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# UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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## UNA Background Paper

March 7, 1991

### THE UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE TO THE GULF CONFLICT:

#### Political, economic, humanitarian, environmental, and social aspects<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the crisis in the Persian Gulf, the United Nations has been deeply involved in numerous ways. Some aspects of United Nations involvement -- such as refugee and humanitarian assistance -- have been in areas widely recognized as traditional multilateral responsibilities. UN actions in other aspects of the Gulf crisis, such as the imposition of sanctions and the authorization by the Security Council of the use of force, are more unusual.

The record of UN responses throughout the Gulf crisis suggests a range of new responsibilities the UN could be asked to undertake in the postwar period -- in restoring peace and stability to the Middle East and in healing the wounds of war.

This paper provides a brief summary of some major areas in which the United Nations already has taken action, either during the Persian Gulf crisis or in preparation for postwar activities. These include:

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<sup>1</sup> This background paper was written by Kathryn G. Sessions, Policy Analyst, United Nations Association of the USA. (© Copyright 1991 by UNA-USA.)

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### Actions by the Security Council

Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, the U.N. Security Council has approved 13 resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The first 12 resolutions were passed by a Security Council composed of the five permanent members (the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China) and ten non-permanent members (Canada, Finland, Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Cote d'Ivoire, Romania, Yemen, and Zaire). These resolutions consisted of:

- \* **Resolution 660**, August 2, 1990 (14-0, Yemen abstaining): Condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- \* **Resolution 661**, August 6, 1990 (13-0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining): Imposed a trade embargo on Iraq and established a Sanctions Committee.
- \* **Resolution 662**, August 9, 1990 (15-0): Nullified the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq.
- \* **Resolution 664**, August 18, 1990 (15-0): Reaffirmed rights of foreign hostages and diplomatic immunity.
- \* **Resolution 665**, August 25, 1990 (13-0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining): Authorized the enforcement of trade sanctions.
- \* **Resolution 666**, September 14, 1990 (13-2, Cuba and Yemen opposed): Addressed issue of humanitarian provision of foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait.
- \* **Resolution 667**, September 16, 1990 (15-0): Condemned Iraqi aggression against diplomatic premises and personnel.
- \* **Resolution 669**, September 24, 1990 (15-0): Addressed economic problems arising from sanctions placed on Iraq.
- \* **Resolution 670**, September 25, 1990 (14-1, Cuba opposed): Initiated an air embargo on Iraq.
- \* **Resolution 674**, October 29, 1990 (13-0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining): Reiterated Iraqi obligations to protect foreign nationals and diplomatic missions.
- \* **Resolution 677**, November 28, 1990 (15-0): Addressed issue of population composition and register of Kuwait.
- \* **Resolution 678**, November 29, 1990 (12-2, Cuba and Yemen opposed, China abstaining): Authorized states to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)

and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

On January 1, 1991, the composition of the Security Council changed with the rotation of five of the ten non-permanent members. The current Security Council, consisting of the five permanent members, five remaining non-permanent members (Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Romania, Yemen, and Zaire), and five new non-permanent members (Austria, Belgium, Ecuador, India, and Zimbabwe), passed one additional resolution:

- \* **Resolution 686**, March 2, 1991 (11-1, Cuba opposed, Yemen, China and India abstaining): Identified conditions Iraqi must meet to have sanctions lifted and to have a formal end to the Gulf war.

#### Actions by the Secretary-General

The extensive efforts of UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar included four personal trips to the Persian Gulf area to seek a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. In addition, the Secretary-General assigned special responsibilities to high-level UN officials to ensure prompt and effective UN actions in critical areas, including:

- \* the appointment early in the Gulf crisis of Under-Secretary-General Sadruddin Aga Khan as the Secretary-General's Personal Representative for Humanitarian Assistance relating to the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait, to ensure a well-coordinated UN response to needs of persons and states adversely affected;
- \* the dispatch in March 1991 of Under-Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari to make a tour of countries affected by the Gulf war. In his announcement, the Secretary-General said that "...the United Nations system must react with all due speed in order to provide help urgently to those in need. Every effort must be made to avoid further human suffering and to prevent human catastrophes from occurring, notably in the fields of health and nutrition;" and
- \* the dispatch in March 1991 of former Under-Secretary-General Abdulrahim A. Farah, along with other UN representatives and advisers, to Kuwait for the purposes of assessing damages and losses sustained by Kuwaiti civilians and infrastructure during the Iraqi occupation.



### Other UN Resolutions

Several UN programs in Iraq and/or Kuwait were suspended following the Iraqi invasion. Additionally, other UN bodies passed resolutions pertaining to the crisis in the Persian Gulf, including:

- \* The **International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)**, which adopted a resolution in October 1990 condemning Iraqi violations of Kuwaiti airspace, seizure of Kuwaiti aircraft, and plunder of Kuwaiti International Airport.

### Human Rights Actions

Although most of the UN's political and legal involvement in the Persian Gulf crisis has been centered in the Security Council, the 45th General Assembly condemned the Iraqi Government and its occupation forces for human rights violations against the Kuwaiti people and third-state nationals. Resolution 45/170, adopted on 18 December 1990 by a vote of 144 to 1 (Iraq opposed) with no abstentions, demanded that Iraq cooperate fully with humanitarian organizations and "treat all prisoners of war and detained civilians in accordance with the internationally recognized principles of humanitarian law and protect them from all acts of violence, including ill-treatment, torture and summary execution." The resolution also called on the UN Commission on Human Rights at its 1991 session "to consider the situation of human rights in occupied Kuwait."

The Commission on Human Rights, which is scheduled to conclude its forty-seventh (1991) session on March 8, 1991, may consider two draft resolutions dealing with human rights situations in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. The draft resolution dealing with alleged Iraqi government abuses of its own citizens' human rights calls for the appointment "of a special rapporteur to prepare a preliminary report as soon as possible and to transmit it to the Secretary-General for dissemination to all member states of the United Nations."

The draft resolution dealing with human rights abuses in occupied Kuwait condemns the August 2nd invasion and "strongly condemns the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces for their grave violations of human rights against the Kuwaiti people and nationals of other states, and in particular, the continued and increasing acts of torture, arbitrary arrest, summary executions and disappearances in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenants on Human Rights, and other relevant legal instruments." Demanding Iraqi compliance with its obligations under the UN Charter and international law, it demands



the release of all prisoners and detainees, and authorizes the appointment of a special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Kuwait.

### Refugee & Other Humanitarian Assistance

#### 1. Refugee Aid/Regional Humanitarian Plan of Action

In the early stages of the crisis, several UN agencies helped facilitate the repatriation of some 750,000 third-country nationals leaving Iraq or Kuwait. [The non-governmental International Organization for Migration (IOM) had primary responsibility for physical transfers of people.]

On January 11 the **UN Coordinator for Disaster Relief (UNDRO)** announced a "Regional Humanitarian Plan of Action" to coordinate international emergency assistance efforts of UN agencies with those of nongovernmental organizations and government officials. Under the plan, UN agencies initially prepositioned relief supplies for up to 100,000 refugees in each of four countries (Iran, Jordan, Syria and Turkey).

The **UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)** established a 24-hour communications center at its headquarters in Geneva. Under the Plan of Action, UNHCR also was given responsibility for site surveys and refugee camp management in recipient countries. Other agencies participating in the Plan of Action included: the **World Food Program (WFP)** for food & transport of food; **World Health Organization (WHO)** and **UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)** for health, water, nutrition and sanitation; the **UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**, and **UN Development Program (UNDP)**. [Also involved in the Plan were non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the IOM, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.]

By early February UNCHR-managed refugee camps had total arrivals of less than 20,000 persons. Explanations for the relatively low number ranged from the type of warfare being waged to a general breakdown of transport systems. In late February and early March UN missions reported thousands of new arrivals (mostly from Iraq), to refugee reception centers in Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. On February 26 UNDRO announced plans to shift its response capabilities among countries in the Middle East to best accommodate the influx of displaced persons. After hostilities ceased, agencies and organizations involved in the Plan of Action began to prepare for limited postwar relief activities.

To finance international efforts under the Plan of Action,



UNDRO made a global appeal of funds for a total Plan budget of approximately \$175 million, nearly \$60 million of which has been contributed by members of the international community. In early March 1991 there were indications that upward revisions of the appeal might be necessary. The US contribution as of February 20 for Calendar Year 1991 totalled \$3 million, including: \$1 million cash pledged to the ICRC; \$1 million cash to UNHCR; and \$750,000 cash to IOM, all under the Plan of Action; and an additional \$250,000 through UNDRO for the Turkish Red Crescent. From August to December 1990, the US contributed \$15 million, including just under \$1 million of in-kind contributions, bringing total US contributions for emergency refugee aid in the Gulf to \$18 million.

## 2. Other Humanitarian Assistance

**A. WHO/UNICEF Mission to Iraq.** The WHO & UNICEF sent a joint humanitarian mission into Iraq from Teheran on February 16, 1991. The week-long mission, declared by UNICEF Executive Director Jim Grant to create a "corridor of tranquility" into Iraq, had two objectives:

- \* to deliver emergency medical supplies for children and mothers (e.g., oral rehydration salts and pediatric doses of antibiotics, with a total value of \$600,000) in all areas under Iraqi control; and
- \* to ascertain essential health care needs of the Iraqi population, particularly of vulnerable groups like women, children, elderly, and displaced persons.

According to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, the mission was sent "within the spirit of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Declaration of the World Summit for Children." Iraqi officials, while allowing the WHO/UNICEF team into Iraq, gave no permission for a similar mission to Kuwait.

Precedents for such "corridors or days of tranquility" include ones set up in four civil wars: El Salvador, for delivery of immunizations in early 1985; Operation Lifeline Sudan, for essential supplies; and the conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia.

Among the areas investigated by the mission team were the state of health systems and medical supplies, evidence of communicable diseases, the water and sanitation situation in Baghdad, and other problems of the target populations.

Upon their return, the mission team reported serious health problems in Iraq as a result of the allied air campaign. Team leader Ali Khogali, of WHO, cited a nationwide shortage of clean



drinking water as the most urgent problem, followed by inoperative sewage treatment facilities and a lack of electricity. The combination of these factors was reported to have led to a quadrupling of intestinal infections and dehydration among children, as well as to a growing threat of outbreaks of typhoid and cholera. Iraqi vaccination programs appeared to have deteriorated, because of the lack of electricity and hence refrigeration for vaccine storage. Other problems cited included inoperative communications, manufacturing, and processing systems; food scarcities and food price increases; and fuel shortages, leading to an increase in use of fuelwood chopped from area trees.

Medical supplies have been exempted under the UN Security Council trade embargo of Iraq. Shipments of food supplies, however, require clearance by the Security Council's Sanctions Committee and must be distributed by UN groups or the ICRC.

**B. WHO Task Force.** In January 1991 WHO set up a task force to monitor and assess the health situation in the Persian Gulf. The task force includes experts in communicable diseases, drug use, chemical safety and toxicology, sanitation and water supply, epidemiological surveillance, health services organization, and health support services. WHO actions in the Gulf have concentrated on provision of health assistance to Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, and Iran in coordination with the UNDRP-led Regional Humanitarian Plan of Action.

At the request of the Kuwaiti Minister of Health, WHO is assisting in the elaboration of emergency assistance plans for Kuwait and a rehabilitation plan for Kuwaiti health services.

**C. Palestinian Health Needs.** In response to deteriorating health conditions of Palestinians in the occupied territories due to the Gulf crisis, WHO in October 1990 issued an appeal for grants of emergency financial assistance. As of 21 December 1990, Canada, Germany and the European Community had announced grants totalling about \$5.4 million of the estimated \$9.1 million needed.

### 3. Needs assessment for postwar efforts.

As noted earlier, following a consultation with UN agency heads, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar announced on March 1 that he had charged Under-Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari with assessing the humanitarian roles which the UN could play in responding to the needs of affected states. Ahtisaari is to make a tour to Iraq and Kuwait, scheduled for early to mid-March, accompanied by a technical team with representatives from WHO, UNICEF, and other agencies. Following the tour, Ahtisaari will report to the Secretary-General on his findings. His report is



expected to include not only an assessment of emergency humanitarian needs but also some indication of needs for longer-term reconstruction.

### Assistance related to Labor Migration

With nearly three million workers fleeing Iraq or Kuwait as a result of the Gulf crisis, several countries requested immediate assistance from the **International Labor Organization (ILO)**. Problems reported by states with large numbers of returnees included not only issues of resettlement and unemployment but also financial problems due to the loss of remittances.

The Governing Body of the ILO requested the Director-General to send a mission of inquiry to Kuwait to report on working conditions there; the Body also established a tripartite (worker, employer, government) committee to examine an Egyptian representation of non-compliance by Iraq with ILO conventions.

The ILO also convened in December 1990 a tripartite round table on international labor migration for eleven Asian and Arab countries to discuss the situation of countries affected by the Gulf crisis. Participants called for a review of international migration systems.

Other ILO activities have included:

- \* the establishment of reception and information centers in five highly-affected Asian countries;
- \* formulation of projects for returnees in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan;
- \* establishment of a re-employment program, with UNDP and Canadian CIDA, in Sri Lanka; and
- \* creation of a questionnaire to be used in estimating losses of workers leaving the Gulf, in order to facilitate efforts at obtaining compensation.

The ILO issued an appeal in November 1990 for international help to finance ILO job creation, retraining and employment counselling programs in the home countries. Responses to the appeal totalled over one million dollars committed by Canada, Switzerland, and the UN Development Program. An additional appeal for a Special Fund for Resettlement was made by ILO Director-General Hansenne in February 1991.

## Environmental Assessment

1. UNEP Consultation. The UN Environment Program (UNEP) sponsored a consultation on February 5-6 of UN agencies, NGOs, representatives of international tanker companies and others to discuss immediate and long-term environmental threats in the Gulf region, means of responding to them, and problems in environmental information flow.

Consultation participants called for international support of the Kuwait Action Plan of 1978 through the revitalization of the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME -- see next item) and the Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Center (MEMAC).

2. Revitalization of ROPME. UNEP has taken a leading role in revitalizing ROPME, an organization including all eight nations in the region (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). In late February ROPME convened a meeting in Bahrain, with UNEP and IMO, for government representatives and UN agencies to discuss the scope of environmental damage and to identify components needed to implement a long-term environmental action plan and to avoid duplication.

3. Environmental Monitoring & Assessment. During the Gulf war, UNEP sent several missions to the Gulf to obtain scientific and technical information on physical and environmental damage in the Persian Gulf. One was a team of three scientists sent to the Gulf in late January. A second was a team of scientific experts sent to the Gulf from February 6 to Feb. 15. Both missions were headed by UNEP's Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS) Director Michael Gwynne.

Following the February mission, Gwynne gave an assessment of the oil slick, noting that damage to coastal ecosystems was already evident but citing problems with available information on the environmental situation in the Gulf. Gwynne stressed the team's recommendation that the Gulf's environmental problems are regional in nature and that regional coordination through ROPME would offer the best means of formulating effective responses. Following this recommendation, UNEP began efforts to strengthen ROPME (see item #2 above) in addition to other steps to address war-related environmental damage in the Gulf.

