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Series A: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1961-1996.

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American Jewish Committee, 1978-1992.

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March 26, 1992

Rabbi Alexander Schindler, Pres.
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10021

Dear Rabbi Schindler:

The American Jewish Committee will conduct its 86th Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C., this year. Pending a more formal invitation, please mark the date of Thursday, May 14, 1992, and plan to join as many as 1,000 American Jewish Committee members from across the country in the Gala Dinner that will be the highlight of our three-day meeting. The dinner is scheduled for 7 p.m. in the Capital Hilton Hotel.

As you can see from the Program Highlights enclosed, among the topics we will address are pluralism and tolerance in the American political process; the health of Jewish communities in the countries of the former Soviet Union; the changing status of the American family; prospects for the Middle East peace process, and the evolving U.S.-Israel relationship.

Please expect our invitation to the Gala Dinner in the coming weeks. I hope you will be able to attend and, as your schedule allows, take part in some of the other events planned for the three days of meetings in Washington.

Sincerely,

Alfred H. Moses
President

AHM:ar
Encl.



Program Highlights

Wednesday, May 13

- 12:00 Noon **Opening Luncheon in the Senate Caucus Room, Capitol Hill**
Presentation of AJC's Congressional Leadership Award to
Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
AMERICAN JEWISH
Election 1992 and Bigotry in the Political Process
Ron Brown and *Richard Bond*, Chairmen of the Democratic and
Republican National Committees, respectively

Release of AJC's newest program publication on Politics & Bigotry
- 2:30 PM **Delegations to Capitol Hill**
Meet in small groups with key Senators and Representatives
- 5:30 PM **Reception and Dinner**
Open National Executive Council - Board of Governors Meeting
The State of The American Jewish Committee
Alfred H. Moses, President, and *David A. Harris*, Executive Vice President

Discuss AJC's role in counteracting anti-Semitism in political campaigns

Thursday, May 14

- 8:00 AM **Plenary Breakfast**
Social Policy - An American Agenda
Senators *Jay D. Rockefeller* (D-WV) and *John H. Chaffee* (R-RI)
- 10:00 AM **Delegations to Foreign Embassies**



af Com
RABBI ALEXANDER M. SCHINDLER • UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS
PRESIDENT 838 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 (212) 249-0100

August 9, 1990
18 Av 5750

Mr. Ira Silverman
Executive Vice President
The American Jewish Committee
Institute of Human Relations
165 East 56th Street
New York, NY 10022

Dear Ira:

I was sorry to learn that you are stepping down from the leadership of the AJC, even more sorry that your health has not sufficiently improved to allow you to take full charge.

This is a loss for the AJC (I was one of those who strongly urged the headhunters to nab you while they could.) But, it is also a loss for all of us since the strength of the Committee is important to the total Jewish community.

I am glad that you are not severing all your relations with the AJC and that in consequence we will have an opportunity to be together.

Of course, I hope and pray that your strength will continue to grow.

With fond good wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

December 15, 1989
17 Kislev 5750

TO: The American Jewish Committee

Enclosed herewith is out check for \$38.40 to cover the cost of twenty-four copies of the National Jewish Family Center's publication "Intermarriage and Rabbinic Officialization" by Egon Mayer.

Many thanks.

Edith J. Miller
Assistant to the President

Edith Miller

12/4/89

Fred Cohen

I had to order additional copies of the Egon Mayer Intermarriage study, published by the American Jewish Committee, Jewish Communal Affairs Department.

Please issue a check for \$38.40, payable to the American Jewish Committee. Forward the check to me for transmittal with a letter.

Thank you.



AJ Committee

January 17, 1990
20 Tevet 5750

Mr. Daniel S. Schechter
552 Woodlawn Avenue
Glencoe, IL 60022

Dear Dan:

As you will note from the enclosed, I have been in contact with the highest leadership of the American Jewish Committee in regard to your plaint.

While the response from Steve Bayme explains how they came to select the leadership to receive their questionnaire, at least the staff and lay leaders of the AJC are aware of our concerns.

With warm regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Encl.



The American Jewish
Committee

Institute of Human Relations
165 East 56 Street
New York, New York 10022-2746
212 751-4000/FAX: 212 319-0975

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John Slawson

January 12, 1990

Rabbi Alexander Schindler
Union of American Hebrew
Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10021

Dear Rabbi Schindler:

Ira Silverman has asked me to respond to your January 4 note and its enclosed correspondence from Daniel Schechter.

I am sorry if the questionnaire developed by Ukeles Associates caused any confusion. Essentially, this is not free-standing research on Jewish leadership. Rather, it is survey research commissioned to advance a particular Task Force on Jewish Leadership created by the AJC, which is chaired by Bob Rifkind and staffed by me.

Upon formation of this Task Force we convened a distinguished advisory body to brainstorm its focus and direction. That meeting resulted in the strong recommendation that the Task Force avoid the temptation to be global and address the entire map of Jewish leadership. Rather, the Task Force mandate became to examine the leadership of the secular or civil sector of Jewish communal organizations. The introduction to the draft report of the Task Force therefore reads as follows:

"The AJC Task Force on Jewish Leadership was charged with development of principles, criteria, and programs to address recruitment, retention, and training of lay leaders and guidelines of appropriate models of lay-staff relations in Jewish communal organizations. Projects designed to enhance professional and religious leadership are equally necessary. It is our hope that serious efforts to fashion appropriate programs in one area will encourage similar programs in other areas."

In other words, the decision on what models of leadership would be included in the study was far more pragmatic than ideological. There was no attempt to communicate the perception that leadership resides beyond the pale of synagogues and religious organizations. It was also our intention from the very beginning that the report state explicitly what is the sample - what it includes and what it does not include, thereby avoiding any pretensions to speak for the entire gamut of Jewish leadership.

Ukeles Associates have now reassured me that the considerations involved were entirely those of research, i.e. to create a comparable data base for the project as a whole and avoid combining apples and oranges. In other words, the Task Force assumptions are that these issues will play themselves out differently in terms of religious leadership and that the Task Force report should focus entirely on the civil sector. There was no intention to make an invidious distinction between secular and religious leadership. I understand from Steve that Jack Ukeles explained these matters to Daniel Schechter at some length.

Once again, I am sorry if this has caused any confusion. Please rest assured that neither I nor other members of the AJC staff perceive Jewish leadership as the monopoly of the secular community.

All best wishes.

Sincerely,


Steven Bayme
Director
Jewish Communal Affairs Department

SB:MD

cc: Ira Silverman
Robert S. Rifkind

Enclosure



January 4, 1990
7 Tevet 5890

Mr. Ira Silverman
Executive Vice President
American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
New York, NY 10022

Dear Ira:

I found the enclosed letter troubling but want to ascertain your reaction and comments before taking this matter further. If, indeed, members of your staff were quoted correctly in regard to conversations with Jacob Ukeles, I have a problem₁

Please let me hear from you as soon as possible. I am eager to have your counsel.

With warm good wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Encl.

January 4, 1990
7 Tevet 5750

Mr. Daniel S. Schechter
552 Woodlawn Avenue
Glencoe, IL 60022

Dear Dan:

Thank you for your letter and a copy of the covering letter from Jacob Ukeles on the survey you received. I appreciate your calling this matter to my attention as well as your having made contact with Mr. Ukeles to express your concern.

I am looking into the matter and want to be certain the comments you received concerning the decision of the AJC Communal Affairs Department staff are indeed correct. If they are, you may be sure I will not allow this matter to go unanswered.

I guess I'm not a Jewish leader....I have no recollection of having received this survey questionnaire. And, needless to note I am as distressed as you are that leadership in the Jewish community is perceived in some quarters as being non-synagogal

Your letter brought to mind comments once made by Arthur Grant, and I'm not certain from whence he obtained them, which Dan Syme quoted in his Biennial address: The synagogue is the only institution in Jewish life which makes Jews, all of the others make use of Jews. How true!

I'll keep you posted as matters develop. I look forward to seeing you at the Executive Committee meeting in February. Until then, warm regards and all good wishes for 1990.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

552 Woodlawn Avenue
Glencoe IL 60022
January 1, 1990

Rabbi Alexander Schindler
President
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York NY 10021

Dear Alex

I recently received the attached cover letter and the questionnaire which accompanied the letter. Because the questionnaire made no reference to synagogue leadership or the leadership of synagogue organizations, I wondered how the definition of Jewish communal leadership had been arrived at. (Indeed, I thought the reference to knowing "how many Jews light Chanukah candles" was gratuitous.)

I called Jacob "Jack" Ukeles, president of the research firm, and asked him about the definition of Jewish communal leader and who had made the decision. He said that in the discussion between his firm and the American Jewish Committee there had been some question about whether synagogue leadership should be identified as such, but that in the end the decision of the AJC Communal Affairs Department had decided against it. He said that Bob Rifkind is the chairman of that task force, and the staff director is Steve Bayne (212/751-4000.) Jack Ukeles cited his late father-in-law as a distinguished rabbi and said it had never occurred to him until my call that someone might be concerned about the absence of synagogue and synagogue organizational leaders from the study unless they were drawn in through some other list.

In view of the fact that it was too late to change the questionnaire, in response to his question of what should be done, I suggested that the report narrative should include explicit reference to how the sample was selected, the reason for the selection, and that he should consider whether any explicit reference should be made to the rationale for exclusion of synagogue leadership from the group being studied. He said he was appreciative of my comments, would follow up on them, and would send me a copy of the study report.

I share this with you because it seems to me that the omission is a reflection of the perception held by an important Jewish organization as to where leadership resides in the Jewish community.

I look forward to serving on the executive committee and to the opportunity of working more closely with you in the new year.

Sincerely

Dan

Daniel S. Schechter



UKELES ASSOCIATES INC
THE CABLE BUILDING
611 BROADWAY
NEW YORK, NY 10012
Tel: (212) 260-8758
Fax: (212) 260-8760

Dear Friend:

The Jewish community in the United States has developed an extraordinary array of organizations, services, and programs. The community depends on a large number of committed and sophisticated volunteers to work with paid professional staff to lead this system.

Yet we know almost nothing about the characteristics and attitudes of these volunteers. We know how many Jews light Chanukah candles; we do not know how many participate in communal leadership. Over the past several years Jewish policy-makers have become increasingly concerned: Is the American Jewish community going to have vibrant leadership in the next decade? What needs to be done to recruit, develop and retain future leadership?

The American Jewish Committee has commissioned the first comprehensive national study of Jewish leadership to help answer these questions. You have been selected from among those who are active in Jewish life to receive this survey. We need to learn how you participate in organized Jewish life, and what your thoughts are on a number of vital issues relating to Jewish leadership, Judaism, and Israel.

Please answer all of the questions in the enclosed survey as soon as possible. It should take no more than 15 minutes. The survey responses are strictly confidential and no information will be released from any individual response. Please use the enclosed stamped, self-addressed envelope. If you have any questions or comments, write me at the above address, or call me or my associate, Dr. Shirley Kurz at 212-260-8758.

We believe that you will find the questions stimulating and interesting. Thank you in advance for your valuable assistance.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading 'Jacob B. Ukeles'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of each word being capitalized.

Jacob B. Ukeles
President

P.S. TO THE PERSON HOLDING THIS SURVEY: PLEASE LOOK AT THE LABEL ON THE ENVELOPE: IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT ONLY THE PERSON WHOSE NAME IS PRINTED ON THE LABEL COMPLETE THIS SURVEY. THE PERSON MIGHT BE YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE HOUSEHOLD. PLEASE GIVE THIS SURVEY TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED.

January 17, 1990
20 Tevet 5750

Mr. Daniel S. Schechter
552 Woodlawn Avenue
Glencoe, IL 60022

Dear Dan:

As you will note from the enclosed, I have been in contact with the highest leadership of the American Jewish Committee in regard to your plaint.

