmud on the topic would have to be looked at. No one is able to memorize the whole talmudic discussion, especially when one halachah in the Mishnah gives rise to four or five pages as [the Talmud] moves from topic to topic, bringing proofs, challenges, and solutions to the point where no one who is not a great expert in the text can possibly summarize the intepretation of a particular Mishnah. And this does not even take into account those halachot whose interpretation is scattered through several different tractates. Second, (as to) the decisors (poskim): I will indicate, for each halachah, whose opinion determines the final decision. Third, that it will serve as an introduction for one beginning to study, enabling him to learn all matters with precision and clarity and to encompass thereby the entire contents of the Talmud; this will greatly assist in the study of the Talmud. And fourth, it will serve as a review for one who has already studied and learned, helping him keep all of his knowledge always accessible and organized.
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> And when I thought about all of these things, I was drawn to write the work of which I had

> conceived. My intention in this work is to explicate the Mishnah as it is interpreted in the Talmud, presenting only the correct interpretations and leaving out those rejected in the Talmud; I will record the reason for each particular decision, as well as the reasons, in some cases, for controversies where they arose; also, the names of the Sages according to whose position the halachah was decided, as indicated in the Talmud. In all this I will strive for brevity of language so that the reader will not be left with uncertainty; for this work is not written to explain to stones, but rather, to explain to those capable of understanding.

The same principled position regarding comprehensive scope is also emphasized in the equation of the Mishnah of R. Judah Hanasi to Maimonides' *Mishneh Torah*. As we have seen, Maimonides identified his magnum opus with the Mishnah and with the "way of the Mishnah;" i.e., the *Mishneh Torah* is equivalent to the Mishnah in its comprehensive scope and in its direct and authoritative approach. This approach, presenting quotations from the Mishnah and authoritative halachah side-by-side, is justified in terms of its pedagogical efficiency and reliability—it facilitates quick understanding and minimizes the burden on memory. The expression, "matters of Torah which require no profound reflection, as for instance established halachot" (*Laws of Prayer*, 4:18) epitomizes the concept exactly. Maimonides' ideal was disciplined scholarly interest in the entire range of the Oral Law, even including those laws pertaining to matters that are no longer relevant.

In order properly to clarify this concept, we should note that here Maimonides differs from R. Bahya Ibn Pakudah, who emphasized that too much occupation with the study of laws remote from current reality does not necessarily contribute to one's religious sensitivity, and may even detract from it. R. Bahya and those who subscribed to his view focussed their attention on matters of theological and ethical contemplation, and thereby limited the study of the Talmud to its practical portions. Maimonides system was quite different: he sought to preserve the Talmud in its entire scope, but with new language and in a different order; he rejected only certain types of *pilpul* which he viewed as empty and pointless. According to his approach, limitation of the scope of study represented an impairment—both religious and intellectual—of the historical-cultural continuity of the nation. This impairment must be prevented. Maimonides' purpose in the *Mishneh Torah* was to improve the methodology of study, without limiting its scope. And just as he refused to accept the assumption that the scope of study must be limited for external reasons, so he also rejected outright the opposing claim that the reliance on summaries and conciseness would interfere with comprehensive study. The balance between inclusiveness and condensation that characterizes the *Mishneh Torah* is most impressive, not less than its brevity of language and refined literary taste.

3.

The study of Gemarah, whether according to its standard definition or according to Maimonides' special definition of it, is difficult, complex, and demanding. In the words of the

introduction to the *Mishneh Torah*:

> Needless to add that . . . the Talmud itself – the Babylonian as well as the Palestinian – . . . require for its comprehension broad knowledge, a wise soul, and considerable study.

Maimonides repeatedly emphasizes that the study of Talmud, in and of itself, without even taking into account historical and other auxiliary factors, is difficult. Even under the most comfortable and undistracting conditions, it requires that the student dedicate himself to it "according to his breadth of mind and maturity of intellect" (*Laws of the Study of Torah* 1:12), "for its method is exceedingly profound" (introduction to the *Mishneh Torah*). The difficulty of study arises both from the nature of the material and from its form: the method of argument and reasoning, the extremely associative nature of its discourse, the condensed and subtle language, the broad scope, the confusing intertwining of subjects and concepts – and in our terms of reference, the whole range of philological, historical, and phenomenological problems – all of these weigh upon the learner. And if this description is fitting for the Talmud in general, what about those passages which are particularly difficult, to the point where the greatest scholars cannot make sense of them? On the subject of purity, Maimonides says:

> And if the greatest of the scholars of the Mishnah, peace be upon them, found these matters very difficult, how much the more so should we [be expected to]. . . . Today, on account of our many sins, if you were to turn to the heads of yeshivot – and certainly of synagogues – you would discover that the matter is very hard for them. . . . Any halachah dealing with purity and impurity . . . and related matters is difficult even for the great scholars – how much the more so for their students.

The most distinctive aspect of the Gemarah is the deliberation that seeks to reconstruct the process of formulation of the laws. The *Mishneh Torah*, like the Mishnah, is described as a work, one of whose main distinctions is its elimination of the complex and exhausting deliberation of the talmudic dialectic. Maimonides' words in his *Commentary on the Mishnah*, Sotah 5:1 (p. 261) are noteworthy in this context:

> There is no conflict between Rabbi and R. Akiba regarding the decision; they only differ regarding its proof. The appropriate place for the details of their controversy and for their proofs for their respective arguments is the deliberation in the Talmud, not here, so that we do not multiply words here at the expense of utility.

It seems then, that a consciousness of the distinction between Mishnah and Talmud is always in order. As a biographical addendum, which sheds some light on this complex matter, it is important to remember that Maimonides' interest in Talmud did not end with the completion of the *Mishneh Torah*. He wrote commentaries and novellae on the Gemarah, not limiting himself to those topics about which questions were addressed to him. This does not contradict the underlying principle of his work. We must keep in mind that on many topics, it was impossible to avoid dealing with the Talmudic deliberation itself. Matters on which a clear

decision had not been reached required renewed examination of the talmudic sources. The same is true for controversial interpretations: these too required a review of the original sources for proper re-evaluation. No abridgement or book of halachic rulings can achieve completeness or win general approval without a basis in the Talmud. With respect to certain matters, the direct study of the Gemarah remains the ultimate authority to which all must turn. Maimonides' supporters, who directed angry or mocking criticism at those students who continued to labor over the Talmud instead of relying exclusively on the *Mishneh Torah*, were not faithful to their master's views. It was not accidental that Maimonides emphatically declared in his letter to R. Pinchas Dayana: "Know from the beginning that I did not, God forbid, say to occupy yourselves with . . . the Gemarah!"

4.

Philosophy, in the broadest sense of the term, is an essential part of the Oral Law and is included in the mitzvot of the study of Torah alongside "the forbidden and the permitted, the impure and the pure." It is worth pointing out an aspect of formal resemblance between these two definitions of Gemarah: both are described as requiring "broad knowledge, a wise soul, and considerable study;" the two types of Gemarah study both require the same distinctive qualities and prior attainments – especially extensive prior knowledge, obtained systematically through a precise and ordered course of study (see also the introduction to the *Commentary on the Mishnah*, and *Guide of the Perplexed* 1:31-34).

The inclusion of philosophy in the Oral Law was already posited by Maimonides in an earlier chapter of *The Book of Knowledge*, in the *Laws of the Basic Principles of Torah* 4:13. There he restated his identification of the "Account of the Creation" with physics, and of the "Account of the Divine Chariot" with metaphysics, as set forth in his *Commentary on the Mishnah* (Hagigah 2:1). The text of the *Commentary on the Mishnah* is as follows:

> Now listen to what I have determined according to my understanding from my study of the writings of the Sages: in the term "Account of Creation" they refer to the natural sciences and the study of cosomogony. By the "Account of the Divine Chariot" they mean theology, i.e., the discussion of the nature of reality and of the existence of the Creator, His knowledge, His attributes, the necessity of all that emanates from Him, the angels, the soul, human reason, and the afterlife. On account of the importance of these two types of science, the natural and the divine, that the Sages rightly considered of great importance, they cautioned against studying them in the same manner as the other disciplines; for it is known that every man, be he foolish or wise, is drawn naturally toward all the disciplines. It is impossible for a man to avoid contemplating these two sciences on a primary level, directing his thought towards them, without any prior introductions and without having progressed through the stages of scientific study. Thus, [the text] warned about this in order to prevent it, seeking to discourage whoever thinks he can direct his thought towards the "Account of Creation" without proper preparation, as it is said: "Whoever gazes upon four things . . . ." And as a warning to one who tries to direct his thoughts and contemplate upon matters

> relating to the divine with his simple imagination, without having progressed through the stages of scientific study, it is said: "Whoever is not careful about the honor of his Maker . . . it would have been better for him not to have come into the world." This means that it would have been better had he not been part of humanity, but had rather been of another species of creature, for he is seeking knowledge not appropriate to his way and his nature; for he does not understand what is above and what is below, but is foolish in matters of reality. And when a man devoid of all knowledge seeks to contemplate and thereby know what is above the heavens and what is beneath the earth, using his deficient imagination which thinks of the heavens as though they were the attic of his house, and [to know] what was before the heavens were created and what will be after they cease to exist, this will surely bring him to despair and distraction. He who considers this wonderful, divinely inspired expression, "Whoever is not careful about the honor of his Maker..." [realizes] that it refers to one who is not careful about his intellect, for the intellect is the honor of God. And since such a man is not aware of the value of this thing which has been granted to him, he is given to the control of his appetites and *is* made animal-like. This is why it was said, " 'Whoever is not careful about the honor of his Maker. . .' refers to one who sins in secret;" and elsewhere it was said, "adulterers do not commit adultery until a spirit of foolishness has entered into them." This is true, for when the appetite rules—any appetite—the intellect is not whole. [The Mishnah] mentions this matter here, because above it was stated that "these are the esssentials of the Torah;" now this text delineates the foundations of the essentials of the Torah.

And here is the text from the *Mishneh Torah*, the *Laws of the Basic Principles of Torah* (4:13):

> The topics connected with these five precepts, treated in the above four chapters, are what our wise men called Pardes (Paradise), as in the passage "Four went into Pardes" (Hagigah 14). And although those four were great men of Israel and great sages, they did not all possess the capcity to know and grasp these subjects clearly. Therefore, I say that it is not proper to dally in Pardes till one has first filled oneself with bread and meat; by which I mean knowledge of what is permitted and what forbidden, and similar distinctions in other classes of precepts. Although these last subjects were called by the sages "a small thing" (when they say "A great thing—Account of the Divine Chariot; a small thing—the discussion of Abbayye and Rava"), still they should have the precedence. For the knowledge of these things gives primarily composure to the mind. They are the precious boon bestowed by God, to promote social well-being on earth, and enable men to obtain bliss in the life hereafter. Moreover, the knowledge of them is within the reach of all, young and old, men and women; those gifted with great intellectual capacity as well as those whose intelligence is limited.

Maimonides' halachic thinking, which integrates philosophy into the essence of the Oral Law, is perfectly consistent with his view on the history of philosophy. Like many authors in the Middle Ages, Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike, Maimonides believed that the Jews had cultivated the sciences of physics and metaphysics in early times, but that they had abandoned these studies over the years for various historical and theological reasons. However, he did not hold the widely accepted view, found in the writings of R. Yehudah Halevi, that the source of all of the sciences is Judaism, from which others drew either by borrowing or by imitation. R. Yehudah Halevi, reflecting a view that had already been articulated by Philo, said that "all of the sciences were transfered root and branch from us to the Chaldeans at first, and later to

Greece, and then to Rome." The fact that Maimonides did not see himself as party to this view can be learned from an argument from silence, from the way he limits himself, in the *Guide*, to establishing the antiquity (in principle) of philosophy in Israel. However, it seems to me that the idea is stated explicitly in the introduction to the *Commentary on the Mishnah*. There, in reviewing a particular argument, Maimonides mentions that the point "was not made known to us by the prophets alone," but also by "the scholars of the peoples of antiquity, even though they never saw the prophets and never heard their words." Maimonides made no effort to show the dependence of any philosophical system on a Jewish source. His only concern was to establish that "wisdom" was a fundamental part of the Oral Law, and that therefore the general study of the Oral Law must include philosophy as well. This is the position—a harmonistic position, uniting the practical, theoretical, and theological aspects of the halachah—that Maimonides set forth in the *Mishneh Torah*.

5.

Moreover, from Maimonides' words in the *Laws of the Basic Principles of Torah* 4:13, we learned that not only is philosophy included, fundamentally, in the Oral Law, but that it is of particular importance. Maimonides accepted without reservation the principle of the superiority of philosophical knowledge. The explicit statement of the *Mishneh Torah* regarding the relative value of Talmud study as opposed to "Account of the Divine Chariot" ("a small thing" vs. "a great thing") is identical not only to the emphasis found in the *Commentary on the Mishnah* with respect to the relationship between "the essentials of Torah" and "the foundations of the essentials of Torah," but also to the implications of the hierarchy of values found in the parable of the king in his castle, in the *Guide of the Perplexed* (3:51):

> Those who have come up to the habitation and walk around it are the jurists who believe true opinions on the basis of traditional authority and study the Law concerning the practices of divine service, but do not engage in speculation concerning the fundamental principles of religion and make no inquiry whatever regarding the rectification of belief. Those who have plunged into speculation concerning the fundamental principles of religion, have entered the antechambers. People there indubitably have different ranks. He, however, who has achieved demonstration, to the extent that that is possible, of everything that may be demonstrated; and who has ascertained in divine matters, to the extent that that is possible, everything that may be ascertained; and who has come close to certainty in those matters in which one can only come close to it—has come to be with the ruler in the inner part of the habitation.

6.

In the *Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance* 10:6, Maimonides writes as follows:

> It is known and certain that the love of God does not become closely knit in a man's heart till he is continuously and thoroughly possessed by it and gives up everything else in the world for it; as

> God commanded us, "with all your heart and with all your soul" (Deut. 6:5). One only loves God with the knowledge with which one knows Him. According to the knowledge will be the love. If the former be little or much, so will the latter be little or much. A person ought therefore to devote himself to the understanding and comprehension of those sciences and studies which will inform him concerning his Master, as far as it lies in human faculties to understand and comprehend – as indeed we have explained in the Laws of the Basic Principles of the Torah.

On the basis of these words, also hinted at in the *Guide of the Perplexed* 3:28 and 3:51, we can take another step, to an additional conclusion which is significant and whose implications are far-reaching. The ultimate, desired perfection is spiritual perfection: love of God anchored in the knowledge of God. We are not dealing here with intellectualism for its own sake. Philosophical knowledge is not the be all and end all. The ultimate purpose of all study is the exalted religious experience – love of God. Intellectual perfection, which occupies a central place in Maimonides' thought, is a necessary pre-condition for the love of God. Note also his words in the *Laws of the Basic Principles of the Torah*, 2:1-2:

> This God, honored and revered, it is our duty to love and fear; as it is said "You shall love the Lord your God" (Deut. 6:5), and it is further said "You shall fear the Lord your God" (ibid. 6:13). And what is the way that will lead to the love of Him and the fear of Him? When a person contemplates His great and wondrous works and creatures and from them obtains a glimpse of His wisdom which is incomparable and infinite, he will straightway love Him, praise Him, glorify Him, and long with an exceeding longing to know His great Name; even as David said, "My soul thirsts for God, for the living God" (Ps. 42:3). And when he ponders these matters, he will recoil frightened, and realize that he is a small creature, lowly and obscure, endowed with slight and slender intelligence, standing in the presence of Him who is perfect in knowledge. And so David said "When I consider Your heavens, the work of Your fingers – what is man that You are mindful of him?" (Ps. 8:4-5). In harmony with these sentiments, I shall explain some large, general aspects of the works of the Sovereign of the Universe, that they may serve the intelligent individual as a door to the love of God, even as our sages have remarked in connection with the theme of the love of God, "Observe the Universe and hence, you will realize Him who spoke and the world was."

Conceptual understanding is not complete unless it leads to the love of God. The critical role of philosophical contemplation is to bring about love of God; i.e., intellectualism was in the eyes of its devotees, including Maimonides, a necessary component of the religious tradition and the religious experience. While in many cases rationalism arose in the context of an apologetic polemic ("for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the eyes of the nations"), nevertheless, it was undoubtedly seen as a positive obligation, of intrinsic significance. Intellectual achievement is a vital and critical component of religious perfection. It is a religious obligation to use our intellectual powers to delve into the nature of the universe and the meaning of the Torah, both of which are revelations of the divine.

The inclusion of the *Book of Knowledge* in a comprehensive halachic treatise highlights Maimonides' conception of the unity of the philosophical and halachic essentials of Judaism.

The purpose of intellectual reflection and of the mastery of the various scientific disciplines is spiritual experience. Learning attains its pinnacle and ultimate purpose to the extent that the learner approaches a condition of absorption in the love of God.

7.

The understanding of the rationales of the commandments (ta'amei ha'mitzvot) is an important component of this process; the study of all of the commandments, with their explanations and reasons, is a religious obligation. Maimonides' words in the *Laws of Trespass*, 8:8, call for careful study:

> It is fitting for man to meditate upon the laws of the holy Torah and to comprehend their full meaning to the extent of his ability. Nevertheless, a law for which he finds no reason and understands no cause should not be trivial in his eyes. Let him not "break through to rise up against the Lord lest the Lord break forth upon him" (Ex. 19:24); nor should his thoughts concerning these things be like his thoughts concerning profane matters. Come and consider how strict the Torah was in the law of trespass! Now if sticks and stones and earth and ashes became hallowed by words alone as soon as the name of the Master of the Universe was invoked upon them, and anyone who comported with them as with a profane thing committed trespass and required atonement even if he acted unwittingly, how much more should man be on guard not to rebel against a commandment decreed for us by the Holy One, blessed by He, only because he does not understand its reason; or to heap words that are not right against the Lord; or to regard the commandments in the manner he regards ordinary affairs.
>
> Behold it is said in Scripture: "You shall therefore keep all My statutes and all Mine ordinances, and do them" (Lev. 20:22); whereupon our sages have commented that "keeping" and "doing" refer to the "statutes" as well as to the "ordinances." "Doing" is well known; namely, to perform the statutes. And "keeping" means that one should be careful concerning them and not imagine that they are less important than the ordinances. Now the "ordinances" are commandments whose reason is obvious, and the benefit derived in this world from doing them is well known; for example, the prohibition against robbery and murder, or the commandment of honoring one's father and mother. The "statutes," on the other hand, are commandments whose reason is not known. Our sages have said: My statutes are the decrees that I have decreed for you, and you are not permitted to question them. A man's impulse pricks him concerning them and the Gentiles reprove us about them, such as the statutes concerning the prohibition against the flesh of the pig and that against meat seethed with milk, the law of the heifer whose neck is broken, the red heifer, or the scapegoat.
>
> How much was King David distressed by heretics and pagans who disputed the statutes! Yet the more they pursued him with false questions, which they plied according to the narrowness of man's mind, the more he increased his cleaving to the Torah; as it is said: "The proud have forged a lie against me; but I with my whole heart will keep Your precepts" (Ps. 119:69). It is also said there concerning this: "All Your commandments are faithful; they persecute me falsely, help You me" (ibid. 119:86).
>
> All the [laws concerning the] offerings are in the category of statutes. The sages have said that

> the world stands because of the service of the offerings; for through the performance of the statutes and the ordinances the righteous merit life in the world to come. Indeed, the Torah puts the commandment concerning the statutes first; as it is said: "You shall therefore keep My statutes, and Mine ordinances which if a man do, he shall live by them" (Lev. 18:5).

And in the *Laws of Substitute Offerings* (4:13) we find further development of the same idea:

> . . . Although the statutes of the Law are all of them divine edicts, as we have explained at the close of Laws of Trespass, yet it is proper to ponder over them and to give a reason for them, so far as we are able to give them a reason. The sages of former times said that King Solomon understood most of the reasons for all the statutes of the Law. It seems to me that in so far as Scripture has said: "Both it and that for which it is changed shall be holy" (Lev. 27:10) – as also in that matter whereof it has said "And if he that sanctified it will redeem his house then he shall add the fifth part of the money of your valuation" (ibid. 17:15) – the Law has plumbed the depths of man's mind and the extremity of his evil impulse. For it is man's nature to increase his possessions and to be sparing of his wealth. Even though a man had made a vow and dedicated something, it may be that later he drew back and repented and would now redeem it with something less than its value. But the Law has said, "If he redeems it for himself he shall add the fifth." So, too, if a man dedicated a beast, to make a sacred offering of its body, perchance he would draw back, and since he cannot redeem it, would change it for something of less worth. And if the right was given to him to change the bad for the good he would change the good for the bad and say, "It is good." Therefore Scripture has stopped the way against him so that he should not change it, and has penalized him if he should change it and has said: "Both it and that for which it was changed shall be holy." And both these laws serve to suppress man's natural tendency and correct his moral qualities . . . .

(*Note:* a comprehensive discussion of these two sources may be found in my book, *Introduction to Maimonides' Mishneh Torah*, pp. 305 ff.)

The religious commandment needs no authority beyond itself: the obligation of obedience to it is not conditional, ". . . for reverence is due not to the commandments themselves, but to Him who has issued them, blessed by He. . . ." (*Laws of Slaughtering* 14:16). Nevertheless, the search for the meaning and purpose of the commandment, the fervent struggle to find its rationale, is a basic component of the knowledge of God and a means for advancing a person on the path to perfection. Only contemplation, inquiry, and constant thought regarding the meaning and purposes of each and every commandment can prevent the neglect of observance of the commandments and the fading of their importance and influence. In this context, we should read *Guide of the Perplexed* 3:51:

> Know that all the practices of the worship, such as reading the Torah, prayer, and the performance of the other commandments, have only the end of training you to occupy yourself with His commandments, may He be exalted, and not with that which is other than He. If, however, you pray merely by moving your lips while facing a wall, and at the same time think about your buying and selling, or if you read the Torah with your tongue while your heart is set upon the building of your habitation and does not consider what you read; and similarly in all cases in which you

> perform a commandment merely with your limbs – as if you were digging a hole in the ground or hewing wood in the forest – without reflecting either upon the meaning of that action or upon Him from whom the commandment proceeds or upon the end of the action, you should not think that you have achieved the end. Rather you will then be similar to those of whom it is said: "You are near in their mouth, and far from their reins" (Jer. 12:2).

This is the aim of all spirituality that is based on the belief in the driving and renewing power of insight and internalization. Only penetration to the intention of the commandments and their very essence can open the way for a man to attain perfection or at least to approach it. If he has no awareness of the ultimate purpose, then his behavior becomes routinized: he carries out the commandments out of mindless habit. He fulfills his obligations, but obtains no spiritual benefit from his effort. Moreover, ignorance of the true purposes of the commandments is liable to lead not only to their cheapening and mechanization, but to their distortion. A clear example of this danger can be found in the *Laws of Mezuzah,* 5:4:

> . . . For these fools [who write names of angels, holy names, a biblical text, or inscriptions usual on seals within the mezuzah] not only fail to fulfill the commandment, but they treat an important precept that expresses the unity of God, the love of Him, and His worship, as if it were an amulet to promote their own personal interests; for, according to their foolish minds, the mezuzah is something that will secure for them advantage in the vanities of the world.

