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Box 55, Folder 7, Arms sales - Saudi Arabia, 1986-1987.

*Memo*

June 5, 1987

TO: CRC Executives and Chairs
FROM: Rabbi Israel Miller, Chair, NJCRAC Israel Task Force Strategy Committee
RE: PROPOSED SALE ON MAVERICK MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA

In an unexpected move last Friday, May 29th, the Administration sent Congress formal notification of its plan to sell Saudi Arabia 1,600 Maverick missiles valued at \$360 million dollars.

Reaction in Congress has been acute: first, because the Administration just postponed notification on all-inclusive package of Mavericks, F-15's and upgrading of the M-60 tanks; secondly, because notification was made last Friday without warning; and finally, because the Administration has opted to dispense with the customary 20 day "informal" pre-notification period.

Identical resolutions of disapproval have been introduced by Senator Bob Packwood and Alan Cranston in the Senate (SJR 153) and Representatives Mel Levine and Larry Smith in the House (HJR 302). As of Friday, June 6th, 57 Senators had signed on as co-sponsors of the Senate resolution of disapproval. Senate hearings may take place as early as June 10th with a vote toward the middle of the week starting June 15th.

RECOMMENDATION: The NJCRAC Israel Task Force Strategy Committee recommends communication from organization presidents and chairpeople calling upon Senators and Representatives to co-sponsor the respective identical Resolution of Disapproval. Talking points have been sent under separate cover by AIPAC.

CVB:mh
O,EX,CHAIR,ITF.NJ

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 26, 1987

Dear Colleague:

We are writing to seek your signature on the attached letter to President Reagan opposing the sale of F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Recent reports indicate that the Administration will soon notify Congress of plans to sell Saudi Arabia 12-15 F-15 fighter aircraft, Maverick air-to-ground missiles, and tank improvements. We do not believe this sale is in the best interests of the United States or our allies. We urge you to sign the attached letter as an early sign of strong opposition to the sale.

A similar letter of disapproval in January 1985 succeeded in deferring a confrontation over the sale of a major defense equipment package to Saudi Arabia. Once again, we hope to avoid such a fight. We do not believe a confrontation over another major arms sale proposal to the Middle East would serve the interest of this country, the Presidency or the Congress -- Republicans and Democrats alike. Such a sale would do nothing to further U.S. interests or the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Instead, it would simply spark another divisive battle between the Administration and Congress at a time when we can least afford it.

We hope you will join us in opposing this potential sale. If you choose to cosign the attached letter, please have a member of your staff contact any one of the following members of our staffs: Steve May (4-9068), Ann Goldman (4-3553), Shawn Smeallie (4-8357), or Peter Harris (4-2315).

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Alan Cranston Bob Packard Al Dixon Alfonse O'Connell

John Heinz Wendell M. Ford Pat Roberts Tom Harkin

- OVER -

Richard Shelby Ed Keller Tom Maschle Paul Rosenberg
David Rosenberg Judy Fischer



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our opposition to the possible sale to Saudi Arabia of 12 to 15 F-15 fighter aircraft, hundreds of Maverick air-to-ground missiles and tank improvements. We do not believe this sale is in the best interests of the United States or our allies.

The Congress and the American people have repeatedly been told that Saudi Arabia is one of America's "best friends" in the region; and that Saudi Arabia is "moderate" and acts to advance U.S. interests and peace in that vital part of the world. We have also repeatedly been urged to support one arms sale after another to Saudi Arabia -- totalling more than \$29 billion since 1981. These sales went forward based on the promise of Saudi friendship and support. The record, unfortunately, shows otherwise.

The Saudis have consistently opposed every American peace initiative in the Middle East. They have consistently refused to negotiate for peace with Israel, our most reliable ally in the region. The Saudis have repeatedly opposed other U.S. interests in the region, including our efforts to curb the outlaw Khadaffi regime, U.S. attempts to expand its strategic presence in the Gulf, and attempts to isolate and weaken the terrorist activities of the PLO and Syria (both of which enjoy enormous Saudi financial support).

Are these the actions of a friend? Are these the actions of a country helpful in the search for peace? Clearly they are not. We do not believe it would be in the best interests of the United States to transfer these weapons to Saudi Arabia and we would oppose such a sale or transfer vigorously should formal notification be sent to Congress.

We have sold billions of dollars worth of arms to Saudi Arabia in what we are repeatedly told are "litmus tests" of American friendship. America has proved her friendship. Saudi Arabia, in response, has just given us more litmus tests. It's time for America to begin testing Saudi friendship as well as her commitment to peace in the region.

-OVER-

Thank you for your consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,

Alan Cranston Bobbie Howard of Diion Alfonse Clavito

John Heinz W. M. V. Jr. Put side Tom Keefe

Richard Shelby R. B. Kent Tom Kuschle Paul Sarban

Don Stenberg Judy Schwartz



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Attack on the Stark Complicates U.S. Military Ties to Saudis

By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 4 — The Iraqi missile attack on the United States frigate Stark last month has complicated Washington's military relationship with Saudi Arabia, whose pilots declined to intercept the Iraqi plane after its strike.

Officials in the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House say that the Saudi pilots and ground controllers performed correctly, following strict guidelines imposed earlier by the United States to preclude Saudi Arabia from using American-built F-15's against Israel or other countries.

In Congress, however, anger over the incident has contributed to an expanding effort to block the Reagan Administration's plans to sell the Saudis 1,600 air-to-ground Maverick missiles, worth \$360 million. As of today, 52 Senators have agreed to co-sponsor a resolution of disapproval, which would need 67 votes to sustain a Presidential veto.

The Congressional opposition comes just as the Administration is trying to persuade Saudi Arabia to provide some air cover for American ships in the Persian Gulf and possibly landing rights for American fighter planes.

It was for this purpose that Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger met today in Nice, France, with the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan. According to a statement by the Saudi Embassy here, "needs of the kingdom" were discussed, an indication that the arms sales came up. Administration officials doubt that the Saudis will want

to take the risk of getting into combat on behalf of the United States without some assurance that American arms will be forthcoming.

"It's a reciprocal relationship," said a senior Administration official. "They can provide some help, if they have the political will. They have to have confidence in our staying power."

"This is a test," he said of the missile sale, "and if they don't think that we pass the test, why should they put themselves in harm's way?"

He and other Administration officials defended the Saudi refusal to intercept the Iraqi jet that attacked the Stark May 17.

Officials said that in recent years, as the Saudis obtained Awacs planes and F-15 fighters, questions of how they would be used were discussed in detail, with contingencies such as an attack on an American ship being considered.

'Take Care of Our Own'

"We said the Saudi mission was to defend the Awacs and to defend Saudi territory," one official said. "In international zones, we would take care of our own."

