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OCT 10 1983

**THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE**

memorandum

**date** October 5, 1983  
**to** Marc Tanenbaum/George Gruen  
**from** M. Bernard Resnikoff

**subject**

I am attaching an article by our own Zalman Abramov entitled "An Ideological Impossibility" that appeared on the back page of the October 4 issue of The Jerusalem Post. A similar piece appeared in the Ha'Aretz of the same day. That does not happen very often.


The reason is clear. This is easily the most compact, laser-type analysis of the ideological and, hence, political differences that divide the solons of the day.

I commend it to you with the suggestion that you may wish to consider reproducing it to the opinion-making members of our commission and board.

MBR/tc  
Attachment



P.S. Since dictating the above I learned that Sam Lewis called Zalman at his home to say that he telexed the article to the State Department with a suggestion that it be duplicated and widely distributed.





# An ideological impossibility

By S. ZALMAN ABRAMOV

IT IS to the credit of the prime minister-designate that in response to public clamour he invited Labour leaders to discuss the formation of a national unity government.

Labour leaders acted wisely in accepting the invitation. It was generally felt that the nation faced serious difficulties, particularly on the domestic front, and that a government based on a wide national consensus was better placed to confront problems which may well call for painful solutions.

The inter-party discussions were held; they were serious and at a high level. They failed to achieve their objective, but they were useful in that they focused public attention on, and better identified, the basic issue of the national debate.

The arguments in favour of a national unity government were weighty indeed, and so seemed the prospects of achieving it.

An agreement on Lebanon could be reached as both parties supported a disengagement in Lebanon following the implementation of security arrangements. Both were aware of the harmful effects of the present economic policy and of the need to put an end to the prosperity festival engineered by Finance Minister Yoram Aridor, with its adverse impact on export and foreign exchange reserves.

That painful measures to remedy the situation were called for was obvious to all. Here, too, agreement was possible. Nor would the distribution of ministerial portfolios prove to be insurmountable.

All these three important issues

did not reach the agenda, for the talks broke down on the ideologically loaded issue of settlements in the administered territories. Had the parties so wanted, they could, by resorting to equivocal and ambiguous formulations, gloss over their differences on this crucial issue. It is to their credit that they preferred to face this issue squarely, and having failed to bridge the gap, agreed to part ways.

FOR THE ISSUE at stake was not just settlements; the term is a code word for a much wider issue — the kind of a Jewish state that conforms to the Zionist ideal.

This is the substance of the grand national debate between two schools of Zionist thought. It began with the Royal Commission of 1937 which recommended the partition of Palestine into two independent states, as a solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict. The Zionist Congress of that year accepted the principle of partition as a basis for a settlement, and the United Nations resolution of 1947 calling for the partitioning of Palestine into two independent states was accepted by the Zionist movement and the Yishuv. The armistice lines that were agreed upon with the Arab states following the War of Independence, were also accepted by Israel.

There is no doubt that if the Arab states had agreed then to sign peace

treaties on the basis of these frontiers, the overwhelming majority of Israelis would have supported such a peace.

It is worth noting that when Herut and the Liberals in 1965 negotiated the Gahal alignment — which preceded Likud — the Liberals refused to incorporate in the manifesto a joint statement affirming the right of Israel to its historic frontiers.

This issue appeared to be laid at rest until 1967, when, in the wake of the Six Day War, it was revived, becoming the most important bone of contention in Israeli politics.

THE LABOUR PARTY and like-minded political formations regard the problem of frontiers in terms of defence and would limit settlements in the administered areas to territories considered to have strategic value, while the bulk of the areas would be returned in exchange for peace treaties and defensive arrangements.

Herut would reject the criterion of defence as the sole guiding principle for the determination of the frontiers, for they are dedicated to the proposition that the attainment of historic frontiers overrides other considerations and that only within such frontiers can the Zionist ideal be fully realized.

Thus, in the view of Labour, the territorial aspect is to be subordinated to considerations of

defence, while the realization of Zionism is dependent upon the character and quality of the state; that is, whether it is to be predominantly Jewish in terms of demography, politics, society and economics.

In their opinion, a state with a rather small Jewish majority — 64 per cent — and a large and growing Arab minority — 36 per cent — cannot in fact be a Jewish state. Even now, the number of births among Arabs through Mandatory Palestine is equal to that among Jews.

It is worth noting that the percentage of the Jewish population within the pre-1967 frontiers is declining, while that of the Arabs is growing, and it is estimated that some 50,000 immigrants will be required each year to maintain the present ratio between the two peoples.

At present, the binational aspect is not reflected in the Knesset because the inhabitants of the administered areas are not citizens of Israel. Once they are incorporated in a large and democratic state, their proportionate representation in politics, the army and administration will result in an Israel totally different from what it is today — it will be a Jewish state in name only; in reality it will be a binational state.

The precedent of Cyprus is illuminating. There, the Turks constituted only 18 per cent of the island's population, but the country

was constituted as a binational state with a united constitutional framework. When tension between the two peoples mounted, the unitary state collapsed to be followed by a *de facto* partition.

If Herut leaders have deliberated on the various aspects of *de facto* binationalism, their conclusions on this subject, if any, were not made public.

THE INTER-PARTY discussions were significant in that they pinpointed the essence of the ideological dispute and demonstrated the wide gulf between two Zionist philosophies, one giving primacy to the territorial aspect, the other stressing the character and quality of the Zionist state.

It is to the credit of the leaders of the two major parties that, in their eagerness to form a grand coalition, they did not gloss over the basic ideological difference and parted rather than patch it up.

By asking Herut to change its policy on settlements, Labour has in fact asked its opponents to abandon their philosophy; Herut, in turn, asked Labour to endorse its settlement policy. Neither party could be expected to perform such political suicide. Hence, the impossibility of a broad coalition government.

This issue will therefore remain on the national agenda until it is resolved by the democracy of Israel — subject, as such issues always are, to the fluctuations of international politics.


The writer is a jurist and historian. He is a former Liberal Party MK and deputy speaker of the Knesset.



**THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE**

**date** October 11, 1982  
**to** Staff Advisory Committee  
**from** Foreign Affairs Department  
**subject** Items 2 & 3 of Enclosed Mailing

**memorandum**



The two Trends Analyses Reports mentioned in the covering letter of the enclosed mailing will be sent to you in the near future by the Trends Analyses Division of DAD.



# The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

October 11, 1982

TO: Foreign Affairs Commission Steering Committee  
FROM: Abraham S. Karlikow

I thought you would be interested in seeing the enclosed material prior to the NEC meeting.