A sentence that gives distinct emphasis to the principle that the commandments are not just decrees, but that there is utility in them, to the necessity of publicizing this principle, making it known to scholars and simple folk alike, is found in the *Epistle to Yemen:*

> If he could only fathom the inner intent of the law, then he would realize that the essence of the true divine religion lies in the deeper meaning of its positive and negative precepts, every one of which will aid man in his striving after perfection. . . .

8.

The deep study of the content of the commandments and their purposes is also required in order to teach us that all of the laws of the Torah are intended to elevate man to the highest possible level of morality, to the most exalted level of holiness, and to the perfection deriving from these attainments. Understanding the inner intent of the commandments teaches that the halachah serves as a springboard, as it were, for aspirations and actions which are beyond the specific requirements of the law. Acts that are according to the specific requirements of the law educate man and lead him toward acts which transcend those requirements. We must understand Maimonides' words in the *Laws of Slaves* (9:8):

> It is permitted to work a heathen slave with rigor. Though such is the rule, it is the quality of piety and the way of wisdom that a man be merciful and pursue justice and not make his yoke heavy upon the slave or distress him, but give him to eat and to drink of all foods and drinks. . . .

> So it is also explained in the good paths of Job, in which he prided himself: "If I did despise the cause of my manservant, or of my maidservant, when they contended with me. . . . Did not He that made me in the womb make him? And did not One fashion us in the womb?" (Job 31:13, 15)
>
> Cruelty and effrontery are not frequent except with heathen who worship idols. the children of our father Abraham, however, i.e., the Israelites, upon whom the Holy One blessed be He, bestowed the favor of the Law and laid upon them statutes and judgments, are merciful people who have mercy upon all.
>
> Thus also is it declared by the attributes of the Holy One, blessed by He, which we are enjoined to imitate: "And His mercies are over all His works" (Ps. 145:9). Furthermore, whoever has compassion will receive compassion, as it is said: "And He will show you mercy, and have compassion upon you, and multiply you" (Deut. 13:18).

"Statutes and judgments" and "the quality of piety and the way of wisdom" are rightly juxtaposed here, within a variegated spectrum of possibilities.

An unavoidable, natural, and spontaneous consequence of constant occupation with the study of Torah is that a man's actions will transcend the specific requirements of the law, and that he will sanctify God. Maimonides emphasizes this lesson in the *Laws of Basic Principles of the Torah*, 5:11:

> And if a man has been scrupulous in his conduct, gentle in his conversation, pleasant toward his fellow-creatures, affable in manner when receiving them, not retorting, even when affronted, but showing courtesy to all, even to those who treat him with disdain, conducting his commercial affairs with integrity, not readily accepting the hospitality of the ignorant nor frequenting their company, not seen at all times, but devoting himself to the study of the Torah, wrapped in tallit and crowned with phylacteries, and doing more than his duty in all things, avoiding, however, extremes and exaggerations – such a man has sanctified God, and concerning him, Scripture says, "And He said to me, 'You are My servant, O Israel, in whom I will be glorified' " (Is. 49:3).

We can summarize by saying that the commandment is simultaneously both the cause and the result of the conceptual purpose, both advancing and forming it, just as it is concurrently both a result – and a driving force – of the love of God. Maimonides taught well the principle that the love of God brings commitment and fervor to the fulfillment of the commandments, and conversely – that fulfilling the commandments, in turn, heightens the intensity of one's longing for and love of God.

9.

In his intellectual-educational view and in his teaching regarding the observance of the commandments and the understanding of their inner purpose, Maimonides makes clear his disapproval of acts that are insincere and inconsistent, of artificiality and exhibitionism, of

cheap externalization and deceit. Let us look at the *Commentary on the Mishnah*, Sotah 3:3:

> 'The afflictors of prushim' may be explained as follows: The Sages, peace be upon them, call themselves 'prushim' because they separate themselves (perishutam) from vices and abominations and the pursuit of worldly matters which cause men to go astray, and they turn towards the world to come and exalted matters. Now there are people who adorn themselves with these qualities; [he who is among them pretends to renounce lowly and abominable things, while at the same time these very things characterize him]. He distances himself from these things only for worldly interests and thus said [the Sages], peace be upon them, [about them]: "There are seven types of perushim." And they listed all those who act with false piety for worldly gain, such as to be honored by others or to preserve one's wealth and well-being. In the Sages' opinion, the only true perushim are those who worship out of love, like our father Abraham. All of the [other] six are to be condemned, for they inflate what is required of them and exaggerate the external aspects in order to deceive others. And therefore, because they add to the Torah and make it despised, they are called "afflictors"; hence the expression 'the afflictors of prushim.'

And we should also consider the following passage on holiness and purity from the *Guide of the Perplexed* (3:33):

> Cleaning garments, washing the body, and removal of dirt also constitute one of the purposes of this Law. But this comes after the purification of the actions and the purification of the heart from polluting opinions and polluting moral qualities. For to confine oneself to cleaning the outward appearance through washing and cleaning the garment, while having at the same time a lust for various pleasures and unbridled license in eating and sexual intercourse, merits the utmost blame. Isaiah says about this: "They that sanctify themselves and purify themselves to go unto the gardens behind one in the midst, eating the flesh of swine, and so on." He says: They purify themselves and sanctify themselves in the open and public places; and afterwards, when they are alone in their rooms and in the interior of their houses, they are engaged in acts of disobedience. . . . To sum up the dictum: Their outward appearances are clean and universally known as unsullied and pure, whereas innerly they are engaged in the pursuit of their desires and the pleasures of their bodies. But this is not the purpose of the Law. . . .

In essence, we find the same outlook and emphasis in the *Laws of Moral Dispositions and Ethical Conduct*, 2:6:

> It is forbidden to accustom oneself to smooth speech and flatteries. One must not say one thing and mean another. Inward and outward self should correspond: only what we have in mind, should we utter with the mouth. We must deceive no one, not even an idolator. . . . Even a single word of flattery or deception is forbidden. A person should always cherish truthful speech, an upright spirit, and a pure heart free from all forwardness and perversity.

Appendix: Aggadah

In Maimonides' eyes, the aggadah was a source of great importance that could be studied in depth and used creatively for various purposes (for example: reinforcing a particular halachach or improving its formulation, supporting a philological argument or a linguistic supposition, and especially – modeling a moral quality or anchoring a philosophical position). Maimonides expressed interest, throughout his life, in the aggadah, in problems of its interpretation and in the spiritual power stored in it . He warned against literal interpretation, carrying special meaning, which missed the point on account of false assumptions and mistaken calculations. Passages of aggadah that seem strange and difficult to accept require a rational-spiritual interpretation in order to set straight those who accept the words of the Sages "at their face value, not interpreting them at all." His words in the introduction to *Perek Helek* are well-known (p. 11):

> The members of this group are poor in knowledge. One can only regret their folly. Their very effort to honor and to exalt the sages in accordance with their own meager understanding actually humiliates them. As God lives, this group destroys the glory of the Torah and extinguishes its light, for they make the Torah of God say the opposite of what it intended. For He said in His perfect Torah, 'The nations who hear of these statutes shall say: Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people' (Deut. 4:6). But this group expounds the laws and the teachings of our sages in such a way that when the other peoples hear them they say that this little people is foolish and ignoble.

Further on in the same source (p. 209), we find a hint of a definite plan to write a special commentary on the aggadot of the Talmud and Midrash, based on rational thought and the allegorical-philosophical method of interpretation:

> I hope to write a book collecting all the sages' teachings on this subject from the Talmud and other works. I shall interpret them systematically, showing which must be understood literally and which metaphorically, and which are dreams to be interpreted by a wakeful mind. There I shall explain the many principles of our faith of which I have discussed a few here.

Even though Maimonides eventually abandoned this plan, he did devote a great deal of attention in the *Guide of the Perplexed* to the problems connected with the understanding of parables and prophecies, and to exegetical approaches allowing for the basing of fundamental beliefs on biblical and rabbinical verses. There is no doubt that he saw the *Guide* as a sort of substitute for the commentary on the aggadot that he had meant to write. He made this clear in his introduction to the *Guide:*

> We had promised in the Commentary on the Mishnah that we would explain strange subjects in the 'Book of Prophecy' and in the 'Book of Correspondence' – the latter being a book in which

we promised to explain all the difficult passages in the Midrashim where the external sense manifestly contradicts the truth and departs from the intelligible. They are all parables. However, when, many years ago, we began these books and composed a part of them, our beginning to explain matters in this way did not commend itself to us. For we saw that if we should adhere to parables and to concealment of what ought to be concealed, we would not be deviating from the primary purpose. We would, as it were, have replaced one individual by another of the same species. If on the other hand, we explained what ought to be explained, it would be unsuitable for the vulgar among the people. Now it was to the vulgar that we wanted to explain the import of the Midrashim and the external meanings of prophecy. . . .

With regard to the meaning of prophecy, the exposition of its various degrees, and the elucidation of the parables occurring in the prophetic books, another manner of explanation is used in this treatise. In view of these considerations, we have given up composing these two books in the way in which they were begun. We have confined ourselves to mentioning briefly the foundations of belief and general truths, while dropping hints that approach a clear exposition, just as we have set them forth in the great legal compilation, the Mishneh Torah.

And in the *Commentary on the Mishnah*, Menahot 4:4

With respect to the matter the of education of habits... the word "education" in this context refers to the beginning of action: this is like breaking-in a tool for a particular task; so also a man at the beginning of his study of a particular discipline or of certain qualities—he must become accustomed to them until he absorbs them as a part of his character.

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Toward a Curriculum for the Modern Orthodox School

MICHAEL ROSENAK

The subject of curriculum for the Jewish school may seem somewhat peripheral to our conference, whose task is to examine the state of Modern Orthodoxy, yet I think we shall find the distinctly educational issue very germane to our deliberations. For, by dealing with the issue of what it should mean to transmit it to the young, we may discover what Modern Orthodoxy actually is and whether there is, in today's Judaism, such a movement and conception. In this connection, we are immediately reminded that Modern Orthodox life began to be problematic and uncertain when so many of its professed adherents insisted on a "more religious" education for their own children and considered themselves religiously superior by virtue of that preference. So, if we are successful in setting guidelines for Modern Orthodox education, of a type that Modern Orthodox Jews will want for their own children, then we will not only learn a good deal about the actual beliefs, aspirations, and priorities in our community, but we shall find that we actually have—and are—a genuine community.

Our first problem arises, of course, with the alleged *shatnez* in the very name of this group or movement: Modern Orthodoxy. By Orthodox Judaism we generally refer to the system of beliefs and practices of those Jews who accept the revealed and normative character of the Torah, written and oral. Orthodox Jews are those who adhere to what traditionally accepted authorities delineate as the Torah's doctrines; who accept classic modes of halakhic decision-making; who carry out, with religious intent, the practical duties mandated by the Torah; who belong to religious communities which accept these norms, and who hold in high esteem the hero-types cultivated and anticipated in these communities. All the above is considered *Ortho-dox*, "right doctrine"—in contradistinction to various wrong doctrines engendered by modern culture, thought, and society. But then, what is *modern* Orthodox and what would *modern*

Orthodox education be? Isn't *modernity* the name of the problem we face if we are Orthodox? Isn't it modernity itself that has been moving Jews in the direction of what is *wrong*?

A good place to begin examining this problem in an educational context is the thought of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch. Despite the rhetoric and the cultural context, which often make him seem bombastic, dated, and even outlandish, he was truly the founding father of Modern Orthodoxy and of its educational philosophy—and every discussion of these topics is indebted to him. It was he who set down the rule that the contemporary Jew must locate *within the Torah itself* the values he accepts and admires in the modern world; his writings exemplify the demand to find all "good" modernity in the Torah—as a moral or pedagogic demand or as a redemptive promise.

Thus, in his essay "The Relation of General to Specifically Jewish Education," he declares that the modern world is moving toward Judaism, that it is, in its "good and noble" features, a fulfillment of biblical visions. This position enables Hirsch to assign positive value to "general" culture and even to see it as clarifying for the student the very meaning of the Torah and of Jewish existence. Note, for example what he says about the teaching of general history:

> The Jewish people is a product of the progressive development of humanity. It has been sent into the midst of the nations to further that development, and for this end the whole course of history has been mapped out before it. *Should not then an acquaintance with world history be for its children not only not superfluous but actually indispensable?* [emphasis added] Can they even dimly comprehend the old prophetic saying about the three different missions of the peoples without some knowledge of the Japhetic-Hellenistic influence on the development of culture up to this day?[1]

Similarly, Hirsch insists on instruction "in the languages of the civilized nations and introducing [children] into their literature" in order to "gain entrance to the intellectual creations of the peoples and feed and enrich their minds with all that is good and noble *and true* [emphasis added] in the contributions of the noblest spirits to the realm of knowledge."[2] And all this is referred back to "seeds of light from the divine flame on Sinai . . . sown in the bosom of the peoples," which, in their conceptions of God, human unity, and the task to

cultivate "truth and goodness, justice and morality . . . have won for themselves an ever larger place in the minds of men, and are continuing to work for the improvement and happiness of mankind."[3]

Hirsch could even adopt, with warm approval, that most prominent feature of modern consciousness which distinguishes between the disparate roles we play and the discrete spheres of legitimate activity. He lauds German immigrants to America who "contribute" to their new "fatherland" by maintaining their German culture—and urges German Jews to learn from this that it will not be disloyal for them to foster Jewish culture as German citizens.[4] He even chides Isaac and Rebecca for "miseducating" Esau by virtue of their not realizing that he had a different temperament and personality than the tent-dwelling Jacob. Esau, declares Hirsch, could have been a good Jew as "the man of the field" that he was.[5]

Despite the disturbing features of modern society (such as its pernicious biblical criticism, based, he believed, on misunderstanding of the text and vestiges of anti-Semitic malice), Hirsch assumed that modernity was part of a messianic thrust, and that it was bliss to live in an age "so enlightened and civilised as the present."[6] For Jews not to participate in that civilization was not simply foolish but impious and blind and, indeed, a rebellion against God and His purpose in history.

The question that Jews and others in our generation ask is, of course, whether this evaluation of modernity is correct and stands up to scrutiny. Are things getting better and better, or are the gifts bestowed upon us by modernity too ambiguous for comfort or even illusionary? Hirsch's detractors in an age of enlightenment looked askance when so "cultured" an individual wished to remain Orthodox. Today, there are Jews who wonder why someone would wish to sacrifice his religious integrity for something so dubious as modernity!

It seems clear that Modern Orthodoxy can no longer accept the sanguine view of our era that characterized Hirsch. There is Hiroshima, the evidence of a plundered planet, horrendous forms of tyranny, and for us, first and foremost, the searing Holocaust. At the same time, we cannot turn our backs on modernity, if only because modernity will not go away *and because we are modern*.

But our fear is not merely of being alienated from what obviously

exists in and around us.[7] It is also that we do not wish to deny the complexity of our world, a complexity which allows for, and in fact demands, valuative distinctions and thoughtful deliberations. Today, therefore, it seems most plausible and fruitful to think of modernity as neither automatic progress nor as perdition wrapped in plastic. Rather, it may be viewed in terms of dichotomies and tensions. Our age is not simply "secular" (a term that may particularly agitate Christians); it is also partly pagan (a concept and condition much more worrisome to Jews!). Having made this distinction, we may entertain the thought that certain *secular* features of modernity may be seen as worthy and enhancing. Such, for example, are the institutions of liberal and pluralistic democracy. On the other hand, we must deplore and combat pagan manifestations of culture, such as totalitarian and militaristic nationalism[8] and the unbridled worship of Venus that is now sold across the counter and in the media as "human nature" and thus healthy and positive.

Along the same lines of tension and dichotomy, we observe that modernity is diversely described and evaluated by social thinkers who believe in the endless possibilities of scientific inquiry, and by representatives of modern literary-existential consciousness. The former tend to be optimistic, celebrating modern rationality and the arts of deliberation; the latter bemoan the alleged "death of God" and see our era through the prism of nihilism and crisis. Examining these two models of polarity and tension we cannot today be certain whether the opponent of religion is really the cautious and tolerant secularist or the pagan looking for new myths of pleasure and power. We wonder whether science can solve as many problems as it thought, and whether writers "at the edge of the abyss" are not pronouncing self-fulfilling prophecies of despoliation, anarchy—and genocide.

Clearly, it is a different "modern world" we live in than the one Hirsch knew, and Modern Orthodox Jews cannot hope to establish feasible curricula for their schools until they consider the contours of their reality. They have not yet done so because, on the one hand, they still think about modernity as Hirsch did, and on the other hand, they know it isn't so. So they suffer "a failure of nerve" and watch in helpless fascination as those of their children who are not moving *away* move to the "right"—to *haredi* Judaism, which constitutes an

outspoken rejection of modernity. The *haredi* position is that Hirsch was wrong, or, as the more tactful prefer to say, that "he was right for his time," when Jews needed *derech eretz* for *parnassa* and had to be kept in the fold with intimations of cultural synthesis. But now, say the *haredim*, one must choose between pernicious differentiation—to be a Jew *and something else*—and, alternatively, "a complete life of Torah." Religious compromise and compartmentalization are juxtaposed with undivided loyalty and authenticity. *Tamim tehyeh!* As for the Modern Orthodox, they know that modernity is flawed, but they haven't yet decided whether to admit it, how to understand it, and what to do about it. So they are often tempted by the *haredi* argument and lured by its promise of serenity. After all, who doesn't know that wholeness is a mitzvah and that serenity is a precious commodity in our time?

The beginning of clarity, for all modern Orthodox Jews since Hirsch, has been to pose the question: *What is wholeness for us?* Can we be whole by turning our backs on the range of our experiences as modern people? For, as already noted, *we are modern!* We read modern books; examine modern theories; support modern institutions which enhance human potential and seek to solve problems which threaten our perceptions of human dignity and self-actualization. Moreover, as modern people, we appreciate diversity, value curiosity about the new and the interesting, and share in a universe of expanded knowledge, dangers, and challenges.

Here, the fundamental distinction between the *haredi* and the Modern Orthodox world-views, recently explored by Mordecai Dadon in a doctoral dissertation,[9] should be systematically stated. The thinkers of both groups articulate a desire for wholeness and a comprehensive religious loyalty; neither considers modern culture a substitute for Torah, neither *believes in* modernity. But the "wholeness" of the *haredi* position requires in principle a rejection of modernity; this rejection is "found" in—and declared to be authorized by—the Jewish tradition itself. In this view, *the Torah says that you can't have Torah and modernity both.* Conversely, the Modern Orthodox Jew, building on the Hirschian tradition,[10] accepts all aspects of modernity which are "good and noble and true," that is, that can be found in the Torah, which, indeed, the Torah commands or foresees. The source of all value is in Judaism, but values are

greeted with "the shock of recognition" when they appear in modern culture.

The *haredim* consider this subtly dishonest. They claim that the Modern Orthodox recourse to tradition is two-faced. That is, more than it legitimates modernity through Torah, it legitimates tradition vis-à-vis the modern concepts that the Modern Orthodox "really" believe in. If there is a convincing and educationally viable Modern Orthodox answer to this charge, it must begin with the conviction that what *haredim* call *two-faced* is, in fact, a *dialectic*. Modern Orthodox interpretation of the Torah in the light of modernity is indeed a creative act, like all interpretation. But, like all interpretation that aims to maintain the accessibility of the normative tradition, it is based on loyalty, and it is occasioned by the danger of alienation.[11] A loyalty which never allows itself to be threatened, which confronts new situations without dialectics, paradoxically *undermines* wholeness, for it narrows the field of vision of its votaries, even as it makes their Torah less illuminating and comprehensive.[12] So we have returned to Hirsch after all, despite the disparity between his "modernity" and ours. For Hirsch, though he proposed *Torah im Derech Eretz*, was not secularizing Torah but was declaring it to be most comprehensive.

We must emphasize and enlarge on this point, for the argument against Modern Orthodoxy is that it *is* secularized, that is has succumbed to differentiation—and thus compartmentalization—and that it diminishes Torah, relegating it to the margins of life. Ultra-Orthodox critics can point to religious schools in which the *main* subjects are the "general" ones; they can show how Torah is taught like "any other subject," and therefore as less important than others, for "less useful."[13] This is a serious critique, for it *does* reflect given realities. But first, let us dwell briefly on the concept of differentiation.

Martin Marty, in surveying various uses of this term, sums it up as follows: Differentiation involves (1) distinguishing and setting apart "of religious ideas and institutions from other parts of the social structure"; (2) the loss of religion's function as "the primary source of legitimation for the whole of society"; and (3) its increasing privatization.[14] Thus, many of us here, for example, may be said to be in the throes of differentiation. In shul we speak as part of the

community of daveners; at the university we theorize as members of the community of scholars. As Heilman has noted, we are often delicately balanced between two worlds, trying to look "more modern" at work, straining to be "really Jewish" in the company of our fellow Orthodox Jews on Shabbat.[15] This is a malady to which *haredim* are allegedly immune.

The problem is a real one. Perhaps we can properly locate it and point toward a resolution by comparing two distinct and conflicting models of what can be called, on the basis of empirical realities, Modern Orthodox education. One of them, as we shall see, is indeed open to *haredi* (and anti-Orthodox) accusations of hypocrisy or lack of integrity.

The first model is that of the Maharal of Prague.[16] The Maharal, in arguing for the teaching of the various domains of wisdom, notes that halakhah requires that we make a blessing in the presence of "the wise of the nations of the world" no less than in the presence of a wise Jew (though we do not allude to the Gentile as one who "fears God"). He reminds his readers that the Midrash (*Eicha Rabba* 2) states that "if someone says to you that there is wisdom among the nations, believe it . . . that there is Torah among the nations—don't believe," from which we learn both to cherish wisdom as universal and, at the same time, to understand the Torah as distinct from wisdom insofar as it is directly revealed and thus entirely divine and spiritual. As for the argument that one should not study "Greek wisdom" (Menachot 99b), the Maharal distinguishes between *Greek* wisdom, "which has no relationship to the Torah at all," and *general* wisdom, about which we make a blessing and which *is* found "among the nations." Thus: ". . . if this is so [that He "gave of His wisdom to flesh and blood"], it seems that one should learn the wisdom of the nations, *for why should one not learn the wisdom which is from God, may He be blessed?*" (emphasis added). And this has nothing to do with the strictures against *Greek* wisdom: ". . . the domains of wisdom which have to do with the reality and the order of the world one may certainly learn . . . for why would they call it Greek wisdom if it were concerned with the reality of the world, since *this wisdom is the wisdom of every person?*" (emphasis added).

A second model is suggested by Naftali Herz Weisel in his *Divrai Shalom V'Emet*, (chapter 1).[17] Weisel divides all knowledge and studies into two categories: *Torat Ha-adam* and *Torat HaShem*. The former includes culturally appropriate behavior (*yidiot nimusiut*), the ways of morality and good character, civility (*derech eretz*) and clear, graceful expression. It also takes in history, geography, astronomy, and the like. The knowledge of all these is founded on reason. The same is true of the natural sciences, "which provide genuine knowledge of all things: animals, plants, minerals, the elements, meteorology, botany, anatomy, medicine, chemistry, etc. It is in man's power to study all of these phenomena by means of his senses and reason: he does not need anything divine to comprehend them."