Consequently, he said, when the Iraqi plane was detected by an Awacs, Saudi F-15's were scrambled to protect the surveillance aircraft. And when a controller in the Awacs reportedly asked the Saudis to intercept the Iraqi plane, the Saudi pilots insisted on checking with their ground controller, who had to check with his superior.

A senior official asked, "What would we do if an Italian ship off North Amer-

ica was accidentally fired at by a Canadian airplane, and the Italian ship said, 'Help!'"

"It would be a completely unanticipated situation. Think how long it would take to get approval for an American plane to go after a Canadian plane."

Iraq and Saudi Arabia have close ties. The Saudis reportedly pay for much of the weaponry Iraq uses in its war with Iran.

According to Administration officials, the restriction on the use of the F-15's was imposed partly in deference to Israel and its supporters, who worried that the planes might be used against Israeli forces. Some supporters of Israel have now used the Saudi failure to act in the Stark attack as an argument against further arms sales.

"The failure of the Saudis to intercept the jet was a factor for many senators" who have endorsed the resolution to block the arms sales, according to Senator Bob Packwood, the Oregon Republican who is the resolution's chief sponsor, along with Senator Alan Cranston, Democrat of California.

Mr. Packwood has framed his opposition to the sales in different terms, however. "The Saudis have consistently opposed every American peace initiative in the Middle East," he said. "They have consistently refused to negotiate for peace with Israel."

The Maverick missile in the proposed sale is a more advanced version of a missile that was approved by Congress for sale to the Saudis in 1984. Saudi Arabia rejected that sale be-

cause those missiles, which were guided by television cameras, could be used only in daylight. The Saudis have now asked for the newer model, which has an infrared sensor, giving it a nighttime capability.

In addition to the missiles, the Administration is preparing three other arms-sale proposals. One is for a dozen F-15's, worth about \$500 million, to be stored in the United States and used to replace Saudi planes that crash. The second proposal is for \$108 million worth of infrared sights, laser range-finders, ballistics computers and other equipment to upgrade M-60 tanks. The third is for \$300 million in advanced electronics for the F-15's.

Syria Is Reported to Curtail Abu Nidal Group's Activities

AMMAN, Jordan, June 4 (AP) — Syria has closed offices of Abu Nidal's Palestinian organization and forced many of his followers to leave the country, The Jordan Times reported today.

The presence of the group, often linked to terrorist attacks, has been a major obstacle to improvement of Syrian relations with the United States and other Western countries.

Abu Nidal is the code name of Sabry al-Banna, who split with the Palestine Liberation Organization a decade ago.

The Syrians closed Abu Nidal operations in the Yarmuk refugee camp for Palestinians and confiscated documents, The Jordan Times said.

OPINION

Standing up for US interests in Saudi arms sale

By Douglas MacArthur II

AGAINST the backdrop of congressional and presidential elections in 1988, an important question faces the newly reconvened Congress. It is the Reagan administration's proposal for a \$1 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia.

The purpose is to strengthen the Saudi defense against Iran — an Iran that recently tried to foment a serious uprising in Saudi Arabia during the holy hajj pilgrimage to Mecca through Iranian "pilgrims" directed by Iran's radical Revolutionary Guards. Iran now declares its intention to destroy the moderate Saudi regime, replacing it with one of Islamic revolutionary zeal.

An independent, friendly, and cooperative Saudi Arabia is important to vital United States security and economic interests and crucial to those of its principal allies, "NATO Europe" in the Atlantic and Japan in the Pacific. These allies provide military forces and bases to preserve the balance of power on which peace depends. Their economies are heavily dependent on Persian Gulf oil, especially on Saudi Arabia, the largest Arab Gulf state, which occupies a key position and sits on about 40 percent of the world's oil reserves.

Should Saudi Arabia and the other smaller, friendly Arab oil states of the Gulf be replaced by hostile revolutionary regimes determined to use oil as an instrument of political persuasion, the future outlook for the US and its principal allies would be bleak.

Indeed so would that of Israel, but Israel is probably counting on US military intervention to prevent such a development.

Although Saudi Arabia faces a serious threat from Iran, the arms sale is expected to face strong opposition from the powerful Zionist lobby in the US, which blocked the sale of defensive Maverick missiles to the Saudis last June. This is the only US lobby that unabashedly takes

direction from a foreign power, Israel. It is powerful not only because it contributes to the campaign funds of members of Congress who support Israel but also because it can mobilize substantial votes, particularly in urban centers.

The administration's arms proposal will raise a fundamental question for many members of Congress: Will their vote be governed by short-term personal political advantage in supporting the Israeli lobby or by the administration's view of vital US national interests?

In its campaign opposing arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the Israeli lobby has advanced the flawed proposition

Congress must choose whose interests it will support. For some members it will be 'the moment of truth.'

that basic US and Israeli interests and objectives in the Middle East are the same. This is not true. Although the US strongly supports a free, independent, and democratic Israel, the US as a global power has other important interests in the Middle East and some major policy differences with Israel on a number of issues important to US security and well-being.

In the first place, Israel is a small, important, but self-centered, regional power. In an area that is generally unfriendly, Israel understandably has a siege mentality; it sees its responsibilities as limited only to itself and its own perception of its national security. This limited sense may explain why it saw fit to infiltrate an Israeli spy, Jonathan Pollard, into a sensitive intelligence structure of the US, Israel's principal benefactor and political and financial supporter.

The US, on the other hand, is a global power, with allies and friends in many parts of the world on whom it

depends for important aspects of its own security; it must be understanding and responsive to their legitimate interests. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states are such friends. These are not US satellites that can or should be brushed off simply because Israel's perception of its limited interests differ with Washington's view.

The US also has differences with Israel on other specific issues:

The US seeks a broad, friendly Arab world under moderate leadership cooperating with the West. Israel's objective is a divided, weak Arab world which would of course be vulnerable to both Arab ultranationalism and Islamic extremism.

The US wants to see an end to the Iran-Iraq war. Israel wants that war to continue as a means of weakening the Arab world and diverting its attention from Israel. This is why the Israeli government played such a leading rôle in the US arms-to-Iran-for-hostages fiasco and indeed why Israel has for the last 25 years been cooperating with Iran in supporting Iraqi Kurd guerrilla operations against the government of Iraq.

The US strongly supported United Nations Resolution 242's "land for peace" formula. Israel, led by Menachem Begin, not only rejected it but sought irreversible de facto annexation of the West Bank and Gaza through the hasty establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, thus dealing a staggering blow to the possibility of peace with the Arab world.

So US and Israeli policies and objectives do not always coincide. Sometimes they are in direct conflict, as in the case of arms for Saudis. Congress must choose whose interests it will support. For some members it will be "the moment of truth."

Douglas MacArthur II has held six presidential appointments, including assistant secretary of state for congressional relations and ambassador to Iran.