While the response from Steve Bayme is scarcely satisfactory, at least the staff and lay leaders of the AJC are aware of our concerns and may be less restrictive in the future.

With warm regards, I am,

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Encl.

Intently off to her
How did meeting between them & Segmon go?



The American Jewish Committee

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Rabbi Alexander Schindler
Union of American Hebrew Congs.
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10021

Dear Alex:

As you can imagine, Catholic-Jewish relations have taken up a good deal of our recent attention. The main focus, of course, has been the Carmelite convent at Auschwitz, about which you have read so much. To refresh your recollections: Jewish groups, ourselves included, have objected to the presence of the convent at the death camp on the ground that it detracts from the Auschwitz symbol of Nazi genocide against Jews during World War II. More than two years ago, European Jewish and Catholic leaders, including four cardinals, signed an agreement stipulating that by February 1989 the convent would be moved. When the deadline arrived without action, some Jewish groups protested at the scene, and a clash between them and Polish workers brought on a suspension of the agreement and some unfortunate anti-Semitic remarks by Jozef Cardinal Glemp, the Primate of Poland.

During this period we have striven not only to calm a growing public controversy that threatened continuing Catholic-Jewish relations -- we worked particularly with Polish-American groups and the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the U.S. -- but also to seek the intervention of the Vatican. That effort promises now to succeed, with the Vatican's announcement that removal of the convent and the building of a new convent has its strong support. We will watch developments carefully.

Rabbi James Rudin, our National Interreligious Affairs Director, and current chairman of Jewish interagency groups consulting with Christian bodies, was in Rome at the time of the announcement. As a matter of fact, he was meeting with Johannes Cardinal Willebrands, President of the Vatican Commission for Religious Relations With the Jews, and received a copy of the statement just prior to its worldwide release. We immediately reacted by warmly welcoming the statement, which we hope will be quickly implemented so that recent strains and tensions between Catholics and Jews can be removed.

By coincidence, all this has come at a time when we have been involved in realigning our relationships with other Jewish groups for consulting with international Christian bodies. Over the years we have been a founding member and stalwart supporter of IJCIC -- the International Jewish Committee for Interreligious Consultations. As a result of differences both in philosophical orientation and approach, though, we have increasingly felt that IJCIC had become unwieldy and no longer fulfilled its original mandate to serve as a single voice. Reluctantly, therefore, we have decided to form a new grouping with the two agencies with whom we have the closest affinity: the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League. That is the genesis of a new group: the Jewish Council for International Inter-religious Relations.

g. et al
(you forwarded this) at 11:00 conference call
14/2
Rob
Received
due to
Alperin

Let me quote briefly from the announcement of the formation of the new group: "We believe there is a need for a more effective instrumentality that can conduct a wide-ranging dialogue with Christian counterparts without the internal constraints that have at times seriously hampered the ability of the Jewish community to act in this area. Among other problems has been the ban on discussions of theological issues, a constraint that has made serious dialogue among religious communities awkward."

Rabbi Rudin is the current chairman of the new group. Its first order of business will be the reestablishment of mutual confidence and understanding between the Jewish community and the Roman Catholic Church after the unfortunate Carmelite monastery controversy. After so many years of significant progress, this seems like a most worthwhile project.

I will continue to keep you informed.

As ever,


Ira Silverman

IS:cpa



Al Comm.

July 8, 1988
23 Tammuz 5748

Ira Silverman, Executive Vice President
The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
New York, NY 10022-02746

Dear Ira:

This note of mazal tov is a bit belated but nonetheless heartfelt. Your arrival on the scene at Committee was at a time when my meeting and travel schedule was exceedingly hectic. Indeed, I've only just returned from Israel where I attended meetings of The Jewish Agency.

Be that as it may, I do want to wish you well as you undertake your new responsibilities with The American Jewish Committee. I am confident that you will lead this fine organization with distinction. You bring many superb qualities of heart and mind to the task and Committee is most fortunate to have you at the helm.

It is my fond hope you will derive a full measure of personal and professional happiness, satisfaction and fulfillment from your endeavors at the AJC.

Needless to note, I look forward to being with you on many occasions in the future. For I know various communal affairs will bring us together. That I welcome very much!

With all good wishes and warm regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler



The American Jewish
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Institute of Human Relations
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Honorary Chair,
National Executive Council

Executive Vice-Presidents Emeriti

Bertram H. Gold

John Slawson

June 23, 1988

*Did I ever engrave
Taa on his rec
post?
If not, please do*

Rabbi Alexander Schindler
Union of American Hebrew Congs.
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10021

Dear Alex:

As you know, I rejoined the American Jewish Committee as its Executive Vice President just a few weeks ago, at the start of the month. It has already proven an exciting challenge, one I would like to share with you by telling you about some of the activities that have been keeping me very busy:

*President Ted Ellenoff, flanked by two AJC staff experts, outlined to a news conference an unprecedented program designed to end the virtual vacuum of information about American Jewry in West German text books and high school curricula. The program resulted from a recent four-day conference in Bonn that we sponsored, where top German government officials and leading educators and textbook publishers agreed that German students finally should be taught about American life and American Jewish life. We are now consulting with German textbook experts on the preparation of new teaching materials, hopefully to affect generations to come. This is another step in AJC's monumental effort to improve relationships between Germans and American Jews.

*Our Interreligious Affairs Dept., continuing an AJC tradition of furthering warm relations with others in our pluralistic America, hosted a luncheon for the Most Rev. Francis J. Mugavero, Bishop of the Diocese of Brooklyn, on his stepping down as Episcopal Moderator of the Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Joining with us in honoring this outstanding leader for many years in building positive relations between Catholics and Jews were the Most Rev. William H. Keeler, Bishop of Harrisburg, who is the new Episcopal Moderator for Catholic-Jewish Relations, and Dr. Eugene J. Fisher, the NCCB's Executive Secretary for Catholic-Jewish Relations, both of them also long-time friends. I would say that Catholic-Jewish relations are in good hands at the moment.

*Charles J. Hynes, the special prosecutor in the Howard Beach case, made an impassioned appeal to "thoughtful men and women" to recognize the evils to which prejudice can lead, in a moving talk to the 43d Annual Meeting of AJC's New York Chapter, where Ron Weiner was reelected chapter president. If any message can be gained from Howard Beach, Joe Hynes told us, where one black was killed and another seriously injured, and where three teenagers have been convicted as felons and the lives of four families destroyed, "It is the hope that fear will deter some future tragedy, and that people will understand the true legacy of hatred."


*Newton Minow, chairman of the National Advisory Board of AJC's William E. Wiener Oral History Library, hosted a lunch here at AJC where Dr. Vartan Gregorian, President of the New York Public Library, joined in a discussion on how 20 years of tapes and other materials from this exciting AJC project will be housed at the landmark institution at 42d St. and Fifth Ave. AJC's Oral History Library is one of those continuing projects that make up one of the hallmarks of our work: quiet, elegant, meaningful, arousing the enthusiastic affection of all who come in contact with it. After 20 years we have simply run out of space to house the fruits of this work, and we are moving into a partnership with one of the world's great libraries so that these efforts will be preserved for scholars and all others. The future historians of the American Jewish experience will thank us for the foresight that this event crystallizes.

*With each day bringing new turns and twists, the Middle East is never away from our intense discussion. But in what we believe to be typical AJC style, we continuously strive to get behind the headlines for the real issues and the long-range trends. So, we held what is called an Academic Consultation on the Middle East, bringing together several dozen of the best minds on the many aspects of the Middle East. We are now sifting through the discussion of such matters as the impact of the Palestinian uprising, the superpowers and the peace talks, the impact of the election campaigns both in the U.S. and in Israel, and other related matters. Out of this we hope to get guidance that will help formulate AJC policy in this area in the days and months ahead.

*A press luncheon marked publication of Basic Books' "The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe," the study of Samuel and Pearl Oliner based on interviews with more than 700 men and women who lived during the Nazi occupation in five European countries, some of them rescuers, others non-rescuers. The Oliner study carves out pioneering ground in answering such searing questions as: Why do some of us risk our lives to save others? And why do some of us simply stand by and watch while the killing is going on? This study, for which major funding came from AJC's John Slawson Fund, parallels the historic Authoritarian Personality study, which 40 years ago pioneered the examination of the personality that tended toward fascism. That study was the conception of Dr. Slawson, then Executive Vice President of AJC, and the two studies lend an appropriate unity to Dr. Slawson's illustrious and productive career.

Clearly these activities are simply a few highlights. I have come back to AJC after seven years, to find a top-notch organization moving ahead in its quest for the best in the Jewish and American experience. Hopefully, we will be moving in new directions while we continue what is already in place. Let me continue to keep you up-to-date on AJC in these days ahead by sending on a note like this once a month, say. And I will of course welcome your comments and calls.

Sincerely,



Ira Silverman
Executive Vice President

IS:mmm

Nordeman Grimm

MBA Resources / The International Search Partnership

April 22, 1988

Mr. Alexander Shindler
President
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10021

Dear Mr. Shindler:

We recently contacted you about a search we were conducting for the next Executive Vice President of the American Jewish Committee.

We wanted to let you know that Ira Silverman will be assuming that position in June.

We wish to thank you once again for all your help in connection with this search and we hope we may continue to keep in touch in the future.

All best wishes,

Sincerely,


Debra Y. Oppenheim


Judith Bacher

MEMORANDUM

From Stuart L. Benick
To Rabbi Daniel Syme
Copies
Subject Market Penetration

Date April 19, 1988

I have given much thought to the feeling that we are not opening new markets for our publications. I sought data to substantiate this position. Instead, I found the opposite to be true. Please consider the attached sales analysis of our Franchise Dealers. As you can see, sales have been down or flat. If 1987-88 continues as is, sales will be down 4.7% from Fiscal Year 1986-87.

While Franchise Dealers sales are down, overall sales are up. I contend that this decline in sales to franchise dealers sales has shifted to an increase in direct sales to congregations, libraries, secular book stores, and other institutions. Direct selling increases our gross margin profits, since discounts to the institutions are less than to the dealers.

Franchise Dealers sales are also poor because of the lack of new Text books; and because of the higher discount on Trade books which made up the majority of our publications in the last two years.

Franchise Dealers sales are down 10.6% since fiscal year 1984-85, while total publication sales are up 13.7%. This swing of 24.3% had to go somewhere. I would like to think some went into new areas.



