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Draft Joint Program Plan Propositions

For Action of NJCRAC Plenum, February 16-19, 1986

(The Plenum will discuss only those propositions with which member agencies disagree and have so advised NJCRAC in writing by February 3, 1986.)

ISRAEL PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION 1 IS: Israel and the Middle East - U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS

Changing Conditions: The relationship between the United States and Israel, which the U.S. government has described as mutually beneficial, continues to grow into one characterized by an extraordinary degree of cooperation and trust. The relationship is likely to continue along this path for the foreseeable future.

Background: The United States and Israel have embarked on new ventures which enhance and deepen the degree of cooperation between them. The Free Trade Agreement of 1985 enables each nation greater access to the other's markets and should prove beneficial to both economies. Similarly, the Strategic Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1981, provides the United States with secure military access in a troubled and volatile region of vital importance to American national interests.

Under the coalition agreement reached following Israel's July 1984 election, the National Unity government will transfer its leadership to Yitzhak Shamir in October, 1986. Given the good working relationships which Mr. Shamir established with American officials during his previous term as Prime Minister, the scheduled transfer of the Prime Ministership is not likely to have significant impact upon the overall contours of U.S.-Israel relations.

The only major difficulty to arise between the United States and Israel during 1985 emerged in the wake of the arrest of an American naval intelligence official who was charged with unauthorized passage of classified information to Israeli diplomats. Both nations moved quickly to minimize potential damage to their relationship, and it is expected that temporary frictions will be overcome.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to emphasize that Israel is the United States' most reliable strategic ally in the Middle East and should continue to receive American political, moral and economic support;
- encourage increased people-to-people exchanges between Israel and the United States through tourism, leadership missions, and academic, cultural and scientific exchanges.

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PROPOSITION 2 IS: Israel and the Middle East - U.S. FOREIGN AID

Changing Conditions: The Administration and Congress continue to be favorably disposed to assist Israel in achieving economic recovery. However, enactment of the Gramm-Rudman balanced budget legislation may have ramifications on the amount of the foreign aid package.

Background: Despite intense budgetary pressures, Congress's approval of the Administration's package of \$1.8 billion in defense and \$1.2 billion in economic grant aid to Israel during Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, along with supplemental grants of \$750 million in both years, demonstrated the U.S. government's nearly universal recognition of Israel's status as a strategic ally and of the need to provide assistance to its economic recovery plan. Strong bipartisan support was also manifested for a proposal introduced by Senators Inouye and Kasten to reduce interest on outstanding U.S. loans to Israel, which amount to approximately \$1 billion per year. The proposal was withdrawn in return for a commitment by Secretary of State Shultz that in 1986 the Administration would submit legislation providing for across-the-board reductions in interest rates for all recipients of foreign aid loans. This commitment is consistent with the Administration's previous revision of the foreign aid process so as to provide aid in the form of grants only, in recognition of the overwhelming debt burdens of most recipient countries. These welcome developments have been clouded by the as yet undetermined impact of the Gramm-Rudman balanced budget legislation. This measure, designed to reduce the nation's federal deficit by 1991, provides that in the event Congress and the President cannot agree on budget packages which meet predetermined ceilings, automatic across-the-board cuts will be made in appropriations according to formulas set forth in the legislation. Since foreign aid is not exempt from the legislation's provisions, assistance to Israel may be affected.

While the recent appropriation assures that foreign aid to Israel will not be the occasion for Congressional action for another two years, Arab Americans lobbied against the legislation and their anti-Israel aid campaign is not expected to abate, despite its notable lack of success or public impact.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to interpret to the Administration, Congress and the American people the reasons why assistance to Israel is in America's national interest;
- support measures to reduce interest payments on foreign aid loans;
- continue to monitor and develop appropriate responses to media campaigns directed against U.S. aid to Israel.

PROPOSITION 3 IS: Israel and the Middle East - U.S. ARMS SALES TO ARAB COUNTRIES

Changing Conditions: Congress, by overwhelmingly agreeing in 1985 the sale of sophisticated American arms to Jordan, appeared to establish the principle that Arab countries must enter into direct and meaningful negotiations with Israel before such sales will be authorized. In agreeing to defer its proposed sale to Jordan, the Administration accepted this position.

Background: In response to President Reagan's formal notification of the Administration's request for an authorization to sell \$1.6-1.9 billion of sophisticated arms to Jordan, Congress, by overwhelming majorities in both the Senate and House of Representatives, took the position that the sale would be disallowed unless the Administration withdrew it. In taking this stance, Congress appeared to establish the principle that it will approve future arms sales to Jordan only if Jordan is engaged in "direct and meaningful negotiations" with Israel. Congress's action moves in the direction, long advocated by the Jewish community relations field, that American arms should be sold only to those Arab states that have concluded peace treaties with Israel. The President's unwillingness to withdraw his proposal indicates that the Administration has not yet abandoned those considerations which in the past have led it and previous administrations to propose other arms sales.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- oppose the sale of sophisticated American arms to any Arab state not actively engaged in direct and meaningful negotiations with Israel.

(NOTE: During 1986, Congress and the Jewish community will face two critical tests: (1) renewed Congressional consideration of the Jordan arms package; and (2) final determination as to whether or not Saudi Arabia has met the conditions previously set forth for final delivery of the AWACS. The Executive Committee or the Plenum will make the ultimate judgment on the wording of this proposition.)

PROPOSITION 4 IS: Israel and the Middle East: THE PEACE PROCESS

Changing Conditions: Greater diplomatic activity than at any time since the late 1970s was devoted last year to initiating direct talks between Israel and Jordan. Israel again demonstrated its willingness to be flexible in accommodating some of the procedural preconditions set forth by Jordan in order to undertake direct peace negotiations. However, the obstacle to peace continues to be the unwillingness of Jordan and other Arab states to come to the negotiating table.

Background: Nineteen eighty-five saw an intensified round of diplomatic initiatives designed to bring about direct peace talks between Jordan and Israel. While serving to produce some favorable media comment about Jordan's and Egypt's roles as "moderates" in the Middle East conflict, consultations involving President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, Assistant Secretary Murphy, Prime Minister Peres, King Hussein, President Mubarak, and PLO chief Yasser Arafat yielded little that was positive or substantive in moving the Arab side toward direct peace negotiations.

Indeed, in some respects events declared indicative of movement toward peace talks often evaporated within days after being proclaimed. Despite the fact that it once again generated a flurry of intimations about readiness to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242, the PLO continued to reject it. Hussein's insistence on coordinating Jordan's moves with the PLO, despite such continual reversals and embarrassments created by Arafat, has caused the monarch to deadlock his own proposals.

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Searching for ways to gain acceptance for his proposals, Hussein reopened diplomatic relations with Egypt during 1984, hoping that the only Arab state to have a peace treaty with Israel would, in return for Jordan's restoration of its status in the Arab world, exercise leverage with the United States and Israel. President Mubarak's reiteration of support for the PLO and Arafat as essential partners in the peace has served only to stalemate further Jordan's advance toward the negotiating table, and to underscore Egypt's ambivalence about its relationship with Israel and about its role as a force for peace and moderation in the Middle East conflict.

In marked contrast to the actions of Jordan and Egypt, Israel has demonstrated increasing readiness to be flexible in meeting a number of key demands set forth by Jordan as preconditions for opening direct negotiations. Reiterating his government's readiness to meet King Hussein without setting any preconditions, Prime Minister Peres used the occasion of an address before the UN General Assembly in October, 1985 to respond to Hussein's call for talks under UN Security Council auspices. Israel, the Prime Minister declared, welcomed the support of the Council's five permanent members for direct Israeli-Jordanian negotiations--an indication that Israel was willing to search for a way to accommodate a key precondition of Hussein's while still preserving Israel's insistence (with respect to a Soviet or Chinese role in the peace process) that other parties involved in negotiations must have diplomatic relations with Israel. (On this point, too, Israel demonstrated flexibility. Prior to the November, 1985 U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, Prime Minister Peres indicated that if the USSR allowed Soviet Jews to emigrate, Israel would be ready to accommodate Soviet participation in the peace process without pressing the USSR to restore diplomatic relations.) The critical element is that whatever international arrangement is utilized, it must immediately lead to direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan. Israel's government is also open to the active participation of a Palestinian delegation in such negotiations so long as such a delegation does not include members of the PLO.

In sum, Israel remains ready to find grounds upon which to move the peace process forward with Jordan. For his part, however, Jordan's monarch seems as yet unable to understand that his articulation of an intention to negotiate with Israel is no substitute for the actual act of negotiation.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to support and interpret to the American public the reasons why the United States insists that any Middle East negotiations must take the form of direct, bilateral talks between Israel and each of its neighbors;
- continue to interpret to the American public the reasons why the United States refuses to deal with the PLO;
- interpret to the U.S. government and the American people that King Hussein holds the key to Middle East peace negotiations, and that his continued insistence that the PLO be accorded a role in the peace process serves only to block progress toward negotiations;
- highlight Israel's flexibility on details of preconditions demanded by King Hussein for opening negotiations, especially as demonstrated in Israel's readiness to accommodate in some fashion participation by Palestinians and support by the international community.

PROPOSITION 5 IS: Israel and the Middle East - THE PLO

Changing Conditions: Despite increasing recognition that the PLO commitment to terrorism is a fundamental and immutable element of its nature, the Arab states and a significant number of western European governments continue to invest the PLO with the status of "the legitimate representative of the Palestinians," and therefore an essential participant in any Middle East peace negotiations.

Background: Revelations of the PLO's complicity in planning and carrying out the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro provided graphic confirmation that the PLO remains fundamentally committed to terrorism despite attempts to portray itself as pursuing its ends through peaceful, diplomatic initiatives. When pressed by Jordan and Egypt to repair damage to the PLO's image wrought by the Achille Lauro incident, PLO chief Yaser Arafat issued a statement in Cairo that, invoking a pledge made in 1974--but never observed--the PLO would not conduct attacks against civilians outside of Israel. Apart from being a bald reassertion of the PLO's commitment to the use of terror against Israelis--no Israeli civilians, including children, are innocents, according to the PLO Covenant--two days later Arafat declared to the Arab press during a visit in Abu Dhabi that his statement was merely intended to placate adverse western reactions to the Achille Lauro affair.

The United States sees the PLO for the terrorist organization it is and remains the only major western nation to have a clear, firm policy rejecting any recognition of the PLO until it accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognizes Israel's right to exist, and unequivocally renounces terrorism. France, however, continues to reaffirm its support for a PLO role in the peace process; and even after the attack on the Achille Lauro, one of Italy's merchant ships, that nation's prime minister was willing to weather a cabinet crisis in order to reiterate his belief that the PLO's use of violence was legitimate.

So long as Arab states, including Jordan and Egypt, continue to sanction the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians," they will continue to give the PLO a virtual veto over any peace process. Such a posture suggests the unwillingness or unreadiness of Arab governments to make concrete steps toward peace with Israel.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- expose attempts to characterize Arafat and the PLO as "moderate";
- educate the public about the true terrorist and intransigent nature of the PLO and its factions.

PROPOSITION 6 IS: Israel and the Middle East - KAHANEISM

Changing Conditions: Members of Israel's government and Israelis in general have demonstrated increasing recognition of the need for programs to improve relationships between the Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel. This need has been brought home particularly by the findings of public opinion surveys conducted in Israel which attest to the small but troubling expressions of sympathy and support for the anti-Arab policies advocated by Meir Kahane.

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Background: The continuing pressures of dislocation upon Israel, created by unremitting war and terrorism, political isolation, and economic difficulty, were manifest in disturbing increases of support for anti-Arab policies advocated by Meir Kahane. The Brooklyn-born founder of the Jewish Defense League, Kahane is now a member of Israel's Knesset after receiving barely 1% (approximately 26,000) of the votes cast in Israel's 1984 general elections. He now takes advantage of his parliamentary status to seek legitimation of his goal of expelling all Arabs from Israel, the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza. Alleging that Judaism and democracy are incompatible, Kahane seeks to appeal to the fears and insecurities of Israelis, particularly those born since the 1967 war, whose attitudes toward the possibilities of Arab-Jewish coexistence have hardened.

During the past year, Israel's government and all the nation's major political parties, along with major American Jewish organizations, have forcefully repudiated such policies and supported measures to reinforce the democratic and pluralistic character of the State of Israel. A growing number of citizen groups and universities within Israel are now finding increased demand for their intercultural education programs designed to foster better understanding and relationships among the nation's Jewish and Arab citizens. In the wake of Meir Kahane's demagogic activities, Education Minister Yitzhak Navon has inaugurated meetings with these groups to indicate the government's support for and encouragement of their work. Their work follows traditions established by the founders and early leaders of the Zionist movement, including Theodor Herzl, and Israel's Prime Ministers beginning with David Ben-Gurion.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to speak out forcefully against Meir Kahane's policies and anti-democratic forces in Israel;
- encourage programs launched by the government and private groups in Israel to counter anti-democratic forces which seek to abridge the civil rights of Israel's Arab citizens;
- interpret to the American Jewish community the dangers of Kahaneism;
- interpret to the American public the efforts being undertaken in Israel to maintain the pluralistic, democratic nature of that country.

JEWISH SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION 7 JS: Jewish Security and Individual Freedom - ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Changing Conditions: The activities of extremist groups in the nation's farm belt and positive responses to Louis Farrakhan in America's black community run counter to the long-term decline of anti-Semitism during the past four decades and are a matter for intense national concern. Nevertheless, the status and security of American Jews remain strong.

Background: Extremists in the midwest are attempting to exploit severe economic conditions among farmers in order to advance an anti-Semitic and racist agenda. In many cases members of groups such as Aryan Nations, Pesse Comitatus, The Order, and the Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord seek to convert farmers to their movements by preaching a theology which holds that Jews are in reality "children of Satan." Of special concern are the violent actions committed by some of these movements' members. State and federal law enforcement officers have been killed while attempting to arrest or question group leaders, and the existence of a "hit list" containing names of prominent Jewish figures was revealed during the trial of an extremist leader accused of murdering a Denver radio talk show host who was Jewish.

Federal authorities have moved aggressively to prosecute extremists for violent acts and many state government and national church, farm and labor organization leaders and the news media have been swift to reject these groups and expose the dangers they pose. The degree to which anti-Semitic extremists have made inroads among America's midwest farm belt population is uncertain. Questions have been raised as to whether local law enforcement officers been sufficiently vigorous in prosecuting extremist violence. There is also concern that local elected officials in rural areas of the plains states have not been sufficiently vigilant in challenging the rise of extremist political movements in their midst. (NOTE: NJCRAC has established a committee to examine farm-belt anti-Semitism. The committee will have met prior to the Plenary Session.)

Equally disturbing has been the response to Louis Farrakhan during his nationwide tour of major American cities during 1985. The Jewish community is concerned that Farrakhan may be contributing to a spreading of anti-Semitic attitudes in the black community. (NOTE: The proposition on "Black-Jewish Relations" addresses these developments and related strategic goals more fully.)

These uses of anti-Semitism to appeal to key groups in American society represent disturbing developments which bear close scrutiny and firm responses. However, judged according to criteria long established to assess the degree of danger anti-Semitic activities pose to American Jews, the Jewish community relations field believes that recent responses to extremist leaders in the nation's midwestern and black communities do not reflect a national rise of anti-Jewish attitudes and actions.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to encourage law enforcement agencies to prosecute vigorously anti-Semitic extremists who commit violent crimes;
- continue to assess the depth and breadth of inroads anti-Semitic extremists have made in gaining support among farm belt residents;
- encourage member agencies to convene meetings with local public officials, civic and religious groups, law enforcement agencies, news media and agricultural college officials to discuss appropriate ways to curtail the activities and impact of anti-Semitic extremists;
- develop guidelines regarding campus appearances by extremist spokespersons.

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PROPOSITION 8 JS: Jewish Security and Individual Freedom - ANTI-ZIONISM

Changing Conditions: Well-founded concern among Jews that expressions of anti-Zionism are used to cloak anti-Semitic attitudes and actions have not proven to be a major problem in the United States. While such manifestations have been noted on the nation's campuses, the media and public opinion reject anti-Zionism as a legitimate category of political belief or opinion. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in western Europe, Africa and Latin America.

Background: The final document adopted by the UN End of Decade of Women Conference, held in Nairobi, Kenya during the summer of 1985, reflected none of the anti-Zionist references contained in previous statements; indeed, the entire conference, including both the official sessions and their parallel non-governmental forums, were marred by far less anti-Zionist rhetoric than most close observers had expected. That this was so was attributable to two factors: extensive coordination among American Jewish women in preparing for participation at the gathering; and the firm resolve of the official American delegation to accept no such conduct or language in the final document. This stance on the part of the American representatives was an outgrowth of a policy established under President Ford, and subsequently adhered to by Presidents Carter and Reagan, to grant no legitimacy to the doctrines of anti-Zionism propounded by the Soviet Union and other supporters of the PLO cause. Indeed, in November, 1985, on the tenth anniversary of the UN's adoption of its anti-Zionist resolution, President Reagan announced that the U.S. delegation to that international body will seek to have the resolution rescinded.

In similar fashion, American public opinion and the media have rejected the notion of anti-Zionism as either a meaningless category of political discourse, or a codeword for anti-Semitism, which remains in wide disrepute. On college campuses anti-Zionism manifests itself among ineffective political fringe groups.

This is not the case, however, in many nations throughout western Europe, Latin America and Africa. There, active Communist parties, the presence of PLO officials, and the existence of or sympathy for Third-World liberation movements or ideologies combine to ensure the injection and diffusion of the anti-Zionist ideology into the media, student political activity and, in some cases, official government policy.

Thus, while American Jews remain relatively unscathed by the impact of anti-Zionism, the security of Jewish communities abroad, depending upon their particular locations, are more vulnerable to its insidious manifestations.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- encourage the United States to analyze the changing nature of alliances within other international forums in order to utilize opportunities to block promulgation of or to secure rejection and repudiation of anti-Zionist statements;
- support the United States government in pursuing diplomatic initiatives that encourage other governments to move away from supporting anti-Zionism in their international diplomacy;
- encourage the United States to seek support from other western nations in its campaign to convince the United Nations to rescind its infamous anti-Zionist resolution.

PROPOSITION 9 JS: Jewish Security and Individual Freedom - ATTACKS ON SUPREME COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Changing Condition: The Attorney General has opened a major debate about U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights' protections of individual freedoms. Congressional legislators and civil liberties and civil rights advocates have expressed concern that the Administration is seeking to reinterpret or reverse landmark Supreme Court decisions not only through advocacy but through its authority to nominate federal judges.

Background: In speeches to bar associations and other civic groups during 1985, Attorney General Edwin Meese took exception to landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions protecting individual rights. He challenged as "intellectually shaky" Court rulings holding that the Fourteenth Amendment obligates states to apply the Bill of Rights in their legislation and administration of justice. He described as "somewhat bizarre" recent decisions upholding separation of church and state, and challenged the Court's Miranda ruling requiring law enforcement officials to inform individuals of their constitutional rights before conducting interrogations. Justices William Brennan and John Paul Stevens took the unusual step of publicly disagreeing with Mr. Meese's comments. Both observed that the Attorney General's opinions are at wide variance with accepted understandings about these matters.

The Court's decisions and the legal principles with which the Attorney General disagreed have long been supported by the Jewish community relations field as cornerstones for protecting and advancing pluralism, civil liberties and civil rights and good intergroup relations in the United States. Should the Attorney General's views become accepted policy regarding the way the nation's laws are enforced, radical shifts could take place in a variety of constitutional protections of individual freedom. In this regard, the Attorney General's views represent a radical departure from a consensus about these issues established during the past forty years, and it is the views of constitutional interpreters such as Justices Brennan and Stevens which serve to conserve this consensus.

An unusually high number of vacancies in the federal judiciary provides the Administration with opportunities to appoint judges who share the Attorney General's positions. In the past it has been the practice of the Executive and Legislative branches to screen, nominate and appoint federal judges on the basis of legal and scholarly qualifications rather than political ideologies. However, in November, 1985 half of the nominees considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee had received the lowest positive rating given by the American Bar Association. Such professional peer judgments raise questions about whether the Administration, in making such nominations, is attempting to evade or subvert a well-established understanding about criteria for filling judicial posts in order to place on the federal bench appointees whose primary qualification to serve is ideological agreement with the Attorney General's criticisms of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Bill of Rights' individual freedom protections.

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Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- conduct educational programs drawing upon long-standing U.S. Supreme Court decisions which buttress the Jewish community's concerns about maintaining individual freedoms in a pluralistic society, and which interpret the dangers the Attorney General's views present to such protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights;
- assess concerns about the Administration's nominations procedures regarding federal judiciary posts in order to determine whether such procedures constitute threats to the traditional independence of the judiciary and to individual freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights;
- examine such assessments with a view toward formulating criteria for offering recommendations regarding nominations to federal judiciary posts.

PROPOSITION 10 JS: Jewish Security and Individual Freedom - CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Changing Conditions: During 1985 lawmakers in the State of Michigan narrowly defeated legislation calling for a Constitutional Convention to adopt an amendment mandating a balanced federal budget. The last state to pass such a call was Missouri, in 1983. Approval by only two more states is needed for a convention to be convened. The chances that such approval may be forthcoming are enhanced by the fact that virtually all state legislatures will meet early in 1987.

Background: Enactment of the Gramm-Rudman legislation to balance federal budgets has undermined the rationale for convening a Constitutional Convention to pass an amendment requiring such action. Nevertheless, convention advocates continue to press their call. Continuing pressure for a convention to consider a balanced budget amendment suggests that some of its proponents are seeking to use a convention to institute other constitutional revisions, such as banning abortion or mandating school prayer, which have previously failed to muster state legislative approval. Legal scholars believe that were a Constitutional Convention convened its deliberations could not be limited solely to consideration of the proposal upon which the call was based. The convention could conceivably make wholesale revisions in existing constitutional protections of individual freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to interpret to state legislators in states which have not passed a call for a Constitutional Convention the dangers inherent in such action;
- continue interpretive efforts in states which have passed such legislation in order to seek revocation of approval for a Constitutional Convention.

PROPOSITION 11 JS: Jewish Security and Individual Freedom -
RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE

Changing Conditions: While the 99th Congress has been unreceptive to a Constitutional amendment prohibiting or restricting abortion, the Administration and anti-abortion advocates continue to press measures that would narrow reproductive choice by seeking to overturn the Supreme Court's landmark Roe v. Wade decision and by sponsoring legislation to curtail family planning services.

Background: In 1985 the House Appropriations Committee defeated a proposal sponsored by Representative Jack Kemp and Senator Orrin Hatch to prohibit family planning clinics receiving federal funds from using non-federal funds to perform abortions, provide abortion counseling, or refer women to abortion clinics. Since existing legislation already prohibits direct use of federal family planning funds to provide abortions, the Kemp-Hatch proposal represented an extension of anti-abortion legislative advocacy into the domestic family planning policy arena. The tactic of attaching anti-abortion riders to appropriations and non-related bills has disrupted consideration of vital legislation, such as the Civil Rights Restoration Act.

The Administration continues to enter amici briefs in appeals of lower court decisions regarding regulation of abortion and family planning services, seeking to persuade the Court to overturn its ruling in Roe v. Wade. It appears unlikely that the current Court will reverse itself in this respect. However, if the Court upholds state laws being challenged in two pending cases--Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians, and Diamond v. Charles--the effect will be to discourage women from seeking family planning and abortion services.

(Thornburg concerns a Pennsylvania law requiring physicians to keep certain records for the state and to give women seeking abortion specified information concerning risks and alternatives. Diamond challenges an Illinois statute mandating physicians who prescribe contraceptives that prevent development of fertilized ova to tell patients such drugs cause fetal death. In previous rulings against these laws, federal appellate courts held that both laws require doctors to endorse the state's theory of life.)

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to oppose attempts in Congress and state legislatures to restrict the right to reproductive choice, whether through constitutional amendment or other forms of legislation;
- support federal and state legislative action to make the full range of reproductive choice options available to all women, including Medicaid funding for abortion;
- oppose efforts to withhold federal and state funding for agencies supporting family planning services;
- undertake efforts to educate the Jewish and non-Jewish communities to better understand the traditional Jewish reverence for the sanctity of life, while at the same time reiterating support for freedom of reproductive choice.

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PROPOSITION 12 JS: Jewish Security and Individual Freedom - CENSORSHIP

Changing Conditions: Textbooks edited to meet fundamentalist objections about treatments of evolution have been rejected by two major state educational systems.

Background: In September, 1985 California's statewide Board of Education rejected all textbooks submitted by four nationally respected publishers after a review panel found the books had "systematically omitted" thorough discussions of evolution in order to avoid controversy. Announcing the Board's decision, the state's Superintendent of Public Instruction observed that the decision was based on adverse evaluations of the 20 textbooks' educational quality, of which their treatment of evolution was an example. The state's Board of Education is evaluating all texts in a similar light. Education experts observed that California's decision was significant since texts accepted there are often adopted by other states and school districts across the nation. The state school board in Texas, another major textbook market, has begun to resist pressures from self-appointed censorship groups to adopt or reject certain texts because of depictions of evolution and other topics.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- encourage state and local boards of education, where appropriate, to apply similar standards of educational quality in adopting school textbooks, and to reject texts edited to meet censorship demands made by rightwing and fundamentalist groups;
- encourage pluralistic-minded parents and civic groups to support decisions by educators and textbook publishers to resist censorship efforts of such groups.

ENERGY PROPOSITION

PROPOSITION 13 EN: ENERGY

Changing Conditions: Despite OPEC's attempts to perpetuate its power over its members' production of oil and thereby maintain high prices, increases in production by non-OPEC nations have caused the petroleum cartel to lose its control over prices. As a result, prices are falling and are expected to continue to do so.

Background: Due to conservation measures taken by businesses and individuals in response to the steep increase in prices a decade ago, there has been a marked reduction in oil consumption since 1979. Yet even at these reduced consumption rates, the percentage of foreign oil consumed by the United States rose to approximately 30% in 1985. Moreover, our nation's domestic oil reserves continue to decline in comparison to the world's total reserves. The long-range outlook is that U.S. dependence on foreign energy will grow, rather than diminish, unless preventive measures are taken.

If the United States permits current reductions in prices to be passed along to consumers, consumption is likely to increase. This is what OPEC wants because increased consumption would absorb current overproduction of oil and thus help OPEC regain its leverage over prices. But if Congress and the Administration take advantage of the glut to impose a tax on cheaper oil, incentives to conserve energy would be maintained, and OPEC's cartel power would be kept at low ebb. Moreover, an oil import tax, in the form of a \$10 levy added to every barrel of foreign oil, would produce an estimated \$40 billion a year in revenues, thereby helping to achieve the goal of balancing the federal budget.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to seek policies to lessen American energy dependence, particularly on Persian Gulf oil, by taking advantage of OPEC price reductions through:
 - promotion of energy conservation;
 - seeking Congressional enactment of a \$10 per barrel fee on imported oil;
 - increasing daily deposits in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve;
 - development of additional alternative energy sources.

CHURCH-STATE AND INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONSHIPS PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION 14 CS: Church-State and Interreligious Relationships - RELIGION AND PUBLIC POLICY

Changing Conditions: Although thwarted by a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the drive to secure legislation and judicial support for aid to religiously-related institutions and public sanction for displays of religiously-related symbols was manifested in Congress's moving closer toward adopting a constitutional amendment permitting silent prayer in public schools. Pressure for passage of such legislation can be expected to increase with the approach of Congressional mid-term elections in November, 1986.

Background: Recent Supreme Court decisions in cases such as Aguilar v. Felton, Jaffree v. Wallace, and Grand Rapids v. Ball have reaffirmed previous rulings barring prayer in public schools and limiting public aid to religiously-related schools. While Congress has previously indicated unwillingness to sanction a constitutional amendment to permit vocal prayer in the public schools or to enact legislation stripping federal courts of their jurisdiction over such church-state issues, Congress has been willing to vote in favor of measures such as equal access and silent prayer or meditation in public schools. Thus, the Supreme Court's recent rulings have triggered calls by members of Congress for passage of a constitutional amendment permitting such prayer. The Administration has also proposed legislative enactment of an educational voucher system that could be used toward tuition payments to religiously-related schools.

The Jewish community relations field has long opposed silent meditation as a subterfuge for introducing school prayer, explicitly banned by the courts. Although any student can, at any time, pray or meditate silently, institutionalizing either meditation or prayer in public school settings fosters what is in fact a religious exercise.

The Administration's educational voucher proposal revives a form of aid to religiously-related schools which the Jewish community relations field has long opposed, and was expressed in NJCRAC's Joint Program Plans of 1970-71 through 1972-73. Under the Administration's plan put forth in response to the Supreme Court's 1985 ruling in Aguilar, approximately \$3.2 billion of Chapter I Federal Education Aid Program funds targeted to disadvantaged children would be

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converted into vouchers of approximately \$600 annually which would be made available to parents of five million children now eligible for such assistance. These vouchers could be used to pay for tuition in private schools or for remedial programs in the public schools. The Jewish community relations field has long held that vouchers provide a form of federal aid to religiously-related schools. It would also drain resources from schools most in need of additional funds to educate disadvantaged children.

In view of growing sentiment in Congress for enactment of a silent prayer measure, as well as the Administration's educational voucher proposal in response to Court decisions against aid to religiously-related schools, church-state issues are likely to be a major focus of many Congressional midterm election contests in November, 1986.

Religious displays, such as creches and menorahs, erected on public property continue to remain a subject for public policy controversy. Supreme Court rulings rendered during 1984-85 were of a nature that did not set clear precedents. In its non-decision in the McCreary case, concerning the Village of Scarsdale's denial that a private group be allowed to erect a creche on public park property, the Court rendered a 4-4 vote without issuing a ruling. Thus, without setting a precedent for application to other similar situations, the Court, by virtue of its deadlocked vote, allowed that particular creche to stand. Even the Court's 5-4 decision in its Lynch ruling, upholding the City of Pawtucket's use of municipal funds to purchase and display a creche, leaves many questions open about the legal status of other public displays of religious symbols. (NOTE: See the 1984-85 Joint Program Plan for fuller explanations of these rulings.)

The Jewish community relations field continues to press its opposition to displays of religious symbols on public property through litigation and advocacy. These challenges are consistent with the Jewish community relations field's long-held view that such placements of religious symbols on public property contravene the principle of separation of church and state.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to oppose school prayer amendments to the Constitution, including those permitting silent prayer;
- continue to support litigation and public advocacy that opposes public sanction of displays of religious symbols on public property;
- conduct educational programs interpreting the Jewish community's stake in opposing placement of religious symbols on public property, including menorahs;
- continue to interpret the Jewish community's objections to government aid to religiously-related schools in the form of direct grants, vouchers, or tuition tax credits;
- continue to monitor the implementation and impact of equal access in public school districts.

PROPOSITION 15 CS: Church-State and Interreligious Relationships:
JEWISH-CATHOLIC RELATIONS

Changing Conditions: Statements issued by the Vatican on matters related to the Second Vatican Council's impact on the Roman Catholic Church since 1965 generated questions within the Jewish community about future progress in Jewish-Catholic dialogue.

Background: The Vatican's publication of "Notes on the Correct Way to Present Jews and Judaism in Preaching and Catechesis in the Roman Catholic Church" occurred as Jews and Catholics throughout the world together marked the 20th anniversary of the Second Vatican Council's papal encyclical "Nostra Aetate," and as an extraordinary synod of bishops met in Rome to consider Vatican II's impact on the Church.

The "Notes" were intended to restate the Church's key understandings about grounds for dialogue with Jews. Among its positive aspects are its mention of the State of Israel (the first in an official Vatican document), its reaffirmation of Christian responsibility in the Holocaust, and its reassertion that Judaism is a living tradition of faith. However, there is concern that the "Notes" referred to Israel only as a theological, rather than a political, homeland for the Jewish people; reasserted that the Catholic Church is the all-embracing means of salvation; and contained no call to Christians to consider the Holocaust as a challenge to their faith. Responding to these concerns, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations has offered different interpretations of these passages, and has welcomed discussion about them as opportunities to renew dialogue on theological and social topics. Moreover, the bishops, in their final report of their synod, reaffirmed that the Church "denies nothing which is true and holy in other non-Christian religions," leavening some concerns about the "Notes."

The Vatican's reassessment of the impact of the Second Vatican Council will generate considerable discussion among Catholic clergy and laity, and between Jews and Catholics during the coming year.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- seek appropriate occasions for dialogue with Catholic clergy and laity to explore the import of the "Notes" and the 1985 Vatican Synod as part of ongoing efforts to advance Jewish-Catholic understanding.

CONTINUING AND URGENT: Church-State and Interreligious Relationships

Proselytizing Activities

Proselytizing activities by a variety of missionary groups, primarily certain Protestant groups, in the U.S. as well as Israel, are increasing. Continuing proselytizing activity by cults and cult-like groups is particularly distressing to the Jewish community. It has led to growing cooperation on the local level between the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish communities, both clergy

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and laity, on counteracting such activities. The Jewish community relations field should conduct a broad-based educational campaign within the Jewish community about the danger of proselytizing missionary groups, and groups that engage in cult-like activity, including information about the various groups and ways to refute them; encourage development of outreach efforts in local communities to increase the Jewish identity among those who might otherwise be vulnerable to the appeal of missionaries; encourage interreligious statements deploring the deceptive nature of proselytizing groups which claim to be both Jewish and Christian at the same time; and foster awareness by appropriate Jewish agencies of needed services that are being provided to youth, the elderly and others, by proselytizing groups.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION 16 SEJ: Social and Economic Justice - FEDERAL POLICY AND POVERTY

Changing Conditions: Despite general national economic recovery from the 1981-83 recession, the number of Americans living in poverty remains at near-record levels. The federal government, led by the Administration and supported by Congress, continues a pattern established four years ago of paring funding for domestic social programs. Enactment of the Gramm-Rudman balanced budget legislation is likely to accelerate this pattern.

Background: The nation's economic recovery has had only modest impact on America's poor. In 1983, U.S. Census Bureau data reported that 15.3% of Americans--35 million people--lived at or below the official poverty line. In 1984, despite declines in unemployment rates, Census Bureau statistics revealed only a modest 0.9% drop in the poverty rate. In other words, 14.4% of the population--or 33.7 million Americans (4.5 million more than when President Reagan took office in 1981)--did not participate in the economic recovery. Among those who remain in poverty are 13.1% of all American families, 34.4% of female-headed families, 21.3% (or one in five) of children under the age of 18, and 33.8% of the nation's black population.

Action to ameliorate poverty's impact was overridden by consensus among the Administration and Congress that reducing the national deficit and balancing the federal budget, rather than restoring cuts in human services programs, should take priority in decisions about national expenditures. Thus, the Gramm-Rudman legislation mandates annually decreasing ceilings for federal budgets until 1991. Across-the-board spending cuts, half in defense and half in domestic programs, will automatically be imposed if Congress and the White House cannot agree on an appropriate package that meets each year's budget reduction target, or if Congress and the Administration cannot agree on tax increases that satisfy the bill's deficit ceilings. Certain key anti-poverty human services programs will remain exempt from such automatic cuts. These include Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the Women, Infant and Children (WIC) nutrition program, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), food stamps, and child nutrition. It should be noted that these programs have already been substantively reduced since 1981. Medicare, will be subject to reductions not to exceed 1% in 1986 and 2% thereafter, with the decreases to come from whatever cost-of-living raises are to be provided for that year.

While this legislation protects these key elements, its effect will be to increase pressures to reduce further, or even eliminate, other programs vital in responding to the needs of those living in or struggling to escape poverty; to cities' attempts to house and educate the poor; and to middle class Americans who rely upon education, health and other social programs to maintain their economic independence and productivity.