- 1) Some of you expressed interest in having a copy of the report on chapter membership reactions to President Reagan's peace proposals that I read out at the Steering Committee meeting. As you are aware, chapters are engaged in a full discussion of the major points of this proposal in preparation for the NEC meeting, so this is but a foretaste of things to come.
- 2) An updated analysis of American reaction to Israel's campaign in Lebanon covering the period from June 22nd to August 21st, when the departure of the PLO from West Beirut began. (The events of September will be covered in a subsequent report that, barring the occurrence of additional momentous events, should be ready in a few weeks.)
- 3) A description of a number of ad hoc anti-Israel groups that have emerged on the American scene since June 6th.
- 4) Mr. Hayim Pinner, Secretary General of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, has taken strong exception to the analysis of the cultural life of British Jewry depicted in the report of June 18, 1982 from our European Office (an AJC office review of Jewish cultural life in eight West European countries) by Nives E. Fox. We are, therefore, forwarding to you Mr. Pinner's views on the situation.
- 5) Minutes of the Foreign Affairs Commission Steering Committee meeting on September 13th.

ASK/es

Enclosures

82-550-40

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JOHN H. STEINHART, San Francisco ■

## THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

**date** September 13, 1982  
**to** Abe Karlikow  
**from** Harold Applebaum HC  
**subject** CHAPTER LEADERSHIP REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE PROPOSALS

During the week of September 6, Area Directors were asked to interview officers and Board members of their chapter to elicit reactions to President Reagan's Middle East peace proposals and Prime Minister Begin's prompt rejection of the plan. They were also invited to recommend a course of action for AJC. The following summarizes the responses of 167 people from 16 chapters. The reports were phoned in by staff between September 7 - 10. Ten Area Directors interviewed groups ranging in size from 5 to 9. Six Directors talked with more than 10 Board members.

One group (Miami) was interviewed immediately following a briefing by Israel's Consul General, and a majority opposed both the substance and timing of the Reagan proposal.

Fourteen Directors reported a consensus supporting the President, albeit with varying levels of enthusiasm. In 9 cities, the President was criticized for failing to notify Israel before going public. In three cities, concern was expressed that the U.S. may poorly serve the peace process if it abandons the role of mediator.

Eleven Area Directors report near-unanimous dismay over Prime Minister Begin's rapid and sharp rejection of the President's initiative. The phrase "public relations disaster" was repeated with great frequency.

Supporters and opponents of the President's plan generally shared the feeling that AJC should avoid publicly criticizing Prime Minister Begin. This reaction was reflected in 13 chapters, although a significant minority of respondents in 6 cities suggested that the time has come to openly disavow the Begin government's policies on settlements.

Most respondents want AJC to move slowly in formulating substantive peace proposals.

To summarize, there was a consensus that AJC should applaud the Reagan initiative because it offers a promising framework for next-step negotiations. There is agreement that AJC should strongly and privately advise the Begin government that its negative response to the President has offended American public opinion. There is a reluctance to endorse specific formulas for resolving substantive issues.

The responses reflect no differences that can be attributed to regional location or size of chapter.

/more/

MEMORANDUM



The following chapters were sampled:

<u>CHAPTER</u>	<u># OF RESPONDENTS</u>
Atlanta	9
Chicago	13
Cleveland	12
Dallas	7
Denver	8
Houston	4
Miami	20
Milwaukee	10
New York	15
Philadelphia	5
Pittsburgh	30
Portland	6
St. Louis	7
San Francisco	6
Seattle	8
Washington, D.C.	7



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Ms. Nives E. Fox , Director,  
American Jewish Committee  
European Headquarters  
4 Rue de la Bienfaisance  
PARIS 8<sup>e</sup>, France.

8th September, 1982.

Dear Nives,

Your "Foreign Affairs Backgrounder" on Europe has been drawn to my attention. I will react only to the Section dealing with Britain which seems to us to be deficient in a number of respects. Let me be more specific.

In para 3 you say "there is no forum for intellectual Jews seeking identity outside the religious mode". This is not true, as witnessed by the development of groups of Intellectual Jews around such Institutions as the Institute of Jewish Affairs (which is not mentioned in this report at all), the Young Leadership Group of the JIA, the Young Jewish Leadership Institute, not to mention the Academic Study Group, the on-going Study Circle on Contemporary Jewry and Zionist Thought (arranged jointly by the World Zionist Organisation and the Institute of Jewish Affairs) and others.

In para 4, you speak of the "poverty of Jewish publications and general lack of writing on Jewish subjects in Britain". Apart from the abundance of weeklies and monthlies published in London and the provinces, there are quality journals such as the old-established Jewish Quarterly, the Jewish Journal of Sociology, the Journal of Jewish Studies, Soviet Jewish Affairs, Patterns of Prejudice and Christian Jewish Relations, all of which are highly regarded internationally. The Jewish Book Council (not mentioned in the report) arranges an annual Book Week with a book sale. Each year a considerable number of books of Jewish interest, not necessarily written by Jews, are displayed by such publishers as the Jewish Chronicle Publications, Oxford University Press, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Frank Cass, Routledge and Kegan Paul, and various paperback publishers. The average number of books of secular Jewish interest, not counting theological works, published in Britain is around 200 a year. To refer to Martin Gilbert and to say that he has published "a booklet on the Holocaust" is a British under-statement par excellence. Mr. Gilbert has, during the past few years, published two major works, Exile and Return and Auschwitz and the Allies, in addition to his numerous historical atlases including his new "Atlas of the Holocaust" published by Michael Joseph in association with the Board of Deputies. By contract George Steiner has not "written extensively on the Holocaust" but has aroused a major controversy over his novel The Portage to San Cristobal of A.H. and its dramatic version performed for a short time in London. Furthermore, no mention is made of the important books on the subject published by others such as Laqueur; Wasserstein, Michaelis, Vago, etc., etc.

Not a word is said about the Littman Library of Jewish Civilisation which has already published a series of most important books of Jewish interest, or of the best handbook on Soviet Jewry The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917, edited by Lionel Kochan and published by OUP for the Institute of Jewish Affairs which has had three editions, the last one in paperback. I could go on endlessly on this subject alone.

To single out in para 6 Jonah and the Jewish Social Responsibility Council as "two socio-political groups recently formed and having some resonance" is, to say the least, an exaggeration.

When you speak of cultural activities "of the standard sort" mentioning the Museum and the non-existent Institute of Jewish Music while omitting the Jewish Historical Society of England, the Institute of Contemporary History, the Institute of Jewish Affairs, the Jewish Book Council, the Jewish Community Development Centre, the Jewish Memorial Council, the Jewish Museum, the Society for Jewish Studies, etc., etc. Incidentally, mention is made of a regular Sunday morning Jewish television programme. No doubt you are referring to "You Don't Have To Be Jewish" which is on British TV and produced in association with the Board of Deputies.

Four lines are devoted in para 8 to the network of Jewish schools throughout the country and no mention is made of Carmel College.


Re para 9: While it is true that the Memorial Foundation supports the Jewish Studies Department at University College, London, this department was established long before the Memorial Foundation came into existence. It is not true that this initiative was not extended to other Universities; there are Jewish Studies at several British Universities e.g. Warwick, Manchester, Oxford. Reference to the Oxford Centre and its Register of Theses on Jewish Subjects is welcome but I should perhaps mention that the IJA published such a register for the whole of Europe in Survey of Research in Jewish Subjects in Europe.