And Now, the Saudi Arms Sale

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17 — Most of the time, the White House is relatively free to pursue foreign policy initiatives without much interference. But when it wants to use arms as a tool of diplomacy, the law requires it to get Congress's permission in most cases. And that gives the lawmakers a rare chance to help shape the direction of foreign policy.

Congress is now seizing that chance in the Middle East, where the Administration wants to sell \$354 million worth of missiles to Saudi Arabia. More than 200 House members and 63 Senators have signed a resolution opposing the deal, and the debate over the sale is turning into a wide-ranging discussion of American policy in the region.

"Selling arms has become a substitute for policy," said Representative David R. Obey, a Wisconsin Democrat who heads the subcommittee that handles foreign aid. "That seems to be the only tool we are actively using."

The debate over the arms sale went public this morning at a hearing on Capitol Hill, a place where hyperbole is a way of life. But Senator Alan Cranston, a California Democrat, opened the proceedings with an unusual understatement. "Mr. Chairman," mused the California Democrat, "it's strange."

Only three days ago, he continued, American planes attacked Libya and its leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. "Yet here we are today," he said, "discussing another President Reagan initiative — a proposal to sell 2,600 missiles to one of Colonel Qaddafi's staunchest friends and supporters: Saudi Arabia."

But Senator Richard G. Lugar, the Indiana Republican who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said the terrorist threat posed by Libya and its leader argued in favor of the arms deal. In combating that threat, he said, the United States needs to cement its relationships with "moderate Arab states" like Saudi Arabia. And the arms sale, Mr. Lugar added, "will be seen as a sign of that."

This sharp disagreement between two senior Senators demonstrates how hard it is for the Administration, and Congress, to calculate the actual



The New York Times

Why sell missiles to one of Qaddafi's staunchest friends?

Senator Alan Cranston

But Reagan's role in the Middle East is at stake.

Senator Richard G. Lugar

impact of American intervention in the Middle East. Often, that intervention takes the form of selling weapons to one country or another, or withholding them. And thus military hardware has become the common currency of diplomacy in many turbulent regions of the world.

On Aid to Rebels

The Saudi issue comes at a time when the Administration is pressing Congress to allocate \$100 million to the Nicaraguan rebels, including \$70 million in military aid. The White House is also reported to be using secret contingency funds to bypass Congress and send antiaircraft weapons to insurgent forces in Angola and Afghanistan.

The Saudi deal has been discussed for a year, but unhappiness on Capitol Hill caused the White House to scale back its request. When the package was finally announced April 8, it was about one-third its original size and contained no weapons that the Saudis do not already have.

According to Senator Lugar, Mr. Reagan expressed his strong determination to push ahead with the sale at a White House meeting this week. The President's main goal, Mr. Lugar added, is a diplomatic one, not a military one.

"I'm telling colleagues," said Senator Lugar, who backs the deal, "that the President's ability to be a player in the Middle East is dependent on his ability to make this sale."

Supporters of the sale also argue that the rising power of the Iranians and their military successes against the Iraqis have placed Saudi Arabia's security in jeopardy. "Iranian forces are only a few miles from Kuwait," noted Representative Lee H. Hamilton, chairman of the Intelligence Committee. "The Saudi oil fields are terribly exposed in the eastern part of the kingdom."

The Administration stressed this point today when Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy told the Congressional hearing that the arms were needed to send "a political signal" to the Iranians.

The Administration argues that this arms sale does not pose a serious threat to Israel. In the past, Israel has seen such deals as a threat, but

this time has accepted the Administration's reasoning and is not working actively against the sale. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a powerful lobbying force that has helped thwart previous sales, has decided to save its political capital and take a

similar stance.

Even so, the sale has provoked widespread uneasiness on Capitol Hill. Congress is required to act on the resolution of disapproval by May 8, a month after the package was first proposed, and it is likely to pass. But the lawmakers will have a much tougher time mustering the two-thirds vote necessary to override a Presidential veto, which is certain to come.

Many lawmakers say it makes no sense to introduce more sophisticated weapons into what Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr. called "a tinderbox part of the world." The Connecticut Republican said he was especially concerned that Stinger antiaircraft missiles sent to the Saudis might make their way into the hands of terrorists.

"You always run the risk of those missiles being turned against the United States or Israel," he said.

'Purely Symbolic'?

To Representative Mel Levine, a California Democrat who is leading the opposition to the sale, the Saudi deal is a "purely symbolic" action that the United States should not make. Arms, he adds, "should not be the centerpiece of our relations with Saudi Arabia."

As recent events demonstrate, however, arms deals have already become the centerpiece of America's diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and with many other countries around the world.



March 11, 1986

Memo

TO: NJCRAC Member Agencies

FROM: Arden Shenker and Rabbi Israel Miller, Co-Chairs,
NJCRAC Israel Task Force

RE: Background on Proposed Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia

As widely reported, the Administration today, Tuesday, March 11, "informally" notified Congress of its intention to sell an advanced missile package to Saudi Arabia. The proposed "package" consists of approximately 1650 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, about 800 Stinger land-to-air missiles and 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles collectively valued at approximately \$350 million. We understand that this package represents about 25%-33% of the original Saudi request for additional F-15 aircraft and enhancements (bomb racks and fuel pods), M-1 tanks, and advanced missiles.

Many in Congress, which has begun to move closer to the principal that U.S. arms should not be sold to Arab states still in a state of war with Israel, are not convinced that the Saudis have been a force for peace in the region. As you know, Senators Cranston and Packwood, along with D'Amato and Dixon, have been leading the effort over the past two years against massive arms sales to the Saudis and were joined by 57 others last fall in a letter asking the Administration to withhold its projected package. Their efforts were successful in discouraging the sale of additional F-15 jet aircraft.

The Administration's principal justification for the sale at this time is the unexpected Iranian advance into Iraqi territory bordering Kuwait and, by implication, thereby threatening Saudi Arabia.

Opponents in Congress have pointed out repeatedly in the past that no infusion of U.S. armaments is likely to make the Saudis capable of deterring or successfully fighting a determined adversary. They contend that a real threat to the Saudis will clearly have to be met by other means, probably requiring action by U.S. forces in the region, a contingency which the Saudis refuse to acknowledge by giving the U.S. basing and armaments pre-positioning rights.

An additional concern of Congress is that the Administration's proposal may be the first of a series of U. S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia to be submitted to Congress. Members of Congress are, therefore, exploring whether the Administration will commit itself not to come in this year with other pieces of the larger package of Saudi requests. Further, some in Congress are also concerned about the inclusion of the Stinger shoulder-held land-to-air missiles, often described as the "perfect" terrorist weapon.

