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WITH THE JEWS OF SOUTH AFRICA


Jacob Neusner

I went to South Africa to speak to Jews about Jewish things, to give the keynote address at the National Congress of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies. I went determined not to talk about what I came to call "The Subject"—race, apartheid—and not to "tell people how to solve their problems." After three weeks and 30 or more public appearances, in Jewish community meetings, student gatherings, and university lecture rooms, I discovered that Jewish things and The Subject cannot be kept apart. And I found no fewer than a dozen scenarios for the future of that beautiful, tormented country and its weak, inconsequential, but truly worthy Jewry. I went to South Africa to learn about the potentialities of Judaism on the moral frontier of humanity. I left ashamed to be a human being but ineffably proud to be a Jew.

Johannesburg and Pretoria, Bloemfontein and Potchefstroom. Cape Town, Simonstown, Stellenbosch, Paarl, Port Elizabeth, Durban, East London—Swaziland, Lesotho, Zululand—once merely place names, now, for me, people: proud, intense, beleaguered. The white minority, not five million out of more than twenty, speaks two languages; the Indians, coloreds, several more; and the blacks, more still. Jews speak English but have studied Afrikaans and Hebrew, and of course there are, as everywhere, the Yiddishists.

What does it mean to live among people of different speech? to know that what is intimate and particular to you is unknown to the other? to won-

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der, what is he thinking, he who speaks words you scarcely grasp, he who thinks words and remembers history which are not yours?

It means that the other is the alien. There is no bridge of shared experience, contained in language, from the one to the next. What does it mean to know that the mass of your countrymen lives in utter human degradation, unable to live in the same nice neighborhood you live in, educate children in decent schools, make use of the same toilet facilities and buses, enjoy the same salary for the same work, take for granted the same fundamental rights of citizenship and permanent residence, benefit from equal protection of the law, remember a past of dignity and hope for a future of comfortable death? How does a person live with the knowledge that the comfort of one is built on the deprivation of the other? What do you call a country which is called by at least three names by its own people—South Africa to the English speaker, Suid Afrika to the Afrikaans speaker, and Azania to the blacks?

How, in other words, do Jews live in South Africa? More interesting: What happens to Judaism there?

The Jews live very well indeed. But despite that fact and against it, Judaism as a tradition of moral imperative and commitment to one Torah for the whole human condition is not yet extinguished.

In diverse ways, the Jews are South African. I met none who was not a white supremacist in the simplest terms. In a country in which censorship and secret police enforce laws against free expression of opinion, the Jews enforce upon themselves censorship which requires acute circumlocutions for the expression of the simplest truths. In a land of abundant, untrained labor, Jews—like other whites—employ an unlimited number of household servants, paying the usual R50 or R60 (\$60-72) monthly. In a land in which physical work is degraded and demeaning, associated as it is with inferior races, Jews—like other whites—have contempt for work and the worker. In a land in which to be a liberal means to concede that blacks are human, Jews—along with other liberals—play the role of Lady Bountiful. In a truly Christian country, whose Christianity requires the closing of movies on Sundays, Jews work out an equally ritualistic and formalized mode of Judaism. Orthodox rabbis—and nearly all are Orthodox—demand the right to exer-

cise a veto on all speakers brought to the Republic by the organized Jewish community. (A case in point is Samuel Sandmel's course on Biblical Thought, introduced through the Academy Without Walls of Haifa University, under the sponsorship of the Board of Deputies. At the Congress, an Orthodox rabbi condemned the use of a "heretical" course by a Reform rabbi, albeit conceding that he had not even seen the course.) In a country far from the centers of Western culture, accomplished in science and technology but out of touch with the life of the humanities, the Jews scarcely acknowledge that being Jewish takes shape in the life of the intellect. Among the handful of rabbis and scholars serving the small community I met only a few who might, on any terms, be employable anywhere else in the Jewish world.


I asked the Congress, "In all the Jewish world, who reads a book written on a Jewish subject by a South African Jew? Who consults a work of scholarship in Jewish learning done by a South African-trained and educated Jew? What Jewish ideas come to illuminate our common condition and to inform our minds, from South African Jewry? Why is it that among the Jewish communities in all the world, your reputation does not include praise for your devotion to the intellect of the Jewish people, to the heart and mind and soul of Jewry?" The answer, of course, is that the sorts of people who think and write cannot make their lives where the State watches their words. Great Jewish writing does come from South Africans—but not, in the main, resident in South Africa.

But art is the expression of life already lived. The heritage of Judaism shapes the perceptions of Jews, and South African Jews include Judaists. That is the other half of the matter. How does Judaism endure in that racist and oppressive society? We know about the emigres, including 9,000 *olim* in the State of Israel from a community which numbers about 120,000, the highest rate of *aliyah* from any country which permits free emigration. Constituencies with sizable Jewish populations send to the *Volksraad* (parliament) Progressive-Reform representatives, of whom Mrs. Helen Suzman is best known abroad. Serving long prison sentences are Jews who have passed out leaflets or joined organizations deemed subversive. I met relatives and friends of some of them. Jewish community organiza-

tions pass resolutions in favor of equal rights for all citizens of the Republic, relations of dignity and respect among all the races. True, they work hard at finding language capable both of expressing what is to be said and of being heard and understood by a closed-minded ruling minority. But the resolutions do pass. Mrs. Suzman's brother-in-law, Mr. Arthur Suzman, has for 16 years now given an address to the National Congress of the Board of Deputies on "public relations," in which he links events in the world to the life of the community. This year he emphasized that "events in the north" (meaning Angola) "have imposed new urgency upon the quest for racial justice" — perhaps mild words for us, but in context, no small matter. And his words met with general approval.

Yet not what we say but what we do matters. And what the Jews of South Africa do is full of contradiction. The Jewish community includes major industrialists who pay equal wages for equal work to white and black workers — and ones who do not. The Union of Jewish Women, one of the strongest Jewish organizations, is devoted to social work in the African townships, bringing food to the hungry, medicine to the sick, and clothing to those in rags. (To be sure, these rather staid and stuffy upper class matrons do nothing to change "the system," but they *do* do things of human meaning.) But in Port Elizabeth my (Jewish) hostess laughed at her servants for trying to enter the elevator with us. "You don't honestly think you can ride with us, do you? Go down the stairs!"

Yet I also saw Jews—and they are not few—who talked with blacks with genuine respect, who had taken the trouble even to learn the music of the Africans' language and to sing out the words in the same timbre and rhythm. True, in some Jewish homes servants serve the food while wearing white gloves; in one, the serving lady wore a large red sash over her white uniform. But it was also in Jewish homes that I saw genuine camaraderie and love, human appreciation clearly shared among equals, even affection expressed, on both sides, in human, physical contact—a pat on the back—which in context is not to be ignored. If within South African Israel there are those who trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth, cows of Bashan in the Rand who oppress the poor, who crush the needy, who say to their husbands, "Bring, that we



may drink!”, there are also those, and they are not few, who hate evil and love good and try to establish justice in the gate.


It is in South Africa that Christian religion lives in its old Calvinist form. The Afrikaaners are very pious, very Christian. They come through as decent and kindly people, very certain of their righteousness in a sinful world. Not a few times I was asked whether I did not agree that Israel (by which they mean the State) and South Africa must unite against the conspiracy of atheism and Communism which threatens the world. I do not know how the Afrikaaner divines, devoted to the Bible as they are, read the literature of the *nevi'im*. But during my three weeks in the country I found myself obsessed with the simple verities of Amos and Isaiah. I could not put out of mind the noble aspiration of the Talmudic rabbis to create an orderly and just society. I never saw a black but that I thought of myself with a yellow star. But his star is his skin, and his Holocaust is for centuries and slow.

The Jews of South Africa are professedly Orthodox. What being Orthodox means is difficult to say. The community leaders whom I met in the main do not keep kosher outside of their homes and do not keep the Sabbath. The major service comes on Friday evenings, as in the old Reform liturgical week. But, then, the Jews are professedly Zionist. Being Zionist means giving vast sums to the State of Israel. It also means to listen with very great care lest something out of conformity with the party line (mainly Revisionist) be said, crouching for the attack on the most innocent thought. My own blunder in this regard came when I said that I thought Zionism must mean a focus upon *aliyah*, and that I suggested Zionists see to it that *all* young people of university age spend a year of study or work in the State of Israel (as I think should be the case in American and Canadian Jewry) as a kind of *aliyah leshe'ah*. I had stepped on a toe: “You don’t seem to realize that we presently send several hundred students every year.” The students are of high school age—not likely to make an immediate commitment to remain in the country. The programs for bringing young adults to the State of Israel reach a couple of hundred, not thousands by any means. In the main, they are the work of the Jewish Agency, not primarily the local community. In brief, *aliyah* is not a significant

part of the Zionist agenda, even in a community where almost every family has children or close relatives in Israel.

The "proud record of philanthropy" is, of course, enviable. There are no income tax deductions for the South African equivalent of UJA. Yet people give. On the other hand, if the per capita rate of giving is the highest in the Jewish world, as I was told, the per capita rate of wealth may well also be the highest. And a fundraiser showed me cards on which the estimate of the donor's capacity to give is listed alongside what the donor actually does give. Among several dozen, the figures did not coincide, any more than they do here in the States: none gave so much as, let alone more than, what peer-committees estimated he should. The Jews are very certain of their righteousness, taking delight in their solemn assemblies and their rich, fat offerings to the State of Israel. And yet, and yet: there are those who search out springs of justice and give their lives—in prisons, as exiles, but also in universities and in industry—to make righteousness roll down like an ever-flowing stream.

Are these last the same Jews who comprise "the organized Jewish community"? The students whom I met perceive the community as staid, cautious, self-satisfied, as indeed I did. But are the decent others not Jews too? Do they not come out of the same families, the same tradition of prophecy and law? In South Africa I learned that the issues of Judaism are drawn starkly and in all their simplicity. South Africa is a land of simple truths. In my last lecture, in Johannesburg the day before I left, I spoke about the indivisibility of freedom, the slavery of the master, the degradation of the superior race. In order to be heard, I said this with as much tact as I could muster. But it slipped out that I thought authentic Judaism is expressed by the prisoners and the exiles, the Jewish whites who give their lives to alleviate the condition of the blacks (only the blacks can change that condition, by rejecting it, as they may now have begun to do), the businessmen and lawyers and industrialists who concretely and in practical ways do what they can (and it is a great deal) to establish for blacks the chance for a life of human dignity. A critic said, "But many of the people to whom you refer are not observant Jews and have nothing to do with the Jewish community. How can they express 'authentic Judaism'?" "Twenty



years ago," I replied, "I would have agreed with you. But then life seemed more subtle and complicated than it does now, than it does here or at home. In my understanding Judaism always has taught that what God wants of the human creature is love of fellow human creatures—to do justice, love mercy, walk humbly with God. Jewish people who, to do justice go to prison or into exile, who, to love mercy spend their lives and fortunes for others, who have the humility to see the Creator in the face of all creatures—such people testify that Judaism endures, even triumphantly, in this time and place."

Yet there is not only Judaism to consider, there is also the Jewish group. What of them and their country? The Jews are weak and unimportant, about one half of one percent of the population of the Republic, not much more than two percent of the white minority of the population. They are socially and psychologically isolated from the other and much larger components of the white minority. Old-fashioned anti-Semitism flourishes. SABC television wanted to delete the episode on genocide from *The World at War* series of Jeremy Isaacs. It televises anti-Semitic preachers, who quote from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Jewish community officials sometimes compare their own work to that of members of the Judenrat. Letters sent to high government officials reach the hands of anti-Semitic leaders, meetings with officers of the Bureau of State Security on organized anti-Semitic movements in the country are made known forthwith to those same movements. At least 2,500 Nazis and other anti-Semites are known to Jewish agencies. The white population is utterly uninformed about Judaism. An SABC official told a Jewish community officer that the reason SABC will not televise programs dealing with the Jews is that there is no reason: "Jews are not really part of South Africa and are aliens (after three or four generations!) anyhow." And no one is interested. Serious and sane Jewish leaders expressed to me their recurrent nightmare: seeing 120,000 South African Jews in transit camps in the State of Israel, coming only with a suitcase of clothing, because of white, not black, action. For their part, Jews live in small enclaves, primarily among other Jews.

