Preserving American Jewish History

MS-603: Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum Collection, 1945-1992.

Series D: International Relations Activities. 1961-1992

Box 62, Folder 7, Israel, 1983-1986.

POLICY BACKGROUND

222/8.5.83/4.06.046

ISRAEL AND LEBANON: IN SEARCH OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP

- 1. The agreement finally reached between Israel and Lebanon, after more than four months of difficult negotiations in which the United States played a pivotal role, reflects four essentials on which Israel and Lebanon see eye to eye: (a) Termination of the state of war between Lebanon and Israel; (b) Respect for each other's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and right to live in peace, within secure and recognized borders; (c) Withdrawal from Lebanese territory as a natural corollary of the previous proposition of all external forces (PLO terrorists, Syrian and Israeli); and (d) Agreement that Lebanon must not again become a base for hostile activity against Israel and that measures will be undertaken to prevent such a development.
- 2. A number of further steps will have to be taken, within the months to come, to "fill out" the agreement and to make possible its full implementation.
- 3. Thus, Propositions (a) and (b), above, require a gradual normalization of mutual relations including the peaceful and unhampered movement of goods, products and persons, communications, etc. Some of these things will need to be formalized in bilateral agreements.
- 4. Proposition (c) withdrawal of forces requires, first of all, the withdrawal of those forces that precipitated the near-collapse of Lebanon during the last decade-and-a-half and created the conditions that made Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee, in the summer of 1982, inevitable. It requires, in other words, the withdrawal of all PLO elements and the simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanese soil together with the Israel Defence Forces now stationed in southern Lebanon.
- 5. Proposition (d) security measures will require carefully worked-out follow-up measures and arrangements, to ensure that the security region set up in southern Lebanon under the terms of the agreement will indeed perform the function it is intended to perform.

- 6. The Israeli-Lebanese negotiations were impeded and complicated, all along, not only by the heterogeneous character of the Lebanese government, which greatly reduced the scope of the Lebanese delegation's bargaining authority at the talks, but also probably mainly by Lebanon's hesitancy in making any kind of move without the approval of its eastern neighbour, Syria, and other Arab countries. In effect, this gave Syria and, behind it, the Soviet Union virtual veto power over Lebanon's positions and decisions, a stance strongly influenced and supported by the rest of the Arab states as well.
- 7. Israel, fully aware of Lebanon's sensitivities in this regard, went out of its way to make concessions designed to smooth the way to an agreement. Thus, when the Lebanese delegation pleaded its Arab affiliation to justify its opposition to Israel's proposal that the present talks culminate in the signing of a peace treaty, Israel agreed to forego this most natural and reasonable of proposals and to content itself, for the time being, with a pragmatic arrangement of "good-neighbourly relations."
- 8. There were other Israeli concessions in the course of the talks, some of them in the realm of substantive issues, others in matters of wording. Always, the aim was to seek compromise wherever possible, in order to keep open the chances of a successful conclusion of the talks and an agreement. Needless to say, concessions could neither be offered nor made on issues that, Israel felt, touched vital security concerns.
- 9. In the final analysis, Israel found it possible to make the concessions it did, because they paved the way for an agreement that does contain the four essential propositions mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper as well as a number of additional clauses that lend a measure of substance and meaning to these basic propositions.
- 10. It is to be hoped that this agreement will serve as the foundation of a growing understanding between Israel and Lebanon, leading ultimately to the extension of the peace process, begun at Camp David, to all of Israel's neighbours.

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PRESS RELEASE

JERUSALEM DAY - May 11, 1983

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: Rev. Isaac C. Rottenberg 212/679-4822 201/783-9106

The Executive Committee of the NATIONAL CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE FOR ISRAEL, meeting in New York City, May 10-11, 1983, has adopted the following statement on Jerusalem. Endorsements of this statement will be sought from Christian leaders representing the broadest possible spectrum of the Christian community.

A CHRISTIAN AFFIRMATION ON JERUSALEM

We speak as Christians who, although coming from very different confessional backgrounds, share a common faith about God's irrevocable covenant with the Jewish people (Romans 11:29) and a commitment to work for the welfare and security of the State of Israel. We affirm our belief in the promise of the land to the Jewish people. This promise, made to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and their descendants, has never been withdrawn or transferred to any other people. We hold that Israel's right to the land is firmly grounded in historical, moral and juridical principles. Jerusalem, the capital of the State of Israel, is the quintessence of the land.

The Uniqueness of Jerusalem

Jerusalem is a very special city to millions of people. Located at the crossraods of continents and civilizations, it has become the meeting ground of spiritual and cultural traditions of East and West. For three major world religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam - Jerusalem has sacred significance.

We recognize, as does the government of Israel, the legitimate concerns of the various religious communities in Jerusalem. Open and free access to the holy places of all faiths is now guaranteed and protected under Israeli jurisdiction. It is the responsibility of all parties involved to cultivate a spirit of dialogue in matters of dispute.

The Centrality of Jerusalem for Jews

While we recognize and cherish the universal character of Jerusalem, we also wish to state our conviction that Jerusalem is uniquely a Jewish city. It has been so from time immemorial. For almost three thousand years Jerusalem has been the apex of Jewish faith, hope and life.

We believe that the essentially Jewish character of Jerusalem must be accepted by Christians, not grudgingly but gratefully. We see here a sign of God's providential grace in history and eternal faithfulness, a source of hope to all.

We call upon Christians everywhere to search their hearts. Christian ignorance and arrogance have been the root of much anti-Semitism and the cause of untold bitter suffering for the Jewish people. Many church proclamations of recent decades have acknowledged this sad history and have called for radically new attitudes and approaches to God's covenant people. Where there is ignorance, Christians must inform themselves; where there is arrogance, Christians need to repent and reform.

The Capital of the State of Israel

In its long history Jerusalem has known many masters. Conquerors have come and gone. Some of them have sought to expel all Jews from their land. But never has Eretz Yisrael been without its Jewish inhabitants, keeping alive the dream of eventual restoration. Of no other nation has Jerusalem ever been the capital except the people of Israel during their periods of independence.

Both justice and peace are best served by an unequivocal declaration from governments and from churches that a free and united Jerusalem must continue as the capital of the sovereign State of Israel. Any attempt to internationalize the city is wrong, futile and ignores biblical and historical reality. Why should Israel among all the nations of the world be denied the right to choose its own capital?

Jerusalem: Today and Tomorrow

Much has been accomplished, particularly since the reunification of the City of Jerusalem. Scrupulous care has been taken by the Israeli authorities to safeguard the holy places. Public services have been improved to the benefit of all the city's inhabitants. The ancient city has developed into an expanding modern metropolis. While these developments inevitably are accompanied by certain problems, objective observers must be impressed with the attention paid to social, aesthetic and ecological matters.

We rejoice in the degree of cooperation and creative interaction that is found today among the residents of Jerusalem. At the same time, we realize that the City of Peace has not yet reached its full destiny of Shalom as envisioned by prophets and sages. Legitimate concerns and grievances deserve a sympathetic hearing. Any outstanding issues can best be resolved through negotiations between the parties directly involved.

"For Zion's sake, I will not keep silent, and for Jerusalem's sake I will not rest" (Isaiah 62:1). For many believers Jerusalem today contains a promise for tomorrow, a hope and expectation of a world where rightsouchess and peace shall dwell. For that world we pray and toward that vision we commit earselves to work.



Office of the M.A. Director

23 June 1983

AMERICAN JEWISH

POINTS MADE TO MS. LEAH SIDES, American Desk, Foreign Ministry of Israel, during a meeting at the Catholic Theological Union, 27 May 1983.

- 1) Despite the Lebanese invasion of last Summer the American Christian community continues in its solid support of Israel. The Israeli government must not make the mistake of overemphasizing the often very vocal, but minority, condemnations from some Christian quarters. The Israeli government must also be careful of setting up the overtly pro-Israel vocabulary of the evangelical churches as the basic barometer of support for Christians in general. For many reasons, mainline Christians will never adopt this vocabulary. But the less explicit support which translates into firm congressional backing for Israeli aid requests, as Fr. Robert Drinan has insisted, in a the long wrong may prove far more crucial to the State than all the "love Israel" slogans of some of the Fundamentalist groups.
- 2) Within the context of continued support Israel may expect some escalation of criticism of specific Israeli policies in the West Bank and in the Galilee from mainline churches. Many Christian churchpeople now recognize a twofold reality vis-a-vis Israel: (1) Its basic security remains under threat; (2) it is a militarily powerful nation that has the capacity to deal strongly with peoples in the Middle East and to involve itself in other international situations in Africa and Central/Latin America. Many Christians recognize that the security interests of Israel will need continued support from the United States and the Western world. But they also recognize that Israel cannot be looked upon any longer merely nation. It has power, both domestically and inas a beleaguerd ternationally. When Israeli power may overstep humanitarian bounds in the West Bank, in the Galilee or in supplying armaments or training the security forces of dictatorial regimes in Africa or Central/Latin America it can expect criticism. Israel must become more conscious of how its power reality affects its public support in key countries like the U.S.

- 3) The one act that would like cause a serious erosion of support for Israel among mainline American Christians would be outright annexation of the West Bank. This would be the straw that would break the camel's back for many in the Christian churches.
- 4) Israel has lost the image of peace initiator. Somehow it needs to regain this with a bold offer for a settlement of the West Bank question. No one in this country seriously believes that the Palestinian issue can be settled only through dealings with the Village League people.
- 5) Israeli governmental officials must become a bit more sensitive relative to their rhetoric about Christian-Jewish relations, especially in its historical aspects. On some occasions non-nuanced broadsides have done considerable damage.
- 6) Every attempt should be made to resolve the problems at the University of Bethlehem. This issue is causing image problems for Israel in the Catholic world. This aspect of the question must be balanced against any real or imagined security risks coming from the students at that school.



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date January 14, 1984

to David Geller

from David A. Harris

subject NJCRAC Propositions for 1985-86 Joint Program Plan

Please review Proposition 7 and prepare any comments by Friday, January 25, at the latest.

ARCHIVES

DAH: RPR

CC: Marc Tanenbaum /

Harold Applebaum

Enclosure

date

January 14, 1985

to

Sidney Liskofsky

from

David A. Harris

subject

NJCRAC Propositions for 1985-86 Joint Program Plan

Please review Propositions 10 and 11 and prepare any comments by Friday, January 25, at the latest.

DAH: RPR

cc: Marc Tanenbaum

Harold Applebaum

Enclosure

cc: Marc Tannenbaum

Harold Applebaum

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date 14 January 1985

10 David Harris

from Jon Levine

subject Consular Visits Program

In an op-ed piece in the January 14 Wall Street Journal William Korey noted that there were no attacks on Israel at the U.N. this year, at least as far as Israel's military cooperation with South Africa is concerned. He implies that, in general, attacks on the U.S. and Israel have diminished significantly.

Is this the case? If so, is there any evidence that the governments of France, Britain, and West Germany have done any lobbying on Israel's behalf? Should we continue to make this an issue as we visit other consuls general?

Best,

Jon



COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL

443 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016 . 684-692

December 14, 1984

Memo

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ESSI

TO: NJCRAC Member agencies

FROM: Albert D. Chernin, Executive Vice Chairman

RE: Joint Program Plan Propositions for Plenary Session Action

Enclosed is a draft of the propositions that will provide the frame of reference for the drafting of the Joint Program Plan for 1985-86 subject to the debate and action of the Plenum, which, as you know, will be held February 17-20, 1985 at the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco.

The Plenum will debate and act upon only those propositions when one or more member agencies have advised us in writing by Friday, February 1st that they differ (and why) from the substance of any of the propositions. Otherwise, it will be assumed that the propositions are acceptable. The judgment of member agencies on the propositions must be transmitted from either the Chairperson or the Executive on behalf of that particular member agency, rather than from individual delegates.

If your agency disagrees with the substance of any of the propositions and believes that it should be debated by the Plenum, you should then state the essence of your difference in one or two sentences. Please identify those propositions on which you are commenting by checking the appropriate box on the enclosed form that lists all the propositions. Also, please feel free to submit alternative propositions or additional propositions.

There is no need to give us editorial revisions of the propositions. The propositions are only intended to succinctly distill the positions which will be amplified in the draft of the Joint Program Plan, which will be acted upon by the Executive Committee in June. On receipt of agency responses, a "Subcommittee described below will review the agency comments to determine which of the judgments meet the criteria for submission to the Plenum. So that the critical major issues can be fully debated, the Subcommittee must, of necessity, be highly selective in their submission of propositions to the Plenum for debate. The criterion is whether a member agency response is substantively different from the proposition. The Subcommittee will not submit to the Plenum:

- observations judged as editorial in nature;
- new issues or positions which have not been previously debated within the NJCRAC process unless they require immediate and urgent action:
- positions that are in essence consistent either with the propositions or previous policies adopted by NJCRAC.

(over)

The Subcommittee will be comprised of the Co-Chairs of the Joint Program Plan Committee; the Chair of the NJCRAC Task Force on Domestic Concerns; a Co-Chair of the Israel Task Force, and the Chair of NJCRAC. At least three days before the Plenum, member agencies will be advised as to how their submissions will be handled. If a member agency disagrees with the Subcommittee's disposition of its recommendations, its delegates may share their views in person with one of two panels that will meet concurrently Saturday evening before the opening of the Plenum. One panel will deal with the International Concerns; the other, Domestic Concerns. Appointments for meeting with these panels must be arranged at least 48 hours in advance of the Plenum. The panels will be comprised of the Co-Chairs of the Joint Program Plan Committees; Co-Chairs of the Israel Task Force; the Chair and Vice Chair of the Task Force on Domestic Concerns, and the Chairs and Vice Chairs of the five NJCRAC Commissions.

The propositions, which are based on NJCRAC policy positions, cover those policy goals that have been judged as being significantly affected by changes in conditions and thus require special emphasis in the program year beginning September 1st, 1985. The key question is whether we foresee trends and conditions that either threaten or advance our policy goals.

From this perspective does your agency agree with the judgments set forth in the changing conditions? Does it agree with the comments explaining the judgments? Does it feel that the strategic goals are responsive to the changing conditions? Does it feel that any of the issues covered by the propositions do not require special emphasis in the coming year? Are there issues omitted that have been significantly affected by changes in conditions? Does your agency have any recommendations for new strategic goals or does it propose any modification of the strategic goals?

The Joint Program Plan is introduced by a section entitled "Overview." It is intended to identify the most compelling concerns of the Jewish community relations field in order to give those concerns urgent priority. It also seeks to provide a broader perspective that goes beyond the issue-by-issue review which is covered in the balance of the Joint Program Plan. This year the procedures for developing and adopting the Joint Program Plan were modified by the Executive Committee last June. The Overview will grow out of the discussions of the Plenum and will be acted upon by the Executive Committee at its meeting in June. Thus the process for developing the Overview will begin at the Plenary Session with the Executive Vice Chairman of NJCRAC presenting on the last day of the Plenum a summary of the underlying currents and themes that were reflected among the delegates in all the sessions that took place the previous three days. Such a summary, which is not binding on the delegates, will provide the basis for the formulation of the first draft of the Overview.

We previously sent you the procedures guiding the development and adoption of the Joint Program Plan as adopted by the Executive Committee on June 25, 1984. If you would like to have additional copies of the procedures, just drop us a note.

ADC:ej Enclosures O,X-EC,EX,CHAIR,PS-5 X,A,All Com.

Draft Joint Program Plan Propositions

For Action of NJCRAC Plenum, February 17-20, 1985

(The Plenum will discuss only those propositions with which member agencies disagree and have so advised NJCRAC in writing by February 1, 1985.)

Israel Propositions

PROPOSITION 1 IS: Israel and the Middle East - U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS

Changing Conditions: The positive relationship between Israel and the United States has grown to an unprecedented degree of cooperation, trust and mutual understanding. However, areas of disagreement could arise around such issues as American arms sales to Arab states, the Mideast peace process, and U.S. foreign aid to Israel.

Comment: The marked upturn in U.S.-Israeli relations has been evidenced by particularly close collaboration on military affairs, cooperative consultation in diplomatic matters, and a supportive American disposition towards Israel's difficult economic situation, all underscored by the recognition that this close relationship benefits the U.S. as well as Israel. Ongoing military cooperation has become well established through the Joint Political/Military Group, and economic cooperation through the Joint Economic Development Group. The U.S. changed its military foreign aid to Israel from the previous half-grant, half-loan, formula to an all-grant arrangement. A Free Trade Area agreement is nearly complete, after an overwhelming Congressional vote authorizing the FTA negotiations, and the U.S. has given a "safety net" assurance on Israel's foreign currency reserves. Other significant steps include joint military and medical emergency exercises, U.S. military purchases from Israel, the release of all U.S. technology for the Lavi fighter aircraft and the prepositioning of U.S. medical and military resources in Israel.

But, there are still potential sources of disagreement. While the U.S. has moved closer to Israel in its assessments of Syria, Lebanon and the PLO, It continues its attempts to cultivate certain other Arab nations -- notably Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Council states -- and it remains eager to foster an alignment among them. This tendency makes the Administration responsive to Arab demands for American arms, and may tend to undercut other dimensions of American Mideast policy. Indeed, anticipated massive arms sales to the Saudis, Jordan, and the Gulf Council states, if carried out, will place a tremendous new burden on Israel's defense capability. (A more detailed discussion of the nature of the proposed sales, being prepared by the NJCRAC Israel Task Force, will be reflected in the final Joint Program Plan draft.) Additionally, the consuming American efforts to reduce federal deficits might hold the potential for problems on foreign aid. Administration efforts to bring the Arabs to the peace table would be welcome, but such steps must guard against accepting preconditions, undermining the principle of direct, face-to-face negotiations or projecting solutions to outstanding issues.

Although disagreements between the U.S. and Israel may arise, they should be seen within the context of the close, positive relations between the two countries. Also, it should be recognized that the American people continue to see Israel as a nation that in terms of values, aspirations, and democratic process is a mirror image of the United States. Although disagreements between the U.S. and Israel may arise, they should be seen within the context of the close, positive relations between the two countries. Also, it should be recognized that the American people continue to see Israel as a national that in terms of values, aspirations, and democratic process is a mirror image of the United States. The present period of close, positive relations offers particularly propitious opportunities for programming that stresses that affinity, and highlights the positive and congruent aspects of Israel's social, cultural and political life.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- -- endeavor to educate the American public to the mutuality of interests between the U.S. and Israel, and toward that end:
 - foster opportunities for Administration speakers, members of Congress, State and Defense Department officials, and other involved and knowledgeable sources to speak to the Jewish and general community and to widely disseminate the tone and substance of their positive statements;
 - foster ongoing programs that stress the positive aspects of Israeli social, cultural and political life, and the striking similarities of Israeli and American society;
- -- educate the American public on the costs and risks of the U.S. supplying its most advanced arms to Arab states;
- -- vigorously oppose the sale of American weapons to Arab states that remain in a state of war with Israel, especially:
 - mobile "Stinger" and "I-Hawk" surface-to-air missiles, and F-16 fighters to Jordan;
 - massive advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Council states.

PROPOSITION 2 IS: <u>Israel and the Middle East--ISRAEL'S ECONOMY</u> <u>AND U.S. FOREIGN AID</u>

Changing Conditions: Because Israel's economic difficulties have reached crisis proportions, Israel will need a short-term increase in U.S. economic and military aid, as well as far-reaching infusion of American investment. The National Unity Government made economic reform its top priority, stressing the necessity for major budget cuts and severe austerity measures in all sectors.

Comment: Israel's economic crisis is seen most dramatically in its spectacular inflation rate, which soared near 1,000% toward the close of 1984. But the

inflation rate is only a symptom of the more basic problem of a stagnant economy which is importing far more than it is exporting. From 1955 to 1973, Israel had one of the world's fastest growing economies, but since then, Israel's GNP has risen only at about the same rate as its population. The burdens carried by Israel's economy can be read in its governmental budget, which totals \$18 bilion, or 70% of its GNP, with defense representing 25% of GNP. In comparison the total U.S. federal budget is less than 30% of GNP. Israel's budget deficit amounts to 12% of its GNP, while the current controversial U.S. federal deficit represents less than 4% of GNP. Israel's balance of paymewnts deficit is about 8% of GNP, compared to the U.S. trade imbalance, which is 2% of GNP.

Much of the problem stems from Israel's defense-related needs, such as repayment of U.S. military aid loans; new military purchases; redeployment from the Sinai; and oil purchases. Yet, cutting Israel's military budget, the major item in the budget after its annual \$9 billion debt service, would weaken Israel militarily. Israel's economy is also burdened by its special needs in social program spending, including the extraordinary costs of absorption of Jews from endangered communities such as Ethiopia.

To address this economic crisis, Israel's National Unity Government has made economic reform its top priority, stressing the necessity for major budget cuts and severe austerity measures in all sectors. But even with these stringent austerity steps, and the sacrifices in a curtailed standard of living, Israel requires increased American economic assistance, on a short-term basis, to achieve economic recovery, and increased military aid to maintain essential defense. Consequently, Israel is seeking an increase in economic and military assistance, from \$2.6 billion to \$4.1 billion. In a period of continuing U.S. budget cutting, Israel's request for an increase, while receiving support from the Administration and Congress, will be the subject of greater public comment. But, such aid is in America's own best interest because Israel, at far less cost proportionately than NATO, shores up the eastern Mediterranean and the Asian/African crossroads against Soviet and Soviet-backed incursions in the area.

The debate over increased U.S. aid to Israel is expected to focus on the Administration's assessment of whether Israel has done enough through its own budget cuts and austerity measures to deserve additional American aid. In addition to the \$1.4 billion Israel has pledged to cut from its budget, Israel may be pressed to substantially reduce or restructure its subsidies for basic commodities (food and gasoline) and for export industries.

An intensification of the media campaign attacking U.S. aid to Israel conducted by the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) and others can be expected. In responding, Jewish community agencies should be mindful of the clear and consistent policy of the Jewish community relations field of shunning any action, that would violate the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment. But the free speech clause does not preclude the right of rebuttal or spontaneous grass-roots reactions.

On the clearly positive side, the authorization for negotiations on a U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area (FTA), with the eventual ending of all trade and commercial barriers between the two countries, promises to make Israel a prime location for U.S. investment. Israel's free trade agreement with the European Common Market gives American investors in Israel a unique market potential.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- -- advocate a significant increase in U.S. aid to Israel;
- -- educate the American public on the advantages gained in terms of furthering U.S. strategic interests through providing aid to Israel;
- -- develop programs encouraging U.S.-Israeli business contact based on the new opportunities arising from the U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Area agreement;
- -- be prepared to actively engage organized campaigns by the National Assopciation of Arab Americans (NAAA) and others arguing against aid to Israel during a period of budget cutting at home.

PROPOSITION 3 IS: Israel and the Middle East--THE PEACE PROCESS

Changing Conditions: Israel's National Unity Government, as well as all preceding governments, has reiterated its eagerness to engage in face-to-face negotiations with Arab states, particularly Jordan, without preconditions and at any time. In aligning himself with Egypt and trying to bring Egypt back into the Arab fold, King Hussein sought to undermine the Camp David framework for negotiations by substituting the bankrupt Geneva approach, which would bring the Soviet Union and the PLO into the talks.

Comment: The new Israeli government, reflecting the desires of all Israelis and indeed world Jewry, reiterated Israel's eagerness to enter into peace talks with Jordan and other Arab states, making clear that it is insisting upon no preconditions. That means that Jordan is not even required to accept the Camp David framework. What Israel does insist upon is that the talks be face-toface, and, as the Camp David framework asserts, all issues may be placed on the table, and all issues are negotiable. But, after the renewal of diplomatic relations with Egypt by Jordan, Jordan's King Hussein proposed a joint Egyptian-Jordanian approach which seeks an international Mideast conference at which the PLO and the Soviet Union would play prominent roles. Hussein's goal is not to enter negotiations, but to give the appearance of seeking peace while undermining the Camp David process. The United States can play a helpful role in trying to bring the Arab state to the table, but in doing so, it must guard against accepting proposals or negotiating processes that would undermine the essential principle of direct negotiations without preconditions. It can be anticipated that the West Europeans may endorse the Egyptian-Jordanian approach as consistent with their 1981 Venice Declaration, which called for a role for the PLO. Hussein's proposal is merely another format for the Arab instransigence that has blocked negotiations, which Israel has consistently stood ready to enter into.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- -- continually emphasize Israel's unchanging and oft-repeated invitations to its Arab neighbors to negotiate without pre-conditions. In doing so, the Administration's stated endorsement of negotiations without preconditions should be underscored and commended;
- -- emphasize that Arab intransigence and refusal to negotiate directly and without preconditions has been, and continues to be, the obstacle to peace.

PROPOSITION 4 IS: Israel and the Middle East--THE PLO

Changing Conditions: The PLO's political and military influence continued to diminish as the division in the PLO continued. But despite internal rifts, the long-range basic goal of all the PLO factions to dismantle Israel remains the same.

Comment: Despite a direct appeal from Jordan's King Hussein to form a joint Jordanian-PLO negotiating front based on Resolution 242, Yasir Arafat's wing of the PLO, meeting in December 1984 once again reiterated its commitment to "armed struggle" and terrorism against Israel as it seeks its ultimate goal of eliminating the sovereign Jewish state. Rather than being a representative nationalist movement as it claims, the PLO through the process of its disintegration has revealed itself to be a radical elite held together by the principle of veto by the most radical—a paradigm in miniature of the overall Arab posture toward Israel. Its military capabilities shattered, the PLO is slowly imploding since it cannot reach consensus, internally, on anything less than its maximalist military program as defined in the Palestinian National Covenant. Hence, while some PLO leaders may make feints at diplomatic activity, and hint of participation in various diplomatic efforts, the only PLO actions that will occur, by all PLO factions, will be acts of terrorism.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- -- expose attempts to characterize Arafat and the Al Fatah as "moderate":
- -- educate the public about the true terrorist and intransigent nature of all PLO factions.

PROPOSITION 5 IS: Israel and the Middle East--LEBANON

Changing Conditions: Even in the face of Lebanese intransigence, fostered by Syrian domination over Lebanon, Israel continues to be ready to withdraw from Lebanon as long as its northern border can be secured, even in the absence of a simultaneous Syrian withdrawal.

Comment: Lebanese policies reflect its domination by Syria, leading it to renew its rejectionist stance toward Israel. Israel's central concern in regard to Lebanon has consistently been, and continues to be, the essential requirement that its northern border be safeguarded against terrorist attack. What Israel has been seeking are effective arrangements that would prevent the recurrance of conditions that led to Israel's 1982 action. Israel has insisted that Syria not advance its position as Israel withdraws, that it not allow PLO to infiltrate into South Lebanon, and that the South Lebanon militia under General Lahad have responsibility for patrolling the Israeli-Lebanese border, rather than the troops of the Central Lebanese government or UNIFIL, which lack the capability of insuring these conditions. The role of the United States as mediator in this process is useful insofar as all parties—the Syrians, Lebanese, and Israelis—require a "guarantor" or witness to their formal agreements and informal understandings.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

-- stress Israel's desire and decision to withdraw from Lebanon, based on arrangements that will prevent a return to those conditions which prompted its entry.

PROPOSITION 6 IS: Israel and the Middle East--INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Changing Conditions: American policy has been moving toward a recognition that terrorism, if unchecked, will continue to spread, and that what is required is a policy of swift and effective action against terrorism. Elsewhere, in Western Europe, governments have begun to move, internally, with greater vigor against terrorism within their borders, but they have not yet moved into a concerted international counterterrorism effort.

Comment: Secretary of State Schultz has strongly reiterated a call for a concerted American and international attack on terrorism. Shultz' approach includes pre-emptive and retaliatory action, and perhaps entails supportive legislation, as well as international efforts. While most Western nations are moving more aggressively against manifestations of international terrorism, when attacks occur within their own borders, an international response, such as that advocated by Shultz, has not yet emerged. Meanwhile, PLO terrorism still constitutes a major portion of the terrorism throughout the world. In Israel, where defense against Arab terrorism continues to be a part of daily life, the isolated acts of terrorism against Arabs that have been manifested were vigorously condemned by all sectors of Israeli society, and swiftly investigated and prosecuted by the authorities.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

-- encourage the U.S. to adopt a comprehensive effective program of counterterrorism, such as that articulated by Secretary of State Shultz.

CONTINUING AND URGENT -- Israel and the Middle East

U.S. EMBASSY IN JERUSELAM

Though the 98th Congress did not formally act on the question of moving the United States Embassy to Israel's capital of Jerusalem, significant support was demonstrated in that a majority in both Houses sponsored the measure. Congressional sponsors are expected to introduce a sense-of-the-Congress resolution in the 99th Congress calling for moving the Embassy to Jerusalem.

2. U.N. WOMEN'S DECADE CONFERENCE

The Nairobi End of the U.N. Women's Decade Conference will have taken place in July, 1985, preceding the publication of the Joint Program Plan. Based on developments in the preparatory process bearing on keeping the agenda free of anti-Israel, "anti-Zionist," and anti-Western items, and, consequently the nature and extent of U.S. participation in the Conference, potential outcomes and community relations implications will be projected and presented to the June Executive Committee meeting which will adopt the Joint Program Plan.

INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION 7 IC: International Concerns--SOVIET JEWRY

Changing Conditions: The renewal of sustained high-level discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union increases the opportunities for American officials to raise the Soviet Jewry issue with the Soviet leadership. These opportunities come at a time of greatest need, as the dire conditions for Soviet Jews grows even grimmer.

Comment: Since 1979, the ability of high-level officials in the United States to press the issue of Soviet Jews with the Soviet Union has been inhibited by the confrontational relationships between the two super powers. The resumption of high-level talks between the United States and the USSR on limiting nuclear weapons as well as on trade eases the potential for relaxation of tensions. Moreover, President Reagan's conception of the talks as encompassing a broad range of issues, "umbrella talks," increased the opportunity for the United States to press the issue of Soviet Jews, which has been a high priority of President Reagan and his predecessors.

The Reagan administration's past record of calling prominent attention to the issue of Soviet Jewry presents heartening prospects about the Administration's willingness to raise the issue during contacts with the Soviet Union. But stepped up efforts by Soviet Jewry advocates, including non-Jewish support, will be especially helpful in giving public prominence to the issue. It will give support to American negotiators pressing the issue, underscore its importance to the Soviet leadership, and strengthen the resolve of Soviet Jews.

The cumulative effect of years of Soviet crackdown on Jewish culture and aliyah activists brought the danger of despair, an increasing sense of isolation felt by Soviet Jews, and the danger of disheartening frustration within the Soviet Jewry movement in the West. The situation, with its unrelieved incremental worsening of conditions over the past six years, has led both the leadership of the American and world Soviet Jewry movement to give the issue a top priority in order to activate and energize the movement.

Srategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- -- encourage U.S. officials to press the Soviet Jewry issue in the increasing contacts with the Soviet leadership during the coming year;
- -- step up efforts to invigorate the Soviet Jewry movement in the United States;
- -- continue efforts to broaden the base of the Soviet Jewry movement, reaching beyond the Jewish community;
- increase direct contact with Soviet Jews through letters, telegrams, and especially visits to the Soviet Union;
- step up efforts to protest the Soviet crackdown on Jewish culture and aliyah activists in the Soviet Union.

PROPOSITION 8 IC: International Concerns--ETHIOPIAN JEWRY

Changing Conditions: The aliyah of the Jews of Ethiopia has reached historic dimensions this past year as thousands of Falashas were brought to Israel.

Comment: The stunning numbers involved in the Ethiopian aliyah will have brought, barring unforeseen developments, the majority of the population of Ethiopian Jews to Israel. This has placed a new and substantial burden on Israel's already strained economy in providing facilities for absorption of the new arrivals into Israeli society. Massive voluntary support is required to facilitate the absorption of the new Ethiopian arrivals. Israel's response to the situation justified the confidence that world Jewry had placed on it. Now, the American Jewish community, as well as world Jewry, faces the challenge of assisting the absorption process. The absorption process, which requires a far greater per capita cost than for any previous aliyah, will not only entail financial problems, but also later social and economic problems that will have to be addressed. Meanwhile the adverse conditions for the Jews remaining in Ethiopia became even more critical, with a drought-born famine sweeping through much of sub-Sahara Africa, especially Ethiopia, now reaching the edges of the Gondar Province where most remaining Falashas are found.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- -- encourage an extraordinary response in voluntary financial assistance for the massive absorption operation now necessary to meet the needs of the large number of Ethiopian Jews arriving in Israel;
- -- deepen the understanding within the Jewish community on the nature and extent of the Ethiopian aliyah and the delicate, complex and vulnerable rescue operation.

AMERICAN IEWISH

PROPOSITION 9 IC: International Concerns--FAMINE IN AFRICA

Changing Conditions: World attention has focused on the catastrophic famine sweeping across much of sub-Sahara Africa, threatening over 150 million people, with particularly devastating effect in Ethiopia. Many countries, including the United States, have responded with famine relief, which will continue to be critically needed throughout the coming year. But a long-term production crisis, reaching beyond the immediate famine into the next decade, may be anticipated.

Comment: A severe drought, now in its third year, has brought one of the worst famines in African history to over 24 countries. In Ethiopia alone, perhaps the most hard hit nation, it was estimated, in November 1984, that over 15% of the population, 10 million people, were starving with 6 million facing death. There is no sign of the drought abating, with the loss of seed from past crops, wide death of livestock, soil erosion, desertification, and population shifts to urban areas all decreasing the planting of crops, and with fundamental changes in the economies of emerging African nations, the famine is likely to continue and deepen throughout the coming year, and beyond.

The United States joined other nations in responding to the catastrophe, pledging \$45 million in famine relief. The remoteness of many of the affected regions, as well as political problems and civil war, complicated relief measures. Private relief agencies, including the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, also responded with famine relief. Quite apart from its concern for Ethiopian Jews, the American Jewish community responded generously to the human disaster as have other Americans, and was prominent in urging U.S. government assistance.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- -- continue to urge massive American famine relief for the threatened populations in Africa;
- -- support concerted international governmental efforts to assist African countries in addressing long-term structural, agricultural problems.

PROPOSITION 10 IC: International Concerns--GENOCIDE CONVENTION

<u>Changing Conditions</u>: Prospects for finally, after 35 years, gaining Senate ratification of the International Genocide Convention have greatly increased in response to a call for ratification by President Reagan.

Comment: Triggered by the active support of the Reagan administration, in 1984, the long efforts to secure Senate ratification of the International Genocide Convention began to near success. The broad coalition of supporting groups, expanded way beyond the Jewish community, greatly stepped up its efforts, resulting in an overwhelming majority of the Senate favoring ratification. But it was blocked by Senator Jesse Helms' (R-SC) filibuster tactics. The result, a "sense-of-the-Senate" resolution favoring ratification, provides a promising context for passage in the 1985 Congressional session. These developments call for a renewed priority effort to obtain ratification by the Jewish community relations field, which spearheaded the coalition that has kept this issue alive for nearly four decades. Its coalition efforts were manifested in the creation 25 years ago of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Human Rights and Genocide Treaties.

Immediately after the Second World War, the United States, repelled by the events of the Holocaust, led efforts to outlaw such crimes, with the American delegate chairing the U.N. committee that drafted the "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide." The U.S. then led the campaign to gain unanimous General Assembly adoption of the treaty, and the United States signed the document in December, 1948. However, when President Truman transmitted the treaty to the Senate, urging its ratification, in 1949, a minority of Senators prevented the needed two-thirds approval, claiming it would "abridge U.S. sovereignty." In the decades since then, every single American President has urged ratification, but the two-thirds Senate majority has not been obtainable.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

-- seek ratification of the International Genocide Convention by the U.S. Senate.

PROPOSITION 11 IC: International Concerns--APARTHEID

Changing Conditions: Mounting protest demonstrations in the United States against the Union of South Africa's stepped up repressive enforcement of its racist apartheid policy, long opposed by the Jewish community relations field, has brought the issue forcefully before the American public. Widening protests may well grow into a sustained movement reflecting the protestors' calls for more forceful American governmental action against apartheid.

Comment: The Union of South Africa white minority government's severe crackdown on opponents of apartheid, including jailings of prominent church and black trade union leaders, triggered mounting protests in the U.S. beginning in

November, 1984. The American protests, spearheaded by the American black community, gathered wide support from other groups, including the Jewish community which has a long-standing policy opposing apartheid. The protests call on the American and world conscience by spotlighting the South African regime's growing repression of apartheid's opponents. In the last five months of 1984, over 4,300 South African blacks were arrested, at least 160 killed in protests, and thousands of workers were fired after protest strikes. The American protestors criticized the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa, the Administration's term for an approach stressing quiet diplomacy to influence South Africa to alter its apartheid policies. The movement can be expected to lead to serious consideration of proposals previously introduced in Congress, such as a federal bar to further U.S. bank loans to the South African government, which has already received \$400 million in American bank loans prohibiting the export of military and police equipment to South Africa; banning or taxing the sale of South African gold coins (Krugerrands) in the U.S.; and legal enforcement of the "Sullivan Principles" requiring fair employment practices by U.S. firms doing business in South Africa. A growing number of state legislatures will consider proposals to divest the investment portfolios of state agencies and trust funds of stock in corporations with investments in South Africa.

The Jewish community relations field's long-standing opposition to apartheid was expressed in the 1966-67 Joint Program Plan, and reiterated in the 1979-80 Plan, which declared NJCRAC's "unanimous and total denunciation of apartheid as repugnant to Jewish tradition and incompatible with the commitment of the Jewish community relations field to equality and equal justice without regard to race, religion, nationality or sex." The field remains implacably opposed to apartheid and to the widespread denial of basic civil liberties carried out by the South African regime.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- -- continue and extend its opposition to <u>apartheid</u> and to the repression and denial of civil liberties by the government of South Africa;
- -- study various proposals aimed at impacting on the South African government to alter its policies, with a view toward taking a position on them.

CONTINUING AND URGENT--International Concerns

JEWS IN ARAB LANDS

The Jewish communities in Arab countries remain highly vulnerable, especially the 4,000 Jews in Syria who are in continuing danger, and the recently discovered hundreds of Jews of Yemen.

CHURCH-STATE AND INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION 12 CS: Church-State and Interreligious Relations
RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Changing Conditions: Advocates of bringing religious practices into the public schools can be expected to continue to vigorously press their cause, while the mood of the country is generally perceived to be more receptive to such incursions of the church-state separation principle. The nature of the continuing strong campaign to enact silent school prayer will be determined by the Supreme Court's decision in the <u>Jaffree</u> case. While federal "equal access" legislation was enacted in 1984, in response to great pressure, there has been no evidence of its immediate implementation in public schools throughout the United States.

Comment: The Supreme Court's decision in the Jaffree case, testing the constitutionality of an Alabama "moment-of-silence" statute, is likely to determine the fate of the 28 already existing state school prayer laws, as well as whether legislation, at both the federal and state level, or a Constitutional Amendment will be pressed by "silent prayer" advocates. An amicus curiae brief was submitted in the Jaffree case by the American Jewish Congress on behalf of NJCRAC and its member agencies. (Note: The decision is expected prior to the June Executive Committee meeting, and will be reflected in the final Joint Program Plan draft.) Similarly, the Court's decision in the McCreary creche case, as well as local implementation of the 1984 Lynch decision on government support for the display of religious symbols, can be expected to impact on religious content of school holiday observances. (See discussion of "Government Sanction of Religious Symbols." Proposition 13.) But. while these nationallevel decisions will greatly affect attempts to bring religion into the public schools, the impact of these decisions will be played out at the community level.

The measures that led to the enactment of the federal "equal access" law were, the result of a broad and concerted campaign. Yet, there are no indications, to date, of widespread introduction of the "equal access" provisions into public school systems. This observation might be due to various factors, including: weak or inadequate monitoring that has failed to record the extent of "equal access" utilization; caution on the part of school boards and school officials in promulgating "equal access" guidelines; or that the religious groups that advocated "equal access" are not prepared to act on its provisions.

Thus far, there has been no litigation, challenging the new federal law, but there have been two federal appellate-level decisions on "equal access" situations that predate the federal law. In both the Nartowicz and Bender cases, meetings of student organizations engaged in religious activities during the school day were ruled violative of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.

The Jewish community has become greatly concerned about increasing pressures to introduce religious practices into the public schools. Those concerns were borne out and heightened by the passage of the "equal access" legislation in 1984, as well as by other attempts at bringing religion into the

ISRAELI VISITORS TO THE U.S.

TRIP NO. 2

April 30 - May 24, 1984

A Report and Evaluation

The second "Get to Know U.S. Jewry" tour for Young Israelis took place this past May involving 10 individuals ranging in age from 28 to 38. There were 4 women and 6 men; 6 Ashkenazim and 4 Sephardim. Most were Sabras. Most described themselves as "non-observant"; one was Orthodox. Three could be described as "centrist" politically; two were somewhat to the right and five somewhat to the left of center. (See Appendix "A" for biographical data on each of the participants).

The participants were selected in Israel, under the direction of Mordechai Gazit, from a number of applicants who were recommended by members of our own Advisory Board in Israel, by the previous participants, and diverse other sources. The candidates were carefully screened prior to their selection and the finalists were given intensive three day orientation sessions in Israel prior to their departure for America.

As with the first group, as part of their orientation they were asked to fill out an extensive questionnaire in Hebrew designed to discover the extent of their knowledge about the American Jewish community and their attitudes as to its present and future viability. The same questionnaire was given to them upon their return to Israel to determine the impact of their visit (See Appendix "B") and, in addition, they were asked to fill out a second questionnaire to give their evaluations of the trip and their recommendations and suggestions for future trips. (See Attachment "C").

The Itinerary

The tour began on April 30th and concluded on May 24th. The first several days were spent in New York and provided an opportunity for the group to attend—and participate in—the AJC's Annual Meeting beginning on Wednesday evening, May 2nd and concluding on Sunday, May 6th. For many this experience was an important concrete introduction to the concept of voluntarism in America, and an opportunity to experience at first hand the many diverse issues of concern to the American Jewish community. While in New York, the group also had an opportunity to visit Yeshiva University and lunch with Dr. Norman Lamm, President of the University and Dr. Israel Miller, Sr. Vice President. They visited the Jewish Museum to view the "Precious Legacy" exhibit and traveled to a Russian-Jewish neighborhood in the Brighton Beach section of Brooklyn. They marched in the annual Solidarity Day parade for Soviet Jewry and enjoyed home hospitality with leaders of our New York City chapter.

Following their initial days in New York they proceeded to Chicago where the focus of their sessions was on the relationship of the Jewish community to other ethnic and religious groups. They were introduced to the activities of AJC's Institute on Pluralism and Group Identity in Chicago and participants gained some insight into the process of inter-ethnic coalition building with particular focus on the plight of Soviet Jewry. They also learned of the issues of concern to the Hispanic, Asian and Polish communities there. Discussions were also held with leaders of Union of American Hebrew Congregations on the diversity of American Jewry, with Dr. Franklin Sherman of the Lutheran School of Theology, and from our own AJC leadership they heard something about the involvement of Jews in State and local politics.

The next three days were spent in Boston where the focus was on Jewish education.

Members of the group attended Orthodox, Reform and Conservative Services, visited Orthodox and secular day schools and various Jewish institutions including Brandeis University, the Jewish Federation and Zionist organizations. They enjoyed an informal rap session with Leonard Fein, editor of Moment Magazine. They heard presentations on the Jewish Community Center and its role as a resource for informal education. They met with the Israeli Sheliach to hear about his efforts in recruiting young Jews for aliyah; with Dr. Bernard Reisman and his Brandeis colleagues to learn about their training programs for Jewish scholars and communal leaders, and with Hillel Foundation representatives to discuss its role in ensuring Jewish continuity on the campuses. There was also an opportunity for some theatre and sightseeing in this historic city before their departure for Washington, D.C.

