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Series B: Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, 1962-1996.

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Israel, 1977-1993.

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CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM OF MEETING HELD MONDAY, MAY 16, 1977 AT THE WHITE HOUSE

NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION

Present: Zb, Bill Quant, Bob Lipschutz, Stu Eisenstat, Joyce Starr, and 1 staff aide.

Of our group: Alex Schindler, Arthur Hertzberg, Israel Miller, Arthur Levine,
Joe Sternstein, Jack Sheinkman, Herman Rosenbaum (Young Israel),
Harry Smith (Miami), Bernice Tennenbaum (Hadassah), Chuck
Hoffberger, Ed Sanders, Max Fisher, Mel Dubinsky and the undersigned.

Zb opened the meeting with a statement of the reaffirmation of the underlying US commitment to Israel; he noted specific organic relationship which binds the US to Israel both through security and economic development; he referred to the desire of the United States to obtain a peaceful settlement negotiated by the parties themselves and expressed the administration's belief that the time was propitious for such a settlement.

Schindler: Expressed happiness to meet at this time, not a time of crisis but rather after news reports of the resolution of the military equipment problem. Expressed apprehension about the existance of an American plan for settlement: namely, peace in exchange for withdrawal and a new state headed by PLO.

Zb: We are on the threshold of important developments. The survival of Israel is no longer an issue but uncertainties and unpredictabilities exist. The future of peace in the Middle East opens up many new possibilities. Israel might become the Switzerland of the Middle East. Stalemate means war, inflation in Israel, dependence of Israel on the United States. He repeated that there is a unique relationship with Israel, both spiritual and organic. The United States has no blueprint for peace settlement but there is a concept which is necessarily preconditioned on three issues: a real peace, security, and settlement of the Palestinian issue. The administration is trying to formulate a framework in which the parties can negotiate. There is an obvious relationship of territory to security. Everyone has an obligation to obtain a settlement. The present stalemate cannot continue on an even keel for the dangers are great.

Hertzberg: All of us share desire to get away from immobilism. A real peace must come from the Arabs. The apprehension of the Jewish community is that the "concept" will lead to a Palestinian State, probably an independent state and led by the P.L.O. If the US has to be the umpire, helping to control the state, this would not be a happy position for the US or Israel.

Zb: Don't jump to the conclusion that the US is in favor of an independent Palestinian State.

A Jordan-West Bank relationship would be more stable. How can we best attain this?

If Arabs would decide this for themselves -- this would be the best. He thinks
Arabs are thinking of this solution as a possibility at the present time. He feels
Arabs will face this issue more realistically. He does not want to create a situation
where Palestinians and other Arab leaders are permanently radicalized. He feels timing
is important now for progress because Israel is surrounded by moderate Arab heads
of state.

Sternstein: The goodwill of the administration is not doubted but the Jewish Community is worried that statements of the president may have raised expectations of Arab states. Prodding of the parties is good but pre-emption of the issues would hurt.

Zb: Re-emphasized that the president is only setting a "conceptual framework".

Maass: Raised the question of defensible borders: since the conquering of a nation requires ground troops, the location of the borders could be crucial for Israel.

Zb: There are no defensible borders: there are defense lines and security of most nations depends on defense lines. A small nation like Israel, surrounded by 100 Million Arabs can never have defensible borders. Borders are created as territorial limits by treaties but these borders are not synonymous with defense lines. There should be agreed upon borders complemented by adequate security arrangements. He mentioned a "binding American commitment" so that there can never be a question about the US commitment. He used the phrase "specific treaties" as well.

Hoffberger: Expressed satisfaction with the resolution of the military equipment problem during the previous week but raised the question of implementation by agencies of government.

Zb: He cannot speak for the Pentagon but Harold Brown and he think alike on this subject. He mentioned his role in getting tanks sent at a time when there appeared to be a bottleneck.

Fisher: Pointed out the difference between what Arabs say to the United States and what they say among themselves. Urged the administration to impress upon the Arabs that it was important to say the same things to both sides.

Zb: He agreed this was important. There would be no settlement based on verbal assurances alone. He is aware of this risk and will not accept agreement to phase one now with a post-ponement of phase two. Agreement will take time but we cannot afford to sit back and expect that settlement will come about without prodding. He emphasized that the United States is telling the Israelis and the Arabs exactly the same thing so that there could be no misunderstanding of position.

Miller: Warned about rushing too fast.

Zb: We're not going too fast, there are many steps in preparation for a possible conference in Geneva.

RM/ttm Richard Maass

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE New York 22, New York Tel.: PLaza 2-1616

Date: June 10, 1977

MEMORANDUM

To:

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler

From:

Chaim Plotzker

Mr. Hellman suggested that you read this letter by Charles Liebman and respond to it in detail. Mr. Hellman feels that it is an incisive comment and thus deserves a serious response.



June 13, 1977

Mr. Charles S. Liebman
The Jewish Theological Seminary of America
3080 BROADWAY
New York, New York 10027

Dear MR. Liebman:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful letter.

I only wish that I had the the to discuss it with you at greater length. Unfortunately, I am keeping so many balls juggling in the eir that my children rightly complain that they have no father. Thus, I must take recourse by this brief note which I hope makes my position clear.

Let me say at once that I could not agree with you more that the statement "a united American Jewish community will remain committed to support the policies of the democratically elected government of Israel" Is indefensible and wrong. Heaven knows I do not believe it, it goes against my grain. From the very beginning of my chairmanship of the Presidents' Conference I have insted on the need for an independent voice for the American Jewish community, independent but supportive of Israel.

I did not make the statement. However, it was prepared for me and read to me over the phone while I was on the run and I did not catch it. Therefore, I have to assume responsibility for it and I have to apologize for it and I have corrected it wherever I have been since it appeared.

The wait and see attitude which you enjoin is precisely what I have been recommending and it has been correctly reported by most of the press. It seems to me that we have essentially a two-fold task:

1/ To remain united in our efforts to secure Israel and its people and to give the democratically elected government of Israel and opportunity (a) to form Itself; (b) to evolve its policies and (c) to have an opportunity to present them to us, to the American Government and to the world.

2/ To make certain that in the period of the interregnum we will allow no erosion of the American Government's position vis-avis Israel. Mr. Charles S. Llebman June 13, 1977 Page -2-

This two-fold motive has impelled everything that I have said and done since the election.

I agree with you that we are approaching a period of acute crisis and I am preparing as best I can to the limit of my abilities to prepare the American Jewish community for this struggle.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler Chairman

cc: Mr. Zalman Abramov Mr. Bertram Gold

bcc: Hellman & Vorspan

THE JEWISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF AMERICA 3080 BROADWAY • NEW YORK NEW YORK 10027 212 RIVERSIDE 9-8000

June 9, 1977

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations 515 Park Avenue New York, N.Y.

Dear Rabbi Schindler:

I read with distress Bernard Gwertzman's column in The New York Times of June 8 headlined "Jews In U.S. Seeking Unity Behind Begin." I won't bother you with my distress at the statement by Dan Gillon of Breira which I believe is harmful to Israel. But I would also take issue with the tenor of some of your statements and particularly with the statement issued by the Conference of Presidents that "a united American Jewish community will remain committed to support the policies of the democratically elected government of Israel."

Let me deal with the statement first. Assuming it is not quoted out of context in the article, it strikes me as an indefensible policy. Officially, the American Jewish community ought to remain committed to support Israel's strength and survival. In support of Israel's survival the American Jewish community may find itself supporting the same policies as the government of Israel. But to announce a priori that American Jews will support the policies of Israel raises questions not of dual loyalty but of disloyalty to America. Secondly, it cuts the ground out from any arguments that you can offer in support of Israeli policy. How credible will your arguments sound when you have already announced you will support Israeli policies regardless of what they are? Why should your arguments in favor of Israel be taken seriously beyond the political clout with which you can back them? Certainly, such a policy surrenders a moral position before it begins.

I was also disturbed by the announcement of your pleasure at Begin's offer to Dayan. I won't elaborate. I suspect that your reading of the Israeli press has led you yourself to regret the statement with which you now must live.

I think the official Conference posture ought to be a "wait and see" attitude. I think its present public position should be that when the new government presents its position American Jewry will decide how supportive it will be. I don't think that you can depend on support from large segments of American Jews or from our "traditional allies" with any other position. In private, I think you ought to make clear to Israel that:

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler-2

- 1. American Jews are not all-powerful.
- Many influential American Jews will not give blind support to Israeli policy.
- 3. Since conflict with Carter is inevitable it is ridiculous to fight with him over a position which neither most Americans or most American Jews feel is a reasonable one.
- 4. American-Israeli conflict threatens American Jewry. Hence, its leaders deserve a voice in the shaping of that policy.

Finally, I'm trying not to sound hysterical but we are approaching a period of acute crisis. I'd like to believe that the Conference leaders are preparing themselves and American Jews for a task that may cast them in an entirely new role visa-vis Israel.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Liebman

cc: Mr. Zalman Abramov cc: Mr. Bertram Gold

P.S. If you have the time or inclination, I'd be happy to discuss my position with you in greater detail.

MEMO

From
RICHARD MAASS

May 18, 1977

Only two (2) copies mailed: one for Schindler and one for Hellman. Any further distribution at your option.

RM/ttm Enc.

1050 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK, N. Y. 10028 June 6, 1977 Dear Juine Alex: the tum + substance of the cracked wateral: American and Jewish leadershy are woefully wept - you probably agree. Cordially + Abalom! Les presidents pur port Tell who are Care Henry resuested meeting 15/2 Conta Ed Soreau bloody mude but Press Sured June 10, 1977

Col. Carl Henry 1050 Fifth Avenue NEW York, N.Y. 10028

Dear Carl:

Thanks for the recent batch of material. You are most thoughtful.

You ought to know that I screamed. I was at the White House for precisely this purpose and I have requested a meeting with Carter. I did scream bloody murder but the press ignored it.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

PLaza 2-1616

Cable Address: COJOGRA

July 28, 1977

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler

FROM:

Yehuda Hellman

I would suggest the following response to Michel's letter, which I am enclosing:

Dear Ernie:

I have received your letter of July 26th.

I must say, however, that you should have read my letter more carefully.

I do not share your worries and I earnestly suggest that instead of repeating what you have already said before, we sit down with your leadership for a serious basic discussion.

With regards,

Sincerely yours,

YH:arf

on col Stationary - as suggested

Ernest W. Michel Executive Vice President and Campaign Director

July 26, 1977

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations
515 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Alex:

Thank you for your letter of July 21st.

Although I do not want to get into an extended written debate on the White House meeting, I do want you to know that I do not agree with your concept of "grass roots" representation. The leadership of the New York UJA-Federation represents one-third of the Jewish population in the country. Therefore, why the selection of leaders to meet in the White House did not, at least, include the President of UJA-Federation escapes me, to say nothing of the Presidents of UJA and Federation, respectively.

Again, I urge that we are asked to participate in all important meetings henceforth.

Kind regards.

Cordially,

Ernest W. Michel

EWM:bc

August 4, 1977

Mr. Ernest W. Michel United Jewish Appeal 220 West 58th Street New York, N.Y. 10019

Dear Ernie:

I have received your letter of July 26th.

I must say, however, that you should have read my letter more carefully.