What to do? My advice was contradictory. It was to make, at last, the difficult choice between the two lead-

ing, and mutually contemptuous, Jewish organizations, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and the South African Zionist Federation. The latter should, I think, intensify its efforts to stimulate *aliyah*, concentrate on *aliyah* to the exclusion of all else. Every Jewish activity under Zionist auspices or influence—and that must mean, in context, every Jewish activity—should center upon the urgency of *aliyah*, for the welfare of the South African Jewish community itself. In effect, it must begin to wind down the affairs of the community. But if that is not an acceptable alternative, the Board of Deputies, which stands for the continuity and legitimacy of Jewish life in South Africa, should engage in a vast program of public relations (in the American sense), to reach out to all populations in the country and to teach the facts of the devotion and contribution of South African Jewry to the life of the Republic, on the one side, and of Judaism as a living religion, on the other. The Jews, for their part, would reach out to these same groups, learn the other languages. Afrikaans would become a language of daily use within Jewry, and the history and culture of the Afrikaans people would be known and shared among Jews, just as Jews in Quebec know and live with French language and culture. Positions in Jewish studies would be created in the universities of the Afrikaans, Indian, colored, and black populations wherever they are accepted. To provide faculty for such positions, native South Africans, of all language groups and races, would be recruited for study in the relevant fields of Jewish learning and sent abroad—to the State of Israel, Europe, and North America—for doctorates. In this way Jewish culture would be better known, and the Jews perceived as they are: another variety of South African. A council of Jews, Christians, and (in Natal and the Cape) Moslems, should be organized, for projects of mutual understanding and cooperation. Much could be done to persuade others that Jews belong in and to the Republic, have contributed and now contribute to its culture and prosperity, and above all share in its future.

Either, or. But what can be done to persuade the Jews of these same facts? For the ordinary folk are neither Zionists (since they remain and evidently plan to remain in the Republic) nor diasporists (since, while remaining, they talk incessantly of emigration, and even buy diamonds for

the day on which they will have to leave). To me, two things symbolize the ordinary folk, not the students or industrialists, the prisoners of conscience or the exiles. One is the buying of diamonds, while remaining comfortably in the rich suburbs of Johannesburg and Cape Town. The other is the little bells. As I said, certain kinds of work are for the blacks, "kaffirwork," I believe, is the word. ("Kaffir" is not used in liberal society.) One sort is the serving of food. When families eat, the lady of the house has a little bell. This she rings when there is work to be done. And the black man and lady come in, white gloved, bringing the food and taking away the plates. I do not live in a level of American society in which people have servants or want them. Among many things which made three weeks in the Republic a personal trial, the hearing of the little bells, the pretense of a life of leisured wealth by rather ordinary folk living on ordinary incomes, stand out. There is nothing degrading about serving food or helping people to raise their families. But the notion of waiters and waitresses—servants who call their employers "master"—gliding in and out in response to a bell, is grotesque and contemptible.

For three weeks I abided by the rules, carefully reading the signs on public toilets to find the one for white males, employing porters to carry my attaché case, because that was expected, trying to concentrate on the requirements of a rather strange and highly formal system of social relations. Only when, about to depart from Johannesburg to London, I came to Smuts International Airport for the last time, did I rebel. I got a dolly, put my own luggage on it, pushed it myself to the check-in line, and loaded it myself onto the scale—not to deprive the porter of his wages, but to give myself, for the first time in three weeks, the pleasure of raising a hand in labor, however slight. It was no one's business but mine, and I meant only to use my own arms and muscles in my own service. It was my modest way of asserting my humanity, a gesture which could have meaning only in that utterly freaked-out country of Calvinist Christianity, white supremacy, Jewish time-serving and enjoyment of life's comforts, that loved land of Jewish, Christian, Moslem, white, brown, yellow, and black anguish, suffering, self-sacrifice, and, despite all things, hope. I came to Sud Afrika/South Africa. I left Azania. God bless Africa. ★

RELIGIOUS NEWS SERVICE

DOMESTIC SERVICE

-16-

THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 1977

LUTHERAN LEADERS REPORT ON
CONDITIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

By Religious News Service (4-7-77)

NEW YORK (RNS) -- Non-white South Africans -- about 80 per cent of the population -- "see no realistic possibility of an improvement in their lot," according to President David Preus of the American Lutheran Church.

Speaking with President Robert Marshall of the Lutheran Church in America at a press briefing here after their return from a two-week "fact-finding trip" to southern Africa, President Preus said there is a pervasive "lack of hope" among South African non-whites.

The two U.S. Lutheran leaders visited South Africa and Namibia (South-West Africa, a territory under South African control).

Asked if what he experienced on his trip suggested any chance of peaceful transition to majority rule, President Preus said, "I certainly don't come back with any greater encouragement."

President Marshall related a description of the situation of non-whites in South Africa offered by one person he met on his trip:

"The lion is in the cage. He's being fed a little better all the time, but he's still in the cage. That is the reason for the lack of hope."

The presidents' itinerary was arranged by Lutheran leaders in southern Africa, and did not include South African government officials, an indication, the presidents said, of the general lack of communication between blacks and whites.

President Preus said a great "tragedy" of the situation is that the "white leadership both in government and church" is "not talking" to black leaders.

President Marshall spoke of the whites' "lack of perception," or what some might term "conscious (self) deception" about black aspirations.

The Lutheran leaders praised the work of their co-religionists in southern Africa, as well as that of the South Africa Council of Churches and the Christian Institute, headed by the Rev. B.F. Beyers Naude, a "maverick" member of the white Dutch Reformed Church.

The Church is "just about the only organization that is allowed to exist in any kind of way that gives...criticism to the state authorities," President Preus said.

(more)

PAGE -16-

RELIGIOUS NEWS SERVICE

DOMESTIC SERVICE

-17-

THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 1977

The presidents endorsed campaigns of U.S. denominations to prevent further corporate investments in South Africa, though President Marshall observed that because of South African laws, withdrawal of current investments might make things worse for the non-white workers, because the South African government would take over operations of the enterprises formerly run by withdrawing corporations.

Conversations and contacts with members and leaders of the four small white German Lutheran denominations in South Africa and Namibia suggest these groups will have "more progressive" leadership in the years ahead, President Marshall said.

The presidents reported that the Synod of the German Evangelical Lutheran Church in South-West Africa, meeting during their visit recommended union with the two large black Namibian Lutheran denominations without the pre-conditions which the blacks had previously found objectionable.

President Marshall said that is a hopeful sign, although the denomination's congregations must still consider the proposal.

Though the government of South Africa "knew in advance what our position was," both said, it gave "full freedom to go everywhere we desired," for which the two presidents are "grateful."

Their trip included a visit to Ovamboland (north Namibia), a restricted area since the independence of neighboring Angola.

The area is a center of strength for the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church, and President Marshall reported that the Lutherans of the area "could not believe we were there."

Asked if Lutheran schools would follow the lead of those under Anglican and Roman Catholic auspices and push for integration despite apartheid laws opposing it, the U.S. Lutheran leaders said that German schools, supported in large part by the West German government, were being told to integrate if they expected continued financial aid.

The Lutherans turned over their primary schools some years ago to the government, a decision some black Lutherans now regret, the presidents reported.

R E L I G I O U S N E W S S E R V I C E

FOREIGN SERVICE

-3-

THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 1977

RELIGIOUS LEADERS PROTEST INTRUSION
OF REGIME IN CHURCH MATTERS

By Religious News Service (4-7-77)

JOHANNESBURG (RNS) -- Several South African church groups and leaders have protested various recent actions by the government.

The council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South Africa said it is "shocked and disgusted" by the detention of the dean of its Northern Diocese, the Rev. T.S. Farisani.

The statement also called for the return of financial records taken by police last year. Loss of the records has "severely affected the administration of the church," it said.

Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town Bill Burnett, metropolitan of the Church of the Province of South Africa, has issued a statement of support of his suffragan, Bishop Patrick Matolengwe, and the Rev. David Russel, both of whom were visited by South African security police in connection with disturbances in the township of Nyanga late last year.

The archbishop said the two men were suffering consequences of attempting to represent feelings of many voiceless people.

The Rev. C.F. Beyers Naude, so-called maverick member of the Dutch Reformed Church who directs the Christian Institute, called the recent banning of a regional director of his organization "another act of desperation on the part of a government which has no other answer to the demands of justice than intimidation and force."

Under terms of the government ban, Mrs. Oshadi Phakathi cannot leave the magisterial district of Pretoria and Mamelodi township and cannot participate in any manner in any activities of five South African organizations, including the institute, until Mar. 31, 1982.

The Rev. Dominec Sholten, secretary-general of the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference, has protested a police search of the office, bedroom, and car of Father, S.P. Makhatshwa, the conference secretary for ecumenism, communications, and development, in Pretoria. Father Scholten called it "an infringement on the liberty of our Church."

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Statement on Human Rights
(Excerpt)

We reaffirm our abhorrence of South Africa's apartheid policy. We deplore especially the repressive measures recently taken by the South African Government, including the banning of numerous independent black and other civic organizations, the closing down of liberal newspapers and the arrest of many opposition leaders. These measures are a disservice to the forces of moderation, both black and white, which are striving for a peaceful resolution to the complex racial problems of South Africa. We urge the South African Government to take concrete steps toward reducing, and ultimately eliminating, the legal and de facto discrimination against its non-white population, inherent in its apartheid policy.

Adopted by the National Executive Council
Atlanta, Georgia
October 30, 1977
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CHURCH AS SHAREHOLDER

an occasional bulletin

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BANKS CURB SOUTH AFRICAN LOANS BUT BALK AT CHURCH POLICY PROPOSALS

IN THIS ISSUE: During the 1978 season of shareholder annual meetings, United Church Boards initiated and/or cast its proxy votes in favor of 22 shareholder proposals. What do the results tell us? Inside this issue, World Issues Secretary Howard Schomer reflects on the use of stockholdings by churches and individuals to turn the social concerns of the United Church of Christ into action.

The World Issues Office opened its shareholder season on March 30 with a UCBWM proposal calling on **First National Bank of Boston** to halt future loans to the South African government and its parastatal corporations. The resolution received 8.2% of the proxy vote—the highest vote recorded to date on any South African proposal. An additional 3% abstained.

Prior to the meeting, First Boston executives had shifted their earlier position and halted loans to the government, but they declined to express this commitment in writing and would not agree to withhold *future* loans until apartheid is dismantled. Citing the eroding social and political situation in South Africa, church proponents argued that the bank should make the resumption of loans dependent upon relief from oppression and movement toward majority rule.

The high proxy vote at the First Boston meeting signalled the growing institutional investor support for church proposals at other meetings in the weeks that followed. The Dreyfus Funds and the Massachusetts State Pension Funds publicly announced their support for the First Boston resolution.

The shareholders of **Manufacturers Hanover** considered a similar resolution

on bank policy toward loans to South Africa and cast 5.5% of the vote in its favor, with 2.2% abstaining. This marked the second year for the presentation of this resolution, and reconsideration by stockholders next year will not be possible because it did not receive the 6% support required by SEC rules.

Manufacturers Hanover Board Chairman Gabriel Huage stated that the bank considers social and political factors in making lending decisions, and that loans to South Africa are restricted to "credit-worthy projects which would, in the judgment of management, generate improved circumstances for the whole population of the nation."

In response, UCC president Avery Post said, "there is no such thing as a good loan to a tyrannical government. The Vorster regime will not request a loan for nuclear weapon development, or to upgrade its... population control technology. Naturally, loans will focus upon developmental enterprise. But the foreign loans release domestic funds for repressive purposes, blocking pressure within South Africa for basic social reform, and bolstering the regime's military and police power."

Citibank moved its annual meeting site from its traditional New York roosting ground to Chicago this year, and Illinois Conference minister Sterling Cary was there to voice UCBWM support for a resolution asking for detailed information on South African lending practices. Despite a highly publicized but ambiguous Citibank statement that it would curb its loans to South Africa, which led many investors to believe that the resolution was dead, the proposal received 4.7% of the vote.

In its proxy statement, Citibank had stated that the bank "is not making balance of payments loans in South Africa nor making loans to the Government of South Africa. Instead, Citicorp is limiting its credit, selectively, to constructive private sector activities that create jobs and which will benefit all South Africans."

Citibank declined a church request for a meeting to ask whether the bank would consider loans to state-owned corporations or would resume loans in the future regardless of the social or political climate in South Africa. With satisfactory answers to these questions, the resolution might have been withdrawn.

