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Series E: General Alphabetical Files. 1960-1992

Box 85, Folder 22, NBC "Holocaust", 1980-1983.

April 14, 1980

Prof. Dr. Friedrich Knilli
Technische Universität Berlin
Sekt. TEL 10
Strasse des 17 Juni 135
D-1000 Berlin 12

My dear Professor Knilli,

Thank you for your recent thoughtful letter.

The American Jewish Committee will be holding its Annual Meeting in New York from May 14th through 18th. If you will telephone me on your arrival I am sure that we will be able to arrange some mutually convenient time to meet.

From May 23rd through 28th I will be in Germany and therefore regret that I will not be able to see you during that time.


I look forward with anticipation to our meeting on your arrival here.

Sincerely,

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum
National Director
Interreligious Affairs

MHT:RPR

cc: Dr. Lutz Ehrlich



B'NAI B'RITH

CH-4125 Riehen, April 8, 1980
Hirzenstr. 10

Präsident:

Joseph H. Domberger
München

Ehrenpräsidenten:

Maitre Paul Jacob
Mulhouse

Georges M. Bloch,
Mentor
Strasbourg

Vizepräsident:

Dr. Hans Kaufmann
Basel

Generalsekretär:

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Florenz

Schatzmeister:

Leopold Marx
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Dr. Marc Aron
Lyon

Sam Hoffenberg
Paris

Elias Hofmann
Frankfurt/M.

Ruth Epsztejn-Sosnowski
Brüssel

Leif Nathan
Virum/Dänemark

Irène Orès
Paris

**Direktor des Distrikts 19
und des International
Council Office:**

Dr. E. L. Ehrlich
Hirzenstrasse 10
CH-4125 Riehen
Tel.: (061) 67 00 65

**Direktor des Pariser
Büros:**

Haim Musicant
16, Ave. de Wagram
F-75008 Paris
Tel.: 924.27.16

Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum
AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
165 E 56th Street


NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

U S A

Dear Marc,

In May Prof. Knilli of the Technische Universität Berlin will visit New York. He is very much interested in the researches of the impact of the Holocaustfilm, and in general also in the research on antisemitism. I would appreciate it very much if you could inform him about the important work which the AJC is doing in those fields. I guess he has already written to you. Please be good enough to make an appointment with him because you may also be interested in what he is doing.

Kindest personal regards and all good wishes,
sincerely yours


Lutz Ehrlich

cc Prof. F. Knilli



Prof. Dr. Friedrich Knilli

Postanschrift: TU Berlin - Sekr. TEL 10 - Straße des 17. Juni 135, D-1000 Berlin 12

Air Mail

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum
National Director
Interreligious Affairs
The American Jewish Comm.
165 East 56 Street
New York, N.Y. 10022
U.S.A.

FACHBEREICH 1
KOMMUNIKATIONS- UND
GESCHICHTS-
WISSEN-
SCHAFTEN

Institut für
Kommunikations-
wissenschaft
Medienwissen-
schaft und Musik-
wissenschaft

Fachgebiet
Germanistik

☎ (030) 314-2322 od. 2992
Kn/hö

Datum
March 20th 1980

Dear Rabbi Tanenbaum:

I will be coming to N.Y. in May and would be grateful if you could find time on May 15th or 16th or between May 24th and 31st to let me visit you. It concerns the Center for Research on Antisemitism of the Technical University, which is presently being founded and for which there will be a position opening for a full professorship. The president of the University has assigned me the job of looking for someone who could fill this position. This person could be a historian of German-Jewish History, or a Judaist, also a sociologist or psychologist with strongpoints in the study of Antisemitism. Knowledge of the German language is not required. Further details are to be found in the enclosed papers. Please think this over, as to whether you know of anyone who would be interested in this position and let me know when we can meet each other.

Sincerely yours,

Friedrich Knilli



Postanschrift: TU Berlin · Sekr. TEL 10 · Straße des 17. Juni 135, D-1000 Berlin 12

Prof. Dr. Friedrich Knilli

FACHBEREICH 1
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KATIONS- UND
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Medienwissen-
schaft und Musik-
wissenschaft

Fachgebiet
Germanistik

▼ (030) 314-2322 od. 2992

Datum

March 1980

May 1980: USA and Mexico

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

Saturday, 10 May 1980: Berlin to N.Y.

Sunday, 11 : N.Y. to Philadelphia (Annenberg School)

M 12

T 13

Wednesday 14 : Philadelphia to N.Y.

Th 15

F 16

Saturday 17 : N.Y. to Acapulco (ICA)

S 18

M 19

T 20

W 21

Th 22

F 23

Saturday 24 : Acapulco to N.Y.

S 25

M 26

T 27

W 28

Th 29

F 30

Saturday 31 : N.Y. to Berlin

Der Fachbereichsrat schlägt in Abweichung vom Kuratoriumsbeschuß A 015/79 dem Präsidenten und dem Kuratorium der TUB eine Organisationsform des "Zentrums für Antisemitismusforschung" vor, die sicherstellen soll, daß der Fachbereich 1 im Benehmen mit dem Präsidenten und in Zusammenarbeit mit den benachbarten Institutionen der Freien Universität Berlin und der Historischen Kommission die gestellten Aufgaben langfristig und erfolgreich lösen kann.

I. Zur Organisationsform

1. Die vom Kuratorium dem Institut für Geschichtswissenschaft bereits zugewiesenen sowie alle später hinzukommenden Stellen sowie der Sachetat werden dem Fachbereich unter einer eigenen Haushaltskennziffer unmittelbar unterstellt. Der Kuratoriumsbeschuß A 015/79 ist entsprechend zu ändern.
2. Der Präsident beruft im Einvernehmen mit dem Fachbereichsrat des Fachbereiches 1 einen wissenschaftlichen Beirat für das Zentrum, dem der Präsident, je ein Vertreter des Fachbereiches 13 der FUB, der Historischen Kommission und des Fachbereiches 1 der TUB sowie zwei Vertreter der internationalen Fachwelt angehört.

Der wissenschaftliche Beirat gewährleistet die Kontinuität der Arbeit des Zentrums. Er konzentriert sich insbesondere auf die vom Kuratorium geforderte interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit, die sicherstellen soll, daß die Entstehungszusammenhänge des Antisemitismus vor allem in Deutschland in der nötigen Breite erforscht werden. Darüberhinaus übernimmt er folgende Aufgaben:

- a) Er schlägt nach seiner Konstituierung dem Fachbereichsrat die Wahl eines Leiters des Zentrums vor. Die Entscheidung des Fachbereichsrates erfolgt im Einvernehmen mit dem Beirat. Der Fachbereichsrat geht entsprechend seinen Beschlüsse, den bisherigen Verhandlungen mit dem Präsidenten und der von Herrn Prof. Rürup bisher geleisteten Arbeit davon aus, daß Herr Prof. Rürup die Funktion des Leiters des Zentrums übernimmt.
- b) Der wissenschaftliche Beirat berät den Fachbereichsrat bei der Besetzung der zugewiesenen Hochschullehrerstellen im Einvernehmen mit dem Leiter des Zentrums. Die Besetzungsvorschläge für die Stellen wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter/wissenschaft-

licher Angestellten erarbeitet der Leiter für den Fachbereichsrat.

3. Der Leiter des Zentrums weist die wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter/wissenschaftlichen Angestellten an und verwaltet den jährlichen Etat. Der Leiter organisiert im Einvernehmen mit dem Beirat die vorgesehenen Symposien und Kongresse und setzt, ebenfalls im Einvernehmen mit dem Beirat die Forschungsaufgaben fest. Ist in strittigen Punkten eine Einigung zwischen Leiter und Beirat nicht zu erzielen, entscheidet der Fachbereichsrat.
4. Weitere organisatorische Maßnahmen, die der Effektivität des Zentrums dienlich sind, schlagen der Leiter des Zentrums oder der Beirat im Einvernehmen mit dem Fachbereichsrat den zuständigen Gremien der Universität vor.

II. Personelle Ausstattung

Hinsichtlich der personellen Ausstattung des Zentrums beantragt der Fachbereichsrat folgende Änderungen bzw. Präzisierungen:

1. Statt der vorgesehenen Angestelltenstelle Nr. 0133-Vb/IVb,1 wird die Stelle eines wissenschaftlichen Bibliothekars beantragt.
Begründung: Der Fachbereichsrat ist in Übereinstimmung mit dem Direktor der Universitätsbibliothek der TUB der Meinung, daß der selbständig und verantwortlich zu leistende Aufbau einer interdisziplinären Fachbibliothek mit einem weit überwiegenden Anteil fremdsprachiger Literatur nur von einem wissenschaftlichen Bibliothekar geleistet werden kann.
2. Statt der Vergütungsgruppe VIb wird die Gruppe Vb BAT für die Verwaltungsangestellten-Stelle Nr. 0133-VIb,5 beantragt.
Begründung: Angesichts der von dem Zentrum erwarteten besonders ausgeprägten internationalen Außenbeziehungen, die für eine erfolgreiche Arbeit grundlegend sind, sowie im Hinblick auf die kontinuierliche Anwesenheit ausländischer Gastprofessoren und anderer ausländischer Forscher, die Vorbereitung internationaler Konferenzen usw. ist die Kenntnis moderner Fremdsprachen auf dem Niveau einer Fremdsprachensekretärin neben den ebenfalls erfor-

derlichen Verwaltungskennntnissen unbedingt erforderlich. Eine entsprechende BAK wird der Fachbereichsrat zu gegebener Zeit vorlegen.

3. Hinsichtlich der Wissenschaftlerstellen O133-IIa,1 und 2 wird beantragt, daß eine Besetzung je nach Qualifikation zwischen Ia und IIa BAT erfolgen kann. Außerdem sollen diese Stellen als "wissenschaftliche Angestellte" (oder ähnlich) und nicht als "wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter" bezeichnet werden.

Begründung: In allen Beratungen und Beschlüssen zur Gründung des Zentrums wurde davon ausgegangen, daß es sich hier um Stellen für hochqualifizierte Wissenschaftler handeln sollte, die auf Zeit (5 Jahre) beschäftigt werden sollten. "Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter" sind nach dem neuen Berliner Hochschulgesetz dagegen die niedrigst eingestuften Wissenschaftlerstellen, für die in der Regel nicht einmal die Promotion vorausgesetzt wird. Die vom Zentrum erwartete interdisziplinäre Arbeit ist mit derart jungen und unerfahrenen Wissenschaftlern nicht zu leisten.

III. Sachmittel

Der Fachbereichsrat hält folgende Sachmittelausstattung des Zentrums für erforderlich, wobei er noch einmal betont, daß die Zuweisung der Mittel zweckgebunden erfolgen muß und nicht zu Lasten der bestehenden wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen des Fachbereiches 1 gehen darf.

Außerdem sind die noch nicht näher spezifizierbaren einmaligen Mittel für die Erstaussstattung der Räume, einschließlich elektrischer Schreibmaschine, Diktiergeräte, Kopierautomaten usw. zu berücksichtigen.

1. Mittel für vier zweijährige Forschungsstipendien á monatlich DM 1.000,--.

Begründung: Durch diese Stipendien, die überregional ausgeschrieben werden sollen, kann eine effektive und langfristige Nachwuchsförderung auf dem Gebiet der Antisemitismusforschung erfolgen. Das Zentrum erhält die Möglichkeit, vorzügliche Nachwuchswissenschaftler nach Berlin zu ziehen und im Rahmen der vom Zentrum zu setzenden Forschungsschwerpunkte arbeiten zu lassen.

- 2. Mittel für 7 - 8 Gastvorträge pro Jahr...ca. DM 10.000,--

Begründung: Für die wissenschaftliche Arbeit des Zentrums, für die nationalen und internationalen Kontakte, für die wissenschaftlichen Anregungen innerhalb Berlins und für die Außenwirkung (Öffentlichkeitsarbeit) des Zentrums ist die regelmäßige Veranstaltung von gastvorträgen mit angesehenen Wissenschaftlern der verschiedenen Disziplinen unerlässlich. Für den Gastvortrag eines Wissenschaftlers aus der Bundesrepublik werden heute bei DM 200,-- Honorar durchschnittliche Gesamtaufwendungen (einschließlich Reise- und Aufenthaltskosten) von ca. 700,-- DM gerechnet. Da der Charakter des Zentrums es erforderlich macht, in beträchtlichem Umfang Fachwissenschaftler aus dem Ausland einzuladen, sind durchschnittlich ca. DM 1.300,-- pro Vortrag anzusetzen.

- 3. Mittel für wissenschaftliche Konferenzen pro Jahr...ca. DM 35.000,--

Begründung: Eine wichtige Funktion des Zentrums wird darin bestehen, Forschungsansätze in verschiedenen Ländern und in unterschiedlichen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen miteinander in Verbindung zu bringen, die internationale Kommunikation der überwiegend vereinzelt betriebenen Antisemitismusforschung zu verbessern, wissenschaftliche Anregungen zu vermitteln und neue Forschungskapazitäten zu erschließen. Das Zentrum stellt den Versuch dar, Berlin zu einem besonders wichtigen Ort für die wissenschaftliche Kommunikation im Bereich der Antisemitismusforschung zu machen. Die Konferenzen bieten darüber hinaus die Möglichkeit, den internationalen Sachverstand zu wichtigen Themen zusammenzufassen; die Ergebnisse sollen in der Regel in der geplanten Veröffentlichungsreihe publiziert werden. Zu rechnen ist mit einer durchschnittlichen Zahl von 35 auswärtigen bzw. ausländischen Teilnehmern.

- 4. Mittel für wissenschaftliche Reisen pro Jahr...DM 15.000,--
Hinzu kommen einmalige Mittel zur Herstellung der Arbeitskontakte mit anderen Instituten im In- und Ausland in Höhe von DM 12.000,--.

Begründung: Für die Forschungen der Mitarbeiter des Zentrums wie auch der Stipendiaten sind Bibliotheks- und Archivreisen unerlässlich. Dabei wird es sich in erster Linie um Forschungsstätten in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR handeln, darüber hinaus natürlich auch im Ausland. Die Kosten lassen sich im einzelnen schwer voraussagen; da Archiv- und Bibliotheksaufenthalte aber nach Wochen und oft auch nach Monaten gerechnet werden, dürften DM 15.000,-- jährlich an der unteren Grenze liegen.

Der einmalige Betrag von DM 12.000,-- soll während der Aufbauphase in den ersten 2-3 Jahren die Möglichkeit bieten, mit den wichtigsten internationalen Forschungsstätten, vor allem in Israel und in den USA, direkte Verbindungen zu knüpfen, um Mißverständnisse zu vermeiden, Doppelarbeit auszuschließen und gemeinsame Projekte zu entwickeln.

5. Bibliotheksmittel pro Jahr...DM 30.000,--

Hinzu kommen einmalige Mittel für die Aufbauphase in Höhe von DM 50.000,--; außerdem sollten in besonderen Fällen außerordentliche Mittel für den Ankauf von Gelehrtenbibliotheken zur Verfügung stehen.

Begründung: Der Aufbau einer Spezialbibliothek ist eine Voraussetzung für die Arbeit des Zentrums. Da viele Titel nur noch antiquarisch zu erwerben sind, wird es nötig sein, möglichst einen Grundstock durch den Ankauf geschlossener Privatbibliotheken zu legen.

6. Jährliche Zuschüsse zu den Veröffentlichungen des Zentrums in Höhe von DM 30.000,--

Begründung: Das Zentrum braucht ein eigenes Publikationsprogramm, durch das die Forschungsergebnisse seiner Mitarbeiter, die Ergebnisse der Konferenzen und einzelne Vorträge einem breiteren Publikum vorgestellt werden. In Einzelfällen werden dabei rückzahlbare Zuschüsse an die Verlage erforderlich sein. Außerdem sollen aus den hier genannten Mitteln auch Übersetzungen wichtiger fremdsprachiger Arbeiten gefördert werden.

7. Mittel für den allgemeinen und besonderen Geschäftsbedarf des Zentrums in Höhe von jährlich DM 10.000,--

Begründung: Neben der üblichen Geschäftsführung wird das Zentrum besondere Aufwendungen insbesondere im Hinblick auf die wissenschaftlichen Konferenzen und die überregionalen und internationalen Kontakte sowie die Forschungsarbeiten und das Veröffentlichungsprogramm haben.

Erforderlich sind somit insgesamt jährliche Sachmittel in Höhe von DM 178.000,--.

Hinzu kommen einmalige Mittel in der Gründungsphase des Zentrums in Höhe von DM 63.000,--.

IV. Raumfrage

Der Fachbereichsrat stellt vorab mit Nachdruck fest, daß die beantragten Räume nicht vom Fachbereich zur Verfügung gestellt werden können, da der Fachbereich 1 ohnehin seit langem räumlich unterausgestattet ist. Der Fachbereichsrat hält folgende Räume langfristig für unabdingbar:

- 1 großer Raum als Bibliotheks- und Konferenzraum (zugleich Arbeitsraum für Nichtmitglieder des Zentrums)
- 1 kleinerer Nebenraum mit Zeitschriftenauslage, der zugleich der Kommunikation der Mitarbeiter und Besucher dient
- 5 Arbeitszimmer für die Professoren (2), die wiss. Angestellten (2) und einen Gastprofessor
- 1 Raum für das Sekretariat
- 1 Raum für den wiss. Bibliothekar und für die stud. Hilfskräfte, die Bibliotheksarbeiten durchführen
- 3 Arbeitsräume für auswärtige und ausländische Wissenschaftler, deren Forschungen von dritter Stelle bezahlt werden (mit diesen Räumen könnten in erheblichem Umfang zusätzliche Forschungskapazitäten an das Zentrum gebunden werden, da das Interesse an einem Arbeitsplatz und dem ständigen Kontakt mit Fachkollegen bei den durch DAAD, Humboldt-Stiftung oder ausländische Stiftungen geförderten Wissenschaftlern durchweg sehr groß ist).

Es handelt sich also um einen Minimalbedarf von 12 Räumen unterschiedlicher Größe und Funktion.

Der Fachbereichsrat hält eine rasche Entscheidung des Kuratoriums zur organisatorischen Form und zur Stellenausstattung ebenso wie eine schnelle verbindliche Stellungnahme des Präsidenten zu der Ausstattung des Zentrums mit Sachmitteln und Räumen für dringend geboten. Im Interesse


Beschlußvorlage für die Sitzung

- TO-PUNKT Nr. -

8

des Ansehens der Technischen Universität Berlin, die in dieser Frage nach Außen in den letzten Monaten sehr entschieden ihre Entschlossenheit bekundet hat, die Gründung des Zentrums zügig zu betreiben, sollte die Arbeit des Zentrums im SS 1980 aufgenommen werden können.

10:0:0



8

Beschluß Nr. FB 1-

Abstimmungsergebnis: \

DEPARTMENT
OF HISTORY

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21218

NOV 8 1983

Nov. 4, 1983

Dear Rabbi Tannenbaum,

Enclosed please find the material I mentioned
to you over the telephone — two scholarly papers,
one more "popular" paper and a brief Statement
on the need for a program on extremism.

I enjoyed talking with you and look forward
to more contact with you.

Sincerely,

Joel Katz

F. E. Katz

2008 Park Heights Ave., Apt. H-4

Baltimore, Md 21215

Tel. 301 358 9247

*

THE NEED FOR A PROGRAM OF RESEARCH ON EXTREMISM

The Nazi Holocaust was a unique occurrence in the history of the Jewish people. It deserves all the attention it has received in recent years -- the commemorations, the publicity in the media, the accumulation of massive amounts of information on what actually happened during the horrendous years, the Holocaust programs in schools and universities, and all efforts at the theme: "we must never forget." All these activities are necessary and important.

Yet all is not well. There are critical issues that have not been addressed.

(1) As far as Jews are concerned, there is the lingering question of the possible repetition of the Holocaust: Can there be another Holocaust, directed against the Jewish people? The Nazi Holocaust was the largest and most comprehensive anti-Semitic assault that ever took place. But historically, lesser anti-Semitic assaults have occurred with disconcerting repetitiveness. Are the Jews destined to continue to suffer periodic assaults?

(2) In this century alone well over 100 million human beings were violently put to death by their fellow human beings. This includes the aftermath of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, the Nazi Holocaust and the various wars. What we call "murder," by criminals or mentally deranged persons, constitutes

* Professor Fred E. Katz, Department of History, Johns Hopkins University. Please direct all inquiries to: F.E.Katz, 7008 Park Heights Avenue, Apt. H-4, Baltimore, Md 21215

a very small proportion of the 100 million man-made deaths. Most of the mass killings were carried out by relatively ordinary citizens, doing their duty or following what they believe to be a noble cause. Even the evil stampede of Nazism included a great many very ordinary sorts of people. And such activities continue to happen up to the present -- in Cambodia, in parts of Africa, in South America.

The question arises: How can ordinary people be stampeded into murderous actions, particularly murder on such a vast scale?

(3) Do the various sorts of massive violence have characteristics in common? The ferocity of the Nazi Holocaust, the fervor of the Chinese and Russian Revolutions, the passion in the assault on the Armenians some sixty years ago -- do such actions have some common characteristics?

My basic proposition is that if we can discover answers to questions #2 and #3 we will be in a stronger position to prevent horrendous occurrences in the future. At the present time we simply do not have the answers to these questions.

We need very different sorts of knowledge than we now possess. Despite all the information about the Holocaust -- the horrendous details fill many libraries and archives -- we still do not know the answers to the questions I just raised.