Weisel notes that *Torat Ha-adam* preceded *Torat HaShem* by twenty-six generations (*Vayikra Rabba* 9); that is, from Adam to Moses men acted according to *Torat Ha-adam* alone. This means that they concerned themselves with the seven Noachide laws and with the etiquette, arts, and science that constitute "worldly affairs." Furthermore, *Torat Ha-adam*, being anterior to the "exalted divine laws," should be learned well to prepare the heart for learning the teachings of God. Also, despite the sublime nature of *Torat HaShem*, it turns out to be practically useless in isolation from *Torat Ha-adam*. For it is the latter alone which "benefits the commonweal."

> Therefore he who lacks *Torah Ha-adam*, even though he has learned the laws and teachings of God and lives according to them, gives no pleasure to others . . . his fellowship is burdensome . . . his speech in worldly affairs will not be in conformity . . . with reason, and his actions worse than useless. . . . [Also] . . . even though the laws and teachings of God are far superior to *Torat Ha-adam*, they are closely correlated with it: where *Torat Ha-adam* ends, the divine teaching begins, instructing us on what is beyond man's power of reason. Therefore, he who is ignorant of the laws of God but is versed in *Torat Ha-adam*, even though the sages of Israel will not benefit from his light in the study of the Torah, he will benefit the remainder of humanity. But he who is ignorant of *Torat Ha-adam*, though he knows the laws of God, gladdens neither the wise of his people nor the remainder of humanity.

The differences between the two orientations is obvious. For the Maharal, study of "general" wisdom is advised because "it is from God, may He be blessed." The justification for all studies is religious, based on halakhic and aggadic sources in the Talmud and Midrash.

He carefully distinguishes between *Torah* and *wisdom*, to give the Torah normative supremacy and sovereignty. Yet he also differentiates between "the wisdom of every person" and "Greek wisdom," thereby answering possible objections to general studies. This distinction ("Greek" and "every person") also serves to indicate which studies have no place in the curriculum, being, perhaps because of their pagan character, outside the pale of true (thus, divine) wisdom.

Weisel, on the other hand, divides knowledge between the domain of the important, useful, *and even moral* (*Torah Ha-adam*) and the merely *religious*, a clear gradation perfunctorily disguised by the terms "sublime" and "exalted" applied to *Torat HaShem*. The former (culture, wisdom, and morality) has no necessary connection to God or Torah: no divine gifts are needed to gain it. Even the Noachide commandments require only human reason.[18] While Weisel considers *Torat HaShem* as "beginning where *Torat Ha-adam* ends," this is not a conception of synthesis but of compartmentalization which, like all compartmentalizations, establish priorities of what is *really* vital and valuable.[19]

Weisel is the father of the idea of modern "supplementary" Jewish education, of the idea that there are "religious" things that Jews should know about in addition to what they learn in their *real* education. This supplementary teaching is not of much use, one doesn't actually *learn* much from it, but it is clearly Jewish and it is considered somehow edifying.

If Modern Orthodoxy adopts the Weisel model, or is perceived to be doing so, it will propel its most religious and spiritual young people into the arms of the *haredim*, who (legitimately) disagree with the idea that morality, cultural riches, and knowledge of God's world have nothing to do with Torah. Unfortunately, they also reject the Maharal's view that all genuine wisdom comes from God, so that, in this century, they are unlikely to know when to make a *bracha* in the presence of a wise person.

The educational model we must develop is an integrated-religious one. We wish to cultivate Jewish personalities whose Jewishness is whole but who are at home, though not always at ease, in this era which happens to be the one they live in. To achieve this, we need to think of a curriculum that is not a balancing act between *Torat HaShem*, burdensome and sublimely dull, and *Torat Ha-adam*, where

the action is. Rather, we should strive for an educational conception in which the "realms of meaning" open to the modern Jewish person are explored within the framework of a Torah culture and integrated through the efforts of mature religious personalities, who have respect for growing ones and some self-confidence, based on competence, that they can help them grow.

It is to these "realms of meaning" that I now turn.

I have borrowed the term "realms of meaning" from Philip H. Phenix's book by that name. Phenix, like related "structure of knowledge" educational theorists, believes that "knowledge in the disciplines has patterns or structures and that an understanding of these typical forms is essential for the guidance of teaching and learning."[20] His particular thesis "grows out of a concept of human nature as rooted in meaning and of human life as directed towards the fulfillment of meaning." The significance of this for curriculum is in that "the various patterns of knowledge are varieties of meaning and the learning of these patterns is the clue to the effective realization of essential humanness."[21]

Phenix's specific division of knowledge into "realms of meaning" (symbolic, empirics, esthetics, synoetic or "personal knowledge," ethics and synoptics) need not concern us here.[22] It suffices that Phenix helps us to understand that aspects of curriculum are variously approached and learned, that they speak to discrete features of our Jewishness and humanity, and that, if "all wisdom comes from God," every feature and form must be present in the curriculum.

That one needs to deal with the various aspects of life, with all the "realms of meaning" made accessible by different modes of learning and educational experience, would seem to be a truism. Yet it must be emphasized, for Modern Orthodoxy, like other ideologies of accommodation that wish to be *both* this *and* that (e.g., modern and Orthodox), tends to succumb easily to what Peter L. Berger has called "cognitive accommodation."[23] We wish to be accepted by and somehow to belong to the "cognitive majority" but not to relinquish our (minority) identity, so we proceed to "make deals" with the majority. For example, we agree to look, act, and perhaps think like everyone else if they will agree that we keep mitzvot, and segregate ourselves on Shabbat and Yom Tov—in which contexts we will be permitted to act and think differently, and even look different. Some,

in cognitive negotiation, will redefine their Judaism in terms of given doctrines alone (e.g., Classical Reform); others will practice their "cognitive minority" religious-ritual patterns while looking modern and thinking in "general" (i.e., majority) philosophical categories (e.g., Mendelssohnian Neo-Orthodoxy). In each case, one "buys" the right to differences by being in other ways (often ostentatiously) like "the others."

The curriculum orientation being proposed is modern and therefore not against cultural interaction and negotiation as such. But, if it is to represent a Judaism that is whole and not a mere appendage to *Torat Ha-adam*, the negotiation must be in the tradition of Maharal and Hirsch. That is, it must be based on an openness to others which is perceived to be required by the Torah itself and which, when encountered *anywhere*, awakens the "shock of recognition" already alluded to. It cannot be a negotiation which results in the Jewish meaning being reduced to (some) halakhah and/or ethnic solidarity, with a smattering of Zionist sentiment added. The Jewish school must deal with all realms of meaning. Some of these are indeed "universal" insofar as they are of concern to all people and are most fully addressed and explored in the universal communities of experience and scholarship. Yet we should address them in terms of their Jewish meaning as well, in order to discover their scope and to delineate their value and also their legitimacy—for not everything done "in the world" is in the Torah or compatible with it. Only then will the various things done in the school not bespeak compartmentalization between the Jewish and the "general", but simply testify to the fact that diverse fields or *realms* are "done" differently. Which means that they raise variegated questions, arrive at different kinds of answers, mandate varied methods of reflection and inquiry, suggest diverse activities, and engage congenial facets of personality.

We suggest that the realms which lay foundations for a comprehensive religious Jewish education are the following:

Knesset Yisroel, the community of Israel
adam, or "existence"
bnai Noach, or humanity
problem-solving, or what Rabbi Soloveitchik has called *hod*
beauty, or *chochmat lev* and *hiddur*
da'at, or understanding

Let us briefly outline several foci of each "realm."

1. The realm of *Knesset Yisrael* has to do with the initiation of the young person into the Jewish people, his/her socialization into the religious-national fellowship of Israel. In this context or realm we teach "the language of the halakhah," we attempt to make this language a self-understood medium of cultural and spiritual life. The goods of *Knesset Yisrael* include the Hebrew language, habits of learning Torah, and a readiness to both respond to it and to represent it; as well as "at-homeness" in the text-cycle, in the life-cycle of the Jewish people, and in its land, Eretz Yisrael. In the framework of this realm of meaning, young people learn to signal "naturally" in the language of Judaism. They understand what is meant by such questions as "Have you davened yet?" "Can you have coffee (with milk)?" "What does Rashi say?" and they respond to them with what we may call "cultural reliability," i.e., they answer within the limits set by halakhic Judaism (e.g., either they have *already* or *not yet* davened). For they are truly members of the covenant community, under the aegis of what I have elsewhere called "explicit religion,"[2] that corpus of religious norm and cultural reality that preceded them into the world and that imposes itself upon them. As for the educating community, it sees itself as the agent whereby God links the young person to the covenant of Torah.

2. The realm of *adam*, or existence, is concerned with the *individual*, who, like every human being, was created singly. For him or her was the world created, but the young person does not yet know what that means and what to *do* with it and what to *make* of it. So the young person must find him/herself. Here, therefore, we are concerned with the questions children ask more than with the answers they are taught: the curriculum of *adam* is geared to arouse these questions. In this realm, the "existential" aspects of Torah are emphasized: first, stories of interesting heroes who will later be seen as complex, eventually *Tehillim*, Job, and *Kohelet*. In the realm of *Knesset Yisrael* we teach halakhah, but in the realm of *adam*, we speak the language of aggadah, teaching "readiness" for mature religious thought.

Poetry, from everywhere, releases powers of reflection and un-

locks stores of empathy; children are permitted to think, dream, and express themselves in sundry ways. The school provides for music listening at leisure, for making things to coax forth what has been called "the fun of handling materials." In this realm, the guiding principles are those of what I have called "implicit religion"[25] i.e., the search of the person for God, addressing Him in his/her life in ways that are connected to the realm of *Knesset Yisrael*, or so we anticipate if we have adequately utilized this realm to intimate a Jewish theology of human existence, but which are irreducible to the norms of the community. For each person is a unique individual.

3. The realm of *bnai Noach*, of humanity, is designed to make children see themselves as members of the human family, sharing a planet, a physical and psychic structure, a common fate, common createdness in God's image. In the realm of *bnai Noach* we teach ethics, but also ecology. We reach toward an understanding of mankind through social studies, but also teach foreign languages and world literature, hoping to expand horizons and to make it clear that while there are times when our differences are of cardinal importance, there are also moments where the loving, the suffering, and the striving of people create human kinships that make these differences insignificant. And so, if the realm of *Knesset Yisrael* gives the child bases and understanding of commandment, the realm of *bnai Noach* intimates redemption. Introduced to the condition of mankind within the framework of Torah, the child will not be able to feel that he or she "has nothing to do with it" and that this is "the best of all possible worlds." Rather, it will appear to be waiting for *yimot Hamashiach*, for which one must pray and work, of which one may not despair lest the moral sense be eroded by cynicism. Thus, on the ethical level this realm presents the child with the tension reflected in the controversy between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Azzai as to "the great principle of the Torah." The realm of *Knesset Yisrael* suggests R. Akiva's "Love thy neighbor [fellow Jew] as thyself"; Ben Azzai's principle is both more universal and more theological: "These are the generations of man [*all* men!] . . . for in the image of God He created him."[26]

4. The realm of problem-solving is, of course, the realm of science in both its theoretical and practical aspects. Since activities in this realm are guided by and based upon scientific modes of

thinking (e.g., creation of hypotheses on the basis of the inadequacy of previous ways of understanding, experimentation, and other problem-appropriate forms of inquiry as well as proposing tentative solutions), it raises serious questions for religious educational philosophy. A crucial one is: can young people be educated to a normative allegiance, of the kind characterizing the realm of *Knesset Yisrael*, and at the same time be initiated into a culture of authentic inquiry and deliberation? For the former posits *a priori* truths and the latter insists on testing and keeping an open mind. This difficulty tempts religious educators to either minimize the teaching of science, reducing it to its mechanical and technological aspects (thereby "hiding" the philosophical problems), or to compartmentalize religion and science as "Jewish" and "general." Yet the theology of either approach raises more problems than it solves; the former undermines wholeness *in the name of wholeness*, and the latter creates precisely the differentiation which leads to a secular orientation, which assumes that all "real" problems have scientific solutions. The key to a solution would seem to lie in a conception of the religious Jew's relationship to the created world and humanity's place both in and, via understanding, in a sense also "above" it. The conception of the "community of majesty" proposed by Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, seems like a large step in the right direction.[27]

5. The realm of *chochmat lev* and *hiddur*, of beauty, introduces in the curriculum the dimension of aesthetics, both appreciated and made. In this realm children learn to listen carefully to music and to look competently at art. They learn to admire the structure of mathematical formulae and to "see" how a literary work or a *suggya* is "constructed." In this part of the curriculum children learn to enjoy playing, not as something childish to be outgrown but as an important dimension of life, where one tests and expands one's powers within "the rules of the game." In the realm of *chochmat lev* one gets the "sense" of how things "out in the world" connect to the inner life and light of individuals who then *give back into the world* by good performance. In this context, Bezalel "saw," even better than Moshe Rabbainu, what God had *shown* regarding the *mishkan* (Brachot 55a). Even more ordinary mortals learn, through prayer, that God, who gives us the power of speech, is asked to "open our lips" so that we may praise Him. We take the sights and

sounds and forms of the world which are given to us, we cultivate and distill, reaching an understanding of why we must bless God for what is beautiful and why we must perform mitzvot with *hiddur*. And as God has given us a world for which we bless Him, He has given us bodies which we can learn to use gracefully and powerfully, and for this health and beauty, we are grateful.

This is a realm which requires careful development in Jewish educational thought. (One possible approach to its most problematic dimension, art, is suggested by Rabbi Abraham I. Kook, in his letter upon the opening of the Bezalel school in Jerusalem [1907].)[28] In any case, even though aspects of this realm appear to be situated on the edge of "Greek wisdom" and therefore were often restricted and neglected, they cannot on that account be shunted aside in the Modern Orthodox school. Beauty and a sensitivity which "sees" and creatively responds to God's creation has surely been given to "every person," and we "find" them readily in the Torah.[29]

6. The realm of *da'at*, of understanding, is, like Phenix's "synoptics," concerned with large and comprehensive ways of "seeing the whole picture." In his conception, it is related to the study of history, religion, and philosophy. In our scheme, too, this realm is meant "to put things together," to enable students to see and make connections between halakhah and aggadah; to "see the point" of diverse activities like scientific inquiry and literature; to build structures of insight and concepts regarding the relationship between Judaism and other faiths, between Israel and the nations. In the realm of *da'at*, the sense of meaning and relationship is fostered by study, reflection, and discussion. Clearly, activities stimulating children to "see the point" are also designed for "seeing the problems." Before one can put "realms of meaning" together, one must, to avoid apologetics and pseudo-philosophizing, discover the tensions within and between them. For example, who in our generation can ignore the dilemma, within the realm of *Knesset Yisrael*, between the demand for loyalty to Torah and the imperative to maintain the unity of *Am Yisrael* and to foster kinship and a sense of community with every Jew? And, that there are tensions *between* realms is obvious. What about the *adam*, *within* us or amongst our pupils, who is uncomfortable with a given norm of *Knesset Yisrael*? Or, how much

are we *Knesset Yisrael* and how much *bnai Noach*—and how much contact with "the others" is too much?

If the educational process is successful, there will be, as a result of it, a degree of integration. Through the realm of *da'at*, represented in the curriculum by subjects such as *Machshevet Yisrael*, *parshanut*, study of *ta'amai hamitzvot* and philosophy (including issues in scientific thought!), students may learn not only to "see the point" of diverse activities, but to build into their personalities points of contact between them. They may discover not only the possibilities inherent in each realm, but how each enriches the other and how each sets limits to the others. (For example, there is "non-kosher" art; there are unaesthetic—therefore unpleasant and wrong—ways to perform mitzvot.) Learning about the interrelationship between realms even while comprehending what constitutes the integrity of each is learning to be one person who can do many things.[30] *Da'at* has to do with becoming a whole person!

But from the realm of *da'at* we also learn that, ultimately, wholeness is not a matter of knowing *about* the world, or being able to explain why something is beautiful or even knowing reasons for the mitzvot. It is *being in the world* in a certain way, *having* beauty in the soul, *being* a Torah person. *Da'at*, Rashi tells us, is *ruach hakodesh*.[31] It is not what schools teach but what they prepare us for. It cannot be explained to the end, and the explanations are not what count.

Peter Winch has said something important about this, in his description of the "limits" of philosophy.

> If one looks at a certain style of life and asks what there is in it which makes it worthwhile, one will find nothing there. One may indeed describe it in terms which bring out "what one sees in it," but the use of these terms already presupposes that one does see it from a perspective from which it matters. The words will fall flat on the ears of someone who does not occupy such a perspective even though he is struggling to attain it. . . .
>
> . . . what a man makes of the possibilities he can comprehend is a matter of what man he is. This is revealed in the way he lives; it is revealed *to him* in his understanding of what he can and what he cannot attach importance to. But philosophy can no more show a man what he should attach importance to than geometry can show a man where he should stand.[32]

Haredim would applaud Winch's words. Haven't they always said that the Modern Orthodox, going back to Hirsch, "explain too much"? What is needed, they say, is a community, without which schools cannot educate, because certain kinds of people are only "made" in certain kinds of communities, which have leaders, *gedolim*, who *are* Torah people and not only *know* a lot of Torah. A *da'at Torah* requires no *asmachta*. I think they are right about that.

Yet on the road to understanding there are no short-cuts, and those who are modern have a better sense of how much ground there is to cover than those who are not. Can we and our schools walk that road together, as a modern religious community that values both wisdom and *yirat Shamayim*, that holds fast to Torah more than all because there is no real *da'at* or *yir'ah* for us without it? That, it seems, is the underlying educational question.

Notes

1. Samson Raphael Hirsch, "The Relation of General to Specifically Jewish Education," in *Judaism Eternal*, trans. and annotated by Dayan I. Grunfeld (London: Soncino Press, 1962), vol. 1, p. 217.

2. Ibid., p. 218.

3. Ibid., p. 219.

4. Hirsch, "On Hebrew Instruction as Part of a General Education," in *Judaism Eternal*, pp. 189–190.

5. Hirsch, Commentary on Genesis 25:27 (*vayigdelu hani'arim*).

6. Hirsch, "Relation of General to Specifically Jewish Education," p. 219.

7. On alienation as denial of cultural reality, see Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 85.

8. I have discussed why these phenomena should be considered pagan in "The Religious Person and Religious Pluralism," in *The Meaning and Limits of Religious Pluralism in the World Today*, ed. Allan R. Brockway and Jean Halperin (Geneva: World Council of Churches and International Jewish Committee on Interreligious Consultations, 1987), pp. 7–22.

9. Mordecai Dadon,"D'fusai T'guva B'hagut Yehudit Neo-Ortodoxit Mul Etgarim Mibikoret Hayahadut Shel Spinoza V'kant [Patterns of response in Neo-Orthodox Jewish thought to critiques of Judaism by Spinoza and Kant], (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University, 1988).

10. It is striking how Hirsch anticipates twentieth-century Modern Orthodox conceptions. Note how similar to R. Soloveitchik's Adam I and Adam II is the following from "On Hebrew Instruction as General Education": "[The Law] . . . deals with the world around man which he has to conquer in order to establish in it a moral society, with rights which he may enjoy as a creature of God and rules which he has to observe as the Law of God" (p. 200).

11. On this issue, see Simon Rawidowicz, "On Interpretation," in *Studies in Jewish Thought*, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1974). Interpretation "derives its strength both from a deep attachment to the 'text' and from an 'alienation' from it, a certain distance, a gap that must be bridged" (p. 47).

12. I have discussed this in *Commandments and Concerns: Jewish Religious Education in Secular Society* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987), especially chap. 10, pp. 174–185.

13. For evaluative questions which indicate "what is really important" in the Jewish school, see Jack Bieler, "Integration of Judaic and General Studies in the Modern Orthodox Day School," *Jewish Education* 54, no. 4 (Winter 1986): 17–18.

14. My citations are from Martin E. Marty, "Post-Modern Reaction to Modernity" (paper delivered at the Hebrew Union College–Jewish Institute of Religion Conference on "Modernity and Tradition and the Crisis of Religion in the Modern World," Jerusalem, April 18–19, 1976).

15. Samuel C. Heilman, *Synagogue Life: A Study in Symbolic Interaction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 7–8, 266. See also Bieler's discussion, "Judaic and General Studies," pp. 16–17.

16. The discussion below is based on a section of *Netivot Olam* included in the anthology of Simcha Assaf, *Mekorot L'Toldot Hachinuch B'Yisrael*, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1954), pp. 51–52.

17. Ibid., p. 225. For an English translation, see Naphtali Herz Wessely, "Words of Peace and Truth," in *The Jew in the Modern World* ed. Paul R. Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 62–67.

18. This seems in accordance with the understanding of his teacher, Moses Mendelssohn, that the Noachide commandments may be accepted on grounds of reason and not necessarily by virtue of their being revealed. On this, see Jacob Katz, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance* (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), pp. 174–177.

19. See the discussion in Beiler, "Judaic and General Studies," pp. 16–17.

20. Philip H. Phenix, *Realms of Meaning: A Philosophy of the Curriculum for General Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. x.

21. Ibid.

22. I have used Phenix's term "realms of value" without adopting the particular and intricate features of his system. His work should, of course, not be judged by my use of the term.

23. Peter L. Berger, *A Rumour of Angels* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1969), chap. 1, esp. pp. 36–37.

24. See *Commandments and Concerns*, chaps. 6, 7.

25. Ibid., chaps. 6, 8.

26. *Sifra, Kedoshim*. See discussion on this *machloket* in Yehuda Moriel, *B'derech Tovim: Mitzvot Sh'bain Adam L'chovero L'or Hamekorot Bomikra Uhehalakha* (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 5736), pp. 15–16. For a survey showing that "neighbor" has been most often interpreted as referring to fellow-Jews, see Ernst Simon, "The Neighbor (*Re'a*) Whom We Shall Love," in *Modern Jewish Ethics: Theory and Practice*, ed. Marvin Fox (Ohio State University Press, 1975), pp. 29–56.

27. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, "The Lonely Man of Faith," *Tradition* 7, no. 2 (Summer 1965): 7–8.

28. *Rav A. Y. Kook: Selected Letters*, trans. and annotated by Tzvi Feldman (Ma'aleh Adumim: Ma'aliot Publications, 1986), pp. 190–198. R. Kook praises the renaissance of Jewish art but also warns against "idolatry" in art.

29. See, for example, Nehama Leibowitz, *Studies in Shemot, Pekudei* (2), "Finishing the Tabernacle," where she points to the analogies of God's *making* the world and Israel's *making* the *mishkan*.

30. It is crucial that interrelationships and integration not precede competence and care to do the specific thing being done *the way it is done* by those who are acknowledged masters of it. How corruptions of scientific study may take place in the name of the theological conceptions being furthered is well illustrated (for Catholic schools) by George R. La Noue, "Religious Schools and 'Secular' Subjects," *Harvard Educational Review* 32, no. 3 (Summer 1962): 255–291.

31. Commentary on Exodus 31:3.

32. Peter Winch, "Moral Integrity," in *Ethics and Action* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 190–191.

The Language of the Educated Jew: Some Guidelines

Michael Rosenak

In the following short paper, I suggest guidelines for "introductions" to Jewish curricular thinking. Such "introductions" are, in my opinion, needed with regard to all identifiable theological and ideological viewpoints in contemporary Judaism and Jewish education. Among those that "deserve" such reflection I would mention secular-cultural Zionism, liberal-religious Judaism, modern Orthodoxy and radically secular (political) Zionism. (The Haredi community has engaged in this activity during the course of this century more than others, and its "introductions to curriculum" are available for study.)