Another "disclosure" resolution before **Continental Illinois** stockholders attracted 8.2% of the vote when the bank held its annual meeting on April 24.

According to Sterling Cary, UCBWM representative at the meeting, the issue evoked stirring debate among the stockholders. A Chicago City Council member announced that he would recommend pulling city accounts out of the bank, while on the other hand a South African government representative gave a glowing account of conditions in South Africa.

Howard Schomer, World Issues Secretary, attended the **BankAmerica** annual meeting to speak in favor of two resolutions filed by other church denominations. The first resolution urged the bank to end future loans to both the government and private corporations operating in South Africa. The resolution received 4.8% of the vote, with 2.2% abstaining.

The second resolution called for the adoption of a bank policy against loans to the Chilean Junta and was supported by 3.5% of the vote, with 3.5% recorded as abstaining.

UNION CARBIDE CONTINUES "BUSINESS AS USUAL" IN SOUTH AFRICA

Five percent of the proxy vote was cast in favor of a resolution asking Union Carbide to refrain from expanding its industrial operations in South Africa. Union Carbide is one of the largest American employers in South Africa with about 1400 black employees in its mining and smelting ventures.

Opposing the resolution as "too restrictive," Union Carbide managers cited recent improvements in black wages and working conditions. All black employees are paid a minimum of 125% of the South African minimum effective level (roughly equivalent to the U.S. poverty level). But church representatives quickly noted that this was deceptive, since over half of the company's black employees do not earn more than the average cost of living in South Africa.

Several very large investors supported the resolution, among them Williams College, where Union Carbide Chairman William Sneath serves as a trustee.

OIL SALES TO RHODESIA CONTINUE

Three U.S. oil companies were pressured by the UCBWM to stem the flow of oil into South Africa which is being resold to Rhodesia. The Texaco resolution, requesting a detailed report on its indirect sales through its Caltex subsidiary, received 2.87% of the proxy vote. Management's adamant posture toward the diverse proponents' statements suggests that new and tougher negotiations are required throughout the coming year.

The proposals to Standard Oil of California and Mobil, if adopted, would put an end to the corporations' complicity in the continuous violation of the U.N. and U.S. trade sanctions against Rhodesia. The proposals request that sales to South Africa be cut back by the amount of oil currently being transhipped into Rhodesia. SoCal reported a 4.4% proxy vote return, the first time a shareholder resolution has ever jumped the 3% hurdle. And unlike the Texaco meeting, press coverage was good and management showed a willingness to engage in serious discussions with con-

cerned shareholders. 3.3% of Mobil Oil shareholders supported the resolution designed to curb Mobil's petroleum imports to South Africa by one-third. Competing against the luminous clock that allocated the minutes given to shareholders for participation in their meeting, church representatives insistently pressed management for clarification and answers. A hostile audience, little press coverage, and no evidence of a policy change indicate a difficult struggle ahead.

The question of whether the Rhodesian political settlement is a sell-out or a solution for genuine majority rule and transfer of power will be answered in time. At present, the U.N. and U.S. sanctions prohibiting sales to the Ian Smith regime are still binding.

NEWMONT REPORTS LITTLE IMPROVEMENT IN NAMIBIAN WORKING CONDITIONS

On May 2, church shareholders attended the annual meeting of Newmont Mining to challenge the suicidal decision of a handful of corporate managers to continue business as usual in Namibia, despite imminent black majority rule in that country.

A UCBWM resolution asked Newmont to report on how its professed global equal employment opportunity policy is being implemented at the company's Tsumeb mine. The mine is the largest employer in Namibia, with over 4,000 black workers. Sources inside Namibia report that black workers' wages are below the poverty level. When the Anglo American Corporation, a South African company, considered purchasing an interest in the mine in 1975, they chose not to because, among other reasons, wages would have to be doubled simply to bring the mine up to South African standards.

The resolution received 3.1% of the vote.

COSMETIC POLICY STATEMENT VEILS TENNECO POLITICAL PAYMENTS

Tenneco shareholders voted for the second year on a proposal to tighten the company's overseas political payments policy. The resolution received only 4.59%

of the proxy vote, and the Tenneco chairman evaded all stockholder questions on the issue. The chairman's facade was rudely shaken, however, by Howard Schomer's pointed question: "Is Tenneco about to be indicted by the Justice Department for its political payments in the United States and abroad?"

Admitted political payments by Tenneco are the subject of various stockholder suits and investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service. The issue of corporate bribes is receiving renewed attention, and Tenneco will not escape the public light as church shareholders continue to monitor the company's policy.

IBM REJECTS HUMAN RIGHTS CRITERIA; OPTS FOR CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH

Would IBM sell a computer to Hitler? Judging by church discussions with company management and the proxy vote on the question (a mere 2.11%), the answer would probably be yes—unless Hitler confessed that he intended to use it to violate human rights!

Opposing a UCBWM resolution calling for the adoption of human rights criteria in the sale and maintenance of its computers, IBM chairman Frank Cary said that information is a "neutral" commodity and that the company has no way of monitoring the use or misuse of its computers by customers. With matchless inconsistency, Cary went on to affirm that every allegation that the police of Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina were using IBM equipment to track and arrest dissidents had been "investigated and proved to be insubstantial."

Moreover, IBM's South African subsidiary is continuing to service government computers, including a computer owned by the South African military, despite U.S. sanctions that would prohibit computer sales or servicing by the parent corporation.

Until IBM agrees to define the "repression" that it would not knowingly support and develop guidelines that would protect human rights from the power of its sophisticated technology, church investors will continue to press for a meaningful response to all the issues posed in this resolution.

BEYOND DEPLORING

A well-known religion editor of the secular daily press recently said: "I don't often go to the national synods and assemblies of the churches anymore. There is not much 'hard news' there. The delegates will express concern for many of the obvious woes of the world, deplore some notorious evils, and launch rhetorical appeals in God's name to *other* people—in the pews, in business, in government—to *do* something about it. They rarely commit themselves to any action."

I leave it to the reader to judge whether this journalist's sweeping statement is justified by the performance of the denominational assemblies he or she knows best. This issue of *Church as Shareholder* provides a round-up of 'hard news' on one church's attempt to turn a few of the *concerns* and the *deplorings* of its recent national synods and agency meetings into *actions* that are calculated to make a difference in the situation addressed.

Since the early 1970's the General Synod of the United Church of Christ and the United Church Boards for Homeland and World Ministries, backed by the United Church Foundation and the Pension Boards, have affirmed that the church's capital funds must be managed in ways that are not only prudent and profitable but also supportive of the church's major social goals. Our church funds must work for world peace, justice for all races and both sexes, economic development for the masses of humanity, enhancement of the environment, and improvement of business and labor ethics.

In the first half of 1978 the United Church Boards have been in dialogue about certain of these goals with about one-fourth of the 123 corporations in which one or more of the Boards is a shareholder, and with a number of other companies even though they are not presently among their shareholders. They have thrown their modest weight as informed and respected institutional investors behind proposals to scale down military production and to subordinate foreign arms and computer sales to human rights criteria. They have argued that corporations in Southern Africa must support black liberation with every means at their disposal—halting bank loans, re-

fusing new investment or expansion, reducing oil imports by the amount that South Africa transships to Rhodesia in violation of sanctions, ending sales of strategic materials to the South African government, bargaining collectively with black unions although such unions are not recognized by the South African government, turning equal opportunity policy declarations into equal employment opportunity in fact. They have investigated some aspects of the impact of agribusiness and pharmaceutical operations on nutrition, food production, purchasing power, and land usage in certain Latin American and Asian countries. They have pressed for more places for women in corporate boards and management. They have participated in ecumenical study of the need for both energy development and environmental protection, for both foreign capital and domestic sovereignty in third world countries. They have struggled for corporate policies that would effectively, rather than cosmetically, end the use of corporate funds overseas for either political contributions or bribery.

In 22 cases this year, corporate managers have been so unwilling to move in a recommended direction that the United Church Boards, in concert with other Protestant or Catholic agencies, have appealed to a higher court: the stockholders. Shareholder resolutions have brought the church recommendations to the attention of millions of *shareholders* through the companies' proxy statements. Among these resolutions were eleven on Southern Africa issues, three on domestic U.S. race issues, three on human rights issues in Latin America and Asia, three on food issues, and two on political payments. Twelve won more than the minimum proxy support required by federal law for refiling next year. Fresh approaches are being planned for the ten others.

As proxy vote support grows, wise management seeks to *manage* rather than merely *react* to the changes that become inevitable. But how much of the growth noted this year has come from actions taken by UCC local churches, state Conferences, related colleges and seminaries, or individual UCC members? The shareholder resolutions pressed by United Church Boards often receive from 40 to 1000 times more votes than are held by all the church agencies joined in the

ecumenical coalition, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility. But many more proxy votes are needed.

At present writing, New Hampshire is the only UCC Conference that has informed us as to how it voted its proxies in the past season—and we are gratified by the strong support it provided. But none of the other Conferences with investment portfolios, none of the UCC-related colleges and seminaries, and very few local churches and individual UCC members have yet let us know of their stewardship in this matter.

The road from deploring to acting in the area of corporate social responsibility is not long, but it passes through the crucible of responsible decision. No investor—even the owner of but one share—is exempt from this decision-making. Where a great public interest issue is posed to the shareholders of the corporation in which he or she is a fractional owner, "there is no hiding place down here." The stockholder either supports the proposal, whose origin is often a position taken by his or her congregation, Conference, or General Synod, or the stockholder supports management's present refusal to move in the desirable direction. Is your proxy vote consistent with the prayer, the preaching, and the policy statements of your fellowship of faith?

— Howard Schomer

SUCCESS! RESOLUTION WITHDRAWN WITH MOBIL/MONTGOMERY WARD

At the *Mobil* annual meeting a UCBWM representative rose to "commend management for the open and productive discussions . . . that led to a successful negotiation and, finally, the withdrawal of the resolution 'on disclosure of equal employment opportunity data.'" At the request of the filers, Wards gave a further breakdown of the national data according to specific minority groups and the women minorities, promising a full report on all data requested. Future steps will include working closely with management to help monitor implementation of its stated EEO goals.

GE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES IGNORE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS

A UCBWM resolution challenging General Electric to adopt firm human rights criteria and procedures for reviewing potential foreign military customers failed to gather more than 2.9% of the proxy vote in its second year of presentation to GE shareholders.

Michael Clark, ICCR staff member and former World Issues intern, spoke in favor of the resolution at the GE annual meeting in Indianapolis on April 24. GE chairman Reginald Jones responded to church shareholder concerns by requesting proposals for human rights guidelines and suggesting a meeting between church representatives and GE officials.

GE is among the ten largest American arms exporters and in the past has made sales to several countries known for their systematic suppression of human rights.

CASTLE & COOKE LABOR POLICIES UNDER SHARP ATTACK

When is a shareholder initiative "successful"? For the management of Castle & Cooke, the low 2.85% proxy support for a UCBWM resolution asking for information on the company's overseas labor practices called for a celebration. The church shareholders had been "defeated." The UCBWM and the UCC Hawaii Conference, however, took pride in the spirited and concerted pressure for management cooperation to disclose the requested data. The struggle created the

best Conference-wide, grass roots team that the UCC has ever had in behalf of corporate responsibility. Extensive press coverage and strong local support provide assurance that the "battle" has only begun.

In the Philippines, 80% of Castle & Cooke's 8,000 employees are members of parishes staffed by the Passionist Fathers. The Passionists, one of the resolution's co-filers, report that many workers are finding a new sense of hope in the church action. Father Deviny, Passionist Regional Superior in the Philippines, voiced questions that he often hears among the workers: "Where do all the enormous profits go? Do they want to control the entire economy of the province?"

In Honduras, workers' attempts to organize rudimentary union representation have been stifled through Honduran government collaboration—a special favor "purchased" by the company. Recently discovered company documents listing government officials receiving special C & C payments are now front-page news.

Prior to the annual meeting, company officials had refused to respond in any meaningful way to church inquiries, so the UCBWM and other co-filers took the unusual step of mounting a formal proxy solicitation campaign to gather support for their resolution. The church proxy statement appeared in a newspaper in Honolulu, where a large portion of C & C stockholders live, and copies were mailed to major shareholders. President Kirchoff, in his address at the annual meeting, however, repeatedly denounced the filers of the resolution as a "knowing pack of liars." Using "unfounded accusa-

tions," he declared, "the techniques of these antagonists are becoming increasingly blatant, callous and libellous."