Finally in para 10 you deal with the activities of Jewish students on and off the campus by devoting two sentences to the Hillel movement and without mentioning Montefiore College, the Jewish Youth Study Groups, the teachers training courses, Maccabi and other organisations, not to mention the Board of Deputies, the Chief Rabbi's and the Zionist Federation's educational and cultural activities.

Please forgive me but I felt we had to put the record straight.

With best wishes for a happy New Year,

Yours sincerely,



Hayim El-Tajer  
Secretary General.

P.S. When in the last paragraph you refer to us as a "Declining Community" you do not seem to be aware of the great deal of research by the Board's Demographic and Statistical Research Unit on this important subject. Without going into great detail, may I merely say that a comment of this kind needs to be qualified by explaining what criteria you employ and whether you are referring to numbers alone.



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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMISSION

STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING

September 13, 1982

Chairperson: Rita E. Hauser

ATTENDANCE

Stanford M. Adelstein  
Norman E. Alexander  
Donald Blinken  
Howard Friedman  
Howard Greenberger  
George Grumbach  
Philip E. Hoffman  
Bee Hoffman  
Gerald Jeremias  
Arthur L. Kimmelfield  
David Lissy  
Richard Maass  
Alfred H. Moses  
Leo Nevas  
Richard Schifter  
George M. Szabad  
Andrew Tisch  
Elmer L. Winter  
Maynard I. Wishner  
Gordon Zacks

GUESTS

Lois Gould Rafaeli  
Charles H. Tobias, Jr.  
Marshall L. Zissman

STAFF

Hyman Bookbinder  
Donald Feldstein  
Morris Fine  
David Geller  
Lois Gottesman  
George Gruen  
Abraham Karlikow  
Jacob Kovadloff  
Sidney Liskofsky  
Sergio Nudelstejer

Excuses for non-attendance received from Mr. Hans Goldschmidt

I. Latin American Subcommittee

Mrs. Hauser briefly reviewed the results of the morning meeting of the Latin American subcommittee. First, there has been some progress in Argentina -- every prisoner on the list AJC presented to the Argentine authorities during the delegation's trip last April has now been released from jail. The delegation also had made a point of the low number of Jews in prominent positions in public office in Argentina. AJC has learned that the number of Jews in high office recently has increased significantly. Second, there appear to be problems brewing in Mexico's Jewish community

as an outcome of the crisis in the economy. A significant percentage of those who have been taking capital out of the country are Jews. About 350 families have left Mexico recently because of the economic situation. AJC would be playing host later in the day to Mexico's Minister of Agrarian Reform Gustavo Carvajal, a close friend of Mexican President Lopez, who had come to discuss the economic situation in Mexico at his initiative. AJC was considering sending a small delegation to meet the incoming President Sr. Hurtado de la Madrid upon his inauguration December 1st.

### III. Israel Update

Mrs. Hauser then turned to discussion of President Reagan's Middle East initiative and possible AJC response to it. She pointed to the possibility of a break in the Jewish organizational support for Israel because of the Prime Minister's harsh rejection of the President's proposal and some American Jewish support for the President.

As a preface to the discussion, Mrs. Hauser reported on a meeting she had attended at the State Department a few days before of outside experts on the Middle East and Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East Nicholas Veliotes, Mr. Fairbanks and others. Among the questions raised at the meeting was that of the timing of the President's speech. According to Veliotes the timing of the speech was dictated by the fact that Egypt's position had changed drastically because of the war in Lebanon; Egypt had said it would not participate in the resumption of the autonomy talks unless the United States undertook a public initiative on the Palestinian issue. As for the response of the parties, Veliotes stated that the State Department had anticipated Israel's negative response; and that prior to the President's speech he had flown to Amman for a secret meeting with King Hussein who, said Veliotes, gave an "amber light." In Mrs. Hauser's view, Hussein did not really say anything substantive to Veliotes. Other experts in the meeting also felt that the Administration had gone ahead without any kind of assurance of Arab support for the President's initiative, even though it should have been obvious that the Arab League meeting at Fez would at the least back the PLO rhetorically and not give Hussein the mandate for negotiating with Israel. State has tried to put the Fez summit in a good light but apparently has not considered what practical steps the United States should now take, given Arab rejection of the proposal. A suggestion that the U.S. push the "Syrian option" -- withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon -- was rejected by Veliotes.

Mr. Maynard Wishner reported on two meetings of Jewish organization leaders with Secretary of State Shultz. At the first meeting, which took place some two weeks before the President's speech, Shultz had said the United States should treat Israel as an ally and not spring surprises on her. Shultz had also warned that Egypt was planning to withdraw from the autonomy talks and then there would be no one for Israel to talk with.



This set the stage for the President's initiative. At the second meeting, after the President's speech, the group concentrated on the procedural style of the initiative rather than its substance -- this was by prior agreement. Shultz mentioned that the speech had been revised at the last minute to include more assurances of United States guarantees of Israel's security, and also that the President had ruled out the use of "leverage" (the reference was to the withholding of economic or military aid) in getting Israel's support for the initiative. Shultz did admit that the U.S. had gotten no assurances from Jordan that it would join the negotiations.

Mr. Bookbinder added with regard to the timing, that his impression was that the Administration felt the war in Lebanon had hurt the U.S. in its relations with the Arabs and judged that it was necessary to find a quick way to redeem the United States' standing in the Arab world -- hence the President's initiative. He also commented that we should not underestimate Israel's "hysteria" over the lack of prior consultation on the President's initiative. Mr. Bookbinder commented that the Jewish opposition to Begin's harsh reaction had been overstated, and that AJC should work to reduce the erroneous impression that there is a split between American Jews and Israel. As for the Administration's next steps, Mr. Bookbinder felt that for the moment it would follow a "be nice" policy, but that it would be prepared to get tough with Israel when the situation will warrant it, and we then would face a difficult public relations problem.

Mrs. Hauser stated that the Steering Committee would have to take action on three items: 1 - A vote on a resolution by Mr. Richard Maass calling on Israel to freeze new settlement activity; 2 - A vote on Mr. Wishner's remarks to the effect that Israel should consider a "pause" on new settlement activity if Jordan responded affirmatively to the President's initiative; 3 - A vote on whether to leave these two items pending on a full debate within the chapters, after which they would be taken up at the November meeting of the National Executive Council. The floor was then opened up for debate.

Mr. Richard Maass commented that he had presented his motion because AJC had never said publicly what it has said privately to Mr. Begin in the past on the settlements issue. The proposed motion did not address the President's initiative but dealt only with settlements; Mr. Maass explained that this was deliberate. He declared that AJC had to take a position in order to maintain its credibility.