For each of these preliminary yet systematic reflections, I would propose the following guidelines which may be used not only to clarify the differences in outlook and ideology among contemporary Jews but also to point toward commonalities for "the educated Jew."

The article attached to my paper was delivered at Jews College of London in 1989 and has recently been published. It represents one attempt to prepare an "introduction to Jewish curricular thinking" for the modern Orthodox community of which I consider myself a member. (Since the publication has not yet reached me, I enclose a typed copy, without footnotes. I shall distribute the complete and printed article, God willing, before or at our January meeting.)

"The educated Jew" can be portrayed as having the following characteristics:

1. S/he has been initiated into and understands "the language" of the Jewish tradition and looks at what Peter Berger calls "the plausibility structure" of Judaism, however loyally or critically, from within. By "language" we refer to the basic assumptions of a culture, to its aspirations and to what it considers problems. The language of a culture, as of a discipline, establishes its forms of rhetoric, its methods of inquiry, patterns of community, its symbolic expressions of reality and its paradigms of order, coherence and norm.[W] While not all modern Jews will interpret the language in the same manner (see below, no. 2) they will all share a mode of communication that it has made available. For example, they will know the difference between Motza-ai Shabbat and Saturday night, between Tanakh and "the Old Testament," and understand which place is refered to by the term, ha-aretz.

2. In terms of a distinction suggested by Peters, the educated Jew will use "the language" to make "literature." Since the "language" gives us forms of articulation and communication, it enables people who know it and are "inside" it to use it for cultural expression and communion, which, when it is "creative," enhances the language itself and enriches it. Thus, Judaism has a rich history of literature in addition to a sacred literature which presents the language itself,. The literature demonstrates the power of the language to shape reality for those who "speak" it and to provide a home within reality for various kinds of "language speakers." As ever new literature is created in the language, its

funds of potential meaning are explored and broadened, even while those who "speak" are expressing themselves, within their historical situation. They are "doing their own thing" but in their (Jewish) language.

3. "Learning the language" means learning considerable parts of the sacred (i.e., language-presenting) literature. It also requires familiarity with the history of "literature" (i.e., what has been done "in the language") throughout the millenia of Jewish life. The educated Jew will "speak" Jewish literature only after knowing how the language works (on the basis of his/her study of sacred literature) and how it has been "spoken" throughout the generations. Previous (non-sacred) "literature" does not oblige him or her, but it does provide paradigms for present cultural activity. However, not all educated Jews will have the same attachments to all of previous literature; they will, consciously or unconsciously, select from it.

Moreover, just as different groups of Jews, of diverse background, sentiment and orientation will differ about which literature is most significant and worth knowing,, so will there be, among modern Jews, diverse ideological positions about Judaism, i.e., what constitutes "sacred literature." Thus, ultra-traditionist Jews will consider almost all worthy (i.e., "Torah") literature to be sacred, that is, indistinguishable from the language itself. Liberal religious Jews will hardly agree with Orthodox ones that the Talmud constitutes "language-presenting" (i.e., sacred) literature to the same extent that the Bible, especially its prophetic portions, does. And secular Jews may be expected to consider the language-presenting literature as formative rather than normative. Subsequently, the latter can be expected to have greater respect for the value of contemporary literature in understanding the

language than their more "traditional" fellow-Jews.

4. The way that the educated Jew uses the language is competent, self-understood, and, in principle, aims at comprehensiveness. Being intrinsic to his or her identity, it is what s/he is as well as does. Consequently, the educated Jew does not depend on proxies or "professionals" to "speak" it for him or her. If, for example, Zionism is a crucial aspect of how a particular educated Jew understands the language and the authentic literature of Judaism in this generation, s/he will do Zionism rather than "take pride in it." Similarly, an educated Jew who is a synagogue-goer need not be told that "we begin our service on page 13." This self-understood and identity-forming-and-maintaining character of his or her Jewish language, means also that Pesach and Rosh Hashanah are not the Jewish holidays, but simply, the holidays. (For an American Jew, the distinction that suggests itself is between the "Yomtovim" and the holidays, but Zionists and ultr-traditional Jews will consider this a move away from Jewish identity.)

5. The educated Jew has loyalty to the communities that speak the language. My use of the plural ("communities"), is meant to intimate that, for all but extreme ultra-traditionalists, this loyalty, in some manner and to some extent, encompasses those who speak it differently. Therefore s/he is ready to defend the entire Jewish community, Bet Yisrael, against its external ill-wishers, though, internally, s/he feels comfortable with machloket. Controversy among Jews does not threaten him or her, and this takes in both controversy among Jews of different world-views and well as those who constitute a specific normative community within the Jewish people. (See below, No. 10.)

6. The educated Jew has the desire, existential need and ability to connect Jewish things to wide vistas of reality and experience, those generally called "universal." The "language of Judaism" that the educated Jew speaks "plugs into" all human concerns and can be partially translated into other cultural ("particularistic") languages.

There are two reasons for this: (a) all human beings, and certainly those who share an historical and cultural situation (e.g., "contemporary Western civilization") share many needs and vulnerabilities and have much work, some evaluations and even many aspirations in common; (b) all languages that share an historical, geographical and technological "space" can help (and have historically helped) other "language-speakers," to do richer "literature" in their own languages and to create some literature in common. (This should not be confused with the viewpoint that all ought to be speaking the same comprehensive language which, in its essence, is indifferent to specific historical and cultural experience. This viewpoint is no more than the "linguistic" assumption of such "universal" religions as Christianity.)

The ability of the educated Jew to "translate," that is, to communicate meaningfully with others, is combined with a reflectiveness that carefully considers both commonalities and differences between languages,. groups and human experience. The educated Jew is "attuned" to understanding the lives and significances of others, as they express them in their languages but s/he remains "situated" within Judaism.

7. The educated Jew has the desire and ability to connect Jewish things to ultimate concerns. S/he wishes (or knows him/herself

commanded) to express what is most important, most commiting and most significant and "deep" dafka in the idiom of Judaism. This idiom appears to the educated and loyal Jew to be a valuable and adequate vehicle, both as source and as medium, for obligation and meaning. This articulates what the religious Jew views as the service of God; the secular Jew is likely to view this as cultural and historical "situatedness" and the legitimacy of finding the treasures of human existence where you are. (When the educated Jew finds him/herself in a state of crisis vis-a-vis the language and literature, and feels the need to appropriate funds of experience and knowledge from without, s/he wishes to do this within a collective "linguistic" Jewish framework so that the appropriation will not lead to - or be construed as - assimilation and betrayal. This, for example, was the view of Zionism; similar considerations may well have been at work in medieval Jewish philosophy.)

Yet, for both religious and secular-minded Jews, these ultimate matters, located within Jewish language and expressed as Jewish literature, are intensely personal as well as national-cultural. And they meet, and can be shown to meet, criteria of sense, morality, and civic-personal decency across the borders of specific languages. For all languages have some divine (or universal) Source (source) in common. Expressed in the "language of Judaism": all humans are created in God's image, and all who abide by the Noahide commandments deserve moral appreciation and reciprocity.

8. The educated Jew is able to maintain a dialectical, "organic" relationship between his or her individuality and the community. S/he does not see the community as "threatening" identity, but as the "place" where it is worked out and expressed. Similarly, the educated Jew wishes his or her Jewish identity to be his/her public

presentation. The person represents the community, always and everywhere and wishes to do so in an exemplary fashion. This is what the religious Jew may call kiddush HaShem and the non-religious one refers to as "pride," though they will claim, from their varying perspectives, that the two are not identical. But there is not always the need or the urge to articulate this representation. The educated Jew is secure enough to take for granted that love of one's language does not mean that one must constantly talk.

9. The educated Jew indeed loves the Jewish language, gains self-esteem from being Jewish and wishes to pass it on to coming generations. This urge to educate (Jewishly) is not perceived as an individual or idiosyncratic preference, but as obligation. It flows from the belief of the educated Jew that a Jewish presence in the world is humanly (perhaps divinely too) significant. In some viewpoints, this is called "mission," in others, an historical treasure; yet others call it the election of Israel. In each instance, the educated Jew has faith in the Jewish way of being in the world. And, seeing it connected to ultimate concerns, the educated Jew both "chooses it" and "has no choice."

10. The educated Jew is critical at the same time as s/he is loyal. This is because s/he has an ideal image of what Jewishness is, therefore, a vision of what it ought to be. This will often conflict with features of the real situation. The educated Jew will wish to articulate his or her criticism to "significant (Jewish!) others" who can be expected to see no disloyalty in such criticism and may, indeed, be mobilized as a force for change. (In my opinion, the educated Jew, when unhappy about some behaviour in his or her Jewish "family," will complain within the family rather than inform

the aggrieved family about that unhappiness. But s/he will not remain silent. Vehamaivin yavin.)

11. For the educated Jew, an ability to solve the problems facing the Jewish people are an essential aspect of "doing literature" as a Jew. In this context, the Zionist movement was created to generate a bold and innovative literature. But no educated Jew should see a conflict between locating and resolving the practical issues of his or her time, and speaking Jewish language, for in positing such a conflict, s/he is diminishing the comprehensiveness of Jewish language-literature. Indeed, in the encounter with the issues of our time as well as with certain perennial moral questions, there emerges a literature common to various languages that are seen to be in perennial dialogue and interaction. And sometimes, it is discovered, languages overlap. Religious Jews may attribute this to universal God-given language: secular ones are more likely to emphasize common human needs, vulnerabilities and achievements.

In fact, there are issues and problems that do not pristinely require Jewish literature at all, and the educated Jew knows when that is the case. It doesn't really depend on your language whether you know how to change a tire but, barring ill health or other infirmity, one should know how to do it. (Nevertheless, because of the comprehensiveness of Jewish language, even this activity may well be "framed" by the language. For example, a religious Jew will note that one is commanded to help the weak and infirm to change tires and that it may not be done on Shabbat; a Zionist will declare that a return to normal physical concerns, doing things that were once left to "the hands of Esau", represent a national value.)

Conversely, how you spend a leisurely evening has a great deal to do with your language and literature. But all educated persons, though they speak different languages or "just" over-lapping ones, should know how to do that too.

Israel Scheffler

HOW CAN A JEWISH SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS BE DEVELOPED?

1. The need for a philosophical analysis of the term 'identity' and its various uses.

The term is both vague and ambiguous; it ought not to be taken as a primitive term for the formulation of hypotheses and practical theses without considerable preliminary analysis.

The descriptive and normative aspects need, for example, to be disentangled. Insofar as a group is specifiable, one may investigate its characteristics empirically, and perhaps try to determine those which are common and peculiar to it. But those who speak of "finding" or "searching for" an identity do not seem to be addressing themselves to such a cluster of empirical traits. Rather, they seem to be raising a set of normative questions: "What to do as a member of a given group, how the group ought itself to act? etc." Different answers to these questions are compatible with any given view of the actual cluster of empirical traits thought to characterize the group. Various forms of normative identification, and even the rejection of all such identification are thus independent possibilities requiring independent consideration even after de facto empirical traits are decided upon.

For these normative issues, empirical investigation has another role to play: to spell out the conditions and consequences of the various normative possibilities in the most realistic way possible. Normative and philosophical dialectic and choice are still required but will at least rest upon reliable assessment of alternatives.

The main fallacy, in my opinion, is the idea that some normative form of identification is already fixed, antecedently given, constituting the es-

sence of the group, to be investigated as a matter of fact and taken as a firm point of reference. Rather, the question is what we are to make of our historical group membership through our own deliberative choices, based upon an accurate awareness of our historical circumstances and as reliable as possible an estimate of alternative possibilities open to us.

2. Particular problem: Jewish education

If psychologists and social philosophers are to be believed, the mind is an achievement. R.S. Peters writes:

> No man is born with a mind; for the development of mind marks a series of individual and racial achievements. A child is born with an awareness not as yet differentiated into beliefs, wants, and feelings. All such specific modes of consciousness, which are internally related to types of object in a public world, develop later pari passu with the pointing out of paradigm objects. Gradually the child comes to want things which there are means of obtaining instead of threshing round beset by unruly and unrealistic wishes; he comes to fear things that may hurt him, and to believe that things will come to pass which have come to pass. He learns to name objects, to locate his experience in a spatio-temporal framework, and to impose causal and means-to-end categories to make sense of events and actions. He creates pools of predictability by making promises and stating his intentions. In the beginning it was not at all like this. Such an embryonic mind is the product of initiation into public traditions enshrined in a public language, which it took our remote ancestors centuries to develop. With the mastery of basic skills the door is opened to a vaster and more variegated inheritance.

> Further differentiation develops as the boy becomes initiated more deeply into distinctive forms of knowledge such as science, history, mathematics, religious and aesthetic appreciation, and into the practical types of knowledge involved in moral, prudential, and technical forms of thought and action. . . . . To have a mind is not to enjoy a private picture show or to exercise some inner diaphanous organ; it is to have an awareness differentiated in accordance with the canons implicit in all these inherited traditions. 'Education' marks out the processes by means of which the individual is initiated into them.

Several points should be noted in this account: Awareness is differentiated through initiation into a public world; such initiation involves action and the interiorization of traditional concepts and canons applicable to, indeed defining, such action. To have accomplished such interiorization is to have learned to act and conceive one's action along distinctive lines. It might be further added that to raise such distinctiveness to consciousness is to have a sense of oneself as located within traditional forms.

If such an account is correct, and if one goal of Jewish education is not only to transmit inherited forms, but to develop a Jewish self-consciousness, how can this be achieved in present circumstances? Peters speaks of the situation of a national, geographically, economically, and politically integrated group with a long and settled tradition and a common language and ethos. What opportunities for common action, common concepts, and common canons are there for Jewish communities round the world? The concreteness of an integrated group is unavailable; the very conception of the Jewish group correspondingly abstract. Imagination and cognitive grasp of a high order are required to develop the very conception of the community if it is not to be watered down and restricted

to limited ceremonial occasions, largely outside the home, or dependent largely on negative pressures from without. Institutionalization of common and suitable forms of action would need to be developed, (but how?) and the concepts and canons implicit in such action seen to be of such seriousness and general import as capable of application in central rather than peripheral regions of life. The problem, seen thus, has not been solved in my opinion. Can any steps be taken in the direction of a solution?

Jewish Education: Purposes, Problems and Possibilities*

ISRAEL SCHEFFLER

I. Purposes

I begin with a caution: If we turn to Jewish education worldwide with the categories of public national systems in mind, we are sure to be misled. Unlike schooling under these systems, Jewish education is not compulsory, it does not derive from national citizenship nor connect with university or professional education. It does not aim to introduce students to the arts and sciences nor does it evaluate them in terms of academic achievement. It provides no vocational, career, or artistic training, nor does it function to select students for adult roles in society. It is, further, neither parallel to, nor a substitute for what may be regarded as general education or universal culture; it no more frees one from the need for such culture than does an Argentinian or Alaskan or Norwegian education.

The purposes of Jewish education differ wholly from those of public education. These purposes are neither civic, nor individualistic, nor utilitarian. Viewed in relation to the pupil, they are: to initiate the Jewish child into the culture, history, and spiritual heritage of the Jewish people, to help the child to learn and face the truth about Jewish history, identity, and existence, to enhance his or her dignity as a Jewish person, and to enable the child to

accept, and to be creative in, the Jewish dimension of its life.

Viewed rather in its relation to the Jewish people, the purposes of Jewish education are: to promote its survival and welfare, to interpret and communicate authentic Jewish experience, to sustain and defend Jewish honor and loyalties, to create living links with one Jewish past, preserving and extending its heritage for future generations. Ideally, Jewish education should be a natural reflection of the inner dignity of the Jewish people, and of its ethical, spiritual and cultural resources, as well as a response to current social and intellectual realities. This means: it should not be merely defensive, or apologetic, or imitative, or archaic, or nostalgic for a past that is no more. Rather, from its own position of inner strength and historical self-awareness, it should have the courage not only to reevaluate its directions, but also to adapt whatever is worthwhile in the environment to its own purposes, thus promoting the creative continuity of its civilization.

II. Problems

The problems facing Jewish education in modern industrial society stand out sharply by contrast with the pre-modern period, for which education in the Jewish school, home, and community was one continuous entity, embodied

concretely in all spheres of life. Insofar as formal Jewish schooling or study was differentiated in the earlier period it was accorded the highest religious and metaphysical status, regarded as an intrinsic value, a form of worship, but also a practical guide in all spheres of life. Scattered in their diverse and fragile communities, Jews assuredly had no control over the world, but they had the word, and the word gave them access to the highest heavens, to which their religious life was dedicated. What sociologists have remarked as the peculiar mixture of Jewish intellectuality, otherworldliness, and steadfastness in adversity is perhaps illuminated by the special role of classical Jewish education.

The Jew lived a precarious existence, but the philosophical framework of Jew and non-Jew alike was largely the same. The world revealed by faith was created by a personal and omnipotent God, who put mankind at the center of his creation, endowed human beings with free will and made absolute moral and devotional demands of them. Human actions were freighted with significance, supervised by Providence, consequential in the last degree. History, an interplay of God's will and men's wills, was to be read partly as natural, partly as miraculous, but in any case as inviting interpretation by personal, moral, and religious categories, such as loyalty, gratitude, reciprocity, covenant, punishment and reward, reverence, sin, stubbornness, and repentance.

The holiness of the Jewish Scriptures, central to this philosophial world-view, was virtually unquestioned. Although Jews suffered for refusing to accept Christianity or Islam as the higher fulfillment of these Scriptures, the Scriptures themselves were regarded by all as sacred. Jewish education was thus based on systematic beliefs, of which the basic philosophical features were recognized and shared by all. Such education offered a genuine reflection of historical Jewish existence, offering an authentic response to that existence in the doctrines and practices of Judaism.

Now every feature of the pre-modern context has been destroyed or rendered problematic in the modern period. The emancipation and entry of the Jew into the mainstream of Western life broke the tightly knit harmony of home, school and community. The general breakdown of the medieval world view shattered the inherited conception of nature and history shared by Jew and non-Jew alike, undermined traditional attitudes to their religious Scriptures, and destroyed the uniform traditional response to Jewish existence which constituted the basis of education in the past.

The Jewish genius for religious creativity, already severely threatened by these changes, has now, further, been profoundly shocked by the incalculable trauma of the Holocaust. Jewish predilections for intellecual and otherworldly thought have, concomitantly, been secularized, largely diverted into scientific and academic channels--thus

reinforcing universalistic ideologies corrosive of Jewish loyalties.

The momentum of the technological society meanwhile proceeds apace, most rapidly in the United States. Mobility destroys communities and dissolves family bonds. Individualism and voluntarism erode the base of religious, and specifically Jewish, values. The pervasive commercialism, the ever more distracting media, the consumerism, the vulgarity, the sheer volume of competing activities and communications salient in contemporary life, all constitute obstacles to a vital Jewish education. Unlike their educational forebears, Jewish educators of today cannot rely on a nearly universal philosophical consensus undergirding religious faith, nor on the support of a devout Jewish home, nor on an authoritative Jewish community and--unlike their public counterparts--they cannot call on political and civic incentives for education, or on those of self-interest or career advancement. It is commonly said that education is a reflection of its society. Contemporary Jewish education has the task of creating the very society of which it should be the reflection.

There is no use bemoaning these facts, or looking back fondly to the memory of circumstances more favorable to Jewish education. If such education is to succeed, it must do so here and now. If it fails, fond memories will afford no consolation. To grasp the possibility of success,

educators need to realize the magnitude of the problem and then to mobilize their efforts to address it. Concerted action on several fronts is needed. I shall here offer some suggestions, divided into two rough categories: organizational, and philosophical.

III. Possibilities

A. Organizational suggestions

The problems of Jewish education, arising from a shared commitment to Jewish survival, nevertheless vary qualitatively with the communities into which the Jewish people is divided. Seen in the worldwide perspective of its overriding purpose, Jewish education must, however, take as a primary task to strengthen the bonds among these communities, to build and reinforce lines of communication among them, developing morale, understanding, and mutual support. The problems they severally face differ in various respects, and they must find correspondingly varying ways of meeting them. But in shared purpose and fate, each has a stake in the success of the rest. Each must therefore foster an awareness of all, seeing itself not merely in local and current terms, but as part of a continuous people, stewards-in-common of a precious heritage of culture.

Among the several Jewish communities, the one in Israel

occupies a central place, as the only one in which the historic language of Jews lives, in which the self-consciousness of Jews as a people is public and explicit, in which the possibility of continuous cultural development is maximal. The love of the land and the deep bond between diaspora and Israeli Jewish communities are basic to Jewish educational goals, and consequently, so also is a profound concern for the welfare of the Jewish community of Israel.

Yet Jewishness is not to be confused with Israelism. Israeli citizens include non-Jews, while most Jews are not Israeli citizens. Nor can Jewish education be reduced to pro-Israelism. It must take into account the rich content of Jewish experience throughout the centuries, reckon with the diverse characteristics and needs of diaspora Jewish communities, and take as its fundamental goal the strengthening of informed Jewish loyalites in diverse spheres of life. It must educate each Jewish community to take a role in the worldwide deliberations of the Jewish people, for each such community has a role to play and a point of view to represent.

Jewish education, in this conception, is inevitably pluralistic. Within the framework of its common purposes, it is to be realized in different ways, every such realization based on an authentic relation to the Jewish past and an effort to make some portion of that past usable in the present. But it is bound, at the same time, to respect the

differing interpretations of Jewish life which strive, in their various ways, to preserve and promote Jewish values.

Jewish education ought, in every one of its realizations, to promote an inclusive sense of time--an awareness of, and affiliation with, the history of the Jewish people; a comprehensive sense of space--an awareness of, and association with, the Jewish communities scattered across the globe, and a cultivated sense of self--a knowledge of the Hebrew language and other languages of Jews, and an acquaintance with the treasured achievements and literatures of Jewish thought, feeling, striving, and expression throughout the ages.

Some suggestions of a curricular and institutional sort are these:

A rethinking of real educational time should be undertaken, both as regards the annual calendar, to emphasize learning time outside traditional school hours, and as regards the life span, to emphasize adult education, family education, education in university settings, and projects linking older and younger generations.

Analogously, a rethinking of real educational space is needed, to emphasize local learning sites outside the traditional school, e.g. Judaica collections in university libraries, Jewish institutions such as hospitals, museums,

newspapers, presses, bookstores, homes for the aged, community councils, studios, educational and service bureaus; as well, exchanges and visits to Jewish communities elsewhere.

In addition, a rethinking of the educational development of Jewish selfhood is needed, to prepare and revise learning materials for children of various ages, and for adults, emphasizing not only history, language and literature, but also experiences and practices, arts and music, and the analysis of social problems confronting contemporary Jewish communities.

Finally, institutions for the worldwide coordination of educational efforts should be developed. These would facilitate research, comparative studies and evaluations, preparation and dissemination of educational materials, and exchanges amongst Jewish educators in the various communities. Centers for research, development, training, field studies and planning should be formed.