Sales to Major Franchise Dealers

	<u>9 Months</u> <u>YTD 1987-88</u>	<u>FY</u> <u>1986-87</u>	<u>FY</u> <u>1985-86</u>	<u>FY</u> <u>1984-85</u>
Behrman House	\$12,203.00	\$11,496.00	\$8,604.00	\$21,911.00
Borenstein	1,419.00	3,318.00	7,161.00	2,734.00
J. Roth	12,878.00	25,727.00	27,942.00	31,265.00
Israel Books, MA.	19,002.00	22,517.00	28,462.00	27,420.00
Negev	3,671.00	3,198.00	5,465.00	3,432.00
Lisbons	7,759.00	10,767.00	12,299.00	11,166.00
The Source	8,847.00	15,073.00	11,211.00	12,685.00
Rosenblums	15,214.00	14,677.00	16,102.00	10,031.00
Jewish Book Store, MD	5,422.00	9,692.00	10,495.00	13,633.00
Israel Book, Toronto	7,839.00	8,840.00	8,319.00	7,766.00
Spitzer	7,983.00	15,287.00	7,807.00	7,527.00
Sky Books	2,398.00	4,295.00	3,243.00	5,101.00
Franks	4,155.00	6,940.00	3,832.00	3,504.00
Rosenberg	10,373.00	16,308.00	9,998.00	11,406.00
Piotricowsky, PA.	4,154.00	3,292.00	5,375.00	5,370.00
L. Stavsky, NY	2,775.00	1,617.00	6,366.00	4,345.00
T.S. Cinnamaon, NY	6,306.00	8,167.00	7,474.00	7,889.00
J. Levine, NY	11,307.00	20,939.00	21,299.00	28,104.00
Israel Gift Shop, Canada	2,966.00	3,620.00	3,413.00	3,506.00
	\$146,673.00	\$205,270.00	\$204,867.00	\$ 218,795.00

Annualized
\$195,564.00

Non Franchise Dealers Growth Accounts

	YTD <u>March 1988</u>	FY <u>1986-87</u>	<u>1985-86</u>
Baker & Taylor	\$12,546.00	\$19,011.00	\$10,408.00
Barnes & Noble	1,091.00	682.00	622.00
Jonathan David	7,466.00	5,290.00	4,815.00
A Kids Bookshop	409.00	475.00	86.00
Steimatsky Israel	344.00	115.00	198.00
Yad Vashem, Israel	494.00	201.00	208.00
Zion Lion	2,796.00	522.00	120.00
Book Nook	1,174.00	1,324.00	629.00
Children Book Bag	496.00	619.00	_____
Philip Wendkos	1,821.00	1,023.00	_____
Once Upon A Time	1,500.00	664.00	418.00
Yussel's Place	283.00	_____	_____
Cody's Book	1,581.00	466.00	473.00
Galapagos Books	172.00	_____	_____
Jewish Museum	672.00	802.00	684.00
R.M. Mills Books	59.00	329.00	113.00
Rabbinic Assembly	510.00	255.00	_____

Hebrew Book Sales

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		3 Quarters ENDING March	FY 1986-87	FY 1985-86	FY 1984-85	FY 1983-84
1	Alef Bet	2166	9769 -	9176 -	17329 -	15709 -
2	Alef Bet Reading Practice	1808	3340 -	3511 -	5530 -	3375 -
3	Ma Tav I	4412	3636 -	3448 -	6243 -	5881 -
4	Ma Tav I wkbk	6585	7257 -	6859 -	10230 -	10709 -
5	Ma Tav II	3298	3630 -	2101 -	3683 -	3808 -
6	Ma Tav II wkbk	3871	1276 -	3861 -	4929 -	5242 -
7	Ma Tav III	1011	—	1079 -	1026 -	1594 -
8	Ma Tav III wkbk	1754	1798 -	1311 -	1822 -	1805 -
9	OLAM Gadd I	3214	3460 -	4900 -	6493 -	7655 -
10	OLAM Gadd II	2302	3420 -	2484 -	2593 -	4013 -
11	OLAM Gadd II wkbk	2914	3836 -	4111 -	4329 -	6317 -
12	Schmueli I	2560	2887 -	2178 -	3216 -	3889 -
13	Schmueli II	1004	920 -	1124	2102 -	2350 -
14		41904	45229 -	46143 -	69535 -	72317 -
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Job Description
MARKETING MANAGER
UAHC PRESS

Bruce Black

As in most small publishing companies, the marketing manager's responsibilities at UAHC Press extend beyond marketing to include a number of different areas, making the job diversified, as indicated below.

I. PROMOTION/ADVERTISING RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Write copy for promotion flyers for approximately 10-15 titles per year.
2. Write descriptions for new and forthcoming titles in annual catalog, re-organizing the catalog into frontlist and backlist sections as necessary.
3. Write copy for trade flyers, library flyers, and fund flyers as requested, recommending various promotion strategies.
4. Write copy for BookNews flyers announcing new titles, certificates, etc., to EMES Plan Members (450).
5. Maintain contact through correspondence, phone, and occasional sales calls, with Franchise Dealers, Judaica Shops, Jewish Community Centers, Jewish libraries, and social agencies to keep them informed of new UAHC titles, price increases, discount policy alterations, and other pertinent information.
6. Write copy for advertisements appearing in Reform Judaism magazine, Compass magazine, and other periodicals.

II. SALES/MARKETING RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Attend approximately 5-10 trade, educational, and Jewish professional conventions per year at various locations around the country, where duties include setting up booth, promoting new and backlist titles, and taking orders.
2. Develop and maintain contact with book wholesalers, such as Bookazine, Ingram, and Golden Lee, and trade bookstore chains, such as B. Dalton's, Waldenbooks, and Barnes and Noble.
3. Develop and maintain contact with independent juvenile and adult booksellers in New York and nationwide to sell UAHC titles.
4. Develop and maintain contact with public libraries in cities with major Jewish populations to sell UAHC titles.
5. Recommend new conventions to attend and new markets to pursue.

III. RESEARCH/DEVELOPMENT/EDITORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Conduct research to determine share of Jewish school population that UAHC titles are successfully capturing.
2. Conduct survey to determine the use of the Torah Commentary in member congregations during worship services.
3. Develop direct mail and telemarketing plans to increase market share of public library and trade bookstore markets.
4. Review manuscripts for potential trade titles to publish.

IV. SUPERVISORY DUTIES/GENERAL ADMINISTRATION RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Supervise employees in department (5) in absence of director.
2. Maintain contact with warehouse to resolve shipping/receiving problems.
3. Maintain own correspondence with individual customers regarding questions or problems arising over prices, availability, and discounts for mail order catalogs, bulk orders, and other special circumstances, as well as handling other difficulties that may arise.

af Comm.

July 11, 1985

Mr. Yehuda Rosenman, Director
Jewish Communal Affairs Department
165 East 56th Street
New York, New York 10022

Dear Yehuda:

In turning to Dan Syme, you turned to the proper person. He is perfectly capable of responding to your request and will provide you with an appropriate list of representatives for the dialogue.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

cc: Rabbi Daniel B. Syme



The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

July 9, 1985

Rabbi Alexander Schindler
President
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10021

Dear Alex:

This morning I had occasion to chat with your associate Rabbi Danny Syme about an important project which the American Jewish Committee is planning to undertake, and I am writing to you to solicit the Union's cooperation.

The AJC, as many other Jewish organizations and individuals, is concerned about the growing polarization and divisiveness in the Jewish community. As a non-religious organization, we feel a responsibility to attempt to bring together a select group of lay leaders of the various Jewish religious groups for a dialog. The uniqueness of our approach is in limiting the dialog participants to lay leaders who have some knowledge and clout in their respective groups.

Our plan is to begin the dialog on what all Jews have in common and then move to areas of difference.

We have gathered some background material on these issues and commissioned a background paper. All this material will of course be made available to the participants.

We have also appointed one of our national leaders, Alfred Moses of Washington, who is a distinguished attorney, and combines a rare, intimate knowledge of Judaism with leadership abilities, to serve as facilitator of this dialog.

We wish to invite between three and five lay leaders from each of the Jewish religious groups ad personam and not as official representatives of their respective groups. Nevertheless, we wish to inform


HOWARD I. FRIEDMAN, President ■ THEODORE ELLENOFF, Chair, Board of Governors ■ EDWARD E. ELSON, Treasurer ■ SHIRLEY M. SZABAD, Secretary ■ ALFRED H. MOSES, Chair, National Executive Council ■ DAVID H. PEIREZ, Associate Treasurer ■ ROBERT S. JACOBS, Chair, Board of Trustees ■ RITA E. HAUSER, Chair, Executive Committee ■ Honorary Presidents: MORRIS B. ABRAM, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, PHILIP E. HOFFMAN, RICHARD MAASS, ELMER L. WINTER, MAYNARD I. WISHNER ■ Honorary Vice-Presidents: NATHAN APPLEMAN, MARTIN GANG, RUTH R. GODDARD, ANDREW GOODMAN, RAYMOND F. KRAVIS, JAMES MARSHALL, WILLIAM ROSENWALD ■ MAX N. FISHER, Honorary Chair, National Executive Council ■ Executive Vice-Presidents Emeriti: JOHN SLAWSON, BERTRAM H. GOLD ■ Vice-Presidents: NORMAN E. ALEXANDER, Westchester; HOWARD A. GILBERT, Chicago; ALAN C. GREENBERG, New York; ROBERT H. HAINES, New York; CHARLOTTE G. HOLSTEIN, Syracuse; ANN P. KAUFMAN, Houston; ROBERT L. PELZ, Westchester; JUELLE RABIN, Dallas; BRUCE M. RAMER, Los Angeles; DAVID F. SQUIRE, Boston; RICHARD L. WEISS, Los Angeles ■

each of the groups about this undertaking and solicit their cooperation by suggesting names of leaders to be invited to participate in the colloquium.

This is a serious project, and we will appreciate your help.

Best wishes for a good summer, and warmest personal regards.

Cordially,



Yehuda Rosenman, Director
Jewish Communal Affairs Department

YR:JG



Of Committee

April 14, 1981

Dr. George E. Gruen
Director, Middle East Affairs
The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56 Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear George:

Thank you for sending me the confidential memo on the meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister. I appreciate your thoughtfulness.

I think you were foolish to go against your doctor's instructions, but I do hope it did not cause any major problem. I hope that you have been granted a refuah shlema and that you have recovered from your bout with the flu. I'm feeling much better, and while I feel badly about missing the meeting in Washington, your presence, after all, was much more important than was my own.

With repeated thanks and best wishes for a swweet Peeach, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler



The American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

April 13, 1981

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
President, Union of American
Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10021

Dear Alexander:

I was very sorry that you were struck with a virus and were unable to attend the Washington meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister. I had assumed you were stuck in traffic either in the air or on the ground. This is what we told the Turkish Foreign Minister since we had not heard from you by phone.

I am enclosing a summary of the meeting, which I hope you will find of interest.

Parenthetically, I was told by my own doctor on Wednesday to go to bed for a week since I had bronchitis and the flu, but I violated doctor's orders and went to Washington on Friday. In any case, I have a clear conscience that I was not the cause of your virus. I hope none of the other participants became ill.

Kind regards and best wishes for a happy and healthy Pesach.

Sincerely,

George
George E. Gruen, Ph. D.
Director, Middle East Affairs

GEG/el
enc.

P.S. I sent a copy of your note to me to the Turkish Ambassador explaining your absence.

MAYNARD I. WISNER, President ■
HOWARD I. FRIEDMAN, Chairman, Board of Governors ■ THEODORE ELLENOFF, Chairman, National Executive Council ■ GERARD WEINSTOCK, Chairman, Board of Trustees
ROBERT L. PELZ, Treasurer ■ MERVIN H. RISEMAN, Secretary ■ ELAINE PETSCHKE, Associate Treasurer ■ Honorary Presidents: MORRIS B. ABRAM, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG,
PHILIP E. HOFFMAN, RICHARD MAASS, ELMER L. WINTER ■ Honorary Vice-Presidents: NATHAN APPLEMAN, RUTH R. GODDARD, ANDREW GOODMAN, JAMES MARSHALL, WILLIAM ROSENWALD
■ MAX M. FISHER, Honorary Chairman, National Executive Council ■ MAURICE GLINERT, Honorary Treasurer ■ JOHN SLAWSON, Executive Vice-President Emeritus
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HARRIS L. KEMPNER, JR., Galveston; HAMILTON M. LOEB, JR., Chicago; JOHN H. STEINHART, San Francisco; EMILY W. SUNSTEIN, Philadelphia; GEORGE M. SZABAD, Westchester
ELISE D. WATERMAN, New York ■

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

date April 4, 1981

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

to Foreign Affairs Department

from George E. Gruen

subject Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister

Background: During the past months Turkey took several steps to lower the level of official relations with Israel, including the closing of the consulate general in Jerusalem and the reduction in the level of diplomatic representatives to a second secretary. (For details see my paper Turkey After the Military Coup.) Harry Hurwitz, Israel's Minister of Information in Washington, raised this problem at a meeting of Jewish professionals convened by the Presidents' Conference about a month ago as among the priority issues for the American Jewish community to deal with as it saw appropriate. About two weeks ago Yehuda Hellman told me that the Turkish Foreign Minister was arriving in Washington on March 30 and asked me to try to set up a small meeting with him for the Presidents' Conference and AJC.

