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NEWS FROM THE Committee

The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations
165 East 56 Street
New York, New York 10022
212 751-4000

Morton Yarmon
Director of Public Relations

The AJC protects Jewish interests the world over; combats bigotry and promotes human rights for all; defends pluralism, enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people, and contributes to the formulation of American public policy from a combined Jewish and American perspective. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the U.S.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK . . . An international conference, "Society, State, and Religion: The Jewish Experience," will be held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, from February 15 through 17. Co-sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations of the Hebrew University, the symposium will be attended by prominent Israeli political and religious spokesmen, and by noted Jewish scholars and leaders in Jewish communal life in Israel, Europe, Latin America, and Australia.

The conference is to be opened by the President of the State of Israel, the Hon. Chaim Herzog.

Among the major themes that the conference participants will examine are: Religion in Israel, on interaction between nationalism and religion; the Jewish character of the State of Israel; political, social and cultural cleavages; main issues and groups in secular-religious cleavages; and women in a Jewish state.

Other sessions will be devoted to religion in the American Jewish community; pluralistic elements in Jewish tradition; strengthening democracy in the diaspora and Israel. There will also be discussion of means and strategies for change in Israel, the role of the media, and the mutual impact of developments in the diaspora and Israel.

The closing session will focus on "Ideas for the Future: What We Can Do Together to Strengthen Jewish Unity."

Among the principal scholars and political personalities who will be participating are: Ambassador Avraham Harman, Chancellor of Hebrew University; Mayor Teddy Kollek; former Minister Dr. Yosef Burg; Members of Knesset Shulamit Aloni of the Civil Rights Party and Rabbi Chaim Druckman of Gush Emunim, Hon. Ely Rubinstein, secretary of the Israeli Cabinet; Prof. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Director of the Davis Institute; and Prof. Shlomo Avineri, former Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

Co-chairmen of the conference are Prof. Harkabi, Director of the Leonard Davis Institute on International Relations of the Hebrew University, and Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, Director of International Relations of the American Jewish Committee.

The organizers of the conference are Dr. Gabriel Sheffer, Associate Director of the Davis Institute, and Dr. George E. Gruen, Director of the Israel and Middle East Division of the American Jewish Committee.

Other scholars and Jewish leaders participating include:

Professors Henry L. Feingold of the City University of New York, Michael Fishbane of Brandeis University, and Samuel Trigano of the University of Paris;

.....more

Hebrew University scholars Naomi Chazan, Judith Elizur, Ruth Gavison, Emanuel Guttman, Moshe Lissak, Avi Ravitsky, Gabi Sheffer, Zvi Werblowsky, and Zvi Zohar. Scholars from the Israeli universities are Charles Liebman and Rabbi Shubert Spero of Bar-Ilan University, Uzzi Ornan of the Technion, and Marilyn Safir of Haifa University. Prominent rabbis who will speak include Eliahu Essas, Roberto Graetz, Richard Hirsch, Wolfe Kelman, Shlomo Riskin and Pesach Schindler. Other personalities include Former Knesset Deputy Speaker S. Zalman Abramov, Australian Jewish leader Isi Leibler, and Hannah Zemer, editor of Davar.

In announcing plans for the conference, Theodore Ellenoff, President of the American Jewish Committee, said:

"The State of Israel has been charged with a formidable task: creating at the same time a Jewish state and a modern, pluralistic democracy. Over the years, unity has been maintained while competing groups attempted to mold the character of the state. In recent years, however, the delicate process has been disturbed....It is within the present climate that we have organized this conference, seeking new ways to increase mutual understanding and hopefully to help bridge the gap among the diverse elements of Judaism."

The American Jewish Committee is this country's pioneer human relations organization. Founded in 1906, it combats bigotry, protects the civil and religious rights of Jews here and abroad, and advances the cause of improved human relations for all people everywhere.

* * * *

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

memorandum

date Feb 11 88

to Charney

from Mort

subject

You may want to take some of these copies for the Feb 15-17 conference in Jerusalem As you know, copies were FAXed both to Charley Levine and to the Israel office of AJC. Can you pls make contact with Charley soonest? He is at 220 02-228-063; he seems to have moved, to 37 Rehov Hillel, and this is a new number; the previous number was 02-234-475. I am about to send him another FAX, mentioning the Fb. 22-25 meeting of the Task Force, and encouraging him to try to arrange interviews, given the intense interest in Israel on how the current situation has been playing here in the States. In talking with Charley, pls stress that, and that AJC people can speak intelligently on just this.

Mort.

The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations
165 East 56 Street
New York, New York 10022-2746
212 751-4000

FOR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION

Date: November 30, 1987

To: Members of the Commission on International Relations
Steering Committee

From: Miles Jaffe, Chair
Marc H. Tanenbaum, Director, International Relations

Subject: Invitation to Jerusalem Conference, February 1988

It is our pleasure to invite you to participate in an international forum on "Society, State, and Religion: The Jewish Experience," to be held in Jerusalem from February 15-17, 1988.

In view of your active involvement in the leadership of the American Jewish Committee, we believe that you will find this conference of particular interest, and especially the discussions of the "Mutual Impact Between Developments in the Diaspora and Israel" and the focus on "Strengthening Diaspora and Israeli Pluralism and Democracy." (An outline of the full program is attached.) The primary language of the discussions will be English.

The Forum, which is being co-sponsored by the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations of the Hebrew University and the International Relations Department of the American Jewish Committee, will be attended by noted Jewish scholars, persons active in Jewish communal life in Israel and the Diaspora, and prominent Israeli political and religious representatives. The conference is to be opened by the President of the State, The Honorable Chaim Herzog.

The State of Israel has been charged with a formidable task: creating at the same time a Jewish state and a modern, pluralistic democracy. Over the years, unity has been maintained while competing groups have attempted to mold the character of the state. In recent years, however, the delicately balanced process has been distributed. Burnt Torah scrolls and vandalized bus stations are grim reminders that some have lost sight of "Ahavat Yisrael," resorting to violence instead of pursuing a peaceful continuation of the process of negotiated understandings.

It is because of our concern over the increasing signs of polarization that we have organized the present forum. Our objectives are to explore ways to increase mutual understanding and to foster a spirit of tolerance and respect among the diverse elements of contemporary Judaism.

In addition to the major speakers listed in the attached program outline, there will be a "second circle" of other concerned scholars, and religious and communal leaders who

we hope will take an active part in discussions generated by the presentations. Our "third circle" will consist of an invited audience of educators, columnists and others actively concerned with state-religion and Israel-Diaspora issues.

We would be pleased if you could arrange your schedule to be present throughout the three-day conference, making your own unique contribution to our understanding of society, state, and religion in Jewish life. (We are recommending that overseas participants plan to arrive in Jerusalem by Sunday, February 14.)

Because space is limited and we need to finalize arrangements, we urge you to give this matter your immediate consideration. We sincerely hope you will be able to join in this potentially important event, and we look forward to your early favorable reply. Please respond directly to Dr. George E. Gruen, Director, Israel and Middle East Affairs Division, who is helping to coordinate this conference for us.

MJ/MHT/CPA
Enclosure

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An International Forum on

SOCIETY, STATE AND RELIGION: THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE

Jerusalem, February 15-17, 1988

Cosponsored by:

The International Relations Department
The American Jewish Committee

The Leonard Davis Institue
for International Relations
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Preliminary List of Sessions, Topics, Principal confirmed Speakers and Discussants

Monday, **February 15**

Morning Session: 9:00 - 1:00

Opening Session

Chairman: Theodore Ellenoff, President, The American Jewish Committee

9:10 - 9:20 Welcoming Remarks, Theodore Ellenoff

9:20 - 9:50 "Approaching a Moment of Truth", Prof. Yaacov Yadlin-Herkabi, Director, Leonard Davis Institute

9:50-10:05 Discussant: Avi Ravitzky

10:05 - 10:30 Discussion

Place, Role and Status of Religion in Contemporary Judaism

Chairman:

10:30 - 11:00 1. "On The Interaction of Nationalism and Religion", Prof. R.J. Zvi Werblowsky, Hebrew University

11:00 - 11:15 Discussant: Prof. Emanuel Guttman, Hebrew University

11:15 - 11:30 Coffee break

11:30 - 11:55 2. "Pluralistic Elements in Jewish Tradition", Prof. Michael Fishbane, Professor of Jewish Religious History and Social Ethics, Brandeis University

11:55 - 12:10 Discussant: Zvi Zohar, Hebrew University

Note: All sessions will be held in the Truman Institute Building, Mount Scopus Campus of the Hebrew University, except for the concluding session, Wednesday afternoon, Feb. 17, which will be at Mishkenot Sha'ananim.

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BIOGRAPHIES OF SPEAKERS AT CONFERENCE

(In order of appearance)

PROF. YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI

Hexter Professor of International Relations and Middle East Studies Hebrew University. Director, Leonard Davis Institute.
Recent books "Fateful Decisions", 1986 and "Bar Kochba Syndrome:Risk and Realism in International Relations", 1983

DR. AVIEZER RAVITSKY

Teacher of Judaic Studies, Heb. U.

PROF. ZVI WERBLOWKSY

Professor of Comparative Religion, Heb U. Served as Chairman of Dept. of History of Jewish Thought. Former Dean of Faculty of Humanities, Heb. U. Among his ecumenical activities he is Chairman of the Israel Interfaith Association.

PROF. EMANUEL GUTMANN

Professor of Political Science, Hebrew University.

PROF. MICHAEL FISHBANE

Samuel Lane Profesor of Jewish Religious History and Social Ethics, Lown School of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, Brandeis Univ.

ZVI ZOHAR

Teaches at the Institute of Contemporary Judaism, Hebrew University.

RABBI MARC H. TANENBAUM

Director of the International Relations Department of American Jewish Committee; Founder and currently chairman of the joint liaison committee of the Vatican Secretariat on Catholic-Jewish Relations and the International Jewish Committee for Interreligious Consultations (IJCIC); (Chairman of IJCIC since January 1, 1988). Formerly, AJC's National Interreligious Affairs Director for many years.

PROF. HENRY FEINGOLD

Professor of History, Baruch College and Graduate School of the City University of New York, and Chairman, Academic Council, American Jewish Historical Society.

RABBI SHLOMO RISKIN

Chief Rabbi of Efrat. Dean of Yeshiva Ohr Torah, Efrat. Founder and former Rabbi of Lincoln Square Synagogue. Ph.D. New York University.

RABBI WOLFE KELMAN

Executive Vice President, Rabbinical Assembly; Chairman, American Section of the World Jewish Congress; Adjunct Professor of History, Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

RABBI RICHARD HIRSCH
Executive Director of the World Union for Progressive Judaism, the International body of Reform Judaism in 25 countries, with its headquarters in Jerusalem. Has written many books and articles on the subject of contemporary Judaism.

SHIMON SAMUELS
Director, American Jewish Committee, Israel Office. Former European Director, Anti Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

ISI LEIBLER
President, Executive Council of Australian Jewry. President Asia Pacific Region World Jewish Congress and Asia Pacific Jewish Association. Has served as the principal spokesman for the Australian Jewish community for over three decades. Chairman and Managing Director, Jetset Tours, the largest travel organization in Australia.

PROF. SHMUEL TRIGANO
Professor of Sociology, University of Paris; Director, College of Jewish Studies at the Alliance Israelite Universelle; Editor, Review of Jewish Studies, Pardes.

RABBI ROBERTO GRAETZ
Head Rabbi, Association Religiosa Israelita, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

RABBI ELIAHU ESSAS
Formerly a leading religious teacher in Russia. In Israel he continues to be active politically regarding the rights of Jews in the USSR and to encourage the Jewish religious revival there, in Israel and the West.

DR. S. ZALMAN ABRAMOV
Has had a legal practice in Israel since 1939. Former Likud MK (1973) and Deputy Speaker of the Knesset (1973-74).

ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN
Government Secretary. Lawyer. Former Legal Advisor and Assistant Director General of the Foreign Ministry

PROF. RUTH GAVISON
Haim Cohen Professor of Human Rights, Law Faculty, Hebrew University. Former Chairperson, Association of Civil Rights in Israel.

DR. GABRIEL SHEFFER
Associate Director, Leonard Davis Institute. Teaches in Political Science Department, Hebrew University.

DR. MOSHE LISSAK
Professor of Sociology. Former Research Fellow, Harvard and Oxford Univs. Recipient of the Ruppin Prize.

PROF. SHLOMO AVINERI
Professor of Political Science. Former Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

PROF. UZZI ORNAN
Professor of Linguistics (computers) Hebrew University. Teacher of Computer Science, Technion, Haifa. Founder of the League Against Religious Coercion. Active in organizations concerned with the separation of religion and state.

DR. MARILYN SAFIR
Clinical Psychologist. Senior Clinical Lecturer Univ. Haifa. Director Women's Studies Program. Director, National Commission for the Advancement of the Status of Women

DR. NAOMI CHAZAN
Senior lecturer in Political Science and African Studies Hebrew Univ. Chairperson, African Studies. Member of the Israeli delegation to the Nairobi Conference on UN Decade of Women. MacArthur Award: Attitudes and Behavior of Israeli Women on War, Peace and Conflict Resolution.

DR. GEORGE E. GRUEN
Director of the Israel and Middle East Affairs Division of the American Jewish Committee; Associate of the Columbia University Seminar on the Middle East. Has taught international relations and Middle East politics and social issues at Columbia, Touro, and Brooklyn and City Colleges of CUNY.

RABBI SHUBERT SPERO
Irving Stone Professor of Contemporary Jewish Thought, Bar Ilan University. Former Rabbi of Young Israel Congregation, Cleveland, Ohio, for 35 years prior to making aliyah.

SHULAMIT ALONI
Member of the Knesset since 1965. Founder (in 1973) and leader of Citizens Rights and Peace Movement. Brought the Basic Law for Human Rights to its first reading at the Knesset.

DR. DANIEL TROPPER
Founder and Director of Gesher - organization trying to bridge the gap between secular and orthodox Jews.

YORAM PERI
Managing Editor of Davar - a major Israeli daily newspaper. Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University and lecturer at the Center for Strategic Studies.

PROF. CHARLES LIEBMAN
Professor of Political Studies at Bar Ilan Univ., specializing in the field of Religion and Society. He has served as a visiting professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary, Brown Univ, Yale Univ, the Univ. of Cape Town, and Trinity College. He is presently collaborating with Steven M. Cohen on a study comparing conceptions of Judaism among Israeli and American Jews, which will be published in 1989 by Yale University Press.

AVRAHAM HARMAN
Chancellor of Hebrew University. Former Israeli Ambassador to the United States.

DR. PESACH SCHINDLER
Director, Center for Conservative Judaism, Jerusalem. Director, Israel Office United Synagogue of America. Director, Israel Office World Council of Synagogues.

TEDDY KOLLEK
Mayor of Jerusalem.

DR. YOSEF BURG
Former Minister of Religion and Minister of the Interior. First Deputy Speaker during the second Knesset.

RABBI CHAIM DRUCKMAN
MK, Mafdal. Co-founder of Gush Emunim. Co-founded Yeshivat "Kerem B'Yavneh" and Yeshivot HaHesder (combining military service with yeshiva education).

OTHER PARTICIPATING AJC BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND STAFF MEMBERS

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Board of Governors; Steering Committee of International Affairs Commission; President, New Jersey area of AJC; former President, Metropolitan Chapter.

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SELMA HIRSH
Associate Director, AJC's Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations; Associate Director Emeritus, AJC; Member, Board of Governors.

PHILIP E. HOFFMAN
Honorary President of the AJC; served as US Representative to the Human Rights Commissions of the United Nations from 1972 - 1975; National President of AJC from 1969 - 1973.

ELAINE WISHNER
Northeastern University received BA; Attended Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis; Post Graduate Teacher Education Program; Vice-President, Chicago Chapter AJC; Member National Executive Council of AJC. Since 1982, staff and child development consultant, Child Care of Evanston.

CHARNEY BROMBERG
Deputy Director, International Relations Department AJC; former Associate Director of National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council and its Director of Middle East Affairs.

ON INTERACTION BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND RELIGION

R.J.Zwi Werblowsky

Permit me to begin, eather than end, with an apology. I do not intend to present a systematic ~~xxxxxxx~~ survey of the "interaction between nationalism and religion" as promised in the printed programme. In fact, I am going to cheat. I have deliberately chosen merely to sketch some of the parameters relevant to the problem. The obvious lessons can be drawn by anyone with ears to hear.

In recent ~~xxxxx~~ decades "national identity" has become a prominent item on the agenda of historians, political scientists, social psychologists, as well as the pundits of press and belles-lettres. Obviously "identity"of sorts has always been with us. Without it history could not have taken place, let alone been written and described. But what do we mean by the adjective "national" in national identity, at least in the modern sense of the term? Sticklers about words might say that the term was an anachronism -- at least when applied to the pre-modern period and to pre-modern forms of group consciousness (a less loaded and more vague term which leaves open the question of the definition of nationalism). I shall use the term nationalism precisely in this scientifically objectionable, vague and diffuse, but for my purposes more convenient way.

There is no standard definition of nationality (an allegedly objective term) or national consciousness (an allegedly more subjective term, influenced by ideological and even mythological factors). The latter aspect is of special relevance in post-French Revolution Europe, when national identities multiplied less as a natural growth but as conscious constructs in the creation of which writers, artists, ideologically inspired scholars and others played their part. From Europe nationalism started on its triumphal expansion over the rest of the globe. In fact, nationalism can be said to have been Europe's most successful export article. Ethnicity, tribal or other background, linguistic identity and a host of other factors including, of course, religion, went into the making of this ill-defined entity. I shall not discuss here the specific weight of the individual elements and factors. In modern France you can be a devout Catholic making a monthly pilgrimage to Lourdes or, alternatively, a Voltairian. You are all equally French. The main symbol is the French language, and the Académie Française is its Temple. Don't take linguistic unity lightly. Belgium is falling apart for reasons of language, although both sides to the conflict are good Catholics. But try

and explain to a Swiss, whether in Zurich, Lausanne or Lugano, that diversity of language was a danger to national unity! On the other hand in Cyprus, or in Sri Lanka for that matter, ethnic, linguistic and religious identities overlap and polarise. In its positivistic-evolutionist phase modern thought assumed that a) nationalism was on the wane, giving way to cosmopolitanism, and b) religion would decrease in importance as secularisation inexorably progressed. Meinecke's classic Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat as well as the growing forest of flagpoles on the U.N.Plaza in New York prove the contrary. The same Jews who are now accused of being Zionist chauvinists used to be stigmatised as "rootless cosmopolitans" by nationalist ideologists. The French Huguenots learned the hard way that --in their time-- French identity included Roman Catholicism. Until a short time ago a Spaniard would have said the same of Spain. I shall refer to Islam later. Suffice it to note here that nobody gets a fit of laughter when reading a newspaper headline to the effect that a conference of Islamic foreign ministers is about to take place, and compare this to the reactions that would greet a description of a NATO summit as a meeting of "Christian heads of state". Yet this does not prevent us from preaching commitment to a Jewish state (whatever that may mean). The opening of an official building in Israel is inevitably accompanied by the solemn affixing of a mezuzah. But just imagine the combined screams of Jewish organisations (W.J.C., A.J.C., B'nai B'rith, A.D.L. and what have you) if London or Paris or Chicago would consider themselves so Christian as to require the putting up of a crucifix over the main entrance to every government or municipal office, hospital or school.

What national and religious identities have in common is that the process of defining your (real or imagined) identity also requires a parallel development of counter-identities (stereotypes), designed to help define yourself positively over and against the "others". Religion is doubly dangerous because, quite apart from the matter of stereotypes, it also casts a halo of absolute value and legitimacy around nationalism. I do not propose to attempt to define religion. For my present purpose it suffices to state that religion, because it is concerned with the "absolute", the "ultimate" or whatever, is one of the most powerfully legitimating factors, conferring some of its absoluteness on whatever it affirms. Hence conflicts that are not essentially religious often adopt the form of religious conflict. Religious identities (as in the case of Northern Ireland) can impart a kind of commitment that overtly economic or ethnic motivations generally cannot compete with.

There is a further problem here that I do not wish to discuss at length but that should at least be hinted at. That is the relationship between national identity and the aspiration to sovereign statehood. Italians shared a common language, literature, art and religion for many centuries, but only the risorgimento converted all this to political identity. Of the Germans it was said that for centuries they were a Kulturnation. Only the 19th century turned them into a Staatsnation that sought its crowning fulfilment in the Nationalstaat. Often this transition was abetted by patriotic thinkers and poets, invoking the deeper identity of the Volksgeist -- no matter whether in its German version, or as ruah Yisra'el sabba, or the Japanese spirit as expounded by the kokugakku thinkers and leading to the kokutai concept of society and the state. In fact, my own research interests in Shinto began with the discovery of the similarity between State Shinto (of non-blessed memory) and national-religious Zionist ideology.

National identity is a macro-identity. But the fashionable cult of identity often fosters micro-identities which are then considered as a threat by the larger identity. It is enough if we remind ourselves of the Bretons in France, of Catalans and Basques in Spain, or of the difficulties experienced by Yugoslavia. Even the Swiss had their problems with their Jurassiens. Often traditional smaller (e.g., tribal) identities are systematically dismantled in the name of the new national identities. A hundred years ago no Nigerian knew that he was Nigerian:he was an Akan, Ewe, Yoruba, Ashanti.

I said earlier that the specific weight of the diverse elements that go into the making up of national identity vary from one case to another. This is certainly true of the role of religion, even in our modern, so-called secularised age. Monsieur Le Pen would like French and Catholic identities to be inseperable. French Jews vociferously protest, on the principle that one man's meat is another man's poison. What is desirable in Israel is unspeakably wicked in France.

Nevertheless, there is no denying that the Jewish case is unique. Historians like myself may well say that the Jewish people gave birth to its religion. But this is distorting the reality not only of the classical texts but of actual life as it was lived and experienced; the reality for which it was religion that gave birth to the people. Israel is a people born of religion. In this

respect it is different also from Islam which is universalistic and therefore, in spite of its basic socio-political ethos, also antagonistic to nationalism stricto sensu. Hence also the frequent swing of the pendulum in recent history between pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. Islam as a religion has, as already pointed out, politico-social though not necessarily nationalist dimensions. The latter are a modern addition. When the British pulled out of India, Gandhi desired a strong, great, wonderful, democratic India that would be a light to the nations, especially to the benighted Occident sunk in hoggish materialism. But the Muslim party insisted on the division of the country because --as Dr Jinnah put it to Gandhi-- "a Muslim has only one fatherland and that is Islam". PLO nationalism tries to conceal its powerful Islamic inspiration and pretends to be secular-nationalist, thereby also wooing and obtaining the support of Christian (~~viz.~~ including ex-Christian) Arabs -- including the Ba'ath people, the Habashs and Khawatmes. The Arab Christians have learned their lesson from history and know full well that in an Islamic society they will always be second or third class citizens. Israel is also different from other examples mentioned earlier. For even the cases of genuinely experienced identity of nation and religion (Catholic France and Spain, traditional Buddhist Burma etc.) are instances of an extant group accepting a new religion and subsequently becoming so fully identified with it that a separation appears unthinkable. This is unlike the Israelite experience, at least as it was expressed by tradition. From the moment that God had made a covenant with Abraham to the effect that the latter's "house" viz. family would become a great nation, but a nation only by virtue of walking in the way of the Lord, the two sides of that one coin have been inseperable. This does not mean that modern ideas and ideals such as pluralism, democracy and secularism have no place in a Jewish framework. But it does mean that the problems connected with national/religious identity are far more basic and far more complicated than elsewhere, and that those who advocate, in somewhat mechanistic fashion, simplistic standard solutions --often copied from elsewhere-- are not fooling anybody except themselves.

Three Approaches to the Sociology of

Ethnic Relations in Israel

Prof. Sammy Smooha

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

University of Haifa

August 1986

Three Approaches to the Sociology of Ethnic Relations in Israel

Abstract

Three approaches to ethnicity compete in contemporary sociology: the cultural, class, and pluralist. In this article each of these three perspectives is first presented in some detail, then applied to the division between Oriental (non-European) and Ashkenazi (European) Jews, and finally it is critically evaluated. The cultural approach emphasizes the assimiliability of Oriental Jews as they lose their cultural distinctiveness and traditionalism. Ethnicity lingers on, however, because of socioeconomic disadvantage and politicization, but in the long run it will become "symbolic" only. The class approach argues, on the other hand, that there exists in Israeli society an ethnic division of labor which is the impetus for the development and eventual explosion of ethnicity. A more complex picture is depicted by the pluralist approach, equally recognizing both the lack of institutionalized ethnic pluralism and the consolidation of ethnic stratification. It discerns two interlocking processes - erosion of Ashkenazi dominance and the deepening of the internal division of Oriental Jews along class and religious observance. It is concluded that the emergence in the seventies of the class and pluralist approaches which challenge the mainstream cultural approach strengthens the sociology of Israeli ethnicity. Today three alternative explanations for various ethnic phenomena can be formulated in most cases. It is neither possible nor desirable for the time being to decide scientifically which perspective is the most valid.

socialization, attitudinal change, education, assimilation, immigrant absorption, and so forth.

The class approach posits an alternative to the cultural approach in its conception of both the society and the ethnic phenomenon. It draws on the Marxist paradigm in its various manifestations. The society is conceived of as a system of inequality, in which classes emerge, acquire consciousness, organize and wage conflicts. In this class struggle, culture, the state, education, ideology and the like may serve as a means to advance class interests. Ethnic differences are one of the means which can be exploited as a weapon in the class struggle. In our own time, however, the ethnic problem has become more complex, since the class struggle in which it is enmeshed has become a part of a global economic struggle. The world today is a single capitalist economic system in which considerations of economic exploitation set in motion population movements and create economic inequality between regions, thus bringing about ethnic fissions or fusions as needed.

The paramount trend in contemporary industrialized capitalist societies is therefore one of economic development entailing economic exploitation of ethnic groups, a process which in turn intensifies ethno-class conflicts. The more specific terms for an analysis are development and underdevelopment (backwardness), discrimination, exploitation and dependency; with the underlying assumption being that ethnic relations are essentially similar to class relations in their asymmetry and potential for conflict (one side can achieve development and well-being only at the expense of another).

Whereas the cultural and class approaches enjoy a direct affiliation with grand sociological paradigms, the pluralist approach explicitly lacks such a linkage. Moreover, the cultural and class perspectives are not in fact informed by a separate theory of ethnicity, but only by a generalization of their view of the society to the ethnic question; whereas the pluralist approach makes reference to the phenomenon of pluralism

(namely, social cleavage according to cultural status groups) - including ethnic pluralism - without developing its own specific perspective on the society. Indeed, the pluralist approach sprang from a critique of the cultural and class approaches, due to their one-sidedness, determinism and inability to account for the enormous ethnic diversity throughout the world today. The underlying premise is that the ethnic phenomenon differs from place to place and from one period to another; hence a uniform set of concepts, be it based on assimilation or on class inequality, will not succeed in explaining the vast disparities that mark ethnic situations. By contrast, the pluralist approach focuses precisely on a comparison of ethnic situations and processes. If broader paradigms are required, it draws them from both functionalist and Marxist perspectives, without seeing itself as contradicting either of them. Thus in analyzing ethnicity, proponents of the pluralist approach utilize concepts derived from the other approaches, such as development and backwardness, solidarity and conflict, assimilation and separation - in each case responding to the specific ethnic situation under study.

The three approaches are distinguished by their affinity with particular ideologies and ethnic groups. There is a clear tendency to link the cultural approach with liberal ideology, and with the dominant group in the society. Similarly, the class approach tends to be bound up with radical ideology and to attract the members of the subordinate community. By contrast, the pluralist approach lacks an unequivocal ideological or social affiliation: it may appear as either reformist or radicalist; in certain situations it is accepted by the dominant group, while in others it gains the enthusiastic backing of the non-dominant group.