In order to obtain the answers we need more comparative sociological research. Such research would investigate how

ordinary sorts of people join extremist movements; how such people can become zealous participants in a cause that involves massive killings and other atrocities; how it is that some extremist movements are curbed before they reach horrendous levels of evil while other movements go on without ever being curbed. What is it in the social, economic and political situation that fosters limitless extremism?

One can investigate such questions by describing each occurrence -- such as the Nazi Holocaust or the Chinese Revolution -- in all its full uniqueness. (This is what social historians usually do.) But one can also investigate the questions with the deliberate objective of extracting generalizations that apply to more than one single historical event, even to future events. One does so by making careful and systematic comparisons between different instances of extremism that have already happened. Only by extracting generalizations can we learn to predict what will happen in the future. This calls for comparative sociological research.

Some comparative sociological research on the Nazi Holocaust has been done. In particular, there is a study (by Helen Fein) of how different European countries, occupied by the Germans, acted against the Jews. Some generalizations were developed -- as to what was, and what was not,

conducive to extreme anti-Semitism. But this, and my own work, is about the only deliberately comparative sociological research on the Holocaust. Far more comparative research is needed if we are to become more effective in preventing or counteracting massive extremism, anti-Semitism included.

My own research work on the Holocaust and extremism has so far resulted in three articles, published in 1982. (My previous research, including five books and 25 articles, deals with other social issues.) They are the beginning of a planned, concerted long-term effort to answer the questions I have raised (#1-3).

I am currently negotiating with some eminent universities for an academic position through which I could carry out the above-described research. My credentials qualify me very well: I have been a full professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Buffalo and at Tel Aviv University. Currently I am a visiting scholar in the Department of History at Johns Hopkins University.

As I work out an arrangement with a university my own salary will be covered. However, I need support for the research program. In particular, I should like

support for two graduate students. This would have two objectives: (1) To have the students assist me in my research work; and (2) to encourage the students to gear their own research -- for graduate degrees -- to research on extremism. The latter will, in the long run, help build a future cadre of researchers in this most vital area.

I estimate the expenses to run to approximately \$40,000. per year. This would cover two graduate student fellowships (each about \$14,000. per year) and a modest fund (\$12,000. per year) for research activities for me and the students.

Funding for this program could come either from an endowed fund that would yield an income of around \$40,000. each year, or from direct funding each year. In either case, I want to emphasize that it is important to have a stable source of funding over a number of years. The reason is that if an excellent student is funded one year and not the next, he or she will soon lose enthusiasm for this area of scholarly research.

This statement is addressed to a general audience. For an audience of professional social scientists I would provide details of the scholarly underpinnings. I would, then, cite work by such scholars as S.M.Lipset, W. Kornhauser, M. Zald, R. Michels, J. Freeman, N. Smelser, J. Geschwender, M. Weber, J.D. McCarthy, G. Marx, A. Oberschall, C. Perrow, F. F. Piven, S. Milgram, R. Cloward. The work by these scholars forms an important point of departure for the proposed program on extremism.

Fred E. Katz



A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE TO THE HOLOCAUST

In her recent book, *The Holocaust and the Historians*, Lucy Dawidowicz draws attention to historians' neglect of the Holocaust.¹ She points out that textbooks on modern history as well as specialized works by respected scholars give scant attention to it.

To a sociologist Dawidowicz' book strikes a timely note. Sociologists, too, have been reluctant to study the Holocaust. Not long ago it was noted in a sociology journal that "there is no sociology of the Holocaust."² This may be doing an injustice to recent work by Helen Fein, who compared the persecution of Jews in different countries that had been occupied by the Nazis³ and to Irving Horowitz' analysis of genocide in relation to national political systems.⁴ But by and large sociologists have concentrated far more on anti-Semitism, ethnic issues and extremism bearing on Jewish life in the English-speaking countries⁵ than on the Nazi Holocaust itself. Given the large number of Jewish sociologists, this remains somewhat of a riddle. Perhaps Hannah Arendt's quasi-sociological work on the banality of Eichmann's evil left a bad aftertaste—particularly its claim, met by much outrage, that the victims heavily contributed to their own demise. Perhaps, too, the trauma of the Holocaust that affects all Jews, including Jewish sociologists, has substituted grief for intellectual inquiry, where dispassionate analysis is the last thing on anyone's mind. A prominent Jewish sociologist recently told me: "The most profound thing anyone can do about the Holocaust is to be silent; but I wish you luck in not being silent."

The upshot of sociologists' silence is that distinctive sociological contributions to knowledge of the Holocaust remain relatively untapped. Such contributions would not be duplications of historians' explanations of why and how the Holocaust happened. They would, instead, clarify wherein the Holocaust was unique and wherein it was generalizable, utilizing existing widespread propensities for evil; and, wherein lie human routines that might again be tapped for massive extremes and wherein lie countervailing forces to extremism.

In this paper I want to take a step in this sociological direction by discussing the Holocaust as a way of routinizing monstrous behavior.

One feature of the routinization process that is especially important is that relatively "ordinary" people participated in the murderous Nazi bureaucracy, and did so with enthusiasm and innovativeness. Of particular interest are people at the middle levels of the Nazi hierarchy, not ideological or government leaders. How were they involved? Before turning to one of these, it is important to be explicit about the theory to be used. The theory will try to go beyond the conventional wisdom about bureaucrats, namely that bureaucrats are extreme examples of two common syndromes: (1) Obedience to authority; (2) the modern era's pursuit of specialization. Both of these have been used by Nazi officials to attempt to be absolved from responsibility for their actions. Both have, in addition, presented scholars with the tantalizing and perverse view that, to some extent, "we are all Nazis."¹¹

I. THEORY

1. Incremental Processes

The Nazi movement, like many other extremist movements, did not have a fully spelled out program to which it adhered. The extermination of the Jews, for example, developed in a step-by-step incremental manner after the Nazis came to power in 1933. It had not been specified in detail beforehand.¹²

Before the systematic physical annihilation began in 1942, the Nazi persecution of Jews included numerous *ad hoc* harassments of individual Jews and a highly orchestrated propaganda campaign of vilification of Jews. But its major device consisted of a series of increasingly repressive laws against Jews.¹³ Through this device Jews were deprived of an ever-larger number of civil rights. Hence, in a technical sense, much of the persecution of Jews was done "legally", that is, through the existing legal machinery of the state. The mass persecution was grafted onto the existing legal machinery of the German nation. No separate legal system was created—no separate system of courts, no separate judiciary staff was employed. The systematic persecution of Jews (and others the Nazis considered undesirable) was being carried out with a minimal attention to its *newness*. After all, the existing machinery of the state was carrying it out. Persecution had become an expression of the will of the state, operating within the established and trusted mechanisms of the state. For an individual bureaucrat, accustomed to executing rather than initiating policy, the challenge of Nazism might not be fundamentally new. This would be especially true when the bureaucrat has become accustomed to Nazi policies in small, incremental installments.

The incremental, step-by-step character of the repressive laws not only contributed to hiding its novelty. It also obscured the degree of

Section I will outline the theory. Section II will apply the theory to Rudolf Hoess, the head of the Auschwitz concentration camp.

The vast scale on which the Holocaust operated means that, to a considerable extent, the killings and torture were routinized. This was so particularly during the latter stage. In the early stage, by contrast, during the mass killings on the Russian front, the non-routinized nature of mass killings produced considerable protest by German military personnel.

Much of the Holocaust was carried out as part of the "ordinary" day-to-day routines of government machinery. Much of it became part-and-parcel of "ordinary" career patterns of civil servants, of military personnel, and of many persons in the civilian, private sector of European nations. Much of it relied on a specially trained staff of concentration camp administrators, persons who were human extermination specialists. I shall dwell on one major exemplar of this species, Rudolf Hoess, the Commandant of Auschwitz.

The starting point for the discussion of Hoess, and a vehicle for developing it, is a harsh decision. Hoess will be heard to say that he had a sensitive inner life and that he abhorred the brutalities at Auschwitz. One is inclined to be utterly incredulous of such claims. To accept Hoess' claims seems to amount to believing in the good intentions of the devil. Given Hoess' *actions*, one's mental world threatens to become unhinged when entertaining claims of this sort. Yet there is one reason, an overriding reason, for saying: Suppose one believes Hoess? It is that one might learn something important by doing so. In part II of this paper I shall try to do just that.

It is crucial to know how the Holocaust came to be routinized. Sociologically, routinization means that complex social objectives—such as public elementary and secondary education, the collection of taxes, the incarceration of criminals, and the conduct of wars—are so organized that they can be carried out in an orderly fashion, even when they involve personal suffering and extreme disruption of life.

A nation's bureaucracies tend to play a major role in such routinization. Bureaucracies are social machineries for accomplishing complex objectives in relatively orderly fashion. They often operate with moral blinders.⁶ The individual bureaucrat typically focuses on a particular task, without considering wide implications, including broader moral issues.⁷ Means, rather than ends, are the main concern.⁸ The possibility that one's actions may be evil is often beyond the day-to-day level of awareness.⁹ So it comes about that when the bureaucrat organizes the transportation of Jews (and Gypsies and others deemed undesirable) to extermination camps, or arranges for the "efficient" use of slave labor in the Ruhr's munitions factories, the immorality of killing people is not taken into account.¹⁰ Morality or immorality may simply be outside the bureaucrat's range of concern. Technological issues—the availability of trains, for example—are apt to prevail.

The history of the Nazi bureaucrats exemplifies these patterns very clearly. Studies of a variety of S.S. officers by Merkl, of early Nazis by Dicks, and of Eichmann by Arendt suggest that many became immersed in Nazism incrementally.¹⁷ Eichmann, for example, joined the Nazi movement because it seemed a "sociable" thing to do. He evidently began with little commitment to extreme anti-Semitism. In the course of his S.S. service he became extremely committed to, and innovative in, the murder of Jews. However, there is a good deal of indication that his zeal for this murderous behavior owed every bit as much to a commitment to a career in the Nazi state machinery as it did to personal commitment to anti-Semitism. Of course, this does not absolve him of responsibility for mass murder. (I shall return to this point under the section on Autonomy.) But it gives a glimmer of understanding that goes beyond the conception that only blind hatred can induce monstrous behavior.

In and of themselves, incremental processes are neither good nor bad. They are part of the repertoire of many *ordinary* patterns of social behavior. They are very typical of features of ongoing social systems. In the present political system of the United States much national policy is made in an incremental manner. For example, policy decisions regarding unemployment and inflation are being influenced by current perceptions about forthcoming congressional elections. New laws are commonly created through *ad hoc* deliberations, often based on compromises among competing factions and interest groups. Many an actual law as finally formulated may not represent the ideal version of any one group. It is the end product of a series of local, incremental decisions.

Let us return to individual Nazis. Officials, such as Eichmann and his superior, Himmler, sometimes expressed distaste for aspects of the extremes of mass murder activities in which they were engaged. Yet they engaged in them enthusiastically and innovatively. How does one explain this apparent anachronism? The easiest explanation is to disbelieve their claims of distaste for their actions, to suggest that they were lying, be it to themselves or to a wider audience. Another explanation, at least as plausible, is that their whole-hearted commitment was to the Nazi cause *in toto*. That cause was a culmination of historic German nationalism which emphasized that (1) the German nation was not only different from the other nations; it was superior to them. And, (2) the individual obtains his ultimate personal fulfillment by subordinating himself to the nation.¹⁸

The murder of Jews, and other designated undesirables, was part of one's duty toward the total, grand cause represented by the Nazi Reich. Himmler, in a message to S.S. members who seemed to recoil from some of the horrors of their own deeds, told them to say to themselves: "What horrible things do I have to witness while carrying out my sacred duty."¹⁹

persecution that was being implemented. In the 1930's few people, even among the Jewish victims, could believe that total annihilation of European Jews was a real prospect. To many Jews individual laws, such as the requirement for Jews to get identification cards or adopt a Jewish-sounding name, were isolated acts. Surely, many believed, this did not presage wholesale murder of Jews. Incrementalism contributed to camouflaging the true direction of the process of persecution. When the final secret order came, in 1942, to actually kill all Jews in German-occupied lands,¹⁴ this was but a further increment in what had become a publicly evolving course of action. It was not out-of-character with what had gone on before. In short, by disguising the extremes and newness of the persecutions, the incremental process contributed to making the persecutions acceptable to the German population.

There is another sense in which incremental processes aided the Nazi cause. It relates to the manner in which individuals come to participate in a career. How did Nazi functionaries come to join and participate in the Nazi movement? Many, perhaps most, Nazi bureaucrats did not start out as professional murderers. Yet, how could they exhibit so much zeal for carrying out programs of extermination of human beings? For some people the choice of an occupational career and, later, one's participation in a career, are not based on one major decision that will set the course of one's occupational life. Instead, it is based on a series of small, localized decisions. Each of these "small" decisions is apt to deal with an immediate problem one is currently facing. Thus, a choice of major field in college may be based on solving certain immediate economic or interpersonal problems.¹⁵ Such *incremental* processes, comprised of a series of localized decisions, may make up the career path throughout one's adult occupational life.

A crucial aspect is that by concentrating on such localized decision-making an individual may become engaged in a course of action to which he has little commitment. A person may become a physician without a commitment to healing; a person may become a teacher without commitment to teaching. This may seem paradoxical, particularly if one assumes that because a person has gone through a program of training in medicine that person becomes committed to healing; because a person has gone through a program of educational studies that person becomes committed to teaching; that, in short, "socialization" takes place in the course of education, especially in the education of professionals. This is far from proven in the existing sociological literature. A person may become a physician, and carry out some of the demands of the role of physician *very fully and enthusiastically*, and still have little commitment to some other dimensions of the role of physician, including a primary concern for healing.¹⁶

hard to believe. Are they simply lying, to deceive others and/or themselves? Correlatedly, are they exhibiting a characteristically Western culture pattern, wherein anti-Semitism often exists but is hidden from public view and acknowledgment? Although these explanations are plausible, yet another explanation must be entertained. It is that some Nazi functionaries were really not committed to anti-Semitism; that the zealous pursuit of the murder of Jews was being carried out by individuals whose primary commitment might be to other things, such as careerism within the Nazi movement. This could take the form of focusing obsessively on one's sacred "mission" within the Nazi package of programs. In the case of Eichmann that sacred mission was the annihilation of Jews. (To be sure there were Nazis, such as Julius Streicher, whose explicit and primary commitment within the Nazi package probably was to anti-Semitism.) In the analysis of anti-Semitism the "non-committed" anti-Semites must be taken very seriously. Their proficiency in things other than anti-Semitism, notably in bureaucratic efficiency, may make them more dangerous anti-Semites than the professed and "committed" anti-Semite. In some ways they may have greater autonomy to practice and implement anti-Semitism than the single-minded anti-Semite. Also, because of the particular package in which their murderous anti-Semitism is contextualized, they may be unreachable through other contexts, such as the context of Judao-Christian canons of the sanctity of human life.²³

3. The Question of Autonomy of Nazi Officials

How much autonomy did Nazi officials have? As noted earlier, much of the persecution, of Jews and others, was carried out through the existing German state's administrative bureaucracies. This fact was used as an excuse by many a Nazi at the Nuremberg and other post-war trials. They claimed that they were merely following orders; they were officials sworn to obey the laws of the state; they were military officers sworn to obey the authority of their superior officers; they were holding positions which were subject to very clear lines of authority. Surely, they claimed, the individual has little discretion under such conditions. Consequently, given their lack of discretion, they bore no responsibility for the character of many of their actions.

All this omits from consideration the fact that bureaucracies operate on a dual track, control and *autonomy*. A bureaucratic organization is not only a mechanism for controlling people's behavior. It is also a mechanism for giving a measure of autonomy to the people who participate in it in order to carry out policies. Stated differently, a bureaucracy is not only an organization that demands service from its functionaries. It also provides these functionaries with the opportunity to pursue a career.²⁴

Commitment was not just to a particular set of deeds, such as the execution of Jews, but to a larger cause. One might find some of one's deeds abhorrent while still regarding them as a positive contribution to a larger, acceptable cause. This cause was comprised of a *package* of programs.

2. The Packaging of Nazism

Nazism was made up of a number of different programs. These included extreme anti-Semitism (a greatly expanded version of long-existing anti-Semitism),²⁰ heightened nationalism (including the plan to recapture land Germany had surrendered because of its loss of the First World War), ethnicism (based on old themes in German culture, that Germans were a master race),²¹ and economic revitalization (which would bring jobs and income to the currently unemployed, as well as renewed growth and prosperity for the nation's industry). Although these programs addressed very different issues, they were amalgamated into one composite. The Nazi movement combined them into one *package* in its propaganda and in its political actions.

Stated differently, the Nazi movement's diverse programs appealed to very diverse groups within Germany. They appealed to unemployed workers as well as industrialists, to military career officers and many a civil service careerist, to anti-Semites and nationalists, to name just a few. Since Nazi Germany was a highly coercive dictatorship, the diverse constituencies could not exercise separate power as "interest groups", as they might in a more loose-knit Western democratic nation. Nazism was one *package*.

Three important characteristics flow from this situation. One, individual Nazis were apt to be attracted to Nazism by one or another of its programs. They need not be drawn by all of its programs. Two, due to the amalgamation of the Nazi programs into a cohesive package, individual Nazis were very apt to be engaged in helping to implement the entire Nazi package, even those components to which they had no strong *personal commitment*. And, given a strong allegiance to the Nazi package, as a *total entity*, they were apt to help implement the entire package with considerable zeal, *even those components items to which they had little commitment*. Three, a cohesive package serves to *contextualize* an individual's activities. It places them in a particular context that has a degree of immunity from other contexts. Horrendous deeds are justified in the name of that one context. Other contexts—such as traditional ethical and religious contexts—are eliminated from consideration.

These features are highlighted in the exasperating claim by some Nazi and S.S. officials, such as Eichmann, that they were not anti-Semitic.²² Given their zealously murderous activities against Jews, such a claim is

over 90,000 persons on the southern front in Russia. However, he was proud to claim that he used his personal initiative—his autonomy—to make these killings as “humane” as possible. He did so, he claimed, by introducing methods and procedures that speeded up the process of killing, so that both the victims and the military personnel who carried out the killings had a minimum amount of mental anguish beforehand.²⁸

It is important to realize not only that individual functionaries have autonomy, in that they have options available to them and that their behavior is not completely predetermined by their position in a hierarchy of a bureaucracy. It is also important to see how the autonomy is being used. In the case of General Ohlendorf, autonomy was used to accomplish two different objectives. One, he used his own autonomy to implement the Nazi extermination policy. He did so by being inventive in developing methods and procedures for mass killing, thereby speeding up the killings. Two, he used his autonomy to reconcile the killings with some of the traditional German values. He did so by developing methods which supposedly introduced a degree of “humanity” into the inhumane process. Complaints from German soldiers had been reaching back home about German atrocities on the Russian front and the strains this produced among the soldiers. Such reports produced some pressure toward “humanizing” the inhumane acts at the front. It is not clear whether Ohlendorf was responding to these pressures or whether he was acting entirely on the basis of his own reactions. At any rate, in *his* view, he was catering to a German value placed on some regard for the quality of human life.

Both of these uses of autonomy—innovating ways to speed up killings and finding ways to reconcile the killings with existing values—contributed to *making the Nazi policies work*. They are self-initiated contributions by a Nazi official toward making Nazi policies a reality. It is not at all clear whether the Nazi extermination policies could have been accomplished as fully had there not been many such contributions, initiated locally at many points within the system.

A contrasting use of autonomy, of deliberately not taking part in the killings, also existed. At the Eichmann trial it was brought out that “. . . it was possible for an S.S. officer to obtain transfer if he felt himself unable to take part in the murder of Jews—without thereby losing rank or status.”²⁹ Even persons under Ohlendorf’s command were transferred in this manner.³⁰

Perhaps the best documented case of how an individual’s autonomy was used to promote the Nazi annihilation process is that of Eichmann.³¹ He manifested considerable zeal and innovativeness to bring about the mass murder of Jews. Indeed, there is every indication that the extermination of Jews became a near-obsession for Eichmann. He used all his autonomy to achieve it. For example, toward the end of the war, when

The manifestations of the career can take the form that the individual, over time, receives increasing income and other positional perquisites, receives advancement within the bureaucratic hierarchy of positions, or receives both. To be entitled to such rewards the bureaucrat is expected to do more than merely obey instructions. He/she is ordinarily expected to make independent contributions, to use initiative. This can only be done through relatively autonomous activity.

From the perspective of the individual who occupies a position within an organization, this involves what Max Weber called “status honor.”²⁵ An individual derives honor from an organization, such as the S.S., because of the status-position he occupies in it. However, what Weber and other social scientists have not clarified is that the individual can also contribute to (or detract from) the honor of his status. He does so through his conduct while he occupies that status. Contributing to the honor of one’s status, and through it to the honor of the SS, to other Nazi organizations and to the larger Nazi cause for which they stand, was a major factor in the behavior of individual Nazi officials. Such contributions to his status honor was typically based on how the bureaucrat used his autonomy, the discretion available to him.

Bureaucrats have considerable autonomy. This has been discovered in sociological research.²⁶ But it is also well known by the general public. Anyone who has had dealings with bureaucrats knows that the individual bureaucrat not only “knows” rules. He or she typically has much autonomy to *interpret* rules. A given bureaucrat may interpret the rules so literally that they destroy the spirit of the rules, the ideals for which the rules stand. Conversely, a bureaucrat may bend the existing rules in order to conform to the spirit of the rules, as he or she interprets their spirit. In the political realm, this goes far to explaining why a new Administration often finds its efforts to introduce change frustrated by the middle and lower levels of the existing bureaucracy, even after new officials have been installed at the top. As a result, after a relatively short period of publicly proclaiming change and innovation a government agency is apt to pursue the same practices and policies it did before the change of Administration.

