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Arab boycott, 1962-1978.

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CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022
PLaza 2-1616
Cable Address: COJOGRA

January 19, 1970

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS:

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

AMERICAN TRADE UNION
COUNCIL for HISTADRUT

AMERICAN ZIONIST COUNCIL

B'NAI B'RITH

CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF
AMERICAN RABBIS

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS
and WELFARE FUNDS (observer)

HADASSAH

JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL—
AMERICAN SECTION

JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE

JEWISH WAR VETERANS
OF THE U.S.A.

LABOR ZIONIST MOVEMENT—
Poale Zion, Farband, Pioneer Women

MIZRACHI-HAPOEL HAMIZRACHI

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
JEWISH WOMEN

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
YOUNG ISRAEL

NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY
RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL

NATIONAL JEWISH WELFARE BOARD

NORTH AMERICAN JEWISH
YOUTH COUNCIL

THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY

RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA

UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW
CONGREGATIONS

UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH
CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA

UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF AMERICA

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA


Dear Colleague:

As you know there will be a National Emergency Conference on Peace in the Middle East to be held in Washington on January 25/26.

In order to plan the seating arrangements for the dias I am requesting the name of your president or representative who will sit on the dias representing your organization.

I am asking you to please contact me or my secretary immediately in order that the proper arrangements be made.

Sincerely,


Aytm Stromberg
Co-Ordinator

1-18-6
MNE 1/19

MEMORANDUM

Date March 16, 1970
(dictated March 12)

From Julian Feldman

To Rabbi Schindler

Copy for information of Al Vorspan

Subject March 6 MEETING ON THE ARAB BOYCOTT

I sat in on this hastily called meeting at your request. It was chaired by Arnold Foster. I could not identify all of the twenty-odd people there, but the few names I could identify were: Harold Stromberg - Conference of Presidents; Henry Levy; Jackie Aviat; George Gruen - American Jewish Committee; Abe Fox; Phil Baum; Sara Ann Fillar - Histradut; Abe Baer - NCRAC; H. Steinberg - American Zionist Council; and Echod Mouchli, who apparently was the Economic Attache of the Israeli Consulate.

This apparently was the first full meeting of the Committee on the Arab Boycott which has apparently met sporadically in the past because of confusion as to appropriate and feasible action - such confusion stemming not only from the American Jewish organizations but also from the Israeli government which has had an ambivalent and inconstant response to the boycott.

Mr. Mouchli reviewed the Israeli government's policy which is apparently to encourage blackmailed governments to insist on selling to both sides. The specific problem at this meeting was Japan where the policy vis-a-vis the Arab boycott has been inconsistent and where the government and the large conglomerates, such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui, have generally withstood Arab threats although there have been some difficulties on which there have been private negotiations. Apparently, George Gruen and Echod Mouchli have negotiated with Panasonic on a confidential basis with what seems to be mixed success.

The Japanese government appears to have given lip service to its devotion to freedom of trade but has disassociated itself from this problem on an official basis, claiming that it is a matter between Japanese and Arab companies involved. It is noted, however, that Japan buys oil from the Arabs, though it is currently seeking other sources.

The immediate current problem is related to EXPO 70 where Israel - for economy reasons - has no pavilion. The planned opening of the Fair was to include a parade, sponsored by a Japanese radio station, on March 15th in which 280 traffic policemen from 52 countries were to march. Israel had been invited to send four participants and was planning to do so. Nine other countries who, like Israel, had no pavilion or other representation at the Fair, were also scheduled to march in the opening parade.

Memo to Rabbi Schindler

Subject: March 6 MEETING ON THE ARAB BOYCOTT

(Austria, Spain, Hungary, Roumania, Poland, Kenya, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Ireland). Saudi Arabia gave the Japanese an ultimatum that if Israeli policemen marched they would withdraw all of their participation in the exhibit and the participation of other Arab countries. Israel turned down the Japanese suggestion that its policemen get sick on March 15 and Japan reportedly gave some consideration to completely eliminating the parade. Another possibility considered was to exclude all of the participants who do not have exhibits. (Some of this background is detailed in the enclosed wire service sheet).

Subsequently, however, Japan succumbed to the Arab pressure and sent a wire to Israel only cancelling her participation in the parade.

Mr. Mouchli brought an "unofficial" request from the Israeli government that the American Jewish organizations issue a strong statement of denunciation of this action.

The lively debate which ensued included the following points.

1. Why had Israel permitted to get itself into the situation where there was no formal presence at such an important world stage.
2. If action is taken, it cannot be a halfway action, we must go all the way and really pound away at our position of protest.
3. Regardless of the strength of our protest, is this action likely to meet with success.
4. Successful or not, is the issue here worth the kind of energy and public relations credit which would be used up.
5. If we are just getting ourselves on the record, maybe protest would be better coming from the Israeli government rather than from the American Jewish organizations.
6. Noting that the negotiations for reciprocity between Japan Airlines and El Al are currently stalled in the face of Arab pressure, and that B'nai B'rith is already putting considerable pressure on JAL through its tour department, perhaps this is an inappropriate device for putting the heat on Japan.

Memo to Rabbi Schindler

Subject: March 6 MEETING ON THE ARAB BOYCOTT

After considerable discussion it was the consensus that the blatancy and rank injustice of this situation made it undesirable to permit the incident to pass unnoticed. The Chairman was thereupon authorized to draft a protest which would put "a committee of the Conference of Presidents of major American Jewish organizations" on record as protesting in the strongest possible terms the action taken to disinvite the Israeli delegates. This was to have been released to the press Friday afternoon. However, I did not see anything about this matter in the newspapers on Saturday or any subsequent time.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of a large, stylized capital 'J' or 'I' followed by a series of loops and a final horizontal stroke.

N.P.
AMIR

LEHALAN HAMAAMAR HAMVUKASH ZEHEMSHECH LESICHATENU HATELEFONIT:

EXPO IS FAR GAME FOR MIDEAST POLITICS

TOKY, FEB 25 --

ONLY 18 DAYS BEFORE THE OPENING OF JAPAN'S EXPO '70, DEDICATED TO "PROGRESS AND HARMONY FOR MANKIND," FAIR OFFICIALS ARE FINDING OUT THE HARD WAY THAT ORIENTAL FINESSE IS NO MATCH FOR THE BROILING PASSIONS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

THE SEEMINGLY UNCONTROVERSIAL ISSUE THAT HAS SUDDENLY PLUNGED EMPARRASSED EXPO OFFICIALS INTO THEIR FIRST PROTOCOL SNAFU IS THE LONG PLANNED PARTICIPATION BY FOUR INVITED ISRAELI POLICEMEN IN THE GRAND OPENING PARADE TO BE STAGED ON MARCH 15 BY 280 TRAFFIC POLICEMEN FROM 52 COUNTRIES.

AS IT HAPPENS, HOWEVER, JAPAN IS CURRENTLY WALKING A NERVOUS TIGHTROPE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD OVER A THREATENED BOYCOTT OF JAPANESE CARS.

LAST YEAR JAPANESE AUTO EXPORTS TO SEVEN ARABLEAGUE COUNTRIES TOTALED 48 MILLION DOLLARS, AND A JAPANESE MISSION RETURNED FROM THE MIDDLE EAST YESTERDAY WITH A FRONT-PAGE WARNING THAT THE CHANCES FOR AVOIDING A BOYCOTT WERE NO BETTER THAN 50-50.

797-3311 / Monrgr-7522 / Infor-7550 / Telox-7550

NY Phone Serv:Telgr. 797-3311 / Monrgr-7522 / Infor-7550 / Telox-7550

NY Phone Serv:Telgr. 797-3311 / Monrgr-7522 / Infor-7550 / Telox-7550

797-3311 / Infor-7550 / Telox-7550

THE ARABS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN ANGERED BY A JOINT VENTURE DEAL
RECENTLY SIGNED BETWEEN JAPAN'S MISSAN MOTORS AND THE FORD
MOTOR CO., UNDER ATTACK FOR OPERATING AN ASSEMBLY PLANT IN ISRAEL.

WHEN SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TAKING PART IN THE
POLICE PARADE FOUND OUT RECENTLY THAT ISRAEL HAD BEEN INCLUDED,
TOO, THE DIPLOMATIC WIRES BEGAN BUZZING.

THE JAPANESE POLITELY SUGGESTED THAT THE TEL AVIV FOURSOME MIGHT
LIKE TO GET SICK ON THE INAUGURAL MORNING, BUT TEL AVIV STOLIDLY
RESPONDED THAT AN INVITATION IS AN INVITATION.

AT LATEST REPORTS, THE SUGGESTIONS WERE GETTING MORE INSISTENT,
AND EXPO OFFICIALS WERE PRIVATELY POINTING OUT TO THOSE INTERESTED
THAT SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI AND EGYPT HAD ENTERED
PAVILIONS OR EXHIBITS, WHILE ISRAEL HAD BEGGED OFF FOR
ECONOMY REASONS.

ONE POSSIBLE WAY OUT NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY FAIR OFFICIALS WOULD
BE TO EXCLUDE NOT ONLY ISRAEL BUT ALL EIGHT PARADE PARTICIPANTS
WITHOUT EXHIBITS IN EXPO.

AD KAN

SHAG :-;

NY Phone Secretariat 707-7511 / 707-7511

NY Phone Secretariat 707-7511 / 707-7511

NY Phone Secretariat 707-7511 / 707-7511

NY Phone Secretariat 707-7511 / 707-7511 / 707-7511 / 707-7511 / 707-7511

MEMORANDUM

Date March 18, 1970From Rabbi Alexander M SchindlerTo Julian FeldmanCopy for information of Al Vorspan

Subject _____

Thanks for your very helpful report covering the Arab Boycott Committee. I appreciate your covering this meeting for me and informing me, so thoroughly, of its work.

As I told you so often -- and the repetition of my statement is your fault for doing so well -- it's a delight to have you on our staff.

*(File in Pres. Conf. Concerning
Arab Boycott)*

Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations

Steering Committee Meeting

April 10, 1967--11:30 a.m.

515 Park Avenue, New York

THOSE PRESENT: Dr. Joachim Prinz, presiding. Mrs. Rose Halprin, Isidore Hamlin, Yehuda Hellman, Rabbi Joseph Karasick, Dr. William Korey, Rabbi Gershon Levi, Rabbi Pesach Levovitz, Morton London, Will Maslow, Henry Rapaport, Rabbi Alex Schindler, Jacques Torczyner

The steering committee met to discuss (1) Presidents Conference testimony at Congressional anti-boycott legislation hearings (2) the Arab boycott and Japan, and (3) a Presidents Conference meeting in Jerusalem in July 1968.

Following are the recommendations of the committee:

- (1) That the overall moral position in support of strengthening anti-boycott legislation be presented at the Congressional hearings by the chairman of the Presidents Conference, or other designee in the name of the Conference.
- (2) That the Presidents Conference in cooperation with the Anti-Defamation League convene a press conference with Japanese newspapermen so that the Arab boycott story may be presented, and that American concern may be conveyed.

(For your further information, we are attaching hereto a summary of the March 29, 1967 meeting of the technical subcommittee on the Arab Boycott at which both matters were discussed.)

- (3) That a working party be appointed to project a tentative program for a Presidents Conference meeting in Jerusalem in July 1968 in conjunction with the 20th anniversary celebration of Israel's independence. The group's recommendations would then be referred back to the steering committee.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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Chairman,
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE

President,
AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

Chairman,
AMERICAN ZIONIST COUNCIL

Chairman,
AMERICAN TRADE UNION COUNCIL
for HISTADRUT

President,
B'NAI B'RITH

President,
CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN
RABBIS

President,
COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS
and WELFARE FUNDS (observer)

President,
HADASSAH

President,
JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL—
AMERICAN SECTION

President,
JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE

Commander,
JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE U.S.A.

President,
LABOR ZIONIST MOVEMENT

President,
MIZRACHI-HAPOEL HAMIZRACHI

Chairman,
NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS
ADVISORY COUNCIL

President,
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN

President,
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF YOUNG ISRAEL

President,
THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY

President,
RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA

President,
UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH
CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA

President,
UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW
CONGREGATIONS

President,
UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF AMERICA

President,
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

April 3, 1967

A-CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FROM YEHUDA HELLMAN

For the record -- we are attaching a brief summary of the March 29, 1967 meeting of the technical subcommittee on the Arab Boycott.

You will recall that there was unanimous agreement that Dr. Joachim Prinz should offer testimony, as Presidents Conference chairman, at the Congressional hearings on anti-boycott legislation.

Too, a report was rendered on Arab boycott activities in Japan and the educational steps to be undertaken in this country to try to mitigate its effects.

You may recall that this problem was first raised at the June 21, 1966 meeting of the technical subcommittee -- and that the Anti-Defamation League was asked to report back to the subcommittee.

I wish to add a personal comment here. The fact that the problem was first brought to the table of the subcommittee--that preparatory work was undertaken--and that a consensus was reached after a full discussion by the subcommittee, points to the practicality of the goals and techniques decided upon by the subcommittee.

The immediate task in this area, of course, is to interest some 50 businessmen doing a million dollars plus trade with Japan.

Technical Subcommittee on the Arab Boycott
of the
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Summary -- March 29, 1967 Meeting

THOSE PRESENT: Yehuda Hellman, presiding, Jack Baker, Philip Baum, Al Chernin, Ruth Hershman, Frank Phillips, Harry Steinberg, Miriam Taub, Rabbi Jerome Unger, Dr. Seymour Weisman.
(Mr. Nat Belth, ADL P.R. director and Mr. Nat Kameny, ADL board member, also participated.)

First, the subcommittee discussed the advisability of Presidents Conference testimony in support of strengthening anti-boycott legislation in Congress. Mr. Baum said that in addition to business testimony, there is value in having the overall moral position presented. Moreover, it is within the purview of a civic organization to petition government on occasion.

Dr. Seymour Weisman then moved that Dr. Joachim Prinz be asked to testify, as chairman of the Presidents Conference, at the Congressional hearings on anti-boycott legislation. The recommendation seconded by Mr. Baum was unanimously approved.

Next, the subcommittee heard a report on Arab boycott activities in Japan. Japanese trade with the Arab nations totals over a billion and a quarter dollars; trade with Israel amounting to \$25-30 million is restricted to small companies not doing business with Arab states because of boycott threats. It was thought that the time had come to use the American scene as a leverage to encourage the Japanese to withstand Arab pressure and normalize business relations with Israel.

Three approaches were suggested at this stage:

- 1) interest some 40-50 large American importers of Japanese goods to write letters to their dealers in Japan. (These businessmen will be furnished with background material as well as a sample letter.)
- 2) convene an unpublicized press conference with Japanese newspaper men here in the States so that the Arab boycott story may be presented and that American concern may be conveyed in Japan.
- 3) establish a committee of businessmen to remove barriers from international trade with Israel.

Mr. Baker said that the ADL was ready to convene a press conference and that a fact sheet on the boycott was being prepared. In answer to questions raised, he emphasized that there would be no domestic publicity. The approach, he reported, would be friendly and educational.

WHEN SILENCE LEAKS

West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's special envoy, Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, is due to arrive in Israel today for what is hoped will be the third and final round of discussions for an overall agreement between Israel and Bonn on the future of relations between the two countries.

According to all accounts the previous talks with Dr. Birrenbach were cordial and friendly, with both parties clearly aware of the deeply sensitive nature of the circumstances surrounding the discussions.

It was because of this awareness, and especially because of the German Chancellor's desire to avoid unduly ruffling Arab feelings, that the talks were draped in heavy secrecy. This desire went so far during Dr. Birrenbach's first visit that the Bonn Government was unwilling to reveal even the identity of those Israeli leader with whom the envoy met here.

That this curtain of secrecy was quickly pierced was only to have been expected. For an active press as exists in Israel and Germany cannot be prevented from discovering the elementary facts of such a mission.

It would have been better had this been realized here from the outset. For as the talks continued the world press found itself receiving obviously planted reports on alleged difficulties and stiff conditions imposed by Israel for its agreement to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany.

While these reports - emanating apparently from Bonn sources who were interested either in sabotaging Dr. Erhard or smoothing over Arab feelings - were circulated, Israel officials, bound by a commitment to silence, found themselves at a distinct disadvantage.

This kind of propaganda footwork was repeated by German government sources during Dr. Birrenbach's second visit, when they "revealed" that Bonn had not agreed to Israel's demand for a German guarantee of Israel's borders.

The result, of course, was that the delicate talks were enveloped in reports and impressions that could only damage the image of Israel's diplomacy, while at the same time confusing the Israel citizen.

No one today would advocate a return to the Wilsonian concept of diplomacy of "open covenants openly arrived at." For the sensitive dealings between modern governments often demand secrecy in order to succeed. However, secrecy can also be exploited to disrupt or damage or confuse.

In the case of the negotiations with Dr. Birrenbach his misuse of a commitment to secrecy bred suspicions concerning talks whose painful historical context required that they be carried on with utmost correctness.

It is hoped therefore that the present round of talks will not be accompanied by a similar spectacle, and that they will now be concluded with an agreement and public announcement befitting their historical moment.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK 22, NEW YORK

Tel.: PL 5-9316-7-8

Date: March 18th, 1965

MEMORANDUM

To: To: Members associated in the Conference of Presidents

From: From: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find a report on the Cukurs Case. We are sending you this confidential report on the suggestion of Dr. Natan Lerner of the World Jewish Congress. The report does not deal with the Cukurs assassination but with his years in Brazil. In an attached letter Dr. Lerner writes:

"As you probably know, the Uruguayan press is blaming Israel. The Uruguayan Government, on the other hand, adopted a friendly attitude towards the representatives of Israel. Just two days ago, LE MONDE of Paris reported that the Brazilian police considers that Cukurs was killed by former SS men for reasons of security."

Dr. Lerner requests that this material be circulated as confidential intended for interior purposes only and not be given to the press.

CONFIDENTIAL

WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
BRAZIL

REPORT ON THE CUKURS CASE

I suppose you are informed by the world press about the latest developments in this case, of which I want to report the Brazilian reaction.

It was on Sunday, March 7th, that the Brazilian radio broadcast the news of the murder of Herbert Cukurs in a chalet on the Carrasco beach in Montevideo. Until yesterday the radio and the newspapers carried various news, sometimes contradictory and mostly confusing, both as to the identity of the corpse found and that of the murderers. In the meantime, the body found in a trunk in the chalet was identified as being really that of Cukurs, who without any doubt had been killed. (We still do not know whether the murder took place in the chalet, or elsewhere and the body brought there.) As to the supposed murderers, we learned from the radio and Brazilian newspapers, that there are a number of suspects: the murderers were French or Austrian or Dutch, or even Israeli, and according to a police investigator in Uruguay, an Israeli diplomatic car, which allegedly bore blood stains, was seen before in the neighborhood of the chalet.

All the newspapers were of the unanimous view - without, however, presenting proof - that it was the work of a Jewish group avenging itself on the Nazi murderer, Cukurs.

Cukurs' family in Sao Paulo made a statement that Cukurs made the trip to Montevideo on the invitation of a Dutchman named Anton Kunzle⁷⁸ to establish there with him a pleasure-boat business on a lake, similar to that he had run years ago in Rio. On the plane with Cukurs were also two Frenchmen, one of whom was said to be Taussig (described also as an Austrian.) All three allegedly disappeared after the murder.

The son of Cukurs in Sao Paulo stated that his father had many times before been threatened, and that he had always been afraid of being murdered by Jews. For this reason he left with his family a list of suspects: Senator Aarao Steinbruch, Dr. Alfredo Gartenberg, Dr. Marcos Constantino, Dr. Israel Skolnikov and two other unimportant Brazilian Jews. (Sen. Steinbruch was the President of the Jewish Federation in Rio, Drs. Gartenberg and Constantino its Executive Directors, and Dr. Skolnikov member of its Executive, who, between 1949 and 1964, investigated Cukurs' past, hearing various witnesses, and consequently impeded the naturalization that Cukurs applied for three times during that period, as stated below in detail.) All these persons denied, in statements to the press, that they had any connection with the case. Dr. Steinbruch declared that he considered it below his dignity to make any comments.

The Brazilian press is dealing daily with the case. All papers, without exception, speak about the "Nazi murderer Cukurs," offering a lot of material to prove his past as the murderer of thousands of Jews in Riga, including children, the aged, and the sick. We furnished the press with documentary material about Cukurs, including literature.

So far the entire press is reacting to our satisfaction, and one of the most important newspapers, "Jornal do Brasil," went even so far as to say today in its editorial, i. e.: "Even if Jews killed Cukurs, they were right, for he was a

cold-blooded Nazi killer, and nobody could blame Jews avenging the innocent deaths of their parents, and children." Some of the Jews here are a little bit worried by the fact that the newspapers unanimously suspect a Jewish group as responsible for Cukurs' death, although, as noted, they are so far sympathetic to the Jewish side of the story. No anti-Semitic manifestations have yet occurred.

We have just learned that Cukurs was assassinated on February 24th, and that the news about the murder was divulged through Bonn. In the Brazilian papers there appeared also a rebuttal from the Israel Embassy in Montevideo regarding the statement of the police investigator (reportedly the chief of the Montevideo political police) that an Israeli diplomat or his car were involved in the case. I shall keep you informed. The Brazilian press, and also all the international news agencies, as well as the "New York Times" are in permanent touch with the Federation in Rio.

The following is background information:

Herbert Cukurs - former Latvian Air Force Captain in Riga, one of the leaders of the Latvian "Perkonkrust" even before the Nazi occupation of Latvia - found his way to Brazil in 1946 and settled in Rio de Janeiro. He came with a Jewish girl who introduced him to the Zichnist Organization in Rio as her savior. (That is true. Some of the Nazi murderers were protected by Jews whom they had saved for their own eventual protection.) In 1949 Cukurs was recognized by some Jews as a Nazi responsible - together with Viktor Arajs - for the murder of about 32,000 Jews in Riga. The information about Cukurs at that time stemmed mainly from Max Kaufmann's book "Churban Lettlands." In the late forties, Rabbi Nurcook visited Brazil for the WJC and accused Cukurs as responsible for the death of many Jews in Riga. He called for his prosecution as a Nazi criminal. Some Latvian Jews also presented to the Federation of Jewish Societies of Rio de Janeiro the transcripts of statements not under oath by Landau, Jaffe, Gersztejn, Tukacier, Shapiro, Fiszkin and Schub, taken by the Board of Investigation of War Crimes in the Baltic Countries, with its seat in London at the WJC.

On the basis of this material, the Federation of Jewish Societies of Rio, on the initiative of the WJC, requested, at that time, the expulsion of Cukurs from Brazil, but this could not be achieved, because Cukurs had become the father of a child born in Brazil.

Cukurs, apparently feeling insecure in Rio and wanting to work on his naturalization in secret, thus avoiding the Federation's attention, later moved from Rio to Niteroi and then to Santos, and from there to Sao Paulo, where he lived undisturbed until his death, becoming even materially well off. (He was an airplane constructor.) Unexpectedly, in 1950, the Federation learned that Cukurs was about to become a Brazilian citizen by naturalization (he was asked only to attach to his file in the Ministry a document about his economic position). The Federation, therefore, intervened with the Ministry and, as it could not obtain an absolute undertaking that citizenship would be denied, it mobilized Brazilian public opinion through the press and some MP's. Almost all newspapers reacted and spoke up against granting citizenship to Cukurs, describing his Nazi past on the basis of the material put at their disposal by the Federation. Public reaction was excellent (though we learned that some Catholic forces were behind Cukurs because "he is a good Catholic" and some sentimental Brazilians because, so they say, "he has been in Brazil for so many years with a good record and even has Brazilian children.") The same happened again in 1960, when he applied for naturalization once more.

In that year the Eichmann case exploded. Some Brazilian newspapers began to

write against the manner of Eichmann's capture, mainly against the violation of our neighbor's sovereignty, though all of them condemned Eichmann. One very serious newspaper, always friendly to Jews, went so far as to write, i.e.: 'We would most strongly protest if this new justice (a la Eichmann) would be practiced in Brazil against Cukurs. The authorities are duty-bound to protect Cukurs by all means.'

In this development of the Eichmann case, Cukurs saw a very good opportunity for himself. He went to the Sao Paulo police, asking for protection, because "his life was endangered by Jews and he was afraid of being kidnapped." He got protection. He also asked the police for an investigation of himself. The police of Sao Paulo accepted this request, hearing Cukurs' own testimony in four long interviews. He denied the accusations against him, saying: that he never persecuted, but saved Jews; described German Nazi atrocities against Jews which he saw with his own eyes; but, at the same time, talked much about Jewish Latvian Communists who received the Russian Army with music in 1939, describing them as enemies of Latvia and the Latvian people, and therefore, many Jews had to pay, but that he himself did not do any wrong against Jews, fighting only against the Russians and the Communists as a Latvian patriot and Catholic. Cukurs appeared at the investigations with his attorney and achieved publication of his testimony in the newspapers. He went so far as to challenge the President of the Federation of Rio, Dr. Steinbruch (who happens to be a member of the Brazilian Parliament) to discuss the case with him on television, which a TV company of Sao Paulo was ready to arrange. As Dr. Steinbruch declined, saying that he could not sit at a table with a proven murderer, Cukurs declared on television and in the press, that the Federation "has been accusing him for ten years without having proof against him, and had not even the courage to come and discuss the case in public."

Cukurs' third bid for naturalization in 1963 definitely failed.

About Cukurs see the following literature:

Gerald Reitlinger, "Die Endloesung," where Cukurs' name appears as that of a Nazi murderer, with his chief, Viktor Araj.

Testimonies at the "Wiener Library" in London from Landau, Jaffe, Gersztejn, Tukacier, Shapiro, Fiszkin and Schub. The Federation in Rio has also the testimony of Hillel Melamed.

Finally we have extracts (but not the books) from "Yahadut Latvia," published in Tel Aviv 1953, where on p. 16 in "Yiskor" by Rabbi M. Nurock, Cukurs is mentioned, and from "The Last Way of Latvian Judaism" by Elhanan Kremer, where Cukurs is mentioned on pp. 330-334.

All this material was put at the disposal of the Brazilian press, which made good use of it.

March 17, 1965

*To Vashan
to use
return*

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF
MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS
515 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, NEW YORK

*Send copy
to
Mand
Lone
11/7/65*

December 17, 1964

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents
From: Yehuda Hellman

Following, please find the suggested reply of the Presidents Conference to West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.

Would you please let us know, as soon as possible, if this text meets with your approval.

SUGGESTED REPLY OF THE PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE TO WEST GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER
GERHARD SCHROEDER

We are in receipt of your reply of November 24, 1964 to our wife of November 20. We are cognizant of the efforts of West Germany to bring Nazi war criminals to trial, as enumerated in detail in your telegram. Indeed, we were encouraged by these efforts and had hoped that they represented a recognition by the German Government of the obligation it owes to the victims of the Nazi holocaust and to the world at large. We have considered these trials to be indispensable to the moral redemption and rehabilitation of the German people in the post-war era.

Your statistical reference to these efforts, however, in no way meets the issue raised by the imminent coming into force of the statute of limitations. Your allegation that "It is very unlikely that a substantial number of hitherto unknown Nazi criminals will be discovered in the future" is necessarily speculative. Moreover, it contradicts the estimates of many leading authorities who believe that the number may run into the many thousands. The history of war crime prosecutions has shown that new information and new indictments arise constantly as a result of fresh evidence uncovered in connection with current investigations. In a more fundamental sense, however, this statistical approach is irrelevant. It evokes quantitative criteria that are altogether unrelated to the moral issue at stake. Whether there be many or few, every Nazi criminal guilty of mass atrocities and genocide must be brought to justice. Each person implicated in mass murder of innocent human beings must be made aware that as long as he lives and wherever he may hide he faces the prospect of being made accountable in a court of law.

It is widely recognized by civilized nations, and it was reaffirmed at Nuremberg, that major crimes against humanity must not be regarded as ordinary crimes, nor can they be subject only to the provisions of ordinary domestic codes. We had hoped that West Germany's signature to the Genocide Convention constituted recognition of this principle which supports the broadest respect of human life. Its present attitude, however, constitutes a complete negation of its professed adherence to this moral principle.

In our telegram we protested the continued participation of German scientists in the development of weapons of mass destruction for the United Arab Republic. It has long been the publically declared intention of the United Arab Republic to use these weapons in a war of destruction against Israel, a country which serves as the home of the surviving remnant of the Nazi holocaust. And yet, in spite of a provision in the West German constitution barring the participation of German citizens in the manufacture of weapons intended for use in an aggressive war, the German Government has failed to act in this matter. Your omission of any reference to this issue in your reply strikes us as further evidence of your disregard of the moral considerations implicit in these decisions.

This attitude of moral indifference, which has caused the West German Government to evade its responsibilities with respect to the extension of the statute of limitations and the withdrawal of German scientists from Cairo undermines our confidence in your government's awareness of the as yet unredeemed obligation of the German people to history and to the survivors of the Nazi holocaust. Until your government has demonstrated its clear understanding of this obligation and its readiness to discharge it in these two major areas of Jewish and general humanitarian concern, Germany's claim to a genuine rebirth and a new moral posture must be vigorously rejected.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR
AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 Park Avenue
New York 22, New York
PLaza 5-9316-7-8

November 24, 1964

TO: MEMBERS ASSOCIATED IN THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
FROM: YEHUDA HELLMAN

Below you will find the text of a telegram which the Presidents Conference has received from the German Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schroeder.

This was in response to our telegram to him dated November 20, 1964, a copy of which was sent to you in a memo on that day (November 20th).

"I regret very much that the tight schedule of my talks in Washington makes it impossible for me to see you at this time as you had wished.

Please be assured, however, that the Federal Government is deeply aware of the problems you wanted to discuss with me and is examining all possibilities to bring about a solution which takes into account both the moral as well as the legal aspects.

After World War II Allied courts have sentenced more than 5000 persons, German courts 5445 persons for Nazi crimes; of these 818 were sentenced to death, 486 of them having been executed. Until now the German authorities have investigated the records of more than 30,000 persons. Until January 1, 1964 12,882 persons have been brought to trial. Now about 750 criminal proceedings are pending, which will engage the German courts for many more years. In all these cases the period of limitation for the prosecution of crimes has been brought to run again by judicial acts, so that the criminal proceeding of the crimes concerned is not stopped.

It is very unlikely that a substantial number of hitherto unknown Nazi criminals will be discovered in the future. To safeguard all possibilities of criminal proceeding the federal government has issued on November 20th the following worldwide appeal for assistance in bringing to justice all Nazi criminals:

'Allied and German courts have already passed final judgment on the great majority of national-socialist crimes and penal proceedings have been instituted regarding a number of other crimes.

Determined to punish national-socialist crimes and to restore violated justice, but considering, on the other hand, that the period of limitation in respect of crimes committed prior to May 9, 1945, cannot, for constitutional reasons, be extended. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany requests all governments, organizations and individual persons, both in Germany and abroad, to make available without delay to the 'Zentralstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklaerung Nationalsozialistischer Gewalttaten' (Central Office of the Land Judicial Administrations for the Elucidation of National Socialist Crimes), Ludwigsburg, Schorndorfer Strasse 28, either original documents, photostat or microfilm copies of material in their possession relating of offenses and their perpetrators still unknown in the Federal Republic of Germany.

All diplomatic or consular missions abroad of the Federal Republic of Germany will accept and forward any documentation intended for the above-mentioned Zentralstelle.'

We very much hope that this appeal will bring the results that you and we hope for."

Gerhard Schroeder
German Foreign Minister

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

To: Members associated with the Conference of Presidents
of Major American Jewish Organizations

From: Yehuda Hellman

I would like to bring to your attention the fact that Israel's Parliament declared yesterday in a unanimous resolution that it was the duty of the West German Government to put an immediate end to the dangerous activity of West German scientists working in Egypt on the development of weapons of mass destruction to be used against Israel.

Enclosed please find the full text of the resolution as adopted by the Knesset.

Also enclosed please find the full text of the statement of the Foreign Minister of the State of Israel on the same subject. This statement was made in the Knesset yesterday.

It is being suggested that this whole problem be brought by you to the attention of the Jewish Community and to the attention of public opinion in general.

It is in this connection that we also would like to inform you that the West German Government has declined comment on the Israeli demand that German scientists be stopped from working on Egyptian armament projects. A German Government spokesman said that no comment would be made until an official report on the Statement by Foreign Minister Golda Meir was available.

The Israeli demand apparently caught the Bonn Government off guard. It seems that the Germans had not expected that the case of the alleged Israeli agents in Switzerland would produce such drastic results.

YH:cs
encl.

TEXT OF THE KNESSET RESOLUTION

1. The Kneset resolves that the activity of German scientists and experts, working in Egypt on the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction to be used against Israel, is a grave danger to the security of Israel and its population.
2. The German people cannot absolve itself of the responsibility for the continuation of this vile work. It is the duty of the German Government to put an immediate end to this dangerous activity of its citizens and to take all steps required to prevent this cooperation with the Egyptian Government.
3. The Kneset calls upon enlightened world public opinion to exercise its influence without delay in order to put a stop to this activity of German experts, whose aim is to expose to destruction the State of Israel, the home of the remnants of our people who have survived the Nazi Holocaust.

TEXT OF FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT TO KNESSET

"As the Knesset is aware, I requested a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, at which I reported on the activities of German scientists and technicians in Egypt, as well as the circumstances in which an Israeli national was arrested in Switzerland.

"At a prolonged session of the committee, many details were reported concerning the activities of these scientists, and the appeals of the Government of Israel to various parties, concerning their activities. The Knesset will certainly not expect that these details should be revealed here. As far as the circumstances of the arrest of the Israeli national are concerned, I must say that with all our appreciation for the traditional, friendly relations existing between the peoples and governments of Switzerland and Israel, we find incomprehensible certain steps taken in this matter by the Swiss authorities.

"For a considerable period now, the Egyptian ruler has attempted to accumulate considerable might in order to realize his avowed aim of annihilating the State of Israel, and for years large amounts of weapons have streamed into Egypt. Recently, a new element was added to the scene - a group of scientists, as well as hundreds of German technicians, who are assisting in the development of Egyptian offensive missiles, and even in the development of weapons prohibited by international law, and serving the exclusive purpose of annihilating life. These types of weapons, which other powers are unwilling and uninterested to supply to Egypt, the Egyptian Government is attempting to get by means of a band of unprincipled scientists, who are prepared not only to act in accordance with Egypt's desire, but also contribute of their own free will to this aim.

"There is no doubt that the driving force behind the schemes of this criminal gang, are lust for gain on one hand, and on the other, a Nazi bent for hatred of Israel and destruction of Jews. Back in the days of Hitler, the intimate contact between Cairo and the Nazis was well known, and it is no secret that Cairo today serves as a center and place of asylum for Nazi leaders. We cannot believe for a moment that this situation should be in accord with the desires of the Government of the German Federal Republic. However, these scientists and technicians are her citizens and her nationals. The German Government cannot remain indifferent to the fact that 18 years after the fall of the Hitler regime, which caused the holocaust of millions of Jews, members of the same people should again be connected with acts intended to annihilate the State of Israel, which contains the survivors of holocaust and destruction.

(Con't.)

"Not a few Germans, who unblemished past we do not doubt, and who disapprove of the activities of the scientists and technicians in Egypt, have stressed the legal difficulties in preventing German citizens from travelling to Egypt and carrying out their nefarious activities there. We say to the German Government and to the masses of German people, who recoil from Germany's Nazi past and desire another Germany, that we cannot acquiesce in this explanation, and we are convinced that enlightened public opinion throughout the world is at our side. We request that the Government of Germany should put an end to the activities of these scientists, and if, for this purpose, legal or other steps should be necessary, we demand that these steps should be undertaken now in order to end immediately this collaboration between German citizens and the Government of Egypt."

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CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, NEW YORK
Tel.: PL 5-9316-7-8

Date: February 24, 1965

MEMORANDUM

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents

From: Yehuda Hellman

The following is the full text of the statement issued after the meeting of the Conference on Tuesday, February 23rd. Please bring it to the attention of your leadership, chapters and affiliated organizations. It should be used in your home organs as well and brought to the attention of as wide a range of Jewish and non-Jewish public opinion as possible.

In continuing the letterwriting campaign that was initiated earlier, this statement can be used as background material. Continue to write and cable the German Embassy in Washington, c/o Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein. It is advisable that copies of these letters be brought to the attention of our Department of State. It is very important that the tone of all communications be responsible and firm. Exaggerations are only harmful. Public expressions by community and local organizations should be fully encouraged.

Also enclosed you will find the release to the press incorporating the following statement.

"Attempts by West Germany to justify her recent actions have occasioned bitter disappointment. West Germany still does not understand the pervasive immorality of her attempt to purchase diplomatic advantage by dealing in the security of Israel, a country which gave haven to Jews who survived the Hitler holocaust and for whose safety Germany must feel forever responsible.

We hope the German government harbors no illusion that it has already provided sufficient proof of a new moral posture. This would be a tragic misreading of German responsibility after World War II. Germany owes a transcendental moral indebtedness to the Jewish people that exceeds any program of material compensation.

By surrendering to Nasser's threats and halting arms shipments to Israel, West Germany has disavowed its solemn commitments. But despite this unilateral action, these commitments remain alive and binding.

Ironically, this retreat from principle has served no purpose other than to exacerbate world tensions. Reports from Cairo indicate that the Egyptian dictator has been encouraged by this easy capitulation to intensify his dangerous demands. It is clear that Nassar's insatiable policies can be countered only by firmness. He must not be allowed to advance his goals by disrupting relationships among other states.

(Over)

Germany is slowly awakening to the realization that submission to blackmail cannot constitute a foreign policy. It would be tragic if this hard lesson is learned only at Israel's expense. We are encouraged by reports that a significant sector of German opinion rejects its government's position.

The unwise and unavailing course pursued by West Germany during the past few weeks has aroused mounting public concern. All Americans are apprehensive over the grave threat to world peace embodied in the series of decisions by the West German government that have endangered the fragile balance in the Middle East. These apprehensions and the deep feeling of American Jewry will be fully pressed upon our own government. We shall urge the United States to use its good offices to persuade West Germany to remain faithful to its commitments and to resist Egyptian threats motivated by her publically declared intention to destroy Israel.

We hope that further steps will be obviated by the immediate resumption and scrupulous fulfillment by West Germany of its agreements with Israel and the discharge of its enduring responsibilities to the Jewish people. But neither as Americans, nor as Jews, do we intend to remain silent witnesses to the unfolding of these events."