The purpose of the present study is to present the cultural, class and pluralist approaches to ethnicity, apply them to ethnic relations in Israel, and assess their achievements and drawbacks. The intention is to sketch the approaches in their most general lines, without analyzing their variations, identifying them with particular sociologists, or passing judgment on which of them is the most valid. Each of the

approaches will be presented in terms of its optimal ability to grasp the ethnic problem in Israel as it exists today and not only historically. The manner of presentation may lead to the relativization of the various approaches, by emphasizing that no single approach is absolutely valid or preferable, and that the explanation offered by a certain approach cannot be fully ratified until it is compared, to the degree possible, with the explanation adduced by the competing approaches. Since the three do not possess equal standing in sociology, their relativization may especially undercut the dominant cultural approach by qualifying its validity, and may bolster the scientific status of the class and pluralist approaches challenging it.

The Cultural Approach

Main Points

Focusing on the divergencies of culture, tradition, identity and mentality among ethnic groups, the cultural approach holds that the tendency in industrialized countries is one of assimilation and of building new national entities. The cultural differences are liable to create difficulties in communication, contact and intermingling among ethnic groups, and to constitute a hothouse for prejudices. Furthermore, they are likely to lead to class inequality, since the ethnic group whose values and behavior most closely approximate those of the dominant culture will have a higher competitive ability than other groups.

However, these differences crumble under the pressure of cultural homogenization and social intermeshing that operate in industrialized societies. The modern state is an assimilating agency par excellence. Through its national institutions - such as the economy, trade unions, political parties, schools, mass media and civil religion - the state assimilates its inhabitants. It dissolves their family, local, religious and ethnic identities, and imbues them with a unifying national identity. The agents of socialization

and the mass media disseminate similar styles of life and thought which facilitate contact and intermingling. Industrialization, urbanization and secularization undermine the patterns of ethnic cleavage and forge a society in which citizenship is the most powerful expression of identity, commitment and loyalty (Eisenstadt and Stein, 1973; Apter, 1967; Deutsch, 1966).

When the majority of the population in the modern state consists of immigrants, assimilation becomes an even more intensive process. The United States, which was built by waves of immigrants from Europe, has become a theoretical and normative model. The American experience, in all its manifestations, beginning with the compulsory model of "Anglo-Saxon conformity" and ending with the liberal model of "cultural pluralism", is an experience of the assimilation of European immigrants and the creation of a new American way of life and identity. Assimilation has many dimensions, but when the obstacle of "structural assimilation" - that is, integration into the institutions, clubs and cliques of the dominant group - is overcome, then the remaining obstacles (such as prejudices, discrimination, endogamy) gradually disappear or lose their importance (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; Gordon, 1964).

Since the 1960s, this cultural approach, which perceives ethnicity as conflicting with modernity, and which holds that under the pressure of industrialization and national integration cultural differences will be blurred, assimilation intensified and ethnicity enfeebled, has had to face the challenge of "the revival of ethnicity" around the world (Smith, 1981). Seeking an explanation for the survival, awakening and even amplification of ethnicity, the proponents of this approach maintained that they had always taken note of the stumbling blocks on the road to full modernization and integration. Modernization is prone to exacerbate the tensions between modern and non-modern communities, augment the inequality between them, and evoke a consciousness of divergence and disparity before the assimilation process reaches the integrative phase (Huntington, 1968: 37-38). This notion was well formulated by Gans (1979) in responding to an attack on the "straight line

theory" (Sandberg, 1974) which posits the eventual assimilation of ethnic groups into the American culture and population. Gans argued against the critics (such as Yancey, Ericksen and Juliani, 1976; Greeley, 1974) that over the course of the generations the separate existence of white immigrant groups had undergone erosion, with their "real ethnicity" metamorphosing into "symbolic ethnicity" - in other words, contracting into ethnic identity, ethnic folklore and the like, which occupy a relatively marginal place in everyday behavior.

Indeed, the cultural approach currently underscores both the main trend of assimilation and the impediments it encounters. Following are the main factors delaying assimilation and nourishing ethnicity in industrialized societies.

(1) Primordiality. Since the descent group is a kind of "extended family", the members of that ethnic group may feel blood ties, fraternity and mutual attraction, and share childhood experiences, life style and personal taste, all of them deeply ingrained in both personality and consciousness. Sociobiology would add that descent groups possess a firm base of "common genetic interests", along with a biological predisposition to prefer members of the same ethnic group (ethnic nepotism) (van den Berghe, 1981). Primordiality, even though it is enfeebled in the transition from one generation to the next, is a factor accounting for the relative ease with which ethnic passions are instigated and enflamed.

(2) Ethnocentrism. The dominant group embraces an attitude of superiority and exclusion towards the other ethnic groups, which may also manifest a similar ethnocentric approach. Since ethnocentrism is an integral part of culture, no less so than the humanitarian and egalitarian values, the citizen of a Western country may find himself living with a constant moral dilemma (Westie, 1964; Myrdal, 1944).

(3) Culture of Poverty. The dominant culture does not spread at a uniform pace to strata among the non-dominant ethnic group; hence it tends to filter down to the

underprivileged strata there at a relatively late stage. Instead of the Protestant Ethic, a culture of poverty (irrational thinking, lack of planning, dependence, fatalism, wastefulness, large families, drunkenness, crime and so forth - Lewis, 1966) arises among these distressed groups, this in itself becoming an obstacle to ethnic integration. Ethnicity becomes the trademark of lack of social mobility.

(4) Functionality. The differences between the ethnic groups are preserved thanks also to several positive contributions they make to the society. In the modern society, marked by the eclipse of community and the rise of alienation, the ethnic framework can provide belongingness, closeness and meaning (Mayo, 1974). In an immigrant society, ethnicity as a transitional phenomenon constitutes, at the least, a shock absorber against culture shock and loss of identity. In a democratic society the organized ethnic group is a pressure group that expands the social pluralism which underlies political democracy. In a new society a multiplicity of ethnic heritages furnish a diversity of sources which can enrich and fructify the nascent national culture.

(5) Preservability. Together with the pressures for assimilation, contemporary mass society also contains effective means for preserving differences of culture and identity. The mass media and the schools can be utilized also for the dissemination and fostering of ethnic heritages, symbols, and ideologies (Connor, 1973). The modern means of organization can be enlisted in the pursuit of ethnic organizing; if desired, ethnic neighborhoods can be established. Thus, if for whatever reason a certain group is interested in perpetuating ethnicity, a convenient range of means is at its disposal in the modern society. For these and other reasons, the process of ethnic assimilation is not smooth but is attended by deviations, regressions and tensions; yet ultimately it will overcome them and emerge as the dominant trend in industrialized nations.

Application to Israel

In applying the cultural approach to Israel, the ethnic question appears to be grave in the short term but solvable in the long term. The central process in ethnic relations is one of cultural and social assimilation, which within several generations could forge a new Israeli society in which ethnic origin will be of no special import in private or public life. This trend will go on despite and alongside temporary and partial ethnic awakening.

The encounter between the veteran Ashkenazi Yishuv and the mass immigration from Islamic lands was marked by cultural diversity and alienation. The major difficulty was the absence of Western culture, as among the immigrants from Yemen, Kurdistan and the Atlas Mountains; or a partial and frustrating acquisition of Western culture abroad, as among the Moroccan immigrants (Bar-Yosef, 1970). By contrast, the European immigrants were absorbed because they arrived with the same Western cultural assets as their veteran compatriots. The culture contact generated stereotypical thinking and social distance (Shuval, 1962). That absorption was implemented via bureaucratic frameworks and that no special assistance was proffered to the Oriental immigrants beyond the initial absorption constituted yet another hindrance (Eisenstadt, 1969).

In the long run, however, powerful forces for ethnic integration are at work. Israel does not fit the standard case of a society composed of distinct descent groups which from the outset lack any common culture, identity or consciousness (as among immigrants to the United States); the Israeli edot (communities) were, rather, "returning Diasporas" of the same ethnic group or nation (like the Germans who moved from East to West Germany after the Second World War, or the French settlers who returned to France after Algeria gained its independence - Ben-Rafael, 1982: 39). Hence, in Israel primordiality is an abetting factor and not an obstacle. True, the contact of cultures engendered new categories of Moroccan, Iraqi, Romanian Jews and the like, as well as Oriental versus Ashkenazi, but these categories are secondary to the ethnic unity. Thus, unlike other new states, Israel

never experienced a problem of national identity; it was patently clear that this would be a Jewish state, and identity was shared in common by all new immigrants and veterans (Bar-Yosef, 1971). Besides, Israel always professed a powerful ideology of ingathering and integration of the exiles, which works to augment tolerance and openness towards the Oriental immigrants. Hence there is no ideological obstruction of ethnocentrism (beyond prejudices at the shallow psychological level of the individual), nor does the Israeli Ashkenazi have the same kind of moral dilemma that is attributed to the American White (Peres, 1976: 79).

Moreover, Israel was never a pluralistic society in the sense of the presence in it of separate cultural groups seeking to preserve their own distinct culture and identity. The cultural differences among the communities are secondary and unstable. They are confined to two areas. One is the existence of variants of the common Jewish culture; but these are relevant only with respect to cultural integration, that is, the manner in which the Oriental heritage will mesh with the emerging national culture. The other area is the disparity in the level of modernity. Here, too, no cultural difference is involved which any side seeks to keep. The traditionalism of the Orientals began to disintegrate while they were still in their countries of origin; whereas in Israel, this inevitable and agreed-upon process of modernization was, as expected, speeded up considerably, replicating the experience of Orientals who immigrated to other Western countries. At all events, the Orientals do not possess a unique culture (religious-Jewish or non-Western Arab) which they wish to preserve or to foist on the society as an alternative to the dominant culture. The process of cultural and social assimilation undergone by Oriental Jews in Israel has been extremely vigorous. The span of about one generation has seen the disappearance of the differences in behavioral patterns and in attitudes between Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews who are equal in education, age and type of settlement (Katz and Gurevitch, 1976; Schwarzwald and Amir, 1984). Mixed marriages at a rate of about two-fifths of the maximum,(2) youth lacking any ethnic affinity whatsoever (in choice of friends, in adducing reasons for success or failure, in attitude towards persons of

different ethnic origin who possess identical characteristics), a growing representation of Orientals in middle echelons and up, and their penetration into government posts: these developments portend a constant erosion of ethnicity and an advanced level of integration from which there is no return.

Yet for the proponents of the cultural approach this considerable ethnic integration does not mean that the assimilation process has run its course, due to both objective hardships and lack of time. First, the difficulty lies in the large initial disparities between the communities in educational level and employment, and in the fact that the Orientals constitute a recognizably localized majority. Second, broad pockets of ethnic backwardness, centered in the lower strata, still exist. Due to long neglect, insufficient exposure to the Israeli culture, and a tendency to continue the diaspora situation, a large distressed stratum emerged in Israel that not only suffers from poverty but also from a "culture of poverty". And third, consideration of an Oriental origin as a basis for compensation and preference, and its exploitation as a political resource hinder the phasing out of ethnicity. In its sensitivity to the ethnic disparity, and in an effort to overcome it as rapidly as possible, the Israeli society went from the extreme of disregarding the gap to that of over-stressing it. The latter is reflected in a backtracking from the policy of uniform culture, in the recognition of ethnic origin as a criterion for the allocation of resources, in an excessive use of ethnic terminology to explain non-ethnic phenomena, and in the ideologization of ethnicity. Ethnicity was further reinforced when it was bound up with politics. It became a resource that was exploited by the two large political blocs for political recruitment and struggle. It is also natural that Oriental functionaries from all parties, who score points through ethnic ferment, should be at pains to ensure its reverberation. To this must be added some assimilated Oriental intellectuals who over-react to painful experiences of accelerated cultural change and toy with ethnic ideologies. Since all these elements have an easier time of it in the era of rapid mass communications, they are able to postpone the extinction of ethnicity.

But these lingering hurdles of ethnicity tend to be overstated and slight the main accomplishments. First, the common dichotomy Orientals vs. Ashkenazim is false. The building block of Jewish ethnicity is still the diluted edah (country of origin) since Orientals have failed to emerge as an ethnic group with a common culture, identity and fate. Second, the use of the statistical categories "Asian-Africans" vs. "Europeans-Americans" ignores the vast internal differences among the Orientals, artificially inflates the ethnic gap by including the Oriental underclass, and underplays the steady Oriental progress. And third, rather than being unique, the Oriental problem is part of a wider Israeli malaise. The stamina, ideological creativity and openness of the original Israeli center have waned. The Orientals (the mobile among them in particular) are only one of numerous groups in Israel (e.g., the Ashkenazi sabra generation, the professionals) feeling excluded by the ailing center and having their attempts to revitalize the collective values and identity thwarted. This proves, however, that their Israelization has advanced immensely over the years (Eisenstadt, 1983 and 1986).

Acculturation, the principal strategy for coping with the vicissitudes of ethnicity, refers to imbuing the lower strata among the Orientals with the values and ideals of the dominant Israeli culture. To this end more intensive use must be made of the present means of education for the culturally disadvantaged, educational integration, the social and physical rehabilitation of poor neighborhoods, broader representation in the existing parties, an increase in the rate of mixed marriages, greater incorporation of the heritage of Oriental Jewry, and more. Once they have cast off cultural backwardness - whether this is accomplished through an encounter with the bearers of the dominant culture or by other ways - the members of the lower strata among the Orientals will acquire competitive capability and social mobility which in the future will bring about genuine ethnic equality and integration.

Will ethnicity vanish? Not necessarily. On the one hand, ethnicity as a central phenomenon in the life of Israeli society or the average Israeli in any case does not

exist. This is because beyond socio-economic status, ethnic background neither determines behavior or attitudes nor blocks social mobility. On the other hand, there is no reason why ethnicity as a secondary phenomenon should not survive into the coming generations. "Symbolic ethnicity" may well flourish; that is, attachment to ethnic symbols and heritages (such as folklore, art or literature) and even ethnic identity can continue to exist precisely because they are peripheral to the life of the individual; indeed, they dovetail well with participation in subcultures that are enjoying an efflorescence in democratic Western societies.

Critical Evaluation

In the sociology of ethnic relations the cultural approach definitely continues to dominate. Its dominance stems primarily from being an inseparable part of the mainstream in Israeli sociology. This is further bolstered by the existence of parallel approaches to ethnicity in the other social sciences in Israel, including political science, anthropology, psychology, education and social work. Yet another source of its resilience is the official national ideology, which negates ethnicity as an exilic heritage while striving to build a new Israeli Jewish society in which ethnic differences will be annulled. Furthermore, the cultural approach is consistent with the outlook and vested interests of the dominant Ashkenazi group(3) and of some Orientals. Nevertheless, its strength does indeed derive from the powerful reality of cultural and social assimilation. Today the majority of the Jews in Israel are native-born or received most of their education in Israel, a development which transforms Israeliness into a shared and accepted experience and value. The fact that the Orientals have never spawned a social movement, or even an ideological stream, advocating separatist ethnic pluralism (a separate identity or culture, a separate institutional system) also reinforces the paramount trend of ethnic amalgamation.

Critics of the cultural approach contend that it cannot provide satisfactory answers to certain important questions, among which are the following:

(1) Is the process of cultural change which the Orientals have been undergoing actually so deterministic, universal, inevitable and irreversible? Will it truly end by assimilating the immigrants in general (including Ashkenazi immigrants), and immigrants from backward countries to Western states in particular, thereby absolving the Ashkenazi veterans of all blame and depriving the Orientals of any option?

(2) If the class inequalities between the ethnic groups stem in the main from cultural differences, why does ethnic equality lag far behind cultural assimilation? If the majority of the Orientals today possess a "Western" Israeli mentality, how is it that their educational and employment achievements are so meager as compared with those of the Ashkenazim? Even assuming that the Orientals are constantly bettering their performance, how will they be able to close the gap if the criteria for status attainment in Israel are continually being raised, in a manner that preserves Ashkenazi superiority? Is it not a reasonable assumption that the Ashkenazim would seek to block a mass penetration of Orientals into various positions, since such a development might not serve their interests?

(3) How can the social fusion of the ethnic groups continue if the majority of the Orientals are to be found in the lower strata and live in separate communities from the Ashkenazim?

(4) Can current developments in the ethnic realm - such as education for the disadvantaged, the rehabilitation of distressed neighborhoods and mixed marriages - shatter the ethno-class structure?

(5) If ethnicity is ideologically invalid and is well on the way to extinction, how does one account for the extensive use of ethnic concepts in reference to social phenomena (such as class inequality, voting patterns and crime)? If the leaders of the Ashkenazi dominant group are truly ideologically committed to ethnic equality and fusion, how can this be reconciled with their paternalism and superciliousness towards the

Orientals, and why do they make use of ethnicity whenever they find it convenient to do so?

(6) If ethnicity is indeed constantly weakening, how does one account for the ongoing ethnic ferment, and the accumulated sense of ethnic discrimination, frustration, hatred and aggression that many Orientals feel?

This evaluation concerns the current version of the cultural approach in the sociology of ethnic relations, which evinces more interest in assimilation than in cultural differences between the ethnic groups. The paradox is that while other social scientists and the Ashkenazi public-at-large underscore the importance of ethnic differences in the culture and the subcultures, Israeli sociologists perceive these differences as no more than a transitional phenomenon. The cultural factor, which is central to the cultural approach, loses its centrality in ethnic relations in Israel, precisely because it is considered to make a positive contribution to narrowing the ethnic gap (Zionist ideology is patently anti-pluralistic, advocating the elimination of cultural diversity and the promotion of ethnic assimilation; Orientals who accept this ideology and who lack a distinct and stable culture, willingly assimilate). In a debate on ethnic differences (Frankenstein and others, 1952) in the early 1950s, Ben-David (1970, originally published in 1951) the only sociologist to take part in the debate, argued that there are no durable and valuable cultural differences and that the relevant sociological question is how to help the Oriental immigrants to change and adapt to life in Israel.

The Israeli sociologists, then, dealt only with the initial cultural change experienced by the Oriental immigrants in the process of their adaptation to agriculture, industry, politics and other modern institutions. The impression one gleans from their work is that with the exception of the cultural backwardness which continues to characterize the lowest stratum of Orientals, in fact over the years the cultural differences between the ethnic groups have all but disappeared. Such a conclusion, positing the blurring of the cultural differences between the ethnic groups, effectively deprives the sociologists of the

cultural school of the chief means - namely, the cultural factor - at their disposal to account for the ethnic problem. The upshot is that they are forced to resort to non-cultural explanations for an analysis of the problem's persistence or its aggravation, or simply minimize the importance of these manifestations.

In Israel the cultural factor looms larger in anthropology, psychology, education and political science than it does in sociology. The anthropologists, most prominently Weingrod, Deshen, Shokeid, Goldberg and Aronoff, have undertaken thorough studies of the cultural change which the Orientals have undergone and are continuing to experience. Even though they accepted the underlying assumptions of the dominant cultural approach (modernization, immigrant absorption, assimilation, "institutionalized" conflict and so on), these anthropologists took a more serious and more respectful attitude towards the cultural patterns of the Oriental Jews, finding in their transformation elements of both continuity and change (Shokeid and Deshen, 1977, Weingrod, 1985). Psychologists and educators also dealt with the cultural aspect through the key concept of the "underprivileged pupil" who suffers from the cultural deprivation syndrome. Political scientists adduced the notion of "political culture" in order to comprehend the Orientals' political behavior.

Yet the vacuum that the sociologists left in their study of the ethnic cultural differences was not adequately filled by others. In practice, the anthropologists dealt neither with the ethnic cultural differences nor with ethnic relations, but focused exclusively on the Jewish immigrants from Islamic lands. And even here they concentrated on certain Oriental communities in the agricultural sector or in development towns - communities which did not constitute a representative sample of the Oriental population (Deshen, 1979). As a result of this cumulative neglect, we do not possess genuinely authoritative information on the cultural differences between the ethnic groups in Israel today.

At the same time, the Ashkenazi general public is imbued with the faith that the ethnic cultural diversity, even if it has diminished over time, is still considerable and constitutes the primary obstacle to ethnic integration and equality. A particularly serious cultural backwardness prevails in the distressed stratum among the Orientals, a group which, as we have noted, suffers as much from cultural as from economic poverty. Indeed, a widespread view holds that many Orientals are still not rooted in the Israeli culture. After all, about half of their children continue to be officially defined as "disadvantaged" - a cultural deprivation which in most cases typifies their parents as well - meaning that they lack the rational thinking and the knowledge which characterize the established population. On the face of it, many Orientals who do not suffer from economic distress exhibit "Israeli" attitudes and behavior patterns - that is, similar to the members of the veteran population or their children - but beneath this different values and orientations still lurk.

It is widely believed that broad strata among the Orientals are distinguished by Israeli variants of Levantinism. These are expressed by vulgar tastes in dress, in music, and in pastime. They include conspicuous consumption, folk traditions, superstitions, simplistic outlooks, loudness, indifference to democratic values, political intolerance, chauvinism, violent behavior, and more. This widespread view was given scientific credence by the Israeli anthropologist Kressel (1984) in his criticism of the Israeli social sciences for neglecting "Arabism (Urubah): a 'concealed' cultural factor in the community 'gap' in Israel". It was succinctly formulated by Mordechai Gur when he served as IDF Chief-of-Staff: "Years upon years will pass before the Oriental communities - even those receiving a full education - will succeed in coping with the West's conceptual and technological mentality" (Haaretz, May 21, 1978). Today the distinction between "two cultures", largely ethnic in nature, has become extremely popular. (See, inter alia, articles by Dankner, 1983; Rabbi, 1982; Oz, 1982; Avineri, 1982, and the responses of Elazar, 1983, and Trigano, 1983.)

Given the paucity of scientific information regarding the cultural differences between the ethnic groups, and the prevalent beliefs which accentuate those differences, sociologists following the "assimilationist" cultural approach would be well advised to reconsider the magnitude of these differences, as well as their repercussions for ethnic assimilation. By doing so they could restore the perceptive power of analysis which they lost after accepting the unfounded assumption regarding the disappearance of ethnic cultural differences.

There are several meaningful lines of research which the proposed cultural approach could pursue:

(1) A comprehensive mapping of the cultural differences in the Israeli society, while determining the ethno-national makeup of each culture and subculture.

(2) An understanding of the total set of factors, including the ethnic one, operating to crystallize or to blur cultural differences.

(3) A study of the interfaces of class, religious observance and ethnic origin (such as the split in subcultures among classes of Orientals, the disparity in religious observance between Orientals and Ashkenazim, the differences in the subculture of the non-religious middle class among Orientals and Ashkenazim, and the differences between them with respect to the subculture of the religious middle class).

(4) An analysis of the influence of Arab culture on Oriental Jews today, as compared with the influence of Eastern European culture on Ashkenazi Jews today.

(5) An investigation of the possible evolution of a non-hierarchical "cultural division of labor" between the ethnic groups as a result of differences in preference for channels of social mobility or certain occupations (such as business and politics vs. science and the free professions).

(6) An exposure of the background to the emergence of a "culture of poverty", its ethnic bases and its nature (is it merely a "reaction" to a readily changeable situation of unfair opportunities, or is it an "authentic" rooted pattern enjoying legitimation and transmitted to the next generation out of a sense of resignation?).

(7) An assessment of the effect of ethnic cultural differences in terms of their contribution to ethnic integration (such as the impact of cultural differences on mixed marriages or on educational integration).

(8) An examination of the changes in the ideology of the elite in the pre-state and statehood periods regarding the ethnic issue (such as mixing between communities, attitudes towards the Oriental vs. the Ashkenazi heritage, cultural pluralism, and the use of ethnic vocabulary to account for non-ethnic phenomena).

The Class Approach

Main Points

The class approach analyzes the relations between the ethnic groups in terms of competition for resources, chiefly economic. Perceiving ethnicity as a marginal phenomenon, a form of false class consciousness, the classic Marxist analysis argued that it would disappear with growing understanding of class exploitation or the achievement of class equality (Cox, 1948). However, since the beginning of the 1970s neo-Marxist analyses have also begun to appear which take a more serious view of ethnicity as a phenomenon in its own right. This fresh approach tends to underscore the strengthening of ethnicity in capitalist industrial societies.

The simplest formulation of the class analysis views ethnic discrimination as a weapon in the competition for resources. The superordinate ethnic group restricts the subordinate ethnic group's access to resources (high-status jobs, self-employed or employer status) in order to fortify its own standing, whether through uncoordinated personal discrimination practiced by large numbers of the dominant ethnic group, or through institutional discrimination. In the latter case the behavior of the social institutions is congruent with the needs and abilities of the dominant group exclusively. They act consistently and legitimately in order to facilitate the competition over resources for the dominant group,

or to allot them in practice greater benefits and rewards. Thus, for example, persons of differing ethnic origins with the same average educational level will achieve the same degree of advancement in the society; but the opportunities to acquire an education are not equal due to an unequal allocation of funds to the different ethnic groups. Ethnic stereotypes and ideologies accord legitimacy to institutional discrimination.

A more complex and comprehensive formulation of class analysis takes as its point of departure the premise that there are three basic conflicts at work in the current world system (Geschwender, 1981).

(1) The conflict between capital and labor. The production process generates an economic surplus which is distributed in a manner that adversely affects the share of the wage workers, whereas the middle classes get relatively more, and the capitalists, who obtain the lion's share, are the sole beneficiaries of accumulated capital, through reinvestment.

(2) The conflict between core and periphery. The capitalist economy is encompassing more and more of the world, and an international division of labor is developing between core, periphery and semi-periphery. The core consists of the industrialized states which manufacture machines and finished products and maintain high wages and living standards; the periphery is made up of the non-industrialized states which supply cheap raw materials and labor, and suffer from mass poverty, while the semi-periphery includes states in intermediate conditions.

(3) The conflict between ethnic groups. The world today is divided into ethnic groups which in the current age of nationalism may be categorized as nations, suppressed nations, and national minorities. A "nation" is a people possessing a collective consciousness or identity and a territorial base, which has realized its right to self-determination in its own state or within some other framework. A "suppressed nation" is a nation under foreign

rule. A "national minority" is a group possessing collective consciousness or identity but lacking a territorial base and hence unable to claim the right to self-determination.

The class approach emphasizes that the ethnic conflict must be analyzed in conjunction with the conflict between capital and labor and the conflict between core and periphery. The distribution of ethnic groups according to their place in the world economy and class standing gives rise to a complex system of relations. The relations between blacks and whites in the United States, for example, are between racial groups belonging to the dominant core. The whites are a nation, whereas the blacks a national minority. Both whites and blacks are subdivided into bourgeoisie and proletariat, so that a fuller understanding requires an analysis of six sets of relations (white bourgeoisie - white proletariat, white bourgeoisie - black bourgeoisie, and so on). Class-race relations in the United States - which belongs to the core - differ, for example, from the relations between the Mestizos and the Indians in Peru, which belongs to the periphery. The white bourgeoisie in the United States can determine their relations with the white or black proletariat, and between them, by importing cheap labor from Peru to the United States, moving plants from the United States to Peru, investing part of the easy profits from plants in Peru to buy industrial and racial quiet in the United States, and so forth.

The class approach focuses on an analysis of the nature of the relations among the various components of the global or state system. The relations between capital and labor are those of direct domination and economic exploitation. The relations between nations in the post-colonial era are of unequal exchange and dependency, according to their location on the core-periphery continuum. The industrialized nations, which control the world market, reinforce their hold over the non-industrialized nations, and deprive them of capital and technological know-how to prevent them from attaining economic independence or a competitive capability with them. In these asymmetrical relations of dependency, the prosperity of the industrialized nations stems from or is contingent upon the continued backwardness of the others. These relations of conflict among nations and among classes

therein are interfused with the relations of conflict between the ethnic groups. The "national suppression" of subordinate groups by superordinate groups is liable to be compounded by class exploitation and dependency relations. Thus, for example, a split labor market could emerge in a certain society, whereby the proletariat of the dominant group prevents the non-dominant group from entering high status or well-paid jobs, or creates a system of unequal pay for equal work performed by the different ethnic groups (Bonacich, 1979).

