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M. Tannenbaum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM

April 5, 1962

To: Members of the Staff Advisory Committee
From: Morris Fine

You will be interested in the attached two papers that were delivered at the Eastern Regional Conference of the Association of Jewish Community Relations Workers in Dearborn, Michigan in February.

Attachments (2)

WHAT IS KNOWN FROM RESEARCH ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT
OF AMERICAN ANTI-SEMITISM*

It is certain that most Jews hold very firm convictions about how much anti-Semitic prejudice and discrimination there are in the United States today; how the present rates compare with past years; and what are the prospects for the future. It is equally certain, however, that these convictions vary greatly, so that it is variously contended that there is very little or a great deal; that there is much less today than before or about the same or much more; and that it will get better in the future or get worse.

Jews also disagree on second-level judgments about the implications of the presumed facts. Even among those who seem to agree about how much anti-Semitic prejudice there is, there is disagreement as to whether this is more or less than one should expect from the society as it is today; and as to whether it is something to be actively concerned about.

Even where there is agreement on these issues, we find disagreement next on the issues as to what should be done about the anti-Semitism, who should do it, and with what sense of urgency.

We need only point to the different programs of the three major Jewish defense organizations to indicate the implementation in action programs of all the diversities we have just specified.

Doubtless each of us here has his favorite version of the situation and an equally favored explanation of why others disagree with us and what this indicates about them. Since almost all these

* A paper delivered by Melvin M. Tumin at the 1962 Mid-Winter Conference of the Association of Jewish Community Relations Workers on February 11, 1962.

theories speak invidiously of the opposition, and since they are all so well known, there is little point in reciting them. Yet a knowledge of the range of theories helps us also identify numerous types of Jewish approaches to Jewishness and the state of Jewish affairs in the United States. In this light, such knowledge is valuable.

Moreover, one must at least seriously entertain the hypothesis that there will be found some significant correlation between one's own kind of Jewish identification, on the one hand, and one's sense of the amount and dangerousness of anti-Semitism in the society on the other. I do not mean to imply anything as simple minded as a unilinear and positive correlation between degree of orthodoxy and degree of sensitivity to anti-Semitism. It would, I think, be betting on very much the wrong hypothesis to hold that the more religious Jews will be more sensitive to anti-Semitism, and vice versa. The variables which we would use to define one's Jewish identification would have to be far more subtle than simple nominal classification into orthodox, conservative, reform and non-believer. There is sure to be significant variation in sensitivity to anti-Semitism within each of these groups; perhaps as much within as between or among the groups so defined. So, too, one is likely to find that there will be significant variations in policy orientation among persons who are equally sensitive about anti-Semitism. But I do mean to imply that one's own attitude toward himself as a Jew is probably significantly reflected in his conception of what Jewishness should mean and constitute, and in his degree of awareness of the attitudes and behavior of the non-Jewish world relative to him and other Jews. I hope we can find out something more about these

relationships than we know when the University of California group does its forthcoming survey of Jewish as well as non-Jewish opinion.

If life were only as complicated as we have just indicated, we would be relatively fortunate. But in fact there are deeper and more perplexing complications. For we have the definitional problem in front of us. That is to say, unless we are agreed as to what we will define as anti-Semitism and how we will identify its presence, it will not do us very much good to conduct polls and surveys. Still another complexity arises when we take into account the non-Jews' subjective estimates of the situation, that is, how much anti-Semitic prejudice and discrimination the non-Jews think there is, how dangerous they think it is, what they think should be done, how it should be done, and so on.

It can be seen that we are dealing with a very complex matter, structurally analagous to any situation of intergroup relations in which dissonant and diverging views of behavior and its implications are naturally characteristic of both or several parties in the relationship. If the questions concerning anti-Negro prejudice and discrimination seem more easily taken for granted and less difficult to establish, it is primarily because Negroes seem more easy to identify than Jews; there are more agreed upon public instruments for the identification of the occurrence of discrimination; and there is more general agreement on the proper public policy with regard to such discrimination. But much of the anti-Semitism one encounters occurs in those areas of human relationships--for instance, private clubs--where public policy is very moot indeed (the Cosmos

Club to the contrary notwithstanding) and where the actual disabilities visited upon the Jews by anti-Semitic discrimination are not always the kind that can evoke moral indignation and high sympathy about deprivation of fundamental rights. More than that, in many areas where one set of Jews would charge anti-Semitism, another segment of Jewry would deny it, if not indeed argue that the activity in question was pro-Semitic. Witness for example the probably different attitudes of successful vs unsuccessful candidates for admission to any Ivy League college toward a quota system, which is sometimes defended as being in the best interests of Jews. Even those of us--as I take it most or all of us here are--who are against numerus clausus on principle, would conceivably, under some specified circumstances, consider seriously the strategic value of the slow and partial introduction of Jews into new areas of social intercourse, as against the possible impact of a sudden inundation. We would feel queasy and uneasy about it all--but we would be sociologically immature not to consider at least whether the temporary suspension of a general principle might not, under conditions of satisfactory control over future events, lead to a firmer and more rapid implementation of the total principle than what would be secured if there were a militant insistence on all or none immediately. Whenever, for instance, we view with perplexity the fact that a neighborhood or suburb is rapidly becoming another upper middle class exclusively Jewish area, we are expressing, implicitly at least, our belief that some form of quota of Jews and Gentiles might be more conducive to better Jew-Gentile relationships for the total community than the observed tendency toward dual community structures.

While all of this is surely old hat to all of you here, I think it is valuable every once in a while to take stock of the actual conduct of our own affairs to see the extent to which we are participating in the very trends which we elsewhere and otherwise observe and comment about. In so doing, we also get a fuller appreciation of how complex these matters are, and we more adequately identify the areas of interaction between Jews and non-Jews in which questions of anti-Semitism are beginning most frequently to occur. I do not mean to imply that the struggle against anti-Semitism is now all at the level of appointing deans and chairmen at Ivy League colleges; that would be as much of a curse as any conceivable blessing it might imply. I do mean to suggest, however, that because of the alteration in the social and economic position of Jews in the United States, we are witnessing a shift in the battleground for equal rights, such that the upper middle class occupations and sites of residence are at one and the same time the loci of the best adjustment of Jews with Gentiles and of the worst situations of discrimination against Jews. One can therefore with justice point to such evidence as the number of Jews who are prominent in the upper reaches of trade, finance, learning, the arts and government; and at the same time one must recognize that the major ranges of discrimination will be found in these very same upper reaches, no matter how more generally widespread the prejudice against Jews may be. Jews have knocked on many of the heretofore closed doors of Gentile society in the United States and have found them open or forced them open. But many of the doors still obviously remain somewhat or totally locked to Jews.

This situation leads to two possible, quite contrasting judgments: one, that Jews are today better off than they ever have been in American society--witness the prominence of Jews in important positions; but, two, judging by the qualifications of Jews and their suitability for the positions, and by the number who get turned away on one ground or another, there is more anti-Semitism than one might think, and perhaps even there is more anti-Semitism today relative to modern circumstances than there was fifty years ago relative to circumstances at those times. Of course, it goes without saying that any anti-Semitism is too much; but let's take that for granted and see if we can make sense out of the trends over time.

Fifty and seventy-five years ago, the main rationales offered for anti-Semitism concerned the unsuitability of Jews, by dress, decorum, language, skills, and the like, for positions in the American community. It was frequently said that if Jews would become American then anti-Semitism would vanish. In fact, of course, many Jews have believed this and have for these and other perhaps more pressing reasons become so American that it is impossible in many cases to tell a Jew from a non-Jew without a program, and that program better not rely on names alone, but had better contain information about the confessed identity of the players. Jews and Gentiles look alike, dress alike, eat alike, live in the same kinds of houses, drive the same kinds of cars, send their children to the same kinds of schools, talk the same language. One is reminded of the story of the time that a very prominent Jew was being introduced at a mass rally at Madison Square Garden to an all Jewish audience, and the introducer said, finally, "And I now give you this man who is

not only a great Jew but a great American." A Yiddish-speaking woman asked her bilingual husband what the speaker had said, and he translated, with a certain acerbity and insight, to the effect that the man had said that the guest of honor was not only a great Jew but an even greater Goy.

The great assimilation of Jews that has taken place should have been accompanied, if previous theories were right, by a matching disappearance of virtually all traces of anti-Semitism. But something very different indeed seems to have transpired. Judging by both polls of opinion and surveys of actual institutional practices, there seems to be less anti-Semitism, both prejudicial and discriminatory, than there was fifty or seventy-five years ago, but not that much less--and our information is admittedly woefully weak--to permit any comfort or security to be derived from the situation.

Or, put in other terms, there has been much less ~~disimination~~ of anti-Semitism than one would have expected if, in fact, it was the "non-American" quality of the earlier Jews that inspired anti-Semitism. What one finds today is that Jews are condemned for the possession of the very same things--skills and abilities and positions and manners--whose absence from their midst fifty and seventy-five years ago was offered as the reasons for anti-Semitism. Jews are now too clever, too skilled, too powerful, too educated, too smooth, too deceptive. In short, the content of the stereotypes has changed, indeed almost reversed itself, but the anti-Semitism lingers on. This suggests forcefully beyond denial that there is much more to anti-Semitism than can be explained by any theory of observed differences and strangeness. Anti-Semites continue to believe that the Jews are different and strange even though by every rational

token of similarity there is no factual basis for their beliefs. The evident irrational character of anti-Semitism and its durability in the face of contradictory cognitive information must surely give us considerable pause and caution every time we start feeling rather blandly assured about the course of affairs for Jews in the United States.

In the same line of reasoning, I am seriously disturbed by the findings of a survey of opinion among four thousand high school youth, 2000 in secular schools and 2000 in Catholic parochial schools, which show--assuming the data are reliable and valid--that the percentage of high school students today who feel and express distance and alienation from Jews is just about the same as the percentage among the adult population who express these feelings and beliefs. One would hardly have expected this. For we cannot say, like father, like son, since, in so many cases, it is just as true, like father, unlike son. It may be, however, that in the realm of ethnic group attitudes consonance between generations is to be expected. The youth may be the victims of the same kinds of status anxieties as their parents; indeed, they may be acting out their parents' anti-Semitic feelings and beliefs in addition to their own, or even in the absence of any deep convictions of their own.

One would scarcely have expected this, however, in view of the events of the past two decades during which the high school students have been born and raised. We did, after all, have the Nazi period with all its possible educational value; we have had the emergence of Israel with all its positive implications for favorable images of the Jew; we have had a whole generation of parents and teachers

exposed to substantially new trends in public opinion, to new cognitive materials on intergroup relations; and we are now at a time where there is little public sanction for the open expression of anti-Semitism. One would have thought that collectively these forces might have made a substantial difference in the attitudes of younger versus older people today. But that seems not to be the case. This suggests that however effective the work of defense and educational agencies may have been over the last two decades, there have been and there remain substantial social and social psychological forces at work which keep generating the anti-Semitism revealed in polls and surveys. We must, of course, wonder, and seriously so, as to whether there might not be much more such anti-Semitic sentiment and discrimination if the work and effects of defense and educational agencies were not present as a countervailing force. I do believe--without much evidence to back me up here--that such democratic agencies today serve primarily to keep anti-Semitism at the present level, a level which I think might well rise very sharply if it were not for the countervailing influences. As a minimum, the work of the agencies has served to publicize and reinforce the general cultural sanction against open expression of anti-Semitism; and we must not underestimate the value of limiting the number of open messages of this kind.