Let it not be assumed that this only applies to American bureaucracies, such as the State or Defense Department’s policies and practices toward the Middle East. It applies amply to Germany in the Nazi era. Nazi bureaucrats, from Gauleiters to other party functionaries, were masters at protecting themselves and using their own autonomy in bureaucratic infighting.²⁷

Individual S.S. officials directing the mass murders found ways to exercise autonomy while carrying out the government’s orders for ultimate destruction of the Jews. There was S.S. General Otto Ohlendorf (an *Einsatzgruppe* Commander) who, in the Nuremberg trials, admitted killing

Hoess in concentration camp administration. He rose in the SS hierarchy and, in 1940, was assigned to establish a camp at Auschwitz. With the exception of some interim service at Berlin headquarters, he remained at Auschwitz, including the period of greatest mass murder.

Hoess describes his childhood love for animals, trees and solitary activities leading to a life-long "passion" for farming. This externally muted man described himself as leading a "sensitive inner life."³⁵ From his devoutly Catholic parents he learned to value absolute obedience to authority. "I had been taught since childhood to be absolutely obedient and meticulously tidy and clean . . ." ³⁶ This served him well when he, himself, was imprisoned (for political murder, in the 1920's). "I did not find it difficult to conform to the strict discipline of prison. I conscientiously carried out all my well-defined duties. I completed the work allotted to me, and usually more . . . [!]-my cell was a model of neatness and cleanliness."³⁷ Here one must note the sense of honor and gratification derived from obedience, even if it means obedience to harsh authority. Obedience to authority is not something one accepts grudgingly, alienatedly fighting it. On the contrary, one glorifies and sanctifies the act of obedience, doing even more than is demanded. One derives honor from using one's capacities for behavioral discretion, one's existing autonomy, to enhance one's obedience. By doing even more than is demanded one contributes honor to one's current status.

Such obedience to authority can take place even when the individual, who exultantly obeys, has commitment only to some items in the larger cause which his obedience serves to implement. There are items, within that cause, to which he has no commitment. In Hoess' case, in the 1920's, he was zealously obeying a government that he was fighting and that was imprisoning him.³⁸

In his autobiography Hoess states that the order to prepare the extermination process, given to him by Himmler, "certainly was an extraordinary and monstrous order."³⁹ Yet it was totally inconceivable to disobey even such an order. He reports that since his arrest a number of persons had asked him why he did not disobey the order or, even, assassinate Himmler. He finds this totally incomprehensible. Not a single SS officer, says Hoess, could even entertain such a thought.⁴⁰ One might complain about harsh orders. But one carried them out.

It seems to me that there was also some element of fear. The SS brooked no disobedience in its ranks. But even more, the idealization of obedience, especially of harsh orders, was a source of great satisfaction. By obeying one was actively contributing to one's status honor. But, let me repeat, here obedience does not mean grudgingly doing the minimum of what one is ordered to do. No. It means actively making a contribution to obedience. Adding to it. Obedience meant supporting the *spirit* of an order rather than, minimally, accepting the letter of an order. All this is

Germany was losing the war and when there was a considerable shortage of trains, Eichmann insisted on getting trains to transport Jews to the extermination camps. This led to conflict with his own superiors, who insisted the trains be used for the transportation of troops. At one point Himmler, Eichmann's superior as head of the S.S., ordered Eichmann to stop transporting Jews to the camps. Eichmann managed to sabotage this order and continued to send Jews to the camps.³²

Eichmann's actions display a bureaucrat's autonomy. He can interpret orders with zeal and he can subvert orders. He can marshal resources in many ways that are not officially spelled out in the existing rules that govern the bureaucracy. The existing rules and orders are typically formulated very broadly. They permit much interpretation by the bureaucrat who implements them. All this points to areas where the individual has autonomy and, therefrom, culpability for his actions. How the bureaucrat uses his or her autonomy is crucial, both for the success of reaching the bureaucracy's goals and for demonstrating the bureaucrat's personal responsibility.

II. RUDOLF HOESS

The career of Rudolf Hoess is highly instructive. He was the commander of the Auschwitz concentration camp during its establishment and, again, during the period of the mass exterminations. He oversaw the extermination of around three million Jews. Bertrand Russell, in his introduction to Hoess' autobiography, describes him as "a very ordinary little man" who, nonetheless, was "perhaps the greatest executioner of all time."³³ "He certainly never sought to hide anything that he had done, and was more prone to exaggerate than understate, for he regarded it as a compliment to his zeal, capacity for work, and devotion to duty to have carried out his gruesome orders with such dispatch and efficiency."³⁴

Russell's description of Hoess as an *ordinary* little man—just as Arendt's notion of the *banality* of evil in regard to Eichmann—diverts attention from a crucial matter. How is the *ordinary* (or the banal) transformed into the *extraordinary*? What is it in *ordinary* human nature, in *ordinary* social processes, that lends itself to the emergence of a profoundly *extraordinary* level of evil?

Hoess was born in 1900, received strict Catholic upbringing, volunteered for military service in the First World War, joined a reactionary organization after that war, met and joined Hitler in 1922, was imprisoned for a political murder in 1923 and, after discharge from prison in 1929, took up farming and married. He had five children, two of whom were born during Hoess' service in concentration camps. In 1934 Himmler persuaded Hoess to join the SS which, from start to finish, involved

most) people knowingly participate in activities that are damaging and obnoxious, alongside activities that are wholesome and benign.

In the role of guard, Hoess points out, there is considerable autonomy: The guard "can make life hell for the prisoners, but (he) can also make his wretched experience easier and even tolerable."⁴⁷ He obviously devoted considerable thought to this matter. During his years of imprisonment he had much time to do so. He claims that it is not a matter of the physical hardships which makes the prisoner's life horrible. It is the mental suffering "caused by the tyranny and meanness" of individual guards or superiors.⁴⁸ He sees the guards having considerable autonomy. He, the commandant, could not stop their misdeeds. Although he was in charge of the camp, his own autonomy was severely limited, at least as he saw it.

Many of Hoess' own scruples disappeared early in his SS career while he was under the tutelage of a severe taskmaster, the commandant of Dachau, Theodor Eicke. He describes the incremental process of becoming accustomed to doing brutal things. He recalls how, rather soon after becoming an SS officer, he had to supervise the execution of a close SS colleague—a man who had had the misfortune that a prisoner under his control had escaped. "I cannot understand to this day how I was able, quite calmly, to give the order (to the firing squad) to fire."⁴⁹ He recalls how he, along with the other officers, was deeply upset after the execution. As they gathered afterwards, no one talked. After this event further executions, particularly those of prisoners, came far more easily to him. Obviously the critical threshold had been crossed. A precedent existed. And the existence of the precedent made similar acts acceptable options for the future. One way of understanding this process is as follows: A person's career can be regarded as a sequence of events. Within such a sequence, a single event may leave an imprint upon subsequent events.⁵⁰ Indeed, one event can be a *critical* increment, one that hovers over all subsequent events. Hoess states: "This event (the execution of the fellow officer) was always before my eyes to remind me of the demand that had been made upon us to exercise perpetual self-mastery and unberiding severity."⁵¹

Hoess reports another critical increment from early in his career as a concentration camp officer. He reports that at one point he felt that he was totally unsuited for such work. He felt that, given his own background as a prisoner, he had far too much sympathy for prisoners. But he lacked the courage to resign, to face the shame of being discharged from the SS. From that moment on he was hooked. From that moment, too, "my guilt actually begins."⁵²

Hoess frequently reports grisly scenes under his command—how children were thrown into the gas chambers together with their mothers, how a member of the Jewish *Sonderkommando* had to drag the corpse of

most magnificently accomplished when, in the eyes of a Hoess, obedience is difficult, even horrible.

The incremental character of Hoess' involvement in Nazism also contributed to his zealous contribution to the Nazi cause. It includes his claim that when he was ordered to establish extermination installations at Auschwitz, in the summer of 1941, he "did not have the slightest idea of their scale or consequences."⁴¹ He notes that he simply did not reflect on such matters. Nor did he reflect on "whether this mass extermination of the Jews was necessary."⁴² Such broad issues were beyond his purview. His obligation, as he saw it, was a more limited one: to carry out the orders he received. He would single-mindedly concentrate on them. There was no distraction derived from addressing larger moral issues. His concern was with a particular segment of the Nazi package, not with all of it. Yet, by concentrating on the segment he was contributing to the total package.

The same pattern, of incremental involvement and not addressing larger issues, was characteristic of Hoess' involvement throughout his career in the SS. When he began his duties as a guard in a concentration camp, he notes, he gave no consideration to its being a "concentration camp"; or, one might add, to the larger issue of what concentration camps were doing to the German nation. "To me it was just a question of being an active soldier once again, of resuming my military career."⁴² The interrupted military career was fused with the role of being an SS guard in a concentration camp. Both involve life in uniform, military discipline, and service to the state. Hoess sees SS service as a military career which, in turn, provides the connecting link through which the Nazi package of programs becomes practicable and acceptable to him. It is his point of attachment to it.⁴⁴

Hoess claims that during his early days as a guard at Dachau he was greatly upset when he saw other guards flogging prisoners. He claims that he deliberately absented himself when he knew that floggings would occur; that he deplored that some SS men enjoyed the spectacle of public flogging of prisoners; that due to his own experience as a prisoner, he could identify with prisoners; and that, finally, he resented being placed in charge of a group of prisoners—he would have preferred to be simply a soldier in a unit of soldiers.⁴⁵ Hoess' resentment of some features of life in concentration camps while, nonetheless, actively contributing to the entire program is no different than what one finds in other, more normal contexts. In a study of physicians⁴⁶ I found that persons may strongly resent some aspects of their professional work, yet they remain fully active in their profession, including enactment of those features which they resent. Hoess' situation is more extreme, since his actions literally involves matters of life and death brutality. But in one respect it is similar to many other contexts. In their everyday life many (perhaps

out and burned . . . I had to do all this because I was the one to whom everyone looked, because I had to show them all that I did not merely issue orders and make the regulations but was also prepared to be present at whatever task I had assigned to my subordinates."⁵⁶

In another context he states: "I (was) aware of the impending horror, namely the Extermination Order (to kill the Gypsies) . . . Nothing surely is harder than to grit one's teeth and go through with such a thing, coldly, pitilessly, and without mercy."⁵⁷

One cannot escape the interpretation that Hoess sees something honorable in carrying out orders even when, or perhaps *because*, they are horribly difficult. He is thereby making a distinctive contribution to his own honor and the honor of the Nazi cause.

(2) Contextualizing the gruesome actions: Packaging

In our kind of society when a soldier kills an enemy soldier in the course of battle during wartime, this is regarded as perfectly acceptable behavior. Killing is here packaged and placed in distinctive *context*. This packaging of killing is spelled out in the rules of warfare, including when and how killing is permitted and encouraged. The contextualizing of killing includes the soldier's separation from home, the official declaration of a state of war, the shunting aside of certain peacetime prohibitions against killing and other forms of violence, and the establishment of the legitimacy of a different sort of conduct against the enemy. Killing is thereby separated from civilian, peacetime pursuits. It exists in a distinctive context. But it is not carried out as a starkly separate activity. On the contrary, it is part of a behavior package that has a degree of internal consistency and a logic of its own.

Hoess tried to contribute to the packaging of mass killing and unmatched brutality. One component of the package—as Hoess sees it—was the "need" to exterminate the Jews. He tells himself that he was not anti-Semitic, did not hate Jews but that Jews were the "enemy of our people."⁵⁸ From Eichmann he repeatedly heard that the extermination of Jews was necessary in order to "preserve the German people."⁵⁹

Another component of the Hoess package was that at Auschwitz he attempted to prescribe moral standards. He is appalled by stealing and sexual liaison between guards and prisoners.⁶⁰ Due to acute shortage of personnel, he had to accept very "low level" personnel. For example, among female Capos, in charge of female prisoners, he says: "I find it incredible that human beings could ever turn into such beasts . . . tearing (Jewish women) to pieces, killing them with axes, and throttling them—it was simply gruesome."⁶¹ He claims that he could not get better personnel and, what is more, could not prevent the brutal behavior of the guards.

A third component of the Hoess package was the use of modern technology to minimize suffering. Hoess takes great satisfaction in the marvel of gas chamber technology. This lessened the need for massive

his own wife out of the gas chamber. He expresses horror. And he reports that, to him in private, his SS men frequently expressed horror.

This makes it doubly astounding that Hoess and the SS people under him continued on course, carrying on in their grisly activities. If Hoess and his underlings had expressed no horror, if they expressed only ghoulish satisfaction about their activities, then one could write them off as sadists or psychopaths.⁶² One interpretation is that they experienced no horror at all. That the reports of a sense of horror are lies, manufactured to curry favor from the Allied authorities. This cannot be completely ruled out. However, if it is correct that Hoess and other SS men did experience a sense of horror, this raises far more profound questions than writing him (and other SS officials) off as mere sadists or psychopaths. From a moral standpoint, it raises the question how it is that persons may carry out, indeed enthusiastically embrace, "radical evil"⁶³ while their faculties are intact. While they are able to distinguish good from evil they engage in evil of a level that is wholly unassimilatable by ordinary canons of moral conduct.

The answer to the astounding issue, that SS people feel and express horror⁶⁴ and yet continue their ghastly deeds, seems to include (1) the honor-derived-from-obedience syndrome, already mentioned; and (2) the packaging and contextualizing of events. Let us consider each of these in turn.

(1) The Obedience Syndrome:

Hoess reports that he was always at great pains to emphasize to his staff that orders from above must be obeyed, that there could be no question of disobedience, that the existing authority system (including his own) was fully justified, that it is especially honorable to obey difficult orders, to be "hard" is good. He states:

"There was no doubt in the mind of any of us that Hitler's order had to be obeyed regardless, and that it was the duty of the SS to carry it out. Nevertheless, we were all touched by severe doubts.

I myself dared not admit such doubt. In order to make my subordinates carry on with their task, it was psychologically essential that I myself appear convinced of the necessity for this gruesomely harsh order.

Everyone watched me . . . I had to exercise self-control in order to prevent my innermost doubts and feelings of oppression from becoming apparent.

I had to appear cold and indifferent to events that must have wrung the heart of anyone possessed of human feeling. I might not even look away when afraid lest my emotions got the upper hand. I had to watch coldly, while mothers with laughing or crying children went into the gas chambers . . . I had to see everything. I had to watch hour after hour . . . the removal and burning of the bodies . . . the whole grisly, interminable business. I had to stand for hours on end in the ghastly stench, while the mass graves were being opened and the bodies dragged

day-to-day execution of policy in the face of relatively great autonomy by his underlings. And this, in turn, prevented him from controlling some of the brutality in the camp. Whether, factually, this is true is simply not known. Perhaps Hoess had subtle ways of encouraging brutality while saying to himself that he opposed brutality. At any rate, the fact that he himself appears to believe that he opposed brutality, but could not prevent it, is important.

Hoess' claim that he wished to lessen brutality at Auschwitz but was unable to do so appears absurd on its face. Surely if anyone could, he could. And yet his statements about limitations to his autonomy should not be dismissed arbitrarily. All persons in leadership positions—be they executives of business firms, high government officials or heads of prisons—have limitations in their freedom-of-action (and not only in a democratic society but in every conceivable society).⁶⁷ For example, and contrary to popular thinking, the distinguishing thing about American business executives is not that they have more autonomy than those under them. They have *different sorts* of autonomy. Executives of a business firm can make decisions, affecting the firm, which underlings cannot make. Most notably, they have autonomy to establish and set in motion company policy. By contrast, blue collar workers have virtually no autonomy in respect to establishing company policy. Indeed, they ordinarily do not participate in policy decisions. But there are areas of behavior where executives do not have autonomy and where those under them, notably blue collar workers, do have autonomy. While on the job blue collar workers can, and do, spend much time talking about their life outside the factory. But it is more than mere talk. Some forty years ago sociologists did much to illustrate this "informal culture" of the workplace, showing it to be a culturally rich and innovative system of behavior, one to which newcomers are carefully initiated and which has its own codes of behavior, and in which workers exercise considerable autonomy.⁶⁸ The informal culture may be used to restrict production and to influence the quality of work done. (In the automobile industry, thanks to the Japanese competition, workers' informal culture is now recognized to be extremely relevant to the quality of goods being produced.) Yet much of this informal culture is entirely separate from the ethos and culture of executive personnel. Indeed, executives are typically excluded entirely from this sphere of life in the factory. From this perspective Hoess' statement, that the guards under him had a great deal of autonomy, comes as no surprise.

It is also important to recognize that, in comparison to the blue collar worker, the executive's role is very broadly defined. That is, when a Vice President for Personnel takes part in a community fund raising campaign to support the community's Little League Baseball team, he remains labelled as a company official. He cannot shed that role very easily when

bloodbaths—"I always shuddered at the prospect of carrying out extermination by shooting when I thought of the vast numbers concerned,⁶² and the women and children . . . I was therefore relieved to think that we were spared all these bloodbaths and the victims would also be spared suffering until their last moment came."⁶³ This kindly method of killing would also prevent what happened during mass killing by means of shooting. "Many gruesome scenes are said to have taken place . . . Many members of the *Einsatzkommandos*, unable to endure wading through blood any longer, had committed suicide. Some had even gone mad."⁶⁴ The new form of killing, packaged in mass production technology, was infinitely preferable.

Hoess reports that members of his staff repeatedly asked him whether the mass killings were really necessary. Despite his own qualms he would reassure them that "it was done on Hitler's orders . . ." and that it was necessary to safeguard the German people. In short, the killing was packaged with high-sounding ideals and the honor derived from obeying orders. What is deliberately left out of the package are many of the values and ethical standards with which most Germans presumably grew up.

The killing and brutality was so strongly contextualized, so thoroughly separated was life at Auschwitz from other moral contexts, that it was largely immune from influence by other contexts. In addition to promoting such separation from other contexts, contextualization contributed to an escalation process whereby evil would contribute its own momentum to ever-growing evil. Maruyama⁶⁶ has described "deviation-amplifying mutual causal processes" whereby, once a deviant act has occurred, it may sow the seeds for further deviations and these, in turn, will still further amplify and continue the course of deviation, producing ever-greater deviation from existing norms. This is most likely to happen when no external countervailing forces come into play. Once begun, the momentum for generating more and more deviations may come entirely from within the system.

The career of Hoess, and life at Auschwitz altogether, contained many such processes where evil compounded evil, producing unmatched intoxication with evil. Thus, when Hoess brooked no sign of mercy this meant that the guards, under his command, would brook no mercy. And this, in turn, meant that Capos would brook no mercy. Hoess could then complain about brutality among Capos and other inmates, and justify further brutality by himself. It was a context where evil begot evil.

1. Autonomy

Much of Hoess' story emphasizes how little autonomy he had as Commandant of Auschwitz. He claims that he had little influence over the

art of cognitive denial, or one who does not understand the difference between the two worlds. This amounts to abdicating one's responsibility for trying to understand how the bucolic and the demonic modes of life could coexist—as they did, on a large scale, in much of Germany in the Nazi era.

In a sense the two worlds represent a version of army base life. There, too, families of soldiers, living in compounds adjacent to field training areas, lead a relatively mundane, family-centered life. In the morning the husband-father leaves for "work", to practice the hallowed art of killing so that he will be ready when war comes. He returns at night, as though nothing had happened, to concern himself with his wife's need for conjugal affection, his children's need for help with their school homework, and the need to do various sundry household chores.

Of course the Auschwitz context was far more extreme. In this camp one was not merely preparing to kill. Killing was every-day business. Some of it was relatively routinized. Some of it was sporadic. All of it was bestial by any standard of human morality, *even by those of the family context of the Hoess household*. But despite the difference in scope and proximity to actual killings, Auschwitz and the army camp life share a common thread. There is routinization of mortal violence in both.

The question remains, how could the demonic and the bucolic worlds coexist in the vicinity of Auschwitz? The two were in close physical proximity. So close, in fact, that participants could not be oblivious to their existence in the course of day-to-day living. What is more, some of the same persons existed and participated in both—namely, Hoess himself and some of the inmates who worked in the Hoess household as servants.

The true measure of the "separateness" of a social structure is not the physical separation from other structures or, even, the overlapping membership of individuals, who may participate in both. It is the degree of autonomy, of independence of action, that exists in each structure.⁷⁰

The Hoess household and the demonic world of the Auschwitz camp were separate contexts that had great autonomy from each other. Each, respectively, was a package of items that cohered, that mutually reinforced one another. In the Hoess household, the items included relative affluence—the freedom from shortages of food, the availability of adequate shelter and clothing—and a variety of daily familial routines, all enacted in a benign country setting. Every one of the items contributed separately to the bucolic atmosphere (from the Hoess viewpoint). But each, in turn, also benefitted from the other items. Thus, economic affluence might contribute to relatively nurturant family activities. And the nurturant family activities might, in turn, contribute to affluence by promoting cooperation, and absence of waste and dissipation of effort and resources.

Hoess, noting that he often could not escape his work role, reports that:

"If I was deeply affected by some incident, I found it impossible to go back to my family. I would mount my horse and ride, until I had chased the terrible picture away. Often, at night, I would walk through the stables and seek relief among my beloved animals.