The main points of the neo-Marxist approach may be summed up as follows:

(1) the ethnic (racial, national) problems of our time arose due to the spread of capitalism as a world economic system: the imperialistic expansion of the white nations of the core into the non-white periphery, the arbitrary determination of political borders irrespective of ethnic boundaries, and the regulation of migratory movement for the exploitation of cheap labor;

(2) ethnic relations are relations of discrimination, dependency and exploitation. The welfare of one ethnic group is a function of the deprivation of another;

(3) the decisive factor in ethnic relations is the economy: capitalist development, manpower requirements, exploitation of cheap labor, new economic opportunities, and so on. Hence the non-economic factors are secondary. Thus, for example, the state can at best be a restraining factor, though in practice it usually aids the capitalists and the upper classes since it has its own interest in maintaining capital accumulation and full employment;

(4) the ethnic conflict will become increasingly aggravated because it tends to be superimposed upon the other conflicts in the following manner: (i) the congruence between the ethnic and the class conflict is expressed in a "cultural (ethnic) division of labor" (Hechter, 1975), that is, the concentration of members of the dominant ethnic group in high or sought after economic positions, with the members of the subordinate ethnic group shunted into low, demeaning, hard or dangerous work. In this state of affairs the exacerbation of the class struggle aggravates the ethnic

cleavage; (ii) the global conflict between core and periphery is transferred into the state itself: the members of the dominant group are concentrated in the center of the country or in large urban centers, while the members of the non-dominant group reside in remote regions or on the fringes of the urban centers. Since the core enjoys greater investment, development, welfare and opportunities than the periphery, the deprivation of the members of the non-dominant group assumes a territorial dimension as well;

(5) the non-dominant group's choice of strategy for resolving the ethnic conflict is relatively simple when the congruence between ethnic, class and regional cleavage approaches totality, but becomes more problematic as the congruence is less complete.

The class approach stresses processes of class formation and economic exploitation which overlap the ethnic division, and hence lead to ethnic antagonism.

Application to Israel

According to the class approach the ethnic problem in Israel is bound to worsen in the foreseeable future. This is evident in the growing differentiation between Orientals and Ashkenazim, which is leading to a mounting confrontation between them on mutually reinforcing ethnic, class and regional fronts.

The roots of the ethnic problem lie in historical processes that led to Ashkenazi dominance in the pre-state period and then in Israel. The spread of capitalist development undermined the traditional material existence of Eastern European Jewry, fanned anti-Semitism and sparked a serious crisis in relations between Jews and Gentiles. A solution then current in Europe which was adopted by some Eastern European Jews, was that of "national liberation", meaning auto-emancipation and the establishment of an independent national entity. This solution led to the founding of the Zionist movement, immigration to Palestine, and the creation of the new Yishuv (Jewish community)

institutions under Ashkenazi control. By contrast, French and British colonialism in the Islamic lands brought about economic and national development which enabled the Oriental Jews to integrate and advance in the acquisition of secular education, the free professions, the clerical and administrative realms, brokerage and commercial employment, and to a certain degree even to participate in the cultural and political domains. Far from undergoing any existential crisis, the Oriental Jews actually had excellent new opportunities opened to them, thus obviating the need for a national solution. The result was that they failed to establish their own Zionist movement, immigrate en masse to Palestine, or forge their own institutional system in the new Yishuv.

The historical turning point came with the establishment of the state. By defeating the Arab states in war, Israel caused rapid undermining of the political basis for the Jews' existence in those countries. Hence the Oriental Jews were compelled to immigrate en masse to Israel. The first years of statehood, under Ben-Gurion's rule, saw changes on a vast scale. Political and economic orientation was shifted to the West, and the socialist ideology was replaced by a nationalist "statism" which cloaked the growing class polarization. Israel underwent accelerated industrialization whose external manifestation was the country's rapid integration into the world capitalist economy, and whose internal result was a major expansion of the middle and bourgeois class (Rosenfeld and Carmi, 1976). The financing for this major economic turnabout was imported from abroad, with the state determining the funds' designation and distribution.

The developments of the 1950s led to an ethnic division of labor. The Oriental immigrants served as a cheap, malleable labor force. They were settled in vacated Arab neighborhoods, and afterwards in ma'abarot (transit camps) where the level of services was extremely low (Bernstein, 1981). They were employed as unskilled or semi-skilled wage workers in construction, industry and the services, receiving a low wage with the consent of the Histadrut (General Labor Federation) (Bernstein and Swirski, 1982). The Ashkenazi veterans, including the overwhelming majority of the proletariat, advanced into

white-collar jobs or entered the middle class, where they enjoyed not only better services but also benefitted from direct state investments in them such as the "Shikun Vatikim" project which furnished housing to old timers at low cost (Hasson, 1981). Economic development was generated through Ashkenazi entrepreneurs, investors and managers, and was directed by government officials who approved the enterprises and injected prodigious sums of money into them. Thus was set in motion a rapid expansion of the petit-bourgeois and bourgeois class, which encompassed also the professionals and some university graduates, following their successful struggle for higher wages and fringe benefits. This ethnic cleavage manifested itself outside the urban centers as well. The Oriental immigrants were sent under duress to establish hundreds of moshavim (smallholders' agricultural cooperatives); since they were provided with only wretched means of production, many of them were compelled to work also as paid laborers in developing the farms of the Ashkenazi veterans. In addition, many of the Orientals were sent to remote development towns, where they became laborers with no prospects of social mobility (Elbaz, 1980).

What transpired, then, in the 1950s was that the Ashkenazi veterans, who had built for themselves an economic-organizational infrastructure during the Yishuv period and who now headed the institutions of the new state, ruled the Oriental immigrants and exploited them as cheap labor. Without the Orientals - who became an urban proletariat, manual laborers in the development towns, and poverty-stricken moshav residents - the capitalist development of the state economy and the Ashkenazi advancement into the middle class and the bourgeoisie would not have been possible. The Oriental immigrants became dependent on the Ashkenazim as employers and managers, while the Ashkenazim had an interest in cultivating dependency and backwardness among the Orientals in order to preserve their superior standing. The Ashkenazi establishment created an ideology to justify the exploitation and the deprivation: the Orientals, according to this ideology, were backward and incompetent, hence they themselves were to blame for their subordinate position.

The ethnic cleavage today has a class and regional aspect. To a large degree, the class division between Orientals and Ashkenazim is congruent with those between employers and employed, managers and subordinates, bourgeois/petit-bourgeois and laborers, the better-off and poor. Yet at the same time it is also a regional division: the Orientals reside on the "periphery" of the cities (the "neighborhoods") and of the country (the development towns, moshavim), whereas the Ashkenazim reside at the "core". Since in a capitalist state the strong are given preference over the weak (capital over labor, core over periphery) and class and regional polarizations are aggravated, the Ashkenazim are given preference over the Orientals and the ethnic polarization is also aggravated.

The main trend in ethnic relations since the proclamation of the state is the emergence and crystallization of the ethnic cleavage. Class and regional divisions have been superimposed upon the ethnic division, increasingly lending it a "generalized" character. The Orientals are the culturally and educationally disadvantaged youths who neither work nor study, the poor, criminals, drug addicts, and hooligans, whereas the Ashkenazim are "the beautiful Israel". Ethnic stereotypes reflect and amplify this reality. Marriage is much more intra-ethnic than inter-ethnic, and voting in elections is growingly along ethnic lines. The sense of ethnic deprivation is becoming more acute, and ethnic friction is growing more frequent and intense.

Since ethnicity in the Israeli society is becoming increasingly polarized, the strategy for change is quite simple: an ethnic struggle which will be simultaneously a class and regional struggle (Swirski, 1981). The Orientals must take their fate in their hands and as residents of the urban neighborhoods, the development towns and the new-immigrant moshavim free themselves of dependency on the Ashkenazim and begin the vigorous building of their own economic-regional infrastructure. This initiative will culminate in the transfer of the ownership and management of the existing plants to the Oriental workers and the construction of new plants of their own; the founding of a new trade union which will faithfully represent the workers' rights; control of the educational and cultural

institutions and of the media so that they respond to the needs of the Orientals; and so forth. Thus the Orientals will stand tall, acquire a proportional slice of the national pie, and able and ready to compete with the Ashkenazim on an equal footing.

Critical Evaluation

Alien to the spirit of sociology as practiced in Israel, the class approach was the last to appear in the sociology of ethnic relations. It sprang up against the backdrop of both the impact of neo-Marxist streams abroad, and the ethnic unrest of the 1970s, more particularly in reaction to the public exposure of the distress of the poorer Orientals. The class approach diagnosed perceptively the focus of the ethnic problem in the 1980s: the majority of the Orientals are in the working and lower classes, while the majority of the Ashkenazim are in the middle and higher classes. This is a conflict situation which cannot be ignored, and one which is an unrelenting source of ethnic strife. The class approach holds that the "ethnic division of labor" arose chiefly in Israel of the 1950s, and that it could have been avoided. During the past generation the ethnic division of labor has become institutionalized and has spread from the economy to other institutional spheres, pushing towards ethnic polarization. Since the class approach constitutes an indictment of the Ashkenazi establishment and public, it provokes understandable resistance among them while at the same time enjoying sympathy among the Orientals, particularly the radical ones.

Critics of the class approach have posited certain key questions:

(1) Is it not an over-simplification to speak of a dichotomous "ethnic division of labor" in Israeli society? Are the Orientals not deeply split along class lines? Do they not enjoy a superior status in an economy in which the Arabs constitute about half of the working and the lower classes?

(2) What is the value of the "core-periphery" dichotomy as an independent geographical distinction when only a minority of the Orientals actually live in the periphery

(namely, in settlements remote from the urban centers), the Ashkenazim living in the periphery are not affected by underdevelopment, yet the Orientals residing in the poor neighborhoods and in the immigrant towns near the center suffer from deprivation?

(3) How relevant today - as opposed to the 1950s - is the concept of the Orientals' "economic dependency" on the Ashkenazim, when the overwhelming majority of the Orientals have steady jobs, enjoy trade union benefits, and are free to support whichever political establishment they wish?

(4) Did the "ethnic division of labor" of the 1950s in fact emerge only because the Ashkenazi veterans exploited the Oriental immigrants politically and economically? What about the weaknesses of the Oriental immigrants as compared with those of the Ashkenazi veterans and Ashkenazi new immigrants, and what about the urgent needs of the state? Moreover, if all the Oriental immigrants equally suffered discrimination and suppression, how does one account, for instance, for the disparity between the achievements of the Iraqis and those of the Moroccans?

(5) In a society where politics is central and the economy depends upon it, how can one disregard the centrality of the political factor to the ethnic problem, and in its place adduce the economic factor both as cause and as means towards a solution?(4)

(6) Is the proposed solution - the formation of a separate economic-organizational infrastructure for the Orientals - feasible? Is such a solution not liable to institutionalize Ashkenazi dominance at the "core" if the Orientals withdraw in order to establish their own organizations?

(7) If Israel is in fact an ethnically pluralistic society, in which an Ashkenazi minority dominates an Oriental majority with every intention of perpetuating that dominance, does any basic difference remain between an Oriental Jew and an Arab in Israel? Would it be realistic to predict, as follows from the class approach, that the Orientals and the Arabs, who are close in terms of class and cultural heritage, will overcome the national barrier that separates them and cooperate in a class struggle?

These critical queries are directed at the current version of the class approach to ethnic relations in Israel, namely, the dependency approach. On the one hand, this version does constitute an improvement over the previous colonialist perspective which, since it is also anti-Zionist, was rejected out of hand by Israeli sociologists (for a brief presentation of the colonialist approach, see Smooha, 1978:33-35; for its comprehensive application to Israeli society in the context of the Arab minority, see Zureik, 1979). On the other hand, the dependency version itself is flawed by simplification and one-sidedness (see, for example, the critiques of Lissak, 1981, and of Sharot, 1983) and cannot be considered as an appropriate representative of the class approach.

A more sophisticated and more flexible formulation of the class approach is required vis-a-vis ethnic relations in Israel, one which follows the lines of analysis set forth above ("Main Points"), and which can deal, among other points, with the following tasks:

(1) a comprehensive (non-dichotomous) mapping of the class structure of Israeli society, while determining the ethno-national makeup of each and every class (like the mapping of the class structure in the United States, see Wright et al., 1982; for an impressionistic classification in Israel, see Enosh, 1980:32-54);

(2) an understanding of the set of factors, including the ethnic one, working to crystallize or to obscure class differences (see, for example, the discussion in Machover and Orr, 1972);

(3) an examination of the interfaces between class and ethnic origin, such as the class cleavage among the Orientals, the ethno-national cleavage within the working class, and the relations between Orientals and Ashkenazim within the middle class;

(4) an investigation of the special problematics of the Oriental proletariat. (Is it imbued with a sense of mission and uniqueness as the last vestige on earth of the Jewish working class, or does it, rather, suffer from a sense of injustice and misfortune precisely because of this fact? Under what conditions is this class likely to produce or constitute a basis for an authentic grass-root Israeli Left?) (In this connection, see the analysis of the changes in the situation of the Jewish

proletariat before and after the establishment of the state, in Yatsiv, 1979, pp. 109-192);

(5) a follow-up of the implications of ethnic assimilation for the ethnic makeup of the social classes;

(6) an analysis of the Israeli economy as a "split labor market" (Palestinians of the territories, Israeli Arabs, Orientals, Ashkenazim) and the status of the Orientals in it;

(7) an inquiry into the ramifications of Israel's place in the world capitalist economy and in the inter-power struggle over ethnic relations (i.e., the mainly moderating effects of the opportunity-intensive structure of the Israeli economy: a "semi-periphery" moving rapidly towards the "core", based on vast capital import, maintaining nearly full employment, enjoying a constant rise in living standard, possessing a "post-industrial" set-up in which the majority are employed in the services, utilizing non-Jewish labor to man the lower levels, and so forth).

The Pluralist Approach

Main Points

The pluralist approach deals with societies segmented into culturally or socially divergent groups. Pluralism exists in diverse societies, i.e., industrialized or non-industrialized, contemporary or historical, and heterogeneous or homogeneous in ethnic makeup (hence pluralism is a broader phenomenon than ethnicity). The manifest differences between the pluralistic situations constitute a point of departure for advocates of the pluralist approach, that suggests an overall framework which can classify, analyze, and account for the vast divergences.

Following are the main points of the pluralist approach:(5)

(1) Pluralism. Pluralism is a structural feature of the overwhelming majority of societies in the world today, and varies both in quantity and in quality. As noted, essentially pluralism refers to the segmentation of the society into groups which are culturally differentiated or living separately; hence its two main dimensions are "cultural diversity" and "social separation". Cultural or social pluralism differ in degree. For example, cultural differences can be restricted to the subculture or extend to the core-culture (basic values, fundamental ideology). Social separation may be confined to friendship and marriage ties, or it may take the form of segregated housing, institutions and public facilities.

Pluralism varies also according to circumstances. Among these should be mentioned in the first place the definition of group membership: ethnicity, race, language, nationality, region, caste, religion, sect and religious observance. Second, the number, the relative size and the geographical distribution of the groups may have a crucial impact. A situation of dominant majority differs from that of dominant minority; concentration that accords a group a territorial base differs from dispersion. Third, the background to the emergence of the pluralistic situation is crucial for its subsequent development. A situation which emanates out of volition (such as free migration) is not the same as one which derives from coercion (such as occupation, annexation, enslavement) because the subordinate group's leverage determines the character of the inter-group relations that evolve. And fourth, the broad social structure is also important: pluralism in a democratic or industrialized society differs from pluralism in a non-democratic or non-industrialized society.

In addition to the divergence in degree and circumstance, pluralism varies also according to its own internal compatibility. For example, institutionalized cultural pluralism with a modicum of social pluralism (Protestants, Catholics and Jews in the United States) differs considerably from maximal social pluralism with minimal cultural pluralism (blacks and whites there) and both of these differ from appreciable cultural and

social pluralism (American Indians and whites). Inconsistency in pluralism (such as among blacks and whites in the United States) will have the most serious consequences since it constitutes racism for its own sake.

(2) Inequality. Inequality in the distribution of resources is the central axis around which group relations revolve in a pluralistic society. Although stratification has manifold dimensions - such as income, property, education, occupation, prestige and power - basically it refers to "class division". Classes are groups of people engaged in similar occupations, maintaining much the same living standards, and enjoying a more or less equal degree of political power in the society. The key question is whether the ethnic composition of classes is saliently disproportionate. Patently, a situation of "dominance" - that is, marked congruence between class division and pluralistic division - differs from a situation of partial congruence and an absence of dominance.

(3) Cohesion. Since conflicts are rife in pluralistic societies, a special need exists to set up mechanisms to preserve the solidarity and stability of these societies. These foci of cohesion may include common values, cross-cutting affiliations, elite accommodation, economic interdependence, political domination, and unifying external elements (such as a common enemy). The unique mixture of these mechanisms differs in each pluralistic situation and constitutes the main mode by which the society attempts to cope with the conflicts stemming from the internal cleavage.

A number of such modes (or models) are discernible: (i) consensus-building: blurring the differences between groups, developing common values, enhancing social integration, allocating rewards chiefly for personal achievement; (ii) consociationalism: preservation of the separate existence and identity of the groups, with resources distributed proportionally according to pre-set quotas, partnership in government, and a politics of constant compromise on controversial issues; (iii) control: the cultural diversity and the separation between groups is maintained, but one group dominates the system, imposes its

culture, looks after its own interests alone, and, by enforcing economic dependence and political regulation, prevents the non-dominant group from accumulating power and from resisting; (iv) a mixed mode: the use of several of these modes simultaneously without opting for any single clear direction. These modes may lead to essentially different inter-group relations.

(4) Change. There is no single, uniform trend of change. This is because change is dependent on the characteristics of the pluralistic situation and can be expressed through assimilation or polarization and take either a peaceful or violent form. It is essential to clarify whether pluralism is stable or transitional, that is, to what extent it is institutionalized within the society and passes from one generation to the next. Similarly with inequality: is it decreasing, or is the class division between the groups becoming a permanent phenomenon or even assuming the hue of an "ethnic division of labor"? A process of erosion differs from a process of institutionalization of dominance of one ethnic group in a pluralistic society.

(5) Causality. What is the moving force of the processes in pluralistic situations? What determines the intensity of the conflict and the direction and form of the change? Advocates of the pluralist approach have a complex stand on this matter. First, the pluralists are consciously less deterministic than the advocates of the cultural or class perspectives, surmising the existence of "broad fringes of indeterminism". For example, "genocide" is a means that is resorted to only in plural, deeply divided societies, but in many of them this measure is not taken (Kuper, 1981).

Second, the potential for conflict is consistent with the degree of pluralism: conflict is minor when pluralism is exclusively cultural, major when it is cultural and social, and prodigious when it is institutional. At the same time, every pluralistic society is bound to experience conflicts and sudden eruptions, even when on the surface the situation seems tranquil.

Third, of all the factors at work in pluralistic societies, the political factor is the most important. The mode of political incorporation of the ethnic groups into the society is a paramount factor: equal personal standing (as in the United States), equal group standing (as in Belgium) or unequal group standing (as in South Africa). These differences in incorporation parallel those in the more general policy for achieving political stability, namely, consensus-building, consociationalism, control, or any mix of them. The political causes of the group's standing in public and national life, the regime's policy vis-a-vis the ethnic problem, the dominant ideology, the relations among the elites, the styles of leadership, and the degree to which the problem has become internationalized - these are considered the most crucial factors in group relations, in comparison with cultural and economic factors. Politics not only reflects the existing cleavage; it also shapes it. A political change can alter the relative standing of the groups and the relations among them.

Fourth, the distinction between pluralism and inequality must be maintained; pluralism must not be reduced to a disguised form of inequality, nor must any a priori determination be made as to which is the more important: this question should be left to empirical examination. Thus, for example, in South America class is paramount, whereas in black Africa pluralism is more blatant as a moving force. In the history of group relations a stage may emerge in which pluralism is prime, though later it gives way to inequality.

The pluralist perspective underscores the vast differences among ethnic (or pluralistic) situations, both in terms of characterization and dynamics. Hence it is careful not to generalize about universalistic, uniform trends with respect to ethnicity in industrialized societies.

Application to Israel

What stands out in the application of the pluralist approach (see Smooha, 1978, and to some degree also Lissak, 1969) is the fact that Israeli pluralism looms very large. If we regard the Palestinians of the territories as not belonging to Israeli society,(6) the national pluralism between Arabs and Jews inside the Green Line (a demographic ratio of 15 per cent to 85 per cent) is undoubtedly the most severe. This is a deep and stable cultural, social, institutional, ideological and class cleavage, with Israel trying to cope with the problems it creates through a machinery of control over the Arab minority (Smooha, 1982). Second in seriousness is the pluralism between religious and non-religious Jews (where the proportion is 20 per cent to 80 per cent). Involved here are separate communities with diverse subcultures and separate institutions, which are at loggerheads over the desirable image of public life in the country. Consociationalism (compromise and partnership as expressed in the "religious status quo") is the formula for overcoming the difficulties generated by this pluralism. The conflict between the religious and non-religious is less grave than that between Arabs and Jews, because in a Jewish-Zionist state caught up in a war with the Arab world the overwhelming majority of the religious sector are considered equal partners, whereas the great majority of Arabs are treated as outsiders and hostile.

Against the backdrop of this extensive, durable and institutionalized pluralistic structure of Israeli society, ethnic pluralism is less severe and less institutionalized. It is prevented from gaining legitimacy and is bound to be eroded through various measures taken against it in the name of the official policy of consensus-building, including efforts to moderate ethnic differences, upgrade ethnic integration, and grant rewards according to merit. When all is said and done, no ideological dispute exists between Orientals and Ashkenazim regarding the character of the state and the final goal of the relations between them - namely, equality and assimilation. These features inform ethnic pluralism with a dynamic character, but do not detract from its significance.

Being comparative, and surmising that the three cleavages in Israeli society are fundamentally different, the pluralist approach seeks to offer an explanation for the ethnic division which will be clearly distinct from its explanations for the divisions between the religious and non-religious and between Israeli Arabs and Jews. It also seeks, as far as possible, to formulate an interpretation which will combine the process of assimilation on which the cultural approach is focused, with the process of crystallization of ethnic stratification on which the class approach capitalizes. What sets the pluralist approach apart is its contention that in Israel the ethnic problem is handled according to a "mixed model" composed of elements of consensus-building, consociationalism (compromise and partnership) and control; this in contrast to an analysis of the cultural approach according to the "consensus-building model" and in contrast to an analysis of the class approach according to the "control model" (which the pluralist approach considers to be relevant to Arab-Jewish relations only). From the standpoint of the pluralist approach, the key question is "ethnic dominance in a process of erosion"; the paramount difficulty, then, being an orderly and quiet transition from the existing situation of the dominance of a strong, veteran ethnic group which has in the meantime lost its numerical majority, to a future situation of balance and equality based on what the sides will agree on. A reduction of ethnic tensions requires that the Orientals evince greater patience vis-a-vis their rate of progress and integration into the society, and that the Ashkenazim come to terms with the growing erosion in their status as the dominant group. The tests awaiting both sides will be difficult.

From the outset the Ashkenazim established the Zionist movement and built the new Yishuv in Palestine as instruments to solve the problem of Eastern European Jewry, and not as pan-national bodies. To the degree that they considered the Oriental Jews, they tended to view them as a backward group incapable of taking part on an equal footing in the building of the Zionist enterprise. This perspective underwent a dramatic change at the beginning of the 1940s and more powerfully after the Second World War. It became evident then that the escalation of the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine and the proclamation of

the state had undermined the standing of the Jews in the Arab countries. Furthermore, the Ashkenazi establishment soon realized that the fledgling state required readily available manpower in large numbers which only Oriental Jewry could provide due to the blocking off of most of the immigration reservoirs of Ashkenazi Jewry (part having been annihilated in the Holocaust, part remaining closed off behind the Iron Curtain, and those in the free world evincing no interest in immigrating to Israel). The gates of the country were opened to mass immigration of which only slightly more than half (54 per cent) came from Oriental lands.

A unique historical concatenation of three factors determined the results of the immigrant absorption in the 1950s: (i) the weaknesses of the Oriental immigrants as compared with the veteran and new-immigrant Ashkenazim; (ii) the urgent needs of the state; and (iii) the establishment policy of discrimination. Thus the meager achievements of the Oriental immigrants are the outcome of the interaction among these three determinants: developments would have thus taken a different course had any one of the three been missing.

Far from undermining the Ashkenazi dominance which had been forged in the Yishuv period, the entry of this prodigious mass of Orientals into Israeli society actually consolidated that dominance. The Oriental immigrants labored under a series of serious disadvantages as compared with the Ashkenazi veterans and, to a certain degree, as compared with the new-immigrant Ashkenazim as well. First, they arrived with less secular education and less occupational training. Second, they had more children to care for. Third, they lacked experience in the development of "modern" ideology, organization and leadership that are prerequisites for political struggle. Fourth, in practice they were helpless, malleable "refugees" and not "free immigrants". Since the overwhelming majority of them were forced to uproot themselves from their lands of origin, Israel was for them the sole refuge, and once in Israel they were unable to return to their land of origin or move on to another country. Fifth, they had no relatives, friends or acquaintances among

the veterans or within the establishment who could assist their absorption. Sixth, the Oriental immigrants were divided according to the countries of origin without any genuine communication or contact among them. And seventh, the Orientals who arrived in Israel as poor refugees had no assets at their disposal (money, real estate, or personal compensations from Germany) such as many of the Ashkenazim had.

The vulnerability of the Orientals was fully exploited by the establishment, which set itself two principal tasks: (i) to avert the danger that the "primitive" Oriental immigrants would undermine the foundations of the fledgling state's "Western" national culture and democratic regime; and (ii) to enlist them in the solution of the country's urgent problems, without giving consideration to the price they were liable to pay. The "policy of absorption" which on the formal plane was known as "amalgamation of exiles" but which in practice assumed the form of "paternalism and co-optation", served as the chief instrument to achieve these goals. The immigrants were provided with basic services, such as a roof over their heads, employment and health insurance; but even though these ensured their initial absorption and prevented destitution, they were insufficient to generate equality. The integration of the Oriental immigrants in the schools, the political parties, the trade unions, the health insurance funds and so forth, was sufficiently effective to counteract wholly any need to form immigrant organizations which would provide such services, and to neutralize the immigrants as an independent force. This was guaranteed through various steps, including the co-optation of the leadership, the breaking of militant elements, and cultural suppression.

For the establishment the crucial importance of this absorption policy lay not only in supplying immediate remedies to the exigencies of absorbing the mass immigration, but in boosting the handling of the central policy questions. What were the urgent problems of the state in its first years, and how did it go about coping with them? First, in order to rebuff the international pressures exerted on it to withdraw to the 1947 partition lines, and in order to block the infiltration of Palestinian refugees, Israel founded hundreds of

new settlements, many of which were in areas that had been captured in the fighting. Second, these settlements promoted the goals of "population dispersal" and of expanding agricultural-rural settlement. Third, it was essential to reinforce the army immediately in order to thwart the Arab threat to launch a new "round". Fourth, to ensure full employment and to integrate itself into the world economy, the small and underdeveloped Israeli economy was adjured to undergo accelerated industrialization. And fifth, the actual absorption of the immigrants, a paramount Zionist objective, demanded an expansion of the services sector, including education, health, housing and public administration. These were all urgent and cardinal tasks for the state, and their implementation required demographic reinforcement.

Since Ashkenazi immigrants did not suffer from the handicaps enumerated above, they were easily able to overcome the defects in the absorption services and to withstand successfully the strong pressures exerted by the establishment. By contrast, the vulnerable Oriental immigrants were amenable to manipulation. And indeed, as part of the solution of the state's immediate problems they were shunted en masse into subordinate positions in all spheres of institutional development; becoming low-status unskilled or skilled workers, privates and non-commissioned officers in the army, dwellers in ma'abarot, remote moshavim, and development towns which were allocated miniscule resources, and so forth. This ramified institutional expansion furnished ample opportunities for the veteran - and soon for the new-immigrant - Ashkenazim. The upshot was that they were "pushed upwards" to the intermediate and high echelons. The paternalistic establishment regarded this absorption of the Oriental immigrants as a natural and just stage. This was the "generation of the wilderness" who "got what they deserved", although the best among them would be trained and climb the social scale. Full equality and integration would be deferred to the next generation, which would undergo the melting pot of the school, youth movement, army, party, etc., and which would from the outset be versed in the Western mentality and the Israeli culture.