In Washington the sessions were planned to give them an intensive exposure to the American political system and to see how Jews operate within that system, including their coalitional activities with other religious and racial groups. They also gained an understanding of the various "official" and unofficial views about Israel and how these impact upon U.S. policy toward Israel. They met with Congressmen and congressional aides, with State Department officials, with Jewish political leaders, including Stuart Eizenstat, the Institute's Chairman, with AJC's Washington representative Hy Bookbinder, with the President of the Middle East Institute, who also was the former Ambassador to Jordan, with black clergy and political leaders, and with staff of AIPAC. They attended meetings of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council and engaged in a discussion on Israel and American Jews In The International Community, together with AJC leader, Ambassador Richard Schifter, who is Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to U.N. Human Rights Commission.

Their final visit was to Miami and Orlando, Florida. Since several of the ten were journalists or involved with media, arrangements were made for them to meet with the editors and reporters of Miami's major newspaper and with news directors and other executives at the major television stations. They also met with leaders of the Hebrew Cuban congregation and with the Latin American Jewish leaders to discuss Jewish immigration from that part of the world. Several also visited Federation facilities for the elderly. In Orlando, where it was intended to have them glimpse a small Jewish community flourishing in a predominantly non-Jewish environment, they also had an opportunity to visit Disney World and Epcot Center which they enjoyed immensely. Back in New York just prior to their departure, we held a major debriefing session with them and

several ended their tour with a visit to the New York Stock Exchange and the Wall Street area.

Impact on Israelis

As with the first group, any attempt to measure accurately the impact of this experience on the visitors suffers from certain limitations, the primary one being a lack of information at this point as to its long range effect. All of them agreed at the debriefing session that this experience would unquestionably affect their attitudes and their future actions in ways impossible to predict at this time. Several have already written and spoken about their experiences in the Israeli press and media which is not surprising since five of them are working journalists.

What follows is a brief summary of what they themselves revealed about the impact of this experience in our session with them at the end of their trip and in their answers to the questionnaires which they filled out upon their return to Israel.

ARC Before VES

In general this group seemed to be quite representative of the intellectuals and professionals of their generation in Israeli society today. At their initial orientation sessions they appeared to be somewhat better informed than the first group, somewhat more sophisticated in their observations and somewhat more questioning about themselves and their relation to the American Jewish community. The leaders of the group announced at the outset that they viewed this trip as "an opportunity to learn more about who we are and who you are." Noting that even though a few of them had been to the U.S. previously, they realized they had little understanding of "the realities of the live, dynamic American Jewish community" which they attributed to the "poor coverage" in Israel given to American Jewry in all its dimensions (except for the philanthropic). Several also spoke frankly of their fear of "getting too close to American Jews" and one described his perception of the relationship between the two communities as essentially a "love/hate relationship." Most, however, felt that the similarities were greater than the differences between the two communi-Several declared that they did not believe Israel to be "the only solution for Jews," but they also experienced uneasiness about this fact given their concern about the future of Judaism in America. They were also frank to talk about their concerns for Israel; about the "politicization of everything in Israel i.e. religion, education, etc.," about their disappointment that Israel has not really provided "new vitality" for the Diaspora; about Israel "losing its role as a leader of world Jewry," and that "the Einstein's of the world do not go to Israel." They commented with sadness upon the fact that Israel is the only Jewish community today under physical threat. "It is a fact of life," one said, "we were brought up negating the Diaspora. For many years I thought all Jews should live in Israel, now I'm thinking differently"..."but we do not quite understand how you live in an open society...we must know more about Jewish communities elsewhere because we are losing connection with them." In short, this group far more than the earlier group, while describing themselves as "soldiers of Zionism," seemed to have a more realistic view of the Jewish world and were eager to gain for themselves any information to buttress their views.

Considering that most of the participants were Sabras, it was of particular interest that on the question as to whether they felt "more Jewish" or "more Israeli," there appeared to be a consistently greater emphasis on their Jewishness. In defining what it means to be Jewish, most stressed the association with a peoplehood and with a civilization; only two felt Jewishness was primarily a nationality. Most of the participants agreed that American Jews should more actively share the "burdens" of Israelis i.e. criticize more freely policies with which they disagree, visit and stay for longer periods of time in Israel, send their children, etc. In short, they would like to be reassured that they can count on American Jewry for more than monetary contributions.

After

In the debriefing session held the morning before their departure for Israel, a welter of comments and impressions poured forth as virtually all agreed that the experience had been far more intense and certainly very different from what they had expected. While they thought they knew a great deal about the American Jewish community before they came, their earlier views were in many respects challenged, sometimes painfully so, according to the comments of several of the participants. Some said they now have "many more questions they must ask themselves" about the relationship between the two communities. Particularly striking, most agreed, was their discovery that perhaps the differences between the two communities are greater than the similarities—quite the reverse of what most had believed prior to their visit.

Each one tried to summarize their thoughts about what they had seen -i.e.: "There must be $\underline{\mathsf{two}}$ communities...for the first time I now understand that...I feel now I must contribute something to a more realistic dialogue."

"I don't see the U.S. as a Diaspora. In a way it seems to me it's a new Jewish experiment just as is Israel."

"I ask myself 'does Judaism have a future in America?' Maybe more than we think because those who define themselves as Jews here are doing so voluntarily, unlike in Israel..."

"We must recognize the U.S. is not just a Diaspora, but a creative, vibrant society and we must find ways of bridging our two communities."

"The American Jewish community needs to be strengthened for itself but also for Israel...maybe you should send us less funds and keep more here for Jewish education."

The one impression most commonly shared was the danger of assimilation that faced American Jews. All expressed concern at the high rate of intermarriage and what this would mean for the future of Jewish life in America, for the future of Jewish leadership, for funds for Jewish institutions and for future support of Israel, politically as well as economically.

All were concerned about the state of Jewish education in the communities they visited except for Boston which they found impressive but, as they traveled throughout the country, they became convinced that what they had seen was atypical.

There was considerable discussion about the concept of pluralism and some little amazement at the importance of the concept to American Jews. One participant described the American Jewish community as "worshiping the cult of pluralism" and in so doing, he believed, they were losing sight of their own interests as Jews. The issue of pluralism was raised also in connection with their feelings about the need for a dramatic improvement in the content of the dialogue between Israelis and American Jews. But with America a pluralistic society and Israel a non-pluralistic one, what can be the basis for dialogue, one questioned. Some described the current dialogue as "false" and "exploitive." Israelis "sell" their army, their accomplishments in the desert and in general give a distorted image of the realities of life in Israel in their attempts to gain support. In this context there was some criticism of the Israeli schlichim who they described as "schnorring" for Israel. On the other hand they pointed out American Jews need to be more forthcoming, not to be afraid to "make waves" in discussing issues of concern to them such as religious pluralism, who is a Jew, human rights issues, etc. Somehow we have to be more frank and open in our communication e.g. "Zionist slogans must be cleared out of our minds. Are we one? I don't believe so. There is not one Jewish people, but two. But where is the common denominator between us?"

Most were profoundly impressed and surprised by the fact that those American Jews whom they met almost universally described themselves as being Americans first and Jews second. To the Israelis this seemed possibly too optimistic, even defensive, since one could not foresee the future for Jews in America not only in terms of the danger of assimilation but the potential for anti-Semitism even though it did not appear to be a major threat at this time. They were impressed, for example, with their meetings with black and ethnic leaders in Chicago and in Washington, but they questioned whether the views of those leaders accurately reflect the views of the rank and file. Some saw blacks and Jews as "inevitably" on a collision course. Those American Jews whom they met seemed to be dealing well with their "dual identity" but to the Israelis their lives seemed "full of contradictions." Jewish education was "too casual." Intermarriage was "made too easy." "There is something in the American way of life," said one, "that must ultimately destroy Jewish identity." On the other hand, several commented favorably on the impressive gallery of Jewish religious and communal leaders, teachers, etc. and one suggested humorously, that the contradictions American Jews live with are no more than those Israelis live with.

Members of the group seemed to be reassured that on the whole that there exists a strong feeling of good will toward Israel among American Jews and even among the non-Jews they met, despite the somewhat "tarnished image" of Israel today. Several observed that the older people seemed to be more supportive of -- and more emotional about -- Israel, while the younger people seemed more critical. But they found the dialogues in which younger people were involved to be more realistic and more concrete and they all urged greater efforts to involve more young American Jews in their 20's and 30's, in frank, substantive dialogue programs. In passing, one individual also suggested the need for education of young people in Israel, perhaps even in high school, providing more

accurate courses on American Jews and Jewish life than those which they had experienced as students. One interesting observation relating to Jewish education here with which many agreed, was the fact that the Holocaust was stressed far more here than it is in Israel where very little mention of it is made.

Finally, since the group consisted of a number of journalists, they also observed that American journalists almost all appeared to have higher standards for Israel than for any other country, a fact which Israeli leaders need constantly to be reminded about.

As with the first group, this experience provided significant serendipity by way of the interest and excitement it generated among our own AJC members and others who met with the group. For the Americans it provided a welcome and highly satisfying opportunity to have a full and frank discussion with the Israelis on issues of concern to them.

Follow-up in Israel

Upon the group's return to Israel they met with Mordechai Gazit to evaluate with him the overall experience and provide suggestions for the next "Get to Know American Jewry" project. Their recommendations had mainly to do with the intensity of the schedule, length of stays, size and composition of the group, pressures relating to home hospitality, etc. All these are presently under consideration.

In terms of content of the program:

- .. They would have liked more time in Washington since they found most enlightening insights they gained into various aspects of the American political process, i.e., hearing not only members of Congress, Jewish leaders and officials who were supporters of Israel but legislators, civic leaders, and lobbyists friendly to Arabs, which gave them a clearer understanding of the problems that confront the American Jewish community in their political activities in support of Israel.
- .. They felt keenly the need to send better trained "schlichim" to America -- a recommendation that several were going to be making to appropriate parties in Israel.
- .. As for the selection of the next group to visit, some suggested a more homogenous group consisting, perhaps of leaders on the campuses of Israeli universities since these would most likely become future political leaders in Israel.

Several weeks after their return to Israel, in late July, the group met again with Bert Gold during his visit to Israel by which time most of the members of the group had sorted out their experiences and were, if anything, more appreciative of the impact the trip had made upon them. One person had completed a book on his experience which is now at the publishers and expected to appear within the next few months. Another had altered the curriculum of the

educational programs he conducts for young people at the Jewish Heritage Center in Jerusalem. A third is developing discussion guides for incorporation in the seminars she organizes for high school students and teachers.

Several had also enjoyed extended person-to-person contacts arranged through our AJC Israel office, with visiting American Jews, and the growing network of such personal relationships was something they all look forward to.

All expressed a willingness and some even a desire, to speak to Israeli groups when called upon to do so and many had already written articles and reported in diverse ways on their experiences and their feelings about the American Jewish community.

A third group is scheduled to come to the United States in early May of 1985.

Q040-Israeli Visitors A FRICAN EN August 20, 1984/TP Selma Hirsh A RCH

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Gad Shimron

Gad Shimron, age 34, was born in Jaffa. At the age of 14, when his father was Israel's representative to the International Atomic Energy Commission, he entered the American School in Vienna, then went on to Vienna University, where he spent a year studying general history. He returned to Israel to enter the Army, serving in the Tank Corps and in Intelligence. He holds a B.A. from Hebrew University in General History and Far East Studies and is currently studying at Tel Aviv University toward an M.A. in Military History. Previously employed by the "Kol Yisrael" News Department and by the Ministry of Defense, he currently works for the Hebrew language daily Maariv. Mr. Shimron is married, with one child.

AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES

Israeli-born Yossef Pnini studied at Yeshivat Hakotel in Jerusalem and at the Hebrew University in the departments of Hebrew Literature, Education and the History of Jewish Thought. He is the former director of the Institute for Jewish Zionist Education and coordinator of the Volunteer Department in the Jerusalem Municipality. In his present capacity as general manager of the Jewish Heritage Center in Jerusalem, Mr. Pnini is responsible for educational programs for youth, demonstrating the positive, humanistic aspects of Judaism to non-practicing Jews. He served in the Education section of the Israel Army and for a number of summers he was associate director of Ramah camps in Israel. As an active member of the Labor Party, Mr. Pnini established and now coordinates "Chug Moreshet" (a group within the party adhering to Religious Zionism), with the aim of strengthening the attachment of the party to the Jewish heritage and attracting religious youth to the party. Mr. Pnini, age 34, is married, with four children.

Chaim Hecht

Chaim Hecht, age 34, was born in Petach Tikvah to Holocaust survivors from Poland. He was active in the Scouts movement and joined a Nahal garin with the Scouts. Following his service in which he reached the rank of lieutenant, he joined Kibbutz Gilad, where he instructed a garin. In 1975 he left to study in England where he received a B.A. in Media Studies from London University, returning in 1978 to settle in Tiberias. For two years he was director of Project Renewal in an area of Tiberias, considered as one of the largest and most problematic renewal neighborhoods in Israel. In 1981 he became northern reporter for Kol Yisrael (Israel Radio) and has spent considerable time in Lebanon including five consecutive months in Beirut.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Ofra Zion

Ofra Zion, age 28, is currently manager of the Youth Department in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Labor Council. She holds a B.A. in Hebrew Literature and the Art of Theater from Tel Aviv University. Ms. Zion is a volunteer lecturer for the Association of Culture and Society in Israel and is active in the Labor Party. From 1978 to 1981 she worked as a discussion group leader during seminars sponsored by the Jewish Agency's Midrasha for Zionist Education. During the same period she was social counselor for student olim in the Tel Aviv University dormitories, assisting the students in their adjustment to Israel. Her present job involves organizing seminars for high school students and teachers on such subjects as the Histadrut, Labor Party and society, etc.

AMERICAN JEWISH A R (Ruth Yovel V E S

Ruth Yovel is a fifth generation Israeli. Her maternal grandparents were among the founders of Tel Aviv. She holds a B.A. in Arabic and in English Literature from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a certificate for teaching both languages in high school. She served in the Army Intelligence Force, where she reached the rank of Sergeant. Formerly employed as chief news editor, correspondent and political programs editor for the Israel Broadcasting Authority's programs in Arabic, she is currently the Arabic news magazine editor. She is married, with two children.

Mordechai Haimowich

Mordechai Haimowich, age 36, is Senior News Editor at "Kol Israel", the Israel radio station. Born in Romania, he arrived in Israel at the age of three. He is a graduate of the De Shalit High School in Rehovot and has completed his B.A. requirements at the University of Tel Aviv in History of the Middle East. During his army service, he was an instructor in the paratroopers corps. In addition to his editing work at "Kol Yisrael", Mr. Haimowich has prepared special reports on events such as the Israeli election campaigns, the return of El Arish to Egypt and the visit of President Jimmy Carter to Israel. Mr. Haimowich is married, with two children.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Tallie Sellinger

Tallie Sellinger, age 28, is in the unique position of being the first woman in a post traditionally filled by men: she is military correspondent of the Hebrew daily newspaper Davar. Previously, she worked with Yaron London of Israel Television, and with Shulamit Aloni (who heads the Civil Rights Movement, "Ratz"). Ms. Sellinger studied General History at university, but soon turned to her chief interest and occupation: writing. She has traveled widely in Europe and in the U.S. during her father's mission with the Israel Consulate in New York. She has toured the states as a speaker for Israel Bonds. In the army, Ms. Sellinger reached the rank of corporal in the Intelligence Section. Politically active, she is now a member of the Secretariat of the Civil Rights Movement. She is married, with one child.

Abraham Lev

Abraham Lev is Regional Supervisor of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare in the Northern Region. Born in Poland in 1946, he came to Israel with his family at the age of four. Mr. Lev received a B.A. in Sociology and Political Science from Haifa University. While at the university, he took an active part in student affairs and was elected President of the Student Union, and a member of the University Board of Trustees. He was the first in Israel to set up a program whereby student volunteers work with disadvantaged youth. In 1974 he became director of an institution for disadvantaged youth and three years later was appointed national director in charge of programs for disadvantaged youth. For the past three years Mr. Lev has held a highly responsible position in the Ministry of Labor and Welfare.

Chaya Cohen

Chaya Cohen reached Israel from Morocco at the age of four. After graduating from the Kfar Batya Agricultural High School, she went on to complete a course of study at Community Workers' College and a Seminar for Public Involvement. She received a B.A. from Bar Ilan University, where she majored in Political Science. In the army, where she served in the Education Section, Ms. Cohen reached the rank of sargeant. Ms. Cohen is former Secretary of Na'amat in Ashdod and currently chairs the Ideological Education and Successor Generation Department of Na'amat. Her other activities include membership on the Prisoner Rehabilitation Committee under the aegis of the President, and on the Committee for Adi (Integration of Israel's Communities) Institute. She has traveled briefly through Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and France, meeting in those countries with young members of the Social Democratic Party. She is married, with three children.

ATTACHMENT "A"

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Haim Shibi

Haim Shibi, 35, is an up and coming journalist with Yediot Ahronot, Israel's largest circulation evening paper. He received an M.A. from the University of Missouri's School of Journalism and a law degree from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Mr. Shibi's father came to Israel from Salonika, in Greece; his mother belongs to one of the old Sephardi families of Jerusalem. He is currently editor of Kol Yerushalayim (Jerusalem Voice), the local supplement of Yediot Ahronot.



ISRAELI YOUNG LEADERSHIP

QUESTIONNAIRE

PART A

PARTICIPANTS

- 1) Yaakov Pnini
- 2) Ruth Yovel
- 3) Avraham Lev
- 4) Tali Selinger
- 5) Mordechai Haimovich
- 6) Haim Hecht AMERICAN, EWISH
- 7) Ofra Zion ARCHIVES
- 8) Haim Shibi
- 9) Gad Shimron

Question 1:

Is there, in your opinion, a long-term future for Diaspora existence?

- 1) Yes
- 2) Yes
- 3) No
- 4) Yes
- 5) No
- 6) Yes
- 7) No
- 8) Yes
- 9) Yes

Question 2:

What is, in your opinion, the greatest threat to the long-term survival of American Jewry?

1) The gravest danger is in the unintentional disappearance of the community due to indifference (assimilation is more of cognizant process.

-more

(Question 2, continued)

- 2) Assimilation, less of Jewish identity, which has implications on political support in Israel, social involvement in American and Jewish life.
- 3) Loss of Jewish identity which will bring about loss of contact with Israel. The symptoms can be seen in the high rate of intermarriage and lack of involvement in Jewish life.
- 4) Anti-Semitism and Assimilation
- 5) Loss of Jewish identity not physical threat but deterioration of the Jewish uniqueness, assimilation, intermarriage, deteriorating Jewish education.
- 6) Assimilation
- 7) Assimilation MEKICAN JEWIST
- 8) Anti-Semitism, Assimilation
- 9) Assimilation

Question 3

In your opinion, is being a Jew in America an advantage or a disadvantage? For each of the following areas, please mark whether it is an advantage, a disadvantage or makes no difference.

. \	ADVANTAGE	DISADVANTAGE	NO DIFFERENCE
POLICICALLY	7 to 3	6	
SOCIALLY	2	With the	3
CULTURALLY	7 4 4	1	4
IN BUSINESS	21/2	21/2	4 .

Question 4:

How important, in your opinion, is American support for Israel?

VERY IMPORTANT 5

SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT 0

UNIMPORTANT 0

Question 5:

In your opinion, how improtant is the political influence of American Jews in winning and maintaining American support for Israel?

VERY IMPORTANT

SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT

MAKES NO DIFFERENCE

Question 6:

In your opinion, what percentage of American Jews contribute to the U.J.A.?

1. 20% 6. 15%

2. 20% AMERICA₇, 50% EWIST

3. 30%

4. 20% 9. 60%

5. No answer

Question 7:

What in your opinion, is the extent of the annual U.S. aid to Israel?

ONE BILLION DOLLARS 1

TWO BILLION DOLLARS 5

FIVE BILLION DOLLARS 2

TEN BILLION DOLLARS 0 (1 no answer)

Question 8:

Of the 535 members of the U.S. Congress, how many, in your opinion, are Jews?

1) 7 0

2) 16 2

3) 38 4

4) 57 2 (1 no answer)

Question 9:

What is, in your opinion, the major aim(s)/function(s) of the following American Jewish organizations?

ORGANIZATION

AIM/FUNCTION

AIPAC

- 1. No Answer
- The lobbying operation in the U.S. Advocating Israel's interests in government
- 3. No Answer
- 4. Lobbying
- Lobbying organization acting on government levels and capital.
 - 6. No Answer
 - 7. Fundraising
 - 8. No Answer
 - 9. Formal activity in the Capital
 - 1. No Answer
 - Active in combatting anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination and prejudice directed at Jews.
 - 3. Fighting anit-Semitism
 - 4. Information and lobbying
 - Combatting discrimination and prejudice against Jews.
 - Fighting hostile organization for positive public opinion re Jews.
 - 7. Fighting discrimination against Jews.
 - Preventing public anti-Semitism
 - 9. Fights anti-Semitism

ADL

(Question 9, continued) AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

- 1. No Answer
- 2. Surveys and researches anti-Semitism
- 3. Jewish communal organization
- 4. Israel Diaspora Relations lobbying
- Political organization in nature, a pioneer in advocating Jewish interests
- 6. No Answer
- 7. Cultural-Social Relations
- Connecting between American Jewry and Israel
- Advocates Jewish interests in the U.S. contact with Israel.

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

- 1. No Answer
- An umbrella organization for Jewish political organizations.
- A political Jewish organization cultivating relationships between Israel and American Jewry.
- 4. No Answer
- Coordinates the political activity of all Jewish ortanizations.
- Coordinating and uniting different Jewish organizations to enhance influence.
- Satisfying ideological political and social needs.
- 8. Policy making for the Jewish Community
- 9. Same as in answer for AJC

B'NAI B'RITH

- 1. No Answer
- Philanthropic

(Question 9, continued)

- 3. Philanthropic cultural organization
- 4. Communal work
- Voluntary organization dealing with social and philanthropic activities.
- 6. Charity, communal work and social activity
- 7. Financial assistance
- 8. Cultivation of Jewish communities.
- 9. Jewish communal activity in the U.S.

HADASSAH

AMERICAN JEWISH

- 1. N/A
- Women's organization providing financial support for a number of institutions in Israel.
- Zionist organization supporting social and cultural activities in Israel.
- 4. Philanthropic and communal activity
- Women's organization supporting various institutions in Israel
- Women's organization active in diverse fields.
- 7. Women's organization helping the needy
- 8. Services to the Jewish family.
- Supports and development of medical institutions in Israel.

Which of the above do you feel is the most important? And why?

- 1) N/A
- 2) N/A
- 3) N/A
- AIPAC Fulfills the most important goal of the Jewish community supporting Israel directly.
- 5) N/A
- 6) N/A

(Question 9, continued)

- 7) N/A
- 8) Hadassah
- 9) AIPAC The American Jewish Committee Because of their function in advocating Jewish interests as well as relations with Israel.

What are the functions of the Jewish Federation?

- Communal umbrella organization focusing on fundraising and allocation of money according to priorities to various local organizations or institutions.
- 2) Organizing local communities.
- 3) N/A
- 4) Activity in the Jewish community
- Acts on the community level, coordinates the activities of the various local Jewish institutions.
- 6) N/A
- Association of Jewish organization (ethnic ideological organization such as the Sepharadic Federation.
- 8) Excell in structuring and organizing services to the community.
- 9) Coordinating activity in communities.

Question 10:

In your opinion, what percentage of young American Jews intermarry?

1) 35%

6) 30%

2) 30%

7) 60%

3) 20%

8) 50%

4) 15%

9) 40%

5) 40%

Question 11:

In your opinion, what percentage of American Jews have visited Israel?

1) 20%

6) 12%

2) 60%

7) 20%

3) 20%

8) /40%

4) 35%

9) 35%

Question 12:

What, in your opinion, does it mean to be a Zionist today?

- To be a partner in the determination of Jews to become soverign in Israel.
- 2) N/A
- To believe and act in making permanent the centrality of Israel in Jewish life and supporting Israel.
- 4) Contact with Israel, moderate Jewish identity.
- 5) To make Aliyah a priority and consider it an ideal even if in reality American Jews don't fulfill it.
- 6) For American Jews it has many meanings from open support in Israel to Aliyah.
- Aliyah as the primary goal which brings about political and social support desire to know about Israel.
- 8) To believe that Israel is the solution for the problem of Jewish survival and identity.
- Desired to live in Israel the reality to support it.

Question 13:

How do you feel about Israelis who live in the U.S.?

- People who don't participate actively in the Zionist movement and abandoned the Zionist idea
- 2) Reservations since they didn't have the strength to confront problems in Israel and sadness since their Israeli identity was not strong enough to prevent them from living in another country as a minority.
- I believe that most of them left Israel because of social or economic difficulties, there is a need to nurture their contact with Israel and help them go back.
- 4) You cannot generalize about people, each person is different, each is connected to Israel differently.
- 5) I consider them lost souls.
- 6) Difficult to define my feelings, generally I am sad that this phenomenon exists and I feel that we have missed something.
- 7) They have the right to live where ever they choose, my expectations of them are high since they can keep close contact with Israel and the Zionist idea.
- 8) I believe in the rights of every person to choose his/her country of residence yet it is painful that so many people chose to leave Israel

(Question 13, continued)

9) Every person have the right to live where he/she can fulfull themselfs according to their wishes and talents.

Question 14:

How do you think most American Jews view Israelis living in America?

VERY POSITIVELY

SOMEWHAT POSITIVELY

none

DON'T CARE

4

SOMEWHAT NEGATIVELY

4

VERY NEGATIVELY none (1 don't know)

Question 15:

What lesson, if any, is there to be learned from the Holocaust?

- 1). When national values become shiveristic it can bring a powerful entity to the killing of innocent.
- b. "Anti-Semitism" is an integral part of the Christian experience (even among the humanists.
- c. The survival of the Jewish people is not assured, not even in Israel.
- The need for the existence of a Jewish state in the land of Israel.
 The certainty and permanence of anti-Semitism.
- 3) That the Jewish people need a central focal force which will be spiritual as well as physical. They need a homeland which will absorb Jews in need.
- 4) That history repeats itself, that what was will be and that one has to draw the lesson.
- 5) The Jewish people face genocide or cultural & social assimilation without a homeland.
- 6) The uncompromising need to support the Zionist idea, and to unify the Jewish people.
- 7) That the Jewish people have to be united culturaly and socailly. Judiasm should be the unifing factor and Israel should be strengthened for the sake of Jewish survival.

(Question 15, continued)

- 8) That the future of the Jewish people is building a national home. That Nazism can emerge in every nation and every generation and transform civilized people into animals.
- 9)

Question 16:

What does the fact that you are Jewish mean to you?

- 1) Obligation to core values & cultural concepts which are reflected in language, waye of life & life cycle. Obligation to know about Jewish tradition & thought.
- Belonging to the Jewish people (culturally not religiously) being Jewish & Israeli is interrelated.
- Belonging to a people unified by history, religion, and spiritual understanding.
- 4) To be an Israeli with a painful history, full of culture & tradition.
- 5) Living in Israel and influencing others to live there.
- 6) Everything from the fact that I live & fight in & for Israel, to guiding what I read and how I react.
- 7) Religious national association
- 8) Tradition, history of uniqueness. A culture of which I am an integral part.
- 9) Part of the Jewish people with all the historical obligations involved.

Question 17:

Below is a rating scale, at one end of which appears the word "Israeli" and at the other end the word "Jewish". Indicate your position on this scale by placing an "X" within the appropriate space. To the extent that the mark is nearer to "Israeli", it means that you feel yourself so much more Israeli than Jewish. To the extent that the "X" is nearer to "Jewish", it means that you feel yourself so much more Jewish.

5) Can't distinguish between the two dimensions of my being.

Question 18:

Which single characteristic best describes the Jewish people?

- 1) (4) Ethnie culture.
- 2) (1) Nationality.
- 3) (1) Nationality.
- 4) (2) Religious.
- 5) (5) Other All of these characterize the Jewish people.
- 6) (5) Other Combination of the four elements you have identified.
- 7) (1) Nationality, (2) Religious.
- 8) (2) Religious.
- 9) (1) Nationality.
 - 1. Nationality, 2 Religious, 3 Race, 4 Ethnic culture, 5 Other.

Question 19:

Please mark each of the following statements according to the strength with which you agree or disagree.

See next page.

19. Please mark each of the following statements according to the strength with which you agree or disagree.

n. i	*	1	2	. 3	4	5
		Agree Strongly	Agree		Disagree	No
Α.	In deciding whom to support in U.S. election, American Jews should give overriding consideration to the can- didates' views on Israel.	2,3,5,7.	1,4,8,9.	6.	i an	
В.	The differences between American Jews and Jews in Israel are more significant than the similarities.	*) **	2,4,6,8,	1,5,	3,7,	* * w
С.	Anti-Zionism is simply a form of anti-Semitism.	3,5,7,	8,9.	1,2,	4,6,	* 98 2
D.	Jews should not engage in public criticism of Israeli policies	can	JEW	4,8, ISH	1,5,6,7,	(ec)
E.	We cannot expect American Jews to emigrate to Israel		1,2,4,	3,8,9.	5,7,	
F.	It's more important to use money raised by American Jew for Jewish education in the U.S. than to send it to Israel.		1,2,5,6,	3,4,7,	8,	
G.	Israel is the only answer to the Holocaust.	3,4,5,6, 7,	2,8,	9,	1,	Æ.
н.	I would like to see the separation of religion and state in Israel		1,5,7,9,	6,	3,	86
	704	AP 30 (MAI 4 11 11 11 11				(6/50
Ι.	Jews are the wealthiest ethnic group in the U.S.	2,	433	5,	3,4,8,9.	1,6,7
J.	We should encourage young American Jews to emigrate to Israel.	1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8,9.			9 12 28 12	4.
К.	Jewish education in the U.S. is bad.	5,	2,4,	3,8	1,	6,7,9,
L.	Israel's image in the U.S. has been negatively affected by Begin's policies.	1,2,4,	5,6,	9.	3,	
М.	Most non-Jews are anti-Semite	s	2,	1,3,9,	4,5,6,7,	· ·
N.	American Jews are influenced by anti-Israeli propaganda on American television.	9 **	2,6,8,9,	3,5,	4,7,	
0.	The Israeli media gives us a good picture of what's happen-		2,3,5,	1,4,	8,9.	6,7,
	ing in the U.S.		8		*	

May 1984

PART B

Question 1.

What were your expectations of the Mission? Which of these were met?

- To get to know the Jewish community and all its shaded and hues, to learn of all Jewish organizations and institutions. Learning about the organized community.
- 2. Meeting with diverse elements in the Jewish community. Fulfilled.
- 3. I was expecting a tremendous experience, a visit to a different planet.
- 4. To observe closely the diverse dimensions of Jewish life in the U.S. The program went beyond my expectation due to the intensive schedule, although it seems at times tiring. In conclusion, it was most efficient.
- 6. I expected to see a liberal advanced and involved communit. Fulfilled.

Which of these were not met?

- 1. The diversity of Jewish life in New York was not exposed. Apart from Yeshiva University I would have liked to visit Williamsberg and Boro Park.
- 2. A. The meeting with "Ark" in Chicago
 - B. Boston Jewish education
 - C. Jewish lobby in Washington
 - D. The Federation in Miami
 - E. Home hospitality.
- I was hoping to meet younger Jews (20's) in central positions in the community.
 If they exist I didn't meet them.
- 5. The composition of the group and the cast of characters did not allow for in-depth discussions.
- 6. Not enough attractions to individual needs. Hospitality was often reserved.

Question 2

Which sessions and experiences of the mission did you find most valuable? Explain.

- 1. A. Stuart Eisenstat Gave a profound and long range outlook about American Jewry.
 - B. Meeting with Black leaders in Washington Was telling of the Jackson impact on Black-Jewish relations.
 - C. Jewish Education Excellent overview of Jewish education , its problems and accomplishments.
 - D. The session on Church-State at the Annual Meeting Some insights on a problem Israel is facing.
- 3, In perspective all of the experiences made up a complete mosaic, yet I feel that the meetings with the Federation in Miami and AIPAC in Washington, D.C. were more important than others. Both experiences reflected an ongoing effort beginning with fundraising and ending with the existance of institutions in the community or in the case of AIPAC beginning with persuasion and ending with a vote in congress.

Question 2, continued

- 4. A. The meetings on Jewish Education in Boston
 - B. Hy Bookbinder and Stu Eisenstat.
 - C. The meetings with Blacks in Washington, D.C. and with the Latin Americans. The ethnic theme was covered more profoundly in Washington, D. C. than in Chicago.
 - D. The experience of the Annual Meeting, the impact of the organization, its broad areas of concern.
- 5. A. Eisenstat Personal interest
 - B. Jewish education Personal interest
 - C. The meeting with Black Church leaders Personal interest.
- 6. The meetings with various ethnic groups which enhance the pluralistic condition so important for Jewish survival. Seein ourselves in the mission of anti-Israel attitudes (State Department in Washington). Boston and the thorough exposure of Jewish education.

Question 3. Which sessions and experiences did you find least valuable? Explain.

- 1. A. Middle EAst Institute
 - B. State Department.
 - Both meetings didn't reveal new information. Often speakers didn't know the facts.
- 2. A. The M.E. center in Washington. This didn't add to my knowledge.
 - B. State Department officials The meeting was not enlightening, the hostile attitude bothersome.
- 3. To my surprise the meetings with media representatives, which we were looking forward to, were the least important in the context of the trip (the meeting at ABC in Miami was the best.) These meetings were not helpful in particular to the understanding of the Jewish community or the general context.
- 4. The meetings with State Department officials and M.E. Institute in Washington.
 Also the meeting with the media there. (The best media meeting was the
 one with Peter Strauss.)
- A. The Annual Meeting and the tour of AJC's headquarters. One day was sufficient.
 - B. The dialogue with ethnic groups. The dialogue is superficial and uninteresting.
 - C. Cocktail parties with AJC leaders. Unnecessary.
- 6. A. Washington M.E. Institute.
 - B. Chicago too surperficial,

Question 4. On the whole, how useful were the various preparatory orientation sessions and background materials given both in the U.S. and Israel?

In Israe	<u>1</u> :	Very Useful	Somewhat Useful	Not Particularly Useful
	Orientation sessions;	1,2,4	3,6	5
<i>V</i> .	Background materials:	1,2,6	3,4	5
In the U	Orientation sessions:	1,2,4,	3,	e e
	Background materials:	1,2,4,	3,6	5,

Question 4, continued

Was there anything about which you were not briefed that would have been useful to know in advance of your mission? If yes, elaborate.

- 1. There was a need to emphasize that the program demands personal involvement and is not a tourist's trip.
- 3. That we will be at times the focus of the discussion and will have to present various dimensions of Israel.
- 4. The intensity of the trip.
- 5. The intensity of the trip.
- 6. The financial arrangements and what to wear at different times.

Question 5.

Please share with us your opinions and recommendations regarding the following dimensions and components of the mission:

Balance between the various dimensions and components of the mission: formal sessions, social and human experiences, cultural events, sightseeing (For reference please use final itinerary.)

- Each community visit should begin with sightseeing (see Chicago itinerary), information on the general picture (history, society) as a backdrop for the Jewish dimension of the program.
- Excellent.
- 3. The balance was very good. It is important however, to advise the participants that social events are as demanding as substantive ones.
- 4. The balance was very good. Although it was an intensive visit, I would not change the itinerary in the future, but would advise the participants.
- 6. Quite good. Not enough sightseeing.

Format of session (dialogues, lectures):

- 1. Dialogues and experiences are more effective than actions.
- 2. Balanced and good.
- Every subject should be first presented as a formal lecture. The diversity of the program was good.
 - 4. Very high level.
 - The diversity of meetings, dialogues and lectures created repetitions of known details.
- 6. The balance is most important.

Quality of speakers and level of information imparted:

- Very high. The quality of speakers on Jewish issues much higher than on general issues.
- 2. Very good and focused.
- 3. The speakers were very good. Stuart Eisenstat was outstanding.
- 4. Very high.
- 5. At times there was repetition of details
- 6. Very high.

Question 5, continued

Home Hospitality:

- Most important. The only way to get to know people, reach some opinions and intimacy.
- 2. Very good.
 - 3. The most important aspect of the visit.
 - 4. There was one unpleasant meeting with young leaders in Boston, otherwise very good. I would suggest, however, to send the Israelis in teams so that the responsibility will be shared.
 - 5. Too many, after few visits the impact was lost.
 - 6. Too tiring, a burden.

Length of stay in the U.S.:

- 1. Excellent
- 2. Three weeks is an ideal length for this kind of a program.
- 3. Just right.
- 4. Should be shortened by three day.s
- 5. Too long.
- 6. Too long.

Traveling in the U.S. (number of days, comfort, etc.

- 1. Excellent.
- 2. The "rhythm" and the transition from city to city looked good and comfortable.
- 3. Very good. I would recommend to replace short flights with travel by car (Boston to Washington, Miami to Orlando).
- 4. I would suggest cutting one community out.
- 5. Outstanding organization.
- 6. Comfortable. I could cut one city.

Size of the Group:

- 1. Suitable,
- 2. Between 10-15 people.
- 3. The optimal size is 12-15 people. Ten is too small a group (when 2 are not present it is immediately noticeable.)
- 4. Fine
- 5. O.K.
- 6. Fine

Composition of the Group:

- Heterogeny of group recommended. Important to make sure that participants will have very good command of the language.
- 2. I liked the fact that the group was heterogenic.
- Very critical. The selection process should be more profound. Knowledge of English should not be the most important criteria.
- 4. Too many journalists.
- Bad. Uneven knowledge and command of the language brought about compromises that affected the quality of meetings and dialogues.
- Not good. Uneven in background, culture, knowledge and command of the language. Created tension and put too much of a burden on a few,

Question 5, continued.

Staff involved in the Mission;

- 1. To be commended for the effort, planning and care,
- 2. Great hospitality, everybody extended himself,
- 3. Fantastic. Good-will combined with care for details of the program. Thanks.
- 4. Warmth, efficiency and willingness to help were characteristic eyerywhere.
- 5. Helpful, friendly, warm and effective.
- 6. Intelligent, open, friendly. Although, often gave us the impression that we have to earn our to the U.S.

Question 6.

If you were planning a similar mission, what changes would you recommend?

Content-Themes

- 1. More time for Jewish education. Focus on AIPAC in Washington. Longer visit in a very small community.
- 2. No changes.
- We received stimulating and broad perception. Yet, excluding Jewish education, we didn't have a chance to deal with problems such as intermarriage, young leadership, future leadership, in depth.
- 4. I would continue to focus on diverse issues as you have done.
- 5. Focus on two three themes at the most.
- 6. Most of the themes were interesting and the entire experience was outstanding.

Accommodations

- 1. Excellent
- 2. No changes.
- 3. Excellent
- 4. Although I was concerned about sharing the room, I got used to it. I know, however, that not everyone was happy about sharing the rooms.
- 5. Excellent.
- 6. Fine, but the hosts should not have let us feel like beggers. Since the expenses were very high, I would suggest being more generous.

Experiences

- 1. Begin each community visit with the general community.
- 2. No changes.
- 4. Too many and too early to list. I am sure that the impressions will come out as we go along and the discuss the experience.
- 5. More free time.
- 6. Diverse, balance and numerous.

Dialogues

- 1. More dialogues, exchange of ideas and debates.
 - 2. No changes.
 - I enjoyed the dialogues although at times was frustrated as I was not sure that we were understood.
 - 5. Cut home hospitality.
 - 6. There were many important and good dialogues although often not open and honest enough.

Question 6, continued

Others

- 2. In Washington more focus on the Jewish lobby,
- 5. Give at least two free days every week.

Question 7

Your impressions of the American Jewish Committee and its activities. Which aspects/programs of AJC were you most impressed with?

- 1. The involvement in forming church-state relations. Intergroup relations.
- 2. The contact with various ethnic groups. The involvement with research, advocacy of Jewish interests and interpreting these to the general community.
- 3. The leadership. The ability to deal with all of the concerns of the community.
- I was impressed with the level of involvement of the lay leadership. The
 activity in the area of intergroup relations.
- 5. No opinion. I lack the information.
- 6. All power to the organization for its persistance in ethnic dialogues and its being a guardian of civil rights.

Which were you least impressed with?

- 3. The hesitations to try to solve these problems with courage.
- 5. No opnion. I lack the information.
- 6. The big events that are organized to justify the existance of the organization (The Annual Meeting).

Question 8

Your impression of the Institute on American Jewish Israeli Relations and its activities.

Which aspects/programs of IAJIR were you most impressed with?

- 1. The mere existance for the purpose of enhancing a live dialogue between American Jews and Israelis.
- 2. The wrk in enhancing the interpersonal relations between American Jews & Israelis.
- 3. The coordination of our trip, profound, broad and full of enthusiasm is the best evidence to its capabilities.
- 4. I am not familiar with its specific activities, yet, but I am very impressed with its establishment and goals.
- 5. No opinion, I lack the information.
- 6. The mere existance of such an institute.

Which were you least impressed with?

No comments

Question 9

Please share with us suggestions regarding follow-up activities to the mission in Israel?

Activities that you personally can be involved in: Specific list;

- 1. A. To meet AJC members in Israel
 - B. Assist the Institute in translating material, editing.
 - C. Hosting American Jews.
- Meetings with groups visiting Israel.

Question 9, continued

- 2 Assisting visits in various educational institutions and Histradrut organizations.
- 3. I will be delighted to help in every possible way, particularly to speak on areas of my expertise. I'll be happy to help in coordinating visits to the Northern part of Israel.
- Lecture, meet with American Jews, Translation of materials, editing. Promoting the Institute and AJC, etc.
- 5. Meet AJC leaders in Israel.
- I would appreciate every suggestion.
 In principle to participate in the on-going dialogue.

Activities that the AJC should consider:

- 1. Work with younger people. At the Annual Meeting we have not seen many young faces. It is essential for the surfival of AJC.
- 2. Hasbara on behalf of Israel in the communities.
- Important to wrk with young leadership.
 Coordinate similar visits for American Jewish leaders in Israel.
- 6. More activity in the local community to enhance the contact with Israel.

Question 10

Please share with us any further recommendations, comments and reflections on the mission you might have.

- 1. Travel in the afternoons from city to city was very wise, it gave time to rest. Lengthen the trip by 2-3 days to enable more free time.
- 2. An excellent visit and very well coordinated. Apart from focusing on the Jewish lobby in Washington, D.C. I would not change a thing. Although it was very intensive, I found it to be necessary. I like the diversity and was very impressed with the insights and experiences planned for us.
- 3. For me, as an individual, this was a most significant experience. I don't know how I or the others will be able to convey the messages, transmit the information, share the insights with others. We have to find ways to the experience. Maybe, video-taping it, making a TV movie on it. I will give more thought to it.

Question 11.

Have your ideas, attitudes and feelings about the American Jewish community changed as a result of your participation in the mission? If yes, how?

- Yes. I was always under the impression that American Jews are torn between the loyalty to the U.S. and to Israel. The seeming conflict between these has been resolved, the greatest challenge is the continuation of Jewish existance.
- Yes. I witnessed the very poor and very rich. I met a proud community, not an
 apologetic one. I saw the urgent need to direct more resources to the needs
 of the Jewish community in the U.S., to Jewish education. Less should be
 directed to Israel.
- 3. Yes. I was rather disrespectful of American Jewry prior to my visit. I recognize now the importance of this community in my life as an Israeli, the partnership.
- 4. I am more concerned now about Jewish interests and the need for real dealogue.
- 5. No
- 6. Yes. I believe now more than ever in the need to talk (Israelis and American Jews) to recognize and confront the truth about our relations.



ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

A REVIEW OF WEEKEND NEWSPAPERS by the Israel Office of The American Jewish Committee

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"Who is a Jew?" versus "One People" (Press Summary-August 5, 1984)

In the aftermath of Israel's election results the dormant debate regarding "Who is a Jew?" has surfaced again. Israelis are debating whether Israel's "Law of Return," which entitles every Jew to immediate citizenship in the Jewish state, should be amended to apply only to those recognized as Jewish by "Halacha," or be left to the current practices of Israel's Ministry of the Interior.