Another UNEP assessment mission report is expected in early March, at which time UNEP is expected to announce plans for immediate and longer-term environmental efforts.

Other UN programs and agencies have been involved in monitoring, assessment, and emergency preparations and responses,



including:

- \* The **International Maritime Organization (IMO)**, which has been coordinating assistance to authorities in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in cleaning up the oil slick. At Saudi request, IMO set up a seven-day, 24-hour coordination center in London to serve as a clearinghouse to match environmental clean-up needs with offers of assistance.
- \* **UNEP's Global Resources Information Database (GRID)**, which has been monitoring the oil spill in the Persian Gulf.
- \* The **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**, which also set up an emergency response system to respond to requests for help from states in the event of releases of radioactivity from damaged nuclear plants.

#### Preparations for Economic Reconstruction

In February 1991 UNDP established a Task Force to help formulate an action plan for postwar development in the Persian Gulf. The Task Force, operating within UNDP's Regional Bureau for Arab States and Europe, is working with officials from the governments concerned, with other UN agencies, and with NGOs in the establishment of priorities, development of plans of action, and coordination of post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.

In a statement before the UNDP Governing Council on February 22, Mohamed A. Nour, Assistant Administrator and Regional Director, Bureau for Arab States and Europe, stressed the comparative advantages of UNDP -- such as its extensive global network of field representatives -- for coordinating postwar development assistance. The UNDP Task Force also draws upon the extensive experience of UNDP in development in other emergency situations.

UNDP efforts are being directed not only at Gulf states experiencing direct physical damage from the war, but also at other countries whose economies, societies or environments have been negatively affected. Nour cited several areas of possible UNDP assistance to states, including:

- \* the creation of systems to assess the impacts on various states of the Gulf crisis;
- \* support for national task forces to facilitate the socio-economic reintegration of returnees;
- \* establishment of country and regional skills development programs, necessarily including programs for women (given



increases in female-headed households); and

- \* special rehabilitation and training programs for disabled persons.

UNDP has begun to collect information on the impacts of the war in four areas: basic human needs, rehabilitation of institutions and infrastructure, economic management, and environmental recovery. The Task Force will present medium and long-term proposals for a Plan of Action for Countries Affected by the Gulf Crisis for consideration by the UNDP Governing Council in June 1991. The Task Force already has begun work on a draft plan for UNDP action and intends to implement components as soon as immediate needs and resources are identified.

### UN Assessments

The UN has received several requests from participants in the Gulf crisis for assessments of particular aspects of the Gulf war, among them:

- \* A request by the Government of Iraq to investigate whether a factory bombed on January 21 by the allied forces was a production plant for infant formula (as maintained by Iraq) or a biological weapons factory (as maintained by the allies);
- \* A request in January 1991 by seventeen Members of the U.S. Congress for UNEP to conduct an investigation of the potential environmental consequences of the war; and
- \* A request by the Government of Kuwait to investigate alleged human rights violations committed by occupying Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

The latter request was submitted to the Security Council for consideration in early March.

As noted earlier, on March 1991 the UN Secretary-General announced that he was dispatching a mission headed by former Under-Secretary-General Abdulrahim A. Farah to Kuwait, to assess damages and losses sustained by Kuwaiti civilians and infrastructure during the Iraqi occupation.

## ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

GEMS	Global Environment Monitoring System
GRID	Global Resources Information Database of UNEP
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MEMAC	Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ROPME	Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Program
UNDRO	UN Coordinator for Disaster Relief
UNEP	UN Environment Program
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

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Please see also the following UNA-USA papers on the Persian Gulf  
crisis:

- \* UNA-USA Occasional Paper No. 3, "Roles for the United Nations After the Gulf War," February 1991.
- \* UNA-USA Occasional Paper No. 1, "The United Nations in the Gulf Crisis and Options for U.S. Policy," David J. Scheffer, revised February 1991.

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October 27, 1989

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Board of Governors

FROM: Edward C. Luck

SUBJECT: Ad Hoc Meeting to Discuss Response to Ford Foundation  
Evaluation

At the Board of Governors meeting on Tuesday, it was decided that we should convene an ad hoc meeting of the Board of Governors to formulate a formal response to the conclusions and recommendations of the Ford Foundation review of UNA-USA, which is enclosed. As you will note, the Foundation would like a written response from the Association. We view this as the opening exchange in a process of dialogue and negotiation with the Foundation regarding the future directions of the Association and the nature and extent of Ford Foundation support. The Foundation staff regard the overall results of their evaluation to be quite positive, but they obviously have some strong views about our future programs and priorities. For us, this is an opportunity both to rethink where we are going as an organization and potentially to gain substantial financial support from Ford to help underwrite new initiatives.

The meeting will be held here at the Arthur Ross Conference Center from 2:30 to 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday, November 14th. John Whitehead will chair the meeting and Max Kampelman will join us via conference call. If any of you are unable to join us here because of the short notice but would be available for a conference call, please let Pat Wilber know. In the meantime, I think you will find the Ford report, even though the analysis is of uneven quality, to be provocative and worthwhile reading.

Thanks very much and I hope that you will be able to join us on November 14th. All the best.



THE FORD FOUNDATION

320 EAST 43<sup>RD</sup> STREET  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

October 20, 1989

Mr. Alexander M. Schindler  
Board of Governors  
The United Nations Association  
of the United States of America  
485 Fifth Avenue  
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Schindler:

The United Nations Association of the United States of America has received support from the Ford Foundation since UNA was established in 1966. When, in 1988, UNA began to develop a plan to put itself on a firmer financial footing, it asked the Foundation to consider increasing our level of support. In light of this request and in view of the growing importance of the United Nations and other international organizations in international affairs in recent years, the Foundation decided to evaluate the UNA and our overall relationship to it. Clearly, the improved international climate and the increasing need for worldwide cooperation confront UNA with exciting new challenges and opportunities.

We are pleased that we are now able to share the evaluation report with you. A copy is enclosed herewith. We have also sent copies to John Whitehead, Max Kampelman, Elliot Richardson, Cyrus Vance, and Edward Luck. As you will see, it clearly reflects our continuing and sympathetic interest in the UNA and its goals.

We would welcome any reactions UNA might have in writing, before January first. Please be assured that there is no need for UNA to respond immediately to the report. After we have received your comments, we would be prepared to arrange a meeting to discuss the evaluation and UNA's responses to it. We would also want to take advantage of the meeting to discuss the representation of women and minorities on UNA's Boards.



With respect to future Ford Foundation funding for UNA, it could take various forms. We have concluded that an endowment grant, revolving fund or wasting capital grant would not be appropriate at this time. The foundation believes that the more appropriate forms would be either continued project support at approximately the level of the past three years, or general support over a number of years for the broad range of UNA's activities. We could discuss these alternatives at our meeting.


We look forward to hearing from you in due course.

Sincerely,



American Jewish Archives

Susan V. Berresford  
Vice President, Program Division  
United States And International Affairs Program



by

Enid C.B. Schoettle  
Director  
International Affairs Program

THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN JEWISH  
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An Evaluation by

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
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


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## ABSTRACT

The United Nations Association, a Foundation grantee since 1966, is committed to making the UN and other multilateral institutions more effective instruments on behalf of world peace and development. In 1988, UNA began to develop a plan to put itself on a firmer financial footing and asked the Foundation to consider increasing its level of support. In light of this request and the increasingly prominent role the UN and other international organizations have assumed in international affairs in recent years, IAP decided to evaluate the UNA and the Foundation's relationship to it. This document summarizes our evaluation of UNA and sets forth our recommendations regarding future Foundation support.

IAP staff believe that the UNA has an important role to play in bringing UN and multilateral issues to attention of the US policymaking community, and in promoting greater public awareness and understanding of multilateral institutions and issues. After assessing the entire range of UNA activities, Foundation staff recommend that UNA restructure its agenda in order to concentrate on multilateral institutions and issues.

Sections I and II sketch the history of UNA and its current programs. Section III outlines how UNA's various constituencies view it. Section IV concludes with recommendations for UNA and options for Foundation funding.



## I. Origins and Development of the UNA

### A. Founding and Early Vision

The UNA was created in 1964 through the merger of the American Association for the United Nations, the United States Committee for the United Nations, and five smaller organizations. Foundation staff had not recommended assistance to the predecessor groups because of "the duplication and lack of focus which characterized their efforts." The new organization was not to be merely a source of strength gathered miraculously from weakness. It was to reflect an entirely new conception. Whereas the earlier organs were "protagonists," the new institution, by contrast, was designed "to provide for the public objective and useful materials of special interest to the U.S. on issues and problems before the UN." The new UNA would be a sympathetic but objective observer. It would "organize study commissions to draw up its policy statements" made up of "leaders and experts from business, science, education, government, the mass media, and other appropriate fields."<sup>1</sup>

The Committee for Economic Development (CED) that had so successfully engaged business, labor and civic leaders in reflection on public economic policies was to be the model. Special effort would be made "to involve men (sic) who have not been previously associated with United Nations affairs but who have a broad understanding of foreign problems and who have national influence in their particular fields." Collaborative projects were anticipated with more than 100 voluntary American business, labor, farm and civic organizations. Moreover, it was hoped, UNA would take the lead in informing the White House, Department of State, the academic and broader educational community and the media about UN-related matters. A former

Foundation staff member and CED official, Porter McKeeever, became the first chief executive officer in 1964.<sup>2</sup>

The Foundation signaled its support for the creation of the UNA by a three-year grant of \$450,000 in 1966. The principal justification for this grant, given to the Trustees in a docket paper, was that the research community had failed to provide satisfactory policy guidance on multilateral affairs. In particular, only "a relatively small number of scholars is giving attention to the wide range of problems involving the UN and other international organizations." Given this vacuum the Foundation had decided, in effect, to support a think tank on the UN and its policy agenda.<sup>3</sup>

Robert S. Benjamin, the first chairman/president of the new UNA, described his task as amalgamating of a set of disparate organizations devoted to the UN and then taking them "from dedicated mediocrity and disorganization to a coherent integration of serious, objective policy studies with professionalism in dissemination and stimulation of discussion." To this end, he looked forward to an annual budget by 1972 of \$3.5 million. In his request to the Foundation he specifically rejected

any special pleading for the United Nations per se, as it is now organized. Despite our inherited institutional label, UNA believes that we can best serve the cause of the United Nations through objective efforts to define how the United States can best use international organizations for getting on with the work of the world, which increasingly ignores the boundaries of nation-states.<sup>4</sup>

Benjamin observed that the new organization had some impressive resources to start out; a magazine (Vista) with a paid circulation approaching 50,000, "active units" on 700 campuses, two hundred chapters, and a board that contained such distinguished figures as Eugene R. Black, Burke Marshall, Robert D. Murphy, Peter Peterson, Robert Roosa, Theodore Sorenson and Whitney Young.<sup>5</sup>



Benjamin suggested that to give the new UNA focus it concentrate on four "clusters of emerging problems for the United States in the international organization field": (1) central structural problems of the United Nations and its agencies; (2) the security role of the United Nations; (3) building more effective economic and social programs within the United Nations system; and (4) relationships between the United Nations and other regional and global organizations. Benjamin asked the Foundation for \$3.5 million over five years of which .5 million would be for a revolving fund to carry the association "through the peaks and valleys of income."<sup>6</sup>

The UNA began not only with large plans and a bold vision but also with substantial early accomplishment. In 1965, the first year of operation, income reached \$1.1 million; by 1967-68 it had risen to \$1.5 million, with a nice balance among gifts from individuals, businesses, and foundations. Moreover, vigorous policy panels met on U.S. policy toward China, non-proliferation, and Atlantic relations; "Ad hoc groups" (CED-like policy panels) were established on UN peacekeeping, conflict resolution, new initiatives, Southern Africa, and financial administration of UN organizations. Plans were afoot for an "Economic Development Center" to serve the business community, a "Communication Center" to serve the media and visitors to the UN, and a college program.<sup>7</sup>

In retrospect it can be seen that UNA came into existence not only with high hopes, impressive auspices and some early accomplishments, but also with potentially serious institutional contradictions. It is indeed a brave conception to gather under one roof so many of those who were oriented in some way toward the UN and multilateral institutions. But on closer inspection the groups seem in some important respects to have been essentially irreconcilable. Among the supporters, at least three groups can be easily discerned. One, that constituted the nationwide membership in the chapters,

contained the community of internationalists who before the war had devoted their energies to the World Court and League of Nations but had transferred their allegiance easily in the 1940s to the new UN. For many of them, these organs of proto-world government could do no wrong. They saw their membership in UNA in this light: almost as if they had joined a missionary society dedicated to converting the heathen.

The second group of supporters shared some sympathies with the first, but was more qualified in its allegiance. It contained liberal, mainly northeastern, businessmen and financiers -- represented by the prominent names on the board -- who saw a just and stable world order, to which the UN was committed, as a political and economic necessity. Thus they viewed the UN as a highly-promising instrument to achieve stability and justice in the world. They did not view the UN with the reverence of the first group. But in the early years at least, they also did not engage in any profound questioning of the UN.

The third category of UNA supporters had, in fact, become somewhat critical of the organization by the mid-1960s. This group was represented by some academics and former diplomats as well as some Foundation staff who dealt with the UNA requests. Their view was that the UN and its associated organs were immensely important to the world's future but were in various ways flawed. Some believed that the UN structure had been created in haste at the war's end and now needed a fundamental reconsideration. Others held that the world had changed dramatically since 1945 and accordingly, substantial changes should be made in the UN in the light of two decades of experience. Their view was that UNA should help perform the required analysis and make the case for reform. It is obvious that this last, more questioning, posture was likely to conflict with the unquestioning devotion of the first group of UNA members and, to some degree, of the second.<sup>8</sup>



Twenty-five years after its formation, the early ambitions of the UNA have not been fully realized. Its vision is little changed today from what it was at the start. What, then, in the history of the past quarter century explains its development? There are some explanations that lie within the UNA itself; others grow out of the historical environment in which it has existed.

#### B. Internal Challenges

Early decisions made by UNA about its structure and goals shaped its performance. These decisions were all inter-related but may be considered separately here.

##### 1. Programs and Functions

The activities of the seven organizations subsumed under the new UNA had been highly varied and in some respects mutually inconsistent. The first task of UNA's leaders was to decide what to discard and what to keep. The strategy was to sort out these responsibilities during the early years and jettison those that had low priority. In fact, however, the early leaders of UNA attempted to retain virtually all of the inherited functions. Some of these have subsequently withered, but more as a result of malnourishment and apathy than a conscious decision to discard them. In brief, those functions that have been retained through most of UNA's history include: (1) explanation of the UN and the concept of multilateralism to the American people; (2) exploration of ways to improve the operation of the UN and its agencies; (3) advocacy for the UN in U.S. policy circles and among the American public at large; (4) service to those constituencies with an interest in or affection for the UN (citizens, students, business leaders, etc.); and (5) analysis of U.S. policy options concerning the United Nations.

The decision to retain all these functions had serious implications for the success of the UNA. First, its image has been complicated by the diversity of its activities. Second, the vigorous performance of some functions has

impeded the successful pursuit of others. As one example, assertiveness as an advocate has reduced credibility as a constructive critic. Last, its resources have been stretched very thin. A relatively small organization, UNA has never been fully able to fulfill several radically different functions.