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS

OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

PLaza 5-9316-7-8 515 Park Avenue - New York 22, N.Y.

COJOGRA

Contact: Richard Cohen
TR 9 - 4500

For Release
Friday AM, Feb. 26

American Jews will urge the Johnson Administration to persuade West Germany to restore the "fragile balance" in the Middle East by resuming arms deliveries to Israel, a spokesman for 20 leading U.S. Jewish groups announced yesterday.

Dr. Joachim Prinz, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, said the decision to seek U.S. intervention was taken at a meeting of the Conference earlier this week.

Dr. Prinz said there was unanimous agreement among the Jewish agencies that the Bonn regime's action in cutting off military supplies to Israel constituted a "grave threat to world peace.

"We shall urge the United States to use its good offices to persuade West Germany to remain faithful to its commitments and to resist Egyptian threats motivated by a publicly-declared intention to destroy Israel," he declared.

"Neither as Americans nor as Jews do we intend to remain silent witnesses to the unfolding of these events."

Dr. Prinz, who is president of the American Jewish Congress, spoke in the name of the 20 Jewish religious and lay organizations making up the Presidents' Conference, the most representative and comprehensive grouping of Jewish agencies in the country. Its statements are regarded as speaking for the overwhelming majority of American Jews

MORE

The American Jewish leader voiced "bitter disappointment" at what he described as "the pervasive immorality of West Germany's attempt to purchase diplomatic advantage by dealing in the security of Israel, a country established to give haven to those Jews who managed to survive the Hitler holocaust and for whose safety Germany must feel forever responsible." He continued:

"We hope the German government harbors no illusion that it has already provided sufficient proof of a new moral posture. This would be a tragic misreading of German responsibility after World War II.

"Germany owes a transcendental moral indebtedness that exceeds any program of material compensation.

"By surrendering to Nasser's threats and halting arms shipments to Israel, West Germany has disavowed its solemn commitments, but despite this unilateral repudiation these commitments remain alive and binding."

Dr. Prinz, a former rabbi of Berlin who was expelled by the Hitler regime for his anti-Nazi sermons, said it was ironic that West Germany's "retreat from principle" had served no purpose "other than to exacerbate world tensions."

Reports from Cairo, he said, indicated that President Nasser of Egypt had been "encouraged by this easy capitulation to intensify his dangerous demands.

"It is clear that Nasser's insatiable policies can be countered only by firmness," Dr. Prinz declared. "He must not be allowed to advance his goals by disrupting the relationships among other states."

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The American Jewish Congress president said he was encouraged by reports that a "significant sector" of German opinion opposed the Bonn government's action. But he said it would be "tragic" if this lesson had to be learned at Israel's expense.

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"All Americans are apprehensive over the grave threat to world peace embodied in the series of decisions by the West German Government that have endangered the fragile balance in the Middle East.

"These apprehensions and the deep feeling of American Jewry will be fully pressed upon our own Government.

"We hope that further steps will be obviated by the immediate resumption and scrupulous fulfillment by West Germany of its agreements with Israel and the discharge of its enduring responsibilities to the Jewish people."

The 20 groups represented in the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations are:

American Israel Public Affairs Committee	Labor Zionist Movement
American Jewish Congress	Mizrachi-Hapoel Hamizrachi
American Zionist Council	National Community Relations Advisory Council
American Trade Union Council for Histadrut	National Council of Jewish Women
B'nai B'rith	National Council of Young Israel
Central Conference of American Rabbis	Rabbinical Assembly
Hadassah	Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
Jewish Agency for Israel -- American Section	Union of American Hebrew Congregations
Jewish Labor Committee	United Synagogue of America
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.	Zionist Organization of America

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Jewish Agency for Israel -- American Section	Union of American Hebrew Congregations
Jewish Labor Committee	United Synagogue of America
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.	Zionist Organization of America

MEMORANDUM

Date February 19, 1965


From Rabbi Jay Kaufman

To Mr. Albert Vorspan

Copy for information of Rabbis Maurice H. Eisendrath, Balfour Brickner & Richard G. Hirsch

Subject _____

The Presidents' Conference decided to have a letter writing campaign to the German Ambassador on withholding of arms, rather than another massive public outcry as in the case of the Statute of Limitations. Two techniques will be used, continued public pressure on the statute of limitations because that is a moral position which becomes fuzzy with arms, and letter writing from many people, best if important Jews and Christians do so on their own personal or business letterheads. Each agency is to push its own people to write letters.



AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
1737 H ST., N.W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
Telephone 298-7174

Dear Friend:

Public opinion may persuade West Germany to reconsider its decision to suspend arms shipments to Israel, if Americans let the Germans know how they feel. This report may be helpful for speeches, statements, resolutions and letters to the press, Congress, the Department of State, and the West German embassy and consulates.

With the compliments of

I. L. KENEN
Executive Director

February 15, 1965

BONN CAPITULATES TO CAIRO

The West German government has surrendered to Nasser's blackmail at the expense of Israel's security.

Bonn has promised Cairo to suspend further U.S.-approved shipments of tanks and helicopters to Israel.

What does Bonn gain in exchange for this extraordinary concession?

President Nasser has merely promised not to extend full diplomatic recognition to East Germany when its Communist leader, Walter Ulbricht, visits Cairo on Feb. 24.

He will not withdraw the invitation to Ulbricht. He may tone down the reception. But that won't cost Egypt anything. Indeed, it will save on hospitality bills.

Egypt also claims that West Germany, in another gesture of appeasement, promised not to enter into full diplomatic relations with Israel. Bonn has denied making that commitment. But Bonn has refrained from recognizing Israel de jure for more than 15 years - in deference to Cairo's pressure. And there is still no sign that Bonn will change its policy on recognition. It would not impress us very much if it did, at this late date and on the heels of the arms cut-off.

Bonn's infamous barter has handed a victory to Moscow diplomacy because it weakens Israel, strengthens East Germany and bolsters Egypt.

As for Israel, it is obvious that Israel must have weapons to preserve the arms balance and enable her to deter aggression. The weakening of Israel would undermine resistance to Soviet penetration throughout the entire Near East.

As for East Germany, it is reported that Nasser extended the invitation to Ulbricht at the behest of the Soviet Union's Deputy Premier Alexander Shelepin, who came to Cairo last December to assure worried Egyptians that the new Soviet rulers would carry out Khrushchev's May promise of a \$280 million loan to Egypt. It is believed that the Soviet Union may be parceling out some of this aid via East Germany. Ulbricht, in fact, is bringing a deal to trade about \$75 million in industrial equipment in exchange for Egyptian cotton.

This official visit by East Germany's head of state seems tantamount to recognition. But if it is so interpreted, then Bonn is automatically compelled by its Hallstein doctrine to sever relations with Cairo.

(over)

Accordingly, Nasser's invitation to Ulbricht was a gamble. If Bonn reacted in maximum indignation and cut off relations, Bonn would also have halted credits and aid, which are estimated at \$300 million - and this at a time when Nasser desperately needs new loans from the West to pay urgent bills for food, consumer goods, machinery and to stave off creditors. Obviously, Nasser stood to lose much more than West Germany did. West Germany had tremendous leverage. But it failed to use it. Instead, Nasser used his - and won.

He intimidated Bonn by the threat to recognize Ulbricht, and to send an ambassador to East Berlin. And, instead of halting aid to Egypt, West Germany went far beyond the call of appeasement. It halted military aid to Israel.

Once again, Nasser has demonstrated how to exploit rivalries on the world scene in order to extort aid from all sides. He attacks the United States and tells us to jump in the Mediterranean. (This is also for the ears of Shelepin, De Gaulle and Chou En-Lai.) He invites Ulbricht and tells Erhard, in effect, to go jump in the Rhine.

Perhaps Nasser was emboldened in the negotiations with Bonn by Washington's reaction to his insulting Port Said speech.

An angry and indignant Congress wanted to ban a \$37 million food shipment to Egypt. Congress then reluctantly allowed the White House flexibility because the White House insisted that this would enable the Administration to "influence" Cairo to "moderate" its attitude. (Many of Israel's friends did not oppose the President's urgent appeal, although they favored the House ban.)

One day after Congress voted to untie President Johnson's hand - Cairo proceeded to tie Erhard's.

For Egypt did not "get the message" from the Hill. The Egyptians have gloatingly interpreted the White House appeal for flexibility as a pro-Egyptian gesture and a blow at Israel and its supporters.

Cairo now celebrates a triple victory over Washington, Bonn and Israel. Aggression and arrogance feed on appeasement.

The Washington Post of Feb. 14, quotes Cairo's Al Gomhuria: "Who could believe that the day would come when Cairo would say its word and Western capitals would not only listen to it but tremble with fear." The Cairo paper went on to say that Washington tried to bring pressure by threatening to halt food shipments but Nasser refused to yield. "Zionism should know that Washington, Bonn, London and Paris cannot impose an opinion on us."

Washington has lostface in the Near East.

And West Germany will lose face and prestige in this country. "Their refusal to stand behind their commitment is believed to have damaged their international image," The New York Times reported Feb. 14.

The new Germany has been trying to persuade the world that it has reformed and that it has stamped out Naziism and the Nazis. But events of the last two years are disconcerting and discouraging; the refusal

EDITORIAL REPRINTED

from

The Washington Post

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1965

Bowing to Blackmail

Both as a political and symbolic matter, West Germany's decision to cancel arms shipments to Israel is highly unfortunate. President Nasser had threatened to recognize East Germany if Bonn did not terminate an arms agreement with Israel. With inglorious alacrity, West Germany collapsed before this blackmail threat and put herself in the wrong with a nation that above all others deserves sympathetic consideration from Germany.

The amount of money involved was relatively modest. West Germany has never officially disclosed her arms agreement with Israel, but the total amount is believed to be \$60 million and it is estimated that 80 per cent of the deliveries have already been made. But if the amount was small, the principle was large.

In diplomacy as in common crime, blackmailers have an insatiable thirst. Mr. Nasser was able to dictate Bonn's foreign policy by a verbal threat and by inviting Walter Ulbricht, head of the East German regime, to Cairo for a visit. Having surrendered once, West Germany may be asked to take other steps adverse to Israel in order to prevent possible recognition of East Germany.

As a symbolic matter, Bonn's position is an unhappy one. It may be that West Germany has done much to provide material compensation for wartime atrocities, and no doubt Bonn cannot be expected to condition every aspect of its foreign policy to the memory of a haunted past. Still, it is true that Germany is tailoring her policies to the demand of an Egyptian dictator who has sworn to destroy the nation of Israel. Such is the truth, no matter how it is rationalized in Germany.

to extend the statute of limitations on war crimes when it expires next May 8; the refusal to recognize Israel *de jure*; the refusal to take effective action to bring back the German scientists who have helped Egypt develop its missiles and jet planes. And now, as reparations come to an end, West Germany breaks an agreement to arm Israel, in painful surrender to the neo-Nazis of the Nile.

Of course, the West Germans can claim that our Government does not show them a very good example. Our Government, too, turns the cheek to Nasser. It is not too late for Bonn to reconsider - and Washington ought to help Bonn reconsider.

Bonn and Washington can force Nasser to abandon his blackmail by joint resistance to his pressures. Nasser needs the West far more than the West needs him. But, deplorably, the impression grows that Western policy in the Near East is dictated by fear of Nasser. And he exploits that fear to the utmost.

P.S. LATE DEVELOPMENTS - Bonn has now hardened its attitude and insists that Egypt cancel the Ulbricht visit or forfeit West German aid....Israel has rejected West Germany's offers of monetary compensation in lieu of arms.

The New York Times.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1965

Bonn's Mideast Muddle

The West Germans have made an almost incredible mess of the linked issues of arms to Israel and relations with Egypt. As a result, President Nasser has been greatly strengthened; tensions in the already tense Middle East have risen; West German relations with Israel, which had improved so greatly in recent years, have again sunk to a low of bitterness and anger; and Communist East Germany, Bonn's enemy, achieves a triumph.

It may have been an error on Chancellor Adenauer's part to make the \$80 million arms agreement with Israel in 1960, but, once made, there was no excuse not to go through with it. Israel's perennially dangerous position, surrounded as she is by Arab nations determined to destroy her, meant that she needed arms to sustain what Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel yesterday called "a balance of deterrence." However, the arms could have been obtained elsewhere.

Another basic error has been Bonn's persistence in the "Hallstein Doctrine" of not dealing with any nation that recognizes East Germany. This has proved to be more of a nuisance in recent years than an asset, and it has by no means been strictly honored.

President Nasser all along demanded that Germany cease her arms shipments to Israel, but he got nowhere until he had the bold idea of inviting East Germany's President Ulbricht to Egypt as a state guest. Bonn objected that this was *de facto* recognition and made the egregious error of trying to buy off Mr. Nasser by halting the arms shipments to Israel. This crude maneuver had no effect on the Egyptians. President Ulbricht is going to Cairo anyway, and he will get red carpet treatment.

Now Germany threatens to cut off economic aid to Egypt if the Ulbricht visit is carried out. Such aid amounted to nearly \$200 million during the first five-year plan. However, President Nasser has proved in the past that he is allergic to dictation based on aid.

Meanwhile, supplies of Russian arms to Egypt and the other Arab countries have been increasing. The Israelis have a right to be profoundly disturbed as well as angry by the loss of the remainder of the arms—some \$20 million worth—which they expected from Germany.

The whole affair has been an ignominious defeat for West Germany, but it has also raised the danger level in the Middle East. Southeast Asia and the Congo are not the only parts of the world where war is possible.

(See other side.)

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, NEW YORK
Tel.: PL 5-9316-7-8

Date: February 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents

From: Yehuda Hellman

I would like to inform you that in accordance with the decisions adopted at the last meeting of the Presidents Conference which was held on Friday, February 12th, Dr. Joachim Prinz, Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations has issued the following statement to the press:

"We feel a sense of anguish and bitter disappointment over reports from Bonn and Cairo that the West German government has decided to terminate military assistance it had been extending to Israel in accordance with Germany's clear commitments.

It is apparent that the Bonn regime surrendered to President Nasser's blackmail threat to recognize East Germany. In so doing, the German government abandoned the grave burden it carries for the life and liberty of those Jews who managed to outlive Hitler -- and for the country of Israel which was established to give them haven.

This decision by West Germany constitutes a breach of international morality which cannot fail but have ever widening consequences. Reports from Cairo already indicate that the Egyptian dictator has been encouraged by Germany's capitulation to intensify the blackmail and to increase its belligerency against Israel. Thus, Germany's action has endangered Israel's security and has jeopardized the fragile balance that alone has deterred Arab aggression in the Middle East.

We cannot help but contrast Germany's ignoble alacrity in acceding to Nasser's dictates with her tenacity in resisting demands from the free world for the withdrawal of German scientists from Cairo developing weapons of destruction for Egypt's war machine. We are disturbed by Germany's ready responsiveness to the compulsion of blackmail and her relative indifference to the dictates of morality.

We are aware of the political threats Nasser has applied to induce Germany to abandon Israel at this hour. But it is exactly this displacement of morality by diplomacy -- this yielding of principle to pressure -- that condemns the West German nation in the eyes of those who believe that the German people owe a special and as yet unredeemed obligation to history and to the survivors of the Nazi holocaust.

We urge the German government and those elements in Germany who have striven for a genuine moral rebirth of their country to reconsider and reject a dishonorable course which is consonant neither with Germany's professed new moral posture nor with indeed her own long range interests.

We are encouraged by news only this morning that Germany

is now actively reviewing these policies and is awakening to the realization that submission to blackmail does not constitute a foreign policy. But it would be tragic if this hard lesson is learned only at Israel's expense.

We ardently hope that the last word on this matter has not yet been heard. We urge the West German government to resume and fulfill its pledge to Israel and to discharge its special and enduring responsibility for the safety and security of the surviving victims of Nazism. In this way, too, Germany can help safeguard the permanent interests of the free world from those who would undermine them."

May 19, 1967

AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF TWENTY-ONE
MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, I EARNESTLY EXPRESS TO
YOU OUR DEEP APPREHENSIONS AND CONCERN OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ARAB TER-
RORIST ATTACKS AND HARRASSMENTS OF ISRAEL IN GROSS VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BE BROUGHT TO AN END AND THAT A CLEAR DISTINC-
TION BETWEEN THE ARAB AGGRESSOR AND THE VICTIM BE RECOGNIZED.
THE MOUNTING TENSIONS ON THE ISRAEL ARAB BORDERS MAY CONCEIVABLY
LEAD TO A MISCALCULATION WHICH COULD EMBROIL THE AREA IN A MAJOR
CONFLAGRATION THAT COULD ENDANGER PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE
RESPECTFULLY REQUEST OUR GOVERNMENT TO MAKE KNOWN TO THE WORLD
NOW ITS COMMITMENT TO SAFEGUARD ISRAEL'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
AND SECURITY.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

DR. JOACHIM PRINZ, CHAIRMAN
CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR
AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

June 5, 1967

(N.Y.) The following statement was issued today by Dr. Joachim Prinz, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, representing 21 of the country's largest national Jewish groups:

"Arab armed forces have attacked Israel -- the inevitable culmination of 20 years of aggression aimed at destroying the State and people of Israel.

"Our hearts are with our brethren in Israel in this desperate hour. To them we pledge everything that is within our power to give, to the end that peace and justice may be restored to the Promised Land.

"Our own Government has a grave responsibility in this hour. America's vital interests in the Middle East are at stake. To protect these interests, we call on our Government to employ whatever means may be necessary to support the people of Israel in their struggle for survival.

"We stand in solidarity with them, proud of their courage and determined that they shall live in their own land and in peace."

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR GIDEON RAFAEL,
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL,
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL JUNE 5, 1967.

Mr. President,

I wish to draw the Council's attention to the grave news that fighting has erupted on Israel's frontiers and that the Israel Defense Forces are now repelling the Egyptian Army and Air Force. I have so far received only first reports about the developments. From these it is evident that in the early hours of this morning Egyptian armoured columns moved in an offensive thrust against Israel's borders. At the same time Egyptian planes took off from airfields in Sinai and struck out toward Israel. Egyptian artillery in the Gaza Strip shelled the Israel villages of Kissufim, Nahal-Oz and Ein Hasheloshah and bombed Natanya and Kfar Yavetz. Israeli forces engaged the Egyptians in the air and on land, and fighting is still going on.

This is a situation of utmost gravity. Though the reports in my possession are incomplete, one thing is already clear -- the huge armies which Egypt has concentrated in Sinai in the last fortnight are now carrying out the order of the day of their commander General Murtagi, who said on June 3: "The eyes of the whole world are looking on you in your glorious war against the Israelis' aggressiveness on the soil of your homeland, hoping to see the outcome of your holy war in victory for the rights of the Arab people.

"The outcome of this special moment is of historic importance for our Arab people and its holy war for restoring the rights of the Arabs which were plundered from them in Palestine. Reconquer the stolen land with God's help and the power of justice and with the strength of your arms and your united faith."

The Egyptian forces met with the immediate response of the Israel Defense Forces acting in self-defense. In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, I bring this development to the immediate attention of the Security Council. The Israel Minister of Defense in a message to the Israel Defense Forces on June 5 stated, and I quote: "Soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces! We have no aim of conquest. Our sole objectives are to put an end to the Arab attempt to conquer our land and cut off and suppress the blockade and the belligerence mounted against us.

"Egypt has recruited and taken command of the armed forces of Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Military units from Kuwait to Algeria have joined them. Their numbers are greater than ours, but we will prevail over them. We are a small but brave people. We want peace, but we are ready to fight for our land and our lives."

I am to the best of my ability remaining in communication with my Government in Jerusalem and I shall keep the Council informed of further developments.

Thank you, Mr. President.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS_{11/20/64}

515 PARK AVENUE •

• NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

TO: Members Associated in Conference of Presidents

FROM: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed is the full text of the address made before the Conference of Presidents on November 10, 1964 by Mr. Nachum Shamir, Economic Minister of the State of Israel.

Also enclosed is the full text of the telegram which was sent to the German Foreign Minister, simultaneously to Bonn and to the German Embassy in Washington. A copy of this telegram was also sent to our State Dept.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am somewhat scared to speak to so many presidents of this wonderful American Jewry. It is my first appearance with your group. After long meditation I have decided not to make my task too easy and read the speech, but rather try to make it an informing talk about problems with which I am dealing.

Speaking about Israel's economy is somewhat complicated--in a way schizophrenic. At a Bonds' meeting we praise the economy; the next day at a UJA meeting we tell how badly money is needed; and the third day we go to Washington for help. And when looking for investors, you can't do so without telling of the good things.

Speaking about economy, I would rather start with defense. Our problems of security, I would say, are so vital and so decisive in our lives that our whole existence depends upon it. Not long ago, General Clay issued a report for President Kennedy about developing countries, and Israel was one of the few countries that, according to the report, have developed enough to be phased out of the foreign aid program of the United States. But this comparison to other countries was lacking in one major thing. If we could get military aid as the other countries, we could probably also be phased out from the foreign aid program. But unfortunately, our foreign debt reached a figure of 1 billion 100 million dollars, and a very big part of it is because of our defense expenditures. Today, a Mirage Plane costs 1½ million plus. But Krushchev said to Nasser that his arsenals are open to him. New supplies are flowing into Egypt.

One thing that really should bother us. There are some other wars in the world; there are probably some wars in preparation. But there is only one war where the enemy declares total annihilation as a goal. Here we are, 20 years after World War II, when even Hitler tried to conceal his real aims toward the Jews. The Arabs are openly declaring war--a war of total annihilation and nobody seems to be shocked. All our neighboring countries are at war with us. Last week, Ben Bella offered his army to fight Tschombe in the Congo and to fight the Jews in Palestine.

We are trying to make our modest contribution to the family of nations. We have now some 1200 people in Africa, Asia and South America. I think our contribution is big. Coming to our economical problems, we find our main one is promoting exports. Our trade gap was 400 million last year, and it might be close to 500 million this year. How to overcome this problem? How can we develop our exports?

We are living in an age of clubs. The nations are also organizing clubs. Whoever wants to get into a club has to pay a high admission fee. Our wages are not the lowest, and productivity not the highest. To compete is difficult. We are unable to develop our exports to Europe in a satisfactory way. Now the new government in Great Britain has imposed higher tariffs on imports. Half of our products exported to the United Kingdom will be affected. The United States has also quite a high protective tariff.

Our industrial production the last year grew by 14-15%. The merchandise available for export is less than ever because the Israel market is consuming more and more. The affluent society of Israel is one of the biggest barriers for our exports.

What we are doing here is to promote the little merchandise and goods we have and to try to sell it on the American market. The balance of trade with the United States is negative for Israel. We buy here three times as much in goods

and services than the United States buys in Israel. In manufactured goods the ratio is 1 to 4.

We have another problem that we are faced with, that of the Arab boycott. It is like walking on a tight rope. If you speak about it you serve their purpose. The more you speak the more it hurts. This is mainly psychological warfare. To find the proper balance is very difficult and complicated. The Arabs have stepped up their economic war against Israel. This is an open and vast field for activity. They are sending, daily, hundreds of letters to different firms in the hope that they will disclose information about trade with Israel. I want you to know that Israel buys 1/3 of the total export of the United States to the Near East. In 1949, we exported 20 million dollars worth of goods. This was negligible, but now that we are exporting \$600 million a year, we are more exposed to attack.

We are entering a second stage of industrial development. The first stage was difficult and ambitious. We have prepared a plan for industrial development until 1970. We have to increase our exports $2\frac{1}{2}$ times to reach the $1\frac{1}{2}$ billion dollar mark. We need know-how. We have the problem of shortage of labor. Instead of building industries that are absorbing a lot of manpower, we have to get into industries that will utilize mechanization and automation.

And, of course, what can be done about the Arab boycott? This boycott is of a unique character. It is forcing third parties to boycott us, sometimes against the American anti-trust laws. We think we should explain the problems, the nature, the business and moral sides, etc. to all Chambers of Commerce all over the United States. We could also retaliate. But should we really go this far?

We have to build our economy for the future. Let us hope that the troubles we have now will fashion us for a better future.

Thank you.

TELEGRAM TO FOREIGN MINISTER, WEST GERMANY

We believe that your visit to the United States presents the proper occasion for American Jews to raise the subject of the mounting grievances of Jews everywhere over many of the current positions of your government. We are mindful of the steps taken by West Germany to make some amends for the violence and brutality visited upon European Jewry during the Hitler period. We hope, however, that the German government does not harbor the illusion that any one regards these efforts at material reparation as a sufficient demonstration of a new moral posture. This would be a tragic misreading both of the reparations program and of the German responsibility after World War II. However, we find no other explanation of current West German attitudes on such matters as the extension of the statute of limitations, and the withdrawal of German scientists in Egypt.

We are appalled by the recent announcement of West Germany's refusal to extend the present statute of limitations for war crimes prosecution. Other nations, including Belgium, East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, have acted to abolish such bars to prosecution within their own jurisdictions. West Germany, as the scene of the horror in the past and as an ally of the free world in the present, can hardly afford to do less.

We reject the argument that all persons vulnerable to potential prosecution as war criminals are covered by the present law. Indeed, if this were so then extending the statute of limitations at the most would be harmless. Obviously, the statute of limitations is being retained and insisted upon only because it will have some effect. And the only effect it can have is to immunize from prosecution war criminals whose identity will be disclosed in the future.

Similarly, we cannot understand the inability of the Bundestag to prevent continued participation by German rocket scientists and other technicians in developing sophisticated armaments for the United Arab Republic in Cairo. The West German constitution prohibits preparation for aggressive war and bars the participation of German citizens in the manufacture of weapons intended for use in aggressive hostilities. Apparently the West German government is unwilling publicly to acknowledge the possibility that Egypt is planning a war of aggression against Israel. Instead West Germany would rather continue to risk Israel's security than alienate Arab business firms.

We believe the German people owe a special, and as yet unredeemed, obligation both to history and to those who survived the Nazi holocaust. For all of its industrial might and political influence, West Germany cannot lay claim to a genuine rebirth in the postwar period until it has demonstrated its clear understanding of this obligation and its readiness to discharge it. The evident reluctance of German spokesmen to act in these areas of Jewish concern do not enhance our confidence in the sincerity or genuineness of current efforts toward this end.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE •

• NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

TO: MEMBERS ASSOCIATED IN THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS

FROM: YEHUDA HELLMAN

August 17, 1964

Enclosed please find some background material in connection with the renewed incidents on the Israel-Syrian border.

FROM: YEHUDA HELLMAN

SOME BACKGROUND MATERIAL IN CONNECTION WITH RENEWED
BORDER INCIDENTS ON THE ISRAEL-SYRIAN BORDER

Israel's border with Syria has again recently become the scene of incidents and clashes. These clashes have their inner logic rooted in intra-Arab developments. The relationship between Cairo and Damascus has worsened considerably recently and it seems that the Syrians need this active anti-Israel posture in order to divert attention from internal strains.

There is every reason to believe that Nasser will continue his pressure against Syria, particularly in view of the forthcoming new Arab Summit Conference which will take place next month.

Following please find some background material in connection with the Middle Eastern situation based upon reports which came from Beirut, Lebanon. According to these reports, the central debate in Arab politics today is between those who want to see an Arab world united around Cairo and those who prefer a more polycentric arrangement with several centers of local influence and power, cooperating closely with each other but nevertheless fully autonomous.

The Ba'th regime in Syria is for the moment the chief advocate of this polycentric view and, as such, it has drawn upon itself the full weight of Cairo's hostility.

The Ba'th leaders contest President Nasser's thesis that the Egyptian revolution and its ideas must be taken as the sole model for all the Arab states.

They argue that each revolutionary experiment in the area - whether Nasser's in Egypt, the FLN's in Algeria or their own in Syria - has something unique to contribute and must be given equal status with the others. They would like to see a "meeting" of Arab revolutions and an exchange and cross-fertilization of ideas and practical experience.

They are at the moment holding out a hand of friendship to Nasser but they have been sharply repulsed. Indeed, the propaganda war waged against the Ba'th regime has rarely been fiercer and the strong suggestion is that an attempt will be made to overthrow the Syrian Government before the next Arab Summit Conference due to be held in Alexandria early in September.

This aim has been stated unambiguously. A group of Cairo-sponsored Syrian exiles met in Beirut from July 14-18 to set on foot a political and military organization dedicated to the destruction of the Ba'th. They have called their movement the Arab Socialist Union for the Syrian region, modeling it on the organization of the same name in the UAR.

A resolution adopted at the Conference declares that: "The Arab Socialist Union in the Syrian region assumes as its first task the restoration of the United Arab Republic (the union of Syria and Egypt) by removing the secessionist Ba'thist regime." The Conference also reaffirmed the central Nasserist credo that the Egyptian revolution must be accepted as the 'base and vanguard' of the Arab revolutionary struggle everywhere and that Nasser's uncontested leadership of the movement must be recognized.

Coordination Treaties:

Parallel to these hostile activities against Syria, Nasser has in recent weeks been seeking to put his relations with his allies on a more formal basis. Agreements have been concluded with the Yemen and Iraq providing for the coordination of policies in the political, military, economic, social, cultural and propaganda fields. These wide-ranging "coordination treaties" stop far short of a constitutional union. Their aim is not to create a single Arab state, but to align Arab policies on Cairo which, as suggested, is one of the constants of Nasser's political program.

To make coordination smoother, both Iraq and Yemen have been encouraged to model themselves on the UAR's internal political and economic organization. Thus Iraq, in mid-July, created in turn an Arab Socialist Union as a single Government party and nationalized all banks, insurance companies, and leading industrial companies. Former shareholders will be given seats on the boards of management and a 25 per cent share of profits in cash and social benefits.

These revolutionary and wholly unexpected measures threaten to undermine President Aref's support among the middle classes. It also remains to be seen whether Iraq's small and ill-trained civil service can cope with the task of running the country's major economic enterprises.

These Iraqi developments are being very closely watched in Cairo. Aref is Nasser's chief ally in Arab Asia. Much of the success of Egypt's present Arab policy depends on his durability. Were his regime to be overthrown and replaced by a Government less dependent on Cairo, the pattern of Arab politics would once more be radically changed and the Ba'th in Syria would breathe more freely.

August 17, 1964

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS
515 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, NEW YORK

Date: June 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents.

From: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find the full text of Lewis H. Weinstein's letter to Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State.

As you recall, this letter was sent in accordance with the decision adopted by the meeting of the Presidents' Conference which took place on June 16, 1964.

Please note that we had decided that this letter should be considered as an internal document and should not be given to the press at the present time.

YH:md
Enc:2



June 18, 1964

Mr. Phillips Talbot
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Talbot:

It was a pleasure to meet with you on Tuesday, and I deeply appreciate your frank and enlightening comments on current developments in our country's Near East policy.

At a meeting with my colleagues in the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, I reported your impression of Premier Eshkol's visit, including your description of the warmth of the personal rapport. We are all deeply gratified that the meetings between President Johnson and the Premier advanced not only the cause of American-Israel friendship but the prospects for peace in the region as well.

We also discussed the details of the International Monetary Fund loan to Egypt, and I must tell you frankly that all of us have strong doubts and reservations about economic aid to Egypt as long as that country openly calls for the liquidation of Israel and uses its foreign exchange to pay for missiles and to acquire new and dangerous weapons. It is our understanding that there may soon be additional loans to Egypt by our own Government. You will recall that last fall Congress adopted an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act calling on the Administration to bar economic assistance to countries preparing for aggression. Obviously, it is the responsibility of the Administration to make its own determination as to whether Nasser's threats are to be regarded as preparations for aggression disqualifying him from further assistance from our country, but certainly there is evidence to support any such determination.

June 18, 1964

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
All of us would like to see a rise of living standards in Egypt and we are fully sympathetic with projects designed for that purpose. It has seemed to us, therefore, that if our Government is to continue assistance to Egypt, it must make every possible effort to persuade Egypt to discontinue the acquisition of weapons and to call a halt to the frightening arms race which burdens the economies of all the peoples of the region and which menaces their security and survival.

The leadership of our Conference has also been devoting a great deal of its concern to the problem of the German scientists who are now in Egypt. It is clear that Egypt is squandering substantial funds to finance these "free-booters" (to use the phrase which you employed during our talk) who are contributing to Nasser's military might, bolstering his aggressive posture and expanding his capacity to carry out his threats.

Not only as friends of Israel - but as American citizens and taxpayers - we cannot be reconciled to the fact that we may thus be contributing to this murderous enterprise.

My associates were pleased to learn that you have agreed to meet with our Conference for a full discussion of the issues that concern us, including those that we touched upon in our Tuesday talk. We hope that this can be arranged for early September and we look forward to seeing you at that time.

Sincerely yours,



Lewis H. Weinstein
Chairman.

MEMORANDUM

Date August 27, 1963

From Gunther Lawrence

To Rabbi Jay Kaufman

Copy for information of _____

Subject Presidents Conference -- meeting on Israel, August 26th.

The meeting dealt primarily with a personal assessment by Ambassador Michael Comay of the current UN discussion on the Syria-Israel complaints in the Security Council.

The Ambassador immediately dismissed the Jordanian incident as being in no way connected with the problems involving Syria. At the most, it could be blamed on Jordanian soldiers who are influenced by Nasser policies. Both countries - each for its own reasons - consider this an unwelcome incident and are trying to calm it down.

The entire Syria-Israel debate at the UN centers around the Bull Report which has just been delivered today and will be studied by the governments tomorrow, since the Security Council meeting has been postponed until Wednesday to give them a chance to digest the Report. The Ambassador expects the Bull Report not to come to any conclusion, since he himself will stress that this is not the role of the general, to condemn any particular government. Second, the evidence will lean in favor of Israel's charge against the Syrians, although the document will not contain a concrete verdict in favor of Israel.

The Report (purported to be 50 pages long) will also be weighted down with a history of other border incidents and kidnappings.

If a government wants to ~~avoid taking a position~~ avoid taking a position on this Security Council discussion, it could find some items in the Report to support such a tactic. Most of the nations are waiting for the United States reaction to the Report, which Ambassador Comay indicated was favorably disposed towards Israel, but open until they have studied the Report.

Ambassador Comay indicated that this time the United States will not shirk its duty and will arrive at some clear-cut course of action.

An interesting side-light was the Ambassadors' political-analyst-type speculation on the current Russian attitude. He said that for the first time he got the impression that the Soviet Union will not offer the Arabs the carte blanche veto they have given them in the previous Council discussions. He believes that this is based on factors such as the general global situation relating to Soviet-Chinese-American relations and possibly some anti-Communist governments in Iraq and Syria.

He concluded by saying that the Israel government already feels that it has made a positive public relations gain by presenting this to the UN Security Council and that Israel was forced to put this before the Council in light of the seriousness of the situation. Beyond this he would not speculate.

Thank you.

MEMORANDUM

Date November 20, 1963From Rabbi Samuel CookTo Dr. M. EisendrathCopy for information of Rabbi Kaufman

Subject _____

Earlier today, I attended an emergency meeting of the Presidents' Group at 515 Park Avenue. The meeting was called by Label Katz and the speaker was Golda Meir. Mrs. Meir was anxious to inform the group about disturbing developments in the United Nations, where, earlier this morning, the American representative (Plimton) submitted a United States Resolution in connection with the Arab refugees. The resolution was most ~~unacceptable~~ ^{unacceptable} to Israel.

Mrs. Meir spent an hour reviewing talks that had been going on between Israel and the United States for half a year. In the light of these talks, Israel felt greatly disappointed, even to the extent of feeling betrayed, by the developments of this morning at the U.N.

I doubt whether describing the details of her talk will be necessary for this memo, especially since the up-shot in the discussion that followed her talk did not lead to any action other than the appointment of a Committee to decide whether to make protest, in the name of the Presidents' Group, to President Kennedy or the State Department.

~~The impression I have is that~~ The next meeting of the Presidents' Group will take place on December ~~2nd~~ ^{2nd}

November 21, 1963

As an addendum to my previous memo about the Presidents' Group, I attach what appeared in the New York Times this morning. From this article, you can pretty well gather the contents of the remarks Mrs. Meir made to the Presidents' Group.

attached to
original
memo to Dr. E.

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CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

September 16, 1963

Rabbi Jay Kaufman
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York 21, New York

Dear Jay:


This is most probably the worst time of the year to write to you, however, I would like to refer to your report to the Conference on September 25th. On re-reading the recommendations of the Committee on Structure and Scope, I recall that there was unanimous opinion on the part of the committee members that the Presidents Conference should, from time to time, put on its agenda non-political problems...a sort of "people to people" program. I think it was Isaiah Minkoff who advanced this proposal, and I believe it would be of value if you would mention it in your report on the 25th of September.

By the way, as you can see from the memorandum of September 13, Mrs. Golda Meir is also going to speak that day. I will let you know as soon as possible whether you will be scheduled to speak in the morning or in the afternoon. This depends on Mrs. Meir's schedule at the United Nations.

Although the Union is not a member of COJO, I am enclosing for your information a memorandum which contains a report on the recent meeting of COJO in Geneva. You will find of particular interest the section dealing with the work of COJO in connection with the Ecumenical Council and also those paragraphs which deal with Jewish education.

L'SHANA TOVA!

Cordially,


Yehuda Hellman
Executive Director

YH: dm
encl.

WORLD CONFERENCE OF JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Participating Organizations:

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
B'NAI B'RITH
BOARD OF DEPUTIES OF
BRITISH JEWS
CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS
CONSEIL REPRESENTATIF DES
JUIFS DE FRANCE (C.R.I.F.)
DELEGACION DE ASOCIACIONES
ISRAELITAS ARGENTINAS
(D.A.I.A.)
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF
AUSTRALIAN JEWRY
JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE
SOUTH AFRICAN JEWISH
BOARD OF DEPUTIES
WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

Observer:
JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL

August 28, 1963

FROM: Yehuda Hellman

TO: Organizations associated with the World Conference
of Jewish Organizations

Enclosed please find the minutes of the meeting of the World Conference of Jewish Organizations which took place in Geneva on August 14, 1963. These minutes also include the decisions which were adopted by the Presidium of the World Council on Jewish Education and the resolution which was adopted under the name of "Basis of Organization" which should be regarded as a recommendation to member organizations and also the full text of the resolution which was adopted by the delegates in connection with the Franz Maurer case.