"Halacha" recognizes as Jews only those born to a Jewish mother or converts to Judaism according to Orthodox ritual. The "Law of Return" acknowledges conversion but does not define the required ritual. Israel's Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for the registration of citizenship, is headed by Dr. Joseph Burg, the leader of the National Religious Party (NRP), which subscribes to Orthodox practice. Recently, newly arrived Ethiopian Jews were allegedly denied Israeli citizenship by the Interior Ministry until they underwent a symbolic conversion known as "Hitchatshut Habrit" (renewal of the convenant). Public pressure has since changed the ministry's practice, but the conversion-like ceremony of Ethiopian Jews continues despite the fact that the predecessors of Israel's Orthodox Chief Rabbinate were among the first to recognize the "Falashas" as Jews. Recently, Jewish Agency officials in Absorption Centers have been confronted by growing opposition among the Ethiopian Jewish immigrants to "renewal of the convenant." ("Ma'ariv," August 1, 1984).

The results of the recent elections in Israel apparently could to lead to the adoption of legislation that would amend the "Law of Return" to suit Orthodox demands that only conversions conducted according to Halacha be recognized. Because the religious parties are needed to form a coalition government their bargaining power is far greater than the percentage of the popular vote (15%) they received. Some fear that the Orthodox will make the amendment of the "Law of Return" their demand for participation in a coalition government.

A lobby to oppose any changes in the "Law of Return" has been formed. Five representatives of organizations opposed to any amendment that would recognize only those conversions performed in accordance with "Halacha" held a press conference in Jerusalem on August 2, to warn that the demands of the "Israeli Orthodox establishment will splinter world Jewry by throwing into question the Jewishness of tens of thousands of people throughout the world who consider themselves Jews," according to news reports in the Israeli press (August 3, 1984).

Participating in the press conference were Rabbi Asher Hirsh of Jerusalem, representing the (Reform) World Union for Progressive Judaism; Dr. Simon Greenberg, vice chancellor of the (Conservative) Jewish Theological Seminary in New York; Theodore Mann, president of the American Jewish Congress; Rabbi Jack J. Cohen of Jerusalem, representing the World B'nai B'rith, and Rabbi Pinhas Spector of Jerusalem, also representing the Conservative Movement.

Mann regards an amendment to the "Law of Return" as an "insult" to about 80 percent of the six million Jews in the United States who belong to Conservative or Reform synagogues, according to a report in the <u>Jerusalem Post</u>. Mann also indicated that an amendment could reduce American Jewry's financial backing of Israel, since "you cannot hurt people and then expect them to maintain their sympathy and support."

Rabbi Hirsh said that the amendment would turn non-Orthodox Jews into "second-class citizens" and Dr. Greenberg noted that "as a Conservative Jew, I don't want the State of Israel to tell me and millions of other Jews that we are something less than Jewish."

Mann asserted that he and his colleagues were not interfering in the internal policies of the State of Israel since "such legislation, if adopted, will affect Jews in the diaspora, and that fully entitles us to express our opinion in this matter," according to a report in Ma'ariv.

In response to Mann's statements, <u>Hatzofeh</u> (August 3), the daily published by the NRP, ran a front page report on the press conference with the headline: "The Reform and Conservative threaten to halt Aliyah and support to the State of Israel." Rabbi Shmuel Chefer, chairman of the Committee for the Integrity of the (Jewish) People, the organization that has led the fight for the amendment of the "Law of Return," said that the press conference was misleading since the amendment "does not deal with the legitimization or deligitmization of the different (religious movements in Judaism), but only with the issue of conversion that is a Halachic act according to all," <u>Hatzofeh</u> reported.

<u>Hatzofeh's</u> editorial, "Who do they speak for?", accused the spokesmen at the press conference of having failed to halt "the wave of assimilation" and intermarriage instead of attacking an amendment to the "Law of Return," which is intended "to say to gentiles who want to join the Jewish national and enjoy equal rights and obligations that they must convert according to Halacha."

In direct reference to the proposition by Reform leader Rabbi Alexander Schindler that Jews need not be the children of Jewish mothers, <u>Hatzofeh</u> warns that "whoever decides that gentiles can be recognized as Jews without conversion has no right to interfere or determine what kind of conversions are required" by the existing Law of Return. "The Reform, by their aforementioned decision, could cause their removal from the Jewish people, unless they hasten to turn back and soon."

Additional criticism of the Reform and Conservative moments came from Ma'ariv columnist Naftali Kraus, who is known for his religious sentiments. Kraus wrote (August 2) that the "final act" in the drama concerning "Who is a Jew?" may be taking place. He recalled how 14 years ago, a ruling by Israel's High Court of Justice to register the gentile wife of an Israeli Army officer as Jewish led the Knesset to adopt an amendment to the Law of Return, which stated that "a Jew is one born to a Jewish mother, or who converted and is not a member

of any other religion." This original amendment, Kraus notes, "was obviously clear and unequivocal that conversion is a Halachic act and no secular conversion exists in reality or administratively, or any sort of conversion, other than conversions according to Halacha. But when there were those who began to act deviously and brought converts to Israel who were supplied with fictitious certificates of conversion in the United States, where they did not undergo the process proscribed by Halacha, the need arose and the demand was made to (further) amend the law by adding 'in accordance with Halacha.'"

Kraus writes that he finds it difficult to appreciate the position of those opposed to the amendment "at a time when the United States itself is inundated by assimilation in worrisome proportions and by intermarriages, many of which are performed together by a rabbi and priest, and reaching 50 percent and more..." How can such rabbis, he asks, claim that their conversions are in accordance with Halacha?

Kraus suggests that the bleak demographic picture of the future Jewish population of the United States, reduced to three million in the next century, is a reflection of what is in store when conversions do not conform to Halacha. "Is it not the right and obligation of the State of Israel to protect Judaism and do everything to block those breaches that encourage assimilation?" he asks.

Most Israeli newspapers and political commentators, however, did not take any editorial stand on the issue of "who is a Jew?" Many chose to discuss the overall implications of a national unity or other coalition government with or without the Orthodox religious parties. An exception was Al Hamishmar, published by the Socialist Mapam party that constitutes a faction of the Alignment. In an editorial (August 3) entitled "Danger of Rupture in Judaism," the newspaper called attention to a supposed "ultimatum" handed down by all of the religious parties to both the Alignment and the Likud, demanding the amendment of the Law of Return in accordance with the requirements of Halacha.

Al Hamishmar warns that such an amendment "would mean not only the fragmentation of the Jewish people, but the transfer of Israel to the periphery of Judaism. The different Orthodox movements are only one percent of the entire Jewish people, and their extremists (such as Agudat Israel, Shas and Morasha) are only a fraction of a percentage. The Sephardi and Ashkenazi diasporas are for the most part Reform in their behavior and conduct, even if not always by declared membership. The attempt to force upon them extremist and nationalistic religious Judaism may lead to their aloofness from Israel and from the Israeli form of Judaism that has recently been pictured in a most repelling fashion."

Al Hamishmar continues: "The question touches upon the roots of our very existence as a nation that has a renewed homeland and a 2,000 year old diaspora. The State of Israel will have no secure future if it should find itself divided or separated from the majority of the Jews of the Golah....An amendment of the 'Who is a Jew?" law may appear to be an insignificant issue that relates only to the validity of the conversion process, but it symbolizes the sovereign disqualification by Israel of a moderate and compromising Judaism, and the position of the monopoly to Israel's militant and extremist Judaism. This is not a thin crack. This constitutes a deep rupture.

Al Hamishmar concludes: "Capitulation to the religious parties on the issue of conversion in accordance with Halacha is not, therefore, a tactical concession, or sovereign approval of one Jewish custom over another; rather this

could be an historic decision with very serious consequences for the State of Israel as the center of Judaism, and for the entire Jewish people. It should be opposed at all costs."

In addition to the Jerusalem press conference conducted by five Jewish leaders opposed to amending the Law of Return, 14 major Jewish organizations, representing the different bodies of the Conservative and Reform movements, as well as the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress and B'nai B'rith, jointly purchased space in Israeli newspapers to declare their opposition to any change in the definition of the word "Jew" in the "Law of Return" that would affect the status-quo concerning religious legislation, hurt the unity of the Jewish people and disrupt relations between Israel and the Diaspora. The announcement was entitled "One People."

The American Jewish leaders and organizations were joined by two Knesset members, Shulamit Aloni of the Ratz (Citizens Rights) party and Yossi Sarid of the Labor Alignment, who issued a joint call to Israel's Orthodox rabbinate to refrain from demands for religious legislation. The two Knesset members, known for their opposition to all religious legislation, and whose campaigns included promises to rescind religious legislation adopted in the previous Knesset, reportedly told the rabbis that they would not tamper with existing religious legislation if the rabbis would also practice restraint. In a front page story in <u>Ha'aretz</u>, under the byline of <u>Akiva Eldar</u> (August 3), Aloni and Sarid declared that "each of us is under obligation to try and mend the breach between religious and secular (Israelis) through mutual concessions. We recognize this obligation and that is why we shall refrain for now from demanding changes in the law that are called for in our view; despite that the status quo in religious matters is contrary to our ideology --- we shall not demand its change, in order to make it possible to sit together in a coalition and work for the integrity of the nation."

This formula, suggested by Aloni and Sarid, was not entirely consistent with a different report by Ilan Shachori, also in Ha'aretz (August 3), but appearing on the inside pages. Accordingly, Ms. Aloni has recommended that the Alignment party, whom she has always supported, should form a national unity government with the Likud in order to run the affairs of state for a limited period of time, during which the economic issues and the war in Lebanon can be resolved without the interference of the small parties. "The grab-like tactics now practiced by the religious parties, who know that no coalition government can be established without them, is disgusting, and should in no way be permitted," Aloni argues. Otherwise, Aloni warns the Alignment that she and her party's other two Knesset members will be perfectly willing to remain in the opposition if the Alignment agrees to allow the NRP to maintain the Ministry of Education and Culture, to adopt "Who is a Jew" and other religiously motivated legislation regarding the authority of the rabbinical courts and limitations on archaeological activities.

Ms. Aloni's joint statement with Yossi Sarid indicates that they doubt that the Alignment ad the Likud will form a national unity government. The religious parties, therefore, would maintain a pivotal position in any future government. Such a possibility is what may have prompted Aloni and Sarid to call on the rabbinate to conduct a mutual "cease-fire."

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Edited by Kenneth Bandler

Ha'aretz is an independent liberal newspaper.

Al Hamishmar is affiliated with the Socialist MAPAM party.

Hatzofeh is published by the National Religious Party.

Ma'ariv is independent, but traditionally Likud-oriented.

<u>Jerusalem Post</u> is an independent newspaper, generally supporting the Labor Party.

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ISRAELI PRESS HIGHLIGHTS

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CAN PRAYER HELP?

(Press Summary - August 12, 1984)

A seat alongside the eastern wall in the synagogue has traditionally symbolized a position of prominence in the community. It was, therefore, symbolic that Labor Party leader Shimon Peres went directly to the Kotel (Western Wall) in Jerusalem after President Chaim Herzog asked him to form the next government of Israel. At the Kotel Mr. Peres placed a brief note among its ancient stones. Mr. Peres'action recalled a similar performance by Menachem Begin, who seven years ago became the first prime minister-elect to pay his respects at Judaism's holiest site when faced with the prospect of forming a new government.

Judging from the reaction in the weekend press, Mr. Peres did not benefit from the same public fealty that accompanied Mr. Begin into office. Instead, Mr. Peres became the target of growing criticism for his visit to a religious site at a time when his very ability to form a government is being questioned. Many recalled that the Alignment's party platform promises to limit the power of Israel's religious parties. Mr. Peres' visit to the Kotel was immediately viewed as an overture to the religious parties whose support he needs to form a government, and an indication that those parties would continue to extract concessions from an Alignment government as they did from the Likud. This time, however, the price would probably include the amendment of the Law of Return.

Yet, it was more likely that Mr. Peres had gone to the Kotel to pray for his political career, despite President Herzog's official blessings, since the close results in the recent elections left very much uncertain who will be the next prime minister. In fact, this is the greatest dividing issue in the current talks between the Alignment and the Likud regarding the formation of a national unity government. The Alignment claims that Mr. Peres deserves the role because he heads the largest party and is the one whom Israel's president chose to form the next government. The Likud claims that since the Alignment does not have enough support in the Knesset to form any other kind of government, the birthright belongs to current Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir whose, chances to form a narrow government are said to be better than that of his opponent. That is why rotation between Messers. Peres and Shamir in the respective roles of prime minister is being suggested.

An article (August 10) in <u>Hatzofeh</u>, published by the National Religious Party (NRP), explained why Mr. Peres does not enjoy any real lead over Mr. Shamir, despite having been given the opportunity to form a new government.

According to <u>Hatzofeh</u>, Mr. Peres can only depend upon 50 seats out of the 61 necessary for a majority in the 120 seat Knesset. These are: the Alignment, 44; Shinui, 3; and CRM, 3, for a total of 50, that would likely be supported as well by six more seats belonging to the two predominantly Arab parties (Communists, 4, and the Progressive List for Peace, 2), for a total of 56 seats.

Similarly, Mr. Shamir is able to count on nearly the same total number of seats as assured the Alignment by adding up the following: Likud, 41; Tehiya, 5; the Orthodox Sephardi party, Shas, 4; Morasha, headed by Rabbi Druckman, 2; and Agudat Yisrael, 2, for a total of 54 seats.

Consequently, neither bloc of right or left parties is capable of forming a government without the additional partnership of five other parties who have all gone on record as demanding the formation of a national unity government. These are: the NRP, 4; Yahad, headed by Ezer Weizman, 3; Ometz, led by former finance minister Yigal Hurwitz, 1; and Tami, 1, for a total of nine seats.

"In these circumstances," $\frac{\text{Hatzofeh}}{\text{of Shimon}}$ notes, "it is difficult to predict anything regarding the chances $\frac{\text{Hatzofeh}}{\text{of Shimon}}$ Peres to form a government headed by himself."

Hatzofeh credits Mr. Peres with having the necessary foresight to have obtained the almost immediate support of the 60 Knesset members whose recommendations led President Herzog to assign him the role of forming a new government. These 60 included those who have been demanding the formation of a national unity government. There participation, we are reminded by Hatzofeh, depends upon whether the constituent member of the Alignment, the socialist Mapam party, agrees to join a government in which the Likud is a partner. In the Likud there are those who sincerely believe that Mapam's dislike for the Likud almost makes it impossible for Mr. Peres to head a national unity government. The reason is that the departure of Mapam from the Alignment would make Mr. Peres the underdog in any negotiations with the Likud for the office of prime minister.

An indication of Mapam's growing disenchantment with Mr. Peres could be discerned in an article entitled "Peres and the Kotel" (August 10), by Arye Palgi in Al Hamishmar, the daily published by Mapam. "Cynics will say that (Mr. Peres went to the Kotel for divine intervention) since without it he has no chance to succeed in his mission (to form the next government)...

"When Menachem Begin, as prime minister-elect, went to the Kotel, many raised an eyebrow because of the theatrics, but none could claim that the act was a departure from the framework of (Begin's) ideology ... But what was Shimon Peres searching for at the Kotel?..."

Palgi continues: "That portion of the public who did not like Peres up until now, but in recent months began to pay attention to him, must also wonder: Is this a change in the man or is he still trying to gather votes at a belated election meeting ...? The Labor Movement people whom Peres was chosen to lead are also trying to figure out (Peres') unexpected step. What are they supposed to learn from it? Which public opinion polls does it serve? What, in fact, is behind the Kotel?" Palgi writes.

<u>Uzi Benziman</u>, writing in the independent daily <u>Ha'aretz</u> (August 10), referred to Mr. Peres as a "Begin for the Poor" and suggested that the visit to the Kotel had to do with the man's reputation. "Shimon Peres knows very well that he has been stuck with the image of a man whose credibility is doubtful. None remember his past achievements and they ignore his staying power and his success in putting his party back on its feet. In the mind of the public, he is identified as speaking with a forked tongue. If he were to be prime minister, his public image would probably improve as was the case with all the prime ministers. But as long as he remains far away from that seat, he bears the features of someone from whom you would rather not buy a used car, an impression he reinforced last week."

"Why in God's name did he need that complicated feat of kissing the stones of the Western Wall? When did he last previously visit the Kotel? When did he ever pray to the One in Heaven? Who will believe that he wrote a note in order to send a message to the Creator through the mail box of the cracks in the Western Wall?" asks Benziman.

Although Menachem Begin's performance at the Kotel may have been a public relations act, Benziman writes, it seemed "authentic." Mr. Begin "is versed in (Jewish) customs and prayers, such as those practiced at the Kotel. His visit to the remnant of the Temple suited his personal style, and it was his original idea to do it. When Shimon Peres approached the Kotel he imitated his predecessor, and that is why this performance appeared to be so pitiful."

Yeshaiyahu Ben-Porat, a popular columnist in Yediot Acharonot, also questioned (August 10) what Mr. Peres was doing at the Kotel. "Even the best friends of Shimon Peres cannot fathom and do not understand what he sought at the Kotel. If Peres had come there in normal times to place a note between the stones without any connection to the formation of a government whose vital component is one or two of the religious parties, nobody would have asked any questions. Menachem Begin, for example, frequently wore a skullcap, even before he became prime minister, and his visit to the Kotel ... did not come as a surprise. But how does Peres, a member of the Socialist International (and candidate of the Mapam party in the Alignment), place a note in the Kotel?"

The first politician to openly criticize Mr. Peres for his visit to the Kotel was Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, a former secretary-general of the Labor Party whose caustic tongue sharply upbraided Mr. Peres for visiting a religious site and "poking a scrap of paper into the Western Wall in order to further the prospects of a hocus-pocus, false (national unity) government." His publicized comments aimed against the prospect of a national unity government encouraged others to criticize Mr. Peres for his behavior.

However, <u>David Landau</u>, the diplomatic correspondent of the <u>Jerusalem Post</u>, chose to take Mr. Ben-Aharon and other critics of Mr. Peres to task for their remarks. In an article entitled "Crack in the Wall" (August 10), Landau remarked that "Ben-Aharon was being a little false himself, or at least disingenuous. For Shimon Peres did not perform this ritual solely to further his prospects of forming a unity government. He did it to further his prospects of forming any government."

Landau defends Mr. Peres for realizing "the underlying political truth of the election results: the religious parties, whichever way you look at it, still hold the balance ... and indeed Ben-Aharon's angry, illogical remarks too, portray a profounder truth: Labor has needlessly, heedlessly, irresponsibly alienated -- and thereby lost -- the hearts and minds of too many people in this country."

"Until this week, there was no point even airing these thoughts. But now, on the sobering, bleak morrow of smashed election illusions, the Labor camp itself is beginning to grope towards the hard realities," writes Landau.

Landau is pleased by the prospects. "Labor and Mapam leaders -- and their Shinui and CRM allies -- realized this week that, because of the cruel election arithmetic 'something's got to give.' The left-liberal wing of the camp, to its great credit, resolved that it would rather 'give' on religion to the religious parties than on peace policy to the Likud."

But Landau voices the concern of Labor leaders who fail to understand why the religious parties, who have been offered better terms than previously given them by the Likud, continue to prefer the company of the latter. The reason for this, Landau explains, lies with the constituents of the religious parties --simple-minded people for whom consorting with Labor has become, during one brief decade, a 'sin' against religion.

"In part this is the legacy of Menachem Begin's deliberate demogoguery ... But to be fair, Begin didn't achieve this single-handedly, or even just with the help of Gush Emunim ... Labor stood by while God was hijacked, in his Holy Land, by Rabbi Levinger, the Temple Mount terrorists and now Meir Kahane," writes Landau.

Landau hopes that the Alignment will find the ways to achieve a new relationship with the religious parties and "the hundreds of thousands of religious and traditional Israelis (for whom) what matters is not merely the horse-trading, the 'concessions,' but rather the 'attitude,' the approach to values these people consider to be holy and eternal."

He suggests that Labor "should be searching out those men of spiritual stature who have kept their heads above the swirling stream of fanaticism: Soloveitchik, Auerbach, Leibowitz ... (and) to project them into the national dialogue so as to give the lie to the crude chauvinism that passes today for religious dogma."

Edited by Kenneth Bandler

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A BRIEF SURVEY OF U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS AND AJC CONCERNS

by George E. Gruen Director, Israel & Middle East Affairs, IRD

- I. Relations between the United States and Israel are presently excellent and may indeed be at an all-time high. Among the positive developments in recent weeks one can note the following:
 - a. Congress approved a proposal to create a U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area by the overwhelming vote of 96-0 in the Senate and 416-6 in the House. Restrictive amendments were defeated and broad authority was granted to the Administration to negotiate with Israel a unique arrangement that should help put commercial relations between the two countries on a sounder economic basis.
 - b. While the total of U.S. military and economic aid to Israel remains at \$2.6 billion, in recognition of Israel's exceptional economic hardships Congress agreed for the first time that all the aid will be in the form of grants. (In recent years nearly all of the U.S. economic aid was eaten up just to service the debt on outstanding loans.) Moreover, following the visit of Prime Minister Shimon Peres to Washington, the Reagan Administration agreed to permit Israel to receive immediately the \$1.2 billion in economic aid allocated for the new fiscal year that began on October 1. A U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group of officials and non-governmental experts has been established to help Israel create a sound economic infrastructure.
 - c. The acrimony that occasionally marred U.S. Defense Department relations with the Israeli Defense Ministry at the beginning of last year has been replaced by a new spirit of practical cooperation to implement the provisions of the agreement on strategic and political cooperation that was reached last November.
 - d. While the current era of good feeling in American-Israeli relations may in part be attributable to the fact that this is an election year, I believe it also reflects a more realistic assessment by the Reagan Administration of the harsh realities in the Middle East. Having been humiliated by the Syrians, who effectively sabotaged the American-brokered May 17, 1983 Lebanese-Israeli Agreement, Secretary of State Shultz is not likely to again put his prestige on the line unless there are clear signs that Syria favors American mediation of any new agreement concerning withdrawal of forces from Lebanon. Although President Reagan recently reaffirmed his commitment to the September 1, 1982 Middle East peace initiative that bears his name, the Administration is not likely to make a major push to implement it in the immediate future. The Palestinian movement is today more fragmented

than ever, the Syrians are denouncing the Jordanian-Egyptian rapprochement, the Iran-Iraq war remains stalemated, and in view of Israel's preoccupation with handling the economic crisis and arranging a safe withdrawal from Lebanon, it would be both imprudent and counterproductive for Washington to expect Israel's ideologically split national unity government to make major concessions in the absence of a clear offer of peace from the Arab side.

- II. There are, however, potential storm clouds brewing that may presage stormy days ahead in American-Israeli relations. The following are some of the issues on the horizon that we will have to watch closely and devise strategies to counteract their harmful effects:
 - a. The immense U.S. budget deficit is already causing budget cuts and much speculation as to what kinds of new taxes are likely to be called for by the American administration following the elections. Foreign aid is never popular and at a time of shrinking domestic budgets there will be increasing opposition to foreign aid. Arab American spokesmen such as James Zogby, co-founder of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, have long opposed generous American aid to Israel. In a recent article Mr. Zogby argued that rather than bail Israel out of its economic difficulties, "Congress and the president should bawl Israel out instead." There is likely to be growing sentiment for cutting foreign aid in order to increase spending for domestic social programs.
 - b. I believe we can most effectively answer the argument that charity should begin at home by pointing out that aid to Israel should not be regarded as charity, but as an investment in America's goal of strengthening international peace and security. In the war-torn, fanatical Middle East Israel stands firmly with the United States as a bastion of freedom and democracy.
 - 1. American aid to Israel represents less than 1 percent of the U.S. defense budget and only about 2 percent of what the U.S. spends annually on the defense of our European NATO allies. And as Premier Peres stressed at a meeting with reporters in New York on October 10, unlike NATO Israel has never asked for American armed forces to be stationed on its soil. He reiterated that Israel would continue to defend itself solely with its own personnel.
 - 2. All Israel seeks is financial help in meeting Israel's colossal defense burden, which takes one-third of the country's gross national product. As an example of the escalating cost of weaponry, Peres noted that in 1974 Israel purchased U.S. Phantom jets at a cost of \$4 million each; the F-15's and F-16's Israel is now purchasing to replace the Phantoms cost about \$40 million per

plane. Meanwhile the Arab states, benefitting from the 15-fold increase in oil prices from 1974 to 1983, have been purchasing massive quantities of arms. Saudi Arabian arms purchases in 1982 alone exceeded Israel's entire GNP.

- 3. U.S. support for a secure Israel helped to bring Egypt to the peace table. Steadfast American support for a viable and defensible Israel may finally convince other Arab states to respond to Israel's repeated offers of peace.
- c. One should also point out that the U.S.-Israel relationship is a two-way street. The United States receives important tangible benefits from the relationship:
 - 1. Maj. Gen. George Keagan, former chief of U.S. Air Force intelligence, has noted that "for every dollar of support which this country has given to Israel, we have gotten a thousand dollars worth of benefits in return" --through access to captured Soviet equipment, Israeli technological breakthroughs, and vital intelligence information. Noting the crucial role Israel plays in U.S. global strategy to counter Soviet expansionism and to defend the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East in particular, more than 130 retired U.S. generals and admirals in March 1983 urged President Reagan to "revitalize strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel."
 - 2. The fruitful cooperation between the two countries is not limited to the field of defense. U.S. aid also helps foster joint projects in such fields as solar energy, arid zone agriculture, and biomedical research, which benefit all humanity.
 - 3. Moreover, Israel is a significant consumer of American goods and buys virtually all its arms in the U.S. Some 60,000 American jobs are created for every billion dollars of U.S. assistance to Israel, according to Peter McPherson, director of the State Department's Agency for International Development.
- d. While the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Committee is in principle a good idea since it will seek to place aid in a rational long-term framework as part of an overall economic plan, we will have to remain alert to see that this does not become an instrument for political pressure on Israel to adopt Administration policies.

- Among the American policies that are certain to arouse controversy are e. the prospective U.S. arms sales to Arab countries. In view of the recent rapprochement between Egypt and Jordan and the tentative moves by Iraq to resume relations with the United States, there will be increasing demands by these countries and Saudi Arabia that the United States provide additional sophisticated weapons to these allegedly "moderate" Arab states. The Soviet Union, long the major arms supplier to Syria, Libya, Iraq, and South Yemen, has recently concluded an arms agreement with Kuwait and has also offered arms to Jordan. The argument will no doubt be made that the U.S. should use arms sales as a means of weaning "moderate" Arab countries away from the U.S.S.R. and toward the West. The United States should insist that the litmus test for genuine moderation is the demonstrated readiness of a Middle East country to settle its disputes peacefully, including a clear readiness to make peace with Israel, as Egypt did. In the absence of an unequivocal commitment to peace, American arms sales only further fuel the fires of fanaticism in the turbulent Middle East.
- Another area in which we will have to be vigilant is the diplomatic f. arena. The Soviet Union is renewing its efforts to bring together an international conference, co-sponsored by the superpowers and with the participation of all the Arab parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Soviet "peace plan" has already received The Soviet plan is in fact a some support from Jordan and Egypt. formula for international pressure upon Israel and would bring out the more extreme Arab demands. The United States should remain firm in its position that genuine and lasting Arab-Israel peace can only be achieved through direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and each of its Arab neighbors. The United States can help to encourage and facilitate this process, as it did at Camp David. The Soviet Union will not become a fit partner in this effort unless and until its basic objectives in the Middle East undergo a fundamental transformation.

In order to monitor developments and help AJC devise appropriate strategies for the coming period, the Middle East Division of the International Relations Department will be bringing together in mid-November leading foreign policy experts for a two-day off-the-record consultation on "U.S. Policy Options After the Elections."

III. The new National Unity Government in Israel is a positive and potentially very constructive development. Among the hopeful signs are the following:

a. In marked contrast to the verbal abuse, ethnic slurs and episodes of physical violence that marked the 1981 Knesset elections, the Israeli elections this past July were conducted in a generally restrained and dignified manner. Some attribute this to the absence of a charismatic figure at the top of either the Likud or Labor Alignment. A more charitable -- and I believe more accurate -- explanation is that both Yitzhak Shamir and Shimon Peres realized that neither of them was likely to win a clear majority in the elections and that to deal

effectively with the major economic issues facing the country some measure of cooperation was indispensable. Consequently neither wished to burn his bridges by engaging in ad hominem attacks that might make post-election reconciliation impossible. There was also some concern in the major parties that rabble rousing rhetoric would increase the fragmentation within Israeli society.

- b. In recent appearances before American Jewish audiences both Peres and Shamir have stressed the historic significance of the new national unity government in Israel. While debate and disagreement have marked the Jewish experience through the ages, this has at times led to catastrophic results, including the destruction of the Temple and the ending of Jewish independence. Noting that the national unity government was not a merger but rather an amalgam in which the constituent parts retained their respective ideologies and policies, Prime Minister Peres outlined the areas in which there is broad consensus:
 - 1. The need to adopt austerity measures to deal with the economic crisis. He was hopeful that a tripartite package deal could be reached among the government, the Histradrut (labor unions) and the manufacturers to curb the price-wage spiral and achieve greater productivity. Peres also stressed that the Israeli public realized that it had to tighten its belt and that American taxpayers could not and should not be asked to underwrite the Israeli standard of living. (He did however appeal to American Jews to contribute to Israel's economic and social revitalization.)
 - 2. An eagerness to withdraw from Lebanon as soon as arrangements can be made to assure the security of Israel's northern border. Israel has given up its earlier conditions that withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon be linked to Syrian withdrawal and to the normalization of relations with Lebanon. While Israel remains concerned that the Syrians and PLO not be permitted to move into areas from which Israel withdraws, the ambitious geopolitical plans espoused by former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon have been dropped.
 - 3. Both labor and Likud remain deeply committed to peace with Israel's Arab neighbors, but the significant differences in approach on such questions as territorial compromise and settlement policy have been shelved for the time being because of the absence of "an Arab partner with whom to negotiate."

- 4. The major parties agree that something must be done to lessen fragmentation of the Israeli political system. A ministerial committee has been formed to explore options for electoral reform, either through raising the percentage of the vote required for a party to win seats in the parliament or through adoption of a constituency system of elections similar to that in the United States.
- c. There has been an overwhelming rejection of anti-democratic and racist tendencies that were reflected in the election to the Knesset of Meir Kahane, whose Kach party advocates the expulsion of the Arabs from Israel and the adoption of anti-miscegenation laws to forbid intimate relations between Arabs and Jews. It is significant that President Chaim Herzog pointedly refused to meet with Kahane as part of the series of negotations with leaders of Knesset factions, that the chief rabbis of Israel condemned Kahane's anti-Arab views as contrary to normative Jewish values, and that Israeli Jews joined with Arabs to bar Kahane's provocative visit to an Arab village.
- d. The comfortable majority that the National Unity Government enjoys in the Knesset has lessened, at least for the time being, the bargaining power of the Orthodox parties in Israel. Prime Minister Peres told the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations in New York that he had successfully resisted Orthodox demands to include within the coalition agreement a commitment to press for a change in the Law of Return to require that only those overseas conversions performed according to Halacha (Jewish religious law) would be accepted in Israel. He promised to remain firm in his commitment to his principles in this matter. Nevertheless, AJC will need to continue its educational efforts in Israel to foster a climate of respect for religious diversity and tolerance among different ethnic groups, consistent with its longstanding commitment to acceptance of pluralism within the Jewish community and advocacy of human rights for all.

NO80/IRD/el 10/22/84

Vatican's pro-Israel 'scenario' seen as trial balloon

By MARC H. TANENBAUM

Despite subsequent denials by a Vatican spokesman, the statement by a Polish archbishop in Vatican City this week favoring diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Israel appears to be a serious trial balloon.

In a carefully constructed scenario, Archbishop Andrzej Maria Deskur, former chairman of the Vatican's secretariat on social communications and a confidant of Pope John Paul II, arranged to "plant" his views supporting diplomatic ties between the Vatican

News analysis

and Israel with NBC-TV's Marvin Kalb and the New York Times. The purpose of the "trial balloon" was to get a feel of Jewish and Arab-Muslim reactions.

As demonstrated during Vatican Council II, the Vatican cannot make a friendly gesture toward Jews or Israel without taking into serious account the possibility of Arab reprisals against several hundreds of thousands of Christians in Arab and Muslim countries.

When the council was preparing its declaration condemning anti-Semitism and calling for mutual respect between Catholics and Jews, President Nasser of

Rabbi Tanenbaum, director of international relations of the American Jewish Committee, is a recognized expert on Vatican-Jewish relations. He was the only rabbi present at Vatican Council II. Egypt and Iraq signaled their displeasure by abruptly closing down Catholic schools and turning off the electricity in Catholic hospitals. Moslem Brotherhood fanatics in Egypt have burned down many Coptic churches. So any positive moves toward Israel inevitably involves Vatican authorities in a balancing act between Jews and Israel on the one hand and Arabs and Muslims on the other.

Archbishop Deskur's "leak" to the media seems to be a calculated decision of the pro-Israel faction in the Vatican to warm up the atmosphere that might lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations. Some observers assert that since October 1985 will mark the 20th anniversary of the Vatican Council's adoption of its declaration on Catholic-Jewish relations, that would be a perfect time to bring about the diplomatic ties between the Holy See and Israel.

The immediate denial of Deskur's proposal by an unnamed Vatican spokesman was described to the author as the inevitable assurance to the Arab-Muslim world that nothing dramatic would take place without taking their interests into account.

This diplomatic minuet did not materialize suddenly. A whole series of discussions on this question have taken place between the last several popes and various prime ministers and foreign ministers of Israel. Beyond that, and less well-known, during the past three years Jewish leaders have taken part in discussions with the Vatican secretariat of state on setting up a process that ultimately would culminate in formal diplomatic ties between the Holy See and Israel.



Pope John Paul II, shown with Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum at a meeting at the Vatican.

Rabbi flays 'myth' of Christian U.S.

By ELENORE LESTER

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum has denounced as "myths and lies" the idea that America was once great because it was a Christian nation.

"Spokesmen for the new Christian right who seek to Christianize America are promoting an ideologically dangerous myth for American democracy which must not go uncontested," Tanenbaum said at a ceremony honoring his 30 years of leadership improving relations between Christians and Jews.

Tanenbaum, director of international relations for the American Jewish Committee, received the fifth annual Earle B. Pleasant Interreligious Award presented by Religion in American Life. He is the first Jew to receive it.

He said that the only time any-



Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum

thing resembling a "Christian republic" existed in the U.S. was in the Massachusetts Bay Colony established in 1629.

"That colony was a Puritan theocracy which yoked together ecclesiastical and civil government," he said.

"As every major church historian acknowledges, the Puritan oligarchy sought religious toleration for themselves but did not believe in religious toleration for others. That 'Christian republic' collapsed after about 60 years when dissenters such as Roger Williams fled persecution in order to find freedom of conscience."

Tanenbaum went on to note that, according to a major church historian, "the great majority of Americans in the 18th century were outside any church, and there was an overwhelming indifference to religion."

He added: "As a result of the vast labor and the rough, uncouth hardships encountered by the pioneers, frontier communities became coarse and partially wild societies, with little or no social restraints and filled with low vices and brutal pleasures."

Tanenbaum also said the writings of such Founding Fathers as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison did not indicate that they perceived America as a "Christian republic."

He also denounced as myths the notion that the country was once more religious and moral than it is today.

"In the 17th and 18th centuries, no more than 10 percent of the population was affiliated with churches and synagogues," he said. "America today is far more religious and moral, and that has taken place because of an atmosphere of freedom of conscience and voluntary commitment to religion.

"The campaign by some members of the new Christian right to elect only born-again Christians to public office is anathema to everything America stands for. It violates Article Six of the U.S. Constitution, which forbids the exercise of a religious test for any citizen running for public office."

The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

October 31, 1984

TO: Members of the Board of Governors

FROM: Theodore Ellenoff, Chair

RE: ADDITIONAL NEWS ABOUT THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS INSTITUTE IN ISRAEL -

FEBRUARY 1-10, 1985 -- DELEGATIONS - FEBRUARY 10-14, 1985

YOUR PROMPT REPLY IS REQUESTED

Enclosed you will find the tentative agenda for the 1985 Board of Governors Institute in Israel. The program was conceived to give AJC an opportunity to convey our basic philosophical premises regarding the viability and significance of Jewish life in the U.S. and the nature of American Jewish-Israeli relations. It will also enable us to reexamine our role in Israel, to assert a higher political presence there and to inaugurate new program initiatives in areas such as intergroup relations and religious pluralism. We also hope that this particular visit will enhance a broader understanding in Israel of our activities in general.

The tentative agenda is based on your input and suggestions, the deliberations of the Planning Committee and the recommendations of the professional staff. Some of its basic features are: a thematic development of the daily itinerary which includes discussions with experts, field trips, and examination of the implications for AJC; dialogues featuring AJC leaders; and meetings in small groups to allow for a meaningful involvement and broader participation. As always, our Institutes in Israel are very demanding as they have to satisfy many organizational needs. We tried, therefore, to cut unnecessary travel from city to city, and since most of the participants have been to Israel numerous times, we were able to minimize the touring aspect of the visit. All of the first-timers are going to participate in a pre-Institute program which is designed especially to suit their needs.

In preparation for the trip, we have enclosed a "Suggested Bibliography on Israel," "Israelis & American Jews: Toward a Meaningful Dialogue," "Jewish Nationalism & Jewish Peoplehood," and "Intergroup Relations Practice In Israel," all of which are in the enclosed binder, which you may want to use to store the material we will be forwarding to you in the coming months.

We know from past experience that many of the Israelis with whom we will be meeting will benefit from biographical data on every member of our group, we would therefore, appreciate it if you would fill out the enclosed bio form (a separate one for each person, please) and return it to us as soon as possible.

...more

HOWARD I. FRIEDMAN, President . DAVID M. GORDIS, Executive Vice-President THEODORE ELLENOFF, Chair, Board of Governors ALFRED H. MOSES, Chair, National Executive Council ROBERT S. JACOBS, Chair, Board of Trustees SHIRLEY M. SZABAD, Secretary EDWARD E. ELSON, Treasurer . EMILY W. SUNSTEIN. Associate Treasurer RITA E. HAUSER, Chair, Executive Committee Honorary Presidents: MORRIS B. ABRAM, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, PHILIP E. HOFFMAN, RICHARD MAASS, ELMER L. WINTER, MAYNARD I. WISHNER Honorary Vice-Presidents: NATHAN APPLEMAN. MARTIN GANG, RUTH R. GODDARD, ANDREW GOODMAN, RAYMOND F. KRAVIS, JAMES MARSHALL, WILLIAM ROSENWALD MAX M. FISHER, Honorary Chair, National Executive Council Executive Vice-Presidents Emeriti: JOHN SLAWSON, BERTRAM H. GOLD Vice-Presidents: NORMAN E. ALEXANDER, Westchester: RICHARD J. FOX, Philadelphia; HOWARD A. GILBERT, Chicago: ALAN C. GREENBERG, New York; ROBERT H. HAINES, New York: CHARLOTTE G. HOLSTEIN, Syracuse; ROBERT L. PELZ, Westchester; IDELLE RABIN, Dallas; GORDON S. ROSENBLUM, Denver DAVID F. SQUIRE, Boston; RICHARD L. WEISS, Los Angeles .

We assume that by now Unitours New York, the travel service for the Institute, has been in touch with you re your special travel requests. Please don't hesitate to contact Nancy Merjos, Board Services Coordinator or Susan Marens at Unitours, outside of New York State (800) 223-1780 or (212) 949-9500, Ext. 528, for any further assistance. A deposit of \$500 per person is required at this time to confirm your hotel and flight arrangements. An additional \$500 per person will be required no later than December 1, 1984 and the balance on January 1, 1985.* Payments will be refunded in full if trip is cancelled at least 30 days before departure. In the event of cancellation less than 30 days before departure, refunds will be subject to any fees imposed by the airlines and hotels involved.

Also, please check your passport \underline{now} to be sure that it will be valid for travel in January 1985, and apply for another passport immediately if necessary.

Delegations to Europe

Our International Relations Department has contacted government officials, U.S representatives and the Jewish communities in each of the countries we will be visiting. We will send you details of the itineraries as soon as we are in the position to do so. In the meantime, please be advised that those traveling to Hungary will need a visa. The necessary forms will be sent to you on receipt of your deposit. The delegations will stay at the Forum Hotel in Budapest, the Excelsior Hotel in Rome and the Princessa Hotel in Madrid.

Further information with specific details about the program in Israel and Europe will be available in the coming weeks along with information on climate clothing, etc.

If you need any additional information re the program, please get in touch with Shula Bahat. Director of the Leadership and Board Services Division.

I look forward to your participation in this unique Institute in Israel and Europe and to your comments on the tentative program.

TE/br Enclosures 84-100-222

P.S. Those of you who have not yet registered will find enclosed only the tentative agenda. We have just mailed to you an additional participant information form. If you plan to join us please return it to us as soon as possible.

*Bills will be mailed to you sometime in December.

FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

AJC NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING Chicago, Illinois November 2, 1984

DRAFT

STATEMENT ON ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

- The establishment of a broadly-based government of national unity in Israel
- 2. which transcends ideological differences, has opened up new opportunities for
- 3. Israel's leaders to take the difficult steps necessary to deal effectively with
- 4. the urgent economic, security and social issues facing the country.
- 5. We note the National Unity Government's positive efforts to bring about a
- 6. withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Lebanon as soon as measures can be arranged to
- 7. assure the security of Israel's northern border. We applaud Israel's renewed
- 8. offers to talk peace with all its Arab neighbors.
- 9. As the Board of Governors stated in its message to Israel's new leaders in
- 10. September, "the American Jewish Committee pledges to continue its activities to
- 11. maintain and strengthen steadfast United States governmental and popular support
- 12. for Israel's efforts to attain economic self-sufficiency and to achieve a secure
- 13. and lasting peace with its Arab neighbors. Through our offices in Jerusalem and
- 14. the United States, we intend to intensify our activities to help reinforce the
- 15. pluralistic nature of Israel's democratic society, and to deepen mutual under-
- 16. standing between American Jews and Israelis."
- 17. In addition, the National Executive Council acknowledges with gratification
- 18. the excellent current state of relations between the United States and Israel.
- 19. These strengthened ties are not only mutually beneficial but help to advance the
- cause of freedom and democracy.

We welcome the overwhelming bipartisan Congressional support for the
 creation of a U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area, which will help put the commercial
 relations between the two countries on a sound economic basis. We also note
 with appreciation that in recognition of Israel's exceptional economic hardships
 the Congress agreed for the first time that all the U.S. economic and military
 aid to Israel be given in the form of grants.

7. We regard as significant the severe austerity measures adopted by the new 8. government and Prime Minister Shimon Peres' statement that the Israeli Governge 9. ment does not seek American aid to preserve Israel's standard of living, but 10. only to help maintain its defense. We believe additional aid requests by Israel 11. should be considered favorably by the new Congress and the next Administration. 12. Israel needs this assistance to help maintain an adequate defense capability in 13. the face of hostile neighbors.

14. We are convinced that aid to Israel greatly benefits U.S. interests. In the war-torn and increasingly fanatical Middle East, Israel stands firmly with 15. the United States as a bastion of freedom and democracy. Aid to Israel thus 16. should be regarded as an investment in international peace and security. 17. American military experts have pointed out that while aid to Israel represents 18. only one percent of our defense budget, the United States has received invalu-19. able strategic assistance from Israel in terms of access to captured Soviet 20. equipment, Israeli technological breakthroughs and vital intelligence informa-21. tion. Moreover, Israel is a significant consumer of American goods. For every 22. billion dollars in assistance extended to Israel, some 60,000 jobs are created 24. in the U.S.

