



THE JACOB RADER MARCUS CENTER OF THE
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Preserving American Jewish History

MS-603: Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum Collection, 1945-1992.

Series D. International Relations Activities. 1961-1992.

Box 62, Folder 6, Israel, 1974, 1979-1981.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JERUSALEM

No. 673

Dr. Marc H. Tanenbaum
National Director
Interreligious Affairs
The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56 th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022



MHT

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

Jerusalem, July 31, 1974.

Dear Marc:

On the 24th. inst. I merely acknowledged the receipt of your letter, and enclosed material, of July 3rd. Meanwhile I had a chance to study the draft document, as well as the other material. You ask me for my reactions. Here they are,- in cablelese:

The draft conjures up a picture of formidable range, and implications. It certainly touches upon the major issues, and focal problems as they now appear to be in the offing.

The theme of world famine, poverty etc. is, of course, also of great concern to Israel. - A related subject is the new emerging relationship between some of the African countries and the Arab World. (In this connection I enclose an article from the Zambia Daily Mail, June 26, 1974, which is very useful)

Re: The M E (p.4) there will be, of course, the major concern of Israel's security and survival. In a position-paper like this, this would probably have to take precedence over the other 4 points. The need for much more clarification as to our approach to those basic up-and-coming issues is much felt here, too. To wit the recent Knesset debate on the Palestinians.

All in all, an outstanding outline,- but as far as implementation is concerned,- a rather tall order!

With cordial regards and Birkat Yishar Koakh

Michael Pragai
Michael Pragai
Director, Church Relations Division

SUBJECT: AFRICAN-ARAB RELATIONS

Zambia Daily Mail, June 26, 1974

During the past few months, African countries which are also members of the OAU have shown increasing concern over the crisis of confidence many African countries are now showing towards their Arab brothers. The whole thing started when front-line Arab countries called upon African countries to help them in their diplomatic war with Israel. Since Egypt, which is a member of the OAU, was involved, African countries naturally obliged and severed their diplomatic relations with Israel, despite the fact that Israel was involved in major projects in many African countries, and the Arab countries were not.

The African countries did not spare their support for the Arabs at international forums such as the UN and its various agencies. While the African countries were showing solidarity with the Arabs, the Arabs, on the other hand increased their price of petrol. And when the African countries appealed to be regarded as a special case since the new prices were going to cause damaging effect on their economies, the Arabs refused to listen to them despite the African support they had received.

This was obviously not the way of behaving to an ally against the Israelis and a friend. But the Arabs decided not to heed the complaints of the Africans. The relations between the Arabs and the Africans were further soured by the African realisation that while Arab countries were calling on African countries for support against Israel, the rich Arab countries contributed nothing towards the OAU fund for the liberation of southern Africa.

African countries are gradually losing faith in their Arab brothers because the latter just do not care a damn for the liberation of southern Africa. The only time Arabs have shown any interest in the liberation

of Africa was during the days of Nasser of Egypt and Ben Bella of Algeria. Despite the fact that most Arab countries are fabulously wealthy because of their oil, they are the only ones who refuse to contribute towards the liberation fund. Only last week, the Arabs had acted as a single block against the African candidate for the post of the Secretary-General of the OAU. We believe that there is some truth in rumours still circulating that they had spent a lot of money to ensure the election of an Arab Secretary-General. And they were doing this despite the fact that the current chairman is an Arab, as is the Chairman of the Ministerial Council of the OAU.

The outcome of all this has been the hardening of feelings by Africans. And the first country to express concern was Tanzania where a Member of Parliament is reported to have suggested that East African countries should seriously consider charging Arabs money for their water from the Nile River. And last week Kenya's Attorney General openly attacked Arabs in a speech in Parliament. He told a questioner that any idea of a United States of Africa should be abandoned because of the Arab attitude towards black Africa.

And we see it, the present attitude by black Africa is bound to go on for quite some time. There is no doubt that many more African voices will join the chorus of those who are openly criticising the Arab attitude towards black Africa. We believe that it is very important that the OAU should not only be united but also that it should be seen to be united by the world. And it can only be effective if members of the OAU do take the trouble to respect other members. It does not appear at the moment that Arab members of the OAU are doing their best to ensure the emergence of a united Africa.

We feel that if Arab members of the OAU are to take any worthwhile contribution towards the OAU, they should adopt an attitude which will help bring all Africa together. They should identify themselves not

only with problems facing Arabs, but also those facing black Africa. It is shocking that an Arab country which promised Zambia trucks to help in the re-routing exercise has still not been able to send these trucks (Libya).

It is shocking that no Arab country contributed towards Zambia's re-routing exercise when Zambia closed the border with the racists in the south to ensure that the OAU aims of dignity for all African people are effected.

We want to see a very strong and united Africa through the OAU. We appeal to the Arabs to help black Africa realise this dream.





ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

Press Summary, November 16th, 1979

More on the Bassam Shak'a Affair

Polles (Ha'aretz) reacts to the announcement in the Israeli papers this week that the decision of the Ministerial Committee not to reconsider Shak'a's deportation was influenced, to a great extent, by the P.L.O.'s instruction to Arab Mayors in the West Bank and Gaza to resign. It was reported that, according to the Ministers, the intervention of the P.L.O. at such a sensitive stage was an attempt to dictate the moves of the struggle. Polles asks whether the Ministers' reaction does not actually show the P.L.O.'s ability to "dictate" to the Israeli government the latter's behavior.

At first, the P.L.O. advised the Arab Mayors not to resign. This went against the latter's initial decision; the reason being that such resignations would mean the loss of influential positions among the Arab population in the occupied territories, as well as the loss of important status within the entire Arab world and among international bodies. However, several days later, the P.L.O. changed its position and called on the Arab Mayors to resign. Obviously the P.L.O. anticipated that Israel would thus be incapable of presenting the elected Arab Mayors' orderly functioning as evidence of the liberal character of the Israeli occupational regime.

Polles believes that the fluctuations within the P.L.O. leadership should not have influenced the Israeli government. If the Ministerial Committee decided to approve Shak'a's deportation in order to prove to the P.L.O. that Israel is not afraid of the Arab Mayors' threat to resign, it only showed how incapable Israel is of making an independent policy without taking the P.L.O. into consideration.

The Israeli position, with regard to the Arab population in the occupied territories, has been contradictory for some time. On one hand, Israel claims that this population has learned to appreciate the economic benefits resulting from their coexistence with Israel. Even if one believes that the Arab population has been advancing in its process of becoming a national entity since 1967, the unavoidable result of this is the growing aspiration of the West Bank and Gaza Arabs for self-determination of their political future, rather than leaving this determination to the Palestinian "exiles" in Beirut.

The autonomy plan is based, to a large extent, on the assumption that it is possible to differentiate between those Palestinians who have learned to appreciate the benefits of cohabitation within the occupied territories and Israel, and those who were not under the occupation, i.e. the P.L.O.

On the other hand, for several years, the military government in Judea, Samaria and Gaza has been convinced that most of the Arab population sees the P.L.O. as its authorized political representative and, for them, the 1976 municipal elections are proof beyond any doubt that the P.L.O. is the dominant factor in the occupied territories. Almost all the Mayors elected in 1976 are strong supporters of the P.L.O.

The Israeli government has not succeeded in overcoming the contradiction between its Hasbara policy, which emphasizes the distinction between the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the P.L.O., and between its realization that the Arab population does, in fact, accept the P.L.O.'s authority. The government's behavior in the case of Bassam Shak'a only sharpens this contradiction, the result being that the Israeli Hasbara will lose its convincing power.

Polles asks what can be expected under such circumstances. In his opinion, this is no way to revive the Jordanian option as a solution for the West Bank. Had the Labour Party been ready to resign itself to something less than the Alon Plan, the Jordanian option could have materialized. However, it is now too late. Israel does not want a "third" country to be established between herself and Jordan, for good reason. Annexation of the occupied territories cannot be implemented now. So what can be done?

Dayan believes that it is possible to leave the sovereignty of the occupied territories undefined; if the Arab population refuses to participate in the autonomy plan the way the present Israeli government suggests, the military government can be removed from the occupied territories thus leaving the daily administration in the hands of the Arab population there.

Polles points out that while Dayan's argument is quite reasonable, the hope hidden behind it--that even after the transitional period of five years it will be possible to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state as well as the returning of most of the territories to Jordan--has no basis.

Begin thought that giving full autonomy to the Arab inhabitants would be the solution to the problem. It seems, however, that this solution has no opportunity to materialize, at least not in the way that Begin understands autonomy.

Polles believes that the most Israel can anticipate from the autonomy, if it is established at all, is that it will neither become a Palestinian state nor cut itself off completely from Israel. This might still be achieved, yet the government's present policy might spoil this chance, too.

Elon Moreh and the Settlement Plan

Ilan Kaffir (Yediot Acharonot) points out that the far-reaching decisions of the Ministerial Committee--to strengthen five blocs of settlements, to establish nineteen new settlements and to turn twelve Nahal settlements in Judea and Samaria into civilian settlements--were aimed, to a great extent, at satisfying the demands of Gush Emunim. There is no doubt that the hidden ultimatum coming from Elon Moreh influenced the Ministerial Committee's decision.

Gush Emunim was optimistic this week in expecting that an arrangement would be made, thus avoiding a confrontation. The members of Gush Emunim hoped that in their meeting with Ezer Weizman, they would receive satisfactory answers regarding the future of the settlements in the occupied territories. The leaders of the "Gush" believe that once Weizman agrees to see their point of view, the entire government will do the same. They are concerned over having to pay the price for comprehensive peace in the same way that the settlers of the Rafiah area had to pay for the peace with Egypt. Gush Emunim suspects that Weizman is ready to sacrifice them in order to sustain the peace with Egypt.

In the meeting this week between Weizman and the leaders of Gush Emunim, the latter were not satisfied with Weizman's settlement plan which calls for the establishment of urban blocs. They claimed that Weizman's plan is, at best, an improved Alon plan, and is far indeed from their concept of the right to settle anywhere in Judea and Samaria. During the meeting Weizman explained to the leaders of Gush Emunim that he is determined to implement the Supreme Court's decision with regard to Elon Moreh and suggested that they move to the other location on government-owned land in Jabbel-El-Kabir, near Nablus. The leaders of Gush Emunim refused to accept Weizman's suggestions.

It does not seem likely that Gush Emunim will accept the Ministerial Committee's decision as a satisfactory substitute to Elon Moreh since it is a general plan with no fixed dates for implementation. The members of Gush Emunim will, no doubt, be pleased by the plan to strengthen the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, however it is unclear whether they will be ready to sacrifice their iron principle according to which Jewish settlements in Eretz Yisrael will never be removed, in exchange for such a plan.

Begin is undoubtedly the tragic figure in the Elon Moreh affair. Unable to forget the events of "Altalena", Begin is terrified of using the army against the settlers of Elon Moreh, especially since the latter promise to put up a tough resistance. On the other hand, Begin sees a holy value in the supremacy of the judicial system and will never force an intervention of the political system on the decisions of the judicial system.

Arieh Zimuki (Yediot Acharonot) explains the argument in the government on settlement policy. Arik Sharon is of the opinion that since in a year's time the autonomy might be implemented in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, making the establishment of new settlements a more difficult task, one should take advantage of this year to establish as many settlements as possible. Sharon believes that Israel should settle everywhere in Judea and Samaria, even if it means putting up huts and strengthening them later, since the important factor is taking hold of the area. Sharon is very concerned with the possible legal implications of the Elon Moreh case and believes that there should be special legislation to prevent such cases in the future. He wants to deal with establishing settlements and not "to deal with removing settlements" as he stated. He does not consider the political implications, which the implementation of a wide settlement plan in Judea and Samaria might have. Sharon believes that it is possible to coexist with the Arabs on the basis of "mutual interests" and not necessarily on the basis of mutual love. He ignores the damaging influence of such a settlement plan, which might entail the seizure of private Arab lands, on world public opinion and on world Jewry. In the same way, Sharon ignores the political damage which might be caused by new legislation preventing Arab land owners from appealing to the Israeli Court.

Ezer Weizman, on the other hand, greatly emphasizes creating a situation in which the coexistence between Jews and Arabs will be ensured. Weizman has also considered the developing peace process with Egypt. Thus he opposes any confiscation of private Arab lands or the establishment of tiny settlements, with no proper infrastructure, near to centers of Arab population. He believes it is necessary to avoid any tensions and agitation in the West Bank. Weizman feels that it is better to concentrate the settlement activity in five or six big blocs and to establish 20,000 dwelling units there, rather than spread out too thinly. He suggested implementing the government's past decisions such as establishing nineteen settlements or turning twelve Nahal settlements into civilian settlements, rather than making new decisions.

Erlich supported Weizman's position. The former believes that the existing settlements should be fortified and that there is no hurry to establish new ones. He complained that Sharon's plan has not been thoroughly examined with regard to its legal and security aspects and pointed out that Sharon's plan will cost tens of billions of Israeli Pounds and not two and a half billion Israeli Pounds, as Sharon claims.

Erlich has appeared more and more as the leader of the moderate camp in the government. Of late, Erlich has expressed his opinion in a much louder voice, both on political as well as internal issues. While he repeatedly emphasizes his loyalty to Begin, Erlich has, of late, taken positions even against those of Begin.

Hammer, the NRP Minister of Education, has been very active recently in trying to achieve some understanding between Sharon and Weizman. Hammer tried as much as possible to moderate the Gush Emunim position and suggested several compromises in order to close the gap between the various camps in the government. He strongly supported implementation of the Supreme Court's decision with regard to Elon Moreh, and declared his reservation of Gush Emunim's attacks on the government. In Hammer's opinion, Begin's government is the best possible one for establishing settlements in Judea and Samaria. However, unlike Weizman, Hammer supports new legislation to ensure the existence of the settlements in the occupied territories as well as the possibility of establishing new settlements in the future.

One might say that the weakness of the government is actually its strength, because the Coalition parties are very well aware of what they might expect in the upcoming Knesset elections. At the same time, concern over what might happen in these elections forces ministers and parties to demonstrate tough positions, as a result of internal political intrigues.

Lea Spector

[start]

Original documents
faded and/or illegible



David Geller

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Assuring survival of Israel both 'a necessity and an historic obligation'

It goes without saying that we Germans share responsibility for the survival and security of Israel, regardless which parties are in power in Bonn or Jerusalem.

This shared responsibility, for the Jews who escaped extermination in Nazi concentration camps and for their State, is based neither on sentiment nor on expediency.



tens of millions, was followed by German viewers.

In Nuremberg, a city forever associated with Third Reich anti-Jewish legislation, 4,000 people attended a joint Christian-Jewish church service at the Protestant Church Congress a couple of months ago.

They were not just old people with personal memories of the Hitler era; most were young folk.

The evil past and a joint future for Germans and Jews were issues that preoccupied the congress from start to finish, and did so much more forcibly and urgently than ever before.

So it is simply not true to say that German commitment to Israel is on the decline.

All Bonn governments base their Middle East policy on the principle that Israel's security and independence must on no account be curtailed. If possible they must be improved.

History has forged a link between the two countries regardless of the distance

between them in both geographical location and mental outlook.

It would be foolish, on the other hand, to be at all surprised that different interests lead to different situation assessments in Bonn and Jerusalem.

There is no harm done, not even on crucial issues, as long as one side does not try to force its views down the other's throat.

Israel rightly expects support from the Federal Republic, but it must be allowed to reach its own political decisions. Countries that maintain cordial ties with it must exercise restraint and keep their advice to themselves.

This does not relieve them of responsibility, however, and when they feel Israel has run aground they must try and find solutions even though Jerusalem is feeling riled at present and suspects intervention.

Excitement has mounted since President Carter's bid to get politics back on the move in the Middle East by sounding out the PLO and including it in political talks on the understanding that it acknowledges Israel's existence.

Ever since, to judge by a number of voices from Jerusalem, America seems to have been cast as the bad guy in Israeli eyes.

In reality this independent outlook is a blessing in disguise for Israel as a major US ally. America is not involved in the fight for survival in the Middle East, so it can afford to take a wider view.

The United States is not obliged by its struggle to view everything in terms of black and white, friend and foe. Talking with Arabs is not treachery by Israel but preparation for the day when embittered silence will no longer be the rule.

Sooner or later, America reasons, talks on a joint future in the Middle East will be feasible again, and Mr Begin, the Israeli Premier, is on record as saying Israel is capable of the change in outlook this will require.

He it was who brought about the political turning point and embarked on the thorny path towards a settlement with Egypt.

Bonn does not have America's opportunities in the Middle East. It lacks the power a mediator needs. Without it a political broker is ineffectual.

A visit by Chancellor Schmidt to Premier Begin would not improve matters and could not do so. That none is currently scheduled is no indication that ties have taken a turn for the worse either.

Foreign Minister Genscher is patiently doing all that Bonn can do at present in the Middle East.

In travelling from one Arab country to another he is trying to ensure that such talks as are possible here and now are not allowed to break off again.

Karl-Alfred Odin
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 8 August 1979)

[end]

Original documents
faded and/or illegible





ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

PRESS SUMMARY, NOVEMBER 9, 1979.

THE BASSAM SHAK'A AFFAIR.

Ha'aretz, in its editorial, states that there is no doubt that Mr. Shak'a, the Mayor of Nablus, whom Israel authorities have decided to deport to an Arab country, completely identified himself with the terrible P.L.O. action on the coastal road on March 11, 1978. The officers of the Military Government were furious, and rightly so, when they heard the Mayor's opinion of the massacre of the bus passengers as well as throwing children into the fire. None of us should pretend to be surprised by an answer which is revolting in its cruelty but expressed the mood of a great part of the Arab population in the occupied territories.

Had Bassam Shak'a said in public what he said in a closed meeting, there would have been a basis for claiming that these were words of incitement which might encourage the breakdown of law and order. However, since he said what he did behind closed doors, he cannot be accused of incitement, and publication in the newspapers thereafter, which was not on his initiative, did not turn his words into a criminal act.

General Matt told Shak'a that the fact that he could say what he did while sitting together at the same table, shows just how democratic Israel is. However, the deportation order invalidates those very words. Bassam Shak'a will now become a hero and who can be sure that the next Mayor of Nablus will have less extreme opinions?

The hatred of the West Bank Arabs towards the Jews, Israel and the Military Government is well known. If Shak'a is deported will it make the autonomy plan more attractive to them, especially since this plan envisages the Military Government's retention of ultimate authority.²

As far as General Matt is concerned, he should be told that it is not his business to conduct pointless discussions with the Arab Mayors. He and his officers should take care of the security of Israel - that is their only function. There is no point in conducting discussions with Municipal Officials when it is clear in advance that they will maintain their views no matter what we say.

The P.L.O. is not the first example of a political movement which regards as permissible what legitimate regimes regard as reprehensible. This gap is unbridgeable.

Davar, in its editorial, believes it repulsive that Mr. Shak'a expressed his understanding of the murderers' motives. Not even an ideological background can justify a crime of this sort. Anyone who identifies himself with the murderers and kidnappers deserves to be denounced. But Shak'a's statement should not lead to hasty action on our part that would serve his political objectives.

The basic opinions of the Arab Mayors in the West Bank were not secret even before the meeting General Matt had with Shak'a. This is a reality with which we have to struggle soberly. We should not complain righteously about its existence.

An adequate limitation on the activity of the West Bank population has been in force for some time. This limitation involves hostile terrorist activity, engaging in which would cause their arrest and trial. However, expressing an opinion - even a revolting one - is not included in what is forbidden, especially when it comes in an answer to a question by a senior Israeli Official in a closed discussion, and not as public incitement.

The Israeli Government is committed to autonomy for the West Bank population. Even if, miraculously, the autonomy authorities form a harmless municipal system and not a political entity, it would be impossible to order them not to express their thoughts verbally. Deporting the Mayor of Nablus will bring about a deterioration in the occupied territories and will be interpreted throughout the world as proof of Israel's intention to use autonomy as a cover only. It is much better that wisdom overcomes instinct.

Shalom Rosenfeld (Ma'ariv) points out that while one cannot overemphasize the severity of what Shak's said, the actual fact that Shak's said what he did under the circumstances which enabled him to do so, is far worse.

If an educated public official of Bassam Shak's's stature can, in a discussion with a Jewish official, sympathetically understand one of the most horrible murders ever committed by Arab terrorists against innocent men, women and children, it shows not only the extent of his hatred for Israel (and maybe Jews in general) but most of all it shows his moral image as a human being. (Shak'a replied to the question on whether he justifies throwing a little child into the fire by saying "This is a bit too much"). One can assume that if Shak's had the courage to express his opinion on the massacre to the most senior Officer of the Military Government ("such actions" he said "have a chance of achieving results") he does not hide this opinion from his own people. It is hard to imagine a more efficient way of incitement to harm women and children in the terrorists' style, than Shak's's opinions. But the most important question, in Rosenfeld's view, is where such "chutzpa" gets its inspiration.

What or who gave the Arab Leaders in Judea, Samaria and Gaza the feeling that they no longer have to be careful about the hateful things they say and that they are free to express the hatred and poison in their hearts against Israel? It is just a lesson they have learned from the way the Israeli democracy functions and from the openness and tolerance of the Israeli society?

Rosenfeld believes that the Arab feeling that "it is already permitted" comes from two sources - one, the undermining of the national consensus in Israel on the most vital issues, including the security of the state in the narrowest sense of the word; and the second, the weakening of the Israeli ruling authority in the occupied territories. This condition is attributed either to the alleged exhaustion of the authorities or to the mistaken notion that autonomy will solve all the problems of Jewish-Arab co-existence.

The image of Israel, in the eyes of the Arabs in the occupied territories, is of a torn and wounded country living in anarchy on the verge of civil war, an economy falling apart and a growing dependency on outside aid, with all their complications.

The Arabs of the occupied territories and their leaders, who identify publicly with the P.L.O. and its aims, will not agree to a de-facto co-existence with a weak Israel - especially an Israel that is ready to put-up with Shak'a in order not to disturb the autonomy talks.

The forced co-existence (since there are no illusions that more than that is possible in the near future) will be established only when the Arab leaders in the occupied territories will understand that we are determined to defend our existence and our vital interests despite the autonomy talks and our internal controversies, and that anyone who sticks a knife in our back because he believes mistakenly that "it is already permitted" will be punished.

THE ARIK SHARON - EZER WEIZMAN CONFRONTATION

Yoseph Chariff (Ma'ariv) reports on what happened in the last Government meeting.

For some time the hidden struggle between Sharon and Weizman has bothered Begin, but in the last Government meeting on Eilon Moreh it came out in the open. Arik Sharon left the Cabinet meeting when Weizman started to make his speech and accused Sharon of piling obstacles in the Government's path. Weizman claimed that Gush Emunim and Arik Sharon are dragging the Government into situations which endanger its existence. Sharon, on the other hand, in a telephone call to Begin, warned him that a plot is being built up behind his back, the aim of which is to cause the fall of the Government. Sharon is sure that Weizman wants to bring about Begin's resignation, while Weizman is convinced that Sharon's actions will eventually bring about the fall of the Government.

The rivalry between the two is not new, so why is the battle taking place now? As far as Sharon is concerned the timing has to do with the latest development. Arik Sharon has the impression that Weizman is seen more and more as Begin's successor in the eyes of the various factions of the existing coalition. Sharon heard from Burg a few weeks ago that there would be a lot of smiling faces if Sharon resigned. Burg gave Sharon his objective assessment that all the gates outside the Government are closed to him, and some influential members of the new party "Hatehiya" have been heard to say that they do not want him in their camp. Sharon, thus believing that time is not in his favor with regard to achieving a standing in Herut, decided to act now.

Weizman's timing also has to do with the latest developments. He cannot allow a situation to develop where Sharon will dictate policy. Since Weizman believes he now has a stronghold in both his own party and the Government, he has decided to throw down the gauntlet. Weizman's statement to the Ministerial Committee for Security, that if a decision is taken by the Government to put the settlers of Eilon Moreh into the nearby IDF camp a situation might develop whereby he would not be able to remain in the Government, carried a lot of weight.

Weizman's influence in Herut is also impressive. On November 8, the secretariat of Herut was elected (the implementing body of the party), and the axix, David Levy - Ezer Weisman received a decisive majority while of Sharon's people no one was elected.

In the government meeting, an interesting turn took place. Begin put to vote his suggestion for a temporary arrangement to settle the Eilon Moreh settlers in an IDF camp close to the present settlement until a new permanent place for them would be ready. Weizman voiced his opposition and suggested the settlement of Eilon Moreh in one of the Nahal settlements (which is not near the present Eilon Moreh). Erlich and Tamir supported Weizman. This in itself is a very significant development. Erlich has very rarely voted against Begin, especially where Begin showed signs of distress. In the past both Tamir and Erlich blindly followed Begin; however, this time they supported Weizman.

Tamir had already, in the Cabinet meeting a week earlier, attacked Sharon for damaging the image of the Government and for the harm he caused by calling Begin at Camp David, on an open line, to discuss the issue of the Rafiah settlement, enabling the Americans to listen in to his agreeing to give up the settlements and thus weakening the Israeli position.

It seems that Tamir has given up any hope of reaching an understanding with Begin (a two and a half year wish). The fact that he was ruled out as a candidate for the Foreign Office Ministry obviously added to his disappointment, and now he is trying to build up an understanding with Ezer Weizman based on long-range political calculations. Meanwhile, Weizman derived encouragement from the support he got in the Cabinet this week, not to mention the atmosphere of anti-Sharon feeling created by factors in the Likud, to the extent that the Liberals of the Likud demanded Sharon's resignation.

Lea Spector.

PORI PUBLIC OPINION POLL

(Ha'aretz - November 11, 1979)

1. Question: Do you believe a Labour Government would have better success in dealing with the problems facing the present Government?

43.3% - No
28.9% - Yes

2. Question: Do you believe the Labour Government is ready to be in power?

43.7% - No
36.0% - yes

3. Question: Do you believe the Likud Government will stay in power till the end of its term (another two years)?

47.8% - yes
34.5% - no

49.3% of those who originated from Asia or Africa said a Labour Government would not be better than a Likud Government. 38.1% of those who originated from Europe and America said the same.

53.1% of those who originated from Asia and Africa believe that the Likud will stay in power while 43.7% originating from Europe and America believe the same.



ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

THE WORLD IS AGAINST US ...

(PRESS SUMMARY, FEBRUARY 29TH, 1980)

Abba Eban (Ma'ariv) is amazed at the worldwide campaign being waged against the international achievement that no one had possibly imagined three years ago -- peace between Egypt and Israel. Once, the gravest international sin was waging war. Nowadays it seems that the unforgivable crime is making peace.

George Ball is heartbroken. In articles in the Washington Post and the Herald Tribune (on January 22nd and 23rd), he accuses the U. S. government of taking the wrong approach to solving the Israeli-Arab conflict. "It invested enormous effort in settling the Egyptian-Israeli conflict which has no connection to oil, and by so doing has brought about the aggravation of the Palestinian problem, which is closely connected to the oil question."

The editorial in the British newspaper Guardian states that the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is no more than "an interesting historical event." Several weeks ago in Paris, government officials and the media expressed dissatisfaction with the arrangement because it was not a comprehensive settlement. And, after a long visit to Asia by the British Foreign Minister, Lord Carrington, the British press hinted that the Arab oil-producing countries will not "agree" to accept U. S. protection against a Soviet invasion if the U. S. does not satisfy their demands on the Palestinian question.

As a matter of fact, George Ball was right in saying that the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is not connected with the oil question. However, this treaty is closely connected with blood ... More than 100,000 people were killed during the Arab-Israeli wars. But people like George Ball do not get excited by such "sentimental" reasoning.

George Ball's fundamental assumption that the U. S. mistakenly determined its priority has no basis whatsoever. It is part of the myth of the "America that can do everything." The fact is that the U. S. had no control over the reasons and moods which dictated Anwar Sadat's initiative, since all these reasons derive from the Egyptian reality alone. No other Arab nation had a similar incentive to cease belligerence and start peace negotiations. Egypt achieved the renewal of its territorial wholeness, the free use of the Suez Canal with its great financial benefits, the return of the oil fields in a more advanced and developed state than when it lost them, the chance of dealing with its economic problems, and getting rid of the Soviet patronage nightmare, whose real motive has been manifested in Afghanistan.

The argument that the peace treaty with Egypt aggravated the Palestinian problem has no basis either. This problem was no less aggravated before the signing of

/ continued /

the peace treaty. On the contrary, the Israeli-Egyptian treaty offered an unprecedented opportunity to the Palestinians. Sadat provided the Palestinians with an example of a political course of action which proved its efficacy much more than the hand grenades, bombs and the Palestinian "convention" which gave neither benefit nor gain. The diplomatic history of the Palestinian Arabs is full of rejection of a certain offer today in order to long for it tomorrow and the day after, once its time has passed. George Ball, the Guardian, Lord Carrington and others would have shown more true friendship to the Palestinians had they advised both the Palestinians and Jordan to exhaust the possibilities hidden in the Camp David agreements, in the same way that some of us beg Begin's government to give the concept of "full autonomy" its full and exact meaning.

It is unrealistic to assume that a drastic reversal from complete hostility to complete peace on the Eastern front is possible overnight. There was no chance of achieving the peace treaty with Egypt without the five-year transition period between signing the agreement on the separation of forces in 1974 and the peace treaty of 1979.

However, the enormous hostility toward this impressive achievement finds its expression not only in the attacks on the peace treaty itself, but also in the special effort to attribute the Iran-Afghanistan crisis to the present stalemate in the autonomy talks. Had a plague broken out in Mongolia, many correspondents would have attributed this terrible disaster to Israel's inflexibility with regard to the West Bank and Gaza. There is no doubt that the West Bank problems have to be solved and that it is vital to instill more sanity into the Israeli policy, but these problems need to be solved according to their own tempo and substance. The inclination to look for an Israeli source for each problem that affects humanity has horrible roots in Jewish history ...

The real truth is that the "crisis in the Middle East" and the "Israeli-Arab conflict" are not one and the same thing. These are two different questions. Most of the factors and reasons for the lack of stability in the Middle East were always unconnected to Israel. But Israel's struggle was conducted in such a dramatic and tense atmosphere that it overshadowed other tensions in this area. Above all, one must remember that the two main superpowers have never reached an understanding in this area concerning spheres of influence, like the one which made possible detente in Europe. Israel is not responsible for all the diseases of the area and therefore does not have to pay the price for the remedies. On the contrary, especially in the desert of fanaticism, hatred and aggression, the efforts of Israel and Egypt to establish new relations is conspicuous as an oasis. Peace with Egypt does not fulfil our dreams to the utmost, nor the full needs of the area. However, it is an intellectual disgrace to struggle with the problems which remain without taking the time to feel pleased and satisfied with the considerable progress already achieved.

Eliahu Salpeter (Ha'aretz) points out that there is not much point in saying that if Israel had the oil resources of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia it would not have any problems with its image in the Western world. The fact is that the Arabs have oil and we do not. This fact influences not only the politicians but also,

/.... continued/

and to an increasing degree, the media which mold Western public opinion. This increases the need for Israel to rely on its main asset, which is the remainder of the West's moral obligation which derives not only from guilt feelings (which are in the process of disappearing) but also from the feeling that Israel is a positive factor and must survive. The image of Israel encouraging thugs who break car windows, deprive villagers of their land, deny another nation its right to self-determination, etc. obviously undermines the feeling of moral obligation of those who sincerely care for our good, and assists our enemies greatly.

The extent of the erosion of Western European support for Israel has recently been manifested. Ireland became the first nation in the Common Market to actually recognize the P.L.O. Britain came out at the head of the European camp initiating a change in Resolution 242 in order to add a clause to it on the national rights of the Palestinians. And Holland, which was well-known for its friendship toward Israel, found it necessary to apologize to the Arabs for agreeing to host the meeting of the representatives from Israel, Egypt and the U. S. for the autonomy talks.

The U. S. President's comments to the U. J. A. about his opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state, his refusal to negotiate with the P. L. O. and his commitment to supplying Israel with the aid needed for its protection are, of course, very important even if they were not without connection to his election campaign. However, they are insufficient to counteract the doubly accelerated efforts of Washington to win the goodwill of the Moslem world in order to counter Soviet penetration after its invasion of Afghanistan, and to strengthen the loyalty and military power of Egypt by supplying large quantities of modern arms. One connection between the economic deterioration of Israel and our relationship with the U. S. is that Israel can no longer adopt the solution of opening the Pentagon taps as compensation for American arms supplies to Arab countries. Israel cannot afford to buy from the U. S. the arms which have already been authorized.

However, more than anything else, we should be concerned with the growing reservations of the leaders of the Jewish diaspora toward Israeli government policy. It is true that Britain's Chief Rabbi was very extreme and does not represent the majority of the Jewish community in England, but it is doubtful that he would have said what he did had he not sensed the change in Jewish public opinion. The conflict between the Israeli Embassy in The Hague and the leaders of the Jewish community in Holland belongs to the same category. The confrontation between Ambassador Rosenne and the French Jews with regard to the "Peace Now" delegation did not strengthen our image among the French Jewish leadership.

Rabbi Alexander Schindler is not lacking in Zionist feeling, nor is he hostile to the present government. His comment that "we would have liked to see a leadership in Israel which would re-examine its priorities and return to a balance between them, the nation's needs and the ideological consensus in Israel" is only a careful echo of the strong criticism from the majority of the leaders of U. S. Jewry toward the policy and actions of this government. The Jewish identification with Israel, which is the dearest asset we have outside our borders, is, for the first time, in real danger. It is doubtful whether the government can stop this process of erosion.

/.... continued/

Arieh Zimuki (Yediot Acharonot) reports that the assessment of the American heads of the Secret Services is that now, more than ever, the conditions are ripe for creating a pro-Western Moslem front to be interwoven in the American strategic deployment in the area. In their opinion, the only prerequisite for establishing such a front is an Israeli agreement on Palestinian self-determination.

American security specialists claim that even the moderate Palestinians believe that the only possible solution to the Palestinian problem is the establishment of a Palestinian entity. The American assessment is that Saudi Arabia and the emirates on the Persian Gulf are ready to join a pro-Western front on the condition that a substantial advance will take place on the Palestinian question. This advance is described now as preparing changes in Resolution 242 to enable the P. L. O. to join the peace talks.

While it seems that the White House speaks in a different voice from the heads of Intelligence, and it is possible that the U. S. Administration will avoid confrontation with Israel until after the elections in November, it is a mistake to believe that below the surface the Americans are not initiating actions on their own or at times through a third party. Lord Carrington put forward his suggestions with regard to changes in Resolution 242 not only as a result of Saudi inspiration but American inspiration as well. The White House has turned several times to heads of European countries asking them to react to various actions of the Israeli government. Carter himself asked German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to influence the Israeli government in order to make progress in the autonomy talks, to express opposition to the settlements and to convince Israel to boycott the Olympic games in Moscow. Schmidt rejected Carter's approach but this is not the important point.

At the meeting of the Israeli Ambassadors of the European countries, it was noted that a change for the worse had taken place in the position of the majority of the European nations with regard to the Palestinian issue. Many Europeans now believe that the right of the Palestinians to self-determination should be recognized, although they have not yet reached a comprehensive and united opinion with regard to the substance of the Palestinian entity. Europe, while motivated by the oil factor in determining its positions on the issues of the area, does not have one consolidated view on the subject. However, a certain consensus now exists in Europe with regard to these questions, which is not favorable for us. More than ever before Israel now needs a Foreign Minister to explain the Israeli position and to develop a wide Hasbara network in the world.

On the Black Hebrews

M. K. David Glass reported in an interview with Ma'ariv that when he was in the U. S. several weeks ago, he spoke with Blacks who had been among the leaders of the Black Hebrews and had left the organization. They told Glass (and also reported to the Israeli representative in the Embassy in Washington) that if his committee recommended that the Black Hebrews be deported, they might go as far as committing mass suicide. Glass said: "I am not ready to take such a possibility on my conscience." Glass reported that "only 10% of the Black Hebrews in Israel have a criminal record." There are 1,500 Black Hebrews in Israel and 5,000 in the U. S. Those ex-members who spoke with Glass in the U. S. warned him that the Black Hebrews in Israel aim at establishing a state within a state, that they plot to establish sovereignty for themselves and that they are more dangerous than the cult of Jim Jones....

/.... continued/

On June 30, 1978, when the Black Hebrews were concerned about their future, their "Foreign Minister", Ben Yehuda, sent a letter from Dimona to Idi Amin, then the President of Uganda, asking for aid in their struggle against Israel. Recently, the "International Ambassador" of the Black Hebrews, Azriel Ben Israel, who is now in the U. S., emphasized the wish of the sect to reach a "positive solution" to the problems with Israel. Glass claimed that "criminal elements will be thrown out of Israel" and that those who will be allowed to stay will first undergo strict identification checks. "Today no one knows who is who," Glass said. Glass knows that the Black Hebrews plan to bring many thousands to Israel; however, he is determined that this plan will not succeed. Glass would like them to be concentrated in one village, but it is unclear whether it will be possible to move them from the four towns in which they are now living -- Dimona, Arad, Mizpeh Ramon and Silwan.

Public Opinion Poll (Yediot Acharonot, February 29, 1980)

Question: Who would you like to constitute the government?

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Likud</u> | <u>Labor Alignment</u> | <u>No preference</u> |
|--------------|--------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| December '79 | 24% | 34% | 42% |
| January '80 | 34 | 31 | 46 |
| February '80 | 24 | 34 | 42 |

Question: Who would you prefer as Prime Minister?

| <u>Candidate</u> | <u>October-December 1979</u> | <u>January-February 1980</u> |
|------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Begin | 16% | 17% |
| Weizman | 15 | 14 |
| Peres | 15 | 17 |
| Rabin | 11 | 6 |
| Allon | 3 | 9 |
| Others | 14 | 11 |
| No preference | 26 | 26 |

(The January-February poll was conducted after Allon officially announced his candidacy for leadership of the Labor Alignment. This accounts for his increase in popularity from 3 in October-December to 9 in January-February).

Ma'ariv is independent, but traditionally Likud-oriented.
Ha'aretz is an independent liberal newspaper.
Yediot Acharonot is independent, but traditionally Likud-oriented.

Lea Spector

THE WEEK IN RELIGION

BY RELIGIOUS NEWS SERVICE

RELIGIOUS NEWS SERVICE
43 West 57th Street
New York, New York 10019

FOR RELEASE: Weekend of
May 23, 1980
WORD COUNT: 1,200

HEBRON, A MIDEAST RELIGIOUS CROSSROAD,
IS ALSO A LONGTIME CENTER OF CONFLICT

The Arab city of Hebron in the Israeli occupied West Bank is like much else in the Middle East -- a paradox.

Set in the hill country south of Jerusalem, rich in biblical associations, it has long been revered as sacred by Muslims and Jews who both claim a common ancestor.

It has also been the scene of decades of bitter communal conflict, a conflict that reached a crisis point on May 2 when Arab terrorists opened fire on a group of ultra-nationalist Jewish settlers returning from Sabbath prayers.

Hebron, a center of Islamic fervor and strong Palestinian nationalism, is called El Khalil -- "the friend" (Abraham) -- by its 50,000 Arab citizens.

Centerpiece of the city and itself a focus of long-standing dispute is an Islamic shrine -- the Mosque of Ibrahim (Abraham) -- built over what are believed to be the tombs of the biblical patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and their wives.

Called the Machpelah Cave, the tomb area is believed to be the place purchased by Abraham for 400 silver shekels as a burial place for his wife Sarah.

(more)

Hebron -- El Khalil -- is the ancient intersection of Islam and Judaism. Both Muslims and Jews believe they are descended from the same forebear, Abraham -- the Jews through Abraham and Sarah's son, Isaac, the Muslims through Ishmael, born to Abraham of an Egyptian servant girl, Hagar.

Thinking herself barren, according to Genesis, Sarah urged her husband: "Go, sleep with my maidservant; perhaps I can build a family through her." Abraham "slept with Hagar, and she conceived."

Later, after Sarah had given birth to Isaac, she prevailed upon her husband to banish Hagar and her son Ishmael to the desert of Beer-sheba. As Ishmael was on the point of death from thirst, God intervened to save the child, promising, "I will make him into a great nation."

According to Genesis, Ishmael is the ancestor of a number of Arabian tribes. Islam, which arose in the sixth century of the Christian era in Arabia, claims Ishmael as its ancestor.

The modern city of Hebron lies at or near the site of the ancient city of Hebron, founded about 1700 B.C. by pre-Israelite inhabitants. It was taken over by the Israelites during the course of the conquest of Canaan by Joshua (1250-1200 B.C.).

Hebron figured prominently in the history of King David (1000-961 B.C.). It was the first seat of his kingdom, which extended over Judah only. There he reigned for seven years. The assembly of Israel, which then conferred the kingship of all Israel upon David, was held at Hebron.

(more)

After the reign of David, Hebron scarcely appears in the Old Testament except for the mention of its resettlement by Jews after the return from their Babylonian exile (ca. 539 B.C.).

Most Jews were driven out of Palestine in the great dispersal which followed the Jewish revolt against the Romans in 68 A.D. Hebron, itself, burned to the ground by the Romans, remained abandoned for centuries, although the supposed burial ground of the Hebrew patriarchs was from time to time a focus of Christian pilgrimage and devotion.

A monument, probably a structure without a roof, was constructed over the site of what came to be known as the Cave of the Patriarchs some time during the first centuries of the Christian era. In the twelfth century, a Crusader church was built upon the site of an earlier Byzantine church that stood over the cave, and Hebron became the seat of a bishop.

When the Muslims conquered the region toward the close of the twelfth century, they took over the Crusader church in Hebron, erased all signs of Christianity from the building, with its Gothic arches, and turned it into a mosque, Haram el Khalil, Mosque of Ibrahim.

In subsequent centuries, a small Jewish community managed to stay on in Hebron (others survived in Jerusalem, Tiberias, and Safed).

During the period of British mandatory rule in Palestine after World War I, Jews were not permitted to go beyond the seventh step of the exterior stairway of the Mosque of Ibrahim. No non-Muslim was allowed to enter the Cave of the Patriarchs.

(more)

In 1929, Arabs rioted all over Palestine against the rising tide of Jewish immigration which had followed after World War I with the "Balfour Declaration" that committed Britain to the concept of a Jewish homeland "in" Palestine.

During the widespread rioting in August of that year, the Jewish community in Hebron was virtually wiped out. A pogrom left 67 dead, 60 wounded, and all but eliminated a Jewish presence in the city.

Jewish access to Hebron was barred from 1948, when Jordan replaced the British in that part of Palestine, to 1967, when Israeli forces moved in.

Under a carefully controlled timetable overseen by Israeli soldiers, Jews and Muslims are now allowed to enter the Mosque of Ibrahim for separate prayer services.

But tensions have persisted in Hebron, indeed grown steadily worse since 1968 when a Jewish settlement was started on a hill just outside the Arab city.

The settlement, known as Qiryat Arba, was founded by a hard core of Israeli Jewish ultra-nationalists, Gush Emunim, who are determined to re-establish a Jewish community in Hebron to replace the one driven out in 1929.

Gush Emunim, in fact, would like to see all 1 million Arabs driven out of what it calls Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and the territory taken over by Jews. After all, says Gush Emunim, the land belongs to Jews -- and Jews alone -- by special divine dispensation.

(more)

Hostility between the Arab residents of Hebron and the Gush Emunim settlers of Qiryat Arba reached a peak of spiraling violence and counterviolence on May 2 when a group of about 100 of the settlers were returning from Sabbath prayers at the tomb of the patriarchs.

Palestinian terrorists opened fire from rooftops on the group, killing six and wounding 17. Among those killed was an American-born Jewish convert who had been convicted a year before of breaking into Arab houses in Hebron, beating up residents, smashing furniture, and ordering Arabs to get out of the city.

The Hebron ambush, orchestrated by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was widely believed to have been aimed at hardening Israel's negotiating position in talks with Egypt and the United States on granting Arabs in the West Bank (and the Gaza Strip) some form of self-administration.

The PLO and most of the Arab world have rejected the talks as aimed at legitimizing perpetual Israeli occupation of the contested territories.

To some observers, the ambush carried an ominous symbolism. It was directed specifically at a group of Jews who say that the "land of Israel" belongs to Jews by God-given right.

The attack struck at the heart of a religious issue.

August 12, 1980

TO: Marc Tanenbaum



*For Your
Information*

BERTRAM H. GOLD.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Notes on Israeli Trip

June 25 - July 6, 1980

These notes are being dictated early in July following a 12 day trip to Israel with Maynard Wishner. However, they will not be transcribed until the end of July and will probably not see the light of day until early August. This time interval may make much of the account irrelevant. Nonetheless, for the sake of the record, the report which follows attempts to present a distillation of impressions resulting from talks with several dozen people in Israel, both from within and outside the government. (A list of those interviewed is appended.)

I. The Mood of the Country

We last visited Israel in February of 1980. In the six months that have elapsed, the country's mood has grown more somber and tense. The most important reasons for this can be listed as follows:

The Continuing Inflation

In February, Finance Minister Hurwitz, newly appointed, seemed to be grappling, imaginatively and energetically, with the problems of inflation. He was presenting new ideas and formulas to the country and offering new hope to the Israelis. Now, six months later, a deep sense of disappointment has set in. Mr. Hurwitz's efforts have not produced very much and inflation still continues at the rate of 120% per annum. The internecine bickering and fighting between Israeli leaders on the economic front continues apace. We were told of a television program featuring a debate between Mr. Hurwitz and Histadrut leader Meschel. In the course of the debate, Mr. Meschel challenged Mr. Hurwitz about the price of things and asked whether Mr. Hurwitz knew what cucumbers cost. Mr. Hurwitz replied that if cucumbers were too expensive, the people should eat lettuce. Whereupon, Mr. Meschel questioned him on the price of lettuce and for what seemed an interminable length of time to the people watching the debate, the two men pettily quarreled about the prices of various vegetables. Perhaps, most importantly, continued inflation is providing a wider gap between wages and living costs. Until fairly recently, the cost of living adjustments had been fairly close to the increased cost of living. Now, however, there is an increasing difference and people are beginning to feel this quite markedly.

Unemployment

For the first time in Israel's history, there is a growing unemployment - currently at 4½% and rising. There has been a freeze put on hiring in all government services so that under no circumstances can people be employed for any kinds of vacancies, whether these be the result of retirement, death or any other cause. As Eliazer Jaffee of the Hebrew University points out, this has not only created a serious problem in human services but has caused a complete breakdown in planning. It is even worse than across the board cuts in personnel. Since the number of retirements and resignations vary from one department to another, based on any number of factors, cuts in service take place haphazardly rather than on a planned basis. While the private sector has not felt the economic pinch as much as the public one, it has also begun to experience the consequences of unemployment. For a country which has

(over)

always prided itself on having a full labor force, this rise in unemployment has been especially disconcerting.

West Bank Tensions

When we were in Israel in February of 1980, peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt were underway and things were quiet on the West Bank. Since that time, we have seen the rise of extremism on both the Israeli and Arab sides. The shooting of a group of Jewish Yesihvan students, the subsequent retaliation, the bombing of two Arab mayors, the expulsion of other Arab mayors have caused a whole new set of worries. One of our drivers told us that only two or three months ago, he had no compunctions about driving through the West Bank. Today, he would not take anybody there. When we drove through a portion of the West Bank on the way to Be'ersheba, Bernie Resnikoff deliberately picked up a soldier carrying a gun. Tourists are even being warned not to go into the old city of Jerusalem. The new problems in the West Bank were very well illustrated by interviews we had with Brandon Grove, Jr., the relatively new American Consul in Jerusalem and General Benjamin Ben Eliazer, the military governor of Judea and Samaria.

Brandon Grove is not an Arabist. Most of his experience in the State Department has been on the Latin American desk. He came to his post in Israel six months ago, succeeding a previous Consul General who had been highly suspect by the Israelis for his very apparent sympathy with the Arabs in the West Bank. Grove spoke to us somewhat stiffly and yet with a good deal of candor about his impressions during these six months. Addressing us somewhat cautiously and trying to be objective, it was obvious he has been disappointed by what he perceives as insensitivity on the part of the Israelis and the lack of due process, particularly in the expulsion of the Mayors and the collective punishment of the family of a boy who had been harassing Israeli soldiers. It was not so much what Mr. Grove said that was disconcerting but that, despite his obvious desire to be supportive of the Israelis, he was having difficulty in doing so - at least insofar as the above incidents were concerned.

The Military Governor of the West Bank is a rather youngish career soldier, Iraqi born, who spoke to us quite coldly and dispassionately of the need to "maintain order" in Judea and Samaria. As he put it, "The situation cannot be allowed to get out of hand. Previously, we used to shoot only in the air when we felt it was necessary to show some force. Now we have instructed our people to shoot first in the air, then if there is no response, to shoot in the legs."

The increased tensions within the West Bank have had a spillover amongst Israelis generally. It is not just a matter of being more fearful about travelling in Judea and Samaria. It manifests itself much more significantly in an increasing apprehension about the future of Israel, a greater ideological rift within the country and a growing polarization.

