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Egypt Arms sales, 1976-1978.

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MEMORANDUM

EJM ✓

From Albert Vorpsan

Date 5/17/78

To Regional Directors

Copies

Subject Post-Mortem on the Carter Arms Package

You will be getting more detailed analysis on the Senate debate and the vote and its implications, but without further delay I wanted to share with you these preliminary thoughts:

1) Many of you did extraordinary jobs on very short notice in reaching key people. Even though many of the Senators were already fixed in cement, committed to the Administration and not amenable to persuasion, I felt that our Washington office, our regional directors and of course, Schindler himself made very substantial inputs in building strong opposition to this dangerous package. We are most grateful to you for dropping other things to plunge into this.

2) It is imperative that those Senators who withstood the extraordinary heat put on by the Administration and its friends now get letters and telephone calls of appreciation. They took plenty of pressure and must hear that we are grateful and aware.

3) Some Administration spokesperson and media mayvins are pronouncing that the "back of the Jewish lobby was broken" in this vote. Bullshit. This was a defeat--indeed, the first serious defeat Israel ever suffered in the Congress--but it is not the calamity in terms of pro-Israel sentiment and influence in the U.S. that is being portrayed. Most of the Senators who voted with the Administration (Muriel Humphrey, Ed Muskie, etc.) are deeply committed to Israel and will continue to be, despite this painful vote which the Administration chose to inflict on them. The Administration played hard-ball on this one, making their Panama Canal pressure look like a Sunday school.

Moreover, I believe that if Israel had rejected the entire package at the very beginning (including planes for Israel), we would have had a good chance of disapproval in both houses. Conflicting signals until two days before the vote bewildered and irritated many Senators and squandered public opinion.

4) The Administration is calling around and trying to placate Jewish leadership. Alex and other leaders have said the most meaningful reassurance would be pressure by the Administration on Sadat to get the negotiations going again for a genuine settlement. That should be our approach to the media, our people, etc.

5) We have a right to criticize the Carter Administration for this ill-conceived and dangerous precedent, but let's not fall into the trap of hysterical charges and over-heated rhetoric. Attached is Alex's op-ed article which appeared in the New York Times, days before the vote, placing Carter into balanced perspective. We're reprinting that in current Reform Judaism as well. Let's not fall into the partisan trap either, because the Republicans actually bailed Carter out (26 Republicans with him, 11 opposed) while a majority of Democrats voted against the



Union of American Hebrew Congregations

838 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 (212) 249-0100

אחדות
ליהדות
ממקומות
באמריקה

Administration (33 to 28).

6) David Saperstein will be sending you some of the fascinating tidbits of the debate, as well as the behind-the-scenes scenarios, as soon as he can do it. He and his people did a marvelous job on the Hill.

7) A condemnation of the arms package will undoubtedly be made by the UAHC Board as part of the resolution it will consider on June 14. What else the resolution will say will be determined by a small committee drawn from the Commission on Social Action, ARZA, Israel Commission, and UAHC Board.

8) We should exploit this emotional and dramatic turn of events (the "watershed of Jewish influence" the pundits are talking about, it isn't, but crucial it is) to maximize support for the dinner honoring Schindler in New York. A good time for Jewish solidarity.

Bestest.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin's visit to the United States has taken place in an atmosphere marred—if one reads the newspapers regularly—by roiling dissension in the American Jewish community, and by a deep rift between that community and the Carter Administration. That image is a distortion, damaging to all, a dangerous diversion from the more serious, substantive issues that need to be faced in the Middle East.

A disagreement on issues does obtain, and since these issues are vital to our lives as Jews, our views are given passionate voice and thus evoke more than a detached response. But internal disagreement on specifics does not signify that our center cannot, will not hold. And a divergence from this or that governmental policy does not mean that there is an irrevocable breach between the Administration and America's Jews.

There is a need to restore the balance. When perceptions are distorted, no fruitful dialogue is possible. Then reason is subjugated to feeling, tempers flare, and soon the image takes on aspects of reality.

What is the truer, more balanced picture?

First, the Administration's motivations are above reproach and question. My dealings with our country's foremost leaders have assured me of their care, their determination to reach a fair Middle East settlement, to secure Israel's right to live in safety and in peace. Those who read overtones of anti-Semitism or hostility to Israel into divergences on policy commit a blunder and a wrong. In fact, no responsible Jewish leader has ever impugned the motivations of our Government's principal representatives.

We did and do have policy differ-

The Jews and Carter

By Alexander M. Schindler

ences with the Administration. We were apprehensive about the Geneva scenario as it evolved last fall. We were appalled by the joint Soviet-United States declaration of Oct. 1, 1977. We were pained by the President's abortive efforts to cosmetize the Palestine Liberation Organization. We are unhappy with the arms package before Congress, because it endangers Israel and interjects a destabilizing factor in the midst of delicate negotiations.

We are particularly offended by the linkage of this arms offer, which makes the sale of jets to Israel contingent on jet sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for we see it as a not-so-subtle form of pressure, even when we were promised, before the election and since, that neither arms nor economic aid would ever be used by our Government as a means to lean on Israel.

All the same there are aspects of the Administration's Middle East policy that we applaud. We appreciate President Carter's insistence that a meaningful peace is a requisite for any concession on Israel's part. We endorse his decision to abandon the Geneva formula and to give the bilateral peacemaking effort of Egypt and Israel every chance and assistance for success. Nor will we ever forget that America remains the only country that grants generous, life-sustaining aid to Israel.

Related issues compel our community's concern and here we have

no reason for doleful plaint. We have said so. Did anybody listen? Mr. Carter's advocacy of human rights encouraged Jewish as well as non-Jewish dissidents in the Soviet Union. His outspoken support of Anatoly Shcharansky was courageous and timely.

His personal intervention rescued victims of Argentinian repression. He lifted immigration quotas so that Jews fleeing oppression from the Soviet Union might find their refuge here, even as his appointed staff played a crucial role in rescuing not a few young women from the tiny, beleaguered Jewish community of Syria.

Nor are American Jews parochial in their concern. The media's efforts to portray us as a single-issue constituency—by their disdainful indifference to anything we have to say on matters other than Israel or Soviet Jews—are grossly misleading.

The ethical mandates flowing from our tradition as well as our bitter experiences as a people have sensitized us to the needs of all who are oppressed. And so we respond to the President's call for more jobs, urban rescue, a national health-care system, and for the protection of consumer, minority and women's rights. Similarly, we support his efforts to conserve and develop energy, to gain Senate ratification of the genocide convention, and to bring to an end at long last that insane nuclear arms race that threatens to annihilate us all.

The Administration's willingness and

ability to fulfill these wider expectations are also a significant factor in determining the Jewish community's assessment of its incumbency.

This, then, is the more balanced perspective of our response to the Carter Administration. Difference on issues clearly obtain. They are marked, consequential, even profound. But they involve means, not ends—and so there is no final rupture. So long as these differences persist, we intend to give them unfettered voice. Given the communality of vision, there is not reason why they cannot be resolved.

Alexander M. Schindler, a rabbi, is chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

October 14, 1976

General Brent Scowcroft
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Scowcroft:

Thank you very much for your response to my telegram on the matter of the military equipment which was sent to Saudi Arabia.

While our views are obviously not fully in harmony, I want to assure you that I will give your response the widest possible distribution among our constituents.

With warm good wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Chairman

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 11, 1976

Dear Rabbi Schindler:

The President has asked me to thank you for your telegram expressing concern over the sale of certain military equipment to Saudi Arabia.

The President wishes to assure you that he fully shares your concern that Israel's security not be jeopardized and that his own long-standing commitment to this fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy will not change. We are committed to the security and integrity of the State of Israel.

The decision to sell a limited amount of military equipment of various kinds to help Saudi Arabia meet its defense needs was made on the basis of a carefully considered judgment that it would not constitute a threat to Israel's clear military superiority. That judgment included a careful analysis of the regional military balance and of Saudi Arabia's military capabilities.


The five brigades of the Saudi Army which the U.S. is helping to train and equip are responsible for the defense of an area as large as the United States east of the Mississippi River, an area with long land and sea borders and which contains over one quarter of the total Free World oil reserves. For such a small force to be able to protect so large an area against the much larger and more powerful Soviet-equipped air and ground forces of potentially hostile neighbors such as Iraq and South Yemen requires both air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles for the F-5 aircraft in the Saudi inventory.

The number of Sidewinder and Maverick missiles needed for the Saudi armed forces was determined by a U.S. military survey. This survey reduced the number of Sidewinders originally requested by Saudi Arabia. In consultation with certain Members of Congress, the number of Mavericks and Sidewinders proposed for sale at this time was further reduced, to less than half of the original number.

The total number of air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles which will be available to Saudi Arabia when the presently-proposed orders are eventually delivered will help strengthen its defense posture but will not appreciably increase its limited capability for operations outside its own borders.

I can readily appreciate your concern and I am pleased to share with you our thoughts on the matter.

Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Chairman
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10021

September 1, 1976

Mr. Robert Jacobs
1180 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10036

Dear Mr. Jacobs:

I am taking the liberty of responding to your August 27 letter to Mr. Rosenbaum since you were kind enough to share a copy with me. I much appreciate your expression of concern and would like to let you know what we have done so far in regard to the subject of your letter.

1/ Since the news broke last Friday, I have been on the phone constantly, both with leaders of the Administration as well as leader of Congress, friend and foe alike, to voice my dismay and to indicate our intention to press for a resolution of this approval should Secretary of State Kissinger's letter be submitted to Congress as heralded in the press.

2/ I asked several Presidents of our constituent organizations to make like contact and they did.

3/ I was in contact, day and night, with the leaders of AIPAC, our principle negotiator affecting legislative matters.

4/ Until late last night we felt that an acceptable compromise had been affected but the efforts were aborted at the last minute. In consequence, this morning I submitted a recommendation to a meeting of the Presidents' Conference and there may have to be a special emergency meeting called before Tuesday to determine whether or not a resolution of dismay should actually be entered. It is quite possible that a satisfactory amendment will be adopted by the Administration. If it is not we will proceed with fuller force.

All that I am really trying to say is that just because nothing appears in the press it does not mean that there is no activity. We have and will be pressing on this matter and will make it public when the time is ripe and when the widest public reaction is needed. This is a most powerful weapon which cannot be applied every day and on every issue lest it lost its effectiveness.