B. Philosophical suggestions

The problems of Jewish education are not, in any event, primarily organizational. Nor are they wholly soluble by exhortation, inspiration, funding or research. All of these have their place but none can substitute for a philosophical

rethinking of the bases of Jewish life in our times.

By philosophy, I intend nothing technical or abstruse, but an engagement with such basic questions as: How can the purposes of Jewish education best be realized in the present? What is the justification for such education? What is our positive vision of an ideal Jewish life in this century? What ought we to expect of Jewish youth under the actual constraints of their life conditions? How help them, and ourselves, to an authentic appreciation of Jewish values? How enable them to go beyond us to develop the latent intimations of Jewish tradition and insights? How shall we introduce them to Jewish materials so that these materials may germinate and grow in their minds and hearts and flourish in the world they will inhabit rather than the worlds we can remember? A reflective answer to this last question requires a fresh perception of the materials themselves, without which they will remain educationally inert. I offer no complete answers here, but only some suggestions on two basic sorts of materials: Jewish texts and religious rituals.

(1) Texts

Jewish education is said to be traditionally text-centered. The attribution is misleading, for the study of sacred texts in classical Judaism was not self-sufficient, but supported by constant educative influences flowing from the life of the family and the practice of the community.

Nevertheless, these texts and their interpretive literatures did constitute the basic focus of formal study.

This traditional role of textual materials, incidentally, offers another, and a positive, dissimilarity with general public schooling. For where such schooling has often come to rely on scattered and artificial items of the "See Spot run" variety in early education, Jewish education can draw on the rich and momentous texts that have shaped both Jewish and non-Jewish consciousness throughout the centuries.

But magnificent as these texts may be, they must be seen, from an educational point of view, as providing only raw materials for learning. In themselves lifeless, they cannot speak to our pupils until these pupils have learned to hear, come within range, acquired the needed meanings, and been prompted to ask the appropriate questions. If these texts seem so obviously meaningful to us--that is, to adult educators--it is only because we have already gone through the processes of learning to hear them. The obviousness of their meaning is an artifact of our early training, and cannot be generated in our youth by mere exposure. They need themselves to learn how to hear the message, to grasp it in a way that will be effective for them, whether or not it was our way in the past.

A reflective or philosophical approach to this task

requires us to rethink the texts ourselves; unlearning our habitual perceptions, we need to look at the texts again with fresh eyes and from new angles. The teaching of the young ought to be an occasion for the re-teaching of ourselves--their teachers. Such re-teaching is a matter, not merely of recalling our own half-remembered learnings, or of relating the text to past context and commentary, but also it is an occasion for exploration and discovery--for finding those new meanings in the text which can only be revealed by the serious effort to make it available in the present. A philosophical approach to teaching the text should, in short, renew the text itself, as well as teach both teacher and pupil.

(2) Religious rituals

Religion is a closed book to large numbers of Jews and non-Jews alike. To open this book, at least partially, through reinterpretation in contemporary intellectual terms is a philosophical task of the first importance. For Jewish education it is crucial in view of the intimate historical dependence of Jewish civilization upon its religious core. I do not pretend to do more here than make some suggestions on the topic of ritual as educational matter.

To begin with, it is worth emphasizing the fact that religion has a history, despite common denials by

religionists themselves. Every doctrine and rite preserves echoes of earlier beliefs no longer accepted reflectively today. The continuity of religion is in substantial part a product of reinterpretation, acknowledged or not. Thus the effort at contemporary reinterpretation has ample precedent.

Attitudes toward ritual have clearly undergone enormous changes, the details of which can here be left to the scholars. But a brief sketch, following Yehezkel Kaufmann, will make the point.[V] Primitive pre-Biblical culture conceived of ritual as magic, a technique for manipulating nature. The rites, properly performed, guaranteed the fertility of flocks and fields, protection against drought, freedom from sickness, victory in war, control over one's enemies, success in enterprise. This conception did not give the gods or spirits a privileged position. These spirits themselves used ritual and magic to gain their ends, and were in turn subject to manipulation by ritual and magic employed by other spirits and by man. These characteristics are amply exhibited in pagan mythology and stories of the gods.

A more humanistic but still primitive view which overlay the magical conception was that of ritual as propitiation of the gods or spirits in control of some natural resource. Pleasing the god in control of rainfall would, it was hoped, guarantee rainfall--not automatically--but through the mediation of the will of the god, who could be dealt with on the basis of pleas and gifts, but not coerced through a

mechanical technique. This was the world view of polytheism--nature as a set of different regions or forces, each under the rule of an independent local will that could be bargained with, as one would bargain with a human being.

Biblical religion wrought a radical transformation in these beliefs, propounding the doctrine of a transcendent, single god, who was not part of nature but who stood wholly beyond it, having created it and all that it contains, and whose will was the source of absolute moral commands laid upon human beings generally and the children of Israel in particular. Such a being had no need of magical devices to attain his goals. He could not be manipulated by the techniques of men nor bargained with like a local landowner or petty politician. The Bible contains the record of this transformation in its rejection of all mythology and its strong polemic against magic, idolatry, and divination. Yet elements of earlier beliefs as to the magical efficacy of rites can still be discerned in the Pentateuch.

Prophetic attitudes toward the rites as conditional and subordinate to the moral commands prevailed in later, Rabbinic Judaism. What, however, was the purpose of rites for which no rational meaning could be found? Kaufmann says "The ultimate sanction of the rite became the divine will. Judaism thus created a noble symbol for its basic idea that everything is a divine command; fulfilling the command is an acknowledgement of the supremacy of God's will. A cult of

a) Denotation: Jewish rites pick out or portray various events and aspects of life associated with Jewish history and with the distinctive values distilled in that history. By repeated occurrence through the year and at major junctions of personal life, rites bring participants into continual contact with these values. Judaism as a historical religion has rites that are largely commemorative. The seasonal rhythms of agricultural rites were historicized as well and thus reflected in ritual after the land was lost. Thus the ritual calendar became the denotative cement holding the whole system together. Beyond the day to day practical tasks of their lives, Jews had in the scheme of ritual observance referential access to a dramatic world of history and purpose in which they found meaning.

b) Expression: Ritual actions have a second symbolic function, beyond denotation, i.e. expression. Just as a painting may express joy or nostalgia while denoting a landscape, a rite may express a feeling or attitude while portraying a historical event. Jewish rituals thus indeed express a whole range of feelings and moods, fear and deliverance (Purim), the bitterness of slavery and the joy of redemption (Passover), contrition and exultation (Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur), wonder, trust and peace (Sabbath). The rites carrying these expressive values do not uniformly evoke the respective emotions in performance. Yet, the repeated exposure to such symbolized values shapes the

commands evolved; the system of commands sanctified all of life to the service of the One. To laws for which no rational explanation could be found, the Rabbis applied the general principle, 'The commandments were given only for the purpose of purifying human beings' (Gen. Rabbah 44.1)."

כך אמר לא ניתנו המצוות אלא לצרף בהן את הבריות.
ובי את איכפת ליה להקב"ה לאי שחוט מן הצואר או אי שחוט
מן הדורסן. הוי לא ניתנו המצוות אלא לצרף בהם את הבריות.

This humanistic attitude of the Rabbis views the rites as, in effect, educative through their symbolic value. Ritual "purifies human beings" not through magical force or propitiatory effect but through its reflexive symbolic impact which helps to relate its participants to higher values and more exalted purposes.

This historical attitude is available to reinterpretive efforts today, and can indeed be considerably extended. A ritual system can be viewed as an elaborate symbolic apparatus, a complex language which profoundly alters the perceptions and sensibilities of those who learn to interpet and apply it in living practice. I mention here three, out of several, cardinal symbolic functions performed by ritual: denotation, expression, and reenactment.

character and sensibility of its participants, over time.

c) Reenactment: Ritual performances allude indirectly to previous performances. Each new Seder calls to mind Sedarim past, i.e. reenacts them while at the same time portraying the exodus, and expressing the joy of liberation from bondage. The repetition of rites thus serves another purpose beyond the shaping of individual perceptions--that is, the development of tradition--the sense, with each repetition of a rite, that it is a repetition. And tradition further structures time; beyond the commemoration of historical events, and beyond the ordering of rhythms of the calendar year, tradition offers a sense of the lenthening duration of ritual performance, hence a sense of stability in a world of change and danger, a rootedness in time. All participants are, further, linked indirectly--by the same ritual reenactments--to one another, thus sharing a linkage in space as well, the sense of a historical community with members bound to one another in the present, wherever they may be. "More than the Jews have kept the Sabbath, the Sabbath has kept the Jews." (It is understandable that the yearning of Soviet Jews for linkage with their brethren should have found expression in rediscovery of the joyful celebration of Simhat Torah.)

The symbol system of Jewish ritual can, I suggest, be treated in these terms in contemporary education. This system is not a piece of magic, superstition, rational theory,

cosmic technology or outmoded theology. It constitutes a language which organizes a world, structuring time and space, orienting us in history, binding us in community, and sensitizing us to those features of life in which our forebears have found the highest value and deepest meanings--freedom, responsibility, sincerity, humility, care, loyalty, righteousness, compassion. The specific interpretations given to this symbolic system have changed throughout our history more frequently than the system itself. It is the system itself we need, however to treat seriously again, recovering it as a potent resource for Jewish education.

* This paper was originally given at a Commencement of the Jerusalem Fellows, in June 1985. It will appear in a memorial volume for Bennett Soloman, ed. D. Margolis and E. Schoenberg, in press.

1. Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel [translated and abridged by Moshe Greenberg], (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), esp. pp. 53-57, 101-103.

2. Ibid., p. 102.

2. Much of what follows derives from my studies of symbolic aspects of ritual, included in my *Inquiries: Philosophical Studies of Language, Science, and Learning* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1986) Part I, Chs. 6, 7, 8.

The Educated Person

(Seminar on the Educated Jew, Jerusalem, April 2, 1992)

I. Scheffler

Seymour Fox: I want to say one word about the genesis of today's paper. We have been working with Professor Scheffler and his colleagues at Harvard for quite some time and when we undertook this project, we thought that it would be useful and it would make a difference if we could get an understanding of what's happening in the world of general education about this problem of the educated person. We felt that that would be important for many reasons; two very simple ones, before we even think about it in a deeper sense, are that it would be important to know why we're not treating issues that they are treating and also to find out why they are not treating issues that we are treating. That would be a wonderful element to introduce into our conversations. So we've asked Professor Scheffler and his colleagues to undertake—and we were pleased that they were willing to undertake—such an assignment. Today we're going to hear first thoughts on that and then I expect that in the future we will have an opportunity to re-introduce his ideas and thoughts and those of his colleagues into our conversations. Before we conclude today, I expect that we'll have a chance to say something very preliminary about the future of our work, but let me just at least indicate that this is one of the elements that we see being introduced into our thinking.

Prof. Israel Scheffler: Thank you very much. If I can just take one second to comment on the discussion we had this morning: I just wanted to say how much I appreciated the comment Mike Rosenak made about language. I think it is very very useful. In fact, it is closer than I had originally thought, the sort of thing that I presented last time in my first paper about categories and so on. I was living with certain categories, the way one is shaping one's perceptions. . . . I still have some qualms about the borderline between language and belief, because if you use a language to express both belief and disbelief in the same language—and I worry a bit about that, but I think it is extremely, extremely fruitful, and since I thought so I just wanted to express my appreciation.

I also want to say a word about the bookishness issue since Charles mentioned my comment about it. I feel in the unaccustomed role of peacemaker. Yesterday I suggested a reconciliation between the two (positions on rationality). Today I'm going to suggest another one. This is a terrible role for me to be in. I don't like it. About the bookishness: I thought originally, when I was talking about bookishness, I wasn't attacking the value of books, but suggesting that one needs to take into account also so-called affective education, socialization. You mentioned the family model. All kinds of emotional aspects of education

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and so on. I presented a thing on Jewish education at Harvard some time back, a kind of an autobiographical thing and one of the people present was Sara Lawrence Lightfoot, who is my colleague, a black woman, who wrote a wonderful book about her mother. She presented something about her education, her mother, and so on, and she heard my presentation. She said, "My, that's tremendously bookish!" She made that comment about me! She said, "Is there nothing sensory in Jewish life?" I said, "I don't know." What have I done? I had to tell about *chalah* and the wine and putting honey on the mouth of the child on the first day of school. All those things that I didn't emphasize. I came across to her as. . . . But the whole underpinning of the emotional and socializing aspects of life that we presuppose, that were presupposed by the emphasis on texts, classical texts, so it was so much evident in my own Jewish experience that it wasn't the focus. The focus was on the text but there is a whole underpinning. When the whole underpinning falls away, emphasis on the text itself becomes tenable. I don't think it will come to that. It is a matter of working on both fronts at once.

One more word about bookishness. I wrote a paper some years ago critical of the use of computers in schools, so I've taken a critical view about computers. On the other hand, I was quite taken back and surprised and pleased to find that one of the first departments to introduce computer literacy, so to speak, as a requirement for graduate studies in many of the universities in the United States is the classics department. I identify computers with MIT, the electronics people, the applied scientists, and so on, but it was the classics. In fact, it was the department of religion that introduced computer requirements for graduate study. Why? Because computers turn out to be for them a tremendously important tool in working with texts. If you want to translate, you can have a split screen and introduce alternative translations of words. My point was that as much as I am technically suspicious of these technological devices, I'm sure that in the service of the word, they can be put to the same use that old technological devices are used, like pencils. They used to be instruments that didn't always exist. They were introduced. It was new technology. There was resistance, I assume. Critics like myself would have said—pencils, this new fangled thing, we don't need it. So basically what I want to do is to see if we can't divorce the concept of language from the concept of the hardware within which the language is embodied. It's as in that Talmudic piece which speaks about the words being burned and the letters blossoming in the air. It's the thing in the air that's the language. It's the department that's the hardware, it's technology. I think this comment that you made earlier is very relevant. That is, it is so pervasive, computers are now so pervasive and other stuff is so pervasive, we have to use it and develop some programs, seeing how it can be used as workers support these flying letters.

Let me say a word about this material. I distributed two papers both by Richard Peters of the University of London, who is an old friend of mine and colleague, because essentially the London School of Philosophy of Education which operated actively from about 1960 to about 1975 or thereabouts was the one that devoted the most time to the issue of defining what he

called the educated man. I say "educated man" and not "educated person" because I want to be true to the text. They said "educated man" in those days and I'll talk later about some of the feminist critics of this kind of approach.

Both Peters, the London School and various movements in the United States, one of which I was involved in, emphasized the analytic approaches to philosophy of education. We all agreed that attention should be paid to the matters concerning the concepts of the terminology, the language within which educational beliefs are formulated. The assumption being that the language actually can't be separated from the thought contained, and calls attention to the language categories within which our beliefs are formulated, and would throw some light on what those beliefs actually are. And also the language, unless we pay conscious attention to it, tends to constrain us. This is part of the reason why I have decided to mention multiculturalism earlier in reference to Mike's paper. You can't say I am not going to pay attention to language. I'll just pay attention to things. I will get rid of, throw away all the language that I have. You can't think the world without thinking in language, but you can liberate yourself to this extent by acquiring many languages. By comparative approach if you can speak many languages, you can get to see how each one may be constraining in its own way, what the limits and the difficulty are in any given formulation.

Now Peters more particularly concerned himself with the definition of what he called the educated man in many of his publications. The first paper that I distributed was a chapter from his book *Ethics in Education*, which came out in 1966. The second paper is a paper that he wrote much later. I don't have the exact date on this copy. I can't reconstruct it from memory, but it certainly was from the seventies in which he came back to the issue. My own work on these topics—I have never gotten involved on this discussion about the educated man. I have shied away from it. I have read what Peters has to say but I have shied away from it. My attention has been focused much more on the concept of teaching. That's a kind of difference between us even though we both share a vested (?) approach to many of these issues.

What's the connection between these two ideas—teaching on the one hand, education on the other? Let me say a word about the differences between these two. Teaching seems to me to be different from—the concept of teaching seems different from the concept of education—in various significant ways. For one, teaching is often more circumscribed in manner than education. There is a constraint on the manner in which teaching proceeds which doesn't also constrain education in the same way. For example, teaching is in American educational theory, and in many other educational theories, contrasted with other things which also influence the student but which fall outside the scope of teaching. For example, teaching versus indoctrination. Many people have said, "Well indoctrination is certainly no stranger to education." Most educational systems indoctrinate. But teaching, on the other

hand, as an activity; if you teach, you'd better differentiate what you're doing from indoctrination. So there is a constraint/distinction of manner which is more operative in attention to concept of teaching and less operative in the concept of education.

Another point is this: that the concept of education is more amorphous than the concept of teaching. Teaching, it seems to me, is more activity directed. If a person is engaged in teaching, you have an idea of a certain form of activity in which he's engaged in trying to get somebody to learn something; and also, teaching sometimes describes an institutional role. If a person is a teacher, you have the notion of a person who is incumbent of a certain role in an institution, involved in a whole, and producing certain learning or promoting certain forms of learning, whereas education as such seems to me less typically descriptive of a particular activity or role. It's much more, in the way in which Peters described it, and here I agree with him, an umbrella term(?) which covers a whole lot of different things that might be going on, the outcome of which it is thought to be significant forms of learning.

The third point is this: I said that the concept of teaching is more restricted in manner than the concept of education; but on the other hand, it is less restricted in the type of the outcome. For example, there is no value constraint on the concept of teaching. You can teach somebody how to be a safe cracker. There is no self contradiction in that. But it would be somewhat self defeating, self contradictory if you say you have educated them to be safe cracker. Education, the notion of education, does involve—and here I agree with Peters again—some sort of value consideration on the outcome. The notion of teaching is much more process oriented. It has no value connotation with respect to the outcome. You can teach anybody anything—forgery, safe cracking, graft taking, anything you want. But on the other hand, if you are teaching it to him, not just indoctrinating, you are actually appealing to his reason in the process. You are explaining how to do it. You are showing him how. You are operating through a certain process that limits the kind of activity involved, whereas the notion of education is just the obverse: it is restricted on the outcome, much less restricted on the manner.

Now there are two main varieties in the concept of education that Peters discusses and other people have discussed. I put it in my own terms here. Peters comes back again and again to it as a point of difficulty. Let me put it in his terms. He talks about Spartan education. Education of Sparta. He says Spartans had an educational system, but he hardly thinks of a Spartan as an educated person, an educated man. That indicates that there is a difference between the first person and the third person uses of the concept of education. If I speak in my own voice about what makes an educated man, what makes an educated Jew in this context, I'm expressing my values. That's a normative expression. I am expressing what I think to be important, what I take to be significant. That's what we have been doing the whole seminar. We have been trading on our value conceptions what should go into the ideal outcome of the Jewish

educational system. On the other hand, there is a descriptive sense of the word in which you can refer to any society's educational system without endorsing the values of that society's educational system. The Nazis had an educational system. God forbid we should. . . (?) You can talk about education in this way, just as anthropologically you can speak of any society's legal system without endorsing it, where by contrasting you speak of what the law requires or not. Speaking from the vantage point of our own little system, we are in fact expressing and endorsing a certain set of values in our system. It's important to see this. Peters harps on this again and again. He begins by saying, by taking the first person normative views as fundamental. He says the concept of education. . . . which is considered by other people to be, I'm not sure, of promoting some value that they appreciate. I can call it a reformed, third person sense, that anthropological sense. So there is a connection between the concept of education and the concept of what Peters calls worthwhileness, but it goes in two stages. Speaking in my own voice when I speak of an education, an educated man and an educated person, I am in effect expressing my values about the content of the education. On the other hand, I can speak of somebody else's conception of the educated man, meaning that it's that education which according to that person expresses a certain set of values. That's a kind of a remote or anthropological sense of the word, of the use.

In talking about the educated man, let's take the normative sense of the word. What criteria does Peters place on this? Does he think that there are commonalities with respect to the way in which everybody uses the concept even though it is a normative concept? We aren't widely disparate in the way we use the word, even in the first person use. There seem to be certain commonalities. At any rate, this is what Peters tries to express. He has these criteria that he proposes. He thinks of what he calls worthwhileness as one criteria. If you speak of an education in the normative sense, you are spcaking about the content of that education as having value or being worthwhile. He emphasizes also the significance of the content as against trivial forms of value. Lots of things have value. Some values are broader, some are narrower; some are specialized, some are not; some are fundamental, some are superficial, and so on. Value comes in a tremendous variety of forms and shapes and we tend to over-simplify terrifically – we talk about the concept of education needing value and we leave it at that. There are all kinds of values. What he is suggesting is that the notion of education involves not merely value but a significant value, a value which is fundamental, which is broad, which is far-reaching and which is fertile as against trivial forms of value.

He also puts a tremendous emphasis on understanding what he calls knowledge and understanding. That's a cognitive criteria with respect to education in the normative sense. And here, there are various ramifications, qualifications that he adds to this general idea. For example, he emphasizes knowledge, but knowledge doesn't mean information. I think it was Whitehead who said "a merely well-informed man is the most useless bore on G-d's earth." It is a very important point to make, to differentiate the notion of knowledge from information,

especially in the present period in which the computer model of education has become so prevalent. This is one of the points that I wanted to make in my paper criticizing computer models in education. The notion of education as consisting in the treasury of information that's in its so-called database, that can be called up at will by the computer operator or metaphorically by the student with a mind, is one that seems to me to be tremendously detrimental to a view of education in the normative sense. A stockpile of information is of no use unless you can call it out when you need it and moreover, it is of no use unless you can call it out when you need it in a relevant way. That is, in a way that is relevant to the problem at hand or the question at hand that you are trying to solve. It's also a notion of education which leaves out of account the ability to raise a question that's distinct from supplying an answer. A piece of information is an answer. You know the old joke about the *yeshiva bocher* who says I have an answer, ask me a question. That's a computer. A computer is a *yeshiva bocher*. It says I have a lot of answers, ask me a question. The human being has to ask a question and the notion of education is centrally a stockpile of information.

What he emphasizes—what he particularly emphasizes—is the knowledge: he always says knowledge and understanding. If you see his paper, he puts the two together. I think even that is too understated a point, but the point of emphasizing understanding is the point of saying that you've not merely got to know some piece of information, but you've got to understand how it works. You've got to be able for any given piece of information you have, you've got to be able to use it, apply it properly, use it intelligently and not stupidly, retrieve it at the right moment, see why it has credibility, what might be said in favor of it, what might be said against it, how it fits with all kinds of other things. There's a whole panoply of competences and skills surrounding any given computer bit of information that if left out account trivializes the whole notion of education, and when you speak about education in the normative sense, all those things need to be taken into account. If you think of an educated man as a person that has some knowledge, you want to make sure to include these other competences and skills in your conception of knowledge unless you are going to be in effect trivializing the conception.

Well suppose we have all of this, we have knowledge and understanding, including all these competences or skills or whatever that I have mentioned, is that enough? Well, no, according to Peters—and to me as well. You want to make sure that you've got knowledge that's (as in the case of the value criteria) you've got knowledge that's significant, not merely trivial. There has been a tradition in which people have defined science as organized information or organized knowledge, and a counter attempt that the best, most handily available book containing organized knowledge is the telephone directory, which is not science. You want to have knowledge that's significant, fundamental or fertile rather than simply organized bits of information.