I do not share your worries and I earnestly suggest that instead of repeating what you have already said before, we sit down with your leadership for a serious basic discussion.

With regards,

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

August 4, 1977

Mrs. Lillian Mattzer 2607 Hendrie Blvd. Huntington Woods, Mich. 48070

Dear Lillian:

I read your report concerning the Carter meeting. Thank you for your excellent report and also for your flattering comments. I am deeply appreciative.

With warmest greetings, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

cc: Eleanor R. Schwartz

777



Eleanor R. Schwartz Executive Director NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TEMPLE SISTERHOODS 838 FIFTH AVE., NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

DATE:

August 2, 1977

TO:

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler

SUBJECT:

Attached Copy of Report From Lillian Maltzer

Mrs. Maltzer especially asked that a copy of her report about the recent meeting at the White House with President Carter be sent to you. We gladly do this.

Sincerely,

ERS:LL

COPY: Mrs. Lillian Maltzer

Enclosure

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TEMPLE SISTERHOODS 838 Fifth Avenue New York, N.Y. 10021

Meeting With President Jimmy Carter

and a Special Group of Presidents of Major

American Jewish Organizations (Presidents' Conference)

The White House July 6, 1977

The principal leaders of the American Jewish Community, under the leadership of Rabbi Alexander Schindler, Chairman of the Presidents' Conference, met with President Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance and Dr. Z. Brzezinski, the President's advisor for National Security, to express our concern for the security of Israel in light of recent statements by spokesmen for the Administration. Because Betty Benjamin, President of NFTS, was out of the country at that time, I attended the meeting on behalf of the more than 100,000 women in our United States membership.

We met first for a briefing session, during which sub-groups were formed to discuss our concern in the areas of peace, borders, security and the Palestinian question as these matters affect Israel's capacity to survive as an independent nation. Each sub-group, under the co-chairmanship of two appointed leaders, formulated questions to be put to the Administration during the afternoon meeting. There was a sense of urgency and serious purpose among the participants, who had come from every part of the country and who represented every shade of religious and secular opinion.

Our meeting at the White House was a dramatic fulfillment of President Carter's promise of an open administration. There was ample evidence that this was not an impromptu gathering, but rather one for which detailed preparations had been made. The format was simple: we took our assigned seats in the Cabinet Room, where Vice President Mondale, Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski made opening statements, the substance of which was reassurance that the United States has not changed its position of support for the security of Israel within the framework of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338; that every Arab leader who has visited the U.S. in recent months has been so informed; and that the position of our government is that there must be a negotiated peace — not an imposed peace — in the Middle East. One spokesman stated emphatically that this Administration will keep its campaign promises ——— "We will not deceive Israel, we will not betray Israel, we will not compel Israel with threats to her security during negotiations."

President Carter made a statement expressing his firm commitment to the survival of Israel as a secure and independent state, and his hope that real peace might be possible within a matter of months. He defined peace as more than cessation of hostilities, but rather a state which would include diplomatic relations, cultural exchange, trade, tourism and open communications. He again stated that while the issue of borders is a major question to be resolved, and the welfare of displaced persons (Jewish and otherwise) must be dealt with, there would be no forced settlement. These statements were made in the presence of the press, and were widely reported in all the media.

In his masterful reply to the President, Rabbi Schindler spoke movingly of the relationship of the Jewish people to the land of Israel and expressed his belief that this President was the historic vessel for the fulfillment of the prophecy of Israel's peace and security. The President was visibly affected by this response to his statement. There followed approximately one hour of discussion, during which the

previously selected Jewish spokesmen addressed President Carter with searching questions and statements pointing out that:

- 1. The American Jewish community cannot pressure Israel to accept a peace inimical to its own interest.
 - 2. No third party can guarantee the peace.
- 3. A Palestinian homeland already exists in Jordan. Any other separate state would add instability to the Middle East.
- 4. Statements which lead the Arab nations to expect less American support for Israel may lead to war rather than peace.

President Carter's response was to restate his personal, political and religious convictions, which he believes are shared by the American people as a whole, that the survival of Israel is paramount.

IMPRESSIONS: I believe that this meeting, which was requested by the Administration, had a strong impact upon the Administration. The unanimous support of the Jewish community for Israel has political implications which cannot be ignored. I was impressed with the obvious sincerity of President Carter and Vice President Mondale when they spoke of their desire and commitment for peace in the Middle East, without sacrificing Israel to that end. That the White House considered this meeting important was evident in that our questions were anticipated, and the President and his aides were prepared to respond with assurances, publicly stated, that strong support for Israel remains U.S. policy.

This report would be incomplete without some recognition of the role of Rabbi Schindler in this historic event. Not only was the meeting effectively planned, but Rabbi Schindler's sensitive and delicate but forthright words to President Carter have done a great service for the Jewish community. We have every reason to be proud that the man who has risen to serve us in this time of some peril to our people has come from the ranks of Reform Judaism.

Finally, it should be noted that while no overt change has taken place in the Middle East situation, there has been a notable change in the tone of reports in the media, particularly noticeable during the visit to this country by Prime Minister Menachim Begin. Mr. Begin was received as a friend (as promised by President Carter), and while differences in opinion remain, the commitment of our government to the support of Israel has been signalled to the world.

Lillian Maltzer, NFTS First Vice President

Huntington Woods, Mich. July, 1977 August 22, 1977

Mr. F. J. Lichtigfeld 84 Second Road, Kew Johannesburg, South Africa

Dear Mr. Lichtigfeld:

Thank you for your letter of August 9 and your expression of concern.

I can advise that we have had some assurance from the U.S. Government that it will we to any endeavor to modify the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This assurance has come from both the President and the State Department and we have absolutely no reason, based on past performance, to doubt these intentions.

There is some suggested reason for fear, however, that if the PLO does accept 242 in some form or another in its councils that the United States will then feel free not to "negotiate" with the PLO but to talk to them and it is this step, the legitimization of the PLO which will ensue from these talks, which gives the American Jewish community reason for profound concern.

We are, of course, vigilant and we will do our utmost to deter such a step.

With kindest greetings, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Dear Rabbi Schindler,

You may remember that you very kindly acknowledged an earlier letter of mine, in what which I mentioned the importance of the Jewish people both within and outside Isr-ael co-operating in finding a way to break the energy monopoly of the Arabs before it was used to totally isolate and destroy us. One can only hope that the current regime in Israel will make such fruitful co-operation one of the central aims of their policy, in that all forms of co-operative endeavour among the Jewish people on a world-wide basis would seem to be the answer to many of the problems fading Israel and therefore involving all of us very deeply in our common destiny in history. Of course, to a far lesser extent does this involve all free societies, since they all seem to be prepared to compromise their hard-won freedom for the traditional pot of lentil soup these days, served up very appetisingly by their Arab economic overlords.

I am now writing to you on another matter of possible current importance. It seems that the PLO will make it conditional on their participation in any Geneva talks to have the Security Council resolutions pertaining to the recognition of Israel modified to include reference to the rights of the Palestinians. I think that Carter will accept this and not veto any proposed modification in the Security Council, no twith standing the pressure of the pro-Isræl lobby in the States. I mean to say what harm can it do, and it might do so much good and all that gaff that makes him much more dangerous than an enemy of Israel would be. However I have noticed that the Arabs, even when talking about the recognition of Israel, always seem to make it conditional on interfering with the law of return of the State of Israel, as if they might recognise a truncated Israel but never the real purpose for which Israel was established and which gives it its basic historico-religious justification in the eyes of the world as well as in motivating all our efforts towards struggling for this aim to be realised as fully as possible in our age. Therefore a far better suggestion to any proposed change in the 242 and 238 resolutions of the Security Council would be to insist on the principle of even-handedness to be applied in the following manner. After any reference to the rights of the Palestinians PTO



AEROGRAM **AFROGRAM**

TO

Rabbi Alexander M(Schindler) Schindler,

President, Union of American Hebrew Cong.,

RSA

838 Fifth Avenue.

New York, N.Y. 10021

United States of America.



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F.J.Lichtigfeld,

84 Second Road, Kew.

Johannesburg, South Africa.

NSLUITINGS WORD NIE TOEGELAAT NIE NCLOSURES ARE NOT PERMITTED

VERSEEL EERS DIE TWEE SYKLAPPE, DAN HIERDIE EEN-SEAL THE TWO SIDE FLAPS FIRST, THEN THIS ONE

it be clearly enunciated that this would not in any way prejudice the operation of the law of Return or the right of return it is based on, for which purpose the State of

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was established. Also the rights of all Jews who wish to avail themselves of the opportunity of using their rights under the Law of Return, refering to the past, present and the future , would in no way be compromised by any interpretation put on the so-

called rights of the Palestinians: in fact this right would remain inviolate, regardless

of any and all claims to the contrary by any party to the dispute or anyone else. The

above wording is a bit clumsy but it gives the general idea; our enemies otherwise would use the amended resolution to interfere with the Law of Return.

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ההסתדרות הציונית העולמית - אגף אמריקאי

WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

American Section, Inc.

MEMORANDUM September 19, 1977

T0:

Rabbi Alexander Schindler

FROM:

Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson

SUBJECT: MAILGRAM FROM AIPAC

I assume you noticed that the mailgram just received from AIPAC urging Washington action was co-sponsored by the NJCRAC's Israel Task Force.

I consider this a very dangerous precedent and feel that it requires immediate discussion and action.

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MAILGRAM SERVICE CENTER

western union Mailgram



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NYBA

CHARLOTTE JACOBSON JEWISH AGENCY 136 E 56TH ST NEW YORK NY 10022

PLEASE WRITE OR WIRE THE PRESIDENT AND YOUR SENATORS AND REPRESENT-ATIVE IMMEDIATELY EXPRESSING STRONG OPPOSITION TO RECENT ADMINIST-RATION STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS OVEREMPHASIZING PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT A FUTURE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS HAVE INDICATED A SHIFT IN POLICY TOWARD U.S RECOGNITION OF THE PLO. DESPITE THE BELLICOSE STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM THE AUGUST PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL MEETING AND ITS REJECTION OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON SEPTEMBER 12 ANNOUNCED ADMINISTRATION INSISTENCE ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT A RECONVENED GENEVA CONFERENCE. THIS STATEMENT WAS WIDELY WELCOMED BY PLO AND ARAB STATES. STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT CAME AFTER A MONTH OF ADMINISTRATION OVERTURES TO PLO WHICH HAVE ALL BEEN REJECTED.

THE STATEMENT COULD BE VIEWED AS CHANGING THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 WHICH REFER ONLY TO NEGOTIATIONS BETWLEN SOVEREIGN STATES.

WHEN CONTACTING THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS ON THIS ISSUE WE SUGGEST YOU DRAW UPON AIPAC'S INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, THE PLO: A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE, AND THE NJCRAC ISRAEL TASK FORCE MEMO OF AUGUST 16TH, RECENTLY MAILED TO YOU, EMPHASIZING THE PLO'S COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION, ITS NUMEROUS TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIANS, ITS STRONG SOVIET TIES, AND AMERICA'S PLEDGE TO ISRAEL NOT TO DEAL WITH THE PLO UNTIL THAT ORGANIZATION ACCEPTS RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND ISRAEL.

TIMELY ACTION IS NECESSARY IN LIGHT OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OPENING AND UPCOMING MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. AND ARAB AND ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTERS.

THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN CONCURRENCE WITH NJCRAC'S ISRAEL TASK FORCE.

LAWRENCE WEINBERG, PRESIDENT
MORRIS J. AMITAY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
20:10 EST

MGMCOMP MGM

September 26, 1977

Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson WZO - American Section, Inc. 515 Park Avenue New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Charlotte:

In response to your note of the 19th, you ought to know that I did not know about the mailgram until I received a copy at my office. I immediately discussed the text with Morrie Amitay and he promised to use more caution in the future and to seek to correct what could indeed be a dangerous precedent.

With warmest regards, 1 am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

יניקב



Rabbi Leon Kronish

4144 Chase Avenue * Miami Beach, Florida 33140 * 538-7231

September 20, 1977 Tishri 8, 5738

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler Union of American Hebrew Congregations 838 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10021

Dear Alex:

I received all this material from the ZOA about your petition to President Jimmy Carter for moving the United States Embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel.

Is this the policy of the Conference of Presidents?

With warmest greetings,

Sincerely,

LK:ehr

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September 26, 1977

Rabbi Leon Kronish Temple Beth Sholom 4144 Chase Avenue Miami Beach, Fla. 33140

Dear Leon:

The material from the ZOA to which you refer in your letter of the 20th is not known to me. I can tell you that I have never petitioned President Carter in this connection. I have often brought up the matter with officials in the Department of State but never directly with the President. You should also know that my requests for such a move have been to no avail and I've had no response to the suggestion.

While there has not been any formal vote in the Presidents' Conference on the matter of moving the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, you should know that there is consensus on this within the American Jewish community and it is safe to assume that were the matter to be put to a vote it would receive approval.

With best wishes for the New Year and warmest regards, I am Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, SUITE 412 · WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 · (202) 638-2256

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Mrs. Louis Kash, Los Angeles, CA
Morris Katz, Indianapolis, IN
Daniel Koshland, San Francisco, CA Mrs. Louis Kash, Los Angeles, CA
Morris Katz, Indianapolis, IN
Daniel Koshland, San Francisco, CA
Mrs. Esther R. Landa, Salt Lake City, UT
Rabbi Arthur J. Lelyveld, Cleveland, OH
Arthur Levine, New York, NY
Rabbi Joseph Lookstein, New York, NY
Theodore Mann, New York, NY
Mrs. Max N. Matzkin, Waterbury, CT
Joseph Meyerhoff, Baltimore, MD
Rabbi Israel Miller, New York, NY
Hon. Abraham J. Multer, Brooklyn, NY
Neil J. Norry, Rochester, NY
Mrs. M. Milton Perry, Elkins Park, PA
Rabbi Stanley Rabinowitz, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Rapoport, Waco, TX
Gary Ratner, Chicago, IL
Dr. Milton Ratner, New York, NY
Robert Riesman, Providence, RI
Daniel Rose, New York, NY
Herman Rosenbaum, New York, NY
Herman Rosenbaum, New York, NY
Dore Schary, New York, NY
Ore Schary, New York, NY
Nors, Sylvan M. Shane, Baltimore, MD
Dr. Judah J. Shapiro, New York, NY
Marvin Shapiro, Los Angeles, CA
Jacob Sheinkman, New York, NY
Arden Shenker, Portland, OR
Dr. Robert Shor, Los Angeles, CA
Josselyn M. Shore, Kingles, CA
Josselyn M. Shore, Kingles, CA
Josselyn M. Shore, Kingles, CA Dr. Robert Shor, Los Angeles, CA Josselyn M. Shore, Kings Point, NY Morton Silberman, Miami, FL Morton Silberman, Miami, FL
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Rabbi Walter Wurzburger, Columbus, OH
Gordon Zacks, Columbus, OH
Burton J. Zien, Milwaukee, WI
Mrs. Harriet M. Zimmerman, Atlanta, GA
Paul Zuckerman, Livonia, MI

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LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR

LEGISLATIVE LIAISONS Richard Straus F. Stephen McArthur DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH

Aaron David Rosenbaum
DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION

September 29, 1977

Rabbi Alexander Schindler Union of American Hebrew Congregations 838 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10021

Dear Alex:

Just to keep the record straight and prevent any repetition of the disturbing assertions made in the enclosed newspaper article, I hope you will join me in the attached letter to Ha'aretz.

Dan Margalit was always one of the more "imaginative" members of the Israeli press corps when he was in Washington, and a joint letter from the two of us should help in putting the proper perspective on his untrue comments about the President's Conference and AIPAC.

Please let me have your reaction soon.

With warm wishes,

Sincerely,

Morris J. Amitay Executive Director

Enclosures

MJA:cc

9/2/27

TO THE EDITOR:

A recent article in your weekly magazine on the "Lobby and the Presidents' Conference" by Dan Margalit presents an extremely unfortunate — and most importantly — untrue description of the working relationship between the Presidents' Conference of Major American Jewish Organization and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

have never been any, "battles" between the organizations. We have found our relationship to be unusually harmonious, with no policy, organizational or personal differences.

We regret that Margalit has expressed this view which has no foundation in fact.

RABBI ALEXANDER SCHINDLER

MORRIS J. AMITAY

Statement by Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, Chairman, Presidents' Conference - October 5, 1977.....

We are deeply gratified that our country and Israel have apparently settled their differences over the conditions for resuming the Geneva Peace Conference. That Conference can only succeed if it is based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and if it concludes with the signing of formal peace treaties that lead to the establishment of diplomatic, trade and cultural relations between Israel and the Arab States. There can be no peace in the Middle East if the so-called Palestine Liberation Organization is granted the status of party to the negotiations and if those negotiations become embroiled in dispute over an independent Palestinian State on the West Bank. Any such Palestinian State would destroy the chances for peace in the Middle East by providing a base for Soviet penetration and for terrorist incursions against both Israel and Jordan.

America has a vital stake in the security of Israel and in the peace and stability of the Middle East. The reported agreement by the President and the Foreign Minister of Israel on how that peace is to be negotiated is an encouraging and gratifying development which we welcome and support.



STEPHEN WISE CONGRESS HOUSE • 15 EAST 84th STREET • NEW YORK, N. Y. 10028 • (212) 879-4500

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

October 7, 1977

Dear Alex:

I must again register my deep concern at the way pronouncements that involve fundamental policy are made by the Presidents Conference without, I believe, sufficient clearance and consultation of leadership within the Conference.

For example, I refer to the statement you issued last Sunday on the United States-Soviet Joint Statement on the Middle East. That was a critically important statement which deserved the most serious discussion and deliberation prior to its release. I believe that an emergency meeting of the Presidents Conference could have been called, or at least an emergency meeting of top leadership could have been called, to discuss this before the statement was issued.

For the past six months several of us have been urging that a Cabinet or Executive Committee of the Presidents Conference be established for just such emergencies. For reasons which I do not understand, this request has continued to be ignored. I again would like to raise it for consideration.

During these difficult days it seems to me that the more opportunity for thoughtful deliberation by leadership, the better. Unilateral responses and reactions are not really the most prudent way of proceeding. The broader the consensus before we go public, not after, should be our goal.

I hope you will act on this letter as soon as possible, in a formal way. I am not for the present sharing these concerns with any of our colleagues. But I must tell you in all candor that I do not want to wake up one morning and find myself (and the organization I represent) committed to the kind of rhetoric that you used in response to the U.S.-Soviet Declaration.

Sincerely,

Arthur Hertzberg

Rabbi Alexander Schindler

ARCHIVES

October 27, 1977

Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg 147 Tenafly Road Englewood, N.J. 07631

Dear Arthur:

Seeing you yesterday reminded me that I really didn't answer your letter of October 7. I kind of hoped to see you and respond in person. Today, at long last, I am back at my desk and hope to get everything which has piled up during the past weeks out of the way. It's possible that you've already forgotten about this letter but I haven't and it has been weighing heavy on my mind.

I agree with your fundamental view that policies should be cleared with the Presidents' Conference before they are articulated - both policies and pronouncements - and that an emergency meeting should be called as necessary. In regard to the Soviet-American statement a meeting was literally impossible. While the Israeli's received the statement on Friday afternoon, some 36 hours before publication, I knew nothing about it until I received a call from a friendly reporter on Saturday morning just before I had to leave for shul and a preaching engagement. I alerted Yehuda and asked Dick to draft a telegram to Vance. Immediately on my return from Brookly, where I preached, I checked with a number of friends and then discussed the substance of the wire with five key people, most of whom are participants in the "informal ad hoc political action group" of which you are a part. Unfortunately, I could not reach all but I received sufficient assent to allow me to determine a consensus, all the more so since most of them (Chuck Hofberger, Max, et al) stand to the left rather than the right of center). You ought to know further that yours is the only letter whice berates me for having been too strong while I have received a slew of letters for having been too weak.

Be that as it may, having received a consensus from a number of others, which was all that I coul do at the moment, I asked that our statement be relayed immediately after the issuance of the joint agreement. Speed was important because only 48 hours separated publication of this particular proclamation from the crucial Carter-Dayan meeting and I wanted a reaction not only from the Jewish community but one which would be as wide as it possibly could be.

Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg October 27, 1977 Page -2-

What puzzles me even more about your letter is that you and I both discussed it before we met Dayan on Monday morning and that you asked me whether I had checked with others. I assured you that I had and you said that you were satisfied. Moreoever, during the Dayan meeting itself you expressed views which were supportive of an even stronger stance by the Jewish community.

Be that as it may, I suppose it all goes back to our inability to find the time to communicate with one another. I really do wish that we could do what we always promised to each other.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022.

PLaza 2-1616

Cable Address: COJOGRA

Contact: Richard Cohen, Press Officer

879-4504

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE October 11, 1977

A four-point program for "political action and public education" to serve

American interests and the cause of Middle East peace was outlined today by Rabbi

Alexander M. Schindler, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American

Jewish Organizations.

In a letter to the presidents of the Conference's 32 national constituent organizations, Rabbi Schindler declared:

"The swiftly-changing Middle East scene is moving into a new and crucial period, one that demands vigorous and informed action by an alert and vigilant Jewish community.

How clearly these events are understood by the American people and the makers of public policy is likely to determine both the future of the Jewish State and the chances of peace in the Middle East.

- (1) Through political action and public education we must make clear that there can be no peace if the murderous band of terrorists who call themselves the Palestine Liberation Organization are permitted to take part in the Geneva peace talks. By word and deed -- by its charter and by its frightful acts of violence -- the P.L.O. has disqualified itself from any table at which the peaceful settlement of disputes is discussed.
- (2) Through political action and public education we must make clear that there can be no peace in the Middle East, no security for America's ally Israel and no protection for American interests in the creation of a so-called Palestinian state.

 By its very existence, such a state would offer a base for terrorist incursion and

Soviet political intrusion of the Middle East, thus exploding whatever settlement is reached by Israel and the Arab states.

- (3) Through political action and public education we must make clear that there can be no peace unless it is a negotiated peace, agreed to in treaties signed by the parties, and that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union -- separately or acting in concert -- can set the terms of the negotiations or determine their outcome.
- (4) Through political action and public education we must make clear that there can be no peace if it is based on the joint U.S.-Soviet declaration of October 1, 1977. Productive negotiations at Geneva can be based only on U.N. Resolution 242, which calls for a "just settlement of the refugee problem" and which affirms the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area" living within "secure and recognized boundaries."