Mr. Gordon Zacks disagreed with this reasoning and stated that it would be a mistake to adopt the Maass resolution. Mr. Zacks remarked that he did not feel that settlements are the real obstacle to Jordan's not coming forward to participate in negotiations; and, after all, Israel has dismantled settlements in Sinai in the past and so this is not an insurmountable obstacle. Though he personally favored the Jordanian option and opposed Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Gaza, he also opposed the President's pressure on Israel to make concessions while removing all pressure from the



Arabs. In his opinion, Mr. Zacks said, the emphasis of the President's speech was wrong and the onus for the failure to make peace should be put on the Arabs. He added that he was very concerned about the media coverage of Israel, which has had a negative impact on U.S. public opinion and the Congress. For all these reasons, therefore, he favored Mr. Wishner's formulation linking a settlement freeze with Jordanian willingness to negotiate.

Mr. Alfred Moses felt there were two problems with the Maass proposal: one was the absence of any linkage with a Jordanian response, and the second was that no distinction was made between settlements for security purposes and those established on the basis of confiscation. AJC had in the past supported the Allon plan which allowed for settlements on the basis of security. Mr. Moses felt that AJC could not wait until the NEC to formulate a response to the Reagan initiative and that we should take the position of "Let both sides consider it with an open mind." Therefore, he backed the Wishner statement, and would add to it a reaffirmation of support for Israeli security and the need for Israel to freeze settlements if Jordan comes into the negotiations.

Mr. Howard Friedman sided with Mr. Zacks and Mr. Moses in arguing that settlements are not the central issue. Rather, in his view, this was a case of "alliance management" -- that is, the United States habit of putting pressure on its ally Israel, which usually results in the Arabs being less, not more forthcoming.

Mr. David Lissy commented that AJC could not avoid taking a position on settlements and that he would like to see language added to the resolution about their legality.

Mr. Maass responded that he had no objection to adding to his resolution linkage with Jordan, but that he felt whatever Jordan does is irrelevant. Likewise, the question of security -- after all, Prime Minister Begin has said repeatedly that security has nothing to do with his settlement policy; and he would argue that every settlement is based on security needs. Therefore, it was necessary to take a position against Begin's settlement policy, whatever the rationale for it; in his view, the Wishner statement wasn't strong enough.

Mr. Norman Alexander remarked that he would like more time to consider the situation on the Middle East before taking a vote on either of the proposed statements, adding that facts have changed over time and now the situation on the West Bank is different from what it used to be. He felt that Israeli annexation might well be a long-term viable basis for Israeli security, given the changing demographic situation -- which is more and more in Israel's favor as the Arab population declines or holds steady -- and the fact that Israel now controls most of the land on the West Bank on a legal basis (this information was contained in a story in Sunday's New York Times).



Mr. George Szabad stated that he supported the Maass resolution with the addition of Mr. Moses' suggestion, saying that it is not in the United States -- or Israeli -- interest to create a situation that works against the possibility of peace. Also, he felt it was an issue of maintaining AJC's credibility and that it was time we went public.

Mr. Richard Schifter also supported the Maass resolution with the minor amendments suggested by Mr. Moses, adding that perhaps the statement should also make clear that we are opposed to any dismantlement of already existing settlements and do not question their legality. (This amendment was adopted.) On the Israeli government reaction to the Reagan initiative, Mr. Schifter commented that historically Jews have accepted peace proposals -- beginning with the 1937 Peel Commission proposal -- while Arab rejection of peace proposals has hurt them. Therefore he sees nothing wrong in AJC welcoming the President's initiative.

Mr. Charles Tobias suggested that the statement explicitly exclude Jerusalem from the section on settlements and, perhaps, also hint at border adjustments.

Mr. Leo Nevas also came out in support of the Maass resolution with the amendments, and added that if adopted, the Wishner statement would have to be amended to agree with it. On the question of linkage, Mr. Nevas suggested that the statement not make a settlement freeze a precondition for Jordanian participation but rather say something along the lines of "inducing" or "encouraging" Jordan to join the peace process, with no time limit.

Mr. Gerald Jeremias felt that if the AJC adopted this resolution it would lead to divisions within the organization. Therefore he favored holding off on a statement until the chapters had had a chance to debate the issues. On the matter of credibility, Mr. Jeremias commented that it is true AJC has to maintain credibility in the United States but it also has to maintain credibility in Israel and, therefore, he felt it would be counter-productive for us to criticize Israel; he opposed the Maass resolution.

Mr. Elmer Winter also opposed the Maass resolution, adding that before the Arab League summit at Fez he probably would have supported it. But, since the Arabs at Fez in effect said "no peace," Mr. Winter felt the AJC should not make matters more difficult for Israel by urging concessions. In any event, he said, the AJC has little influence on the Begin government.

Mr. Alfred Moses stated that though he has always been against Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and the settlement policy of Begin, he opposed the Maass resolution as it stood, arguing that as Israel was about to enter into negotiations there was no reason for her to give away something for nothing -- when there isn't even an Arab partner to negotiate with. He urged adding language to the resolution to the effect that a halt in new settlement activity should be contingent on a Jordanian response.

Mr. Donald Blinken agreed with Mr. Winter, saying he favored adopting the Wishner statement with the addition of some tougher language.

Mrs. Rita Hauser then gave her personal point of view, arguing that we're the American Jewish Committee, and it is our President who has made an initiative; therefore, we shouldn't only consider whether this is good for Israel but, more importantly, whether it is good for the United States. And, she added, the present Israeli government has consistently taken positions against United States interests. Because Jewish organizations have heretofore defended Israel's stance, they have lost credibility in the U.S., especially in Congress, for not upholding American interests. There is no reason to assume, Mrs. Hauser argued, that Israel will always take positions consistent with U.S. interests.

Mr. Maynard Wishner observed that the only pressure at this time on the Arabs to come to the negotiating table are the Israeli settlements; so it is really up to them to make the first move.

Mr. Arthur Kimmelfield moved for a vote on the Maass resolution, with the addition of language to the effect that AJC call for a prior Israeli freeze on the establishment of settlements on the West Bank for a "reasonable period of time sufficient for Jordan to respond affirmatively to President Reagan's call to negotiate with Israel."

The Steering Committee approved this added language with a vote of 9-7. On the Wishner statement, the Committee approved it subject to changing the language to conform to the Maass resolution just adopted. The Committee also voted for a full debate in the chapters and deliberations at the NEC. All these decisions were then forwarded to the Board of Governors for its consideration.

Before closing the meeting, Mrs. Hauser announced the cancellation of the planned Brussels III Conference on Soviet Jewry that had been scheduled for October in Paris.

Submitted by Lois Gottesman

82-550-39

Excuses received from Hans Goldschmidt for not being able to attend.





October 12, 1983

A Conversation with Dr. Avia Spivak

ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC CRISIS

You are cordially invited to a conversation with Dr. Avia Spivak on Thursday, November 3rd at 9:45am in the AEI Boardroom on the 12th Floor. Dr. Spivak, an Israeli economist, will discuss "Israel's Economic Crisis."

