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Box 75, Folder 11, United States policy towards United Nations,
1976-1980.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date September 19, 1980

to STAFF CABINET

from Sidney Liskofsky

subject

The attached is a statement on U.S. policy toward the UN which was issued in 1976 under the aegis of an Ad Hoc Group established in reaction to the successful PLO offensive moves, dramatized by the Arafat appearance at the 1975 General Assembly. The Ad Hoc Group was established on our initiative and still meets occasionally under Morris Abrams' chairmanship as a small and loose "group" of academics, former diplomats and others with background in UN, international law and world affairs.

We took this initiative out of concern for the diminishing U.S. influence in the UN, the steady rise in Third World and Arab power, and the accompanying deterioration of Israel's situation. Our premise was that, if the situation was at all reversible, only the U.S. had the power -- and the openness to persuasion -- to muster an effort to achieve it. Therefore, any effort to that end had to be addressed to the U.S. national interest and to reflect a consensus embracing influential foreign policy perspectives.

The statement (which purports to express the views of the signers and not of the Ad Hoc Group as such) combines recognition of the need for a universal organization to cope with increasingly dangerous "world order" problems, along with an indication of recent developments and tendencies of serious concern to the American people. It combines (in a sense) the strategy of the carrot and the stick, the tough line of Moynihan and the soft line of Andrew Young, by recommending a "synchronized diplomacy" of speaking out forcefully in support of U.S. principles and interests, with an effort to accommodate the hopefully reachable elements of the Third World.

It assumes the heart of U.S. problems in the UN to lie in its relationship with the Third World, which currently dominates the organization and sees it as a major vehicle for advancing its interests and power in the international system. It sees the solutions, if any, in a sincere effort to accommodate the genuine grievances of the Third World poverty and under-development curable only by favorable re-adjustments of their economic relationships with the industrialized world; and South African racism curable only with Western acquiescence and cooperation.

In return, the Third World moderates, who would be enabled thereby to wrest leadership from the ideologists and radicals, would have the incentive to cooperate with the U.S. on its issues and concerns, including its supportive relationship with Israel, and its desire to reverse the politicization and other unwholesome UN tendencies.

(over)

The statement recommends various options for U.S. policy, leaving it ambiguous as to whether the "stick" options are to be applied at once or only after the "carrot" (i.e., accommodative) strategy has been tried and proved unavailing. The options relate among others to policy on participation and financing, and the uses of U.S. bilateral relationships to influence the UN behavior of states whom we aid and with whom we trade. I believe that whether or not the overall perspective of the statement holds up today -- I personally am dubious about the "accommodative" economic strategy in the short range (in the long-range you're dead) -- the suggested "options" touch on most of the specific counter-active measures that might be espoused in American Jewish communal recommendations to the U.S. Executive Branch or Congress (apart from repudiation of particular UN decisions or programs, and general attacks on the biases and abuses of the Organization).

At the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Group before the Summer, it was recommended that the statement be reviewed and updated in light of UN and world developments, especially Afghanistan, since 1976. This is being planned.

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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a 30-Year Perspective

"A bill of rights is what people are entitled to against every government on earth." With this quotation from a letter of Thomas Jefferson to James Madison in 1787, the president of the World Jewish Congress began his opening remarks at the December 2 seminar marking the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was held in New York under the joint auspices of the World Jewish Congress and the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations of New York City University. Mr. Klutznick went on to defend the statement by President Carter in the UN General Assembly: "No member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation of freedom occurs in any part of the world."

Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, a distinguished authority on American history, took as his starting point the international reaction to the Carter administration's efforts to make human rights a primary theme in the international relations of the US. He described some of the debates triggered by the profound Ameri-

can impulse to demonstrate sympathy for victims of persecution in other lands.

"Should the US limit itself to exerting a moral influence by its own example? Is quiet diplomacy more effective in international persuasion than public denunciation? By what right could the US interfere in internal affairs of other countries?"

Differences of opinion notwithstanding, Schlesinger pointed out that the US did on occasion condemn persecution in other lands—such as the persecution of the Jews in Russia, Eastern Europe and the Levant, the massacre of the Armenians in Turkey, and the oppression of the Irish. He suggested that justification probably lay in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

Professor Louis Henkin of Columbia Law School, in his presentation, maintained that what was governed by international agreement or law could not be regarded as domestic or internal. This applied to the UN Charter to the Covenants, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to customary international law. In his opinion, although the Helsinki Final Act was not a legal agreement, it was "a political deal in which there was payment in valuable political coin, and parties to it could react politically to violations. In fact,

the Final Act specifies reactions, including review".

UN ambassadors Rikhi Jaipal of India, and Miljan Komatina of Yugoslavia, Minister Plenipotentiary Emilia Castro-de Barish of Costa Rica, Mr. Brady Tyson, deputy US representative to the Human Rights Commission, Mr. Sydney Liskofsky of the Blaustein Foundation, and Dr. William Korey, director of International Policy Research, B'nai B'rith, participated in the luncheon session which was devoted to a panel discussion on whether in the international struggle for human rights, primacy had unjustifiably been given to civil and political rights at the expense of economic and other rights listed in the Universal Declaration. Moderating the panel, Ambassador Seymour Maxwell Finger, director of the Ralph Bunche Institute, noted that there was a dichotomy between those who saw governments as the source and grantors of human rights, and those who believed governments had no role beyond securing inalienable rights with which men are endowed by their creator.

Dr. Natan Lerner, former professor of international law and executive director of the WJC Israel Branch, spoke on the participation of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the struggle for human rights and reviewed the extensive WJC contribution in this field. His presentation in an expanded form is currently being published by the Congress (see page opposite).

Other notable participants included Ambassador Edward Mezvinsky, US representative to the US Commission on Human Rights; Mr. Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union; and Mr. Joseph Lash, author of *Eleanor Roosevelt and Human Rights*. Mr. Max Melamet, executive director of the WJC, and Ambassador Finger arranged the program of the Seminar; and Dr. Susan Gitelson, who is in charge of the WJC's Africa-Asia desk, and Professor Israel Singer, WJC deputy-director for the New York Office, helped with the Seminar's organization.

Study Day on Iranian Jewry Heritage

Topicality of subject posed no problem for the organizers of an intensive study day on Iranian Jewry Heritage which was held on December 17, 1978, in Jerusalem at the Van Leer Institute. The event which understandably attracted a large audience and great public interest was arranged by the Council of the Sephardi Community, the Centre for Integration of Oriental Jewish Heritage in the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Association for Iranian Jewry Heritage and the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress.

In his introduction, Mr. Itzhak Harkavi, director of the WJC Cultural Department, reviewed the historical and cultural aspects of Iranian Jewry and commented as well on the present situation.

Jewish Education in Iran, Persian Jewry in Iran, and The Zionist Process among Iranian Jewry were some of the lectures delivered following which a group discussion on the current situation of Iranian Jewry took place.

All the lectures were recorded and will be available at a later date.

Kristallnacht

The discourses of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, WJC Founder-President Nahum Goldmann, and Mr. Werner Nachmann, president of the Central Council of Jews from Germany, at the Cologne commemoration of Kristallnacht (see News & Views December 1978) have just been published in a German monograph by the German government. English and French translations are in preparation.

Israel Branch Meeting :

(Continued from page 1)

felt that the situation in Iran was very similar but that Jews were waiting until the last moment when it might be too late to save themselves.

Reporting on the negotiations with the German government on material reparations, Dr. Goldmann also expressed his hope that Germany would extend the present law on non-applicability of the Statute of Limitation to crimes committed by Nazis (see page 1). With regard to the Soviet Union, he foresaw the possibility of a change in policy. Signals from Moscow indicated that a larger number of Jews would be given exit permits in the near future.

Reviewing the prospects of peace in the Middle East and the challenge that the end of the state of war might involve for Israel and the Jewish people, President Klutznick reported on the progress in the activities of the Economic and Social Commission recently established by the WJC under the chairmanship of Baron Guy de Rothschild (see News & Views December 1978). He also discussed Israel's potential for trade, especially with the Far East. Observing that even China should not be excluded from Israel's future plans, Mr. Klutznick maintained that the development of Eilat and the Negev would depend on Israel's trade expansion towards the Far East. He urged that Israel shake off the stigma of isolation and take advantage of the wide range of development possibilities.

WJC Secretary-General Dr. Gerhart Riegner summarized his impressions after his recent visit to Latin America (see page 6). The political crisis prevailing in some Latin American countries had its impact upon Jewish communities, but on the whole, Jewish organizational life had not been affected. There were manifestations of anti-Semitism, and Jewish representative organizations had been active in securing governmental measures against anti-Jewish groups. However, a main problem for the communities was the deterioration of internal Jewish life mainly in the cultural and educational fields.

Jerusalem—Unique and Universal: 19th French Colloque

Jerusalem is the permanent point of departure for three religions . . . if the Jews have not tried at any moment in the Colloque to monopolise Jerusalem, it is because this city remains a subject of dispute. This is perhaps part of its calling.