A third finding which helps bind the first two together is to the effect that as much anti-Semitic prejudice tends to be expressed by people who have had little or no contact with Jews as by those who have had some or extensive contact. This is not the case of ignorance resulting in prejudice. Rather, we have here evidence that

there exists in the culture a widespread bank or fund of anti-Semitic stereotypes--part of America's heritage or legacy--on which any and all persons can and often do draw, along with all the other basic ideas and images of people and places and events that constitute the mental inheritance of the society. The result has been formulated in the phrase that one doesn't need Jews in order to have anti-Semitism, one only needs anti-Semites. But it would be more correct to say, one doesn't need Jews or anti-Semites to have anti-Semitism, one only needs to have ideas about Jews. This finding suggests that perhaps many of the high school students who express distance or alienation from Jews are simply expressing learned, emotionally-very-low-toned attitudes and images about which they do not have very strong convictions or deep emotional needs. The ideas they express constitute part and parcel of what their parents say or believe and these then become what they themselves repeat under the appropriate stimuli. Without corrective materials this primarily cognitive, non-emotional anti-Semitism is not easily altered by contact with Jews alone. Yet we may not ignore the finding--general throughout intergroup relations materials--that non-competitive contact and association on an equal status level is conducive to good relations. We probably cannot establish any large scale policy on the basis of such a finding, but it does alert us to the conditions under which other kinds of contacts are not likely to be effective in reducing anti-Semitic prejudice.

If thus far we have focused primarily on prejudice, i.e., the beliefs and images and feelings, with little attention to the actions called discrimination, it is partly because the evidence on prejudice

is much more ample and clearer. That is, the picture of discrimination is more mixed, varied and ambiguous than is the picture of prejudice.

The major Jewish defense organizations are of course constantly at work on the problem of securing an adequate inventory of discriminatory practices. I am most familiar with the work of the Anti-Defamation League. On the basis of such materials as are reported in its publication, Barriers, and its regional surveys of discrimination in employment agencies and in a variety of industries, such as banking and insurance, one can say with some confidence that anti-Semitic practices are sufficiently widespread in the few samples of American society so far studied to justify, at least from my point of view and my degree of sensitivities, much more intensive investigation and the readiness for much more concerted and widespread action.

Since there seem to be so many subjective elements in this kind of judgment, I want to try to advance some grounds on which wider agreement might be secured. The basic problem here concerns the attitude regarding the future that one thinks the present state of affairs justifies. May one relax? Is there more security? Are things getting better? If one asks for an historical precedent, perhaps the closest analogue that comes to mind is that of pre-Hitler Germany, where the assimilation of the Jews had proceeded to such an ample degree that in some cities intermarriages had achieved an all-time high in European Jewish history. As here today, so there then, Jews were in prominent places and positions of power and influence. And yet, within a relatively short period of time,

the non-Jewish German population was converted from one nominally favorable and accommodating to Jews to one which participated relatively en masse, tacitly if not actively, in the extermination of Jews and the destruction of Jewish life throughout Europe. The Allies may have won the war against Germany, but the Nazis won the war against the Jews.

If it is argued that such things could not happen here, the person advancing that argument, I think, needs to give reasons other than the traditional ones referring to German patterns of authoritarian child rearing, worship of order and authority, etc. We may argue to German national character all we wish, but we cannot blink away the fact that character did not act itself out in the form of Nazism until severe depression, severe internal strife, and a sense of national bitterness and alienation had been capitalized upon and formulated into a program, requiring Jews for scapegoats, by Hitler and his friends. If a high degree of assimilation and apparent widespread feelings of amiability can quickly be altered under such circumstances to a total destructiveness, what is to prevent the same from occurring here? Not many people in the U.S. today seem to care very much about the resurgence of Nazism in Europe. Certainly, there is little effective activity from the American side to prevent or impede such developments. Few people, not excepting the German youth, want to hear about Nazism. Few people seem to have drawn from Nazism the same lesson that so many Jews cannot avoid drawing. And recent reactions to the Eichmann trial by Jew and non-Jew (in the form of a kind of know-nothingness combined with an exaggerated legalism) are also worrisome portents.

On recent polls conducted in the United States, for instance, 31 per cent of the American people said they had no opinion as to whether Eichmann was or was not getting a fair trial, and 7 per cent thought not. Only 44 per cent thought that it was right for Israel to try him rather than hand him over to the Germans or to an international court. Thirteen per cent had not heard or read about the trial, and another 10 per cent said they were not interested. Eighteen per cent thought it was a bad thing for the world to be reminded of the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps and 20 per cent had no opinion on this. Finally, of those who said that the Eichmann trial had altered their feelings about Germany, nearly one-third said the trial had made them more sympathetic toward Germany and the Germans!

None of these figures differs very much from the reports on the same questions put to British and Swiss populations. If anything, the Swiss population is somewhat less trustworthy on these matters than the American, and the British somewhat more.

I know that you can read these statistics the other way, if you wish, and point to the large percentages who give positive and favorable responses. But no one has ever contended that during periods of prosperity and relative well being we should expect a majority to be anti-Semitic or to be ignorant. I don't see how we can fail to be concerned with the percentages, minorities though they be, who express negative sentiments of one kind or another about Jews.

Will they translate these into action at the proper time? Will they discriminate against Jews? Do they now? We do not know if they

now do--but we can point to some things which seem to me to increase the likelihood that those who discriminate are probably most heavily drawn from the ranks of those who openly express prejudice in response to questionnaires.

It is my contention that we cannot view attitudes as unitary. No man's attitude toward another person, much less toward another group, is uniform and homogeneous. It is composed of different dimensions or components, for one thing, and also varies with circumstances. I would distinguish, in general, at least four, perhaps five, different components that go into any attitude. There is, first, the image of what the person or group is like, usually by nature; there is, second, the image of the "typical" social behavior of the group members; there is, third, the evaluation of the social relations presently had with members of the group; there is, fourth, the range of hypothetical relations the person would or would not be willing to have; and there is, fifth, the person's prediction as to what he would do in various hypothetical circumstances where he found himself, willy-nilly, in relationship to the individual.

Now, each of these components can, I think, vary depending on the circumstance under which it is being expressed. There is the inner heart of the individual; there is what he says to his immediate intimates; there is what he says to his friendly acquaintances when he thinks everyone present is like-minded; there is what he says in more public circumstances when he has no reason to believe he is being checked up and identifiable; and there is what he says in a situation as public, scrutinizing, and identifying as a face-to-face interview.

What is his real attitude? Is it his most privately expressed image? Or his most publicly expressed reaction to hypothetical social relations? I submit it is impossible to assign more reality or profundity to one rather than another. I submit each of these specifies a different, probably equally valid, and revealing, component. What one says in anger to one's children or wife does not any more really reflect one's real attitude toward them than when one is overwhelmed with love for them. If this reasoning is adequate, then it follows that public avowals of sentiment are probably the best predictors of what the individual will do in public. For, the same pressures and forces which evoke the public statement are likely to evoke a matching public action--assuming, of course, the constancy of quality and quantity of the influences.

If this hypothesis is correct, then it is further correct to say that the amount of anti-Semitic prejudice expressed in response to questionnaires is a pretty good indication of the amount of anti-Semitic discrimination one could reasonably expect. If, however, the questionnaires are taken under conditions of anonymity, then we should expect that individuals will discriminate less than is predictable from their expressed prejudice, especially if they must act out their discrimination in public circumstances. But since so much of the present-day discrimination can and does take place without personal identification, I see no grounds on which to doubt that if one-third of the American adult public and about the same per cent of high school students say they do not want to live in the same neighborhood as Jews, do not want to have them for friends, would not work side by side with them, etc., then, roughly this proportion will, if given the opportunity, try to avoid the contacts

so specified.

Of course, the force of law and community custom often make it difficult for persons to act out even their most publicly expressed sentiments. But this only serves to verify the importance of constant vigilance and activity directed at producing countervailing influences which will impede or prevent the translation of prejudice into discrimination.

Such countervailing pressures as are brought through law and community action are excellent to the extent that they are accompanied and reinforced, especially for long-range purposes, by continuing education in inter-group conduct. I mean both formal education in the schools and the informal education that occurs via the mass media, official models of inter-group conduct, and the like.

The importance of formal and informal education cannot be stressed enough. There has been some tendency to derogate the power of education on the supposition that prejudices are buried deep in the emotions and, hence, are not subject to cognitive correction, and that, further, since discrimination is supposedly the acting-out of deep-felt emotional needs, it is not subject to formal educational impact. But I think these are mistaken assumptions, at least so far as a large number of prejudiced and discriminatory people are concerned.

The evidence of the greatest bulk of research quite clearly indicates, for instance, that every additional year of formal schooling, at least in America, results in shifts from parochialism, sectarianism, nationalism, and bigotry to something closer to a

community-minded, liberal, internationalist and democratic outlook. Recent news releases by the American Jewish Committee concerning Herbert Stember's excellent summary of the researches on education give one to believe to the contrary, namely, that formal education is relatively impotent. But those news releases are simply at fundamental variance with what in fact is to be found in the Stember volume. A close study of this volume reveals unmistakably that formal educational exposure makes a difference--not always a big one, not always a spectacular difference, and not always--but most of the time, and to some degree, and often most impressively.

If these researches are correct--and there is little ground on which to doubt them--then it stands to reason that cognitive materials, introduced in the educational process, exercise some effect on prejudice and probably on discrimination as well. This could be true only under the condition that it is also true, as we have earlier claimed, that much of the anti-Semitic prejudice, especially among the youth, is due to cognitive error and distortion that have not been effectively countered by truthful materials. New learning of correct materials is therefore likely to be influential in correcting such errors, and, hence, in altering the attitudes and actions based on them. Moreover, it is crucial that such corrections should be made before the simple anti-Semitism finds emotional needs to which to become attached and by which it then is made much less susceptible to correction.

Any education, therefore, education in the truth about Jews; education in the consequences and prices of prejudice and discrimination; education in the fact that the community disapproves of

such attitudes--any and all forms are valuable. As a minimum, we will thereby alter attitudes by posing against what the individual already feels and thinks he knows or believes a set of contrary and possibly balancing ideas which help make him more cautious, less certain, more restrained in his tendencies to express himself, and more inhibited in the ways in which he acts out his beliefs.