When tax reform was originally taken up in Congress, there was concern that these vital services might be severely affected by the proposals then being advocated by the Administration. The original proposal would have seriously limited the deduction for charitable contributions. Some of the concerns voiced by non-profit voluntary agencies which provide vital services have been met in the bill enacted by the House, although there still remain problems that could adversely affect charitable giving. Concerns were also raised that elimination of the federal deduction for state and local taxes would have a chilling effect on state and local government services supported by these taxes. The House bill has been responsive to this concern and has maintained the deductions. The Senate is now considering this bill, and it is uncertain how these provisions will fare.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- oppose budget reductions that further curtail or eliminate vital social and economic programs that alleviate the plight of the poor, the unemployed and our nation's cities, and which assist the middle class to become and remain productive;
- interpret to Congress and the American people that further reductions in domestic and defense appropriations are not the sole means by which federal budget ceilings need be reached;
- undertake programs to reawaken the nation's awareness that severe economic and social problems still exist;
- interpret to the Jewish community the extent and impact of unemployment and rising poverty in the general and Jewish communities;
- urge Congress to adopt a comprehensive national attack on unemployment, reflecting the goals of the Emergency Jobs Program of the Full Employment Action Council (See: 1984-85 Joint Program Plan, page 37), and encourage public-private to provide job training and permanent job opportunities in the private sector;
- forge coalitions with social service agency networks to secure these goals.

PROPOSITION 17 SEJ: Social and Economic Justice - CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT

Changing Conditions: Enforcement of federal civil laws rights continues to erode under the Reagan Administration. While Congress has been increasingly concerned about the Administration's posture on civil rights, civil rights issues have not been given high priority on the legislative agenda.

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Background: The Administration's posture on civil rights enforcement was reflected in its proposal to revise Executive Order 11246, and in its decision to submit an amicus brief concerning a voting rights case being heard before the U.S. Supreme Court. The proposed revision of the Executive Order, originally signed by President Johnson in 1965, would have eliminated Labor Department affirmative action requirements for federal contractors. The revisions prompted protests from the business community and even members of the Cabinet, as well as civil rights organizations, Congress and trade unions. These protests led the President to postpone issuing the order. With regard to voting rights, the Justice Department filed an amicus brief in Thornburg v. Gingles, a case pending before the Supreme Court. The case stems from a federal court ruling that the state's creation of new, multi-member legislative districts were illegal because, in the context of the state's history of racial discrimination, they resulted in discrimination against blacks. North Carolina appealed the ruling, and the Administration is supporting the appeal. In response, a bipartisan group of 10 members of Congress, including Senate Majority Leader Dole, filed an amicus brief rejecting the Justice Department position; and the Republican National Committee and North Carolina's Republican governor also submitted similar briefs. With regard to elimination of housing discrimination, the Administration continues to rely on voluntary compliance rather than remedies such as affirmative market agreements that are provided under existing fair housing laws. In addition, federal housing lawsuits have been narrowly focused on individual landlords and management companies rather than groups of management companies, municipalities, or practices affecting large segments of a community.

Indicative of the low priority Congress has given to the civil rights agenda has been its failure to bring to a vote the Civil Rights Restoration Act, first proposed in 1984, which would remedy a Supreme Court decision (Grove City) permitting federal funds to be given to educational institutions which discriminate in some of their programs. Similarly, action on fair housing legislation pending before the Congress has lain dormant.

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has been sharply criticized for failing to meet its mandate as an independent watchdog over civil rights enforcement by the federal government. Since the Commission's reconstitution in 1983, it has not published any reports or statements on the enforcement record of any federal agency. Its only fact-finding study, issued in 1985, concerned pay equity and was undertaken after key Commission members had indicated publicly their opposition to the concept of comparable worth. Following its publication, an analysis conducted by the independent General Accounting Office faulted the study for containing distortions, inconsistencies and mistakes of fact. With respect to a school desegregation study planned by the Commission, a nationally recognized expert in the field resigned from the project's advisory committee after charging that the undertaking was technically flawed and biased against busing, showed little concern for the effects of school desegregation on black and Hispanic children, and focused almost exclusively on the departure of white children from desegregated districts.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- seek vigorous enforcement of federal civil rights laws by federal enforcement agencies;
- assess the directions taken by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission since its reorganization in 1983, in light of the mandate Congress has placed upon it.

PROPOSITION 18 SEJ: Social and Economic Justice - BLACK-JEWISH RELATIONS

Changing Conditions: Black-Jewish relations have become more strained by perceptions that sectors of the black community are receptive to Louis Farrakhan's unabated anti-Semitism, and that important leaders in the black community were hesitant to challenge Farrakhan's anti-Semitism.

Background: Louis Farrakhan's anti-Semitic rhetoric during a nationwide tour in 1985 continued a pattern of demagoguery long known to the Jewish community. More worrisome than his rhetoric, however, was the fact that his appearances in major cities across the nation attracted large audiences, heightening concern about the extent to which anti-Jewish attitudes may be growing in the black community. The reluctance of some black leaders to denounce Farrakhan was difficult for the Jewish community to comprehend, but it was recognized that these leaders view Farrakhan with repugnance. Many black community leaders have explained their hesitance to repudiate Farrakhan as a fear of possible political consequences. Farrakhan's use of anti-Semitism is but the latest in a series of episodes since the mid-1960s--including the Oceanhill-Brownsville controversy over community control of education in New York City, Andrew Young's resignation as U.N. Ambassador, and the Rev. Jesse Jackson's Democratic presidential primary campaign--in which black-Jewish relations have been strained. Corroborating the Jewish community's perceptions that Farrakhan's anti-Semitic rhetoric strikes a responsive chord among his audiences is data derived from public opinion surveys conducted during the 1970s and 80s indicating that young, educated and middle-to-upper income blacks are more likely to hold anti-Semitic attitudes than other segments of the black community. Such findings are in direct contrast to nationwide patterns showing that those most likely to hold such views are older, less educated and of lower income.

Despite these sources of tension, there continues to exist a shared concern among leaders of both communities for a domestic agenda that meets the social and economic needs of their nation. It is reflected in the voting patterns of both the black and Jewish communities. It is reflected in voting patterns in Congress, where members of the Black Caucus consistently provide strong support for legislation on foreign relations and civil liberties and civil rights issues of vital interest to American Jews. These shared concerns have led to increased joint community projects and dialogue on the local level. Such patterns point to the bases upon which the two communities can focus mutual examinations of recent tensions while continuing to work together to mutual advantage.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- identify and give emphasis to those issues upon which it and black leaders can act in concert with other groups;
- continue to pursue steps, nationally and locally, to rebuild working relationships with black leadership, based on a recognition of each community's interests, priorities, needs and differences;
- continue efforts to deepen the Jewish community's awareness of current and emerging program priorities of key groups in the black community, including the agenda of black political leadership, in order to identify and act upon issues of shared concern; and to sensitize the black community to issues of primary concern to the Jewish community;
- actively communicate to black community leaders and media Jewish community relations positions on issues of special interest to the black community.

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PROPOSITION 19 SEJ: Social and Economic Justice - IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LEGISLATION

Changing Conditions: Legislation to reform the nation's immigration laws has moved closer to passage in Congress, but lack of final action continues to exacerbate a growing national crisis. Meanwhile, bipartisan support is building for legislation to address the plight of Salvadorans seeking refuge in the United States.

Background: As both houses of Congress began their fifth year of debate about different versions of legislation to reform our nation's immigration laws, a series of compromises were adopted on employer sanctions and amnesty and legalization programs for undocumented aliens, thus diminishing objections raised by constituencies that would be affected by such provisions. Nevertheless, significant differences in the measures passed by the Senate in September, 1985 and in the proposal currently before the House, which the Jewish community relations field has judged to be more compatible with its principles and goals, ensure that further compromises will be needed if any immigration reform act is to be signed into law. A major obstacle to reconciling the two versions will be the Senate's provision to allow up to 350,000 guest workers to enter the U.S. each year to harvest perishable fruits and vegetables. This provision has been opposed by Senator Alan Simpson, the legislation's sponsor, as well as Hispanic, Jewish and labor groups, and did not receive the Administration's backing. Should compromise on this and other items prove unreachable, the danger will remain that if illegal immigration continues Congress will be tempted to enact harsh legislation that will restrict legal as well as illegal immigration.

Similarly awaiting Congressional action is legislation to address the refugee status of Salvadoran asylum-seekers who have entered the United States illegally after fleeing political and civil unrest in their homeland. The Administration, particularly the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department, contend that the vast majority of such asylum seekers do not have a "well-founded fear of persecution based upon membership in a religious, political or social group"--the internationally accepted criteria to be received as refugees. Rather, the Administration contends, the Salvadorans have come to the United States for economic reasons. Proponents of accepting Salvadoran asylum seekers as refugees argue that the federal government's application of the criteria for granting refugee status to Salvadorans is overly strict and inconsistent when compared to the manner in which these criteria are applied to other groups, and that an undue proportion of Salvadorans' requests for refugee asylum are rejected with inadequate investigation. To remedy this situation, Senator Dennis DeConcini and Congressman Joe Moakley have introduced legislation to suspend deportation of Salvadoran asylum-seekers until Congress's General Accounting Office can assess the extent of danger they would face should they be returned to their native country.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- continue to support basic immigration reform legislation, in accordance with the policy principles previously adopted by NJCRAC;
- urge Congressional passage of the DeConcini-Moakley legislation regarding Salvadoran asylum seekers.

PROPOSITION 20 SEJ: Social and Economic Justice - U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN

Changing Conditions: The success achieved in keeping 1985's U.N. End of Decade of Women Conference in Nairobi targeted on substantive issues has focused attention on securing U.S. ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

Background: The idea of an international convention addressing discrimination against women emerged from the 1975 Mexico conference that launched the United Nations Decade of Women, and was certified by the U.N. six years ago. The treaty includes 30 articles setting forth principles and measures to achieve equal rights for women. Broadly, it calls for national legislation to ban discrimination, temporary measures to speed equality, and action to modify social and cultural patterns which perpetuate discrimination. Fifty-one countries, including the U.S., signed it during a special ceremony at the 1980 Copenhagen Mid-Decade conference. President Carter submitted it to the Senate for ratification on November 12, 1980, but to date the Senate has failed to do so. It has been pending in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for five years. As of June, 1985, 92 nations had signed the Convention, and 69 had ratified it.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

-- urge Senate ratification of the Convention.

NOTE: NJCRAC has not yet taken a position on the Convention. NJCRAC's Task Force on Women has recommended support for Senate ratification, and the Plenum will be asked to take action on this recommendation. Background material on the Convention will be sent to member agencies in a separate memo.

CONTINUING AND URGENT -- Social and Economic Justice

1. Equal Rights Amendment

Virtually all state legislatures will convene in 1987. Efforts to pass equal rights amendments to state constitutions will continue. Although prospects for passage of a federal Equal Rights Amendment appear dim, advocates may press for Congressional action.

2. Economic Equity

Advocates of women's rights will continue to press for passage of provisions of the wide-ranging Economic Equity Act. In the 99th Congress, major laws encompassing its provisions on child-support enforcement and private pension reform were passed. During the next Congress, the focus is likely to be on expansion of pensions covering working women, providing more options for child care, and revising Social Security benefits for women. Non-discrimination in insurance remains a prime concern, but advocates are expected to focus efforts on the courts and state legislatures, rather than on Congressional action.

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3. Child Care

The changing role of women in the American economy has focused growing attention on the need for national, state and local action to provide quality and readily available child care. In the United States, available child care resources are woefully inadequate, with this nation lagging far behind other industrialized nations in day care facilities. The Jewish community relations field should evaluate comprehensive federal, state and local child care proposals with the goal of supporting proposals to promote and provide adequate cost-effective day care.

INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION 21 IC: International Concerns - SOVIET JEWRY

Changing Conditions: A fundamental change in the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations emerged in November, 1985 when after a lapse of more than six years the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Soviet Union held a summit meeting. While there are no indications that decisions were reached on substantive issues, including future emigration of Soviet Jews, there was agreement that high-level dialogue between the two nations should continue and that the two leaders will meet again in the United States during 1986 and in Moscow in 1987. These future summit sessions will provide new occasions to press the issue of Soviet Jewry.

Background: The Geneva summit negotiations took place at a time when Soviet Jewish emigration remained at an all-time low and harassment of Jewish activists, particularly Hebrew teachers, steadily increased. No details have been divulged about the content of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev's discussion concerning Soviet Jewry, but there is strong reason to believe that the President was a forceful advocate for Soviet Jews, and that he took the position that the West looks upon the Soviet Union's adherence to international human rights agreements as a measure of its credibility in living up to international agreements in other areas. This is a position long advocated by the Jewish community relations field. The extent to which this view is widely held among Americans was illustrated by the Rev. Jesse Jackson's pointed questioning of General Secretary Gorbachev about Soviet Jewish emigration when, as a member of a private group of Americans concerned about nuclear disarmament, he spoke with the Soviet leader during the Geneva summit.

The first stages of discussions begun in Geneva will be continued in follow-up meetings in the United States during 1986 and in Moscow during 1987, and will be reinforced by all the other diplomatic contacts these summits will require. With the first summit having significantly improved the atmosphere in U.S.-Soviet relations, there will be greater pressures on the other summit sessions to produce agreements on substantial questions. In this context, the position taken by the President on Soviet Jews, and reinforced by similar concerns expressed by various Americans, will have to be even more forcefully put forth by the President.

Among the bilateral agreements approved during the summit meeting was one concerning resumption of cultural exchanges between the two nations. The Jewish community relations field does not oppose renewed visits of Soviet artistic troupes and intellectuals. Indeed, for more than a decade we have urged that Americans should use such occasions as opportunities to impress upon and remind influential Soviet citizens, through reasoned and reasonable means, of Americans' concerns for the human rights of Soviet Jews.

One area in which future bilateral agreements are likely to be reached is trade. Although General Secretary Gorbachev has stated that no large-scale U.S.-Soviet trade will develop so long as political obstacles to trade exist (in other words, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment), Soviet officials appeared to welcome resumption of contacts with American business leaders and to hold out the prospect of entering into joint ventures utilizing American high technology in such fields as oil exploration. If emigration were to increase as the climate of bilateral relations improved, Jackson-Vanik's provisions would no longer be an obstacle to increased U.S.-Soviet trade, since the legislation permits the President to waive application of its provisions under such conditions and grant "Most-Favored Nation" status to the Soviet Union. However, the President must certify to the Congress that the Soviet Union is in compliance with Jackson-Vanik.

Meanwhile, until greater Jewish emigration is forthcoming from the Soviet Union, the world Jewish community will continue to face the challenge of maintaining contacts and providing resources to help Soviet Jews retain their Jewish identities in an inhospitable environment.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- step up efforts to ensure that when the scheduled 1986 and 1987 Soviet-American summit meetings convene their participants understand that Soviet Jewry's human rights are of critical concern to the American people, and that the status of Soviet Jewry will be one of the criteria against which bilateral agreements on other issues will be judged;
- encourage U.S. officials to continue to press the Soviet Jewry issue in all contacts with Soviet officials in follow-ups to the Geneva summit and in preparation for future summit sessions;
- continue to broaden the base of the Soviet Jewry movement by reaching beyond the Jewish community, particularly to those to whom the Soviet leadership may be more receptive, as illustrated in the initiative the Rev. Jesse Jackson undertook when, as a member of the American peace delegation, he raised Soviet Jewry issues with General Secretary Gorbachev during the Geneva summit;
- increase efforts to interpret to American academics, educators and intellectuals the plight of Soviet Jewish Hebrew teachers subjected to harassment and arrest;
- urge member agencies to give higher priority to encouraging visits with Soviet Jews.

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PROPOSITION 22 IC: International Concerns - ETHIOPIAN JEWRY

Changing Conditions: While the majority of Ethiopian Jews now reside in Israel, concern increases for those who remain in Ethiopia, yearning to fulfill their centuries-old dream of making aliyah. Opportunities for them to join their community in Israel have become more complicated as a result of recent developments in the region.

Background: Thousands of Ethiopian Jews have found new, more secure lives in Israel. The Jews of Israel have warmly received this newest aliyah, and have extended every effort to ease their absorption into the country. The absorption process has placed enormous strain on Israel's already-strained human services resources. As was true of all previous aliyot, Beta Yisrael also brings its own rich traditions and its own special problems: an estimated 35% of its family units now in Israel are single-parent households. An additional source of strain in the absorption process has been the conflict about Beta Yisrael's religious status.

The overthrow of the Numeiry regime in the Sudan in early 1985 and the subsequent trials of its vice-president and chief security official have radically altered political conditions in the region, with profound implications for future rescue efforts.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- intensify educational efforts within the American Jewish community about the continuing needs Israel must meet in absorbing Beta Yisrael;
- persist in efforts to keep lines of communications open with the Ethiopian Jewish community;
- continue to explore effective ways to facilitate aliyah for Ethiopian Jews.

PROPOSITION 23 IC: International Concerns - APARTHEID

Changing Conditions: Despite mounting racial strife and death tolls due to police actions, the government of South Africa resisted taking additional meaningful steps during 1985 to dismantle its apartheid system. This led the United States to express growing impatience through a variety of measures. These actions reflected a growing national consensus in the United States in opposition to South Africa's apartheid system.

Background: President Reagan in September 1984 issued an Executive Order imposing economic sanctions, including bans on exports of nuclear technology and computers for use by South Africa's military police and security forces; U.S. export assistance to companies not observing fair employment practices; imports of kruggerands; and loans to the South African government (except for purposes that would improve opportunities for South Africans disadvantaged by apartheid). The Executive Order was especially significant because it constituted a marked departure from the Administration's policy of "constructive engagement," which NJCRAC criticized as inadequate in its 1985-86 Joint Program Plan. Nevertheless, these sanctions were more limited in scope than those proposed in a variety of measures, including the Kennedy-Gray Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, which Congress had under consideration when the Executive Order was issued. Congressional anti-apartheid leaders have indicated they may renew efforts to enact stronger sanctions, pending assessment of South Africa's response to sanctions imposed by the U.S. and other nations.

A growing number of American public and private institutions are turning to divestment as a means to pressure Pretoria for reform. A New York Times poll conducted in November, 1985 showed that the proportion of Americans who support such action has grown to nearly half. As of late 1985 nine states and 31 cities have passed, and 20 other states are considering, legislation restricting or prohibiting investment of public or pension funds in companies doing business in South Africa; colleges and universities divested their portfolios of more than \$251 million; and 16 American corporations closed subsidiaries in South Africa.

The effectiveness of such sanctions depends upon the extent to which Western Europe, Japan and the United States coordinate their pressures. The 11 Common Market countries have agreed to sanctions, including an embargo on oil, arms and law enforcement equipment, a ban on military cooperation, and the withdrawal of military attaches. They have also banned exports of armaments and nuclear material, and military cooperation. But only France and Denmark, along with Japan, prohibit direct investment in companies doing business in South Africa. The effectiveness of these policies is directly related to America's role because the United States is the dominant Western economic and military power.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- encourage Jewish communal institutions to examine their policies on divestment, including application of divestment to their own portfolios;
- continue to advocate passage of the Kennedy-Gray Anti-Apartheid Act;
- encourage Congress to monitor and evaluate the impact of President Reagan's Executive Order imposing limited economic sanctions on South Africa;
- engage in coalitional activities with other responsible citizens' groups to press our government to take the lead in formulating an overall western strategy of pressure upon the South African government;
- undertake educational programs within the Jewish community to interpret our stake in the fight against the racial policies which the apartheid system represents and embodies.

NOTE: NJCRAC is seeking to formulate a position on divestment for action by the Executive Committee no later than June, 1986. Such a position would then be reflected in the 1986-87 Joint Program Plan.

PROPOSITION 24 IC: International Concerns - INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Changing Conditions: The capture in October, 1985 of hijackers who seized the Italian liner Acille Lauro demonstrated the increased readiness of the United States to deal forcefully with terrorism. While Western European nations' citizens and facilities are frequently affected by terrorism, these nations have been reluctant to join the United States in effective, coordinated action against terrorists. They continue to pursue policies that seek to appease the PLO, a chief sponsor of world terrorist activity.

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Background: While the United States' bold action demonstrated the potential available for bringing terrorists to justice for their crimes, other events connected with the episode, such as Italian Prime Minister Bruno Craxi's decision to release Abu Abbas, the hijacking's mastermind, illustrated the degree to which many of our western European allies remain unwilling to undertake effective, coordinated action in response to terrorism. Such failures stem from calculations that appeasement of the PLO, which provides training, arms and funding to many of the major terrorist groups around the world, will insulate their nations from further terrorism. Experience, however, demonstrates that although Americans, Jews and Israelis are the main targets, citizens not only of western Europe but also the Soviet Union and even Arab states continue to be victims of terrorist violence.

Secretary of State Shultz pointed to both the problem of and solution for effective action to counter terrorism in a speech delivered in London during December, 1985. Contrasting European states' recognition of the PLO with America's refusal to do so until the PLO renounces terrorism and recognizes Israel, Mr. Shultz declared: "Extremists must be resisted, not appeased. Unlike some of our European friends, we feel that gestures toward the PLO only mislead its leaders into thinking their present inadequate policy is gaining them international acceptance and stature." It follows from these principles, long a cornerstone of U.S. Middle East policy, that a major priority of America's efforts to counter terrorism should be to press its European allies to join in developing a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, including intelligence sharing, coordinated rescue efforts, extradition treaties, and imposition of sanctions against nations offering terrorists sanctuary.

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- examine the adequacy of current U.S. and international laws to enable governments, both individually and collectively, to impose sanctions upon nations that do not cooperate in apprehending and prosecuting terrorists.
- press the Administration and Congress to pursue an active, comprehensive anti-terrorism policy with its western allies and the entire community of nations;
- support the principle that acts of terrorism must be met by swift action to bring terrorists to justice;
- give higher priority to interpreting to the American public the unchanging nature of the role of terror as a fundamental instrument of PLO policy.

CONTINUING AND URGENT -- International Concerns

1. Jews in Arab and Muslim Countries

The position of the small Jewish communities remaining in the Arab and Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa continues to be precarious.

They may at any time be threatened by a sudden change of regime, by arbitrary actions of the rulers or by violence on the part of individuals or groups who choose to scapegoat Jews when local or regional tensions erupt. During 1985 three Jews were killed and 11 others wounded while attending Simhat Torah services in Jerba, Tunisia, when a crazed security guard opened fire. The Tunisian Prime Minister attributed his action to the influence of a renewed campaign of radio broadcasts from Khadaffi's Libya calling on Tunisians to kill the Jews and overthrow the pro-Western regime, following Israel's raid on the PLO headquarters. In Lebanon, several prominent members of the Jewish community in Beirut were kidnapped by Shiite fundamentalist bands, and efforts to obtain their release have thus far been unsuccessful. Rumors of a recent largescale pogrom and mass conversion of Jews in North Yeman proved to be unfounded. However, Yemeni Jews remain largely isolated and they, like the larger Jewish community in Syria, are denied the right to emigrate. Travel from Iran is severely restricted and there are fears for the future of the Jewish community should Khomeini pass from the scene. These conditions must be closely monitored; whatever responses are required should be undertaken on the basis of interagency consultation and coordination.

2. Genocide Convention

Despite President Reagan's endorsement of U.S. ratification of the U.N. Genocide Convention, the Senate has thus far been unable to bring the treaty to the floor for a vote. The Jewish community relations field should continue to work with the Executive branch and Senate leadership, in concert with other organizations, to ensure that support and momentum for ratification are sustained.

3. Famine in Africa

World attention has focused on the catastrophic famine sweeping across much of sub-Saharan Africa, threatening over 150 million people. Many countries, including the United States, have responded with famine relief, which will continue to be critically needed throughout the coming year. But a long-term production crisis, reaching beyond the immediate famine into the next decade, may be anticipated. The Jewish community relations field should continue to urge massive American famine relief for the threatened populations of Africa, and support concerted international governmental efforts to assist African countries in addressing long-term structural, agricultural and ecological problems.

4. Holocaust Programming

Many decades after the Holocaust even more needs to be done to convey a deeper understanding of the Holocaust's meaning. A major focus of the Jewish community relations field in the coming year should be on what programs are required to more effectively deepen the understanding of the lessons of the Holocaust, especially an awareness about the conditions that brought it about. The waning of the immediacy of the events, the ageing of the generation of sur-

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vivors and actual witnesses, and the coming of age of post-war generations make this complex task all the more difficult but even more compelling. This vital educational effort should be undertaken on an ongoing basis, particularly in public and private schools, in the media, and in special observances on notable occasions.

5. Nazi War Criminals

Prosecution of Nazis in the U.S. can be expected to continue during the coming year. Public interest will be essential to assure effective continuation of the Justice Department's investigation, deportation, and denaturalization work and to counter the efforts of some ethnic groups to curtail the Justice Department's work.



OPINION

AFTER SHCHARANSKY? WHAT'S NEXT FOR SOVIET JEWRY?

BY DAVID A. HARRIS

Together with millions of other people around the world, I spent several days holding my breath, praying silently and passing each hour with a radio glued to one ear. Could this latest report, unlike so many previous others, of the imminent release of Anatoly Shcharansky be accurate? Would he, a moral giant of the Jewish people and a name synonymous with the struggle for repatriation to Israel, finally be released almost nine years after his arrest?

Would the unimaginable suffering and agony he endured in Soviet prisons and labor camps be over? Would he finally be permitted to join his wife Avital, whose unstinting devotion to her husband's cause has inspired people everywhere, after 11½ years of separation? Would his elderly mother's courage and perseverance in support of her beleaguered son no longer be necessary? Would the unstinting efforts of President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz, members of Congress, foreign leaders and private citizens everywhere at last yield results?

Would Shcharansky's profound faith, stated so eloquently during his trial in Moscow in July 1978, finally be redeemed? At that time, he said: "For more than 2,000 years the Jewish people, my people, have been dispersed. But wherever they are, wherever Jews are found, every year they have repeated, 'Next year in Jerusalem.' Now, when I am further than ever from my people, from Avital, facing many years of imprisonment, I say, turning to my people, my Avital: Next year in Jerusalem." Would it be this year in Jerusalem?

We rejoice in the news of his release and reunification with Avital. We are humbled by his courage, and inspired by his faith. Yet, at the same time, it is difficult to

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overlook the fact that his release, as welcome and important as it truly is, is not necessarily the result of an altruistic, humanitarian gesture on the Soviets' part. Rather, it serves four very concrete purposes for the Kremlin: 1) It is part of an exchange involving spies, hence permitting Moscow to maintain its original contention that Shcharansky was in the employ of the CIA—even though Shcharansky always denied the espionage charge and had he yielded to extreme Soviet pressure to admit to the accusation, he might well have been released years ago. 2) It generates favorable media attention for the Soviets at a time when the battle for Western public opinion being waged fiercely by the Kremlin. 3) It serves to rid Moscow of one of the two preeminent human rights symbols, together with Andrei Sakharov, within its borders. 4) It returns several key east bloc agents.

Is Shcharansky's release, nevertheless, a genuine signal by the Kremlin?

As much as one would like to believe so, the prevailing condition of Soviet Jewry gives serious pause. Consider:

- The emigration rate which was inching upwards from a mere 29 in August 1985 to 128 in November, the month of the summit, has now reversed direction. 62 people left in December and only 79 in January.

- On Jan. 8, Vladimir Lifshits, a Leningrad refusenik, was arrested on a charge of anti-Soviet propaganda and now faces trial.

- On Jan. 17, seven young Jews in the Leningrad area participated in an Oneg Shabbat celebration. The party was disrupted by the local police who accompanied the group to the local police station, beating a few along the way and threatening them with expulsion from university and military conscription. They were interrogated about their Jewish activities and study of Torah, and accused of holding a private religious ceremony.

- Inna Meiman, the wife of mathematician Naum Meiman, has been suffering from a growing tumor on

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the back of her neck, near her spinal column, for more than two years. The only apparent remaining hope for treatment, after four painful and ultimately unsuccessful operations in Moscow, is at one of a few oncological centers in the West which have the sophisticated equipment to treat the cancerous growth. Despite countless appeals, the Kremlin has adamantly refused the Meimans permission to travel to the West for medical care, citing Professor Meiman's classified work—work performed more than 30 years ago!

• And despite all the focus on Elena Bonner's visit to the West for medical treatment and a visit with her family in Boston, she will soon rejoin her husband, Andrei Sakharov, in an exile that, in everything but name, is the equivalent of imprisonment in remote Gorky. Sakharov, a non-Jew, is an extraordinarily courageous man dedicated to peace and to human rights, and a righteous Gentile if ever one lives today.

How, then, does one interpret current Kremlin policy?

It is to remain tough at home as a signal that no loosening of the reins is in the offing. On the other hand, for Western consumption, it pursues a two-pronged strategy. First, the staggered release of a few prominent figures, such as long-term refuseniks Mark Nashpitz, Yakov Mesh, Eliyahu Essas and Yakov Gorodetsky, succeeds in generating positive publicity for the Soviets at relatively little cost and serves equally to deflect attention from the stark reality facing the

Soviet Jewish community. Second, the traditional Soviet campaign of disinformation abroad continues apace. In this regard, events of the last year are revealing:

1) In January 1985, Soviet State Bank Chairman Alkhimov told U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce Olmer that if good relations with the U.S. were restored, 50,000 Jewish emi-

“What is needed as a signal is evident: not words but convincing action by the Soviet Union.”

grants annually would be “no problem.” After a flurry of Western press attention and U.S. interest in studying the apparent opening, the Soviets subsequently denied the story.

2) Three months later, optimism was again generated when *The New York Times* carried a front-page story from Moscow that as many as 1,000 Jews, including long-term refuseniks, were reportedly being summoned to OVIR (visa office) and being issued exit visas, but nothing resulted.

3) In July, at a meeting with the

Israeli envoy in Paris, Soviet Ambassador Vorontsov indicated his country's preparedness to move forward on diplomatic relations in exchange for Soviet participation in the Middle East peace process and Israeli flexibility on the Golan Heights issue. Much media attention was given the story, but no real progress has occurred.

4) Reports, originating in Moscow, of an imminent release of 15-20,000 Soviet Jews and their transfer to Israel via Warsaw, have appeared in many Anglo-Jewish papers this fall. To date, though, nothing has happened.

5) During his visit to France in October, Soviet leader Gorbachev addressed the emigration question by noting that the Soviet Union “solves” the problem of family reunification, refusing permission “only where state secrets are involved.” In such cases, added Gorbachev, applicants can leave after waiting between five and ten years. Despite these well-publicized assertions, the several thousand long-term refuseniks with close relatives in Israel and elsewhere, whose first applications were submitted as long ago as 1970, offer ample proof of the inaccuracy of the claim. And, a shrewd and sophisticated communicator, Gorbachev also used the occasion to speak of Soviet Jews as a “privileged nationality,” yet another element of the Soviet disinformation campaign.

6) Finally, there was *The New York Times* front-page story on Dec. 26, headlined “Russian said to Predict Israeli ties and Increased Jewish Emigration,” referring to a

Soviet embassy official in Washington. TASS, the Soviet news agency, later denied the story.

If Moscow genuinely seeks to send an unambiguously positive message, it should follow the advice of Anthony Lewis (*The New York Times*, March 14, 1985): “What is needed as a signal is evident: not words but convincing action by the Soviet Union.”

What would be convincing action? In my view, it would mean significant progress toward the goals of the institution of an orderly process of repatriation to Israel and reunification of families with a definite time limit on those cases involving previous security clearance, a resolution of the prisoner of conscience and long-term refusenik cases, an end to harassment of Jewish activists and arrests on trumped-up charges, and a guarantee of the religious and cultural rights for Jews (including the right to study Hebrew) given to other Soviet citizens.

If movement can be truly made in these areas, it will doubtless be welcomed in this country and contribute to further progress in other dimensions of the bilateral relationship, not to speak of a more general improvement in the “atmospherics” that can play such an important role in shaping the direction of superpower relations.

In the meantime, welcome Anatoly. We pledge that our efforts will not cease until all in whose name you struggle so valiantly will be able to join you and Avital in Israel.



National Conference on Soviet Jewry

February 17, 1986

TO: Board of Governors
Community Contacts

FROM: NCSJ Washington Office
William Keyserling, Director
Mark Levin, Assoc Director
Robin Saipe, Community Contact

RE: Maintaining Congressional Contacts Through Summit II

Given the thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations, many Senators and Representatives have a "full plate" of U.S.-Soviet issues before them. To maintain the current goodwill and ensure that Jewish emigration stays on the front burner between now and the Summit II meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, we propose the following actions for the Campaign to Summit II.

I. February 20th Special Order:

To send a message that Jewish emigration remains a fundamental concern in U.S.-Soviet relations, Congressmen Wyche Fowler (D-Ga) and Jack Kemp (R-NY) have organized a "Special Order" for February 20, 1986.

Initiated with the NCSJ, this "Special Order" is timed with the February 25th meeting of the Communist Party Congress in Moscow. (Knowing that the Soviets read the Congressional Record, the date was scheduled to make sure that the message reaches the Kremlin by the beginning of the Party Congress.)

The Congressional Coalition for Soviet Jews has already contacted all Representatives, but it would be helpful if you can find time to follow-up by telephone.

II. Recognition of past commitment:

As relations between the super powers continue to thaw, and Senators and Representatives are looking at the entire slate of pending issues, it is critical to continue to demonstrate the importance of human rights and Jewish emigration in the Soviet Union.

The best way to keep our issue in the minds of lawmakers is to publicly recognize their past support for our cause. To do this we recommend that each community schedule a community "event" during the Congressional "District Work Period" which is currently scheduled from March 27 - April 7, 1986.

We suggest that the event be used to present "certificates of appreciation," printed by the NCSJ, to Senators and Representatives who have joined the Congressional Coalition for Soviet Jews. A list is enclosed.

Since all 435 Representatives (excepting those who are retiring) and one-third of



the 100 Senators are running for re-election, there is a great likelihood that they will be home during this period. Most likely, they will be looking for recognition which we are prepared to give.

We suggest that the event (whether integrated into an already planned meeting with your lawmakers or a special event) be public and covered by your local Jewish and community news media.

In the event that your Senators and/or Representatives are not on the enclosed list, we would suggest that you contact them directly to get them to join so that they can be given the award at an appropriate time.

The certificate is being designed and should be ready within ten days. Because Senators are "shared" by many of you, their certificates will state, i.e., from the "California Jewish Federations and Community Councils". If you plan to participate in this part of the "pre-summit II program" please fill out the enclosed form and send it to us immediately.

Finally, if you know that time and resources don't permit a public presentation, please let us know so that we can arrange to deliver a certificate to your Representative's office or prepare one for you to deliver through the mail.

III. The Shcharansky Release

Since Anatoly Shcharansky's release, Congressional offices are asking what the release means to the 18 remaining Prisoners of Conscience, the 27 former prisoners who have not been allowed to leave, the 15,000 Refuseniks and the literally hundreds of thousands of others waiting to leave.

We have told them that we are, of course, delighted with the Shcharansky news, but that we must all remain mindful of the others, and specifically Vladimir Lifshits of Leningrad who is awaiting trial while the world is joyous over the Shcharansky release.

What the Shcharansky release means is best summed up in the enclosed paper which was written by David Harris, formerly NCSJ Washington Director and currently Deputy Director of the International Division of the American Jewish Committee. Please share this with your Senators and Representatives when you are in touch with them.

IV: The Campaign to Summit II:

By now you should have received a notice about the "Campaign to Summit II" as approved by the NCSJ Executive Committee. Should you come up with any "unique" programs with respect to Senators and Congressmen, please let us know so that we can share them with other communities.

THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND SUMMIT II (When Secretary Gorbachev comes to Washington) IS CRITICAL. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR INCLUDING JEWISH EMIGRATION ON THE AGENDA FOR THAT MEETING IS CRUCIAL. SO ANYTHING YOU ARE ABLE TO DO TO THAT END IS NEEDED.