In interpreting these vital issues to our fellow Americans, we will be serving the interests of our country and the cause of Middle East peace -- and thus the security and dignity of our fellow Jews abroad.

XXX

Philip M. Klutznick

875 North Michigan Avenue · Suite 4044 · Chicago, Illinois 606II

November 30, 1977

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler President Union of American Hebrew Congregations 838 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10021

My dear Alex:

I have just returned from a hurried trip to Israel where by sheer accident I was present at those awesome days. What is more, by similar accident, Sadat usurped the appointment that I had with the Prime Minister. I was to see the Prime Minister at 8 o'clock on Saturday night, and Sadat arrived at exactly that time. I did succeed in getting a long visit with him. During part of it we discussed you and the things that you have been doing. I do not know why you have convinced him that you are as great as you are, but he certainly is one of your true "chassidim".

Thank you for your good wishes on November 11. I hope that my arrival at this station late in life will still permit us to have some time together. When you have returned from your meetings and your schedule is a bit straightened out, let us get together. It is not only Morocco we must talk about but much more in view of recent events.

With affectionate regards,

Cordially,

Philip M. Klutznick

PMK:mbt

January 26, 1978

Mr. Bruno Foa 630 Park Avenue New York, N.Y. 10021

Dear Mr. Foa:

On my return from the Middle East I was almost immediately involved in travel here in the U.S. and so I trust you will forgive the delay in responding to your fetter of January 13.

Day by day events and statements to the contrary notwithstanding, I have the following convictions:

- a) That the present effort to achieve agreement between Israel and Egypt will reach a successful conclusion; and
- b) that responsive leadership of Israel is committed to reach this goal and will do everything short of risking Israel's vital security needs to achieve this goal.

What we are hearing now are the statements made in the process of begotiations which should not be seen as ultimate positions on either side. They are merely part of the process of the negotiations in and of themselves and are calculated beyond this by the need to respond to domestic pressures within Israel as well as within Egypt and from the larger Arab world.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler Chairman

cc: Rabbi Judah Nadich

630 Park Avenue New York, New York 10021 January 13, 1978

Rabbi Alexander Schindler Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations 515 Park Avenue New York, New York 10021

Dear Rabbi Schindler:

The concern of the American Jewish community for the security of the people of Israel found a recent and effective expression in the aftermath of the unfortunate U.S.-Russian statement of last October.

We are witnessing now an entirely different and fast-changing situation, requiring momentous choices by the Government and people of Israel on which will hinge the entire future of the nation as well as of the entire area. We who are sitting in the security of the North American continent have no right to pass judgment on Israel's minimum security requirements. However, speaking as an individual and as a life-time believer in and supporter of Zionism, I feel that at this stage it is incumbent upon responsible organizations such as the Conference over which you preside to canvass quietly but extensively the opinions of the American Jewish community and make those voices felt in Jerusalem no less than Washington.

I do not consider my own personal views as "typical" except to the extent of reflecting comments which have surfaced in conversations with many friends, Jew and Gentile alike. Their common denominator is that Sadat's dramatic and courageous move of last November has not been matched as yet by any Israeli move (I mean substance, not gesture, though even the latter has been conspicuously absent) of comparable sweep and generosity. Prime Minister Begin handled the early stages of the Sadat initiative with warmth and professions of flexibility which delighted all but his extreme followers. He reverted later to a half-way posture which was partly responsible for the failure of the Ismailia conference. More recently there are these baffling moves on new settlements, and ambiguities on the future of Judaea and Samaria, which have resulted in a definite loss of momentum.

Successive Prime Ministers of Israel insisted over a generation, and rightly so, on the need for direct negotiations with the Arab governments. Now that the President of Egypt has made such an historic move at the risk of his own life, there is again question of relying on friendly third-party intermediaries such as President Carter and Secretary Vance. Nor is the cause of peace helped by the leader of the Labor Opposition, Mr. Peres Shimon, who is apparently even more of a hardliner than Mr. Begin himself.

Failure to take advantage of this once-in-a-lifetime chance for peace, in the context of a situation in which the Arab rejection front is impotent and the political fortunes of the PLO are at an alltime low, would be of course tragic.

The price for peace will inevitably be a recognition of some Palestinian national entity - at any rate of the principle of an Arab-Palestinian collective identity - based on both sides of the Jordan and including the bulk of Judaea and Samaria. The principle can be implemented in stages, and with the strictest possible safeguards for the security of Israel, including rejection of a mini-State dominated by the PLO and open to Russian, Cuban or Chinese mischief. However, it seems impossible to justify any claim to indefinite control by Israel over a one million plus compact Arab population living in the West Bank. Hence there should be no question of going ahead with new settlements.

A corollary of this approach would be of course an "opening" to the Arab Palestinians for friendship and reconciliation, e.g. on the lines suggested by Anthony Lewis in today's New York Times (clipping included). Anyhow, if a price, and a big one, has to be paid for peace, better offer it voluntarily in a context that would immeasurably strengthen the political and moral posture of Israel, rather than alternating between stonewalling and piecemeal retreats under outside pressure.

Sincerely yours,

Bruno Foa

cc: Rabbi Judah Nadich Park Avenue Synagogue, N.Y.C.

November 22, 1978 Mr. Robert O. Lehrman 20 Montchanin Road Wilmington, Del. 19807 Dear Mr. Lehrman: Thank you for your letter of November 14. I appreciate your having shared your concerns with me and want you to know I share them fully. So far, I have been unable to achieve a cohesive approach to the problem which is being thrashed about by quite a few groups, each one doing a chunk of work when what is actually needed is a well planned, cordinated and financed overall effort. While I have made some progress in that direction, I cannot yet give you the encouragement of having succeeded. With warmest regards, I am Sincerely, Alexander M. Schindler

November 29, 1978

His Excellency, The Prime Minister of the State of Israel Menachem Begin Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Begin:

It was gratifying to receive, via Paul Kedar, your most gracious invitation to attend the ceremonies in Oslo when you receive the Nobel Peace Prize. This is a simcha I would truly wish to share with you, it would give me great pride and pleasure, as well as a full measure of nachas, to be present on so auspicious an occasion.

Alas, my meeting and travel schedule simply preclude my being in Oslo. On the very day of the ceremonies I am scheduled to be the keynote speaker at two important functions. In each instance hundreds of people have been invited, they expect to hear me speak, and plans for the programs are set with no possibility of postponement. Each of the functions are of the utmost importance to the institutions sponsoring them and it would be most unseemly for me to cancel out with such short notice.

Needless to note, I deeply rue the conflict. However, in view of the specific events I will be attending I have a feeling I will be of more help to you and the people of Israel by remaining in the States than my presence at the ceremonies in Oslo. My addresses will deal with the situation in the Middle East and, as you know, I want to bring to our people an understanding and appreciation of the ramifications and impact of Camp David and beyond on Israel and the world Jewish community.

Believe me, I shall be with you in heart and thought and spirit on the 10th of December!

With warmest personal regards to you and Mrs. Begin, in which Rhea joins me, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

the dicheta

ROBERT O. LEHRMAN V
20 MONTCHANIN ROAD
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19807

November 14, 1978

Rabbi Alexander Schindler Union of American-Hebrew Congregation 838 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10028

Dear Rabbi:

We met, you may recall, several times in New York when I was a vice-president-public affairs with Con Edison and active in energy matters in that capacity. I am currently a senior vice-president with Columbia Gas System.

Incidentally, Yossi Vardi is a good friend of ours and has stayed at our home--most recently last summer--when he has been in the United States. I know he is aware of your interest in the energy situation.

I've continued working with Americans for Energy Independence and AJC's Ad Hoc Energy Committee. Despite their efforts, I remain greatly concerned about the lack of emphasis in the Jewish community-at-large on energy matters generally, and in particular on the need for domestic energy production.

Another question of some importance, I think, relates to coordination of the work of the lay and staff personnel involved in energy matters for the various Jewish organizations.

I'd be interested in hearing your views on these subjects, and I'd be pleased to discuss my ideas with you.

Sincerely,

BW heloman P.J. Attached is an example of the things we need much more of.

The conversation Issue on Lenergy Independence

WASHINGTON

Is the energy crisis a Jewish issue? To answer the question, THE NATIONAL JEWISH MONTHLY interviewed Dr. Elihu Bergman, executive director of Americans for Energy Independence and Bettina Silber, director of government relations. Washington-based AFEI defines itself as "a non-profit coalition uniting members of the business, labor, academic, scientific, industrial, consumer, conservation, ethnic and religious communities."

In your travels around the country what responses do you find among Jews to the energy crisis?

Bergman: It has been startling to me that the Jewish community as a whole has failed to make a connection between our need for energy independence and the well-being of Israel, which is a major obligation of American Jews. Energy independ-

ence should be on the top of the American Jewish agenda.

Take the example of the recent Congressional approval of the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia. Of the many analyses I read on the debate and the final vote, a one-word explanation by Senator John Stennis is the most accurate post-mortem: "Oil." No question about it, the bottom line on that vote was our anxiety about securing oil from Saudi Arabia. Even George McGovern, always a critic of U. S. arms sales abroad, voted for the deal.

How do you explain the lack of awareness among Jews of the Jewish component in the energy crisis?

Bergman: First, the energy scene is complex—and made even more complex by those who try to explain it. Experts disagree all the time. People tend to walk away from a complex problem they don't understand. Second, lots of Jews don't want to take sides in a controversial issue.

As a community, Jews are hesitant to take on something that doesn't have a direct, visible impact on Israel. They see their traditional liberal friends arguing, simplistically, that greater domestic energy production would despoil the environment. Jews want to be in the forefront of the environmentalist movement. It's noble and trendy. Besides, most of them belong in the middle and upper middle classes and can afford the luxury of environmental extremism.

Are you opposed to the environmental cause?

Silber: We are environmentalists. Few people want to see our rivers polluted, our natural environment destroyed. We are against extreme environmentalists who mindlessly strike out against development, against any new power facility. They are people who need a cause—and the cause has to be against something.

The environmentalist movement used to have a sense of perspective. Certainly, without environmental concern, industry would be without restraint.

Bergman: Environmental extremists believe that we don't need more energy—many of them call for decentralization which, they think, obviates the need for the energy systems we now have. They think everybody can have an energy supply in his backyard.

Their new weapon for imposing their ideas is legal intervention. You need only a few people to stop a giant project. And Jews are often in the forefront of lawsuits to prevent offshore drilling, to stop new coal mines, to block the building of nuclear reactors.

Jews must decide who their friends are. Many of the people up front in these stop-development projects are those who call Israel intransigent and characterize the PLO as moderate.

When talking about allies and coalitions, it's worth mentioning that blacks and other disadvantaged minorities, as well as labor, are putting distance between themselves and environmental extremists. When a plant isn't built or when employment cuts are made because of higher energy prices, it's the minorities who suffer first.

Silber: We are against an a priori decision, made without examining the merits of the case, to oppose a new plant. We are against indiscriminate protest which claims that all growth is bad and no new power facilities are needed. We need a clean environment and more energy; we should be committed to both. There has to be a trade off—a balance.