Mr. Robert Jacobs
September 1, 1976
Page -2-

Again, I express my deep appreciation for your expression of concern.

With kindest greetings, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

cc: Mr. Herman Rosenbaum
Mr. Yehuda Hellman

KANAREK AND JACOBS
ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS
1180 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10036
212-575-0090

IRVING H. KANAREK, C.P.A.
ROBERT JACOBS, PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
SEYMOUR KAYE

August 27, 1976

Mr. Herman Rosenbaum
President
National Council of Young Israel
3 West 16th Street
New York, New York 10011

Dear Mr. Rosenbaum:

I am absolutely amazed at the silence of our organization including the President's Conference on the proposed missile sales to Sadia Arabia. We should be organizing riots in the streets if necessary to try to stop this. What are we doing?

Once again I would like to know your ideas on this subject.

Very truly yours,

Robert Jacobs

cc; Rabbi Schlinder
President's Conference
515 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017

CERTIFIED

April 28, 1976

Senator Edward M. Kennedy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Kennedy:

Many thanks for your letter of April 15 in response to my communication on the sale of aircraft to Egypt.

I am grateful to you for taking the time to share your views with me and assure you I will, in turn, share them with our constituency.

With kindest greetings and every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY
MASSACHUSETTS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 15, 1976

Mr. Alexander Schindler, Chrmn.
Conference of Presidents
of Major American Jewish Organiz.
515 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Mr. Schindler:


Thank you for writing to me concerning the sale of six C-130 cargo aircraft to Egypt.

My basic concern in the Middle East is to help promote the conclusion of a real and lasting peace, one which must include the right of Israel to live within secure and recognized borders. Thus, I would strongly oppose any sale of arms that would jeopardize either Israel's security or the chances of moving toward peace.

I have made clear my opposition to an open pipeline of arms to Egypt -- and particularly my opposition to sales of weapons such as jet fighters and anti-tank missiles, reportedly requested by that country. I feel such sales would effect the balance of military power and thereby diminish the chances of peace. At the same time, however, I believe that it is important for us to build upon our new relationship with Egypt, in an effort to move that country continually in the direction of peace. I believe it is unfortunate that the Administration has chosen to use arms sales as the means to achieve that end. While I have not opposed this specific sale of cargo planes, provided there is a sustained effort on the part of Egypt to work for peace, I do oppose any such action without a clear statement that it does not signify our becoming Egypt's arms supplier.

Again, thank you for writing.

Sincerely,


Edward M. Kennedy

April 9, 1976

His Excellency, The American Ambassador
William Scranton
United States Mission to the United Nations
New York, New York

My Dear Mr. Scranton:

I've just returned from Israel and this is my first opportunity to express my appreciation to you. It was good meeting with you and I am grateful to you for having taken the time for such a get together.

I don't know if you know or not, but I did my best to bring your words - to which there was such an overreaction by the Israeli people and press - into proper perspective. Ambassador Toon expressed his thanks to me for so doing.

Be that as it may, I write to express my delight at learning that you have agreed to meet with a select group of leaders of the Presidents' Conference. I am truly pleased we will have an opportunity to have a discussion with you and want to assure you that we will, of course, give you an opportunity to speak to the group before opening the session for questions and answers. As you know, we will meet on Thursday, April 29 at 10:00 a.m. in the Penthouse of 515 Park Avenue. I look forward to seeing you at that time.

With kindest greetings and every good wish to you and your dear ones for a lovely Easter, I am

Sincerely,

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Chairman

cc: Mr. Yehuda Hellman

March 29, 1976

Senator Fred Harris
Harris for President
1212 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Senator Harris:

Thank you for your letter of March 11. I am grateful to you for sharing with me your comments on military assistance to Egypt. I shall, in turn, share your comments with our constituents.

With kindest greetings, I am

Sincerely,

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Chairman

FRED HARRIS FOR PRESIDENT '76

March 11, 1976


Alexander M. Schindler,
Chairman,
Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Avenue,
New York, New York 10022

Dear Chairman Schindler,

I am strongly opposed to sending any American military assistance to Egypt. We are justly committed to the right of Israel to continue to exist, and we must help provide her with the ability to do so. And we must stop arming the other side. With the greatest threat to peace coming from an overbalance of arms against Israel, it makes no sense for us to help arm Israel's adversaries, including Egypt.

If I can be of any further assistance please let me know.

With Warmest Personal Regards,



Fred R. Harris

March 29, 1976

The Honorable Robert P. Griffin
Senator from Michigan
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Griffin:

Thank you for your letter of March 10. I appreciate your sharing your comments with me and I shall, in turn, share them with our constituents.

With kindest greetings, I am

Sincerely,

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Chairman

ROBERT P. GRIFFIN
MICHIGAN

United States Senate

OFFICE OF
THE ASSISTANT MINORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 10, 1976

Mr. Alexander Schindler,
Chairman
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Mr. Schindler:


Thanks for your recent mailgram expressing concern regarding the proposed sale of military transport aircraft to Egypt. Your comments have been carefully noted.

To date, the Administration has not made any formal proposals on such a sale. Under existing law, the Congress must be notified of proposed military sales in excess of \$25 million. Should notification of such a sale to Egypt be received, you may be assured that it will receive careful scrutiny in both the House and Senate.

It was thoughtful of you to take time to provide me with the benefit of your thinking. Your personal interest is appreciated and you may be assured that I shall have your views in mind should this subject receive attention in the Senate.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Griffin". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Robert" being the most prominent.

Robert P. Griffin
U. S. Senator

RPG:ltd

March 29, 1976

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Senator from Delaware
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Biden:

Thank you for your letter of March 17. I appreciate your sharing your comments with me and I, in turn, will make them known to our constituents.

With kindest greetings, I am

Sincerely,

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Chairman

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 17, 1976

Mr. Alexander Schindler
Chairman
Conference of Presidents
of Major Jewish Organizations
515 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Mr. Schindler:


Thank you for your mailgram of March 8th, regarding possible U.S. sale of military items to Egypt.

I fully understand your concerns for the security of Israel, the balance of forces in the Middle East, and the policy balance in Washington. I have supported arms aid to Israel and will continue to do so.

In my view the significance of the Administration's new initiatives with respect to Egypt rests on whether they reflect any prior, private commitments, and whether the C-130's are not just symbolic items, but represent the entering wedge of a significant amount and variety of military items. I will want to be satisfied on these two scores before I can support the proposition.

Thank you for sharing your concern with me.

Sincerely,


Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senator

JRB/hfc

March 5, 1976

Dear Mr. President,

✓ I must convey to you the grave concern of the member organizations of the Conference of Presidents, which is shared by many other segments of American society at large, concerning the initiation and the signaled extension of the United States military aid to Egypt.

We understand the general thrust of American Foreign Policy, which seeks to draw Egypt into the orbit of U.S. influence. We have therefore accepted and even supported the granting of economic aid to Egypt, and in this context noted the nuclear capabilities which have been granted to Egypt by America despite our fears that this capability will be diverted from economic to military purposes.

However, we are most strenuously opposed to military assistance to Egypt, which when seen in the context of arms aid and sales supplied to a host of Arab Countries by many nations, including America, will seriously impair that tenuous balance of power which presently obtains in the Middle East thus threatening the very security of Israel to which our government has always been pledged.

We respectfully and urgently request a response which will clarify the administration's present position and intentions in this realm.

Alexander Schindler
Chairman

March 5, 1976

Dear Mr. Congressman or Senator,

X I would like to take this opportunity to convey to you the grave concern of the member organizations of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, which is shared by many other segments of American society at large, concerning the initiation and the signaled extension of United States military aid to Egypt.

We understand the general thrust of American Foreign Policy, which seeks to draw Egypt into the orbit of U.S. influence. We have therefore accepted and even supported the granting of economic aid to Egypt, and in this context noted the nuclear capabilities which have been granted to Egypt by America despite our fears that this capability will be diverted from economic to military purposes.

However, we are most strenuously opposed to military assistance to Egypt, which when seen in the context of arms aid and sales supplied to a host of Arab Countries by many nations, including America, will seriously impair that tenuous balance of power which presently obtains in the Middle East thus threatening the very security of Israel to which our government has always been pledged.

We respectfully and urgently request a response to this mailogram, regarding your present position on this matter of profound concern.

Respectfully yours,

Alexander Schindler
Chairman, Conference of
Presidents of Major American
Jewish Organizations

AS:cm

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022
Plaza 2-1616
Cable Address: COJOGRA

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS:

American Israel Public
Affairs Committee
American Jewish Congress
American Mizrahi Women's
Organization
American Zionist Federation
Anti-Defamation League
B'nai B'rith
B'nai B'rith Women
Bnai Zion
Central Conference of
American Rabbis
Council of Jewish Federations
and Welfare Funds (observer)
Hadassah
Jewish Labor Committee
Jewish Reconstructionist
Foundation
Jewish War Veterans
of the U.S.A.
Labor Zionist Alliance
Mizrahi-Hapoel Hamizrachi
National Committee for
Labor Israel, Inc.
National Council of
Jewish Women
National Council of
Young Israel
National Federation of
Temple Sisterhoods
National Jewish Community
Relations Advisory Council
National Jewish Welfare Board
North American Jewish
Youth Council
Pioneer Women
The Rabbinical Assembly
Rabbinical Council of America
Union of American Hebrew
Congregations
Union of Orthodox Jewish
Congregations of America
United Synagogue of America
Women's American ORT
Women's League for
Conservative Judaism
World Zionist Organization
American Section, Inc.
Zionist Organization of America

February 12, 1976

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I write to convey to you our Conference's grave concern with the reports given wide circulation in the public press that the administration is giving serious consideration, indeed, is about to reach a decision on a program of arms aid and sales to Egypt.

As you know, we have been understanding of and sympathetic with the general thrust of American foreign policy which seeks to strengthen the moderate forces in the Arab world and which has been so successful in drawing Egypt more closely into the orbit of U.S. influence. As a consequence, we have accepted and even supported the granting of extensive economic aid to Egypt. Not only is this wise, but it is also morally right.

But the sale of arms to Egypt is another matter in its entirety.