NEW RESOURCES

The Church and the Multinationals. A 30-minute, 16 mm. sound-film produced by CBS. Film and study guide are available through the World Issues Office for the cost of postage and handling.

A Citizen's Guide to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, by Homer Jack. A 23-page handbook published by the World Conference on Religion and Peace, available through the World Issues Office. Single copy free.

Managing the Global Plantation. A slide-tape presentation produced by the American Friends Service Committee that describes the growth of Castle & Cooke into a multinational agribusiness corporation. Available from the World Issues Office for the cost of postage and handling.

A Shareowners' Manual, by Eleanor Craig. This 195-page manual, published by the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, provides basic information on shareholder rights, investor responsibility, and ways that churches and individuals can monitor the social impact of their investments. Available from ICCR, Room 566, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027. Cost: \$3.50.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA: WHAT POLICY AND PROGRAM OPTIONS FOR AJC?

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WHAT POLICY AND PROGRAM OPTIONS FOR AJC?

Few issues on the AJC foreign affairs agenda have been more vexing than that of the struggle for majority rule in southern Africa. Its complexities include the problems of black/Jewish relations in the United States, increasing interaction between Israel and South Africa, the substantial and possibly hostage Jewish community in South Africa, and the establishment of limited majority rule in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

The struggle for majority rule is being waged in South Africa, Zimbabwe Rhodesia, and Namibia/South-West Africa. There are issues unique to each of these three areas and common to all.

The purpose of this paper is to enable AJC to make an informed determination as to whether or not it ought to re-act more concretely to southern African affairs; and, if the decision is affirmative, to suggest possible policies to be advocated and programs to be instituted.

To date, southern Africa has been an area of low priority for AJC. It has had no involvement with events in Namibia. Regarding Zimbabwe Rhodesia, there is only Richard Maass's expressed hope, at this year's annual meeting, that the United States, in cooperation with Great Britain, recognize the Muzorewa government and end the boycott of that country. In the area, AJC has been most concerned with apartheid and South Africa. In addition to yearly staff meetings on the subject, AJC has twice issued statements condemning apartheid and particular events in South Africa, in 1960 and 1977. Also, a number of speakers have given reports on the situation in South Africa.

.../

BACKGROUND: SOUTH AFRICA

The central actor and anticipated last bastion of white minority rule in southern Africa is South Africa. South Africa has the largest number of whites (over four million); the largest percentage of population which is white (over 14%), and the longest history of white settlement (over 300 years). Most important of all, the Afrikaaners view themselves as the white tribe of Africa, a unique people with no European homeland to which they could withdraw, as did the British, Belgians, Portuguese, and other colonials.

The present day South African society is built upon the policy of separate development of the races. This policy, which has been condemned by the world community, in turn rests upon the system of apartheid and the establishment of nine separate "homelands" for South African blacks. Apartheid is the system of separation of the races which presently protects white political, biological, and demographic independence in anticipation of the future system of separation by nationality. The homelands policy anticipates the ultimate division of South Africa into ten independent nations, the nine black homelands on 13% of the land and the white Republic of South Africa with 87%. All blacks are seen as having a homeland based upon their tribal affiliations and the location of a particular tribe's "ancestral" lands, no matter how urbanized or "de-tribalized" they are. Under the homelands concept, even though white South Africa will always need black workers to support its economy, such workers would legally be considered as temporary, resident aliens, without any rights of South African citizenship. So far, three homelands have been granted independence, but none have been recognized as such by any nation other than South Africa.

While South Africa may be vulnerable in the medium to long run, its White regime appears impregnable today. It has the strongest economy and armed forces on the continent. The white standard of living may well be the highest in the world. Economically, its only weak point is oil, which is being remedied by the world's most advanced program of synthetic fuel production. It has great reserves of coal and a growing nuclear energy program.

Politically, the regime has near total white support: by the Afrikaaners for reasons of nationality and religion and by the others for at least economic reasons. While blacks clearly oppose the present minority regime, they are politically powerless. While there are some accommodationists who have participated in the homelands policy, a majority supports a unitary South African state with majority rule.

The government not only permits tribal identification and affiliation, but fosters them as part of its homelands policy. On the other hand, it resists all pan-African programs as threatening that policy.

The black majority has not been successful so far because of three main factors: 1) the overwhelming strength of the police state, 2) the divided tribal loyalties of the blacks, and 3) the relative economic success of the blacks, themselves. Compared to blacks in independent African states, South African blacks have the highest standard of

living on the continent, which is just high enough so that they would have something to lose in a political upheaval.

There has been very little physical resistance to the minority regime. There is no internal guerilla movement and there are only rare guerilla incursions from across the Mozambique border. Two 'incidents', however, did attract world-wide attention. During the course of a passive resistance campaign in March, 1960 against the "pass laws," white police fired on an African crowd in Sharpeville, killing 69 people.

The American Jewish Committee, in one of its two statements issued on South Africa, condemned the policies and actions of the South African government. In its Statement on South Africa of April 24, 1960, the Committee commended the U.N. Security Council for deploring the recent disturbances and loss of life in South Africa and the policies and actions of its government which gave rise to them, and expressed the hope that the government and people of South Africa would respond favorably to the Security Council plea that they "initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality..."

The second incident was the Soweto riots. In the summer of 1976, several hundred Africans were killed in Soweto, a black township outside of Johannesburg, while protesting against the institution of Afrikaans as the language of instruction in African schools.

Subsequent to these killings, AJC issued its statement of 1977 on the situation in South Africa, which affirmed AJC's abhorrence of South Africa's apartheid policy, called for a peaceful solution for its racial problems, and urged the elimination of legal and de facto racial discrimination.

As a result of its policies, South Africa is viewed as a pariah state by most of the world's nations. It is the number one enemy of the third world and is continuously being denounced at world assemblies. In 1977, for the only time in the history of the United Nations, the Security Council authorized mandatory sanctions against a member state, an embargo of all arms and military material to South Africa. The General Assembly has also called for a total trade embargo of South Africa. Also unique, the General Assembly has refused to permit South Africa to exercise its rights of membership in that body. In 1973, the General Assembly adopted the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and called upon all states to sign and ratify it. More than 50 states have since ratified the convention recognizing apartheid as a crime against humanity.

BACKGROUND: SOUTH-WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA

Namibia is located in the southwest tip of Africa and is bordered by Angola, Zambia, Botswana, and South Africa. Originally a German colony and known as South-West Africa, it is a former League of Nations mandate administered by South Africa. It is about twice the size of California and has a population of about one million, 9% of whom are whites. The territory is enormously rich in uranium and diamonds.

In 1966, the UN General Assembly decided that South Africa had not fulfilled its obligations under the mandate and, therefore, terminated the mandate, declaring the territory would be directly administered by the UN. In 1967, the General Assembly established the Council for Namibia for this direct administration, but South Africa refused to recognize its legitimacy and authority. That same year, the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) launched its war of liberation, largely from Angola and Zambia. SWAPO was subsequently recognized by the General Assembly as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. The termination of the mandate was endorsed by the Security Council and, in an advisory opinion in 1971, the International Court of Justice declared that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal.

In 1972, the General Assembly called upon the Secretary General to initiate contacts with all parties, so as to create the conditions necessary for the Namibian people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. In 1976, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 385 calling upon South Africa to accept UN provisions for free elections under UN supervision and control. The original date for such elections was August 31, 1976.

In response to this resolution, a "western plan" was formulated by the United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Canada; endorsed by the Security Council; and accepted by South Africa and SWAPO. The plan envisioned the following:

- a) a UN operation in Namibia,
- b) withdrawal of South African forces,
- c) restriction of SWAPO's armed activities,
- d) release of political prisoners,
- e) reintegration of refugees,
- f) repeal of discriminatory legislation, and
- g) free elections under UN supervision and control.

The resulting Constituent Assembly would then draw up a constitution for an independent Namibia.

South Africa objected to a number of the procedures of the implementation plan and, in December, 1978, proceeded with its own election for a Constituent Assembly for Namibia. SWAPO boycotted these elections, which were won by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. The Alliance was supported by a majority of whites and the tribal chiefs. South Africa did eliminate all discriminatory legislation. Many feel that these elections were a prelude to another unilateral declaration of independence similar to that in Rhodesia. So far, such a move has not been attempted by the Alliance. However, on August 13, 1979, South Africa's Prime Minister P.W. Botha signed a proclamation officially granting legislative powers to the National Assembly in South-West Africa, which had been formed by the Constituent Assembly.

Negotiations between the parties continued and a final agreement was believed reached. When the final settlement plan was announced by the Secretary General, South Africa once again protested that it did not reflect the agreement. South Africa asserts that the agreement includes provision for both SWAPO and South African forces to be restricted to bases and for UN monitoring of SWAPO bases. Since all SWAPO bases are in Angola and Zambia according to South Africa, implicitly the UN would monitor the SWAPO bases in these two states. The agreement reported by the Secretary General did not provide for monitoring outside Namibia and provided for 2,500 SWAPO troops to be restricted to bases within Namibia. South Africa has most strongly rejected this provision, stating that there never were such bases in Namibia and that they would be used to intimidate voters, thus violating the provision for free elections. SWAPO soldiers could individually be repatriated under the provision for the return of refugees, but without arms. On August 11, 1979, it was reported that new proposals for a solution were forthcoming as a result of concessions made by President Neto of Angola during secret talks with an American delegation the previous month. Dr. Neto's suggestions included:

a demilitarized zone of about 31 miles on each side of the Namibia/Angola border to prevent either guerrilla attacks on Namibia or South African incursions into Angola,

restrictions to their bases in Angola, under Angolan supervision, of any SWAPO guerrillas unwilling to return to Namibia in order to participate in free elections and a provisional government, and

a UN presence in Angola during a transition period to help insure adherence to any agreement.

To date, there has been no South African response.

Meanwhile, SWAPO raids continue, as do South African strikes into Angola and Zambia. Church groups and other international human rights organizations continue to report arrests and detentions by the South African police of the peaceful opponents of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance who have remained in Namibia.

One other issue remains outstanding, that of Walvis Bay. Walvis Bay is an enclave of approximately 30 square miles which South Africa claims is not part of Namibia, but an integral part of South Africa proper. This enclave, which is 400 miles from South Africa, would be a minor irritation, except that it is the only viable harbor along all of Namibia's coastline. Without Walvis Bay, Namibia would be effectively landlocked. The UN and human rights groups support its inclusion within the state of Namibia. This seems reasonable from both a moral and a geographic point of view. However, from a strictly international law viewpoint, South Africa appears to be correct. When Germany controlled South West Africa, Walvis Bay was a colony of Great Britain and subsequently became part of the Union of South Africa. It was never a part of the League of Nations mandate of South West Africa.

BACKGROUND: ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

In the past half year or so, world attention has been focused on the often confusing and violent events in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The former British colony of Southern Rhodesia was established ninety years ago and is surrounded by Zambia, Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia. With a population of 6.8 million blacks and 250,000 whites, Zimbabwe Rhodesia has the smallest white population by percentage, 3.5%, of the three white-dominated states in southern Africa. Without South African support, minority rule would have been impossible.

Twenty years ago, it had been expected that Southern Rhodesia would move towards independence and majority rule along the path of Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya, rather than along that of Angola, Mozambique, or Namibia. Instead, in 1965, the white minority rejected a proposed constitution providing for majority rule and, behind the leadership of Ian Smith, announced its Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Great Britain. While Great Britain denounced Ian Smith and his cohorts, it was unwilling to use military force in order to put down the rebellion by its national cousins, as it had against black rebellion in Africa. Rhodesia was condemned by the world community and the Security Council found the situation in Rhodesia to be a threat to international peace and security. A mandatory embargo of all trade with Rhodesia was authorized by the Council in 1968.

As Rhodesia became more isolated, it also became more dependent upon South African support. Fifty percent of the land was reserved for whites and apartheid-like laws were passed. After a period of initial successes, the demise of absolute white rule became apparent with the expulsion of the Portuguese from neighboring Angola and Mozambique and the ever-increasing economic and social costs of black guerrilla opposition.

A most important factor was the change in the South African view of its own best interests. Under strong American pressure, South Africa decided to compromise on Rhodesia, hoping, thereby, to direct world attention away from itself. South Africa withdrew its direct military support from Smith and endorsed Anglo-American efforts for a negotiated settlement.