WORLD CONFERENCE OF JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

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ISRAELITAS ARGENTINAS
(D.A.I.A.)
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF
AUSTRALIAN JEWRY
JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE
SOUTH AFRICAN JEWISH
BOARD OF DEPUTIES
WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

August 29, 1963

Summary of the Minutes of the Meeting of the
World Conference of Jewish Organizations (COJO)
which took place in Geneva on August 14, 1963

Observer:

JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL

In opening the meeting, Dr. Nahum Goldmann delivered a brief review of anti-Jewish propaganda financed by Arabs in Latin America. He informed the meeting that the Jewish community is watching this situation closely. He also informed the delegates that the conference dealing with the problem of Soviet Jewry would be shortly convened in South America and that this conference would be patterned after the Paris conference which took place three years ago.

Dr. Goldmann then announced that the agenda of the meeting would include the following points:

- 1) a report on our work in connection with the Ecumenical Council, and
- 2) organizational problems.

Dr. Goldmann informed the delegates that simultaneous with this meeting a meeting of the Presidium of the Temporary World Council on Jewish Education would be held in Geneva. He welcomed Mr. Philip Lown, president of the American Association for Jewish Education as a guest of this meeting, particularly as Mr. Lown had come especially from New York to attend these deliberations at Geneva. He also welcomed Rabbi Joseph Lookstein who was elected together with Mr. Lown to represent the United States Jewish community at the Presidium of the World Council of Jewish Education. He thanked both gentlemen for having made this special effort in order to attend.

Dr. Goldmann announced that Mr. Zvi Lurie, member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, Dr. S. Levenberg of London and Dr. M. Avidor of Jerusalem would attend this meeting as observers on behalf of the Jewish Agency.

Dr. Goldmann then called on Dr. Gerhard Riegner to give his report on the Ecumenical Council.

Dr. Reigner observed that Pope John had become an international symbol and the interest of the world had focused upon his personality. No one could have foreseen what course the Church was to follow after his death. However, informed sources insisted that the process of adaptation initiated, to a great extent, under Pope John's leadership, would not be interrupted. The forces set in motion in the Catholic world were so strong that apparently it had become impossible to reverse the process.

Dr. Reigner continued that it was his feeling that this opinion would prove to be correct. Pope Paul, though a different personality, is following the line which the late Pope had initiated. Although Pope Paul is much more of a politician and has much deeper roots in the previous period of the Church (he worked closely with Pope Pius), his present policies are based on the current climate of opinion in the Church.

Dr. Reigner delivered a detailed report about the work being done in preparation for the second Ecumenical Council which will convene at the end of September. He went on to note that COJO had approached church leaders in over 30 countries throughout the world. He commented that "we have undertaken a great task and we have done tremendous work and are proud of it." He added that there are however still many factors which will influence the final decision of the Council which we cannot predict. As an example of possible, unforeseeable influences, he mentioned the forthcoming productions of the new Hochut play.

Dr. Reigner went on to say that pressures were exerted to issue statements concerning the play. However, "we have refused." He felt that one had to have a positive outlook although one could not predict with certainty the outcome of the forthcoming sessions of the Council, as far as a positive result affecting Jews was concerned. Mr. Ehrlich then commented that it was important that if a document be adopted to deal with Jews then this document should be within the scheme of Ecumenism and not the Vatican. (Which means that the same dignity be accorded to Jews as to all other non-Catholic religions.) He went on to say that as a whole, the climate and atmosphere had changed for the better. For example, after Father Weigel made his declaration in the United States to the effect that no statement would be made on the subject of the Jews at the Ecumenical Council because of Arab pressure, the office of Cardinal Bea immediately announced that Father Weigel was incorrect and that Weigel was not empowered to make any statements in connection with the Ecumenical Council.

Dr. Ehrlich reported that he had spoken to Cardinal Bea in connection with the Hochut play and that the Cardinal did not display too much concern on this matter. The Cardinal was glad that the Israelis would not produce the play within the next few months, or during the time when the voting at the Council will take place. Dr. Ehrlich concluded that our attitude should be that we have nothing to do with the play.

Sir Barnett Janner stated that other sections of the Christian community are disturbed about the play and are trying to prevent its production. He expressed the opinion that the Jewish community should try to play the matter down.

Mr. Benjamin Tabachinsky (Jewish Labor Committee), Dr. Levenberg (London, Jewish Agency) and Dr. Nahum Goldmann disagreed with Sir Barnett Janner, and their opinions, in summary, were that the play was not written by a Jew, and that its general content was not the responsibility of the Jewish community, and that the Jewish community should not act as a censor for the theatre nor react to this play in one way or another. Dr. Goldmann added that it was to be assumed that some people would "put pressure" on Billy Rose not to produce the play in New York but that even if he does not produce it, someone else would because of the play's tremendous impact. However, he went on, this situation does not call for any official action by the Jewish community or by COJO.

The discussion was concluded and Dr. Reigner and Dr. Ehrlich were requested to continue their work at the Vatican in the spirit of the memorandum submitted by COJO.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

Dr. Goldmann asked Mr. Hellman to comment on the various proposals submitted regarding the reorganization of COJO. Mr. Hellman reviewed the essentials of a proposal received from the Executive Council of Australian Jewry and the amendment submitted by the Board of Deputies of British Jews. Mr. Hellman pointed out that the proposals basically underlined one essential point: that when a situation arises effecting an internal situation in a given community, COJO should not adopt any specific course of action without the consent of the representative organization of that Jewish community. If such a representative organization is not affiliated with COJO, then its point of view should be expressed through a member organization of COJO to which that community is affiliated. Mr. Hellman said that he felt that the time had come for COJO to improve its present vague working rules and regulations.

Dr. Goldmann then commented that although there was no constitution or formal rules and regulations, it was clear that all those who originally joined COJO did so on the basis of the unanimity rule. This matter, in terms of COJO's past history, should not be obscured.

Mr. Eliezer Argov proposed that a committee be appointed which could prepare one document containing all points of view.

Mr. Katz stated that in his opinion the discussion was an indication of the progress that had been made by COJO. The real problem before the membership was how it could organize into a more formal body. Mr. Katz suggested that a criteria for membership be evolved which would take into account the factor of international and national organizations and their eligibility for membership in COJO. He underlined the fact that the B'nai B'rith endorses the concept of COJO and of unity in the Jewish world.

Mr. Abbey (Canadian Jewish Congress) commented that if the question of criteria of membership was introduced into the debate, it would be essential that the delegates be given the opportunity to again discuss these matters with their respective organizations. Dr. Roth and Mr. Bloch suggested that a committee be appointed as suggested by Mr. Argov.

Mr. Paul Jacob (B'nai B'rith - Europe) emphasized that he would have to discuss these matters within his own organization first and he doubted whether this was an appropriate time to appoint a subcommittee.

Mr. Bloch, in reply, stated that the whole matter could be simplified if all organizations would be presented with one single text for their consideration.

The following committee was appointed by Dr. Goldmann to study the various proposals and to work out a draft for the consideration of the members of COJO: Mr. Arnold Bloch, Chairman (Executive Council of Australian Jewry); Mr. Benjamin Tabachinsky (Jewish Labor Committee); Mr. A.G. Brotman (Board of Deputies of British Jews); Dr. S. Roth (World Jewish Congress); Mr. Hayim Pinner (B'nai B'rith) and Dr. I. Goldenberg (DAIA).

Dr. Goldmann then stated that the problem being discussed was of particular importance to the World Jewish Congress. In the event that COJO should decide to become a functioning organization the World Jewish Congress would be confronted with the question of "to be or not to be." (The other organizations such as B'nai B'rith or the Labor Committee would not be affected.) On the other hand, Dr. Goldmann pointed out that even as a non-functioning body, COJO should increase its coordinating functions. There was no reason why there should not be a permanent coordinating group in America and England. There is no reason why closer coordination cannot be established, for example, between the Board of Deputies, the B'nai B'rith and the World Jewish Congress in England. Dr. Goldmann also mentioned the problem of the budget which he said should be provided by all members of COJO. The Commission which is being appointed now should discuss the future of COJO in the light of these questions. Dr. Goldmann concluded that Mr. Katz was correct in emphasizing that the whole problem of membership must be discussed. The morning session was then adjourned.

AFTERNOON SESSION:

Mr. Katz announced the decisions adopted by the Presidium of the World Council on Jewish Education as follows:

THE PROVISIONAL WORLD COUNCIL ON JEWISH EDUCATION

1. The Presidium of the Provisional World Council on Jewish Education met at Geneva on August 14, 1963. Six members attended: Dr. N. Goldmann, Sir Barnett Janner, Mr. Label Katz, Rabbi J. Lookstein, Mr. Philip Lown and Dr. V. Modiano. Mr. Moshe Sharett, the seventh member, was unable to attend. Dr. Moshe Avidor, Coordinator of the Council and Mr. Yehuda Hellman, Secretary to the Presidium, also participated at the meeting.

2. The Presidium decided to complete the nomination of the first 35 members of the Provisional Council by the end of October.

Thereafter, it could proceed to nominate up to 15 additional members, with a view to balancing the composition of the Council regarding educators and lay leaders as well as the various trends of Jewish education and thought.

3. The Presidium will proceed to set up an Advisory Board of Educators to advise the Provisional Council and ultimately the Permanent Council on all matters of educational policy, programming, etc. An effort will be made to have a report of this committee available for the March Council meeting.

4. The Presidium decided to seek the services of a suitably qualified Director for the World Council of Jewish Education.

5. The Presidium decided, in accordance with the resolutions of the New York, March 5, 1963 meeting, to establish a Jewish Education Clearing House in Jerusalem for assembling and disseminating educational information. The first Clearing House is being inaugurated in Jerusalem for practical reasons; preparations will be started for opening such Clearing Houses in Europe (Paris) and elsewhere in 1964.

6. Steps will be initiated for the publication of a Jewish educational yearbook, and progress reports on the work of the Clearing House will be distributed periodically.

7. A meeting of the World Provisional Council on Jewish Education will be convened at Brussels on March 11-12, 1964. At this meeting a program of activities and budget will be adopted by the Council for a two year period -- from the Summer of 1964 through the Summer of 1966, at which time a second World Conference on Jewish Education will meet. The March 1964 meeting will also have to decide on the structural organization of the Council for the years 1964-66.

8. The Presidium decided to ask the organizations and communities participating in the Provisional World Council on Jewish Education to contribute their share towards the required expenditure for the proposed activities until March 1964 as well as for convening the Council in March 1964.

9. It is estimated that the Council's budget for 1964 will amount to at least 100,000 dollars, and various Jewish organizations indicated their willingness to contribute towards this budget.

10. The Presidium has taken note of the seriousness of the problem of teachers in the field of Jewish education and believes that this issue should be given priority in the work of the World Council on Jewish Education.

11. The Presidium subsequently consulted with members of the Provisional Council attending the COJO meeting at an informal meeting and took note of their opinions and proposals.

Geneva, August 15, 1963

Mr. Katz then noted that since Mr. Shazar had assumed the Presidency of Israel, Mr. Moshe Sharett was elected to succeed him as a member of the Presidium. Three additional members, Dr. V. Modiano of France, Mr. Philip Lown and Rabbi Joseph Lookstein of America, had also been appointed. Mr. Katz announced that the next meeting of the World Council would take place in Brussels on the 11th and 12th of March, following the March 9th and 10th meetings of COJO.

Mr. Tabachinsky then stated that he was not satisfied with the resolutions adopted. He believed it was impossible to discuss the problem of Jewish education today without also insuring that adequate funds be available. He suggested that a one hundred million dollar fund be established to be made available on a ten year basis at ten million dollars per year. He concluded that without such a fund, it would be impossible to cope with the problem of the shortage of Jewish teachers.

Mr. Katz then called on Mr. Arnold Bloch to present the proposals of his committee in connection with the reorganization of COJO. Mr. Bloch's report was as follows:

The meeting of COJO held in Geneva on the 14th of August 1963 -

I. Recommends to members the approval of the following basis of organization.

BASIS OF ORGANIZATION

A. COJO is a voluntary association of representative bodies meeting for consultation and, if need be, for joint action under which members' independence and freedom of action is fully reserved. its members are as follows:

- American Jewish Congress
- B'nai B'rith
- Board of Deputies of British Jews
- Canadian Jewish Congress
- Conseil Representatif des Juifs de France
- Delegacion de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas
- Executive Council of Australian Jewry
- Jewish Labor Committee
- South African Jewish Board of Deputies
- World Jewish Congress

B. In a country where an overall representative organisation exists only that organisation will be eligible for membership in COJO.

The following present national members of COJO are accepted as overall representative organisations in respect of their national communities:

The British Board of Deputies
The Canadian Jewish Congress
The Conseil representatif des Juifs de France
The Executive Council of Australian Jewry
The South African Jewish Board of Deputies
The Delegacion de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas

C. As from the adoption of this Basis of Organisation decisions of COJO shall be made on the following bases:

- a) Each member shall have one vote
- b) The Chairman shall have no casting vote and if voting is equal the resolution shall be considered lost.
- c) Resolutions shall be adopted by majority vote but any dissentient member may declare within a reasonable time that it reserves its freedom on the subject of the resolution and in that event that member shall not be bound by the resolution.
- d) No resolution may be adopted which specifically affects the Jews of any country in which there is an overall representative organisation if, after debate, that organisation dissents from the resolution. Such dissent may only be expressed if the organisation is not itself a member of COJO, by a member of COJO to which the organisation is affiliated or if it is not so affiliated, by a member of COJO which it authorises to act on its behalf.

D. COJO shall be maintained by the contributions of its members.

E. Such contributions shall be assessed only by agreement, and shall be based upon the resources of the respective organisations, and where these are overall Jewish representative organisations, the members and resources of the Communities represented.



II. Requests that the basis of organisation be formally adopted at the next meeting of COJO.

III. Requests that any proposed amendments be submitted to the Secretariat for circulation not later than the 31st of December, 1962

IV. Resolves that the Presidium establish a special committee to consider the problems involved in the formulation of a constitution consistent with the above basis of organisation, including the question of admission of new members, and that the Committee present its report to a later meeting.

In the debate that followed, Mr. Katz, Dr. Goldmann, Dr. Levenberg, Mr. Bloch, Mr. Teff, Dr. Roth, Mr. Monroe, Dr. Jacob, Dr. Reigner, Sir Barnett Janner, Dr. Perlzweig, Lady Janner, Lady Reading, Mr. Linton and Counselor Moss discussed the above resolution and agreed that paragraph 3D was not adequately phrased and the debate centered on the best possible rephrasing of paragraph 3D.

Sir Barnett Janner then moved for the following amendment to paragraph 3D:

No resolution may be adopted which specifically effects the Jews of any country in which there is an overall organization, if after debate, that organization dissents from the resolution. Such dissent may also be expressed if the organization is not itself a member of COJO, by a member of COJO to which the organization is affiliated. If it is not so affiliated, and COJO deems it necessary then COJO may call upon it to do so either through its direct representatives or by a member of COJO which acts on its behalf.

The delegates then voted unanimously to accept the amended document. It was recommended that the delegates present the proposals in a favorable light and that a final resolution be adopted at the next meeting of COJO to be held in Europe in March.

Mr. Tabachinsky informed the delegates that he was proceeding to Vienna in order to review the Maurer case with the Austrian authorities. A subcommittee was appointed headed by Mr. Tabachinsky and composed also of Mr. Brotman and Dr. Perlzweig which formulated the following resolution which was subsequently made public by COJO:

The World Conference of Jewish Organizations, composed of Jewish representative bodies from all parts of the world, at its meeting in Geneva, noted with distress and astonishment the acquittal of Franz Maurer by an Austrian Court of First Instance, of the charge of participation in the murder of tens of thousands of Jews in Vilna and other localities in Poland.

This amazing verdict was arrived at in the face of the sworn testimony of first hand witnesses from many parts of the world who were survivors of these mass murders.

The reaction of world opinion to this conspicuous affront to the principles of justice has already begun to express itself in public demonstrations in the cities of many countries, including Austria itself.

The Conference, taking into account that notice of appeal has been given by the prosecution, expressed the hope that the judicial authorities in Austria would ensure that justice should prevail.

The Conference, expressing the anxiety of enlightened public opinion, which is disturbed by repeated manifestations of a surprising Nazi mentality in Austria, urged on the authorities of the Republic of Austria to exercise all their powers to eradicate this evil.

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CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA



July 10, 1963

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents

From: Yehuda Hellman

In view of the fact that the June 20th meeting of the Conference of Presidents, in which Mr. Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, and Mr. William Crawford, Officer-in-Charge of Lebanon Isreal Affairs, participated, was intended as an off-the-record meeting, we are not going to send out minutes of this meeting.

However, a comprehensive report on the proceedings is available in the Conference of Presidents files. In case you would want a copy, please let us know and we will be glad to forward this material to you.

This is again to remind you that the next meeting of the Conference of Presidents is going to take place on September 25. More details concerning this meeting will be forwarded to you at a later date.

YH:cs

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

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July 5, 1963

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents
From: Yehuda Hellman

This is to inform you that the next regular meeting of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations will take place on September 25.

We are writing to you well ahead of time because this meeting is being planned as a full-day session. The morning session will begin at 10:30 A.M. This will be followed by a luncheon meeting, and then there will be an afternoon session which we hope will be over by approximately 4:30 P.M.

This full-day session is going to be devoted to a comprehensive discussion of matters of policy, in connection with American-Israel relations, and officials of the State Department will participate. A full session will also be devoted to internal problems of the Conference.

A much more detailed agenda will be forwarded to you at a later date. We just would like to make sure that you block off this date on your calendar upon receipt of this memorandum.

YH:cs

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

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Cable Address: COJOGRA

September 4, 1963

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents

From: Yehuda Hellman

Below is a short summary of the minutes of the Presidents Conference which took place on August 26th and dealt with the recent incursions by Syria into Israel territory.

Rabbi Miller opened the meeting and thanked all those present for having found it possible to attend this meeting on such short notice in view of the fact that telephone invitations were issued earlier in the morning. Rabbi Miller then introduced Ambassador Michael Comay who addressed himself first to the exchange of fire which occurred on the morning of August 25th in the Jerusalem area.

Mr. Comay stated that "the Jerusalem flare-up was unexpected; it is unclear why it happened. We are inclined to play down its significance, to regard it as almost accidental and without political significance. It may possibly have been perpetrated by a Nasser or Syrian provocateur. It is unlikely that this was Amman policy. On the contrary, this is probably unwelcome to Jordan. There has been no renewal of shooting in two days. Israel and Jordan have both lodged complaints and asked for an emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission. A subcommittee made arrangements for an investigation. The prospect is that Israel and Jordan will unofficially agree that it should not be played up; neither side will insist on a verdict. This is not to be tied up with the Syrian incident."

Turning to the incidents at Almagor, Mr. Comay in reply to questions posed by members of the Conference, made the following observations: No one can tell what position the Soviet Union will take; there are factors which may have affected the Russian position (the Moscow Treaty, the Sino-Soviet difficulties, the fact that Russian influence in the Middle East has declined in the past year.) All of these factors have to be taken into account. Israel's concern now is what the United States will do. Israel is asking the Security Council to condemn Syria and to demand that Syria cease its violations of the Armistice Agreement.

The Bull report, to be distributed later today, will deal with a variety of points. Almagor is the main issue for Israel; it will be a test of the Security Council. Bull will not say that Syria is responsible. He can only transmit the statements of Israel witnesses and the corroborating evidence found by United Nations observers. General Bull's responsibility is only to transmit a statement of fact. It is up to the Security Council to judge, and it is up to the United States to take the lead. The report will also probably deal with the recent kidnappings, the Mixed Armistice Commission, et cetera.

With reference to Mixed Armistice Commission, Israel has been out of it since 1951 on the grounds that Syria has nothing to do with the demilitarized zone in Israel. There has been pressure on Israel to return. The United Nations has also demanded the right of its inspectors to move freely around the border. Israel has not agreed for security reasons. (An Israeli officer must accompany U.N. personnel.)

It is unlikely that the Bull report will corroborate the Syrian complaint against Israel.

Israel will make an effort to steer clear of all but the main issue --Almagor. Syria will try everything possible to focus on the demilitarized zone, the Mixed Armistice Commission, etc.

Although Bull will most probably not attempt to fix the blame on Syrians (and this is not his job), the dry evidence will make a very strong impression and leave little room for any but the Israel explanation.

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Rabbi Miller thanked Ambassador Comay for spending as much time with the Conference as he did despite his heavy commitments at the United Nations. Rabbi Miller then announced that the next meeting of the Presidents Conference would be held on September 25, at 10:30 A.M. The meeting will last for several hours. The agenda will include the report of the Committee on Structure and Scope of the Presidents Conference.

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CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

September 5, 1963

TO: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations

FROM: Yehuda Hellman, Executive Director

We are forwarding to you under separate cover a short summary of the minutes of the emergency meeting of the Conference of Presidents which took place on August 26th and was devoted to the Syrian-Israeli border conflict.

The following is a summary of the proceedings at the Security Council of the United Nations dealing with the Israeli complaint before the Security Council regarding the murder of two Israeli citizens at Almagor on August 19th 1963 and the Syrian counter-complaint.

Israel's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Michael Comay presented Israel's complaint to the Security Council at the United Nations and the Security Council requested General Bull, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to make an on-the-spot investigation and to present a report to the Council on the Israeli charges and the Syrian counter-charges. General Bull submitted a detailed document establishing the pertinent facts involved. The report does not condemn either party but rather leaves the members of the Security Council to draw their own conclusions.

The following draft resolution was consequently presented on August 28 to members of the Security Council by two of its permanent members, the United States and the United Kingdom:

DRAFT RESOLUTION: UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the Representatives of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic,

Taking into consideration the report of the Secretary General dated 24 August 1963,

1. Condemns the wanton murder at Almagor in Israel territory of two Israel citizens on 19 August 1963;

2. Calls the attention of the Syrian Arab Republic to evidence in the Secretary General's report to the effect that those responsible for the killings appear to have been an armed group who entered Israel territory from the direction of the Jordan River and afterwards left in the same direction;

3. Notes with satisfaction that the report of the Secretary General indicates that, although there was an exchange of fire, there was no substantial show of force in the Demilitarized Zone on 20 August 1963;
4. Appeals to the parties to cooperate in the early exchange of prisoners in accordance with the suggestion contained in paragraph 49 of the Secretary General's report;
5. Notes from the report of the Secretary General that the Chief of Staff of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization has proposed to the parties concerned certain measures to alleviate tension and restore tranquility in the area;
6. Calls upon the parties to offer to the Chief of Staff all possible cooperation in the pursuit of this end in conformity with the General Armistice Agreement;
7. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council by December 31, 1963 on the progress made in regard to the measures proposed by the Chief of Staff.

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After introducing the above resolution, Ambassador Stevenson took the floor and made the following statement:

The first order of business for us today is to consider Israel's complaint regarding the wanton murder of two of its citizens. The picture of two innocent farmers, murdered in cold blood by a raiding party which struck them down at work in their fields must distress us all.

We can sympathize with the sense of outrage felt by the people of Israel, especially since this slaughter follows so close upon the Syrian abduction of three Israeli subjects, including two young girls, who were boating on Lake Tiberias. The United States deeply deplores these incidents.

The evidence cited in the report of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization is admittedly circumstantial, but its implications are clear enough. The testimony of the survivor of the attack who saw the uniformed men shooting down his companions; the tracks which the U.N. officials found leading to the scene of the crime and continuing in the direction of Syria, the spent bullets, cartridge cases, and grenade fragments found in the vicinity of the attack; and the departure afterwards in the same direction, all add up to a clear picture which permits objective observers to draw the same conclusions about the origin of the attack.

Also we have before us a Syrian counter-complaint about incidents of August 20, 1963, which the UN investigation has not corroborated.

As the Security Council is well aware, these incidents are the latest in a long history of unrest and bloodshed on these frontiers.

Difficulties on the Syrian-Israeli frontiers have broken out periodically ever since the signing of the General Armistice Agreement back in 1948. Indeed this Council has devoted nearly 200 sessions -- one fifth of all its

meetings -- to this subject. The nature of the alleged violations of the agreement varies somewhat from time to time; but the fundamental cause of the difficulties remains the same; it springs from the failure of the two parties to live in peaceful -- if armed -- truce in accordance with the armistice agreement. This failure is at the cost -- now as in the past -- of human lives lost and continuing threats to peace. Although we find ourselves back in session again on the same general issue, I would like to emphasize that the United States does not consider either past or present efforts of this Council to be in vain. Above all, we wish to state that we consider any other remedy for these difficulties than resort to the United Nations to be dangerous to peace and intolerable to the international community. In the present connection, we believe there are some hopeful signs. During the debate in the Security Council on the Tiberias incident in the spring of 1962, the United States Representative stressed repeatedly the necessity for shunning direct unilateral action in the face of provocation and for appealing to this body to cope with threats to the peace. We are gratified to note that these new complaints have been brought to the Security Council.

Of course, we also continue to believe that fuller recourse should be had to United Nations machinery provided locally for dealing with such complain

Now that the Council has been summoned to act, it must accept its responsibilities and act with courage and wisdom in the light of the best evidence available to it. For us the course which this body should follow is clear. In all justice and in the interests of law and order in international affairs, we believe this reprehensible act of murder on August 20 deserves the strongest condemnation. Only then can it be made clear that outrages of this kind cannot pass without the stern disapproval of the international community.

In our consideration of this case we are fortunate to have before us the report submitted by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. We all here owe a debt of gratitude to the new Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Lt. General Odd Bull, and to other United Nations officials, for the excellent work they are doing in this area. General Bull's skill and tact in obtaining the agreement of both parties to observe a cease-fire and to permit visits by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to both the demilitarized zone and defensive areas are highly commendable.

This brings me to what we regard as the heart of the troubles which have erupted so often on the Israel-Syrian frontier. It is evident that largely as a result of the conflicting interests of the two parties, and the varying interpretations which they have chosen to place upon the meaning of the General Armistice Agreement, the United Nations peace-keeping machinery is unable to function as effectively as was originally intended and expected. This problem came to the attention of the Security Council during its meetings on this subject in April of 1962 and you will recall that the resolution of April 9, 1962, endorsed the measures recommended by the then Chief of Staff for the strengthening of the Truce Supervision Organization in its tasks of maintaining and restoring the peace and detecting and deterring future incidents, and called upon the Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist the Chief of Staff in their early implementation. Unfortunately no notable progress resulted from that section of the resolution.

We now have before us some recommendations which General Bull has in mind for the strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization machinery. These recommendations have been proposed by General Bull in the light of his three months' study of the problem. We believe the proposals are wise ones and have been advanced in full appreciation of the special points of view of the two sides. We believe that one element in his proposals is absolutely vital. Without it none of the others is likely to be very meaningful. I refer to Paragraph 41 in the report. In it, General Bull calls for the parties to "comply fully with the order contained in the Security Council Resolution of 11 August 1949 to observe an unconditional cease-fire and should also abstain from any acts of hostility as provided in the General Armistice Agreement." General Bull adds (and we fully endorse his statement):

"I cannot therefore subscribe to any policy by the parties based on the use of force, nor can I condone any firing for whatever purpose across the armistice demarcation line."

We believe details of the plan for strengthening the United Nations Truce Observation Organization should be worked out by the Chief of Staff in consultation with the Governments of Israel and Syria. What is vital is the full and willing cooperation, without reservation, of the two sides with the Chief of Staff in what he is trying to accomplish. He will be able to strengthen the United Nations Truce Observation Organization only if the two sides are willing to cooperate with him in his efforts. Ultimately the United Nations Truce Observation Organization can only be as useful as the two sides want it to be.

Our belief is that the United Nations peace keeping organization, strengthened by such measures as the Chief of Staff proposes, could prevent many of the kinds of incidents which both sides in this controversy are complaining about to the Security Council today. And if these incidents can be avoided, surely the tension which has gripped the frontiers of Syria and Israel can be relaxed and the danger of raids and retaliation significantly reduced. This would be in the interests of both Israel and Syria and in the interests of peace in the Near East.

We do not believe that anybody can lightly refuse to extend his full cooperation. The peace and well-being of the people of the area depend too much upon it. The judgment of the United Nations and the world community is based upon it. In the interests of all, we bespeak that cooperation vital to the success of our efforts here today in behalf of international peace.

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In the debate that followed, broad support of the United States - United Kingdom Draft Resolution was indicated. It was clear from the onset that Morocco would naturally oppose. However, the cardinal question remained the attitude of the Soviet Union and whether that nation would use the power of the veto despite the clear indication of Syrian guilt.

Below is an editorial printed in the New York Herald Tribune on Monday, September 2, 1963, which attempts to analyze the international implications of the Soviet attitude:

THE SOVIET VETO WILL TELL

Tomorrow's vote in the Security Council will provide the first formal test of Soviet intentions since the signing of the nuclear test-ban treaty. The Russians have been telling us that the treaty should improve the atmosphere, prepare the way for other agreements and promote "peaceful co-existence" between East and West. We shall see tomorrow whether we should put any more credence than before in Soviet words.

The issue before the Security Council is whether to adopt an Anglo-American draft resolution which would severely censure Syria for violating the Israeli frontier. Evidence gathered by the UN and accepted by the majority of the eleven members of the Council is that the Syrians had committed wanton murder of two Israeli farmers.

The case is as clear-cut as any to be brought before the Council, and the broader significance of tomorrow's vote, apart from the immediate issue, is whether the Russians are resolved to paralyze the will of the majority with their veto and to continue their reckless and mischievous game of Middle East power politics.

If Mr. Khrushchev casts his veto, as his UN delegate indicated Friday he would do, then it will be clear for all to see that his behavior both in the UN and in the Middle East is little different from that of Mr. Stalin. His aim, as in the case of his predecessor, would be to immobilize the Security Council and to encourage the Arabs to make war on Israel so that communism might present itself as an alternative to the misery it helped to promote.

That would not necessarily be an argument against ratifying the nuclear test-ban treaty, but it would help cure us of any illusions that the Russians want a genuine settlement with the West.

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On Friday, August 30th, the Moroccan Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, Mr. Dey Ould Sidi Baba, introduced a draft amendment to the two-power resolution. The amendment suggested that the Council state that it "regrets the death at Almagor in Israel territory of two persons on 19 August 1963." Mr. Sidi Baba then proceeded to state that "the condemnation the draft now carried was not, in his view appropriate since a well-established attack had not been proved."* The Moroccan delegate also requested that the Council adjourn until September 3rd in order to give its members additional time to consider the Moroccan amendment.

* United Nations Press Release SC/2512 - 30 August 1963

Over the weekend Arab representatives in the respective capitals of the countries represented in the Security Council emphasized that the Moroccan resolution was more balanced "and would avoid any condemnation of Syria." When the Council again convened on Tuesday, September 3rd, the Moroccan proposal was presented for a vote and received its only support from the Soviet Union and Morocco. All other members abstained and consequently the amendment failed.

When the United States - United Kingdom Draft Resolution was presented, eight hands were raised in favor (Brazil, France, Ghana, Nationalist China, Norway and the Philippines). One member abstained (Venezuela) and two negative votes were cast (Morocco and the Soviet Union). Thus the apprehensions expressed in the New York Herald Tribune editorial of September 2nd were realized.

The following is a summary of a statement made by Ambassador Michael Comay after the vote was taken:

Mr. Comay said the debate had witnessed a sincere effort by the majority to take a decision based squarely on the available facts, having the effect of pacifying the Israel-Syria border. That effort, he stated had been blocked by the negative vote of one permanent member.

He said the employment of the "veto" to "shield the Arab party" had been regrettable in the past. It was even more regrettable now, when the same great Power had joined with others in an historic attempt to relax international tension "and might have been expected to extend the same attitude to the task of peace-keeping in the Middle East."

Mr. Comay added that Syria could take "very little comfort" from the failure of the draft to be adopted because "no veto can wipe out the damning facts."

He said the "veto" could not delete the "clear view" of every member, except Morocco and the USSR.

The fact that amendments designed to "water down" the resolution had been supported only by Morocco and the Soviet Union was a circumstance that spoke for itself, he said.

He regarded Israel's complaint as being "vindicated, and Syria as morally condemned." He hoped Syria would not fail to pay heed to the weight of international opinion.

Turning then to the "statesman-like and timely appeal" of the President, he said Israel would faithfully observe its undertaking regarding the cease-fire. He hoped there would be no more firing across the border by Syria.

On the specific question of detainees, the representative of Israel said he was authorized by his Government to state that it would welcome an immediate and simultaneous return of all persons mentioned in the Secretary-General's report, including the three Israelis "abducted" on 17 July.

It had been essential to indicate to Syria that "its use of murder and force" as instruments of policy could not be condoned, he stated.

He said he assured the Council that Israel was most anxious to keep the borders peaceful and stable until a permanent peace was attained. To that end, he said, Israel would continue to extend its co-operation to the United Nations representatives.

#

The general feeling of impartial observers at the United Nations was that although the Soviet Union had from a formal point of view succeeded to kill the United States - United Kingdom Resolution, Israel had emerged as moral victor. Not only did the United States, the United Kingdom and France (the three Western Powers) stand by Israel, but also Ghana (representing Africa) and the Philippines (representing Asia) stood by Israel and continued to defend the Israeli position despite all Arab efforts to the contrary.

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CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents
From: Yehuda Hellman

Below is the text of a telegram which was sent today by the Chairman of the Conference to the President. Similar telegrams were sent by Rabbi Miller to the Secretary of State and to Ambassador Stevenson.

ON BEHALF OF THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, OUR PROFOUND APPRECIATION OF THE POSITION TAKEN BY OUR GOVERNMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON ISRAEL'S CHARGES AGAINST SYRIA IN CONNECTION WITH THE ALMAGOR MURDERS ON AUGUST 19TH. WE WERE GREATLY HEARTENED BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON'S CALL TO THE COUNCIL TO "ACCEPT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACT WITH COURAGE AND WISDOM." IT IS OUR SINCERE HOPE THAT REGARDLESS OF THE FINAL OUTCOME, OUR COUNTRY'S FIRM POSITION WILL DETER FURTHER AGGRESSION IN THE MIDDLE AND PROMOTE STABILITY AND ORDER.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,
RABBI IRVING MILLER, CHAIRMAN
CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR
AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

September 4, 1963

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

June 3, 1963

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents
From: Yehuda Hellman

I would like to bring to your attention the following excerpt from the editorial which appeared in the Jerusalem Post on Friday, May 31. It deals with the possible consequences of the failure of the Tripartite Arab Federation to materialize at the present. The editorial, entitled "Through Israeli Eyes", points out the following:

"For Israel -- at least for the time being -- the outlook is not likely to change substantially one way or the other. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the indefinite deferment of Arab federation and the repeated failure to attain it are necessary a blessing. The raw, opinionated, inexperienced and numerically negligible Ba'th, which currently acts as a bulwark against total Nasserist domination of Iraq and Syria, could prove far more adventurous and reckless -- and therefore more of a threat to the area's peace and its security than Nasser. Moreover, the Ba'th cannot be said to hold any promise of real stability inside the countries in which it is now in power -- and without stability no Arab regime can hope to muster enough time or courage to do some badly needed fresh thinking on the subject of Israel's existence."

I also would like to bring to your attention the context of "Ben-Gurion's Exchange of Letters with JFK and Other Leaders on the Middle East." I am quoting on this the Jerusalem Post Diplomatic Reporter of Friday, May 31.

"The Foreign Ministry spokesman yesterday confirmed that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had recently exchanged letters with President Kennedy and "other heads of state" on the Middle East situation.

The exchange was initiated by Mr. Ben-Gurion in response to the dangers to Israel posed by the new moves for Arab federation.

It is believed that in addition to Mr. Kennedy, the Prime Minister communicated with Premier Khrushchev, President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan.

Officials confirmed a report in "Yediot Aharonot" yesterday that a reply had been received from Mr. Kennedy, but declined to comment on its contents.

Continued

Mr. Ben-Gurion's letters are understood to have proposed a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee of Israel's borders or, failing that, a military pact with the U.S. to deter Arab aggression -- proposals which he voiced in a television interview with the American CBS radio network.

Mr. Ben-Gurion also urged the powers to use their influence, publicly and through diplomatic channels, to proclaim their concern for the situation in the area and to dissuade Egypt from any adventures likely to lead to conflict.

It is believed the recent statements made in Washington, London and Paris, expressing concern for the stability of the region, were a direct result of these exchanges.

In his letters the Prime Minister is believed to have stressed that so long as there is no joint Soviet-U.S. agreement to withhold arms from Egypt, Israel must continue to strengthen its deterrent force. Mr. Ben-Gurion is believed to have pointed out to President Kennedy that the U.S. policy of trying to contain the arms race in the area, when Soviet arms continue to flow to Egypt, would merely deprive Israel of the weapons it needed and increase the danger of war."

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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May 24, 1963

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents

From: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find the edited and final text of the Letter which was sent in the name of the presidents associated in the Conference to the President of the United States.

This letter was dated May 22, 1963.

May 22, 1963

Hon. John F. Kennedy
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Thoughtful Americans share your concern over the threats to peace in the Middle East. Instead of diminishing, Arab threats to attack and destroy Israel have increased, accompanied by massive rearmament of Egypt and other Arab countries by the Soviet Union.

The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, therefore, welcomes the statement you made at your press conference on May 8th, voicing your determination to oppose aggression whether direct or indirect. The Conference is also gratified to know that it is our country's intention to work through the United Nations and to act on its own to prevent or stop such aggression.

Against this background, Mr. President, we most respectfully suggest to you that unless urgent steps are taken, especially by our own country, the serious situation now obtaining in the Middle East may well explode into war. Indeed, while the Arab States continue to receive arms in increasing numbers from the Soviet Union, the possession of additional deterrent arms by Israel would further deter aggression. In this context, your decision to sell Israel Hawk missiles was a meaningful and significant act.

Under all circumstances, it must be made clear beyond danger of miscalculation that Israel, openly and repeatedly threatened by liquidation, does not stand alone. Only thus can Arab designs for aggression be thwarted.

Once again, we are encouraged by the continuing and striking evidence of your concern with this problem, and your readiness to provide in this, as in so many other sensitive situations, firm and inspiring leadership.