A strong U.S.-Israel relationship has also been helpful in bringing about

2. progress toward resolving the Arab-Israel conflict. American support for a

3. secure Israel helped bring Egypt to the peace table and has contributed to more

4. than five years of peaceful Egypt-Israel relations.,

5. We are, however, disturbed by the continued negative and rejectionist

6. policies of other Arab states toward the State of Israel. The recent example of

7. King Hussein's peremptory and categorical rejection of the National Unity

8. Government's offer to engage in direct, unconditional peace talks clearly

9. demonstrates once again that the refusal of Arab countries, other than Egypt, to

10. recognize and negotiate with Israel remains the major impediment to moving the

11. stalled peace process forward. We hope that steadfast American support for a

12. viable and defensible Israel will finally convince other Arab states to respond

13. positively to Israel's repeated offers of peace.

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date November 25, 1984

to Shula Bahat

from M. Bernard Resnikoff

subject Board of Governors Institute (BOG 85-13)

The Israel office is open on Thanksgiving Day. It turned out to be a good day for Yaacov and me to go through every scrap of paper in the file and find out exactly where we stand as of that day. We also went through every piece of paper in the 1980 file and are suggesting you do the same to help us both see the dimensions of the problems before us.

In any case, as a result of our deliberations, I set forth before you two kinds of agendas. The first, called "Old Business", represents a series of questions, unanswered comments and the like appearing in our previous correspondence. We here should be grateful if you got your staff to do the same to check on us. The second agenda, called "New Business", refers to items uncovered as we did our "run-through".

OLD BUSINESS

1. There needs to be an official representation to Zalman Abramov concerning making him our guest of honor. In that connection, I raised a question about honoring both him and Sam Lewis, and you said, "it's perfectly okay". Perhaps it is. But I must tell you that some Israelis here with whom I consulted think it just a little bit strange for Americans to come to Israel to honor a fellow American. This, they claim, is better done in the U.S., saving the visit here to honor Israelis.

Think about it and let me know.

Meanwhile, I remind you that Zalman will be in the national office the first week of December, when this should be nailed down.

- 2. You have not yet responded to my memorandum in which I raised questions about how to record the sessions.
- 3. We discussed and did not agree on what staff needs would be required to prepare for the program in advance. You thought that Yaacov, even on a part-time basis, would be enough, and you felt that he should lead the "Generations" program. We did not discuss January at all, although I will put in a pitch for him that he is indispensable at that time. In any event, you said you would check my position and get back to me. For myself, I am prepared to wait until I find out what decision is made about how we use Rogov.

Meanwhile, I would bring to your attention the three-page memorandum we wrote Selma Hirsh on January 8, 1980 as an example of the kind of maximum involvement on the part of staff in planning in advance for the institute. This kind of preparation is no longer available to this office if you pull out Yaacov, keeping in mind that we do not have available to us the kind of assistance I got from Leah Spector who, in 1980, was a full-time person.

- 4. We await your decision on public relations and what pieces are to be picked up by a professional consultant.
- 5. I have already written you about the printed cover to our program and I say, finally, unless I hear from you to the contrary, we are going ahead with the one shown you when you were here.
- 6. We asked for and have not yet received a copy of the contract or at least the specifications of the services the travel agency has committed to us.
- 7. I haven't yet heard whether you got the Israel Ambassador or the New York Consul to write the Foreign Office to offer help to us.

- 8. I raised the question with you about a news release to be distributed upon arrival. I suppose this will wait for Rogov.
- 9. I had asked whether the printed program might include the tour for the First-Timers, as well as the institute sessions on January 31. I need answers to that as well.
- 10. We exchanged views about kits and you sent me samples of what was already distributed. But take a look at the 1980 file in the national office. You will find that George Gruen prepared at least four backgrounders in connection with issues to be explored at that time, as well as relevant copies of Israel office reports, not to speak of reprints.
- 11. We spoke about luggage tags, even though each institute member would have to claim his own luggage. What I said was that the tags would be useful as a way for porters to identify our property.
- 12. Amoz Oz will not be in the country, so Hulda is out. We here will work on a comparable kibbutz experience, geographically accessible, or a similar intellectual experience.
- 13. Regarding the cocktail party, assuming we can find time for a cocktail party for VIPs other than the ones we are meeting, I ask for guidelines about the quality desired: posh or spartan?

NEW BUSINESS

- 1. In the sample copies of memoranda to the Board that you sent me, I see no reference to health insurance or baggage insurance. Would you not want to do this again?
- 2. If you check the 1980 file, you will find that the late Lee Billig prepared and brought with her many copies of the Board Institute Membership List, arranged in alphabetical order and double-spaced. This turned out to be an enormously useful device for the purposes of bus assignments, workshop allocations, check-off lists for this or that, assignments and so forth. I suggest you do the same. Alternatively, you can send me one clean copy in advance and we will duplicate them here, so long as you send us this material well in advance.

3. In another turn at the Tentative Agenda, this time concentrating on names, we came across a problem that needs resolution. "Israel's Political Landscape" and "The Middle East Conflict" could suggest overlap. Ditto "Israel's Social Challenges" and "Religious Pluralism". Again, "The Mood and Challenges of Israeli Society" and "Israel's Social Challenges". Finally we have "Inter-group Relations: the American and Israeli Experience" and "American Jews and Israelis: what divides us and what connects us". While we here can easily figure out what you folks are thinking, I don't want to take any chances, and certainly not with the speakers we are approaching on your behalf. We have a suggestion on how to handle it.

George Gruen provided this service back in 1980 and he is very good at it. For each theme, for each formal session, there should be prepared for us well in advance a series of three or four questions to be answered within that rubric, that we can give to the speaker as a guide for the task definition. We strongly recommend this procedure in order to avoid the danger of repetition.

Aside from the "stars" you designated in our last telephonic review of the program on a day-by-day basis, we are going to feel free here to make substitutions for panel discussion leaders and the like without consultation -- only because of time; unless you advise us otherwise.

- 4. We are getting negative feedback on the outline for the Peace session on the evening of February 5. The argument is that, if we want perspective, let's not deal exclusively with formal peace organizations but with others as well who also want peace but think their way is better. We here recommend a spectrum rather than a full array of "Peace Now"-type people.
- 5. On a number of occasions, our Board is split up into a number of sub-groups. This is perfectly fine and this is the way I would have it. The question is, when we would know how many Board members are attending each workshop. For example, if you look at February 8, we already have an inquiry as to how many people might be expected at Ben-Gurion University and they are asking not merely because of luncheon arrangements but for other reasons as well.

Are you planning to solicit workshop and panel discussions in advance? If so, please keep in mind that we will need a fairly equal distribution among the 100 people among the options available. To take a scary example: With a 100 or so people coming, it would be disastrous if only ten people showed up for the Minister of Defense on February 8.

6. On the meeting with Knesset members on February 6, I have checked this out and I think it would be virtually impossible for Knesset members to stay put in different locations to receive rotating delegations of Board members. I just don't think it would work. The most we could hope for is to distribute the Board fairly evenly among the different Knesset members for more effective and small-group discussions with the Knesset member of their choice.

Of one thing you can be sure, there will be more to follow.

cc: Marc Tanenbaum/George Gruen

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date November 28, 1984

from Shula Bahat
M. Bernard Resnikoff

subject Board of Governors Institute (BOG 85-14)

Miscellaneous Items

- l. For your interest and appropriate action, I now enclose a two-page letter dated November 17 from Sarah Gilead, the travel agent from Spain about whom I wrote you previously. I am also attaching the two suggested itineraries for your consideration. These itineraries were based not on any information I could give her (which I haven't) but are merely suggestions on her part. What you do about this is your own affair but I would appreciate being kept informed.
- I have been advised by my mole in the office of the President that a meeting on a Saturday night in the Residence of the President is absolutely out of the question. Meeting with him at the King David Hotel is highly unlikely -- given the fact that the President is almost never in Jerusalem over the Sabbath "weekend". Add to this the alleged distaste that the President has for such kind of meetings, I am told, and we are left with a whole series of question marks. He has not yet responded to our initial overture. At the present time, I would guess that Saturday night, February 2, is out for the President, that we will meet him some other time, and that we will have to make some kind of substitute for that evening. I will keep working on it.
- itinerary for "First-Timers". It wasn't bad. But I am writing at this time to tell you that such a tentative itinerary was prepared by Yaacov and was sent to you by FAX yesterday, November 27, i.e., simultaneously. Both our offices have so much to do that it would be a shame if we duplicate each other's efforts. If you recall, you explicitly and (I might add) quite naturally, asked Yaacov to develop such a tentative itinerary. Shula, you always take off at the crack of a gun. But why should you jump the gun?

Regards.

cc: Marc Tanenbaum/George Gruen

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
Ohio-Kentucky Area
Cleveland Chapter
625 Hanna Building
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
(216) 781-6035

Date:_	December 10, 1984
To:	Marc Tanenbaum
From:_	Ellen Vendeland
7	For your information
Ð.	For approval
_	Per your request
· -	Please handle
<u> </u>	Your comments please
REMARK	S:

Ven Deceller 12/8/84

U.S. is Jews' homeland, rabbi asserts

By GEORGE W. CORNELL

AP RELIGION WRITER

"Next year, in Jerusalem." It's an old dream of the scattered faithful of Judaism, that someday, in bright fulfillment, they all would again be gathered in their spiritual homeland of Israel. But the goal has altered for many in America.

The change often is pondered in Jewish circles, discussed and debated, but rarely voiced explicitly and publicly — something that Rabbi David M. Gordis of the American Jewish Committee has put in forthright terms.

"This is our home," he told the organization's recent executive council meeting in Chicago, adding that American Jewry now should also be seen as an enduring center of the faith in "equal partnership" with Israel.

He said "the time has come" to assert "that we are part of a proud and self-confident Jewish community that can, and will, survive creatively in this country, in a constructive and mutually enhancing partnership with Israel."

This runs counter to the classical idea of Zionism that, with the establishment of Israel, the "diaspora" — the Jews dispersed around the world — would gradually all return to Israel, he noted, adding:

"It is now clear that this will not happen."

While American Jews may encourage "aliya," or return, he said they

need to recognize that it's not an inclusive aspiration in this country, nor a broadly realistic expectation.

"There will be no mass shifts of Jewish population to Israel, except from countries where Jews face grave danger or severe and ongoing discrimination," he said, emphasizing that this is not the case in the United States.

Other Jewish scholars also say a growing reassessment of Zionism has gone on in American Jewish thought, a shift in attitudes about it, despite continued strong emotional ties to the biblical homeland.

"Ideology has undergone a transformation, a fundamental change," said Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, the committee's international affairs director. Instead of the classical ideal of an "ingathering of the exiles," he said, "we've come to see America as our home, a land of liberty, justice and fulfillment."

The United States has about 6 million Jews, compared to about 4 million in Israel.

Gordis, a Talmudic scholar, former vice president of the Jewish Seminary in Los Angeles and recently named the committee's executive vice president, said:

"We may accept a central role for Israel in Jewish life, but we reject totally the principle that because we do not live in Israel we are only peripheral to Jewish life."

Citing "mutually respectful" exchanges in educational, cultural and political life, he said:

"Israel may safely predicate its viability and its future on American Jewry's strong and continued support, but not on the disintegration of American Jewish life," he said.

"Israel must not be built on the ruins of American Jewry."

Classical Zionism sees "diaspora Judaism" — the scattered flock — as "historically irrelevant" at best, and "at worst, a destructive aberration," Gordis said.

"There are many in Israel, and some in this country as well, who still believe this. But there are many all over the world who challenge this assumption. .. We will continue to feel strongly and personally Israel's anguish and triumphs. But this is our home."

Another Zionist assumption that requires "rethinking," he said, is the "expectation that creation of a Jewish state would bring about a 'normalization' of the Jewish people."

Gordis said "I, myself, have serious doubts that there is such a thing as a 'normal people.' But even if there is, I'm quite sure we Jews do not fit the bill. We defy all the usual sociological characterizations.

"We are a universal people and a nationality; we are a faith an an ethnic community; and the relationship between the state of Israel and world Jewry is an essential element of Jewish uniqueness and, if you will, our abnormality.

"Given all of these 'aberrations,' I see no normalization in sight, nor do I crave it."

In regard to Judaism's firm and permanent establishment in the United States, he said "Jews occupy a prominent position in American political, social and economic life. Our voices are heard in the corridors of power, nationally and locally."

While pockets of anti-Semitism persist, he said conditions for Jews have changed and "we Jews are no longer powerless, in this country or elsewhere." However, "many of us continue to see the Jew primarily as victim, and the worldwide Jewish agenda as primarily defensive," he said.

"I suggest the time has come to see ourselves more realistically — to recognize not only our vulnerabilities but also our ability to affect our present and influence our future."

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date December 11, 1984

10 Marc H. Tanenbaum

from David A.HHarris

subject Board Institute in Israel

Elmer Winter dropped by and again urged that the question of the Israel economy be given more attention during the Board Institute, or that, at the very least, a core group of 6-8 Board members be formed to pursue serious discussion with key Israeli government and private sector figures on the economy, investment and U.S. aid. He also felt it would be useful for several of the Board members to spend a day in Washington prior to departure, being briefed at the State Department and in Congress on the outlook for an expanded U.S. aid package, to be better prepared for discussions in Israel.

DAH: RPR

cc: Shula Bahat

December 18, 1984

Executive Mission

December 1984

SCHEDULE OF APPOINTMENTS

(Unless otherwise indicated, all appointments are at the Sheraton Hotel.)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 17

10:00	a.m.	Depart for Prime Minister's office	
10:30	a.m.	Meeting with Prime Minister Shimon Per	es
12:30	p.m.	Privately-scheduled luncheon appointme	nt
3:00	p.m.	Hanoch Smith	
4:30	p.m.	Sam Halpern	
6:00	p.m.	Chaim Rosenbloom	
7:30	p.m.	Dinner meeting with Rose Bernstein of the American Embassy	

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18

8:00 a	.m.	Breakfast meeting with Hanon Bar-On, Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
9:30 a		Yitzhak Rogow Nitza Shapiro-Libai, Prime Minister's Office Room 375	
11:30 a	.m.	Shmuel Hollander	
12:30 p	o.m.	Malak Tabori	
2:00 p	o.m	H.F., D.G and W.T. to meet with Rabbi Richard Hirsch, at Hebrew Union College, 13 King David Street	
4:00 p	o.m. (H.F. and W.T. to meet Mr. and Mrs. Littman	
4:30 p	o.m.	D.G. to meet Prof. Moshe Davis at his home, 14 Balfour Street	

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19

9:30	a.m.	Moshe Pollack, of Ambassa Investment Ltd., followed if desired		
11:00	a.m.	Dr. Hertzl Fishman		
12:30	p.m.	David Shacham	:	
2:00	p.m.	Anglo-Saxon Realty		
5:00	p.m.	Ambassador Samuel Lewis,	at Embas	sv i

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date December 19, 1984

to Shula Bahat

from M. Bernard Resnikoff

subject Board of Governors Institute

BOG 85-20 (Meeting with Yitzhak Rogow)

In this memo I want to report to you the substance of the agreements reached when the executive staff met with Yitzhak Rogow and his staff on December 18.

- 1. It was agreed that there would be created a pre-Institute press release highlighting the program content. In discussing how this would be done and by whom it was agreed that a preliminary news release would be submitted by Mort Yarmon, to reach this country no later than January 20, which would give us time both to add local color to the basic content and to translate it into Hebrew. Rogow stressed that he wanted some quotes. Dave made a note of this minute and I believe he will communicate this to Mort; however, perhaps you will follow it up
- 2. An advance group is scheduled to arrive January 31, including, I believe, Howard, Dave, Stuart Eisenstadt, and others (probably Al Moses and Ted Ellenoff. For this group arrival, we will order the VIP room for a short, quick but necessary interview by ITIM to highlight the arrival. For this event we will need the following:
 - a. A list of those arriving;
 - b. Flight arrival details;
- c. A separate biographical statement for Stuart which, I imagine, will not be included in the Board of Governors' bios;
- d. An understanding at your end to indicate to those arriving that the only two people to be interviewed will be Howard (for the Board) and Stu (for the Institute).
- 3. Rogow needs to know no later than mid-January whether or not we want a press conference. Whether or not we want it, he said and we all know, depends on whether or not we can produce something reportable that will attract attention as well as space.

Shula Bahat December 19, 1984 Page Two.

- 4. Rogow is asking for about 50 copies of suitable material for distribution to the press. I have in those quantities things such as "The American Jewish Committee -- an Inside Look" and "What If ...?" and "This is the American Jewish Committee". If there is something else, updated or more appropriate for distribution to the press, please rush such 50 either via Yehuda Rosenman (who will be here next week) or via air freight.
- We need to designate an Institute spokesman.
- 6. Open authorization was given to provide press photography; it is recognized that this is a cost item. It will be monitored but it was authorized.
- 7. I previously requested and this committee confirmed that you should bring with you one or more rostrum AJC bunting covers. In addition, Rogow was authorized to strike up logo bunting to include our name in Hebrew.
- 8. Here is another thing that is abecedarian but which Rogow stressed. It would be a good thing if, simultaneous with the arrival of the VIP group on January 31 or the opening of the Institute itself, it could be released at the same time an important announcement, the results of an important study, revelation of fresh findings, a stirring program about fresh ways to help the ailing Israel economy, or whatnot. Dave made a note of this as well but it would seem to me a good idea to comb the departments to see what might be coming up and to try to time the study or the announcement or the finding to coincide with the January 31 release date.

CC: Marc Tanenbaum/George Gruen

9. P.S. - In a subsequent, quick consultation with Dave, he suggested printing for the closing banquet a graceful but inexpensive brochure on colored stock with a simple fold containing a photo and paragraph about each of our two honorees plus the banquet program itself. With the staff and production resources of the national office, this is probably best handled at your end. I will get and forward bios and pictures of Sam and Zalman.

	THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 165 E. 56th St., New York, N. Y. 10022
	DATE: Jen 4 84
	FROM: RABBI MARC H. TANENBAUM
	TO: Dans Gordis
	Please circulate to:
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	For approval AN JEWISH
	V For your information
	Please handle
	Read and return
	Returned as requested
	Please telephone me
	Your comments, please

Remarks:

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date December 21, 1984

Marc Tanenbaum/David Harris

from M. Bernard Resnikoff

subject New office

As you know, Howard Friedman and David Gordis saw a number of facilities here as possible sites for our new location.

I understand that the process of such selection will take time. Still, I want to point out to you that our lease here expires on March 31, 1985.

To be sure, the lease can be extended. Yet, because of our contract with the school, I woudn't be surprised if we lose our subtenant, nor would I be surprised if our landlord, knowing that we are no longer a long-term tenant, jacks up the price indecently.

This is not sufficient cause to take short-cuts in making the decision but I thought you should have these facts.

MM

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date December 21, 1984

to Shula Bahat

from M. Bernard Resnikoff

subject Board of Governors Institute (BOG 85-21)

By this time, information requested, advice sought, and requested instructions are well overdue -- by your own deadline. I always thought that your well-established reputation for efficiency was blessed with a pinch of "yekke-ism".

Seriously, Shula, we are now being held up and cannot move further in certain areas without answers to all outstanding questions before you. Please respond promptly by FAX with respect to all outstanding questions.

While I am writing, I want to bring up additional matters at this time:

- 1. Printing takes a long time in this country and I want to place an order now for printing the invitation to the February 9 cocktail party. What kind of text do you prefer? Something like, "You are cordially invited to a cocktail party on the occasion of the American Jewish Committee's Board of Governors Institute in Israel"? Or, "Howard Friedman, President of the American Jewish Committee, invites you to a cocktail party on the occasion of ..."?
 Better yet, why don't you FAX to me the desired text and I will add here the "Regrets only" or customary text.
- 2. This idea came to me last night when former ambassador to the U.S. Eliahu Eilat called me at home. It grabbed me but it was also a little bit kitchy. But, come to think of it, don't you have a number of daises at your annual meeting? The idea is this -- that at our festive banquet we have a separate dais reserved for all the available former Israel ambassadors to the United States; offhand, I can think of four. This seems to me to be an intriguing idea that all these ambassadors are present, at a table of distinction, as we choose to honor Sam Lewis. Why don't you put this idea on a poster and have a sandwich man stalk up and down the eighth floor and see if anyone sits up to take notice.

c: Marc Tanenbaym/George Gruen

Mak

DEC 28 1984

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date

December 23, 1984

to

Shula Bahat

from

M. Bernard Resnikoff

subject

Board of Governors Institute

BOG 85-23

In this memo I am responding to your December 21 FAX memo. For purposes of control, I will not introduce any new questions in this memorandum; it is only a response to the items you mention in your memo. I was glad to receive that memo and thank you for all the information you gave me, but, frankly, I was hoping for many more definitive answers. But, you can do what you can and no more.

- 1. Regarding the Bio Digest, I note with regret that the December 14 deadline could not be kept and you now offer a new deadline of January 1. Our problem with this is that speakers are asking who their audiences are and I have been stalling them all along. Now I have to stall them some more.
- 2. Regarding PR, see my separate memo on the subject (BOG 85-20, dated December 19th) after the executive staff and local staff met with Yitzhak Rogow. React to this special report at your pleasure.
- 3. I note that I will be hearing from you after December 24 regarding AJC recommendations to the international business task force.
- 4. On the February 6 meeting with Abba Eban, I will see what I can do. But you should know that, time being a conditioning factor, I doubt very much that it will be possible to have two Knesset members speaking one after another, giving each the minimum time he deserves, and still accomplish everything in an allotted time. I have an alternate suggestion: forget Olmert and, instead, prime one or two Board members to respond to the Eban presentation. This is one of the ways we can intensify the interactional process.
- 5. About the <u>ISEF</u>, the answer is "no", the local people were not in touch with me. I am well familiar with the organization and their representatives. I have said to my colleagues in my department and I now say to you that while this is a perfectly fine program, this is one

Shula Bahat December 23, 1984 Page Two.

of many, and I have never understood why AJC national gives them so much attention. I know they were a favorite of Abe Karlikow's, and with good reason, but this is not necessarily a good reason why we should take out a piece of the day and turn it over exclusively to them and their project. Nina Weiner is a dynamo when it comes to promotion but that is not a good enough reason to single it out for that much attention. Besides, that program unit is pretty well tied up.

- I understand and agree that a final decision cannot be made until you have a final itinerary. But please remember this. Israel being what it is, the final itinerary may not be ready until much too late for other things to happen. I urge you to work on an earlier draft which could be final and making decisions on that basis, leaving open the possibility of changes at the last minute.
- Meals at other hotels -- I will explain the advantage of scheduling meals at other hotels. I take your point and agree that when we are at the hotel and a meal is scheduled, that we have the meal at the King David, for convenience, to avoid going out in bad weather, and to keep hotel rooms convenient for guests. On the other hand, if we are out in the field and have a meal scheduled, instead of coming back to our hotel for a meal, I would see us going to another hotel if only for a change of location and, above all, a change in menu. I mentioned this to Dave and Marc and they seemed to agree. I have no vested interest in this matter, only suggesting variety. You had better FAX me back on this one particular point, at least, because I am setting up all my reservations this week. As a matter of fact, I have a preliminary conference on the subject today, December 23, and I therefore suggest a FAX reply in a day or two.



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 165 E. 56 St., New York, NY 10022

DATE:	9/14
FROM:	DAVID A. HARRIS
TO:	KENNETH BANDLER
	DAVID GELLER
	GEORGE GRUEN
	ALLAN KAGEDAN
0	JACOB KOVADLOFF
- 19	SIDNEY LISKOFSKY
	MARC TANENBAUM
	For approval V E S
1	For your information
	Please handle
	Read and return
	Returned as requested
	Please telephone me
	Your comments, please.
48	104

REMARKS: MARC-

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publication?

Winter 1984

30 King David Street, Jerusalem, Israel 94101 Tel: 02-0224844

Director: Harry Wall

Assistant Director and Editor: Roberta Fahn Reisman

Owing to the central role Israel plays in the activities of the ADL, the Israel office was established by the National Commission of the ADL in 1977. As a result, over the past six years closer ties have been fashioned between the ADL with the State and people of Israel. The ADL-Israel office, part of the International Affairs Division under the direction of Abraham H. Foxman, Associate National Director, serves primarily as a resource for obtaining-and conveying-information-on various issues to the national office and, through it, to the regional offices and the broader ADL constituency. Conversely, the Jerusalem office helps to keep various Israeli parties informed about events in the United States and other countries where the ADL is active. The Israel office maintains regular and frequent contacts with government ministries and officials, Knesset members and other key figures. We also keep in close and regular contact with the American Embassy on issues and activities of mutual concern. Others with

whom we have established close ties include members of the Israel and foreign press corps, the Jewish Agency, and representatives of the academic and interfaith communities. We have also created the "Israel Friends of ADL", an association representing the broad spectrum of Israeli life. Finally, the ADL-Israel office plays a key role in promoting a better understanding of Israel abroad and helping to interpret the complex issues of the Middle East. It does this in a number of different ways: through background papers on controversial matters, by assisting in the production of films, audio-visual programs, and publications; and by facilitating the visits of influential opinion-moulders to Israel and other countries.

The JERUSALEM REPORT is intended to apprise our many friends abroad of the work of the ADL-Israel office. It will also serve as a format to provide insight on some of the issues concerning Israel and the Middle East. We hope you will enjoy reading it.

EDITORIAL CARTOONISTS IN ISRAEL

For seven days in November, five U.S. editorial cartoonists and their wives toured Israel on a special study mission organized by the ADL Israel Office and Ya'akov Kirschen, creator of "Dry Bones" in the Jerusalem Post. Jules Feiffer, David Levine, Paul Rigby, Steve Benson, and Steve Kelley participated in the program, all visiting Israel for the first time.

As part of ADL's ongoing study of the media in relation to Israel, particularly during the Lebanese War, an in-depth report was prepared earlier this year by Gerald Baumgarten of ADL's Research Dept. entitled "Political Cartoons on the Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Insensitivity to Anti-Semitism." The analysis concluded that many cartoonists displayed insensitivity to blatant anti-Semitic themes. The purpose of the ADL mission, therefore, was to try to expose a number of cartoonists representing a variety of opinion to as many different people, sites and experiences as

possible in order to give them a better grasp of the realities and views that comprise this country.

During their very intensive tour the cartoonists met such personalities as Teddy Kollek; Yitzhak Rabin; Dan Meridor, Secretary of the Government; Jamil Hamad, a Palestinian journalist; Anwar El Nuseibah, Former Defense minister in the Jordanian parliament; Zeidan Atashe, Israeli Druze



leader; Ze'ev, Israel's prominent editorial cartoonist for Ma'ariv and Ha'aretz; and many others representing the wide spectrum of opinion in Israel. They traveled to the Golan Heights and the Lebanese border, staying overnight at Kibbutz Afikim. They visited Efrat, a new Jewish settlement south of Bethlehem, and Katzrin, a new city in the Golan. They spent time in the Knesset in Jerusalem and Yad Vashem.

At the conclusion of their stay the cartoonists met with some representatives of the Israeli press. Asked if the visit had an impact on them, David Levine said that he was now much more aware of the complexities here. "My hand will be slowed to a glib reflex from now on." Jules Feiffer was affected on a personal level —by the people he met and the conversations he had, "the wonderful conversations" that showed him Israel is a healthy, functioning society.

Steve Benson and Steve Kelley were mostly affected by what they learned about the Holocaust. For Benson it was a "real eyeopener." Benson was cautious in pointing out that even after this experience he "wouldn't ever want to close off creative options. However, given the same opportunity to draw the [Butcher of Lyon/Butcher of Beirut] cartoon, I'd think and re-think first." Kelley, however, came to a differ-"Yad Vashem showed me how ent conclusion. to use the Holocaust -- and if it can be used against Jews. It is insensitive; it hurts. Before seeing Yad Vashem, I would have defended a cartoonist's right to use [Holocaust/Nazi analogy], but not now."

Jules Feiffer left Israel with hope. "I don't despair because I think there will be a solution. Not tomorrow, but there will be because the people of this region have a sense of history that we don't have." David Levine agreed: "Jewish history was always the history of anti-Semitism. But with the creation of the State of Israel, that is no longer the case."

Exhausted from the endless debate, the talking and of course the jokes, Feiffer perhaps reflected the thinking of all in the group when he concluded that "Israelis are far more aware of what is wrong here than I could be. Israel has a concern that makes me confident."

CONGRESSMEN LAUD ADL ISRAEL MISSIONS

Rep. Sander Levin (D-Mich.) who has participated in a wide variety of field trips, study missions and international conferences around the world, said of his August ADL Israel Mission: "The trip was first rate. It was unusually well integrated and all facets of its implementation were skillfully executed."

Rep. Levin, who traveled with Rep. Mike Andrews (D-TX), was the 20th member of Congress to visit Israel with the ADL this year. Just this past July, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) and former Rep. Robert Dornan (R-CA) joined an ADL tour. In August, Mark Briskman of the ADL Dallas office brought to Israel Reps. Steve Bartlett (R-TX), John Bryant (D-TX), Ron Coleman (D-TX), and Gerry Sikorski (D-MN); immediately followed by a group organized by Sheldon Steinhauser of the Denver office, which included Reps. Hank Brown (R-CO), Richard Cheney (R-WY), Ray Kogovsek (D-CO), and Dan Schaefer (R-CO).

Rep. Levin was impressed with the efforts made to expose the members of Congress to as many views and aspects of Israeli society as possible: "As to the meetings themselves, there was an obvious effort to cover a broad combination of political, economic, military and social factors operating within Israel today."

Comments from the American southwest reflect Levin's enthusiasm. Rep. Bryant was quoted in the Dallas Morning News: "The trip reinforced my feeling that we must support democratic countries that have the same ethical values that we do. Israel is the only country in that region that has been and will continue to be a dependable ally, although I hope Egypt can become such an ally." Rep. Bartlett told the newspaper that the past "gives Israel a sense of purpose, a sense of destiny, and a sense of unity." He went on to conclude that there are some "absolutes" today in the region: "Israel must be protected, Israel must make peace, and Jerusalem is indivisible." As for the future of the ADL Israel Missions program, we are encouraged to conti-

nue it. Although it demands great time and

energy on the part of this office, and the participating regional offices, we see a positive impact. Rep. Levin, in a letter to the ADL writes: "These trips are financially costly and fundraising for them is time consuming, but they have to be one of the most effective investments in American understanding of and support for Israel. If at all possible, they should be expanded, in my judgment, to include Members of Congress from all parts of the country."

PHYLLIS DILLER & MONTY HALL LEAD ADL ISRAEL GOLF TOURNEY

Some 35 golfers from the United States joined comedienne Phyllis Diller, television host Monty Hall and 20 local golfers in ADL's first annual Golf Tournament at Israel's Caesaria Golf Club in October. Former Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz spoke at the gala awards dinner at the Dan Caesaria, where more than 130 dinner guests were treated to a fashion show of Israeli designer furs, the presentation of awards by Monty Hall, and a stand-up monologue by the queen of comedy, Phyllis Diller. ing the festivities that night were other Israeli personalities including comedienne Rifka Michaeli, film producer Itzhak Kol, basketball star Tal Brody, the current Miss Israel, and Sam Federmann, President of the Dan Hotel Corp.

The ADL participants spent the remaining five days of their Israel visit in Jerusa-



Former Israel Ambassador Simcha Dinitz with American personalities Phyllis Diller and Monty Hall.

lem. From there they toured various sites around the country, and also met with some Israeli leaders, including Mayor Teddy Kollek who joined the group for cocktails at their closing banquet, and with Ehud Ohlmert, M.K. at the Knesset.

ADL PARTNER IN FALASHA FILM

Production on a full-length documentary film about the Falashas, the Jews of Ethiopia, has begun as a joint project of the ADL and Kastel Communications Ltd., an Israeli film company. Despite a steady and increasing number of Ethiopian Jews arriving in Israel over the last year, controversy on this issue has not subsided. Still very much debated in the American Jewish community, the campaign to rescue Ethiopian Jews suffers from a lack of comprehensive educational material. In response to this need, ADL has embarked on this project.

Twelve years ago, on behalf of Israel Television, Kastel produced a documentary film on the life of the Falashas in Ethiopia. Times were very different then -- Haile Selassie was the ruling monarch, Jews were a protected but impoverished community, suffering from native anti-Semitism and a decree that did not allow them to emigrate. The Kastel film traced their traditions and lifestyle, preserving the words and dreams of local Falasha leaders.

Today, seven years into the pro-Soviet rule of Lt. Col. Mariam Mengistu, who deposed Selassie in a military junta, the situation for those Jews interviewed 12 years ago, and for the Ethiopian Jewish community at large, has dramatically altered. Coupled with the new political and economic situation is a daring effort on the part of some Jews to make their way to Israel.

The new film will cover the gap of these historical years in Ethiopia, and take a close look at those Ethiopian Jews who have made Israel their home. Set for completion early this summer, the film should help to further introduce the Falashas to American, Israeli and other world Jewish communities, while serving as an important resource for diplomatic and other activities waged on their behalf. This project is being co-ordinated for the ADL by Theodore Freedman, ADL Program Director, and Roberta Fahn Reisman, Assistant Director, ADL Israel Office.

ADL ISRAEL DIRECTOR ADDRESSES POLITICAL CONSULTANTS CONFERENCE

Harry Wall, Director ADL Israel Office, addressed the International Association of Political Consultants, who met in Jerusalem for their annual conference this past October. Sharing a platform with former Israeli Ambassador to the U.N. Abba Eban, M.K., Wall discussed the interactive effects between the politics of Israel and the U.S. Participating in the conference were political consultants from all over the world, including the men and women who are directly engaged in the election campaigns of American presidential candidates.

The first part of Wall's address dealt with the more familiar subject of the role that concern for Israel plays in American politics and policy-making circles. While recognizing the historical, spiritual, and democratic ties that bind the two countries, Wall explained that the case for Israel is made with American interests in mind. He spoke about the influence of Jewish voting in the U.S., and coalition politics that Jews were, and still are, so much a part of. At the same time, Wall noted, alliances have shifted and traditional Jewish voting patterns have changed. Israel and the perception of pro-Israel sympathies have much to do with the current state of Jewish intergroup relations, and impacts on its future.

The second part of Wall's address dealt with a less familiar subject: to what extent, and in what ways, do American Jews exercise any measurable impact on the Israeli body politic. Wall's conclusion. in short, is: they don't. A closer look reveals an intricate system of dialogue that enables clearer understanding between American Jews and Israel. Wall attributes this to the Israeli national psyche that is determined by the constant awareness of the immediacy of the military threat to Israel's very existence. Comprehension and integration of this threat marks the gap that divides the Israeli and Diaspora Jewish communities, and keeps the final security perogative in the hands of the Israeli government and people alone.

UPSWING IN AFRICA AND ISRAEL RELATIONS

The visit to Israel late last summer of Liberian President Samuel K. Doe marked a

major turning point in African-Israeli relations. Doe was the first African head of state to visit Israel since 1973, when most African countries severed diplomatic ties with Israel.

Liberia is the second African state to reestablish formal relations with Israel (Zaire broke the diplomatic freeze in 1982). Several other black African nations are reported to be considering resuming official ties with Israel, which has earned a positive image in Africa for its technical and agricultural assistance projects. Dozens of Israeli companies continue to operate in Africa and large numbers of Africans, mainly students, visit Israel despite the absence of diplomatic ties.

The ADL has taken several initiatives toward reinforcing the African-Israel rapprochement with the view that such actions serve long-range Western interests. In 1982 an ADL group, comprising several businessmen, visited Kenya, Zaire, and Zimbabwe on a good will and trade mission. A similar mission was slated to visit the Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Togo last October but had to be postponed at the last minute. In May of 1982 Harry Wall, ADL-Jerusalem director, was invited to Kenya as part of a group to promote friendship and tourism with the American Jewish community and Israel. Finally, last September the ADL hosted Liberian President Doe at a reception at its national headquarters in New York.

"ZUBIN AND THE IPO" IN BEIRUT

ADL's "Zubin and the IPO" documentary film highlighted the first cultural event ever organized by the Israeli diplomatic mission in Beirut. More than 100 Lebanese artists and intellectuals attended the presentation that took place last August in the Baabda suburb of Beirut. The film showing was the springboard for a dialogue between Israelis and Lebanese present on developing further cultural exchanges in order to strengthen peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the two peoples. Some Israelis had already had an opportunity to view the film during its premiere in Jerusalem last May with Arnold Forster, ADL's general counsel, who wrote and narrated the film.

With the Compliments of

SIDNEY LISKOPSKY

More are provided—There are notes I gave felma to draw on felma to draw on for the presentation for the Blansferms.

Sidvey

The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, Oct. 23... The American Jewish Committee today welcomed reports in the media that certain groups within the Vatican favored the diplomatic recognition of Israel.

Howard I. Friedman, President, pointed out that the agency's international relations department, headed by Rabbi Marc H. Tananbaum, had informed Vatican authorities during conversations in recent years that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the State of Israel would be "a significant contribution to the cause of peace and reconciliation in the Middle East."

Mr. Friedman added that the American Jewish Committee would watch closely and would welcome concrete steps that the Holy See would take during the coming months "to translate these reports into reality."

The American Jewish Committee is this country's pioneer human relations organization. Founded in 1906, it combats bigotry, protects the civil and religious rights of people here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people everywhere.

AJRZ 84-960-408

ISRAELI ELECTIONS IN A TIME OF CRISIS:

An Analysis of Issues, Parties and Personalities
by Hanoch Smith

AMERICAN JEWISH

A Special Report Prepared for the International Relations Department



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 165 East 56th Street New York, N.Y. 10022

ISRAELI ELECTIONS IN A TIME OF CRISIS:

An Analysis of Issues, Parties and Personalities

by Hanoch Smith*

As Israel's two major political parties, Likud and Labor, and 24 smaller parties gear up their campaigns for the country's national elections on July 23, the Israeli public is strongly polarized on key issues as never before. Defenders of the present regime wax defiant. The opposition waiver between hope and despair, with a sense that they must win now because the conditions are right.

The only recent Knesset elections held in such an atmosphere of tension and uncertainty were the 1973 elections, which were held shortly after the Yom Kippur war. In 1973 the Labor share of the popular vote fell to 39%, fully 10% less than the Labor parties had received in the previous seven Knesset elections. The Likud share of the vote rose to 32%, a record high for centrist parties. With the help of the Independent Liberals and the National Religious Party (NRP), Labor formed a coalition government with a narrow majority. But, with this election Israel had already embarked on an electoral revolution, which led to the Likud victories of 1977 and 1981.

Israelis vote for political parties and not for specific individuals. When an Israeli goes to the polls, he votes for the full party list of candidates for the Knesset. A party gets Knesset seats in proportion to its popular vote. But a party cannot get Knesset representation if it gets less than one percent of the vote. The Likud, for example, earned 37.1% of the popular vote in 1981, and thus won 48 Knesset seats. Only the first 48 names on Likud's candidate list won Knesset seats. Yet, because no party has ever received enough votes to win more than 61 seats, there always have been coalition governments in Israel.

^{*}This is the first of two reports on the 1984 elections commissioned by the Israel and Middle East Division of the International Relations Department as part of the American Jewish Committee's ongoing efforts to increase understanding within the United States of developments in Israel. Mr. Smith is Director of the Smith Research Center, a leading Israeli public opinion and economic research institution. Mr. Smith's interpretation of the significance of the election results will be available in August.

After seven years of rule, the Likud-led coalition now faces difficult obstacles in its attempt to get yet another mandate from the people. The declining economy and the unresolved situation in Lebanon loom as almost insurmountable obstacles to further electoral success. And the early polls indeed gave Labor a significant lead over the Likud. Why, then, is the Israeli public doubtful about a Labor victory?

The answer lies in how the Likud got into power and what forces support it. The primary factor determining the outcome of recent Israeli elections has been ethnicity. This report will examine the ethnic factor, as well as the parties and the personalities in the 1984 political campaign.

1. The Ethnic Factor

All significant changes in Israeli politics since 1969 (i.e., starting with the 1973 elections) have been caused by shifts in the voting patterns of Oriental Jews. For the purposes of this report Oriental Jews are those originating from Moslem countries in Asia and North Africa, and their Israeli-born offspring. The single largest concentration of Oriental Jews are from Morocco, but there are also large contingents from Yemen, Iraq, Iran and Tunisia. Although the Oriental Jews represent a small majority of Israel's Jewish population, a large percentage of them are still under eighteen years of age, Israel's minimum voting age. Thus, Jews of European origin (as well as Americans) continue to represent a slight majority of the country's eligible voters. But, unless there are unexpected demographic developments, by 1990 the Oriental Jews will constitute more than 50% of all eligible Jewish voters.

In the 1969 elections, before ethnicity became a central factor, the Labor Alignment received 46.2% of the vote and other opposition parties another 5.5%, which together made up a clear majority. The Likud parties received 22.9% of the vote and the religious parties a combined 14.7%. This same voting pattern had occurred in all six previous Knesset elections, with Labor-oriented parties gaining a slight majority, center parties 25%, and religious parties 14% of the vote.

My rough assessment of the voting patterns among the two major Jewish ethnic groups at that time revealed that among European Jews about 51% voted Labor, 24% Likud and 11% religious, while among Oriental Jews approximately 46% voted Labor, 23% Likud and 21% religious. Along the ethnic lines the voting patterns were quite similar in the 1969 elections. Although Oriental Jews voted more for religious parties than did European Jews, with regard to the ratio of Labor to Likud votes, the patterns in both major Jewish ethnic groups showed that Labor led Likud by a two-to-one ratio.

Contrast these results with those of the 1981 elections. Voters of European origin in 1981 cast their ballots approximately 52% for Labor, 25% Likud and 10% religious -- practically unchanged from 1969. However, among the Oriental voters there was a complete reversal in 1981 -- Labor 21%, Likud 56%, religious 16% -- from 1969. Thus, over

the past three elections Oriental Jewish support for Labor declined by about 25%, and for the religious by 5%, while it increased for the Likud by 32%. While Labor led Likud by a 2:1 margin among Oriental Jews in 1969, the Likud led the Alignment by nearly 3:1 in 1981.

To illustrate what changes these voting patterns represent in tangible terms, let us examine the voting records in two very different cities. Givatayim, a veteran city in the suburbs of Tel Aviv, has a predominantly European population. In 1969, 53% of its voters chose Labor, 26% Likud and 7% religious. In 1981, 50% still chose Labor, while 31% voted Likud, and 7% religious. The small shifts from Labor to Likud were caused by the city's Oriental minority, which constitutes approximately 20% of the voters. The Europeans in that community voted slightly more for Labor in 1981 than they did in 1969.

About five miles from Givatayim lies the predominantly Oriental town of Or Yehuda. In 1969 Or Yehuda voted 50% Labor, 18% Likud and 19% religious, which was similar to Givatayim in its Labor vote, but 13% higher for the religious and 13% less for the Likud. In the 1981 elections, 59% voted Likud, 19% Labor and 10% religious -- a Likud landslide!

Significance of the Shift in the Oriental Vote

The examples of Givatayim and Or Yehuda illustrate a very important point in recent Israeli elections. Both in 1977 and 1981, the Likud defeated Labor by larger margins among Oriental Jews than Labor defeated Likud among European Jews. Considering that demographically the Jewish population was almost equally divided between the two ethnic groups, Likud, in effect, led Labor in the total Jewish vote.

This shift in voting patterns over three elections resulted in the fact that in 1981 nearly 75% of the Labor voters were European and nearly 70% of the Likud voters were Oriental Jews. This does not mean, however, that Israel has ethnic parties. The Likud is not an "Oriental" party. With the exception of Deputy Prime Minister David Levy, all of the top Likud government ministers are Europeans. Indeed, historically, Labor consistently has had more Oriental Jews on its Knesset list than the Likud. Beginning in 1973, Oriental Jews turned to Likud because they saw faults in the Labor administration, apparently felt like outsiders and, conversely, tended to feel more at home in the Likud. The detailed reasons of this process of mass political transfer are still the subject of much controversy and research.