The Anglo-American plan was based on two essentials: a cease fire and UN-supervised elections. After repeated attempts at such a settlement had failed, Smith surprised the world by announcing in March, 1978 an internal settlement with black leaders within Rhodesia, which excluded the two leaders of the black guerrilla forces based in Zambia and Mozambique. In April of this year, elections were held under the new constitution with Bishop Muzorewa of the United African Nationalist Council becoming Zimbabwe Rhodesia's first black prime minister.

The internal settlement and subsequent election have received little support in the world community. Only South Africa has announced full support for the new government, although even it has not officially recognized the new regime. The United States and Great Britain have given qualified encouragement. The UN is still maintaining the mandatory sanctions and calling for an all parties conference, including the Patriotic Front, the external armed opposition, as the only viable and acceptable solution. In July, at the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Monrovia, Liberia, the African leaders voted to recognize the guerrillas of the Patriotic Front as "the sole representatives" of the people of Zimbabwe, but did not close the door on a peaceful solution by also endorsing an all-parties conference to include the government of Bishop Muzowera.

The United States government is in a particularly difficult position. The Carter administration African policy has been directed towards support for the concerns of the black African states and support for legitimate, democratic forces seeking majority rule in southern Africa. It is also especially sensitive to the views of black Americans and of Nigeria, which is the second largest source of imported oil to America after Saudi Arabia. All these interests strongly oppose recognition of the Muzorewa government.

On the other hand, on the domestic front, there has always been conservative support for the interests of the white minority regimes in southern Africa, justified by anti-communism across the spectrum to outright racism. There are also those who, from a liberal perspective, view the March 1978 internal settlement as reasonably democratic and just under the existing circumstances. Looking at the past history of independent black Africa, they see the special provisions protecting white rights under the constitution as benefitting the political and economic well-being of all the citizens of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. In their eyes, the Patriotic Front is an anti-democratic force, whose success would be to the detriment of the Zimbabwe Rhodesians and the interests of the United States.

There are two legal restraints of importance to the administration. First, under international law, the United States is still obligated to comply with the Security Council's mandatory sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. (For a period of time, under the Byrd Amendment, since repealed, the United States had ignored the sanctions solely for the purpose of purchasing Rhodesian chrome on security grounds.) Second, the President was required by the terms of the Case-Javits amendment of October 1978 to lift sanctions, if the Zimbabwe Rhodesian elections had been free and fair and the new government was willing to participate at an all-parties conference. In May, the Senate passed, 75-19, an amendment as a "sense of Congress" resolution, which, while not binding on the President, stated that the requirements of Case-Javits had been met and that the President should lift the sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

On June 7, President Carter announced that although the elections were reasonably fair under the circumstances and represented encouraging progress, the Case-Javits requirements had not been met and the sanctions would not be lifted; the situation would be reviewed monthly in order to ascertain whether changing practices and policies of the Muzorewa

government warranted a reversal of this determination. Both the President and Secretary of State, in a statement on June 12, listed a number of reasons for this decision, some of which are enumerated below.

Regarding the nature of the elections, it was noted that the constitution under which the election was held was only submitted for a vote of approval of the whites. For ten years, the 3.5% of the population which is white would control 28% of the seats in Parliament and similar disproportionate representation in the Cabinet. Even after these ten years, the body which would review changes in the constitution would have at least two of its five members white, and almost definitely would have three. 120 of the 170 clauses in the constitution require amendment approval by 78 of the 100 members of the Parliament, an effective white veto of major constitutional reform. Similar white vetoes apply to law-making concerning housing standards, electoral laws, medical care, and education. While the constitution prohibits racial discrimination in general, it exempts from the discrimination ban such areas as family law, entry into employment, appropriation of public funds, and particular aspects of criminal proceedings.

Secretary Vance particularly stressed that disproportionate white representation per se was not objectionable, but that the continued white control of the military, police, courts, and civil service reflected white domination of the basic elements of sovereignty.

Also objectionable was the requirement by the election authorities that no political party could participate unless it first embraced the Constitution adopted by the whites only. The two black opposition parties making up the Patriotic Front were outlawed for the seven months preceding the election and hundreds of their members legitimately in Zimbabwe Rhodesia were detained by the police. Meetings, rallies, and expression of opposition to the election by these parties were prohibited. Lastly, it is unreasonable to consider elections free and fair between two parties who have been waging a war for years, when only one of the parties controls that election.

The other main requirement of Case-Javits was that the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government be willing to attend an all-parties conference and engage in good faith negotiations on all relevant issues. While then Prime Minister Smith stated when visiting Washington last fall that he was willing to attend such a conference, he would not negotiate issues which in his eyes would endanger the internal settlement. This attitude did not comply with the good faith negotiations requirement. The Conference Report on Case-Javits defined "all relevant issues" to include, among others, the terms of majority rule, the protection of minority rights, the Anglo-American plan calling for UN-supervised elections, and the terms of the internal settlement.

Without an all-parties conference and a subsequent agreement on a neutrally supervised election, the violence in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia can be expected to continue, destroying the very nation over which the battles are being waged. 20,000 have already died and the parties are so evenly balanced that the end of the killing cannot be foreseen.

The Zimbabwe Rhodesian forces have the technological edges and a maximum manpower advantage of 4.5:1, which is enough to contain

the guerrilla forces, but not enough to defeat them. Clearly, it was the strategy of both Smith and Muzorewa that the elections would result in at least British and American economic and military aid enough to enable them to defeat the Patriotic Front. Without such support, the stalemate will continue, as will the destruction of the economy. If the economy is collapsing, the whites will increasingly depart and thus ensure the defeat of the Muzorewa government. Presently, the war costs the government one and one half million dollars per day and the white population is slowly decreasing. Since 1974, the per capita gross national product has decreased by 25%, almost to the level at the time of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965.

What will get the parties to stop fighting short of a complete victory by either side is a most difficult question. It is the general position of the Patriotic Front that, as the fighters who caused the end of Smith's direct rule, they are entitled to establish the new government of Zimbabwe.

Even if both Smith and Muzorewa were to disappear, the struggle would not be over. The Patriotic Front is a creature forced on the two guerrilla factions by their African backers. Both Robert Mugabe, head of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and Joshua Nkomo, head of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), claim to be the ultimate embodiment of the liberation struggle. Both have been acting in anticipation of a final showdown.

Nkomo's forces are based in Zambia. Although his main support has come from the Soviet Union, he has been described as a pragmatist and a potential ally of the internal settlement for the right political price. While his guerrillas are considered better trained than those of Mugabe, he has committed only 2,500 of them for action within Zimbabwe Rhodesia and held the remaining 10,000 back in Zambia for the battle with Mugabe. Mugabe is based in Mozambique and is supported by the Chinese, although he has been attempting to steal Nkomo's Soviet support. Unlike Nkomo, Mugabe has most of his 10,500 guerrillas operating within Zimbabwe Rhodesia, for which reason he believes that he is the more legitimate leader of the Patriotic Front. He has gone so far as to order his forces to expand their operating area into areas controlled by Nkomo, even if that means armed conflict with Nkomo's forces. Mugabe is a Marxist and is certainly not a democrat in the western sense of the word. Mugabe's greatest advantage is that he is a Mashona, an ethnic group which accounts for 80% of the population of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Nkomo is a Matabele, a people who make up 15% of Zimbabwe Rhodesia's population. Prime Minister Muzorewa is also a Mashona and, if tribalism were to be the controlling factor in the final struggle for power, the choice would appear to be between Muzorewa and Mugabe.

On August 5th, at the Commonwealth meetings in Lusaka, Zambia, as a result of concessions on the part of Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain and Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania a new proposal to end the war in Zimbabwe Rhodesia was unanimously approved. The proposal calls for a cease-fire, a new constitution, and new elections to be supervised by Great Britain.

The accord supported genuine black majority rule with appropriate safeguards for minorities and recognized that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects.

Subsequently, Prime Minister Muzorewa, former Prime Minister Smith, and the leaders of the Patriotic Front, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, all accepted Great Britain's invitation to attend a conference in London on September 10th, where they presently remain.



POLICY OPTIONS: SOUTH AFRICA

The issue of South Africa is a very sensitive one for the American Jewish Committee in both its moral and political aspects. Apartheid is clearly repugnant to the Jewish religion and moral tradition. Besides the statement on Sharpeville in 1960, the American Jewish Committee in its Statement on Human Rights in 1977 again affirmed its abhorrence of South Africa's apartheid policy, calling for a peaceful solution of its racial problems including the elimination of legal and de facto racial discrimination. The Committee has not, however, gone beyond these statements. A number of staff meetings have been held on the subject resulting in recommendations for further studies; this paper is in part a response to such recommendations.

There are a number of considerations for and against further involvement in this issue. One is Jewish relations with the black community. South Africa is at the top of the black-American foreign policy agenda and the center of their international activities. Working with blacks on South Africa could perhaps repair some of the ill-will generated by disagreements on quotas and affirmative action, and most recently by the resignation of Ambassador Young.

South Africa has also long been a central concern of the international human rights community. Despite the over-all Jewish record in support of human rights, Jewish participation in this community has been seen as ethnocentric, defending only the Jewish interest or Israel under attack. Increased activity in this area could help to dispel this misconception.

Lastly, active participation on our part in the anti-apartheid movement may enhance AJC's ability to develop a meaningful program in the third world area, especially as it relates to Africa.

Complicating AJC's efforts to move beyond the simple statement of concern are the problems of the Jewish community in South Africa and of Israel/South Africa relations. South Africa has a substantial Jewish community of approximately 125,000 whose economic well-being may even exceed that of the average white South African. While the Jewish community has been the most liberal segment of white South Africa, in recent elections, it has been moving in a conservative direction. When the struggle in South Africa is reduced to its simplest form, it is seen as black vs. white; and Jews who have chosen to remain under the present system will be perceived as white.

The Jewish community is in a state of flux. Many of its members send their children abroad for professional education. Of those educated abroad, many choose to make **their** lives outside of South Africa. Ironically, at the same time, a number of Israelis presently are emigrating to South Africa, being drawn by the current prosperity.

There are strong neo-nazi, neo-fascist, and anti-Semitic strands within the white South African community. Although they are condemned today because of good relations with Israel and the Afrikaner self-identification with the Jewish struggle in Palestine, they are more acceptable and obvious than in other western states. Strong Jewish support for majority rule and against the present system, might well tip this balance within the non-Jewish white community to a more active anti-Jewish stance.

While Israel has stated that it complies with the Security Council's mandatory arms embargo of South Africa; other political, cultural, and economic relations with South Africa have been growing steadily over the past few years. Trade between the two states had increased 50% in 1978 over the previous year, although this still represents a very small percentage of total South African international trade (0.4%). Recently, South Africa has permitted its nationals to expatriate rands in the form of Israel bond purchases, which is a unique exception to South Africa's rigid exchange controls.

The question of Israel's relations with South Africa is a difficult one. Many African states which condemn South Africa, and Israel for trading with her, themselves trade with South Africa in a barely disguised manner. Their defense is that they are economically weak and have no other alternative. Israel can also posit that argument, that it is a politically and economically isolated state with very little alternative. From Israel's point of view, simple survival must come before good public relations. It was South Africa, not black Africa, which provided badly needed support during the Yom Kippur War. While this may be correct in the short term, long term damage may be very costly. This argument has not been persuasive to American blacks.

Another factor to be considered is that of precedent. If AJC endorses particular sanctions against South Africa, some day it may find these same sanctions being invoked against Israel in the United Nations. This is not an unreasonable expectation, as Israel appears to rank second after South Africa as an object of UN ire.

Lastly, will any AJC activity regarding South Africa short of total opposition to the present regime silence the critics of our inaction? Will moderate steps simply result in the demand for more radical action? Some have urged that if AJC ultimately will be condemned for not taking radical action, we might as well avoid taking any action at all and simply re-affirm our anti-apartheid statements.

On the other hand, there may be constructive, moderate steps which can be taken and which need not engender successive demands for even greater commitment. One step could be, in a new AJC policy statement, to indorse the more activist demands and programs of the UN and of non-governmental groups. For example, the two existing AJC statements do not address the issues of majority rule and territorial integrity of South Africa, including black homelands. A stronger statement could call for one man/one vote or,

at least, a transitional process toward that goal. Such a statement could also declare that any political solution must be for the whole of the territory of South Africa and, hence, come out against the exclusion of substantial numbers of blacks from South African citizenship by the ruse of small, isolated, independent black homelands.