To begin with, we see no justifiable need for such aid. Egypt, even now, and thanks to the lavish rearmament program of the U.S.S.R., enjoys a vast superiority in arms and personnel over Israel. Does Egypt really need more military equipment? Does it stand under the threat of imminent attack? In a word, we fear that such sales to Egypt will only further impair that tenuous balance of power which presently obtains and which is the necessary precondition of peace. Military supplies for Egypt must be seen in the context of the arms which are supplied to Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and a host of other Arab countries from a variety of sources.

Moreover, the experience of the past has taught America that once such arms are dispatched, their disposition can never really be restrained, all promises to the contrary notwithstanding. No one can be certain where this equipment will be sent or how it will ultimately be used. All effective American control might well be lost.

These, then, are some of the reasons among others which give rise to our concerns, and we would much appreciate your thoughtful response to them.

Again, we have no objection in principle to economic aid, and I write even from the more personal experience of a recent lengthy journey through that land. What Egypt needs are tractors and not tanks; what its people desperately need and want is bread and not more bullets.

Very sincerely yours,

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Chairman

March 15, 1976

Mr. Morris J. Amitay, Executive Director
American Israel Public Affairs Committee
1341 G Street, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Amitay:

Rabbi Schindler is currently out-of-the-city on a speaking tour and is not due back until March 22. I know he will be most grateful to you for sharing with him the report prepared for AIPAC on American Public Opinion and Israel. Thank you too for the copy of the AIPAC letter on arms sales to Egypt.

Needless to note all these materials will be brought to the attention of Rabbi Schindler on his return and you will undoubtedly be hearing from him directly.

With kindest greetings, I am

Sincerely,

Edith J. Miller
Assistant to the President

The Dangers of Arming Egypt

The first state visit by an Egyptian head of state to Washington is almost anti-climactic, having been made inevitable by former President Nixon's visit to Cairo in June 1974. As for the outcome, only time can tell whether Egypt's westward turn and talk of progress toward peace is genuine and lasting.

By seemingly making himself dependent on the United States for additional economic aid, new military assistance and continued diplomatic momentum, Egyptian President Sadat is gambling that the United States will be able to deliver what his Soviet support could not — essentially a return of the territories gained by Israel in 1967 and along with this generous amounts of funding, technology, and investment.

So far, the Administration seems to be sticking to its "no stalemate or stagnation" line, and pressure on Israel is precisely what Sadat wants. The dangers of continued indirect negotiation without reconciliation between the parties are apparent, but there is now the added danger of U.S. arms shipments to Egypt.

Sadat is clearly seeking to elevate Egypt to Israel's status here in the United States. While red-carpet treatment for him will go a long way in creating this impression, the real test of "evenhandedness" is whether the United States will become an arms supplier to Egypt. If this is to occur — whether by sales now or grant aid and military credits later — it not only would be a bitter psychological blow to Israel but also a serious blunder that could easily backfire to the detriment of American interests.

Recognizing the Pitfalls

- U.S. arms supplies to Egypt would supplement — not supplant — existing Egyptian sources and stocks. President Sadat falsely asserted last Sunday on ABC's *Issues and Answers* that "up until this moment, I haven't replaced any piece of arms that I lost in the war." According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London), the Soviet Union not only has replaced most of Sadat's losses in the Yom Kippur War but has added to his military capacity in some vital areas.

- Because Egypt also continues to receive the latest equipment from France, Britain, and other nations, the United States can expect to have no control over Egypt's total arms purchases. There is ample precedent to demonstrate that once arms are supplied, their use cannot be controlled by the supplier.

- Egyptian procurement of U.S. arms would clearly alter the delicate military balance of power between the Arab states and Israel. At the present time, without additional western help, Egypt alone has considerably more troops, planes and ships than Israel, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies. The combination of Soviet quantity with superior American quality presents a particularly grave danger.

- Egypt clearly has no need to procure more arms than the levels she now maintains, unless she has aggressive intentions, and the acquisition of American arms could strengthen those elements in the Egyptian army with aggressive intentions toward Israel. Israel, on the other hand, has never been a threat to the existence of Egypt or the Arab world.

- Egyptian needs today dictate expenditures for tractors, not tanks. The people suffer from terrible poverty and deteriorating social services, and their government's efforts should be directed toward improving their plight, not toward preparing for another costly war.

- Unlike Israel, who pays her debts with interest, Egypt has a terrible track record. Currently, Egypt owes the Soviet Union about \$7 billion and still owes the United States more than \$400 million in economic loans made before 1967.

- The totalitarian Egyptian regime is inherently unstable and its complexion could literally change overnight.

- Finally, the United States should at least wait until the ink is dry on the Sinai interim agreement before even agreeing in principle to supply Sadat with arms. We have little indication to date of his peaceful intentions beyond his mere words.

Time is needed to tell how serious Sadat is both about peace with Israel and cooperation with the United States. If the Administration fails to acknowledge the pitfalls involved in such a reckless course of action, it is hoped that the Congress will use better judgment. If, according to Sadat, peace between Egypt and Israel is for the next generation, then perhaps American arms for Egypt should wait until then also.

NEAR EAST report

Washington letter on
American policy in the Near East

Vol. XIX, No. 44, October 29, 1975



Foreigners Flee Beirut

Beirut fighting escalated severely last week, to a point where foreign embassies, including the United States, urged their citizens to evacuate Lebanon. Shots reportedly hit the U.S. embassy on Tuesday, and thousands of foreigners jammed the Beirut airport attempting to flee the latest fighting.

Battles between Moslem leftists and Christian rightists spread into the downtown hotel district where the luxury Holiday Inn was reported to be aflame. The Lebanese Parliament also came under fire on Tuesday, necessitating evacuation of members by the Lebanese army. In the last few days United Nations personnel have been evacuated to Israel.

Since Sunday, the death toll is estimated in the hundreds, and it is expected to rise when the fate of more than 200 kidnap victims is uncovered. Among the wounded was *Chicago Times* correspondent Philip Caputo, who was deliberately shot in the feet while reporting on the street-fighting. Caputo managed to crawl away and was taken to a besieged hospital, but attempts to evacuate him on Tuesday failed. The fate of two American USIA workers, kidnapped last week, remains unknown.

Human Deluge in Sahara: Over one hundred thousand Moroccans streamed southward this week toward Spanish Sahara to stake out King Hassan's claim on the phosphate-rich territory. Observers expect the actual border crossing by 350,000 Moroccans to take place on Nov. 3 or 4, and little resistance is expected from Spanish troops stationed in the Sahara or from the Spanish Sahara independence movement.

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Leonard J. Davis

March 4, 1976

Dear Senator:

By now you are aware of plans to begin a military supply relationship between the United States and Egypt. For the reasons outlined in the enclosed memorandum, we believe that the shipment of U. S. military equipment to Egypt at this time would be detrimental to progress toward peace and stability in the area and start the United States on a course of action whose ultimate effects have not been sufficiently considered.


There is good reason to believe that anticipated shipments go beyond six C-130 military transports and that deliveries of advanced U. S. equipment in significant quantities are anticipated.

We wanted you to be aware of our views and the strong case against supplying Egypt with American military equipment.

We would be pleased to discuss this matter further with you or your staff at any time.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Morris J. Amitay
Executive Director

Enclosures

MEMORANDUM

March, 1976

WHY NO U. S. ARMS TO EGYPT

1. U. S. arms supplies to Egypt would supplement -- not supplant -- existing Egyptian sources and stocks. According to the authoritative International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Soviet Union not only has replaced most of Sadat's losses in the Egyptian-initiated Yom Kippur War but has added to his military capacity in some vital areas.
2. Since Egypt continues to receive the latest equipment from France, Britain, and other nations, the United States cannot expect to have any control over Egypt's total arms purchases. There is ample precedent to demonstrate that once arms are supplied their use cannot be controlled by the supplier.
3. Egyptian procurement of U. S. arms would clearly alter the delicate military balance of power between the Arab states and Israel. At present, without additional Western help, Egypt alone has considerably more troops, aircraft and ships than Israel. The combination of Soviet quantity with superior American quality presents a particularly grave danger to Israel in any future conflict.
4. Egypt clearly has no need to procure more arms than the levels she now maintains, unless she has aggressive intentions toward Israel, and the acquisition of American arms could strengthen those elements in the Egyptian army with such intentions. Israel, on the other hand, has never been a threat to the existence of Egypt nor does any other Arab state threaten Egypt militarily.
5. Egyptian needs today dictate expenditures for tractors, not tanks. The Egyptian people suffer from terrible poverty and deteriorating social services, and their government's efforts should be directed toward improving their plight, not toward preparing for another costly war.
6. The Egyptian regime is inherently unstable and its complexion and leadership could literally change overnight, along with its present "moderate" policies.
7. Finally Congress should carefully consider all the implications of this decision before agreeing to supply Egypt with arms. If, according to President Sadat, peace between Egypt and Israel is for the next generation, then perhaps American arms for Egypt should wait until then also. We have little indication to date of Egypt's further peaceful intentions beyond mere words. Further, time is needed to tell how serious Sadat is both about peace with Israel and cooperation with the United States.

U.S. WEIGHING SALE OF ARMS TO EGYPT

N. Y. T. FEB. 8, 1976

Nears Decision on Request for Aircraft, Patrol Boats, Missiles and Radar

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7—The Ford Administration, seeking to strengthen ties with Cairo, was reported today close to a major decision to consult with Congressional leaders on ending a long-standing ban on the sale of military equipment to Egypt.

High Administration officials have said in interviews that a final decision has not yet been made on the controversial question.

But they said that various recommendations on how to proceed toward lifting the embargo were at the White House the result of weeks of inter-agency discussions in which the State Department took the lead. Because of the extreme political sensitivity of the issue in this election year, the Administration has been moving cautiously.

Officials said they were aware that any decision to sell military equipment to Egypt would cause concern in Israel and among Israel's supporters, in Congress and in general. Thus, the officials said, the Administration was determined to take no action without first consulting Congressional leaders and committees.

President Anwar el-Sadat, who has broken Egypt's once close ties with the Soviet Union, has urged the United States for the last two years to lift the embargo and allow him to purchase a wide range of military equipment to help Egypt overcome the loss of arms from the Soviet Union.