## 2. Leadership and Senior Staff

UNA's leadership has had mixed success in responding to the challenges facing the organization. In part this may be attributed to accidents of history. In part, it grows out of the ambitious and heterogeneous range of functions that was assigned to the organization. For a start, it was not clear what was needed in a leader. With such a multitude of objectives, should the chief executive be a scholar, an intellectual, a diplomat, a manager, a fund-raiser, a publicist, or a Renaissance combination of all these roles? The failure to grow as the early plans had prescribed, together with the retention of so many functions, put a premium on selecting for leadership persons able to undertake several tasks at once. The results have been mixed. Porter McKeever, the first chief executive officer, had been Executive Director at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and later a prominent staff member at the Ford Foundation. His successor in 1973 was a retired diplomat who failed to perform. He was followed by James Leonard, a well respected foreign service officer and former U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN; Robert Ratner, a specialist in fund-raising; and in 1984 by Edward Luck, who had come directly to UNA from graduate school and risen through the ranks.

The responsibilities of the senior staff of the Association have typically been so large and varied that they have not been able to demonstrate the gains from specialization. Moreover, the smorgasbord of tasks required has not proved to be highly attractive in recruiting first-rate people.

## 3. Funding

The problems faced in attracting truly outstanding leaders and senior staff to UNA were reflected also in fund-raising. Foundations, corporations,



government agencies, and even private individuals are accustomed to assisting institutions that serve some clearly identified purpose and do so well. UNA with its Jack-of-all-trades image was not in this mold. It is not academically rigorous like Brookings; it is not representative of business interests like the CED; it is not deeply attentive to members like the Council on Foreign Relations; and it does not get to Congress effectively like the Center for Strategic and International Studies. With its diffusion of programs, some potential donors have not had to look hard for convincing reasons why they should decline to supply funds to UNA and put them elsewhere. As noted in the next section, UNA's funding prospects have also been substantially affected by the declining popularity of the United Nations.

### C. A Hostile External Environment

While UNA's history can be explained in part by its internal characteristics, its external political environment has from time to time been distinctly inhospitable. This has been a significant cause of its failure to achieve its multiple objectives.

#### 1. The Changing Political Landscape

The quarter century since UNA's establishment has in many respects been a rough period for international organizations. The hopes for stable and viable multilateralism that blossomed at the end of World War II with the birth of the United Nations and the institutions of a new global economic system -- the IBRD, the IMF, GATT, etc... -- were soon dashed. The first signs of crumbling came with the early expression of Cold War rivalry within the General Assembly and the Security Council in the 1940s. In the 1950s, the UN did contribute constructively to the process of decolonization and the resolution of crises such as Suez in 1956, but continuing East-West rivalries and instabilities in the newly-independent countries of the developing world were not amenable to multilateral restraints. Breakdowns in the multilateral international economic

system were symbolized by President Nixon's Smithsonian Declaration, the rise of OPEC, and the triumph of regional customs unions such as the European Community. The United States also had to come to terms with vituperative oratory in the General Assembly and evidence of seeming sloth and ineffectiveness in many of the specialized agencies. Faced with mounting criticism of the UN in particular, and skepticism of multilateralism in general, UNA increased the proportion of its efforts devoted to damage limitation through relatively uncritical defense of multilateral institutions. This posture endeared it to loyal friends of the UN, but also constrained its effectiveness with a wider, less committed audience.

Perhaps the most crucial factor for the UNA was a steady decline in sympathy among UN members for policies of the state of Israel, particularly with respect to Israeli occupation of Arab lands. Criticism of Israel in the General Assembly mounted through the 1970s, culminating in a 1975 resolution that equated Zionism with racism. For some of UNA's most generous supporters who had supported the UN in part because it seemed to promise a world safe for Israel, the situation was now exactly reversed. The UN was now a place where nations could gang up and berate Israel. For these persons, the notion of supporting a UN lobby rapidly lost its appeal.

During the early years of the Reagan administration, criticism of the UN carried considerable political weight and found expression in a flurry of statements and actions from the Congress and the Executive Branch. These included the passage in 1983 of Public Law 98-151, which prohibited U.S. aid to countries whose votes in the UN exhibited a consistent pattern of opposition to U.S. foreign policy; the US Government's decision announced in December 1983 to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO); repeated threats to leave the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); and the 1984 Kassebaum Amendment, which



stipulated that unless weighted voting were introduced at the UN, the U.S. would reduce its contribution from 25 to 20 percent. In response to this threat, the UN adopted a package of budgetary and administrative reforms including consensus adoption of its budget. The U.S. unilaterally cut its contribution in 1986 and 1987. In late 1988 the administration expressed satisfaction with the changes at the UN and promised to pay the full U.S. assessment and its arrearages, although it has not yet done so.

## 2. The Changing Intellectual Landscape

The committed constituency has been very important to the UNA over its life course. It has provided devoted chapter members, paying subscribers to UN Day celebrations, and even occasional "angels" willing to pay the bills and cover the deficits of the New York office. It has two drawbacks. First, it has alienated other potential friends who have a more critical stance. And second, it has been aging rapidly and, with few new entrants, declining in numbers.

But while the committed enthusiasts of multilateral institutions have become an endangered species, the critics have multiplied. They fall into two categories. First, there are those who simply reflect a kind of mindless isolationism and xenophobia. They bemoan the loss of "our" Panama Canal and see every international organization as part of "the communist conspiracy" to weaken our resolve to fight for what is rightfully "ours." These critics have been emboldened by some of the exaggerated anti-American rhetoric that has come out of the General Assembly. This is reflected in the Congressional reluctance to approve appropriations for the UN. It may also reflect among certain political circles a kind of displaced racism against the non-white majority in the UN, at a time when overt racism is no longer permissible in domestic U.S. politics.

Second, there has also developed in the U.S. since World War II a body of political thought -- associated in the early years with Hans Morgenthau and Arnold Wolfers and more recently with Henry Kissinger, Samuel Huntington, and Jeane Kirkpatrick -- characterized as Realpolitik. This perspective suggests that U.S. national interests must be accomplished primarily through unilateral assertiveness or collective action with like-minded Western nations. This approach stresses a "hard-eyed" examination of what may advance or detract from U.S. interests. Advocates of Realpolitik view the UN and other international organizations merely as weapons in the arsenal of U.S. foreign policy, not as sacred icons or institutions with value apart from their capacity to advance the national interest.

Just as UNA has tended to side somewhat uneasily with the uncritical advocates of multilateralism, it has historically kept its distance from the hard-headed realists. In recent years it has made some tentative advances to the "other side," such as the appointment of Jeane Kirkpatrick and Henry Kissinger's longtime associate Helmut Sonnenfeldt to the Board of Directors. But the UNA has never agreed to a posture of agnosticism, much less cynicism, as a legitimate starting point for a consideration of multilateralism. In consequence, it has increasingly given up a large body of intellectual terrain, and potential support, to more disinterested groups.

#### D. The Foundation's Role

The Foundation's posture toward the UN itself during its early years was essentially that of uncritical booster. The UN seemed indubitably calculated to "advance human welfare" and to improve the "conditions for peace" two of the key objectives identified for the Foundation in its founding Charter. Moreover, the two institutions were close neighbors. It is not surprising that one of the Foundation's earliest presidents, Paul G. Hoffman, served as a member of the U.S. delegation to the UN after he left the Foundation, and was



one of the founders in 1956 of the United Nations Special Fund, a forerunner of the United Nations Development Programme. It seemed only appropriate that the Foundation should contribute over \$21 million for construction of the UN Library and the UN School and to improve the working environment. In addition it granted almost \$5 million for early program activities of several specialized agencies.<sup>9</sup>

It was not until 1962 that a note of doubt about the UN crept into program discussions and the Foundation began to wonder how it might assist the UN to "adapt to changing needs and opportunities." That year the Foundation commissioned a substantial report from Lawrence Finkelstein of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, prompted, it seems, both by a sense that the UN was not living up to its potential and early expectations, and by a concern that less temperate criticisms of the institution and charges of irrelevance needed a moderate response.

Finkelstein concluded that the UN remained an extremely valuable institution with many important functions still unexplored, and that the Foundation should be extremely cautious about becoming directly involved with UN problems. Finkelstein recommended that the Foundation should from time to time: assist the UN with program innovations such as support for the enhancement of the UN's own capacity to analyze issues; and support UN-related research by universities and independent think-tanks, such as Brookings.

It is almost a truism that government participation in the United Nations will be strengthened if government decision-making can rest upon a solid base of non-governmental research.... As a general rule, the emphasis should not be on the study of the United Nations as a distinct entity, but rather on the UN as an element in the context of international, political, economic and social relationships and forces.<sup>10</sup>

Finkelstein concluded:

The UN can be supported by strengthening the capabilities of national delegations and national governments to participate more effectively in the organization, by strengthening the supporting research and educational capabilities available in the larger

community, both in the United States and abroad, and by strengthening the instruments which have the potential of helping to deepen general public understanding of the relationship of the UN to national concerns and aspirations.<sup>11</sup>

Joseph Slater, the program officer in the International Affairs office responsible for UN matters from 1957 to 1967, reflected in his oral history on the Foundation's concern in the early 1960s about "the strengthening of the UN and the UN process." He had the impression that in this area "philanthropy has been particularly weak, as has national policy." The place where foundations could be helpful, he thought, was in the strengthening of "networks." He observed that there were different "sets" of people concerned with different aspects of international affairs.

"There was one set of people concerned with NATO and the Marshall Plan and OECD; there was another set of people dealing with the UN. They were both good communities in a way, but had no relations with each other."

The answer to this problem of communication was "the CED type process of bringing people from different parts of the society together to work on a problem, work responsibly with the government, issue recommendations that have some chance of making an impact, both in an educational sense and in the broadest sense of citizen participation at the leader level of foreign policy."

It is clear from Slater's comments that the Foundation's support for the UNA was intended to encourage policy studies and citizen education. It was assumed that the advocacy performed by the predecessor organization would cease and the chapter responsibilities would either wither or not interfere with the main business of policy analysis. As Slater saw it, the new UNA would bring together otherwise non-intersecting elites and produce consensus policy statements based on solid reasoning and designed both for the guidance of policymakers and the comfort of citizens called upon to support such policies.



To put the UNA in a larger context, the fundamental precepts were that "correct" public policy could be arrived at ineluctably by honest forthright persons who took the time to consult the facts and apply disciplined common sense. The subsequent packaging of the policy conclusions and the dissemination process for citizen education were crucial. The right medium was required to deliver the proper message. The educational justification for support of UNA was repeated in Foundation documents throughout the 1960s. There was no hint that the kind of consensual policy studies conducted by UNA would result either in the identification of a set of alternative policy options, among which choice would have to be made, or that some unexpected policy conclusions would emerge. The purpose described in the 1968 grant request is typical: to "involve influential citizens from many walks of life and communities in reviewing important foreign policy issues; on the grounds not only of promoting a more enlightened public but also for the purpose of encouraging the evaluation of foreign policies outside official governmental channels."<sup>13</sup> By the late 1960s, Cyrus Vance had emerged as the leader of the policy panels, with Elmore Jackson the key staff person.

A significant extension of the policy panels' conception was introduced in 1969 when "parallel panels" were begun with the UNA-USSR. Whereas the panels to date had been designed to discover and enunciate consensus foreign policy for the American people, parallel panels were to be an exercise in international relations, almost in private diplomacy. The 1969 grant request says "it is hoped that through an exchange of preliminary papers and a series of direct discussions, parallel reports can then be prepared which will diminish differences and propose new areas of common ground that might lead to future cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States."<sup>14</sup>

The other activities of UNA were of little interest to Foundation staff, except to the extent that they seemed to weaken the Association. The schools



program and the services to chapters in particular were seen as overlapping or conflicting with the outputs of the Foreign Policy Association. A revolving fund of \$100,000 was provided in 1968 "to launch ventures that can bring new income."<sup>15</sup> The fund seems shortly to have been consumed without mobilizing new revenues.

By the early 1970s, despite the glowing rhetoric that came from UNA, there was growing unease among Foundation staff even about what the UNA policy panels had accomplished. The 1971 request for grant action reported "persuasive evidence that the statements on China, peace-keeping, and population have contributed significantly to the course of negotiation and policy formation on these matters." At the same time "the evidence of their effects is necessarily difficult to trace, because it operates in the midst of other influences and in the necessarily private processes of the formation of policy views by leading figures in this country, in the United Nations and abroad." Arguments provided for continuing support to UNA were that the UN itself needed help and that this was no time to cut loose anything that looked like a life preserver: "At a time when disillusion with the attainments of the UN and with idealistic approaches to international affairs generally is very high, it seems important that the principal American organizations concerned with the United Nations not be seen as high- but simple-minded."<sup>16</sup>

Nevertheless, in the 1970s Foundation support for the UNA became progressively more selective and tightly targeted toward well-defined tasks. Funds were provided to assist UNA to take on the annual publication entitled Issues Before the nth General Assembly of the United Nations, orphaned in 1974 by the program redirection of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.<sup>17</sup> Although by 1977 it could be reported that "the policy reports do not rank well when measured by scholarly standards (even the background papers



vary greatly in quality)," support was still recommended for individual panels such as one in that year on international disaster relief.<sup>18</sup> But support for the original broad-based Policy Studies Program was abandoned. In 1978 a special grant of \$100,000 was made to help complete the match for a \$2 million reserve fund initiated with a gift from James S. McDonnell, Chair of both McDonnell Douglas and UNA.<sup>19</sup>

By the late 1970s, the principal UNA activity assisted by the Foundation was the Soviet-American parallel panels initiated with a Foundation grant in 1969. The staff judgment was that the parallel panels had improved dramatically over the years and deserved continued support into the indefinite future. American academic experts on the USSR had joined the U.S. group, providing briefings and a level of sophistication not evident at the beginning. The Soviets, moreover, had responded with improved delegations which had become steadily more substantive, forthcoming and flexible, involving higher-level Soviet panelists from a wider range of government and Party institutions and minimizing purely propagandistic exchanges. From the mid-1970s on, the parallel panels shifted from environmental and UN-related subjects to a wide range of arms control and international economic subjects, thus mirroring the main interests of the elite panel members as well as the evolution in substantive priorities in the Foundation's International Affairs Program.<sup>20</sup> In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Foundation staff felt that unofficial contacts involving the elite private group of UNA panelists could fill some of the vacuum left by the breakdown of diplomacy. "At a time when governments find it difficult to communicate, private institutions are able to play a special role by insuring that contacts do not atrophy entirely and that the door is left at least lightly ajar between the two societies."<sup>21</sup> By the 1980s the UNA staff could even claim that, as a result of the continuity and experience made possible by Foundation support, UNA could perform the function of private diplomacy. They cited

examples of arranging "an informal meeting between Central Committee staff members and a top U.S. official responsible for arms control policy" as well as meetings "between Soviet economists and American bankers to discuss the economic difficulties faced by Poland and other Eastern European states with serious debt problems."<sup>22</sup>

Clearly by the 1980s, the support provided to the UNA for the Parallel Studies Program had very little to do with the original and distinctive focus of the UNA on multilateralism and multilateral institutions. Indeed, through the parallel panels, the UNA approach had become distinctly bilateral and not multilateral: concerned with relations conducted outside the United Nations and its organs. The UNA program filled a niche in the Foundation's strategy of East-West exchanges, balancing the heavy emphasis on scholarly flows reflected in large grants to the International Research and Exchanges Board and to university-based Soviet and arms control studies center. A request for grant action in 1984 said simply: "We are convinced that UNA's exchange efforts are among the best managed and most productive of all the various exchange activities sponsored by U.S. organizations."<sup>23</sup> But the UNA programs had little if anything to do with the UN and multilateralism.