Dr. Avia Spivak is a senior lecturer at Ben Gurion University. He is currently a visiting professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania. His academic career has included teaching assignments at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Brown University and the University of California at Los Angeles. He served as a consultant to the Research Department of the Bank of Israel (the central bank) during the past two years. He has contributed scholarly articles to the Journal of Political Economy (1981) the American Economic Review, and the Journal of Economic Theory. He is currently working on major articles on inflationary expectations of the public in Israel and on the behavior of the money supply in Israel. Dr. Spivak received his Ph.D. in economics from Hebrew University in 1977.

We hope you will be able to join us for this timely discussion. Please R.S.V.P. as soon as possible to Mr. Graham Hueber at 862-6462. The meeting will conclude at 11:30am.

*Judith Kipper*

Judith Kipper  
Resident Fellow



October 12, 1983

A Conversation with Daniel Elazar and Zalman Shoval

"THE SHARED RULE OPTION FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP"

You are cordially invited to a conversation with Daniel Elazar and Zalman Shoval on Wednesday, October 26th at 9:45am in the AEI Boardroom on the 12th Floor. Dr. Elazar and Mr. Shoval will discuss "The Shared Rule Option for the West Bank and Gaza Strip."

Daniel Elazar, President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and Zalman Shoval were both members of a study group which examined possible options for a comprehensive solution for an acceptable peace between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs on the basis of federal principles leading to a combination of self-rule and shared rule. This study, "Shared Rule: The Only Realistic Option for Peace," was published in June, 1983 by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs in English and in Hebrew.

Daniel Elazar is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Federalism at Temple University, Philadelphia. He is also the head of the Institute of Local Government at Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. Dr. Elazar holds several distinguished academic offices including Chairman, Israel Political Science Association. He is the author or editor of some 30 books including two studies published by AEI. He received his M.A. (1957) and his Ph.D. (1959) in political science from the University of Chicago. He holds many honors including Phi Beta Kappa and has received several fellowships and grants.

Zalman Shoval was a member of the Knesset from 1970-1980. He first served as a member of the Rafi Party and then as a member of Likud. He was founding member of the Telem Party. Mr. Shoval is now a businessman.

We hope you will be able to join us for this timely discussion. Please R.S.V.P. as soon as possible to Mr. Graham Hueber at 862-6462. The meeting will conclude at 11:30 pm.

Robert J. Pranger  
Director,  
International Programs

Judith Kipper  
Resident Fellow

Harold H. Saunders  
Resident Fellow



American Jewish Committee - Israel Office

Program Projections - 1983/1984

1. "Jewish life in the Diaspora as reflected in films". A series of film showings, twice monthly, in cooperation with the Museum of the Diaspora, at the museum.
2. Assist the "Community Action" Department of the University of Haifa in enhancing its community leadership program, in which public figures from underprivileged and developing areas are helped to study for a university degree.
3. Plan and co-sponsor a series of lectures on American Jewish life and its relationship to Israel under the auspices of the Hebrew University Forum.
4. Support the Leo Beck School in Haifa in furthering their program to teach Arabic culture in the school and to enhance relationships between the youths of these two ethnic groups.
5. Modest subsidy to help and support the "Jewish Almanac", a publication by and for Yiddish writers from the Soviet Union.
6. Make a study of and monitor cults in Israel.
7. Help and support the Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation in its educational program to teach the Arabic language, customs, traditions and religion in Israel's school system.
8. Step up a program of assisting the <sup>American</sup> diplomatic corps better to understand religious, life in Jerusalem and the quarters in which they are to be found.
9. Act as consultant to "East for Peace", a new organization organized by and for Sepharadim to help educate the public as to the pluralist nature of the Sephardic community.
10. Produce a Hebrew translation of "Pleasers and Protesters" - the Future of Citizen Organizations in Israel, by Eliezer D. Jaffe.
11. Develop an in-service service training program for Israel's history teachers on the "social characteristics of American Jews" to be co-sponsored with the Bar Ilan School of University Extra-Curriculum Department.
12. Sponsor a regularly scheduled course at Bar Ilan University on "Jewish Diaspora Life as Reflected in Jewish Fiction" (in the planning stages).
13. Co-sponsor with The Hebrew University Martin Buber Center and the Israel Interfaith Association a public program on religious pluralism and toleration.
14. In connection with the above, conduct an intensive consultation with representatives of related disciplines to plan how to change societal attitudes towards the other in both the inter as well as in the intra-religious communities.
15. In planning stage: a) public programs on Jewish Americana in the popular Hebrew University Forum series; and b) organize a consultation together with the editors of Forum Magazine to investigate the implications of the distorted image of American Jews as revealed in the Steve Cohen Study.

## THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

**date** March 13, 1983  
**to** Abe Karlikow  
**from** M. Bernard Resnikoff

### **subject**

Herewith, as requested, is an updated summary of where we stand with respect to current projects. Most of what follows is based on, and is an extension of, the original outline submitted some months ago entitled "Program Plans for the Near Future."

#### IN-SERVICE TRAINING PROGRAM ON AMERICAN JEWRY FOR ISRAELI SCHOOL TEACHERS

As reported on January 23rd, the course is now in progress. The first session was on February 15th, with the opening plenary session featuring Emmanuel Rachman and Richard Hirsch, on the subject of "The Unique Position of American Jewry."

#### PUBLIC LECTURE SERIES ON THE ISRAEL-DIASPORA RELATIONSHIP

Cosponsored with Beit Hatfutzoth, and held in their auditorium, the first in a series of public lectures took place January 19th on the subject of "All Jews are Responsible for One Another." The following persons participated: Simcha Dinitz, Shlomo Avineri, Hillel Halkin and Elli Belfer. Future session will deal with dissent and the unique character of American Jewry.

#### VOLUNTEERISM

In response to expressed need, this office was approached by the Joseftal Institute (overall social welfare planning organization in the country) to put out a Hebrew version of Jaffe's Pleasers and Protesters. They offered to pay for the translating, which is estimated at some \$500. We agreed to help find someone to pay for the printing.

#### RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

A consortium of some eight organizations was set up here last November to follow up the implications of our symposium on "Religious Liberty and the Law." Following consultations, discussion and meetings, three activities emerged:

a) A meeting has already been set up for this consortium on March 22nd, together with M.K. Wurshubsky, to help plan the launching of an educational program on religious pluralism, simultaneous with the reintroduction of a bill to remove the constraints on non-orthodox rabbis in practicing their ministry.

Memorandum



b) In cooperation with the Israel Interfaith Committee and the World Jewish Congress, we are planning an all-day conference, to be followed by the establishment of permanent study committees, on the general subject of "From Polarization to Co-existence."

c) Acting as consultants to Sovlanut (Tolerance), I have met with the officers a number of times, and given them written suggestions of whom to turn to for support and funding. In addition, the Israel Office is organizing and arranging a consultation with various experts from different disciplines, in order to help the organization establish its priorities, given the limitations of manpower and means.