President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger have shown understanding of Mr. Sadat's problems. Mr. Ford, in an exceedingly candid inter-

view before Mr. Sadat's visit to this country in October, said he believed the United States had "an implied commitment" to sell certain equipment to Egypt.

When Mr. Sadat was here he discussed military sales with American leaders but no decisions were made. Officials have been working intensely on the matter and categories of military equipment sought by Egypt have been under study.

Missiles, Planes and Radar

The requests from Mr. Sadat are extensive. They include C-130 military transport planes, Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, wire-guided TOW anti-tank weapons, radar and communications equipment, Naval patrol boats, and F-5E jet fighter planes.

At the moment, a high State Department official said, Mr. Sadat has asked for early action on his request for six C-130's, which would cost Egypt a total of \$30-million to \$40 million.

"It has become a prestige item for Egypt," the official added.

A Presidential decision would be needed to allow the sale, but the Administration has told Congress that nothing would be done without consultation.

"On sales to Egypt we want Congress in on the take-off as well as the landing," another official said.

But within the Ford Administration, many top officials have contended that rather than go to Congressional leaders just on the C-130's it would be better to discuss with them a long-range approach to military sales to Egypt.

'We'll Have a Plan'

A White House official told several Senate staff aides on Thursday that when the Administration decided to act on lifting the embargo, "We'll have a plan." The aide, in an interview, said that the Administration "had learned its lesson" in the past by being too secretive on military deals and wanted to be as candid as possible.

"We want to be able to say: 'Look we're in favor of selling Egypt the following items over a one-year or five-year period,'" the White House official said. "We'll be able to say: 'Look, in 1977 Egypt would be able to buy this from the

United States, but Israel will have this much more, so the balance won't be upset.'"

The aide and other officials have been in contact with Senators, Representatives and their aides because of rumors about the size of the projected sales. The Congressional concern was stirred by an article in The Boston Globe last week that said a decision had been made to sell six C-130's to Egypt.

Kissinger Informed Rabin

Actually, the formal decision on the C-130 has not been made, but Mr. Kissinger informed Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel last week during his visit here that the Administration would probably go to Congress and seek approval of the C-130 sale.

The Administration is not legally required to consult Congress but has begun doing so to avoid surprise and anger on Capitol Hill. Last year, Congress was surprised by a sale of a \$350 million anti-aircraft defense system to Jordan, and this led to a prolonged and often bitter dispute.

Under current law, any government-to-government sale of more than \$25 million in military equipment can be vetoed by concurrent resolution of Congress within 20 days of notification. If no action is taken in that time, the sale goes through.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a bill now before the full Senate, has extended the veto authority to 30 days and includes commercial as well as government-to-government sales.

Any sales to Egypt would be for cash, officials said. The Egyptians have been promised help from Saudi Arabia in financing purchases here.

Egypt, under the current aid bill before the Senate, would receive \$700 million in economic assistance for the fiscal year ending June 30. The Administration plans to ask \$750 million for the next fiscal year.

The United States has been striving to strengthen ties with Egypt since it became clear in 1974 that Mr. Sadat was basing his policy on close ties with Washington and was the strongest supporter in the Arab world of Mr. Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy toward peace in the Middle East.

Administration officials assert that with Egypt vying with Syria, a radical state, for prestige in the Arab world, it is more important than ever to give Mr. Sadat something to show as a benefit for his ties with the United States.

Arming Egypt

By William Safire

WASHINGTON—The Ford Administration has begun to prepare American public opinion for the gift of United States planes, missiles and military communications equipment to Egypt.

In its opening stages, this persuasion effort puts forth the general proposition in a deft denial of specifics. Says Mr. Ford's Secretary of State: "I don't think we will be prepared at this moment to make any specific commitments of military aid, but we will be prepared to discuss the problem with him [Mr. Sadat] in general terms."

Then, as White House sources assured us that Mr. Sadat had not come on this first visit with a specific arms shopping list, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger told Barbara Walters on television: "I think it would be advisable from the standpoint of American policy to achieve a diversification of the sources of arms going to Egypt."

That mushmouthed euphemism—"diversification of the sources of arms"—means, in plain words, giving military equipment to Egypt as soon as Americans will hold still for it.

The argument for such "diversification" goes like this: Since we provide Israel with arms, why not Egypt as well? That would show how evenhanded we are. And if we do not give Mr. Sadat the arms he wants, he might go back to the Russians and get all he wants from them. Thus we would lose our leverage, or control, over Egypt.

But let's go to the basic reason for sending American arms to the Mideast. Israel needs arms to defend herself against invasions by Egypt, which take place on the average of once every five years. Egypt, on the contrary, does not need arms to defend herself against aggression by Israel, which has never happened. The only reason Egypt ever needs arms is to help her threaten, and ultimately attack, Israel.

Is it a step toward peace for America to become an arms supplier to Egypt, helping her win back the land she lost in her invasion before last? No. Sometimes "evenhandedness" asks too much. If the recent agreement Egypt signed not to attack Israel for nearly four years means anything at all, it means that Egypt does not need fresh military assistance. The gift of arms will hardly be an incentive to keep the truce.

What about the "leverage" we would get if we were one of Egypt's arms suppliers? The premise is false. Right now, Egypt is buying arms, with Saudi Arabian money, from France and Britain. Right now, Egypt's next-door neighbor, oil-rich Libya, is buying arms at a great rate from the Soviet

Union, which will make it the arsenal of anti-democracy in the next shift of Arab alliances.

If we were to add American arms to the Egyptian arsenal, can it be seriously argued that an American threat to cut off future contributions of arms would stop the Egyptians from attacking when they felt strong enough to win? Again, no. They would simply say, "If you cut off military aid, we'll go back to the Russians." Some "leverage."

Moreover, the supply of the same sophisticated communications equipment, missiles and planes to Egypt as

ESSAY

we sell to Israel would severely undercut the value of the Israelis' arms. When an attacker is trained in the defender's equipment, the attacker has an enormous advantage. Giving Egypt such an insight into Israeli defense does not win a friend, it loses a deterrent to war.

The central idea on which we base military aid to Israel is that a strong Israel is less likely to be attacked: When Arabs believe they will lose a war, they do not start a war. Today, that sensible idea is being turned on its head. The Ford Administration is saying that if Egyptian arms come partly from the United States, Egypt will then become hooked on our military hardware, and Mr. Sadat can be counted upon to do his friend Henry a favor and not use those arms in attacking Israel. Rarely has such inverted logic been presented as the basis for a military assistance proposal.

The only "leverage" we will ever have on Egypt will come from economic aid and the building of connective tissue of investment and trade. If we help Mr. Sadat feed, clothe and house impoverished Egyptians, they will react as human beings do everywhere, by wanting more food and clothing and shelter, not more opportunity to starve and bleed in another round of war.

I think of a young Israeli lieutenant, born in Albany, N. Y., stationed now at the Allenby Bridge, helping Arabs move back and forth across the border to visit their families. The thought of his being the target of an American-built missile, guided by American-built technology, and delivered by an American-built jet aircraft the next time Egypt feels strong enough to attack is more than a little disturbing.

It will not help to then say that the means of killing him was provided by the American taxpayer in the name of "diversification of the sources of arms."

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Morris J. Amitay
Executive Director

March 5, 1976

Dear Alex:

I am enclosing a report that was recently prepared for AIPAC on trends in American public opinion toward Israel.

The author of this analysis is a professional analyst of polls on foreign policy issues.

I hope this report will be of interest to you and that you will respect its confidentiality. Your own comments and reactions would, of course, be most appreciated.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Morris J. Amitay

Enclosure

MJA:FAN

P.S. Am enclosing our letter
to Congress on arms sales
to Egypt.
Let's stay in close
touch.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND ISRAEL

1975 Trends

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AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND ISRAEL: TRENDS

A Report Prepared for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

February, 1976

American Public Opinion and Israel 1975 Trends

Introduction

Any assessment of public opinion should first state a few of polling's limitations. Most of the surveys reported in this paper were conducted with nationwide samples of 1,000 to 1,500 adult respondents. This number requires a five to seven percent margin of error when comparing results from within a sample and about a 10 percent error when comparing results between two such samples. Thus, subtle differences or changes are difficult to record in public opinion surveys. Polling, by its very nature, deals mainly with broad trends in opinion.

The public's aggregate views on the issues can often be contradictory and violate accepted rules of logic. Yet, in a country like the United States, events and information are perceived in many different ways, often varying by age, occupation, level of education, income and other factors. This paper tries to show such differences when reported and meaningful. The reader should remember, however, that differences in opinion may not be due solely to variations in age, education or whatever, but rather by differences in lifestyle and experiences which accompany demographic variations.

Most of the findings reported in this paper are drawn from the Gallup Poll and Harris Survey findings for 1975 (each organization usually conducts two nationwide surveys a month). Other nationwide surveys include:

Roper Poll, June

Time magazine "Soundings", August (conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly and White)

Gannett News Service Poll, September (conducted by Decision Research Corp.)

Conference Board surveys of consumer confidence, bimonthly (conducted by National Family Opinion, Inc.)

University of Michigan surveys of consumer sentiment (conducted by the university's Institute for Social Research)

Statwide surveys in California (May) and Iowa (June) are also cited, although one should be cautious in projecting their findings to the nation at large.

The first chapter of this paper gives a summary of the findings and possible implications for 1976. One rather fearless prediction that can be made for 1976 is that the nation's pollsters will dwell more and more on the Presidential election, probably at the expense of more substantive issues. The wealth of available data reported here may not be so plentiful this coming year.

Summary and Implications for 1976

American opinion towards Israel cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Attitudes toward U.S. policies in the Middle East resulted from actions involving the countries in the region, of course, but also from other interconnected events and developments, both foreign and domestic.

1. The Economy.

Americans were most concerned about the state of the U.S. economy during 1975. In January, Americans still appeared upset at the unilateral oil price increases instigated by Arab and other producers in 1974, and largely blamed the severe recession on them. As 1975 wore on, however, the public became more accustomed to high energy costs and more willing to sacrifice (basically through the price mechanism) to develop domestic resources as the answer to the energy problem. By September, Arab oil producers were joined by big business and government spending in the public mind, as those responsible for America's economic difficulties.