In the early 1980s the Foundation began to reconsider program opportunities in the field of international organizations and public international law. An important turning point was an international conference of scholars and practitioners convened by the Foundation's International Affairs Program (IAP) in November 1984 to examine the role of private institutions in the promotion of multilateralism. The consensus of that meeting was that the Foundation should renew its commitment to the field. Thus, the IAP initiated a series of grants on international organizations and public international law. In January 1986, the Foundation appointed the retiring UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Brian



Urquhart, as Scholar-in-Residence to reflect on how the UN might be strengthened.

UNA was a major recipient of this renewed grantmaking. Among the several UNA activities assisted by the Foundation, by far the most important has been the UNA's panel on Management and Decision-Making at the UN, established in 1985. Two years later, the panel issued its report entitled A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow.<sup>24</sup> In 1987, a major follow-up grant provided for outreach through UNA's Multilateral Project through "discussion and media attention in communities throughout the country on U.S. policy toward the United Nations with regard to the principal issues covered by the study: management, global resources, human security, economic development and peace and security."<sup>25</sup> Ninety UNA chapters took part in this exercise and contributed to a final document of policy recommendations for the U.S. government. Other grants to UNA included support for three conferences on the policies of the U.S. and other industrialized nations toward the UN and for a blue ribbon panel to reexamine the mission and capabilities of UNESCO.<sup>26</sup> Although the Foundation continues to support the US-Soviet Parallel Studies Program, our funds are now specifically earmarked to that program's newly launched series of dialogues on superpower policies toward the UN and multilateralism.

The grants since 1984 have, in fact, been close in spirit to the Foundation's early grants in the 1960s. They supported policy analysis and discussion aimed at improving the effectiveness of the UN, at least in part so that the confidence of the American people in it would remain strong.

In sum, as UNA has sought to define -- and redefine -- for itself productive roles that attract public and financial support, its relationship with Foundation staff have been characterized by a continuing search for common ground upon which to base grant support. The Foundation has from the

beginning been committed to research and public education that would raise the quality and salience of debate about multilateral institutions. UNA, in part because of its continued commitment to its chapters and in part because of the predispositions of its staff, has been more consistently dedicated to mobilizing public support for the United Nations. Differences over the intellectual and analytic quality of some UNA products may well have been a by-product of this difference in perspective.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, a renewed Foundation commitment to international organizations and public international law, reinforced toward the end of the decade by renewed public attention to and interest in multilateral organizations, led staff to urge a refocusing on multilateral issues. This reemphasis on the original focus of UNA, moreover, has given new importance to the unresolved issue of whether UNA should serve to mobilize attention to, or support for, the UN and other multilateral institutions. At the same time, UNA is currently trying to put itself on a firmer financial footing and has sought increased Foundation support to help it reach that goal.

Throughout this quarter century, notwithstanding differing perspectives and emphases, two considerations have kept the Foundation and UNA involved in a continuing relationship. First has been a common commitment to making the United Nations and other international organizations more effective instruments on behalf of world peace and development. Second has been the continuing willingness of men and women of great wisdom, experience, and stature -- individuals such as Cyrus Vance, Elliot Richardson, and Brent Scowcroft, to name only a few -- to commit their time, energy and reputation in working with UNA's professional staff to make it an effective center for promoting knowledge and understanding of international institutions. Given the growing capacity of the UN and other multilateral institutions to be effective as a result of the remarkable recent changes in East-West relations,



this is a natural time for a wide-ranging reevaluation of UNA, and the Foundation's relationship to it.



## II. UNA'S Current Structure and Program

In order to gain an understanding of UNA's range of activities, its current structure and programs are outlined below, as restructured in 1987 under three divisions: Policy Analysis and Dialogue, Constituencies and Communications, and Development and Finance.

### A. Governance

#### 1. Mission

UNA describes its mission in Article I and II/sec. 1 of its Bylaws of 1983 as follows:

The purpose of the Association is to study and promote the fundamental basis of peace with justice and the machinery necessary for its development. The Association shall carry on educational and informational activities so that the people of the United States of America and their government may participate to the greatest extent practicable in the United Nations and other official international and regional organizations functioning in various fields of international cooperation and law.

UNA also uses the following text published in its 1986 Annual Report to summarize its objectives:

UNA helps to make the UN work. Through policy research, public outreach, and international dialogue, UNA is building a national and international constituency for global cooperation. A non-profit, non-partisan membership organization, UNA participates actively in the public debate about America's role in the world, serving as a major source of information for Congress, the executive branch, students and the media. Step by step, UNA is bringing the U.S., the UN, and the global community closer together.



## 2. Board of Directors

The main responsibility of the Board of Directors is to establish procedures and guidelines for the entire Association and elect the Board of Governors, the National Council, and the President of the Association. The Board of Directors consists of not more than 135 members and meets at least once a year. Members of the Board of Directors are themselves elected for five-year terms at the National Convention, which convenes twice every five years. John C. Whitehead currently serves as Chairman of the Association and of the Board of Directors, having succeeded Elliot L. Richardson in 1989.

## 3. Board of Governors

The Board of Governors exercises the function of an Executive Committee, Vice Chair, and Treasury. When the Board of Directors is not in session, the Board of Governors assumes full responsibility. The Board of Governors consists of between 19 and 32 members of the Board of Directors, and meets at least three times a year. The Chairman of the Board of Governors is Max Kampelman, who succeeded Ivan Selin in 1989.

## 4. National Council

Individuals who have distinguished themselves in the service of the Association, the United Nations or U.S. foreign policy may be invited to serve as honorary members of the National Council of the Association. Members are elected by the Board of Directors to serve a maximum five-year term, with total membership not exceeding 100. The National Council is currently co-chaired by Cyrus R. Vance and Elliot L. Richardson.

## 5. President

The President is chief executive officer of the Association and, by virtue of his office, a member of the Board of Directors and the Board of Governors. His duty is to direct the activities of the Association and to assure execution of its policies and programs, as adopted and announced by the

Board and National Convention. The current President is Edward C. Luck, who has served in that capacity since 1984.

B. Policy Analysis and Dialogue

Chairman, Policy Studies Committee: Robert V. Roosa  
Vice President for Policy Studies: Toby Trister Gati

1. Parallel Studies Program

Program Coordinator: Kathryn Wille  
Consultant: Mike Mochizuki

UNA conducts a series of high-level policy discussion on various bilateral and some multilateral issues through its Parallel Studies Programs with the Soviet Union, Japan, and the People's Republic of China. The programs collectively provide a forum for former policymakers, business and professional leaders and specialists to meet on a regular basis to discuss political, security and economic issues outside of formal intergovernmental negotiations.

a. The Soviet-American Parallel Studies Program

The Soviet program consists of a series of unofficial high-level meetings between panels organized by UNA-USA and the UNA-USSR. Since its inception in 1969, UNA's Soviet-American Parallel Studies Program has evolved from focusing on the environment, to specific arms control, security and economic issues, to again addressing Soviet and American roles in shaping global trends. The program's mandate was recently expanded to include a new working group on the future of the UN. The U.S. co-chairs are Professor Richard Gardner, Columbia Law School and former U.S. ambassador to Italy, and John Petty, former chair of Marine Midland Bank and now chair of the High Level Review Committee of the Inter-American Development Bank. The Soviet chair is Georgii Arbatov, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies of the Academy of Sciences.



b. The Japanese-American Parallel Studies Program

UNA set up the Japan program in 1974 with the Asia Pacific Association of Japan. The program emphasizes the importance of U.S.-Japanese bilateral relations as well as the growing strategic and economic importance of Asia in U.S. and Japanese foreign policy. Earlier panels have discussed the role of the NICs in the global economy; the political and economic requirements for U.S.-Japanese leadership on international economic policy; current macroeconomic trends and U.S.-Japanese economic policies; and international institutional structures for an interdependent world. The program's most recent project on U.S. and Japanese policies toward the Soviet Union is chaired by McGeorge Bundy, former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Hoshio Okawara, former Japanese ambassador to the United States. The final report of 1988, entitled "Gorbachev's Asian Policy: Refashioning American and Japanese Policy Toward the Soviet Union," was published in spring 1989.

c. The People's Republic of China Parallel Studies Program.

The program with China began in 1984 with the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS) and UNA-PRC. This program was until recently chaired on the U.S. side by Brent Scowcroft, who, after his appointment as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was replaced by John Bierwith, former chair of the Grumman Corporation. The Chinese panel is led by General Chai Chengwen, Deputy Chair of BIISS. The focus is primarily on security, with considerable emphasis on Sino-Soviet relations. Other themes include regional conflict, the Chinese role in multilateral negotiations and in multilateral institutions, and the United Nations' role in the maintenance of peace and security.

d. The Quadrilateral Project

UNA is planning to hold the first session of a new Quadrilateral Project in 1990, bringing together policy specialists from the U.S., Japan, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. UNA considers the Parallel Studies Program a suitable forum for conducting informal discussion among the four powers on events and issues in Asia. The proposed project -- entitled "Asian Security Problems: Opportunities for Reducing Tensions among the Major Powers" to be chaired by Frank A. Carlucci -- will assess the Asian security environment and consider opportunities for developing more constructive relations among all nations in the region. The following themes have been selected:

- 1) General Overview of Security and Stability in Asia: Looking towards the year 2000;
- 2) Arms control and confidence building measures in an Asian context (including a discussion of the European experience and its relevance to Asia);
- 3) Proliferation Risks: the reduction of political and military tensions and ways to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

2. Multilateral Studies

Executive Director: Jeffrey Laurenti  
Program Administrator: Marilyn Messer

a. The Multilateral Project

The Multilateral Project, established in 1982, is an effort to involve the American public and U.S. and international officials in formulating ideas and recommendations concerning contemporary global problems. UNA annually selects a subject in multilateralism to be analyzed by UNA chapters and local chapters of UNA's affiliated national organizations. UNA produces a briefing book of background information on the subject selected, and outlines policy



choices facing the United States and the world community. As many as ninety UNA and affiliate chapters then organize study panels, hold public meetings, debate policy options and formulate specific recommendations. UNA synthesizes the findings under the direction of an Executive Council and the Multilateral Project Advisory Group, composed of a team of leading U.S. and international experts (listed on page 26). A final consensus report is released each year on UN Day, October 24.

The reports published under the program are as follows:

- 1988 Pulling Together: A Program for America in the UN
- 1987 A Time to Plant: International Cooperation to End Hunger
- 1986 The Next Giant Leap in Space: An Agenda in International Cooperation
- 1984-85 Keeping the Peace in Troubled Times: Recommendations for Multilateral Action
- 1982-83 Nuclear Proliferation: Toward Global Restraint



## Appendix to the Multilateral Project

### The Executive Council of the Multilateral Project

Chairman: Elliot L. Richardson, Former Chairman of the Association

#### Members:

- William Miller, Chairman, Council of Chapter and Division Presidents
- Ivan Selin, Member, Board of Directors and Governors
- Matthew Nimetz, Chairman of the Advisory Group, The Multilateral Project
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Member, Policy Studies Committee
- Mary Purcell, Chairman of the Conference of UN Representatives
- Cyrus R. Vance, Chairman of the National Council

### The Multilateral Project Advisory Group

- Matthew Nimetz, Chairman, Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
- Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Professor of Political Science, MIT
- Sybil S. Craig, Past President, Rochester Association for the UN
- Richard N. Gardner, Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia University
- Catherine Gwin, Consultant, The Rockefeller Foundation
- J. Bryan Hehir, Director, Office of International Justice and Peace, U.S. Catholic Conference
- Robert D. Hormats, Vice President for International Corporate Finance, Goldman, Sachs & Company
- Harold K. Jacobson, Professor Political Science and Associate Director, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan
- James A. Joseph, President and CEO, Council on Foundations
- Frank E. Loy, President, the German Marshall Fund
- Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Vice President and Director of Research, World Resources Institute
- Charles William Maynes, Editor, Foreign Policy
- Donald F. McHenry, Research Professor of Diplomacy and International Affairs, Georgetown University
- William S. Norman, Group Vice President, Market and Business Development, National Railroad Passenger Corporation
- Harvey Picker, Former Dean of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
- J. Stanley Pottinger, President, Pottinger and Company
- John Gerard Ruggie, Professor, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California at San Diego
- Edward G. Sanders, President, International Planning Analysis Center
- Larry N. Stern, President, North Carolina Division, UNA
- William J. van den Heuvel, Partner, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan



b. Management and Decision-Making Project

Project Director: Peter Fromuth

In 1985, UNA launched a two-year research project entitled, "The UN Management and Decision-Making Project," funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation. UNA convened a blue-ribbon international panel of policymakers, diplomats and management experts -- listed on page 28 --to formulate recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the UN. The final report, A Successor Vision: the United Nations of Tomorrow, was issued in late 1987 and figured prominently in discussions on reforming the UN. The Management and Decision-Making Project also generated the following series of research reports:

The U.N. at 40: the Problems and the Opportunities, 1986, by Peter Fromuth.

The U.N. in Profile: How its Resources are Distributed, 1986, by Maurice Bertrand.

Leadership at the United Nations: The Role of the Secretary-General and the Member States, 1986, First Panel Report.

Fairness and Accountability in U.N. Financial Decision-Making, 1986, by Fredrick K. Lister.

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation in the United Nations, 1987, by Maurice Bertrand.

U.N. Personnel Policy Issues, 1987, by Peter Fromuth and Ruth Raymond.

The Role of the United Nations in the Economic and Social Fields, 1987, by Maurice Bertrand.

Improving the Disaster Management Capability of the United Nations, 1988, by Sadruddin Aga Khan.

## Appendix to the Management and Decision-Making Project

### The International Panel

- Elliot L. Richardson, Chairman, UNA
- Andres Aguilar Mawdsley, Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the UN
- Otto Borch, Danish Ambassador to NATO
- Andrew F. Brimmer, President, Brimmer & Company
- Enrique V. Iglesias, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uruguay
- Senator Nancy L. Kassebaum
- Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees
- T.T.B. Koh, Singaporean Ambassador to the United States
- K.B. Lall, Chairman, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations
- Jaques Leprette, Former Permanent Representative of France to the UN
- Robert S. McNamara, Former President of the World Bank and Former Secretary of Defense
- Frederic V. Malek, President Marriott Hotels and Resorts
- Olusegun Obasanjo, Former President of Nigeria
- Philip A. Odeen, Regional Managing Partner, Management Consulting Services, Coopers & Lybrand
- Sadako Ogata, Professor, Sophia University, Tokyo
- Paul H. O'Neill, Chairman and CEO, ALCOA
- Olara A. Otunnu, Former Foreign Minister, Uganda
- Mohamed Sahnoun, Algerian Ambassador to the United States
- Salim A. Salim, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and National Service, United Republic of Tanzania
- Helmut Schmidt, Former Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany
- Brian Urquhart, Scholar-in-Residence, the Ford Foundation, and former UN Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs
- Cyrus R. Vance, Senior Partner, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, and former U.S. Secretary of State

### c. International Emergency Relief

In 1987, UNA began a two-year project on International Emergency Relief designed to clarify and evaluate aspects of emergency relief and recommend steps to improve media coverage and public understanding. Reports issued in 1988 have focused on public awareness of the renewed crisis in the East African region. The project's final report is due for release in 1989.