Polarization

There is a growing divergence on many ideological fronts. There is the rift between the religious and secular communities which is being spelled out in many different ways. There is the conflict between the Peace Now movement seeking an end to settlements and some kind of territorial compromise and those who favor an aggressive settlement policy and a greater Israel. There is conflict on the economic front and a continuing gap between Ashkenazi and Sephardi.

Of course, these differences have always existed but what seems to be different today is the sharpening tone of acrimony and the greater distance that separate various ideological forces. One observer commented to us that when the group of Jewish extremists had been ambushed and shot by Arabs, a friend had remarked how ashamed and guilty he was that his first impulse had been to say to himself, "They got what they deserved." The countrywide concern and anguish about the child who was kidnapped and subsequently killed by his kidnapper was, in many ways, an unconscious attempt to find a unity in a country that is so divided on so many issues.

The Quality of Life

Here too, there has been a deterioration particularly in the increasing number of crimes of violence. In the twelve days in which we were in Israel, there were two violent murders. This is a relatively recent phenomenon and is causing a good deal of concern amongst Israelis generally.

The Disintegration of the Government

Hanon Smith, who is probably the most outstanding pollster in Israel is about to come out with a new poll that shows a further weakening of the Likkud. As he points out, this does not necessarily mean a greater support for the Labour Government. However, it does indicate tremendous dissatisfaction and frustration with the present government. This also tends to promote greater polarization. However, it is important to add a cautionary note. It does not mean that the middle has disappeared but simply that it is growing smaller, feels more impotent and does not know in which direction to turn.

While we have described the mood of the country in rather bleak terms, the Israelis are a strong, resilient and hopeful people. Even as they talk in extreme terms and reflect divisive ideological rifts, there is an awareness of what is taking place and a desire to move ahead and try to overcome the malaise that seems to have overtaken them. Much of their success in so doing will depend upon the economic situation and the way in which the next government will take charge.

(over)

II: The Internal Political Scene

While we were in Israel, a vote of non-confidence in the Likkud government took place and was defeated. As a matter of fact, it was during that vote that Begin suffered his heart attack. This was also the afternoon before the morning appointment that we had with Mr. Begin. Obviously, the appointment had to be cancelled.

Since the Knesset adjourns the end of July and does not reconvene until the fall, it is obvious that the government will last through at least early autumn. Even if it were to fall then, in accordance with Israeli procedures, the election would not take place until the spring of 1981. And, of course, it may very well be that the government will last through until its scheduled time which is the fall of 1981.

Whatever the timetable, it is apparent that the political campaign in Israel has started. All of the utterances, all of the actions of the major politicians are influenced by the knowledge that an election is in the offing. Just as Maynard and I had the feeling, when we were in Washington before we left for this trip, that the entire capital was affected by the forthcoming Presidential election, so too does everything here in Israel appear to revolve around the 1981 elections in Israel.

The major factor determining how long the Likkud will hold power depends on the National Religious Party. For the time being, the NRP never had it so good. Minister Berg seems to be relishing his role as chief Israeli negotiator. Through its control of the Ministry of Education, the party has more financial power and greater clout than it ever has had. However, there are some important motivations for them to leave the coalition. If it appears - as the polls seem to indicate - that the Likkud is doomed to be defeated, the NRP may want to distance itself from the coalition early enough so as not to be completely tainted with the sour smell of failure too close to election time. Further, if they want to make some kind of arrangement with the Labour Party, it would be best to do so before Labour feels it does not need them, since they may very well have an outright majority in the election.

Yigal Yadin has been urged by many of his former academic colleagues and some of his closest associates to leave the government and force a new election. Thus far, he has resisted this importuning. While he told us that he is giving the matter consideration, there is little indication that he is seriously thinking of resigning. His rationale seems to be that despite the disappointment of his former followers, he believes he is performing an important moderating function in the government. And certainly, the opportunity to be Acting Prime Minister and Acting Defense Minister for a period of a few months is an added inducement.

The Marach, according to Shimon Peres, is the victim of its own success. With the polls showing the labor alignment to be far ahead and, perhaps, even obtaining a clear majority, there is no inducement for the other parties or waiverers within the Likkud to vote against the government. However, even though Labour has such a current big lead, there is constant worry about the split within its own ranks. Contrary to Peres' assurances to us that the split is not serious, there is a good deal of evidence that the Rabin forces and, particularly Rabin himself, who has declared outright war against Peres, are doing everything they can to unseat Peres as the party leader. While Peres

controls the Central Committee, the party's convention will be held in May of 1981 and, if there is no election before then, it is not certain that Peres will prevail over Rabin at the convention, although the odds are in his favor.

It is interesting to note that Rabin seems to have made a comeback in the general population. In the polls, he scores ahead of Peres. Somehow, he has overcome the problem of the Washington bank account, whereas Peres is mistrusted and considered by many as being too "clever."

In summary, while no one can be certain, there seems to be a general agreement that the government will fall sometime this coming autumn unless there is some major event like a new triumphant Camp David Summit. It is further assumed that in an early spring election, Labour will win with either a clear majority or pretty close to one. It will then attempt a wall-to-wall government of unity which, at the very least, will try to bring in the NRP and the Liberal Party and the Weizman List.

To be sure, Ezer Weizman's political future, at the time of this writing, is a little unclear. When we asked Peres about him, Peres shrugged his shoulders and said that he didn't think Weizman knew himself what he was going to do. When we met with Weizman and asked him the same question, his answer was that he was biding his time and waiting to see what would happen. However, it was apparent that, despite Weizman's insouciance, he is seriously thinking of running his own list. During the hour that we spent with him, he had a couple of political aides in and out of the place and took several phone calls all dealing with the question of his political future.

No one, of course, can be certain but, despite some drop in popularity because of the abruptness of his resignation, there is a consensus that with a good list, Weizman can win somewhere between 15 to 20 seats in the Knesset which would make him a formidable figure in any future coalition. Parenthetically, Weizman's comments about Mr. Begin were, to put it mildly, most unkind and it is apparent that a deep animosity has developed between the two men.

There are some who believe that it is very important indeed for there to be created a middle group headed by Weizman. This belief is based upon the assumption that only a very broad based coalition with Weizman active in it will be able to make any concessions to the Egyptians in the peace process against Begin's opposition. The general feeling is that Mr. Begin will not cave in, no matter what the pressures, on anything having to do with Judaea and Samaria. With him in the opposition and with the backing of the Gush Emumeem, who will now look to him once again to be their ideological leader, it would require a very broad coalition to make any concessions on the West Bank.

III. The Peace Negotiations

It is quite evident that the Likkud government is not prepared to change its settlement policy or make any major concessions with respect to Judaea and Samaria. This became quite clear in our discussions with Foreign Minister Shamir and with Harry Hurwitz.

Shamir is a rather impressive person. He speaks English quite well and there is a measured thoughtfulness about him which contradicts the reputation

(over)

he has for being even to the right of Begin. Nonetheless, he is quite adamant about the need for maintaining the current Herut policy.

While Harry Hurwitz will not be making policy, he sees himself having a very special mission in his new job as Minister of Information in Washington. That mission is to educate the American-Jewish community on the government's position. He believes that if it is properly told, the position will be accepted by the American-Jewish community which, in turn, will be able to affect United States policy. Although he did indicate that he wants to work with the Jewish organizations to reach different audiences in the United States, there was no question that his emphasis will be on influencing the views of the Jewish community.

There is a good deal of lip service given to the idea that there may be some progress made in the negotiations before the elections in the United States. This is based on the theory that President Carter desperately wants to see such progress in order to enhance his electoral bid and that both Sadat and Begin, for different reasons, also would like to see fairly immediate progress. Sadat because he needs to re-establish himself with the Arab world and Begin because he might find it much more difficult to deal with a re-elected President Carter who won't owe the Jewish community anything. Despite this, there doesn't seem to be much conviction that anything will be accomplished - not at least until there is a new government in Israel.

Even those who would prefer a Labour government, which would be non-ideological as far as the West Bank is concerned and which might be prepared to begin at the green line and make concessions from that point onward, are concerned whether it will be able to deliver anything in a polarized country and against the opposition of Mr. Begin. Deep down, even some of the Peace Now people are worried that there are no moderate Arabs around and they wonder how secure Israel will be with a separate Palestinian state which would likely emerge with the partitioning of the West Bank.

Professor Akzin offered an interesting analysis of the problem. According to him, there are a number of possible alternatives when the final negotiations take place following the interim peace agreement. One such alternative would be to give back most of the West Bank to the Arabs and to create a separate Arab state. A second alternative would be the final culmination of an autonomous region which would not be under the sovereignty of anyone. A third alternative would be some kind of federation of the area as a separate state with either Israel or/and Jordan. A fourth possibility would be some kind of divided authority between Jordan and Israel over the West Bank. The Israelis obviously would prefer those alternatives which would not lead to the creation of a separate independent state, whereas the Egyptians would seek those alternatives that would lead to some kind of Palestinian entity. In the present negotiations, therefore, each party is trying to develop those circumstances in the agreements which will now be signed which will help to fashion their ultimate goals. Based on this analysis, the bargaining at this point will be hard, vigorous and protracted.

Bertram Gold

List of Those Interviewed

June 25 - July 6, 1980

Israel

Zalman Abramov, AJC Consultant

Professor Benjamin Akzin, Professor Emeritus, Hebrew University

Yehuda Avner, Political Advisor to Prime Minister Begin

Hanan Bar-On, Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Yitzhak Berman, Speaker of Knesset

Yona Bogala, Falashan elder Statesman

Professor Gabriel Cohen, Historian, Member of the National Academy of Science

Brandon Grove, Jr., U.S. Consul General

Professor Dan Horowitz, Political Science, Hebrew University; Director, Davis Institute for International Relations

Harry Hurwitz, Minister of Information, designate Israel Embassy in Washington

Dr. Lester Jaffe, Senior Lecturer, Hebrew University School of Social Work

Samuel W. Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel

Yaacov Levinsohn, Chairman, Board of Directors, Bank Hapoalim and Ampal American Israel Corporation

Shimon Peres, Leader of the Labor opposition

Professor Yoram Ben Porat, Economist, Hebrew University; Head, Falk Institute for Economic Research

Professor Itamar Rabinowitz, Arabist; Head, Shiloach Institute, Tel Aviv University

Shaul Ramati, Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, division of Diaspora Affairs

Ari Rath, Editor and Managing Director, The Jerusalem Post

Dr. M. Bernard Resnikoff, Director, Israel Office

Avraham Schenker, Jewish Agency

Yitzhak Shamir, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Lea Spector, AJC, Israel Office

Shiake Weinberg, Director, Museum of Diaspora

Ezer Weizman, Knesset member

Arie Wolf, Jewish Agency

Yigael Yadin, Deputy Prime Minister

Moshe Yegar, Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs





UPI PHOTO

Begin talks to reporters after Muskie greeted him yesterday at Andrews Air Force base in Washington.

Jewish 'worries' dominate parley

By ARMAND GEBERT
News Staff Writer

DET. NEWS
11/13/80

Confronted by an increase in anti-Semitism, North American Jewry must strengthen its links with Israel and meet its responsibilities to Jewish communities at home and abroad.

That message was given last night to about 2,000 delegates from the United States and Canada who attended the opening plenary session of the Council of Jewish Federations' (CJF) 49th general assembly in the Detroit Plaza Hotel.

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin tonight is scheduled to address the delegates, who represent 90 percent of North American Jewry. Begin arrived in Washington yesterday for talks with Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and congressional leaders. He was to meet today with President Carter before flying to Detroit.

At last night's session, Rabbi Richard C. Hertz, of the Temple Beth-El in Birmingham, told the assembly that "we are experiencing it again — anti-Semitism is back again."

Hertz also spoke of other "worries:" the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); the plight of Soviet Jews who aren't allowed to emigrate; "the spectre of Islamic nationalism which has turned the Middle East into a cauldron of hate and revenge;" and the question of whether the (U.S.) "State Department will stand fast for Israeli security."

The issue of anti-Semitism and a "new intensity of terrorism" was also raised by George M. Zeltzer, president of the Detroit Jewish Welfare Federation, who welcomed the delegates to Detroit.

CJF President Morton L. Mandel of Cleveland told of the need "to raise more dollars — a \$1-billion campaign and a \$1-billion endowment fund" — by the mid 1980s, as compared to the present \$550 million campaign. The money would be used to continue and enhance CJF projects serving nearly 800 communities in North America. Programs range from senior citizen and family service agencies to assisting in the resettlement of Soviet Jews.

Calling for the creation of "stronger links to Israel," Mandel said: "Israel's well-being is central to our well-being." He advocated a special public relations effort "to interpret Israel better" in the light of current events.

amnesty international news release

304 West 58 Street . New York NY 10019

Tel: (212) 582-4440

Telex: 666628

EMBARGOED FOR: 8:01 P.M., MONDAY,

CONTACT: Larry Cox
Press Officer
212/582-4440

SEPTEMBER 1, 1980

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CALLS ON ISRAEL FOR PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO COMPLAINTS OF ILL-TREATMENT OF SUSPECTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Amnesty International today (Monday, September 1, 1980) called on the Israeli Government to set up a public and impartial inquiry into complaints of brutality to people arrested on suspicion of security offenses in the Occupied Territories.

The international human rights organization urged the government to change its procedures immediately to bar the ill-treatment of suspects.

The Israeli authorities had not been able to refute persistent complaints of brutality, Amnesty International said.

The present procedures permit the holding of suspects--some of whom are not suspected of involvement in violence--incommunicado for long periods, and reliance on uncorroborated confessions to convict them. These procedures increase the chances that ill-treatment will be used by interrogators to force confessions out of prisoners, the organization said.

Amnesty International's recommendations were originally made in a detailed memorandum to the Israeli authorities, made public today together with an Israeli reply rejecting them. The documents were published in a 74-page report, which also contained Amnesty International's comments on the Israeli answer and a renewed appeal to the Israeli Government.

The memorandum was submitted after an Amnesty International mission visited Israel in June 1979 to look into the problem and discuss it with officials.

It focuses on complaints of ill-treatment said to be inflicted while suspects are held incommunicado, sometimes for months, denied visits by relatives, lawyers or their own doctors. These suspects then face trial by military courts, which often convict them mainly on the basis of confessions obtained by official interrogators while the suspects were being held incommunicado.

As examples of the kind of allegations which Israeli authorities have been unable to refute, the memorandum cites four typical testimonies. In them, former prisoners testified to various kinds of ill-treatment, including being repeatedly beaten or kicked and in a number of cases being forced to stand for days at a time, sometimes tied to a water pipe. Prisoners said the aim was to force them to make confessions demanded by their interrogators. Amnesty International said it was not able to judge the facts in these particular cases, but was citing them as typical of persistent complaints to which the Israeli authorities were unable to provide any convincing answer under their present procedures.

(continued)

As background to its recommendations, Amnesty International referred to a number of previous reports, including those of a United Nations special committee, the United States State Department, the British weekly Sunday Times, U.S. consular officials in Israel, and others concluding that there had apparently been ill-treatment of prisoners.

Amnesty International urged the government to permit relatives, lawyers and independent doctors to have prompt and regular access to security suspects, as an immediate way of protecting them against ill-treatment.

The official Israeli reply from Attorney General Itzhak Zamir, published as part of the Amnesty International report issued today, defended the continuation of military rule in the Occupied Territories and the procedures now in effect, saying that Israel faces an "exceptional security dilemma." It argued: "In these circumstances, the question of human rights takes on a very different complexion."

Amnesty International commented that while international conventions permit governments to take emergency measures, they require the protection of fundamental human rights.

An Amnesty International representative added today: "Basic human rights do not change according to circumstances; they are irreducible, and they include freedom from torture, and from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."

- 30 -

NOTE: The full text of the report, Report and Recommendations of an Amnesty International Mission to The Government of the State of Israel 3-7 June 1979, including the Government's response and Amnesty International comments, is available from Amnesty International U.S.A., 304 West 58 Street, New York, New York 10019.



ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

Marc Torenbaum

CONFRONTATION BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA

(Press Summary, December 5, 1980)

Polles (*Ha'aretz*) notes that Syria's moves last week prompted many people to take a good look at Jordan's position in the region and at Israel's attitude toward it. Those who reject the Jordanian option as a solution to the Palestinian problem have not changed their minds, nor have those who support such a solution. But among those who are somewhere between these two positions, there is increased recognition of the fact that an independent Jordan may be of value to Israel, and that it ought to be involved in working out a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Syria accused Jordan of attempting to undermine President Assad's regime from within, and then moved troops to its border with Jordan. Was Assad acting on his own initiative or in collaboration with the Soviets, with whom he recently signed a twenty-year friendship treaty?

If Russian support was behind the Syrian action, then it must be interpreted as a cover for Soviet expansionism. The Kremlin, which has been very careful to stay out of the Iraq-Iran war, may be trying to strengthen its position elsewhere in the Middle East while the attention of the West is glued to the Persian Gulf.

One cannot discount such an interpretation, for it is hard to believe that Assad would endanger himself in a war against Jordan without first making sure that the Russians would back him. On the other hand, it is not impossible that the Syrian leader acted without consulting Moscow, on the assumption that if he miscalculated, his treaty partners would save him from military defeat.

In the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee meeting last week, top Israeli military officials said that the position of the U. S. S. R. with regard to the Syrian move was unknown.

Israel can only hope that the Jordanian king will continue to stand up to the Syrian threat: Whatever Israel's reservations regarding King Hussein's policies, the continuation of Hashemite rule in Amman is preferable to its elimination. Israel has to cultivate a conservative policy with regard to

the political structure of this area. The notion that an understanding with the PLO is possible only if Israel agrees to have Yasser Arafat sit in Amman is a chimera. And since the PLO is hiding behind Assad's back, Israel's sympathies should lie with King Hussein in the present confrontation.

The "Jordanian option" as the Labor Party presented it is not a detailed plan, and President Sadat's opposition presents a serious obstacle to pursuing it. Nevertheless, the present Syrian threat should make it clear that continued Hashemite rule in Jordan is in Israel's interest. Even those who toy with the illusion that there is a better alternative can see that Syria with the PLO under its wing is surely not it.

Ariel Ginai (*Yediot Acharonot*) believes that the Camp David agreements were the indirect cause of the latest developments in the Middle East. These agreements shifted Egypt from the center of the Arab world to the sidelines, encouraging Iraq to try to achieve its old dream of hegemony in the area. This dream was impossible as long as Egypt was the major factor in the Arab world.

Iraq's first objective, then, was to replace Iran as policeman of the Persian Gulf. Baghdad claims that its war against Iran was waged in the name of the whole Arab nation and for its sake. Once Iraq's leadership is strengthened, its next step may be to try to make Jordan its satellite. This process, which has already begun, could open a window in the Middle East for Iraq -- at Syria's expense -- and could set the stage of an Iraqi-led attack against Israel in which the atom bomb would have a role, if only as a threat.

This plan is not compatible with Syria's aspirations. Damascus has not given up its dream of a "Greater Syria," which would include Lebanon, Palestine under a PLO leadership subordinate to Syria's will, and eventually even Iraq, which would be governed by the Syrian branch of the Ba'ath Party rather than the hostile Iraqi branch which rules that country today.

In each of these rival plans, there are clear roles for Jordan and the PLO. By joining the Iraqi camp, Jordan has dealt a blow to the Syrian cause. Moreover, King Hussein's declarations and actions have made it clear that he has not given up his claim on the territories he lost in the 1967 war -- and it seems that Iraq supports Hussein in his demands. This greatly worries the PLO, on which Syria relies for help in achieving its aims.

If Jordan does not join the Camp David peace process, it will be due to the Syrian threat as well as to Hussein's assessment that neither the Begin government nor any possible future government led by Shimon Peres would be willing to return the territories taken in 1967. Hussein has declared more than once that he could make peace with Israel only on conditions similar to those agreed upon with Sadat.

The most outstanding aspect of this conflict is the fact that Israel is taking an absolutely neutral position. Things have changed a lot since

1970. Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon is not the only one who is asking himself whether it isn't in Israel's interest for the Palestinians to take over Jordan. Such a possibility would obviously involve dangers for Israel, but it might also open the door to new opportunities.

Arieh Zimuki (*Yediot Acharonot*) reports that the Americans are working hard to learn what Israel's intentions are in case the situation on the Jordanian-Syrian border deteriorates. But Israel, for a change, is not saying anything that could be binding. Government circles expressed criticism of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Defense Minister and others who were in a hurry to express their satisfaction at the tension between Jordan and Syria and even at the possibility of war between the two countries. Arik Sharon and others are of the opinion that "it wouldn't be a disaster" if King Hussein falls, even if Arafat takes his place. This, however, is a minority opinion.

The general assessment in Israel is that a full-scale war between Jordan and Syria is unlikely, but that further deterioration and a limited war are not impossible.

The Syria-Jordan confrontation provides more proof -- to any for whom the Iraq-Iran war is not proof enough -- that the Arab-Israel conflict is neither the only nor even the major cause of tension in this volatile area.

Yitzhak Rabin (*Ma'ariv*) points out that the current situation differs greatly from that of 1970, when King Hussein went to war against Fatah, whose main forces and commanders were inside Jordan. Hussein's aim was to terminate the Fatah state within the Jordanian state. The Syrian army then invaded Jordan in order to help Arafat overthrow Hussein, and the joint American-Israeli move was aimed at limiting and threatening the Syrian force. That American-Israeli move helped keep the Hashemite regime in power, and Rabin is convinced that it was the right move.

Today, too, Rabin would prefer to see the Hashemite regime remain as the ruler of Jordan and as a partner to peace negotiations on Israel's eastern front together with representatives of the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. If Israel is asked to help Jordan against Syria, Rabin would support steps in this direction. Rabin points out, however, that Jordan has many Arab supporters and does not need Israel's help.

Yehoshua Tadmor (*Davar*) asserts that King Hussein wanted Arafat to take part in the Amman summit meeting, and that Arafat was also interested in participating because he knew the Jordanian king was planning to make a move with regard to the PLO. But Syria's boycott of the summit tied Arafat's hands.

It is possible that Assad was seriously worried by Hussein's declared intention to conduct talks with President-elect Reagan on the Palestinian issue, and by his clear hints that political conditions have changed. Syrian President

Assad knew that this was more than just talk, and that the king had been looking for an opportunity to join the peace negotiations for some time. Assad has long suspected Hussein of planning to bring Arafat into his camp, thus taking the whole Palestinian issue out of Damascus' hands.

Assad's answer to all this -- and to Hussein's moves toward Iraq -- was to present a military threat that would harm Hussein's prestige, put a stop to his actions, and dampen his aspirations.

Lea Spector

Edited by Lois Gottesman

Ma'ariv and Yediot Acharonot are independent but traditionally Likud-oriented.

Davar is affiliated with the Histadrut and the Labor Party.

Ha'aretz is an independent liberal newspaper.





ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

Mac Janenbaum

AMERICAN JEWISH

POSSIBLE CHANGES IN ISRAEL'S POLITICAL MAP

(Press Summary, November 28, 1980)

Yeshayahu Ben-Porat (Yediot Acharonot) weighs the possibilities for changes in Israel's political map. It is not only those who voted for the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) in 1977 and some members of the Peace Now movement who are among today's floating votes -- in light of the Government's political and economic failures and Prime Minister Begin's fragile leadership, many former Likud voters are looking for a new option. They probably won't go as far as voting for the Labor Alignment, but a list initiated by former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman might appeal to them under certain circumstances.

No one knows whether Weizman will actually try to establish a new list, and it is possible that he has not yet decided whether to try. But one thing is clear: Weizman's sincerity and impulsiveness alone are not enough to carry off the formation of a new list. Weizman seems to be aware of the fact that his success or failure depends on his ability to enlist a sizable number of promising names.

But that alone is not enough. If and when Weizman puts such a list together, he will have to secure former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's agreement to head it. This may not have been essential as long as Dayan's name was not publicly mentioned in this connection. However, Weizman did mention Dayan's name as candidate for Prime Minister, and he may now find himself trapped if he is unable to get Dayan to agree. Dayan still seems far from saying yes.

A list led by Dayan and Weizman is expected to win 12-15 seats in the Knesset. This would not enable the Dayan-Weizman group

to determine the composition of the next ruling coalition, but it promises them a respectable place in a Labor-led government. Weizman would then be able to demand the defense portfolio, and Dayan, if he wished, would be appointed consultant to the Prime Minister on the Palestinian issue. The Labor Alignment could then free itself from its historic dependence on the National Religious Party (NRP). Is this just a pipe dream of a man who is fed up with the Likud but hesitant to give the Labor Alignment an absolute majority? Perhaps. But public sentiment seems to indicate that when the day comes many would gladly give their votes to a Dayan-Weizman party. Nonetheless, it is too early to guess whether such a party will actually be formed, and Weizman himself is well aware of the dangers of such an endeavor.

Not much is new in the Labor Alignment. Whether Shimon Peres won 70 percent of the party vote, as his supporters claim, or 60 percent as the Rabin camp claims, Party Chairman Peres was victorious in the elections to the party convention. This makes it quite certain that Labor's candidate for Prime Minister in the general elections will be Shimon Peres and not Yitzhak Rabin. Meanwhile, at the convention, pro-Rabin delegates will fight for the largest possible minority, while Peres' people will do all they can to limit Rabin's delegates. If Rabin's group wins 30 percent of the party vote, it will be in a position to demand participation in the political leadership. If it gets less than 30 percent, Peres and his supporters will find it easier to ignore the minority's demands.

The confrontation between Peres and Rabin gets uglier and the animosity more bitter from day to day. Still, it is said that in politics one should never say "never." If one can gamble on a new Dayan-Weizman list, it is a fair bet as well that Rabin's political career will not end with Peres' nomination as the Labor candidate for Prime Minister.

Arieh Zimuki (Yediot Acharonot) reports that Begin was in a very bad mood at this week's Cabinet meeting. It is hard for Begin to accept the present difficult parliamentary situation, in which his Cabinet has only 60 Knesset members to lean on, not all of whom are reliable. Begin was hurt particularly by the anti-government votes of former government members Dayan and Weizman in last week's no-confidence vote.

The coalition's problem now is to get through the next three months. If the government survives this period, there will be no need for early elections. The greatest pressure on the government results from economic problems. That the Prime Minister is feeling this pressure was apparent at the Cabinet meeting when he asked the ministers to limit their travel expenses as much as possible. Begin wants a substantive discussion

on the government's economic policy to take place soon -- if only to demonstrate the importance he attaches to the issue. The ministers want to relieve economic distress and alleviate the public's depression, which has resulted from the endless series of belt-tightening measures. Thus it is likely that a discussion on the economy will take place within the next couple of weeks.

The ministers will have to iron out their differences if they want to try to keep the government in power by curbing inflation, and that is not a simple matter.

Finance Minister Yigael Hurvitz is sticking to his "psychological" position, which claims that the people will accept more stringent economic measures if the government can do a good job of explaining why they are necessary for curing the country's economic ills. Other ministers claim that cutting the defense budget and credit for industry is unavoidable because basic commodities like bread, milk and gasoline must be subsidized. Is it possible to bridge the gap between these positions? What are Yigael Hurvitz' plans? The answers are still unknown.

Hanoch Smith (*Ma'ariv*) has published the results of a new public opinion poll, which show that while support for the Likud has decreased since the last poll, support for Begin has been stabilized:

(in percentages)

| | <u>Believe Begin is a good Prime Minister</u> | <u>Will vote for a party in the Coalition</u> | <u>Will vote for the Likud</u> |
|-----------------|---|---|--|
| May 1979 | 59 | 40 | 26 |
| Sept. 1979 | 53 | 35 | 23 |
| Feb.-Mar. 1980 | 40 | 31 | 20 |
| Aug.-Sept. 1980 | 41 | 30 | 18 |
| Oct.-Nov. 1980 | 41 | 28 | 16 |

The percentage of those who believe that Begin is doing a good job as Prime Minister is much higher than that of those who will vote for the Likud. Begin seems to be a major political power and the main asset of this government in the elections. This is especially true with Dayan and Weizman, the two most popular figures in the government, out of the running.

Other ministers have also increased in popularity. Thirty-three percent of those polled believe Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir is doing a good job. This is a sharp increase from the 20 percent he received two months ago. But Shamir's support still does not approach the two-thirds given Dayan by Israeli Jews polled when he was Foreign Minister -- even as late as May 1979.

Another figure supported by the public is Agriculture Minister Arik Sharon. In the October-November poll, 37 percent believed he was doing a good job. However, Sharon is controversial. The number of his supporters is no smaller than the number of his critics: in the last poll, 31 percent believed that he was not performing well. As Sharon is the power behind the settlements in occupied territories, growing support for him may be connected with the rise in support for the settlement policy which he advocates.

The October-November poll also shows that extreme views on the territories are gaining support:

Question: Which of the following positions on settlements in Judea and Samaria is closest to yours?

(in percentages)

| | Oct.-Nov.1980 | Aug.-Sept.1980 | Feb.-Mar. 1980 |
|--|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| Gush Emunim-Sharon: wide-spread settlement | 28 | 22 | 14 |
| Ezer Weizman: controlled settlement in big blocs | 15 | 19 | 20 |
| The position of some of the Opposition: settlement only in strategic areas which are unpopulated | 23 | 20 | 21 |
| Against new settlements, but for strengthening existing settlements | 9 | 11 | 9 |
| Against new settlements during peace negotiations | 12 | 14 | 21 |
| Other | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| No opinion | 12 | 13 | 11 |

The percentage of those who support the position of Gush Emunim and Arik Sharon has doubled since February-March 1980. The most substantial decrease is in support for the position that no new settlements should be established during peace negotiations.

Careful examination of this table shows a clear shift in support from a policy limiting settlement in one way or another toward the Gush Emunim-Sharon position. However, the supporters of Gush Emunim-Sharon are still a minority, if a substantial one. The various positions of the Opposition still enjoy strong support, although overall support for the last three positions has decreased from 50 percent to 44 percent.

More evidence for the spread of extremism on vital political issues can be seen on the subject of territorial compromise with Jordan if the latter agrees to make peace with Israel. Ninety-one percent of Jews polled said that they oppose any territorial compromise on East Jerusalem -- the same percentage as in August-September. However, with regard to other territories, some changes have occurred:

Question: In exchange for peace with Jordan and King Hussein similar to the agreement with Egypt and Sadat, would you be willing to return territories?
If so, which?

(in percentages)

| | | No | Only part of it | All | No opinion |
|-------------------|------------|----|-----------------|-----|------------|
| Judea and Samaria | Aug.-Sept. | 50 | 37 | 10 | 3 |
| | Oct.-Nov. | 57 | 33 | 9 | 1 |
| Gaza Strip | Aug.-Sept. | 38 | 21 | 37 | 4 |
| | Oct.-Nov. | 44 | 19 | 35 | 2 |

Both with regard to Judea and Samaria and with regard to Gaza there is a substantial increase in the number of those opposing the return of territories in exchange for peace with Jordan. The percentage more or less corresponds to the increase in support for the Sharon-Gush Emunim position on settlements. A clear though not decisive majority prefers no territorial compromise with Jordan for peace, while a majority is ready to compromise at least on part of Gaza for peace. So, despite the extremist trend in Israeli attitudes on these issues, the nation is still divided, and it is hard to achieve a consensus.

It may come as something of a surprise that despite more support

for extreme positions on the subjects of settlements in the occupied territories and territorial compromises to Jordan in exchange for peace, support for the Likud continues to decline. Government members who do enjoy public support are Sharon and Shamir.

Lea Spector

Edited by Lois Gottesman.

Yediot Acharonot and Ma'ariv are independent but traditionally Likud-oriented.





ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

Marc Lanenbaum

WHERE IS EZER WEIZMAN HEADING?

(Press Summary, November 21, 1980)

In the vote of no-confidence which took place in the Knesset on November 19, the government won, 57-54 with two abstentions. Ezer Weizman -- who resigned his office as Minister of Defense but is still a member of the ruling Likud -- voted against the government. [Note: As a result Weizman was ousted from the Herut party on November 23.]

In a television interview on November 21, Weizman disclosed that he has been negotiating with various personalities about the possibility of going to the next election with a new list. Weizman claimed that his aim was not to form a new party, but to offer an alternative to the party in office. Weizman said that he would be happy to become Minister of Defense again, and that the best man to head the proposed new list -- that is, for the job of Prime Minister -- is Moshe Dayan. According to Weizman, Dayan is better suited to the job than either Prime Minister Menachem Begin or Labor Party chief Shimon Peres. Weizman praised Dayan as exceptionally perceptive, a man of vision and great experience who has a lot to say on the subject of the place of Israel in the Middle East, a man who is respected and accepted by the world at large and by the Arab world as well.

Asked whether Dayan approves of this plan to create a new list for the coming elections, Weizman refused to answer directly, but said: "I had lunch with Dayan, which was tasty both with regard to the food and with regard to the content of the discussion."

Weizman believes that there should be a Palestinian entity which would be granted full autonomy in everything except foreign affairs and defense. Weizman also believes that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) should be re-deployed in Judea and Samaria as Israel agreed to do in the Camp David agreements, and that no more Arab land should be confiscated for settlement except for security reasons.

Weizman believes that the Likud has lost its credibility. Had things been handled differently, he said, the peace between Israel and Egypt could have been a positive factor in stimulating the economy. Weizman criticized those members of the Likud, especially Finance Minister Yigael Hurvitz, who regard the peace treaty (which included the return of the Sinai oil fields) as a

negative factor and even the main cause of Israel's economic problems.

Moshe Dayan was asked to react to Weizman's plans for the next elections. Dayan's only comment was to repeat what he had said before, that at the present time he had no plans to run for the next Knesset.

The Prime Minister's office reacted to the Weizman interview by saying that they were not at all concerned and that Weizman was "not a serious person."

Joseph Chariff (Ma'ariy) discusses Weizman's vote against the government. He believes that Weizman intended his vote and his speech in the Knesset to be his last fight in Herut and the Likud. Weizman was trying to convince the Likud that its only chance of staying in power and surviving as a major political body was with Weizman in and Begin out. It is clear to Weizman that the Likud is not big enough for both of them, and that he offers Likud a last chance. Weizman knows that this is no easy job -- that it may even be an impossible one -- but he felt he owed it to himself to make this last attempt to get Begin out before deciding whether he wants to establish his own list with whatever combination of partners is possible.

Perhaps Weizman believed that this time the government would lose. (In all previous no-confidence votes, Weizman contented himself with absence from the Knesset.) Begin would then have had to submit his resignation to the President, and either the Knesset would have voted for early elections or the President would have asked either Begin or Peres to form a new government. At that point, Weizman would have emerged as Likud's last chance.

It is hard to guess what Weizman will do now. As things stand, his only chance for success lies in forming a new list which could win mandates from the disappointed public, and then joining forces with Shimon Peres.

Recent events may have altered things with regard to Dayan. No one knows what Dayan's political plans are -- he has declared that he does not intend to run for Knesset again. However, should he change his mind, he may find himself without his traditional supporters: the Rafi faction of the Likud, led by Yigael Hurvitz. In his speech in the Knesset, Dayan tried to explain that if the no-confidence vote had been against Yigael Hurvitz, he would have voted against it, i. e., for Hurvitz. But the fact is that Dayan voted against the government, and the final sentence of his speech was: "I vote for the Labor Alignment no-confidence motion because it is impossible to vote for 200% inflation." If this was not directed against Hurvitz, who was it directed against?

Hurvitz's reaction was predictable: he will have nothing more to do with Dayan.

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

Hanoch Smith (Ma'ariy) published the results of several of his polls, together with his evaluation of them. His predictions for the next election (in percentages) are as follows:

| <u>Date of Poll</u> | <u>Likud</u> | <u>Labor</u> | <u>Religious Parties</u> | <u>Other Parties</u> | <u>Undecided</u> |
|---------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| May 1979 | 26 | 33 | 13 | 8 | 20 |
| Sept. 1979 | 23 | 36 | 11 | 6 | 24 |
| Feb.-March 1980 | 20 | 37 | 11 | 6 | 26 |
| Aug.-Sept. 1980 | 18 | 40 | 12 | 7 | 23 |
| Oct.-Nov. 1980 | 16 | 42 | 12 | 6 | 24 |

This poll represents Jewish voters only. By adjusting the results to include an estimate of the way minority groups would vote and comparing these corrected results with past voting patterns, Smith reveals the following picture:

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Likud</u> | <u>Labor</u> | <u>Religious Parties</u> | <u>Other Jewish Parties</u> | <u>Arab Parties</u> | <u>Undecided</u> |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Oct-Nov. 1980 | 14 | 29 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 23 |
| 1973 Knes-set election | 30 | 40 | 12 | 12 | 6 | -- |
| 1977 Knes-set election | 35 | 25 | 14 | 20 | 6 | -- |

This poll shows that support for Labor has reached the level of 1973, even with the large percentage of the voters -- 23% -- who are undecided.

Among those who said they voted Likud in 1977, only a little over 35% said they would vote Likud today. 25% of them said they would vote Labor, while 23% are undecided. 9% of those who voted Likud in the past said they are so disappointed that if elections took place today they would not vote at all. Of those who voted for the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) in 1977, only a marginal percentage said they would now vote for Yadin's Democrats, while 5% said they would vote for Amnon Rubinstein's Sha'f. More than 58% would vote for Labor, and 23% are undecided.

Those who voted Labor in 1977, on the other hand, continue to support the party. Almost 90% of 1977 Labor voters would vote the same way today; the other 10% are undecided. Thus, despite internal disputes over the leadership of the Labor party, the party is maintaining its strength and gaining supporters among those who voted Likud and DMC three years ago. This strengthens Smith's belief that in the period just before the election campaign begins, support for opposition parties is a function of the public's reaction to the ruling party or coalition, and is influenced very little by the opposition's own internal problems.

Still, the voters' tendency to move from Likud to Labor in the last few months is surprising, not only in light of the sharp conflicts inside the Labor party, but also in light of the following poll:

Question: In your opinion, is the government effective in the following areas?
(by percentage of those who believe the government is effective)

| | <u>Sept. 1979</u> | <u>Feb.-Mar.1980</u> | <u>Aug.-Sept. 1980</u> | <u>Oct.-Nov. 1980</u> |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Economic Issues | 11 | 18 | 14 | 14 |
| Social Issues | 18 | 15 | 18 | 19 |
| Security Issues | 69 | 61 | 56 | 68 |
| Foreign Affairs | 44 | 31 | 20 | 27 |
| General Opinion on the govern- ment's effective- ness | 25 | 20 | 17 | 18 |

In comparing the answers of August-September to those of October-November 1980, it appears that in certain areas there is a growing feeling that the government is functioning more effectively.

On security issues there is a substantial increase in the numbers of those who believe that the government is effective or mostly effective. At the time this poll was conducted, the main events in the sphere of security were successful raids by the IDF on terrorist bases in Lebanon, and it is possible that the support reflected in the poll is directed more toward the IDF than toward the government. In addition, the absence of pressure from the United States as a result of the election campaign there may have contributed more to the government's rise in public favor on foreign affairs than anything the government itself may have done. These factors may explain the fact that increases in the security and foreign affairs assessments are not reflected in the overall assessment of government effectiveness, which only increased 1%.

On social and economic issues, no change took place. Only a small percentage of the voters believe that the government is successful in these areas. The public assessment was heavily influenced by the August-September cost of living index, which showed sharp price increases.

The slight increase in the public's opinion of the government's overall effectiveness -- from 17% to 18% -- while not meaningful statistically, is interesting in that it parallels a decrease in general support for Likud within the government coalition.

Apart from security matters, on which all Israeli governments traditionally enjoy popular support, the present government continues to be the target of sharp public criticism in most areas. Small changes from poll to poll, writes Smith, do not obscure this fact. The decided decrease in support for the Likud and the near-complete disappearance of the DMC provide proof of the public's feelings of resentment toward the government.

Lea Spector

Edited by Lois Gottesman

Ma'ariv is independent, but traditionally Likud-oriented.

Please refer:
Ben G. Frank
687-3383 (914) 238-8024

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SENATOR RUDY BOSCHWITZ OF MINNESOTA, NEWLY APPOINTED CHAIRMAN OF THE MIDDLE EAST SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ADDRESSES NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ZOA

SENATOR BOSCHWITZ AND IVAN J. NOVICK, PRESIDENT OF THE ZOA, DECLARE THAT THE JEWISH VOTE IS NOW A "SWING VOTE" WHICH MAKES IT MORE VALUABLE POLITICALLY

New York--The newly appointed Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee told the Zionist Organization of America Saturday night, that the State of Israel "is indeed a strategic asset to the U.S."

And added Republican Senator Rudy Boschwitz, who within the last few days has been appointed Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee "while Israel can not exist without U.S. aid; ---the U.S., if it is to continue to grow stronger--- "can not exist without Israel."

The nearly 200 ZOA leaders who were attending the two-day National Executive Committee meeting of the Zionist Organization of America here, were told by both Senator Boschwitz and Ivan J. Novick, President of the ZOA, that the Jewish vote was now a "swing vote," which made it more valuable politically.

In an address in what probably was his first talk before a Jewish Organization as the new Chairman of the Subcommittee, Senator Boschwitz of Minnesota, firmly asserted that "peace in the Middle East is not going to come by establishing a Palestinian state."

Calling any proposal of a Palestinian state as "unsettling," he said that if Senator Charles Percy of Illinois feels that creating a PLO state would end tensions in the Middle East, Senator Percy should "look to" the conflicts today among the Arab states themselves.

In his address to the NEC meeting this weekend at ZOA headquarters in New York City, Mr. Novick said he "looked with anticipation to the possibility that the new administration will examine the State Department and decide, once and for all, that the long-entrenched pro-Arabists no longer will determine policy. We will carefully observe what action is taken as an indicator of the direction the Reagan Administration will take."

Declaring that the ZOA, "consistent with its tradition and sense of responsibility will continue to address issues," Mr. Novick said:

"I do believe we can accept at face value the firm declaration made by both President-elect Reagan and Vice President-elect Bush that Jerusalem belongs to Israel and to the Jewish people. I believe that the incoming administration means what it has said in its rejection of the PLO---that it will not deal with it or recognize it, Mr. Percy notwithstanding. I look forward to this new administration in the hope that it will work towards making American military strong, and that urgent international and domestic issues confronting the security and the welfare of the American people will be addressed forthrightly and expeditiously."

Citing the large increase in the number of Jews who voted for the Republican Party candidates, Mr. Novick said that "evidently the Jewish community found it difficult to accept the Carter, Andrew Young, Harold Saunders and Donald McHenry policies."

But Mr. Novick cautioned: "Never have Jews been able to relax their vigilance, and in view of what we see in the world, this vigilance will be more important than ever before."


Senator Boschwitz, a Berlin-born Jew whose parents fled Nazi Germany for America when he was three years old, told the ZOA that "over and over again, Israel has tried to achieve peace in the Middle East."

He said that since the beginning of the Century, "Jews have sought peace with the Arabs and yet have been frustrated in every desire for peaceful coexistence with the Arabs."

In introducing Senator Boschwitz, Gordon B. Zacks, prominent Jewish leader in the Republican Party, made the announcement of Sen. Boschwitz' appointment as Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Alleck A. Resnick, Chairman of the National Executive Committee presided at the NEC meeting of the ZOA.

121580



ההסתדרות הציונית של ארצות הברית



Zionist Organization of America

JACOB and LIBBY GOODMAN ZOA HOUSE • 4 EAST 34th STREET • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016 • (212) 481-1500

In Israel:
ZOA HOUSE
1 DANIEL FRISCH ST., TEL-AVIV
CABLES: ZOAHOUSE, TEL-AVIV

December 19, 1980

CABLES: ZIONISTS, NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Dear ZOA Leader:

The recent meeting of the National Executive Committee held at ZOA House, New York this past weekend, under the Chairmanship of Alleck A. Resnick of Baltimore, Maryland was an outstanding success. The attendance was the best we have had in some time and the discussions and program were extremely good.

The Saturday evening session included an impressive report by Ivan J. Novick, National President, who analyzed the recent November elections, with particular emphasis on the reaction of the Jewish voter. This was a revealing and perceptive review which NEC members found highly informative.

Due to an unexpected development, the scheduled guest speaker - Mr. Richard Allen, Foreign Policy Advisor to President-elect Ronald Reagan had to remain in Washington. It was to our good fortune that Senator Rudy Boschwitz, (R. Minn.) was able to be with us. Special importance to his presence on the ZOA platform was the fact that Senator Boschwitz was recently appointed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Furthermore, Gordon Zacks of Columbus, Ohio, a prominent Jewish communal leader and advisor to Ronald Reagan, who introduced Senator Boschwitz, announced that the Senator had just been appointed Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Middle East Sub-Committee.

The presentation by Senator Boschwitz was met with great enthusiasm by the audience and his scintillating and informative comments received a highly favorable reception. The question and answer period that followed provided an additional dimension to an evening that those present found gratifying.

On Sunday, the National Executive Committee heard from Leon Dulzin, Chairman of the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency Executive, in a wide-ranging discussion on economic and political issues. Mr. Dulzin provided our leadership with important insights. (see attached)

Reports of the above are enclosed as well as a report on the geo-political views held by General Alexander Haig, Jr., nominated to be Secretary of State, which he expressed in Miami Beach, Florida in October 1979 when the ZOA held its International Leadership Conference. We enclose the text from the JTA which you will find of interest.

Best regards.

Paul Flacks

* * * * *
*
* THE NEXT MEETING OF THE NEC WILL BE HELD ON FEBRUARY *
* 21ST AND 22ND, 1980 IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA *
*
* * * * *

JTA daily news bulletin

Contents copyright: Republication only by previous arrangement.

Published by Jewish Telegraphic Agency / 165 West 46th Street / New York, New York 10036

Vol. LVIII - 63rd Year

Monday, December 15, 1980

No. 228

BOSCHWITZ SAYS PALESTINIAN STATE WILL NOT LEAD TO MIDEAST PEACE

NEW YORK, Dec. 14 (JTA) -- Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R. Minn.), the newly appointed chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Middle East Subcommittee, declared here last night that Israel "is indeed a strategic asset to the United States" and asserted that "peace in the Middle East is not going to come by establishing a Palestinian state."

Boschwitz, a Berlin-born Jew whose parents fled Nazi Germany and came to America when he was three years old, told some 200 Zionist Organization of America leaders attending a two-day national executive committee meeting here that any proposal for a Palestinian state is "unsettling."

He said that if Sen. Charles Percy (R. Ill.), who reportedly told Soviet leaders last month that he favored a Palestinian state headed by Palestine Liberation Organization chief Yasir Arafat, feels that creating a PLO state would end tensions in the Mideast, Percy should look to the conflicts today among the Arab states themselves. Percy is due to head the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the next administration.

Boschwitz emphasized that "over and over again, Israel has tried to achieve peace in the Middle East." He said that since the beginning of this century, "Jews have sought peace with the Arabs and yet have been frustrated in every desire for peaceful coexistence with the Arabs."

Hopes To Move Against Pro-Arabists

Ivan Novick, president of the ZOA, said he "looked with anticipation to the possibility that the new Administration will examine the State Department and decide, once and for all, that the long entrenched pro-Arabists no longer will determine policy. We will carefully observe what action is taken as an indicator of the direction the Reagan Administration will take."

Novick said he believes "we can accept at face value the firm declarations made by both President-elect Reagan and Vice President-elect Bush that Jerusalem belongs to Israel and to the Jewish people. I believe that the incoming administration means what it has said in its rejection of the PLO -- that it will not deal with it or recognize it, Mr. Percy notwithstanding." The ZOA leader also said he looks forward to the new administration addressing itself "forthrightly and expeditiously" on urgent international and domestic issues.

JTA daily news bulletin

Contents copyright: Republication only by previous arrangement.

Published by Jewish Telegraphic Agency / 165 West 46th Street / New York, New York 10036

Vol. LVIII - 63rd Year

Tuesday, December 16, 1980

No. 229

DULZIN SAYS ISRAEL CANNOT AFFORD RECESSION TO BRING DOWN INFLATION

NEW YORK, Dec. 15 (JTA) -- Leon Dulzin, chairman of the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency Executives, said here yesterday that Israel "cannot afford" to go into a recession in order to bring down inflation. A recession, he told nearly 200 Zionist Organization of America leaders attending the organization's national executive committee meeting, "would bring about a large number of unemployed, and while it would help bring down inflation it would be at the expense of new immigrants and aliya."

In a wide-ranging discussion on economic and political issues, Dulzin a veteran leader of Israel's Liberal Party, said that the high price of oil and Israel's steep military budget is a tremendous burden "no matter which government is in power." Referring to the upcoming national elections in Israel, he predicted that "no matter who wins the elections, a government of national unity will be formed."

Dulzin also said that there is a broad consensus in Israel against a Palestinian state and against negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization. In addition, he said that no one in Israel "is for dividing Jerusalem."