Complex ethnic change transpired in the 1960s and the 1970s. The Orientals consolidated economically, some broke through to the intermediate and higher rungs, and most of them adopted Israeli cultural patterns. Contributing to this change were severance from the lands of origin, an orientation towards Western values and integration in Israel, absorption as families and not as communities, civil equality which was accorded upon immigration, incorporation into the existing frameworks, and the heavy pressures that were exerted for cultural change and social assimilation. To these must be added an erosion in the strength of the Labor Party establishment which loosened the citizens' dependence on government, thus slowly releasing the Orientals from its ways.

At the same time, this ethnic change was not sufficiently comprehensive or profound to dislodge cultural and social pluralism and to bring about ethnic equality. Beyond the core culture shared by all the ethnic groups (Hebrew language and literature, Jewish faith and nationalism, the centrality of the family, most of the values of the Protestant Ethic and a political consensus on Israel as a Jewish-Zionist, liberal, welfare state, practicing political democracy, and oriented towards the Western bloc) differences exist in the subcultures. As compared with the Ashkenazim, the Orientals observe religion more and maintain their own religious styles; their families are larger; their Hebrew accent is more authentic and their use of language less formal; their approach to politics is more passive and compromising, less ideological; those among them who are in the working class are developing a unique "proletarian culture"; and some of those who are in the distressed stratum suffer from a "culture of poverty". This cultural divergence is based on social separation, with most of the families in the country, along with many settlements and neighborhoods and the majority of the elementary school classes, being mono-ethnic.

The Orientals' economic consolidation and social mobility notwithstanding, an ethno-class structure is taking shape in Israel. Virtually the entire disadvantaged Jewish population is Oriental, as is most of the Jewish working class. The middle stratum is mixed, with a slight Ashkenazi predominance; the upper-middle stratum (professionals,

managers, small businesses) is largely Ashkenazi; while the elite stratum is almost exclusively Ashkenazi. This ethnic makeup of the classes is being transmitted to the next generation and is acquiring informal legitimation. Nor does this ethno-class structure entail, however, an "ethnic division of labor", for two reasons. First, a deep class cleavage exists among the Orientals themselves, between the two-fifths that are situated in the middle classes and higher, and the three-fifths who are located in the working and lower classes. Second, the Orientals as a whole constitute a middle stratum of preferred status in the ethno-class structure, since they are placed above an extremely broad stratum of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians from the territories who are employed inside the Green Line, and who form nearly half of the working and lower classes in the country.

Today, these cultural and class differences serve as an infrastructure for Ashkenazi dominance. The discrepancy in subcultures is still sufficiently significant to (i) hinder a considerable portion of the Orientals from competing on an equal footing with the Ashkenazim in a society whose norms are geared more to the needs of the latter; (ii) go on feeding the paternalistic and patronizing ideology of the Ashkenazi establishment and public vis-a-vis the Oriental Jews; and (iii) forge and reinforce feelings of discrimination, inferiority and alienation among the Orientals. To this must be added the substantial class gap which insures that the Ashkenazim will continue to retain political, economic and cultural dominance. Ashkenazi dominance continues. It is supported by a series of maintenance and reinforcement processes and mechanisms which include: (i) a class inheritance that preserves the existing ethno-class structure; (ii) the formation of ethno-class communities; (iii) institutional discrimination against the lower strata and the Orientals; (iv) Ashkenazi control over the means of cultural transmission (media, formal and informal educational institutions); (v) a constellation of factors inhibiting a serious, organized struggle by the Orientals (their ongoing division by class, generation and country of origin; the co-optation of their leadership; the existence of a broad Arab stratum beneath them; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the full-employment and foreign-subsidization economy; the anti-ethnic ideology); (vi) growing class and cultural

unity among the Ashkenazim (despite their ideological disagreement) which reinforces their ethnic seclusion; and (vii) an absence of government policy aimed at effecting a meaningful change in the ethnic situation.

At the same time, indications of an incipient erosion of Ashkenazi dominance have been visible since the early 1970s. These signs include: (i) the fact that the two-fifths of the Orientals who are situated in the middle and higher classes are competing and integrating with the Ashkenazim; (ii) penetration of Orientals into "strategic" and sensitive frameworks (for example, about half of the members of the Herut Party's Central Committee are Orientals; and about half of all persons of Oriental origin have Ashkenazi close kin)(7); (iii) the concentration of voting for the ruling parties accords a certain bargaining power to the Orientals or to the functionaries among them who contest - sometimes successfully - even the highest posts (such as president, prime minister, chief-of staff, and secretary-general of the Histadrut Labor Federation); (iv) the ongoing Oriental protest is a permanent nuisance which must be taken into account (the Black Panthers, the Chalim Movement, the activists against the Ashkenazi-tilted Israel Television documentary series "Pillar of Fire", hostility towards the kibbutzim, disruption of the 1981 Knesset election campaign, and so forth); and (v) the exposure and excoriation of the Labor movement establishment - the base of Ashkenazi dominance - by the Likud.

The erosion of ethnic dominance is creating an increasingly serious problem of objective and psychological adaptation among the Ashkenazim. Since the 1970s they have had to come to grips with a situation in which they must sometimes compete with Oriental candidates for certain positions, face criticisms and even insults loaded with ethnic insinuations, make a distinction in their own mind between their own concepts and interests as the dominant group and pan-Israeli or national concepts and interests, develop an Ashkenazi identity, feel what it means to be a numerical minority and be apprehensive about ethnic discrimination, fear ethnic unrest which is liable to undercut

their privileged status, culture, quality of life, and so on. Ashkenazi adaptability to a new situation marked by non-dominance or by equal standing is crucial for the attainment of a new modus vivendi in ethnic relations (in connection with certain implications of these processes for the Ashkenazi identity, see Lotan, 1983).

The direction of the search for a solution to the ethnic problem lies in the accelerated process of erosion of Ashkenazi dominance. What is required to that end is awakened and augmented political awareness among the Orientals, their assumption of responsibility for their situation, and the launching of an organized political struggle to erase ethnic stratification, and to obtain greater cultural expression.

Critical Evaluation

The pluralist approach is a perspective which recognizes the validity of the main claims of the cultural and class perspectives and seeks to bridge them. It agrees with the cultural approach that ethnic pluralism (i.e., the cultural diversity and social separation among the ethnic groups) is not institutionalized (i.e., is unstable and illegitimate), and it concurs with the class approach that ethnic stratification is so extensive that the majority of Orientals today are situated in the working and lower classes, in contrast to the majority of Ashkenazim who are in the middle or higher classes. It holds that as a result of these two basic facts, the ethnic situation in Israel is volatile. It points to two paramount trends which are closely interwoven: an erosion of Ashkenazi dominance, and a deepening of the internal cleavage among the Orientals. It sees the Orientals as a non-dominant majority which is accumulating power and challenging Ashkenazi dominance, but which fundamentally remains weak, since it is - within the framework of the Jewish-Zionist state - a minority among the Jewish people, deeply riven internally, and ambivalent regarding its basic way of life and orientation. It perceives the Ashkenazim as a dominant minority which is defending itself against the pressures of the Oriental majority, finding it difficult to adapt to the decline of its

dominance, while being forced into the gradual discovery that the ethnic problem concerns not only the Orientals but the Ashkenazim as well.

If the main advantage of the pluralist approach is its sensitivity to the central processes that mark ethnic relations, its chief weakness lies precisely in being an eclectic, synthesizing and compromising approach. Certain questions may be posed:

(1) What new ideas are contained in the pluralist approach which are not to be found in the cultural or the class approach?

(2) Isn't the pluralist analysis so neutral, factual, conventional, and inconsequential that the advocates of both the cultural and class approaches will be ready in principle to accept it (if not in all its details)?

(3) If the pluralist approach grants that ethnic pluralism in Israel is not institutionalized, why does it disregard the inevitable results of this process which necessarily leads to the elimination of ethnicity - failing to analyze the ethnic situation in terms of long-term assimilation?

(4) If the pluralist approach agrees that considerable ethnic stratification does exist in Israel, why does it gloss over the inescapable consequences of this process - which necessarily leads to ethno-class polarization - failing to analyze the ethnic situation in terms of long-term ethnic confrontation?

(5) What alternative solution does the pluralist approach offer if it is not ready today to adopt the notion of the "pluralistic society" in which cultural and social pluralism among Orientals and Ashkenazim would be institutionalized, along the lines of the pluralism between religious and non-religious Jews, or between Israeli Arabs and Jews?

Comparison

In applying the three perspectives on ethnic relations to the situation in Israel I have tried to refrain from identifying them with specific sociologists, leaving them as general as possible. While this objective is applicable to the cultural approach, which explicitly or implicitly informs the work of most of the Israeli sociologists who deal with the subject, it is all but impossible with respect to the two competing approaches, which are connected with a handful of sociologists. Between 1978 and 1982 three books were published on ethnic relations in Israel - each applying one of the three perspectives. It is important to glance briefly at their authors' attitude towards the rival approaches, and see to what extent their applications represent the general approaches which have been set forth here.

Chronologically, the first book is my own study, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, published in 1978 although based on work dating back to 1973. This was the first scientific work to assert that there are three approaches in the sociology of ethnic relations in Israel, and the first to put forward a systematic analysis based on one of those approaches.(8) In the book the cultural approach is termed the "nation-building" perspective and its application to the ethnic sphere is called an "immigrant-absorption and modernization model", while the class approach appears in its colonialist version. These two approaches are presented and criticized, with the pluralist approach being offered as an alternative. The book is devoted to the application of the pluralist approach to the relations between Orientals and Ashkenazim, while systematically comparing them with the relations between religious and non-religious Jews and with the relations between Israeli Arabs and Jews. What emerges is a portrait of Israel in the mid-1970s. The pluralist approach and its application to Israel in the present study are based largely on this book, although formulations and emphases have undergone considerable revisions, as necessitated by the changes in the field and by updatings of the analysis.

The second book, Orientals and Ashkenazim in Israel: The Ethnic Division of Labor, was published in 1981 by Swirski and is based on work which began to appear in 1979. The book applies the dependency version of the class approach, while granting explicit recognition to the two other approaches. However, the conclusion drawn from the critique of the pluralist approach - which is presented in a distorted manner - is that it does not constitute a genuine alternative to the dominant functionalist (cultural) approach, so that the burden of the struggle against it is borne by the dependency approach alone. This assessment comes as no surprise, since in the Marxist worldview the division thrusts toward dichotomy: if you're not with us, you're against us. The general class approach set forth here is a more sophisticated version, incorporating several neo-Marxist trends, but its application is close to the dependency version because this is the fashionable formulation in Israel today.

In his book The Emergence of Ethnicity: Cultural Groups and Social Conflict in Israel, published in 1982, but drawing on earlier work, Ben-Rafael offers a systematic application of the cultural approach. He presents his approach only and refrains from even alluding to the existence of the two competing approaches. In his preface Ben-Rafael maintains that hundreds of studies exist on the ethnic issue, but "up to now no attempt has been made to draw out a comprehensive picture of the Israeli case that might reveal features unexamined by researchers concerned with specific issues" (p. xvii). Thus the author chooses to ignore totally the attempts of his predecessors - advocates of the pluralist and class schools - to conduct a comprehensive analysis of ethnic relations in Israel. The cultural approach outlined here is far broader than the conceptual framework formulated in Ben-Rafael's book, and its application, too, is not entirely consistent with his discussion.



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Comparison between Applications of Three Approaches in the

Sociology of Ethnic Relations in Israel

Criterion	Cultural Approach (Ben-Rafael)	Class Approach (Swirski)	Pluralist Approach (Smooha)
Diagnosis	Crypto (illegitimate) ethnic pluralism (stable ethnic division which contradicts the ideology of ethnic integration).	Dependency relations (one ethnic group dominates another through economic dependency).	Ethnic dominance in slow process of erosion (one ethnic group has political, economic, cultural and ideological domination, but this domination is temporary, conditional and declining) (paternalistic relations).
Main Cause	Cultural-Ideological.	Economic.	Political.

Model of Ethnic Relations	Consensus-building model (national agreement on ethnic integration, reward for merit, an open society assimilating any able and mobile Oriental).	Domination model (Ashkenazim's control over the economy, politics, culture and media enable them to create and maintain Oriental dependency and to prevent Orientals for the time being from organizing to wage a radical struggle for doing away with dependency relations).	Mixed model entailing consensus-building (promoting agreement on ethnic amalgamation and formation of a common national culture), consociationalism (compromise and partnership in certain areas - dual religious institutions, ethnic appointments, etc.), and domination (ethnic dominance in most spheres and use of force to break resistance when needed).
Base of Ethnic Membership	Descent + Culture + class ("ethnic" is only one who is lower on all three).	Descent + class (everyone is "ethnic").	Descent (everyone is "ethnic").

erion	Cultural Approach	Class Approach	Pluralist Approach
	(Ben-Rafael)	(Swirski)	(Smooha)
ies to Fthnic sion	a. "Fthnic" - members of Yemenite, Moroccan, etc. edot (communities); Oriental countries of origin constitute an aggregate of status groups and ethno-classes that keep their ethnic distinctiveness and do not merge into a broad Oriental ethnic group.	a. "Orientals" (Jews originating from Asia and Africa) undergoing a process of crystallization as one ethno-class.	a. "Orientals" - Jews originating from Asia and Africa (including Soviet Georgia, Spain, the Balkans) divided by country of origin, subculture and class, but most are united by the common interest of doing away with Ashkenazi dominance and achieving ethnic equality and hence undergoing a process of crystallization as an Oriental ethnic group.
	b. "Outs", including dominant stock (Ashkenazi veterans and their offsprings) and the middle class (Ashkenazi new im-	b. Ashkenazim (Jews originating from Europe and America) constituting one crystallized ethno-class.	b. Ashkenazim - Jews originating from Europe and America and others constituting a crystallized ethno-class dis-

	migrants and mobile Orientals) - all are carriers of the dominant culture.		guised as "Israeli" (non-ethnic) but as its dominance is eroding, its awareness of its ethnic interests and identity is rising.
Status and size of Non-Dominant Group	{Ethnics are a non-dominant minority (1/3 to 2/5 of the Jewish population)}.	{Orientals are a non-dominant majority}.	Orientals are a non-dominant majority.
Ethnic Ideology	The official ideology of ethnic integration has enormous impact on ethnic relations in many areas (uncualified acceptance of "ethnics" into society pressures and programs to assimilate them, their view of themselves, as transitory, etc.).	{The official ideology of ethnic integration is not important; it serves as a tool for mystification of ethnic relations by disguising the real Ashkenazi interests and by pacifying the Orientals}; the Ashkenazi establishment dehumanizes the Orientals in order to	The official ideology of ethnic integration is important for the Ashkenazim as a weapon against Oriental organizing and for the Oriental as a weapon for equality not less important is the non-official ideology of paternalism and co-optation which guides

Criterion	Cultural Approach (Ben-Rafael)	Class Approach (Swirski)	Pluralist Approach (Smooha)
		justify domination and exploitation.	the establishment in its relations with the Orientals - legitimizing the Ashkenazi dominance and conditioning the ethnic equality and fusion upon the Orientals ridding themselves of backwar traditionalism and Arab mentality.
Cultural Differences	The dominant, Western, secular and cosmopolitan culture characterizes the "outs" (non-ethnics) only; since the ethnic culture incorporates the exilic heritage with modern elements, it is new and eclectic as well as ethnic-traditional and	(There is no explicit reference to cultural differences; it is assumed that they do not have significant or direct implications for ethnic relations).	There are no ethnic differences in the core culture (religion nationality, language familism, Protestant ethic, political consensus), but significan differences prevail i the subcultures, but no precisely on th

	backward-Arab; despite the significant change they underwent, the ethnics are still not modern because they are unprepared for total change.		traditionalism-modernism continuum (accent and uses of the language, religious observance and style, political and class subculture, etc.).
Class Disparities	There is clear inequality: the ethnics are lower ethno-classes (Orientals only) whereas the "outs" are in the non-ethnic middle and upper classes (most are Ashkenazi by origin and some are Oriental).	There is an ethnic division of labor: the Orientals are a lower ethno-class while the Ashkenazim are a higher ethno-class which owns and manages the economy.	There is distinctive ethnic stratification: lower working stratum - Oriental, higher working stratum - mostly Oriental, middle stratum - mixed, upper-middle - mostly Ashkenazi, upper-Ashkenazi; the Orientals constitute only half of the working class while the Arab citizens and aliens the other half; around 90% of the Ashkenazim and 40% of the Orientals are situated in the middle and higher strata.

Criterion	Cultural Approach (Ben-Rafael)	Class Approach (Swirski)	Pluralist Approach (Smooha)
Disparities in Political Power	The "edot" are non-dominant groups whose power is small and whose qualifications to reach elite positions are deficient; they are aware of their political inferiority and interpret it in ethnic rather than class terms; their liberation from the tutelage of the establishment shifted their support to the right-wing parties and not to ethnic or radical parties; their politics is self-serving, neither ideological nor ethnic.	{Ashkenazim control politics through the economy and control the Orientals through both}; Orientals' participation in partisan and parliamentary politics is necessarily accompanied by cooptation and accommodation and hence prevents change; extra-parliamentary or separatist politics can help Orientals to break their dependency on Ashkenazim.	Ethnic dominance is primarily political: Ashkenazim control politics and through it other institutions as well (economy, media, culture education, etc.) and push Orientals to lower positions; availing themselves of their numerical preponderance in a democracy, the Orientals cumulate power by participating in integrationist ethnic politics within the existing institutions; as they rid themselves of political control the cost of cooptation begin to rise constantly; th

			Oriental rise in power erodes Ashkenazi dominance in politics which effects other areas; a turning point is expected when Orientals will obtain a control over one of the major political blocks.
Geographical Concentration	The "edot" are largely concentrated in separate communities which serve as a base for their perpetuation as ethno-classes, despite the fact that most localities are not populated by a single edah (a country of origin).	The division between core and periphery is the key stone of the ethnic divide: the Ashkenazim live in the core (urban centers which enjoy investments, opportunities and accumulation of capital) whereas the Orientals live in the periphery (development towns, remote moshavim and poor	The ethnic concentrations create ethnic communities which perpetuate the ethnic separation and inequality.

Criterion	Cultural Approach (Pen-Rafael)	Class Approach (Swirski)	Pluralist Approach (Smooha)
		neighborhoods where resources are scarce); the Orientals in the periphery also suffer from the domination of Ashkenazi localities which are the extensions of the core.	
Social and Institutional Separation	The mobile ethnics are assimilating into the non-ethnic middle-class; offsprings of mixed marriages are perceived as non-ethnic; while voting is ethnic, there are no permanent ethnic parties.	Separation crystallizes the Orientals and Ashkenazim as ethno-classes: separate community institutions, endogamy, ethnic voting, separated workplaces according to rank in job, etc.	The absence of ethnic separation in institutions (except religion) destabilizes ethnic pluralism, advances assimilation, and in the long-run erodes Ashkenazi dominance; there is considerable social separation (in neighborhoods, schools, etc.) which is crystallizing the Ashkenazim into an ethnic

			entity and is slowly consolidating the Orientals into an ethnic entity.
Mobility	The ongoing mobility of the able and achieving ethnics into the middle class deprives the edot of leadership, downgrades their manpower and consolidates them further into lower ethno-classes.	There is Ashkenazi mobility (massive in the 1950s and moderate thereafter) which is possible only by keeping the Orientals backward and in place; (Oriental mobility is insignificant, except of few deserters who function as Ashkenazim).	There is Ashkenazi mobility (massive in the 1950s and moderate thereafter) which takes place at the expense of the Orientals whose ability to compete is smaller; there is some Oriental mobility at the expense of Arab citizens and aliens; Orientals' mobility depletes them of leadership and reinforces the meritocratic-voluntaristic ethos (everyone who tries hard would make it, there is no ethnic discrimination).

iterion	Cultural Approach (Ben-Rafael)	Class Approach (Swirski)	Pluralist Approach (Smooha)
nflict	The potential for the conflict is limited: although there exists a large real gap which is perceived by the ethnics as ethnic deprivation, but the conflict is not real because conflicting group interests are lacking, there is neither discrimination nor blocked mobility; the intensity of the conflict is low: the ethnics do not wish to wage a struggle on an ethnic basis.	The potential for the conflict is high: the Orientals suffer from considerable discrimination, exploitation and alienation; the intensity of the conflict is low to moderate: the Orientals are in the stage of disillusionment with equality and integration and of developing awareness of their predicament.	The potential for the conflict is moderate: large ethnic gap, paternalism and institutional discrimination against the Orientals, and some Oriental alienation; the intensity of the conflict is low to moderate: the Orientals feel very ambivalent towards the necessity, chances and legitimacy of ethnic struggle.
e Expla-tion for e Ethnic iet	The edot are an aggregate of "truncated ethnoclasses" that as long as they accept the ideology	Being dependent on Ashkenazim, the Orientals are subject to uninterrupted manipulations,	A mix of positive and negative factors preserves the ethnic quiet: the ideology of ethnic

	of ethnic integration and view themselves as transitional they remain unorganized and cannot challenge the ethnic status quo.	still lack consciousness of their predicament, and have no independent economic base to struggle for liberation from dependency.	integration, the Israeli-Arab conflict, the subsidized economy with opportunities for mobility, a national class structure which makes Orientals a privileged middle stratum (above the Arabs), the Oriental internal split, the cooptation of the Oriental leadership, the Ashkenazi establishment's preparedness to pay the rising price of continuing cooptation and to thwart the efforts of Oriental militant groups.
The Explanation for the Formation of Ethnic Relations	Cultural inadequacy of most Orientals for life in a Western, secular and democratic society.	Capitalist development which necessitated the exploitation of cheap manpower which was supplied by the Oriental immigrants.	A special combination of three factors: (a) the Oriental immigrants' weaknesses as compared to Ashkenazi veterans and immigrants, (b) the

iterion	Cultural Approach (Pen-Rafael)	Class Approach (Swirski)	Pluralist Approach (Smooha)
			State's urgent needs, and (c) the discriminatory policy of the establishment that exploited the weaknesses of the Oriental immigrants for solving the immediate State's problems.
uture rends	Stability - continuity of the mobility of the ethnics and continuity of the edot as separate, low-status ethnic communities.	Polarization-exacerbation of the ethnic division of labor and its growing overlap with class (capital and labor) and regional (core and periphery) divisions.	Dialectics of moderation and exacerbation - the erosion of Ashkenazi dominance increases the Oriental intolerance of its continuity (the intensification of the sense of relative deprivation) and the Ashkenazi apprehension of its repercussions.

Existing Programs to Achieve Ethnic Equality	They reinforce the ethnic gap by the continuation of the mobility to the middle class and of the assimilation of the able and ambitious ethnics and by confirming the ideological commitment to ethnic integration and to the negation of ethnicity.	They reinforce the dependency relations and exploitation between the ethnic groups: they provide Orientals with temporary relief and with illusion of progress within the existing system, and they further benefit the Ashkenazim who supply the professional services and manage the assistance programs.	They raise the Oriental "floor" without reducing the Ashkenazi well-being, continue the mobility of the Oriental achievers, demonstrate the goodwill of the Ashkenazi establishment and affirm the belief in the ideology of ethnic integration and equality.
Recommended Strategy for Change	{None; by implication: Westernization and secularization of the edot and ridding them of their ethnic heritage and identity}.	The building of a separate, socialist, economic-organizational infra-structure by the Orientals.	The political organizing of Orientals inside and outside the existing frameworks in order to break Ashkenazi dominance.

Criterion	Cultural Approach (Ben-Rafael)	Class Approach (Swirski)	Pluralist Approach (Smooha)
Implications for the Wider Society	The ethnic gap creates cultural discontinuity in Israeli society, which serves as a source of social tension between cultural groups (the Levantinized Edot and others) and ideological tension between the ideal of ethnic integration and the reality of the ethnic gap.	The ethnic division of labor augments exploitation and polarization in society for the short-run (but for the long-run it boosts the chances for revolutionary change, i.e., the transition to a socialist society which is politically and culturally integrated into the Middle East).	The ethnic gap turns Israel into an ethnically pluralistic society laden with tensions and conflicts, and wasting manpower resources (the untapped Oriental potential); today the ethnic gap has an indirect and limited impact on politics and culture, but in the future, when the Orientals master power, they will have positive contributions to the society (the adaptation of Israel to the Middle East, the mitigation of the conflict between the religious and non-religious, etc.).

Social Criticism	(None; there is an implicit justification of the ethnic status-quo and social system, and the placing of the blame on the Orientals).	Radical criticism: negation of the ethnic status-quo, rejection of the existing social-economic system and the placing of the blame on the Ashkenazim.	Moderate criticism: negation of the ethnic status-quo, criticism of certain institutional arrangements (condemnation of institutional discrimination), recognition of the Oriental weaknesses, and the placing of some blame on Ashkenazim.

Conclusions

The appearance of three alternative approaches to ethnic differences signals the maturation of Israeli sociology. Its emancipation from monolithism abets the scientific virtues of skepticism, criticism, and the need to decide among competing explanations, and thus also enhances the level of objectivity. Yet welcome as this development is, no one who expects science to provide a clear answer can avoid feeling a sense of bewilderment and frustration, the more so in view of the prevalent belief in science that which of a series of approaches is preferable may be determined according to scientific criteria.

However, in the existing state of affairs it is impossible to decide scientifically among the approaches. This is due in principle to the fact that in science a certain specific hypothesis may be directly refuted or indirectly accepted. It is difficult to reject or verify a theory, which is a system of assumptions and explanations (confirmed hypotheses) in a certain area. It is all but impossible to examine scientifically an approach (a theoretical perspective) which is a complex of assumptions, conceptual and methodological orientations and explanations. And certainly there is no possiblility of assessing the scientific validity of a paradigm, which is even more general and complex. Since we are dealing with approaches to ethnic relations, and not with hypotheses (or even with theories) a scientifically grounded decision is out of the question. This is because from each approach can follow hypotheses that are verifiable, and each approach has explanations that are correct for part of reality.

Yet it is, finally, on rather more pragmatic grounds that no decision is possible. If the decisive consideration is to be the general direction in ethnic relations that each approach identifies and predicts, the problem is one of a paucity of direct empirical material precisely on this critical subject. Although we possess many details about ethnic differences in various spheres, few concrete data are available on the two key questions: (i) What is the situation of cultural and social pluralism (i.e., the degree of

ethnic assimilation) today, and what is the trend over the years? (ii) What is the situation of inequality (i.e., the ethnic makeup of the social classes) today, and what is the trend over the years? Since the material required is complex and the reality itself is, evidently, vague and fraught with contradictions, considerable room for maneuver exists which enables each approach to interpret things according to its own lights.

Yet even if it were possible to determine which of the three approaches is the best, this would be undesirable now. The race among the approaches is only beginning. The cultural approach is still dominant in the Israeli sociology of ethnic relations: it is of longer standing, more widely accepted, supported by the majority of sociologists, including the leading figures in the field, anchored in hundreds of studies, consistent with the national ethos of ingathering and integration, and it dovetails with the worldview and interest of the dominant Ashkenazi group. By contrast, the class and pluralist approaches appeared only in the 1970s and are still in an incipient phase of making critiques, putting forward argumentation, and breaking new ground. While they benefit from the ethnic ferment and from the erosion in Ashkenazi dominance which actually enabled their emergence, they still lack the necessary resources to make real inroads.

A comparison among the three approaches should be deferred until the two new approaches have more completely exhausted their inherent potential. A class analysis of the ethnic problem, if marked by greater balance and sophistication, will undoubtedly constitute a contribution to and innovation in Israeli sociology, since all three approaches agree that stratification is a central component of ethnic relations today. Similarly, the future of the pluralist approach is also promising because the strengthening of the class approach and the weakening of the cultural approach will enhance its standing as a central, open, flexible perspective incorporating the main points of the two rival approaches while offering a message of its own.