Perhaps the most serious economic news in 1975 was New York City's struggle for financial solvency. By year's end, many Americans, stung by New York's experiences, showed increasing concern with rising government spending and its implications for the future. While the economy remained as the number-one issue, its nature shifted from one focusing on energy problems to a many-sided problem encompassing energy costs, business and government activities.

2. Confidence in American Institutions

The year 1975 marked a sharp decrease in public confidence in its large national institutions, particularly government. The failure of the Federal

government (both Congress and the Executive) to solve the nagging domestic problems of inflation, unemployment, energy shortages, crime and welfare caused many Americans to characterize government performance as either fair or poor. The trend away from affiliation with either major political party was another indication of this lack of confidence. Other larger, distant and national institutions such as big business and labor suffered similar losses.

The one exception to this pattern concerned national security matters. Americans generally displayed more faith in the foreign policy machinery's performance (personified by Dr. Kissinger) than those responsible for domestic affairs. The fall of Vietnam, for example, dulled Dr. Kissinger's glow minimally and only temporarily. By the Fall of 1975, solid majorities of Americans continued to give him high marks for his work. (Since then, however, his popularity has slipped considerably.)

3. Vietnam and Future American Commitments

The collapse of America's adventure in Southeast Asia was probably the major foreign policy event for most Americans, and it prompted many questions on this country's resolve to keep its commitments. Results suggest no weakening in the desire to provide aid to America's traditional allies (including Israel) for stopping Communist-backed attacks on their soil. However, Americans generally opposed using troops outside the North American continent and showed increasing displeasure with the idea of military assistance programs.

4. U.S. Middle East Policies.

Few Americans showed a high interest in American policies in the Middle East during 1975 and only a minority claimed to closely follow these developments in the media. However, three events captured the attention of most Americans:

the breakdown of shuttle diplomacy (March), the Sinai agreement (August-September) and the U.N.'s Zionism resolution (November).

Despite the media treatment and the attention given to these events, a trend towards personal non-commitment to either side in the dispute continued throughout 1975. The Arab states have few friends in this country and their backers are usually dwarfed by the number of Israel's supporters (largely from among the more articulate, politically active elements of the public). However, the number of those taking neither side in the dispute or having no opinion grew throughout the year to the point that it now encompasses about half of the adult public.

It should be noted that this pattern has been evident at least since 1967, where it usually takes a shooting war in the Middle East to gain majority support for Israel among Americans. Even the U.N.'s Zionism resolution, which attacked the very rationale for Israel's existence, did not turn this trend around. Americans generally developed more negative opinions toward the U.N. than sympathy for Israel.

Limited findings suggest that even among Israel's staunchest supporters, Americans (with an opinion on the matter) would rather have seen the U.S. take an active role as mediator rather than aid Israel (very few were willing to support the Arabs). In addition, sizable numbers would still have preferred the U.S. to stay out of the conflict completely. In 1975, only a large-scale, Soviet-backed attack on Israel would probably have caused a substantial segment of the public to support generous American military aid for Israel (few would still have supported the use of American troops).

Implications for 1976

The following implications assume a continuation of trends from 1975 which, of course, could be upset by unforeseen events.

1. Strong support for Israel will probably continue among the more articulate and politically-active elements of the public -- those with college education, higher incomes (\$20,000 per year or more) and having executive or professional occupations. These people are generally the leaders in their communities and provide Israel with her greatest source of strength in this country.

2. Dr. Kissinger will probably continue to receive a large measure of support from the public, particularly among the leading and active elements who also support Israel. However, these same people show more inclination to favor an American role as mediator rather than an arms supplier to one side. This elite public may need to view Israel as cooperating with Dr. Kissinger's peace efforts in order to maintain their sympathies.

3. Israel may not be able to count on the oil-price issue to build antipathy against the Arabs. Many Americans may be growing more accustomed to high oil prices and, although still eager to develop self-sufficiency in energy, appear less likely to blame America's economic woes solely on the Arabs. With an expanding economy, the "energy crisis" of 1973-74 may become a fading memory.

4. The taxes-spending issue may become the dominant concern in the economy and could hamper Israel's ability to secure multi-billion dollar aid packages

1. State of the Nation

"The trouble with most leaders is they treat the public as though it had a 12-year-old mentality instead of as grown-up human beings who can take the hard truth on most issues."

Agree	71%
Disagree	23
Not sure	6

(Harris Survey, September 1975)

Most Americans will not remember 1975 as a particularly good year.

Polls taken throughout the year found a preponderant concern with a struggling economy, weakening personal involvement with politics and a growing lack of confidence in this country's major social, economic and political institutions.

Concerns of the Public

Far and away, Americans considered the state of the economy as the number-one problem facing the U.S. Harris (December) found 85 percent of the public listing the economy as this country's main problem. Most of this concern centered around inflation. Gallup, in March and July found 51 to 60 percent mainly concerned about inflation while about a fifth in each poll listed unemployment. The related issue of taxes and spending was the second leading problem in Harris' December survey, the magnitude of which increased nearly four-fold since 1974 (33% in 1975, 9% in 1974).

Crime, integrity in government, energy shortages and welfare each were named by 10 to 20 percent as main concerns facing this country, which about equalled their 1974 figures (Harris, December). Both Harris and Gallup found foreign affairs named by no more than 5 percent.

from the U.S. Inflation and unemployment have slowly subsided, but pessimism still characterizes the public's mood on the economy. This pessimism seems to result from a lack of confidence in the government's ability to handle economic problems, such as skyrocketing public costs and the higher taxes they cause.

Should the taxes-spending issue become more urgent (further problems in New York City, New York State, Massachusetts or other financially tight jurisdictions could promote this issue in 1976), foreign aid and military assistance may receive hard scrutiny from a public never very enamored with either of these programs. While currently seen in a domestic context, the taxes-spending issue could very well include foreign policies in 1976.

Personal Involvement with Political Issues

Since 1972, Americans have showed increasing reluctance to affiliate with either major political party. The percentage of "independents" increased to 35 percent in 1975 from 30 percent in 1974. Some 21 percent now call themselves Republicans, which has dropped from 28 percent in 1972. The 44 percent who currently call themselves Democrats has stayed about constant since 1972. (Gallup, June-August)

The growing legion of "independents" are less likely to vote or take part in political activities than party affiliates. In August, Harris found Republicans, Easterners, college-educated and older Americans (age 50 and over) more likely to participate in such activities as wearing buttons, putting bumper-stickers on their cars, attend rallies or dinners, donate money to campaigns or work for political candidates.

In June, a Roper Poll found about a third of the public closely following events in the Middle East. However, this figure was dwarfed by the 75 percent who followed inflation news. Other leading news developments followed closely by Americans included other economic issues such as unemployment (70%), talk of depression (55%) and the medical-malpractice crisis (46%).

Political news, both foreign and domestic, generally took second place to economic issues. About three to four in 10 mentioned news about the Ford Administration, America's loss of prestige and influence, possible candidates for President and relations between Israel and the Arab countries as those issues followed closely in the media.

Confidence in Leadership and Institutions

Harris, in September, conducted an extensive survey on confidence in American leaders and institutions, with startling results. Over half (56%)

thought the quality of leadership had worsened in the past decade. Only one in 10 thought things had improved while three in 10 saw no change.

Some 71 percent agreed that leaders too often treat the public like 12-year-olds rather than adults. Nearly the same number felt that leaders too often try to give "more of the same" rather than improving the quality of life. Some 60 percent also believed that leaders are too often out for themselves rather than working for the common good.

The larger, distant, less familiar national institutions received the most fire. Fewer than four in 10 expressed a great deal of confidence in the White House, executive branch, Congress or Supreme Court. Gallup (May-June) found about the same low proportion with a great deal of confidence in big business or organized labor.

Both surveys, however, found larger numbers with a great deal of confidence in institutions represented (at least in part) at the local level such as medicine, television news, banks, the press, colleges, small companies and state or local governments. The importance of the "familiarity" factor is highlighted in Gallup's finding that about twice as many Americans had a great deal of confidence in "the company or business you work for" (67%) than in "big business" (33%).

Time magazine (August) found sharp differences in opinion over the federal government's handling of national issues. Between six to eight in 10 believed the federal government was doing a poor job in areas of welfare, unemployment, keeping the economy healthy and preventing crime. About the same numbers, however, saw the government doing a good job in national-security matters such as defense and foreign affairs. This positive feeling varied with the issues and personalities involved, as we shall see in the next chapter.

2. U.S. Foreign Relations

"Do you tend to agree or disagree that if we are to keep our commitments to our friends and allies, we must sometimes fight limited wars, even if our chances of winning a clear-cut victory are slim?"

U.S. must fight sometimes	44%
Must not fight sometimes	43
Not sure	13

(Harris Survey, April 1975)

The final collapse of American policy in Southeast Asia was probably the major foreign policy event to most Americans. Yet, the public appeared more sanguine about the national-security and foreign policy makers (Dr. Kissinger, in particular) than those responsible for domestic affairs and economic policy. Nonetheless, polls taken around the fall of Vietnam show divided opinion toward the use of American troops and generally negative attitudes toward American military assistance programs.

Public's Evaluation of Foreign Policy Makers

Most adult Americans saw American foreign policy as mainly the work of Henry Kissinger. In March, Harris found that nearly three-quarters (73%) considered Dr. Kissinger as having a "very important" role in the making of foreign policy. This figure exceeded the the 49 percent who saw President Ford as having a "very important" role in foreign policy, 39 percent for Congress, 36 percent for the State Department and 19 percent for public opinion. On the same token, nearly six in 10 (58%) would like to have seen public opinion play a larger role in foreign policy, as would 49 percent for Congress, 44 percent for President Ford and only 30 percent for Dr. Kissinger.