After phone calls and correspondence with the Turkish Embassy, the meeting was set for Friday morning, April 4, 1981 at 10 AM at the Embassy. The ground rules were that the meeting was to be off-the-record, the fact of the meeting itself not to be publicized, and the Jewish delegation to be limited to four or five persons to facilitate a full and frank discussion. The Jewish participants met at 9 AM at the AJC Washington office to review the points we wished to cover and our tactics on handling sensitive issues, such as the Greek-Turkish dispute and the Turkish concern over Armenian efforts to have the Holocaust Commission broadened to deal with Armenian charges of "genocide" during World War I. (See Hy Bookbinder's memo to me. Fortunately, the latter subject did not come up.)

The Jewish participants were Alfred Moses and myself for the American Jewish Committee, and Jack Spitzer and Warren Eisenberg of B'nai B'rith International. (Spitzer's inclusion had been suggested by the Turkish Embassy, since he had separately requested a meeting with the Foreign Minister through the State Department.) Rabbi Alexander Schindler, past chairman of the Presidents' Conference, who had been designated by Squadron and Hellman to represent the Conference and who had assured me the previous night by phone that he would definitely be there--although he might be a few minutes late to the 9 AM briefing--failed to appear.

Meeting with Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen

Foreign Minister Turkmen was accompanied by Şükrü Elekdag, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, and Mithat Balkan, councillor at the Embassy. The meeting was held in an elegant upstairs sitting room of the Embassy, a large French-style mansion with some Middle Eastern motifs. The meeting lasted over 45 minutes and was generally conducted in a friendly atmosphere. I detected a trace of nervousness in the Foreign Minister at one point, although he tended

to be more soft-spoken than the more direct, at times almost brusque, Ambassador.

After introducing the group, Moses noted that we recognized Turkey's importance as a strategic ally of the U. S. We also appreciated that Turkey had been the first state in the region to recognize Israel and that historically Turkey had welcomed the Jewish exiles from Spain. Foreign Minister Turkmen said that he did not know of any problem facing the Turkish Jewish minority, whom he estimated as numbering 30,000.

He added that there was also a *Dönme* community, whose members were well educated and influential. (The *Dönme* derive from Jewish supporters of Shabbetai Zvi who ostensibly embraced Islam.) After discussion of the fact that there were large Jewish and *Dönme* communities in Salonika, the birthplace of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which had led to some speculation that even Atatürk may have had some Jewish connection, Turkmen said that the majority of the city had, in fact, been Moslem, adding that if the principle of self-determination had been applied then, the city would have remained Turkish and not become part of Greece. I noted that self-determination was a principle which was quite selectively and unevenly applied, depending on whose interests were involved. (I had in mind the discrepancy between Turkey's championing of Palestinian self-determination, while fiercely opposing any separatist national movement among the Kurds today or the Armenians earlier. For obvious reasons, I refrained from any explicit mention of either group.)

Having spent a few minutes on peripheral matters while waiting vainly for Schindler to join us, Moses then asked the Foreign Minister to begin with any general comment he wished to make. Mr. Turkmen said that Israel had not been helpful and that the Jerusalem law in particular had not only excited the Arabs, but had even inflamed the Turkish populace. He added that Turkey faced great difficulties with its Islamic neighbors because it was the only country to maintain relations with Israel. When I asked, "what about Egypt?" Ambassador Elekdag interjected, "Sadat did it to get back Sinai." Turkmen said that despite their frequent disagreements, it was easier for the Arab states to reconcile with one another, while Turkish-Arab relations were long and more "controversial."

He recalled that Turkey had voted against partition at the UN but in 1949 recognized Israel as a fact. Since then Turkey had been working for a negotiated settlement. Turkey had stayed out of direct involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict. Just as in a controversy between a father and a mother, taking one side risks antagonizing both, so Turkey had tried to be balanced in its approach. He said that in his speeches at the UN and elsewhere he always stressed the right of every state in the Middle East to live in peace and security and sometimes explicitly mentioned Israel.

I said that while this was so in the past, in reports of recent statements by Turkish officials which I had seen, such as that made by the Prime Minister at the Taif Islamic Summit Conference, the Turkish representative had supported the Arab demands explicitly and in detail, without explicitly calling on the Arabs to make peace with Israel. In view of the fact that the Taif Summit included a call for *jihad*, the public might be left with the impression that Turkish participation represented a fundamental shift in position.

He responded that conferences such as that at Taif reflect only a general

consensus and many delegations went out of their way to interpret *jihad* not as a holy war, but as a more general struggle by political and economic means. Turkey was for peaceful settlement of all disputes, including the Arab-Israel conflict. We should understand that Turkey is constantly criticized by the Arabs, "why do you have better relations with Israel than Spain or Greece, which are Christian European countries?!" He added that he had read that Israel was attempting to get Spain to establish relations in view of Spain's entry into the EEC. We added that the same was true with regard to Greece.

Turkmen said that he did not like the letter from the 69 U. S. Senators criticizing Turkey for lowering the level of relations with Israel. He said such public pressure was the wrong tactic. He preferred quiet, frank dialogue, such as the one we were having. He added that Turkey also continued to have a dialogue with Israel. He added wryly that "you have a strong pressure group within Turkey as well, we received quite a lot of criticism" for the downgrading of relations. He then added that it was probably healthy to have this pressure to keep a balance within Turkey against pressures in the other direction. (He was apparently alluding to the pro-Islamic and pan-Islamic sentiment in some circles in Turkey.)

Elekdag said that he in fact maintained good contacts in Washington with Messrs. Eisenberg, Amitai (who had been head of AIPAC), and Bookbinder. But, he said, the Jewish community could do more to help Turkey. He had the impression that the American Jewish community was supporting the Greeks. We had expected this reaction and as per our briefing meeting, Al Moses proceeded to point out that while a few individual Jewish legislators may have supported Greece, largely because of many constituents of Greek ancestry, others supported aid to Turkey. But more importantly, despite the public support offered by American Greek ethnic groups to Israel, especially during the Yom Kippur War, the organized Jewish community resisted their demands for support over Cyprus and other issues on a basis of reciprocity. Jack Spitzer confirmed that to his knowledge, no major Jewish organization had taken a partisan position on the Greco-Turkish dispute. The reason was that we were sensitive to Turkish concerns as well.

It was becoming increasingly difficult for us, however, to explain to the American Jewish community and to the general public -- which strongly supports Israel and the Camp David peace process -- that Turkey is a friend of Israel in view of recent Turkish statements and actions which appear one-sidedly pro-Arab. Spitzer noted that before the meeting Mr. Balkan had told us that the Foreign Minister was to speak at Princeton and other public forums. It would be helpful if he could reiterate there the balanced approach that he had previously used at the UN. Mr. Turkmen replied that there was no difficulty at all in saying that Turkey favored the right of every state in the Middle East to live in peace and security. He not only said this but in fact believed it to be true. We pressed him to make the reference to Israel explicit. Moses added that he hoped Turkish officials would say this also to their Arab and Islamic friends with whom they met. Turkmen assured us that in fact he did do so.

Ambassador Elekdag said that we had to understand that Turkey needed to cultivate the friendship of the Islamic countries. Moreover, Turkey since 1950 had become a multi-party democracy and an "information society," by which he meant free press and public debate. Despite a basic commitment to the principle of secularism the Turkish population was Moslem and their Islamic sensitivities had to be understood. As regards relations with Israel, it was

in Israel's interest to have a strong Turkey on her northern flank. Eisenberg said we also recognized this and supported the concept of cooperation for mutual interest, e. g. against terrorism, subversion, Soviet expansion, in the region, among Egypt, Israel, Turkey, and other countries as long as this was not at Israel's expense.

Elekdag went on to acknowledge that Turkey also saw a value in Israel and in fact cooperated in various quiet ways. He mentioned that when he served in the Foreign Ministry in Ankara he would have many friendly contacts with Shmuel Divon. At one time Divon tearfully told him the Jewish people would never forget Turkey's help on behalf of Syrian Jews who managed to cross the border. Divon, he said, had promised to tell the American Jewish organizations and Elekdag wanted to know whether we had received such a letter. I replied that we knew what Turkey had been doing and were grateful. Foreign Minister Turkmen interjected to urge that we not make this public. I assured him that in our backgrounders on Syrian Jewry we carefully omitted any reference to Turkey. He added that some Arab officials had questioned him in Saudi Arabia about Turkey's help to Syrian Jews and he made believe he did not know anything about the subject. Al Moses quoted Ed Muskie's advice that sometimes the best policy is silence.

Elekdag added that while Turkey had been compelled "to make a gesture", El Al and Turkish airlines continued to fly between Istanbul and Ben Gurion airport, and the Israeli consulate continued to function normally. Both he and Foreign Minister Turkmen stressed that it was in our interest to help Turkey become a "robust and flourishing" country. Once Turkey achieved this it would not be susceptible to pressures. We said we all wished Turkey well and expressed our thanks to the Foreign Minister for the opportunity of meeting with him.

(Afterwards I asked the ambassador, to whom I had conveyed regards from a mutual friend in Istanbul, for copies of the Foreign Minister's speeches, which he promised to provide. Elekdag added that I should understand that the Foreign Minister was not as free as he might wish to be to discuss the details of Turkish-Israeli relations.)

GEG/el

cc: Hyman Bookbinder
Bert Gold
Yehuda Hellman
Abe Karlikow
Al Moses
M. B. Resnikoff
Maynard Wishner
Warren Eisenberg



Permanent Mission Of Turkey To the United Nations

TURKISH CENTER, 821 U N PLAZA, 10th Floor, N. Y. 10017, 212-949-0150

BIOGRAPHIES / 1980

THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

H.E. İLTER TÜRKMEN

H.E. İlter Türkmen, a career diplomat, has been named as the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Turkish Government formed by H.E. Bülent Ulusu.

Mr. Türkmen was recently appointed the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Just prior to his appointment he had served as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for Humanitarian Affairs in South East Asia.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey was born in Istanbul in 1927, and is a graduate of the prestigious Galatasaray Lycee in Istanbul and the School of Political Science of the University of Ankara. Upon graduation from the University, he joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as a Third Secretary. He served as Third, Second and First Secretary and Counsellor at the Permanent Turkish Missions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and to the United Nations and at the Turkish Embassies in Cairo and Washington.

In 1964 he was appointed Director General of the Political Planning Group in the Ministry and in 1967 the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs. He served as Turkey's Ambassador to Greece from 1968 to 1972 and to Soviet Union from 1972 to 1975 when he was appointed to be Turkey's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, where he stayed until 1978.

Mr. Türkmen is married and has two children.

background paper.. background paper.. background paper.

April 6, 1981

Dr. George Gruen
American Jewish Committee
165 East 56 Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear George:

I am awfully sorry that I wasn't able to make the Washington meeting, but a virus which circulated in my family this past week finally caught up with me and laid me low. I cancelled not only you but several other important meetings. I trust you understand that it is only the most dire of circumstances which kept me from being with you.

I would appreciate it if you would drop me a line and let me know how things went.

Again my apologies. All the very best.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

165 East 56 Street, New York, N. Y. 10022 — Plaza 1-4000, Ext. 266

DATE:

4/1/81

TO:

Rabbi Alexander Schindler

The attached provide background material for our ^{FRIDAY} meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister etc. We will have a preliminary meeting at 9 AM sharp in office of AJCom. 818 18th St NW.

If you have any questions, please call me (212) 663-5829.

Best wishes, George

GEORGE E. GRUEN, Ph.D.

Director

Israel & Middle East Affairs

P.S. Excuse hand written note.