We may illustrate the problematics of choosing among the various approaches by examining their explanations of the ethnic differences in voting (some of these explanations are cited by Shamir and Arian, 1982). In the 1981 Knesset elections Alignment voters were 75 per cent Ashkenazim and 25 per cent Orientals, whereas among Likud voters the division was 30 per cent Ashkenazim and 70 per cent Orientals (Peres and Shamir, 1984).

One explanation that the cultural approach tends to adduce for the Orientals' preference for the Likud is based on the unique characteristics of their political culture. These include authoritarianism, following charismatic leaders, preservation of religious tradition and greater continuity of the Diaspora heritage, intolerance of Arabs as a reaction to their suffering in their countries of origin and to their anxiety lest they be identified as backward Arabs, hawkishness in foreign and defense policy, and feelings of insult and discrimination that accumulated during their painful absorption in the 1950s under the Labor rule. This political culture meshes better with the populism of the Likud under the leadership of Herut, which utilizes these same cultural codes and exploits the grudge the Orientals harbor against the Labor establishment. This account emphasizes the "failure of the political absorption" of the Orientals. Because of their exilic heritage and because the Labor movement did not invest enough in their political education, the Oriental immigrants and their children were not inculcated with the dominant political culture of the veteran Ashkenazi Yishuv, hence they were pushed into the arms of the Likud (Avineri, 1983: 290-293).

Although this cultural interpretation views the Orientals' vote for the Likud in ethnic terms by branding their political culture and protest as ethnic, another cultural explanation underscores precisely the non-ethnic message in their voting (Herzog, 1984). In their vote the Orientals want to give expression to the advanced process of cultural and social assimilation they are undergoing, to their behavior and identity as Israelis in every respect, and to their fierce desire to cast off the ethnic tag they have been stuck

with. Since the Likud is less "ethnic" (more national-statist and less class-oriented) than Labor, and is more willing to recognize their Israeliness, the Orientals give it greater support (Lewis, 1984).

The class approach can offer an explanation of a different kind. The "ethnic division of labor" created a situation in which the Orientals are becoming one, single ethnic division, inferior and exploited, seeking appropriate political expression. Since the Labor movement bears direct responsibility for their predicament, the Orientals expressed themselves by voting for the opposition, and their support for the Likud remains an ethnic protest along with the hope for change. Yet this is only a transitional stage which marks a false class and political consciousness. Since the Likud and Labor are controlled by the same Ashkenazi conservative class forces, the Orientals' disappointment will not be long in coming because they will understand that no concrete improvement of their status will be achieved as a result of the 1977 political turnabout. The long-term trend is towards the Orientals' liberation from Ashkenazi rule through building an independent political and economic base of power (Swirski, 1984).

By comparison with these explanations, the pluralist approach stresses the cultural and class heterogeneity of the Orientals, and accordingly the differences in their motives. For some of them a vote for the Likud is an ethnic protest vote, for some it is an expression of ethnic political culture, while for still others it reflects a desire for liberation from ethnicity. But beyond this, the Orientals back the Likud because it serves them in two ways: it excoriates and exposes the Labor establishment which is the very heart of the Ashkenazi dominance; and it is constructing a new, competing establishment in which the Orientals have a better chance of integrating themselves. Hence the coalition between the Likud and the Orientals is not the result of an "irrational" political culture - since the Orientals do not accept Revisionist ideology and have no ideological commitment to the Greater Israel idea - nor is it the result of a "passing" false consciousness. Moreover, the Orientals are slowly becoming aware of their electoral

strength, and in the next stage they will seek to translate it into a takeover of the Likud. It will take a sustained effort and long time to achieve this goal, but once achieved it will bring about a political and economic shift within the Likud, have a serious adverse effect on Ashkenazi dominance in the country, and generate a meaningful change in ethnic relations.

Finally, these accounts of the political behavior of the Orientals and the Ashkenazim point to certain conclusions regarding the approaches in the sociology of ethnic relations in Israel. First, they show that the three approaches do indeed exist today which offer distinct and diverse accounts for the various aspects of the ethnic problem. Second, since it is clear that no simple and immediate way exists to examine which interpretation is best, there is no practical possibility of deciding among the three perspectives. And third, those who advocate one approach will do well to familiarize themselves with the alternative explanations that follow from the other approaches, so that they can at least improve on their own account and fortify themselves against the critique they can expect from their adversaries.

NOTES

(1) This distinction between three major approaches is made by van den Berghe (1979) in his review of the present state of comparative ethnic relations, but I am responsible for the titles.

(2) Roughly 20 per cent of all Jewish marriages contracted annually since the mid-1970s are ethnically mixed. Since the maximum is around 50 per cent (because the number of brides and grooms among Orientals and Ashkenazim is almost equal), the rate of mixed marriages is about 40 per cent of the maximum.

(3) It is arguable that the cultural approach is part of the national consensus and is accepted by Orientals and Ashkenazim alike, so that it should not be identified with the interests of the Ashkenazi group. Still, it was the Ashkenazim who determined that the cultural backwardness of the Orientals is the primary source of the ethnic problem and that its solution lies in their integration and assimilation. Since in the Israeli society the Orientals were not offered a legitimate option between separate existence and assimilation, there is no foundation to the notion that the Orientals accepted assimilation willingly.

(4) Interestingly, among the advocates of the colonialist approach there are in fact some who recognize the primacy of politics in Israeli society. In this connection see the analysis by Ehrlich, 1978.

(5) What follows is the flexible version of the pluralist approach (in this connection, see Smooha, 1978:6-20; van den Berghe, 1973; Kuper and Smith, 1969; Schermerhorn, 1970; and Smith, 1984).

(6) This assumption loses some credence over time. Creeping annexation is rendering Palestinian-Israeli pluralism of ever greater relevance to Israeli society, notably under Likud rule (1977-84), which officially advocated a policy of institutionalizing this pluralism.

(7) In a representative survey of the Jewish population in Israel which I conducted in June 1985, one of the questions dealt with the degree of involvement in mixed

marriages (between Ashkenazim and non-Ashkenazim). It was found that of all the 1,200 persons polled, 12 per cent were of ethnically mixed descent, 21 per cent were Orientals who have an Ashkenazi as a close kin (a spouse to themselves, their children or grandchildren), 16 per cent were Ashkenazim who have an Oriental as a close kin, and 51 per cent were persons without immediate inter-ethnic affinity. In other words, half of all Jewish Israelis are today intimately affected by mixed marriages. This is also true of about half of the Jews of Oriental descent.

(8) Peres's book, Ethnic Relations in Israel, published in 1976, does not, in my opinion, constitute a systematic summation of any of the three sociological (or, more precisely, macro-sociological) perspectives on the ethnic problem. In saying this I do not intend, of course, to detract from its value.

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1 of 4

To: George Gruen

From: Yaacov Pnini

February 7, 1988

RELIGION, STATE AND SOCIETY:

1. Chairmen:

Abe Harman agrees.

Shimon Samuels reported to me that you had approached him to chair a session. He is suggesting that Marc chairs the session on Monday afternoon - Place and Role of Religion in the American Jewish Community, and that he chair the Role of Religion in the Diaspora. This will enable Mordechai Gazit to be relieved of his post. He feels honored at the request, but is, and I can vouch for this, very very busy and as Shimon was asked and has accepted, I suggest that we leave it that way.

2. List of participants. We did not receive your amended list. We shall make up a complete list in time for the conference.

3. Recording has been organized. Students have been contracted for the daily summaries.

4. Both Chana and Madeleine will be at the conference as hostesses. No tags have been prepared. Both Chana and I do not think it necessary.

5. Ads have been requested in the Jerusalem Post (Tues, Fri) and Haaretz, Maariv and Yediot (Tues, Wed, Thurs). Attach copy of ad.

6. Information on transportation will be given out at the end of previous sessions.

7. The dinner at the King David on the 17th is cancelled.

Regards, Yaacov.

bc M.T. C.B. B.Gold G Wolf

THE AD

The American Jewish Committee and **The Leonard Davis Institute**

invite the public to an international forum

Society, State and Religion: The Jewish Experience

on February 15th, 16th and 17th, 1988

at Beit Hillel, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus

Monday, February 15

9:00 - 13:00 **Religion in Contemporary Judaism** Chair: T. Ellenoff

Y. Harkabi, **Approaching a Moment of Truth** (Discussant: A. Ravitzky)

Z. Werblowsky, **On Interaction Between Nationalism and Religion** (Discussant: E. Gutmann)

M. Fishbane, **Pluralistic Elements in Jewish Tradition** (Discussant: Z. Zohar)

14:30 - 18:00 **Religion in the American Jewish Community**

Chair: B. Resnikoff

H. Feingold, **Judaism and Jewishness in the American Jewish Perception**

Rabbi S. Riskin, Rabbi W. Kelman, Rabbi R. Hirsch

Tuesday, February 16

9:00 - 13:00 **Religion in the Diaspora** Chair: M. Tanenbaum

I. Leibler, S. Trigano, R. Graetz, E. Essas

14:30 - 19:30 **Religion in Israel** Chair:S. Z. Abramov

E. Rubinstein, **The Jewish Character of the State of Israel** (Discussant: R. Gavison)

G. Sheffer, M. Lissak, **Political, Social & Cultural Cleavages**

S. Avineri, **Main Issues & Groups in Secular-Religious Cleavages** (Discussant: U. Ornan)

M. Safir, **Women in a Jewish State** (Discussant: N. Chazan)

Wednesday, February 17

9:00 - 13:00 **Strengthening Democracy in the Diaspora and Israel**

Chair: G. E. Gruen

S. Aloni, S. Spero, **Means and Strategies for Change in Israel**
(Discussant: D. Tropper)

H. Zemer, **Role of the Media** (Discussant: J. Elizur)

C. Liebman, **Mutual Impact of Developments in the Diaspora & Israel**

15:30 - 18:30

This session will be held at Mishkenot Shaananim, Fisher Hall

Conclusion: Ideas for the Future

What We Can Do Together to Strengthen Jewish Unity

Chair: B. H. Gold

A. Harman, T. Kollek, Y. Burg, H. Druckman, P. Schindler

For information call Hannah, 02-882312, or Madelaine 02-228862

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Conclusion: Ideas for the Future
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The Status of Women in Jewish State

Marilyn P. Safir

Univesity of Haifa

from a chapter with Dafna Izraeli in Women from a Cross-Cultural Perspective, Ed. by L.L.Adler 1988:Praeger/Greenwood.

In the early 1970s, when feminism was gaining momentum in the United States and other countries in the West, Israelis were confident that that they had already achieved equality between the sexes. The confidence was not without some justification. Israel was one of the only countries in which a woman was Head of State, where military service was compulsory for both men and women and where the Declaration of Independence (1948) promised to "maintain equal social and political rights for all citizens, irrespective of...sex." This commitment to equality was in keeping with the legacy left by the founding generations of modern Israel when in the 1920s, men and women pioneers engaged in activities of national reconstruction. Women (primarily members of the "G'dud haOvodah"- a small percentage of the female population) built roads, constructed houses and tilled the soil. The confidence in their achievements and their self esteem as women and Israelis are echoed in the words of Beba Idelson, (long time member of the Knesset and first secretary of the Working women's Council, Israel's most powerful women's organization - today called Naamat) who in 1973 proclaimed that "The achievements of Israel's women have become an axiom around the world." During the last 15 years, accumulated information and a new consciousness raised by feminist activities have gradually eroded the myth of the liberation of the the Israeli woman.

This paper underlines the tension between the contemporary/secular conception of woman as person entitled to equal opportunities and traditional/relgious conception of woman as wife and mother; between the intellectual commitment to women's liberation and the emotional commitment to the traditional role of women. However, the problem is not clear cut as there are contemporary thinkers within the religous camp and even in those segments of population that are nonobservant, religion is still a major sociological force.

The traditional-modern conflict is also reflected in ethnic terms. The major ethnic cleavage within Jewish society is between immigrants primarily from modern, Western countries (Ashkenazim) influenced by egalitarian ideologies and immigrants from Islamic countries (Sephardim) who imported a distinctly traditional orientation and patriarchal family life style. For the Sephardim, Judaism and tradition are almost completely interwovens. When there is movement from the religious to the secular world, traditional values are carried intact. Today a little more than half of all Jews in Israel are first or second generation Sephardicms.

An other source of conflicting pulls is between the collectivistic and the individualistic orientations of Israeli society. The former emphasizes the individual's prior obligation to the collective (the Jewish State), the latter emphasizes the obligation of the individual to his/her own self realization. The two major survival issues of the collective today are defence and what is called "the demographic problem", namely the disproportionately greater birth rate of the non-Jewish population. Men serve the collective through reserve army service throughout their adult lives, women, by having many children.

Thus while on one hand, individual occupational achievement has become an increasingly important ambition for women, at the same time public policy is directed to promoting fertility. This policy is consistent with and suported by the religious mandate.

Labor Zionism espoused an ideology of sexual equality. And yet, women's emancipation was not an issue on the movement's agenda. Socialist theory proposed that the elimination of exploitive relationships would automatically result in women's emancipation, so that within the new society in Palestine, equality for women would naturally evolve. However, women were told that the Jewish woman "must bear in mind that even those women fighting for emancipation view her first not as a woman, but as a Jewess."

During the 1920s the Working Women's Council conducted a determined struggle to breakdown occupational sex barriers and to find non-traditional employment opportunities for women. The period is characterized by great innovativeness and an emphasis on women's acquisition of the personal social and technical skills necessary for their full partnership in the creation of a new society.

From the early 1930s the weakening of the transformative and creative orientation of the Working Women's Movement was reflected in the shift away from experimentation and toward serving the needs of women in their traditional roles as wives and mothers. Among the services established,was a network of child care centers.

The issue of women's suffrage first arose in 1903 when delegates of the Yishuv gathered to establish the first Jewish representative body in Eretz Yisrael. The major opponents to women's suffrage were among the Old Yishuv(who had immigrated before the 20th century), namely the farmers, the Sephardic Jews but foremost the Orthodox Jews of European origin. Defining the matter as a question of religious principle, the latter were adament in their refusal to participate in elections in which women partook, or even more critical, sit in a house in which women were delegates. This sounds familiar to us today in that the same arguments are used against Leah Shakdiel in Yoruham and in the Tel Aviv City Concil. In 1925, the issue was finally decided in a vote of 103 against excluding women, 53 in favor.

Israeli society is a family oriented society. Marriage and divorce rates are more similar to agarian than to western urban society. Only one out of 10 marriages ends in divorce. The centrality of marriage in Israeli society can be gaged by the large number of Professional matchmakers that exist in the religious community, the large numbers of of marriage bureaus, the endless advertisments in the personal columns in all major and minor newspapers and the efforts of kibbutz society to find marriage partners for singles. A complete industry has developed around the marriage ceremony-from beauty palors that rent the bride her dress,do facials and her cosmetics as well as her hair, to the abundance of public and private halls that cater the wedding. Only 2.4% of women never marry. There is no recognized social role for single women, in Jewish tradition, especially never marrieds without children. One parent families account for only 5% of families in Israel. Eighty percent of women marry before age 29. A childless marriage is not considered a family and the couple are pitied. Fertility is a major concern of Israeli society.

The average number of children is 2.8 in Jewish families, 4 in kibbutz families and in extremely orthodox families -6 or more. In fact, Shahar (1977) found that a cross section of 18 year olds rated founding a family as the most important reason for marriage. One positive aspect of the centrality of marriage and family in Israel, is family stability.

Orthodox Jewish religion delegates both the active and community role to males only. However, both religious and secular families celebrate the Brit Mila and the Bar Mitzva with large parties. Rarely is there an equivalent "rite of passage" celebration for girls. In addition, male chidren may have higher status then female chidren as a result of their potential front line military service. Alazarov-Por (1983) found that while parents do not admit a preference for either sex on questionaires designed to examine preferences for either boys or girls, a preference for boys over girls is revealed in indepth interviews. This preference appears across social class, city and kibbutz, ashkenazim and sephardim as well as arab and jew.

This traditional/Jewish preference for boys appears to effect children's performance on intellegence tests in Israel and the Orthodox community in the U.S. to the detrement of the girls. Western findings reveal no differences in overall total scores of intellegence between males and females, but at around age 14, girls surpass boys on verbal skills and boys surpass girls on (performance) math skills. Contrary to western findings, in studies in Israel, boys by age 9 begin to surpass girls and by age 11 they achieve significantly higher verbal IQ scores (Lieblich, 1985.) By 13 the boys' Performance IQ is also significanly higher and by 16 the boys TotalIQ is more than 10 points higher than the girls'. Lieblich found an almost identical pattern on intel-

ligence tests of Arab children as she did in Jewish chidren. The only similar findings in the west were in yeshivot in N.Y.C. I have suggested (Safir, 1986) that parents' attitudes and general societal values are resposible for producing these suprising results.

Child care has been and continues to be primarily the mother's responsiblity. Early labor laws were based on the perception that women are the natural caretakers of chidren and far ranging protective legislation was passed: to prevent the employer from firing pregnant women; to enable nursing mothers to work an hour less without pay deductions, to take days off to care for sick chidren without being docked; to take paid maternity leave for three months and an additional nine months without pay. We are far in advance of the U.S. Nevertheless the mother's responsiblity for childcare is legislated in-contrast to the more contemporary parental laws in Scandinavia.

Daycare centers exist to encourge mothers to work and are welcomed as a child care solution by working women. Though there are not enough places available to meet the demand, the situation in Israel is far better then most western industrialized nations and result from profamily attitudes of the society as a whole.

The legal status of women in Israel is determined at one and the same time by one of the most modern and one of the most ancient legal systems in the world. The former - secular law - is based on the principle of one law for both men and women. The latter - Jewish (religious) law - views man and woman as different and not equal. It imposes a different legal status on each and assigns to each a different set of rights and obligations. Personal status is

under the sole jusrisdiction of the Rabbinical courts. As a result, a major problem for Jewiish women in Israel today occurs at the break-up of the marriage. When a couple comes to the Rabbinical court with an agreement, obtaining a divorce is probally as easy, if not easier, in Israel as in any place else in the world. The problem occurs when there is disagreement. The husband can use his status as the grantor of the divorce as a means of blackmail. This results in part because unlike his wife, he is free to create a new family with an unmarried woman without a divorce, without having any stigma attached to his children. His wife, if she lives with a man before she receives her divorce, can be prevented from eventually marrying this man. Needless to say - any children born of this union are mamsarim.

While Dayanim can use coersion to pressure a recalcitrant husband to grant a divorce, acording to a survey by Naamat, this has occured in only 30 cases since the birth of Israel. The same survey reported that in a 5 year period (1981-1986) Dayanim granted permission to 93 men (within halacha) the right to marry a second wife without a divorce. Israeli women believe that the Dayan are not trying to find halahalic means of dealing with the problems of Agunot and women with recalcitrant husbands.

Another other problem results from an overlap in jurisdiction between the religious and civil courts over issues of child custody and of financial maintance-alimony and child suport, when the couple plans a legal seperations without or before divorce proceedings. Quite often the wife will try to get to the district courts as they tend to grant higher maintainance payments. The husband trys to get under the jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts. Since the court in which the proceedings has begun has jurisdiction over the

seperation agreement, the outcome of this race becomes critical. It would appear that the only solution for these problems is civil marriage and civil divorce.

This solution is currently unrealistic because of the lack of a clear cut majority voting for either major political party. The religious parties, inspite of their small parliamentary representation, enjoy impressive political clout through their participation in government coalitions would never support changes in personal status jurisdiction. While only 20% of the population consider themselves religious, the extremist sects compose only 3-4% of this population, their polictical power is even more out of proportion to their absolute numbers and their attiudes towards women are most extreme.

Women in the Defence Forces

Israel was the first and is still one of the few states which has universal compulsory military service for both men and women. The significance of women's participation as well as the ambivalence felt towards women's position in the army were expressed by Prime Minister Ben Gurion to the second Knesset (1951):

> "When one discusses the position of women, two factors must be taken into consideration. First women have a special mission as mothers...However, ... the woman is not only a woman, but a personality in her own right in the same way as a man. As such she should enjoy the same rights and responsibilities as the man....We have no intention of putting women into combat although no one can be sure that, should we be attacked and have to fight for our lives we should not call on the service of every man and woman. But the law in question deals with a peacetime situation and we want to give women only the most basic military training."

It was an issue of contention after Independence whether women's participation in the Israel Defence Forces (Zahal) would be modelled after the

Palmach (Jewish underground) where women were relatively integrated into the various units, or after the A.T.S. of the British army where the women were segregated in specialized units.

A second issue of contention related to the universality of conscription. Marriage, pregnancy, motherhood and religious conviction were defined as grounds for non conscription of women. The two decades following Independence, brought about a continuous restriction of women to the more traditionally female jobs . This continued until the shortage in human (male) resources following the Six Day War (1967) precipitated a more extensive use of women in non-traditionally female jobs to free men for combat units. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war and the intensification in the use of sophisticated technologies led the army to reevaluate its policies regarding the most efficient use of women.

However in 1978, as a result of the coalition agreement negotiated by the religious parties, the Knesset ammended the military service law to facilitate release on the basis of religious conviction. The proportion of women released on the basis of a personal declaration of religiousity, consequently rose from 18.5% to 25%, where it has remained since 1983. Nevertheless, by 1986, 65% of the female 18 year old cohort (an increase of almost 15% from 1977) had been recruited to the army, thanks to an impressive drop in the proportion of women not recruited because of a lack of the minimum qualifications required for recruitment. (80 percent of this category in 1976 were Sephardim.) Research shows that army service has a significant positive impact on women's self esteem and occupational aspirations (Bloom & Bar Joseph, 1985).

In 1976, only 210 (30%) out of 709 jobs in the defense forces were open to women, the majority of them clerical jobs. Since 1984 the range of jobs filled by women expanded greatly (60% by the end of 1985) and there is continued experimentation to break down the barriers to women's integration as far as possible. New technologies create new occupations for which the more educated women soldiers are well suited. However, the fact that women do not serve in combat roles, their shorter period of service (two years compared to three for men), their disinclination to sign up for an additional period of army service, their release upon marriage and their negligible availability for reserve duty, were and remain major disincentives to intensifying the investments in women's training and to expanding the number of jobs available to them.

The Post Army years and Higher Education

The traditional Jewish emphasis on education, hand in hand with an increase in the general standard of living, has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of students in Israeli univerisities in the last 25 years, from 9,275 in 1959/60 to 65,050 in 1984/5. During that period the proportion of women among the student body more than doubled, from less than 25% to 50%. The spread of higher education among women is perhaps the single most significant development for women's status with both specific positive repercussions for their opportunities in the labor market and diffuse implications impacting on women's self-esteem, aspirations and life style.

In Israel, as abroad, women concentrate in certain fields more than others, which influences their occupational choice and opportunities. In the last dec-

ade, however, there has been an impressive growth in the proportion of women students in non traditional fields such as law (40%), medicine (33%) business administration (25%), and agriculture(35%). This is not the case in the field of technology where the proportion of women at all levels from technician to engineer is very small. The lack of attraction these fields hold for women is today recognized as a problem in a number of public forums such as the army which requires recruits with prior technological training, industry, and the Ministry of Education. There is general agreement that the problem needs to be dealt with during the early years of schooling but to date there has been no serious effort to do so.

Women in the World of Work

Between 1955 and 1984 the proportion of women in the civilian labor force grew from 27% to 38%. Among Jewish women the figure reached 42% but among non-Jewish women it was approximately 10% (up from 7% in 1970). In 1984 there were 547,700 women employed or actively looking for work. The growth in female participation came at a time of declining participation rates for men, so that during the 1970s, women contributed more than 55% to the net increase in the labor force.

Women joined the labor force in response to the demand created for educated workers by the growth in public, community, financial and business services following the Six-Day War (1967). At the same time growing military and defence-related needs absorbed men from the civilian sector, shrinking the pool of those available a trend intensified by the growth in the number of students in the universities. In most cases the demand for labor came from occupations such as teaching, social work and clerical work where women al-

ready had a foothold. In others it came from occupations previously closed to women, such as bank tellers, where, unable to attract men in sufficient numbers, employers were compelled to hire women. In addition new occupations which initially had no clear sex label such as in the fields of computers and human resource management, were receptive to women. The demand for labor during the seventies opened opportunities also to older women who had previously encountered difficulty competing for jobs.

The proportion of married women going to work grew from 26% in 1968 to 43% in 1984. The presence of small children has become less of a deterrent to women's employment in recent years. In 1984 57% of all non-single Jewish women with youngest child aged 2-4 were in the labor force and among women with 13 and more years of schooling the figure was more than 75%. While 60% of all women work part time, in this group the majority work full time.

The more educated a woman is, the more likely she is to be in the labor force. This applies to Arab women as well, although the affect of education is not as significant as it is for Jewish women. Among those with 16+ years of education, participation rates for women are the same as for men. The availability of ever-increasing numbers of women with university education, makes it likely that the upward drift in female labor force activity will continue provided employment opportunities remain available. The female labor force is on the average more educated than the male labor force. The median years of schooling in 1984 was 12.3 years for women and 11.4 years for men.

IN the early 1970s, the number of day care centers was tripled as part of government policy to encourage female labor force participation so that by

1980, 57% of the two year olds, 89% of the three year olds and 97% of the four year olds were in some pre-school setting. Many of the new job openings permitted part time employment, or were concentrated in the public sector where work schedules could be better synchronized with school day schedules. The rising expectations for a more materially comfortable style of life created greater reliance of the family on a second income (Bar-Yosef and Lieblich, 1983). Between 1969-1984 there was a 98% increase in the female labor force but only a 29% increase in the male labor force.

There is general consensus among researchers, that Israel is a family centered society (Bar-Yosef, Bloom and Levy, 1977, Peres and Katz, 1981; Schrift, 1982). While the family is valued by both sexes, it impacts differently on men and women's occupational roles. In a study of men and women in middle level and high ranking jobs, Gafni (1981) found no sex difference in relative importance attributed to career and family. However, Izraeli reanalyzed this data and discovered that for women there is a significant negative correlation between relative importance attributed to family and preference for a job that entails making decisions and exerting authority (r=.32, p.001); aspirations for a more senior managerial position (r=.26, p.001); perceived chances for advancing to a more senior position (r=.26, p.001) and belief that she is qualified for a senior managerial position (r=.23, p.001). None of these correlations are signficant for men. Thus family and the household remain the primary responsibility of women, even if they are employed. Peres and Katz (1983) found that whether or not mothers work outside the home, the amount of time spent by husbands in housework and childcare remains the same.

Even when husbands play an active role in domestic tasks, however, they are rarely full partners in managing the home. The situation is sustained by sex socialization. He is encouraged by changing social norms "to give her a hand" that is, to share the work but not to share the responsibility. The difference is significant. Responsibility requires psychological involvement even if one is not doing the work. It engages the person in planning, supervising, and finding alternative solutions when plans fall through. Women are responsible not only for most of the work done in the home for the family but also for a disproportionate amount of the tasks that family needs produce interactions within the community. Even tasks traditionally identified as masculine such as banking, car repair and guarding school grounds are, in the first two cases increasingly performed by women and in the third almost exclusively performed by women. Despite the fact that most younger women today are at work, societal arrangements continue to operate as if women were still full time homemakers.

When children reach adulthood and enter army service the result is more often that of an intensification of mothering rather than of a "empty nest". Caring for elderly and often chronically ill parents is another area of family work which falls primarily within the woman's domain (Cibulski, 1981). With the aging of the population, with health care policy geared to reducing hospital budgets, and with services for the elderly being as inadequate as they are, women's work for the family continues to expand.