The fall of Vietnam tarnished the super-star image Dr. Kissinger has created over the past few years. Despite this fact, no less than 56 percent

of the public (in May and August) considered Dr. Kissinger to be doing an excellent or good job. By September, this figure had increased somewhat to 63 percent, probably as a result of the Sinai agreement. (Harris)

Vietnam appeared to have some effect on the public's impression of other aspects of Dr. Kissinger's work. Favorable ratings on his working for peace in the world, handling relations with Russia and China, negotiating arms-control agreements, and handling the Middle East and Cyprus crises dropped in May and August as well. In March and September, these favorable scores for Dr. Kissinger were five to ten points higher. (Harris)

Traditionally, Americans in the upper-income, managerial-professional and college-educated groups have been the strongest supporters of U.S. foreign policies. Dr. Kissinger has the backing of these groups generally, but he also has gained the support of much of the middle-class as well. In April, in the midst of Vietnam's collapse, Gallup found white-collar workers and middle-income groups (\$10-20,000 per year) to be almost as likely to give Dr. Kissinger favorable marks for his performance as the upper social-class.

Public ratings on President Ford's performance in office seemed to react to domestic and economic developments more than foreign policy events. His overall ratings started off rather low in 1975, probably as a result of the recession. Throughout most of the year, favorable ratings on the President's handling of foreign policy matters generally showed little change. (Gallup, Harris, Time magazine).

Yet, some exceptions to this pattern occurred. The President's highest overall ratings came in the wake of the Mayaguez affair (Harris, May). Favorable marks for the President's handling of the Middle East crisis

jumped from 26 percent in April to 42 percent in October, probably as a result of the Sinai agreement (Harris).

Only minorities gave Congress favorable scores on foreign policy matters. About a third (33-36%) considered Congress' performance as either excellent or good in working for peace in the world or keeping the U.S. strong militarily. Even fewer (17-16%) gave Congress high marks for handling the energy crisis. (Harris: January, March, July)

Use of American Troops

Events in Southeast Asia in 1975 prompted questions on American willingness to use troops to keep defense commitments. In April, Harris found the public evenly split (44-43%) on whether or not the U.S. should fight limited wars to help American allies, even if it meant little chance of clear-cut victory.

Also in April, Gallup found less than a majority of Americans willing to send American troops to help such traditional allies as England, Mexico, Philippines, West Germany, Japan and Israel stop Communist-supported attacks on their soil. Many more Americans, however, were willing to send aid to these countries to stop Communist-backed attacks, which when added to the numbers in favor of sending troops, amounted to majorities of the public (54 to 76%) willing to help America's allies.

Military Assistance

In principle, majorities of Americans opposed the United States either giving military aid (65%) or selling arms to other countries (53%). In March, Harris also found half to three-quarters of Americans agreeing that military aid programs make other countries too dependent on the U.S., get this country too involved in the affairs of other countries, aggravate relations with other countries, encourage dictatorships to use their power against their own

people, lead to support of military-controlled governments, hurt our own economy and do not help our national security.

Large numbers (but not majorities), however, feel American military assistance strengthens our political friends abroad, provides a good substitute for using American troops and helps people in other countries live better.

Other Aspects of U.S. Foreign Relations

Time magazine (August) found a souring attitude towards detente with the Soviet Union. More Americans (45%) felt the USSR got more out of detente than the United States (3%). About three in 10 believed neither side gained an advantage.

In July, Harris found the public generally opposed to using tactical nuclear weapons in Korea (52% opposed, 32% in favor), but the use of troops to defend the South against invasion received a more even reaction (46% opposed, 39% in favor). Majorities of Californians in May preferred a pull-out of American troops in Korea and Thailand rather than fighting Communist attacks or insurgencies in those countries.

Despite the General Assembly's vote on Zionism, majorities of Americans in December would not favor pulling out of the United Nations, according to both Gallup and Harris. Nonetheless, only a minority felt the U.N. was doing a good job, even before the Zionism vote. In December, Harris found about half of the public (49%) willing to cut American funds to the U.N.

3. U.S. Middle East Policies

"In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or the Arab states?"

	<u>January</u>	<u>December</u>
Israel	52%	42%
Arab states	7	5
Neither, both	30) 41%	38) 53%
Not sure	11)	15)

(Harris Surveys, 1975)

Three major events in 1975 highlighted U.S. policies in the Middle East: the breakdown of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in March, the Sinai agreement in September and the U.N. Zionism resolution in November. Despite these events, a gradual erosion in sympathy for Israel occurred, which by the end of the year showed about half of the public not taking any side in the dispute. However, Israel continued receiving strong support among the politically active, articulate elements of the public throughout 1975.

Sympathies

Since 1967, Americans have generally favored Israel over the Arab states in the Near East dispute, with support for Israel increasing during times of war. During other times, including 1975, from four to six in 10 Americans favored neither side or had no opinion. This "uncommitted" group usually equalled or exceeded the number supporting Israel.

During 1975, both Gallup and Harris found support for Israel greatest at the beginning of the year. As we shall see later, many Americans had blamed the recession on the rapid rise in oil prices generated by the Arab oil-producing countries, and this may have reflected in strong support for Israel.

With the breakdown of shuttle diplomacy in March, Gallup found sympathy for Israel to slip from 44 to 37 percent, with the proportion of "uncommitted" Americans (favoring neither side or no opinion) rising from 48 to 55 percent.

<u>Support for....</u>	<u>January</u>	<u>April</u>
Israel	44%	37%
Arab states	8	8
Neither, both	24) 48%	24) 55%
Not sure, no opinion	24)	31)

While the U.N. Zionism resolution may have arrested the trend towards non-commitment, Harris' findings did not show any great increase in support for Israel as a result (see table at beginning of this chapter). When considering the negative reactions to the resolution and the loss of support for the U.N. among Americans, the Zionism resolution appeared to generate more unfavorable feeling for the U.N. than sympathy for Israel's cause.

Throughout 1975, both Gallup and Harris found the higher-income, college-educated and professional-managerial occupation groups more likely to support Israel than the public at large. As noted earlier, these were the same groups which supported Dr. Kissinger most strongly and showed the greatest likelihood to get involved in political activity. The failure of shuttle diplomacy in March, however, caused even these groups to somewhat reduce their support for Israel. Younger members of the public were the most volatile. According to Gallup, between January and April, support for Israel among those under 30 years of age slipped from 52 to 41 percent while the number of "uncommitted" youth increased from 36 to 49 percent.

After the Zionism resolution, those under 30, according to Harris, were no more likely to support Israel than the public at large. At this point, however, Harris found liberals and Democrats more likely to support Israel than the general public.

Statewide surveys in California and Iowa in May and June showed about the same support for the different parties found in the national surveys during the first half of the year.

As noted earlier, Americans generally took a dim view of military assistance programs, particularly when Vietnam was a fresh memory. In January and March, however, Harris found a solid majority of Americans (65 and 64 percent respectively) willing to supply Israel with military equipment to offset Soviet aid to Egypt and Syria. In May, about the same percentage of Californians (62%) preferred to stay neutral in a new Middle East war rather than help Israel (28%) or the Arab states (2%) with troops or supplies. Should have Israel's very survival been at stake, about equal numbers of Californians would have helped Israel (48%) as would have preferred staying neutral (44%).

While one should be cautious in projecting the California results to the country at large, the threat of Soviet intervention appeared to generate more support among Americans for Israeli arms aid than a conflict between the Middle East parties themselves.

Breakdown of Negotiations

The failure of Israel and Egypt to reach an agreement in March prompted many Americans, including a large segment of the college-educated, to adopt a "plague on both your houses" attitude. About eight in 10 Americans were aware of that round of talks. Of those with an opinion on the question, larger numbers blamed both the Israelis and the Arabs for the breakdown, rather than just one of the parties. This pattern also characterized the college-educated public, usually a strong supporter of Israel (Gallup, April).

As a result of the breakdown of talks, about a third of the general public would have liked the U.S. to stay out of the dispute, compared to about two in 10 who would have preferred the U.S. to continue as a mediator.

About a third of the college-educated also preferred non-involvement, but about the same number would have favored an active U.S. role as mediator (Gallup, April).

Sinai Agreement

By September, an interim agreement on the Sinai had been reached with the active help of the United States. Most Americans were aware of the accord and a majority (56%) believed it would prevent another Middle East war, at least through the end of the year. However, some provisions of the agreement did not meet with general approval or at best caused divided opinions among Americans.

At the time of the accord, Harris found most Americans who had an opinion on the agreement (particularly the college-educated) to consider it "fair and just" to both sides. However, a large percentage (40%) had no opinion in that survey, which about equalled the number Gallup found to be unaware of the agreement.

The provision which committed American technicians to staff radar stations in the Sinai was perhaps the most well-known and debated part of the agreement. Gallup found about equally divided opinion on the question among those aware of the accord, with 50 percent in favor and 44 percent opposed. More support for this provision came from Israel's traditional supporters (higher-income, college-educated, professional-managerial groups), as well as the under 30 and white-collar groups.

The aid provisions of the agreement prompted somewhat conflicting results. Harris found more approval (49% in favor, 20% opposed) for the principle

that Israel be guaranteed oil supplies to compensate for the loss of the Abu Rodeis fields. However, a survey sponsored by the Gannett newspapers found majorities disapproving the United States supplying oil to Israel (56%). The Gannett survey also found 64 percent of the Americans opposed to supplying \$2.5 billion in military and economic aid to Israel. It should be noted that both the Harris and Gannett surveys were conducted about the same time as the agreement and probably contain a large number of respondents generally unaware of its specific points or implications.

Zionism Resolution

As noted above, both Harris and Gallup found the U.N.'s resolution equating Zionism with racism to cause considerable negative feeling against the organization. Harris also found the resolution itself to be opposed 49 to 9 percent by Americans, particularly among Israel's strongest supporters (higher-income, college-educated, professional-managerial). This negative feeling cut across political and ideological lines as well. However, opinions toward the resolution varied among the different parts of the country with the Western states more likely to oppose the resolution (64-8%) and the South less likely to oppose it (28-14%).

4. The Economy and Israel

"If it came down to it, and the only way we could get Arab oil in enough quantity and at lower prices was to stop supporting Israel with military aid, would you favor or oppose such a move by this country?"

	General Public	Elite Public
Favor	18%	5%
Oppose	64	93
Not sure	18	2

(Harris Survey, January 1975)

The United States began 1975 in its worst recession since World War II. Many Americans perceived this country as a victim of Arab oil producers in January, but as the year wore on and the economy slowly strengthened, energy issues became secondary to taxes and spending. New York's financial problems may have prompted a realization that government resources were not infinite, which could have implications for future domestic (and even foreign) spending.