SCHEDULE FOR DEBATE*

JOINT PROGRAM PLAN PROPOSITION RESPONSES

SUBMITTED BY THE JOINT PROGRAM PLAN
PROPOSITIONS REVIEW SUB-COMMITTEE**

Monday, 1:30 - 3:30 PM

Proposition 6	Kahaneism
Proposition 23	Apartheid
Proposition 17	Civil Rights Enforcement
Proposition 18	Black-Jewish Relations

Tuesday, 2:30 - 5:00 PM

Proposition 7	Anti-Semitism in the U.S.
Proposition 16	Federal Policy and Poverty
Proposition 13	Energy
New Proposition	Pay Equity

Wednesday, 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

New Proposition	Protestant Jewish Relations
Proposition 9	Attacks on Bill of Rights

* Should debate not be completed on those propositions scheduled for Monday or Tuesday, they will be carried over to Wednesday.

**Based on procedures adopted by the NJCRAC Executive Committee, debate will be limited to the propositions listed above unless the Joint Program Plan Appeals Panels specifically authorize other propositions to be brought to the Plenum for floor debate. Any proposition responses approved for floor debate by the Appeals Panels will be distributed in a separate compilation.

PROPOSITION 6 IS: KAHANEISM

FORT LAUDERDALE

The Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation of Greater Fort Lauderdale agrees that the Joint Program Plan should include a proposition dealing with the issue of relationships between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel and the disturbing increase of support for the anti-Arab policies of Meir Kahane. However, we object to the use of the label "Kahaneism", believing that (1) it gives Kahane the individual more attention and legitimacy than he deserves and (2) it does not accurately reflect the tone of the proposition. The content of the proposition focuses on efforts to improve relationships and reinforce the democratic and pluralistic nature of the State of Israel, but the label "Kahaneism" focuses on the problem rather than attempts to deal with it. It is our recommendation that the proposition be included, but that it be called "Israel and the Middle East - JEWISH/ARAB RELATIONS".

UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA

We strongly object to Proposition 6 being headed "Kahaneism". The term "racism" would be more appropriate. The Orthodox Union will veto any Program Plan section that focuses exclusively on Meir Kahane and "Kahaneism" while disregarding any virulent internal dangers to Israeli democracy from both right and left.

CHICAGO

General - There was some expression of discomfort with using Kahane as personification of a movement. It was not a majority but you might want to consider another title.

Background: eliminate the statistics and percentages. Make it more clear that we are directing American organizations about what should be done in this country by American Jews. Make it clear that we are not directing actions in Israel. However, an attempt to delete Strategic Goal #2 did not succeed. It is a matter of emphasis.

Include a statement that the American Jewish community rejects all racism, no matter the source or the target.

PHILADELPHIA

Kahanism [preferred spelling, I think] should include more discussion of activities undertaken in Israel to improve Arab-Jewish cooperation and understanding.

SCRANTON

The consensus of our Community Relations Committee is that speaking out "forcefully" and initiating forums in which to discuss Kahane is not necessary and tends to promote the ideas of Kahane. The other three strategic goals cover the matter adequately rendering number one redundant.



PROPOSITION 7 JS: ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE U. S.

WOMEN'S AMERICAN ORT

Although the Proposition rightly observes the emergence and actions of extremist groups in the farm belt and, in this as well as Proposition 18, the disturbing Farrakhan phenomenon, in our judgement it underestimates the quantitative and qualitative extent of anti-Semitism and the impact on Jewish well-being. As regards the newly noted manifestations themselves, we disagree that responses to them "do not reflect a national rise of anti-Jewish attitudes and actions." We have seen that the extremist groups and Farrakhan, through their techniques of persuasion and rhetoric, have succeeded to some extent in their efforts to generate hatred toward Jews. Viewing these developments in the light of two of the criteria for measuring anti-Semitism--"prevailing attitudes toward Jews" and "expressions of anti-Semitism by public figures"--we conclude that the influence of the farm belt groups and the prominence of Farrakhan, one of the few black leaders since Martin Luther King, Jr. who could fill Madison Square Garden, do jeopardize Jewish well-being. Thus we would suggest the last sentence under "Background" read as follows:

"Judged according to criteria long established to assess the present status of anti-Semitism and its potential damage to the Jewish community's well-being, the Jewish community relations field believes that recent responses to extremist

leaders in the nation's midwestern and black communities reflect an increase in anti-Jewish attitudes and actions."

We also feel that the Proposition fails to take note of other less publicized manifestations. We refer, for example, to discussion during the deliberations of NJCRAC's Subcommittee on Assessing Criteria for Measuring Anti-Semitism. We believe more than one participant suggested that there are many more personal experiences of anti-Semitism--another of the criteria--than make their way into national surveys. This is not to minimize attempts to survey the situation, but instead to emphasize that formal surveys cannot be our sole barometer. Therefore, we would recommend the Proposition acknowledge that a general apprehension among the grass roots of the Jewish community -- an apprehension for some years recognized by Jewish community leaders and professionals--is, to an appreciable extent, based upon actual experiences of anti-Semitic innuendo and explicit expression much of it unreported, as well as the broad sweep of influences such as the Zionism/racism calumny which invades individuals' perceptions of Jews.

In view of these observations, we believe that, in addition to the new Strategic Goals, three Strategic Goals which have appeared in previous Joint Program Plans have even greater relevance today, and merit re-emphasis and inclusion, as follows:

"The Jewish community relations field should:

- forcefully condemn any manifestations of anti-Semitism;
- conduct educational efforts to sensitize non-Jewish leaders and the general public about the danger anti-Semitism poses to the fabric of a democratic society, and the need to unequivocally condemn it whenever it appears;
- foster intergroup coalitions to undertake educational efforts against anti-Semitism and all other forms of bigotry and discrimination."

SUGGESTED CHANGES RECOMMENDED BY JOINT PROGRAM PLAN SUBCOMMITTEE:

Last sentence in last paragraph of background should read:

"However, judged according to criteria long established to assess the degree of danger anti-Semitic activities pose to American Jews, the Jewish community relations field believes that, despite responses to extremist leaders in the nation's midwestern and black communities, those conditions that are essential to the security of the American Jewish community remain fundamentally sound."

Add a new strategic goal (to be cross-referenced with Proposition 18, Black-Jewish Relations):

--continue to convey to Black leaders with whom we work at the national and local level the Jewish community's deep concerns about Louis Farrakhan's anti-semitic statements and what we perceive as the response to them.


PROPOSITION 9 JS: ATTACKS ON BILL OF RIGHTS

INDIANAPOLIS

We recommend eliminating Strategic Goals #2 and #3. In general, our committee felt that the system has worked fairly well and therefore, why raise the issue. Our consensus was that overall, we get a fairly decent caliber of federal judge and historically, individuals have demonstrated that once they are appointed to the bench, they become fairly independent as a result of a lifetime tenure. Our committee also felt that it was presumptuous of our field to try to "formulate criteria" regarding such nominees.

DETROIT

We would also recommend that the third strategic goal, which states that the community relations field should "examine such assessments with a view toward formulating criteria for offering recommendations regarding nominations to Federal judiciary posts," be stricken. We make this recommendation, because we are concerned that this strategic goal offers a "liberal litmus test" for Federal judges in place of the conservative litmus test being criticized.



PROPOSITION 13 EN: ENERGY

DAYTON

In addition, the specific strategies listed, such as a \$10 surcharge, should be deleted as we do not believe anyone can determine whether these tactics are the right ones and will achieve the desired objectives.

BOSTON

It is the feeling of the Jewish Community Relations Council Energy Committee that an oil import tax would unduly hinder the Northeast Region. Due to the colder climate in the Northeast, we are forced to use more oil for heating than is needed by other parts of the country.

FLINT

Under Strategic Goals, we recommend eliminating in the first strategic goal the language "particularly on Persian Gulf Oil..." and substituting the word "through:"; and oppose the inclusion of the second strategic goal calling for a \$10 per barrel fee on imported oil.

CHERRY HILL, NJ

The committee recommends that the JPP should not include any mention of congressional enactment of \$10 per barrel fee on imported oil.

Page 13: Delete "-seeking Congressional enactment of a \$10 per barrel fee on imported oil;"

BRIDGEPORT

Eliminate strategic goal which begins, "seeking Congressional enactment of a \$10 per barrel fee on imported oil". Reasons: 1) tax would have a disproportionately regional impact. East Coast markets rely heavily on foreign oil, while areas in the Mid-West and West use more domestic oil; 2) tax could have serious negative effect on Mexico, which has a foreign debt problem and has supplied more of our oil in recent years; 3) necessity of dealing with this issue is not imminent. Prices have not yet dipped. When time is appropriate, solution should be to tax not only imported oil but to place a national tax on oil consumption across the board, thereby achieving, in an equitable manner, the desired goal of advancing conservation efforts.

In addition, priority should be placed on strategic goal dealing with development of additional energy sources.

JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE

JLC urges that a decision on Proposition 13 be referred to the incoming Executive Board of NJCRAC. This would give additional time to examine the possible impact of a decision to enact a ten dollar per barrel fee on imported oil.

We do not, of course, disagree with the need to prevent OPEC's cartel power from reasserting itself, or the need to develop incentives to promote energy conservation. However, certain other questions must be examined.

1. Will the deflationary effect and lower interest rates triggered by falling oil prices have a sufficiently strong impact so that the greater economic growth and lower unemployment resulting outweigh the immediate benefits of the oil import tax?
2. Will a ten dollar per barrel oil import tax result in a further decline in the ability of American industry to compete with the Japanese and West Europeans?
3. Would a tax on gasoline at the pump achieve many of the benefits with fewer negative impacts of the oil import tax?
4. If there are negative impacts, can American industry and jobs be protected?
5. If an oil import tax is enacted, at what oil price should it be instituted in order to achieve the benefits that are sought without a possible negative impact on the American economy?
6. Can the regressive nature of the tax be partially mitigated by substituting a gasoline tax with refunds to persons with low incomes?

CHURCH-STATE AND INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS

NEW PROPOSITION: JEWISH-PROTESTANT RELATIONS

PHILADELPHIA

On-going relationships with Protestant churches should continue both nationally and locally. A number of CRCs have found that community based dialogues provide excellent forums for developing and maintaining ties with local Protestant denominations. Understanding the nature of other faith communities and developing relationships with their leaders can lead to increased support for our agenda and can allow the Jewish community to participate in new coalitions and projects.



PROPOSITION 16 SEJ: FEDERAL POLICY AND POVERTY

DALLAS

(3) add a new third strategic goal to read:

—support the establishment of sound fiscal policies that will stop or, at least, slow down the dramatic increase in governmental debt that is accumulating to the detriment of future generations of Americans;

(4) delete the second listed strategic goal.

Rationale: The existing draft does not show enough sensitivity to the critical need that has been recognized by Democrats and Republicans alike to instill greater discipline into our federal fiscal policy.

We stand fully behind the proposition that our Jewish tradition requires that we support all reasonable efforts to assist people in need. Statements, however, that suggest in general terms that we oppose cuts for "our nation's cities" and programs "which assist the middle class to become and remain productive" may not be helpful. In this fiscal environment, as many progressive, humane politicians have recognized, it may not be possible to provide the assistance so desperately required by people in real need and, at the same time, refrain from cutting middle class subsidies and aid programs to the cities.

Fiscal discipline and debt growth reduction are imperative to our nation's economic health. Politicians of all stripes agree, and we do our cause of promoting the welfare of those in need no good to be blind to these important goals.

The meaning of the second stated strategic goal is unclear. If the drafter is suggesting tax increases, why not say so directly? What taxes? How much? Who bears what portion of the burden? It probably makes more sense to avoid this topic since we probably are not prepared as a community to take a clear position on these questions.

PROPOSITION 17 SEJ: CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

Mirroring last year's Joint Program Plan, the proposed section on civil rights again highlights the "nefarious" conduct of the Administration and the U.S. Civil Rights Commission on this issue. In the strongest terms possible, ADL rejects that position. Both the Justice Department and the Civil Rights Commission have been forthright in upholding what ADL continues to believe is a socially, morally and legally correct position on the issue of race preferences -- pro "equality of opportunity" rather than "results" and staunchly anti-quota. To condemn them for this position while continuing to overlook the positive steps taken by the Justice Department on such issues as religious discrimination, Sabbath Observer rights and racial and ethnic harrassment is extremely disturbing. I would urge the Plenum to recast the section to accurately and fairly reflect the facts as they are. Failing that, we reserve our right to dissent on this issue.



PROPOSITION 18 SEJ: BLACK-JEWISH RELATIONS

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

While this section purports to address the failure of black leadership to repudiate Louis Farrakhan's anti-Semitism, it does so in an apologetic and totally unacceptable manner. Rather than condemning those black "leaders" forthrightly for their failure of leadership, the section strains to explain away their inaction. Clearly, a revision is in order.

As to the section on "strategic goals" it omits any reference to the need for addressing the Farrakhan phenomenon in particular and the more general problem of black anti-Semitism.

UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA

Proposition 18 as drafted is one-sided and suggests that only Blacks are responsible for the perceived deterioration in Black-Jewish relations. In particular, we object to lumping together Andrew Young's resignation from the United Nations, the Rev. Jackson's presidential primary and the Farrakhan phenomena.

ST. LOUIS

- 1) Replace current Changing Conditions with the following: "In the past year, efforts to rebuild important ties between the Black and Jewish communities have resulted in cooperative action on projects including anti-apartheid activity and the first observance of the Federal holiday commemorating the birth of Martin Luther King, Jr. Black-Jewish relations did, however, experience some additional strain in the wake of Louis Farrakhan's 1985 national speaking tour."
- 2) Replace lines 1 - 10 of the Background section with the following: "Louis Farrakhan's anti-semitic rhetoric received extensive media attention during his 1985 speaking tour. More worrisome than his rhetoric, however, was the fact that his appearances in major cities across the nation attracted large audiences, heightening concern about the extent to which anti-Jewish attitudes may be growing in sectors of the black community. It was recognized that most black political leaders view Farrakhan's anti-semitism with repugnance. However, the reluctance of some black leaders to publicly denounce Farrakhan's anti-semitism was difficult for many in the Jewish community to understand."

RATIONALE:

The analysis in the draft proposition is unnecessarily negative in tone, and contains no acknowledgement of joint projects undertaken to rebuild ties in the wake of the Jesse Jackson campaign. We see no rationale for including a list of all the issues which have created tension between the communities in the last 20 years. The draft proposition overstates the importance of Farrakhan as an opinion-maker in the Black community and as the key factor setting the tone for Black-Jewish relations in 1985 and 1986.

Delete the Background section in its entirety and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

There continues to exist a shared concern among leaders of both communities for a domestic agenda that meets the social and economic needs of their nation. It is reflected in the voting patterns of both the black and Jewish communities. It is reflected in voting patterns in Congress, where members of the Black Caucus consistently provide strong support for legislation on foreign relations, civil liberties and civil rights issues of vital interest to American Jews. These shared concerns have led to increased joint community projects and dialogue on the local level. Such patterns point to the bases upon which the two communities can focus mutual examinations of recent tensions while continuing to work together to mutual advantage.

Louis Farrakhan's anti-Semitic rhetoric during a nationwide tour in 1985 continued a pattern of demagoguery long known to the Jewish community. More worrisome than his rhetoric, however, was the fact that his appearances in major cities across the nation attracted large audiences, heightening concern about the extent to which anti-Jewish attitudes may be growing in the black community. The reluctance of some black leaders to denounce Farrakhan was difficult and painful for the Jewish community.

Corroborating the Jewish community's perceptions that anti-Semitic rhetoric strikes a responsive chord among black audiences is data derived from public opinion surveys conducted during the 1970s and 80s indicating that young, educated and middle-to-upper income blacks are more likely to hold anti-Semitic attitudes than other segments of the black community. Such findings are in direct contrast to nationwide patterns showing that those most likely to hold such views are older, less educated and of lower income. Equally disturbing are perceptions that racism is on the rise in the Jewish community.

Delete the first Strategic Goal in its entirety.

In the second Strategic Goal, delete the word "rebuild" and substitute the word build.

Add a new Strategic Goal as follows:

--actively combat racism and bigotry in all forms wherever they exist through joint efforts with the black community.

Rationale: We believe that the original Background section is very negative in nature and fails to comment sufficiently on the positive elements of Black-Jewish relations. We also believe that it concentrates too much on the Farrakhan issue and implies that that is the litmus test for the status of Black-Jewish relations. We further believe that the original Background does not take cognizance of what we perceive to be growing racism in the Jewish community. For these reasons, we recommend the adoption of the Background language proposed above, as well as the adoption of the new Strategic Goal.

We believe the change from the work "rebuild" to build, again, is more positive in tone.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE -

NEW PROPOSITION -- PAY EQUITY

National Council
of Jewish Women

Within the framework of Social and Economic Justice we believe that it is time for the full NJCRAC delegate body to discuss the continuing economic disparity between male and female workers. Inequality based on gender is unacceptable under any circumstances, and the persisting wage disparity between men and women raises serious questions about the social and economic equality of women. The National Council of Jewish Women believes that a Proposition in the Joint Program Plan must address this facet of equality. "

The Background of this Proposition should provide:

- A history of women in the work force and the wage disparity between women and men.
- Examine the various explanations for the existing wage gaps.
- Outline possible options aimed at closing existing wage gaps.

Strategic Goals should:

- Call on constituents to review pay disparities in their communities and study the efforts being made to reduce the disparities.
- Call on NJCRAC to study remedies and recommend a clear strategy for achieving pay equity.

Rationale: This issue has been in discussion within the NJCRAC structure for more than three years under a variety of headings, including the feminization of poverty, economic equity and comparable worth. The debate on how to achieve pay equity between men and women has taken place within the Domestic Task Force, the Task Force on Women and the Equal Opportunities Commission. It is, therefore, timely to expand the discussion of pay equity for consideration by the full delegate body.

PROPOSITION 23 INT: APARTHEID

BALTIMORE

Delete the original Strategic Goal #1, beginning with the words "encourage Jewish communal institutions..." and substitute the following Strategic Goal:
--urge Jewish communal institutions to begin measures of divestment in companies which do not subscribe to the Sullivan principles.

Add a new Strategic Goal to read as follows:
--interpret to groups - as needed - Israel's relationship with South Africa.

Rationale: The reasons are self-evident. We must be loud and clear as to where the American Jewish community is on this subject. We must also take a position of "urging divestment," not "examination of policies of divestment." It's overdue, as has been demonstrated by many Federations.



The language expressed in the strategic goals is more reminiscent of "tried and failed" methods of the past rather than the cruel reality of the day.

In the Gramm-Rudman era, massive public approaches to problems such as poverty are impracticable. The Jewish Community Relations field should emphasize innovative, private sector efforts at the state and local level to attack poverty, with a special focus on employing social service organizations.

SACRAMENTO

Would like it to be known that we are opposed to increased military spending at expense of social programs.

DETROIT

Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

-- URGE THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES TO ESTABLISH A HIERARCHY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC GOALS TO PROMOTE A COHERENT DOMESTIC POLICY;

-- INITIATE A NATIONWIDE DIALOGUE REGARDING THE NEED FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A COHERENT DOMESTIC POLICY AND THE SPECIFIC AGENDA WHICH WOULD COMPRISE SUCH A POLICY;

-- oppose budget reductions that further curtail or eliminate vital social and economic programs that alleviate the plight of the poor, the unemployed and our nation's cities, and which assist the middle class to become and remain productive;

-- interpret to Congress and the American people that further reductions in domestic and defense appropriations are not the sole means by which federal budget ceilings need be reached;

-- PROMOTE THE ADOPTION OF A DOMESTIC AGENDA WHICH GIVES HIGHEST PRIORITY TO INTRINSIC HUMAN NEEDS AND EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY;

-- undertake programs to reawaken the nation's awareness REAFFIRM TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF SOCIAL WELFARE LEGISLATION OF THE PAST FIFTY YEARS AND THE CONCOMITANT RECOGNITION that severe economic and social problems still exist;

-- INFORM the Jewish community OF the extent and impact of unemployment and rising poverty in the general and Jewish JEWISH AS WELL AS GENERAL communities;

-- urge Congress to adopt UNDERTAKE a comprehensive national attack on unemployment AND UNDER-EMPLOYMENT; reflecting the goals of the Emergency Jobs Program of the Full Employment Action Council (see 1984-85 Joint Program Plan, page 37), and encourage public-private to provide job training and permanent job opportunities in the private sector;

-- Forge coalitions with social service agency networks to secure these goals.

-- DEMONSTRATE, THROUGH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS, THAT SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE, AND IN CONJUNCTION THEREWITH, OPPOSE BUDGET REDUCTIONS THAT WOULD IMPAIR CHANCES FOR COMPREHENSIVE, ...



Preliminary Report

NJCRAC REVIEW COMMITTEE

Submitted to the NJCRAC Plenary Session
New York City
February 17, 1986



**NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS
ADVISORY COUNCIL**

443 PARK AVENUE SOUTH • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016 • (212) 684-6950

**NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL
CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS**

NATIONAL AGENCIES

American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
B'nai-B'rith—Anti-Defamation League
Hadassah
Jewish Labor Committee
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.

National Council of Jewish Women
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
United Synagogue of America—Women's League
for Conservative Judaism
Women's American ORT

Local, State and County Agencies* and their Locations

ALABAMA

BIRMINGHAM JCC

ARIZONA

GREATER PHOENIX Jewish Federation
TUCSON Jewish Federation of Southern Arizona

CALIFORNIA

GREATER LONG BEACH AND WEST ORANGE COUNTY Jewish
Community Federation
LOS ANGELES CRC of Jewish Federation-Council
OAKLAND Greater East Bay JCRC
ORANGE COUNTY Jewish Federation
SACRAMENTO JCRC
SAN DIEGO CRC of United Jewish Federation
SAN FRANCISCO JCRC
GREATER SAN JOSE JCRC

CONNECTICUT

GREATER BRIDGEPORT Jewish Federation
GREATER DANBURY CRC of Jewish Federation
GREATER HARTFORD CRC of Jewish Federation
NEW HAVEN Jewish Federation
EASTERN CONN. Jewish Federation
GREATER NORWALK Jewish Federation
STAMFORD United Jewish Federation
WATERBURY Jewish Federation
JCRC of Connecticut

DELAWARE

WILMINGTON Jewish Federation of Delaware

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GREATER WASHINGTON JCC

FLORIDA

SOUTH BROWARD Jewish Federation
GREATER FORT LAUDERDALE Jewish Federation
JACKSONVILLE JCC
GREATER MIAMI Jewish Federation
GREATER ORLANDO Jewish Federation
PALM BEACH COUNTY Jewish Federation
PINELLAS COUNTY Jewish Federation
SARASOTA Jewish Federation
SOUTH COUNTY Jewish Federation

GEORGIA

ATLANTA Jewish Federation
SAVANNAH Jewish Council

ILLINOIS

METROPOLITAN CHICAGO Public Affairs Committee of Jewish United Fund
PEORIA Jewish Federation
SPRINGFIELD Jewish Federation

INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS JCRC
SOUTH BEND Jewish Federation of St. Joseph Valley
JCRC of Indiana

IOWA

GREATER DES MOINES Jewish Federation

KANSAS

KANSAS CITY, see Missouri

KENTUCKY

LEXINGTON Central Kentucky Jewish Association
LOUISVILLE Jewish Community Federation

LOUISIANA

GREATER NEW ORLEANS Jewish Federation
SHREVEPORT Jewish Federation

MAINE

PORTLAND Southern Maine Jewish Federation—Community Council

MARYLAND

BALTIMORE Jewish Council
(Montgomery County, see D.C.)

MASSACHUSETTS

GREATER BOSTON JCRC
MARBLEHEAD North Shore Jewish Federation
GREATER NEW BEDFORD Jewish Federation
SPRINGFIELD Jewish Federation
WORCESTER Jewish Federation

MICHIGAN

METROPOLITAN DETROIT JCC
FLINT Jewish Federation

MINNESOTA

MINNEAPOLIS Minnesota and Dakotas JCRC—Anti-Defamation League

MISSOURI

GREATER KANSAS CITY Jewish Community Relations Bureau
ST. LOUIS JCRC

NEBRASKA

OMAHA JCRC Committee of Jewish Federation

NEW JERSEY

ATLANTIC COUNTY Federation of Jewish Agencies
BERGEN COUNTY JCRC of United Jewish Community
CHERRY HILL JCRC of Southern New Jersey Jewish Federation
DELAWARE VALLEY Jewish Federation
EAST ORANGE MetroWest New Jersey Jewish Community Federation
GREATER MIDDLESEX COUNTY Jewish Federation
UNION Central New Jersey Jewish Federation
WAYNE North Jersey Jewish Federation

NEW MEXICO

ALBUQUERQUE JCC

NEW YORK

GREATER ALBANY Jewish Federation
BINGHAMTON Jewish Federation of Broome County
GREATER BUFFALO Jewish Federation
ELMIRA CRC of Jewish Welfare Fund
GREATER KINGSTON Jewish Federation
NEW YORK JCRC
ROCHESTER Jewish Community Federation
GREATER SCHENECTADY Jewish Federation
SYRACUSE Jewish Federation
UTICA JCC

OHIO

AKRON Jewish Community Federation
CANTON Jewish Community Federation
CINCINNATI JCRC
CLEVELAND Jewish Community Federation
COLUMBUS CRC of Jewish Federation
GREATER DAYTON CRC of Jewish Federation
TOLEDO CRC of Jewish Welfare Federation
YOUNGSTOWN JCRC of Jewish Federation

OKLAHOMA

OKLAHOMA CITY JCC
TULSA JCC

OREGON

PORTLAND Jewish Federation

PENNSYLVANIA

ALLENTOWN CRC of Jewish Federation
ERIE JCC
GREATER PHILADELPHIA JCRC
PITTSBURGH CRC of United Jewish Federation
SCRANTON-LACKAWANNA Jewish Federation
GREATER WILKES-BARRE Jewish Federation

RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE CRC of Rhode Island Jewish Federation

SOUTH CAROLINA

CHARLESTON JCRC Committee
COLUMBIA CRC of Jewish Welfare Federation

TENNESSEE

MEMPHIS JCRC
NASHVILLE AND MIDDLE TENNESSEE Jewish Federation

TEXAS

AUSTIN JCC
GREATER DALLAS JCRC of Jewish Federation
EL PASO JCRC Committee

GREATER HOUSTON Jewish Federation
FORT WORTH Jewish Federation

SAN ANTONIO JCRC of Jewish Federation

VIRGINIA

NEWPORT NEWS-HAMPTON-WILLIAMSBURG United Jewish

Community of the Virginia Peninsula
RICHMOND Jewish Community Federation

TIDEWATER United Jewish Federation
(Northern Virginia, see D.C.)

WASHINGTON

GREATER SEATTLE Jewish Federation

WISCONSIN

MADISON JCC
MILWAUKEE Jewish Council

* Community Relations Committee (CRC); Jewish Community Council (JCC); Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC)

PRELIMINARY REPORT

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PRELIMINARY REPORT OF NJCRAC REVIEW COMMITTEE

Submitted to NJCRAC Plenary Session

New York, February 17, 1986

Introduction

Review Committee Process

In a major address to the Plenary Session of NJCRAC marking its 40th anniversary in February, 1984, Jacqueline K. Levine, Chair of NJCRAC, announced her decision to appoint a committee "to reflect upon how we (NJCRAC) are fulfilling our Statement of Purposes."

Charge to Review Committee

Mrs. Levine emphasized that the 40 years of communities and national agencies working together "in partnership on the basis of pluralism, unity and voluntarism, has well served the American Jewish community and American society." She said that would be the point of departure of the Committee. She stated that the charge upon the Committee would be on how to assure the continued effectiveness of the NJCRAC cooperative process in meeting the challenges of the balance of the 20th century.

While the process has been effective, Mrs. Levine noted that there also have been strains and tensions in the process of achieving full cooperation among community and national agencies. She stated, "While being the strongest advocates for working in coalition in the general community on a broad range of issues, Jewish community relations agencies, national or local, at times still shrink from giving fully to that ongoing process that coalesces the

resources of the Jewish community for the common weal. Such a coalition is absolutely essential to the goals of the Jewish community... Our strength as a field is in the unique partnership of national and community agencies." Mrs. Levine felt that cooperation and mutual trust could be strengthened through a joint self-examination by the member agencies themselves.

Earlier Reviews of NJCRAC

This review of the NJCRAC was not the first. The Executive Committee of the National Community Relations Advisory Council (its name until 1969) established in 1950 the Special Committee on Evaluative Studies. Under the supervision of that Committee, a far-reaching study process was undertaken by a technical study group, consisting of social scientists on the staffs of the NCRAC agencies, and a prominent social scientist not connected with any of the NCRAC agencies, but acceptable to all (Professor Robert M. MacIver of Columbia University). This led to a comprehensive survey of the field prepared by Professor MacIver, and the Barr Resolution adopted by the NCRAC Plenary Session on November 26, 1951, which, among other things, provided for the continuing process of joint program planning. Objecting to the Barr Resolution, the American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith withdrew from membership in NCRAC in 1952.

A less formal review of the Statement of Purposes, Organization and Operations of NCRAC was undertaken prior to June, 1966 when NCRAC leadership negotiated the return to membership in NJCRAC of the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. As a result of those discussions, the Statement of Purposes, Organization and Operations was amended in June 1966 and it continues to serve as the fundamental charter of NJCRAC.

In the summer of 1975, (when Albert D. Chernin succeeded Isaiah M. Minkoff, who had served as executive vice chairman since 1944) the officers of NJCRAC met for three days in a retreat on Long Island where they examined all aspects of the NJCRAC operation and process. This led to major changes in the joint program planning process, the nature and timing of NJCRAC plenary sessions, the joining of commission meetings to executive committee meetings, and the expansion of community participation in NJCRAC decision-making.

In 1981 a subcommittee of CRC directors engaged in a joint review process with NJCRAC officers, focusing particularly on community involvement, community consultation, and the role of NJCRAC in Washington with special emphasis on the response to the domestic agenda. Among other results, this process led to the creation of the NJCRAC Task Force on Domestic Concerns, and a Joint Program Plan Study Committee, which produced substantial changes in the procedures for adopting the Joint Program Plan.

Composition of Review Committee

The Review Committee is comprised of lay and professional representatives of seven national and eleven community member agencies. They are individuals who have had extensive experience as leaders in the field of Jewish community relations and Jewish communal service including the chair of NJCRAC, two past NJCRAC chairmen, a past president of the Council of Jewish Federations, five past presidents of federations, all of whom also have been CRC chairs, and the current chairman and three past chairpeople of the CRC Directors Association. They come from large, intermediate and small cities located in virtually every section of the United States. All but two of the national agency representatives attended every meeting of the Review

Committee. Those appointed as members of the Review Committee were:

Raymond Epstein, Chicago, Review Committee Chairman

Harold Adler & Jeff Sinensky, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith

Harold Applebaum, American Jewish Committee

Phil Baum, American Jewish Congress

Julius Berman, UOJCA

Lewis D. Cole, Louisville

Alvin Kushner, Detroit

Martin Lapan, Jewish Labor Committee

Jacqueline K. Levine, NJCRAC Chair, ex-officio

Beverly Minkoff, Women's American ORT

Peggy Norton, Chicago

Michael A. Pelavin, Flint, MI

Lawrence Rubin, Philadelphia

Arden Shenker, Portland, OR

Stanley Sollins, Baltimore

Albert Vorspan, Union of American Hebrew Congregations

Beryl Weinstein, Waterbury, CT

Bernard S. White, Washington, DC

Bennett Yanowitz, Cleveland

Albert D. Chernin, NJCRAC Executive Vice Chairman, staff

Prior to the Plenary Session of 1986, the Committee held 11 meetings, each one an in-depth discussion of the NJCRAC process, running 4-6 hours. The discussions were exceptionally candid and open; there were on occasion sharp differences of opinion, but they were also marked by "true and considerate

regard by all" for the opinions of each member of the Committee. Even as they confronted difficult, and, at times, seemingly intractable issues, members of the Committee displayed a strong sense of collegiality and mutual respect.

The Basic Posture of the Committee

The Statement of Purposes, Organization and Operations ("Statement of Purposes," Appendix C) provided the frame of reference for the Review Committee's examination. The Committee examined how well NJCRAC has been meeting the charge placed upon it by the Statement of Purposes. In order to assure the continuing effectiveness of NJCRAC as a "consultative, coordinating, and advisory council," the Committee considered whether there was a need for any changes in any aspect of the NJCRAC operation in light of the sweeping changes in conditions and circumstances since NJCRAC was created in 1944. In that framework everything was open for discussion, including whether the Statement of Purposes itself should be modified.

The Review Committee at an early stage of its deliberations agreed that it should not see itself as a "constitutional convention." It approached the question of making any changes in the Statement of Purposes with great caution. That reflected the Committee's recognition of NJCRAC as a delicately balanced instrument that over the course of more than four decades has been able to reconcile the conflicting interests and concerns of disparate member agencies for the good of the common cause.

The Committee recognized that the Statement of Purposes of necessity was deliberately ambiguous. Those ambiguities were in response to the disparate nature of NJCRAC member agencies. Inevitably, they have led to unavoidable tensions in inter-agency relationships, and operating difficulties

within NJCRAC. That is inherent in the makeup of NJCRAC, reflecting the conflict of interests of different constituencies. These differences are the tapestry of Jewish life. It is this reality that is the source of NJCRAC's strength and difficulties. Agencies cannot nor should not be forced into one particular mold.

The Committee recognized that the Statement of Purposes is not a contract that can be enforced against member agencies. Rather, the Statement was viewed by the Committee as the optimal arrangement for maximizing voluntary cooperation among national and local agencies around issues of common concern to the American Jewish community.

Throughout its deliberations the Committee was guided by the determination that the union that is NJCRAC should be preserved. Even though it has not functioned to perfection, the Committee found that member agencies, national and local, have actively engaged in cooperation, collaboration, and consultation around the tables of NJCRAC. The guiding principles have been fairness, respect for autonomy and voluntarism, and a commitment to the common cause. NJCRAC was seen as having made a singular contribution to the well-being of the American Jewish community, to whom NJCRAC is ultimately accountable.

Thus the findings and recommendations of the Committee are within the framework of the Statement of Purposes. It sought to interpret and clarify the meaning and intent of the various provisions of the Statement, rather than seek changes in the basic document. In doing so, the Committee drew upon more than 200 pages of minutes of its 11 meetings. The minutes gave continuity to the discussions, and provided the legislative history which served as the

basis of the judgments of the Review Committee described in this report.

The Approach of the Committee

The Committee drew upon the experience of members of the Committee, all of whom have been intimately involved in NJCRAC for a number of years, some of them dating back to the earliest years of NJCRAC. That knowledge of NJCRAC and the field of Jewish community relations proved beneficial to the deliberations of the process. In examining the NJCRAC process the Committee adopted a discussion outline (see Appendix D), which was derived from the Statement of Purposes. That discussion outline dealt with questions on the process for shaping consensus, the nature of coordination once consensus is achieved, procedures for the issuance of public statements and the undertaking of public action, and whether the role originally defined for NJCRAC was responsive to the needs and concerns of the Jewish community today.

In addition to being guided by the questions of the discussion outline, the Review Committee also considered the following sets of questions:

- 1) Has the NJCRAC included within its scope of concerns all of those issues which its constituent member agencies and the communities feel require attention? Is it possible to establish criteria which would enable NJCRAC to determine what should or should not be included on the agenda? Can the Review Committee formulate a hierarchy of priorities in response to the limited resources of the field of Jewish community relations?
- 2) Do the structure and operating procedures of NJCRAC provide an environment in which disparate constituencies can operate harmoniously and effectively?