— Professor Jean Halpérin, president of the Colloque

Jerusalem—meeting place of different religions, but also disputed capital; Jerusalem—today's city of town planning problems, intercommunal relations, taxation and elections, but also yesterday's city of the Bible and symbol of eternity; Jerusalem—a mystical concept in the heart of every Jew, Moslem and Christian—all these aspects were examined in the intensive three-day colloque of Jewish French Intellectuals held in Paris under the auspices of the French Section of the World Jewish Congress.

Following the unparalleled interest created by last year's colloque theme *The Moslem Community* which profoundly touched Christians, Moslems and Jews—the proceeding of which have just been published by the Presses universitaires de France—the Colloque Preparatory Committee determined to continue along those lines, selecting a subject that would definitely appeal to and challenge the contemporary conscience. Because of its burning topicality and its basic and permanent position in Judaism, *Jerusalem—Unique and Universal* proved a most apt choice.

More than 700 people crowded the large conference hall, and smaller working groups totalling some two hundred participants met while specialists examined the particular aspects of the subject.

Stimulating topics made for a wide variety of presentations which included *Talmudic Lesson* by Professor Emmanuel Levinas of the Sorbonne; *Temporal Jerusalem, Heavenly Jerusalem Between*

Judaism and the Christian World by Joshua Prawer, professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; *Jerusalem, Disputed Capital* by David Ruzie, professor of International Law at the University of Paris; and *Jerusalem, Symbolic Mainstay*, by Robert Misrahi, professor at the University of Paris.

Notable scholarly participants in a Round Table on *Jerusalem, Crossroad of Religions* were Father Bernard Dupuy, secretary of the French Episcopal Committee for Relations with Judaism; Father Nicolas Obolenski, archpriest of St. Alexandre Newski Cathedral; Chief Rabbi Max Warschawski of Bas-Rhin; and Bach Agha Rabah Benaïssa, vice-president of the Islamic Religious Organization in France.

Opened by the ambassador of Israel, Mr. Mordehai Gazit and Dr. Maurice Grynfolgel, president of the WJC French Section, this 19th Colloque attracted such notable personalities as Mrs. Simone Veil, French minister of Health; Mrs. Marie-Hélène Bérard, technical advisor to the Ministry of the Budget; and Roger Pierrot, head curator of the Manuscript Department at the French National Library.

The president of the Colloque, Professor Jean Halpérin, summed up the salient features of the intensive three-day discussions at a crowded closing session of the Colloque. The thorough press coverage resulted in detailed articles in the prestigious French paper, *Le Monde* and the main French Catholic Daily, *La Croix*.

The burning of Drancy synagogue

"Neo-Nazism is a threat not only in France, but in many countries today." In commenting on the recent burning of Drancy synagogue in France, the WJC emphasized that "this diabolical ideology which now openly uses violence as its strategy, must not be allowed to seek

shelter behind the doctrine of democracy. Governments everywhere should recognize neo-Nazism for the evil it is, for the threat it represents to the basic values of our way of life, and should act resolutely against it."

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date March 15, 1976
to Foreign Affairs Commission
from Jerome Shestack, Chairman
subject United States Policy in the United Nations

I invite your attention to the attached two documents dealing with United States policy in the United Nations.

The first of these is AJC's testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Relations Committee, submitted by Sidney Liskofsky of AJC's Foreign Affairs Department. The second, on the same subject, was prepared under the auspices of an Ad Hoc Group on United States Policy Toward the United Nations, consisting of leading authorities on the UN system, international organizations and international law. These documents should be read together as they complement each other.

AJC has been cooperating with this Ad Hoc Group since its formation over a year ago following the appearance of Yasser Arafat at the 29th session of the General Assembly. Its members considered guidelines that should govern U.S. policy in its participation in UN bodies, and they made recommendations in this regard to Ambassador Moynihan when he first took office. More recently, following the anti-Zionism resolution, the Ad Hoc Group met again with Ambassador Moynihan to discuss what the U.S. government was doing or contemplated doing in response to this and other troublesome developments.

Following that meeting the Ad Hoc Group decided to have the attached paper prepared spelling out its views as to the readjustment of U.S. policy in the UN in light of these developments. It has been submitted to the State Department and to the Senate and the House Committees on International Relations holding hearings on U.S. policy in the UN. The Ad Hoc Group also plans to meet with William W. Scranton, the new U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to present this document to him and discuss its contents.

We believe this material is worth careful reading and wide discussion in your community. The backing of such a prestigious group for this comprehensive series of recommendations adds a significant dimension of authority behind the search for a constructive approach to a very complex problem. The path charted in these recommendations could, we believe, contribute materially to preventing or at least reducing the gross abuses in the UN system that we have witnessed in recent years.

JJS/d
Encls.

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

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MAY 13-16, 1976, THE WASHINGTON HILTON

Testimony Before

Subcommittee on International Organizations

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Congress of the United States

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

February 11, 1976

By Sidney Liskofsky, Director of
International Organizations

I am Sidney Liskofsky, director of the American Jewish Committee's Division of International Organizations. The American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, is this country's pioneer human relations agency. Its aim is to combat bigotry, protect the civil and religious rights of Jews at home and abroad, and seek improved human relations for all people everywhere.

The Committee's commitment to the ideals and aims of the UN Charter antedates the creation of the world organization. Through the years we have remained staunch supporters of and participants in the programs of the UN bodies and agencies, especially those dealing with human rights, and UNESCO.

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JEROME L. GREENE, New York; LEONARD KAPLAN, Boston; DAVID LLOYD KREEGER, Washington, D.C.; RICHARD H. LEVIN, Chicago; ARNOLD H. UNGERMAN, Tulsa ■

Though we maintain our belief in the goals of the UN Charter, we are convinced of the need for new policies, designed both to safeguard America's national interests and to see to it that the UN in fact functions so as to contribute to and not to frustrate and undermine the purposes it was created to promote and to achieve.

It is not necessary to repeat the sources of the disquiet with recent developments felt by the UN's traditional supporters in this country. This disquiet stems in large part from the acquiescence by the UN's majority, now largely dominated by a combination of Arab-Muslim and Communist states, in the Arab manipulation of every part of the UN system in the campaign to delegitimize Israel, whose membership antedates that of the majority of UN members. The General Assembly's November 10, 1975 resolution, falsely branding Zionism as racism, is the climactic, and in many respects the most noxious, manifestation of this campaign.

An important lesson that one should be aware of is to deal with dangerous diseases at the earliest appearance of their symptoms. The symptoms of the disease in this case were visible years ago when Arab spokesmen, abetted by Communist and some Third World allies, began to pour out anti-Israel venom in the various UN forums and to introduce into resolutions false and misleading findings and invidious formulae. The fact that these lies were not immediately exposed built up a reservoir of quasi-acceptance that

provided support for later and more insidious attacks.

In approving the anti-Zionism resolution, the General Assembly in effect passed judgment on a movement only vaguely understood by its detractors, and on the state based on that movement. In so doing, the Assembly assumed the role of a court, which is not its proper role. It functioned as both judge and jury, although it possessed the attributes for neither of these roles, nor is it assigned such roles in the Charter. The Assembly is neither a court nor a legislature, but essentially an arena for diplomacy.

The resolution was rushed through as an exercise in political warfare, distorting the meaning of the terms at issue and applying the "taint" of racism egregiously in disregard of flagrant situations elsewhere. Indeed, racial discrimination as defined in Article I of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is sufficiently broad to encompass any discriminatory condition, however small and however unintentional. Not one UN member is free of discrimination under its definition, not to speak of states where the grossest discriminations exist, but which the UN, under its selective morality, overlooks.

Incidentally, this Convention, on which the Arab argument rested, has been applied with the utmost restraint by its implementing body, the Committee on Racial Discrimination. In no case, has this body handed down a "determination" amounting to a con-

demnatory judgment, as done by the Assembly against Israel in the anti-Zionism resolution, ostensibly on the basis of this Convention (even though Israel, understandably mistrusting the objectivity of this Committee, has not acceded to the Convention).

In the case of the anti-Zionism resolution, the coalition of Arab-Muslim and Communist states was joined by a number of Third World states subjected to pressures and influenced by considerations such as fear of reprisals from the Arab oil-rich states, bloc loyalty and discipline, and anti-American resentments. To their everlasting credit, a considerable number of African and other Third World members resisted these pressures and either voted no or abstained. For the first time in many years, nearly all the world's democratic nations voted against an Assembly resolution, which they recognized as a political gesture aimed at the existence of a member state rather than the evils of racism.

The successes of the Arab anti-Israel campaign in the UN justify the disquiet, not simply because of the injustice toward this one state, but because of what it reveals about the way the system operates - and the indication that if one state can be lynched by rhetoric and resolution, so can others. In submitting to the Arab pressures, the majority supporting their requests demonstrated the fragility of its commitment to principles in regard to the UN's functioning, which Americans hold important, notably: equality of treatment, respect for constitutionality, procedural fairness, non-poli-

ticization of technical or public service agencies and programs, universality of membership and participation, and resolving differences through accomodation and conciliation rather than coercion.