THE KNESSET VOTE BY PARTY GROUPING (in Percentages)

	Present Government				22	Opposition				
Knesset	Likud	Religious	Other Govn't	Total .	Labor	Other Oppo- sition	Arab Part		Total	
1969	22.9	14.8	3.1	40.8	46.2	5.6	6.3	1.6	59.2	
1973	30.2	12.1		42.3	39.6	7.8	6.8	3.3	57.6	
1977	35.3	13.9	2.0	51.2	24.6	15.6	6.4	2.2	48.8	
1981	37.1	11.8	3.9	52.8	36.6	3.9	4.5	2.2	47.2	

From 1969-1981 there was a steady rise in support for the Likud. The big gain occurred in 1973, when the Likud vote rose by 7.3%, thereby putting the party on the political map. Another 4.9% gain in 1977, plus a 2.8% gain in the religious vote made possible the first basic government change in Israel. The Likud-religious alliance, formed then, had a small lead in the popular vote and 61 Knesset seats of 120, just enough to form the governing coalition which has ruled Israel ever since together with other partners.

In 1981 the Likud gained another 1.8% to reach 37.1% of the popular vote (up 14.2% from 1969). The religious partners in the coalition, however, lost 2.2%. To gain an absolute majority, Likud had to form a coalition with two new parties -- Tehiya, the party backed by the maximalist elements who favor incorporation of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) into Israel, which won 2.3% of the vote, and with the late Moshe Dayan's Telem party, which gained 1.6% of the vote. As in 1977, the Likud-religious camp had 61 seats, barely enough to form the basic coalition. The additional two parties gave the Likud a working majority.

Meanwhile, Labor tumbled in two consecutive elections. Although support for Labor dropped by 6.6% in 1973, it was still able to find coalition partners from the National Religious Party (NRP) and other smaller parties. The loss of another 15% in 1977 was a more severe blow and caused Labor to lose its 29 year control of the government.

The data indicate that a large segment of the public, 11.6%, voted for Yigal Yadin's Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), a party that joined the government in the autumn of 1977, giving it a large majority for a time. Voters for DMC were drawn overwhelmingly from previous Labor supporters, and in 1981 nearly all returned to support Labor again.

In 1981 Labor gained 36.6% of the vote, only fractionally less than Likud, but still 9.6% less than in 1969. With the decline in support for other opposition parties, Labor fell short of enough Knesset seats to form a government without the support of parties in the governing coalition.

Thus, the progressive shift in the voting patterns of Oriental Jews has put the Likud and its coalition partners into power by increasing margins. However, even in 1981, the combined governing coalition only enjoyed a narrow lead over the combined opposition in the Knesset, a situation that could change easily in 1984.

In order to reverse recent trends, the opposition will have to pay special attention to the Oriental vote. In 1981, the present governing coalition received 75% of this vote, while Labor and the other opposition parties gained only 22%. Only solid gains by the Ma'arach (Labor Alignment) and other opposition parties among Oriental Jews would swing the pendulum back to Labor. Indeed, among Jews in 1981, 56% voted for one of the coalition parties and only 42% for an opposition party, with the remaining 2% for parties which had no previous Knesset representation.

Changes in the Arab Vote

The closeness of the overall vote has been due to the vote of the third major ethnic group, Israel's Arab citizens. In recent elections the Arab minority has accounted for some 8.5% of all votes, or approximately the equivalent of 10 of the 120 seats in the Knesset. From the formation of the New Democratic Party (Rakah) in 1961, which split from the Communist party, until the elections of 1981, Rakah gradually increased its strength among the Arab minority. In 1977, 50% of the Arab vote went to Rakah, and the party won 5 Knesset seats. In contrast, the vote for minority parties associated with Labor, which in the past has constituted the most popular party among Arabs, declined precipitously. (In the period 1961-1977, 33-39% of the Arabs had voted for a Zionist party.)

In 1981 trends suddenly reversed. The Rakah fell to 37% of the Arab vote, receiving only 4 Knesset seats. Labor received nearly 28% of the Arab vote instead of the traditional 10-13%. This sudden increase in Arab support for Labor did not result from campaigning, but from the decision made by many Arabs that the way to bring down the Likud was to vote for Labor. This increase in Arabs voting Labor reduced the Likud advantage over Labor from 2.5% to 0.5% in the overall final results. Among Arab voters, only 11% voted for a governing coalition party, 6.5% of them for the Likud. The Likud vote was especially concentrated among Druze voters, who make up approximately 10% of the total Arab vote. Overall, the Arab vote went nearly 90% against the Likud-religious government, nearly half for Rakah and other Arab parties, and 40% for Labor and other opposition parties.

In the 1984 elections there are no prospects that the government parties will gain more votes among Arabs. To gain a bare majority in the Knesset again the Likud and its coalition partners will need to get 60 out of the 110 seats expected to be won by Jewish contenders, a feat which will not be easy to accomplish in present-day Israel.

The Competing Parties

A record 31 parties competed in the 1981 elections. However, only 10 succeeded in obtaining the one percent of the popular vote minimum needed for representation in the Knesset. The Likud won 48 seats and Labor won 47. This represented the highest concentration of seats in the hands of the large parties in Israel's electoral history. In addition to the Likud seats, the outgoing government included 13 members of religious parties: 6 from the National Religious Party (NRP), 4 from Agudat Israel, and 3 from Tami, the new Sephardi party. Together, the Likud and the religious parties had 61 seats, the minimum majority needed to form a government. In addition, Telem's two members and Tehiya's three members joined the government, giving the Likud-led coalition a total of 66 seats.

During the term of the 10th Knesset two Likud members defected to Labor, leaving 64 seats for the coalition. New elections were called more than a year before they were officially required because the 3 Tami members bolted the government on the early election issue, and they were joined by one Liberal member of the Likud and one member of Telem, giving the opposition a majority of one to call for early elections.

In addition to Labor, the opposition during the 10th Knesset included 2 members of Shinui (the remnants of the Democratic Movement for Change), one member of the Citizens Rights Party, and four from Rakah (the overwhelmingly Arab Communist Party). Together with the two Likud members who changed allegiance the opposition had 56 seats.

Because of the anti-Jewish state sentiments of Rakah, no major party has ever considered them as a coalition partner. Therefore, the religious parties as a bloc determined the coalition government of 1981. It is often forgotten that had they so desired, the combined religious parties could have formed a coalition government with Labor and its allies.

So long as there is a stand-off between the Labor and Likud camps, the religious parties, individually and collectively, hold the balance of political power in Israel. Thus, ironically, in 1981, when the religious parties suffered their worst losses in the Knesset elections (only 11.8% of the total vote instead of the usual 14%), their political power was greatly enhanced by the overall political situation.

The two major parties will also dominate the 1984 elections. The party that will set up the new government will be determined not only by which one gets more votes than the other, but also by the total number of votes garnered by its allies and by the readiness of other parties to shift camps in order to be part of the governing coalition. It is conceivable that Labor will receive a greater percentage of the

popular vote than the Likud, but will still be unable to form a government, should none of the religious parties be willing to join their coalition. Indeed, if Labor defeats Likud by a small percentage, the coalition forming process may be agonizingly long.

In contrast to the 1981 elections, when the Labor campaign was torn by rivalries between factions and the Likud ran a unified and ordered campaign, the roles are reversed in 1984. The first part of the campaign showed intense rivalry between Likud factions and individuals. The reason for the new situation in Likud was, undoubtedly, the retirement of Menachem Begin, the dominating figure in the Likud. His successor, Yitzhak Shamir, has not been able to establish his authority as firmly over the party, while other powerful leaders like David Levy, Minister of Defense Moshe Arens and Minister-without-Portfolio Ariel Sharon have emerged.

Infighting within the Blocs

In addition, the two major factions of Likud, Herut and the Liberals, had difficulties in determining the representation quotas of each on the combined party list. When the agreement between Herut and the Liberals to form the Likud was ratified in 1965, the two camps were of equal strength, and they agreed on nearly equal representation. In the subsequent years, Herut support among Likud voters increased rapidly, while support for Liberals declined sharply. While Begin handled this situation artfully, his Herut successors have been more sanguine -- they demand more representation for their list and less for the Liberals. Led by Yitzhak Moda'i, the Liberals put up a stiff defense to change, even threatening to run independently for the Knesset, but rather than suffer a large drop in Knesset representation, they recently compromised with the Likud, accepting only a modest reduction in their quota of Knesset seats.

On the opposition side, Labor succeeded at an early stage to defuse internal quarreling. The advent of former President Yitzhak Navon as a top contender and his ceding first place to Shimon Peres served to create an atmosphere of cooperation at the top of the Labor party.

In other camps there has been much debate and change. Among the religious parties, Tami and Agudat Israel solved most of their listing problems with relative ease, while the National Religious Party was torn by factionalism and debate. Three separate groupings emerged from the NRP, including Matzad, Mafdal and a separate list of religious women. The split in the NRP resulted more from personal and group differences rather than ideology. New political forces also began to emerge, such as Shass, another new Sephardi Aguda party. However, although Shass was successful in the Jerusalem municipal elections, it has had difficulty establishing itself nationally.

Newly Formed Parties

Among other coalition parties Tehiya is the strongest and has made efforts to strengthen itself further by joining with <u>Tzomet</u>, a new party established by former Chief-of-Staff Rafael Eitan, who also

supports a very "hawkish" line. Although Telem has folded, Dayan's successors, Yigal Hurwitz and Menachem Ben-Porat are heading personal lists in the competition for representation in the next Knesset.

On the opposition side, the major change is the attempt of Shulamit Aloni's Citizens Rights Party to increase its strength. It has formed an alliance with more leftist forces, including Shelli (all of whose members failed previously to cross the 1% barrier to getting Knesset representation). However, this has not prevented other personal and party lists, like that headed by Lova Eliav, from being formed. It is unlikely that any of the more leftist parties, with the exception of the Citizens Rights Party, will earn Knesset representation.

The major new change in the election campaign picture is the emergence of Ezer Weizman and his new Yahad Party list. It is essentially a centrist party completely dominated by a charismatic leader. Mr. Weizman hopes to get enough Knesset seats to have a role as a balance of power broker when the next government is formed after the elections.

The list of new parties has continued to grow from election to election in recent times. This probably is related to the increasing television time allocations given to parties during election campaigns. New parties are allocated several short spots during the campaign. This gives an opportunity to deliver short, succinct orations on special issues or for specific disadvantaged groups at minimal cost. 26 parties are competing in the 1984 elections. While this is fewer than in 1981, it is far more than average for a Knesset election.

3. Personalities in Politics

Although Israelis vote for parties and not for specific individuals, personality can play a role in politics. Many Israelis asserted that they voted Likud in 1981 because of the charismatic personality of Menachem Begin.

However, the 1984 elections will not be based on the charismatic character of the party leaders. Neither Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir nor Labor Party leader Shimon Peres compares with Begin as an outstanding public personality. Surveys carried out by the Smith Research Center show that the public focus has passed to leadership teams rather than to top leaders. This does not imply that issues have become more important than personalities in Israel. Rather, people continue to identify mostly with parties in the abstract and with leaders and leadership groups. In an April survey only 20% listed stands on issues as the most important factor in determining their votes.

The key "new" figures in the 1984 elections are Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Navon. Both are charismatic figures. But neither heads his party's list. General Sharon, whose status was undermined by the Lebanese war and the Sabra-Shatilla massacres, has bulldozed his way back into the limelight during this campaign. He attracts many in the Likud masses and repels very many in the opposition.

Yitzhak Navon, on the other hand, the former President, is admired universally. His problem has been in translating this reverence into votes for his party. His quietly accepting second place on his party's list, despite the fact that he was by far the most popular figure his party produced since Golda Meir, makes his task difficult. Also, unlike Sharon, he is a man of peace and compromise, given to seeking consensus. Two more contrasting figures are hard to find. Yet, these are the two dominant figures.

Otherwise, there are no significant changes among political figures in any of the major parties. Political processes in Israel, based on party machines, do not easily create new, dynamic leaders. The machines move people forward slowly. The main new top-level blood usually flows from the army, which retires its officers at early ages. Former chiefs of staff and top commanders like Rabin, Bar-Lev, Gur, Sharon, Weizman and Eitan are top figures in the political hierarchies.

However, an important factor in the 1984 elections is that there was little difference in early polls in the popular appeal of the leadership teams of the two major parties. This has left much more latitude for the play of issues and events.

4. Issues and Events

The economy and Lebanon are the two central issues dominating the election campaign, and both have equal weight in the public's eyes.

a) Economic Problems

The government is most vulnerable on the economy issue. The government lost its lead in the polls after the near collapse of the bank shares and the devaluation of the Shekel last October. The government's economic policy has involved austere measures lowering standards of living and increasing unemployment in order to increase exports, and productivity, and improve to the balance of payments deficit. But this policy has increased inflation, at least for the short-term.

The April cost-of-living index published in mid-May showed a consumer's price increase of 20.6% in one month! The annual rate of inflation since October has reached 400%! Inflation has become the number-one concern in Israel today. The public views the Likud as failing with the economy.

However, in February 1981, the government was similarly unpopular on the economy. At the time Yoram Aridor entered the scene, changed the economic policy and pumped money into the economy, specifically into private consumption. This policy turned a deficit of 30% in the polls into a neck-and-neck race within three months.

The public and the Likud remember 1981 well. Therefore, the early leads of 10-15% for Labor in April and May have not convinced many in the public to start betting that Labor would win. Indeed, most expect the Likud to abandon -- at least temporarily -- its severe economic policies and again pump money into the economy. Within limits this has

been done. However, a return to Aridor's policies has proved impossible. The inflation is too serious and uncontrolled, and a mechanism for raising real wages has not been developed. During the campaign the money market has been uncertain, there have been runs on foreign currencies, and there have been other signs of a lack of confidence in the economy.

Nevertheless, the public has not entirely abandoned the Likud on the economy. As in 1981, Labor has failed to produce either credible economic leaders or believable economic policies in 1984. The population as a whole does not credit Labor with better ideas. In light of Likud failures with the economy, however, the public views Labor with a better potential for solving these problems. Thus, if the Likud, with an electoral economic policy, succeeds in improving living standards during the last two months of the campaign, it is not certain that Labor will have a meaningful lead on election day.

However, without doubt, the economic situation works to the benefit of Labor. Since the Israeli public tends to vote <u>against</u> governments rather than <u>for</u> oppositions, the economy will be the main trump card for Labor in this year's elections.

b) The Lebanese Morass

Lebanon should also be playing into the hands of the Labor opposition. The Israeli public is very unhappy about the unresolved situation in Lebanon, the costs, the dangers and the casualties. But the public does not blame the government for this as severely as it blames it for the economic problems. The decision to withdraw the IDF from Beirut back to the Awali River was widely approved by the public. In addition, the public accepts staying in Lebanon until a solution is found that will assure the security of Israel's northern cities and settlements. Labor's proposed policy of a hasty withdrawal from Lebanon has not attracted a majority. As a result, the Likud is viewed as the party better able to solve the Lebanese crisis despite the whole history of the Lebanese war. In relative terms, the Likud and its partners are in a better situation than the opposition regarding Lebanon.

On foreign policy issues, as noted in my report of October 1983 for the American Jewish Committee's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, "Attitudes of Israelis Towards America and American Jews," the polarization between the parties continues unabated. Government supporters remain hawkish on issues involving Arabs and the West Bank, while the opposition supporters are dovish.

The public is equally divided on the issue "Israel should give up part of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) for peace with Jordan." The almost even split on this question has continued, with modest variations, for over a decade. The only change has been the increasing polarizations on the issue between government and opposition supporters.

Regarding the settlement policy in the territories, which government supporters try to thrust to the fore, the major changes recently have been over the priority of the issues. Opinion polls conducted by the Smith Research Center reveal that the public considers the settlement issue a low national priority. The economic decline during the past year has led the public to place priority on such issues as helping the development towns and poor neighborhoods within Israel, to the detriment of helping new settlements in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria).

c) Other Issues

In addition to Lebanon, the highest priority issues have been the recession, general security, the social gap and the balance of payments. Foreign policy subjects, including peace with the Arabs, have been given very low priority in this campaign. Perhaps the election campaign in the United States, and the corresponding freeze on new policy objectives in this area, have led to the whole topic of peace being taken off the top of the agenda in Israel as well.

Issues of concern to religious Israelis and religious demonstrations have gained much media attention during the campaign, but the topic receives little public priority outside of religious circles. Though only 15% of the public favor religious demonstrations against Shabbat violations, like those which recently took place in Petah Tikva, it is only the religious themselves who take these actions seriously. The broad, non-Orthodox public seems to react only when personally threatened. An interesting point is that the Orthodox have tended to become more extreme of late, too. In a recent poll, 94% of the 15% defining themselves as "religious" agreed with the statement: "Our religion should determine the laws and customs by which our government should operate." Few of the remaining 85% defining themselves as traditional and secular Jews agreed with this.

It should also be stressed that because the government holds the purse strings of the economy and controls defense and foreign affairs, resources exist for influencing the chain of events.

Yet, so taut are ideological party lines in Israel that a sensational event such as the discovery of a Jewish terrorist underground and the apprehension of its members, may have little influence on the actual vote in Israel. Gush Emunim supporters may find justification in the political motives of the group and may even sympathize with them. Such stubborn support for a cause is not rare in Israel. Before the Kahan Commission delivered its verdict on the Sabra-Shatilla massacres, 51% of Jewish Israelis thought Sharon was good as defense minister. After the commission delivered its verdict, which led to his resignation as defense minister, 51% still thought him good as defense minister. On some issues many Israelis are passionate and uncompromising.

Among the broad population, however, the acts and plans of the Jewish terrorist group are a source of national debate. The question is really what influence the debate will have on groups supporting the governing coalition, particularly religious groups. Some hardening of

the views of more extreme factions is inevitable. But there are milder elements among the religious and the Likud whose party affiliations may be affected by the great debate.

It is impossible to forecast if there will be more unexpected events and, therefore, it is difficult to predict the outcome of the elections. But it is useful to examine possible scenarios.

Prognostications: Possible Scenarios

A. Results Similar to 1981

Basically, this means little difference between Likud and Labor in the number of Knesset seats. It would then depend on religious and other small party votes. Since the religious vote will represent the single largest bloc among the small parties, they would have a deciding voice and could again choose the Likud to form the government even if Labor has a slight edge in Knesset seats. The weakness in their camp comes from Tami, which brought down the government and is unlikely to join another Likud-led government. Weizman's party would also be unlikely to tip the scales. Thus, in order to be able to form a government, the Likud needs actually to gain some votes for its coalition over the outgoing one. Nevertheless, it is a very unlikely outcome in light of all that has been discussed in this report.

B. A Narrow Labor Victory

In this scenario, suppose Labor gets 50-51 seats compared to its present 47. Its allied parties would be unlikely to garner more than 3-4 seats, leaving Labor with 53-55 seats in the coalition. Tami, with 2-4 seats, might also join a Labor-led coalition and so might Weizman, if his list gets 2-4 seats. Then, Labor could form a very narrow majority without major religious support. Or, Labor could try to make a coalition with the whole religious bloc. Given the complexity of Israeli politics, however, groups inside Labor and around it could prevent a Labor-religious coalition. Thus, a narrow Labor victory could produce a kind of stalemate, with neither camp able to form a viable coalition, or a very awkward one with mutually antagonistic forces preventing a government from taking needed, serious measures.

C. A Moderate or Sizeable Labor Victory

This implies 53 or more seats for Labor. In this instance Labor would be able to form a coalition with its allies, Weizman's group, Tami and even other selected religious groups. In other words, with less than 53 seats Labor will have difficulties forming a strong, stable government. A Labor landslide, in which the party wins at least 55 seats, is possible, but unlikely. However, Labor, would have little difficulty in forming a new government if it wins by such a margin.

D. A Small Party Trend

This implies vote losses both to Labor and Likud, making them more dependent on small parties. In this case, it depends on which small parties prosper. The leading candidates are Weizman's party in the center and Tehiya-Tzomet on the right. Religious parties, because of factionalization and splits, are unlikely to score substantial gains, although Tami has a certain potential for capturing North African origin votes. Again, coalition formation depends on the balance of forces between the camps. If this scenario occurs, it will only make government formation that much harder.

Of course, with so many parties and camps, many other scenarios are possible. But judging from past elections and early opinion polls, the scenario of the 1981 elections should not be ruled out. However, given all the new obstacles -- less charismatic leadership, a much more serious economic situation, the Lebanon imbroglio, the Jewish underground group -- it would have to be viewed an upset if the Likud and its allies get the same proportion of Knesset seats they now have.

Conversely, despite all the advantages listed above, a Labor landslide is also unlikely, mainly because Labor has been having difficulties developing new credible leaders and policies. Labor must rely heavily on exploiting the weaknesses and errors of the outgoing administration. We have an example, common in elections in democratic countries, of voting an incumbent government out rather than voting a new government in.

Given the above analysis, the most likely outcome is a moderate Labor victory, meaning that Labor will have to persevere to be able to form a viable coalition government.

However, the campaign is full of uncertainties. The Likud is working hard to maintain the overwhelming support it enjoys in the Oriental community -- evoking images of nationalism, patriotism, settlement policy, firm policies toward Arabs in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), playing down economic policy, while trying to improve the economy. Because of the propensity of the Oriental community to support the Likud and its partners, it is hard to know if this Likud campaign will be effective until shortly before the elections, if supposed deeper feelings will surface to offset present economic ills, spiralling inflation and the drain of blood and resources in Lebanon.

Americans should remember that Israeli Jews think differently about their own priorities than others do. Israeli politics have become unusually tense and polarized. Only Israelis in free elections can decide if they will seek confrontations within or outside the country, or choose paths of moderation and compromise. Much will depend on the halance of political forces that emerge from this election.

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MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, Dec. 19...A new analysis of the Sephardi vote in Israel's Knesset election this past July reveals that Sephardim on the whole rejected the concept of ethnic party lists, voting heavily instead for the mainstream Likud Party over the Labor Alignment by nearly three-to-one.

The study, titled, "The 'Sephardi-Oriental Vote' in the 1984 Elections," was released today by the American Jewish Committee's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, headed by Bertram H. Gold, former AJC executive vice president.

According to the report, the two Sephardi religious parties, Tami and Shas, did poorly among Sephardi voters. Tami, a breakaway party from the NRP (National Religious Party), received only 3.1 percent of the total Sephardi vote while Shas, a new party, won 6.4 percent of the overall Sephardi vote.

The study quotes Prof. Hanna Herzog, sociologist and anthropologist at Tel Aviv University, who noted, "Ethnic lists are a marginal issue on the Israeli political landscape. They serve as a tool for political bargaining and are used to form temporary and conditional alliances between political entrepeneurs. On the whole, ethnic political organizations are marginal in Israeli politics, but not ethnicity as a political resource."

The study reports that Sephardim cast 52.3 percent of their votes for Likud in 1984, compared with 19.7 percent for the Labor Alignment. This trend in support for Likud over Labor, the report indicates, first became visible after the 1973 War.

NOTE: For a copy of "The 'Sephardi-Oriental Vote' in the 1984 Elections," write to Morton Yarmon, American Jewish Committee, 165 E. 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022.

Before 1973, Likud averaged approximately 25 percent of the Sephardi vote, but by 1977 the Sephardi vote had accounted for 60 percent of the Likud's total and helped significantly in the formation of the first Likud Government in Israeli history. In 1981, the Sephardi vote for Likud had risen to 70 percent.

The study adds: "Surveys had shown that Labor suffered from an image of being unsympathetic to the Sephardim and largely responsible for feelings of past discrimination."

Vestiges of such discrimination may be discerned in the report's profile on the ethnic background of the new Knesset, which points out that only 26 percent of the Knesset's 120 members are of Sephardi-Oriental descent in a nation where Sephardim and Orientals comprise a majority of the population.

More positively, the study concludes, early predictions of inter-ethnic conflicts erupting during the campaign proved unfounded, leaving hope that such tensions may be abating as the socio-economic gap continues to narrow between the Sephardim and the Ashkenazim of European descent.

The American Jewish Committee is this country's pioneer human relations organization. Founded in 1906, it combats bigotry, protects the civil and religious rights of people here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people everywhere.

#84-960-480

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CPA

CONFERENCE ON ASHKENAZI-SEPHARDI RELATIONS IN ISRAEL

Wednesday, June 12, 1985 10:00 A.M. - 4:00 P.M.

A R C H I V

SPONSORS

Department of International Relations
The American Jewish Committee

Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations

International Sephardic Education Foundation

Institute of Human Relations
The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Luncheon Session

Morning Session

CHAIR: Stuart E. Eizenstat, Chairman, U.S. Advisory Bd Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations

PRESENTATIONS:

Ethnic Relations in Israel in the Wake of the 1984 Elections.

Maurice Roumani, Visiting Professor, Georgetown University; Director, Eliachar Center for Studies in Sephardi Heritage, Ben Gurion University

Eastern and Western Jewry Meet in Israeli Schools: Retrospect and Prospect

David Harman, Visiting Professor, Teachers College, Columbia University; Professor of Education, Hebrew University

Comments

Daniel Serfaty, Doctoral Candidate, University of Connecticut

DISCUSSION

CHAIR: Nina A. Weiner, President

International Sephardic Education Foundation

PRESENTATIONS:

The Personal Experiences of a Moroccan-born Jewish Immigrant in Israel's Educational System.

Raphael Israeli, Visiting Scholar, Harvard University; Senior Lecturer in Islamic Civilization, Hebrew University.

Some Present Ethnic Problems and Possible Solutions - A Student's Perspective.

Yossi Yonah, Ph.D. Candidate in Social Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania.

DISCUSSION

Afternoon Session

CHAIR: Leo Nevas, Chairman, Commission on International Relations, The American Jewish Committee

PRESENTATION:

Agendas for a New Partnership: Implications of Israel's Changing Society for Relations Between American Jews and Israelis.

Eliezer Jaffe, Associate Pofessor of Social Work, Hebrew University.

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date January 9, 1985

to Shula Bahat

from M. Bernard Resnikoff

subject Board of Governors Institute (BOG 85-27)

In our telephone conversation of January 7, we talked once again about the possibility of planting JNF trees and I understood your final decision to be negative. This corresponds with the results of a conversation I had

with Dave Gordis when he was here, where we agreed that such an activity is just a little too touristy and maybe even a little bit "kitsh". And so I agree that the decision is a right one

is a right one.

And yet -- and yet.

I want to report to you and others that I represented the American Jewish Committee yesterday at the dedication of the Senator Henry M. Jackson Memorial Forest. This dedication was in the presence of Mrs. Jackson, Ambassador Lewis and his wife Sally, Abe Harman, Moshe Arens and others. The dedication took place in the American Independence Park, which was established on the bi-centennial of the U.S. and officially inaugurated on July 4, 1976. It reflects a living testimonial to the friendship between Israel and the U.S. In the presence of that august company, I was asked to read prayers in Hebrew and English; I did so and I am attaching copies of the prayer.

I must tell you, Shula, that even hardened jaded, veteran professionals are capable of being moved. It is something altogether appropriate for Senator Jackson to be so memorialized and it was altogether appropriate for Americans to participate in that program and, in this way, to enliven and enrich the American Independence Park. It was, by all counts, a deeply moving and appropriate experience.

And so, I agree with you that the decision not to have tree planting for the Board of Governors was correct. But I wish we weren't.

In a related development, Bookie at one time suggested planting trees in the forest named after Martin Luther King. What is said above for Jackson applies for King as well. And so, I am dropping the whole idea from the Board Institute program -- but my heart is not in it.

Encl.

cc/encl.

Marc Tanenbaum/George Gruen Hyman Bookbinder

ARCHIVES

HEAVENLY FATHER

Thou who buildest Zion and Jerusalem Take pleasure in Thy land And bestow upon it of Thy goodness And Thy grace.

Give dew for a blessing
And cause beneficent rains
To fall in their season,
To satiate the mountains of Israel
And her valleys,
And to water thereon
Every plant and tree.
And these saplings
Which we plant before thee this day,

in the

SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON

MEMORIAL FOREST

Make deep their roots
And wide their crown,
That they may blossom forth in grace
Amongst all the trees in Israel,
For good and for beauty.

And strengthen the hands
Of all our brethren,
Who toi! to revive the sacred soil
And make fruitful its wastes.
Bless, o Lord, their might,
And may the work of their hands
Find favour before Thee.

Look down from Thy holy habitation, From heaven, And bless this land That it may flow again With milk and honey.

Amen.



PAIE CRIADOR QUE ESTAS NO CÉU:

Tu que constróis Zion e Jerusalém, E que ergueste de novo a soberania De Israel — Olha de Tua habitação celeste E abençoa Teu povo, Israel — E a terra que nos deste Na promessa feita a nossos Antepassados.

Alegra-te, oh Senhor, na Tua terra, Dá-lhe de Tua bondade e de Tua Graça.
Abençoa a terra com o orvalho, Dá-lhe o benefício das chuvas no Tempo propício
Para saciar os montes e os vales de Israel,
Para regar cada planta e cada Árvore
E êstes brotos que plantamos diante De Ti neste dia

Faz com que sejam fundas as suas Raízes e amplas as suas copas; Que floresçam em Tua graça, Entre tôdas as árvores de Israel, Dando bênção e beleza.

Fortelece os braçaos de todos os Irmãos Que trabalham esta terra santa E devolvem or êrmo à fertilidade.

Abençoa, Senhor, seus esforços, E dispensa Teu favor ao labor de Suas mãos.

Amém.

HEMELSE VADER.

U, die Zion en Jeruzalem bouwt, U, die er genot in schept Uw land te zien opbloeien, Het zegent met Uw goedheid en Genade.

Geef op tijd dauw en regen Om de heuvels en valleien Van Israel te besproeien, Om iedere plant en boom te Drenken, Vooral deze jonge boompjes, Welke wij deze dag voor U planten.

Moge zij wortel schieten En tot flinke krachtige bomen Uitgroeien, Te midden van de andere bomen In het land van Israel.

Geef kracht, O Heer,
Aan al degenen die het Land
Bebouwen
En zegen de arbeid van hun
Handen,
Opdat het land weer vruchtbaar
Worde
En weer overvloeie
Van melk en honing.

Amen!



PADRE NOSTRO,

Tu che edificasti Sion E Gerusalemme Godi della Tua terra E concedile la Tua Bontà E la Tua Grazia

Dai la rugiada come benedizione E fa cadere le pioggie benefiche Nelle loro stagioni Per dissetare le montagne E le valli d'Israele Ed irrigare ogni pianta Ed ogni albero.

E a questi arbusti
Che piantiamo oggi
Rafforza le radici
Allargane le corone
Affinché fioriscano con grazia
Fra gli alberi d'Israele
Che portano abbondanza e bellezza!
Rafforza le mani
Dei nostri fratelli
Che faticano per far rivivere il suolo
E far fiorire i nostri deserti.

Benedici o Signore, il loro potere E possa l'opera delle loro mani Ottenere la Tua Grazia.

Guarda dall'alto del Tuo Cielo E benedici questa terra Affinché vi scorra nuovamente Latte e miele.

Amen!

CC. Sordis Traster Garner

VIA FAX

TO:

Marc Tanenbaum

FROM:

M. Bernard Resnikoff

DATE:

January 15, 1985

Within hours following receipt of the news release and your covering memo, the news release was reproduced in quantity and distributed, by a team of couriers, to the following, among others:

- over one hundred to Jerusalem reporters, both local and foreign, correspondents, the Prime Minister and other ministers, aides to these ministers, other American Jewish organizations, legislative whips and all members of the Knesset. In addition, there was extensive and additional distribution of the cable Dave sent out on December 27 on the same issue of the proposed changes to the Law of Return



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Rabbi Tannenbaum

7002 E. Opatas Place Tueson, Arizona 85715 January 16, 1985

The Prime Minister of Israel, if news reports are to be believed, has just been warned by the American Secretary of State that Israel will receive no further American aid unless it "takes care of its economic and social problems" (i.e the American Flag and the American Family). Americans may wonder at the motives of their Secretary of State in giving this warning. Obstainly he must be aware that similar pressures by the Carter Administration caused the political demise of Golda Meir, Menachem Begin, Ariel Sharon, and Carter, and the violent death of Anwar Sadat. Perhaps George Schultz is another Machiavelli who wishes to destroy Israel and thus relieve our government of an unwanted financial burden. Or perhaps like Jimmy Carter, he has borrowed large sums for his own husiness ventures using the American Flag as collateral. Or perhaps the large manufacturer of defense equirment which employed him before he sought government service has raised venture capital by promising its investors that the American Flag will be used to pay the interest to the bond holders.

It is difficult to believe that George Schultz has the best interest of the United States in mind in devising his foreign policy. Israel is a valuable and loyal ally of our country and has much to contribute to the future prosperity of the peoples of the Middle East. Her friendship is more valuable to the defense of the United States than any esoteric weapon which a defense manufacturer might produce. Perhaps the true explanation is that George Schulz is a politically naive man unaware of the realities of Israel's history.

When Israel was declared an independent state in 1948, a delegation was sent to President Truman to beg permission for Israel to use the American Flag as their own flag. This permission had already been granted to the fifty one countries which became members of the United Nations in 1945. Truman was reluctant to grant this permission, believing that it would lead to trouble for the United States, both internally and externally. He was aware that our country was settled primarily by Christian Protestants fleeing from the tyranny of the Catholic Church and wealthy Jewish bankers and industrial agits in Europe. Until the 20th century membership and high office in the Masonic Order, (which organized the American Revolution) was a prerequisite for holding political office in the United States. Although Jews and Catholics were admitted at their own request, they were not permitted to rise in the hierarchy due to fear that their loyalty would be divided. Their loyal service in the American armed forces during both Warld Wars allayed much of this suspicion and provided them with the organizational skills, attain political power.

Truman finally gave in to political pressure from American Jews and granted the privilege they sought. Israel, protected in this manner, survived the difficult days of its infancy and prospered and grew. However it was not long before Truman's fears were realized. America and her family became embroiled not only in the struggles between Israel and her Arab neighbors, but also in the internal political battles of Israel. Delegations of rich Arabs were sent to the cities where America and her Family resided to bribe government officals with large campaign contributions. Israel sent its army officers in mufti to organize local Jewish communities to attack, capture or destroy America and her Family. Jewish journalists, industrialist, professionals and academicians have used their prestige to defame and slander the American Flag in the eyes of the American People.

At Camp David both Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin were finally persuaded by President Carter to sign a agreement abandoning the American Flag with the intention of destroying her and using her to fund the coffers of all three governments; an agreement which was unenforcable, and which resulted in the political demise of all three leaders. Their fate should serve as a lesson to all Israeli and American Jews that if they wish to continue to enjoy the considerable benefits and advantages which have resulted from the protection of the American Flag, they must cease their attacks upon her and the institutions which she protects, they must live up to the oaths of allegiance which they have repeatedly sworn, and they must become loyal and responsible citizens of their country.

Respectfully submitted,

Cuily Words Blanco

Dr. Cicely Woods Hlanco Doctor of Economic Theory

[end]

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Dear Marc,



האגודה להבנה בינדתית בישראל جمعية المؤاخاة بين الأديان في اسرائيل THE ISRAEL INTERFAITH ASSOCIATION

At our meeting in New York with Gerhard, we discussed the possibility

of ITCIC. You expressed your understanding of our problems and agreed to bring the proposal before your colleagues. Meanwhile time is passing and our position is getting serious. We would like to know whether you have any reply for us. Perhaps we could discuss it further on your

of ongoing support for the Interfaith Association from the members

forthcoming visit to Jerusalem. We would like to meet you, and any

your stay in Jerusalem and hope you will find the time.

Looking forward to hearing from and seeing you.

other representatives of the Committee you may deem appropriate, during

Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum the American Jewish Committee 165 E 56th st. New York, New York U.S.A.

January 16th, 1985

Ref. 6.70.4.10

מר שניאור זלמו אברמוב הרב ד"ר ישראל גולדשטייו שייד מוחמד חוביישי ח.כ. חמד חלאילה מר יוסף חמיס מונסיניור אוגוסטין תרפוש מר שמואל טולידנו השופט חיים כהן פרופ' בנימין מזר ארכיבישוף מכסימוס סלום פרופ' עקיבא ארנסט סימון שייך מוסא אל־עטאוונה שייך תופיק מחמוד עסליה מר טדי קולק הרב פרופ' מנחם עמנואל רקמן ד"ר נתן א. שוראקי

> יו"ר המועצה שייד פריד וג'די טברי

נשיאות הכבוד שייד לביב אבו רכו

יו"ר הועד המנהל פרופי ר.י. צבי ורבלובסקי

> מזכיר כללי מר יוסף עמנואל

الرئاسة الفخرية

فضيلة الشيخ فريد وجدي الطبري

المحامى شنؤر زلمان ابراموب

عطوقة المطران اغوسطين حرقوش عطوفة المطران مك إلبروفسور عقيبا ارنست السيد شموئيل طوليدانو الشيخ موسى العطاونة فضيلة الشيخ توفيق محمود عسلية الحاخام الدكتور يسرائيل غولدشتين القاضى حييم كوهين السيد تيدي كوليا البروفيسور بنيامين مزار الحاخام البروفيسور مناحيم ع. رقما الدكتور أ. شوراقي

JW/rp

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CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

PROFESSOR R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY

SECRETARY GENERAL MR. JOSEPH EMANUEL

JAN 23 1985

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المكتب الرئيسي : شارع رداك ١٤ صندوق بريد ٩ ٧٧٣ القدس_منطقة رقم ١٠٧٧ ٩ המשרד הראשי: רחי רדייק 14 ת.ד. 7739, ירושלים 91077

THE AMERICAN JEWISH

date

January 18, 1985

to

M. Bernard Resnikoff

from

Yaacov Pnini

subject

Vacation

Following preliminary consultations, I now confirm in writing that I will be taking the month of March for my regular vacation.

cc:

Shula Bahat

Inge Lederer-Gibel

Marc Tanenbaum/David Harris

JAN 23 1985

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date Jan. 23, 1985

to Marc

from Mort

subject

The attached came in this morning from Kanovsky. You will find it interesting, and perhaps useful for your own work.



Economic legacy of Camp David

By ELLAHU KANOVSKY

VOLUMES have been written about Israel's economic crisis, its causes, and proposed solutions. Rarely is any mention made of the crushing economic burden borne by Israel to this day, as a consequence of the Camp David Accords. Let me say at the outset that, in my view, if, as we all hope, the agreement with Egypt prevents hostilities and saves lives, now and in future, this is a very great blessing.

Egypt received, gratis, very valuable assets, developed by Israel, in the Sinai Peninsula, especially the military bases, and the Alma oil field, while Israel was left with burdensome, long-term economic liabilities, which will be enumerated below. Many in Israel had hoped that economic relations with Egypt would rapidly develop, compensating, in part, for its economic losses. In my studies (published by the Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation in 1978 and in 1980), I expressed the view that the prospective gains from economic relations with Egypt would be minor, even in the absence of political impediments, other than the possibility that the agreement might allow Israel, as well as Egypt. to significantly reduce their huge military outlays. This has not come to

I am not privy to what transpired at Camp David, other than the published reports, which indicated that the Israeli delegation was under intense pressure to make concessions. However, I have the distinct impression that the Israeli leaders at Camp David had little understanding of the long-term consequences of the economic aspects of the agreement.

The Alma oil field, which Israel had developed following its withdrawal from the Abu Rhodeis oil field in 1975, was producing about two million tons annually, about one-fourth of Israel's oil consumption. There were very good prospects for continued growth in production. Moreover, the withdrawal

from the Alma oil field in 1979 was concurrent with the rapid escalation in world oil prices that followed the Iranian revolution. As a consequence Israel's fuel imports skyrocketed from \$775 million in 1978 to over \$2 billion in 1980 and again in 1981. (All the figures are from Bank of Israel reports.)

To put these figures into perspective. U.S. grants in 1979-81 averaged \$1,479 million per annum. as compared with \$1,046 million in 1978. The enormous increment in the oil bill greatly added to inflationary pressures and to the deterioration in the balance of payments.

Egypt's "concession" that it would sell to Israel two million tons per annum at market prices, was, and is, of dubious value. At their peak (the first quarter of 1981) Egyptian prices were about equal to or higher than the spot market prices where oil is readily available to any buver. Since that time Egyptian prices have often exceeded spot market prices. Fortunately, there has been a radical change in world oil markets since 1981, and Israel's payments for fuel imports significantly dropped to \$1.6 billion in 1983, and I surmise that they were even lower in 1984. I anticipate now, as I have during the past few years, that oil

prices will continue to decline. While the burden of oil imports is diminishing, the burden of interest payments on loans from the U.S. Government taken as a consequence of Camp David is rising, and will continue for many years. Loans from the U.S. Government received during and after the Yom Kippur war were given at low rates of interest. Thus Israel's loan repayments in 1974 were \$229 million, of which \$155 million was on account of principal, and \$74 million on account of interest. In 1978 loan repayments to the U.S. Government were \$424 million, of which \$225 million was on account of principal, and \$199 million on account of interest. Following the Camp David agreement, the loans were at very high rates of interest. In 1983 Israel's loan repayments to the U.S. Government reached \$927 million of which \$772 million (83 per cent) was on account of interest, and only \$155 million on account of principal.

What is even more distressing is that even if no additional loans are received from the U.S. Government (i.e., all future aid will be in the form of grants), the annual interest payments alone, on past loans, aside from principal, will be \$800 million or more per annum for the next 10 or 15 years.

A MAJOR part of these most burdensome loans was a consequence of the Camp David agreement. Not only had Israel handed over very valuable economic assets, without compensation, but it also had to undertake, from its own resources. the relocation of its armed forces to the Negev. as well as very onerous loans to finance, in part, the two air bases built by American firms in the Negev, and other expenditures related to the Camp David agreement.

I hope that this is not misinterpreted as an expression of ingratitude. Israelis have every reason to be grateful for American aid. However. Israel faces a most onerous military burden, which requires it to allocate 15-16 per cent of its own resources (over and above total U.S. aid) to defence, in the decade since the Yom Kippur war. If one adds repavment of debts incurred on account of military loans from the U.S., the ratio rises to 20 per cent in recent years. By way of comparison, the U.S. defence budget is 6-7 per cent of its GNP; for the Nato countries in Europe the military budget is equivalent to about 4 per cent of. their GNP; and in Japan, a meagre 1 per cent. The small defence burdens of the Western European countries. and especially of Japan, arise from their defence treaties with the U.S. and their assurance of American protection from foreign aggression.

It makes good economic sense for a country to accept foreign loans for the expansion of its productive capacity and export potential. If the investment projects are selected wisely and implemented efficiently, the country's export earnings will grow, and it will have the wherewithal to repay the principal plus interest, and profit as well. However, for a country to accept loans of the kind undertaken after Camp David. especially if it is already bearing a crushing burden of defence, defies economic rationality, as well as any sense of equity.

The \$800 million in interest payments to the U.S. Government annually for the next 10 or 15 years, is a terrible burden. The present government is talking of budgetary cuts on the order of \$1.5 billion, and it will be an achievement if, in fact, half of that figure is realized. Even a budgetary cutback of \$750 million will entail severe unemployment, additional hardships for the poorer groups in society, and much social unrest. We are already witnessing these developments. It is easy for economists, including this writer,

and others, to advocate severe cuts in government expenditures. For the weaker elements in society the consequences will be heart-rending. None should be envious of the political leaders who are charged with administering the bitter medicine.

None of what I have said should be interpreted as justifying, as it were, the many sins of omission and commission in the economic realm on the ! part of past Israeli Governments. In . order to face the challenges a basic! restructuring of the economy is required. Many economists have suggested various measures towards that end, and I could add a few of my ' own. But a basic restructuring is a longer-term process. In the short run ; there is no visible alternative to! drastic and painful budgetary cuts and lower real wages, with all their severe social effects.

The economic legacy of Camp David has added significantly to this heavy burden. Recriminations about the past will not help solve the present crisis, but it is wise to put things into proper perspective.

The writer is chairman of the department of economics at Bar-llan University.