It would often happen, when at home, that my thoughts suddenly turned to incidents that had occurred during the exterminations. I then had to go out. I could no longer bear to be in my homely [sic] family circle . . ."⁷¹

All this should not blind one to the fact that Hoess regarded his family life at Auschwitz to be exceedingly happy—a "paradise," he called it—that was only occasionally visited by the realities of his monstrous work. He attempted to keep family and work thoroughly separate. Much of the time he evidently succeeded. He and his family appeared to be able to live a life of comfortable German burgerhood. There were bucolic joys of quiet walks in the woods, not far from the electric fences and the chimneys. There were the privileges of the high executive combined with a virtual feudal lord's unlimited access to human services for personal pleasure and comfort. Paradise indeed.

The juxtaposition of the bucolic life and the demonic life is extraordinary. The two were not entirely separate. After all, Hoess lived and operated in both. His family received goods and human services from the camp. But the two were able to maintain considerable autonomy from one another. They were two distinctive contexts. They were utterly different in moral tone and behavior content. Evidently, for example, there was no brutality—certainly no physical brutality—in the Hoess household. There appeared to be a measure of German familial kindness, emanating especially from Mrs. Hoess. This was bestowed on family members as well as on camp inmates who worked in the Hoess household. The Hoess household, with its children at play, its wife-and-mother devoted to household maintenance, its docile servants (drawn from the camp inmate population) represented some measure of tranquility and "ordinary" German family life for the Hoesses. Despite Rudolf Hoess' complaint of occasional intrusion of his camp experiences when he went home, his family enjoyed considerable insulation from the camp's mode of life as it maintained a substantially autonomous way of life. Here Hoess, the head-of-household, evidently exhibited none of the cold and limitless severity that was so typical of his behavior in the camp.

Hoess personifies not only the reality of both modes of life. He also personifies, *in extremis*, man's capacity to coexist in two such worlds. The easiest thing would be to dismiss Hoess, the individual, as some peculiar psychopath who can operate in two such worlds by being a master of the

modern political and industrial bureaucracies. This paper has focused on the bureaucratic processes involved by concentrating on three facets of their operation: (1) The nature of *incremental* career decision-making and personal participation in bureaucracies, particularly by Nazi functionaries; (2) The *packaging* of diverse political programs into one cohesive entity, particularly the packaging of the Nazi programs; (3) The *autonomy*, in the sense of discretionary behavior, of bureaucrats, particularly the autonomy enjoyed by Nazi functionaries. Each is integral to the process as a whole.

Part II of the paper has presented a case study of Rudolf Hoess, the Commandant of Auschwitz. Hoess presents us with a paradigm of how bureaucratic mechanisms can effectively nurture demonic actions and, at the same time, cordon off these actions from the remainder of one's life. The mechanisms are so effective that Hoess (and others like him) is able, for example, to maintain a semblance of normal family life while engaging in unparalleled atrocities. In an extreme form this represents a micro-cosmic picture of what happened in Germany at large.

Above all, the sociological lesson to be learned from a study of Hoess and his SS colleagues is how evil can be *routinized*. For they show us how "ordinary" human behavior can be harnessed in the service of "extraordinary," and monstrous, objectives.

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NOTES

1. L. Dawidowicz, *The Holocaust and the Historians* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1981).
2. B. M. Dank, Review of "On the Edge of Destruction," in *Contemporary Sociology*, 8, 1 (1979), p. 129.
3. H. Fein, *Accounting for Genocide* (New York, 1979).
4. I. L. Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power* (New Brunswick, [N.J.], 1980).
5. For example, S. M. Lipset and E. Raab, *The Politics of Unreason* (Chicago, 1978); G. J. Selznick and S. Steinberg, *The Tenacity of Prejudice* (New York, 1969); C. Y. Glock and R. Stark, *Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism* (New York, 1973); W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York, 1959).
6. M. Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. T. Parsons (New York, 1947); R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York, 1968); H. C. Kellman, "Violence Without Moral Restraint," *Journal of Social Issues* 29, 4 (1973), pp. 25-61; M. Silver and D. Geller, "On the Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and Individual Action," *Journal of Social Issues*, 33, 4 (1978), pp. 2561.
7. S. Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York, 1974).
8. R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York, 1968).
9. M. Silver and D. Geller, *op. cit.*; H. C. Kellman, *op. cit.*

In the camp, the package included the various interrelated items in the cycle of violence—the starvation diet, the supremely arbitrary power over inmate life, and the deliberate administrative brutalities. These items, too, contributed independently to the totality of violence. And, in turn, each item was influenced by the separate contribution of other items. Thus, the starvation diet contributed its own measure of misery to the inmates, namely to proclivity to illness and death. It also augmented administrative brutality by debilitating the victims, lowering their capacity to resist or evade brutal measures. In turn, the administrative brutalities, even when they did not directly include depriving inmates of food, contributed to inmates' susceptibility to starvation. Sometimes, indeed, starvation was embraced as the lesser evil.

Each context was not merely a package of different items. Each was a composite package where the mutual reinforcement of the component parts contributed to autonomy of that context from the other context. The Hoess household and the Auschwitz camp contained self-sustaining components that fed one another, that escalated and reinforced each world's autonomous identity, that contributed to each world's separateness from the other world, even when that other world was physically adjacent.

In addition to this, Hoess himself made every effort to safeguard the autonomy of the camp and the autonomy of his home, protecting and separating each from the other. When, while at home, thoughts about the day's executions troubled him, he would go for a solitary walk or ride one of his horses. He would not discuss the problem with his wife. He actively sought to preserve the autonomy—the freedom to act independently—of each context. He appears to have succeeded to a considerable extent. In doing so he helped nurture the separation, the coexistence and the routinization of a demonic and a bucolic world.

Doubtless the life of Hoess contains aspects that are unique and idiosyncratic to Hoess, the individual. I have deliberately not dealt with these. Instead, I have concentrated on using the life of Hoess illustratively. This suggests how drastically different worlds could coexist: how a measure of human concern for others might exist alongside unparallelled evil; how common forms of adaptation to one's place of work and career can be harnessed to the service of limitless savagery; and how both could contribute to the routinization of monstrous behavior.

CONCLUSION

The Holocaust remains abhorrent, but it need not remain a mystery. Much of the Holocaust can be seen as a by-product of modern bureaucratization.⁷¹ Indeed, much of it relied upon the sort of orderliness found in

sentenced to death. There is no indication that Hoess believed the autobiography might possibly serve to exonerate him. There is no indication, furthermore, that he deliberately tried to introduce falsification. This does not mean that the autobiography does not, in fact, include falsifications.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*

38. One is reminded of British prisoners in a Japanese prisoner of war camp during the Second World War, fictionalized in: Pierre Boulle, *The Bridge on the River Kwai* (Transl. X. Fielding), (London, 1961). The ranking British officer zealously organized building a bridge for the Japanese, despite hardships and danger, and despite hatred for the Japanese. In the grandest British tradition, if a task has to be done, it is going to be done well. There is honor to be derived in giving the Japanese a taste of British character and moral superiority, even if it means contributing to the enemy's cause. One does it without commitment to the cause of the enemy. One does it from a commitment to performing one's current role honorably. Through this one is contributing to the honor of being British.

An individual Briton might currently be imprisoned. But even here, by exemplary adherence to the British value of doing one's tasks superbly well, and accepting the discipline that necessarily goes with it, one can hold one's head high, knowing that one is contributing to the British tradition.

39. R. Hoess, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

44. This illustrates the theoretical model which suggests that a person may be attached to one part of a package and, yet, be implicated in carrying out the entire package. However, given Hoess' early history of involvement in the Nazi movement, it is doubtful whether he did not also share a great deal of the Nazi ideology and, therefore, commitment to most items in the Nazi package of programs.

45. R. Hoess, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.

46. F. E. Katz, 1968, *op. cit.*

47. R. Hoess, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

50. This has been called the *rider phenomenon*—where aspects of one event become an ingredient of other events, even if the events are widely separated in time or space. See, F. E. Katz, "Social Participation and Social Structure," *Social Forces* (1966). Freud laid the groundwork for this by his insight that aspects of early childhood events can intrude into the lives of adults.

51. R. Hoess, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

53. Some SS men actually did express ghoulish sentiments in the course of their heinous work.

54. K. R. Seeskin, "The Reality of Radical Evil," *Judaism*, 29, 4 (Fall, 1980), pp. 440-453.

10. F. E. Katz, "Implementation of the Holocaust: The Behavior of Nazi Officials," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, 3 (July, 1982).

11. H. Ashkenazy, *Are We All Nazis?* (Secaucus [N.Y.], 1978).

12. Y. Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* (Seattle, 1978).

13. L. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews, 1939-1945*, (New York, 1975); R. Hilberg, *The Destruction of European Jews* (Chicago, 1961).

14. K. A. Schleunes, *The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews, 1933-1939* (Urbana [Ill.], 1970).

15. F. E. Katz and H. Martin, "Career Choice Processes," *Social Forces*, 41 (1962), pp. 149-153.

16. F. E. Katz, *Autonomy and Organization: The Limits of Social Control* (New York, 1968), Part II.

17. H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York, 1976); H. Dicks, *Licensed Murder: A Socio-Psychological Study of Some S.S. Killers* (New York, 1972); P. H. Merkl, *Political Violence Under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis* (Princeton [N.J.], 1975).

18. Lucy Dawidowicz, *The Holocaust and the Historians* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), p. 45; Georg Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought From Herder to the Present* (Middletown [Conn.], 1968).

19. H. Dicks, *op. cit.*; E. Crankshaw, *Gestapo* (Moonachie [N.J.], 1977).

20. L. Dawidowicz, 1975, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

21. H. W. Koch, *The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development, 1922-1945* (New York, 1975).

22. R. Hilberg, *op. cit.*; H. Arendt, *op. cit.*

23. The mechanism of *contextualization* seems to be basic to explaining Milgram's well-known findings. (Milgram, *op. cit.*, 1974) Milgram found that persons were willing to inflict serious pain on innocent persons when requested to do so in a laboratory situation. Here was a context in which the canons of supposedly pure science prevailed, shutting out other, countervailing contexts.

24. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (trans. and edd.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1958).

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-7.

26. P. M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago, 1955); F. E. Katz, 1968, *op. cit.*

27. Cf., A. Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York, 1970).

28. E. Crankshaw, 1977, *op. cit.*

29. M. Pearlman, *The Capture and Trial of Adolf Eichmann* (New York, 1963), pp. 401ff.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 404.

31. H. Arendt, *op. cit.*; M. Pearlman, *Ibid.*

32. M. Pearlman, *Ibid.*, pp. 195, 353, 366-67.

33. R. Hoess, *Commandant of Auschwitz* (New York, 1959), p. 24.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 17; Much of the following discussion is based on Hoess' autobiography, written during his period of incarceration before his execution in April, 1947. One might question the veracity of Hoess' descriptions, the possibly self-serving biases, and efforts to rationalize his actions in order to gain favor from his captors (See, Introduction to Hoess, *Ibid.*, 1959). Yet, given Hoess' ready acknowledgement of his guilt, there was no question that he knew that he would be

55. And perhaps blame the victims for having such feelings!
56. R. Hoess, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-171.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 242-3.
60. In respect to sexual behavior, there is indication that Hoess did not practice what he preached. When his mistress became pregnant he had her killed, doing so in a particularly brutal way.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
62. This contrasts somewhat with Hoess' claim that when he was first instructed to develop the extermination program, he had little conception of its scale, of the "vast number" of persons to be killed.
63. R. Hoess, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
66. Magaroh Maruyama, "The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes" in Fred E. Katz (Ed.) *Contemporary Sociological Theory* (New York, 1971).
67. F. E. Katz, 1968, *op. cit.*, and 1976, *op. cit.*
68. Donald Roy, "'Banana Time' Job Satisfaction and Informal Interaction," *Human Organization* 18 (1960), pp. 158-168.
69. R. Hoess, *op. cit.*, p. 172.
70. Fred E. Katz, *Structuralism in Sociology* (Albany, 1976), Chapter 3.
71. R. L. Rubenstein, *The Cunning of History* (New York, 1978).

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Implementation of the Holocaust: The Behavior of Nazi Officials

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Historical research has supplied extensive information about the stark facts of the Holocaust. It includes efforts both to document the full extent of the horror and to maintain a degree of objectivity and avoid undue sentimentality (Bauer 1978). The historical work includes, and goes beyond, chronicling the details of the murderous events. It points up unresolved—and possibly unresolvable—questions, such as the nature of the involvement and responsibility of European Christians. That issue involves, at one end, the accusation that Pope Pius XII was, at the very least, inactive in the face of a supreme moral challenge (Falconi 1970). At another end, it involves acknowledgement of extensive efforts by Christians to protect Jews, at considerable risk to themselves (Friedman 1980; Flender 1963).

Above all, the historical research illuminates not only the extreme brutality but the immense scope of the killings and the highly complex administrative processes that were needed in order to accomplish so vast an enterprise as the effort to exterminate millions of people (Hilberg 1967; Dawidowicz 1975; Shirer 1960). Vast material and human resources had to be harnessed. To a great extent the existing administrative structure of the German nation was utilized to accomplish the genocide. Utilized, too, were ideological antecedents to Nazism, such as the *Urvolk* theme, and a highly systematized indoctrination of the young (Koch 1975).

The administrative processes through which a nation enacts a program of genocide contain many sociological facets. Some of these are now beginning to be addressed. Horowitz (1976, 1980) has suggested that one needs to classify and analyze whole societies on the basis of whether they are acquiescent to genocidal practices—“whether and to what degree [a society] permits the official and arbitrary termination of lives of its citizenry” (1976:31).

Fein (1979) has examined how the different German-occupied countries

responded to Nazi pressure to enact extermination policies against their Jewish populations. The countries varied greatly in the extent of their collaboration and in the resultant execution of the Nazi policies of extermination. Fein's theory is that this is due to the fact that the countries themselves differed in the following ways: (1) The degree of German control. Where there was lack of resistance to the Germans, where there was much cooperation with the Germans, victimization of Jews was extensive. (2) The degree of social solidarity in the country before the war. If, before the German invasion, there was strong solidarity, with Jews being included, there was little victimization of Jews after the German occupation. (3) The extent to which Jews had been included in a common "universe of obligations" before the war. Where such inclusion of Jews was the general rule, there was little victimization during the German occupation. Fein, like Horowitz, is emphasizing the bearing of a nation's social structure upon genocidal actions.

Wytwycky (1980) dwells on the fact that the Nazis conducted extensive extermination programs against a variety of peoples, not just against Jews. Gypsies, Poles, Belorussians, and Ukrainians suffered on the order of ten million killed through genocide, aside from those who died in military actions of the war. Wytwycky's work shows that the *method* of genocide—routine and efficient—was highly exportable. It was applied to different peoples, in different geographic regions. Sociologically, this fact demands that one seek explanations of genocide beyond that supplied by the unique circumstances of the Jews. Hence the present paper, although it concentrates on the genocidal persecution of Jews, attempts to raise sociological considerations that may be extended beyond the fate of the Jews.

There exists even today a relatively small body of sociological research on the Holocaust. Indeed, it has been said that "there is in essence no American sociological literature on the Holocaust" (Dank 1979:129). The shortage may be due to the fact that when it comes to explaining extraordinary events social scientists operate under a severe handicap. As scientists we are inclined to look to the ordinary in order to explain the extraordinary. This means accepting the possibility that routine and mundane behavior can produce morally monstrous behavior, and that "extremist movements are not primarily the product of extremists" (Lipset and Raab 1978).

Looking to the ordinary to explain the extraordinary is inherent in the paradigms of the scientist. But these paradigms can become highly suspect, even repugnant, to the public when addressed to events seen as morally outrageous and uniquely abhorrent. For many who suffered in the Holocaust or whose kinsfolk were victims, the Holocaust is an evil that is utterly unique. For them, focus on the "ordinary" cannot do justice to the Holocaust. Insights of the routine, the mundane, cannot compare with insights of the poet, such as Nellie Sachs, or the novelist, such as Elie Wiesel, or the numerous

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The literature on social movements, particularly that on extremist movements, has moved from focus on a specific mind-set and other personal characteristics of a movement's adherents to focus on conditions in the social structure that have generated social movements. The social structure can produce conditions of considerable strain, which is fertile ground for extremist movements. This can happen when social conditions produce dislocated and dispossessed individuals who then become candidates for recruitment into extremist movements (Kornhauser 1959). Or, there may be relatively specific strains that are endemic to existing social structures and which also nourish the development of extremist movements (Lipset and Raab 1978).

Both of these explanations are essentially "theories of mobilization" (Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Zald 1979), that is, they elucidate how movements are generated and how they subsequently organize resources for achieving certain objectives. It has also been shown that existing conditions in the social structure influence the direction of social movements—whether, for example, such movements will be of the extreme right or extreme left—and the sorts of options that will be entertained within movements (Lipset and Raab 1978; Tilly 1964, 1978).

Operating in the tradition of Durkheim, the sociological scholarship has emphasized the importance of "social" factors. That is, much of what goes on in social movements is to be understood in terms of conditions outside of individual persons. There are *social* strains and dislocations, and *social* institutions can foster movements. These have input into the behavior of individuals who participate in social movements.

Nonetheless there is a crucial insight in that earlier perspective which focussed on the person, one that must not be ignored. It is that *individual persons* carry out the programs of social movements. This is the case even in mass societies, where it is easy to lose track of the contributions of individuals. It is also the case in authoritarian societies, where leaders have overwhelming power. There, too, individual persons implement the programs.

How, then, are individuals immersed in movements, especially in extremist movements that may demand violent behavior? How, in the course of mobilization, do individuals become linked to a movement? How do they participate after they are immersed in the movement? How do they manage to carry out violent programs, especially when these programs conflict with some aspects of their own upbringing? To these questions the present study addresses itself.

ROUTINIZATION OF BEHAVIOR

Max Weber's work on bureaucracy remains the central bench mark for any study of routinization. He emphasized routinization of behavior in the

autobiographical reports that dwell on the uniqueness, the incomparability of the Holocaust to any other event.¹ There obviously is need for a reconciliation between two realms, that of the social scientist sifting the ordinary for clues to the extraordinary, and that of the morally outraged human being.

This essay tries to contribute to a reconciliation by a twofold approach. On the one hand, it attempts to develop scientific explanations; on the other, it attempts to link these explanations to the perceptions of laymen, where the monstrous nature of the Holocaust is only too real. Practically, this means taking "monster" perceptions seriously. Conceptually, it means trying to understand how exceptionally violent behavior can be practiced routinely and can, in fact, be incorporated into the day-to-day workings of a bureaucratic apparatus. Processes that produce this result—the routinization and bureaucratization of extremely violent behavior—are the focus of this study. Stated differently, we seek to discover what patterns of social structure and what patterns of personal immersion in a social situation serve to implement the program of an extremist movement.

Many analysts have recognized that bureaucracies have a potential for operating with moral blinders (Weber 1947, 1958; Merton 1968; Moore 1978; Kellman 1973; Silver and Geller 1978; Antonio 1979). The bureaucrat's focus on a particular task and particular work context can be accompanied by moral myopia. Considerations that go beyond the immediate task are apt to be ignored. Thus, in coping with problems of transporting Jews and Gypsies to extermination camps, or of the efficient use of wartime slave labor in munitions factories in the German Ruhr, the morality of killing people is obscured because it is beyond the particular bureaucrat's range of responsibility. In trying to comprehend this phenomenon, one needs to bear in mind that there was also a deliberate political campaign against the victims. They were portrayed as outcasts, as a species of lesser human, as vermin (Fein 1978). Doubtless this may have contributed to the bureaucrat's moral myopia as well as to the willingness to adopt extraordinarily cruel methods of killing. But one also needs to analyze the process of implementation, the process which carried out the political campaign, the process which acted upon the less-than-human presumption to annihilate people en masse.

Research on social movements and on routinization offers leads. It also offers indications of where the gaps in knowledge lie, and where further conceptualization is needed.

¹ Sociologists (and historians) are also aware of the strong disagreement aroused by Hannah Arendt (1968, 1976). She pointed to the ordinariness, the "banality" of evil in the life of Eichmann. Part of the disagreement with her work arose because of her theme that the victims contributed heavily to their own demise. That theme is certainly questionable, given both the actual Jewish resistance that occurred (and not only in the Warsaw ghetto) and the overwhelming nature of the assault on the victims.

definite controls, but definite sectors of autonomy. This theme is central to the following discussion.

Before turning to some characteristics of Nazism that seem to promote routinization of violent behavior it is necessary to insert a note about anti-Semitism. The focus here on the bureaucratization of extremely violent behavior does not mean to imply that the middle-level bureaucrats, the subjects of this study, were not anti-Semitic and filled with hatred for Jews. It is plausible to assume that many were indeed deeply anti-Semitic. But the theme of this study is that one can account for a great deal of extremely violent anti-Semitic behavior without a basis in personal hatred for the Jews. It is assumed that a particular form of behavior, such as the killing of Jews, may derive from a wide range of motives, not necessarily those of hatred. This does not absolve Nazi officials from culpability for their deeds. And it does not accept the view that the individuals were merely following orders, that they had no choice but to execute orders that came from above. Instead, it is postulated that in their roles as bureaucrats these officials had a significant amount of autonomy. They exercised considerable discretion in the course of their murderous activities.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NAZISM: INCREMENTAL PROCESSES

There is every indication that the Nazis had no clearly worked out plans for the extermination of the Jews before the party came to power in 1933 (Bauer 1978). The extermination evolved in a step-by-step incremental manner.

After the Nazi ascent in 1933, a progression of repressive laws against Jews was passed. These laws deprived Jews of an increasingly large number of rights, with each law more severe than its predecessor. Every new law was an increment in a cumulative process that culminated in Jews being deprived of virtually all rights of citizenship.