Does it permit appropriate freedom of action to all of its member agencies? Is there general satisfaction with the working relationships among its member agencies? Is the environment conducive to achieving consensus, cooperation and coordination?

3) Recognizing that the major financial support for NJCRAC comes from the federations which created NJCRAC, is NJCRAC fulfilling their aspirations? Is their understanding and perception of NJCRAC's role congruent with the role and goals set forth in the Statement of Purposes?

As part of the review process, a subcommittee of the Review Committee interviewed 11 lay and professional leaders of several federations and national agencies to get their perceptions of NJCRAC.

As a result of this extensive process, the Review Committee is submitting this preliminary report to the NJCRAC Plenary Session meeting in New York at the Waldorf-Astoria from February 16-19, 1986. The report was drafted by Albert D. Chernin, NJCRAC Executive Vice Chairman, and then reviewed by the Committee. The discussion at the Plenum is regarded by the Review Committee as the first step in a 12-month process of soliciting the views and observations of federations, CRCs and national member agencies. On the basis of these consultations the Review Committee then will complete its final report.

Outline of the Preliminary Report

The preliminary report includes:

— a survey of what the field of Jewish community relations has

- accomplished since the creation of NJCRAC in 1944; the radical changes that have occurred in American Jewish life since 1944; how the agenda has changed over the course of these past four decades in response to these developments; their impact on the field of Jewish community relations and its priorities, and how the organizational development of the field and federations has changed;
- perceptions of the role of NJCRAC and of how it is carrying it out;
 - an assessment of the responsiveness of the agenda of the Jewish community relations field, particularly as it is expressed in the Joint Program Plan, to the needs and concerns of member agencies and the Jewish community as a whole; an examination of criteria for determining the agenda of the field of Jewish community relations, and guidelines for setting the priorities of the field;
 - an examination of NJCRAC's roles, processes and procedures, including coordination; its role as a clearing house; assignment of responsibility for specific tasks; maximizing community input into the process; procedures for issuing public statements and undertaking public actions; enhancing coordination in Washington, DC, and deepening community understanding of NJCRAC.

In regard to the questions of public action and public statements and coordination in Washington, the Review Committee agreed to defer making final recommendations until the culmination of the extensive process of consultation that will be undertaken among national and local agencies throughout the year 1986. The report does present the different views about the nature of the

problems in these areas, and various proposals for responding to these problems. It also identifies other problems, which were not examined in-depth by the Committee. They will require further consideration by the Review Committee or by other deliberative bodies of NJCRAC.



Section I - Preliminary Report

Achievements and Changing Nature of the Field of Jewish Community Relations from 1944 to 1986

In its examination of how NJCRAC was meeting the charge placed upon it by the Statement of Purposes the Review Committee was conscious that the charge which had been originally formulated in 1944, has remained essentially the same, although modified in some respects in 1952 and 1966. The Review Committee examined the charge in light of the radical changes which have occurred in American society, the American Jewish community, the agenda of the Jewish community relations field, and in the organizational development of the Jewish community relations field and federations. The Review Committee recognized that the factors described in this section and Appendix A have deeply affected the agenda, the role, the efficacy, structures, and budgets of the field of Jewish community relations.

Impact of Field

In reviewing how the network of national and local member agencies have worked together through NJCRAC the Review Committee's assessment rested on its recognition of the profound impact the field of Jewish community relations as a whole has had since World War II. Those achievements substantially enhanced the status and security of the Jewish community at home and abroad. Because of their relevance in evaluating the cooperative process that is NJCRAC, the highlights of those landmark achievements follow:*

*An elaboration of these achievements is attached as Appendix B in the text of the address of NJCRAC Chair, Jacqueline K. Levine, to the Plenary Session, marking the fortieth anniversary of NJCRAC in February, 1984.

Changing Fundamental Conditions in America

In the period immediately following World War II anti-Semitism was endemic in America. The most extreme anti-Semitic groups enjoyed widespread popular support. Jews suffered discrimination in higher education, employment, housing and public accommodations. Quotas were part of the American way of life. Restrictive covenants were enforced in the courts. It was a Protestant America, evident in the daily routine of prayers and Bible reading in the public schools, a constant reminder that this was a Christian nation.

In response the network of agencies comprising NJCRAC, played a vital role in bringing about revolutionary changes in American society, and in the nature of Jewish life in ways only scarcely imagined. It was launched in the 1940s in partnership with the NAACP with a campaign seeking the sanction of law to enforce equal opportunity in employment, housing, education. To that end coalitions were essential. Nationally NJCRAC member agencies joined with the NAACP in creating the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.* In the communities CRCs took the lead in creating similar coalitions. State-by-state, city-by-city, law-by-law, CRCs and national agencies were in the vanguard of achieving the enactment in the 1940s and 1950s of the infrastructure of civil rights legislation that paved the way to the historic acts of Congress in the mid-1960s.

To achieve a society in which the state was neutral among religious beliefs, and between belief and non-belief, Jewish community relations agencies in the 1940s turned to the First Amendment of the Constitution, the cornerstone of American liberties, guaranteeing the separation of church and state, and freedom of religion. By the early 1960s the separation principle was being enforced in case after case by the Supreme Court. Those landmark opinions

*Arnold Aronson, as a member of NJCRAC's staff, served as the secretary of the LCCR with Roy Wilkins as chairman from its creation to the late 1970s.

reflected what the Jewish community relations field collectively argued in its many briefs in the 1940s and the 1950s. No longer would Jewish children be subjected to daily religious rituals in the public schools which affected their self-image and status as Americans and as Jews.

The network of Jewish agencies bitterly opposed in 1952 the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, codifying America's racist immigration laws which cost thousands of Jewish lives in the 1930s. Almost alone the field fought to keep the issue alive in the 1950s, when few others cared, and together with a few close friends, forged a new coalition which was to be called the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference, still a force today as the National Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Forum. As a result of these efforts, the vicious national origins quota system was overwhelmingly repealed by Congress in 1965.*

Fostering Support for Israel

Israel did not become a significant item on the agenda of the Jewish community relations field collectively until the 1950s, and Soviet Jewry, not until the 1960s. By the mid-1950s Soviet weapons of war were flowing into the Arab world on a massive basis to spur them on in their determination to drive Israel from the Middle East. It was then that Israel was mentioned for the first time in the 1954 Joint Program Plan. The first NJCRAC committee on Israel, which interestingly, was called the Committee on the Community Relations Aspects of the Middle East, was not created until 1955.**

*For his efforts, Albert D. Chernin, as a member of NJCRAC's staff, received one of the pens used by President Johnson in signing into law this act on October 3, 1965.

**The first chairman of this committee was Julian Freeman, who then was the immediate past president of the Council of Jewish Federations.

As the role of the United States became increasingly critical to the security and survival of the State of Israel, the Jewish community relations field, year-by-year, steadily increased its emphasis on American foreign policy in the Middle East. By 1967 Israel had become a top priority of the Jewish community relations field. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, the largest share of the community relations resources was directed at interpreting Israel. At that time (1974) the NJCRAC Israel Task Force ("I.T.F.") was established, and more than \$900,000 was raised by the Council of Jewish Federations ("C.J.F.") from federations for special projects which were administered by NJCRAC member agencies through the NJCRAC I.T.F. for a three-year period.* In 1980 more than \$200,000 was raised by the CJF for the same purpose. U.S. support for the security and survival of Israel remains as the highest priority of the field.

Advocacy of Soviet Jewry Cause

As threats to the security of American Jews diminished, the Jewish community increasingly responded to endangered Jewish communities abroad, particularly the Jews of the Soviet Union. Suffering harsh repression, they were cut off from their past and denied their future, isolated and alienated, and barred from leaving. They were a frightened and intimidated Jewish community without hope.

Although Soviet Jews had been a matter of deep concern, it was not until 1963 that Soviet Jews became a priority for the Jewish community relations field when the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry was created for the purpose of engaging in an active public campaign to expose the repression of Soviet Jews. From 1965 to 1971 NJCRAC was assigned the responsibility of staffing that umbrella body, which was the predecessor organization of the National Conference

*The first chairman of the ITF was Theodore R. Mann, who subsequently served as chairman of NJCRAC.

on Soviet Jewry and the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry.* By 1970 the issue drew upon virtually the entire seven-person staff of NJCRAC, and led to the acceptance of fully-funding the umbrella body for Soviet Jewry, giving it a separate staff. In the creation of the NCSJ, its organizers formally recognized the role of NJCRAC as the coordinator and catalyst of community activity on behalf of Soviet Jews.

In that campaign, launched in the 1960s, the invisible Jews of the Soviet Union became an issue of world concern and an issue high on the agenda of U.S.-Soviet relations. Responding to Western demonstrations on their behalf, the Jews of the Soviet Union engaged in incredible acts of courage in publicly petitioning the Soviet government for their rights. The Soviet regime reacted with an iron fist, but it also permitted in the 1970s unprecedented movement from the Soviet Union of thousands of Soviet Jews. Thousands more applying for visas to Israel continued to be denied that fundamental human right. Thus the perilous status of Soviet Jews remains among the critical concerns of the field.

Total Agenda

The shift to priority emphasis on threats to Jewish security abroad (the original emphasis of the American Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress in the early 20th century) also represented a shift in the preoccupation of the Jewish community relations field from protecting the rights of Jews as individuals to fostering conditions hospitable to the creative survival of the American Jewish community as a community. The earlier concern was on enabling the American Jew to become integrated into American society, and as the goal became more of a reality, the emphasis shifted to the creative continuity of the Jewish community as a distinctive community.

*As staff members of NJCRAC, Henry Siegman (summer of 1975); Albert D. Chernin (1965-68), and Abraham Bayer (1968-71) served as coordinators of the AJCSJ.

Advocacy on behalf of Israel and Soviet Jewry required substantial grass roots support and involvement. It required agencies capable of mobilizing the entire American Jewish community, nationally and locally. The active involvement of the grass roots Jewish community on issues of such critical concern led to less emphasis on issues of concern to other groups in American society. While the field concentrated primarily on threats to the security of Jews in other lands, the Jewish community relations agenda, paradoxically, also was broadened to deal with issues that affect the overall nature of American society. The earlier concerns about such issues as anti-Semitism, church-state, civil rights, and immigration did not disappear from the agenda; indeed, developments since 1979 have led to renewed emphasis on these issues as well. The end result is that the demands on Jewish community relations agencies have increased enormously over these past four decades; new layers of issues have been piled on old layers of concerns.

Cooperation in the Common Cause

In the perspective of these forty years, these achievements have been extraordinary, and they were achieved by the Jewish community relations field as a whole. Each agency, national or local, made its own special contribution. They represent the collective efforts of agencies, each functioning in its own particular way.

No one agency could have achieved these results alone. They could only have been accomplished by the network of agencies, national and local, working together through the NJCRAC. They did not function in isolation, in a state of anarchy, each acting without reference to the efforts of the others.

Changing Structure of Jewish Communal Service

Responsive to fundamental changes that took place in the American Jewish community were fundamental changes in the Jewish communal structure of the American Jewish community. Since World War II significant growth occurred in the community relations field among national agencies and CRCs. This has paralleled a phenomenal growth of federations, who also have played a key role in the development of the Jewish community relations field. The American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Congress, and Jewish Labor Committee comprised the original national agency membership of NJCRAC. They also formed the General Jewish Council, the predecessor organization of NJCRAC. The uniqueness of NJCRAC was that it joined these national agencies to community agencies in forming a special kind of partnership.

Since 1944, the number of CRCs has grown from the 14 that comprised the original membership of NJCRAC to 113 community member agencies. To qualify for membership in NJCRAC a CRC must be representative in its composition, conduct a community relations program on an ongoing basis, be staffed professionally on at least a part-time basis, and be accountable to the local Jewish community. Thirteen CRCs are autonomous constituent agencies of their federations, and the other 100 are either departments or committees of federations. In 1944, 12 of the original 14 community agencies were staffed on a full-time basis. Today 39 CRCs have full-time community relations staff. Ten CRCs have professional staffs of 4-8 professionals. There are now more than 90 full-time CRC professionals. In the last 25 years the amount budgeted for all CRCs has grown from less than \$1.5 million to nearly eight million dollars.

Significant growth also has occurred among three national Jewish community relations agencies, the American Jewish Committee, ADL, and American Jewish Congress. In 1965 their combined budgets totaled nearly \$8.5 million, and they received more than \$2 million in allocations from federations. In 1985 their budgets totaled more than \$44 million and they received in federation allocations about \$4 million. Today they have 74 regional offices in nearly 50 cities, and staff totaling more than 400.

In 1944, when NJCRAC was established, its staff was limited to an Executive Director (Isaiah M. Minkoff). Shortly thereafter it was agreed, after considerable discussion, that four other professionals should be added to the staff. In 1948 the NJCRAC staff was increased from five to six professionals, and in 1957, to seven professionals. That remained the size of the staff roster until 1975. In the last 10 years the size of the NJCRAC staff has increased to 12 professionals. Its 1986 budget is \$1.2 million.

"Federations have emerged as the dominant communal force on the American scene, the magnet for requests and demands for action on new needs," noted Philip Bernstein, Executive Director Emeritus of the CJF, in his recent book, "To Dwell in Unity." Federations have played a critical role in the NJCRAC from its very creation. They were responsible not only for creating NJCRAC but similarly for CRCs throughout the United States. Federations look upon CRCs and the NJCRAC as their community relations arms. They provide virtually all of the funding of CRCs, and about 70% of NJCRAC's budget (in 1985, \$800,000), in addition to the 8% of the budget provided to NJCRAC by CRCs in service dues. Federations also provide nearly 10% of the funding of the national budgets of ADL, AJCommittee, and AJCongress.

In various ways federations directly and through the CJF have played an active role over these past four decades in seeking to strengthen NJCRAC's role as the national coordinating body of the field of Jewish community relations. The interest in Jewish community relations of federation leaders is reflected in the number of sessions devoted to community relations at the General Assemblies as well as Quarterlies. In setting up such sessions as well as in the resolutions process, CJF uses NJCRAC as its consultative body.

From 1932 when the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds was organized it has grown from the original group of 29 federations to an association of more than 200 federations in the United States and Canada, serving nearly 800 Jewish communities. Before World War II there were 60 federations with full time professional staff. Today there are 148 federations with 1,393 professionals on their staffs; the 17 largest federations alone have staffing of almost 900 professionals,

Before World War II federations collectively raised nearly \$30 million. In 1946, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the federations raised in more than \$130 million, and that figure grew to \$205 million in 1948 when the State of Israel was created. In campaigns triggered by the Yom Kippur War federations raised more than \$700 million. At their current plateau, they collectively raise about \$750 million. The endowment funds of the federations today total more than one billion dollars.

In addition to the growth of federations, national agencies, CRCs and the creation of the NJCRAC over these past 40 years, there have been other significant organizational developments in the Jewish community relations field. In 1950 the American Israel Public Affairs Committee was established. It has grown into a formidable lobbying force in Washington, DC on behalf of

Israel, and since 1975, its budget has grown from approximately \$500,000 to more than six million dollars. In 1955 the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations was established to serve as the American Jewish spokesman to the government of the United States on threats to world Jewry, primarily Israel. In 1963, as previously noted, the American Jewish Conference of Soviet Jewry was created and this body became the National Conference on Soviet Jewry in 1971.

Other national organizations, whose primary charge was not in community relations, became increasingly involved in Jewish community relations and were accepted into membership in NJCRAC. The Jewish War Veterans became the fifth national member agency of NJCRAC. The Union of American Hebrew Congregations staffed its Commission on Social Action on a professional basis and joined NJCRAC in the early 1950s, followed by the United Synagogue, and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America.* National Council of Jewish Women affiliated in the 1960s. Women's American ORT and Hadassah were the last national agencies accepted into membership in NJCRAC in the late 1970s. All of them have demonstrated increasing responsiveness, especially through their local chapters, to the community relations agenda.

The Review Committee also noted that periodically, in response to some critical concern, groups emerged that have operated outside the umbrella structures of the Jewish community such as Breira, the New Jewish Agenda, the American Association for Ethiopian Jews, and the Union of Councils of Soviet Jews.

*In 1952 Albert Vorspan, then a member of the staff of NJCRAC, was appointed the director (its first) of the new Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism.

Section II - Preliminary Report

Perceptions of NJCRAC

As part of the review process of the NJCRAC Review Committee, interviews were conducted with a sampling representation of federation and national agency leaders to get their perceptions of NJCRAC. Those interviewed were leaders of four Big 16 and Large Intermediate Cities from the Far West, Midwest, Eastern Seaboard and South, and presidents of two major national agencies. They were Esther Leah Ritz, immediate Past President of the Milwaukee Federation; Ted Kanner, Executive Vice President of the Los Angeles Federation; Ted Farber, Executive Vice President of the Federation of Washington, DC; Norman Lipoff, immediate Past President of the Miami Federation; Sam Adler, President of the Miami Federation; Myron Brodie, Executive Vice President of the Miami Federation; Theodore R. Mann, President of the American Jewish Congress; Howard Friedman, President of the American Jewish Committee, and David Gordis, Executive Vice President of the American Jewish Committee. The Review Committee as a whole met on May 16, 1985 with Carmi Schwartz, executive vice president of the CJF, who presented what he described as the perceptions of federations (his observations are identified by name).

Those who conducted the other interviews (although they were not all present for each of the interviews) were Harold Applebaum, Phil Baum, Albert D. Chernin, Raymond Epstein, Jacqueline Levine, Peggy Norton, Bernard White, and Bennett Yanowitz.

The interviewees were asked their conception of the role of NJCRAC; the role of communities in NJCRAC; the role of national agencies in NJCRAC; their

judgment about how NJCRAC was carrying out its role; whether the issues with which NJCRAC was dealing were responsive to the Jewish community's concerns; whether NJCRAC's role is understood by their leadership, and what services NJCRAC should provide to member agencies.

What follows are the perceptions of NJCRAC of those who were interviewed. Their views, as well as those perceptions expressed by members of the Review Committee, are responded to in the other sections of this report, particularly Sections III and IV.

Coordination

"The charge upon NJCRAC is to coordinate," declared the president of one of NJCRAC's national member agencies. Agreeing, the president of a Big 16 Federation added that included, when necessary, agencies, which were not members of NJCRAC such as AIPAC.

In emphasizing NJCRAC's role as the national coordinating body for the field of Jewish community relations, this national agency president distinguished between CRCs, which are functional, he said, "and NJCRAC which must be different." If NJCRAC were operational, he stated, "it would be competitive with its own member agencies, and undermine its coordinating role." He characterized NJCRAC as "a magnificent conception" and NJCRAC should remain true to that conception.

Carmi Schwartz recalled that NJCRAC was created as the instrument of federations in order to effectively utilize the valuable resources of the national agencies on a coordinated basis. It sought to strengthen the network of their own local community relations instrumentalities, namely the CRCs, and the national agencies through NJCRAC.

A national agency president and a federation president described NJCRAC as the coordinating body to develop a national consensus among agencies to the extent possible. In doing so, they felt NJCRAC should recognize that the Jewish community is not monolithic, and should "expand consensus without smothering differences, and see that all different points of view are known."

Asserting that NJCRAC makes a conscientious effort to solicit the views of national member agencies, the other president of a national member agency saw NJCRAC as the table which has provided opportunities for the expression of diverse points of view. He said that the identification of variations in points of views in agencies is a helpful service to the Jewish community.

Mr. Schwartz expressed the view that once consensus had been reached through the NJCRAC consultation process, NJCRAC had a responsibility to press for compliance with the positions jointly agreed upon by its member agencies. He cited situations when this did not happen.

Some federation presidents and executives said that while they believe NJCRAC is effective in reaching consensus, they don't have a sense of the coordination of agency activities once consensus has been achieved except for the Israel Task Force projects and the campaigns against the sales of arms to Arab states. A federation executive added that "duplication is endemic in the community relations field; a lot of money is being spent on similar activities by too many entities."

A Big 16 executive also was troubled by what he saw as an erosion of special areas of competence and expertise that had distinguished one agency from another. He cited, as an example, litigation. He felt that NJCRAC should try to get national agencies to respect the primary roles that agencies

had been undertaking in certain areas over the course of many years, although he stated he was well aware how difficult this could be for NJCRAC to achieve.

The same executive also noted that the United Jewish Appeal and AIPAC are in substantially different positions today than in earlier years and suggested that consideration be given to bringing them into the coordinating process of NJCRAC. A federation president added that in regard to AIPAC, communities tended to turn to that agency on Middle East issues, rather than national agencies or NJCRAC because of the Washington, DC connection.

A Big 16 executive felt that NJCRAC should have given stronger leadership in resolving jurisdictional problems in regard to Soviet Jewry. He said that he found it incredible that the Jewish community has both the NJCRAC and the National Conference on Soviet Jewry working on the issue of Soviet Jewry. He felt that the activities in which they both engage require one agency to undertake these tasks. He said that he would prefer that the National Conference on Soviet Jewry be folded into NJCRAC. A president of a national member agency was critical of what he described as a "turf" conflict between the NJCRAC and the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.

The executive of an NJCRAC national agency described the NJCRAC process as cumbersome, requiring too much staff time from his agency.

National Resource of Communities

A past president of a Big 16 federation commented that an individual community is helpless to effect change, but communities collectively are much more capable of doing so. That's why it (NJCRAC) is so vital to them. A

federation executive characterized NJCRAC as "our" national coordinating body, and less so as the national coordinating body of national agencies. A federation president looked upon NJCRAC as "the umbrella for the communities," but it also has responsibility to recognize its national agency constituency and the philosophical conflicts that may grow out of that constituency.

Similarly, a federation agency executive said that communities want NJCRAC to be "our" agency to see that the community relations field is responding to those issues that the community is concerned about, and that NJCRAC also should play the role of conciliation among national agencies.

NJCRAC is the national resource body of the communities and the instrument for coordinating them, similar to CJF, noted one federation executive. He added, as did a federation president, that when their communities seek guidance, NJCRAC is the initial source to which they turn. In the same vein, another federation executive saw NJCRAC primarily as the feeder of information to communities.

Mr. Schwartz stated that clearly the federations' national instrument in community relations is NJCRAC. CJF looks to NJCRAC for guidance on the community relations program of the General Assembly, seeking the assistance of NJCRAC in trying to secure the best available resources, including those from national agencies, for participation in the programs of the General Assembly. While the "chosen instrument" of federations in community relations on the national level is their own creation, NJCRAC, he emphasized that there is a relationship between federations and national agencies including a financial relationship, political relationships and other forms of relationships.

A federation executive felt that NJCRAC has a special responsibility to help the leadership of CRCs understand the role of the CRC, especially when a CRC may be failing to carry out its role. He also felt that NJCRAC should give greater emphasis to developing training programs for personnel of CRCs. In that connection he commended the NJCRAC Minkoff Institute for full-time CRC executives.

The president of a national member agency suggested that NJCRAC give greater priority to initiating regional consultations, particularly in crisis situations, drawing upon national resources for such consultations. He favorably recalled the kind of regional consultations that NJCRAC held during the arms package battle in 1978.

Role of National Agencies in NJCRAC

"NJCRAC is owned and dominated by national agencies. It doesn't have the freedom, license and resources to reflect local community needs and desires. It doesn't have the space in which to maneuver."

"Major national agencies are acting to suppress NJCRAC," trying to limit the role of NJCRAC" to merely convening meetings," seeking "to prevent NJCRAC from serving as an umbrella body of the field of Jewish community relations...(and) trying to keep the NJCRAC operation at the lowest level."

"NJCRAC is controlled by national agencies."

A Big 16 executive noted that in the last 40 years national agencies have grown enormously without the comparable growth in stature and budget of NJCRAC.

These comments typified judgments of federation presidents and executives. Mr. Schwartz asked whether NJCRAC in fact serves and involves its principal clients, the local CRCs, as equal partners with the national agencies, or does it give greater weight to the large national agencies that comprise NJCRAC? He said that the perception is that the nationals are more actively involved in such a process within NJCRAC than are the communities. Mr. Schwartz said there has to be a way of bringing the communities into the process so that policy and program are not viewed as being solely the product of national agencies from which the communities have been excluded. NJCRAC should pay heed to those seeking greater input from the local "CRC-Federation."

A past federation president felt that the sense of powerlessness that communities may feel in the NJCRAC process relative to national agencies should not be surprising in the light of the specialized expertise that national agencies bring as distinguished from the participation of community people tend to who be generalists.

The president of a national agency felt that the approach of national agencies in NJCRAC should be one of reasonableness, avoiding postures of moral certitude. He said the national agencies, as well as the communities, must realize that they don't always have the right answers. He felt that national agencies should draw upon NJCRAC to show the complexity of issues.

Role of CRCs

A national agency president saw significant participation of communities in NJCRAC. A federation executive, who has served in key positions in three Big 16 cities, all member agencies of NJCRAC, said he was impressed

by the many knowledgeable people actively involved in NJCRAC from those cities. Based on that experience, he thought that was an indication of the success of NJCRAC in attracting and involving community people.

On the other hand, another executive of a Big 16 Federation said he did not get a sense of close links between his community and NJCRAC. He stated that his people don't feel an investment in NJCRAC, unlike his community's relationship to the CJF. He noted that previously CJF had a similar problem with his community. He felt the issue was how NJCRAC uses itself to bring in the community leadership and how NJCRAC utilizes them.

One federation president said that federations see themselves as part of NJCRAC. But the federation headed by this person does not feel that it has input in NJCRAC. How a federation relates to NJCRAC may be determined by whether its CRC is autonomous or a committee or department of the federation, this president suggested. This particular president and a federation executive looked favorably on having a community caucus within NJCRAC; believing it would increase community acceptance of NJCRAC.

A federation president also said that CRCs should be recognized as the agency to implement action programs locally and CRCs should draw upon local affiliates of national agencies in carrying out such programs. A national agency president expressed concern about turf conflicts between national agencies and CRCs, who he perceives as very competitive with national agencies. He added that CRCs tend to be reactive, usually with knee-jerk responses to issues, and their statements tend to be superficial and oversimplified. The other national agency president commented that his agency finds that on the local level CRCs are "stealing their ideas."

Role of Federations

Carmi Schwartz observed that federations in recent years have either discovered, or in some instances, rediscovered community relations with a greater level of intensity than at any previous time (at least to his knowledge). Historically, federations delegated the community relations responsibility to their CRC instrumentality, whether it was a committee of the federation or autonomous, and to some degree to national agencies, particularly NJCRAC. They looked to them, nationally and locally, to analyze, respond, speak, in short, to do whatever was necessary to handle a given issue. They did not seek major involvement or input, but they expected to be kept informed.

He said that in recent years there has been an increasing demand, almost an urgent demand, by federations to be involved in the area of community relations. Federations no longer are content merely to be recipients of information; they want to be part of that process that develops policy and strategy. This has had both negative and positive implications. There are a whole set of forces working upon federation leadership that lead to their becoming increasingly sensitive to community relations. Mr. Schwartz said that he thought that pattern would grow in future years. One important factor is that the activities of the federation as the nexus where community relations and fund raising intersect, are not always compatible, or mutually supportive. Mr. Schwartz said that he could recall situations in recent years when community relations and fund raising were not on the same track.

In the extensive review process of the CJF, a major consideration was on how the CJF should relate to NJCRAC on behalf of federations in order to

make NJCRAC a better instrument, to strengthen its ability to coordinate and to service its principal client, namely the local CRC, as well as the federation, certainly a client, if not a principal client. That concern was expressed in the creation of the CJF/NJCRAC Liaison Committee.

Responsiveness of Agenda to Community Concerns

A past president of a Big 16 federation said that as a federation president, he found that the priority issues that NJCRAC was addressing were sensitive to community concerns and needs, and that they were timely. Another federation president felt that while the issues on the agenda were responsive to the needs of the Jewish community, they were not perceived that way. This president saw the issues as having become much more complex and more remote from the rank and file; it requires a high degree of sophistication to recognize the Jewish stake in these issues. Thus it is harder to connect with individuals on the local level with these issues as distinguished from those issues that trigger a gut reaction.

Carmi Schwartz stated that Israel today is the dominant concern of federations. It represents a major portion of federation relationships and activities including fund raising, interpretation, and other programmatic aspects. Clearly, the Israel factor is also dominated by significant community relations dimensions. In regard to Israel there is a growing common concern, although not necessarily a congruence in strategies and approaches between federations and community relations. There are other considerations that affect the agenda of federations that do not stem from community relations but they have obvious community relations ramifications. He pointed, as an example, to the Washington Mission Program. Although it is in response

to fund raising needs, it contains a major community relations piece, both in terms of international concerns and domestic concerns.

A federation executive of a Big 16 community saw NJCRAC as playing an important role in strengthening Soviet Jewry programs. Similarly, he felt, as did a federation president, that NJCRAC has played an effective role in regard to Ethiopian Jews. However, he and another federation executive said that they did not have a sense of a clear identifiable, comprehensive program to interpret Israel, even when there are no crises. He felt that not enough attention was given to the Middle East. They commended the Israel Task Force projects of NJCRAC and expressed regret that the media project no longer was in existence.

Another federation executive described NJCRAC as primarily reactive, particularly in regard to the Middle East. He did not have a perception of a "posture of leadership." He expressed the view that NJCRAC was "a captive of Israel, particularly during the war in Lebanon."

Deeply concerned about Israel, a federation executive also expressed concern about what he described as movement by many within the Jewish community away from support of domestic positions which Jewish agencies traditionally advocated. He felt there was a need to give greater emphasis to educational programs to interpret the Jewish community's stake in these programs.

The president of a national agency felt that there was a very substantial gap between the wide range of issues covered by the Joint Program Plan and the concerns of the Jewish community. While impressed by what he charac-

terized as the thoughtfulness of the Joint Program Plan, he felt that it essentially set forth the liberal agenda, and he questioned whether it was responsive to the needs and interests of the Jewish community.

Several presidents and executives of federations said they found the Joint Program Plan helpful. They looked to the Plan as a reflection of the consensus of communities and national agencies on critical issues. Several said they keep it readily available, referring to it frequently.

Program Exchange and Clearance

One of the national agency presidents felt that an important role of NJCRAC is program exchange, and that should include information about national agency programs. NJCRAC should let everybody know about "the outstanding programs being undertaken by national agencies as well as CRCs." He said that NJCRAC should do so even if such reports may seem to be imbalanced, and may offend agencies whose reports of activities appear less often. A past president of a Big 16 federation, who has also been a CRC chairman, said that national agencies might be less defensive, were NJCRAC to keep communities informed of what national agencies are doing.

A national agency president said that while national agencies usually know what other agencies are doing, the NJCRAC process has provided good opportunities to learn what other agencies are thinking and doing.

This agency president also said that his agency should be more disciplined in keeping NJCRAC informed. The other national agency president said that his agency would share plans and new issues with NJCRAC, but it lacks trust in NJCRAC.

Section III - Preliminary Report

Responsiveness of NJCRAC Agenda to Needs and Concerns of the Jewish Community

In five different meetings the Review Committee engaged in an intensive examination of whether the NJCRAC process, particularly the Joint Program Plan, has resulted in an agenda and guidelines that were responsive to the needs and concerns of the field of Jewish community relations and the Jewish community as a whole. It considered such questions as: Has the NJCRAC included within its scope of concerns all of those issues which its member national and community agencies feel require attention? Is it possible to establish criteria which would enable NJCRAC to determine which issue should or should not be included on the agenda? Can NJCRAC develop criteria for determining priorities in relation to the available resources of the field of Jewish community relations?

The Review Committee recognized that the function of the NJCRAC Joint Program Plan is to identify those issues of compelling community relations concern to the organized Jewish community. Described by several members of the Review Committee as a "blueprint for action," the Plan is intended to provide guidelines for responding to changes in conditions that either threaten or advance the goals of the field of Jewish community relations. In light of the assessment of conditions it should set forth priorities and strategic goals for the coming year. In doing so it should be selective among the many issues on the table. Some members of the Review Committee found that the Plan has been too far-reaching in the issues with which it deals. The Committee recognized that in post-World War II America the issues of vital concern to the Jewish community have radically expanded. The agenda not only continues

to include the original priorities of domestic anti-Semitism, church-state, immigration, interreligious relations, discrimination, but also now includes priorities of international concern, particularly Israel and Soviet Jewry, and other issues growing out of a concern for social justice. It further recognized that the issues have become increasingly complex and seemingly remote from the immediate concerns of the Jewish community. The Committee felt that the expanded agenda also is in response to a readiness of member agencies to accommodate the special concerns of one or more member agencies or the strong feelings of some representatives of member agencies about a specific issue, even when these concerns are not widely shared.

Some members of the the Review Committee felt that the process should be more disciplined in limiting the agenda for the field to the overriding concerns of the Jewish community as a whole. Some members of the Committee felt that the Plan should err on the side of inclusiveness because the Plan, they said, serves as a valuable tool in educating the Jewish community on issues of import to some NJCRAC member agencies, in addition to its function as a guide to planning.

Scope of Jewish Community Relations

Agreeing on the desirability of the Joint Program Plan being more selective, the Committee in the early days of its discussions concluded that it would be helpful to develop standards that could be invoked as a basis for excluding issues from the agenda. This led the Review Committee into an examination of criteria for determining which issues to include and exclude from the Joint Program Plan. In engaging in this examination the Review Committee was careful to differentiate between identifying overall philosophical prin-

principles that should guide NJCRAC in determining the agenda and priorities as distinguished from the annual joint program planning process of NJCRAC to identify the specific priority issues for that given year. The Committee recognized that the latter role is the prerogative of the Plenum, the Joint Program Plan Committee and the NJCRAC Executive Committee.

The Review Committee examined what it regarded as the post-war World War II conceptions of the field of Jewish community relations, particularly the thesis that political freedom is the "sine qua non" for Jewish security, and thus should be the primary concern of the field. This has led the Jewish community relations field to be alert particularly to those forces and conditions in society that pose a threat to the stability of society and the democratic political process. In the context of this thesis the trigger to acting on an issue is not necessarily the issue itself but the consequences of that issue on the essential elements that foster and protect the American democratic system. Does the issue adversely impinge on the Bill of Rights? Is it leading to polarization? Intergroup tensions? Provoke conflicts that could unravel the social fabric of society?

While in accord with this proposition, members of the Committee found that it was too restrictive. The Committee felt other considerations enter into the determination as to whether an issue should be a matter of concern for the field of Jewish community relations. They felt that social and economic moral imperatives, rooted in the Jewish ethos, shape the agenda. Other considerations such as the need to build coalitions also influenced the agenda. It was suggested that there is a seamless web between social and economic justice issues and the primary concern of the field about the health of the democratic political process.

The Committee was divided as to whether it was possible to identify a definitive and systematic set of underlying principles that guide the field of Jewish community relations. For the purpose of this review the Committee concluded that it would not be productive to pursue its efforts to define criteria that could clearly determine which issues appropriately belong on the agenda of the Jewish community relations field. The Review Committee felt that advocates of a particular issue could always find compelling reasons for justifying the inclusion of that or any issue on the agenda.

While unwilling to formulate criteria to determine which issue falls within the scope of Jewish community relations, the Committee concluded that it would be productive to develop a statement of principles which would provide guidance in determining priorities. Such criteria could be helpful in determining which issues require special emphasis in the expenditure of resources by the Jewish community relations field.

The Review Committee also concluded that it would be more realistic and helpful to identify the major substantive spheres of concern and the basic approaches utilized by the field of Jewish community relations.

Spheres of Concern

The Committee felt that the overriding charge on the Jewish community relations field is to protect and enhance conditions conducive to the creative continuity and well being of the Jewish community at home and abroad. Growing out of that charge are the following substantive spheres of work:

- fostering American support for the well-being, security and survival of Israel;

- aiding endangered overseas Jewish communities;
- combatting anti-Semitism at home;
- fostering and protecting the democratic constraints embodied in the Bill of Rights, particularly the First Amendment, and
- fostering a plural, democratic society in the United States.