The failure to observe these principles is most apparent to us in the fields of human rights and UNESCO, with which we are best acquainted.

In the Human Rights Commission and other UN bodies dealing with questions of human rights, the present majority has tended to select the violations on a political basis, focusing on a few countries while closing its eyes to equal or worse violations elsewhere. It has effectively blocked or undermined mechanisms for investigating violations in all countries on the basis of generally applicable criteria. In the choice of issues or subjects to study, or about which to formulate standards of conduct, it has bypassed issues in the sphere of civil and political rights and individual freedoms.

UNESCO, WHO and other specialized agencies, as well as specialized Conferences held under UN auspices(eg, IWY Conference, Mexico City, June 1975)have also been abused in the service of the political ends of the Arab-Muslim and Communist blocs.

It is not necessary to review the unhappy events of the past two years in UNESCO, which have been extensively reported

in the press and are well known to this Subcommittee. However, we take this opportunity to commend the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO for the forthright resolutions adopted at its Annual Meeting in Williamsburg, Va, this past December. In four resolutions, it pointed out the reasons for its concern with overall tendencies in the UN system, articulated premises it espouses for U.S. participation in the UN system, including UNESCO, and proposed steps intended to reverse the unfortunate decisions of this agency.

The National Commission expressed alarm at the present situation within the UN system where a majority of nations has demonstrated its readiness to pervert long-standing concepts of human rights for temporary political advantage. It rejected the General Assembly's anti-Zionism resolution, noting with concern the possibility of its serving to encourage anti-semitism, and the "diversions" from the Organization's "basic professional purposes."

It affirmed as major premises of our country's participation in the UN system, including UNESCO, dedication to the principles of individual freedom and fundamental human rights; unbiased application of these principles; non-politicization of the professional purposes of UNESCO, and essentiality of the principle of universality.

With regard to UNESCO, the National Commission directed its executive committee to establish immediately a special task force to develop a strategy aimed at reversing at the next General Conference "the unfortunate trend of events" at last year's Conference.

We share the sentiments expressed in these resolutions and hope the U.S. National Commission and its executive committee will implement them with vigor. We believe that the national commissions provide valuable means for influencing popular attitudes and governmental policies affecting UNESCO. Accordingly, the U.S. National Commission may be able, through contacts and relationships with other national commissions, to contribute to reversing UNESCO's disastrous course which has undermined its integrity and repelled its supporters throughout the world. In this connection, the meeting of national commissions scheduled to open next Monday, February 16, in Paris offers an opportunity to enlist the other national commissions in supporting the programmatic elements in these resolutions. We hope this opportunity will be effectively utilized.

The unwholesome condition in the UN will not be corrected, if at all, unless the U.S. determines to make it happen so as to enable the UN to carry out the Charter's purposes of maintaining peace, developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, achieving international cooperation in solving problems of an economic, social, cul-

tural, or humanitarian character, promoting human rights and freedoms, and being a center for harmonizing the actions of nations.

It will not happen unless the U.S., while forthrightly defending its own interests, sincerely undertakes to accommodate the genuine concerns and interests of the Third World in such areas as economics, Southern Africa and colonialism. At the same time, we should try to convince the pragmatic and moderate elements in the Third World that it is in their interest as in ours to promote unpoliticized human rights and public service programs, in both the UN bodies and the specialized agencies. While we make credible our promise to accommodate their concerns, they, in turn, must appreciate ours. They must understand that if the present anti-libertarian and demagogic trends continue in the world organization, we may be forced to reassess its utility - and even compelled to look for new international arrangements to deal with the many difficult problems of world order the world organization was intended to help the member nations solve cooperatively. They must understand that our relationship with them in various areas, including aid and development, cannot but be affected by how responsibly they behave in the UN.

Though we oppose total U.S. withdrawal from or non-participation in the UN system, we do suggest that our government participate selectively, and that the test of participation be whether the forum makes possible the conduct of constructive diplomacy - and, of course, where, as in the Security Council, the forum is one where our interests are

safeguarded by our power.

Where the issue under consideration is a serious one and is being fairly debated, we should participate, even if out-talked and out-voted. However, we should stay away from and thereby discredit - and encourage like-minded delegations to do likewise - frivolous or demagogically politicized meetings, conferences and programs. In this connection, we commend our country's representative to the recent UNESCO expert conference for walking out, together with other experts from the Western European countries, in protest against the majority's acceptance of an Arab-sponsored proposal to incorporate the General Assembly's anti-Zionism resolution into a declaration being drafted on the role of the mass media in efforts for peace and against racial discrimination.

Similarly, we should pursue a policy of selective financing, as we did in the case of UNESCO, by delaying dues payments to agencies that persist in discriminatory or other politically distorted actions. Bearing in mind the principle of the "Goldberg Reservation" of 1965, by which the U.S. reserved the right to withhold payments for "good and compelling" reasons, we should deduct from our overall UN dues our country's proportionate (25 per cent) share of the estimated cost of any "tainted" program - even if, as in the case of the Decade Against Racism (defined to include Zionism), the amount is small and the significance of the withholding only symbolic.

In the long-run, we should set as a goal the restructuring of the UN bodies and agencies so as to strengthen their conciliational roles and diminish the significance of voting as a means of decision-making.

Finally, we endorse the general approach of Ambassador Moynihan of calling a spade a spade and drawing attention to human rights problems everywhere, including the Communist and Third World nations. While admitting our own imperfections, we should expose the false claims of the Communist and other authoritarian regimes and point out the untruths in the attribution to the U.S. and the West of responsibility for all the world's ills - for example - for the food crisis and underdevelopment. And we should call attention proudly to the authentic achievements of liberal democracy.

AD HOC GROUP ON UNITED STATES POLICY
TOWARDS THE UNITED NATIONS

AMERICAN JEWISH


A New United States Policy Towards the
United Nations

March 1976



A New United States Policy Towards the United Nations

This memorandum was prepared by an Ad Hoc Group on United States Policy Toward the United Nations, comprising scholars professionally concerned with international affairs, former U.S. delegates to the UN and nongovernmental organization leaders. The Ad Hoc Group met periodically during the past 18 months and reached a consensus on the broad conclusions set forth in the memorandum. While all the participants agreed on the broad conclusions, they did not necessarily concur in every specific recommendation. Among the participants were:



Morris B. Abram
John Carey
Norman Cousins
Seymour M. Finger
Thomas M. Franck
Richard N. Gardner
Bertram H. Gold
Rita Hauser
Philip E. Hoffman
Sidney Liskofsky
Charles William Maynes
Hans Morgenthau
Leo Nevas
Nathan Pelcovits
Jerome Shestack

A NEW UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS

The policy of the United States in the United Nations is in a state of unprecedented disarray. Stimulated by policy reverses at the last UN General Assembly session, Congressional hearings are underway to re-evaluate U.S. participation in the UN. The appointment of a new U.S. Ambassador to the UN -- our eighth in eight years -- provides an opportunity to redefine the U.S. relationship to the world organization.

The members of the Ad Hoc Group that cooperated in the writing of this report are united by a shared conviction that we wish to record at the outset. It is that a central task of U.S. foreign policy in the crucial next quarter of the twentieth century is the building of effective world institutions to manage critical world problems of vital importance to the American people and to all peoples and nations.

These problems include the proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, the increasing financial burden of the arms race, the population explosion, protecting the environment, food and energy shortages, unemployment and mass poverty. International institutions can play a crucial role in helping control local conflicts through peacekeeping and in developing an orderly structure for the international economy to break the disastrous cycle of poverty and underdevelopment in most regions of the world.

We believe that despite our differences with the developing nations, if we try sincerely to accommodate their genuine concerns, many will find it in their interest to cooperate with us in dealing constructively with these problems through the UN system.

We are deeply concerned by the fact that international structures in these areas are manifestly weak and inadequate when measured against the tasks to be performed. This is not mainly the fault of the U.S. -- our country has played a role of constructive leadership in the history of the UN and its overall record compares favorably to that of most other countries, many of which have exploited the UN as a propaganda instrument or for political warfare while demonstrating little concern for pressing global problems. Nevertheless,

we find inescapable the conclusion that U.S. participation in the UN system has followed a declining path of effectiveness under both Republican and Democratic administrations during the last decade.

This trend can and must be reversed. American influence can be restored because our power remains real. By regaining our sense of purpose and direction, we will again be in a position to use our power in international affairs. The survival of the U.S. as a free, secure and prosperous country demands that the vital business of managing international interdependence be somehow performed. There is no more important challenge to U.S. foreign policy than to determine which items of interdependence business can still be effectively performed by the UN and which cannot. In the former cases, the U.S. needs to do much more to reform and strengthen the UN system; in the latter cases, it will have to disengage and urgently set about building alternative structures.