Three additional related factors explain this division of responsibility between men and women: generally women work fewer hours in the market, (in 1984 an average of 33 hours per week compared to 44 hours for men (CBS 1985b:72) their time is cheaper as they also earn less per hour and husbands'

work is considered to be more important for the family than wives' work. The first two explanations, however, are as much the consequence as the cause of the fact that women have responsibility for tasks in and out of the home. The fact that women take responsibility for them allows men to make uninterrupted investments in work and to enter more lucrative jobs, which in turn makes them more attractive candidates for promotion to responsibile higher level positions.

The major point being argued here is that the centrality of family life and the increasing elaboration of tasks performed for the family both within the home and in linking the home to society combined with the non-symmetrical division of domestic labor between husband and wife are crucial in shaping women's occupational choices, their decisions about allocation of time and the direction, amplitude and timing of their work career. An important factor in the choice of part time work is the short school day: the first 6 grades attend school until 11:45-1pm.This seriously constrain women's choice of jobs. Women gravitate to jobs which are synchronized with the children's school schedule such as teaching or that have flexible working hours. Half time job holders acrue social benefits and job tenure, so women who worked part time are not financially penalized as in the US. However, working part-time may effect career advancement and promotion to managerial positions. Avgar (1985) observed that part time work is a matter of expedience for many women rather than a reflection of low commitment. In short, caught in the "greedy institution" of the family (Coser and Coser, 1974), women juggle family and work by avoiding demanding or "greedy" occupations or occupational roles.

It is not unusual for a woman to keep her work simmering "on a low fire" while the children are small and then to increase her investments in the workplace when they grow more independent. It is interesting to note that between 1979-1984 the only age group where there was an increase in the proportion of full time workers was among women 35-44. (CBS april 1986: 92). This would be a feasible solution were it not for the fact that career timetables, built as they are on the male experience, expect people to reach the height of their careers by the early forties and not to begin building at that time. On the surface women's decision to limit time investments in the labor market in favor of time investments in the family appears voluntary and freely selected in line with their values and preferences. The underlying coercive character of the social injunction which requires women to do so and the structural arrangements which discourage them from doing otherwise and which constrain them from achievements in other spheres are usually overlooked.

The centrality of the family in Israeli society is only a partial explanation for the fact that so few women reach senior positions in work organizations. Discriminatory attitudes and a preference for males as candidates for advancement (Avgar, 1985; Pazzi, 1986; Zemach and Peled, 1984; Zemach, 1984) are important contributory factors. The fact that they are not discussed in this paper is not intended to discount their signficance.

In conclusion, the status of women in Israel is complex, overladen with contradictions which result in considerable ambivalence concerning equality between the sexes. Widely held traditional values endorse a patriarchical system of social relations which emphasize the centrality of the patriarchical family with its sex division of labor and of social status. Israeli society

has opened new opportunities for women to participate in the public sphere but it has not adapted the family roles nor developed sufficient services for women to successed in their careers without considerable strain.

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Pluralistic Elements in the Jewish Tradition

Michael Fishbane

It is no idle matter that brings us together today, but a concern for the integrity of our moral life and the capacity of our religious heritage to sponsor moral action. For if we seek in our Tradition intimations, or proofs, or precedents of what we would now call pluralism, or even something akin to tolerance, we do not do so for any abstract historical considerations. We seek these sources because we hope that our Tradition-- out of which we live and think-- can provide some spiritual resource for a renewal of these values in our own day. We must naturally be aware that this Tradition is replete with many strands, and thus beware not to dogmatize only those patterns that appeal to us. No old 'florilegium of pluralism' exists in rabbinic literature. And even if such an anthology could be invoked, contrary values can also be found in our Tradition. But this is an old matter. Diverse understandings of the Tradition are known from the earliest sources. As R. Eleazar ben Azariah noted in an old sermon, divrei torah parin ve-rabin, 'the words of Torah are bountiful and without number'-- because of the sages who sit in diverse groups, some declaring a matter pure and others impure.

This diversity of scholarly opinion need not, however, result in despair, in the manner of the sage who worried: 'How then, in these circumstances, might I learn Torah?' It is rather an occasion for open discourse in the public realm, and thus a moral

and intellectual imperative as well. Such a view was endorsed by R. Eleazar himself, whose response may be paraphrased as follows: All Jews who stand within the covenant have the obligation to set their ears to the sounds and silences of the Tradition and to assert their hermeneutical priviledge to discern and evaluate one thing and another. More than that, one may even say that all Jews have the moral duty to formulate those meta-halakhic considerations that will provide the ethical presuppositions of their moral life. However, because of the inherent diversity of judgment within the Tradition, the validity of one's decisions cannot depend upon a list of prooftexts. Indeed, such a presentation of proofs-- in the manner of a neo-medieval disputation-- is often but a disguised form of political power: a situation where the spiritual resources of Judaism are reduced to a numbers game, and where the persuasiveness of values is exchanged for the capacity of certain people to impose <u>their</u> readings of the Tradition. Against such cultural apologetics and counter-apologetics, I would argue that the proof of our hermeneutical decisions lies in the moral and religious testimony of our lived lives. One can only give the proof of life verification for our choices: the proof of <u>Bewaerung</u>. It was in this manner that Buber and Rosenzweig interpreted the Scriptural passage:

וצדקה תהיה לנו כי נשמר לעשות את כל המצוה הזאת (Deut. 6:25).

I

For the historically minded, it must appear paradoxical that I should open this discussion by appealing to hermeneutical freedom, and even do so through an allusion to a Talmudic passage (b. Hagiga 3b), when just this freedom has been repeatedly contradicted in actual practice. Ever since antiquity, the historical record of Judaism shows that debates over the validity of certain religious claims-- debates which also had the effect of reinforcing social inclusions and exclusions-- turned on the question of legitimate interpretation. The evidence cuts across halakhic and theological lines. Thus polemics among the Pharisees themselves, or between them and the Saduccees, or between the Qumran community and their rivals, all focus on the question of proper interpretation. Similarly, medieval debates between the Rabbinites and Karaites, the Maimunists and anti-Maimunists, the Hasidim and Mitnaggedim, or also the Orthodox and Reformers since the 19th century, all revolve around contradictory claims concerning the valid interpretation of Scripture.

It would seem that the source of this problem lies in the Bible itself, which conceptually and in fact takes shape through a rejection--indeed, an ongoing rejection-- of idolatry. The character type of Elijah, the purist prophet who is zealous for divine exclusivity, reflects this ideological modality. One must therefore take serious note of the profound continuity between ancient Israelite prophetic zeal against idolatry and ongoing Jewish zeal for this or another mode of interpretation. Both

types evince the passion of persons convinced of the exclusiveness of Truth-- that, in short, they are in the right, in the Light, while the 'others' are in the wrong, the Dark. Whatever be the merit of Nathan Soderblom's lament that polytheism knows no correponding exclusivist vigor, we must face the serious and painful question of the degree to which pluralism (or tolerance) is possible within a monotheistic framework. It is moral question we cannot by-pass; nor is it unrelated to the role and power of interpretation as the handmaiden of ideology.

At the dawn of the modern era, Moses Mendelssohn expressed deep sensitivity to these matters. In a letter to R. Jacob Emden (on October 26, 1773), he said, as a matter of great personal conviction, that he could not believe that all mankind save the Jews were utterly rejected by God in their divine service. "Should all inhabitants of the earth except ourselves be doomed to perdition unless they believed in the Torah, which was given to the congregation of Jacob alone...?...Does God, then, treat His creatures in the way of a tyrant by denying them a share in the World to Come) though they committed no injustice?" (see Jubilaeumsausgabe [Stuttgart, 1971 ff], 16, letter 154, p. 178). The rhetorical and impassioned nature of the query answers itself. Mendelssohn was thus at great pains to prove that tolerance is part and parcel of Judaism-- or rather, in this instance, to show that Judaism taught that pious Gentiles,. "Kinder der ewigen Seligkeit," had a share in the World to Come.

A broader perspective on these reflections on monotheism and exclusiveness may be had by a brief recourse to John Locke's great tract on Tolerance (1689). Building in rabbinic fashion on the textual conjunction of Exod. 22:19 and 20, which juxtapose the rejection or idolatry and the notion of divine exclusiveness to the commandment not to oppress the stranger, Locke formally distinguished between internal control and external lenience--that is, between intolerance for religious deviance within the community of the faithful and broad tolerance for the stranger without. This fundamental distinction, in broad terms, characterizes our own rabbinic sources. As numerous rabbinic texts make clear, the sages utterly rejected idolators and idolatrous practices within the community (save for some leniance during persecutions); but they also provided the conceptual structure for tolerance in their list of universal moral prescriptions. This list is known as the 'Seven Commandments of the Noachides' (בני נח שבע מצוות). For present purposes, it is not necessary to decide whether the sages regarded these prescriptions of minimal social morality as based on 'natural law,' and thus only secondarily justified by interpretation, or whether they considered Noachide morality to be a type of universal revelation. The fact is that anyone following these precepts (which include the prohibition of murder and theft, and the obligation to set-up courts of law) must be regarded as a human being in the full sense, regardless of his or her mode of religious practice. To be sure, the severe constraints which limited contact between Jew

and idolator often made this distinction somewhat academic. Even R. Menahem Hameiri in the Middle Ages, who went so far as to extend to Christianity the status of a non-idolatrous religion as a matter of principle, and thus virtually equated Christianity with Noachidism, never dreamed of a notion of tolerance that would compromise the internal regulation of the Jewish community and its need for utter distinction (in practice and ideology) from all other religions-- including Christianity: "for if this not be done, the laws of Israel will be void" (Beit HaBehirah ad b. Baba Qama 113a).

Nevertheless, the very notion of Noachidism, of a pre-Jewish universalism based on morality, provides a fundamental bridge over the ideological chasm separating Jew from idolator. In its own way, it paved the way for a notion of pluralism on the social-moral plane. Indeed, it was this very distinction which Mendelssohn utilized in his contention that pious Gentiles-- which for him meant those who kept the Noachian laws-- had a share in salvation. Mendelssohn further extended his tolerant position with the argument that religious regulations should be a matter of private concern (for the person or the voluntarily formed community) only, and that the role of the State was to abet the social-moral welfare of all its citizens. Noachidism is thus the minimal standard for social tolerance. Religious differences, insofar as they do not infringe upon the public welfare of the State, are not subject to public regulation. They are matters both personal and private, and must therefore be

tolerated and protected by the State itself.

We may close this part of our discussion, dealing with aspects of tolerance in Judaism towards the non-Jew, with a more vigorous advocation of this value. The advocate was Nahman Krochmal who, in the 19th century, was among the first Jewish moderns concerned to integrate Tradition and Modernity. In this instance, the issue is the openness of Judaism-- on a spiritual and moral level-- to other persons and religions. Krochmal published his "Mashal Musari" ("Moral Parable") in the first issue of Yerushalayim Ha-Benuyah, a periodical for Maskilim writing in Hebrew. In the parable, Krochmal takes up the Scriptural passage of Abraham sitting at the entrance to his tent, at sunset. When an old man appeared on the horizon, Abraham leaped forward to invite him to lodge in his dwelling, and provided everything possible for the man's comfort. However, after the meal, when Abraham invited his guest "to bless the Lord, Creator of heaven and earth, who has sated us with his bounty," the stranger said that he does not know the god of Abraham, and will rather bless his own god. Therewith, Abraham banished the man to the desert. But then the Lord came to Abraham and rebuked him, saying that he had tended this man for lo so many years, dressing and feeding him even though he rejected Him, while Abraham could not even care for him one night. Rebuked, Abraham says hata'ti, "I have sinned," and immediately went and retrieved the man and spoke kindly to him.

Let us, for now, leave Abraham with this stranger in his

tent and turn to the even more vexing matter of disputes and contention "within the (very) tents of Shem."

II

The winds of controversy have often blown through the tents of Shem, and a tolerant temper towards internal diversity is not one of the hallmarks of those who dwell therein. As is well-known, embittered intellectual disagreements often set the House of Hillel against the House of Shammai-- not because the contrary position was inconceivable but because of the anticipated practical consequences of these decisions. For all that, one particular tradition preserved in Tosefta Yevamot (I. 10-11) may prove instructive in the present context. We learn:

> Although the House of Shammai differed from the House of Hillel in regard to co-wives, sisters, a woman whose marriage is in doubt, an old bill of divorce, one who marries a woman with an item worth a perutah, and a man who divorces his wife but spends the night with her at the (same) inn, nevertheless Shammaites did not refrain from marrying women from Hillelite families, nor did Hillelites refrain from marrying women from Shammaite families. Truth and peace prevailed between them, as is said: "Therefore love truth and peace" (Zech. 8:17). Although these prohibited and the others permitted, they did not refrain from preparing levitically pure food with one another.

My purpose in citing this tradition is not to play that old cracked record we love to hear, namely, that the preservation of diverse views in our classical literature is proof of a tolerant spirit. Whatever the real merit of this claim-- and let us at least acknowledge its self-serving merits!-- my present

purpose in citing this text (which you can hear also harks back to the Haqiqah passage referred to earlier) is to note how serious practical differences are overcome through meta-halakhic considerations. In the present instance, the principle which permits a modus vivendi in the literal sense is the imperative to love truth and peace-- an exhortation from the prophet Zecharia. Clearly, the force of the Scriptural passage as used here lies with the conjunctive "and." That is to say, the Hillelites and Shammaites found ways to overcome their differences by joining their search for truth with the more supreme value of peace-- thus, "truth and peace," truth in the service of peace.

Another principle related to peace which has been used in halakhic decision making is based on a passage from Proverbs (3:17): "Her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace." Now already in the old midrashic sources "Her ways" refer to the ways of Torah, and the values of "pleasantness" (darkhei no'am) and "peace" (shalom) are even presented as the basis of Moses' criticism of God and the laws of herem (Tanhuma Buber, Tzav, 8). But beyond such homilies, the principle of darkhei no'am has been used as a guidline in decision making in various areas of halakha, including the areas of personal status and family law. Examples can be found in the Talmud and the decisions of post-Talmudic authorities-- for example, the Maharsha in his commentary on Yevamot (see Hidushei Maharsha, Yevamot [3d Gur-Ari ed., 1981]). In our own day, Justice Menahem Elon has applied this principle with respect to the status of the

Ethiopian Jews-- thereby siding with the opinions of the Radbaz and Rabbi Castro four centuries ago.

The passage from Tosefta Yevamot serves another end. Following the indication of the controversies between the Houses of Hillel and Shammai, the text concludes that an accord was reached between the plurality of views "in order to fulfill what Scripture says: 'Every way of man is correct in his eyes, but the Lord measures the heart'." The intention of the redactor of the Tosefta in adducing this passage from Proverbs (16:2) can only be surmised. It would seem that he understands the abatement of intellectual controversy-- by the adversaries themselves!-- as due to a humble assessment of man's hermeneutical powers: each person judges according to his own lights, thinking himself correct, whereas the full truth is accessible only to God-- who judges man not according to the accuracy of his reason but according to the sincerity of his heart. Rashi's comment (on this verse) that God measures the heart follows the spirit of this interpretation. As regards this matter of sincerity of intention as a criterion for access to divine truth, let us recall the beautiful lines of Ibn Gabirol's Keter Malkhut with respect to the plurality of religious access to the Divine Throne:

ולא יחסר כל קוֶיך בלתי עובדי זולתך, כי כוונת כולם להגיע עדיך.

*

These words of Ibn Gabirol may permit us to move from the phenomenon of intellectual pluralism, and the possibility of

transcending permanant division through the application of various meta-halakhic principles, to more metaphysical perspectives. Notable in this regard is a passage from an essay entitled "Fragments of Light: A View as to the Reason for the Commandments," by Ha-Ra'ayah, the late Rav Kook. In it, the teacher acknowledges the plurality of viewpoints in the House of Israel and the discord this sows; but he also proposes a spiritual perspective through which concord is envisioned and diversity perceived to be part of God's plenitude and truth. He said:

> On reaching full maturity, the human spirit aspires to rise above conflict and opposition. It will recognize all expressions of the spiritual life as an organic whole, in which differences in states will not be erased, in which there will remain a distinction between the primary and the peripheral, high and low, more holy and less holy, and between these two and secular. But this will not be in a grievous form that inspires discord and hostility. It will be in a form similar to the divisions of organs of the body, and to the distinctive impulses in the fully developed spiritual life, each of which recognizes its place as well as that of its neighbor, whether it be below or above it.

In this powerful teaching we have the rudiments of a theological pluralism that balances the moral parable of Krochmal presented earlier. In saying this, I do not mean any disparagement to Krochmal; for I do not think that religious humanism needs the tint of Tradition in order to be morally legitimate. Krochmal's liberal-moral perspective is an authentic teaching of pluralism in our Tradition in its own right-- despite the fact that it is (in part) stimulated by currents of Western humanism and morality. To be sure, we can conveniently delude ourselves with the notion that the only authentic Jewish teaching is a

so-called 'pure' teaching-- something unsullied by external cultural influences (not to mention the base coin of human reason). But such an unalloyed Tradition never existed, and many of our most profound truths and values have been shaped in response to outside stimuli. This is not the place to sound a tatoo on that score. Let me merely say that the teachings of the Maskilim and reformers with respect to a recognition of the legitimate diversity of Jewish perspectives (and of other religions) have, in my opinion, an honorable place among the so-called 'pluralistic elements' of Jewish Tradition-- whatever their historical provenance or provocation. They provide a deep call to conscience, and show how monotheism can be a force for unity and not division.

It is from this perspective, then, that I say that Rav Kook's teaching balances that of Nahman Krochmal. As the latter called for moral vigilence and the need to transcend parochial impulses in the Tradition, Rav Kook acknowledges "<u>all expressions of the spiritual life</u>" from within his ultra-orthodox perspective. His teaching is thus a thoroughly traditional perspective on the unifying force of monotheism. Since I noted earlier that monotheism often displays forms of dissension and division, this particular advocation of religious pluralism is of no idle merit. It is a direct rebuke to those who would imperiously judge the spiritual legitimacy of the 'other' in God's world, or whose notion of monotheism righteously paints all faces with the same monochrome. Rav Kook's perspective may even dovetail with

that of Mendelssohn-- strange bedfellows though they be!-- insofar as neither would seek to impose his spiritual perspective upon another, even another Jew. In this sense, Kook's teaching lives out the blessing which one is required to state upon seeing another Jew: "Blessed is the Wise Knower of Secrets, for their minds differ from one another and there are no two faces alike" (b. Berakhot 58a).

These matters lead us to the more radical theological and metaphysical pluralism of Franz Rosenzweig. In this context, my concern is not to invoke his theory of a 'double-covenant,' which views Christianity as a co-bearer with Judaism of the truth of God in this world. Important as this view is, my present purpose is to stress his teaching on 'love of neighbor.' As a theological theme, Rosenzweig may have been drawn to the topic through the influence of Hermann Cohen, his mentor. Rejecting the standard, traditional perspective on Lev. 19:18, which teaches that the neighbor "like you" whom you are commanded to love is none other than your fellow Jew, Cohen argued for the universal presupposition of this statement and provided a Kantian perspective on the ethics involved. Rosenzweig also emphasized the universal thrust of this biblical teaching, but radicalized its religious presence and authority by placing it under the wings of revelation.

For Rosenzweig, love of neighbor is the religious response to God's unconditional love for the world and its creatures. Because of this axial role of human love in extending and

mediating divine love in creation; indeed, for Rosenzweig, just because acts of love are an anticipation of redemption, one must love one's neighbor because he, "like you," is a creature of God and the recipient of God's love. Such a neighbor is not far off that one must search him out, but rather the very person who is nighest now-- the one, anyone, who is most near to me at this or any other moment. Thus my neighbor, teaches Rosenzweig, reveals God's presence to me just as he or she appears before me-- revealing the world to me through speech and mere communicating presence, and thus demanding my own response and speech. From this perspective, pluralism is at once morally radicalized, since it valorizes all moments of human meeting, and theologically radicalized, since in this meeting the divine becomes present to us. Having referred earlier to Krochmal's parable of Abraham's neighborly love at Mamre, let me mention the kernal of a sermon given by Rabbi Nehemiah Nobel, an orthodox rabbi in Frankfort with whom Rosenzweig studied Talmud. He reminded us that, when telling this event, Scripture first says that "the Lord appeared" to Abraham while he was sitting in his tent. Immediately thereafter, however, it says: "and behold! three men."

By way of conclusion, let us listen to a second teaching of Rav Kook (Olat HaRayah, vol. I [Jerusalem, 1939], p.330). His words bring us back to the earlier themes of intellectual pluralism and peace as a meta-halakhic value-- all within a theological and metaphysical perspective. Perhaps it is not a

teaching for everyone, or for all times. But it is a teaching for us and our times. It turns on the well-known Talmudic designation of scholars as builders. The midrashic transformation of the biblical word 'sons' (banayik) into 'builders' (bonayik) gives us pause to wonder what it takes to turn our many and different sons into the many and different builders of our future. The answer is as simple as it is difficult. What is required is humility and largeness of spirit. This is how Rav Kook teaches it:

> For the building is constructed from various parts, and the truth of the light of the world will be built from various dimensions, from various approaches, for these and those are the words of the living God...It is precisely the multiplicity of opinions which derives from variegated souls and backgrounds which enriches wisdom and brings about its enlargement. In the end all matters will be properly understood and it will be recognized that it was impossible for the structure of peace to be built without those trends which appeared to be in conflict.

So says Rav Kook. To his words we would only add: beneih beitekha begarov: build your house with the one who is near to you.

האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים
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המכון ליחסים בינלאומיים
ע"ש לאונרד דיוויס

December 1, 1987
H-4-gruenfat

Mr. George Gruen
165 East 56th Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear George,

As you surely are aware, the plans for our forthcoming joint forum are progressing. We have lined up some important personalities, with varying perspectives, which should make for an interesting and productive interchange of ideas.

I enclose herewith an article which Professor Harkabi has just recently written for publication in the journal of Progressive Judaism, MANNA, in London. I thought you might be interested in reading it, as Professor Harkabi will be joining the speakers in our forum, in the first session, **Place, Role and Status of Religion in Contemporary Judaism**, as speaker no.3, with the tentative title, "Judaism: A Call for Change."

I am sending a copy of same also to Ted Ellenoff, so that you may both be in the picture.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

/G. Sheffer

Gabi Sheffer

Truman Building, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, 91 905 בנין טרומן הר הצופים, ירושלים
Telex 26458 Cables: Scopus Jerusalem, Tel. 820014 882312

Yehoshafat Harkabi

Judaism: A Call For Change

Grave problems beset Jewish religious life, engendering tensions and dissensions: the rift between the Orthodox, Conservative and Reform streams, whereby the Jewish religion has become a divisive factor; the ferocious bickering between the different segments within Orthodoxy; the cleavage between the religious and the secular sectors in Israel. All these issues are perilous. However, the most threatening problem lies elsewhere – in new developments within the Jewish religion which may adversely affect the relations between Jews and gentiles and gravely impair the stature of the Jewish religion in the world. I adore Judaism and worry that it may suffer a grave setback. It is a nightmare to contemplate that the Jewish religion that hitherto has bolstered Jewish existence may become detrimental to it.

In all religions there are components of hostility against other religions. Happily, in the Jewish religion these elements were for a long period kept under control or suppressed, as Jews living precariously in foreign countries did not allow these components to emerge. In Israel, this inhibitory factor waned, especially after the victory in 1967, which was interpreted as prompted by divine intervention, portending a change in history towards Jewish ascendency. It subsided further after the Likud victory of 1977, as some religious circles were heartened by the idea of Jewish might, a central tenet in the Jabotinsky-Begin ideology. Manifestations of hostility against gentiles have recently surfaced within these circles, who make no bones about expressing them blatantly.

I find myself enmeshed in a harrowing dilemma. Citing examples of such anti-gentile manifestations might supply antisemites with ammunition against the Jews, their religion and against Israel. However, in order to combat these trends, and especially to prevent their burgeoning and spreading, there is no escape from exposing them. One cannot fight against a phenomenon without identifying it. I shall disclose no secrets. All my examples are taken from the media.

The Israeli Chief Rabbi, Mordekhai Eliahu, has forbidden Jews in Israel to sell flats to gentiles, "even one flat" (*Haaretz*, 17 Jan. 1986). I do not dispute the Halakhic validity of his authoritative ruling (probably from "Lo tehanem", Deuteronomy 7:2; as Maimonides explained not to make their sojourn permanent, *Hilkhot Avodah Zarah VeHukot Hagoim*, Ch. 10:4). However, the Rabbi shows complete insensitivity to the need of reciprocity. Why then should gentiles in their countries sell real estate to Jews? A failure to understand that Jews cannot arrogate to themselves privileges which they do not recognize as valid for others, appears in Israel too frequently.

In response to a query, former Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yoseph, ruled that a Jew who happened to possess the New and Old Testaments bound together should tear them apart and burn the new Testament (*Haaretz*, 23 Oct. 1979). A military Rabbi ordered the burning of a copy of the New Testament found in the library of his base (*Maariv*, 14 June 1985). Subsequently, the affair was discussed in the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee (*Maariv*, 5 July 1985). One wonders if Rabbis understand that such enactments give retroactive legitimization to the burning of the Talmud by Christians. Can we allow ourselves to go back to the worst aberrations of the Middle Ages?

In recent Jewish religious writings Christians are frequently denigrated as "Ovdei Avodah Zarah" ("pagans"), falling back on the authority of Maimonides who in his original writings – not those tampered with by medieval censorship – explicitly depicted Christians as pagans, because of the Trinity; whereas he released Moslems from the ignominy of paganism. In Hebrew, "Avodah Zarah" is a term of abhorrence, much more so than is conveyed in the parallel term of "paganism". The Catholic Church, in the spirit of ecumenism, has made some effort to purge from its prayer books invectives against the Jews; should Jews revile Christianity? Furthermore, naming a religion or people as "Avodah Zarah" has practical consequences in Jewish law. According to Maimonides, "Avodah Zarah", its worshippers and their institutions of worship have to be destroyed in any area which comes under Jewish control (*Hilkhot Avodah Zarah VeHukot Hagoim*, Ch. 7:1). A similar ruling applies to the parallel denomination "Star Worshippers" ("Akum", which serves as well a code name for gentiles). The application of this ruling is specifically widened to encompass many Africans and Asians.

Calling for the expulsion of non-Jews from Israel is not an eccentricity of Rabbi Meir Kahane, for in religious pronouncements it is stressed that only a "Ger Toshav", a gentile who fulfills the seven precepts of the Sons of Noah, can live in a Jewish state. Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, the recipient of the prestigious Israel Prize in Judaic Studies for 1976, declared: "I support the application of the *Halakha* that a gentile ("Goi") should not live in Jerusalem; in order to apply the *Halakha* correctly, we would have to expel all Goyim from Jerusalem and purify it completely" (quoted by Professor Amnon Rubinstein in his book *From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back*, Schocken, 1980, p. 123, based on *Haaretz*, 9 May 1976). In a discussion on the Mormon University at the Knesset, no less a personality than Avraham Shapira, Chairman of the Financial Committee, complained: "Jesus is allowed to come back to Jerusalem" (*Haaretz*, 11 Dec. 1985). Should Israel exclude Christians from Jerusalem or even express such an intention? Utterings like these cannot fail to attract attention in Rome. Hebrew is not an esoteric language and Israeli newspapers are read by non-Jews. The Vatican, representing hundreds of millions of believers, might still have a say when the political settlement of Jerusalem is negotiated.