Now Peters puts a contrast or makes this point in connection with what he calls cognitive perspective or breadth of knowledge as against the training, the narrow skill learning. He puts it in connection with the concept of narrow versus broad, so that an educated man can't be simply a specialist with a tremendous amount of information and understanding – indeed, even creativity in any sense that you want to explain it, but in a very specialized realm. What he speaks of is cognitive perspective. That's the terminology he uses – cognitive perspective. He wants the knowledge that is involved in education to be broad rather than specialized. He wants the knowledge to be connected with understanding rather than with simple skill training or skill learning, and in a special passage, he emphasizes what he speaks of as a transformation in the way of looking at things. This is a significant passage. It is at the bottom of page 8 of the first paper.

If you look at the section on page 8, "knowledge and understanding," the first part of that paragraph (the second half of the page) he says: "We do not call a person educated who has simply mastered a skill, even though the skill may be very highly prized, such as pottery. For a man to be educated it is insufficient that he should possess a mere know-how and knack. He must have also some body of knowledge and some kind of conceptual scheme to raise this above the level of a collection of disjointed facts." That's the idea that I had in connection with the computer. You want the knowledge, the bits, to be organized. You want them to be conceptually structured in some form.

"This implies some understanding of principles for the organization of facts. We would not call a man who was merely informed an educated man." A person who is merely well informed might be called knowledgeable but knowledgeability, although a necessary condition, is not sufficient for thinking about an educated man. That's another important distinction. The distinction between broad and narrow, a distinction between skill trained and breadth of understanding, and a distinction between knowledgeability or mere cultivation and education. You'd expect an educated man to be cultivated. Cultivation is not enough.

Here's the example of Sparta. "He must also have some understanding of the 'reason why' of things. The Spartans, for instance, were militarily and morally trained. They knew how to fight and they knew what was right and wrong. They were also possessed of a certain stock of folklore, which enabled them to manage provided they stayed in Sparta. But we would not say that they had received a military or moral education; for they had never been encouraged to probe into the principles underlying their code." That's another important element of this notion, the notion that education provides the student with a code, and that's a necessary part of moral education: to acquire a moral code as a way of behaving, a set of conceptions of right and wrong, a set of dispositions to conjure at a certain time. What Peters is suggesting now is that all of that isn't enough, that going beyond that involves the capability to probe into the principles underlying the very code that one has given the student – and that means giving the

students a dangerous instrument by which they themselves, in effect, can judge the very code that we ourselves are interested in supplying. That means giving them the opportunity to rethink the very code that we have given them. We are risking our own code by educating people.

My predecessor at Harvard, Robert Moore, used to say education is a tremendous risk. It's a dangerous business. You don't expect to be free of risks if you enter into education. John Dewey said that every time you think, you place a piece of the world in jeopardy. That's a very important and very profound comment. An educational system, now speaking descriptively, that doesn't place the world in jeopardy in the process of educating its people, isn't creating an educated man by this normative criterion. Whether you accept it or not is another matter, but this is a statement of a normative criterion – the ability not merely to acquire a code but the ability to understand the principles why. You have to probe into those principles – that means to put your mind to see whether they can claim to convince you or not (?).

It is the next paragraph that I want to emphasize and that is his concept of the knowledge that you have not being inert. Now the concept of inert knowledge is Whitehead's. Whitehead gives a tirade against what he calls inert knowledge. Whitehead thought, in his well-known essay, "The Rhythm of Education," that education comes in stages. The first stage, we talked about development here and developmental stages. Maybe this applies to Jewish education in the same way. The first stage of Whitehead's scheme is what he calls the stage of romance. The point of education is to charm, to enchant, to give an entry into some field. Forget about the details. It is to give the large sketch that entices by its charm. The second stage is what he calls the stage of precision. That's when you get past the charm and you get into the nitty gritty. That's the secondary school as distinct from the elementary school (?). The third stage is what he called the stage of generalization in which we can rise again to the broad level of romance but now with the knowledge and detail behind you. You can actually put things together and structure, and he thought that's what universities should do. They shouldn't provide more information. They should be devoted to make you challenge it(?), to enable you and encourage you to shape the ideas up into new structures and generalize them into new and comprehensive forms.

It is in the context of his tirade against inert knowledge that Whitehead makes that statement I quoted earlier about a merely informed man being the most useless bore on God's earth. It is kind of an exaggeration anyway. Nevertheless . . . Now here Peters elaborates. This is a little 'perush' on what's meant by inertness in Whitehead. He is saying knowledge ought to be inert. Two ways we have to fight inertness. In the first place, he says, it must characterize his way of looking at things rather than be isolated. It is possible for man to know a lot of history in the sense that he can give correct answers to questions in class and examinations, yet this might never affect the way in which he looks at buildings and institutions around him. You might

describe such a man as knowledgeable but we wouldn't describe him as educated. Education implies that a man's outlook is transformed by what he knows. That is the sense, one sense of inertness. The sense in which the knowledge enters into the cognitive apparatus by which the person perceives the world around. The knowledge isn't segregated. It is not plugged into one portion of the mind which is used for answering questions. It actually transforms perception, sensitivity, response, disposition and all the rest. I remember being shocked when I first came to Harvard and had contact with Professor Skinner, the behaviorist whose view of education was a behavioristic one—in his own version of behaviorism—and consisted of building up what he spoke of as a repertoire of responses by operative conditioning. His great achievement was getting pigeons to play ping pong. If you reward a pigeon properly, pigeons are wonderful animals. In fact, one of Skinner's student, Professor Hapenstein, wrote an article called "In Praise of the Pigeon Brain." We make fun of pigeons, but pigeons, if you give them enough food and organized behavioral scheduling and so on, they can do all kinds of things. They can actually do quality control. They are also very good in spotting and analyzing aerial reconnaissance photographs. So I'm told by Hapenstein, I believe. . . . Delay of gratification as well.

There is a famous joke about this, about the pigeon in the cage saying to the fellow pigeon: I've got the psychologist beautifully conditioned. Every time I push the lever, he drops in another pellet of food. Skinner tried to analyze education and training. In fact he invented a teaching machine in those days—the first version of it in the fifties. He tried to analyze knowledge and education in terms of responses. When it comes to history, he faced a problem. Historical knowledge seems not to be mirrored in any kind of response. If you have a historical fact, what kind of response does it represent? His answer was, it represents an answer to a possible question on a history examination, so that historical knowledge consists in storing up a set of verbal responses to potential questions that you might be asked on a history examination. From this point of view, there is a world of difference between that conception and what Peters is suggesting here—that historical knowledge isn't simply, or oughtn't to be, or can't be conceived from the point of view of education as something that gets stored away as potential answers to grilling by a history professor. It has to actually transform the way in which you look at the buildings and institutions around you now. You see this, as living in Jerusalem, as you walk through the environment, you walk through the historical landscape. History is not inert, not in the sense that somebody is going to ask you a question but in the sense of how you look at the landscape is transformed by what you know about it. I'm struck by this, I came here via France and I went to various museums in Paris. I was struck again by the way in which museums operate. Without any historical knowledge, you can walk through a museum for 100 years and you'll never learn a thing. You just see the patterns on the walls. In order to understand or to gain the educational potential in the museum, you've got to come well stocked with historical knowledge which actually transforms what you see and how you see it.

Put it this way. I've often thought of it that people think that you see with your eyes, but that's an understatement. You see not only with your eyes but with your education. Your education is a visual instrument. It's not optical, but it's visual, because it alters what you see – and that's the notion of education: an educated man as being somebody who doesn't simply have a bunch of information stored away to which you can apply examinations, but the persons whose knowledge, whatever else it does, transforms his perceptions of the world and dealings with the world around him.

That's one conception in which knowledge ought not to be inert. The second point, that is quite interesting as well: he connects the second point with Socrates and Plato and the doctrine that virtue is knowledge and what he expresses here is the fact that education must involve knowledge: "It must involve the kind of commitment that comes from being on the inside of a form of thought and awareness. A man cannot really understand what it is to think scientifically unless he already knows that evidence must be found for assumptions, but knows also what counts as evidence and cares that it should be found. In forms of thought where proof is possible, cogency, simplicity and elegance must be felt to matter. And what would historical and philosophical thought amount to if there were no concern about relevance, consistency or coherence. All forms of thoughts and awareness have their own internal standards of appraisal. To be on the inside of them is both to understand and to care. Without such commitment, they lose their point. I do not think that we would call a person educated whose knowledge was purely external and inert in this way." That's the punch line.

The idea is that an educated man has to care about something. You can't be uncaring. I think he exaggerates in saying that you can't really understand what it is to think in a certain way unless you care. We can understand science without caring about science, in my view. I differ with him on that sentence, but I agree with him on the point that you can't be an educated person unless there is some form of caring that activates, unless you care deeply about some things. Passion is part of your equipment as an educated man. Here is the connection with something that Menachem said about nihilism. A nihilist – if you imagine a nihilist who cares about nothing – might be extremely knowledgeable but wouldn't be educated. You might put it that way. So inertness is defeated or ought to be defeated in two ways. In one way, knowledge ought to transform the way of looking at things and in the second sense, it ought to produce some forms of caring.

I'm going to make some comments about Jewish education in a moment. I have also, aside from these points that Peters makes here – and he certainly makes a number of other points that I am not commenting on directly – I have emphasized also in my own thinking about these matters the notion of originality that's involved in the idea of an educated man normatively speaking, as I view of it, and that is a certain ability to see things not really in a way that's transformed by the knowledge but in a way that represents the individual vantage

point, and not simply thought by a cliche. You're able to respond to your own individual situation and express it. You can stand up for your annual vision, so to speak. You can speak with your own voice. You can see things in your own way, and not only see things in your own way, but be aware of seeing things in your own way and be able to express things from the way in which you see them. The ability to articulate your own independently given or earned theories and feelings. That's terrifically important, I think, in counteracting the view that education is simply a matter of transmission. As John Stuart Mill once criticized the education of his own day as the view that "the world already knows everything—all it has to do is give it to its children."

To counteract that view—that the information is already there, all you have to give it to your children—is a matter of recognizing that in building the idea of an educated man you want to do something that is going to yield unpredictable results, as the teacher doesn't already know what the result is. This is the so-called part of the risk of education. It is not really that your own code is going to be subjected to independent judgement. That's one sense of risk. The other sense of it is that you don't know in advance what forms of creative vision the educated man is going to produce as a result of your teaching. You have a curriculum, but the curriculum does not give you all the outcomes. The outcomes are not predictable and they ought to be unpredictable. You ought to be, as a teacher, surprised by what students tell you—if you are successful in producing an educated man—now speaking for myself rather than for Peters—an educated man or an educated person.

Now there is another theme that Peters emphasizes in other papers of his and that other people have as well. Here I might mention John Pasmour, who has written a very important book called *The Philosophy of Teaching* which has been hardly noted (inaudible, something about a personal comment which Pasmour made on the book's not being republished). Pasmour has written as follows about the educated man. He says an educated man is more than a cultivated man. He must be independent, critical, capable of facing problems, but further, and here's a quote, "he must be able to participate in the great human traditions of imaginative thought—science, history, literature, philosophy, technology—and to participate in these traditions one must first be instructed, must learn a discipline, must be initiated." He used Richard Peters language. "The critical spirit has a capacity to be a critical participant within a tradition even if the effect of his criticism has profoundly modified the operations of that tradition." This is a point that Pasmour makes in his condensed form—Peters has in other writings of his including in a memorable (?) lecture that he gave at the University of London called "Education as Initiation." It's the theme of initiation—the idea that education is not merely acquiring information, even information with knowledge and understanding and value and even with originality and all the things that I've talked about—but it's a matter of being initiated into a tradition of thought, and here he lists what he considers the great traditions of imaginative thought and these are all, one could say, universal traditions. They are the

common property of mankind—science, history, literature, philosophy, technology. Notice what he leaves out. He leaves out religion. He leaves out knowledge of one's own culture particularly, but he does emphasize initiation, which is a matter of becoming a participant in some way of life and becoming a participant requires in the first place discipline, learning the hows and whys and the wherefores.

Take science just for an example. Becoming a participant or being initiated into science is not a matter of simply of acquiring the information that the given branch of science has to offer, but becoming a participant in a way of thinking and operating on ideas, using scientific methods, scientific modes of thought; and that is a matter of acquiring a discipline and I would add myself the acquiring of a historical basis in the tradition that's involved. You can't learn science just by learning the disciplinary structure of the branch of science in question. You've got to actually learn the material, the corpus. You can't learn a tradition without learning the details. The tradition lives in the details. This is the point I want to make which isn't always evident from this way of putting it and the point I'm making now has been made by writers on education, like in particular Michael Oakeshotte, who has emphasized the fact that you can't abstract the structure of a discipline and teach it in the abstract. You've got to provide the actual details in acquiring the ability to abstract from them.

Another point here—this theme of initiation is the acquisition of participatory ability through initiation and mastery of detail, but furthermore the ability to be critical within the tradition. That means, as I earlier mentioned in the case of code, of being able to stand apart from the code even as one has acquired the operation and the conduct relating to the code. This has a bit to do with a comment that I made earlier about the so-called language model that Mike Rosenak has emphasized. The notion of multilingualism is partly motivated by some of these comments now. If you think of a code as a language, then the notion of acquiring not only the language, but the ability to go beyond the language by learning other languages or being able to create new forms of language—that's an emphasis on the critical aspect of initiation.

To sum up some of this, here are the various criteria that have been proposed within these general discussions for the notion of an educated man. We can in a moment talk about what has to do with the future, but here's the general list. Peters in fact gives his own summary on page twenty of the same paper. Education requires "the transmission of what is worthwhile to those who become committed to it." Education "must involve knowledge and understanding, and some kind of cognitive perspective which are not inert." Education "at least rules out some procedures of transmission; on the grounds that they lack willingness and voluntariness." I haven't discussed that point, but there it is. But if you sum up what I've so far said, here are the criteria: **worthwhile content; significant content; content that is broad rather than narrow; content that involves understanding rather than mere acquisition of skill through training; knowledge that is broad in the sense of providing cognitive**

perspective; knowledge that involves the transformation of one's perception of the world around; knowledge that involves care or produces some form of passion and care and commitment; an education that involves originality in the sense of freedom from prevalent cliche—the ability to articulate one's own views and feelings; capability of being a participant, and moreover a critical participant within various traditions of human imaginative thought. That's the list so far.

Now since Peters began this discussion and others have joined in, he has in the second paper come back again and again to various details that he has worried about. Rather than going into that matter of his own rethinking, I'd like to mention some criticism of Peters that I have encountered in teaching some of this stuff in my classes. Students have been extremely critical of Peters in the following ways.

Some of them have, many have criticized him for being too conservative. They don't like the idea of initiation. They say this is an Englishman talking. This is English aristocracy speaking about initiation into the English way of life. It's too emphatic on tradition and too little emphatic on the importance of modification of tradition. This is a cultural difference. American students don't think about tradition. They don't think about initiation. The whole concept of tradition and initiation into tradition—it's not an American thing. It's an English thing. It's a Jewish thing, as we know from *Fiddler on the Roof*. Even Americans have heard of that, but they have—I think justifiably perhaps—pointed out that both Oakeshotte and Peters have too little emphasized the point that I made at the end, about the capability of being critical of one's own tradition, the capability of producing something new, probing into the code that one has acquired; or to put it in terms of the language metaphor that Mike introduced some time back, creating new literature rather than common language. This is a point that Oakeshotte contrasts. Literature and language are two different ideas. You can acquire English, but the particular poetry that you write with English is new material. The capability of producing new literature and moreover transforming the very language that you acquire in creating new literature—all of these aspects of innovation have been items that I think Mike (unclear) emphasized more than some of these papers have suggested. So, I would be inclined to accept that criticism and say let's do it, let's make a special effort to include those aspects within a normative conception of the educated man.

If you think about Jewish education for a moment, I'll talk about Jewish education in a final set of comments. Let me just continue in this vein. Another criticism that my students have made, and I think again this is partly a cultural difference and a historical difference in epoch, is the criticism of feminists that Peters puts his whole discussion in terms of the educated man. This is a tradition in which writers in this period have participated, and the critique is that whether or not it is conscious or unconscious, what this restriction does is to overlook the fact that there are social differentiations in the roles that men and women have played, structured

by society, and that putting the discussion in terms of the educated man tends to ignore this particular fact. It tends to ignore the position of women, the special roles that women have been cast into (?), the special forms of life, special responsibilities that being female involve, and that therefore the whole educational landscape gets skewed in such a way as to overlook half of the human race. That's putting the feminist criticism . . . . The feminists have done a real philosophical service here by saying let's think more specifically about the differentiation of social roles, particular roles, sex roles but also different roles in the society. Let's get more particular about the special problems of life that society's structures place on people and let's not assume a universalistic stance to begin with and beg all those questions. I think that's exceedingly important. The challenge is that once the criticism is made, you need to then think about whether the roles that now exist are appropriate, or whether they shouldn't be changed, whether they are good or bad. If they are good, they need be perpetuated, think about the differences that they entail. If they are bad, how to reform them. Here the feminists themselves have, as I understand it, got internal differences. Some say yes there are different roles. They ought to be different. Some say there are different roles, but they ought to be merged. It is too bad that they differ, but at any rate, one needs to think from an educational point of view some of the universalistic themes put in these general terms by these writers.

And finally, the most recent form of criticism that I have encountered as I have spoken about these matters with my students has been in the recent emphasis on multiculturalism. There is a lot of the multiculturalism talk that I don't agree with, but I think that there is a core, an important criticism here and that is this: to what extent does the theme of initiation restrict itself by thinking about education as simply becoming a participant in one's own tradition and leaving out of account the learning about other cultures and traditions outside of one's own. Even if one says let's get people initiated to their own tradition and let them be critical of their own tradition, let them innovate inside it, let them create new literature inside it, let them become original within their tradition, it seems to me that the idea of multiculturalism raises this question. The question is, is this enough? Doesn't it tend to encapsulate people too prematurely? Oughtn't the idea of an educated person to involve an understanding of and an appreciation of the cultures from without?

So let's think about Jewish education for a minute and I'll start backwards. If you think about Jewish education, is it enough to say that the educated Jew ought to understand Jewish religion, ought to know all the classical texts of Jewish tradition period? Even with (unclear) critical participation, to what extent ought Jewish education to require say an understanding of Christianity? I know in the Jewish institution that I attended, we were never taught anything about the New Testament. It was beyond the pale, literally. I had to learn the New Testament on my own later on. In one summer, I went away to Cape Cod (?) on vacation. I went to the Cape. I carried around the New Testament and my wife said you look like a religious nut. That's all you are doing, sitting by the pool and reading the gospels. I figured it

was time for me to know about the gospels. Last year I read a book by Sam Lachs called *The Rabbinic Sources of the New Testament*. I thought it was a wonderful book. I read it with the book of gospels beside me and all of the Jewish sources beside me naturally too. Now should I have had to do this on my own and privy(?) it?

Let me now take the previous one. Take the thing about feminists. Obviously it seems to me that the whole issue of Jewish woman as distinct from the Jewish man, and the Jewish child as distinct from the Jewish adult, the Jew in different national circumstances—all these structures, historical structures, social structures, seem to me to be thought of as part of some ideal Jewish education. An educated Jew in my opinion is one that would expand on some of these points. It ought to be given an opportunity to think hard about the differentiations within Jewish society and not only to assume that Jewish society is one block. I take it that part of what Menachem was emphasizing, speaking against the abstract conception of Jewish education, can be thought of in these terms, some of the points that Charles raised—the sociological and historical differentiations between the Jewish people—seem to me to be important as aspects of Jewish enlightenment, both to be one of the many products of Jewish education and to present another challenge to Jewish educators (?).

I think that these conceptions of Pasmour and Peters are too universalistic in certain respects and I take it that this is a defect. I resonate to what Menachem said earlier and what Moshe said earlier, all of us have said it at one point or another. This is a kind of, they speak of the great traditions of imaginative thought—science, history, literature, philosophy, technology—as if the kind of participant in one's own cultural, historical identity is just out of the picture. You do that on your own time. You become an educated person, an educated man and you do this stuff and the other stuff is left out. It seems to me here Jewish education provides not only an addition, but it seems to me it provides a corrective, I think this is a kind of false universalism myself. The very idea of a Jewish education presents a challenge to the general discussion and ought to.

I think all the other points have almost a direct relevance to the discussions about the educated Jew. The notion of significant content is one that we've emphasized in our discussion. The idea of selection: the material is just too great. I guess in the Jewish sphere the selection of what's fundamental is (?) the selection of what's significant. I think the point about cognitive perspective and inertness—that I think is important in the field of Jewish education. A lot of Jewish education as I've encountered it in schools has emphasized the idea of erudition rather than a transformational perspective. I think *bekiyut* for the sake of *bekiyut* is something that I think one has to reason with as to what extent the transformation of one's perceptive capacities enter into the notion of an educated Jew. And I take it this is something that Mike had in mind in speaking about language, and this is the part that I agree with Mike. The idea of a language needs to be elaborated, although it is not a matter of simply knowing

the meaning of the word. It is a matter of using the word as a category by which to classify one's experiences. I am grateful to Moshe who last time at Harvard, when I mentioned some of these remarks, mentioned to me the work of Max Kaddushin. I went back and got his books out of the library at the (?) suggestion and I think he makes some of that emphasis. It's an emphasis I agree with. It's thinking of the language of Jewish thought not just as a matter of words. This is another sense in which the idea of bookishness is okay, but it needs to be elaborated to include this. The book is also like a visual instrument. It is not something you get off the page. It's something which if it enters into your brain, it gets you to see things differently. And the notion of categories of Jewish thought being usable from outright (?) may be important in the notion of the educated Jew, at least that's an application that I would want to make myself.

And finally the stress upon originality, free from cliche. I think that's a matter of, I would put it this way: it is a matter of not simply thinking of Jewish education as limited to the great texts of the past. Great texts of the past are great achievements of the past, but the language isn't limited by the literature. The language actually opens up the potential for infinite literature and what we need to do is to create new texts and I take it that's the point, the point about modern literature is not that it's better, but that it is there, it's part of the creative potential of the tradition that we have.

So the dialectic between past and future, I think here becomes important. It's thinking about Jewish education. It's retrieving the past. It's certainly tremendously important not only to retrieve the past, but at the same time we ought to value whatever creative possibilities the language of the past has possible for the present. No matter how much we admire. . . . I take the analogy from music. We all admire Mozart, but big as Mozart is and was, music is bigger than Mozart, because the language of music which supersedes any given . . . the whole point about music is that there is an infinite number of compositions possible and no matter how much we get caught up in infatuation with Mozart, that ought not to prevent new composers from composing. We have to urge them to compose. I would say one aspect of creating an educated Jew is to keep composing within the sphere of Jewish thought. That means not only knowing the past, to not only work it over and comment about it, because that itself is a creative task. I don't mean to exclude commentary. Commentary is creative, but to welcome new literature, literature in the broadest sense, to interpret it within Jewish words, Jewish music, Jewish drama, all spheres of Jewish cultural life. I better stop here.

Seymour Fox: Thank you very much. I think that you have started treating this topic in a way that would certainly very much enrich our discussion.