PHONE-O-GRAM[®] for:

Ann Put in
folder

M. George Gruen of _____

☐ Telephoned

☐ Returned your call

☐ Came In

☐ Will call again

☐ Please return the call

☐ See me

Message: Meeting on Fri. in Wa. - come a
few mins. before 9 to 818 18 St -
AJC office. Bring a few bios w/
you for Turks.

Phone: PL1-4000 or tomorrow 663-5829
Date 4/1 Time _____ By _____

TURKEY AFTER THE MILITARY COUP:

Impact on the Jewish Community
and on Turkish-Israeli Relations

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

By Dr. George E. Gruen

Director,
Middle East Affairs

Foreign Affairs Department

American Jewish Committee

Institute of Human Relations, 165 E. 56 St., New York, N. Y. 10022

TURKEY AFTER THE MILITARY COUP:

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE TURKISH JEWISH COMMUNITY

AND TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS*

by Dr. George E. Gruen

(Director, Middle East Affairs, American Jewish Committee
and Associate, Columbia University Seminar on the Middle East)

Geographically situated on the crossroads between Europe and Asia, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, Turkey has had its history intertwined with both the Jewish and Arab peoples. While Jews have lived in Turkey since antiquity, the largest influx occurred after 1492 when Sultan Bayezid II openly welcomed the Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal. In 1517 the Turks conquered the Holy Land and for the next four centuries the Ottoman Empire ruled most of the Arab Middle East and North Africa. The position of the Jews in Turkey can be fully understood only against this historical background and within the broader social, economic and political context.

"I feel that we are sitting on a volcano," is the way a prominent leader of the Jewish community of Istanbul described the situation in Turkey when I spoke with him toward the end of February 1980. He quickly added that he felt particularly uneasy not primarily because he was a Jew but because he was a member of the upper middle class. He was fearful that Turkey might descend into chaos and mob violence unless the new government of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel succeeded in curbing the rising wave of political terrorism and the government's austerity measures brought about a rapid improvement in the country's desperate economic situation.

At 2 AM on September 12, residents of Ankara were awakened by the rumble of tanks. The volcano had erupted. Top Turkish military officers, headed by General Kenan Evren, chief of the General Staff, seized power, took the political leaders into custody, dissolved parliament and placed the entire country under martial law. A large-scale roundup of left-wing and right-wing extremists was undertaken. The top officers formed a National Security Council of which Evren was named president. He also assumed the position of acting Head of State. The leaders of the junta promised a return to democracy once order had been restored and the necessary constitutional changes had been made to prevent future abuses.

*Originally prepared for the Fifth International Conference on Mediterranean Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel, August 5-7, 1980, this paper has been substantially revised and expanded to examine the significance of the military intervention of September 12, 1980 and the recent down-grading of the level of Turkey's diplomatic relations with Israel.

Factors Leading to the Military Takeover

The army's action was not completely unexpected. In a paper delivered at a conference of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in May 1980, I noted:¹

The army, which twice before (in 1960 and 1971) intervened briefly when Turkish democracy appeared endangered, earlier this year pointedly appealed to the leading parties to bury their differences and to cooperate in confronting the nation's economic problems, the escalating terrorism, and the threats of anarchy and ethnic secession.

Indeed, on the economic front the picture remained grim. Although the government had managed to receive several billion dollars in new credits and loans from the United States, Western European countries and the International Monetary Fund, Turkey's foreign debt rose to some \$16 billion, and unemployment increased to about 25 percent. The government's belt-tightening program -- involving the ending of subsidies for many products -- while beneficial in the long term, brought increased hardship in the short term. Consumer prices soared over 100 percent and workers' wages did not keep pace. Strikes proliferated.²

While the foreign aid was seen as a vote of confidence in the Demirel Government's austerity program, Turgut Ozal, Turkey's chief economic planner, pointed out that much of the aid pledged in the previous years had not become available because of donor restrictions and bureaucratic delays. As a New York Times editorial stressed: "This year's offerings will work only if they stimulate large sums also from the I. M. F., the World Bank, the Common Market, the OPEC countries and, one hopes, private lenders and investors."³

A crucial factor compounding Turkey's economic problems was the doubling of world oil prices following the Iranian revolution. This meant that the cost of Turkey's oil imports alone exceeded all of Turkey's exports. During several months in the winter of 1979-1980 schools were closed for lack of heat and many persons were ill with pneumonia. Even in the coffee shop of the Istanbul Hilton there was no coffee but only tea served. (In the past I had brought instant coffee from the U. S. to friends in Israel, this time a Turkish *olah* in Jerusalem asked me to take high priced coffee from Israel to her parents in Istanbul.) The grim joke in Turkey was that the country was going to change its name to *Yokistan* -- *yok* being the Turkish word for "there isn't any."

On the domestic political front the government of Prime Minister Demirel failed to develop a clear working majority. Demirel had become Prime Minister on November 12, 1979 after Bülent Ecevit, leader of the Republican People's Party (RPP), the other main centrist party, stepped down following the loss of five seats in the October by-elections. Demirel's Justice Party controlled 185 seats, 41 short of a majority in

the 450 member Assembly. The logical solution would have been a government of national unity with the RPP. But long-standing personal animosity and policy differences between Demirel and Ecevit prevented their co-operation. Consequently the government was dependent upon the tenuous and ideologically dangerous support of two small extremist parties, the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party (NSP) and the right-wing pan-Turkic and neo-fascist National Action Party (NAP).

One consequence of the political stalemate was that much needed legislation was deferred. Most notable was the failure of the National Assembly, despite well over 100 ballots, to elect a President of the Republic to succeed Fahri Korutürk, whose seven-year term of office expired on April 6, 1980.

With regard to the fight against terrorism, the government had managed to smash some terrorist groups, but violence continued to increase, and the universities, the trade unions, and even the police were increasingly polarized between leftist and rightist elements. Ecevit, whose Republican People's Party was moving left of center, charged that Demirel was arresting only terrorists of the left and giving a free hand to right-wing terrorists, who had been clandestinely funded by the rightist National Action Party. Demirel vehemently denied the charge, adding that when Ecevit had been in power he had tended to be too soft toward leftist groups.⁴

Terrorist violence continued to escalate, with as many as 20 persons killed a day. In his speech to the nation explaining the coup on September 12, General Evren noted that "terror has claimed 5,241 lives in the last two years."⁵

But these processes of economic difficulty, political dissension and terrorist violence had been continuing for quite some time. Why did the army pick September 12 to intervene? What was the incident that finally convinced the reluctant military that they could wait no longer but had to intervene to "protect and defend the Turkish Republic" against "treacherous ideological and physical attack against its existence, its political system and its independence through the provocation of external and internal enemies"? ⁶

The Last Straw: The Konya Rally

The answer to this question is of special significance for understanding the position of the Jewish community in Turkey. According to knowledgeable observers, the incident that "triggered" the military coup was a massive rally held in Konya on September 6 where religious fanatics shouted slogans for the abolition of secularism in Turkey. Ostensibly, the march was called to protest against Israel's Knesset decision proclaiming unified Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital.

But the demonstration, officially described as "Jerusalem Liberation Day," went much further. The rally was addressed by Islamic fundamentalist

Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the National Salvation Party, who called on Turkey to break all diplomatic relations with Israel and urged all Moslems "to liberate Jerusalem." Ignoring the fact that Israel was in the midst of withdrawing from Sinai, Erbakan charged that Israel intended to annex all the territory "from the Nile to the Euphrates" and even sought to seize parts of Turkish Anatolia!

The rally quickly took on an overtly anti-Semitic tone: "A seven-year old child, dressed in traditionalist costumes, marched carrying a banner which said: 'death to the Jews.'" Another banner proclaimed: "One branch of Zionism is capitalism, the other is Communism." The demonstration ended with the burning of the Israeli, American and Soviet flags. ⁷ (This symbolized that for Erbakan, as for Ayatollah Khomeini, the three great Satans which Islam had to confront were Israel, the U. S. and the Soviet Union.)

Relations with Israel: Issue in Turkish Domestic Politics

Turkish Jews were naturally disturbed over the anti-Semitic tone of Erbakan's appeal. Yet there was nothing particularly new in his call for the breaking of relations with Israel or his blaming of all of Turkey's economic problems on "international Zionism." He had made similar charges while on a visit to Pakistan in December 1979, where he had also called for establishment of a Moslem United Nations and an Islamic Common Market.⁸ The desire for improved relations with the Moslem world and particularly with the oil producing countries among them was not inconsistent with the Turkish Government's own policy. Moreover, most persons in Turkey -- including some in the Jewish community -- had previously not taken Erbakan too seriously, noting that his party commanded only 22 seats out of the 450 in the Turkish National Assembly. They also tended to dismiss as publicity stunts his complaints that Turkish Airlines flew to Tel Aviv and not to Mecca, and his printing up of imitation Turkish banknotes with pictures of then Prime Minister Demirel and main opposition leader Bülent Ecevit wearing Moshe-Dayan type eyepatches -- to dramatize his allegation that they were both tools of Israel.

However, in the days before the Konya rally Erbakan demonstrated that he was able to use his swing vote power in parliament to challenge the basic foreign policy orientation of the Demirel government. As a first step to toppling the government, the National Salvation Party on August 28 introduced a motion of censure against Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen, charging that his pro-European and anti-Islamic policies were damaging to Turkey's national interests. NSP Deputy Recai Kutan from Malatya demanded that "all relations with Israel, political as well as economic be immediately severed." ⁹

Earlier on the same day the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that Turkey had decided to close down its consulate general in Jerusalem "because of the fait accompli which Israel tried to create regarding the

legal status of Jerusalem." This followed upon Turkey's action on July 31 to recall its chargé d'affaires from Tel Aviv "for consultations" as a sign of protest over the Knesset law. 10

Former Turkish Defense Minister Hasan Isık (RPP-Istanbul) called the decision to close the consulate "a mistake both politically and diplomatically," because the consulate general, which dated back to the days of the Ottoman Empire, was not a diplomatic mission accredited to the Israel Government. UN Security Council Resolution 478 of August 20 had called upon member states to withdraw only their dip-lomatic missions from Jerusalem, and Turkey had never approved of the annexation of Jerusalem, as proven by the maintenance of the legation in Tel Aviv. 11

If, as many suspected, the government had hoped to placate Erbakan by closing down the Jerusalem consulate, this ploy failed. Erkmen had tried to defend himself by stressing that he was not following personal policies but carrying out those of his government, "based on Turkey's traditional values and Atatürk's principles." He pointed out that Turkey had been the first country to stand against Israel's action on Jerusalem, adding that under his government, "Turkey's relations with the Islamic world had reached unprecedented levels." 12

On September 3 Erbakan submitted a formal no-confidence motion against Foreign Minister Erkmen, charging *inter alia* that Turkey's failure to break off relations with Israel damaged Turkey's relations with the Moslem world, that his efforts to have Turkey join the European Economic Community would separate Turkey from the Islamic world and make it a province of Christian Europe, that the government had failed to support Iran and Afghanistan sufficiently at Islamic Conferences and had offered too many concessions to Greece regarding Turkish interests in the Aegean and Western Thrace. 13

On September 5 Erkmen was ousted in a no-confidence vote by 231 votes to 2. The NSP was joined by Ecevit's Republican People's Party and five independents. Demirel's Justice Party and the right-wing National Action Party had boycotted the session in a vain attempt to prevent a quorum.

The very next day, Saturday, September 6, Erbakan addressed a massive rally in Konya, a fundamentalist Islamic stronghold noted for its 407 mosques, and declared that the ouster of Erkmen was "a historic and important decision" and marked the beginning of his party's successful struggle to end "the false Western mentality" that ruled in Turkey. 14

The massive rally in Konya in which some 40,000 persons participated, was the final straw. Yavuz Tolun, the editor of Briefing, a newsweekly published in Ankara, headlined his report "The Konya Rally -- a direct threat to Atatürk's Republic," and went on to re-

port that "the rally sent shivers up the spines of even many right of center Turks. Under a mighty banner proclaiming the greatness of Allah in Arabic, Necmettin Erbakan and the leading figures of the NSP marched through the streets of Konya." Other posters openly called for a return to a theocratic Islamic state based on the *Sharia*.¹⁵

To symbolize the total rejection of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the secular republic he had founded, some posters even called for moving the capital of the country from the modern center Atatürk had built in Ankara to Konya, which had been the spiritual and temporal capital of the Seljuk Turks some 800 years ago!