BOARD INSTITUTE IN ISRAEL

January 31 - February 10, 1985

TENTATIVE AGENDA

Thursday, January 31

6:30 PM

Departure - From JFK Airport with El Al #004 (or as individually arranged with travel agent)

Friday, February 1

11:45 AM

5:00 PM

Arrival - At Ben-Gurion Airport

Early evening Shabbat Dinner

Theodore Ellenoff David Gordis

Discussion re:

Parina

Saturday, February 2

11:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.

Brunch

Israel's Political Landscape 1985

Discussion with prominent political
Analyst: Dr. Shlomo Avineri

Concurrent Discussions & Briefing on Current Internal Political Situation with leading experts.

Dr. Yaron Ezrahi - Dr. Ehud Sprinzak Dr. Itzhak Galnoor - Yanet Aviue

Optional walking tour of old Jerusalem

12:30 - 2:30 P.M.

Afternoon

Saturday, February 2 - Cont'd

5:00 P.M.

Cocktail Reception & Dinner

The Mood & Challenges of Israeli Society

Speaker: Chaim Herzog, President of Israel

Discussion

Sunday, February 2

8:30 AM

Israel's Social Challenges: Intergroup Relations in Israel

Plenary Breakfast - with noted Israeli sociologist

Rivka Bar-Yosef or Shmuel Eizenstadt

Concurrent Meetings:

Western & Eastern Jews

Yohanan Peres - Pnina Talmon

Jews. Arabs & Druze

Shmuel Toledano - Zaidan Atashi -Rafik Halabi

Orthodox & Secular

Zev Shternhel - Adin Steinzalz Plenary Luncheon:

- Reports of groups
- Panel discussion: Intergroup Relations: The American & Israeli Experience - Implications for AJC

Dr. Efraim Ya'ar and AJC Leaders

**Announcement of the establishment of a Conference Center on Pluralism for projects dealing with intergroup understanding.

10:00 A.M.

12 Noon - 2:00 PM

Sunday, February 2 - Cont'd

Afternoon

Folubar

Group Visits related to intergroup relations:

- 1. Moshav Aviezer, settled originally by Jews from Cochin, India as well as Jews from other ethnic origins who settled at a later time.
- 2. Visit to Abu-bosh, an Arab village outside of Jerusalem with a long history of friendly Arab-Jewish relations.

3. Visit Kfar Zacharia a moshav settled by Jews from Kurdistan.

4. Visit But Hillel

Reception at Zalman Abramov's home

8:00 PM

Monday, February 3

8:00 AM

10:00 AM

12:00 Noon - 2:30 PM

Religious Pluralism in Israel Plenary Breakfast

Discussion with Dr. David Hartman on issues such as Who is a Jew? The Law or Return

Concurrent visits with leaders of religious movements & groups including representatives of Orthodox, Conservative & Reform movements. "Gesher" etc.

Plenary Luncheon

Reports of Groups

- *Discussion with Professor Itzhak Zamir, legal advisor to the Israeli government
- *Panel discussion re: Implications for American Jewry & AJC's role

Monday, February 3 - Cont'd

**Statement on Religious Pluralism

5:00 PM

Meeting with leaders of Bet Shemesh, a development town near Jerusalem

7:00 PM

Dinner - Kibbutz Hulda Dining Hall

Discussion with:

Israeli authors Amos Oz - A. B. Yehushua - Dalia Ravikowitz & Eli Amir on Israeli & American Perspectives on challenges facing world Jewry.

AMERICAN

Tuesday, February 5

8:00 A.M.

The Palestinian issues - Jewish & Arab Perspectives

Delegations of AJC leaders to West Bank and Gaza to meet with Palestinian leaders and Jewish leaders including tour of the West Bank highlighting the geographical dimensions of various proposed pland for the West Bank (Alon plan, etc.)

Plenary Lunch: reports of delegations

Prospects for Peace - Panel
Discussion with representatives of
the various peace movements:

Avraham Burg - Mordecai Bar-on -Muhammud Nasser - Mordecai Virshuvsky & AJC leaders

11:00 PM - 3:00 PM

Tuesday, February 5 - Cont'd

6:00 PM

The implications of fundamentalism on the political situation in the Middle East

Discussion with Professor Dan Shiftan & Itamar Rabinowitz of the Shiloach Institute, Tel Aviv University

Reception & Visit to the Israel Museum

8:00 PM

Wednesday, February 6

8:00 AM

Concurrent Breakfast meetings at the

Knesset with representatives of various political parties to discuss issues of

mutual concern.

Avraham Shapira (Agudat Israel) -Shitrit (Likud) Rafi Adar Ezer Weizman (Labor) - Amnon Rubinstein (Shineu) Yehuda Ben-Meir (National Religious Party) Shulamit Aloni (Civil Rights Movement) Chaya Grossman (Mapam), etc.

DR

Concurrent meetings with various Knesset Committees

AJC memorial service at Yad Vashem

11:00 AM

Wednesday, February 6 - Cont'd

12:00 Noon

Plenary Luncheon

American Jews & Israelis: What Divides Us - What Unites Us

Panel Discussion re: Interdependence & Mutual Responsibility Uni Cordon

Afternoon

Optional Visit to archeological discoveries

6:00 PM

Evening Reception and Dinner at Knesset with Israel's political leadership

Speaker: Shimon Peres - Prime Minister of Israel

Thursday, February 7

8:00 AM

Plenary Breakfast

Israel's Foreign Policy

Discusson with Itzhak Shamir, Israel's Foreign Minister

Travel to Tel Aviv

U.S. - Israel Relations - Current Issues

Meeting at American Embassy with Sam Lewis, the American Ambassador and staff.

11:00 AM

Thursday, February 7 - Cont'd

12:30 PM

Plenary Luncheon

Israel's Financial & Economic

Concerns

Meeting with Minister Itzhak Modai & Israeli business leaders & Dan Tolkovski or Eli Hurowitz

2:30 PM

ATC'S Pole

5:00 PM

Concurrent visits to high tech industries in the Tel Aviv area.

Return to Jerusalem

Reception at the Tel Aviv

Friday, February 8

8:00 AM

Plenary Breakfast

Discussion with Itzhak Rabin, Israel's Minister of Defense, on Israel's defense and security needs

Visits to:

- 1. The Jacob Blaustein Institute For Desert Research in Sde Boker
- Israel's educational & cultural challenges (confronting modernity and continuing tradition) Meeting with: Minister Itzhak Navon

Education

Friday, February 8 - Cont'd

6:00 PM

Evening Shabbat Dinner

We Are One...Or Are We?

Perspective on Zionism Today

Panel discussion: AJC Leaders, Israeli Counterparts, including members of IAJIR Israeli Board & Associates

Reservice, Moste

Michael

Monde

Saturday, February 9

AMERICAN JEWISH

Shabbath Services

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Meting

11:00 A.M.

12:00 Noon

Briefing re: Delegations to Europe

Plenary Luncheon

AJC's Prospective Role in Israel

5:00 P.M.

7:00 P.M.

Cocktail Reception

Farewell Party

Guest of Honor: Zalman Abramov

Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of AJC's Israel Office

Sunday, February 10

Morning

Departure of Delegations to Italy, Hungary, Spain or return to US

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W. • SUITE 412 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 • (202) 638-2256

MEMORANDUM

February 14, 1985

To: Key Contacts and Community Leaders

From: Lori Posin, Community Contacts Coordinator

Julie Spiegel, Assistant Community Contacts Coordinator

Re: Preparation for the Months Ahead

The 99th Congress has convened. Already we are in the midst of confronting Israel's economic crisis and Saudi Arabia's latest demands for sophisticated U.S. arms. Once again, we will need your help this year as you meet with Members of Congress to discuss the issues.

As you may have heard, the Administration has delayed any formal proposal to sell Saudi Arabia the multibillion dollar arms package they desire which includes 40 F-15 jet fighters and thousands of missiles. The Administration is currently conducting a review of its arms sales policy in the region, the results of which will be announced in a few weeks time. Although there has been a postponement, we fully expect a Saudi arms sale will be proposed in the weeks ahead.

We must not waste precious moments--now is the time to educate ourselves, Members of Congress and those in our communities about why this sale is not only unnecessary and undeserving, but how it also endangeres Israel's security and economic recovery.

In addition, we must emphasize the painstaking measures Israel is taking in order to put her economic house in order. Particularly at a time when we see Israel's willingness to solve this crisis we cannot deny her the vital economic aid she needs.

Attached for your information are background materials including: memorandum, "Israel Makes Progress on Economy", "Why Sell More Arms to Saudi Arabia," an article reprinted from the Chicago Tribune, "Saudi Arms on Hold," and "More Military Aid for Saudi Arabia?" from the Washington Times. For your own reference you will also find information regarding the 99th Congress; a list of new Members of Congress, Jewish members, and key Senate and House committees and subcommittees.

If you should need any additional information or have questions about the attached material, please feel free to contact us. We appreciate your support and enthusiasm and look forward to working with you this year as we face the challenges that lie ahead.

JS:tnd Attachments

February 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM

Israel Makes Progress on Economy

Economic stability is being restored to Israel.

The monthly inflation rate plunged from October's high of 24.3% to December's low of 3.7%, the lowest level in 18 months. That was largely the result of a historic pact known as the "Package Deal" agreed to by the government, the workers' union, and the manufacturers association. Under this agreement, prices were frozen, workers' monthly cost of living adjustments were reduced by one third, and taxes were frozen for three months.

There is also encouraging progress on the trade front. Recently released 1984 figures reveal that Israel was able to reduce its trade deficit by almost a third, an improvement of \$1 billion over the previous year. Exports of goods rose by 13% and exports of high-tech, science-based products increased by an impressive 21%. This demonstrates that despite Israel's economic problems, the country has a vibrant export sector which continues to thrive and shows great promise for the future.

In order to keep up the progress, the government has concluded a second "Package Deal" to continue to cool off inflation; large budget cuts including reducing subsidies on basic commodities; and further austerity measures to cut wages, conserve foreign exchange, and reduce the balance of payments deficit.

PACKAGE DEAL II

Package Deal II is an eight month pact, from Feb. 5 to Oct. 5, 1985, with the possibility of revision or termination by any of the three parties in July.

Package Deal II's main features are the following:

1. Controlled price increases averaging 3-5% per month.

2. Reduction of government subsidies on basic goods and services. Workers will be compensated for price increases on these previously subsidized goods by several lump sum payments (\$2-\$10) rather than receiving a fully indexed cost of living adjustment, breaking the past pattern of near complete indexation of workers' wages to price increases.

3. Unlike Package Deal I, there will no longer be a

3. Unlike Package Deal I, there will no longer be a freeze on government-imposed taxes. It is expected that taxes on luxury goods will rise and user fees will be imposed for

services currently provided free by the government.

BUDGET CUTS

For the coming Israeli fiscal year (beginning April 1, 1985), the Cabinet has approved a \$23 billion budget with about \$2.3 billion in cuts from the current spending level. This is a reduction of about 18% from the operational budget, since about half of the \$23 billion goes to paying back debts.

Included in the cuts is a \$1.2 billion slash in subsidies. Every Israeli will be affected by these cuts, which include:

-- an immediate termination of all subsidies for fuel

-- halving the water subsidies

-- increasing the price of industrial electricity by 54% and electricity for home use by 25%

-- increasing the price of subsidized food by up to 13%.
per month

-- increasing public transportation fares by 55%.

The government also plans to cut about \$1.1 billion in program expenditures, including:

-- cutting the defense budget by \$300 million in addition to the \$300 million cut in last year's military budget. The Defense Minister has called such drastic cuts unprecedented and has warned that the cuts will affect the welfare of soldiers and the level of national security.

-- education funds will be cut severely. Hundreds of teachers will be fired and thousands of instruction hours eliminated. For the first time, it is expected that there

will be tuition fees for public school education.

-- other cuts will come in the areas of health programs, housing, aid to local communities, and investment.

LATEST AUSTERITY MEASURES

On Feb. 5, the government announced further emergency measures to prevent continued erosion of Israel's essential reserves of foreign currency and improve Israel's balance of payments, while simultaneously increasing government revenue.

-- a 40% deposit imposed on luxury and consumer goods has now been raised to 60%. This fee will be reduced 3% per month over the coming year.

-- the current travel tax will be doubled.

-- a 15% levy on imported services imposed last fall will now be extended to the purchase of travel tickets.

-- a tax of 3% will be imposed on the purchase of cars,

boats, private planes.

-- The Bank of Israel will stop paying interest on new "patam" or dollar-linked accounts for periods less than a year. The purpose of this measure is to reduce the amount of money in Israelis' hands which would be used for inflationary spending or for buying scarce dollars. It is also expected to increase savings and increase monetary stability.

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

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January 30, 1985

WHY SELL MORE ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA?

On February 11, King Fahd will arrive in Washington with a shopping list of new weapons to add to Saudi Arabia's already bulging arsenal. He wants more F-15s - this time with ground attack capabilities. He wants more Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft missiles - the ideal terrorist weapon. And he wants thousands more Sidewinder air-to-air missiles - to stockpile 30 missiles for every Saudi F-15 (more than double the USAF's 13 per aircraft).

THEY DON'T NEED THEM

These new requests come in the wake of a \$16 billion, 12-year Saudi spending spree which has already equipped the Kingdom's armed forces with more weapons than they can possibly absorb. Since 1973, in imitation of the Shah of Iran, Saudi Arabia has signed contracts for almost \$50 billion in US military contracts, plus billions more from Western European sources. The Saudis simply do not need more weapons:

- o According to Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan, "Our Air Force currently possesses all the methods and means to tackle any air attack..." (Al-Watan Al-Arabi, January 14, 1985)
- o If the current threat is Iran, the Saudi Air Force already operates 200 advanced combat aircraft compared to Iran's 70. And as the Saudis demonstrated when they shot down an Iranian fighter in June 1984, they are quite capable of defending themselves against Iran with existing equipment.
- o If the future threat is Iraq, the Saudis could easily avoid this problem by stopping payment for the aircraft that Baghdad is now acquiring.

THEY DON'T DESERVE THEM

In 1981, President Reagan persuaded the Senate to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia on the explicit assurance that the Saudis would provide "substantial assistance" to the United States in promoting peace in the Middle East. Since then, Saudi Arabia has actually helped to undermine every American peace initiative in the region.

- o They opposed the Camp David process, punishing Egypt for making peace with Israel. The Saudis continue to obstruct Egypt's efforts to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Arab world because it signed the Camp David Accords.
- o They thwarted the Reagan Plan by threatening King Hussein with economic sanctions if he entered negotiations with Israel and by repeatedly undermining his efforts to overcome a PLO veto.

- o They undermined US policy in Lebanon by refusing to fulfill an explicit promise to use their financial leverage on Syria to persuade it to withdraw. Instead, after the United States had negotiated an agreement for Israeli withdrawal, they urged Washington to scrap the accord and then denounced the US presence in Lebanon as "a true shame" (Washington Post, February 3, 1984).
- o They encouraged PLO rejectionism by refusing to pressure Arafat to support the Reagan Plan and by providing financial support for the continuation of the PLO's "armed struggle" long after most of the Arab world has ceased to do so.

Moreover, the Saudis have acted against American interests in other vital areas.

- o They have maintained artificially high oil prices by drastically cutting their own oil production and pressuring other producers to follow suit.
- o They have obstructed an American strategic presence in the Gulf by refusing to host American bases and by acquiescing in a Kuwaiti-led effort to bribe Oman to cancel its access agreements with the United States.
- o They have subsidized massive Soviet arms purchases by Syria and Iraq. At the same time, they have canceled aid to Egypt because it made peace with Israel and threatened Jordan with economic sanctions for daring to contemplate Egypt's example.

THEY SHOULDN'T GET THEM

Saudi Arabia's failure to fulfill its part of the AWACS bargain and its undermining of American interests should not be rewarded by further sales of sophisticated American weaponry.

- o It will send the wrong signal by confirming the Saudi perception of the U.S. that "you are just arms salesmen and we pay cash" (New York Times, July 14, 1982). It will do nothing to encourage Saudi respect for American interests.
- o It will repeat the error of arming the Shah, diverting the Saudi regime's attention and resources from the very real internal threats to its stability
- o It will create a huge stockpile of the most sophisticated American weapons in a highly unstable region where terrorists and other enemies of the United States might well gain access.
- o It will increase the threat to Israel by markedly improving the ground attack and air-to-air combat capability of the Saudi Air Force which maintains air bases less than 10 minutes flying time from Israel. It will exacerbate Israel's economic problems by forcing it to divert even more resources to defense. It will also reduce Saudi Arabia's ability to resist pressure to join another war with Israel.

Saudi arms on hold

White House to act after Fahd visit

By Terry Atlas Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—The White House has decided to postpone action on Saudi Arabia's request for a multibillion-dollar package of U.S. arms, including 40 F-15 jet fighters, according to congressional and diplomatic sources.

The White House, while apparently favoring the sale, decided to delay the required congressional notification for at least six weeks, which would be after the planned state visit by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on Feb. 11.

The postponement apparently settles for now the internal administration debate about whether to use the royal visit to press for quick action on the sale or to yield to congressional leaders, including some Senate Republicans, who want the deal to be more politically "salable" through linkage to some fresh U.S. peace initiative in the Middle East.

An administration official said action on American arms sales to the Saudis and other friendly Arab nations had been delayed pending a "broad regional look at security-related issues" in the Middle East. He added, however, that the administration did not anticipate "any fundamental change in policy or commitments in the region."

The Washington Times reported Tuesday that the Saudi monarch might cancel his visit because of the administration's delay of the arms sale. But officials at the White House and State Department said they had no indications that the royal visit would not take place as scheduled. And a source close to the Saudis said flatly that the report was wrong.

The visit will be Fahd's first since 1977, when as crown prince he met with President Jimmy Carter. Reagan and Fahd met in 1981 during the North-South economic conference in Cancun, Mexico.

Reagan is expected to seek Fahd's help in reviving the President's Middle East peace plan. On the king's agenda, Saudi officials have said, are the Palestinian situation and Saudi security concerns raised by the Iran-Iraq war.

The Saudi arms package is reported to be almost as large as the country's \$8.5 billion purchase in 1982 of Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS] planes and other aircraft equipment.

In addition to the 40 F-15s, the Saudis are said to want about 3,000 Sidewinder air to-air missiles, 1,000 shoulder-fired Stinger antiaircraft missiles, an unspecified number of Maverick air-to-ground antitank missiles and multiple-ejection bomb racks for their F-15 jets. The Saudis bought 60 F-15s in 1978.

The arms sale, which has been pending for two years, is expected to draw opposition from Israel's friends in Congress. Some administration officials are concerned that a fight in Congress over the Saudi sale could jeopardize anticipated arms deals with other friendly Arab countries, such as Oman, Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait.

Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, visiting Washington this week, told senior administration officials that Israel strongly opposes American arms sales to any Arab country that, unlike Egypt, has failed to reach a peace accord with it. In reply, he was told the Saudi arms sale is important to reaffirm American ties with that country and to help bolster its defenses against the threat from Iran, according to an Israeli diplomatic source.

Late last week, Sen. Richard Lugar [R., Ind.], chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reflected the concern of many of his colleagues by saying he would be "very cautious" about approving the sale of the F-15s and other military hardware to the Saudis. He said he hoped the administration would move slowly and make the sale "part of a major policy initiative."

The Washington Times

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1985

• Q&A / 3D • CLASSIFIED / 4D-8D

COMMENTARY

PAGE 1

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DANIEL PIPES

More military aid for Saudi Arabia?

ing Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who is to arrive in Washington today, brings a shopping list for arms totaling at least \$3 billion. He is asking for F-15 fighter airplanes, Sidewinder missiles, M-1 tanks, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), and a great many lesser weapons. The Reagan administration has decided to institute a comprehensive review before responding to his request.

What will follow should the United States agree to sell the king what he is seeking? Paradoxically, the two countries' ties will not improve; more likely, they will be damaged.

This is exactly what happened after Saudi Arabia won the right to purchase five AWACS in October 1981. Although supporters of the sale predicted an upturn in relations with Saudi Arabia, the reverse took place: the Saudis immediately undertook unfriendly steps. They charged \$2 more per barrel of oil just one day after the Senate vote, forcing the price to an all-time high of \$34 a barrel. Within a month, they gave more than \$28 million to the Palestine Liberation Organization and participated in an urgent campaign against Oman's agreement to cooperate militarily with the United

These three policies — raising oil prices, aiding the PLO, and sabotaging American defense efforts in the Persian Gulf — were then repeated many times in subsequent

Saudi leaders also went out of their way to associate themselves with America's enemies, including Syria, Libya, and the Soviet Union. They supported the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and called for the withdrawal of American forces. Diplomatic relations with Libya were resumed in January 1982; contact with the Soviet Union began in mid-1983 for the first time in many years.

In addition, the Saudis obstructed the Reagan administration's two major initiatives for the Middle East. They pressured Jordan not to accept the Reagan plan and they endorsed Syrian opposition to the Lebanese-Israeli agreement of May 1983.

In return for the United States agreeing to sell its most advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia, the latter responded with an outpouring of unfriendly acts. Why?

Ingratitude and perfidy are not the explanation. Rather, the answer lies in the contrary needs of the Saudi and American governments.

In Riyadh, maintaining a distance from Washington has critical importance. Too close identification with a superpower makes a Moslem ruler vulnerable to the accusation of dissipating his sovereignty. Few things arouse a Moslem populace against the authorities so much as this. If the shah of Iran and Anwar Sadat forgot this lesson, Saudi monarchs remember to keep their distance, publicly at least, from the United States. For King Fahd to retain legitimacy, he cannot allow himself even the appearance of taking orders from . Washington. Thus, he demands that ; cooperation between the countries be limited and very quiet.

In the normal course of events, the American government goes out of its way to accommodate the Saudi need for secrecy. For example, the Saudis and other Arab states were granted the unique privilege of having the record of their investments in the United States kept confidential.

But because it requires congressional approval, sale of a major weapons system cannot be made quietly. Controversy over Saudi Arabia's friendliness toward the United States prompts intense debates — and publicity — about the wisdom of sharing with it the most advanced arms.

Congress initially balked at the Reagan administration proposal of the AWACS sale in 1981. To win approval, President Reagan assured the Senate that the AWACS would be transferred only after he had certified that "initiatives toward the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region have ... been accomplished with the substantial assistance of Saudi Arabia." In short, he publicly proclaimed that Saudi Arabia would continue to serve American diplomacy in the Middle Fast

This helped in Congress, but it threatened Saudi leaders in their own country. In response, the king asserted Saudi independence by taking a great number of unfriendly acts against the United States, and the two countries' relations sharply deteriorated.

he downward spiral that took place after October 1981 will presumably be repeated should the current Saudi arms request be granted. Again, the president will emphasize the Saudi government's utility and again this will provoke hostile Saudi actions.

If a steady partnership is ever to be built with Riyadh, it will be based on modest and discreet relations, not on weapons spectaculars.

Daniel Pipes is associate professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., and is editor of the Harvard Middle East Papers.

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Syria Is Next Step On Mideast Path

2.17.85

By Don Oberdorfer Washington Post Staff Writer

The immediate future of new Arab diplomacy with Israel hinges on decisions to be made in Syria, according to administration officials monitoring the swiftly changing Middle East situation.

Syria's official media have reflected strong opposition to efforts by Jordan's King Hussein and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat to unite for direct negotiations

NEWS ANALYSIS with Israel. The important question is how effective and sustained Syria's opposition will be. As Washington edged cautiously toward renewed ensent two friendly diplomatic signals to Syria about U.S. policy toward the Golan Heights and the gaining of freedom by an

American journalist from Syrian-controlled eastern Lebanon.
U.S. policy makers are watching with unusual interest the trip to Damascus this weekend by Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States, who is expected to inform Syrian President Hafez Assad about the U.S.-Saudi discussions here last week and to probe Assad's

position on the Jordan-PLO maneuvers. Bandar was a participant in the two working sessions last week between President Reagan and Saudi King Fahd and in other Saudi discussions with senior U.S. officials.

"There can be no war without Egypt and no peace without Syria," according to a statement about the Arabs attributed to former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger. That maxim was cited last week by a senior Saudi official to explain Bandar's trip and Damascus' central role.

Syria bitterly opposed Egypt's peace treaty with Israel under the late President Anwar Sadat. Last week Damascus state radio denounced the Jordan-PLO "framework for joint action" as a path "similar to Sadat's [and] paved by concessions, humiliation and capitulation."

Arafat, who was kicked out of Syria after a break with Assad in mid-1983, is expected soon to submit his and Hussein's "framework" for negotiations with Israel to several PLO governing bodies in Algiers and Tunis. Arab sources said Arafat believes that he has majority support for the compromises he is proposing, despite public objections by several prominent PLO figures.

These sources said Arafat seeks near-unanimous backing for the Palestinian concessions aimed at getting the United States involved again in the peace process and at starting broad negotiations with Israel.

The opposition that Hussein and Arafat encounter will be affected by Syria, which retains a degree of influence with elements of the PLO and which in the past has employed military and paramilitary muscle to make things tough for foes.

To improve U.S. relations with Syria, the State Department volunteered in a public statement last week that the peace-for-territory bargain in the Middle East, encompassed in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, applies to all Israeli fronts "including the Golan Heights."

The statement by State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb last Wednesday was intended as a "sig-

nal" to Syria, according to officials, although in substance it restates an established U.S. position. The Golan Heights, a strip of Syrian land slightly more than 10 miles wide, was occupied by Israel in the 1967 war and annexed over U.S. protests by Israel in December 1981.

Saudi Arabian policy makers, who had been urging a U.S. gesture toward Syria, expressed approval of Wednesday's Golan Heights statement and were expected to cite it in Damascus.

Israeli policy makers, especially those from the Likud Party whose government annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, strongly objected to the U.S. declaration. Foreign Minister Yitzak Shamir, head of the Likud faction of Israel's unity government, declared that the Golan is "an inseparable part of Eretz Israel" and is not negotiable. "Not even a statement by an American official will change this," Shamir said.

The gaining of freedom by American television journalist Jeremy Levin after 11 months of captivity in Syrian-dominated eastern Lebanon gave the State Department another opportunity to speak well of the Damascus regime. "The Syrians have played a positive role" in the effort to free Levin from his captors, believed to be pro-Iranian terrorists, State Department spokesman Edward Djerejian said Friday. He said the United States has "expressed our appreciation."

U.S. and Saudi officials said they considered the release of Levin unrelated to Fahd's trip or the revival of Mideast diplomatic activity. The same terrorists are believed to be holding a Saudi diplomat seized in Lebanon as well as four other Americans.

In another Mideast development, the State Department said reports indicated that Syria's Assad will not make an expected state visit to Iran in the near future.

U.S. relations with Syria, which is armed and backed politically by the Soviet Union, have been poor throughout the Reagan administration. Syria blocked implementation of the U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Lebanese accords of May 17, 1983, and was accused of masterminding military and terrorist opposition that brought about withdrawal of U.S. combat troops a year ago.

At the height of U.S. military involvement late in 1983, Syrian antiaircraft batteries in Lebanon fired on U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and American warplanes and ships attacked Syrian positions in return. The two nations at that point seemed close to expanding warfare.

Soviet support for Syria and the Soviet position on the Jordan-PLO "framework for joint action" are among the expected topics for U.S. and Soviet diplomats meeting Tuesday and Wednesday in Vienna to discuss Middle East issues. The State Department, mindful of fears

that Washington and Moscow might make deals at the expense of regional powers, insists that the talks will be only "an exchange of views."

According to an Arab diplomat familiar with the thinking in Damascus, Assad argues that peace gestures toward Israel are doomed to failure now because Israel will not give up the occupied West Bank or the Golan Heights. The United States, he argues, is unwilling or unable to pressure Israel sufficient-

ly to change this position.

Rather than negotiate now,
Assad reportedly argues, the Arabs should build their military might to equal Israel's and try to diminish political support for Israel in the

United States.

But Hussein and other "moderate Arabs" increasingly have accepted the U.S. view that the only way to peace is through direct negotiations with Israel, with active participation by the United States. Secretary of State George P. Shultz called repeatedly for such face-to-face Arab-Israeli negotiations last week. He said in a Voice of America interview Wednesday that when and if these parties sit down together, "I'm sure that they will want us to be present, they usually do, and we'll be glad to be present and try to be helpful."

The "framework" agreed upon by Hussein and Arafat lacks the clarity that Hussein had hoped for and which would elicit a clear-cut U.S. endorsement, according to State Department officials. But Shultz and others have described the potential "framework" as a step in the right direction. Statements from the White House and, in somewhat more muted fashion, the State Department, portrayed the develop-

ments as encouraging.

State Department officials said they anticipate a complex round of maneuvers in the Arab camp, with some central decisions likely to become clear by the time Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak arrives three weeks from now to see Reagan. Mubarak is among the most important and most vocal sponsors of the new negotiating efforts.

In private conversation, Shultz is reported to have cautioned the Saudis that the divisions on Palestinian issues within the two poles of the Israeli unity government—Prime Minister Shimon Peres' Labor Party and Foreign Minister Shamir's Likud Party—are such that any serious peace drive by the Arabs is likely to bring about a political shakeup in Israel.

Some Arabs appear ready to bring Israel's divided sentiments about negotiations to a test. Many Israelis, as well as a succession of U.S. administrations, have asked for such negotiations by the Arabs in vain for a long time.

Asked about Arafat's motivations in working with Hussein toward a common negotiating position, an Arab diplomat who has held lengthy discussions with the PLO leader replied, "There have been signals that Israel will be willing to negotiate and that the United States will get involved.

The diplomat said that Arafat, though weakened by divisions in the PLO, feels buoyed by the support for negotiations he is receiving from Palestinians on the West Bank, increasingly his most vital constituency.



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Morton Yarmon @ 271

Feb. 20, 1985

Marc: The attached letter came in to Murray Polner and to others in the building. Be sure to read the last page, in which the author comments about AJC positions.

mort.



DATE: January 28, 1985

TO: About 1807 American Jewish Committee people

FROM: Rabbi Nathaniel Zimskind

#360

Analysis of a Disaster

YOHANAN RAMATI West Bank-Suga settlements
PURPOSE: To foster consideration of the implications for AJC polycy of Israeli
concerns about: I. America's stance on Lebanon, and II. Palestinian extremism

Western influence in Lebanon has been largely eliminated. The international force has been withdrawn, after suffering serious casualties. Syria, with its Soviet ally, is the dominant force once again. Only a year ago, the United States seemed in control of the situation. Now it has bowed out, leaving its friends in Lebanon at the tender mercies of the Syrians. Why?

The answer must be sought, first and foremost, in Washington. To succeed in an international or regional conflict you must know who is your friend and who is your enemy. Then you must act against the enemy, or help your friend to do so. In addition, you must realize that force you are not ready to use will be useless.

The problem in Lebanon was only marginally the Lebanese. They are divided among themselves and have been fighting each other since 1975. But except for a salient to the north of Beirut, where the once ruling element — the Maronite Christians — managed to hold out, Lebanon before the Israeli incursion of June, 1982, was ruled by Syria and the PLO. Syria and the PLO were pro-Soviet. The Maronites — and the Israelis — were pro-American. Syria, which regards Lebanon as a part of Greater Syria and has never recognized its independence, has probably the best of all the Arab armies. It can also rely on Soviet support for modern arms and advice.

The crucial mistake made by Washington was to believe that an anti-American Syria would leave Lebanon of its own accord in order to enable a pro-American government to rule in Beirut. A second mistake was the pipe-dreams about wooing the Syrians away from the USSR with Saudi money or Israeli-held territory. The third mistake was to ignore both military realities and vital psychological factors — such as limitations on the use of force imposed by the media and public opinion in democratic countries.

A little logic would have led to the conclusion that a pro-Western Lebanon meant a Lebanon without Syrian influence and that the only way to get Syria out of Lebanon was either to defeat it militarily or to threaten credibly to do so. But instead of thinking logically, the administration preferred to take Saudi advice. And this proved disastrous.

When Israel decided to eliminate the large and fast-

growing concentration of PLO arms in southern Lebanon, it had two choices: a limited advance to the Zahrani or Awali River, leaving the PLO headquarters and Syrian domination of Lebanon intact; or an advance across the Beirut-Damascus highway, separating the Syrian forces from the PLO and from Beirut. The Israelis reasoned that the first option could not be of interest to the West, since it left Lebanon under Syrian — and thus indirectly Soviet — tutelage. The West would therefore join forces with the USSR and the Third World to urge an unconditional Israeli retreat, as after the Litani campaign. The status quo would then be restored, and nothing would have been gained.

It was decided to execute the second of fun, with the first serving as a smokescreen to gain tactical surprise.

If Israel thought that by destroying the territorial

If Israel thought that by destroying the territorial base of the PLO (from which fundry terrorist movements operated all over the Western world) and by creating the conditions required for a pro-American government in Beirut it would gain U.S. support, the hope proved vain. And the repercussions of this American decision eventually led to the surrender of Lebanon to anti-Western forces. Western media attacked Israel from the first day of its Lebanese involvement, successfully creating sympathy for the PLO and the Syrians. West European governments, afraid to offend Arab oil-producing states, echoed this attitude. The United States likewise seemed more concerned with the fate of the Palestinian Arabs than with establishing peace between Israel and Lebanon, or even transferring Lebanon to the Western camp.

This was the heyday of Philip Habib and his Saudi orientation. Washington decided that the pro-Western shift among Lebanese politicians created by the Israeli advance across the Beirut-Damascus highway should be exploited to create a Lebanon oriented towards Saudi Arabia. This meant strengthening Muslim rather than Christian elements in the Lebanese government, keeping relations between the Christians and the Israelis cool, and eventually trying to force the withdrawal of Israel and Syria on terms unfavorable to both. The Saudis were to lubricate this process with money and to remain the most influential Arab factor in Beirut when it was completed. Once out of Lebanon, Israel would be asked to make concessions to Jordan within the framework of the Reagan Plan.

This policy, rooted in fear of anti-American reactions in Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf (business interests were especially anxious about losing rich contracts in the Gulf to the more anti-Israel West Europeans) created

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serious strains between Washington and Jerusalem. One of its facets was encouragement of the Israeli opposition, which was trying to make the Lebanese war unpopular at home. It was almost as if the U.S. had adopted the Israel Labor Party line that the nature of the regime in Beirut (i.e., whether it was pro-Western or pro-Soviet) was none of Israel's business.

The crucial period that determined the fate of U.S. influence in Lebanon covers the last five months of 1982 and the first quarter of 1983. At the end of July, 1982, Israel was besieging West Beirut, Syria, dispirited by Soviet inability to prevent its military failures, was licking its wounds, and the stock of the United States in Lebanon stood very high. Instead of exerting pressure on Syria to leave Lebanon at this point and encouraging Israel to drive the Syrians out if they failed to do so, the United States decided instead to use this opportunity to mend its fences with the Arab "moderates." Little attention was paid to the Syrians. The Saudis were telling Washington that they could shift Syria to the Western camp, if only Washington were less pro-Israeli.

Habib's plan involved the Saudis in negotiations to evacuate the PLO from Beirut. He wanted to kill two birds with one stone: get rid of the pro-Soviet PLO while simultaneously putting Saudi Arabia on the American side by the claim that it "was saving the PLO from the Israelis." Israeli capture of West Beirut would upset this stratagem, so every pressure was put on Jerusalem to discourage such a move. Israel decided not to annoy the U.S. over this issue, and waited for some weeks while Habib and the Saudis negotiated, fruitlessly, with the PLO. Arafat had no reason to evacuate when everyone was telling him the Israelis would not attack. Only when Israel started to bombard West Beirut heavily from sea and air and ordered its land forces to begin moving forward did Arafat change his mind; then the negotiations with Habib were quickly concluded.

Everything seemed to be going according to Habib's plan. The United States had regained some leverage in Saudi Arabia, dissociating itself from the Israeli bombardments and advances that had allowed Habib's negotiations to succeed, and both pro-Soviet factors — Syria and the PLO — were out of Beirut. He thought he had laid the foundation for a pro-Western Lebanon. In fact, his policy achieved the opposite.

The sequence of events here is instructive: On August 21, 1982, an international force of U.S., French, and Italian units arrived in Beirut. Its sole declared purpose was to protect the PLO and its allies in West Beirut from Israeli or Maronite molestation. Two days later, the pro-Western leader of the Falange militia, Bashir Gemayel, was elected President of Lebanon. As soon as the PLO and Syrian forces were safely evacuated from Beirut, the international force also left. By September

11, there was not a single American, French, or Italian soldier in the city. And on September 14, Bashir Gemayel, with 26 of his officers, was murdered by Syrian agents.

The next day. Israel occupied West Beirut, meeting little resistance. With Syrian, PLO, and other anti-Western elements jubilant after Bashir's murder, while pro-Western Lebanese, fearing to share his fate, were cowed, anything less would have spelled the end of Habib's hopes. Yet the United States protested. Two days later, its reaction became completely hostile. Israel had permitted the Falange to enter the Sabra and Shatila camps, from which snipers had caused some 20 Israeli casualties. The Falange, deciding to avenge its leader and score some political points, killed some 435 Palestinian Arabs in the process. The reaction to this massacre was the turning point, convincing the Syrians that they had little to fear from the Western powers or the Israelis.

What happened at Sabra and Shatila was no worse than many other massacres in the course of the Lebanese civil war. It could not be compared to Assad's killing of some 20,000 rebellious Syrians in Hama or to King Hussein's massacre in September, 1970, of nearly 20,000 Palestinian Arabs. Yet all over the Western world, the Israelis were castigated for an act they had not even performed, while in Israel itself hundreds of thousands demonstrated against their government, identifying themselves with the critics and the victims. The immediate objective of the Falange - making Beirut understand that it was safer to be pro-Western than anti-Western - had been achieved. But Syria now knew that the purblind democracies would not rest until they had destroyed their advantage. It turned to Moscow with a sigh of relief and began to draw up plans to eliminate Western influence from Lebanon.

Though the Israeli opposition spared no effort to make the Lebanese war unpopular, the main responsibility for creating an atmosphere aiding Syria must be borne by the politicians in Washington, Paris, London, and Rome. There was no effort to counteract the anti-Israeli propaganda spread by most Western media. Indeed, the governments themselves, still under Saudi "guidance," were being demonstratively unfriendly to anyone in Lebanon with genuine pro-Western views. By September 19, Israel had already turned over West Beirut to the Lebanese army; by September 26, the French and Italian contingents of the international force had returned to take over the protection of the Palestinian Arab camps, while U.S. Marines had occupied the Beirut airport, making it very clear that Israelis were not wanted there. To Middle Eastern minds, the message was clear: it paid, after all, to be anti-American rather than pro-American.

For the moment, however, the Lebanese still thought

that the West might be in earnest about maintaining its influence in their country, that it had emasculated the Israelis in order to substitute its own forces. Besides, Syria had not yet made good its losses. So the new Lebanese President, Bashir's pliant and unreliable brother Amin, who had been a pro-Syrian parliamentarian when the Syrians were holding the upper hand before June, 1982, was now cautiously pro-U.S.

Being pro-American was not easy. U.S. policy aimed at getting Israel and Syria out of Lebanon. There was a division of labor: the Saudis would deal with the Syrians, the U.S. with the Israelis. But Saudi Arabia had its own game to play. A rich yet militarily weak state with a ruling oligarchy fearful of losing its power to a successful coup, Saudi Arabia had long adopted a policy of appeasing the radical forces in the Arab world — especially those controlling terrorist groups, such as Syria, Iraq, and the PLO. The PLO was paid huge amounts of money. Syria not only got funds, but was helped by the Saudis diplomatically. Washington had been consistently told by Riyadh that the USSR-Syrian ties were loose, that Syria could be pried out of its Soviet orientation by a more anti-Israeli U.S. policy. Now it was also being told that Syria would leave Lebanon as soon as Israel did, that the only real problem was getting Israel to retreat. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia warned Lebanon to sign no agreements with Israel.

Habib wanted to please the Saudis, but knew Israel would not retreat without something to show for it. His "solution" brought about the worst of all possible worlds. The U.S., dominating the negotiations between a chastened Israel and a Lebanese government still under the American thumb, tried for some four months to persuade the Israelis to withdraw almost unconditionally. The idea of peace between the two countries was frowned upon. Even meaningful "normalization" was discouraged. And Habib told the Israeli negotiators that the Lebanese army could protect Israel's northern border. They disagreed. Time passed.

The time was used by Syria to strengthen its links with the SovietUnion, replenish its arsenal of modern arms, and restore the morale of its armed forces. Damascus realized that, listening to Saudi advice, the West had effectively neutralized the only military force capable of imposing its will on the Syrians in Lebanon. More, it realized that the West would have no stomach to do the job itself. This meant that the international force — the symbol of Western influence in Lebanon — could now be attacked with impunity.

By May, 1983, Israel, understanding that the U.S. intended to follow its withdrawal from Lebanon with pressure to implement the Reagan Plan, was telling Habib that if the Lebanese army could protect Galilee, it should have no difficulty in protecting Beirut and the Shouf mountains. Therefore, Israel would withdraw unilaterally to the Awali River. Negotiations could be resumed when the Lebanese army had proved its met-

tle. At this point, U.S. policy changed. George Shultz, a realist, recognized that Saudi Arabia had been deceiving the West about Syria. He recalled Habib and quickly obtained an agreement between Lebanon and Israel meeting the most important Israeli demands but assuring a complete evacuation of Lebanon by Israeli forces — providing Syria moved out too. The Saudis were still saying that the Syrians would leave, though they probably knew otherwise.

The Shultz intervention came too late. Not only had Syria fully recovered from the effects of its defeat, but the Habib policies had enormously strengthened the anti-war opposition in Israel, which demanded unconditional evacuation of Lebanon and rejected any idea of Israeli armed forces being used to aid American objectives. Its slogan was: "We cannot be the policeman of the Middle East." The pressure inside Israel for a withdrawal from at least part of Lebanon could no longer be resisted, and the United States would have to pay the price. This was the result of punishing Israel (with the Reagan Plan) for creating the conditions for a pro-Western regime in Beirut instead of offering it political rewards.

Though there were now U.S. hints that Israel should reconsider its withdrawal from the Beirut-Damascus highway and the Shouf, it was awkward to press for this after demanding for four months that Israel withdraw from all of Lebanon. Moreover, the Israeli policy of cooperating with the pro-Western Maronite militias had been sabotaged by Habib's insistence that the Maronites put a distance between themselves and the Israelis and concentrate on their ties with the "moderate" Arab states. Amin Gemayel was happy to play along, despite some grumbling from the Falange leadership. And the Israeli Druze, whose traditional loyalty was too important to lose, were also pressing hard for an end to Israel's support of Lebanon's Christians.

Arens, who had taken over from Sharon at the Ministry of Defense, took all this into consideration. He also that putting a distance between the U.S. Marines in Beirut and Israeli forces could only improve relations with the United States, since the proximity was being exploited for "incidents" designed to stress that the function of the Marines was not to cooperate with the Israelis but to protect the inhabitants of West Beirut from them. So Israel withdrew to the Awali River line quickly, without the loss of a single man.

The repercussions of the Israeli withdrawal were immediate. The futility of trying to shore up Western influence in Lebanon by the Lebanese army became obvious when this army was routed by the Druze, who reoccupied the Shouf mountains and began to threaten Beirut itself. The Shi'ite militias, which had previously maintained an uneasy neutrality, joined in the fray, undermining and eventually terminating the Lebanese

government's control of West Beirut. And the international force in Beirut became a major objective of the Syrians and their Lebanese supporters.

The Syrian campaign to expel the West from Lebanon was proceeding as planned. Instead of risking their own forces, the Syrians used surrogates. Iran, helped by Syria in its war against Iraq, had returned the favor by sending to Lebanon terrorists who operated under Syrian orders. It also tried to spread disaffection among the Lebanese Shi'ites. Since attitudes in Lebanon are largely determined by the balance of military power, which was now shifting towards Syria, more and more of the Shi'ites turned anti-Western.