The policy recommendations here are quite obvious--at least some of them. Intensive work in the schools is indispensable; and if this is to be any good, there has to be intensive work in the teachers' colleges and on the texts and other curricular materials used by students. The ADL study of a sample of social studies books used in various schools throughout the U.S. reveals a dismal failure of many of the books to address themselves in any significant way to current problems of intergroup relations. This I find an intolerable situation, and one eminently subject to correction. What little we know about teachers' attitudes and levels of information tells us there is a problem there too--though I do not want to go into this, simply because I do not want to be understood as singling out the schools as a primary target of condemnation. That is all too easy and all too worthless an approach. Teachers' colleges are by no means the major sinners; the liberal arts colleges of our country, in which the majority of our primary and secondary school teachers are trained, are as responsible and short, if not more so.

We have spoken mostly of the unemotional anti-Semites. And I have done so deliberately, partly to indicate what we all know--namely, that there is substantial room for work of an eminently practical nature, and partly to contradict, at least implicitly, and

now explicitly, the notion that anti-Semitism is a function only of diseased or twisted personalities.

The work edited by Professor Horkheimer, especially the volume on The Authoritarian Personality, was monumental in character and import. One can hardly sing enough praise for the great amount and kinds of difference that this publication made. I do think, however, that one of the most popular misconceptions of the study has done the study itself and the whole theory of inter-group behavior considerable harm, namely, the idea that all prejudiced people are sick, or, more modestly, that only some people are authoritarian and these are the prejudiced people. In fact, if we look at the characteristics of the authoritarian personality we must be staggered by the extent to which it sounds like a description of the normal average man on the street. Of course, there must be great variability in the kinds and quantities of authoritarian characteristics manifested by many different Americans. And there is little doubt that one type of bigot is characterized by an extremity of authoritarianism. But we must not, we dare not infer from this that anti-Semitism, or anti-Negroism, or anti-other group sentiments are the peculiar properties of extreme authoritarian personalities. If we did, we should miss very much anti-Semites in our survey, I would guess.

The bigots on the extreme, however, represent a danger all their own. Small in number though they may be, they flourish in a society which is peculiarly suited, by its curious views on civil liberties, to their active growth and development. That they have not attracted many followers during this period in our history is understandable.

Condemnations by prestigious persons, plus the unacceptable extremism of their program, plus the general well-being of the populace, plus the yet remaining sanctions against open and especially virulent anti-Semitism combine to render such persons as Lincoln Rockwell rather ineffective at the moment. Other social movements slightly closer to the political center, however, may represent considerably more danger. I find in them a crankiness and querulousness and a tone of bitterness that seems to me all too easily converted into a pogrom-type of psychology. Members of the John Birch Society seem embittered at their lack of representation, at their claimed lack of audience, at their solitariness in defense of American ideals. I think they are relatively ineffective at the moment but extremely dangerous, and with a great potential for growth. If they continue to increase their effectiveness in their activity in schools and libraries--as there are some indications they may--and if they find a way to broaden their bases so as to include disaffected members of the lower class, and if we undergo even a mild recession, they may show a power and a danger potential not now visible. More importantly, they obviously have been able to introduce their own kind of countervailing influence onto the political scene, and seem to have been able to force a new kind of equilibrium between right and center (there being no left in America today) that must surely be disturbing to any New Frontiersman in the room. They do not now have any explicit anti-Semitic overtones, but they may tomorrow, if and when today's stigma against open anti-Semitism diminishes. And when another movement entitles itself the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, one must wonder how long it will be before this is taken to

mean that Jews are, by equation, Communists.

Because such movements represent a diversion of national purpose and a divisiveness of national effort far beyond and far more destructive than anything the Communists are able today to do in America, I would be inclined to treat them publicly and openly as unwitting tools of the Communists. That they are, surely. But other hours will have to be devoted to considering the most effective ways in which one deals with these. Let it be said for now that they dare not be ignored however crackpot they may now seem and however small their memberships are today.

From whence this anti-Semitism that is reported in polls and surveys? From where does this general character type emerge? What are the conditions of life that seem to generate it? I should like to suggest a familiar but crucial factor here, and urge that widespread status anxiety is the most excellent breeding ground for group antipathy, and that status anxiety is perhaps the most persisting general feature of the social psychological organization of the average man in today's society. Throw into the pot the fact that there is available in the general atmosphere of American social life a widespread and deeply held set of ideas unfavorable to Jews. In short, there is a body of doctrine ready to be received. This is an inheritance from other days when the conditions of its genesis and of its reception may have been different. Whatever the genesis, there is anti-Semitism available for consumption throughout American society, and especially in the urban areas where Jews are concentrated. The potential consumers, the newcomers to the society, the new generations, are prepared adequately to receive, accept and

believe the anti-Semitism they hear and see others expressing and acting out. They are prepared for they are anxious. And they are anxious because few men can feel genuinely secure and securely assured of their worth in modern American society. Indeed, in some ~~senses~~ the most momentarily successful men are among the most insecure regarding the tenure of their prestigious positions. The volatility and mobility of career patterns leaves no man untouched.

In such a volatile status-system, it is easy to believe that Jews are powerful and dangerous competitors; disrupters of the old order; strange newcomers who displace familiar persons and places; aggressors against exclusive and familiar sanctuaries. Above all, because Jews are in fact relatively powerless compared to non-Jews, it becomes all the more convenient to single out Jews for special condemnation, for scapegoating if one wishes, because one can easily, for the moment at least, deal with his own sense of failure or possible failure on the status market by ascribing his difficulties to Jews.

In short, the Jew is picked out for special treatment or abuse first, because he is a skillful and putatively powerful competitor, and secondly, because he is weak enough to become the victim of aggression. Of such stuff is an ideal enemy composed. Or, if one cannot make him an open enemy, of such ^{stuff} is an ideal scapegoat composed. Or, finally, if one is himself too weak to succeed in competition, it is evidently convenient to blame one's failure on the duplicity and/or native shrewdness of Jewish competitors. Jews are most useful objects for the status-anxious anti-Semites.

Is all this old stuff, old hat, old and trite theory? Indeed it

is--and indeed it should be, if the calculations I have made regarding the extent and intensity of anti-Semitism are correct. For, contrary to what many Jews and non-Jews would prefer to think and believe, anti-Semitism seems very much with us. And there is little ground on which to expect that the reasons for its extent and intensity--the real reasons--should differ today from the reasons that obtained a generation and two generations ago.

In the nature of the case, all these observations must be offered as tentative and provisional. We shall sometime soon have the decided advantage of a serious and well designed survey from the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley. We shall know more surely than we do now about how much anti-Semitism of what kind there is in the United States. And perhaps we shall also know more about the content of today's stereotypes and the special character of today's psychological needs that render the needy persons susceptible and willing consumer of the anti-Semitic ideas available on the market.

But I have little hesitancy in offering the following as a set of strongly likely hypotheses: 1. There is more anti-Semitic prejudice and discrimination of all kinds than the polls, surveys, and institutional studies currently reveal. 2. Much of this will be unknown to the very persons who hold these feelings and engage in these discriminations. 3. If and when confronted with the accusation that they harbor anti-Semitic feelings, or that their actions are anti-Semitic, these respondents will feel hard pressed to deny that characterization and will seek to rationalize them as simple preference for one's own kind. 4. There will be systematic

denial of the likelihood that anti-Semitism of the gentlemen's agreement type has any real chance for growth into anything more serious. 5. Few if any chances will be said to exist that anything resembling German Nazism could occur in this society. 6. Whatever difficulties Jews encounter will be said by a substantial number of respondents to be in some significant way the fault of the Jews themselves.

I would also hypothesize that among the most important predictors of anti-Semitism will be the sense of trustworthiness of the social order. That is to say, anti-Semitism will be found to be highest among those who 1) express least confidence in what the future has in store for them; and who 2) feel least able to count on support and fair play from their neighbors and associates; and who 3) feel that persons like themselves do not have an effective voice in the determination of community affairs; and who 4) feel that they have little control over the source of future events.

If time permitted, I would here develop additional hypotheses concerning anti-Semitism and the religious structure of our society. For it seems to me that genuine religious pluralism is a most difficult social organization to sustain, and that diversity of religious convictions is an eminently good source of interreligious hostility. In that light, one would suppose that anti-Semitism would run highest among those who are most fervently religious and, at the same time, see the Jews primarily as a divergent religious group rather than as an ethnic or cultural group. This would be a special case of anti-Semitism as a function of status anxiety, where the security of one's own religious conviction is felt to be

threatened by the disagreement implicitly expressed by the existence of the competing Jewish religion.

Because status-uncertainty is widespread, and because it is clearly significant in producing intergroup hostilities, I would urge, in conclusion, that there is a significant and serious amount of anti-Semitic prejudice and discrimination in the United States today that deserves both the most intensive research and the most immediate and resolute social action that we can contrive.



COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR TUMIN'S PAPER

by

ABRAHAM F. CITRON

Director of Community Relations and Research
Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit

Professor Tumin starts us off by stating some of the complexities which make judgments about anti-Semitism difficult. He intrigued me greatly when he said:

"We have the definitional problem in front of us. That is to say, unless we are agreed as to what we will define as anti-Semitism and how we will identify its presence, it will do us not very much good to conduct polls and surveys."

Having raised what I take to be a fundamental question, the paper makes no approach to solution. Rather, the answer is assumed by implication. This paper defines anti-Semitism as various testers, public opinion pollers, interviewers, and discrimination observers, have defined it. By accepting common usage, Professor Tumin seems to be saying that at the practical and working level there is no problem of definition. (He does raise the problem of definition again in discussing discrimination, but only briefly and as a general caution.)

Cutting to the essence of Professor Tumin's message, it is that although there is less anti-Semitism in America today than 50 or 75 years ago, there is still a great deal of anti-Semitism in America, both expressed and potential; much more than should be present in an enlightened, prosperous, modern, post-Hitler society. He says further that in America potential anti-Semitism is an ever-threatening danger, that events similar to those which overwhelmed German Jewry are possible here; and that the level of anti-Semitic expression and discrimination has been depressed in important degree by the efforts of the defense agencies in the field.

There are those who, in general, accept this view and those who reject it, basically or in large part.

For our purposes, what is crucial is the evidence pointing to one or another view. What is the nature of the evidence Professor Tumin brings to the support of this view?

First, Professor Tumin refers to the fact that although the content of the stereotypes about Jews changes, the stereotypes persist. He does not, however, examine what this difference in content means. Is there pattern, progression, retrogression? Are the new kinds of stereotypes merely the reflection of the general development of the culture, or of the assimilation of the Jew, or

are deeper symbolic and psychological changes evident? There are stereotypes of many groups where discrimination does not necessarily follow, nor does any important hostility.

Second, he says that although Jews are accepted much more "in the upper reaches of trade, finance, learning, the arts, and government," yet it is just here that we find the major ranges of discrimination, and that "judging by the increased qualifications of Jews, and by the numbers turned away, there is perhaps more anti-Semitism today, relative to modern circumstances, than there was 50 years ago, relative to the circumstances of those times."

Professor Tumin's note here reminds me of the reaction of many in the Negro community who feel that, as Negroes break through employment and social barriers, and raise preparation levels, greatly increase the numbers who knock, the numbers admitted, the doors knocked on, they are actually worse off than they were before. What occurs, of course, is a leap in level of expectation. Then the new frustrations are judged against the new level. What Professor Tumin has described is the normal course of resistance as new levels are reached.