#### STUDY OF SEPHARDI LEADERSHIP

As outlined in a report submitted last September, a team has been established, headed by Dr. Sami Smooha, to study the status of Sephardi leadership in Israeli society. This included roles, leadership identification, leadership issues and training needs. There may be an appendix dealing with the problems in volunteerism for the Oriental community. It is contemplated that this study will be finished by about May.

#### ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE ORIENTAL JEWISH COMMUNITY


A contemplated study, that I have been negotiating for some months, and which is nearing settlement in the conference you and I had this week with Prof. Smooha.

#### LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Agreements have been made with the Institute for Educational Development, to conduct a program of leadership training for young and promising citizens in the development town of Kiryat Shemona. We already have the approval of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The local school principal has agreed to serve as project director. This is as far as we have gotten. There remains to be settled an agreed-upon curriculum, criteria for eligibility and, most of all, selecting qualified young men and women willing to submit to the requirement of a disciplined program of training.

MBR/sw





Where there is no bread  
There is no Torah.

NOV 7 1983  
Friends of  
The Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress\*

220 East 42nd Street New York, NY 10017 212/953-7700

November 4, 1983

Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum  
American Jewish Committee  
165 East 56th Street  
New York, N.Y. 10022

**Board of Governors:**

**Executive Committee:**

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Chairman
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- Louis Lantz
- Leslie Lenkowsky
- Edward Minor
- Robert Russell
- Prof. Seymour Seigel
- Stephen Shalom
- Prof. Herbert Stein

Dear Rabbi Tanenbaum:

After reading for years about your achievements, it was indeed a pleasure to meet you and to hear about the ambitious plans of the Commission on International Relations. I hope that, even though your pre-arranged schedule did not permit inclusion of a presentation on the Israeli economy at the recent N.E.C. Meetings, you will be able, in the near future, to bring the issue to the attention of your Commission and of the A.J.C.


I have added your name to our mailing list, and I hope that you will find the time to study our materials and that you will agree with us that among the many serious problems facing the Jewish people, changing the economic system in Israel may be one of the most urgent and important.

As suggested by you and by Gordy Zacks, following are the names of three of our Israeli Board members that could meet with your mission to discuss the Israeli economy. Foremost is Dr. Steven Plaut of the Technion, a Princeton Ph.D. in Economics and Demography, who has published in Fortune, Commentary, Midstream, and the Jerusalem Post, etc. Steve is an excellent speaker. In past meetings, he has opened with a five minute presentation that was followed by a question and answer period. On the panel with Steve, I would recommend Ya'akov Amihud, who teaches in the Finance School of Tel Aviv University and at the New York University Graduate School of Business, and also Professor Dan Galai of the Hebrew University and U.C.L.A. (Galai, incidentally, is one of the world's foremost experts on financial futures. He helped to establish the Chicago Board.)

Steven Plaut can be contacted in Haifa at 04-292-921 (office), or 04-864-15 (home). Ya'akov Amihud is at 03-420-506 (office) or 03-425-734 (home). Dan Galai is at 02-883-119 (office) or 02-667-2344 (home).

I would appreciate it if you would let me know the itinerary of your group and its composition so that I can inform our friends in Israel about it.

Sincerely,

  
Daniel Doron

ISRAELI BOARD OF ADVISORS

Drs. Menachem Brenner, Danny Galai, Yoram Lanskroner, David Levhari and Tsvi Ophir of Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Drs. Yakov Amihud, Dan Givoli, Avner Kalay, Tzvi Liber and Uriel Reichman of Tel Aviv University. Drs. Benjamin Bentai, Uri Ben-Zion, Alan Kirshenbaum, Dan Peled and Steven Plaut of Technion in Haifa. Drs. Moshe Kim, Aryeh Melnik, Oded Palmon and Menachem Spiegel of Haifa University. Dr. Jacob Paroush of Bar-Ilan University. Mark Heinrich of Tel Aviv.

\*The organization was incorporated under the name "Friends of the Israel Institute for Economic Freedom." This original name is now being changed to "Friends of the Israel Center for Social & Economic Progress.



November 8, 1983

M. Bernard Resnikoff


Lois Gottesman

This is in response to your memo of October 26th concerning the delay in releasing the Rosen monograph.

My understanding was that George discussed it with Harry Rosen a few weeks ago, who then agreed to send us some revisions. I am now waiting for the revisions to arrive. The need for revisions, may I remind you, was mentioned quite a while ago (including my two-page memo to you which was never acknowledged), and the enclosed memo of comments on the paper (from a friend who is quite expert in the area and with whom I shared the draft on Abe's advice) will, I think, bear out this need.

I suggest that you discuss the whole thing with Marc. Once this is cleared up, the manuscript can go out within days.

cc: George Gruen  
Marc Tanenbaum



MEMORANDUM

TO: The File

November 2, 1983

RE: Growing Leadership Roles of  
Sephardi Jews in Israel

This paper attempts to analyze a complex sociological issue charged with emotion: ethnic relationship as reflected in distribution of power in Israel. It chooses to deal with the subject from a single narrow point of view: the leadership roles of Sephardi Jews in Israel. My comments are twofold: general as well as specific; technical and well as substantive.

By and large the paper is full of contradictions, misuses of conceptions, and utilizes various unidentified sources of data. In short, no coherent methodology is presented.

One is tempted to argue that the paper pretends to blend a scientific as well as a personal perspective of the subject matter; the author uses wording that is a mixture of personal views and journalistic writing based on some data which have been collected and presented in 1973 (or in 1978). It does not really give a sense of what is the significance of the data of growing leadership roles of Sephardi Jews in the Israel context vis a vis (a) impact on cultural Jewish life, (b) formation of immigrant society, (c) comparison of such trends to the Afro-Asian/Euro-American Jewish Diaspora communities, and (d) implications of this trend on future relationship between the community in Israel and Jewish communities throughout the world.



If one intends to use this study for public relations purposes, it is advisable to do so with caution in order to avoid inaccurate presentation of the social climate in Israel. In summary, in dealing with this paper, multi-faceted methodological difficulties arise which need to be considered before presenting this paper in any form by any responsible agency.

#### METHODOLOGY-CONCEPTUALIZATION

The author uses the terms "Sephardi" and "Oriental" interchangeably. One must distinguish the differences between and among the various factions of "Oriental"/Sephardim Jews in Israel. Grouping them under one label does not serve a purpose and could be misleading to say the least. The social mobility of the various factions could prove to be different, although these groups may seem to share a common background. The same argument holds true vis a vis Ashkenasim. (Hereafter, the term used to identify the Sephardi will be Afro-Asian, and Ashkenasim will be Euro-American.)