While the armaments in question must be factored into Israeli defense planning, with the attendant demands on Israel's strained economy and reduced defense budget, we are advised that the missiles themselves would not significantly alter the balance of power. (As you know, Israel has already returned \$51 million in economic aid for 1986, under the provi-

(over)

sions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sequestration act, and will lose approximately \$77 million from its military (FMS) grants this year alone.) The Israeli Cabinet issued a communique on March 9, stating that "Israel objects to U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia," according to today's New York Times, which is enclosed. But, the Times also reported that Israel does not plan to launch a major campaign against the sale; it was not seen as a "decisive battle."

All this takes place within the context of unprecedentedly warm relations between Israel and the United States which have become stronger this past year. Hence, neither the Administration nor Israel wants a major confrontation over this issue.

These issues and concerns are likely to be the subject of intense negotiation and discussion between Members of Congress and the Administration during the twenty-day "informal" notification period starting today, March 11, which precedes the formal thirty-day period when the Administration submits the final details of the package it intends to sell. Defeat of the sale requires resolutions of disapproval in both the House and Senate, which can be vetoed by the President.

As a general proposition NJCRAC opposes arms sales to Arab states which have not made peace with Israel. The just-concluded NJCRAC Plenary Session stated "that Jewish community relations agencies should advocate that any sale of sophisticated American arms to an Arab state must await both its renunciation of the state of war, and establishment of full normalized relations with Israel."

However, the application of this broad policy to this particular proposal depends on a number of considerations. Those considerations have been a matter of continuing discussion among several NJCRAC national member agencies, a representative group of CRC Directors and AIPAC. For a better understanding of the ramifications of this issue and the role of communities, we will keep you fully apprised about developments in regard to this proposal and the judgments about the role we should play. We urge you to call our staff, particularly Charney Bromberg, Kenneth Bandler, Irwin Schulman or Jerry Levinrad, on receipt of this memo.

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EX/O/CHAIR/ITF.NJ/CJF.EX,

Enc.

U.S. PLANS TO SELL ADVANCED MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA

President to Notify Congress
Today of \$350 Million Deal
— Israeli Reaction Mild

By **BERNARD GWERTZMAN**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 10 — The Reagan Administration will notify Congress on Tuesday that it intends to sell Saudi Arabia \$350 million worth of advanced missiles, White House officials said today.

There are indications the proposal will face strong opposition on Capitol Hill.

In Jerusalem, senior Israeli officials said that although the Government opposed the plan, it did not intend to mount a major campaign against the sale. The officials indicated that the reason was a desire to avoid a political fight with what is perceived to be a friendly Reagan Administration over a weapons package that is not viewed as threatening to Israel's security.

Opposition Expected

White House and State Department officials said they expected a difficult battle to prevent Congress from blocking the transfer of the missiles. The main argument being used by opponents is that Saudi Arabia has failed to support the United States in its Middle East peace initiatives and in fighting terrorism and should no longer be provided with whatever weapons it wants.

An official of the main pro-Israel lobby, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, said the organization would oppose the sale even though Israel is not actively trying to stop it. He said his vote count showed that in this Congressional election year, two-thirds of both the House and the Senate would vote against the sale.

50 Days to Consider Sale

Under law, Congress will have 50 working days to consider the arms sale. It will go ahead unless blocked by majority votes in both the House and the Senate. The President then has the right to veto the resolution of disapproval. But the Congress, by a two-third votes in both the House and the Senate, could override the President.

President Reagan sent a personal message to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia last week assuring him that he would use his influence to see the sale through. Mr. Reagan, however, is

deeply involved in trying to persuade Congress to approve \$100 million in aid for Nicaraguan rebels. The Saudi deal will stretch the lobbying abilities of the White House and the State Department, Administration officials said.

Having yielded to Congressional opposition in January and postponed indefinitely a \$1.9 billion arms sale to Jordan, State Department officials said the Administration's "Arab policy" was at stake if it could not continue providing Arab friends with arms.

Several Congressional and Administration sources said today that a new consideration in the debate was the reduced concern in Washington over oil, given the oversupply and lowered prices on the world market. One Administration official said that "it is easier for some Congressmen who don't like the Saudis to vote against the sale because they don't have to worry about lines in front of gas stations."

"We have to argue that the Saudis are our friends and failure to support them will send the wrong signals everywhere in the world," the official said. "And the Saudis have a legitimate concern about the Iranians."

A Major Weapons Market

Another argument is that even though Saudi oil is not as crucial as in the past, Saudi Arabia remains a major market for the United States, and the \$350 million would be a substantial sale for American weapons manufacturers.

Since 1971, the United States has sold the Saudis \$4 billion in arms and military services, which makes Saudi Arabia one of the world's largest importers of military goods. Recently, the Saudis, unhappy over the failure of the Administration to provide them with additional jet fighters, put in a large order for British Tornados, and they have threatened to diversify their arms purchases even more.

The sale involves 800 shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft weapons, 1,700 air-to-air Sidewinder missiles of two different types and 100 Harpoon antiship missiles.

The Saudis have a large inventory of all these weapons, but King Fahd, worried about Iran's recent military successes against Iraq, has sought a reaffirmation of American military support.

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Israeli Reaction Is Mild

By **THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN**

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, March 10 — Israel does not plan to mount a major campaign to fight a new sale of American weapons to Saudi Arabia, senior Israeli officials said today.

The Israeli officials said that they did not welcome the deal, which will soon be proposed to Congress by the Reagan Administration, and that they planned to continue verbally objecting to it in public.

On Sunday, the Cabinet noted in a communiqué that "Israel objects to U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia."

The statement said Israel's position was "consistent with its opposition to arms sales to every country in a state of war with Israel."

The officials indicated that underlying the Israeli reluctance to fight the Saudi deal was a desire to avoid a messy political fight with what is perceived to be a friendly Administration over a weapons package that is not viewed as threatening to Israel's security.

"We will present our opposition, make clear that we are against the deal, but we will not be organizing our forces for a major fight," an official said. "This is not a decisive battle. We have to save our forces for the big ones."

The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, the lobby organization, appears to be taking a "medium" degree of opposition to the sale and is now involved in negotiations with the Reagan Administration over some kind of compromise arrangement, in which certain weapons in the Saudi package might be removed in exchange for the lobby group's support, political sources said.

Israeli officials note that Israel just won a major battle with the Administration over its proposed \$1.9 billion arms sale package to Jordan, which involved F-16 fighter-bombers, antitank missiles and mobile Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries. The Administration withdrew the package even before it came to a vote because of the overwhelming sentiment against it in Congress.

"We won the battle over the Jordan deal, and that was serious," an Israeli official said. "The attitude now is, 'Let's not get carried away, especially over an issue that won't change our basic security.'"

The Reagan administration is also seen as having been friendly to Israel, and there is a desire to do the Administration a good turn.