This memorandum is not intended to provide detailed answers to all the specific questions that will have to be addressed as part of a thoroughgoing review of U.S. participation in the UN system. Hopefully, however, it may offer a useful conceptual framework as well as a stimulus for the re-examination of policy which now needs to be undertaken by the Executive Branch, the Congress and the American people.

Rethinking the Problem

Recent disquieting events at the UN -- the extremist rhetoric over economic issues, the campaign to delegitimize Israel by branding Zionism as racism and calling on states to desist from economic aid to Israel, the failure to deal with international terrorism, the votes against Guam bases and for Puerto Rican independence, the use of the General Assembly as a forum for vilifying America -- have intensified American disenchantment with the UN and its agencies. They have spurred doubts about its value (as a recent Gallup poll demonstrated) and led to a Congressional call for a reassessment of our multilateral diplomacy.

Partly the problem is immediate and tactical -- how to stem the tide of accelerating political abuse and misuse of the UN's deliberative bodies. This is not solely a task of ensuring due process and procedural fairness. To be sure, it remains necessary to protest against such acts as the twisting of the rules by the Security Council to seat the PLO with all the privileges of a member state. But procedural abuse is not the crux of the problem.

Rather the problems in the Assembly and indeed throughout the UN system have been caused by politicized behavior which has undermined the institutional capacity of the system to deal with matters of world concern in an impartial and effective manner. How is it possible to turn around political behavior so that the institution will become again an environment for constructive dialogue and constructive action?

Beyond this, recent events have illuminated the basic and chronic impairment in the UN system: During the past decade the UN has become less responsive to the objective requirement of international cooperation and less efficient in coping with world order tasks. It has become increasingly difficult for the U.S. and other nations to conduct constructive multilateral diplomacy in the UN. Accelerated political abuse of UN bodies, the assertiveness of majorities that dictate not only the agenda but one-sided solutions, and insensitivity to legitimate national interests, including those of the U.S. -- these have put strains on the effectiveness and credibility of multilateral institutions.

The American people are so outraged that they lose sight of the functional value to be found in UN agencies and UN activities. Congressional and popular support has been eroded to the point where any program that bears the UN label is suspect, making it more difficult to make use of UN resources for peacekeeping, economic development, promotion of human rights, protecting the environment, eradicating epidemic diseases, regulating the airways, and managing ocean resources -- problems which are too global and too complex to be solved by one nation or even by all the Western nations together.

Inconsistencies in American multilateral diplomacy have complicated the task. Sometimes the U.S. has spoken with several voices (e.g., on economic and African issues) and has been insufficiently vigilant. For example, it failed to communicate at a high level in the capitals of UN members the reason for American concern about the Zionism resolution and the damage it might do to the prospects for Middle East peace, to the authentic fight against racism, and to American support for multilateral cooperation.

A Possible Approach

Whatever weight one attributes to these various causes of our predicament, a corrective strategy is imperative. Its aim should be not punitive but remedial, to turn around political behavior. The U.S.

must be seen as acting not out of pique but out of concern for restoring the UN as an effective institution for dealing with the world's interests. And this means synchronizing tough diplomacy -- speaking forthrightly to set the record straight, defending our interests vigorously, and delineating the limits beyond which the U.S. will not be pushed -- with a readiness to accommodate honest grievances and bargain about the real economic and other interests of the developing world.

Some have criticized the policy of standing up to any majority as incompatible with "accommodation," but this sets up false alternatives. A viable strategy recognized that these are two sides of the same coin. Philosophically and in terms of practical politics, Congress and the American people will not make sacrifices or agree to economic accommodations in a political context where America's legitimate concerns are ignored or brushed aside and the negotiating atmosphere poisoned by venomous political debates. There can be no rescue of the UN or room for accommodation save by dealing with the Third World (and the Communists for that matter) in a spirit of realism and candor. The Third World nations must know that America cannot satisfy their economic interests if they are insensitive to vital political and economic interests about which the U.S. feels strongly, or if international forums are used to impress domestic constituencies without regard to interested constituencies in the U.S.

This understood, our strategy should be to appeal to those elements in the Third World that are more interested in solving economic and political problems than scoring ideological points. Encompassing these elements proved successful at the Seventh Special Session on economic issues in September 1975. Our purpose should be to identify and pursue interests we share with the moderates and pragmatists, to explore opportunities for working with Third World leaders who are ready to engage in collective bargaining. A viable strategy must take into account the possibility of a bargain in which we try to satisfy the priority concerns of the less developed countries (LDCs) in economic development and eliminating the remnants of colonialism in exchange for their cooperation in peacekeeping, enlarging respect for the entire range of human rights and cooperating in solving world order problems. This strategy is credible only if the Third World is seen not as an ideological monolith but as an aggregation of interest groups. Our approach should be positive, not only because there are limits to the power of negative thinking, but also because we can succeed in the long run only by enlisting allies and mobilizing the non-doctrinaire pro-UN constituency, including

those in the Third World.

Next Steps for U.S. Policy

Given this conception of the problem, what steps can be taken to fashion a constructive diplomacy for both the short term and the long haul -- to stem the erosion of American influence and to serve long-term U.S. interests in effective international institutions? What can be done to stop the unyielding radical Arab campaign to delegitimize Israel and make the world organization once again a valid instrument for achieving a just and lasting Middle East peace?

Total withdrawal from the UN or total non-participation are not really sensible options -- though it may be necessary to consider selective participation as suggested below. For the purpose is not to weaken the UN but to improve it ; nor is there profit in absenting ourselves altogether from the Assembly which can often serve as a useful platform and negotiating forum. Even the most skeptical see value in UN peacekeeping and in the UN's public service functions. (Even Israel, despite understandable frustrations, has chosen to stay in the UN which provides a certificate of legitimacy and an arena of communication in a cold diplomatic world.)

We believe that the national interest in a stronger and more responsible UN would be best served by new U.S. policies in the following areas:

1. Making Multilateral Affairs Part of Overall Diplomacy

The key to successful action in the UN is to perceive and conduct multilateral diplomacy as an organic part of total diplomacy. Issues and interests do not divide neatly into bilateral and UN boxes. In recent years, the U.S. has come to perceive what a negative influence on its bilateral diplomacy a weak position in the UN can have. Just as poorly conceived diplomacy, particularly in the Third World, undermines U.S. influence in the UN, so do setbacks to the U.S. in the UN complicate U.S. bilateral objectives. We need to pay more attention to what goes on in multilateral forums, using American diplomatic leverage as needed to accomplish our purposes. Our concern about events at the 30th General Assembly was twofold: that it impeded our foreign policy objectives, notably by making a Middle East settlement more difficult ; and that it undermined the integrity of multilateral institutions. Unless the threat to the integrity of these institutions is overcome or contained we may be compelled to disengage and fashion new international arrangements

to cope with world order tasks.

Our strategy then must be to convey the message that we take very seriously policies and votes in the UN which support or undercut our major foreign policy aims. A clear-cut measurement of "responsible" UN behavior is hard to define ; but it is possible to discern consistent patterns of constructive as against destructive conduct in utterances and votes. The overall pattern of a country's UN behavior should be taken into account in our overall relationship with them. For UN behavior is an aspect of the national politics and diplomacy of each country and necessarily affects the bilateral relationship. The Department of State has belatedly recognized this fact by appointing an official in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to monitor patterns of multilateral behavior, discern where vital American interests are at stake, and draw policy implications. This office is supposed to alert foreign nations in advance about issues and votes the U.S. considers of major importance. This can be a constructive development provided that the new office does not punish countries for defending legitimate national interests (e.g., supporting a resolution on commodity agreements opposed by the U.S.), but for a consistent pattern of negative behavior that serves no genuine national interest and weakens international institutional structures.

In implementing this diplomacy certain steps are indicated:

a. Diplomatic representations. Diplomatic approaches should be initiated with key nations (including missions by regional Assistant Secretary of State) for a candid view of recent UN events and their implications. The purpose should be to define and register the American interest, and the message to be conveyed to these nations should be that American cooperation on matters of interest to them cannot be unrelated to their behavior in UN forums and agencies on matters of interest to us. The U.S. must be concerned when countries with no active interest in such issues as the Middle East, Korea, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal, etc. pursue certain policies and cast their votes for reasons of bloc solidarity or log-rolling.

Diplomatic approaches are imperative where nations have played an egregiously damaging role. On the diplomatic front, also, the U.S. should not leave the USSR in doubt about its displeasure over the major role played by Soviet representatives behind the scenes in launching the anti-Zionism offensive. This is a grave compromise of detente rules of the game and calls into question Soviet cooperation in fostering a peaceful settlement of the Middle East dispute.