### d. UNESCO

In 1988, UNA began a project that will examine UNESCO's current mandate, capabilities, and programs. An international panel chaired by former U.S. Senator Robert Stafford is evaluating the organization and will produce a set of guidelines for reform of UNESCO.



e. The Roper Survey

UNA engaged the Roper Organization in 1988 to conduct an in-depth survey of American public perceptions of the United Nations. The results, released in May 1989, demonstrated a strong public endorsement of the UN and its affiliate institutions and overall willingness to strengthen U.S. involvement in international organizations.

f. Disarmament Conference

The UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs asked UNA in 1987 to chair three conferences on the UN and disarmament. The first two took place in November 1987 and May 1988, and the third will be held in October 1989.

g. Strategic Defense Conference

In 1986 UNA organized a conference on Strategic Defense: Arms Control, Global Security and Emerging Technology, in Talloires, France.

h. The UN and Western Democracies

In September 1987, the UNA-USA and the UNA-FRG jointly organized a conference on the major Western democracies and their interests in and views on the UN. Participants included policymakers, scholars and journalists from the major Western industrial democracies.

3. The Economic Policy Council

Co-Chairmen:

Henry Kaufman, Managing Director and Member of the Executive Committee, Salomon Brothers, Inc.  
Jack Scheinkman, Secretary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC

Executive Director: Peter Fromuth

### Steering Committee

- Charles F. Barber, Former Chairman, ASARCO, Incorporated
- Henry Kaufman, Managing Director and Member of the Executive Committee, Salomon Brothers, Inc.
- Ray Marshall, Bernard Rapoport Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin
- Jack Sheinkman, Secretary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC
- Thomas A. Vanderslice, Chairman, President and CEO, Apollo Computer, Inc.
- Lynn R. Williams, President, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC

UNA established the Economic Policy Council (EPC) in 1976 to bring together leaders of American business and labor at a time of international economic turbulence. Its mandate is to forge a consensus between labor and management on international economic issues and to encourage the formulation of common responses to emerging economic challenges.

The EPC works closely in its research and policy analysis with the Executive Branch and Congress and holds annual plenary meetings in Washington, D.C. which are regularly attended by the nation's policymakers. In addition, EPC staff are frequently called upon to present their findings before Congressional committees. The Council issues reports containing recommendations and policy options for government, management and labor. These include:

Third World Debt: A Reexamination of Long-Term Management, co-chaired by Anthony Solomon, Chairman, S.G. Warburg USA. and former President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank; and Rodney B. Wagner, Vice Chairman, Credit Policy Committee, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.

America and the Next Economic Decade: The Need for a National Investment Strategy, co-chaired by Victor Gotbaum, Special Advisor, District Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; and Felix Rohatyn, General partner, Lazard Frères and Co.

U.S. Policy Toward the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), 1987, co-chaired by Thornton F. Bradshaw, former Chairman of the Board, RCA; and Robert D. Hormats, Vice President for International Corporate Finance, Goldman Sachs and Company.



Work and Family in the United States: A Policy Initiative, 1986, co-chaired by Alice S. Ilchman, President, Sarah Lawrence College; and John J. Sweeney, International President, Service Employers, International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC.

The Jobs Challenge: Pressures and Possibilities, 1985, co-chaired by John H. Filer, Former Chairman, Aetna Life & Casualty Company; and Douglas A. Fraser, President Emeritus, International Union-United Auto Workers.

The Global Repercussions of U.S. Monetary and Fiscal Policy, 1984, co-chaired by Henry Kaufman, Executive Director, Salomon Brothers Inc.; and Peter B. Kenen, Walker Professor of Economics and International Finance, Princeton University.

The Productivity Problem: U.S. Labor-Management Relations, 1983, co-chaired by Ray Marshall, Bernard Rapoport Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, and former Secretary of Labor; and Richard F. Schubert, President, American Red Cross.

U.S. Trade and Economic Relations with Japan and Mexico, 1983, co-chaired by Robert S. Ingersoll, Trustee, University of Chicago, and former U.S. Ambassador to Japan; and Lynn R. Williams, President, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC.

U.S. Policies Toward the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 1982, co-chaired by James R. Greene, Dean, School of Business Administration, Monmouth College; and John R. Petty, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Marine Midland Banks, Inc.

#### 4. The Washington Office

Executive Director: Steven Dimoff

UNA established an office in Washington in 1972 for the purpose of disseminating information about international organizations to the Executive and Legislative Branches and the non-governmental community. It is staffed by Steven Dimoff and a secretary. According to Dimoff, in 1987 and 1988 the office devoted the bulk of its efforts to providing information to the policy-making community on the issue of U.S. funding of the United Nations. UNA has held a number of programs and conferences under Washington Office auspices, including the ongoing International Issues Speaker Series, which addresses several areas of U. S. policy toward the UN. The office has published a weekly newsletter, Washington Weekly Report since 1974, which



covers in considerable detail current Washington activities relating to multilateralism. The office also arranges visits to the United Nations by delegations of members of Congress.

### C. CONSTITUENCIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Directors: James Olson and John Tessitore

#### 1. Constituencies

Consultant: Peggy Sanford Carlin  
Executive Director for National Programs: James Olson  
Director of Administration for National Programs: Carol Christian

##### a. Chapters and Divisions

UNA has a national membership of about 20,000 distributed in a network of 165 local chapters and divisions. These units conduct educational and advocacy programs on the United Nations and multilateralism in local communities, implement the Multilateral Project, and coordinate local celebrations of UN Day and Human Rights Day. Twice every five years, UNA holds a national convention of its chapter representatives in order to elect the Board of Directors, discuss subjects requiring citizen action, and hear prominent speakers from the United Nations talk about the organization.

October 24 has been proclaimed National United Nations Day by every United States President since 1947. Each year, the president appoints a National UN Day Chairman. Assisted by a National UN Day Committee, the chairman coordinates a nationwide program with UNA chapters commemorating and drawing public attention to the United Nations.

##### b. Council of Organizations

UNA also works with the Council of Organizations consisting of 130 national groups which have an interest in, among other things, the United Nations. The two working bodies of the Council of Organizations are the Council of Washington Representatives on the UN (chaired by Alejandro Palacios of the U.S. Committee for UNICEF) and the Conference of UN Representatives in



New York (Chaired by Mary Purcell of the American Association of University Women). UNA and the Council of Organizations convene an annual Washington conference on U.S. policy toward the world body.

c. Youth Programs

Director: James Muldoon

1). Model UN Program

In an effort to involve young people in the study and discussion of multilateral issues, UNA has sponsored since 1978 an annual Model UN Seminar for student leaders and faculty advisors. Representatives from approximately 200 Model UN groups across the country participate. UNA publishes an annual Guide To Delegate Preparation to encourage involvement and assure accurate UN simulation, and Network News, a quarterly newsletter which updates developments in the worldwide Model UN movement.

2). U.S.-Soviet Student Exchange

In 1988, UNA-USA and UNA-USSR began a program of university student meetings to discuss current bilateral issues. The students also have the opportunity to travel and meet with university students and participate in Model UN activities in the host country.

3). Internships

UNA appoints several graduate and undergraduate students each summer to work as interns in its New York headquarters and learn more about multilateral organizations.

4). High School Essay Contest

In 1985, with support from Ambassador Peter H. Dailey, former President of the World Business Council, UNA established an annual essay contest for high school students. Entrants write on a topic selected by UNA relating to the UN and winners receive cash prizes and visits to UN agencies. The fourth annual contest, in 1988, asked students to write a U.S. Presidential address

to the United Nations General Assembly. The winners travelled to Morocco, Egypt and Jamaica to visit UN development projects. The 1988 contest received media coverage including the appearance of the winners on the NBC Today Show.

## 2. Communications

### a. Public Relations

Director: John Tessitore  
 Managing Editor: Susan Woolfson  
 Production Manager: Maureen Merriman  
 Public Affairs Coordinator: Jennifer Metzger

#### 1). Editors' Seminar

Since 1974, UNA has arranged an annual briefing at the United Nations for approximately seventy editors representing newspapers, radio and television from all over the U.S. and abroad. Speakers include senior UN officials and diplomats from the permanent missions to the United Nations.

#### 2). General Work with the Media

UNA responds to requests for information from the media on the United Nations. UNA board and staff members contribute op-ed pieces for national and local newspapers and appear on radio and television programs to discuss the United Nations. UNA and the School of International Affairs at Columbia University are currently planning a "Media and the UN" conference, to be held in conjunction with the Editors' Seminar in September 1989. Leading journalists, editors, diplomats and UN officials will address questions about the interaction between the United Nations and the media.

### b. Publications

Director: John Tessitore

UNA publishes the newsletter, Washington Weekly Report; a bimonthly paper, The Interdependent; the annual, Issues Before the nth General Assembly of the United Nations; research reports; fact sheets on the United Nations; books; and its own annual report.



D. Development and Finance

Executive Director: Fred Tamalonis

1. Special Events

Director: Stanley Raisen

Assistant Director: Gloria Klein

UNA holds annual special events for fund-raising and outreach. These include the Inaugural UN Day Ball, held in May-June, in New York City, and the UN Concert and Dinner held in October in Washington, D.C.

2. Finance and Funding

Director: Sherry Polen

For a breakdown of grant-giving foundations for the period 1984-1988, see pages 36-37. For a breakdown of Ford Foundation grants see pages 38-40.



Foundations and aggregate funding for 1984-1988

<u>Foundation</u>	<u>Amount</u>
- Ford Foundation	1,354,654* (See page 40)
- MacArthur Foundation	925,000
- U.S.-Japan Foundation	621,435
- Carnegie Corporation	450,000
- Rockefeller Foundation	436,000
- J.S. McDonnell Foundation	422,202
- Rockefeller Bros. Fund	310,000
- Branta Foundation	304,730
- McDonnell Douglas Foundation	250,000
- Atlantic Richfield Foundation	200,000
- Patrick Gerschel Foundation	200,000
- Arthur Ross Foundation	152,650
- Armand Hammer Foundation	100,000
- General Services Foundation	97,000
- W. Alton Jones Foundation	65,651
- Schmeelk Foundation	50,000
- Asia Foundation	43,875
- German Marshall Fund	37,000
- Xerox Foundation	35,000
- Guide Foundation	35,000
- Smith-Richardson Foundation	30,000
- Sloan Foundation	26,000
- Shell Companies Foundation	25,000
- Kettering Foundation	25,000
- H & E Kaufman Foundation	25,000
- Dover Foundation	25,000
- GTE Foundation	23,000
- AT&T Foundation	21,000
- W.P. Laughlin Trust	20,000
- Harriman Foundation	17,500
- Salomon Foundation	15,000
- Shaw-North Foundation	13,500
- New York Times Foundation	13,000
- Ed Lamb Foundation	12,000
- Ford Motor Co.	10,000
- Mobil Foundation	10,000
- May Store Foundation	10,000
- Weyerhaeuser Foundation	10,000
- UPS Foundation	10,000
- Allied Corp. Foundation	8,500
- Ploughshares Fund	8,000
- American Exp. Foundation	7,500
- Klutznick Foundation	6,000
- Gund Fund	6,000
- Pillsbury Co. Foundation	5,000
- McAshen Trust	5,000
- Archer Daniels Foundation	5,000
- Dailey Family Foundation	5,000



- McGraw Hill Foundation	3,000
- Leo Nevas Family Foundation	2,500
- TRW Foundation	2,500
- Motorola Foundation	2,000
- The Ganlee Fund	1,500
- International Paper Company Foundation	1,000
- NH Char. Trust	1,000
- Hickrill Foundation	1,000
- FM Kirby Foundation	1,000
- Miller Foundation	1,000
- Joselow Foundation	1,000
- Piesces Foundation	1,000



Synopsis of Grants from the Ford Foundation to the UNA, 1966-1989

UNA resulted from the merger in 1964 of the American Association for the United Nations and the United States Committee for the United Nations. The first Foundation grant to UNA was on March 18, 1966 with the provision of \$450,000 over a three-year period for "development and project support" of the emergent UNA. To date, a total of \$3,383,654 through 26 grants has been provided.

<u>Date &amp; #</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Program Officer</u>	<u>Grant #</u>
March '66	450,000	N/A	#66-128
Development and Project support, to increase effectiveness of the new Association's programs, operations, and staff.			
May '68;	400,000	Howard R. Swearer	#66-128A
Development and project support supplement.			
July '69	3,000	W. B. Bader	#69-600
Funding for the first International Model Security Council program for college students from 21 countries.			
Oct. '69	85,000	H.R. Swearer	#70-0073
Funding to undertake a program of parallel studies between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, in cooperation with the UNA-USSR. Topics to include nuclear weapons and arms proliferation, and global environmental concerns.			
Jan. '71	300,000	F.X. Sutton	#71-123
Continued funding for the UNA policy studies program, which strives to develop American thinking on major questions of U.S. foreign policy and the United Nations.			
Oct. '72	175,000	Arthur Cyr	#71-123A
Continued funding of the Policy Studies Program, Supplement 1.			
Aug. '75	16,000	Felice D. Gaer	#75-592
Grant to provide assistance for the research, writing, editing and publishing of <u>Issues Before the 30th General Assembly of the UN</u> , discussing the topics on the agenda of the upcoming special and regular sessions of the Assembly.			
Apr. '77	34,000	Bruce Bushey	#770-0337
Partial support for a policy study panel on international disaster relief operations to review their methods and effectiveness.			
May '77	11,000	F D. Gaer	#775-0422
Partial support of planning phase for a Soviet-American dialogue on economic and arms control problems, to expand upon issues for discussion between Americans and Soviets.			
Jan. '78	50,000	F.D. Gaer	#78-205
Supplement for above.			