Other inaccurate usage of concepts and data, for example, is 50 percent of the population is of Afro-Asian origin (P.3), while in the beginning of the paper, the majority of the population is Afro-Asian. What does he mean by the term "majority"?

Another serious methodological problem is that the paper is biasly presented. A biased picture of the author's understanding of the Israel society is indicated by the statement, "He would rather see it from a bright positive point of view." One is lead to believe that this statement colors the issues the paper intends to explore and thus raises questions as to its reliability and validity.

The Preface itself raises more questions than answers. It leaves a person who has little knowledge of the social issues in Israel in the dark. It should be clarified that the "paradox" in Israel society and the "differences" between Euro-American and Afro-Asian groups is a true paradox in the sense that it deals with the same "race" nation-peoplehood and religion. Are there biological, environmental and cultural differences between the groups? Did the Israeli melting pot fail? Or, does the current social situation reflect the strength of the Israel culture that has evolved during the past 35 years out of multi-ethnic groups, and although under ideological pressure of melting pot, have succeeded to maintain ethnic identities, while accepting and adhering to national symbols by all concerned groups? These symbols might be one cause for the differences which have existed for as long as Diaspora Jewry has existed.

The author identified the data's source (P.2 and P.20), Israel Pluralism and Conflict by Sami Samoha, as having two different publication dates: 1973 and 1978 and claims that the data was updated. When was the data updated?

#### DATA ANALYSIS

The assumption that the "next generation will see Sephardim and Ashkenasim confrontation, blurred and ultimately replaced, a confrontation of in's and out's, have and have-nots, based on class or otherwise, but not on ethnic lines." (P.1), is a far fetched assumption, or at least wishful thinking. It is rather hard to predict what could be the course of such confrontation, let alone it if should ever happen. The past 35 years proved that ethnic lines are the lines that one can identify clearly as a



basis for confrontation. These might be expressed otherwise, but basically these are the lines. Moreover, those who have not, are identified with lower social strata which turn out to be of Afro-Asian origin. Should the confrontation take the form of cultural revolution, one must not overlook the fact that the groundwork is being prepared now, and that the Europe-America group has a head start.

In discussing the data by the Central Bureau of Statistics (P.2), one can see that the generalization and usage of the term Sephardim interchangeably does not shed light on the issue. Within the Afro-Asian community in Israel, one can find a social hierarchy of prestige/power status, etc. extending along the social ladder vis a vis the society at large in Israel.

Regarding the Central Bureau of Statistics' data (P.3) presented by Dr. Sikron, various questions arise: For example: Can the Afro-Asian community, which makes up 50 percent of the Israel society, be considered in the full sense of the term as a majority? Obviously, the significance and implication of the following demographic statement is not analyzed: "According to age, 60 percent of the 15-29 years old are of Afro-Asian origin; among the elderly, the largest percentage is of Euro-American background." (P.4) Accordingly, the infant mortality went down for both groups, or at least they are getting closer to each other on this scale. Should not this improvement be attributed to improvement in environmental factors (health services)? Is this a social indicator of "closing gap" and is it relevant to leadership roles, or does it reflect changes in the Afro-Asian family structure, which in fact tells more about the influences of one group (Euro-American) or the other (Afro-Asian) regarding birth rate, i.e. imitation of Western culture which has for so long a period been dominant in Israel society?

The decrease in infant mortality is an example of how structural improvements have successfully helped to bridge the gap between the two groups. Such a phenomenon has yet to be repeated to that extent in any other social area.

Regarding the educational data, the author states that the illiteracy is almost zero ("0"). "Almost all those born in Israel have now had a limited school education." (P.4) What does this mean? All those born in Israel represent about 80 percent of the total school age population in Israel. Attending school does not necessarily imply learning. There are about 20,000 youth between ages 12-18 who are out of any conventional educational system (a low estimate); almost all are "illiterate," if examined by any acceptable educational standards.

In the following two statements, the author contradicts himself:

(a) "Although 77-83% of those Afro-Asian origin attended high school, a percentage that is not so different from those of Euro-American origin, the kind of high school attended further reinforces the gap in education." (P.4)

and

(b) "In a country whose economy is developing increasingly in a direction of high technology, those attending vocational schools would seem to be at an advantage rather than a handicap." (P.12)

No further elaboration is provided. One must remember also that a compulsory education law up to the 10th grade is enforced to a certain degree; therefore, students from Afro-Asian backgrounds must attend schools. The bottle-neck theory of education explains why only 15.9% (in 1975) of Afro-Asian attend academic institutions while 83 percent attend high school. This is in part due to the character of the Israeli educational system which is a sponsor and not a



competitive type of system. In other words, students are being channeled and directed by their advisors to a certain type of high school -- academic and/or vocational. Unfortunately, most of the advisors tend to direct most of the Afro-Asian students toward vocational schools, and not the better ones. Data on the attendance of Afro-Asian students in the prestigious vocational schools might shed light on this issue.

The data about the agricultural (rural) settlements reflect an interesting phenomenon (P.5). Considering that agriculture has been a pillar of Zionist ideology changing the Jewish occupational pyramid, the fact that 70 percent of the population in Moshovim since 1948 are of Afro-Asian origin and is an example of how this ideology, which have not really been considered an integral part of the Afro-Asian Jews, had been accomplished.

The inter-marriage social indicator is a delicate issue (P.5). A point of clarity: Are the terms "mixed marriage" and "inter-marriage" (P.5) similar? The usage of this concept reflects the relationship between the two groups in Israel. The term "inter-marriage" is associated with a Jewish experience in the Diaspora. Applied to the Israel context, it creates the impression that the two groups are different in terms of religion. Furthermore, the data presented -- 23 percent of inter-marriage -- does not indicate the trend of this social indicator.

An opposite argument could be that although 20-22 percent of marriage between the two groups is important as a significant social indicator for

closeness between the two groups, why did it take so long to get to a 22 percentile in 35 years? Why is it still much lower than the 50-50% population distribution between the two groups?

This is a complex data presentation without clearly an effort to interpret it in depth. Technical point: Such data might be more clearly presented in a table format and could also save time/energy of reading.

### LEADERSHIP

A general comment regarding the focus of this paper: "leadership" The Author presents quantified data which is not accompanied with a qualitative analysis. The term leadership is not defined clearly. Is it an elite? Why are such fields as art, academics, medicine and science not included? This approach is symptomatic, choosing the political sphere as the indicator for bridging the social gap (P.7-8). This is important in light of the Israeli historical perspective of relationships between and among the elites in Israel. A case in point is the new "Shalom La Mizrach (Peace) Movement," which the author discussed, and the Labor Movement tradition of calling from time to time on its intellectuals.

What is the purpose of relating the protestant ethic philosophy to the Israel context (P.4)? One has to make a significant intellectual effort, which is mostly sociological and theoretical, in order to understand this Weberian concept. By applying it to Israel society, the author is negating what the paper is intended to understand. Imposing a Western concept which has emerged in the Western cultural context onto a society which has 50 percent Oriental in their culture is a "long-shot analysis."