Bergman: I think that all reasonable people and particularly Jews, with their special obligations, must exercise a critical bit of political clout which energy independence needs. It should be recognized that decisions determined by our energy dependence—such as our military supply to Saudi Arabia—can deal a devastating blow to America's capability to help lease!

MEMORANDUM

TO: FILE

FROM: HMS

Re: World Wide Trip - January 14 - 25, 1982

I. FRANCE

The two and one half days spent in France were split between meetings with French government and party officials and meetings and tours of the French Jewish community. Throughout the two and one half days, the entire American Jewish Congress delegation was accorded the utmost in consideration. As two examples: Air France officials upgraded the entire delegation's passage from Kennedy Airport to a Concorde flight in order to assure prompt arrival in Paris; and the entire delegation travelled by police escort from a meeting with Mayor Chirac to Foreign Minister Cheysson's government quarters in order that the meeting with Cheysson might start on time.

Extensive conversations with the leading government figures in French political life firmly established that the Mitterand government intends to shift its policies to a more "even-handed" approach to the Mideast. In an extensive briefing by the Israeli Ambassador to France, Meir Rosenne, this was made quite clear. Rosenne spoke of the fact that his own position in the French capital had changed dramatically since Mitterand took office. He spoke of Claude Cheysson's recent trip to Israel as well as President

Mitterand's upcoming trip. Rosenne pointed out that since Mitterand had assumed office, no resolutions hostile to Israel had been enacted by the EEC, France had agreed to participate in the multi-national force in the Sinai and the French anti-Arab boycott law that had been administratively suspended by the Giscard government had been restored.

Nonetheless, it was equally clear from discussions with French government officials that France has no intention of risking its relations with Arab states in order to solidify its new position with Israel. Members of both parties openly state that Israel must accept Palestinian self-determination, including eventually the reality of a Palestinian state. While one party believes that Israel must be coerced into accommodating this position -- as DeGaulle, Pompidou and Giscard attempted -- the governing party is persuaded that Israel must be coaxed into this position. This different approach was reflected in a lengthy analysis provided by Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson.

In an hour-long meeting with the entire American Jewish Congress delegation, Cheysson stated that he was convinced that peace in the Middle East could not be imposed from the outside. The Camp David accords were approved by the Socialist Party in 1978, but the question now was whether the parties could move beyond these accords. Cheysson stated that he believed that there was much mileage left in Camp David beyond April 25th (prior to the arrival of the delegation, Cheysson had been quoted as saying that Camp David was "dead".)

Cheysson continued by stating that the first priority was to re-establish "normal relations" with Israel. The Venice Declaration was "dead", he said. Israel could no longer be treated as a pariah

state. Official government visits were in order -- as both he and President Mitterand intended to demonstrate. Cheysson stated that when he returned to France from Israel, he was called by Lord Carrington who inquired how Cheysson had been treated in Israel. Carrington indicated that he, too, would seek an invitation to Israel, and indeed, since the return of the Congress delegation to the United States, Carrington has made arrangements to go to Israel, as has Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany.

Cheysson affirmed that his government found it destructive to ignore Israel or to treat it with hostility; he thought that this could only exacerbate tensions. As a matter of France's own national interest, Cheysson stated that France would not allow Israel's survival to be endangered. Cheysson reported that he and Foreign Minister Shamir were in frequent communication with one another. In fact, Cheysson said that he had been one of the first to be contacted by Shamir after the Golan Resolution had been passed by the Knesset.

Cheysson warned nonetheless that rapprochement with Israel would not be easy. He shared with the group his fear of the rise of Moslem fundamentalism and the danger which this new phenomenon posed to moderate Arab states. He emphasized that in his view the meaning of the near-coup at Bahrein a few weeks before had been seriously underestimated by the West -- but that its significance had not been lost upon the leaders of the Arab world.

In private conversation with Cheysson before the meeting, Squadron raised the issue of France's role in the United Nations, particularly focusing on the fact that the United States would be in a better position if it were not the only nation willing to exercise a veto in the Security Council. Cheysson responded by stating that he had the highest regard for Jeane Kirkpatrick and that his new Ambassador to the United Nations had been instructed to work with her, and in fact was doing so. But he implied that France would not veto the Security Council resolution. His view was that as long as the issue was going to be referred to the General Assembly in any event, it would make no difference how the vote came down in the Security Council. (Subsequent to the visit, France chose to abstain when the Security Council resolution was put to a vote, but voted against the General Assembly resolution.)

In another conversation with Monsieur Pierre Beregovoy, Secretary General to the President of the French Republic, and a man who is a Jew, much of what Cheysson had said was confirmed. One fact which underlined France's intention to warm up what has been a cool and frigid relationship with Israel was Beregovoy's response when Squadron raised the possibility of a French resumption of arms shipments to Israel. Beregovoy stated that Shamir had raised the question, that there was no reason in this area to discriminate against Israel (France recently concluded an arms deal with Egypt) -- and that the Shamir request was now being reviewed.

A meeting with the Mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, was held just prior to the ceremony presenting the Medal of Paris to Howard Squadron. A lively dialogue between Squadron and Chirac took place. Chirac prides himself on maintaining a close, even intimate friendship with Libyan President Quaddafi and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Chirac stated that he regarded such friend-

ships as important and beneficial in that they allowed France to help maintain stable relations among states of the Middle East. As an illustration of the manner in which this intimacy with Arab extremists operated to help protect states friendly to Israel, he offered the example of the assistance he had provided to Tunisia during the time he was the French Prime Minister. It was his own personal intervention, he said, that had convinced Quaddafi to change his plans to invade Tunisia. He ordered 15 planes and 3 warships to Tunisia and flew to Tripoli to advise Quaddafi personally. Chirac made it quite clear that he would deem the same kind of action to be appropriate should Israel ever be faced with comparable danger. He stated explicitly that he would never permit Israel's survival to be threatened, even if he had to involve himself personally.

Squadron inquired of Chirac whether he planned any trips in the future to Israel. Chirac replied that he had been invited by Teddy Kollek to visit Jerusalem in the past, and that he had been meaning to go. Squadron indicated that he would make certain that Kollek would call him again (which he subsequently did), to which Chirac responded that he might go to Israel in that event.

There followed the public ceremony in City Hall where Squadron was personally awarded the Medal of Paris. The members of the delegation each received a numbered lithograph in honor of the event.

In addition to these meetings with government and party officials, the group enjoyed a tour of Paris with Mr. Leon Abramowicz, with special attention paid to Jewish sights; an interview with the

French Jewish Telegraphic Agency; a meeting with a number of officials of the UDF; meetings with the boards of the Fonds Social Juif Unifie (the active Vice President of which is Jacques Attali, a personal councellor to President Mitterand) and the Consistoire; and a dinner in honor of Squadron given by the French section of the World Jewish Congress, and attended by the chief Rabbi of France, the chief Rabbi of Paris, Baron Guy de Rothschild, Samuel Pisar, the officers of the Consistoire, Meir Rosenne and the top leadership of French-Jewish communal bodies.



March 29, 1982

Mr. Howard M. Squadron, Chairman Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations 515 Park Avenue New York, NY 10022

Dear Howard:

Many thanks for sharing with me the full memorandum of your January trip. I am grateful for your thoughtfulness and commend you on this report. I found it very interesting and more than satisfactory.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Schindler

Conference of Presidents Of Major American Jewish Organizations

212 752-1616 • 515 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022 • Cable Address: COJOGRA

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS:

American Israel Public Affairs Committee

American Jewish Congress

American Mizrachi Women

American Zionist Federation

Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

ARZA — Association of Reform Zionists of America

B'nai B'rith

B'nai B'rith Women

Bnai Zion

Central Conference of American Rabbis

Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (observer)

Emunah Women of America

Hadassah

Herut Zionists of America

Jewish Labor Committee

Jewish National Fund

Jewish Reconstructionist Foundation

Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.

Labor Zionist Alliance

Mizrachi-Hapoel Hamizrachi

National Committee for Labor Israel, Inc.

National Council of Jewish Women

Mational Council of Young Israel

National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods

National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council

National Jewish Welfare Board

North American Jewish Youth Council

Pioneer Women

The Rabbinical Assembly

Rabbinical Council of America

Union of American Hebrew Congregations

Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America

United Synagogue of America

Women's American ORT

Women's League for Conservative Judaism

Workmen's Circle

World Zionist Organization American Section, Inc.

Zionist Organization of America

December 24, 1982

FO: Presidents and Executive Directors

FROM: Julius Berman and Yehuda Hellman

You will recall the draft advertisement that was circulated to you on November 14. A number of organizations telephoned their approval of the text; others made suggestions for improving it, and we are grateful to them for the time and trouble they took.

The various suggestions were carefully examined and most of them were incorporated into the final text, which is enclosed for your information. We have no immediate plans to run the ad, but plan to do so at an appropriate time.

Enc.

We, the secular and religious institutions that comprise the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, stand united in support of the people and the State of Israel.

We remain steadfast in our commitment to Israel's security and to its retention of defensible borders. We reaffirm our conviction that the government of Israel has the right -- indeed, the duty -- to protect its people from the terror and hostility that threaten them. And we declare that the arrangements for achieving that security must be decided only by the people of Israel, as represented by their democratically-elected government, through direct negotiations with their Arab neighbors.

We assert that Israel's settlements in Judea and Samaria are neither illegal nor an obstacle to peace, but rather an expression of the right of Jews to settle anywhere in the Holy Land.

We welcome President Reagan's expressed commitment to the Jewish state and its security, and we join the President in opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state on Israel's borders. But the President's pledge must be supported by conditions on the ground; whatever arrangements are finally made by the parties, any possibility of establishing such a Palestinian state must be effectively foreclosed.

We applaud the President for opposing a return to the pre-1967 Arab-Israel borders and for rejecting the participation of the PLO in any consultation or negotiation. By its charter, which calls for the destruction of Israel, and by its strategy and tactics, which call for an unremitting war of terrorism against the people of Israel, the PLO has disqualified itself from any participation in the peace process.

We support the Camp David process as the only proven basis for achieving a comprehensive, just and durable Middle East peace. And we remain committed to a united Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the State of Israel.

We regard the central and overriding impediment to peace as the Arab world's continued rejection of the existence of Israel, the Arab denial of the legitimate and rightful place of Israel in the family of nations, the Arab refusal to recognize and negotiate openly and directly with the Jewish state. We are dismayed that the League of Arab States, as recently as at its meeting in Fez in September, continues to adhere to a policy of rejection and intransigence.

We are proud that Israel remains a vigorous island of democracy in a sea of repression. We recognize and admire the high moral and ethical standards, the respect for human life and liberty, that the State of Israel and her armed forces have demonstrated in war and in peace.

We believe these sentiments represent the views of the American Jewish community. That there might be differences of opinion on some specific issues is inevitable; no community is monolithic, and we have always welcomed discussion and debate. But on the major issues affecting Israel there is no division. There is consensus, and commitment, and determination that the people and the State of Israel live -- and shall live -- in security, in dignity and in peace.

II. EGYPT

Despite the extraordinary differences between the nations of France and Egypt, the hospitality and reception offered the American Jewish Congress delegation by Egypt were equally as impressive as that extended by France. Although the members of the Congress mission arrived in the Egyptian airport at 2:00 A.M.