To these ends the Jewish community relations field seeks to influence the democratic political process with special emphasis on the use of law and social action; building coalitions on issues of mutual concern; interpreting to the general community and the Jewish community the views, beliefs and positions of the Jewish community relations field, and fostering amicable and harmonious intergroup relations.

Criteria for Determining Priorities

The Review Committee urged future Plenums and Executive Committees to make a conscious effort to be much more selective in determining the priorities and strategic goals to be included in the Joint Program Plan, and it felt the following criteria could be helpful. The order in which these principles have been set forth should not be construed as the Committee's judgment as to a ranking given these principles. They all should be taken into account in determining the use of resources including volunteers, staff, and budgets.

The Committee agreed on the following principles:

1. The nature and extent of threats to Jews as individuals or as a Jewish community, at home or abroad. When any Jewish community is

endangered, when Jewish lives are at stake, when the opportunities for sustaining Jewish identity and Jewish continuity are repressed, or when the State of Israel is threatened, all require the highest priority by the field of Jewish community relations, and on occasion, the total mobilization of its resources.

2. The nature and extent of threats to the American democratic process.

The emergence of issues that pose a threat to the social fabric of American society, particularly in regard to civil rights, civil liberties, church-state and religious freedom, or the emergence of a national consensus on remedies in response to deeply rooted conflicts and tensions triggered by these issues, warrant special emphasis by the field of Jewish community relations.

3. Impact of changing conditions on positions of Jewish community relations field.

The critical factor in determining whether an issue should be given priority or marginal attention is how the issue is playing itself out on the American scene at any given time. The positions that the Jewish community relations agencies take on various issues may be constant from year to year, but what does change are conditions which are perceived as either threatening or advancing the achievement of those positions. Thus issues, previously marginal, may be catapulted into a preeminent position on the agenda as a result of shifts in conditions.

4. The perceptions of the Jewish community about particular issues.

Indications of deep, widespread concern and anxiety within the Jewish community about a particular issue at a given time require a

response from Jewish community relations agencies, even when those concerns do not coincide with the assessments of the Jewish community relations field. If these fears which may be endemic within the Jewish community are not justified by conditions as agencies assess them, the Jewish community relations field has a responsibility to provide channels through which the anxiety of the Jewish community can be constructively expressed. It also has a responsibility to educate the Jewish community to the realities of economic, political, and social conditions as assessed by the field.

5. The efficacy of remedies in resolving issues. When there are no effective remedies available, certain issues, even when they directly affect Jewish interest, may receive a lower priority in the allocation of agency resources. Nevertheless, even in the face of what may appear at that time to be a hopeless situation, there may be cogent reasons for devoting major resources to arousing the consciousness and understanding of the issue both within the Jewish community and the general community.
6. Priority concerns of allies. The depth of concern about a particular issue by allies and friends who in the past have joined the Jewish community in support of issues of profound concern to Jews also may call for priority consideration, if the issue does not collide with basic Jewish positions. The Jewish community relations field has long recognized that no group, however powerful, can single-handedly achieve its programmatic goals in isolation from other groups on the American scene. Providing such support to allies does not necessarily require

playing a role as a prime mover. Such roles may be supportive, and may entail the allocation of only limited resources.

Format for Joint Program Plan

In the context of considering criteria for determining priorities the Review Committee also recommended that the Joint Program Plan should be comprised of three sections. The first section of the Joint Program Plan should identify those compelling, overriding concerns which are viewed as warranting the allocation of substantial resources by the entire field of Jewish community relations. The second section of the Joint Program Plan should identify all the issues that call for the significant allocation of resources by national and local agencies. The third section should be a summary of those positions adopted by NJCRAC in the previous year, which would not entail a significant allocation of resources of agencies.

The Review Committee also found that the index of the NJCRAC Joint Program Plan for the period from 1952 to 1977 had been most helpful, and it recommended that the index should be updated to the current year. Thereafter, the Review Committee recommended, the index should be kept current, possibly on an annual basis.

Some members of the Committee expressed concern about the time and resources of member agencies and NJCRAC staff that are required by the process in the development and adoption of the Joint Program Plan. The Review Committee recommended that the Committee which has periodically reviewed the Joint Program Plan process, should examine these concerns.

Section IV - Preliminary Report

Roles, Process and Procedures

The NJCRAC Review Committee examined in depth the roles, process and procedures of NJCRAC. In doing so it considered such questions as: Do the structures and operating procedures of NJCRAC provide an environment in which disparate constituencies can operate harmoniously and effectively? Does it permit appropriate freedom of action to all of its member agencies? Is there general satisfaction with the working relationships among its member agencies? Is the environment conducive to achieving consensus, cooperation and coordination?

Within the framework of these questions and the NJCRAC Statement of Purposes, Organization and Operations, the Review Committee evaluated the nature of coordination, clearance, community involvement, public actions and public statements, and coordination in Washington, DC. What follows are the judgments and recommendations of the Review Committee in regard to these categories.

Coordination

The charge placed upon NJCRAC in the Statement of Purposes is to bring member agencies together through its various processes in order to enable them to reach joint agreement on:

- (a) the issues on which Jewish community relations agencies should take positions;
- (b) the positions to be taken on such issues;

- (c) the activities which should be undertaken in order to deal effectively with these issues;
- (d) which issues and programs are more important and which, though desirable, are less urgent, and
- (e) ways in which the combined resources of all the agencies may be used effectively to assure their concerted impact on these issues and programs.

The Review Committee believes that NJCRAC's role to facilitate joint agreement among member agencies on these questions (including goals, strategies, tactics and assignment of responsibility) continues to be responsive to current needs. It was recognized that the success of coordination depends upon the readiness of member agencies to participate voluntarily in such a process. In such a voluntary process, the autonomy of each member agency must be fully respected. But the process also calls for a commitment of each agency, national and local, to the common cause that brings all agencies together.

Examples of coordination considered by the Review Committee underscored the profound impact of collective efforts of member agencies on a wide range of issues over the course of many years (the major achievements of the field were described in Section I). Within the perspective of those great accomplishments of the field the Committee was concerned about the difficulties and tensions that have arisen on occasion in the coordination of these issues. The issues in which coordination has worked effectively recently have ranged from immigration reform legislation to the plight of

Ethiopian Jews; from opposition to a constitutional convention to a proposed comprehensive policy on the Middle East by the National Council of Churches; from the prosecution of Nazi war criminals to the Women's Decade Conference in Nairobi; from enactment of legislation aimed at Arab economic warfare to the 1978 and 1981 campaigns against the arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Jordan; from the campaign on behalf of Soviet Jewry to challenging the assault on the separation of church and state.

The Review Committee found that when goals are defined more concretely and more precisely, such as in legislative campaigns, then concerted efforts tend to be more effective and results more easily measured.

The Review Committee felt that the NJCRAC process must be sensitive to the legitimate institutional needs of member agencies, national and local, to project a distinctive image, particularly to their constituencies, but the Committee also felt that the agencies should be more sensitive to the mandate upon NJCRAC to bring them together to achieve joint agreement and coordination. The Committee recognized that the collective judgments reached through NJCRAC are not binding but advisory. It is not expected that they will be accepted or applied uncritically, but member agencies were urged to carefully weigh the collective nature of the judgments in arriving at their own positions.

The Review Committee agreed that at minimum NJCRAC should seek a broad national framework of agreement among member agencies on basic issues and approaches within which each of the agencies could express its own distinctive views, styles and approaches. If there has been prior agreement on general policies and strategies, the Review Committee felt that clearly an agency is

within its right to express itself according to its own best judgments. Further, the Committee recognized that not every single issue requires joint consultation or joint action. The Committee found that problems frequently arise when there have not been prior understandings on policy or strategy. Absent understandings on issues of deep common concern, the Committee called for a greater openness to interconsultation through NJCRAC, particularly before an agency goes public with its policy or program.

The Committee found that the success of coordination depended not only on formal meetings of the NJCRAC deliberative process but in the day-to-day working relationships between the staffs of NJCRAC and member agencies. The Committee found that when there is not an openness on the part of any member agency to the interrelationship that genuinely exists between the staffs of member agencies, and NJCRAC staff.

The Review Committee also recognized:

- There are times when there is virtue in a pluralistic response of the Jewish community relations field to certain issues, and that it is not necessary always to appear to be in agreement on every issue.
- Even when there is agreement on strategic and tactical goals, it is not necessary in all cases that member agencies undertake the same programmatic response to accomplish these common goals.
- Even when agencies in the end take divergent positions, the process of seeking to clarify and reconcile differences both on policy and strategy is beneficial for the Jewish community as a whole.

Adherence to Clearance Procedures

The Review Committee examined at great length the adherence of member agencies to the provision on clearance in the Statement of Purposes, which follows:

The clearance process in the NCRAC consists of the exchange of information and plans among the member agencies. There is no formalized procedure. Some agencies make copies of minutes available, others rely on communications in writing or orally, either to the NCRAC office or in the course of meetings. No attempt is made to define matters for clearance or the stage at which plans are to be cleared. It is assumed that, as a matter of cooperation and in good faith, every agency will seek the joint judgment of the entire family of agencies in regard to any plan or project which might benefit from mutual scrutiny or profit from joint participation in execution. It is understood that, as a guide, a statement or project that is in line with a previously agreed upon joint policy or that reflects a previously known policy or approach of the agency making the statement or undertaking the project need not be cleared; but that any agency contemplating assertion of a new policy or a major departure in strategy or approach would feel it desirable, where possible, to consult through the NCRAC before taking such contemplated action.

To foster such an exchange of information NJCRAC plays an active role in contacting member agencies about issues which it believes may require responses or restraint. While this process has been, for the most part, productive, some members observed that there have been many breaches of the provisions of the Statement of Purposes by member agencies. The Committee found that the clearance process has depended on NJCRAC initiatives, which place a heavy burden on NJCRAC's small staff. It has led to serious gaps in information being conveyed to NJCRAC from member agencies, particularly national agencies, either about new developments or actions that the agencies are planning to take. The Review Committee felt that if NJCRAC is to carry out the charge placed upon it by the Statement of Purposes, then all member agencies should abide by all facets of the Statement. It would be highly desirable for all member agencies, national and local, to take the initiative in seeking,

through the NJCRAC process, the joint judgment of member agencies, rather than relying only on NJCRAC staff initiatives.

The Review Committee found extensive consultation has taken place through NJCRAC among member agencies, particularly some of the national agencies, when critical issues of concern have emerged. This in turn has led to an exchange of information about agency plans and activities. Those that were cited as examples included the Reagan initiative in the Middle East; the resignation of Andrew Young as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and Jesse Jackson's candidacy for President. But the ongoing process of exchanging information is more limited.

In the judgment of the Review Committee what may underlie the problem of clearance are different perceptions of the relationship member agencies have to NJCRAC. The community agencies tend to view NJCRAC as their national instrumentality and thus regard a stronger, closer relationship among all member agencies in NJCRAC as enhancing their effectiveness. Some national agencies do not view their relationship to the NJCRAC in the same terms. They have a greater concern about assuring their autonomy in their relationship to NJCRAC.

The Review Committee agreed that the language of the Statement of Purposes on clearance should not be modified. Instead, the Review Committee said ways should be found to encourage member agencies, national and local, to adhere to the spirit of the clearance process. The Review Committee recognized that adherence to the clearance is not mandatory because that is not the nature of the voluntary relationship of member agencies to NJCRAC, but the Committee agreed that the Statement of Purposes, including, of course, the provision on clearance represents a clear statement of intent: "That any

agency contemplating assertion of a new policy or a major departure in strategy or approach would feel it desirable, where possible, to consult through NJCRAC before taking such contemplated action." It is assumed that the commitment of member agencies to the common cause would lead member agencies to be responsive to this provision. Member agencies should be open to sharing program information experiences and to joint consultations on major community relations issues and significant strategic questions as long as it is understood that doing so does not bind any agency to the decisions jointly reached by NJCRAC.

The Committee recognized that clearance is not expected in all areas of activity, and agreed on criteria on what ought to be cleared by member agencies, national and local. Reflecting these judgments, the Review Committee agreed that agencies would feel it desirable, where possible, to seek the joint judgment of the NJCRAC family of agencies in response to:

1. New issues or new directions in social conditions or the perception of new dimensions of ongoing issues, which are seen as either threatening or advancing the overriding goals and strategies of the Jewish community relations field;
2. Urgent breaking issues of clear common concern which require immediate responses and/or sustained follow-up;
3. New policies, strategies or actions on fundamental issues of common concern;
4. Departures from previously established NJCRAC joint policies, strategies or approaches on critical issues. While member agencies

are not expected to accept or apply uncritically judgments jointly reached by NJCRAC, they at minimum are expected to advise NJCRAC member agencies of departures from such joint positions.

The Review Committee also reiterated the following procedures for facilitating the clearance process:

- a. Member agencies, national and local, should take the initiative to use the NJCRAC process to secure the judgments of other member agencies;
- b. NJCRAC, orally or in writing, should continue actively to contact member agencies for their judgments;
- c. NJCRAC or member agencies should utilize meetings of NJCRAC to exchange views, experiences, new policies, and programs, and
- d. Member agencies routinely should share with NJCRAC meeting notices, meeting agendas, minutes, public statements, news releases, reports, and printed material sent to members of their governing bodies as background for discussion of critical national issues.

Assignment of Responsibility

The Review Committee agreed that only the appropriate governing bodies and constituencies of each member agency could define its sphere of activity. It was recognized that coordination by NJCRAC does not involve allocation of responsibility. It does involve a recognition of NJCRAC's responsibility to seek to achieve the most effective utilization of the resources and capacities of member agencies to achieve jointly agreed upon goals.

The Review Committee agreed that it should be clearly understood that, under the Statement of Purposes, the assignment of responsibility for the performance of necessary tasks should continue to be on a case-by-case basis. The joint decision-making process of NJCRAC is used to make such assignments. The process depends upon the voluntary cooperation of member agencies; assignments cannot be imposed under NJCRAC procedures. The NJCRAC process looks to member agencies to volunteer their services to undertake assignments.

In the event a member agency disagrees on the assignment that is made to another member agency, the Committee recognized that the dissenting agency is free to carry out that task on its own behalf.

The Review Committee also recognized that any task assigned to a member agency that involves a document, including briefs, is subject to review by an appropriate NJCRAC body.

The issue of assignment was of special concern to the Review Committee in regard to legal briefs. The Committee found that there has been a 40-year history of member agencies submitting amicus briefs to the courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, on behalf of NJCRAC. The determination of whether NJCRAC should submit such briefs rests with the appropriate deliberative bodies of NJCRAC, consistent with the procedures for undertaking public action. The assignment of drafting the brief flows from such a recommendation. Recommendations for briefs may urge a single brief on behalf of the Jewish community, but it is understood that such recommendations are advisory, not binding on any member agency.

The Review Committee concluded that the language of the Statement of

Purposes, as follows, on assignment of responsibility continues effectively to spell out NJCRAC's role and the rights of member agencies:

1. Being autonomous, all agencies have the equal and inviolate right to engage in whatever areas of community relations work they choose and to create whatever structure and organizational arrangements they deem desirable, while seeking to avoid duplication wherever possible.
2. At the same time, it is recognized that, in order to utilize available resources most effectively, it will prove desirable from time to time that particular tasks, jointly agreed upon as necessary, be undertaken by one of the agencies. Assignment of responsibility for performance of such tasks will be on a case-by-case basis. In the event of disagreement on assignment of responsibility in a specific case, the right of the agency dissenting from such assignment shall be respected and the right of any agency to undertake such responsibility on its own shall be respected. When the task assigned involves preparation of a document for publication, the draft thereof will be subject to review by an appropriate NCRAC body.
3. It is agreed that, by their nature, activities requiring the concerted impact of multiple influences and forces -- such as social action problems of all sorts -- are the common responsibility of all agencies.

National Coordination in Washington, DC

The Review Committee examined a proposal submitted in behalf of the CRC Full-time Directors Association for NJCRAC to open a Washington, DC office as a means of enhancing NJCRAC's role as the national coordinating body for the field of Jewish community relations. In presenting the proposal to the Committee it was recalled that such a proposal had originally been put forward more than five years ago by the full-time CRC Directors in discussions with NJCRAC officers and several national member agencies. At that time the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Congress opposed such an office, but agreed to alternative steps to respond to some of the concerns which were raised then.

As a result of those discussions, the NJCRAC Task Force on Domestic Concerns was created. As part of that understanding, the Domestic Task Force holds some of its meetings in Washington, DC as does the NJCRAC Israel Task Force; an NJCRAC staff member regularly attends the "First Tuesday" meetings of the Washington representatives of national agencies; a staff summary of those discussions are shared with the full-time CRC directors, and NJCRAC staff fly down to Washington with greater frequency, often in response to calls from national agency Washington representatives.

These steps have fostered an increasing readiness on the part of Washington representatives to be in touch with NJCRAC staff in New York on issues of common concern. It was noted that one of the national agency Washington representatives has said that it is the NJCRAC that usually brings AIPAC together for meetings with Washington agency representatives on issues which are of urgent concern. The proponents of the Washington office felt these steps have been helpful in response to the domestic agenda, less so in terms of Israel. These limited steps, they felt, demonstrate what could be done on a full-time basis.

They also recalled that in lieu of NJCRAC opening a Washington office, CRCs were promised a greater flow of information from Washington representatives. The work of the Washington representatives in regard to the issues on the agenda of the Joint Program Plan remains largely unreported, they said. The CRC directors recalled that one national agency representative agreed to prepare a newsletter geared to the Joint Program Plan and the special needs and concerns of CRCs. The CRC directors said that they understood why it was not implemented since each national agency had its own needs, agendas, and priorities, respon-

sive to its constituency.

Thus they felt that these steps fell far short in meeting the needs of the field of Jewish community relations as a whole, especially the communities. Advocates of the proposal for an NJCRAC Washington presence stressed that in the past 40 years there has been a major shift in the emphasis and direction of the field toward Washington as the locus of national decisions on the critical issues high on the agenda of the Jewish community. They noted that a major part of the Joint Program Plan is geared to what happens in Washington, DC. Some suggested that were the field just beginning, all the agencies probably would locate themselves in Washington, DC.

They said the field has had a major impact on these national public policy issues because of the concerted efforts of the national network of 11 national agencies and 113 community agencies. They saw this network as critical to the national influence, particularly in Washington, of the American Jewish community. They felt that the Review Committee had a responsibility to the Jewish community to develop the best system to maximize the impact of this network.

They recognized that there are a number of national agency representatives currently located in Washington. Five national member agencies of NJCRAC have offices in Washington staffed on a full-time basis, and two other national member agencies have their national headquarters in Washington. Other national agencies of NJCRAC have some form of Washington representation either through a part-time staff person or lay leaders undertaking that task. In addition, they cited the Washington offices of the Council of Jewish Federations, National Conference on Soviet Jewry and AIPAC. They noted that

other national Jewish organizations also are represented in Washington, and that now even some federations have engaged Washington representatives. They also cited the exceptional quality of the professionals representing agencies in Washington.

While they agreed that what the Jewish community does not need is one more functional Jewish community relations agency in Washington, they concluded that what is lacking among this complex of agencies in Washington, is the kind of coordinating process that distinguishes NJCRAC. Even though there are a number of Washington offices with quality staffing, they held that their full potential has not been realized on a concerted and ongoing basis, particularly in concert with the network of community as well as national agencies. They felt that the monthly "First Tuesday" meetings of Washington "reps" did not meet the need.* They characterized the absence of NJCRAC from Washington as dysfunctional for the field, compromising its effectiveness.

To fill the hole that exists in Washington, they called upon NJCRAC to undertake its unique role as the coordinating body for the field of Jewish community relations by opening an office in Washington. They saw a need for NJCRAC to operate in Washington as a means of carrying out the charge that is spelled out in the Statement of Purposes. That role cannot be undertaken as effectively by NJCRAC staff shuttling between Washington and New York or by long-distance telephone calls. They maintained that NJCRAC is not limited to carrying out its charge only from New York City.

In relation to Washington the NJCRAC role would be to facilitate the exchange of information, experience, and views among member agencies; to foster

*The Washington representatives were originally convened on a regular basis more than 15 years ago by Albert E. Arent when he served as Chairman of NJCRAC. Mr. Arent is a Washington attorney.

consensus on policies, priorities, strategies and tactics; to facilitate the voluntary acceptance of assignments, and then to follow up on these decisions in order to ensure a concerted response including a more strategic use of CRCs and all the national agencies in NJCRAC. It also would involve transmitting the judgments and information derived from this process to CRCs and in turn facilitating the transmittal of community input into the deliberations.

NJCRAC also would meet the need of serving as the clearinghouse for information, which they saw as its appropriate role. In addition to saving their staff time, CRCs also prefer to call NJCRAC, rather than three or four agencies, to get an overview and the consensus view of agencies including how various agencies may differ from the consensus on issues in Washington which are of special concern to CRCs. They saw this naturally flowing out of NJCRAC's community consultation role. They felt that such information from Washington needs to be transmitted on a regular and timely basis to the communities, and could best come from NJCRAC, even as similar information from NJCRAC is routinely transmitted to NJCRAC member agencies.

In the Review Committee deliberations representatives of the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress opposed the opening of an NJCRAC office in Washington. They said they did not recognize the problem which CRCs described. They noted that the contact between NJCRAC staff and Washington representatives has increased, and should be sufficient to provide the information that CRCs are seeking. They maintained that if there is an information gap, they are confident that the Review Committee could come up with remedies which would not necessitate an NJCRAC Washington office. National agency spokesmen noted that national agencies are supposed to service the communities, although they recognized that

national bodies have their own national priorities and are accountable to their own governing boards.

They saw the proposal as an extravagant duplication of the existing resources in Washington, DC. They felt that an NJCRAC office in Washington would inevitably end up doing what other Washington representatives do; this, they said, grows out of the very nature of the Washington scene. They maintained that this would be even more likely because of the kind of skilled professional that NJCRAC would have in Washington. They felt that there is a fundamental difference between having an NJCRAC staff person operating in an NJCRAC Washington office and NJCRAC meetings being held in Washington or NJCRAC staff shuttling between Washington and New York. The presence in Washington of an NJCRAC staff person, they felt, would only compound an existing problem that Washington representatives tend to operate separate and apart from the national decision-making apparatus that is located in New York.

Their fundamental concern was that they saw NJCRAC being converted into a national functional entity, which would be in direct competition with the national agencies operating in Washington, DC. They felt that issue goes beyond the specific question under discussion. They contended that the basic problem is that CRCs see only the NJCRAC as carrying out the mandate of the CRCs, expressing their voice, accepting their points of view, and responding to their interests. They regarded such an office as a matter of grave concern to national agencies.

They stated that if the Committee found NJCRAC was filling its charge imperfectly in regard to Washington, the national agencies were prepared to join with other members of the Review Committee in formulating new remedies,

new devices, new strategies, new procedures to enable NJCRAC to fulfill the charge placed upon it by the Statement of Purposes. But they said they could not agree to the creation of another national functional entity, which, they held, would be the effect of an NJCRAC Washington office.

The Committee's discussion centered on the broad concept of an NJCRAC presence in Washington. It did not examine in detail the specific responsibilities of such an office; how it should be staffed; where it should be located, or what should be its budget. Because this issue is of such profound importance to the national and community member agencies of NJCRAC, the Review Committee felt that a decision on this issue should be deferred as the Review Committee continues to search for a creative accommodation that would be responsive both to the concerns of communities and national agencies.

Community Involvement

The NJCRAC was created to enable communities through CRCs to play a role in national decision making in the field of Jewish community relations in partnership with national agencies. Thus the Review Committee recognized a central purpose of NJCRAC is to involve CRCs in the process on the basis of parity with national agencies. The concept of parity of communities with national agencies is an essential guiding principle in the governance of NJCRAC, and is reflected in the composition of its Executive Committee, Commissions and Task Forces. The exception is the Plenum in which national agencies each receive 10 votes, and each community has up to four votes depending on the size of its Jewish population.

The Committee considered the perception among communities that NJCRAC staff appear to consult national agencies primarily and this was regarded as a fundamental problem. When NJCRAC was created, it was relatively easy to consult its 14 member CRCs as well as the four national member agencies. Indeed, in the early years of NJCRAC's existence even the Plenary Session, NJCRAC's highest policy making body, met on a quarterly basis. That situation has been radically altered by NJCRAC now having 113 community member agencies and 11—in reality 13—national agencies, all of whom legitimately expect to be consulted. The Committee recognized that it is not possible in all situations to consult with 113 community agencies.

In examining this problem the Committee was conscious of the demands of the community relations agenda in frequently requiring swift reactions to fast-breaking developments. The Review Committee examined the NJCRAC process in response to emergency situations such as the dismissal of Andy Young as United States Ambassador to the United Nations; the Reagan televised speech on a new initiative in the Middle East, and the outbreak of the war in Lebanon. These types of situations require NJCRAC to convene member agency representatives immediately to make decisions in a matter of a few hours. This has been done either through telephone conference calls which must involve only a small number of people in order to allow for the fullest kind of exchange or through a meeting in New York, which means involving those who are in New York or near New York City. The Review Committee recognized that these forms of consultations are necessary since such situations do not normally lend themselves to instant, simple answers. More than a "yes" or "no" are required in response to the questions posed by such situations. The issues usually require an interconsultation process that assures an active

exchange of views that leads to a consensus posture.

Quite apart from the response of the NJCRAC process to fast-breaking issues, the Committee also was concerned as to whether the NJCRAC process was fostering a continuing dialogue between CRCs and national agencies on the ongoing work of the field of Jewish community relations. It was felt that a substantial part of the agenda of the field does not require instant reactions or public statements. Thus, of equal concern to the Review Committee was the input of communities on an ongoing basis in the determination of NJCRAC policies, priorities, strategies, and specific programmatic recommendations.

The Review Committee recognized the steps that NJCRAC has taken in the past 10 years which have significantly enhanced community participation in the NJCRAC process. More than 75% of the community member agencies now serve on various NJCRAC Commissions. This has included a substantial increase in representation of CRCs from distant geographic areas such as the western region of the United States. In earlier years a representative was rotated annually between Los Angeles and San Francisco; today 12 representatives of CRCs from the western region are members of either the NJCRAC Executive Committee or Commissions. Nearly all of the full-time CRC executives serve on the Executive Committee, Commissions or Task Forces, especially noteworthy since the number of full-time staffed CRC operations has nearly doubled in the past 10 years. In addition, NJCRAC initiated 10 years ago the Minkoff Institute for full-time CRC directors which led to the full-time CRC directors meeting as often as five times a year. NJCRAC has initiated similar meetings of part-time CRC executives.

NJCRAC also has regularized the meeting schedule of the Commissions, and, more recently, of the Task Forces on Israel and Domestic Concerns. All these meetings are scheduled at least one year in advance, and the Plenum, Executive Committee and Commissions two years in advance. As a result, at least one of these established deliberative structures of NJCRAC will be meeting every six weeks. By joining the meetings of the Commissions to the meetings of the NJCRAC Executive Committee more than 50 communities are now in attendance at Executive Committee/Commission meetings. Total attendance at the Executive Committee meeting reaches almost 100 from communities and national agencies. Plenary Session attendance has doubled in the past 10 years.

There are also a number of meetings of ad hoc committees as well as those of other standing bodies such as the Strategy Committee of the Israel Task Force; the NJCRAC Committee on Rural Anti-Semitism; the NJCRAC Committee on Reassessing Measurements for Evaluating Anti-Semitism; the Task Force on Women, and the NJCRAC Review Committee. The Review Committee itself met 11 times over a 20-month period. In all there are 28 NJCRAC Commissions, Committees and Task Forces, all involving communities as well as national agencies. The Review Committee also noted that agendas and background material are sent to member agencies in advance of all of these meetings.

The Review Committee cited the high quality and extensive involvement of national and local member agencies in the formulation and adoption of the annual Joint Program Plan. (Some felt, as previously noted, that such involvement was too demanding on member agencies as well as NJCRAC resources, and suggested this be examined in the future by NJCRAC.) Propositions, which

form the basis of the NJCRAC Joint Program Plan, are sent to communities and national agencies more than eight weeks in advance of the Plenum, and more than 50 national and local agencies respond as a result of local and national examinations of these propositions. All agencies participate in the Plenum debates which reconcile substantive differences over the propositions. The first draft of the Plan is reviewed by a committee equally balanced between communities and all national member agencies. The revised draft of the Plan is then sent to all Executive Committee and Commission members soliciting their views well in advance of final action by the Executive Committee.

The Review Committee recognized that between meetings of its standing bodies, NJCRAC does consult with some CRCs as well as national agencies when issues arise that require such consultation. The Review Committee observed that consultation is increasingly undertaken by telephone conference calls, in which CRCs as well as national agencies are included, and through the electronic mail system, in which 26 CRCs participate. There was a tendency by NJCRAC staff, the Committee felt, to call the same CRCs, usually those which are perceived as more actively involved in the total agenda of the Jewish community relations field. The Committee felt that the determination as to which CRCs are consulted is made on an ad hoc basis.

It was felt that there should be a systematic and regularized process in the selection of CRCs to be consulted to assure that representative points of view of the communities were adequately reflected in NJCRAC joint decision-making. The Review Committee explored various proposals to enable staff to systematically canvas a designated and limited number of CRCs as part of the process of national decision-making. In the adoption of new policy positions between meetings of the Plenum or the Executive Committee, the Review

Committee felt that not only should each of the national member agencies of NJCRAC be consulted but that the community members of the Executive Committee should be canvassed as well. This was the practice followed in the adoption of a position on apartheid in June, 1985. It was felt that this was technically feasible, but it was also recognized as more difficult to implement when more than a "yes" or "no" answer is required. When there is established policy, it was felt that on the issuance of public statements the principle of parity would be observed by contacting 11 community representatives to match the 11 national member agencies comprising NJCRAC's national membership. (The process for the issuance of public statements is discussed in the next subsection on public statements and public actions.)

While a proposed policy position or a public statement requires consultation with each of NJCRAC's national member agencies, it was recognized that such consultation is not required in arriving at judgments on strategies, tactics or recommendations for specific programs, unless such actions in effect are policy decisions. The Review Committee agreed that on questions of this type a smaller number of agencies may be consulted, six to eight, for example, as long as there is parity between national agencies and communities. Apart from the principle of parity, the critical factor is that community representatives who are to be consulted should be designated in advance, known to other communities, and be periodically rotated.

The Review Committee recognized that more than convenience led NJCRAC staff to consult with some national and community representatives more often than other member agencies. The complex nature of many of the issues prompts staff to approach those, nationally and locally, who have demonstrated greater expertise and experience in dealing with certain substantive categories. To

assure such expertise the Review Committee suggested that two groups be designated in advance for consultation by NJCRAC staff, one drawn from the Israel Task Force and the other from the Domestic Task Force.

In the context of discussing the NJCRAC process for eliciting the views of member agencies, concern was expressed as to whether such views represented those of individuals speaking for themselves, or represented valid points of view of their own agencies. It was emphasized that NJCRAC is a council of agencies, not a membership body of individuals, and so it was felt that individuals, whether speaking at NJCRAC meetings or being consulted by phone by NJCRAC staff, should take care to try to reflect the views of the agency for whom they were speaking. However, the Review Committee also recognized that how each agency arrived at its own judgments was an internal matter for that agency, not a matter for the NJCRAC or the Review Committee.

As another means of enhancing the participation of CRCs in national decision making, the Review Committee recommended increasing the community membership on the NJCRAC Executive Committee to at least 25% of the community member agencies of NJCRAC. That would raise the number today to 28 community members from 22 community members. Currently, the number of community members is based on parity with the national agencies, each of whom have two representatives on the Executive Committee. The community members would continue to be rotated after three consecutive one-year terms as now required by NJCRAC policy. The increase to 25% would require amending the Statement of Purposes. As a contribution to improving the environment of national and local agencies working together, representatives of national agencies on the Review Committee accepted this increase in community membership on the Executive Committee.

The community members of the Nominating Committee, who submit the slate of community nominees to the Plenum for election, would continue to be guided by the same criteria which has guided the nomination of community members. The Nominating Committee tries to strike a balance in community membership on the Executive Committee in terms of geographic spread, sizes of community, budgets and professional staffing of the CRC, sex, leadership experience in the federation and/or CRC, extent of participation in the NJCRAC process, and the frequency the community has been represented on the Executive Committee.

In considering community input into the NJCRAC process, the Review Committee also perceived that federations want greater input into community relations decision making. They too want to be consulted on what they regard as critical issues of concern to the Jewish community, particularly when they perceive American support of Israel is in jeopardy, such as during and after the Yom Kippur War and the war in Lebanon. As reflected in the section on perceptions, the Review Committee noted that on occasion there have been differences in assessments and goals between federations and the community relations field, which it felt grew out of the different roles that each must play in crisis situations. The question was how should federations have such input? Regarding themselves as among the clients of NJCRAC, should federations have input directly into NJCRAC? Should they do so through their CRCs which, as has been described, are committees or departments of the federation among 90% of the community members of NJCRAC? Even where the CRC is autonomous, the CRC is regarded as the community relations arm of the federation. It was noted that locally there are occasional tensions between the CRC and federation as to who should serve as the spokesman for the Jewish community. The Review Committee did not resolve these questions. It noted the existence of the CJF/NJCRAC Liaison Committee, created as a result of the CJF review,

and expressed disappointment in the inactive role that it has played in recent years. It urged that the Liaison Committee be activated, and used as a vehicle for an ongoing dialogue between the top lay and professional leadership of NJCRAC and CJF.

NJCRAC Public Statements and Public Actions

NJCRAC policies are adopted by a majority vote of either the Plenary Session or the Executive Committee. While achieving consensus is the primary charge placed upon NJCRAC, the right of dissent is critical to the success of the NJCRAC process. As one of the means of protecting the right of dissent, the NJCRAC Statement of Purposes permits a national agency to exercise a veto over the issuance of an NJCRAC policy in public statements or the undertaking of public actions in the name of NJCRAC.

While the Statement of Purposes has language which could be interpreted as permitting community member agencies to exercise the veto as well as national agencies, the Review Committee found that throughout the 42-year history of NJCRAC the "veto" provision has been construed as restricted only to national agencies. The Committee determined that based on the "common law" principle such an interpretation has the force of a by-law. It also noted the footnote added to the Statement of Purposes in 1966, which makes this explicit.

The three options providing for a national agency dissent are spelled out in the following provisions of the Statement of Purposes:

A statement may be made public or a public action taken in the name of the NJCRAC when there is unanimous agreement in the Plenum, the Executive Committee, or a commission or committee, both as to substantive position and as to the desirability of a public statement or public action thereon.

Lacking unanimity, the dissenting or abstaining agency or agencies may, at their option, specify one of the following procedures:

- (1) that the majority position be made public in the name of the NCRAC, omitting the name of those agencies not subscribing to it.
- (2) that the majority position be made public by the NCRAC as a releasing agent, in the names only of those agencies subscribing to it, and with the dissents or abstentions of the non-participating agencies explicitly noted, should they so desire.
- (3) that the facilities of the NCRAC be used to make public the position of the majority, in their names only, and without the use of the name of NCRAC (i.e., on the blank stationery).

The foregoing provisions governing public statements and actions shall be changed only by unanimous agreement in the Executive Committee or the Plenary Session of the NCRAC.

ARCHIVES

NOTE:

Since all national member agencies are represented in the Plenum, the Executive Committee and all commissions and committees, each national agency, in effect, may veto any public statement or action by the NCRAC.