Respectfully yours,

Irving Miller
Chairman

Following on the next page are the names of the presidents who comprise the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

Hon. John F. Kennedy
May 22, 1963
Page Two

Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein	President	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
Rabbi Joachim Prinz	President	American Jewish Congress
Rabbi Irving Miller	President	American Zionist Council
Mr. Moe Falikman	President	American Trade Union Council for Histadrut
Mr. Label Katz	President	B'nai B'rith
Mrs. S. Kramarsky	President	Hadassah
Dr. Emanuel Neumann	President	American Section of the Jewish Agency for Israel
Mr. Adolph Held	President	Jewish Labor Committee
Mr. Morton London	Commander	Jewish War Veterans of the United States
Mrs. Clara Leff	President	Labor Zionist Movement
Rabbi Mordechai Kirshblum	President	Mizrachi Hapoel Mizrachi
Mr. Lewis Weinstein	President	National Community Relations Advisory Council
Mrs. Joseph Willen	President	National Council of Jewish Women
Rabbi David Hill	President	National Council of Young Israel
Mr. Moses Feurestein	President	Union of Orthodox Jewish Organizations of America
Dr. Maurice Eisendrath	President	Union of American Hebrew Congregations
Mr. George Maislen	President	United Synagogue of America
Dr. Max Nussbaum	President	Zionist Organization of America

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

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Cable Address: COJOGRA

May 15, 1963

To: Members Associated in the Presidents Conference
From: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find a short summary of the meeting of May 13th,
which was held in the Delmonico Hotel and lasted from 1 P.M. to
3 P.M.

YH:cs
encl.

PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE MEETING
May 13, 1963

The meeting was called to order by the Chairman at 1 P.M. Rabbi Miller welcomed the guests, who expressed appreciation for the opportunity afforded them to meet the Conference. One of them made a few remarks of an informative nature. After the guests had left, Rabbi Miller called upon Mr. Katz and Commander London to report on their visit with Governor Harriman last Wednesday, May 8th.

Mr. Katz and Commander London discussed first their visit with Mr. Strong (Mr. Talbot was out of the country.) Both men pointed out that Mr. Strong had been firm in asserting that he did not feel the situation was as serious as they believed. Using the term, "Myth of the Missiles", he said all reports indicated that Egypt's weapons were unsophisticated and comparable to World War I bombs and TNT. He also stated outright that as far as the State Department was concerned, they would not recommend any sort of pact with Israel, since this would offset the efforts of the United States to wean the Arab countries away from Russia.

Mr. Harriman differed with Mr. Strong in his analysis of the missile programs. He said he was still awaiting evaluation of U.S. observers, but that the existence of missiles -- whether big or little -- was a very serious situation. However, he indicated that reports from the State Department and the Pentagon did not agree with our appraisals, and that he believed Israel could discharge itself well in any military undertaking.

Where a mutual agreement or draft pact were concerned, he said he thought this would be "counter-productive" for the same reasons Strong gave. As far as other affirmations of support, he said he relied greatly on the President's statement, and indicated that through private channels Nasser had been warned not to take any offensive action.

He condemned Radio Cairo propaganda as "the most vicious in the world", and also drew analogies between Indian nationalism and Arab pan-nationalism which were unfavorable to Nasser. He said that he could well understand and respect our position with respect to German scientists in Egypt.

At the close of the visit, Governor Harriman indicated his door was open for further discussion and consultation.

Mr. Sy Kenen then asked for the floor and informed the group of the legislative situation in connection with developments in the Middle East. He also suggested that letters should be written to the President commending him for his statement of May 8th, and urging that his

continued

affirmation of support be followed by more concrete and firm measures that would lead to implementation. However, he suggested that he felt the situation did not call for a mass campaign of letter-writing.

Mr. Label Katz suggested that a steering committee be appointed that could deal with this problem on a day-to-day basis. The committee could then be in a position to get all the information, study it, and then make suggestions for implementation.

A discussion followed in which Dr. Neumann, Rabbi Kaufman, Mrs. Halprin, Mr. Segal, Mr. London, Mr. Tabachinsky and Mr. Minkoff spoke. Almost all the speakers expressed themselves in support of a steering committee for the purpose of working out a well-considered statement to the President, and providing information and guidelines to the constituency. Caution was urged in formulating a letter to the President, in that both commendation and a call for firmer measures should be expressed. Commander London underlined that he would urge the steering committee not to send out any statement until all organizations receive a copy and express agreement with it.

Mr. Tabachinsky (speaking in Yiddish) asked that in the future the Chairman should always come prepared with concrete recommendations to the meeting, which the plenum would then discuss, either rejecting or accepting. This would make the discussions more concrete and more realistic. He also urged the Chairman not to forget his group this time, and appoint a representative from his organization to the steering committee.

Rabbi Miller summarized the discussion as follows:

1. The Chairman will appoint a steering committee to keep in daily touch with the present situation, and to take such action as is called for within the policy enunciated at this meeting.
2. Mr. Kenen will prepare a fact sheet which, upon approval of the steering committee, will be made available to the organizations, to be distributed among their constituencies for educational purposes.
3. Mr. Kenen will deal with the legislative situation in Washington and advise the steering committee of the results.
4. A letter will be prepared by the Chairman to be sent to the President with reference to his statement on May 8th, and will be circulated among the presidents. Upon receiving their approval, the letter will be forwarded to President Kennedy.

Following this summary, the meeting was adjourned.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

May 15, 1963

To: Members Associated in the Presidents Conference
From: Yehuda Hellman

Rabbi Miller has asked me to inform you that in conformity with the decisions as summarized at the meeting of the Conference of Presidents on May 13th, he has appointed the presidents (or their representatives) of the following organizations to serve on the steering committee, which is to deal with the present situation on a day-to-day basis:

1. American Israel Public Affairs Committee
2. American Jewish Congress
3. B'nai B'rith
4. Hadassah
5. Jewish Labor Committee
6. United Synagogue of America

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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May 16, 1963

To: All Members Associated in the Presidents Conference
From: Yehuda Hellman

Rabbi Miller has asked me to bring to your attention as soon as possible the following memorandum:

"I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I proposed to send to the President on behalf of the Conference, in accordance with the decision of last Monday's meeting.

Since time is of the essence, I would plead with you to read it immediately so that we may receive your approval no later than Friday, May 17, when the office of the Conference will call you on the phone."

YH:cs
encl.

Dear Mr. President:

The Conference of Presidents welcomes the statement on the Middle East which you made at your press conference on May 8th. It gave clear expression both to your determination to oppose aggression whether direct or indirect, as well as to our country's intention to work through the United Nations and to act on its own to prevent or stop such aggression.

Americans of all faiths share your concern over recent developments in the Middle East. Instead of diminishing, Arab threats to attack and destroy Israel have increased, accompanied by massive rearmament of Egypt and other Arab countries by the Soviet Union. Unless urgent and decisive steps are taken, more especially by our own country, the serious situation now obtaining in the Middle East may well explode into war.

Against this background we most respectfully suggest to you that a further clarification of the policy you enounced on the 8th of May would serve to remove doubts and dangers of miscalculation. || Indeed while the Arab States continue to receive arms in increasing numbers from the Soviet Union, the possession of deterrent arms by Israel would preserve the balance of military power and thus further deter aggression. In this context your decision to sell Israel Hawk missiles was a meaningful and significant act. Under all circumstances Israel, openly and repeatedly threatened with liquidation, must know that it does not stand alone. Only thus can Arab designs for aggression be thwarted.

Once again we are encouraged by the continuing and striking evidence of your concern with this problem and your readiness to provide in this, as in so many other sensitive situations, firm and inspiring leadership.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

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Cable Address: COJOGRA

April 24, 1963

To: Members Participating in the Conference of Presidents
From: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find a short summary of the meeting of the Presidents Conference which took place on April 5, 1963 at the Delmonico Hotel in New York.

YH:cs
encl.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

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MEETING OF APRIL 5, 1963

Rabbi Miller opened the meeting at 12:30, and thanked the guests who were present.

A comprehensive report about the work of German scientists in Egypt, and other related problems, was then rendered. The following members participated in the debate that ensued: Commander Morton London, Dr. Joachim Prinz, Rabbi David Hill, and Rabbi Irving Miller.

Rabbi Miller congratulated Dr. Emanuel Neumann, who had just assumed the chairmanship of the Jewish Agency in New York, and he wished him a successful tenure of office.

Rabbi Miller then proceeded to congratulate Mrs. Joseph Willen, the new President of the National Council of Jewish Women. He regretted very much that Mrs. Willen could not be present because of a previous commitment, and he requested Miss Hannah Stein to convey to her new President the sincere congratulations of the Presidents Conference. Miss Stein thanked Rabbi Miller in the name of Mrs. Willen, and said that she would convey the greetings of the gathering to her.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Rabbi Miller proceeded to discuss the budget of the Presidents Conference. He proposed that the Conference continue for the near future, as of April 1, 1963, on the same basis as in the previous year (April 1962-April 1963). Rabbi Miller told the Conference that the first meeting of the Subcommittee on Structure and Scope had already taken place on March 15, and that two further meetings were scheduled; one to take place on April 18 and the second on April 30. He said that this Committee would, among other things, review the budget of the Presidents Conference, and that in the meantime he proposed that the Conference continue without change until such time as Rabbi Kaufman would be able to bring in his report to the plenary meeting of the Conference of Presidents. Rabbi Miller's suggestion met with unanimous approval.

continued

The meeting then adjourned, and the Chairman thanked the guests present who had come especially in order to attend this meeting. He described the discussion that took place as very important and most useful.

The Presidents of the following organizations were either present or represented at this meeting:

American Israel Public Affairs Committee
American Jewish Congress
American Zionist Council
American Trade Union Council for Histadrut
B'nai B'rith
Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (OBSERVER)
Hadassah
Jewish Agency for Israel
Jewish Labor Committee
Jewish War Veterans of the United States
Labor Zionist Movement
Misrachi Hapoel Misrachi
National Community Relations Advisory Council
National Council of Jewish Women
National Council of Young Israel
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
Zionist Organization of America

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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May 14, 1963

To: Members Associated in the Conference of Presidents
From: Yehuda Hellman

The following resolution was passed in the Knesset following Prime Minister Ben Gurion's statement.

The Knesset notes the statement made by the Prime Minister on May 7, 1963.

The Knesset draws the attention of the great powers and world public opinion to the threat to Israel's existence which is contained in the plan of action of the Federation of Egypt, Syria and Iraq, headed by Nasser.

The Knesset instructs the Government to increase and strengthen the preventive force and state of preparedness of the Defence Force of Israel, and to continue to reinforce the frontier settlements.

YH:dm

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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Cable Address: COJOGRA

May 14, 1963

To: Members Associated in the Presidents Conference
From: Yehuda Hellman

The following is the text of the Foreign Policy Statement made by Prime Minister Ben Gurion in the Knesset in the afternoon of May 13th.

"We have done everything, and we shall continue to do everything, to prevent German experts assisting the Hitler of our days -- the one in Egypt - I believe the work that has been done has been successful and it has not yet been completed. But we shall not deceive the people, and distract their attention and the world's from the true danger that threatens us from our neighbours, with the ugly and dangerous racist theory that it is not Hitler's Fascist and Nazi teachings but the German race that constitutes a danger to Israel. A scientist from any other country who helps Nasser in his Nazi designs to destroy Israel is no less dangerous than a German scientist who does so; all the true danger that threatens us from Egypt consists in the conventional arms that flow to Egypt and are continuing to flow, though the suppliers know what the arms are meant for," Mr. Ben Gurion declared.

"Mr. Ben-Eliezer was right in saying that the main point of my statement was that Israel's policy is devoted to the prevention of war, and war will be prevented, not by saying 'peace, peace' when there is no peace, but in two ways, and in these alone: by constantly increasing the deterrent strength of the Israel Defense Forces and by securing the moral and political support of all those world forces that are as concerned as we are for the preservation of peace in the Middle East," the Prime Minister went on.

"We are in favour of general disarmament in Israel and the Arab countries under mutual supervision. Anyone who speaks specifically of limited and not general disarmament does not understand the reality of the position and ignores the dangers threatening us from conventional arms - and rockets, bombers, submarines, tanks, and artillery are conventional arms.

(Con't.)

"The position in our area is not like the position in the world at large. Here there is no cold war, in which no country threatens to destroy the other, but the contrary, all proclaim their desire for peaceful coexistence. In our area, not a single Arab country has yet declared in favour of peaceful coexistence, and the recent treaty of union between three Arab States contains an official declaration on the destruction of Israel under the mask of the liberation of Palestine.

"I know, from scores of talks that people who have visited Egypt have had with the Egyptian dictator, that he is capable of telling the man he is talking to whatever he would like to hear; he has no compunction in telling Smith one thing and Jones the opposite. I remember that about six months ago or more, he told two distinguished visitors, who, he apparently realized, were not enemies of Israel, that if Israel gave the Arab refugees freedom of choice whether to return to her territory, not more than sixty thousand refugees would return. And I should not be surprised if he told the American or British Ambassador tomorrow that he has no intention at all of attacking Israel, since Israel is not mentioned by name in the tripartite treaty, and that all the anxiety of lovers of peace and friends of Israel during the past few weeks is without foundation.

"Perhaps some people may be, or may pretend to be, simple enough to accept such hypocritical statements. But I am confident that not only will the Jews in Israel and the world at large not be deceived by these verbal acrobatics, but the same also applies to every upright and decent man who is truly concerned for peace in the area, and does not want to see Israel destroyed, even if the process is described as "the liberation of Palestine."

Referring to the failure of Nasser's visit to Algeria last week and the Ben-Bella--Nasser joint declaration on the "Liberation of Palestine," the Prime Minister declared: "Not common friendship for the benefit of the Arab peoples, but common hatred of Israel - that is the only thing which unites the Arab rulers today. This is what we must bring to the attention of the entire world - Governments and public opinion; we must bring home to the world the grave danger involved in this hatred, and its moral and political responsibility to ensure, as far as possible, peaceful coexistence for all the countries and all the peoples in this area."

Mr. Ben-Gurion replied to opposition members who had discussed alliances and guarantees, saying "There is nothing wrong in an alliance that is meant only for defence.

"But neither a guarantee nor an alliance is sufficient without strength of our own, adequate to deter because it can act at a time of inescapable necessity, and act with success. Such a force, and only such a force, is capable of deterring and preventing war. Therefore, we must, to the utmost of our capacity, increase the deterrent strength of the Israel Defence Forces."

Pointing out "that not all our friends understand the vital need to increase the deterrent strength of the Israel Defence Forces as the most effective means of preserving peace," Mr. Ben-Gurion referred to President Kennedy's statement

(Continued)

last Wednesday saying, "He continues to follow the traditional American policy of friendship towards Israel, is not content with continuing this assistance, but has made a number of important new departures in this direction. It is not out of an unfriendly attitude to the Arab peoples that he does so - America gives more aid to the Arab countries than does any other State. The aid to Israel is given out of a sincere desire to assist in the development of this small country, the only one in the Middle East that is capable of serving as an example to all its neighbours - and it serves as an example to many developed countries - in its democratic regime, the liberty of its citizens and respect for human dignity."

In conclusion the Prime Minister declared: If it was in the American President's power to prevent the flow of arms to all the countries of the Near East, he would undoubtedly bring great benefits to the area and to the world, and there is nothing for which we more fervently pray than to be rid of the need to waste manpower and material resources on defence - resources that we need so much in order to absorb the immigrants, develop the country, especially its wastelands, improve education, and foster science, literature and the arts. But the President of the United States is as well aware as I am that we are the only country in the world all of whose neighbours preach its destruction and are preparing to wipe it off the face of the earth.

"If there was a possibility of joint action between the United States and the Soviet Union, not only to prevent the arms race, but to bring about, as we propose, general disarmament in Israel and the Arab countries, thus safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial independence of all the Middle East countries - that would be one of the greatest acts of peace in the world. I do not know whether this is possible at this time, though that is what we aspire for, and the moment the two powers respond to this demand we shall be ready to respond to a joint demand from them, in the hope that our neighbors will do the same, for I have hardly the slightest doubt that these two powers are capable of bringing about peace in our area through joint and coordinated action.

"At this hour, however, no such joint action exists, though I do not despair of the possibility in the future. And when there is no joint action the President of the U.S. can only withhold arms from Israel, but he has no power at all to prevent the constant stream of arms to Egypt from the countries of the Communist bloc.

"Thus the limitation of the arms race of which the President speaks - and I have no doubt at all of his good intentions - amounts in practice only to the withholding of arms from Israel, at a time when Egypt, whose armaments are already twice or three times those of Israel - continues to receive a flow of arms from the Soviet Union and its allies. It is just such one-sided action that is liable to intensify the danger of war in the Middle East.

"Israel therefore insists - and I am confident that the American people, headed by its President, will understand this - that so long as there is no cooperation between the two great powers for safeguarding the peace and security of all the countries of the Middle East, and Egypt continues to receive arms from one side - Israel is entitled to strengthen her forces with sufficient equipment to enable them to serve the principal purpose to which they are dedicated: to deter and to prevent war.

(Continued)

"This is Israel's policy, and she is entitled both to aid in strengthening her Defence Forces, and to joint efforts to ensure peace for all the countries in the area, from all the states in the world to whom peace is not an empty slogan but a sincere desire, as it is the most profound and sincere desire of Israel."

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CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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May 10, 1963

To: Members participating in the Presidents Conference
From: Yehuda Hellman

The New York Times of Friday, May 10th, carries a dispatch datelined Jerusalem, May 9th, under the heading of: "KENNEDY'S STAND PLEASES ISRAELIS". Commenting on the statement by the President in his press conference of May 8th concerning the situation in the Middle East, Mr. W. Granger Blair, cabling to the United States from Israel, wrote: "The Israeli Government's attitude was believed to be reflected in a general way in editorials published by the newspapers, Jerusalem Post and Maariv."

Following please find the full text of the Jerusalem Post editorial which was referred to. As you can see, the headline of the New York Times does not reflect fully the position expressed by the Jerusalem Post.

"President Kennedy's statement will be welcomed in Israel. It is good that the U.S. should be concerned for our security and that of the whole area; it is good that they should say that they are opposed to aggression and preparation for aggression. In fact, despite the State Department's habitual doubts and hesitations, this country has many genuine friends in the United States.

Such a basis of underlying friendship can produce a somewhat incomplete gesture, such as that made yesterday: in the long run it is much more to be valued than technical help given as a matter of political expediency. But it is by no means an empty gesture. A reasonable Nasser -- and that is the face he turns to the U.S. -- should accept the statement as a warning that he cannot possibly gain by any attempt to destroy Israel. But perhaps, if he were reasonable, we should in any case not have to fear an attempt to destroy us.

At the same time it is clear that the American statement does not go far, and cannot go very far. Once rocket war has been launched on us, it will be too late to "take steps." Throughout the turbulent 15 years of the State, it has been our aim to prevent attack before it starts. And what constitutes "preparation for aggression"? The destruction of Israel is listed high up among the aims of Nasser's new Federation, and yet the British have already given their opinion that this is not evidence that any Arab state is contemplating an attack on Israel, that is, preparing for aggression.

(Continued)

Would it constitute "preparation for aggression" if a Nasser-engineered coup in Jordan brought Egyptian military forces into the other half of the Old City without a shot being fired? In 1956 it was held here that if Iraqi troops crossed the Jordan and established themselves on the western bank of the river, we should consider our security had been threatened. Would Pentagon military experts necessarily consider such a move a threat? And would America also consider itself under an obligation to intervene if, under such circumstances, we used force to secure our strategic position on the frontier of a Kingdom of Jordan that might have ceased to exist in the meantime?

Certainly, threats from Egypt have been perennial, and have not always materialized, so that the wording of the threats is perhaps no longer the main clue to peace or war. We have reconciled ourselves to the position that the desire to destroy us exists, and learned to judge the seriousness of the actual position at any point by examining the Egyptian military potential, and any strategic advantage that the Federation might offer Nasser. We cannot expect any outside power to estimate the gravity of this situation exactly as we do, nor can we, in a matter of our own survival and security, be expected to accept the judgment of anyone not immediately involved. President Kennedy's statement, therefore, is in the nature of the "moral and political influence" which Mr. Ben-Gurion on Monday said was the second element in the prevention of an outbreak, having listed the deterrent strength of our own military forces as the first.

It is worth remembering, however, that there is a healthy realism in the U.S. today. They have been involved in the sharpest form of Cold War with the Soviet Union for so long that they differentiate without any difficulty between lip-service to world peace and appeals for global disarmament, and the stubborn refusal to permit efficient inspection of nuclear armaments. If they will judge Nasser as carefully by his armaments, his expansionism and his methods of bringing about political change in his Federation partners, we shall have considerably less to worry about."

(Jerusalem Post - May 8, 1963)

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

May 10, 1963

To: Members participating in the Presidents Conference

From: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find a short summary of the meeting of the Presidents Conference, which took place on Tuesday, May 7th, in the Delmonico Hotel in New York.

A more detailed summary of the minutes is also available, and we will be happy to send it out upon request.

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PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE MEETING
MAY 7, 1963

The meeting was called to order by the Chairman at 11 A.M. Rabbi Miller announced that the next meeting of the Presidents Conference would take place as planned on May 13th at 1 P.M. He then went on to discuss the reasons for calling this special assembly.

Rabbi Miller explained that the Jewish War Veterans and the American Jewish Congress had, in letters to him, objected to his sending a letter to Governor W. Averell Harriman on April 22, requesting an appointment. This letter had followed the Harriman statement to Representative Farbstein, made public on April 12, in which, Rabbi Miller said, "Harriman sought somehow to justify the presence of German scientists in Cairo." The two organizations had questioned Rabbi Miller's prerogative to write this particular letter without the authorization of the Conference and without taking action to express the views of the Conference with respect to the Harriman statement. After reading the letters in question into the record, Rabbi Miller called for discussion.

Commander London and Rabbi Prinz expounded on their viewpoints. Both agreed that the core of their objection was in the procedure involved in taking such action. Commander London said: "Some presidents have been consulted but not all of us were. We should have called a meeting immediately, met on short notice and discussed it." Rabbi Prinz stated: "We are your counselors. By sitting around the table we might have arrived at the very same decision, but I want to be consulted on such matters." He also expressed regret that "the voice of this Conference was not heard..." in response to Harriman's statement.

Mr. Tabachinsky, Rabbi Kirshblum, and Mr. Label Katz supported Rabbi Miller in his decision to send the letter. Mr. Tabachinsky criticized the group for what he felt amounted to bickering, and explained that his organization was excluded from consultation very often because it was not part of the Subcommittee, and requested that this situation be remedied. Rabbi Kirshblum urged that this matter be put aside for a discussion of more crucial issues, and expressed the view that a meeting with Harriman would result in a full report on the Middle East situation, and a more realistic basis for making decisions. Mr. Katz stated: "I do not share the viewpoint that the Chairman cannot make this kind of overture, not only to Mr. Harriman, but to any government official. As long as the Chairman does not enunciate a policy statement, he has the right to maintain contact and relationships." Mr. Minkoff felt that the Technical Subcommittee should have been consulted, and suggested that its actual functions be reviewed.

Rabbi Miller explained that, prior to sending the letter to Harriman, he had consulted with his predecessors, Phil Klutznick and Label Katz. It was their opinion also that an attack on Harriman was not wise at that time. He stressed that the letter in question was for the purpose of establishing contact with Harriman and involving him. There were no congratulations or an ensuing exchange of messages. He agreed that the letter should have been circulated and regretted this oversight, but held

that "any action on the part of the Conference before a visit with Harriman would have been very inadvisable."

In answer to a question by Mr. Maslow, Rabbi Miller explained that there was a delay in calling a Subcommittee meeting after the initial request on April 12th (a Friday), because of the Passover Holidays. The Subcommittee was convened at the earliest practical date.

This discussion was brought to a close by Rabbi Kaufman's proposal that the procedures involved in sending the letter to Harriman, along with the question of the Subcommittee's functions, be referred to the Committee on Structure and Scope. This proposal was seconded by Dr. Neumann and Mr. Minkoff, and unanimously accepted.

Rabbi Miller then disclosed that as a result of his letter, a meeting had been arranged with Mr. Harriman, Mr. Label Katz and himself for the following day, May 8th at 5 P.M. Mr. Talbot had also requested that Rabbi Miller visit him first at 4 P.M. the same day.

A comprehensive discussion followed on the situation in the Middle East, particularly as it effects Israel's security. Rabbi Bernstein, Mr. Katz, Commander London, Mr. Minkoff, Dr. Neumann, Mrs. Leff and Mr. Barr took part in this discussion.

Dr. Neumann requested that Rabbi Miller come to the next meeting on May 13th with formulated recommendations based on the talks with Harriman, with regard to the counsel and guidance to be offered to the organizations, and with regard to a public statement of position, whether by the Presidents Conference as a whole, or by individual organizations. He expressed his belief that the discussion had been valuable and enlightening.

Mr. Barr felt that it was unfortunate that the American Jewish Committee was neither a participant or an observer in the Presidents Conference. He also expressed strong disapproval of individuals who were leaving before the close of the meeting, and particularly that no concrete decisions had been reached.

Rabbi Miller responded to Mr. Barr's last point by saying that meaningful action could be taken only after the visit with Harriman, and that the meeting on Monday would be the appropriate time for such decisions.

Dr. Freund from Hadassah declared that her group would not wait until Monday, and would take action now. She expressed disappointment that the Table of the Presidents Conference had not been represented at the important Public Affairs Committee meeting held last weekend.

Mr. Minkoff agreed with Rabbi Miller that the Conference as a whole could not take action today, but believed that it had not been indicated that individual organizations must also wait. Rabbi Miller, and the assembly at large, confirmed Mr. Minkoff's impression.

The meeting was then adjourned by Rabbi Miller.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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December 17, 1962

To: Members participating in the Conference of Presidents

From: Yehuda Hellman

We are enclosing herewith the statement by Mrs. Golda Meir, Foreign Minister of Israel, in the Special Political Committee of the United Nations on December 14, 1962.

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has a
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Statement by Mrs. Golda Meir, Foreign Minister of Israel
in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly
on December 14, 1962

Mr. Chairman,

For fifteen sessions of the General Assembly, this Committee has debated the refugee problem. There are certainly many distinguished representatives here who have heard it for years. Although the item on the agenda is entitled, "Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East", very little has been said by Arab representatives on the relief and works functions which constitute the mandate of the Agency itself. No serious attempt has been made by them to suggest improvements of the UNWRA operation to enable more people to find means of self-support and rehabilitation in their new surroundings; this was clearly not their main object of concern in our discussions.

With the opening of the debate, the Arab delegations proclaim their theme: Israel must not exist.

In their speeches the Arab spokesmen are trying to assert that Israel is not a nation; that the Jews are not a people; that the Jews have no real connection with the Holy Land; that Zionism is a sinister imperialist conspiracy; that the United Nations had no right to take the decision in 1947; that it was not the Arabs who had attacked Israel after that decision. This year, Arab representatives have treated the Committee to an innovation: an attempt to rewrite the Bible.

Distinguished delegates are by now so thoroughly familiar with the subject that I do not have to deal with the Arab allegations point by point. I feel, though, that some brief reference to the background may not be out of place. The first expression of Zionism occurred when the Children of Israel were led by Moses from Egyptian bondage into the Promised Land. Although at various stages our land was conquered and occupied by mighty foreign empires, the Jewish people never submitted to their rules. Historical records, now supplemented by archeological discoveries all over the Middle East, bear testimony to Israel's rebellions against foreign rulers and its struggle for independence. Although twice driven into exile by superior forces and dispersed among the nations of the world, there never was a Jewish community anywhere which severed its links with the land of its forefathers. For generation upon generation, throughout the centuries, Jews have turned towards Jerusalem in their daily devotions, and the words of the Psalmist, "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem," have become perhaps the most essential tenet of Judaism. The Bible, at once, set the distinctive course of Israel and of the land of Israel in human history, a course of interlocked and lasting destiny.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask your indulgence, and that of the Committee, to read to you here a passage from the official Report of the Palestine Royal Commission of July 1937:

"While the Jews had thus been dispersed over the world, they had never forgotten Palestine. If Christians have become familiar through the Bible with the physiognomy of the country and its placenames and events that happened more than two thousand years ago, the link which binds the Jews to Palestine and its past history is to them far closer and

more intimate. Judaism and its ritual are rooted in those memories. Among countless illustrations it is enough to cite the fact that the Jews, wherever they may be, still pray for rain at the season it is needed in Palestine. And the same devotion to the Land of Israel, Eretz Israel, the same sense of exile from it, permeates Jewish secular thought. Some of the finest Hebrew poetry written in the diaspora has been inspired like the Psalms of the Captivity by the longing to return to Zion.

"Nor has the link been merely spiritual or intellectual. Always or almost always since the fall of the Jewish State, some Jews have been living in Palestine. Under Arab rule there were substantial Jewish communities in the chief towns. In the period of the Crusades and again in the Mongol invasions, they were nearly but not entirely blotted out. Under Ottoman rule they slowly recovered. Fresh immigrants arrived from time to time, from Spain in the sixteenth century, from Eastern Europe in the seventeenth. They settled mainly in Galilee, in numerous villages spreading northwards to the Lebanon and in the towns of Safad and Tiberias. Safad, which according to Jewish tradition contained as many as 15,000 Jews in the sixteenth century, became a centre of Rabbinical learning and exercised a profound influence on Jewish thought throughout the diaspora."

The Report continues:

"Small though their numbers were, the continued existence of those Jews in Palestine meant much to all Jewry. Multitudes of poor Jews and ignorant Jews in the ghettos of Eastern Europe felt themselves represented, as it were, by this remnant of their race who were keeping a foothold in the land against the day of the coming of the Messiah.

"This belief in the divine promise of eventual return to Palestine largely accounts for the steadfastness with which the Jews of the diaspora clung to their faith and endured persecution."

What wonder then that down the ages this unique phenomenon has inspired men of spirit and vision to support the restoration of the Jewish people to its land. What could be more natural than that this people again and again produced a leader to advance this cause and organize a movement for its realization? A mind as sensitive as that of Theodor Herzl was shocked into recognition of the tragedy of Jewish homelessness by the Dreyfus trial. Maybe this is something that cannot be understood by those who deride and besmirch the Jewish liberation movement, when men like Herzl joined hands in various parts of the world to put an end to the indignity and humiliation suffered by Jews because they were Jews. What purpose or ideal is there in any national liberation movement if not the restoration, to a people and to each individual in it, of their rightful national and personal dignity? What could be more natural than the conclusion that only the revival of Jewish statehood could make this possible? What could be more natural than looking back at the land from which Jewish nationhood had stemmed, in which it had existed for centuries and where it had created its culture, and from which it had been expelled by force?

The recognition of this fundamental truth was the cause for the Balfour Declaration, for the League of Nations Mandate, for the support that we have en-

joyed throughout the years from many men and women of different faiths throughout the world, and finally for the resolution of the United Nations to establish a Jewish State in part of Palestine. No oratory and no vituperation can change these historic facts.

Let us now consider for a moment the fulfilment of the aspirations of the Arab national movement. What was the political landscape in the Middle East before the First World War? Not a single independent Arab State existed at that time. The area that is now Israel, Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon were vilayets of the Syrian Province of the Ottoman Empire. What is today Iraq and the independent states in the Arabian Peninsula were also provinces of that Empire. Only in the framework of the political settlement after the First World War did a pattern of new territorial entities emerge.

It is interesting to remember that those territories which are now independent Arab States have become such as a result of what the Arab delegations have described here as "imperialist machinations". With the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and only then, did Palestine become a separate political entity designated by the League of Nations in 1921 to contain the national home of the Jewish people. In the White Paper of 1922, Mr. Churchill limited the territory to which the Jewish National Home provisions of the Mandate applied, to the land situated west of the Jordan River, i.e. to less than one-fourth of the original area of the Mandate. In 1947 this latter area, by the Resolution of the United Nations of 29 November, was further partitioned. The State of Israel today has about 8,000 square miles; the area in the Middle East in which the Arab States have gained their independence since the end of the First World War covers over 3,000,000 square miles.

I should like in this connection to quote here from the statement made in the Committee by the distinguished Representative of Liberia:

"It would have been a sad spectacle for us if our brethren occupying the 11,545,000 square miles which comprised Africa had refused to yield us only 45,000 square miles as an asylum from man's inhumanity to man. They gave us the land, and we have co-operated as kin and kith in every conceivable way. Anything to the contrary is outrageously false."

As my colleague, Ambassador Comay, has told the Committee, there were elements in the 1947 Resolution that were painful to us -- yet we accepted the compromise. Had the Arabs done likewise, the history of the Middle East would have taken an entirely different course -- a course of co-operation, friendship and constructive development for all, without war and the destruction of life and property, and without refugees.

This, Mr. Chairman, is the authentic version of events. Even if the Arab Governments are as yet unwilling or incapable of understanding the spiritual and moral sources of the aspirations of the Jewish people for the renewal of its statehood, they will have to accept the fact that that statehood will not be given up, even in the face of aggressive speeches or threats of force.

We are today faced with an Arab refugee problem as a result of the war which the Arab States launched against Israel in 1947 and 1948. This has remained the only group of refugees whose lot has not been eased by their own kinsmen. Many millions of other refugees, displaced as a result of wars and upheavals, have been received and rehabilitated by their people and been permitted to

lead a normal life amongst them. In some instances the solution lay in an exchange of populations, as in the case of Greece and Turkey. The Arab refugee problem is the only instance where out of political considerations, hundreds of thousands of people are compelled to remain refugees, denied natural acceptance by their own kinsmen. How can one reconcile the outcry over the fate of the refugees living on international charity with the fierce opposition to any plan of constructive development, of resettlement, and of integration designed to rehabilitate these unfortunate people?

I mentioned that in some cases the solution lay in an exchange of population. I should like to emphasize the fact that we in Israel have received since 1948 over 500,000 Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, that is, practically the same number as that of Arabs who left the area which is Israel.

These Jewish refugees from Arab States and their children comprise a very substantial part of Israel's total population. A striking indication of this lies in the fact that no less than 55 percent of the children of grade-school age in Israel are from families which came to Israel from the countries which are members of the Arab league.

On their arrival in Israel the occupational structure of these Jewish refugees was heavily imbalanced. Less than one percent of them in their countries of origin had been engaged in agriculture; less than two percent had been engaged in the building trades; a very substantial percentage were illiterate. The vast majority could be absorbed initially only in unskilled work, and nearly all had to be taught new trades and occupations before they could be fully integrated into the country's growing economy.

Our approach to these refugees was that they were our brothers and sisters; they must be given full equality, not just in theory but in practice; they must be helped to take a productive part in our economy and our public life, and their children in particular must be helped quickly to move upwards on the educational ladder so that within as short a period as possible they would reach the general level.

Of course, this policy could not be carried out without what has been referred to in Dr. Davis' Report as "uneconomic" expenditure. I think that these expenditures produce the greatest economic asset that any society could possibly wish for or possess, namely, human beings who have regained their dignity, who realize the extent of their God-given capacities and are filled with the desire to express those capacities in their own interests and in the interest of the society of which they are part.

As a result of this attitude towards these refugees and of the determination to help them transform themselves as rapidly as possible into productive citizens, we have seen this growing section of our population change with striking speed. Those who were unemployable on their arrival are today gainfully employed in agriculture, industry, mining, communications and services. Those who needed assistance upon their arrival for their most elementary needs of shelter, medical care, food, clothing and education, today are making their full contribution as self-supporting citizens to the common good.

I do not think that we in Israel are at all unique in this respect. I could mention a number of countries which in the period since the end of World War II have reacted in the same way to human challenge of refugee populations of their own kinsmen, both in Europe and Asia. We have listened with interest to

what the distinguished Representative of Greece has told the Committee, about the reception centres for Greek refugees arriving in his country since 1957. It is not without significance that precisely where such an attitude had been displayed it has resulted not only in the transformation of refugees into citizens, but also in the economic growth and development of the countries receiving them.

The eyes of the refugees should be directed towards the future, towards the opportunities present in his existing environment to which he is closely linked by ties of language, culture, faith and customs.

The central aspect of the Arab presentations which we have heard during the debate this year, as on so many previous occasions, is that the refugee is used as a political instrument for the attainment of negative and destructive objectives which we have heard defined in this very Committee in terms diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

I have no doubt what members of the United Nations think of these objectives or of the spirit which advances them. It breeds not peace but war. It is a spirit which does not solve refugees problems but which, if permitted to express itself in action, would create only additional human misery in the entire area.

Mr. Chairman, I shall now refer specifically to the Report of the Commissioner General of UNRWA. It is well to remember that UNRWA is not the only United Nations Agency dealing with refugees. It is striking that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is in a position to report annually on the progress that is being made towards a constructive and rapid solution of similar problems which have sprung up all over the world. Yet the UNRWA Report which we have before us specifically recommends the exclusion of all economic and development projects for the future of the refugees. When Dr. Davis goes beyond the immediate scope of his mandate to tell us of the feelings of the whole Arab Middle East, would it not at least also be proper for him to ascertain and report the views and feelings of the people of Israel on this subject as well? And, in describing Arab feelings, would it not be relevant to enlighten us about the spirit and intent in which the Arabs claim repatriation?

To illustrate my point, Mr. Chairman, I should like to read to you from a despatch published on 28 July 1962, by the Beirut Daily "AL-HAYAT", which reports on a proposal by Dr. Izzat Tannous, who addressed the Committee yesterday. The Report says:

"He (Dr. Tannous) proposes the establishment of a large Palestine army that will constitute the spearhead of the Arab forces for the liberation of Palestine. This army will be mobilized from all Palestinians in equal measure, and, if need be, there will be compulsory mobilization at a rate of ten percent of the Palestinians. In accordance with the proposal a Palestine army of 100,000 officers and men will be raised in Jordan; of 35,000 in the Gaza strip; of 10,000 in Syria; of 12,000 in the Lebanon; of 500 in Iraq, and so on. In other words, a total army of over 157,000 strong will be mobilized.

"Each army will be trained in the country of its location under the direction of a Supreme Military Committee common

to all the Arab States, which will coordinate the various parts of the army. This committee will be subordinate to the Arab League.

"By itself, the army will not be able to rescue Palestine, but its task will be to be the spearhead, and without doubt, the Arab States are now preparing for the day of battle."

Another illustration: Radio Cairo announced on 11 November 1962, that the United Arab Republic is training Palestinians, and went on to say:

"The leaders of the Palestinian nation in Gaza reported that the publication of the constitution represents an additional setup towards the liberation of their homeland, particularly after the UAR had strengthened the Palestinian armed forces and had thoroughly trained them."