Egyptian time, they were met by the Chamberlain to the President. Three large limousines had been set aside for the exclusive use of the six members of the delegation. At all times these limousines were accompanied by a motorcycle escort and two cars, complete with security officers and equipped with powerful and piercing sirens. All hotel charges — without exception — were paid by the Government of Egypt, as the group were guests of the President. Most important, complete access to the top echelon of government officials was provided.

A meeting with President Mubarak at the official presidential residence lasted for more than an hour and a quarter, despite the fact that NBC broadcaster Tom Brokaw was impatiently waiting to record an interview for immediate broadcast on the "Today" Show. Mubarak impressed everyone as direct, forceful, plain-spoken and decisive. While he lacks the charm, charisma and dramatic quality of Sadat, he is far more capable of engaging in true dialogue, and less prone to the histrionics in which Sadat so ably engaged.

Mubarak's conception of himself and of his role in the Arab world is also different from Sadat's. Sadat had a bold self-

image which led him to believe that he knew what was best for the Arab world and which caused him to express contempt for those who were not able to recognize his vision. Mubarak, in contrast, feels it necessary to re-align Egypt with the rest of the Arab world, and at least in part to respond to what they say is in their best interests. Sadat was therefore a risk-taker. Mubarak - at least at this stage in his presidency - is a risk-avoider.

Mubarak had a clear message for the American Jewish Congress delegation. Egypt is irrovocably committed to the Camp David process and war with Israel is out of the question. This will remain as true after April 25 - when the Sinai is to be completely returned - as it is now. In fact, Mubarak maintained that there is reason to anticipate even better relations with Israel after April 25th, since both sides will be relieved of the pressures now artificially generated by that date.

Moreover, the normalization process "is going on" and will continue. Egypt, of course, will keep the door open to its Arab friends "but not at the expense of our relations with Israel." It is, after all, in the "best interests of our neighbors to have good relations with Israel." Autonomy, however, "is something else." President Mubarak "had to be frank"; the differences between Israel and Egypt on autonomy were so broad that there could be "no way to narrow the gap in one or two months." Indeed, it would be "suspicious" if a breakthrough were suddenly to be accomplished. It would look as though Egypt were selling out the interests of the Palestinians on the West Bank to insure the return of its own territories in the Sinai.

Mubarak insisted that Israel's treatment of the Palestinians

remains the key to the ultimate achievement of peace. While Camp David offered "the only framework for negotiations", and the Venice Declaration was "dead", the solutions reached through the Camp David process would have to be "reasonable and acceptable." President Mubarak explained that he could not agree to any autonomy arrangements that were not "reasonable and acceptable" to the Palestinians, because the rights of people living on the West Bank were not Egypt's to give or barter away. The preferred solution was to bring in the Palestinians and the other countries in the area and make them direct parties to the negotiations. Indeed, Egypt had already received positive indications of a readiness to participate from Saudi Arabia -although those "could not be openly declared, of course." And Jordan would not enter into negotiations until it received a green light from Saudi Arabia. Mubarak maintained that it was incumbent upon Israel to provide some positive incentives for these countries to join the process. Under any circumstances, it would not be easy for them to do so, given the fact that the Saudi princes are deathly afraid of the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism currently endemnic to the Arab world.

Mubarak stated that the group must understand that Egypt had no comparable fear, either of terrorism or of religious fundamentalism; Egypt was prepared to persevere in the peace process and to seek to bring in others, but Israel "must help." Mubarak stated that Israel must engage in "confidence-building measures" -- a statement that was echoed by most of the other Egyptians with whom the group talked. Israel must provide a climate in which negotiations could move forward. When asked exactly what these confidence-

building measures entailed, all of the officials agreed that peace required credibility among the parties, and Israel had lost credibility. Israel talked of peace but continued its expansion on the West Bank, its confiscation of land and its annexation of territories. It bombed Beirut and bombed the nuclear reactor in Iraq. To annul the disastrous consequences of these acts, Israel must at the very least announce and carry out a moratorium on settlements on the West Bank and a more lenient and sympathetic approach to the rights of Arabs in Jerusalem to participate in any vote relating to a Palestinian authority.

When asked what concessions Egypt might be prepared to make in return, President Mubarak emphatically declared that Egypt could not now afford to make any compromise on autonomy. Egypt had demonstrated its courage by initiating and maintaining the Camp David process despite the cost to Egypt in terms of isolation in the Arab world -- despite the severence of diplomatic relations with many of its neighbors. Any additional concession by Egypt, especially with respect to the rights of the Palestinians, would have a "terrific" negative effect. It would preclude the possibility of mending fences with the Arab world. It would escalate and inflame hostility both to Egypt and to Camp David. It would allow the Soviet Union to exploit this opening to its own advantage, an event which would be disastrous to Egypt, the United States, and Israel.

President Mubarak made it quite clear that he wanted nothing to do with the Russians. During his career he had had extensive dealings with them when he received his military course of training in Moscow, and when he was commander of the Egyptian airforce.

Mubarak even recounted a story about how the Russians had tried to browbeat him when he was a colonel, but he had refused to allow them to do so.

Mubarak continued by stating that he believed that the Camp David process and the autonomy negotiations would ultimately be successful. The negotiations could not be forced, however, into an unrealistic timetable. It would take time for the parties to work out their differences. Meanwhile, none of us must lose patience. Prime Minister Begin, he said, was a tough negotiator, but he was a man of his word and a man of honor. When he signed an agreement, he could be counted on to live up to its pledge. (In private conversations later conducted with U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Roy Atherton, and U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis, Squadron confirmed that both held little hope for an autonomy agreement to be reached by April. Both believed that the chances for such an agreement before the withdrawal date from the Sinai were less than 30%.)

During his private meeting with President Mubarak, Squadron raised a possibility which was entirely a result of his independent thinking. Squadron told Mubarak that he had never understood why the notion of sovereignty over a given piece of territory was confused with the ethnic identity of the people living on that territory. He suggested that Egypt would benefit enormously from allowing those Israeli settlers who wished to, to remain on Egyptian territory after April 25. There was no reason why Egyptian territory had to be free of Jews. Were Mubarak to agree to this, he would strengthen his own position vis a vis both Jerusalem and the West Bank; Arabs in Jerusalem could vote in a West Bank election without threa-

tening the sovereignty of Israel over East Jerusalem, and Israel would be more willing to see an evolution of West Bank sovereignty if it was not imperative for Israeli settlers to abandon that territory. Mubarak responded that this was not a bad idea at all, but that it came too late. He stated that he could not make even the slightest concession with respect to the Sinai; he could not have any foreigners in the Sinai as it would create internal problems.

Immediately following the meeting with President Mubarak, a meeting with Dr. Boutros Ghali, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, took place at the headquarters of the ministry in Tahrir. Ghali is a coptic Christian, reportedly married to a Jewish woman. He is reputed to have been among the sharpest and most incisive of all of Egypt's representatives during the peace talks, and continues to take the hardest line with respect to the autonomy negotiations and normalization of relations with Israel.

Ghali, too, hastened to assure the group that the Camp David peace would endure, and would continue unchanged after April 25th. Unfortunately, he maintained, the date was causing gratuitous tension and suspicion on both sides — the Israelis feared that Egypt would change after the 25th and the Arabs feared that Israel intended to squeeze Egypt, using April 25th and the return of the Sinai as a form of blackmail. Ghali maintained, however, that nothing would happen after April 25th. If anything, Egypt would have an even greater incentive to continue the negotiations after that date in order to prove to the other Arabs that they were not interested solely in their own narrow advantage.

The problem, Boutros Ghali insisted, was that any settlement if it was to endure must have the endorsement of the Palestinians and that had been made virtuously impossible "because of the attitude and action of the Begin government." The peace process currently "has no credibility" with the Palestinians. How could it have, he queried. During the past two years "nothing has been done to improve conditions on the West Bank - instead things have been getting worse." For two years "the Israelis have done exactly the opposite of what they are supposed to do. As a result, hope for early agreement on autonomy - certainly for any agreement before April 25th - is for all practical purposes foreclosed. At best, it would take seven or eight months of daily negotiations to achieve any significant result."

Unlike President Mubarak, Boutros Ghali believes that the impediment to agreement derives in large part from the fact that Begin does not carry out his promises or fulfill his pledges. It should be noted that Ghali was the only Egyptian during the Congress mission who challenged Begin's honesty or his fidelity to his commitment.

Ghali repeated and emphasized Mubarak's call for "confidence-building measures." He said he had outlined at least 30 measures that Israel might initiate to help Egypt forge a lasting peace. As an example of the disdain which Israel had for these measures, Ghali cited Israel's refusal to act on the list of 120 Egyptians still imprisoned in Israel whose return to Egypt had been demanded.

Finally, during the conversation with Ghali, the Egyptian-Palestinian relationship was made quite clear. Ghali stated that he was in touch with the moderates on the West Bank. When asked why Egypt could not persuade these moderates that some autonomy was better than none, Ghali responded by pointing out that these moderates in turn were in touch with the PLO in Beirut. From this brief statement, a major reason was revealed for the stalemate in the talks. With each of the potential Arab negotiators looking over their shoulder toward a less moderate Palestinian representative, the most radical elements of the PLO were exercising a final veto over any possibility put forward by the Israelis or the Egyptians.

In contrast to the hard-line, pessimistic approach of Boutros Ghali, was the genial optimism of Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali. The Foreign Minister was fresh from an apparently successful round of talks with Arik Sharon on the final modalities of the withdrawal from Sinai. They had agreed - upon Egypt's insistence - that the old border should be restored without a centimeter change in either direction, resulting in a resort in Eilat being dismantled and residences in Rafiah being evacuated and blown-up (the owners to receive compensation, of course).

Ali urged that we not regard the autonomy talks as "destiny", but that we focus on the attainment of a comprehensive and permanent peace. The Egyptian-Israeli settlement will provide a model for others but, again, it will "take time." If there is an eventual autonomy agreement, Jordan "certainly will join" and the Palestinians will recognize that they "have to participate regardless of the PLO." There is movement even at present. The "moderate countries are very near to accepting the idea of a comprehensive

peace with Israel," witness the Fahd plan, but they are still intimidated by the PLO and the Syrians. Ali estimated that it would "take three years to get the Jordanians and Palestinians to come along."

Meanwhile, normalization was proceeding successfully. At the very moment we were talking, the Foreign Minister told us an international conference on remote communications was taking place in the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo with the participation of seven Arab countries - including, he believed, Iraq and Sudan - and Israel. Ali also estimated that "forty-two" trade, commercial or professional delegations of one kind or another had been exchanged between Israel and Egypt in the previous two months, and he pointed out that the very week we were in Cairo, seventy-five Egyptian school children were visiting Israel.

When asked about the lack of Egyptian tourism to Israel,
Ali replied that one had to be "pragmatic." Egyptians did not
travel much, and when they did, they usually went to Europe - somewhere outside the Middle East "for a change of scene."

The most important factor for Foreign Minister Ali was that the Egyptian people - according to the polls - were solidly behind Camp David and opposed to terrorism. (This was the platform on which Mubarak ran for election as President). Without Egypt, there was no possibility of war, no chance for a successful attack upon Israel. Even with Soviet logistics support, Syria and Iraq by themselves had virtually no chance of carrying out a successful attack upon Israel. Israel's fears therefore were "99% exaggerated." And with Syria tied up in Lebanon, any miniscule likelihood of an

attack was still further diminished. As for the PLO, it may have the ability to carry out "ambushes" and to engage in terrorist harrassment, but it has no power or capacity to launch a serious attack, certainly not against the Israeli army. Furthermore, Ali stated, the PLO was now convinced that it will have to work through the United States because it believes that the European initiative is exhausted.