He emphasized that Zionist groups in the United States must insist on unity to face the challenges ahead. He called for an educational campaign to explain the meaning of Zionism, noting that its enemies are identifying Zionism with "everything that is bad in the world." This was apparently a reference to the 1975 United Nations General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism and the program of action adopted by the world conference of the United Nations Decade for Women in Copenhagen last August which listed Zionism as one of the world's main evils, along with colonialism and apartheid.

JTA daily news bulletin

Contents copyright: Republication only by previous arrangement.

Published by Jewish Telegraphic Agency / 165 West 46th Street / New York, New York 10036

Vol. LVIII - 63rd Year

Wednesday, December 17, 1980

No. 230

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

HAIG FAVORS STRONG U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL; OPPOSES U.S. TALKS WITH OR RECOGNITION OF THE PLO

By Joseph Polakoff

WASHINGTON, Dec. 16 (JTA) -- Retired Gen. Alexander Haig Jr., named today by President-elect Reagan to be his Secretary of State, has expressed himself in favor of strong U.S. support for Israel both as a strategic ally and as a friend on moral grounds.

He also has endorsed the U.S. commitment by Presidents Ford and Carter in 1975 and 1979, respectively, opposing U.S. recognition of or negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization until it accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist.

Haig, who retired last year as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is certain to face prolonged scrutiny by the Senate which must confirm his appointment.

Three prominent Democratic Senators -- outgoing Majority Leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia, Alan Cranston of California and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts -- have expressed strong opposition to him on the basis that he was President Nixon's last Chief of Staff at the White House during the Watergate scandals and for his role in the Vietnam war. Some Senators dislike the idea of a military officer in charge at the State Department.

However, since Republicans will control the Senate when Haig's nomination is considered after Reagan's inauguration Jan. 20, it is expected that he will be confirmed.

On Israeli-American affairs, Haig made his views known in a speech in Miami on October 27, 1979 before a conference of the Zionist Organization of America. At that time he was considered a possible Republican Presidential candidate. It is understood here that he has not deviated from the positions he expressed on that occasion. He posed several questions relative to American policy toward the Middle East. The following are the questions and his responses:

Moral To Support Israel

Q: "Is Israel a strategic liability to American national interests, being worthy of support only on moral grounds?"

A: "No. It is moral to support the right of the Jewish people to their own State. It is gratifying and important that Israel is a lively democracy, sharing our basic political values in a world hostile to democracy. As the strongest military power in the Middle East, Israel's very existence serves to deter Soviet aggression. As in the past, a strong, viable Israel will continue to offer assistance to American interests and activities which bolster our friends in the region and elsewhere."

over

Q: Does Israel have an unfair veto over U.S. communications with the PLO that hampers the peace process?"

A: "No. As the U.S. pledged in 1975 and reiterated in 1979, so long as the PLO advocates views incompatible with the peace process, the U.S. will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO. It is simply wrong to believe, as some of our diplomats seem to suggest, that official recognition is necessary to communication. Communication is not the issue between the U.S. and the PLO. Attempts to draw the PLO into the negotiations without agreement on the goals of the (Camp David) process undermines President (Anwar) Sadat (of Egypt) as well as Premier (Menachem) Begin (of Israel). We should not compromise what we have accomplished already through concessions to the outspoken opponents of Sadat's courageous policy."

View On The Peace Treaty

Q: "Is the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty contrary to U.S. interests because it leaves out other parties to the conflict?"

A: "No. The Egyptian-Israeli treaty does not bar other states from joining the peace process. The treaty of peace between the leading Arab state and Israel is a deterrent to war. Without the treaty, neither U.S. interests nor those of others can be realized."

Oil and Peace

Q: "Will the price of oil be stabilized by a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict?"

A: "No. The 'link' between an Arab-Israeli settlement and oil prices is tenuous. First, not all members of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) are Arab. Second, oil prices are determined more by supply and demand and the value of the dollar than the issue of 'who rules Jerusalem.' Third, to speak of such a link is dangerous, not only to the U.S. but also to the leading Arab oil producers. Fourth, it is

illusory to be considered a superpower if foreign policies are distorted by domestic needs. Linking oil needs and prices to foreign policy only invites more dictation by radical or anti-American states. This is not in our interests nor is it in the interests of such states as Saudi Arabia."

Q: "Is recognition of the PLO necessary to strengthen U.S.-Saudi ties?"

A: "No. Our apparent differences with Saudi Arabia do not rest solely with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Several differences are rooted in these developments: 1. Our failure to contest Soviet activity in Africa and Asia; 2. the Soviet-Cuban build-up in South Yemen; 3. our inability to prevent the fall of the Shah; 4. our mismanagement of the dollar. Recognizing the PLO would not deal with these issues."

Haig, 56, is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and holds a Masters degree in international relations from Georgetown University. He worked at the Pentagon during the Kennedy Administration and was a specialist on European, Middle East and Latin American affairs. Regarded as a protege of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Haig is reported to have played major roles in the Vietnam peace talks and in policies involving the Middle East, China and other areas.



ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

Press Summary July 27, 1979

How Well Is The Israeli Government Functioning?

Uzi Benziman (Ha'aretz) points out that one cannot help getting the impression that the Israeli government's settlement policy is not based on a set consensus of principles accepted by the government but rather results from the political power and personal commitment of the Minister of Agriculture, Arik Sharon. The Israeli settlement policy which is making international waves and is causing Israel political difficulties is not the result of a fundamental plan agreed upon by all the cabinet members, but the central aim of Arik Sharon who implements it in his own way.

The issue of the future of the U.N. Emergency Forces which created tension between Israel and the U.S. this week was handled in the same manner. Last Saturday, Begin told Yadin to convene the Ministerial Committee for Security to discuss the American proposal according to which the U.N. Emergency Forces would be replaced by U.N. Observers. Since Begin was hospitalized, Yadin, who chaired the cabinet meeting at the beginning of the week, sent requests to the members of the Ministerial Committee asking them to stay on for the meeting. Ezer Weizman thought the meeting was called to discuss the negotiations with Egypt of the transition of 8 students from Gaza who study in Cairo and want to come home to Gaza for their vacation. Egypt wants the transition to be through the Red Cross as has been the custom since 1967 while Israel demands a direct transition with no mediators. However, when the meeting started the first subject to be discussed, at Dayan's request, was the way the IDF should be deployed in the Gaza Strip area. Weizman was furious since this subject had not been included on the agenda and especially since it had been agreed upon before in a previous cabinet meeting and in the Ministerial Committee for Security that the IDF would re-examine this issue. Weizman was annoyed that Dayan raised this subject again before the office of the Chief of Staff had finished examining this subject. Hence, Weizman got up and left the meeting just when it started. The end result was that when the question of the American suggestion of substituting the U.N. Emergency Forces with Observers was discussed Weizman, the Minister of Defence was not present.

Since April 20th the U.S. has been reporting its ideas to Israel about the future of the U.N. Emergency Forces in Sinai. In the last 2-3 weeks the frequency of the contacts with the U.S. concerning this issue have increased. While the U.S. did not hear from authorized Israeli sources that its suggestion of substituting U.N. Emergency Forces with U.N. Observers was acceptable, Begin had suggested at some point to the Americans that they forward their suggestion so it could be discussed. At the end of last week, Begin received the American suggestion. In a written paper, Washington very clearly stated its position that U.N. Observers

should take the place of the Emergency Forces. This substitution will bring about the U.N. involvement in the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement and thereby ensure international support. This was the only way out since the U.S.S.R. announced its intention to veto the prolonging of the mandate of the U.N. Emergency Forces.

However, in the Ministerial Committee for Security, Dayan recommended rejecting the American proposal. His position was that Israel cannot agree to the U.S. attempt to get out of its commitments in the peace agreement. Dayan's position was endorsed.

Dayan's determined position stood in contradiction to the tone in which Israel had accepted the American communication regarding the future of the U.N. Emergency Forces. Improvisation was manifested here as well since the cabinet had never dealt with the issue and the Minister of Defence had declared publicly that in his opinion the American suggestion is acceptable as there is no difference between U.N. Emergency Forces or U.N. Observers in Sinai. The American attempt to renege on its commitment signed in the peace agreement is a poor statement of its credibility regarding its assumed obligations. However, the Israeli government cannot be excused from its responsibility for the weakness of its position on this issue.

The same is true regarding economic policy. The suggestion to abolish the subsidies on basic food products which were supposed to be brought to the government at its fruitless night meeting last week was presented at the last minute. When Erlich plied the ministers with suggestions and data, the ministers weren't prepared enough to offer alternatives to the Treasurer's suggestions. The suggestions are usually presented to the cabinet ministers during the last minutes of the meeting when they are requested to make decisions. As a result, the ministers didn't have time to check the data or to prepare themselves. This irresponsible procedure explains how it is possible that the Treasurer and the Prime Minister found out only ten minutes before the start of the cabinet meeting what the rate of price increase would be once the subsidies were abolished. This haphazard procedure results in the declaration of a price freeze one day and the announcement of a price rise the next.

The same is true regarding the U.S. position in the Middle East. On one hand the government (or at least its Foreign Minister) requests an increase in American involvement in the peace process - Dayan pointed out to the cabinet the need to suggest American use of Sinai airfields - and on the other hand Israel is struggling to limit Washington's participation in the negotiations on autonomy.

When the government shoots from the hip only and does not handle state affairs according to basic rules of planning and presenting alternatives, there inevitably begins to arise a growing doubt as to its ability to govern.

Daniel Bloch (Davar) claims that in this government, in comparison to previous government, there is a phenomena which worsens the situation when the Prime Minister is ill and that is the lack of a second center of power which can really rule during a long period of absenteeism by Begin. In Begin's government,

there is no minister or even a small group of ministers who can rule authoritatively and deal effectively with state affairs during Begin's absence. This situation has already affected the pace of the negotiations for peace during the times Begin was ill or absent from the country.

The problem of the Likud is not just the lack of a central power in the government which is capable of temporarily filling the vacuum but mainly that there is no possible heir acceptable to all the factions of the Likud who could hold it together. It seems that the natural candidate is Weizman. However, while Weizman enjoys great popularity among the public inside Israel and abroad, this is not the case among the Likud officials and the cabinet ministers.

Another possible candidate is the Minister of Justice - Shmuel Tamir. He is not a member of the Likud at the present time but this could change. It seems that in Begin's circle and among influential figures in Herut a more positive attitude towards Tamir has been felt lately, but the question is how the other partners in the Likud will react.

The Chairman of the Knesset, Itzhack Shamir also has a good chance. A known hawk, he is also one of the pragmatists in the Likud. Shamir might become a compromise candidate who could succeed, at least temporarily, in preventing a crisis in the Likud or in the government and the coalition. The name of Moshe Arens, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset is mentioned too in this context, however, the assessment is that his chances are very slim. In the past Erlich's name used to be mentioned as a future Prime Minister but, at present, his chances are minute. Erlich is not interested in the position personally but there is no doubt that in the near future Erlich will have a big influence on determining the candidate.

Israel and The African Nations

Tamar Golan (Ma'ariv) tells us that the day in which the Israeli flag will fly over Israeli embassies in Africa is not near at hand. One of the main reasons is that Israel's partner to the peace agreement, i.e. Egypt, is not interested at this stage. After the signing of the Camp David agreements, Israel sent diplomatic letters to most of the countries of Africa reminding them that when they cut the diplomatic relationships with Israel they did it out of solidarity with Egypt, an African country which was one of the founders of the "Organization for African Unity". Now, while Egypt is negotiating with Israel, the African nations could do so too. However, nothing has changed so far.

To some extent Israel can be blamed. The Israeli leadership is too busy handling the difficult negotiations with Egypt and it is hard to find the time to deal with a "side issue" like Africa whom many think is substantially unimportant. But there is more to it than that. The Egyptians told the African leaders that it is too early to renew the relationship with Israel since they want to use this issue to pressure Israel on the Palestinian issue.

The problem is not just whether various African leaders believe the time has come to renew the relationship with Israel but whether they are capable of

turning a wish into a reality and standing up against the pressures which follow such a move. Judging by the latest conference of the "Organization for African Unity", the answer to this question is negative. Moreover, in many African nations military revolutions have taken place in the past few years which brought to power a new generation who does not have any sentiments toward Israel nor are they aware of the enormous contribution by Israel to the African nations. The new rulers are receptive to Arab propaganda, Arab money and to the criticism of Israel which is heard so often in the international media.

The fact that Israel does not have the possibility of explaining itself directly resulted in the fact that most of the African leaders today are ignorant of its positions and blindly support the Palestinians who are presented in Africa as a repressed nation like the blacks in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Thus while Israeli companies continue to act without disturbance in Africa it is hard to predict when the Israeli diplomatic-political activity there will be renewed. Israel should perhaps ask itself whether it is necessary to go back to the status it held before in Africa. If so, perhaps a way to achieve this is to concentrate on half a dozen important nations and to ignore the others at least for the time being.



Lea Spector
LS:1m

Middle Eastern Quandaries

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.

JERUSALEM—This is a report on a first visit to Israel, a starkly beautiful land filled with marvelous people, terrible food and tragic problems.

The world's concern focuses of course on the West Bank, where, since the failure of the Arab attempt to destroy Israel in 1967, 1.2 million Arab Palestinians have lived under Israeli military occupation. There the Camp David process has ground to a halt. There the Begin government presses a provocative program of Jewish settlement. There Arab and Jewish extremists feed on each other's atrocities.

The problem of the West Bank divides Israel itself. Any notion that Israel stands united behind the Begin government vanishes in 24 hours. I was in the country for three days before I found anyone prepared to defend the Begin policy. The internal argument can be understood in several ways. Hawk v. dove is the most inevitable and least illuminating description. I received a better clue from Professor Shlomo Avineri, the distinguished political scientist who served for a time as director-general of the Foreign Ministry. The debate, he suggests, is between those who believe that Israel's policy must be prescribed by considerations of security and those who believe it must be prescribed by memories of history.

The passion of the Jewish traditionalists is to restore the Israel of the sacred texts. Begin talks not about the West Bank but about Judea and Samaria, "the land of our forefathers." He had no problem, Mr. Avineri points out, about giving up the Sinai to Egypt: for the Sinai was not part of historic Israel. But Hebron, though today an Arab town on the West Bank, is very different in Begin's eyes; and he insists on the right of 20th Century Israelis to plant settlements in Hebron or anywhere else the writ of ancient Israel ran.

The experience of founding and maintaining West Bank settlements, as I saw when I visited one, generates great pride in achievement and tends to transform the temporary into the permanent. The more settlements Israel plants on the West Bank, the harder it is to envisage eventual Israeli withdrawal; the greater the Palestinian resentment and resistance, the more cruel and oppressive the response of the Israeli military occupation.

A Mystic Vision

Begin's supporters deny any intention of annexing the West Bank. Yet where else does his policy lead? Begin's is a mystic vision of historic repossession, fueled by the old and terrifying vanity of the Chosen People myth: fueled too by the grim facts of modern history, by those bitter memories of the world's indifference to the Holocaust that have tumbled from Begin's lips in recent weeks. His policy commands fervent support from religious, predominantly oriental Jews, who have grown in recent years to constitute almost 50% of the electorate.

Against this traditionalist passion stand the security-oriented Israelis, who are more European; secular and pragmatic. They agree with the opposition Labor Party that Israel "should not exercise permanent rule" over the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; for such rule would make Israel both non-Jewish and non-democratic. Yet, as realists, they insist that Israel must hold enough strong points on the West Bank to deter Arab invasion. They would locate these strategic sites in areas without Palestinian population. They would turn over the Palestinian areas to self-rule as soon as some larger framework can be established.

The security-minded therefore oppose

settlements that have no defense rationale and that invade areas where Palestinians have long lived and worked. They see Begin's settlement campaign not only as disastrous internationally but as an escape from his domestic failures. Begin's application of rightwing economic ideas has resulted in an inflation rate officially conceded as 125% and widely believed to be closer to 190%.

Beyond that, Begin's opponents understand that military occupation not only radicalizes the occupied but corrupts the occupier. The Beginites already talk about Arabs rather as George Wallace used to talk about blacks in the American South.

Board of Contributors

Begin's supporters deny any intention of annexing the West Bank. Yet where else does his policy lead?

with no sympathy for their condition or acknowledgment that they might have rights too. Many Israelis are filled with shame when Israeli soldiers punish an entire family because a boy throws a rock at a police car, forbid the circulation of Jerusalem's Arab newspapers on the West Bank and practice against the Palestinians brutality of a kind practiced through history against Jews themselves.

No one thinks that the Begin government organized the recent atrocities against the PLO West Bank mayors. But many agree with Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem, who holds Begin "philosophically" responsible; "you have a situation where the government believes in this, then you will always have young people who interpret it in their own way." Israeli intellectuals fear that the recent rise in fanaticism, violence and paramilitary activity may even threaten the disintegration of Israel's democratic institutions.

The security-minded pin their hopes for the future of the West Bank on "the Jordanian option." Jordan, they note, already exists as a de facto Palestinian state. King Hussein still sends subventions to West Bank municipal administrations. Nor presumably would he be overjoyed by the creation of a PLO state in the narrow strip between Jordan and Israel. At the same time, he deeply resents his exclusion from the Camp David process. The West Bank Palestinians, wrenched from ancient ways by changes wrought under Israeli rule—votes for women as well as jobs and mobility for men—might well bring disturbing ideas into Jordan itself.

A few, very few, Israelis, persuaded that the Jordanian option is an illusion, argue that Israel must face up to the PLO option. But the overwhelming majority see no point in treating with a terrorist organization that incessantly vows their own liquidation. At the very least, why throw away the bargaining chip? Why recognize the PLO before the PLO concedes Israel's elementary right to exist? Pessimists add that a moderate leader—say Arafat—who made this concession would be liquidated by more fanatical colleagues. Optimists recall that thirty years ago Begin and his Foreign Minister were terrorists themselves.

But few expect progress toward even the Jordanian option so long as the ailing Mr. Begin remains in power. The polls currently forecast a Labor victory. Pessimists insert a point here too. Begin is hopeless enough in office; but what would he not do in unbridled opposition? With his dogmatic

gift, his dogmatic certitude, his messianic bigotry, he could, out of power, whip up the emotions of his followers, denounce withdrawal from the West Bank as betrayal of the prophets and accelerate the disintegration of Israel's democratic institutions.

And the Labor Party has its troubles too. Its leader and presumed next prime minister is Shimon Peres, an admirable man, reasonable, civilized, witty and realistic. But the American visitor is astonished by the resurgence of his rival, the egregious Yitzhak Rabin, whom at least one poll alleges as more popular among Labor voters than Peres. As ambassador to the United States in 1972, Rabin engaged in shameless and unpardonable intervention in the presidential election on behalf of Richard Nixon—a past not calculated to endear him to Democratic administrations in Washington. Personal scandal had seemed later to eliminate him from Israeli politics. But, like his American hero, Rabin has a dogged capacity for comebacks.

A Clouded Future

So, to put it mildly, the future of Israel is clouded. Still the best hope is surely a Labor victory and a Peres government—and as soon as possible, before the Jordanian option entirely fades away. It is not easy to see how outsiders can influence the situation, except to refrain from playing into Begin's hands, as the European Economic Community did at Venice last month. Even Secretary Muskie's Middle Eastern speech, measured and sensible as it was, was regretted by the moderates whom it was doubtless designed to help on the ground that it gave Begin one more chance to pose as the champion of oppressed Israel against an unregenerate world. Muskie's message, they feel, should be conveyed privately, not publicly.

There is no great need, as West Europeans apparently think, to make an international production about Palestinian self-determination. Reasonable Israelis accept this already for most of the West Bank. External pressure ought to be directed not at persuading the Israelis to embrace the PLO but at persuading Jordan and Saudi Arabia to consider a Jordanian-Palestinian federation absorbing the West Bank. Perhaps this is what Washington should seek in exchange for equipping Saudi Arabia's F15 fighters with missiles, fuel tanks and bomb racks.

In the end, the fate of Israel rests in the hands of the Israelis. Recently an eminent Israeli historian, Jacob Talmon, died in Jerusalem. His scholarly concern, as in his notable work "The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy," was to warn against the delusions of messianism, against the doctrine of "a vanguard of the enlightened, who justified themselves in the use of coercion against those who refused to be free and virtuous." His last article was an open letter to Begin. The danger of Palestinian self-determination, Talmon said, was a good deal less than the danger of Israeli domination of a hostile population: "The chauvinism and sectarianism which your government encourages will not only not hold the Jews of the world together, but will alienate them from Judaism and from Israel."

The question is whether the Middle East can be saved from the twin and repellent messianisms of Arab and Israeli traditionalists.

Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York, winner of Pulitzer Prizes in history and biography and a member of the Journal's Board of Contributors.

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W. • SUITE 412 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 • (202) 638-2256

LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

May 1980

TO: Executive Committee, National Council and Key Contacts

FROM: Morrie Amitay, Executive Director
Doug Bloomfield, Legislative Director

I. FY 1980 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

As reported in previous UPDATES, the FY 1980 foreign assistance appropriations bill is stalled because the Conference Committee on this bill did not complete its work on the legislation until Congress had already exceeded its self-imposed budget ceiling. The House has enacted and the Senate has before it revisions in these ceilings, but it is still questionable whether the final agreed upon spending limits will be enough to accommodate passage of the FY 1980 foreign assistance appropriations bill.

Israel's aid levels for Fiscal Year 1980 are not affected because a continuing resolution (enacted last November) has maintained funding at FY 1979 levels. However, the difficulty in passing a FY 1980 bill is now being reflected in the debate on the FY 1981 budget. The FY 1981 appropriations bill may well include increases in aid for Israel that could be endangered if another continuing resolution is required for 1981. (See II. below)

II. FY 1981 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on May 1, gave tentative approval to increasing next year's aid package for Israel by \$200 million over the Administration's request and \$400 million over present levels. This brings the Senate version in line with that approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee -- \$1.4 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, of which \$500 million is to be forgiven, plus \$785 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), which is to be 100% grant. (See April UPDATE for details.)

In addition, the Senate committee deleted all aid for Syria. The Administration had requested \$5 million and the House committee had recommended \$3.5 million.

Meanwhile, the appropriations process is underway. The Constitution mandates that all spending bills originate in the House so the appropriations bill must formally begin there. However, both the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees on foreign operations have begun their hearings (AIPAC testified before the Senate panel April 1) and mark-up is expected later this month.

Pro-Arab organizations are actively lobbying the Congress to cut \$150 million from Israel's aid package, contending that is the amount Israel is spending on West Bank settlements. While Hill observers do not rate chances for success of the pro-Arab amendment very highly, the Administration's stance on this will be important and the issue will be troublesome.

The House is considering and the Senate is about to take up the First Budget Resolution for FY 1981, which could cause severe cutbacks in the 1981 foreign aid program. This resolution is a non-binding bill which must be passed by May 15 and which states spending targets for broad "functions" such as "Function 150: International Affairs." A second resolution which sets binding ceilings must be passed by September 15.

Specific items such as aid for Israel are not addressed in the budget resolution. However, if the final aggregate "outlay" figures for Function 150 in the second budget resolution are too low then aid for Israel could be affected along with a number of other foreign aid programs. Both the House Committee version of the First Budget Resolution and the Senate Committee's resolution are well below the Administration's request of \$10.2 billion. Supporters of foreign aid on Capitol Hill are concerned that if the figures which emerge this fall in the Second Resolution are cut any more deeply, the FY 1981 foreign aid bill could be crippled.

III. MILITARY SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA & IRAQ

According to press reports, the Carter Administration has decided to turn down, for the time being, a request by Saudi Arabia for various accessories for her F-15 aircraft. Equipment to make the F-15 capable of mid-air refueling plus fuel tanks, multiple ejection racks and AWACs aircraft with sophisticated radar (for use as a command plane for F-15s) are among the items that Administration officials are reportedly reluctant to bring before Congress in an election year. The Saudis can be expected to renew their request next year.

A renewed effort is underway in the House of Representatives to reverse a Commerce Department decision to sell \$11.2 million worth of U.S. manufactured engines to outfit four frigates for the Iraqi Navy. This controversial sale first surfaced in February when Representatives Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) and Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) complained to the Commerce Department that the sales may violate a U.S. prohibition on military sales to nations supporting international terrorism. Protests against the sale were renewed in the wake of the terrorist attack on Kibbutz Misgav Am by the Iraqi supported Arab Liberation Front, but to no apparent avail. Now Representatives Bingham and Fenwick have been joined by Representatives John Buchanan (R-AL) and Dante Fascell (D-FL) in circulating a "Dear Colleague" letter to all members of the House of Representatives asking them to sign a letter to the President urging him to revoke the license for the Iraqi frigate engines and establish safeguards to prevent such sales in the future. According to critics, the frigates can enable Iraq to control the Persian Gulf at a time when the Administration uses just such a threat to justify its sales of gunboats, ship-to-ship missiles and other weapons to the Saudi Navy.

IV. 1980 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

All 435 seats in the House of Representatives plus 34 in the Senate are at stake in this year's election. Below is a recap of all announced retirements and other changes plus a list of Senate races.

RETIRES - SENATE

Sen. Henry Bellmon (R-OK)
Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT)
Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-PA)
Sen. Adlai Stevenson (D-IL)
Sen. Milton Young (R-ND)

RETIRES - HOUSE

Rep. Tim Lee Carter (R-KY)
Rep. John Cavanaugh (D-NE)
Rep. James Cleveland (R-NH)
Rep. Mendel Davis (D-SC)
Rep. Robert Giaino (D-CT)
Rep. Jim Hanley (D-NY)
Rep. William Harsha (R-OH)
Rep. Richard Ichord (D-MO)
Rep. Jim Johnson (R-CO)
Rep. Robert McEwen (R-NY)
Rep. William Moorehead (D-PA)
Rep. Morgan Murphy (D-IL)
Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-MI)
Rep. Richard Nolan (D-MN)
Rep. Edward J. Patten (D-NJ)
Rep. Ray Roberts (D-TX)
Rep. David Satterfield (D-VA)
Rep. Keith Sebelius (R-KS)
Rep. Harley Staggers (D-WV)
Rep. Tom Steed (D-OK)
Rep. Charles Vanik (D-OH)
Rep. Bob Wilson (R-CA)
Rep. Joe Wyatt (D-TX)
Rep. John Wydler (R-NY)

ELECTED TO OTHER OFFICE

Rep. David Treen (R-LA), Governor

RESIGNATIONS

Rep. Dan Flood (D-PA), Health
(Rep. Ray Misto (D-PA), elected Apr. 9)

DIED IN OFFICE

Rep. John Slack (D-WV)
(Special election June 3)

NOMINATED TO OTHER OFFICE

Sen. Edmund Muskie (D-ME), Sec. of State
(successor to be appointed by Governor)

SENATORS RUNNING FOR REELECTION

Sen. Birch Bayh (D-IN)
Sen. Dale Bumpers (D-AR)
Sen. Frank Church (D-ID)
Sen. Alan Cranston (D-CA)
Sen. John Culver (D-IO)
Sen. Bob Dole (R-KS)
Sen. John Durkin (D-NH)
Sen. Tom Eagleton (D-MO)
Sen. Wendell Ford (D-KY)
Sen. Jake Garn (R-UT)
Sen. John Glenn (D-OH)
Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ)
Sen. Mike Gravel (D-AK)
Sen. Gary Hart (D-CO)
Sen. Ernest Hollings (D-SC)
Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-HA)
Sen. Jacob Javits (R-NY)
Sen. Paul Laxalt (R-NV)
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
Sen. Russell Long (D-LA)
Sen. Warren Magnuson (D-WA)
Sen. Charles McC Mathias, Jr. (R-MD)
Sen. George McGovern (D-SD)
Sen. Robert Morgan (D-NC)
Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-WI)
Sen. Bob Packwood (R-OR)
Sen. Donald Stewart (D-AL)
Sen. Richard Stone (D-FL)
Sen. Herman Talmadge (D-GA)

RUNNING FOR OTHER OFFICE

Rep. James Abdnor (R-SD), Senate
Rep. John Anderson (R-IL), President
Rep. Charles Grassley (R-IO), Senate
Rep. Dawson Mathis (D-GA), Senate
Rep. Dan Quayle (R-IN), Senate
Rep. Chris Dodd (D-CT), Senate
Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY), Senate
Rep. Steve Symms (R-ID), Senate
Rep. Mark Andrews (R-ND), Senate

DEFEATED FOR RENOMINATION

Rep. Bennett Stewart (D-IL)

Mare Tamen
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
SHULA BAHAT
Kaum

memorandum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date October 1, 1980
to Participants in Staff Seminar with Dr. Peter Medding
from Bert Gold *BG*
subject Israel - Diaspora Interdependence

In preparation for the Staff Seminar with Peter Medding, which will be held on Tuesday, October 7, 2:00 P.M. - 5:30 P.M., Room 200C, I am pleased to send you a copy of Dr. Medding's article: A Contemporary Paradox: Israel & Jewish Peoplehood. The issues covered will serve as useful background for our discussion.

We anticipate exploring the following themes in depth with Peter Medding:

Personal perceptions and images of Israel.

Israel as a factor in Jewish identity and in Jewish communal life.

Ties and tensions in the relationships between American Jews and Israel.

The development of creative lines of communications between Israel and American Jews.

I look forward to your participation in this unique dialogue.

BG/cpa
Enclosure

cc: Shula Bahat
Gene DuBow
Gladys Rosen
Yehuda Rosenman

#80-750-105

A CONTEMPORARY PARADOX

ISRAEL AND JEWISH PEOPLEHOOD

PETER Y. MEDDING

IN COMPARISON with the past contemporary Jewish life is characterized by three factors: an absolute decline in the extent and intensity of Jewish religious practice and belief; a relative rise in importance of the ethnic dimension of Jewish identity; and the over-towering presence, inspiration and claims of the State of Israel. This article examines the way in which these factors are currently inter-related in the light of historical developments, and their impact upon contemporary Jewish peoplehood. It also analyzes some of the consequences of the existence of independent Jewish political sovereignty in Israel alongside minority Jewish communities, particularly those

in the secular democratic and pluralist societies in the west.

Religion and Ethnicity

The contemporary basis of Jewish ethnic identity particularly in secular pluralist western societies, in which membership of the Jewish community is by the formally free choice of the individual, is no longer as straightforward and clear-cut as it was in the past. Despite ready acceptance of Jewishness by both non-Jews and Jews alike, the bonds that currently hold these Jewish communities together are something of a mystery. The Jewish religion, previously the unquestioned source of collective and individual behavior has reached a plateau of convenience and formality. Yiddish and Zionist cultural life have gone into decline. In every sense the average Jew in the west is less Jewish than his counterparts in Europe before the emancipation, and than those in Eastern Europe as recently as fifty years ago.¹ Yet, paradoxically, Jews seem more closely bound to each other than at any time in recent memory, contribute in-

Peter Medding is Reader in Politics at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. He is the author of a number of books including *Mapai in Israel: Political Organisation and Government in a New Society* (Cambridge, 1972), and has contributed to various professional journals. He is a Fellow of the Center for Jewish Community Studies. In 1975 he was Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science and at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University. He is currently working on a book on the Israeli Labor Party.

Parts of this paper were first presented at the President of Israel's Continuing Seminar on *World Jewry and The State of Israel*, held in August 1976.

¹ I have developed this theme at length in "Equality and the Shrinkage of Jewish Identity" in a forthcoming book, edited by Moshe Davis, on the President of Israel's Continuing Seminar on *World Jewry and the State of Israel*, held in July 1975.

creasingly greater sums for Jewish causes, and appear more united, whilst formally organized Jewish community activities and structures have become strengthened. Part of the explanation for this state of affairs can be found in the changing nature of Jewish identity, and in the fact that the Jewish religion as the key defining characteristic, motivating force and central focus of loyalties has become overlaid (but not completely replaced) by ethnic aspects of Jewishness. These can be best described as a sense of peoplehood or even of national identity, as distinct from nationality.

Judaism was always a highly conscious ethnic religion (confined to and coterminous with one people) even though its sense of mission and its messianic end-goals were universalistic. The people of Israel, and land of Israel and the religion of Israel were inextricably woven together so that both the people and the land (ethnic elements) were invested by the religion with the highest religious significance. The people became a people by virtue of the religious covenant. The land was sanctified, and given to them (under conditions of maintaining religious precepts) by the same covenant. In that sense, in its original form Jewish ethnicity was invested with the highest religious significance.

The religion itself, furthermore, made the test for membership of the group not one of religious performance but one of ethnic origins. To join the group, and be subject to its rights and obligations, it was sufficient to be born of a Jewish mother. Similarly one could not leave the group or be disqualified by not performing religious precepts, or even by active and vocal denial

of the most important religious beliefs. Thus while one could be a member of the Jewish people without following the Jewish religion, one could not adopt the Jewish religion without becoming a member of the Jewish people. In fact the only instance of a religious test for membership of the group was that of conversion, for those who did not pass the ethnic test and in fact could never pass it. Only in such a case did the religion ordain religious criteria for membership.

The Emancipation and Its Effects

In pre-emancipation Europe political legal and social separation further emphasized Jewry's group distinctiveness. Having specific political rights and duties for which they had to bargain politically, and which were symbolized in and maintained by their corporate self-governing institutions, constituted Jewry as a people, if not a nation, apart.

Emancipation which promoted the concept of equal citizenship within the framework of the nation-state destroyed the independent political existence of Jewish peoplehood. As citizenship and nationality became coterminous not only in the formal legal sense, but in the cultural sense as well, peoples that did not have nation-states found their legitimacy as separate and independent entities challenged. As minorities not only were they no longer granted rights of autonomous self-government, they were under pressure to become incorporated within the new wider entity as *individuals*, not as groups. Political identity was directly related to citizenship, whilst citizenship was either formally or informally connected to national identity and culture. An individual who was not solely and com-

pletely committed to the dominant national cultural values was regarded and sometimes treated as a second class citizen.

For Jews this had a number of effects in addition to the loss of separate political identity. Paradoxically, while the practice of religion declined in significance within the Jewish world, it became more central as a defining and identifying characteristic of Jews for both non-Jews and Jews alike. To the extent that ethnic and peoplehood concepts lost their legitimacy, Jewishness became to some Jews narrowly defined in religious terms. This was particularly so among Jews who sought to exploit the available freedom of opportunity to become fully integrated as individuals into the political, cultural, national and intellectual life of their societies. Treating Jewishness merely as a religion, made it possible for both Jews and non-Jews to argue for its compatibility with the national cultural tradition.

An opposite tendency also developed. This emphasized Jewish peoplehood and nationality as a culturally independent form of group existence that derived its legitimacy from the Jewish people and from its cultural values, as distinct from the national and cultural values of the people and the society within which Jews happened to be found. Major manifestations of this trend were variously, Zionism in all its forms; movements for Jewish autonomy in Eastern Europe; and the Bundist variety of the socialist solution. What divided these groups was the way in which expression could most appropriately be given to this sense of Jewish peoplehood, bearing in mind the political realities of the time. In a certain sense they attempted to reassert some of the

political distinctiveness and separateness that preceded the emancipation.

Within the Jewish world these developments had direct consequences with regard to the relationship between religion and ethnicity, particularly when many Jews in the more liberal, pluralistic and secular societies ceased to observe Jewish religious practices. The decline in the authority of religion and of religious leadership produced within Jewry a conscious and articulated *equality of membership* of all Jews based on criteria of birth in place of a conscious and articulated *hierarchy of membership*, based upon religious performance or scholarship. All Jews were formally equal, and in terms of the ethnic denominator of birth all were equally Jewish. Second, as the relationship of Jews to Jewish values became attenuated, the key element joining Jews with each other no longer was their common pursuit of these goals and aspirations, *but simply their common ties*. Jews were now tied to each other on the basis of the lowest common denominator—the accident of birth. This increased emphasis upon common ties as such was radically heightened by recent events in Jewish history, the Nazi holocaust and the establishment of Israel. Both in different ways emphasized the unity of Jews everywhere on the basis of the ethnic criteria of birth and peoplehood.

This emphasis upon common ties as such has been particularly accentuated in modern western societies, where the physical boundaries and social constraints separating Jews from the other members of society have been broken down. In these societies, various studies have shown that the most characteristic and common expression of contemporary Jewish existence

is in intimate friendship, and through fairly widespread organizational affiliation characterized more by the fact of membership than by its intensity or degree of commitment.² Both aspects affirm the common ties as such, and thereby increase their significance as compared with other aspects of Jewish existence. Because they are now made to carry a much greater part of the load of Jewishness, these common ties have become more central than in the past, mainly because they have been stripped of their value and culture components. What was formerly the unarticulated basis and foundation of a rich and varied community and national life has now become a major part of the total substance of that life. To understand the meaning of contemporary Jewish peoplehood therefore, we must more closely examine and analyze the nature and consequences of this modern emphasis upon common ties as such.

Primordial Loyalties

Clifford Geertz's analysis provides the starting point for this examination. According to him:

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens"—or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed

"givens"—of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour, one's fellow believer, *ipso facto*; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.³

The crucial elements of this analysis are two-fold. Firstly that Jewish ethnic ties ("blood, speech and custom") are inescapable "givens." Secondly they may give rise to a powerful intensity of belonging which attributes an "absolute import" to the "very tie itself," merely by virtue of its existence. For those members of the Jewish people who accept the "givenness" of their situation (and probably for many who do not), Jewishness constitutes a tie of this kind.

But it is insufficient simply to assert the existence of these ties, even if one can point to their clear effects in action, without assessing their substance and content. Taking the analysis further suggests three basic constituents of contemporary Jewish ethnic ties: a biological sense of kinship and family; a psychological sense of loyalty reinforced by a sense of honor; and a cul-

² See G. Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, New York 1961; M. Sklare and J. G. Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*, New York 1967. For Australian evidence of the same phenomena see P. Y. Medding, *From Assimilation to Group Survival*, Melbourne 1968, P. Y. Medding (ed.), *Jews in Australian Society*, Melbourne 1973, and S. Encel et al, *The New South Wales Jewish Community: A Survey*, (mimeo), 1972.

³ Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States" in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States*, Free Press, Glencoe: 1963, p. 109.

tural and national sense of shared peoplehood. These are basic only in the sense that they are minimal; but they themselves and others may be developed much further, and to that extent they are not intended to be a statement of goals or ideals. They are more an attempt to point to what currently exists empirically. Whether these minimal criteria are sufficient to ensure future Jewish survival, whether they are strong enough to maintain themselves and whether they are rich enough to continue to engage Jewish loyalties and so remain at the basis of Jewish existence are separate and vital questions.

Contemporary Jewish Ties

It has been argued that Jews are loyal to the Jewish community "because the Jewish community, current and historic, is a family, literally a family of families."⁴ Such loyalty to the family as a primitive psychological, even biological, mode of relating to the bio-social group into which we have been born needs no explanation. "It makes as little sense to ask why one is attached to one's family as to ask why an infant loves its mother. It is characteristic of infants that they love their mothers; they cannot do otherwise. In the same way it is characteristic of all humans that they cling to their families, overtly or covertly, consciously or unconsciously."⁵

This deep-seated primitive biological mode of belonging is accompanied at the conscious level, as Milton Himmelfarb has

recently reminded us,⁶ by a sense of honor derived from belonging, or perhaps put more incisively, by the fear of dishonor that would be aroused either by conscious denial of membership, or by actual conversion to Christianity. When this was a real option in the past, most Jews did not avail themselves of it, though some individuals certainly did, both before and after the emancipation. But this was regarded by Jews as thoroughly dishonorable, because it generally seemed to be a matter of expediency and convenience, an attempt to escape from disadvantage, rather than a matter of deep conviction or commitment.

After the emancipation Jews maintained their "ineffable" biological and psychological ties even as they participated more fully in the life of the general society. Honor demanded not only the non-denial of ties and loyalties, but their affirmation whenever the occasion demanded. What is more, some societies not only did not put pressure on the individual to divorce himself completely from his primordial community, but, on the contrary, encouraged loyalty to it as a general social value. Thus ethnic honor as a positive value was reinforced by broader national values and goals. By the same token the path of honor is currently easier and less demanding; it merely involves accepting one's ethnic identity and affirming it, and the costs and disadvantages of doing so are

⁴ M. Ostow, "Jewish Youth in Dissent" in D. Sidorsky (ed.), *The Future of the Jewish Community in America*, Basic Books, New York: 1973, p. 234.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ See Milton Himmelfarb, *The Jews of Modernity*, Basic Books, New York: 1974, pp. 3-21. Leonard Fein has taken up the same theme in an essay "The New Left and Israel" in M. Chertoff (ed.), *The New Left and the Jews*, Pitman Publishing Corporation, New York: 1971, pp. 132-151.

clearly less than in the past. The question of honor is particularly reinforced when Jewish physical survival is actually in danger. To refuse to affirm membership or to deny it under these conditions, can incur high social and psychological costs in terms of dishonor.

This analysis also suggests that we should reconsider the common assumption that membership of the Jewish community is entirely voluntary. While this may be true in a formal sense, it misses the point that membership of the Jewish group is hardly a voluntary matter, and there is little distinction between membership of the Jewish group and membership of the Jewish community. Membership of the Jewish group is involuntary in two senses. There is the immediate and obvious sense in which birth is involuntary, and it is birth that creates the family and ethnic connection. Second, even if affiliation is formally free and voluntary, the social and psychological costs of non-affiliation and disaffiliation may be so high as to cease to be a real option.

The third constituent element of contemporary Jewish ethnic ties is the sense of shared peoplehood. This sense of shared peoplehood facilitates the *tangible* expression of the broad family ties and of honor. It consists of an affirmation of the sense of ethnic continuity in the personal sphere: "these are the people of my ancestors, therefore they are my people, and they will be the people of my children."⁷ At the cultural level it is an affirmation of the historical continuity of tradition, culture, and custom. Because of the tradi-

tions, cultural values and historical memories of their common ancestors members of the same ethnic group enjoy a sense of indissoluble and intimate identity,⁸ which is shared and is to be passed on to their offspring. These two combine to produce that sense of interdependence of fate so characteristic of Jewry, that feeling of "being ultimately bound up with the fate of these people."⁹ Such a sense of shared peoplehood may and often does give rise to a more articulated form of cultural expression, in specific religious, and national values, practices and customs, and to elaborate and coherent value systems, philosophical approaches and world views—the perpetuation of which become ends in themselves. Clearly these give rise to various specific institutions seeking to further such goals, and these in turn reinforce the senses of family, honor and peoplehood. While this may be obvious both historically and logically, what is not so obvious is whether and the extent to which the minimal criteria of family, honor and peoplehood will be able to maintain and perpetuate themselves in the absence of articulated and conscious commitment to these elaborate value frameworks.

In Pluralist and Secular Societies

Geertz also contrasts primordial and ethnic ties with civil sentiments. The latter involve allegiance to the state and to the particular form of political system and are closely connected with concepts of political loyalty, national identity and citizen-

⁷ M. M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, O.U.P. New York: 1964, p. 29.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 53. The general line of thought is of course that of Kurt Lewin.

ship. In his view, primordial sentiments and civil sentiments represent "not just competing loyalties, but competing loyalties of the same general order, on the same level of integration."¹⁰ Both engage aspects of personality close to the core, and if intensely felt may come into conflict as mutually exclusive. That is why tribal, ethnic and religious conflict within states often leads to demands for separation, autonomy, partition and self-determination, as means of resolving such intense conflicts. But clearly some primordial and ethnic loyalties may and do coexist within states without being in conflict, and certainly without threatening the integrity of the state. Differing primordial loyalties therefore are not *necessarily* in conflict, but are always *potentially* in conflict.

Competing loyalties of the same order of integration, however, can create tensions capable of causing considerable unease, insecurity and anxiety, even if they do not actually threaten the integrity of the state. Much of the unease and anxiety stem from the recognition, that although currently not so, the competing primordial loyalties are *in the last resort* mutually incompatible and incapable of coexistence if held intensely and uncompromisingly. Thus, the potentiality of future conflict, however hypothetical, may lead to certain aspects of such potentially conflicting loyalties being underplayed and others reinforced in order to increase their degree of integration and thereby to relieve the tension. There is, however, nothing permanent about such compromises and no guarantee that they will always be successful. In

¹⁰ C. Geertz, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

general terms, this is the situation with Jewry and its particular set of primordial loyalties in the context of modern democratic pluralist secular nation states and bears further analysis.

The Role of Israel

The primordial feelings of Jewish peoplehood focus upon Israel, this being the only territory that exercises any legitimate Jewish claims upon the members of the Jewish people. This means that Jewry outside of Israel has its sense of peoplehood continually reinforced by the various connections with Israel, and the greater the pull of Israel the less the claims for any kind of Jewish autonomy in countries outside of Israel, which were a feature of Jewish politics prior to the existence of Israel as an independent sovereign Jewish political entity.

Israel serves to reinforce the Jewish sense of peoplehood as a primordial loyalty, more strongly than even before. What was previously inchoate, vague and unconscious is now real, specific and highly visible. But at the same time Israel as the *permanent* focus of Jewish peoplehood generates conflict with certain demands of national identity in the nation-states. The conflict may not always be close to the surface, and it may be underplayed, but it exists nonetheless, and ought to be recognized as such however much unease this may create.

The Religious Tension

One main area of tension and anxiety arising from the existence of the primordial sense of Jewish peoplehood in modern secular, pluralist societies relates to the question of secularism and religious neutra-

lity. Irrespective of the exact nature of the relationship of Jews with Judaism as a religion, even after the emancipation Jews have been united among themselves and separated from the rest of society, at least in the fact that they, unlike the surrounding majority, were not Christian. And, as we pointed out above, as other differences lessened, the religious distinction increased in significance.

The vision and the promise of the emancipation was to break down the shackles, prejudices and widespread denial of rights of the traditional society by creating a "neutral society." Such a society was not only meant to be politically egalitarian as regards citizenship, but also embodied a secular vision of universality and complete indifference both to religion in general and to specific religions. And as Jacob Katz has pointed out this was also the "vision that had sustained Jews when they first started to leave behind the boundaries of their traditional society. This vision embraced the free contact between Jew and non-Jew that would lead to cooperation and friendship resting on personal association, unhampered by the prejudices which clung to the image of the Jews."¹¹

However, rather than creating a fully neutral society completely indifferent to the existence of religion, the emancipation produced at best a "semi-neutral society" where both Christians and liberal secularists did not expect Jews to remain Jewish. And where they remained Jewish, their inferior status was ignored "more by con-

scious effort rather than eliminated by actual equality."¹² The result was that Jews remained socially distinct and fulfilled their social needs, then (as now) in all-Jewish social circles.

"Secular" practice, as distinct from the secular vision, either expected Jews to give up their own form of particularism as part of the universal rejection of religion or expected them to join the majority by becoming Christian. Both possibilities were made possible by the emancipation's promises of liberty, equality and fraternity. As time went on neither expectation was fulfilled. Jews wished to remain Jews, even if Jewish secularists—not neutral secularists, and certainly not Christians. The majority also made it clear that it would not fully accept Jews, even after they had become Christians. The vision of the emancipation in the religious sphere had to learn to live with the continued existence of various religions, and be satisfied with the non-establishment of religion, its free exercise, and the separation of church and state, or whichever other formulation was used to convey the concept of the "semi-neutral" secular state.

None of these arrangements and formulations, however, alters the fact that today the history, traditions and cultural values of the majority of the members of those states are in fact Christian. Despite the states' formal secularity these are regularly embodied in many aspects of daily life, national symbols, holidays and celebrations, thereby infusing nationality and citizenship with Christian religious values and symbolisms. As Milton Himmelfarb has cogently argued, for Jews in modern

¹¹ Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770-1870*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.: 1973, pp. 201-2.

¹² *Ibid.*

pluralist secular societies, therefore, there are really only two options, to be Christian or to be Jewish. The third option, to be secular, does not exist, because secularism is so infused with Christian values and symbols that it does not exist as a separate and meaningful neutral option.¹³ Given such options, historically most Jews have chosen to remain Jewish, thereby limiting their capacity to identify with important national values, symbols and historical associations to the extent that these are either manifestly or latently Christian.

Such limitations are expressed in the inability of individual Jews to identify with, accept and incorporate major aspects of the national culture. It also creates marked problems for the legitimacy of distinctive group participation in the workings of the pluralist society. If society is secular and religiously neutral (not anti-religious), then it makes difficult group participation based on religious values, because the latter ought not to play any role in public life. But if society is Christian, then Jewish religious values and group claims seek recognition and legitimacy for a religious value system, however attenuated, which is antipathetic in basic beliefs to that of the majority, and which questions its major tenets and presumptions at every turn.

The Citizenship Tension

In contemporary secular pluralist nation-states a second major area of tension for Jewry may develop over the extent to which citizenship and national identity are coterminous. This involves not the formal legal requirements and obligations of ci-

tizenship, but rather the nature, degree and intensity of the loyalties involved in citizenship, and the extent to which they involve primordial components. If citizenship is construed as being coterminous with national identity so that only the "true" unhyphenated national is the "true" citizen, this must inevitably create severe problems for Jewry because of the primordial peoplehood aspects of Jewishness.