I think we are entitled to ask whether the refugees so enlisted continue to be wards of UNRWA.

The same campaign of hatred and destruction is used to pervert the souls and minds of the young. Dr. Luther Evans, former Director-General of UNESCO, stated in 1957: "Arab children are being taught, with UNESCO funds, that some day they will push the Israelis into the sea." School-books and readers published in Cairo and Damascus, and used by UNRWA, are full of examples bearing out Dr. Evans' statement. For example, the 1959 story of the "UNRWA-UNESCO Arab Refugee Schools", by Robert Faherty, says:

"The reading room displays a large map of Palestine, with a legend above it: 'The Holy Land, which was lost cheaply, will not be restored without bloodshed of the new generation.' "

What would the attitude be of any country represented here regarding the admission into its territory of people brought up in this spirit?

I now turn to the economic aspects of the Report before us. It stresses two negative views regarding the unemployable status of the refugees and the lack of absorptive capacity in the host countries.

The main reason given the refugees' "unemployable status" is that "traditionally....the oncoming generation has acquired its skills by working with the parent or some other family member, and that young adult refugees have not been able to learn to farm in this way." This is an argument which goes against the whole trend of current economic thinking.

The Middle East lands, like developing countries elsewhere, are for the most part going through a transition period, with a consequent change in patterns of employment, and the acquisition of new skills. Even in farming, old methods are giving way to new techniques.

It has been recognized more and more that in economic progress, human adap-

tability is no less important than capital and natural resources. Thus the Secretary-General in his recent "Proposals for Action for the United Nations Development Decade," in May 1962, points out:

"Recently there has also been much more widespread realization of the importance of the human factor in economic development. Research and experience have indicated that the contribution of physical capital alone is by no means as dominant as had at one time been imagined. This realization opened up new approaches through education, training, community development, use of idle manpower and eradication of disease to use the vast latent human resources of the developing countries. While at the beginning of the last decade the problem of developing countries was viewed essentially as a problem of producing wealth, by the end of the decade it became widely acknowledged that the crucial factor was not production but rather the capacity to produce, which is inherent in people."

(Document E/3613, pp.11-12)

By passing judgement on the potential manpower of the refugee population as largely "unemployable", by writing off the younger adult refugees as handicapped for life, the UNRWA Report is in effect casting doubt on the possibility of newer countries to develop their economies. The economic and social development of these countries requires training in new skills, and I have tried to show how this problem has found its solution in my own country.

In the 1959 Report of the late Secretary-General, he was much less inclined to regard the refugees as doomed to unemployment for life. His view was that the integration of the Arab refugee population was practicable as part of the general economic development of the area. He presented calculations as to the total capital investments required for this end and showed that capital of that magnitude could be obtained.

Regarding the lack of capacity of the host countries, the UNRWA Report states that a major proportion of them "must cross an international boundary if they are to find suitable employment without resort on the part of the host countries to uneconomic investment of considerable magnitude." (At the last Assembly, the Commissioner-General stated that this applied to two-thirds of the refugees.) This necessarily prompts the question, how the Commissioner-General's view on this point can be reconciled with his opinion that the refugees are unemployable. If that indeed is so, which countries will open their gates to them? It further raises the question, why investment in refugee resettlement should be "uneconomic"? I have already referred at some length to this contention which is not borne out by the experience of Israel and other developing countries who are faced with employment problems.

In 1953, the Acting Director of UNRWA estimated that, given the cooperation of the host Governments, 445,000 refugees could be made self-supporting in the host countries from 1954 to 1958, on the basis of the programme agreements already concluded with these Governments. This did not materialize because of political obstacles, and not because of the lack of absorptive capacity in these countries. In the meantime, substantial spontaneous integration into the economic life of the host countries is taking place in spite of all the difficulties.

I must now dwell in some detail on the numbers of Arab refugees. There is no doubt that the present UNRWA rolls are being inflated. There are not a million-odd bonafide refugees and there never were. On 31 December 1946, according to the figures supplied by the Government of Palestine to UNSCOP, the total number of Arabs in unpartitioned Palestine was 1,288,000. Of this number were resident in the former mandated territory, later annexed by Jordan, about 500,000. In the area later annexed by Egypt, namely the Gaza Strip, there were over 100,000. Furthermore, about 100,000 Arabs never left the area which is now Israel, and a further 40,000 returned to Israel. The total of Arabs, therefore, who left the area which is Israel could not have exceeded 540,000 to 550,000.

As the Commissioner-General has pointed out, at least twenty percent were immediately absorbed, and never became dependent on UNRWA. This should have left about 400,000 genuine refugees on the rolls. But, as United Nations documents indicate, the original lists of relief recipients in 1948-49 included not only refugees, but also a large proportion of impoverished local inhabitants. On 4 November 1949, the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly a "Report of Assistance to Palestine Refugees" (Document A/1060). In a passage headed "Difficulty of Definition" this Report describes the haphazard way in which the relief rolls were compiled, the lack of any eligibility test, and the extreme difficulty in practice to distinguish between persons displaced from their homes as a result of hostilities, indigent or unemployed local residents, and nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin who would naturally gather at places where food was being distributed. The Secretary-General added that a considerable percentage of the refugees were in small villages where the food was being distributed by the local mayor and it could not be doubted that in many cases individuals who could not qualify as being "bonafide" refugees were in fact on relief rolls. In the same year, 1949, the Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Commission to the Middle East (the Clapp Report), (Document A/AC/25/6) estimated that at least 160,000 non-refugees had managed to get on to the relief rolls.

During the years since then, as has often been pointed out in UNRWA Reports, the figures have become even more inflated. In Table I, annexed to this year's report, a footnote warns that -

"The above statistics are based on the Agency's registration records which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as the high rate of unreported deaths and undetected false registrations."

In addition, the Agency has no adequate machinery for checking which of the refugees have become wholly or partly self-supporting. This would in any circumstances not have been easy to find out, since only 40 percent of the refugees live in camps. A substantial measure of "spontaneous absorption", taking place in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, is not adequately reflected in UNRWA statistics.

These are some of the factors which explain the inflation of the rolls. The Agency claims that since 1950, more than 425,000 names have been removed from the rolls through routine processes (Information Paper No. 6, September 1962). A good part of those names must relate to "bonafide" refugees registered in 1949 who, as we have pointed out, were about 400,000. Naturally, there is a fair margin of error in any such calculations. But, even allowing for natural increase, it is clear that only a part of UNRWA's present grand total of 1,174,760 fall within the accepted definition of Palestinian refugees.

The rectification of the rolls has come up repeatedly in Annual Reports and Assembly Resolutions, but it has not been carried out due to the opposition of the host Governments.

Mr. Chairman, the Arab Governments must not be allowed to make of UNRWA an instrument in the Arab warfare against Israel. My delegation has always voted in favour of appropriations for the Agency. I am sure that it was also the intention of all other delegations that the funds should be used for the immediate welfare of the refugees as well as for constructive endeavors which would aid them to become productive members of their communities.

I should now like to turn to Draft Resolution A/SPC/L.90, which proposes the appointment of a "United Nations Custodian for the administration and protection of Arab property, assets and property rights within Israel." That demand -- which has been repeatedly rejected by the General Assembly -- for the appointment of a United Nations custodian to administer property within Israel, has been aptly described by a number of distinguished delegates in this Committee as being designed to strike at the very foundations of Israel's sovereignty. A measure of this kind, deliberately and without justification aimed at interfering in the internal affairs and very sovereignty of a member-State, is utterly without foundation in the Charter and in international law. Furthermore, the Draft Resolution contains a deliberately misleading paraphrase of Resolution 394(V) of 14 December 1950. That Resolution did not direct the Palestine Conciliation Commission to take measures for the protection of the rights, property and interests of the Palestine Arab refugees, as is stated in the first preambular paragraph of the Draft. Its direction to the Conciliation Commission was quite different, namely to continue consultations with the parties regarding measures for the protection of those rights and interests.

There has in fact been a great deal of cooperation between the Israel Government and the Conciliation Commission on a number of property questions, e.g. the programme for the identification and evaluation of Arab immovable property, the actual release of blocked accounts of all Arab refugees in Israel banks, amounting to over nine million dollars, and the transfer of the contents of a great number of safe-deposit lockers and valuables left behind in Israel by Arab refugees. Israel's actions in these matters have been based on the voluntary exercise of its sovereign prerogatives.

In my statement in this Committee on 15 December 1961, I explained fully how the abandoned Arab properties were many years ago taken over by the State in order to ensure their proper utilization and integration into the national economy. The figures produced by Arab spokesmen about the extent of the Arab land holdings are completely incorrect. The abandoned properties have certainly not brought my Government the alleged vast revenues.

In view of the strange Arab interpretations of international law which have been repeatedly given in this Committee, I find it necessary to recall with the utmost brevity the relevant applicable principles. Firstly, property within every sovereign State is exclusively and beyond question subject to the laws of that State. Secondly, the United Nations has no competence whatsoever to interfere in these matters. Thirdly, this situation is not altered by the fact that the individual claimants happen to be refugees. All this, too, my delegation set forth fully last year, and I shall not take up the Committee's time by repeating now our position.

From the outset my Government has offered to pay compensation for the property abandoned by the Arab refugees. In any negotiations about compensation, Israel has reserved the right to present claims for the properties of the half a million Jewish refugees from Arab countries, as well as the assets of Israel that were taken over or destroyed by Arab Governments during the war in areas under Arab control.

Mr. Chairman, we have before us a Draft Resolution sponsored by twenty-one members of the United Nations (Document A/SPC/L.89), calling for the solving of disputes by peaceful negotiations. My delegation welcomes this initiative which points at the very root of the problem. We have always taken the view that all outstanding issues between nations, including of course, those between us and our neighbours, should be discussed directly between the parties concerned. This specific Draft Resolution, in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, undoubtedly gives sincere expression to the desire of many Governments in many lands that there should be a move towards a solution of this unfortunate and barren conflict.

A number of important statements were made in this Committee during the last days, in which distinguished delegates associated themselves with the principle of direct negotiations. The distinguished Representative of Iceland put the issue with great clarity. He mentioned three possibilities regarding the future of the Arab refugees: the problem might remain unsolved for decades, or even forever; a solution might be brought about through war; or there might be a peaceful solution through mediation and negotiations. The distinguished Representative pleaded for the third alternative.

The distinguished Representative of the Central African Republic said in the debate:

"To our friends from the Arab countries, my delegation directs the urgent appeal to understand - in good spirit - the imperative necessity of direct negotiation; with a view to bringing about a final settlement of this tragic problem still unsolved, that of the Arab refugees."

Finally, I should like to remind the Committee of the statement made by the distinguished Representative of the Ivory Coast, in which he said:

"The world belongs to all of us and nobody has the right to endanger it. Whether we want it or not, we are compelled to negotiate. And we have to emphasize this in every single resolution dealing with a conflict between States. The methods of peaceful settlements envisaged by the Charter are the best: they will triumph."

We remain convinced that in a peaceful negotiation and solution of the conflict lies the only hope for a better future for the Middle East as a whole.

Recently, Mr. Chairman, the Representative of a certain member-State thus described the position of his Government in regard to international relations:

- "(1) Non- intervention in the internal affairs of any State.
- (2) Each State has complete freedom to choose its own political system of government and way of life.
- (3) Each State has the right and the freedom to bring his defences up

the standard which will secure its political independence and territorial integrity.

- (4) We have always maintained, as a loyal member of the United Nations, that in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter, all members should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. Similarly we have advocated the view that member-States should settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered."

This statement was made by the Representative of the UAR in the Security Council at its 1024th meeting, held on Wednesday, 24 October 1962, regarding the question of Cuba. If the Government of the UAR were to apply these principles to the Arab-Israel conflict, the refugee problem would soon be on its way to a constructive settlement.

In closing, Mr Chairman, let me say: If the Arab refugee problem were dealt with as any other refugee question, it would have been solved many years ago. The only obstruction to the solution of this refugee problem is the belligerent attitude and the policy of the Arab States. The position of my Government regarding compensation and all the other aspects has been made clear in this Committee on past occasions, and we stand by that position despite the venomous attacks that were made upon us here again. The solution to all issues outstanding between Israel and the Arab States can be brought about rapidly and effectively if the Arab Governments accommodate themselves to the reality of Israel's existence. It is entirely up to them.

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CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

December 6, 1962

To: Members participating in the Presidents Conference

From: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find a statement which Rabbi Irving Miller has issued today. It is suggested that the concepts of this statement be brought to the attention of as many Americans as possible. It is also suggested, for your consideration, that your organization issue a similar public statement.

A copy of this statement has been brought to the attention of Ambassador Adlai Stevenson.

YH:dm
enclosure

Rabbi Irving Miller, Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, today called upon Americans of every faith to protest the current revival of Adolph Hitler's philosophy by Arab nations' spokesmen at the United Nations. "The discussions in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee about the renewal of U.N. support of its relief agencies has been the excuse for this wrongdoing. Arab delegates offend human decency with vulgar comparisons of democratic nations to Hitler's Third Reich.

"There is certainly a legitimate area for genuine discussion of Middle East problems in any of the U.N. forums," said Rabbi Miller. "The nations of the world are sufficiently mature to engage in serious debate regarding possible solutions for all of their problems. However, there must never be room in such international discussions for the injection of racial or religious bigotry and for name-calling of the kind in which Arab statesmen are now indulging.

"The American people hold equally high the need to feed hungry mouths and the dignity of the individual. They can only be shocked," said Rabbi Miller, "when Arab representatives in a United Nations examination of how to furnish relief for their masses of people, engage in unspeakable attacks upon other religious groups.

"It must be," Rabbi Miller concluded, "that Arab spokesmen substitute name-calling and vituperation for substance and logic because their cause lacks justice even in their own eyes."

December 6, 1962

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September 27, 1962

To: Members participating in the Presidents Conference

From: Yehuda Hellman

Rabbi Irving Miller has asked me to inform you that he has sent today the following telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk:

"HONORABLE DEAN RUSK
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SELL TO ISRAEL SHORT-RANGE DEFENSIVE MISSILES WILL BE WELCOMED BY ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT WILL PREVENT A DANGEROUS IMBALANCE OF POWER RESULTING FROM THE FLOW OF ARMS INTO THE ARAB STATES, AND THEIR AGGRESSIVE USE AGAINST ISRAEL. I PRAY THAT THIS CONSTRUCTIVE MEASURE ON YOUR PART WILL CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

RESPECTFULLY,

RABBI IRVING MILLER, CHAIRMAN
CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR
AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS"

Rabbi Miller has also wired Mr. Myer Feldman, presidential assistant, requesting that this wire be brought to the attention of the President.

I would like to take this opportunity to inform you that the next regular meeting of the Presidents Conference is going to take place on October 24 at 12:30 P.M. The agenda will be forwarded to you shortly.

YH:dm

**CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS**

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

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Cable Address: COJOGRA



October 15, 1962

To: Members participating in the Presidents Conference
From: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find the minutes of the meeting of the Presidents
Conference of September 20th, 1962.

YH:dm
enclosure
40A

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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MINUTES OF PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE

SEPTEMBER 20, 1962 - 12:00 NOON

Rabbi Irving Miller opened the meeting announcing that her Excellency, the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, would be detained and would therefore join the Conference after lunch. Rabbi Miller then discussed the constructive relations which have been maintained between the Conference and the Consul Generals of Israel in New York...and introduced the new Consul General, Ambassador Katriel Katz, who greeted the Conference and stated that he too, of course, was happy to assure the Conference of his cooperation, et cetera.

Rabbi Miller went on to congratulate Mrs. Kramarsky on her third re-election to the presidency of Hadassah, and on the successful performance of Hadassah at its recent convention.

Rabbi Miller then proceeded to announce the appointment of a Nominating Committee so that the Conference can proceed at the next meeting, with the election of a new chairman for the coming year.

Rabbi Miller informed the Conference that as of April 1, 1962, the Conference was continuing on the same budget as in the previous year. He informed the Conference that he would have more to say on this subject at the next meeting of the Conference and that this item would be placed on the agenda.

Dr. Neumann took the floor and asked for a discussion of the recent meetings with Jewish leaders at the invitation of the White House. He felt that these meetings had a direct bearing on the work of the Presidents Conference. Rabbi Miller suggested that this not be discussed immediately in view of the presence of the Israel Foreign Minister and the Ambassador of Israel to the United States. Rabbi Miller assured the Conference that this matter would be taken up in due course.

The floor was then given to Mrs. Meir who proceeded, in a speech that lasted approximately two hours, to give a detailed analysis of the problems confronting the State of Israel at the forthcoming General Assembly session. Mrs. Meir analyzed the Johnson report and the proposals sponsored by certain African, Asian and European nations for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.

Mrs. Meir also discussed problems of immigration to Israel from various countries as they developed during the past year.

At the request of Mrs. Meir, no notes were taken during her report which she defined as "strictly confidential" and "off the record". Consequently, we will not circulate any of her remarks.

*To
Vospener
to read & return*



TO: Members associated in the Presidents Conference

FROM: Yehuda Hellman

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL: For your personal use only

Attached please find the minutes of the special meeting of the Presidents Conference which was held November 21st, 1961 at the U.N. with the participation of Ambassador Michael Comay of the Israeli Delegation.

November 27, 1961

Special meeting of the Presidents' Conference on November 21, 1961 at the U. N. to hear a report from Ambassador Michael Comay, Israel Ambassador to the U.N. delegation, on the Arab Refugee Problem. The meeting was opened by Rabbi Miller, President of the Conference. He especially welcomed the President of the Board of Jewish Deputies of Great Britain, Sir Barnett Janner who had just come to this country to speak in some of our important cities. Upon learning of this meeting, he asked to be invited, "which we were delighted to do."

Rabbi Miller - The meeting is going to be devoted to the question of the Arab Refugee problem, which is now to be debated at the U.N. In order to know what we should do and what our tasks on this important matter will be, he felt that we ought to be briefed both by the Ambassador of Israel as well as the Ambassador from our own country. It is a great honor and privilege to present to you the Ambassador of Israel to the U.N., Ambassador Michael Comay.

Ambassador Comay: I think the purpose of this discussion is very timely and I hope you will regard it only as a discussion - a discussion about things which are still unsettled and will remain unsettled for a long time. There is another somewhat preliminary observation that I want to make, and everything I say is said on the assumption that this is a closed meeting and that one can talk freely and off-the-record about these problems.

Before I talk about the Arab Refugee problem, I feel obliged to mention that it is the main problem for us on the agenda but, not the only one. Too many of our friends here assume that this particular question is the only one with which the Israel delegation is concerned. I want to tell you that there are over 90 other items on the agenda. We are involved in all of them. Some of them carry very serious, difficult and delicate implications for Israel in relation to various countries. There are South African problems, atomic tests and various other matters on which we are obliged to take positions, not because we are happy about those positions, but because they may be the least prejudiced and the least of the various evils that present themselves to us.

Now I want to plunge into the Arab Refugee problem. At this moment it is not quite clear when the debate will start in the committee. The expectation was that it will start at the end of this week or possibly at the beginning of next week. It isn't clear at the moment for two reasons. One, the report of Dr. Johnson, the Special Emissary sent from the Middle East, has not yet been released. I suspect it is being held up because the Arab Governments are not very happy with the draft which is being made available to them. The delegations want to study the report before starting the debate. The report is not officially before the committee or even on the agenda for the Assembly. Dr. Johnson does not report to the General Assembly. He is sent by the P.C.C. and he reports to them. Whereas the report is not technically before the committee, the committee wants to know what is in it and will refer to it as being the latest expression of opinion. What I can tell you is that its operative part suggests that after a preliminary round of conversations with the Government's consent, it is worthwhile appointing someone as a special representative of the Conciliatory Commission to continue this exploratory mission in the hope of turning up some possible progress and report back again in a year's time. In order to make such a suggestion, Dr. Johnson has carefully refrained from committing himself to opinions on the substance of matters that are matters of controversy between Israel and the Arabs. The fact that a report is not yet available, of course, is something which tends to push off the beginning of the debate.

Whether for this reason, or other technical reasons, there are also negotiations in the delegates lounge with the Arabs suddenly suggesting that this item be pushed off and that the item on Oman, which is a quarrel between the Arabs and Britain, which was going to come after the Refugee debate, should come before it.

It is also bound up, perhaps, with another question and that is, whether this debate on the Refugees would have to be squeezed in now and disposed of before the end of the Assembly, or whether there is going to be a resumed session in New York and this may be one of the items which can be left unfinished and can be revived and continued the second time around.

This is going to be, perhaps in one way, easier than we expected. We and the U.S. and other people expected a month or two ago that at this Assembly they would have to come to grips with the substance of the problem; they would have to make decisions which would lay down the line. If the U.S. will back the idea, and I am pretty sure that they will, the U.S. will not want to deal with the basic issues this year. That only applies to the U.S. and maybe to some other countries, but certainly not to the Arabs. The Arabs are going to force the issue as hard as they can. What is the issue that they want to force? This is the key to understanding the fight which is going on. The issue for the Arabs is not the Arab Refugees at all! They will try very hard to disengage the attention of the Assembly from the problem of a certain number of displaced persons who have to be resettled, fed and schooled. It is not about Dr. Johnson's report that the Arabs want to talk. What the Arabs want is to reopen the whole "Palestinian problem" in all its political aspects. They do not accept the existence of the State of Israel and they want to try and press the views that they pressed initially, that Palestine is part of the Arab homeland, that a people has been dispossessed, that this people must be restored to its homeland, what you are hearing more and more is paradoxically, an "Arab Zionism." This is a situation that the world must not accept. They don't believe that by virtue of any resolutions that might be pushed through the U.N., Israel will disappear from sight. They know that it doesn't work that way because Israelis will not cooperate to that extent. They do believe that by pressing this issue, you can undermine Israeli's international position and you can keep the whole pot boiling instead of the whole problem fading out of existence altogether.

If there is any military showdown with Israel and they talk amongst themselves about the possibility of creating an Algerian situation in Israel, they will have created an international climate of opinion which is favorable to such an enterprise. These are ambitious and far-reaching objectives. In stating them as such. All their tactics or their concrete proposals on this or that aspect of the subject are related to these ultimate objectives.

For instance, the first fight we are going to have in the Assembly is one which started last year and that was to secure recognition in the committee for the Palestinian-Arab Delegation as such. A request was put in that certain people constitute the Palestinian-Arab Delegation and they want a hearing for them. The significance of this is that they are not asking for these people to be heard as spokesmen for the refugees, but as spokesmen for the Palestinian-Arab people, wherever they may be. These are actually two groups of people who have now joined forces. One group represents the Mufti (who was thrown out of Egypt and the Mufti's sponsors who are now Iraqis). This is part of inter-Arab politics. The Egyptians produced a rival delegation from the Gaza Strip and after some fighting, they are appearing as one united Palestinian delegation.

The significance of that is not merely that we have to listen to 30 or 32 Arab speeches. The important thing is whether they will manage to establish that this is a Palestinian problem and not a refugee problem. Then they will again revive a proposal, that was put forth last year and was not carried, to get the U.N. to take charge of all the abandoned property and lands of Israel and send a custodian from the U.N. to take care of them. Even if it were carried, no custodian would be allowed into Israel.

Another Arab proposal will be to take the Conciliation Commission and say that we have no confidence in the Commission and we must reopen and reconstruct the Commission and put into it neutralists and maybe Soviet countries and produce a kind of Commission which will not be friendly to Israel. All these are to drive wedges in the way that I suggested and, of course, they will try to get resolutions through that will spell out more fully that the refugees have the right to go or not to go back to their homes.

With all these things that I have mentioned, we are in for a tougher fight than we have had for some years. You might ask why after thirteen or fourteen years it should have been revived so much more strongly last year and even more this year. I would suggest two reasons for this. One is that the structures and the rivalries in the Arab world drive this Palestinian problem to the surface. They try to outbid each other as to who will be the big brother of the Palestinian Arabs and who will drive the Israelis into the sea; plus the fact of the new countries that have come into birth in Asia and Africa and are now streaming into the U.N. It is a new U.N.; it has become larger, more representative, more unpredictable, more unwieldy, more difficult to control. The vote of Mauritania is the same as the vote of the U.S. or the Soviet Union. All the Arab propaganda now is directly channeled to this new audience and is all dressed up in terms which they think will get the right emotional response. You are dealing now with people sitting at the U.N. who are hearing about the Palestine conflict for the first time. They haven't got the slightest idea as to what happened in 1948. They never heard of the Balfour Declaration, of Theodore Herzl or the Partition Decision of 1947. There is an attempt to identify Zionism with colonialism; that Israel came to the Middle East as a spearhead to Colonialism.

I am going to stop at this point and give you an indication of what we are up against. I have spoken pretty realistically, but if I have spoken realistically, I do not want to speak pessimistically. We can put up a pretty good fight; we have many friends. I think that the Arabs' extreme proposals will run into difficulties and I think that what is encouraging to us is not only that we have many traditional friends in Europe and in America, but that we have many new friends amongst the new countries. So far the Arab propaganda against these nations has not been very effective. It is a process which depends less on what we do in the U.N. than what we are able to do in Africa, and if we cannot succeed in establishing our position of friendship and firm basis of cooperation in Africa, then we have something to worry about. One final word which follows what I just said.

With all the importance internationally of what gets said or what gets decided at the U.N., the existence of Israel and the future of Israel depends on the strength of Israel itself, its capacity to grow under any conditions and, secondly, on the bilateral ties between Israel and other friendly countries, first and foremost the U.S. As long as our own people in the U.N. are behind us, we are never going to feel isolated or alone in the world.

Rabbi Miller: I think you will all agree with me that we have reason to be grateful to Ambassador Comay for the frankness with which he spoke to us. I think we

now realize what confronts Israel and what will confront us when this debate gets under way. From this point of view, this meeting and what we heard will be of tremendous value to us. We are not going to keep the Ambassador or you long because one of the stipulations we had to make is that we came here only to listen to an Ambassador or to a visiting delegation. We did not come here to transact our own business. After we have spoken to the Ambassador, we will adjourn. I hope many of you will be able to come back to Park Avenue to listen to Ambassador Dimpton later in the afternoon.

Q: In view of these developments, how do you find the behavior of the U.S. delegation in connection with this question?

Amb. Comay: We have very close contacts with the U.S. delegation and there are very few questions that come up which we don't discuss together. On both sides there is an acceptance that between the U.S. and Israel we stand for the same things and we should work together.

Q: Why are the Arabs interested in having the Oman question come up before the Palestine question?

A: This is something new that came up today. It has not been decided formally. What I can tell you about the reasons are purely speculative. I imagine that it is to some extent some dissatisfaction with the terms of Dr. Johnson's report. They might hope to gain time. There are variety of reasons of tactical and parliamentary nature.

Q: Would it be to the advantage of Israel to have the discussion go on immediately as planned?

A: I imagine you can argue it both ways. Our basic position is that the whole discussion is superfluous. It solves nothing. It does not bring a solution of the Arab refugee problem any closer, in fact it creates more tension and inflames the problem. My own opinion is if they want to, let's have it. We are prepared for it and will explain our position. If the Committee wants to push it off, we won't fight to have it put on.

Q: World protest bodies and the Catholic church are expressing viewpoints on this topic. Are those viewpoints considered in the UN?

A: I would say that the views expressed cut right across religious lines. I do not think it would be helpful to try to sort out views according to these lines.

Q: Would the extreme proposals from the Arab delegations help to impress some of the nations that the Arabs are not so right?

A: People vote for all kinds of reasons because they feel a certain solidarity with the countries who present the problems. As far as some of the newer countries are concerned, they might vote along with the Arabs for reasons that have nothing to do with the nature of the proposal. The wilder and more irrational the Arab proposals are, the easier it is to fight them. The day the Arabs bring proposals that appear to be reasonable, it will be harder to meet that challenge. The second thing is that we have often wanted to initiate proposals that press for direct negotiations!

The difficulty is that the Arabs fight this and may be in a position to block it and vote it down. Therefore, delegations who believe that this is the proper way to vote, hesitate because they think that it won't get the votes required to have it accepted. Nevertheless, this is a possibility that is always there.

Q: Are we to assume that there is a possibility that you may counter any resolutions that may be offered to the U.N. by the Arab bloc with resolutions of your own?

A: I do not want to commit myself to say that there is such a possibility. I merely want to say that we must not rule out that possibility.

Q: In your view, would it be productive or not to encourage further public discussion?

A: I want to express a personal opinion on this. I am quite happy to present to you the U.N. picture as I see it. What conclusions you might wish to draw from this is a matter of discussion, and I would prefer that my colleagues who deal with the American scene try to offer you guidance in these matters. Personally, I think that for some years now we are not particularly interested in stirring up a great deal of public discussion about this in the UN or in the newspapers. What happens with refugee problems is that people get tired of them. Public interest in these matters is expendable and I find that although there are many people who are interested in it, the general public is almost indifferent. I am not suggesting that there are not ways and means in the American Jewish community of making itself felt. I am answering this strictly in terms of arousing a great deal of public interest and I have some doubts. There are certain basic aspects of the problem that you cannot get away from.

Q: What effect did the Knesset position on refugees have here in the U.N. circles?

A: The Knesset position indicated that this is a matter of vital concern to the State of Israel in which the State of Israel has a firm position, which is not merely that of a spokesman at the U.N. We can't say that it is particularly welcome to the American delegation. They would rather, from their point of view, that Israel appear to be flexible on this point of view than that Israel appear to have a strong position on the Arab refugee problem. I think it does strengthen our position, I don't think it has been particularly welcome to other people.

Rabbi Miller: I again want to express our deepest gratitude to the Ambassador. We are going to meet at 5:30 p.m. at 515 Park Avenue to listen to Ambassador Plimpton. Then I will convene a meeting of our Technical Sub-committee for the purpose of discussing in practical terms what we are called upon to do at this time. As soon as the Technical Sub-committee will have a chance to go over these and other suggestions, we will convene a meeting of the Presidents' Conference to approve the proposals of the Technical Sub-committee. We don't want to stir up public opinion too much, but there is no question that public opinion is vocal and there is something that the Presidents' Conference can do.

The meeting was adjourned at 2:30 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

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[Handwritten signatures]

TO: Members associated in the Presidents Conference

FROM: Yehuda Hellman



Enclosed please find the Confidential, Off-the-Record minutes of the Presidents' Conference meeting with Ambassador Plimpton of November 21st, 1961.

[Handwritten signature]

November 27, 1961

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

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CONFIDENTIAL OFF-THE-RECORD - PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR PLIMPTON
NOVEMBER 21, 1961 - 5:30 P.M. - PENTHOUSE

Ambassador Plimpton was introduced by Rabbi Irving Miller. Rabbi Miller also welcomed Mr. Bob Blake, who accompanied the Ambassador.

Mr. Plimpton, who had just returned from Washington, pointed out that at the last General Assembly meeting, the 15th session, the Arab delegation submitted the resolution which, if adopted, would have had the impact of suggesting the appointment of a United Nations custodian in what is now the territory of the State of Israel. The United States opposed this resolution because, according to their point of view, the problem of property rights in Israel is a matter for litigation and not subject to a political approach. The Arabs resented the U.S. position, rightfully so, because the U.S. was responsible in great measure for the defeat of the Arab suggestions. It is very probable that the Arabs will bring up the problem of custodianship again in the General Assembly. It is very possible that the Arabs will also suggest that the U. N. form a commission for the investigation of Israel's mistreatment of Arab residents, trying to point out the parallel between Israel and South Africa in this respect. It is also very probable that the Arabs may want to change the composition of the P.C.C., which is presently made up of the U.S., France and Turkey, by adding communist and neutral representatives. The U.S. will oppose all three objectives.

In the affirmative sense, the U.S. will try to continue to work within the framework of the present P.C.C. and will advocate the continuation of the Johnson Mission. Mr. Johnson's reporting is not conclusive. He has seen during his recent tour in the Middle East all the heads of state involved except Mr. Nasser. At present, Mr. Johnson's report is making no definite suggestions. The 1948 resolution on the P.C.C. including paragraph 11 should continue to be the terms of reference of Mr. Johnson's goodwill quest. The U.S. wants to encourage the Johnson Mission as much as possible.

Mr. Shukairy has already requested six hours of speaking time at the opening session of the debate. The U.S. assumes that Mr. Shukairy is going to set a most harmful tone. However, the U.S. proposes to be philosophical about the edicts of this Saudi Arabia hirling. The United States would oppose the postponement of the item of the Arab refugees. The Arabs are aiming to have the debate last as long as possible and then have this item transferred automatically to the beginning of the next year's session. The U.S. is opposed to this. The Arabs would need a two-thirds majority to reverse the order of the agenda, and the U.S. is hopeful that the Arabs will not obtain it.

In answer to questions that followed, the Ambassador stated that the termination date for UNRWA is set for June, 1963. 70% of the budget for this agency is provided

by the U.S. The U.S. naturally could by that time revise its present position and its financial contribution. Mr. Blake interrupted at this point and stated that the interruption of the work of UNRWA could cause only confusion and bitterness, by which only Russia would benefit..

The Ambassador further stated that the U.S did not recognize any Arab delegation speaking on behalf of Palestine. The U.S. would recognize Arab spokesmen appearing as individuals. The Ambassador underlined that the Arab refugee problem was a festering boil. However, he felt that there was very little that could be done to solve this problem as the Arabs are only talking about repatriation, which the Israeli Knesset is on record with precisely the opposite point of view. The U.S. would support any solution or combination of solutions in order to solve the problem.

In answer to a further question, the Ambassador stated that on the whole there were currently 1,200,000 Arab refugees in the area. When the authenticity of this figure was questioned from the floor, Mr. Blake interrupted again to say that objective observers working on the problem, like Don Peretz, accept this figure.

At the end of the meeting Rabbi Miller thanked the Ambassador and Mr. Blake. The representatives of the Presidents Conference and Ambassador and Mr. Blake felt that this was a most useful meeting, and that whenever necessary it would be useful for both parties to maintain contact.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA



TO: Members associated in the Presidents Conference
FROM: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find a copy of the minutes of the Presidents
Conference dinner meeting held on October 26, 1961

October 30, 1961

Rabbi Miller, Chairman of the Presidents' Conference opened the meeting and said: I wish to extend to all very warm greetings ^{at this} ~~to the~~ meeting of the Conference of Presidents. There were a number of calls that came into the office inquiring as to the real purpose of this meeting. The only purpose is the one stated in the letter. I have the feeling that united as we are in a great cause and working as we do for a common goal, there ought to be a time when we get together on a relaxed, social basis and get to know each other a little better. We are leaders in our respective organizations. We carry our own specific responsibilities and obligations. We join here together for a specific goal and I feel that it would be good to spend an hour in this fashion to sit and talk, to chat, to meet with your neighbor and perhaps compare notes. I also feel that I could not properly begin my administration without paying a tribute to the men who preceded me. These are the men who really made the conference, brought it about, labored in its behalf, gave it great devotion and attention, and I feel that they have set a fine example. I wanted to acknowledge publicly the debt that all of us owe to them. So I asked Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Klutznick and Mr. Katz to be our special guests and they accepted quite enthusiastically. Unfortunately, Dr. Goldmann met with a rather serious accident, serious in terms that he has to stay home and cannot be here. Dr. Goldmann asked me to express his regrets to you and asked for a raincheck to come back to another meeting and speak to us. We are really the losers tonight because Dr. Goldmann has come back from his recent trip to Israel and Europe with a comprehensive and revealing report.

Mr. Klutznick, who now serves as the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., was called to the White House today but should be here very shortly.

All of us were delighted and happy to see Label Katz here and to have him with us. I know that he can keep us very interested as a result of the trip that he made to the Soviet Union.

Lastly, I wish to welcome and greet all the members of the Conference who are here tonight, together with any guests that were invited by them.

The Consul General of Israel in the U.S., Mr. Eliav, was introduced by Rabbi Miller as a true friend of the Conference of Presidents, understanding in full measure its significance and implications.

Consul General Eliav: I would like to take this very pleasant opportunity to thank Label Katz for the year of cooperation we had when Label was President. I am sure that the same intimate relationship and cooperation will continue with Rabbi Miller. I would like to congratulate him now publicly. There is a slight misunderstanding of the structure and functioning of this body between you and Israeli opinion. The Israelis do not understand this trend of having a loose group with a weak center and therefore, in Israel, when people speak about the Presidents' Conference in America, they think that this is some kind of central Jewish organization with full authority which meets and makes decisions. These decisions come out as orders to all Jews in America who immediately implement whatever is decided. I have learned in the short time that I am in New York to understand how much strength there is in your "weak" kind of organization and that in a voluntary community such as the Jewish community is, this kind of voluntary coming together and achieving unanimity by discussion might be even stronger than if we had any kind of an authoritative structure. I have learned to appreciate your form of organization and do my best to educate members of departments and indirectly, Israeli opinion, about the correct position, structure and function of this very important body.

I would only like to point out that I read in the papers about the recognition of Israel by Ethiopia. It is my guess that Ethiopia was always friendly to Israel and I believe that this is one of the clearest examples of a State being afraid

to acknowledge its friendship to Israel because of Arab pressure. Now it is a "marriage" and the significant point is that they are now not afraid to do this. Whether it is a direct result of the break of Syria from the U.A.R. or not, it is an important symptom which is very encouraging. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to greet you here.

Rabbi Miller, in introducing his predecessor and the Presidents of B'nai B'rith, Label Katz, said: In a very real sense Label was the architect of that unity that we are enjoying today in the Presidents' Conference. There was a time when very serious divergence of opinion appeared and when a committee was appointed to re-study the structure and purposes of the Conference of Presidents and to bring in a report. It looked as if the committee had quite a task on its hands. Fortunately, the Chairman of that committee was Label Katz and all of us recall that he did a superb job in reconciling the differences of opinion and in bringing to us a unanimous report of the future structure of the Conference, and we are operating to this day within the terms of reference and the basis of that structure. Very soon after that he became President of the Conference and gave of himself completely. It is with great pleasure that I publicly acknowledge the indebtedness that we all feel.