In practice a national agency formally notifies NJCRAC when it chooses to exercise option (3), which has come to be known as the veto. It is usually exercised in response to positions that are judged as a challenge to a fundamental ideological or policy position of that agency. When option (3), the veto, is exercised, any member agency may request that NJCRAC canvas all of its national and local member agencies to ask that they join a public statement expressing the NJCRAC majority position. Such a statement is then issued in the names of the signator agencies on blank letterhead. NJCRAC staff resources are used to facilitate the process including the release of the statement, but the release of such a statement is not in the name of NJCRAC nor does NJCRAC's name appear in the statement, on the letterhead or in the

release. In these cases NJCRAC is in effect invisible in the public perception.

The issue for the Review Committee was whether these procedures and their implementation undermined the right of dissent, on the one hand, or the public expression of the majority position, particularly the collective expression of community points of view on the national level. The Review Committee decided to defer recommending remedies to respond to the concerns that were examined. This report is limited to setting forth the issues, various points of view, and proposed remedies.

The Review Committee engaged in an extensive examination as to whether the veto should be retained. It did so conscious of the requirement of the Statement of Purposes that such a provision could be modified only by a unanimous vote of the Plenum or Executive Committee. Some members of the Review Committee felt that the very existence of the veto, even when it is not exercised, has a chilling effect on efforts to achieve consensus. They were concerned that the availability of the sanction has resulted in aborting potential NJCRAC statements at the first stages of the process, even when there were no substantial differences over the substance, in a sense a form of self-censorship. In addition, it was perceived by some as giving national agencies superior status in their membership in NJCRAC, suggesting to communities that they were less than equal within NJCRAC, despite the principle of parity that guides NJCRAC. They also felt that it leaves control of the decisions ultimately in the hands of national agencies only. However, the foremost concern was that when the veto was exercised, the implementation of option III had the practical effect of blocking the collective public

expression of the communities on national issues of vital concern to them.

Those in favor of retaining the veto recalled that NJCRAC was formed by autonomous agencies, coming together on a voluntary basis. In doing so these agencies did not give up their sovereignty and their right to speak on behalf of their constituencies. They joined NJCRAC to maximize cooperation on issues of common concern, but not to be placed in the position that they must compromise fundamental ideological positions. That's why the principle of dissent is so essential to the success of the NJCRAC process. They felt that there are times when simply dissenting was not sufficient in protecting the integrity of agency positions. They maintained that NJCRAC positions are perceived as representing opinions of the entire membership, and thus have the effect of undermining the integrity of dissenting positions, which at times, in the judgment of the dissenting agency, only can be protected by the veto. They felt that option (3), (the veto), does not prevent the majority point of view from being issued as a joint statement. It only prevents a collective statement from being issued in the name of NJCRAC. They felt that this process has well served the NJCRAC and the American Jewish community. It was also felt that the availability of a veto leads to a greater readiness to accommodate because both the majority and the minority would prefer that the veto not be exercised. Some also maintained that since the veto is exercised infrequently and with restraint, they did not see it as a major problem in the NJCRAC process.

Notwithstanding the concerns of some, the Review Committee agreed that the exercise of the veto is a legitimate tool for national agencies, and should be retained in the NJCRAC process. It felt that the right of dissent

is the touchstone of membership in NJCRAC and a veto is a vital part of protecting that principle. The Review Committee felt that if the veto was deemed by a national agency as essential to underscoring the absence of consensus within NJCRAC on issues of profound concern to that agency, national agencies should not be denied this option.

The Review Committee considered the question as to whether communities should be given some form of veto. In doing so it considered a proposal that would have permitted a veto if a specified percentage of the communities, such as 2/3 or 3/4, so directed in a formal vote. However, it was felt that when there is substantial dissent among communities in regard to a particular position, then there is little likelihood that a consensus could be reached within NJCRAC. Experience has demonstrated that a majority vote among member agencies must include a substantial community vote in favor of that position. The pattern of voting within NJCRAC has been that the majority is always comprised of some national agencies joined to a substantial representation of communities, and the minority usually includes communities as well as some national agencies. There has not been a single issue in the past 40 years in which all of the national agencies have lined up against all of the community agencies. Therefore the Review Committee felt that any expansion of the veto could severely undermine the NJCRAC process, and could even paralyze it.

The Review Committee examined proposals that would not require NJCRAC to canvas all of its community member agencies in order to permit a joint statement of national and community member agencies to be issued in their names when there is a veto. One proposal recommended that when a national agency exercises a veto, those members of the Executive Committee who are elected by

the communities, would have a right to issue a statement in their name as "the community members of the NJCRAC Executive Committee." Such a public statement would not be issued on NJCRAC letterhead, consistent with the prohibition set forth in option (3). It would be issued on a letterhead that would be simply descriptive with the imprint: "Community members of NJCRAC Executive Committee." The letterhead would list the names and communities of those who are voting members of the NJCRAC Executive Committee. On the reverse side of the letterhead the names of all the community agencies would be listed. National agencies could join in such a statement by the community members of the Executive Committee.

In response to a concern that such a procedure might exacerbate divisions between communities and national agencies, that proposal was modified so that when a veto was exercised, a statement could be issued by the community and national agency members of the Executive Committee. The statement would not be issued on NJCRAC letterhead, but on a letterhead with the imprint "Members of NJCRAC Executive Committee." It was felt that this modification maintained the principle which has always characterized NJCRAC: that there is equal respect accorded national and community member agencies in their participation in the NJCRAC process.

However, some national agency representatives felt that even the imprint of "Members of the Executive Committee" would conflict with the prohibition of using NJCRAC letterhead. Thus the proposal was further modified so that only blank letterhead would be used, and the statement would be introduced with the formulation which would state: "Because of the dissent of a national member agency of NJCRAC (the name of the agency would not be given), the following members of the NJCRAC Executive Committee join together in the following statement." This statement on blank letterhead would list the names

and agency affiliations of those who concurred in the statement. It would include a brief descriptive note which would explain that national agency representatives are designated by their agencies and the community members of the NJCRAC Executive Committee are elected annually by community member agencies meeting at the Plenary Session of NJCRAC.

Advocates of the third proposal felt that it did not change the role of NJCRAC nor the intent of the Statement of Purposes. They contended that it was a practical remedy to enable NJCRAC to implement option III of the Statement of Purposes more expeditiously. They felt it was very much in the spirit of NJCRAC's role as the national coordinating body of CRCs and national agencies. The proposal still maintains NJCRAC's role as that of a facilitating agent, which was intended by option (3), the veto. They argued that option (3) did not intend to block the expression of a majority point of view. This proposal provides a mechanism to remedy a process that has been too cumbersome to accomplish what option (3) intended. They felt that the issue was not an abstract principle or symbol, but a response to real problems of concern to communities. The critical issue, they maintained, was to enable the communities to speak collectively on a national level when the veto is exercised. It was recognized that each community can speak locally on national and international issues, and indeed could issue statements nationally. But they felt doing so in isolation from other communities, and national agencies, limits the impact of such a statement. Conversely, when communities join together with other communities and national agencies, the impact is substantially enhanced. Doing so does not undermine the integrity of the dissent of the national agency, nor the concept of pluralism to which NJCRAC is committed. The purpose is to enable a maximum number of agencies to impact on an issue of deep concern to them when overwhelming support for that position exists within NJCRAC.

Those opposed to this proposal felt that a statement issued by members of the NJCRAC Executive Committee, even on blank letterhead, is an NJCRAC statement, and thus undermines the veto provision. If adopted, the proposal would fundamentally alter the relationship of member agencies to NJCRAC, and be destructive to the NJCRAC process. They felt it changed the conditions under which national agencies participated in NJCRAC. They saw it as representing an unfolding of tendencies which were moving NJCRAC in the direction of becoming a national functional community agency.

Under another proposal considered by the Review Committee, community members of the Executive Committee would be authorized to act for all community member agencies in joining with national agencies in the issuance of statements in the names of all the community member agencies on blank letterhead when the veto was exercised by a national member agency. Such authorization would be renewed annually by the formal action of the community member agencies meeting at the NJCRAC Plenary Session. Members of the Review Committee recognized that the grant of such authority would represent a substantial action by communities. It meant that 90 communities were giving their decision-making power to Executive Committee members representing 25% of the community agencies to use their agency name on national public statements. National agency representatives said that such a proposal was not inconsistent with option (3). They felt that the delegation of such authority was a matter for the communities to determine, not a decision for national agencies.

As noted earlier, the Review Committee agreed that it would not try to reach agreement on these proposals at this time, but rather seek to reconcile the differences in regard to these proposals through extended consultations, formal and informal, in the coming year.

Section V - Preliminary Report

Deepening Community and National Agency Understanding of Role of NJCRAC

The Review Committee called for a major educational campaign by NJCRAC to interpret the role, scope, responsibilities and authority of NJCRAC. The Committee found widespread misunderstanding of NJCRAC even among the top leadership of CRCs, federations, and national member agencies. It felt NJCRAC should heed similar concerns expressed by those interviewed that in many instances key leadership of communities or national agencies have no concept of the function and nature of the NJCRAC process.

A past president of a Big 16 federation said, "Most people in his community don't know what NJCRAC is," adding that many members of his Budget Committee knew little about NJCRAC; for that matter, even the leadership of his federation would have difficulty explaining what the initials represent. A national agency president said that he personally was not too familiar with NJCRAC. Another president of a national member agency felt that his leadership has no knowledge of NJCRAC, noting that they probably were unaware that his agency paid dues to NJCRAC.

The Committee agreed with the president of a Big 16 federation who urged NJCRAC to increase the number of speakers going to CRCs, and federations, emphasizing that there are many opportunities available locally to showcase NJCRAC, and they should be exploited. Therefore the Committee urged that steps be taken to develop a comprehensive public relations effort to interpret NJCRAC. Leadership of NJCRAC should meet with the boards of federations and national agencies as well as CRCs. Included in their interpretation of NJCRAC should

be clarification of misconceptions such as those described below. It also was recommended that printed material should be prepared that is geared to those with little knowledge of NJCRAC, including definitive statements that distill the key elements of the deliberations of the Review Committee, and the Statement of Purposes. The Review Committee felt that the preliminary report itself could serve as an effective tool in the coming year in educating key community and national leadership about the nature of NJCRAC, and it urged national, regional and local meetings be undertaken throughout the United States to focus on the preliminary report.

The Review Committee was troubled by the perception of many that inter-agency relationships exist only in terms of tensions and friction. It felt that in its public relations campaign stress should be placed on the significant coordinating role that NJCRAC plays. The Committee felt that many are not aware of how the talent from national and community member agencies are made available for cooperative efforts through the NJCRAC process, and how their working together has led to the impressive product which NJCRAC shares with communities. They found that there is little understanding or appreciation of how NJCRAC as a non-functional body pools information from its national agencies and reconciles different points of view to shape the consensus guides sent to the communities. The Committee felt that national and local leadership should be helped to recognize how these valuable services of NJCRAC have enriched the Jewish community.

The Review Committee also was troubled by perceptions regarding the relationship between NJCRAC and its member agencies. It was felt that community

leadership should be helped to understand that NJCRAC positions are not binding, and that they are advisory judgments. They are given a great deal of weight by virtue of the process that produced them. Local leadership should be helped to understand that in the final analysis each agency must determine for itself whether it will accept or reject any given NJCRAC position. NJCRAC may attempt to persuade member agencies to accept its consensus positions, but NJCRAC has no authority to compel adherence by member agencies to these positions. Fundamental to the NJCRAC process is the right of dissent, and this needs to be emphasized in the interpretive process.

The Review Committee also felt that such interpretation should convey the role and nature of national agencies in the American Jewish community. They should be recognized as more than technical services, but in fact movements in Jewish life that are vital to the creative continuity of the Jewish community. In doing so the interpretive process should emphasize the fundamental principles of the Statement of Purposes regarding the autonomy of member agencies, voluntary cooperation, pluralism, and common cause.

The Review Committee also felt that there was a need to clarify the misunderstandings that exist in regard to the NJCRAC role on the issue of duplication. Such interpretations should emphasize that NJCRAC's role is to facilitate agreement among member agencies on "the most effective ways of utilizing all of the resources available to the field for advancement of joint purposes." NJCRAC does not have the authority to eliminate duplicate programs of member agencies.

Overall Conclusion

While the Review Committee found conflict and tension in the operation of NJCRAC to be constitutionally inherent in its composition, the Review Committee concluded that the structures and operating procedures of NJCRAC currently do provide in general an environment in which disparate constituencies can and do operate harmoniously and effectively, permitting appropriate freedom of action to all member agencies.

In order to enhance the working relationships among member agencies, in an environment conducive to achieving consensus, cooperation and coordination, the Review Committee has set forth in this preliminary report its tentative findings, recommendations and conclusions in regard to various categories of the NJCRAC process with the exception of proposals on public action and public statements and coordination in Washington, DC.

All the judgments in this document should be regarded as preliminary judgments, still awaiting a final action by the Review Committee. The final report may include additional categories which are not now covered in this preliminary report. Before adopting a final report, the Review Committee will seek input of national and community member agencies, and federations, by using the preliminary report as a basis for community and national meetings which will be arranged throughout the United States in the coming year.

As noted earlier, the Review Committee agreed that it would not try to reach agreement on these proposals at this time, but rather seek to reconcile the differences in regard to these proposals through extended consultations, formal and informal, in the coming year.

The Committee agreed that the strength of NJCRAC is in serving as an instrumentality of national and community agencies, and it felt that as the amalgam of community and national agencies it was of enormous value to the American Jewish community. Thus they urged that all proposals should be based on the preservation of NJCRAC as an instrumentality of both communities and national agencies. Any weakening of this partnership would be a severe blow to the best interests of the American Jewish community.



APPENDIX AThe American Jewish Community: Demography and Political Ramifications

While it has become a smaller percentage of the total population of the United States, today the American Jewish community is the largest Jewish community in the world. In 1937 the American Jewish community was 3.7% of the total population, and today it is approximately 2.5% of the population, although there has been some growth in the Jewish community's population from under 5 million in 1944 to roughly 5.5 - 6 million today. But more critical than population increases has been the other demographic changes in the profile of the Jewish community. These changes profoundly influenced the role of the Jewish community relations field.

Since 1944 American Jews have become an exceptionally affluent and highly educated community. In his book on the American Jewish community, "A Certain People," Charles E. Silberman reported that in 1984 fewer than one American Jewish family in six had incomes of less than \$20,000 compared to one in two among non-Hispanic whites. He noted that 41% of Jewish households are estimated to have incomes of \$50,000 or more or more than four times the proportion among non-Hispanic whites.

Mr. Silberman described the American Jewish community as the best educated American subgroup in the United States. More than 80% of Jewish high school graduates go on to college. He reported that three Jewish men in five are college graduates, which is three times the proportion among non-Hispanic whites. One in three Jewish men hold either graduate or professional degrees, which is 3½ times the proportion of the population at large. Similarly Jewish

women were twice as likely to have college degrees and four times as likely to have graduate or professional degrees than non-Jewish women. Mr. Silberman noted the disproportionate number of Jews who tend to go to elite universities. In the last 30 years Jewish students comprised about one-third of the undergraduate student population, and roughly the same in law and med schools of Ivy League universities.

In a pattern that has characterized all Americans, American Jews have been on the move. Thus a critical change over these past 40 years has been the dispersal of Jewish centers of population throughout the United States. (Described by Donald Feldstein in a report prepared for the American Jewish Congress.) In 1930 68% of Jews of American lived in the northeast corridor; today that percentage is 54%. In 1949 75% of American Jews lived in the 14 largest urban centers; today, 50% live in the 12 largest urban centers. In 1949 New York City's Jewish population was 2.1 million; today, 1.2 million. According to American Jewish Yearbooks, in 1949 the Jewish population of South Florida (West Palm Beach to Miami) was less than 50,000; today it is nearing 500,000. Since 1949 the Jewish population of Los Angeles has doubled to more than 500,000. In California there have been other population explosions such as Orange County, not even listed in the American Jewish Yearbook in 1949, and today more than 60,000; San Diego has grown from 5,000 to 34,000; San Jose, 1,300 to 25,000, and San Francisco from 50,000 to 80,000. Other Jewish population centers scattered throughout the United States, have emerged including Phoenix, growing from approximately 4,000 in 1950 to more than 32,000; Denver from 16,000 to 40,000; Atlanta, from 10,000 to 32,000; Washington, DC from 45,000 to 160,000. At the same time old population centers such as Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit and Philadelphia have remained relatively stable.


These changes in the Jewish community parallel the radical change that has taken place in American society since 1944. In these past 50 years the United States has undergone a peaceful revolution, politically, socially, and economically. It has moved closer to realizing the American Creed. In that open American society a flourishing, creative Jewish community has emerged. That Jewish community has been able to affect Jewish destiny more profoundly than at any time in the 2,000 year history of the Diaspora. The role has been enhanced not only by the openness of American society, but by the United States as a super power, having become the central democratic force in world politics today.

In spite of warnings 40 years ago that the post-War American Jewish community would become thoroughly assimilated by the year 2,000, the American Jewish community has maintained, if not strengthened, its sense of Jewish identity and cohesiveness. In spite of the significant upward movement in its economic status and occupational pattern, the Jewish community has continued to express a strong sense of social consciousness that characterized the Jewish community of America prior to World War II. It has been expressed in the active participation of American Jews in the American political process, and in the voting patterns of the rank and file.

Illustrative of their involvement in the political process are 30 Jewish Congressmen representing such areas as Dallas, Wichita, St. Louis, Alabama, Virginia. Despite the drop in Jewish population in New York City, it has today six Jewish Congressmen as contrasted to two in 1944. In California there are seven Jewish members of Congress. In the United States

Senate there are eight Jewish Senators representing Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Nebraska, and New Hampshire. These members of Congress reflect only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the number of American Jews holding or running for public office at all levels of government from school boards to mayors to governors in every section of the United States.

The political influence of the Jewish community has been enhanced by the Jews of American being strategically located in nine states which have a total of 182 of the 272 votes which constitute a majority in the electoral college, as Earl Raab and Seymour Lipset pointed out in a publication of the American Jewish Congress. This strength has been reinforced by the unusually high turnout of Jews, as compared to other voters, in voting in general elections and primaries. The most significant factor may be the exceptional high level of involvement of the Jews in America in campaigns of candidates for major offices, especially in fund raising for such candidates.



APPENDIX B

1944-1984: OUR ROLE IN THE BUILDING OF A NEW AMERICA

*Chair's Address, by Jacqueline K. Levine
Plenary Session, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council
Washington, DC—February 27, 1984*

In the winter of 1944, when NJCRAC was created, in Pittsburgh, at the General Assembly by the Council of Jewish Federations, the world was in darkness. We cannot recall that period without remembering and, yes, even feeling the sense of helplessness and powerlessness in the face of the horror of the time: the conscious, systematic, deliberate, extermination of the Jews of Europe. The year in which we were founded was 1944, but in fact humanity was experiencing 1984. It was that period, not today, which represented the ultimate expression of the totalitarianism that Orwell was to describe four years later. The peoples of Europe were under the evil sway of one man, who exercised complete domination over their thought, expression and behavior through modern technology and modern management. The norm of that society was cruelty, and the forces of darkness of Nazi Europe were paralleled by those of the Soviet Union, totally dominated by another brutal, paranoid dictator. It was not fiction; *1944 was 1984*.

In that world, the United States represented hope, light, and freedom. But even this arsenal of democracy, this giant among nations had cracks in its armor. Japanese-Americans were interned in relocation camps, and there were no protests, no demonstrations. We were on the brink of the era of witch hunting during which careers, even lives, were destroyed while high government officials, Congress, and the media were intimidated into silence. Further, more than 80 years after the Emancipation Proclamation, and the subsequent adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, black Americans suffered the most brutal forms of segregation and oppression in the south, and in the north as well. Lynching was still not an uncommon occurrence in American society, and anti-lynch laws could not even reach the floor of Congress for a vote.

We as an American Jewish community suffered the indignities of anti-Semitism, even as this nation fought the ultimate expression of anti-Semitism in Europe. Personal humiliations were common and endemic, but the suffering went beyond personal hurt. Jews suffered discrimination in higher education. Quotas were part of the American way of life. Jews were denied employment in major corporations. Restrictive covenants, enforced by law, denied them housing in certain areas. Discrimination in resorts was commonplace. The most extreme anti-Semitic groups enjoyed widespread popular support, and their echoes could be heard in the halls of Con-

gress and in state legislatures. Father Coughlin broadcast his anti-Semitic slanders, every Sunday, while Charles Lindbergh praised Nazi Germany.

We Jews lived in a Protestant America, and most particularly, this was evident in our public school system. In the daily routine of schools we were reminded, through prayer and Bible reading, that this was a Christian nation.

We were an immigrant Jewish population, preoccupied with the struggle to meet the needs of our families amidst economic disaster. The challenge to the Jewish community then was to enable individual Jews to enter that society, not on how to maintain Jewish identity in a free, open, and voluntary society. The challenge for us then was to hold America to its promise of dignity and equality.

Changing Fundamental Conditions

It was in that world and at that time that four national agencies—the American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee, Jewish Labor Committee and Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith—and fourteen Jewish community relations councils were joined together at the initiative of the federation movement to create the NJCRAC, or as it was then known, NCRAC—the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council.

We were called into being at the nadir of Jewish survival. But we were also, in 1944, at the dawn of a new era. It was to radically alter the nature of Jewish life in ways only scarcely imagined during the 2,000 years of the diaspora, and to revolutionize the nature and character of American society. Our network of agencies played a vital role in bringing about these revolutionary changes. We were to operate on the premise that the security of the American Jewish community was ultimately dependent upon the strength of the American democratic system and we envisioned a society which would enable ethnic, religious, and social groups to fulfill their own distinctive aspirations on a voluntary basis. As a Jewish community relations field, we were not satisfied with a society, however tolerant and benevolent, which continued to remind us of our place in a Christian America. We insisted upon more than toleration. We had to be an integral part of American society while maintaining our own distinctiveness, in order to function as the non-conformists which we were, and are. We wanted a society which was open to non-conformity, in which, in Horace Kallen's words, there was "equality of the different," of different social groups and cul-

tures as well as of different individuals:

We wanted opportunity in the areas of employment and education and in all other arenas in which Americans competed. We wanted to be judged solely upon the bases of our own individual capabilities. We wanted a society in which the state and its instrumentalities were totally neutral among religious beliefs, and also between belief and non-belief.

To achieve such a society we looked to the foundation of American liberties, to the Bill of Rights, and particularly to the First Amendment. We sought to translate the Bill of Rights into the reality of American life. We recognized that the realization of the American creed could not be achieved by exhortation alone, but required the sanction of law, which also served to set the standard of what was expected of all Americans. Our goal was not public relations, or good will, or love, which we would have welcomed, then as now, but our due as American citizens: those fundamental rights of equality to which every American as an individual was entitled. We understood that those rights were indivisible. They could not be enjoyed by some, and denied to others. The strategy for assuring the security of the Jewish community was correct in the 1940s, and it is still correct in 1984.

It led our field into partnership with the NAACP in developing a total package of civil rights legislation: fair employment practices, fair housing practices, fair education practices, laws and state and city commissions on human relations. Although focused upon discrimination suffered by Jews, we knew that our goals had to be universal ones, concerned for the rights of all people in the society.

We knew then, as we know now, that we alone could not achieve our aims, that coalitions were essential. Nationally we joined with the NAACP in creating the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. In communities in all parts of the United States, CRCs took the lead in creating similar coalitions, generally called human relations councils.

The initial successes were achieved on the community level, but nationally, Southern power in the Congress and the use of the filibuster were insurmountable obstacles. So state-by-state, city-by-city, law-by-law CRCs were in the vanguard of creating in the 1940s and 1950s the infrastructure of civil rights legislation that led to the historic acts of Congress in the mid-1960s.

If one were asked to identify the singular contribution of the American Jewish community to the making of American democracy, the answer would have to be that, just as we built the infrastructure of civil rights laws, so did we play a vital role in giving life to the First Amendment to the Constitution. It is, as Madison and Jefferson envisioned, the cornerstone of our liberties, guaranteeing the separation of church and state, the supremacy of conscience, freedom of belief, freedom of speech, and freedom of the written word.

By the early 1960s the separation principle was being enforced in case after case by the Supreme Court.

Those historic Court opinions reflected what we as a Jewish community relations field argued in our many briefs in the 1940s and the 1950s. No longer would our children be subjected to daily religious rituals in the public schools which affected their image and status as Americans and as Jews. As a result of those landmark decisions, we are a different Jewish community living in a different America.

Our dream of the kind of nation we wanted was nurtured in the *shtetl*, but it coincided with that of the 18th century political philosophers who shaped the character of this nation. We were the children of the Age of Enlightenment. We were the spiritual heirs of Jefferson and Madison.

We helped radically alter the demographic nature of American society in our single-minded drive to repeal the racist barriers to immigration, established in American law at the height of the power of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s. That infamous law cost thousands of Jewish lives in the 1930s. We fought bitterly against its codification in the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952, but we lost, despite President Truman's veto. But we were not content to accept the issue as settled. Supported by such great Senators as Herbert Lehman, we fought to keep the issue alive in the 1950s, when few others cared. In bill after bill in the gloom of the 1950s, we set forth the ideals which we knew had to be enacted into American immigration law.

Following our practice, we in the Jewish community relations field, together with a few other close friends, forged a new coalition which was to be called the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference, today the National Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Forum. We acted almost alone until 1960 when a young candidate for President picked up our banner and the issue once again became a priority concern. By 1965 the repeal of the vicious national origins quota system was overwhelmingly approved by the Congress.

These were not small, peripheral or marginal changes. They changed the face of America, and because of them, we can speak and act more effectively today, as a strong secure Jewish community, on behalf of not only American Jews, but of Jews abroad who are endangered by oppression or besieged by Arab armies.

By the 1960s we had become a new, indigenous American Jewish community, radically different in profile from that Jewish community of 1944. We were primarily native-born: exceptionally well-educated: affluent: secure: articulate: fully integrated into American society, yet proudly identified as a Jewish community. And, our use of political power became ever-more sophisticated.

Advocacy of Soviet Jewry Cause

These changes which had evolved over the course of a generation coincided with a major shift in the priorities of the Jewish community relations field. We had been preoccupied with our status as Americans

and the status of our fellow Americans, especially the black community. As threats to our security as American Jews diminished, we were moved in new directions as a result of threats to the security of our fellow Jews abroad.

We had never lost consciousness of our brothers and sisters in the Soviet Union. In the nightmare of the Holocaust we knew of their terrible suffering, of the blood of Jews which flowed in Babi Yar. We did not forget them in the "*schwartzte yoren*"—the black years from 1948-1953 under Stalin. We stood by, virtually helpless, as we witnessed them being murdered; disappearing; imprisoned in forced labor camps. We watched the destruction of once-great Jewish institutions—Jewish schools, Jewish theatres, Jewish papers, Jewish culture. We saw synagogue after synagogue closed.

We were not inactive. We tried to ameliorate their plight, albeit discreetly, but we were not successful. Even after Stalin, Jews fulfilled their traditional role as scapegoats. They were "chosen" for execution for economic crimes that were endemic in the Soviet Union, as instructive lessons to all Soviet citizens. They suffered a government-directed anti-Semitic campaign manifest as in Kichko's notorious book until it was withdrawn by worldwide outrage. For a time they were even barred from the baking of matzah for Passover.

The Jews of the Soviet Union were cut off from their past and denied their future. They were cut off from Jewish life abroad, except for the presence in Moscow of the Embassy of Israel. They were discouraged from being Jews, and were not accepted into significant sectors of Russian life. They were cultural amnesiacs, atomized, isolated and alienated—seemingly forgotten. And they were barred from leaving—fewer than 100 Jews a year were able to get out. They were a frightened and intimidated Jewish community without hope.

In the face of all this, we as an American Jewish community, particularly in the Jewish community relations field, could no longer rely on discreet channels to petition for Soviet Jews. This new Jewish community of the 1960s was no longer the powerless Jewish community of an earlier generation. We chose to challenge the Soviet Union in the marketplace of ideas. We would focus the spotlight of public opinion on the Kremlin's malevolent repression of Soviet Jews. We acted on the audacious belief that public denunciations in this country would lead the Soviet Union to modify its policies against the Jews. What madness!

In response to the passionate appeals of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel and demands from communities, American Jewish organizations convened and then established the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry as a permanent body, with NJCRAC staffing it from 1965 until 1970 when the very success of the effort began to overwhelm our limited resources. That led to the creation of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry as the successor

body, and to the very special relationship between NJCRAC and the National Conference which exists to this day.

In that campaign of the 1960s the invisible Jews of the Soviet Union became an issue on the international agenda. That was our first achievement. We aroused the consciences of men and women—Sartre; Simone de Beauvoir; Bertrand Russell; Martin Luther King. Even the Communist parties of France and Italy took note of their plight. We placed the matter on the agenda of the United States government. All American diplomatic channels were to be used by our government on behalf of Soviet Jews.

This led to a significant response from the government of the Soviet Union, which anticipated immigration developments when Kosygin publicly signaled a crack in Soviet emigration policy at the end of 1966.

Most important, we renewed the link with Soviet Jews, and thereby ended their isolation. American Jews and Soviet Jews touched each other through our public expressions of outrage, so that by 1969 the Jews of the Soviet Union were engaged in incredible acts of courage in publicly petitioning for their rights under Soviet law and constitution. In the very shadow of the Kremlin, in unprecedented actions, they demanded the right to return to their national Jewish homeland. Those exceptional acts were to become routine in the decade that followed.

The Soviet Union responded with an iron fist, but they could not quell the Soviet Jewish freedom movement. They had to accommodate it as well. The 1970s saw the incredible movement from the Soviet Union of thousands of Soviet Jews, which we would not have dared to dream in 1964. But we also witnessed thousands more applying for visas to Israel, only to be denied that fundamental human right.

The redemption of Soviet Jews was a miracle which was achieved not through the power of the sword, but through the righteousness of our words. We accomplished this miracle by being single-minded in our efforts, isolating this issue from all other issues which referred to the Soviet Union. Our demands were not revolutionary; we did not seek a change in the Soviet system. We called upon the Soviet Union to fulfill the commitments of the Soviet Union's Constitution and of international treaties to which it was a signator.

Our strength lay in our ability to take the long view, knowing that this struggle would not end in a day or a week or a year or a decade. In the perspective of these past 20 years, our determination has not weakened. We will continue the struggle through the balance of the eighties and, if necessary, through the balance of the twentieth century.

We know that the combined courage of Soviet Jews and our efforts in the West shall lead to the time when thousands more will emerge from the Soviet Union to recite the deeds of the Jewish people in the land of Israel, and rebuild their lives in the West.

Fostering U.S. Support for Israel

Our generation of Jews have been blessed with miracles, unlike any other generation in the last two thousand years. And the most miraculous miracle of all was the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. After two thousand years, after endless persecutions, after the anguish of the Holocaust, the Jewish state was reborn, as if out of the ashes of Auschwitz. Prayers uttered day after day, century after century, were finally fulfilled. The dream became reality. Those prayers, and those dreams, were fulfilled by the exceptional bravery and idealism of Jewish *chalutzim*, nurtured in the *shtetl*, and tested in the swamps of the Galilee, and then on the battlefields against armies of more than a hundred million Arabs.

The Jewish state, formally declared in 1948 although its infrastructure was already firmly in place, desired only to live in peace with its neighbors. For peace, it was ready to make all kinds of accommodations, and compromises, including territorial concessions. But the readiness to accommodate, before and after 1948, was answered by the Arab states in "holy war"—*jihads* aimed at the destruction of the State of Israel. Only Egypt has broken from the unending Arab path of warfare against Israel, and poor Lebanon, which tried, but now is broken.

In 1948 Israel was besieged, but not alone. The family of nations had welcomed her into their midst. The United States was the first to recognize Israel, and even the Soviet Union joined in supporting her creation. By the mid-1950s Soviet weapons of war were flowing into the Arab world on a massive basis to spur them on in their determination to drive Israel from the Middle East. The flow of Soviet arms has continued, almost uninterrupted, to this very day.

The values which led the nations of the world to vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations for the creation of the State of Israel were soon corrupted by oil and petrodollars. In the course of time, Israel stood almost alone but for the special relationship with the United States.

As the role of the United States became increasingly critical to the security and survival of the State of Israel, the Jewish community relations field, year-by-year, steadily increased its emphasis on American foreign policy in the Middle East. Our priorities and role were clearly defined for us by May 1967, when Israel was threatened by new Arab oppression and rebuffed by her closest ally, France, leaving the United States as the only major power in support of Israel. No longer did we rationalize our role as we did in the early fifties, in terms of responding to the community relations consequences of the Middle East. Our responsibility was clear: the security and survival of the State of Israel.

We have had no choice since 1967 but to devote maximum resources and efforts to assure the strong support of the United States for Israel. Tragically, the Arab states did not respond to the olive branch extended by Israel immediately upon the conclusion of

the Six-Day War. Rather, they continued on their relentless, senseless destructive path of war: wars of attrition, terrorism, the Yom Kippur War, and the oil embargo. The response of the world, except for the United States, was at best indifference and at worst treachery, indeed, anti-Semitism, in the United Nations, and cynical and perfidious policies of Western nations such as Britain and France.

As we meet today, the relationship between Israel and the United States is as good as it ever has been. But we in the Jewish community relations field know full well the complexity of that relationship and try to avoid wild swings between euphoria or despair in our assessments of U.S. policy. We know that the United States does have a firm commitment to the survival and security of Israel, and that that commitment is based on a special affinity with Israel in terms of its values and aspirations as well as a recognition of a congruity of strategic interests. That commitment, we are convinced, is strong and enduring, though constantly tested by oil and petrodollars.

So, our focus has been on public policy. It is within that framework that we assess public attitudes and the media treatment of the Middle East. We set for ourselves clearly defined public policy goals, and we have resisted being deflected, even when overwhelming anxieties of many in the Jewish community would have altered our course and priorities. As you may recall, we were thus pressed in the winter of 1973-74 during the oil embargo, and the summer of 1982 in the war in Lebanon. The wisdom of the course we set has been demonstrated in the perspective of time. Our success in dealing with the Middle East grows out of our knowing where we wanted to go and why.

Of course, United States policy is not a function of what we have accomplished alone. We, above all, understand that our nation has been receptive to our appeals because of its affinity with Israel. We have been effective because the Jewish community, in all of its varied segments, has consistently joined together in pursuing the goals we have set for ourselves. We have been effective because our concern for Israel is consonant with America's interests. America's values, America's aspirations. We have spoken in that language because we, as American Jewish community relations agencies, are rooted in American society, even as we are rooted in the stream of Jewish history. It has led us to develop the skills and understanding so necessary in this complex arena—skills which will continue to be called upon until peace finally comes to the Middle East, a peace which Israel, American Jewry, and the United States fervently desires.

Cooperation in the Common Cause

In the perspective of these forty years, our achievements on both domestic and international agendas have been extraordinary, and they were achieved by the Jewish community relations field as a whole. Each agency, national or local, made its own special contribution. They represent the collective efforts of

agencies, each functioning in its own particular way.

No one agency could have achieved this alone. It could only have been accomplished by our network of agencies, national and local, working as a harmonious whole. They did not function in isolation, in a state of anarchy, each acting as it chose to without reference to the efforts of the others. As a field, through the NJCRAC process, we have consciously, deliberately joined together in reaching agreement on the priority issues of Jewish community relations. We determine the positions we should take on those issues, the strategies, approaches, and programs best calculated to advance them, and the best means for improving the methods, approaches and techniques of the field. Together we designed the blueprints of our joint efforts. Together we celebrate our successes.

We were able to do this because our constituents are committed to the common cause. They *do* believe in *k'lal Yisrael*. They *do* believe in the unity of the Jewish people. Toward that higher goal, agencies, again and again, have demonstrated a readiness to subordinate their own institutional interests. The result is all that we have seen achieved in these past forty years.