In general, our Ambassadors and their staffs overseas should be asked to communicate more frequently and at a higher level with host governments on U.S. policies in multilateral institutions. This is particularly important since many of the 144 UN delegates act without instructions on the vast majority of UN agenda items. As a practical matter, representations in their capitals may be the most effective way to influence their policies. To be effective, our diplomacy must be consistent. Courting a country whose behavior in international matters -- early recognition of the MPLA in Angola, voting for the anti-Zionism resolution, unfriendly statements by the foreign minister -- has been damaging, is hardly effective diplomacy.

b. Diplomacy toward the Third World. The success of such a diplomatic approach hinges on a specially-designed effort -- to be pursued between now and the next General Assembly -- directed toward persuading moderate Third World leaders that their true interests lie not in confrontationist demands of have-nots on the haves but in cooperating in seeking solutions to common world problems. On many real issues, such as help in capital formation and technology, agricultural development, stabilizing export earnings, the more responsible leadership can be induced to seek negotiated solutions rather than confrontation. Moreover, we share with them real interests in promoting peaceful settlement of conflict, combatting terrorism, enlarging the area of respect for human rights. (Specific proposals for pursuing shared interests are explored below). These approaches to the Third World need to be undertaken on a selective basis by analyzing the record. Many Third World countries are likely to be receptive to such a constructive approach and would join in cooperative and constructive efforts at the UN as a consequence.

c. Aid and Trade. As a guideline in aid-trade policy a rule should be adopted that a consistent pattern of responsible or irresponsible behavior on important multilateral issues will be taken into account in bilateral aid and trade relationships. For example, granting access to Eximbank credits and pricing arrangements on commodities involves hard choices in allocating limited resources which should take account of the spectrum of relationships, including the multilateral record. We believe Congress will properly want to consider the multilateral dimension of other nations' policies, even where the Administration does not.

In aid-giving the principle needs to be established that responsible UN behavior is an important consideration in allocating development assistance. Under a new provision in the

International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 assistance may be withheld from any country with a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." A comparable approach should be taken by the Administration where there is a consistent pattern of irresponsible behavior in multilateral bodies. This would not be an absolute criterion but one factor to be given due weight and balanced against other national interest considerations. Thus, humanitarian considerations should continue to be overriding, so that emergency relief in famine and other types of disaster would be dispensed on humanitarian grounds irrespective of the balance sheet of "responsible" behavior in UN forums. To be effective, such a policy requires rebuilding our foreign aid program as a major tool of U.S. foreign policy, including a commitment to an increase in official development assistance and appropriation in full of our authorized contribution to the International Development Association (IDA). Otherwise our leverage is weak and it is unrealistic to speak of orchestrating aid policy according to a pattern of behavior in multilateral bodies.

d. UN context. It is more complicated to apply this approach to U.S. contributions to UN budgets without hurting institutions and programs we favor. Withholding money from assessed UN budgets as a sign of displeasure with noxious programs could fail to hit the mark. Financial management rules prevent the earmarking of contributions. Moreover, not paying dues to which we are committed by treaty (even though the Soviets and others have occasionally followed this course), raises serious legal questions. If we delay payment it should be perceived as not vindictive but a principled move in line with the Goldberg reservation" in 1965 which declared that we reserved the right to withhold funds from "certain" activities for "strong and compelling" reasons. Cutting off or reducing donations to voluntary programs presents no legal problems but such programs generally support humanitarian and public service activities we favor, as the appended table makes clear. Besides, such broadside cuts could hurt responsible and friendly UN members as well as others.

On balance, we believe the following actions deserve consideration:

- a) While continuing vigilant participation, the U.S. should carry on with the policy of delaying payment of dues to UNESCO and other agencies that persist in discriminatory or other improper actions.
- b) The U.S. should disengage selectively from "tainted" programs such as the action program in support of the decade to eliminate racism, as the latter has been re-defined to include Zionism. This would implement the policy declared by the U.S. representative in the Fifth (Administrative and Financial) Committee on December 16 that the U.S. could "no longer support this program." The U.S. voted

against the appropriation for the biennium 1976-77.

The principle is that any human rights or other meritorious program that is politically distorted ceases to be desirable. Credibility and principle now demand that we deduct from the U.S. contribution our share (25%) of the estimate for any such program. Though the U.S. share of the cost of the "decade against racism" is modest (about \$30,000) and the gesture would thus be mainly symbolic, it would help establish the principle. To drive home the point that we oppose not the commendable purposes of the anti-racism program but its perversion, we should add an equivalent amount to voluntary UN programs we favor.

2. Selective Participation in UN Agencies and Programs

At this stage in history, the U.S. should be selective about participation in UN agencies and programs. Energies should be concentrated on those agencies and programs where possibilities for constructive diplomacy are most promising. For political and security issues this means the Security Council, for despite the capacity of Third World coalitions to exercise a passive veto, U.S. and allied interests can still be protected there and constructive peacekeeping action undertaken. On economic matters action responsibility should be vested, to the largest extent possible, in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and a reformed and strengthened General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other agencies where American interests can be adequately safeguarded.

The U.S. should continue to participate actively, and indeed continue to assert leadership, in such endeavors as the forthcoming session of the Law of the Sea Conference designed to produce agreement for the orderly use and management of the oceans and their resources -- a major objective of U.S. foreign policy. Contrariwise, the U.S. should disengage from conferences and activities which reflect a perversion of a technical agenda by "politicization" or discriminatory practices. Walk-outs of U.S. and like-minded delegations -- as occurred at the UNESCO world-media conference over its incorporation of the Zionism-equals-racism resolution in its official declaration -- are to be encouraged. Moreover, the U.S. should refuse to pay its share of the costs of such conferences and programs and announce this intention in advance.

Selective involvement in the work of the General Assembly is indicated when that body fails to conduct its business in a responsible fashion. Within the Assembly the U.S. should focus efforts where consensus is possible and practical matters, such as food, law of the

seas, drug abuse control, promotion of human rights, are being advanced. The Assembly clearly has a useful role in launching programs such as protection of the environment, but every effort should be made to ensure that the Assembly does not interfere in operational functions.

Selective involvement in Assembly proceedings means participating where constructive discussion is possible : to articulate a strongly held minority view where necessary on matters such as disarmament, satellite broadcasting and rules governing expropriation of foreign property; to add our support to worthwhile programs such as peacekeeping, drug abuse control, and law of the seas; and to explain and protect our policies and negotiating position. We should, of course, retain a watching brief over all Assembly-related activities, but on issues manipulated for political warfare follow a damage-limiting strategy. On marginal issues or those designed strictly for propaganda, we should downgrade our participation. France and China have often followed a policy of the empty seat and the U.S. left the anti-colonialism committee when it became a forum for villifying America and one-sided espousal of "national liberation" movements. Our departure did not end the abuse but the committee lost its audience. We should make it clear that our absence is not simply a symbolic "protest," but a judgment of where serious business is being conducted and where it is not.

The voting process as a way of making decisions should be devalued, and the U.S. should work for increased use of consensus procedure in the Assembly's decision-making process, especially on economic issues. We should vote less to affect the outcome than to make a point: to affirm convictions and underline the diplomatic as against the "legislative" uses of the Assembly. There is nothing wrong with splendid isolation on a vote: it helps make the point. For example, at the 29th session (1974) the U.S. alone voted against a seemingly innocuous resolution affirming the need to "strengthen international security" (a perennial Soviet showpiece) because of a provision renouncing the use of peaceful diplomatic or judicial channels to influence the nationalization of resources.

3. Coalition of the Like-Minded

To improve our parliamentary position and enhance opportunities for positive action in UN bodies, the U.S. should concert with like-minded states. Consultation should be carried out beforehand on all key issues as well as through normal diplomatic exchanges during sessions. The U.S. should take the lead in forming a "world order coalition" -- maintaining rapid communication among foreign ministries on crucial multilateral issues and

engaging in advance planning. The core of the coalition would be some of our European allies and Japan and like-minded developing nations. (It should be made clear that the world-order coalition is not intended to split the Third World.) Formation of such a world order coalition should of course be complemented by less formal diplomatic liaison with those sympathetic countries that prefer not to join a formal group. In addition, opinion leaders and non-governmental organizations could be mobilized to help stimulate constructive policies in UN agencies.

4. Structural Reforms

We should work much harder at reforming and strengthening the work of UN agencies, even while recognizing that the prospects may not be too promising in the short run because of the overheated atmosphere at the UN and because only limited benefits can be expected from improved mechanisms unless they are accompanied by political will. Most promising is the approach of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the UN System (which designed a new structure for economic cooperation) under which contentious items before the General Assembly and ECOSOC would be referred to negotiating groups for consultation and conciliation. The groups would include countries "principally interested in the subject matter," function in private under a full-time chairman (who may travel to capitals to attempt to conciliate positions), and may take a year or two to reach agreement. Pending agreement the plenary body would normally refrain from pressing the issue to a vote and give conciliation a chance to succeed.

Other reforms are needed that will redress the unfair balance in deliberative bodies, working groups and secretariats.

5. Reassessing the Utility of UN Agencies

The U.S. should take a hard look at international institutions to which it belongs to determine whether they are still workable and still promote major American and world order interests. Where the machinery is no longer serving the purpose for which it was established, or working inefficiently because of political taint or bureaucratic petrification, the U.S. should take the lead in organizing more manageable groupings which reflect our interests and are better able to deal with emerging world problems. An example of a new mechanism is the Conference on International Economic Cooperation which brings together 27 industrialized, OPEC and non-oil producing developing nations. The eventual linking of such new agencies to the UN would be desirable, provided the General Assembly and other UN bodies reform themselves and evolve into more responsible institutions.