In integrated nation-states there is a strong and inherent tendency for nationality and citizenship to coalesce and overlap. The sense of peoplehood felt by the members of the society is generally more or less identical to the sense of citizenship. American citizens generally feel that they belong to the American people and no other, French citizens to the French people, and no other, and so on. In other words, they have come to develop a sense of peoplehood which enables all, including the immigrants, to say that even if these are not literally the "people of my ancestors," they are the people with whom I share a special kind of intimacy, and what is most important in this context, they will be the people of my descendants.

The Jewish sense of peoplehood, by way of contrast, informed as it is with the lessons of Jewish history and constantly reinforced by the existence of Israel, cannot so easily, if at all, develop such an unqualified sense of peoplehood identification either in the past or present with any other people, even the people sharing a common citizenship loyalty, however liberal and accepting that concept of citizenship may be. The possibilities of present and future identification are greater in so-

¹³ Himmelfarb, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-36.

cities where Jews are accepted as equals, but in the last resort it comes down to the question of whether it is possible to have more than one family. At best, what happens is that two senses of peoplehood and identity develop at one level, but at a deeper level only one exists, relating to the group with which one shares that special intimate sense of past, present, and future identity.

But the existence of Israel as a *sovereign* political entity creates problems for this capacity to maintain two senses of peoplehood simultaneously. It is quite possible that states within which Jews are citizens, may come into conflict with Israel, and the political demands of citizenship may force individuals to make a choice between their two peoplehood obligations. That this has not yet happened in western societies should not lead us to ignore either the possibility that it might happen, or the tensions and anxieties which this potentiality currently create. Neither is the fact that conflicts have so far been at the policy level any guarantee that they will always remain so, or that Jews will continue to be able to seek to influence policy at the political level without their citizenship loyalty being called into question. In democratic societies, citizens may attempt to influence foreign policy, and to do so may even be regarded as one's civic duty. But in circumstances of long-standing treaty, alliance or bloc arrangements, not to speak of war, the opportunities for influence are narrowed, whilst national identity and citizen loyalty may be demanded in support of government policy and action. Under such conditions to oppose government policy may involve serious questions of national loyalty and civic

obligation which conflict with Jewish ties and loyalties. There is no way of predicting beforehand precisely how such conflicts would be resolved.

Nor can one predict all the courses of action, policy stands and international alignment which future governments of Israel might take. In this context, one must ask the question whether there is a peoplehood obligation for Jews throughout the world to underwrite and support any action or policy of the government of Israel. Israel's future acts, therefore, may create problems of Jewish peoplehood identification, causing Jews to draw away from it in opposition to its policies, irrespective of whether the governments of the states in which they are citizens support Israel or not.

The contemporary situation in most western societies is characterized by capacity to maintain a sense of citizenship and national identity together with a sense of Jewish peoplehood, even if accompanied by ambivalence and ambiguity. It is also marked by a high degree of identification with the policies and acts of the government of Israel. Generally the societies in which Jews are citizens *permit* such a pattern of identification, even if they do not encourage it. But in the long run this Jewish peoplehood identification prevents the unimpeded development among Jews of the full sense of nationality implied in the concept of citizenship. That these societies do not demand such a total commitment and are prepared to function without it, does not diminish the limitations which Jewish peoplehood imposes upon Jewry as compared with other citizens in the unfettered development of national identity.

Two-sided Effect

The immediate implication of this analysis is that the effect of Israel upon Jewish peoplehood is ultimately two-sided. Israel has, on the one hand, become the central symbol of Jewish existence, the main rationale for its continuation, and the permanent focus of a heightened and expanded sense of Jewish peoplehood. At the same time, as is well known, its existence has made a major contribution to the "normalization" of Jewish psychological attitudes, and removed some of the tensions of minority existence, by providing an example of ongoing majority living and by enabling Jews to feel pride, honor and a sense of vicarious participation in its achievements.

On the other hand, Israel has sharpened the abnormality of the Jewish political situation in western liberal secular societies by reinforcing religious and citizenship tensions, which we analyzed above. It has also served as a more "respectable" target of hostility to Jewish interests and a seemingly more "legitimate" outlet for anti-Jewish antipathies and prejudices than traditional antisemitism, with its racist demonology. The existence of Israel, and its trials and tribulations, therefore, have added a unique dimension of permanence and urgency to these tensions, because of the central place which Israel occupies in the Jewish world, and the hopes, aspirations, and extensions of individual Jewish personality anchored in its continued existence—in short, because the stakes are now so high.

Problems of religious and citizenship integration are not new for Jewry in the western world, and it is clear from the history of the last 200 years that Jews

have had great difficulties in adjusting to them. What is unique in the current situation (above and beyond the fact that the stakes are high) is that Israel—as a tangible fact, the values it represents, and its role as an actor on the international stage—highlights these tensions and problems more clearly than ever before. As the center of independent Jewish national existence, Israel suggests the seemingly permanent irreconcilability of the religious, citizenship and nationality demands and tensions facing Jews in western societies, and the ultimate impossibility of their resolution by synthesizing or integrating them into a new overarching totality. At the same time, the constant focus upon the Israeli connection makes it difficult to resolve the tensions by ignoring them.

The international dimension and impact of these issues exacerbates such tensions. The demands of Israel and the commitments to be made towards it, are expressed not only in feelings, sentiments, values and beliefs, but often result in direct and intensive political activity aimed at influencing the foreign policy actions and commitments of the countries within which Jews are citizens. Israel has therefore become a major, if not the major, universal Jewish political interest and the concern for its security the top priority item on the Jewish political agenda. Such international Jewish political concern is permanent, total and unquestioning (in public at least), and is thus qualitatively different from the foreign policy concerns and views of other groups in such societies. In political systems where the publicly committed groups and the key issues tend to change frequently as the political agenda changes, the very permanence of such commitments

may lead directly to the questioning of domestic political loyalties both by traditional political allies as well as by opponents. And within the context of a total commitment to Israel one must also take account of the specific acts of Israeli governments and political leaders, which may give rise to severe complications and tensions in political relationships with groups with whom Jews are allied for internal domestic political reasons even if they do not immediately arouse questions of national identity or citizenship loyalty.

The Paradox

Such factors increase both the actual and potential pressure of these tensions. In general individuals need to find mechanisms for dealing with such tensions, and the greater the threat or pressure, the greater the need for their satisfactory resolution. Ideally if the elements creating tension are valued, then strategies will be devised to enable the continued existence and development of all these elements in some form. If suitable synthesizing, integrating, or compartmentalizing strategies are not found, it is not only possible but likely,

that tensions will be resolved by the fundamental weakening or even eradication of one or other element, or by the radical strengthening and reinforcement of the other. In the specific terms of our case, where the tension is sharp and seemingly irreconcilable either the nationality or citizenship elements will be made to give way or the Jewish elements will be made to give way.

Resolution of these tensions by adoption of the latter alternative represents a fundamental challenge to Jewry which could lead to an erosion of even the minimal ethnic ties and sense of peoplehood, which we analyzed above. Under these conditions Jewish life everywhere would be impoverished, and consequently Israel's global situation, to the extent that it rests upon the support of world Jewry, would be greatly weakened.

Herein lies the paradox of Israel for Jewish peoplehood. Its existence may so heighten the sense and meaning of peoplehood for Jews elsewhere that sharp tensions are created, the resolution of which may in turn lead to a dramatic attenuation of the Jewish commitment and to a consequent weakening of Israel.

The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022
PLaza 1-4000

Date 3/26

TO: IAD

FROM: Abe Karlikow

For approval

For your information

Please handle

Please talk to me about this

Read and file

Returned as requested

Your comments please

No need to return

Remarks:



Abramov: cc - IAD - Please

Memorandum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date 19th March 1980.
to ~~Abe Karlikow~~/Sid Liskofsky
from M. Bernard Resnikoff
subject

You will recall the reports I have sent you, from time to time, concerning a conference we sponsored last November on the subject of "Law and Religious Liberty" together with a Christian and an Interfaith group. That symposium was always intended to be a kind of a pilot in order to determine the shape of a more proper conference. By the way, that conference was written up, in fairly accurate form, with due credit to the AJC in the February 1980 issue of The UCCI News Magazine (I believe the Interreligious Affairs Department gets copies of that brochure, if not, let me know and I will send you a copy).


In any case, I want to tell that plans are shaping up very nicely for the follow up of that conference which will take place on Wednesday, March 26 at the Hebrew Union College in an all day conference entitled "Symposium on Religious Liberty and the Law". Once again, it is co-sponsored with the United Christian Council in Israel and the Israel Interfaith Committee. The general outline of the conference is this. Herbert Kerrigan, Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Southern California, will discuss the topic from the point of view of Constitutional Law. Our own Nathan Lerner of the World Jewish Congress will discuss the same subject from the point of view of international organisations. This will be followed by group discussions.

The second afternoon session, after an organised lunch, will apply the same subject dealing with religious liberty in Israel. The discussion will consist of a panel including Dr. Klinghoffer, Professor Emeritus of the Hebrew University Law Faculty, Professor Yitzchak Engelhardt, Law Professor of the Bar Ilan University, and Father Joseph Stiassny, long-time Catholic citizen of Israel representing Roman Institutional (as distinguished from church) interests. Zalman Abramov has a role in this by being the chairman for the second and third sessions.

This is not intended as a public, or city-wide conference. Rather, we are reaching out to about 40 selected people, with thought on the subject, or who have something to say, in order to focus on the reaching of a consensus, if possible, on the status of religious liberty in Israel, and what steps need to be taken in order to protect it.

Corresponding issues in the U.S. are reflected in such reports as Rabinove's recent article in the February issue of Reform Judaism and William Thompson's "The erosion of religious liberty in America" in the January 9 issue of The Christian Century.

MBR/kk.



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE


date May 5, 1980
to Foreign Affairs Steering Committee
from Rita Hauser
subject Paper by Leo Nevas

A favorite tactic of Israel's enemies is to accuse her of serious violations of human rights within Israel and the administered territories of the West Bank and Gaza, including torture.

Leo Nevas, when recently in Israel, undertook his own personal investigation into these allegations, and has written a review and evaluation.

I am glad to be able to send you this paper, which Leo has shared with the American Jewish Committee. I am certain you will find this report most useful, in any situation or conversation where such charges arise.

RH:jar
enclosure
80-550-18





AMERICAN JEWISH

ARCHIVES
REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN ISRAEL AND WEST BANK AREA

BY LEO NEVAS

זכר אלה יעקב וישראל

REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN ISRAEL AND WEST BANK AREA

by LEO NEVAS

I. Introduction

Over the past several years, the public has been exposed to a number of critical articles and reports on alleged violations of human rights within Israel and the administered territories of the West Bank and Gaza. The Sunday Times of London published several articles alleging the use of torture against Arab prisoners in detention in Israel. The Washington Post also gave credence to these accounts of torture in articles based on reports from a Consular Officer at the United States Consulate in Jerusalem. In addition, a report by the National Lawyers' Guild took Israeli authorities to task for the "widespread, systematic and officially sanctioned" use of torture, although a minority report attacked the findings.

For all the publicity that these articles and reports have received, the issue is far from settled -- even in the press. David Krivine, a highly regarded reporter for the Jerusalem Post, conducted an in-depth study of the charges leveled by the Sunday Times and rejected the allegations. The ombudsman of the Washington Post criticized his paper in print for sensationalizing and distorting the accusations. The State Department, in its official study of the observation of human rights in nations which receive U.S. foreign assistance while reporting alleged violations of human rights, found no evidence of systematic torture in Israel. And this is not to mention the many refutations of the torture allegations which have received little attention.

What, then, is the validity of these charges? In order to properly evaluate the allegations, a number of factors need to be considered. First, the situation in which these claims arise must be reviewed. Israel has been in a state of war with its neighbors for thirty years, and has been subjected to repeated acts of terrorism throughout its short history. This is not to suggest that Israel's security requirements justify torture. But Israel's constant battle against terrorist assaults on its civilian population must be taken into account when one uncovers instances of what one often deemed to be human rights abuses.

Second, the motive for some of the criticism of Israel's human rights practices, which casts Israel in such an unfavorable light, must be questioned. One need not be anti-Israeli to fault Israel for human rights violations. Some of the reports are from individuals who attempt to maintain a reasonable degree of objectivity. But some of the charges do come from confirmed enemies of Israel who have a stake in seeing Israel lose international support and who make little attempt to mask their objectives.

Finally, and most importantly, the accuracy of the overlapping and often confusing allegations needs to be double-checked. In a matter of this importance, it is not asking too much to seek additional independent confirmation of the charges. As preparation for this report, I have personally interviewed many Arab prisoners and have visited numerous jails and detention centers both early in 1979 and again in February, 1980. The charges and countercharges may not be resolved unless a first-hand examination in depth is made by a group of highly competent individuals, who are judged to be impartial by a wide-range of interested parties. Such an inspection has yet to come to pass and none of the reports to date meets these standards. Some of the difficulties of ascertaining the truth will become obvious. In the meantime, I have offered my own experiences in order to help clarify the issues.

II. Allegations of Human Rights Violations

Allegations of human rights violations in Israel run the gamut from complaints about administrative detention and overcrowding in prisons to charges of systematic torture condoned by Israeli officials at the highest level of government. Too often, all of these issues are lumped together, as if the fact of one alleged abuse would count as evidence for the entire mass of accusations. The truth, of course, is more complicated than this; an understanding of the issue can best be advanced by making some careful distinctions.

III. Administrative detention and legal rights in the Territories

Israel's judicial practices are founded on the British legal system which Israel inherited in 1948. The basic safeguards provided by English Common Law exist within Israel and the administered territories. In addition, Israel has modernized its judicial system in important ways.

In 1967, when Israel assumed control over the West Bank, Israel allowed the local court system, established by Jordan, to continue its jurisdiction over most cases. Israel, however, did prohibit the imposition of the death sentence, a punishment which was provided for when the West Bank was under Jordanian control. It is important to note that in spite of the dangerous and tense situation that exists, not a single person has been executed in 32 years, even for multiple acts of murder, except Adolph Eichmann for his part in the mass murders of six million Jews in Europe. While Israel did remove security cases from the jurisdiction of the local courts to the military courts, it established an appellate procedure within the military justice system to prevent abuses by its military authorities in the territories. Inhabitants of the territories have the right to petition the Israeli Supreme Court with respect to any order of the military administration in the territories or the order of any other Israeli authority. This is the only situation of which the writer has knowledge where a military administration of an occupied territory permits recourse to the civilian Supreme Court.

Israel inherited Defense Emergency Regulations from the British Mandatory Government at the time the State of Israel was created in 1948. Israel continued these regulations in effect in spite of the sharp criticism leveled at them from within the country, because of the emergency in which Israel found itself immediately upon its creation. However, a limited and cautious use was made of the regulations in comparison with the large-scale and indiscriminate use made by the British authorities. There was a continuous clamor within Israel for repeal of these regulations and the enactment of more reasonable and restricted regulations. It should be kept in mind that administrative detention is commonplace in many democracies of the Western world and it is not unique to Israel.

In 1979 the existing administrative regulations referred to above were repealed and were replaced with a new Israeli law which sought to meet the requirements of Israel's security and nevertheless safeguard the rights of individuals. Among the changes made as a result of this legislation was that which limited the effectiveness of the law to the period in which a state of emergency exists in Israel which is to be declared by the legislative authority instead of the prior British law which was unlimited in duration.

A further change provided that the power to order administrative detention was vested solely in the Minister of Defense who bore the responsibility of answering to the Cabinet and to the Knesset. This is in contrast to the prior authority of an area military commander or the Chief of the General Staff being authorized to issue such an order. Under the new provisions, the Chief of Staff could order the temporary arrest of a person who had to be released within 48 hours unless the Minister of Defense has in the meantime issued an order for arrest.

A further change in the law provided that a judicial examination was required in each case of administrative detention and any order issued by the Minister of Defense is required to be submitted for the approval of the President of the District Court within 48 hours from the arrest. If the hearing before the President does not begin within those 48 hours, the detainee is to be released. The decision of the President is appealable to the Supreme Court.

Whereas under the prior emergency regulations the detention could have been for an unlimited period of time, the maximum now permissible by order of the Minister of Defense with the safeguards above-mentioned is for a period of six months. This period might be extended for a further six months but it must be established that the conditions warranting the original detention order still exist and this order would again have to be submitted for judicial confirmation within 48 hours.

It was heretofore the law that a police officer or soldier might arrest a person for security reasons for a period not exceeding one week without further requirements. This is no longer permitted.

In addition, the President of the District Court reviews the detention order at least once every three months and he may do so more frequently if he desires. The new law further provides a right of appearance for the detainee at hearings in the District Court and in the Supreme Court unless the President of the District Court is satisfied that the taking of evidence in the presence of the detainee or disclosure to him may be injurious to the security of the State. It is clear that the change in this law governing Israel itself provided welcome revision.

However, since the law of Israel does not apply to the territories, this law did not automatically become applicable to the territories. Nevertheless, since the time of its enactment in the spring of 1979, there was

continuous agitation from many sources, including the Minister of Justice, Shmuel Tamir, for the military authority to adopt the main provisions of this law for governing the territories, in place of the existing British Mandatory Emergency Regulations. On January 8, 1980, the military government of the territories adopted regulations making the above-mentioned laws governing administrative detention applicable to the territory with the following modifications:

1. The temporary detention was increased from 48 to 96 hours.
2. The review of the orders was conducted by the Military Courts rather than by the Civil Courts.
3. Miscellaneous other changes which would make the provisions compatible with the authority of the military in the territories.

Nevertheless, these changes were a major improvement in the laws governing the administrative detention and should serve to remove many of the areas of criticism that have heretofore existed. Yet neither the Western press nor any human rights organizations have mentioned these progressive steps. Administrative detention is objectionable to most Americans with or without the above-mentioned safeguards. Israel, like most other democracies in the world, has nothing analogous to the Miranda decision or some of the other laws oriented toward protection of the defendant found in the United States, nor are these protections found in any other western democracy. But Israel's predicament is unique. It is a country which has had war continuously declared on it by its neighbors, many of whom have been in a state of war with Israel since 1948. In spite of this, Israel relies upon the labor of many of its non-Israel Arab inhabitants. Every day 60,000 Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza enter Israel without molestation or fear. As much as Israel uses their labor, they nevertheless do pose a potential security threat. These changes are designed to permit Israel to deal with its security needs but nevertheless provide safeguards for its citizens and others who might be subjected to administrative detention.

IV. Prison Conditions

Few in Israel contend that prison conditions are ideal. The Israel National Television aired a series of programs in 1978 which graphically portrayed poor prison conditions in Israeli jails. Most Israeli prisons are

overcrowded and prison authorities sometimes find it difficult to cope with the influx of inmates. In large measure, as in other nations, this problem is traceable to politics and special conditions. Crime is on the rise in Israel and prison reform is not a high-priority item in a nation beset by a wide assortment of economic ills. Moreover, the Knesset, like any legislature, is not always responsive to social causes which do not have effective lobbies. As a result, much-needed prisons have not been built and the 6,000 prisoners of all kinds in Israel are housed in too few and inadequate prisons and in overcrowded conditions.

My first-hand observations conducted both in 1979 and February, 1980 can only confirm the calls for reform. Many years ago when I served as a Municipal Court Judge and Prosecutor, I visited prisons in Connecticut, and the prisons I saw in Israel had many of the same shortcomings of those I inspected in the past. In addition, in the Israeli jails I visited, young people were often kept in the same prisons as adults, although an attempt was made to separate them. This practice tends to subject the younger inmates to the corrupting influences of the more experienced. On my recent visit to Ashkelon prison this year, I learned that all persons under 21 had been moved to another institution for younger prisoners, which is a positive step.

On the plus side, it should be noted that Israel's free-wheeling press has publicized many of the abuses. The legal system also contains many safeguards for defendants and prisoners not found elsewhere. I know of no other system in which the Justices of the Supreme Court, regularly and unannounced, visit prisons to inspect conditions there. Nor do I know of another system which has an "Amnesty Commission," which re-examines the records of all prisoners, their sentences and present circumstances in order to determine if some prisoners should be pardoned, have their sentences reduced or receive some other form of relief. The "Amnesty Commissions" are headed by retired Supreme Court Justices and are made up of outstanding citizens. The "Amnesty Commissions" are not convened at the request of prisoners, but function as a regular part of judicial apparatus. Nevertheless, prisoners in Israeli jails still retain the right to appeal to the Supreme Court for consideration of their grievances simply by addressing a letter to that Court. Moreover, that Court is constituted of men who are knowledgeable of the plight of the prisoner.

During my stay in Israel, Justice Shamgar of the Supreme Court pointed out to me that he had served approximately four years in prison, both in Israel and in Africa as a prisoner of the British during the mandate period. Minister of Justice Tamir likewise was a prisoner of the British and stated to me in no uncertain terms that he was determined to see that Israel prison conditions did not resemble those of the British military jails he had known as an inmate.

V. Torture and Allegations of Physical Abuse

Charges of torture received worldwide attention with the June 1977 article in the London Sunday Times which reported that physical abuse of Arab prisoners was extensive. Interestingly enough, however, a number of human rights organizations and journalists have issued reports which contradict the Sunday Times. As these reports have, in the main, not been widely publicized, it is useful to review them for the record.

One noteworthy study was conducted under the auspices of the Catholic Lawyers Association of Europe and the French Bar. It was prepared by Professor Andre Decocq, M. Gervaise Hue of the Office of Procurer of the French Government and Mario Stassi, a leading French Advocate of the Cour d'Appal d'Paris and a member of the Conseil d'L'Orare. This group set off to investigate the allegations in the Sunday Times and it completed its reports in February, 1978.

The group reports that it was given the cooperation of the Israeli Government and was permitted to visit any prisons in the territories it desired and interview any prisoners there that it wished. Among the prisons it visited was one at Ramle, which is the most important and largest penitentiary in Israel itself, as well as a prison in Gaza and one in Ramallah, an administered territory. It reported that there were no problems in pursuing their investigations.

The group reported that there was absolutely no evidence which would justify the claim of any systematic or widespread torture within the prisons either after the sentences or during the period of interrogation. It did state that when they interviewed prisoners individually, no claims of mistreatment or torture were found. However, when large groups of thirty or forty were interviewed together, there were "leaders" who would come forward and assert claims of mistreatment during interrogation.

Another significant report was made as far back as 1972 by Jerome J. Shestack, a well-known Philadelphia lawyer who has served as Chairman of the Committee on Civil Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar Association, formerly President of the International League for Human Rights and presently the U.S. Representative on the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Shestack visited two prisons in Israel, Ramle and Neve Tirza. He interrogated many prisoners, with full freedom of the prison and complete lack of interference by the authorities in order to determine whether Israel was complying with the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. He filed an eighteen-page printed report and I quote from two portions of that report. First, with respect to his interrogation of prisoners at Neve Tirza prison and the second, at Ramle Prison.

"I asked a number of terrorist prisoners to tell me whether they were mistreated in any way. In particular, I asked various prisoners whether they had ever been beaten or tortured or sexually molested. In every case, the answer was negative. My inquiry included not only the period of imprisonment, but also the period prior to trial when the prisoner when the prisoner was being interrogated and which would be the time when mistreatment was most likely to occur. I framed my inquiries in different ways, sometimes using leading questions to evoke an answer. I specifically asked witnesses who were sentenced to life terms and therefore, had nothing to lose. In each case, the answer was negative; there are no complaints or any evidence of physical mistreatment."

"I asked prisoners, in particular, terrorist prisoners, whether they had been mistreated or beaten either while in prison or while being interrogated prior to trial. Answers were negative except in one case. One prisoner whom I interviewed in one of the workshops said that during his interrogation he had been hit, 'but not much'. On further questioning, he indicated that during a long question period he had been cuffed a number of times by hand and once with a stick. He said that it left no marks and it was no more than he expected. . . . I asked whether he had received medical treatment as a result of these blows and he said that he had not needed it."

Journalists have also come up with similar observations. A Rueter correspondent, Bernard Edinger, was permitted to mix freely with Palestinian terrorists in Gaza prison, accompanied by a cameraman. He spent six hours there and

spoke to twenty detainees chosen by him at random. Nineteen of these admitted to the crimes for which they had been convicted, but none claimed to have undergone torture. Several did say that on and immediately after arrest, they had received beatings, but none said they had received electric shocks, sexual assaults or any of the other lurid tortures that had been described.

David Krivine, of the Jerusalem Post, also investigated allegations of torture but found no evidence to substantiate these charges.

The International Commission of Jurists recently reported that their investigation which dealt with a period of about eighteen months from the middle of 1978 until the end of 1979 brought to light no reports of torture, which it was certain would have been disclosed by its investigation. The Commission report stated that in their judgment there was no systematic practice.

The International Commission of Jurists report also expressed gratification at the steps taken to prevent physical torture of suspects, and investigate and follow through on any allegations of ill-treatment. The report further welcomed the agreement with the International Committee of the Red Cross pursuant to which the ICRC interviews alone all suspects under interrogation every fourteen days. It expressed the wish that more countries would permit this safeguard which is apparently unique to the territories.

During my stay in Israel, I conducted my own inquiry into the accusations. When I began I was unaware of the findings of in the report sponsored by the Catholic Lawyers Association of Europe and the French Bar. But many of my observations do parallel these findings. In order to best explain my procedure in conducting this investigation, which took place in 1979 and February 1980 and my conclusion, a detailed account of my trip is as follows:

VI. Torture Allegations: A first-hand View

My inquiry began when I advised the Israeli Minister of Justice and the Foreign Office that I wanted the opportunity to talk with appropriate officials dealing with these matters and likewise, to visit some of the prisons. I was given every possible cooperation and no request that I made was rejected.

Those in the Government who spoke with me included Supreme Court Justice Shamgar, a civil libertarian who has also served as Attorney General and Judge Advocate General

of the Military; the present Attorney General, Professor Itzhak Zamir; Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir, one of Israel's leading trial lawyers and a well-known human rights advocate; Mayer Gabay, the Director General of the Ministry of Justice, President of the United Nations Association of Israel and a leading member of the Israeli team of negotiators in the present Egyptian-Israeli negotiations; Ms. Tamar Golan of the Ministry of Justice, whose responsibilities lie in the field of human rights; and Anne-Marie Lambert of the Foreign Office, who has represented Israel at the Human Rights Commission as well as at UNESCO. I likewise met with various members of the prison staff and of the Department of Interior, members of the Attorney General's Office and with the Prosecuting Staff of the Military Government. I also met with Ms. Felicia Langer and Ms. Leah Tsemel, two extremely well-known defenders of persons charged with terrorist activities. I likewise conferred with two Arab lawyers from East Jerusalem and the West Bank, one of whom advised me that he had defended over five hundred persons charged with terrorist activities.

In addition to these interviews, I met with many prisoners at two prisons, Ashkelon and Nablus in the administered territories. At both institutions the authorities gave me absolute free reign to interview any prisoners I desired, to go to any part of the prisons I desired, and to talk to any prisoners privately if they could communicate with me in English, or through an interpreter I brought along with me if they were unable to communicate in English. I also met with the visiting surgeon at Ashkelon and many prison officials and wardens.

The basic complaints involved the general conditions including the food, medical attention, overcrowding, lack of exercise, entertainment, reading material and other such matters.

My experience with food was quite limited, but what I did see of it, seemed to me to be quite adequate. I was at Ashkelon during the noon meal and though I would not recommend this meal for any gourmet, it was a well-balanced meal, with vegetables and meat, and seemed like a more than adequate dinner. I was informed by the authorities that all the prisoners were given the same rations as the men serving in the Army. This is true whether they are common criminals or whether they have been convicted of terrorist crimes. On my second visit I ate lunch at the prison and was served basically the same food as the prisoners and found it more than adequate.

Both prisons had small libraries with perhaps approximately two thousand volumes each in English, Arabic and Hebrew. In addition, each prison had English and Arabic newspapers plus TIME and other magazines. I was informed by the prisoners who took care of the library that there is a very heavy usage of the facility and that the variety of materials is quite good. The prisoners are entitled to receive, under an order of the Israeli Supreme Court, any book they desire in their own language, whether it be Arabic, Turkish, or whatever. I learned that many of them had requested Karl Marx' books as well as other Communist literature, all of which was obtained for them. However, on my second visit, the request for books and materials was mainly religious and showed the influence of the Khomeini revival.

In addition, correspondence courses are provided for the prisoners in almost any field that they desire that is obtainable. The number and depth of the courses and the extent of their usage is rather surprising. They are permitted to take university exams upon completion of a course. Approximately twenty percent of the prisoners were college or university graduates and about fifty percent were high school graduates.

There are facilities and workshops for the prisoners but in each prison in 1979 there were a substantial number who refused to work because they felt that by doing so they would be helping the State of Israel. Others do selective work, such as maintenance of the prison grounds, since this is not as helpful to the State. In 1980 almost all prisoners in Ashkelon had refused to work because of threats from other prisoners.

One complaint that I felt was definitely justified was the lack of adequate space in the cells, which were overcrowded. This is the most serious shortcoming both from the point of view of the prisoners, as well as the welfare of the institution.

In my visits through the prisons, I saw no rooms, facilities or equipment which could be or was utilized for torture as alleged in some of the reports. At Nablus, I did see the gallows, which had been used regularly by the Jordanians during their occupation of the West Bank territory, but which had not been used since the Israelis occupied the area. The room in which the gallows are located is now being used for the storage of stationery and records. There has not been a single person executed in any of the territories by the Israelis since 1967.

Not a single prisoner that I interviewed at either prison privately ever alleged that there had been any torture or mistreatment either of himself or of any other prisoner that he knew and the worst claim made by any one of them was that on a few occasions they had been "slapped," an action they demonstrated with an open hand. These individuals denied that they had been tortured in any of the ways which had been so commonly set forth, such as being hung by their hands or by their feet, beaten by rods or sticks, given electric shock treatments or abuse of the sexual parts of their bodies or any other of the other common allegations.

Insofar as the frequency and length of interrogation is concerned, their statements could be summarized by stating that the maximum period of interrogation in any 24-hour period was approximately two and a half to three hours and that they were questioned as frequently as daily for four or five days and then every two or three days during periods that extended from a five-day period of interrogation to up to twenty-three days of interrogation. No prisoner stated that he was interrogated more than about eight times, regardless of the period during which they were under interrogation.

At Ashkelon, which is a maximum security prison where about eighty-five percent of the prisoners are serving at least one life sentence and up to twelve life sentences, I talked, in 1979, to three different large groups of prisoners of about 35 or 40 each. In each one of these instances, there was a spokesman for the group who came forward with a list of the acts of torture or mistreatment claimed. Although these ranged widely, none of these claims included sexual abuse or some of the terrible charges that have been voiced in many of the press accounts. The charges they cited included severe beatings, claims of having been put out in the cold at night, being hit on their feet with sticks and being punched. In one instance, a prisoner claimed that an electric wire had been attached to his head. However, when I attempted to inquire of specific prisoners chosen at random in that group, exactly what had been done to them, I was interrupted by the "spokesman" who continued his recitation of various acts of abuse, reading these from a well-worn sheet of paper he had taken from his pocket. He would not permit me to question the individual prisoners, nor would he permit them to respond.

When I pressed for specific acts of torture, I was given the following by the spokesman of the different groups, but not by the individual involved:

1. One prisoner exhibited a scar of about one-quarter inch in diameter which the spokesman claimed had been inflicted by electric wires attached to his head. Examination of his file disclosed that at the time of the trial in the Military Court, psychiatric tests had been taken at the request of the prisoner's own lawyer. The prisoner had insisted that he was not a member of the FATA but was an Egyptian intelligence officer. No evidence of psychiatric difficulty was found, and he was tried and convicted for his terrorist activities. During his confinement, he had been sent to the hospital on eight different occasions because of various complaints, but the examinations disclosed nothing wrong with him. He had made complaints to the ICRC first about the alleged torture and about the absence of medical care, neither of which was substantiated. I saw this prisoner again on my visit this year, but this time alone. He did not recognize me and on questioning, stated that he had never been mistreated or tortured. I removed the cap he was wearing and asked him to explain the scar on his head. He stated that he had been wrestling with another prisoner and had his head on a bar which caused the wound.

2. Another prisoner exhibited a shrunken calf of his right leg. It was alleged by the spokesman that during his period of interrogation, the leg had been broken. Upon examination of the file at the office, it was disclosed that the deformed leg had been X-rayed on three different occasions and the X-rays showed no physical injury to that leg. As I was leaving the institution, I met the visiting surgeon who visits the prison twice a week. I inquired about this prisoner, as well as about two others who will be mentioned. He advised me that he was familiar with the claims made by this prisoner and that there is absolutely no evidence of any injury or damage to that leg, except that the muscle of that leg has atrophied. It was his own personal opinion that since there was no medical explanation for this result, the prisoner was deliberately permitting this atrophy to occur and would seek a medical discharge. He acknowledged that this was speculation on his part and the other doctors, but there was no other medical explanation for the complaint. I visited with this prisoner again this year, but alone, and he informed me that his leg was broken in the hospital. I was informed by the authorities that he has been in hospitals many times for many complaints. They expected to release him soon for medical reasons.

3. A spokesman for one large group at Ashkelon was a very intelligent and eloquent gentleman whom I later learned

had been a medical student. He took off his shoe and sock to show me a very horribly deformed foot. I attempted to find out from him how this had occurred, but he was extremely evasive, merely indicating that it resulted from treatment in the prison, and stated that prison authorities were not taking care of him and wanted to see him lose his leg. I later learned from the records, which were confirmed by the surgeon, that this particular prisoner had led an attack of a PLO group against Israeli soldiers and in that process had been shot so that he lost the toes of his foot. He could not go to a hospital without disclosing how this had occurred and immediately disclosing himself. He therefore administered morphine to himself and with an ordinary axe, had severed the injured part of his foot. He continued in hiding until it healed sufficiently for him to resume his terrorist activities, but was then caught during another attack. After being caught, he was taken to Hadassah Hospital where surgery was performed upon that foot. The surgery was not successful.

The surgeon told me that they were attempting to determine what action ought to be taken. He stated that a further operation on the foot would probably not be successful. The recommendation had been made that the only way to take care of this properly would be to remove the leg at the knee. He explained to me that the prisoner objected to this procedure. At that time, the prison authorities intended to take this prisoner to one of the major hospitals and either perform a further operation on the foot, with not much chance of success, or, if the prisoner consents, the amputation. When I saw this prisoner this year, he told me that they performed an operation on his foot, and though not completely successful, it was improved. He exhibited the foot to me and it seemed quite improved.

4. The spokesman told me that one of the prisoners in this group alleged that his hands and legs had been tied while he had been left hanging by his hands. Electric wires were connected to his arms. The soles of his feet were burned and threats were made against his wife. He not only stated these claims, but made certain that he stated them loudly enough so that the prison officers overheard it at some distance. He clearly had no fear at all of any reprisals or any other dire results from this episode. I asked to see this prisoner's feet to determine whether there were any burn marks left or any other evidence of this treatment. The prisoner avoided removing his shoes and stockings. Examination of his record indicated that some of these claims had been asserted several years ago and that the Red Cross had made an investigation but had found no facts to substantiate these claims.

5. In another large group of prisoners, I was told that one of the group who was sick was receiving no medical attention and that he was being left to die. I asked to see this prisoner and he appeared to me to indeed be ill. On discussing this with the surgeon, I learned that this prisoner had an ulcer as well as colitis and that he was scheduled to enter the hospital within a short period for surgery for both conditions. This year I learned that he indeed had received that treatment and when I saw him, he was well.

6. On several occasions I was told of two prisoners who were being transported to a hospital and were beaten en route by two of the prison wardens. I found one of these prisoners in one of the groups that I interviewed and he stated that when the vehicle was outside the prison gates, the guards stopped it and proceeded to beat them. In response to the question as to what had provoked this attack, I was advised that it was totally unprovoked.

The prison record indicated that these two prisoners, as they were leaving the prison in a prison vehicle, started shouting inflammatory remarks to the other prisoners as well as to the guards and refused to stop when ordered by the guards. It appeared that the guards then used excessive force on the prisoners. After an investigation and hearing, the authorities found that the guards had indeed used unnecessarily excessive force and mistreated the prisoners, as a result of which they were severely punished for their actions.

7. I was told that a former prisoner had been beaten to death at Ashkelon Prison. The story was related to me in various versions by different prisoners in the groups I interviewed. Upon inquiring of the prison officials and checking into the records, I learned that in 1973 the PLO had organized a program of sabotage within the prison, destroying equipment and various other acts of sabotage. The authorities believed it was part of their plan to blow up a part of the prison. One of the prisoners locked himself in the metal workshop and proceeded to destroy the equipment and started fires in that area. The authorities concluded that he was engaged in an effort to totally destroy this facility. Tear gas was introduced into this workshop in large quantities which completely disoriented the prisoner. He started throwing himself wildly around the room. During the course of this behavior, he apparently hit his head upon the wall with considerable force. When the wardens broke into the room, he was either unconscious or semiconscious and was immediately taken

to a hospital where he remained for two and a half months. There was apparently brain damage resulting from this injury and he received treatment for that. The records indicated that while in the hospital he contracted pneumonia and died as a result of pneumonia. An investigation was ordered by the Courts, and they found that there was no excessive use of force and that the death resulted from a cause having no relationship to anything that occurred in the prison. The Red Cross also made an independent investigation and confirmed these findings.

Contrasted with these claims made by prisoners in large groups were the results of interviews with individual prisoners, which disclosed nothing of severe beatings or other forms of mistreatment or torture. "Slappings" or blows with a fist were claimed. Two specific examples were the following:

At Ashkelon, I spoke with a so-called solitary confinement prisoner who shared a cell with another prisoner, both of whom were there because they had badly beaten a guard. In return, they had received beatings from other guards. On questioning this prisoner, he seemed like a most reasonable man. He confirmed these facts and further stated that a hand had never been laid on him prior to this occasion, whether in interrogation or at the prison, and that he had never been subjected to any mistreatment or torture nor had he ever witnessed any such acts or had any direct knowledge of them. We talked for some time about his complaints, which involved overcrowding at the prison, unsatisfactory food, and other similar complaints. I was amazed at his frankness and directness, but I was more amazed when I learned that this very "reasonable and decent" person was serving three life sentences for the murders of a mother and two children. The mother and children were waiting in their car for the father to return from a market which he had entered. This prisoner had opened the door of the vehicle and thrown a hand grenade into the car, killing the three innocent victims. After his apprehension, it developed that the police had been looking for him for other terrorist murders. If there were ever circumstances which would provoke police brutality, I think this was it.

I saw him again this year and he reiterated to me that no mistreatment had ever occurred. He took pains to volunteer to me that these three murders were not the only ones he had committed; I suppose the fact that three life sentences had already been imposed gave him assurance that nothing more could happen to him.

In an interview with another prisoner who had already served quite a few years for a murder, which he admitted to me, he stated that in all the time he had been at the prison

and during interrogation, no one had ever touched him or mistreated him. He had never seen anybody mistreated or tortured and the only time he had seen any prisoner hit by a guard was when a prisoner had acted up or had instigated the blow.

All of the prisoners at Ashkelon, with the exception of those I mentioned above and the six people who were then in the clinic recovering from operations, were in good health and in good general condition. What was particularly notable was the fact that none of these prisoners seemed cowed or beaten or afraid of any of the guards, wardens or other officials.

While I was in a room with forty or more of these prisoners, practically all of whom had been convicted of at least one murder, I was rather surprised at the ease with which they talked with me and their lack of concern for the authorities. The most surprising event of all was when the spokesman for one of the groups asked me if I had read the "Washington Post story," which had appeared only a very few days before.

During this year's visit I learned that some of the prisoners I had interviewed last year had been released in an exchange of some 60 PLO prisoners in 1979 for one Israeli prisoner and this year's exchange of about twelve PLO prisoners for an Israeli.

I also visited Nablus in 1979, where my experiences paralleled those at Ashkelon, although this was a prison for people awaiting trial, as well as those with sentences of up to fifteen years.

There I also talked to groups of prisoners as well as to individuals. When talking with the groups, I had experiences similar to those at Ashkelon. In talking to individual prisoners, I found that they made no claims that they had experienced any torture or substantial mistreatment at any time since they were apprehended, nor were they witness to any.

I had two unusual experiences here. I interviewed some prisoners being held in administrative detention. There were in all approximately twenty prisoners in all of Israel or the territories, both Israelis and Arabs, being held in administrative detention in March 1979 of which six were at Nablus. There are now sixteen being held. The administrative detainees had been there for varying periods of time, the longest being for some seven or eight months, and the shortest being only a matter of a few days. The one who had been there the longest period stated that he had been interrogated over a twenty-three-day period, but never more than an hour and a half to two and a half hours on any day, and during that twenty-three-day

period he was interrogated about every third day. He stated that on occasion, an interrogator slapped him, but that no other acts of mistreatment or torture had occurred. The others that I questioned had been there for shorter periods and had experienced no physical abuse except slapping.

The other interesting group was that of twenty-eight prisoners who are segregated at Nablus for their own safety and security. I was informed by the authorities and prisoners that they had been subject to abuse by the other Arab prisoners and some, if not all, had been the victims of a prisoners' trial within the prison walls. One prisoner related to me that he was on trial for three days, accused of collaborating with the Israelis, and that his fellow prisoners had actually sentenced him to death. In another instance, a prisoner told me that he and his friend had been tried and sentenced to death by fellow prisoners. His friend, he said, was beaten and trampled to death. This prisoner was rescued by the guards after a severe beating and was near death himself. A third one of these prisoners exhibited numerous slices and wounds across his body and particularly on his abdomen and he said that these had been inflicted upon him by his fellow prisoners.

All of these prisoners stated that not one of them had ever been tortured or mistreated during interrogation or at the prison by the Israeli authorities and it was volunteered by one of the prisoners that "the Israelis do not know how to torture; they should learn that from the PLO and from the Jordanians."

On my visit to Ashkelon this year, I talked with many prisoners in addition to those I have referred to above. Whereas in 1979 most prisoners were working, this year almost all had refused to work. I questioned the prisoners as to why they refused to work when by working they enjoyed many privileges such as earning money which they could spend at the canteen and they would be out of the cells for a long period of time daily. They responded by saying that they didn't want to help the State of Israel, but a few indicated to me that it was not a matter of their choice, clearly indicating that there were pressures to force this action on them. One of the leaders of the group complained that five of their comrades had been placed in solitary confinement and had been there for three years. I took down these names and upon checking the records, ascertained that they were definitely not in solitary confinement, but had been moved from this prison and dispersed to several other prisons. The authorities stated that they had caused difficulties with other prisoners and had therefore been separated and removed. One prisoner who appeared to be quite ill told me that he was receiving very good treatment each day. He received 12 pills as well as an injection and

was taken care of at the clinic each day. Another prisoner had recently had an operation performed for glaucoma and had had two operations for hemorrhoids. He likewise had an internal operation performed several years ago. This prisoner seemed to indicate that he had been receiving exceptionally good medical care.

One thing stood out from this most recent visit and that was the great improvement in the medical care of the prisoners. When I had visited Ashkelon in 1979 the surgeon had advised me that there were many prisoners who needed surgery for one reason or another and he was attempting to make arrangements at the Ashkelon Hospital for four or five operations a week to be performed either by himself or by other specialists who volunteered to assist in various types of operations. I learned from the records that in this period of approximately 11 months operations had been performed on 170 prisoners by this team of surgeons. The clinic had been occupied by several prisoners a year ago but was now empty of any bed patients. However, I was advised by the medical aide and his assistant who took care of the clinic that they have over 100 visits per day from prisoners who come to them either for medication or with some complaint or other. He indicated that many of the visits were not necessary, but that the prisoners felt free to come to them with complaints and to obtain medication for them, whether they be real or imaginary. They also have a dentist who comes twice a week and the regular doctor comes three or four times a week, depending on the need. In all cases of surgery, the surgeons continue to visit the prisoners as long as post-operative care is required.

With very few exceptions, the prisoners looked to be in good and healthy condition and seemed unusually well cared for, for such an institution.

I did meet seven other prisoners who had been segregated from the rest of the inmates at Ashkelon for their own safety. It appears that these seven prisoners had expressed their support for the Camp David Accords and for the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The guards learned from a prisoner that death sentences imposed by their own tribunal were to be carried out that very day. The guards went to the cells where these prisoners were and found that attempts had already been made on one prisoner. The side of his face and a portion of his throat had already been cut. He was rushed to the hospital and his life waned. I saw the scar which stretched from near his ear down his cheekbone and across his neck. I also met the other six prisoners who had likewise been segregated. They confirmed the story although they were obviously frightened when talking about it.

One other significant change had taken place in this period and that was the reason for the obvious increase in religious fervor. This was obvious to me in the nature of the books that they had in their cells, the always present copy of the Koran and the conversations in which they continuously talked about the lack of opportunity to carry on their religious activities. A year ago, this complaint had not been heard.

The role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been minimized and yet Peter Kung, in charge of Red Cross in Israel, states that they have available either a regular Red Cross doctor or an Arab or Jewish doctor whom they utilize to examine any prisoner that they feel requires it. The Israeli government allows a physician chosen by the Red Cross to see a prisoner whenever the Red Cross requests it and Mr. Kung stated that this arrangement had never been violated by the Israelis.

The ICRC can see all prisoners except prisoners being interrogated, at any time they please. In cases of those under interrogation, they may see them no later than fourteen days after they have been taken into custody, but in any event, within the fourteen-day period. At the first meeting with the prisoner within the fourteen-day period, ICRC may inquire only as to his health and the conditions under which he is detained, but thereafter they may inquire about anything else that they desire even though he may still be under interrogation. In the event anything requires any corrective action, the ICRC communicates immediately with the Foreign Ministry and has direct access to the Ministry of Justice, including the Minister himself. The interviews by the ICRC are done without any Israeli presence. In any case where they have received a complaint that a prisoner has been ill-treated, the ICRC submits an urgent demand for an inquiry and according to Mr. Kung, they receive "detailed answers on the particular cases we raise. We see that something has been done." Mr. Kung stated that "We would be very happy if we had an agreement like the Israeli one with every country in which we operate." The ICRC was particularly pleased with the recent change in the administrative detention procedures, which came into effect in January 1980.


It has been suggested by some reporters that since similar charges had come from different prisoners at different times that these allegations must be authentic and are plausible. It should be pointed out that these places are only short distances apart. Hebron is about forty minutes from Jerusalem. Ramallah is about fifteen minutes from Jerusalem. Nablus is about forty or forty-five minutes from Ramallah. In considering the activities of organizations such as the PLO, with its network that spreads throughout Israel and the Middle East, including the prisons

themselves, these distances are insignificant. Quite contrary to the assumption that these identical allegations give credibility to the charges, it is more likely that the similarity of allegations stems from the fact that they all read the Arab newspapers, converse with other members of the same groups, are represented by the same politically motivated attorneys and in most instances are fellow members of the PLO. It is therefore no coincidence that they repeat the same charges. If the charges made in The Washington Post can travel to Ashkelon in a very few days, why should one be surprised that these allegations flow through the West Bank with such ease? If the charges are read in the press and the papers are available in the prisons, why should they not be repeated by other prisoners who seek the approbation of their fellow prisoners and their PLO colleagues?

In my discussions with two of the noted defense lawyers referred to earlier, they both advised me of their own political beliefs and that they were both Communist. They looked upon the charges against their clients as a political action against the political beliefs of the people they represented. The personal political objectives of these attorneys was the replacement of the form of government of Israel and other governments of the Middle East by the establishment of Communist governments in their stead. They view all of their activities as steps toward those objectives. Nevertheless, they vigorously defend their clients and have the press available to publicize their charges. Yet, three out of the four defense lawyers assured me that the military tribunals and courts gave them an adequate and reasonable chance to defend their clients as well as to present their cases. The judges were competent, capable, and reasonable. They did state that in most instances, confessions already obtained were sufficient to convict their clients, in spite of the fact that under the law corroboration was required. All four of them agreed that the Supreme Court of Israel was very diligent and careful in protecting the human and civil rights of defendants and that the Court exercises every precaution to be certain that these rights are not infringed upon. It is interesting to note that the military courts are not made up of career officers, untrained and inexperienced in law, but always have at least one, and usually two, trained lawyers who have come from civilian life and are doing their reserve duty of a month or so, sitting in these tribunals. Many of them are well-known defense lawyers who are experienced in the trial and disposition of litigation.

Although my own investigations in 1979 were spread over a period of approximately three months and probably consumed a total of thirty days in that period, and my follow-up in 1980 involved a few days, I would certainly not want to claim that prisoners are never abused. I can only express my own personal opinion, based upon my interviews and examinations,

and the opinions of others referred to above, that there is no credible evidence of torture or systematic abuse. I would reiterate my earlier statement that not until a group of highly competent, independent and impartial individuals have an opportunity to make a wide-ranging study in depth can these issues be resolved. However, I would suggest that in the meantime, the sensational highly publicized accounts based on limited information be treated with skepticism.



AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

This report is the report of Leo Nevas individually. The author is admitted to the Connecticut Bar and admitted to practice in the U. S. Supreme Court. He was formerly a Prosecutor and Judge in the Municipal Courts of Connecticut, a member of the Connecticut Human Rights Commission and Chairman of the NGO Human Rights Committee at the United Nations. He is presently a member of the Board of the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, a Vice Chairman of the United Nations Association of the United States, President of the Cornell Law School Association and a Vice President of the International League for Human Rights.

March 12, 1980

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

STATEMENT ON ARAB-ISRAEL PEACE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Firm commitment to the Camp David accords, their spirit and implementation, and above all their emphasis on the process of direct negotiation among the parties concerned, represents the surest available way to Arab-Israel peace. Any attempts to undermine these accords or the Camp David peace process--whatever the source or reason--can only be detrimental to the cause of peace.

To defend and implement the accords is to defend and implement American geo-political interests. The U.S. has a vital security stake in democratic Israel, America's most trustworthy ally in the Middle East. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the anti-Americanism of Iran, the internal fragility of a host of Arab states all emphasize the value of Israel to America, as our country seeks to counter destabilizing forces in the Middle East and prevent the Soviet Union, either directly or through radical client states, from gaining control of the oil supplies of the Arabian peninsula and of the sea lanes thereto.

* * *

That those intent on destroying Israel should seek to undermine the Camp David accords and UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 on which they are based was to be expected. It would be deplorable and tragic, however, if those efforts were aided by Western Europe, engaging in patent appeasement of the Arabs at Israel's expense for reasons of oil and hoped-for economic gain.

This appeasement is fraught with danger not only for Israel but for West European states as well. Introduction of a PLO, pro-Soviet client state in the Middle East creates more favorable conditions for Soviet dominance there, which would profoundly change the world balance of power at the expense of all democracies.

The tragedy of the Western European initiatives is that they do not contribute positively to the peace process but may seriously damage it. Such enhanced support for the PLO can only make Israel feel more vulnerable and less ready for concession. It can mislead Palestinians into believing that outside influence, rather than their own direct participation in the Camp David process, can bring meaningful autonomy.

(over)

The Government of the United States has made an historic contribution in bringing about the Camp David agreement. Unfortunately, the U.S. inconsistency in their implementation has given encouragement to those opposing these agreements. On the one hand, President Carter and top administration officials affirm their support for the accords and the UN resolutions on which they are based. Regularly they declare the U.S. will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO as long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not agree to UN Resolutions 242 and 338. This is encouraging. On the other hand, there was the administration's vote--subsequently disavowed by President Carter--for UN Security Council Resolution 465, which undermined Resolution 242, prejudged ultimate sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza and the unified status of Jerusalem and negated the validity of the Camp David negotiations.

United States action in the UN and elsewhere must be consistent with Camp David policy if that policy is to succeed. Our government should vote against, not abstain on or approve, UN General Assembly or Security Council resolutions that include any language contradicting the Camp David agreements or violative of its spirit. It is incumbent on the U.S. to reaffirm to the nations of Western Europe as to all other states that it will not swerve from the firm implementation of the peace process for which it laid the groundwork. We welcome Secretary of State Muskie's action urging NATO nations not to take any initiatives that might divert attention from the Camp David process.

* * *

True peace depends on the relations that will be established between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Israel has demonstrated the kind of sacrifices it is ready to make for peace, even at risk of its own security. It already has returned most of the Sinai to Egypt, including precious oil fields and the new cities and settlements it developed. Israel, however, cannot be the only party asked to make concessions. It cannot be expected to recognize or deal with the PLO which is pledged to its destruction and engages in terrorism against civilians. The Palestinians and the nations in the area must recognize that there can be no comprehensive peace unless Israel's legitimate security needs are met. The nature of the autonomy negotiated for the West Bank and Gaza will, we are confident, be consistent with the basic human rights and aspirations to dignity due any individual or group.

As regards settlements, we believe that they are not contrary to international law where required for security purposes. We further believe that Jews have a right to live on the West Bank. While

recognizing this right, however, we note that there has been much criticism in Israel and abroad in recent months as to the political wisdom of the establishment of additional Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Only Israel can decide through its democratic process what its settlement policies should be. Nonetheless, to prevent erosion of support, we urge Israel, its rights notwithstanding, to show restraint in the creation of new settlements at this time. In the meantime, continued emphasis by the U.S. on the alleged illegality of Israeli settlements in administered territories serves no useful purpose.

The principal obstacle to Arab-Israeli peace is not Israeli settlement policy which is peripheral but, rather, the continuing refusal of Arab states other than Egypt to recognize Israel and to negotiate with her within the Camp David framework or on any other terms. Instead, they support the PLO in its commitment to the destruction of Israel. It is to their intransigence, to the unwillingness of Jordan to enter into the Camp David process and of other states like Saudi Arabia to engage in peaceful resolution of the conflict that the pressure of the United States and other governments as well as world public opinion ought more properly be directed.

It is understandable that the negotiations on autonomy concerning the West Bank and Gaza and their residents are complex and arduous. Key matters still in dispute such as security, use of water and the source of authority of any administrative council to be set up are difficult to resolve. May 26, 1980 is a target date, not a deadline. All issues may not be resolved by that time. It does, however, provide an opportunity to demonstrate new, substantive progress, to confound enemies and contradict critics of the Camp David accords. The interruption of the autonomy negotiations by Egypt should not become a reason or excuse to pressure Israel to make further concessions.

The Camp David process already has great accomplishments to its credit. Israel and Egypt are at peace for the first time since the Jewish state came into being. Normalization progresses. Both states have gained significantly in many ways.

To those who would deny or impede such progress there can be but one reply: reaffirmation of the Camp David agreements, and their translation into a wider and enduring peace.

#

Adopted at
74th Annual Meeting
Waldorf Astoria Hotel
May 18, 1980

80-550-21

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

PLaza 2-1616

Cable Address: COJOGRA

March 25, 1980

TO: Major American Jewish Organizations

FROM: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed you will find a statement made by our chairman, Theodore R. Mann,
at a meeting of the Presidents Conference on March 24.

I am moved to make these remarks because of the article in the New York Times on March 22 by the Acting Chairman of the World Jewish Congress.

Since President Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem in November, 1977, we have been witness to three essentially identical scenarios. Each involved first an utterly outrageous verbal abuse of the Israelis by top Administration officials in Washington, followed by a confrontation between the Administration and properly angered American Jews -- in some cases joined by many others, and finally swift remedial action by the Administration which moved the peace process a step forward. We are in the middle of one of those scenarios now.

It has been my working assumption since February, 1978 that all of this has been prearranged; that the verbal tonque lashing of Israel by America is regarded by President Sadat and President Carter as essential to President Sadat's survival in the Arab world.

Before there is any more destructive quarreling among Jews in these trying times, we should consider that we are purposely being used by several of the principal actors in this ongoing drama, and that in the peculiar dynamics of the pending negotiations Jewish verbal assaults by the World Jewish Congress or others upon other Jews are especially destructive to Israel's interests and make us all look like damned fools.

Consider these three scenarios:

In January, 1978, peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt were begun in earnest. In literally a matter of days the parties had agreed on almost everything. Israel wanted to keep its settlements on territory occupying 2 percent of the Sinai, and Moshe Dayan made clear that even that was negotiable. The Egyptians walked away from the negotiations. President Sadat came to Washington to see President Carter.

Most informed opinion predicted that President Carter would tell Sadat that he had not given negotiations a fair chance. Not so. From February through June, top Administration officials put the blame for the impasse on Israel. Zbigniew Brzezinski relished an opportunity in March to tell American Jewish leaders that Israel was really interested in territorial aggrandizement (for offering only 98 percent of the Sinai to Sadat and offering to negotiate further about the remaining 2 percent!). Alex Schindler immediately counterattacked with all of his ample verbal talents. Begin was called intransigent at every turn. And all the while it was Sadat who had walked out on the negotiations after a period of only days.

By June prominent American Jews were attacking Begin in the New York Times, and the media had joined in the chorus of Israeli condemnation.

Then as suddenly as the storm had started, it ended. The United States, with a competence no one knew it possessed, quickly brought the parties together, first at Leeds in August and then at Camp David in September, and the Camp David accords were born. That is the end of Act I.

* * * * *

The September Camp David accords called for an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement within three months. The three months were up in December, 1978. Cyrus Vance came from Cairo to Israel with Sadat's latest offer and brusquely -- with a crudeness altogether out of character for Cyrus Vance -- told the Israelis to

take it or leave it. President Carter characterized that offer as "generous," although it represented a serious backing away from the Camp David accords. When the Israelis were rightfully offended, Vance or Saunders accused the Israelis of "distortion" in a "not-for-attribution" briefing. Again, when the situation clearly called for pressure on Egypt, the Administration pressured and abused the Israelis. Several weeks later, Andy Young published an article expressing the view that America had to find ways of relating to the PLO. This time the situation was so obvious that the media generally attacked the Carter Administration for bungling its job as mediator. The predictable and altogether proper American Jewish reaction ended with a meeting at the White House. In short order, and again with quite remarkable competency, the Carter team put the pieces back together again, first by inviting Begin to Washington in February and then by virtually moving the American government into the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and helping to produce the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March, 1979. So ended Act II.

* * * * *

Three weeks ago, in the midst of sensitive autonomy negotiations which its talented negotiator Sol Linowitz was mediating, the Administration joined in a Security Council resolution condemning Israel's settlement policy, calling for their dismantlement, describing the West Bank as "Palestinian territory" and calling Jerusalem "occupied territory." Instead of waiting several months to back away from such an obvious breach of the Camp David accords, the Administration backed away from the most outrageous of those positions within two days -- because a New York primary was around the corner. American Jews were nonetheless angry. Once again, President Carter invited Begin and Sadat to Washington in April. We will see whether the pattern holds; whether Act III will end as Act I and Act II ended; whether through newly discovered competence the Carter Administration puts the pieces back together again and helps the parties take another big step forward. I am betting the pattern will be followed, if not in April, then in May or June. But in the meanwhile we have made fools of ourselves once again, with the acting head of the World Jewish Congress blaming Begin and American Jewish organizations for castigating the Administration.

* * * * *

As I noted earlier, it has been clear to me since February, 1978 when Sadat broke off negotiations that were moving forward with remarkable speed and good will, that it serves Sadat's essential purposes within the Arab world to have Israeli concessions come grudgingly, not graciously, and to have them come as the result of American pressure, not spontaneously. It has been equally clear that the Carter Administration is cooperating with President Sadat to create that perception. And it has been just as clear that Menachem Begin knows this. Remember, the most abusive American reaction came not when Begin was most intransigent. It came rather in February, 1978, when Begin was most forthcoming and generous. Begin cannot appear to be forthcoming, because no matter how much he gives up voluntarily, Sadat's requirements are that President Carter appear to be the one who squeezed concessions out of the Israeli lemon. It is worth remembering, in assessing Menachem Begin's negotiating technique, that he must not only concern himself with President Carter's last minute pressures; he must consider the possibility too that in the final weeks of negotiations Palestinian representatives or Jordan might decide to enter the negotiations, with yet additional demands. Thus, premature concessions in this negotiation could well be so counterproductive as to destroy the whole process.

Such are the peculiar dynamics of these negotiations. Israeli "hunkering down" is built in; outrageous American verbal pressure is built in; the American Jewish response is built in. And America coming to the rescue is built in. We are all playing our assigned roles in a Greek tragedy written by President Sadat and President Carter with, hopefully, a happy ending.

No other explanation fits the facts as they have repeated themselves over the past two years. Without such an explanation one would have to believe that the President and Secretary of State periodically, in fits of pique, fly off the handle and endanger world peace; or that they alternate between periods of extraordinary incompetency and remarkable competence; or that they are covering up a hatred for Israel which from time to time emerges through the cracks. I don't believe any of these things, not because I have blind faith in our national leaders, but because such alternative explanations of American policy simply are not consonant with my personal observations.

But one recurring reaction, Jewish attacks on other Jews, is not built in to the dynamics of the negotiations. That we bring on ourselves. When the Administration undertakes to verbally assault Israel, regardless of its motivations, American Jews should take umbrage, if only out of self-respect. The spectacle of other Jews defending the Administration in that circumstance, and accusing the established organizations of a "knee-jerk" reaction, fills me with dismay.

Many of you are leaders of organizations within the World Jewish Congress -- American Section. I plead with the World Jewish Congress, and I plead with you to use your influence within that body to make certain that the World Jewish Congress reacts in the coming months with the dignity and the self-discipline that this moment in Jewish history requires.

- Theodore R. Mann
Chairman, Conference of Presidents
of Major American Jewish Organizations

March 24, 1980



ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

PRESS SUMMARY, MAY 9-11, 1980

The autonomy talks have been postponed.

Ha'aretz (in its editorial) is of the opinion that the postponement of the autonomy talks is not due solely to internal Egyptian problems but also to President Sadat's preference for a halt in order to review the talks held in Herzliya. Since it is doubtful that the autonomy negotiations could, by May 26, lead to even a temporary agreement, a postponement of the negotiations does not have to cause irreparable damage.

Naturally the question arises, how are things going to continue from now on? There are those who believe that Cairo is trying to drag the talks on until after the U. S. Presidential elections, on the assumption that once Carter is re-elected he will be free to increase pressure on Israel. Ha'aretz is not convinced by this since it does not believe Sadat is gambling that much on the U. S. election results. Ha'aretz is not convinced either by those who believe that the postponement of the negotiations is aimed at bringing about a summit meeting between Sadat, Begin and Carter.

We can expect a certain period of lack of diplomatic activity with regard to the continuation of the negotiations. However, we can still assume that Sadat continues to be interested in implementing autonomy according to the Camp David agreements and that he prefers these to all other possible alternatives. He might not be satisfied with the rate of progress in the negotiations to date, but Weizman has stated that Israel is not satisfied either. Since this negative symmetry exists, there is still hope that sooner or later a way will be found to continue the negotiations.

Davar entitles its editorial "Sadat's new scoop," and points out that Sadat has managed to surprise us once again. However, Davar believes that the suspension of the autonomy talks is not a disaster and that in the history of our political process with Egypt worse crises have arisen. The Israeli government should take this opportunity to do some soul searching. It was quite clear that what could not be achieved in the past 11 months would not be achieved in two weeks. Thus, instead of waiting until the last day, the 26th of May, Sadat took the initiative and created a situation in which Israel as well as the U. S. will have to react.

One should not take too seriously the annoyance expressed by the Egyptian representatives over the Israeli position on security in the autonomous areas. The Egyptians know full well that this is one of the very few issues on which there is wide national consensus in Israel. On the other hand, there are many in Israel who believe that the government's present position on other aspects of autonomy can be made more flexible. With no Israeli initiative on these aspects, Sadat continues to maneuver as he pleases. It is obvious that in view of the

postponement of the talks, any cabinet decision which might influence the future of the territories, such as changing the legal status there, will be heavily criticized. One would hope that the government will not only be clever enough to avoid negative actions but will initiate positive moves. The idea of autonomy in Gaza is not new but perhaps now is the time to implement it.

More on the Hebron Issue

Dan Margalit (*Ha'aretz*) questions the remarks of Haim Bar-Lev in the Knesset, who said that had the government evacuated the Hadassah clinic in Hebron the group of worshippers would not have been such an easy target for the terrorists. Begin is not sorry that the original cabinet decision to evacuate the Hadassah clinic was not implemented. According to those close to Begin, that decision did not call for evacuating the building, but was merely a request that the women who had occupied the Hadassah clinic leave the place. Now Begin is taking a hard line and wants to settle Jews in the heart of Hebron. Does Begin regret the "soft hand" policy in the occupied territories followed until now? He does not say one way or the other. However, Begin declared that the government as a whole is responsible for the "soft" line in the territories and not just the Minister of Defense, Ezer Weizman. This week's cabinet meeting showed that although the "hard line" is now very popular, Weizman continues to believe that the use of tough measures against the Arab population should be limited to the necessary minimum. Weizman found a partner for this position in the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Rafael Eitan. When Eitan appeared before the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee he defended the existing arrangements which restrict the use of weapons by the IDF in the territories. This was a moderate position in comparison with some of the suggestions mentioned in the cabinet meeting, such as limiting the freedom of the press with regard to reportage on the West Bank situation and the expulsion of the leaders of the National Guidance Committee.

Under the present conditions, and given the fact that the government intends to continue to rule Judea and Samaria with no time limitation, the Military Government took the most moderate and the only possible action. Had it not hastily expelled the two mayors and the *Qadi* and blown up the houses from which the murderers shot their victims, the position of the Military Government could not have been restored. One must also remember that the government concerned is a Likud government which wants to keep Judea and Samaria and does not support retreat and territorial compromise. This is a government which is not even willing to support Dayan's plan of implementing autonomy unilaterally. Thus, the policy this government is following is the barest minimum of a "hard line". This is preferable to the "adequate Zionist response" (i.e. settling Israelis in the heart of Hebron) which characterized the policy of this government after the murder in Hebron of Joshua Sloma, the Yeshiva student, last February.

Haim Bar-Lev (*Ha'aretz*) discusses the public controversy following the terrorist attack in Hebron, specifically the assertion that there is practically no difference between Hebron and Misgav Am (a kibbutz in the Galil where a terrorist attack took place during Passover). Bar-Lev points out that this is true only with regard to the terrorists' intentions. The terrorists try to attack us everywhere, both within and outside the Green Line. The same hand committed the murders in Misgav Am and in Hebron. There is no pardon for attacking an Israeli, not even in Hebron, and there is no question that the Israeli government and its security forces must ensure the safety and security of every Israeli everywhere. However, the difference between Hebron and Misgav Am is very great. First, there is no dispute among Israelis and the Jewish people throughout the world over the necessity of settlement in Misgav Am. This is not the case with regard to Hebron. No issue caused a greater split among the Jewish people both inside and outside Israel as the question of settlement in Hebron.

It is obvious that our settlement policy cannot be conducted according to the agreement or opposition of the nations of the world. However, one cannot completely ignore the fact that Misgav Am is an Israeli settlement, which no one doubts has the right to exist, while the necessity of settling Jews in Hebron is not only doubted by the entire world but also by a large number of Israelis themselves.

Most important of all is the fact that Misgav Am was a very difficult target for the terrorists, while a group walking from prayer toward the Hadassah clinic is a very easy target for a terrorist action. In Misgav Am the terrorists managed to infiltrate because of a breakdown in the warning system, but none of them came out alive. In Hebron, the terrorists managed to escape alive and well. This was a very easy target for them. The correct conclusion Israel must draw from this attack is not to give up civilian settlement in the West Bank, but to avoid creating easy targets for the terrorists. Anything which is not vital now and is an easy target for terrorist activities should be avoided. Settling Jews in Hebron is one of these things. One should avoid settlement which also antagonizes those Arabs who are not terrorists and who want to live and work in peace. In the present and the foreseeable future there is no chance of Jewish-Arab cooperation in the territories if they live one at the expense of the other. But it has already been proven that living side by side is possible, to the mutual benefit of both. If the areas of friction between Jews and Arabs in the territories can be minimized, and if civilian settlement in the West Bank is limited to specific areas located for security needs, then there is a chance to restore calm to that troubled area.

Ha'aretz - Pori Public Opinion Poll (May 9, 1980)

1. Question: If you had the choice, whom would you prefer as Prime Minister -- Shimon Peres or Ezer Weizman?

34.3% -- Weizman
30.7% -- Peres
25.7% -- Neither
9.3% -- No opinion

Question: If you had the choice whom would you prefer as Prime Minister -- Ezer Weizman or Yitzchak Rabin?

49.1% -- Rabin
28.2% -- Weizman
14.5% -- Neither
8.2% -- No opinion

Among Labor Alignment voters -- 66% would choose Peres over Rabin; 50% would choose Rabin over Peres.

Among Labor Alignment voters -- 28.4% would choose Weizman over Rabin; 26% would choose Weizman over Peres.

In the Likud -- 22.2% would choose Weizman over Rabin; 22.6% would choose Weizman over Peres.

2. On the issue of whether the security arrangements within the autonomy framework on the West Bank set up in the Camp David agreements fulfill the security requirements of Israel --

17.1% -- do not fulfill Israeli requirements at all
12.8% -- do not fulfill them very well
33.4% -- fulfill partially
18.3% -- fulfill completely
18.4% -- have no opinion

Lea Spector

Ha'aretz is an independent liberal newspaper.

Davar is affiliated with the Histadrut and the Labor Party.



REPORT

From the Israel Office of the American Jewish Committee

Rehov Ethiopia 9, Jerusalem 95 149 Tel. 228932, 233551 Ccble: Wisnom, Jerusalem

RECENT TRENDS IN ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION

This survey of Israeli attitudes was compiled by Dr. M. Bernard Resnikoff, Director of the American Jewish Committee's Israel Office, on the basis of a series of polls conducted in the past six months by the Institute for Applied Social Research and the Institute for Communication of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Dr. Mina Tsemach of Dahaf Co. Among the topics covered in the polls are domestic politics, the economy, relations with the United States, and personal identification with Israel. The results of the various polls, which were outlined at the American Jewish Committee's 74th Annual Meeting, are presented below:

A. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE

A March 1980 survey by the Institute for Applied Social Research and by the Institute for Communication of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem concludes:

Government Credibility and Early Elections

63% of the public gives very little credibility to the Government. Of these, most do not give any credibility to the Government.

60% of the public wants early elections (only 36% wanted them in February). 47% of those who voted for the Likud in 1977 favor early elections. 22% of them would like to see the Likud out of the future coalition and 27% of them would like to see the Likud in a broad coalition Government with the Labor Alignment.

42% of the public said they would vote Labor (compared to 34% in February) and 16% would vote for the Likud (24% in February).

A comparatively high 42% are undecided.

Labor Alignment and Likud

An analysis based on seven surveys that were conducted in the past six months showed that only 32% of those who voted for the Likud in May 1977 would do so again.

The Alignment has a clear advantage over the Likud among all sectors of the public. The advantage of the Alignment increases among the more educated classes, among Israelis of European origin, and among the non-Orthodox.

A survey made by Dr. Mina Tsemach, Director of Dahaf Co., (published in Ha'aretz, April 25, 1980), showed that if the elections were held in mid-April the Alignment, led by Shimon Peres, would have received 61 seats in the Knesset (about 50% of the votes), and if Yitzhak Rabin led the Alignment it would have received 66 seats (55%). The Likud would have received 23 seats in the Knesset (19%).

If then Defense Minister Ezer Weizman had led the Likud the gap between the Alignment and the Likud would have been reduced from 23 seats to 6 seats: the Alignment would have received 49 seats (40%) and the Likud 43 seats (36%). In March the gap between the two parties, under similar conditions, was 11 seats (51 to 40). However, if Mr. Rabin led the Alignment against Weizman in the Likud, the gap would increase to 22 seats: Alignment, 57 seats and Likud, 35 seats. (Weizman resigned on May 25, 1980.) The survey also shows that Rabin enjoys the highest plurality, 29.3%; Peres followed with 24.7%; Menachem Begin is next with 21.1%; and then comes Weizman with 17.7%.

69% of the public would like to see President Yitzhak Navon return to political life after he completes his term as President.

Other Political Parties

The survey shows that the National Religious Party (N. R. P.) of Interior Minister Yosef Burg would have received 8 to 10 votes. The Democratic Movement for Change (D. M. C.) of Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin and Shay, headed by Amnon Rubinstein, would have received only 2 seats (in comparison with 15 seats that they jointly received in the last election); and the Agudah Block, 6 seats. All other smaller parties, including the Communists, Sheli, Ha-tehiya, and Ratz would obtain a total of 16 seats. (Sheli is a left-wing party, headed by S. Marciano. Ha-tehiya is a right-wing, ultra-nationalist party, headed by Professor Yuval Ne'eman; and Ratz is an acronym for Citizens' Rights Movement, led by Shulamit Aloni.) In effect, the N. R. P. would remain a force, while the D. M. C. would become insignificant.

The Undecided Voters

The surveys show that there is a large group of undecided voters, estimated as high as 42%. Most of them are former voters for the D. M. C. and the Likud. The undecided tend to see the leadership of the Alignment as better fit to handle the economic, political and social challenges in Israel today.

Attitudes toward Government policies

According to the surveys, the majority of the Israeli public is of the opinion that Israel's economic, political, and social situation is not good, and that the Government is unable to handle the issues. The public's attitude between February and April proved to be more pessimistic than in previous months.

The feeling of distress is felt not only on a national level but also on a personal one. Some 57% of the public feel that their personal economic situation became worse in the last few months, some two-thirds of the public (68%) feel that the Government compensation of the low income group does not match the increase in prices, and 67% of the public think that the present Government's economic policy will therefore widen the social gap. However, 75% of the public think they themselves can cope with the situation.

Settlements, Palestinian State and the PLO

60% object to the continuation of the present settlement policy as long as negotiations between Israel and Egypt continue. However, the vast majority of the Israeli public is against negotiations with the PLO and against the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip because of security reasons. Among those that support Peace Now, some are willing to consider negotiations with the PLO if the latter will stop its terrorist activities against Israel, and will recognize Israel's right to exist. They are ready to consider this option only if it will become 100% clear that this is the only way to pursue the peace process.

Israel- U. S. Relations

There has been a sharp decrease in the number of people who define Israel-U. S. relations as being good. Also, the number of people who trust President Carter and who are willing to rely on the readiness of the U. S. A. to help Israel has sharply declined.

Summary

- 1) The public views the political, social, and economic conditions as not good.
- 2) The public views the Government's handling of these issues as a failure.
- 3) The majority does not have confidence in the present Government and would like to have early elections.
- 4) The feeling of the majority is that the Government's economic policy will widen the social gap.
- 5) There is a broad objection to the settlement policy as long as the negotiations with Egypt go on.

B. ISRAEL-U. S. RELATIONS

The following conclusions are the result of a survey that was conducted in January 1980 by the Institute for Applied Social Research and the Institute for Communication of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem:

The events in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan refocused public attention on the issue of Israel-U. S. relations. In response to questions, the public answered as follows:

- 1) 82% think that the events in Iran and Afghanistan can constitute a danger to Israel.
- 2) 45% are ready to rely on the U. S. "to the same degree as before the events."
39% rely on the U. S. "less than before the events."
15% rely on the U. S. "more than before the events."
- 3) 83% support the conclusion of a defense pact between Israel and the U. S.
- 4) 68% support the idea of giving the U. S. military bases in Israel. The American position regarding the PLO or a Palestinian state did not affect the people's support for a defense pact with the U. S. or for providing military bases to the U. S.

In January 1980, more people supported the idea of a defense pact than in any previous survey.

It is interesting to note that the public does not see a linkage between U. S. encouragement of the possible establishment of a Palestinian state and the real possibility that such a state might develop as a result of the autonomy negotiations with Egypt.

- 5) The public's readiness to make more concessions and to listen to U. S. requests from Israel depends on the degree it is ready to rely on President Carter. It does not depend on the degree of public reliance on U. S. commitments not to recognize the PLO., etc. However, the gap between reliance on President Carter and readiness to accept U. S. counsel is still very wide.
- 6) The public judges Israel's general situation without almost any relationship to Israel-U. S. relations. However, the public's view of Israel's political situation is connected to the way it views Israeli-American relations. The public evaluates the political situation as being "better" to the extent that they expect and rely on stronger American political support of Israel.

- 7) The public's view of the credibility of the peace treaty with Egypt depends to a certain extent on its evaluation of Israel-U. S. relations.
- 8) World events such as the crises in Afghanistan and in Iran do not affect the mood of the individual, who is deeply affected by the economic situation.

C. ISRAELI SENSE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH HIS COUNTRY

The Institute for Applied Social Research and the Institute for Communication, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, conducted a survey on this subject between December 1979 and April 1980.

The public was asked three questions in order to measure the degree of identification with the country.

- 1) Are you sure that you will stay in Israel?

76% -- are sure.
10% -- are quite sure.
8% -- may stay.
4% -- think they won't stay.
2% -- are almost certain they won't stay.

- 2) To what degree do you feel part of the State and its problems?

55% -- to a very large degree.
25% -- to a large degree.
12% -- to a certain degree.
4% -- to a small degree.
4% -- to a very small degree.

- 3) If you had the opportunity would you want to live permanently abroad?

7% -- want very much to live abroad.
3% -- want to live abroad.
4% -- want to a certain degree.
28% -- do not want to live abroad.
59% -- do not want to live abroad at all.

It is interesting to note that the higher the age the stronger the identification with Israel. The feeling of identification among the 30-50 year olds is stronger to a certain extent than among 20 year olds. The difference is not dramatic but is meaningful.

The public was asked to express its feelings of identification on three levels:

- 1) The State: its condition, ability to face challenges, and the functioning of the Government.
- 2) The individual in relation to the State: what worries the individual regarding changing situations.
- 3) The condition of the individual: demographic background, economic conditions, the mood and the degree of adaptation.

1) The State

The public is concerned mostly with the following problems:

- a) The economy (90%).
- b) Terrorist activities (90%).
- c) Violence /daily street violence/ (89%).
- d) Underworld violence (77%).
- e) Social conditions (77%).
- f) Israel's political situation. (76%).
- g) The developments in Iran and their impact on Israel (73%).
- h) Confrontations between religious and secular groups (73%).
- i) Terrorism in the immediate neighborhood. (64%).
- j) The economic situation of the individual (59%).
- k) Israel's security situation (55%).

It is interesting to note that the individual seems more concerned with State-public matters (the economy, terror) rather than with matters which are closer to him (the economic situation of the individual). The reason for this may be because the individual views State matters as affecting him directly.

2) The Functioning of the Government

a) The Economy

14% think the Government handles the economy well.
16% -- fairly well.
70% -- badly.

b) Social Problems

16% think the Government handles the social problems very well.
15% -- fairly well.
75% -- badly.

c) Security

48% think the Government handles security well.
35% -- not well enough.
17% -- not well.

d) Political Problems

22% think the Government handles the political problems very well.
43% -- not well enough.
35% -- not well.

3) Is Israeli Society Able to Meet the Challenges?

(This question was asked as a separate issue.)

a) Security

91% -- yes.
7% -- fairly well.
2% -- not at all.

b) Political Problems


74% -- yes.
23% -- fairly well.
3% -- not at all.

c) Social Problems

60% -- yes.
33% -- fairly well.
8% -- not at all.

d) Economic Problems

44% -- yes.
42% -- fairly well.
14% -- not at all.





ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

THE SUSPENSION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS

(Press summary, May 16, 1980)

Yoseph Chariff (*Ma'ariv*) believes that the cause of the autonomy impasse is President Sadat's belief that the Sinai precedent (i.e., Israel's readiness to relinquish sovereignty to the Egyptians and to remove settlements) applies to other areas. Egypt is now demanding that the autonomous council have authority over IDF movement in Judea and Samaria. In other words, security will not be left to Israel's exclusive discretion.

Egypt's position was manifested in the Egyptian paper of January 1980 on autonomy, which had been given to the Americans and also brought to Israel's attention. Among other things, this paper suggests that the autonomous council be situated in East Jerusalem. In the clause regarding security, the paper quotes the Camp David agreements with regard to the withdrawal of Israeli forces and their redeployment in specific security locations. However, a small section, unrelated to the Camp David agreements, was inserted to the effect that all army movement into and out of the autonomous area will require a permit from the self-governing authority.

Even the Americans were astounded. In an attempt to mollify Prime Minister Begin, Ambassador Linowitz told him that he had clarified things with the Egyptians and advised Begin to ignore the paper. However, it is not clear on what grounds Linowitz offered this advice, as not only have the Egyptians not retracted their demand, but, on the contrary, that small section of the January 1980 paper has been expanded into a nine-page paper, which was submitted to the negotiating teams last week by the Egyptian Minister of Defense, General Ali. It is interesting to note that the Americans refused to accept the new paper; even the Americans disapproved of its contents.

The Egyptian view of autonomy, as expressed in the Ali paper, mentions only a "Palestinian entity" to be implemented by the end of the first five years of autonomy. But the substance, as demanded by the Egyptians, is that of a Palestinian state. For example, it is emphasized that the movement of army forces, their size and their routes will have to be

determined with the approval of the self-governing authority. Moreover, internal security will have to be co-ordinated with the strong police force which will be established in accordance with the Camp David agreements. This police force, according to the Egyptian concept, should have security services and border guards as well as check points to control entry and exit.

When General Ali was questioned about the establishment of "the Palestinian entity," as he described it, he explained that he had not been understood correctly. He claimed that he did not mean an entity in a political sense, but a 'geographical entity.' However, Chariff points out that Ali says such an entity should be delineated by boundaries and check points which will be in the hands of the police force of the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza ...

The Americans don't go into great depth about what they hear from the Egyptians and pass on to us. We can only hope that they are not attempting to mislead Israel. For example, just before Ali's paper, an expansion of the January 1980 paper into an operative, crystalized program, was put on the negotiating table, Linowitz told the Israelis that this time they would get "good stuff" from the Egyptians. It seems that Linowitz was convinced that the Egyptians had really 'corrected' the clause in the January 1980 paper which he had told Begin to ignore. When asked, after the Ali paper was submitted, if that constituted in his opinion "good stuff", Linowitz apologized, saying that the Egyptians had not let him see the paper beforehand...

Sadat's move to stop the talks caused a soberness in Jerusalem. The prevalent view is that Israel should not hurry to return to the negotiations without basic clarification of this issue, first in the cabinet and then with the Americans and the Egyptians -- all this prior to formal renewal of the autonomy talks.

The appointment of General Ali as head of the Egyptian negotiating team has been interpreted as an intentional move directed as 'inviting' Israel to appoint Ali's counterpart, Israeli Minister of Defense Weizman, in whom the Egyptians see a more amenable partner. The Egyptians received their answer last week when Minister Yosef Burg made it clear to Prime Minister Khalil that he himself would continue to head the Israeli team. The composition of the Israeli Ministerial committee for autonomy was intentionally arranged in such a way that neither Dayan nor Weizman, who were the chief negotiators with Egypt on Sinai, would have a decisive influence. Dayan understood Begin's hint and left altogether while Weizman, who left the committee, has now decided to return. However, it is doubtful whether Begin will allow anyone to hold the reins on the Judea and Samaria issue.

The two main sticking points in this complicated subject of autonomy are

security and Jerusalem. As long as Egypt keeps to its position on these two issues -- Jerusalem (where Sadat again repeated that Jerusalem is part of the West Bank) and security, as explained in the "Ali paper" -- it is doubtful whether there is much point in renewing the talks.

Moshe Zak (Ma'ariv) claims that while Israeli ministers were present at the talks that Prime Minister Khalil and General Ali conducted with U. S. Ambassador Robert Strauss and then with Ambassador Sol Linowitz, the autonomy negotiations have been between Egypt and the U. S. and not between Egypt and Israel. Thus there is no reason for Egypt to renew the negotiations with Israel on autonomy since these negotiations were never conducted in the first place.

What are the negotiations between the Egyptians and the Americans about? Those who believe that the negotiations between Washington and Cairo concern a possible compromise between the Egyptian position, which demands complete withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, and the Israeli position, which attempts to ensure an Israeli presence there after the transitional period, are mistaken. This is not the core of the talks between the U. S. and Egypt. Both the Americans and the Egyptians strive for the same goal -- bringing the Israeli forces back to the "Green Line." However, while the Egyptians are searching for a formula which would be acceptable to their opponents in the Arab world, the Americans are less interested in a formula and more in practical achievements. They want a real withdrawal of the Israeli forces behind the Green Line and do not care what the formula is. The Egyptians want to remove Israel's authority from Judea and Samaria. They insist on every detail and demand that all their powers should be transferred immediately to the autonomous council. The Americans, on the other hand, are willing to compromise and have all the authorities Israel insists on keeping transferred to the Israeli-Egyptian-Jordanian permanent joint committee. The main thing is to tempt Israel to relinquish its authority not only with regard to water but also with regard to defense and internal security. As far as the U. S. is concerned, Israel should withdraw and not let a theoretical argument over division of power delay the withdrawal.

Sadat is trying to extract an advance commitment from Washington with regard to the status of Jerusalem. He needs this to strengthen his position in the Arab world. However, President Carter does not think in terms of a formula, he thinks only about withdrawal -- Israel's withdrawal. In order to get Israel out of Judea and Samaria, Carter is offering Israel a carrot. The carrot is that Israel should not be concerned about the joint committee since Israel will have a veto, and thus will be able to maintain its positions through the use of the veto. Meanwhile, facts will be determined in the field, and the main fact will be that of withdrawal.

Pori Public Opinion Poll (Ha'aretz, May 16, 1980)

Question: Do you have plans to emigrate and settle in another country in the near future?

4.9% -- yes (2.2% in 1976)

6.0% -- maybe (2.8% in 1976)

4.1% of the total want to settle in the U. S., 1.9% in Canada, 0.8% in France, 0.6% in Australia and the rest in England, South America, Germany, Scandinavia and South Africa. 2.6% have not yet decided where to go.

Among those who answered "yes" --

9.5% are between the ages of 18-29

8.1% were born in Israel

7.7% have high school education

7.5% are manual workers

7.9% are of Asian and African origin

Public Opinion Poll (Yediot Acharonot, May 16, 1980)

Question: Should Israel participate in the Olympic Games in Moscow?

42% -- yes

49% -- no

9% -- have no opinion

(The demand to boycott the games is evident especially among academicians.)

Lea Spector:

Ma'ariv is independent, but traditionally Likud-oriented.



REPORT

From the Israel Office of the American Jewish Committee

Rehov Ethiopia 9, Jerusalem 95 149 Tel. 228862, 233551 Cable: Wishom, Jerusalem

MORE ON THE SITUATION IN THE WEST BANK

(May 9, 1980)

Three Arab leaders were expelled to Lebanon following the terrorist attack in Hebron. The U. S. denounced Israel for the expulsion on the grounds that it was contrary to international law, that the three men were expelled without a trial, and that there was no evidence to prove that these leaders were responsible for the terrorist attack in Hebron.

Who are these three leaders?

Fahd Kawasme, the mayor of Hebron, has been in office since April 1976. Then he was the first mayor to be freely elected in Hebron in 40 years. Before the elections he had worked in the Ministry of Agriculture as an agricultural engineer. In the 1976 elections Kawasme was the number two man on Ahmed an-Natshe's list, one of the leaders of the Communist party in the territories and a member of the Palestinian National Committee. An-Natshe was expelled by order of the Israeli security authorities. Thus Kawasme suddenly found himself at the top of the list. He was elected mayor, winning all ten seats in the municipal council and completely defeating the supporters of the previous mayor, Sheikh Muhammad Ali Jaabri. For a long time Kawasme managed to maneuver between the various political streams and achieved much for the municipality. Kawasme created a big storm in Israel a year ago when, for the first time, he met with the head of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. However, the Military Government did not take any action. Since the signing of the Camp David agreements, Kawasme has been a member of the National Guidance Committee, a body which was established in order to undermine the autonomy talks. For many months Kawasme was thought to be one of the more moderate members of this committee, unlike the mayor of Ramallah or the mayor of Nablus. However, in the two months since the Israeli government decided to resettle Jews in Hebron, Kawasme has become an extremist.

Muhammad Hassan Milhem, the mayor of Halhoul, who was elected to this position in 1976, is a member of an educated family. His brother, a dentist, Dr. Mustafa Milhem, was expelled from Israel about eight years ago for provocation and hostile propaganda. Before becoming mayor, Milhem worked as a teacher in the local high school. Over the years Milhem has proved to be an enthusiastic supporter of the PLO and was very close to Bassam Shak'a, the mayor of Nablus, and to Karim Khallaf, the mayor of Ramallah. Like Kawasme, Milhem is a member of the National Guidance Committee, as well as of the Preparatory Committee of the Palestine National Front, which was outlawed in Israel about six months

ago. This committee, which consisted of eight persons, among them the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah, had been established as a co-ordinating body between the PLO and the notables in the West Bank and initiated several protests.

Sheikh Tamimi, the Qadi of Hebron, is a controversial figure. He has seniority among the religious leadership in Hebron, but was not considered a political figure in the past. He is said to have been a member of the organization of the "Moslem Brothers." Sheikh Tamimi made an extreme speech at the meeting of Arab leaders in Hebron, calling for the liberation of Haifa, Acre and Jaffa. His words created grave concern in the Military Government since he called for a "*jihad*" (holy war).

Whether or not the expulsion of these three Arab leaders was contrary to international law, the expulsion was certainly contrary to the internal law of Israel. The legal procedures for such expulsions allow those whom the Military Government wishes to expel to appeal to a special committee. This committee, consisting primarily of Military Government officials, hears both sides and then makes recommendations to the Military Government. If the committee recommends expulsion, the Arabs can then appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court. These procedures were not followed this time. It appears that the security authorities in Israel learned their lesson from the Bassam Shak'a affair of a few months ago, when the government decided to expel him and then reversed itself because of the ensuing political upheaval.

The Supreme Court's position on such cases is that the security authorities have absolute discretion. As in other cases when a public authority has absolute discretion, the Supreme Court cannot intervene unless it is a case of corruption or discrimination. In practice, however, the Supreme Court can intervene in certain cases. But cases involving security are very complicated. Any disclosure to the court regarding security would jeopardize the operations of the Israeli security services in the occupied territories. Thus, in such cases, there is always some confrontation between the State Attorney and the Supreme Court Justices, because the former claims absolute discretion and refuses to disclose any security secrets. The Justices have no way of deciding the issue since all they have before them is the testimony of each side.

In addition, the process of appeal to the special committee and the Supreme Court takes a long time, during which hunger strikes are staged, other Arab mayors threaten to resign, the situation in the territories, already unstable, deteriorates, and international pressure is exerted. It seems that the Israeli security authorities learned from the Bassam Shak'a affair that especially when things are rough, as they are in the West Bank, the only way to expel Arab leaders is to do it in a hurry and without resort to legal procedures. Otherwise it is better not to do it at all.

On the question of how responsible the Arab leaders were for what happened in Hebron, former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan gave his opinion. Dayan claims that today, more than at any time in the past, there is widespread

general opposition to the presence of Israel in the territories and to Israel's policies. The attacks and stone throwing incidents demonstrate the mood of the Arab population. Local West Bank leaders are responsible for this mood and must face the consequences or resign. Israel cannot tolerate a situation like the present one. Thus, the mayor or local notable must be held responsible for what happens in his area. Dayan strongly supports a policy which will not only stop the Arab population's active aid to the terrorists (although there are groups of terrorists who act on their own) but also halt the stone throwing incidents. Political controversies are legitimate but stone throwing, whether by Jews or Arabs, must be stopped by every possible means. Dayan pointed out that he is well aware of the fact that some of the bad feelings between Arabs and Jews are due to certain actions by Jewish settlers.

Dayan believes that Israel will remain in Judea, Samaria and Gaza and thus it is necessary to learn to live with the Arabs. Dayan believes that it is possible to have a correct relationship between Jews and Arabs. Though Dayan thinks that the Hadassah clinic in Hebron should not have been occupied by Jews, and he opposes settling Jews as individuals or in groups in Hebron, he does not agree with Haim Bar-Lev (M. K. of the Labor Party) that the presence of Jews at Hadassah brought about the murder in Hebron. Dayan pointed out that Jews have been murdered by the PLO in many places, including the coastal road, which are within the Green Line.

What can be done?

Dayan believes that the Palestinians want us to leave the territories and want Israel to disappear from the world map. They really desire a Palestinian state and want the refugees in Lebanon to return to their homes in Haifa and Jaffa.

Dayan's estimate is that the Palestinians will not join the negotiations nor will they sign any agreement resulting therefrom. However, Dayan believes that Israel cannot allow its presence in Haifa, Jaffa or Kiryat Arba to be subject to the wish or agreement of the Palestinians or anyone else. Neither the Palestinians nor Israel have any choice in the matter: Israel, because we must not leave the West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinians, because the IDF will remain there. Therefore, our objective must be to decrease the tension as much as possible.

Dayan reiterated his suggestion that Israel should implement unilaterally those parts of the Camp David agreements relating to autonomy. West Bank mayors, who are the duly elected representatives of the Arab population, should be approached and asked whether they are prepared to maintain law and order and prevent the West Bank from becoming a PLO base once Israel withdraws the army and the military government. If they reply positively, then, Dayan recommends, the army should withdraw. If they reply negatively, then we remain. However, Dayan believes that the Arabs would not be

too unhappy to see the Israeli army leaving their towns.

Dayan does not reject the idea of implementing autonomy in Gaza first or in Nablus first or anywhere else. However, he does not believe that there is a realistic chance for this since, in his opinion, the Arabs will be afraid to appear as traitors to Palestinian unity.

Dayan explains that he does not know whose sovereignty will eventually prevail in the West Bank and Gaza. What he does know is that the IDF and only the IDF should be there, that Jewish settlements should be there, but also that the Arabs should be able to live there and work with us. Dayan does not suggest forcing annexation on the Arabs in the territories nor denying them Jordanian citizenship. He thinks the Arabs there should have as close connections with Jordan as possible. The only things he would insist on are no Jordanian sovereignty in these areas, no Palestinian state and no forced Israeli sovereignty. Dayan favors establishing settlements, without distinguishing between Arab populated areas and others. However, he believes in a policy of selective settlement, which would create viable settlements where people can live on agriculture and industry. Dayan thinks that the existing areas of settlement, namely, the Jordan valley, Gush Etzion, Gaza and Jerusalem, are enough -- there is no need for more. His opinion is that 4-5 settlements should be added to the existing ones each year.

Meanwhile, four Arab mayors who were warned by the Military Government that they would be held responsible for any disturbance of law and order in their towns, have appealed to the Supreme Court in order to prevent their sudden expulsion à la Kawasme, Milhem and Tamimi. However, since the Arab mayors stick to their policy of non-recognition of the Israeli authorities, but at the same time wish to take advantage of the good services of the Israeli Supreme Court, their appeal to the court was not made in their own names but in those of their wives...

Lea Spector

Sun-Times

Friday, June 29, 1979

Challenging the 'Biblical' claim to West Bank

Georgie Anne Geyer



WASHINGTON—At a largely unreported meeting in LaGrange, Ill., a group of Christian clergymen and theologians met recently and came out with an extraordinary statement. In doing so, they began to mark out a clear challenge to Israel's "Biblical" claim to the Arab-populated West Bank.

The final statement, while totally sympathetic to Israel as it exists today, nevertheless was strong regarding expansionism. "We are anguished," it said, "by the fact that countless Christians believe that the Bible gives to the modern state of Israel a divine right to lands inhabited by Palestinian people." It declares that the gifts "of life, peoplehood and land . . . enjoyed by the Jewish people of Israel have been denied to the Palestinian people" and calls for a Palestinian "sovereign state."

NOW, SOME MAY DISMISS this as the work of a few "liberal" clergymen like anti-Vietnam activist Don Luce and the Rev. Ralph Abernathy, but the fact is more than 80 Christian leaders have now signed it. It is a clear break with a few years, when evangelicals in particular supported historic claims.

Michaelson, editor of the thoughtful evangelical . . . , told me:

"If there is going to be a change, it will have to come from U.S. Christians who say Prime Minister Menachem Begin's claim to the Arab West Bank is a perversion of the Bible. Theologians and Biblical scholars say the idea of divine sanction for land or that a special people is blessed is totally without foundation. Indeed, if we want to draw on the perspectives of the Bible, then we should draw on the perspective of justice for all."

SUCH THINGS AS the takeover of Arab land by Israel for settlements, he went on, "are precisely the issues which were consistently brought before the traditional kings of Israel and condemned by them."

Now, all of this is fascinating because, in this time of real and spurious religious resurgence, we must constantly question how genuine that resurgence is—and, particularly, whether any of it applies to purely political questions.

These questions are also broached by American Jewish leaders, who seem to see an impending tragedy. At a meeting at Georgetown University last week on the new religious-political world, the brilliant young Israel Singer, director of the World Jewish Congress, said, "The Israeli papers are filled with reports of people whose religious fervor is translated into the political."

Then he warned that "religion takes on ethnocentrism that is not religion at all. It is really in-group versus out-group. People within a group, in order to love people within that group, need to reject those outside."

And the eloquent Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, vice president of the congress, spoke with equally unequivocal courage. "The new Zionist ayatollahs are not a secular event but the 'beginning of the roots of redemption.' Once you presume that this is part of the millennium, then anything, up to Elan Moreh (the new, provocative Jewish settlement on the West Bank), is acceptable."

He warned against the "false messiahs" who have arisen at times of Jewish trauma, said only a "superior force" could stop Israeli actions and ended with a ringing, "God save the Middle East from religion!"

THIS WOULD ALL SEEM somewhat bizarre and unnecessarily political except for the fact that Middle East policy, American security and even the energy question are, at core, being decided on the interpretation by some Israelis of ancient Biblical "prophecy."