One curious exchange with Ali was contradicted only two weeks later when Squadron and a group from the Conference of Presidents met with Mubarak and Ali in Washington. During the trip to Egypt, Ali had stated that plans had just been completed for a high school program in Sharm El Sheikh in which 1,000 Israeli and 1,000 Egyptian high school students would be studying together. In Washington, however, when Squadron mentioned this fact in support of Mubarak's statement that normalization was proceeding, both Mubarak and Ali immediately corrected him, explaining that the academy was to be in Cairo, not the Sinai. Mubarak forcefully stated that there would be no joint activities in the Sinai, that Egypt was not in a position to allow such. (Subsequent to the Washington meeting, Squadron obtained a clarification from the Israeli Consulate in New York. While Egypt had agreed to a joint academy in the Sinai, and the agreement had been documented in the minutes of an October, 1981 meeting, Egyptian officials later refused to discuss the point, making it quite clear that no such academy would come into existence. Separate discussions were still in progress on the possibility of an institute in Cairo for the study of the Arab world, particularly Egypt, by Israeli experts).

A final illuminating event took place when the Congress delegation met with the Chairman of the Board of Al Ahram newspaper, Mr. Abdallah Abdel Bari, and the Director of the Strategic Studies Center at Al Ahram, Mr. Sayed Yassin.

The Center is perhaps the leading think-tank in Egypt. Sayed Yassin prides himself on having prepared the first detailed study of Israeli society published in the Arab world, long before Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. But Yassin stated that he had no intention of travelling to Israel, although he had received invitations from "many friends in Israel." The group pressed him when told that he had not been to Israel, arguing that in light of his scientific interests he should be one of the first to go to Israel. Yassin explained that he was opposed to doing so on ideological grounds, that he wasn't going to Israel because he didn't think that Israel "deserved it"; Israel did not merit the "luxury" of normalization. Other explanations of course, could have been offered by Yassin, such as the possibility that an Arab think-tank could suffer a loss of influence in other Arab countries if its director made friendly trips to Israel. But Yassin chose not to offer such explanations. Interestingly, Mr. Bari, the Chairman of the Board of Al Ahram, informed Mr. Yassin that the entire group would be travelling to Israel that summer, including Mr. Yassin.

In October of 1981, Squadron headed a small delegation from the Presidents Conference in a meeting with Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr of Austria. The meeting was lengthy and from the point of view of the members of the Presidents Conference, a worthwhile exchange of views. Present at the meeting was the Austrian Counsellor to New York, Mr. Novotny. During the following three months, Squadron and Novotny talked on a number of occasions. Their conversations culminated in an invitation from Novotny for Squadron to meet with Chancellor Kreisky in Austria.

The meeting with Chancellor Kreisky took place at his private residence in Vienna, with Kreisky clad in pajamas as a result of his poor health. (Kreisky continues to have need for a dialysis machine for a kidney problem, and uses an inhalator for chronic bronchitis.) The meeting with Squadron was the only one which Kreisky had kept during a period of three days.

In addition to Squadron and Kreisky, three other individuals were present at the session; Yehuda Hellman of the Presidents Conference, Mrs. Kreisky and an assistant to Kreisky, Mr. Lennkh.

Kreisky, despite his ill health, began the meeting in an aggressive manner. Skipping the usual amenities which would initiate such a session, Kreisky criticized one of Squadron's predecessors, Alex Schindler, for having been critical of Kreisky regarding a meeting of Jewish leaders with Sadat prior to November, 1977. Squadron responded by stating that he, too, had criticized Chancellor Kreisky on many an occasion, and then drew out an article from the Nouvelle Observateur which contained a quotation by Kreisky

on the subject of Jewish peoplehood. Squadron challenged Kreisky's statement that there was no such thing as a Jewish people, stating that it was equally possible to argue that there was no such thing as an international social democratic movement. Clearly, there was a vast difference between Austrian, German, French and other social democrats. Why could Kreisky accept that social democrats could form a group - despite their differences - and mock the fact that the Jews do so.

Despite the sharp tone of this conversation, however,
Kreisky only showed real anger when Squadron challenged Kreisky's
relationship with the PLO. Kreisky responded by stating that 300,000
Jews had travelled through Austria from Russia unharmed. This was
because Kreisky had been able to make a deal with Arafat that Arafat
would not touch a hair on their heads. Squadron commended Kreisky
for the achievement, but commented that it was not necessary to
criticize Israel in order to make such arrangements.

Two other points of interest arose during the course of the conversation. First, Kreisky stated that his relationship with Palestinian and Arab leaders would enable him to put together five Palestinian leaders, including representatives of Arab nations, who could meet with five Israeli leaders. When Squadron and Hellman indicated interest in this possibility, Kreisky drew back. Second, Kreisky promised to use his close ties with the Russians to try to ameliorate the situation of the Falashan Jews of Ethiopia. Since the Russians are closest to Mengistu, Kreisky stated that he would try to use his ties with the Russians to get them to exert pressure on Mengistu.

Kreisky also stated categorically that it was not necessary to have a Palestinian state on the West Bank in order to satisfy the Arab world. A meaningful autonomy would be adequate. On the subject of the dispute with the Jewish Agency regarding the right of Soviet Jews to go elseshere than Israel, Squadron and Kreisky agreed that the problem was being resolved among the Austrian Interior Ministry, the local representatives in Vienna and the Jewish Agency. There should be no further public dispute.

Kreisky was quite proud of having travelled to Iran, at personal risk, to attempt to solve the American hostage problem. He also was proud of being favorably received in most Arab countries, and particularly Saudi Arabia. However, he said he would not visit Israel again (he had done so twice before - once when Rabin was Prime Minister), so long as Begin was Prime Minister. He stated that he did not agree with Begin on any subject and as a result, he was persona non grata in Israel.

Despite Kreisky's obvious closeness with the USSR, he concluded the meeting by showing Hellman and Squadron the mantle in his living room which displayed a number of pictures. These pictures showed Kreisky with each of the American Presidents since Eisenhower. There were no other pictures in the room showing Kreisky with any other international figure. When asked which President Kreisky had most enjoyed, he immediately responded John Kennedy.

The meeting came to an end when Kreisky stated that all he truly cared about was that his children and his grandchildren

would live in peace. Squadron responded that he meant no impertinance, but only the night before, sitting in the study of the Prime Minister of Israel, who was also ill, he had been told the identical thing.



CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

515 PARK AVENUE NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

PLaza 2-1616

Cable Address: COJOGRA

March 22, 1982

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler President Union of American Hebrew Congregations 838 Fifth Avenue New York, N.Y. 10021

Dear Alex:

I enclose full memorandum of the January trip for your personal information only.

I propose - subject to your comments - to appoint the following people to the Nominating Committee.

> Ted Mann Israel Miller Jacob Stein Frieda Lewis Jack Spitzer Bennett Yanowitz Joseph Sternstein

Please let me hear from you. Best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Howard M. Squadron

HMS/mka Enc.

MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN - JANUARY 22ND and JANUARY 24TH

Each meeting lasted approximately one hour and a half. Those present at the meetings were the Prime Minister, Yehuda Avner, Yehuda Hellman and myself.

Before leaving the United States, I met with Jeane Kirk-She requested that I convey her fond regards to the Prime Minister. My last stop before arriving in Israel was in Cairo. There, I spent an hour with Jihan Sadat at her home. The other persons present were Phil Baum and for the latter half of the visit, the youngest daughter of Sadat, also named Jihan (called "Nana"). It was a very moving meeting during which I conveyed condolences of the American Jewish community, and my personal understanding, from my own experience of losing a spouse, regarding her grief. Many interesting personal things about the Sadat family were discussed. Jihan intends to resume teaching at Cairo University in September of 1982. She seems quite comfortable and confident about her relationship with the Mubaraks, both husband and wife. She has prominently displayed a picture of her husband looking up at the aerial display, at the moment before the assassination. He's perfectly peaceful and happy in that picture. She told me about her four children, of whom the youngest (Nana) has just graduated Cairo University at the age of 20. She feels that her husband was too idealistic and honorable. She disapproved of the United States selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, because she thinks the Saudis are uncultured and primitive. However, her husband said that the Saudis are friendly to the United States and should be able to buy any arms they want.

Prime Minister Begin's attendance at the funeral was very brave and meaningful to her. Accordingly, she asked me to convey her fond regards to the Prime Minister.

Accordingly, I opened the first meeting with the Prime Minister by telling him that he must be quite a ladies man. When he asked why I told him that I brought fond regards from two very impressive women. He said they must be over seventy. When I told him that the regards came from Jeane Kirkpatrick and Jihan Sadat, he responded with delight. He said that he loved Jeane Kirkpatrick, and thought she was a remarkable woman. He asked me to convey an invitation to her to come to Israel as his personal guest. (I have since done so).

As for Jihan Sadat, he recognized how impressed she was by his coming to the funeral of her husband. However, he said that it was less brave than it appeared to her, because the decision as to the death of anyone is not in his hands, but only in the hands of God. However, he did ask Arik Sharon what would happen if somebody were to shoot machine guns at them, as they were walking in the funeral procession. Sharon said: "Don't worry. We have the fire power to handle it." Begin laughed and said: "That is typical of Sharon. We only had some pistols." In any event, according to Begin, the real problem with attending Sadat's funeral was that he had to stay near the burial place, because he could not ride on the Sabbath. The only accommodations were quite primitive, particularly the toilet facilities. The odor was so bad that he was delighted to be able to leave as soon as the Sabbath ended.

We then talked about the Golan law and the official American reaction. I asked why he had never answered my letter, pointing out the failure to take political consequences into account. He referred to it as my "angry letter" which he decided not to answer, particularly since I began to criticize the Administration for imposing sanctions - and that indicated to him that I understood his point of view. When I said that it was still not clear to me, he provided a detailed explanation. While he was lying in the hospital recovering from his leg injury (we met with him at home in his study upstairs and his leg was still extended on a chair. He was navigating with a walker and was proud that he had been able to use it to go to the bathroom by himself for the first time that day), Syria undermined the Fez Conference, refused to remove the missiles during the Habib visit and announced that even if the PLO negotiated with Israel, Syria would never make peace within 100 years. In that case, why not clarify the status of the Golan? Besides, it had been on the Knesset table months before and it was part of the published platform of the coalition government to pass such a law. It was done hastily, so as not to put the United States in the position of asking Israel not to pass the law, when it absolutely had to be done. Finally, it had to be done before April 25th so that the Egyptians would not withdraw their Ambassador, or take similar action.

When I said the Reagan Administration would still have difficulty understanding, Begin responded that Secretary Haig was sitting one week earlier in the very chair I was occupying, and had never mentioned the Golan. I said that he undoubtedly did not want to get into an argument.