More controversial but inescapable if the "reassessment" of U.S. policy toward the UN is to be comprehensive, is to take another look at our membership and extent of participation in specialized UN agencies. Not only have some of them become politicized and debased but some may no longer serve the national interest (and may have lost the support of the domestic constituency which should be their natural supporters) or even the broader world objectives of standard setting, delivery of technical aid, and transnational communication for which they were created. Of course the purpose of such an appraisal is not to kill the agency -- others may find value in them -- but to calculate whether we still have a net interest in belonging ourselves. The presumption should be for staying in, but U.S. policy should not exclude the option of renouncing membership in certain agencies when a careful appraisal indicates that our interest in a cooperative world order would be better served by getting out.

6. Pursuing Shared Interests with Third World

Ultimately, effective multilateral diplomacy rests on an assumption -- that the West shares a common interest with much of the developing world in negotiated solutions to common economic and political problems. It assumes, moreover, a shared perception about the need to cooperate through international institutions and to fashion improved international arrangements to cope with such inter-related problems as population, food, environment, energy, mass poverty, unemployment, inflation and depression, social and political instability, proliferating nuclear and conventional weapons and escalating terrorism and international conflict. While the attitudes of developing nations may differ from those of the West on many of these world order issues, we believe accommodations in the mutual interest are still possible.

Colonialism. A more positive American stance on southern African and human rights problems could help defuse the colonialist issue. In the UN, particularly because of the Byrd amendment, we are seen as lacking concern about colonialism and racism. Some steps, such as the speech by Clarence Mitchell made at the 30th General Assembly, have been taken. Repeal of the Byrd amendment (which puts us in default of Security Council sanctions), joining the Council on Namibia, a more accommodating stance on commissions of inquiry for southern Africa, paying more attention to Africa in our diplomacy -- are other measures that might give the U.S. moral leverage.

Human Rights. Accommodation on colonialism should be linked to a more active position on humanitarian and human rights considerations in overall foreign policy. A fitting bicentennial action would be U.S. adherence to Conventions on Genocide, Racial Discrimination, Forced Labor and the two Covenants on Human Rights. (Of 22 treaties drafted

by UN bodies the U.S. is a party to three, the Supplementary Convention on Slavery and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.)

Even more important, we should call attention to human rights violations anywhere in the world on an objective basis and underscore our concern over the disturbing trend in the Human Rights Commission and other forums of deviation from their proper role as expert bodies examining issues on their merits. We should make it clear that we cannot accept the lack of balance in concern about human rights -- the disproportionate concentration on unsustained and exaggerated charges against one country while ignoring more serious violations elsewhere, singling out oppression in one country while turning a blind eye to political repression in many countries and torture and mass murder in too many places. And, we should call attention to inhumane practices wherever they occur.

We should work harder to persuade Africans and Asians that our concern and theirs ought to extend not only to institutionalized racial/ethnic discrimination (contrary to Article 7 of the Universal Declaration to Human Rights) but also to mass murder (contrary to Article 3), torture (Article 5), arbitrary and unfair detention and trial (Articles 9, 10, 11) and denial of the right to emigration (Article 13).

We should seek common ground with countries which are coming to share our perception about the importance of upgrading civil and political rights and combatting the grosser forms of oppression. In addition an effort should be made to get their support for ending the selective morality in the implementation procedures under Resolution 1503, which the Human Rights Commission and the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities should apply impartially to private petitions charging human rights violations.

A juster economic deal. The paramount issue for the developing countries is the economic relationship. The U.S. should regain the momentum of last September -- the initiative at the special session to foster a constructive dialogue on development and economic cooperation. The final document (Resolution 3362) incorporated much of the American plan, notably a facility to stabilize export earnings through the International Monetary Fund, replenishment of the International Development Association, increased capitalization of the International Finance Corporation, an international energy institute, a center for the exchange of technological information, a world grain reserve and an International Fund for Agricultural Development. While

the U.S. had reservations about some aspects of the final document, a satisfactory accord was achieved on specific provisions and larger objectives. Now we should move in concert with Western allies and cooperative Third World nations to implement the promises and build the institutions.

This exercise showed that with good will in negotiation a very substantial measure of agreement on real things can be reached, and the main message to the developing world is that more is to be gained from working with us than against us. A related message: since much of the program depends on Congressional action or concurrence, e.g. participation in the tin, coffee and other commodity agreements, increased capitalization of the IFC, replenishment of the International Development Association, enlargement of quotas in the International Monetary Fund, responsible behavior in the UN may become a practical prerequisite to success. To be successful, America must commit itself to the goals of the Second Development Decade, including the aid target, and pursue vigorous efforts to provide developing world access to our markets under conditions which protect American workers either through generous adjustment assistance or scheduled import entry. Without clear and convincing evidence that the U.S. cares about the issue of world poverty, there is little hope of success for the strategy of tough diplomacy and accommodation of the real concerns of the Third World.

Conclusion

The cardinal feature of American strategy, then, should not be a test of strength with the Third World but a test of whether pragmatic interests will override ideological fixations. We should make a sustained effort to re-establish American influence through the "synchronized diplomacy" described above. This will enable us to determine whether present trends can be overcome by American leadership and honest bargaining or whether the trends are irreversible. If grievances are real and aspirations concrete, there is room for collective bargaining, provided political leaders on all sides substitute statesmanship for showmanship -- focusing on practical programs rather than abstract doctrines and showing a decent respect for one another's political and economic concerns. In such bargaining we can be sympathetic and friendly. If the response is nonetheless to debase the institutions, to rely on steamroller majorities, to avoid consensus, and to try to "legislate" rather than negotiate farreaching changes in the world order, our recourse is clear -- to downgrade politicized UN institutions, to participate selectively and fashion new institutions and new groupings around real interests.

AD HOC GROUP ON UNITED STATES POLICY
TOWARDS THE UNITED NATIONS
March 1976

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1974¹

ASSESSMENTS FOR REGULAR BUDGET AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES	TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ALL STATES	U.S. CONTRIBUTION	% OF TOTAL	PER CAPITA ²
United Nations Regular Budget	\$264,322,000	\$ 63,472,000	25.00	\$.299
Food and Agricultural Organization	62,650,000	13,531,000	25.00	.063
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization	2,894,000	152,000	5.27	.0007
International Atomic Energy Agency	23,137,000	7,779,000	31.91	.036
International Civil Aviation Organization	9,778,000	2,811,000	28.75	.013
ICAO - Joint Financing Program	5,892,000	2,231,000	37.87	.011
International Labor Organization	45,135,000	11,284,000	25.00	.053
International Telecommunications Union	13,246,000	1,535,000	11.59	.007
United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization	61,720,000	18,543,000	29.41	.087
Universal Postal Union	4,177,000	168,000	4.02	.0008
World Health Organization	112,938,000	26,802,000 ³ ³	.126
World Intellectual Property Organization	1,143,000	52,000	4.52	.0002
World Meteorological Organization	6,954,000	1,571,000	23.47	.007
TOTAL	\$613,986,000	\$149,931,000	26.10	\$.707
PEACEKEEPING				
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNFICYP - Voluntary	\$ 15,500,000	\$ 4,800,000	30.97	\$.022
United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East				
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Golan Heights) - Assessed	82,100,000	23,719,000	28.89	.111
UNEF/UNDOF - Voluntary	1,920,000	400,000	20.83	.002
TOTAL	\$ 99,520,000	\$ 28,919,000	29.06	\$.136
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS				
International Atomic Energy Agency Operational Program	\$ 5,500,000	\$ 2,000,000	36.36	\$.009
United Nations Children's Fund	59,163,000	15,000,000	25.35	.070
United Nations Development Program	352,382,000	70,784,000	20.09	.333
United Nations Environment Program	20,874,000	8,200,000	39.28	.038
United Nations/Food and Agricultural Organization World Food Program	178,281,000	68,000,000	38.14	.320
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control	3,428,000	2,000,000	58.34	.009
United Nations Fund for Population Activities	54,000,000	20,000,000	37.04	.094
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Program	7,522,000	1,100,000	14.62	.005
United Nations Trust Fund for Development Planning and Projections	2,500,000	750,000	30.00	.003
United Nations Fund for Namibia	169,000	50,000	29.51	.0002
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)	89,218,000	29,400,000	32.95	.139
United Nations Institute for Training and Research	1,672,000	400,000	23.92	.002
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Trust Fund for Nubian Monuments)	12,000,000	2,000,000	16.67	.009
World Health Organization Special Programs	18,866,000	1,561,000	8.27	.007
World Meteorological Organization Voluntary Assistance Program	5,000,000	1,500,000	30.00	.007
TOTAL	\$810,575,000	\$222,745,000	27.48	\$1.05
SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS				
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: South Asia - Exchange of Persons	2,857,000	\$ 2,400,000	84.00	\$.011
Cyprus Humanitarian Assistance	22,000,000	7,300,000	33.18	.034
Chile Refugee Relief Program	2,556,000	1,000,000	39.12	.005
Vietnam & Laos Displaced Persons Program	6,345,000	1,000,000	15.76	.005
United Nations/Food and Agricultural Organization Sahelian Trust Fund	8,009,000	2,600,000	32.46	.012
TOTAL	\$ 41,767,000	\$ 14,300,000	34.24	\$.067
GRAND TOTAL	\$1,565,848,000	\$415,895,000	27.22	\$1.96

¹ Data for calendar year 1974 is preliminary as of May 1975. Data on contributions to the regular budgets of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and UNEF represent amounts assessed by the appropriate bodies. Data on voluntary contributions to UNFICYP, UNEF, other voluntary programs, and special humanitarian programs represent commitments by governments which may include the value of commodities and services as well as cash.