To add insult to injury, thousands of demonstrators reportedly "sat on the ground while the national anthem was being sung."¹⁶ This was a blatant public act of defiance of the Turkish Republic. The previous week Erbakan had been conspicuous by his absence from the annual Victory Day ceremonies held on August 30 at the Atatürk Mausoleum. When questioned by the press about this, he gave the evasive answer that he was "neither against nor on the side of August 30, but right inside it." This irritated Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren sufficiently to demand that "NSP leader Erbakan must prove with his actions" where he stood. ¹⁷ Evren made it clear that the answer was not simply a matter of his personal curiosity but one which deeply concerned the Turkish armed forces, the guardians of Atatürk's reforms, when he told the semi-official Anatolia Agency: "Is Necmettin Erbakan against 30 August [Victory Day] or not? I want to know. The Chief of the General Staff wants to know." ¹⁸

There also had been rumors that Erbakan was receiving financial support from foreign Islamic sources, including Libya and Saudi Arabia. The presence of foreign representatives at the Konya rally from Libya, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, the Sudan, Pakistan and the Palestine Liberation Organization strengthened the concern among the Turkish military that these foreign elements were working with Erbakan to undermine Turkey's secularism and its fundamental ties with the United States and NATO. These fears were further heightened when Erbakan flew off to London the following day as the guest of a National Salvation Party affiliate in Britain. He was ceremoniously greeted at Heathrow Airport by officials of the Islamic Council of Europe. ¹⁹

Army Reasserts Secularist Principle

General Evren, the leader of the military takeover, is typical of the generation of army officers who were raised with a spirit of sacred mission to protect the basic principles of the Turkish Republic as established by Kemal Atatürk. Evren, 62, graduated from the military academy in 1938, the year Atatürk died. A cardinal principle of "Kemalism" has been secularism. This grew out of a firm belief that the decline and military defeat of the Ottoman Empire grew out of its

association with the backward Arab countries and with fatalistic Islamic fundamentalism. The new Turkey, they believed, could only succeed if it transformed itself into a modern nation-state with close ties to the Western world.

In a communiqué issued to the armed services early on the morning of the coup, Evren called upon them to uphold "Atatürk's principles" and to wage an unrelenting struggle against "anarchy, terrorism and division, and against communist, fascist and fanatical religious ideologies..." 20

In a message broadcast to the Turkish people, General Evren declared: 21

Despite the fact that our constitution clearly states that Turkish citizens cannot be criticized because of their religious beliefs, our political parties...have considered it beneficial to incite sectarian differences...and have incited our citizens to massacre each other for the sake of political interests. It has been forgotten that all who live within the borders of the Turkish Republic and who consider themselves Turkish citizens form the Turkish nation as one body.

This statement was certainly reassuring to the Jewish community of Turkey, which today numbers only around 20,000, out of an overwhelmingly Moslem population of 45,000,000. The majority of Turkey's Moslems are Sunni, but there is a sizable minority of Shi'ites of the Alevi sect, variously estimated at between 10 and 25 percent of the Moslem population. Until recently under the Turkish Republic the various Moslem sects also coexisted peacefully. However, a few years ago a wave of violent clashes broke out along sectarian lines in several towns and villages in Anatolia. Adding to the traditional familial and tribal rivalries, social and economic class differences played a role, with the Shi'ites tending to be from the poorer elements, who became susceptible to communist ideology as Turkey's economy deteriorated.

Another divisive influence has come from the spread of fundamentalist Islamic revival movements in the Arab world ranging from the Moslem Brotherhood operating secretly in neighboring Syria to the peculiar mixture of socialism and Islamic revolution proclaimed by Qaddafi in Libya. The rise of Ayatollah Khomeini to power in Iran has also had a measure of spillover influence on some traditionally religious Turks, especially Shi'ites living in the eastern provinces near Iran. But more important, the fact that the Ayatollah had successfully overthrown the pro-Western, American-supported Shah, whose father Reza Shah had consciously taken Atatürk as his model to emulate in bringing Iran into the 20th century, served to embolden persons such as Erbakan to think that the Kemalist reforms could be undone even

in Turkey itself.

The military junta that seized power within a week of the Konya demonstration quickly made it absolutely clear that Turkey was not Iran and that neither a Khomeini nor a Qaddafi had any place within the Turkish political system.

On the day of the coup all major political leaders and some 100 members of parliament were placed in "protective custody." Ex-prime ministers Demirel and Ecevit together with their wives were kept in a luxury seaside resort hotel, where they had a chance to reflect upon the cost of their past bitter rivalry! Although barred from engaging in political activity and stripped of their parliamentary immunity they and most of the other parliamentarians were soon released.

But this was not the fate of Necmettin Erbakan. He was held by the Ankara Martial Law Command to face charges of violating Article No. 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, namely of "establishing and leading an organization dedicated to basing the state on religious principles, which is in violation of the Constitutional principle of secularism." He and leading members of his party were also charged with "violating the law on rallies and marches, with possession of explosives and weapons and with destroying incriminatory evidence." 22 On February 24, 1981 the state prosecutor requested a prison term of 14 to 36 years for Erbakan and 33 of his followers, including 17 former members of parliament. 23

Right-Wing National Action Party Banned

The other Turkish political leader who was harshly dealt with by the military junta is General Alpaslan Türkeş, the leader of the right-wing National Action Party. As a young army officer in the military junta that took over in a bloodless coup in 1960, Türkeş advocated installing an authoritarian military regime under what his critics regard as a form of fascism. The majority of the army leaders, however, favored returning power to the civilian authorities after trying the leaders of the previous regime for unlawful actions and after drafting of a constitution that explicitly spelled out basic civil and human rights and contained other safeguards against anti-democratic measures. 24

The NAP increased its strength from three percent of the vote in 1973 to six percent in 1977 and controlled 17 seats in the Assembly before the September 12 coup. Türkeş denied that he was a fascist and maintained that he was simply a nationalist and anti-Communist, who believes in discipline, self-sacrifice and strong personal leadership. He even tried to reassure leaders of the Jewish community that he considered them as brothers.

But what worried some Jews and other members of Turkish minorities

was that Türkiye began his career by advocating Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism, meaning the political unification of Turkey with the Turkic-speaking populations in Iran, the Soviet Union and China. While the basis of such a union is linguistic rather than racial, members of the non-Moslem minorities wondered how secure their position would be if an authoritarian regime on the Türkiye model came into power. They recalled that when members of the National Action Party controlled the Ministry of Culture in 1977 they permitted the publication of articles blaming the "minorities" for the "deterioration of ethics in Turkish society." The NAP had the support of uniformed paramilitary cadres, who are widely believed to be responsible for the violent attacks upon leftists. Acting in the name of law and order, they contributed by their resort to extralegal methods to the escalation of violence. 25

On October 11 it was officially announced that following an investigation into the activities of the National Action Party, Türkiye and 28 of his party administrators were arrested and warrants were issued for 36 others in absentia. The investigation had reportedly found evidence that "the suspects armed the people against each other and drove them to mass massacres." 26 The following month they were formally charged also with attempting to "set up a fascist state." 27

Here again the Jewish community was naturally relieved to know that both leaders of right-wing extremist parties that were either overtly or potentially anti-Semitic were behind bars. The military also undertook a vigorous campaign to root out left-wing terrorists and dissolved the militant groups of both extremes. Jews as well as the Turkish population in general welcomed the sharp reduction of terrorism and the return of a semblance of normality to Turkish life. One couple I know in Istanbul dared for the first time in three years to go out in the evening to see a movie.

Increasing Emigration

How has Jewish life in Turkey changed over the past three decades? The Jewish community of Turkey, which numbered nearly 80,000 in 1948, is now variously estimated at between 17,000 and a maximum of 25,000. No precise figures are available since the latest census, in 1980, no longer contained a question on religion. While Chief Rabbi David Asseo believes the total to be around 25,000, most other knowledgeable sources estimate that the total is closer to 20,000, of whom 18,000 live in Istanbul, some 1,500 in Izmir, and several hundred in Ankara, Turkey's capital. Only small remnants of once flourishing communities remain in such places as Edirne (Adrianople), Bursa, Mersin, Adana, Milas, Çorlu, Antakya and Gaziantep. 28

The escalation of terrorist violence and the deterioration of the economic situation combined to engender a sense of malaise among the

Turkish population in general and the Jewish community in particular. This was reflected in increased emigration. For the first time in recent years, *aliyah* to Israel exceeded 1,000 during 1979, and more than 500 Jews are believed to have left for Western Europe and the United States. This trend continued in 1980. Whether it will be reversed will depend on the military's ability to control terrorism over the long run and carry out the economic reforms that Demirel began.

In contrast to the first wave of large-scale *aliyah* to Israel from 1948 to 1952, which consisted primarily of the poorer and less educated elements of the population, the newest *olim* included many highly-skilled and well-educated persons who might have been expected to remain in Turkey under normal circumstances. Most of the Jews from outlying communities in the Anatolian provinces moved to the large cities or to Israel in the early years of the Jewish state. Recently, there was further movement out of the smaller towns as social and ethnic unrest in the eastern provinces sometimes led to armed clashes between members of the Sunni and Alevi Moslem communities.

Turkish Jews are free to emigrate and to take their household effects with them. There are direct flights between Istanbul's Yeşilköy Airport and Israel's Ben Gurion Airport, serviced by both El Al and Turkish Airlines. Turkish tourists have been limited to one foreign trip in three years because of the severe shortage of foreign exchange. This has not seriously impeded the travel of Turkish Jews wishing to go to Israel, however, because they either qualify as businessmen or else have their tickets paid for by relatives in Israel. Virtually every Turkish Jewish family has relatives among the estimated 48,000 Jews of Turkish origin living in Israel. 29

Communal Institutions

The economic and social trends in Turkey have also had their impact upon Jewish communal life in Turkey. As Jews have moved out of certain neighborhoods and cities, communal institutions have had to close. Under Turkish law no nationwide religious organization is permitted. This is not directed against the Jews as such but was instituted by Atatürk, primarily as a means of undercutting the power of the traditional Moslem religious leadership and promoting the concept of a secular (*laik*) republic. Consequently, it is only a local community that may own and manage a mosque, church or synagogue. Jacques Veissid, the acting president of the Jewish community in Istanbul, told me that the community in Edirne had donated a magnificent synagogue -- "a jewel" -- to the Ministry of Culture to preserve as a museum, and thus to prevent its being

desecrated. The once flourishing Edirne community no longer has a regular *minyan*.

The Jewish schools in the Istanbul communities of Balat and Ortaköy also closed after the Jews moved to other neighborhoods. Today there is only one full-time official Jewish school, whose curriculum is set by the Ministry of Education, but which is financially supported by the Jewish community. There are about 300 students in the primary school *Birinci Musevi Karma İlkokul* and slightly more in the *Musevi Lisesi*, the Jewish high school. Women affiliated with the local B'nai B'rith provide hot lunches in an effort to induce more families to send their children to the Jewish school. There is concern that if enrollment drops, the government will remove its recognition of the school. Most of the wealthier Jewish families send their children to French, English or Turkish private schools.