Further, there is an assumed degree of discrimination here. He says, "Judging by the numbers turned away". What numbers? Just who and how many are turned away from what?

Finally, on this point, the argument advanced that perhaps there is more anti-Semitism today, relative to our times, than 50 years ago, relative to those times, seems to me to plunge us into a morass of subjectivity.

I believe the evidence of careful, systematic surveys would show tremendously increased acceptance of Jews in the economic, educational, political and social life of the land and significant penetration of middle and upper-middle class power and status positions. We do not have systematic surveys of acceptance. Our data, where we have it, is on rejection.

Third, in evidence, Professor Tumin refers to a survey of 4,000 high school youths, which shows just about the same percentage of these youths express "distance and alienation" from Jews as is shown among the adult population. Professor Tumin feels that this means that we may be making no progress in reducing anti-Semitism as between these generations.

1st, the much more pertinent evidence on progress or lack of it between generations would be that furnished by identical or very similar instruments administered to similar populations at given intervals.

2nd, there is contrary evidence; for example, the Bogardus samplings in 1926, 1946, and 1956.

3rd, it is quite possible to argue that there is little or no differential between these generations because the adults have been exposed fully to events of the Hitler period, World War II, birth of Israel, which today's teen-agers did not experience.

4th, Professor Tumin refers to feelings of "distance and alienation" expressed by high school youngsters. I, for one, expect continued expressions of distance as a normal and inevitable aspect of Jewish non-Jewish relations in America. I might say the same about aspects of alienation. We need to know (a) just what question evoked these responses, (b) what do these responses mean?, and (c) what shall we call dangerous in an attitude and what not dangerous?

This raises one of the most fundamental questions of attitude testing and of human behavior, namely the kinds of relationships that obtain between what a person indicates he feels about a person, group, or object, and how he will act toward the person, group, or object.

Professor Tumin is keenly aware of the research indicating disparity, non-congruence, between what people say and what they will do. He argues that, nonetheless, what people say publicly about what they will do to and about Jews is our best measure of what they will do in public. I might agree that this is our best measure while maintaining that it is quite a poor one for predictive purpose. The general context and permissiveness of the situation, the forces of the field as felt and perceived by the actor, seem to be exceedingly important in the evocation of specific behavior. For these and other reasons, I am not convinced by Professor Tumin's argument on this point.

He goes on to state (and here he says he has little evidence) that he feels that the activities of the defense and educational agencies have served to keep anti-Semitic expression and discrimination at a level far lower than would be the case if these programs did not exist. My point here is to inquire why it is we have so little evidence on so crucial a point.

I, for example, doubt that the programs of the agencies have been a major factor in affecting the basic generative forces of anti-Semitism. There are many who question any important effect of the agencies on the expression of anti-Semitism. Nobody wants to spend the money to obtain evidence on these points. Nobody wants to spend the money to put any part of their own or anyone else's program to a real test. We want to be a profession, but I do not find us urging the research that could make us more effective.

Professor Tumin is concerned with the "bank or fund of stereotypes" existing in the culture, from which all kinds of people may draw. He treats this cultural fund of stereotypes and feeling about Jews as if it were a fundamental causal agent. But I would want him to dig deeper. Stereotypes are generated and kept alive by needs. Professor Tumin has pointed to the shifting content of stereotypes of the Jews. What are the underlying needs and motivations? Where

do we get at the roots of the matter?

Is it indeed his theory that we attack the anti-Semitic spiral at the level of eliminating stereotypes or access to stereotypes in order to increase greatly our effectiveness? I would question the efficacy of such an approach.

Professor Tumin places emphasis on the necessity of constant vigilance, constant program, and on the need and efficacy of education. But he does not help us when we ask why it should be necessary to continue year after year at the cost of millions of dollars, to sit on the lid of what to him is a cauldron of hatred, which might, given sufficient conditions, surge over us in a Nazi-like holocaust. He doesn't tell us how to turn out the fire under the pot. He does not, in this paper, turn attention to basic causational factors.

It is probable that he does not emphasize this aspect of the problem because research on it is so very thin and tentative. The great proportion of research on anti-Semitism in America (and here all of us are vastly indebted to Professor Tumin's excellent survey) is on one or another aspect of attitudes toward Jews; on the attempt to identify key environmental factors such as education, or personality co-relates such as authoritarianism, or cultural stress factors like status anxiety. All this, while exceedingly important, and while throwing some light on basic causes, does not probe for essential causal factors. What research and researchers are asking the fundamental question: Why the Jews?

As we look over material on causes we note that it is not experimental but theoretical. We have papers and essays and books projecting theories, but no tests of theories. Why is this? I have some ideas, but out of a sense of iron discipline, will withhold them.

I find myself in disagreement with Professor Tumin's interpretation which implies the continuation, indeed, the intensification of the old posture and program of defense.

We should, in my view, essentially abandon the program and posture of defense and adopt that of a religiously committed community. Aspects of the approach of Manheim Shapiro and Rabbi Jay Kaufman seem relevant to me. Catholics, at their weakest, did not have defense agencies. The American Friends Service Committee is not the defense agency of the Society of Friends. Jews should be busy building the Jewish community, building Judaism, and expressing its requirements in the Jewish Community, in society and in the world.

As the UN Probes Prejudice

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

Observations on

**The United Nations Inquiry into Anti-Semitism
And Other Forms of Religious and Racial Prejudice**

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Manifestations of Anti-Semitism and Other Forms of Racial Prejudice and Religious Intolerance of a Similar Nature

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

MARCH 16, 1960

Noting with deep concern the manifestations of anti-Semitism and other forms of racial prejudice and religious intolerance of a similar nature which have recently occurred in various countries and which might be once again the forerunner of other heinous acts endangering the future;

Expressing its gratification that governments, peoples and private organizations have spontaneously reacted in opposition to these manifestations;

Taking into account the recommendations on the subject by the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities;

1. *Condemns* these manifestations as violations of principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in particular as a violation of the human rights of the groups against which they are directed, and as a threat to the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all peoples;

2. *Urges* States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies to take all appropriate action to prevent effectively such acts and to punish them where they have been committed;

3. *Calls upon* public authorities and private organizations to make sustained efforts to educate public opinion with a view to the eradication of racial prejudice and religious intolerance reflected in such mani-

festations and the elimination of all undesirable influences promoting such prejudices, and to take appropriate measures so that education may be directed with due regard to Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Principle 10 of the Principles of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted in General Assembly Resolution 1386 (XIV);

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange in consultation with the governments of States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in whose territory such manifestations have occurred, UNESCO and non-governmental organizations in consultative status, to obtain any information or comments relevant to such manifestations and public reactions to them, the measures taken to combat them and their causes or motivations;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit all the above information and comments, from time to time, as received, to the Members of the Subcommission;

6. *Requests* the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, at its next session, to evaluate the materials received in response to the above requests, to draw such conclusions therefrom as seem to be justified, to recommend such action as seems to be desirable, and to report thereon to the Commission on Human Rights.

Introduction

This analysis was prepared for submission to the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations with the hope of aiding our Government in its reply to the UN inquiry concerning recent "manifestations of anti-Semitism and other forms of racial prejudice and religious intolerance."

The Resolution initiating the current UN investigation was adopted unanimously by the UN Commission on Human Rights, on March 16, 1960.

The UN's action was unprecedented. For the first time in history, the family of nations officially recognized anti-Semitism as a threat to the fundamental freedoms of all peoples.

The Resolution grew out of deliberations by the Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which was in session during the disturbing outbreak of swastika daubings and related anti-Semitic incidents in January 1960. The Subcommittee, which has been investigating various forms of discrimination throughout the world—in education, employment, and religious and political rights—quite naturally was deeply concerned about the portent of these occurrences in West Germany and other countries.

On January 7, 1960, the International League for the Rights of Man called upon the Subcommittee to condemn the current

outbreak of anti-Semitism and "undertake an inquiry into the origin and purposes of the present movement in those countries where it has already been reported." This proposal, which received strong support from many other non-governmental organizations, was unanimously adopted by the Subcommittee and referred to the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission's March 16 Resolution followed.

The American Jewish Committee discussed this important UN development at its 53rd Annual Meeting in April 1960. In a resolution commending "the foresight and judgment of the members of the Subcommittee who responded swiftly and with vigor to the dangers they discerned in the anti-Semitic manifestations," the Committee undertook to cooperate actively with the Subcommittee through appropriate channels, "in the hope that its inquiry will contribute significantly to the elimination of 'anti-Semitism and other forms of racial prejudice and religious intolerance of a similar nature.'" The present analysis represents a first step in the fulfillment of that resolve.

The American Jewish Committee sees the reappearance of the swastika as but the latest symptom of a crippling social disorder demanding profound study and long-range corrective treatment by the United Nations, its Member States and non-govern-

mental organizations. We believe this attention to be warranted by the history of anti-Semitism as a disruptive factor in international relations—its proven effectiveness as an instrument for furthering anti-democratic, totalitarian and aggressive movements which violate human rights and culminate in genocide; its exportable and contagious nature which defies geographic containment.

In the light of experience in our own time, one can no longer view outbreaks of anti-Semitism, however inconsequential they may appear on the surface, without envisaging a chain reaction in which fundamental freedoms are liquidated, human beings are subjected to mass murder, and the peace of all mankind is jeopardized. The swastika stands as an eternal warning of the deadly potential of prejudice. This explains the universal horror occasioned by its re-emergence on the world scene this year.

According to the Resolution of the Commission on Human Rights, the inquiry is not confined to the 1960 swastika incidents: it encompasses recent manifestations of anti-Semitism, regardless of kind and location. We therefore include in this analysis certain recent happenings which, although they involved no flaunting of the swastika, are nonetheless of grave significance.

The Resolution is focused on the manifestations "which have recently occurred . . ." Yet the unfolding present cannot be seen in full dimension except against the background of the past. Thus we shall also endeavor to review—cursorily, to be sure—those developments of history which cast light upon the nature of anti-Semitism, particularly its exploitation as an instrument to gain political power within national boundaries and to extend foreign aggression. We shall also refer to the findings of psychology and sociology which bear on causes and motivations. Finally, we shall indicate certain lines of fundamental inquiry which we believe our Government can fruitfully suggest to the Subcommittee as a means of implementing the purposes and terms of the Resolution.

The American Jewish Committee believes that the UN's inquiry, as delineated by the Commission on Human Rights, can increase understanding not merely of the recent manifestations to which the Resolution refers, but of anti-Semitism in general. It can lay the groundwork for practical programs designed not only to prevent overt acts of vandalism and violence, but also to reach and ultimately overcome the deep-seated forces operative in society and within man himself that give rise to religious and racial prejudices.

Recent Manifestations: Facts and Hypotheses

The onset of the swastika epidemic and related manifestations occurred on Christmas Eve, 1959, in Cologne, West Germany, where two 25-year-old men defaced the recently rededicated synagogue. Both were tried before a German court and convicted on February 6, 1960. Both, during trial, delivered themselves of violent anti-Semitic diatribes.