² Per Capita is based on mid-1974 population estimate of 212 million.

³ Represents the maximum amount that may be contributed under the 25% statutory limitation.




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AMERICAN JEWISH
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Address by Leonard Garment, U.S. Representative
to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
at a Meeting of the American Jewish Congress,
Washington, D.C., Thursday, April 1, 1976.

The Conspiracy of the Majority

I welcome this opportunity to speak in this particular forum because the assumptions and apprehensions we hold in common enable me to speak very directly.

Shortly after the 32nd Session of the Human Rights Commission ended, the Manchester Guardian began a March 5 editorial with this two-paragraph description of the work of the Commission:

"Once upon a time, before the days of the dragon Daniel Patrick, the United States and others saw the United Nations as the champion of human rights and an impartial defender of general faiths.

"Disillusionment -- and not just American disillusionment -- has now reached such a level that the U. S. delegate at this year's annual session of the UN Human Rights Commission could call the Commission's work a "travesty of human rights" and accuse the Commission of having become an "instrument of evil".

The London Times in a March 14 report by three senior correspondents entitled "A Conspiracy to Oppress", said the Commission was "perhaps the most poignant and disgraceful of false international pretences that the governments of the world have yet had the temerity to devise"; that the Commission

is "an almost total lie"; and that it "plays a vital part in what Sean McBride, the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize Winner, has described as a 'conspiracy of governments' to deprive people of their rights."

All this is true -- as far as it goes. But it falls short of the mark. For, as those of you who followed the proceedings at the UN General Assembly in New York must have sensed, and as those of us who participated there and in the work of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva have come to know, something more is at work than a conspiracy by governments to cover up the systematic infliction of suffering and shame on vast numbers of individuals, disgraceful as that conspiracy is.

What is at work is indeed a conspiracy, that is, a pattern of concerted acts by men from many countries at numberless meetings and in different places, with varying primary motives and objectives but with a common and almost universally desired consequence: the weakening of the ideas and forms of the democratic West and the strengthening of the ideas and forms of totalitarianism.

Who are the conspirators? It is of course no secret that the Warsaw Pact countries are at the center of the conspiratorial circle, but the alarming fact is that the Soviet Union and its satellites now provide mainly ideological

and strategic inspiration. Most of the legwork is performed by Third World countries from Cuba and Yugoslavia to Tanzania and India. The common denominator is pervasive fear of the liberties that exist in the industrial democracies -- free speech, assembly, religion, regular elections, guarantees of due process. This audience knows how Indira Gandhi has obliterated political and civil liberties in India. Her pretext that India is too poor to enjoy freedom is now the standard line. Bread now, liberty later. Maybe. And Tito's Yugoslavia, stirred by premonitions of conflict and disintegration when its leader finally passes from the scene, is beginning to tighten the screws of totalitarian oppression at home while it still exploits a reputation in international forums for relatively enlightened policies. But the mask slips, and the repressive face of this regime is revealed when it arrests a prominent lawyer and crudely condemns him for having made too vigorous a defense of a client charged with a political crime.

It should be clear by now that my use of the word "conspiracy" is not casual. I know the risks and resistances that word engenders. I know the interplay among the participants is complex and that different roles are played. But I also know there is no way to comprehend the nature of the contest we are in, and what our peril is, except by

making clear that it is not the product of incidents and accidents. It results from coordinated international action led and organized by men and women who are coolly and objectively hostile to the West. They are hostile because they rightly consider freedom the main threat to their power. Let us be under no illusions. They are the enemies of freedom. They think that way. They act that way. And they act together.

Indeed, the characteristics of this conspiracy are altogether classic. It flourishes in darkness and in quiet places. It works to weaken its opponents by little moves, with each destructive step seemingly so minor that one can always justify not putting up a defense -- just yet. The conspirators are inexorably consistent; their acts may be separate and distinct, but they all point in the same direction. And as with other conspiracies, the only way to prevail against this one is through precise, unrelenting, complete exposure. One of the extraordinary things about this systematic and immensely successful attack on Western values is how rarely we take note of it. And how resistant we are to warning voices. Even Solzhenitsyn, bearing witness out of a life of agony, meets with diffidence or skepticism -- admired, ye's, but also patronized and subtly discounted.

The evidence of the activities and victories of the conspiracy is endless. Since I am here as the U. S. Representative to the Human Rights Commission, I will talk about some of the things I experienced personally at the February meeting of the Commission. But note this. These items are not at all unusual. They are typical. They occurred throughout the meeting. They occur wherever international meetings are held. They are occurring everywhere faster and more forcefully. They form a deadly pattern.

First, religion. Starting over a decade ago, the United States and Western European governments urged the Commission to adopt a Declaration on Religious Freedom. Now, ten years later, the title and a handful of introductory paragraphs are agreed upon. It is not particularly significant that little progress has been made. What matters more is the direction the Declaration is taking. The title is now "Draft declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief". It is no longer a Declaration clearly intended to protect the individual's religious belief from acts of official intolerance. Rather, it is slowly taking shape as a twisted text designed to limit religious freedom and individual belief on the pretext that religion breeds intolerance, racism, and colonialism, causing threats to

this is peace and/the critical factor -- endangering state security. Under unrelenting Communist bloc effort and pressure, the draft Declaration is being transformed from a benign, if modest, affirmation of religious values into an instrument that can serve to undermine the legitimacy of religious organizations and religious practices, and may indeed be used to legitimize their repression in hostile countries. The Declaration is years away from adoption but its direction is already obvious.

The second part of the pattern, Israel's legitimacy. Twenty-eight years ago the United Nations adopted a resolution that confirmed the legitimacy of the State of Israel. Between then and now, largely as Western initiatives, the UN adopted a series of resolutions that have the effect of denying legitimacy to governments that systematically violate human rights. Now we are seeing precisely these protective concepts being used by the UN majority, in the General Assembly, in the Human Rights Commission, in other specialized agencies and bodies, to erode the legitimacy of the State of Israel. The syllogism is by now a familiar one: Racism is illegal; Zionism is racism; Israel is a Zionist State; Israel is therefore illegal. It was only to be expected that when the Israeli observer at this past meeting of the Human Rights Commission raised the question of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union,

Ambassador Zorin would seek to cut him off in these terms:

"Of course I believe in freedom of speech and in the right of governments to speak here. But (Israel) is not an ordinary government. This is the representative of the Zionist regime. He has no right to speak on the subject of the violation of human rights." A coordinated objection was made by the Commission member representing Byelorussia. So step by step, resolution by resolution, in New York, Geneva, Nairobi, at UNCTAD, WHO and so on, Israel is to be cast out of the international community. I have not the slightest doubt that the Zionist resolution has played an instrumental role in stirring Arab passions and inciting Arab violence not only on the West Bank but in Israel itself. And don't think for one moment that consequences of this kind were not calculated.

A third piece of the pattern, the "right to life" as the primary human right. Thirty years ago the UN Charter established the principle that violations of human rights in any country are a cause of international concern. After the holocaust this seemed a truth that urgently required standing in international law. The early work of the UN sought to do this by building on the principle that human rights are natural rights, inherent in the human personality, which do not depend upon the state for their existence. This idea was crucial to the balanced language

of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was the philosophical basis for the West's insistence on some form of human rights recognition at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. What action did the conspiratorial majority take at Geneva on this issue this year? They gutted the principle and destroyed the balance by adopting a resolution based on a shopworn Soviet line that the "right to life" is the foundation for all human rights and takes absolute precedence over all the others. The meaning of this year's resolution is quite plain: If the State determines in some manner that it is not "secure", or if the State determines in some manner that there is a "threat to peace", then it can now, with the formal endorsement of the UN Human Rights Commission, suspend all other human rights -- speech, religious exercise, assembly, emigration -- until the threat to the supreme "right to life" passes. What unbelievable nonsense! It is hard to imagine a more transparently cynical and counterfeit transaction by a so-called Human Rights Commission. As if the proponents of this resolution abide the exercise of human rights under even the best of circumstances. But there was a rational objective to this maneuver. It was to legitimate law-breaking by passing and publishing a resolution that can be

brandished at one meeting and built on at the next, a resolution that permits human rights crimes to be committed openly, even proudly, in the name of peace and international security.