In addition to problems of enrollment, the Jewish school suffers from a lack of qualified Hebrew teachers. The government does not permit the importation of teachers from Israel. This, too, is part of a general policy undertaken during Atatürk's time to prevent the spread of Communist or other foreign influence after the bitter experience of the Ottoman Empire with the Capitulation treaties that granted special status to foreigners. There are few local Turkish Hebrew teachers. Two young *hazzanim* and *shohetim* who had been trained by the Chief Rabbi as teachers left for Israel in 1979, and a third was planning to leave. The relatively low salary the teachers receive also acts as a deterrent to more young Jews entering the profession.

The general inflation has caused Jewish communal expenses to triple in the past couple of years and it is increasingly difficult to get members to pay their pledges. The community is not permitted to have formal connections with international Jewish organizations, such as the World Jewish Congress. Even the local lodge of B'nai B'rith is incorporated as a purely Turkish benevolent society with no formal ties to the international organization. The Turkish Rotary Club is the first national group to succeed in getting official permission to affiliate with an international organization.

The Jewish community also still maintains a hospital with 70 beds, although most of the patients are Moslem, and a Jewish old age home for some 80 persons.

The majority of the Jewish community is middle class and some are quite wealthy. Most of the poor left in the early years of the Jewish State -- for Zionist, religious and economic reasons. In 1980 there were only some 500 poor families, consisting of a total of around 1,500 persons. Of these, 345 families received Jewish assistance from a fund named *Mattan Beseter* (Gift in Secret, in accordance with Maimonides's principle). Most of the families in need of aid are handicapped persons and their dependents.

In addition to the rabbinical council there is a lay council of the community, but it has no formal legal existence, acting in theory as only an advisory body under the *Hahambaşı*, the Chief Rabbi. Because of legal constraints and the ingrained Turkish suspicion of foreigners, the Jewish community seeks to keep a very low profile and shuns public identification with Israel or outside international Jewish bodies.

Social Interaction and Inter-marriage

The older generation of Turkish Jews tended to socialize within their own community and spoke either Ladino (Judeo-Spanish) or French at home. The younger generation, educated in the public schools and the state universities, speaks fluent Turkish. The forces of secularization and assimilation have begun to have an effect. Under the Ottoman *millet* system, marriage, divorce and other questions of personal status were left to the jurisdiction of the religious authorities of the respective communities. Under the Turkish Republic this has been supplemented by legislation providing for civil marriage.

Consequently, intermarriage between Jews and Christians and even between Jews and Moslems is no longer a rare occurrence. It is estimated that the intermarriage rate is now between 5 and 10 percent of all marriages involving Jews. The Istanbul *Beth Din* handles some two to three cases of conversion to Judaism a year. I was unable to obtain estimates of the number of conversions to Christianity or Islam. It is assumed that most partners in intermarriages formally retain the religion of their birth, although they may be agnostic if not atheist in personal belief.

Jewish men are drafted into the army but do not make military service a career. There is an unwritten gentleman's agreement that the professional officer corps does not encourage non-Moslems. Jews are reluctant to get involved in politics. The late Solomon Adatto, who served in the Grand National Assembly and was active in Democratic party politics in the 1950's, was an exception.

While Turkish Jews enjoy full equal rights under the law, there are still elements of the population who tend to feel that the non-Moslem minorities -- Jews, Greeks and Armenians -- are not real Turks. The Turkish Jewish community also tends to be identified with Israel and American Jewry, despite the local community's efforts to keep a low profile. The fact that some Jewish members of Congress had supported the Greek position in the Cyprus dispute and opposed U. S. aid to Turkey led to false allegations that there were Jewish and Greek lobbies working together against Turkey. The public support given to American aid to Turkey by other Jewish members of Congress, such as Rep. Stephen Solarz, helped somewhat to counteract this mistaken impression. 30

The popular identification of the minorities with foreigners and with control of the country's commercial life had its origin in the fact that in the Ottoman period, Turkish Moslems shunned commerce and industry as professions beneath their dignity. Today more than 80% of the country's economic life is in the hands of Moslem Turks. The ethnic composition of Istanbul, Turkey's largest commercial center, also reflects these changes. As late as 1945 nearly a quarter of Istanbul's population of 850,000 were non-Moslems. Today the city's total population exceeds 3 million, swollen by natural increase and the influx from the farm villages of Anatolia. Yet the total number of non-Moslems is less than 100,000. There has been a steady decline in the number of Armenians and Greeks, accelerated by the anti-Greek riots in 1955 and continuing Greco-Turkish tensions over Cyprus.

Thus, although the Jewish role in Turkey's economic life is relatively marginal today, what remains true is that most Jews belong to the business and professional classes and may be regarded as among "the haves" by those who would stir up the economically disadvantaged. There is no official, government-inspired anti-Semitism and the military rulers are formally committed to restoring a functioning secular democracy respecting religious pluralism.

Attempts at Rapprochement with Moslem Nations

While anti-Semitism is not a problem, the spillover effect of Turkey's efforts to improve relations with the Islamic world has been a problem for Israel and indirectly for Turkish Jews. The OPEC quadrupling of oil prices in 1974 provided an economic incentive for Turkey to improve its relations with its oil-rich Islamic neighbors. As recession cut the demand for Turkish guest workers in Western Europe and as Turkey found it difficult to compete effectively for markets in the European Economic Community, the idea began to develop in Ankara that the solution to Turkey's problems lay in creating a new tripartite partnership. This would combine Arab and Iranian petrodollars, Western technology and Turkish manpower. It was hoped that Islamic sentiment would prompt the Arabs to aid Ankara, while Turkey's longer experience with modernization would enable Turkish professional and industrial workers to bring the fruits of Western technology to the massive development programs being undertaken in the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf and Libya.

An Arab-Turkish Bank was established with Libyan and Kuwaiti funds and a considerable number of bilateral Turkish-Arab construction projects have been undertaken. Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Turkey's major Middle East oil suppliers, have at times allowed Turkey to defer payment on its purchases, but while this has given the Turks a few

months grace to find the money, the price of oil has been set around OPEC levels.

On the political level most Turks have come to realize that neither Islam nor non-alignment offer realistic alternatives to continued close cooperation with the Western nations. There was much annoyance expressed in the Turkish press when, after Ecevit agreed in the summer of 1979 to the opening of a Palestine Liberation Organization office in Ankara, the PLO and most Arab states proceeded to endorse a Greek-sponsored resolution condemning Turkey at the Havana non-aligned conference. While the original decision to permit the opening of a PLO office had been taken three years earlier at an Islamic conference hosted by Turkey in Istanbul, the Turkish authorities had hesitated to permit the PLO to operate within the country in view of the clear evidence that various Turkish urban terrorist groups had received training and other support in Palestinian camps in Lebanon and Syria. ³¹

Ecevit had agreed in July 1979 to open the office as a gesture of gratitude to Yassir Arafat after a PLO mediating team had helped end the seizure of the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara by a dissident Palestinian terrorist group, the Eagles of the Revolution. Ecevit formally received Arafat when he came to open the PLO office in Ankara in October 1979. The Turkish opposition expressed outrage when during the trial of the terrorists evidence was produced that one of Arafat's mediators had in fact been involved in the planning of the attack and that the "Eagles" were affiliated with *as-Saiqa*, a Syrian-backed PLO member group. On December 23, 1980 a criminal court in Ankara imposed the death sentence upon the four Palestinian terrorists. ³²

Extreme Leftists Groups

The basically pro-Western, democratic orientation of Turkish policy was threatened on the far left by the Turkish Labor Party, a Marxist-Leninist group that is pro-Soviet, other communist factions leaning toward Peking and a variety of clandestine terrorist groups, some of which have been linked to the Palestine Liberation Organization. None of these groups had been strong enough to win seats in the Turkish Assembly and most are dedicated to overthrowing the present parliamentary system. These groups are also violently anti-Israel, regarding the Jewish state as an ally of Western imperialism.

The first upsurge of leftist terrorism occurred a decade ago when the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA) assassinated Israeli Consul General Ephraim Elrom in Istanbul in 1971, as well as British and Canadian radar technicians. Under the martial law imposed briefly at that time, the Turkish military captured the leaders of the TPLA. At their trial evidence was produced that the group's members had received training in Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Three

TPLA leaders were convicted and hanged in 1972.

These left extremists groups are now being rooted out and their members arrested or killed by the Turkish security forces. The Interior Ministry announced on December 1 that 5,850 persons had been arrested for "anarchic activity" and 3,412 weapons seized since the September 12 coup. 33

Prospects for the Future

The basic question, however, is how long will the present relative tranquility last? Will the new Constitutional Assembly that is supposed to begin deliberations this fall be able to overcome the flaws in the Turkish party system and create a more workable democracy? Will the country be able to resolve its longstanding economic problems?

A good sign is that Turgut Ozal, the financial planner who guided the Demirel economic reforms, has retained his position under the military junta. Recently General Evren suggested that the long-term solution to Turkey's crushing burden of oil imports was for the country to greatly expand wheat and meat production sufficiently to generate export earnings that would more than balance the oil imports. Turkey has also offered more favorable terms to foreign companies to prospect for oil within Turkey. 34

In the short-run, however, Turkey is becoming increasingly dependent upon Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq for its oil supplies. This dependence became acute when Iranian oil to Turkey was cut off after the start of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980. The Saudis had agreed in August to provide Turkey with a \$250 million 15-year loan. In mid-November, during an official visit to Saudi Arabia, Turkish Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen announced that the Saudis had "responded positively to contributing to Turkey's oil need." The Iraqis agreed in December to let Turkey draw upon the oil it was able to export to the Mediterranean region through the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline. 35

Renewed Arab Pressures on Turkey to Cut Ties with Israel

But there was a price to be exacted for this aid. Saudi Arabia and Iraq placed inordinate pressure upon Turkey to break diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel.

On December 2, 1980 the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued the following announcement: 36

Turkey has decided to limit its relations with Israel and to mutually reduce the level of representation. This decision was made after it became evident that Israel will

not retreat from its intransigent policy concerning the Middle East conflict and the fait accompli that it wishes to create in connection with the legal status of Jerusalem. The Israeli Government was informed about this decision on 26 November. In accordance with this decision, all diplomatic personnel, with the exception of a second secretary who will have the title of a temporary chargé d'affaires, will be called back within three months.

It seems more than coincidence that the Saudi announcement of the completion of the \$250 million in aid also occurred on November 26 and the Saudi check was delivered to Turkey on December 2.

However, Turkey stopped short of a total break and the Turkish Prime Minister, Admiral Bulent Ulusu, refused to be pinned down when asked in Saudi Arabia whether Turkey would endorse the Taif Islamic Summit conference's resolution calling upon all Islamic countries to break relations and to adhere to the Arab boycott of Israel. He reportedly said that Turkey would apply the Islamic Conference's resolutions in accordance with Ankara's determination of Turkish national interests.³⁷

One of those interests is maintenance of good relations with the United States Government. A bipartisan group of 69 U. S. Senators, or more than a two-thirds majority, on January 21, 1981 presented a letter to Turkish Ambassador Sukru Elekdag voicing strong concern at Turkey's cutback in relations with Israel. In their polite but firm letter, the Senators placed the Turkish action in the context of the American-backed peace process. After saying that they had been "impressed by the resolve" Turkey had displayed in the past in maintaining normal diplomatic relations with both Egypt and Israel "in the face of pressure from other governments," the Senators noted that "recent pressure upon your government had led it to downgrade its diplomatic relationship with Israel." The 69 Senators warned:³⁸

This step could have harmful consequences to both Israel and Egypt, two countries which are our great friends. If your government persists in this action it will undermine the Camp David Accords, hurt Israel, and hamper the efforts of President Sadat to bring moderation to the Middle East.

We believe that Israel and Egypt present a strong hope for a just peace in the Middle East. We would be deeply disappointed if Turkey should yield to the wishes of extremist countries which seek only to bring discord to the Middle East.

The Senators urged the Turkish government to reconsider its recent decision concerning diplomatic relations with Israel and asked Ambassador Elekdag to "express to General Evren our strong concerns."