Sept. '80	90,000	F.D. Gaer	#78-205A
Supplement for above.			
Dec. '78	100,000	F.X. Sutton/E.C.B. Schoettle	#790-0132
Matching fund (of McDonnell Douglas Corp) to provide long-term capital funding for the Association.			
Sept. '81	25,000	E.C.B. Schoettle	#81-0889
Partial support for a conference series and papers on U.S. participation in multilateral arms control efforts.			
June '83	120,000	Gary G. Sick	#830-0572
Continued partial support for the program of bilateral U.S.-Soviet exchanges, which brings together private American experts with Soviet officials and researchers on a range of topics.			
Aug. '84	150,000	G.Sick	#830-0572A
Supplement to above.			
Feb. '87	150,000	G. Sick	#830-0572B
Supplement to above.			
Dec. '87	300,000	K. Vosskühler/S.J. Heginbotham	#830-0572C
Supplement to above.			
Feb. '84	18,000	Amy S. Vance/T.O. Bayard	#845-0295
Support for an Economic Policy Council panel review of the treatment of work and family life issues in the United States and Europe.			
Apr. '84	32,829	Paul Balaran	#845-0392
Support for a conference jointly sponsored by UNA and the Brookings Institutions on "The United Nations in World Affairs: Options for the United States." Participants to include representatives of the UN, Congress, Administration, foreign policy community and media.			
Feb. '85	49,400	Paul Balaran	#855-0329
A planning grant to enable the UNA to conduct a preparatory study for a project on management and decision-making at the United Nations.			
Aug. '85	10,000	T.O. Bayard	#855-0858
Support for a project on "U.S. Policy Toward the Newly Emerging Industrial Countries" which would address the perspectives of the developing countries and the United States on these trade conflicts and impacts.			
Oct. '85	389,900	P. Balaran/ E.C.B. Schoettle	#860-0030
Grant to enable UNA/Multilateral Studies to undertake a study of management and decision-making at the United Nations. The study would consider issues relating to the missions, purposes and priorities of the UN and issues concerning its performance in fulfilling these tasks.			

Oct. '87            298,625            Balaran/Schoettle            #860-0030A  
 Support for a program on "United States Priorities for a More Effective United Nations," an educational program on U.S. policy toward the UN that would promote interest in and discussion about the UN and relationship with the United States. Program would build upon the report and recommendations of the management and decision-making study.

Mar. '86            25,900            Balaran/Schoettle            #865-0320  
 Partial support for a conference in the Federal Republic of Germany on "Making the UN Work: Initiatives for the Industrial Democracies." Representatives from North America, Western Europe and Japan are to discuss ways of coordinating policies for strengthening the United Nations.

July '88            50,000            Paul Balaran            #885-0838  
 Partial support for a re-examination of the mission of UNESCO. The study would be conducted by an international panel of scientists, educators and academics from around the world, who would consider UNESCO's mandate, structure, and finances and U.S. policy options toward the organization.

Mar. '89            50,000            K. Vosskuhler            #895-0373  
 This grant would provide partial support for preparatory and follow-up costs for a National Conference on the United States and the UN convened by the Council of Washington Representatives in Washington, D.C.

Total 1966-1989    \$3,383,654





### III. How Its Various Constituencies View the UNA

The decision by the UNA in the 1960s to serve many masters makes the task of assessing its overall impact today rather complex. We identified seven constituencies that UNA currently attempts to serve in various ways: business and professional elites; the public and the chapters; the media; universities, colleges and schools; the policy research community; the U.S. government; and the UN and its diplomatic community. In the conduct of this review, we contacted several persons in each constituency. In addition, we consulted the Foundation's grant files which record earlier contacts of various kinds. Although our sampling techniques were not rigorous, we are moderately confident that we have been able to gain a fair understanding of the appreciation felt for UNA and its work in the middle to late 1980s.

#### 1. Business and Professional Elites

UNA was created on the model of the CED, the post-war institution that perhaps more than any other served the northeastern community of business and professional leaders with common-sensical reports on issues of national consequence, drawing on distinguished social scientists using accepted social science techniques to prepare the reports. The CED is credited with helping to build an elite consensus behind Keynesian macroeconomics and global free trade and free investment. The committee was thought to have distilled a consensus Keynesianism that appealed to all "right-thinking" citizens.

It was hoped that UNA would develop a similar consensus behind multilateralism, constraints on the use of force, and acceptance of the rule

of international law. To this end presumably, Cyrus Vance, Elliott Richardson, McGeorge Bundy, Orville Freeman and other American leaders over the years have given their time and their names generously to the policy panels program.

A one-time officer of both UNA and a major firm explained to us that he was convinced that multilateralism was one important way to pursue American interests abroad and that is why he volunteered his time to UNA. He believed that the Reagan administration had unfairly prejudiced the public mind against such institutions as the regional development banks and that the UNA was able to act as a counterweight. He was especially supportive of the chapters, not because he himself or anyone he knew took part in them, but because they gave UNA extra clout in the Washington colloquy. He compared UNA's role among the defenders of multilateralism to that of a development agency providing technical assistance to get a job done.

As the years have gone by, however, a good many elite leaders have found the development of a consensus behind multilateralism less promising and less palatable. They have undoubtedly shared the doubts felt in other parts of American society that multilateralism would in fact bring security, justice and/or respect. Viet Nam, OPEC, the Iranian revolution and America's declining global economic position all seemed to point toward unilateralism, bilateralism or like-minded groupings as more promising courses. Perhaps sensing the sand shifting beneath its feet, the UNA in the 1970s moved toward two alternative programs to replace the CED-style policy panels in service to the business and professional elites: an Economic Policy Council, and bilateral parallel panels, most prominently with the Soviet Union.

The few appraisals we heard of the Economic Policy Council (EPC) suggest that it does a modestly useful job in pointing out to the U.S. business



community the potential gains from multilateral trade and investment, and especially economic relations with the Third World. However, the EPC has never pursued a consistent path of emphasizing multilateralism in its work. The subjects addressed over time include: illegal immigration to the United States; U.S.-Mexican economic relations; and work and family issues in the United States and Europe -- all topics addressed in other policy forums. We heard from some that other organizations -- such as the Business Council for the UN (BCUN) and the Overseas Development Council (ODC) -- are more effective at the same tasks. As one interviewee opined: "ODC comes from the head, the UNA from the heart." At the same time, EPC does not attract the highest level of business leadership, and we did not get the sense that it has a major impact on the topics it addresses.

A corporate executive and former UNA board member acknowledged that the Council often acted independently of the rest of UNA. Often, in the past, it had not even indicated in its announcements and reports that it was a part of UNA. He has to a certain extent been able to bring its work into line with the themes of the organization. When asked whether EPC has some comparative advantage in the international economics field, he responded that EPC "paid for itself."

He said that UNA had not developed a substantial following in the business community, with the result that its finances are always on a weak footing. In contrast, BCUN has forged effective ties with corporations through its programs of dinner meetings for corporate executives with United Nations officials and diplomats. To remedy this deficiency in UNA, he and the Board have decided to open discussions with BCUN on a possible merger of the two organizations. According to him, the union would combine UNA's strength in dealing with the substantive issues and BCUN's legitimacy in the eyes of corporate America.

The parallel panels with the Soviets and the later additions of dialogues with the Chinese and the Japanese, on the other hand, have struck a deeply responsive chord with the business and professional elites. The enthusiasts are of two types. Those who have served in government at senior levels (e.g. Brent Scowcroft, John Tower, Cyrus Vance, Elliot Richardson) seem to enjoy a period on the panels because they feel if not back in harness, at least under light rein. The parallel panels are conducted quite close to the U.S. government, with official briefings before and after. The Soviets have appointed high level delegations, and the former governmental officials on the U.S. side really feel they are making a difference in the final policy resolutions. Those on the panels without U.S. governmental experience have felt exhilaration -- even intoxication -- from the experience, especially as the agenda moved in the 1970s from subjects like UN management and the environment to arms control and international economics. For an American businessman to find himself in Moscow in the company of former Cabinet members discussing world peace with the potential enemy is a heady experience indeed, and one to be treasured. We heard nothing but praise from those involved.

UNA Board and staff point with pride to the evolution of the parallel studies program with the Soviet Union. Now, when the Soviet leadership has adopted a new approach to the United Nations and multilateral institutions in general, it is only UNA that convenes annual meetings with Soviets explicitly on policies toward these organizations. Moreover, a UNA staff person stressed that had it not been for UNA's bilateral discussions on arms control and other topics over the years, UNA could never have attracted individuals such as Scowcroft to issues of multilateralism. It was through UNA that they came to participate in discussions of the United Nations with their Soviet counterparts.

At the same time, Board and staff admitted that UNA's parallel programs with the Chinese and Japanese have been overwhelmingly bilateral in subject



matter. The former Board member explained that the Japan program was an important investment for the future. When Japan becomes ready to focus on multilateral issues, as it clearly will in the not too distant future, UNA will have built up the contacts and experience to be the appropriate U.S. interlocutor. Furthermore, the Japan program pays for itself. He ruled out the idea that UNA aspires to be a significant actor in the crowded world of bilateral U.S.-Japan dialogues. With regard to the China program, he saw it as remaining a minor strand in UNA's work, but said that it did allow UNA to convene a possible quadrilateral meeting of Chinese, Japanese, Soviet and U.S. representatives in early 1990.

More generally, the business elite supporters of UNA dismissed the criticisms customarily lodged against the Association. They claim it is an effective, albeit friendly, critic of the UN. They think the chapters do give it extra clout in Washington and therefore see them to be justified, although not an end in themselves. The only dangers they perceive are that the chapters may be too much of a financial drain and threaten sometimes to give the UNA the aura of the World Federalists. The elite members see Ed Luck as just the right kind of leader: self-effacing, yet effective. One businessman spoke to us eloquently about the "failures of imagination" in U.S. foreign policy and the "crisis of leadership." He saw the UNA as just the right kind of base from which these problems could be addressed in the private sector.

## 2. The Public and The Chapters

Support for the chapters in the form of publications, speakers, information and advice has always been an important function of the New York headquarters of UNA, although such support has waned in recent years. We spoke with a small sample of chapter executives, which was perhaps biased because they are on the national board.

We gathered that the services provided today are limited in number. All members receive the Interdependent and are encouraged to attend such symbolic

events as UN Day. To the extent that chapters have speaker programs, they seem to depend mainly on local resources. The chapters now use the Great Decisions series of the Foreign Policy Association in their meetings, whereas in earlier years, UNA Headquarters used to provide its own materials. The recently introduced Multilateral Project has been welcomed by the chapters as a successful innovation, since UNA prepares detailed background materials for the participating chapters and produces a final report incorporating the views of the chapters on the subject in question.

In 1987, UNA launched a model program designed to revitalize some targeted chapters and attract new members. If successful, the program would be expanded to other local chapters.

The chapter leaders with whom we talked all value their links with New York, and the national convention held twice every five years, in particular. However there does not seem in any case to be an extended or intense exchange between the center and the periphery. A Board member of UNA criticized the senior staff of UNA for their lack of interest in the chapters. He said that the chapters are still "second class citizens" of UNA. He complained that there is no feedback to the chapters from the parallel studies programs or any of the other policy-related activities carried out by UNA Headquarters staff, except for the multilateral project.

One of the major decisions taken by the UNA Board in 1988 was to stop subsidizing the chapters, which had become a drain on the organization's finances. The Board approved a new fee structure and a new financial relationship between New York and the chapters. As a result, in 1989 it will now cost UNA in New York only \$20,000 a year as opposed to \$200,000 in 1988 to service the chapters. The chapters, which will now be forced to bring in more money for themselves, in the main, have evidently accepted the changes.



Peggy Carlin, as executive vice president responsible for service to the chapters, had displayed an unmistakable personal commitment to the chapters and had spent innumerable hours visiting them all over the United States. With her retirement in 1989, along with the Board decision to discontinue subsidies, it seems likely that services to the chapters will decline even more.

The attitude of Board members to the chapters was mixed. Some saw the chapters as an integral component of UNA that give the organization important legitimacy in Washington. At the same time, it was common to hear about the aging population of UNA's membership and the pressing need to reinvigorate the chapters. All agreed that strengthening the membership would be a long process. Some Board members said that if UNA were to be established today, they would recommend against creating a network of chapters.

### 3. The Media

The UNA depends heavily on the media to accomplish one of its main objectives, which is to improve the image of the UN in the U.S. government and among the American citizenry at large. The press seems to depend heavily upon UNA both for "the facts" about what is happening in UN institutions (reflecting mistrust of the UN's own information services) and for editorial writing on the subject. Luck is active in assisting newspapers and other media in developing positions on U.S. policy toward the United Nations. As the clipping files put together by UNA's staff attest, Luck has left his imprint on the debate concerning U.S. funding of the United Nations. In addition, he has appeared with increasing regularity on C-Span and public radio. Current data and reporting about the course of events contained in the Washington Weekly Report is helpful to reporters, as well as to friendly

congressmen, and is much appreciated. We heard grateful testimony about the ready availability of Luck and Dimoff for supplementary comment as well.

Luck has noted that UNA needs to improve its use of the media. In 1988, Patrick Gerschell, a member of the UNA Board of Directors, made a special grant to strengthen UNA's public relations and media work.

One interesting insight into UNA was offered by a former newspaper correspondent at the United Nations who observed that it was difficult to describe UNA in newspaper articles because it performs so many roles. As a result, the public does not have a clear grasp of the organization.

#### 4. Universities, Colleges and Schools

UNA penetrates universities, colleges and schools somewhat, but, in our view, misses several important opportunities. It has provided, from time to time, materials and services such as an annual guide and a quarterly newsletter to encourage student involvement in support of the Model UN programs of colleges and schools. Several of the organizations it absorbed in 1964 were concerned principally with the Model UN. However, since the 1960s, this function has been reduced.

One rather small additional link to the academic community has been to a few faculty members who retain a strong personal interest in and commitment to the UN and see the UNA as their advocate. Sometimes these are former UN staff or U.S. diplomats turned academics. In small communities, these academics are often members of UNA chapters, while in New York, Boston, and Washington they are part of the community that surrounds the UNA itself. We interviewed several academics, one of whom has only the highest praise for the Association, emphasizing in particular its role in providing information to Congress and conducting supplementary diplomacy with the Soviets. Others saw the UNA mainly as a vehicle for "vulgarization" and regrets its virtual absence from the serious academic community.



In 1987, a new organization called the Academic Council for United Nations Studies (ACUNS) was established, with Ford Foundation support. Its goals are to promote more effective teaching and broad public understanding of international organizations; to encourage greater scholarly attention to the subject and closer ties between academics and policymakers; and to facilitate access by researchers to the archives of international organizations. It is significant that UNA has no regularized links even with these academics, who are also likely to be enthusiasts, or at least moderate partisans, of the UN. One academic compared UNA to the Atlantic Council, respectable and responsible but so committed to a point of view that it could not be a major point of scholarly involvement.

The lack of communication between UNA and those in the academic world who are concerned with UN and multilateral issues was severely criticized by one leading academic specialist on the UN. He regularly lectures around the country on the United Nations and international institutions, and UNA local chapter members are often in the audience. Yet, UNA Headquarters has never contacted him and he said that he does not even know how one becomes a member or participates in the activities of the organization. When Foundation staff mentioned the most recent UNA project on the United Nations - a study of the potential for reform of UNESCO -- he said that it would have been helpful for him to know of this work since he and several colleagues had contemplated launching a collaborative research effort on UNESCO. Their plans were never realized but he felt that their efforts and those of the UNA could have complemented one another.