It must be said that the Soviets handled this piece of business adroitly; and a word on this is instructive. First, they resubmitted their old resolution. When this was rejected by the West and most of the so-called "non-aligned" countries, Yugoslavia, Cuba and Senegal were enlisted to take over the effort by incorporating the Soviet idea into a Third World resolution, embellished with a number of favored Third World economic and social declarations. Some few crumbs were even thrown in for the West. Then the sponsors passed the message to the Western delegations: "We have the votes. It will pass. Accept what is inevitable and later on we'll give you a vote on something you want." And, sad to say, the Western delegations were wholly prepared to accommodate this charade with abstentions until the strongest possible representations were made by the U. S. State Department in their home capitals. In the end, even with Western support, we were beaten solidly. Another totalitarian resolution was entered in the UN books. But at least, for once, the West resisted the temptation to be an accomplice in its own

undoing, as it has done so frequently and out of politeness as much as anything else.

Now a small piece on selective morality. It is universally known how narrow is the Commission's range of human rights concerns -- in recent years, repeatedly, exclusively, obsessively, Chile, South Africa and Israel. There have been any number of well-documented cases against well-known offenders but never any action. This year the United States formally moved for studies or other action against three other countries. The Communists and the so-called non-aligned joined to vote overwhelmingly to drop all the cases. Our defeat was pre-ordained, coming after a spurious debate. The names of the countries and the content of the debate must, however, remain secret and the reasons for our defeat must also remain secret because the proceedings are decreed to be secret. Catch 22 on the international level. But it was reliably reported in the London Times that one of the problems was that the communications reflecting the violations were found to be too old, although under existing Commission procedures it was impossible for more current communications to be received! Then the Commission, in public session, declined to take up a simple amendment to cure this obvious procedural flaw. Immune to embarrassment, the arrogance

of the totalitarian is unlimited. And their string of victories unbroken. Even implementation of the vaunted Declaration on Torture, mandated by this fall's Session of the General Assembly, was gutted and action deferred for a year.

Some final odds and ends. In response to a suggestion from the United States that a powerful parliamentary majority should not proceed without regard and understanding for the minority viewpoint, we were read a lecture on democracy by those paragons of representative government, Egypt and Pakistan, and denounced as "anti-democratic" for suggesting that majority action could be arbitrary and tyrannical. A simple resolution affirming the principle of conscientious objection was attacked because it did not declare that conscientious objection was available to all if the State was conducting an aggressive war, and available to none if it was a war of national liberation. The resolution was thereupon postponed by its sponsor, the Austrian representative (a former Chairman of the Commission), who explained, sadly, that nothing of consequence can now be passed in the United Nations if it does not contain a denunciation of apartheid, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, racial discrimination, foreign occupation and collaborationism. The latter is the now criminal practice

of trading with the enemy -- South Africa today, no doubt others, like Israel, tomorrow. This jargon of condemnation, the representative explained, has become part of the official language of the UN. At the very end of the proceedings, after the Commission deferred, without vote, four formal proposals of the United States, we requested, indeed we virtually pleaded with, the Commission to vote on our last proposal, knowing we would lose but wanting at least one vote on a U. S. proposal. Request denied. Nothing can come to a vote that is not part of the majority's plan.

And so we conclude where we began -- with the majority's "plan". What is that plan? It is, I submit, to use the principles and procedures of the West in such a way as to distort them, eventually to undermine their legitimacy, ultimately to destroy them. Today Israel, tomorrow the West. The corollary of the majority's preference for the totalitarian style is their fear of freedom, particularly the principle that no government is legitimate that does not enjoy the regularly renewed consent of the governed, which is another way of saying that self-determination does not really exist if it does not survive its initial exercise.

There is a certain elegance in the plan's execution. First the conspirators take up one of our basic beliefs -- in the sanctity of life or tolerance or the elimination of racism. Next they use their numerical majority to promulgate, in some world body, a new official definition of what exactly that belief means or how it is to be applied. Zionism becomes racism; religion becomes intolerance. Wherever possible, they invert the meaning of our own words, and then use these transmogrified words to condemn us, to shake our convictions, to discredit our society, to make us believe that it is our own ideals that we betray. Thus the one state in the world established as a refuge from racism is attacked as the bastion of racism; the right of an individual to life becomes the right of a state to impoverish life.

And one can describe the conspiracy's tactics in even more detail. The distinguishing features are usually the same. Get the result accomplished as unobtrusively as possible. Do it in the dark. Do it quietly. Above all, don't let anyone find out until it is too late. Seize and hold the initiative. Take small steps. Place the formal initiative in the hands of ex-colonial countries, to take advantage of Western guilt. Make the big moves on the road, in nice forgotten places like Geneva, Kampala, Lima, or Mexico City, where there is a sleepy press corps

and no spectator interest. Score the big political firsts at technical level meetings, in the hope that Western technicians will not put up too much fight. And then, with all these small victories inscribed in six languages in UN documents, proceed to the General Assembly to confirm the victories before an isolated and disarrayed Western world. Be sure to keep pointing out to the West that it can't win. It hasn't the votes. By opposing one new abomination in the open, it will lose something else as well. To get along in this world, one has to go along. So go along. Accept the fact that the evil in the world is largely your fault.

The role we are asked to play in this plot is an extraordinary one, that of willing victim. For this is no ordinary conspiracy. If the victim is not willing, if the victim understands the end planned for him, he can frustrate its objectives. What we have to do is clear. The question is whether we have the will and energy to do it.

First, we have to be sure that all the intended victims -- primarily the industrial democracies -- understand and accept the fact that the life of the West is under serious attack. To the totalitarian, existence of free Western countries, alive with creative disorder, is anathema.

So long as we exist, we demonstrate that there is another way, a better way. It is no accident that after 60 years of tyranny the Soviet Union, potentially one of the richest nations on the planet, cannot feed its own people. How so inefficient a government could have been taken as a model for emulation, in its techniques, forms and practices even where communism itself has been scorned, must be one of the most astonishing occurrences of history -- unless we understand that what is important to the emulators is not the economic failure or success of the model but its deliberate creation of a subservient, loyal, and incurious population.

The Solzhenitsyns and Sakharovs, the dissenters from totalitarianism, and the lovers of freedom who live under tyrannies have said it often, and it can never be said too often; like plants growing in barren soil, without the light that falls on them from the West, they cannot survive. The rulers of the unfree world know that so long as the West continues united in freedom, their systems and their rule are endangered. So make no mistake about it; they are determined to pull us down. While we are free and strong, they cannot be free from fear.

Second, we have to be sure that this is a fight that takes place in the open, in words that people understand, not masked in the ambiguities of diplomatic

jargon. The best defense is strong and clear language. One small example: get the Commission on Human Rights back to New York where a vigilant public opinion can operate. Let nothing of substance pass unnoticed, unexplained, unanswered. Our adversaries know the superiority of our principles and beliefs, know what a threat these principles are to totalitarian governments, and know that they can only rob us of our beliefs if we fail to acknowledge what is happening to us, and fail to act. Most important, we and like-minded friends and allies must stand together, for we and they can only be destroyed if we permit ourselves to succumb one by one.

Third, we have to be sure that the enemies of freedom understand that there are no more willing victims, that we are not going to weaken ourselves, that we are going to affirm our fundamental values and not reject them. We should work to persuade those who help the attack on freedom, particularly the newer countries, that freedom is a safe thing, that an oppressive society eventually makes everyone a victim, that the protection of civil and political rights cannot be postponed indefinitely. We should make it clear -- first of all to ourselves -- that we will not let honest doubts about our acts at home and our role in the world degenerate into self-destructive

guilt under the goading of societies whose main dynamic is fear and envy of the West.

A final word.

These years have been troublesome ones for the United States. Political disillusion has compounded military defeat. Worst of all, the response to these events by entire segments of our leadership -- in the universities, in government, in business, in the press -- has ended by eroding the belief of Americans in the principles and ideas that make this country a unique -- and uniquely successful -- experiment in human society.

One can say our Bicentennial has come just in time -- but it is as much a time for alarm as celebration. The values that led to the founding of the United States and that have given this country its special place in history are everywhere under attack. Elementary freedoms are denied to the people of most of the world. Only a handful of governments rely on the consent of the governed. We must prize those that do and stimulate those that might. Few in this world agree with us that human rights and civil liberties take precedence over state policy. Those few that do are America's most precious allies, whatever their size.

It is an irony that in this downward drifting world, America must search for affirmation among her own people. But search she must, for our basic values are threatened, and it will take a fighting defense to preserve them from internal detractors and external enemies. We have been fearless in exposing America's faults. All to the good. Now let us begin to put some of our energy and intelligence to work advocating America's virtues.