While it is impossible to predict the outcome, it would be out of character for the generals in Ankara, who pride themselves on safeguarding Turkey's independence, to yield supinely to Arab demands for a total break with Israel. 39 This is all the more unlikely since Turkey's Western-educated military leaders regard Israel as a Westernizing influence in the area, respect the Israel Defense Forces' strategic value in countering Soviet-supported radical elements in the region, and see in Israel a useful ally in combatting international terrorist groups. Yet while such cooperation may continue quietly, Ankara is likely to refrain from any public displays of Turkish-Israeli friendship so long as Turkey remains heavily dependent on the Arabs for oil and economic aid.

Meanwhile the Turkish Jews are awaiting developments anxiously. As one prominent Turkish Jew told me in private, "our fate is affected by a triangle of forces: 1) domestic developments within Turkey, 2) the state of Turkey's relations with the United States, and 3) the state of Ankara's relations with Israel and the Arab states."

Americans and Israelis also have an interest in following developments closely regarding strategically-placed Turkey. They share the hope that the country will return soon to a functioning democracy, that it will weather the economic storms that beset it, and that Turkey will be helped to resist the blandishments and threats of its oil-rich Islamic neighbors. If these conditions are met, the prospects will increase for Turkey to adhere to its basically pro-Western posture, including friendship with the United States and Israel.

March 26, 1981

81-580-14

NOTES

1. George E. Gruen, "Ambivalence in the Alliance: U. S. Interests In the Middle East and the Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy," published in ORBIS (Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA) Summer 1980, pp. 363-79. Quote from p. 376.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 364-65. See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Oct. 31, 1980, pp. 30541-42.
3. New York Times, Apr. 21, 1980.
4. Cited in Turkey in Turmoil: Impact on the Jewish Community, by George E. Gruen, American Jewish Committee, Institute of Human Relations, New York, Sept. 8, 1980, pp. 12-13.
5. Text broadcast by Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish (ADST) 1000 GMT, Sept. 12, 1980, English translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (cited subsequently as FBIS), VII. 12 Sep 80, T 5-9.
6. Quotation from National Security Council Communique No. 1, broadcast by ADST, Sept. 12, 1980, FBIS, VII. 12 Sep 80, T 5-9.
7. Briefing, Weekly Inside Perspective on Turkish Political, Economic and Business Affairs, Ankara, Special Edition, The Military Takes Over, Sept. 15, 1980, pp. 2, 16-18. See also Sam Cohen, "Turks' Anti-Israel Moves," Jewish Chronicle (London), Sept. 12, 1980.
8. For Erbakan's statements in Pakistan see The Muslim World (Karachi), Dec. 15, 1979, p.4.
9. Reported in ADST 1600 GMT Aug. 28, 1980, FBIS, VII. 29 Aug 80 T 1. The following day Erbakan boasted, "We shall topple the foreign minister as well as the government," if Demirel asked for a vote of confidence. (ADST 1600 GMT Aug. 29, 1980, FBIS, VII, 3 Sep 80 T 1)
10. ADST 100 GMT Aug. 28, 1980, FBIS, VII. 29 Aug 80 T 1. and New York Times, Aug. 2, 1980. See also note 12. On role of Saudi pressure see p.15 and n.35 below.
11. News analysis in Cumhuriyet, Sept. 2, 1980.
12. ADST 1000 GMT Aug. 28, 1980, FBIS, VII. 29 Aug 80 T 2. A delegation of the diplomatic representatives in Ankara of 13 Islamic countries and the PLO had called on Prime Minister Demirel on July 29 "to express their gratitude to Turkey for being the first country to denounce Israel's decision to make Jerusalem its capital." Demirel responded by reiterating that the Turkish government considered Israel's action "erroneous," increasing the danger of new hostilities and "contradicting international law and justice." Turkey opposed a policy "of gaining territory by the use of force," since this

"can never lead to a valid solution." [Presumably the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus was exempt from this rule!--GEG] Demirel noted that "in 1967, I made a similar statement on the issue of Israeli occupation. I have repeated this view in connection with Jerusalem as well. Jerusalem, which is a holy city, should never be in Israeli hands." (ADST 1400 GMT July 29, 1980, FBIS, VII. 30 Jul 80 T 1.)

13. ADST 200 GMT Sept. 2, 1980, FBIS, VII. 4 Sep 80 T 1. New York Times, Sept. 6, 1980.
14. ADST 1600 GMT Sept. 6, 1980, FBIS, VII. 9 Sep 80 T 1.
15. Briefing, Sept. 15, 1980, p. 16.
16. Mediterranean News Agency report broadcast by ADS in Turkish 1600 GMT Sept. 6, 1980, FBIS, VII. 9 Sep 80 T 1.
17. Milliyet, Sept. 1, 1980.
18. "Evren's Question to Erbakan," editorial in Tercuman, Aug. 31, 1980. Emphasis noted in the editorial.
19. Briefing, Sept. 15, 1980, p. 17.
20. National Security Council Communiqué No. 6, ADST 430 GMT Sept. 12, 1980, FBIS, VII. 12 Sep 80 T 4. Emphasis added. At a ceremony on Dec. 23, marking the 50th anniversary of the murder of a Turkish army officer by religious extremists in Menemen, Evren vowed that "religious fanatics will be crushed."
21. ADST 1000 GMT Sept. 12, 1980, FBIS, VII. 12 Sep 80 T 7.
22. ADST 1500 GMT Oct. 15, 1980, FBIS, VII. 16 Oct 80 T 1.
23. New York Times, Feb. 25, 1981.
24. See Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey's Travails," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 58 No. 1) 1979, pp. 89 and 91-92.
25. See George E. Gruen, "Ambivalence in Ankara," Jerusalem Post Magazine, July 27, 1979.
26. ADST 2000 GMT Oct. 11, 1980, FBIS, VII. 11 Oct 80 T 4.
27. Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1980.
28. Most of those within the Jewish community and others interviewed in June 1979 and February 1980 requested that they not be quoted by name. The position of Jewish and other non-Muslim minorities in the Turkish Republic is discussed by Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey (New York: Praeger, 1955), pp. 117-21, and 155-62. See also Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

29. For a detailed examination of Turkish-Israeli relations, see George E. Gruen, Turkey, Israel and the Palestine Question, 1948-1960: A Study in the Diplomacy of Ambivalence (New York: Columbia University, 1970).
30. The effect of the Cyprus dispute on Turkish-U. S. relations is examined by George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, American Enterprise Institute (Washington, D. C.) and Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1972; and Ferenc Váli, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore 1971). See also Jacob M. Landau, Johnson's 1964 letter to İnönü and Greek Lobbying of the White House, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems no. 28, 1979.
31. For additional details on Turkish-Arab, Turkish-Islamic and Turkish-Israeli relations in recent years see George E. Gruen, "Ambivalence in Ankara," Jerusalem Post Magazine, July 27, 1979. Turkey and Greece have continued to compete for Arab support on the Cyprus issue at the UN. As a consequence, Turkey and Greece have supported pro-Palestinian resolutions opposed by other NATO allies, such as the U. S. and Canada, e. g. UN General Assembly Resolution ES-7/2 of July 29, 1980. Most West-Europeans abstained. On the linkages among Turkish, Palestinian and Soviet terrorist agents see Claire Sterling, "Terrorism: Tracing the International Network," New York Times Magazine, Mar. 1, 1981, pp. 16-19, 24, 54-56.
32. Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, October 7, 1979. Oktay Eksi in Hürriyet (Oct. 5) criticized the PLO's support of the Greek Cypriotes, and Ahsen Batur in the NAP organ Hergün (Oct. 6) attacked the PLO for its ties with Marxist-Leninist terrorists threatening Turkey and international stability. Death sentence reported in New York Times, Dec. 24, 1980.
33. New York Times, Dec. 2, 1980. The Anatolia Agency reported on Dec. 28 that more than 30,000 terrorists had been arrested and over 160,000 weapons seized. (FBIS, VII. 31 Dec 80 T 3.) For an analysis of "The Left in Turkey," see the article by George S. Harris in Problems of Communism, July-Aug. 1980, pp. 26-41.
34. Turkey Today, published by the Turkish Embassy, Washington, D. C., No. 29, Dec. 1980.
35. The Saudi loan had been agreed upon in principle on Aug. 23 in Ankara where Saudi Finance Minister Shaykh Muhammad al-Ali Aba al-Khayl declared that Israel's action on Jerusalem had created "a grave situation" requiring Islamic solidarity, that Saudi Arabia was prepared to increase cooperation with all Islamic countries and that "Turkey's contribution to this is also necessary." Turkish Foreign Minister Erkmén responded that the two countries had agreed to increase political solidarity and economic cooperation, noting "Turkey and Saudi Arabia shared the same view regarding Israel's decision..." (ADST 1000 and 1600 GMT, Aug. 23, 1980, FBIS, VII. 26 Aug 80 T 2). Five days later Turkey closed its Jerusalem consulate. For Turkmen's statement see ADST 1600 GMT, Nov. 8, 1980; FBIS, VII. 10 Nov. 80 T 2. The Iraqi promise to supply 10 million tons of crude oil was arranged in December after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had agreed to General Evren's personal request, Turkey Today, No. 29, Dec. 1980; FBIS, VII. 10 Nov 80 T 5-8; Cumhuriyet, Dec. 13, 1980.

36. ADST 1300 GMT, Dec. 2, 1980, FBIS, VII. 3 Dec, 80 T 1. Marvine Howe reported that sources close to the Turkish government confirmed that the action was linked to Turkey's reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and the latter's agreement to fill the gap in Turkey's oil supply caused by the Iran-Iraq war. (New York Times, Dec. 3, 1980.) The Turkish action was somewhat bizarre. Technically, Turkey had been represented by only a chargé d'affaires in Israel ever since Ankara recalled its minister from Tel Aviv in response to Iraqi pressure at the time of the 1956 Sinai Campaign. The official announcement of November 26, 1956 stated that the Turkish envoy would not return to his post "until a just and final solution of the Palestine question has been achieved." (Text in Gruen, Turkey, Israel and the Palestine Question, p. 343.) In fact, however, both Israel and Turkey had been designating senior diplomats, including some with the personal rank of ambassador, to fill the post of "chargé" in Ankara and Tel Aviv.
37. When asked by a Saudi radio correspondent whether he did not agree that Muslim countries should completely sever relations with Israel, Uluşu evaded a direct response. He repeated Turkey's view that "Israel should withdraw from all the occupied territories and above all Jerusalem," and that the Palestinians should enjoy the right of self-determination under the leadership of the PLO. He noted that Turkey's diplomatic representation in Israel "was reduced to the minimum level" two months ago. The main reason for this measure, he said, was that "Israel sought to Judaize Jerusalem and impose a fait accompli." (Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 510 GMT Jan. 26, 1981. Uluşu's answers had been translated from Turkish to Arabic, FBIS, V. 28 Jan 81 A 22.) Turkish officials told U. S. officials that the Turkish delegation had formally reserved its position regarding the Taif resolutions.
38. Text in Near East Report, (Washington D. C.), Jan. 30, 1981, p 19; list of signatories, p. 18.
39. Objection to going too far in meeting Arab and Islamic demands was voiced in an editorial column in a major Turkish independent daily, Milliyet, on Jan. 25, 1981: Even though Turkey had not been blessed with oil as some of her Arab neighbors were, Turkey had to be careful not to change her fundamental course as a result of the Islamic Summit. "Turkey cannot participate in a Holy *Jihad*, for she is a secular state," the editorial concluded.



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November 22, 1978

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
President
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10021

Dear Alex:

It is good to know that every once in a while that
you do some work for the American Jewish Committee
-- especially when you do it so well.

Now that you may have a little more time let's have
lunch one of these days.

Best regards.

Cordially,

Bertram H. Gold
Executive Vice President

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