The remains of a woman, who was born a Christian, lived most of her life as a Jewess, married a Jew, though she did not officially convert, and whose son served in the Israeli Army as a Jew and Israeli, were dug up and removed from a Jewish cemetery in Rishon LeZion. The perpetrators of this crime were duly punished by an Israeli court. Released after few months of imprisonment, they were given a public reception in Shabbat Square in Jerusalem. In their defense, the claim was made – supported by the local Rabbis of Rishon LeZion and the Chief Rabbinate of Israel – that a Christian, as "Oved Avodah Zarah", cannot be buried with Jews, just as an "evil doer ("rasha") cannot be buried with a righteous man ("tzaddik") (Rabbi Zemmer's articles in *Davar*, 3 April 1984, and in *Haaretz*, 19 April 1984, and the text of the verdict of the local Rabbis confirmed by the Israeli Chief Rabbinate). This case presented a conflict between the laws of the Israeli state and Jewish religious laws. Religious circles claimed that the religious laws should prevail, as "divine law is above human law". The implication is far-reaching, as it means that religious Jews throughout the world cannot be fully subservient to the laws of their country. True, the problem of relationship between religious law and civil law arises in other religions. However, in Christianity it was attenuated by the principle

of separation between Church and State, and in Islam (except present Iran) the subservience of the religious authorities to the lay authorities has become firmly established as an historical practice. It is significant that the old principle *"Dina deMalkhuta Dina"* – "The law of the kingdom is a law" was not invoked in the Rishon LeZion case, as its application is circumscribed. If dead Jews and one dead Christian cannot be neighbours in a cemetery, how can Jews and Christians reside together while still alive? Will Jewish religious spokesmen be allowed, unopposed, to undermine the possibility for Jews to live in Christian countries?

When we studied the Bible and read the divine command to destroy the Amalekites, most of us probably considered it as an archaic episode of bygone primitive times having no relevance to the present. However, Rabbinical circles resurrect it as pertinent to our times. They cite Maimonides who included the destruction of the Amalekites among the three highest priority precepts for Jews to carry out when returning to a Jewish state (*Hilkhot Melakhim*, Ch. 1:1, based on *Sanhedrin*, 20b). Thus, it becomes a precept for the future, and not only the past. So long as the Amalekites are not annihilated, God's throne is defective (*Midrash Tanhumah*, Tetze), as cited by Rabbi Israel Hess, the former campus Rabbi of Bar Ilan University, who also specified that the Arabs (Palestinians) are the present day Amalekites (ominously his article was entitled: "The Genocide Commandment in the Torah", *Bat Kol*, 26 Feb. 1980, reported by Amnon Rubinstein, *op. cit.*; it is even mentioned in a publication in English of the Kaplan Center for Jewish Studies at the University of Cape Town). His is by no means a solitary voice. Thus, the Amalekites become an algebraic notation which each generation may decide whom it fits. Even if the explicit identification of the Palestinians as Amalekites comes from a minority, it should annoy and disturb us. Religious circles do not understand that by making the destruction of a people, such as the Amalekites, not an event of antiquity, but a standing religious order, they present the Jewish religion as genocidal. If this resurrection of the issue of the Amalekites were to continue, it could even change the general attitude to the Holocaust, inasmuch as associative analogies might be drawn. Even the apologetic contention that only the Messiah will identify the Amalekites, is unacceptable, as it still implies that there is a human group, men, women, their children and flock, that deserves total annihilation.

I sympathize with our forefathers who, in their suffering of all kinds of persecutions and discriminations, found solace in specifying the measures that would be imposed on non-Jews once there was a Jewish state. In many cases they copied the discriminations to which they themselves were subjected. Such expressions of hostility may have had for them a cathartic effect; indulging in writing what they could not practice. It was the anguished vengeance of the helpless. They envisaged the re-establishment of a Jewish state only after the coming of the Messiah, who would usher in the era "when the hand of Israel prevails over the nations of the world". Furthermore, they did not worry how such rulings might affect Jews in the Diaspora, as they considered that the ingathering of the Jews to the Jewish State would be total. Thus, all those enactments against gentiles were utopian, meant to be carried out, not in historical circumstances, but in an extra-historical era, eschatologically. What was excusable from them is no longer tolerable from us.

We are faced now with a completely new situation: a Jewish state was established without the labours and the mediation of a Messiah, in circumstances in which the hand of Israel does not prevail over the nations of the world and most Jews live outside the Jewish state. Some people reproach the founding fathers of Zionism for an oversight in not considering the Arab Palestinian problem, which is not completely valid. Of much greater significance was their lack of comprehension concerning the twofold problem the Jewish religion would produce for the Jewish state and the Jewish state would produce for the Jewish religion. However, extreme orthodox Jewish circles understood the Halakhic complications Jewish statehood would create, and thus opposed Zionism adamantly.

On the other hand, the Zionist religious circles who maintained that a Jewish non-Messianic state is feasible, failed in their reaction to the challenges to the Jewish religion presented by the establishment of a Jewish state. Rabbi Maimon (Fishman) understood the quandary and proposed to convene a "Sanhedrin", a gathering of distinguished Rabbis to examine the new situation and enact the necessary laws and changes. His proposal was rejected. Today, even anti-Zionist Orthodoxy that does not recognize the legitimacy of Israel's statehood for whom it is the incarnation of blasphemy, demands that Jewish laws be applied in it, particularly on the Shabbat. The Zionist religious circles follow suit. Furthermore, religious circles which had previously maintained moderate political positions or were even anti-Zionist be-

came the spearhead of extreme nationalist positions, in particular against the Arabs. Jewish religious precepts are evoked to proscribe any step towards territorial concession and a compromise with the Arabs. Thus the Jewish religion now serves as an impediment in the formation of a reasonable Israeli policy.

Maimonides, when he ruled that in the Jewish state a non-Jew should not be appointed to any public position – even the most junior one of controlling channels of water for irrigation (*Hilkhot Melakhim*, Ch. 1:4) – probably considered such discrimination as hypothetical until the Messiah comes. It did not dawn upon him that the chairman of the Tel Aviv Great Synagogue would invoke him as an authority to oppose the appointment of an Arab as Deputy Minister of Education (*Haaretz*, 30 Oct. 1986). Furthermore, can we admit, even on principle, that the Messiah will launch, not an era of justice and equality, but a dark age of racial discrimination? Is this the Jewish ideal?

We find ourselves in a grave predicament. True, expressions of hostility and discriminatory enactments existed earlier, but until now they were theoretical. Recently, their status changed as vitality has been infused into them by references to them and the demand that they be applied here and now. Thus, they have been actualized and made concrete. We can no longer shrug our shoulders and underrate the hostile precepts on the pretext that they represent only a minority. As these expressions of hostility accumulate our enemies will not fail to use them against us. It is irresponsibly optimistic to think otherwise. They are all in the public domain. Rabbi Kahane publishes his writings in English. He has the merit of offering a mirror for us to see ourselves. One of the worst results of the outrages our enemies have inflicted on us is that many among us have become habituated to criticize others, forgetting the need to examine and criticize ourselves.

Furthermore, in one central version, "Chosen People" does not imply a potentiality that will come about by our arduous efforts, but an accomplished fact. Such an approach, strange as it seems, suited the secular nationalistic ethos of the Jabotinsky school, which in its turn encouraged the new religious developments. The affinity, political and ideological, between the Likud and the main religious parties and groups is more than accidental.

Religion is influenced by external factors such as the political climate of opinion. During the period when the pragmatic realistic political attitudes of Weizmann – Ben-Gurion – Labour prevailed, religion kept the hostile component submerged. That was the achievement of

the religious moderates such as the Mizrahi. Once the climate of opinion changed during 1967–1977, the hostile elements in religion surfaced with their political corollaries on the issues of the West Bank and annexation. Thus a wide segment of Israeli population, because of its traditionalist inclinations, could be enlisted to support the policy of annexation, and though unversed in the Revisionist ideology, it adopted some of its core values. Jews, with a collective memory of oppression, and especially from less developed countries, could be swayed by the idea of ethnocentric power, once they felt they could afford it. Unfortunately political leadership did not rise to restrain such a tendency and counsel reasonableness. Some leaders even capitalized on such proclivities to get into power.

I suspect that the new developments in the Jewish religion constitute an unprecedented transmutation of great significance. As these changes occur before our eyes we may fail to appreciate how revolutionary they are. What has surfaced cannot again be mechanically submerged.

The religious radicals who support these religious trends understand their significance. Thus they are haunted by forebodings of the crisis in the position of the Jews and their religion that these changes may bring, or the havoc they may wreak in the relationship between Jews and the world. The rise in expectations of the imminent coming of the Messiah, calling this period the "beginning of redemption", Habad slogan "Messiah now", "Messiah Mamash", the intensive study of the laws of sacrifice as if the Temple is due to start operating, the weaving of clothes for the priests in a Jerusalem Yeshivah, are all symptoms of the premonition that we are in the throes of a crisis from which only a Messiah can deliver. Before, the Messiah was a hope, a yearning; now he has become a necessity.

Excessive reliance on the impending coming of the Messiah, which traditionally was severely proscribed, is already producing a reaction within Zionist religious circles apprehensive of the results of disappointment and disillusionment. Thus they demand to wait patiently. But then Zionism and the Jewish state are not precursors of the Messiah's coming and are devoid of religious significance. Some of the Zionist religious radicals even in Gush Emunim already show an inclination to fall back on the position of separation between history and theology, propounded in its strict form by Natorei Karta. This trend is already manifest in their mode of dressing which is commonly labelled as "blackening", drawing near the Haredi attire. However, it is doubtful

if the Natorei Karta solution can be generalized in appealing to large numbers. Finding peace in their fold can suit only a small minority.

The trend towards religious extremism and hostility is not merely an Israeli phenomenon. Jewish centres of Orthodoxy in the Diaspora, particularly in the United States, serve as their source of inspiration and financial support, including financial contributions given to them perhaps unwittingly by secular Jews who are unaware what they help to build up.

The big question is: What is to be done? The gravity of the situation demands radical treatment. Instead, we witness palliatives. For instance, because Rabbi Kahane's stark policy prescriptions are derived from religious precepts, strong strictures were levelled against Rabbi Kahane by some moderate religious circles. However, what is needed is not taking to task the person who quotes, but coming to grips with his quotations from the most venerated sources. Apparently, he does not distort his sources; he only turns for support to the ugly strain in Judaism, and in this he is not alone. So long as the rulings expressed in these quotations and enshrined in our books are not disowned, they continue to constitute organic tenets of the Jewish religion.

There are in Judaism admirable warm expressions of great humanism and of delicate perceptive moral insights. We can be very proud of the humane wisdom and sensitivity of our Sages. However, citing such humanistic expressions does not obviate the other elements of hostility and discrimination against non-Jews. On the contrary, paradoxical as it may appear, it reinforces them, for by depicting Judaism in its entirety as humanistic, the non-humanistic elements are sheltered by remaining uncondemned and are thereby legitimized; coexistence between the ugly and the upright is sanctioned, to the benefit of the ugly.

Presenting the Jewish religion as humanistic is not enough to make it so. We have to make it humanistic, by discarding those elements which are not. Beside the moral historical merit of such an operation, it is required as a pre-emptive measure, as eventually these negative elements will be thrown in our faces.

One should beware of false exegesis which may also signify deficient mastery of the sources. For instance, the humanity of Judaism has been advanced by liberal Rabbis who brandish such sayings as: "Do not do to your friend what you do not wish should be done to you", "Love your friend as yourself" ("Love thy neighbour" in the Christian

parallel). Orthodox Rabbis claim that the expression "friend" in the Talmud refers to a Jewish friend. They too contradict the demand to be kind to aliens – as "Ger," claiming that it means "Ger Tzedek", a proselyte to Judaism. I do not dispute their erudition and that theirs is probably the correct interpretation. I am not in a position to judge. I feel great affinity to our Sages and love reading them. I want to warn against the use of false argumentation, be it with the best intentions, and the propagation of counterfeited versions which Orthodox Rabbis may rebut.

We are burdened with an onerous heritage of mixed baggage. It is only natural that sediments of a negative nature would have accumulated owing to the circumstances of our tragic history. We must discard these embarrassing elements, first and foremost the doctrine that the difference between Jews and non-Jews is ontological (i.e. that Jews and non-Jews are different species), which has even spilled over into the liturgy of the Havdalah, in the claim that Jews differ from gentiles qualitatively, in their essence, as between day and night, the sacred and the profane. Can we countenance such instructions, derivative from this basic doctrine, and found in the most authoritative sources (Maimonides, Turim, Shulhan-Aruch) that a Jewish doctor should not heal a non-Jew, or that a Jew should not aid a non-Jew drowning in a river; or help a non-Jew falling into a well; or that the murder of a non-Jew by a Jew is not answerable in an ordinary court of law, but only before the Almighty? This last ruling was invoked recently when the members of the Jewish terrorist underground were brought to justice. According to Rabbi Shakh, the leader of the Lithuanian Yeshivot and the mentor of "Shas" in his book *Avi Ezer*, (*Haaretz*, 1 July 1987) a Jew may take the law into his own hands and without ado kill a non-Jew who contravenes any of the seven precepts of the Sons of Noah.

Two clauses of dispension previously used to mitigate these rulings can no longer serve us. First, that Jews can make exception to them "for the sake of peace" (*Darkhei Shalom*), or in order not to arouse "hostility" (*Eiva*), which means disobeying them, not because such deeds are wrong in themselves, but for the sake of expediency; as such acts might invite hostile reaction harmful to Jews. Second, the traditional claim that all these rulings should not apply now, but only during the "era when the hand of Israel prevails over the nations of the world." Thus, the contents of these rulings are approved, the only problem being one of timing; present circumstances are not opportune, and

therefore, their application is only to be deferred.

Expressions of hostility towards gentiles and the religious extreme positions on Israel's foreign affairs, stem from the same body of religious rulings. They are basically two facets of the same substratum: one, on the social level in the attitudes towards gentiles, and the other, on the political level in the relations between Israel and its neighbouring Arabs. Actually, the component of hostility on the social level is more basic and conditions the newly contrived political positions.

For instance, Dr. Mordechai Nisan (lecturer in the Overseas Students' School of the Hebrew University), uses asymmetrical discrimination in the Halakhah "to show the relevance of the Halakhic material to the present circumstances between Jews and Arabs in Eretz Israel" (*The Jewish State and the Arab Problem*, Tel Aviv, Hadar Publishing House, 1986, p. 147). He exemplifies this asymmetry by laws such as: There is no need for compensation in case an ox owned by a Jew gores an ox owned by a gentile, whereas there is need for compensation in the opposite case (*Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon*, Ch. 8:5). An article lost by a Jew should be returned but not one lost by a gentile (*Hilkhot Gzeilah VeAvedah*, ch. 11). Dr. Nisan justifies these discriminations on the grounds of "cultural differences" (*Ibid*). He claims that these discriminatory laws should now be transposed from the private to the political domain. Thus, Palestinian political demands have no standing and are summarily rejected and so is any need for a compromise with them. The West Bank should be annexed by Israel forthright, and the ensuing demographic problem be solved by a "transfer" of the Arabs to other countries. (*Ibid*, p. 124).

The position of politically moderate Orthodox circles who do their best to propound religious argumentations for a political dovish position will founder, so long as they do not concomittantly modify the more basic religious positions on the social level, of hostility towards gentiles. They are caught in an inconsistency that explains their ineffectiveness. Their opposition to the use of religion as underpinning for political radicalization regarding the occupied territories and the Palestinians is vitiated by their failure to deal with the religious elements of hostility and discrimination against gentiles. They simply prefer to ignore these elements.

Some religious moderates pin their hopes on "reinterpretation" as a means of disposing elegantly of the embarrassing components in our heritage, by changing their meaning. They should be congratulated and encouraged. Where such benign versions exist, they should be

given all prominence. However, many texts are not so malleable, rather their basic, traditional and literal meaning ("pshat") supports the extremists' interpretation. For instance, can Maimonides' proscribing the appointment of a gentile to any official post in a Jewish state be reinterpreted as meaning that he "really" intended to call for a benevolent policy of enlisting gentiles in the Jewish administration? Explaining away these negative precepts by casuistry arguing that their straightforward and explicit meaning is not their intent, cannot conjure them out of existence. If remedying our predicament can be achieved by reinterpretation, why do our moderates tarry? In the meantime the expectancy of miraculous relief by reinterpretation allows for delay and indifference which aggravate the situation.

Let the modern moderates beware of posing as Latter-Day Sages. The Sages could allow themselves to advance flagrant reinterpratations such as the famous example that "An eye for an eye" really meant "Monetary compensation for an eye". They presented their innovations as old tradition already received on Mount Sinai, and eventually succeeded in suppressing opposition to them. Paradoxically, in order to make leeway for their innovations they narrowed the scope for future attempts to emulate them. Reinterpretation requires tacit consensus which is impossible to attain in times of dissension as the present, and thus the new version is bound to be challenged and ridiculed. Plastering cosmetically over the negative components will produce a transparent glaze which will only bring upon the moderates the charge of hypocrisy. Innovation is not only a supplement, but entails the painful negation of the outmoded, the passé. It cannot be always achieved by an indirect approach of relying on a process of subliminal metamorphosis, or of a spontaneous evolution, but requires time and again head-on confrontation. The changes required cannot be made without high cost, perhaps a serious crisis.

An appropriate means of disposing of hard core texts is the contention of "historical relativity", as evoked by Rabbi Menahem HaMeiri (1249–1316), when he reversed Maimonides' position on the paganism of Christianity. Historical relativity is not slighting our forebears, but on the contrary, explaining why their choice, which was called for in their circumstances, is no longer valid. Historical relativity is not the imputing of new meaning, but an act of jettisoning flotsam, called for when it jeopardizes remaining afloat. It is predicated on living in history and acknowledging the relevance of its exigencies. Jews living among Christians could not afford to treat Christianity as did the

Jews living among Moslems. For those indulging in a Messianic mood the imperatives of history seem flippant; the Messiah will soon rescue them from all troubles.

The claim that Judaism has to be modernized to suit the contemporary world, and thus reformed, is not convincing. Modernity means greater compatibility with present-day fashions. Who says that they are good? Why should Judaism, at whose centre is the idea of God rather than man, not make painful demands? However, weeding out growths which have accumulated and have deformed and disfigured the religion is a much better cause. That should become the main item on the agenda of the debate with Orthodoxy. Progressive Rabbis should challenge Orthodoxy on this score. All other controversies and goals should be secondary. Let Orthodoxy or parts in it assume the stance of defending these negative elements such as those I have cited. Their position will be much more difficult, perhaps untenable. Most Jews will rebel against their leadership if these Rabbis persist in adhering to them. But in order to start such a debate one has to be ready to divulge and specify these elements, with all the embarrassment involved and despite the qualms that such a step may serve our enemies. Eventually, these elements will have to be determined by Rabbis scholars of high reputation in Judaic Studies.

Other religions have similar problems with their fundamentalists and their negative components. They too must deliberate upon how to deal with them. It may temporarily take the pressure from us, and provide the necessary time for the required changes in our own religion. The rise of fundamentalism is a worldwide phenomenon, but it is a mistake to regard it as a continuous, endless trend. The present preoccupation of other religions with their own problems will one day abate and they will then be in a position to look at others, including us.

The Christian world is inhibited in its dealings with the Jewish people and religion by its own history, recently by the role of the Catholic church and other churches as spectators of the Holocaust, failing to oppose it. Acknowledging their failures, the Christian leaders may eventually overcome these inhibitions and then they may turn and present their demands from us. The urge to assuage their discomfort and redress a balance may also serve as a motivating factor in the desire to point out that we too have our blemishes. Such a démarche may prove devastating for us. For many Jews, the disclosure of our negative rulings and precepts by foreigners may come as a shocking surprise, as

they are not aware of the existence of such elements in Judaism. It may subvert their allegiance to the Jewish religion and people. Let us now take steps to forestall such a possibility. Charity begins at home. We have to set our house in order, not only because of external criticism but for our own sake. There is a great difference between disowning those negative rulings by our own initiative, by exertion from within, and doing it under duress, coerced by external pressures. Part of Orthdoxy may be responsive to the need of changes and make important contributions towards them. Let those who refuse and continue cherishing these rulings stand alone.

Demonstrating to Orthodoxy that some of its rulings are liable to raise general opprobrium may facilitate the achievement of a modus vivendi between it and the other streams in contemporary Judaism, and between the religious and the secular sectors in Israel. Only thus can some unity, be restored to the Jewish people. Only thus can we avert a crisis in Judaism without relying on the coming of the Messiah, and alleviate the blow to the Jewish religion when the political position of annexation of Judea and Samaria supported by religion comes to grief. Only thus will Judaism be reinforced and strengthened. Self criticism and making the necessary changes can become a source of elation and pride in our ability to face up to the challenges. Only thus we shall rise to be a People of Choice ("Am Muvhar"). Only by assuming a critical stance can we identify ourselves with the totality of Jewish history, with all the currents and undercurrents in Judaism, with its history and counter-history. Personally, I have learnt that I can associate myself with the predicament and dilemmas of the Zealots and Bar-Kokhba by being critical of their tragic feats. We shall remain Jews through self-criticism; blinkers can benefit only a tiny minority.

Undoubtedly, what I suggest is very difficult. The complications of introducing changes in a religion that sanctions the principle "no addition and no deduction" ("ein gor'in veein mosifin") are momentous. Nevertheless, Rabbis did venture to introduce important changes when they judged them to be of dire importance. The choice before us is between bad and worse. It will be painful to achieve the necessary changes; not to make them may prove more harmful for our status in the world and our collective integrity.

We need a worldwide debate among our people on these fateful issues. I do not come to impose a line but only to propose one for consideration. I shudder to think of what may become the image of Juda-

ism if the necessary changes are not made. We shall soon face a moment of truth. What is at stake is not only Israel following unrealistic policies but the whole stature of the Jewish people, our religion and culture and their relationship with the world. Considering the gravity of the dangers, even excessive circumspection is preferable to carefree heedlessness. "Al kol tzara shelo tavo al hazibur matri'in". Warning against a calamity, even of small probability, is mandatory. How much the more so if its probability is considerable.

(This is a revised and enlarged version of a presentation to the Council of Reform and Liberal Rabbis at the Liberal Jewish Synagogue in London on 26th May, 1987.)

JUDAISM AND JEWISHNESS IN THE AMERICAN JEWISH PERCEPTION: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

[preliminary draft, not for publication]

Prof. Henry L. Feingold
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This discussion probes the interplay between Judaism, the religious component of Jewish group identity, and Jewishness, its ethnic peoplehood element. It focuses on the impact of secularization in America and defines a secular Jew as one who believes that it is possible to remain Jewish, without being Judaic. What we want to know is whether a secularized Jewry developing along its present path can carry the Jewish enterprise forward. Such discussions are inevitably haunted by the question of survival.

In contrast with recent optimistic studies regarding the condition of American Jewry, my conclusions are less hopeful although not despairing. A great deal will depend on whether American Jewry can muster the will to reverse the deracination inherent in the secularization process. To speak of will, as Herzl spoke of it in willing a Jewish state, may sound mystical, yet when there is nothing natural or inevitable about Jewish survival, especially in the modern epoch, what else is there to draw upon? It has to be contrived. Much depends on whether a self conscious secular Jewish culture would voluntarily cohere in free societies of the West. The American diaspora marks a new page in Jewish history. American Jewry is comfortable and seems secure, but it has not yet developed a strategy and a will sufficiently compelling to assure survival in a benevolent ingathering host culture.

I. THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL SETTING

The story of what happened to Jewry on the way to becoming

Americanized is full of strange turns and paradoxes because the national container in which that process occurred was no ordinary one. For Jews America was, and is different. Its benevolent absorbency produced a strong solvent which, over a three hundred year period, reshaped the contours of Jewish faith and community. Its unity and internal coherence was replaced by pluralism and fragmentation. Its particularity was universalized and made to fit into America's civil religion and its aesthetics were altered beyond recognition. Above all, the centrality of religion in determining for the community and for the now free individuated Jew, how life should be lived, was radically diminished. Modern secular man takes few of his behavioral cues from rabbis, priests or ministers. No American sub-culture has more avidly welcomed the opportunity to free itself from the constrictions of a law-obsessed religion and yet no group has been more insistent on the right to social space to develop its particularity, even when it is no longer quite certain on what ought to be planted in a Jewish garden. Its spiritual and ethnic bonds may in fact be loosening yet American Jewry is, today more than ever before, a conspicuous, sometimes noisy presence, on the American scene. That noisiness is viewed by some as a sign of vitality and confidence. But it may just as easily be considered a symptom of survival anxiety.

American Jewish ambivalence towards religion emanates partly from the host culture. Observers of the American scene like De Toqueville have long since noted that, of all western societies, America takes religion most seriously, even while it strictly

upholds the wall of separation between church and state and continues its intense love affair with all things modern. When there is conflict between the persistent Christian hegemonism and secularism, whether over school prayers or Sunday closing laws, Jews are usually found on the side of the secularists. They understand instinctively that given the intense religiosity of America, the separation of church and state, preserve their space. But they are increasingly aware that pervasive secularism, promotes an unbridled selfness which undermines the corporate communalism which has historically served as the cornerstone of Jewish continuance. What happens in that larger world of America is perhaps the most important determinant of what happens to Jewisness and Judaism. Whatever else has changed, it is still as true as it ever was, that when the Christian world sneezes, the Jewish world catches cold.

The reaction to the larger world of America determines, in some measure, the contours of Jewish life. It is there where the individual Jew must live his day-to-day life. But Jews are different from other sub-cultures in America because they receive signals from a pre-existing/co-existing millenial religious civilization, which also has its claims. When Horace Kallen, one of the major thinkers of American Jewry, proposed the idea of cultural pluralism in 1915, it was part of a strategy to permit more space for the expression of Jewish particularity whithin which the signals of that religious civilization were embodied. It was accepted by American elites because it confirmed what had already developed on the ethnic and religious front. Ethnically

America had become a "nation of Nations" and religiously Protestanism had proliferated into numerous denominations which, when added to Catholicism and Judaism and numerous exotic religious sects, made the religious world appear like a department store where the consumer rather than the diety reigned supreme. Cultural pluralism, which became a buzz work in all discussions regarding American Judaism, clearly worked to its advantage. Some, like Arthur Herzberg, argue that American Jewry, in its unwavering support of Israel, has gone beyond its bounds. If that is true, it is a measure of America's extraordinary tolerance of American Jewry's divided loyalty.

For practical reasons, the American polity was compelled to develop a tolerance for religious diversity which was no easy thing for the original population of the colonies. They had often emigrated in search of a place where they might worship freely. But like many who take religion seriously, they were not tolerant folk, prepared to extend that freedom to others. To have established one church would have divided the polity into "ins" and "outs" and made it vulnerable to both external and internal threats and probably prevented the founding of a "more perfect union." Pluralism served the Jewish community well for other reasons too. It meant it was never alone in its aberrance. There were those who quaked and shook and saw the imminence of Armageddon, who could deflect the wrath of the majority. Peter Stuyvesant, the Governor of New Amsterdam, may have despised the Jews and counselled the directors of his company to get rid of them at the earliest moment, but he also hated Papists, Congregatio-

nalists and hung Quakers ~~in the town square.~~

The wall created between Church and State protected Jews, but beyond that the formula ultimately developed for the organization of the national community was a centripetal one which sought to gather in all communities, with the distinct exception of the Negro and the Indian. It was not consistently applied as the many conversionist efforts of the 18th and 19th centuries attest. The struggle against Sunday Blue Laws and other forms of Christian hegemonism persisted well into the 20th century. Yet from the beginning the American polity was different. It was an artfully constructed pays legal, a rational contrivance, which for practical as well as ideological reasons invited Jews to join.

What were these ideological reasons? They stemmed from the principles of the enlightenment. America was its favorite child. Almost totally devoid of the feudal historic freight which burdened other nation states of the West, it was able to shape itself more precisely according to its principles. Here the multiple differentiations between citizens never took root. All were to be equal. Political and civil liberty was by right the patrimony of the "citoyen" which included Jews from the outset. The fact that America's political evolution occurred almost totally in the post-enlightenment period meant that the tensions between pre-enlightenment and post enlightenment interests did not determine the contours of the emancipation transaction. Jews were "present at the creation," they had become citizens of most of the states before the republic was established. There was little inclination to dispute their right to belong.