For example, on 23 July 1938, a decree was issued that ordered all Jews to apply for identification cards, to be carried at all times (Dawidowicz 1975). A law passed on 17 August 1938 ordered Jews to adopt, as of 1 January 1939, particular Hebrew-sounding names (Sarah for women, Abraham for men). Such steps would serve to identify Jews readily when it came time to round them up for transport to the death camps. But since the steps were taken legally, they could serve to coopt, in an incremental manner, the legal machinery of the state.

The gradual curtailment of rights eventually terminated virtually all Jewish rights of citizenship. This, in turn, was a crucial step toward the 1942 secret order directing the physical annihilation of all Jews in German-occupied territories (Schleunes 1970). The piecemeal nature of the legislative sequence deceived many, even many of the victims, into believing that the actual killing of Jews was unlikely to happen (Schleunes 1970). The series of ever more repressive laws generated a course of action so extreme that it might have

bureaucratic context. He pointed out bureaucratic conditions that are conducive to harnessing human resources. Bureaucracies coordinate the skills of diverse specialists and functionaries in the pursuit of goals that are subdivided into limited discrete tasks. Weber left a legacy of looking at such routinization both microscopically, within the confines of specific organizational settings, and macroscopically, as a part of the values and institutional order of a society. Both are clearly recognized by sociologists studying social organization and social psychologists studying sanctioned massacres and other organized violence (Parsons 1949; Williams 1970; Smelser 1963; Lipset 1963; Kellman 1973).

The microscopic legacy has led to the realization that individuals can be submerged in the context of organizations. The individual bureaucrat is apt to attach his morality to the discharge of assigned duties and not to the choice of ends (Milgram 1974). Means, rather than ends, dominate the bureaucrat's thinking and action (Merton 1968). An organization's objectives may be so fractionated into component parts that the end state is obscured, and that the question of performing good or evil deeds becomes irrelevant (Silver and Geller 1978). The individual working in a bureaucracy may simply not apply these kinds of judgments to his or her own activities. As Kellman (1973) noted, the capacity to be aware of evil in one's behavior is influenced by one's integration into a system of norms. And systems of norms are translated into concrete behavior arrangements—in one's work, in one's family, in one's community. In all of these one may, in Kellman's sense, become unaware of one's own evil behavior.

Etzioni developed an important modification of Weber's formulation in regard to routinization. He worked out a scheme for clarifying *compliance* in bureaucratic and other settings. This augments Weber's rather exclusive emphasis on control and authority, and concentrates on those who are subject to control, on followers rather than leaders, on middle and lower echelons rather than top echelons (Etzioni 1961). Etzioni postulates three different sorts of compliance patterns—alienative, calculative, and normative—that are found in different sorts of social settings. Katz has suggested that each form of compliance also includes a characteristic form of autonomy, or discretionary activity (Katz 1968, 1976). The uses of autonomy are crucial to the functioning and survival of any social organization. This perspective will be applied to the behavior of Nazi functionaries.

Blau (1955) demonstrated that routinization of bureaucratic activities does not preclude innovative activities. He showed that, on the contrary, bureaucratic functionaries (social workers, in this case) do innovate as a matter of course. The routine performance of their tasks includes, of necessity, a considerable amount of innovative activities. Yet these activities do not necessarily destroy the over-all orderly, bureaucratic setting in which they exist. Indeed, they can help sustain it. Routinization, one may conclude, includes not only

activity was pursued with the view to furthering his personal career, rather than with an ideological commitment to hating Jews. His career was carried out in the context of the Nazi state machinery. To live effectively, for Eichmann, meant contributing to that machinery.

Incremental processes are very common. On the American national scene, for example, we find a great deal of ad hoc action in national policy making, in steering the economy, in carrying out reforms of welfare systems, in reorganizing bureaucratic procedures, in adapting to international pressures. Ad hoc activity means, in each case, that one adapts to pressures by trying to find immediate, stopgap answers. One makes specific and direct responses to immediate issues, rather than developing long-term plans and carrying these out systematically. (I am not saying that ad hoc action is intrinsically bad or good. Ad hoc action can scarcely be avoided in a nation based on pluralistic politics at home, where pressure groups are easily mobilized, and on complex international alliances abroad, where coexistence with some strange bedfellows is a necessity.)

It is not only the Eichmanns who develop their careers incrementally. In a study I did some years ago, it was evident that persons can enter into an occupational career by a series of localized, immediate decisions, and without any explicit commitment to that occupation at all (Katz and Martin 1962). For example, one may enter a nursing school because one's closest friend is attending that school, and for no other reason. One may continue in nursing school because it would be costly to drop out and start afresh in another occupation. One may then continue on and enter nursing as a profession. In this sequence there need be no special commitment to nursing. Yet a career in nursing is the result. And there is no evidence to suggest that such noncommitted nurses cannot carry out their profession fully, that they cannot be full-fledged, dedicated nurses.

Nurses are not unique in this respect. In every occupation there are likely to be persons who enter the profession by this same unplanned route. They incrementally carry out activities that lead to that particular occupation. They make decisions on an ad hoc basis, without ever having committed themselves to be in that occupation.

It is often assumed that a person who goes through lengthy occupational training is bound to pick up a commitment to that occupation during that course of training if a definite commitment to the occupation did not already exist beforehand. But this assumption should be regarded with skepticism. There are indications that persons can fully engage in an occupation without commitment to its core features. A particular teacher may not be committed to teaching, and yet be engaged in teaching.² Or a particular physician may not

² Sylvia Ashton Warner, a greatly honored teacher, reports in her autobiography that she had not real commitment to teaching and that she did not enjoy teaching (1979). However, one illustrative example, such as this, tells us nothing about the prevalence of this circumstance.

proven unacceptable to the German people—and perhaps impossible to carry out—if it had been attempted in one single action, without the incremental build-up.

In a well-known series of experimental situations, Milgram (1974) showed that people who are asked to follow instructions tend to do so, even if the instructions are to hurt cruelly an innocent person. They do this although the behavior may conflict with their own broader values.

The participants in the Milgram experiments were asked to take part in a scientific experiment. It may be argued that their compliance with the instructions was a way of expressing their respect for a countervalue, namely the value of scientific research. But why accept this value when it is believed to hurt innocent people in *this* situation? Why could the value of scientific research here supercede humane values prohibiting the injury of innocent people? Presumably these participants would not deliberately hurt innocent people in other situations.

An explanation of the apparent paradox may be that people are able to separate behavior in a particular situation in which they may find themselves from behavior in other situations. It is a way of solving *immediate* problems—by accepting the regimen of the present situation—while giving little attention to broader issues (Silver and Geller 1978), or to long-term consequences. Here persons solve problems one at a time, dealing with what confronts them right now. Stated differently, immediate situations in which individuals find themselves can serve as catalysts for activating some values while deactivating others.

The restriction of behavioral focus to the immediate situation can have very unexpected consequences. The behavior can become the increments in a cumulative process that has truly monstrous properties. Documented life histories of a number of the Nazi SS officials demonstrate this. Hannah Arendt's study of Adolf Eichman (1976), the study of SS officers by the British psychiatrist Henry Dicks (1972), and the analysis of 581 biographies of early Nazis by Peter Merkl (1975), bear out the gradual nature of their becoming immersed in the Nazi programs. For example, the young Eichmann, following failures in education and work, was about to join an organization of youths dedicated to pranks and totally unpolitical recreational activities, when a friend asked him to join the Nazi party instead (Arendt 1976). Eichmann did join, but he evidently did so without commitment to, or even real knowledge of, the movement's ideology (Arendt 1976). He advanced in the movement in a step-by-step sequence while retaining reservations about the murder of Jews. He had some Jewish relatives. He claimed, perhaps with sincerity, to retain loyalty to these persons. He even proposed different solutions to the "Jewish question"—notably, that European Jews resettle in Madagascar.

But all this did not keep Eichmann from complete adherence to the Nazi program of destroying the Jews. That adherence meant his becoming a highly significant and even innovative functionary in the mass murders. Much of his

recapture all the land that Germany had had to give up as the result of World War I), ethnicism (including the romantic master race theme), and economic development (including new career possibilities for many who had suffered in the crash of the 1920s). All these components tended to be extensions of older, existing German values that were then being sanctified and reformulated. The ideology of German nationalism, for example, was built upon Herder's (1744-1803) concept of *Volk*. In its early versions, *Volk* referred to an organic, natural family, in contrast to the artificiality of the nation state (Koch 1975:5ff.). It was subsequently reinterpreted by the philosopher Fichte, to point to unique German individuality. Nazi ideologists gave it added meanings, particularly those of the romanticism and superiority of the German master race. These were used extensively in the indoctrination of children in the Hitler youth groups (Koch 1975).

Those persons who became leading figures among the Nazis were evidently attracted to different items in the Nazi package. It is likely that Julius Streicher, with his history of hatred for Jews, was heavily and primarily attracted by the movement's anti-Semitism (Crankshaw 1977). Eichmann was probably attracted by, and committed to, its bureaucratic career possibilities. Hermann Goering was apparently also attracted to its career possibilities, but on a higher level of seeking personal aggrandizement and power (Arendt 1968). All of them are likely to have seen at least one feature in the Nazi movement that offered links to something important in their own lives. Tilly (1964, 1978), Oberschall (1973), Zald and Ash (1966), and Zald (1979) have shown that social movements recruit not only drifters and the unattached; they also attract people with definite social interests and links, to which the movement caters.

Fanatical anti-Semitism was part of the Nazi package. It was linked to a number of existing and past components of German national life. Dawidowicz (1975:220) writes:

Layer upon layer of anti-Semitism of all kinds—Christian church teachings about Jesus, Volkist anti-Semitism, doctrines of racial superiority, economic theories about the role of Jews in capitalism and commerce, and a half century of political anti-Semitism—were joined with the solder of German nationalism. . . .

Doubtless many a person was attracted to Nazism because of its anti-Semitism, although the proportion of Nazis that fall into this category is not known. In addition, it is very likely that Nazism converted many members to anti-Semitism after they joined the Nazi party. A third category consists of those who joined the Nazi party and actively participated in anti-Semitism but who nonetheless may not have had a personal commitment to anti-Semitism. Indeed, *anti-Semitic actions could be carried out, with great zeal and persistence, by persons who may not have had a personal commitment to anti-Semitism*. Their commitment was to some other components of the Nazi package and to the acceptance of the total Nazi package. It is conceivable that

be committed to healing, and yet be engaged in healing.³ Each may have come to the occupation via an incremental process whereby the commitment to the core feature is minimal, at best. The real commitment may be, for instance, to careerism. And the career will, in turn, be embedded in a social context.

Eichmann and Heinrich Himmler, chief of the SS, represent extreme careerists. Both occasionally expressed misgivings about their murderous work. But this did not keep them from enthusiastically and inventively continuing in it. Himmler, while noting the horror involved in carrying out mass murders, proposed that SS members should not say, "What horrible things am I doing!" On the contrary, they should say, "What horrible things do I have to witness while carrying out my sacred duty!" (Dicks 1972; Crankshaw 1977). The emphasis is on the great contribution one is making to the sacred cause, to the immediate social context of which one is a part, especially by doing things that may be personally obnoxious.

Incremental processes lend themselves well to the practice of deception. They were so used by the Nazis at every step to obscure the direction toward mass murder (Dawidowicz 1975:202). Deception even occurred at the decisive conference on 20 January 1942, where the mass killing of Jews was specifically decided upon and the methods chosen for carrying this out (Hilberg 1967:102ff.). Deception also occurred in the transportation of Jews to the extermination camps. For example, the victims had to pay a fare for the train trip to their "relocation" (Hilberg 1967:114).

The individual increments—the acts of individuals inventing and executing ever more efficient forms of murder—are components of personal careers that are embedded in a social context. That context is, itself, a composite package that needs to be understood.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NAZISM: PACKAGED BEHAVIOR

Nazism was a package, a composite of very diverse programs.⁴ This package included extreme anti-Semitism, strong nationalism (including the hope to

³ A study of surgeons reports that some surgeons have little commitment to surgery, but continue to perform it (P. Katz, n.d.).

⁴ The notion of a package, a composite of linked items that form one whole, bears similarity to Gestalt psychology. The Gestaltists, too, emphasized the "wholistic" unity of a setting, as against discrete and separate component parts of that setting. But the Gestaltists concentrated almost entirely on the psychology of perception, on how people perceive a situation. They did not dwell on the social organization of behavior that may accompany the Gestalt phenomena. In the present essay, by contrast, the social organization of behavior is the central concern.

The idea of a package is also similar to the anthropologist's conceptions of culture configurations and culture complexes. By these constructs anthropologists emphasize the diversity of items manifested within cultures. But the manner and degree of amalgamation of the diverse items within a culture configuration or complex are usually taken as given, not subjects to be empirically investigated and conceptualized in a theory. The present study, however, seeks to examine the manner in which the diverse parts are amalgamated and, at the same time, the manner in which those parts retain a degree of separateness.

unhappiness about the decision to annihilate the Jews, but he displayed the greatest zeal in its implementation. He was accepting the entire Nazi package of programs.

A variant of this pattern was exhibited by Rudolf Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz, under whose command millions of Jews were murdered. In his diary, Hoess (1959) completely accepts the "need" to annihilate the Jews. He does so because he accepts the ideology that Jews were the ultimate enemies of Germany. Yet Hoess was able to maintain, to himself at least, that he did not hate Jews and that he was appalled by some of the cruelty exhibited by the guards under his command. In this situation, one component—namely, a particular ideology—so dominates that other components are largely ignored. Here, too, the entire package is accepted, even those components that are distasteful.

The acceptance of an entire package while having reservations about some of its components is a paradox. Yet it is a common enough paradox. In the daily execution of their occupations, individuals may be highly committed to some aspect of the work and not at all committed to other aspects. Nonetheless, they carry on with their jobs, including enactment of those aspects to which they are not committed. The individual's real commitment is very likely to be one or another item among the total number of items that constitute the occupation's total package of behavior. And yet the total package of behavior is being carried out.

Behavior packages can change. Individual items from one package can recombine with items from another package to form a new package. In a presently continuing study of social movements it is becoming evident that packages can indeed be changed (F. E. Katz, n.d.). Packages can be undone and the constituent behavior "repackaged." For example, in the 1930s followers of Father Charles E. Coughlin were involved in his package of populism and advocacy of fairly radical economic reforms, increasingly severe anti-Semitism, and political leaning toward the fascistic regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. But as the United States came to be drawn into ever firmer alliance with the enemies of Mussolini and Hitler, the Coughlin package became increasingly unacceptable to many of Coughlin's followers. That is, Coughlin's package contained one item—friendship toward Mussolini and Hitler—that came into ever sharper conflict with the official national policy of the United States. As war approached, a rival package emerged in full bloom. It was highlighted by loyalty to the country in time of emergency—as against supporting a potential enemy. The new package contained the components of military service, active economic and military help for America's European allies, considerable reorganization of the national economy, internment of persons of Japanese descent, and much more. This package was composed of some of the same items as Coughlin's package, such as nationalism, but they were assembled differently. That is, they were placed in conjunction with

deeds of noncommitted anti-Semites—those who were committed to, say, bureaucratic efficiency—may have been more pernicious than those of the committed anti-Semite.

For example, there is some indication that Eichmann had no pronounced hatred for Jews when he joined the Nazi party (Arendt 1976). Eichmann claimed that he was not anti-Semitic. Toward the end of his life he stated: "An anti-Semite I never was—no!" (Hilberg 1967:106). It is by no means certain that his claim, as he understood it, was false. If one believes Eichmann's denial of anti-Semitism, one is not thereby absolving him of responsibility for his behavior. This is discussed in the next section.

A belief that Eichmann's assertion may be true impels one to draw some powerful sociological conclusions about the nature of Nazism and, for that matter, about participation in other extremist movements. They include the possibility that people can be thoroughgoing participants in a program of action to which they do not wholly subscribe, and that people can be indifferent or opposed to some components of a movement's program, components in which they are actually engaged but for which their scruples are held in abeyance. Anyone who has served in an army knows that this is not a far-fetched idea. Soldiers routinely disregard moral assessments of many aspects of their task of killing enemies. One should not be misled by the revulsion against killing that emerged among many soldiers in the Vietnam war. This was the exception rather than the rule. Usually military killings are carried out relatively unquestioningly. The soldier's moral commitment against killing ordinarily remains intact for nonmilitary contexts, that is, for the context of the civilian life package. While adhering to the total set of components of the package of military service, the soldier may retain scruples against killing, but they will be held in abeyance. In short, participation in killing does not necessarily mean a commitment to killing itself; people can be enthusiastic participants in programs to which they do not wholly subscribe.

The unquestioning participation in mass killing was particularly likely when the killing was routinized, as it was in the gas chamber operations. When the method of killing was not routinized, the participants were very likely to express revulsion.⁵ This took place when German soldiers, stationed behind the Russian front lines in 1941, were ordered to kill civilians and prisoners indiscriminately.

In the course of his career as an SS officer, Eichmann evidently did not have great personal commitment to every item of behavior in the SS package of behavior. And this was true for other SS officers (Dicks 1972). Eichmann expressed fairly explicit reservations for some items (Arendt 1976). But nevertheless he, and the other SS officers, carried them all out. He expressed

⁵ Here, and in a number of other parts of this essay, I am greatly indebted to an anonymous reviewer of the previous draft.

was successful even during the latter part of the war when there was a severe strain on the German railroad system. At that point he made special trips to plead with this or that official who had insisted on using the trains to transport troops. His persistence even meant by-passing some of his own superiors. Indeed, at one point toward the end of the war, Himmler, who was Eichmann's over-all superior official as head of the SS, ordered Eichmann to stop the transportation of Jews to the death camps. (Himmler had not suddenly become a humanitarian. He was concerned about the advancing Allied armies discovering the Nazi atrocities. He was also under pressure to yield facilities, such as trains and manpower, to the German army in the last ditch effort to stop the Allied armies.) Eichmann, however, sabotaged this order and continued to transport the Jews (Arendt 1976). Here Eichmann was clearly demonstrating autonomy in accomplishing what he regarded as the mission entrusted to him in his position. He was also demonstrating that the bureaucratic system allowed for considerable flexibility for devising means of reaching objectives. It had enough built-in autonomy for the individual functionary to be inventive.

SS Major General Otto Ohlendorf similarly exhibited autonomy in implementing the mass murders (Crankshaw 1977). At the Nuremberg trials he admitted to killing over 90,000 men, women, and children on the Russian southern front. He prided himself, however, on the efficient and "humane" manner in which the killings under his command were carried out. He instigated methods whereby there was little delay once the victims knew what was in store for them. The killings were carried out with military precision and speed. Ohlendorf prided himself on thereby reducing mental strain, for both victims and executioners.

Eichmann exhibited autonomy in his bureaucratic zeal even after his capture by Israeli agents. Using a bureaucrat's style, he collaborated to a degree that astonished the agents. For example, after his capture in Argentina, his captors asked him to sign a document acknowledging his willingness to be brought to Israel for trial. He insisted on composing a document himself, in which he expressed the intentions of the Israeli captors in far more formidable bureaucratic language than his captors had done (Harel 1975).

Bureaucracies, Max Weber noted some sixty years ago, are effective instruments for getting complicated work done. They help coordinate the work of many different specialists. Priorities are arranged strictly so that objectives can be reached. Weber emphasized that bureaucracies were engines of social control, control geared to integrating and routinizing the work of many specialized functionaries. He was well aware that bureaucracies could be established for diverse purposes—for organizing military service, for organizing political administration of a region, for organizing a business concern. However, he probably did not imagine that his own country would establish a bureaucracy to routinize mass murder. He also did not imagine that the au-

items which the Coughlin package did not include, and some Coughlin items were excluded altogether.

For many of Coughlin's followers, the new package, with its highlight of nationalism in a state of emergency, was one they could not resist, and they abandoned Coughlin. To be sure, Coughlin's own package also included a large amount of nationalism. But that nationalism was contained within a package very different from that encouraged by the federal government. Nationalism was being repackaged.

In a similar vein, some of the early appeal of Nazism was due to the fact that its program was a repackaged version of some existing themes of German national life, such as that of *Volk*, of German national exclusiveness. High-level army officers saw Nazism's fervent nationalism as something they could accept (Taylor 1953:59ff.). Nazism was not an utterly new series of programs. It did contain some new elements, but it was also a rearrangement of some existing ingredients of German culture, ingredients to which many were already committed. In short, individual items of culture may persist in the context of different packages. Similarly, too, when the Nazi youth movements were obviously winning a mass allegiance, some Catholic youth movements tried to repackage their own programs by including some of the Nazi items, such as paramilitary training and rifle practice.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NAZISM: AUTONOMY

How much and what sort of autonomy did Nazi officials have? Were they merely following orders, as many claimed when they faced trial for murderous deeds?

Nazi officials were members of a state-organized bureaucracy. As bureaucrats, they were subject to administrative regulations and controls. During the trials of Nazi war criminals, accused officials frequently referred to these controls and to their own lack of discretionary power in carrying out orders.

The focus on bureaucratic control leaves a crucial component out of consideration. Bureaucrats do have considerable autonomy. Sociologists have shown that bureaucrats can carve out autonomy for themselves even when administrative rules seem to allow little leeway for it (Blau 1955). They have also shown that many forms of autonomy are built into the structure of bureaucratic organizations (Katz 1968, 1976). Such autonomy is part of the very fabric of bureaucracies. It is just as basic to the continuing operation of bureaucracies as are the controls.