The listing below, arranged in order of severity, suggests the range of activist recommendations that could be directed toward the United States government as well as toward public opinion generally:

- 1) get U.S. companies now in South Africa to put pressure on the South African government,
- 2) prevent all new business investment in South Africa,
- 3) end all U.S. trade with South Africa,
- 4) force all U.S. businesses now in South Africa to close their corporations there,
- 5) cut off all shipments of military supplies and replacement parts for South Africa,
- 6) persuade our allies to join us in refusing to send military supplies and replacement parts to South Africa,
- 7) send military supplies to nearby black nations in Africa,
- 8) help build up military pressures in Africa on South Africa,
- 9) urge blacks in South Africa to engage in guerrilla warfare against the white government, and/or
- 10) start a limited military action against South Africa.

AJC could choose appropriately from this gamut for inclusion in a stronger statement.

To date, the strongest condemnation of South Africa by an American Jewish organization was the 1976 resolution on South Africa of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, which found South Africa's present constitution and mode of establishment of its government repugnant and offensive to the sensibilities of humanity and called "upon the government of the United States, indeed all governments, to refrain from politically or militarily supporting the government of the Republic of South Africa and to embargo voluntarily trade between the U.S.A. and the Republic of South Africa."

It should be noted that such a statement endorses the employment of a trade embargo as a political tool, which could someday be applied against Israel, and implicitly condemns current Israeli relations with South Africa.

POLICY OPTIONS: NAMIBIA

The situation in Namibia is different from the one in South Africa in that a general outline for solution of the problem has been agreed to in principle by all the parties.

If we are to get involved in southern Africa, a statement on Namibia might be appropriate. The statement could cover the following points: 1) South African administration of Namibia is illegal under international law; 2) the legitimate trusteeship authority resides in the United Nations Council for Namibia; 3) elections for a constitutional convention with all parties participating should be held under UN supervision; 4) both South African and SWAPO forces should be restricted to base, with temporary police authority residing in a UN Transition Assistance Group; 5) the peaceful repatriation of refugees, and 6) either that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia or that the question of Walvis Bay should be resolved by the parties after the elections.

The only other realistic option is not to have a statement at all. It would be untrue to assert that South Africa is the legitimate authority in Namibia under international law. While one could assert that Walvis Bay is not an integral part of Namibia under international law, such an assertion would run counter to the purposes of AJC involvement in this area.

POLICY OPTIONS: ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

As with Namibia, AJC has never taken a position regarding Zimbabwe Rhodesia. At the past Annual Meeting, however, Richard Maass did express the hope that the United States, in cooperation with Great Britain, would recognize the new Rhodesian government and end its economic boycott. Realistically, there appear to be three options: 1) recognition of the new government and a call for the lifting of sanctions; 2) support for the Administration position -- non-recognition and maintenance of sanctions, while encouraging the Muzorewa government to push for greater political liberalization, and 3) support for an all-parties conference and ultimately for neutrally supervised elections with all parties participating without restriction, the hoped for goal of the current London conference.

As to point one, a good case can be made that no statement would be preferable. First, the lifting of sanctions would violate international law, unless the Security Council's mandatory sanctions were ended. Second, while the present government is certainly an improvement on the former Smith regime, the internal settlement is inequitable and unacceptable for the reasons enumerated earlier: 1) the constitution was not subject to approval by blacks, 2) it permits continued racial discrimination in a number of important sectors, 3) whites continue to control the essentials of sovereignty -- army, police, courts, civil service, etc., and 4) the exclusion from the electoral process of ZAPO and ZANU and all others who opposed the internal settlement, itself. From a political point of view, it would make no sense for AJC to take the unique position of supporting the internal settlement, when it has received no support either by the human rights community or by the community of nations, except possibly by South Africa.

One special point has been raised by those who support the internal settlement. They assert that the 28% legislative representation for the 3.5% of the population which is white is both reasonable, as a protection of minority whites and an encouragement for them to remain, thus benefiting black economic interests as well, and not without precedent -- other black states upon independence from Britain gave as much as 30% legislative representation to a 1% white minority.

What is being ignored are the differences in political and historical contexts. Earlier examples of disproportionate white representation were both incentives for peaceful transition to majority rule and acceptable to black independence leaders. White Rhodesian leadership had rejected this path in 1965 and decided to "tough it out" instead. Now, after fourteen years of effort to maintain minority rule by force, this same regime strikes a deal with its own chosen blacks, ignoring the armed opposition, which most of the world recognizes as having earned the right to speak for Zimbabwe Rhodesia's blacks. Having first rejected peaceful evolution, the whites cannot now pretend that fourteen years of killing did not follow and claim the same incentives to peaceful evolution.

The Administration's present stance is more realistic, but probably not realistic enough. Simply stated, the black parties to the internal settlement do not have the military authority to press Smith further and it is military force that Smith has been most responsive to. The unstated goal of the Administration position is really the third option -- an all-parties conference and a neutrally supervised election with all parties participating.

This last option has the support of the UN, the OAU, the human rights community and, most recently, the Commonwealth and Great Britain. The forces of the Patriotic Front have earned the right to participate in a final settlement and subsequent elections. If ZANU and ZAPU refuse to participate in a democratic solution, then there would be a different situation, but they have not yet done so. A desirable course may be for AJC to commend the internal settlement only as a first step and call for an ultimate solution of the problem at an all-parties conference with the final goal being a democratic election with all parties participating under neutral supervision.

PROGRAM OPTIONS: SOUTH AFRICA

If AJC decides to become more actively involved in southern African affairs, there are a number of program options available to the agency. While the programs which follow are described in terms of South Africa, most of them can also serve as models for programs regarding Namibia and Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Possible programs include: 1) AJC self-education, 2) participation with other organizations in educating the general public, 3) support for the university education of South African refugees, 4) humanitarian aid for South African refugees, 5) participation in legal defense funds and programs for political prisoners within South Africa, 6) financial or legal support for civil rights causes within South Africa, 7) support for the adoption of the Sullivan principles by those U.S. corporations which do business with South Africa, 8) participation in shareholder actions protesting corporate investment in South Africa, and 9) withdrawal of AJC funds from banks and the sale of AJC stocks in corporations which do business with South Africa.

Self-Education

Even if AJC is prepared to take no further action at this time, self-education on South African issues would appear to be desirable. Two kinds of speakers could be invited to address AJC audiences: South Africans, white or black, active in the struggle for black rights and representatives of American organizations active in the field. There are a number of sources for South African speakers including the State Department's International Visitors Program, American Committee on Africa, American Friends Service Committee (South Africa Program), and the African-American Institute. Groups which could provide speakers to discuss their particular agendas, described below, include the American Committee on Africa, American Friends Service Committee, African-American Institute, Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Information Center, International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Office for Church and Society -- United Church of Christ, Africa Legal Assistance Project of the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the Lutheran World Federation, and TransAfrica. In working with any of these organizations, due care should be taken regarding their particular attitudes toward the Middle East conflict.

Education of the General Public

Many of the above-mentioned organizations devote a great deal of effort to the education of the general public about South African issues and events. While it need not be AJC's role to initiate such programs on its own, it could co-sponsor various programs, seminars, and speakers in cooperation with organizations already active in the field.

University Education of South African Refugees

The African-American Institute has a number of programs which aid Africans in obtaining a technical school, university, or graduate education in the United States. Particularly directed at refugees are the Southern Africa Refugee Education Project (secondary and university level education in independent Africa) and the South African Student Program (graduate education in the United States). AJC could sponsor a student or students under these programs, or perhaps be a sponsor independently. If independently, the agency could support the education of such a student at a Jewish institution such as Einstein or Brandeis in the United States or at a university in Israel. It costs approximately \$6,400-\$9,800 per year to sponsor an African studying in the United States.

Humanitarian Aid for Refugees

Of Africa's four million refugees, approximately one million are from South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe Rhodesia. These people are in need of every kind of humanitarian assistance from food and shelter to medical and educational supplies. Again, AJC might help to provide such assistance independently or as part of several ongoing programs, such as those of the Lutheran World Federation, the African-American Institute, and the American Committee on Africa and its associated The Africa Fund:

AJC could support Jewish or Israeli doctors providing specialized medical aid to refugees in Africa or sponsor the treatment of amputees or other war-wounded at Jewish medical institutions in the United States or Israel.

Legal Defense Programs in South Africa

The International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Africa Legal Assistance Project, and the World Lutheran Federation are all involved in providing legal assistance for political prisoners and aid for their families in both South Africa and Namibia. The assistance is provided in the form of both money and the services of their lawyers. AJC might financially support such a legal project or donate the services of member attorneys for particular cases.

Support for Internal South African Civil Rights Organization

AJC might provide legal or financial support for this kind of organization based in South Africa such as the South African Institute of Race Relations. Working with American based legal groups discussed above would seem preferable, however, as it would better further the aim of a visible Jewish presence in this field at home.

Sullivan Principles/Shareholder Actions/Divestiture

The issue of American corporate participation in the South African and Namibian economies is probably the most difficult question facing the human rights community. On one side are those who believe that American corporate investment in South Africa and Namibia is immoral and only serves to prop up an unconscionable minority regime. On the other side are those who believe that a withdrawal of such corporations would barely affect the South African economy and, if it harmed anyone, it would be the black worker. These people believe that those corporations already in South Africa should remain, but only if they are willing to treat all their workers, black and white, in a non-discriminatory manner. Such a labor relations policy would both benefit the particular black workers and serve as a workable model of good racial co-existence for the rest of South African society.

This latter view is embodied in the Sullivan Six Principles, to which corporations remaining in South Africa have been asked to adhere. These principles are: 1) racial integration in all plant facilities; 2) equal and fair employment practices for all workers; 3) equal pay scales; 4) equal access to training; 5) more non-white managers and supervisors; and 6) corporate aid in improving employees' lives outside the plant. Of the 280 U.S. corporations active in South Africa, 120 have pledged to adhere to these principles covering 50,000 of the 5.7 million economically active blacks. Sullivan supporters emphasize that the American corporate investment in South Africa involves only 1.6 to 2.0 billion dollars, which is not a significant portion of the South African economy. Complete withdrawal of this investment, if allowed at all by the government, would undoubtedly be spaced over quite a number of years and do little damage to the economy as a whole.

Opponents of Sullivan describe the principles as too little, too late, and often a sham affecting the lives of an insignificant number of blacks. They charge that adoption of the principles have been used as a justification for greater investment. Since Soweto, the trend within the human rights community has been against the Sullivan principles.

When a determination has been made as to whether AJC favors the Sullivan principles or termination of U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa, it could then participate in shareholder actions in support of the chosen policy. The InterFaith Center on Corporate Responsibility coordinates such actions and the Corporate Information Center provides "briefs" on targeted corporations. In its own backyard, AJC might decide to withdraw its funds from banks which do business with South Africa and sell its holdings in corporations which have investments there.

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APPENDIX

Selected Organizations Active in Southern African Affairs

Africa Legal Assistance Project

Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights under Law
733 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Legal assistance for political prisoners and families in Namibia and South Africa.

The African-American Institute

833 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

Educational assistance, humanitarian aid, visitors programs, and information services.

American Committee on Africa and The African Fund

198 Broadway
New York, N.Y. 10038

Information, visitors programs, humanitarian aid, and opposition to economic relations with South Africa.

American Friends Service Committee (Southern Africa Program)

1501 Cherry Street
Philadelphia, Pa 19102

Information and visitors program.

Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa

14 West 11th Street
New York, N.Y. 10011

Information, lobbying, human rights, and prisoners in southern Africa.

InterFaith Center on Corporate Responsibility AND
Corporate Information Center

475 Riverside Drive, Room 846
New York, N.Y. 10027

Helps churches and synagogues mount stockholders resolutions, etc. against corporate relations with South Africa.

Lutheran World Ministries/Lutheran World Federation

360 Park Avenue South
New York, N.Y. 10016

Information, visitors programs, educational and humanitarian aid.

Office of Church and Society -- United Church of Christ
297 Park Avenue South
New York, N.Y. 10010

Information and humanitarian aid.

TransAfrica
Washington, D.C.

Black lobby representing a number of black organizations concerned with southern African affairs.

Washington Office on Africa
110 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Information and lobby sponsored by four denominations and the American Committee on Africa.