Despite vigorous government denunciation, similar outrages followed elsewhere in Germany and in other countries. In West Germany, Jewish homes and institutions were smeared with swastikas. Some Catholic and Evangelical churches, war memorials and railroad cars were likewise defaced. Vienna's only synagogue was besmirched with "Juden raus" ("Jews get out"). The same slogan was scrawled on several London buildings housing Jewish organizations. A number of Jewish members of Parliament received telephone threats.

In Italy, "Morte" appeared on walls; a Milan rabbi received a death threat; police seized large quantities of Nazi literature and arrested 20 youths calling themselves the New European Order.

In Amsterdam, Holland, five prominent Jews were sent swastika-embellished notes proclaiming, "Jews are not wanted." In Vancouver, Canada, the editor of an Anglo-Jewish newspaper was anonymously warned, "We're going to make soap out of you." In Brazil, "Viva Hitler" was inscribed on the walls of buildings.

In Oslo, Norway, a foot-high swastika was carved on a factory entrance, while a painted caption, "Potsdam Jewish shop-

keeper," defaced a statue of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Storekeepers in Johannesburg and Durban, South Africa, found anti-Jewish leaflets posted on their windows. Swastikas were scrawled on store windows in Hong Kong.

In the United States, on January 3, a large swastika was painted on New York City's noted Temple Emanu-El — swiftly followed by incidents elsewhere, in small towns as well as large cities. Synagogues, churches, stores, libraries, schools and tombstones were smeared with "Heil Hitler," "Jews get out" and similar markings.

Precise statistics for the various countries are unavailable, partly due to haphazard reporting and partly because what constitutes an "incident" is undefined. Acts of one kind or another, ranging from crude scrawls to serious defacements and threats of bodily harm, were reported in almost 40 countries, reaching an estimated total of about 2,000 up to the end of February 1960. Over 40 per cent occurred in West Germany.

Despite the difficulty in obtaining conclusive figures and properly weighing the relative significance of different types of acts, the data at hand permits certain initial observations in response to the Resolution of the Human Rights Commission.

Informed opinion appears to have converged upon two main hypotheses. The first is that the outbreaks were brought about by organized anti-Semitic activity, including neo-Nazi political parties and groups centered in West Germany and operating separately or in contact with anti-Semitic groups in different countries.

The second hypothesis is that, however the first incidents came about, their rapid geographic sweep was due to unorganized and spontaneous deviltry on the part of unstable elements, mainly youths. The avidity with which they seized upon the swastika is explained by some as an expression of juvenile delinquency, and by others as an imitative or faddist response aggravated by over-dramatic treatment in the press and other mass media of communication.

In considering these hypotheses, it is important to bear in mind that the implications and potential consequences of anti-Semitic outbreaks differ from country to country. In some, anti-Semitism has been entrenched for many generations and is thus reinforced by social and political tradition. In Nazi Germany it was transformed into a program of genocide. But in countries firmly grounded in democracy, the historical and cultural climate has produced effective antidotes to intergroup hostility.

As so often happens in examining the causes of social phenomena, it is likely that the recent manifestations will be found to have their wellsprings in a combination of many factors — be they political, psychological, social or economic. The problem then becomes one of seeking the most promising points of departure toward constructive and far-reaching remedial action.

With this end in view, we shall comment on the two main hypotheses.

ORGANIZED ANTI-SEMITISM

Some who see the Cologne incident and the ensuing outbreaks as the outcome of organized anti-Semitic activity are of the opinion that the entire series of events, particularly in West Germany, represented a political attack on the West German Government and the Western defensive alliance by neo-Nazi groups which still harbor the "Aryan" dream of "redemption through force." Their boldness is said to have been prompted, among other things, by the increasing votes drawn by the German Reichs Party, which the Federal Government has

declined to outlaw, as well as by the Government's refusal to oust former Nazis from important offices in the judiciary, the armed services and the educational system. The fact that the two perpetrators of the Cologne outrage were members of the German Reichs Party is cited as supporting evidence.

Proponents of this view hold that the demonstrated responsiveness to incitement on the part of German youth, even though animated by non-political motives, will encourage resurgent Nazis in West Germany to press their campaign again at the first opportunity. As evidence of this resurgence, apart from the growing strength of the German Reichs Party, the following facts are cited:

Eleven other splinter neo-Nazi political parties are functioning openly. These include the German Block, headed by Karl Meissner; the German Community, headed by August Haussleiter, who participated in the unsuccessful Hitler putsch of 1923; the Free Socialist People's Party, headed by former Nazi leader Erwin Schonborn, now in prison at Mainz for insulting the president of the West German Bundestag; and the German Social Union of Otto Strasser.

Two other groups, organized as movements rather than political parties, are the German Social Movement which has achieved notoriety primarily because of its connection with the publication *Nation Europa*, and the Ludendorff Group, which has made vicious attacks on "Jews, Freemasons and super-state occult powers."

Other important potential sources of neo-Nazi extremism are organizations of former members of Hitler's Wehrmacht, which in recent years have issued newspapers, periodicals and books, and have held mass demonstrations glorifying their military past and justifying the Hitler regime. The most important of these organizations is the HIAG, a mutual aid organization of former Waffen SS men, which maintains branches in Austria.

Nationalist youth groups, many associated with neo-Nazi parties or movements, are believed to embrace from 20,000 to 30,000 members, although some estimates

run as high as 70,000. Seven of the most important of these groups have joined forces in a new federation, formed in June 1959 in the town of Idstein. Among the participants at this convocation were representatives of the German National Youth, a Berlin movement modeled on the Hitler Youth and known to have organized a "combat group" to break up meetings of democratic youth bodies; the German-Socialist Youth Storm, a Saar group whose emblem is the eagle of the Third Reich; the German Youth Commando, headed by former SS and Nazi youth chief Gunther Hessler; and the Viking Youth, also headed by a former Nazi party member.

Although these groups are not representative of German youth as a whole and are greatly outnumbered by organizations connected with such leading parties as the Christian Democratic Union and the Socialists, they indicate that the Nazi ideology is being effectively transmitted to at least a portion of German youth.

Regardless whether the swastika flare-ups were actually plotted by neo-Nazi groups in Germany, it is hardly questionable that these groups must bear a heavy burden of responsibility for perpetuating public receptivity to anti-Semitic provocation.

Groups similar in their ultimate objectives, although perhaps less menacing because the environment in which they operate is less hospitable to anti-democratic ideologies, are to be found in various countries. The following are examples:

In Sweden, Per Engdahl has provided leadership for Swedish and other European hatemongers from his Malmoe headquarters. He operates the European Social Movement, which claims 50 affiliate groups in 14 countries, and the New Swedish Movement. Another notorious Swedish anti-Semite, Einar Aberg of Norvijken, has been flooding the international mails for more than 10 years with quantities of leaflets containing Streicher-like cartoons and hate slogans.

In England, one of the most persistent agitators of intergroup discord is Sir Oswald Mosley, Fascist leader of the Union Movement, whose activities antedate World War

II. While disclaiming anti-Semitism, he inflames other prejudices which are readily transferable—currently those resulting from the influx of West Indian Negroes into various sections of London. Other organizations in England are the League of Empire Loyalists, the National Labor Party and the White Defense League.

The Italian Social Movement is a rallying point for former Fascists in Italy. It is noteworthy that when the wave of anti-Semitic incidents broke out early in 1960, the Italian police sought the culprits at the headquarters of this Movement's youth groups. Likewise active in Italy are smaller organizations, such as the Revolutionary Action Group.

One of the most active organizations in France is the French Nationalist Party, formerly the Young Nation, which has been banned by the de Gaulle Government. This group, whose members are believed to be responsible for anti-Semitic inscriptions chalked in increasing numbers on Paris street walls and subways, publishes a magazine which features virulent anti-Semitic articles. Another organization spreading anti-Semitic propaganda is Pierre Poujade's Union for the Defense of Merchants and Artisans.

Besides these relative newcomers, several older anti-Semitic instrumentalities remain on the French scene. One is *Aspects de la France*, a pro-royalist weekly edited by Xavier Vallat, former Commissioner for Jewish Affairs under the Pétain regime. Another is *Rivarol*, a weekly supported by former Nazi collaborators, which carries on the tradition of "intellectual" anti-Semitism. A third is *Defense de l'Occident*, a monthly published by Maurice Bardeche, probably the leading anti-Semitic intellectual in France today.

In Latin America, the most important of the groups with neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic programs are the Nationalist Unions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Peru. Besides having local branches in many Latin American cities and provinces, these groups are said to maintain links with European neo-Nazi organizations.

Former Nazi leaders, including Adolf Eichmann, have found refuge in Latin America, particularly Argentina.

Another country where escaped Nazis have been accorded hospitality, and where they are now reported to be active in influential circles, is the United Arab Republic. In 1958, Hans Eisle, one-time doctor in Buchenwald, fled from trial in Germany to Cairo. The UAR refused West Germany's request for extradition. In 1959, Ludwig Zind, neo-Nazi schoolteacher, escaped to Egypt after having been sentenced by a German court for making anti-Semitic remarks. All in all, several hundred German Nazis are believed to be in Egypt, some concealed under Arab aliases. They include former SS, SD, German army officers, and Nazi party officials, of whom perhaps the most notorious is Johann von Leers, former Nazi propagandist. The recent Arabic edition of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* may be attributed to their influence. They seem to operate an underground railway for Nazi war criminals.

Although anti-Semitic groups exist in the United States, they are generally regarded with scorn and dismissed as a "lunatic fringe." Recently they have succeeded in claiming some attention by capitalizing on the race tensions surrounding the desegregation issue in the South.

One of these groups, the National States Rights Party, exploits tensions in the South by charging that Jews have promoted the cause of integration. The Party's organ, *The Thunderbolt*, bears the characteristic Nazi lightning insignia. A few members of this group are believed by responsible observers to have been implicated in the bombing of an Atlanta, Georgia, synagogue on October 12, 1958.

This was but one of a series of attempted and actual bombings of Jewish houses of worship which began in November 1957, and occurred in various cities, chiefly in the South.

Other groups which exploit regional tensions are the White Citizens Councils and the Ku Klux Klan. The KKK, a racist movement tracing its origins to post-Civil War days, charges that the Jews are furthering

Negro rights "in order to mongrelize the nation." Klan members wear white robes and hoods, hold nocturnal cross burnings before the homes of persons they seek to intimidate, and engage in physical violence.

Other anti-Semitic groups are the American Nazi Party, spearheaded from a suburb of Washington, D.C., by George Lincoln Rockwell; the National Renaissance Party, operated from New York City by James H. Madole; Conde McGinley's Christian Education Association, at Union City, N.J., which publishes the bi-weekly *Common Sense*. Likewise notorious are Elizabeth Dilling, and Gerald L. K. Smith, who publishes *The Cross and the Flag*. Both have numerous targets in addition to Jews—the UN, UNESCO, progressive education and other liberal and democratic institutions and programs. Merwin K. Hart of the National Economic Council directs similar propaganda to businessmen and industrialists through his National Economic Council Newsletter.