When Nazi bureaucratic functionaries said they were merely following orders, they were hiding the fact that they had considerable amounts of autonomy. Their inventiveness in the course of their work, their flexibility when they wanted to be flexible, all demonstrated autonomy. To give an example: Eichmann displayed a great deal of ingenuity and adaptability in his work of devising ways of getting trainloads of victims to their final destinations. He

could not arise in the mind of [us] for [we] had sworn obedience to the people who issued the orders' (Crankshaw 1977:141).

The interpretation of the court, and of many social analysts, was that such statements were a denial of personal responsibility for actions that (a) demand much personal initiative and (b) were so extreme that the orders, even if legally promulgated and delivered, should have been disobeyed. But this point of view does not adequately capture the sense in which Ohlendorf's autonomy was important to himself. The general's statement demonstrates that by obeying orders, even difficult orders, the officer is *making a contribution to his status' honor*, to use Max Weber's term. After all, has he not sworn to carry out orders? When would he be making the greatest independent—autonomous—contribution to the honor of his status, when carrying out orders that are easy or when carrying out orders that are difficult, even repugnant?

The same theme was noted by Himmler. In the speech to SS leaders cited earlier, he recognized the moral and emotional difficulties involved in participating in mass killings. He emphasized that by participating in such abhorrent activities, they were actually contributing to a "grand historic mission." Instead of dwelling on the horrible things "I am doing," they should dwell on the horrible things "I have to witness while carrying out my sacred duty." They should regard themselves as killers making a contribution to their honor, and should take pride in that contribution (Crankshaw 1977).

The bureaucrat who says he was merely following orders ignores his own originality in the course of his contribution. We have seen that the Nazi functionaries had considerable autonomy. The people at the top of bureaucracies have autonomy to make the big decisions. They formulate policies. But their underlings also have considerable autonomy, even when they claim that they do not. This is only too well known to anyone who has to deal with a bureaucrat. It is true that bureaucrats base their work on law, on existing rules, and on orders received from persons above them in the hierarchy. But

⁷ Kingsley Davis (1949:93-94) set the stage for this insight by distinguishing between *prestige*, the rank accorded a social position, and *esteem*, the evaluation of a particular individual's performance of the responsibilities in that position. However, Davis and a subsequent generation of scholars have emphasized assessments of a position and of an individual made by other persons, not by the individual who occupies the position. What is thereby omitted is that the position's occupant can personally have a sense of contributing to the position's honor. This can happen (a) whether or not the position is itself ranked highly in relation to other positions and (b) whether or not the occupant is rewarded by esteem from others.

Even a person holding a low-ranked position may have a sense of status enhancement, of contributing to the honor of the position occupied and, thereby, derive a sense of dignity. (The traditional English butler, proud and urbane, is an example.) What is crucial is that the individual derives satisfaction not only from the relation of his position to other positions and not only from the esteem of others. The individual can also derive satisfaction from believing that he is making a contribution to the honor of his position. In making such a contribution the individual may exercise considerable autonomy.

tonomy of bureaucratic functionaries could provide a crucial component for reaching murderous objectives.

In granting functionaries a measure of autonomy in the interpretation of rules, bureaucracies provide a mechanism for rationalizing horrendous deeds.⁶ When functionaries need acknowledge only adherence to rules, they can disregard their own independent contributions to murderous behavior. They can, then, concentrate on "technical" problems (Hilberg 1967:57-59), on the means rather than the end (Merton 1968). In recognizing the bureaucrat's autonomy, where he or she makes an independent contribution, one is clarifying where personal culpability exists.

When the Eichmanns invented ways of bringing victims to the death camps, they were operating within definite zones of autonomy. This autonomy was granted to them—and, to be sure, with ample encouragement to put it to use—by the Nazi regime of which they were members. Within their zones of autonomy, Nazi officials enjoyed the exercise of much discretion. There they could, and did, innovate, elaborate, and amplify on the instructions they received. There, finally, lies their culpability.

In the folklore about bureaucracy, the individual bureaucrat is merely part of the machinery. He bears no responsibility for his actions. He merely follows rules. He does not make them. This is, of course, a very inadequate view of what actually goes on inside a bureaucracy. But it served as a shield behind which many a Nazi official tried to hide. And it may have served not only for public consumption, as the bureaucrat faced other people and tried to justify his activities. It may have been even more important as a framework for self-deception. To themselves, bureaucrats could justify deeds, no matter how novel or resourceful, on the basis that these acts were merely the result of following orders. Those above oneself bear the responsibility. The bureaucrat could therefore continue to hold a conception of self that was completely at variance with actual behavior within the bureaucracy. Thus, Eichmann could say, with apparent sincerity, that he was not anti-Semitic (Hilberg 1967:106).

During the Nuremberg trials, most of the Nazi officials, such as General Ohlendorf, exhibited an extreme version of the obedience-to-authority theme. They claimed that in carrying out the planning and execution of mass murders they were merely carrying out orders. Ohlendorf, for example, acknowledged during questioning by lawyers that he had had reservations about the morality of the killings. Why, then, did he carry them out? "Because to me it is inconceivable that a subordinate leader should not carry out orders given by the leaders of the state." When asked about questioning the legality of the orders, "Ohlendorf replied, perplexed: 'I do not understand the question; since the order was issued by the superior authorities, the question of legality

⁶ I am indebted to Carl Sheingold for this insight.

(3) Nazism included a variety of political, economic, and racial programs which were amalgamated to form a cohesive *package*. Because of this amalgamation, adherents to one of the component programs were likely to implement the entire package of programs, even those programs to which they had no strong personal commitment. This behavior dovetails with the incremental decision process—in both it is a question of evaluating only some components of a larger entity in which one is, in fact, participating.

The Nazi package of programs contained some new items. But since it was also a *repackaged* version of some previously existing themes of German national life, it could appeal to people by relying on previous affiliations and commitments. (Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Zald and Ash 1966; Zald 1979) It was a matter of repackaging existing allegiances rather than depending on entirely new ones. In this process some new ingredients were added, notably extremes of anti-Semitism. The new items became acceptable because they were part of a larger package, a package that promised revitalization of the national honor and the economy. The extreme anti-Semitism of Nazism was, at the same time, an incremental increase of the longstanding Western anti-Semitism (Dawidowicz 1975); it was a repackaged form of earlier anti-Semitism.

The combination of behavioral autonomy, incremental decision making, and packaging of behavior helps to explain how some of the officials were able to participate in an extremist movement. They help explain, also, how these officials could engage in routinized mass murder.

In future work, the great variation in the degree to which the different German-occupied countries cooperated in the genocidal process can be examined in the light of the concepts of incrementalism, packaging, and autonomy. Provisionally, and building upon Fein's work (1979), one can say: (1) In countries where Jews were previously defined as being outside a "universe of obligations," the ideology underlying Jewish genocide was but an incremental addition to an already existing orientation. It was not drastically new. The new ideology and its application in practice were therefore readily acceptable. (2) Where German control over the occupied country was strong, the German government was in a position to repackage the country's social structure, incorporating much Nazi policy in doing so. (3) Those leaders in occupied countries who favored the Nazi programs were given considerable autonomy to enact Nazi policies. Leaders who opposed those programs were severely restricted in the capacity to act if, indeed, they were allowed even to live.

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they can carry out orders with zeal or, figuratively, they can drag their feet. They can destroy the spirit of the law by insisting on the letter of the law. Or they can bend the letter of the law to achieve the spirit of the law. They can interpret orders in many ways. This behavior is common and "normal" in any bureaucracy. It involves using the bureaucrat's existing autonomy, the sort of autonomy that Nazi functionaries had in ample supply.

When bureaucrats deny their own contributions they are practicing self-deception. One need not be a monster to engage in such self-deception. Indeed, it is possible that many a bureaucrat indulges in it to some extent as part of the "ordinary" day-to-day activity. Yet ordinary bureaucratic behavior, like ordinary incremental behavior and ordinary packaging of behavior, can become an ingredient contributing to monstrous deeds.

CONCLUSION

Sociologically the Holocaust is one instance of a genre of social behavior. Massive social violence is not unique. The Holocaust is unique only in its extreme amount of concerted violence. Implementation of the Holocaust depended to a considerable extent on behavior that is ordinary and mundane. As sociologists we begin by dwelling on the ordinary. Therefrom we may eventually extract and contribute knowledge that can curb transformation of the ordinary into the monstrous and the malignant.

Some of the "ordinary" behavior that existed in the Holocaust phenomenon can be conceptualized as follows:

(1) Clarification of where *autonomy* lies also clarifies where inventiveness, for good or ill, can be practiced.

Knowing where an individual's autonomy lies clarifies where his personal culpability lies.

The Nazi programs gave Nazi functionaries considerable autonomy. They used it to tailor bureaucratic techniques to a task, the attempt to annihilate a particular population, the scale of which had not been attempted before.

Autonomy often goes unrecognized, even one's own. This can serve as a mechanism for rationalizing horrendous deeds.

(2) A person's involvement in a social movement or in a personal career may result from a series of *incremental decisions*. These can focus on solving immediate problems, one at a time, without regard for wider concerns. This limited outlook can result in a lack of response to the moral issues involved in the total course of action by the persons who are, in fact, carrying out that course of action.

It is not known how many Nazi officials acted in such incremental fashion. Nor, for that matter, is it known how common incremental decision making is generally or how culture specific it is. But it is clear that Eichmann was not alone among Nazi officials in the incremental way in which he became immersed in executing Nazi policies (Schleunes 1970).

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Old Wounds and New Lessons

Fred E. Katz

When Pope John Paul II granted an audience to Yasir Arafat last year, Jewish sensitivities were aroused. Menachem Begin expressed this sensitivity in some harsh words. Begin is hardly a cautious diplomat, one who is careful not to offend when telling the truth or who lies with convincing sincerity. Begin is blunt. He put his fingers squarely on a wound in the Jewish soul, one as old as Christian persecution of Jews. That wound had a great deal of salt rubbed into it by the actions of Pius XII during the Second World War. No one has described that pope more arrestingly than Rolf Hochhuth did in *The Deputy*.

Hochhuth contends that the pope's character played a large part in abetting Hitler's program of exterminating the Jews. But a single leader's character—be it the pope's or, even, Hitler's—is not enough to explain how so vast a program of ultimate evil could be implemented so effectively. The implementation required a great deal of cooperation by a great many people. And much of the cooperation was far more subtle than crudely shared anti-Semitism. Massive evil, such as the extermination of millions of Jews, means routinized enactment of evil. Such routinization relied on harnessing some very ordinary patterns of human behavior, such as common sorts of career processes, and putting them to use in the service of an evil cause.

The Deputy is a play, a piece of art. As such, it does not attempt to provide a balanced recital of all factors that entered into the situation in which the Jews, the Nazis, and the pope found themselves during the Nazi era. It is not intended to be factual history. Instead, it does what art necessarily does. It focuses on some aspects. And it highlights them.

The play focuses on personal character. It portrays heroism by some Catholic priests and alleges conspicuous failure by the highest priest of all, the pope. The pope's failure can be the symbol of other people's failures. Hochhuth, interviewed after the play was published, said: "To me Pius [XII] is a symbol, not only for all leaders, but for all men—Christians, atheists,

Jews... who are passive when their brother is deported to death." Given such a symbol, each viewer can add his own names to the list—including that of God. He, too, was silent.

By using art as his vehicle, Hochhuth highlights some aspects of the horrendous reality. He necessarily leaves out much of what happened, which the historian would include. *The Deputy* does not deal, for example, with the fact that at local levels the Catholic Church displayed much variation. In France, Belgium, and Holland the bishops publicly objected to the Nazi persecution of Jews. In 1943, a Dutch bishop forbade Catholic policemen to participate in hunting down Jews. The bishops were not fully successful, but their actions had an impact. In Germany, on the other hand, the Catholic hierarchy provided a great deal of support for Nazi anti-Semitism. Guenter Lewy quotes Archbishop Groeber's statement in an official Church publication in 1939, that since the nineteenth century "the unhealthy and un-German developments in art" had been the work of "the uprooted and aesthetically perverted Jews or those under their influence." In a pastoral letter, written the same year, Bishop Hilfrich of Limburg, also cited by Lewy, stated that the Jewish people were guilty of the murder of God and have been under a curse since the day of the crucifixion. There was much more in this vein, at every level of the German Catholic hierarchy. In support of Hochhuth's theme, it is worth mentioning that Pius XII was heavily immersed in the German milieu prior to achieving the highest post of the Church.

To guard himself against some of the potential criticisms by historians, Hochhuth added an historical appendix to his play, much of which is reprinted in this issue of *Society*. In it Hochhuth gives us much of the information that forms the underpinnings for the play's message. He also gives us an explicit statement of his own assessment of Pope Pius XII.

What sort of a man was Pius XII, who remained so silent in the face of such immense suffering? Hochhuth describes him: "He was not a 'criminal for reasons of state'

[that is, he did not commit crimes out of political motives]; he was a fence-sitter, an over-ambitious careerist who, having attained his goal, wasted his time on inconsequential trifles while the tormented world . . . waited in vain for a word of spiritual leadership from him." Hochhuth describes him as highly intelligent, a man of considerable scholarly gifts, a grand speaker. He was also a very remote man, an ascetic, beset by personal foibles. He could never get his hands clean enough. He detested physical contact with people.

Hochhuth claims that Pius XII was not anti-Semitic. His silence in the face of the Nazi persecution of Jews paralleled his silence when some priests were persecuted, even murdered, by these same Nazis. In each case official silence was central to the pope's effort to maintain a rapprochement with Hitler—to align the Church with this powerful, if hated, dictator because it contained some benefit for the Church.

Was Pius XII simply weak? Apparently not. He spoke out firmly when it suited him, as he did against the Allied bombing of Rome. Hochhuth contends that Pius XII lacked a fundamental commitment to morality. He knew about the horrendous deeds of the Nazis. He regarded them as horrendous. But he refused to be swayed by moral outrage. He chose not to assert his own considerable power against Hitler, even though he alone (if Hochhuth is correct) could have obliged Hitler to stop the horrendous course of action.

Pius XII developed his posture toward Hitler before he became pope. As Vatican Secretary of State, he was

Through the rapprochement with Hitler, the pope helped to underwrite the total amalgam of Nazi programs, even those anathema to him.

deeply involved in the rapprochement with Hitler and never deviated from it after he became pope. It was, says Hochhuth, part of an icily controlled pattern of career opportunism in which personally felt moral outrage had very little part to play.

Some people have argued that Pius XII spoke out against the persecution of Jews. They cite speeches in which he told of his sorrow about the suffering that was happening at the time. Hochhuth notes that Pius never explicitly mentioned the Nazi horrors against the Jews in any of his speeches. (Similarly, his predecessor, Pius XI, made a famous speech in 1937 expressing his "burning concern" for the victims of modern inhumanity. He did not mention the Jews either.) Because of this omission,

the Nazi government could, and did, safely ignore the pope's speech. To the Nazis it was clear and obvious, says Hochhuth, that the speech was designed to *not* cause them any trouble.

Pope John Paul II's meeting with Arafat forces one to make comparisons with Pius XII. John Paul is an entirely different sort of person. He has a peasant-like earthiness. He takes many trips (Pius XII rarely traveled). Upon arrival he kisses the soil. This is no empty gesture: he is a man of the soil and of the people. He relishes contact with human beings, seemingly drawing sustenance from them while he, in turn, exudes warmth and human concern.

John Paul could be the overarching figure on the present world scene. He has the charismatic qualities for it. What holds him back—and what keeps many (Catholics and non-Catholics) from accepting him whole heartedly—is his rather sternly conservative theology. On issues such as abortion he is the spokesman for an earlier era, scarcely in touch with some of today's issues.

Yet John Paul radiates warmth and compassion. It is hard to conceive of his being silent in the face of mass murder.

Does Hochhuth provide an adequate explanation of the Church's default? Is it enough to point to moral weakness in a pope? Is it enough to concentrate on a leader's personality when analyzing a social institution as large and complex as the Catholic Church?

If it were enough, how is it that the highly moral John Paul II visited Auschwitz, spoke movingly about the victims, but did not explicitly mention the Jews? Why did he not specifically identify the two-and-a-half million who perished there because they were Jews? This is not to suggest that only the Jewish victims at Auschwitz should be identified; the non-Jewish victims deserve equally profound concern. But Jews were singled out for lethal treatment by people who were at least nominally Christian. This deserves explicit attention by every Christian leader.

How is it that under this same pope the Vatican still has no ambassador in Israel? *Realpolitik* is surely at work. But we can do better than merely point to the long tentacles of Arab oil blackmail, the Soviet capacity for mischief in the unlikeliest places, or encrusted secular processes geared to the Church's self-preservation as a world-wide institution. Perhaps there is, after all, some small amount of active and lingering anti-Semitism?

To be sure, Pope John Paul II recently denounced "excesses" of the Spanish Inquisition—about three hundred years late, but clearly not too late. To be sure, too, the present Church has a far more open and enlightened attitude toward Jews than it did in the past. But within the Catholic Church anti-Semitism is not dead. Currently there is no anti-Semitic leader of the stature of Father Coughlin, who ran his nationwide campaign in the 1930s. But anti-Semitic voices are still being heard in the councils of the Church, even though they may be a minority. The Lebanese war brought some of them out of

the woodwork. Two examples, taken from Church publications, follow. (They are gleaned from a survey of Catholic publications carried out by the Anti-Defamation League during the summer and fall of 1982.)

Monsignor Charles O. Rice, in the *Pittsburgh Catholic* on July 16, 1982, wrote: "Israel has come very close to a *final solution* of her Palestinian problem" (emphasis added) and "a powerful faction within the Israel leadership is obviously after more land and water as well as security . . . [and] a powerful faction within our leadership sees Israel, with our materiel and *Jewish brains* and guts, as a major power—and will let Israel get away with anything" (emphasis added).

The phrase "final solution" equates Israeli action in the Lebanese war with the Nazi program of deliberate and systematic extermination. The phrase "Jewish brains" is an old standby in the anti-Semitic repertoire of besmirching symbols. It has cropped up many times over the years, implying that Jews use their especially clever and devious brains against innocent non-Jews.

Father Robert Campbell (an American Jesuit working in Lebanon) wrote an article on June 26, 1982, in *The Tablet*, published by the Archdiocese of Brooklyn. Its title was: "Jesuit to Palestinians: Resist 'Israeli Wehrmacht' with Statesmanship"; its subtitle, "Don't 'shuffle silently' to new Holocaust." Here, too, the meaning is obvious. The Israeli action against the PLO in Lebanon was equated with the Nazi Holocaust. Father Campbell advised the PLO that its violence is ineffective. He did not say it is wrong. The PLO must continue to fight Israel, but it should use other means: "The resistance must not die; there must be no submission to Zionism."

Not all local Church publications adhered to this kind of position. But a majority did. Furthermore, Monsignor Rice and Father Campbell probably do not consider themselves to be anti-Semitic. Theirs is a veiled and incidental form of anti-Semitism. They are, at most, "a little bit" anti-Semitic.

Jews have learned over the years that "a little bit" of anti-Semitism can be exceedingly dangerous. It can lead to anti-Semitic acts by a person who is not basically anti-Semitic. It may influence a course of action without the individual participant's being aware of its profoundly anti-Semitic character. In this way a thoroughly evil course of action can be generated by persons who are relatively ordinary sorts of people, neither personally evil nor mentally deranged. The most extreme and virulent example of this was Adolf Eichmann.

Eichmann's career demonstrates that one need not be a committed anti-Semite to contribute mightily to anti-Semitism. Menachem Begin learned this the hard way, through personal experience in Europe and Israel. It lurks behind his seemingly paranoid attack on a righteous man such as Pope John Paul II.

Eichmann claimed that he was not anti-Semitic. Of course, he said, he believed the Nazi message that Jews were a danger to Germany. But he, personally, did not

hate Jews. During his trial in Jerusalem he said: "An anti-Semite I never was. No!" At that time he had nothing to gain from lying. And he sounded earnest and sincere. If we take Eichmann's claim seriously, we can learn something about anti-Semitism.

To begin with, Eichmann was not entirely accurate. He said that he was not anti-Semitic because he did not hate Jews. Yet he believed that Jews were a danger to Germany. This made him a bit of an anti-Semite, even if he did not display the blind hatred and rage against Jews shown by some of his Nazi colleagues, such as Julius Streicher. Eichmann's career demonstrates, however,

Massive evil, such as the extermination of millions of Jews, means routinized enactment of evil.

that his bit of anti-Semitism could go a long way. In fact, his career suggests that the most dangerous anti-Semite may not be the full-time, raving one. It may be the individual whose thoughts are but slightly tainted by anti-Semitism, but who is a man of action, a person capable of influencing the world in which he finds himself.

Eichmann became involved in Nazism through a very common and typical kind of incremental career process. It started when he joined a group of Nazi youths because it offered him sociability. The group was made up of young people of roughly Eichmann's own age, with roughly similar interests. They were especially interested in sports. Nazi ideology, including anti-Semitism, played a rather small part at that stage. Step-by-step, however, Eichmann became more involved in the Nazi movement. He joined the SS. It offered him a promising career at a time when he had failed to get ahead outside the Nazi movement.

Eichmann's career in the SS became his central point of attachment to the Nazi cause. At his trial, that SS career, particularly his difficulties in being promoted, weighed on him far more heavily than did his contributions to mass murder. His yearning for excellence as a functionary, advancement and recognition, kindled his zeal for his murderous work. He did accept the Nazi anti-Semitic ideology that Jews endangered Germany; but equally importantly, he was driven by his yearning for success as a bureaucrat. That he was not driven by sheer hatred of Jews made him a very lethal anti-Semite.