Many Israelis are deeply traumatized by what is happening, too, but those men of conscience ironically have gotten little support from the weak Carter White House or from the American Jewish community. Meir Merhav, the brilliant columnist in the Jerusalem Post, after watching on Israeli TV while Jewish "brown shirts" invaded peaceful Arab homes, killed a few of them and went free, wrote out of his pain at what is happening to the Zionist dream:

"It does no good to pretend that the cowardly raid on Arab homes in Hebron was an isolated 'incident.' We are rapidly descending, rung by rung, the ladder of evil."

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date July 21, 1980
to Abe Karlikow
from M. Bernard Resnikoff

subject

This is a report of a full and formal conference with the Hebrew University President Abe Harmon, the substance of which has recently surfaced, as per earlier memoranda to you this month.

I'm not sending copies of this to anyone so that you can make your own decision whether to share it with Bert, Zack and Nives, Marc or - to list all the options - nobody.

Abe wanted to know that the Hebrew University is rapidly expanding its services to non-Jews and is soliciting AJC interest (read, money - but also programmatic input, administrative support and public relations mileage).

Different elements of this program include:

1. The regular program of the annual study program of the Pontifical Biblical Institute of Rome, which is now in its 6th year. I previously wrote you about this and, I subsequently spoke to Father Francis Furlong, Head of the Institute who strongly endorsed our participation on the grounds of the compatibility of objectives between the Institute and the AJC.
2. The regular annual program for Seton Hall University which is well-known to the Interreligious Affairs Department.
3. Reaching into Southeast Asia, there is a young theological student from Thailand who is now coming to the University, at the initiative of Zvi Werblowsky, in order to study Bible and Hebrew here as a way of giving her fellow Christians a better understanding of Israel and the religious roots of the State. Out of conviction of the value of the program, the University has waived all fees for this student but other legitimate expenses will be equivalent to some \$1100, for which Abe is turning to us, among others, for help. Recalling Marc's own growing interest and activity in that portion of Asia, and recalling Third World implications, this idea is not as outlandish as it would seem at first glance.

Based on the success of the Thailand experience, the University is ready to broaden its program to include citizens of Nepal and Singapore. The University also offers a short-term program for theological students from Norway and combined classes plus fieldwork.

4. Finally, there is the regular program of Catholic student advisors who, originally came under our auspices and now are part of the theology program of the University.

Abe was told and knows of course, that the Blaustein Foundation is, and the AJC isn't, a granting foundation. If, then, the AJC were to participate in any of these programs, I argued, there would need to be a built-in programmatic element so that the programs chosen are co-sponsored ones in more than name but in substance as well. Abe agreed with the concept, agreeing to postpone the elaboration based on an initial reaction.

I send you all this material even before receiving from Israel the material he promised me which, in part, supports what I have written about. Meanwhile, I am forwarding, at Abe's request, a copy of the March 28 report he issued to the members of the Hebrew University Board on this subject.

האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

לשכת הנשיא

March 28, 1980

TO : Members of the Board
and Members of the Honorary Alumni

FROM : Avraham Harman, President

I thought you might be interested in information about some of the activities of our University in the area of Jewish Studies in the non-Jewish world. I am prompted to send you this letter, because I have just received the following letter from Archbishop Shahe Ajamian, of the Armenian Patriarchate in the Old City of Jerusalem:

"Dear Mr. Harman: I am really grateful for the arrangement of a tuition-free Scholarship for Fr. Mesrob Mutafian. This will enable us to see the first Armenian Priest graduating from the Hebrew University in Jewish Studies. We are hoping that we will have many graduates from our Theological School who would be admitted at the Hebrew University in the future, and enjoy the high standard of studies and the learning in your honorable institution. We assure you, dear Mr. President, of our high esteem and friendly feelings.

February 6, 1980

Archbishop Shahe Ajamian".

It is not only the Armenian Church which draws on the resources of the Hebrew University in the area of Jewish Studies. Biblical and Theological students of many Christian denominations from many parts of the world, come to Jerusalem periodically for Courses in Jewish Studies.

The most ambitious and regular of these programs has been our Annual Course for the Pontifical Biblical Institute of Rome, the fifth of which has been completed. These Courses last for seven months, and have been attended by about twenty students each year, primarily priests from all over the world who are being prepared by the Pontifical Institute to

teach the Scriptures at colleges, seminaries and universities, and for other scholarly pursuits. Those who choose to spend a year studying in Jerusalem, receive credit for their second year of studies in Rome. They take a study program in conjunction with our School for Overseas Students, which includes Courses in Modern and Biblical Hebrew, Archaeology and Historical Geography, Readings in Deuteronomy, and Jewish Sects and Ideologies in the Intertestamental Period. In addition, they are taken on study tours of archaeological sites, and participate in a two-week dig organized by our Institute of Archaeology.

These priests come from all over the world, including countries which do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. For example, this year's participants came from India, Ghana, Angola, Mexico, Poland, Uganda, Brazil, Nigeria, Korea, Burundi, Italy, Tonga, Belgium and Sudan.

The University was also host this year to a group of 45 Norwegian theological students, who came from the Theology School of the University of Trondheim, and took a special two-week Course here entitled: "Jerusalem: The Holy City." The Course dealt with the archaeology and historical background of the city, as well as its significance to the three major religious faiths. Typical of the lectures were: "Jerusalem of David and Solomon", "Jerusalem of King Herod", and "Aelia Capitolina". In addition to the many field trips to sites of historical importance, the Course included a meeting with representatives of the various religious communities in Israel organized by the Israel Inter-faith Committee.

American Christian groups have been frequent visiting students at the University. We have organized several programs for the Catholic Campus Ministry Association, an organization of priests and nuns who serve the student communities on various American Campuses. Our Course on Contemporary Israel included lectures on: "The Religious Significance of Israel to the Jewish People", "The Christian Presence within Israel", "Biblical Jerusalem", and "Israel - A Society of Immigrants". A special Course on "Jerusalem in the Light of Archaeology" was given recently for a group of 20 American clergymen of all denominations, brought to Israel by a New Jersey Rabbi.

For five years now, the University has organized an annual program for Seton Hall University, a Catholic university located in South Orange, New Jersey. The three-week program is entitled: "An International Seminar in the Humanities and Social Sciences: An Israeli Experience". Led by Professor (Sister) Rose Thering, of Seton Hall's School of Education, this program includes, in addition to lectures, symposia and field trips, specially arranged visits to Christian institutions of higher education in Jerusalem: The Pontifical Biblical Institute, The Institute of Holy Land Studies, and The École Biblique.

In the past, the University has been host to a group of theology students from Freiburg, Germany, who were especially interested in Jewish philosophy, as well as other groups from Germany. A special program was arranged for students from The Free University of Amsterdam and the School of Theology at Kampen, Holland, on the subject: "The Jewish Background of Early Christianity". This program consisted of three major topics: "The Land of Israel after the Destruction of the First Temple: The Return from Exile and the Restitution of the Jewish Center in the Land of Israel", "The Diversification of Judaism: the Emergence of Jewish Sectarianism", and "The Beginnings of Rabbinic Judaism".

Each year, a number of Japanese students come to Jerusalem for advanced work in Hebrew and Jewish Studies. A number of Ph.D.'s have been earned here by Japanese students in Bible, Hebrew Language, and Yiddish. After they have returned to Japan, these Hebrew University graduates have remained in touch with their Jerusalem professors, have initiated Jewish Studies programs in Japan, and in a number of cases have translated scholarly works by members of our Institute of Jewish Studies into Japanese.

The University is thus steadily expanding its function of being the center for the dissemination of Jewish Studies to the non-Jewish world as well as to the Jewish world.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING
October 23-26, 1980
Bond Court Hotel Cleveland, Ohio

PROPOSED STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM

For consideration by the
National Executive Council
Sunday, October 26, 1980

For millenia of Jewish history, Jerusalem has evoked the deepest religious and mystical feelings. Jerusalem, "the Holy City," has been the central and permanent focus of Jewish prayer since Solomon built the first Temple. The centrality of Jerusalem in Jewish faith is epitomized by the Prophetic verse: "For out of Zion [a hill in Jerusalem] shall go forth the Law and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem." [Isaiah 2:3]

But beyond its theological symbolism and psychological significance, Jerusalem has been a physical entity of profound national political and strategic importance -- from the time 3,000 years ago when King David first made it the capital of the United Israelite Monarchy until today when it serves as the capital of the sovereign State of Israel. The city of Jerusalem is also a vibrant urban center, which must provide services to the highly diverse multi-ethnic and religious population of over 400,000 persons who work and live within its municipal boundaries.

The detailed and complex arrangements necessary to harmonize and accommodate these varied religious, political and civic interests will probably be formalized only when the Arab-Israel peace process reaches the final stages of negotiation. Nevertheless, we feel it would be useful to outline some of the guiding principles which we believe should undergird the future of Jerusalem. In our view the principles which follow serve the best interests of all who live in Jerusalem, the adherents of the three religions whose holy places are located in the city, and the world community, which has such a high stake in peace and stability in the Middle East.

1. The city shall continue to remain physically united. Even Jordan and Egypt now declare that they do not wish a return to the walls and barbed wire that artificially divided the city from 1948 to 1967. This division was the direct result of the illegal conquest of the eastern portion of the city by Jordanian forces, following the Arab invasion of Palestine, which was in violation of the United Nations Charter and the provisions of the UN General Assembly's 1947 partition resolution. The partition plan had provided for independent Jewish and Arab states, linked by an economic union. A special UN trusteeship was to govern an area including Jerusalem and Bethlehem. After a period of ten years, the residents would have been free to express their wishes for modification of this regime by means of a referendum.

The Jews reluctantly accepted partition in the hope that the major concessions involved would result in Arab acceptance of a sovereign Jewish state, unrestricted immigration and free access to the Jewish holy places. The Arabs refused and went to war to prevent the creation of the UN-sanctioned Jewish state. The UN proved impotent to stop the Arab invasion. Jordanian forces occupied the Jewish quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem, expelled

its Jewish population and destroyed or desecrated nearly all synagogues and the Mount of Olives cemetery. The proposed governor of the UN Trusteeship never assumed office. The UN did nothing to prevent the fighting or to censure Jordan for denying access of Jews, and even Israeli Muslims, to their holy places in the Old City and to their cultural institutions on Mount Scopus. These Jordanian actions were not only contrary to the stillborn UN partition plan but were in violation of specific promises of free access contained in the 1949 Jordanian-Israeli Armistice Agreement.

In light of this history it is clear that neither artificial division nor internationalization offers hope of a practical and viable solution. The unhappy experience of Berlin is another living reminder of the consequences of walling off one part of a city from the other. Berlin also demonstrates the failure of efforts to place a city under international control.

2. Jerusalem shall continue to be the capital of Israel, the seat of its legislative, judicial and executive organs, and an inseparable part of the sovereign State of Israel. It should be noted that today nearly three-quarters of the city's population is Jewish. The city has had a Jewish majority ever since the first census in 1840, and historically it was only under Jewish rule that Jerusalem served as a national capital. While the city has special meaning for Muslims and Christians also, for none of them does Jerusalem mark the primary focus of their religious attachment. (Indeed, when President Sadat prayed in the al Aqsa Mosque in 1977, he bowed toward Mecca.) Only for Jews is Jerusalem the center of religious and national aspirations. The Passover and Yom Kippur prayers conclude: "Next Year in Jerusalem," and traditional Jews still pray thrice daily for the restoration of Jewish sovereignty in Jerusalem. Enlightened Muslim and Christian leaders, who champion independence for nations around the globe, should acknowledge the right of Israeli sovereignty in the historic national center of Jerusalem.

3. There shall continue to be free access to all the Holy Places regardless of creed or nationality, and they shall be administered by their adherents. This is Israeli practice today. In June 1967, Israel enacted a law to protect the Holy Places, and the new Basic Law on Jerusalem (July 30, 1980) enshrines in Israel's constitution the provision that "The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places." Israel has at various times proposed to negotiate formal agreements which would accord the Holy Places the privileges and immunities traditionally accorded to diplomatic embassies.

4. Everything possible shall continue to be done to ensure unhindered development of the Arab way of life in the predominantly Arab sections of the city and to ensure the Muslims and Christians the fullest measure of administrative autonomy in the conduct of their religious, cultural and other affairs.

5. Everything possible shall be done to ensure equal governmental, municipal and social services in all parts of the city.

6. Continuing efforts shall be made to increase cultural, social, and economic contacts among the various elements of Jerusalem's pluralistic population. Even today Arabs and Jews coexist with a minimum of friction in Jerusalem. But it is only under conditions of true and lasting Arab-Israeli peace that coexistence can be transformed into active cooperation and mutual understanding.

We call upon the United States Government, which is an active partner in the quest for peace, to accept the principles outlined above and to use its influence in the United Nations and among the interested parties to oppose any measures that would contradict or undermine these principles. We hope that through dedicated and consistent pursuit of the peace process commenced at Camp David, Jerusalem will truly achieve its prophetic destiny as the City of Peace.

80-100-139





SIXTHS PRESIDENT OF ISRAEL

CHAIM HERZOG

Chaim Herzog was born on 17 September 1918 in Belfast, Ireland, the son of Rabbi Yitzhak Halevy Herzog, who was Israel's Ashkenazi chief rabbi from 1936 to 1959.

In 1935 Herzog immigrated to Eretz-Israel (Palestine), and for two years attended the Hebron Yeshiva in Jerusalem. While studying, he joined the Jewish underground defence organization, Haganah. Returning to Britain to continue his education, he graduated in law from the universities of London and Cambridge.

In 1939 Herzog enlisted in the British army, graduating from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. During World War II he served in the infantry and armoured corps, taking part in the landing at Normandy. He was with the first troops to cross the Rhine River into Germany, and participated in the liberation of the concentration camps. At the end of the war Herzog was serving, with the rank of major, in British intelligence in northern Germany, and was Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's personal representative to the first Jewish displaced persons conference in 1945 at Bergen-Belsen.

Discharged from the British army in 1947, Herzog returned to Eretz-Israel, re-joined the Haganah and headed the Jewish Agency Security Department (1947-48). In the 1948 War of Independence, he served as operations officer with the Seventh Brigade, participating in the battle for Latrun.

Upon formation of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in 1948, Herzog served as the first chief of military intelligence until 1950, when he was appointed defence attaché at Israel's embassy in Washington, a post he held for four years. From 1954 to 1957, Herzog was commander of the Jerusalem Brigade and spent the following two years (1957-59) as chief of staff, Southern Command. From 1959 until his retirement from the IDF in 1962, he again served as chief of military intelligence, with the rank of major general.

Herzog began private law practice in 1962, becoming a senior partner ten years later in a Tel Aviv-based international commercial law office. He also was managing director of GUS Industries (1962-72), today part of the Clal Corporation. Returning to public service during the 1967 Six-Day War, Herzog became Israel's leading political and military commentator - in both Hebrew and English - a role he repeated during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In June 1967 Herzog was appointed first military governor of Judea and Samaria, a post he held until returning to civilian life the following year.

In January 1975 Herzog was appointed Israel's Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations. During his three-year tenure, he played a leading role in Israel's on-going message to the American public. Again and again, he decried the UN's "paranoid obsession" with Israel. At a rally of 100,000 in mid-Manhattan in the autumn of 1975, Herzog tore up the UN's "Zionism-is-racism" resolution, declaring, "... for us Jews, it no longer exists."

Long active in business and community affairs, Herzog sat on the board of numerous commercial, educational and charitable institutions. He started the Variety Club in Israel for handicapped and underprivileged children; served on the executive committees of Bar-Ilan, Hebrew and Tel Aviv universities, and the Weizmann Institute of Science; and was long-time president of ORT-Israel and of the World ORT Union. In 1970, he was made Knight Commander of the British Empire (KBE), and he has received honorary doctorates from Bar-Ilan University, and from Yeshiva University and the Jewish Theological Seminary, both in New York. In addition to English and Hebrew, Herzog also speaks Yiddish, French, German and Arabic.

A well-reputed writer on political, military and economic affairs, Herzog is a frequent contributor to periodicals in Israel and abroad. His published books include *Israel's Finest Hour* (1967), *Days of Awe* (1963), *War of Atonement* (1975) *Who Stands Accused* (1978), *Battles of the Bible* (with Mordechai Gihon, 1979), and *Arab-Israeli Wars* (1982).

Herzog and his wife, Aura, have four children: Yoel, Michael, Yitzhak and Ronit.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING
October 23-26, 1980
Bond Court Hotel, Cleveland, Ohio

JERUSALEM: RENEWED FOCUS OF CONTROVERSY

A Background Memorandum

By George E. Gruen, Director, Middle East Affairs

Mounting International Pressures

The long-standing rejectionist Arab campaign to delegitimize Israel has in recent months focused upon Jerusalem. The Arabs have succeeded in obtaining overwhelming majorities at the United Nations for a series of resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from "all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem." (Emphasis added.)

One effect of the Arab campaign has been to prompt Israel to reassert its own claim to sovereignty over the entire city. An initiative which began on May 14 as a private member's bill by Geula Cohen -- a former supporter of Prime Minister Begin who left the Herut party over the concessions contained in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty -- was transformed into a Basic Law and thus part of Israel's Constitution by the Knesset on July 30, 1980. The law declares that "Jerusalem united in its entirety is the capital of Israel" and that the city is the seat of the President, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court. The new law also provides that "the Holy Places shall be protected from desecration" or from interference with free access to them by their respective adherents.

Because of the deep emotions that Jerusalem arouses and the intertwining of religious, national and municipal interests, the Arabs have managed to enlist allies in their campaign to deny Israeli sovereignty over the city even among traditional friends of Israel, such as the Western European and Latin American nations. Some of these countries, particularly Latin American Catholic nations, have also been influenced by the Vatican's position. In recent years the Vatican had seemed to move away from its historic advocacy of "territorial internationalization" as proposed in the abortive 1947 UN General Assembly's partition plan, which would have created a corpus separatum to be carved out of an enlarged Jerusalem area (including Bethlehem) to be placed under a UN Trusteeship.

On June 30, 1980, as the Security Council was completing debate on the status of Jerusalem, the Vatican issued a lengthy document setting out its own position. While referring to internationalization in historical terms rather than reasserting it as a solution, the Vatican statement clearly rejects efforts by Israel to decide the city's future unilaterally, asserts the need for assuring "a level of parity" among Christianity, Islam and

Judaism in the city, and calls for an appropriate juridical system to protect "the city." The Vatican adds that this arrangement should be enshrined in a "special statute" and "guaranteed by a higher international body."

The detailed Vatican statement was an elaboration of a more general comment by Pope John Paul II the previous week, with President Carter at his side, in which the Pope stressed that a solution to the question of Jerusalem, which "embodies interests and aspirations that are shared by different people,..." was "pivotal to a just peace" in the Middle East.

The following day an Israel Government spokesman announced that Prime Minister Begin had decided to move his staff offices and the Cabinet conference room from the Prime Ministry building, located in West Jerusalem near the Knesset, to a new office building being constructed in East Jerusalem -- the section of the city that had been occupied by Jordan between the 1948 and 1967 wars. Although the move had reportedly first been mentioned publicly over a year previously, the spokesman explained that the official announcement was intended as a gesture symbolizing the unity of Jerusalem under Israeli rule. (The move has not yet been implemented. Its timing has been criticized even by some Cabinet members.)

On the Arab side, oil pressure and religious fervor are also being used in the effort to enlist international opposition to Israel's policy on Jerusalem. On August 6 Saudi Arabia and Iraq, two of the world's major oil exporters, declared that they would cut political and economic ties with any country that accepted Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem. The joint communiqué issued after talks in Saudi Arabia between King Khalid and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein said the sanctions would also apply to those countries retaining their embassies in Jerusalem. A conference of foreign ministers from 39 Islamic nations concluded a meeting in Fez, Morocco, on September 20, by approving a Saudi proposal for a jihad, or holy war, against the formal annexation of East Jerusalem and also called for efforts to bar Israel from the UN General Assembly. But a proposal by Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization to begin mobilizing an Islamic army and to impose a rigorous oil embargo against Israel and its allies, including the United States, was shelved.

Jerusalem and the Camp David Peace Process

It was not possible for President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to bridge their differences on Jerusalem during the September 1978 Camp David summit conference, despite intensive efforts by President Carter to achieve an agreed joint statement. To prevent the breakup of the conference over this issue, it was decided that Israel, Egypt and the United States would set out their respective positions in letters to each other. The experience at Camp David confirmed the conventional wisdom among political analysts that because Jerusalem was such an emotionally-charged and complex issue, the subject had best be deferred until a later stage of the peace-making process when greater practical cooperation and mutual trust between Israel and its Arab neighbors had developed.

It is useful to review the official positions set forth in the letters accompanying the September 1978 Camp David Accords. This provides a basis for judging the various charges that Israel and/or Egypt has recently spoken or acted in a manner contrary to the accords.

The Israeli Position

In his letter on Jerusalem, Prime Minister Begin informed President Carter of the June 28, 1967 law by which the Knesset had empowered the Government by decree to apply "the law, the jurisdiction and the administration of the State of Israel to any part of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel -- Palestine)" and that on the basis of this law Israel's Government decreed in July 1967 that "Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capital of the State of Israel." Without formally calling it annexation, the Government in effect annexed the Jordanian-held part of the city by simply submitting a map to the Knesset indicating the enlarged boundaries of the Jerusalem municipal area to which Israeli jurisdiction was to extend. The Israelis contend, therefore, that the Basic Law on Jerusalem is nothing new, but simply codifies the existing situation.

The American Position

President Carter, in his September 1978 letter, declared that the United States position on Jerusalem "remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations Security Council on July 14, 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969." This blandly phrased sentence masks a fundamental disagreement between the American and Israeli positions that preceded the Begin and Carter Administrations. Arthur Goldberg had emphasized that the United States did not consider the Israeli measures other than "interim and provisional, which cannot affect the present status nor prejudice the final and permanent status of Jerusalem." Ambassador Charles Yost went further and told the Security Council in 1969 that the international law governing occupied territories also applied to East Jerusalem. In the American view, he said:

The expropriation or confiscation of land, the construction of housing on such land, the demolition or confiscation of buildings, including those having historic or religious significance, and the application of Israeli law to occupied portions of the city are detrimental to our common interests in the city. (Emphasis added.)

The Egyptian Position

The most detailed letter on Jerusalem was the one sent by President Sadat to Carter "to reaffirm" the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt. The statement is interesting both for what it said and what it left unsaid:

"1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored. 2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty. 3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian People in the West Bank."

Sadat did not define the term "Arab Jerusalem", but presumably he meant the section known as East Jerusalem, in effect acknowledging Israeli rule and sovereignty over West Jerusalem, the part of the city that had remained in Israeli hands after the 1948 war and had become Israel's capital. Point 4 called for the application of relevant Security Council resolutions, declared Israeli measures to alter the city's status null and void, and called for them to be rescinded. In this Sadat's position was close to that of the American Government.

"5. All people must have free access to the City and enjoy the free exercise of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination. 6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives."

Points 5 and 6 are consistent with Israeli principles and Israeli practice of letting the various religious bodies administer their respective holy places. In terms of free access, Israel has been scrupulously carrying out these provisions. Israeli citizens, both Jews and Moslems, had been denied free access to their holy places during the Jordanian occupation of the Old City. Implicit in the Sadat position was a modification of point 2 to permit Israeli Jewish control of the Western Wall and access thereto through the Jewish Quarter of the Old City from which the Jews had been expelled by Jordan during the 1948 war. In an interview with Le Figaro, in September 1980, President Sadat made this explicit, saying: "Yes, the city should not be divided; the Wailing Wall, which is in the Arab part, they can have it in the sovereign part of Israel despite the fact that it is in the Arab part of Jerusalem."

"7. Essential functions in the City should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the City shall be undivided."

This offer of a jointly run and physically undivided municipality also seems to mitigate in practice the demand for Arab sovereignty contained in point 2. Various Israeli proposals have also recommended a unified administration, but the Jerusalem Arabs have thus far refused to serve in the Israeli municipality. Sadat's suggestion of a 1:1 ratio of Arab to Israeli members is obviously unacceptable to Israel since the Jewish population exceeds the Arab by a 3:1 ratio. Nevertheless, it is similar in principle to suggestions by Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek and his former assistant, Meron Benvenisti, to create a single greater municipal council composed of a considerable number of relatively autonomous boroughs. As in the American federal Congressional compromise an arrangement might presumably be worked out whereby on some matters there would be parity between Arabs and Israelis, while on others representation would be according to population. Mayor Kollek has insisted, however, that all Jerusalem remain under Israeli sovereignty.

In the Figaro interview Sadat elaborated on his September 1978 municipality proposal: "Then for the one city there is a municipal council of Jews and Arabs with one mayor who will be elected by rotation, six months Arabs, six months Israelis." When Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir was asked in New York about this proposal he said that there was nothing in Israeli law to prevent an Arab from serving as mayor of Jerusalem. The basic issue, though, he said, was one of sovereignty.

Recent Sadat-Begin Exchange

On sovereignty the two sides still appear far apart. In the Figaro interview Sadat said that he had written Begin on August 2, pointing out that "our positions are very near" since he agreed that the city shall not be divided again and that the city is a source of "sentimental inspiration for 18 million Jews." But, he added, it was also a sentimental inspiration for 800 million Moslems and to insist on Israeli sovereignty over the entire city was against this Islamic sentiment. Therefore, he concluded, "Why should not this Arab part be under the Arab sovereignty and the Jewish under Israeli sovereignty?"

Prime Minister Begin, in his August 4, 1980 response to President Sadat's letter, said that to support the unity of Jerusalem and at the same time to demand that eastern Jerusalem be put under Arab sovereignty "is a contradiction in terms. Two sovereignties over one city means re-partition. Impossible. Jerusalem is and will be one, under Israel's sovereignty, its indivisible capital in which Jews and Arabs will dwell together in peace and human dignity." In his reply to Begin, on August 15, Sadat insisted that he saw "no contradiction whatsoever between the existence of two sovereignties and the administrative or municipal unification of the City." He added:

Many Israelis and prominent leaders of the Jewish communities abroad did not fail to see the logic of this imaginative prescription for reconciliation and harmonious co-existence between the followers of the World's greatest faiths. To insist on a rigid solution based on the logic of "all or nothing at all" as advocated by the rejectionists on both sides, would be a grave historic mistake.

Jerusalem and the Autonomy Talks

The question of Jerusalem's relationship to the West Bank was immediately brought to the fore by the Camp David Framework dealing with Palestinian autonomy. In September 1978 Begin sent Carter another letter saying that wherever the agreements spoke of "West Bank" the Government of Israel understood this to mean "Judea and Samaria." Begin was thus putting Carter and Sadat on notice that the territory in question was not regarded as occupied and that in any case East Jerusalem was not part of the West Bank.

Not surprisingly, among the questions about Camp David King Hussein submitted to President Carter were several on Jerusalem: Did the United States include East Jerusalem in its definition of the West Bank? Would the proposed self-governing authority extend to East Jerusalem? Would East Jerusalem Arabs participate in the elections? What would be the final status of East Jerusalem as envisaged by the United States?

The President's answers, transmitted to Hussein in October 1978 by Asst. Secretary of State Harold Saunders, reaffirmed that the United States had traditionally regarded East Jerusalem as being occupied territory, but added that the special nature of the city of Jerusalem meant that it could not be dealt with simply as an extension of the West Bank. East Jerusalem would not be included within the boundaries of the proposed autonomy during the transitional period, but the United States was prepared "to support proposals that would permit Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem who are not Israeli citizens" to vote

in the elections leading to self-rule and such Jerusalem Arabs might share in the work of the Self-Governing Authority (SGA). As for the final status of Jerusalem, that, as many other outstanding questions, would have to be settled in the negotiations which Hussein had been invited to join under the Camp David accords. The American response did not satisfy King Hussein, but it infuriated Prime Minister Begin.

Special U. S. Envoy Sol Linowitz subsequently suggested that the Jerusalem Arabs might participate in the elections to the SGA through a form of absentee ballot, but this too was rejected by Israel as a dangerous precedent undermining the unity of Jerusalem.

In his speech before the Security Council on August 20, 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie strongly criticized the series of "unbalanced and unrealistic resolutions" on Middle East issues that had been brought before the UN organs. Nevertheless, while calling the latest resolution "fundamentally flawed," Muskie abstained instead of vetoing Resolution 478 in which the Council censured Israel's enactment of the Basic Law on Jerusalem, decided not to recognize the validity of this law and called upon all UN members "(a) to accept this decision; (b) and upon those States that have established diplomatic Missions in Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City;..." Explaining the U. S. vote, Muskie emphasized that it was "vital that a political climate be preserved" in which the work for peace could succeed. This was understood to be an allusion to reports that Sadat had threatened to pull Egypt out of the peace talks if the U. S. blocked the Council resolution.

The Secretary of State reiterated the American commitment to the vision of "an undivided Jerusalem, with free access to the Holy Places for people of all faiths." But, he stressed, that vision could not be achieved "by unilateral actions, nor by narrow resolutions" of the UN. The status of Jerusalem "must be agreed to by the parties" within the context of negotiations for a "comprehensive, just and lasting Middle East peace." It was for this reason that "we have urged all the parties not to take unilateral steps that could prejudice the outcome of the negotiations."

Critics of the Administration's position charged that the United States had failed to condemn Egyptian unilateral actions. Howard M. Squadron, Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, in a statement on August 21 charged that "our country abstained to punish Israel for the Knesset action affirming Jerusalem as its eternal capital, ignoring the earlier action of the Egyptian Parliament on April 1 declaring Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian people."

American Jewish Committee President Maynard I. Wishner declared that it was "distressing" that the United States had decided merely to abstain. He pointed out that "a veto would have gone a long way to diminishing the destructive tendencies the Secretary himself decried." Although Secretary Muskie declared that the United States regarded the call for withdrawal of diplomatic missions from Jerusalem as "not binding," some states, such as the Netherlands and the Latin American countries which announced that they were removing their embassies from the city, justified their action as mandated by the Council's decision. Mr. Muskie put the United Nations on notice that the United States "will continue firmly and forcefully to resist any attempt to impose sanctions against Israel" and pledged to vote against any such resolution. Resolution 478 concluded with a request to the UN Secretary-General to report to the Council "on the implementation of this resolution before November 15, 1980,"

Jerusalem and the Presidential Campaign

Governor Ronald Reagan and Congressman John B. Anderson issued statements condemning the Carter Administration's failure to veto the August 20 Security Council resolution. Governor Reagan charged that the Administration's action was not only a disservice to the cause of peace, but "ludicrous in light of the 1980 Democratic platform, which explicitly recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and urges that the U. S. Embassy be moved there from Tel Aviv." Governor Reagan failed to mention that the Republican platform did not contain any such pledge.

The following is what the 1980 platforms of the three leading presidential contenders have to say on the subject of Jerusalem:

Democratic Party Platform

Jerusalem should remain forever undivided, with free access to the holy places for people of all faiths....

As stated in the 1976 platform, the Democratic Party recognizes and supports "the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, with free access to all its holy places provided to all faiths. As a symbol of this stand, the U. S. Embassy should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem."

[Under Democratic National Convention rules the candidate had to inform the party if he differed with the platform on any issue. President Carter responded: "It has been and it must remain our policy that the ultimate status of Jerusalem should be a matter of negotiation between the parties."]

Republican Party Platform

Republicans believe that Jerusalem should remain an undivided city with continued free and unimpeded access to all holy places by people of all faiths.

Anderson-Lucey Independent Presidential Platform

The questions of Israeli settlements on the West Bank and the final status of East Jerusalem must be decided by negotiations. The United States will support free and unimpeded access to Jerusalem's holy places by people of all faiths. Jerusalem should remain an open and undivided city. At the conclusion of the peace-making process and as a final act of settlement, we will recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the U. S. Embassy there.

Conclusion

The Governments of Egypt and Israel and the next President of the United States all agree that Jerusalem should remain a physically undivided city, with free access to all. There is also general acknowledgement that West Jerusalem,

which became Israel's capital shortly after the 1948 war, will remain under Israeli jurisdiction and control. There continues to be considerable controversy, however, over the ultimate disposition of East Jerusalem, and particularly the Old City within the walls, and the abstract issue of sovereignty. The United States, Egypt and Israel may have learned from the recent controversy that these ultimate questions had best be deferred. But the Arab rejectionist states and their Islamic allies are likely to press forward, once the American elections are over, with their campaign to use Jerusalem as a vehicle for delegitimizing Israel at the United Nations and around the world.

September 29, 1980
80-580-28



13

Ibid., pp. 22, 50-51.

14

See Letty Cottin Pogrebin, "Anti-Semitism in the Women's Movement," Ms. (June 1982), and Inge Lederer Gibel, "The Women's Movement and Anti-Semitism," (Paper presented in Boston, March 24, 1983).

15

This is the official mandate of the Nairobi conference. A good review of preparations may be found in The Tribune, newsletter 26, 1st Quarter (1984).

16

Inge Lederer Gibel, "Anti-Semitism and its Role in International Politics," (New York: January 1984, mimeo.).



ajc

בברכה

With our Compliments



Mr. Marc Tannenbaum

The American Jewish Committee Israel Office

החוב אתמיה פ ירושלים הוועד היהודי האמריקני

9 Ethiopia Street Jerusalem Tel. 228862, 233551 .סל

The American



Jewish Committee

הוועד היהודי האמריקני • רח' אתיופיה 9, ירושלים 95 149 • טלפון 233551, 228862 • מברקים: ווישקום, ירושלים
ISRAEL OFFICE: Rehov Ethiopia 9, Jerusalem 95 149 • Tel. 228862, 233551 • Cable: Wishcom, Jerusalem

THE OBSCURANTISTS' AGGRESSIVENESS

by S. Z. Abramov

The aggressiveness of ultra-orthodox extremists -- especially those who deny Zionism and dissociate themselves from the State of Israel -- can be felt in a variety of ways. These circles include institutions which receive government support and even State institutions which exist entirely at the taxpayer's expense. In the atmosphere of clericalism that has prevailed in recent years, these circles have acquired self-confidence and have engaged in agitation accompanied by verbal and physical violence.

Before the High Holidays, the Jerusalem Chief Rabbinate made public to Jerusalem area residents through the Jerusalem Post -- and one may assume the Hebrew papers too -- a proclamation signed by Rabbi Yaacov Bezalel Zholti and Rabbi Shalom Mashash under the heading: "Halachic Decree". The content was: "Many have asked us if it is permitted to participate in prayer during the Days of Awe which is conducted by the Conservative Movement. We wish to establish by Halachic decree that our holy Tora forbids participation in these prayers, and that no one is absolved of his prayer obligation by praying in a Conservative synagogue during the Days of Awe or any other days of the year. Likewise, no one is performing the mitzva of blowing the shofar in the "prayer house" of the Conservative Movement. Therefore we call upon the public not to answer the call of this movement, not to take part in its prayers and not to join it."

It is the right of the Jerusalem Rabbinate in Jerusalem to call the congregation of believers to prayer, but there is a long way from this to imposing a prohibition upon Jews against praying in a synagogue of their choice. Yet, in the above case, a State institution has arrogated to itself the authority to invalidate a religious trend which holds a position of honor in the Jewish world, and to decree that the synagogues of this movement are not synagogues and that anyone who prays in them is not fulfilling the mitzva of prayer. In other words: a State institution has simply denied the religiosity of Jews who see themselves as religious in every way and has removed them from the domain of religious Judaism.

Conservative Judaism is known to adhere to Halacha but to interpret it in its own way. The Conservatives keep dietary laws, observe Shabbat, festivals, and the like, but hold prayer for men and women together and reject laws which conflict with principles of morality such as forbidding the marriage of a cohen to a divorced woman, halitza (removing the sandal of the brother-in-law in the law of the levirate), etc. The number of people in Conservative congregations in the Diaspora is far greater than the number of Orthodox congregations, and the contributions of the former to the State of Israel -- from the point of view of identification with and moral support of the State, as well as from the material point of view -- are greater than those of the latter. The Conservative Movement has established hundreds of congregations and educational institutions, is vigilant in its efforts to ensure the survival of Judaism, and enhances consciousness of Klal Yisrael and Ahavat Yisrael. It claims sympathizers in Israel as well, who have established congregations and synagogues -- and now, by virtue of a Halachic decree, they are prohibited from praying in these synagogues.

* * * * *

Orthodoxy has a long tradition of ostracizing, banning and excommunicating. It is fitting for Rabbi Zholti to remember that even as he invalidates Conservative Judaism, so is he invalidated in the eyes of Neturei Karta. Nor is this the end of the chain of invalidations: Neturei Karta deny the religious legitimacy of Augdat Yisrael, while the latter denies the religious legitimacy of members of the National Religious Party, and the Council of the Sages repudiates the authority of the Chief Rabbinate. This invalidation has its source in the alienation of the ultra-orthodox community from the totality of the Jewish people, and in its numbness of Klal Yisrael and Ahavat Yisrael sentiments. The result: to an ever-increasing extent, the ultra-orthodox stagnate in its own pridefulness, segregation and intolerance.

Rabbi Zholti's mindset is understandable, as is his wrath at the Conservative and Reform movements which now have a stake in Israel. Until these religious trends appeared in Israel, the ultra-orthodox were able to claim that Judaism is a monolithic religion, and that the religion of Israel and Orthodoxy are one and the same, from which it follows that the public is divided into two absolutely distinct categories: the religious, i.e. Orthodox, on one hand; and those who are not Orthodox and are therefore viewed by the Orthodox as secularists, on the other hand. It is to the advantage of the Orthodox to claim that there is no religious alternative to Orthodoxy aside from secularism, for in doing so they lay claim to a monopoly on religion in Israel. Thus, they avoid an intellectual confrontation with the secularists, for between these concepts there is no common denominator.

The appearance of other religious trends in our country presents a challenge to Orthodoxy. Moreover, the existence, although presently limited, of other religious trends compels the Orthodox establishment to meet this challenge on the conceptual plane. However, the Orthodox lack the intellectual tools for such a confrontation. It is more convenient for Orthodoxy to invalidate the other religious trends -- thus placing them in the category of secularism, and to continue to nurture the model of coexistence they evolved between themselves and the secularists -- than it is to come to terms with the existence of the other trends, which would inevitably put Orthodoxy in a defensive position.

An Orthodox individual or group is entitled to consider or to question the religious credentials of other Jews, but a Government-sponsored institution like the Jerusalem Chief Rabbinate is not entitled to deny the religious validity of religious trends which guide the majority of the House of Israel in the Diaspora. The action of the Jerusalem Rabbinate does damage to the principle of *Klal Yisrael* and is likely to estrange many Diaspora Jews from Israel. Were the Israeli Government free of the prevailing atmosphere of clericalism, it would be its duty to hold the Jerusalem Rabbinate to account, with a view to restraining its aggressions.

It is well known that the war of the obscurantists against enlightenment has known no mercy, nor did they discriminate in the choice of means to achieve their objective. Orthodoxy has preferred ostracizing and banning to persuasion and intellectual confrontation, and in doing so has lost the historic battle. The history of the Old Yishuv in Jerusalem is a long and gloomy saga of bans, ostracisms, and acts of calumny on the part of the ultra-Orthodox. In the Diaspora, this war has long since come to an end, and the three major religious trends treat each other with mutual respect and even cooperate in important areas, to their mutual advantage. It is most ironic that the State of Israel today should be the last battlefield in the war of the Orthodox against innovation and innovators. The stature of Orthodox Judaism will not be enhanced by this war, and its contribution to Tora Judaism will therefore be a negative one.

NOTE: This English translation of an article that appeared originally in Haaretz on September 18, 1980 was produced and distributed as a public service.

80-585-40

MARC - I think much of the historical part already published, and I am not convinced we should help put out any particular solution at this stage - What's your view?

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

memorandum

Abe

date April 29, 1980.
to Abe Karlikow/Sid Liskowsky
from M. Bernard Resnikoff
subject

Attached is a summary and outline of a doctoral work completed on the subject of "The Legal Status of the Holy Places in Israel" by Shmuel Berkowitz. Attached, also, is a letter of endorsement by the Oxford University Press.

Help is being sought to find ways to get this book published and the American Jewish Committee is being turned to, among others. You must know that I have never spoken to Berkowitz. The overture comes from the Ministry of Justice, with the verbal endorsement of the Minister and Director-General with the explicit request that the American Jewish Committee might be interested. I am also told verbally - and I could get this in writing as well - that Berkowitz, who got his degree, is highly thought of and his doctoral committee enthusiastically endorsed his doctoral work for accuracy and thoroughness.

I am suggesting that you might wish to confer with the good folks in the Inter-Religious Affairs Department to decide whether, in your judgment, based on the way in which the continuing controversy about Holy Places affects political attitudes -- whether this makes the publication of this document desirable.

I know that the Annual Meeting is coming on soon and I do not expect a response overnight. But I do plead for an early reaction.

Many thanks.

Encl.
MBR/ml



[start]

Original documents
faded and/or illegible





Oxford University Press

Ely House, 37 Dover Street, London W1X 4AH

Telephone 01 629 8494 Cables FROBDE LONDON W1 Telex 262749

JRH/ML/LF

7 February 1980

Dear Benzion

Thank you for yours of 20 January. I showed the synopsis and list of contents of THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE HOLY PLACES IN ISRAEL to one of our senior editors and he seemed very interested in it. He would very much like to receive a complete typescript in order to look at the book more closely. Perhaps you can tell us when you intend to publish it and what sort of arrangement you had in mind with OUP, that is, whether you would offer us world English language rights or just rights for the UK and the US.

With very good wishes

Yours

Martine Mizrahi

International Rights Department

Mr Benzion Yehonhva
The Magnes Press
The Hebrew University
Jerusalem

Shmuel Berkowitz

The Study

The study before us is a survey and analysis of the problem of the Holy Places in Israel, both in terms of international law and relations and in terms of Israeli law.

The first section of the study spans the history of the problem of the Holy Places, beginning with the recognition of Christianity as the official religion of the Holy Roman Empire in the fourth century C.E., up to the present, with the Egyptian vice president's call for the formation of a march by one million Muslims to free Jerusalem and return the city to Arab hands. In the course of this section, the author examines the policies of Jordan and Israel in the Holy Places, and describes the relations between Israel and the Christian Churches against the backdrop of this issue. He concludes with a critical evaluation of the various solutions proffered for the problem and presents his own original suggestion. The main points of that solution are the granting of a special status to the important Holy Places, similar to that enjoyed by diplomatic legations, and the partition of Jerusalem's Temple Mount into three sections: one under sovereign Muslim rule (the area of the mosques), one under sovereign Jewish rule (the area deemed permissible for prayer according to Jewish law), and the remainder under joint Jewish-Muslim supervision. Jerusalem itself would remain united and subject to Israeli jurisdiction. The proposal is accompanied by a detailed outline for the juridical administration of the Holy Places.

The second section of the study is an examination of the central problems in Israeli law regarding the Holy Places: the definition of a "Holy Place" according to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; determining the authority responsible for establishing Holy Places in Israel and the occupied territories; the legality of rights in Holy Places; the authority of the Israeli courts to adjudicate disputes related to the Holy Places, with reference to the limitations imposed by royal decrees on the Holy Places, the doctrine of adjudication, the "status quo" of the Holy Places, freedom of religion and conscience in Israel and the obligation of the authorities to maintain the public peace in the Holy Places; the right of Jews to pray on the Temple Mount and the possibility of compelling the Minister of Religious Affairs to take measures to implement this right. A series of proposed Israeli legislative changes concludes the section.

The question of the Holy Places has been an inseparable part of the history of the Land of Israel for hundreds of years. It played an important role in the struggle for the creation of a national homeland/for the Jewish people, and, in our own day, is one of the central issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict and bears universal religious and political significance.

The study in question is a basic and comprehensive attempt to tackle a thorny and problematic question. An outstanding aspect of the study is the wide range of issues it tackles, its up-to-date (to 1979) examination of the topic from all prospects, and basing itself on all relevant sources, further referring the reader to consult English, French, Latin, German, Arabic and Hebrew texts collected in a rich bibliography. The study is also based on wide-ranging field-work: visits to the important Holy Places and a series of meetings and interviews with well-established experts and clergymen of the three major faiths.

To date, the study represents the most comprehensive, profound and up-to-date work on the Holy Places in Israel. It includes a number of scholarly findings and original solutions to the problems inherent in achieving a resolution of the question of the Holy Places in Israel.

The study was originally presented to the authorities of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in completion of the requirements for the author's degree as Doctor of Laws (1978). Three of the four members of the evaluation committee assigned to it granted the study the highest grade: "excellent." Some of the comments made by the evaluators are presented below:

"Mr. Berkowitz's work is original, comprehensive and elemental. It reflects an independent approach and the ability to analyze. It represents a major contribution to the elucidation of a complex and practical problem in Israeli law. The work demanded study and research in many fields, and the author was able to master varied and not easily accessible material."

"The entire dissertation is clear and systematic. It confronts the reader with the major problems and viewpoints objectively, at the same time not disguising the author's own position. It is an interesting blend of international history and the analysis of religious and theological methods...."

"Mr. Berkowitz laboriously examined all the known sources relevant to the subject, analyzed them historically and legalistically, and composed a veritable treatise on the topic. It is well written and thoughtfully laid out; each section of the study, ^{the} international section and the Israeli section, could in itself justifiably have served as the entire dissertation and would have earned the author the degree of Doctor of Laws."

The study received wide publicity in the Israeli press, and has since its appearance served as background material for the Israeli delegation to the peace talks at Camp David. Israeli government officials, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Minister of Justice Shmuel Tamir, the former Legal Adviser to the Government (currently serving as a Justice on the Israeli Supreme Court) Aharon Barak, as well as other well-known figures, have acquainted themselves with the study and commended its level, originality and comprehensiveness. A wide international public will doubtless find interest in a book based on the study.

The Author


Shmuel Berkowitz was born in Jerusalem in 1947. Between 1967-71 he studied at the Hebrew University's Faculty of Law and graduated cum laude, also earning the prize awarded to the outstanding student of the graduating class. While an undergraduate, the author published a comprehensive study on "The Reduction of Israeli National Military Service on Religious and Conscientious Grounds."

In 1972 the author began studies toward his Master's degree. That same year, he published a comprehensive examination of the question of autopsies in Israel, a work that generated a great deal of public interest.

The author was licensed to practice law in 1973. At the same time, his outstanding scholastic achievements in the course of his first year of graduate studies prompted university authorities to grant him permission to undertake immediate preparation of his doctoral dissertation on "The Legal Status of the Holy Places in Israel." The author devoted the years 1974-78 to researching and completing his dissertation.