All of these American groups affect a pious patriotism to disguise their anti-democratic inclinations and programs.

Since the end of World War II, certain of the Hungarian and Slavic emigrés in West Germany, the United States and other countries have formed nationalistic and Irredentist groups which issue publications with a strong pro-Nazi, anti-Semitic line. One of the most active is a Hungarian group led from Munich, Germany, by Lajos Marschalko. In 1958 he wrote *The World Conquerors*, a book which contains virtually every canard leveled against the Jews through the ages.

Translated into English and published in London by another agitator, Joseph Sueli, *The World Conquerors* has made its way around the world. It is promoted in the United States not only by certain Hungarian groups, but also by various anti-Semitic publications. The National States Rights Party advertises the book as a "current documentary on communism and the Jewish masterminds behind it." In short, it is a key reference text.

On various occasions in the past, anti-

Semitic groups have tried to organize on an international basis. As far back as 1882, a world conference of anti-Semites was held in Dresden, followed by similar meetings in Bochum (1889), Budapest (1925), Copenhagen (1926), Erfurt (1937). A "congress" under Nazi auspices, scheduled to be held in Krakow in 1944, was canceled because of the Allied advance. In 1951, Per Engdahl convened a meeting in Malmoe, Sweden, followed by several other gatherings. As late as June 1960, a plan of German neo-Nazis to hold a secret Fascist Congress in Wiesbaden was exposed by the state government of Hesse. Although the conference has been abandoned, there is evidence that its promoters continue to aid and maintain contact with one another.

The publicists of the Nazi-Fascist network have developed an informal system of syndication by reprinting or quoting one another's writings. Mutually serviceable items are translated into different languages.

While these propagandists exploit various domestic issues to attract followings in their own countries, their ideological staples are monotonously repetitive. These include the infamous conspiratorial theme of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*; the canard that Jews control communism and the Soviet Union, as well as capitalism; and distortions, some hundreds of years old, of Hebrew religious writings.

Substantiation of direct organizational or inter-organizational responsibility for the recent manifestations has not been adduced; yet it is beyond question that these propaganda activities have contributed to the climate of group hatred and divisiveness in many countries.

DELINQUENT AND IMITATIVE OUTBURSTS

Most eras in history have produced their own problems of "juvenile delinquency." In our own day, expressions of cynicism and defiance among youth are ascribed to the pressures of modern life, such as rapid industrialization, mechanization and urbanization, with accompanying dislocation of

family ties; the stirring of appetites for material satisfactions at the expense of moral and spiritual values; the instability of national commitments to social ideals; and the persistent threat of all-consuming war.

These conditions, it is said, incline youth to reject established authority and gravitate toward anti-social activities. Proponents of this theory in the United States point to the existence, for some years prior to 1960, of several neo-Nazi student groups among high-school and even primary-school children in widely separated communities.

During the recent swastika incidents, some 150 offenders were apprehended in the United States, almost all below the age of 21. The median age was 15 to 16, and some were as young as 9 and 10. (In West Germany the situation was quite different. Of the almost 250 persons apprehended there in the first five weeks of the epidemic, a very substantial number were in the adult age groups.)

According to the "juvenile delinquency" hypothesis, the main compulsion of the swastika daubers was to perform anti-social acts; swastikas and racist slogans served merely as variations of the obscenities adolescents scrawl on walls to express defiance.

However, some observers question this thesis, since it fails to clarify why mal-adjusted and hostile youth seized upon the symbols of Nazi anti-Semitism; they suggest as a more likely explanation the prevalence of latent anti-Semitism, especially among youth, to a greater extent than had been generally suspected.

It has been suggested that the buildup of the incidents into worldwide hysteria was due to extensive news coverage which provoked imitative behavior on the part of unstable, bigot-minded and publicity-craving elements, particularly among youth. It is true that the press, radio and television reported the succession of outbreaks in highly dramatic tones. Yet the same media also reported unanimous condemnation by the world's highest religious, political and civic leaders. Why did this weight of authority fail to exercise a more sobering influence?

And finally, is a tendency toward fad-dist or imitative behavior sufficient to explain the eruption, in quick succession, of nearly identical and seemingly coordinated manifestations all over the globe? Was there not a predisposition to respond in this particular manner?

To cast light on some of these questions, the Commission on Intergroup Relations of the City of New York requested the American Jewish Committee to initiate a study of the influences that motivated this form of delinquency. The study is now being conducted for the American Jewish Committee by the Research Center of the New

York School of Social Work. It involves scrutinizing an adequate sampling of youths and young adults arrested since January 1, 1960, for defacing places of worship in Metropolitan New York City, Philadelphia, Utica, N.Y., and several other communities. The characteristics of the offenders, and of the total environment in which each has lived, will be examined. Individual histories will be recorded in an effort to identify the social, economic, psychological and community factors that led to delinquent behavior in each case. The results of this study, and of others doubtless being conducted by other agencies, may well suggest a pattern for similar investigations in other countries.



Public Reactions to the Recent Manifestations

One heartening aspect of the otherwise distressing swastika episodes was the reaction they evoked in almost all countries. Government officials, religious, labor and civic leaders, editorial writers, and radio and television commentators joined in unqualified condemnation. In some countries, national or local authorities instituted special police measures to apprehend the perpetrators of the incidents and to prevent their recurrence.

The World Council of Churches, representing 171 Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox denominations and groups, expressed the hope that "this dangerous recrudescence of anti-Semitism may be suppressed from the outset." The Council statement also regretted that "after all the Jewish people have gone through in recent times, once again they should become the target of mischievous anti-Semitic propaganda."

Archbishop Iakovos, Primate of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America, declared: "I think that this situation should alarm us Christians all over the world. Instead of talking sometimes just to make headlines we must work very conscientiously and responsively so that we may get back some order in our Christian thinking, in our Christian living and our society throughout the world."

In West Germany, reactions of dismay and outrage were speedy and strong. The Federal Government promptly instituted an inquiry which resulted in the issuance, on February 18, 1960, of a White Book setting forth the following major conclusions: The manifestations showed no evidence of any

organized or concerted anti-Semitic campaign; the bulk of the West German population was opposed to anti-Semitism and determined to fight it; however, the offenders had been influenced by the political ideas of rightist anti-Semitic publications; and while there was no evidence of Communist instigation, the stigma cast on the population of the West German Government had rebounded to communism's advantage.

Conjectures advanced by federal and local officials, party leaders and newspaper commentators were conflicting. Some maintained that the incidents were the work of hooligans and children, and that mass hysteria was caused by excessive publicity; others charged the Communists with instigation as part of their effort to discredit the West German Government. Some blamed the Government for retaining former Nazis in key positions and not developing adequate programs of democratic education or instruction in the meaning and misdeeds of the Hitler era.

The German Reichs Party and other neo-Nazi groups were held responsible by some, while others did not regard neo-Nazi influences as major factors. Some traced the roots of the outbreaks to the traditional German "folk ideology" with its sidelines of anti-liberalism, anti-humanitarianism and anti-Semitism—the latter still latent even among "decent Germans." Others pointed to anti-Semitism as a symptom of deep-seated psychological disorder.

Various courses of remedial action were proposed—instituting drastic measures against hoodlum elements; outlawing neo-

Nazi groups; ousting Nazis from influential positions; enacting anti-defamation legislation; and improving education about the Nazi past, and for democracy.

In Austria, as in West Germany, laws were proposed to deal with group defamation. In France and Great Britain, rallies and marches were held to protest the incidents.

In Latin America, the incidents elicited vigorous condemnation from the highest officials and leaders of political parties, churches, labor unions and the press.

Denunciation in the United States came from every corner of society; government, churches, labor, the press, civic groups. In various communities, officials instituted preventive and punitive measures. In New York City, for example, the Mayor and Chief of Police designated special officers to deal with the situation and instructed the Commission on Intergroup Relations to give it top priority. Some school boards undertook to examine the adequacy of history texts and teaching methods in interpreting the Hitler era to high-school students.

The *New York World-Telegram and Sun* warned that "prejudice is a dangerous infection—easily spread and implanted in immature or warped minds, and always ready to flower into ugly violence at the drop of a cue."

The *Chicago Daily News* wrote of the swastika: "This ancient crooked cross adopted by the Nazis symbolizes the persecution that led to the deaths of six million people in the most hideous mass crime in all history." The editorial concluded: "The outrage and the concern are amply justified. The germs of the monstrous disease spread by Adolf Hitler still exist; they must never be allowed to multiply."

The Bishops of the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference called on "all citizens, whether Christians or Jews," to protest privately and publicly against further manifestation of bigotry, and deplored "any revival of the anti-Semitic prejudice which in its earlier manifestation culminated in such terrible disaster."

General Perspective

As suggested earlier, it may be useful, in seeking the causes of the recent manifestations, to take note of the insights yielded by studies of the long history of anti-Semitism. The findings are often contradictory or inconclusive, as are the results of so many social studies. But the fact that social phenomena elude the controlled experimentation and precise analysis to which physical phenomena can be subjected does not detract from the necessity of pressing the search for knowledge.

Indeed, the studies of the past, despite their limitations, have immeasurably increased our understanding of the forces that give rise to prejudice and discrimination. Future inquiries—and it is hoped that those conducted by the Subcommittee will loom large among them—will doubtless open up even broader vistas.

In approaching the problem of anti-Semitism, one must bear in mind certain aspects of the history of the Jews which rendered them vulnerable to prejudice. In ancient times there was the distinctiveness of Jewish monotheism. Later came Jewish resistance to Christian proselytizing. Religious antagonisms subjected the Jews to disabilities which isolated them from normal community life and pursuits; during medieval times they were excluded from land ownership and from the artisan guilds, and were forced to seek their livelihood in mercantile, later urban, occupations. With the rise of modern nationalism, their presence as a religious and ethnic minority in many lands and their positions as a middle-class urban group further invited prejudice.

As history has indicated time and again, anti-Semitism is utilized as a means of channeling public resentment away from an oppressive political regime. The pretext may be that Jews are radicals, hostile to the social order. After a revolution the new government may claim that Jews are reactionaries. Thus, the alleged grounds of anti-Semitism are often contradictory and irrational.

One must also distinguish among varying degrees of anti-Jewish discrimination, ranging from private exclusionary policies to official and total rejection by the government, even to the point of genocide.

In the brief exposition which follows, we shall endeavor to review some of the main theories of causation within the framework of historical events but without strict adherence to chronological sequence. It should be borne in mind that anti-Semitism is cumulative rather than evolutionary, in the sense that it feeds on earlier sources of nourishment, even those which have lost their initial rationale. But whatever the cause or motivation, anti-Semitism's most crucial attribute, and the reason why it is a matter of profound concern for the world, is its susceptibility to exploitation as a means of attaining ulterior political ends, eroding freedom and subverting justice.

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION

Most scholars place the beginnings of anti-Semitism at least as early as 70-135 A.D., when Christianity, initially a movement

with close ties to Judaism, changed to a definitely Gentile movement.