Confidence in the American Economy

As noted earlier, inflation and unemployment were considered the main problems facing this country in 1975. During the year, according to surveys conducted by the Conference Board and the University of Michigan, consumer confidence in the economy slowly gained ground and personal buying plans became more expansive. However, Gallup, in December, still found pessimism to prevail for most Americans, but at a lesser magnitude than had been found in 1974.

Energy

At the beginning of the year, Harris found three-quarters of the public blaming "foreign oil producers raising prices on crude oil" as the cause of inflation. Slightly fewer (64%) blamed "foreign oil producers" or "Arab oil producing countries" as the causes of recession. By September, Americans continued to blame oil-rich Arab countries, but also spread the blame for

inflation to other causes such as oil companies, businessmen, middlemen, worldwide inflation or spending by Congress. Thus, the public seemed to become less likely to put total responsibility for the problems of the economy on the Arab oil producers. This could have been a result of rising confidence in the economy, a growing accommodation with high energy prices, or New York's financial problems (a major news story at that time).

Even in January, the Arab oil threat did not stimulate many Americans to resort to drastic measures. Should the Arabs have imposed another oil boycott, Gallup (January) found only one in 10 willing to use force and about a quarter in favor of imposing economic sanctions against the Arabs. Most of those with an opinion on the question favored stronger measures to become self-sufficient in energy. Also in January, Harris found about two-thirds of the general public and nine in 10 "elite" Americans unwilling to reduce American support for Israel in order to gain more Arab oil at lower prices.

Throughout the year, both Gallup and Harris found a willingness to give tax breaks to domestic companies and de-regulate domestic prices to increase energy supplies at home, even if higher prices would result. In October, Harris also found fewer Americans engaging in energy-saving practices such as lowering thermostats, driving less often and limiting gasoline purchases.

Taxes and Spending

Probably the most serious economic news in 1975 was the financial plight of New York City. In October, Gallup found about three-quarters (77%) of the public following this news in the media. Both the Conference Board and University of Michigan reported slight drops in their consumer confidence indices while New York dominated the headlines. This issue also catapulted

"taxes and spending" into one of the leading concerns of the American public by December (Harris).

American opinions were generally split over whether to guarantee New York's bonds or give the city outright aid (bond-guarantees had somewhat more supporters). Younger members of the public (under 30) generally were more sympathetic to helping New York.

In August, Gallup found about equal numbers supporting fictitious candidates who either favored higher spending levels to spur economic growth (46%), or spending limits to balance the budget (42%). By October, Gallup's results showed more Americans supporting candidates willing to cut the number of federal employees five percent a year for the next four years (53% in favor, 31% opposed), and two-thirds (67%) supporting President Ford's proposal to cut taxes and government spending by the same amount.

No surveys tested proposals for cutting foreign aid or military assistance in order to lower taxes, but considering the general lack of support for these programs to start with, one suspects that Americans would have largely favored cutting overseas spending as an economy measure.

July 12, 1978

Mr. Al Riesenburger
P.O. Box 1116
Columbus, Georgia 31902

Dear Al:

Your letter of July 5 and the correspondence to you from Senator Nunn reached our office during the absence of Rabbi Schindler. He'll be back at his desk late in July and I know he will find this material to be of interest.

Fondest regards to you and Eileen, and best wishes for a beautiful and rewarding summer.

Sincerely,

Edith J. Miller
Assistant to the President

Georgia International Life Insurance Company

Al Riesenburg, CLU
Career Agent
Godwin Agency
P.O. Box 1116
Columbus, Georgia 31902
(404) 323-6426

July 5, 1978

Rabbi Alexander Schindler
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10021

Dear Alex,

Enclosed please find a letter from Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia to me, that I thought would be interesting for you to read.

Hope you and your family have a most pleasant summer.

With best regards from our house to your house.

Sincerely,

Al

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 16, 1978

Mr. Al Riesenburger
Box 1116
Columbus, Georgia 31902

Dear Al:

I appreciate your communication expressing concern over the Administration's proposed sale of jet fighter aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. As you know, on May 15 the resolution of disapproval was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 54-44. I voted with the minority to disapprove the sale, primarily because of the timing of the sale with regard to continued progress towards peace in the Middle East.

I believe that the Soviet Union and its Cuban allies are carefully and deliberately surrounding the oil-rich Persian Gulf. I also believe that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are in the forefront of the forces of moderation in the Arab world, have a legitimate need to modernize and upgrade their military forces. Both countries face growing threats to their security posed by such Soviet client states as Iraq, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and Ethiopia.

The F-15s being sold to Saudi Arabia cannot be delivered prior to 1982. For this reason, I believe that this arms sale will have very little impact upon the Middle East military balance for the next three to four years. It does, however, have a large psychological impact, and I was afraid that regardless of the outcome of the vote in the Senate, the "losing" side will be less likely to make the concessions necessary to promote a peace settlement in the Middle East. For this reason, I joined with Senator Jackson and Senator Moynihan in a letter to President Carter urging him to delay submitting the proposed sale to the Congress pending further movement toward a peace settlement. I am enclosing a copy of this letter for your information.


I also worked for a compromise which could have avoided any of our friends in the Middle East feeling that they had lost the Senate vote, but all such efforts failed.

I believe that in the long run a stable peace in the Middle East can only be brought about through improved relations between Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Although I would have preferred to see the sale postponed pending further peace efforts, I am hopeful that my fears will not be realized and that all three countries will realize that their security can best be protected by moderation and compromise which will lead to peace in the Middle East.

I am also hopeful that these sales will not interfere with the long-standing relationship between our country and Israel. I believe that the Senate and the Administration are determined to continue to maintain this U.S.-Israel friendship.

I appreciate your sharing your views with me on this very important issue, and hope that you will continue to advise me on matters of concern to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sam", with a large, stylized initial "S" that loops around the first part of the name.

Sam Nunn

Enclosure

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 25, 1978

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Without getting into the substance of your proposal to sell sophisticated aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt, we write to address the issue of the timing of the Administration's request to the Congress to authorize a new arms "package."

There is no doubt that the proposal will face an intensive and divisive debate in the Senate where the outcome is uncertain. Indeed, there are strong indications that a majority of the Senate will vote to disapprove at least one of the proposed sales. We share what we believe to be the overwhelming sentiment of the Senate that the package not now be presented for debate and decision.

Our national effort would be far better directed toward encouraging a peace between Israel and Egypt, to reinforcing the promising elements of the Sadat-Begin dialogue and to bringing those negotiations to a favorable conclusion. Were the proposed arms sales presented to the Congress following a peace between Israel and Egypt, there is no doubt that it would receive favorable consideration in the Congress.


Approval by the Congress with a consensus rather than the probable rejection of part of the package after a bitter controversy is clearly in the national interest. A delay would facilitate an intensified negotiation effort.

Once a peace agreement has been reached, the Congressional attitude toward the provision of sophisticated weapons to the parties would be very different from what it is today. In the aftermath of a peace agreement, the atmosphere in which the arms proposals would be considered would be far more conducive to the outcome you desire.


For all these reasons we believe that a delay of a few months is essential. It would provide additional time and additional incentives for the realization of a peace accord. It would spare the country and

our friends in the Middle East a debate certain to be marked by bitterness and contention. We hope that you will give serious consideration to this proposal; and we stand ready, individually, to assist in the efforts to bring about a peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely,


Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.


Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S.S.


Sam Nunn, U.S.S.

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN., CHAIRMAN

JOHN L. MC CLELLAN, ARK.
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CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
JOHN C. DANFORTH, MO.
H. JOHN HEINZ III, PA.

RICHARD A. WEGMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 5, 1978

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, President
Union of American Hebrew Congregations
838 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10021

Dear Alex:

On my return from abroad, Mr. Campbell
related to me his telephone conversation with
you.

You are always welcome at my office
whenever you are in Washington.

With all my best.

Sincerely,



Abe Ribicoff

May 19, 1978

Mr. Michael Roth
32 Norman Drive
Rye, N.Y. 10580

Dear Mike:

Many thanks for all your efforts in regard to the package deal on the sale of aircraft. We tried our best but the pressures from Administration sources were just too great to overcome. Nonetheless, I am deeply grateful for your help.

I hope your meetings with Torczyner and Klein are fruitful.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

From the desk of

Michael Roth

5/15/78

Dear Alex;

The enclosed mailgram
was sent to Senators Baker, Lugar,
Mathias, Danforth, Domenici, Chafee,
Roth, ^{Griffin} and Pearson. Hope it helps.

I have a date with
Jacques Torcziner on Thursday

Thanks for your help.

Let's stay in touch.

Mike

and George
Kellen
on Monday

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1 9146983981 MGM TDRN RYE NY 05-14 1059A EST

MICHAEL ROTH
32 NORMAN DR
RYE NY 10580

THIS MAILGRAM IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

9146983981 MGM TDRN RYE NY 100 05-14 1059A EST

ZIP

SENATOR HOWARD BAKER

US SENATE

WASHINGTON DC 20510

I STRONGLY URGE YOU TO VOTE AGAINST THE PROPOSED SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO
EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA. PRESIDENT CARTER IS OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO FORCE
ISRAEL TO MAKE CONCESSIONS SO THAT HE CAN RUN IN 1980 ON A PLATFORM OF
MIDDLE EAST PEACEMAKER. ISRAEL'S LONG TERM SURVIVAL IS FAR MORE
IMPORTANT TO AMERICAN POLICY THAN CARTER'S 1980 POLITICAL AMBITIONS

MICHAEL ROTH 32 NORMAN DR RYE NY 10580

11:00 EST

MGMCOMP MGM

Vote on Arms Package Senators up for reelection

No - 4

Guffin - Mi
Helms
Johnston
McCure
Peray
Randolph
Stevens
Thurmond
Tower

Yes - 12

Andersm
~~Biden~~ Biden
Brook
Case
Clark
Domenici
Haskell
Mark Hatfield
Alathaway
McIntyre
Nunn
Pell

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

PLaza 2-1616

Cable Address: COJOGRA

Statement by Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, chairman,
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations, commenting on the Senate vote to back
jet sales to the Middle East:

In narrowly rejecting the resolution of disapproval of the arms package, the Senate has accepted President Carter at his word. Now it is up to the President to make his word good.