Begin said that he thought the relations were very good and showed me a letter addressed: "Dear Menachem" and signed "Ron" that he had received that very day from the President. He placed great emphasis on the cordial and familiar tone implied by the signature "Ron," rather than "Ronald," etc. He then showed me the series of letters between him and the President, following the Golan incident, the subsequent American response and his angry statement to Ambassador Lewis. Immediately thereafter, Senator Percy had visited and there had been a very sharp discussion, including a warning by Percy that any invasion of Southern Lebanon would have very serious political consequences in the United States. Then, the President wrote to Begin saying that he was unhappy about the deterioration in understanding since Begin's visit in September. The letter said that some wine does not travel well and he hoped that the wine reflecting their relationship had not soured on its trip back to Israel. However, the President went on to say that Senator Percy had reported to him that there would be no invasion of Southern Lebanon unless there was a clear provocation of very substantial nature, and he was pleased to hear that. Begin responded by saying that the wine was still tasty but that Percy had the formulation wrong. He and Secretary Haig discussed a proper formulation and it was agreed that there would be no invasion of Southern Lebanon unless there was a "clear provocation" - the words "of a substantial nature" were not appropriate. He gave me the letters to read on a confidential basis and eventually gave me copies of his portion of the correspondence to keep.

We then talked about the prospects for an autonomy agreement. On the basis of my visit to Egypt, I expressed doubt that any agreement could be reached by April 25th, because Mubarak was not willing to take the risk that Sadat might have taken. After April 25th, on the basis of the Egyptian formulation that any agreement would have to be "reasonable and acceptable" from the point of view of the Palestinians (and therefore the PLO), it appeared possible that there would be long and fruitless discussions. tably, there would be pressure on Israel to approach the matter differently and I wondered whether the Dayan proposal for unilateral autonomy would not have to be considered. Begin rejected the idea and said that Israel was trying to be forthcoming in the autonomy negotiations. He gave me a copy of the memorandum that had been furnished to Secretary Haig, together with the original Egyptian proposal at Camp David, which had been rejected in the final framework agreement but which the Egyptians were still demanding. He expressed the view that Israel had made all the concessions it could make.

Between the first and the second visits, I spent several hours with Ambassador Sam Lewis. Sam told me that the Prime Minister had a stenographer in the room when he went into his tirade against the United States action, following the Golan law. The tirade lasted about 45 minutes and only about 15 minutes worth were released to the press. According to Sam, he picked out the highlights, but the entire performance was considerably worse. However, Sam sat quietly, correcting an historical error or two and, as Begin had stated that this was a message for the American government, he started back to

Tel Aviv to transmit the message. On the way, the radio announced the message because Begin had released it to the press. This got Sam very angry. On the occasion of the Percy visit, Lewis expressed his feelings to Begin, emphasizing that he was not a messenger, but an Ambassador and that if Begin wished to communicate with his government by press release, it was not appropriate to harangue the Ambassador first. Begin apologized lamely saying that he told the members of the Cabinet immediately after Lewis left and that it was sure to reach the press so he authorized the release. However, it is Sam's view that Begin knows he overdid it, although he will not admit it. Further, according to Sam, Syria was becoming increasingly isolated in the Arab world and Begin had simply made the Arab countries rally around Syria. Sam agreed, as did Roy Atherton in Cairo, that the assassination of Sadat had reduced the chances of an autonomy agreement very substantially. The possibility of reaching such an agreement before April 25th was less than 30%, although Haig was due to return within a few days to make a final judgment on the possibility. Haig had finally mastered the complexities of the autonomy negotiation, and was now able to deal with them. However, he would undoubtedly designate some Deputy from the State Department to hold things together, until a breakthrough seemed likely. When I told Sam how much emphasis Begin was placing on the cordial letter from "Ron" he said that was a short letter because Reagan did not want to get into a detailed response to Begin's six-page letter; but he was sure Haig would convey the response, including a repetition of the Administration's concern about any move by Israel into Southern Lebanon. Bill Brown, Sam's Deputy, was with us for a

good part of the meeting. Both agreed that Begin was stronger than ever internally and the Labor Party was in disarray.

After meeting with Ambassador Lewis, and before the second meeting with Prime Minister Begin, I had dinner at the home of Shimon Peres. It was a Friday night family dinner, very warm and cordial. Apparently Shimon and his brother alternate Friday night family dinners for their parents and their children and grandchildren. The other outside guests included Simcha and Vivian Dinitz and several women journalists. Peres and I spent a half hour talking alone about the Reagan Administration, the Labor Party's prospects and the policies of the Begin government. There was hardly anything noteworthy in the conversation, except the acknowledgment by Peres that the Labor Party had reacted very weakly to the Begin blitz on the Golan law. He also gave me some advice and insight regarding the meeting I was to have three days later with Chancellor Kreisky. He is a thoughtful, philosophical man, who would never permit himself an emotional outburst such as Begin's with Ambassador Lewis. He has greater breadth than Begin but has no idea how to obtain power.

At the beginning of our second meeting on Sunday, Begin greeted me by saying that he wanted me to give Arthur Hertzberg a message. (A story had appeared in the Jerusalem Post that day about a Hertzberg article that was due to be published in the New York Review of Books, accusing Begin of "provocation politics"). Although I assured Begin that I was not in regular touch with Hertzberg, I agreed to listen to his message. (And at the subsequent meeting with Mubarak in Washington I conveyed it to Hertzberg). The message was:

(a) Vive la difference; (b) the most provocative policy was that of Ben-Gurion who claimed that any Jew who did not come to Israel lacked God in his heart; and (c) Ahad Haam referred to slavery in freedom. Begin was obviously preoccupied with the Hertzberg article because he spoke to Harry Horowitz by telephone during the meeting and urged him to get somebody to reply to the article.

Both in his reaction to the Hertzberg article, and in his reaction to the "non-political" convocation of support for Israel, Begin demonstrated how thin-skinned he is. He agreed that the leaders of the Labor Party should be involved in the Conference, but pointed out that he was taken off the list of Israel Bond speakers the day following his resignation from Golda's government of National Unity. (However, as soon as he complained to Golda, he was reinstated.)

We discussed the Falashas. Begin was passionate about the fact that he had insisted on rescuing the Falashas; and he subsequently provided to me on a confidential basis his correspondence dating back to 1977 with Mengistu, urging that Ethiopian Jews be permitted to leave Ethiopia. During our conversation, he received a telephone call confirming that 354 Falashas had been taken out of the Sudan onto Israeli navy boats and that they would reach Israel safely. He described the operation as a dangerous one in which the Falashas were taken out at night with Israeli sailors holding children and others over their heads in the water to get to the boats. I had been briefed by Jewish Agency and Foreign Ministry representatives between the two Begin meetings and assured him that I would do my best to persuade skeptical Americans that Israel was

sincerely committed to rescuing Falashas and taking risks to that end.

Knowing from Sam Lewis that the brief letter from Reagan was a way to avoid further discussion of the Golan issue, I repeated to Begin that the Administration still did not understand the why, the when or the how of the Golan law. He insisted that an important agreement had been reached that had eluded three prior Israeli Administrations when Haig made his last visit. I made no further inquiry but I did point out that the Administration was sure to challenge the justification for any move into Southern Lebanon. Begin indicated that such a move would be better taken before April 25th than after.

A good part of the meeting was devoted to stories about Begin's mother and father. Begin was bragging about how patient he is, either in connection with the Hertzberg letter or with Southern Lebanon and the Syrian missiles. He said he learned his patience from his mother who was the most patient person he ever knew. On the other hand, his sister, who constantly advises him and bothers him about every matter, is more like his father. His father was the Secretary of the Jewish community in Brest-Litovsk. On one occasion a policeman grabbed the beard of the Rabbi. Begin's father struck the policeman's wrist with his walking stick, was arrested and beaten up, but came home and told his son Menachem that he had upheld the dignity of the Jewish community and was proud. Subsequently, he got a letter of apology from the Police Chief, which he always displayed. On another occasion, he protected the synagogue

from hooligans, guns were fired and the family thought he was killed, but he returned home safely and again got a letter of apology, this time from the Mayor, which he displayed. (Throughout both meetings, Begin was displaying the letter from President Reagan.)



Conference of Presidents

Israel Mission Scheduling Preferences

Organization_


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PLEASE INDICATE YOUR AVAILABILITY FOR EACH DATE.

Availability	Dec. 27-31, 1992	Jan. 3-7, 1993	Jan. 10-14, 1993
YES	Possible		
NO		notgood	X







Shoshana S. Cardin

Malcolm I. Hoenlein Executive Director

August 28, 1992

To:

Presidents & Executive Directors

From:

Shoshana S. Cardin Chairman

Malcolm Hoenlein, Executive Director

Re:

Israel Mission Dates

Member agencies were recently polled to determine which dates would allow maximum participation in the upcoming Presidents Conference Israel mission. As in past years, many mission participants are planning to attend the February Jewish Agency meetings and have suggested that the Conference mission precede or follow the Agency deliberations.

However, the weeks immediately prior to and after these dates pose numerous conflicts for agencies. Three alternative times are under consideration: December 27-31, 1992, January 3-7 or January 10-14, 1993.

These dates reflect the recent Scope Committee recommendation that the mission be extended to four days to allow a more in-depth examination of issues.

Please return the enclosed form to us <u>immediately</u> by fax, (212) 644-4135, to indicate your availability.

Louismelle

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Conference of Presidents



Israel Mission 1994 Scheduling Preferences

ameRabbi Alexand	er M. Schindler	
rganization <u>Unio</u>	n of American Hebrew Congreg	ations
elephone (212	249-0100	
LEACE DIDICATE V	OUR AVAILABILITY FOR FA	CH D ATE
LEASE INDICATE Y	OUR AVAILABILITY FOR EA	CH DATE
LEASE INDICATE Y Availability	Feb. 13-17, 1994	CH DATE Feb. 27-March 3, 1994

Dates of Conflict (Jan., Fe	eb., March) Fr	om Edith Miller to	
Carolyn: Rabbi Schindler won'	t be back until a	fter July 9, but at the mo	ment,
the dates do not seem to conflichanges, I will get back to you		on our schedule. If the	message
Do you plan to attend?	Will Try yes	no	
Would you participate in a prior to the mission		er country?	
following the missi	on yes	no	
That would depend on the date	of the mission an	d the locale of the visit	

Please return buy mail to the Conference office: 110 E. 59 St., New York, NY 10022 or by fax (212) 644-4135.



Lester Pollack Chairman

Malcolm I. Hoenlein Executive Vice Chairman

June 23, 1993

TO:

Presidents and Executive Directors

FROM:

Lester Pollack, Chairman

Malcolm Hoenlein, Executive Vice Chairman

Carolyn Greene, Assistant Director

RE: PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE 1994 ISRAEL MISSION

We are in the process of scheduling the 1994 date for the Presidents Conference annual Israel Mission. In order to avoid conflicts and ensure maximum participation of our leadership, we would like to finalize the dates soon. Please use the enclosed form to notify us of any schedule conflicts during the months of January, February and March.

In the past organizational leaders have preferred that the mission precede or follow the Jewish Agency meetings, scheduled for February 17-24, 1994. Please indicate whether February 13-17 or February 27 - March 3 would be convenient for you. A pre- or post mission trip to another country, as we did to Egypt this year is also being considered. Please let us know of your availability.

Please indicate your preference below. We will try to accommodate everyone to the best of our ability. Please return the form to Carolyn Greene at the Conference office by July 9.

LP MH CG 2/6-7 VAHE EXEC 2/20.22 Here Ba. 2/27.13 Norm France