In order to counteract the appeal of Judaism to the pagan population, as well as to discourage Jewish converts from reverting to their original faith, the early Church Fathers depicted Judaism as a distortion of true religion, and the Jews as rebels against God, guilty of desecrating the host, committing ritual murder and perpetrating other alleged misdeeds.

At the same time, a Jewish stereotype was created in Christian art and literature. Distorted figures of the Jew were emblazoned on medieval frescoes, stained-glass windows, monuments and memorials; on illustrated Bibles, psalters and prayer books.

Today the divisive impact of certain Christian textbooks and lesson materials, including the treatment of the crucifixion story, is widely acknowledged by high authorities of Protestant and Catholic churches in the United States. A number of studies of the texts used in religious education have been undertaken by Protestant and Catholic scholars with a view to eliminating inaccurate and prejudicial material. A far-reaching and revealing survey along these lines was recently conducted by the Yale Divinity School at the initiation of the American Jewish Committee. The findings are contained in a scholarly book shortly to be published by the Yale University Press and entitled, *The Victims and the Oppressors: A Depth Analysis of the Protestant Images of Their Own and Other Groups in Situations of Conflict, Deprivation and Persecution, As They Appear in Religious Education Materials*.

Comparable studies of Catholic parochial-school materials are now being conducted at St. Louis University, a leading Jesuit institution in America.

The Yale study indicates that prejudice is not inherent in the core of religious doctrine; it stems mainly from cultural and historical encrustations which have been superimposed upon theological concepts. Invidious stereotypes reflect these superimposed teachings rather than the basic precepts of Christianity.

As will be noted later, many of the "religious" themes of anti-Semitism, which enlightened Christian denominations have long since repudiated, were appropriated by nazism. Present-day neo-Nazi propaganda seeks to conceal its amoral, racist materialism behind a desire to defend "Christian civilization" against the "alien Jew" bent on subjugating the world. Quotations to this effect can be culled by the thousands from current neo-Nazi literature.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

As might be expected, hostility to Jews has usually been most severe in times of economic stress, when competition for scarce opportunities led the dominant elements of the population to turn against vulnerable minorities, or when the entry of immigrants was thought to pose a threat of economic competition.

Under the Church's domination of feudal society and its guilds during the Middle Ages, Jews became peddlers, tradesmen and middlemen. Those with capital became moneylenders and then bankers. But when Christians likewise entered these occupations, competition intensified anti-Semitism.

By the end of the Middle Ages, economic displacement had caused physical displacement; the Jews were forced out of England, France and many parts of Germany, and were pushed eastward. In the course of centuries they were constantly displaced from economic positions they had largely pioneered.

The industrial revolution brought with it a vast migration from the village to the city and a corresponding shift from rural to urban occupations. Long excluded from land ownership, the Jews had preceded the non-Jewish population into mercantile and other urban pursuits. As the non-Jewish population pressed increasingly into these fields, they sought to bar the Jews by restrictive measures.

In modern times, Poland afforded a classic example of economic strangulation as a weapon of anti-Semitism. With that

country's gradual urbanization and industrialization, Christians aspiring to higher economic status found Jews already engaged in the middle-class occupations—small business and industry, and the professions. At the start of the 20th century, when theories of racial superiority came into fashion, the concept of the Jews as "aliens" gained wide currency, intensifying nationalism and justifying the economic persecution of Jews. The Government's unrelenting campaign to drive the Jews out of the Polish economy subjected millions to crushing poverty and brought about a vast Jewish emigration.

NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL POWER DRIVES

In the view of many scholars, modern anti-Semitism has been intertwined with the growth of chauvinist nationalism in countries of Eastern and Central Europe, where nationhood was attained with greater tension and difficulty, and on a less secure basis than in Western Europe and North America. In Germany, Poland, Hungary and Rumania, anti-Semitism was used to achieve or retain political power.

One of the most penetrating analyses of political anti-Semitism is contained in Paul Massing's *Rehearsal for Destruction*, published in 1949 as part of the five-volume *Studies in Prejudice* sponsored by the American Jewish Committee.

In tracing the social and political history of Germany in the era of Bismarck and the Kaisers, Massing's study substantiates that German anti-Semitism was historically rooted neither in the characteristics or activities of the Jews, nor in widespread popular sentiment. Rather, racist feelings were cynically incited and manipulated by those who perceived the explosive potential of prejudice as a political weapon, and who finally succeeded in conditioning important sectors of the German people—political parties, religious and professional organizations, and the whole cultural fabric of the country—to blind acceptance of anti-Semitism, thus laying the foundation for the drastic consequences of the Hitler regime.

The Dreyfus Affair in France, just after the turn of the 20th century, is a classic pre-Nazi example of the deliberate use of anti-Semitism in the struggle for political power. Even after the innocence of the accused Dreyfus was generally acknowledged, a coalition of the army officer class, heirs of the old aristocracy and elements of the Catholic clergy continued to use the anti-Semitic dynamism of the case to undermine the French Republic.

In czarist Russia, only brief interludes afforded some respite from successive and increasingly violent waves of anti-Semitism. The 18th century closed with the establishment of the Pale of Settlement, excluding Jews from living in major Russian cities and certain Russian provinces. The 19th century closed with a series of bloody pogroms and an accretion of anti-Jewish legislation surpassed only by the Nuremberg laws. This policy was deliberately planned and systematically carried out by the organs of the czarist government and the Russian Orthodox Church to divert popular discontent.

With the third and final partition of Poland, Russia had become ruler over a large Jewish population. The Government justified the brutal pogroms of the 1880's and 1890's as the people's only protection against exploitation by the Jews. Decades of government-sanctioned lawlessness against Jews and incessant propaganda depicting them as enemies of the Russian people created what seemed an almost ingrained popular urge toward anti-Semitism.

After the Revolution, the Communists passed a law banning anti-Semitism, but their pledge that it would disappear was not fulfilled. Not only did the Soviet Government fail to reeducate the Russian people in this regard; it exacerbated those anti-Jewish feelings which were the czarist heritage by means of official policies. Jews continued to be exploited as convenient scapegoats in order to deflect popular discontent.

During the purge of 1936-1939, many leading Soviet figures of Jewish origin were exterminated. In addition, anti-Jewish

propaganda was encouraged, and the elimination of Jews from many branches of the public service began.

In the fall of 1948, a new anti-Jewish drive was promoted by the Kremlin. Launched as a crusade against Zionism, it broadened into an attack on Jews as Jews. They were accused of both "bourgeois nationalism" and "cosmopolitanism." After January 1953, when the Soviet authorities announced the arrests and confessions of prominent physicians, including Jews, who were accused of having murdered or attempted to murder government leaders, an official campaign of anti-Jewish terror raged throughout the country.

In April 1953, after Stalin's death, the Kremlin admitted that the "doctors' plot" was a frameup and that the anti-Semitic agitation had been instigated by the Government itself. After Khrushchev denounced Stalin before the 20th Party Congress, the Soviet authorities permitted some liberalization of policies towards Jews. But discrimination against them as a special group continued.

Today there is clear evidence that the Jews and the Jewish religion continue to suffer disabilities in the Soviet Union, to an even greater extent than other religious groups. Observing Jews cannot easily procure supplies needed for religious worship, nor enjoy access to buildings for use as synagogues. They have inadequate means for training rabbis and communal officials, and are not permitted to form national organizations as are other religious groups. The printing of Hebrew Bibles is forbidden. Further, though the Jews are deemed a nationality, a status clearly accepted by those 2,268,000 who voluntarily declared themselves to be Jews in the January 1959 census, and though some 472,000 give Yiddish as their native language, they are denied the linguistic rights of all other nationalities in the Soviet Union.

Examination of a representative collection of anti-Jewish feuilletons which have been appearing in the Soviet press (a Government and Party monopoly) indicates that

Jews, especially religious Jews, are pictured as anti-social; their religious assemblies are represented as conspiracies; and Judaism generally is identified as counter-revolutionary and unpatriotic.

The inclination of the Soviet press in recent years to publish articles of this nature has created a hostile climate conducive to violent anti-Semitic outbreaks.

A resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on November 10, 1954, and published in *Pravda* on the following day, states:

The Party . . . always considered it essential carefully to avoid offending the religious feelings of believers . . . It must not be forgotten that there are citizens who, though actively participating in the country's life and faithfully fulfilling their civic duty, still remain under the influence of various religious beliefs. Toward them the Party has always, and will always, demand a tactful, considerate attitude. It is especially stupid to put these or other Soviet citizens under political suspicion because of their religious convictions.

This warning was echoed as recently as August 21, 1959, in *Pravda*. But these standards are evidently not applied to Jews and Judaism.

CULTURAL FACTORS AND RACIST IDEOLOGIES

Historians have pointed to cultural factors in the development of anti-Semitism, such as the influence of German romanticists of the 19th century—Wagner, with his repudiation of reason and his vague, sentimental Teutonism, and the historians and poets who joined in idealizing the Germanic folk past and in extolling the mission of the "German-Aryan race."

A pseudo-scientific base for this type of anti-Semitism was provided around the middle of the 19th century by a Frenchman, Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau. In his *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*, Gobineau sought to prove that only the white race was civilized; that the "Aryan" was the superior division of the white race; and

that the Germanic was the most creative branch of the Aryan.

Some scholars went even beyond the uncritical racist speculations of Gobineau and, by spurious linguistic analysis, discovered certain inherent qualities in the different races. Thus, Ernest Renan, in his *History of the Semitic Languages* (1855), contended that "science and philosophy were almost foreign to the Semites" and "the Semitic race, compared to the Indo-European, represents in reality an inferior conception of human nature."

Germany's rise to a first-class power after the Franco-Prussian War stimulated further pseudo-scientific works designed to prove the superiority of the Germans. Most imposing of these was *The Foundations of the 19th Century*, by Houston-Stewart Chamberlain, British son-in-law of Richard Wagner. Published in 1900, it was one of the chief inspirations of the Nazi racist dogma. Hitler's *Mein Kampf* drew heavily on Chamberlain's work. Also influential in giving anti-Semitic theories respectability among students and educated classes in Germany and other countries in the latter decades of the 19th century were philosopher Eugen Dühring and historian Heinrich Treitschke.

Hitler changed the dimension of anti-Semitism. Translating theory into practice, he carried racist propositions to their nightmarish conclusions. The nonsense of racial soul, blood and "Volk" was embodied in law and action. The Nuremberg laws of 1935, forbidding marriage and sexual relations between Germans and Jews "for the protection of the German blood and honor," laid the basis for mass murder, which came to be known euphemistically as the "final solution of the Jewish problem."

German scholarship was organized to "prove" Nazi theories of German racial superiority. Professors were set to work in libraries and research institutes specially devoted to the "solution of the Jewish problem."

Nazi racial anti-Semitism was an integral part of the Nazi program for world conquest and the destruction of Western

civilization. A German Foreign Office circular of January 1939 was quite explicit:

It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the idea of Greater Germany, since the Jewish policy was both the basis and consequence of the events of the year 1938.