The careers of the other SS functionaries, such as Rudolf Hoess, the chief of Auschwitz, were remarkably similar to Eichmann's. Hoess, too, was convinced that he did not hate Jews. He saw himself as a soldier, rather than as a mass killer eradicating Jews.

Eichmann's career linked up with the larger Nazi

agenda. The persecution of Jews, to which Eichmann made such a generous contribution, was part of a series of diverse social and political programs. These programs included the promise to return Germany to its pre-World War I level of political power, to cast off some of the shame of Germany's defeat in that war, to strengthen its economy, as well as to purify Germany from Jewish influence. These programs appealed to many sectors of the German population. Some people embraced Nazi anti-Semitism. Others embraced its economic or its political programs. The important fact is that a person who accepted the Nazi political program might not have approved of its economic program. A person who relished the persecution of Jews might not have approved of the politics of military expansion. In short, a person who embraced one program might not have embraced others.

The Nazi programs, however, were welded together into one composite whole, an amalgam. The internal economics of national socialism, the politics of German expansionism, and the zeal for destroying Jews became inextricably linked. Hence, people like Krupp, the munitions manufacturer, probably shared the "normal" amount of German cultural anti-Semitism. He probably had numerous stereotypes about Jews, but no raging desire to murder them. Yet Krupp became involved in the wholesale murder of Jews through the slave labor program in his industrial empire. Similarly, Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, was a central figure in the mass murder programs. But he was also involved in large-scale economic, technical, and military matters. (There was an attempt to establish factories within concentration camps. The SS established separate, front-line military units.)

The result was that leaders and officials who had a personal commitment to any one Nazi program were likely to contribute to the entire amalgam of programs, even those to which they had little personal commitment. Although Eichmann said, and believed, that he had no commitment to hating Jews, this did not keep him from helping to destroy Jews, and doing it with great zeal. Eichmann, the bureaucrat, was entrusted with getting the Jews to the extermination camps. He would probably have shown similar zeal if he has been entrusted with the preservation of Germany's forests. He would have found ways to safeguard trees at all costs. When everyone else was indifferent, he would have doggedly persisted in protecting trees.

Bureaucrats engage in a dispassionate search for efficiency. This means that they take practical, tactical problems very seriously. It also means that they often ignore the larger moral issues.

Eichmann's statement that he did not hate Jews was probably true. But this is small comfort. It did not keep him from active involvement in the mass murder of Jews. One can be an enthusiastic participant in activities in which one does not believe. The appeal of one program can be enough to ensure one's full participation in an entire amalgam of programs.

When Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII,

engaged in the rapprochement with Hitler, he did so because he saw in Hitler some specific benefits for the Church, notably a strong ally against Russian Communism; this one aspect of Nazism was appealing. But through the rapprochement the pope helped to underwrite the total amalgam of Nazi programs, even those which were anathema to him. Through the rapprochement the Church gave carte blanche to Hitler. This does not mean that Pius XII approved of Hitler's extermination of the Jews. He was not a raving anti-Semite.

This brings us back to the present Jewish sensitivity to Pope John Paul's meeting with Yasir Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The amalgam of PLO programs includes finding a homeland for the Palestinian refugees. It also includes destruction of the state of Israel through whatever means are available, including terrorism against all Jews, wherever they live.

When the pope granted Arafat an interview, he was presumably motivated solely by the one item in the PLO amalgam of programs that has bearing on the plight of the Palestinian refugees. He was not deliberately underwriting terrorism or the destruction of the state of Israel. Yet there can be little doubt that many people—Jews and non-Jews, and especially the followers of Arafat—interpreted the pope's action as support for the PLO's entire amalgam of programs, including its hostility toward Israel and toward the world's Jews. Surely, say Jews, the pope might have foreseen this result.

Perhaps the pope believes that the existing PLO amalgam of programs can be dismantled—that some items, such as the unyielding hostility to the state of Israel, might be removed; and that he, the pope, might be the catalyst for bringing this about. Perhaps, too, he hopes to bring some measure of dispassionate practicality to bear on the problems of the Middle East, at a time when there is altogether too much obfuscating anger.

Pope John Paul II is no explicit anti-Semite. But it does not take much explicit anti-Semitism to help generate and implement some profoundly anti-Semitic programs. Even perfectly well-intentioned persons have contributed. □

READING SUGGESTED BY THE AUTHOR:

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Fred E. Katz is visiting scholar in the Department of History at the Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of Structuralism in Sociology: An Approach to Knowledge, Autonomy and Organization and editor of Contemporary Sociological Theory. He is currently working on comparative studies of extremism, including the Holocaust.

JEWISH-BORN NUN BEATIFIED BY POPE

In West Germany, John Paul
Honors a Victim of Nazis
Who Died at Auschwitz

By JOHN TAGLIABUE

Special to The New York Times

COLOGNE, West Germany, May 1 — Pope John Paul II today beatified a Jewish-born Carmelite nun killed in Auschwitz, saying she "offered herself to God as a sacrifice for genuine peace, and above all for her threatened and humiliated Jewish people."

The Pope, on the second day of a five-day visit to West Germany, spoke at an open-air mass attended by about 75,000 people, including relatives of the woman, Edith Stein.

John Paul, who has focused the visit on the role of the Roman Catholic Church under Nazism, said the church honored "a daughter of the Jewish people, rich in wisdom and courage."

His remarks appeared to be an effort to smooth differences that had arisen over the church's motives for declaring Edith Stein blessed, the last step before sainthood.


Some Jews, including members of her family, had criticized the decision to beatify Edith Stein, who as a Catholic nun was called Sister Teresia Benedicta a Cruce, arguing that she was murdered by the Nazis not for her Christian faith, the grounds for martyrdom, but for her Jewish origins.

Spokesmen for the German Bishops Conference were unable to cite a previous example of a Jewish-born Catholic being elevated to the status of blessed.

Euthanasia Denounced

This evening in Münster, the Pope, addressing a large crowd near the city's Romanesque cathedral, set forth a theme begun on the first day of his tour, likening abortion and euthanasia to the Nazi killing of the mentally ill and other disabled people.

Earlier, in Cologne, the Pope met



A group of nuns waving and applauding as Pope John Paul II arrived at a stadium in Cologne, West Germany, for beatification of Edith Stein, a Carmelite nun who died in the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz.

with German Jews, who number about 30,000. Explaining the beatification ceremony, John Paul said, "Today, the church is honoring a daughter of Israel who remained faithful, as a Jew, to the Jewish people, and as a Catholic, to our crucified Lord Jesus Christ."

Praise and Criticism

Jewish reactions to the Pope's efforts at explanation varied. An American Jewish scholar who has written a biography of Edith Stein, James Baaden, said John Paul merited "full marks" for "trying to find some way to say, she was a fusion of the Jewish and Catholic."

"He didn't launch any big missionary appeal," he said, "He didn't describe her as a beacon beckoning to other Jews."

There appeared to be efforts, at

times awkward, to respect Jewish sensitivities. The Pope and German prelates departed from their prepared texts, which spoke of Sister Teresia Benedicta, referring instead to Sister Teresia Benedicta Edith Stein. In the presence of a Jewish delegation, John Paul spoke only of Edith Stein.

But Susanne M. Batzdorff, a niece who was close to her aunt and has written about her, said: "I still believe she was a Jewish martyr. I think she was one of six million. In her own family she was one of four who were killed."

Seized From Dutch Convent

Edith Stein was seized in August 1942 from a Carmelite convent in Echt, the Netherlands, where she had fled the Nazis, together with her sister Rosa, who also converted to Catholicism. They were shipped to Auschwitz,

where they died in the gas chambers several days later. Two other siblings lost their lives in death camps.

"I would have been happy if she could have been saved by the church in 1933, or in the early days," said Miss Batzdorff, who shook the hand of John Paul after the mass. In 1933, she noted, her aunt sought unsuccessfully to win the support of Pope Pius XI for the defense of the Jews.

But she added, "I'm glad I was here to see it."

In Cologne this morning, the Church of Saint Brictius, about a mile from the site of the papal mass, burned to the ground. The police said they were investigating possible links with unknown people who two days ago wrote on another Cologne church, "We like churches burning."

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"HOLOCAUST" FOLLOW-UP

An open forum to discuss impact and implications
of the T.V. drama --

THURSDAY, APRIL 20

8:15 P.M.

at the

Jewish Community Center

Panelists Include
Holocaust Survivors
Federation-Center Staff
Rev. G. Taft Lyon
Guest Rabbi

MALCOM SPARER, U.S.A. Reserves
President, Northern California Board of Rabbis
President, American Zionist Federation
Senior Lecturer, University of San Francisco

Come and bring your friends

405 Mardi Gras Drive

584-4437

HOLOCAUST QUESTIONNAIRE

The Jewish Federation-Center and Jewish Community Relations Committee, in cooperation with local and national agencies, were most pleased to be involved with the recent production of "Holocaust". A great deal of time and effort went into alerting the public to this program. We would be most appreciative if you would be willing to answer a few questions regarding your reactions, and mail them back to:

The Jewish Federation-Center
P. O. Box 12097
El Paso, Texas 79912

The questionnaire need not be signed and the results will be used for our own benefit, communicated to NBC, and to our national organizations. Your cooperation will be most appreciated.

Howard Burnham
Executive Director

1. How much of the "Holocaust" presentation did you watch?
_____ All four segments; _____ three segments; _____ two segments;
_____ one segment; _____ none.
2. We watched the program: _____ At home; _____ At a friend's house;
_____ With friends; _____ Other.
3. The youngest person in our family to watch the program was:
_____ Over 16; _____ Over 12; _____ Under 12 (If so give age)
4. My knowledge of the Holocaust, before the production, was:
_____ I knew a lot; _____ I knew some; _____ I knew very little;
_____ I knew nothing.
5. My overall impression of the production was: _____ It was very good;
_____ It was fair; _____ It was poor; _____ Other.
6. I believe the subject matter was treated: _____ fairly; _____ reason-
ably fair; _____ unfair; _____ other.
7. There are those who say the Holocaust never happened: _____ I do
not believe this; _____ I understand why they believe this;
_____ I believe this.
8. In 1978 my attitude on anti-Semitism is: _____ There is a lot;
_____ There is some; _____ There is very little.
9. I believe that showing this program at this time was: _____ appro-
priate; _____ Inappropriate; _____ Too late; _____ Too soon.
- (Optional) 10. _____ I am Jewish; _____ I am not Jewish.

Thank you.

WHAT DO THESE WORDS MEAN TO YOU ??

Babi Yar

cattle cars

concentration camps

Adolph Eichman

Exodus

Anne Frank

Final Solution

Goebels

Goering

Himmler

Adolph Hitler

immigrant

Jewish anti-Semitism

Juden verboten

Kristallnacht

Luftwaffe

Nuremberg trials

Palestine

refugee

reparations

Resistance

"Rise and Fall of the Third Reich"

S.S.

Star of David

Leon Uris - Elie Weisel

Warsaw Ghetto

"Work Brings Freedom" - "Arbeit Macht Frei"

Yad Vashem

Yom Hashoah

Yiddish

Yiddishkeit

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES



THE HOLOCAUST TO ERETZ YISRAEL . . .

A TIME TO REMEMBER

SATURDAY, MAY 6; 8:30 PM - 12 MID.; CONG. B'NAI ZION
HOLOCAUST TEACH-IN FEATURING DANNY SIEGEL
- ADMISSION: FREE

SUNDAY, MAY 7; TEMPLE MT. SINAI
9:30 AM - FILM: "THE TWO OF US" (FOR CHILDREN) - A CHARMING FILM BASED ON AN ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OF JEWISH BOY HIDING WITH A CHRISTIAN FAMILY DURING THE NAZI OCCUPATION IN FRANCE / BRUNCH WITH DANNY SIEGEL (FOR ADULTS & ADULTS)

11:15 AM - COMMUNITY-WIDE HOLOCAUST COMMEMORATIVE SERVICE
2:00 PM - FILM: "THE DIARY OF ANNE FRANK" AT J.C.C., FOLLOWED BY PANEL DISCUSSION, CO-SPONSORED BY NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN / ADMISSION: \$1.00

MONDAY, MAY 8; 8:00; J.C.C.
"THE WORLD OF THE HOLOCAUST" A PRESENTATION IN POEM & SLIDE BY DANNY SIEGEL / - ADDRESSES THE ISSUES OF FEELING IN EXPERIENCE / ADMISSION: \$1.50

TUESDAY, MAY 9; 7:30; J.C.C.
BOOK REVIEW: "NEW LIVES" BY DOBORNY RABINOWITZ / FILM: "HOLOCAUST & RESISTANCE" / - REVIEWED BY DELILAH HOLMAN-COHEN, REVIEWER FOR E.P. HERALD-POST & HOUSTON CHRONICLE. / WITH DISCUSSION: CO-SPONSORED BY E.P. JEWISH AWARENESS GROUP

WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 7:00 PM; J.C.C.
FILM: "EXODUS" CO-STARRING PAUL NEWMAN, EVA MARIE SAINT, AND SAL MINEO; THIS FAMOUS FILM DEPICTS THE FOUNDING OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL / ADMISSION: \$1.00

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 8:00; J.C.C.
"TRAVELING TO ISRAEL" THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF GOING TO ISRAEL; HOW TO GO, WHAT TO TAKE, WHAT TO SEE, TRAVELING INSIDE THE COUNTRY, COSTS, ETC. / - LED BY PHYLLIS STERN, ED. DIRECTOR OF TEMPLE MT. SINAI, AND HOLLI BERRY, EXPERIENCED ISRAELI TRAVELER.

FRIDAY, MAY 12; 8:00; TEMPLE MT. SINAI
COMMUNITY-WIDE MULTI-MEDIA YOM HAATZMAUT SERVICE / ONEG FOLLOWING

SATURDAY, MAY 13; 8:00 TEMPLE MT. SINAI / CONCERT-LECTURE
"HISTORY OF ISRAEL; JEWISH MUSIC" / QUACK & LEA FELDMAN

SUNDAY-TUESDAY, MAY 14-16; J.C.C.
ISRAEL'S 30TH - A NATION REBORN



SCHOLAR-IN-RESIDENCE:
DANNY SIEGEL

A POET, TALMUDIC SCHOLAR AND RECAN-TOUR, DANNY WILL PRESENT SLIDES BASED ON VISITS TO MAUTHAUSEN, AUSCHWITZ, AND U.S.S.R. SIEGEL WILL LEAD THE TEACHIN, GIVE READINGS AND DISCUSS THE HOLOCAUST IN DEPTH. HE IS THE AUTHOR OF SOULSTONED AND ... AND GOD BRAIDED EVE'S HAIR, BOOKS OF JEWISH POETRY.



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Auschwitz: Beginning of a New Era? Reflections on the Holocaust edited by Eva Fleischner 469 pages, paperback \$6.95

Major papers originally presented at the International Symposium on the Holocaust held at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York, June 1974.

The Authoritarian Personality, by T. W. Adorno Norton Press, 1969, paperback \$7.95
Forward by M. Horkheimer & S. Flowerman

Christology After Auschwitz, by Michael B. McGarry, C.S.P. Paulist Press, New York, 1977

The Crucifixion of the Jews: The Failure of the Christians to Understand the Jewish Experience, by Franklin H. Littell Harper & Row, New York, 1975

Provides an understanding of the Holocaust and the problems of anti-Semitism for Christians.

The German Church Struggle and the Holocaust, edited by Franklin H. Littell and Hubert G. Locke Wayne State University Press, 1974

Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, William L. Shirer Fawcett Books, New York

A history of Nazi Germany by a journalist formerly stationed in Berlin.

The War Against the Jews, by Lucy S. Dawidowicz Bantam Books, New York, 1976

Stresses and makes clear the extent to which the destruction of the Jews was Hitler's chief goal, and emphasizes the demoniac consistency of his policies.

While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy, by Arthur Morse Hart, New York, 1975

A well-documented narrative about the indifference of the United States government to the fate of the European Jews before and after World War II.

FICTION


The Last of the Just, by Andre Schwarz-Bart Atheneum Press, New York, 1973
Translated from the French by Stephen Becker paperback \$3.95

Night, by Eli Wiesel Avon Books, New York, paperback 1969

The personal experiences of the writer in Nazi concentration camps. Realistic horror but not too extreme for young students. Short & very readable. For mature junior high & all senior high readers.

The Oath, by Eli Wiesel Avon Books, New York, 1974, paperback \$1.75

The Wall, by John Hersey Bantam Books, New York, 1976, paperback \$2.25



LETTER TO CHRISTIAN LEADERS, EDUCATORS (?), BLACK LEADERS, LABOR

Dear Bishop.....,

We should like to extend to you a warm invitation to take part in what we believe may well be one of the most significant ecumenical and interreligious events in ~~the coming months~~ the coming months.

On Monday, March 13, a group of the Presidents, Senior Executives, and foremost religious personalities in the Roman Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical, Orthodox, Black, and Jewish communities are being invited to join in an extended dialogue on the ~~primary~~ central moral and human problems of violence and dehumanization in the world today perceived in light of the Nazi holocaust.

The occasion for the coming together of key religious leadership will be the showing of a special preview of the nine-hour NBC-TV production of "The Holocaust" which will be aired nationally ~~on~~ from ~~April~~ April 16 through 19. The preview of this remarkable dramatization will be held at Magno Theater, It will begin at 1 p.m., and should conclude about 5 p.m.

We have also invited the major religion writers and editors of daily newspaper, newsmagazines, wire services, and the religious press to join in this conversation, as well as to report on the discussion itself.

The enclosed Film Feedback on "The Holocaust" prepared by Ms. Bea Rothenbuecher of the ~~Executive~~ Communication Commission of the National Council of Churches provides, we believe, a thoughtful background document on this vital subject, as well as stimulating questions for joint exploration.

This invitation is being extended to a limited group of 75 religious leaders and writers, and it is a personal invitation to you. Please do let us know that you will join us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Dr. Eugene Fisher
Executive Secretary
National Conference of ~~Catholic~~
Catholic Bishops'
Secretariat on Catholic-Jewish
Relations

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum
National Interreligious
~~Affairs~~ Director
American Jewish Committee

Dr. William Weiler
Director of
Jewish-Christian
Relations
National Council
of Churches



As you know, "Holocaust" is a 9½ hour mini-series that NBC-TV will air for four nights beginning Sunday, April 16.

Gerald Green, who wrote the teleplay for the series, is also the author of the novel based on his script. The 408-page paperback original debuted at #12 of the New York Post bestseller list of March 25 and has gone back to press six times in advance of the April 1 pub date for a total of 1,150,000 copies in print.

We hope you'll have an opportunity to read Gerald Green's HOLOCAUST before the airing of the mini-series and that you'll pass along the news of its availability to your friends and colleagues.

Cordially,

Stuart Applebaum
Publicity Manager

SA: fby
encl.

A Viewer's Guide to

HOLOCAUST

HOLOCAUST has received the recommendation of the National Education Association.



The following statement is from John Ryor, President, National Education Association:

"HOLOCAUST is an example of television at its best. In an era when educators often criticize television, a series like HOLOCAUST fortunately comes along to illustrate the impact quality television can make as a dramatic vehicle for the nation."

NBC-TV, on four consecutive nights, Sunday, April 16 (8-11 p.m. NYT), Monday-Tuesday, April 17-18 (9-11 p.m. NYT each night), and Wednesday, April 19 (8:30-11 p.m. NYT).

Original screenplay by Gerald Green (THE LAST ANGRY MAN). Herbert Brodtkin, Robert Berger producers. Directed by Marvin Chomsky (who directed six hours of ROOTS). Titus Productions, Inc., is the production company for HOLOCAUST.

HOLOCAUST stars an impressive international cast including Tom Bell, Joseph Bottoms, Tovah Feldshuh, Marius Goring, Rosemary Harris, Anthony Haygarth, Ian Holm, Lee Montague, Michael Moriarty, Deborah Norton, George Rose, Robert Stephens, Meryl Streep, Sam Wanamaker, David Warner, Fritz Weaver and James Woods. It will introduce Blanche Baker.

The nine-and-a-half-hour original drama is the saga of a gentle and compassionate physician and his family, all of whom are, in different ways, buffeted by the Nazi fury and torment that was unleashed upon the Jews and millions of other people. Paralleling the tragedy of this family is the story of an ambitious young German lawyer, who, prodded by his even more ambitious wife, joins the SS and becomes an influential aide to the chief planner of the annihilation of the Jews.

We wish to acknowledge with appreciation the helpful cooperation of the American Jewish Committee in the preparation of this guide.

I. TO THE TEACHER

The Holocaust—the persecution and mass murder of European Jews under Adolf Hitler's German dictatorship (1933-45)—remains an event unique in history. While the Second World War was raging across Europe, huge numbers of men, women and children were methodically segregated, degraded, starved, tortured, forced into slave labor, subjected to cruel pseudoscientific experiments and eventually gassed and cremated in enormous death factories built expressly for the purpose. Carefully researched evidence documents the fact that of the 12 million people slaughtered by the Nazis (exclusive of those killed in actual warfare), over six million were Jews—more than one-third of all Jews in the world.

Other Nazi Victims

Jews were tormented and killed because Nazi theory branded them as an "inferior, subhuman race"; but they were not the only victims of Nazi racism. Slavic peoples also ranked as subhuman in Nazi ideology and suffered enslavement and murder. Czechs and Slovaks were massacred. Over two million Poles were systematically killed, as were several million Soviet prisoners of war. Christian clergy, Masons, Jehovah's Witnesses, trade unionists, Socialists and many other racial, religious or political "enemies of the Third Reich" were also singled out for persecution by the Hitler regime. But only two groups—Gypsies and Jews—were slated for total extinction.