Israel, South Africa, and the West

RITA E. HAUSER

The entente cordiale between Israel and the Republic of South Africa, which developed with some intensity following the Yom Kippur War, has not been greeted with joy by the vast majority of Israelis for whom South Africa bears a distinct stigma of moral unacceptability. South Africans by and large welcome the friendship of what they view as a courageous people able and willing to defend itself against its more numerous enemies and to stand up to its most important ally, the United States, when events require it to do so. Yet, South Africans recognize that this is a relationship born of necessity since their nation is so isolated on the international scene that it cannot refuse a handshake from anyone.

This state of affairs yields the paradox of a deepening relationship between the two countries which is accompanied by a studied determination in many quarters to pretend it is not happening. Yet, the very fact of the relationship reveals certain truths about American policy toward these two strategically vital countries. The attitude of the Carter administration toward Israel and South Africa clearly is shaped more by political pressures than by an assessment of vital Western interests. An acute danger to our strategic concerns in the Middle East and Africa is thus posed, which in the end hardens the very positions (of these two nations) which Washington seeks to alter.

I

The history of Zionism is quite well known and hardly requires retelling here. But the development of Afrikaner nationalism deserves some attention. The first European settlement at what is now Cape Town was made by the Dutch East India Company in 1652, under Jan van Riebeeck. These settlers were joined in 1688 by Huguenots seeking religious freedom. The two groups eventually fused into a single cultural group which evolved its own language (Afrikaans) from the original Dutch, and whose descendants came to be known as Afrikaners.

Britain and Holland engaged in a series of wars commencing in 1780, and Holland

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ceded the Cape to Britain in 1814 in the general post-Napoleonic settlements in Europe. In 1820, some 5,000 British settlers arrived in and around Cape Town. Unable to accept British domination (which entailed English being declared the official language in 1825 and the abolition of slavery in 1834 against the wishes of the Afrikaner farmers), many Afrikaners migrated to the interior in what was known as the Great Trek, begun in 1836. The Republic of Natal was established two years later by these Voor Trekkers, as they came to be called, only to be made a British colony five years later. The settlers pushed on and set up two independent republics, one in the north (Transvaal) and one in the central area of the country (Orange Free State), which Britain recognized in 1852 and 1854. But with the discovery of diamonds and then gold in the Transvaal some 15 years later and the emigration of prospectors from everywhere, especially from English-speaking countries, Britain proclaimed the Transvaal its territory in 1877. This led to the first Anglo-Boer War in 1880, won by the Boers. Thereafter, the South African Republic was established in the Transvaal under Paul Kruger and was soon linked up with the Orange Free State.

The Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 brought defeat to the Boers after a ghastly loss of more than 20,000 Afrikaner women and children in wretched concentration camps set up by the British after the burning of their farmlands as retaliation against Afrikaner guerrillas. But in less than a decade, skillful diplomatic negotiations by the Afrikaners won them the peace and the founding of an independent Union of South Africa in 1910, which grouped the two former Afrikaner republics and the two former British colonies. Afrikaners dominated English-speaking Whites by about three to two, but political and economic power remained with the Anglos. United by strong religious bonds and their own language, the Afrikaners fought to establish equality in the face of overt, often hostile discrimination by the English-speaking group. In 1948, Daniel Malan led the Nationalist party to a slim victory, and it has never lost control since.

It is critical to appreciate that those Afrikaners coming to power in 1948 had grown up as second-class citizens of White South Africa. (Black political concerns barely figured in any White's thoughts up to that date.) For example, in the late 1940s, there were only three Afrikaans high schools in the central area of the Transvaal, as against 26 for the English-speaking, although the population was about equal. After 1948, all schooling of Whites was divided on a language basis, requiring attendance of pupils at the school of their mother tongue. The other language was taught as a secondary one. Afrikaans universities were made the equal of the English. Thus, two excellent universities stand side by side today in the Cape, that at Stellenbosch and Cape Town University.

Determined to survive intact and maintain power, the Nationalist party promulgated a series of laws (collectively called apartheid legislation) to prevent Blacks, Coloreds, and Indians from threatening its control and status. These groups were by law segregated from Whites and from one another in every aspect of life. Each group has its own schools and universities. Blacks were denied the vote, and the Coloreds who did vote were disenfranchised in 1955 in an effort to block any possible voting alliance

with the English-dominated United party. Indians were never enfranchised on the national level. By the Group Areas Act, Blacks, Coloreds, and the Indians are obliged to live in separate areas, and could not own land until recently. Marriage or fornication between the groups was strictly prohibited. Repressive controls followed, including the infamous Pass Laws, prohibiting freedom of movement. Security laws were and are today enforced without benefit of judicial review. And, in the economy, Blacks, in particular, were paid disproportionately less for their labor and were prevented from obtaining better paying jobs by exclusionary rules supported by White unions. White business leaders of the English-speaking group predictably went along with this approach and benefited enormously, although stating their distaste for the public record.

These extraordinary laws flew in the face of history. At that very moment of time, scores of former colonies throughout Africa were achieving independence. The United Nations Charter proclaimed the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people. Legal discrimination based on race was destined to end everywhere in the world.

II

From the time of its independence in 1948 (the very year the Nationalists came to power in South Africa), Israel guaranteed basic rights and equality before the law to all its citizens, and the Labor party took pains to confirm that its principles and purposes were in accord with generally prevailing political concepts. Relations between the two countries were hesitant for many years. Although Israel established a diplomatic and consular mission in South Africa in 1949, the latter did not reciprocate (on the grounds that the British Embassy in Israel represented it as part of the Commonwealth, a position which differed from that taken by Australia and Canada). It was widely believed that South Africa did not wish to alienate the Arab states by any close relations with Israel. Israel's mission stemmed from the existence of a large Jewish community in South Africa (many of whom later emigrated to Israel), and the need for the new nation to establish as many diplomatic relations as possible. The imbalance in official representation continued until 1971 when South Africa established a consulate general in Tel Aviv. Most observers believe that Israel's stunning military victory in 1967 impressed Pretoria, and it sought closer ties as a consequence. Moreover, South Africa had been forced into an ever more isolated diplomatic position.

In 1960, South Africa faced expulsion from the British Commonwealth (heavily dominated by Third World nations) and chose instead to resign and declare itself a republic, free from all ties with Britain. Since then, unrelenting pressure has caused its withdrawal or exclusion from scores of internationally recognized activities, from the Olympic games to diverse UN bodies. Numerous countries broke relations with it, denied it landing rights, embargoed its products, and otherwise dealt with it as an outcast nation. The Security Council in 1977 voted a total embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. The pace of Western investments slowed markedly, with several nations pressed to disinvest by a coalition of church and liberal groups opposing

apartheid. Indeed, 1979 has been proclaimed Anti-Apartheid Year, and this move has been vigorously supported by many Western European and American-based activist groups.

From the time Israel entered the United Nations, it disassociated itself from South Africa. Israel purposefully allied with the emerging countries of Black Africa, in part to seek a counterweight to the Arab states, and in part because it shared a common vision with them as a new nation striving to develop socialism without the use of brute force. From 1948 until the Yom Kippur War, Israel was publicly critical of South Africa's racial policies. Israel stated over and over again in the United Nations its abhorrence of apartheid and voted against South Africa on countless occasions. This decision by Israel to disassociate from South Africa's domestic policies was painful to many South Africans. Jews had emigrated to South Africa from Europe from the very outset of the Cape Colony and later in two major waves, from 1882 to 1912, and then again in the 1930s. Zionism was deeply rooted in South Africa, and a Zionist conference took place there as early as 1905. Jan Smuts, once head of the United party and a founder of the United Nations, himself a member of the British War Cabinet in World War I, was one of the authors of the Balfour Declaration. He admired the tenacity of the Jews and stated that they reminded him of his own Afrikaner people. South Africa immediately recognized Israel de facto in 1948. To this day, South Africa's approximately 120,000 Jews raise more money per capita for Israel than any other country, despite the nondeductibility of such contributions from taxable income. And Jews were not inconsequential in the life of South Africa, contributing cabinet ministers, chief justices, members of Parliament, countless mayors, and top business figures, who largely built the gold and diamond industries of the nation.

Despite these affinities, Israel maintained only limited relations with South Africa. It chose instead to produce an ambitious Development Assistance Program for Black Africa, starting in 1957, when, at the invitation of President Nkrumah, it created Ghana's Trade Union Congress. The Development Program encompassed 31 African countries. Thousands of Israelis have served as expert advisers and teachers in Black Africa, and thousands of Blacks have been trained in Israel. This policy produced political dividends for some time. Black Africa (including many of the Moslem nations) did not side overtly and automatically with the Arab group in the United Nations. Anti-Israel resolutions could often be defeated with the help of Black African states. But the advent of the Yom Kippur War changed the picture. Out of the 33 Black African states with which Israel had relations, 29 broke their ties. The motivating reasons were multiple: Moslem solidarity, political pressures, and, most important, the promise of heavy financial aid from the oil-rich Arab states. When Zaire broke diplomatic relations, Abba Eban called President Mobutu a "traitor." Israel soon found itself, like South Africa, isolated within the United Nations. Black Africa and the Arab world made common cause frequently, exchanging votes of support against South Africa (and Portugal) for those denouncing Israel. Finally—and most cruelly from the Israeli standpoint—numerous former friends of Israel, like Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Zaire, and Zambia, voted for the "Zionism is Racism"

resolution, with only two, Liberia and the Ivory Coast, voting against. The rest abstained.

South Africa responded differently. It sent a message of support to Israel following the 1973 war. Despite stringent exchange controls, it adjusted its regulations to permit greater private donations to Israel. It spoke of the common Western policy interests shared by both nations. Trade increased. Israel upgraded its diplomatic representation to South Africa, appointing its first ambassador in June 1974. At the end of 1975, South Africa reciprocated and named its envoy to Israel. Prime Minister Vorster, to some the embodiment of apartheid, decided to pay an "unofficial" visit to Israel in April 1976 and was made welcome. When there, he visited the Yad Vashem Memorial and was near tears in his emotional speech given at the dinner in his honor tendered by Prime Minister Rabin. Visits by prominent Israelis to South Africa followed, including those by Moshe Dayan and major military and scientific personalities. Student exchanges and organized tours increased rapidly.

ARCHIVES III

This growing relationship was met by incredulity in some Jewish quarters in the United States, and not long after that Black leaders began to openly question the policy. Many friends of Israel urged that the whole business be played down. They understood the motivating reasons, but preferred not to attempt any justification or explanation. Yet, the reasons for this relationship are clear: The two nations, both of which conceive of themselves as part of the Western world, have been the object of intensive political pressures from the West itself, seeking to force a change in their respective internal policies; both nations are isolated in world bodies; both are the subject of vilification; both feel a keen vulnerability deriving from the power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and from the growing importance of the oil-rich Arab states in shaping Western policy. Both nations depended heavily on Iranian oil, now in jeopardy. Under these circumstances, it is natural that each should turn to the other for mutual support. And they easily found the basis for a satisfactory trading relationship. Israel's scarcity of raw materials, but a highly developed labor force, offered a perfect complement to South Africa's situation. Since 1973, numerous joint ventures have commenced, and air and shipping facilities have been arranged. Trade between the two countries is now estimated at about \$90 million annually and is in rough balance. Israel mainly exports machinery, chemicals, textiles, and metals, while South Africa provides foodstuffs, minerals, chemicals, and iron and steel products. Israel's major export earner, cut and polished diamonds, is imported mainly from South Africa. Cooperation between scientific and research institutes has grown in fields such as the recycling of waste water, soil erosion, and desalinization. South Africa's well-developed technology is being applied to upgrade Israel's old-fashioned steel industry, including the use of specialized hard steels for sheathing tanks. In return, South Africa has purchased several Reshef warships, electronic surveillance equipment, radar stations, antiguerrilla alarm systems, and night vision devices. Israel may soon license production of its Kfir jet airplane.

Of the greatest importance, cooperation and trade is growing in energy fields. It was announced in January that Israel would buy about nine million tons of coal from South Africa this year. South Africa plans to open its first nuclear energy station in 1982, and expects at that time to become a major supplier of enriched uranium as a result of a new process pioneered by its scientists. Namibia (formerly South-West Africa) is exceedingly rich in uranium and, whatever its final political evolution, its mines will be dominated by South African industry.

In sum, a clear situation of mutual benefit to both countries exists and is being exploited. Israel continues to trade with Black Africa (as does South Africa) and does not view its relationship with the republic as contradictory to betterment of relations with Black African states. Jerusalem continues to disagree profoundly with the policy of apartheid, but feels it cannot alter the policy. To deny itself needed trade, energy sources, and technical assistance, some of it vital to its survival, would jeopardize its deepest national interests.