To emphasize the point made earlier -- imposing western concepts on Israel society -- in the last paragraph (P.8), the author states that: "I hear echoes of phrases I haven't heard for a long time. He is a white Jew." This concept is taken from the American social context, where color has been a major issue, while in Israel, the "color problem" is just for identification of origin of countries: Africa - black and Europe - white. The words serve a symbolic use and purpose. However, to impose fears and anxiety from one context to another could lead to misunderstanding of the issue. The issue has to be dealt with in the open and realize that a Bat-Yaana (Ostrich) policy will not create the ambience necessary to understand this issue.

The major explanation for this paper is presented on Pages 9-12 where the author discusses the theoretical background. Presenting famous Israeli professors (Eisenstadt, Samoha, Adler, and Friedman) does not legitimize whatever is presented. One point, though, made by Eisenstadt is important: "That the complaints of the Jews from North Africa and Asia are not expressed in the demands for separatism." One has to realize that there is a legitimacy of claiming power and the struggle for power in any political system, even in Israel. In particular, when the dominant culture is imposing itself with its worst as well as best values (example for the former is the western consumer society). However, a counter-argument could be that the Eisenstadt argument has served as a cover for discrimination (latent or manifest policy) against Afro-Asians during the 1950's and 1960's. With the Afro-Asian awakening, they understood what was happening, i.e., that to take any action could be labeled

as separatist demands against the National Jewish interest, and would have been interpreted as such by the Euro-American establishment. A more accurate term would have been by replacing the term separatism with pluralism.

Although one could argue that there was no official discrimination, it was inevitably inherent in the state of minds and state of power of the decision-makers at that time; the Afro-Asian were and are still not considered an appropriate group or community to relinquish the power to.

How could a sample of some 100 Israeli's be a basis for presenting even an informal point of view (P.11). It's adding insult to injury by treating a critical issue with less than an appropriate scientific approach.

In order to present us with the argument that the economic gap will be closed with education (P.11), one has to compare groups of Euro-American and Afro-Asian Jews with 10 years of education in both groups, to show if there are any differences at all.

If education is the "key to leadership roles, not the only key, but a necessary one" (P.12), then could one anticipate or predict that an industrial leadership could be forthcoming in the future from the potential population who have attended vocational educational schools? Is there a basis for the argument that the vocational education will be an advantage and/or a handicap in a technological society (P.12), while the elite in the political sphere mostly come from the academic background.

The author indicates that researchers have recently brought much of the information up to date based on their understanding and common knowledge of names and distinguishing Afro-Asian names from Euro-American names (P.13).



What about those that Hebricate their family names and make them sound completely neutral, like Bar-Am, Orly, Bar-on, Chen, etc.? The validity of the data should be contested.

The data presented on various leadership categories (P.14-20) could have been presented in tables with graphs and then focus on the explanation of the data through the whole gamut of politically centralized power in Israel: (Prime Ministers, President, Histdrut, Supreme Court, Parliament, Ministers, National Parties, and strangely enough under Miscellaneous, the "Association for Journalists"). The analysis is a quantitative one and it is suspected of totology, i.e., the author argues that every place where there is a majority of Afro-Asians, the leadership is Afro-Asian. Is the snow white? Is there a relationship between growth trend in various categories? Why is there a situation like in the police force where the proportion of Afro-Asians is higher than in the Israeli defense forces in leadership roles?

By and large, the whole presentation of this statistical data is based on the assumption that there is a 50-50% distribution between Afro-Asian and Euro-American, then the same proportional presentation in every category is called for. But as presented, on the average, Afro-Asian leadership is about 30-35% in every category. Why? A very interesting note to add here is that the author ignores the fact that the prison population in Israel -- 90% of the inmates are Afro-Asian. Why?

Data can be interpreted in many ways: It was zero ("0") in 1948 and now it stands at about 30%. That's a tremendous increase. But it was zero ("0") in 1948 "and understandable," then Afro-Asians were apparently

much less than 50%, why is it only 30-35% now that they constitute at least 50% of the population? Is there a shortage of potential Afro-Asian leadership?

Moreover, although the percentage is growing and absolute numbers are also growing, does one keep pace with the other? Most of the decision-making bodies presented have been expanded concurrently in absolute terms since the 1950's. An X-number of committee members to an X + N number of committee members in the 1970's. Why? If the trend is to democratize the decision-making process and to decentralize it, then a process of political maturity took hold in Israel and not the good will of an established power center, which realizes that it cannot afford ignoring the numbers game, but rather present it as democratic ideal.

If one would go one step further, one could argue that since no differentiation was offered within the Afro-Asian community, a Yemenite might not consider himself Afro-Asian in terms of social standing vis a vis the society at large and vis a vis the organization that he is serving. The group labeled leadership could be identified further by a major characteristic of minority within a minority which is accepted neither by Euro-Americans nor by Afro-Asians. In other words, such a "leader" might be neither close enough to his reference group nor to his belonging group. Afro-Asian leadership who reach high powerful positions tend to publically not identify themselves with the ethnic issues (D. Levy is a case in hand).

An example for the illogical thrust of the data presented in the paper: There is only one Afro-Asian member out of 56 members in the National Academy of Science and Humanities. Are not there qualified Afro-Asians for this body?



Or why only six (6) Afro-Asians out of 126 won the Israel Award in five years? Are not there talented Afro-Asians researchers to win the Award, or does the Award symbolize the "other Israel" which Afro-Asians have no right to share?

Stating that the police are trying to cope with the violent riots in Jerusalem attended by religious zealots (P.22) (the former are Afro-Asian and the latter are Euro-American) is to exacerbate the problem. Is it incidental? The author reads too much into it and which in turn "colors" the issue.

The statement: "It was the Black Panthers who first gave organized impression for the cause of equal opportunity" (P.23) is inaccurate. The first uprising violent equal rights demonstration took place in 1959 in Wadi Salib in Haifa.

#### SUMMARY

In summary, this paper uses concepts incorrectly, inconsistently, and inaccurately. The data presented is without an indepth explanations. The theoretical basis for the whole paper is very superficial. The result is a mixture of personal impressions, blended with the so-called scientific and journalistic approach, which colors any objective interpretations of data. The issue is too serious to deal with it in such a manner. In the one paragraph (P.12) the author summarizes the issue by indicating that the Afro-Asians have learned a lesson and understand that numbers count in politics. Unless this was true, there would have been no purpose for writing this paper.

Imagine the following scenario: Had such data been applied to the American context, all Jewish community relation agencies will scream "gewalt": ADL, AJC (Institute for Pluralism), NAJCRC, and civil rights movements and liberals of all kinds "would have" called for "affirmative action," minority rights, coalition building, etc. etc. Would not it appear to be ABSURD to follow such a course of action in the Israeli context?

Seeing this from a very radical point of view, one should ask:  
"If the cup is half-empty or half-full."