Label Katz: Rabbi Miller, Mr. Ambassador, Your Excellency, Ladies and Gentlemen, I first want to acknowledge my own indebtedness to Irving Miller because the picture which he portrayed was a flattering one. I must confess that I am human enough to be flattered but realistic enough to recognize it as such. When I originally was extended the invitation to participate in this evening's program, I was advised that the other participants were to be the Ambassador to the U.N. and our own Jewish International Ambassador, with or without portfolio, now with the World Conference of Jewish Organizations (known as COJO). We find that both on the international level as well as the domestic level, we have coordinating

organizations which serve as a consultative body where representatives of Jewry throughout the world have the opportunity to concern themselves in these times with the pressing issues that confront world Jewry. The very physical, religious, cultural and spiritual survival of the Jewish people is at the top of the agenda and deserves the highest priority of concern. We never know in what area a crisis will develop which necessitates the pooling of all of our resources which we can bring to bear in the resolution of these difficult problems. They are beyond the capacity of any one organization to deal with. The degree of success which the Presidents' Conference has been able to achieve in dealing with matters of this nature, is obvious to all of us. I would hope that the time would not be too distant when other organizations would find it possible to join hands with us so that we would have within the fold of the Presidents' Conference all of the important and significant Jewish Organizations on the American scene.

In the latter part of August, I visited behind the iron curtain. There was a B'nai B'rith delegation of some 35 who took advantage of the opportunity to visit Russia. What motivated us was not a desire to see the geography of Russia but to observe and try to sense at first hand the predicament and plight of our fellow Jews in the countries behind the iron curtain.

At this point Mr. Katz went on to give a full and comprehensive report of the conditions, circumstances, situations and problems that he and his group encountered in their visit to the Soviet Union. In conclusion, Mr. Katz wished to emphasize that there are two factors which we should take into account in the Soviet Union. While this process of cultural suffocation has been going on since 1917, a number of things have happened in the past five or six years which have had a dramatic effect upon the Jewish community. That is, that every identification card of a Jew is stamped "Jew" and everyone in the Soviet Union must have an identification card. Secondly, because of the rampant and violent anti-semitism

which existed during the last days of Stalin, the Jewish community was sensitized to the fact that they were different from their fellow Soviet citizens. All of this has had a traumatic effect on the Jewish consciousness of our people. They have been made aware in the negative sense and our problem is to convert this negative into a positive. What can they and we do to make it possible to develop a Jewish life which has meaning, substance and significance for them? In this sense all of us have a tremendous challenge in trying to find the answer to this problem. There are no ready answers this evening, but I believe that we must exert every energy and resource to further sensitizing the Soviet Government about our concern for the Jews in the Soviet Union.

Rabbi Miller thanked Label Katz. Introducing Ambassador Klutznick, Rabbi Miller said: "We^L, in the Presidents' Conference, are very happy to have made the Ambassador available to the United States. This Conference owes a great deal to Philip Klutznick and to pay this tribute to him and to tell him that we are all in his debt. I give you His Excellency, Ambassador Klutznick."

When we set up the Presidents' Conference, we did have a charter. I do not know how much we have amended that by usage and practice, but the reason for the charter still exists. Let's not lose sight of it. What was the charter? - the American Jewish community's concern with the security, development and prosperity of the State of Israel. This is the charter and unless you have changed it in my absence, this is still the commitment. There was one other thought we had in mind. We hoped that by combining forces in this fashion, we would bring a kind of status and dignity to any representations or any positions we found it necessary to take. This means that we never settled for conferences in the lower bowels of the State Department. Jews will never be any more respected than they respect themselves. This is the first lesson of any kind of life and certainly of domestic political life. There are still some jobs to be done, all of which

you know. Some of them will be discussed not far from here; some problems still exist that are in the security area. I think the Presidents' Conference is yet to finish its job! I think there is a necessity for careful understanding of what those problems are. This Conference would not have been possible if it was organized around any other charter. Since responsible Jewish organizations undertook this task, responsible organizations must complete it and the completion of it at this time will be more difficult than it was in the dramatic days when many of the struggles had even the glory of battle about them. It calls for the kind of understanding and statesmanship that brooks no small thinking and it calls for the kind of self-respect that the Jewish community will continue to have, with a substantially unified and dignified voice that will be heard in the right places at the right time. It is well to remember the beginning and not to forget that there is an unfinished job ahead and a job that has been complicated by success. It should make us all more sensible and alert; it should make of us all statesmen working in this extremely challenging task. Maybe if we succeed in our basic jobs, representatives of the State of Israel behind the iron curtain and elsewhere will be able to do a more effective job than they are now doing. That may be the most direct route through which to solve some of the problems. Honor your President, give him your support and together renew your vow that we took long ago to see this job of American Jewish interests completed.

Rabbi Miller: Thank you very much. Ladies, and Gentlemen, I want to tell you what our plans are for the immediate future. It looks now, and of course this is off-the-record, as if the refugee problem will be up before the Special Committee of the U.N. that is dealing with it, sometime in November. We do not know at this time what form the discussion of this question will take. A great deal of effort is being taken to avoid a head-on discussion of this problem, but we do not know whether these efforts will succeed. We have decided to devote the next meeting

of the Presidents' Conference to the consideration of this problem so that we may be on the alert, so that we may be prepared, if called upon, to play our roles in this question. If necessary, to elucidate in certain quarters, to make presentations, to educate and to argue.

I have arranged for a meeting on Tuesday, November 21st, 1961 of the Presidents' Conference at the U.N. I asked the permanent representative from Israel to the U.N. to be with us and he eagerly agreed. I also asked Ambassador Plimpton to come and share the thinking of our own Government on this problem, and I am glad to say that he readily consented and will also be with us to tell us how our Government views this problem.

December will witness the special annual conference of the United Jewish Appeal. For this conference Mr. Eshkol, who is the Ambassador of Finance and who will probably be Ambassador of Finance again, will be here. I have asked Mr. Eshkol to meet with the Presidents' Conference so that we can learn more of the economic problems concerning Israel. I am awaiting word from him as to the time that he will put at our disposal. I am giving you this in advance so that the Presidents of the organizations may make such arrangements as will enable them to participate in these meetings.

I would like to tell the Conference that from the highest Israeli quarters in America I received the warmest commendation for the work the Technical Sub-committee of the Conference has been doing, particularly in the boycott area. They had nothing but the highest praise of the effectiveness of the Technical Sub-committee that has worked in this Conference. I see Isaiah Minkoff, Arnold Forster, Rabbi Unger, Council of Jewish Women, Hadassah and several other organizations who are on this Committee.

Phil referred to the charter of this organization, to the terms of reference that we were created for a certain purpose. I want to close on this note. This Conference represents a serious and earnest attempt at unity - in Israeli-American

relationships - and displays a unity that we should cherish and be proud of. I think we ought to be proud to say to American Jews and particularly to some who are not in this Conference, that we do cherish the concept and ideal of Jewish unity and we are proud that we have found the platform for the expression of American Jewish unity. American Jewry and Israel has only to benefit from the strength of unity and the stronger and firmer we can make this Conference in these terms, the greater will be the benefit to American Jewry. So I plead with you for attention to the work of the Conference, for a deep interest and concern in its progress and for the fullest participation in all that lies ahead. I want to thank you for your attendance, and bid you good evening.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

TO: Members participating in the Presidents Conference
FROM: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find the text of a letter which I have addressed to Mr. Shimshon Arad on October 11, and his answer to me dated October 13. Also enclosed please find a news item which appeared in the J.T.A. to serve as background material.

October 17, 1961

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

October 11, 1961

Mr. Shimshon Arad
Israeli Consulate
11 East 70th Street
New York, New York

Dear Shimshon:

I was surprised to read in the October 10th J.T.A. that the Israeli Ministry of Transport and Communication has demanded that Regie Renault publicly disassociate itself from the Arab League's economic boycott of Israel.

As you well might remember, Regie Renault has done so at the insistence of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations on November 15, 1960. Commenting at that time on the status of the controversy between Renault and Kaiser-Fraser of Israel, Mr. Katz stated in the name of the Presidents Conference that he regarded this matter as settled. Mr. Katz's statement was issued on November 21, 1960 and was made public the same day.

I would greatly appreciate having your comments as soon as possible as I would like to share them with my colleagues of the Sub-committee of the Presidents Conference, and later on with the Conference at large.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Yehuda Hellman
Executive Director

Consulate General

11 E. 70th Street
New York 21, New York
-
TRafalgar 9-7600

October 13, 1961

Dear Yehuda:

I would like to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated October 11 which I am transmitting to Jerusalem. I should hope to communicate with you as soon as I get a reply.

Sincerely yours,

Shimshon Arad

Mr. Yehuda Hellman
Executive Director
Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Avenue
New York 22, New York

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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ISRAEL GOVERNMENT 'UNLIKELY' TO LIFT BAN ON IMPORT OF RENAULT CARS

JERUSALEM, Oct. 9 (JTA) -- An application by an Israeli firm for lifting the ban against the import of automobiles made by Regie Renault of France has been filed with the Ministry of Transport and Communication and is "unlikely" to be granted, the Ministry confirmed here today.

Two years ago, the French automobile manufacturing firm canceled its contract for assembly of its cars in this country, under pressure of the Arab boycott office. Recently, an Israeli firm has entered a contract with Renault for import of its Dauphine car, and has applied to the Ministry for an import license. That application is being shelved, the Ministry stated today, until such time as Regie Renault publicly disassociates itself from the Arab League's economic boycott against Israel.

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TO: Members associated in the Presidents Conference
FROM: Yehuda Hellman
RE: Brown-Williamson Case

Enclosed please find the following release issued by
Rabbi Irving Miller today.

October 16, 1961

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Tel.: PL 5-1820

Cable Address: COJOGRA

Rabbi Irving Miller, President of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, today released the text of a telegram he received from Brown and Williamson informing him that the cigarette company was resuming trade relations with Israeli importers. The telegram said: "In view of our extended conversations over a period of several years regarding Brown and Williamson's trade relations with Israeli cigarette importers, happy to inform you that matter is being satisfactorily resolved. Our request for issuance of cigarette import licenses for Luckies, Pall Mall, Viceroy and other Brown and Williamson brands is being granted by Israeli Government and trade relations will be fully resumed. Would appreciate your informing your constituents accordingly."

In notifying the 18 Presidents of the Conference about the contents of the telegram Rabbi Miller said that the Brown and Williamson boycott of Israel first became evident in 1956 when it sent letters to Israeli importers notifying them that no future orders could be accepted. Soon afterward, the Presidents Conference issued a pamphlet, "A Report on the Arab Boycott Against Americans," which stated that Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation had been "forced to succumb to pressures of the Arab League."

According to Rabbi Miller about three weeks ago a Brown and Williamson

representative indicated to the Presidents Conference the willingness of the company to resume shipment of all its cigarettes to Israel and that it would approach Israeli trade officials accordingly. Rabbi Miller said that the Presidents Conference is "gratified that Brown and Williamson -- together with its parent body, the British American Tobacco Company -- has concluded that it is better ethics and morality to resist Arab boycott demands and to resume its trade relations with Israel. They will find, in the long run, that it is better business too," he said.

JOHN E. BROWN

F. ASCE

STRUCTURAL ENGINEER

PRESIDENT

Jan 4/18
Helmer

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SANTA ROSA, CA. 546-1533

AROUND THE WORLD

and C, British licensee for the French system, but now Comrie-Smith says GLC hopes soon to sell the 560 x 150-ft factory building to any manufacturer interested in it.

Comrie-Smith and the contractor agree that the building system had other drawbacks. "Even though we had problems in the early days, these were almost entirely solved once GLC and the contractor worked out standards for the panels produced at the plant and once the labor force was adequately trained," says Comrie-Smith.

Comrie-Smith explains that the system requires workers who are trained in that specific type of construction, so "we naturally had problems until men became adjusted to the Balency techniques. After a while, the wastage became relatively low."

Nevertheless, there were minor problems with the system, according to Comrie-Smith. Panels that sometimes were damaged when crane-lifted into place, were often only poorly repaired, he says. Poor repairs of correctly manufactured, but handling-damaged panels sometimes caused uneven joining, which in turn, allowed rain to enter, according to Comrie-Smith. But fundamentally there is nothing wrong with the system, Comrie-Smith adds.

George Lowe, who supervised most of the repairs for GLC, also contends that most of the problems would not have occurred had the labor force been trained in use of the system, when work first started.

Lowe says the problems involved some vertical seals at the corners of the structures. "There is a triangular groove that runs along the interior of the corner, and this must be continuous for the full height of the building," he says. "In that way, any water that penetrates the seal will be caught in the triangular groove and drain to the bottom."

"But what sometimes happened was that, when the edges were chipped in the erection process, the panels were sometimes not adequately repaired. And when that occurred, the groove ceased to be continuous and, of course, there was a buildup of water."

H&H and C, which holds the management and construction contract, will bid on the next work phase.

"We regret GLC's decision on Balency," a company spokesman says. "We tried to explore alternatives, but we can work with brick and concrete by conventional means just as easily, and

New Tehran town—Llewelyn-Davies International, London, has been awarded a contract by the municipality of Tehran for planning Shahestan Pahlavi, a new town on a 400-acre site within the Iranian capital. The project will include housing for 50,000, a civic center, government complex and commercial buildings.

More sanguine on Sanguine—For a change, the Pentagon can probably be sure of no congressional opposition to its request for \$18 million this year to continue development of Project Sanguine, the Navy's planned huge underground antenna system (up to 3,000 sq miles) for low-frequency communication with submarines. The Navy drew objections when it proposed sites near population centers in Michigan, Texas and Wisconsin. Now it plans to build the system either at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada or the White Sands missile testing ground in New Mexico.

U.S. loses suit—Federal agencies must obey state pollution laws, the U.S. Court of Appeals in San Francisco has ruled. In suits brought against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by California and Washington, the two states had challenged an EPA regulation that excluded the federal government from having to apply to local authorities for discharge permits. EPA has not decided whether to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, a spokesman says.

Suez Canal tunnels—Egypt has called for international bids on the design and construction of three vehicular and railway tunnels under the Suez Canal. The Arab Contractors Co. is responsible for the job and will form a joint venture with the winning bidders. Each of the three tunnels will carry a three-lane highway plus water mains and utilities, and one tunnel will carry a one-track railway.

Water quality surveyed—Seventy-five percent of New York state's population is drinking water with concentrations of at least one of 53 chemicals and 17 pesticides, according to the first statewide report, prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey. But only 18 of 365 water supply systems examined were found to

have concentrations of health-related chemicals exceeding the state's limits for drinking water. About 42% of the systems contained excessive amounts of chemicals that cause taste, odor or color problems.

U.S. engineer wins—Fluor Utah, Inc., San Mateo, Calif., won a \$12-million contract for engineering, procurement and construction management of a uranium processing plant near Ljubljana, Yugoslavia. Geoloski Zavod, Ljubljana, owner of the project, will produce fuel to feed Yugoslavia's first nuclear powerplant, a \$500-million facility to be built near Krsko, in the province of Slovenia.

Uruguay to get monobuoy—Uruguay plans to award a \$44-million turnkey contract to a consortium to construct a 200,000-ton tanker offshore oil monobuoy, 90-mile onshore pipeline and tank farm. The consortium consists of Victor M. Contreras, Argentina; Saiceem, Uruguay; Spie-Betignoles, France; and Land & Marine Organization, Great Britain.

A big cleaning bill—A Rhode Island state study says it will cost more than \$102 million to make the polluted Woonasquatucket River, near Providence, clean enough for fish and wildlife. The study also says it will take \$90 million to control storm overflows responsible for periodic shellfishing bans in upper Narragansett Bay. This is the first of seven reports on the state's river basins.

Canadian petrochemical plant—Petro-say, Ltd., a venture of three chemical companies, will build a petrochemical plant estimated to cost more than \$400 million at Sarnia, Ontario, about 50 miles northeast of Detroit.

California canal postponed—Construction of California's \$286-million Peripheral Canal will be delayed at least one year, according to Department of Water Resources director John R. Teerink. He cites as a major reason work that remains to be done on the draft of the state's environmental impact report (ENR 11/14/74 p. 51), which several reviewers have criticized. Construction of the 43-mile canal was to start next September.

THERE WERE 5 PLANNED.
WHO IS BUILDING THE OTHER 2?
AND WHY?

April 16, 1975

Mr. John E. Brown
2902 McBride Lane
Santa Rosa, Ca.

Dear John:

Many thanks for the item from the Engineering News Record. I appreciate your sending this kind of material on to me and want to assure you that I am sharing the data with the right people in the right places.

Please do continue to send me any other items you feel will be of interest.

Rhea joins me in sending fondest regards from house to house.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

March 14, 1975

Mr. Arnold Forster
Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith
315 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10016

Dear Arnie:

Would that I could be of help in connection with ADL's investigation of discriminatory practices against Jews in connection with investments by Arabs. It's just not possible for me to release any further information on the two west coast firms I had referred to in my press statement. The party involved elicited my promise to retain the information on a confidential basis. He is now employed with a firm in Tennessee which has connections with some Arab countries and he is fearful of losing his job again should the data he provided me with be made public.

A few weeks ago I had a letter from a man who had been fired by Japan Airlines after a number of years of service. He gave me permission to share his confidential report with the American Jewish Congress and he may or may not agree to have a suit instituted.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH

315 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016, TEL. 689-7400

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March 10, 1975

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, President
The Union of American Hebrew Congregations in New York
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Alex
Dear Rabbi Schindler:

In the course of ADL's investigation of discriminatory practices against Jews in connection with Arab investments, your statement to the UAHC Executive Committee was brought to my attention. The JTA of Friday, February 14th, reported that you have evidence of two West Coast firms which were the victims of such discriminatory treatment. Because of our interest and activity in this area, we would appreciate receiving from you the documentation on these two cases. It would be most helpful in our efforts to bar these practices and in seeking to obtain the needed remedial legislation.

Thank you for your cooperation. With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

Arnold Forster
Arnold Forster

AF:ek

*P.S. Alex: This is
written by staff. Can
you help on the above?*

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 *MORTON R. GODINE, Chestnut Hill, Mass.
 HAROLD S. GOLDMAN, Buffalo, N.Y.
 *CHARLES GOLDRING, Los Angeles, Calif.
 *JOHN L. GOLDWATER, New York, N.Y.

J. LEO GORDON, Beverly Hills, Calif.
 *SEYMOUR GRAUBARD, New York, N.Y.
 *MAXWELL E. GREENBERG, Los Angeles, Calif.
 ROBERT J. GREENEBAUM, Highland Park, Ill.
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 JAMES L. HOCHFELDER, New York, N.Y.
 *BRUCE I. HOCHMAN, Los Angeles, Calif.
 MRS. NATHAN HOLSTEIN, Pittsburgh, Pa.
 BEN HYMAN, Atlanta, Ga.
 *LOUIS G. ISAACSON, Denver, Colo.
 JULIUS M. ISRAEL, Houston, Texas
 HARRIS JACOBS, Atlanta, Ga.
 LEONARD JED, Baltimore, Md.
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 MRS. LOUIS KASH, Los Angeles, Calif.
 MORRIS S. KRAUS, San Diego, Calif.
 *MOE KUDLER, Los Angeles, Calif.
 MRS. MOE KUDLER, Los Angeles, Calif.
 MERRILL M. KULLER, St. Paul, Minn.
 BERNARD A. KUTTNER, Newark, N.J.
 *LARRY M. LAVINSKY, Rye, N.Y.
 *RICHARD M. LEDERER, JR., White Plains, N.Y.
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 *SAMUEL SCHEFF, New York, N.Y.
 *NORMAN J. SCHLOSSMAN, Highland Park, Ill.
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 HERBERT D. SETLOW, New Haven, Conn.
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 *MRS. MILTON T. SMITH, Austin, Texas
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 *ALVIN J. STEINBERG, Kensington, Md.
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*Members of National Executive Committee

✓

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

March 7, 1975

Ms. Naomi Levine
American Jewish Congress
15 East 84th Street
New York, N.Y. 10028

Dear Naomi:

Per our conversation I enclose herewith correspondence from
Mr. Eli Gabel. He will be calling you in this connection.

Please keep me posted on developments.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Encl.

called Gabel and told him of AJ Cong. legal division - etc.
he would like to discuss with you first.....called Naomi
Levine, she's at meeting and hasn't returned call yet.

471-6332

Call him Monday
Naomi
Levine

ELI GABEL
577 GRASSMERE TERRACE
FAR ROCKAWAY, N. Y. 11691

February 19, 1975

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, President
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10021

Dear Rabbi Schindler:

It is with a great deal of interest that I read reports of your recent statements warning that Arab blackmail and boycotts may be operating to jeopardize the civil rights of Jewish individuals in the U.S. who are employed by firms doing business with Arab countries.

In 1969 I joined Japan Air Lines in a research and marketing function. Shortly thereafter JAL became the target, along with several other Japanese firms, of a campaign launched by ADL and other Jewish organizations accusing them of giving in to the Arab boycott. In the case of JAL they allegedly denied (or caused to be denied) Tokyo landing rights for El Al Israel Airlines.

Having become familiar with JAL's growth plans and operating procedures I saw that many of the charges were incorrect and offered my knowledge of the American Jewish community to JAL's PR department and top executives to counter the ADL directed campaign. I received no extra pay for this work which was in addition to my other duties. Also outside consultants were hired to help tell JAL's story to the Jewish community in this country and abroad. This was the period in which I developed a "synagogues of the Pacific Basin" PR campaign and the well received "kosher pastrami on rye in Tokyo" ad campaign.

After the Yom Kippur war JAL management seemed to lose interest in cultivating the Jewish community and I gradually felt a chill set in. In the spring of 1974 I was suddenly dismissed. At the time I believe I was the highest ranking Jew employed by JAL and one of a very few people to be dismissed. (JAL did not undertake the massive layoffs that other oil price squeezed airlines instituted in 1974).

I joined a Jewish owned PR firm (open on Yom Kippur however) which specialized in Japanese accounts. This job lasted until December, 1974. I have been unemployed since. Several different versions of my resume are enclosed - the reasons for the diversity being quite obvious. Would appreciate your treating this in a confidential manner as I have never reported this to any City or State Human Rights agency. Should you require further information please do not hesitate to call me.

Sincerely,



(A)

Personal Resume of:

Eli Gabel
577 Grassmere Terrace
Far Rockaway, New York 11691
(212) 471-6332

FULL TIME EXPERIENCE

April, 1974 - December, 1974	INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS CO., LTD. New York Account Executive, copywriter and analyst assigned to corporate, association and tourism accounts.
June, 1969 - April, 1974	JAPAN AIR LINES New York Staff Manager - Special Programs. Progressively responsible positions in advertising & sales promotion, passenger sales, and market development departments. Strong incentive, convention and trade mission experience. Developed aggressive sales lead research system. Served as Community Relations consultant.
June, 1968 - June, 1969	SHARON TRAVEL ASSOCIATES (Sharon Tours) New York Associate Manager for Tour Operations and Sales. Responsibilities similar to those at Global Tours below. Also participated in a state computer training program.
Feb. 1968 - June, 1968	Temporary employment as retail sales representative with Empress Travel Service, and as a benefits examiner for the Federal Government.
April, 1965 - Feb., 1968	GLOBAL TOURS INC. (Global of London) New York Sales & Operations Coordinator in New York office of major inter- national tour operator. Group & individual itinerary planning, costing, contracting, and promotion. Included brochure production and maintenance of industry contacts. Also in charge of "Visit USA" program on behalf of Global's overseas offices.
March, 1962 - April, 1965	Regional director, publicist, and fund raiser for major Jewish community service organizations in New York, and New Jersey, includ- ing ZOA, Jewish Education Committee and Histadruth Ivrit.

PART-TIME EXPERIENCE

Travel marketing lecturer at Adelphi University - Fall, 1973

College Degree

January 1962 - BA; Sociology, Bronx Campus, Hunter College.
Herzliah Hebrew Institute

Additional Data

Male
Married, 2 children

Born: August 12, 1939

(B)

Personal Resume of:

Eli Gabel

577 Grassmere Terrace

Far Rockaway, New York 11691

(212) 471-6332

FULL TIME EXPERIENCE

April, 1974 -
December, 1974

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS CO., LTD., New York
Account Executive, copywriter and analyst assigned to Japanese
corporate, association and tourism accounts including Japan Tobacco
Corp., Japan Whaling Assoc., and Hotel New Otani.

June, 1969 -
April, 1974

JAPAN AIR LINES New York
Staff Manager - Special Programs. Progressively responsible
positions in advertising & sales promotion, passenger sales, and
market development departments. Strong incentive, convention and
trade mission experience. Developed aggressive sales lead research
system. Served as Community Relations consultant.

June, 1968 -
June, 1969

SHARON TRAVEL ASSOCIATES (Sharon Tours) New York
Associate Manager for Tour Operations and Sales. Responsibilities
similar to those at Global Tours below. Also participated in a state
computer training program.

Feb. 1968 -
June, 1968

Temporary employment as retail sales representative with Empress
Travel Service, and as a benefits examiner for the Federal
Government.

April, 1965 -
Feb., 1968

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Sales & Operations Coordinator in New York office of major inter-
national tour operator. Group & individual itinerary planning, cost-
ing, contracting, and promotion. Included brochure production and
maintenance of industry contacts. Also in charge of "Visit USA"
program on behalf of Global's overseas offices.

March, 1962 -
April, 1965

Regional Director, publicist, and fund raiser for major community
service organizations in New York, and New Jersey.

PART-TIME EXPERIENCE

Travel marketing lecturer at Adelphi University - Fall, 1973

College Degree

January 1962 - BA; Sociology, Bronx Campus, Hunter College.

Additional Data

Male

Born: August 12, 1939

Married, 2 children

January 25, 1978

Dr. Judah J. Shapiro
302 West 86th Street
New York, N.Y. 10024

Dear Jddah:

Just before I left for a jaunt to Denver and Toronto, this past Monday, I spoke to David Blumberg. He is very disappointed in the composition of the Nominating Committee. I assured him that when you and I selected the committee we were concerned with giving representation to each and every grouping within the Presidents' Conference and that we had no idea whether any of these people had made any kind of a personal commitment.

David's anger stems from the fact, so he tells me, that each of the members of the Nominating Committee has his or her own candidate and David's interests are represented by no one at all. Inasmuch as I did not attend the meeting of the Nominating Committee, nor do I intend to interfere in its work, you are the only one to judge whether David's candidacy is disadvantaged in this manner. If it is, I certainly think that someone could be added to the present committee but only if you as chairman agree with David's assessment and are willing to accept such an appointment.

With fondest regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Institute of Human Relations • 165 East 56 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • 212/751-4000 • Cable Wishcom, N.Y.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

January 17, 1978

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
The Union of Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Alex:

I was pleased to learn that it is your intention to recommend that the Presidents Conference establish a committee on structure and organization which will look into a reorganization of the Conference in order to enhance its effectiveness.

I shall report this to our Board of Governors when it meets during the second week of February and will tell them of your invitation to the American Jewish Committee to participate in the study process. I will be in touch with you directly upon my return from the west coast where our Board will be meeting.

Thank you so much for your good wishes for my recovery. As you know, everything turned out well.

Best regards.

Cordially,

Richard Maass

RM/bf

RICHARD MAASS, President ■
MAYNARD I. WISHNER, Chairman, Board of Governors ■ MORTON K. BLAUSTEIN, Chairman, National Executive Council ■ HOWARD I. FRIEDMAN, Chairman, Board of Trustees ■
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ALFRED H. MOSES, Washington, D.C.; ELAINE PETSCHER, Westchester; MERVIN H. RISEMAN, New York; RICHARD E. SHERWOOD, Los Angeles; SHERMAN H. STARR, Boston ■

January 4, 1978

MR. Richard Maass, President
American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
New York, New York 10022

Dear Richard:

My experience as chairman of the Presidents' Conference has convinced me that a re-structuring of the organization is in order. I can say this more readily now that the conclusion of my term approaches. In this re-organization, not only should the present full-members of the Conference be involved, but also other organizations such as yours which have participated in our work and have contributed to it both substantively and materially, as well as still other organizations which have stood at a greater distance.

Accordingly, it is my intention to recommend the establishment of a Committee on Structure and Organization which will take a fresh look at our present work and at the total Jewish community in order to find a way of enhancing our effectiveness.

I would much appreciate it if you were to let me know whether you and your organization would be willing to participate in such a process.

Bert has told me of your problems. Needless to say, you have my good wishes for a full recovery.

With warm personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

cc: Mr. Bertram H. Gold



B'NAI B'RITH

1640 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, NW, WASHINGTON 6, D. C. • Executive 3-5284

857 6600

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

December 30, 1977

Mr. Yehuda Hellman
Presidents' Conference
515 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Yehuda:

I am following up my telephone conversation with you of December 29 to formally urge that we proceed quickly with the appropriate steps to insure a fair and fitting process for the selection of the next President of the Presidents' Conference.

It will come as no surprise to you if I indicate my chagrin at the looseness with which the Presidents' Conference business is conducted.

In the matter of the nomination process, it is my view that we cannot afford to operate without clear structure and public accounting. This means that there must be the appointment of a nominating committee that is representative of the Presidents' Conference. Adequate attention must be paid to the various groupings that make up the Presidents' Conference and the relative size of organizations.

The committee's membership should be announced forthwith to all members of the Presidents' Conference. The committee should meet quickly so that it can do its work with all due deliberate speed in order to meet the deadlines that have been set.

Nothing would hurt the credibility of the Presidents' Conference more--within its membership--than a hurried process or one that does not meet the expected deadline.

I am aware of the interest of a number of persons in serving in the capacity of President. This only increases the need to have a very carefully developed structure that would eliminate any possibility of criticism.

I want to write to you about a number of other items and hope that very soon the Presidents' Conference can meet in private to look at its way of operating and especially at its decision making process.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Daniel Thursz

DT:nls

CONFIDENTIAL

September 23, 1975

Mr. Yehuda Hellman
Presidents' Conference
515 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Yehuda:

I share the enclosed with you and ask that you share it with
the proper people. Many thanks.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Encl.

JB

Rabbi Ira Youdovin

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler

May 5, 1975

Yehuda Hellman; Al Vorspan

Yehuda would like you to serve on the committee planning the Leadership Conference of the Presidents' Conference which has now been projected for the latter part of May. I told Yehuda that I would certainly be delighted to have you serve in this capacity.

PRESIDENTS' CONFERENCE - CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE

Arthur Levine, Chairman

Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg

David M. Blumberg

Rabbi Joseph B. Glaser

Rabbi Wolfe Kelman

Rabbi Israel Klavan

Emanuel Muravchik

Daniel Rose

Isaiah Minkoff

Isadore Hamlin

Faya Schenk

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

PLaza 2-1616

Cable Address: COJOGRA

March 14, 1975

TO: Presidents and Executive Directors

FROM: Yehuda Hellman

This is to confirm that the next meeting of the Presidents Conference will take place on Tuesday, March 18, 1975, in the top floor meeting room at 515 Park Avenue.

In addition to the Washington report and the discussion on the PLO and Arab propaganda, the issue of the Arab boycott will also be included in our agenda.

The meeting will begin promptly at 12:00 noon and will last until approximately 2:30 p.m. A light luncheon will be served.

Please call our office as soon as possible with the name of your representative.

On Calendar

WORLD CONFERENCE OF JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022

Participating Organizations:

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
B'NAI B'RITH
BOARD OF DEPUTIES OF
BRITISH JEWS
CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS
CONSEIL REPRESENTATIF DES
JUIFS DE FRANCE (C.R.I.F.)
DELEGACION DE ASOCIACIONES
ISRAELITAS ARGENTINAS
(D.A.I.A.)
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF
AUSTRALIAN JEWRY
JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE
SOUTH AFRICAN JEWISH
BOARD OF DEPUTIES
WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

February 7, 1975

TO: Members associated in the World Conference of
Jewish Organizations (COJO)

FROM: Yehuda Hellman

Enclosed please find a summary of Ambassador Dinitz's presentation and the ensuing discussion which took place at the December Plenary Meeting of COJO in New York.

Member organizations have asked for this material and we are herewith disseminating it to you. Although several weeks have passed since the COJO meeting, it seems to us that this material is most timely and relevant indeed. We are passing it on to you for background purposes.

WORLD CONFERENCE OF JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS (COJO)

The 1974 COJO meeting took place in New York on December 4-5.

The meeting of COJO was called to order by Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson, acting chairman, who welcomed the new chairman of the Jewish Agency, Mr. Pinchas Sapir, and pledged to him the cooperation of all of COJO's members "in his most important task for world Jewry."

COJO COMMISSION ON EDUCATION

Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson: We are meeting at a time when all of us have a tremendous desire to meet as often as possible with fellow Jews. We have this tremendous sense of isolation in the midst of a world which seems to have become more indifferent and more callous not only to Israel but to all humanitarian problems; I do not ever recall a period when we have received -- all of us, as leaders -- so many telephone calls from fellow-Jews from every country expressing the desire to meet together, to counsel together, to make plans together. Indeed, one of the things we will discuss at some point during our conference is whether or not there is need for a large international gathering of some kind quite soon.

I want to say that we feel that we have not yet tapped the full resources of world Jewry on behalf of Israel and all the issues which it faces today. And I will add that there is no limit to what each of us is willing to do and that we must take counsel together in order to do it.

Present among us at this meeting of COJO are representatives of all five continents -- North and South America, Africa, Australia and Europe. I am confident that, together, we will be able to bring our thinking together to come up with policies and programs that will best serve world Jewry. Sometime during the Conference, we will also discuss when we should have a full plenum this summer, at which time the election of officers will be on the agenda, so that all the business items as well as the discussion items will be placed before you during this next period. Here I want to thank not only Yehuda Hellman but also Max Melamet and Herman Edelsberg for planning the conference. We have tried to select the issues which we thought you would want to discuss; in each case, we have invited speakers eminently qualified to lead the discussion. But most of all we want these people to hear from you, because if we are to gain from the collective thinking which COJO represents, then I think your voices -- our voices -- must be heard.

While Mr. Bar-On, who is here from Jerusalem, is still with us (he must return very shortly to Israel), I would like to ask him to give a brief report on the Committee on Informal Adult Education, which he has headed.

Mr. Mordecai Bar-On: I will try to be as brief as possible. In July of '73 COJO at its meeting in Geneva appointed a committee to discuss projects under the heading of informal education and adult education, part of COJO's educational efforts. The members of the committee were Dr. Kahn from the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation, Felix Hollander from the Joint Distribution Committee, Sigfried Roth from the World Jewish Congress, Ron Finkel from the World Union of Jewish Students and myself, as Chairman. We worked throughout that year and met with the presidium of COJO again in July of '74. We presented the presidium with a proposal which assumes a certain measure of financial backing. COJO would have to put up only part of the money, at most 50 per cent while the rest would come from the international participating bodies and, preferably, from the local communities in which the specific projects take place. That means that if we had \$100,000,

which we probably will have, we could undertake projects costing close to a quarter of a million dollars. This is not a great sum; we look at it, rather, as an initial contribution.

As of the moment, we have been allocated a sum of \$50,000 to work with until the end of April '75. At our meeting at the end of October in Jerusalem, we adopted a four-point program:

- 1) Expanding the World Jewish Congress-type of colloquium (such as were held by the WJC in England and in France) to two new and smaller communities in Europe and Latin America. We hope to hold one colloquium early in the spring in a smaller European community (one of the Scandinavian countries, perhaps) and one in Latin America. This project is being handled by the World Jewish Congress with the cooperation of WZO, B'nai B'rith and others.
- 2) Developing educational resource centers in smaller communities. In Europe the leadership in developing these centers in Europe will be taken by the European Council of Jewish Communities; in Latin America, by the WZO -- both, of course, with participation by local communities and by other members of COJO.
- 3) Launching a program of scholars-in-residence. Between now and April or May we hope to be able to send to Europe about eight or ten scholars; some of them from Israel and some from other countries. The main idea is to have an exchange of Jewish intellectuals, no matter where they are from.
- 4) Helping WUJS in its venture of an inter-continental, USA-Latin American Conference in Miami which I believe now will probably be getting off the ground. They still have some tzoers so we decided to help them on this one project.

These are the four items that we are able to work up and while I admit it is a very modest program, it shows we are moving into new fields and new areas and that we are doing so with the full collaboration of international bodies and local communities. Thank you.

Mrs. Jacobson: That was a very comprehensive and clear report by Mr. Bar-On. As you can see, these are four projects which will really plant seeds in parts of the world which did not, up until now, have the benefit of these programs. We look forward with great interest to receiving continued progress reports on these items.

And now dear friends, I think you will agree that it is particularly gracious of the Israel Ambassador to Washington to take time out from his very, very heavy schedule to come to be with us today. The Ambassador to Washington has, certainly, a heavy responsibility just to keep up with his duties vis-a-vis the American Government, but the Ambassador to Washington also has six million Jews, all of whom think they know much better than he how to

handle the American Government. Simcha Dinitz has been able to establish the kind of rapport and relationship with the American Jewish community by means of a wonderful give and take of opinion, due really to his tremendous patience and fortitude. We know that we are living in a period when the situation changes from day to day. We are constantly calling upon him for an evaluation of new trends. When he's optimistic, we scold him and say he's not realistic. When he's pessimistic, we tell him that he's not lifting the morale of the Jewish people; and so he has to exercise every kind of wisdom to give us straight thinking and, at the same time, to imbue within us the sense of solidarity that we need. There have been so many statements in the newspapers this past week that I'm sure all of you have a whole host of questions to ask. But first we will hear the thinking and evaluation of Simcha Dinitz, a very, very, very distinguished Ambassador, and good friend to all of us, of the State of Israel in Washington.

Ambassador Simcha Dinitz: Thank you very much, Charlotte. I'm really grateful that you invited me here. This room is not at all strange to me; I come very often, but not until now within the framework of COJO. I welcome this opportunity because the events we deal with transcend the border of this continent, both northward towards Canada and westward and eastward. We are, indeed, facing not only a difficult situation, which we all know, but also a very fluid situation -- fluid not merely because of the oil but because the components of the problem are changing at a faster rate perhaps than they ever have in the history of the Arab-Israel dispute. We will not be doing justice to ourselves if we do not re-examine our position and re-evaluate our stand as events develop; this is, after all, the art of politics and statesmanship as well.

I want to say at the outset, in response to what Charlotte said, that at no point -- at no point -- do I feel there is reason for despair, or that we should sink into despondency or adopt the fatalistic approach that "we have no control of things, things are going from bad to worse so we had better sit down and just count the days til the Doomsday." I am totally and unequivocally against this approach, not only because it is not justified by the facts, but because I think it is the worst possible attitude to take towards any crisis.