But this process of cooperation has worked because we in NJCRAC also recognize the distinctiveness of each agency. We respect the autonomy of each agency. We recognize that the cooperation extended by agencies to each other through the NJCRAC process can be based only on voluntarism. That respect for the autonomy and distinctiveness of our member agencies and our appreciation of the pluralistic character of the Jewish community has been essential to our effectiveness. NJCRAC's charge was to serve as a "consultative, coordinating, and advisory council," not as a functional agency, separate and apart from our member agencies.

Over the years there have been those who urged that the field could be more effectively organized through a strong, central, functional, monolithic, national body. Even were it possible to create such an instrumentality, I believe that such an agency could not have achieved the results of these four decades. It would not have reached the diverse constituencies that make up the Jewish community which are critical to our effectiveness. Nor would it have fostered the varied expressions of Jewish life so vital to the creative survival of the Jewish community in America. To the extent that those varied expressions are diminished, is the extent to which we will become a sterile Jewish community.

That unique process that the Council of Jewish Federations created forty years ago of joining communities and national agencies in partnership on the basis of pluralism, unity and voluntarism has well served the American Jewish community and American society.

Yet we cannot pretend that there have not been severe strains and tensions in the process of achieving full cooperation among community and national

agencies. Even in these forty years, we still do not have the whole-hearted trust and mutual respect that is so necessary to the fulfillment of our common cause. While being the strongest advocates for working in coalition in the general community on a broad range of issues, Jewish community relations agencies, national or local, at times still shrink from giving fully to that ongoing process that coalesces the resources of the Jewish community for the common weal. Such a coalition is absolutely essential to the goals of the Jewish community. Ad hoc responses are not sufficient, nor is a body made up solely of national agencies or a faction of those agencies. A coalition made up only of community agencies would not be responsive to the needs of the Jewish community. Our strength as a field is in the unique partnership of national and community agencies. Of course, there will be conflicts of interests among agencies, but through "true and considerate regard by all," as it is written in our Statement of Purposes, for the opinions of each agency and for the joint judgments reached together, we can respond to the common cause and still respect the integrity and autonomy of each agency as we have done.

The process of cooperation and mutual trust can always be strengthened through our own internal deliberations. As a modest, yet I believe, important step in that direction, I will appoint a small committee to reflect upon how we are fulfilling our Statement of Purposes. This committee, balanced between national agencies and communities, will consider together how we are meeting our defined charge. I am pleased to announce that Raymond Epstein has accepted the Chairmanship of this committee. Its point of departure will be these 40 years of experience which have worked; its charge will be how to assure our continued effectiveness in meeting the challenges of the balance of the 20th century.

Challenges in the Future

What are those challenges? Our recitation of what we have achieved might make it appear that we have conquered all frontiers. But if everything is so good, then why is it so bad?

As I have indicated, what we did achieve is little short of a miracle in regard to Soviet Jews, but that very accomplishment underscores the enormity of the task which lies before us. The basic principles which guided us in bringing out thousands of Soviet Jews were effective in the past, but will they work for us in overcoming the crisis of the present? The time may have come for a major reassessment conference to re-examine the premises of our efforts of these past two decades. We may very well arrive at the conclusion that those principles are still valid and that what is required is the readiness to persevere over the long haul. But we do have an obligation to submit them to a re-examination. Thus, I propose that we consider holding a reassessment conference on the premises and strategy for Soviet Jewry with the

cooperation of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.

In regard to Israel, we pray that, before this century ends, indeed before this decade ends, we shall see peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Four decades of Arab intransigence does not encourage such hope. A new Sadat is not on the horizon and we are likely to face more threats to Israel's security and survival. The future of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) will remain open, and it will continue to test the unity of the American Jewish community and possibly of U.S.-Israeli ties. We may be called upon to give increased attention to the nature of Israel as a Jewish state in which all Jews have a profound stake, and also to the manner in which religious pluralism is permitted to express itself in Israel.

In many ways the international agenda may be clearer for us than the domestic agenda. In these forty years the nature and extent of individual freedoms have radically expanded in America, particularly through Supreme Court decisions. Nevertheless, the new technology and new roles of government may pose serious threats to individual freedoms.

As much as we welcome the expansion of individualism, we should recognize that it may be fostering a stress on individualism that is not responsive to community, eroding the sense of national purpose and national will, internationally and domestically, and weakening the family unit and group cohesiveness including that of the Jewish community.

Eighteen years after the passage of comprehensive civil rights legislation, we continue to pay a terrible price for the legacy and consequences of 300 years of slavery and segregation. The problems of the permanent underclass appear to be virtually intractable. They seem to be invisible in the affluence that is enjoyed by a majority of Americans. Today we see broadside attacks on voluntary and court-ordered efforts to eliminate these legacies of segregation and discrimination. We see the poor ravaged by the effects of cuts in social programs and the depression which swept their communities. A national consensus to confront these enormous problems continues

to elude us, and the prospects for a national assault on these issues in the decade ahead are dim, although failure to act can endanger the social fabric of this nation.

I am not among those who foresee a disappearing Jewish community as we move towards the end of the 20th century. But we do have to ask ourselves what kind of Jewish community we will be as we move into the 21st century. The moral imperatives of economic and social justice, which were part of the muscle fiber of the Jewish community relations field in earlier years, tragically seem to grow weaker as a driving force in Jewish life. They are further diminished by the fact that many Jews who are moved by a sense of social justice are not conscious of the Jewish roots of their value system. Today they may do what is right, but they are unable to transmit that precious heritage to the next generation. Only when Jews consciously act out those values as Jews, only when they are aware of the Jewishness which motivates them, can they preserve these values. Otherwise, they will disappear, along with those "good people" who see their Jewishness as marginal to their existence.

We as a Jewish community relations field are not prophets or preachers. We are practitioners who have the ability to mobilize the Jewish community in the common and good cause. But we provide the channels by which Jews, as Jews, can act on the fundamental issues that confront society, and in our so doing we can foster a Jewish consciousness that preserves our heritage. We serve as the vehicles for preserving the best that is Jewish and, as we do so, we also preserve the best that is American. But we must once again be on the cutting edge. We must once again address the critical issues of this nation as we did in our earlier years. We must be neither resigned nor passive in the face of age-old evils, nor inured to the scabrous ugliness of poverty, to the scourge of war or to hatreds directed against those who are different. That is what our Judaism mandates. That is what being "a good Jew" means. That is what NJCRAC is all about.

NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL
PURPOSES, ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS*

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

Being motivated by a common desire to improve Jewish community relations in America, and recognizing that this common desire can best be advanced through the sharing of knowledge and ideas and other forms of cooperation, the autonomous Jewish community relations agencies comprising the NCRAC have joined together for the effective furtherance of such cooperation.

The National Community Relations Advisory Council is the instrument for seeking effective cooperation among Jewish community relations agencies within a framework embracing the reciprocal concepts of common cause and voluntarism.

The common cause is that of better Jewish community relations to which all the agencies in the field are committed. In this common cause, all the agencies agree to join together in cooperative efforts to reach agreement on:

- (1) the issues on which the agencies should take positions,
- (2) what those positions should be,
- (3) the strategies, approaches and programs best calculated to advance those positions,
- (4) the best means for improving the methods, approaches, and techniques being pursued by the field as a whole, and
- (5) the most effective ways of utilizing all the resources available to the field for advancement of joint purposes.

Voluntarism characterizes the nature of the relationships among the agencies, signifying that they are autonomous and that they enter into the cooperative relationship voluntarily and without any surrender of their autonomy. It is understood that each agency is the sole arbiter of its own positions, policies, and programs; and of the structure and form of organization that it deems best suited to the attainment of its objectives.

As a result of the cooperative process of sharing of information and experience, exchange of views and determination of consensus, certain judgments, conclusions and recommendations will be reached jointly. It is understood that these are advisory, and that each agency may adopt, modify or reject them in accordance with its own best judgment.

It is recognized that, to be effective, a cooperative relationship based on the reciprocal principles of common cause and voluntarism must rest upon:

- (1) full and complete exchange of knowledge, views, etc. among all the participating agencies,

*as amended June, 1966

- (2) true and considerate regard by all for the opinions of each, whether in accord or in disagreement, and
- (3) equally true and considerate regard by all for joint judgments and recommendations reached by consensus.

The NCRAC is a consultative, coordinating and advisory council for the furtherance of the foregoing purposes. It is not a functional community relations agency separate and apart from its autonomous member agencies. The foregoing statement of purpose shall be changed only by the unanimous action of the NCRAC Executive Committee.

MEMBERSHIP

The NCRAC works by bringing together its member agencies, both national and local, to plan together and think together about common problems. Membership in the NCRAC thus means participation in the process by which the knowledge, experience and opinions of all are pooled for the common good.

ELIGIBILITY

National Agencies: National agencies shall be admitted to membership by vote of the Executive Committee or the Plenary Session.

Local Agencies: To be eligible for membership in the NCRAC, a local council must

- (1) be representative of the community it serves;
- (2) conduct an on-going community relations program;
- (3) have a full- or part-time paid executive who is responsible to the local council.

Any change in these eligibility requirements shall be by unanimous action of the Executive Committee.

Applications for membership are evaluated by a Membership Committee, which reports with recommendations to either the Executive Committee or the Plenary Session, where final action is taken by majority vote.

GOVERNING BODIES

The Plenum of the NCRAC, its highest governing body, meets annually. It consists of two representatives, of whom one is the professional and one a lay person, named by each of the community member agencies, and five representatives named by each of the national member agencies.

The Executive Committee, which is the highest governing body in the interim between Plenary Sessions, is elected by the Plenary Session. It consists of two representatives nominated at the time of the Plenary Session by each of the national member agencies; and eighteen persons, representing the total group of community member agencies, nominated by a caucus of the community delegates.

to the Plenary Session. The officers, including past chairmen of the NCRAC who are included in this group, are members of the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee meets approximately four times a year.

The Association of Jewish Community Relations Workers, the professional organization in the field, designates one of its members an ex-officio member of the Executive Committee. The chairmen and vice chairmen of commissions and committees also serve as ex-officio members of the Executive Committee.

Commissions and Committees

The essential processes of the NCRAC are carried forward through the work of standing commissions and/or committees, ad hoc committees being formed as required for special purposes. Each commission or committee within its area of concern maintains continual alertness to changing conditions, evaluates their implications for programming and develops recommendations for the member agencies or for consideration by the Executive Committee or Plenary Session. Each commission or committee comprises representation from each of the member national agencies and an equal number of community representatives, both lay and professional.

NATIONAL-LOCAL RELATIONSHIPS

The following statement of principles, adopted by the NCRAC Executive Committee April 15, 1953 continues to govern national-local relationships:

Jewish community relations agencies are concerned with protecting the rights and furthering the welfare of the Jewish community as a whole and not merely with service to their own members. For this reason, Jewish community relations agencies, national and local, recognize their accountability to the Jewish community in whose cause they serve.

National and local community relations agencies play complementary roles in the general community relations program. Full cooperation and harmony between national and local agencies is imperative for the most effective conduct of community relations activities. Where the local community relations council is representative of the community and involves the participation of the responsible organized Jewish groups in the local community or region, its primacy as the central body for local Jewish community relations is recognized.

With respect to their activities and those of their local affiliates as well as in the establishment and operation of branch offices, it should be the policy of national agencies to:

1. Recognize the CRC as the central body with primary responsibility for planning and conducting community relations programs.
2. Encourage their constituents to conduct activities with the approval of the CRC.
3. Place their facilities and resources at the service of the CRC.
4. Encourage the formation of CRCs where they do not now exist.

It should be the policy of CRCs to:

1. Give full recognition to the constituents of national agencies as channels through which the implementation of local community relations programs can be facilitated.
2. Avail themselves of the services of the national agencies.
3. Assist and further the program of local chapters and branches of national agencies.
4. Recognize that no national agency need or should be asked to compromise its fundamental philosophy.

The resolution on national-local relations unanimously adopted on December 16, 1944 is hereby reaffirmed. If difficulties arise between any national agency and local organization, with respect to the application of the foregoing principles, such difficulties shall be submitted to the NCRAC for its advisory opinion.

PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES

The program and activities of the NCRAC are divided into seven major headings as follows:

Joint Policy Formulation

This involves effort to reach agreement as to:

- (a) The issues on which it is deemed desirable for Jewish community relations agencies to take positions and
- (b) The best positions to be taken on such issues.

Joint Program Planning and Coordination

This involves seeking agreement on:

- (a) Needs -- what are the major community relations problems?
- (b) Programs -- what activities should be undertaken in order to deal most effectively with those problems?
- (c) Priorities - which programs are most important and which, though desirable, are less urgent?
- (d) Resources -- ways in which the combined resources of all the agencies may be used most effectively.

Reassessment and Evaluation

This involves seeking agreement on best approaches and methods in the light of changing conditions. It is a process whereby the cooperating agencies systematically examine:

- (a) The assumptions on which approaches and programs in various areas are based.
- (b) New developments in the areas and relevant findings of social science.
- (c) How well the methods and approaches that have been used are working.
- (d) What better methods and approaches might be tried.

The reassessment process shall deal with the field as a whole and shall not seek to pass judgment upon the nature, structure, scope or program of individual agencies.

Community Consultation

This involves consultation on:

- (a) Organization of local community relations structures;
- (b) Development of local programs;
- (c) Orientation and training of beginning community relations workers;
- (d) Joint policies and program recommendations; and
- (e) Resources and functional services available from the cooperating national agencies.

Information Service

This provides for a continual exchange of information among the cooperating agencies and the channelling of appropriate information and interpretation about the cooperative process and its products to the Jewish community.

Personnel Service

An information exchange is maintained in the NCRAC office regarding employment opportunities in the community relations fields and persons seeking employment, whereby agencies and communities are helped to find qualified personnel. Individuals considering entering the field are given information and counsel. There is no charge for this service either to agencies or applicants.

PROCESS AND PROCEDURES

The basic process of the NCRAC is that of sharing. The constituent organizations share their plans, their knowledge, their experience, their ideas, with full mutual confidence and regard. Joint scrutiny may result in joint endorsement, produce suggestions for improvement, lead to common policies, coordinated programs, or have other outcomes.

CLEARANCE

The clearance process in the NCRAC consists of the exchange of information and plans among the member agencies. There is no formalized procedure. Some

agencies make copies of minutes available, others rely on communications in writing or orally, either to the NCRAC office or in the course of meetings. No attempt is made to define matters for clearance or the stage at which plans are to be cleared. It is assumed that, as a matter of cooperation and in good faith, every agency will seek the joint judgment of the entire family of agencies in regard to any plan or project which might benefit from mutual scrutiny or profit from joint participation in execution. It is understood that, as a guide, a statement or project that is in line with a previously agreed upon joint policy or that reflects a previously known policy or approach of the agency making the statement or undertaking the project need not be cleared; but that any agency contemplating assertion of a new policy or a major departure in strategy or approach would feel it desirable, where possible, to consult through the NCRAC before taking such contemplated action.

NCRAC Is an Advisory Council

The collective judgments of the agencies reached by the NCRAC process -- whether they are collective policy formulations, joint program plans or recommendations for concerted action -- are not binding, but advisory. It is not expected that they will be accepted and applied uncritically, but rather that agencies and communities will regard them as guides, to be accepted, modified or rejected by each as it plans its own programs according to its needs, resources and priorities.

Voting

Voting in the NCRAC is for the purpose of establishing consensus so that the NCRAC may advise the Jewish community relations agencies of both the majority and the minority views on disputed issues, thus enabling them to take all views into account in their own consideration of the issues. Voting is invoked only after thorough discussion reveals that differences cannot be reconciled by mutual accommodation. Since all cooperating agencies are autonomous, no vote is binding upon any of them.

To provide for the infrequent occasion on which formal votes become necessary, the following distribution of votes has been established among the agencies:

- (1) In the Executive Committee, each national agency has two votes and the community representatives share votes equal to the combined votes of the national agencies.
- (2) In the Plenum, each community member agency with a Jewish population of 5,000 or more is entitled to four votes; community agencies with less than 5,000 Jewish population to one vote each. National agencies are entitled to ten votes each.
- (3) In commissions and committees, voting strength is divided equally between national agency representatives and community representatives.

Public Statements and Actions

A statement may be made public or a public action taken in the name of the NCRAC when there is unanimous agreement in the Plenum, the Executive Committee, or a commission or committee, both as to substantive position and as to the desirability of a public statement or public action thereon.

Lacking unanimity, the dissenting or abstaining agency or agencies may, at their option, specify one of the following procedures:

- (1) that the majority position be made public in the name of the NCRAC, omitting the name of those agencies not subscribing to it.
- (2) that the majority position be made public by the NCRAC as a releasing agent, in the names only of those agencies subscribing to it, and with the dissents or abstentions of the non-participating agencies explicitly noted, should they so desire.
- (3) that the facilities of the NCRAC be used to make public the position of the majority, in their names only, and without the use of the name of the NCRAC (i.e., on blank stationery).

The foregoing provisions governing public statements and actions shall be changed only by unanimous agreement in the Executive Committee of the Plenary Session of the NCRAC.

- NOTES: 1. The NCRAC is in all cases an enabling mechanism. Public statements and actions by NCRAC are always explicitly statements and actions of the cooperating agencies. The NCRAC is not represented as speaking on behalf of the agencies but as the vehicle for their statements and actions. NCRAC publications, and statements of policy on position emanating from NCRAC, whether public or internal within the Jewish community, and whether arrived at unanimously or by majority vote, are so formulated as to make clear that the policies or positions are those of the agencies in the NCRAC and not of the NCRAC separate from or independent of the constituent agencies.
2. Since all national member agencies are represented in the Plenum, the Executive Committee and all commissions and committees, each national agency, in effect, may veto any public statement or action by the NCRAC.

Umbrella Organizations

The NCRAC presently participates in the following: American Immigration and Citizenship Conference, American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, Citizens Crusade against Poverty, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing. Future participation in other such bodies or forums shall require the unanimous approval of the NCRAC Executive Committee.

NCRAC participates in umbrella organizations as a channel or conduit of communication between such organizations and the community member agencies; it does not speak or act for or on behalf of any of its cooperating national agencies.

NCRAC representatives in such umbrella organizations will not vote on issues when there is evidence of differences of opinion on the issues among its national member agencies.

The same rule of unanimity that applies to the issuance of public statements by NCRAC applies to the authorization of the use of the name of NCRAC in connection with any public statement or action by such umbrella organization.

The foregoing provisions regarding umbrella organizations shall be changed only by the unanimous action of the NCRAC Executive Committee or Plenary Session.

Effective Utilization of Resources

1. Being autonomous, all agencies have the equal and inviolate right to engage in whatever areas of community relations work they choose and to create whatever structure and organizational arrangements they deem desirable, while seeking to avoid duplication wherever possible.

2. At the same time, it is recognized that, in order to utilize available resources most effectively, it will prove desirable from time to time that particular tasks, jointly agreed upon as necessary, be undertaken by one of the agencies. Assignment of responsibility for performance of such tasks will be on a case-by-case basis. In the event of disagreement on assignment of responsibility in a specific case, the right of the agency dissenting from such assignment shall be respected and the right of any agency to undertake such responsibility on its own shall be respected. When the task assigned involves preparation of a document for publication, the draft thereof will be subject to review by an appropriate NCRAC body.

3. It is agreed that, by their nature, activities requiring the concerted impact of multiple influences and forces — such as social action problems of all sorts — are the common responsibility of all agencies.

4. The foregoing provisions for effective utilization of resources shall be changed only by unanimous agreement in the Executive Committee or the Plenary Session of the NCRAC.

SUPERSEDING CLAUSE

This statement describes the basis for cooperation among Jewish community relations agencies and supersedes any and all preexisting NCRAC statements, resolutions, and procedures relating to the cooperative process which are inconsistent with this statement.

NJCRAC Review Committee

Discussion Outline

In relation to NJCRAC efforts to achieve agreement among member agencies on the community relations agenda, i.e., issues, policies, priorities, strategies, programs, public statements and actions, the Review Committee will examine:

I Shaping Consensus

How has NJCRAC sought out the views of member agencies? National? Community?

Do the member agencies -- national, local -- use the NJCRAC process to seek the joint judgments of member agencies? Do member agencies -- national, local -- consult through the NJCRAC before asserting a new policy or undertaking a major departure in strategy or approach?

Is the process readily available to an open exchange of views and experiences among the agencies? Are the agencies -- national, local -- receptive to this process?

Is there an openness to community input by NJCRAC? By national agencies?

Do communities initiate use of the process by bringing CRC views and proposals to NJCRAC for joint consideration or do they await NJCRAC initiatives?

II Public Statements and Action

Is the process for the issuance of public statements or undertaking public actions in the name of NJCRAC in accord with the Statement of Purposes?

Are national agencies open to this charge and process?

Does the process enable communities to jointly express their views in public on the national level?

III Coordination

Once consensus is reached, are member agencies open to coordination through NJCRAC?

Does such coordination facilitate the concerted impact of the multiple efforts of member agencies?

What is the scope as well as limits of such coordination?

Are the resources of member agencies readily available to member agencies through the NJCRAC process? Are they readily utilized?

Is there an openness by national agencies to assignments of specific responsibilities on a case-by-case basis?

IV Relevance of Process to Needs and Concerns of Jewish Community

Is the process timely? Is the transmission of the consensus timely?

Do NJCRAC's community consultation services channel the appropriate information and interpretation on joint policies and program recommendations?

Does the process result in an agenda and guidelines that are responsive to the needs and concerns of the field of Jewish community relations? Of the Jewish community as a whole?

V Conclusions and Recommendations

Is NJCRAC fulfilling the charge placed upon it by Statement of Purposes?

Is NJCRAC undertaking roles that go beyond the Statement of Purposes?

Are there needs which are not being met by NJCRAC?

In light of these assessments, what modifications, if any, are required in the manner in which NJCRAC carries out these roles? In its staffing? In the Statement of Purposes?

Is the Statement responsive to contemporary needs of the Jewish community?



January 8, 1985

TO: NJCRAC and CJF Member Agencies

FROM: Albert D. Chernin, Executive Vice Chairman

RE: Further on Response and Suggested Guidelines to Communities Regarding Ethiopian Crisis

As a follow-up to our electronic communication yesterday, we are enclosing the text of a front-page statement that will appear in the St. Louis Jewish Light this coming week under the byline of its Editor-in-Chief, Robert Cohen. Cohen, who also serves as President of the American Jewish Press Association, will forward the statement to editors of the Anglo-Jewish press throughout the country, urging them to make similar use of the editorial. No attribution to Cohen or the St. Louis Jewish Light is needed. The broadest use of the statement's themes in the Anglo-Jewish press is our goal.

We wholeheartedly subscribe to the principles enunciated in this statement. We strongly urge every CRC and Federation to encourage their local Anglo-Jewish press to utilize the statement or its themes as the most appropriate way of dealing with the issue of Ethiopian Jewry. This treatment, instead of news stories such as those that have appeared in the media this weekend, would best serve the interests of Ethiopian Jews.

If you have any questions about the principles of the statement or the guidelines issued yesterday by electronic mail, please contact NJCRAC.

We are also enclosing the full text of our electronic mail statement of yesterday.

ADC:ej
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The following message was sent by Electronic Communication Network by Al Chernin to the communities on Monday, January 7, 1985.

TO: NJCRAC and CJF Member Agencies
FROM: Albert D. Chernin
SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Ethiopian Crisis

A committee met at the NJCRAC today, composed of representatives of NJCRAC, CJF, UJA, UIA, several NJCRAC national member agencies, and representatives of the Israeli Government, to decide upon guidelines for reacting to immediate media, public and community inquiries regarding the crisis of Ethiopian Jews.

There was unanimous agreement that every effort must be made to contain any further comment or public disclosures on movement of Ethiopian Jews because the consequences are affecting Jewish lives, as is clearly evident.

The requirement of the campaign for absorption does not dictate that any initiative be taken with the media on this subject of Ethiopian Jews. Any mention of Ethiopian Jews in the Anglo and Federation papers should focus on absorption only.

We request that there be no campaign, public or discreet, to pressure any government, including the United States Government or its officials, with regard to Ethiopian Jews.

Responses to all inquiries, be it from the media, from individuals or from Congressmen, should be that we cannot comment when the situation is so critical, so delicate, and so fluid.

Further guidelines for communities and the Anglo-Jewish newspapers are being prepared by a joint committee and will be sped to you Tuesday by electronic mail and regular post. Be in contact by telephone with NJCRAC staff for further details.

The agencies participating in the meeting were:

NJCRAC, CJF, American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee, UJA, UIA, ADL, UAHC, HIAS, and the Israel Consulate.

January 8, 1985

STATEMENT ON ETHIOPIAN JEWS

SENT TODAY

TO THE AMERICAN JEWISH PRESS ASSOCIATION

"The more we succeed in removing the subject from the headlines, the greater the chances of rescuing the remnants." So stated Chaim Herzog, President of Israel, in response to the widespread media coverage on the rescue of Ethiopian Jews this week. We believe that this principle should guide the work of every newspaper and Jew in dealing with the issue of Ethiopian Jews. This principle will guide this newspaper and, except for straight news, which does not jeopardize the safety of the effort, we will not comment when the situation is so critical, so delicate and so fluid.

We agree with national and local Jewish leadership that further disclosures or comments about movement of Ethiopian Jews can affect Jewish lives, as was clearly evident by the tragic consequences of the recent media disclosures. When it is a choice between saving Jewish lives or publishing a good story, we have no problem at all about what to do. We will not comment.

As the Jewish Agency and the Prime Minister indicated, "This historic rescue has been carried out in accord with the purpose and role of Israel: to gather in all of the exiles of the Jewish people from all four corners of the earth." We pay tribute to the innovation and dedication of the people and government of Israel and World Jewry who are exercising every effort and resource to bring this historic segment of Judaism home to Israel and absorb them successfully into the fabric of modern Israeli society.

Today, and in the future, each of us should contribute to that effort by giving even more of ourselves than pledged previously to the Federation campaigns providing the funds essential to their absorption.



November 26, 1984

Memo

TO: NJCRAC and CJF Member Agencies

FROM: Robert Schroyer, Chairman, NJCRAC Committee on Ethiopian Jews

RE: Materials on Israel's Absorption Program for Ethiopian Jewry

The absorption of Ethiopian Jews increasingly will become a major focus of community attention, especially in the campaign. Thus, we want to share with you a report prepared by Barry Weise, Director of the NJCRAC Ethiopian Jewry Desk. Its point of departure was the visit made this past summer by Mr. Weise and Abraham J. Bayer, Director of the NJCRAC International Commission, to 14 out of the 25 absorption centers in Israel serving Ethiopian Jewish olim. They met extensively with new immigrants and Jewish Agency and government officials during their trip. As a result, they brought information and materials to help interpret to the American Jewish community this new aliyah.

The absorption piece is designed for wide distribution in the community and is also most appropriate for use in the Anglo-Jewish press and Federation newspapers.

We are also pleased to include a translation of an article which appeared in the Israeli magazine "Bemachane", detailing the experiences of a young Ethiopian Jew in the Israeli Army. We encourage you to publish the story in your local Federation paper to help illustrate the potential for success of the integration of Ethiopian Jews into Israeli society.

Also available are:

a. A videotape on Ethiopian Jews in Israel's Youth Aliyah villages, produced by the Youth Aliyah Department of the Jewish Agency. Through the cooperation of the National UJA, it has now become available for distribution in the communities. The videotape describes Youth Aliyah programs for the absorption of the hundreds of young Ethiopian Jews who, due to the dangerous conditions of their journey to Israel, arrive without their parents. The tape is 22 minutes long and is suitable for meetings of CRCs, organizations, youth groups, etc.

Please contact Mrs. Langer at NJCRAC to order the tape. The purchase price is \$20.

b. "Home-Coming" poster describing UJA/Jewish Agency efforts to absorb Ethiopian Jews in Israel. Please contact National UJA for this poster.

Shortly we will be sending you an updated version of the NJCRAC Q & A on Ethiopian Jewry, reflecting significant changes in the situation since publication last March.

Please inform NJCRAC as to how you use the enclosed materials.

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ISRAEL'S ABSORPTION PROGRAM FOR ETHIOPIAN JEWS

By Barry Weise, Director, Ethiopian Jewry Desk

After 2,000 years of separation, the long hoped-for aliyah of Ethiopian Jewry has begun. Ethiopian Jews arrive in Israel after a long and dangerous journey, full of hope and potential. Although their difficult trip is behind them, their arrival in Israel signals the beginning of another challenge ahead of them, the challenge of their successful absorption into modern Israeli society.

The realities of the absorption of Ethiopian Jews are vastly different from previous groups. Ethiopian Jews and the government and people of Israel have an enormous task ahead of them. Ethiopian Jews come from one of the poorest countries in the world. They come in need of medical care, clothing and educational training. In order to effectively integrate the large numbers of Ethiopian Jews arriving in Israel, the government is making tremendous investments in their absorption. Examples of the success of the effort are everywhere. In the classrooms, adults are learning to read and write in Hebrew after a lifetime of never holding a pen. On a soccer field or in a swimming pool, children can be seen playing vigorously after arriving in Israel emaciated from malaria or parasites. In bright airy apartments, Ethiopian Jews have space to breathe for the first time in their lives.

In the army, Ethiopian Jews proudly serve their country after years of insecurity and degradation in Ethiopia. And finally, as exemplified by the young Ethiopian Jew who won the National Bible Contest in Israel, Ethiopian Jews are able for the first time to freely practice their religion and study Judaism.

Yet, despite all the success stories, some problems still exist in the absorption effort. Israel is beset with severe economic difficulties in addition to its political and military problems. Rampant, triple-digit inflation may limit the resources that the government is able to allocate to the absorption effort. While The Jewish Agency has succeeded in providing such basic services as housing, education, and medical care, Israel's overall need for belt-tightening has kept some enrichment efforts for the community from being implemented. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties the economic situation creates, the degree of success that has been achieved is nothing short of miraculous. On a per capita basis, Israel is exerting more effort and expending more resources for this aliya than for any other previous immigration. Every community in the country has a vital share in the progress through participation in Federation and UJA campaigns.

THE ABSORPTION PROCESS

The First Few Weeks

The process of absorption begins shortly after a new immigrant's arrival in Israel. They come exhausted from their long journey and are in need of food, clothes and medical care. Upon arrival, they are interviewed by Jewish Agency

workers to determine their family status and medical needs. Some are hospitalized immediately the rest are taken to absorption centers around the country. The interviews are conducted by teams of social workers and veteran Israeli-Ethiopian madrichim, (instructors). They organize the immigrants into family units, attempting to place children and elderly immigrants who have been separated from their families with other relatives in Israel.

At the Jewish Agency's absorption centers they are given food and clothes, and are assigned to their new apartments. Paraprofessionals called "somchot" immediately begin to teach the new immigrants how to properly use gas stoves and electrical appliances. In the following days, medical treatment administered by the Ministry of Health begins. Nearly every immigrant is ill from one tropical ailment or another. Malaria, tuberculosis, pneumonia and intestinal parasites are commonly found. Youngsters and even some adults arrive wearing rags; children under five sometimes come wearing nothing at all.

Somehow, relatives from all over the country learn of the new arrivals and flock to the absorption center. Heart-rending scenes of joy and sorrow occur when relations learn of the fate of their loved ones. During the first few days the new Israelis are left alone to be with their relatives to rest and to adjust to being in Israel.

During the first four to six weeks, the new immigrants learn the basics of dealing with life in a modern society, i.e., how to use money, go shopping, and open a bank account. Medical care continues throughout this period. Informal classes are conducted introducing them to Hebrew, Jewish history and Israeli society.

The Ulpan: Learning To Live in Modern Israel

At the end of the initial acclimatization period, the Ministry of Education begins formal classes in Hebrew, (the Ulpan). Except for a limited number of young people who have received upwards to twelve years of education in Ethiopia, most Ethiopian immigrants come with no formal educational back-ground. Most adults are illiterate in their native language, Amharic. Indeed, many times the Ulpan must begin with a lesson on how to hold a pencil.

The Ulpan lasts half a year during which time the new immigrants learn to read, write and speak basic Hebrew. Children learn Hebrew very quickly and as soon as possible they are placed in classes with other Israelis in community schools in order to help preserve the strong religious heritage they bring with them. All immigrant children from Ethiopia attend religious schools. Older children learn in special classes for Ethiopian immigrants. They are extraordinarily motivated to learn and advance themselves. Eventually they are able to "catch up" with their non-Ethiopian Israeli counterparts and enter the religious school system.

Unstable conditions in Ethiopia and in the border refugee camps have brought about the arrival in Israel of hundreds of children without their parents. These children are under the care of the Youth Aliyah Department of the Jewish Agency. They live in Youth Aliyah villages designed to deal with the special needs of young immigrants who come to Israel alone.

In addition to training them in Hebrew, the Ulpan provides instruction in government, modern Israeli culture and rituals according to traditional Rabbinic practice. Trips are organized by the director of the absorption center to various

parts of Israel. With the assistance of the *somehot* and social workers, the process of learning to deal with the mechanics of life in an industrialized society continues. They learn to cope with the Israeli bureaucracy and to become increasingly independent.

Those young Ethiopian immigrants who have finished several years of elementary and secondary education in Ethiopia are placed in special absorption centers in order to prepare them for post-secondary education. Unlike the majority of Ethiopian immigrants, they are literate and sophisticated. The centers created for them cater to their specialized needs and attempt to bridge the gap between the educational levels of Ethiopian and Israeli schools.

While technical challenges such as learning to operate a gas stove or going shopping are easily met, personal problems relating to the long and hard journey to Israel and the differences in the cultures of Ethiopia and Israel are far more difficult to overcome. The journey to Israel results in frequent disruptions of family units. Children arrive without parents and spouses without mates. Elderly parents often are unable to make the trip and are left behind in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the life style of modern Israel is greatly different from that of traditional Ethiopia. Patriarchical figures of authority are soon displaced by younger, often female, officials of the Jewish Agency or other government offices. The difficulties resulting from these situations can impede successful absorption and thus much attention is given to these problems by the social workers of the Jewish Agency.

Beginning Vocational Training

After the first half year is over, most adults begin a vocational course of study. The purpose of the course is to retrain the new immigrants for life in modern Israel. The course is designed to acquaint the Ethiopian immigrants with the basic skills necessary for success in vocational training courses. In addition to arithmetic, intermediate Hebrew and technical terminology, basic work habits and familiarity with machine parts are taught. At the conclusion of the vocational course, the immigrant decides if he will continue on further to a professional training course or if he will go directly to the Israeli work force.

Those who decide to go directly to work are aided in finding jobs by a representative of the Ministry of Labor. The social workers also participate in the job hunt in order to help ensure that jobs with promise are found. In most cases the immigrants are placed in factory jobs that include "hands on" training and possibilities for advancement. Although Ethiopian Jews are in Israel only a short period of time, they have already established a reputation for being dedicated and hard-working employees.

Those who decide to train for a profession continue in courses that last from a few months to a year. All those who are able are encouraged to go on to the professional training. Courses offered enable them to become electricians, automobile body workers, carpenters, garage mechanics, plumbers, seamstresses, beauticians, etc. Lessons in the Hebrew language also continue during the training. At the conclusion of the course, the graduates are given certificates of completion and are aided in job placement.

Out Into The Community

After finishing formal studies at the Ulpan, vocational or professional course, most immigrant families leave the absorption center and move to rent-subsidized apartments. Representatives of the Housing Ministry aid them in their efforts to secure an apartment. The apartments are located in development towns, usually in complexes near other Ethiopian immigrants to promote mutual support systems creating "cluster" formations. In order to avoid the formation of "ghettos," the "clusters" are interspersed within areas where Israelis who come from other parts of the world are living.

In order to ease the transition from life in the absorption center to that of independent living outside of the center, early on in the absorption process the social workers plan projects to promote contact with non-Ethiopian Israelis. The "home hospitality" program with veteran Israeli families is one such project. Ethiopian immigrants are also encouraged to take part in programs offered by local community centers. Finally, day-to-day contact with other Israelis at the store, bank or government ministries increases as the months pass.