The first major move against the West was the blowup up of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The effect was devastating. The Lebanese were made to feel that a superpower claiming that it was able to protect its friends in Lebanon was not even able to protect its own embassy. Later came the attacks on the U.S. Marines and on the French forces in Beirut. Some 241 Marines and nearly 60 French soldiers were killed by two truck bombs. Syrian responsibility was clear and openly acknowledged by the U.S. administration. Yet even now, no action was taken against Syria's positions in Lebanon. More attacks on the international force followed, resulting in additional casualties.

All this was happening while an armada of U.S. ships with enormous firepower was stationed off the coast of Lebanon. Occasionally, its guns were used against the Druze and Shi'ite surrogates, but hardly ever against the Syrians themselves. Hafez Assad, who cared little how many of the surrogates were killed, had estimated Western reactions correctly. He expected and received pressure from Western media and public opinion to evacuate the international force from Lebanon. He did not expect any major military move against his forces by the West. He knew that fear of complications with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil producers would restrain any impulses to avenge the deaths of the U.S. Marines, that the Vietnam syndrome was still acute enough to make the Americans cut and run. He could kill as many American Marines as he wished, adopt an inflexible stance when U.S. diplomats came to visit him in Damascus, and get away with it scot-free. And the Israelis, their morale undermined by the hostility of their Western friends to everything they had tried to achieve in Lebanon, could no longer be expected to pull the Western chestnuts out of the fire.

George Shultz, who had read the situation correctly, though many months too late, now became the advocate of closer cooperation with Israel in the strategic sphere and of tougher action against the Syrians. Strategic cooperation with Israel was seriously embarked upon for the first time. But as for Lebanon, the administration decided to write it off. Whether Shultz was

overruled on this and favored punishing the Syrians, or whether, persuaded that even limited hostilities involving relatively few casualties could not be faced in an election year, he went along with the others, is still unclear. Yet the basic issue posed by the defeat in Lebanon must eventually be faced, whoever the next President of the United States will be.

When it comes down to bedrock, the fundamental error made in Lebanon was the same as that made during the Suez crisis 27 years earlier: undermining the strength of an ally does not mean that your influence will supplant his in the region concerned; it means paving the way for your enemies. In 1956, the U.S. eliminated British and French influence from Egypt only to have it supplanted by Soviet influence, which lasted until 1973. The side-effects caused the fall of a pro-Western government in Iraq, ending the Baghdad Pact, and were felt all over the Middle East and even in parts of Africa. In 1982-83, the U.S. eliminated Israeli influence from Lebanon. As in 1956, it hoped to substitute its own. And, as in 1956, the beneficiaries were the enemies of the West — Syria and the USSR.

The other major error was the underestimation of the importance of military force in determining diplomatic issues, while overestimating, as usual, the importance of money. And this illustrates a moral for the future. Lebanon proved that the West does not have the courage to use force even against a country like Syria. The message has registered, and can only reduce U.S. influence everywhere in the Middle East. Trying to regain it by selling out Israel will not help. The reaction again will be that it is not worthwhile to be a friend of the United States.

American Presidents can go on looking for gimmicks, for the mantle of "peacemakers" who sacrifice their allies on the altar of their vanity. Or they can start helping their friends instead of exerting pressure on them. There is no middle course. Despite the damage to its morale caused by U.S. and West European policies, Israel remains the only military factor capable of serving the Western strategic interest to the south of Turkey. This factor can be eliminated by forcing Israeli territorial concessions to Jordan or Syria, which will make it impossible for the Israeli army to deploy effectively. Should this happen — with or without the assistance of a different Israeli government — the prognosis for keeping any part of the Middle East pro-Western will not be good.

The vacuum left by an emasculated Israel will not be filled by American, French, or British forces. It will be filled by the Soviet Union and its growing number of Arab friends — who will go where the power is. Even Saudi Arabia.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger speaking yesterday at the American Jewish Committee luncheon in New York. In Damascus, President Hafez al-Assad of Syria, right, and Elie Salem, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, conferred at meeting.



II

Well over 90

percent of the Muslims dwelling within Israel's "undisputed" borders, where they possess all the civil and political rights of Jews and enjoy a standard of living far excelling that of any Muslim country, nonetheless deny - to Jewish pollsters - the right of Israel to be a sovereign and independent state.

(Paul Eidelberg, "Democracy and the Mideast Conflict," Midstream, March, 1984, pp. 7-8.)

Another PLO backer who benefitted from Amnesty International's "humanitarianism" was Raymonda Tawil. Tawil, a Ramallah journalist and prominent anti-Israel agitator, has long been the darling of foreign correspondents stationed in Israel. She was arrested by Israeli security forces and briefly imprisoned in March-April, 1978. Amnesty quickly intervened on her behalf, insisting that she was an innocent "Palestinian journalist" known for "her support of the view that an independent Palestinian state should be set up alongside the state of Israel."14 Actually what Tawil says is that the only reason Arabs should not openly call for the destruction of Israel is because such rhetorical extremism is a tactical error. "Proposing such an idea would harm the Palestinian cause,"15 she wrote, because "this aim *West Bank.

could not be achieved in the short run. "16 "Politics is the art of the possible."17 She therefore proposes that Israel retreat to the 1947 Partition boundaries, though even the 1947 lines, she admits, are merely "an interim solution" until the final solution, "a nonviolent reunification of the whole of Palestine"19 - that is, the nonviolent elimination of the whole of Israel. Meanwhile, Tawil makes no bones about her "love and esteem "20 for PLO terror, her "full support for the PLO and its leadership."21 That Tawil received the 1981 Bruno Kreisky Human Rights Award is indeed appropriate, since she has made anti-Semitic remarks — to Arab audiences — including a reference to Israel's "Jewish money-lender's mentality" and citation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as the "ideological basis" of Israeli "imperialism."2

(Rafael Medoff, "Amnesty International's PLO Problem," Midstream, December, 1984, p. 8.)

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In contrast to the American Jewish Committee's past support of Washington's efforts to win potentially dangerous territorial concessions from Israel on the West Bank and Gaza ("The American Jewish Committee believes that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 embraced in the Camp David Accords, as applied to the West Bank and Gaza, ought to lead to territorial compromise..." -- AJC Position Statement on the Middle East, April 8, 1983, pp. 3-4), I would cite the view of Joseph Sisco, former Undersecretary of State for Middle East Affairs. Responding to a question of mine at the AJC Annual Meeting in New York on May 6, 1984, he stated (after supporting my observation that the Arabs have more autonomy under the Israeli administration of the West Bank than elsewhere):

...I have never, for example, conceived of an ultimate territorial solution in the West Bank that is based on a partition, with Arabs living in one part of that West Bank and Jews in the other. I believe that one has to think in terms of Arabs and Jews living alongside one another there. But it's one thing in terms of (Arab) autonomy and the kind of thing we've been talking about on an interim basis. It's another thing to be talking in terms of what in effect is a de facto (Israeli) control....It's a fine line, a very difficult problem. It's one that successive Israeli governments will have to deal with over the next decade or two. ("Toward a New Middle East Strategy," 15-53-84, Tape A, Audio Visual Transcripts, 250 West 49th Street, New York, N. Y. 19019.)

Since there is at present no tolerance for genuine democracy in Moslem culture, the only chance for nurturing this Israeli contribution to the Middle East among the West Bank-Gaza Arabs is to give it time to grow under Israeli military protection. One day it will be strong enough to be an important factor in Jordanian life, when the time comes for union -- more political than territorial, I would think -- of the Arab enclaves with that country. And eventually the Arab democracy of this bold experiment may grow in Jordan to the point where it will be attractive to other Arab peoples. But all this could happen in the foreseeable future only if the fledgling phenomenon of Moslem democracy is kept safe from uneasy Arab autocrats bent on crippling it the moment Israel was forced to pull out of the disputed territories. After all, it was for the destruction of Israel and not for the promotion of democracy that these autocrats opted to put the PLO forger of southern Lebanon's democratic bonanza in charge of the West Bank and Gaza.

As for the Reagan Plan's proposed confederation of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan, Paul Eidelberg, professor of political science at Israel's Bar-Ilan University, observes:

The democratic and pacifist propensity for mirror-imaging and wishful thinking aside, no honest observer can say that Israel, with the bulk of its population squeezed into a 10-mile wide coastal strip, would be militarily defensible even if (the West Bank) were brought into confederation with Jordan and demilitarized....Furthermore, it would be no easy task to demilitarize the hilly terrain of (the West Bank); witness the difficulty of demilitarizing southern Lebanon. Katyusha-armed terrorists operating from (the West Bank) would have Israel's population centers at their mercy; every plane at Ben-Gurion Airport would be a sitting duck. Here I am reminded of George Will's telling remark: "The secure are always exhorting Israel to be daring. Similarly, the governments of the world constantly insist that Israel be more daring than these governments ever are." ("Democracy and the Mideast Conflict," Midstream, March, 1984, p. 8.)

And Zalman Shoval, A former Knesset Member, in the course of describing the defensive advantages of retaining the West Bank, states:

There is a pivotal role for some (though not all) of the settlements that seem to make the AJC so unhappy -- their primary role being to secure the road-network between the Green Line and the Jordan valley. All this, of course, pre-supposes a continued Israeli political presence in (the West Bank), for, as the late Moshe Dayan used to point out, without clear-cut political and legal rights -- though not necessarily sovereignty -- and without a Jewish civilian presence in the area (i.e., settlements), Israel will in the long run not be able to take care of its military needs there either. ("AJC's Ill-Advised Step," Jerusalem Post, May 29-June 4, 1983, p. 6.)

Please address your views on what your believe AJC's public position should (or should not) be regarding the question of interspersed Israeli and Arab West Bank-Gaza settlements versus Israeli territorial concessions to Mr. Leo Nevas, the new lay Chairman of the International Relations Commission, The American Jewish Committee, 165 East 56th Street, New York, N. Y. 10022.

LYNNE IANNIELLO Director, Communications



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

New York, NY, Feb. 20....A leading Israeli political and military analyst said today that regardless of developments in Lebanon, Syria will not make peace with Israel but is preparing instead for war -- "not today but sometime in the future."

In what he described as a "realistic assessment" of the strategic problems confronting the Jewish state as it pursues its planned withdrawal from Lebanon, Dr. Yosef Olmert, head of the Syrian-Lebanon section of the Tel Aviv University Shiloah Center, said that the Syrians keep "rejecting all political solutions." And with the support of the Soviet Union, he went on to say, they are becoming "stronger and stronger" militarily for their eventual confrontation with Israel.

Dr. Olmert, a lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies at the University, told a meeting of the Middle Eastern Affairs Committee of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith that in his estimation the possibility of a Syrian war with Israel "is 50-50."

He went on to say that he expects no change as long as Assad remains in power since Syria is determined to become the area's "dominant power."

Describing Syria as the "major barrier to peace" in the region, Dr. Olmert declared that the Syrians are in a dilemma as to their "next step" after Israel's Defense Forces are no longer in Lebanon.

He noted that Syria is "directly and indirectly" involved in the spate of terrorism being inflicted upon Israel's forces in Lebanon mainly by the Shi'ite portion of the population and said that the Syrian problem is whether or not to continue to stimulate terrorist attacks or permit them to subside so as not to provoke an Israeli reprisal.

Despite Syrian promises to evacuate Lebanon after the Israel with-drawal, Dr. Olmert said that there are no signs that it is doing so although the Lebanese do not want them there either. "Syria has a deep ideological commitment to remain," he stated.

Dr. Olmert indicated that while Syria may consider its continuing presence in Lebanon a "victory" because of Israel's decision to leave, it has not yet "capitalized" on the situation and remains isolated in the Arab camp from those countries which, like Egypt, have made peace, and Jordan which is seeking negotiations. He added that this "isolation" may deter Syria from a military adventure.

As far as Israel is concerned, Dr. Olmert stressed that "it must make clear -- the sooner the better -- that it will defend its vital interests."

Irving Shapiro, chairman of ADL's Middle Eastern Affairs Committee, presided at the meeting.

GROWING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ROLES OF SEPHARDI JEWS IN ISRAEL

by Harry M. Rosen

Prepared for the Israel Office

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

165 East 56th Street New York, N.Y. 10022

PREFACE

Recognizing the paradox in Israeli society that the current majority in Israel's Jewish population is -- and has for some years been -- the Sephardim, while positions of power have remained predominantly in the hands of Ashkenazim, the American Jewish Committee's Israel Office commissioned this monograph by Harry Rosen to examine whether or not change has occurred in recent years. And if so, to what extent the Sephardi community has been acceding to political leadership. Sephardi involvement in selected and representative bodies and organizations is studied as an index of absorption, shared leadership, ranking and hierarchical arrangements.

The results are encouraging. Sephardim <u>are</u> rising in political leadership roles in most of the bodies selected for study. The Israeli-born Sephardi is doing much better than his immigrant father. Differences between Ashkenazim and Sephardim bear continued attention but are being progressively reduced. And if differences continue to exist -- and they do -- they are due not to immutable prejudice but to "the unequal history of opportunity."

We hope this preliminary study, which is only one of AJC's current efforts in the area of intergroup relations, will stimulate further research and will serve to create better understanding of the social characteristics of Israel's changing, growing society. I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of my colleagues, Dr. George E. Gruen, Director of Israel and Middle East Affairs in the International Relations Department, and his associate, Kenneth Bandler, during the course of the preparation of this study and its revision for publication.

Dr. M. Bernard Resnikoff, Director Israel Office

AMERICAN JEWISH A R ABOUT THE AUTHOR V E S

Harry M. Rosen is Secretary-General of the Jewish Agency for Israel. He received a B.S. in Biology and Public Health from M.I.T. and an M.S. in Social Administration from Ohio State University. After a distinguished career in the United States and France with Jewish and non-sectarian organizations, he made aliyah with his family in 1967. Mr. Rosen is the author of several books, including Arabs and Jews in Israel (1970) and Volunteerism in Israel (1979), both published by the American Jewish Committee.

LEADERSHIP ROLES OF SEPHARDI JEWS IN ISRAEL

After spending several months preparing this study, and reflecting on my own observations after almost sixteen years in Israel, I conclude that Sephardim are increasingly finding their place in leadership positions in Israel. While the proportion of Sephardim in leadership positions will undoubtedly continue to grow, there remain great tensions between Sephardim and Ashkenazim, especially in the political arena where the confrontation is between the "ins" and the "outs." However, these tensions are also spreading to the social arena, as the consciousness of potential Sephardi political power develops, and the disadvantaged part of the population organizes itself and presses for better housing, services, and general economic conditions.

In my view, another generation will see Sephardi leadership firmly established in all sectors of Israeli life, perhaps in the dominant positions politically. Another generation will see the Sephardi-Ashkenazi confrontation blurred and ultimately replaced by confrontations of "ins" and "outs" and "haves" and "have-nots" based on class or other lines, but not on ethnic lines.

"Sephardi" vs. "Oriental"

Many people use the terms "Sephardi" and "Oriental" interchangeably. According to Dr. Sammy Smooha, a noted professor of sociology at Haifa University, the term "Oriental" rather than "Sephardi" more accurately describes the people of whom we are speaking. For many Sephardim, however, the term "Oriental" has pejorative connotations. Leaders in the World and American Sephardi Federations, for example, have expressed to me their strong resentment of the term. Professor Daniel Elazar, writing about confusion on the semantic level, has said that "in conventional usage, Ashkenazim are labelled 'Western' and Sephardim 'Oriental', terms clearly intended to reflect prevailing assumptions with regard to culture and modernity. In fact, however, these terms are more self-serving (to Ashkenazim) than accurate."

Dr. Smooha defines "Orientals" as "Jews from the Near East and North Africa, including descendants of Jews from Spain." Descendants of Jews from Spain include some southern European communities, such as those in Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In addition, the Jews of Soviet Bokhara, Georgia and Tat are generally included in the non-Ashkenazi category.

For the purposes of this study, we will define Ashkenazim as the Jews of Eastern and Central European origin, while Sephardim or Orientals are Jews originating from North Africa and the Middle East, as well as those European Jewish communities whose ancestors came from Spain and Portugal. Since the terms "Sephardi" and "Ashkenazi" are commonly used in Israel -- for example, there is an Ashkenazi and a Sephardi chief rabbi -- we will include the Jews of Arab and Islamic country origin, in the category of Sephardim.

Social and Economic Indicators

The Statistical Annual of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics monitors the social and economic status of Ashkenazim and Sephardim according to "Continent of Origin" such as Afro-Asia and Europe-America. The Director of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Professor Moshe Sicron, summarized recent trends in a paper presented at a conference on "Social Divisions in Israel: The Ethnic Dimension," at the Hebrew University in May 1983.

According to Professor Sicron, the Israeli population has changed from a nation of immigrants to a nation of Sabras, or native-born Israelis. More than 57% of today's Jewish population was born in Israel. While Jews of European origin used to comprise the majority of the population, Jews originating from Arab and Islamic countries now make up more than 50% of the population. The continued influx of immigrants from Europe, primarily from the Soviet Union, during the 1970s, and the U.S. has prevented the Sephardi percentage from rising even further. An examination of the population according to age group indicates that the Sephardim will continue to grow as a percentage of the total population. For example, some 60% of Jews in the 15-29 years-old group are of Sephardi origin, while among the elderly the larger percentage is of European-American background.

Sicron presented statistical evidence showing that the gap between the two groups is closing in some areas, such as health, though wide disparities remain in others. In the areas of adult and infant mortality, there is now almost no difference between those of Afro-Asian and European-American backgrounds. A similar development has taken place with regard to fertility and birth control. Whereas in 1951, those of Afro-Asian background had twice the number of children as did those of European-American origin, in 1982 parents of Afro-Asian origin were having only five percent more births than their European-American counterparts. While Sephardim have decreased their fertility rate tremendously, Ashkenazim have maintained a steady rate. With regard to the average age at marriage, the difference that used to exist between the groups has largely disappeared; Sephardi women, who used to marry at an early age, now get married at an age similar to the European-American women (20 to 24).

Wide gaps between Ashkenazim and Sephardim remain in terms of educational achievement and geographic distribution. Those Jews who originally came from African and Asian countries generally had very low educational exposure. Programs were set up in Israel to teach the next generation starting from the pre-kindergarten years. Almost all of those born in Israel have had at least an elementary school education, placing them on a par with their co-religionists of European-American origin.

At the high school level the disparity between the two ethnic groups is significant. Although 77-83% of Sephardim attend high schools, a percentage that is similar to Ashkenazim, the kind of high school attended further reinforces the gap in education. The vast majority of Ashkenazim are enrolled in academic high schools. Only one-third of the Sephardi high school students are in such programs, while two-thirds are in vocational and agricultural programs. This predominance in technical and agricultural programs closes the door to further academic study in university for which academic instruction on the high school level is required. Perhaps as a result, Ashkenazi enrollment predomi-

nates at the university level. Approximately 50% of Israeli-born children of European-American descent have had university education, compared with only five percent of those with Arab and Islamic country origins.

Professor Sicron also noted that the government's policy of settling Sephardi immigrants affects their social integration into Israeli society. When the new immigrants came en masse from Arab and Islamic countries, Sicron noted, they were sent to towns and neighborhoods according to national origin. This resulted in settlements, frontier towns and neighborhoods having one nationality dominance. Of 797 rural settlements, 20% are populated by Sephardim. Of these, 74% are one-country dominant in origin. (It should be noted that in the moshavim established since 1948, some 70% of the population is of Sephardi origin. Forty percent of city neighborhoods are one-country origin dominant.) About 75% of the European-American origined population live in areas that are overwhelmingly Ashkenazi.

The number of marriages between Sephardim and Ashkenazim steadily increased over the years and now represents some 20% of all Jewish marriages in Israel. If we include such ethnically mixed marriages among children born in Israel, the percentage is 23%.

Sicron raised the question whether the choice of partner was determined by nationality or whether educational achievement was the primary determining factor. For example, the percentage of mixed marriages increased when the husband is Sephardi and has 16 or more years of education, because he is more likely to marry an Ashkenazi girl with high educational achievement, since the number of Sephardi women with 16 years of education is limited. Similarly, an Ashkenazi man with more than 16 years of education rarely married a Sephardi. Ashkenazi men usually seek out Ashkenazi women with similar educational backgrounds. Those with a low education level may marry Sephardi women with similar level of education. When a Sephardi female marries an Ashkenazi male, the educational levels of both are usually low. When a Sephardi male marries an Ashkenazi female, their combined educational average is usually high.

In his report, Sicron did not discuss the comparative economic status of the two groups. However, the Central Bureau of Statistics' studies of urban wage earners reveal a serious gap in income. In 1981, Sephardi family income, with an average of 1.6 wage-earners per household, equaled 80.8% of Ashkenazi family income. This represented an improvement over 1965, when Sephardi family income was only 71.7% of Ashkenazi family income. But Sephardi families in 1981 had an average of 4.6 persons per household, as compared with 3.1 persons per Ashkenazi household. This means that Sephardi per capita income was only 55% of Ashkenazi per capita income in 1981.

The figures for Israeli-born wage-earners, however, indicate that the gap is closing. Although the figures are not broken down according to continent of origin of the fathers, there is no question that the Israeli-born generation of Sephardi families is doing much better than the parent generation. With 1.6 wage-earners per household, Israeli-born household income in 1981 was 97 percent of European-American household income. With an average of 3.6 persons per household, per capita income was 84% of European-American family income.

The figures continue to show a direct correlation between years of schooling of wage-earners and income. The less formal education, the less income. The more years of schooling, the more income. In a society where more and more education is required for Israel's increasingly technology-based industry, the educationally disadvantaged become the economically disadvantaged. To the extent, therefore, that Sephardim have less higher education than Ashkenazim, the income disparities will continue.

The Issue of Leadership

Political leadership is the principal concern of this paper. The term "leader," as used here, betokens influence, power, a constituency. Actually, I see leadership as a reflection of the status of Sephardim in Israel thirty-six years after the rebirth of the State. Clearly, the Ashkenazim play the majority role in Israel, although they constitute something less than half the Jewish population. Dr. Smooha writes: "Despite their numerical preponderance (about 55 percent of all Israeli Jews), they (Orientals) occupy a subordinate position in the Jewish community. The Ashkenazim, European Jews, are the old-timers who founded the new Jewish society, set up its Western or Eastern European social institutions, and still run it." 1

Although Dr. Smooha wrote the above in 1978, it is still true today. Political power is still in the hands of Ashkenazim. The school system continues to reflect the values and culture of the Eastern European founding fathers of Israel. The closest thing that Israel has to the "Protestant ethic" of the United States, cited as the American ethic and established by a distinct minority, is the "kibbutz ethic," established by Israel's "Pilgrims" beginning a century ago.

The vast majority of Ashkenazim will argue that ethnic discrimination is not a factor inhibiting Sephardi leadership achievement. But many Sephardim maintain that discrimination is indeed a significant factor hindering their advancement. One theory about the nature of relations between Sephardim and Ashkenazim widely accepted by Israeli sociologists (most of them, incidentally, Ashkenazim), is described by Dr. Smooha as the "absorption-modernization model of Oriental-Ashkenazi relations." This is a "Zionist" model, what Smooha calls "a nation-building perspective." The problem is seen in terms of "absorbing" the masses of Jews who came to Israel in the early years of the State from the Arab and Islamic countries of North Africa and the Middle East, and then "modernizing" them to fit into the modern "western" society which Israel was building. For those who accept this model, Israel has been successful by and large in carrying out "Mizug Galuyot," the "fusion of the exiles," into some kind of Israeli entity.

How then can one explain the clearly ethnic-based confrontation that has appeared in Israeli society in recent years? How can one explain the frustrations expressed by an increasing proportion of the largely Sephardi disadvantaged sector of Israel's Jewish population?

¹ Dr. Smooha is preparing an annotated bibliography on Ashkenazi-Sephardi relations for the American Jewish Committee.

At the Hebrew University conference on "Social Divisions in Israel: the Ethnic Dimension," the distinguished Israeli sociologist Professor S.N. Eisenstadt, a supporter of the "absorption-modernization" model, agreed that there were indeed dangerous tensions between the two groups. However, he sees these tensions deriving not from cultural differences between the two groups, but from internal developments in Israel. In the early years of the State, Professor Eisenstadt notes, all immigrants were united in the common struggle to build the State. It was not until the late 1950s and 1960s, that labels based on country of origin began to apply, and divisions in the society became apparent. Professor Eisenstadt further notes that the Jews from North Africa and the Middle East do not demand separatism. Rather, they express frustration in terms of not being able to advance fast enough within the society.

Professor Smooha says that "Oriental-Ashkenazi relations can be better conceptualized in terms of a 'dynamic paternalism-cooptation' model" than by an absorption-modernization model. He continues: "Briefly, the Orientals are coopted into an Ashkenazi-dominated system. Since they are still 'unqualified,' they cannot move freely into higher echelons because of Ashkenazi paternalism, yet their status is changing with the erosion in the inhibitory forces." Professor Smooha takes the centuries-old separatism of the two ethnic groups as a point of departure. "The mass influx of 'forgotten' Oriental Jews after 1948 presented a problem to the established Ashkenazi groups, which viewed them as 'backward' non-Europeans... The policies of immigrant absorption and modernization were employed in a piecemeal, partial fashion in order to avert the possible hazards of overflowing the Western structure with Orientalism, rather than to promote equality and integration. While professing the ideals of the ingathering and merging of exiles, the Ashkenazim looked down on the Orientals as 'a generation of the desert.' This paternalistic, strong though unofficial, ideology, which conceives of the Orientals as impossible to be perfected, has delayed full equality to the next generation or reserved it to the select few."

Professor Avraham Friedman, Senior Lecturer in Business Administration at the Hebrew University, draws from the corporate experience with upward mobility to make the point that "the Ashkenazim got in first." The Ashkenazim were already firmly rooted in Palestine when the State was established in 1948. They had already laid the foundations of the establishment that would govern and set the tone for the State. Since it was a young as well as a small establishment, they could preempt virtually all the positions, and hold on to them for a long time. Add to this the advantages in educational level of the Ashkenazi pioneers, and one can see how they dominated the leadership echelons in Israel for such a long time.

It, therefore, would appear that Sephardim were not barred from leadership positions by virtue of their being Sephardim, but that the crucial issue was unequal qualifications which were translated into unequal opportunities. In a country where the correlation between income, for example, and years of schooling is direct, consider that less than 20% of university graduates come from the Sephardi community.

Indeed, Professor Chaim Adler argues that the social and economic gap will be further narrowed when the educational gap is closed. There are many social scientists and other observers of Israel's ethnic scene who also believe the answer lies in education. It must be remembered that only twenty years ago Israel had an illiteracy rate (defined as zero years of schooling) of some 16%,

almost all of it concentrated in the adult population of Arab and Islamic country origin. This does not exist today simply because all children must go to school for at least ten years, and, in fact, the proportion of youth in high school - something near 80% - is almost the same for both ethnic groups.

To be sure, as noted above, there is a much higher proportion of Sephardi youth in vocational tracks of high school education and proportionately less in the academic tracks. (But, in a country whose economy is developing increasingly in the direction of high technology, this may become an advantage rather than a handicap.) In the meantime, however, in terms of stereotypes, Ashkenazim are associated with academic education and Sephardim as - at best - "Johnny-come-latelies" to higher education. While the proportion of Sephardim in universities remains far below their proportion in the population, it is increasing rapidly.

Co-optation of Sephardim by the Ashkenazi-controlled establishment has been a major factor in the leadership achievements of Sephardim. In recent years, however, groups that are predominantly Sephardi, such as the Tami and Shas parties, have given the kind of public exposure to Sephardi leaders which has enabled them to move upward significantly, particularly in the political field. We are increasingly finding that where the majority of the constituency is Sephardi, the elected officials are Sephardi especially in the case of local politics. Many of the young Sephardi leaders who "learned the business" in local politics are now mobilizing the large Sephardi constituencies to help them achieve leadership roles on the national scene.

The influence of the sizable Sephardi electorate in Israel's national elections has been well documented by the Israeli pollster, Hanoch Smith, who is Director of the Smith Research Center in Jerusalem. In a special report prepared by Mr. Smith for the American Jewish Committee in August 1984, "Highlights of Israel's Election Results: Polarization, Fragmentation and Ethnicity", he projected that by 1990 Sephardim will constitute more than 50% of all Jewish voters. This means that in future Knesset elections the Sephardi electorate will play an even more crucial role, which cannot be ignored by any of the major political parties. It also means that Sephardi political leaders will advance through the ranks of the establishment parties, which until now have been dominated by Ashkenazi politicians.

While Jews of European-American origin and those of Arab and Islamic country origin voted similarly in all national elections from 1949 to 1969, the Sephardim have thrown their electoral weight behind the Likud Party and its allies in the last three elections. Thus, as Mr. Smith points out in his report, Labor and parties allied with it gained only 24.6% of this vote in 1977, 22.5% in 1981, and 21.5% in 1984. The Likud and its allies received nearly 70% of this vote in 1981. Despite the unresolved situation in Lebanon and the serious economic problems, some 72% of the Sephardi vote went to Likud in the 1984 elections. While Mr. Smith points out that his opinion surveys show that the Sephardim prefer Likud because they perceive that party as being better on the social and economic issues, he notes that the reasons for the dramatic shift in voting patterns by Sephardi Jews are still the subject of much debate in Israel.

Sephardim in Leadership Roles

Professor Smooha has gathered extensive data on Oriental leadership roles in a broad range of political fields, the army, police, and public organizations, for his book, <u>Israel: Pluralism and Conflict</u> (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). For the purposes of this paper his researchers recently updated much of this information through 1983. For certain political positions, I have incorporated the results of the 1984 national elections.

The researcher faces certain difficulties in classifying individuals as Oriental or Ashkenazi from rosters of office-holders, when he relies mainly on the name and some common knowledge about the person. For example, Ohayon is known to be a Moroccan name, and Chayat is an Iraqi name. But Deputy Prime Minister David Levy obviously could not be classified by name alone. It is common knowledge that he was born in Morocco and, therefore, he can be labelled accordingly for the purposes of this study. There are, however, many Cohens and Levys in the Oriental community, as there are in the Ashkenazi community, who cannot be so easily categorized. Professor Smooha's researchers, therefore, classified as "Oriental" only those individuals who are definitely known to have Arab and Islamic country origins. When there was any doubt, the individuals were listed as Ashkenazi. Thus, the figures given below are probably conservative on the Oriental side.

Prime Minsters and Presidents

There have been six Presidents of Israel, one of whom was of the Sephardi community. Yitzhak Navon, who served as President from 1978 to 1983, is of Moroccan origin. As yet, there has not been an Oriental Prime Minister. However, during the previous Likud government, David Levy who was born in Morocco, served as Deputy Prime Minister.

Cabinet Ministers

In 1955, one of the twelve Cabinet Ministers was Oriental (8.3%), while in 1973, two of the 18 were Oriental (11.1%). In 1983, four of 19 Ministers were of Oriental background (21.1%). (It should be noted that the last government had eight Deputy Ministers, three of whom were Oriental (37.5%).) The current Government of National Unity has 25 Cabinet Ministers, four of whom are Sephardi. They are: Yitzhak Navon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education and Culture; David Levy, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Construction and Housing; Moshe Katzav, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs; Moshe Shahal, Minister of Energy and Infrastructure; and Yitzhak Peretz, Minister of Interior.

Knesset Members

In 1955, ten of 113 Jewish Members of Knesset were Sephardi (8.8%), in 1973, 19 of 114 Jewish MKs (16.7%), and in 1983, 30 of 115 MKs (26.1%) were of Arab and Islamic country origin. As a result of the national elections held

last July, the current Knesset has 113 Jewish members, 32 of whom are Sephardi (28.3%). This reflects the steady, if gradual, rise in the percentage of Sephardim in the nation's parliament.

Supreme Court Justices

The High Court commands great prestige in Israel, as in most western countries. There are many Sephardi lawyers, and probably a goodly number of judges. In 1973, the first Sephardi judge was appointed to the Supreme Court. There is only one on that bench today, out of ten justices.

Israel Defense Forces

The number of Orientals in leadership positions in the Israel Defense Forces has definitely improved, but the exact figures are difficult to obtain because of the name problems. The importance of the IDF in terms of security and in the daily life of the nation gives officers very high status and prestige. In addition, the IDF is the key social integrating institution in Israeli society. Professor Smooha reports that in an interview in the late 1970s with then Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, he was told that at least 30% of all army officers were from the Sephardi community.

The present Chief of Staff, General Moshe Levi, is Sephardi. A previous Chief of Staff, the late David Elazar, came from Yugoslavia and is thus considered to belong in the Sephardi column.

In 1955, according to Professor Smooha's data, there were no Orientals among six Major Generals, and in 1973, none among 21 Major Generals. However, his data show three Sephardim among 24 Major Generals in 1982.

Newspaper reporters do not always exercise the same scientific caution as sociologists. In a recent article reviewing the status of Sephardim in the IDF, journalist Yaakov Haelyon wrote in the Hebrew daily Ma'ariv (March 28, 1983) that "It is inconceivable that the Israel Defense Forces would entrust human lives and security - the very soul of the nation - to people selected on the basis of national origin or in order to 'balance' ethnic ratios." He continued: "When I investigated the ethnic issue in the IDF, I was both surprised and proud² to learn that many Oriental Jews held command, expert and leadership positions and that they played a major role in contributing to our security - in the field and at headquarters - throughout all of Israel's battles." Haelyon could not list the names of all the brigadier-generals, but he reports that at least five IDF Corps are headed by Sephardim, and many others serve as senior staff officers, division commanders and in other classified positions. Without being able to account for all of them, Haelyon found 13 brigadier-generals, a rank which he stresses "is not awarded easily or over-generously in the IDF."

Note: I don't know whether the "proud" is an indication that he is himself Oriental -- to use his own designation -- or whether he is being a proud Israeli.

Police Force

The police force is commonly viewed as being made up of Sephardi "troops" and Ashkenazi "commanders." In 1955, barely four percent of all police officers (holding commissions) were Sephardim. In 1969 the proportion had jumped to 25%. It was not possible to get more recent figures, but it is generally accepted that the proportion of Sephardi officers in the police force has increased substantially since 1969. Sephardim do occupy top posts. Ma'ariv reporter Haelyon cites the examples of the National Chief of Police Operations, who was born in Kurdistan; the Moroccan-origined commander of the Tel Aviv District; and the Libyan origined head of the Quartermaster Division, who formerly served as deputy commander of the Northern District.

World Zionist Organization

The WZO continues to be a stronghold of Ashkenazi domination. From 1955 to 1960, only one of 51 Israeli members of the Zionist Executive was Sephardi. In 1972-73, six of 45 members were Sephardim. A significant change was initiated with the affiliation to the WZO of the World Sephardi Federation, and the establishment within the WZO of a Department for Sephardi Affairs. Today, three of the 20 Israeli members of the Zionist Executive and seven of the 49 Israeli members of the Zionist General Council are Sephardim. The current Chairman of the Zionist General Council is Sephardi, as were his two predecessors, one of whom was Yitzhak Navon.

Histadrut

This is the General Federation of Labor in Israel, a very powerful body in which are organized the vast majority of Israel's workers. Israel Kessar, who was born in Yemen, is the current Secretary-General of the Histadrut. He is the first Sephardi to hold that position. The Histadrut dates back to long before the establishment of the State, and founded many of the country's social, health and educational institutions. It is also a major entrepreneurial institution, its holding company Hevrat Ovdim owning and/or controlling some 22% of Israel's industrial production. In other words, the Histadrut is a highly important and prestigious public body.

In 1956, there were no Sephardim on the thirteen-member Central Committee of the Histadrut. In 1973, five of the 20 members were Sephardim. In 1983, there were 12 Sephardim among the 42-member Central Committee. On the Executive Council, which had 91 members in 1956, there were eight Sephardim. In 1970, the proportion had risen to 34 out of 163. In 1983, there were 84 Sephardim among the 198 members of the Executive Council, or 42.4%.

Among the thirty-four General Secretaries of unions in 1983, ten were Sephardim. On the Executive of the holding company Hevrat Ovdim, there are four Sephardim among the 32 members, and 14 among the 62 members of the Secretariat (not very high, but a higher proportion than in the Presidium and Executive Committee of the Industrialists Association of Israel).

Political Parties

In a country with so political a culture as Israel political parties are obviously important bodies, and considerable influence and prestige is attached to membership in the governing bodies of the parties.

In 1983, about 30%, or 1,200, out of some 4,000 members of the governing committees of five major political parties were Sephardim. In 1950, only eight out of 104 of members of the top governing bodies in five major parties were Sephardim. In 1973, the proportion was 14 out of 130. Because the current lists of the Herut³ committees could not be obtained, it is necessary to depend on "informed" estimates. It is estimated that today 35 of the estimated 170 members of the top committees of five major parties are Sephardim.

With the splintering and regrouping of Israel's political parties, it is difficult to make accurate comparisons between the situation today and five and ten years ago. However, given the available data, there are some interesting trends. From the early 1950s to 1973, there was a fairly consistent proportion of Sephardim in the Labor Party's top committee, the "Bureau": about 9-12% of a body averaging from 17-22 members. Today there are 80 people in the Labor Party Bureau, of whom 13, or 16.3% are Sephardim. In the much larger Central Committee, with 1,143 members, there are 363 Sephardim (31.8%).

The National Religious Party has the highest proportion of Sephardim in its top committees: seven out of fifteen members in one committee (46.7%), and 17 out of 59 on the other top committee (28.8%). In the larger, lower-echelon committees, the proportions are 24.6% (17 out of 69 members) and 42.5% (105 out of 247 members), respectively.

The Liberal Party has low percentages compared to the other parties -- only one Sephardi in its eight-member Presidium; six out of 48 and 53 out of 244 in its lower committees.

The proportions for the Herut Party have varied considerably over the years, for reasons that perhaps can be explained simply by the changes in the party structure. With an Executive Committee ranging from nine members in 1949-51 to 31 members in 1973, the percentage of Sephardim was zero in 1949-51 and 12.9% in 1973. However, in 1968-70 the proportion was 31.3%, and in the two prior Executives about 20%. Unfortunately, as stated above, the lists for 1983 could not be obtained, but there is unquestionably a high proportion as compared with most other parties, somewhere between 30-35% by some estimates. As for the larger Central Committee, there were only two Sephardi members of the 29-member committee in 1949-51 (6.9%), 73 out of 251 members in 1973 (29.1%) and an estimated 35-40% in 1983.

Considering how poorly the Labor Party fared in the last two elections in predominantly Sephardi neighborhoods, I would have expected a much lower percentage of Sephardi committee members in Labor than in Herut. This is not the case, and the answer to the why of Labor's performance at the polls, as far as the "neighborhoods" are concerned, must be sought elsewhere.

³ Herut is the main political party in the Likud bloc.

Local Bodies

Where Sephardim are the majority population, they hold the political power. It is a pyramidal phenomenon, as we have seen in the parties. Sephardim hold a much greater proportion of the posts in local authorities and other bodies because they are by far the largest proportion of the population in the development towns and the smaller local units.

In 1955, only 11 of 96 heads of local authorities were Sephardi, and by 1972, the proportion had increased to 33 out of 98. In 1983, there were 44 Sephardi heads of local authorities out of 100.

Referring now only to 1983 figures, the influential local Workers' Councils have 45 Sephardi Secretaries out of 68, or 66 percent.

The cooptation theory undoubtedly was politically applicable in the early and middle years of the State, insofar as party - then Ashkenazi - control over local constituents is concerned. It is much less the case today, perhaps not applicable at all. The local bodies have served to propel their Sephardi leaders onto the national scene. Nowhere is this more true than in Herut. It may well be that the politically-wise Herut leaders, with their image as a "populist" party, maintain this image by "coopting" this local leadership. But these new leaders - former mayors of development towns, for example - know their political strength is in the people who made them leaders in the first place. As this knowledge grows and with it political sophistication, the cooptation formula may well be reversed, with the leaders of the Sephardi voter majority "coopting" the Ashkenazi "minority" where it is needed.

What Does it All Mean?

The figures tell the story: the Sephardi share of leadership in Israel is growing. More specifically, in the political field, it is clear that the Sephardi community will determine the next government. The Sephardim are becoming a numerical majority in the electorate. It is true that the near equality in birth rate and the larger proportion of Ashkenazim among new immigrants may in time reduce the margin of Sephardi numerical majority. In the meantime, the younger Sephardi population has more children reaching voting age.

There will undoubtedly continue to be more Ashkenazim in positions of political leadership for another generation. Nevertheless, they will have to take the Sephardi voters more and more into account. Likud has a potential Sephardi Prime Minister in David Levy. And, the name of another Sephardi, Yitzhak Navon, has been advanced as a possible Labor candidate for Prime Minister. In the party elections that preceded last July's Knesset elections, both Levy and Navon were serious contenders for the top position of their respective parties. Although Yitzhak Shamir retained his position as Herut leader, and thus Likud's candidate for prime minister, Levy received an impresive 40% of the votes, including substantial support from Ashkenazi members of the Herut Central Committee, and was placed second on the party's list for the Knesset elections. Navon was easily the most popular candidate of the rank and file to head the Labor Party, but in the interests of preserving party unity, he

decided not to challenge the incumbent party leader, Shimom Peres. In any case, for a moment it seemed very possible that in 1984 Israel would have its first Sephardi prime minister.

Political dominance, if - and probably when - they achieve it, by Sephardim is not necessarily the answer to the ultimate position of Sephardim in Israeli society. Nor is it class. The answer to those who claim the differences are class rather than ethnic background is that, for the Sephardi population, the net result is the same: their position is still inferior.

Professor Smooha insists that the issue is ideological. The origin of prevailing ideologies in Israel today is Ashkenazi. The Sephardi community has not yet had a chance, he says, to shape new ideologies which can challenge those of the dominant Ashkenazim. In establishing the framework for his chapter on "Pluralism and Inequality," Professor Smooha points out that "pluralism stands simply for cultural diversity and social separation, and inequality refers to socioeconomic gaps and power disparities." He points out further that "Orientals and the Ashkenazim... share the same core-culture, i.e., language, nationality, religion, family structure and basic ideology."

The need to settle the land and the accompanying need to build a country in the most literal sense made labor a basic ideological value of Israel's pioneers and founding fathers. Labor in this pioneer sense has since become rather devalued. Tolerance of differences and "love of brothers" were seen as values brought from Eastern Europe, although they are values basic to Jewish life everywhere and throughout the history of the Jewish people. Indeed, in recent months, police (ironically, many of them Sephardim) are trying to cope with violent riots in the Ashkenazi Mea Shearim quarter of Jerusalem, where the haredim - religious zealots - are invoking formal curses on those working on archeological digs, and stoning the police in the process. And it should also be noted that Rabbi Meir Kahane, who has called in the Knesset for antidemocratic measures against the Arabs, was born in Brooklyn, New York, and is of Ashkenazi origin. Thus, a measure of humility would be proper for Israelis of western origin who fear that as Israel's population becomes increasingly Sephardi in origin there will be a weakening of "western democratic values" in the country.

There are a number of developments in Israel today which point to the emergence of new ideological values, and, certainly, concerns which will find their expression in new or redefined values. The impetus seems to be coming from the Sephardi side. One basic concern of the nation is the social gap. For most of Israel's 36 years as a state, the eyes of the population were always turned towards the borders. The major concern was defense and security. Election campaigns were fought on the issues of economic and foreign policies. No political party in Israel included social policy as a top priority in its campaign platform.

There are new winds blowing across the political scene today. More and more, political leaders, mainly Sephardim, are calling for greater attention to social issues. It is no accident that much of the support for the candidacies of David Levy and Yitzhak Navon as potential leaders of their respective parties is based on the social views of these men. The young leaders in Herut, whose base was their leadership in development towns, are talking about social justice

and equal opportunity at home rather than about foreign policy. This is becoming increasingly important as the austerity measures being adopted by the government to deal with the economic crisis lead to cuts in social services.