MAR 06 1986

NATIONAL JEWISH



COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL

443 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016 • 684-6950

March 4, 1986

Memo

TO: NJCRAC Community Member Agencies

FROM: Charney V. Bromberg, Associate Director

RE: Reported Administration Plan to Sell Partial Package of Arms to Saudis

The following message was sent out today to communities over the NJCRAC-CJF Telecommunications network:

It has been widely though not prominently reported that the Administration intends to proceed with the sale of a partial package of arms requested by Saudi Arabia. Early reports that the notification procedure—a 20 day informal notification period followed by the 30 day "formal notification period"—would commence this week were, apparently premature. Our latest information is that informal notification will be sent to the Hill a week from today, March 11.

At issue is a proposed sale of missiles—Sidewinder, Stingers and Harpoons—which constitute only a fraction of the Saudi's original request for F-15 and F-16 aircraft (since withdrawn in favor of the British Tornado), tanks and other advanced weapons systems.

At the Plenum, just past, NJCRAC reaffirmed its policy in opposition to the sale of sophisticated U.S. arms to Arab countries stating that "any sale of sophisticated American arms to an Arab state must await both its renunciation of the state of war, and establishment of full normalized relations, with Israel"—conditions Saudi Arabia clearly does not meet.

It is, as yet, not clear how Congressional opponents of the sale will proceed in view of the Administration's recent indefinite postponement of the Jordanian arms sale and its scaling down of the current request. We will, therefore, be consulting the NJCRAC Israel Task Force and AIPAC over the next week on strategy.

In the meantime, please feel free to consult me or Ken Bandler by phone.

CVB/gl

O,EX,ITF.NJ

(over)

Reagan Approves Arms for Saudis But Faces Hard Fight in Congress

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 — President Reagan has decided to sell more than \$300 million worth of missiles to Saudi Arabia despite the strong possibility that the sale will be blocked by Israeli supporters in Congress, a senior White House official said today.

The official said the Saudis were concerned about recent successes by Iran in its war with Iraq because Iranian troops had moved close to Kuwait and the Persian Gulf oilfields.

"We're going to ask the Congress for it," the official said of the sale, "on the grounds that the Saudis think they need it. They feel threatened right now with Iran seemingly pushing Iraq back and seizing Iraq territory. They are getting very close to Kuwait, and you know from Kuwait to the oilfields doesn't take that much time."

The official said the arms package included advanced models of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile and the shoulder-held Stinger anti-aircraft missile. Harpoon anti-ship missiles may also be included. The exact number of missiles was still being worked on, State Department officials said, but are said to include as many as 1,700 Sidewinders, 800 Stingers, and 100 Harpoon missiles.

May Go to Congress Next Week

The package will probably be submitted to Congress next week, department officials said. Congress will have 30 days to reject the sale by majority votes in both houses. If that happened and President Reagan then vetoed the rejection, it would take a two-thirds vote to overturn his veto.

The senior White House official said the Administration was aware that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the leading pro-Israeli lobby in Congress, had already begun a campaign against the deal, and that a majority of the Senate was on record as opposing it.

Last month overwhelming opposition from Congress caused the Administration to reluctantly suspend a pending \$1.9 billion military sale to Jordan. Senior State and Defense Department officials have expressed concern that if the Administration cannot follow through on the sale to Saudi Arabia, it would severely damage American credibility with its traditional friends in the Arab world.

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The Administration originally planned a year ago to sell Saudi Arabia a much larger arms package, including F-15 jet fighters, M-1 tanks and bomb racks and auxiliary fuel tanks for the F-15's. But because of opposition expressed informally by more than two-thirds of the Senate, the offer was never made. There have since been extensive discussions with the Saudis, and the sale has been reduced to just the missile package, which the Administration will argue is consistent with past arms sales.

Iranian Success a Surprise

The Iranians' breakthrough near Basra, Iraq, came as a surprise to American intelligence analysts, who believed that Iraq was virtually impregnable.

The Saudis have said almost nothing publicly about the sale. Last year Saudi Arabia announced it would buy British Tornado fighters because it could not get more American F-15's to add to the 60 it already had.

Alan Cranston, a California Democrat, is leading the Senate opposition to the Saudi sale. He said that even though the Administration described the Saudis as American allies, they had been "actively and aggressively opposing United States interests and policies in the Middle East."

In an interview, he said the Saudis paid "hush money" to both the Palestine Liberation Organization and to Syria, which undercut United States antiterrorist policy. He said the Saudis failed to support King Hussein of Jordan in his recent peace efforts, and that they continued to snub Egypt. And, he said, the Saudis have taken the lead in trying to impose sanctions on American companies doing business with Israel.

Mr. Cranston, in addition to promising to lead the fight against the missile sale, has also raised the possibility of trying to block the transfer to Saudi Arabia later this summer of Awacs electronic command and surveillance planes.

The planes were sold to Saudi Arabia in 1981, after a bitter contest in Congress, but Mr. Reagan promised that before he sent them to the Saudis in 1986, he would certify that the transfer would contribute to stability in the region and help the atmosphere and prospects for progress toward peace.

Mr. Reagan said he has secured the promise of Senator Richard G. Lugar, the Indiana Republican who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, for a hearing on Saudi Arabia next month or in early April.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date March 14, 1986
to Steering Committee, International Relations Commission
from George E. Gruen, Director, Israel & Middle East Affairs
subject Proposed U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia

The American Jewish Committee shares the concern of the United States Government to maintain the free flow of oil from the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf, to support the security and stability of the pro-Western Gulf states, to oppose radical forces in the area and the expansion of Soviet influence into the region. We have serious questions, however, about the wisdom and efficacy of certain planned Administration actions intended to achieve these strategic goals.

The Reagan Administration notified Congress on March 11 that it proposes to sell Saudi Arabia \$354 million worth of additional sophisticated air-to-air, air-to-sea, and ground-to-air missiles in the belief that such action would advance these interests and that the sale was made urgent by the recent successes of the Iranian forces against Iraq and the potential threat this poses to neighboring Kuwait and eventually to Saudi Arabia. The Administration contends that failure to meet the Saudi requests at this time would harm bilateral Saudi-American relations and hurt the credibility of the United States with the rest of the Gulf Arabs. The Administration further contends that these arms are needed for Saudi defense, can be absorbed within the Saudi military, and

"do not represent a threat to Israel," since "this sale will not threaten Israel's qualitative military edge nor change the balance of power in the Middle East."

The American Jewish Committee believes that this sale should not be seen in isolation, but within the context of Saudi Arabia's overall program of acquisition of large quantities of the most advanced aircraft and missiles. We believe that before deciding whether or not to approve the present Saudi arms request, the Congress should carefully examine whether all these additional missiles are in fact needed in view of the large stockpile already present in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the current Saudi ratio of missiles per plane exceeds that of the U.S. and Israeli air forces. In any case, their delivery should be made contingent on the depletion of existing supplies as they are expended in training and through attrition.