He had high praise for two UNA publications - Issues Before the nth General Assembly and the Washington Newsletter. He finds Issues Before the nth General Assembly a useful text for his courses on international organizations. His principal complaint, however, was that UNA does not



aggressively promote the book among faculty members in international relations departments and law schools around the country. He also felt that the newsletter was an excellent introduction to the U.S. policy-making process and believed it should be publicized in universities as a topical adjunct to courses on U.S. foreign policy. In this connection, he recommended that UNA look to the growing body of students taking courses in multilateralism as an important source of new members. UNA should, he argued, actively pursue this constituency and take upon itself the task of assisting it by offering such services as a clearinghouse for information on internships and employment possibilities with international organizations.

In sum, his view was that UNA had potential for services to the academic community but was not seizing even the opportunities that currently exist. He believed UNA could perform valuable services to the academic community by legitimizing the subjects on which the small cadre of academics specializing in multilateralism work and by broadening the academic constituency for these issues. But, he stressed, this would require a genuine desire on UNA's part to collaborate and communicate with the academic community: a desire he has never sensed.

In its research and analyses, moreover, UNA does not address the kinds of theoretical and interpretive questions that interest academics and their advanced students. Nor does it have on the staff or among its usual advisors well-respected, modern social scientists likely to make an impact on an academic audience. It was striking to hear one academic admirer of UNA speak disparagingly of such modern social scientists -- for example the "political economists" in political science who depend heavily on social choice and game theory -- as persons not likely to benefit from UNA nor likely to make any useful contribution to the policy discussions in which UNA takes part.



## 5. Policy Research Community

With regard to the policy research institutions in Washington and elsewhere, UNA does not loom large, principally because the UNA does not operate a research program in any real sense. It does not see itself as in any way analogous to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace or to the Brookings Institution, and the feeling is reciprocated.

The one Washington policy research center that engages in debate with UNA is the Heritage Foundation. We interviewed one senior analyst at Heritage whose view of UNA can perhaps be best described as mild contempt. The analyst reported that when Heritage first decided to examine UN affairs, he received little cooperation from UNA. The attitude was, if you are going to be a critic we will not play. He concluded that UNA really did not have the facts and was unwilling to struggle with truly hard questions. Heritage, he says, has never recommended that the U.S. leave the UN, nor even leave UNESCO, but when they even began to discuss a "world without the UN" as a policy exercise, the UNA staff member stopped coming to their meetings. The Heritage analyst acknowledges that Heritage takes a provocative position on the UN, produces material quickly, sometimes makes mistakes, and aims above all at the current policy agenda. Therefore it is only natural that Heritage will face bitter critiques, refutations, and discovery of error. He says many of the critiques of Heritage have been very well done: he spoke admiringly of pieces by Christopher Hitchens in The Nation. But he dismissed UNA as an adversary. He claimed that UNA's responses had been "sophomoric" and full of mistakes; their tone was hysterical and unprofessional; and they misrepresented the Heritage position and thus they could not be taken seriously. Indeed, he claimed the UNA counterattack backfired and strengthened the Heritage position in Congress and the media.

The Heritage Foundation analyst argued that UNA was mainly a lobby in Congress for the Third World position in the UN, in contrast to Heritage,

which was trying to sort out where the long-run U.S. interests lay in policy toward the UN and insisted on looking at all options. He challenged UNA to join Heritage in pointing out that there are serious administrative weaknesses in the UN. In his view, the Management and Decision-Making Project was only a defensive response to Heritage's pressure on a sensitive nerve. Like several senior officials concerned with UN affairs in the Reagan Administration, this analyst believes that constructive criticism should be the UNA's role and indeed would have to be if it were ever to be accepted again as a legitimate intellectual player in the U.S. policy research community.

It is perhaps worth commenting on the seeming anomaly that UNA receives high marks for accuracy and integrity from Executive Branch personnel, Congressional staff and the media while receiving such condemnation for carelessness and superficiality from the Heritage staff. The explanation seems to be that the kind of fact-finding for which UNA is justly applauded concerns such matters as the current state of the funding crisis, when UN-related issues will come to a vote in committee, and other very short-run items on the Washington scene. These are often matters on which UNA can use its often excellent contacts in official circles. The areas in which UNA is charged with ignorance by Heritage more often relate to operational issues, such as the effectiveness of the specialized agencies and modes of financing peace-keeping, that frequently require investigative research of the kind often resisted by some of the official circles that UNA cultivates. UNA also does not engage in wide-ranging analyses of how U.S. interests are and can be served in multilateral institutions.

#### 6. The U.S. Government

Those in government, whether in Congress or the Executive, tend to divide over the value of UNA according to their views of the UN itself. Most advocates of the UN see UNA as doing God's work, performing tasks that



reinforce their activities but that they dare not attempt themselves because of political or bureaucratic restrictions. Others see UNA as, at a minimum, an early warning alert system and intelligence unit that provides friends with reliable data and advice on how to respond to UN-bashers. One senatorial aide said that his senator was largely sympathetic to the United Nations, but the aide didn't have the time or expertise to prepare material in its defense for his boss. He relied heavily on UNA's Washington representative Steve Dimhoff to remain current on UN issues and made extensive use of the weekly Newsletter. Furthermore, the member took his cue from the advice such distinguished statesmen as Elliot Richardson and Cyrus Vance provided.

Another observer in government said that both Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Walters were really "closet UNophiles" and it was only the efforts of UNA, particularly through the Congressional testimony of Elliot Richardson, that enabled them to do what they thought was right in the hostile environment of the Reagan administration. The general picture painted by UN supporters is that the 1970s and most of the 1980s were the worst of times for the UN. In the 1970s, the American people simply switched off and you could not get anyone to pay attention to any discussion of multilateralism. During that period, the UNA fought a losing battle with public apathy or antipathy. Then in the 1980s, the UN had to cope with full-scale -- and to their minds -- unfair attacks from Senator Jesse Helms, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and the Heritage Foundation. The UNA found itself outgunned but fighting valiantly all the same. Finally, by 1988 the time had come for UNA to go on the offensive for the first time in twenty years. East-West tensions were lessening, opportunities for UN mediation and peacekeeping were breaking out in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, Angola, Namibia and elsewhere. Indeed, in recognition of what has become a reinvigorated United Nations, President Reagan requested again full payment of America's assessment.



The UN advocates in government regret that Heritage was able to set the terms of the debate over the past difficult decade and urge that UNA somehow regain the initiative. Unlike members of the business elite, these supporters in government call for a return to the initial conception of consensus-building CED-type panel reports. They have less interest in the parallel panels and indeed urge that bilateral matters be avoided by UNA, on the grounds that they fall outside UNA's mandate and are well done by others. They wish to see UNA try to reach agreed positions in such areas as "Financial Issues relating to the UN" and "Peace Making and Peacekeeping."

For example, one senior official in the Reagan Administration was generally well disposed to UNA but saw the need for basic change in the organization's approach. He said that although there are those in government who are critical or dismissive of UNA because of its stance on the budget issue, he thought that UNA served a useful purpose. Since the United Nations is not a major concern of most Americans, it needs an organization that engages in outreach activities in this country. He said that some of UNA's output is very thoughtful and cited the 1987 final report on the Management and Decision-Making Project as a good example. He noted that the project provided important input to the discussions in Washington on the United Nations' financial and structural problems.

One criticism he had of UNA was that, even when the United Nations occasionally does what he called "disreputable things," UNA still oversells the world body and acts as a cheerleader. He claimed that UNA thus loses credibility and is viewed as a lobbying organization. UNA would have greater credibility and be more effective if it acknowledged that the United Nations has flaws. He said that UNA could perform a valuable service by helping people from local communities meet and discuss their views on the United Nations with their Senators and Representatives. For example, he recommended



that UNA arrange for a delegation of people from Wisconsin to have a policy dialogue with their Senator, Bob Kasten, an extreme critic of the United Nations.

He strongly urged that UNA become a forum for the examination of important policy issues in relation to which the UN could play a constructive role, such as the environment and drugs, and give practitioners and academics the opportunity to analyze them jointly and present general principles and guidelines for UN actions. Finally, he said that UNA would be more effective if it emphasized how U.S. interests are served through the work of the UN and other multilateral organizations.

A UN supporter at the State Department argued for a new role for UNA. It should have as its primary mission the analysis of mid-term issues that will confront the United Nations. Nobody is looking seriously at multilateralism in the 1990s, and UNA could become the source of new thinking in this area.

A high ranking career Foreign Service officer at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations thought the UNA's posture toward the UN should be roughly that of the Japan Society toward Japan -- dignified boosterism, sympathetic interpretation, and, occasionally, a modest question or two in the event of transgression. He also suggested that UNA concentrate its energies on the United Nations and multilateralism and avoid involvement in other issues. Another supporter suggested the UNA was like the "shock troops" of the UN--it was just a shame that there were so few of them.

The role of the UNA as committed advocate, even lobby, was most intensely appreciated on Capitol Hill. One staff member reported that UNA was consistently more effective with his committee than the State Department's own Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Another committee staffer said he had always thought the UNA was an adjunct of the UN! Friendly critics of

UNA's role on the Hill complained that the Association did not seem to be able to get out of a defensive mode. UNA provided accurate corrective data but unlike Heritage, they couldn't throw around big ideas. Two longtime committee staffers said they remembered when UNA was a source of fresh ideas and more active; now they feel it is just a low profile lobby.

One of the staffers attributed UNA's problems not only to the decline of the UN but also to the greying of the membership. He told about going to the Capital area chapter meetings and thinking he had wandered into an old folks home. He thought the Association was caught in a real dilemma: its strong point of view excluded new members, especially younger ones, but if it attempted to broaden its appeal it might lose its *raison d'être*. Moreover, the UNA's symbols appeared outdated and their main leaders and supporters were all retired from public life.

Several Congressional staff suggested that the "UN" in the title of UNA destined it to remain an anachronism. The case for global cooperation had never been stronger, with crises facing the planet in arms control, AIDS, climate change, financial debt, and a host of other problems. But being compelled to think about such multilateral issues exclusively within a UN context was unacceptably confining for most legislators. The ideal condition should be for the UN itself to tell its own story in Washington and leave the UNA (with a different name) to more detached appraisal of multilateral issues.

One former political appointee in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations during the Reagan administration gave his account of the history of UNA and its travails. He described, on the one hand, a postwar American intellectual community fearful that the U.S. would return to isolationism. On the other hand, the UN came into being in the last days of Western imperial power. During the early years neither the Third World nor the Socialist countries had



much real influence at the UN and it was a "playground of the Western alliance." But after this period the UN quickly became an anachronism. Moreover, the decolonization process and the entry of the newly independent states into the UN reduced the U.S. influence there. The rhetoric of the General Assembly was simply a manifestation of the flailing about that went on in the multilateral community. The problem with the UNA was that it (or rather its predecessors) were created to boost knee jerk multilateralism, and when this no longer made any sense, UNA kept right on in this obsolete style. UNA has thus never caught up with the evolution of U.S. foreign policy and the world, and finding a new role for it will be hard.

The same former official thinks that the academic world has been completely derelict and has "failed miserably" in giving guidance both to the UN and to the US about the UN. When he went to the US Mission he combed the literature and found anecdotal accounts that gave some flavor of the institution, but no more. The big question today is how the UN should adapt to its changed environment. This is the question UNA should be addressing. Instead, it takes merely a repetitive, defensive posture. The Management and Decision-Making Project, he thinks, was undertaken defensively and only in response to charges from Heritage. In his opinion, coincidentally, the management report was very poorly done and UNA lost a major opportunity to make a contribution there.

In his view, UNA should get out front for a change. What the UN needs today, he argues, is neither a closed-minded booster (UNA) nor a closed-minded critic (Heritage). The UN does not need a cheerleader or tender loving care, anymore than it needs bitter partisan critics. Rather, it needs an open-minded and constructive adviser. The big middle ground is empty and should be filled by unbiased observers. He thinks few people really

understand the UN, either inside or outside the organization. He found it a political backwater, closest in form to a U.S. State legislature. The few who study it treat it too reverently. The Soviets have a much more sophisticated understanding of the UN than do American observers, in his view.

As a ranking official, he said he would like to have been able to use the UNA as the reflection of American opinion. Instead it was simply a "narrow cadre of people who had fallen into support for the UN and thought it was still 1945." He thought it possible perhaps to reform the UNA and make it useful, but also thought it would not be easy. It would require the development of a skeptical turn of mind and enlistment of those few Americans with real personal knowledge of the organization and sympathy for it who are unwilling just to lead the cheers. "Multilateral diplomacy and international organizations" should be the focus of UNA's attention, with the "United Nations" only a subheading.

#### 7. The UN and Its Diplomatic Community

We talked with several high-ranking UN officials, both U.S. citizens and others, and found them universally ecstatic about UNA and all its works, such as its publications, conferences, and general promotion of multilateralism. For them, the recent years have been taken up largely with the funding crisis and they find that the UNA has been their most effective ally in Washington. They complain (privately, of course) about the hopeless incompetence of the UN's own 800 person, \$80 million per year Department of Public Information (shades of the Heritage Foundation critique!) and say they must depend on a few effective organizers like Luck and Dimoff to mobilize friends in Washington.



#### IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

Foundation staff believe that a changing international environment is opening up major new opportunities for UNA. The organization retains, moreover, many sources of strength, especially in the quality and dedication of its Directors, Governors, and many of its professional staff. Some of the modes of operation that have evolved in order to sustain UNA during many fallow years for the United Nations and multilateralism in U.S. policy circles, however, seem less well adapted to current realities and opportunities. We would note two, especially, that merit serious review.

First is the widespread perception that UNA is primarily an advocacy group for the United Nations in the U.S. public policy arena. Though UNA staff often argue that they provide objective materials and an open forum for discussion of UN issues, the unmistakable impression of many who view UNA from the outside is that, though highly respectable as an institution, UNA is also highly predictable and uncritical as an advocate for the UN and its agencies.

Second is the undertaking of programs that have little or nothing to do with the United Nations or multilateralism. Though sometimes of excellent quality and supportive of unexceptionable goals for U.S. foreign policy, these efforts are not only costly in terms of staff time and financial resources, but also dilute and blur the public image of UNA as an institution.

In contrast to these modes of operation, Foundation staff would suggest that UNA consider adopting two major objectives that might be used to assess and guide its current and future program activities:

1. That UNA should work to keep policy issues involving the United Nations and multilateralism on the active agenda of the U.S.



polymaking community, providing analytic materials that present policy alternatives and promoting education, discussion and debate among a wide range of foreign policy analysts and decision makers.

2. That UNA should work to raise the awareness of the US public about the importance of the UN and other multilateral organizations, and to promote greater knowledge and sophistication about issues of U.S. policy toward international organizations.

It may be helpful to evaluate services provided to the seven constituencies identified in section IV in the light of these two objectives and to describe the modes of operation that would follow from these principles.

1. Business and Professional Elites

The bilateral programs with the USSR and Japan have grown significantly in recent years in terms of their scope of activities and a China program was added in 1984. All these programs have only a tangential relationship to UNA's central concern with multilateralism. Only one program, the USSR-U.S. parallel studies program, has a component -- newly-initiated in 1988 -- that is explicitly concerned with multilateralism and the UN.

Although these programs are remote from the central mission of the organization, UNA's senior officers devote a great deal of time, effort and travel to them. Thus, even when grants cover all the expenses, the bilateral programs are a significant drain on UNA's managerial talent.