Mr. Carter argued that sending arms to Egypt and Saudi Arabia would encourage the forces of "moderation" in the Middle East and promote the cause of peace. Now it is up to the President to bring Egypt back to the negotiating table and to win the public support of Saudi Arabia for the renewal of the peace process.

The President's Secretary of Defense, in an unusual seven-page letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, gave his assurances that 60 F-15's for Saudi Arabia would be used for defensive purposes only. By that action, the President assumed a solemn moral obligation to honor those assurances to the letter.

We are confident that all Americans who believe, as we do, that the security of Israel is an essential element of our own country's security will join us in this declaration: that President Carter has bound himself and his successors in the White House to the proposition that the F-15 fighter bomber will never be used against Israel.

Meanwhile, Israel remains at war and under siege, its security dangerously imperiled by the Carter package. If there is to be peace and if Israel is to be secure, our country must redress the dangerous arms imbalance resulting from the President's arms package. For America's own interests, for the cause of peace and for the security of our democratic ally Israel, our country's original commitment to provide a full complement of arms to Israel must now be honored.

Tuesday, 16 May 1973

May 18, 1978

Rabbi Max A. Shapiro
Temple Israel
2324 Emerson Avenue, So.
Minneapolis, Minn. 55405

Dear Max:

It was good chatting with you. I am deeply grateful for your efforts in regard to the package deal. Many, many thanks.

We did our best but I guess pressure from Administration sources was just too much to beat. What bothers me, however, is that the Jewish community is being accused of being "brutal" while very little is said of pressure on members of the Senate from big business and economic sources.

With warmest regards from house to house, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

May 18, 1978

Dear Rudi:

Just a note to express my gratitude to you for contacting Senator Baker on the package deal. We did our best but the pressure from Administration sources was just too much to beat. But I am grateful for your efforts and support.

It was good to learn that you mother made such a remarkable recovery. Prayers can be answered!

Rhea joins me in sending fondest regards from house to house. We look forward to seeing you and Noney in June.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Mr. Rudi E. Scheidt
P.O. Box 193
Memphis, Tenn. 38101

May 18, 1978

Dear Barbara and Gus:

Just a note to express my gratitude to you for contacting Senator Sasser in regard to the package deal vote. We gave it a good try but the pressure from Administration sources was just too strong.

Rhea joins me sending love to you both.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Mr. and Mrs. Gus D. Kuhn, Jr.
1214 Chickering Road
Nashville, Tenn. 37215

May 18, 1978

Mr. Al Riesenburger
1622 Iris Drive
Columbus, GA. 31906

Dear Al:

Just a word to express my gratitude for your personal efforts in contacting Senators Talmadge and Nunn on the package deal vote. We gave it a good try and met with success in some instances but the pressure on the Senate from Administration sources was just too great to beat.

Rhea joins me in sending warmest regards to you and Eileen. We look forward to seeing you in June.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler

May 2, 1978

Morris Amitay

One of our Board members in Grand Rapids shared the following information with me:

"Saw our Congressman here today - Harold Sawyer - and we spoke about the Mid East Arms Sale package and Harold told me he will vote against it - he changed his position from his original stand."

Warmest regards.



From the desk of

MORRIS J. AMITAY

Executive Director

BOSTON GLOBE 9 MAY 1976, Pg 27 (11)

Soviet-Egyptian rift may be patched so arms can flow from Moscow to Cairo

By William Beecher

Globe Staff

CAIRO There are signs that Egypt and the Soviet Union are seriously considering patching up their bitter differences to open the way for Russian arms and spare parts to flow here again.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat announced two years ago that his nation would no longer rely on the Soviets for arms. Relations between the two nations have since deteriorated.

Diplomatic and Egyptian sources say quiet, tentative steps toward reconciliation have recently been taken on Egypt's part because it is becoming persuaded it probably is not going to acquire more than marginal alternative arms supplies in the West. The Soviets, for their part, see their Mideast position rapidly eroding as the United States, France, Britain and China build their influence.

United Press International reported that a weekly Egyptian magazine said the Soviet Union has agreed to send a high-level delegation to Egypt next fall in an effort to improve Moscow's deteriorating relations with Cairo.

Rowe El-Youssef said in today's issue that the Soviets agreed to send a delegation at the suggestion of Yugoslav President Josip Brđz Tito.

It is understood that the Russian embassy here has been telling the Kremlin that unless it patches things up with Cairo by the end of this year, Egypt may have already signed long-term contracts that will commit it to re-equipping its armed forces with Western weapons.

Indeed, for more than a year Sadat has held off a decision on whether to sign a long-term contract with France for co-production of the Mirage F1 fighter-bomber at an old plane factory in Helwan. He is said to have hoped that once past the elec-

tions, the United States might agree to provide F5E fighters, which are cheaper and easier to maintain.

But after the heated congressional debate over the sale of six C130 transports to Egypt, government leaders here think: a big F5 deal probably is not in the cards, even if President Ford is elected, and especially if he is not.

Among the recent steps toward reconciliation between Moscow and Cairo are the following:

—Russia has indicated a readiness to sign a new five-year trade agreement with Egypt that would not require annual renegotiations. It is understood that terms are being secretly negotiated.

—Soviet officials have passed the word to Egyptians they may be ready to supply arms again. The Soviet ambassador to Egypt last week asked for and got an appointment with Gen. Muhammed Gamasy, the minister of war. Sources here noted it was unprecedented for a Russian ambassador to ask for a private meeting with the war minister rather than with the foreign minister or the president.

—The Soviets recently called for a two-stage resumption of the Geneva conference with the Palestinians present at the first stage, but not necessarily on an equal footing with the others. The Egyptians regard this as a significant Soviet shift to their position.

—After the death of Marshal Grechko, the Soviet defense minister, Egypt initially had intended to have its minister of housing, who was in Moscow, represent the nation at the funeral. Instead, General Gamasy flew to Moscow for the rites.

While President Sadat is said to be angry at the Russians, most recently for forbidding India to sell him spare parts for his MIG fighters, sources here feel he would bow to pres-

sure from his generals to renew a Soviet connection — If the Russians made the deal attractive enough, and if it could be presented publicly as Moscow coming back with hat in hand.

But if the Russians are invited back, sources here believe it probably would be on a more or less equal footing with Western arms sources, who would be kept for leverage against another cutoff and to help build up an Egyptian arms industry. And the Russians would not again be permitted to operate from airfields and naval bases as if they owned them.

"The Egyptians are coming to the realization that only two countries, the Soviet Union and the United States, have a sufficiently large defense industry to provide the quality of weapons they need and on a time scale that makes military sense, commented one diplomat.

Despite the fanfare attending the visit of Egyptian Vice President Hosny Mubarak to Peking, it is understood China agreed only to provide Egypt with 20 more engines for the nearly obsolescent MIG17 fighter, added to the 30 MIG engines it promised earlier, 10 engines for M14 helicopters, 10 engines for IL28 light bombers, and 30 engines for T54 tanks.

While China offered all the engines free, including delivery, the quantity involved will not make a dent in Egypt's increasingly urgent needs if it is to keep its Russian planes and tanks operating.

And despite the large quantities of arms mentioned in speculative reports about President Sadat's recent trip to Europe, sources say actual deals were quite modest.

Relatively speaking, Israeli forces are a good deal stronger than before the 1973 war and Egyptian forces are somewhat

weaker. In purely military terms, the Egyptians retain the capability of a limited offensive aimed not at territory but at inflicting heavy casualties on Israeli forces, competent sources believe.

"They're not about to go to war," said one experienced observer. "For one thing, it would destroy President Sadat's strategy of attacking his massive economic problems by attracting Western investment. But the capability is there for military action.

"Meanwhile Sadat will remain patient for a while to see how the economic gamble goes and what progress is made in negotiations, at least well into 1977, before readdressing the situation."

March 23, 1976

Mr. A. D. Capen, Chairman
Ridgefield World Study Group
55 Prospect Street - Apt. 15
Ridgefield, Conn. 06877

Dear Mr. Capen:

I have your letter of March 12 and I am really surprised by its tone. It does not reflect the kind of spirit of perception which is inherent in the word "study" which is included in the title of your group.

I have not the vaguest idea where you saw the telegram which you quote. Suffice it to say that the message which was actually relayed to President Ford in no wise contained any of those "threats" and "dictates" with which you charge me and the organization which I represent.

I do not have a copy of the telegram but I have a copy of an earlier letter I sent to President Ford which more truly reflects our views and which, as you will see, is fully supportive of the dominant thrust of present American foreign policy.

It seems to me that any group which labels itself a study group and which above all is representing a group of Americans should take the trouble to listen to all sides of issues and to go beyond an extract printed in a newspaper and the interpolation that may or may not have been given to it by a journalist before sending off denunciatory letters which also contain all manner of threats.

I do not like to be challenged by threats. I like to be challenged by ideas and to those I am willing to listen and that is the American ideal for which I fought and for which I received many rows of medals which entitle me to speak.

If you would like to have an exchange on that level I will be glad to continue our dialogue.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

bcc: Yehuda Hellman

Ridgefield World Study Group

A. D. CAPEN, CHAIRMAN

55 PROSPECT STREET, APT 15 - RIDGEFIELD, CONN., 06877

March 12, 1976

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Rabbi Schindler:

Your organization representing 32 Jewish groups , in a recent telegram to President Ford threatening Mr. Ford's chances for election by Jewish voters, has increased the continuing building up of rancor by many Americans.

The strong-armed tactics by Jewish organizations and lobbyists demanding increased military aid, often given as grants to Israel, and opposition to six C-130 military transports to Egypt has not only caused deep concern but bitter resentment among increasing numbers of Americans. More and more are becoming aware of the strangle-hold that Israel, an aggressor nation and Zionists in this country are exerting.

We hope that anti Jewish discrimination would not result from these aggressive actions, which are no longer paying off , if indeed they ever did. On the contrary they have aroused the public to the danger of a small militant foreign nation dictating United States policy. And Israel's determination to force its will in the Middle East by violent means.

It is reported that Israel is again demanding Pershing missiles while endeavoring to prevent small requests from Arab nations. We hope that you are aware that this is not being overlooked or ignored by the majority of people in this country.

Sincerely yours,

A. D. Capen

A.D.Capen, Chairman