Today the author is recognized in Israel as a well-established expert and sought-after lecturer in the field. He is also a partner in a successful law practice in Jerusalem and handles both civil and criminal cases.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE HOLY PLACES
IN ISRAEL



Submitted to the Senate of the Hebrew University on March 1978

C O N T E N T S

PART ONE

PAGE

INTRODUCTION

SECTION ONE: General Historical Resume: The Question of the Holy Places..... 1

CHAPTER 1: The Question of the Holy Places from its birth in the 7th Century C.E. until the Conquest of Palestine by the Muslims in the 12th Century C.E. 1

CHAPTER 2: The Question of the Holy Places from the 13th Century C.E. until the British Mandate (29.9.1923) 6

CHAPTER 3: The Question of the Holy Places during the Mandate 30

CHAPTER 4: The Question of the Holy Places from the establishment of the State of Israel until the Six Day War 73

CHAPTER 5: The Question of the Holy Places in the Post Six Day War period (1967-1977).... 99

SECTION TWO: The State of Israel and the Question of the Holy Places 130

CHAPTER 6: Israel's policy in practical terms 130

(1) From the establishment of the State until the Six Day War 130

(2) Post Six Day War 137

(a) General 137

(b) In Jerusalem 148

(c) In the Occupied Territories 186

(d) In the X-Green Area Territories 197

CHAPTER 7: Israel's stand on the political future of the Holy Places 200

| | <u>PAGE</u> | |
|--|-------------|-----|
| <u>CHAPTER 8: Israel's policy on this</u> Question - Summary and Evaluation | 209 | |
| <u>SECTION THREE:</u> | | |
| <u>CHAPTER 9: Jordan and the Question of</u> Jerusalem and the Holy Places until the Six Day War | 225 | |
| <u>SECTION FOUR: The Christian Churches' stand on</u> the Question of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, post-Six Day War (1967-1977) | | 238 |
| <u>CHAPTER 10: General</u> | 238 | |
| <u>CHAPTER 11: The Catholic Church -</u> The Vatican' | 250 | |
| (1) Introduction - Israeli-Vatican Relations prior to the Six Day War | 250 | |
| (2) Jewish-Catholic Church's relations as a result of the "Nostra Aetate" Declaration | 252 | |
| (3) Israeli-Vatican relations post Six Day War | 259 | |
| <u>CHAPTER 12: The other Christian Churches'</u> stand on this Question..... | 270 | |
| <u>SECTION FIVE: Suggestions for a solution to the</u> problem of the Holy Places in Palestine | | 289 |
| <u>CHAPTER 13: The nature of the main interests</u> in the Holy Places | 289 | |
| (1) The Christian Interest | 290 | |
| (2) The Muslim Interest | 291 | |
| (3) The Jewish Interest | 294 | |
| <u>CHAPTER 14: De Facto Solutions</u> | 297 | |
| (1) British Solution | 297 | |
| (2) Israeli Solution | 298 | |
| (3) Jordanian Solution | 299 | |

| | <u>PAGE</u> |
|--|-------------|
| <u>CHAPTER 15 : Theoretical Solutions -</u> Recommendations for the future political status of Jerusalem and/or Holy Places..... | 300 |
| (1) Permanent Mandate | 300 |
| (2) Total Territorial Internationalization of Jerusalem | 302 |
| (1) Nature of the term Internationalization | 303 |
| (2) Recommendations for the Territorial Internationalization over Jerusalem..... | 304 |
| (3) Territorial Internationalization over Jerusalem (Holy Places only)..... | 308 |
| (4) Functional Internationalization..... | 310 |
| (1) Nature of this term..... | 310 |
| (2) Recommendations..... | 311 |
| (5) The "Holy Places State" (akin to Vatican)... | 315 |
| (1) The Vatican in Italy..... | 316 |
| (2) A Holy Places State in Israel - a critical point of view..... | 319 |
| (6) Diplomatic Status to the Holy Places (Israel's Recommendation)..... | 319 |
| (7) Dual-administration of Jerusalem..... | 332 |
| (8) Condominium of East Jerusalem..... | 336 |
| (9) "Peace-Kiryat" Proposal (of ex-Knesset member Hazan)..... | 339 |
| <u>CHAPTER 16: The desirable Solution.....</u> | 344 |
| (1) General Lines..... | 344 |
| (2) The Fundamental Principles..... | 351 |

| | <u>PAGE</u> |
|---|-------------|
| (3) Ascertainment of the Holy Places... | 363 |
| (4) Formal Formation of this Solution.. | 366 |
| (5) Recommendation for Constitution over the Holy Places | 368 |

SECTION SIX:

| | |
|---|-----|
| <u>CHAPTER 17: General Conclusion</u> | 377 |
|---|-----|



| | <u>PAGE</u> |
|---|-------------|
| <u>SECTION TWO :</u> <u>The Various Rights connected with the Holy Places in Palestine:</u> | 531 |
| <u>Introduction:</u> | 531 |
| <u>CHAPTER 5:</u> <u>Rights due to the holiness of the holy places</u> | 535 |
| (1) <u>Defence of the holy places against physical damage.</u> | |
| (2) <u>Defence of the holy places against desecration or other injuries or "any other matter likely to hurt the feelings of the religious to these holy places"</u> | 538 |
| (3) <u>Guarantee of freedom of prayer at the holy places</u> | 542 |
| (4) <u>Preservation of the right of free access to the holy places</u> | 543 |
| (5) <u>Exemptions from taxes and other levies on those places</u> | 545 |
| <u>CHAPTER 6:</u> <u>Nature of the Rights in the Holy Places</u> | 551 |
| (1) <u>Differentiation between Obligatory Rights and the Proprietary Rights</u> | 551 |
| (2) <u>Nature of the Rights in the Holy Places, on the basis of this differentiation</u> | 553 |
| <u>SECTION THREE:</u> <u>Enforcing the Various Rights connected with the Holy Places in Palestine and their Restrictions</u> | 590 |
| <u>Introduction:</u> | 590 |
| <u>CHAPTER 7:</u> <u>Enforcing Rights as a result of the holiness of the places</u> | 594 |
| <u>CHAPTER 8:</u> <u>Enforcing the Rights in the Holy Places</u> | 595 |

| | | |
|-------------------|---|-----|
| <u>CHAPTER 9:</u> | Restricting the Court's jurisdiction to deal with the disputes connected with the Holy Places, on the basis of the relation between the Order in Council on the Holy Places 1924, and the Law on the Preservation of the Holy Places, 1967... | 596 |
| | <u>Introduction:</u> | 596 |
| (1) | Provisions of the Order in Council on Palestine (Holy Places) 1924.. | 597 |
| (2) | Order in Council and the establishment of the State | 598 |
| (3) | Order in Council and the Principles of the Democratic rule of the State of Israel | 603 |
| (4) | Order in Council on the Holy Places and the Courts Law, 1957 | 605 |
| (5) | Order in Council - The Reality post Six Day War and the Preservation of the Holy Places Law, 1967 | 610 |
| (6) | Case Law on the question of the validity of the Order in Council | 621 |
| (7) | Relation between the Order in Council and Criminal Code Ordinance | 626 |
| (8) | Court's Jurisdiction to deal with disputes connected with the holy places, on the assumption that the Order in Council has been abolished pro tanto by the Preservation of the Holy Places Law | 636 |
| (9) | Relation between the Order in Council and between the Order for Preservation of the Holy Places (Judea and Samaria) (No. 327), 1969 | 642 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| <u>CHAPTER 10:</u> Defence of the Freedom of Religion in Israel as a restriction to judicial intervention in disputes connected with the Holy Places | 645 |
| <u>Introduction:</u> | 645 |
| (1) Freedom of religion in Israel | 646 |
| (2) Judicial intervention in disputes connected with the Holy Places and defence of freedom of Religion | 648 |
| <u>CHAPTER 11:</u> Legal Status of the Status Quo in its narrow or wide meaning, as an obstacle in the intervention of the Courts in disputes connected with the Holy Places | 651 |
| <u>CHAPTER 12:</u> Taking away of the Courts' power to deal with disputes connected with the Holy Places, due to the "Jurisdictional" Doctrine | 656 |
| (1) The Doctrine | 656 |
| (2) The Nature of the Jurisdictional proceeding | 658 |
| (3) The Types of matters outside the Courts' jurisdiction .. | 660 |
| (4) Non-Jurisdiction in matters connected with the Holy Places | 607 |
| <u>CHAPTER 13:</u> Preservation of the public order as a central factor in the question of the Courts' help in enforcing fundamental rights resulting from the holiness of the Holy Places (Jews' Right of Prayer on the Temple Mount) | 674 |

| | <u>PAGE</u> |
|--|-------------|
| <u>Introduction:</u> | 674 |
| (1) Preservation of the Public Order as a reason for preventing Jews from praying on the Temple Mount | 676 |
| (2) Possibility of forcing the Minister of Religious Affairs to enact Regulations on the matter of prayers for Jews on the Temple Mount | 687 |
| <u>CHAPTER 14:</u> The Desirable legal situation in the question of the jurisdiction of the Courts to deal with disputes connected with the Holy Places..... | 699 |
| <u>CHAPTER 15:</u> General Summary | 703 |
| <u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u> | 726 |



[end]

Original documents
faded and/or illegible



A GUIDE TO ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL

Fixing the Date of Elections — Israel's Voting System — The Political Parties

* * *

A Foreign Affairs Department Background Memorandum

by Lois Gottesman, Research Analyst

Early parliamentary elections are now a virtual certainty in Israel. Israeli voters, it is already clear, will be faced with a perplexing array of political parties and factions. Defections and splits have studded the political landscape since the 1977 vote that brought Prime Minister Menachem Begin to power. A short guide to the Israeli electoral system and the groups that will soon be contesting the right to lead the nation can help in promoting understanding.

Fixing the date of elections

Israeli law calls for national elections to be held every four years. The Begin government resulting from the 1977 vote thus could have remained in office until November 17, 1981, so long as it commanded a working majority allowing it to win confidence votes in the Knesset (Israel's parliament). The resignation of Finance Minister Yigal Hurwitz from the Begin cabinet on January 11, 1981 and the loss of the three votes held by his party, Rafi, effectively eliminated Mr. Begin's working majority.

Since Israel's is a parliamentary system, similar to that of European democratic countries in which the Prime Minister serves only so long as he enjoys a majority in Parliament, governments can fall at any time and new elections may be called before the normal expiration of a Knesset's four-year term. In this respect, Israel's democracy differs from the American system of separation of powers, in which the President is an independent chief executive whose four-year term is fixed irrespective of his party's control of Congress. In Israel the Prime Minister is chosen by the Knesset and reflects the power of the ruling party or coalition of parties. The President in Israel occupies more of a ceremonial position, removed from day-to-day politics. In the case of a government crisis, however, the President is the one who accepts the resignation of a Prime Minister or his government and may designate another Knesset member to attempt to form a new government. It is the Knesset, however, which determines when to call new elections.

In order to stave off a new no-confidence vote following the Hurwitz resignation, Mr. Begin proposed that elections be held July 7. This leaves more than ample time for the 100-day electoral campaign mandated by law. So, too, does the May 12 electoral date being called for by the major opposition group, the Labor Alignment. There is belief in Israel that a compromise date may be agreed upon among the major parties and approved by the Knesset. If the Knesset accepts Begin's proposal, he will head a caretaker government until after new Knesset elections are held and a new government formed. Under Israeli law, no minister may resign from, or be added to, a caretaker government. This is certainly one factor in the government's trying to hold an election as late as possible for it would have more time to promote its present policies, e. g. settlements.

If the Knesset approves the July 7 election date, Begin's government would then have surpassed all other Israeli governments for time served between its installation and the next parliamentary elections. Presumably, this was another factor in the Cabinet's choice of the date.

How the Israelis vote

Israel's multi-party system and the shifting coalitions among different factions reflect the special nature of the country's electoral process. Unlike the American electoral system, in which the country is divided into numerous districts and the citizen votes for a local district representative to represent him in

Congress, in Israel the entire country is regarded as one electoral district and Israelis vote for parties rather than individuals. Each party prepares its own nationwide slate of candidates, ranging in number from 1 to 120, depending on the party's degree of optimism as to its success with the voters. Under a system of proportional representation, the number of persons on the list who eventually gain seats in the Knesset reflects the relative strength of the party in proportion to the total number of votes cast for all the different lists. Thus, if a party garners 10% of the popular vote, it will receive twelve seats in the Knesset, occupied by the first twelve individuals on that party's list.

While there have been various proposals in the past to change to a single member constituency system, as in the United States, these reform proposals have never won Knesset approval. In order to improve their chances with the voters, some smaller parties have merged totally with others to create a new party, while others have reached temporary arrangements to run on a single joint list, while retaining their individual party structures. Thus mergers, splits and new alignments are natural features of the dynamic Israeli political scene.

The Political Parties

Following is a brief survey of the current political map in Israel, of political party representation in the Knesset today and the figures of the 1973 and 1977 elections:

| | 1973 | 1977 | 1981 | |
|--|------|------|------|--------------|
| LIKUD BLOC | 39 | 45 | 39 | Composed of: |
| HERUT | | | | 20 |
| LIBERAL | | | | 12 |
| LA'AM | | | | 4 |
| RAFI | | | | 3 |
| LABOR ALIGNMENT | 51 | 32 | 34 | Composed of: |
| LABOR PARTY | | | | 29 |
| MAPAM | | | | 5 |
| NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP) | 10 | 12 | 12 | |
| DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE (DMC) now split into: | - | 15 | - | |
| DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT SHINUI | | | 3 | |
| AHVA | | | 6 | |
| | | | 3 | |
| TORAH RELIGIOUS FRONT | 5 | - | - | |
| AGUDAT ISRAEL | - | 4 | 4 | |
| POALEI AGUDAT ISRAEL | - | 1 | 1 | |
| NEW COMMUNIST (RAKAH) | 4 | 5 | 5 | |
| SHELI | 1 | 2 | 2 | |
| INDEPENDENT LIBERAL PARTY | 4 | 1 | 1 | |
| CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT | 3 | 1 | 1 | |
| FLATTO-SHARON | - | 1 | 1 | |
| UNITED ARAB LIST (affiliated with Labor) | 3 | 1 | 1 | |
| TEHIYA | - | - | 2 | |
| UNAFFILIATED | | | 5 | |

The governing Likud coalition, which until Hurwitz's resignation commanded 61 votes (the minimum needed for a majority in the 120-member Knesset), consists of:

*The Herut Party, which Prime Minister Begin heads. As the major component of the Likud bloc, Herut commands the largest number of ministerial portfolios, including Foreign Affairs (currently held by Yitzhak Shamir), Defense (held by Begin), Communications and Finance. Yoram Aridor, who recently joined the Cabinet as Minister of Communications, on January 19 was unanimously approved by the Cabinet to fill the post of Finance Minister. Aridor, an attorney, is chairman of the Herut Party Executive and a close associate of Prime Minister Begin. Thus Aridor's appointment does not increase the size of the Begin government's parliamentary strength.

Presently Herut can muster 20 votes in the Knesset, having lost members such as Geula Cohen, who left in 1979 to help found the Tehiya party (see below), and former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, who was ousted from the Herut after he voted against the government in a no-confidence motion last November. It should be noted that Weizman, too, had earlier resigned from the government on an economic issue -- i. e., the Cabinet's approval of Hurwitz's cuts in the Defense Ministry budget. Weizman has hinted publicly of plans of either attempting to replace Begin as head of the Herut or forming his own "centrist" party, possibly with another former government member, Moshe Dayan:

*The Liberal Party, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Simcha Erlich, holds twelve seats and has opposed holding early elections. But Energy Minister Yitzhak Modai, a key member of the party, said on Israel Radio on January 8 that the government had "outlived its usefulness," that "only a miracle" could save it, and that it should call early elections. Some observers believe Modai may follow Hurwitz out of the crumbling coalition.

*La'am (For the People), a four-man faction formed out of elements of the Free Center Party, the State List and the Greater Land of Israel Movement.

*The Rafi faction, once a part of the Labor Party, is headed by Yigal Hurwitz, with three votes. Rafi may run as an independent party in the next elections, possibly headed by former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. A public opinion poll commissioned by Hurwitz showed that if Rafi ran on its own it would command about seven Knesset seats; with Dayan at its head, Rafi could gain as many as 20 seats. The possibility of a strong showing in the next elections may have contributed to Hurwitz's decision to resign from the coalition.

The above groups comprise the Likud bloc.

Likud's coalition partners in the government are:

*The Democratic Movement, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin, which currently has three votes in the Knesset. The Democratic Movement is the remnant of the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), a "new" center party formed in 1976, which managed to win 15 seats in the 1977 elections. The DMC, touted as a new force in Israeli politics, was plagued by disagreements and defections almost from the start, when it had to decide whether to join the coalition government. In 1978 the DMC split into its two major constituent parts -- the Democratic Movement of Yadin and Shinui (Change), headed by Amnon Rubinstein. The Democratic Movement, left with six seats in the Knesset, was further eroded last year when three members broke away and formed Ahva (Brotherhood), an independent party. As a result, the Democratic Movement's future as a political party is in doubt.

*The National Religious Party (NRP), under the leadership of Interior Minister Yosef Burg, has twelve seats in the Knesset. The party has been a coalition member of every Israeli government and recent polls show that its support has remained steady. But rumors of scandals involving Burg (who has been accused of obstructing a police investigation of alleged financial irregularities in the ministry) and Minister of Religious Affairs Aharon Abuhatzaira (whose parliamentary immunity has just been lifted so that he can be tried on charges of accepting bribes) have rocked the party and led to fears that the party would emerge from new elections in a much weaker position. Thus, the NRP has staunchly opposed holding early elections. Ironically, NRP member and Education Minister Zevulun Hammer played a role in the latest crisis by threatening to resign and bring the government down unless the pay hike for teachers was approved. When

the measure was accepted, Finance Minister Hurwitz resigned instead.

*Agudat Israel, an ultra-religious party with four seats in the Knesset, nearly precipitated the government's downfall when it pushed for amendment of the autopsy law late last year. Since 1949 the party had never formally participated in an Israeli government until it joined the Begin government in 1977. Whether it will join a future Labor or Likud-led government is uncertain.

The remaining three Likud votes are from one-man factions in the Knesset.

In opposition to the government is a loose collection of parties headed by the Labor Alignment. Labor, which had controlled all Israeli governments for 29 years, now has only 34 seats in the Knesset, 29 of them from the Labor Party and five from the leftist Mapam faction. Labor's chances of winning an absolute majority, which for the first time in Israel's history would eliminate the need for coalition partners, are currently rated as good, despite the recent bitter struggle between Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin for leadership of the party. In December 1980 the party convention finally confirmed Mr. Peres as party leader by a 70-30 margin, but the bitterness over the power struggle remains. Rabin's supporters in the party are certain to make a bid to restore him to prominence.

Other parties opposed to the government are:

*the New Communist party (Rakah), with five seats.

*Shinui (Change), headed by Amnon Rubinstein, which broke away from the now defunct DMC in 1978. Shinui currently has six seats in the Knesset.

*She'li, a left-wing party with two seats, which supports a West Bank Palestinian state.

*Tehiya, a right-wing party formed in 1979 to protest what some felt were excessive Israeli concessions in the Camp David agreements. Tehiya is currently headed by Prof. Yuval Ne'eman and is represented in the Knesset by Geula Cohen and Moshe Shamir. Mrs. Cohen was the original sponsor of the Jerusalem Bill of July 1980, which aroused the ire of the international community and led to the departure of thirteen Western embassies from Jerusalem. The law reflected the power of a small pressure group to seize upon an emotional issue and sway the legislators at a time of forthcoming elections. The bill was enacted into law since hardly any Knesset members were prepared openly to oppose it, despite the misgivings of many that the timing was inopportune and that the law itself was unnecessary.

Joining with the opposition to the Begin government are four independents, including former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman.

The remaining seats come from the three-man Ahva party, which split off from the Democratic Movement, and three independents.

* * *

January 26, 1981

FAD/ISR & ME
81-580-4

ISRAELI POLITICS IN TRANSITION AND THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS

A Special Report Prepared for AJC's Israel Office

by Yosef Goell

Editor and Political Columnist, the Jerusalem Post
Lecturer in Israeli Politics, Hebrew University's
School for Overseas Students

* * * * *

Israel's domestic politics have always been complex. In recent years, however, they have tended towards incoherence.

One result of this breakdown in the coherence of the system and of the relative predictability of political behavior is that it has become more difficult than ever to foretell the outcome of elections. This was true in 1977 and seems to be true in this election year.

A persistent feature of Israeli public opinion polls over the past half year has been the prediction that the opposition Labor Party would beat Menachem Begin's Likud handily. But there is an important caveat: About 40 percent and sometimes even a greater proportion of the electorate remains undecided (and troubled) about whom to vote for.

Israeli politics are obviously in transition. The spectacular defeat of Labor in 1977 after 29 years in continuous power (actually 42 years if one counts the pre-State yishuv period) was itself a sign of the changes sweeping the political arena. The current unpopularity of the Begin government coupled with persistent suspicion and unease at the thought of the return to power of an "unreconstructed" Labor Party provide further evidence of shifting political loyalties.

Despite the complexity of the system (an average of 24 parties contending in Knesset elections and an average of 14 lists winning at least one Knesset seat), Israeli politics until the mid-1970's were largely a continuation of patterns established in the formative pre-State years. The impressive stability in the identity of the powerholders during this protracted period was all the more remarkable in view of the quintupling of Israel's population during the first three decades after independence. If anything, the internal make-up of the population changed even more dramatically than its numbers.

Indeed, the surprise is that basic political change took so long in coming, given the revolutionary change in the population base. That changes have been occurring in recent years is largely the result of the following factors:

The mass-membership, true-believer, ideological parties have largely broken down. These parties originally provided the power bases for the country's "heroic" leadership. They were the main factors in lending coherence to the fragmented party system and consistency to government policies. In the past decade Israelis have become nearly totally turned off from the political parties, although there is no sign of alienation from politics and public affairs. Party membership, where it exists, is nearly always of the self-serving, vested-interest type characteristic of party functionaries. The younger the Israeli the more disillusioned and cynical about party politics he tends to be. The old-time ambience of loyal party-member relationships is to be found today primarily on the margin of politics, in such movements as Gush Emunim on the ultra-nationalist-religious right and Peace Now on the secular-left-of-center. Neither of these two movements have yet taken the step of turning into political parties intending to run in the Knesset elections.

The "heroic age" founding fathers of nearly all political parties have either died or retired. They have been succeeded by much weaker second generation collegial leaders who have not succeeded in establishing their primacy in their respective parties. The parties' inability to choose strong new leaders has been a major cause of instability. In this sense Menachem Begin is the last of a breed, the charismatic leader whose continued primacy is not based on the need to win elections. When he goes, it is more than likely that the Likud bloc he heads will fall apart and that his Herut party will become enmeshed in

the same internal struggles for succession that have marked Labor and the National Religious Party (NRP) throughout the 1970's.

The NRP's long-time founder-leader, Moshe Haim Shapira, died in 1970. The party has proven incapable of choosing a recognized leader to succeed him. Much the same can be said about the Labor Party following the resignation of "founding mother" Golda Meir in 1974. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin never was granted the title of party leader and was finally rejected in favor of Shimon Peres. Peres, who in all likelihood will be the next Prime Minister after the elections, was a candidate of convenience for the large majority of the party activists. He does not, at present, enjoy the loyalty and devotion of the party's rank and file and its middle-level activists to the extent that Ben Gurion, Eshkol or Golda Meir did.

The major political issues of the 1970's and 80's cut across party lines. Thus they proved to be internally divisive within the leading parties rather than defining differences among them. Labor, the Likud and the NRP are all split down the middle, for instance, on the major issue of the ultimate fate of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, settlement activities and even on the Camp David agreement and peace treaty with Egypt.

The Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), which made a phoenix-like appearance in the 1977 elections as a "good government, sweep-out-all-the-old parties" list, was also divided on these basic issues. The party has since disappeared to all intents and purposes, in a series of splits resulting largely from these differences.

On the major socio-economic issues of the day the right-wing Herut acts like a populist party representing the poorer sectors of the Oriental communities. This is in direct contradiction to the policy preferences of its Liberal partners who rally to the call of 19th century Friedmann-style "free enterprise" solutions to the country's economic ills. Labor, which still sees itself as ostensibly "socialist," was responsible during its long rule for the introduction, perpetuation and widening of income and wealth differentials in the economy. Peres, who is identified with the pragmatic, anti-ideological right of the Labor Party, is surrounded by an inner circle from defense-connected big industry and Labor-controlled Histadrut enterprises.

The breakdown of the traditional parties has led to a growing emphasis on personalism and personal popularity in politics, with the fracturing of the older ideological basis of political differentiation. Leading political figures like Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman, recently resigned Finance Minister Yigal Hurwitz and former Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir have established the precedents for switching parties easily. Even a person like Arik Sharon, who is today so identified with Herut's ultra-nationalist settlement policy, originally flirted with Labor when he left the army at the beginning of the 1970's and served as Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's confidential advisor in the last Labor government. The emphasis on personal popularity can be expected to grow as a factor in politics, especially with the further development of the influence of television on politics.

One trend that could have been expected to develop but did not, is ethnic politics. Sensitivity to representation for large ethnic voting blocs (e. g. Moroccans, Iraqis) is highly developed in Labor and in Herut. But attempts to set up separate ethnic parties have all failed. The most recent attempt to set up a Moroccan-based Black Panthers movement proved to be a total flop, electorally. There is no indication that such attempts will meet with any degree of success in the immediate future.

One exception to this statement is the growing tendency of Arab voters to vote for the Communist Party. This is not so much communist as it is the only legal vehicle of expression for anti-Israel, pro-PLO sentiments among Israel's Arab minority.

The upshot of all this is that it is extremely difficult to make valid statements about who stands for what and who will join with whom in Israeli politics in 1981. The situation is simply too fluid and too transitional.

Having said this, some predictions can nevertheless be attempted. It is as close to a certainty as anything can be in politics that Labor will again emerge as the largest party after the next elections and that Shimon Peres will be the next Prime Minister. It is nearly as certain that Abba Eban will be Peres' Foreign Minister and that former army Chief-of-Staff and current Labor Party secretary Haim Barlev will be Minister of Defense. Beyond that, who will be what in a Peres government still remains somewhat murky. The main question concerns the identity of the Labor Finance Minister. Given the urgency and intractability of the country's economic problems (such as an inflation rate currently running at 180 percent annually), the decision as to who will be Finance Minister and what powers he will be given to manage the economy and bang heads together among Labor's economic barons will in all likelihood determine the fate of the next Labor government.

At present Ya'acov Levinson, chairman of the board of the Histadrut's Bank Hapaolim, is considered the front runner for that post. He is a complete newcomer to electoral politics; and his unease in public will be one factor governing his decision on whether to seek the post or not. If Levinson decides to back down Peres may well go outside the list of Labor ex-ministers to fill the government's top economic position. The decision will most likely be taken after the convening of the second session of the Labor Party convention in February, which will be devoted to economic and social matters.

Although it seems quite certain that Labor will be returned as the largest party and will form the next government, what is far from clear is whether it will win an absolute majority and so be freed of the trammels of forming a coalition government.

In Israel's 32-year electoral history no party has ever won an outright majority. All governments were, perforce, coalition governments. Labor's perennial coalition partner was the NRP, which Labor prime ministers always balanced with other smaller, secular coalition parties so as not to be totally beholden to it. The NRP has also been the Likud's major coalition partner.

It is considered likely that Peres would prefer to have the NRP in his government; various overtures to that effect have already been made. Other Labor leaders, however, would prefer, if possible, to "punish" the NRP for its defection to the Likud in 1977. For had the NRP then stayed with Labor, despite its electoral defeat, Peres would have been Prime Minister. So there is a desire to keep the NRP out of the next government, at least at the beginning.

Whether Labor will be able to do without the NRP will depend on the size of its plurality. Given the magnitude of the floating, undecided vote, it is not entirely impossible for Peres and Labor to accomplish the feat that eluded Ben Gurion, Eshkol and Golda: winning an outright majority. It also will depend on whether a center party will emerge between it and the Likud that could serve as an alternative to the NRP as a coalition partner.

Attempts to set up such a party, which have so far proven inconclusive, are being made around such men as Hurwitz, Dayan, Weizman and others. Polls show that such a party headed by Dayan could get up to 15 seats. This, though, is one of those "betwixt the cup and lip" perspectives that can be very far from the mark on election day. In any case, Moshe Dayan -- who is the key name in these attempts -- is so far continuing to sit on the fence with regard to a possible return to active politics.

The election campaign will in all likelihood be conducted around the twin issues of foreign policy and inflation. The Likud will attempt to push the line that Labor and Peres, if elected, will "sell out Eretz Israel" (e. g., the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) to Arafat, via King Hussein and Peres' "Jordanian option." Labor will blast away at the Likud government's sorry performance and its responsibility for inflation, and for the first-ever real drop in Israelis' personal income recorded in 1980.

Television will have an important effect on the elections, especially in view of the growing importance of the personality factor. This might well give Labor an additional edge, given its greater financial resources with which to pay for quality television programming.

Another important factor not to be overlooked is a possible repeat of the effect of the timing of American pressure on Israel for concessions to the

Arabs. President Carter's application of such pressure in his first meeting with Prime Minister Rabin in February 1977 had an important effect on swinging resentful voters from Labor towards the Likud. Voters today are sensitive to Likud charges that Peres would prove weaker than Begin in the face of American pressures for concessions to the Arabs, and would, in all likelihood, react to any early evidence of such pressures from the Reagan administration.

It is impossible at this time to predict what Labor's actual policies will be towards the territories, concessions to the Palestinians and continued Egyptian foot-dragging on normalization. Peres has been a life-long hawk on defense-related questions. He has, however, turned into a pragmatist, "saying all things to all men" in recent years, in an attempt to obtain broad support from party hawks and doves.

Peres and his Labor ministers will clearly be more sensitive to the effect of their policies and pronouncements on foreign opinion than Begin was. The extent to which such heightened sensitivity will express itself primarily in improved public relations or in actual policy changes will depend on specific situations, and on the balance of forces among the hawks, doves and pragmatists within the Labor parliamentary faction. One of the things to keep an eye on, therefore, will be the composition of the realistic part of Labor's list of candidates, the 45-55 names that will top the Labor list.

January 26, 1981
FAD/ ISR & ME
81-580-5





ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS
by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

EARLY ELECTIONS -- AND THEN WHAT?

(Press Summary, January 16, 1981)

Shmuel Schnitzer (*Ma'ariv*) notes that three years ago we discovered that it was possible to change governments in Israel. We are now about to learn another lesson in political science: one government is not so very different from another

The general public knows that the composition of the Knesset no longer reflects the range of opinion in Israeli society. But while most people are deeply disappointed in the political change of 1977, they don't expect anything better after the 1981 elections.

Still, change is necessary, since those political parties which have allowed Israel's chronic problems to worsen over the past four years cannot be given a mandate to keep up the good work. On the other hand, there is not much hope that the old-new Labor government, which was responsible for creating those problems, can now provide the answers it did not have for 29 continuous years of undefined rule. There is no special enthusiasm for a return to a Labor government, and no great rush.

The Labor Alignment's only suggestions for freeing Israel from the political web in which it is trapped are formulae like "territorial compromise" and "Jordanian option" -- both so flexible and general as to be meaningless, and both consistently rejected by our would-be negotiating partners, the Jordanians and Palestinians, as well as by our active partners, the Egyptians. The Labor Alignment cannot unilaterally release itself from commitments made by the Likud government. Thus it will be forced to continue the autonomy negotiations. Labor will face the same problems the present government is facing, and will probably be forced to adhere to many of the same positions. The Labor Alignment's position on Jerusalem, for example, is not substantially different from that of the Likud, so that if this is currently the main obstacle in the autonomy negotiations, the talks will remain stalled even after the government changes.

The Labor Alignment possesses no magic charms against the destructive processes which undermine Israel's economy. It has no clear program for fighting inflation, nor does it have any short-term solution to the housing shortage which plagues young couples and new immigrants.

What the Labor Alignment does have is just what the present government has: good intentions, theories which look good on paper but are difficult to implement, and an inability to make the tough decisions which can offer a better future at the cost of momentary popularity for the government.

What is most frightening is the rapid deterioration of faith in the Zionist dream and of trust in the leadership which is supposed to make the dream come true. Many Israelis are deeply anxious about our ability to run a proper state with a proper economy, and to maintain Jewish and Zionist motivation. Most believe that without the state there will be no Jewish people. Most are ready to make any necessary sacrifices. But many are no longer sure that the public is ready to do likewise, or that the leadership -- present or future -- has the power to unite the nation for the trials ahead.

The ability to command public trust and offer a national vision is the true test of leadership, and, when faced with this test, those who want to assume power are no better than those who rule Israel today.

Yoel Marcus (Ha'aretz) believes there are three problems facing the Labor Alignment. First, it has not yet convinced the people that Shimon Peres' leadership will be superior to Menachem Begin's. Second, Labor's vocal demand for an absolute majority could become sticky. Memories of past Labor governments, even without absolute majority, are not heartwarming. And even after the big victory predicted for Labor in the coming Histadrut elections, many people will hesitate to deliver the keys to the state to the Labor Alignment exclusively.

The third problem -- economic woes -- was the major cause of Likud's downfall. Everyone knows who Labor's prime minister, foreign minister and defense minister will be, but who will assume the treasury portfolio remains a mystery. Bank Hapoalim Board Chairman Ya'acov Levinson was once thought to be Labor's man for the treasury, but his name was later dropped, and no other candidates have taken his place.

Not a peep was heard from Labor on cutting the defense budget or satisfying the teachers' demand for more money, leaving their views on the economy a mystery. But rumor has it that the Labor Alignment will start its term with tough economic decrees.

It will not be difficult for the Likud to create the impression that Labor's ascent to power will place limits on the good life of the individual. And since the ultimate election issues are the economy and territorial compromise -- for neither of which are clear, simple solutions offered by either major party -- the Likud may still be able to take steps to cut the Labor victory down to size.

Bina Barzel (Yediot Acharonot) reveals that in discussions with some of his close friends, former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman analyzed the prospects for a separate list with himself at its head in the coming election. Weizman said that such a list could win a few Knesset seats, that it would enter a coalition with Labor, and that perhaps Weizman would get the defense portfolio -- but then what? The successes would be attributed to Peres and the failures to Weizman. For Weizman, a separate list would also mean a final break with the Likud, in which there are still, according to Weizman's own assessment, countless faithful troops ready to accept Weizman's leadership in the future.

From this analysis, some infer that Weizman has not yet closed the door on the possibility of returning to the Likud as its leader.

Danny Rubinstein (*Davar*) writes that East Jerusalem papers were not at all excited about the present coalition crisis which threatens to bring down the government. In their editorials, East Jerusalem papers wrote that there was no meaningful difference between the Likud and the Labor Alignment. The editor of the well-known newspaper *Al-Quds* wrote that the Arabs of Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza judge the governments of Israel according to their actions in the territories. And since it was the Labor governments that annexed East Jerusalem, established settlements on the West Bank, and refused to recognize Palestinian nationalism, the Arabs have no reason to cheer Labor's return.

In fact, most radical Palestinians leaders are worried and unhappy at the prospect of Begin's fall and a Labor comeback. "The worse, the better" applies here. Militant Palestinian nationalism needs a reliable excuse to keep its offensive legitimate and effective in the eyes of the world. When Israel conducts a policy of toughness and massive Jewish settlement in the territories and of bombings in southern Lebanon, it is easier for the Palestinians to unite their forces. Israeli actions such as passage of the Jerusalem Bill and the deportation of the Arab mayors help them gain political momentum and international sympathy. The Palestinians have a better chance with Begin than with the Labor Alignment. A prominent, successful Gush Emunim and a Begin government that includes Arik Sharon provide the Palestinians with a clearly defined enemy. They do not desire an Israeli withdrawal; they want Israel to establish settlements and annex the territories. This would arouse the hatred and animosity needed to intensify their struggle and advance their cause. A Labor government, with its foggy and slippery policy formulations, will force the Palestinians to work harder to "reveal the true face of Israel." When a Labor government says it will give back substantial areas of the West Bank, world political leaders will look less favorably on Palestinian proclamations and actions. So Palestinian leaders fear they will have to be on the defensive and apologize for continuing their violent struggle.

That is why there are sad people in Beirut, Nablus and East Jerusalem now that the Begin government is about to fall.

Lea Spector

Ma'ariv is independent but traditionally Likud-oriented.

Ha'aretz is an independent liberal newspaper.

Yediot Acharonot is independent but traditionally Likud-oriented.

Davar is affiliated with the Histadrut and the Labor Party.



קונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בניו-יורק

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK N.Y. 10017

OXFORD 7-5500

April 1981

ISRAEL IS INTERNATIONAL CLEARING HOUSE FOR
IRRIGATION INFORMATION

Dear Editor:

In honor of the 33rd Anniversary of Israel's Independence, we are pleased to enclose herewith a feature article on a unique information center in Israel which supplies data on irrigation to countries throughout the world.

Since water and the proper management of it are crucial to survival on this planet and its effective use necessary to increase the world's food supply, it is vital, says Janina Bard, the dedicated general manager of the International Irrigation Information Center, that existing knowledge be shared among nations.

The only clearing house of this nature in the world, the IIIC handles thousands of pieces of information about irrigation both in output and input. Because of poor soil conditions and water scarcity, Israel has developed the most sophisticated irrigation techniques in the world. It is the inventor of drip irrigation which, according to Janina Bard, is the most popular subject of requests that reach her desk. The article describes in detail the varied and extensive work of the IIIC, as well as developments and innovations in the field of irrigation which have been discussed in its quarterly publication, Irrinews.

Israel's vast irrigation expertise makes it a natural site for such a center. An additional asset is the fact that the country's population includes immigrants from 80 lands who can supply the language skills needed to handle requests for translations into 22 languages. It publishes articles about all countries regardless of the political situation in or between those involved. Interestingly enough, Irrinews, which has increased its circulation some 400% since it appeared in 1975 is received by 120 subscribers in 15 Moslem countries.

You may use this material in any way you wish, with or without photographs, prints of which you may order by circling their numbers on the attached picture page and returning the form to us. We would appreciate your letting us know the disposition of this article.

Sincerely yours,

A. Arazi
A. Arazi
Consul

Farm Features from Israel Farm Features from Israel Farm Features from Israel



ISRAEL IS INTERNATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE
FOR IRRIGATION INFORMATION

BY MARY STEWART KROSNEY

Beit Dagan, Israel - Janina Bard, a petite and articulate immigrant who came to Israel from England six years ago, is neither prophet nor philosopher. And yet she keeps reminding us that water and the proper management of it are crucial to survival on this planet.

"Effective use of water is one of the most important keys to increasing the world's food supply," says Bard, the dedicated general manager of the unique International Irrigation Information Center (IIIC) located here.

INPUT AND OUTPUT

Explaining the purpose of her organization, she says it is vital that existing irrigation knowledge be shared between nations. The IIIC, she points out, is the only clearinghouse of this nature in the world.

Every year, Janina Bard and her staff handle thousands of pieces of information about irrigation. So far the input amounts to some 4000 publications from places as farflung as Nepal and Zambia and in exotic languages like Thai and Byelorussian.

As for output, Irrigation Center staff are constantly filling requests for information from interested officials, scientists and farmers who want copies of publications they have seen listed in the IIIC's quarterly abstract, or who wish to

P.O.B. 13134, Jerusalem

order practical manuals produced by the Center. Typical are the following requests: A Peace Corps volunteer working in South America asks for basic plans and diagrams that deal with drip irrigation for vegetables and fruit trees; a European investment bank asks for a bibliography to aid it in researching costs of an irrigation project; a student from Bangladesh studying in Bulgaria requests material to help him in preparing a thesis on "sprinkle irrigation of maize."

ISRAELI LOCALE

The six-year-old International Irrigation Information Center is a nonprofit organization financed by "untied" aid from the Canadian government with services provided by the government of Israel.

Israel's vast irrigation expertise makes it a natural site for such a center. Due to poor soil conditions and water scarcity (Israel uses 95% of her available water supply and 70% for agriculture), it has developed the most sophisticated irrigation techniques in the world. It is the birthplace of drip irrigation, which according to Janina Bard is the most popular subject of requests that reach her desk at the Center. The system of slowly dripping carefully calculated amounts of water mixed with nutrients onto plant roots effects a 20-40% savings in water and unprecedented plant growth.

Drip irrigation may be an old story for Israeli farmers, who have used it for years, but IIIC statistics show that information about it is still in great demand all over the world. Improvements in drip irrigation continue to arise in Israel and Irrinews, the Irrigation Center's quarterly newsletter, brings news of all irrigation innovations to its readers. Janina Bard points to a recent issue of Irrinews which tells how Israel is using drip irrigation for the first time to grow cotton. It is, in fact, being used for 5% of the country's total area of planted cotton; scientists report that both the percentage and the cotton are growing like crazy.

Another area of expertise that prompts many queries from abroad is the use of saline water for irrigation. Israelis can point to their success in the desert, where settlers are using brackish water pumped from giant underground aquifers to grow record harvests of sweet melons, peppers and cucumbers. Scientists at Ben Gurion University of the Negev are always striving to develop newer and stronger strains of crops which can thrive on vast salty-water resources found lying under many of the great deserts of the world.

A third important area of irrigation know-how in this arid country is that of recycling sewage and industrial waste into water available for agriculture. Methods of producing cheaper and better-quality recycled water, sometimes using algae and solar energy in the process, are constantly in the works at Israeli institutions.

Another asset that Israel brings to the IIIC is the fact that the country's population includes immigrants from 80 lands, who can supply the language skills needed to handle requests for translations into 22 languages.

TACKLING DIVERSE PROBLEMS

Quite conveniently, Janina Bard and her staff are in close touch with Israeli scientists because the Center is located on the grounds of the Israel Agricultural Research Organization near Tel Aviv. Israeli experts, in turn, have access to thousands of publications at the Irrigation Center.

Janina Bard is insistent, however, that Israel's expertise in the field of irrigation technology does not dominate the work of the Center and much attention is also given to unsophisticated techniques suited to developing countries. The latest developments in drip irrigation, she says, may have no meaning for many readers, so alongside the Irrinews article on drip irrigation for cotton is a review of tests conducted at the Rajbari Demonstration Farm in Dinajpur, Bangladesh, on bicycle-, foot- and hand-pumping of water for irrigation.

Another article tells how farmers in Nebraska, U.S.A., are dealing with the problem of the depletion of water tables due to the over-drilling of wells.

In order to maintain an international standing the IIIC publishes articles about all countries, regardless of the political situation in or between those involved. For example, a recent Irrinews item relates how Libya (which does not have diplomatic ties with Israel) is beginning to tap a new water source - urban waste water - to irrigate forage for livestock near Tripoli. Significantly, Irrinews, which has increased its circulation some 400% since first appearing in 1975, is received by 120 subscribers in 15 Moslem countries.

MOTIVATED BY CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCE

General manager Bard admits that water documenting may be a dry activity and that the day-in-day-out cataloging and handling of publications having to do with irrigation may sometimes become mountains of tedious paperwork, but the information scientist approaches her work with a basic personal commitment that water is food and food is life.

"One of the reasons I've been working here is that I was hungry for years during the Second World War," Janina Bard explains. She was the sole survivor of her family in Poland and after being shuttled from hiding place to hiding place, she eventually found refuge in England at age ten. There she grew up, married and became a mother of two, immigrating to Israel in 1974.

"I had been kept alive by agencies and people. Food does matter. Most of us must be reminded that people in certain parts of the world are starving on a horrifying scale." The work of the Irrigation Center to consolidate and disseminate information about irrigation, she believes, is an essential tool in attacking the awesome issue of world food supply.



Dear Editor:


If you wish to receive any of the following photos, please return the form below.



1. Dr. Etan Pressman of the Agricultural Research Organization tests tomato plants for their maximum tolerance to saline water in which they have been successfully grown in Israel.



2. New life in Israel's desert: Desalinated water will make possible the cultivation of vast new areas in the world.



3. Near the Dead Sea newly-discovered underground deposits of brackish water are being tapped.



4. Volcani Institute, agricultural research center at Beit Dagon, Israel.



5. Information scientist Janina Baird at the International Irrigation Center, Beit Dagan, Israel. (Credit: Ya'akov Sa'ar)



6. Computerized control of drip irrigation water is being used in Israel kibbutzim.



7. Water desalination plant at Eilat, Israel's southernmost town.



8. Disposable hoses introduced in Israel now make it possible to use drip irrigation with large areas of field row crops.

TO: RALENE LEVY/INFORMATION DEPT./CONSULATE GENERAL of ISRAEL/800 2ND AVE./N.Y., N.Y. 10017
TODAY'S DATE: _____

PLEASE SEND ME THE FOLLOWING PHOTOS TO USE WITH THE IRRIGATION STORY: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 .

NAME: _____ TITLE: _____
PUBLICATION: _____ CIRC.: _____
ADDRESS: _____ TELE.: _____
DATE AND PURPOSE OF PROJECTED USE: _____

« مشاركة »

رابطه خلق ظروف ملائمة للمشاركة بين العرب واليهود
موشاب ريشبون أو حيفا شارع هجينم ٣٨



Partnership . مشاركة . שותפות

שותפות.

איגוד ליצירת תנאים לשותפות בין ערבים ליהודים
מושב רישפון או חיפה רח' הגנים 38

«PARTNERSHIP» Union for Creating Conditions of Partnership between Arabs and Jews. MOSHAV RISHBON Israel
or HAIFA, 38, HAGANIM St.

March 15, 1981

Dear Friends,

PARTNERSHIP, a grass-roots Israeli organization for teaching and affecting reconciliation between Arabs and Jews, is seeking financial assistance in order to expand its scope of services and activities. With the hope of gaining your and your organization's interest, we have prepared the following items for your review:

- * A SHORT HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF PARTNERSHIP
- * OUR GOALS, ACTION STRATEGIES AND PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
- * DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PROJECTS TO BE SUPPORTED, INCLUDING SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH AND ADULTS; COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS; AND RESEARCH, EVALUATION, AND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
- * PROPOSED EXPENDITURES FOR THE COMING YEAR

Additional information may be obtained by writing us directly, or by contacting a volunteer U.S. representative: _____

Adequate funding and proper execution of our programs will help us make a significant impact on the nature of individual and groups relations in Israel's Jewish and Arab society. We hope that you agree, and will contact one of our people soon.

We thank you in advance for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Benyamin Yanoov
Jewish Co-chairman

Nimer Ismir
Arab Co-chairman

حسابات : بنك هابوعليم ، فرع ٦٢٩ ، نوف - يام ،
للملة المحلية ٥٩١٠١ والاجنبية ٥١/٥٩١٠٠٠٦٠٥٩١٠

Bankers : Bank Hapoalim , Branch 629 , Nof - Jam. Acc. No. 59101 (for IL), 0605910/51 (for Foreign Currencies)

חשבונו בנק : בנק הפועלים, סניף 629, נוף-ים,
59101 (בלי), 0605910/51 (במטבע זר)

0605910/51 (for Foreign Currencies)

A SHORT HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP

In November of 1974, after ten years of studying the Arab-Jewish problem, Dr. Rachel Rosenzweig decided to try a different way. . . what is today known as the way of PARTNERSHIP. The first phase culminated in July 1975. Rachel and Ibrahim Sim'an of Haifa prepared a detailed proposal on how to end terror as a precondition to an arrangement with the Palestinians. From this first attempt a double lesson was gained: (a) there is little value in working for a change in relationships between Israel and the Palestinians as long as minimum conditions for partnership between Jews and Arabs within the country itself remain unfulfilled, and (b) in order to convince people of the validity of the theory of PARTNERSHIP, a model, such as those used in the sciences, must be developed.

Rachel and Ibrahim chose the case of the village of Bir'am, a situation involving a conflict of interests over land rights. A solution was proposed which would satisfy the displaced Arab residents without creating hostility in the neighboring kibbutz and moshav. Between August 1975 and July 1976, the proposal was prepared for the Labor government's experts and officials. However, before this official stand could be adopted, that government was voted out of office. To this day, the Bir'am problem remains unsolved.

In March of 1977, PARTNERSHIP was founded at a meeting in the Arab village of Tira. Nimer Ismir, a member of the council of displaced residents of Bir'am and vice-principal of the Seminar for Arab Teachers Training, and Rachel were elected co-chairpersons of PARTNERSHIP. This transition from the project of a few specialists to a citizen's movement led to new kinds of activities, a shift from an "objective" to an interpersonal-psychological focus. Countless workshops, summer camps, weekend retreats, etc. provided the experience from which a "creative meeting" approach was developed. (The "creative meeting" is an ongoing, ever-changing framework of direct encounter during which the conditions for partnership between Arabs and Jews may be developed.)

In July 1978, PARTNERSHIP entered another phase. We came to realize that the work demanded of volunteers - work with human beings on their feelings of helplessness and other irrationalities - would be meaningful only if the volunteers receive training and guidance, entering into a framework of mutual support. We chose to work in depth with a limited number of active members before moving toward expanding the organization. After several false starts, we developed some practical social and psychological tools to help us convert problems into challenges, increase our efficiency and enjoy the creativity of our work.

In April 1979, after the election of a second national board and the employment of two part-time staff members, PARTNERSHIP devoted special efforts to planning a nation-wide course for group leaders. The need for training such leaders continued to increase, as we received requests for further activities from youth groups, schools, municipalities and the Kibbutz Movements.

In order to increase in scope and efficiency, PARTNERSHIP has entered into a special joint working relationship with Neve Shalom, the young, Arab-Jewish village near Jerusalem. In 1980, a cooperative leadership training course was held, providing us with more than 30 potential group leaders for future activity. Today our challenge is to organize activities in ever-increasing numbers while continuing to improve quality, in order that a more significant portion of Israeli society may discover and practice the Way of PARTNERSHIP.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP

PARTNERSHIP is an Ottoman Association (non-profit organization) registered by law. The governing body is the annual General Conference which elects the seven member executive board, which in turn appoints from its members two chairpersons - an Arab and a Jew. In addition to the executive board, The General Conference elects a three members auditors committee, which sees that our activities are in accordance with the purposes, objectives and goals of the organization. The executive board employs an executive director, a program director and a part-time secretary, and supervises other voluntary and semi-voluntary positions such as regional coordinators and group leaders.

Any resident of Israel who is over 18 years of age and agrees with the constitution may join the organization as a voting member. Young people between the ages of 10 - 18 may become members of **PARTNERSHIP YOUTH**.

ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS

The goals of **PARTNERSHIP** as stated in the constitution are:

1. To propose and initiate concrete solutions to specific problems - solutions that can create and improve the conditions which enable Jews and Arabs to live as partners. The basic conditions are defined as common interest, mutual trust, and equality (based on equality of self-esteem).
2. To aid individuals, groups and the general public to challenge the problems which hinder a life of partnership between Arabs and Jews.
3. To make every effort to prevent future activities that may arouse conflicts of interest and mutual distrust between Jews and Arabs.

ACTION STRATEGY

Our basic strategy for meeting our goals is to create frameworks of direct encounter, on equal grounds, of as many Arabs and Jews (youth and adults from all classes and walks of life) as possible, and in doing so to help them discover common interests, to develop mutual trust, and to build within themselves and each other the sense of equality.

PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS

In this application we are requesting funding for **PARTNERSHIP**'s overall operating budget. This budget has formerly been supplied by certain organizations in Europe and the United States who were interested in providing "seed money" for some of our programs. Most of these organizations limit their support in hope that we will find other sources of funding. This could actually result in a reduction of budget at a time when our projects and programs are multiplying.

For purposes of clarity we have divided our program activities into four frameworks: Social and Educational Programs for Youth (see objectives 1 and 2, below); Social and Educational Programs for Adults (objectives 3 and 4); Community Development Projects (objectives 5 and 6); and Research, Evaluation, Information Dissemination (objective 7).

At present, social and educational programs constitute our most extensive effort. To increase efficiency and effectiveness, these programs are carried out under maximum cooperation with other organizations (Neve Shalom, Interns for Peace, local and regional government councils, youth movements, kibbutz organizations, and the Ministry of Education).

It may be said that the broad goal of our programs and projects is to create a nation-wide network of Arab and Jewish individuals and groups who participate in on-going creative meetings. The creative meeting has shown itself to be the most effective tool available for breaking down the social and psychological barriers to mutual understanding and trust. It provides a basis for actual problem-solving and future cooperative social action. Our goal is to enable larger numbers of Israelis to participate in such meetings.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES 1981 - 82

- 1) To increase participation in classroom projects to more than 500 pupils per year.
- 2) To increase youth workshop participation to over 300 participants per year.
- 3) To double or triple the number of trained counselors and group leaders at our disposal.
- 4) To double or triple the adult participation in "creative meetings."
- 5) To aid in the establishment of youth services and youth groups in communities where youth movements and community centers are inactive.
- 6) To attain regional coordination in at least five regions: Haifa, Galilee, Central, Jerusalem and the Negev.
- 7) To supply training, research findings and other aids to a larger number of organizations and personnel in the fields of education, politics and social services.

SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH

A wide variety of youth programs constitutes PARTNERSHIP's most extensive outreach to Israeli society. Among them are Peace Studies, the Classrooms Project, Youth Workshops and other special activities.

In Israel, educational services are generally seen as either formal (meaning that they are held in the framework of the elementary or secondary curriculum), or informal (held in the framework of such after-school programs as youth movements, local youth or community centers, or other organizations). In addition, there exists an important synthesis of these two frameworks called "social education." This constitutes something like "citizenship education" - informal educational activities held in the framework of the "formal" schoolday.

PARTNERSHIP attempts to work in all three of these frameworks. The choice is often made on the basis of strategic planning, although circumstances also play

an important role. As a result, most teachers, youth workers, group leaders, or administrators who approach us for assistance in setting up a joint Jewish-Arab program for their class or group, receive our help. The programs which we offer at present include:

Peace Studies - a compact educational program held simultaneously in parallel Arab and Jewish junior high and high schools. This program consists of five, two-hour sessions, in which pupils explore the meanings of peace, the implications and obstacles involved, and ways to achieve it. In the final sessions, the class meets a representative from the "other side," and eventually the two classes come together for a joint meeting. Members of the classes may choose to participate in a more advanced workshop, or some other joint community project, subsequently.

Classrooms Project - in some ways similar to peace studies, this is a more "informal" approach to reconciliation and cooperation. While it is also structured as a series of rather short meetings, the Jewish and Arab pupils are brought together earlier in the program. Emphasis is placed on structured group experiences and processes ("games") which deal with such issues as primary acquaintance, language and communication, personal, cultural and national identities, and building motivation for further contact and activity. The classes (or youth groups) may eventually choose to take part in a two, three or four-day workshop, or they may build their own programs (hikes, mutual visits, sports events, community projects).

Youth Workshops - a wide variety available, these workshops last from two to five days during vacations or weekends, or even on schooldays. They take place either in the participants' communities, or at a specially selected site (kibbutz, youth hostel, or at Neve Shalom, the joint Jewish and Arab village near Jerusalem). Workshops are designed and carried out by a team of workers, and, when possible, representatives from the groups involved. The workshops are packed with a variety of social and educational activities including: various group processes (mentioned above), lectures on relevant topics, open discussions, creative drama, role play and simulations, and many special creative projects, such as designing an integrated school or village. Opportunities are also provided for working together in the kitchen, gardens or fields, and for organizing fun and cultural events with ethnic music, dances, stories and poetry, foods, etc.

SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR ADULTS

While the target populations for many of PARTNERSHIP's programs consist of Israeli Jewish and Arab youth, the key to reaching these youth lies in the successful location and training of adults who will fill the positions of group leaders and facilitators, counselors and program organizers. Therefore, we find that our programs for adults are most essential::

Leadership and Counselor Training Courses - For a training course, participants are located from the fields of education, psychology and social work; from individual schools (teachers), student or youth groups, national youth movements, municipal education or youth and recreation departments, etc. Twenty to forty motivated Arab and Jewish individuals are selected to participate in the course. The first part consists of four to eight days of intensive training in an isolated community setting. After the intensive part of the training, groups of participants engage in field work, organizing their first joint Arab-Jewish activities, as they continue to attend regularly held seminars in the northern and central regions of the country. Guidance and aid are provided continuously by both the staffs of Partnership and of Neve Shalom.

The content of the courses is continually renewed as we receive evaluations

from our work in the field, redefine objectives, and further develop our training techniques. In general, the fields of study covered include:

Information on the Arab-Jewish conflict;

Participation in human relations and awareness workshops;

Techniques and methods for leading ethnically mixed groups;

Techniques of program development - to design and choose activities which will help overcome stereotypes, build trust, improve communication skills, cope with feelings, build motivation, etc.

Other Programs for Adults - PARTNERSHIP holds inter-community workshops and infrequent regional-national workshops or social gatherings for members of the organization and other interested parties (for examples, see Basic Information).

There seems to be a direct connection between these other adult meetings and the training courses described above. Most course participants first attend some regional gathering or workshop, gain interest, and then go on for further training. Of course, not every adult participant need become a group leader or youth counselor. Some can volunteer for organizational tasks, such as holding a social gathering, starting a chapter in their area, or locating official parties interested in cooperative projects. Others simply enjoy the opportunity of deepening acquaintances - Jews with Arabs and Arabs with Jews.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

PARTNERSHIP engages in a variety of selected community projects according to certain basic principles. For example, one of the objective requirements for relations of partnership is the attainment of some degree of symmetry between the partners involved. This does not mean symmetry of numbers of participants alone, but symmetry of strength, of development, of ability, or of need.

Too often, one of the sides is lacking in strength or level of development in a particular (social, educational or other) field. Practically speaking, this means that it is difficult to hold joint meetings of Arab and Jewish youth clubs when the Arab youth have no club, mutual projects between community centers when one side has no community center, or joint summer camps when only one side really knows what a summer camp is!

PARTNERSHIP has neither the resources nor the intention of constituting a "General Welfare Agency" for community development among the Arabs of Israel. Nevertheless, by subsidizing carefully selected projects - youth clubs, summer camps, kindergartens, evening courses, discussion groups, etc. - we provide foundations for facilitating mutual relations between Arab and Jewish communities on a more equal basis.

In addition to direct subsidies, PARTNERSHIP provides aid, advice and encouragement to both Jewish and Arab municipal personell and private individuals who show interest in setting up their own programs of mutual activity. Sometimes no more is needed than providing transportation of youth from one town or village to another in order to enable full participation in shared activities.

Setting up regional chapters for members and volunteer is another method for facilitating joint programs or projects. At one point PARTNERSHIP IN THE NEGEV (a regional)chapter) was able to run a kindergarten in a Bedouin tribe, provide

literacy training for adults, and carry out a research project on the problems of Bedouins in the Negev region, all at the same time!

We also combine efforts with other organizations for joint community development. A recent example can be found in the Haifa region, including the cities of Kiryat Ata and Shefar Am, and the villages of Tamra and Ibillin. Together, PARTNERSHIP, Interns for Peace, and the City and Village Municipalities are creating a framework for involving education and social work personell, administrators, parents, youth and children in mutual social and educational programs. Such activities further the goals of fruitful co-existence and mutual growth.

RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

PARTNERSHIP sponsors research in two related fields of conflict resolution: a) specific and objective problem-solving, and b) attitude and behavior change in group and inter-group contexts.

Objective problem-solving engages us in researching specific situations which involve conflicting Arab (Palestinian) and Jewish interests in Israel and the Middle East. The two most distinct examples of our work in this area are the Bir'am Project and the Report on the Bedouins. In both cases, extensive efforts were made both for the collection of data and for the creation of model solutions which would be acceptable to all parties involved.

The field of attitude and behavior change involves us in searching for the most effective methods for replacing patterns of fear, mistrust, competition and victimization with those of mutual trust, interest, respect, equality and sharing, particularly between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Continued evaluation of the group processes most positively associated with the latter qualities is required. Therefore we support, and occasionally sponsor, research and evaluation projects which will help us refine our techniques and select our activities for maximum effectiveness. To date we have sponsored several such research projects, gaining important data and insights from each.

PARTNERSHIP is also concerned with information dissemination and public relations. These are not only for building the organization, but for the benefit of the many individuals and groups in Israel and abroad who desparately wish to contribute to the cause but don't know how to do so. Partnership periodically publishes basic information, reports, project descriptions and evaluations in Hebrew, Arabic and English.

PROPOSED EXPENDITURES 1981 - 82

A summary of proposed expenditures has been prepared, based on the 1981-82 program objectives, listed earlier. In addition, a line-by-line breakdown of these expenditures is provided, on the following pages.

| | |
|--|---------------------|
| PERSONELL (Salaried and hourly)..... | \$35,600.00 |
| ROOM AND BOARD (Courses, workshops, etc.)..... | 23,500.00 |
| COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS | 19,500.00 |
| TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION | 13,900.00 |
| RESEARCH, PUBLICATIONS, PUBLIC RELATIONS | 9,500.00 |
| OFFICE AND ADMINISTRATION (excluding salaries) | 7,200.00 |
| TOTAL PROPOSED EXPENDITURES | \$109,200.00 |

PROPOSED EXPENDITURES 1981 - 82 (line-by-line)

PERSONELL:

Salaried

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| 2 full-time staff @ \$10,000.00 ea. | \$20,000.00 |
| 1 half-time secretary | 4,000.00 |
| 1 part-time community worker | 2,000.00 |

Contractual (hourly or daily)

| | |
|--|-------------|
| Staff for 2 leadership trainings (approx. 56 person/days @ \$28.00/day) | \$ 1,588.00 |
| Staff for Classroom Projects (6 double classes x 10 meetings ea. x 4 counselors per meeting @\$12.50 per counselor per meeting) | 3,000.00 |
| Staff for 5 winter workshops (x 3 days x 6 counselors = approx. 90 person/days @\$28.00/day) | 2,520.00 |
| Staff for 3 summer workshops { x 5 days x 6 counselors = approx. 90 person/days @ \$28.00/day) | 2,520.00 |

TOTAL PERSONELL: \$35,628.00

ROOM AND BOARD (based on cost of \$12.00 per person per day):

| | |
|---|------------|
| Leadership Training Course 'a' (35 x 10 days = 350 person/days) | \$4,200.00 |
| Leadership Training Course 'b' (30 x 4 days = 120 person/days) | 1,440.00 |
| Winter workshops (40 persons x 3 days x 5 workshops = 600 pers/days) | 7,200.00 |
| Summer workshops (40 persons x 5 days x 3 workshops = 600 pers/days) | 7,200.00 |
| Hosting visiting groups from abroad - approx | 1,500.00 |
| Hosting regional or nat'l meetings | " 2,000.00 |

TOTAL ROOM AND BOARD: 23,540.00

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Subsidies to Summer Camps (4-5 camps @ \$2000-2500.00 ea.) | \$11,000.00 |
|---|-------------|

(continued)

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (continued)

| | |
|---|---------------|
| Summer camps (from preceding page) | (\$11,000.00) |
| Subsidies for youth groups (approx. 5 groups @ \$700.00 ea.) | 3,500.00 |
| Regional Chapters (seed monies and project funds -- includes Negev projects) | 4,000.00 |
| Community - Regional Consultations and Seminars | 1,000.00 |

TOTAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS \$19,500.00

TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION

Staff Travel (for planning and execution of programs; includes bus and taxi fares, gas and oil, and meals when necessary):

| | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|
| Leadership Training courses | \$ 400.00 |
| Workshops (youth and adult) | 500.00 |
| Classroom Projects | 500.00 |
| Negev Projects | 1,000.00 |
| Office staff travel (general) | 6,000.00 |

Transportation (of participants to and from workshops, camps, etc.)

| | |
|-------------------------|----------|
| Youth workshops | 1,500.00 |
| Classroom Projects | 2,500.00 |
| Youth groups activities | 1,500.00 |

TOTAL TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION 13,900.00

RESEARCH, PUBLICATIONS, PUBLIC RELATIONS

| | |
|--------------------------------------|------------|
| Research Projects | \$2,500.00 |
| Publications - 3 languages | 3,000.00 |
| Publicity | 3,500.00 |
| Promotions (T-shirts, posters, etc.) | 500.00 |

TOTAL RESEARCH, PUBLICATIONS, P.R. 9,500.00

OFFICE AND ADMINISTRATION

| | |
|---------------------------|------------|
| Utilities and maintenance | \$2,200.00 |
| Telephone and Mailings | 3,000.00 |
| Office supplies | 2,000.00 |

TOTAL OFFICE AND ADMINISTRATION 7,200.00

TOTAL PROPOSED EXPENDITURES 1981-82

\$109,100.00



הקונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בניו-יורק

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

OXFORD 7-5500

January 1981

Dear Editor,

Med-Dead Sea Canal Will Give Israel New Energy Sources

We are pleased to enclose herewith a feature article on a proposed seawater canal joining the Mediterranean Sea and the Dead Sea which, if implemented, would make it possible for Israel to have at least one half of its energy needs supplied by the end of the century.

Approved in principle unanimously by Israel's Cabinet, the monumental project would be completed in ten years' time at an estimated cost of \$685,000,000.

The idea of a seawater link had been considered by officials, scientists and engineers for decades but has become economically feasible only in recent years owing to the constant rise in oil prices.

The article describes in detail the history of this venture, its technical aspects including those of a controversial nature, alternative alignments and the potential benefits. A map is attached.

You may use the material in any way you wish, with or without photographs, prints of which you may order by circling their numbers on the attached picture page and returning the form to us.

Sincerely yours,

A. Arazi
A. Arazi
Consul

SCIENCE FEATURES FROM ISRAEL

MED-DEAD SEA CANAL WILL GIVE ISRAEL NEW ENERGY SOURCES

by Ellen Davidson

Jerusalem - A unanimous decision by the Israeli Cabinet to approve in principle the construction of a monumental seawater canal joining the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea has initiated a flurry of debate and unprecedented scientific activity here. Planners hope that the project, if implemented, will provide a total of one half of Israel's energy needs by the end of the century.

Officials, scientists and engineers have been considering the idea of a seawater link for decades, but the project has become economically feasible only in recent years owing to the constant rise in oil prices. Israel's Minister of Energy, Yitzhak Modai, said that a hydroelectric plant, to be built at a point where the water would tumble 400 meters from the Judean Hills into the Dead Sea, would supply 600 megawatts of power during the six hours of peak demand each day. Additionally, he explained, the water may be stored in reservoirs until needed to help out the rest of Israel's power grid.

Minister Modai also noted that if the hydroelectric plant, which could supply 15% of Israel's energy needs by the end of the century,

is completed according to schedule in ten years' time - Israel will be able to postpone building its next fossil fuel powered plant for about six years, saving a considerable amount of money.

The estimated cost of the canal project at today's prices is \$685,000,000. The Israeli government is currently studying outside offers to finance the project. The decade needed to complete the canal includes another year of site testing and mapping, two to three years of detailed planning and five to six years for construction.

In addition to the goal of producing valuable hydroelectric power, planners emphasize the need to halt the high rate of evaporation taking place in the Dead Sea. This mineral rich body of water, fed by the Jordan River, has been shrinking dramatically in the past 25 years as both Israel and Jordan have tapped the Jordan River for fresh water. Since 1955, the level of the unique lake has fallen seven meters - to minus 400 meters. The Dead Sea, located at the lowest and one of the hottest points on earth, continues to lose some 2,000 cu.m. annually, through evaporation.

The northern part of the Dead Sea is 150 meters deep, while the southern sector, where the lucrative potash works are located, is 3.5 meters deep. (Due to the low level, the two parts of the Dead Sea are divided by a full-fledged land link between Israel and Jordan, according to recent reports.)

The aim of the planners is to use the canal to restore the 1955 level of minus-393 meters within 20 years of the project's completion. This goal involves an annual pumping of 1 billion cu. m. of Mediterranean Sea water into the Dead Sea.

A special committee appointed by the government awaits the results of several studies which will show how the ecology and, more importantly, the evaporation rate, of the Dead Sea will be affected by the introduction of seawater. If seawater mixed with Dead Sea water slows down the evaporation rate too drastically, the amount of water running through the hydroelectric plant will obviously have to be reduced, thus bringing into question the feasibility of the whole project.

In addition to the contribution of the hydroelectric plant to Israel's energy needs, the project could serve two alternate sources of energy - nuclear and solar. The canal could supply large quantities of water needed to cool a projected atomic power plant - a major hope for the future.

As for energy from the sun, scientists see the incoming water as a means for building a large complex of solar ponds at the level of the Dead Sea with a potential of 1,500 megawatts per hour. A successful solar pond already exists near Ein Bokek on the Dead Sea, powering a 150-kilowatt plant. The pond, lined in a special black material, is made up of layers of water differing in degree of salinity. Very hot water accumulates in the bottom layers

of the pond, from which energy may then be extracted and fed to turbines designed specifically to produce electricity. Taking into account the need for different layers of saline water, scientists say that incoming seawater from the Mediterranean would be a welcome combination with the heavier water of the Dead Sea.

Another potential benefit of pumping the seawater inland would be the possibility of establishing seawater ponds for the breeding of sea fish. With Israel's Red Sea coast line being cut to 10 kilometers by the Israel-Egypt Peace treaty, Israeli experts in mariculture look forward eagerly to the prospect of building vast inland seafood industries in the wide open spaces of the Negev Desert. Other possibilities would be sea water recreational lakes and a desalination plant.

The recommended route across the Negev Desert from Katif to Ein-Bokek will consist of a six-kilometer tunnel at the western intake point, followed by a 22-kilometer open canal (10-15 meters wide) and then 80 kilometers of tunnel (5 meters wide) to the Dead Sea terminus.

The canal committee recommended building the waterway in the country's south after considering other alternatives; a northern route, which was thought unsuitable due to the possibility of salt water pollution of the Jordan Valley and the high costs of a long aqueduct through the Valley; and a central route, untenable due to geological and ecological considerations.

Since the steering committee's interim report was presented to the Cabinet in August 1980, a number of reservations regarding the project have been voiced. For one thing, some economists say that the cost of the project may be as much as 50% higher than that quoted by committee head Professor Yuval Ne'eman, a physicist and former chief scientist of the Israel Defense Forces.

Furthermore, the estimated cost of \$685,000,000 does not include the expenses of maintaining and operating the project, including the cost of conventional fuel to operate the pump and power plant.

It is not yet certain how the project will be financed. At first the canal was to have been built and operated by foreign investors. Now the government is considering a joint enterprise to be undertaken by the government and private investors.

The planners admit that they are apprehensive about the ecological effects of the canal. The mixture of water from the Mediterranean and Dead Seas could affect the flora and fauna of the area and might cause a decline in production of potash by up to 15% or twenty million dollars annually.

Taking into account the controversial aspects of the planned canal, Committee Chairman Ne'eman and other scientists are nevertheless optimistic about the project. Planners anxiously await the results of the current studies which will evaluate the feasibility

of the project and assist the committee in deciding which is the most advantageous route between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea. Supporters of the canal project repeatedly point out that regarding Israel's energy needs, the tiny country is currently up against the wall. "We'll bring the Dead Sea to what it was, and at the same time produce energy." says Professor Ne'eman .





12/80

GENERAL LAYOUT OF ALTERNATIVE ALIGNMENTS

LEGEND :

- TUNNEL
- CHANNEL
- OPTION
- REGULATING RESERVOIR
- POWER STATION
- PUMPING STATION
- INTAKE STRUCTURE



Dear Editor:


If you wish to use the following photos, please return the form below:



1. Israel Admiral Arieh Hughes-Games (R.) at work on his project to grow oysters in the nutritious fish pond run-off at the mariculture project of the Oceanographic Institute, Eilat.



2. Israel's Minister of Energy, Yitzhak Moda1 (L.) and Professor Yuval Ne'eman explain the proposed southern route of the sea watercanal.




3. Scientists in Eilat, Israel's Red Sea Port, conduct research into the "denise," a sea water fish they hope to soon be farming in salt water ponds in the desert.



4. New solar pond to supply power for Israeli resort hotel at the Dead Sea shown with heavy black lining, an important part of the collection & storage process, prior to being filled with saline water.



5. A view of the health facilities at Ein Bokek, Israel, on the Dead Sea.



6. Water Desalination plant at Eilat, Israel's southernmost town.



7. One answer to the energy crisis is this solar pond at the Dead Sea, developed by Israeli scientists, which can channel energy from the sun to run a 150-KW power plant.

TO: CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL
INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017
ATTN: RALENE LEVY

DATE: _____

Please send me the following photos to use with the story on the DEAD SEA CANALS. (Circle the number(s) corresponding to the photo(s) you wish to receive: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7.)

NAME: _____ TITLE: _____

PUBLICATION: _____ CIRC.: _____

ADDRESS: _____ TELE.: _____

DATE AND PURPOSE OF PROJECTED USE: _____

RELIGION, PEOPLE AND LAND

I

The general Problematik underlying our theme has been sketched by the present writer in his opening paper "Religion and Peoplehood" published in the volume The Jerusalem Colloquium on Religion, Peoplehood, Nation and Land (edd. M.Tanenbaum and R.J.Z.Werblowsky), Jerusalem 1972. Whilst the aforementioned paper (a xeroxed copy of which is attached) focussed on the notion of "peoplehood", the following remarks will deal more specifically with the problem of land.

Whereas "people" and "nation" are historical concepts, "territory" and "land" are natural facts. People live on this earth as long as they do not float in interstellar space. The relationship to the fact of land viz territory exhibits a very wide spectrum, from the "territorial imperative" of certain animal groups, through the historic bonds forged by human societies to a completely "de-territorialized" spirituality. The collective or individual ownership and possession of land, its usufruct or administration as "faithful stewards" with responsibility to God (religion) or to one's fellow-men and future generations (humanist ethics) are problems for which answers can be sought on different levels, depending on the levels on which the questions are posed.

- a) How is "peoplehood" conceived? Does ethnic identity or historic consciousness imply a special kind of relationship to a certain land? How does this kind of relationship take note of facts (viz modes of history) such as migration, conquest, demographic shifts, national sovereignty, nomadic versus sedentary existence, etc.?
- b) If peoples are considered to have a special type of bond to special parts of this earth, how are these facts (if facts they are), evaluated religiously? Are they religiously irrelevant, or religiously neutral, or religiously valorised? For many primitive and ancient religions the answer seems obvious and simple, but for religions with a universal orientation the matter appears to be more complex. Even the so-called "particularism" of Judaism is universalist in the sense that it affirms the particularity of others no less than its own (particularity as a universal category as distinct from exclusive particularism on the one hand, and from universal uniformity on the other), and that it sees in all these particularities the hand of the Creator who is - by definition - universal. Cf. Exodus 19:5-6, Deut. 32:8 and Amos. 9:7
- c) If peoplehood, and the relations of peoples to specific lands are seen as part of the ordo naturalis (or ordo creationis), then religion could relate to them positively, albeit indirectly. Few people, however, would nowadays resort to the concept of a natural order as something given (a "datum") in a static manner. There are dynamic changes in the nature of societies, in their relation to the land on which they exist, and in the conceptual apparatus which we construct in order to comprehend these relationships.

- d) Hence the difficulty for theological thinking to effect the transition from historical theology to immediately relevant norms. Not everything that is descriptively correct of past theology, can ipso facto be applied prescriptively to present conditions. Hence the limits of the usefulness (which, however, does not mean the uselessness !) of historical theological enquiry.
- e) Focussing on the Jewish attitudes to this problem it may be argued - by way of a summary anticipation of Pt.III of this paper - that Judaism traditionally viewed peoples and their lands as God-given and God-willed particularities, ultimately grounded in the counsel of the Creator of the earth who is also the Creator not only of "men" but also of "peoples", and who is also the Lord not only of their individual salvation but also of their historic destinies (including even such phenomena as the migrations of peoples; cf. Amos). However, being more pre-occupied with the fate, vocation and destiny of the Jewish people (i.e. Israel), the Hebrew Bible and the later Jewish writings take it for granted that the election of the people and that of the land in which they are called to live out their vocation as a kingdom of priests and a holy nation, are interrelated and inter-covenanted. No amount of "spiritualizing" exegesis could ever spiritualize away this covenanted relationship to the point of liquidating its concrete, historico-social connotation.
- f) The patterns of traditional Jewish thought on this subject show even in the apparently secularized forms of modern Judaism. The case of Judaism may or may not be unique. Jewish theology seems to have concentrated more on explicating the reality of the mysterious bond between Keneseth Yisra'el (the "ekklesia Israel") and Erets Yisra'el (the chosen, destined, promised and covenanted Land); it had less to say on the nature and the modalities of the relation of other peoples to their lands. This reticence (or failure) may be due to a particularistic lack of interest; it may equally well be interpreted as a refusal to legislate for others the forms of their historic consciousness, and as an openness that invites others to do their own thinking and formulating regarding their experience of peoplehood and land. The "nations of the world" (even when they take their inspiration - or part of it - from the Hebrew Bible, must bring their own insights into the meaning of Scripture and of their experience, to bear upon this problem. The rest of this paper will attempt to describe the experience of Judaism in a deliberately semi-theological language so as to do at least partial justice to both the traditional and the more secularized (modern) versions of this experience.



AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

The relationship of the Jewish people to the tiny mediterranean coastal strip known as Palestine is something of a problem; the more theologically minded would even call it a "mystery". It is a relationship that has at all times found expression in certain facts, and this relationship and these facts (including traditions, beliefs, attitudes and actions) begot claims which in their turn resulted in new historic facts. They are part of Jewish history, and their understanding is necessarily part of the understanding of Jewish history - whether it is the Jew's self-understanding of his historical existence or the gentile's understanding (neutral, sympathetic or hostile) of this awkward, somewhat irregular and hence also irritating phenomenon. Even the fact that for many Jews - including some of the founding fathers of modern Zionism - this relationship and the claims implicit in it were so much taken for granted that they seemed to require no further justification, is in itself part of the total phenomenon to be understood.

Whenever Jews tried to understand the nature of this bond, they resorted to Biblical texts, to Biblical language, and to the prophetic promises. But it is important to realize that they did not quote these texts as legal claims to be recognized by courts of law. They rather quoted these Biblical promises as a way to articulate their sense of profound certainty and unshakable conviction that this bond, as the deepest reality of their soul, was also the deepest reality of their history, and that this inner certainty and conviction were stronger than the vicissitudes of exile and diaspora. The appeal to the Bible was an appeal to the roots of their own being and to the sources of their inner strength. They cannot in all fairness and decency be meant as a legal appeal, the validity of which ought to be recognized by others. Biblical prophecy is a key to the mystery of the strength of the Jewish faith. It is not a title deed to be presented to a land registry office.

To understand the nature of the bond between the people and the land, it is of course necessary to appreciate Israel's understanding of itself as a people. I do not wish to engage here in the futile exercise of attempting a hard and fast definition of peoplehood, nationhood, or ethnicity. Suffice it to say that at all stages of its recorded existence, the Jewish people took its peoplehood for granted. The attempt to describe the Jews as a denomination, comparable to Catholics, Baptists, Lutherans, et cetera, is a falsification of the basic facts of history and a perversion of the fundamental nature of Jewish existence. It could even be argued that political Zionism with its allegedly nationalist ideology was much less a departure from traditional Jewish consciousness than the movement of religious reform and social assimilation which sought to turn Judaism into a denominational entity organized in synagogues and administered by consistories, synagogue councils, and similar establishments. It is hardly necessary to add that the Jew's historic consciousness is rooted in his original experience of election, that is to say, his awareness of the difference of his group or people from other peoples (the Gentiles). Whatever the corruptions which the doctrine of election is capable of (and some of them are as surely Jewish corruptions as others are the projection, on the Jew, of sub-conscious Gentile corruptions), it is primarily in terms of difference of fate and vocation rather than of superiority that election must be understood.

This historical self-awareness always contained, as an essential element, a relationship to a particular land. There was, correlated to the chosen people, a chosen, that is, "promised", land. If the Jews are not just a group of people sharing similar theological beliefs, but a people with a specific historic identity- and that is what they considered themselves to be - then the bond to the elect land was part and parcel of their consciousness and religio-national identity.

Like the doctrine of election, the bond to the land could be articulated and rationalised in different ways. At times this bond was "ideal" only: it was experienced in the privative mode of separation and exile, and expressed in the language of eschatological hope. But whether it was actualised in messianic movements or "stored" in liturgical formulae and eschatological expectations, this bond formed part of the total complex of Jewish experience. Some rabbis rationalised the attachment to the land in terms of Halakhic piety: only in the Holy Land was it possible to keep God's commandments and fully do His will. To others it was evident that only in the Promised Land could Israel achieve the spiritual perfection to which it was called. Whatever one may think of a spiritual calling subject to geography, it behooves us to take this tradition for what it is: not only a protest against a disincarnate spirituality, but more specifically, an unconscious testimony to the inability to affirm any sort of Jewish spirituality other than that of a people - it being understood that this people fully realised its existence only in a "Hypostatic Union" with the land. Traces of this ideology can be found in the earliest strata of Biblical literature. Compared to the chosen land, all other countries were impure (Joshua 22:19; Amos 7:17), and to be exiled from the land was tantamount to serving strange gods. Rabbinic legend surrounded the land with a halo of superlatives: its fruit was better than that of any other country, and the very fact of dwelling therein had atoning and quasi-sacramental qualities. Where the rabbis left off, popular piety took over: wherever a Jew is buried a handful of dust or earth from the Holy Land is laid in his grave or coffin. After all, one wants to be buried "at home".

In the experience of the Jews their relation to the land actually preceded their existence as a people. This may sound poor logic, but the Lord had said unto Abraham "Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto the land that I will show thee" (Genesis 12:1). This promise became an "everlasting covenant", as permanent as the laws of nature (Jeremiah 31:34-35; 33:20-21, 25-26), and the Jews always knew, deep down in their hearts and in the midst of the most abject humiliation, persecution and massacre, that God would not only remember His covenant with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob but that He would also "remember the land" (Leviticus 26:42). The notion of a "return" thus became a basic element of Jewish self-understanding and of the interpretation of their existence in exile. Foolishness to Greeks and liberals, and a scandal to Christians, the obstinate Jews persisted in their determination to consider all countries except one tiny mediterranean coastal strip as the lands of their dispersion. And when - even greater foolishness and worse scandal - they established the State of Israel, this historical event was experienced by them as a "return". Perhaps it is not going too far to suggest that this return was possible because in the historical consciousness of the Jews the bond with their land was consistently formulated in terms of the future. The "Land of Israel" is neither a "fatherland" nor a "mother country"; it is the land of which God had said that He would show it to Abraham and give it to his seed as an everlasting heritage. In less biblical language we might say that the myth binding people and land together is anchored in the future and not in the past. Perhaps this future-oriented quality of the myth goes a long way towards explaining why even the longest separations could not sever this bond. The crucial point here is not that the Israelite tribes, at some early period of their history, conceived the idea of a promised land but that this bond, once it had been conceived, persisted even after close on two thousand years of exile with sufficient vitality to become a dynamic and constructive historical factor.

The way the Jews saw it, there always was a mysterious parallelism between their fate and that of the land. For even as they were in exile, suffering ignominy and persecution, so also the land was waste and waiting for the return of its predestined partner. The Biblical prophecy (Leviticus 26:32) seemed to be confirmed: "I will bring the land into desolation, and your enemies that dwell therein shall be desolate as well". I do not pretend that this translation of the verse (Leviticus 26:32) is the philologically correct one. But this is the way in which traditional Jewish exegesis interpreted this verse, and I tried in my translation to bring out this traditional Jewish understanding. In point of fact, this understanding of the text fitted the actual facts remarkably well, since the history of the land, as reported by travellers and pilgrims, seemed to bear out to a remarkable degree the picture which the Jews in the lands of their exile had formed of it. One of the most fertile regions of the ancient world had become a waste and malaria-ridden area. After the Turkish conquest the desolation of the land reached its peak, and in the 19th century, when the population of the world was everywhere expanding, that of Palestine dropped to less than half a million. Hence it is understandable that the impressive achievement of the Jewish pioneers in reclaiming the land and "making her wilderness like Eden, and her desert like the garden of the Lord" (Isaiah 51:3) should be perceived, even by convinced secularists, through a halo

of Biblical associations. In fact, if the land blossomed again this was not merely the result of the heroic and self-sacrificing efforts of the Zionist pioneers in reclaiming malarial swamps and irrigating the desert waste; it was rather - in terms of the traditional Jewish mystique - the response of the Sleeping Beauty to the Prince that had come, at long last, to resuscitate her by his kiss. Whether successful colonization and the transformation of a desert into a garden of the Lord can establish a claim to a territory - claims of this kind have occasionally been advanced by white settlers in Africa - is not the point at all since we are concerned, in the present context, with showing that in Jewish experience the "rebuilding of the land" is the result of an anterior relationship and not a cause. As such it confirms a title and does not create one.

Among these symbolic expressions and irrational imponderabilia there is one to which Martin Buber has drawn attention. He was referring to the fact that the national renaissance of Jewry "was named after a place and not, like others, after a people". The name Zionism indicates "that it is not so much a question of a particular people as such, but of its association with a particular land." Duber's point, in order to be fully appreciated, should be focussed even further. The national renaissance of the Jewish people took its name not from a country but from a city. Zion, which since Biblical times is synonymous and interchangeable with Jerusalem, serves as a symbol for the country as a whole, and the country is an extension of all that is signified, emotionally and symbolically, by "Zion". The hymn of the Zionist movement, which in 1949 became the national anthem of Israel, speaks of the "eye looking towards Zion" and of the millennial hope of a return to "the land of Zion and Jerusalem". The anthem, known as ha-Tiqvah ("Hope") is very poor poetry indeed, but in all its awkwardness and sentimentality it somehow catches the essential - or, if you prefer, the existential - awareness of the Jewish people that at its centre there is an indissoluble bond with the land, and that at the centre of this centre is Zion, the City of David. Jerusalem and Zion are geographical terms beyond mere geography; they are "the local habitation and the name" for the meaning of Jewish existence and of its continuity from the days when God spoke of a certain place that He would chose to the days of the return which - however improbable it might seem - was never in doubt for the Jew. **

Letter to the Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43 St.
New York, N. Y.


Dear Editor,

As an human relations organization that has been deeply involved in advancing the cause of improved understanding and friendship between Arabs and Jews in Israel literally since the founding of the Jewish State in 1948, we found the series of articles by David Shipler on "Arab-Jewish Relationships" deeply disappointing and unhelpful.

No responsible person would deny the seriousness and urgency of facing the problems of intergroup tensions between Arabs and Jews in Israel, as the American Jewish Committee and many Jewish leaders in Israel have sought to do during the past four decades. To make a constructive contribution to the resolution of those tensions requires a careful and balanced analysis of the historic sources of those problems as well as the contemporary pressures that need to be surmounted if genuine progress is to continue.

Instead, Mr. Shipler has conceptually given us a morality play, with Jewish "types" whom he depicts as generally "racist" and "arrogant," contrasted with Arab "anti-types" whom he portrays as by and at large as "oppressed victims," somehow justified in their hatreds and resentments. Rather than help the general reader understand the magnitude of the complexity of the issues at stake, he piles on one horror story after another, many of them coming from the mouths of members of extremist groups in both the Jewish and Arab populations. Their inflamed rhetoric of animosity is given prominent attention throughout the series while the views of moderate elements committed to coexistence and reconciliation are treated far more marginally. That results in distortion of the mainstream Israeli reality, and even borders on sensationalism.

The American Jewish Committee
Information and Research Services



Attitudes of the American Public Toward
American Jews and Israel: December 1979
(with an Appendix incorporating earlier polls)

The latest in a series of attitude surveys sponsored by the American Jewish Committee reflects changes brought about by the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of March 1979.

In December 1979 the Yankelovich, Skelly & White organization conducted a national telephone survey to ask a representative sample of American voters questions dealing with attitudes toward Israel in relation to Egypt, to other Arab nations, to the Palestinians, and to the PLO; and with perceptions of groups having excessive power over United States policy.

The major finding of the December poll is that Americans have come to see Egypt as apart from other Arab nations. More respondents than before are sympathetic to Egypt, with a resulting drop in the proportion sympathetic to Israel. Nevertheless, Israel is still preferred to any Arab nation-- in the case of Arab countries other than Egypt, by a ratio of 8 to 1.

It is similarly striking, and gratifying, that even in these difficult times Jews are at the bottom of the list of groups held to be too powerful.

Sympathy for Israel

Asked: "If war broke out between Israel and Egypt, with whom would your sympathies lie?", half the respondents did not commit themselves, and of those who did, slightly more

than twice as many chose Israel as Egypt:

| | <u>Per cent</u> |
|----------|-----------------|
| Israel | 34 |
| Egypt | 16 |
| Neither | 20 |
| Not sure | 31 |

"If war broke out between Israel and other Arab nations?"

Israel is even farther in front:

| | <u>Per cent</u> |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| Israel | 49 |
| Other Arab nations | 6 |
| Neither | 16 |
| Not sure | 29 |

Israel's popularity of 1974 has waned somewhat, from 55* to 49 per cent, but the points are not picked up by the Arabs. Instead there is a 15 per cent increase in the number who say they are not sure.

A large proportion, between 40 and 50 per cent, do not take sides. The undecided may swing toward the Arabs in future.

Palestinians and PLO

In the December poll we asked: "In the dispute between Israel and the PLO"--in the next question, "Israel and the Palestinians"--"with whom would you sympathize more?" The answers were as follows:

* Appendix, Table I.

| | <u>Per cent</u> | | <u>Per cent</u> |
|----------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Israel | 56 | Israel | 49 |
| PLO | 11 | Palestinians | 15 |
| Neither | 10 | Neither | 12 |
| Both | 2 | Both | 3 |
| Not sure | 22 | Not sure | 22 |

The responses show a 5-to-1 support for Israel over the PLO and 3-to-1 over the Palestinians. It is to be noted, however, that these did better in 1979 than earlier.*

In each case about one third expressed no preference.

Although only 11 per cent of the respondents favored the PLO, when asked, "Is Israel doing the right or wrong thing in refusing to negotiate with the PLO?", four said Israel was wrong for every three who said she was right:

| | <u>Per cent</u> |
|-----------|-----------------|
| Right | 30 |
| Wrong | 41 |
| Not sure | 16 |
| No answer | 13 |

Again, close to a third either were not sure or gave no answer.

In the wake of the publicity accorded former Governor John B. Connolly's proposal to "pursue a new approach...based on American interests" in the Middle East, the following question was asked: "Some people say we should negotiate with the PLO, even if Israel objects. Do you think the U.S. should or should not negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization?"

*Appendix, Table I.

| | <u>Per cent</u> |
|------------|-----------------|
| Should | 34 |
| Should not | 42 |
| No opinion | 24 |

The respondents may be saying they do not want the United States to get involved.

American Jews

A question tapping feelings about American Jews, asked in two previous polls, was repeated in December. Respondents were asked to select, from a number of groups (9) those "having too much power in the United States." Jews score lowest, with "Zionist organizations" just behind "church interests" and just before "black groups." Oil companies, big business/corporations, organized labor, and Arab interests are at the top:

| | <u>Per cent</u> |
|---------------------------|-----------------|
| Oil companies | 86 |
| Big business/corporations | 82 |
| Organized labor | 66 |
| Arab interests | 54 |
| Environmentalists | 30 |
| Church interests | 25 |
| Zionist organizations | 24 |
| Black groups | 23 |
| American Jews | 17 |

Note the intermediate position of "environmentalists."

In 1979 we asked about too much "power" in the United States rather than too much "influence," as in earlier polls.*

* Appendix, Table VI.

The difference in wording did not call forth a significantly different response.

Perception of oil companies as having too much power rose 6 points from January 1975 to December 1979, and of big corporations 4 points. Concern about Arab interests in the United States rose 17 points from January 1975.

The College-educated

In Anti-Semitism and Israel: A Report on American Public Opinion, prepared for the American Jewish Committee in December 1978, Professor William Schneider warned of a critical reversal in support of Israel among the college-educated. He pointed out that in a poll taken by CBS News and the New York Times in April 1978 the best-educated were most likely to feel that the U.S. should "pay more attention to the Arabs at the risk of antagonizing Israel."^{*}

In the Yankelovich survey of December 1979, answers to the questions of sympathy in case of war--Israel compared with Egypt and with other Arab nations--indicate that the college-educated, like others, prefer Israel to the Arab nations, but are definitely more sympathetic to Egypt (17 per cent) than to other Arab nations (6 per cent). Several months earlier, in April 1979, we had asked whether people felt more or less friendly than before toward Israel and Egypt.^{**} Responses to this question indicated that the college-educated Americans

^{*}In August 1979 the Gallup poll asked the same question and found a higher proportion of college-educated than others ready to "pay more attention to the Arabs."

^{**}Appendix, Table VII.

had been considerably affected by Egypt's efforts toward peace. More than any other group, and by 19 per cent more than the total population, the college-educated felt friendlier than before toward Egypt. But in other respects (sympathy in case of war and feelings about the PLO) the college-educated back Israel by higher percentages than the total population. In fact, even compared with the non-college population with opinions, a greater proportion of the college-educated with opinions support Israel.

About Blacks

Professor Schneider's report also noted the increase since 1974 of black antisemitism, particularly among younger and better-educated black people. In a supplement (March 6, 1979) Schneider discussed the Harris survey conducted for the National Conference of Christians and Jews in October 1978, which confirmed this finding and further revealed that black leaders as a group entertained more negative stereotypes about Jews than blacks generally.

Schneider suggests that the increase in black antisemitism may be the result of ideology and a heightened awareness of conflict of interest between blacks and Jews. Do blacks, then, more than others, see Jews as having too much power?

In the poll of December 1979 most Americans, non-whites* as well as whites, do not see Jews as excessively powerful. Nevertheless, there is a sharp difference, 25 per cent of non-whites thinking Jews have too much power, compared with 15 per cent of whites.**

* In 1979 Yankelovich started using the category non-white rather than black: Appendix, Table II, note.

** These figures have been extrapolated from data which are the basis for Tables III and VI.

As regards the Middle East, non-whites are considerably less pro-Israel and more pro-PLO than whites. Asked about sympathies in a possible Middle East conflict, 30 per cent of non-whites said they would sympathize with the PLO, and 31 per cent with Israel. Among whites the corresponding figures were 12 and 62.




APPENDIX

The Tables that follow are based on Yankelovich polls for the American Jewish Committee from April 1974 to December 1979.

The tracking questions--those measuring the same attitudes over a period of time--appear in Tables I, II, IV, and VI.

The data for college-educated and non-whites bear on the discussion on pages 5 to 7. These categories are not mutually exclusive.



In terms of the Mideast trouble, if war should break out, with whom would you probably identify most?

| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ. Per cent</u> | <u>Blacks</u> |
|----------|--------------|--------------------------------------|---------------|
| Israel | 55 | 66 | 58 |
| Arabs | 9 | 5 | 7 |
| Both | 5 | 7 | 2 |
| Neither | 17 | 15 | 12 |
| Not sure | 14 | 6 | 21 |

April 1979

December 1979

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

TABLE II

If war broke out between Israel and Egypt, with whom would your sympathies lie?

| | <u>April 1979</u> | | | <u>December 1979</u> | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white**</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- Educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> |
| | <u>Per cent</u> | | | | | |
| Israel | 37 | 41 | 33 | 34 | 39 | 18 |
| Egypt | 14 | 15 | 11 | 16 | 17 | 24 |
| Neither (volunteered) | 24 | 24 | 31 | 20 | 19 | 25 |
| Not sure | 25 | 19 | 25 | 31 | 25 | 31 |

Between Israel and other Arab nations?

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Israel | 47 | 63 | 33 | 49 | 54 | 36 |
| Other Arab nations | 11 | 7 | 13 | 6 | 6 | 14 |
| Neither (volunteered) | 19 | 15 | 21 | 16 | 12 | 24 |
| Not sure | 22 | 12 | 34 | 29 | 28 | 26 |

*The wording had been changed from "identify with" in 1974 to "with whom would your sympathies lie" in 1979.

**Non-whites are 12 per cent of the total respondents. Of this group, 9 per cent are black, 2 per cent are Hispanics, 1 per cent other.

December 1979

TABLE III

In a dispute between Israel and the PLO [Palestinians], with whom would your sympathies lie?

| | <u>PLO</u> | | | <u>Palestinians</u> | | | |
|----------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|----|
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> | |
| | <u>Per cent</u> | | | <u>Per cent</u> | | | |
| Israel | 56 | 64 | 31 | Israel | 49 | 54 | 31 |
| PLO | 11 | 8 | 30 | Palestinians | 15 | 16 | 24 |
| Neither | 10 | 11 | 14 | Neither | 12 | 11 | 18 |
| Both | 2 | 4 | 2 | Both | 33 | 4 | 5 |
| Not sure | 22 | 13 | 22 | Not sure | 22 | 15 | 22 |

January 1975
December 1979

TABLE IV
AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Is Israel right or wrong in refusing to negotiate with the PLO?

| | <u>January 1975</u> | | | <u>December 1979</u> | | |
|------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> |
| | <u>Per cent</u> | | | <u>Per cent</u> | | |
| Right | 29 | 38 | 27 | 30 | 37 | 14 |
| Wrong | 36 | 41 | 34 | 41 | 47 | 52 |
| Not sure | 34 | 21 | 37 | 16 | 10 | 19 |
| No opinion | 1 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 6 | 14 |
| No answer | | | | 1 | 1 | -- |

December 1979

TABLE V

Should U.S. negotiate with the PLO even if Israel objects?

| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> |
|------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>Per cent</u> | | |
| Should | 34 | 33 | 47 |
| Should not | 42 | 51 | 26 |
| No opinion | 24 | 16 | 27 |

January 1975
 January 1976
 December 1979

TABLE VI

A number of groups have been mentioned by some people as having too much influence* over U.S. policies. Do you feel / has too much influence? /

| | <u>1975</u> | | | <u>1976</u> | | | <u>1979</u> | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Black</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Black</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> |
| | <u>Per cent</u> | | | <u>Per cent</u> | | | <u>Per cent</u> | | |
| Big business/corporations | 78 | 76 | 78 | 76 | 80 | 69 | 82 | 78 | 76 |
| Organized labor | 60 | 63 | 46 | 63 | 78 | 39 | 66 | 74 | 53 |
| Oil companies | 80 | 80 | 73 | 79 | 79 | 68 | 86 | 77 | 81 |
| Church interests | 23 | 16 | 27 | 17 | 20 | 14 | 25 | 25 | 36 |
| Zionist organizations | 22 | 24 | 19 | 21 | 19 | 23 | 24 | 22 | 29 |
| Arab interests | 37 | 31 | 48 | 40 | 35 | 35 | 54 | 46 | 62 |
| American Jews | 37** | 32 | 42 | 26 | 26 | 19 | 17 | 16 | 30 |
| Environmentalists | not asked | | | not asked | | | 30 | 29 | 24 |
| Black groups | not asked | | | not asked | | | 23 | 20 | 7 |
| CIA | 42 | 39 | 48 | 45 | 36 | 48 | not asked | | |
| Media | 50 | 54 | 41 | 50 | 55 | 42 | not asked | | |

*Underlining ours. In January 1976 the question was changed to: "In general, do you feel that / has too much power in the U.S.?"

** This survey was in the field in December 1974, one month after the then Chief of Staff General George S. Brown said that Jews "own...the banks in this country, the newspapers." This may account for the one-time larger percentage naming Jews.

April 1979

TABLE VII

Do you feel more friendly toward _____
than you used to? Less? The same?

| | <u>Egypt</u> | | | <u>Israel</u> | | | <u>American Jews</u> | | |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Coll.- educ.</u> | <u>Non- white</u> |
| | <u>Per cent</u> | | | <u>Per cent</u> | | | <u>Per cent</u> | | |
| More friendly | 29 | 48 | 15 | 20 | 21 | 16 | 12 | 12 | 11 |
| Less friendly | 5 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| The same | 58 | 46 | 69 | 64 | 65 | 74 | 75 | 79 | 69 |
| Not sure | 8 | 3 | 11 | 9 | 4 | 8 | 11 | 7 | 16 |