A Prolegomenon to a Philosophy of Jewish Education

If men are to lead a life of order, coherence, and meaning; if they are to live, in short, by principles; we, as educators and committed Jews, must fulfill two tasks. The first task is to discover the operative meaning or relevance of those principles in the circumstances of the present century. To do this is the necessary work of making the principles appropriate to the raw materials they must form, as well as to the ideas they represent. That is, they must be capable of molding the nascent character of our children here and now in the image of the ideals the principles represent. The task of so adjusting principles is analogous to the work of the wise judge in English common law; to adjust statutes written in one era so that they will apply effectively in another.

The second task flows from the first. It is the task of making real and actual what is so far only potential and possible; that is, the person who is, in values, habits, and skills, a living embodiment of the chosen principles. This task involves two stages. There is first the work of discovering those habits, skills, and values which spell out the idea of the principle and then to use these enunciated qualities as the immediate, concrete, or proximate ends. The actual educational approach will then consist of the means necessary to attain the immediate or proximate ends. Thus we move, first, from an ideal to a possible; second, from the possible to a plan for making it real.

These are together the problems of education. Namely, to specify to a modern context a body of principles, to specify the proximate ends which embody these principles. To specify the means and methods which will lead to these proximate ends.

The profound philosophers and philosophies of education have proceeded thus. Having first developed their principles they proceeded to adumbrate the kind of societies, men, actions and habits which would exhibit these principles. These embodiments of the principles then served as guides to determine the educational approach whose purpose it was to bring to life their ideal of man and society.

Let us examine, briefly and sketchily, two such complete philosophies so separated in time as Plato and Dewey, where we can see in bold relief the creation of an educational theory that flows from the context of the philosopher.

For Plato the world we live in is composed of two ingredients: on the one hand, a component which is intelligible and good; on the other hand, a component which muddles and dilutes the intelligible good. Man is similarly divided consisting of a reason which could make contact with the intelligible good the world, and a part which chains and muddles this ability to perceive the good. Concretely, Plato saw man as a tripartite psyche or soul. The first of the parts of man was the Rational – that which man desires, loves, hates, etc. The second part was

Appetitive — that with which man desires, wishes, wants. The third part was the Spirited — the source of energy which under the "normal" conditions abides by the rule of the Rational.

Up to this point we have, in Plato, the development of principles in an ideal form and the invention of a schema by which to state them, the function of a merely formal philosophy. Were those precepts to be used without undertaking what we call the first task of the educators, to indicate the relevance of the principles, Plato would have proceeded to recommend the state consisting entirely of disembodied intellects; men altogether shorn of appetite serving reason only. But, he is guilty of no such ellipsis. He faces the fact of human differences. He poses a state therefore in which a structure of classes takes account of varying human abilities. Each of these classes mirrors the rule of reason in a different way, each way appropriate to the ability of the individual in the class. Having thus changed his ideal to the possible, he proceeds to the second step, that of moving from the possible to a plan for making it real. The first phase of this second step is to spell out the competence required of each class. This he does, creating a ruling, an auxiliary, and an artisan class. The last phase of the second step is to turn to the store of culture, of science, and scholarship available to him and to select therefrom the materials and methods appropriate to his proximate possible ends. Therefore, in Books II, III and VII of *The Republic* Plato selects the appropriate education, first music and gymnastics, then arithmetic and geometry, as preparation for the dialectic — the method required to grasp truth and reason.

For John Dewey, on the other hand, the world we live in is a flux created by the effects of living things constantly attempting to modify themselves and their environment. Every effort at change instigated by a need, leads to changes and so on ad infinitum. The only way for a man to approach such a world is by rational efforts at perceiving problems and inventing solutions — the method of inquiry or, in more popular terms, the "scientific method."

Dewey saw man therefore as primarily an inquiring animal; one who felt needs as do all living things, but also one who sought to anticipate and identify his needs; one who sought to invent and develop an armoury or variety of means for their solution.

Up to this point we have in Dewey the development of principles in merely an ideal form. Had he followed these without taking the step which moves the ideal to the possible, Dewey would have commended a world in which all men equally participated in all inquiries. But again, the philosopher is guilty of no such ellipsis. He recognized the diverse needs and interests of different men, their diverse abilities, and the complex structure of modern society. He develops a scheme of social relations and communications, and a division of labor with respect to the kinds of problems and problem-solving knowledge. With this scheme, he is able to recognize different kinds and levels of problem-solving competences, any one of which

could be the proximate or immediate goal of a school, depending on the abilities, needs and social situations of its clientele.

Thus, like Plato, he moves his "ideal" to the realm of possibility and proceeds to what we have named the second step. To make his plan for converting the possible to the real, he turns to what we know of human love, human association and human learning and adapts them to the classroom, the apprenticeship, the committee, the community, and other learning situations.

The second phase of step two, that of prescribing specific means or methodologies, is more difficult for Dewey than for Plato because Dewey's conception of a world in flux forbids his specifying the precise materials and methods used. Rather, he must take his second step by proxy; by describing the training and the behavior of the teacher, leaving to such a teacher the task of final selection of materials and methods.

We see, in these two examples, the essential components of a defensible program of education; ultimate ends, proximate ends, and materials with metbods. Each is developed in the light of the others; the proximate ends mirroring the ultimate and designed for feasibility, the means developed as means to the proximate ends.

But, when we approach Jewish education somehow we find the picture far less clear. It is almost as though Jewish education and Jewish educators have forgotten the problem of ends or goals. Or possibly, they have assumed that the ends are given and therefore need not be re-examined. But, whatever the case may be, and whatever the cause, Jewish education has paid a very heavy price for its refusal to deal in depth with the problem of a philosophy of Jewish education. There have been many people who have documented the extent to which Jewish education is aimless. And when education is aimless then the practical, the means of education, educational methodology, becomes a matter of taste. One teaches a given way or organizes subject matter because it appears to succeed. But, it appears to succeed only because it is vague and ill-defined. In fact, we ask little or nothing about what we succeed at or whether the successes are appropriate to our ultimate aims. We act as if the means of Platonic education could be used to achieve the ends of Dewey and that the means of Dewey and education could be used to achieve the ends of Jewish education.

Any observer of the Jewish school notices how Jewish education points with pride to the use of "modern" methodologies of education. Some of these means and methods disclosed by modern science doubtless could and should be utilized in developing the educated or ideal Jew. The determining question will be, however: Do these means give promise of developing the ends implied within the Jewish tradition? In short, one must be critical in employing the

means disclosed by "scientific" education or psychology for they are not neutral. They will serve only those ends whose principles are consistent with the principles of the science which created the means. For example, a medical therapy based on one conception of health and disease will, if successful at all, achieve the state of health from which the therapy was derived. If the health we wish to achieve is in any way fundamentally different we must remodel the therapy. Thus, in psychiatry Freud, Sullivan, and Fromm differ as to what constitutes health or cure. Therefore, they imply and employ different means of therapies.

Jewish education cannot escape this dilemma. It cannot import means of education from one scheme or system and ends from another and hope that they will work together except by lucky accident.

The problem of a philosophy of Jewish education is to disclose the principles that will lead to a coherent structure of ends and means. Principles which are Jewish, embodiments appropriate to life in the 20th century, means and methodologies which indeed will lead to those embodiments and not some unknown others.

Even this statement of our problem must come under the principles we are trying to state; this is an ideal. It will not, in any simple sense, be achieved. It is an ideal, and not a possible. The possible must take account of the vast riches which constitute the Jewish tradition, and the great inventiveness which characterizes Jewish scholarship. In brief, we will not achieve a single system of Jewish education to which we all subscribe. Instead, we must expect, nay welcome, a number of such schemes differing as different scholars give different weights to different sources of Jewish tradition and organize them according to their lights. But each scheme will be a valid theory for education and an authentic image of Judaism.

I would like to suggest an approach, a framework, with which one could view the Jewish tradition, with the hope of discovering the educational theories implicit in it. It has been formulated with the help of Professor Joseph Schwab, my teacher and colleague, Professor of Education at the University of Chicago.

A. *Practical specification*

Only rarely does a tradition specify its ideal of the educated man explicitly enough for educational purposes. Instead, it is implied in stated ideals and approved conditions of the state, the society, the family, the hero, the person and the relations of men to each other and God. Hence, the educational ideal must be spelled out from such sources in its own terms. One set of terms for such a specification follows.

To begin with the most general categories, it is usually necessary to state:

1. What bodies of knowledge the educated man is to possess, e.g., science, mathematics, history, ethics.
2. In what state this knowledge is possessed, i.e., on the one hand, whether as received, unquestionable doctrine, as the product of ongoing enquiry, as substance for continuing revision, or as passing sophistry. On the other hand, whether held by the individual man only at the verbal level as something capable of being repeated, or in more intimate ways, as for instance, knowledge known in terms of its validating arguments and evidence and as wisdom to be brought to bear on appropriate problems.
3. What skills—intellectual, interpersonal, artistic or technical—God, to fellowmen, to himself, to work and play, to natural things, to things made by man.

To expand the above categories:

1. Knowledge: It is useful to divide knowledge into large sets such as the following and to determine for a culture (a) what relative emphases it makes among them, and (b) what specific content it places in each:
   - 1.1 "Science": All oranized theories and doctrines
     Science of nature: science in the modern sense, metaphysics, etc.
     Science of human and divine past: history
     Science of God: theology
     Science of the good, the true, the beautiful: ethics, politics, aesthetics, epistemology
   - 1.2 "Mathematics" and "logic": Organized lore concerning *how* to think or concerning the ideational forms into which knowledge is to be cast.
   - 1.3 Art: Knowledge of the elements, structure and variety of works of fine art.
   - 1.4 Technics: Knowledge of the variety, structure and elements of the useful arts, whether as things to be used or as things to be made (including agriculture and husbandry, as well as the arts of inanimate objects).
   - 1.5 Practice: Grasp of rules and precepts governing behavior—the bases of personal, social, juridical and political decision and action.
2. The state of knowledge: This category is difficult to specify beyond the remarks made in the first paragraph above.

3. Skills:

3.1 Intellectual skills

Basic:

Languages, numbers, calculation, measurement

Nature:

Of enquiry

Discovery and invention of principles, evidence, data.

Inference and interpretation: leading from principles, evidence, data to theories, conclusions, laws.

Of application and emendation

Adaptation of knowledge to changing or growing problems and circumstances.

Specification of knowledge to particular cases, conditions and problems.

3.2 Interpersonal skills: the skills required to initiate and maintain human relations

Hierarchial

Governance, leadership, admonishment, advising, teaching; being governed, obedience, servitude, learning.

Nurturant

Parenthood, love and friendship, support and assistance.

Peer

Maintenance of individuality and difference; coming to agreement ad cooperation; group, team and mass action.

3.3 Artistic and technical skills

Skills desired for all

Specialized skills—vocations and avocations.

3.4 Manners:

Rituals of daily life.

4. Values: as expressed in habits and attitudes

Work and leisure:	whether work is treated as a necessity, a duty, a satisfaction whether undertaken for itself primarily or for the end product whether leisure is growth and fulfilment or regeneration of energy or the occasion for license, etc.
Relations to God:	whether God is inscrutable manipulator, implacable meter of intelligible justice, placable power, giver to beggar, Father and Protector, friend, etc.
Self:	conceptions of personal honor, duty, right, privilege.
Others:	See Appendix I.
Things and events:	whether master or victim, i.e., whether attitude to the world is one of intelligent use, adaptation and structuring, or one of fear, and submission to the unknowable and uncontrollable.

B. *Sources of evidence of a culture' conception of the educated man:*

Cultures are too various and their histories, memorials and other records occur in too varied a form to permit a universal format for the search for evidence concerning the educated man. Hence, what follows is only suggestive and will be applicable only in part to the record of any one culture.

Further, it should be borne in mind that the idea of uniformity suggested by the phrase "a culture" is very likely to be a romantic simplification. A given culture is likely to be woven of several competing original views. Further, as time passes, there is development, change or addition of novel elements. Hence, one may need to report several views of the educated man or to select one among several as the major prevailing or increasingly dominant role.

Ideals

1. National or group aspirations on image of itself *re* other nations or groups:

   Whether conquest or co-existence. If the former, its conception of the conquered: whether enslaved, encultured, colonized, exploited.

   If the latter, how peaceful relations are maintained: by trade isolation, by cultural exchange, by cultural assimilation.

   Each of these intentions—enslavement, exploitation, cultural exchange, etc., implies certain qualities necessary in leaders and representatives of the culture and these constitute one contribution to the image of the educated man.

2. Group aspiration re itself:

   2.1 Whether of economic austerity, simplicity, well-being or luxury.

   2.2 Whether class-structured or homogeneous. If class- structure, what distinguishable leadership and "followership" rules.

   2.3 Whether conceived as a political entity or a looser aggregate of clans, tribes, families or individuals. On this choice will rest the culture's emphasis on social and cohesive virtues versus individual virtues and achievements.

   2.4 What relative emphases on

Life of the group:	love, friendship, parenthood, cronies, neighborliness. As this factor is emphasized, so also are the interpersonal virtues together with the skills and values necessary to maintain smoothness of relations: distributive and retributive justice, sharing of goods, cooperation, readiness for consensus.
Life of the individual:	the celebration of maximum development of individuality; whether the bent is social, active, intellectual, spiritual, etc.
Life of activity:	farming, husbandry, crafts, industry, trade.
Life of service:	to each other or to strangers; glorification of the physician, the minister, the father, the friend.
Life of taste:	the aesthetic; glorification of the production

and appreciation of the fine arts. (Not to be confused with art which functions primarily to celebrate national achievement, e.g., monument, public buildings, epics.)

Life of the mind: scholarship, learning, enquiry.

Life of the 'spirit': rites, contemplation, ecstasy, "otherworldliness," preparation for death or an afterlife.

Life of the body: hedonics: food, drink, play, athletics, games, spectacles, sex, other forms of amusing or being amused.

3. Heroes

3.1 Whether uniform or varied: If varied, what variety, e.g., warriors, athletes, judges, prophets, priests, martyrs, artists, scholars, the specific virtues which define a heroic judge, artist, warrior, etc. The degree of heroism attributed to each variety. There also may be a marked absence of heroes, their place being taken by the notion of commonly-achieved ideals such as the good father, the good son, the good citizen, the good king. These yield evidence which overlaps category 2.

4. Ideals formulated as exhortations, warning, advice: the content of these orations, preachings, and so on which have been preserved and honored.

Reals

5. The form of government:

Whether loose or rigid control. The distribution of rights, powers and responsibilities.

The source of power of the governors: whether hereditary, elected, anointed, etc.

Each of the above possibilities implies its own list of civic virtues which would constitute one major responsibility of the educational means and institutions.

6. The family:

   Its ramifications (whether two or more generations, whether lineal or expansive), its role in the society, the duties and relations which hold among its members. Each of these again call for certain capacities, habits, attitudes, etc.

7. Circumstances and economics:

   urban, rural, nomadic; austere, luxurious, free, persecuted, subjugated, enslaved, inimical or friendly climate, geographic isolation or conjunction with other cultures or nations.

8. The common life:

   category 2, except in fact, instead of an ideal.

9. The extant literature and art:

   9.1 Its genres and subject: i.e., whether primarily scientific, religious, ethical-political, etc. (see A1 and A2).

   9.2 Its degree of sophistication and advancement.

   9.3 Specific items of content: e.g., pictures and narratives of individual lives, of group life, etc.

When we answer such questions as these (and, of course, a more complete set of questions will emerge as we pursue the investigation) then I believe we will discover the image of the ideal or educated Jew. This would enable us to take the remaining steps which constitute the whole of a defensible theory of education. We will create appropriate new means and methodologies of Jewish education and possibly new educational institutions.

It is unnecessary to despair at what appears to be, at first blush, an overwhelming task. Educators have created new means and new educational institutions when they were faced with the problems of developing a given image of an educated man. For example, a new organization or subject matter; new means of instruction that tap the continuity of the child, a new organization of objective elements in the educational situation. All of these were created in little less than two decades between the promulgation of Dewey's theory and the full flowering of the progressive school.

A democratic society that assumes it can develop creative, growing people must invent the means to achieve this end. And so, a means was developed that created a new profession—group work. As it is well known, this profession has found expression not only in informal group settings, but in education, religion, business and therapy.

I believe that the investigation of the Jewish tradition with a view toward discovering the

educational philosophy implicit in it might provide us with some starting discoveries. What does the notion of *shimush talmidey chachamim* mean? Obviously the *talmid chacham* was not only to be observed to recognize and emulate his behavior. The intellect and the character trait seemed to be inseparably bound up in this notion. What is implied is a synthesis of the intellectual and affective in man that if emulated would virtually transform the emulator.

Something like this is emerging from certain modern sources of psychiatric theory: a view which reorganizes the traditional structures of 19th century and recent personality theories. It may be well that an adequate development of the Jewish traditions and nascent developments in current psychiatric theory would converge to develop a new bond between ethics and psychology to replace the current state of things in which psychology has all but assimilated morals.

The inner life of man is a central consideration in Judaism. How this inner life of man is conceived and what means are implied to make contact with this might offer some very important insights. The relation of *kavana* to *ma'aseh,* of intent to action implies a notion of responsibility that appears to be very intriguing.

A Prolegomenon frees the author from the responsibility of presenting a full-blown statement. By the very approach to educational philosophy that has been presented, no one individual could hope to present the finished product. The task of developing an educational philosophy is an interdisciplinary endeavor requiring text scholars who are acquainted with the problems of philosophy and education, educators and philosophers rooted in text who are sensitive to and respect the materials of the tradition.

This task that must be faced for the future of Jewish life, not only in this country but throughout the world, requires that we define very precisely what it is that we so want to preserve.

coped with others. Teachers and students will bargain to ease the effects of the requirements. A second consequence, typically ignored by school reformers, is that educational requirements piled onto high schools cannot substitute for real economic and social incentives for study. If many demanding and rewarding jobs awaited well-educated high school graduates, lots of students who now take it easy would work harder. If college and university entrance requirements were substantial, many students who now idle through the college track would step on the gas. But when real incentives that make hard work in high school rational for most students are absent, requirements alone have an Alice-in-Wonderland effect, crazily compounding the problems that schools already have. For the requirements fly in the face of what everyone knows, inviting disbelief and evasion, creating a widespread sense that the enterprise is dishonest — and this sense is fatal to good teaching and learning.

Still, there is a certain logic to the requirements. It is easier to criticize high schools than it is to criticize great corporations. It is easier to impose educational requirements on high schools than it is to press higher education to devise and enforce stronger entrance requirements — especially when many colleges and universities are hungry for bodies. And it is easier to press requirements on public institutions than it is to repair labor market problems that arise in that diffuse entity called the private sector.

One encouraging feature of the eighties debate about high schools is that it presented an opportunity to raise these questions. But one discouraging fact is that they were raised so infrequently. It seems plain enough that apathy, a sense of irrelevance, and compulsion are not the ingredients of good education. It seems plain that compounding this stew of sentiments with more requirements cannot improve education much; it may only further corrupt it. But if all of this is well known to educators, few voices were raised to question their corrupting effects. Nor did many commentators point out that even if problems in labor markets and higher education will not be addressed, there are other ways to cope with youth who see nothing for themselves in secondary studies. One is a national youth service, open to students of high school age. Another is lifetime educational entitlements for those who cannot make good use of secondary school on the established schedule. Still another

is a lowered school-leaving age. These ideas have all been advanced before, and in one way or another America has had experience with each. Yet they found little place in the eighties debate. Whether or not schools are the appropriate target for reform, they are available, visible, and easy to hit. They are an easy mark for officials who feel they must respond to popular dismay about education, but who have not the time or inclination to probe a little into the sources of dismay.

It seems odd that educators have failed to make these arguments and have instead insisted again that high schools can meet all students' needs. They repeated the old litanies about programs that are practical, interesting, and relevant. They urged that dropouts be pressed back into school. And they pleaded only that more money was required. In part this is a reflex of tradition: educators have long been committed to the evangelical notion that schools have something for everyone. In part it is self-serving: most school systems get state aid based on the number of students attending. And in part it is political strategy: educators have rarely pointed out the misdirection of reform efforts because they want to capitalize on public interest — even critical interest. Promising to do more has long been a way to avoid disappointing constituents while squeezing out more money, hiring more teachers, gaining more esteem, or improving working conditions. The strategy makes sense from one angle — appropriations to education have increased over the decades. But it has also been foolish, because the added resources have remained modest in comparison to the promises that educators have made and the demands that they have embraced. What the high schools delivered for most students therefore has always been much thinner and less effective than what was advertised. By promising to do everything well for everyone, educators have contributed to the growing sense that they can do nothing well for anyone.

There is one last, unhappy reason that educators have not pointed to certain misdirections in the current crop of reforms: one cannot point to an incorrect direction without some sense of the correct one. But American schoolpeople have been singularly unable to think of an educational purpose that they should not embrace. As a result, they never have made much effort to figure out what high schools could do well, what high schools should do, and how they

could best do it. Secondary educators have tried to solve the problem of competing purposes by accepting all of them, and by building an institution that would accommodate the result.

Unfortunately, the flip side of the belief that all directions are correct is the belief that no direction is incorrect — which is a sort of intellectual bankruptcy. Those who work in secondary education have little sense of an agenda for studies. There is only a long list of subjects that may be studied, a longer list of courses that may be taken, and a list of requirements for graduation. But there is no answer to the query, Why these and not others? Approaching things this way has made it easy to avoid arguments and decisions about purpose, both of which can be troublesome — especially in our divided and contentious society. But this approach has made it easy for schools to accept many assignments that they could not do well, and it has made nearly any sort of work from students and teachers acceptable, as long as it caused no trouble.

Another way to put the point is to say that most of the foundation work of decent secondary education still remains to be done, seven or eight decades after the system began to take shape. High schools seem unlikely to make marked improvement, especially for the many students and teachers now drifting around the malls, until there is a much clearer sense of what is most important to teach and learn, and why, and how it can best be done. This is an enormous job, one that is never finished but should long ago have been started. We watched hundreds of teachers at work, but in most cases no sense of intellectual purpose shone through. The most common purposes were getting through the period or covering the material, or some combination of the two. But why does one cover the material? If the only answer is that it has been mandated, or that it is in the book, then how can the material be taught well, or learned more than fleetingly?

Americans will never completely agree on educational purposes. But educators could, through study and debate, have made some decisions to guide them in public argument and professional work. They might have decided, for instance, that their chief purpose was to produce students who could read well and critically, who could write plainly and persuasively, and who could reason clearly. Reading, writing, and reasoning are not subjects — they are intellectual capacities. They can be taught by studying academic disciplines, but only if the teachers possess the capacities in good measure, if they are trying to teach those capacities rather than to cover the material, and if the materials for study are arranged so as to cultivate those capacities — as opposed, say, to the capacity to remember a few facts, or write down disjointed bits of information.

We do not imply that these capacities are content-free, as so many approaches to "basic skills" seem to suggest today. But neither are these capacities the same thing as subjects or disciplines. In fact, the capacities we mention probably could better be cultivated if teachers were able to range across disciplines. Critical reading ability is as crucial to learning English as to learning history, and clear reasoning is no more the special province of mathematics than it is of physics or philosophy. Cutting the curriculum up into subjects makes it easy for students and teachers to forget the capacities that ought to be cultivated, and easier to pursue the illusion that education is a matter of covering the material. All of the standard academic subjects are good material for cultivating these capacities, but that is rather a different way of looking at them than as content to be learned.