Moreover, in view of the limited number of serviceable planes available to the Iranian air force, there is considerable doubt as to how much of a realistic challenge they pose to Saudi Arabia, which already has numerous planes and missiles, as well as the effective advance warning and electronic support provided by the four U.S. Air Force AWACS currently stationed in the country. The recent Iranian successes against Iraq have been achieved through massive infantry attacks and not through airpower. The missiles are also no barrier to the propaganda and subversion campaigns being mounted by Iran against its conservative neighbors.

Finally, Congress should weigh the Administration's request in the context of the Congressionally mandated requirement that the Saudis must provide "substantial assistance" to the United States in promoting peace

in the region. We note with deep concern that Saudi Arabia continues to furnish financial assistance to Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization to enable them to carry on what it calls the "armed struggle" against "the Zionist enemy." Moreover, the Saudis have in recent months proclaimed their "categorical solidarity" with Libya -- including a pledge to replace losses resulting from American economic sanctions. At the United Nations last December and at the Islamic Conference Organization meeting this past January the Saudis sponsored resolutions calling on all states to sever their ties with Israel and laying the groundwork for expelling the Jewish state from the United Nations.

In view of this record, it is crucial that the United States insist on verifiable safeguards to insure that any arms it furnishes -- and particularly such ideal terrorist weapons as the Stinger handheld anti-aircraft missiles -- be available exclusively for defense of Saudi territory. They must not be allowed to be diverted to use against Israeli or American aircraft by radical forces such as the PLO, the Syrians or the Libyans.

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AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
500 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W. • SUITE 300 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 • (202) 638-2256

ACTION ALERT MEMORANDUM

TO: Key Contacts, Community Leaders, and Rabbis

FROM: Thomas A. Dine, Executive Director
Ester Kurz, Deputy Legislative Director
Amy Cooper, Senior Political Mobilization Coordinator
Rachel Mann, Political Mobilization Coordinator

DATE: June 3, 1987

RE: Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia

On Friday, May 29, at 5:57 p.m., the Administration formally notified Congress (thus we now have less than 30 days) of its plans to sell 1600 Maverick-D air-to-ground missiles, valued at \$360 million, to Saudi Arabia. These missiles are a more sophisticated version of the 2400 Maverick-A missiles already in use by the Saudi Air Force for its 100 F-5 fighters. The improved weapons employ an infrared guidance system which makes night and all-weather attacks possible and doubles the range of target recognition.

Opposition to this sale is expected to be intense. Saudi Arabia has consistently failed to support or enhance U.S. policies in the Middle East. The Saudis support the PLO monetarily; they have opposed all peace initiatives in the region; they refuse to recognize Israel; and they participated in a campaign against Oman's agreement to cooperate militarily with the U.S. Recent events in the Persian Gulf further raise the question of the reliability of our Saudi "ally."

A Resolution of Disapproval to stop the sale is now circulating in both the Senate and the House. AIPAC is opposed to this sale and is actively lobbying to defeat it.

WE NEED YOUR HELP! VOTES IN BOTH HOUSES MUST TAKE PLACE BY JUNE 29. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS CRUCIAL.

- * PLEASE CALL YOUR SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVE AND URGE THEM TO CO-SPONSOR THE RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL AGAINST THE SAUDI ARMS SALE (H.J.R. 302; S.J.R. 153).
- * HELP AIPAC BY GENERATING SIMILAR CALLS WITHIN YOUR OWN COMMUNITY.
- * IF YOUR SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVE HAVE ALREADY SIGNED ON AS A CO-SPONSOR, PLEASE WRITE TO THANK THEM.
- * CONTACT AMY COOPER OR RACHEL MANN (202/638-2256) WITH ANY RESPONSE SO APPROPRIATE ACTION MAY BE TAKEN.

Enclosed are important talking points about this sale and a list of original sponsors. Your timely and informed contact with your Senators and Representative is very important and appreciated. Thank you.



AIPAC MEMORANDUM

500 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W. • SUITE 300 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 • (202) 638-2256

"NO" TO MAVERICKS TO SAUDI ARABIA

At 5:57 p.m. on May 29, 1987, the Administration formally notified the Congress of its intent to sell 1,600 Maverick-D air-to-ground missiles to Saudi Arabia valued at \$360 million. The Maverick-D is an infrared air-to-ground guided missile that the United States has not sold to any other nation.

Such a sale to Saudi Arabia is not in the United States' best interest. It lacks any clear rationale -- whether in terms of Gulf defense, furtherance of the Mideast peace process, regional stability or the protection of US interests.

Saudi Arabia, despite receiving \$29 billion in US military sales since 1981 alone, is apparently unwilling to defend itself or its Gulf neighbors in event of threat. Its refusal to give US aircraft the access to Saudi bases necessary to defend Gulf shipping is inexcusable. That comes on top of Saudi support for the terrorists running Syria and the PLO, its unflagging opposition to our ally Israel, and its flagrant use of the oil weapon to the detriment of US and Western economies.

For nearly two decades successive Administrations have told the Congress that just one more arms sale to Saudi Arabia is vital to cementing our friendship, that the Saudis view each sale as a litmus test of that friendship. It is time for the United States to ask the Saudis for something in return. It is time for the United States to ask for some concrete demonstrations of friendship from the Saudis. Until the Saudis become more helpful in the search for peace in the Middle East, in the war against terrorism, in protecting Western interests, and in securing economic stability, the Congress should "just say no" to such arms sales.

This latest sale should not proceed for many reasons.

No Military Justification

1. The Saudis already have purchased 2,582 Maverick-A missiles for use on approximately 100 F-5 aircraft, for a ratio of nearly 26 missiles per aircraft. The addition of 1,600 "D" model Mavericks would give them nearly 4,200 Mavericks or about 42 per plane.
2. Compared to Saudi Arabia's projected 4,200 Mavericks, Israel has only 900,

Egypt 700, Sweden and Taiwan 500 each, Greece 268 and Korea 200. Moreover, only Saudi Arabia will have the advanced "D" model.

3. The Maverick-D has not been sold to any other country, including Israel.
4. The "A" model is TV-guided for daylight use. The "D" model can pick out its target from twice as far as the TV-version (it can lock on a target six nautical miles distant) and, because it is infrared guided, it can be used at night and in all weather conditions. Once the pilot locks on to the target, he can "fire and forget" because the missiles will home in on the target with a high degree of accuracy.
5. The F-5s in the Saudi air force are specially equipped for aerial refueling to extend their range, thus enabling them to hit targets in Israel.
6. The Maverick is primarily for use against armored vehicles, particularly tanks. In the present context of a threat to Gulf shipping, the Maverick is irrelevant. As for protecting shipping, last year, the Administration sold to the Saudis -- again over broad Congressional opposition -- more than 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles thereby doubling its inventory of that weapon.
7. Claims that the Mavericks would enhance Saudi defenses against Iran are without substance. Iran's armored forces are negligible. Moreover, for Iran to send tanks to Saudi Arabia they would have to go through marshes and swamps, across busy rivers and waterways, through Iraq and Kuwait before getting to the Saudi border. In other words, there is no realistic Iranian tank threat to Saudi Arabia. Iran's limited armor assets are almost totally dedicated to the Iraqi front, the remainder are deployed towards the Soviets and in the east.
8. The only tank force within range of Saudi jets which Saudi military planners consider hostile is in Israel. The excessive number of these anti-tank missiles in the Saudi inventory would force Israel to take the Saudi threat more seriously.