Genocide

Genocide is the name given to a deliberate attempt to exterminate all members of a particular national or racial group *simply because they are members of that group*. Not every war crime or act of oppression, however unjust and horrible it may be, is genocide. But what went on in the Nazi death factories, and what led up to it, was genocide in the truest sense of the term.

About NBC's Film, HOLOCAUST

HOLOCAUST anchors the Nazi years in historical reality and dramatizes this history through the lives of two families in Hitler's "Third Reich." The families are fictitious, *but the events depicted really happened*. It is important to stress

this point, because young viewers—and even adults—are not always clear about what is fact and what is fiction on TV.



II. HOW COULD IT HAPPEN?

Religious Anti-Semitism

In the spring of 1945, three trucks loaded with eight to nine tons of human ashes, from the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, were dumped into a canal in order to conceal the high rate of Jewish executions. When a German general was asked at Nuremberg how such things could happen, he replied: "I am of the opinion that when for years, for decades, the doctrine is preached that Jews are not even human, such an outcome is inevitable"...The doctrine which made such deeds inevitable had been preached, not merely for years or for decades, but for many centuries...The German crime of genocide has its logical roots in the mediaeval theory that the Jews were outcasts, condemned by God to a life of perpetual servitude.

—Malcolm Hay, "Thy Brother's Blood"

Anti-Semitism, meaning hatred or persecution of Jews, is an ancient evil. While it has figured in politics, economics and other areas of life, its oldest and most persistent root has been religious: the charge that Jews as a group are "Christ-killers," living under a curse and doomed to punishment in each succeeding generation. For many centuries, this idea was a staple of church teaching and policy; not until the 1960s did churches repudiate it and condemn anti-Semitism.

Many of the Nazi measures against Jews—excluding them from various occupations and from universities, confining them to ghettos, forcing them to wear identifying badges—harked back to medieval laws designed to degrade and punish the Jews for refusing to convert to Christianity. And religious oppression in earlier

centuries often turned into bloody persecution despite papal edicts proscribing anti-Jewish violence. Tens of thousands of Jews were slaughtered by the Crusaders on their way to redeem the Holy Land from the Moslems, and similar massacres took place in other places and centuries.

(NBC's HOLOCAUST notes the link between Christian hostility and Nazi anti-Semitism. When one of the Dorf children asks why everyone hates the Jews, the other answers: "Cause they killed Christ. Didn't you learn that in Sunday school?" Heydrich remarks to Dorf: "Christians may disagree on a lot of things, but as men of conscience they can unite on hatred of Jews." In a conversation with Himmler, Dorf says: "The Fuhrer himself said we were completing the work of Christianity, defending Western culture.")

Of course, not all Christians were anti-Semitic. In every century men and women spoke out for the Jews, defended them and tried to protect them. This was true under the Nazis, too.

(Inge, Karl's young Christian wife in the film, is an example of individual Germans who rejected Nazi anti-Semitism and stood up against it.)

At Yad Vashem, in Jerusalem—Israel's international memorial and research center dedicated to the Holocaust—there is a tree-lined "Avenue of the Righteous," in which each tree is a living memorial to a non-Jew known to have saved at least one Jewish life at the risk of his or her own.

German Nationalism

Modern German anti-Semitism was the bastard child of the union of Christian anti-Semitism with German nationalism.

—Lucy S. Dawidowicz. "The War Against the Jews"

In 1918, after Germany's defeat in the First World War, the Weimar Republic, a model constitutional democracy, was established; but there was no strong popular commitment to democratic principles. The humiliating peace terms imposed on Germany enraged the German people, and the inflation, poverty and depression that followed the war bred fear, despair and a search for scapegoats.

Capitalizing on this mass discontent, Hitler built his insignificant National Socialist German Workers' Party into a powerful political base. Promising a Greater Germany that would last a

thousand years, he and his followers exalted the Germans as the "master race," and blamed the Jews for all of Germany's troubles. By the time Hitler came to power in 1933, the nation was ripe for his own virulent brand of racist anti-Semitism.

(The opening scenes of HOLOCAUST show how the Nazi philosophy and the growing authoritarianism of the Nazi state affected average Germans. The opportunities for jobs and power made available to young disillusioned Germans by the Nazi government's new institutions are illustrated in Erik Dorf's gradual espousal of the Nazi cause.

The horror of the "Crystal Night" (1938)—the first wholesale physical persecution of Jews—and the ever-growing legal and social isolation of Jews accepted by the German people in the months that followed provide a case history of the average person's potential for evil.)

Racism

Anti-Semitism was given a new pseudo-scientific rationale in 19th-century Europe when race came to be viewed by many as the determining factor in history. German nationalists now proclaimed that the Germans were the only pure "Teutonic race"—the purest form of the "Aryan" race, on which the future of civilization supposedly depended.

Serious scientists gradually abandoned these early race theories, but scientific quacks and portions of the general public clung to the notion of Aryan superiority, giving anti-Semites in Germany and elsewhere an additional weapon against the Jews.

At the same time that the Weimar Republic adopted a constitution guaranteeing German Jews, and all other Germans, political equality, Hitler and his National Socialists were hammering away at the need to rescue Germany from the "subhuman Jewish race." When Hitler came to power in 1933, the race theory became a state dogma, and anti-Semitism became government policy.

(In HOLOCAUST, Heydrich points out to Erik Dorf that although this "racial stuff" might be nonsense, it has its practical side: "Anti-Semitism is the cement that binds us together.")

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How did traditional religious anti-Semitism

pave the way for the German people's acceptance of Hitler's program of mass destruction?

2. How did Germany's past history set the stage for the failure of the Weimar Republic?
3. What new elements did Hitler and the Nazis add to traditional anti-Semitism?
4. How did the theory of "Aryan racial superiority" enable Hitler to persecute minority groups more savagely than anybody before him?
5. Does anyone today still think in terms of "master races"?
6. What did Hitler's police state mean to Germans and others who were not Jews?

III. HOW IT HAPPENED

Mounting Oppression

It began with job dismissals and pressures on Jewish business enterprises. Later (came) forced sales of companies, discriminatory property taxes, blocking of bank deposits, compulsory labor, reduced wages, special income taxes, lowered rations, and confiscation of personal property, pensions and claims.... Later (came) a series of housing restrictions, movement limitations and identification measures. The Jews of Germany now were forced to undergo document stamping, name changes, and the marking of their clothes with a star....

—Raul Hilberg, "Documents of Destruction"

With his rise to power, Hitler began to put into practice the anti-Jewish ideology he had outlined in his book, *Mein Kampf*, as an essential part of his blueprint for conquest. To make Germany *judenrein* (clean of Jews), the Nazis gradually instituted restrictions aimed at making life so intolerable for Jews that they would be forced to emigrate. In a caricature of law-making, they were progressively excluded from holding public office, practicing professions, attending public schools, and eventually even using public parks or transportation. As early as 1935, a set of laws decreed at a party rally in Nuremberg officially declared Jews to be second-class citizens without civil rights. Non-Jews were forbidden to marry Jews, and any close relationships between Jews and others were, in effect, barred.

At first, the Jews of Germany—a community of

over half a million—could not understand what was happening. The ancestors of some of them had come to Germany with the Roman armies, 2,000 years back; their German roots were deep, and most were staunchly patriotic. The horrors of the Middle Ages were long past and Jews had gradually made their way in German society. Anti-Semitism was visible and widespread but it was far less savage than in some other countries. Germany's relapse into barbarism found most Jews disoriented and incredulous.

(HOLOCAUST depicts the patriotism of German Jews in the character of Mr. Palitz, who takes great pride in the medal he won as a soldier in the First World War and identifies strongly with German history, which he considers his own.)

Jews and other opponents of the Nazi regime were brutally mistreated in prisons and concentration camps from the start. By 1938 open violence and public atrocities or acts of degradation had become commonplace throughout Germany; they later became equally common in almost every country that came under German domination. In 1938—the year Hitler seized Austria—the Government staged a supposedly spontaneous nationwide terror action called the "Crystal Night," or night of shattered glass (after the many broken windows of Jewish establishments). Synagogues were burned, Jews were brutalized on the streets, and Jewish-owned businesses and other properties were expropriated under transparent pretexts. Thousands of Jews were thrown into concentration camps, along with religious and other opponents of the regime.

(HOLOCAUST shows how the Nazis conspired to make the "Crystal Night" appear as a spontaneous eruption of popular anger against the Jews.)

Ghettoization and Destruction

At camps maintaining labor installations, like Auschwitz, 10 percent of the arrivals—those who looked fittest—were selected for work. The remainder were...instructed to undress; the women and girls had their hair cut. They were then marched between files of auxiliary police (Ukrainians usually) who hurried them along with whips, sticks, or guns, to the gas chambers.... These were identified as shower rooms. The Jews were rammed in, one person per square foot. The gassing lasted from ten to thirty minutes, depending on the facilities and techniques used. In Belzec, according to an eyewitness, it took thirty-two

minutes and "finally, all were dead," he wrote, "like pillars of basalt, still erect, not having any space to fall."...Later the bodies were burned... "At night the red sky over Auschwitz could be seen for miles."

—Lucy S. Dawidowicz, "The War Against the Jews"

The "final solution"—the plan to annihilate all Jews in Europe—was put into practice in 1941, two years after Hitler's invasion of Poland and the start of the Second World War. German Jewry, alone, might have been dispersed to other lands; but no policy of forced emigration could have worked—even if the frontiers had not been closed by war—for Poland's 3½ million Jews and millions more in the Soviet Union, Lithuania and other Eastern countries.

The original plan was to have the Jews killed by mobile squads that accompanied the German troops on their conquest of Eastern Europe. That was not efficient enough, so "death factories" were set up in a number of camps in Poland to gas Jews wholesale. The monstrous undertaking was kept secret for a long time; only gradually did the story leak out to the intended victims and the free world.

As the German armies moved eastward, the Jews in given towns and regions were segregated in walled-off ghettos, where they were forced to work as slave laborers and systematically starved to reduce their numbers. Jewish Councils (*Judenräte*), appointed by the Nazis, were responsible for governing the ghettos and for everything that went on there. They were also forced to select specified numbers of people to be transported to parts unknown, ostensibly for resettlement. Some councils complied, because they were told that those not sent away would be left undisturbed; others were defiant and became centers of resistance.

Those selected for resettlement—which eventually meant everybody—were shipped away by rail, in box cars. The trains were given the same priority as urgently needed troop trains—an indication of the haste and fanaticism with which the annihilation of Jews was pursued. At the end of the line stood the gas chambers and crematoria of the death camps.

(In HOLOCAUST, these events are given human proportions. We experience the Buchenwald concentration

camp with Karl Weiss. Through the experience of Dr. Weiss and the Lowys we sense the desperation of the deportations and the harrowing decisions to be made.

The horror of Auschwitz is epitomized by Hoess, the camp commandant: "We've got it down to a factory system, but I'm still behind schedule. They undress...we take the valuables...take them to the showers...burn them...bury the ashes.")

The near destruction of European Jewry by Hitler was followed by the founding of the State of Israel in 1948. The Jewish State came into existence in part because the Holocaust survivors challenged the conscience of the postwar world.

(The scene in HOLOCAUST in which Rudi Weiss, at the request of the Jewish Agency representative in Terezin, becomes the leader of 40 Greek orphans headed for illegal immigration into Palestine provides some sense of the exodus of survivors from Europe to Palestine.)

In looking back at the Hitler era, it is clear that concerted action by the world powers could have saved millions of lives. But the Western nations did relatively little to stem the Nazi excesses or to provide a haven for those who tried to flee.

Even when the reports of the death camps had been documented, the Allied powers decided that rescue would have to wait for victory over the Nazis, lest such efforts complicate military plans.

Courageous individuals in many of the occupied countries risked their lives to hide Jewish adults and children or to help them to pass as non-Jews. But these quiet heroes were in the minority. Most of the conquered avoided awareness of what was happening; to former friends and neighbors and cooperated with their conquerors—some out of sympathy for the Nazi cause, some for the sake of their own safety. Many actually profited from the misfortunes of the victims by acquiring their property or collecting rewards for betraying them.

(HOLOCAUST shows Father Lichtenberg continuing to pray for the Jews despite Erik Dorf's warnings. But it is made clear that Father Lichtenberg (who was a real person) was one of very few to raise their voices in defense of the victims, and that most people—whatever their walks of life—accepted or blinked at the evils of nazism.)

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why did German Jews find it so hard to see

what the Nazi rise foreboded? Why did people like Berta Weiss and the Palitzes refuse to leave Germany, even when warned to do so?

2. Why did the majority of the German people fail to protest the "Crystal Night" violence against their Jewish neighbors, and later the murders in the concentration camps?

3. Could a "Crystal Night" have happened in other countries? In the United States?

4. Most Holocaust survivors went to live in what is now Israel or in the United States, but some have returned to their native countries or to Germany. Could you go back to live in those countries after the Holocaust experience?

5. What could the Allied countries have done to help the Jews slated for destruction by Hitler? Were they justified in putting such matters aside until victory was won? Has the world made any progress in providing asylum for refugees since the Hitler era?

6. Edmund Burke said: "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." How does the Nazi period illustrate this point? In a showdown, would you protest, like Father Lichtenberg, or look away, like most of his fellow Germans? Why?

7. During his trial in Israel for war crimes, Adolf Eichmann—one of the masterminds of the Holocaust—defended himself by saying he had "only followed orders." The same defense was used by Lt. William Calley in his trial for crimes against Vietnamese civilians at My Lai. Is "following orders" a valid excuse for criminal acts?

IV. RESISTANCE AND ARMED STRUGGLE From Nonviolence to Open Defiance

...When rabbis and other leaders in those days counseled against taking up arms, they did not advocate giving in to the forces of evil; they meant that the struggle should be carried on, as long as possible, by other, life-affirming means. It was a strategy that seemed well-suited to the circumstances in 1940 and 1941, when no one could know how totally different Nazi persecution would be from any sufferings experienced before.

—Yehuda Bauer, "They Chose Life"

6

Young people confronted with the Holocaust frequently ask: "Why didn't the Jews fight back?"

The answer is that they did fight back. For many years after the Second World War this fact was not well known, because almost the only data available were from German documents, and the Germans, who kept full account of their successes, were far less meticulous in recording any defiance of their supposedly invincible war machine. But more recently, the true story has emerged—chiefly from papers and diaries secretly assembled by Jewish leaders and historians before they were murdered, and from the recollections of those who survived. At Terezin in Czechoslovakia—a camp which the Nazis maintained as a showcase—inmates, including children, left a record of their nightmarish experiences in drawings and paintings.

(In HOLOCAUST, the artist Karl Weiss recorded what he saw, and his drawings were recovered after the war.)

Initially, most Jewish resistance was nonviolent. Its goal was not to destroy the Nazi juggernaut—an obviously impossible task for unarmed and largely unaided resisters—but to preserve the continuity of Jewish life and the Jewish people. The Nazis forbade religious worship and cultural activities in the ghettos; the Jews secretly continued their religious celebrations, held lectures, plays and concerts to lift their spirits, even published illegal newspapers and operated illegal school systems for their children. The Nazis constantly reduced food allowances, cut off medical and social services; the Jews smuggled food and medicine over the walls and, with superhuman effort, kept hospitals and clinics operating.

Such tactics had helped Jews withstand earlier periods of oppression and plunder; and since the Nazis concealed their "final solution" so carefully, the victims did not know for a long time that they faced not merely persecution but annihilation. Not until 1942 did the ghetto dwellers learn that relatives and neighbors taken to be "resettled" were actually going to their deaths. When the truth finally became known, nonviolent resistance was replaced by armed struggle.

By Force of Arms

It is pure myth that the Jews were merely "passive," that they did not resist the Nazis who had decided on their

destruction. The Jews fought back against their enemies to a degree no other community anywhere in the world would have been capable of doing were it to find itself similarly beleaguered. They fought against hunger and starvation, against epidemic disease, against the deadly Nazi economic blockade. They fought against the German murderers and against the traitors within their own ranks, and they were utterly alone in their fight....In the end it was ruse, deception and cunning beyond anything the world has ever seen, which accomplished what hunger and disease could not achieve. What defeated us, ultimately, was Jewry's indestructible optimism, our eternal faith in the goodness of man—or rather, in the limits of his degradation....And when, finally, we saw how we had been deceived, and...took up arms, we inscribed in the annals of history the unforgettable epic of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.

—Alexander Donat, "Jewish Resistance"
(in Albert H. Friedlander, ed., *Out of the Whirlwind*)



The battle of the Warsaw ghetto has become a symbol for heroism before hopeless odds. In April and May 1943, young men and women armed with a handful of guns, grenades and bricks stood off Nazi tanks, guns and mortar for several weeks. They fought from rooftops, stairwells and sewers and from hidden bunkers that dotted the ghetto. And they fought until all of them were dead.

(*HOLOCAUST* portrays how the people in the Warsaw ghetto struggled to give their lives a semblance of normality, and how they finally organized for the rebellion they knew would mean their death.)

Warsaw was not the only case of armed resistance. Some 40 East European ghettos, possibly more, had armed underground units. Some were organized for fighting near home, others for escape and partisan fighting in the deep Polish or Russian forests.

In Western Europe, too—in France, Belgium,

the Netherlands, and Germany itself—Jews joined resistance groups or set up their own resistance units. Even within the electrified barbed wire of the concentration and annihilation camps, Jews fought back. There were prisoner uprisings at Sobibor, Treblinka, Auschwitz and a number of other camps. The Sobibor camp was dismantled by the Germans two days after the rebellion; at Treblinka there was so much destruction that the death factory was not rebuilt.

(In *HOLOCAUST*, the bravery of the resistance fighters is exemplified by Rudi Weiss and by Helena, a Czech Jew, who brings Rudi into the Resistance.)

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why did few Jews engage in militant resistance during the early days of Nazi rule?
2. Why did the Nazis seek to hide evidence of Jewish defiance? How did the facts about Jewish resistance finally become known?
3. Are people more likely to resist oppression when they have some hope of succeeding, or when they feel their position is hopeless?
4. What made the Jews eventually rebel when they knew it was futile to resist their murderers?
5. How did the position of Jews in the Nazi ghettos compare with that of black slaves in the United States?

V. THE LESSON TO BE LEARNED

First the Nazis came for the Communists; and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Communist. Then they came for the Jews; and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. When they came for the trade unionists I didn't speak up, because I wasn't a trade unionist. And when they came for the Catholics I didn't speak up, because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me.... And by that time there was no one left to speak for anyone.

—Attributed to Pastor Martin Niemöller

If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And if I am for myself alone, who am I? And if not now—when? —Hillel

Not only did the Holocaust leave deep scars on those who perpetrated and condoned the atrocities, and on those who suffered them; it also destroyed the comforting illusion of men and women all over the world that the inhumanities

of the past were safely in the past. Once it had happened, there was no avoiding the realization that it could happen again—to Jews or to some other group.

Neither education nor wealth nor sophistication nor religious affiliation necessarily immunized individuals against the infection of nazism. The Holocaust was not simply the work of lunatics, sadists and criminals; it was planned by intellectuals and professionals and was carried out with the help of civil servants and businessmen, police officers and housewives, as well as military personnel and the entire SS.

(Ernst Biberstein and Paul Blobel, portrayed in HOLOCAUST as heads of mobile killing units, were real persons, whose units murdered thousands of civilians. Biberstein was a Protestant minister, Blobel an architect.)

Such tragedies do not come out of nowhere; and the responsibility for preventing them from happening again lies with all of us.

The testimony of the Hitler years—in documented records and diaries, works of history, novels, dramatizations like HOLOCAUST—can help us understand how the Hitler era happened and strengthen our resolve to guard against the hatred and fanaticism, bigotry and racism that can lead us—can lead any society—down the same grim path. We are—we must be—our brothers' keepers.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What do the statements of Martin Niemöller and Hillel tell us about an individual's responsibility to himself and to others in society?

2. Do you think the German people could have prevented the Holocaust if they had refused to go along with Hitler's campaign to destroy the Jews?

3. Do you believe that how you think about other groups and how you behave towards them can affect the way your community and your Government treats its citizens?

4. One characteristic of a totalitarian regime is the brutal elimination of all who might constitute an opposition. Can democracies like the United States do anything to prevent such atrocities in

other parts of the world? Should they?

5. Do you know of any human rights violations now going on in other countries? In this country?

6. What did the philosopher George Santayana mean when he said that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it?"

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QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

AMERICAN JEWISH
FOR 'HOLOCAUST'
ARCHIVES

For use with campus and adult groups.



QUESTIONS AND TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Discuss the illusions of German Jewry as portrayed in the story.
2. How does Jewish optimism prove itself deadly in our story?
3. Were all Nazis anti-Semites and racists?
4. Were all Germans, Nazis?
5. Did the Jewish Councils resist or collaborate with the Nazis?
6. What problems did Jews encounter in order to maintain armed resistance?
7. What did armed resistance accomplish?
8. With which of the characters can you identify?
9. Discuss the "spiritual resistance" of Dr. Weiss, Karl Weiss and Inga Weiss. Is this kind of resistance more courageous than armed resistance?
10. What does Green's position on intermarriage seem to be?
11. Under the circumstances, was it moral for Inga to sleep with the guard at Bucherwald? Are normal standards of moral behavior applicable to the choices people had to make during the Holocaust -- Jews and Germans?
12. Is "I was only following orders", a good moral defense?
13. Are there any lessons for American Jewry which can be elicited from the story? If so, what? If not, why not?
14. How responsible is Christian teachings for the Holocaust?
15. Discuss possible sequels to the story. What happens to Rudi? to Inga? to Inga and Karl's son?