This brief formulation leaves out a good deal, but it does reveal how much work remains to be done if high schools are to improve substantially. If educators could agree on such purposes, they would be better armed for debating about education and for deciding that some things cannot be done because others are more important. In addition, they would be in a position to think seriously about pedagogy — that is, about how to achieve educational purposes. Amazingly, high school educators have yet to take up this work as a profession. They have inherited a few catch phrases from the progressives: making studies practical; meeting students' needs; building the curriculum around activities — but even these have not been much developed. Perhaps there is little to develop. At the moment we don't know, because a pedagogy for high schools remains to be created.

There have been some beginnings, but most have remained very limited, or have fallen into disuse, or both. From time to time, various reformers have tried to reformulate educational purposes and to sketch out suitable pedagogy, usually from the perspective

of one discipline or another. Many of these efforts — most recently, the 1950s curriculum reforms — have been promising. But these never spread very far, or cut very deep. Only a small number of teachers ever used the new materials as the basis for working out a pedagogy for secondary studies, and all reports suggest that most of these efforts have since been abandoned. Of course, every teacher has an approach to her or his craft, but each approach is practiced in isolation and does not contribute to a body of shared professional knowledge about how to teach. These separately practiced versions of the teacher's trade do not contribute to developing the skills of those entering the profession, or to deciding about when teaching is good enough, or to improving teaching when it is not good enough. This is an unfortunate list, one that many teachers regret. For every teacher must solve the problem of how to teach. But because the schools have embraced so many purposes, they have impeded the development of a body of professional knowledge about how to teach well. The high schools' many successes have helped to produce this failure.

What we outline is a tall order. We do so partly in the hope that it may help a little in current efforts to improve the schools. But our brief discussion of purposes and pedagogy also reveals just how far high schools are from such improvement. The high schools' greatest strength has been their embracing capacity to avoid these issues, to cope with many contrary visions of education by promising to pursue all of them. That has produced institutions that are remarkably flexible, ambitious, and tolerant, capable of making room for many different sorts of students and teachers and many different wishes for education. They are institutions nicely suited to cope with Americans' fickle political and educational sensibilities. All are important strengths, but they have had crippling effects. They have stunted the high schools' capacity to take all students seriously. They have blocked teachers' capacity to cultivate those qualities long valued in educated men and women — the ability to read well and critically, to write plainly and persuasively, and to reason clearly. And they have nurtured a constrained and demeaning vision of education among Americans, a vision that persistently returns to haunt the profession that helped to create it.

Conclusion: Renegotiating the Treaties

DEEPLY IMBEDDED in American history and deeply reflective of American preferences, the shopping mall high school is likely to withstand efforts to dismantle it: too many teenagers are served in the way they want to be served, and too many school professionals willingly provide the services. Many students are served very well indeed, and most graduate. Those are historic achievements. Whatever school participants and the public in general may think about high schools in the abstract, they seem generally satisfied with or tolerant of the educational accommodations made in their own local schools. Much of what is proposed as educational reform is thus designed to make the mall more appealing to sellers and shoppers alike, rather than to alter the educational assumptions on which it is based.

In most communities and for most students, the mall works well because it is so exclusively governed by consumer choice. Learning is voluntary: it is one among many things for sale. The mall's central qualities — variety of offerings, choice among them, and neutrality about their value — have succeeded in holding most teenagers on terms they and their teachers can live with. The will to learn is perceived, in a deceptively sensible formulation, simply as the responsibility of students and their families. Students who want to learn generally can do so, especially if they seek out or are sought

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Toward a General Theory of Jewish Education

SEYMOUR FOX

In order to deal effectively with the problems of Jewish education,[1] it is first necessary to locate the particular areas of dissatisfaction. Very often discussions of Jewish educational shortcomings are merely discussions of solutions which are difficult to justify because they have not been related to any specific problems. For instance, we are told that what Jewish education needs most for the alleviation of its ills are large sums of money. Now it is true that Jewish education is woefully underfinanced and that any significant program of improvement would probably require more funds than are currently available, but funding, crucial as this is, should not, I believe, precede decisions concerning ideas or programs. We are also told—and this, too, is indisputable—that Jewish education cannot succeed unless the child attends classes for more than the usual three or six hours a week; but rarely do we consider what might be done with this additional time, and what the nature of any new program should be. Similarly, in the matter of teaching personnel, which some see as the "basic" problem of Jewish education, one can hardly deny that the quality of teaching leaves much to be desired, and that new and different personnel must be recruited; however, any changes that are to be initiated must depend on one's conception of Jewish education.

The above recounting hardly exhausts the list of complaints that

[1] In this chapter Jewish education refers essentially to formal educational programs.

have been offered to explain the sad state of Jewish education in the United States. Be that as it may, they all fail to deal with the fundamental problem—the nature of the Jewish education we want to develop or preserve. I stress this point not merely to state the obvious, that means are somehow related to ends in education. Rather, I should like to emphasize that none of the solutions offered can possibly succeed if the nature of Jewish education has not been clarified. We cannot hope to attract talented young teachers—apart from the question of the profession's low status and salaries—unless Jewish education is presented as an honorable cause, worthy of professional devotion. We will not be able to develop new or even different curricula for Jewish schools unless the specialists—scholars, teachers, and educators—are inspired by authentic conceptions. We will not even convince the various funding agencies within the Jewish community to change their priorities and to allocate substantial sums for Jewish education unless we can argue convincingly that the education we want to develop has some chance of substantially affecting the lives of their constituencies.

In short, I maintain that the most urgent problem facing Jewish education today is its lack of purpose and, consequently, its blandness. Therefore, until we engage in serious deliberation aimed at rectifying this state of affairs, we cannot even hope to deal with all the other issues that demand solution. Let me state at once that deliberation alone regarding the ends and content of Jewish education and new conceptions of Jewish education will not solve the problems. Rather, deliberation is both a prior and necessary condition that will make it possible subsequently to tackle such questions as curricula, personnel, structure, and financing.

It is generally assumed that a base for this kind of deliberation already exists, that one has only to study current practice to uncover its implicit philosophy. Of course current practice must be carefully investigated, but it is my feeling that the investigation of most forms of Jewish education, except for the ultra-Orthodox, would reveal that their curricula and methods of teacher training bear little resemblance to what the leadership of the given movement, school, or institution claims to be central in its conception of education.

It is necessary to cite several examples in order to clarify this point. Let us consider first the importance of character development, which all Jewish religious groups in the United States, I believe, regard as one of the main purposes of education. An investigation of the existing

programs of Jewish schooling would reveal that character education does not play a significant role. If it can be demonstrated that Jewish education as it is presently constituted barely concerns itself with character education, then I am sure that most Jewish scholars, rabbis, and parents would agree that a serious revision of Jewish educational practice is called for.

Another area of consensus, shared by practically all trends of Jewish religious thought, is the centrality of *halakha* (taken philosophically and psychologically) in Jewish life. An aim of religious education should, therefore, be to find ways to commit the young to the concept of *halakha* and to teach them how to use *halakha* as a guide in their everyday lives. Youngsters, whether attending Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform religious schools, should thus be taught to develop the ability to apply *halakhic* principles to a variety of practical situations. The ability to recall the appropriate principle at the proper time, and to choose properly among different and sometimes conflicting principles, as well as the skill required to apply principles to complex practical situations, are vital if we are interested in developing Jews who want to live by *halakha*. It may be that traditional Jewish education, with its heavy investment of time and energy devoted to mastering the details and method of the Talmudic dialectic, had as its goal the development of precisely such talents. It is questionable whether under present conditions this method remains viable, but we have as yet found no substitute.

There seems to be a good deal of evidence that the State of Israel plays an important part in the lives of American Jews, yet the subject of Israel has been virtually ignored by the American Jewish religious schools. This is not the place to discuss in detail the various aspects of the particular question; indeed, it deserves a separate chapter. Suffice it to note here that Israel is an important issue for the philosophy of Jewish education, and that the study of Israel should be introduced into the curricula of schools and teacher-training institutions. Israel is also a source of teacher personnel and should be utilized for the training of American Jewish educators.

Another subject which has received insufficient attention—as Professor Abraham J. Heschel has noted—is the teaching of Jewish philosophy and theology. Professor Heschel's plea to include these studies in the curriculum of the Jewish school remains unanswered, and his valuable suggestions for the teaching of prayer, while acclaimed in public, are ignored in practice. Finally, the Holocaust is

barely mentioned in our classrooms. These are but a few examples of how the Jewish school neglects its responsibilities.

I cannot avoid complicating the discussion by indicating that the means and techniques that have been adopted by Jewish education are often imported indiscriminately from general education. Since the means of education are not neutral, it is quite possible that some of the means employed for Jewish education cancel out whatever there is in Jewish education that is related to "authentic" Judaism.[2] There is, therefore, an urgent need for a serious discussion of what kind of Jewish education would reflect the various conceptions of Judaism. Such a discussion would result in the development of competing philosophies of Jewish education, but this, in turn, would make it possible for creative educators to develop means appropriate to the basic ideas in each of these philosophies.

It may appear frivolous to suggest philosophical discussion when the "house is burning," but I believe that such deliberation is ultimately the quickest, most effective way to extinguish the fire and to rebuild.

Philosophical deliberation would affect educational decisions in several areas, the first of which is curriculum. The current curriculum of the Jewish school is, by and large, based on the models of its predecessors—the *cheder* and the *yeshiva*—but modified in the light of the reduced instruction time in the present-day institutions. This is hardly a sound educational approach. What is possible and appropriate for a fifteen to twenty hour a week program is often impossible and inappropriate for a three to six hour a week program. Moreover, despite the limited time, the modern school attempts to teach subjects that were not deemed necessary in the *cheder* or the *yeshiva*, such as prayer, "synagogue skills," and simple Jewish observances, all of which were formerly handled within the domain of the family and the community. Nowadays, of course, the family and the community are no longer equipped for the task, and the school has been forced to assume the burden. Overburdened by more subjects than it can possibly handle, and lacking a guiding philosophy that would enable it to pick and choose among subjects competing for the limited time available, the Jewish school finds itself virtually paralyzed.

[2] I have discussed this matter in detail in "A Prolegomenon to a Philosophy of Jewish Education," in *Kivunin Rabim—Kavana Achat* (Jerusalem: School of Education of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1969), pp. 145–154. This volume was published on the occasion of the seventieth birthday of Professor Ernst Simon.

This lack of clarity, with all its disastrous results, is evident in almost any subject taught in the Jewish school. Let us examine two of these, Hebrew and Bible. Hebrew is taught in most afternoon and day schools and in many one-day-a-week schools. The time allocated to the study of Hebrew in the afternoon school is usually from one-third to one-half of the total available teaching time during the first three years. Results have been most disappointing, and consequently the study of Hebrew is usually a source of tension among parents, rabbis, and educators. When we examine the methods and materials of the various programs developed to teach Hebrew, we discover that almost all of them are geared to the mastery of modern Hebrew speech. The programs devote only token time to the problem of effecting a transition from modern Hebrew to the Hebrew of the Bible and prayer book. There has been even less concern for developing materials and preparing personnel to deal with this transition. Yet it is asserted that the purpose of Hebrew study is to prepare the child to participate in the synagogue service and to understand the prayers, the Bible, and other classic Jewish texts.[3] Some educators, of course, contend that the purpose is to develop spoken language skills. If so, it is difficult to understand how this goal is to be achieved within the limited time available. We have here a striking example of a major school subject whose purpose for inclusion in the curriculum is unclear; the result is a series of inappropriate and dated compromises.

Bible is taught in Jewish schools with almost no concern for the relevance of the subject to the life of the child.[4] By and large, the Bible is not even treated as a religious or ethical text. Often, Biblical verses, commentary, and *midrash* are used interchangeably, leading to confusion in the mind of the student. The teacher avoids dealing with questions that are of interest to the child, such as the divinity and historicity of the Bible. The teacher cannot help but avoid these issues as he has not been trained to handle them. There are no materials to guide him and there is no effort to provide him with in-service training.

Bible study, therefore, often leaves the child with the impression

[3] Professor Chaim Rabin, the distinguished linguist of the Hebrew University, has asserted that it is extremely difficult to teach spoken Hebrew to children in Jewish schools in the United States as a step toward a mastery of the Hebrew of the Bible and the prayer book.

[4] An important exception is the work of the Melton Research Center, and certain materials prepared by the Reform Movement and by the American Council for Judaism.

that religion deals only in legends. In many cases, it is not until the Hebrew school student reaches college and takes a course in religion that he learns, for the first time, that the Bible is great literature, that it deals with basic ethical issues, and that it expresses a significant world view different from that of other ancient Near Eastern societies. This condition will continue as long as there is no commitment to specific goals for Bible teaching. As soon as such a commitment is made, our educational agencies will be forced to prepare appropriate materials, and to train and retrain teachers so that they can handle or at least grapple with the desired goals.

There is a strong feeling that Jewish educational matters are being dealt with more successfully in the day school than in the afternoon schools. It may be too early to judge, but my impressions are that the day school has only enlarged and intensified the current program of Jewish education. In some cases this has made for "success"; that is, if there are more hours available for the teaching of Hebrew and Bible, the child will certainly "know" more. Also, full-time teachers are likely to be better teachers and remain longer than their part-time colleagues. However, such matters as character education, commitment, and Jewish involvement do not seem to receive novel or consistent treatment in the day school. There have been some attempts to integrate general and Jewish subjects, but there has been little thought given to the preparation of materials that could launch the day school on new paths.

I do not believe that curriculum revision in general is a theoretical undertaking. It is essentially a practical endeavor,[5] requiring an analysis of failures in the educational reality (student boredom, poorly trained teachers, parental dissatisfaction, lack of achievement), a decision on the nature of the problem, and subsequent creation of means to tackle the problem. However, for the Jewish school, a good deal of theoretical discussion will have to precede analysis of the reality, for the latter has been determined in many cases by implicit and explicit commitments that will continue to render Jewish education problematic unless the commitments are disclosed, and criticized. We will have to decide why we want to teach Hebrew, for that will determine

[5] For a discussion of curriculum as a practical endeavor see Joseph J. Schwab, *The Practical: A Language for Curriculum* (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1970); and Seymour Fox, "A Practical Image of the Practical," in *Curriculum Theory Network* (Toronto, Ontario: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1973), pp. 60–77.

what kind of Hebrew we teach and how we teach it. We will have to decide whether the Bible must be studied in the original Hebrew, and, if so, how to treat its religious and ethical ideas. We will have to decide whether the majority of children are to leave the Jewish school knowing nothing more about Judaism than the Bible, or whether their course of instruction shall also include Talmud, medieval philosophy and literature, modern Hebrew literature, and modern Jewish theology.[6]

No doubt there will be much discussion as to just how many subjects the Jewish school can reasonably teach and what their content should include. But it is difficult to understand how we will be able to make reasonable or defensible decisions unless we arrive at some kind of consensus as to the basic ideas for the curriculum of the Jewish school.[7] This kind of deliberation will make it possible for us to discover, invent, and import (where appropriate) means that are likely to lead to the goals we have agreed upon. For example, if we identify large portions of Jewish education with character education, we will have to devise means of education, possibly even new educational institutions, to meet this challenge. We will also have to take into account the contribution of informal Jewish education—camping, youth movements, junior congregations, and so on.[8] A clarification of the goals and content of Jewish education will make it possible for us to assign different and complementary tasks to the school, the youth movement, the club, the junior congregation, and the camp. Vacation periods, holidays, and community service would be viewed as integral parts of the curriculum, and thus change the content and form of the formal curriculum. I have been encouraged to believe by the work of the Melton Faculty Seminar—consisting of scholars in Bible history, Jewish and general philosophy, Talmud, Hebrew literature, Jewish and general education—that goals can be agreed upon which will yield content and curriculum materials that would revolutionize the Jewish school.

We will have to invest a good deal of money and energy in social-

[6] These subjects are handled for the most part in the Jewish high school, which no more than 20 percent of Jewish children attend.

[7] Even with consensus, alternative and competing curricula will be developed to attain the same goals.

[8] Though the effectiveness of informal education, e.g., camping, has not been demonstrated "scientifically," there is good reason to assume that it is a very powerful tool for Jewish education. Camps such as Ramah, Massad, and Cejwin appear to have made a great impact.

science research to accompany our investigation of the goals and content of Jewish education. I do not pretend to know whether ample psychological and sociological research has been undertaken concerning the Jewish community. However, almost no information concerning the attitudes, reactions, and commitments of students in Jewish schools is available to the educator. We know even less about parents and the family as related to Jewish education. We do not know the answers to such questions as: What would happen if schools "succeeded"? Would parents then engage in subtle sabotage? What are the expectations of rabbis, teachers, and educational administrators as to the potential of Jewish education? Could young people be induced into the profession of Jewish education if it were viewed as the vehicle by which the Jewish community would be transformed into a subculture struggling to respond to traditional ethical and religious values in the complex world in which we live? How does community leadership feel and think, and how would it react if new, unusual, and expensive programs of Jewish education were presented?

Such problems, and many others, would have to be investigated if the educational reality is to be dealt with seriously, for there is little doubt that, having agreed upon goals and content for Jewish education and even having discovered promising means and methods, logistics and strategy will change means and ends as we are forced to decide about priorities.

Greater clarity as to the goals of Jewish education and sensible curricular suggestions would prepare us for the deliberation concerning personnel and the structure of the Jewish school. It is difficult to justify the current approach to the recruitment, training, and retraining of personnel. No significant recruitment program has been attempted. Teacher training has not been reexamined for years, and the number of students being trained is inadequate. The financing of teacher-training institutions is not treated seriously, and the faculty of these institutions must be supported, enlarged, and supplemented. As to retraining, it is all but nonexistent.

Though we probably ought to defer judgment on how to treat the problem of personnel until we have a clearer notion of the kind of Jewish education we want to develop, there is one aspect of the question that appears to permit discussion even at this early stage of our thinking. It is an astonishing fact that there are practically no scholars or researchers in the field of Jewish education. Obviously, this is a very serious matter, for how can we hope to train proper personnel or

look at Jewish education reflexively if there are no experts to undertake these tasks? As long as the leadership of Jewish education is administrative rather than scholarly by training and experience, the problem of personnel will remain insoluble. If Jewish education is discussed only in terms of time, money, and space, or embedded in slogans that ignore complexity and diversity, we can only repel the very people we need most to attract. We should, I believe, learn from experience in the field of Jewish studies at the university level, where a few outstanding scholars have attracted a substantial following and are able to compete successfully for the allegiance of bright and talented Jewish students. This may prove to be the key to many other matters.

It is my contention that the necessary discussion on the goals and curriculum of the Jewish school cannot be undertaken by the present leadership of Jewish education (though it should have a significant role in the deliberation).[9] For this we will need the expertise of scholars in the field of Judaica as well as social scientists, who must somehow be induced to devote their academic talent to the problems of Jewish education. This is by no means a radical suggestion. The pattern already exists in general education, where great benefits are being derived from the partnership of educators, subject-matter specialists, and social scientists. If we can recruit such people to the education faculties of teacher-training schools and rabbinical seminaries, and if we can establish research institutes,[10] we will be well on our way toward the desired restructuring of Jewish education in this country. The challenge to effect needed changes in Jewish education should prove attractive to young Jewish students who are looking for ways to join scholarship with action and commitment. If Jewish education would involve itself in character training, and seek to emphasize the need for roots[11] as well as involvement in the contemporary society, it would undoubtedly attract many talented young people to its professional ranks.

At this stage of our thinking there is little to be gained from consid-

[9] This is not to be taken as a negative criticism of the present leadership of Jewish education or their predecessors. They were forced to devote their lives to the building of the institutions we are now looking at reflexively. It is doubtful whether they had any other options open to them.

[10] There are only two institutes in the United States devoted to research in Jewish education.

[11] See Joseph J. Schwab, "The Religiously Oriented School in the United States: A Memorandum on Policy," *Conservative Judaism*, Spring 1964, pp. 1–14.

ering the many other problems of personnel. As I have emphasized, solution will depend on answers to the prior questions of philosophy, curriculum, and available resources. However, it is important to note that we are currently in the grip of rigid and unimaginative procedures. We train one kind of teacher for all tasks, and training methods are basically the same in all teacher-training institutions. But can one teacher develop language skills as well as conduct an inquiry into the traditional texts? Should this same person also be expected to serve as the model of religious behavior to be emulated by the students? On the other hand, is it necessary to have all tasks in the Jewish school handled only by graduates of teachers institutes? Cannot housewives, for instance, or college students, or even teen-agers be trained to perform certain tasks? It may be that such people can do better at some tasks than the graduate teachers.

The structure of Jewish education—that is, the organization of the schools and the relationship of the schools to each other and to other community organizations—will certainly undergo changes as we begin to ponder the basic issues. We might even conclude that the school, or the school as currently conceived, is not the best place to obtain a Jewish education. At any rate, we must avoid premature and merely administrative suggestions. One such suggestion that has been advanced periodically, and that undoubtedly will resurface, is to combine forces, to merge Conservative and Reform, and even perhaps Orthodox, schools. According to this view, denominationalism is the ogre of Jewish education. But combining confused, tired, and uninspired forces may not prove very useful. More of the same is not always better. Overarching structures or neutral organizational auspices may serve to ease the financial burden, but they cannot provide the requisite inspiration. The issue of the structure of Jewish education is serious and should, therefore, not be viewed in solely administrative terms. Nor would we be acting responsibly if we were to make our suggestions based on extrapolations from past and present experiences, for neither has yielded satisfying results.

In conclusion, we may say that Jewish education can have a significant impact on the future of Jewish life in the United States only if it is prepared to establish, through serious deliberation, philosophies of education to guide the creation of new programs and practices. These programs must be based on a sound analysis of both the reality and the potential of Jewish life. To undertake these tasks, a new kind of personnel will have to be recruited, from the ranks of Jewish scholar-

ship and the social sciences, to assume positions of leadership in Jewish education. Their task will be to develop ideas that will inspire talented Jewish students, in turn, to consider a career in Jewish education. These new sources of energy must inevitably infuse new ideas into the curriculum, teacher training, and the structure of education itself. To accomplish all this will require large allocations of funds—but should the developments I have been advocating come about, the funding agencies will at last be afforded the opportunity to base their decisions on competing futures rather than merely on competing demands.

11

Decision-Making in the American Jewish Community

DANIEL J. ELAZAR

Environmental and Cultural Factors

THE CHARACTER OF AMERICAN JEWRY

American Jewry forms the largest Jewish community in Jewish history and, indeed, is the largest aggregation of Jews ever located under a single government, with the possible exception of Czarist Russia on the eve of the mass migration. Its major local communities are larger than all but a handful of countrywide communities in the past.

The spread of Jews from the East Coast to the West Coast and from the Far North to the Deep South, despite the unevenness of the distribution, has given the American Jewish community major concentrations of population at the farthest reaches of the country. Moreover, the density of Jewish population in the Northeast has been declining, at least since the end of World War II. California now has more Jews than any country in the world other than the United States itself, the Soviet Union, and Israel. Los Angeles, the second largest local Jewish community in the world, has as many Jews as all of France, which ranks as the country with the fourth largest Jewish population. Simple geography serves to reinforce all other tendencies to disperse decision-making in the American Jewish community as in American society as a whole. It has proved difficult for any "central office" to control countrywide operations in the United States regardless of who or what is involved.