The Black Panthers, a group from Musrara, a Jerusalem slum neighborhood which is almost entirely North African, first gave organized expression to the call for equal opportunity. A whole new generation of leadership is coming of age in the deprived city neighborhoods and the development towns. They are the members of the local steering committees in some 70 predominantly Sephardi neighborhoods and towns, who are responsible for the planning and implementation of Project Renewal in their communities. It was the American Jewish contributors who, having watched the failure of urban renewal programs in the United States, made it a condition of their participation in Project Renewal that the local residents constitute at least half of the local steering committees. Thus, after some five years of successful experience in Project Renewal, these local leaders are beginning to feel their political oats, and must increasingly be reckoned with as an important factor in Israel's political scene.

The Jewish Agency, in conjunction with the World Sephardi Federation and the University of Haifa, initiated some years ago a program called "Bridging the Gap," which made it possible for civil servants in development towns to complete or acquire at least the first university degree. Dr. Yael Yishai, of the Political Science Department of Haifa University, conducted a study of the graduates of this program. Two of the conclusions drawn from this research are the following: Graduates are the sons and daughters of Sephardi immigrants who live in the development towns and neighborhoods. Second, higher education has created a significant transformation in the life of these graduates, psychologically raising their self-esteem, financially improving their standard of living, and in a certain measure increasing their political involvement.

Here, then, is another element encouraging the growth and development in Israel of a new breed of political leader - young Sephardim concerned with social values. Together with the new activities deriving from Project Renewal, there are already a few thousand Sephardim who have started to climb the ladder of leadership, carrying with them new goals and new values.

Finally, one small but very significant new development is worth noting here: the emergence of a movement called "East for Peace." The Jerusalem Post article of July 8, 1983 describing the movement is captioned "Smashing the Stereotype," namely, that the Sephardim are all hawkish in their views on solving the Arab-Israel conflict. The opening paragraph states: "East for Peace aspires to be much more than a Sephardi version of Peace Now. The movement, barely one month old, has on its agenda nothing less than a total revolution in Israeli society." The movement's aims, as stated in its founding proclamation, are: to encourage the peace process in the Middle East; to combat allegations that Oriental Israelis are extremist, violent and hostile to peace; to further the political consciousness of the Oriental masses, who have been subject to political manipulation, and to support their struggle for the realization of their true social and cultural rights.

In concluding the article, journalist Daniel Gavron writes: "How significant is East for Peace? A colleague points out that the late Elie Eliachar, a leading Sephardi figure in Jerusalem, used to say the same things about peace and about Oriental Jews being able to make contact with the Arabs. But Eliachar

was a representative of the small Sephardi aristocracy, while East for Peace represents the mass immigration of the 1960s, the 'second Israel', which is at last starting to find its voice. Only time will tell whether we are seeing the emergence of just another marginal protest group, or a dynamic movement which will turn this country on its head."

Looking at East for Peace as part of the new social thrust of a new Sephardi leadership, and looking at the history of the past several years in terms of growing Sephardi political position and power, I see the leadership gap being closed. I see Sephardim assuming their deserved place in Israeli society. But I don't know what kind of culture, what kind of values my grandchildren will have. Whatever it will be, it will not be Sephardi or Ashkenazi - it will be Israeli. And I am hopeful that the new Israeli leaders will continue to enrich Israel's democratic society.





BA'OLAM."IN THE WORLD"

Published by the World Affairs Department WOMEN'S LEAGUE FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM the organization of the Sisterhoods of the Conservative Movement

"By explicitly rejecting the legitimacy and authenticity of non-Orthodox movements, the Knesset would be taking a judgmental action totally beyond its competence. This would damage the capacity of the State to call upon every Jew equally for sup ... (Instal of neitstrimut) daylis tot FEBRUARY 1985

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
The recent defeat of the Knesset Bill to amend the Law of Return should provide only momentary comfort to those who worry about the Jewish condition. Like Ground Hog Day, it has become a fixed ritual, occuring at set intervals. However, make no mistake about it - it is a serious issue with awesome ramifications for Israel and world Jewry. We need to take it as seriously as do its proponents.. "We strongly urge the oftisens of tares and

The regularity of the attempt to amend the Law of Return has at least affected the ability of American Jewry to respond effectively. On the eve of the Knesset vote on January 16, spokesmen for 21 American Jewish religious (Women's League among them) and secular organizations called on political leaders in Israel to resist demands by the Orthodox religious parties to amend Israel's Law of Return. Heform Zionists of America (ARA). I rich, Central Conference of American

A proposed change in the law, would be "contrary to the interests and welfare of world Jewry," the Jewish leaders charged. In a joint statement the Jewish leaders said the proposed change, which would invalidate conversions to Judaism by non-Orthodox rabbis, would "do violence to the principle of Jewish unity and jeopardize the sense of solidarity that binds the Jewish people everywhere to the State of Israel." In add has been a CONT'D P. 2

Hadassah, in a separate release, toppted a resolution of oriographs in larger's law of Seturn and further stability Towal of Seturn "hes stood as a sacred atfirmation of the unity of the Jewish people" . "Hadassah believes that any action to amend the Law of Beturn threatens had endangers this unity."

THE RELIGIOUS LOBBY



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Wednesday, March 20, 1985

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IMPRISONED FOR THEIR RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL

PRACTICES

COME TO WASHINGTON · SUPPORT THEIR CAUSE!

"The self-serving demand of a group of Orthodox spokesmen in Israel that they be recognized as the sole interpreters of Jewish religion, and specifically that their authority to determine the legitimacy of conversions performed ouside Israel be spelled out in the secular law of Israel, is morally and religiously offensive to us;"....

"By explicitly rejecting the legitimacy and authenticity of non-Orthodox movements, the Knesset would be taking a judgmental action totally beyond its competence. This would damage the capacity of the State to call upon every Jew equally for support, and weaken the appeal for aliyah (immigration to Israel)....

"The Knesset, a democratic national body, should not attempt to legislate religious homogeneity. Religious differences are to be resolved neither by majority vote nor by coalition politics.

"The issue of who is a Jew must ultimately be resolved among the religious groups involved. Meeting in a spirit of good will, we should be able to reconcile divergent views in ways which will at once respect the differences among us and emphasize our common concern for the unity of the Jewish people.

"We strongly urge the citizens of Israel and its leaders in the government and the Knesset to continue to recognize the reality and importance of religious diversity and pluralism among the Jewish people, and therefore to reject all demands for revision of the Law of Return," the joint statement concluded.

It is important to note the organizations which joined in: American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, American for Progressive Israel, Association of Reform Zionists of America (ARZA), B'nai B'rith, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Federation of Jewish Men's Clubs, Federation of Reconstructionist Congregations - Havurot, Hebrew Union College, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, Labor Zionist Alliance, Mercaz, National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, Pioneer Women/Na'amat, Rabbinical Assembly of America, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, United Synagogue of America, Women's League for Conservative Judaism, World Union for Progressive Judaism and the Zionist Organization of America.

Hadassah, in a separate release, adopted a resolution opposing changes in Israel's Law of Return and further stating The Law of Return "has stood as a sacred affirmation of the unity of the Jewish people".... "Hadassah believes that any action to amend the Law of Return threatens and endangers this unity."

THE RELIGIOUS LOBBY

The Israeli press has dubbed the 12 Knesset members including the 4 religious parties (NRP, SHAS, Morasha and Agudat Israel) and those from Likud as the "Religious Lobby." This indicates a change in the status of the religious parties, who previously had enjoyed the role of "balance of power" in former coalition governments. The establishment of the current national unity government, accompanied by the decline of the electoral clout of the religious parties, deprived those parties of the influence they had enjoyed in the past. Observers now believe that the emergence of a so-called "religious lobby," supported by Knesset members from secular-oriented parties, could become a more vocal vehicle of expression with every passing day. and the second second second second

CONT'D P. 9

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION - TOO CLOSE TO A CALL!

The threat of a Call to convene a Constitutional Convention is perilously close to becoming a reality. Just how close are we? Thirty-two states have already ratified a Constitutional Convention "call", with the last being the State of Missouri in 1983. Only 2 more state ratifications of a call are needed to mandate a Constitutional Convention. During the past year the legislatures of Michigan and Montana defeated Calls and a referendum favoring a call was ruled off the Ballot in California. Washington, Ohio and Vermont are expected to take up this issue in 1985.

We have been close to a Constitutional Convention before in our history - on an amendment to limit the federal income tax, on another to dilute the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions - but it always fell short of the necessary two-thirds.

According to NJCRAC, "Inherent in a constitutional convention is its great potential for sharp, bitter conflict with dangerous consequences to the nature and structure of the United States. Possible results include modifications in the Bill of Rights and an opportunity for every special interest group to seek to revise the Constitution. The pitfalls and potential disastrous consequences of a constitutional convention are among the reasons it has never been used as a method for amending the constitution." Our Constitution has been amended by the traditional procedure of a 2/3 Congressional vote and ratification by 3/4 of the states, twenty-six times! This process which has proved so successful in the past, can and should continue to be the way to meet the needs of a changing society.

The father of our Constitution, James Madison, contemplating the possibility of a second convention warned that it would "give greater agitation to the public mind; and election into it would be courted by the most violent partisans on both sides; ...it would no doubt contain individuals of insidious views, who under the mask of seeking alterations popular in some parts but inadmissible in other parts of the Union might have a dangerous opportunity of sapping the very foundations of the fabric... Having witnessed the difficulties and dangers experienced by the first Convention which assembled under every propitious circumstance, I would tremble for the result of a Second."

"There are no laws, rules or precedents for how a constitutional convention would be convened, how it would operate, how and by whom delegates would be selected. It is feared that a convention could not be limited to a single issue but would instead open a 'Pandora's Box' of amendments which could drastically and radically change the Constitution that has served this nation so well for nearly two centuries."

In response to this threat to our constitutional liberties, Women's League for Conservative Judaism, in convention assembled on November 14, 1984, passed the following resolution:

"Women's League for Conservative Judaism, therefore, urges its Sisterhoods to:

- Develop an educational program within the Sisterhood and community leading to a full and comprehensive understanding of the perilous threat of a Constitutional Convention.
- 2. Oppose any petition calling for a Constitutional Convention in those states where such legislation has not been passed.

MODERATE INCREASE IN ANTI-SEMITIC VANDALISM

Anti-Semitic vandalism and other assaults or threats against Jews, Jewish institutions or property increased moderately in 1984 after having declined for two years in a row, according to the annual audit conducted by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. The audit revealed a noticeable increase in such serious crimes as arson and bombings.

ADL national director Nathan Perlmutter said the survey revealed a total of 715 incidents of vandalism, an increase of 6.7% over the 1983 total of 670. Of the 715, there were 32 serious crimes as compared to 23 in 1983. The 32 included 17 cases of arson and attempted arson, compared to 13 the previous year; 3 bombings as against none in 1983; one attempted bombing - the same as in 1983 - and 11 cemetery desecrations, compared to 9 for the previous year.

The 1984 audit showed that the following five states had the most vandalism episodes: New York, 237; California, 99; Maryland, 69; New Jersey, 56; and Florida, 48. Overall, 32 states and the District of Columbia were involved in the incidents.

Mr. Perlmutter said that the 1984 figures are "disturbing because they reverse a two-year decline." He pointed out, however, that the 6.7% figure was far smaller than the 192 and 158 percent increases in 1980 and 1981, and added that the 1985 totals will be carefully watched for signs of any new trend.

Key findings of the 1984 audit included:

- * In 1984, as in past years, the overwhelming majority of those arrested were age 20 or younger. In only 5 of the thousands of anti-Semitic incidents during the last six years was there any reported evidence of organized group involvement the last in 1981.
- * While the total number of assaults, threats and harassments directed against Jews or Jewish-owned properties remained practically unchanged 369 in 1984 compared to 350 in 1983 there was a reversal of the statistical breakdown.

The number of episodes in which Jewish institutions were the targets of mail or telephone threats and other means of harassment increased markedly from 39 in 1983 to 106 in 1984. At the same time, however, the total of incidents in which individual Jews were the targets dropped by 48 - from 311 in 1983 to 263 in 1984.

In assessing the findings of the audit, Mr. Perlmutter said the statistics provide only one barometer for measuring anti-Jewish bigotry in this country. Others, he said, include anti-Semitic rhetoric in election campaigns; anti-Israel and anti-Zionist propaganda disseminated in this country and in the United Nations by Arab and pro PLO groups; the propaganda activities of organized right-wing anti-Jewish hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi groups and such organizations as Willis Carto's Liberty Lobby and Lyndon LaRouche's operations, and activities of radical leftist organizations such as the Communist Party, USA.

Mr. Perlmutter called for stepped-up counteraction efforts and for heightened public concern to combat anti-Semitic incidents. He said that measures taken thus far - including stricter law enforcement, local security conferences and educational programs - had helped bring about the 1982 and 1983 declines from the peak of 974 vandalism incidents reported in 1981.

* * * *

HATE THROUGH COMPUTERS

In a separate release, ADL reports that hatemongering has entered the computer age with right-wing extremists employing modern technology to spread racial and religious bigotry. Two "networks of hate" accessed through a home computer and a modem (phone link-up) are currently operating in the United States.

Justin J. Finger, director of ADL's Civil Rights Division, said the more widely publicized of the two is operated by the Aryan Nations, an Idaho-based group that disseminates racist and anti-Semitic propaganda and which seeks to set up a "nationalist racist state." Known as the "Aryan Nation Liberty Net," the computer network was established and is run by Louis Beam, a leader of Aryan Nations and a grand dragon of the Texas state unit of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

The other hate network, "Info International," is operated out of West Virginia by George Dietz, a farm broker who runs Liberty Bell Publications, one of the largest outlets for neo-Nazi literature in the U.S.. Dietz emigrated to this country in 1957 from Germany, where he had earlier been a member of the Hitler Youth Organization. His "Info International" is similar in content to the Aryan Nations' network and also purveys anti-Semitism, including Holocaust revisionism that questions the reality of the Nazi massacre of Jews.

Access to the Aryan Nation Liberty Net is made by dialing specified phone numbers in Idaho, Texas, or North Carolina. Once the connection is made, the caller follows a few simple commands to receive a variety of hate messages. Authorized users of the system are encouraged to deposit their own hate messages.

In addition to hate propaganda, the Aryan Nations' network supplies under the heading of "enemies" a listing of the addresses and phone numbers of the Anti-Defamation League's national and regional offices. In the same category are listed what the Aryan Nations refers to as "informers" for the "Zionist Occupational Government," its name for the United States government.

Also provided are the names and addresses of so-called patriotic organizations, including a variety of neo-Nazi, Klan and armed racist groups. The computer supplies dates and locations of their meetings.

Mr. Finger said that "although purveyors of hate material are seeking to adapt to the computer age, we see little evidence to suggest a great leap forward in the spread of anti-Semitic and racist propaganda." He added, however, that "given the objectives and ideology of those who are most prominent in this network, it is a development which merits continued monitoring."

* * * *

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION CONT'D

- Urge state legislators to support legislation to rescind the petition for the Convention in those states which have already passed legislation calling for a Constitutional Convention.
- 4. Join with responsible, like-minded groups to work against a Constitutional Convention."

A more comprehensive background paper is available from the National office - Write to:

WOMEN'S LEAGUE FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM 48 East 74 Street, New York, N.Y. 10021

MiPOH... MiSHAM... (From Here And There)

P'RU UR'VU: The population of Israel stood at 4,235,000 at the end of 1984, of which 3.5 million are Jews, according to estimates published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The Jewish population increased by 82,000 during the past year, a 1.9% rise. The non-Jewish population rose by 20,000, a 2.8% increase. The figures do not include the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Bureau reported that Israel's Jewish population increased by some 500,000 during the last 5 years.

U.S. TOURISM SHATTERS ALL RECORDS: 1984 marks a year of the greatest increase of American tourism to Israel since the establishment of the State, it was announced by Moshe Shoshani, Israel's Commissioner for Tourism for North America. "405,000 Americans visited Israel in 1984 which represents a staggering 15% increase over 1983 when 354,000 Americans travelled there," Shoshani stated. A peak figure of 1.3 million visitors worldwide was also a record achievement. This number is 8% higher than the 1983 figures and exceeds the prior record established in 1980 by 7%. Tourism to Israel is the greatest source of foreign currency and in this landmark year resulted in \$1,080,000,000 being channelled into the economy.

ISRAEL - A COUNTRY OF WHEELS: Given the ratio of vehicles to highway miles, Israel is the most heavily travelled country in the world, according to Haim Corfu, the Minister of Transport. There are 820,000 vehicles in Israel, and 2 out of every 10 Israelis owns a car. Road accidents declined by 5% in the past year; injuries due to traffic accidents were down by 6% and fatalities by 10%. Corfu said that 43% of Israelis who apply for driver's licenses fail to pass their road tests.

LEHA'YIM - TO LIFE: Israeli wine exports burgeoned from \$15,000 in 1948 to nearly \$5 million in 1984. Much of the credit, according to the winemakers themselves, should go to the country's scientists, whose highly sophisticated agro-technological developments have vastly increased grape yields. Israeli winegrowers continue to produce and perfect vintages which are highly competitive on the world market. The traditional sweet wines for Jewish ceremonial uses, longtime big sellers, have in recent years been augmented by aromatic and tasty dry wines, appealing to the palates of discerning wine tipplers around the globe. As personal consumption goes, however, Israelis themselves are still relatively unsophisticated. Annual per capita consumption of fine wines is a mere 4.1 liters, compared to 8 liters in the United States and 96 liters in France.

YEAR OF THE FOREST: This year, 1985, has been declared "The Year of the Forest" in Israel. When the State was founded in 1948, it consisted of some five million trees spread over 10,000 acres. Today there are 170 million trees in the forest which has been expanded to 300,000 acres. "The Year of the Forest" in Israel is part of the International Forest Year proclaimed by the United Nations. During the next 12 months the JNF will organize hikes and other activities in its forests all over the country.

100% COMPUTERIZED COTTON: Acre for acre, Israeli cotton growers lead the world by a wide margin. Current annual output averages 1,282 pounds per acre, compared to 543 pounds per acre in the U.S. and 153 pounds in India. The secret of this success is the use of computers to coordinate data and advise farmers on precisely what to do to achieve the best possible crop. This high level of organization has resulted in about \$135 million in exports in '84, making cotton Israel's second-largest cash crop after citrus. Israeli farmers are sharing their newly-developed expertise with Asian, African and Latin American farmers.

UNICEF and UNESCO: What's the Difference?

Historically there has been a certain amount of confusion between the acronyms of UNICEF (the United Nations Children's Fund) and UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). These are, in fact, two separate agencies with totally different mandates, governing bodies, staffs and budgets. Because of the confusion in names, however, publicity concerning UNESCO has adversely affected the U.S. Committee for UNICEF and UNICEF International. On several occasions the U.S. Committee has found it necessary to re-emphasize the distinction between the two organizations. What follows is a brief overview of its establishment, purpose and structure.

The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund was created by unanimous vote of the UN General Assembly on December 11, 1946 to provide massive emergency relief to the destitute young victims of the Second World War. By 1953, when the General Assembly extended UNICEF's mandate indefinitely and the words "International" and "Emergency" were dropped from its name, the Fund had begun to focus its attention on the widespread malnutrition, disease and illiteracy afflicting millions of children throughout the developing world. In 1965, UNICEF was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize because "it has fulfilled the condition of Alfred Nobel's will, the promotion of brotherhood among the nations."

UNICEF's primary task is to help the Governments of developing countries at their request to improve the quality of life of their children, irrespective of race, creed, sex or political persuasion. UNICEF works in over 100 developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the child population exceeds 1.3 billion.

UNICEF has semi-autonomous status within the United Nations, reporting to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. An Executive Board, composed of representatives of 41 Governments chosen by the Economic and Social Council, establishes UNICEF policies and meets annually to review the Fund's programs. Executive Director James P. Grant of the United States is responsible for the day-to-day operations of UNICEF. The Fund depends entirely on voluntary contributions to finance its activities. Approximately three-quarters of its income is contributed by Governments; the remainder comes from the general public through greeting card sales and various fund-raising campaigns. The United States Committee for UNICEF and national committees from 32 other countries raise funds and help to inform the public about the needs of children in the developing world and how UNICEF works to meet these needs.

The Israeli Government, which has had severe problems and political differences with the General Assembly and the Security Council in the United Nations, has only praise for the assistance they received from UNICEF in the first 18 years of their existence. UNICEF helped stabilize their child care program until the Israeli Government was satisfied that they had reached an acceptable standard and could proceed without further assistance. Israel supports UNICEF both financially and politically.

Numerous articles have appeared in BA'OLAM on the polticization of UNESCO. Women's League has also called for withdrawal of U.S. funds directed to UNESCO.

-F.O.U.

REPORT FROM CANADA....

NATIONAL GATHERING OF HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS AND CANADIAN JEWS to be held in Ottawa April 28-30, 1985. Keynote speakers will be Beate and Serge Klarsfeld, hunters of Nazi war criminals, Jan Nowak, Polish resistance fighter and Gretta Fisher, a social worker who entered the death camps as part of the UNRWA team to rehabiliate displaced children, many of whom were sent to Canada. For further information write to: OTTAWA GATHERING '85, 1130 Sherbrooke Street W., Suite 3120, MONTREAL, QUEBEC H3A 2M8, Canada.

TORONTO'S JEWISH POPULATION has grown faster than the general population - from 106,000 in 1971 to 128,000 in 1981, according to a 6 month study just released by the Social Planning Committee of the Toronto Jewish Congress. Findings were based on Statistics Canada reports culled from 1981 census figures. The population increase was due primarily to migration to the city, with the largest influx coming from Montreal - 8000. Newcomers from the Soviet Union accounting for 6000; South Africa 2500. The study discloses that one out of every seven Toronoto Jews lives below or slightly above the poverty line, which is defined by Statistics Canada as \$18,000 before taxes, for a family of four. Seniors 65 and over, are the hardest hit, with one in three among the poor, particularly elderly women whose numbers constitute 2/3 of this group.

THE INSTITUTE QUEBECOIS DE RECHERCHE SUR LA CULTURE has published a collection of essays called Juifs et Realites Juives au Quebec, edited by Pierre Anetil and Gary Caldwell, analyzing the position of the Jewish community in Quebec past and present. The publishers call the 360 page book the first in the French language offering an overview of the Jewish Community in the Province of Quebec.

TRADING PARTNERS: The Israeli Trade Commissioner in Canada reports that in the period January to August 1984 Israeli exports grew to \$56 million, an increase of 48.9% over the same period last year. Canadian exports to Israel for the same period grew to \$99 million, an increase of 23.6% over last year. Meetings between Canadian Federal Communications Minister Marcel Mosse and his Israeli counterpart, Communication Minister Amnon Rubinstein, have resulted in a television co-production agreement, between the two countries. At the same time, a sizeable contingent of 15 prominent businessmen representing the Canadian food industry was in Tel Aviv to take part in Israel Food Week at the Tel Aviv Hilton Hotel where more than 100 Israeli food producers displayed their goods. The export of Israeli food products to Canada has increased this past year to \$11 million.

ORDER OF CANADA: A number of Jewish names appear on the list of those appointed to the Order of Canada by Governor General Jeanne Sauve. New officers include Harry Freedman of Toronto, composer and performer with the Toronto Symphony, and Nina Roginsky, noted Victoria photographer. Among the members appointed are: Montreal community leader David Azriel and businessman Michael Hornstein; Esther Manolson Robins of Calgary, who works extensively with cancer patients and Winnipeg educator and author Sybil Shock.

MATCHMAKING IN CANADA: A non-profit matchmaking program for Jewish singles has been set up by the Canadian Jewish Congress to fill what is seen as a long-felt need in the community. The Jewish Introduction Service is open to all ages but is targeting the 20-40 years age group. Applicants are welcome from across Canada and the service will be advertised in the U.S.A. as well. According to figures from Allied Jewish Community Services, there are about 20,000 single persons of all ages in the Jewish Community in Montreal alone.

-M. G.

Active financial and political intervention by the Lubavitch Movement has been clearly substantiated. Berka Wolf, the spokesman for Lubavitch in Israel warned "if the Amendment to The Law of Return does not pass.... there are those in New York who have budgeted \$1 million in order to shake up the coalition if it should cause this law to fail."

RESPONSA FROM THE KNESSET?

The absurdity of the Knesset deciding halakhah appeared even more ridiculous when you consider that both Arab, Communist and secular members of the Knesset had the right to vote on such a question.

What should be clear is that the Conservative Movement is in no way opposed to Jewish standards; it never has been. What we are saying is that halakhic standards do not belong within the purview of the Knesset. They belong to the Rabbinic community whose integrity can best be preserved by separating them from the halls of government. We American Jews understand that lesson very well.

One of the contributing factors in this recurrent theme is the passivity of the general Israeli population who see "religious" issues as outside their area of interest or concern. This is simply not true! It is not a religious issue, but a political issue. It has to do with pluralism; it has to do with democracy and individual rights.

All of us have the responsibility as caring and committed Jews to raise the consciousness of our Israeli brothers and sisters. Nothing less than the unity of our people is at stake!

-B.B.

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HANDGUNS SELF-DEFENSE MYTH DEBUNKED

For every time a criminal is killed by a handgun-wielding civilian, handguns will terminate over 100 innocent lives, the National Coalition to Ban Handguns (NCBH) announced. The Coalition's findings are based on a three year analysis of unpublished FBI justifiable homicide statistics.

Between 1981 and 1983, nearly 69,000 Americans lost their lives in handgun murders, suicides and accidents. During that same period, there were only 583 instances in which a handgun was used by a civilian to justifiably kill a stranger - the group that includes robbers, rapists, burglars and other criminals. Using these figures, a handgun is 118 times more likely to be used in a murder, suicide or a fatal accident than to kill a criminal.

Michael K. Beard, president of the National Coalition to ban Handguns, states, "these FBI figures explode once and for all the myth of the self-defense handgun. These deadly tools are rarely being used to kill criminals, but the friends and family of 69,000 dead Americans can tell you what they are being used for. To tolerate the continued possession of an object that is over 100 times more likely to do harm than good is to establish self-destructiveness as a criteria for social policy."

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WOMEN'S LEAGUE FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM 48 EAST 74 STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N.Y. 10022, (212) 751-4000

The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States. It protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people.

MORTON YARMON, Director of Public Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, Jan. 17....The American Jewish Committee announced today that its Board of Governors had scheduled a Board Institute in Israel, the top priorities of which would be to engage in "serious discussions of Israel's economic concerns and the United States aid to Israel's troubled economy....as well as the state of religious pluralism in Israel and its impact on world Jewry."

Noting that the Institute would take place from January 31 to February 10, Theodore Ellenoff, Chairman of the Board of Governors, stated that its purpose was "to provide AJC's national leaders with the opportunity to participate in a dialogue with our Israeli counterparts on issues pertaining to both our communities and to explore areas of future cooperation."

The Board also hoped to acquire first-hand knowledge and insight about the current political, social and economic situation in Israel, Mr. Ellenoff added, and "to demonstrate our commitment to Israel and our continued and keen interest in cultivating the partnership between the American Jewish community and Israel."

Supplementing Mr. Ellenoff's remarks, Dr. David M. Gordis, Executive Vice President of the American Jewish Committee, said that the program was conceived to give AJC an opportunity to "convey our basic philosophic premises regarding the viability and significance of Jewish life in the United States and the nature of American Jewish-Israeli relations."

It would also, he asserted, "enable us to re-examine our role in Israel, to assert a higher political presence there and to inaugurate our new program initiatives in areas such as intergroup relations and religious pluralism."

- more -

"We also hope that this particular visit will enhance a broader understanding in Israel of our activities in the U.S. and other parts of the world," Dr. Gordis said.

Discussing the events planned during the Institute, Howard I. Friedman, President of AJC, declared that it would also mark the 25th anniversary of the founding of AJC's Office in Israel, as well as the establishment there next month of a center on pluralism for projects dealing with intergroup understanding.

The three American Jewish Committee leaders emphasized that scheduled meetings with Chaim Herzog, President of Israel; Shimon Peres, Prime Minister of Israel; Itzhak Shamir, Israel's Foreign Minister; David Kimchi, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, and other top officials would help promote understanding not only of Israel's financial and economic concerns and of its other internal problems, but also of the overall situation in the Middle East.

Among the key Israeli figures with whom the Board would meet, Mr. Ellenoff stated, were the prominent political analyst Dr. Shlomo Avineri; former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, currently Chairman of the Knesset Committee on Defense; Dr. Efraim Ya'ar, noted Israeli sociologist of Tel Aviv University; Gad Ya'akobi, Minister of Economics and planning; Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem; and Itzhak Navon, Minister of Culture and Education.

The Institute members will visit Kiriat Arba to meet with Ethiopian Jews who have settled there and Moshav Aviezer, settled originally by Jews from Cochin, India, as well as Jews from other ethnic origins. There will also be meetings with Arab and Druze residents of Israel.

On February 8 there will be a visit to the Jacob Blaustein Institute for Desert Research in Sde Boker. The late Mr. Blaustein, a leading industrialist and benefactor of numerous philanthropies throughout the world, was President of the American Jewish Committee from 1949 to 1954.

A February 9th dinner celebrating the AJC Israel Office founding will pay tribute to U.S. Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis and his wife, and to Mr. & Mrs. Zalman Abramov. Mr. Abramov, a former member of the Knesset, is a prominent attorney and author.

Among the topics slated for discussion over the course of the Institute are the following:

- * Israel's Political Landscape 1985
- * Israel's Social Challenges
- * Religious Pluralism in Israel
- * Intergroup Relations: The American and Israeli Experience
- * Probing the Palestinian Issue -- Jewish and Arab Perspectives
- * Israel's Financial and Economic Concerns
- * U.S. -- Israel Relations: Current Issues
- * Jewish Identity: Issues in Education
- * Are we one?...Or are we: Perspectives on Zionism

At the conclusion of the Board Institute in Israel, delegations will leave for four-day discussions in Budapest, Madrid and Rome with senior government officials, with leaders of the Jewish communities and of the Catholic and Protestant churches, and with the U.S. Ambassadors in Hungary, Italy and Spain.

The American Jewish Committee is this country's pioneer human relations organization. Founded in 1906, it combats bigotry, protects the civil and religious rights of people here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people everywhere.

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THE MURDER OF LEBANESE JEWISH HOSTAGES

(An International Relations Department Analysis)

By George E. Gruen, Ph.D. Director, Middle East Affairs

The murder of two defenseless Lebanese Jewish hostages at the end of December 1985 by a militant Muslim group has aroused deep fear within the tiny remnant of the ancient Lebanese Jewish community, which today numbers fewer than one hundred.

The murder victims are **Haim Cohen**, 38, a department store accountant who was killed on December 24. He leaves a wife, Sheila, and three young children -- Robert, 16; Edward 13; and Alain, 6. He was one of four Jews kidnapped at the end of March 1985 from West Beirut.

The second murder victim, Professor Isaac Tarrab, was killed at the end of December. A single man in his 70's, Tarrab was a retired professor of mathematics who was a much admired teacher and distinguished member of his profession, honored in France as well as Lebanon for his innovative mathematical formulas. He continued to be active and was giving a series of lectures in the Spring of 1985 at the time he was kidnapped.

Neither Mr. Cohen nor Professor Tarrab was involved in partisan Lebanese politics or in the Arab-Israel conflict in any way. Indeed, it was because they felt themselves deeply rooted in Lebanon that they and the other Jews who are now hostages remained behind when most of the Lebanese Jewish community emigrated either to Israel or to join relatives in Western countries during the years of turmoil that engulfed their country.

Mrs. Myra Mizrahi, a niece of Isaac Sasson, one of the other hostages, and a neighbor for many years of Professor Tarrab, stressed to me that they were not Zionists. While her uncle has been active in the local Jewish community, Professor Tarrab had virtually no connection with Jewish life. "He was not interested in anything but his figures and his pipe," she recalled. Professor Tarrab was a Jew only in that "he had the luck to be born one." She characterized his killing as a "senseless death."

Presumably because the Shi'ite fundamentalist group who killed them know that it is explicitly against Islamic law to persecute innocent Jews, since they belong to a recognized monotheistic religion, the kidnappers denied that they were seized simply because they were Jewish. The previously little known group, which calls itself "the Organization of the Oppressed (Mustad'afin) in the World," in its statements in mid-December declared it had arrested "a group of spies who work for the



Lebanese branch of Israeli intelligence." It added the further ridiculous claim that "they were trying to establish an association under the name of "The Committee to Support the Establishment of Israel in Lebanon." It nevertheless offered to trade the four Jewish hostages it claimed to hold for Shi'ite <u>mujahidin</u> (holy warriors) allegedly being held by the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army in a camp in Khiyam.

The Organization of the Oppressed threatened to kill them if their comrades were not released "promptly." (An-Nahar, Beirut, December 17, 1985.) In a statement on December 28, the fundamentalist group also threatened to strike at other Jews "on whom we may lay our hands" unless Israel stopped shelling Shi'ite Muslim villages in South Lebanon. (Unconfirmed rumors that three additional Jews had in fact been kidnapped at the beginning of January have been circulating among Lebanese Jews in the United States. The first name of one is believed to be Ephraim and of another Joseph. Nothing further is known as yet.)

The two other Jewish hostages which the Organization of the Oppressed says it is holding are Elie (Yussef) Srour and Isaac Sasson. Mr. Srour, 68, had been in charge of preparing the dead for burial according to Jewish religious rites. He was kidnapped on March 30, 1985.

Mr. Sasson, in his mid-60's, is the president of the Lebanese Jewish community. He was kidnapped by an armed gang on Sunday, March 31, while travelling to the city from Beirut International Airport. Mr. Sasson was returning to Beirut from a business trip to the United Arab Emirates on behalf of Khalil Fattal & Fils, a major Lebanese trading company, whose pharmaceutical department he heads. When news spread of the kidnapping of three other Lebanese Jews earlier in the weekend, his friends sought to warn him not to go to West Beirut, and the company sent a car with police guards to meet him and take him to presumably safer Christian East Beirut. Eyewitnesses say that when armed men stopped the car and demanded Mr. Sasson, the guards in the car offered no resistance. Mr. Sasson is believed to suffer from diabetes.

The other Lebanese Jewish leader kidnapped at the end of March is Dr. Elie Hallak, 60, vice president of the Central Committee of the Lebanese Jewish community. Dr. Hallak is a respected pediatrician whose patients have come from the various ethnic and religious communities. Indeed, some years back he treated the son of one of the Palestinian Liberation Organization's leaders in the city. Although there were reliable reports that he was earlier being held together with Mr. Sasson and some of the other hostages, the Organization of the Oppressed has not claimed to be holding him. He has been reported to be working as a doctor among his captors, who are believed to be connected with the Shi'ite fundamentalist group Hezbullah (the Party of God), whose headquarters are in Baalbek in the Bequa Valley.

Also still missing is **Salim Jammous**, secretary general of the Jewish community, who was kidnapped on August 15, 1984, reportedly by three armed men who abducted him from his car near the communal office located in the compound of the main synagogue in the Wadi Abu Jamil quarter of West Beirut.

Nothing is known of the whereabouts of **Yehuda Benisti**, 68, a former manager of Bank Safra in Beirut. His son, Joseph, 32, is rumored to be among those kidnapped in recent days.

The number of Jews remaining today in Muslim West Beirut is estimated at between 20 and 30, while those in Christian East Beirut is about 47. This is only a tiny remnant of a community, which still numbered 6,000 in 1967. This gradually dwindled to 200 in 1981 and the few dozen at present.

The <u>Hezbullah</u> and the Islamic <u>Jihad</u> (holy war) are other Shi'ite radical groups aligned with Iran, who have been implicated in attacks on American and other Western installations in Lebanon. It is not known what precise links there are between these groups and the recently surfaced Organization of the Oppressed. Until the latter made its declarations, no group claimed responsibility for the Jews kidnapped during the past year, nor were any political demands made for their release.

A clear linkage among these groups emerges from the words of Ayatollah Khomeini. During a meeting with the Syrian Foreign Minister on August 16, 1979, Khomeimi declared:

I hope that a party under the name of the "Party of the Oppressed" will be formed throughout the world...in order to actualize the promise of Islam which means the reign of the oppressed over the oppressors and their inheritance of the earth...Now that a demonstration of unity among the oppressed has actualized in the Muslim lands, this must be applied more extensively among all strata of mankind in history under the name of the "Party of the Oppressed" which is the same as the "Party of God" (Hezbullah). (The Imam Versus Zionism, official publication of the Iranian Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1983, p. 40.)

At the same meeting, Khomeimi charged that the Arab and Islamic countries had been disunited and "made the mistake of not stifling the voice of Israel right from the beginning." Khomeimi went on to charge that Israel had "set Southern Lebanon on fire and wants to push Palestine aside." He concluded:

We have repeatedly stated that Israel -- this germ of corruption -- will not content itself with Quds (Jerusalem); and if it is given the opportunity it will endanger all of the Islamic governments.

The past mistake must be rectified through the Muslims' unity and through the "Party of the Oppressed" against the oppressors, at the head of which are the criminal America and its most corrupt servant, Israel. (Ibid., p. 41.)

Indeed, precisely because the Lebanese Jews have no connection with Israel and play no role in local or regional politics, the kidnappings have outraged Muslim as well as Christian leaders in the country. In fact, Nabih Berri, the leader of the Amal, the mainstream Shi'ite militia, explicitly condemned the kidnapping of four Jewish leaders at the end of March. Mr. Berri, who has served in the Lebanese Cabinet as Minister of Justice and Minister for South Lebanon Affairs, declared on April 4 that the kidnappings "falsify the image of Beirut, which is built on co-existence." He concluded that "whoever kidnaps a Jew just because he is Jewish only helps Zionism and has nothing to do with patriotism or the struggle...."

However, as became evident during the TWA hostage crisis, the more pragmatic and Western-educated Mr. Berri has himself been facing a challenge to his leadership within the Shi'ite community posed by fanatical, pro-Iranian fundamentalist groups such as the Hezbullah. Some of the latter apparently have been so blinded by hatred that they make no distinction between Israelis and Jews in general, despite Ayatollah Khomeini's clear injunction that under an Islamic Republic Jews and Judaism are to be respected, so long as they do not actively aid "the Zionist enemy."

How absurd the charge of aiding Israel is when applied to the Lebanese Jewish hostages was most poignantly pointed out by Dr. Rosemary Cohen, the sister-in-law of Haim Cohen. Speaking at a memorial service for him in Los Angeles, Dr. Cohen noted that "my brother-in-law was given the opportunity to go to Israel. But he did not want to go so as not to have to face the possibility of killing his Arab friends. He chose to stay in Lebanon. He was such a kind and gentle person. How could his killers look into his loving eyes and pull a trigger?"

The American Jewish Committee, which has been in contact with the American, Lebanese, French, and Syrian authorities, and with various other governments and human rights groups since the beginning of the kidnappings, urgently appeals to all persons of good will to intensify their humanitarian efforts to obtain the safe and unconditional release of the Jewish and other hostages still being held in Lebanon.

January 7, 1986 9692-(IRD-5)/el TO: MHT

From: Harry Milkman

Discussion with Walter Eytan, first Director-Jeneral of Israel's Foreign Ministry and former Israeli Ambassador to France

New Israel Fund Roundtable, 1/21/36

Terrorism

While conceding that there is "no ready answer" as to how to stop terrorism, Ambassador Eytan posited that the only effective method of combatting terrorism is through intelligence work, i.e., by infiltrating terrorist organizations and thereby gaining foreknowledge of planned attacks. "In Israel, far, far more terrorist incidents are averted than actually occur," he asserted.

Amb. Eytan said that America's perception of terrorism differs from that of its European allies due to the fact that the major European powers are confronted with indigenous terrorist movements of their own, and have become "immured to it."

Commenting on the effects of terrorism on Israeli domestic politics, Amb. Eytan stated that acts of terrorism increase the hatred of Arabs which exists among a large section of Israeli society -- particularly Jews from Arab countries -- and tends to drive these "primitive, politically unsophisticated" Israeli voters toward the Likud and other right-wing parties. Terrorism also feeds the argument that Arabs cannot be trusted or believed, and thereby cannot uphold any peace agreement.

The West Bank

Ambassador Eytan asserted that the West Bank "does not belong to anybody, and has not since the end of the Ottoman Empire." He then went on to elaborate the history of the territory since World War I — the artificial creation of Transjordan to satisfy the ousted Hashemite ruler of the Hejaz, the the illegal Jordanian annexation of the West Bank, its conquest by Israel in 1967, etc.

Amb. Eytan expressed his belief that a West Bank Palestinian "mini-state" would not satisfy the Palestinians, except as a provisional stage in the process of "the liberation of all of Palestine." He scorned the fact that all press references to the PLO's alleged "compromise" position omit that all PLO statements continue with the words "only as a first step toward...."

Amb. Eytan similarly ruled out the possibility of a West Bank Palestinian state confederated with Jordan. On the one hand, Jordan's membership in the Arab League obligates it to work toward the establishment of an independent Palestine. On the other hand, Hussein will not go to the point of seriously endangering Israel's security:

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Israel has protected Jordan from Syrian invasion on more than one occasion. Hashemite sovereignty over Jordanian territory is challenged not only by Syria (whose Hafez al-Assad still harbors the dream of a "Greater Syria"), but also by Saudi Arabia (which does not recognize Jordanian sovereignty south of Ma'an) and by the Palestinians (who make up over two-thirds of Jordan's population).

Jerusalem

Eytan believes the problem of Jerusalem to be the greatest obstacle to reaching an Israeli-Jordanian peace settlement. Hussein will only make peace with Israel if he can secure the return of East Jerusalem (including the Temple Mount) to Jordan. He must regain the prestige of the "Hashemite protector of the Islamic holy places" that he lost in 1967. His grandfather suffered a similar loss in Arabia (i.e., Mecca and Medina) when he was ousted by Ibn Saud. "It is inconceivable that King Hussein would concede to allow Israel to continue to rule East Jerusalem — but it is equally inconceivable that Israel will return any part of Jerusalem to anybody." Enthusiasm for peace among the Israeli populace is not so great that Israel would be willing to make unlimited concessions for peace; as long as war can be averted, the status quo will suffice.

Israel-Diaspora relations

Eytan believes that the only significant Diaspora community is that of the United States; all others are dwindling. He regrets the lack of mutual understanding among Israelis and Americans of the other's "Jewish experience." It is for this reason that Eytan agreed to become a member of the Israeli advisory board of AJC's Institute of American Jewish-Israeli Relations.

According to Eytan, the key question which determines American Jewish attitudes toward Israel is whether Israel is considered to be a <u>refuge</u> for endangered Jewish communities (Ethiopians, Sephardim, Soviets, etc.) or the Jewish national home.

Social tension in Israel

Eytan believes that concern over the Ashkenazi-Sephardi rift is unwarranted. Currently, one-third of marriages between Israelis are "intermarriages" between Ashkenazim and Sephardim; it is only a matter of time until the communities will be fully assimilated.

Israel's most significant socio-political problem, according to Eytan, is the secular-religious conflict. The solution to this problem requires the alteration of the Israeli electoral process, i.e., to raise the minimum percentage of votes required for a Knesset seat. Only in this way can the disproportionate influence of the religious be eliminated.

Jewish-Arab relations in Israel

There are no significant Jewish-Arab relations in Israel, according to Eytan. The overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews have no relations with Arabs (except construction workers, domestic help and merchants) and neither side is anxious to foster a relationship. Arabs and Jews live two different cultures, and the abyss between them is difficult to bridge, although there are a number of organizations who make that their goal. The American Jewish role in fostering Arab-Jewish relations in Israel can only be philanthropic support of such organizations, or making aliyah, according to Eytan.

The Israeli economy

Eytan noted that there has been a freeze on wages, taxes and subsidies since last August, and this has brought inflation down from nearly 400% to approximately 50%. Most Israelis accept the required belt-tightening positively, and see it as being for the good of the country, i.e., contributing toward its economic independence.

Israel's most serious economic problem, according to Eytan, is its continuing inability to increase productivity significantly.