A Flawed Policy

1. The purpose of this sale is unclear. The State Department spokesman told reporters on June 1 that the rationale is, "Because the Saudis asked." Prince Sultan, the Saudi Defense Minister, according to a February 16, 1987, The Washington Post report, "has focused [the kingdom's] new military buildup on Israel" because, in the words of a western military analyst based in Saudi Arabia, "The Saudis are mesmerized by the Israeli threat and they plan their forces against it."
2. Different voices in the administration have different reasons for proposing the sale. While the State Department spokesman says it is "because the Saudis asked," Defense Department briefers are quietly telling people in the Senate

that the Saudis need these missiles to combat an Iraqi tank threat. This is particularly puzzling in light of the Administration's current tilt toward Iraq and Saudi Arabia's role as Iraq's chief ally and financial backer in its war with Iran. Are the Iraqis and Saudis allies or enemies? What does each one say? The Saudis could do much to prevent that Iraqi threat by refusing to fund the Iraqi war machine so generously.

3. This is the latest slice of the Administration's \$2.3-billion Saudi arms package for 1987. Submitting it slice by slice only demonstrates the lack of coherence in Administration arms transfer policy. To date this year the Administration has submitted piecemeal sales of armored personnel carriers, transport and attack helicopters, electronic countermeasure upgrades for fighter aircraft, ammunition and depleted uranium tank rounds. A new Saudi arms sale has been submitted to Congress every few weeks. And more are expected in coming weeks, including at least a dozen F-15 fighters. It is time to halt this piecemeal approach and for the administration to submit its full program publicly and justify it rather than hide behind a classified wishlist from Riyadh.

ARCHIVES

An Unreliable Ally

1. Since 1981 the United States has made over \$29 billion worth of military sales to Saudi Arabia, including our most sophisticated weapons, as well as the infrastructure to operate them. One major justification was that the Saudis wanted the United States "15 minutes away over the horizon" and needed all this materiel so they could defend the Gulf region against threats without an American presence. However, when the first threat to the Gulf region arises, the Saudis are apparently not only unable and unwilling to defend themselves, but they also expect us to do the job. They are even unwilling to provide us the minimal help we need to do that job.

2. It is time to ask what the Saudis have done and are willing to do for the United States. The Saudis consistently have failed to support US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace initiatives and continue to finance Syrian arms purchases from the Soviet Union and the terrorist PLO.

3. Saudi Arabia has proven to be an unreliable ally. Despite an apparent direct US request, the Saudis failed to intercept the Iraqi fighter that recently attacked the USS Stark. Now, as the US Navy prepares to escort oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and US-manned AWACS patrol the skies over Saudi Arabia, the Saudis refuse to allow American aircraft to operate from Saudi Air Force bases -- many of which were built or significantly upgraded by the United States. The Washington Post reported that the JCS would prefer to use a Saudi airbase, but Pentagon officials doubt that the Saudis will grant permission. The State Department and the Defense Department have

downplayed the need for access to Saudi airbases in order to avoid embarrassing the Saudis.

4. Some media reports contend the Saudis did not intercept the Iraqi fighter which attacked the USS Stark because their F-15's did not have the fuel capacity necessary. However, Saudi F-15's do have extended range capability. Over vigorous Congressional objections in 1981, the Administration sold the Saudis long-range fuel tanks for its F-15 fighters.

5. This sale raises the stakes in the region. It contributes nothing to the peace process other than to point out the failure of the Saudis to be helpful or to act as good allies.

Flaunting Congress

1. Many Members of Congress object on procedural grounds. The administration refused to send the usual 20-day informal pre-notification to the Congress on the grounds that it had notified the Congress of a similar sale three and a half years ago. However, the contents of that sale were significantly different: the January 1984 sale was for \$119 million worth of -B model Mavericks (similar to the "A's" already in stock), whereas the 1987 sale is for \$360 million worth of "D's." In both instances the quantity is the same. Thus, with the new sale costing three times as much as the prior one, there must be significant differences between the two missiles, as indeed there is [see above]. In addition, that was the 98th Congress and this is the 100th; and there are many new Members of Congress since 1984. Moreover, to deliver the notification to the Congress at 5:57 pm on a Friday denies the Congress of one tenth of the time it has to consider such arms transfers; "fair play" would have been to submit on Monday and at the beginning of a day rather than try to limit the Congressional ability to study the sale.

2. Despite Administration claims to the contrary, the Congress never "approved" the 1984 sale.

3. This sale, and the lack of adequate Congressional consultation and notification, proves once again the need for a coherent arms transfer policy. It underscores the need for legislation such as the Arms Export Control Reform Act. With such legislation on the books, no Administration could pull a Friday-night sneak notice and refuse to honor the 20-day pre-notification.

6/3/87

RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL -- SAUDI MAVERICKS
 HOUSE COSPONSORS -- JUNE 4, 1987 -- 10 A.M.