That does not mean we are not going to have difficulties. We will have them. The Arab world has never been so united as it is now. The oil situation and the financial crisis growing out of it has never been so dangerous as it is today; the influence of these two factors on Europe, on the Far East, on the Third World, on international organizations and on every government in the world in one degree or another is a factor we must contend with. At the same time, one of the great hopes of this crisis is its very magnitude; sometimes it is much more difficult to solve small problems than to overcome a crisis of great magnitude. The magnitude of this crisis contains the embryo of the solution. Let me explain what I mean by this: if the oil situation, for example, has been such that it could be solved by any specific action of Israel the pressure on Israel to take such a step would have been tremendous. This was the situation in Munich in 1938

when Chamberlain believed that by giving a particular piece of Czechoslovakian territory to Hitler, he could save the world and bring about peace.

Fortunately, the situation today is recognized as being different -- not only by us, but also by those who conduct the foreign policy of the United States and also, I believe, by leaders of other foreign governments. In other words, there is no Israeli currency that can buy a secure world free of the world's energy crisis, free of the world's monetary problem, free of the inflation and depression and recession in the world today. And because this is so, we must make it amply clear that it is an illusion to believe that by pressing Israel to make these or other concessions, the oil problem could be solved or the inflation problem, or the recession, or Western civilization. Since the situation is so much more serious, the solution must be much more radical and all-encompassing than pinning it on the State of Israel. Now, any serious examination of the situation will lead to this conclusion. But it is also our responsibility to see to it that the world clearly recognizes this.

Add to this the fact that the United States is in the process of detente with the Soviet Union, and the pros and cons of whether the Middle East is included by the detente or not. I beg to differ with some analysts who say, "All we need to solve our problems is to bring detente into the Middle East." Not necessarily. There may be additional problems if the United States and the Soviet Union come to a mutually-agreed on policy with regard to the Middle East. It all depends on what that policy will be. If it is a kind of lowest-common-denominator policy, we will be better off if the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States over the Middle East continue. If it is an acceptable policy then the chances for peace would be greater if there were an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States.

What I'm warning against here is the simplistic view that as long as the Middle East is not included in detente, that's bad, and that if the Middle East were only part and parcel of detente, that would be the beginning of salvation. Things are not so cut and dried. detente -- the way I see it -- is not a question of eliminating differences of opinion between the United States and the Soviet Union but rather finding a common acceptable denominator for those problems that they deal with in order to minimize -- not to eliminate, but to minimize -- the danger of confrontation between the superpowers. I don't think anyone in Washington regards detente as a panacea or as a formula to eliminate the differences between the general ideology and approach of the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather detente is an effort to find areas of agreement, a lowest-common-denominator to work in. Indeed, I do not think there is more detente about Europe or even nuclear weapons than there is about the Middle East.

Here's an example: When Dr. Kissinger negotiated the Syrian Israeli disengagement agreement, the Soviet Union was trying to do everything in its power not to kill the negotiation but to try to get the best possible bargain for the Arabs. It is not correct to say the Soviets disrupted the negotiation; rather, the Soviets used their influence to get a more acceptable solution for the Syrians. I remember that when I came back from the negotiations I appeared on one of the national television shows and was asked whether the Soviets were helpful on the Syrian negotiation. My answer was "No, they were not helpful." Then the news commentator asked me, "Wasn't the agreement achieved because Gromyko was in Damascus at that time?" My answer was that the agreement was achieved in spite of the fact that Gromyko was in Damascus, and not because of it. Well, that afternoon I got a call from one of Dr. Kissinger's aides in the State Department, who said to me, "I watched the program and it was fine, but you said the Soviets were not helpful and only yesterday the Secretary of State appeared on television and said the Soviets were not unhelpful." So I said to the gentleman, "You can tell the Secretary of State that I know him well enough to know that when he wants to say something positive he doesn't have to resort to two negatives." So sometimes you find the American Government resorting to two negatives to maintain the possibility and the air of detente and also because the U.S. believes that without it, the Soviets will be driven to more extreme positions. But at the same time the U.S. does not say there is harmony or understanding or cooperation or helpfulness on the part of the Soviet Union at least as far as advancing negotiations in the Middle East is concerned.

What is the basic different of approach between the Soviet Union and the United States with regard to the Middle East? In strategic terms, the difference is that the Soviet Union wants a total solution that will force Israel to return to the '67 borders and give the Palestinians their "rights." The Soviet Union, unlike Arafat and unlike other extreme elements among the Palestinians, does not talk about the abolition of the State of Israel or the replacement of the State of Israel by an Arafat-type state, democratic, secular or whatever. But the Soviets do talk about restoring the rights of the Palestinians, leaving it purposely vague so that they don't quarrel with Arafat, because in fact the restoration of the rights of the Palestinians means the undoing of the State of Israel. Such rights would, at a minimum, mean a return of refugees in some concentration of numbers; so this point is deliberately kept ambiguous. But they are not ambiguous about demanding total Israeli withdrawal. The Americans' attitude toward a Middle East solution is a step-by-step approach. They say, let us not discuss now what the final border is going to be, let us not fix now a total solution with all the Arabs but rather handle each phase as it comes and start with those phases which are most easily handled.

Now, when you have these two different strategic approaches you also employ two different tactics to achieve them. The Soviet tactic is, therefore, to re-convene the Geneva Conference where all the parties would be brought together to deal with all the issues under the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union. The Americans by approaching the problem on a step-by-ste

basis, are trying to do everything in their power to deter Geneva and in order to be able to deal with each country bilaterally. So how do the Americans resolve their differences with the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union gives a kind of nod of its head to the American approach of step-by-step bilateral negotiations; the United States, in return says it is prepared to convene the Geneva Conference as soon as possible. So, there is sort of a gentlemen's agreement; you go ahead and try to see what you can do in the step-by-step basis, but remember that the Russian Bear is waiting behind the door with his option of a total solution, a reconvening of Geneva, of pressing for a final and total Israeli withdrawal.

This is how the two superpowers stand with regard to the Middle East situation. Now, obviously, where our interests lie is quite clear. Our interests lie in achieving a final peace but, as Charlotte said, being neither pessimistic nor optimistic but realistic, we recognize that we cannot achieve a final peace at this stage. The reason is simply that any attempt to force a final peace now will raise the ultimate question of where the borders of Israel should be. Thus as early as next January we would have to discuss the West Bank of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Sharm el-Sheikh, the Palestinians, etc. -- all at a time when the Arabs are not prepared to accept anything vaguely resembling what we see as the future map of Israel. Even if the Arabs were prepared for a final peace settlement now -- which they are not -- but even if they were, the question that we must ask ourselves is this: With the oil crisis at its height, with the economic situation the way it is, is this the best moment to make a final determination of where the borders of Israel should be, what the rights of the Palestinians are, etc., etc.

Luckily, the Arabs don't present us with this challenge now for their own reasons. Therefore, if we are not in a position to force a peace neither do we want this decision to be taken at this moment. What flows from it, therefore, is this choice: either to maintain a steadfast position and insist that unless there is a total and final peace there shall be no movement anywhere, and we shall stay where we are 20 kilometers from the Canal, sitting on the Golan Heights and the West Bank, waiting for better times to come; or to look for ways and means by which we can advance step-by-step toward peace without endangering the security of Israel, making certain that for every physical move we make there will be a parallel political move by the other side. I emphasize the second point very strongly because if the other side does not want to do anything then you have a stalemate. But there is a great difference between a stalemate of which you are the victim and a stalemate of which you are the author. In my judgment, Israel should not be in a position to be blamed for a stalemate of which we are the author and not the victim. If the stalemate is inevitable, then let it be a stalemate despite every possible effort on the part of Israel to find means and ways for negotiating with the Arab states surrounding it; let it be clear that the blame for the lack of progress is put on the other side, not on ours.

Having said this, however, I must also warn that there is danger in the other course. It is this: If we are tackling the issues separately, one by one, there is the danger that we may fall victim to salami tactics in which, with every withdrawal that we make, the Arabs will be getting closer to their coveted '67 borders to the point that, should they want to start a new war against Israel, they would be able to do so from a better military position than now. This is the real danger of choosing the course we have taken. But let us also bear in mind two very important elements: One is the political *quid pro quo* we demand in exchange for every military move. I do not buy the criticism that the military disengagements we already made were without a political *quid pro quo*, but I do not want to go into this argument now. What is crystal clear is that every withdrawal we may make from now on must be accompanied by a political move by the other side. I want you to understand that this is more than a slogan. I do not expect that if Israel withdraws "X" additional miles from Sinai then Sadat will sign a peace; even if he wanted to, he couldn't possibly do it because he is, after all, in addition to being an Egyptian leader also an Arab leader, and even the strongest Arab country, militarily speaking, cannot sign a peace with Israel until there is a resolution of all the other outstanding problems -- Syria, Jordan, the Palestinians, etc. So I don't think we can expect that any additional Israeli move in Sinai will result in a peace agreement with Sadat. But when I say we need to have a definite political return for every Israeli military move, that means that just as we pull back militarily, so Egypt has to make a substantial step towards political settlement with Israel.

I don't want to pre-empt the negotiations and, of course, I cannot go into any details, but I want to tell you what are the basic concepts of a settlement that we would expect. I think it would have to have three elements: one, the element of non-belligerency, a definite advance from a situation of total war (as it is now) to a situation of movement toward peace. Secondly, there must be physical arrangements on the ground that will not make Israel weaker if and when the Egyptians decide to violate the agreement and launch another war against Israel. Thirdly, it will have to have the element of time. The longer the time element in such a temporary arrangement, the more positive an impact it will have not only on Egyptian-Israeli relations but also on Israel's relations with Syria and Jordan. So for any additional Israeli withdrawal there must be a political concession and also the assurance of military security, which among other things means that no Egyptians would move into an area evacuated by Israel. In Sinai there are great expanses which (some of them) are more important for who is not there rather than for who is. So, a proper and controlled demilitarization of the area that we undertake to evacuate is a necessary element in our military consideration. There are others, too -- elements of topography, of resources -- that I don't want to go into now but which, obviously will have to guide us in any negotiations we enter with Egypt. The third element -- that of time -- is important not only for the political impact it will have if Egypt gets out of the dispute for "X" number of years but also in the event there is war with Syria; if you ask me, I would say

the more likely war that may be developing in the Middle East is one with Syria. If there should be war with Syria, the least we can do is try to localize it; if we deal with only one front, we can deal with it effectively, we can deal with it quickly.

I know this raises all sorts of questions, legitimate questions, for example: What guarantee will there be that Egypt would not violate an agreement and join such a war? This is among the risks that must be taken into consideration when we make any withdrawal. Therefore, I put it as the cardinal element of any arrangement that at no time should we enter into any agreement that will jeopardize our own security vis-a-vis the Egyptians in case the Egyptians violate it. Let me add only this caution: do not assume that every withdrawal we make endangers Israel's defensive posture.

The reason I have mentioned Egypt is that in earnestly and sincerely working to break the deadlock, this is the one front in which there could be considerable movement diplomatically, politically and militarily. The reason is, of course, that in the North, with the Syrians, we have practically nothing to concede territorially. There is no government in Israel that would advocate a descent from the Golan Heights. Any government that gives up the Heights gives up the valleys; a government that gives up the valleys gives up Northern Israel; a government that gives up the defense of Northern Israel gives up the defense of Israel. So on the Golan there is no room for movement except within a context of peace. By this I mean that I do not want to create the impression that if we sign peace agreements with Syria we cannot move several yards here and there to rectify a line. But the principle must be that we shall remain on the Heights; that is what protects the security of Northern Israel and subsequently of all Israel. Since the Syrians are not interested in negotiating any partial agreement or, indeed, any peace at all, but rather in our getting down from the Golan Heights, which we will not do, there is no realistic possibility of entering into any meaningful negotiations with Syria at this point.

Now, moving from the realm of diplomacy to the realm of P.R., that does not mean we have to shout day and night that there is nothing we can do with Syria. By saying this out loud all the time all we do is drive Syria into an even more extreme position -- and possibly into the option of war. In general, I distinguish between things we must work for and things we must say. I know that the hardest job, not only for Israelis but for Jews in general, is not to make public pronouncements. In this particular case, while our policy with regard to Syria is crystal clear, it is not in the interest of Israel or for that matter of any one to use every opportunity to say, "Nothing can be done with Syria." Therefore I welcomed the government's statement a few weeks ago that Israel is prepared to negotiate peace with Egypt, with Jordan and with Syria. I'm

not optimistic over the possibility of early negotiations with Syria; I'm saying we must not foreclose this option and drive Syria into the only remaining alternative, which is war.

On the Jordanian front, there is no possibility of doing anything now. Here I want to speak candidly. I do not believe we missed any "train" with regard to Jordan. The only train we missed with regard to Jordan was the Arafat train, and we can always get on that one. But this train, my friends, leads to Auschwitz and to no other destination. Therefore, I totally reject the idea that we missed out on the possibility of making peace with Jordan. Jordan knew very well what our suggestions were; we have negotiated in various ways (and don't ask me to elaborate) with Jordan. The King knew exactly what we were prepared to do, and we heard from the King exactly what he was prepared to do. What he proposed was a withdrawal by Israel of 10 kilometers all along the Jordan River. That was totally unacceptable to us because it would have meant handing over to Hussein the very areas that are of such strategic importance in blocking armies and terrorists from infiltrating into Israel. Nor would it have given Hussein any population back; there is hardly any population along the Jordan Valley. The other suggestion the King had was for a total Israeli withdrawal, including Jerusalem. Any time Israel decides to get on this train, we will have all the partners in the world to negotiate with.

The one thing we did miss is falling into the trap of giving a slice of the West Bank, as the King proposed, with no political return whatsoever. Had we done so, there is every likelihood that in this stretch of territory Mr. Arafat and his friends, would be sitting, rather than King Hussein. I don't need to tell you that this is not a prospect that is very pleasing to the Israelis. So what do I think should be done with regard to the Eastern Front? Right now, nothing. By this I mean that at this stage we must allow for time to lapse so that Arafat and the PLO will be regarded -- as they could very well be regarded within a period of six, nine or twelve months -- by the Palestinians and by the other Arab countries which built Arafat, as someone who can produce slogans but not a single inch of territory. The moment Arafat is recognized as a vehicle for PR and for slogan-producing but not for a practical political settlement, he will become obsolete and there will be much greater chance that the Arab world will turn either back to the King or to other moderate elements within the Palestinians to see whether they can negotiate with Israel on some sort of a settlement.

Therefore, our function at this stage is not to keep coming up with new solutions with regard to the Palestinians. In the next few months our function will be to deal with other issues. By this I don't mean that any of us believes there could be a total solution to the Middle East situation without taking care of the Palestinian element. What I am saying is that at this stage we must direct all our efforts to break the deadlock not on the Eastern front, but on the Southern front. There would be a completely different situation on the Eastern front if we can come to some sort of

arrangement with Sadat on the Sinai. Maybe it is part of the tragedy of the Palestinian people that every time there is a chance for a turning-point in their history, in which negotiations could take place with them, they manage to produce the most extreme leadership and the most extreme demands, killing the prospect of negotiations at the very outset. That was the case with the Mufti, that was the case with the Pasha over the Partition Plan, etc., etc. I don't need to elaborate on this history. I think that in spite of their UN victory and their Rabat victory -- perhaps because of them -- in historical perspective this period will be recalled by the Palestinians as one of the great missed opportunities they had to enter into negotiations with Israel.

So I come to the conclusion that what we are facing now is the necessity to explore seriously what can be done in terms of progress towards peace on the Southern front, and on this I'm not totally pessimistic. I am quite sure that when Egypt paid the lip service that it did in Rabat in accepting decision on the PLO, it built itself a Golem which in time it will find threatening its own freedom of movement more than it helps its national interests. Because I think Sadat realizes this, I have every reason to believe that he has left for himself the option, once the dust settles on Rabat and in the UN, to continue to explore bilateral possibilities for advancement. If you say that's a contradiction in terms, I would reply, not in the Arab mind. Sadat could very well reason to himself and to his Arab friends in the following manner: "I've done my bit for the Palestinians. I supported them in Rabat, I gave them political support in the UN, Faisal and I together have neutralized Hussein for you and bought him for \$300,000,000 a year, I have done all these things for the Palestinian cause, now let us see what I can do for myself." This is a very typical Arab and very typical Sadat approach, so I do not exclude at all that explorations in this direction could yield positive results.

One more word before I conclude my preliminary remarks and answer questions: there is a kind of deadline facing us -- the visit of Brezhnev to Cairo on the 15th of January. Since none of us in the free world wants Sadat to return to the Soviet fold, something should be started, some breaking of the ice should take place before Mr. Brezhnev makes his appearance in Cairo and before Sadat has to choose between the American option of continued negotiations and the Soviet option of renewal of military supplies which would lead to war. Here too I want to be a bit more cautious. I do not believe that Sadat's choices are as simple and as clear-cut and as one-sided as that. First of all, Sadat, personally, has jeopardized his position seriously with the Soviet Union. Before he makes a decision of a full-fledged return of the Soviet Union to Egypt, he will have to do what every President does in calculating whether what he does will enhance or curtail his own authority -- in Sadat's case his very life. In other words, a decision by Sadat to bring back Soviet influence into Egypt could very well mean for him an end of his Presidency. The Soviets took a chance with him once and once again; they might not take a chance with him a third time, and there are many other Egyptians --

some of them free and some of them still in prisons -- who could do the Soviets' bidding in a much more clear-cut and uninhibited and uncomplicated and un-Western way than Sadat. So in making this decision, Sadat will have to consider his continued Presidency of Egypt and, indeed, his very life. Secondly, he knows that if he decides with Brezhnev on a full-fledged renewal of Soviet arms shipment to Egypt, he is making the decision to choose the Soviet option to endanger the very continuation of the diplomatic process begun by Dr. Kissinger, to jeopardize all the services and assistance already received and promised for the future from the United States. And, if you say, "Yes, but he's frustrated because America promised him economic aid and didn't deliver and promised him a nuclear reactor and didn't deliver," I would reply that nevertheless Sadat does see that, after all, his association with the United States produced things that six or seven years of Soviet partnership did not. It got him the Canal back, it got the Israelis across the Canal, it saved his Second Army and possibly the Third Army, etc., etc. So the question of deciding whether to accept arms from the Soviet Union and restore Soviet influence of the Soviet Union or continue with the American option is not a simple one.

So I believe that we should dangle a carrot in front of Sadat before he sees Brezhnev but we should not let him bite the carrot until Brezhnev leaves. That's if he already had a bite before Brezhnev came, then the Soviet leader's visit would be used as a platform to launch additional political demands. So, a very delicate and sophisticated diplomatic game must be played, in which explorations are undertaken to see whether there is a possibility of movement before the visit of Brezhnev, to make sure that nothing is consummated or finalized until well into '75, after the visit, if and when Sadat indicates that he does choose the continued role of diplomatic negotiations over the option of war.

But the only way this game can be played is if Israel is strengthening itself from day to day. If we are in a weak position, either militarily or politically, not only do we undermine our security but the very chance of continuing the negotiating process. There is no greater truism than this: the Arabs will never negotiate with an Israel they can overcome militarily. Therefore, simultaneously with our exploration of the various diplomatic options, we must see to the strengthening of Israel militarily, economically and politically; that means in arms, that means in money, that means in informational activities in the political sphere. Without these three elements, our diplomatic efforts would be futile and the possibility of war would be nearer and more likely. Thank you very much.

Charlotte Jacobson: If there is such a thing as outdoing yourself, Ambassador Dinitz, you certainly did it today with your superbly clear and magnificent analysis, and so we express our appreciation. Now we will have questions and comments; we'll take a few at a time.

Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg: Simcha, I can only second what Charlotte has said. I do want to ask you about one element of fact in your remarks. You were very emphatic on the point that Israel had not missed a single opportunity to talk reasonably to the Arabs and you included in that, quite cryptically, some discussion that had been held fairly recently with Hussein. Now, I would like to raise at this table -- because a number of people know it, because it floats around in various places, it has been printed and it is repeated in Foggy Bottom by people who sit not too far from the floor in which the "Senior State Department official" sits, -- the story that goes like this: when Rabin was in Washington in September, there was an agreement for withdrawal involving Jericho and some real estate around it; that the agreement was the card that the Secretary had in hand which assured him that he was going to keep Rabat from going for Arafat; that the agreement had been accepted, more than in principle, by the Israeli Government; and that the reason it was finally not acted upon was due to Israeli internal political consideration.

Now, you gave a quite different version of this report, describing it as something militarily and politically impossible. You seemed to imply that it was a suggestion that had, perhaps, been made but that was rejected on its merits. This seems to be what you're saying to us today, and it appears to be a very considerable variance with what one keeps hearing around from those who are busy saying, "Rabat would not have happened if the Israelis had only handed Hussein a little sugar candy with which to survive." It seems to those of us who are engaged, at least, in some of the things you're talking about such as Hasbara, that this ghost be laid to rest.

Herman Edelsberg: You've made a very persuasive statement, Mr. Ambassador, about a policy towards the PLO, but I think Israel faces more of a dilemma with respect to the PLO than you acknowledge. It seems to me that Israel, her Arab opponents, and the suppliers of both of you are agreed that you must maintain the momentum of negotiations; otherwise, there would be war. At the same time, nearly all of you seem to agree that you must do something for the Palestinians if the momentum of negotiations is to be maintained. Now, if that is a correct statement of the premises, how do you avoid doing something vis-a-vis the agency which Rabat and the UN say is the representative of the Palestinian people?

Phil Baum: Herman has asked my question; if I may just amplify it a little bit. The major problem many of us have is in confronting the question about the reluctance of Israel to do what seems to everyone else to be a very natural thing. What would it cost us to take a position very similar to that attributed to General Yariv and say publicly that Israel is prepared to negotiate with all elements among the Palestinians, including the PLO, who themselves are prepared to affirm and accept the presence of Israel in the Middle East? And I say to you, Mr. Ambassador,

that I had occasion to put this same question to Mr. Eban yesterday at a meeting of the Presidents Conference, so, I'd be most grateful for your answer now.

Ambassador Dinitz: Let me start with Dr. Hertzberg's question. I'm really grateful for it because I think we should at least know the facts and then we can decide how to deal with them. Let me make it emphatically clear that there was at no point any suggestion on the part of Israel to Hussein or anyone else to give back Jericho or part of the West Bank; moreover, there was never, at any point, any hint of an acceptance of Hussein of such a suggestion that wasn't made. Who made this suggestion? The same people in Foggy Bottom who are now saying that this is a missed opportunity. You see, you have these officials in the State Department who are producing papers and suggestions daily. First of all, they have the problem of getting their own superiors to accept these proposals they come up with. Then, their superiors have problems telling the Secretary of State to accept them; then when these things are not accepted by either side and very often even not by their superiors, they are frustrated and say, "It's a missed opportunity." Maybe it's a missed opportunity as far as they are concerned, but in fact this suggestion was neither made by Israel nor accepted by Hussein.

I'll tell you something else. Since they were floating this suggestion, I have every reason to believe that not only you and I knew about it but Hussein knew about it too. And if Hussein knew about it, and was interested in it, he had millions of ways of communicating to us that he was prepared to discuss it. Then the Israel Government, with or without reference to internal political difficulties, would have been able to say yes or no. But Hussein was never interested in such suggestions. The only two suggestions that Hussein was interested in was a disengagement agreement in which Israel pulled back 10 kilometers from the Jordan in exchange for nothing, or a total Israeli withdrawal, including Jerusalem, for peace or for political settlement. Let me repeat: in terms of Israel's withdrawing 10 kilometers, Hussein said he would offer no political concessions in return. At no point did I say that we have negotiated with Hussein; because I do not want it to come out of this meeting that the Israeli Ambassador has said that there were negotiations with Hussein. I said that Hussein knows what we think and we know what Hussein thinks and both of us know what the State Department thinks; the only ones who missed any opportunity were the official or officials in the State Department who thought it was a good idea. And if it was missed, it was not because of us but because the Jordanians never expressed the slightest interest in it. Therefore, we couldn't possibly have missed any train to peace. The only two trains that were going was one 10 kilometers along the Jordan River and one straight into Israel through Jerusalem. I know the story is circulating in Foggy Bottom. I am doing everything in my power, whenever I appear in public or private, to denounce it. For your information, I have told this to the Secretary of State in no uncertain terms, and he knows the

truth. There was no proposal submitted to us with regard to withdrawal in Jericho except in the minds of some State Department officials and maybe in the minds of some journalists.

Now the question with regard to the PLO. I don't know what Eban answered; I'll tell you my answer. First, I do not think that the propaganda battle with regard to the PLO and Arafat's speech in the United Nations was lost on the American scene. I say that on the basis of an analysis of five or six hundred editorials and television and radio commentators. What Arafat did for us was to make it crystal clear where he stands and where the PLO stands. And this is not only what the New York Times said, not only the Washington Post, but also the Houston Post, the Denver Post, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the New Orleans Times Picayune, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Globe Democrat of St. Louis and others. Of course, there were some papers and some officials in the same Foggy Bottom that Arthur was talking about that say that Israel should negotiate with the PLO or that phrase it that if the PLO were different, Israel should negotiate. I have news for you. They believed the same way before Rabat and before Arafat's speech at the UN; at least they are consistent in their opinions. That does not make their opinion more correct after the UN and Arafat; on the contrary. In this respect, Arafat has done us a great service. Everybody saw the gun he spoke of. Very few people observed the olive branch. And I suggest that we ourselves should not question this now.

When I am asked this question, my answer is much simpler. I do not say Israel is prepared to negotiate with the PLO "if," I have had some experience with the media and I know that newsmen have a habit of picking out of a sentence what is convenient for them. If I say Israel is prepared to negotiate with the PLO "if," the "if" will get lost between me and the first edition of the New York Times. Arik Sharon had this experience. He said that Israel should negotiate with the PLO for the destruction of Jordan and establish in Jordan a Palestinian state. I was in Boston that day and heard it on CBS. In the morning CBS said, "Arik Sharon called for negotiations with the PLO." The rest of the sentence, "in order to destroy Jordan and establish a Palestinian state," had completely disappeared. In the afternoon, when a fuller text was available, CBS said, "Israel wants to use the PLO as an instrument to destroy Jordan." You see, neither of these interpretations does us any good. So I absolutely and honestly believe that if we say we are prepared to negotiate with the PLO "on condition that," it will give a license to people to say, "If Israel is prepared to negotiate with the PLO on condition that," Israel can also negotiate without any pre-conditions. So when I am asked, "what would you do if the PLO acknowledged the existence of Israel and agreed not to use terrorist methods," I quote a famous Jewish story, the punch line of which is that if the tiger had no spots it would have been a pussycat. When we have to deal with pussycats, we'll deal with pussycats. Right now, we have to deal with a tiger.

Mr. Abram Marks: I was a bit disturbed by the appearance of Ambassador Dinitz's political gamemanship if not brinksmanship. I really think his approach is far too sophisticated for the man in the street to understand, and I wonder if we're going to be able to put it over and get anybody to understand it? It all sounds so tortuous. I keep asking myself and everybody I meet, what are the alternatives? It's very difficult to find a straightforward, clean-cut answer to the alternatives for the man in the street. There are some who say there is no alternative. Last year, before Yom Kippur, we were sitting around in our drawing rooms thinking Israel was strong and powerful. We'd been told for years that Israel could resist any Arab attack. And then look at what happened. Three thousand Israeli boys were killed and 20,000 Arab boys, that's what happened. And here we are, it seems, playing the brinksmanship game with Israel armed to the teeth, still capable (we are told) of dealing with anything thrown at her.

Ambassador Dinitz spoke of Sadat's wanting to keep his office and the danger of getting too close to the Russians. I suggest that Sadat will also have to take into account the price of becoming isolated from the rest of the Arab world and whether what he gets from Israel and America will make up for what he loses from the rest of the Arab world. And then we hear this sort of compound epigram about the situation with Syria. We must, apparently, continue to pretend to negotiate because if you give up the Golan, then you give up the Huleh and if you give up the Huleh, you give up Northern Israel and if you give up Northern Israel, you give up Israel. Is this really a valid premise today? Can't anyone give us just one little glimmer of light that we could take back to the people we have to meet? Their doubts, their questions are very valid and very important ones in general.

Mr. Abraham Schenker: There are two points I want to raise. I think there is no debate about recognition of the PLO. The real question people ask, at least from my experience, traveling through the country, is: "Does Israel make a distinction between the PLO and the Palestinians?" And, if so, wasn't there a missed opportunity, not so much with regard to Hussein but in finding an alternative leadership among the Palestinians to Arafat. How does this tie in with the recent statement by Foreign Minister Allon about Israel's going out now to seek to encourage such political organization? Should we not deal with this question in terms of our answers with regard to the PLO? That's one question that I want to deal with. The other question: if, post-Rabat, the Geneva Conference should include the four elements that Rabat decided would be at the next stage of negotiations -- Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO -- where would Israel stand?

Mr. Max Schecter: Mr. Ambassador, among the newspapers you did not mention, when you spoke about editorials, was the Toronto Globe Mail which hasn't really been that friendly to us, but since Rabat and since Arafat's

appearance at the United Nations has been tremendously friendly to us. However, in this morning's edition, there appears an editorial severely criticizing the statement made yesterday or the day before by President Katzir in connection with Israel's capabilities of producing nuclear warheads. I just thought you might want to know.

Mr. Sydney M. Harris: Mr. Ambassador, one of the matters that I want to raise was, I think, raised in part by Mr. Marks. What I'm really concerned about, what I think he's concerned about, is the fact that while it's all well enough for us to sit around a room and discuss the possibilities reasonably and dispassionately, and understand the problems we face, we have to go back and interpret the situation to our communities. I can speak only about the Canadian community -- and, perhaps about only certain parts of that -- but I think it's fair to say that no matter how strong Canadian Government support has been of Israel, all it takes is one abstention to give a large percentage of the Canadian people, the Canadian Jewish community, at least, the feeling that unless Canada and other countries stand 100% behind Israel on every single thing, they have absolutely no faith in Israel, and are letting us down. We are left with total fear and the total feeling in our communities that tomorrow the Holocaust will start again.

That's what Mr. Marks was trying to ask and that's what I'm trying to ask. How do we go back to our communities and try to explain the facts of life, and point out that there may well have to be some changes in some of the positions that we have so very strongly advocated over the years? We will never do such and such, we will never consider such and such, we will never discuss matters with so and so. And now, it appears, maybe we will and maybe we have to; the world situation is such, the realities of life are such that we may have to do the things we said we never would. If I can quote something Naomi Levine said to me the other night: "Perhaps we have oversold certain positions that we may have to start underselling to ourselves." I think that's one of the things we have to come to some conclusion on today. In any event, some of our thinking is changing; in the nature of things, political situations do change. The trouble is that emotional positions don't change, and our major problem at the moment, it seems to me, is how are we going to be able to get across to our communities the fact that we have to start being more logical and less emotional if we're going to be able to solve the problems that face all of us.

Mr. Jules Braunschvig: Mr. Ambassador, as a foreigner here, I have one remark and one question to ask. My question is the following: In Europe and, especially in France, you often hear people say that, at the end, one is always obliged to negotiate with the liberation movements with whom one didn't want to talk. I don't agree with the idea which is at the back of it, but a good answer to that question would,

certainly be very useful. The second point which I wanted to raise, Mr. Ambassador, is that your conclusion was that if we want the Arabs one day to negotiate with us, what Israel needs is arms, money and the political support we can bring. I would suggest a fourth point: I have been very struck, during the days that I have spent in America, by the low morale of the Jewish public. On this point, I would like to hear from the Ambassador some advice as to how we can bring here a part of the morale one finds in Israel.

Alderman Michael M. Fidler: Quite frankly, I was far more encouraged by what Mr. Dinitz said today than Mr. Eban's response the other day. In my view, any suggestion of negotiation with the PLO with any "if's and but's" will lend an air of respectability and credibility to those who, at the moment, are in a stage of indecision. I speak to you after having spent a fortnight trying to persuade leaders of the British Government to vote against both resolutions in the United Nations, and, alas, having failed, because they abstained on recognition of the PLO, and voted against the PLO only on the other. So I'm conscious of the difficulty. Nevertheless, in my view, if there's any suggestion by the Israeli Government that there are certain circumstances in which they would negotiate with the PLO, then you will take away the possible support that lies, not only in Britain but in the whole of the European economic community. I believe they could still be persuaded to turn their faces resolutely against any pressure on Israel to deal with the PLO, but only if it's crystal-clear that Israel is adamant in having nothing to do with it. I cannot, for example, conceive the British Government's ever agreeing to negotiate with the IRA in solving the problem in Northern Ireland. I think we are, in fact, crediting the PLO with something that they have no right to acquire for themselves. I don't regard the PLO as a liberation movement. Do they represent anybody? I would like to say to Mr. Dinitz that I hope that Israel will be adamant.

Now, to ask you a couple of questions. Taking long-term strategies, if it's accepted that it's an American interest never to see Israel vanish, and if it's accepted that it's a USSR interest, for entirely different reasons, never to see Israel vanish because the removal of Israel in the Middle East will destroy Russia's potential influence and presence in the Middle East, then isn't this a case that intransigence will pay Israel just as handsomely as compliance? I'm saying this deliberately; if you fear that one side seeks the destruction of Israel, then you have to think in terms of possible compliance. But if both sides, even for different reasons, still support Israel's continued existence, then isn't it a fact that intransigence will in the long run pay off just as handsomely or as well as compliance at this stage?

The other question I want to raise in dealing with the Palestinian question is this: Why cannot we make more ground with the suggestion of transfer of population? We have a crystal-clear case that 800,000 Jews or more from the Arab countries were absorbed into Israel. Why cannot we say that as an

international solution to the problem, those Arabs who see no future for themselves within the State of Israel should be assisted to their future peaceful development inside Arab countries, absorbing them in the same way that Jews were absorbed in Israel.

Dr. Gerhart Riegner: I want to come back to the analysis about America and Russia. Mr. Dinitz explained their differing approaches very well. I believe that in the end, America and Russia will have to agree. Accepting your argument that there cannot be an overall settlement without Soviet agreement, is it not also true that there cannot be without a step-by-step solution, the Soviet Union? Didn't we see that in the Syrian case? Wasn't Dr. Kissinger blocked by the Russians in the step-by-step negotiation with Syria until the Russians gave it the go-ahead? Isn't the basic problem one of getting the U.S. and the USSR to agree?

Judge I.A. Maisels: The Ambassador's message, I think, excluded the probability of a Munich. I would like to ask him why he completely excludes that I would also ask him whether he does not consider that the European community can play a very negative part vis-a-vis Israel in this connection?

Ambassador Dinitz: I am reminded of the story Golda once told me about the man who refused to pay the 50¢ admission the Pioneer Women in Milwaukee used to charge when they had a name speaker. One man who always came to those meetings refused to pay. When they asked him why, his reply was straightforward: "I did not come to hear the lecture, I came to ask questions." I want to start with Mr. Marks and relate my answer also to Mr. Harris' question. I am very much afraid of certain expressions, Mr. Marks, one of them being "the man in the street." When we talk about "the man in the street," first of all we don't talk about ourselves because none of us will admit that he's "the man in the street." So I want to make an agreement with you, right here and now -- let us try to understand each other; then the man in the street will understand. I have no difficulty with "the man in the street." I meet thousands of them throughout the United States. (Of course, I cannot speak about "the man in the street" in London.) I sometimes have difficulty with those who purport to believe what "the man in the street" feels or knows or understands. If you think, with all due respect, Mr. Marks, that my presentation was not comprehensible to "the man in the street" I find it very difficult to explain to "the man in the street" what your question really was because it seems to me your analysis of the situation was far more complicated to my understanding than the one I gave.

You are saying that maybe the time has come for us to re-examine some of the positions that we have taken in the light of new realities. I started my remarks by saying that the art of a political negotiation is to adjust

yourself to circumstances. Obviously, you have to do this to the best of your ability without compromising your principle or the security of the real estate you are trying to protect. You can't do it by saying what is easy to explain in the street or what is salable from a PR point of view and then adjusting your policies accordingly. This is not a beauty contest, it is not even a popularity contest; it is a matter of life and death of people. This must be the criterion of what we should or should not do, what we should say and not say. Having said this, I fail to understand why you saw a contradiction in my saying that we must do everything in our power to explore every possible negotiating posture and remain strong at the same time. I don't think it's a question of "either/or." It is a necessity that both these approaches will be made simultaneously. With all due respect, I do not find "the man in the street" not comprehending. In fact, I will go even further, I will say, and I agree with you completely Mr. Marks, that Israel must do everything in its power to advance the cause of negotiation -- not only because it is popular but because it is the best thing for Israel to do. Before I have to assume this posture with regard to the United States, I have to do so with regard to my own children who might have to fight another war. They have to be convinced that we have done everything in our power to break the deadlock. Only then they will fight the way they fought in the past and only then, Mr. Marks, they will be powerful enough to throw back, as they have done in the past including the Yom Kippur War, every onslaught -- even if it comes as a surprise. That is why we have to do the two things simultaneously. We will not be able to do either of these things effectively if we separate them; and it's not gamesmanship -- I didn't talk about gamesmanship. If we neglect the diplomatic effort to advance politically in our dispute with the Arabs, we will also be injuring our ability to remain strong. If to translate it in very concrete terms, it will be that much more difficult to get the arms and financing from the United States that we need to remain strong. On the other hand, if we only pursue the diplomatic approach without, at the same time, doing everything in our power to strengthen ourselves, we would have no diplomatic chance whatsoever to make any progress toward a settlement.

The fact of the matter is that the reason Egypt and Syria entered into disengagement agreements with us was not that they had attained a new confidence but that they realized that, in spite of all the facts and elements that were working in their favor on the eve of the Yom Kippur War and in the first few days of the fighting, we wound up the war 60 miles from Cairo and 25 miles from Damascus. That was the reason they agreed to negotiate for a disengagement. Otherwise, all the talent in the world of Dr. Kissinger would not have been sufficient.