Indeed, there was an inclination to welcome them precisely because they were Jews. There were some who felt that Jews especially should be part of the "New Jerusalem." There was an affinity for things hebraic in colonial America. Steeped in Old Testament lore, the early settlers often saw themselves as the "children of Israel" and the new country as the "promised land." Even today place names in once Puritan Massachusetts and Mormon Utah as well as other states where Protestant fundamentalism was strong , read like a biblical atlas. There are Jerusalems, Babylons and Beershebas in virtually every state of the union. There was a period in the early 18th century when the best Hebraists were not Jews, but gentiles anxious to familiarize themselves with scriptures in their original language. The Republic, President Coolidge later informed the nation, was held together by an "Hebraic mortar." While these bible-drenched Christians often held ambivalent views of actual Jews, it gave Judaism a special parental place. Even if the Jews had gone astray and the covenant now bound a new people, there was still a special place for Judaism. Perhaps they would one day see the light that first shown at Calvary. Rather than a pariah people they were a people who dwelt near the source. There was that sense of continuance which later encouraged both Jews and Christians to speak of the Judeo-Christian ethic.

The hebraism of the colonial settlers warrants our attention because it goes far to explain the benevolence of the American environment. That in turn explains much regarding the development of Judaism and Jewishness in America. In the 1950s Will Herberg,

the sociologist of religion, called attention to the fact that while American Jewry formed a little over 3% of the total population, Judaism, the religion, was granted one third of the religious established. As evidenced by such things as the frequency rabbis were called upon to deliver religious invocations at civic functions, it was in fact one of the three major religions. Clearly the Jewish experience in America was marked by such a remarkable confluence between itself and the host culture that it gave Jews extraordinary access to the promise of American life and held out the prospect of full integration on equal terms. That was a new page in the millenial history of the Jewish Diaspora. No other Jewish community had to conceive of its survival in circumstances of acceptance, not by monarchical fiat, but by an openness generated by a genuine pluralism reinforced by the ideology of the enlightenment. Both were part of a larger process of modernization and secularization about which we will say more presently.

II. DISINTEGRATION OR TRANSFORMATION

It would be natural to imagine that given such a benevolent host environment and the sense of at homeness which it engendered that Judaism would have seized the opportunity to enter a new Golden Age and elaborate its religious culture, as it had done in Spain. There are some researchers who read the history of American Judaism that way. But the survival anxiety of recent years serves as a signal that this is not the way the historical cooky is crumbling. For Diaspora communities survival can be as much

threatened by drowning in a sea of perfume as it can by virulent anti Semitism. Moreover, whether one feels that American Judaism is disintegrating or merely being transformed into something else, the signs of radical alteration are undeniable. Not only is America different but the Judaism it incubates is different too.

One of the most manifest signs of alteration is the diminution of the religious passion which has characterized Jewry in previous historical epochs. It is as if freed of the crucible of victimization, American Jewry has lost its sense of self without which there can be no will to endure. That loss of inner spirit was not easily discernable in the nineteenth century, although some like Isaac Leeser complained of it even then. It was concealed by the rapid development of institutions, Rabbinic academies, synagogues, an elaborate system of organized philanthropy and fund raising, and an organizational infrastructure, which gave American Jewry the flush of health. Yet today it is clear that the building of the brick and mortar edifice occurred at the juncture when the the totalistic environment which turned a Jew toward the east wall thrice daily for prayer, as if by Pavlovian conditioning, could not be reproduced in modern America. Survival required an act of will. Nor was such a loss of identity and spirit confined to the religious enterprise.

By the 1920s it was no longer possible for survivalists to complacently believe that even if religious identity diminished there was still the safety net of Jewish ethnicity, it came to be known as peoplehood, which could catch "fallen" Jews. Surviva-

lists could reason that relgion was not the only way one could express one's belonging in a a modern age. But it soon became apparent that the same process which was eroding the religious spirit was also weakening the bonds of Jewish peoplehood. Today few social scientists are as certain, as were Horace Kallen and Mordecai Kaplan, that the melting pot model of acculturation is not really what is happening. Behind all is the process of secularization which continues apace and shapes the mind set and perception even of those who would most resist its influence. Its massive impact can be seen everywhere in American Jewry but because it entails a change in perception few fully fathom how it impacts on American Jewish identity.

The decade of the twenties serves as the anchorage of many of the changes which are fully manifest today. It witnessed a movement of the second generation, the sons of the eastern immigrants, into the mainstream of American life. We need not detail here the rise in real income, the professionalization and general occupational enhancement of American Jewry during this period. But Jewishly there are crucial developments which make sense only in retrospect. For example on the religious front the data we possess today indicate an enormous and expensive expansion of operations. New synagogues in areas of second settlement usually of the Conservative branch, but also Reform, attracted thousands of new congregants. Between 1912 and 1922 the Conservative movement experienced a growth from 22 to 350 congregations. During the single fiscal year 1921-1922 the Reform movement's Union of American Hebrew Congregations added 26 congregations to the 200 which

already belonged. Especially successful were the new Jewish centers, "a shul with a pool and a school" which offered an entire way of life for its members. By 1927 there were 47 such centers with about 100,000 members. The figure had risen to 234 centers with 435,000 members by 1941. New rabbinic organizations for the Conservatives and the Orthodox, and the establishemnt of the Jewish Institute of Religion by Stephen Wise, (later absorbed by the Reform movement). The separation between Orthodoxy and Conservatism was not as apparent as it is today. In the Spring of 1926 there was talk of a federated unification of the Isaac Elchanan Yeshiva with the Jewish Theological Seminary. ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ ~~Spring of 1926.~~ The negotiations failed but both institutions continued to thrive until severely hit by the Depression. Rabbis were being trained and ostensibly Torah was being "learned." An organizational edifice was being built built for the operation of a Judaic church in America. On the surface the "striking growth of Judaism," proudly proclaimed by the American Hebrew on May 29, 1925, seemed to be born out by the physical facts.

But closer scrutiny reveals a far different picture. There is for example the almost banal incident of the need for sacramental wine to celebrate the kiddush which occupied the learned minds of the community in the early twenties. It seemed that some "fake" Rabbis were getting around the Volstead Law by using its exemption which allowed fermented wine to be purchased for religious purposes. Did the Halacha demand that fermented wine be used? The Orthodox, whose transient congregations were most frequently used for such illegal purpose, argued that it was, although some rabbis must have been fully aware that the

thousands of gallons of wine so ordered could not possibly be consumed for the sanctification of the kid·dush alone. At the same time there occurred the fierce kosher meat and poultry wars in which underworld thugs were used by both sides. It was hardly inspiring to the diminishing number who clung to kashrut when they learned that they were paying high prices for meat and poultry, 70% of which was in fact terefa. Most crucial for our understanding, the actual demand for Kashrut in New York City had in fact radically declined. Between 1914 and 1924, the consumption of only Kosher food, generally believed to be the last thing to be abandoned by secularizing Jews, declined by 25 to 30%.

There was more than the integrity of the observant community involved. The complaints of the difficulty of rearing children according to Jewish law reached a crescendo during the twenties. The synagogues were built but frequently they were empty. Every year beween 1921 and 1929 the American Hebrew, the leading Anglo Jewish weekly, ironically counseled synagogue architects to build "accordian shaped" buildings so that synagogues which were virtually empty during daily and weekly Sabbath services might be expanded during the "Days of Awe," when they were packed. Yet even such annual attendance was declining. A study in 1935 discovered that 72% of Jewish men between the ages of fifteen and twenty five and 78% of women had not attended services at all during the preceding year. By 1929 the 2,948 congregations, one congregation for every 1,386 Jews, had a total budget of 16.5 million dollars. But in New York City only 3% of the Jewish population held synagogue membership. Undoubtedly other "state of

the faith" indices, number of children receiving religious education, number of mikvehs built, number of Sabbath observers, etc. would show a parallel weakness. That decline in sheer knowledge of the culture was as true of the rabbinate as the laity. An indigenous English speaking rabbinate was being produced. In secular terms it was a increasingly well educated. By 1937 64% had earned the BA degree, 23% held and MA and 12% were the proud recipients of the Ph.D, but that of course did not transfer over to knowledgability in Judaic subjects where the picture was gloomier. It includes the graduates of HUC, on one extreme, who did not speak Hebrew and the appearance of Orthodox "wonder rebbes," on the other, who resembled the "rain makers" of the revivalist Protestant denominations. Moreover the increase in secular education encouraged a growing number of rabbis, traditionally the most learned member of the Jewish community, to think of themselves as merely professionals, a category which came into its own during the twenties. Increasingly such rabbis were more occupied with personal counseling of congregants, administration of large congregations and being the Jewish representatives to the Christian community.

One could of course argue that the depiction of the malaise is unfair or at least incomplete. The twenties were after all a decade when institutionalized religion entered a period of disrepute especially among the opinion-leader elite who were disheartened by what they believed the Scopes trial revealed about the ability of organized religion to accommodate to modernity. The impact could not help but be felt by American Judaism. Others may note that the disruption of the chain of generations was not

as dire as imagined. The journalist Judd Teller, a keen observer of Jewish life during the twenties, noted that Jewish neighborhoods were considerably darker on Friday nights than on weekday evenings and one could see the Sabbath candles flickering in many a flat. No matter how secularized a Jew had become, he could still be moved to tears by a rendition of Eli Eli. That may of course be true and it compells us to add that the break from tradition was gradual and occured in generational increments. Moreover for the secularizing Jews of the twenties who did not yet make the division between Yiddishkeit and Judaism xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxg and still recognized Orthodoxy as the only valid expression of religious Judaism, such a break was not acknowledged. The visible trappings of religion could be maintained for decades even while the perception of the role of religion in life had changed. But eventually such Jews, or more likely their children, lapsed in their observance. Often they rationalized that they were merely moving to a different kind of Judaism, less demanding but no less real.

That is the reason why Mordecai Kaplan's use of the term "crisis" in an article in the Menorah Journal in 1921 was found by many Jews to be unduly alarming. He pointed out that "Western Civilization has become as necessary to him (the Jew) as breathing" but that in adoring it, his own religious culture was crowded out and left in "an appalling poverty of spirit." Indeed those who imagined that an ethnic net would catch "fallen" Jews had only to look at the result of the restrictive immigration laws of 1921 and 1924. Whereas almost a half million Jews had

entered the country between 1902 and 1914, only 70,000 had done so between 1921 and 1927. The Yiddishkeit/peoplehood culture secular survivalists like to imagine as a back up, was like many facets of American Jewish culture, carried in the baggage of these immigrants and when they no longer came it was destined to decline. Like so many other segments of secular Jewish culture it was derivative. The Yiddish press and yiddish theater, the shining ~~shining~~ exemplars of that culture, did in fact experience a sharp decline during the twentieth as did the Yiddish schools. Despite the fact that during the twenties many Jews still spoke Yiddish, it was Hebrew which became part of the high school curriculum in 1922. It was more acceptable because it was considered more modern and did not smack of the immigrant culture which Americanized Jews wanted to forget.

Predictably it was the Orthodox community which was most reluctant to heed Kaplan's warning, convinced, as they were, that rather than making the Torah fashion itself to the times, the times must be made "to harmonize with the Torah". (Agudath Harabonim, 1926). They preoccupied themselves with such matters as disciplining those orthodox congregations which permitted mixed seating or the question of the permisability of using a mechanical clamp (called a gomko) to perform circumcision. Not until June 1945, when a group of orthodox rabbis read the Cherem against Mordecai Kaplan, may it have occured to some members of Agudath Harabonim how serious the situation actually was. Most Jews simply did not take the cherem seriously and rejected the authority of the rabbis to determine the definition of who was a Jew. They discovered again that their word counted for almost nothing among a people well on the road to scularization.

well on the road to secularization.

Orthodox Jews were not alone in their conviction that all that was required was to convince Jews to hang on to their faith. Most committed Jews bemoaned the visible manifestations of change. That was as true of secularists, who berued the decline of yiddish culture, as of observant Jews, who regreted the loss of faith in the younger generation. But they could not comprehend what they could not see and the change in mind set was as invisible as it was pervasive.

We need here only examine those facets of the secularization process which impinge on our story, those which impacted on the formation of American Jewish group identity. Its historical impact has already been described in the preceding paragraphs. What American Jewry continued to experience was a secularization process which internalized and privatized the religious sensibility, compromised its sense of group belonging by individualization and detribalization and finally inhibited the ability to believe in a commanding voice outside of itself by a process of desacrelization and celebration of selfness. These familiar code words of the secularization process warrant some further examination.

It should be understood that what is described here is the ideal model. It is truer of some communities and individuals than others. In real life most American Jews positioned themselves somewhere along an axis at one end of which was the totally secularized autonomous individual, and on the other a totally tribalized ultra Orthodox Jew, perhaps of the Agudath persuasion. The choice of place is based on comfort which is impor-

tant in the day to day lives of those who are free to choose. American Jewry is a Jewry of comfort, bound neither by the "yoke of Torah" nor the "yoke of aliyah." Consistency is not its strong point. There are atheists who enjoyed hearing a good chazan and members of Beth Dins who retrieve responsa by computer. Secular identity is multileveled rather than linear or organized around a core of beliefs. We are no longer necessarily what we appear to be.

American secularists are today rarely committed seriously to political and religious ideologies which demand a shaping role in life and limit autonomy. They may call themselves Zionists but mean by it simply that they support Israel. Or they may call themselves Orthodox, but not be Sabbath observers. In the case of the latter, they mean that if they were not secular, they would be Orthodox, as their fathers were. Like most modernists they place a high priority on rationalism and therefore are more intent on understanding than belief which involves the supernatural or mythic. Maurice Samuels may have been on to something when he described the cool operational Zionists of the Brandeis-/Mack variety as "logical" rather than "biological." Secularization explains a great deal about the "practical" character of American Zionism. Historically, it was more interested in developing a Potash industry on the Dead Sea then chalutzlut.

The secular mind set cherishes a sense of autonomy and freeness. At the turn of the century Jewish secularists often referred to themselves as "free thinkers." We would better under-

stand that concept if we think of them as people not bound by the imperatives of the group, community or tribe. His association with these is voluntary and given on his own terms. That makes Jewish governance in the American diaspora problematic. It is not only Halacha that can be disregarded, but all other types of fiat which have not proven persuasive. There is no power that can compell an American Jew to be Jewish or Judaic, and a growing number choose to be neither. That individual autonomy also accounts for the troublesome incoherence of the American Jewish polity. Leaders cannot lead, in the normal sense, because followers are not bound to follow. The quest to be free may go beyond ridding oneself of tribal and communal fetters. It is possible to imagine that it extends to family. That may be one reason for the astronomical divorce rates in highly secularized societies.

In the name of science, American secularism displays a strong penchant for separating and reclassifying things that were once unified. In politics there is a wall of separation between church and state. In culture, art is no longer part of the religion. Ethics, the principles which ostensibly govern how we live and etiquette, the socially derived rules of how we actually conduct ourselves, are no longer confluent. In the area of Jewish identity, Judaism, the faith with its myriad laws, and Jewishness, the ethnic peoplehood, are separated and often at war with each other. It is that bifurcation which is at the heart of the dilemma which this discussion probes.

When a pervasive sense of individualism reigns supreme it is

bound to conflict with a traditional hallmark of Judaism, its corporateness. In that contest religious ideologies and political ones like Zionism come off second best. The need for self actualization subverts all that would lay claim to having a dominant role in how life should be lived. Indeed ideologies which maintain too insistant a claim on individuals and communities are inevitably broken. That is what the Russians and the Chinese are discovering. One reason why in America, political Zionism was replaced by a less demanding cultural Zionism, is that the praxis element in all modern ideologies, which insists that the theory must be bound to practice, inhibits autonomy and freeness. It therefore needs to be redefined or transmuted. The old wine is poured into new bottles. Particular religion is transmuted into universalized belief systems like Ethical Culture or Socialism or secular humanism or, in the words of Joseph Blau, "moralism." The wish for the Messiah may for modern man be transmuted into a desire for social justice. The deity may loose specificity and be transmuted into a generalized creative spirit or a pantheistic one. For diaspora Jews the sense of exile may become a sense of personal alienation, the feeling of belonging nowhere and to no one. Heschel said it best: "Not only are all of us in Galut, Galut is in us."

Once it is understood that the secular perception is organized around selfness much of what has happend to Judaism and Jewishness in America becomes clearer. Individuated secular Jews can be enlisted for communal objectives only when their first committment to self has been satisfied or can be seen to correspond to their needs. That may include a need for transcendence

which among American Jews is often fulfilled through philanthropic giving. He picks and chooses those facets of the regnant ideology which fit his purposes. He has become his own lonely tribal chieftain. Yet though the secular Jew is in effect a tribe of one, when he can recognize a Jewish interest and is mobilized in its behalf, he brings enormous talent and influence to bear. In America that did not happen enough during the bitter years of the Holocaust. Yet the power of secular Jews when fully mobilized was in evidence in the decades after World War II. It was in some measure their pressure on the Truman administration which brought about the recognition of the Jewish state and its loving nurture thereafter. It is largely their skills and support which keep the social service and organizational structure of American Jewry going. The question for survivalists is, how long can that memory of a memory which still enables secular Jews to recognize a Jewish interest be counted upon. Memories of peoplehood fade when there is nothing to support them.

III SURVIVAL

Can Jewishness survive without Judaism? That is really the dilemma secular survivalists have faced for the two centuries since the enlightenment. At least part of the answer depends on the society in which the process is occurring. Because the Holocaust cut the thriving Jewish cultures of eastern Europe down, we will never know if Jewish secularism might have sustained itself in Poland and other societies where the host culture proved to be impenetrable and rejecting. In such societies even after the secularizing Jew abandoned the religious culture, he

could not stop being Jewish by simply becoming a Pole. There were ideologies, Bundism and varieties of Zionism, even Esperantism, which generated a distinct and self-conscious Jewish culture. There was a secular net which could catch "fallen" Jews. In some degree, the same process is observable in contemporary Israel where the impact of modernity is no less intense. There a "fallen" Jew is caught in the net of the Jewish nation supported by a Jewish state which keeps him at least nominally Jewish. (Although there is a great difference between Jewishness as nurtured in eastern Europe and Israelism.) This is one of the reasons why Abba Hilel Silver became such a staunch proponent of Zionism. He was convinced that a secular Jewish life was possible only in Palestine and not in the U.S..

From the Scottish enlightenment and its voice, John Locke, we have inherited a "hard", but centripetal secularism which makes it difficult to sustain a separate Jewish culture. The distinct Jewish presence in America can linger for centuries and have strong influence and impact, but in the end no distinct self-conscious Jewish culture can be sustained. We speak here of an authentic culture which offers sufficient support and can deflect secularizing Jews on their way to join a host culture which beckons. There is in America no distinct Jewish language, theater and literature. These cannot develop when there is no conscious community which can incubate such basic instruments of culture. Even if Jewish writers like Cynthia Ozick have something distinctively Jewish to say she writes it in English and publishes in Esquire.

Achievement in all fields, which serves as the driving force of secular persons, requires individuation and a focus on selfhood. Observe the scientists, doctors, lawyers and sundry professionals which are the pride of the Jewish community. They are first and foremost professionals who, incidentally and sometimes unhappily, happen to be Jewish. In the secular mind-set commitment to profession comes first. What often gives American Jewry the flush of health is that through professionalization and the use of committed Jews who still abound, it is possible to maintain a stong organizational structure. But even if that reaches and supports millions of Jews, it is still a far cry from a distinct Jewish culture. It does not solve the problem of what to transmit through the organizational and congregational conduits which have been established. Gradually American Jewry is becoming more American and less Jewish. What was distinctive about them still prevailed in the second and third generation but now it vanishes.

The problem of how to keep Judaism and Jewishness together has in fact been the major preoccupation of the various religious branches of Judaism. At one end was classical Reform of the Pittsburgh platform period (1885) which viewed Judaism simply in denominational religious terms and, by stressing prophetic Judaism, established an attractive consonance with the principles of the enlightenment. At the other end was the Orthodox camp which responded to the force of modernity in a variety of ways but mostly by wariness and a determination to hold on to what was. If Reformists were reductive, the Orthodox community was deductive. Most interesting is the Conservative movement and its off-spring, the Reconstructionists. Interesting because they

recognized that secular Jewishness had gained the initiative and therefore had to be confronted. Under Solomon Schechter, the Conservative movement sought to enshrine Jewish ethnicity by such concepts as "catholic Israel." It wanted to become the "folk religion" of American Jewry and thereby provide a conduit for secularizing Jews to remain Jewish. Although both Mordecai Kaplan and Schechter supported Cultural Zionism for ideological reasons, they were also aware that modern secular Zionism incorporated the peoplehod element in its most pristine form. It too could serve an instrument to keep dejudaizing Jews, Jewish. Kaplan who was among the first to recognize that the loss of millions of secularizing Jews was a crisis of immense proportions, also thought in terms of Jewish peoplehood which generated an evolving Jewish religious civilization. Judaism becomes a cultural expression, one among many, of the Jewish people. Similarly when an alarmed Reform movement altered its vision in 1937 and stated in its new Columbus Platform that "Judaism is the soul of which Israel is the body," it was responding to the chasm which had developed in the Reform movement between secularized Jewishness and Judaism which caused it to loose forward momentum in the thirties. But it would take more than rhetoric and eloquent metaphors to revitalize a radically bifurcated American Jewry.

It is not always easy to determine whether such dialectical legerdemain is working to keep secularized Jews in the fold. We have seen that in secular cultures things may not be what they seem. In terms of organizational structure, fund raising capacity,

advocating the Jewish interest before the American seat of power, American Jewry seems vital. But the strategy of tightly binding Judaism and Jewishness together by ideological fiat, in the hope of reversing the very logic of modernity in America, was perhaps forlorn from the outset. Secularism is primarily a perception, a way of looking at the world and defining reality. It has become part of the culture and effects even those who most resist its embrace. Those who understand its full implications for faith and seek to neutralize its influence sometimes try to skillfully balance the claims of two worlds. Sometimes that is ingeniously achieved. A Jewish comedien does a hilarious routine which describes how observant Jews prepare themselves for a weekend skiing trip. (They take lots of cans of tuna fish.) Such balancing acts require will and energy and there is loss of spirit and authenticity. We do not yet know the full story of the massive attrition in the Orthodox community but it must have been high since most American Jews who are now more or less secular can still remember their observant grandparents. Even during the current period of triumphalism, Orthodoxy has actually experienced a slower proportional growth than other branches and a decline in relation to the number of Jews who no longer affiliate at all. Similarly the Conservative movement is plagued by a decline in observance. Their attempt to accommodate the modernization process, based, as it is, on a transaction in which each side has conceded something, has been less than successful. American Judaism has been as much altered as it has sought to alter, perhaps more. For some even the changes such as ordination of women and adoption of patrilineal descent would be acceptable if they

held out the promise of taming the secularization process. But clearly the process is inexorable and the changes it requires, endless. One can negotiate the terms of living together and the concessions each side must make, but one cannot negotiate away the process itself. A secularized Jewry which sanctifies freedom and equality the way its forefathers cherished Torah and mitzvot, is bound to produce ever more claims which erode the ties of corporateness central to Judaism. From the host culture American Jewry has imbibed a concept of freeness and individualism so extreme that rather than acting through community it acts against it. The rapacious businessman insists that enterprise be free and the pornographer becomes a staunch defender of free speech. Both are a far cry from the Jewish tradition which matches freedom with responsibility. Jews are free to worship the one God and perform mitzvot. It is a freedom exercised through community rather than against it. For that reason the problems which emanate from the "who is a Jew" question will seem tame compared with what is in store. Can "gays" study for the rabbinate? Is surrogate parenting permissable? Is brith milah essential?. Already they stretch the tolerance threshhold of the observant accommodators to the breaking point. In the end the question may well be, not whether Jewish law can be adjusted to the growing demands for change which the secularization process brings in its wake, but whether secular Jews can still believe in the one God who spoke at Sinai or, failing that, a secular culture can be developed to hold them by other means.

Without linkage to the religious component, the survival

potential of secular Jews in America is limited. It may linger for generations and individual secular Jews may make great contributions to American culture and technology, but in the absence of authentic Jewish secular culture it cannot produce the will to be Jewish, generation after generation. Without the particularistic tension which Judaism provides it would evolve into a bland universalized religiosity which fits comfortably into America's civil religion. Eventually the secular Jew would no longer know what he is deviating from. He would be anchorless in a seductive secular world.

But what of the reverse question? Can Judaism survive without the overwhelming mass of Jews who simply believe themselves to be Jewish but not religious? More precisely, can the proportionately small core of Orthodox Jews in America who have more or less resisted the blandishments of secular life survive without the mass of American Jews who have come to terms with it? Survival, as used here, means more than personal or small group continuance. It means the generation of an American Jewish culture worthy of the name, rather than becoming merely another religious sect on the already cluttered American landscape.

Let us assume that in the decades to come American Jewry realizes that continuing along the present path would lead to its demise and they want to find ways to avoid that. Suppose they somehow realize that they must take a page from the Orthodox community and at least make the investment these Jews make in living a Jewish life. The upholders of tradition then become a potential leadership elite for American Jewry. Some already hold that position. But in a free secular community elites need

continually to take care that their links to their constituency remain strong. Free Jews are after all capable of choosing other elites composed perhaps of psychoanalysts, scientists, even businessmen. Elites who neglect or, in the American Jewish case, reject their constituency, become extremely vulnerable. In Poland and other eastern countries the great fear of the Communist nomenclatura emanates directly from the fact that they are unable to earn the support of the working class whom they purport to represent and even less, the nation at large. In American Jewry the masses of secular Jews have not read Orthodoxy out of the community which they might easily do by the democratic process of superior numbers and their control of the philanthropic dollar. A study of the budgets of many local federations would show that the reverse is happening. Orthodox agencies have slightly increased their share of the philanthropic dollar contributed overwhelmingly by secularized Jews. (For other reasons they have done even better in Israel.) We have the strange case of a potential elite, rejecting its role and refusing to reach out to its natural constituency. The hope of having one Jewish people by the year two thousand is thereby minimized and the potential elite becomes vulnerable. It is after all not a foregone conclusion that an aberrant ultra Orthodox community which has cut itself off from the great mass of secularized Jews and therefore no longer has claim to ~~the protective~~ protective mantle can by itself fend off the anti Semitism which exists latently even in America.

Beyond that, should the serious tension between Jewishness and Judaism which characterizes American Jewish life come to an

end, should either of the contestants leave the arena, American Jewry would experience a more rapid decline. The tension is agonizing and increasingly uncivil, but it is a creative one which gives American Jewry measured change. Partly because of recent post-emancipation Jewish history, partly because of the society with which it has cast its lot, American Jewry has inherited a secular spirit so certain of its vision of what the future should be, future that, if not checked by an equally determined force, it will generate "life styles" which make communal life increasingly impossible. The turn of the century Jewish secularists who celebrated Yom Kippur feasts before synagogues were not reasonable men, and neither are their contemporary successors. Their passion for change is familiar to Jewish observers for whom it recalls nothing so much as the religious fervor of the a truly pious Jew. They have contended in the community since before the turn of the century and in the process have given American Jewry something more reasonable than either side proposes on its own. Who knows what will happen if the natural checks that we have been fortunate enough to inherit are dissipated.

Thankfully this discussion promised only to examine the interplay between Jewishness and Judaism in the American historical context and not to propose solutions. I would reveal my own secular proclivities by optimistically assuming that for every problem there exists a solution. All one need do is find them or better yet develop some "scientific" instrument to restore harmony. I have grown less hopeful than researchers like Charles Silberman, who parade statistics which show a vital

American Jewry. Statistics are themselves the artifacts of the secular mentalité. They tell us only how things look not what they are. I am more concerned about things of the spirit which statistics and data do not reveal. I cannot conclude that Mordecai Kaplan, or the sundry other thinkers and leaders, who have sought solutions about how to accommodate secularism to an ancient faith, have been successful. Jewishness and Judaism seem to be growing further apart and the former does not, it seems to me, have much of a lease on life in America. But historically the Jews have been a resilient people. Perhaps what we witness is not disintegration but transformation. It would be nice to be able to convince oneself of that. But then there is the historical reality that Jewish survival in the post-emancipation Diaspora has not been natural. It must be willed. That is even truer of the benevolent American diaspora than of others. But to will survival there must be a culture or a belief to generate it. For secular Jews there must also be a sense of the worthwhileness of that culture lest the question of the first son, "survival for what?" remains unanswered.