H.J.R. 302

NAME	P	ST	MAVERICK	NAME	P	ST	MAV
Annunzio, Frank	D	IL	X	Kennedy, Joseph	D	MA	X
Atkins, Chester	D	MA	X	Konnyu, Ernest	R	CA	X
AuCoin, Les	D	OR	X	Lantos, Tom	D	CA	X
Ballenger, Cass	R	NC	X	Lehman, William	D	FL	X
Bates, Jim	D	CA	X	Leland, Mickey	D	TX	X
Beilenson, Anthony	D	CA	X	Lent, Norman	R	NY	X
Biaggi, Mario	D	NY	X	Levin, Sander	D	MI	X
Bilbray, James	D	NV	X	Levine, Mel	D	CA	X
Bilirakis, Michael	R	FL	X	Lewis, Tom	R	FL	X
Boehlert, Sherwood	R	NY	X	Mack, Connie	R	FL	X
Bonker, Don	D	WA	X	Matsui, Robert	D	CA	X
Borski, Robert	D	PA	X	Mavroules, Nicholas	D	MA	X
Boxer, Barbara	D	CA	X	McEwen, Bob	R	OH	X
Brown, Hank	R	CO	X	McGrath, Raymond	R	NY	X
Bryant, John	D	TX	X	McHugh, Matthew	D	NY	X
Buechner, Jack	R	MO	X	Mica, Dan	D	FL	X
Bunning, Jim	R	KY	X	Miller, George	D	CA	X
Cardin, Benjamin	D	MD	X	Miller, John	R	WA	X
Carr, Bob	D	MI	X	Moody, Jim	D	WI	X
Coble, Howard	R	NC	X	Obey, David	D	WI	X
Coelho, Tony	D	CA	X	Owens, Wayne	D	UT	X
Coleman, Ronald D.	D	TX	X	Panetta, Leon	D	CA	X
Courter, Jim	R	NJ	X	Pepper, Claude	D	FL	X
Daub, Hal	R	NE	X	Richardson, Bill	D	NM	X
Davis, Jack	R	IL	X	Rinaldo, Matthew	R	NJ	X
Dellums, Ron	D	CA	X	Robinson, Tommy	D	AR	X
DioGuardi, Joseph	R	NY	X	Rodino, Peter	D	NJ	X
Dornan, Robert	R	CA	X	Rose, Charlie	D	NC	X
Downey, Thomas	D	NY	X	Scheuer, James	D	NY	X
Durbin, Dick	D	IL	X	Schuette, Bill	R	MI	X
Eckart, Dennis	D	OH	X	Schumer, Charles	D	NY	X
Erdreich, Ben	D	AL	X	Shaw, E. Clay	R	FL	X
Fazio, Vic	D	CA	X	Sikorski, Gerry	D	MN	X
Feighan, Ed	D	OH	X	Smith, Christopher	R	NJ	X
Florio, James	D	NJ	X	Smith, Larry	D	FL	X
Foglietta, Thomas	D	PA	X	Snowe, Olympia	R	ME	X
Foley, Thomas	D	WA	X	Solarz, Stephen	D	NY	X
Frank, Barney	D	MA	X	Stokes, Louis	D	OH	X
Frost, Martin	D	TX	X	Synar, Mike	D	OK	X
Garcia, Robert	D	NY	X	Tallon, Robin	D	SC	X
Gejdenson, Samuel	D	CT	X	Torricelli, Robert	D	NJ	X
Gilman, Ben	R	NY	X	Traficant, James	D	OH	X
Glickman, Dan	D	KS	X	Watkins, Wes	D	OK	X
Gordon, Bart	D	TN	X	Waxman, Henry	D	CA	X
Grandy, Fred	R	IA	X	Weber, Vin	R	MN	X
Green, Bill	R	NY	X	Weiss, Ted	D	NY	X
Guarini, Frank	D	NJ	X	Wyden, Ron	D	OR	X
Hall, Tony	D	OH	X				
Harris, Claude	D	AL	X				
Hertel, Dennis	D	MI	X				
Hochbrueckner, George	D	NY	X				
Hoyer, Steny	D	MD	X				

Summary: @COUNT Field: NAME

		MAVERICKS	ALL
		X	ALL
P	D	71	71
	R	28	28
	ALL	99	99

RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL -- SAUDI MAVERICKS
 SENATE COSPONSORS -- JUNE 4, 1987 -- 10 A.M.

S.J.R. 153

NAME	P	ST	MAVERICK	NAME	P	ST	MAV
Adams, Bro	D	WA		Kasten, Ro	R	WI	X
Armstrong,	R	CO		Kennedy, E	D	MA	X
Baucus, Ma	D	MT		Kerry, Joh	D	MA	X
Bentsen, L	D	TX		Lautenberg	D	NJ	X
Biden, Jos	D	DE	X	Leahy, Pat	D	VT	X
Bingaman,	D	NM	X	Levin, Car	D	MI	X
Bond, Chri	R	MO	X	Lugar, Ric	R	IN	
Boren, Dav	D	OK		Matsunaga,	D	HI	X
Boschwitz,	R	MN	X	McCain, Jo	R	AZ	
Bradley, B	D	NJ	X	McClure, J	R	ID	
Breaux, Jo	D	LA		McConnell,	R	KY	X
Bumpers, D	D	AR		Melcher, J	D	MT	X
Burdick, Q	D	ND	X	Metzenbaum	D	OH	X
Byrd, Robe	D	WV		Mikulski,	D	MD	X
Chafee, Jo	R	RI		Mitchell,	D	ME	X
Chiles, La	D	FL	X	Moynihan,	D	NY	X
Cochran, T	R	MS		Murkowski,	R	AK	
Cohen, Wil	R	ME		Nickles, D	R	OK	
Conrad, Ke	D	ND		Nunn, Sam	D	GA	
Cranston,	D	CA	X	Packwood,	R	OR	X
D'Amato, A	R	NY	X	Pell, Clai	D	RI	X
Danforth,	R	MO	X	Pressler,	R	SD	X
Daschle, T	D	SD	X	Proxmire,	D	WI	X
DeConcini,	D	AZ	X	Pryor, Dav	D	AR	
Dixon, Ala	D	IL	X	Quayle, Da	R	IN	
Dodd, Chri	D	CT		Reid, Harr	D	NV	X
Dole, Robe	R	KS		Riegle, Do	D	MI	X
Domenici,	R	NM		Rockefelle	D	WV	
Durenberge	R	MN	X	Roth, Will	R	DE	
Evans, Dan	R	WA		Rudman, Wa	R	NH	
Exon, J.Ja	D	NE		Sanford, T	D	NC	X
Ford, Wend	D	KY	X	Sarbanes,	D	MD	X
Fowler, Wy	D	GA	X	Sasser, Ja	D	TN	X
Garn, Jake	R	UT		Shelby, Ri	D	AL	X
Glenn, Joh	D	OH		Simon, Pau	D	IL	X
Gore, Albe	D	TN	X	Simpson, A	R	WY	
Graham, Bo	D	FL	X	Specter, A	R	PA	X
Gramm, Phi	R	TX		Stafford,	R	VT	
Grassley,	R	IA	X	Stennis, J	D	MS	
Harkin, To	D	IA	X	Stevens, T	R	AK	
Hatch, Orr	R	UT		Symms, Ste	R	ID	
Hatfield,	R	OR		Thurmond,	R	SC	
Hecht, Chi	R	NV	X	Trible, Pa	R	VA	X
Heflin, Ho	D	AL		Wallop, Ma	R	WY	
Heinz, Joh	R	PA	X	Warner, Jo	R	VA	
Helms, Jes	R	NC		Weicker, L	R	CT	X
Hollings,	D	SC		Wilson, Pe	R	CA	X
Humphrey,	R	NH		Wirth, Tim	D	CO	X
Inouye, Da	D	HI					
Johnston,	D	LA	X				
Karnes, Da	R	NE	X				
Kassebaum,	R	KS					

Summary: @COUNT Field: NAME

		MAVERICKS	
		X	ALL
		-----	-----
P	D	36	54
	R	17	46
	ALL	53	100