So I do not see any contradiction between the two courses of action that I advocate -- in fact, they are interconnected -- just as I do not see any confusion resulting from this. It is not a question of saying Israel will not negotiate on the Golan, Israel will not negotiate in the South, Israel will not negotiate with the Palestinians. I haven't said any of these things. On the contrary, I said Israel will negotiate with Egypt, Israel will

negotiate with Syria, Israel will negotiate with Jordan and, in the framework of negotiating with Jordan, Israel will negotiate with the Palestinians. I have just tried in this meeting between us to tell you the realities of each negotiation, why it is so difficult to negotiate with Syria; why it is impossible, now, to negotiate with Jordan; why it is, I believe, possible now to negotiate with Egypt. By this I think I put a positive stamp rather than a negative one on every one of the issues that trouble you and all of us. One of the reasons I believe we should stretch ourselves to come to an agreement with Egypt, if it is at all possible, is in order not to be blamed for freezing the situation but rather using everything in our power and every bit of imagination to break the deadlock so that if war does, nevertheless, break out it would not be of our making, so that we know and the United States knows and the world knows what we have done. I separate them not because the United States is outside of the world but because the United States is in a different set of circumstances by which to judge the situation from the one Europe is in. All should be convinced that we have done everything in our power to advance the cause of negotiation and that, therefore, war is not the first resort but the last resort. It is not the desired thing, but it may be unavoidable. I think this is very simple and very comprehensible. I, at least, have not found that this creates confusion, either for leadership or for "the man of the street."

Mr. Schenker asked about the Palestinians and the PLO. We definitely do distinguish between the two. We don't say that we will not negotiate with the Palestinians; we have never said this. We say we won't negotiate with the PLO. You have asked whether everything was done during the years to encourage, to promote and to foster local leadership in the West Bank as an alternative to Arafat. "Everything" is another phrase that I'm afraid of. I do not believe we can do everything on any subject, but I believe that the policy of open bridges, the policy of (as it's sometimes called by non-Jews) the "benevolent occupation," the policy of retaining the local regimes and school system and strengthening the economy were, all of them, encouraging for the development of such leadership. There were attempts to do this. Whether everything was done, I will not go out on a limb to say. Maybe, in retrospect, more could have been done. There are others who claim, with just as much vigor, that no matter what we had done, if the Palestinians had been allowed greater freedom of organization they would have turned to Arafat anyway. I cannot prove it. I doubt whether you can. I don't want to enter into this argument; it is a question really for the historians. But the fact of the matter is that if we still have hope for a Palestinian representation of some sort, Jordanian or indigenous West Bank, to develop for us to do business with, the prerequisite must be total, absolute and unequivocal negation of the PLO and what it stands for. Because if we continue to compromise on this, the first ones who will read the message will be the Palestinians who live on the West Bank. It was not the appearance of Arafat in the United Nations or the decisions of Rabat but the spectacle of 100 nations getting up and applauding him that caused the riots in the

democracy that exists there. He can do a fine job in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan and in Yemen and in Syria and even in Egypt -- none of them have reached the epitome of secular democracy he is so concerned about. With regard to being a minority under Arafat, there are plenty of reasons why it would not be my favorite choice. This, I think, also goes to the second question of the distinguished Mr. Braunschvig -- and, by this I don't mean to say that the other questioners were not distinguished too.

On the question of morale: I agree with you 100% and that is how I started my remarks. The belief in ourselves in the full sense of the word conditions everything we do; otherwise, we may sink into apathy or into despair or into confusion before we succeed to confuse anybody else. If this conference should take anything with it, it's not to despair. If the delegates carry away one message, it is that we have been in far worse situations and we have emerged. Jews, in general, don't react like ostriches when they are facing difficult situations; rather they close ranks. Of course, they are never unanimous on anything -- God forbid, it is not even Jewish to be so -- but they are harmonious. It is the harmony that counts and not the unanimity. I would be worried if every Jew outside Israel and in Israel thought alike; that's the time to close shop. But there is a difference between unanimity and harmony. Harmony, I think, is what we need, each in his own way and his own thinking, leading to the same goal which is one for all of us.

Mr. Fidler offered partly a statement, which I do not contest, and partly a question. I've already responded to the question that flowed from Mr. Fidler's remark about how dangerous the "if's and the but's" are, but I also said in response to another question, let us not claim for Arafat that moderation which he does not claim for himself, for pity's sake. And let us not search for reasons why we must change our fundamental concepts on the ground that other countries have changed theirs. The example of Norway I think is an important one and I sincerely believe that before long England will also re-examine the situation. I don't have any inside information and I've been in politics too long not to know there is a difference between Wilson and the Cabinet and between the Cabinet and the Civil Service and between the Civil Service and the Foreign Service and between the Foreign Service and the bureaucracy. But, in any event, I still believe that the world will either unite to lessen the pressure of Arab oil or advance towards self-sufficiency. In America this is definitely an attainable goal even by conservation alone; and in Europe it will eventually become an attainable goal. To that extent you will see the ideology changing with it.

With regard to Mr. Fidler's point about the exchange of population, we say this time and again and, of course, there is a basic truth in it and, of course, it is something that must be repeated. I mean the whole history of the Palestinian question, not only the exchange of population but what motivated their escape, their running from Israel. These are the sort of ABC's that we must not forget even when we deal with the XYZ's.

Mr. Riegner asked about the role of the Soviets and whether they too should not be involved in the step-by-step process. My answer is that the very process of the step-by-step is contrary to the Soviet approach to the problem. Because when the Americans are pursuing the diplomacy of step-by-step, they are motivated by the fine desire -- and I am not cynical about the United States -- to have peace in the Middle East and also by the fact that only in this way can they minimize the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. True, the basic interest of the United States is peace in the Middle East, but the U.S. also knows that peace in the Middle East makes the role of the Soviet Union weaker.

Here, with your permission, I want to elaborate a bit. I don't remember who said it, but obviously the interest of the United States is the continued existence of Israel; this is a safe premise to make under any administration. The follow-up is that the United States' interest is in a strong Israel and not in a vulnerable Israel, because a vulnerable Israel is subject to Arab and Soviet take-over, and you don't want to have to bring American soldiers to fight for Israel's survival. We in Israel do not want to be attacked by the Russians, but we also do not want to be saved by the Americans. Both of these are cardinal points in our policy. I mean if, God forbid, we are attacked by the Russians then obviously the next move is an American move because what the Soviet Union is doing is challenging the American position in the Middle East and not the independence of Israel. But short of this, our aim and our policy is not only not to be attacked by the Russians but also not to have a single American soldier fight for our liberty and survival, because that will be the day in which we will be in danger in this country. So, since America is thinking the same way with us on this score, then the United States Government must, as a follow-up to its commitment to the non-vulnerability of Israel, have a strong Israel, not an Israel over which American soldiers might have to be involved. And here is where the General Brown statement is not only unwarranted and bad but stupid, because if you want to destroy Israel or to weaken Israel you have to fight against the Jewish lobby whether it exists or not. But if you want to make Israel strong enough so it can defend itself, then if you don't have a Jewish lobby, you have to build one to see to it that Israel is strong. Secretary Schlesinger, for example, understands it. So I think there is a definite link here between American step-by-step diplomacy and the need for a strong Israel. If there is a weak Israel, America cannot pursue this policy of step-by-step negotiations because the Arabs will turn to the Russian option again.

So let us remember that by strengthening us America is also doing a great service for its own national interests. This is not something I can say out loud because it is not for me to say what the American interest is but in a closed discussion I can tell you we had no argument with the United States over this. Indeed, there would never be the amount of support that we have in this country -- in Congress, in the press, in the labor movement, in the State Department, in the White House, in the Defense Department -- if it was not in the American interest. Let us not

kid ourselves -- all the lobby we could muster could not bring us a fraction of what we get in American support because it is in the American interest. Today Congress is voting on supporting assistance for Israel of \$339.5 million. This is not peanuts in a time like this for the economy of the United States.

Judge Maisels asked me, why do I exclude the possibility of another Munich. I wish I could say that I totally and absolutely exclude Munich. I did not say this. I said that I don't think we will see develop a Munich-type situation. And the reason I said so is that the magnitude of the problem is not such that it can be dealt with in pieces. If I read history correctly, Chamberlain sincerely believed he was saving the peace of the world when he sold out Czechoslovakia. But there is not a serious thinking man in Washington who believes that the ills of western civilization can be solved by selling Israel down the river. So I do not see a new Munich, but that does not mean that we should lower our guard for one minute. There always were, are and will be forces that will try to get across the idea that, "Just sacrifice Israel and everything will be fine." Still, I don't think this is the prevailing mood, now. We have to see to it that it will not become the prevailing mood in this country in the future.

Rabbi Benjamin Kahn: My question has to do with BREIRA, a group with which you're quite familiar. Do you regard the BREIRA group as an indication of the strength of the American Jewish community, wherein differences of opinion even vis-a-vis Israel can be made public rather than grumbling behind the scenes, or do you see it as undercutting the efforts of the State of Israel vis-a-vis the PLO?

Mr. Richard Cohen: This question is about a third state on the West Bank and Gaza. In his speech Sunday night, Mitchell Sharp, the former Foreign Minister of Canada, Mr. Sharp had a sentence in the text of his speech which he did not, fortunately, use. The omission, I think, was significant. He spoke in that sentence about the inevitability of a Palestinian State. We know of Israel's opposition to such a state in the hands of the PLO. Does Israel's opposition to such a state continue if it were to be created by a more moderate group?

Mr. Jacques Torczyner: Mr. Ambassador, we have now a new export commodity from Israel in the United States: ex-Ministers who travel around the country and make statements. Mrs. Shulamit Aloni, who speaks for the United Jewish Appeal, has stated on several occasions that Israel should and must negotiate with the PLO. That's her right. It depends what platform she uses to expound this position. Secondly, we heard the ex-Defense Minister of Israel state that Israel can withdraw from the whole water line along the Gulf of Suez without any danger. Another general stated that if we give up the oil fields, Israel will not be able to wage the next war. You said today that it is very possible that Israel may find a

better defense line further back in the Sinai. I would like to have a little more explanation about that. About Hussein: Do you believe that there is any future for Hussein? The PLO phase may also be a passing phase. Do you believe there is any possibility some time in the future that we'll have to talk to Hussein again because he may survive and the PLO may not survive?

In reference to the United Nations: I saw, to my great surprise, that many countries which abstained on Israel suddenly voted with America on Cambodia. Why? Because the American lobby at the UN was better on Cambodia than on Israel. The cause of the whole malaise is not the oil but the military weakness of the United States. If the United States were stronger today, if Europe had a little more confidence than it has today in our strength, I think the whole problem would be much different. On the transfer of populations, I want to remind Mr. Fidler that the man who suggested the transfer of population was one of the most popular American Presidents, Herbert Hoover. That concept has been discussed most recently in regard to the Cyprus problem. It is not excluded that there may be a transfer of population on the island of Cyprus; therefore, that idea can be revived by us once the Cyprus problem is taken up.

Mr. Isaiah Minkoff: First of all, I really am very grateful to the Ambassador for spending so much time with us and so eloquently presenting his case and discussing it with all of us. I agree with you that there are strategic economic and national interests that determine positions; but there is also such a thing as PR to properly interpret a position and to create a climate that is understood by the populace. I say this because I have something professionally to do with it. There are agencies in this room that are engaged in making sure this climate exists in the United States and I think it's a vindication of that position. I hope representatives from the other Jewish communities will not mind if I say that they should pay greater attention to the whole technique and profession of interpreting the position of Israel through the vehicle of community relations.

My question is this: After the '67 war the position of Israel was that time was on your side; some of us argued the other way around, that time was not on your side. It's not a question of being prophets or of saying you were wrong and we were right, but unfortunately, I would say that time has proven you were not correct on the question of timing. Now, you cannot use the very same reasoning to assert now, after the Yom Kippur War, that time is again on your side. Now the question is, with all the factors in today's situation -- the Soviet Union, oil, the economy, -- is time really on Israel's side? Would it not be in our interest to come out with a general position for a lasting peace? You argued against it; you were afraid that your minimum position would be their jumping-off point, that they would whittle it down from there. Can't we now, perhaps, explain to the world our commitment to a lasting peace?

Dr. George Gruen: What about the idea that giving arms to Israel somehow depletes the American arsenal? Is it not possible now that there is such a recession that Chrysler and General Motors should put their employees to work producing tanks instead of cars they can't sell. Shouldn't we promote the idea that maybe now is the time to build up both the American and the Israeli armies? The other question (Mr. Minkoff raised it in part) deals with time. Should not Israel now come up with a package plan for a global settlement rather than permit her position to deteriorate as time goes on? And finally, do you have any kind of hopes or anticipations that it will be possible for Israel to continue to have access to the Abu Rodeis oil if it should withdraw beyond that point? Might Sadat not be asked to make such oil available as a kind of political *quid pro quo* to show good faith?

Charlotte Jacobson: Well, like a good chairman, I've let myself wait to the last. I find there is quite a difference between taking a point of view that it's in America's interest to keep Israel strong and defining what strong means. I believe that many of us in our hearts feel the United States has not given up what we used to call the "Rogers Plan." In fact the U.S. has never committed itself to Israel's keeping any territory gained as a result of the '67 war. I wonder if you have any sense of concern over the fact that the Soviets want Israel brought back to the '67 lines just as the Rogers plan does. Are you not concerned that the Soviet Union and the United States may not decide together that this is the way to settle the problem in the Middle East?

The second point I'd like to put before you is this: I have never been able to accept for myself since the demise of Nasser that Egypt is still the kingpin of the Arab world. Sadat is not Nasser, I don't even think he has the same ambitions as Nasser. The Arab people don't look at Sadat the way they adored Nasser and they did adore him as a leader. Yet, in every discussion, whether with the representatives of Israel or the representatives of the United States Government, they've always started from the premise that without Egypt in an agreement, there's no point in taking steps toward disengagement and peace. Personally I feel that this is out of step with today's reality of the Egyptian position in the context of the Arab world.

The third thing is this: every once in a while you get a hint from the Israeli press (there was one just recently) that sometimes private agreements have been made, such as Egypt's agreement that Israel will be able to use the Canal. If it's private then there's very little comfort to the Jewish community at large that Israel is making agreements. Isn't there reason for concern that maybe there are things not so favorable for Israel that have also been agreed upon in private sessions? I must say that, for myself, the PLO is not the issue of the day; I have a very strong feeling (coming back a bit to what Dr. Riegner said) that at some point the United States and the Soviet Union will come to an agreement and in effect impose a settlement. I just wonder if you have any sense of concern about this.

And one last thing: perhaps the time has come for all of us, in a resolution, to come out with a statement calling for an exchange of population, as was mentioned here by several people. The United States Congress has before it not only aid to Israel, but aid for the Arab world as well; we know that \$100 million is being kept for Syria. Perhaps, the time may come that we may want to oppose aid to Syria, tying it up to the situation of the Syrian Jewry. I just wonder whether there shouldn't be a new evaluation of the power structure of the Arab world today.

Dr. Joachim Prinz: I want the Ambassador to know how very deeply I appreciated what he said and how he said it but I would like to end this discussion by urging him to take the desperation of the Jewish people seriously. You said that we ought not to be desperate but the fact of the matter is that the Jewish people are desperate. I want the Ambassador of Israel to the United States to take the desperation very seriously because it comes from love. It comes from great fear. For the first time I hear, "Will Israel exist?" or, as we read in the New York Times last Sunday, "Israel Forever?" Some witty observer said Israel lost the Yom Kippur War because she was not permitted to win it and the Arabs won the war because they were not permitted to lose it. To me, that is not merely a witty remark but a recognition of the fact that Israel is no longer an independent, sovereign country. A country that is totally isolated politically, as we have seen, and dependent upon one country -- to wit, the United States -- cannot be considered an independent country. Let me add to that, Simcha, just one question. I am profoundly afraid of the change of moods within the United States. I am not so sure of my government. I have read two statements made by a man who happens to serve as the President of the United States, Mr. Ford, which I found to reflect some change in the American attitude toward Israel in talking about other things. There was the Pentagon statement that, after all, if the Pentagon delivers certain arms to Israel the U.S. will be deprived of self-protection. The basic question is this: Is war possible? That is, will it be permitted to happen? More importantly, what is the political efficacy of an Israeli victory? What is the political profit in an Israeli victory? And if I conceive of a possibility of a war in the Near East, it should be the last thing to wish for, although there are some Jews who hope for war. I am not a great believer in victory; I think there was tragedy as well as triumph in 1967. My question to you is: If there should be war, war started by Israel or war that breaks out, and if as we hope and pray Israel should win it, what will be the price of victory and how will victory translate itself into political profit for Israel and the world?

Simcha Dinitz: Dr. Kahn asked me a simple question -- that is, whether I think that the BREIRA group is an indication of strength or weakness. I was born in Israel and I was raised on the same principles of a free society in which every opinion may be heard even if it is in error.

Therefore, I would be the last one to say that people who believe as the BREIRA group believe do not have the right to sound their opinions and express them. If you ask me whether I agree with it or if I think that it fortifies our position, my answer is negative. It doesn't. And this is not because they don't have the right to say it. But there is, after all, a difference between being engaged in academic discussion in a university over an academic problem and being engaged in a political battle which you have to fight every day and every night in the corridors of the State Department and in the halls of the Pentagon and in the rooms of the White House and in the halls of Congress. Just to dispel any wrong impression that you might have had, Dr. Prinz, I believe that we are now fighting our second war of independence in the political field. I do believe that we will overcome, because if 650,000 Jews won the military battle in 1948, then three million Jews in Israel and millions of Jews all over the world will win the political battle now. That is why I'm not desperate, but I know exactly what the score is and my reply to Ben Kahn's question is, that at a time like this, when we have to mobilize every single resource and intellect and bit of know-how and effort in order to keep our heads above water in view of the well-equipped and well-endowed forces arrayed against us, we must dispense with public rhetoric about the issues that confront us. We are not dealing with academia, we are not dealing with the abstract, we are dealing with a very severe and difficult battle politically and possibly militarily for the sake of the survival of Israel. So I would never negate the right to express an opinion, but you have asked me for my candid evaluation. I will fight like mad for the right to say what they have to say, but I will also fight very strongly against what they have to say because it is not helpful. It is not necessary at all times and under all circumstances to use the rights you have.

Richard Cohen has asked me a legitimate question with regard to our stand on a Palestinian State, but I don't know why he had to invoke the Foreign Minister of Canada, especially for a speech in which the remark was deleted. I am quite capable and willing to entertain this question on the merits of Mr. Cohen and not on the unexpressed notion of Mr. Sharp. Yes, I am against the establishment of an independent political entity between Israel and Jordan because I believe such an entity will be economically not viable, historically not justifiable, politically frustrated and militarily bent on destroying both Israel and Jordan. Therefore, I do not believe that we can solve the question of Palestine by creating the embryo of another war. I am not for the solution of the question of Palestine by the dissolution of Israel, and that is bound to lead to it. This may also explain why I am not in so much of a hurry to give the "if's and the but's" to the PLO; if it is not the PLO but the OLR or some other organization that wants to establish an independent Palestinian State between Israel and Jordan it will still be a great danger to Israel.

Isaiah, you of all people should know that I don't disregard PR; in fact, for a long time, I made a living, as meager as it was, out of being the

Minister of Information. But what I want is for the PR to get our political ideas across, not to have our ideas arranged according to PR. Fortunately, we are not at the stage where we have to deal with the idea of a West Bank-Gaza state because Arafat doesn't want it. I do not know of a single serious Palestinian who advocates this. I know many Jewish professors who advocate it but not a single Palestinian leader who does. What it means, of course, is a slice of the West Bank without Jerusalem. I don't know of many Jews who are prepared to give Jerusalem back as well. So if you find me Palestinian leadership be prepared to accept a state composed of part of the West Bank without Jerusalem and without some other things that none of you would want to give them, then I will have that problem to contend with. But as long as this comes not from the Palestinians but from my own best friends who happen to be Jewish; as long as this is an internal Jewish problem, as it were, it is an academic problem. Why then do I have to deal with this academic problem when both the Arab states and the Palestinians say what they want in plain and simple terms.

Richard Cohen: That's why I said it was Sharp's idea, not mine.

Ambassador Dinitz: It wasn't even Sharp's idea; it was an idea of one speech writer that was negated by another speech writer.

Then there is the question of my dear friend, Mr. Torczyner -- and again by this I do not imply that the rest are not my dear friends. I find it difficult to explain Aloni; I don't find it difficult to explain Allon. And the difference is, not only a "yud" between Allon and Aloni. The fact is that I haven't heard it but if you tell me that Mrs. Aloni is going around this country advocating negotiations with the PLO, this is probably one of the reasons why she doesn't sit in the Government. And whether she should be brought here by some organizations to express these ideas, that question is a legitimate question and should be addressed to these organizations. But if she says what you report her as saying, not only doesn't she represent the opinion of the Government, she doesn't represent the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the people of Israel and also, I believe, of the Jewish people. May I suggest that you discuss Shulamit Aloni with Mrs. Aloni.

The second question of Mr. Torczyner is much easier for me to answer because you always had a good ear for nuances. I did not say that we must not conclude anything with Egypt before the visit of Brezhnev but that we must explore and see whether there is a possibility to start something; I even used the phrase "dangling the carrot and not biting it." This was precisely why Allon accepted the invitation to come now -- in order to conduct mutual explorations with our best friend; as Dr. Prinz says, our only friend. (I will refer to this later.) I think it is important that we do this. I think the timing is right to do it. I would not favor --

depends what you do in the time that is allotted to you. I can go back to the records of six and seven years ago, from immediately after the '67 war all the way to the Yom Kippur War. I said time is like a television set; you put the program on and what comes out you don't blame time for as such. When I say now that we can use time, I don't mean use time by inactivity. I was outlining what I think is possible, what is feasible, what is desirable and what is probable that can be done. By no means did I suggest that we should just close ourselves up and stay away. At the same time, if we do the right things in the time we have, I believe the time to place the final adjudication of our case before the world would be better in '76 than in '74 and in '78 possibly better than '76 for reasons of both a political and an economic nature, particularly in regard to the state of the world economy. But we will never be able to judge whether time was for us or against us if we use it only for inaction. And this is exactly what I do not advocate to do. Therefore, in answer also to the question of Dr. Gruen, it is not a question of whether time is for us or against us but rather of whether we do the right thing in the time allotted to us. That does not mean, Isaiah, that we are not making our total position very clear to all interested governments and especially to the United States, which is involved in the practical step-by-step movement. I want you to understand what I am saying because this touches on Charlotte's question. Obviously, this is what concerns us. Obviously, what concerns us is not only the next move that we take with Egypt, or the next move that we take with Jordan but what the finality of it will be. Now, there are various ways of discussing it. There is the public way of saying we want an Israel that will have Sharm el-Sheikh and the Golan Heights and this part of the West Bank because we need for our security, A, B, C, D, and E and put it in the court of public opinion. In my judgment this will produce several reactions in the public mind. Some will say it's too much and some will say it's too little but it will not become a document for negotiation. It will become a subject for editorials. Now if we had to finally make peace with the New York Times or with the Washington Post, it would be fine. The New York Times would write a counter editorial and I would write a letter to the editor and finally Abe Rosenthal and I would agree. But if we are dealing here with a document that's supposed to be negotiated with the Arabs, then just as it is important that the United States has a clear idea of what we have in mind, so it is important that this would not be adjudicated in the court of public opinion prematurely. I can assure you with regard to the first that the U.S. does have in mind exactly what we consider a secure Israel. This is important because otherwise, we could be blamed by them and by history for not making our position clear.

Dr. Gruen asked about the Pentagon's statement and that giving supplies to Israel weakens the defense posture of the United States. I want to tell you that the Secretary of Defense of the United States on his own initiative assured me before the Brown statement, during the Brown statement and since the Brown statement that he totally disagrees with the concept that supplying military aid to Israel weakens the United States. In

and neither conclude anything between now and the time that Brezhnev goes to Cairo, but I think that to the extent some political movement can begin before the Brezhnev visit, it would be a positive and not a negative development.

Then I was asked to comment on Mr. Torczyner's reminder that we have so many ex-Ministers visiting us. I hope I will not be quoted out of context if I say, jokingly, that before the Palestinians establish a government in exile, we have done so.

Regarding Mr. Torczyner's remark about Dayan's having said that we should move from the old line of the Suez, I really don't want to refer to statements I haven't heard. I can only explain what I said. When I said, Mr. Torczyner, that we should consider what kind of political return would be acceptable in exchange for further withdrawal in Sinai, I did not specify where. You did not hear from me at any point a suggestion that we should give the oil fields or this or that. I have very strong opinions about this, which I will not with your permission share with you a few days before negotiations start in Washington, with all my confidence and trust in you, because it would be inappropriate. But I did not at any point in my remarks suggest withdrawing from the Gulf of Suez line, which would mean giving back the oil, or giving this part back or any other part. All I said was that we should be prepared for further withdrawal in Sinai for an adequate political return which must also take into account the element of time. That is what I said and by this I don't want to comment on any other statement that I did not hear, and especially if it was said by people who do not now speak for the government. If BREIRA has the right to express their opinion, our ex-Ministers have a right to express theirs.

The third question by Mr. Torczyner is one that I did touch on in the course of my remarks. You asked me if I see a possibility that Hussein might be returned the mandate to represent the Palestinians. Obviously, I see it as one of the possibilities that can emerge, provided we stand fast against the "koshering," as it were, of the PLO. It can either develop this way or develop another way but by no means do I exclude this possibility. And I want to call your attention that with all the measures that he is taking resulting from Rabat -- changing some of the Palestinian Ministers in his Cabinet and severing some other relations with the West Bank -- Hussein has retained very strong options with regard to the West Bank. In practical terms, in keeping the bridges open, in continuing to pay the salaries of the various officials in the West Bank, etc., I don't know how this would develop, but I don't exclude at all the possibility that the mandate will be returned to him again or that he will take it without having it returned to him.

Mr. Minkoff talked about the element of time. He knows very well that I, for one, never at any point said that the time was either working for or against, and I will tell you why. You did hear me say several times that time does not have an intrinsic value as such; it's a framework. It all

fact, he said this not only to me but also to a group of Jewish leaders. Mr. Schlesinger believes that strengthening Israel is not only in the best interests of the United States but also strengthens the United States Army from the conventional weapons point of view. To give you only one figure: If the United States produced 250 tanks in 1973 when the Soviet Union produced 3,000 tanks, and if the United States has now expanded its production to 500 and 600 tanks a year and plans before long to double it again to 1,200 tanks a year, it is primarily -- so says the Secretary of Defense of the United States -- because of Israel's requirements and Israel's pushing for strong supplies of conventional weapons. The same is true with regard to personnel carriers and artillery and other conventional weapons. I said to Secretary Schlesinger, "Now that I know it and you know it and the Jewish community knows it, it's important that the American public knows it." He has indicated that he will find an opportunity to bring this to the attention of the American public. I think it is very important that Americans hear it from the Secretary of Defense of the United States. Therefore, not only is the thesis about weakening the U.S. to meet our needs denied by me as an Israeli, it is important that this forum knows that it is rejected by the Secretary of Defense; in fact, he told me that he has also related this to a group of top officers. Not only will their ally Israel be stronger but they themselves their own units, will be stronger and better equipped, more modernly equipped and with a greater production than ever before. This also relates to the economic question. It is not my function to explain to the Secretary of State, how to solve the unemployment problem or how many workers should be moved from producing trucks to producing tanks. But, obviously, in a tight economy if new factories are opened and new items to into production, it's a positive and not a negative development. But they understand that even without my explanation.

Dr. Gruen also asked about our access to Sinai oil. I've already assured Mr. Torczyner that I have not proposed to sell our oil in this negotiation. But I want to add that if and when the occasion arises that Israel is faced with the possibility of negotiating for the oil fields, there is no doubt in my mind that we will do everything to assure a continued flow of oil; in other words, you don't have to own an oil field or sit on it in order to be supplied from it. You ask me, how can we trust the Egyptians? Of course, it's a legitimate question and would have to be worked out, but the question in my mind is not a practical one right now. For the future however, if somebody talks about the availability of oil to Israel, that is obviously a cardinal question in our mind. Not only can't you conduct a war without oil, you can't even conduct peace without oil.

Charlotte in her own quiet way asked me the most penetrating question, which I can only partially answer. She asked why there is no U.S.-Soviet agreement if the United States still holds to the Rogers Plan and the Soviet Union really basically wants the same thing. Charlotte, if the United States still held to the Rogers Plan and if all the Soviet Union

wanted was the Rogers Plan, that there would have been an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. The fact that there is no agreement today between the United States and the Soviet Union means that there is a discrepancy in their approach. By this I do not mean to predict that the United States would under no circumstances ever return to the Rogers Plan. It is our task to see to it that it will not. Nor can I sit here and predict that the United States and the Soviet Union will never agree on a formula. And here I answer all those people who ask whether there could be a permanent peace in the Middle East without an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. My answer is that for peace to be permanent and to be achieved there will, of course, eventually have to be an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, but the real issue is what the basis of that peace will be. And this can be changed. As long as the Soviet Union keeps on echoing the Arab demands, there will be no inducement for the United States to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union; it can do it with the Arabs. If the Soviets are only the mouthpiece of the Arabs, why should the United States agree with them and then let them take the credit with the Arabs? The United States can negotiate directly with the Arabs, give them what they want and accept the credit from the Arabs and not from the Soviets. So before there is an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, in my opinion, the Soviet Union will have to considerably modify its position with regard to the situation. It is our job to see to it that this modification is meaningful enough to lead to a peace that we can live with, not one that is unacceptable to us. And this is exactly the whole essence of our political battle.

Then you ask, Charlotte, about whether Egypt is still the kingpin or not. A central figure in any political situation may be judged not only by its ability to act positively but also by its ability to disrupt. I have no doubt that Egypt continues to be today the most important factor in the Middle East. When I say this I don't mean to negate the oil power of Faisal or the bellicosity of Syria or the terrorism of Arafat, but when the chips are down the one country that can have a meaningful war against Israel, the one country without which no meaningful war can be launched against Israel, is Egypt. Egypt, therefore, has to be paramount in our consideration, not only on how to avoid war but how to advance toward peace. If we succeed to separate her from the rest of the Arab countries, even on a temporary basis, to that extent we succeed in our diplomacy; this is not gamesmanship, this is realpolitik, because if we have to go to war against Syria it's better if we can fight Syria alone and not on two fronts at the same time (and not against the whole Arab League either). Then you asked about the report that as part of the disengagement agreement, Israel's right to transport goods through the Suez Canal was assured; you indicated you were afraid that if this is part of a secret agreement, so to speak, maybe there are other secret agreements that we don't know about. First of all, with all due respect to my Foreign Minister, Mr. Allon, I said exactly these words in the National Press Club in Washington before 550 newspapermen about a year ago. The reason I said it then was

not to make the headlines but because I wanted to make sure from the very beginning that this freedom of navigation in the Canal for our goods was not sold to us twice -- once in the framework of a disengagement agreement, then in the framework of the next step in negotiations. It was a secret agreement in the sense that it was not publicized at the time but you cannot have a secret agreement without getting the commitment of the other side to honor it, since the United States doesn't sit on the Canal, so if we have an agreement with the United States that Israel should be allowed to pass goods through the Suez Canal, that means the United States has the OK from Egypt to give us this commitment; otherwise, we can go through the Hudson River, but not through the Canal. If, in order to give a commitment to Israel, they need Egyptian consent, then in order to give a commitment to the Egyptians they need Israeli consent if they want it to be meaningful. Therefore, it cannot be kept secret from us because they cannot get a commitment from us without our knowing what we are committing ourselves to. This should allay your fear with regard to this question. But the real problem with regard to secret commitments is not those commitments that were given behind our back or commitments we were not aware of, not what America committed herself to in the name of Israel or the United States, but how the Arabs interpret American words to them. I believe the President of the United States and Secretary of State of the United States and all the other officials when they say to us that they have not given the Arabs commitment that Israel will return to the '67 frontier. But I want to know what Sadat thinks he can get from the United States; that is what really matters. Sometimes ambiguity is necessary to keep the motion going. Sometimes ambiguity is misleading because the other side can interpret the commitment of the United States far beyond what the United States actually intended or is capable of delivering. This is another area where I think we must be on constant watch, it is another area where we always have to see to it that on the primary and basic issues there is no equivocation but a clear and strong and forthright statement.

The last question Charlotte asked was with regard to Syria and whether we should object to U.S. aid to Syria. Of course, Charlotte, you know that it is difficult, next to impossible, to object to aid to Syria when aid to Syria specifically was not requested. The \$100 million that you refer to, which is left in abeyance, could or could not be used for Syria. If you ask my personal opinion, I would be for the stipulation that this \$100 million, if allocated to a certain country, should require additional Congressional approval before it is allocated. If the United States should come and say, "We want to give it to Syria," we will examine the situation in the sense, now is it going to Syria after a negotiation with Israel, is it going to a Syria from which we can expect freedom of Jewish emigration, etc., etc." So I think that the first important thing is to see to it that the allocation of these \$100 million is examined further and approved by Congress before it can be used freely, unless the money is used for countries to which aid was already authorized. If the United States would like to give us this \$100 million, I think I can convince Mr. Rabinovitch to accept it with a credit.

I can assure Dr. Prinz, with all the honesty and sincerity that has always marked our relationship, that I would be the last one to underestimate the great anxiety that exists in the Jewish community in America and, I am sure, throughout the world with regard to Israel. I can tell you that we are partners in this, too. If you think that every night before I go to sleep I have no worry in the world, you are wrong. So I don't think that you need to worry, Dr. Prinz, that I belittle or misunderstand or underestimate this despair. What I have been saying during the course of this afternoon is that this desperation must be translated into positive action; it must not be allowed to remain there as a heavy stone dragging us down but rather as a platform from which to state our case. Here lies the whole difference. Desperate people can be vigorous people; desperate people can also be weak people. I don't want us to be weak. We cannot afford to be weak; we are too few, too thinly spread. We must utilize the severity of the situation to overcome a lot of internal bickering and apathy and disunity that still exists within our ranks and derive a new sense of inspiration for the great tasks ahead. I do not believe there is a greater task in Jewish life today than the preservation and the strength of the Jewish State of Israel. I am also mindful of the fact that we have a situation in the United Nations, and in the political arena we are supported almost exclusively by the United States. One of the reasons that Western Europe can afford to vote for the PLO in the UN or abstain, is because they know that the United States assumes the real responsibility for the situation. They have a mentor on whom they rely for defense, on whom they will rely for economic aid soon, on whom they rely for solving the political dilemma in which the free world finds itself, even if they think that in the short run they can do better by making deals with the Arabs. It is our task to try to dismantle this unholy coalition but I humbly believe that not everything was done in this respect and that much more can be done especially outside the U.S. When I talk occasionally to world leaders, I have yet to find one of them who would tell me privately that what he was doing in the UN was right. In the last analysis this is something that must be driven into the minds of every government. Are you prepared to have done unto yourself what you appear willing to have done to the people of Israel? Thank you very much.

Charlotte Jacobson: Simcha, this was really an intellectual treat and I must say I'm sure everybody agrees it was worth the trip from all parts of the world to be with you today. We want to express our affection, our pride in what you are doing and, if you need it -- and I hope you don't -- our sense of solidarity in all that you are trying to do and all that we're trying to do.

We'll have a recess for twenty minutes and prepare for our next guest, Mr. Roy Atherton.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022
PLaza 2-1616
Cable Address: COJOGRA

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AMERICAN ZIONIST COUNCIL

B'NAI B'RITH

CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF
AMERICAN RABBIS

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS
and WELFARE FUNDS (observer)

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UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW
CONGREGATIONS

UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH
CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA

UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF AMERICA

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

April 23, 1970

TO: Members of the Anti Boycott Committee

FROM: Arnold Forster, Chairman

This is to inform you that a meeting of our committee will take place on Thursday April 30 at 12:00 in the 9th floor conference room at 515 Park Avenue.

The agenda will include new developments regarding Japan and the Arab boycott. Luncheon will be served.

Please notify our office of your attendance in order that we can prepare for the luncheon which will be served.

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UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF AMERICA

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

January 2, 1970

TO: Executive-Directors of organizations
associated with the Presidents Conference

FROM: Rabbi Herschel Schacter, Chairman

This is to confirm that a special meeting of the
PLANNING COMMITTEE for the National Emergency
Conference of Jewish Leadership on Peace in the
Middle-East (which will be held in Washington, D.C.
on January 25-26) will take place:

at 11:00 a.m.
TUESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1970
in the
top floor conference room
515 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y.

* * *

Luncheon will be served.

* * *

We estimate that the meeting will last until
approximately 2:00 p.m.

Participation in this Planning Committee is limited
to one representative from each organization,
preferably its president or top executive officer.

HS/scc

March 18, 1970

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler

Julian Feldman

Al Vorspan

Thanks for your very helpful report covering the Arab Boycott Committee. I appreciate your covering this meeting for me and informing me, so thoroughly, of its work.

As I told you so often -- and the repetition of my statement is your fault for doing so well -- it's a delight to have you on our staff.

December 23, 1977

Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Humphrey:

In recognition of your untiring efforts on behalf of the closer U.S. - Israel ties for so many years, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Organizations would like to express its gratitude.

As you may know, the Conference represents 33 major American Jewish Organizations -- almost the totality of the organized American Jewish community -- on issues relating to Israel. We would leave means of presentation entirely to your convenience, and we are prepared to host a suitable large public event or a small private presentation at the location of your choice.

Please let us know if you will give us the opportunity to express our deepest thanks.

With warm wishes, I am

Sincerely,

AMS:djb

Alexander M. Schindler
President

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W., SUITE 412
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
Telephone (202) 638-2256

December 21, 1977

Alex:

M.

~~Prosser~~
esp. → 600 New Hampshire Ave NW
D.C. 20037

Max Kampelman suggested that you send a letter along the following lines to Humphrey with a blind carbon to him (and me) -- and we will do the the follcw-up here. Please let me know what you will be doing.

Morrie

ADL
MU97400

gh

With the compliments of

MORRIS J. AMITAY

Executive Director

SUGGESTED DRAFT TO SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY FROM RABBI SCHINDLER

Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Please let us know if you will give us the opportunity to express our deepest thanks.

With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

Alexander Schindler
President



western union

Telegram

AHT022 NL PDB DS AH NEW YORK NY 10

RABBI ALEX SCHINDLER UNION OF AMER HEBREW CONGREGATIONS

838 FIFTH AVE NYC

PLEASE INFORM YOUR DELEGATES PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE MEETING
WITH ABBA EBAN THURSDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 11, RESCHEDULED FOR
7 P.M. INSTEAD OF 4 P.M. SAME PLACE

HELLMAN

*adjusted
at 2
J. Evans*



Telegram

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SF-1201 (R5-69)

will attend

M V
Jane Evans + Chaim of Israel Comm of 77HS