The Economic Policy Council has also sponsored many projects that are unrelated to multilateralism. With its highly diffuse program, EPC also seems to detract from UNA's image and distort the organization's own sense of purpose and direction. Other organizations are engaged in the same lines of work as the parallel studies programs and EPC, often with comparative advantages over UNA deriving from their specialized expertise on a particular policy topic or region. For example, numerous organizations involved in



ongoing policy dialogues with Japan, such as the Japan Society, have far broader contacts in Japan and much greater in-house expertise relevant to such dialogues than does UNA.

Thus, the two guiding program principles suggested above would seem to point to the phasing out of current bilateral programs that do not focus centrally on the UN or multilateralism. EPC would also be wound down and the structure disbanded, consistent with existing commitments. It would be important, however, to do everything possible, as that process takes place, to engage those who have actively participated in these programs in new UNA activities.

## 2. The Public and the Chapters

UNA is active in public education and maintains a structure of local chapters. Neither the chapters nor the small numbers of committed members who sustain them, however, seem to be effective voices on UN issues in U.S. policymaking circles. A related source of concern is that many chapters, in order to retain interest and membership, have expanded the substance of their activities to a broad range of foreign policy issues, many of them peripheral to the UN and multilateralism.

Clearly, many U.S. citizens are not very interested in multilateral issues and/or the UN. But certainly hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions, are. UNA's attempt to revitalize the local chapters and attract new members through its model chapter program is painstakingly slow and, in the meantime, a much broader community interested in multilateralism is not being served by UNA.

We would recommend that UNA adopt a three-pronged approach to public education and outreach. First, UNA should continue its chapter revitalization efforts, perhaps setting a long-term goal of having up to fifty strong chapters nation-wide in five years. It should also integrate these chapters

into its other activities particularly its work with the policy community in Washington.

Second, UNA should try to stimulate greater interest in the UN and multilateral affairs among grass roots organizations not specifically concerned with the world body but involved with subjects that fall squarely within the purview of the UN, such as the environment.

Finally, UNA should focus its public outreach and education efforts on producing and distributing balanced information and policy analysis on UN and multilateral-related issues. The Overseas Development Council (ODC) has demonstrated how this approach can be made to work. ODC reaches millions of people on the subject of U.S. relations with the developing world through short pamphlets for distribution to interested national organizations, such as the Methodist Church Women (several million strong), the AFL-CIO, and associations of chambers of commerce. ODC also uses radio and tv spots and a host of other devices that UNA could profitably emulate. The success of such outreach, of course, depends substantially on the character and quality of what is to be transmitted. Material that smacks of single issue stridency or advocacy would not travel well to the larger public. But succinct, balanced and authoritative discussions of current multilateral issues or U.S. policies toward the UN would appeal to a broad public, and would stimulate broader attention among U.S. policymakers to the multilateral agenda. The outreach would also enhance the visibility and reputation of UNA, thereby reinforcing its chapter-building activities and strengthening its other efforts and programs.

### 3. The Media

Though the UNA collects data of various kinds about the UN and U.S. policies toward it, independent media use of UNA data and materials appears limited. Journalists consult UNA for certain data, such as the amount owed by



the U.S. to the UN, and the UNA is seen as a better source for such data than the U.S. government or the UN itself. UNA is less regularly consulted on policy matters, however, because of the perception that it would present only one side of the story. The need for a resource on multilateral policy issues for the media is clearly apparent, but UNA cannot effectively play that role now because it detracts from its own credibility by the predictability of its approach.

We would suggest that UNA distance itself sufficiently from the UN to build a reputation as an institution that knowledgeably describes and analyzes that organization, and other multilateral institutions, "warts and all." It should no longer hold its annual briefings for the press at UN headquarters or convene conferences on behalf of the UN. By eliminating activities that reinforce the notion that UNA is an extension of the UN, and by displaying an openmindedness and independence of viewpoint in its policy analyses and writing, UNA could become a credible and important resource on U.S. policy toward the UN and on multilateralism more generally. It could then, with added resources, expand the services offered to the press and thereby improve the quality and quantity of U.S. press coverage of such issues. A grant recently made to UNA by one of its Board members to improve its outreach and public relations may well be helpful in this regard, and we applaud this initiative.

#### 4. Universities, Colleges and Schools

Of the various constituencies of UNA, perhaps scholars of the UN and multilateralism feel most remote from and neglected by the organization. For some, the advocacy role of UNA undermines its perceived relevance to academic inquiry; for others, UNA seems uninterested in the analytic questions and research that underlie effective teaching and writing necessary to educate new generations of students about current multilateral realities.



UNA can make a contribution to the related fields of international law and international organizations, which have seen in the past few years a resurgence of interest on the part of both political science/international relations specialists and legal scholars. Organizations such as the Institute for International Economics, (Washington, D.C.) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London), provide useful models for how UNA might serve as a valuable and influential point of contact between scholars and policymakers. Both institutions provide contexts in which the analytical approaches of the scholar are suggested in return for the practitioner's information on policy agendas and data about the real world. We think UNA should be able to perform this role for the study of multilateral issues and international institutions, particularly the UN.

We would recommend that UNA consider appointing a director of research and policy analysis with both a strong academic background and policy experience, part of whose mandate would be to maintain contact with the academic community and to arrange for the production and appropriate dissemination of written output on multilateral issues. An advisory council for research and policy studies composed of talented scholars and policymakers concerned with multilateral issues, building perhaps on the existing Advisory Council to the Multilateral Project, could usefully be named to establish priorities for inquiries, discussions and publications. It could assure quality control and contacts in the intellectual community that would be necessary to the fulfillment of the new function. Such a body would complement the existing governing boards.

Finally, we would recommend that UNA, in making future appointments to its board, consider appointing a representative of the Academic Council on the United Nations as an ex-officio member, and add senior academic figures in legal and international relations scholarship. Michael Riesmann and Henry Koh of Yale Law School, Abram Chayes of Harvard Law School and Thomas Franck of



NYU Law School are obvious candidates in the former category; as are John Ruggie of the University of California at San Diego and Robert Keohane of Harvard University in the latter.

##### 5. The Policy Research Community

UNA has played a useful role for policy-minded activists who support the UN, and especially for those who strongly oppose efforts to use partial non-payment of U.S. assessments as leverage to force procedural and budgetary changes in the UN and its agencies. UNA has assisted these persons to make presentations before the Department of State, Congress and other parts of the government. UNA staff join in the Washington representations, write op ed pieces about the UN, hold press briefings, and in other ways try to explain, justify, clarify, and often defend the UN and its performance. However, no other specialized foreign policy institute or policy research organization is analyzing major multilateral issues and the role of international institutions therein, for the broader policy community. Indeed, most of the specialized policy research organizations have avoided the multilateral field, though some now seem more open to such work, particularly on the environment.

We believe that UNA could move into this vacuum. Multilateral policy issues need to be brought forcefully to the attention of the policy community. UNA could help to do so directly through its own policy analyses and through defining a challenging research agenda on multilateral issues that would catch the attention of organizations such as Brookings, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, RAND and the Council on Foreign Relations. Over time, through independent analyses and collaborative ventures with other policy research organizations, UNA could establish itself as a leading source of influential analysis on a broad range of multilateral policy issues.

## 6. The U.S. Government

Among supporters of the UN in the Executive Branch and Congress, UNA is seen as a valuable source of current intelligence on what is happening at the United Nations, especially with respect to funding and reform issues. Its visibility and impact seem to be minimal, however, among the broader range of foreign policy officials who view the UN and its associated agencies more dispassionately. UNA could, however, play a broader role for this wider policy community. Many specialized private organizations concerned with other aspects of foreign policy provide an important service by raising the importance of "their" issues, and by providing informed analyses of policy alternatives to various parts of the U.S. government. ODC does this on development; the African-American Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies do it on Africa; Brookings does it on the Middle East, etc. No organization does it for the multilateral agenda.

This approach to working with the U.S. government would suggest that UNA expand its Washington office into a major point of contact with the Washington policy analysis community on multilateral issues. Possibly the Carnegie Endowment might provide a temporary home for such activities.

## 7. The UN and its Diplomatic Community

Because UNA performs some functions directly for the UN, the two organizations are not clearly distinguishable in the eyes of many. Indeed, even in UNA's eyes the distinction seems sometimes to be blurred. We recommend that UNA consider the need to stop performing functions for the UN that in any way compromise the perception that UNA is an independent organization with an independent approach to multilateral issues. UNA should limit itself to programs that promote attention to, information about, and debate on issues relating to the UN. UNA would have to work hard to interpret this reorientation to its many friends in the UN community and to engage them



actively in its new programs. It could valuably draw on and support those friends by facilitating their access to those who are engaged in U.S. public policy debates on multilateral issues. It could also make effective use of its excellent contacts within the UN community to assure that capable and effective voices represent the UN's interests and concerns in public debates and discussion about the UN throughout the United States.



PERSONS CONSULTED DURING EVALUATION OF UNA-USA

YARASHI AKASHI	Undersecretary-General, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.
JIM BOND	Minority leader, Senate Appropriations Committee. Professional staff member for Foreign Operations with Senator Robert Kasten.
SAMUEL BROOKFIELD	President, Business Council for the United Nations
WARREN CAIN	Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee. Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and State.
PEGGY CARLIN	Consultant, ex-Senior Vice President, UNA.
STEVEN DIMOFF	Executive Director, Washington D.C. Office, UNA.
JAMES FAIRCHILD	Minority Staff assistant, House Committee on Appropriations for Rep. Silvio Conte (R-MA).
AMBASSADOR SEYMOUR MAXWELL FINGER	Director Emeritus, Ralph Bunche Institute. Professor Emeritus of Political Science, City University of New York.
ROBERT FINLEY	Deputy Chief of Staff, House Foreign Affairs Committee for Rep. Dante Fascell (D-FL). Former Staff leader, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights/International Organizations.
THOMAS FRANCK	Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
PETER FROMUTH	Executive Director, Economic Policy Council, UNA.
MARGARET GALEY	Staff consultant, House Foreign Affairs Committee.



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TOBY T. GATI

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FRAN GOODWIN

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RUTH J. HINERFELD

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ROBERT IMMERMAN

Minister Councillor, U.S. Mission to the UN

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AMBASSADOR CHARLES LIECHTENSTEIN

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EDWARD C. LUCK

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WILLIAM R. MILLER

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JAMES P. MULDOON

Director, Model UN and Youth Programs, UNA.

AMBASSADOR HERBERT S. OKUN

U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative of the US to the UN

JAMES M. OLSON	National Field Director for national membership, UNA.
ALEX PALLACIOS	Chair, Council of Washington Representatives on the UN Washington Representative, US Committee for UNICEF.
JOHN PETTY	UNA - Treasurer, Board of Governors. Chair, High Level Review Committee of the Inter-American Development Bank. Former Chairman of Marine Midland Bank.
EVELYN M. PICKARTS	Board of Governors, UNA.
JULIANA PILON	Director, "UN Project," Heritage Foundation.
JOSEPH REED	White House Chief of Protocol. Former UN Undersecretary General for General Assembly and Political Affairs
ANDREW RICE	Senior Consultant, Council of Washington Representatives on the UN
ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON	Ex-Chairman of Association, UNA. Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadly & McCloy (Washington, D.C.).
RICHARD J. SCHMEELK	Vice-Chairman - UNA. Senior Partner, The Wyvern Partners, Inc.
ELAINE SCIOLINO	Chief of Washington Bureau, <u>New York Times</u> . Former <u>New York Times</u> correspondent at the UN
IVAN SELIN	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, former Chairman of the Board, American Management Systems. Member, Board of Directors and Governors, UNA
JOHN SHANK	Minority Professional Staff Member, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and State for Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH).



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SANDRA VOGELSGANG

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, US Department of State.

TRINA VARGO


Legislative Assistant to Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA).

JOHN WASHBURN

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Former US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations.



Footnotes

1. Recommendation for Grant Action, International Affairs, United Nations Association of the United States of America, Development and Project Support. PA 66-128.
2. Ibid., p.2.
3. Ibid., p.3.
4. Letter/memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, from Robert S. Benjamin, November 29, 1967, p.1-2. PA 66-128.
5. Ibid., p.4.
6. Ibid., pp. 5-9.
7. "Grant Request," attached to Benjamin to Bundy, November 29, 1967, pp. 12, 13, 20, 20-29, and 44-68. PA 66-128.7.  
See for example, James M. Hyde, Memorandum for Mr. Joseph E. Slater,
8. "Re: United Nations Association Proposal for 5-year Development Program and Revolving Fund -- \$3.4 million," December 8, 1967; and David Finkelstein to Mr. Slater, "UNA-USA Proposal. Draft of October 31, 1967, November 30, 1963, PA 66-128. Howard Swearer, program officer and later in charge of the International Affairs Program, worried in 1967 that its very name would constrain UNA from conducting valuable analysis "from observations on the campus, the more hard-headed and better students of international relations do not take easily to U.N.-labelled activities. This may be regrettable but it is a fact." Memorandum to F.X. Sutton from H.R. Swearer, "UNA Proposal and Jim Hyde's Appraisal," January 9, 1968. PA 66-128.
9. See Arthur Cyr to Craufurd D. Goodwin, "The Ford Foundation and the UN," May 15, 1972.
10. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "Report of Inquiry into ways the Ford Foundation can appropriately assist the United Nations' adaptation to changing needs and opportunities," August 31, 1962, pp. 46 and 47. Report #010734.
11. Ibid., p.9.
12. "Joseph Slater, Oral History Transcript," pp. 51-53.
13. Request for grant action, United Nations Association of the United States of America, Inc. \$400,000, May 10, 1968, p.4. PA 66-128A.
14. Request for grant action, United Nations Association of the United States of America, Inc. \$85,000, October 6, 1969 p.4. PA 70-0073.
15. R.G.A. PA 66-128A, p.5.
16. Request for grant action, United Nations Association of the United States of America, \$300,000, January 18, 1971, pp. 4, 9. PA 710-0123.



17. Support began with grant 750-0592, for \$16,000, discussed in request for grant action dated August 25, 1975.
18. Request for grant action, United Nations Association of United States of America, \$35,000, April 19, 1977, p. 5. PA770-0337.
19. Grant 790-0132.
20. See discussions in requests for grant action 780-0205, \$50,000 to the United Nations Association of the United States of America, January 31, 1978; 78-0205A, \$90,000, September 25, 1980; and 830-0572, \$120,000, June 23, 1983.
21. Request for grant action, United Nations Association of the United States, \$150,000, August 30, 1984, p. 3. PA 830-0572A.
22. Request for grant action, United Nations Association of the United States, \$120,000, June 23, 1983, p.6. PA 830-0572.
23. Request for grant action, United Nations Association of the United States, \$150,000, August 30, 1984, p. 9.
24. Grants 855-0329, \$49,000, and 860-0030, \$389,900.
25. Request for grant action, United Nations Association of the United States, \$298,625, October 8, 1987, p. 2. PA 86-30A.
26. Grants 845-0392, \$32,829; 845-0295, \$18,000; 855-0858, \$10,000; and 865-0320, \$25,900.