In the course of the war, as the Nazis succeeded in dominating the European continent, they were able to work toward their ultimate goal of genocide. Historians, geopoliticians and biologists gave way to the engineers, chemists and doctors who established and ran the ghettos, the death camps and the gas chambers. The SS, the SD, the German Army and special police groups were drawn into active participation. The murder of the Jews was a goal that went hand in hand with winning the war.

During the war, SS head Himmler addressed a meeting of SS group leaders:

I also want to talk to you quite frankly on a very grave matter . . . I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish race . . . This is a page of glory in our history.

World War II cost an estimated 20 million lives—6 million of them Jews; over a trillion dollars in armaments, and property damage of over \$230 billion. On September 30, 1946, the leaders of the Nazi Government were found guilty by the International Military Tribunal of three kinds of crimes: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The horrors of World War II and its unprecedented losses in life and property were the work of nazism, which was based on anti-Semitic theories of racial purity.

SOCIAL PREJUDICE

In continental Europe, anti-Semitism has tended to assume political and ideological forms, to become a formal plank in programs of political movements and to be dignified by treatment in pseudo-scientific dissertations. Except for a few fringe elements, this has not been true of the United States.

The modern European brand of political anti-Semitism has never taken root in American soil. Anti-Jewish discrimination in certain fields of employment, which was prevalent particularly during periods of economic depression, has markedly diminished in recent years.

Prejudice encountered by Jews in America today is mainly expressed in various forms of social discrimination—exclusion from some vacation resorts and residential neighborhoods; from certain college fraternities; from a few purely private social institutions, such as city and country clubs; and from a few private educational institutions of higher learning. Never have such practices been sanctioned by the United States Government. Some have persisted more out of habit or custom than because of bigotry. Some are due to competition for status and prestige—to climb the social ladder, to be one of the select group, one must exclude others.

Yet social discrimination is by no means harmless. In fact, it is central to the problem of anti-Semitism, producing harmful results which go far beyond personal

affronts and embarrassment. It implies the inferiority and undesirability of an entire group. It justifies the freezing of ethnic, religious or racial groups into a "caste" system. By rendering judgment on the basis of group identity, rather than individual merit and ability, it perpetuates the infection of bigotry and silently authorizes discriminatory practices in fields other than social.

In practical effect, those barred from approved social circles because of bigotry are often not considered eligible—regardless of their personal qualifications and attainments—for certain types of employment as well, notably the higher managerial and policy-forming echelons of large corporations which are increasingly the pivotal centers of American business and industry.

While it is most important to distinguish between social and political anti-Semitism, it is also essential to recognize that social anti-Semitism can be a symptom of dangerous hostility, temporarily suppressed or modified to fit the temper of the time, but nevertheless potentially explosive. If unchallenged, it may create an atmosphere in which anti-Semitism can be utilized as a political tactic.

The Contributions of Social Science

Attempts to apply scientific methods to studying anti-Semitism and other forms of prejudice are a relatively recent development. Though research in this field is still pioneering and experimental, and many of the findings are tentative, it has already yielded insights of great value concerning the nature of prejudice, its manifold causes and consequences, and methods of reducing or preventing it.

The fruits of a concerted effort on the part of social scientists are contained in the *Studies in Prejudice* undertaken as part of a long-range research program outlined by American scholars of various backgrounds and disciplines who were convened by the American Jewish Committee in 1944. The foreword of the *Studies*, published in 1949, is still timely:

At this moment in world history anti-Semitism is not manifesting itself with the full and violent destructiveness of which we know it to be capable. Even a social disease has its periods of quiescence during which the social scientist, like the biologist or the physician, can study it in the search for more effective ways to prevent or reduce the virulence of the next outbreak.

Today the world scarcely remembers the mechanized persecution and extermination of millions of human beings only a short span of years away in what was once regarded as the citadel of Western civilization. Yet the conscience of many men was aroused. How could it be, they asked each other, that in a culture of law, order and reason, there should have survived the irrational remnants of ancient racial and religious hatreds? How could they explain the willingness of great masses of people to tolerate the mass extermination of their

fellow citizens? What tissues in the life of our modern society remain cancerous, and despite our assumed enlightenment show the incongruous atavism of ancient peoples? And what within the individual organism responds to certain stimuli in our culture with attitudes and acts of destructive aggression?

The answers to these questions are crucial to the future of all human rights.

We venture to indicate in broad terms some of the basic approaches of social science to the causes and motivations of anti-Semitism and similar forms of bigotry.

The problem of prejudice has been approached both from the viewpoint of studying the individual qua individual, as well as studying the group and its influence on the attitudes and habits of the individual. Increasingly, scholars are stressing the interdependence and interaction between the individual and the group. The individual lives in a society which has formed certain patterns of intergroup prejudices. In most cultures, there are patterns both sanctioning and discouraging egalitarian attitudes. Both patterns are transmitted by parents, the school, the church and other influences to which the child is exposed.

Prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior patterns will be assumed more readily if certain personality traits are present. Known in their totality as the "authoritarian personality," these include compulsive conformism, unconscious inferiority feelings springing from a sense of inadequacy, poor insight into self and the projection of one's own undesired traits onto others. Also important are strong devotion to certain per-

sons and values on the verbal level, combined with strong hostilities on the unconscious level.

It has further been suggested that prejudice is a form of rebellion against certain values in the surrounding culture which people unconsciously fear and hate, but which they dare not consciously reject.

But prejudice does not serve only as an outlet for internal personality conflicts. It also may be an outlet for frustrations and grievances arising from difficult economic conditions, governmental abuses or other national problems. In such circumstances, persons susceptible to prejudice often fall prey to manipulators who seek to advance their own selfish economic or political interests. Not only are people misled into blaming social evils on scapegoats; they also come to hold an unwarranted sense of status superiority over the victimized minority group.

Psychological studies have also convincingly demonstrated that prejudiced peo-

ple dislike more than one group at a time—they hate and fear many different kinds of people.

Many of the conditions that characterize present-day society—rapid change, social tensions and pervasive anxiety—are regarded as conducive to group hostility. The modern depersonalized community renders it difficult for individuals and groups to solve common problems or feel themselves part of a larger cohesive community, thus provoking a sense of defeat and cynicism, and encouraging scapegoating.

Preventive action in relation to anti-Semitism and other forms of prejudice need not, indeed cannot, await conclusive validation of these or other theories of cause and effect. The crippling consequences of the social disease we call prejudice are by now axiomatic in all civilized society, and measures should be taken to deal with it, even as we continue to probe into its nature.



Counteraction and Problems for Exploration

This cursory examination of the roots of anti-Semitism in religion, economics, culture, social and political conflict, and personality indicates the complexity of the subject we are dealing with and its urgency from the standpoint of safeguarding human rights and international peace.

In a broad sense, most of the studies already projected by the Subcommittee impinge upon this subject. The several studies conducted or projected, concerning discrimination in education, employment, religious rights, political rights, emigration and travel, have in view remedial recommendations along many lines. With implementation of these recommendations, the reduction of discrimination and prejudice, including anti-Semitism, would be a natural consequence.

The two Conferences of Non-Governmental Organizations Interested in the Eradication of Prejudice and Discrimination, held in 1955 and 1959, also were concerned with remedies. The report of the 1959 Conference is on the agenda of the forthcoming Subcommittee session (January 1961).

Of particular importance to the problem of counteraction is the question of the extent to which legal sanctions can be invoked by a nation against anti-Semitic or similar manifestations within its jurisdiction. The answer to this question depends on two factors: 1) the form which the manifestations assume; and 2) the basic legal premises of the country.

If anti-Semitic conduct consists of physical attacks on persons, or defacement or injury to property, the conventional criminal statutes of all nations would apply to

the offense—provided only that the culprit be apprehended, tried and convicted.

On the other hand, if anti-Semitic conduct takes the form of offensive speech, printed propaganda or assembly, prohibition or punishment of such conduct in each nation will depend upon the status of constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, press and assembly. In countries where such conduct is constitutionally exempt from legal restraint, it may be necessary to delay legal attempts to interfere with the anti-Semitic and similar manifestations until they bring about a breach of some law within the power of the state to enact and enforce, such as incitement to riot, conspiracy to commit crimes, or actual injury to persons or damage to property. In other nations, where speech, press and assembly are not constitutionally protected against governmental regulation, it may be possible to draft criminal statutes to proscribe such manifestations which take the form of offensive speech, press or assembly.

Each sovereign nation necessarily must evaluate, in light of its own history, traditions and basic legal principles, whether the threat to national welfare or security is great enough and imminent enough to warrant imposition of legal restrictions which limit full freedom of expression.

In our view, one of the main constructive results that could emerge from the present inquiry would be a report on the measures adopted and programs currently conducted by governments of the Member States of the United Nations, for the purpose of eradicating anti-Semitism and other

forms of prejudice and discrimination. Such a report would analyze the extent to which the penal statutes of Member States proscribe anti-Semitic or similar manifestations which involve physical attacks on persons or property, as well as those involving offensive oral or written propaganda, assembly or conspiracy. It would consider regulatory and educational measures adopted by Member States and their political subdivisions to counteract prejudice and discrimination. A number of the states in the United States, for example, have established special commissions to deal with such problems. Others have directed existing agencies of government to develop and promote positive programs to improve inter-group relations.

The report also would deal with the ways whereby the home, school and church, which are in a key position to influence the flexible minds of the young, are fostering wholesome, outgoing and unprejudiced attitudes essential to the individual's mental health, as well as to the well-being of the community. The influence of private citizens through their voluntary organizations might also be examined.

Second, the Subcommittee should undertake a thorough survey of neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic organizations throughout the world, including specific information about the nature of each group, its membership, ideology, literature and activities, and an assessment of its influence. Knowledge about these groups and their interrelations would facilitate counteraction. Particular emphasis should be given to the use of anti-Semitism for political ends.

Third, there are major problems directly connected with outbreaks of bigotry that need further exploration. For example, more needs to be learned about the social and psychological factors, including culture con-

flicts, that result in hostile action against particular groups. The correlation between anti-Semitic attitudes and hostile attitudes toward other groups—racial, religious, ethnic—needs further exploration; likewise the correlation between group prejudices and hostile attitudes toward democratic ideas, movements and institutions generally, including the UN itself.

The degree to which news coverage by the mass media provokes imitative behavior needs to be studied.

In exploring these and other problems, the Subcommittee would doubtless find it desirable to solicit the views of UN bodies and specialized agencies concerned with related problems, notably UNESCO. The guidance of the Social Commission might be enlisted in studying how juvenile delinquency translates itself into hostile action against Jews or other racial or religious groups.

We hope that our Government will consider the views and data submitted in this preliminary statement of sufficient merit to warrant the attention of the Subcommittee. We trust our representatives will also express our appreciation of the Subcommittee's initiative in conceiving this most significant inquiry. As the inquiry proceeds, and as opportunity is afforded to non-governmental organizations desiring to be helpful, we hope we may be able to submit additional information and views.

Together with other American organizations, we see in the United Nations one of the key instruments available to modern man for achieving in all countries the goal of equal respect among fellow human beings, regardless of religion or race. We believe the present undertaking to be one of the most telling ways of fulfilling the UN's commitment to the protection of human rights as the cornerstone of peace.