South Africa's external situation has altered drastically since the collapse of Portugal in Angola and Mozambique, the civil war in Rhodesia, and the uncertain politics of Namibia. The Western nations have embargoed the sale of arms and threaten disinvestment. They seem unable to counter the growing Russian/Cuban involvement in much of Africa. While profoundly richer than Israel and nearly self-sufficient, South Africa knows it must provide for its own defense without benefit of Western aid. It cannot afford to delay upgrading and improvement of its military apparatus and has turned to Israel for assistance. The Afrikaners feel an affinity to the Israelis, an embattled people with few friends. Moreover, the Dutch Reformed Church supports a Jewish homeland on Biblical grounds.

The sense of embattlement and isolation felt by these two Western-oriented nations comes in no small part from the policies of the Western Alliance. The United States and its NATO allies, in recent years, have not been able to separate clearly the pressures put upon them by Black Africa and the Arab states with respect to the internal policies of South Africa and Israel from the external, geopolitical situation now operative in the Middle East and southern Africa. Even if they are correct in the conviction that Israel must yield control over the West Bank to some form of Palestinian nationalism and that South Africa must devise a method of sharing power with the Blacks, there is no justification for policies which isolate and weaken these two countries to the detriment of vital Western interests. Israel is surely the linchpin of any serious policy to counter Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Even if current Palestinian territorial ambitions on the West Bank were completely satisfied, disorder and conflict would still prevail within and among various Arab nations and instability, as in Iran, would continue. Israel must resolve the West Bank problem itself, first within its own body politic (where no consensus currently exists on the proper direction of policy) and then through direct negotiation with its immediate neighbors. Washington can disagree with Israel's current position, but it must not seek to compel a change in policy by weakening an ally whose very security, like our own, is threatened by a growing Soviet incursion into the whole region. To the contrary, it is

urgent for the United States to move away from its excessive involvement in the divisive Palestinian question to a policy of forging a tacit alliance among antagonists, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, which together can counter Soviet aggressive policies. If the Saudis become convinced that the United States intends to defend its interests and those of the West in the Middle East, they are likely to support the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and Jordan's entry into the negotiations. Only then can the West effectively deal with OPEC.

Whatever Washington may utter from time to time, our policymakers must realize that immediate resolution of the West Bank problem is not vital to the safeguarding of Western interests. An acceptable solution may evolve once the region is assured of stability and committed American support against the Soviet threat; surely those in Israel who understand the dynamics of competing nationalisms will find the means to develop a political consensus as to the future of the West Bank which will not threaten the security of Israel. That prospect is impossible as long as disorder and subversion within the whole region are operative realities.

South Africa, too, is an ally whose stability is vitally important to the West. Its internal policies are repugnant. Such small changes as have come about these last few years, in terms of desegregation of sports, international hotels, and the like, result from a growing sense within the nation that change is required. The pregnant issue in South Africa is whether the changes needed will come fast enough to avoid civil conflict. Pretoria has just proposed a new constitution which would create three chambers, one each for the Whites, the Coloreds, and the Indians, to be elected by each group and some Cabinet Council on top to determine national policy, the makeup of which is not yet fully defined. The proposal is badly flawed in that it excludes Blacks altogether on the specious argument that they belong to their respective homelands of origin and should vote there. This of course completely ignores the presence of some five million urban Blacks who do not live in the homelands and whose labor is essential for the industrial life of the country. The proposed constitution may well go nowhere, or it may prove to be a first step in the right direction. But future changes must develop out of the realities of South Africa, particularly the separate ethnic components of its population. The outcome will not be majoritarian rule in a unitary state unless it results from total civil conflict and the overthrow of White power. A different egalitarian form of government based on ethnicity is what may emerge if a peaceful process can prevail.

This issue will be decided by the nation itself in response to its internal circumstances. Intensive pressure from the West does not promote a growing consensus for positive change. Rather, it produces a sense of near isolation which clearly resulted in the overwhelming victory of the Nationalist party last year, with some 30 percent of the English-speaking population voting for it. As a consequence, the major opposition United party disintegrated completely. Prospects for change might fare better if South Africa were invited to take its place as a full and vital ally, provided it accepts prevailing human rights standards. A policy of embargoes and withholding friendship is less effective than the promise of admission to that group of countries with which

South Africa identifies, on the condition that it move in an acceptable direction and on an acceptable timetable.

IV

South Africa and Israel both are developed nations vital to the West. Each derived from a peculiar history and each must come to grips soon with the contending nationalisms within and outside its borders. Israel will jeopardize its ability to accommodate to Palestinian nationalism if it holds on to the West Bank for too long and negates the development of local moderate political leadership. South Africa will fall into civil decay if it refuses to deal with the realities of Black demands for political participation and the enjoyment of the fruits of the economy on a fair basis. The United States cannot compel either country to take the necessary steps and, as long as both nations feel totally isolated and vulnerable in the face of a threat to basic security, there is little chance for voluntary—and enduring—change.

The primary task of the United States foreign policy is to provide for the common security of the Free World, and both Israel and South Africa play an important role in the defense of mutual interests. When the record of the last decades is reviewed, it is clear that the best investment of military weaponry sold in the Middle East was to Israel, which alone has remained free, politically stable, and self-reliant, attached to the interests of the West. The vast tonnage of arms sold to the Arab states has not increased their stability one whit and, indeed, threatened it in Iran. In a showdown, Israel would fight for our common purposes, as its own security and survival depend upon negation of Soviet dominance of the region. Withholding arms from Israel, so often suggested as a means to compel a change in its West Bank policy, is self-defeating and shortsighted. The danger to the West does not derive from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but from the Soviets, and satisfying the former will not destroy the latter's ability to manipulate but may well endanger our one true ally in the region.

Withholding arms from South Africa is equally shortsighted. Arms continue to be sold, embargo or no, at a higher cost and from non-Western sources. Providing arms and consultations, sharing the military defense of southern Africa, stockpiling vital minerals produced there—in short, a cooperation between allies should produce a far greater incentive for South Africa to change internally than the current policy of isolation. If South Africans really believe that they are part of the West, then they must abolish all forms of apartheid. That is the entrance fee to a union of developed countries with similar basic goals. American policy will be far better enhanced by sharing common interests and strategies with both Israel and South Africa than by succumbing to the multiple pressures advanced by those nations which would not be at our side even in the event their pressures succeeded totally in changing the policies of Israel and South Africa. Alliances are forged by the realities of national interests, and not as a result of rhetoric or threats. It seems plain that winning friends in the United Nations or in OPEC at the expense of Western security will not serve our interests, but, alas, that lesson remains yet to be fully appreciated by policymakers in Washington and Europe.

Marc Tanenbaum

The American



Jewish Committee

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October 12, 1979

TO: Members of the Foreign Affairs Commission

FROM: Abraham S. Karlikow

We hope to see you all at the forthcoming Foreign Affairs Commission Meeting dinner Thursday, October 25, in the Fountain Room of the Fairmount Hotel, at the AJC's National Executive Council Meeting in San Francisco.

The Commission will be dealing with three key areas of foreign affairs activity; with Rita Hauser as chairperson.

---What kind of changes can one foresee in the Soviet scene, and what will be the effect of these changes on the Jews of the U.S.S.R. Professor Philip Siegelman of San Francisco will be presenting the views of a distinguished panel of Sovietologists, meeting under the AJC auspices just prior to the NEC.

---AJC's Director for South America will describe the confidential background to the release from house arrest of noted Argentine editor Jacob Timerman--guest of honor at the gala Saturday night dinner--as part of an analysis of the situation of Jews in Latin America today.

---And the Commission will consider what options are open to AJC for combatting Southern Africa's apartheid policy in more concrete fashion.

Enclosed in the material sent you, you will find two papers relevant to this discussion:

continued...

RICHARD MAASS, President ■
MAYNARD I. WISNER, Chairman, Board of Governors ■ MORTON K. BLAUSTEIN, Chairman, National Executive Council ■ HOWARD I. FRIEDMAN, Chairman, Board of Trustees ■
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GEORGE M. SZABAD, Westchester; ELISE D. WATERMAN, New York ■

An article by Rita Hauser entitled Israel, South Africa and the West that recently appeared in The Washington Quarterly;

And a paper prepared by Mark Mintz of FAD's International Division under Sidney Liskofsky's guidance outlining possible action options for AJC.

We should appreciate it if you would read these papers carefully in preparation for discussion in San Francisco. So that we may have a sense of FACommission out look on this subject, would you be kind enough to send back the attached sheet to us here at AJC headquarters, checking off those options you would prefer and adding any comments you think pertinent.

Thanks in advance for your help and cooperation.

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Israel and the Middle East will, as ever, occupy a prominent position on the AJC foreign affairs agenda at the NEC. Former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin will be addressing a plenary session Friday at lunch. And Sunday's morning plenary session will examine current Middle East issues, around a panel moderated by AJC Vice-president Alfred Moses and featuring Professor William M. Brinner, Richard Schifter, Vice-president of the Washington chapter and Hy Bookbinder.

Enclosed is an interview with Mr. Rabin done by Lea Spector of AJC's Israel Office.

You previously received Dr. George Gruen's report on Jordanian attitudes, following his recent trip to the Middle East. We now send you his view of the Egyptian scene. Plus, as we consider Jews in the Moslem world, two reports by European Representative Nives Fox on the Jews in Lebanon and Algeria.

In anticipation of San Francisco.

ASK/anc
Encs.

78-550-48

Cordially —
A. L. Karlin

OPTIONS FOR AN AJC POLICY RE SOUTHERN AFRICA AND APARTHEID

(See particularly pages 11-19 of Mark Mintz Paper, Southern Africa: What Policy and Program Options for AJC)

- Am satisfied with present AJC stance.
- Desire reaffirmation, or Stronger Statement re Apartheid
- Greater AJC Self Education
- AJC Should Work to Help Educate General Public
- AJC Should Aid Africans in Obtaining Education in U.S.
- AJC Should Seek to Participate in or Initiate Humanitarian Aid Programs for Refugees from Southern Africa
- AJC Should Support Legal Defense Programs for South Africans
- AJC Should Support Internal South African Civil Rights Groups
- AJC Should Support the Sullivan Six Principles re Corporate Participation in South Africa
- AJC Should Advocate More Severe Measures Such as Working to:
 - Prevent All New Investment in South Africa
 - End U.S. Trade with South Africa
 - Cut Off Military Aid to South Africa
 - Send Military Supplies to Nearby Black Nations in Africa
 - Urge or Support Military Action Against South Africa

* * *

AJC Should Urge Israel to:

- Strengthen its Ties
- Maintain its Ties at Present Level
- Weaken its Ties with South Africa
- Cut Military Sales Only

Any comments that you wish to send us will be appreciated.

Please Return to Foreign Affairs Department, AJC, 165 E. 56 St., N.Y. 10022
Attention: Mrs. Judith Roberts

Background Papers on Southern Africa

The situation in southern Africa has been for years one of the central concerns of both the international and the U.S. human rights communities. It has been a particular concern of black Americans in the international arena. In the wake of Andrew Young's resignation, black leaders have questioned the relations between South Africa and Israel and the Jewish community's moral posture regarding these more than before.

AJC, like other Jewish organizations, has expressed its abhorrence of South Africa's apartheid system. However, it has not moved beyond principled condemnation to participation in action programs such as those undertaken by American human rights, church and other groups.

What are policy and programs options for AJC if it were to assume a more activist posture in this field? The enclosed papers by Rita Hauser and Mark Mintz illuminate the issues that must be considered in dealing with this question.

Mrs. Hauser's paper, reprinted from THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, "Israel, South Africa, and the West," examines succinctly the growing relationship between South Africa and Israel and the strategic importance of both states to the West. It describes the evolution of South Africa's racially divided society in light of its unique history and urges the termination of apartheid as a just entrance fee into the Western community of nations.

Mark Mintz's paper, prepared under the guidance of Sidney Liskofsky, director of AJC's Division of International Organizations, briefly describes the political background of recent developments in South Africa, Zimbabwe Rhodesia, and Namibia (South-West Africa) as background for a number of policy options and activities available to AJC.

A listing of approaches and activities of various U.S. groups involved in the anti-apartheid movement is appended as a discussion aid.

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