Their integration is also helped by government efforts to educate the general Israeli populace about Ethiopian Jews. As Ethiopian Jews are brought to a new town, meetings are held with officials of the various municipal offices to acquaint them with the special needs of Ethiopian immigrants. Also, public meetings are held to educate the general community about the new residents of the town. Lectures are given by the social workers and veteran Israeli Ethiopians about the history and culture of Ethiopian Jews. In many towns the result has been very successful, with public events welcoming the new immigrants and volunteer efforts to aid them in their absorption needs. Finally, special Kabbalat Shabbat and other events are organized by the community so that Ethiopian Jews may join them for the holiday celebration.

Despite all of the challenges, the aliyah of Ethiopian Jews maintains an extraordinary potential. Their arrival in Israel is the final step in a 2,000 year journey. They come with the hope and optimism of a community beginning a new life. With their determination, along with the help of the government of Israel and the Jewish people, they will soon be leading productive lives in Israel and be making their special contribution to the Jewish people.

"Chaim Getaon - A Soldier of Distinction"

by Ayelet Yechiav, April 4, 1984, "Bemachane"

It was impossible to ignore the figure of Chaim Getaon among the groups of soldiers that reported to the commander of the Golani division. It was the end of the winter recruitment session, and they had come to receive their Certificate of Distinction for being outstanding soldiers. Under different circumstances, he might have received a pointed finger or a curious stare. But as the commander shook his hand and handed him the Certificate of Distinction while patting his shoulder in a fatherly manner, dozens of soldiers cheered. What the commander said to him is their secret. Only a smile of bliss was visible on Getaon's dark features, witness to the acclimatization of the Falasha soldier into that division.

Chaim had joined the division about a year ago, when it was in a dangerous, snow-covered line at the height of its activity in Lebanon. "My first concern was that he will not be accepted into the group because the others view him as black. And the story that he came from the Nachal after some disputes with people there, did not help build up a positive image," said Noam, the commander of Chaim's division.

"At first one does not know the man because he is a Falasha. And because of the rumors about him, my expectations were minimal. I demanded very little of him. And he, from his end, gave back as little as I had given him. That's how it was until we left the frontline. Later, at the beginning of the recruitment session, during the first series of exercises, I took care to see that he wouldn't stand out. I remembered him from the line and I wanted to give him a low profile, so he wouldn't be too visible."

But Chaim had a heritage that couldn't be ignored--he arrived at the unit with superior physical coordination. And fitness is a useful commodity in the infantry. "The key to success is fitness," remembers Noam as he continues to unravel the Cinderella story of Chaim Getaon. "In one of the maneuvers he took the communication instrument." I said to him, "Chaim, come with me. Then he ran and ran and ran, while I kept looking behind me...and he always remained right behind."

"From then on I understood there was more to him than fitness alone. But one has to know how to extract it from him. After that there were no problems with him. Even though he is alone, as his family is still in Ethiopia, he is always smiling and happy. Another exercise and another exercise--and the man is like a panther. From that moment on I decided that I would demand of him and would give to him the same as to all the others."

"On the last combat line he was one hundred percent. Since his earlier training he is number one at everything. Sometimes he pretends not to understand, whenever it suits him. But when I make demands of him, he understands, and is cooperative. Only once we had an incident and he refused to budge. In the end, it was to his credit since it turned out that he was right."

Noam continues to praise Chaim: "In Golani we have an image of a veteran soldier who is unique. Chaim is not a veteran. He is an unknown entity. But he helps people. He is unusual both as an individual soldier and among the soldiers as a whole. I don't have many like him."

(over)

Chaim Getaon is 21 years old. He left Ethiopia six years ago. "I lived in the capital city, Addis Ababa, and came to Israel directly from there. We arrived in Afula in 1977. We were 60 Ethiopian immigrants. I studied Hebrew for four months in an Ulpan and then they threw me into school in the middle of the 10th grade, because in Addis Ababa I had studied up to the 9th grade. I was depressed but I finished 12th grade and was immediately inducted."

Chaim's class was inducted as a Nachal Garin (an agricultural military unit). They talked him into it and he joined. After one year the Garin dispersed. People left; others came up with low medical profiles. Chaim decided to switch units and joined the Golani.

It was no accident that he was transferred to that division and to that department. Two Ethiopians had already served there--David Ariani and Yitzchak Angada. Their quick absorption into the unit and the personal relationships they had developed with the other soldiers in the division reinforced the idea that it was quite possible to successfully absorb new immigrants from Ethiopia.

Itzik Angada immigrated to Israel four years ago. He was born in the Gondar region of Ethiopia. His parents died nine years ago leaving him alone with his two younger sisters and his aunt. When he was 16 years old he became involved in the devastating battles between the government forces and the revolutionaries.

"To fight against the revolutionaries was difficult. It was a guerilla war. We chased them into the woods. It was impossible to catch them in the rivers or on the mountains to which they escaped. Some good friends were killed fighting the rebel forces and when the government forces left, the rebels returned to battle us again. We had no arms left to fight with. The rebels took all us young ones to fight against the government forces.

"For one year I was with the rebels. The government bombed us repeatedly and we had no protection. We could not escape. Friends were killed. It was very difficult. We conquered two cities and after a while they let us out. In the end they won and we were dispersed.

"I returned home and I saw the rebels had taken my cows and my belongings. I was left without a thing. I sold my ammunition and lived off that money, also using it to take care of my sisters. I then worked for two years for someone who owned steers and after that I immigrated."

They had learned about Israel from their parents and from the news. They knew about the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War.

"For the first few months in Israel I was happy," recalls Yitzchak. "After that I started thinking back about my younger sisters who had no one to care for them but my aunt." He shuttled between the Ulpan in Ofakim, the youth center in town, and the Ulpan at Maagan Michael. Finally he was inducted into the army.

"I wanted to go to the Golani division from the time I was at the Ulpan in the Kibbutz and my adoptive family told me about the division. I also had a lot of physical stamina and was always running and exercising, morning and night," said Itzik Ariani. "I was told that I wouldn't fit into any other unit as well as the Golani."

After all the other soldiers in the course had already joined their units, David and Yitzchak were the only ones left at the training center. "We were told that in a month we would get a driving course," said Yitzchak. After many delays, the two succeeded in going to the Golani training session in August 1982. They had some difficulties because of their poor Hebrew, but thanks to their courage, and strong motivation to prove themselves, combined with the assistance they received from their fellow soldiers, they successfully completed their training. "Five months seemed to fly by like a week," laughs Itzik. He himself was the distinguished trainee in his division.

"When I was in Golani I was pleased that there was no discrimination. I was there almost two years and nothing happened to me. I am homesick for the division. They will go up to Lebanon and I won't be seeing them. I would like to see them. We were at the front line together at Baalai, in training, and at a second front Ein-Zachalta and Jubel Baruch. We were good friends with everyone."

"Yes, the other soldiers always helped me in many ways," agrees Samo Brown, another Ethiopian Jew. He was the only Ethiopian in his Golani unit at the recruitment center and even though he was not single, he received special leave during his recruitment period in order to help his parents.

"But, do you know when I hear talk?" asks Samo. "When I get on a bus. When I walk down the street. Once I went to the movies with a Yemenite friend and we sat upstairs, in the balcony. People were turning around to stare at us instead of at the screen. I was embarrassed." He told them: "The movie is down there. Not here." He laughs a painful laugh.

"Yes, when it comes to absorption, we are last," says Chaim trying to comprehend the reasons for such problems. "All the ethnic groups, Moroccans, Iraqis, Russians, they all had to go through the same stages we are passing through and it was difficult for them. In the meantime we are the last. So the entire State is looking at us."

"Because we are different," objects Samo. "It's not true. It's not the color!" insists Chaim, "Some came uneducated and illiterate so it's hard for them. Of course there are hardships, but people help. Here at Golani there are no difficulties. Here I feel as though I'm in my own home." Chaim reminds him that he is single, without a family and the unit serves as a warm substitute for a home.

"Here at the base there is no discrimination. Outside there is," Samo insists and Chaim is forced to agree: "Outside there is some. But I try to convince people that we are like everybody else." "It's impossible," Samo pauses. "Believe me, it's possible," Chaim Getaon says consolingly.

Chaim Getaon had thought he might have problems at Golani but realized that he was wrong after joining the division. "When do you test friendship?" he asks, and replies, "In the difficult moments everyone here is united. There are no differences between people."

"Differences?" laugh the soldiers in Chaim and Samo's unit as they invite them to participate in a game of volley ball while ribbing Samo about his new girl friend:

"Look at us, anyhow at the end of each maneuver, at the end of each activity, we are all equally black!"

Translation: Eva Jacoby

Editing: Barry Weise



Memo

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON ETHIOPIAN JEWRY:

BACKGROUNDER ON THEIR SITUATION, RESCUE AND RESETTLEMENT IN ISRAEL

October 15, 1984

WORKING DRAFT - NOV. 1984 For Community Leadership
ARRIVAL STATISTICS ETC.
NEED REVISION (Not for Media Publication)

1. HOW MANY ETHIOPIAN JEWS ARE THERE IN ISRAEL?

There are more than 7,000 Ethiopian Jews living in Israel. Most have come to Israel in recent years although the community's origins in Israel can be traced to the early 1950s. At that time 27 young Ethiopian Jews were brought to Kfar Batya in Israel to receive a modern Jewish education. Many of these students returned to Ethiopia to serve as teachers. Those who stayed in Israel formed the nucleus of a community which today has grown to constitute over one-fourth of the total population of Ethiopian Jews.

2. WHAT IS THE WORLD POPULATION OF ETHIOPIAN JEWS?

Over the centuries, various visitors to Ethiopia estimated the population of Ethiopian Jews to number in the tens of thousands...or even greater. The only reliable census of 28,000, however, was taken in 1976 by the Falasha Welfare Association of London. This year, significant numbers of Ethiopian Jews fled the country in order to try to reach Israel. The recent movement of the Ethiopian Jewish community signifies a historic change in Judaism's 2,000 year sojourn in the Horn of Africa.

3. WHAT ARE THE LIVING CONDITIONS IN ETHIOPIA?

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries on earth. The average life span in Ethiopia is 36 years, and the country suffers from an infant mortality rate of 15 percent. Most villages are inaccessible even by jeep, and have no electricity or running water. The average per capita income is estimated to be \$100 a year, and medical care is almost non-existent. These miserable conditions exist throughout Ethiopia, with Jews and other minorities finding themselves the "poorest of the poor."

4. DOES THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA PERMIT EMIGRATION?

The government of Ethiopia does not permit the emigration of any of its citizens--Jews and non-Jews alike. Thus far, all Israeli and American entreaties to the Ethiopian government regarding mass emigration have been fruitless. Illegal emigration is considered treasonous and is punishable by long-term prison sentences. Relatives of those who have fled also face possible imprisonment. Prisoners in Ethiopia are ill-treated and many are tortured, although recently prison treatment has improved.

(over)

5. IS THERE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JEWS IN ETHIOPIA?

As a Marxist state, the Ethiopian government discourages the observance of all faiths including Christianity, Islam, Judaism and traditional religions. However, the government's anti-religious energies have been directed towards the weaker minority religions, e.g., Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Baptists and Jews. Jews may suffer further discrimination since, as Zionists they identify with Israel, a foreign state inimical to Third World Marxist Ethiopia. They are fearful of attending religious services and the teaching of Judaism and Hebrew is forbidden. Many religious leaders have been imprisoned and tortured. In addition vestiges of endemic Ethiopian anti-Semitism still persist.

6. ARE ETHIOPIAN JEWS THREATENED BY THE CURRENT FAMINE PLAGUING MOST OF AFRICA?

Currently, 24 African states are affected by a devastating drought. As many as 150,000,000 people are estimated to be threatened by famine conditions. In Ethiopia, tens of thousands are probably dying of starvation and related diseases, and six million are in dire need of food. Ethiopian officials and private relief organizations have warned that the death toll may rise to "catastrophic proportions," perhaps as many as 200,000--the number that died during the 1974 famine--unless grain and funding for transport are forthcoming. The famine is most severe in Sidamo, Eritrea, Wollo, and Tigre provinces. Most Ethiopian Jews still in Ethiopia live in the areas of Gondar province where rainfall has been adequate and are, therefore, not threatened by famine conditions. However, the famine has caused the cost of foodstuffs to rise substantially, creating economic hardships for Ethiopian Jews and other Ethiopians. The NJCRAC Joint Program Plan has responded to the situation by urging the U.S. government to increase famine relief for Ethiopia and other drought-devastated African countries.

7. ARE ETHIOPIAN JEWS BEING KILLED OR SOLD INTO SLAVERY?

During the years from 1977 to 1980, Ethiopia was wracked with revolutionary terror. Counter-revolutionary forces fought to topple the new Marxist regime. Ethiopian Jews were soon caught in the crossfire. Some thousands of Ethiopian Jews are thought to have been made homeless during this period. Many were lost and hundreds may have been killed. At that time, reports were received of Jews being forced to work without pay, a common form of slavery in Ethiopia. Physical threats to Jews lessened by 1980 when the central government gained control of Gondar province. Recently, the anti-government forces of the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) have succeeded in mounting a threat to the rule of the central government in the northern provinces. As the TPLF is not anti-Falasha, Ethiopian Jews have not been attacked by their forces. However, reports have been received of sporadic attacks by the local Christian peasantry upon the increasingly vulnerable population of Jews remaining behind.

8. COULD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT "MAKE A DEAL" TO RESCUE ETHIOPIAN JEWRY?

Given Ethiopia's internal social problems and the poor status of United States-Ethiopian relations, leverage to "make a deal" is not available. The Soviet Union provides Ethiopia with billions of dollars of military assistance. Also, at the urgency of the USSR, Ethiopia finally declared the establishment of its Communist Party this September. U.S.-Ethiopia diplomatic relations have remained on the Charge level since the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador in 1980. The United States maintains minimal trade relations with Ethiopia of non-essential items, and grants Ethiopia approximately \$12 million dollars in emergency relief. It is illogical to conclude that this relatively small amount of trade and emergency assistance can offset Soviet aid and influence Ethiopian emigration policy.

9. CAN A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN HELP ETHIOPIAN JEWS EMIGRATE AS IT DID FOR SOVIET JEWS?

The public campaign for Soviet Jewry was to a great extent dependent upon the Soviet Union's interest in detente. When relations between the United States and the Soviet Union chilled, the number of Soviet Jews permitted to leave dropped dramatically. Despite recent improvements in contacts with Ethiopia in matters relating to tourism and humanitarian relief, United States-Ethiopian relations are minimal. Furthermore, it is the policy of the Ethiopian government to deemphasize the notion of ethnic identity in an attempt to unify Ethiopia, a country comprised of a mosaic of cultures and tribal groups. In this situation, the Ethiopian government is opposed to granting special privileges to any one nationality, especially the right to emigrate. In addition to the above, if one takes into account Ethiopia's poor human rights record, it is likely that a public campaign for Ethiopian Jews would be more harmful than beneficial to the aliyah of Ethiopian Jewry.

10. COULD ETHIOPIAN JEWS HAVE BEEN RESCUED SOONER?

The aliyah of large numbers of Ethiopian Jews did not become possible until around 1979, when they began to flee Ethiopia along with tens of thousands of other Ethiopians in the wake of revolutionary turmoil. Prior to this time, Ethiopian Jews were not located in refugee camps where Israel could rescue them. Once this happened the current rescue effort was initiated. Over the years the effort has brought growing success as the infrastructure for the effort became increasingly developed. Although, before the revolution, Israel's relations with Ethiopia were better under Haile Selassie, even he did not permit emigration. Their aliyah was also impeded because they were not recognized as Jews until shortly before the Marxist revolution of 1974.

11. WHAT WERE THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO THEIR RECOGNITION AS JEWS?

Due to Ethiopian Jewry's long separation from the mainstream of world Jewry--almost 2000 years, the Israeli civil authorities were not able to include them under the Law of Return until Sephardic Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef declared them to be Jews in 1973. His declaration was later supported in 1974 by Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren. These acts followed the authoritative declarations of the highest authorities in Rabbinic Responsa from the great rabbinic master

the "Radbaz" in the sixteenth century to the German Halachic scholar Rabbi Azriel Hildesheimer in 1864, and to Chief Rabbi Avraham Kook of Palestine in 1921. Their recognition was delayed because it was not certain whether the ancestors of Ethiopian Jews were Ethiopians who had converted to Judaism without Rabbinic assistance or if they were Jewish descendants from the tribe of Dan. If indeed they were from the tribe of Dan, as the rabbis concluded, then the question remained as to whether or not their pre-Rabbinic faith could be considered Jewish according to the Chief Rabbinate of the modern state of Israel. With Ovadia Yosef's declaration, all obstacles to the aliyah of Ethiopian Jewry from the Israeli side of the equation were removed.

12. HOW DO ETHIOPIAN JEWS REACH ISRAEL?

Just like Yemenite Jews who had to leave Yemen and trek the dangerous route to Aden before they could be brought to Israel, Ethiopian Jews must first escape Ethiopia before they can be rescued. Unfortunately, once across the border they do not find themselves in a friendly Commonwealth Protectorate like Aden, but rather in a Moslem country hostile to Jews. They are then rescued in an extraordinary effort as expeditiously as safety factors permit and brought home to Israel.

13. WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS FOR JEWS AS THEY WAIT TO BE RESCUED?

Ethiopian Jews live in fear among 750,000 other refugees in the refugee camps. The camps are rife with the internecine battles of warring, political factions, including the Moslem brotherhood, the PLO, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, the Tigre Peoples Liberation Front, etc. Jews must hide their identity and live in constant danger until they are rescued by Israel. As with other refugees in the camps, Ethiopian Jews are threatened by malnutrition, dehydration and disease. During the summer rainy season, outbreaks of epidemics caused many refugees, mostly children and the elderly, to succumb to the conditions. Israel and world Jewry are making an assiduous effort to improve the medical situation until they can be rescued.

14. COULD PUBLICITY ABOUT THEIR PLIGHT HELP THEM TO BE RESCUED?

Ethiopian Jews live under cover among hundreds of thousands of other refugees in the camps. Discovery of their identity could mean imprisonment . . . or worse. The Israeli effort to rescue them takes place "behind the lines" of enemy Moslem territory and, therefore, must be conducted in absolute secrecy. Publicity could only serve to endanger both the Jews in hiding and the rescue efforts to save them.

15. IS MONEY NEEDED TO RESCUE ETHIOPIAN JEWS?

The government of Israel and the Jewish Agency grant whatever budget is required for the rescue of Ethiopian Jews and all other Jews in peril. Therefore, all funds needed for the rescue of Ethiopian Jews are available to the relevant agencies. Thus, a separate campaign to raise money in the U.S.A. for the rescue of Ethiopian Jews is not needed. Such a campaign is dangerous since it increases risks by drawing unnecessary attention to the rescue effort.

16. WHO CAN BEST RESCUE ETHIOPIAN JEWS?

The rescue of Ethiopian Jewry can best be accomplished through the resources of a sovereign state. Israel's specialized branches have over thirty-five years of experience in rescue efforts all over the world. Their experience is being applied in an expert manner to rescue Ethiopian Jews today. Because life and freedom are at stake, voluntary groups, no matter how well-intentioned, cannot help but make mistakes which may ultimately endanger the professional effort which has thus far rescued thousands.

17. HAVEN'T SOME ETHIOPIAN JEWS BEEN HELPED BY VOLUNTARY EFFORTS?

Of course the rescue of even one Jew is welcomed, but one must also take into account not only those rescued today, but also those still waiting to be rescued. If one particular rescue effort closes off the possibility of another of greater potential, then it is counterproductive. A method of rescuing ten individuals cannot be allowed to jeopardize the movement of hundreds. Unfortunately, voluntary efforts have unwittingly interfered and harmed the Israeli effort. Routes have been closed and rescues delayed; also delicate information has found its way into newspaper articles on three continents, i.e., the London Observer, and the Nairobi Standard, and The New York Times. In more than one instance Ethiopian Jews and their rescue were imperiled when an amateur group was caught and imprisoned.

18. CAN ISRAEL RESCUE ETHIOPIAN JEWS IN AN ENTEBBE-LIKE EFFORT?

Although Israel's efforts are extraordinary, critical differences exist between the Entebbe operation and the situation of Ethiopian Jews. Entebbe was a "one-time-only" affair dependent on surprise. All of the Entebbe hostages were located in a single facility on airport grounds. The situation of Ethiopian Jews is radically different. The effort must be one that can be repeated again and again. We are not only concerned with small groups, but how the rescue of all 20,000 Jews can be accomplished.

19. DOES PUBLIC PRESSURE ON ISRAEL HELP RESCUE ETHIOPIAN JEWS?

Once the decision was made by the Knesset in 1975 to include Ethiopian Jews under the Law of Return, obstacles to their being fully welcomed in Israel were removed. Now, the factors limiting their aliyah are on the African side of the equation. They include: limited relations between Ethiopia and Israel and the West, unstable security conditions in the Horn of Africa, and Ethiopian Jews living in camps among tens of thousands of other refugees in a hostile Moslem country. Nevertheless, Israel has overcome these problems and rescued over 6,700 Ethiopian Jews in the last four years. The effort is based on the Jewish tradition and mitzvah of Pidyon Sh'vuyim (the rescue of prisoners). The record shows as far back as 1977 Israel rescued Ethiopian Jews before, during, after and regardless of such pressure. Public pressure rather than being helpful, is harmful, as the publicity it generates endangers the safety of Israel's rescue efforts.

20. HOW ARE ETHIOPIAN JEWS INTEGRATING INTO ISRAELI SOCIETY?

In 1975, the government commissioned a survey to measure the reception of the Israeli people to the aliyah of Ethiopian Jewry. The survey found that an overwhelming majority of Israelis welcomed Ethiopian Jews as neighbors, as fellow workers and in schools with their children. Nevertheless, isolated instances of prejudice do occur. In an effort to ease their integration into Israeli society, the government has embarked upon an educational program for the Israeli public about the culture and history of Ethiopian Jewry. Furthermore, the government is applying the lessons learned from absorbing hundreds of thousands of new immigrants from many countries and cultures. Extraordinary efforts are being made by the Jewish Agency to ensure the successful absorption of Ethiopian Jews who are to be in 23 absorption centers, with over 1,100 children in Youth Aliyah Projects. UJA missions to Israel are encouraged to visit with them. Because they come from such an impoverished background, Ethiopian Jews remain in absorption centers much longer than Western immigrants. During that period, they learn Hebrew, basic reading, writing, arithmetic, and other skills needed for life in a modern industrialized society. Hadassah Hospital has graduated groups of Ethiopian Jewish nurses, and many young Ethiopian Jews are studying in the universities and are serving in the army. An Ethiopian Jew has already been ordained as an Orthodox rabbi in Israel.

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DRAFT JOINT PROGRAM PLAN

Incorporating Actions of the 1986 NJCRAC Plenum

For Action of the NJCRAC Joint Program Plan

Subcommittee on Sunday, May 4, 1986

Harris

International Concerns

SOVIET JEWRY

1 Changing Conditions: A fundamental change in the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet
2 relations emerged in November, 1985 when after a lapse of more than six years
3 the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Soviet Union
4 held a summit meeting. While there are no indications that decisions were
5 reached on substantive issues, including future emigration of Soviet Jews, there
6 was agreement that high-level dialogue between the two nations should continue
7 and that the two leaders will meet again in the United States during 1986 and in
8 Moscow in 1987. These future summit sessions will provide new occasions to
9 press the issue of Soviet Jewry.

10 Comment: The Geneva summit negotiations took place at a time when Soviet Jewish
11 emigration remained at less than 100 per month. Since January, 1985, eight
12 Refuseniks have been imprisoned, bringing the number to 21. Harassment of
13 Jewish activists, particularly Hebrew teachers, steadily increased. No details
14 have been divulged about the content of President Reagan and General Secretary
15 Gorbachev's discussion concerning Soviet Jewry, but there is strong reason to
16 believe that the President was a forceful advocate for Soviet Jews, and that he
17 took the position that the West looks upon the Soviet Union's adherence to
18 international human rights agreements as a measure of its credibility in living
19 up to international agreements in other areas. This is a position long advocated
20 by the Jewish community relations field. The extent to which this view is widely

1 held among Americans was illustrated by the unanimous declaration of the U.S.
2 Senate, and an open letter sent to President Reagan from more than 100 mayors of
3 the nation's major cities, both published on the eve of the summit.

4 The release of Anatoly Shcharansky from Soviet prison camp after nine years
5 of incarceration and the euphoric welcome Israel accorded to Shcharansky once
6 again reminded the world of the harsh conditions tens of thousands of Soviet
7 Jews continue to experience. But it also underscored that the Soviet Union is
8 not insensitive to continued exposure of its brutal policies against Soviet
9 Jews, including prisoners of conscience. His release represents a token signal
10 of accommodation, but it cannot obscure the number of arrests and imprisonments
11 of Soviet Jews in 1985 or the virtual closedown of Jewish emigration.

12 The first Reagan-Gorbachev discussions in Geneva appear to have generated
13 more style than substance. Nevertheless, the two leaders did reach at least one
14 significant agreement: to meet again, in the United States in 1986, and in the
15 Soviet Union in 1987. It is clear that whenever Summit II occurs, it will pro-
16 vide an unparalleled opportunity to illuminate the cause of Soviet Jewry to the
17 American public. In this context, the President will act as a vigorous advocate
18 for on Soviet Jews, and his advocacy will be reinforced by dramatic and forceful
19 expressions throughout the United States by thousands of Americans, from the
20 public and private sectors, from prominent leaders and the grassroots.

21 Among the bilateral agreements approved during the Geneva summit meeting
22 was one concerning resumption of cultural exchanges between the two nations.
23 The Jewish community relations field does not oppose renewed visits of Soviet
24 artistic troupes and intellectuals. Indeed, for more than a decade we have
25 urged that Americans should use such occasions as opportunities to impress upon
26 and remind influential Soviet citizens, through reasoned and reasonable means,
27 of Americans' concerns for the human rights of Soviet Jews. Similarly,

1 Americans who participate in cultural and other exchange programs are presented
2 with excellent opportunities to raise the issue of Soviet Jewry with their coun-
3 terparts and to convey the message that the American people are deeply concerned
4 about the Soviet government's treatment of the Jewish community.

5 One area in which future bilateral agreements are likely to be reached is
6 trade. Although General Secretary Gorbachev has stated that no large-scale
7 U.S.-Soviet trade will develop so long as political obstacles to trade exist (in
8 other words, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment), Soviet officials appeared to welcome
9 resumption of contacts with American business leaders and to hold out the
10 prospect of entering into joint ventures utilizing American high technology in
11 such fields as oil exploration. Jackson-Vanik's provisions would not be an
12 obstacle to increased U.S.-Soviet trade, were the Soviet Union to permit signi-
13 ficantly increased and sustained emigration, since the legislation permits the
14 President to exercise a waiver to permit the granting of "Most-Favored Nation"
15 status to the Soviet Union. To do so, the President must certify to the
16 Congress that the Soviet Union's emigration policies are fulfilling the intent
17 of Jackson-Vanik. A significant change in Soviet emigration practices is likely
18 to lead to a readiness to repeal the 1974 Stevenson Amendment to the 1974 Trade
19 Act, which limits the potential for expanded U.S.-Soviet trade by placing a
20 ceiling on the amount of trade credits the U.S. may extend to the Soviet Union.

21 Meanwhile, the world Jewish community will continue to face the challenge
22 of maintaining contacts and providing resources to help Soviet Jews retain their
23 Jewish identities in an inhospitable environment.

24 Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

25 -- mobilize the American Jewish community for an unprecedented manifesta-

1 tion of concern, to be held in Washington, D.C., on the eve of Summit II
2 to demonstrate that Soviet Jewry's human rights are of critical concern
3 to the American people, and that the status of Soviet Jewry will be one
4 of the criteria against which bilateral agreements on other issues will
5 be judged;

6 -- continue to support American efforts to press the Soviet Union to meet
7 its commitments, under its own laws and the provisions of the Helsinki
8 Final Act and other international documents to which it is a signatory,
9 to honor the rights of freedom of religion and emigration for the Jews
10 of the USSR;

11 -- encourage U.S. officials to continue to press the Soviet Jewry issue in
12 all contacts with Soviet officials in follow-ups to the Geneva summit
13 and in preparation for future summit sessions;

14 -- continue to broaden the base of the Soviet Jewry movement by reaching
15 beyond the Jewish community, particularly to those to whom the Soviet
16 leadership may be more receptive, as illustrated in the initiative the
17 Rev. Jesse Jackson undertook when, as a member of the American peace
18 delegation, he raised Soviet Jewry issues with General Secretary
19 Gorbachev during the Geneva summit;

20 -- reach out to those corporate leaders to whom the Soviet leadership may
21 be attentive on Soviet Jewry issues;

22 -- monitor Soviet disinformation campaigns, such as were conducted prior to
23 the Geneva Summit meeting, and expose them when the need arises;

1 — increase efforts to interpret to American academics, educators and
2 intellectuals the plight of their Soviet Jewish counterparts who are
3 subjected to harassment and arrest, and to enlist participation by
4 American intellectuals in protesting the Soviet government's campaign of
5 anti-Semitism directed at Soviet Jews in general, and Hebrew teachers
6 and Jewish religious and cultural activists in particular;

7 — urge member agencies to give higher priority to encouraging visits with
8 Soviet Jews.

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES
International Concerns
ETHIOPIAN JEWRY

Harris

9 Changing Conditions: While the majority of Ethiopian Jews now reside in Israel,
10 concern increases for those who remain in Ethiopia, yearning to fulfill their
11 centuries-old dream of making aliyah. Opportunities for them to join their com-
12 munity in Israel have become more complicated as a result of recent developments
13 in the region.

14 Comment: Thousands of Ethiopian Jews have found new, more secure lives in
15 Israel. The Jews of Israel have warmly received this newest aliyah, and have
16 extended every effort to ease their absorption into the country. The absorption
17 process has placed enormous strain on Israel's already-strained human services
18 resources. As was true of all previous aliyot, Beta Yisrael also brings its own
19 rich traditions and its own special problems: an estimated 35% of its family
20 units now in Israel are single-parent households. An additional source of
21 strain in the absorption process has been the conflict about Beta Yisrael's
22 religious status.

1 The overthrow of the Nimiery regime in the Sudan in early 1985 and the
2 subsequent trials of its vice-president and chief security official have radi-
3 cally altered political conditions in the region, with profound implications for
4 future rescue efforts.

5 Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- 6 -- continue to explore effective ways to facilitate aliyah and absorption
7 of Ethiopian Jews;
- 8 -- persist in efforts to keep lines of communications open with the
9 Jewish community in Ethiopia;
- 10 -- intensify educational efforts within the American Jewish community
11 about the continuing financial support Israel needs to help absorb
12 and resettle Beta Yisrael;

International Concerns

APARTHEID

13 *Harris* Changing Conditions: Despite mounting racial strife and death tolls due to
14 police actions, the government of South Africa resisted taking additional
15 meaningful steps during 1985 to dismantle its apartheid system. This led the
16 United States to express growing impatience through a variety of measures. These
17 actions reflected a growing national consensus in the United States in opposition
18 to South Africa's apartheid system.

19 Comment: In September 1985, President Reagan issued an Executive Order imposing
20 economic sanctions, including bans on exports of nuclear technology and computers

1 for use by South Africa's military police and security forces; U.S. export
2 assistance to companies not observing fair employment practices; imports of
3 kruggerands; and loans to the South African government (except for purposes that
4 would improve opportunities for South Africans disadvantaged by apartheid). The
5 Executive Order was especially significant because it constituted a marked
6 departure from the Administration's policy of "constructive engagement," which
7 NJCRAC criticized as inadequate in its 1985-86 Joint Program Plan. Nevertheless,
8 these sanctions were more limited in scope than those proposed in a variety of
9 measures, including the Kennedy-Gray Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, which Congress
10 had under consideration when the Executive Order was issued. Congressional
11 anti-apartheid leaders have indicated they may renew efforts to enact stronger
12 sanctions, pending assessment of South Africa's response to sanctions imposed
13 by the U.S.

14 A growing number of American public and private institutions are turning
15 to divestment as a means to pressure Pretoria for reform. The "Sullivan
16 Principles" have become a standard guiding many institutions which are con-
17 templating divestment of holdings in American corporations doing business in
18 South Africa. These principles, which NJCRAC's Plenum has endorsed, suggest
19 that shareholders divest holdings in corporations which do not voluntarily
20 comply with specified standards regarding equal and fair employment practices,
21 training programs to prepare blacks and other non-whites for supervisory and
22 administrative positions, programs to promote more blacks and non-whites in
23 those jobs, and efforts to provide a higher quality of life outside the work
24 environment.* On the general issue of divestment, a New York Times poll con-
25 ducted in November, 1985, showed that the proportion of Americans who support

26 *NOTE: At its June meeting, the Executive Committee will act on a recommendation
of a special committee appointed to examine the larger question of divestment.

1 such action has grown to nearly half. As of late 1985 16 states and 50 cities
2 had passed, and 24 other states were considering, legislation restricting or
3 prohibiting investment of public or pension funds in companies doing business in
4 South Africa; 70 colleges and universities divested their portfolios of more than
5 \$411 million; and 16 American corporations had closed subsidiaries in South
6 Africa.

7 The effectiveness of such sanctions depends upon the extent to which Western
8 Europe, Japan and the United States coordinate their pressures. The 11 Common
9 Market countries have agreed to sanctions, including an embargo on oil, arms and
10 law enforcement equipment, a ban on military cooperation, and the withdrawal of
11 military attaches. They have also banned exports of armaments and nuclear
12 material, and military cooperation. But only France and Denmark, along with
13 Japan, prohibit direct investment in companies doing business in South Africa.
14 The effectiveness of these policies is directly related to America's role
15 because the United States is the dominant Western economic and military power.

16 Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

- 17 -- urge Jewish communal institutions to divest their portfolios of invest-
18 ments in companies which do not comply with the Sullivan Principles;
- 19 -- encourage Congress to monitor and evaluate the impact of President
20 Reagan's Executive Order imposing limited economic sanctions on South
21 Africa;
- 22 -- continue to advocate passage of the Kennedy-Gray Anti-Apartheid Act;
- 23 -- in coalition with other concerned groups, press our government to take
24 the lead in formulating an overall western strategy of pressure upon the
25 South African government;

- 1 -- interpret to leaders of the anti-apartheid movement the Jewish com-
2 munity's stance on apartheid;
- 3 -- monitor the use of anti-Semitic, anti-Israel and anti-Zionist statements
4 associated with leaders of anti-apartheid movements;
- 5 -- undertake educational programs within the Jewish community to interpret
6 our stake in the fight against the racial policies which the apartheid
7 system represents and embodies;
- 8 -- continue to develop and disseminate, as needed, information interpreting
9 the minimal nature of relations between Israel and South Africa in com-
10 parison with those of other nations which trade with South Africa;

International Concerns

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Tanenbaum
11 Changing Conditions: The United States implemented a policy in the past year of
12 a measured, firm and unambiguous response to the outrage of international
13 terrorism. While Western European nations' citizens and facilities continue to
14 be targets for Arab terrorism, these nations, with occasional and significant
15 exceptions, have been reluctant to join the United States in carrying out effec-
16 tive, coordinated action against international terrorists. They continue to
17 pursue policies which, by their nature, seek to appease the chief sponsors of
18 world terrorist activity: the PLO, Libya, Syria and Iran.

19 Comment: The United States, through its bold actions during the past year,
20 demonstrated clearly that terrorists cannot, henceforth, act with impunity. The
21 capture in October, 1985, of the hijackers who seized the Italian liner Achille